Escaping the Deadly Embrace: How Encirclement Causes Major Wars 9781501765926

Citation preview

Escaping the Deadly Embrace

a volume in the series

Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Edited by Robert J. Art, Alexander B. Downes, Kelly M. Greenhill, Robert Jervis, Caitlin Talmadge, and Stephen M. Walt Founding series editors: Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis A list of titles in this series is available at cornellpress​.­cornell​.­edu.

Escaping the Deadly Embrace How Encirclement C ­ auses Major Wars

Andr ea Bartoletti

Cornell University Press Ithaca and London

Copyright © 2022 by Andrea Bartoletti All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress​.­cornell​.­edu. First published 2022 by Cornell University Press Library of Congress Cataloging-­i n-­Publication Data Names: Bartoletti, Andrea, 1988– author. Title: Escaping the deadly embrace: how encirclement causes major wars / Andrea Bartoletti. Description: Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2022. | Series: Cornell studies in security affairs | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022001480 (print) | LCCN 2022001481 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501765919 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781501765926 (pdf  ) | ISBN 9781501765933 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Envelopment (Military science) | War—Causes. Classification: LCC U167.5.E57 B37 2022 (print) | LCC U167.5.E57 (ebook) | DDC 358—dc23/eng/20220215 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022001480 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022001481

Someone asked Gurdjieff, “Can something be done to stop wars?” He said, “Nothing can be done—­because t­ hose who are fighting, they are fast asleep, and ­those who are pacifists, they are fast asleep. And every­one is ­going on in a sleep. ­These happenings are natu­ral, inevitable. ­Unless man is awake, nothing can be changed, ­because ­these are all just by-­products of his sleep. He ­will fight; he cannot be ­stopped from fighting. Only the ­causes can be changed.” —­Osho, The Book of Secrets: 112 Meditations to Discover the Mystery Within

Contents

Acknowl­edgments

ix

Introduction

1

1. A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

7

2. France and the Italian Wars

42

3. France and the Thirty Years’ War

68

4. Germany and World War I

99

5. The Origins of Modern Major Wars

134

6. The F ­ uture of Major War

155

Notes 167 Bibliography 209 Index 235

vii

Acknowl­edgments

If I had to explain where the association between encirclement and major war came from, I honestly could not answer. In the initial phase of research on the ­causes of major wars, I found a quote on encirclement and war by Richelieu that inexplicably made complete sense to me. That eureka moment, however, would not have turned into this book without all the support I received. As with any proj­ect that takes years to complete, ­there are several ­people who have made impor­tant contributions to this book and whom I want to thank. The Department of Po­liti­cal Science at the University of Chicago has been the ideal place to stimulate my intellect and define my area of expertise. John Mearsheimer, Paul Poast, and Austin Carson helped me greatly with their knowledge and mentorship. Each person has taught me specific lessons and tricks on how to become a scholar, but the enthusiasm and commitment that Austin has shown in all t­ hose years have been invaluable to me. My gratitude also goes to the Workshop of International Politics at the University of Chicago, where I received excellent feedback on an ­earlier draft of this book. I also want to thank all the faculty and administrative members at the University of Chicago for creating an engaging and inclusive environment. Although COVID-19 prevented me from physically joining Stanford University, my year as postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) has been impor­tant to complete this book. I thank Harold Trinkunas, Rose Gottemoeller, and Steven Pifer for their ability to keep me engaged remotely and for their suggestions on the policy implications of this book. I also want to thank the CISAC Research Seminar and all the CISAC fellows for providing feedback on the last draft of this book. A fundamental contribution to the last version of this manuscript comes from the helpful comments of Bob Art and of an anonymous reviewer. My ix

ACKNOWL­E DGMENTS

gratitude also goes to Michael McGandy, Michelle Witkowski, Clare Jones, and every­one at Cornell University Press who guided me through the publication pro­cess. Even though I started my research on the origins of major wars at the University of Chicago, I cannot overlook my time at Università degli Studi di Firenze. I would like to express special thanks to Luciano Bozzo for his excellent teaching style that sparked my interest in international relations. Heartfelt thanks go to my friend Maura Cremin for not only her feedback on the manuscript but most impor­tant, for all the years we spent together at the University of Chicago. I doubt that I would have graduated without finding someone who shares the same love for dark humor. My final acknowl­edgment goes to my parents, Marco and Cinzia, for their unconditional love. My gratitude is even greater ­because they never failed to be by my side, even when they did not fully understand what I was ­doing with my life. The publication of this book is also the result of their unwavering support since I was a child.

x

Introduction

“Surrender. ­You’re surrounded!” In any movie with a hostage standoff, ­these words are the nightmare for ­every criminal. Surrounded by a cordon of police and with no way out, the “bad guys” have two drastic and opposite choices: fight for their freedom with the serious risk of death, or surrender and end up in jail. This desperate situation rarely has a successful conclusion. This dreadful scenario is not unique to movies. The presence of g ­ reat powers on two dif­fer­ent borders—­encirclement—­has been considered the greatest threat to state survival from ancient times to con­temporary international politics. As historian Victor Hanson emphasizes, “Why did Athens risk a campaign that might involve facing the Boeotians? Again, it was the old-­age desire to be f­ ree of a two-­front war, the specter that ­later haunted Rome when it faced the Cartha­ginians and Philip V of Macedon, the traditional German dilemma of being wedged between Rus­sia and France, and the predicament Amer­i­ca found itself in during World War II, with both Pacific and Eu­ro­pean theaters.”1 Encirclement lies at the origins of major wars, but we still lack a theory that analyzes the impact of the two-­front-­war prob­ lem on security competition, alliance formation, and great-­power war. The main purpose of this book is to fill this gap.

The Topic: Encirclement and Major War Encirclement is a geographic variable that has been overlooked by scholars. Jack Snyder introduces the concept of “self-­encirclement,” which he considers the result of strategic overcommitments that are driven by imperialist myths of domestic elites rather than the main cause of war.2 Moreover, the findings of this book contradict Snyder’s predictions on state be­hav­ior since they show that the encircled ­great power does not initiate a conflict to expand but rather to prevent the surrounding ­great powers from launching a simultaneous invasion. 1

INTRODUCTION

Although encirclement has not been theorized, the role that the two-­front-­ war prob­lem plays in the outbreak of major wars is often mentioned by International Relations (IR) scholars. Dale Copeland emphasizes how encirclement was a critical f­actor in the Nazi decision to invade Poland in 1939: “Hitler’s conference with se­nior commanders on May 23 shows how impending encirclement and ­others’ accelerating rearmament had convinced him to speed up plans to invade Poland.”3 John Mearsheimer suggests that the German fear of encirclement contributed to the outbreak of World War I: “The German decision to push for war in 1914 was not a case of wacky strategic ideas pushing a state to start a war it was sure to lose. It was . . . ​a calculated risk motivated in large part by Germany’s desire to break its encirclement by the ­Triple Entente, prevent the growth of Rus­sian power, and become Eu­rope’s hegemon.”4 The two-­front-­war prob­lem has not been ameliorated by the advent of nuclear weapons. As Robert Gilpin notes, the Soviet Union deeply understood the dangers of encirclement: “As long as western Eu­rope lacks po­liti­cal unity, Japan remains weak militarily, and China continues in a backward state, this danger is minimized, though by no means eliminated. Certainly, the Soviet Union has a genuine fear of a surrounding alliance composed of ­these neighboring powers and the United States.”5 According to Stephen Walt, the possibility of facing a joint attack on two dif­fer­ent fronts is what heightened the security dilemma between the Soviet Union and the United States: “Geography places the Soviet Union against virtually all the other impor­tant and power­ful countries in the world. If a Soviet strategic planner could be granted one wish, it should be to move his country somewhere ­else. . . . ​The Soviet response to this unfavorable situation is both predictable and self-­defeating. Faced by a surrounding co­ali­tion of vastly superior latent resources, the Soviet Union devotes a large share of its national income to amassing military power. . . . ​Like Wilhelmine Germany and con­temporary Israel, the Soviet Union may view an offensive capability as desirable if it must fight on several fronts.”6 In sum, encirclement is considered a uniquely dangerous situation that has a profound impact on international politics. Several scholars mention encirclement in passing, but they do not elucidate how it leads to major war. In short, they do not explain how encirclement works.

The Argument in Brief What are the origins of major wars? The s­ imple answer is encirclement, a situation that creates a two-­front-­war prob­lem for the encircled g ­ reat power, ­because it shares two dif­fer­ent borders with one or two ­great powers (surrounding ­great powers).7

2

INTRODUCTION

Being a geographic variable, encirclement is constant and cannot explain the variation of war and peace. I identify an intervening variable—­the increase of the invasion ability of the immediate rival—as the causal mechanism that links encirclement to the outbreak of major wars. This variable is not a function of state be­hav­ior or gradual power shifts in the ­future but rather of imminent, operational changes that alter the ability of the immediate rival to launch a successful invasion. Since the immediate rival is the state that poses the greatest threat to survival based on its ability to launch a successful invasion, the surrounding ­great powers and the encircled ­great power are mutual immediate rivals.8 When the surrounding ­great powers increase their operational capability to launch a simultaneous invasion, the encircled ­great power initiates an attack against one of the surrounding ­great powers. The other ­great powers are dragged into this dyadic conflict as part of the existing rival-­based network of alliances b ­ ecause they want to prevent their own immediate rival from increasing its invasion ability. Briefly, encirclement leads to the outbreak of major wars through a three-­step pro­cess: double security dilemma, war initiation, and war contagion. The two-­front-­war prob­lem creates a uniquely dangerous situation. The encircled ­great power stands a good chance of being defeated, even when it has military superiority over each of the surrounding ­great powers, ­because it cannot concentrate its military forces against a simultaneous attack on multiple fronts. This strategic nightmare compels the encircled ­great power to eliminate its encirclement by seeking alliances and establishing buffer zones that would hinder the ability of the surrounding ­g reat powers to launch a joint attack. On the other hand, the mea­sures that the encircled ­great power undertakes to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem decrease the security of the surrounding g ­ reat powers which, in turn, conduct similar countermea­sures that tighten their grip on the encircled ­great power. Therefore, encirclement engenders a double security dilemma (step 1) that leads to the formation of two alliance blocs and to a spiral of intense security competition that increases the likelihood of war. The dynamics of the double security dilemma provoke the outcome that the encircled g ­ reat power is trying to prevent. The surrounding g ­ reat powers do not always have the ability to initiate a joint attack, but an increase of their invasion ability changes the “threat environment” of the encircled g ­ reat power and gives the surrounding ­great powers the operational capability to launch a simultaneous invasion. Increases in the invasion ability of the surrounding g ­ reat powers can take two forms: first, the surrounding g ­ reat powers eliminate all the (internal and external) security threats that prevent them from concentrating their forces; second, they annex territory along the borders of the encircled ­great power, thereby creating a new gate for invasion. An increase in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers

3

INTRODUCTION

imminently threatens the survival of the encircled ­great power ­because a simultaneous invasion becomes a concrete possibility. Facing the looming prospects for a two-­front war, the encircled ­great power initiates an attack against one of the surrounding ­great powers (step 2). Like an animal that attacks its predator to escape when feeling trapped, the encircled ­great power resorts to war as a mea­sure of last resort when it ­faces the choice of ­either fighting or surrendering. The attempts of the encircled g ­ reat power to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem have a profound impact not only on war initiation but also on the last step on the path to major war: war contagion (step 3). The other ­great powers in the system are dragged into the dyadic conflict between the encircled ­great power and one of the surrounding ­great powers b ­ ecause of the existing rival-­ based network of alliances that emerged during the double security dilemma. This system of alliances links the survival of all the members of each bloc, and it ties the separate dyadic antagonisms of immediate rivals in one unified zero-­sum game. The attack of the encircled ­great power triggers a cascade of military interventions. Each ­great power in the system tries to prevent an increase in the invasion ability of its own immediate rival, which could happen if it loses a great-­power ally (by military defeat or defection) or if the immediate rival annexes territory along its borders. Like an earthquake whose devastation radiates out from its epicenter, the attempts of the encircled ­great power to “escape the deadly embrace” of the surrounding ­great powers lead to the progressive involvement of all the other g ­ reat powers in a major war.

Implications of the Argument This book makes three main theoretical contributions. First, it elaborates a new explanation on the origins of major wars (encirclement theory). A ­great power that ­faces a two-­front-­war prob­lem initiates war with the ­limited goal of preventing a simultaneous invasion by the surrounding ­great powers and it attacks even if it lacks power preponderance. In turn, the findings of this study challenge ­those arguments that consider major wars to be the result of the most power­ful state’s attempts to e­ ither achieve or preserve its hegemony. Second, encirclement theory highlights the importance of quick operational shifts in the ability to invade of the surrounding ­g reat powers, rather than gradual power changes, as the ­factor that links the geographic variable of encirclement to the outbreak of major wars. Third, this work outlines an argument that explains both endemic characteristics of state be­ hav­ior (such as security competition and alliance formation) and the dynamic outbreak of major wars. Existing theories usually account for separate steps that lead to major wars, but they fail to connect them in a comprehensive explanation. Instead, encirclement theory purports to explain both why and when major war begins. 4

INTRODUCTION

In addition to ­these theoretical contributions, this book provides insights on the prospects for ­future major wars. Some scholars consider great-­power war to be anachronistic, while ­others consider the rise of China and US incentives to launch a preventive strike to stop its relative decline to be a likely scenario of conflict. Instead, I argue that the most dangerous situation ­will ensue from the encirclement of China, which currently shares borders with one ­great power (Rus­sia) and with an emerging one (India).

Plan of the Book The remainder of the book is structured as follows. In chapter 1, I lay out a theory that links encirclement to major war. A ­ fter a general overview of the argument, I define the key variables of my argument: encirclement, the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great power, major war, and great-­power status. Then I unpack my theory in each of the three steps that can provoke the outbreak of major war. Before delineating the research agenda of this study, I identify the main competing explanations on the origins of major wars. Chapter  2 provides an assessment of encirclement theory in the Italian Wars (1521–1559). I outline how the encirclement of France by Austria and Spain emerged, triggering a double security dilemma that revolved around the French attempts to create a buffer zone in northern Italy with the goal of breaking the lines of communication between the surrounding ­great powers. ­After Charles V inherited the Spanish and Austrian possessions of the Hapsburg in 1519, France initiated a series of attacks to prevent him from controlling the Duchy of Milan. Then I move to the analy­sis of the motivation for intervention by the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers. I conclude by showing how the findings of this case study undermine alternative explanations. In chapter 3, I evaluate my argument in the Thirty Years’ War (1635–1648). ­After providing an overview of the historiographical debate on the origins of this major war, I explore how the Spanish encirclement of France triggered a double security dilemma that led to the formation of a rival-­based network of alliances and to the adoption of increasingly aggressive mea­sures that increased the chances of war. Then I show that France de­cided to launch an attack against Spain as a mea­sure of last resort to prevent actualized encirclement, which would have resulted from an increase in the invasion ability of the Hapsburg. I move to the assessment of the logic of war contagion by showing that the Swedish and Austrian interventions on the side of their allies (France and Spain, respectively) w ­ ere driven by concerns that their own immediate rival would increase its invasion ability. I conclude the chapter by showing how theories that stress hegemonic ambitions or the role of religion cannot explain the outbreak of this major war. Chapter 4 shows that the encirclement of Germany by France and Rus­sia led to the outbreak of World War I (1914–1918). ­After analyzing Otto von 5

INTRODUCTION

Bismarck’s and Wilhelm II’s attempts to break the “deadly embrace” by splitting the Franco-­Russian alliance, I identify the Rus­sian construction of strategic railroads in Poland as the increase of the invasion ability that led to the escalation of the July crisis. I explore the logic of intervention of the other ­great powers ­after Germany declared war on Rus­sia, and I end the chapter by underlining the shortcomings of existing explanations of the outbreak of World War I. In chapter 5, I provide an overview of all the other major wars in modern history. I start by outlining the three major wars that ­were initiated by Louis XIV (Franco-­Dutch War, Nine Years’ War, and the War of the Spanish Succession), the two major wars that ­were caused by the encirclement of Prus­ sia (War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War), and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Then I analyze in more detail the main anomaly for encirclement theory: the outbreak of World War II. In chapter 6, I explore the prospects for ­future major war. ­After debunking the myth that the nuclear revolution has made major wars anachronistic, I identify China as the next encircled g ­ reat power that could initiate a major war to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem. I conclude this book by highlighting ­future directions for studies focusing on the role of encirclement.

6

chapter 1

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

As noted in the introduction, scholars generally consider the two-­front-­war prob­lem a uniquely dangerous situation that seriously undermines the survival of the encircled ­great power. Nevertheless, we lack an explanation of how encirclement leads to the outbreak of major wars. In this chapter, I develop a new theory that aims to fill this gap in the lit­er­a­ture. Major wars (dependent variable) have their foundations in the encirclement of one ­great power (the in­de­pen­dent variable) and unfold through a three-­step pro­cess, the causal mechanism of which is the result of changes in the invasion ability of the immediate rival (the intervening variable). Encirclement is pre­sent when a g ­ reat power (encircled g ­ reat power) shares two dif­fer­ent borders with one or two ­great powers (surrounding g ­ reat powers). This two-­front-­war prob­lem creates a double security dilemma for the encircled ­great power ­because it must disperse its forces for securing its borders against a potential invasion from dif­fer­ent fronts (step 1). The encircled g ­ reat power adopts two major strategies to prevent the surrounding ­great powers from acquiring the ability to launch a simultaneous invasion: seeking allies and establishing buffer zones. The mea­sures that the encircled g ­ reat power adopts to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem trigger the other two steps that lead to the outbreak of major wars. The first outcome of the double security dilemma has a direct impact on war initiation (step 2). The strategies that the encircled g ­ reat power undertakes to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem alarm the surrounding g ­ reat powers ­because seeking external support from other ­great powers or creating buffer zones could not only improve the security of the encircled ­great power, but it could also increase its ability to launch an attack from more defensible borders. Accordingly, the surrounding ­great powers respond by adopting similar countermea­sures that could result in improvements in their operational capacity to launch a simultaneous invasion. Given that the surrounding g ­ reat powers are the immediate rivals of the encircled ­great power, as they are the states that pose the greatest threat to its survival, an increase of their invasion ability engenders a fundamental 7

chapter 1

change in the threat environment of the encircled g ­ reat power. Encirclement creates the two-­front-­war prob­lem (latent encirclement), but the surrounding g ­ reat powers often lack the operational capability of conducting a joint attack. Increases in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers give them the operational capability to launch a joint attack (actualized encirclement) and to conquer part or all the territory of the encircled ­great power. Change in the operational ability to launch an invasion is dif­fer­ent from relative power shifts and it is much more dangerous: the former is rapid and drastic, creating the possibility of an imminent invasion and occupation of territory; the latter is usually gradual and takes years before it is transformed in ­actual ability to attack an adversary.1 Therefore, the encircled ­great power launches an attack against one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers as a mea­sure of last resort to prevent actualized encirclement, even if it risks triggering a two-­front war against the surrounding ­great powers. The second consequence of the double security dilemma has a direct influence on war contagion (step 3). During the double security dilemma, the encircled ­great power attempts to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem by seeking external support from other states that regard the surrounding ­great powers as their own immediate rival. This strategy compels the surrounding g ­ reat powers to form an alliance among themselves and with ­those states that consider the encircled ­great power or one of its allies their own immediate rival. The result is the formation of a rival-­based network of alliances, where each ­great power joins the opposite bloc of its own immediate rival. This checkerboard system of alliances is activated by the dyadic war between the encircled g ­ reat power and one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers. The other ­great powers are dragged into this conflict to prevent increase in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival, which could happen by losing a great-­power ally (by military defeat or defection) or if a ­great power annexes territory along the borders of its immediate rival. Therefore, this rival-­based system of alliances entwines the survival of all the members of each bloc, and it ties the separate dyadic antagonisms of immediate rivals in one unified zero-­sum game. As dropping a stone into a lake creates a ­ripple effect that radiates from its center to the banks, the attempt of the encircled ­great power to “escape its deadly embrace” is the common thread that ties the double security dilemma, war initiation, and war contagion. Coming full circle, encirclement lies at the origins of major wars. Figure 1.1 illustrates the logic of my argument. In the remainder of this chapter, I elaborate on the logic of my argument. I start by defining the key components of my theory. ­After emphasizing the primary role of geography, I examine how encirclement lies at the origins of major wars through the unfolding of three steps: double security dilemma, war initiation, and war contagion. Then I analyze the main alternative explanations on the origins of major war. I conclude by outlining the research agenda and case se­lection of this book. 8

Figure 1.1. Encirclement at the origins of major wars

chapter 1

Definitions My explanation for the outbreak of major wars introduces new concepts and refines existing ones. To clarify the logic of my argument, I identify its key components. I begin this section by offering a definition of the main variables of my theory: encirclement, the invasion ability of the immediate rival, and major wars. Moreover, to support my claim that the number of ­great powers and the distribution of power among them do not affect the incidence or the outbreak of specific major wars, I define the unit level of analy­ sis of this book (great-­power status). In­de­pen­den t V a ri a ble: En ci rclemen t The conventional definition of encirclement refers to its military component. It is essential to clarify that I adopt a dif­fer­ent terminology that emphasizes the strategic aspect of the two-­front-­war prob­lem. Military strategists consider encirclement a tactical operation in which the attacker can surround its opponent.2 The defender finds himself in a desperate situation that leaves him with the choice of e­ ither surrendering or resisting multiple assaults by superior forces. As Carl von Clausewitz notes, “The risk of having to fight on two fronts, and the even greater risk of finding one’s retreat cut off, tend to paralyze movement and the ability to resist, and so affect the balance between victory and defeat. What is more, in the case of defeat, they increase the losses and can raise them to their very limit to annihilation. A threat to the rear can, therefore, make a defeat more probable, as well as more decisive.”3 The concrete dangers of being surrounded by hostile troops are shown by numerous historical examples, where the use of this military tactic led to the complete destruction of the ­enemy’s army: “From the time of Alexander at Cannae, through the Soviets at Sta­lin­grad, to the North Viet­nam­ese at Dien Bien Phu, the history of warfare has been filled with examples of how one army overcame an opponent by encirclement. Each instance led to the destruction of the ­enemy and a strategic and operational victory.”4 Strategic encirclement pre­sents states with a more complicated predicament ­because the encircled ­great power has to disperse its forces across dif­fer­ent war theaters, and it can be defeated even if it is more power­ful than each of the surrounding ­great powers.5 Encirclement is a geographic variable that occurs in the presence of one or two ­great powers on two dif­fer­ent borders of the encircled ­great power. Therefore, the two-­front-­war prob­lem can take two pos­si­ble forms: 1)  Two surrounding g ­ reat powers, both of which share a dif­fer­ent border with the encircled g ­ reat power. The most illustrative case is the situation of Germany since its unification in 1871. Germany was encircled 10

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

by Rus­sia on the eastern border and France on the western border (surrounding ­g reat powers). 2)  One ­great power that shares two separate and distinct borders with the encircled g ­ reat power. For example, the United Hapsburg ­u nder Charles  V (surrounding ­great power) controlled territories along the southern, eastern, and northern frontiers of France. In modern history, ­there have been multiple examples of ­great powers that faced the two-­front-­war prob­lem. Based on my definition of latent encirclement, I identify the following cases (­table 1.1). It is essential to clarify when the two-­front-­war prob­lem is absent. First, a ­great power is not encircled if it shares borders with states that have not achieved great-­power status. For instance, the United States is not encircled by Mexico and Canada. Second, diplomatic be­hav­ior does not affect latent encirclement, a geographic variable. The hy­po­thet­i­cal alliance of one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers does not eliminate the two-­front-­war prob­lem. For example, Germany was still encircled between 1873 and 1880, when it was allied with Austria-­Hungary and Rus­sia in the League of the Three Emperors. Third, the encirclement of smaller states is beyond the scope of my theory ­because I consider this situation not to be conducive to major wars. Fourth, a ­great power does not face encirclement if it shares one border with a ­great power and another border with a minor state that can be overrun by a second ­great power. The territory of the minor power might be nothing more than a “speed bump” b ­ ecause of its incapability to deny the passage of foreign troops; however, the lack of territorial contiguity with two g ­ reat powers does not strictly engender a two-­front-­war prob­lem. For instance, Nazi Germany was not encircled by France and the Soviet Union b ­ ecause of the presence of Poland, even if Hitler did not consider this geographic barrier to be sufficient for stopping a potential Soviet attack. Fi­nally, I suggest that only continental ­great powers could be encircled. Technically, an insular state could be encircled if another g ­ reat power could sustainedly control all the sea lanes around ­Table 1.1 ​Latent encirclement in modern history (1494–­pre­sent) Time period

Encircled ­great power

Surrounding ­great powers

1482–1519 1519–1556 1556–1713 1738–1772 1787–1806 1871–1919 1939–1940 1939–1945

France France France Prus­sia France Germany Germany USSR

Austria* and Spain United Hapsburg Spain Austria and Rus­sia Austria and Prus­sia France and Rus­sia France and USSR Germany and Japan

* All references to Austria refer to the Austrian Hapsburg.

11

chapter 1

it, but the difficulties of this enterprise and of launching amphibious assaults lead me to rule out latent encirclement for maritime ­great powers. In terveni n g V a ri a ble: I n va si o n A bi li t y of the I m m ed iate Ri va l Encirclement is a geographic variable, and as such, it is constant; yet, my argument is not deterministic. I consider the invasion ability of the immediate rival to be the catalyst for war initiation (the decision of the encircled ­great power to attack one of the surrounding ­great powers) and for war contagion (the decision of the other ­great powers to intervene in this dyadic conflict). The encircled g ­ reat power and the surrounding g ­ reat powers are mutual immediate rivals. Based on the type of threat environment of the encircled ­great power, which is a function of the operational ability of the surrounding ­great powers to launch a two-­front war, I distinguish two pos­si­ble layers of encirclement: 1)  Latent encirclement occurs when the encircled g ­ reat power has one or two g ­ reat powers at two distinct borders, but t­ here is no serious possibility of a two-­front war. Although ­there is the potential of a simultaneous invasion by the surrounding ­great powers in the ­future, they lack the operational ability to launch a joint invasion in the pre­sent. Therefore, latent encirclement triggers the double security dilemma for the encircled ­great power, but it is insufficient to cause war initiation. 2)  Actualized encirclement occurs when the surrounding ­great powers develop the operational capability to launch a joint attack against the encircled ­great power. Although a simultaneous attack by the surrounding ­great powers is not inevitable, actualized encirclement makes a two-­ front war a concrete probability in the pre­sent rather than a mere possibility in the f­ uture. An increase in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers produces a fundamental change in the threat environment of the encircled ­great power ­because it gives the former the operational capability to launch a successful attack against the latter. Hence, the encircled g ­ reat power initiates an attack against one of the surrounding ­great powers to prevent actualized encirclement. An increase in the invasion ability of the immediate rival also triggers war contagion, ­after the encircled ­great power attacks one of the surrounding ­g reat powers. The other ­g reat powers in the region are concerned with changes in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival b ­ ecause it is the state that poses the most serious threat to their survival due to a combination of geographic proximity and relative power.6 Each g ­ reat power has its own immediate rival, but states do not share the same one. The other ­great powers in the region coalesce in a counterhegemonic co­ali­tion only in presence of a state with clear power preponderance. 12

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

It is impor­tant to emphasize that this variable is not the same as changes in states’ perceptions of their opponents’ strength or of increases in their military power.7 For instance, the mobilization of troops of one of the surrounding ­great powers along the borders of the encircled ­great power does not entail a shift in raw military capabilities, but it still ­causes the outbreak of hostilities. Moreover, the invasion ability of the immediate rival differs from gradual power shifts. Power transition theorists stress the role of exogenous changes in relative power as results of uneven economic growth. ­These power shifts, however, are rarely rapid enough to explain war initiation; quite the contrary, they are usually the consequence of war.8 To test the falsifiability of my argument, it is particularly impor­tant to compare increases in the invasion ability of the immediate rival with Dale Copeland’s dynamic differentials.9 Copeland identifies rapid and large power shifts in the ­future as the reason for the declining hegemon, while being more power­ful than the rising challenger, launches a preventive war. Instead, an increase in the invasion ability of the immediate rival generates a concrete military advantage that a g ­ reat power could use to coerce or invade its immediate rival in the pre­sent. I identify three impor­tant contributions of my theory that allow me to explain the dynamic outbreak of major wars. First, I emphasize the role of the operational capability of the immediate rival to launch an invasion, an endogenous product of state be­hav­ior. The encircled ­great power does not fear an adverse power shift in the ­future but rather an imminent attack by the surrounding ­great powers. The second implication of my argument is that the encircled ­great power does not need to be relatively more power­ful than each surrounding g ­ reat power to initiate war. Third, changes in the invasion ability of the immediate rival have a territorial component that makes them extremely dangerous. Other increases in relative power, such as internal and external balancing, occur all the time without directly threatening the survival of other ­great powers and triggering a military response. G ­ reat powers primarily fear increases in invasion ability ­because they enhance the immediate rival’s operational capability to launch an attack on their national territory. Depend ent Va ri a ble: Ma j o r Wa r To determine when a military conflict can be considered a major war, I start my analy­sis from Jack Levy’s distinction between great-­power wars and general wars.10 Great-­power wars require the presence of at least one ­great power on each side of the conflict. Levy classifies general wars as military conflicts that “involve at least two-­thirds of the ­Great Powers and an intensity exceeding 1,000 b ­ attle deaths per for million population.”11 Alternatively, Copeland considers major wars ­those military conflicts that “involve all the ­great powers, that are fought at the highest level of intensity, and where ­there is a strong possibility that g ­ reat powers may be eliminated as sovereign states.”12 13

chapter 1

I consider ­t hese two definitions to be troublesome ­because they focus on the conduct or the potential outcome rather than the peculiar nature of major wars. First, the rationale ­behind Levy’s threshold for the onset of major wars (two-­thirds of g ­ reat powers) is unclear. If a major war is a sweeping phenomenon that shakes the foundations of the system, the survival of all ­great powers is threatened. ­Unless a state is temporarily knocked out the balance of power due to specific circumstances (such as, economic inability to finance the war or internal revolts), one would expect ­every ­great power to intervene. Furthermore, the pa­ram­e­ter of intensity is misleading b ­ ecause it cannot consider variation in technology, such as the lethality of weapons and the improvement of modern medicine.13 The conduct of the war certainly affects its duration and the type of peace that concludes it, but it should not be considered a criterion for classifying major wars. Unlike Levy and Copeland, I provide a definition that captures the key ele­ ment that distinguishes major wars from other great-­power wars: the survival of all ­great powers is threatened. I regard major wars as overt and direct military confrontations among all the ­great powers of a specific region.14 My definition of major wars generates two differences from Levy’s and Copeland’s lists. Like Copeland, I include the Italian Wars (1521–1559), a major war that is excluded by Levy. Moreover, I concur with Levy in treating the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815) as a single major war, whereas Copeland starts his analy­sis from the Napoleonic period. Fi­nally, I argue that the Thirty Years’ War did not begin in 1618, as Levy and Copeland suggest, but when France attacked Spain in May 1635. The first phase of the major war was characterized by a civil war within the Holy Roman Empire and a combination of separate dyadic wars, but it did not involve all the ­great powers in the region. In t­ able 1.2, I identify the ten major wars that have occurred since 1494. ­There are four impor­tant caveats to my definition. First, I exclude from the classification of major wars secret involvement and proxy wars. For instance, the Korean War (1950–1953) is not considered a major war ­because the Soviet Union was not officially belligerent and played only a covert role. ­Table 1.2 ​Major wars in modern history (1494–­pre­sent) Major war Italian Wars Thirty Years’ War Franco-­Dutch War Nine Years’ War War of the Spanish Succession War of the Austrian Succession Seven Years’ War French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars World War I World War II

14

1521–1559 1635–1648 1672–1678 1688–1697 1701–1713 1740–1748 1756–1763 1792–1815 1914–1918 1939–1945

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

Second, I exclude military conflicts that involve regional powers, none of which has great-­power status at the global level. Third, major wars entail the involvement of ­great powers in their own region. This implies that the intervention of extra-­regional ­great powers is not necessary to classify the conflict as a major war. Fi­nally, to identify the involvement of all the ­great powers in the region, I focus on the situation at the beginning the conflict. On the one hand, it is an anomaly if a ­great power is capable of fighting but decides to stay on the sidelines at the beginning of a major war. On the other hand, the definition is met in ­those cases where ­great powers cannot intervene throughout the major war b ­ ecause of internal prob­lems that prevent war efforts. For instance, E ­ ngland was incapable of intervening in the Thirty Years’ War ­because of financial difficulties and ­because of the internal strug­ gle between King Charles I and the Parliament. The assessment of my theory requires determining which states achieved great-­power status in modern Eu­ro­pean history. Encirclement can occur only if a ­g reat power shares two dif­fer­ent borders with one or two ­g reat powers. Moreover, major wars occur only if all the g ­ reat powers in a specific region are involved. In t­ able 1.3, I identify the g ­ reat powers since 1494.15 I adopt the traditional definition of g ­ reat powers as states that have “a plausible chance of avoiding defeat in an all-­out defensive war against the most power­ful state in the system.”16 My approach focuses on material capabilities and refutes the inclusion of additional variables such as aggressive be­hav­ior, the perception of other states, and formal criteria such as the classification of states as ­great powers in international conferences and treaties.17 Furthermore, I argue that the possession of a nuclear arsenal is a necessary but insufficient condition to be considered a ­great power. Although not possessing nuclear weapons, specifically second-­strike capabilities, excludes ­Table 1.3 ​List of ­great powers (1494–­pre­sent) ­Great power status France En­gland/Great Britain Austria* Spain* Ottoman Empire Dutch Republic Sweden Rus­sia/USSR Prus­sia Germany Japan United States China

Period 1494–1940 1494–1945 1494–1866 1494–1713 1526–1699 1648–1713 1617–1721 1721–­pre­sent 1738–1807 1871–1945 1868–1945 1898–­pre­sent 2008–­pre­sent

* Austria and Spain w ­ ere not separate po­liti­cal entities during the reign of Charles V (United Hapsburg, 1519–1556).

15

chapter 1

certain states from great-­power status (such as Germany), economic and conventional military power remain a fundamental prerequisite for being considered a ­great power. For instance, North ­Korea is still considered a minor power ­because it lacks the economic and military capabilities that are needed for a conventional all-­out war against another ­great power.

Encirclement and Major War: A Three-­Step Path Major wars are caused by the attempts of the encircled g ­ reat power to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem. The necessity to “escape its deadly embrace” leads to a self-­fulfilling prophecy that unfolds in three steps: double security dilemma, war initiation, and war contagion. Latent encirclement creates a uniquely dangerous situation for the encircled ­great power ­because it must disperse its forces to defend its borders against the surrounding g ­ reat powers. To prevent them from fully concentrating their armies and being capable of launching a simultaneous invasion (actualized encirclement), it forms alliances and it tries to create buffer zones. The strategies that the encircled ­great power adopts to guarantee its survival undermine the security of the surrounding g ­ reat powers, which carry out similar countermea­sures that tighten their grip on the encircled ­great power. As the situation evolves from latent encirclement to actualized encirclement, the encircled g ­ reat power f­ aces a double security dilemma that leads to the formation of a rival-­based network of alliances and to the adoption of increasingly aggressive mea­sures that could alter the ability of the surrounding g ­ reat powers to launch an invasion. Changes in the invasion ability of the surrounding g ­ reat powers create an imminent threat to the survival of the encircled g ­ reat power b ­ ecause they cause a two-­front war against the surrounding g ­ reat powers. Increases in the invasion ability can occur in two ways: first, the surrounding ­great powers eliminate all (internal and external) security threats that prevented them from fully mobilizing their armies against the encircled ­great power; second, the surrounding g ­ reat powers extend their territorial control along the borders of the encircled ­great power, opening a new gate from which they can launch an invasion. Therefore, to prevent the surrounding g ­ reat powers from increasing their invasion ability, the encircled ­great power launches an attack even if it means fighting a two-­front war. Inaction would be equivalent to surrender. The encircled ­great power’s attack against one of the surrounding ­great powers leads to a cascade of military interventions by the other ­great powers ­because it activates the rival-­based network of alliances that was formed during the double security dilemma. ­Great powers have dif­fer­ent immediate rivals, and they form alliances with e­ ither the encircled g ­ reat power or the surrounding g ­ reat powers to contain their own immediate rival. Even if they are not directly attacked, each ­great power is dragged into the dyadic conflict 16

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

to prevent an increase in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival, which could occur in two ways: the annexation of territory along the borders of one g ­ reat power by its own immediate rival or the loss of a great-­power ally by military defeat or defection. In the end, the rival-­based network of alliances ties the separate dyadic antagonisms of immediate rivals in a unified and interconnected zero-­sum game where if one ­great power increases its invasion ability, it threatens not only its own immediate rival but also its allies. Before analyzing the logic of my argument in each of t­ hese three steps, it is impor­tant to emphasize the role of geography for the prospects for cooperation and conflict among states. Understanding the impact of this variable is essential for appreciating the qualitative difference that latent encirclement engenders. T h e Ro le of Geo gra ph y The starting point of my theory is the emphasis on the impact of geography in international relations. In addition to accepting the core assumptions of structural realism and acknowledging the importance of relative power, I underline how this ­factor is not sufficient in understanding state be­hav­ior and international outcomes. Geography lies at the foundation of the formation of international rivalries, security competition, and the prospects for conflict and cooperation. As Napoleon famously stated, “To know a nation’s geography is to know its foreign policy.”18 In an anarchic system where pre­sent and ­future intentions of states cannot be known, rational states compete to guarantee their primary goal of survival.19 The structural characteristics of the international system trigger a security dilemma, according to which the strategies that a state adopts to increase its security reduces the security of other states. The intensity of security competition varies, though. Among the dif­fer­ent arguments that have been advanced to explain what might mitigate or exacerbate the security dilemma, I suggest that geography is the most impor­tant ­factor in understanding the variation in the likelihood of cooperation and conflict among states. ­Great powers regard one another as potential adversaries, but they do not assume the worst about all the other states; rather, their primary concern is with the immediate rival b ­ ecause of its ability to launch an invasion.20 The geographic proximity of a power­ful state directly threatens the territorial integrity of its neighboring states who try to decrease their vulnerability by carry­ing out strategies that secure their borders. States that share frontiers become increasingly worried about the adoption of t­ hese mea­sures b ­ ecause they could be used to plan an invasion. Even actions that should be regarded as defensive in nature, such as building an impenetrable line of fortification, are looked upon suspiciously ­because impenetrable defense opens the possibility for expansion. ­After all, “criminals as well as policemen wear bulletproof vests.”21 Rephrasing the security dilemma to account for the importance 17

chapter 1

of geography, the means by which a state tries to protect its borders undermine the territorial integrity of its neighboring states. Understanding the connection between geographic proximity and the creation of international rivalries sheds light not only on the reason for the intense security competition between immediate rivals but also on the logic b ­ ehind cooperation among states that are not immediate rivals. The realist emphasis on the prob­lem of relative gains as hindrance to international cooperation is misplaced, as it cannot account for numerous occasions in which states cede relative power.22 I argue that on the one hand, relative gains are a fundamental prob­lem between immediate rivals b ­ ecause of their ability to launch a direct attack. On the other hand, ­great powers are willing to cede power for realist reasons if this strategy reduces the vulnerability of their borders. This conclusion does not imply that the security dilemma between allies is eliminated, given that uncertainty about pre­sent and ­future intentions is not ameliorated, but the presence of a shared immediate rival allows states to overcome fear and mutual suspicion and to cooperate to increase their relative power at the expense of the ­great power that poses the greatest threat to their survival. For instance, the Franco-­Russian military alliance before World War I decreased the relative power of France compared to Rus­sia, but this cooperation gave French leaders the opportunity to contain Germany (immediate rival). The geographic landscape also affects the likelihood of war. States are not satisfied with the status quo ­until their survival is assured, but the pursuit of this primary goal requires the control of territory along their borders. ­Limited expansion to reach natu­ral frontiers (such as impenetrable mountains or large bodies of w ­ ater) or to create artificial barriers (buffer zones) is sometimes necessary when other less risky and costly options fail. This security-­driven motivation, however, makes territorial contiguity an almost intractable issue that prevents states from reaching a prewar bargain. Therefore, the impossibility for almost all the states in the international system to secure their borders against invasion makes the security dilemma inescapable and territorial contiguity an enduring source of conflict among states. As Robert Jervis points out, If all states w ­ ere self-­sufficient islands, anarchy would be much less of a prob­lem. . . . ​Although geography cannot be changed to conform to borders, borders can and do change to conform to geography. Borders across which an attack is easy tend to be unstable. States living within them are likely to expand or to be absorbed. Frequent wars are almost inevitable since attack ­will often seem as the best way to protect what one has. This pro­cess w ­ ill stop, or at least slow down, when the state’s borders reach . . . ​a line of natu­ ral obstacles. Security without attack ­will then be pos­si­ble.23

In the end, geography plays a fundamental role in the creation of enduring international rivalries, in the intensity of the security competition be18

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

tween them, in the formation of alliances to contain a common e­ nemy, and in war propensity. This analy­sis mostly focuses on the interactions between dyads, however, and it is not sufficient to trace the origins of major wars, an international phenomenon that is widespread in terms of geographic reach, intensity, and numbers of actors involved. This leads us to the million-­dollar question: what lies at the origins of major wars? S t ep 1: Do uble Secu ri ty D i lemma Major wars are caused by an encircled g ­ reat power’s attempts to escape its encirclement. The possibility of a two-­front war exacerbates the security dilemma, it provokes the formation of two alliance blocs that revolve around the encircled ­great power and the surrounding ­great power, and it staggeringly increases the chances that a dyadic conflict extends to all the ­g reat powers in the region. Encirclement creates an acute sense of fear and vulnerability b ­ ecause the encircled g ­ reat power f­ aces the possibility of a joint invasion from separate fronts. Its geographic situation constantly jeopardizes its survival b ­ ecause it cannot concentrate its military capabilities and defend itself even if it is more power­ful than each of its opponents. This uniquely dangerous situation creates a double security dilemma for the encircled ­great power, which is compelled to carry out an active and aggressive foreign policy u ­ ntil the possibility of a simultaneous invasion from two fronts is eliminated. Inaction equals surrender. Like sharks that need to swim constantly to stay alive, the encircled g ­ reat power relentlessly tries to find a means to escape the deadly embrace of the surrounding ­great powers. Ideally, the encircled ­great power would eliminate its encirclement by achieving a decisive military victory against one of the surrounding ­great powers so that the latter is relegated to a less-­than-­great-­power status. This solution would, however, almost inevitably cause the outcome that the encircled g ­ reat power is trying to prevent: a two-­front war against the surrounding ­great powers. The other surrounding ­great power could not stay on the sidelines while its immediate rival significantly increases its invasion ability. Even if the encircled g ­ reat power is by far the most power­ful state in the system, eliminating its encirclement through preventive war would be daunting. The option of strengthening its borders is not feasible ­either. A ­great power can defend its frontier by concentrating its forces to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat another ­great power. For instance, France could strengthen its eastern border before World War I and World War II b ­ ecause it had only one ­great power that could pose a serious threat of invasion: imperial Germany and Nazi Germany, respectively. The encircled ­great power cannot concentrate its forces along one border against one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers ­because it leaves the other border completely exposed to a military attack. This is the essence of the two-­front-­war dilemma. 19

chapter 1

To make all its borders defensible, the encircled ­g reat power would require a massive increase in military power to the point of becoming more power­ful than the two surrounding g ­ reat powers combined. This situation would eliminate the two-­front-­war prob­lem b ­ ecause it would relegate the surrounding g ­ reat powers to a less-­t han-­g reat-­power status, but this outcome is extremely difficult to obtain due to internal and external constraints. In the worst-­case scenario, it could trigger a two-­front attack by the surrounding ­great powers to prevent the encircled ­great power from increasing its invasion ability. Since preventive wars and securing all national frontiers are not options, the encircled g ­ reat power adopts two main strategies to hinder the ability of the surrounding ­great powers to launch a simultaneous invasion: 1)  Seeking alliances Continental ­great powers share borders with other states, but they can usually defend themselves against an attack ­because they are not surrounded by other ­great powers. One of the unique characteristics of the two-­front-­war prob­lem is that the encircled ­great power cannot guarantee its survival only by resorting to its internal capabilities. Therefore, it actively seeks the support of other states in its attempts to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem. The formation of alliances engenders three main advantages. First, it deters the surrounding g ­ reat powers from attacking the encircled g ­ reat power out of fear of having to fight multiple enemies in dif­fer­ent war theaters. If deterrence fails, the territory of an ally could become an artificial line of defense that could halt potential advances of the surrounding g ­ reat powers. Second, support from other ­great powers prevents the latter from cooperating with the surrounding g ­ reat powers. For example, Otto von Bismarck’s attempts to create a network of alliances aimed not only at improving German diplomatic position but also at isolating France. Fi­nally, other internal and external security threats prevent the surrounding g ­ reat powers from concentrating their forces against the encircled g ­ reat power. Cardinal Richelieu’s strategy of “wars by diversion,” which entailed covert financial and military aid to French allies against the Hapsburg, is an example.24 2)  Creating buffer zones The encircled ­great power attempts to establish buffer zones by extending its control over strategic territory along its borders. The creation of a line of territory between the encircled ­great power and the surrounding ­great powers becomes a first line of defense and it stops or at least hinders an invasion by the surrounding g ­ reat powers. Furthermore, gaining control of territory between the two surrounding ­great powers might create a wedge that prevents them from uniting their armies. Jervis identifies the impact of geography, and specifically buffer zones, in reducing the threat of invasion:

20

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

Anything that increases the amount of ground the attacker has to cross, or impedes his pro­gress across it, or makes him more vulnerable while crossing, increases the advantage accruing to the defense. When states are separated by barriers that produce ­these effects, the security dilemma is eased, since both can have forces adequate for defense without being able to attack. Impenetrable barriers would actually prevent war; in real­ity, decision makers have to s­ ettle for a good deal less. Buffer zones slow the attacker’s pro­ gress; they thereby give the defender time to prepare, increase prob­lems of logistics, and reduce the number of soldiers available for the final assault.25

­There are several ways the encircled ­great power tries to establish buffer zones. First, it can form a tight alliance with minor powers that have the military wherewithal and the willingness to halt the advances of the surrounding ­great powers. For example, Cardinal Mazarin tried to reduce the possibility of a joint invasion by Spain and Austria by facilitating the formation of the League of the Rhine (1658), a confederation of all German states that could prevent Leopold I of Austria from uniting the imperial troops with the Spanish army on the eastern border of France.26 Second, the encircled g ­ reat power could coerce less power­ful states to make territorial concessions without fighting. Alternatively, the encircled ­g reat power can threaten to use force to coerce less power­ful states into accepting its “protection” so that they do not become another point of entrance for an invasion of the surrounding g ­ reat powers. Fi­nally, the encircled g ­ reat power can decide to directly control strategic territory by annexing it at the expense of minor powers. For instance, the War of the Reunions (1683–1684) was part of Louis XIV’s strategy of piecemeal aggression that exploited the Ottoman attacks on Austria to make strategic territorial acquisitions and to prevent Austrian forces from joining the Spanish army in the Rhineland. In sum, the encircled g ­ reat power tries to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­ lem with diplomatic and military mea­sures that do not trigger a major war. Launching a decisive, victorious preventive war against the surrounding ­great powers would solve encirclement once and for all, but it risks causing the outcome that it tries to prevent: a two-­front war against the surrounding ­great powers. Fostering a rapprochement with the surrounding g ­ reat powers also does not solve the prob­lem b ­ ecause it does not remove the strategic nightmare of having two fronts threatened. The encircled ­great power could maintain good relations with the surrounding g ­ reat powers, but it cannot trust that they would not increase their invasion ability. Therefore, the best strategies that the encircled g ­ reat power have to escape the deadly embrace of the surrounding g ­ reat powers are seeking alliances with other states that consider the surrounding g ­ reat powers to be their own immediate rival and creating a buffer zone that would halt an attack by the surrounding ­great powers.

21

chapter 1

The encircled g ­ reat power’s attempts to eliminate its encirclement concern the surrounding g ­ reat powers ­because seeking external support from other ­great powers and establishing buffer zones can increase not only the ability of the encircled ­great power to improve its security but also to launch an attack from its more defensible borders. As Jervis notes, “The concern is with direct attack. To protect themselves, states seek to control, or at least to neutralize, areas on their borders. But attempts to establish buffer zones can alarm ­others who have states ­there. . . . ​Their vulnerability ­will be increased.”27 The surrounding ­g reat powers adopt similar countermea­sures for containing the encircled ­g reat power and preventing it from increasing its invasion ability. The more aggressive the attempts of the encircled g ­ reat power to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem, the greater the incentive for the surrounding ­great powers to tighten their grip by forming alliances and to resort to ­limited use of force. But the attempts of the surrounding ­great powers to contain the encircled g ­ reat power have the inevitable consequence of increasing its conviction that they are trying to “put its head in a noose.” Containment and encirclement are two sides of the same coin and the “target of this containment strategy . . . ​is sure to view any balancing co­ ali­t ion forming against it as encirclement by its rivals.”28 It is impor­tant to underline how the reaction of the surrounding g ­ reat powers is driven by structural considerations rather than domestic reasons. On the one hand, the combination of uncertainty about intentions and high costs of potential miscalculation compels the surrounding ­great powers to assume the worst about the encircled g ­ reat power, which is their own immediate rival. On the other hand, the geographic proximity of the encircled ­great power rather than its relative power is what drives them to adopt a strategy of containment. Certainly, the more power­ful the encircled g ­ reat power is, the more the surrounding ­great powers are concerned about their survival. But even if it is militarily weaker than them, the military mea­sures that it adopts to eliminate the possibility of a two-­front war compel the surrounding ­great powers to carry out defensive precautionary mea­sures that would hinder shifts in relative power at their expense. The foreign policy of France and the Hapsburg from the end of the Italian Wars to the Thirty Years’ War is a good example of the dynamics of the double security dilemma. France tried to prevent the reunification of the Austrian and Spanish branches of the House of Hapsburg by creating buffer zones along its borders, from northern Italy to the Spanish Netherlands. French attempts to eliminate the possibility of a two-­front war compelled Spain and Austria to adopt similar countermea­sures that led to a tightening, rather than a loosening, of their grip on France. This tit-­for-­tat approach led to the adoption of increasingly aggressive mea­sures and it created the conditions for the French decision to initiate a war to prevent the materialization of actualized encirclement by the Spanish and Austrian branches of the House of Hapsburg. 22

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

To summarize, the double security dilemma provokes an intense security competition between the encircled g ­ reat power and the surrounding ­great powers and it engenders two impor­tant consequences. First, the need of the encircled g ­ reat power to seek external support to guarantee its survival and the response of the surrounding g ­ reat powers lead to the formation of a rival-­based network of alliances. The other g ­ reat powers in the system form alliances with e­ ither the encircled g ­ reat power or the surrounding g ­ reat powers to ­counter their own immediate rival. Furthermore, the increasingly aggressive mea­sures that the encircled ­great power adopts to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem push the surrounding ­great powers to tighten their grip and to adopt similar countermea­sures. In turn, this response can increase their ability to launch a successful invasion. S t ep 2: W ar I n i ti ati o n Latent encirclement is destiny. This geographic variable can explain the endemic intense security competition that characterizes the relationship between the encircled ­great power and the surrounding ­great powers, but given that the two-­front-­war prob­lem is constant, it cannot account for the outbreak of a dyadic conflict between them. What explains war initiation? Increases in the invasion ability of the immediate rival drive the decision of the encircled g ­ reat power to initiate war. An increase in their ability to launch a simultaneous invasion creates the outcome that the encircled ­great power tries to prevent: a two-­front war against the surrounding ­great powers. Therefore, it initiates a war not out of fear that gradual power shifts ­will undermine its long-­term security but out of concern that changes in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers pose imminent threats to its survival. ­There are two pos­si­ble scenarios that the encircled ­great power considers a point of no return, beyond which less risky mea­sures become insufficient to prevent the surrounding g ­ reat powers from increasing their ability to launch a joint invasion: 1)  Concentration of forces The surrounding ­great powers eliminate all (internal and external) security threats that prevented them from concentrating their forces against the encircled ­great power. This outcome undermines its survival ­because it cannot defend its territorial integrity against two g ­ reat powers that can fully mobilize their armies against it. Even if the surrounding ­great powers did not launch a joint invasion, they could easily coerce the encircled ­great power and undermine its ability to conduct an in­de­pen­dent foreign policy. For instance, the Nine Years’ War was launched by Louis XIV b ­ ecause the Austrian emperor Leopold I was about to defeat the Ottoman Empire, which for de­cades had prevented the Hapsburg from uniting troops with Spain and concentrating its full force against France.29 23

chapter 1

2)  Closure of the circle The surrounding g ­ reat powers increase their ability to invade the encircled g ­ reat power by annexing territory along its borders. This outcome would add another layer to latent encirclement by opening a new door to invasion. For example, the War of the Austrian Succession was initiated by Frederick the G ­ reat to prevent the Russian-­sponsored king of Poland and Saxony from taking Silesia and surrounding Prus­sia from east to west.30 When one of t­ hese two situations arise, the encircled g ­ reat power launches an attack against one of the surrounding ­great powers.31 The encircled ­great power is aware that its attack ­will likely cause a two-­front war, but inaction would be equivalent to surrender. Since all the strategies, short of open warfare, that the encircled ­great power ­adopted to prevent actualized encirclement failed, launching an attack against one of the surrounding ­great powers becomes the only rational option to guarantee its survival. This decision is a mea­sure of last resort and it is not based on the likelihood of victory against the surrounding g ­ reat powers.32 Even when it is more power­ful than the surrounding ­great powers, the encircled ­great power does not launch preventive wars to take on the system. Instead, the encircled ­great power attacks ­because it failed to prevent actualized encirclement with less costly and risky mea­sures. The German decision to attack France at the end of the July crisis best captures the dramatic situation that the encircled ­great power has to endure. Being on the edge of a cliff, the encircled g ­ reat power has to face its destiny or step ­behind and fall into the abyss. One might won­der why the encircled ­great power and the surrounding ­great powers do not reach a prewar settlement. The logic of war initiation might elicit two main criticisms. Some scholars could argue that the costs of a potential two-­front war exceed by far the potential benefits of victory. However, this argument fails to consider the greater costs of inaction. The increase in the invasion ability of the surrounding g ­ reat powers leads to actualized encirclement, which would put the encircled ­great power at the mercy of its enemies. This situation of extreme emergency makes standing firm and fighting less costly than backing down and accepting an intolerable peace. The second critique would argue that rational surrounding g ­ reat powers should undertake reassuring mea­sures to avoid war. Following Sun Tzu’s military advice—­“when you surround an army, leave an outlet f­ ree; do not press a desperate foe too hard”33 —­t hey should not tighten their grip too much on the encircled ­great power. The only way in which a prewar bargain could be reached was if the surrounding g ­ reat powers ­adopted unilateral concessions that would prevent them from increasing their invasion ability. Other conciliatory policies would be insufficient ­because the encircled ­great power cannot afford to make a m ­ istake that would be fatal. However, making ­t hese concessions would be irrational for the surrounding ­g reat 24

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

powers ­because it would prevent them from containing the encircled ­g reat power and it would undermine their ability to prevent increases in the invasion ability of their mutual immediate rival. Thus, the surrounding ­great powers are not willing to strike a bargain ­because keeping the encircled ­great power weak and incapable of concentrating its forces against one of them decreases its ability to launch an attack. It is impor­tant to underline that the logic of war initiation in my theory falls somewhere between preemption and prevention.34 If the encircled g ­ reat power ­adopted a preventive war logic, it would attack well before the surrounding ­great powers acquired the operational capability to launch a two-­ front war. If its attack was driven by a preemptive war logic, it would not initiate a war ­unless the surrounding ­great powers mobilized their armies. Instead, the encircled ­great power attacks ­because the increase in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers enables the latter to launch a simultaneous joint invasion. The attack is not caused by an adverse power shift in the long term but by the imminent threat of a two-­front war (preemptive war logic), even though the surrounding g ­ reat powers might not have mobilized their armies for an invasion (preventive war logic). Rather than being driven by a better-­now-­than-­later calculus, war initiation follows a now-­or-­never logic. Although the intervening variable of my study stresses the importance of changes in the threat environment, it is impor­tant to distinguish it from the relative balance of power between the encircled ­great power and the surrounding ­great powers. Indeed, the two pos­si­ble increases in the invasion ability of the surrounding g ­ reat powers—­concentration of forces and the closure of the circle—­occurred across dif­fer­ent distributions of power and regardless of w ­ hether the encircled g ­ reat power was more or less power­ful than the surrounding g ­ reat powers. For example, France launched an attack to prevent the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburg from eliminating their internal and external security threats when it was weaker than the surrounding ­great powers (Thirty Years’ War) as well as when it was the most power­ful state in the system (Nine Years’ War). Fi­nally, it is worth emphasizing how the first two steps of my theory on the origins of major wars are strictly linked. Encirclement alone does not cause war initiation, but the increasingly aggressive mea­sures that the encircled ­great power adopts to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem push the surrounding ­great powers to carry out strategies that could provoke a change in their invasion ability. Encirclement engenders a self-­fulfilling prophecy: any attempt by the encircled ­great power to prevent actualized encirclement increases the chances that it materializes. In sum, war initiation is a mea­sure of last resort when alternative strategies prove to be in­effec­t ive at preventing actualized encirclement. An increase in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers surpasses the threshold beyond which a joint invasion becomes a concrete probability 25

chapter 1

rather than a distant possibility. This point of no return creates a terrible dilemma for the encircled g ­ reat power: surrender or fight a two-­front war. In ­either case, the encircled ­great power ­faces its final hour. S t ep 3: W ar Co n tagi o n Materialization of actualized encirclement leads to the encircled ­great power’s decision to attack one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers, but it remains to be explained how the outbreak of this dyadic conflict expands to the other ­great powers in the region. Great-­power war usually remains geo­ graph­i­cally contained and ­limited to the two warring parties. Instead, the attack that is initiated by the encircled g ­ reat power does not allow the other ­great powers to stay on the sidelines. What is the under­lying mechanism of war contagion in the presence of an encircled ­great power? To analyze the logic of intervention by the other g ­ reat powers, it is essential to understand the connection between war contagion and the double security dilemma. Since the encircled ­great power has to disperse its forces along its borders, it seeks the support of other states. The surrounding ­great powers react by forming an alliance between them and with other states. Each ­great power enters into one of the two blocs to ­counter their immediate rival.35 “Once an alliance forms, a counter-­alliance necessarily follows, since t­ here is no way of knowing that the first alliance is intended only for defensive purposes. The eventual result is the division of the system into two rival co­ali­tions.”36 The result is the formation of a rival-­based network of alliances on a checkerboard pattern,37 which makes one’s neighbor an ­enemy and makes the ­enemy’s neighbor one’s friend. The importance of geography in the formation of this rival-­based alliance is well illustrated by the following passage by Kautilya: The king who is situated anywhere immediately on the circumference of the conqueror’s territory is termed the e­ nemy. The king who is likewise situated close to the e­ nemy, but separated from the conqueror only by the e­ nemy is termed the friend (of the conqueror). In front of the conqueror and close to the ­enemy, ­there happened to be situated kings such as the conqueror’s friend, next to him the ­enemy’s friend, and next to the last the conqueror’s friend’s friend, and next, the ­enemy’s friend’s friend.38

The double security dilemma extends the logic of bilateral relative gains between immediate rivals to the ­whole region, as each separate dyad of rivalry becomes interwoven through the attempts of the encircled ­great power to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem. The result is a zero-­sum game between the two opposite alliance blocs in which if one ­great power increases its invasion ability, it threatens not only its immediate rival but also its allies.39 Accordingly, the encircled ­great power’s attack against one of the sur26

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

Figure 1.2. Logic of war contagion

rounding g ­ reat powers triggers a cascade of military interventions by all the ­great powers in the region. Figure  1.2 illustrates the structure of alliances that leads to the cascade of military interventions by the other ­great powers. When the encircled ­great power (E) attacks one of the surrounding ­great powers (S2), the other surrounding ­great power (S1) intervenes on the side of its ally S2. The allies of E (A1 and A2) enter the conflict to prevent their own immediate rival (S1 and S2, respectively) from increasing its invasion ability. Based on the same logic, the allies of S1 and S2 (A3 and A4) cannot stay on the sidelines. Like pushing the first domino ­will knock over the following ­until the entire structure collapses, the attack of the encircled ­great power triggers a chain reaction where each ­great power intervenes as part of the rival-­based network of alliances that emerged during the double security dilemma. The outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession is a good example of the mechanism of war contagion. The Prus­sian invasion of Silesia not only undermined the territorial integrity of the Austrian Hapsburg, but the other Eu­ro­pean ­great powers (Rus­sia, France, and ­Great Britain) also intervened in the dyadic war to contain their own immediate rival. Rus­sia feared that the military defeat of its Austrian ally would allow Prus­sia to increase its ability to invade Poland and then to attack Rus­sia. France viewed with suspicion the alliance between ­England and the Austrian Hapsburg, which controlled territories along the northern French border and could attack Paris with British support. G ­ reat Britain could not lose its Austrian ally b ­ ecause the absence of a continental counterweight to France would raise French ability to launch an amphibious assault. In a nutshell, all the ­great powers ­were dragged into the dyadic conflict between Prus­sia and Austria ­because of potential changes in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival. Each ­great power in the region intervenes in the dyadic conflict between the encircled g ­ reat power and one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers to prevent an increase in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival. I identify two situations that lead to the cascade of military intervention.40 1)  Loss of great-­power ally by military defeat or defection If a g ­ reat power stays on the sidelines when one of its great-­power allies is attacked by its immediate rival, it risks losing an ally by e­ ither military defeat or defection. 27

chapter 1

First, the immediate rival might increase its invasion ability by achieving a decisive military victory against the ally of the g ­ reat power. This outcome would allow the immediate rival not to disperse its forces and, in turn, to be in a better position to launch an invasion. For example, the victory of Charles V in the ­Battle of Pavia (1525) compelled Sultan Suleiman I to intervene on the side of France to prevent the Hapsburg from concentrating its forces against the Ottoman Empire. Second, the immediate rival might increase its invasion ability if the ally of the ­great power reneges from its commitment.41 Even if its ally was not likely to be easily defeated, failure to intervene on its side would increase the chances that it ­will defect from the alliance. If the ­great power stays on the sidelines when its ally is involved in a major war, it w ­ ill be unlikely to intervene in f­ uture crises. Therefore, the g ­ reat power has a strong incentive to intervene to prevent the breakup of the alliance that would allow its immediate rival to reduce the number of threats to its security and to have a f­ ree hand to launch an invasion. For example, France did not back down in the July crisis (1914) out of fear that staying on the sidelines would have undermined its defensive alliance with Rus­sia. 2)  Annexation of territory Ag ­ reat power might take advantage of the attack by one of its allies against its immediate rival to increase its territorial possessions along the borders of the immediate rival. The difficulty for the immediate rival of projecting power in dif­fer­ent war theaters while ­under attack creates a favorable condition for annexing territory. For instance, the Rus­sian intervention against Napoleonic France (War of the Fourth Co­ali­tion, October 1806–­July 1807) was provoked by the defeat of Prus­sia in the ­Battle of Jena and by French advances in Poland, the annexation of which would have posed the greatest threat of invasion to the Rus­sian homeland.42 Moreover, territorial annexation along the borders of one ­great power by its immediate rival could create a two-­front-­ war prob­lem. For example, in 1935, the Soviet Union formed an alliance with France out of fear of German expansionism in eastern Eu­rope, the annexation of which would have led to the encirclement of Germany and Japan. It is also impor­tant to stress that war contagion is primarily a function of geography and changes in the threat environment rather than mere shifts in raw military power. G ­ reat powers decide to cooperate with other states and to fight on their side ­because of concerns about their own immediate rival, the geo­graph­i­cally most proximate state that could undermine their survival. This is not to deny that power plays an impor­tant role in alliance formation and on the decision to intervene militarily, but its salience is subordinated to the impact of geography. To summarize, encirclement connects the double security dilemma to war contagion. The necessity of eliminating the possibility of a two-­front war leads to the formation of two opposite alliance blocs that revolve round the encircled 28

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

­ reat power and the surrounding g g ­ reat powers. The attack of the encircled ­great power against one of the surrounding ­great powers triggers a cascade of military interventions by the other g ­ reat powers to prevent changes in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival. The result of the encircled g ­ reat power’s attempts to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem is the outbreak of a military conflagration among all the ­great powers in the region. S u m m a ry of th e A rgu men t Major wars are the consequence of the encircled ­great power’s attempts to “escape its deadly embrace.” The path to military conflicts that involves all the g ­ reat powers in a region is caused by encirclement, and through increases in the invasion ability of the immediate rival, it unfolds in three steps: double security dilemma, war initiation, and war contagion. ­Table 1.4 shows how encirclement is tied to major wars by illustrating the causal mechanism b ­ ehind each step. Latent encirclement triggers the first step by creating a double security dilemma. The threat that the two-­front-­war prob­lem poses to the survival of the encircled ­great power compels it to seek allies and to create buffer zones. ­These attempts to eliminate its encirclement have the effect of bringing the surrounding ­g reat powers closer together and of tightening their grip on the encircled ­great power. As a result of the double security dilemma, the encircled g ­ reat power and the surrounding g ­ reat powers form two opposite alliance blocs and adopt increasingly aggressive mea­sures that could lead to the increase in the invasion ability of the surrounding g ­ reat powers.

­Table 1.4 ​The three-­step logic of major wars Step to war

In­de­pen­dent variable

Dependent variable

Causal mechanism

Double security dilemma

Encirclement

(a) R ival-­based network of alliances (b) I ncreasingly aggressive foreign policy

The encircled ­great power tries to eliminate its two-­ front-­war prob­lem by (a) forming alliances (b) creating buffer zones.

War initiation

Invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers

Attack by the encircled ­great power against one of the surrounding ­great powers

The encircled ­g reat power attacks to prevent actualized encirclement by (a) concentration of forces (b) closure of the circle.

War contagion

Invasion ability of the immediate rival

Major war

­ reat powers intervene to G prevent an increase in the invasion ability of their immediate rival by (a) loss of great-­power ally (b) annexation of territory.

29

chapter 1

When the surrounding g ­ reat powers can increase their invasion ability by eliminating security threats that hindered them from concentrating their forces or by annexing territory along the borders of the encircled g ­ reat power, the latter launches a direct attack against one of the surrounding ­great powers as a mea­sure of last resort to prevent actualized encirclement. This change in the threat environment imminently undermines the survival of the encircled ­great power, which becomes willing to risk fighting a two-­ front war, as inaction would equal surrender. All the other g ­ reat powers in the region are dragged into this dyadic conflict as part of the rival-­based network of alliances, which emerged during the double security dilemma. The other ­great powers intervene to prevent an increase in the invasion ability of their immediate rival that could result by losing a great-­power ally or if the immediate rival annexes territory along its borders. The connection between the survival of all the members of each bloc means that an increase in the invasion ability of one ­great power threatens not only its immediate rival but also its allies. The encircled ­great power’s attack leads to the spread of the dyadic conflict to a major war among all the ­great powers in the region.

Alternative Explanations on War My theory on the origins of major wars explains endemic features of the international system, such as intense security competition and alliances, as well as dynamic outcomes such as war initiation and the intervention by other ­great powers in a dyadic conflict. To understand the theoretical contributions of this book, this section shows that alternative explanations are flawed or incomplete.43 G e ogra phy This study is indebted to the insights of seminal works of geopolitics, which stress the importance of geography in foreign-­policy decision making.44 As Nicholas Spykman noted, “Geography does not determine [policy], but it does condition. . . . ​Ministers come and go, even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand un­perturbed. . . . ​The nature of the territorial base has influenced [statesmen] in the past and w ­ ill continue to do so in the f­ uture.”45 The fundamental difference between encirclement theory and the classics of geopolitics is in how they account for change. In order not to elaborate deterministic theories that rely solely on geography, domestic variables are often introduced to explain variation in state be­hav­ior and international outcomes. I depart from unit-­level variables and instead elaborate a theory of foreign policy and international politics that shows the deep connection between geography and operational power shifts. 30

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

My emphasis on encirclement provides a novel explanation of the role of geography in international politics. Several International Relations (IR) scholars have analyzed the impact of territory on balancing dynamics and on the likelihood of war,46 but ­these works do not address the issue of major wars or they use geography as an intervening variable.47 The main exception is represented by the steps-­to-­war explanation, which analyzes all the dif­fer­ent stages that lead to major wars.48 Nevertheless, this area of research does not lay out a clear mechanism that distinguishes the dynamics of major wars from other great-­power wars and it fails to identify a common thread that ties the dif­fer­ent steps to war in a cohesive framework.49 Additionally, what accounts for change in the steps-­to-­war explanation seems to be domestic politics rather than geography. Specifically, the emergence of hardliners who adopt realpolitik foreign policy worsens existing territorial disputes and increases the likelihood of crisis escalation. S e curi ty D ilemma My explanation for the dynamics of the double security dilemma is clearly influenced by the intra-­realist debate on the nature of the security dilemma, but it moves beyond the dichotomy between raw power and military capabilities and it stresses the role of geography and of operational power shifts that alter the invasion ability of the immediate rival.50 The security dilemma holds that states that are satisfied with the status quo still compete with one another ­because of the structural constraints of the international system. In an anarchic, self-­help environment where (pre­sent and ­future) intentions cannot be known, “the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of o ­ thers.”51 Even if all states have survival as their primary goal and do not want to alter the status quo, security competition becomes inevitable and leads to a spiral of tension, arms buildup, and the recurrence of international crises that might escalate to war.52 Although structural realists generally agree on the competitive nature of the international system, they diverge on the amount of power that states pursue.53 Offensive realism suggests that the structural features of the international system make the security dilemma inescapable and compel states to exploit ­every opportunity to maximize their relative power.54 Moreover, John Mearsheimer argues that the presence of a power imbalance gives the most power­ful state in the system strong incentives to bid for regional hegemony. This power asymmetry exacerbates the security dilemma by altering the other states’ sense of fear and by leading to the formation of a counterhegemonic alliance.55 Defensive realists argue that states pursue “an appropriate amount of power.”56 Power maximization is self-­defeating b ­ ecause attempts to achieve hegemony trigger the formation of a counterbalancing co­ali­tion. Although they are in ­favor of the status quo, states engage in security competition and 31

chapter 1

even fight one another ­because of structural constraints. However, certain ­factors can ameliorate the security dilemma and foster cooperation among states. For instance, unit-­level variables (such as regime type, the presence of greedy states, or the ability to understand another state’s motive) can facilitate cooperation among states by increasing the transparency of their actions or by allowing them to signal their intentions.57 My approach diverges from the conclusions of both offensive and defensive realists. On the one hand, power is a necessary ­factor that can exacerbate the security dilemma, but it is not sufficient to explain variation in the level of competition when a potential hegemon is not pre­sent in the system. On the other hand, I concur that the operational ability of a state to launch an invasion is a key ­factor in accelerating the vicious spiral of insecurity and competition among states, but I call into question the explanatory validity of unit-­level variables.58 Geography explains the variation in intensity of the security dilemma: the encircled ­great power behaves more aggressively than ­others since it has to double its efforts to guarantee its survival. In turn, the defensively motivated mea­sures that the encircled ­great power adopts to eliminate its two-­front-­ war prob­lem trigger the reaction of the surrounding ­g reat powers who tighten their grip on the encircled ­great power. This response is not driven by domestic motives; it is the change of the international threat environment that compels the surrounding g ­ reat powers to react to protect themselves. ­After all, the encircled ­great power is their own immediate rival—­namely, the state that poses the greatest threat of invasion ­because of its geographic proximity and military capabilities. Therefore, the increase in the invasion ability of the surrounding g ­ reat powers is not caused by unit-­level variables but by the actions of the encircled g ­ reat power who, in turn, is compelled to act aggressively ­because of its geographic situation. Offense-­D efense Ba la n ce The offense-­defense balance theory argues that war is more likely when the offense has the advantage over the defense.59 If military technology ­favors the offense, conquest is relatively easy, and states have strong incentives to adopt expansionist policies such as arms races and the use of ­limited force. In a world where the military advantage of striking first increases, states are more likely to initiate preemptive and preventive wars. When the defense has the advantage, military adventurism is more likely to produce a stalemate. Since the costs of war increase in a defense-­dominant world, cooperation among states is less difficult. ­There are several empirical and theoretical puzzles that make the offense-­ defense balance theory problematic.60 First, scholars have pointed out that it is difficult not only to differentiate between offensive and defensive weapons (offense-­defense distinguishability) but also to determine w ­ hether certain mil32

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

itary technology clearly facilitates the offense over the defense. Second, leaders often failed to recognize the correct offense-­defense balance. Since offense dominance has been rare in history,61 it is puzzling why g ­ reat powers have competed so harshly and have become involved in several major wars. Fi­nally, the offense-­defense balance theory cannot explain war initiation. Although military technology leads to a variation of the balance, changes are not sufficiently dynamic. An advantage of the offense or the defense could explain the adoption of more aggressive policies but not the timing of war initiation. The offense-­defense balance theory is an unsatisfactory theory on the ­causes of war and peace. Scholars have mainly focused on the role of technology, but another ­factor that could alter the balance has not been sufficiently analyzed: geography. B ­ ecause of its precarious position, surrounded by g ­ reat powers, the encircled g ­ reat power lives in a world where the offense has the advantage. The unique geographic situation that encirclement engenders compels the encircled ­great power to adopt aggressive mea­sures that increase the tension with the surrounding g ­ reat powers. However, the correspondence between encirclement theory and the predictions of the offense-­defense balance theory stops ­there. It is incorrect to assume that a two-­front-­war prob­lem pushes the encircled g ­ reat power to set expansionist goals. Instead, the encircled ­great power tries to adopt other mea­sures short of war to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem (such as the creation of buffer zones) and it initiates war only as a mea­sure of last resort. T h e Ba rgai n in g Mo d el o f Wa r The bargaining model of war contributes to the debate on the ­causes of war and peace by addressing why states cannot reach a prewar settlement that is less costly than fighting. James Fearon identifies three main explanations for war: the informational prob­lem, the commitment prob­lem, and issue indivisibility.62 First, private information can lead to military conflicts b ­ ecause statesmen do not have the necessary knowledge to gauge other states’ capabilities, intentions, or resolve and they know that the adversary has an incentive to engage in misrepre­sen­ta­tion to gain an advantage and extract more prewar concessions. Second, a bargain is also difficult to reach when states have complete information ­because they cannot credibly reassure the opponent that they ­will not renege on an agreement. Fi­nally, disputes that involve issues that cannot be divided between the two adversaries cannot be solved with a prewar bargain. The first and third explanations for war provide impor­tant insights into the dynamics of war initiation.63 The informational prob­lem highlights why the encircled g ­ reat power and the surrounding g ­ reat powers fail to reach a prewar agreement. The known incentives to misrepresent can play a part in worsening the spiral dynamics of the double security dilemma. Moreover, the annexation of territories along the encircled ­great power’s borders (closure of the 33

chapter 1

circle) could be considered an example of issue indivisibility over tangible issues.64 Increases in the ability of the surrounding ­great powers to launch a simultaneous invasion pose such a threat to the encircled g ­ reat power’s survival that it is compelled to stand firm and to prevent ­these operational power shifts. Despite its contribution to IR lit­er­a­ture on the ­causes of war, the bargaining model is characterized by several puzzles that call into question its applicability in concrete case studies of major wars. First, since the informational prob­ lem is a constant in IR, it cannot explain a dynamic phenomenon like the outbreak of war. Second, the bargaining model does not explain the endemic competition among ­great powers or why the intensity of the security dilemma intensifies between immediate rivals. Third, the informational prob­lem cannot explain prolonged conflicts.65 Since bargaining failure is a suboptimal outcome due to the asymmetry of information between opponents, war should be short as it reveals the information that was miscalculated during the crisis. This criticism leads to the last and greatest shortcoming of the bargaining model. As Fearon acknowledges, most wars are over territorial issues.66 This implies that conflicts are often fought to guarantee survival. This is certainly true for issues that cause major wars over which it is impossible to reach a bargain b ­ ecause they undermine the survival of all g ­ reat powers in the region. States do not act irrationally, but they consider the costs of war to be less than t­ hose of an unacceptable peace. This is the exact prob­lem that the encircled ­great power and the surrounding ­great powers face. When one of the surrounding ­great powers increases its invasion ability, the value of peace becomes so low that both the encircled ­great power and the surrounding ­great power consider war to be less costly than making concessions to the immediate rival. But if the encircled ­great power remains passive, it ­will allow the surrounding ­great powers to significantly enhance their operational ability and to launch a simultaneous invasion. Since its survival is imminently threatened, it is even willing to risk a two-­front war, as inaction would be equivalent to surrender. Still, the surrounding g ­ reat powers are unwilling to offer reassuring concessions ­because this would hinder their ability to contain the encircled ­great power. Maintaining military pressure on two dif­fer­ent fronts allows them to keep the encircled g ­ reat power vulnerable and unable to conduct an active foreign policy, if not to launch an attack against one of them. Allia nces The lit­er­a­ture on alliances provides insights into both the dynamics of the double security dilemma and on war contagion. Structural realists disagree on who ­great powers balance against.67 On the one hand, balance-­of-­power scholars argue that ­great powers coalesce on the weaker side to prevent the most power­ful state in the system from becoming the hegemon.68 On the other hand, balance-­ of-­ threat theorists identify four variables (aggregate 34

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

power, offensive power, aggressive intentions, and geographic proximity) that alter threat perception and explain balancing dynamics.69 My logic for alliance formation departs from t­ hese scholars by suggesting that g ­ reat powers cooperate when they share an immediate rival. During the double security dilemma, the encircled ­great power seeks external assistance from ­those states that consider one of the surrounding ­great powers to be their own immediate rival. The surrounding ­great powers form alliances with states that oppose the encircled g ­ reat power or one of its allies. In short, this mechanism leads to the creation of a rival-­based system of alliances that puts immediate rivals in two opposite blocs. Only in presence of a state with clear power preponderance would I predict the formation of a counterhegemonic co­ali­tion, as the potential hegemon is considered the immediate rival by all the other ­great powers in the system due to its ability to dominate the entire region.70 Another relevant branch of lit­er­a­ture discusses the impact of alliances on war initiation and war diffusion. Scholars disagree on w ­ hether alliances deter or enable the outbreak of war and its escalation.71 I suggest that alliances play an essential role in the cascade of military interventions by all the ­great powers (war contagion) but only a marginal role in the decision of the encircled g ­ reat power to launch an attack (war initiation). T h eo ries o f Hegemo n i c Wa r ­These areas of research address only some of the steps on the path to major wars and they lack the connection that ties them together in an overarching framework. In the rest of this section, I analyze Mearsheimer’s offensive realism and Copeland’s dynamic differential theory. ­These theories of hegemonic war pose the greatest challenge to my argument ­because they claim that major wars are caused by the most power­ful state in the system’s attempt to ­either become or remain a hegemon.72 Nonetheless, I show that they are characterized by theoretical flaws and empirical puzzles that undermine their explanatory validity. Mearsheimer argues that in an anarchic self-­help international system, rational states that have offensive capabilities and cannot know each other’s pre­sent and ­future intentions try to maximize their relative power ­until they achieve regional hegemony as the best way to guarantee their primary goal of survival.73 The structure of the international system creates the conditions for this zero-­sum competition, but its constant features cannot account for variation in war and peace. Therefore, Mearsheimer introduces the number of g ­ reat powers and the distribution of power among them as the critical variables to explain the likelihood of major wars.74 ­These systemic conflicts are more likely to occur in un­balanced multipolarity, when the bid for hegemony by the most power­ful state (potential hegemon) triggers the formation of a counterbalancing co­ali­tion by the other ­great powers in the region. 35

chapter 1

Copeland theorizes the probability of major wars as the result of changes in relative power that ­will cause a ­future power transition between the most power­ful state in the system (declining hegemon) and the rising challenger.75 The existing hegemon adopts a variety of strategies short of war to prevent adverse power shifts, but when its decline becomes “deep and inevitable,” it launches a preventive attack against the rising challenger. In addition to the dynamic differentials, Copeland argues that the probability of major wars is affected by the polarity of the system. Bi­polar­ity is more unstable than multipolarity ­because the declining hegemon needs less power advantage to launch a successful attack against the rising challenger. The more the ­great powers in the system, the bigger the counterbalancing co­ali­tion that w ­ ill form against the declining hegemon. ­These two explanations share one impor­tant trait that diverges from my theory: they argue that major wars are caused by the most power­ful state’s attempts to take on the system. The main difference is in the timing of the attack. According to Mearsheimer, the bid for hegemony occurs when the most power­ful state is in ascendancy and the conditions are the most favorable to succeed. Copeland claims that a preventive war is launched as a mea­sure of last resort when the most power­ful state in the system is already in deep inevitable decline. Both authors expect the other g ­ reat powers to coalesce in a counterhegemonic balancing co­ali­tion against the most power­ful state in the system. I argue that offensive realism and dynamic differential theory are characterized by theoretical flaws and empirical puzzles. First, Mearsheimer and Copeland cannot account for major wars that occur in the absence of a (potential or declining) hegemon. Based on conventional wisdom on periods of power preponderance and on the accepted classification of major wars, five of the ten major wars since 1494 occurred in absence of a (potential or declining) hegemon: the Thirty Years’ War, the Franco-­Dutch War, the War of the Austrian Succession, the Seven Years’ War, and the French Revolutionary Wars.76 As John Vasquez points out, “Few wars are fought purely to gain power and/or hegemony . . . ​, and only about half of the time do power transitions or other shifts in capability end in war. Conversely, most of the interstate wars that are fought are between neighbors.”77 I also challenge Mearsheimer’s and Copeland’s claims that major wars are the result of attempts by the most power­ful state in the region to e­ither achieve or preserve hegemony. With the singular exception of World War II, the encircled ­great power attacked one of the surrounding ­great powers as a mea­sure of last resort for the ­limited aim of preventing them from gaining the capability to launch a two-­front war.78 This logic was pre­sent in three out of the five cases when a near-­preponderant state was pre­sent: the Nine Years’ War, the War of the Spanish Succession, and World War I. In another major war (Italian Wars), the most power­ful state in Eu­rope (the United Hapsburg ­under Charles V) did not initiate war, but rather, it was attacked by the en36

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

circled militarily inferior ­great power (France). In sum, I suggest that theories of hegemonic war cannot predict 50  ­percent of major wars since 1494 and they fail to provide a compelling explanation in another 40  ­percent of the cases. Second, offensive realism and dynamic differential theory fail to explain why periods that ­were characterized by imbalances of power in the system or by large and rapid power shifts did not lead to the outbreak of major wars. Britain’s decisions not to bid for hegemony in the first half of the nineteenth ­century and not to launch a preventive war against imperial Germany at the turn of the twentieth ­century are two major empirical puzzles for Mearsheimer’s and Copeland’s theory, respectively. Third, I argue that both theories miss a step in their comprehensive explanation for the outbreak of major wars. Offensive realism does not provide clear observable predictions on the timing of war initiation. The number of g ­ reat powers and the presence of a power imbalance can explain the intensification of the security dilemma and war propensity of the system, but ­these static variables fail to predict when a ­great power bids for hegemony. In addition to accounting for the dynamics of security competition between immediate rivals during the double security dilemma, encirclement theory establishes a clear threshold for escalation: changes in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers. Copeland identifies a clear mechanism for the timing of war initiation; yet, preventive motivation is a necessary but insufficient condition for the outbreak of major wars.79 Why should a declining hegemon risk being attacked in the ­future if the rising challenger surpasses it? U ­ nless the declining hegemon can reach its status only through hegemonic war, why can transition not be peaceful? And if a preventive attack by the declining hegemon is inevitable, why would a rational challenger rise? Why is it dissatisfied? What are the costs of remaining number two? Do they outweigh the risks of a preventive war? In the end, dynamic differentials can only be an intervening variable, but they cannot account for the intense security competition that leads to war.80 Copeland’s main variable is also insufficient to explain the outbreak of major wars without resorting to necessary, yet undertheorized, unit-­level ­factors: “One may still won­der if the theory ultimately needs unit-­level drives for major war, such as greed, glory-­seeking, or ideological hostility, to be workable. The short answer is yes. The possibility of such drives arising in the ­future is a necessary condition for the theory’s causal argument.”81 Additionally, Copeland identifies the internal development of states as the reason for deep and inevitable decline; however, ­these power shifts are rarely large and rapid enough to explain the sense of urgency of the attacker.82 If war is launched as a mea­sure of last resort, as we both agree, the reason for war initiation is not the perception of adverse power shifts in the ­future but the imminent threat that an operational increase in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers poses to the survival of the encircled ­great power. 37

chapter 1

­Table 1.5 ​Main competing theories Author

Security competition

War initiation

War contagion

Mearsheimer

­Great powers maximize their relative power to achieve regional hegemony

Bid for hegemony by most power­f ul state in the region (undertheorized)

Counterhegemonic alliance

Copeland

The declining hegemon tries to stop the rise of a challenger (undertheorized)

“Deep and inevitable” power shift between the declining hegemon and the rising challenger

Counterhegemonic alliance

Encirclement theory

The encircled ­great power tries to eliminate its two-­ front-­war prob­lem (latent encirclement)

Preventing an increase in the invasion ability of the surrounding g ­ reat powers (actualized encirclement)

Rival-­based network of alliances

Fourth, both Mearsheimer and Copeland predict the formation of counterhegemonic alliances to thwart the attempt of the most power­ful state in the system to pursue or preserve hegemony. However, alliances are not always characterized by the modality “one versus the rest.” The recurrent formation of two opposite blocs in modern history shows that the motivation of states in forming an alliance is not merely to stop the rise of the most power­ful state in the system but to ­counter their own immediate rival. In the end, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism and Copeland’s dynamic differential theory provide an impor­tant contribution to explaining the origins of major wars, but they are at best incomplete. In addition to failing to account for major wars that ­were not initiated by the most power­ful state in the system, Mearsheimer cannot make clear predictions on when major wars ­will break out, and Copeland’s gradual power shifts are not dynamic enough to explain the imminent decision to escalate an international crisis. As Mearsheimer points out, the fundamental flaw of structural theories is of being “not capable of explaining precisely how often war ­will occur. . . . ​Nor are they capable of predicting exactly when wars ­will occur.”83 In ­table 1.5, I compare the logic of encirclement theory with Mearsheimer’s offensive realism and Copeland’s dynamic differential theory for each step that leads to the outbreak of major wars in modern history.

Research Agenda To assess my argument, I adopt a qualitative approach that combines archival work with historiography. Given that my theory analyzes not only the 38

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

immediate ­causes for the outbreak of hostilities among g ­ reat powers but also the most relevant foreign-­policy decisions that are caused by encirclement, I employ pro­cess tracing to make within-­case inferences about the causal mechanism of my theory. I limit the assessment of my argument to cases of encirclement of ­great powers. This does not mean that minor powers never face a two-­front-­war prob­lem, but even if they do, their attempts to escape the deadly embrace do not lead to the outbreak of major wars that, by definition, involve all the ­great powers in the region. Moreover, the logic of war conduct and war termination is outside the scope of my theory, which focuses only on the ­causes of major wars. Fi­nally, I begin the treatment of this study in 1494 ­because it is usually considered to be the origin point of the modern great-­power system and ­because the main alternative explanations of this study limit their analy­ sis to the post-1494 period due to the scarcity of primary sources.84 C a se Se­lecti o n My argument is evaluated in the unfolding of three major wars in modern history: the Italian Wars, the Thirty Years’ War, and World War  I.85 ­There are four main reasons for the se­lection of ­these three cases. First, many IR scholars and historians consider ­these three major wars to support alternative explanations, in par­tic­u­lar theories of hegemonic war. Both Mearsheimer and Copeland regard World War I as an illustrative example of their arguments, claiming that it was caused by Germany’s attempt to pursue or preserve its hegemony in Eu­rope, respectively. Another period in history that was characterized by a clear imbalance of power in Eu­rope occurred during the Italian Wars (the United Hapsburg u ­ nder Charles V, 1526–1530); yet, this major war was initiated by a less power­ful state (France, the encircled g ­ reat power). Conventional wisdom regards the Thirty Years’ War as the last of the Eu­ro­pean religious wars, an explanation that should undermine my claim that it was fought based on realist considerations. Second, I select three major wars in historical periods that w ­ ere characterized by variation in the number of g ­ reat powers and in the distribution of power among them to show that neither polarity nor the presence of a power imbalance in the system can explain the outbreak of major wars. Third, t­ hese three major wars are characterized by dif­fer­ent types of latent encirclement. World War I is a case of two surrounding ­great powers (France and Rus­sia) sharing the border of the encircled ­great power (Germany). In the Thirty Years’ War, one surrounding ­great power (Spain) encircled France in the south and in the north (the Iberian Peninsula and the Spanish Netherlands, respectively). In the years that led to the outbreak of the Italian Wars, France (encircled ­great power) initially faced two surrounding ­great powers (Spain and Austria) that became united ­under the reign of Charles V since 1519. 39

chapter 1

Fi­nally, I explore the logic of war initiation by selecting major wars that are characterized by within-­case variation in the second step of my theory. The analy­sis of the Italian Wars shows a mechanism of actualized encirclement (closure of the circle) that is dif­fer­ent from the Thirty Years’ War and World War I (concentration of forces). Moreover, I assess my theory on cases of failed escalation and explain why encircled ­great powers initiated an attack against one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers only when actualized encirclement is imminent. For instance, the analy­sis of World War I ­will account for Germany’s decision not to attack France during the Russo-­ Japanese War (1904–1905) or to escalate the First Balkan War (1912–1913). My empirical strategy in each case study is divided into four main parts. First, I outline the situation of encirclement and I identify the encircled ­great power, the surrounding ­great powers, and other ­great powers in the region. Second, I evaluate the key strategies and events that characterized the double security dilemma. Third, I assess the changes in the invasion ability of the surrounding g ­ reat powers and I show how the materialization of actualized encirclement compels the encircled ­great power to launch an attack against one of the surrounding ­great powers. Fi­nally, I explore the dynamics of war contagion by analyzing the decision of the other ­great powers to form alliances with ­either the encircled ­great power or the surrounding ­great powers and by exploring the motivation for their intervention ­after the encircled ­great power’s attack. My theory is falsified if evidence shows any of the following outcomes. First, a major war occurs in the absence of an encircled g ­ reat power. Second, the dyadic conflict between the encircled g ­ reat power and one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers is initiated without the materialization of actualized encirclement. Third, the encircled ­great power motivates war initiation with the absolute goal of dominating the system rather than the l­ imited aim of eliminating its two-­front-­war prob­lem. Fourth, the other g ­ reat powers willingly decide to stay on the sidelines a­ fter war initiation. Fi­nally, leaders’ decisions do not align with the rational action assumption or are driven by nonrealist variables such as ideology.

Conclusion This chapter offers a new explanation on the origins of major wars that stresses the fundamental importance of encirclement and the intervening ­factor of the immediate rival’s invasion ability. ­After defining the key variables of my research, I explored how major wars unfold in a three-­step pro­ cess. Latent encirclement triggers the double security dilemma for the encircled g ­ reat power, who tries to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem by creating buffer zones and seeking alliances. Its attempts to eliminate latent encirclement compel the surrounding g ­ reat powers to react by adopting sim40

A Theory of Encirclement and Major War

ilar countermea­sures that, in turn, lead to an increased sense of vulnerability by the encircled ­g reat power. When the surrounding ­g reat powers increase their invasion ability by ­either eliminating all security threats that prevented them from concentrating their forces or by annexing territory along the borders of the encircled ­great power, the encircled ­great power initiates war against one of the surrounding ­great powers. This attack drags all the other ­great powers into the dyadic conflict to prevent changes in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival. In the end, encirclement is the common thread that ties the three steps on the path to major war. The next chapter assesses the explanatory validity of encirclement theory in the Italian Wars.

41

chapter 2

France and the Italian Wars

The Italian Wars ­were a series of military conflicts that involved all major Eu­ro­pean powers between 1521 and 1559. The distribution of power was characterized by France, Spain, Austria, ­England, and the Ottoman Empire.1 France (the encircled g ­ reat power) faced a potential two-­front war by Austria and Spain (the surrounding ­great powers). In addition to the Spanish threat from the south, the archduke of Austria and f­ uture Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I conquered the Low Countries in 1482. When Charles V united the Spanish and Austrian possessions of the House of Hapsburg as a unified empire in 1519, France faced a two-­front-­ war prob­lem by one single surrounding ­great power (the United Hapsburg). The other g ­ reat powers became involved in the French attempts to eliminate its encirclement through the rival-­based pattern of alliances: besides the formation of a counterhegemonic co­ali­tion against Charles V between 1526 and 1530, E ­ ngland sided with the United Hapsburg against France and the Ottoman Empire. The disagreement that led to the outbreak of the Italian Wars concerned the control of the Duchy of Milan: if the surrounding g ­ reat powers had annexed it, they would have completed the encirclement of France around its borders with Hapsburg possessions from the North Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. To prevent actualized encirclement, France tried to control the Duchy of Milan and make it a buffer zone that would break the main line of communications between the Spanish kingdom and the Austrian Empire. This goal was temporarily achieved with the French victory at the ­Battle of Marignano (1515), but the election of Charles as Holy Roman Emperor undermined the French position in northern Italy. When Charles V started to prepare the annexation of the Duchy of Milan, France initiated a series of attacks to prevent the United Hapsburg from increasing their invasion ability by “closing the circle.” The major war was characterized by pauses in hostilities ­because of war fatigue by France and the Hapsburg, but each instance of war initiation was caused by French attempts to prevent Charles V from controlling the duchy. 42

France and the Italian Wars

The other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers w ­ ere dragged into each of t­hese several dyadic conflicts to ­counter their own immediate rival. The Ottoman Empire intervened on the side of France to prevent the empire’s immediate rival (the United Hapsburg) from defeating France’s only great-­power ally. ­England sided with Charles V to ­counter ­England’s historical rival (France) and to guarantee that France would not expand its control in the Spanish Netherlands and, undisturbed, launch an invasion of ­England. The only exception in the En­glish alliance be­hav­ior occurred between 1526 and 1530, when it joined France and the Ottoman Empire ­because the United Hapsburg emerged as a potential hegemon in Eu­rope. Evaluating the outbreak of the Italian Wars allows me to emphasize essential components of encirclement theory. First, it shows how the encircled ­great power (France) tried to escape the deadly embrace of the two surrounding g ­ reat powers (Spain and Austria) by resorting to one main strategy: the creation of a buffer zone in northern Italy that would prevent the concentration of Spanish and Austrian forces. Second, the analy­sis of the Italian Wars shows how its initiation was caused by French attempts to prevent actualized encirclement by Charles V through the annexation of territory along French borders (a case of closure of the circle). Additionally, the g ­ reat within-­ case variation of the Italian Wars, a major war that included several intermittent military conflicts, allows me to assess the dynamics of war initiation in multiple outbreaks of hostilities between France and the United Hapsburg (1521–1526, 1526–1530, 1536–1538, 1542–1546, 1551–1559). Fi­nally, the variation in alliance blocs throughout the Italian Wars allows me to underscore that the logic b ­ ehind external balancing was not the concerted efforts of Eu­ro­ pean g ­ reat powers to stop a hegemonic bid by Charles V but rather the concerns about the increase in invasion ability of their own immediate rival. The analy­sis of this case study is impor­tant to validate the explanatory power of my theory in comparison with existing explanations for major wars. Conventional wisdom identifies the origins of the Italian Wars as ­either a Hapsburg bid for universal monarchy or a French attempt to stop its inevitable decline. ­There is ample evidence that the outbreak of the major war was not caused by attempts on the part of the most power­ful state to “take on the system.” Quite the contrary, the weaker g ­ reat power (France) initiated the Italian Wars, a main puzzle for both John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism and Dale Copeland’s dynamic differential theory. Fi­nally, the analy­ sis of this major war undermines the importance of the polarity of the system as a ­factor that can account for the outbreak of war. Encirclement was the constant in all the instances of war initiation, while the number of ­great powers and the distribution of power among them varied. The findings of this chapter have impor­tant implications for the characteristics of ­future major wars. The fact that major wars can be launched by weaker ­great powers that face a two-­front-­war prob­lem dims the prospects for peace in Asia. Even if China’s economic growth comes to a halt and the 43

chapter 2

country does not become a potential hegemon, it ­will still initiate an attack against one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers (India and Rus­sia) to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem. Major war in Asia could be a real possibility if China becomes encircled, regardless of the distribution of power in the region. I investigate my claims using a combination of archival research and historiographic work. Primary sources provide insights into the decision-­ making pro­cess of Francis I of France, of Charles V and his close circle of advisers, and of Henry VIII of ­England. T ­ hese documents consist of internal deliberations, communications with foreign leaders and diplomats, and rulers’ private accounts. I also utilize primary rec­ords of diplomats of other Eu­ro­pean actors that ­were directly involved in the conflict, even though they ­were not ­great powers, such as Venice, the Duchy of Lombardy, and the Papal States. This analy­sis allows me to assess the dynamics of the double security dilemma, the outbreak of the distinct phases of the Italian Wars, and the logic of contagion. To enrich the analy­sis, I also draw on historiographic accounts of the war, paying par­tic­u­lar attention to historians who had access to Eu­ro­pean decision makers at the time of the conflict. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. A ­ fter giving a historical background on how the encirclement of France emerged, I assess the dynamics of the double security dilemma. Then I explore the dif­fer­ent instances of war initiation by France between 1521 and 1559. I conclude the account of the Italian Wars by explaining the logic of intervention by E ­ ngland and the Ottoman Empire. A ­ fter providing empirical support for my theory, I assess its explanatory validity in comparison with alternative explanations.

Overview In the fifteenth ­century, the House of Valois emerged from the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453) as the legitimate dynastic ruler of France. The victory over E ­ ngland extended French control over the Duchies of Brittany and Normandy; the conquest of Picardy and the Duchy of Burgundy (Burgundian Wars, 1474–1477) made France a power­ful Eu­ro­pean monarchy. ­These victories guaranteed the internal consolidation of power, but they did not lead to external security as French control along its northern and eastern frontiers was threatened by the presence of Austria. At the death of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, his d ­ aughter Mary inherited only parts of the Burgundian territories to France. To recover the rest of the Duchy of Burgundy from France, Mary married Maximilian I, the Archduke of Austria and ­future Holy Roman Emperor.2 Louis XI of France responded with the War of the Burgundian Succession (1477–1482), which concluded with the Hapsburg recognition of the French annexation of the entire Duchy of Burgundy in return for France’s ac­ cep­ tance of Maximilian’s control of the 44

France and the Italian Wars

County of Flanders (Treaty of Arras, December  1482). In short, Hapsburg control of the Low Countries created the possibility of a simultaneous war by Austria and Spain against France.3 Historians usually regard the Italian Wars as a power strug­gle between the House of Valois in France and the House of Hapsburg in Austria and Spain.4 The role of encirclement in this conflict has never been fully theorized, but it is often mentioned as a fundamental f­actor to explain the aggressive French strategy in Italy between 1494 and 1519 and Francis I’s decision to initiate a series of attacks against Charles V ­after his election as Holy Roman Emperor.5 As Paul Kennedy notes, “To the Valois kings of France, fresh from consolidating their own authority internally and ­eager to expand into the rich Italian Peninsula, Charles V’s possessions seemed to encircle the French state—­and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the chief aim of the French in Eu­rope over the next two centuries would be to break the influence of the Habsburgs.”6 Scholars sometimes identify the beginning of the Italian Wars with the French invasion of Italy in 1494. The period before the outbreak of hostilities between France and the United Habsburg, however, was characterized by proxy wars and by l­ imited use of force that did not escalate to the other Eu­ro­ pean ­great powers. Therefore, initiation of this major war occurred only in 1521. This case study has been almost completely ignored by IR scholars. A notable exception is Copeland, who claims that its origins lie in the attempt of France (the declining hegemon) to stop its inevitable decline by preventing the ascent of Charles V (rising challenger) as ruler of the United Hapsburg.7 In spite of his ­limited analy­sis of this conflict, Copeland still identifies the true cause of the Italian Wars: the encirclement of France. Commenting on the possibility that the son of Maximilian of Austria could marry the ­daughter of Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon, he states, “For the French, this was a somber warning, for upon the death of Ferdinand and Maximilian, Philip would rule a united empire that would include not only Spain and Austria, but the Spanish Netherlands and Burgundy on France’s eastern front. France would be effectively encircled.”8 Before analyzing of the origins of the Italian Wars, I would like to clarify the observable implications of my argument for this case study (­table 2.1). First, my theory predicts that France would try to eliminate its two-­front-­ war prob­lem with mea­sures that would avoid all-­out war with the surrounding g ­ reat powers. During the double security dilemma, I expect French rulers to seek alliances with states that considered ­either Spain or Austria as their own immediate rival and to resort to more aggressive strategies, such as ­limited war, for establishing a buffer zone that would protect its borders against a simultaneous invasion. Second, my argument predicts that an encircled ­great power launches an attack against one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers as a mea­sure of last resort to prevent an increase in their invasion ability. In this case study, France 45

chapter 2

­Table 2.1 ​The three-­step logic of the Italian Wars Steps to war

In­de­pen­dent variable

Dependent variable

Causal logic

Double security dilemma

The encirclement of France by Spain and Austria

French invasions of Italy (1482–1520)

France tries to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem by controlling the Duchy of Milan, a buffer zone that separates Austria and Spain from uniting their forces.

War initiation

Increase in the invasion ability of the United Hapsburg

French attacks against Charles V (1521, 1526, 1536, 1542, 1551)

France attacks Charles V to prevent actualized encirclement by the Hapsburg annexation of the Duchy of Milan: closure of the circle.

War contagion

Increases in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival

Major war (1521–1559)

­ reat powers intervened G to prevent increase in the invasion ability of their immediate rival: Ottoman Empire → loss of great-­power ally ­England → annexation of territory

should initiate war to stop Charles V from annexing additional territory along French borders: a case of actualized encirclement by closure of the circle. Fi­nally, the dynamics of military intervention by the other ­great powers must be driven by a concern about an increase in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival. This does not deny that a counterhegemonic alliance could be formed, but in order for my theory to work, this occurrence must follow the emergence of a potential hegemon in Eu­rope that, b ­ ecause of its preponderance of power, becomes the common immediate rival for all the other ­great powers in the region.

Step 1: Double Security Dilemma The double security dilemma that characterized the period between 1482 and 1521 was full of tension, crises, and l­imited conflicts in which France had to face the brunt of all the other ­great powers. The threat that the two surrounding g ­ reat powers (Austria and Spain) posed along its borders could not be alleviated by seeking support of the other ­g reat power (­England) ­because of the continuous rivalry that characterized the relations between France and ­England ­after the end of the Hundred Years’ War.9 Although France formed alliances of con­ve­nience with other minor powers that considered one of the surrounding ­great powers their own imme46

France and the Italian Wars

diate rival, the main strategy to prevent Austria and Spain from concentrating their forces in a simultaneous two-­front war (actualized encirclement) was to extend French territorial control over northern Italy. In par­tic­u­lar, control of the Duchy of Milan was strategically crucial b ­ ecause it connected the Austrian possessions of Tyrol in northern Italy with the port of Genoa (the main sea connection to Spain) and the Kingdom of Naples, which was u ­ nder Spanish control.10 In the end, creating a buffer zone in northern Italy and specifically in the Duchy of Milan was the main strategy that French kings ­adopted from the end of the War of Burgundian Succession ­until the conclusion of the Italian Wars.11 French attempts to control the Duchy of Milan threatened the survival of Austria and Spain. Had France successfully created a wedge between them, it would have been able to increase its possessions close to the Austrian border and to create the conditions necessary to extend its control over the Italian Peninsula, thereby threatening the Kingdom of Naples. A ­ fter preventing its surrounding g ­ reat powers from concentrating their forces, France could use ­these territorial annexations (an increase in its invasion ability) to launch a direct military attack against ­either Spain or Austria. To guarantee their survival, the most effective strategy was to keep France encircled: the threat of a two-­front war would have restrained French foreign policy in northern Italy. This goal led to the formation of alliances between the two surrounding ­great powers and ­England in order to thwart any French invasion of Italy. It also led Spain and Austria to indirectly support ­those Italian states that risked being subjugated by French ambitions. The first example of the growing tension and of the burgeoning rivalry between France and the other Eu­ro­pean ­great powers can be seen in the French-­ Breton War (1487–1491), a military conflict that was initiated by France to crush the claim of in­de­pen­dence by the Duchy of Brittany.12 Spain, Austria, and ­England provided external assistance to the rebellious Duke Francis II to undermine France domestically, to weaken it internationally, and to take advantage of the Breton rebellion to make territorial gains over historical disputes.13 In response to the French repression of the Breton strug­gle for in­de­pen­dence, Spain and E ­ ngland formed an alliance of mutual assistance in case of war against France. The Spanish monarchs even pressed Henry VII of ­England to plan an invasion to restore the territories lost throughout the fifteenth ­century: ­ fter the conclusion of the alliances, the King of E A ­ ngland ­shall bind himself to make war upon the King of France ­every time and whenever Spain is at war with France, and whenever he is requested to do so; also, he ­shall not be at liberty to make peace or alliance with France, or any truce, without out express consent, except the King of France do ­really give back to the King of ­England the Duchies of Guienne and Normandy. In that case the said King of E ­ ngland is at liberty to conclude peace and alliance with the King of 47

chapter 2

France. In the same way we bind ourselves to make war on the on the said King of France ­every time and whenever the said King of ­England is at war with France, and we are requested by him to do so, and ­will make no peace or alliance with the King of France, or assent to any truce, without his (King of E ­ ngland) consent, except the said King of France give back to us our counties of Roussillon and Cerdaña, in which case we s­ hall be at liberty to conclude peace and alliance with France.14

The threat to France from this hostile co­ali­tion was serious, but the victory over the Breton rebellion defused the crisis. Charles VIII of France de­ cided to resolve the disputes with the other g ­ reat powers in a series of treaties: the Peace of Étaples with E ­ ngland (December 13, 1492), by which Henry VII recognized the French control of the Duchy of Brittany in exchange for France ceasing support of Perkin Warbeck, pretender to the En­ glish throne; the Treaty of Barcelona (January 19, 1493), which entailed the restitution of the counties of Roussillon and Cerdaña to Spain in return for Spain’s sworn neutrality with regard to any f­ uture French invasion of Italy; and the Treaty of Senlis with Austria (May 23, 1493), with which Maximilian of Austria regained the County of Burgundy and Arras in exchange for the renunciation of the Duchies of Burgundy and Picardy.15 F r ench In vasi o n s o f I ta ly Having stabilized its frontiers, Charles VIII planned an intervention in Italy that could create a buffer zone between Spain and Austria so that ­these states would not be able to unite their forces and, with external support of ­England, launch a simultaneous attack against France. Between 1494 and 1516, Charles VIII, Louis XII, and Francis I implemented this plan through a series of invasions of Italian states, which led to proxy wars with Austria and Spain and risked escalation to a Eu­ro­pean war.16 The dispute over the dynastic claim of the Duchy of Milan between Ludovico Sforza and his challenger, Alfonso II of Naples, created the conditions for the French intervention in northern Italy.17 Responding to Sforza’s request for support, Charles VIII launched an invasion and moved down the Italian Peninsula to threaten the Kingdom of Naples, which was ­under Spanish control. French control of parts of the Italian Peninsula threatened to cut cooperation between Spain and Austria ­because, as Maximilian I noted, “once the king of France has gained Naples, he ­will want to occupy the other states of Italy.”18 However, the Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers ­were reluctant to escalate the crisis; thus, they ­limited their response accordingly. First, Spain and Austria strengthened their dynastic ties by proposing the marriage between Maximilian’s heir, Philip the Handsome, and Ferdinand’s d ­ aughter Joanna the Mad, a ­union that would have impor­tant implications for Eu­rope, given that 48

France and the Italian Wars

their son would become Charles V. Second, the two countries mobilized an anti-­French co­ali­tion that guaranteed the in­de­pen­dence of the Italian states from unprovoked aggression (League of Venice, August 1454). Response to the French advances eliminated the territorial acquisitions of Charles VIII, who died and left the French monarchy to Louis XII. Continuing the policy of his pre­de­ces­sor, the new French king tried to safeguard the eastern border from an Austrian attack on the Duchy of Burgundy, while securing En­glish complacency by renewing the Peace of Étaples. Furthermore, he received Venetian support for an invasion of Lombardy. In 1499, ­under the pretext of dynastic claims, Louis XII ousted Sforza and temporarily secured French control of the Duchy of Milan. Maximilian I was alarmed that France would use its presence in Italy to “expel the Spanish from Calabria and Apulia and then invade Spain from Roussillon, [and] to join the Pope and determine with him the pending controversies regarding the Italian dominions, which belong to me and the Empire.” This would result in “dividing together the rest of the Peninsula and also the Kingdom of Naples, the succession of which is entitled to us.”19 Such an outcome would undermine the Spanish presence in Italy and, in turn, make Spain more vulnerable to a French attack through the Pyrenees. To guarantee its survival, the Spanish monarchy even considered launching a joint attack with E ­ ngland against their common ­enemy in order to compel France to desist from any ­future invasion of Italy: We have learned that the King of France continues to prepare his enterprise at Milan and Florence, which is near to [Naples], and has gathered together large bodies of troops at Genoa, with the intention to send them to Naples, and that he has already made war upon us ­t here. . . . ​Should the King of France, therefore, gain the Kingdom, which God forbid, he would be sole monarch of all Italy; and if Italy w ­ ere to be joined to France, it is easy to see the peril in which all other Princes would be placed. . . . ​Now this enterprise of the King of France cannot be hindered except by putting him u ­ nder the necessity of defending his kingdom of France. This, to be of any use, cannot, as you know, be done by means of one King only. But if we and the King of ­England ­were to join together to make a descent upon France, each one with all his forces, . . . ​the King of France would be obliged to quit Italy, in order to come to the defence of his own kingdom.20

Facing the possibility of a mutual invasion by Spain and E ­ ngland, with the likely support of Maximilian I, Louis XII backed down and ended his military campaign. The second French invasion of Italy concluded with the Treaty of Lyon (January 31, 1504), which stipulated that the French king renounced his dynastic claim over Naples in exchange for Spanish recognition of French control over the Duchy of Milan.21 This peace proved to be a truce rather than a lasting agreement among Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers. France renewed its efforts to extend its control over 49

chapter 2

the Kingdom of Naples in order to fortify its position in northern Italy and to cut the connection between Spain and southern Italy. The growing ambition of Louis XII of France over the Kingdom of Naples triggered a reaction by the surrounding ­great powers that, like previous crises, tried to contain any further French expansion rather than escalating the crisis in the Italian Peninsula. Austria and Spain renewed their strategy of acting as guarantor of the in­de­pen­dence of Italian states (Holy League, 1511–1513). They provided financial support to ­those Italian states that ­were resisting the invasion of France and they even intervened in proxy wars such as the local conflict between Pisa and Florence.22 The tightening of the encirclement by the surrounding ­great powers explains why France tried to find a way out in northern Italy and why it eventually failed. Both Charles VIII and Louis XII attempted to exploit the internecine rivalries among Italian states to extend French control over the Duchy of Milan, but France was incapable of maintaining protracted control ­because it needed to maintain most of its troops along its borders to ­counter a potential invasion by Spain and Austria with pos­si­ble support from ­England. In 1512, the Duchy of Milan was fi­nally taken by Swiss forces with support from Maximilian I.23 This temporary loss did not make France desist. Obtaining control of northern Italy was paramount to prevent Austria and Spain from concentrating their forces and launching a two-­front war. The plan of invasion that the surrounding ­g reat powers envisaged, although never implemented, ­limited French military ability. At the same time, it increased the strategic importance of controlling the Duchy of Milan. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the first action of Francis I was to orchestrate a plan to regain control of this vital territory. The new French king prepared the ground diplomatically and militarily with both Eu­ro­pean powers and the Italian states. First, Francis I reduced the threat on the eastern border by signing a treaty with Charles (Treaty of Paris, March 1515), who at the time ruled the Low Countries: Francis I would end his support of the Duke of Guelders’s rebellion in exchange for Charles’s recognition of French control of the Duchy of Brittany and his promise not to attack the Low Countries or to assist aggressors.24 Second, the French king renewed alliance with Venice and Genoa, which “­were pressed by Ferdinand and by [Pope] Leo to make concessions to Maximilian, to f­ree him to be able to concentrate his efforts against France.”25 Taking advantage of the favorable situation, Francis I won the decisive ­Battle of Marignano (September 14–15, 1515) and occupied Milan and the adjacent republic of Genoa.26 The third French attempt to extend its control over northern Italy was successful. Both Charles, who had inherited the Spanish throne in 1516, and Maximilian I of Austria recognized Francis I’s claims over Milan in exchange for his official renunciation of his ambitions over the Kingdom of Naples (Treaty of Noyon, August 1516 and Treaty of Brussels, December 1516). How50

France and the Italian Wars

ever, this military and diplomatic victory would not last long. Maximilian became increasingly worried that the Treaty of Noyon would endanger his possessions in northern Italy: “ceding Verona . . . ​who could hinder the Venetians to invade Tyrol, and who the French to attack Naples?”27 Most importantly, the French victory at Marignano pushed Maximilian I to secure his son Charles as his successor to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire. The death of Maximilian I (January 1519) would change the po­liti­cal landscape of Eu­rope for de­cades and lead to the outbreak of the Italian Wars (1521–1559). In sum, the double security dilemma that characterized the relations between France and its surrounding g ­ reat powers revolved around the control of northern Italy. French kings tried to annex the Duchy of Milan to sever ties between Austria and Spain, which saw this mea­sure as a policy of divide and conquer. Despite the incompatibility of their strategic goals, major war did not ensue. On the one hand, France was not willing to escalate crises with the surrounding ­great powers as they ­were still incapable of concentrating their forces or to extend their direct control over northern Italy, one of two possibilities of actualized encirclement. On the other hand, Spain and Austria ­were capable of containing France by tightening their grip with the threat of a potential attack on two fronts and by supporting the Italian states in resisting French invasion. Nonetheless, the French reiterated attempts to escape its deadly embrace by controlling the Duchy of Milan “sowed the seeds of ­those wars that, in a period of roughly 36 years, would extinguish the last remainder of [Italian] in­de­pen­dence” and provoke a major war that extended to the Eu­ro­pean system.28

Step 2: War Initiation The intense security competition between France and the surrounding ­great powers escalated to war a­ fter Charles V succeeded Maximilian I as Holy Roman Emperor and attempted to control the Duchy of Milan. This annexation would have increased the invasion ability of the United Hapsburg by creating a new gateway to invade France, which would have been surrounded by Hapsburg possessions along all of its borders (actualized encirclement). The emergence of the United Hapsburg increased the pressure on Francis I to strengthen French control in northern Italy and to cut the line of communications of Charles V’s territories. However, France’s attempts to escape its encirclement increased Hapsburg concerns about the stability of the Habsburg Empire and the importance of preventing French presence in the Italian Peninsula. “The possession of Milan was the essential issue for both of them. For Francis it meant escape from encirclement and the door to Italy and Naples; for Charles it was at once the preservation of an Imperial fief 51

chapter 2

and the maintenance of a line of communication between Spain, via Genoa, and Germany.”29 Therefore, Francis I de­cided to initiate war to prevent Charles V from controlling the Duchy of Milan and completing the encirclement of France—­a case of closure of the circle. It is impor­tant to emphasize that the election of Charles as Holy Roman Emperor was not the catalyst of the war. Had this been the reason for escalation, Francis I would have launched an attack in 1519. The creation of the United Hapsburg certainly created a sense of urgency in France, but it did not lead to increase in its invasion ability. On the one hand, Charles V combined the Spanish and Austrian possessions, but he did not show intent in annexing new territories ­until 1521. On the other hand, the United Hapsburg was never capable of concentrating its forces against France ­because of internal dissent (the revolt of the comuneros in Spain, the Dutch rebellion in the Low Countries, and the Protestant uprising in the Holy Roman Empire) and for the constant Ottoman threat on its eastern border. Although the Italian Wars (1521–1559) are historically treated as a single major war, they are characterized by a series of military conflicts that involved all the Eu­ro­pean ­great powers (1521–1526, 1526–1530, 1536–1538, 1542– 1546, 1551–1559). Fighting was interrupted ­because of war fatigue, but France initiated attacks e­ very time Charles V attempted to extend his control over the Duchy of Milan. ­After assessing the importance of the election of the Holy Roman Emperor, I analyze the dynamics of war initiation observable in each one of ­these instances and show that France escalated dif­fer­ent crises with the ultimate goal of preventing the United Hapsburg from annexing the Duchy of Milan. E l ectio n o f the H o ly Ro ma n Empero r The initiation of the Italian Wars is strictly linked to the double security dilemma. Since the Treaty of Noyon undermined the Hapsburg position in northern Italy, both Ferdinand of Aragon and Maximilian I undertook mea­ sures to ensure the inheritance of their kingdoms and to reinforce them against potential French attacks. While the succession of the Spanish kingdom to Charles did not elicit tension between France and the Hapsburg, the question of the Holy Roman Empire’s ­future became the catalyst for Eu­ro­ pean security competition.30 The Holy Roman Empire included a complex of territories in western and central Eu­rope, some of which ­were contiguous to France (in par­tic­u­lar, the Duchy of Savoy was on the French southeastern border and adjacent to Milan).31 Although ­these po­liti­cal entities ­were de facto in­de­pen­dent, the emperor indirectly ruled over them. Therefore, the reign of Charles V undermined the French presence in northern Italy.32 The Holy Roman Empire was an elective monarchy that was usually obtained easily by the Hapsburg, but the result of the 1519 election was all but 52

France and the Italian Wars

certain. Francis I considered the election a ­great danger but also an opportunity and advanced his candidacy to the throne. On the one hand, if Francis I had become the Holy Roman Emperor, he would have ended the encirclement of France for the last time without resorting to war. On the other hand, Charles’s inheritance of not only the Spanish kingdom but also the Austrian territories would have created a single entity in the House of Hapsburg. This ­union would have removed the hindrances to concentrate their forces to retake Milan and subjugate France: “If the Catholic King [Charles] obtain the Empire . . . ​I would receive a ­great damage, as it could well be foreseen that he would do anything to expel me from Italy.”33 Therefore, the French king initiated an aggressive campaign for his election and resorted to substantial bribes to the prince-­electors of Trier, Mainz, Palatinate, and Brandenburg. At first, it seemed that Francis I would receive the majority for the election.34 Charles considered the possibility that France could extend its control of the Holy Roman Empire to be a major threat, as he reminded his f­ ather, Maximilian I, “­After your death the Empire should not fall into the hands of the king of France [­because it would] greatly harm the House of Habsburg.”35 Mercurino Arborio de Gattinara, adviser of Charles and chancellor of the Holy Roman Empire, recognized the risk that the election of Francis I would entail for not only Austria but also for the Spanish kingdom: “If he rejected it, the empire might go to the French . . . ​[and then] Charles would not be able to maintain his hereditary lands in Austria and Burgundy, nor even the kingdoms of Spain itself.”36 Avoiding separation of the Spanish and Austrian dynasties of the House of Hapsburg would become the fundamental strategy to contain France for centuries.37 Accordingly, Charles thwarted Francis I’s attempts to become Holy Roman Emperor and to divide the Hapsburg, when the French king proposed the candidacy of his ­brother Ferdinand.38 The separation of the House of Hapsburg “would make it easier to break apart our common strength and entirely destroy our dynasty” b ­ ecause it could undermine the ability of Spain to provide support to the Holy Roman Empire that, without external support, would be incapable of defending itself against internal and external security threats: The king of France . . . ​, realizing that he could not obtain the Empire himself, at least tried to prevent me from having it, and u ­ nder pretense of charity he promotes my ­brother, having in mind to give him his ­daughter in marriage, in order to dismember all the dominions of Austria l­ ater, sowing discord between him and me, and dissolve the bundle of states left to us by our ancestors, so that, being divided, it would be easier to break the arrows of our common power and destroy us completely.39

On June 28, 1519, Charles became Holy Roman Emperor and extended his control along all French frontiers, posing a direct threat of invasion to the 53

chapter 2

Duchy of Milan from Tyrol and the Duchy of Savoy.40 Furthermore, Francis I’s attempts to win the election left him almost bankrupt and lessened France’s grip over the Duchy of Milan. Charles V took advantage of the economic and military weakness of his immediate rival to stir anti-­French sentiments in northern Italy and to regain possession of the Duchy of Milan, which was an imperial fief. The possibility of the Hapsburg annexing territories close to the French borders—­closure of the circle—­led to Francis I’s decision to initiate war. Although the Italian Wars would be fought all over Eu­rope, the epicenter would be the Duchy of Milan and the other Hapsburg possessions in the Italian Peninsula. “Italy would become a major arena in which the rivalry between Francis and Charles and their heirs, between Valois and Habsburgs, would be played out for the next forty years.”41 One, Tw o, Three, Fo u r .  .  .  ​F i ve Wa r I ni t i at i o ns The French attack on the Hapsburg followed the realization that Charles V was planning to regain control of the Duchy of Milan, to recover the Duchy of Burgundy, and to ultimately subdue France:42 the “true aim” b ­ ehind Charles’s occupation of northern Italy was “to establish himself, so as afterwards to hold down and keep in subjection our kingdoms, lands and subjects and do with them as he would.”43 To prevent Charles V from regaining the Duchy of Milan, in February 1521, Francis I orchestrated a series of attacks on Hapsburg territories by local allies: he assisted Robert de la March’s invasion on Luxembourg, Henri d’Albret’s efforts to recover the Spanish-­held Navarre, the Burgundian rebellion of Charles II, Duke of Guelders, and the anti-­Hapsburg opposition of the Swiss and Venice. Although the French king tried to deny his involvement in the incursions, it was widely acknowledged across Eu­rope that ­these assaults ­were led “by Frenchmen and at the King’s charge.”44 Charles V’s response was both diplomatic and military. First, the imperial army led by Count Henry III of Nassau thwarted the French-­supported invasions and it threatened France’s northern border. Second, the emperor fostered a rapprochement with Pope Leo X. On May 25, 1521, the latter declared the Edict of Worms against Martin Luther, whose rebellion threatened the internal stability of the Holy Roman Empire, in exchange for Charles V’s promise to expel the French from Milan and Genoa. Although the Holy Roman Emperor tried to avert a French reaction by resorting to Swiss forces and exiles of Lombardy, he pledged to resort to “any necessary mea­sure to guarantee the calm of Italy and to root out the roots of its discords.”45 The true goal was to “re-­establish the feudal link between Lombardy and the Empire, by which he would have opened the u ­ nion of German and Spanish forces.”46 Accordingly, Charles V invaded northern Italy and quickly regained control of Milan and Genoa ­after the ­Battle of Bicocca (April 1522). Fi­nally, Charles V signed a secret treaty with Henry VIII of 54

France and the Italian Wars

­ ngland (secret Treaty of Bruges, August 25, 1521) that included the “­Great E Enterprise” plan, based on which they agreed to launch a simultaneous invasion and to dismember France by 1523.47 In spite of this grandiose plan, which was never implemented, the fulcrum of the war remained northern Italy due to its strategic role for both the United Hapsburg and France. On the one hand, as Gattinara advised Charles V, Milan and Genoa “are the key to retaining and maintaining Naples and Sicily. They are also the true means of keeping the Venetians and all the rest of Italy u ­ nder your control and entirely obedient to you, and through them to keep all Germany and Switzerland in fear, and to do with them what you want.”48 On the other hand, the growing anti-­French co­ali­t ion cornered Francis I and pushed him to renew his efforts to control the Duchy of Milan: “All Eu­rope . . . ​to conspire to damage me: so be it, and I ­will stand up to ­whole Eu­rope.”49 The center of his plan remained Italy, where “I w ­ ill go myself: I ­will go to Milan, I w ­ ill take it and I w ­ ill not leave anything of what has been taken from me to my enemies. . . . ​I ­will not stop u ­ ntil I w ­ ill be pass t­ here with my army.”50 The clashing interests of France and the United Hapsburg culminated with the B ­ attle of Pavia (January 1525), which resulted in a military debacle for Francis I, who lost his army and was captured by hostile forces.51 In spite of the military victory and the imprisonment of the French king, Charles V’s resources started to become ­limited, and the increasing threat of the Ottoman Empire led him to conclude the first round of the Italian Wars (1521–1526). Negotiations over the settlement did not eliminate the main cause of disagreement. Charles V tried to take advantage of the favorable strategic situation not only to maintain control of northern Italy but also to advance his claim over the Duchy of Burgundy: Francis I would lose “every­thing that the late Duke Charles [the Bold] held by the treaties of Arras, Conflans and Peronne, . . . ​abandon all his friends and allies,52 . . . ​only make alliances with ­those approved by the emperor, [and] must grant the State of Milan to the duke of Bourbon, who would no longer owe allegiance to the crown of France, but only to the emperor.”53 Failure to meet ­these demands would have resulted in the invasion of France. Francis I refused to accept ­these requests. In par­tic­u­lar, ceding the Duchy of Burgundy would allow Charles V to connect all the territories along the French eastern border by connecting the Low Countries with the Franche-­ Comté and the imperial fiefs in northern Italy (Savoy and Milan). As the En­glish chancellor Cardinal Wolsey clearly understood, France would be completely encircled along all its borders: “The realme of Fraunce shal be envyronned on 3 parts, and scituated, as it wer, in the mydde of th’emperors countryes” and, in case of a Hapsburg invasion, it would “be inforced to stond at their defence on the said 3 parts.”54 Francis I accepted the humiliating Treaty of Madrid (January 14, 1526) in which he agreed to the restitution of Milan to Francesco II Sforza, renounced 55

chapter 2

all claims in Italy, promised to join Charles V in his fight against Luther and the Ottoman Empire, and ceded his possessions in the Duchy of Burgundy, Flanders, and Artois.55 However, as Gattinara predicted, Francis I signed the compromise just to be released and he soon initiated a new attack against the United Hapsburg. The second round of the Italian Wars (1526–1530) still revolved around recovering the Duchy of Milan. On May  22, 1526, Francis I denounced the Treaty of Madrid and formed an alliance with ­England and several Italian states (the League of Cognac) with the goal of expelling Charles V from northern Italy.56 Moreover, the French king tried to divert Hapsburg forces by fomenting the rebellion of German princes within the Holy Roman Empire and by fostering cooperation with the Ottoman sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. As Francis I admitted, “I keenly desire the Turk remain very power­ful and ready for war, not for himself, ­because he is an infidel and we are Christians, but to undermine the emperor’s power, to force heavy expenses upon him, and to reassure all other governments against so g ­ reat an ­enemy.”57 The concerted attack at Lodi and the Ottoman advances closer to the Austrian border put Charles V in a dilemma. In spite of the threat to the Holy Roman Empire, he prioritized the pacification of Italy as the key to keeping his territories, proving that control of the Duchy of Milan was the essential ­factor b ­ ehind the outbreak of the Italian Wars. Losing control of his possessions in the Italian Peninsula would have led to his position weakening against the Ottomans as well, as Charles V explained to his ­brother Ferdinand (king of Hungary): Without the prior pacification of Italy, it could happen that as soon as I leave to succour you, Venice, Florence, Ferrara, and Francesco Sforza w ­ ill ally together, pool all their resources, and invite the French to support them. . . . ​ Turks attack Ferdinand in Hungary. If we could have peace, you can be sure that I would deploy every­thing I have to Hungary; but if the wars concerning my own possessions are g ­ oing to continue—­and I see for sure that they ­will—­I leave you to judge w ­ hether I should not look to my own defence and deploy all my resources for that. . . . ​I already have a tiresome Turk to deal with: the king of France.58

The initial advances of the League of Cognac ­were soon reversed by imperial troops, which recovered Milan and punished papal support to France in the infamous Sack of Rome (May 6, 1527).59 The victories in Italy, however, ­were undermined by Ottoman assaults close to the Austrian border. French inability to recover Milan and Charles V’s need to face the growing prob­lem of Lutheranism led to the war’s conclusion. The Treaty of Cambrai (August 3, 1529) reinstated the provisions of the Treaty of Madrid with one exception: it allowed the French to retain the Duchy of Burgundy.60 56

France and the Italian Wars

Although this peace lasted longer, it was nothing but a truce in the continuous strug­gle over the control of northern Italy. Charles V’s refusal to make the Duchy of Milan in­de­pen­dent, as suggested by Pope Clement VII, and his actions to prevent another war created the conditions for a new outbreak of hostilities. First, Charles V maintained a standing army in Italy. Second, he tried to strengthen his position in northern Italy by forming an alliance with the Duchy of Savoy, which entailed exchanges of territory that would have allowed the United Hapsburg to create a wedge between southeastern France and the Duchy of Milan. This mea­sure was not part of a hegemonic plan but an attempt to prevent the French king from regaining control of Milan and Genoa and thus, threatening Charles V’s empire. This strategy, however, undermined French survival as Charles V “would have surrounded this kingdom on all sides and thus achieved his goal.”61 The casus belli for the third round of the Italian Wars (1536–1538) was the death without heirs of Francesco II Sforza (October 24, 1535). Charles V faced a harsh dilemma: on the one hand, he could install a new dynasty that would have been weak and more prone to French influence, if not invasion; on the other hand, if the United Hapsburg had assumed direct control of the Duchy of Milan, it would have provoked a new war. Due to the essential importance of Milan for Charles V’s empire, he followed the advice of his general Antonio de Leyva and kept control of the duchy: this decision could “cause a ­great war to start . . . ​more harsh and ­bitter than ever before,” but “your Majesty knows better than I what this duchy means to you; and please remember that is linked to Genoa, which I think is of no less importance, given its naval power—­and, again, Your Majesty knows better than anyone the importance of this.”62 When Charles V’s son Philip inherited the Duchy of Milan, France invaded Italy to prevent another Hapsburg attempt to annex territory close to its borders. To prevent actualized encirclement by closure of the circle, Francis I attacked the Hapsburg ally of Savoy and marched his troops across Piedmont and close to the border of the Duchy of Milan, failing to capture it. Pope Paul III’s failure to mediate the conflict led to escalation in the crisis, with Charles V launching a joint attack from the Low Countries and the Ottoman Empire intervening on the side of France.63 During this round of hostilities, Francis I was unable to regain control of the Duchy of Milan, but Charles V also proved incapable of sustaining a prolonged conflict against the Franco-Ottoman alliance. This stalemate led to the conclusion of the conflict with the ten-­year Truce of Nice (June 18, 1538), based on which Charles V agreed to give up his claims to Burgundy in exchange for Francis I’s renunciation of Milan and the end of French support to the rebellion of Duke Charles of Guelders in the Low Countries.64 Like previous interruptions of hostilities, the Truce of Nice could not prevent the outbreak of war ­because it did not eliminate the source of the prob­ lem: Francis I’s need to regain the Duchy of Milan to prevent the United 57

chapter 2

Hapsburg from completing the ring of encirclement. The fact that the truce was just a pause rather than a conclusion to the Italian Wars is evident from Francis I’s comments about the ­future of Milan: Milan . . . ​must be returned to me in perpetual inheritance, without conditions of any kind: however, I consent not to demand it for now, provided that the Duke of Orleans [his son Philip], a­ fter consummating the marriage, is placed in full possession and enjoyment of the inheritance of Burgundy: if he dies before his wife, ­whether he has ­children or not, I ­will return to all my rights on Milan; if he survives his infant, he alone, not his c­ hildren, ­will remain in possession of the states of Burgundy u ­ ntil the restitution of the Duchy of Milan.65

The period ­after the Truce of Nice was characterized by Charles V’s failure to prevent Francis I’s renewed attempts to take possession of Milan. The Holy Roman Emperor even proposed settling the dispute by giving Maria of Spain in marriage to Francis’s younger son, the Duke of Orléans, so that they would inherit the Low Countries and Burgundy a­ fter his death. In exchange, Francis I would surrender his claims to all northern Italy, ratify the Treaty of Madrid and the Treaty of Cambrai, and support Charles in his fight against the Ottoman Empire. Francis I’s response reveals that encirclement was still the fundamental issue at stake. Rejecting Charles V’s proposal, he agreed to renounce Milan in exchange for receiving immediate and direct control of the Low Countries.66 This solution would have eliminated the French two-­front-­war prob­lem for the last time by securing the northeastern border against a Hapsburg attack and En­glish plans to invade Normandy through Calais.67 In the end, the conflicting goals of France and the United Hapsburg prevented a lasting settlement and paved the road to the fourth round of the Italian Wars (1542–1546). The failure to reach a lasting settlement led both Charles V and Francis I to prepare for the eventuality of a new outbreak of hostilities. The Holy Roman Emperor feared a “major war” in Italy in the event that the Duchy of Milan should “fall into hostile hands, or t­ hose of someone unable to defend it.”68 To prepare for a potential French attack, he tried to ­settle the internal disputes with the Lutherans, sought an alliance with E ­ ngland, and nominated his ­brother Philip as the regent of the Duchy of Milan. Francis I considered Charles V’s diplomacy a move t­ oward a joint attack. In turn, he sought cooperation from the enemies of the Holy Roman Emperor and renewed alliance with the Ottomans by coordinating with Suleiman a mutual attack against the United Hapsburg.69 The assassination of the French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Antoine de Rincon, while he was traveling near Pavia, created the immediate cause for escalation.70 Francis I accused Charles V and demanded Milan as reparation (October 1541): “If th’empereur would deliver him Milan, with th’appurtenaunces, 58

France and the Italian Wars

‘Then we have peace already’; but if th’empereur would not, ‘­T here is no point in talking about peace.’ . . . ​Milan and nothing els.”71 When Charles V denied all responsibility and refused to accept the French terms, Francis I initiated a two-­front offensive in the north, where the Duke of Orléans quickly captured Luxembourg, and in the south, where a larger army u ­ nder Claude d’Annebault failed to control the strategic city of Perpignan in northern Spain. The joint response of the Hapsburg and E ­ ngland posed a threat not only to Francis I’s advances in Piedmont but also to French territory. The loss of Boulogne convinced the French king to concede to Charles V’s demands in the Treaty of Crépy (September 18, 1544). In exchange for recovering the national territories lost to the English-­Hapsburg invasion, Francis I had to evacuate Piedmont, to renounce his claims to Naples and the Low Countries, to conclude the alliance with Suleiman, and to join Charles V’s efforts to defeat the Ottomans.72 The Treaty of Crépy meant that Charles V would cede direct control of ­either the Low Countries or Milan. The decision elicited a heated debate among his advisers, but Charles V eventually confirmed the long-­lasting policy of controlling Milan as the fundamental territory to hold the Hapsburg territories together. As the Duke of Alba, one of the members of the decision council, noted, [Milan] is the gateway through which we come and go to Germany and maintain the authority and obedience of the Empire. Without Milan it would seem that [the empire] cannot be governed, and the kingdoms of Your Majesty w ­ ill remain separated and divided from each other. . . . ​Given the greed and ambition of the French, it goes without saying that if they gain a foothold in Milan, they ­will try to gain Naples and Sicily, and Your Majesty ­will not be able to send any help. . . . ​No help can come from Spain b ­ ecause we ­will lack any port between Catalonia and Naples capable of sheltering a fleet.73

The situation in Italy seemed to be stabilized, but concern over Charles V’s direct control of northern Italy provoked another round of the Italian Wars (1551–1559). The immediate cause of the conflict was the assassination of Pier Luigi Farnese, Duke of Parma and son of Pope Paul III. Ottavio Farnese, son of Pier Luigi, sought French support to take control of Parma against the attempts of Pope Julius III, who was supported by Charles V. What seemed a proxy war escalated into a general war b ­ ecause of the strategic importance of the Duchy of Parma for the United Hapsburg.74 If Charles V had installed a friendly regime in Parma, French attempts to recover Milan would have been seriously undermined. Therefore, control of northern Italy remained the fulcrum of the fifth and final round of the Italian Wars. Henry II of France, who succeeded Francis I, continued his f­ ather’s strategy and declared war on the United Hapsburg to regain control of the Duchy 59

chapter 2

of Milan.75 He sought alliances with the enemies of Charles V, finding support in the Ottoman Empire, German states within the Holy Roman Empire, and rebels in the Low Countries.76 The simultaneous attack on multiple fronts prevented Charles V from continuing his control of all Hapsburg dominions and led to his decision to abdicate (1556) and to divide the House of Hapsburg between the Spanish and the Austrian branches (Charles V’s son Philip and b ­ rother Ferdinand, respectively). Although the war would continue for three more years (Peace of Cateau-­ Cambrésis, April 3, 1559) and Henry II would not regain the Duchy of Milan, the end of Charles V’s empire eliminated the immediate threat of actualized encirclement. The treaty assigned the Duchy of Milan and the Low Countries to the Spanish king, and ­u nless he joined forces with the Austrian emperor, France would be able to resort to mea­sures short of war to eliminate its latent encirclement. In the end, with the abdication of Charles V, the cause of the Italian Wars—­actualized encirclement by closure of the circle—­was removed. In sum, war initiation was strictly linked with the previous phase of the double security dilemma, which stemmed from the latent encirclement that France had faced since 1482. Francis I and Henry II of France initiated a series of attacks against Charles V to prevent him from obtaining direct control of the Duchy of Milan, a situation that would have increased the presence of the Hapsburg on French frontiers and materialized actualized encirclement. Controlling northern Italy was considered essential for state survival and the pursuit of that goal led to the outbreak of war as a mea­sure of last resort: “The conflict between Charles and the French Valois kings had its roots in the po­ liti­cal configuration of western Eu­rope. . . . ​France was hemmed in on both the south (by Aragon) and the east (by Flanders, Hainaut, Luxembourg, and Franche-­Comté) by the possessions of a single ruler. Charles’s succession to the Empire reinforced the perceived threat to France’s eastern border. . . . ​For France, therefore, only Italy remained as a point of exit from her encirclement.”77

Step 3: War Contagion ­ very French attack against the United Hapsburg triggered the involvement E of the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers. The pattern of alliances that characterized war contagion is illustrated in figure 2.1.78 ­England intervened on the side of Charles V to prevent France (immediate rival) from annexing territory that it could use to launch an invasion. Only during one instance of war initiation (1526–1530) did Henry VIII side with France against the United Hapsburg, which became the common immediate rival ­because it emerged as a potential Eu­ro­pean hegemon. The Ot-

60

France and the Italian Wars

Figure 2.1. Logic of war contagion in the Italian Wars

toman Empire always intervened against Charles V (immediate rival) to prevent the loss of its great-­power ally (France) by military defeat. ­E n gla nd For almost two centuries, France had been the immediate rival of ­England ­ ecause it was the ­great power that was most likely to succeed in launching b an invasion across the En­glish Channel. Such outcome could result if France annexed the Low Countries and eliminated the only remaining En­glish possession on the Eu­ ro­ pean continent (Calais). Therefore, in almost all the rounds of the Italian Wars, E ­ ngland intervened on the side of Charles V for hindering France from annexing territory close to its borders (case for intervention: annexation of territory). To ­counter France, ­England formed alliances with Spain and Austria to assist each other in case of war against France. ­England even planned a mutual invasion to recover territories that ­were lost at the end of the Hundred Years’ War. French success at the B ­ attle of Marignano and conquest of the Duchy of Milan reinforced ­England’s concerns since its proxies (Swiss forces) proved to be incapable of resisting Francis  I. Nonetheless, ­England was unwilling to launch a direct attack, u ­ nless France threatened to increase its invasion ability by extending its control over the Low Countries at the expense of Maximilian  I. Indeed, Cardinal Wolsey used all his diplomatic skills to mediate a potential conflict ­after the election of Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor. Wolsey’s strategy aimed to reduce Francis I’s victories in northern Italy, not at invading France.79 The failure to mediate between Francis I and Charles V left ­England with no choice in whom to support. The En­glish king formed an alliance with Charles V in July  1520 (Treaty of Gravelines) with the goal of deterring France.80 The French attack against the United Hapsburg in 1521 compelled Henry VIII to intervene and, in order to contain the immediate rival, even to agree on a coordinated invasion of France (secret Treaty of Bruges, August  1521). E ­ ngland offered Charles V f­ree passage between Spain and the Low Countries across the En­glish Channel since the inland route was blocked

61

chapter 2

by French attacks. In return for this support for the Hapsburg advances, ­England would receive Brittany ­after the defeat of Francis I. The same logic of keeping the French in check by supporting Charles V would recur in almost all the other rounds of the Italian Wars. This decision was reinforced by French plans to undermine En­glish internal stability by forming an alliance with James V of Scotland, a situation that would have posed the threat of invasion and partition of ­England between France and Scotland.81 Accordingly, ­England opposed France ­because it could exploit the control of the Low Countries or the Scottish alliance to cross the En­glish Channel. In only one instance did E ­ ngland decide to intervene on the side of France against Charles V. Something extraordinary was needed to overcome centuries of rivalry. French defeat at the ­Battle of Pavia brought about the emergence of the United Hapsburg as a potential hegemon. This change in the distribution of power made Charles V the common immediate rival for all Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers and led to a temporary break in the historical Anglo-­ French enmity. In 1526, E ­ ngland intervened on the side of Francis I ­because Charles V’s victory would have given him control not only in northern Italy but also in the Low Countries. Henry VIII’s decision was driven by fear that the potential increase in the invasion ability of the United Hapsburg would undermine E ­ ngland’s survival. Giuseppe de Leva clearly points out the motivation ­behind Henry VIII’s alliance with Charles V during the Italian Wars and his sudden change of mind in 1526–1530: “It was already strong in the soul of the King of ­England which warring parties he would support. His policy, founded on the antipathy he always felt t­ owards France, and conform to the universally approved goal of preventing its excesses, led hit to the necessity of aiding the rival power [the United Hapsburg], ­until he started to also fear for the Eu­ro­pean balance.”82 T h e O ttom a n Empi re Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent consistently supported France to ­counter his immediate rival: the United Hapsburg. Had the French re­sis­tance in western Eu­rope and in Italy collapsed, Charles V would have been able to concentrate his military expeditions in the heart of the Ottoman Empire. This fear was founded in the policy of Charles when he was still the Spanish king. Suleiman was concerned about Hapsburg support, which turned into a formal alliance in 1529, to the Persian shah Tahmāsp.83 Potential advance of Charles V in eastern Eu­rope and the strengthening of the Persian Empire would have confronted the Ottoman Empire with a two-­front-­war dilemma.84 To ­counter Charles V, Suleiman planned “to make the capital Buda one of the abodes of Islam and take possession of Hungary with my victorious sword.”85 The goal was not necessarily expansionist, but rather, it was driven 62

France and the Italian Wars

by fear of Hapsburg advances in eastern Eu­rope in conjunction with Persian threat to the rear. The subjugation of the Kingdom of Hungary was necessary to make it a vassal state, a buffer zone, that would protect the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. As Lâszlé Bârdossy claims, Suleiman’s strategy ­toward Hungary was restrained ­because the Ottoman Empire “consciously remained an Asian power” and the sultan considered Eu­rope to be secondary theater to primarily divert the attention of the Hapsburg. The geopo­liti­cal situation worsened with the election of the Holy Roman Emperor. Charles V became a strong ally of Hungary since the Hungarian king Louis II married Mary of Hapsburg in 1522. Suleiman considered this marital alliance a potential threat to his control over the Balkans, but he did not plan to annex the region. Escalation ensued only when he failed to reach an agreement that would have guaranteed Hungarian in­de­pen­dence in exchange for the Hapsburg renouncing its support for Louis II and adopting a more Ottoman-­friendly foreign policy. To secure his possessions in eastern Eu­rope, Suleiman intervened in the Italian Wars to prevent French defeat. Such an outcome would have allowed the United Hapsburg to concentrate its forces on the eastern front—­a case of intervention to prevent the loss of a great-­power ally by military defeat. The support to Francis I even preceded the emergence of the Ottoman Empire as a Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat power a­ fter its stunning victory against Hungary in the ­Battle of Mohács (August 1526). For instance, the mediation of Sultan Suleiman and his threat to renew his advances on the eastern border of the Holy Roman Empire ­were essential to securing the release of Francis I in the Treaty of Madrid. Since the second round of the Italian Wars, the Ottoman Empire became increasingly involved in both formal and informal alliances with France against Charles V—­the “unholy alliance”—by launching several offensives against Hungary and in the Mediterranean Sea in order to relieve the pressure that Charles was placing on France.86 In sum, the En­glish and Ottoman interventions in the Italian Wars w ­ ere driven by concerns about their own immediate rival. For Suleiman, a defeat of France would have entailed a potential attack by the United Hapsburg with all its force against his possessions in the Balkans. Henry VIII countered France ­because of the threat of invasion across the En­glish Channel. When the United Hapsburg emerged as a potential hegemon between 1526 and 1530, ­England switched side, as Charles V’s victory would have created a bigger threat to En­glish survival than France.

Assessment of Alternative Explanations This analy­sis highlights three impor­tant findings that support my theory. First, the security competition that characterized the relations between 63

chapter 2

France and the Hapsburg intensified ­after France started to face a situation of latent encirclement, thereby triggering a double security dilemma. The two-­front-­war prob­lem led to Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy in 1494 and to Francis I’s successful conquest of Milan in 1515. Second, war initiation was caused by French attempts to prevent the United Hapsburg from realizing actualized encirclement by annexing the Duchy of Milan, which would have connected Hapsburg possessions along the French borders. Last, the dynamics of contagion ­were driven by En­glish and Ottoman concerns that their own immediate rival would increase its invasion ability by e­ ither annexing territory that would facilitate an invasion or by defeating a great-­power ally that could function as a counterweight. Except for the second round of the Italian Wars (1526–1530), which was characterized by the presence of a near-­ preponderant state, alliances followed a rival-­based pattern.87 In the rest of this section, I assess my theory in comparison with the main alternative explanations (­table 2.2). The claims that the Italian Wars w ­ ere caused by e­ ither Charles V’s bid for hegemony or by a French attempt to stop its deep and inevitable decline are characterized by several empirical puzzles. First, primary sources and accurate historiographic accounts of the Italian Wars clearly show that on numerous occasions Charles V acted to secure control of the Holy Roman Empire and to foster Eu­ro­pean peace. His election to Holy Roman Emperor was not part of a master plan to subjugate France but rather a way to prevent Francis I from extending his control in central Eu­rope and northern Italy. ­After obtaining the title of Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V acted in defense of his territories rather than preparing an invasion of France. This restraint became evident when he did not take advantage of the imprisonment of Francis I ­after the ­Battle of Pavia. Charles V rejected the plan for a mu-

­Table 2.2 ​Competing explanations on the origins of the Italian Wars Step 1: Double security dilemma

Author

Step 2: War initiation

Step 3: War contagion

Mearsheimer*

International anarchy and uncertainty of intentions

Charles V’s bid for hegemony (undertheorized)

Counterhegemonic alliance against the United Hapsburg

Copeland

Undertheorized

French preventive war to stop its deep and inevitable decline

Counterhegemonic alliance against France

Encirclement theory

Encirclement of France by Austria and Spain

Closure of the circle by the United ­Hapsburg

Rival-­based network of alliances

* Mearsheimer does not analyze the Italian Wars. My analy­sis is based on the logic of offensive realism.

64

France and the Italian Wars

tual invasion with ­England to partition France, an enterprise he had threatened since the beginning of the war to deter Francis I. Instead, he proposed negotiations to eliminate French adventurism in northern Italy given its strategic role in connecting Hapsburg territories: “If my army is lost, or forced to demobilize, I w ­ ill soon lose Naples and Sicily.”88 The strategy to contain France was well laid out by Ferdinand, Charles V’s ­brother: “Ensure that neither the king of France nor his successors ­will ever have the power to threaten you or your successors . . . ​to pluck some feathers [of the French king] so that he cannot fly, even if he wants to, and thus the emperor and his successors ­will be sure to enjoy perpetual peace.”89 This reluctance to escalate the crisis characterized Charles V’s foreign policy throughout the Italian Wars, undermining the argument that his goal was to establish Hapsburg hegemony over Eu­rope.90 Second, Copeland’s argument is undermined by the fact that France never became a hegemon before Charles V inherited the Holy Roman Empire and, in turn, the French repeated attacks could not be attempts to stop the rise of a challenger. Quite the contrary, during the first round of the Italian Wars, the Hapsburg ­were concerned that they ­were in an unfavorable position rather than a ­great power on the rise. As Marie, regent of Netherlands, confessed to Charles V, “Even though I have always hated war it would be better to fight now, b ­ ecause I am not sure that every­thing would favour His Majesty as much at some other time.”91 Even if one admits that France was superior to the United Hapsburg in 1521, ­after the ­Battle of Pavia (1525) France was in complete disarray and cannot be considered the most power­ ful state in Eu­rope. Based on Copeland’s logic, this utter defeat should have prevented any ­future war ­after the Treaty of Madrid in 1526. How can dynamic differential theory account for the additional four war initiations that protracted this major conflict for over thirty years? Third, an assessment of the distribution of power during the Italian Wars shows that the system was balanced with the exception of the second round of hostilities (1526–1530). For instance, at the onset of the Italian Wars, which is often considered the peak of power of e­ ither France or the Hapsburg, the imperial and French armies ­were similar in strength.92 Indeed, before the (unexpected) victory in the ­Battle of Pavia, Charles V was pushing to conclude a truce ­because “not accepting it and continuing the war, I go ­towards the risk of seeing the Kingdom of Naples invaded and Germany turned upside down. Only for protecting the borders of my states.”93 Moreover, changes in the distribution of power during the Italian Wars undermine Mearsheimer’s and Copeland’s claims about the impact of the polarity of the system on the likelihood of war. The Eu­ro­pean system was characterized by balanced tripolarity between 1521 and 1526 (the United Hapsburg, France, and ­England), by un­balanced multipolarity between 1526 and 1530 (the United Hapsburg as the potential hegemon, France, ­England, and the Ottoman Empire), and by balanced multipolarity in the years 65

chapter 2

following the Italian Wars (the United Hapsburg, France, E ­ ngland, and the Ottoman Empire).94 However, between 1521 and 1559, war remained a constant feature of international politics in spite of variations in the Eu­ro­pean distribution of power. Fourth, theories of hegemonic war would predict that the most power­ful state in the system would launch a war to ­either preserve or obtain hegemony. Instead, the encircled ­great power (France) was the initiator of all attacks against the United Hapsburg. War occurred not only when Francis I’s military strength was similar in size to that of Charles V but also when his army was in complete disarray. It is particularly puzzling for alternative explanations that Francis I, a­ fter being released following a military debacle and personal imprisonment, would initiate a new war while in a state of complete military inferiority. One might consider this be­hav­ior to be irrational, but it was actually driven by the dreadful strategic situation of northern Italy. To guarantee French survival, Francis I was willing to risk every­thing to prevent the United Hapsburg from realizing actualized encirclement. The costs of inaction (actualized encirclement) ­were higher than ­those of risking a war in a situation of military inferiority and economic emergency. The logic of French aggression was defensively motivated, not expansionist. France resorted to war as a mea­sure of last resort only when less risky strategies, such as attempts to create a buffer zone in northern Italy and Francis I’s attempts to obtain the Holy Roman Empire through substantial bribes, failed and the prospects for a simultaneous two-­front invasion became concrete. Fi­nally, neither Mearsheimer nor Copeland can account for the pattern of alliances throughout the Italian Wars. If the United Hapsburg was the most power­ful state in Eu­rope, the other g ­ reat powers should have all coalesced against the common e­ nemy in e­ very instance of war initiation. Instead, this pattern of alliances occurred only between 1526 and 1630, when the United Hapsburg was a potential hegemon, thereby becoming the immediate rival for all Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers. Moreover, competing explanations cannot account for the pattern of alliance between 1494 and 1520, when all ­great powers coalesced against France even though it was not the most power­ful state. In the end, states intervened based on a rival-­based pattern of alliances. Changes in En­glish affiliations throughout the Italian Wars show how each ­great power was dragged into the conflict between France and the United Hapsburg to prevent its own immediate rival from increasing the rival’s invasion ability.

Conclusion The Italian Wars w ­ ere characterized by the latent encirclement of France (encircled ­great power) by Spain and Austria (surrounding ­great powers). Be66

France and the Italian Wars

tween 1482 and 1520, France tried to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem by creating a buffer zone in northern Italy, which would have cut the main line of communication between the surrounding g ­ reat powers and prevented them from concentrating their forces in a joint invasion. ­After Charles V became Holy Roman Emperor and planned to expand his control over the Duchy of Lombardy, France initiated a series of attacks to prevent the United Hapsburg from annexing territories along France’s borders (actualized encirclement). ­England and the Ottoman Empire intervened on the side of their allies (Charles V and France, respectively) to prevent their own immediate rival (France and Charles V, respectively) from increasing its invasion ability by e­ ither annexing territory along its borders or by defeating a great-­ power ally. The only exception in the pattern of alliance formation during the Italian Wars occurred between 1526 and 1530, when the En­glish king sided with France and the Ottoman Empire a­ fter the United Hapsburg emerged as the potential hegemon in Eu­rope, becoming the common immediate rival for all the other ­great powers in the region. The abdication of Charles eliminated the immediate cause of hostilities, but it did not eliminate the roots of security competition, alliances, and war between France and the Hapsburg. In the next chapter, I ­will analyze another major war that was caused by France’s attempts to eliminate its two-­ front-­war prob­lem: the Thirty Years’ War.

67

chapter 3

France and the Thirty Years’ War

The Thirty Years’ Wars was a major war fought between 1635 and 1648 by France, Spain, Austria, and Sweden.1 At the end of the Italian Wars in 1559, France (encircled ­great power) continued to face a two-­front-­war prob­lem: Charles V’s decision to abdicate and to divide his possessions between the Spanish and Austrian branches of the House of Hapsburg meant that France remained encircled by Spain (surrounding g ­ reat power). It may sound unusual that a single state could pose a two-­front-­war prob­lem, but Philip II of Spain inherited the Iberian Peninsula in the south, the Spanish Netherlands in the north, and the Franche-­Comté in the east: “the Habsburg encirclement of France became the Spanish encirclement.”2 During the first step of the double security dilemma, France tried to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem by forming alliances with states that considered the Hapsburg their own immediate rival (e.g., Sweden, the Dutch rebels, and the German Protestant states) and by creating buffer zones along the Rhine and in northern Italy with the aim of cutting the Spanish Road, which provided Spain and Austria the lines of communication to mobilize their armies. France de­cided to declare war on Spain (May 1635) to prevent the reemergence of the “Charles V situation”: Spain and Austria became capable of concentrating their forces (actualized encirclement) by eliminating all their internal and external security threats through the decisive victory over Sweden in the ­Battle of Nördlingen (September 1634) and the repression of the rebellious German states within the Holy Roman Empire (Peace of Prague, May 1635).3 The other ­great powers became involved in the dyadic conflict between France and Spain b ­ ecause of the existing network of rival-­based alliances. Sweden joined France to prevent Austria (immediate rival) from annexing territory in northern Germany, as this expansion would have threatened Swedish control of the Baltic Sea and increased the Hapsburg ability to launch an amphibious assault. Austria intervened to prevent the loss of its main ally (Spain), on which it heavi­ly relied to quench the revolts within its

68

France and the Thirty Years’ War

possessions and to forestall the renewed advances of Sweden (immediate rival) in southern Germany. This analy­sis of the Thirty Years’ War highlights the main components of encirclement theory. First, during the double security dilemma, France resorted both to the formation of alliances and to the creation of buffer zones to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem. Moreover, this major war is characterized by one failed instance of war initiation (the War of the Mantuan Succession, 1628–1631) that pre­sents striking similarities with the situation that led to the outbreak of the conflict in 1635. The diverse outcome of ­these two crises strengthens my theory by providing additional within-­case variation. Assessing this specific crisis emphasizes how the increase of the invasion ability of the Hapsburg was the fundamental cause ­behind the French declaration of war. Fi­nally, this case study is characterized by variation in the motivations b ­ ehind war contagion, given that Austria and Sweden intervened to prevent the loss of a great-­power ally and the annexation of territory by the immediate rival, respectively.4 I argue that the findings of this empirical analy­sis undermine the mutual understanding of the war, given that the conventional wisdom considers it the last war of religion. Evidence shows inconsistencies with an ideological explanation, while it provides ample support for my explanation that emphasizes the role of geography. In addition to downplaying the role of religion, the findings of this chapter reveal several puzzles for the theories of hegemonic war. Fi­nally, the importance of studying the Thirty Years’ War results from the relative paucity of IR studies on the topic. Despite the fact that this conflict has been considered a watershed moment in history, ­there is no detailed analy­sis of this major war by IR scholars. The last contribution of this case study relates to the dynamics of ­future major wars. The Thirty Years’ War has been brought back from oblivion for drawing (often inappropriate) parallels with the current Syrian civil war.5 Although I do not think that this local conflict w ­ ill escalate into a major war ­because it does not involve an encircled ­great power, the power-­politics dynamics that underlie the apparent religious divide in the ­Middle East have similarities with the Thirty Years’ War. Most interestingly, the analy­sis of this major war shows that ­great powers sometimes escalate crisis over small pieces of territory that, at a superficial glance, do not seem to be of ­g reat value. ­After all, why die for the Spanish Road? This study reveals how this narrow strip of territory had impor­tant implications for the survival of both France and Spain. In turn, the analy­sis of the Thirty Years’ War shows the potential path of ­future conflict escalation in Asia, where China has several territorial disputes with all its neighboring countries. In this chapter, I rely on to a combination of primary sources and historical works. I use documentary evidence on the decision making of Cardinal Richelieu and Count-­Duke of Olivares (the prime ministers of France and

69

chapter 3

Spain, respectively, since 1624) to explain the dynamics of the double security dilemma and of war initiation. I analyze original documents of the Austrian emperors (Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III) and of the Swedish leaders (King Gustavus Adolphus and, a­ fter his death in 1632, Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna) to explore the logic of war contagion. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, I give an overview of the historiographic debates on the origins of this major war. Second, I demonstrate the dynamics of the double security dilemma by analyzing the main strategies of France and the Hapsburg before the French declaration of war on Spain in May 1635. Third, I show that the escalation of the conflict from a civil war within the Holy Roman Empire into a major Eu­ro­pean conflagration resulted from Richelieu’s realization that the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburg ­were about to combine their armed forces for a planned invasion of France. Fourth, I account for war contagion by explaining the logic of intervention by the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers. Fi­nally, I assess encirclement theory in comparison with alternative explanations on the origins of the Thirty Years’ War.

Overview Historians are still debating the c­ auses of the Thirty Years’ War, but they usually recognize the Spanish encirclement of France as a fundamental cause of the internationalization of the conflict.6 Nonetheless, current explanations of this major war fail to theorize the impact of the French two-­ front-­war prob­lem on the dynamics of security competition, war initiation, and war contagion. Conventional wisdom identifies the Defenestration of Prague and the subsequent revolt in Bohemia as the starting point of the conflict between the Protestant and Catholic states that formed the Holy Roman Empire.7 Some historians consider the Thirty Years’ War the last war of religion and trace its origins back to the split between Lutherans and Catholics with the Edict of Worms (1521) and to its temporary resolution with the Peace of Augsburg (1555), according to which each ruler within the Holy Roman Empire could dictate the religion in his realm (cuius regio, eius religio).8 This historiographic approach identifies domestic politics as the main level of analy­sis for understanding the internationalization of the conflict. The revolt of the Protestant Bohemians against the Catholic Hapsburg of Austria spread as each group tried to defend its religious liberty. The presence of dif­fer­ent religious factions within Eu­ro­pean kingdoms prevented the isolation of separate conflicts, as each local minority feared that the victory of the religious adversary in another kingdom would undermine their ability to survive at home. Therefore, this argument considers domestic politics

70

France and the Thirty Years’ War

not only as the catalyst of the conflict but also as a power­ful influence in foreign-­policy decision making. The main alternative explanation for the origins of the Thirty Years’ War places the civil war within the Holy Roman Empire in the wider context of the Eu­ro­pean strug­gle between the French and the Hapsburg.9 Theories that stress the international character of the major war usually regard it as the last episode of the Hapsburg pursuit of Eu­ro­pean domination or as the Spanish attempt to stop its own inevitable decline by thwarting the rise of the French challenger.10 I accept the international characterization of the Thirty Years’ War as part of the French anti-­Hapsburg strug­gle that characterized Eu­rope from 1477 to 1713, but I argue that this major war was the consequence of the French attempt to prevent actualized encirclement by the Hapsburg powers of Spain and Austria. Focusing on the international character of the Thirty Years’ War calls into question not only the religious roots of the conflict but also its temporal bound­aries.11 Conventional view is a “figment of retrospective imagination,” a crystallized myth that is nonetheless extremely difficult to deconstruct: “we are dealing with a Eu­ro­pean war during the thirty years 1618–48. But it is well known that war . . . ​did not end in 1648, and less well known that it did not begin in 1618.”12 According to this historiographic approach, the war started with the French direct military intervention against Spain in 1635 and lasted ­until Spain and France signed the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659.13 I concur with viewing the Thirty Years’ War as part of the French-­ Hapsburg rivalry, but based on the definition of major war that I formulated in chapter 1, I consider it to have lasted from the French declaration of war on Spain ­until the signing of the Peace of Westphalia (1635–1648).14 Additionally, this approach has the merit of identifying the key geographic area ­behind the intensification of the security competition between France and Spain and the extension of their strug­gle to all Eu­rope. Conventional wisdom focuses on the events within the Holy Roman Empire to explain the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War. “The arch of Eu­ro­pean politics rested on the keystone of Germany,” Cicely Wedgwood suggests.15 Rather, I argue that the most impor­tant geographic area was the strip of territories that bordered France from north to south: the Spanish Road, in par­tic­u­lar northern Italy and the Spanish Netherlands. The control of the conglomerate of states that formed the Holy Roman Empire was impor­tant ­because it would allow imperial troops to join the Spanish Army of Flanders against the Dutch rebels. Nonetheless, the focus of the French-­Hapsburg rivalry rested in western and southern Eu­rope, not in Germany. IR scholars usually consider the Thirty Years’ War as a watershed in modern history, as it concluded centuries of religious conflicts and heralded the emergence of the Eu­ro­pean state system.16 As Hans Morgenthau noted, the Peace of Westphalia “made the territorial state the cornerstone

71

chapter 3

­Table 3.1 ​The three-­step logic of the Thirty Years’ War Step to war

In­de­pen­dent variable

Dependent variable

Causal logic

Double security dilemma

The Spanish encirclement of France

(a)   R ival-­based network of alliances: France-­ Sweden vs. Spain-­Austria (b) A nnexation of territory at the expense of minor powers

France tries to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem by disrupting the Spanish Road

War initiation

Increase in the invasion ability of Spain and Austria

France declares war on Spain (May 19, 1635)

France attacks to prevent actualized encirclement by the Hapsburg: concentration of forces

War contagion

Increases in the invasion ability of the immediate rival

Major war (1635–1648)

Austria and Sweden intervened to prevent changes in the invasion ability of their immediate rival: Austria → loss of great-­power ally Sweden → annexation of territory

of the modern state system.”17 In spite of being regarded as the starting point for studying international politics, the paucity of works that analyze the Thirty Years’ War is surprising. Nonetheless, the few authors who address it underline the importance of the Spanish encirclement as a fundamental cause of the major war. For instance, Dale Copeland emphasizes its impact on shaping Spanish foreign policy: “From 1618 to 1627, the Spanish goal was to keep the Austrian cousins strong in eastern Germany while Spain, to maintain the encirclement of France, improved its position in the west and reduced Dutch strength.”18 Before moving to the analy­sis of the three steps that characterized the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War, I identify the observable implications of my argument (­table 3.1). First, France should try to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem with mea­ sures short of war: the formation of alliances with states that consider the Hapsburg their own immediate rival and the creation of buffer zones along the Spanish Road that would prevent Spain and Austria from uniting their armies. Second, France should attack Spain as a mea­sure of last resort to prevent actualized encirclement. The specific increase in the invasion ability that would trigger the war was the Hapsburg ability to concentrate their force, through the elimination of internal and external security threats that prevented them from launching a simultaneous attack against France. Third, 72

France and the Thirty Years’ War

Sweden and Austria should be dragged into the conflict due to the existing network of alliances and due to the concern that their own immediate rival could increase its invasion ability if they remained on the sidelines.

Step 1: Double Security Dilemma Since the conclusion of the Italian Wars (Treaty of Cateau-­Cambrésis, 1559) up to the French declaration of war on Spain (May 19, 1635), France had been trying to prevent the reemergence of the “Charles V situation”—­namely, actualized encirclement by the united House of Hapsburg. The Spanish encirclement engendered a double security dilemma for France ­because it could not concentrate its army against one single opponent. The two-­front-­war prob­lem created an acute sense of fear and vulnerability that compelled French rulers to adopt military mea­sures that could disrupt the Spanish Road, the line of communication that connected the Spanish and Austrian possessions in northern Italy to the Spanish Netherlands through the Valtelline. Between 1559 and 1635, dif­fer­ent French rulers ­adopted two mea­sures to hinder the Spanish transfer of troops along the Spanish Road and to prevent the Army of Flanders and imperial troops from concentrating their forces and launch a simultaneous invasion of France.19 First, they forged bilateral alliances with ­those states (the Dutch, German states, and Sweden) that considered ­either Spain or Austria their own immediate rivals. Furthermore, they established a buffer zone in the Rhineland and in northern Italy. French rulers conducted ­these strategies with utmost caution and secrecy in order to avoid provoking the outcome that they ­were trying to prevent: a two-­front attack by Spain and Austria. The defensive motive b ­ ehind French attempts to break the Spanish encirclement is clearly illustrated by Richelieu’s foreign-­policy plan: Abroad, we must perpetually strive to arrest the course of Spain’s pro­gress. And contrary to that nation’s aim to increase her dominion and extend her frontiers, France should seek only to fortify herself and to build an open gateway for the purpose of entering into the states of her neighbors, so as to be able to protect them from Spanish oppression whenever the opportunities for this may pre­sent themselves. [We] must consider fortifying your position at Metz and advancing as far as Strasbourg if pos­si­ble, so as to gain a gateway into Germany. This must be done with ­great discretion and with quiet and clandestine methods . . . ​open the door into that country [the Swiss cantons], and out Geneva in the position of being one of the outworks of France. . . . ​We may think of Navarre and the Franche-­Comté as belonging to us, since they are contiguous with France and easy to conquer whenever we have nothing e­ lse to do. This, however, should not be bruited about since it would be imprudent to consider it if 73

chapter 3

t­ hese more impor­tant ­matters had not succeeded and b ­ ecause it could not be done without causing open war with Spain, which must be avoided as far as ­pos­si­ble.20

Although the French strategies to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem w ­ ere defensively motivated, the Hapsburg regarded them as indicative of a policy of divide and conquer. In par­tic­u­lar, the creation of a buffer zone along the Spanish Road directly undermined Spain’s security, which relied on this route to transfer its troops to quash the Dutch rebellion in the Low Countries.21 Moreover, a French success in establishing a buffer zone would have undermined the core princi­ple of Hapsburg foreign policy since the abdication of Charles V: maintaining the ­union of the two branches of the House of Hapsburg. As Count-­Duke Olivares succinctly stated, “Not for anything must t­ hese two ­houses let themselves be divided.”22 If the French ­were allowed to separate the Spanish possessions in western Eu­rope and to isolate it from its Austrian ally, they could be in a position to expand in the Rhineland or in northern Italy. Therefore, Olivares identified control of the Spanish Road as an essential condition for securing the kingdom against an attack: “France lies between Spain and Flanders, and, as a result, it is impossible to send help from Germany to Flanders or Italy, or to Italy from Flanders, or from Italy to Flanders, or to Spain from Flanders and vice versa, except by way of the Channel, with French ports on one side and En­glish on the other, and the Channel itself swarming with the Dutch.”23 The Spanish and the Austrian branches of the House of Hapsburg responded to French attempts to create buffer zones by strengthening their alliance, by fomenting internal division within the French kingdom to keep it weak and incapable of adopting an active foreign policy, and by resorting to ­limited use of force to safeguard the ­free passage of troops along the Spanish Road. However, ­these countermea­sures increased the fear of French rulers, who renewed their efforts to prevent actualized encirclement by Austria and Spain. In the end, the Spanish encirclement of France created a double security dilemma that revolved around the control of the Spanish Road. The consequences of this spiral of intense security competition led to the formation of two opposite networks of alliances, to the adoption of increasingly aggressive foreign-­policy decisions, and to the outbreak of international crises that eventually escalated into open war in May 1635. In the rest of this section, I analyze the two main strategies that France a­ dopted to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem as well as the Hapsburg response. Allia nces a nd Co u n tera lli a n ces The first mea­sure that France undertook to ameliorate its strategic position was to seek the support of states that considered the Hapsburg their 74

France and the Thirty Years’ War

own immediate rival. French rulers tried to establish a network of alliances that could function as the first line of defense in case of Hapsburg advances. Henry IV concluded agreements with the Duchy of Lorraine and the Swiss. He worked for an alliance with the Protestant princes within the Holy Roman Empire. The French king also mediated the conflict between Venice and the pope so as to allow them to concentrate their attention on the Austrian emperor. As Henry IV expressed in a letter to the Maurice of Hesse-­Kassel, the goal was to create an anti-­Hapsburg league that would be “neither allied nor in ­union with the House of Austria.”24 Likewise, Cardinal Richelieu tried to coalesce the rebellious German states within the Holy Roman Empire in an anti-­Hapsburg league that could deter imperial troops from marching in the Rhineland or from joining Spanish forces in northern Italy and the Low Countries. When attempts to create an anti-­Hapsburg league of states failed due to Henry IV’s inability to reconcile existing rivalries among t­hose states,25 French rulers resorted to bilateral agreements that subsidized the efforts of ­t hose international actors that ­were waging wars against ­either Spain or Austria.26 “Wars by diversion” allowed French rulers to put significant pressure on the Hapsburg without risking to fight a two-­front war.27 As Richelieu noted, the ultimate goal of this strategy was to “keep . . . ​enemies occupied on all sides so that they could be invincible in none.”28 The Dutch rebels ­were the ally that received the most substantial support for a sustained period. From the end of the sixteenth c­ entury ­until the Dutch Republic gained in­de­pen­dence in 1648 with the Treaty of Münster, French rulers supported the Dutch rebellion with heavy subsidies in the Low Countries and they forced the Army of the Flanders to become embroiled in a lengthy war of attrition.29 This strategy created ­great alarm among Spanish rulers. Had the Dutch Republic become in­de­pen­dent, they could have coordinated a joint attack with France to partition the rest of the Low Countries.30 In turn, if France could have secured its northern frontier against a Spanish attack, it would have been able to proj­ect its power into the Italian Peninsula, to prevent imperial troops from joining the Spanish army, and to combine its forces with the Dutch for a two-­front war against Spain. Hence, securing the Low Countries had become vital to preserving the Spanish Empire and to undermining the pos­si­ble emergence of a Franco-­Dutch encirclement. The need to crush the Dutch rebellion led to a strengthening of Spain’s relations with Austria through the secret Treaty of Oñate (March 1617). Since the Austrian Hapsburg had been reluctant to unite forces with Spain in the Low Countries while it was confronting internal and external security threats, the Spanish king guaranteed “the protection of the House of Austria” in exchange for the Austrian possessions along the Spanish Road.31 The agreement was a  double-­edge sword for Spain: on the one hand, Philip III of Spain had made pro­gress in his attempts to obtain the support of the Austrian H ­ apsburg 75

chapter 3

against the Dutch rebellion; on the other hand, the growing dependence of the Austrian emperor on Spanish support risked spreading German conflicts to the rest of Eu­rope. It is in this context that the Protestant rebellion against the Austrian emperor in Bohemia,32 a distant Eu­ro­pean region with no importance for the ­great powers, risked expanding into a wider conflict. The po­liti­cal threat of the Protestant Union led Ferdinand II of Austria to request Spanish support.33 In turn, the growing interdependence between the two branches of the Hapsburg explains the urgency of Philip III, who mobilized troops in the House of Lower Palatinate despite the economic restraints that Spain faced: “­These mea­sures are so urgent that the council of finance must find a way. Germany simply cannot be lost.”34 The Holy Roman Empire was not vital for Spanish survival, but Spain believed that the collapse of the Austrian Hapsburg would have a domino effect that would also destroy the Spanish Empire. As Olivares concisely illustrated, “­After Germany would fall Italy, ­after Italy, Flanders, then the Indies, Naples, and Sicily.”35 Moreover, the emergence of a potential alliance between the Dutch Republic and the rebellious Protestant states within the Holy Roman Empire risked creating the possibility of a two-­front war against the Army of the Flanders, as Commander Ambrogio di Spinola warned:36 “[Without help] it is quite pos­si­ble that the House of Austria may be turned out of Germany bag and baggage. If the Protestants succeed in ­doing this, they w ­ ill then join the Dutch in the attack upon t­hese provinces. . . . ​If all the German and Dutch Protestants ­were to unite in attacking us ­after a victory in Germany, it would be hopeless for us to attempt to resist them.”37 The Spanish intervention in support of the Austrian emperor led to the stunning victory against the rebellious German states at the ­Battle of White Mountain (November 8, 1620). The ensuing occupation of the Palatinate (February 1623) and the Hapsburg advances in northern Eu­rope had the inevitable consequence of threatening not only minor powers (such as German states and Denmark) but also Sweden. Accordingly, France took advantage of the emergence of new enemies of the Hapsburg by subsidizing their war efforts, so that neither Austria nor Spain could increase their invasion ability by combining their armies. Therefore, French support of “wars by diversion” against the Austrian and Spanish branches of the House of Hapsburg compelled them to tighten their alliance and to take increasingly aggressive mea­sures to crush their internal and external enemies. In the end, France’s attempts to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem led to the formation of a rival-­based network of alliances—­France and Sweden versus Spain and Austria—­that posed the necessary conditions for war contagion.38 The spiral of intense security competition between France and the Hapsburg created a “cold war” that increased the risks of extending marginal conflicts to the ­whole Eu­ro­pean system. 76

France and the Thirty Years’ War

C u tti n g the Spa n i sh Roa d Even though alliances ­were useful to contain a potential attack by their enemies, French rulers could not be satisfied with this mea­sure, b ­ ecause allies could always renege or be defeated. The other way in which France tried to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem was by creating buffer zones that would disrupt the Spanish Road. The first area where France tried to establish a buffer zone by controlling strategic territory was the Rhineland. In addition to extending its “protection” to German states in the Rhine (such as the Elector of Trier), it tried to annex territories at the expense of minor powers that ­were sympathetic to the Hapsburg. The creation of gateways (portés) to Germany was necessary not only to prevent the Spanish and the Austrian Hapsburg from uniting their armies but also to allow the safe passage of troops through the Holy Roman Empire. The credibility of the French commitments rested on the ability to use force, if necessary, to protect allies against Hapsburg aggression. Although l­imited military incursions across the eastern French border (e.g., in Lorraine) had a defensive rather than expansionist purpose, opening safe passages for French troops could also be used to cut the Spanish Road or even launch an attack against the Hapsburg.39 Extending control on its eastern border would have certainly improved the French strategic position, but it would have diverted, rather than interrupted, the ability of Spanish troops to march along the Spanish Road. That said, creating a buffer zone in northern Italy had the benefit of cutting off the transfer of Spanish troops at the beginning of the Spanish Road and of preventing a u ­ nion of forces with imperial troops.40 The most illustrative example of French attempts to create a buffer zone is Richelieu’s plan to take control of the Valtelline.41 This narrow strip of territory, which lay between the Duchy of Milan and Tyrol, had historically been a cause of disagreement between the French and the Hapsburg, b ­ ecause it was the main passage through which Spanish and imperial armies could join forces.42As Wedgwood argues, the “Val Telline was the essential pivot of the ­whole Habsburg Empire. . . . ​Block the Val Telline and the ­house would fall.”43 ­After assuming the most influential po­liti­cal position in 1624, Cardinal Richelieu orchestrated a plan with the Duke of Savoy to retake the valley without triggering Spanish retaliation.44 In November 1624, he signed a secret agreement, based on which Charles Emmanuel of Savoy would attack the Republic of Genoa (a Spanish ally) while a small French contingent would occupy the Valtelline.45 Spain was caught by surprise, but it soon mobilized the Army of Flanders to prevent the interruption of the Spanish Road, which would have led to the loss of Spanish possessions in the Low Countries. Richelieu’s plan failed b ­ ecause of his inability to gather support from ­England and Venice against the Republic of Genoa and the Duchy of Milan, respectively. ­After French initial advances, Spain regained control of Genoa 77

chapter 3

and started marching in the Valtelline to expel the French. Confronted with the option of withdrawing or risking war against the surrounding g ­ reat powers, Richelieu de­cided to return to the policy of “war by diversion” to prevent the Hapsburg from re-­creating the “Charles V situation.” The Valtelline crisis shows the risks of escalation that the double security dilemma presented. A major war among all the g ­ reat powers did not break out in 1624 b ­ ecause the French could still resort to less costly mea­sures to prevent actualized encirclement and ­because the Hapsburg ­were not yet capable of joining their forces for a simultaneous attack. As the situation evolved from latent encirclement to actualized encirclement, France ­adopted increasingly aggressive mea­sures to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem. To summarize, since the end of the Italian Wars, the Spanish encirclement created a double security dilemma that compelled France to conduct risky mea­sures short of open war. In turn, the attempts to establish buffer zones that would prevent the Hapsburg from concentrating their forces threatened to curb the Spanish Road and led to a strengthening of the relations between the Spanish king and the Holy Roman Emperor. As John Huxtable Elliott points out in his analy­sis of the foreign policy of Olivares and Richelieu during the Thirty Years’ War, “Richelieu’s obsession with the dangers of encirclement by Spain was therefore paralleled by Olivares’ obsession with the French threat to the network of international communications on which Spanish power depended. What to France was a noose, was to Spain a life-­line.”46 The result was a spiral of intense security competition that led to the formation of a rival-­based network of alliances and to the adoption of increasingly aggressive mea­sures that led to the French decision to declare war on Spain in May 1635.

Step 2: War Initiation In this section, I examine the motivation and the timing for the French declaration of war on Spain (May 1635). I argue that France’s decision to launch an attack was a mea­sure of last resort to prevent actualized encirclement. The Hapsburg achieved two impor­tant successes: the decisive victory over Sweden in the ­Battle of Nördlingen and the repression of the revolt within the Holy Roman Empire culminating in the Peace of Prague. ­These diplomatic and military victories increased their invasion ability by eliminating all the internal and external security threats that prevented them from joining their armies and attacking France—­a case of concentration of forces. Before assessing the impact of t­ hese two notable events, I start this section by exploring the previous crisis: the War of the Mantuan Succession (1628–1631).47 Analyzing this conflict is impor­tant for two main reasons. First of all, the analy­sis of this “negative” case allows me to highlight the logic of 78

France and the Thirty Years’ War

war initiation, given that the situation both in 1630 and 1635 showed strong similarities. Moreover, although the crisis was settled without a major war, the War of the Mantuan Succession intensified the double security dilemma, and in the end, it only postponed the time for the final reckoning between France and the Hapsburg. Wa r of th e M an tua n Su ccessi o n The dispute over the succession in the Duchy of Mantua began in 1627 ­after the death of Duke Vincenzo II. The most legitimate claimant was Charles, Duke of Nevers, who had close ties with France. His potential succession concerned Philip IV of Spain, b ­ ecause the Duchy of Mantua included territories that surrounded the Duchy of Milan on its eastern and western borders.48 Had the Duchy of Mantua become a French ally, it could have been used to cut the Spanish Road. Spanish prime minister Olivares indirectly referred to the French threat in his advice to the king: “The duke of Nevers is the legitimate heir to all the Mantuan estates, and s­ imple justice is undoubtedly on his side. . . . ​Whilst Montferrat remains outside our control, we can never close the door firmly upon t­ hose who seek to disturb the peace of Italy. . . . ​ This is of the greatest value, and thus it follows that it is in the public interest for your majesty to hold Montferrat. . . . ​I desire more than anything e­ lse in the world to see your majesty master of Montferrat.”49 Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, governor of Milan, had already secretly formed an alliance with Charles Emmanuel of Savoy to challenge the inheritance of Charles of Nevers, and he invited the Spanish to intervene to partition the Duchy of Mantua between Casale and Montferrat. Olivares was aware of the risks of this military enterprise, from the financial difficulties of conducting another war while attempting to crush the Dutch revolt,50 to the potential French reaction. However, Olivares was convinced that a small contingent of Spanish troops could quickly control Casale and negotiate from a position of strength. His miscalculation about the ability of Charles of Nevers to hold Casale risked causing the outbreak of another major war in Eu­rope. Louis XIII of France reacted to the Spanish attack by crossing the Alps (February 1629), defeating the Duke of Savoy, occupying the strategic fortress of Pinerolo, and driving the Spanish out of Casale.51 In turn, the French advances in northern Italy provoked the retaliation of the Austrian emperor, who officially controlled the succession of the Duchy of Mantua as one of the imperial fiefdoms in Italy. Moreover, the decision of Charles of Nevers to cross the border into the Cremonese posed a direct threat to the Duchy of Milan. To forestall the French expansion and the threat it posed to his Italian possessions in Tyrol, Ferdinand II sent thirty thousand imperial troops to invade the Duchy of Mantua (August 1629). Although Richelieu was aware of the military superiority of his adversaries,52 the inability of his allies to function as a counterweight to the concentrations of forces by the united branches 79

chapter 3

of the House of Hapsburg forced Richelieu to escalate this international crisis. As David Parrott points out, “The strug­gle over Monferrato and Mantua was perceived in Paris, Madrid and Vienna as an extension of the wider Eu­ ro­pean conflict: France’s response to ­these new Habsburg military initiatives no longer reflected a concern to defend the inheritance and interests of Charles de Nevers but was part of a much wider concern to thwart the consolidation of Habsburg power.”53 The House of Hapsburg’s tightening grip on France highlights the link between the double security dilemma and war initiation. In the War of the Mantuan Succession, Richelieu was willing to escalate the crisis to prevent Spain and Austria from eliminating all of their internal and external enemies, connecting their territories, and joining their armies to attack the French kingdom—­a case of concentration of forces. Although Richelieu wanted to avoid an all-­out war ­because France was no match against the United Hapsburg, he would go to war even in a position of military disadvantage to prevent the reemergence of the “Charles V situation.” A dispute over the succession of a small territory in northern Italy in late 1627 nearly provoked a wider Eu­ro­pean conflict in the autumn of 1629. What prevented the explosion of this powder keg? The solution to the crisis came from the opposite side of Eu­rope: Sweden intervened against the Austrian emperor to halt his advances in the Baltic Sea, while the Protestant states in Germany resumed their rebellion.54 The emergence of ­these internal and external security threats compelled Ferdinand II to sign a separate treaty with France (Peace of Regensburg, October 1630). The Austrian emperor could no longer disperse forces while confronting internal and external security threats within the Holy Roman Empire.55 The resulting withdrawal of the imperial troops from northern Italy once again tilted the balance of power in the battlefield. Being incapable of maintaining another war theater in addition to the one against the Dutch rebels in the Low Countries without Austria’s support, Olivares begrudgingly accepted Charles of Nevers as the ruler of Mantua and Montferrat and agreed to transfer the strategic fortress of Pinerolo from Savoy to France (Treaty of Cherasco, June 1631). In the end, the War of the Mantuan Succession highlights the logic of war initiation. Its similarities with the situation that led to the French attack on Spain in May 1635 are striking. Richelieu intervened militarily in spite of French military weakness to prevent an increase in the Hapsburg’s invasion ability, which would have ensued if Spain and Austria had been able to concentrate their forces against France. Instead, Spain intervened to prevent the French from increasing their invasion ability by cutting the Spanish Road. As I mentioned in the previous section, severing ties from the Spanish Netherlands to the mainland had been Spain’s strategic nightmare since the beginning of the Dutch rebellion, b ­ ecause it could have created the emer80

France and the Thirty Years’ War

gence of a Franco-­Dutch encirclement. Austria needed to not only preserve its possessions in Italy but, most of all, to prevent a collapse of their Spanish ally on which they relied heavi­ly to control the rebellions of German Protestant states within the Holy Roman Empire. The emergence of a new, more pressing threat that diverted Ferdinand II’s attention (the Swedish advances in the Holy Roman Empire) prevented a major war that nobody planned for or wanted, but the War of the Mantuan Succession had “the most serious medium-­term result . . . ​to change the possibility of an unlimited military confrontation between Spain and France into a probability.”56 The years that followed the Treaty of Cherasco ­were characterized by an intensification of the double security dilemma. The increasingly aggressive mea­sures that both France and the Hapsburg a­ dopted created the conditions for the major war, which eventually broke out in May 1635. R oad to th e F ren ch D ecla rati o n o f W a r Richelieu’s diplomatic victory proved to be counterproductive ­because it showed to both Philip IV of Spain and Ferdinand II of Austria the importance of keeping the two branches of the House of Hapsburg undivided. The growing dependence of the Austrian emperor on Spanish support to crush the German rebellious states and to stop the Swedish incursions led not only to a major involvement of Spanish troops within the Holy Roman Empire but also to the increasing commitment of Ferdinand II to support Spain against the Dutch rebellion. Acknowledging the impossibility of Spain containing the French threat without the Austrian emperor’s support, Olivares tried “to ­settle ­matters in the Empire . . . ​, get an honourable peace with the Dutch, reach a settlement in Italy, restore the Duke of Lorraine, and sow in France the discord it so handsomely deserves.”57 In par­t ic­u­lar, negotiating a settlement with the Dutch rebels and defeating the enemies of Ferdinand II in the Holy Roman Empire w ­ ere two essential strategies to unite imperial and Spanish troops against France.58 The first strategy aimed to reach a favorable settlement with the Dutch Republic. The impact of the War of the Mantuan Succession on this policy change is evident if one considers that Olivares staunchly opposed peace talks in 1629–1630. The difficulties of opening a new war theater in northern Italy reflected Spain’s inability to fight a simultaneous war against France and the Dutch rebels. An armistice with the Dutch Republic was necessary “in order to apply the army [of Flanders] to a more con­ve­nient task” (as Philip IV informed the regent of the Spanish Netherlands)—­namely, “the likelihood of war with France on all our borders with [the French] king.”59 France was considered the main threat to the House of Hapsburg; without its subsidies, the Dutch would not be able to continue their rebellion and they would come to terms with the Spanish king. 81

chapter 3

Concluding a truce with the Dutch Republic would have allowed Spain to concentrate its war efforts against the enemies of the Austrian emperor. Olivares’s diplomatic failures increased Spanish incentives to tie the destiny of Ferdinand II to the Spanish cause.60 Since the Army of Flanders could not be fully mobilized against a single ­enemy, Spain needed Austria’s support to eliminate Dutch Republic re­sis­tance and to contain French aggression. However, Ferdinand II had always been reluctant to divert his troops while he still had to secure his reign against the rebellion of the Protestant estates within the Holy Roman Empire. His l­ imited intervention in the War of the Mantuan Succession made it even clearer that Ferdinand II could not afford to disperse his imperial troops across dif­fer­ent war theaters, especially ­after Sweden took advantage of the diversion of the campaign in northern Italy to advance to the heart of the Holy Roman Empire. Olivares tried to overcome Austrian reluctance to intervene in western Eu­rope by increasing Spanish involvement on the side of Ferdinand II so that the joint Hapsburg forces could contain the advances of Swedish forces and crush once and for all the Protestant aspirations of autonomy within the Holy Roman Empire. The War of the Mantuan Succession also had an impor­tant impact on Richelieu’s foreign policy. Although the military campaign in northern Italy ended with a favorable settlement, Ferdinand II’s decision to move imperial troops showed that France would not have been capable of resisting two power­ful enemies at once. The tightening of the Spanish encirclement compelled the French cardinal to double the efforts to prevent actualized encirclement.61 Richelieu’s strategy ­after 1631 continued to prioritize the creation of a buffer zone in the Rhineland by extending French protection to German states (such as the Elector of Trier) and by annexing ­those minor powers that resisted its efforts (such as the Duchy of Lorraine). Moreover, he increased efforts to finance the “wars by diversion” of French allies. In par­tic­u­lar, France heavi­ly supported the advances of Sweden by agreeing to provide one million livres each year (the Treaty of Bärwalde, January 1631) in exchange for Swedish promise to keep its army (thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry) as a counterweight to Ferdinand II’s troops.62 In November 1634, a­ fter the Swedish defeat in the ­Battle of Nördlingen, Louis XIII even agreed to provide Sweden with twelve thousand troops. However, in order to distance himself from Sweden and prevent open conflict with the Hapsburgs, Louis ensured the troops would not be French. Olivares’s and Richelieu’s strategies between June  1631 and May  1635 greatly increased the chances of war. As Elliott notes, one can acknowledge that “an open state of war . . . ​already existed for some months before the formal French declaration.”63 However, it would be a m ­ istake to think that ­either Spain or France was planning for a major war. Coercive diplomacy was used as a diplomatic tool to obtain their respective goals while avoiding a direct military confrontation. For instance, Olivares opposed t­ hose 82

France and the Thirty Years’ War

members within the Spanish Council of State, who in 1634, advocated a preventive strike against France. In February 1635, he restated the need to prioritize the war against the Dutch Republic.64 Likewise, Richelieu’s refusal to enter into open alliances against the Hapsburg with ­either the Dutch rebels or Sweden shows his concern with avoiding Hapsburg retaliation. Nonetheless, the increasing assertiveness of Spanish and French foreign-­policy decisions paved the way to general war. In the end, Olivares’s and Richelieu’s strategies ­adopted ­after 1631 ­were defensively motivated, and both prime ministers pursued a cautious foreign policy to avoid unintended escalation of local crises. Their willingness to avoid a wider Eu­ro­pean conflict leads to the question, why did a major war break out if nobody wanted it? Hapsbu rg Con cen trati o n o f Fo rces For a de­cade, Richelieu tried all mea­sures short of war to prevent the Austrian and Spanish branches of the House of Hapsburg from joining forces. By the beginning of 1635, it became clear that his strategies of creating a network of alliances and of subsidizing “wars by diversion” w ­ ere failing. France’s attempts to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem had the opposite effect of worsening it b ­ ecause they pushed Ferdinand II to coordinate his military objectives with Philip IV. Spanish refusal to release the Elector of Trier, who officially accepted French protection from April 1632, created the casus belli.65 Yet, two other events ­were pivotal in determining the French decision to declare war on Spain on May 19, 1635: the Swedish debacle at the ­Battle of Nördlingen and the Peace of Prague.66 Austrian diplomatic and military victories eliminated internal and external security threats that prevented the emperor from joining Spain in crushing the Dutch rebellion and ultimately from launching a mutual attack with Spain against France. Therefore, changes in the invasion ability of its surrounding states—­concentration of forces—­compelled France to initiate war. The first episode that brought Eu­rope closer to the edge of a major conflagration was the imperial and Spanish victory at the ­Battle of Nördlingen (September 6, 1634).67 Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus had started preparing for an intervention in the Thirty Years’ War since late 1627, ­after Wallenstein’s army advanced in northern Germany and began to coordinate a joint attack in the Baltic with Poland. The break in the lasting war with Poland through French mediation (Truce of Altmark, September 1629) allowed Gustavus Adolphus to prepare to land on the Eu­ro­pean continent and to conduct a series of victorious campaigns in the Holy Roman Empire.68 Although Richelieu found it difficult to control his ally and to align their strategic objectives,69 Swedish victories had proven to be an effective counterweight to the Hapsburg advances in the Rhineland. However, the tide started 83

chapter 3

to turn a­ fter the Swedish king was killed in the ­Battle of Lützen (November 16, 1632). The greater advances of imperial and Spanish troops in southern Germany and the victory at Nördlingen decisively undermined Swedish ability to maintain an army in the Holy Roman Empire. Bernhard of SaxeWeimar stressed the seriousness of their military debacle in the aftermath of the ­battle: “The g ­ reat misfortune is so bad it could not be any worse.”70 The other impor­tant event that compelled Richelieu to decide to initiate war against Spain was the beginning of negotiations between the Protestant states and the Austrian emperor. Ferdinand II tried to capitalize on the victory in Nördlingen to s­ ettle ­matters within the Holy Roman Empire.71 His goals ­were to remove internal opposition by the Protestant states, dissolve any hostile alliance, unify the troops of each German state within a single imperial army u ­ nder the command of the Austrian emperor, and liberate the Holy Roman Empire from current and ­future foreign invaders.72 The collapse of the French strategy of “wars by diversion” started with the termination of all alliances with Protestant states in the Holy Roman Empire. The dissolution of the Heilbronn League (April 1633) was followed by rapprochement between the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg and Ferdinand II at the end of 1634 (Pirna note) and by the dynastic alliance between the Elector of Bavaria and the emperor in January 1635.73 The tremendous importance of ­these agreements, which ­were ­later ratified in the Peace of Prague (May 30, 1635),74 was well captured by the Swedish chancellor Oxenstierna: “The emperor has achieved more in this peace than if he had won two b ­ attles of Nördlingen.”75 The diplomatic victories of Ferdinand II suddenly “awakened Richelieu to the fact that the defeat of the Swedes at Nördlingen had a singularly dangerous side.”76 Moreover, the French received worrying news about military preparations for a Spanish and Austrian joint attack against France.77 The imminent possibility of the Hapsburg uniting their forces for a mutual invasion explains Richelieu’s increasing sense of urgency and his decision to reverse his policy of avoiding overt commitments with French allies in order to avoid triggering Hapsburg retaliation. In February 1635, France signed an offensive alliance with the Dutch Republic to coordinate a joint invasion of the Spanish Netherlands, even though Richelieu had rejected the same Dutch proposal in April 1634.78 In April 1635, Richelieu agreed to conclude a pact (Treaty of Compiègne) that considered Sweden an equal ally to France and promised to declare war on Spain.79 In the end, between autumn of 1634 and spring of 1635 France’s worst nightmare was about to materialize: the re-­creation of the “Charles V situation.” The only option left to prevent the materialization of actualized encirclement was to initiate war, as Richelieu counseled Louis XIII in late 1634: It is certain that if the [Protestant] party is entirely ruined, the brunt of power of the House of Austria w ­ ill fall on France. It is also certain that a­ fter the 84

France and the Thirty Years’ War

recent setback [­Battle of Nördlingen], the party cannot subsist if it is not sustained by pre­sent and notable help and by greater hope of a power­ful name—it is certain that without such help, all the imperial cities would disarm, Saxony would come to terms. . . . ​It is certain, moreover, that even if France did not declare herself on this occasion, the House of Austria would be no less hostile to her, b ­ ecause it would conclude that she had only failed to do so out of imprudence, weakness, or fear. It is also certain that the worst ­thing that France can do is to conduct herself in such a manner that she would remain alone to bear the brunt of the emperor and Spain, which ­will be inevitable if she does not gather up the remainder of this g ­ reat party that has been substituting for a while in Germany. By such means, the worst that could happen to her would be to sustain for a while the expense of war in Germany. . . . ​Other­wise, it would be necessary to sustain the war in the heart of France without the assistance of the princes in whose states it would other­wise be waged.80

To summarize, French decision to escalate the crisis of Trier was the result of two events that would have increased the Hapsburg’s invasion ability: the decisive military victory of Hapsburg troops against Sweden in the ­Battle of Nördlingen and Ferdinand II’s diplomatic success in settling disputes within the Holy Roman Empire through the Peace of Prague. Richelieu could no longer resort to “wars by diversion” to prevent the Spanish and Austrian branches of the House of Hapsburg from joining their armies and to launch a simultaneous two-­front conflict against France. This imminent concentration of forces—­“the worst pos­si­ble situation that could arise”—­could only be ­stopped through open warfare against the Hapsburg.81

Step 3: War Contagion France’s declaration of war on Spain led to a cascade of military interventions by the other g ­ reat powers in the system. The rival-­based network of alliances that emerged during the double security dilemma pitched France and Sweden against Spain and Austria (figure 3.1).82 Each g ­ reat power was dragged into the dyadic conflict between Spain and France to prevent their own immediate rival from increasing its invasion ability.83 Sweden intervened ­because Austria (immediate rival) was advancing dangerously in northern Germany, threatening Swedish control of the Baltic Sea, and acquiring the ability to launch an amphibious assault (annexation of territory). The Austrian Hapsburg entered the conflict to secure Spanish support for the Holy Roman Empire, on which it relied to safeguard its possessions against Sweden (immediate rival) and to a long-­term internal stability against the German rebellious states (loss of great-­power ally by military defeat).

85

chapter 3

Figure 3.1. Logic of war contagion in the Thirty Years’ War

S w eden In order to comprehend the Swedish willingness to continue fighting against Ferdinand II in 1635, we first need to understand the reason for its intervention within the Holy Roman Empire in 1630.84 At first, Gustavus Adolphus de­cided not to intervene in support of ­either Frederick V of Palatinate or Denmark. Negotiations with ­England and the Dutch rebels to provide financial assistance to Denmark (Treaty of the Hague, December 1625) failed due to the historical rivalry over control of the Baltic Sea. Moreover, Sweden had to confront the most urgent threat of invasion posed by Poland, against which Gustavus Adolphus had been at war from 1621 to 1629.85 The strategic calculus of Gustavus Adolphus started to change in the summer of 1626, when imperial troops led by Wallenstein achieved a decisive victory against Denmark at the B ­ attle of Lutter (August 27, 1626) and continued their advances in the northern part of the Holy Roman Empire. Furthermore, the Swedish king became increasingly concerned upon receiving intelligence regarding military coordination between Poland and the Austrian emperor with the financial assistance of the Spanish king. Gustavus Adolphus concluded that the imminent defeat of the Danes would create the possibility of a two-­front attack by Poland and the Hapsburg.86 Indeed, in November  1627, the imperial commander Wallenstein was planning to launch a joint invasion of Poland against Sweden, as the following private letter to Sigismund III shows: We have come to know with certainty that you . . . ​have won a considerable victory in the principality of Holstein against the king of Denmark, the ­enemy of His Majesty the emperor. . . . ​One might easily be able to use such a sizable armada to seize . . . ​the entire kingdom of Denmark. The king of Spain would also thereby be empowered against his e­ nemy, and we too would then be able to regain our kingdom of Sweden much sooner and easier through the aid and assistance of the king of Spain—­something of which he already assured us. . . . ​We did not want to fail cordially to . . . ​seek your assistance against Sweden from His Majesty the emperor . . . ; for w ­ ere we to gain this support, Sweden might then be attacked from both one side and the other.87 86

France and the Thirty Years’ War

What has become known as the “Baltic design” was part of Olivares’s plan to block the Dutch trade by forming a naval alliance with the Hanseatic League while Wallenstein would crush the Protestant rebellion by gaining control over the bases of Mecklenburg and Stralsund. Hapsburg control of ­these ports posed a threat to the Swedish homeland b ­ ecause they could be used for an amphibious assault.88 Moreover, they would have allowed the Hapsburg to control the Baltic Sea, on which the economy and military power of Sweden depended. Hence, along with the rhe­toric of supporting “German liberties” against the oppression of the emperor,89 the Swedish manifesto stressed that Gustavus Adolphus’s war aim was to prevent his immediate rivals from improving their ability to launch an invasion:90 The Spaniards and the House of Austria . . . ​soon began to range the sea and fortify the port of the city of Stralsund . . . ; a t­ hing that so nearly concerned all the neighboring states and galled them so much that the King of Sweden, who from time immemorial had a right to the protection of the Baltic Sea, neither could or ­ought to suffer any further pro­gress to be made. . . . ​For Stralsund was then harassed and attacked on all sides, the gates crowded with soldiers to infest the Swedish Ocean; and as the highest piece of injustice, a very g ­ reat army . . . ​designed for Prus­sia against his Majesty of Sweden, u ­ nder the conduct and the command of Arnim, the emperor’s camp marshal. . . . ​Since the emperor has disconcerted and hindered the peace or agreement with the King of Poland, and on the contrary assisted him with a ­great many troops; since he caused ­whole armies to march into Prus­sia against his Majesty and the kingdom of Sweden, to ruin them.91

Although the Austrian threat of invasion was still pre­sent by the time France declared war on Spain, the renewed Swedish efforts in the war against Ferdinand II a­ fter the ­Battle of Nördlingen was all but certain. The military defeats in southern Germany and the inability to keep an army in the Holy Roman Empire while facing frequent mutinies increased the internal opposition to the war. Members of his council urged Chancellor Oxenstierna to s­ ettle for peace with Ferdinand II, even if it meant making g ­ reat sacrifices: “It was considered wisest and best to start a negotiation with the emperor, and extricate ourselves from the German war; if it cannot be done on honourable terms, then let us content ourselves with what­ever terms we can get; for the resources of the country are not adequate to the maintenance of ­great armies.”92 The decision to renew the alliance with France in the fight against the Hapsburg resulted from Ferdinand II’s unwillingness to come to terms in the aftermath of Nördlingen. A ­ fter settling the disputes with the Protestant states in the empire, the Austrian emperor tried to take advantage of his military superiority by offering the region of Silesia to Poland in exchange for the promise to launch a joint operation in the Baltic against Sweden. The annexation of territory that this alliance meant would have re-­created the situation that led Gustavus Adolphus to intervene in the Holy Roman 87

chapter 3

Empire ­after 1630—­namely, the possibility of a two-­front attack by the emperor and the Polish king. Richelieu’s mediation for a truce between Sweden and Poland (Treaty of Stuhmsdorf, September 1635) rescued Chancellor Oxenstierna from a desperate situation, but it increasingly tied Sweden’s destiny to French foreign policy. As a result of its increasing military dependence on France to guarantee its survival against the Hapsburg, Sweden entered an alliance with France that prevented Oxenstierna from signing a separate peace with the emperor. Austri a Sweden’s decision to continue to fight on the French side would not have led to war contagion if the Austrian emperor had stayed on the sidelines. Although the two branches of the House of Hapsburg had been cooperating, Ferdinand II’s decision to intervene outside the Holy Roman Empire was not assured. However, Frederick’s growing dependence on Spanish support to suppress his internal foes led him to agree to sending imperial troops to fight Spanish enemies in western Eu­rope. Even though the two branches of the Hapsburg ­were often considered a single entity in the rhe­toric of French rulers, Austria and Spain often disagreed on the prioritization of security threats and on the means to deal with them. Coordination between the two branches had improved following the settlement of the dynastic dispute (Treaty of Oñate, March 1617), but the Austrian emperor remained unwilling to commit imperial troops outside the Holy Roman Empire. Ferdinand II’s reluctance to assist Spain against the Dutch rebels was caused by the presence of internal and external security threats. ­Every time imperial troops achieved a decisive victory against an ­enemy, a new one emerged to challenge Ferdinand II’s authority. ­After crushing the Bohemian revolt in the B ­ attle of White Mountain and occupying the Palatinate, imperial troops had to face the intervention of the Danish king. ­After achieving a decisive victory against Denmark in the B ­ attle of Lutter, the Austrian Hapsburg faced the pos­si­ble resumption of the long-­term war with the Ottoman Empire.93 Indeed, in the summer of 1627, Ferdinand II wrote to the governor of Moravia requesting deployment of imperial troops a­ fter receiving worrying news that “the Turks and Bethlen Gábor are daily making such extremely suspicious military preparations and provisions that we can count on another incomprehensible break in the peace, a territorially damaging invasion and attack into ­those lands that neighbor them. . . . ​We consider it to be an absolute emergency and have, for that reason, consulted . . . ​to arrange for a number of cavalry and infantry troops to be set on the border between Moravia and Hungary as soon as pos­si­ble.”94 The reduction of the Ottoman and Danish threats seemed to give Ferdinand II the possibility of settling ­matters within the empire. Wallenstein’s 88

France and the Thirty Years’ War

advances in northern Germany should not be seen as expansionist but rather as attempts to negotiate with the Protestant states from a position of strength. However, imperial advances in the Baltic Sea led to the Swedish response, which prevented the Austrian emperor from continuing to assist Spanish troops in the War of the Mantuan Succession. Even before Gustavus Adolphus invaded Germany, Wallenstein mentioned the inability of imperial forces to confront multiple enemies. On October 10, 1629, Wallenstein warned Ferdinand II that to divert forces in the Low Countries or northern Italy would jeopardize the security of the empire: ­ fter all the troops I had to send to the Netherlands and Italy, ­t here are A no more than one com­pany of cavalry and three or four of foot left in the Empire. . . . ​Meanwhile, the few troops that I still have . . . ​must remain to keep an eye on ­things, ­because Sweden’s hostile intentions are becoming clear by the day. . . . ​Since ­there are everywhere states and ­others ill-­intentioned whose machinations may well cause a general uprising in the Empire and force Your Imperial Majesty to continue the war, no men can be spared in the coming spring, let alone sending reinforcements to the Netherlands.95

The presence of multiple threats increased Ferdinand II’s need for Spanish support, and it tied the destiny of the two branches of the House of Hapsburg. Accordingly, Austria could not stay on the sidelines when France declared war on Spain, ­because losing its ally by military defeat would have threatened its own survival. Moreover, the initial French military campaigns in southern Germany on the side of Sweden and Saxe-­Weimar risked undermining the military and diplomatic victories achieved at Nördlingen and with the Peace of Prague.96 The French attack put to test the settlement with the German states, according to which they would have fought u ­ nder the imperial commander against foreign invaders. Ferdinand II’s military response was vital to preventing resumption of the rebellion within the Holy Roman Empire. Furthermore, the French advances prevented the imperial troops from concentrating against the Swedish army, which remained the closest ­enemy to Vienna. In sum, war contagion was strictly related to the double security dilemma. Richelieu attempted to resolve the strategic vulnerability, which the Spanish encirclement created, by creating a network of alliances that would serve as a counterweight to the Hapsburg. The other Eu­ro­pean ­great powers became embroiled in the French-­Hapsburg rivalry to prevent changes in the invasion ability of their immediate rival: Sweden intervened to thwart territorial annexations close to its borders by Austria; the Austrian emperor could not stay on the sidelines and risk losing Spain as an ally. In the end, the checkerboard system of alliances that resulted from the double security dilemma created a zero-­sum game that tied the destiny of almost e­ very Eu­ro­pean state. 89

chapter 3

P e ace Settlemen t The Thirty Years’ War was the result of French attempts to escape Spanish encirclement. France’s need to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem and the Hapsburg goal of keeping the two branches of the ­house united lay at the foundations of the double security dilemma, war initiation, and war contagion. The characteristics of ­these three steps could also be identified in the conduct of the war and in the conditions that the g ­ reat powers advanced in negotiations to end hostilities. The Hapsburg continued their efforts to eliminate additional security threats that prevented them from concentrating their forces against the French threat. Spanish attempts to conclude a separate truce with the Dutch Republic and similar overtures of Ferdinand III to Sweden ­were symptomatic of this overarching goal. Furthermore, the Spanish and Austrian branches agreed not to come to separate terms. Austria’s concern that France could split up the House of Hapsburg is evident from the secret instructions that Ferdinand III gave to his emissaries conducting peace negotiations: It is known that all our enemies’ dissegni, intentions [plans, intentions], effort and work is directed to separate the Germans from the Spanish et secundum illud, divide et vinces [and according to the princi­ple divide and conquer], defeat one or the other or both successively. Therefore, Count von Trauttmannsdorff [chief minister of state] ­will above all ensure that it w ­ ill not come to such separation and ­will rather let go to rack and ruin that this to happen. To avoid this danger, one must ensure that Spain is included in the peace.97

Richelieu tried to end hostilities with the Hapsburg as soon as 1637, when he proposed that France would renounce claims over Alsace and Lorraine in exchange for Metz, Toul, and Verdun. Peace negotiations failed ­because of his request to include the Protestant states as parties in the peace, which would have undermined the Peace of Prague. When the attempt to come to terms with Ferdinand III failed, the French wanted to create a wedge between the two branches of the Hapsburg and to compel one of them to end the hostilities. For instance, Richelieu tried to convince the Elector of Bavaria to abandon the Austrian emperor, and he fomented the Catalan and Portuguese revolts against the Spanish king. The shift in power on the battlefield a­ fter the ­Battle of Rocroi (May 19, 1643) emboldened Richelieu’s successor, Cardinal Mazarin. France was now in a position to negotiate not only l­ imited territorial acquisitions but its ultimate goal of eliminating once and for all the possibility of a simultaneous attack by Austrian and Spanish forces: First, the acquisition of the [Spanish] Netherlands would form an impregnable bulwark for the city of Paris. . . . ​The frontiers would be extended up to 90

France and the Thirty Years’ War

Holland [Dutch Republic], in the direction of Germany, where ­there is also much to be feared, and up to the Rhine through the retention of Lorraine and Alsace, and by the possession of Luxembourg and the county of Burgundy. If France has anything to fear from the House of Austria, it can only come from the direction of Flanders and Germany, both ­because they can unite forces (­these countries being contiguous) and b ­ ecause . . . ​a single success of theirs . . . ​can immediately cause as much terror in Paris, which is close, as ­there was with the capture of Corbie and the loss of the ­battle of Honnecourt, and so oblige us to withdraw or at least weaken the forces employed at a distance, as in Catalonia and Italy, and leave t­hese places unguarded as was done for Corbie. The acquisition of the Netherlands would f­ree us from t­hese two fears forever. ­There would be no more junction of ­enemy troops, since Spain would not possess anything in that direction; and, having extended our frontiers up to the Rhine everywhere, . . . ​his fear of us would oblige him to conserve his good relations with this kingdom, all of which would contribute . . . ​to the separation that France has so much reason to desire between the House of Austria in Spain and that in Germany.98

The lack of a decisive victory throughout the course of the Thirty Years’ War prevented a negotiated settlement, ­because France and the Hapsburg continued to pursue incompatible goals with the conviction that they could shift the balance of power in the battlefield and increase their bargaining leverage. French attempt to break the Spanish encirclement required controlling the Spanish Road, supporting of the Dutch war of in­de­pen­dence, and eliminating the presence of the Army of Flanders from its northern border. Had France succeeded in its plans, it could have threatened Spanish possessions in northern Italy and in the Low Countries. Moreover, the inability to keep France weak would have prevented Spain from supporting Austria, which was heavi­ly dependent on the assistance of the Spanish king to control the Holy Roman Empire. Therefore, it is no surprise that the fight between France and the Hapsburg lasted u ­ ntil 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia was signed, and that the Franco-­Spanish conflict would last ­until 1659 (Treaty of the Pyrenees). Ultimately, the end of hostilities was more the result of war fatigue than of resolution of the roots of the conflict. Although France obtained territorial acquisitions and Spain was weakened by the recognition of Dutch in­ de­pen­dence, the pos­si­ble reemergence of the “Charles V situation” would haunt France ­until the end of the War of the Spanish Succession (1713).99

Assessment of Alternative Explanations The evidence provided in this chapter provides ample support for the encirclement theory. Spain’s presence on two dif­fer­ent borders created a double security dilemma for France, which tried to obviate its two-­front-­war 91

chapter 3

­Table 3.2 ​Competing explanations on the origins of the Thirty Years’ War Step 1: Double security dilemma

Author

Step 2: War initiation

Step 3: War contagion

Mearsheimer*

International anarchy and uncertainty of intentions

Spanish bid for hegemony (undertheorized)

Counterhegemonic alliance against Spain

Copeland

Undertheorized

Spanish preventive war to stop its deep and inevitable decline

Counterhegemonic alliance against Spain

Encirclement theory

Encirclement of France by Spain

Concentration of forces by Spain and Austria

Rival-­based network of alliances

* Mearsheimer does not analyze the Thirty Years’ Wars. My analy­sis is based on the logic of offensive realism.

prob­lem by creating buffer zones and seeking support of the g ­ reat powers that considered the Hapsburg to be their own immediate rival. France initiated war to prevent an increase in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers, which would be able to concentrate their forces a­ fter eliminating their internal and external security threats. Fi­nally, the other ­great powers (Austria and Sweden) intervened on the opposite side of their own immediate rival to prevent an increase in their rival’s invasion ability by ­either annexation of territory (Sweden against Austria in support of France) or loss of great-­ power ally (Austria against France in support of Spain). The findings of this analy­sis also challenge conventional wisdom on the origins of this major war. Neither the religious explanation nor hegemonic theories can account for the three steps that led to the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War. In the rest of this section, I analyze ­these alternative claims and show the lack of correspondence between their predictions and empirical evidence. ­Table 2.2 illustrates my predictions with two other leading alternative arguments. S t ep 1: Do uble Secu ri ty D i lemma I argue that the previous analy­sis of the France-­Spain security competition undermines the main alternative theories on the origins of the Thirty Years’ War. Domestic variables ­were not the primary motive for both ­great powers’ foreign policy, nor ­were counterhegemonic alliances against Spain formed as offensive realism and dynamic differential theory would predict. Arguments that stress the role of unit-­level variables such as religion or internal strug­gles for power cannot explain the consistency of French foreign policy from 1559 to 1635 despite a succession of rulers and the shifting

92

France and the Thirty Years’ War

influence of religious minorities.100 The clearest example is the continuation of French enmity t­ oward Spain before and a­ fter Henry IV converted to Catholicism (1593). Given the structural constraints that Spanish encirclement had placed on French foreign policy since the end of the Italian Wars, this consistency is unsurprising.101 Moreover, ideological explanations fail to account for the rivalry between Catholic ­great powers (France, Spain, and Austria) or for the alliance between France and Protestant states (such as Sweden, the Dutch Republic, and German rebellious states). The role of domestic politics played only a marginal role in limiting the strategies that rulers could adopt to ­counter their immediate rival. For instance, since the end of the Italian Wars, French kings faced periods of internal pressure by religious rebellions (the Huguenot revolts) and of attempted conspiracy by French nobles that hoped to foster a rapprochement with Austria on the basis of shared Catholicism of the two countries. This internal instability at times ­limited French ability to conduct an active anti-­ Hapsburg foreign policy, but this policy was always disregarded as soon as the domestic prob­lems ­were dealt with. However, the main tenets of French and Hapsburg strategies remained unchanged from the end of the Italian Wars u ­ ntil the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War. In the end, religion was mainly used as a rhetorical tool to justify decisions based on raison d’état, but it cannot be considered the driving force ­behind the war. As Peter Wilson notes, “The Thirty Years War was a holy war only for a minority of militants who did not necessarily hold this view. . . . ​Religion played a small role in justifications for hostilities that focused on l­egal and po­liti­cal rights. . . . ​Religion and politics remained distinct throughout the war.”102 Structural explanations can predict some dynamics of the double security dilemma, but they do not explain the intense security competition between France and the Hapsburg ­because the Eu­ro­pean system was not characterized by a state that could be considered a hegemon.103 ­These arguments fail to understand how the Spanish encirclement triggered the formation of rival-­based network of alliances and the adoption of aggressive foreign-­policy mea­sures by both France and the Hapsburg. Moreover, Spain’s decision not to take advantage of France’s weakness ­after the end of the Italian Wars undermines Mearsheimer’s claim that rational ­g reat powers ­will pursue any possibility to increase their relative power. Philip II of Spain ruled over a power­ful state in Eu­rope, extending his possessions from the Low Countries in the north to the Italian Peninsula in the south, maintaining a large army and navy in Eu­rope, and sustaining his reign eco­nom­ically through the gold and silver that came to Spain from the American colonies.104 However, Spain did not attempt to dominate the system. As the Venetian ambassador noted in 1559, Philip II’s primary motive was “not to wage war so that he can add to his kingdoms, but to wage peace so that he can keep the land he has.”105

93

chapter 3

S t ep 2: W ar I n i ti ati o n Understanding the impact of the increased Hapsburg ability to launch a two-­front war is essential to explain the differences between the French decision to attack in 1635 rather than in the War of the Mantuan Succession. The analy­sis of war initiation also undermines alternative theories that consider the outbreak of major conflict in 1635 as the result of a premeditated plan to ­either achieve or preserve regional hegemony. ­There are three main arguments to explain the escalation of the French-­Hapsburg rivalry. The first claim suggests that France’s attack was part of its bid for hegemony. Richelieu de­cided to attack Spain in May 1635 instead of escalating the War of the Mantuan Succession in 1631 b ­ ecause he was waiting for a more favorable opportunity to “take on the system” as France was growing in military power relative to Spain. T ­ here are at least two conditions necessary to sustain this argument: France was the most power­f ul state in the system, and it was more power­ful in 1635 than in 1631. Evidence shows, however, that France was not a potential hegemon and that its strategic position had worsened by the time of the attack. The French situation was not more propitious in 1635 than a­ fter the War of the Mantuan Succession. The ­limited campaign in northern Italy made clear to Richelieu that French troops w ­ ere incapable of sustaining a long military campaign ­because of their numerical inferiority and lack of military skills. Moreover, “their frivolity and feebleness [made them] not suitable for conquests that need time, nor for the preservation of what they conquer in any instant.”106 In spite of the French army’s weakness, France did not embark on significant military buildups.107 By the end of 1634, national forces included an estimated 45,000 infantry and 34,000 cavalry,108 and even a­ fter the declaration of war on Spain, the French army was not superior to its opponents—­the highest estimate puts French military personnel at 70,000– 80,000 infantry and 9,500 cavalry.109 Additionally, France’s financial difficulties intensified ­after 1632, leading to partial bankruptcy in 1634 and to the point that the ability to subsidize Richelieu’s “wars by diversion” was called into question.110 France’s insufficient financial and military preparedness became evident in the first months of the war, when the country was almost always on the defensive in a (sometimes desperate) fight to protect its borders. The “year of Corbie” is a case in point.111 In the summer of 1636, the combined Spanish and imperial forces captured Corbie, eighty miles from Paris, causing havoc and terror among the public and the council of the French king. Only the Austrian decision not to march to Paris saved the French army from a military debacle. In the end, France was not more power­ful than its adversaries ­either in 1631 or 1635, and Richelieu did not take any considerable steps to alter the situation ­until war became imminent.

94

France and the Thirty Years’ War

Furthermore, the motivation b ­ ehind the French attack was not preventive.112 Richelieu did not have a ­grand design that would allow France to extend its “national frontiers” or even to become the dominant power in Eu­ rope; rather, his coercive diplomacy was an attempt to escape encirclement without triggering a Eu­ro­pean war. To prevent the Hapsburg from joining forces had been the cornerstone of French foreign policy since 1559. Richelieu’s foreign policy since 1624 reflected this primary goal and it was implemented by a cunning combination of diplomacy and ­limited military campaigns. Richelieu considered open war against the Hapsburg a mea­sure of last resort, to be employed only when all of his other foreign-­policy strategies became unavailable, and he received “irrefutable evidence that Spain intended to launch a pre-­emptive strike into France in the spring of 1635.”113 As the French cardinal himself recollects in his memoirs, “If it is an action of singular wisdom to have kept all the forces of the enemies of your State occupied for ten years by the armies of your allies, using your trea­sury and not your weapons, then, when your allies could no longer survive on their own, it was an act of both courage and wisdom to enter into open war. . . . ​Your Majesty did not enter the war ­until it was unavoidable.”114 The second explanation views the Thirty Years’ War as the result of Spanish attempt to achieve hegemony over Eu­rope. Although Spain was relatively the most power­ful state in the region, it is doubtful that it was capable of bidding for hegemony. At the peak of its power during the reign of Philip II, Spain still lacked sufficient resources to undermine the French kingdom during the French Wars of Religion (1562–1598); to quench the Dutch revolt; or to financially sustain war in more than one theater. Even though its military situation improved considerably between the autumn of 1634 and spring of 1635, Spanish troops w ­ ere still insufficient to contain the rebellion of the Dutch Republic and to weaken France at the same time. Only uniting forces with the Austrian Hapsburg would have allowed Philip II to succeed against his enemies. An analy­sis of Spanish foreign policy between 1559 and 1635 also reveals its defensive character. Since the end of the Italian Wars, Spain aimed to keep France weak not with the goal of conquering it but to prevent it from destabilizing the Spanish kingdom. The prolonged fight against the Dutch rebels in the Low Countries should not be seen as part of an ambitious plan to achieve Eu­ro­pean mastery but as an attempt to keep enemies away from Spain: “The war which we have fought with the Dutch,” Philip IV wrote in 1626, “diverted our enemies in ­those parts so that, had we not done so, it is certain that we would have had war in Spain. . . . ​The costs was no less and the danger was greater ­because the armies of our enemies ­were nearer the heart.”115 Moreover, when the Eu­ro­pean situation seemed to ­favor Spain, as it did in the aftermath of the Valtelline crisis, the Spanish king did not order an attack against France.116 Quite the contrary, Olivares not only declined

95

chapter 3

to exploit the Huguenot revolts but indeed formed an alliance with France against ­England. The last argument explains the outbreak of major war in 1635 as the Spanish attempt to stop an inevitable decline and to preserve its hegemony in Eu­rope. I suggest that this explanation is flawed. Although Olivares’s foreign policy became more assertive ­after the War of the Mantuan Succession, the decision to launch an attack against France was not made ­until late 1634, when Spain was in a favorable position to wage war against France rather than in steep and inevitable decline. Olivares did not have a premeditated plan; rather, he took advantage of Ferdinand II’s willingness to coordinate the strategic goals of the two branches of the House of Hapsburg for the first time since Charles V (Treaty of Ebersdorf, October 1634). Ferdinand II had always been reticent in providing external support to Spain against the Dutch rebels, but in the autumn of 1634, he agreed to extend the guarantee of the Treaty of Oñate to all Spanish enemies. The defeat of Ferdinand II’s enemies had created the best opportunity to combine the Hapsburg forces with the aim of regaining control of the Low Countries and containing France. Olivares’s confidence about the imminent joint attack against France undermines the thesis that Spain launched a preventive war out of fear of its relative decline: Your majesty finds himself preparing at ­great expense to comply with the requirements of the alliance [with the emperor], in which it is expressly laid down, if not in so many words, that war ­will be declared against France. . . . ​ Despite fears that the Imperialists view with disquiet the prospect of a joint war against France, our latest dispatches from Germany take the fact of such a war as already accomplished.117

If ­there was a moment when the Spanish situation seemed to worsen considerably, it was in October 1630, when the Peace of Regensburg between France and Ferdinand II led to the withdrawal of imperial troops from northern Italy and to the Austrian emperor’s inability to aid the Spanish king against his enemies. Recollecting the War of the Mantuan Succession, Philip IV emphatically stated that 1629 was “the year that by common consent my Monarchy began visibly to decline.”118 Instead of escalating the l­imited war with France in northern Italy to prevent its deep and inevitable decline, Spain accepted the French diplomatic victory at the Treaty of Cherasco. This was certainly a surprising decision for Copeland’s dynamic differential theory. In sum, the French declaration of war on Spain was a mea­sure of last resort to prevent actualized encirclement. France did not premeditate the war ­after 1631, but it launched a preemptive strike when the concentration of forces by imperial and Spanish troops and a planned joint attack against France

96

France and the Thirty Years’ War

became imminent. The alternative explanations that view the origins of the major war as a Spanish attempt to arrest its decline or as a bid for hegemony by ­either France or Spain do not find support in the g ­ reat powers’ military power and foreign-­policy be­hav­ior. S t ep 3: W ar Co n tagi o n This analy­sis of the reasons for the diffusion of the French attack against Spain to the entire system clearly contradicts arguments that stress the role of religion. Catholic ­great powers not only formed alliances with ideologically incompatible states, but they also come to rescue Protestant g ­ reat powers from military defeat. For instance, Sweden’s decision to support France in its war efforts was made in spite of their religious differences. Chancellor Oxenstierna (Protestant) remained willing to fight the Austrian emperor (Catholic) with the French king (Catholic) in spite of the dreadful military status of the Swedish army a­ fter Nördlingen. ­Those scholars, who would foresee war contagion as the result of the formation of a counterhegemonic co­ali­tion, also fail to explain the alliance pattern of the Thirty Years’ War. The Eu­ro­pean balance of power was characterized by one state that was relatively more power­ful than its opponents (Spain) but was not capable of dominating the system. In turn, the lack of a preponderant state split alliances based on rivalry. States joined the side that did not include their own immediate rival and they intervened in the dyadic conflict between France and Spain to prevent their own immediate rival from increasing its invasion ability rather than to thwart a Spanish attempt to dominate the system.

Conclusion The Thirty Years’ War was caused by the latent encirclement of France (encircled ­great power) by Spain (surrounding ­great power). Since the end of the Italian Wars, France tried to eliminate its two-­f ront-­war prob­lem by forming alliances with states that considered the Hapsburg their own immediate rival and by cutting the Spanish Road, the line of communication that could allow the unification of the Spanish and Austrian armies. When Spain and Austria eliminated all their internal and external security threats by defeating Sweden at Nördlingen and solving the Protestant rebellion in the Holy Roman Empire (actualized encirclement), France declared war on Spain to prevent the Hapsburg from concentrating their forces in a simultaneous two-­f ront war. The other g ­ reat powers, Sweden and Austria, w ­ ere dragged into this dyadic conflict due to the rival-­based network of alliances that resulted from the double security dilemma. Sweden sided with France

97

chapter 3

to prevent Austria (immediate rival) from annexing territories across the Baltic Sea, an expansion that could have led to an invasion of the homeland. The Austrian emperor intervened on the side of his ally, Spain, which Austria heavi­ly relied on to ­counter its internal (rebellious German states) and external (Sweden, the immediate rival) security threats.

98

chapter 4

Germany and World War I

Since unification in 1871, Germany faced the possibility of a two-­front war: as one scholar wrote, “modern Germany was born encircled.”1 Germany’s (encircled g ­ reat power) attempt to “escape the deadly embrace” of France and Rus­sia (surrounding g ­ reat powers) caused the outbreak of World War I. Germany’s main strategy to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem was to prevent the creation of a Franco-­Russian alliance and, ­after it was formed, to provoke its split through the use of coercive diplomacy. The key f­ actor in altering German willingness to risk a two-­front war was Rus­sia’s decision to ramp up the construction of strategic railroads in Poland a­ fter the end of the Balkan Wars. Due to significant pressure by France and to the diplomatic debacles in the Balkans, Rus­sia significantly increased its ability to launch a simultaneous invasion with France by reducing the time needed to mobilize its army from weeks to a few days (actualized encirclement). The shift in Rus­sia’s ability to move its troops to the eastern border of Germany explains the decision to initiate and escalate the July crisis. Germany’s declaration of war on Rus­sia led to a cascade of military interventions by the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers based on the rival-­based network of alliances: Austria-­Hungary joined Germany to c­ ounter Rus­sia (immediate rival), France supported Rus­sia to contain their mutual immediate rival (Germany), and ­Great Britain intervened on the side of France and Rus­sia to oppose Germany (immediate rival). In the end, German attempt to prevent actualized encirclement led to a self-­fulfilling prophecy that plunged Eu­rope into a major war. This chapter highlights several components of my theory on the origins of major wars. Unlike the ­g reat powers in the other chapters, Germany’s unique geographic position did not allow the creation of buffer zones through territorial annexation without risking a two-­f ront war. German leaders had to resort to other mea­sures, such as coercive diplomacy, to undermine the operational ability of the surrounding ­great powers to launch a simultaneous war. Moreover, similar dynamics of escalation that characterized the First Balkan War to the July crisis stress the fundamental role played by Rus­sia’s construction of strategic railroads in Poland. Fi­nally, the 99

chapter 4

motivations of the other ­g reat powers to intervene in the dyadic conflict cover several ways in which states try to prevent their own immediate rival from increasing its invasion ability (loss of ally by military defeat or defection and annexation of territory along their borders). This chapter provides a novel interpretation that contributes in several ways to the current understanding of the origins of World War I. First, my argument challenges the claim that Germany provoked a continental war as part of its master plan to become the Eu­ro­pean hegemon. Quite the contrary, I show that German leaders resorted to war as a mea­sure of last resort, to be employed only when it was impossible to prevent France and Rus­sia from acquiring the operational capabilities to launch a simultaneous attack. German foreign policy, specifically the decision to escalate the July crisis, was driven by the defensive ­limited goal of preventing actualized encirclement. Second, the key distinction that compelled Germany to initiate war in 1914 was the Rus­sian construction of railroads in Poland, which enabled Rus­sia to quickly mobilize troops on the eastern border of Germany (general mobilization) and to implement a two-­front-­war strategy with France (actualized encirclement). This change in the invasion ability of the immediate rival explains the failed escalations in previous crises, such as the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), when Rus­sia backed down a­ fter initial partial mobilization against Austria-­ Hungary. In turn, this mechanism of escalation underscores the geographic dimension of war initiation. Germany’s decision to escalate the July crisis was not driven by the fear of f­ uture adverse power shifts, as power transition theory suggests, but by Rus­sia’s increased ability to proj­ect power and the resulting threat that it would conduct a mutual invasion with France. Third, existing theories explain some of the steps that led to the major war, mainly focusing on the enduring security dilemma among Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers or on the dynamics of escalation during the July crisis. ­These assessments, however, fail to provide an overarching framework that connects Germany’s need to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem to the mea­sures that the other ­great powers undertook to counteract ­these attempts (double security dilemma), to the German rationale for escalating the July crisis with the aim of preventing actualized encirclement (war initiation), and to the other ­great powers’ concern about their own immediate rival as the motivations ­behind their intervention (war contagion). To investigate the ­causes of World War I, I analyze diplomatic documents and military archives of the main ­great powers. I rely on German primary sources to analyze the first step of the double security dilemma, and I expand my assessment to French and British documents in order to understand the dynamics of escalation during the July crisis. The findings of this chapter have impor­tant implications for understanding the outbreak of ­f uture major wars. The current debate regarding the prospects for a U.S.-­China conflict usually considers World War I a good example of what ­will cause the next great-­power conflict, arguing that the 100

Germany and World War I

current hegemon in decline (United States) w ­ ill launch a preventive attack to thwart the rise of its challenger (China).2 Although my analy­sis shows that the current situation in Asia could become similar to the Eu­ro­pean system in the de­cades before World War I, the motivation b ­ ehind a potential major war in Asia is completely dif­fer­ent. I predict that China (like Germany) ­will face encirclement by two ­great powers (Rus­sia and India, similar to France and Rus­sia) and that its attempts to prevent them from acquiring the operational capabilities to launch a simultaneous attack w ­ ill trigger a double security dilemma and create the conditions for escalation to a major war. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, I provide an overview of the existing explanations on the origins of World War I. Second, I analyze the double security dilemma that Germany faced following its unification. I assess Otto von Bismarck’s diplomatic moves, French and Rus­ sian countermea­sures, and the kaiser’s increasing use of coercive diplomacy to break the Franco-­Russian alliance. Third, I explore the dynamics of war initiation by looking at the similarities between the First Balkan War and the July crisis and by assessing the variation that led to Germany’s decision to declare war on Rus­sia. Fourth, I show how the motivation for the other ­great powers’ intervention was driven by the concern about the increase in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival. Fi­nally, I assess the faulty logic of competing explanations for the origins of World War I.

Overview World War I is a fundamental case for the study of the ­causes of war and peace. This major war lies at the foundation of the discipline of International Relations (IR) and it still “remains the case to which nearly ­every IR conflict theorist is drawn.”3 The existing lit­er­a­ture on World War I is extensive and has been recently rekindled by the centenary of the war’s outbreak. In spite of the variety of accounts of World War I’s origins, four main explanations continue to dominate the field.4 First, the “primacy of domestic politics” school claims that the internal dynamics within the German state ­were the driving force ­behind the war.5 Fritz Fischer, the main proponent of this thesis, contends that German leaders caused foreign crises and exploited the fear of external threats to unify the German public and to arrest the rise of the Social Demo­crats. To safeguard their position in the threatened domestic status quo, German ruling elites orchestrated a premeditated plan for territorial aggrandizement and manipulated the July crisis to launch a preventive war against France and Rus­sia.6 Second, several authors concur with the Fischer thesis in identifying Germany as the state primarily responsible for the outbreak of World War I, but they stress that the conflict was caused by structural features of the international system rather than domestic variables.7 Although t­ hese scholars agree 101

chapter 4

in considering German be­hav­ior to be security-­driven, they disagree on the under­lying motive for its decision to launch a preventive war. John Mearsheimer argues that Germany was willing to fight a continental war (a war against France and Rus­sia) and even to risk a world war (a conflict that would also include ­Great Britain) to achieve hegemony in Eu­rope.8 Dale Copeland claims that German foreign policy was driven by fear about Rus­sia’s rise and that preventive war was a mea­sure of last resort to arrest Germany’s deep inevitable decline.9 Third, some historians challenge the “primacy of domestic politics” school and stress the impact of the international system’s structure, but unlike the previous explanation, they do not consider Germany to have planned a continental war.10 The war was the result of the failed attempt to break the ­Triple Entente by exploiting the rivalry between Austria-­Hungary and Serbia. German decision makers resorted to a strategy of calculated risk that would pre­sent the other ­great powers with a fait accompli by localizing the conflict in the Balkans. Germany’s miscalculation of Rus­sian resolve and the risk of losing its only great-­power ally (Austria-­Hungary) compelled Germany to stand firm and fight a major war that it had tried to avoid. In addition to downplaying the responsibility of Germany, some scholars in this school of thought emphasize the Rus­sia’s and ­Great Britain’s role during the crisis escalation in July 1914.11 Fi­nally, the “inadvertent war” thesis contends that World War I was an “accident” that nobody wanted.12 States acted for preemptive reasons due to the advantage inherent in ­going on the offensive and to the mobilization mechanisms that interlocked the Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers. Civilians’ lack of understanding of t­hese mechanisms provoked the adoption of diplomatic moves that set in motion a wheel that could not be s­ topped and gave the military control over the ultimate decision to go to war. As George Quester notes, “World War I broke as a spasm of pre-­emptive mobilization schedules.”13 Theoretical flaws and empirical anomalies characterize existing explanations on the origins of World War  I. Some arguments lack any persuasive evidence, while ­others capture only part of the dynamics for the outbreak of the war. Existing theories fail to provide a comprehensive theory that accounts for the intense security dilemma in the de­cades preceding World War I, timing and motivation for war initiation, and the logic of its contagion to the ­whole region. The reason for the incompleteness in existing scholarship is the fact that the “­factor of geography is one that not only Fischer but also his critics miss.”14 Although the German two-­front-­war prob­lem is often recognized as an impor­tant ele­ment in influencing its foreign policy, both historians and IR scholars fail to understand that this geographic variable connects the dif­ fer­ent steps that led to the major war’s outbreak.15 Latent encirclement, the possibility of a two-­front war against France and Rus­sia, exacerbated the intensity of the double security dilemma between Germany and the sur102

Germany and World War I

­Table 4.1 ​The three-­step logic of World War I Step to war

In­de­pen­dent variable

Dependent variable

Causal logic

Double security dilemma

The Franco-­Russian encirclement of Germany

(a)  Germany tries to prevent and then split the alliance between France and Rus­sia (b) R ival-­based network of alliances: Germany-­ Austria-­Hungary vs. France-­Russia-­ Great Britain

Germany tries to eliminate its two-­front-­ war prob­lem by trying to isolate France and maintaining the Austrian threat to Rus­sia

War initiation

Increase in Rus­sia’s invasion ability

Germany declares war on Rus­sia (August 1, 1914)

Germany attacks to prevent actualized encirclement: concentration of forces

War contagion

Increases in the invasion ability of the immediate rival

Major war (1914–1918)

France, ­England, and Austria-­Hungary intervened to prevent changes in the invasion ability of their immediate rival: France → loss of great-­ power ally ­England → loss of great-­power ally Austria → annexation of territory

rounding g ­ reat powers. ­After Rus­sia ramped up the construction of strategic railroads in Poland and Austria-­ Hungary became incapable of diverting some Rus­sian troops from the eastern border of Germany, German rulers de­ cided to adopt increasingly risky mea­sures to strengthen Austria-­Hungary’s position in the Balkans. The failed ­gamble of the July crisis led to the decision to escalate the war to prevent Rus­sia from becoming capable of uniting its forces with France against Germany (actualized encirclement). The other Eu­ ro­pean g ­ reat powers ­were dragged into the conflict ­because of the rival-­based network of alliances that had formed in the previous two de­cades. In ­table 4.1, I outline the observable implications of encirclement theory for each step that led to the outbreak of World War I. First, my argument is supported if German foreign policy was driven by the attempt to prevent France and Rus­sia from joining forces or to disrupt their alliance ­after it was formed. Second, Germany’s decision to escalate the July crisis should result from an attempt to prevent Rus­sia from increasing its invasion ability by constructing railroads in Poland and expanding in the Balkans at the expense of Austria-­Hungary. My explanation predicts 103

chapter 4

that ­German leaders preferred a localized conflict in the Balkans over a continental war against France and Rus­sia (theories of hegemonic war) or even worse, a world war that would involve ­Great Britain. Third, I expect that the alliance system that emerged in the de­cades preceding the war was driven by g ­ reat powers’ concerns about the immediate rival rather than ideological reasons or fear that one state could dominate the system. Furthermore, I predict that the logic of war contagion was caused by an attempt of ­every intervening ­great power to prevent the loss of one of its allies or territorial expansion by its immediate rival. My theory is undermined if one of the following hypotheses is demonstrated: first, domestic politics was the primary motive for any of the steps that led to war; second, evidence shows that Germany planned a continental (or even global) war to maintain or preserve its hegemony; third, the crisis slipped out of the hands of incompetent civilians; fi­nally, alliance be­hav­ior during the double security dilemma was driven by fear of German hegemonic goals rather than concerns by states about their own immediate rival.

Step 1: Double Security Dilemma From 1871 to 1914, all German rulers w ­ ere obsessed with Franco-­Russian encirclement, and their foreign policy revolved around the goal of preventing France and Rus­sia from acquiring the operational ability to launch a simultaneous invasion. As Helmuth von Moltke the Elder affirmed immediately ­after the end of the Franco-­Prussian War (1870–1871), “The most dangerous challenge to the continued existence of the new German Reich would be a simultaneous war against Rus­sia and France.”16 Since Germany could not extend its territories to create a buffer zone without triggering a two-­front war, the main option to prevent actualized encirclement was to create a network of alliances that would prevent France and Rus­sia from concentrating their forces against Germany by keeping them occupied on one front. The mastermind of this strategy was Chancellor Bismarck, who attempted to isolate France by forging alliances with all the other major Eu­ro­pean players. When the efforts to prevent a Franco-­Russian alliance failed, German rulers a­ dopted an increasingly aggressive foreign policy to hinder the surrounding ­great powers’ invasion ability and to break their alliance.17 The strategic moves that Germany undertook to guarantee its survival increasingly worried all the Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers and led them to strengthen their relations rather than loosen their ties with each other. First, French foreign policy had been driven by the goal of retaking the “lost provinces” of Alsace and Lorraine since the humiliating Treaty of Frankfurt (May 1871).18 However, France emerged from the Franco-­Prussian War weaker than its German neighbor and incapable of pursuing its policy 104

Germany and World War I

of revanchism without the support of other ­great powers. The increase in German military power drew France closer to Rus­sia to deter any potential invasion or, in case of war, to maximize the likelihood of victory. Second, Rus­sia’s relationship with Germany started to deteriorate as Bismarck and l­ ater Kaiser Wilhelm II tried to conclude an alliance with ­Great Britain. German rulers attempted to exploit the British conflict of interest with Rus­sia over the Eastern Question and over the control of Central Asia.19 Concern that Germany would form an alliance bloc with Austria-­Hungary and ­Great Britain was a fundamental reason for Rus­sia’s alliance with France. Fi­nally, Germany’s failure to force a rapprochement with ­Great Britain through a strategy of coercive diplomacy compelled the British to solve their colonial disputes with France and Rus­sia. The growth of German naval power since the end of the nineteenth ­century posed a serious threat to British survival ­because control of the North Sea would have increased Germany’s ability to launch an invasion of the British homeland and to cut the sea lanes that allowed ­Great Britain to maintain its colonial empire. P r eventi n g a Fra n co - R ­ u ssi a n A lli a n c e Germany’s exceptional geographic situation—­“surrounded by three g ­ reat Empires with armies as large as our own, any two of whom might coalesce against us”20—­created a double security dilemma that led to Bismarck’s policy of forming alliances with other states to keep France diplomatically isolated. The primary goal of the chancellor’s foreign policy was to prevent what he considered the “nightmare of co­ali­tions,” which would compel Germany to fight an unwinnable two-­front war: The idea of co­ali­tions gave me nightmares. We had waged victorious wars against two of the Eu­ro­pean ­Great Powers [Austria (Austro-­Prussian War, 1866) and France (Franco-­Prussian War, 1870–1871)]; every­thing depended on inducing at least one of the two mighty foes whom we had beaten in the field to renounce the anticipated design of uniting with the other in a war of revenge. This situation demanded an effort to limit the range of the pos­si­ble anti-­ German co­ali­tion by means of treaty arrangements placing our relations with at least one of the G ­ reat Powers upon a firm footing. The choice could only lie between Austria and Rus­sia, for the En­glish constitution does not admit of alliances of assured permanence, and a ­union with Italy alone did not promise an adequate counterpoise to a co­ali­tion of the other three ­Great Powers.21

The cornerstone of Bismarck’s foreign policy was to create a “situation, in which all the Powers, except France, have need of us, and are removed from the possibility of coalescing against us by the nature of their relations ­towards each other.”22 In order to prevent a co­ali­tion against Germany, the chancellor exploited conflicts of interest between the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat 105

chapter 4

powers so that they would become embroiled in disputes over colonies or on the periphery of Eu­rope. In par­tic­u­lar, Bismarck revolved his structure of alliances around the tensions between Austria-­Hungary, Rus­sia, and ­Great Britain over the Eastern Question.23 Rus­sia’s security depended on its ability to control the southern border. Facing a unified Germany on its western frontier, Rus­sian rulers w ­ ere concerned that a hostile power would be able to seize the Balkans or the Turkish Straits.24 Accordingly, Rus­sia intervened diplomatically and militarily in crises that involved the Ottoman Empire, such as the ­g reat eastern crisis (1875–1878), with the aim of creating a friendly state that could function as a buffer zone. Moreover, increased activity by Austria-­Hungary in the Balkans made it more impor­tant for Rus­sia to control the Turkish Straits. As Czar Alexander III ordered Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Obruchev on the eve of the great eastern crisis, “We should have one main goal: the occupation of Constantinople in order to establish ourselves in the Straits forever and know that they ­will always be in our hands.”25 Rus­sia’s goal of extending its influence over the Turkish Straits created growing tension with ­Great Britain. The weakening of the Ottoman Empire—­ the “sick man of Europe”—­and the potential expansion of Rus­sian presence in the Turkish Straits threatened Britain’s position in the Mediterranean Sea and its ability to secure the route to India.26 Moreover, Rus­sian actions in Central Asia, which ­were aimed at diverting British attention from Eu­rope, intensified the competition between the two g ­ reat powers. As the Rus­sian statesman Pyotr Andreyevich Suvalov told the British foreign Secretary Lord Derby in a private conversation in 1878, “Rus­sia does not want to invade India, nor to conquer Af­ghan­i­stan; but she does wish to establish herself in such a position on the Indian frontier as to be able to prevent ­England from interfering with her when she next moves on Constantinople.”27 To thwart Rus­sian expansionism, British rulers supported the claims of Austria-­Hungary in the Balkans, strengthened their protection of the Ottoman Empire, and occupied Egypt to secure control of the Suez Canal (1882). The memorandum that the permanent under-­secretary of the Foreign Office Edmund Hammond composed in October 1870 captures the British perspective over the Eastern Question: It is a m ­ atter of no small moment for the maritime Powers that Rus­sia should not be allowed to maintain a fleet of unlimited strength in a secure basin, inaccessible to the navies of other Powers who are excluded from the Black Sea by the Treaty which closes against them in time of peace the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, which would be ready at any moment to take forcible possession of the Straits, and to establish the Empire of Rus­sia at Constantinople. Look at the interest of ­England alone in preventing such a catastrophe. The land-­road to India lies naturally through the provinces bordering on the Straits.28

106

Germany and World War I

Fi­nally, the primary goal of Austria-­Hungary was to “keep Rus­sia off the Balkans”29 ­because Rus­sia’s cooperation with the Slavic separatist movements undermined the domestic stability of the dual monarchy and b ­ ecause a potential territorial expansion of Rus­sia into southern Eu­rope could potentially surround Austro-­Hungarian possessions.30 Particularly ­after the Treaty of Berlin ( July 1878), Austria-­Hungary became afraid that the newly created Bulgaria would fall ­under the influence of Rus­sia and that Romania would become a Rus­sian vassal state. This situation was unacceptable ­because, as the Austro-­Hungarian Foreign Office affirmed in August 1884, “Austria-­Hungary cannot allow the completion of the Rus­sian ring from Silesia to Dalmatia. A Slav conformation of the Balkan peninsula u ­ nder Rus­sian material or moral protection would cut our vital arteries.”31 The core of Bismarck’s strategy to prevent the nightmare of co­ali­t ions relied on the ability to unite Rus­sia and Austria-­Hungary in an alliance with Germany in the League of the Three Emperors (1873–1880).32 However, as the weakening of the Ottoman Empire exacerbated the security competition among Rus­sia, Austria-­Hungary, and ­Great Britain over the Eastern Question, it put the league u ­ nder serious strain, undermining Bismarck’s efforts to isolate France.33 The failure to keep Austria-­Hungary and Rus­sia within the same alliance compelled Bismarck to reshape Germany’s alliance structure. Germany tended to prefer Austria-­Hungary over Rus­sia, but at the same time, it signed bilateral agreements with Rus­sia to keep France isolated. Bismarck’s goal was to maintain the focus of Austria-­Hungary and Rus­sia on the Eastern Question without having to choose one over the other, regarding as desirable the “gravitation of the interests of Rus­sia and Austria, and their mutual rivalries, ­towards the East,” pushing “Rus­sia to be impelled to take up a strong defensive position in the East, and on her own shores, and to stand in need of our Alliance.”34 The result of Bismarck’s crafty foreign policy was a system of separate bilateral alliances with Austria-­Hungary and Rus­sia, which included secret provisions ensuring each against the other. On the one hand, the Dual Alliance with Austria-­Hungary (1879) consisted of a mutual defensive guarantee in case of a Rus­sian attack.35 This agreement was extended to include Italy, which approached Germany in 1882 due to its disputes with France in the Mediterranean Sea, thereby forming the T ­ riple Alliance. Bismarck de­ cided to include Italy for its strategic position in spite of its military weakness. An alliance with Austria-­Hungary and Italy would reduce the chances of a conflict between ­these two countries and, in turn, allow Austria-­ Hungary to concentrate its troops against Rus­sia: “Supposing France in alliance with Rus­sia undertook a war, Italy ­were on our side, . . . ​we should thus be f­ ree to employ elsewhere the troops, which we should other­wise have to place in or near the Alps.”36

107

chapter 4

Supporting the claims of Austria-­Hungary on the Eastern Question risked pushing Rus­sia to form an alliance with France. To prevent this hostile co­ ali­tion, Germany tried to persuade ­Great Britain to form an alliance to ­counter the Rus­sian threat.37 In exchange for German support for British interests on the Eastern Question, Germany required “­England’s active and armed support against Rus­sia.” It would not be sufficient if the support was “to limit herself, in the event of a war between ourselves and Rus­sia, to keep her eye on France,” given that “war between us and Rus­sia is a calamity for us, even if France did not take part. [Only if] we are absolutely protected in the rearm can we afford to enter into this strug­gle.”38 “Neither France nor Rus­sia w ­ ill break the peace, if they are officially told that, if they do so, they ­will at once find ­England against them for a certainty.”39 Germany increasingly supported British colonial policy (particularly regarding the occupation of Egypt), reaching a general understanding with the Mediterranean Sea Agreements (1887), but it could not obtain a security guarantee. The British government well understood the reason for and the methods by which Germany had tried to form an alliance with ­Great Britain: Germany is in a dangerous situation in Eu­rope. . . . ​The internal trou­bles of the Austro-­Hungarian Empire detract from its value to Germany as an ally. . . . ​In view of her endangered position in Eu­rope it was necessary for Germany “to endeavour to obtain the certainty of armed support from ­England for the contingency of an attack on Germany by France and Rus­sia combined; for if ­England be not bound to Germany, and His Majesty’s Government come to a general understanding with France and Rus­sia, or e­ ither of them, the position of Germany in Eu­rope w ­ ill become critical.” For t­hese reasons Germany was ­doing her utmost to create mistrust between Britain and Rus­sia and between Britain and France.40

The failure to extend the ­Triple Alliance to ­Great Britain compelled Bismarck to appease Rus­sia over the Eastern Question in order to prevent it from looking for the only other potential ally (France). The Reinsurance Treaty (1887) ensured benevolent neutrality in case of war initiated by a third country.41 Moreover, it included a secret protocol wherein Germany promised neutrality in case of Rus­sian intervention against the Ottoman Empire for control of the Turkish Straits. Keeping Rus­sia embroiled in the periphery of Eu­rope ensured that the czar could not concentrate his attention on his western border. As Bismarck revealed, “The ideal would be to draw Rus­ sia to Constantinople [and] to open the gates wide for her in anticipation of the collapse of the northern colossus and of war with ­England as the natu­ ral result of such a change of direction.”42 The failure to orchestrate an alliance with G ­ reat Britain, the duplicity of Bismarck’s foreign policy over the Eastern Question, and the decision to for108

Germany and World War I

bid loans to Rus­sia planted the seeds of the Franco-­Russian rapprochement.43 Bismarck’s dismissal (1890) reinforced the tendency in German circles to seek reconciliation with ­England instead of a renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty with Rus­sia. Kaiser Wilhelm II and the new chancellor Leo von Caprivi could not maintain an agreement that risked undermining the ­Triple Alliance.44 Moreover, the kaiser was convinced that his personal friendship with Czar Alexander III would be sufficient to reduce Rus­sian fears about the Austro-­ Hungarian and British claims on the Eastern Question.45 German refusal to prolong the Reinsurance Treaty, the renewal of the ­Triple Alliance, and signs that ­Great Britain intended to join an alliance with Germany and Austria-­Hungary risked leaving Rus­sia diplomatically isolated. The only option was to improve relations with the other ­great power that was left out of Bismarck’s network of alliances: France. Negotiations between the two countries started ­after the renewal of the ­Triple Alliance and led to the conclusion of a secret defensive alliance in 1892.46 The Franco-­ Russian military convention prescribed coordination of their mobilizations to launch a two-­front war against Germany. France would support Rus­sia in case of an attack by Germany or Austria-­Hungary, and Rus­sia, in Alexander III’s words, “must immediately hurl ourselves upon the Germans” in case of an attack by Germany or Italy.47 B r eaki n g the Fra n co - R ­ u ssi a n A lli a n c e The establishment of the Franco-­Russian alliance—­“a military alliance with a direct anti- ­German tendency, with the ultimate intention of smashing Germany”—­marked the end of Bismarck’s attempt to prevent the formation of the nightmare of co­ali­tions.48 Given the inability to create a buffer zone on its borders without triggering a two-­front war, Germany de­cided to pursue a rapprochement with G ­ reat Britain. The main strategy to achieve this goal was to develop German interests outside Eu­rope. German elites ­were convinced that this approach would show ­Great Britain the dangers that the Franco-­Russian alliance posed to its control of India and the Mediterranean Sea.49 As Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow stated, “Your Majesty [Kaiser Wilhelm II] is absolutely correct in the belief that the En­glish must now come to us. . . . ​­England’s trou­bles w ­ ill increase in the coming months, and with them ­will rise the price we ­shall be able to demand.”50 Growing tensions with France and Rus­sia pushed G ­ reat Britain into Germany’s arms and facilitated the conclusion of a security guarantee in Eu­rope. The implementation of this strategy required the extension of Germany’s presence in the world and, in turn, the construction of a High Seas Fleet to coerce ­Great Britain into an alliance. As Kaiser Wilhelm II stated in 1906, “­England’s attitude ­will remain unchanged ­until we are so strong at sea that we become desirable allies.”51 But rather than bringing ­Great Britain closer to Germany, the global German foreign policy (Weltpolitik) had the opposite 109

chapter 4

effect, pushing the British to resolve their disputes with their historical rival, France.52 The growth of the German navy threatened British survival ­because it would allow Germany to control the North Sea and to cut the sea lanes that connected the British Empire to the motherland. In the end, the deterioration of Anglo-­German relations led to the entente cordiale between France and ­Great Britain (April 1904), an agreement that settled ­those states’ colonial disputes.53 The rapprochement between France and ­Great Britain shocked Germany and precluded almost any possibility to escape encirclement.54 Although France would not have altered the status quo out of fear of British intervention, “with E ­ ngland’s support the revenge idea might one day come to life again.”55 The German response of seeking to prevent France and Rus­sia from concentrating their forces in a simultaneous attack relied on the use of coercive diplomacy to break up the Anglo-­French entente and the Franco-­Russian alliance.56 The first attempt to “destroy the possibility of a Russian-­French-­British alliance”57 emerged during the first Moroccan crisis (March 1905–­May 1906), when the kaiser supported the sovereignty of the sultan against French claims over Morocco.58 However, Germany did not achieve the goal of creating a wedge between ­Great Britain and France; quite the contrary, the crisis strengthened the entente cordiale, extended British concerns about German actions, and facilitated an Anglo-­Russian rapprochement. Germany could have resorted to coercive diplomacy and even threaten war with France, ­because Rus­sia could not have put pressure on the eastern border of Germany due to the outbreak of the Russo-­Japanese War (February 1904–­September 1905).59 Czar Nicholas II could not have come to support the French colonial claims while Japan attacked Rus­sia. French rulers ­were unwilling to intervene on the side of Rus­sia to prevent tensions with ­Great Britain, which had established an alliance with Japan (January 1902). The kaiser tried to exploit the French reluctance to intervene in the Russo-­ Japanese War and sought a rapprochement with the czar. The two rulers met on a cruise and signed the secret treaty of Björkö (July 24, 1905), which gave mutual defensive support in case Rus­sia or Germany ­were attacked by another Eu­ro­pean ­great power.60 The agreement was received with jubilation by the kaiser ­because it would have broken the Franco-­Russian alliance: “My eyes ­were brimming with tears of happiness. . . . ​T he morning of 24 July 1905 at Björkö has become a turning-­point in the history of Eu­rope, thanks to the grace of God; and a ­great relief for my dear fatherland, which at last be freed from the dreadful clutch of the Gallo-­Russian pincers.”61 To Wilhelm II’s consternation, the dream of escaping the German two-­ front-­war prob­lem did not last long. The treaty was not ratified by the Rus­ sian government, which had not been consulted by the czar during the negotiations, b ­ ecause the Treaty of Björkö would have undermined the alliance with France. Even worse, the combination of German coercive diplo110

Germany and World War I

macy and the weakness of the Rus­sian army a­ fter the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 1905), which sanctioned the Japa­nese victory, compelled the other g ­ reat powers to strengthen their relations. As the famous Crowe memorandum stated in 1907, “The Anglo-­French entente had acquired a dif­fer­ent significance, from that which it had at the moment of its inception. Then ­there had been but a friendly settlement of par­tic­u­lar outstanding differences;  .  .  . ​now ­there had emerged an ele­ment of common re­sis­tance to outside dictation and aggression, a unity of special interests tending to develop into active co-­operation against a third Power. It is essential to bear in mind that this new feature of the entente was the direct effect produced by Germany’s effort to break it up.”62 The last link of the ring of encirclement was fi­nally concluded with the Anglo-­Russian Convention of 1907, which ended the ­Great Game in Central Asia and eliminated the main conflict between the British and Rus­sian governments.63 In spite of Sir Edward Grey’s reassurance of the nonmilitary nature of the agreement with Rus­sia, Kaiser Wilhelm II considered it the last step in the encirclement of Germany and a threat to its survival: “The Franco-­ Russian Alliance is a military alliance first and foremost against us (on the pretense of a threatened German attack). ­England in 1904–05 joined this notoriously anti-­German co­ali­tion and offered France military assistance on the Continent. . . . ​­England always forgets that the Russo-­French alliance is a military alliance with a direct anti-­German tendency, with the ultimate intention of smashing Germany.”64 The feeling of isolation was now complete. Germany was surrounded by hostile g ­ reat powers. Eu­rope was divided in two opposite rival-­based alliance systems and Germany could only resort to increasingly aggressive mea­sures to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem. Chancellor von Bülow expressed well the potential escalation that the two-­front-­war prob­lem could generate: “A policy aiming at the encirclement of Germany and seeking to form a ring of Powers in order to isolate and paralyze it would be disastrous for the peace of Eu­rope. The forming of such a ring would not be pos­si­ble without exerting some pressure. Pressure provokes counter-­pressure. And out of pressure and counter-­pressure fi­nally explosions may arise.”65 In sum, concerns over the Franco-­Russian encirclement dominated German foreign policy ­toward the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers. German leaders, from Bismarck to Kaiser Wilhelm, tried to prevent France and Rus­sia from acquiring the operational capabilities to launch a two-­front war. This goal required preventing the two surrounding g ­ reat powers from forging a military alliance and from concentrating their forces against Germany. The strategies that German rulers undertook to eliminate the possibility of a two-­ front war, however, led to the very outcome they ­were trying to prevent—­ namely, the creation of a network of hostile alliances. The response of France, Rus­sia, and ­Great Britain triggered a double security dilemma that created the conditions for the outbreak of war. As Henry Kissinger synthesizes, “In 111

chapter 4

trying to deal with its worst nightmare—an alliance between France and Russia—­Germany made this alliance inevitable. As German defense was geared to coping with a two-­front war, it presented an increasing threat to all its neighbors.”66

Step 2: War Initiation Why did Germany declare war on Rus­sia on August 1, 1914? Why did German rulers refrain from escalating previous crises in the Balkans? I argue that Germany de­cided to initiate a conflict when France and Rus­sia became capable of concentrating their forces in a two-­front war (actualized encirclement). This scenario materialized ­after Rus­sia’s decision to ramp up construction of strategic railroads in Poland. Moreover, the progressive decline of Austria-­Hungary hindered its ability to divert Rus­sian forces from a potential invasion of Germany’s eastern border. When Czar Nicholas II issued the order of general mobilization (July 30, 1914), Kaiser Wilhelm II was compelled to escalate the July crisis to rescue Austria-­Hungary from a conflict with Rus­sia and to avoid remaining isolated against France and Rus­sia. ­After the completion of the ring of hostile alliances with the T ­ riple Entente, Germany considered its survival to be threatened. As the kaiser pointed out, “As long as Salisbury’s policy of co-­operating with the ­Triple Alliance was adhered to, the Eu­ro­pean equilibrium was ­there and was assured; for Gaul-­Russia, allied against us, had to keep quiet. When E ­ ngland joined Rus­sia at Reval in 1907 they both became insolent and have ever since—­relying on ­England—­threatened us and Eu­rope with war. Thus, the Eu­ro­pean equilibrium has been upset.”67 In order to prevent the concentration of Franco-­Russian forces, German rulers resorted to coercive diplomacy and undertook increasingly risky be­hav­ior in response to a series of crises in the Balkans. T ­ hese actions ­were intended to undermine the ­Triple Entente and reinforce Austria-­Hungary’s position as a counterweight to Rus­sia. An analy­sis of the coercive game that characterized the First Balkan War not only sheds light on the dynamics of war initiation during the July crisis, but it also underlines the key variation that determined peace in one case and war in another. Both crises shared common features—­the use of coercive diplomacy to break the ­Triple Entente and arrest Austria-­Hungary’s decline, the German blank check to Austria-­Hungary, and Germany’s hesitation ­after the Rus­sian order of partial mobilization—­but the decisive ­factor that compelled Germany to escalate the July crisis was the Rus­sian construction of strategic railroads in Poland and the czar’s order of general mobilization. This crucial decision was in turn influenced by the “French blank check”—­ namely, President Raymond Poincaré’s willingness to exploit the Balkan crisis to avenge the humiliation of Sedan. The goal under­lying the German use of coercive diplomacy in the localized conflict between Austria-­Hungary 112

Germany and World War I

and Serbia—­breaking up the ­Triple Entente’s encirclement—­had the opposite effect of eliminating the obstacles that prevented France and Rus­sia from launching a simultaneous attack. Facing the fateful prospect of strategic surrender if they did not back up Austria-­Hungary, German rulers had no option but to risk a continental war against the nightmare of co­ali­tions. In sta bili ty i n th e Ba lka n s The assassination of the Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand by South Slav nationalist Gavrilo Princip initiated the July crisis, but Eu­rope had already been on the verge of war during the First Balkan War (October 1912–­ May 1913). The Balkans had been a powder keg since the nineteenth ­century, but the formation of the T ­ riple Entente in 1907 created ripe conditions for a major conflagration. Serbia and Slavic groups within Austria-­Hungary exploited he unstoppable erosion of power of the Ottoman Empire. They de­cided to stop t­ hese disintegrating tendencies within the Austro-­Hungarian Empire by annexing Bosnia-­Herzegovina.68 The crisis that pitted Austria-­Hungary against Serbia (Bosnian crisis, October 1908–­April 1909) was resolved by the mediation of Germany and Rus­ sia’s allies (France and G ­ reat Britain). In spite of this diplomatic victory for Austria-­Hungary and Germany, the annexation of Bosnia-­Herzegovina had the downside of triggering a negative Rus­sian response.69 First, the crisis revealed the weakness of Rus­sian armed forces and led to a push within Rus­ sia t­oward modernization. Second, Rus­sia ­adopted a more assertive foreign policy, actively supporting Balkan states against Austria-­Hungary. Fi­nally, the Bosnian crisis led to a tightening of the encirclement of Germany, as members of the ­Triple Entente became increasingly unwilling to back down in ­future crisis out of fear of undermining their alliance. As the Rus­sian ambassador to Paris emphasized in the aftermath of the crisis, it is necessary “to bind ourselves still more closely to France and ­England in order to oppose in common the further penetration of Germany and Austria in the Balkans.”70 It was in this situation of instability and increasing tension between Austria-­ Hungary and Serbia that a Eu­ro­pean conflagration almost broke out during the First Balkan War.71 Rus­sia attempted to counteract Austro-­Hungarian expansion in the Balkans by supporting the creation of the Balkan League.72 Although the immediate target of this co­ali­tion of states was the Ottoman Empire, the major territorial dispute involved the Serbian nationalist aspirations to the Adriatic Sea and its aspiration to take over Bosnia-­Herzegovina.73 This possibility undermined not only the survival of Austria-­Hungary but also of Germany, b ­ ecause the inability of its ally to c­ ounter Slavic nationalist aspirations along its borders and within the Austro-­Hungarian Empire would have likely provoked its disintegration and its inability to put pressure on Rus­ sia’s southern border. Had the Russian-­sponsored Balkan League succeeded 113

chapter 4

in undermining Austria-­Hungary, Rus­sia would have been capable of concentrating its forces exclusively on the eastern border of Germany. Kaiser Wilhelm II and General Helmuth von Moltke reassured AustriaHungary that they would support their ally “­under all circumstances,” even at the risk of a clash with France and Rus­sia.74 As Archduke Franz Ferdinand recounted ­after a meeting with the kaiser in Berlin (November 22, 1912), the “emperor declared most graciously his readiness to support us in all t­hings. Perfect certainty in this re­spect.”75 In spite of this “blank check,” German decision makers ­were unwilling to risk a two-­front war ­unless the country’s survival was threatened. As the kaiser made clear several times during the crisis (November 7, 9, and 11, 1912), the T ­ riple Alliance “was intended as a limine [threshold] to guarantee continuance of ­actual possessions.” A military confrontation between Austria-­Hungary and Rus­sia “requires the mobilisation and a war against 2 fronts for Germany,” “a war of survival with 3 ­Great Powers in which every­thing has to be risked and perhaps she can perish.” Germany would “not march against Paris and Moscow for the sake of Albania and Durazzo,” risking a “war of annihilation” against the ­Triple Entente.76 The change in German calculations occurred a­ fter the czar issued an order of partial mobilization against Austria-­Hungary (November 23, 1912).77 In this fateful situation (“worse than 1866,” as the kaiser emphasized), which would require Germany to fight “a strug­gle for existence,” the choice was ­either to intervene on the side of Austria-­Hungary and trigger a continental war or to lose the support of its ally as a counterweight to Rus­sian concentration of forces on the eastern border of Germany.78 As it became clear in July 1914, German survival had become inextricably intertwined with the destiny of the Austro-­Hungarian Empire:79 “If Austria has to fight for its position as a G ­ reat Power, regardless of the cause, then we must stand at her side so as not to have to fight alone at a ­later stage with a weakened Austria beside us. . . . ​We cannot permit our ally to suffer any humiliation. We wish to avoid war for as long as that is pos­si­ble with honour; if that should prove impossible, we s­ hall face it with . . . ​firm resolve.”80 As Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-­Hollweg emphasized in his Reichstag speech on December 2, 1912, if Austria-­Hungary is attacked and its “very existence threatened, then . . . ​we would have to fight on the side of our ally to maintain our own position in Eu­rope, to defend the security and ­future of our own country.”81 Therefore, Germany had to support Austria-­Hungary and, if diplomacy failed, resort to war to ensure the “vital condition of both countries not to be encircled by a ring of Slavs.”82 The Russian-­sponsored creation of a power­ful Serbian Empire was thwarted by the intervention of the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers. Both France and ­Great Britain restrained their ally in order to avoid the outbreak of a continental war. President Poincaré was unwilling to escalate the First Balkan War b ­ ecause of the insufficient preparation of the French army. The British secretary of foreign affairs, Sir Eduard Grey, did not want to commit 114

Germany and World War I

­ reat Britain to a war over the Balkans: if Rus­sia “­were to march into GaliG cia rather than again put up with a humiliation like that of 1909, thus forcing Germany to come to the aid of Austria, France would inevitably be drawn in” and the escalation would have led to British intervention, since “it was for ­England of vital necessity to prevent that country [France] from being crushed by Germany.”83 Instability in the Balkans not only brought Eu­rope to the verge of a major war, but it also showed the dynamics of initiation and contagion. Although British and French leaders ­were capable of restraining their Rus­sian ally, the conclusion of the First Balkan War (Treaty of London, May 30, 1913) could not arrest the demise of the Ottoman Empire, satisfy the territorial aspirations of Serbia and Bulgaria, or solve the endemic tension between Rus­sia and Austria-­ Hungary. Most importantly, the collapse of the Russian-­ sponsored league in the Balkans and France’s insistence on reducing the time needed to mobilize against Germany led to the key change in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers: Rus­sia’s decision to construct strategic railroads in Poland. This shift in the Rus­sian operational capability to launch a two-­front war with France pushed Germany to initiate the July crisis and to escalate it ­after Rus­sia ordered general mobilization. R u s­s i a n Strategi c Ra i lroa d s i n Po la nd The diplomatic victory that Germany and Austria-­Hungary obtained in the First Balkan War triggered the Rus­sian and French response, which in turn pushed Germany to adopt a risky strategy of coercive diplomacy in the Balkans.84 The German situation was well understood by the surrounding ­great powers, as Rus­sian war minister Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov told French general Pierre de Laguiche in February 1913, “Germany is in a very critical position . . . ​encircled by ­enemy forces . . . ​and it fears them. . . . ​I can understand its worry, and as a result the mea­sures it is taking seem natu­ral to me.”85 Nonetheless, the collapse of the Rus­sian policy in the Balkans due to its failure to support Bulgaria during the Second Balkan War (October 1911–­ July 1913) and troubling signs of rapprochement between Germany and the Ottoman Empire risked jeopardizing Rus­sia’s ability to control the Turkish Straits.86 ­Because of the threat that German foreign policy posed to Rus­sian strategic interests over the Eastern Question, Rus­sia a­ dopted a more assertive foreign policy. The closing win­dow of opportunity to seize the Turkish Straits ­shaped Rus­sian foreign policy in the months that preceded the July crisis.87 In a secret meeting of civil and military leaders (February 21, 1914), Rus­sian foreign minister Sergey Sazonov argued that “a favourable moment was approaching for settling with Austria-­Hungary” and taking control the straits at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.88 The French diplomat Maurice Paléologue even 115

chapter 4

r­eported that influential figures in the Rus­sian Council of Ministers had stated that in the event of the death of the Austrian emperor, “we would be obliged to annex Galicia.89 Our minister of war General Vladimir A. Sukhomlinov, explained to me just the other day that the possession of Galicia is indispensable to the security of our frontier.”90 The surrounding ­great powers’ military actions created a sense of urgency in German circles. In spite of Germany’s diplomatic victory in the First Balkan War, the tightening of the encirclement by the ­Triple Entente and the weakness of Austria-­Hungary w ­ ere narrowing German options to prevent a Franco-­Russian joint attack. But the key f­ actor that forced Germany’s hand in the July crisis was the increase in Rus­sia’s operational ability to launch an invasion that resulted from the construction of railroads in Poland (actualized encirclement). France had urged Rus­sia to construct strategic railroads since the formation of their alliance and it often tried to tie its financial support to reduce the time for Rus­sian general mobilization.91 However, Rus­sia proved to be incapable or unwilling to meet French demands: on the one hand, the debacle of the Russo-­Japanese War showed the military backwardness of its military apparatus and prevented Rus­sia from posing a significant threat to ­either Germany or Austria-­Hungary ­until 1912; on the other hand, Rus­ sia was reluctant to construct strategic railroads in the west out of fear that Germany would use them to conquer Poland and then threaten Moscow.92 Indeed, as Robert Jervis points out, “Railroad construction radically [alters] the abilities of countries to defend themselves and to attack ­others.”93 Instability in the Balkans led to Rus­sia’s decision to increase its strategic railways close to the eastern border of Germany. The annexation of Bosnia-­ Herzegovina by Austria-­Hungary had raised concerns in Rus­sian circles. Diplomatic defeats in the two Balkan crises led Rus­sia to reevaluate the need to pose a credible threat to the German eastern border. Being able to quickly deploy troops in Poland was considered vital for Rus­sia’s survival. Therefore, impor­tant steps ­were taken to launch a two-­front war with France against Germany. In 1911, the Rus­sian general staff promised its French counterpart that an attack on the eastern border of Germany would become pos­si­ble fifteen days ­after general mobilization. In September 1912, France and Rus­sia agreed to construct nine hundred kilo­meters of new railways in Poland.94 By 1913, the czar ordered to ramp up construction of strategic railroads in Poland. In the end, by summer of 1914, Rus­sia greatly reduced the time for general mobilization and its ability to quickly deploy troops against Germany. In addition to increased Rus­sian capacity to deploy troops on the eastern border of Germany, France improved its ability to invade in the months that preceded the July crisis. The French army reforms of 1913 (Three Year Law), which lengthened the terms of ser­vice for draftees from two to three years, concerned the German general staff. This policy would significantly increase the number of French trained reserves that could be deployed, thereby 116

Germany and World War I

thwarting Germany’s ability to quickly defeat France in the west before concentrating its forces against Rus­sia.95 Since German unification, decision makers had recognized the importance of railways in preventing a two-­front war, but Rus­sia’s reluctance to ramp up its construction in Poland prevented a concentration of forces in a simultaneous attack with France. The shift in Rus­sia’s ability to move its troops to the eastern border of Germany explains the decision to initiate and escalate the July crisis. “New strategic railways in western Rus­sia would shrink Rus­sia’s mobilization time and erase Germany’s hope for victory.”96 German officials did not fear a ­future shift in relative power but ­were concerned that a quick Rus­sian general mobilization (days instead of weeks) would enable Rus­sia to launch a simultaneous two-­front war in conjunction with France.97 The importance of this operational power shift was clearly recognized by Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg at the onset of the July crisis (July 7, 1914): Anglo-­Russian negotiations for a naval agreement and a landing in Pomerania [was] the last link in a chain. . . . ​­After the completion of their strategic railroads in Poland our position [­will be] untenable. . . . ​[Austria] increasingly undermined from north and south-­east, at any rate incapable of ­going to war for German interests as our ally. . . . ​The Entente knows that we are, therefore, completely, para­lyzed.98

T h e J u ly Cri si s The Balkan Wars created the conditions for the outbreak of World War I. In the months before the July crisis,99 Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers ­adopted aggressive military mea­sures that vastly increased the chances of escalation and that linked their destinies in a unified zero-­sum game. The key difference from the previous crises was Rus­sia’s construction of strategic railroads in Poland and its decision to order general mobilization in response to French support for a continental war. Germany was compelled to escalate the crisis to prevent the collapse of its only ally, which in turn would have left Rus­sia unhindered in its attempts to expand in the Balkans and, worse, to launch a simultaneous attack in conjunction with France. Therefore, German rulers de­cided to stand by Austria-­Hungary and risk a continental war to prevent the surrounding ­great powers from increasing their invasion ability by concentrating their forces against Germany. It is in this ominous scenario that German rulers ­adopted a “now or never” logic. In contrast with the interpretation of the Fischer thesis, Germany did not plan to launch a continental war for dominating Eu­rope; rather, it ­adopted an aggressive policy with the goal of breaking its encirclement.100 Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg referred to Germany’s need to deal with the Serbian threat to Austria-­Hungary, which required amassing troops on the southern border of Germany and giving Rus­sia ­free hand to 117

chapter 4

concentrate its forces against Germany. This strategy of coercive diplomacy required Germany to support Austria-­Hungary against Serbia without risking a continental war, as it did in previous crises in the Balkans. Localizing the Austro-­Serbian conflict was intended to arrest the expansion of Rus­sian influence in the Balkan Peninsula as well as splitting the ­Triple Entente.101 Evidence that Germany wanted a localized conflict is overwhelming.102 The famous “blank check” to Austria-­Hungary (July 5, 1914) was issued to pre­sent the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers with a fait accompli, since it was considered unlikely that Rus­sia would intervene on the side of Serbia without receiving French support.103 The report of a meeting between German se­nior decision makers in July 1914 captures the understanding among German military and civil officials: “Our opinion is that the Austrians should act against Serbia the sooner the better and that the Russians—­though friends of Serbia—­nonetheless ­will not participate.”104 This strategy continued to be implemented through the July crisis, even when German officials started to receive news that Rus­sia had begun premobilization mea­sures (July 24–26).105 For instance, Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg advocated restraint to the Austro-­Hungarian emperor a few days before the outbreak of World War I (July 26): “As long as Rus­sia commits no hostile act, I believe that our attitude, which aims at localization, must also remain a calm one.”106 The decision to adopt a strategy of calculated risk in the July crisis was a consequence of the tightening encirclement by the ­Triple Entente and it was driven by the need to safeguard Austria-­Hungary as the last bulwark against Rus­sia. The fateful choice of ­either losing its last ally or adopting an aggressive foreign policy in the Balkans was the result of the “desperate position” that Germany faced.107 As the kaiser affirmed on July 5, 1914, to stop “Rus­ sia’s manifest encirclement tendencies against the Monarchy [Austria-­ Hungary],”108 “we should abstain from direct influence and advice, since we should work with all our means t­owards the goal of not letting the Austro-­Serbian quarrel become an international conflict. . . . ​Emperor Francis Joseph should know that we ­will not desert Austria-­Hungary in the serious hour. Our own vital interests demand the preservation of Austria.”109 Moreover, Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg was convinced that clear support for Austria-­Hungary against Serbia would deter the other ­great powers and lead to a realignment of southeastern states, breaking the encirclement by the surrounding g ­ reat powers: “If we succeed not only in keeping France itself quiet, but also in having it plead for peace in Petersburg, this turn of events ­will weaken the Franco-­Russian alliance.”110 British be­hav­ior in the years before the July crisis also encouraged the strategy of localized conflict in the Balkans. Improved relations with G ­ reat Britain (Anglo-­German détente, 1911–1914) convinced German officials that the British would stay out of a military conflict that was confined to eastern Eu­rope. Indeed, in the previous Balkan crises, ­Great Britain had supported German efforts to prevent the escalation of the crises into a continental 118

Germany and World War I

war.111 Therefore, German officials ­were hopeful of repeating the successful strategy and further undermining the ­Triple Entente.112 The July crisis was supposed to be a “third Balkan crisis.” Germany’s goal was to undermine Rus­sia’s ability to deploy troops close to its borders. However, the localization of the conflict between Austria-­Hungary and Serbia failed b ­ ecause German officials underestimated French and Rus­sian determination to stand firm. As General Anatoly Neklyudov affirmed, “Rus­sia could never surrender to the third Austro-­German ultimatum in five years, nor could it abandon all its influence in the Balkans.”113 France likewise proved unyielding out of fear of breaking the Franco-­Russian alliance, which had already been weakened by the previous Balkan crises. Therefore, French foreign minister Théophile Delcassé issued a “blank check” by reassuring Sazonov that “France ­will go as far as Rus­sia wishes.”114 Receiving full support from France, Rus­sian officials de­cided to increase their military preparations to the German and Austro-­Hungarian strategic moves, which would have precluded Rus­sia’s ability to control the Turkish Straits. Indeed, the czar’s order of partial mobilization (July 28) was a response to the declaration of war by Austria-­Hungary against Serbia and an attempt to force a favorable diplomatic settlement rather than an effort to escalate the crisis.115 As Sazonov clearly remarked a­ fter receiving news of the mobilization of Austria-­Hungary, Austria-­Hungary’s clear aim, “which is apparently supported by Germany, is the total annihilation of Serbia and disturbance of the po­liti­cal equilibrium in the Balkans.”116 The Rus­sian order of partial mobilization represented a fundamental step in the escalation of the July crisis.117 For advocates of the Fischer thesis, this decision should have been welcomed by German officials ­because of their presumed premeditated plan to trigger a continental war against France and Rus­sia; quite the contrary, news of Rus­sian partial mobilization led to a softening of German foreign policy. In a last-­minute attempt to prevent crisis escalation, Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg, who had previously rejected a peaceful settlement, desperately tried to stop the Austro-­Hungarian escalation by warning that Germany would not allow itself “to be dragged by Vienna, wantonly and without regard to our advice, into a world conflagration.”118 German efforts to prevent a continental war ­were thwarted by Rus­sia’s decision to order general mobilization. On July 30, Sazonov met with the czar “to show that war was becoming inevitable, as it was clear to every­ body that Germany had de­cided to bring about a collision, as other­wise she would not have rejected all the pacificatory proposal that had been made and could easily have brought her ally to reason.”119 Nicholas II eventually concurred that “it would be very dangerous not to make timely preparations for what was apparently an inevitable war, and therefore gave his decision in favour of an immediate general mobilization.” As Czar Nicholas II recognized that Rus­sia was heading ­toward “certain catastrophe,” he reluctantly “gave his decision in favour of an immediate general mobilization.”120 119

chapter 4

“The Rus­sian general mobilization was the decisive calamity.”121 Mediation to localize the Austro-­Serbian conflict was no longer pos­si­ble, as the implementation of the Schlieffen plan required Germany to mobilize quickly before Rus­sia and France could concentrate their forces in a simultaneous attack. As Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg noted a week before the Rus­sian order of general mobilization, “We could hardly sit and talk any longer, b ­ ecause we have to strike immediately in order to have any chance of winning at all.”122 Germany’s strategic position was worsened by the fact that Rus­sia had already initiated secret premobilization mea­sures days before the order of general mobilization. German intelligence had detected movement of troops in the Rus­sian regions of Poland and Ukraine since July 25.123 ­These mea­ sures showed that Rus­sia was already taking preparatory military steps against Germany and that it was increasing its operational capabilities to launch a two-­front war with its French ally at an alarming rate.124 Even the most belligerent German official, General von Moltke, reacted reluctantly to the prospects for a continental war. Nonetheless, the Rus­sian order of general mobilization required a German response before the possibility to avoid a two-­front war was totally precluded.125 Germany’s need to act quickly in response to the Rus­sian general mobilization was clearly shown by the kaiser’s response upon receiving the czar’s confirmation that Rus­sia had increased its military mea­sures to ­counter Austro-­Hungarian preparations for war (the Willy-­Nicky tele­gram, July 30): “Thus it is almost a week ahead of us. . . . ​I cannot agree to any more mediation, since the Tsar . . . ​secretly mobilized b ­ ehind my back.”126 In order not to leave Austria-­Hungary unsupported in a war against Rus­ sia and to prevent Rus­sia and France from concentrating their forces in a simultaneous two-­front war, Germany issued a twelve-­hour ultimatum to Rus­sia (July 31) to reverse its order of general mobilization. When that expired, Germany declared war on Rus­sia (August 1).127 Kaiser Wilhelm clearly identified the closing of the ring of encirclement by the T ­ riple Entente as the reason for initiating war against Rus­sia: For that is clear to me beyond all doubt: E ­ ngland, Rus­sia and France have agreed among themselves . . . ​to take the Austro-­Serbian conflict for an excuse for waging a war of extermination against us. . . . ​­Either we are shamefully to betray our allies, sacrifice them to Russia—­thereby breaking up the ­Triple Alliance, or we are to be attacked in common by of the ­Triple Entente for our fidelity to our allies and punished, whereby they ­will satisfy their jealousy by joining in totally ruining us. That is the real naked situation in nuce. . . . ​So, the famous “encirclement” of Germany has fi­nally become a complete fact, despite e­ very effort of our politicians and diplomat to prevent it.128

In sum, ­after the establishment of the ­Triple Entente, Germany tried to break its encirclement without triggering a two-­front war. Since it was not 120

Germany and World War I

pos­si­ble to create a buffer zone that would hinder a simultaneous Franco-­ Russian invasion, German officials ­adopted a strategy of coercive diplomacy in all the Balkans crises. The goal was to prevent the concentration of forces of the surrounding g ­ reat powers (actualized encirclement) by strengthening its Austro-­Hungarian ally and by undermining the ­Triple Entente. The key ­factor that explains war initiation is the Rus­sian construction of strategic railroads in Poland, which reduced the time needed to move its troops to the eastern border of Germany. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand gave German officials the perfect pretext. Like the previous Balkan crises, Germany promised its full support to Austria-­Hungary in a localized conflict against Serbia (German “blank check”). However, it also restrained its ally a­ fter Rus­sia’s order of partial mobilization in order to avoid escalation of the crisis into a continental war. The key difference that prevented a final mediation of the July crisis was France’s decision to support its Rus­sian ally against Austria-­Hungary (French “blank check”). This in turn led to the czar’s decision to order general mobilization. In the end, the failure of the German coercive game in the Balkans led to the outcome that it tried to prevent: the prospects for a two-­front war against France and Rus­sia, both of whom would be able to concentrate their armies in eastern Prus­sia due to Austria-­Hungary’s military weakness. Facing the fateful choice of e­ ither standing aside and losing its ally or escalating the crisis and risking a major war, Kaiser Wilhelm had no option but to hasten military preparations and declare war on Rus­sia.

Step 3: War Contagion Scholars often consider World War I to be like a chain gang ­because a state was dragged into the conflict of an ally out of fear that it would defect or be defeated.129 The crystallization of the Eu­ro­pean system into two opposite blocs—­the ­Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-­Hungary, and Italy) and the ­Triple Entente (France, Rus­sia, and G ­ reat Britain)—­ensured that a conflict involving one of ­these ­great powers would inevitably spread to the entire region: if “two ­Great Powers ­were to go to war, no one of the ­others could be sure of not being drawn into it.”130 Therefore, the rival-­based network of alliances that emerged during the double security dilemma connected the separate antagonisms among ­g reat powers into one unified zero-­sum game.131 Figure 4.1 illustrates the dynamics of war contagion.132 F r an ce Escalation of the crisis between Serbia and Austria-­Hungary put France in a dilemma of e­ ither supporting Rus­sia and being dragged into a Eu­ro­ pean conflagration or losing its ally and freeing Germany from the threat to 121

chapter 4

Figure 4.1. Logic of war contagion in World War I

its rear. The Franco-­Russian alliance had been ­under strain in several situations before the July crisis and it showed alarming signs of irrevocable damage. On the one hand, France had failed to support Rus­sia during its war against Japan (1904–1905), in the Balkan crisis (1908–1909), and in the First Balkan War (1912–1913). On the other hand, Rus­sia showed signs of potential rapprochement with Germany (the secret treaty of Björkö, 1905) and it did not support France during the second Moroccan crisis (1911). This spiral of defections risked breaking the alliance and leaving the two ­great powers isolated against their common immediate rival (Germany). In order to prevent the loss of a great-­power ally by defection, in the months preceding the war, President Poincaré tightened France’s ties with Rus­sia by increasing the coordination of their mobilizations and by consulting with Moscow during foreign policy crises. It is in light of this new strengthened relationship that France gave a “blank check” to Rus­sia during the July crisis and stood by its ally a­ fter Germany’s declaration of war.133 As President Poincaré affirmed in the days before the French intervention in the war, “Not to break up an alliance on which French policy has been based for a quarter of a c­ entury and the break-up of which would leave us in isolation at the mercy of our rivals.”134 In addition to preserving the Franco-­Russian alliance, French leaders w ­ ere convinced that the moment was propitious to avenge the military debacle of the Franco-­Prussian War and to take possession of the “lost provinces” of Alsace and Lorraine. Rather than being worried about the prospects for a major Eu­ro­pean conflagration, the French cabinet considered the situation to be “extraordinarily favorable”—­“from a strategic point of view a better occasion can never be found”—­because it would guarantee Rus­sian involvement in a war that began with a German attack on France: “It was for all the members of the cabinet a real relief.”135 “Never before had a declaration of war been welcomed with such satisfaction. . . . ​It was indispensable that Germany, who was entirely responsible for the aggression, should be led into publicly confessing her intentions. If we had to declare war ourselves, the Rus­sian alliance would have been contested.”136

122

Germany and World War I

­G r eat Britai n The official catalyst for ­Great Britain’s intervention in World War I was the German invasion of Belgium, the neutrality of which was guaranteed by the Treaty of London (1839). Although this violation was the immediate cause, ­Great Britain primarily entered into the conflict to support France. Britain’s main concern was the loss of a great-­power ally by military defeat. Had Germany controlled the territories on the other side of the En­glish Channel and forced France into a settlement ­after marching into Paris, ­Great Britain would have been alone in resisting a German amphibious assault. In a nutshell, the British intervention in support of France was to prevent its immediate rival (Germany) from increasing its ability to invade the mainland. This concern drove British foreign policy ­after the increase in the size and power of the German fleet at the turn of the nineteenth ­century. The naval arms race and the rapprochement of its historical rivals ­were the two main responses that ­Great Britain pursued to contain Germany.137 Moreover, British officials began conversations with both France and Rus­sia for the formation of an official military alliance in the months before the July crisis. Although the British government wanted to maintain freedom of action, the concern that France might defect from the T ­ riple Entente led to naval talks with Rus­sia. As British undersecretary for foreign affairs Sir Arthur Nicolson noted on April 27, 1914, “I know the French are haunted with the same apprehension—­that if we do not try to tighten up ties with Rus­sia, she may become weary of us and throw us overboard.”138 ­Until the German declaration of war on Rus­sia, the British government had tried to mediate the July crisis like it did in the previous Balkan crises. Unlike France, Britain’s decision to intervene was not driven by concern that Rus­sia would defect if not supported by G ­ reat Britain in a continental war. The vagueness of British commitment to military intervention in eastern Eu­ rope is well exemplified by the erroneous tele­gram of August 1, which temporarily gave Kaiser Wilhelm the impression that ­Great Britain would not intervene if Germany ­limited the war to eastern Eu­rope without attacking France.139 On the contrary, the British government clearly stated that it would not stand aside in a war between Germany and France, a commitment that was reiterated by prominent officials since the First Balkan War. As Secretary of State Grey stressed in December 1912, if “the position of France as a power” was threatened, G ­ reat Britain would not stay on the sidelines.140 Moreover, in stark contrast with the uncertainty over Britain’s commitment to Rus­sia, the inevitability of British intervention in a war that involved France was clearly understood by German officials: “­England would therefore ­under no circumstances allow France to be defeated. . . . ​Should thus Germany be embroiled in the conflict by Austria, and thus end up at war with France, then current would be created in ­England which no government could resist.”141

123

chapter 4

Austri a -­H un g a ry The motivation of Austria-­Hungary to intervene in the Russo-­German dyadic conflict could not be disentangled from the German strategy of coercive diplomacy during the July crisis. Nonetheless, it would be a ­mistake to consider the interests and fears of ­these two allies to be identical. Austria’s decisions to initiate the crisis, to declare war on Serbia when its ultimatum failed, and to take part into the general conflagration that ensued from the Rus­sian general mobilization was driven by the fear that Rus­sia would annex territory along its borders.142 Since its diplomatic victory in annexing Bosnia-­Herzegovina, Austria-­ Hungary was alarmed by Rus­sian schemes to retaliate and increase its influence in the Balkans. The creation of the Balkan League and the Rus­sian army’s massive rearmament showed the expansionist nature of Rus­sian foreign policy. In par­tic­u­lar, the strengthening of Rus­sian ties with Serbia increased Austria-­Hungary’s concern about an extension of Rus­sian presence in the Balkans, which risked fomenting aspirations among Slavs within Austria for the creation of a Greater Serbia. Furthermore, Austria-­Hungary received numerous reports that Rus­sia was willing to s­ ettle the disputes in the Balkans by military means. For instance, Rus­sian Foreign Minister Sazonov affirmed that within Rus­sian circles “in close touch with certain Court and military centers, t­here was a rooted conviction that a favourable moment was approaching for settling accounts with Austria-­Hungary.” Rus­sian newspapers openly advocated the acquisition of Galicia and the dismantling of the Austro-­Hungarian Empire, while the czar reinforced this internal pressure by commenting that “the disintegration of the Austrian Empire was merely a question of time.”143 The Rus­sian policy in the Balkans could even lead to the “encirclement” of Austria-­Hungary by hostile powers:144 “The general international situation as it has developed over the years increasingly pushes the Monarchy into the most exposed position. It cannot be too much longer before it w ­ ill be so surrounded that its enemies ­will feel themselves downright challenged to attack it.”145 In sum, the German declaration of war on Rus­sia unleashed a chain of reactions by all the other ­great powers to prevent their own immediate rival from increasing its invasion ability. France supported Rus­sia to avoid losing a great-­power ally by defection. G ­ reat Britain intervened to prevent a French military defeat that would have allowed Germany to concentrate on building a fleet that could defeat the Royal Navy and threaten the survival of G ­ reat Britain. Austria-­Hungary entered the war with its German ally to ­counter Rus­sian influence in the Balkans and the possibility that Rus­sia could surround Austria-­Hungary by annexing territories along its borders. As Kenneth Waltz underlines, “The game of Eu­ro­pean power politics had become, with rough equivalence, a two-­person zero-­sum game. A gain for any state became a gain for its side, and si­mul­ta­neously a loss for the other. 124

Germany and World War I

A single move then had a double effect and, with the two sides roughly balanced, neither could permit the other the gain that would be its own loss as well.”146 In the end, the rival-­based network of alliance dragged each ­great power into the conflict and turned a crisis in the periphery of Eu­rope into a major war.

Assessment of Alternative Explanations This analy­sis of the origins of World War I underlines that the encirclement of Germany triggered a double security dilemma with France and Rus­sia, that Rus­sian construction of strategic railroads increased the operational ability of the surrounding ­g reat powers and led to Germany’s attempt to break the Franco-­Russian alliance in the July crisis, and that the other Eu­ ro­pean ­great powers ­were dragged into this dyadic conflict to prevent their own immediate rival from increasing its invasion ability. Furthermore, evidence shows that Germany did not plan a continental war to become the hegemon or preserve its hegemony in Eu­rope. Instead, German officials escalated the July crisis as a mea­sure of last resort to prevent Rus­sia and France from acquiring the ability to launch a simultaneous attack. ­Table 4.2 summarizes the predictions of my theory and of the main alternative explanations.147 My explanation provides a coherent and complete account of all the steps that led to World War I, while other theories fail to analyze impor­tant aspects such as the formation of alliances and the timing of crisis escalation.148 The

­Table 4.2 ​Competing explanations on the origins of World War I Author

Step 1: Double security dilemma

Step 2: War initiation

Step 3: War contagion

Primacy of domestic politics

Undertheorized

Bid for hegemony (domestic ­causes)

Undertheorized

Primacy of foreign politics

International anarchy and uncertainty of intentions

Bid for hegemony (structural ­causes)

Counterhegemonic alliance against Germany

Calculated risk

Undertheorized

Failure of German coercive diplomacy

Undertheorized

Inadvertent war

International anarchy and uncertainty of intentions

Incompetence of civilian leaders

Undertheorized

Encirclement theory

Encirclement of Germany by France and Rus­sia

Concentration of forces by France and Russia

Rival-­based network of alliances

125

chapter 4

findings of this chapter undermine the argument that Germany planned a continental war for domestic reasons (Fischer), to become the Eu­ro­pean hegemon (Mearsheimer), or to arrest its inevitable decline by thwarting Rus­sia’s rise (Copeland). Evidence also undermines the “inadvertent war” thesis. Civilians did not lose control during the July crisis, as both German and Rus­ sian leaders ­were fully aware of the po­liti­cal and military consequences of their actions. Fi­nally, I provide new insights into the argument that World War I resulted from a failed attempt to split the T ­ riple Entente. Scholars who claim that Germany tried to localize the crisis between Austria-­Hungary and Serbia fail to recognize the importance of the Rus­sian construction of strategic railroads in Poland. In the rest of this section, I analyze in detail the flaws of existing arguments at each step that led to the outbreak of World War I. S t ep 1: Do uble Secu ri ty D i lemma My analy­sis of the double security dilemma casts doubts on two alternative explanations. First of all, it shows that German foreign policy did not vary significantly a­ fter Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890 and that considerations of domestic policy ­were trumped by foreign policy concerns. Moreover, it undermines the claim that Eu­ro­pean security competition was the result of Germany’s attempt to dominate the system. One cannot deny that certain differences exist in German foreign policy between 1871 and 1914, but it would be erroneous to identify a stark divide between Bismarck’s status quo–­oriented goal to isolate France and Wilhelm II’s Weltpolitik.149 The main change that occurred was in the reduced number of strategies that Germany could adopt ­after France and Rus­sia formed a military alliance, the establishment of which was highly influenced by Bismarck’s foreign policy in the 1880s. The main goal to prevent France and Rus­sia from being able to concentrate their forces in a two-­front war led to Bismarck’s attempt to isolate France diplomatically, and when this strategy failed, the kaiser resorted to coercive diplomacy to break the ring of hostile ­great powers. Additionally, the claim that the goal b ­ ehind Wilhelm II’s imperialist foreign policy was to allow Germany to rise as a global power in pursuing hegemony is misleading. Since the Franco-­Russian alliance had blocked Germany’s ability to expand on the Eu­ro­pean continent without triggering a two-­front war, the kaiser tried to escape the deadly embrace by increasing Germany’s presence in the world. Like Bismarck, Wilhelm II’s policy over the colonies and the Eastern Question was not “an end in itself for us, but merely a means for regulating our relations ­towards other Powers in a way best suited to our interests.”150 The German navy’s expansion did not aim to threaten the Royal Navy but rather to coerce ­Great Britain to join the ­Triple Alliance.151 Moreover, Wilhelm II’s strategy to ­counter the Franco-­Russian alliance with an Anglo-­ German bloc was not only pursued in the 1880s, but it was facilitated by 126

Germany and World War I

Bismarck’s decisions over the Eastern Question. Germany’s support for Austria-­Hungary had already alienated Rus­sia before the chancellor’s dismissal and the irreconcilable interests of the Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers could no longer be resolved with Bismarck’s dexterous duplicity. Germany’s increasingly assertive foreign policy a­ dopted ­after the turn of the twentieth c­ entury was not caused by a change in domestic politics but by structural constraints. Yet, arguments that underline how the anarchic nature of the international system and uncertainty of intentions created the condition for security competition among ­great powers overlook encirclement as a variable that exacerbated the security dilemma. German foreign policy underwent shifts ­every time the ring of hostile powers was closing in. The agreements among France, Rus­sia, and G ­ reat Britain reduced the options that Germany had to thwart a potential two-­front war and increased the urgency of breaking the encirclement through more aggressive mea­ sures. In turn, the actions that Germany undertook to prevent actualized encirclement compelled the surrounding ­great powers to strengthen their relationships and to adopt similar mea­sures to contain the German threat. Therefore, anarchy and uncertainty of intentions played a fundamental role in triggering security competition among the ­great powers, but only by considering the role of encirclement can we understand impor­tant foreign policy decisions that increased the chances of major war. My analy­sis of the double security dilemma also undermines the argument that Germany tried to preserve or achieve a preponderant status in Eu­rope. From Bismarck to the kaiser, Germany tried to secure its position in Eu­rope by preventing France and Rus­sia from being capable of concentrating their forces and launching a simultaneous invasion. War was considered a mea­sure of last resort. It was initiated only a­ fter Rus­sia began constructing strategic railroads in Poland. Moreover, Austria-­Hungary’s decline made it unlikely that Germany could rely on this ally to divert Rus­ sian military forces from the eastern border of Germany, leaving Germany alone in confronting a simultaneous two-­front war: The idea of German-­Austrian combination for war against Rus­sia and France would not alarm us, if the Austrian army ­were proportionately as strong and well-­trained as our own and ­were equally well equipped. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and the burden of a ­future war on two fronts (Doppelkrieges) would therefore tend to rest upon our shoulders. It would thus be a war, which we could be prepared to undertake, only if we w ­ ere directly attacked, and if our in­de­pen­dence was threatened, in fact, u ­ nder circumstances, when the most unequal fight must be fought out.152

Even when Rus­sia was para­lyzed by the war with Japan, Germany was not power­ful enough to launch a preventive war against France, let alone bidding for hegemony.153 As Kaiser Wilhelm noted in 1905, “If you, my dear Bülow, are 127

chapter 4

reckoning on the prospect of a pos­si­ble war . . . ​you ­ought to be very active in seeking out our allies. . . . ​For on our own we are not in a position to wage war against an alliance of Gaul and ­England. . . . ​I would very strongly advise that ­matters should be arranged so that as far as is at all pos­si­ble, we are spared the necessity of deciding to go to war for the time being.”154 Indeed, German conduct was l­imited to testing the Anglo-­French entente cordiale through coercive diplomacy (first Moroccan crisis) and to attempting to break the Franco-­Russian alliance by offering the czar a new alliance with Germany. Nor did the kaiser exploit Rus­sian military weakness in the years ­after the Russo-­Japanese War in spite of Rus­sia’s disappointing refusal to ratify the secret treaty of Björkö and its decision to foster a rapprochement with ­Great Britain. S t ep 2: W ar I n i ti ati o n Understanding the defensive motivation b ­ ehind German foreign policy— to prevent France and Rus­ sia from acquiring operational capabilities to launch a two-­front war (actualized encirclement)—is essential to explain its decision to escalate the July crisis. My analy­sis supports the claim that the war resulted from a failed policy of calculated risk, and it undermines alternative theories that explain World War I as e­ ither an “accident” (inadvertent war) or a German bid for hegemony. Furthermore, my explanation of the origins of World War I enriches our understanding on the policy of calculated risk employed during the July crisis. Although the argument that stress the failed strategy of calculated risk can explain why Germany preferred a localized conflict over a continental war, it fails to explain why escalation occurred in 1914 but not in previous analogous crises in the Balkans. The Fischer thesis argues that Germany manipulated the July crisis to start a continental war before Rus­sia could become too power­ful.155 As Mearsheimer argues, “Germany’s leaders ­were principally responsible for starting World War I in the summer of 1914. The aim was to defeat Germany’s great-­power rivals decisively and redraw the map of Eu­rope to ensure German hegemony for the foreseeable f­ uture.”156 The decision to launch a preventive war against France was reached during the First Balkan War but postponed ­until 1914, when Germany reached the height of power and could quickly defeat France before Rus­sia could mobilize.157 In addition to evidence documented in the previous sections on the German willingness to localize the Austro-­Serbian conflict, ­there is no proof of a master plan to become the Eu­ro­pean hegemon.158 ­T here are four major anomalies that seriously undermine the Fischer thesis. First, the logic of this argument is based on a presumed connection between the War Council on December 8, 1912 and the ability to implement the Schlieffen Plan. However, the war council was deemed inconclusive.159 Furthermore, Germany failed to prepare eco­nom­ically and militarily for a 128

Germany and World War I

continental war, and it showed a striking lack of coordination with Austria-­ Hungary.160 This lack of planning is puzzling for ­those who claim that Germany orchestrated the July crisis to provoke a continental war. Moreover, the Septemberprogramm did not detail any premeditated plan for hegemony.161 Instead, it shows once again that Germany started the war to break the Franco-­ Russian encirclement.162 Chancellor Bethmann-­ Hollweg planned to create two buffer zones on German borders by making Belgium and Poland two “vassal states” in order to guarantee the “security for the German Reich in west and east for all imaginable time.” Additional support to the claim that Germany’s main objective was the creation of a buffer zone that would eliminate its two-­front war prob­lem can be found in the Treaty of Brest-­Litovsk with Rus­sia (March  3, 1918), which resulted in key Rus­sian losses in eastern and southern Eu­rope.163 This agreement created an impenetrable buffer zone that would have eliminated the encirclement of Germany permanently. Second, the claim that German be­hav­ior during the July crisis reflected an attempt to ensure British neutrality in western Eu­rope is also unsupported by documentary evidence. From the end of the First Balkan War, the kaiser was certain of British involvement in any war that involved France: “Haldane stated definitely that the possibility of a defeat could not be allowed, therefore it is absolutely certain that ­England ­will intervene immediately.”164 The chancellor’s hesitation in the last days of the July crisis was not caused by the realization that an attack on France would provoke British intervention but by the news of the Rus­sian order of partial mobilization.165 Moreover, the German plan for an attack on the western front included the invasion of Belgium, the inviolability of which was guaranteed by an alliance with ­Great Britain, suggesting that British intervention in a war that involved France was considered inevitable. General von Moltke clearly stated why to avoid a two-­front war would require Germany to go on the offensive and risk being labeled as an aggressor: “We must put on one side . . . ​all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. . . . ​Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ­ought not to leave Rus­sia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not inferiority, to that of France.”166 Third, German officials ­were not convinced of the feasibility of achieving a quick victory against France; rather, they considered a protracted war to be inevitable.167 The difficulties of the Schlieffen Plan ­were clearly understood by General von Moltke, ­after he assumed the role of chief of general staff: even a war with France alone “cannot be won in one decisive ­battle but ­will turn into a long and tedious strug­gle with a country that w ­ ill not give up before the strength of its entire p ­ eople has been broken. Our own ­people too ­will be utterly exhausted, even if we should be victorious.”168 This conviction was reinforced by Rus­sia’s increasing ability to quickly mobilize its troops following the construction of strategic railroads in Poland. Indeed, 129

chapter 4

skepticism within military circles about the likelihood of avoiding a two-­ front war was growing. As Col­o­nel Erich Ludendorff informed Moltke in 1912, “We ­will have to be ready to fight a lengthy campaign with numerous hard, lengthy b ­ attles u ­ ntil we can defeat [even] one of our enemies.”169 Concerns regarding the ability to implement the Schlieffen Plan ­were also based on the insufficient military power of German armed forces.170 In July 1914, German military power was not sufficient to be considered preponderant, nor was it adequate to attempt to dominate the system. Quite the contrary, the Eu­ro­pean system should be considered to have been balanced in 1914.171 This argument is not supported by a comparison of the material capabilities of the g ­ reat powers but also by the assessment of German leaders. Even the most belligerent official, General von Moltke, believed in May 1914 that “the situation among our potential opponents has shifted in a very significant way to our disadvantage. . . . ​We must not close our eyes to ­these facts which are so unfavourable to us,”172 as “we do not have superiority over the French.”173 The lack of military preparedness and of confidence regarding the prospects for victory in 1914 undermines the claim that Germany planned a continental war at the height of its relative power in relation to the surrounding ­great powers; quite the contrary, it supports my argument that the kaiser de­cided to escalate the July crisis as a mea­sure of last resort. The fact that Germany did not exploit its relative military advantage to bid for hegemony is made clear by the decision not to take advantage of Rus­sian military weakness from the Russo-­Japanese War up to the First Balkan War. Germany considered that “from a military point of view the pre­sent [1908] would be the best moment to ­settle accounts with the Rus­sians,” but instead of taking advantage of Rus­sia’s complete inability “to fight even the Turks,” it refused to risk a two-­front war by launching a preventive attack against one of the surrounding states.174 The need to avoid a continental war remained ­until the specter of actualized encirclement began to materialize in the last days of the July crisis. Reflecting on the military situation at the outbreak of World War I in comparison to 1905, Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg considered the latter to be “the one that would have offered us the greatest chances. But the Kaiser had not waged a preventive war [then] and w ­ ill not wage one [now].”175 Fi­nally, the be­hav­ior of the other g ­ reat powers also undermines the claim that Germany was near-preponderant and that in 1914, the time for preventive war was ripe. Both surrounding g ­ reat powers ­were willing to go to war and considered the July crisis to be a favorable moment. ­After the First Balkan War, French generals ­were “in favour of a war now as being a good opportunity, France [and] Rus­sia being ready [and] Austria in a state of confusion.”176 In January 1914, during a meeting of the Rus­sian Council of Ministers, War Minister Sukhomlinov affirmed categorically that “Rus­sia was perfectly prepared for a duel with Germany, not to speak of one with Austria.”177 During the July crisis, French general Joseph Joffre was even confident that France would win a quick and certain victory against Germany.178 130

Germany and World War I

The fact that France and Rus­sia ­were willing to escalate the July crisis also casts doubt on the argument that World War I was an “accident.” The “inadvertent war” thesis suggests that nobody wanted a continental war that broke out b ­ ecause incompetent civilian leaders did not understand the implications of mobilization mechanisms. As Albertini stated, World War I was the consequence of “the po­liti­cal leaders’ ignorance of what mobilization implied and the dangers it involved which led them light-­heartedly to take the step of mobilizing and thus unleash a Eu­ro­pean war.”179 In addition to failing to explain why World War I occur in 1914 instead of in one of the previous Balkan crises, evidence shows that Eu­ro­pean leaders ­were fully aware of the dynamics of escalation since the Bosnian crisis.180 First, although German officials did not manipulate the July crisis to provoke a continental war, they w ­ ere fully aware of the risks of their strategy of calculated risk.181 It is also incorrect, as the “inadvertent war” thesis claims, that civilians ­were not in control of German foreign policy in the last stages of the crisis. The main advocate for preventive war, General von Moltke, had been marginalized.182 Wilhelm II’s order to abandon the Schlieffen plan ­after receiving the erroneous tele­gram of August 1 and Moltke’s frustration at his inability to change Wilhelm II’s mind showed that civilians retained control over German foreign policy throughout the July crisis.183 Rus­sian leaders also understood that general mobilization would escalate the July crisis b ­ ecause of Germany’s need to avoid a two-­front war. The impact of mobilization on crisis escalation was known since the stipulation of the defensive treaty with France. In a conversation with the deputy chief of the French general staff, Raoul Le Mouton de Boisdeffre (May 1891), Czar Alexander III agreed “that mobilization was the declaration of war; that to mobilize was to force one neighbor’s to do the same; . . . ​that to allow a million men to be mobilized along one’s frontiers without d ­ oing as much oneself at the same time meant placing oneself in a situation of an individual who, with a pistol in his pocket, would allow his neighbor to put a loaded gun against his forehead without drawing his own.”184 Additionally, Rus­sia received warnings of the consequences of prewar military mea­sures by both G ­ reat Britain and Germany. On July 25, 1914, the British ambassador to Rus­sia told Sazonov that “if Rus­sia mobilized, Germany . . . ​would prob­ably declare war at once.”185 On July 26, the German ambassador to Rus­sia warned that “preparatory military mea­sures on the part of Rus­sia aimed in any way at us would compel us to take mea­sures for our own protection which would have to consist in the mobilization of the army. Mobilization, however, would mean war.”186 As John Vasquez summarizes, “Moltke and the army got their preventive war not ­because their case had been intellectually accepted but ­because of the rush of events. The Kaiser and the Chancellor should not be seen as planning a war, but as getting caught up in one ­because of the coercive game they ­were playing failed.” For Rus­sia “the point of placing Germany in 131

chapter 4

a position of having to fight a two-­front war was to prevent a war and to intimidate Germany in bargaining situations.”187 S t ep 3: W ar Co n tagi o n The inability of alternative explanations to fully explain the dynamics of the double security dilemma inevitably undermines their claims regarding the logic of contagion. The most relevant thesis claims that the Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers formed a counterhegemonic alliance to thwart Germany’s attempt to obtain or preserve its hegemony. However, this argument fails to explain why the Franco-­Russian alliance was formed when Germany was not a near-­ preponderant state, nor does it explain why Austria-­Hungary sided with Germany. This apparent puzzle is easily solved if we consider alliance formation an attempt by ­great powers to prevent an increase in the invasion ability of their own immediate rival. Being concerned that Rus­sia would take advantage of the Ottoman Empire’s decline a­ fter the Russo-­Turkish War (1877–1878), Austria-­Hungary began to seek support from g ­ reat powers that had divergent interests from Rus­sia’s. Although Germany was more power­ful than Rus­sia, Austria-­Hungary pushed for the creation of the Dual Alliance (1879) ­because it feared that Rus­sia would extend its influence close to its southern border. Therefore, Austria-­Hungary tried to counteract pos­si­ble Rus­sian encirclement by forming an alliance with Germany. The dynamics that led to the formation of the Franco-­Russian alliance followed the same logic of preventing the immediate rival from increasing its invasion ability. Each alliance created a vulnerability for the opposite bloc. As Germany’s relationship with Austria-­Hungary grew closer, Rus­sia had to counteract this alliance by seeking the support of other g ­ reat powers. Due to Rus­sia’s disputes with ­Great Britain over the Eastern Question and Central Asia, the only ­g reat power that could balance the Dual Alliance was France, who, in turn, yearned to escape its diplomatic isolation and regain possession of Alsace and Lorraine at the expense of its immediate rival (Germany). ­After the prospects for a Russo-­German rapprochement vanished with the Treaty of Björkö (1905), France and Rus­sia strengthened their alliance by taking steps to deter Germany’s aggressive foreign policy. Fi­nally, Britain’s decision to solve its historical tensions with France and Rus­sia over colonies in Africa and Asia was not a result of fear that Germany could become the Eu­ro­pean hegemon. Certainly, the British government wanted to maintain a balance of power on the continent, but its goal was to prevent any ­great power from being able to challenge the Royal Navy. The ability to guarantee its survival rested on preserving its superiority over the other Eu­ro­pean fleets so that they could not threaten to invade or cut the sea lanes that connected to its colonies, in par­tic­u­lar India. When Germany embarked on naval rearmament, the relationship between the two countries 132

Germany and World War I

changed drastically. The British government began to consider Germany its immediate rival well before Germany could pose a threat to continental Eu­ rope. As Lord Balfour bluntly replied when asked the reason for the worsening of the Anglo-­German relations,188 “Yes, but then you had no fleet.”189 Therefore, to prevent Germany from increasing its invasion ability, ­Great Britain responded not only by increasing military spending on the Royal Navy but also by forming alliances with the other Eu­ro­pean ­great powers.190 In the end, the concern regarding the ability of their own immediate rival to increase its invasion ability, rather than the fear of a Eu­ro­pean hegemon, was the driving force b ­ ehind the formation of the two opposite blocs that preceded the outbreak of World War I. This rival-­based network of alliances intertwined the dyadic rivalries into one unified zero-­sum game that inevitably dragged all the ­great powers in a­ fter Germany de­cided to declare war on Rus­sia.

Conclusion World War I was the result of attempts by Germany (encircled ­great power) to eliminate the latent encirclement of France and Rus­sia (surrounding g ­ reat powers). Since its unification in 1871, Germany tried to isolate France and prevent the emergence of a Franco-­Russian alliance. ­After this primary goal failed, Kaiser Wilhelm II tried to split the Franco-­Russian alliance using coercive diplomacy. Rus­sia’s decision to ramp up construction of strategic railroads in Poland ­after its diplomatic defeat in the First Balkan War was the main cause for the outbreak of the July crisis. The reduction in the time for Rus­sian mobilization provoked an increase in its invasion ability ­because it could quickly concentrate its army in a simultaneous attack with France (actualized encirclement). Germany, again, attempted to split the Franco-­Russian alliance by fomenting a localized conflict between Austria-­Hungary and Serbia during the July crisis. The Rus­sian order of general mobilization, which was supported by the French “blank check,” forced German leaders to declare war on Rus­sia. All the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers w ­ ere dragged into the conflict due to the tight network of alliances that had formed in the previous two de­ cades. France supported Rus­sia against Germany (immediate rival) ­because their alliance would not have survived another diplomatic defeat in a crisis in the Balkans. Since 1912, G ­ reat Britain was clearly committed to intervene on the side of France in case of a war with Germany (immediate rival) ­because a defeat of its ally would have allowed Germany to control the other side of the En­glish Channel and to concentrate its forces in an amphibious assault of the mainland. Austria-­Hungary’s decision to escalate the crisis with Serbia and, in turn, to participate in the major war on the side of Germany was driven by the fear that Rus­sia (immediate rival) would surround its southern border by extending its influence in the Balkans. 133

chapter 5

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

In this chapter, I provide an overview of all the remaining major wars in modern history. I start the analy­sis by looking at three major wars that characterized the reign of Louis XIV (Franco-­Dutch War, Nine Years’ War, and the War of the Spanish Succession), showing that they ­were caused by Louis XIV’s attempts to inherit Spain and eliminate France’s two-­front-­war prob­ lem. Then I explore two major wars that w ­ ere initiated by Frederick the ­Great to break the encirclement of Prus­sia (War of the Austrian Succession and Seven Years’ War). The following section identifies the encirclement of France at the beginning of the French Revolutionary Wars and of its continuation during the Napoleonic Wars. I conclude by analyzing in more detail the main anomaly of this study: the origins of World War II. Since a detailed analy­sis of all the events that characterized the double security dilemma of each major war is not pos­si­ble due to space constraints, I identify the most relevant ele­ments for encirclement theory: the presence of a two-­front-­war prob­lem (latent encirclement), the change in the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers (actualized encirclement) that led to war initiation, and the logic of war contagion.

The Major Wars of Louis XIV The end of the Thirty Years’ War (1648) and the conclusion of the prolonged dyadic conflict between France and Spain (Treaty of the Pyrenees, 1659) did not eliminate the Spanish encirclement of France. In the period between the Peace of Westphalia and the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Eu­rope experienced the outbreak of three major wars caused by an attempt by France (encircled g ­ reat power) to eliminate the encirclement of Spain (surrounding ­great power): the Franco-­Dutch War (1672– 1678), the Nine Years’ War (1688–1697), and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1713). As French military official Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban clearly stated, France felt surrounded, “in the ­middle of the most considerable powers 134

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

of Christendom, . . . ​equally in range of blows from Spain, Italy, Germany, the Low Countries, and E ­ ngland.”1 During his rule over France, Louis XIV continued his pre­de­ces­sors’ foreign policy.2 His main goal was to keep the Spanish and Austrian branches of the House of Hapsburg separate. Like Henry IV or Cardinal Richelieu, the Sun King resorted to two main mea­sures: diplomatic maneuvers to isolate the surrounding g ­ reat powers and calculated aggression against minor powers to create buffer zones in the Low Countries and in the Rhineland that would establish more defensible borders, thereby protecting Paris. France’s obsession with the possibility of a two-­front war was exacerbated by the death of Philip IV of Spain in 1665. Philip IV left the throne to a very sick four-­year-­old son that nobody in Eu­rope expected to live long.3 Although the Spanish succession would directly trigger only one of the three major wars u ­ nder Louis XIV, the ­future of the Spanish monarchy became the obsession of the French king.4 The death of Philip IV created a ­great opportunity as well as a major risk b ­ ecause the two pos­si­ble heirs ­were e­ ither Leopold I of Austria or Louis XIV.5 On the one hand, the Sun King could eliminate the encirclement of France once and for all by inheriting all the Spanish territories. On the other hand, if the succession passed to the Austrian emperor, he would resurrect the “Charles V situation” and unite the Spanish and Austrian branches of the House of Hapsburg.6 In the end, France continued to face the two-­front-­war prob­lem that had characterized its position since the end of the fifteenth c­ entury. The attempts of Louis XIV to escape the Spanish encirclement led to the outbreak of three major wars that, despite their uniqueness and complexities, revolved around the question of the Spanish succession. ­After having established the common thread that guided French foreign policy in ­those de­cades, I show that Louis XIV initiated three major wars to prevent actualized encirclement. Before moving to the analy­sis of the Franco-­Dutch War, I analyze another military conflict that was initiated by the Sun King but that did not escalate into a Eu­ro­pean conflagration: the War of Devolution. F a i led Escalati o n i n th e Wa r o f D evo l u t i o n ­After the death of Philip IV of Spain, Louis XIV had an opportunity to lay dynastic claims over large parts of the Spanish Netherlands. Taking advantage of the conflict between ­England and the Dutch Republic (Second Anglo-­ Dutch War, 1665–1667), France formed a secret pact with E ­ ngland in which the latter would not oppose a French conquest of the Spanish Netherlands.7 Having obtained En­glish acquiescence, Louis XIV launched an invasion of the Spanish Netherlands, starting the War of Devolution (1667–1668). French advances in the Flanders concerned the Dutch Republic, which considered the Spanish Netherlands a buffer zone that would protect them from an invasion. The reaction of the other g ­ reat powers8 and the risk of triggering 135

chapter 5

a major war on multiple fronts compelled Louis XIV to desist from his designs. In the Treaty of Aix-­la-­Chapelle (May 1668), France returned most of the cities it occupied in the Spanish Netherlands. Nonetheless, the Sun King continued to believe that it was “necessary and desirable to gain more territory in the north. This would strengthen France’s military position as it would break the Habsburg encirclement. . . . ​ Acquiring the Spanish Netherlands was therefore the central line of his foreign policy.”9 In addition to ending alliance with the Dutch, the War of Devolution led Louis XIV to realize that to claim the Spanish throne and, in turn, to eliminate the two-­front-­war prob­lem was necessary to neutralize the Dutch Republic. Since the mid-­sixteenth ­century, the Dutch had been an impor­tant counterweight to the Spanish ability to launch a two-­front war. To prevent a concentration of Spanish forces (actualized encirclement), Louis XIV had only two options: one the one hand, he could declare war on Spain, at the risk of triggering the reaction of the ­Triple Alliance; on the other hand, he could attack the Dutch Republic and remove the last barrier to the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, ending once and for all the Spanish encirclement of France. Fearing a war against the T ­ riple Alliance, the Sun King de­cided on the second option and put all his diplomatic “efforts to keep Spain from joining the Dutch.”10 T h e Fra nco -­D utch Wa r In the years that preceded the outbreak of the Franco-­Dutch War (1672– 1678), Louis XIV resorted to skillful diplomacy to isolate the Dutch Republic. First, the Sun King signed the Secret Treaty of Vienna (January 1668) with Leopold I in which they agreed on the f­ uture partition of the Spanish Empire at the death of the son of Philip IV. In exchange for the rights to the Iberian Peninsula and the Spanish possessions in northern Italy and in the colonies, the Austrian emperor agreed to stay on the sidelines in a ­future conflict that involved the Spanish Netherlands.11 Second, France forged agreements with small states in proximity to the Dutch Republic, such as the Electors of Cologne and of Münster, that would have allowed France to attack the Dutch Republic bypassing the Spanish Netherlands. Third, Louis XIV managed to break the T ­ riple Alliance by obtaining the neutrality of Sweden along with the Swedish promise of intervention if Leopold I or the Elector of Brandenburg came to the aid of the Dutch Republic.12 Fi­nally, the Sun King forged a secret pact with E ­ ngland (Treaty of Dover, June 1670) that would guarantee British support for the French claim on the Spanish monarchy and its intervention in a war between France and the Dutch Republic.13 ­After ­t hese diplomatic maneuvers, in May 1672, Louis XIV de­cided to launch an attack against the Dutch Republic to prevent them from concentrating their forces with the Spanish army (actualized encirclement). Despite his efforts to keep the conflict localized, French advances in the Low Countries and in the Rhineland alarmed Louis XIV’s opponents and triggered in136

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

Figure 5.1. Logic of war contagion in the Franco-­Dutch War

tervention by all the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers.14 Figure 5.1 illustrates 15 the dynamics of contagion. Spain intervened on the side of the Dutch Republic b ­ ecause the loss of a great-­power ally by military defeat would have put at risk the control of the Spanish Netherlands to France. If Louis XIV had increased his territorial possessions, he could have also separated the House of Hapsburg and in turn threatened the unity of the Holy Roman Empire. Facing the Ottoman threat in the east, Leopold I reneged on the secret treaty of 1668 and de­cided to intervene on the side of Spain (reason of intervention: annexation of territory). On the other side, ­England and Sweden joined France to ­counter their own immediate rival. ­England wanted to prevent the strengthening of the Dutch Republic and initiated the Third Anglo-­Dutch War (reason of intervention: annexation of territory). Sweden sought to c­ ounter any advance of Austria close to the Baltic Sea (reason of intervention: annexation of territory). In sum, France continued to face a two-­front-­war prob­lem b ­ ecause of Spanish encirclement. The death of Philip IV of Spain increased French concern that the Hapsburg could concentrate their forces, threatening to re-­create the “Charles V situation.” Accordingly, the first years of the reign of Louis XIV ­were characterized by attempts to control the Spanish Netherlands in order to acquire dynastic rights to the Spanish succession. The change of alliances that occurred b ­ ecause of the War of Devolution, with the Dutch provinces switching side in f­ avor of Spain, compelled Louis XIV to initiate war. The Franco-­Dutch War was not fought with hegemonic ambitions. Initiating a localized conflict against the Dutch Republic was the only way to prevent actualized encirclement. Louis XIV used all his diplomatic skills to isolate the Dutch and to avoid the escalation of the dyadic war, but his miscalculations over the intervention of the Austrian emperor triggered the reaction of all Eu­ro­pean ­great powers based on the rival-­based alliances that emerged in the years that preceded the Franco-­Dutch War. T h e N in e Years’ Wa r The Treaties of Nijmegen (August 1678) brought peace to Eu­rope, but they did not eliminate the fundamental prob­lem of the Spanish encirclement of France. When the Austrian emperor removed the internal and external 137

chapter 5

security threats that prevented him from concentrating his army in western Eu­rope in a simultaneous attack with Spain and the Dutch, Louis XIV initiated another major war (Nine Years’ War, 1688–1697). The gains that France made brought all the Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers together in an effort to contain French expansionism.16 With no possibility of creating a network of alliances to isolate his immediate rival, the Sun King and his advisers developed a strategy that required the construction of a system of impenetrable fortresses along French borders. However, this defensive proj­ect required France to obtain territories from neighboring states through calculated aggression. In turn, France’s military mea­sures compelled the other ­great powers to tighten their anti-­French co­ali­tion.17 ­After Leopold I intervened on the side of the Dutch Republic in the Franco-­ Dutch War, Louis XIV started to consider Austria a major threat and became increasingly concerned about Leopold I’s intention to launch a joint attack with Spain and the Dutch. However, in the years that followed the Peace of Nijmegen, the Austrian emperor concentrated his resources and attention on the eastern border ­because of the Ottoman threat. Moreover, the Sun King continued to finance several German states (Mainz, Trier, Cologne, Saxony, Bavaria, and Brandenburg) to forestall any attempt to raise a unified army against France. Louis XIV exploited this situation to secure the eastern border of France. The annexation of Franche-­Comté allowed France to seize other strategic points of entry in the Rhineland, such as Strasbourg (September 1681), that ­were essential to preventing a potential Austrian attack. Furthermore, the Sun King took advantage of the new round of hostilities between Austria and the Ottoman Empire (­Great Turkish War, 1683–­1699) to obtain strategic cities in the Spanish Netherlands (War of the Reunions, 1683–­1684).18 As tensions seemed to subside, the internal and external security threats that ­were preventing the Hapsburg from concentrating their forces against France began to fade (actualized encirclement). First of all, the Sun King’s decision to undermine freedom of religion for Protestants (Edict of Fontainebleau, 1685) led to the deterioration of relations with several German states. Most importantly, the Ottoman defeat in the B ­ attle of Vienna (September 1683) caused a progressive retreat from the Eu­ro­pean theater. ­After the defeats in the B ­ attle at Buda (September 1686) and in the B ­ attle of Mohács (August 1687), it became evident that it was just a m ­ atter of time before Leopold I could move his troops from the Balkans and reverse the gains made by France in the War of the Reunions.19 In a last attempt to create an impenetrable buffer zone in the Rhineland, Louis XIV tried in vain to consolidate the gains made with the Truce of Ratisbon by turning it into a permanent settlement, thereby erecting a barrier made by German Protestant states against a potential attack by the Austrian emperor.20 When the Ottoman re­sis­tance collapsed in the Siege of Belgrade (September 4, 1688), the Sun King had no option but to initiate war before 138

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

Leopold I could move his troops across Germany and launch a simultaneous war with Spain (September 27, 1688).21 This attack aimed to force the reluctant German states into a peaceful settlement favorable to France and at reinvigorating Ottoman efforts against the Austrian emperor. Although Louis XIV wanted a short defensive war like the War of the Reunions, the situation on the continent had changed. Since 1686, Spain, Austria, E ­ ngland, and the Dutch Republic had formed an anti-­French alliance (the League of Augsburg) to prevent any further expansion along the Rhine.22 Louis XIV’s conquests in the years preceding the Nine Years’ War had turned France in a potential hegemon in Eu­rope, thereby making it the common immediate rival of all the other ­great powers.23 Therefore, the attack of Louis XIV on the Spanish Netherlands and in the Rhineland led to the outbreak of a long war of attrition, where all the Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers coalesced against France to thwart any attempt to alter the status quo. T h e W a r of th e Spa n i sh Su ccessi o n The Peace of Ryswick (1697) ended the Nine Years’ War, but Eu­rope would soon be devastated by another major war: the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–­1713). When Charles II of Spain died without an heir in 1700, all concerns that had characterized the years ­ after the death of his ­ father reemerged.24 Since the Spanish king had named the grand­son of Louis XIV as his legitimate heir, the Sun King once again had the opportunity to eliminate Spanish encirclement once and for all. On the other hand, Louis XIV was aware that the Austrian emperor would not stay idle out of fear of separating the Spanish and Austrian branches of the House of Hapsburg: ­ here are members of the emperor’s Council so passionately devoted to the T concept of an inseparable u ­ nion of the two h ­ ouses of Spain and Austria that they would take mea­sures in Spain as well as trying to persuade His Imperial Majesty that his honour and dignity demand that he never give up Spain, if they perceived the slightest sign that Your Majesty intended to contest the succession or wanted to s­ ettle it by partition.25

Before the death of the Spanish king, Louis XIV had tried to ­settle the question of inheritance by reaching an agreement with E ­ ngland, but his proposal of partitioning Spain was unsuccessful.26 Left with no choice but risking a major war or accepting Leopold I’s son inheriting the crown, Louis XIV supported the claim of his grand­son to the throne. “What is clear is that Louis felt he could not let the succession go by default to Austria; that would mean . . . ​the certainty of encirclement.”27 Therefore, the Sun King made a decision, which he knew would likely trigger the outbreak of a major war, to prevent the Austrian emperor from re-­creating the “Charles V situation” (a case of actualized encirclement by closure of the circle). 139

chapter 5

Figure 5.2. Logic of war contagion in the War of the Spanish Succession

The proclamation of the grand­son of Louis XIV as the rightful heir to the Spanish throne led to the outbreak of hostilities. The French campaign against the Dutch Republic in the Low Countries resulted in a cascade of military interventions by the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers (figure  5.2): France and Spain against the ­Grand Alliance, which included ­England, Austria, and the Dutch Republic.28 Austria intervened in the war b ­ ecause if France had inherited the Spanish monarchy, it could attack the Austrian possessions in northern Italy as it did in the first phase of the war (reason for intervention: annexation of territory close to the border).29 ­After being attacked, the Dutch Republic supported the war efforts of the ­Grand Alliance ­because Louis XIV’s victory would have led to the annexation of the Spanish Netherlands and eliminated the last barrier from French invasion that the Dutch had fought for since the War of Devolution (reason for intervention: annexation of territory close to the border). Fi­ nally, E ­ ngland was concerned that the defeat of the Dutch Republic would give France control of the Dutch barrier, which would enable France to blockade of the En­glish Channel and even create the possibility of an invasion of ­England (reason for intervention: loss of great-­power ally by military defeat). The War of the Spanish Succession, like the Franco-­Dutch War and the Nine Years’ War, was initiated by Louis XIV to prevent Leopold I from gaining control of the Spanish Empire and, in turn, re-­creating France’s strategic nightmare of being completely encircled by the united House of Hapsburg (the “Charles V situation”). France’s aim was defensive and ­limited in scope rather than hegemonic. France triggered ­these major wars when it was more power­ ful than its opponents (Nine Years’ War) as well as when the Eu­ro­pean system was balanced (Franco-­Dutch War and the War of the Spanish Succession). Although France was not superior to its adversaries at the onset of the war, the Peace of Utrecht (April 1713) gave France the long-­coveted goal of eliminating its two-­front-­war prob­lem. The demise of the Dutch Republic and of Spain from great-­power status eliminated once and for all the Spanish encirclement of France: “A remarkable change occurred in the po­liti­cal structure of Eu­rope ­toward the end of Louis XIV’s life. France had lost most of the major b ­ attles of the War of the Spanish Succession, and yet, in a very real sense, France had won the war: the nightmare of the Spanish encirclement that had plagued it for two hundred years was no more.”30 140

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

The Encirclement of Prus­sia The beginning of the eigh­teenth ­century brought about considerable changes in the Eu­ro­pean system of ­great powers. In addition to the fall of Spain and the Dutch Republic from the ranks of g ­ reat powers, the G ­ reat Northern War (1700–­1721) caused the demise of Sweden and the rise of two new ­great powers: Rus­sia and Prus­sia.31 ­Until the rise of Napoleonic France, Eu­rope would be characterized by a balanced system with five ­great powers.32 Although states still engaged in security competition and in dyadic conflicts, the first two de­cades ­after the Peace of Utrecht lacked significant great-­power confrontations. The main cause of this period of peace was the absence of an encircled g ­ reat power. However, this situation would soon change a­ fter the War of the Polish Succession (1733–­1738). The Polish-­Lithuanian Commonwealth was an assemblage of provinces that ­were controlled by August II of Poland. At his death, ­great powers tried to intervene to advance their own national interests by facilitating the succession of a friendly ruler. France supported Stanislaus I to oppose its immediate rival, Austria; Rus­sia and Austria supported the victorious August III.33 A major result of this military conflict was the weakening of Poland, which became increasingly controlled by Rus­sia. In par­tic­u­lar, the Peace of Vienna gave the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia to a Rus­sian protégé, making this region a de facto vassal state.34 Thus, the settlement to the War of the Polish Succession created the encirclement of Prus­sia (encircled ­great power), which shared its eastern border with Rus­sia and its southern border with Austria. To escape the deadly embrace of Austria and Rus­sia (surrounding ­great powers), Prus­sia resorted to the two most common foreign policy actions for an encircled g ­ reat power. The first mea­sure was to seek alliances that could ­counter the surrounding ­great powers. Rus­sia and Austria had been formal allies since 1726 (Treaty of Vienna), when the czar supported the Austrian involvement in the war between Spain and ­England, and their relationship became even stronger during the War of the Polish Succession. In addition to posing a threat close to the western border of Prus­sia, the British rapprochement with Austria in the summer of 1730 (second Treaty of Vienna) prevented Prus­sia’s alliance with ­Great Britain.35 Therefore, France was the only ­great power that could support Prus­sia against the surrounding ­great powers. The improvement of Franco-­Prussian relations culminated in the secret treaty of April  1739  in which France promised to join Prus­sia in case of war and to threaten Austria to prevent it from concentrating its forces with Rus­sia.36 The other mea­sure that Frederick William I of Prus­sia ­adopted to prevent Austria and Rus­sia from launching a two-­front war was to create a buffer zone. Attempts to control the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia could not eliminate the two-­front-­war prob­lem (since the eastern border of Prus­sia would have still been threatened by Rus­sia) and Prus­sian influence in Poland 141

chapter 5

was minimal in the years that followed the War of the Polish Succession. Conquering Saxony, on Prus­sia’s western border, would not have solved the issue of encirclement e­ ither. Moreover, it likely would have triggered the reaction of the surrounding ­great powers since they ­were allies of August III (Duke of Saxony and King of Poland). The only area that would have improved the situation of Prus­sia was control of Silesia, an Austrian region with high strategic value, as it could slow the advance of the Austrian emperor in northern Eu­rope and undermine his connection with the Rus­sian Empire.37 In the end, the control of this territory would lead to the outbreak of two major wars: the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War. T h e W a r of th e A u stri a n Su ccessi o n The conditions for the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) emerged when the Austrian emperor Charles VI died without a male heir, leaving the throne to his ­daughter Maria Theresa. Although the pragmatic sanction allowed a w ­ oman to become ruler of the Hapsburg monarchy, the Austrian succession created a potential power vacuum that other states sought to exploit.38 Since the Austrian succession required the approval of the German Electorates in the Imperial Diet, the prince-­elector August of Saxony did not recognize Maria Theresa as legitimate heir and instead claimed the throne himself. The succession of August of Saxony, who was also king of Poland, to the throne of the Hapsburg monarchy would have united his territorial possessions, leaving Prus­sia surrounded: a case of actualized encirclement by closure of the circle.39 To prevent actualized encirclement, Frederick the G ­ reat preempted the actions of August of Saxony and Poland and, supported by the secret alliance with France, invaded Silesia (December 1740). Within weeks, the entire region was u ­ nder Prus­sian control and Frederick the G ­ reat initiated secret negotiations with Maria Theresa to prevent the contagion of the conflict in exchange for Frederick the G ­ reat’s recognition of Maria Theresa’s legitimacy as ruler of the Hapsburg monarchy as well as his guarantee of the integrity of all the other Austrian provinces.40 The actions of Frederick the ­Great show the ­limited motive ­behind the invasion of Silesia. Prus­sia did not want to become a preponderant state in Eu­rope or to annihilate its immediate rival. Quite the contrary, in the years before the invasion of Silesia, Prus­sia did not take advantage of the financial and military weakness of Austria.41 If the goal of Frederick the ­Great had been expansionist, he should have shown more opportunistic be­hav­ior and taken advantage of the war between the Austrian emperor and the Turks (Austro-­Turkish War, 1737–­1739).42 Instead, the Prus­sian king was compelled to attack only to prevent his ­enemy, the Russian-­backed king of Saxony and Poland, from cornering Prus­sia and creating a three-­front war prob­lem. 142

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

Figure 5.3. Logic of war contagion in the War of the Austrian Succession

Despite the Prus­sian attempts to localize the conflict with a fait accompli, the network of alliances that emerged before the invasion of Silesia led to a cascade of military interventions by all the other Eu­ro­pean ­great powers, which ­were concerned by their own immediate rival. Figure 5.3 illustrates the logic of contagion in the War of the Austrian Succession.43 The military conflict escalated into a major war due to the French intervention on the side of Prus­sia. The main concern of France was that a failure to intervene would undermine its alliance with Prus­sia, leaving France isolated against all the other ­great powers (case of intervention: loss of great-­power ally by defection). Moreover, France tried to take advantage of the weakness of Maria Theresa to extend its influence in central Eu­rope and to eliminate the Austrian threat on the northern frontier. In the other alliance bloc, G ­ reat Britain intervened to ­counter France, its immediate rival. ­Great Britain’s main goal was to prevent the collapse of its Austrian ally, which acted as a counterweight to France in central Eu­rope and close to the En­glish Channel due to the control of the Austrian Netherlands (case of intervention: loss of great-­ power ally by military defeat). Fi­nally, Rus­sia intervened on the side of Austria out of fear that the loss of its great-­power ally would embolden Prus­sia and encourage it to extend its influence in Poland and ultimately attack the Rus­sian Empire. The escalation of the dyadic conflict between Prus­sia and Austria to all the ­great powers in the region thwarted the attempts of Frederick the ­Great to achieve a quick and decisive victory and negotiate separate settlement with Maria Theresa from a position of strength. The war would last u ­ ntil the end of 1748, when the ­great powers reached an agreement with the Treaty of Aachen. The main consequence of the treaty was the transfer of Silesia to Prus­sia, but the pact did not solve the under­lying ­causes of the war. Prus­sia still faced a two-front war problem. Furthermore, the conclusion of the peace left Austria unsatisfied and keen to retake possession of Silesia at its first opportunity. Fi­nally, the British mediation in the Treaty of Aachen started to undermine relations with its Austrian ally, as ­Great Britain approved the transfer of Silesia to Prus­sia to end the conflict. The break of the Anglo-­ Austrian alliance would eventually lead to the outbreak of the following major war: the Seven Years’ War. 143

chapter 5

T h e Seven Years’ Wa r The inability of the Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers to solve the rivalry between Prus­sia and Austria over the control of Silesia made the outbreak of new hostilities almost inevitable. The Treaty of Aachen proved to be an armistice and the years that preceded the beginning of the Seven Years’ War (1756–­ 1763) an opportunity to regain strength ­after a lengthy and costly military conflict, rather than a real period of peace.44 Prus­sia still faced a two-­front-­war prob­lem (latent encirclement), but the two surrounding g ­ reat powers ­were momentarily incapable of launching a simultaneous attack (actualized encirclement) ­because of Austrian financial prob­lems. Rather than try to expand his holding, Frederick the ­Great declined to exploit Austria’s weakness to launch a preventive attack or even to increase his territorial possessions. Quite the contrary, Prus­sian foreign policy a­ fter the War of the Austrian Succession tried to maintain the status quo and secure control of Silesia.45 The circumstances leading to the outbreak of the war w ­ ere created by the aggressive policy of Maria Theresa, who had not renounced her claims on Silesia. ­After rapidly modernizing her army, she made diplomatic moves to obtain external support for her plan to invade Silesia. Securing the staunch support of Rus­sia in exchange for the formal annexation of eastern Prus­sia to Poland, the Austrian empress tried to gain British approval for an attack on Prus­sia.46 However, the relations between the two ­great powers had become increasingly strained a­ fter the War of the Austrian Succession. Maria Theresa resented ­Great Britain ­because the latter excluded Austria from negotiations with Prus­sia facilitating the loss of Silesia. At the same time, British officials w ­ ere growing weary of giving financial aid to a reluctant ally that gave l­ ittle support in the defense of Hanover against France. It is in this situation that one of the most surprising strategic realignments in history occurred.47 When ­Great Britain refused to support the Austrian attack to retake Silesia, Maria Theresa settled her dispute with France, a long-­ term rival of Austria, and forged a defensive alliance in which each state would guarantee the other’s support if attacked by ­either Prus­sia or ­Great Britain (Treaty of Versailles). Remaining completely isolated in the Eu­ro­pean system and fearing that its immediate rival (France) would take advantage of this situation, ­Great Britain hastily formed an alliance with Prus­sia (Westminster Convention) in which it received promises of the integrity of Hanover in exchange for not supporting Austria in case of a new conflict over Silesia. In the first few months of 1756, the Diplomatic Revolution completely reshaped the structure of alliances and gave Maria Theresa an opportunity to seek revenge against Prus­sia.48 “The First Treaty of Versailles was a serious ­matter for Frederick, since it completed the encirclement of Prus­sia, now isolated and facing three power­ful enemies.”49 With a strong and modernized army and the support of Rus­sia and France, Maria Theresa could now mobi144

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

lize her army against Prus­sia (actualized encirclement by concentration of forces). In 1756, Maria Theresa started military preparations for a joint attack with Rus­sia that aimed not only at retaking Silesia but also at incorporating eastern Prus­sia in the Polish-­Lithuanian Commonwealth, thereby relegating Prus­sia to minor-­power status.50 As “Prus­sia was encircled and faced a strug­gle for her very existence,” Frederick the ­Great launched a preemptive war against Austria to thwart the imminent two-­f ront attack of the surrounding ­great powers.51 In turn, the Prus­sian invasion of Saxony and Bohemia activated the new system of rival-­based alliances that the Diplomatic Revolution had created (figure 5.4).52 Rus­sia intervened against its immediate rival (Prus­sia) to prevent the military defeat of its Austrian ally, which would have increased Prus­sia’s ability to extend its influence in Poland (case of intervention: loss of great-­power ally by military defeat). The British monarchy complied with the Westminster Convention and joined Prus­sia to prevent its military defeat, which would have left ­Great Britain completely isolated against the other g ­ reat powers. The collapse of its only ally would have totally undermined the British policy of containing the ambitions of France (immediate rival) in Eu­rope, weakening the possession of Hanover, and North Amer­i­ca (case of intervention: loss of great-­power ally by military defeat). Additionally, a victory in the Seven Years’ War would have given France the Low Countries, which would have secured the frontier close to Paris against the encroachment of Prus­sia into territory near France’s eastern border.53 Fi­nally, France intervened against Prus­sia to prevent the loss of its ­great power ally (Austria) and, in turn, a worsening of its relative position vis-­à-­vis its immediate rival (­Great Britain). In sum, both the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War ­were caused by the attempts of Frederick the ­Great of Prus­sia to escape the deadly embrace of Austria and Rus­sia by assuming control of Silesia, a strategic region of the Austrian Empire. The motive ­behind the Prus­sian initiation of the two conflicts was defensive and ­limited, not aimed to become the most power­ful state. Despite the bloody and prolonged military confrontations, ­t hese major wars did not solve the Prus­sian two-­front-­war prob­lem since the Treaty of

Figure 5.4. Logic of war contagion in the Seven Years’ War

145

chapter 5

Paris and the Treaty of Hubertusburg (1763) restored the status quo ante. However, Frederick the ­Great would eventually break the Austro-­Russian encirclement without another major war. In three successive partitions (most importantly, that which occurred in 1772), Prus­sia, Rus­sia, and Austria agreed to dismember completely the Polish-­Lithuanian Commonwealth.54 This created a defensible buffer zone that, although it could not thwart an Austrian invasion from the south, ­limited Rus­sia’s ability to launch a joint attack with Austria. The solidity of this agreement, which held even at the outbreak of tense internal crises such as the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778–­1779), shows that the strategic nightmare of encirclement could be resolved without great-­power conflict.55 Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to reach this kind of arrangement particularly ­after a major war. Indeed, the elimination of the encirclement of Prus­sia through the partition of Poland remains the only example in modern history.

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars The French Revolutionary Wars and their continuation with the Napoleonic Wars (1792–­1815) is a multifaceted case that is still debated by historians.56 In spite of its complexity, it is pos­si­ble to identify the concern a simultaneous Austro-­Prussian invasion as the catalyst for the French decision to initiate the war. The French Revolution shook the Eu­ro­pean system, but it did not cause the outbreak of hostilities. The other g ­ reat powers ­were certainly alarmed by the events in Paris, but they did not intervene to contain the revolution. What triggered the major war was the emergence of the Austro-­Prussian encirclement of France. Austria controlled the Austrian Netherlands and other territories in the eastern border of France.57 Furthermore, Prus­sia increased its presence along the northeastern border of France. Heavi­ly subsidized by ­Great Britain, Frederick the ­Great intervened militarily to restore his niece Wilhelmina of Prus­sia as the ruler of the Dutch Republic (Prus­sian invasion of the Netherlands, September–­October 1787). The British prime minister William Pitt even threatened France with invasion in case of interference in Dutch affairs.58 Furthermore, Prus­sia increased its presence close to the eastern border of France. The acquisition of the Principality of Ansbach and Frederick’s ties with rulers in the Rhineland, near the French province of Alsace, created a second front in addition to the Austrian presence in the Low Countries. The possibility of a joint invasion by Austria and Prus­sia became the central prob­lem for Revolutionary France, but the internal and external security threats that Austria faced l­ imited its ability to launch an attack with Prus­sia. Austria was involved in another military conflict with the Ottoman

146

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

Empire (Austro-­Turkish War, 1788–1791). Moreover, ­after the death of Emperor Joseph II (1790), the Hapsburg monarchy was in turmoil, and it was more concerned with unrest in Hungary than with the spread of the French Revolution. The situation quickly began to change between the end of 1790 and the beginning of 1792, when Prus­sia and Austria removed all the barriers that prevented their concentration of forces in a two-­front invasion (actualized encirclement). First, they solved their historical disputes in the Treaty of Reichenbach (July 27, 1790), agreed to end Prus­sian support for the Turks, and strengthened Austrian military presence in the Low Countries. Second, Austria concluded a peace with the Ottoman Empire and started to transfer its troops to western Eu­rope.59 Third, they issued the Declaration of Pillnitz (August 1791) in which they threatened war if France did not restore King Louis XVI and Queen Marie-­Antoinette to the throne. Fourth, Austria and Prus­sia officially formed a defensive alliance to intervene on the side of the dethroned French king (February 1792) and agreed to secretly divide the Palatinate and Alsace. Fi­nally, a­ fter the creation of the alliance, both countries started to mobilize and to amass significant troops along the Rhine, threatening to invade the northern and eastern frontiers of France. The removal of the barrier that prevented the two surrounding ­great powers from concentrating their forces led to the outbreak of hostilities. Since late 1790, France had tried to block an entry of invasion from its eastern border by coercing the Electors of Trier and Mainz, but this strategy pushed Austria and Prus­sia to tighten their encirclement of France. ­After the Austrian emperor refused to give assurances that he would withdraw his army and denounce any agreement against France, a “descent on France” was considered imminent.60 In April 1792, the French Legislative Assembly was “forced” to declare war against the Austrian emperor as a “just defense of a ­free ­people against the unjust aggression of a king”61 and to launch a preemptive strike on the Austrian Netherlands. As French diplomat Claude-­Charles de Peyssonnel stated in March 1790, this action was required by the certainty that the Austro-­Prussian goal was to launch a two-­front invasion: “Who could guarantee that the forces of Austria and Prus­sia, joined within our borders, would not attack French Flanders, Hainault, Cambresis, our first and second lines [of defense] and would not perhaps try to attack Alsace and Lorraine?”62 The French declaration of war led to a quick spread of the conflict since all the ­great powers intervened against France.63 Prus­sia intervened on the side of its Austrian ally to prevent a quick victory by France, which would have undermined Prus­sian presence in the Rhineland and threatened the Prussian-­sponsored regency of the Dutch Republic (case for intervention: loss of great-­power ally). Likewise, Rus­sia joined the anti-­French co­ali­tion out of fear of losing its Austrian ally, which was essential to countering Prus­ sian presence in Poland.64 Fi­nally, ­Great Britain intervened out of fear that a

147

chapter 5

collapse of the Austro-­Prussian alliance would have given France (immediate rival) the ability to expand in the Austrian Netherlands and even in the Dutch Republic (case for intervention: annexation of territory). In addition of being part of the ­Triple Alliance with Prus­sia and the Dutch, ­Great Britain was concerned that the annexation of the Low Countries by the French would increase their ability to cross the En­glish Channel.65 In sum, France initiated a preemptive attack against Austria b ­ ecause the latter was planning a two-­front invasion with Prus­sia. The other ­great powers intervened in the French Revolutionary Wars to ­counter their own immediate rival. This situation put France in isolation against all the other g ­ reat powers, both when it was not a potential hegemon (1792–­1802) and when Napoleon raised France to the status of the most power­ful state in Eu­rope (1803–­1815).66 My theory does not make predictions on the conduct of major wars. However, the continuation of the major war during the Napoleonic era remains a puzzle ­because the French annexation of the Austrian Netherlands eliminated the two-­front-­war prob­lem. Since hostilities continued almost seamlessly, I stand by Levy’s characterization of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as a single major war. Nonetheless, if one separated this case in two discrete international phenomena, my theory could not explain the phase of the Napoleonic Wars.67 French defeat in the ­Battle of Waterloo ( June 18, 1815) would establish not just the end of hostilities but also of the encirclement of France. The geopo­ liti­cal earthquake that this major war caused had the consequence of preventing the encirclement of another ­g reat power ­u ntil the unification of Germany in 1871. Eu­rope would then enjoy one of the most peaceful periods in its modern history.

World War II One major finding of this book is that the encircled g ­ reat power initiates war against one of the surrounding g ­ reat powers as a mea­sure of last resort and with the ­limited aim of preventing actualized encirclement. Another implication is that major wars can happen in the absence of a near-­preponderant state that tries to establish hegemony in its own region, a clear absolute goal. Nonetheless, my theory is not contradicted if the encircled ­great power is the most power­ful state in the region and it initiates an attack against one of the surrounding ­great powers to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem once and for all. On the other hand, my theory is undermined if major wars occur in the absence of encirclement or if the encircled g ­ reat power attacks for hegemonic ambitions rather than for preventing actualized encirclement. Therefore, I conclude this chapter by analyzing in detail the main anomaly of this study: World War II (1939–­1945).

148

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

Encirclement theory cannot fully account for this major war ­because the Weimar Republic ­after the end of World War I and then Nazi Germany did not face a two-­front-­war prob­lem. Although Germany shared its western border with France, the reconstitution of Poland ­after World War I created a wedge between Germany and the Soviet Union. Moreover, conventional wisdom considers this major war to be caused by Adolf Hitler’s dreams of domination, ­whether they ­were influenced by geopo­liti­cal considerations or his ideology.68 On the other hand, encirclement theory still provides useful insights into the origins of World War II. First, Hitler considered Germany to be encircled ­after the end of World War I ­because he regarded Poland as a “speed bump” more than an effective barrier against Soviet invasion. Accordingly, his main strategy was to create a credible buffer zone to prevent the Soviet Union from uniting its forces with France in a simultaneous attack. Second, the decision to invade Poland despite the likely response of France and ­Great Britain was driven by concrete fear that they would create a military alliance with the Soviet Union. An agreement with the Allied Powers and with Poland allowing passage to Soviet troops would have increased the invasion ability of the Soviet Union and allowed a simultaneous attack with France (actualized encirclement by concentration of forces). Third, the pattern of alliances among the Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers was influenced by concerns about their own immediate rival. France formed an alliance with the Soviet Union and with ­Great Britain to c­ ounter Nazi Germany (its immediate rival). ­Great Britain initially fostered a rapprochement with Nazi Germany to c­ ounter the ambitions of the Soviet Union (immediate rival) on the Turkish Straits, but it reversed to considering Nazi Germany its immediate rival ­after Hitler’s territorial expansion in eastern Eu­rope. The Soviet Union formed an alliance with France to contain Nazi Germany (Franco-­Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, May 1935). Only a­ fter negotiations for a formal alliance with ­Great Britain failed did it resort to signing a nonaggression treaty (Ribbentrop-­Molotov Pact on August 23, 1939) to postpone the final reckoning with Nazi Germany (immediate rival). Fi­nally, it is worthwhile to note that the invasion of Poland (September 1939) did not provoke direct military confrontations among Eu­ro­pean ­great powers. The drôle de guerre (September 1939–­May 1940) did not differ much from the pattern of great-­power be­hav­ior following Hitler’s violation of the Munich Agreement (September 1939) and the invasion of Czecho­slo­va­kia (March 1939).69 One could argue that the major war did not start u ­ ntil the German invasion of Denmark (April 1940) or even the ­Battle of France (May 1940). An in­ter­est­ing implication stems from considering the beginning of World War II not to have occurred until the onset of ­actual great-­power fighting: the partition of Poland created a unique situation of double encirclement ­because Nazi Germany became encircled by France and the Soviet Union while the Soviet Union faced a two-­front-­war prob­lem by Nazi Germany and Japan.

149

chapter 5

T h e “En circlemen t” o f N a zi Germa n y The Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919) imposed a humiliating peace on Germany, ­shaped two de­cades of foreign relations among Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers, and led to the outbreak of another devastating war. Although the “Versailles diktat” left Germany in a position of weakness and ­limited autonomy, it temporarily eliminated its two-­front-­war prob­lem b ­ ecause the creation of several minor powers (Czecho­slo­va­kia, Poland, and the Baltic States) on its eastern border created a buffer zone with the Soviet Union. Even the pattern of alliances that France established in the east70 did not engender encirclement for the Weimar Republic ­because of the French inability to proj­ect power on the eastern border of Germany and the newly in­de­pen­dent states’ lack of military power.71 Although Germany did not share borders with two ­great powers, Hitler considered the Treaty of Versailles to have been designed to keep Germany encircled. “The Peace of ‘Diktat’ of Versailles did not come into existence by chance. It was the goal of t­ hose who for years had sought to encircle Germany and had at last reached their goal. We have no right to doubt that to-­ day the same policy is being pursued only to attain the same goal.”72 The Führer did not consider the Baltic States or Poland to be safe barriers against the Soviet Union and he watched with concern the spread of French alliances in eastern Eu­rope:73 “Germany at the pre­sent time is encircled by three power ­factors or power groups. ­England, Rus­sia, and France are at pre­sent militarily the most threatening of German’s neighbors. At the same time French power appears strengthened by a system of Eu­ro­pean alliances which reach from Paris to Belgrade via Warsaw and Prague.”74 This situation created a double security dilemma for Germany and ­shaped its foreign policy ­until the outbreak of World War II.75 Before becoming a relevant po­liti­cal figure, Hitler recognized that the enduring survival of Germany relied on eliminating its two-­front-­war prob­lem once and for all. Germany should “never suffer the rise of two continental powers in Eu­rope. Regard any attempt to or­ga­n ize a second military power on the German frontiers, even if only in the form of creating a state capable of military strength, as an attack on Germany, and in it see not only the right, but also the duty, to employ all means up to armed force to prevent the rise of such a state, or, if one has already arisen, to smash it again.”76 Encirclement created a sense of urgency ­because Germany could not defend itself against a bloc of hostile nations. In addition to initiating a program of military rearmament, Hitler made diplomatic moves to prevent France and the Soviet Union from concentrating their forces.77 Nazi Germany tried to disrupt the network of alliances that the surrounding ­great powers created in eastern Eu­rope78 and to hinder France’s attempts to increase its influence in Austria.79 Furthermore, Hitler supported the rise of Japan, where it could pose a threat to Rus­sian Siberia, and formed a co­ali­ 150

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

tion with Italy (Rome-­Berlin Axis, October 25, 1936) to c­ ounter their common immediate rival, France.80 Most importantly, Germany exploited the Soviet-­British rivalry overt in the Turkish Straits to foster a rapprochement with ­Great Britain, symbolized by the Anglo-­German Naval Agreement in June 1935.81 In d ­ oing so, Hitler sought to prevent G ­ reat Britain from joining its forces with France and the Soviet Union. The increasing assertiveness of German foreign policy alarmed France and the Soviet Union, which reacted by trying to envelope Nazi Germany further. A ­ fter the Japa­nese occupation of Manchuria (September 1932), Joseph Stalin needed to secure the western border of the Soviet Union and to pose a counterweight to German ambitions in eastern Eu­rope in order to avoid the emergence of encirclement by Germany and Japan.82 The result was the Soviet formation of alliances with France (Franco-­Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance) and Czecho­slo­va­kia (Czechoslovak-­Soviet Treaty of Alliance) in May 1935.83 France’s inclusion of the Soviet Union in its network of alliances in eastern Eu­rope created a cordon sanitaire that reinforced the post–­World War II French goal of creating a two-­front-­war prob­lem for Germany as a way of containing Hitler’s aggressive be­hav­ior: “Our firmest guarantee against German aggression is that b ­ ehind Germany, in an excellent strategic position, stand Czecho­slo­va­kia and Poland.”84 The response of the surrounding g ­ reat powers tightened their grip on Nazi Germany and reduced the number of effective strategies to prevent actualized encirclement. The second strategy that Hitler ­adopted was to attack minor powers to secure the eastern border of Germany against a potential Soviet invasion.85 ­These included the annexation of Austria (March 12, 1938), the control of the Sudetenland with the Munich Agreement, and the occupation of Czecho­slo­va­kia. Despite Germany’s increasing military aggressiveness, ­ these decisions ­were not cases of reckless expansionism; quite the contrary, Hitler had accurately calculated the best way of extending Nazi territorial possessions and potentially creating a buffer zone in central Eu­rope without triggering a reaction by France and the Soviet Union. Germany’s unwillingness to escalate the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) is illustrative of the caution of German foreign policy. Even though the Spanish Nationalists’ rise to power could have reduced French freedom to launch an attack in the Ruhr, Hitler gave ­limited, covert support to Francisco Franco out of fear of triggering French retaliation.86 Indeed, an open intervention by Germany risked escalating the Spanish Civil War and provoking a mutual attack by France and the Soviet Union. Hitler’s calculations regarding war initiation changed ­after the occupation of Czecho­slo­va­kia. The main obstacle to a simultaneous two-­front war was Polish reluctance to allow the passage of Soviet troops for an attack on the eastern border of Germany. The reaction of the surrounding ­great powers to the violation of the Munich Agreement created the prospects for an increase in their invasion ability—­namely, actualized encirclement. Not only 151

chapter 5

did the British government extend a military guarantee to Poland, thereby uniting the western front with France, but serious conversations ­were initiated to include the Soviet Union in an alliance with Poland.87 Had this diplomatic move succeeded, the Soviet Union would have been able to extend its sphere of action to the eastern border of Germany, thereby leaving even a power­ful state like Nazi Germany at the mercy of its surrounding g ­ reat powers. Reaching this point of no return—­“the end of appeasement and an increased effort to encircle Germany”—­Hitler invaded Poland to eliminate the possibility of a simultaneous attack by France and the Soviet Union once and for all, even if this decision would inevitably lead to an escalation of the conflict into a major war.88 In the end, Hitler’s foreign policy was driven by the need to eliminate the encirclement of Germany. Unable to rely only on its military forces to ­counter a simultaneous invasion by France and the Soviet Union, Hitler resorted to skillful diplomacy to increase his territorial possessions in central Eu­rope and to prevent the surrounding ­great powers from concentrating their forces. This outcome was dependent on the British willingness to act as a counterweight to the Franco-­Soviet bloc: “The encirclement of Germany has been almost completed. . . . ​It depends on Britain alone w ­ hether the complete encirclement of Germany is achieved or not. If Britain joins the ring of surrounding States, then the surrounding structure w ­ ill be complete.”89 When the British government abandoned its policy of appeasement and showed signs of an alliance with the Soviet Union and Poland, Nazi Germany began the “fight for its freedom.” Ano m ali es o f Wo rld Wa r I I In the previous section, I provided evidence of the impact of latent encirclement on the double security dilemma that characterized German foreign policy ­after World War I. I also trace the logic of war initiation to prevent actualized encirclement. However, ­there are two puzzles for my theory: the Soviet refusal to intervene on the side of France during the Nazi invasion and Hitler’s decision to continue fighting ­after the defeat of France.90 The unexpected alliance between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany (Molotov-­Ribbentrop Pact) shocked Eu­ro­pean diplomacy.91 The motivation ­behind Hitler’s and Stalin’s decision to momentarily put aside their differences (postponing war and diverting their resources to create a buffer zone that would hinder the invasion of the immediate rival) aligns with the expectations of my argument. In par­tic­u­lar, the alliance enabled Nazi Germany not only to partition Poland with the Soviet Union but also to concentrate its forces on the western front without fighting a two-­front war. However, the Soviet decision not to aid France ­after the Nazi attack contradicts my predictions ­because it allowed Nazi Germany (the immediate rival of the Soviet

152

The Origins of Modern Major Wars

Union) to increase its invasion ability and, in turn, to take advantage of French defeat to direct its attention to the Soviet Union.92 The second anomaly involves Hitler’s decision to continue the war ­after the B ­ attle of France (May–­June 1940). A ­ fter this victory, Nazi Germany had eliminated its two-­front-­war prob­lem by subjugating France into a vassal state. Although the Soviet Union could still pose a threat on the eastern border of Germany, the conquest of France would have allowed Nazi Germany to meet the challenge. In turn, the military campaign against the United Kingdom (­Battle of Britain, July–­October 1940) and the invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa, June 22, 1941) cannot be fully explained by my theory ­because they support the claim that Hitler had hegemonic ambitions.

Conclusion The analy­sis of the remaining major wars provides ample support for encirclement theory. The only significant anomaly is World War II b ­ ecause Nazi Germany initiated the conflict when it was not encircled. Nonetheless, I have shown that encirclement and the invasion ability of the surrounding ­great powers ­were the two determining ­factors in unfolding the three steps that led to the outbreak of World War II. The unfolding of six of the remaining seven major wars fully corresponds with the predictions of my argument. ­These major wars w ­ ere caused by the attempts of the encircled g ­ reat power to prevent actualized encirclement, which occurred when the surrounding g ­ reat powers increased their ability to launch a simultaneous two-­front war. In t­ able 5.1, I list the type of actualized encirclement for each modern major war.

­Table 5.1 ​Actualized encirclement in modern major wars Major war Franco-­Dutch War (1672–1678) Nine Years’ War (1688–1697) War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1713) War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815) World War II (1939–1945)

Actualized encirclement Concentration of forces: Alliance of the Dutch Republic with Spain Concentration of forces: Collapse of the Ottoman Empire against Austria Closure of the circle: Austrian inheritance of the Spanish Empire Closure of the circle: King of Saxony’s claim to Austria Closure of the circle: Austrian attempt to annex Silesia Concentration of forces: Austrian and Prus­sian mobilization along the Rhine Concentration of forces: Potential alliance between USSR, UK, and Poland

153

chapter 5

Understanding the lessons of the past is vital to shed light on the ­future of international politics. In the final chapter, I w ­ ill debunk the claim that great-­power conflict has become obsolete and I w ­ ill assess the situation that is most likely to trigger the next major war: the encirclement of China by India and Rus­sia.

154

chapter 6

The ­Future of Major War

In this book, I have argued that major wars are caused by the attempts of a ­great power to escape its encirclement. The change in the invasion ability of an immediate rival is the causal mechanism that links the two-­front-­war prob­lem to major wars through a three-­step pro­cess: double security dilemma, war initiation, and war contagion. Encirclement creates a two-­front-­war prob­lem for the encircled ­great power ­because that state shares at least two dif­fer­ent borders with one single opponent or two g ­ reat powers (surrounding ­great powers). This uniquely dangerous situation generates a double security dilemma for the encircled ­great power ­because it has to disperse its forces against the surrounding g ­ reat powers. The mea­sures short of war that the encircled ­great power undertakes to eliminate its encirclement (forging alliances and creating buffer zones) decrease the security of the surrounding g ­ reat powers, which conduct similar countermea­sures to contain the encircled ­great power. War initiation is caused by a change in the “threat environment” of the encircled ­great power. The surrounding ­great powers do not always have the operational ability to launch a simultaneous attack (latent encirclement). When the strategies that the surrounding ­great powers adopt to tighten their grip on the encircled ­great power provoke increases in their operational capability to launch a joint invasion (actualized encirclement), the encircled ­great power attacks one of the surrounding ­great powers as a mea­sure of last resort. The other ­great powers are dragged into the dyadic war between the encircled g ­ reat power and one of the surrounding states b ­ ecause of the rival-­ based network of alliances that was formed during the phase of the double security dilemma (war contagion). The encircled ­great power seeks alliances with states that consider one of the surrounding ­great powers its own immediate rival—­namely, the state that poses the greatest threat to its survival based on its ability to launch a successful invasion. The surrounding ­great powers respond by forging alliances with t­hose states that regard the encircled ­great power or one of its allies as their own immediate rival. The 155

chapter 6

result is the formation of two opposite alliance blocs that connect separate dyads of rivalry into one unified zero-­sum game. The findings of previous empirical chapters not only increase our understanding of historical events, but they also point at two fundamental features that w ­ ill characterize f­uture major wars. First, the encircled g ­ reat power initiates a war as a mea­sure of last resort and with the ­limited aim of preventing actualized encirclement. Second, major wars can happen in the absence of a near-­preponderant state that tries to establish hegemony in its own region. In the rest of the chapter, ­after challenging the claim that major wars have become obsolete, I explore the scenario that is most likely to trigger the next major war: the encirclement of China by Rus­sia and India.

The Prospects for F­ uture Major Wars The absence of great-­power war since World War II and the beginning of the unipolar era ­after the collapse of the Soviet Union have reduced the concerns about the outbreak of major military conflicts. Some authors have concluded that major war has become anachronistic, a relic of the past.1 Even without completely excluding this possibility, authors have underlined how the presence of a unipole, the post–­World War II international order, the qualitative change in the level of economic interdependence among states, ideational ­factors, and the increased costs of war can promote peace and greatly decrease the chances of great-­power conflicts.2 Among the vari­ ous explanations for the post–­World War II lack of major wars, a power­ful argument suggests that the destructiveness that nuclear weapons has eliminated great-­power war as a state strategy. T h e I m pact o f th e N u clea r Revo lu ti o n The theory of nuclear revolution states that nuclear weapons have a pacifying effect for ­those states that can retaliate ­after suffering a first nuclear strike (second-­strike capability).3 In a world of mutual assured destruction (MAD), the risk of being annihilated makes military victory impossible. Since states that have second-­strike capability cannot be conquered, their survival is guaranteed. The main implication of this argument is that not only great-­power war but also security competition is irrational. The typical strategies of realpolitik that characterized centuries of international relations (arm races, alliances, calculated aggression for securing strategic territory) have become anachronistic. As Robert Jervis notes, “If nuclear weapons have had the influence that the nuclear-­revolution theory indicates they should have, then ­there ­will be peace between the superpowers, crises w ­ ill be rare, neither side ­will be e­ ager to press bargaining advantages

156

The ­Future of Major War

to the limit, the status quo ­will be relatively easy to maintain, and po­liti­cal outcomes w ­ ill not be closely related to ­either the nuclear or the conventional balance.”4 In a nutshell, nuclear weapons have revolutionized international politics ­because they have eliminated the security dilemma. The argument that the post–­World War II absence of great-­power war is caused by the nuclear revolution is characterized by theoretical and empirical flaws. The first prob­lem is embedded in the claim that nuclear states would not resort to conventional war out of fear of escalation. The nuclear revolution implies that leaders would act cautiously ­because the risks and costs of nuclear retaliation outweigh any pos­si­ble benefit. On the other hand, the fact that using nuclear weapons is “subrationally unthinkable,” even a taboo, could enable the use of force in more l­ imited ways.5 As Jervis points out, “If an uncontrolled war would lead to mutual destruction, then neither side should ever start one. But this very stability allows e­ ither side to use ­limited vio­lence ­because the other’s threat to respond by all-­out retaliation cannot be very credible.”6 Therefore, the stability-­instability paradox entails that if the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely, leaders can adopt aggressive policies and even launch conventional attacks without risking escalation.7 Great-­power war would not be eliminated, but it would instead remain at the conventional level. To address this conundrum, the proponents of the nuclear revolution suggest that nuclear escalation is pos­si­ble but that it would likely occur inadvertently. Since “events can readily escape control,” leaders do not engage in risky foreign-­policy be­hav­ior.8 Uncertainty regarding escalation and mutual vulnerability should restrain leaders. “While both sides have an interest in eliminating extreme crisis instability, they need to see that t­ here is some chance that events could get out of control once vio­lence is employed ­because this is the main generator of caution, and the primary means of exerting pressure on the other side. . . . ​If security is linked in part to the danger of inadvertent war, then too much stability could make the world safe for coercion and vio­lence.”9 However, it is unclear why states that are aware of the consequences of escalation and want to avoid war at all costs are completely incapable of controlling escalation. One would think that even if the wheels are set in motion, leaders would recognize the risks and de-­escalate a crisis. Instead, the nuclear revolution seems to show ­little agency, if not subrational be­hav­ior, ­after ­limited use of forces is deployed. This puzzle is caused by the problematic assumption that nuclear escalation ­will be almost certain and that if it ever occurs, it w ­ ill be inadvertent. Jervis considers a war ensuing from controlled escalation “strains the imagination.”10 Instead, escalation may not necessarily be inadvertent, but leaders could exploit the almost certain escalation of international crises to coerce an adversary by rationally “manipulating the risk.”11 The prob­lem of controlled escalation is that this dangerous game of “chicken” could be played by both nuclear states, increasing the chances that even “small issues w ­ ill

157

chapter 6

often loom large, not ­because of their intrinsic importance, but ­because they are taken as tests of resolve.”12 Some scholars have even suggested that states could intentionally launch a tactical nuclear attack as part of a conventional military campaign.13 Furthermore, the logic of nuclear revolution undermines the claim that nuclear weapons “heavi­ly ­favors defense.”14 Jervis suggests that in a spiral of inadvertent escalation, states would have a strong incentive to strike first at full force: “A wide variety of issues and chains of events could lead to all-­out nuclear war, but the last step in almost all of them would be preemption. Total war could not occur in the absence of the belief that war is imminent and inevitable and that, as terrible as striking first would be, receiving the first blow would be even worse.”15 However, the importance that the nuclear revolution places on pre-­emption challenges the claim that a MAD world ­favors the defense. In addition to t­hese theoretical shortcomings, the empirical rec­ord casts even more doubt on the nuclear revolution. Proponents of this theory not only claim that nuclear weapons eliminate the possibility of great-­power war, but they also state that nuclear weapons have dramatically changed the nature of international politics: in the presence of nuclear weapons, the old-­ fashioned realpolitik mea­ sures became obsolete. Unfortunately, security competition has remained a constant feature of great-­power politics.16 As Kier Lieber and Daryl Press rightly won­ders, “If nuclear weapons are such power­ful instruments of deterrence, then why do so many aspects of international competition in the nuclear age resemble t­ hose of the prenuclear era? Why do nuclear powers continue to fear rising powers, strive for superior weaponry, build entangling allies, and covet strategically advantageous territory? If nuclear-­armed countries are fundamentally secure from attack, why d ­ on’t they act like it?”17 ­There has not been any major war since World War II, but this has by no means led to a lack of intense security competition. The amount of evidence against the nuclear revolution theory is significant, as nuclear states have continued to engage in arms races, alliance formation, and even ­limited use of force. The be­hav­ior of nuclear states does not show that nuclear weapons guarantee survival or that the stalemate that MAD creates is irreversible.18 Quite the contrary, the be­hav­ior of nuclear states indicates that they continue to search for technological innovations that can allow them to escape a situation of mutual vulnerability. For instance, during the Cold War, the United States has been trying to escape MAD by achieving nuclear superiority.19 Indeed, in the early 1980s, the Soviet Union became increasingly worried that the Americans ­were planning a surprise attack: “se­nior Soviet officials with high-­level contacts said that during this time Soviet leaders formally cautioned the bureaucracy that the new US Administration was considering the possibility of starting a nuclear war, and that the prospect of a surprise nuclear strike against the Soviet Union had to be taken seriously.”20 158

The ­Future of Major War

The typical geopo­liti­cal mea­sures that have characterized modern history continue to be pre­sent in international politics. The intensification of great-­ power rivalry since the end of the Cold War, highlighted by events such as the Rus­sian annexation of Crimea (March 2014) and the growing security competition between the United States and China, further undermines the argument that nuclear weapons guarantee survival and eliminate the security dilemma. In sum, the nuclear revolution has not changed the nature of international politics. One cannot deny that the possibility of nuclear retaliation has ­limited the strategies that states can adopt to advance their national interests, but it would be misleading to claim that the absence of major war ­after World War II is the result of nuclear weapons. If the chance of facing an invasion remains, survival is not guaranteed, and security competition and war ­will continue to occur in international politics. Nuclear weapons have a mixed effect on the likelihood of conflict. The risk of escalation ­will restrain the encircled ­great power and facilitate the adoption of less costly strategies to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem. However, nuclear weapons w ­ ill not stop the encircled g ­ reat power from launching a war to prevent actualized encirclement b ­ ecause the increased invasion ability of the surrounding g ­ reat powers creates an imminent, deadly threat to its survival. I would not expect ­great powers to arrive at all-­out nuclear exchange even to protect their homeland, but this restraint would not prevent conventional attacks and even the use of tactical nuclear weapons. If the nuclear revolution does not invalidate encirclement theory, it does challenge theories of hegemonic war. The presence of nuclear weapons compels states to act with more restraint and to resort to a conventional attack only as mea­sure of last resort. Indeed, throughout history, encircled g ­ reat powers started wars with the ­limited aim of preventing actualized encirclement, not to preserve or achieve hegemony. Therefore, I expect the next major war to assume features of a Clausewitzian ­limited war.21 If the nuclear revolution cannot account for the absence of major wars since World War II, what is the cause of ­these de­cades of peace? I argue that this peace is the result of the lack of an encircled ­great power in the international system. Indeed, this is not the first period in modern history when peace prospered, and in all previous cases, none of the ­great powers faced a two-­front-­war prob­lem.22 In the end, this analy­sis leads to a fundamental question for the ­future of international politics: if nuclear weapons have not revolutionized international politics, which “life-­or-­death situation” w ­ ill cause the next major war? T h e En circlemen t o f Ch i na The post–­World War II international system has remained peaceful ­because of the absence of an encircled ­g reat power, but this situation w ­ ill likely 159

chapter 6

change in the ­future. The geographic area that is likely to be characterized by the emergence of encirclement is Asia. Observers who worry about the return of great-­power rivalry and of major war are most concerned about rising US-­China tensions leading to conflict. The academic or scholarly debate on the ­f uture of ­g reat power war focuses on supposed similarities in US-­China relations with ­those seen in Eu­rope before World War I or with Athens and Sparta at the onset of the Peloponnesian War. International Relations (IR) scholars’ concern is that China’s rise as a potential peer competitor of the United States ­will compel the latter to launch a preventive war to stop the former.23 A strug­gle for hegemony would be the motive b ­ ehind this conflict, which could result in a total war for annihilation against the opponent to prevent it from being the hegemon in the system. From my perspective, the existing debate focuses on the wrong scenario ­because China and the United States are incapable of posing an existential threat to each other. First, they do not share land borders and t­ here is a big ocean between them. Second, the presence of nuclear deterrents, although it does not make great-­power war anachronistic, has considerably ­limited the reasons for conflict u ­ nless state survival is imminently threatened.24 It is not plausible that China ­will launch wars of conquest to become a regional hegemon, as they ­will not only be extremely costly, but they ­will likely undermine China’s own survival.25 It is also doubtful that the United States ­will risk a nuclear war to stop China’s rise over concerns about its long-­term security, given that the geography of the United States provides a power­ful barrier against any potential territorial invasion by an extraregional ­great power.26 Predictions that the next great-­power conflict ­will be total are a result of the fact that “World War I and II have severely skewed our sense of what war is.”27 The next major war ­will result from the encirclement of China. China currently shares a border with another ­great power (Rus­sia) and India’s rise to great-­power status ­will create a two-­front-­war prob­lem.28 The concept of strategic encirclement is embedded in Chinese culture. For instance, wei qi (alternatively called go) is an ancient board game that revolves around the goal of preventing the adversary from surrounding—­encircling—­ your pieces.29 During the Cold War, the Chinese Communist Party was concerned about potential encirclement by the two superpowers. Mao Tse-­ tung became increasingly worried that the Soviet Union wanted to proj­ect its power into the southern border of China during the Vietnam War. As Chinese premier Zhou Enlai remarked in April 1968, “For a long time the USA has been half-­surrounding China. Now the Soviet Union is also surrounding China. The circle is getting complete, except [the part of] Vietnam.”30 China’s rapprochement with the United States in the 1970s and the war with Vietnam (Sino-­Vietnamese War, February–­March 1979) stemmed from the Chinese fear of encirclement.31 160

The ­Future of Major War

The post–­Cold War policy debate has focused its attention on US “encirclement” of China in the Asia-­Pacific region,32 but this strategy w ­ ill not be the catalyst of war. The United States does not have the power projection capabilities to launch a land invasion of China; only the expansion of its military presence along the Chinese borders could create a two-­front-­war prob­lem. On the other hand, the increase of US military bases in Af­ghan­i­stan and Central Asia as part of the Global War on Terror started to alarm the Chinese Communist Party b ­ ecause the United States could extend its sphere of influence close to China’s western border, which already faced the prob­lem of the Uighur separatist movement.33 Another aspect of US foreign policy in the Asia-­Pacific region can have a major impact on the likelihood that China w ­ ill face encirclement in the long term: the network of alliances that the United States has created risks to facilitating the emergence of power­ful regional competitors.34 Chinese leaders have looked with par­tic­u­lar suspicion at the US support for India’s rise, as it is the creation of a hub-­and-­spoke system of alliances that creates a hostile environment for China: [The United States] strengthened its military deployments in the Asia-­Pacific region, . . . ​strengthened strategic cooperation with India, improved relations with Vietnam, inveigled Pakistan, established a pro-­American government in Af­ghan­i­stan. . . . ​They have extended outposts and placed pressure points on us from the east, south, and west. This makes a ­great change in our geo­ politi­cal environment.35

Although US ­grand strategy in the Asia-­Pacific region ­will play a role in the security competition with China, India-­China rivalry is a more likely source of conflict. Since they share a land border and historical disputes, they are more capable of posing a major threat to each other.36 This ­will only get worse as India rises to great-­power status. Indeed, the security competition between China and India has greatly increased in recent years. The Chinese response to India’s rise has been to improve of its relations with neighboring countries, which could prevent India from concentrating its forces against China.37 In par­tic­u­lar, Beijing has increased its presence in the Indian Ocean by strengthening its relations with Pakistan and Myanmar and by constructing commercial and military outposts—­the “string of pearls”—­that would guarantee the safety of Chinese shipping lanes.38 Given that 80 ­percent of its crude oil imports passes through the Indo-­ Pacific routes, it is vital for China to defend them against a potential naval blockade, particularly in a vulnerable area such as the Strait of Malacca, which would have a negative impact on China’s internal stability.39 Furthermore, China has used the Shanghai Cooperation Organ­ization to establish its western border by establishing economic ties with the Central Asian Republics and diversifying its energy imports, to further minimize 161

chapter 6

the consequences of a naval blockade of the Strait of Malacca.40 Chinese authorities began the construction of the Kazakhstan-­China oil pipeline, which would give access the Caspian Sea, as well as of the Central Asia gas pipeline, which would connect Xinjiang with Turkmenistan.41 Fi­nally, China has improved its relations with North K ­ orea, which can function as a counterweight against the US military presence in the Korean Peninsula.42 The strategies that China has carried out to prevent the emergence of a two-­ front-­war prob­lem have increased India’s sense of vulnerability.43 Chinese activities alarm India b ­ ecause they can increase China’s invasion ability and even create a two-­front-­war prob­lem: China’s military buildup in Tibet risks altering the balance of power in Kashmir; “China-­Pakistan nexus” poses a threat to the western border of India; and China’s close relations with Myanmar and Bangladesh undermine the security of its eastern border.44 Hence, in the last two de­cades, New Delhi has started to identify China instead of Pakistan as its own immediate rival. As the Indian defense minister stated in 1998, “China is potential threat number one. . . . ​China is and is likely to remain the primary security challenge to India in the medium and long-­term . . . ​the potential threat from China is greater than that from Pakistan and any person who is concerned about India’s security must agree with that.”45 New Delhi has conducted mea­sures to counteract China’s activities along its border. First, India has launched an intensive program to modernize its navy to expand its power projection capability to the Strait of Malacca.46 Second, India’s “Look East” policy aims to create a counterweight to China’s influence at sea through the creation of a network of alliances with other naval powers. In addition to its 2005 strategic partnership with the United States, India has developed military security cooperation agreements with several Asian states (Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, and Indonesia).47 In par­tic­u­lar, India’s strategic partnership with Vietnam can counteract the pressure that China poses on India’s eastern border due to its cooperation with Myanmar. Third, New Delhi has taken advantage of the instability in Af­ghan­i­stan and Central Asia to support the creation of friendly governments that could limit China’s and Pakistan’s spheres of influence.48 Fi­nally, India strengthened its ties with t­ hose states that could function as a cordon sanitaire against a potential Chinese invasion, such as Bhutan and Nepal. Competition over control of this buffer area erupted in skirmishes between the two countries in 2017 and 2021.49 The India-­China rivalry w ­ ill likely characterize the next double security dilemma. However, this security competition would be insufficient to trigger a major war. For encirclement to occur from the Chinese perspective, Rus­sia needs to be in the mix. Most ­people ­today dismiss the likelihood of Russia-­China conflict due to pre­sent closeness, economic integration, and regional cooperation agreements.50 However, Russia-­China rapprochement is temporary and the likelihood that it ­will persist is not well supported in historical rec­ords. ­There is plenty of Russia-­China conflict in the past, such 162

The ­Future of Major War

as the Sino-­Soviet split in the 1960s that culminated in the Sino-­Soviet conflict over the Ussuri River (1969).51 ­There is no par­tic­u­lar reason to expect that ­there should be any less risk of conflict between China and Rus­sia in the f­ uture.52 In fact, the expansion Chinese activities in Central Asia closer to the Rus­sian border has already created concerns in the Kremlin and has pushed Rus­sia to hedge against China.53 The worsening of Rus­sia’s relationship with Eu­rope since the Ukraine crisis (2014) and the possibility that Rus­sia ­will face latent encirclement if the North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ization (NATO) expands to Ukraine or Georgia only reinforce Rus­sia’s fears concerning China’s actions on its eastern border.54 Additionally, as China strengthens, the security prob­lem for Rus­sia only becomes more acute since it is a declining power and its eastern regions are underpopulated and poorly connected to the rest of the country. However, anything Rus­sia does to make itself more secure is also threatening to China, leading China to feel encircled. The geography of Asia might even increase the chances of conventional war. Asia’s geographic circumstances are much dif­fer­ent than t­ hose that characterized the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in Eu­rope during the Cold War, where conventional attacks could quickly escalate b ­ ecause of the substantial number of troops that confronted each superpower in Eu­rope. The current territorial disputes between India and China (Aksai Chin on the western flank of the Hi­ma­la­yas and Arunachal Pradesh on the eastern flank) or a resurgence of the historical Sino-­Soviet border conflict do not affect the vital interests of any of the three ­great powers ­because they do not undermine the survivability of their nuclear arsenals or endanger the centers of their po­liti­cal and economic power. This implies that if India and Rus­sia can increase their invasion ability (actualized encirclement), China w ­ ill have fewer constraints in launching a conventional attack due to the calculus that all-­out nuclear escalation would be unlikely.55 In sum, the current situation already reflects the intensification of India-­ China rivalry. When India emerges as a new ­great power, China ­will be encircled and ­will take increasingly aggressive mea­sures that ­will threaten not only India but also Rus­sia. The evolution of the double security dilemma ­will push the two surrounding ­great powers (India and Rus­sia) to strengthen their relations in opposition to China. Indeed, the first signs of rapprochement between India and Rus­sia have already occurred.56 The presence of ongoing territorial disputes between India and China is a powder keg that risks exploding when India and Rus­sia can concentrate their forces in a simultaneous attack against China.57 It is unlikely that this scenario ­will emerge in the short term since actualized encirclement w ­ ill require that Pakistan become incapable of acting as a counterweight to India and that NATO expansion ceases to pose a threat to the western border of Rus­sia. However, the seeds of discord have been 163

chapter 6

sowed and a potential major war looms on the horizon. Although one should be careful of drawing analogies with the past, World War I may give us impor­tant insights about what to expect. As the German attempts to escape the Franco-­Russian deadly embrace caused World War I, “China’s efforts to enhance its influence as a rising power in an assertive way ­will backfire and result in an unintended encirclement of China by her neighbors. The irony is that this ‘security dilemma’ was exactly what happened in Eu­rope when Kaiser Wilhelm II, confident of rising power of Germany, began to practice a muscular diplomacy in 1890.”58

­Future Directions of This Research This book identifies the essential part that encirclement plays in the outbreak of major wars. Although I focus on the origins of major wars, I suggest that additional research on encirclement could provide new insights into other international outcomes. Considering the be­hav­ior of states that have not achieved great-­power status may account for other impor­tant historical and con­temporary case studies. For instance, the Franco-­Prussian War (1870–1871) was initiated over the candidacy of a Prus­sian prince to the throne of Spain, which would have created a situation of encirclement for France.59 Another illustrative example is the two-­f ront-­war prob­lem that Israel faced since its in­de­pen­dence, which has led to the repeated outbreak of numerous conflicts with its surrounding states.60 Likewise, Pakistan has tried to acquire “strategic depth” in Af­ghan­i­stan to prevent India from installing a friendly government in Kabul.61 Pakistan’s attempt to prevent the encirclement of India can explain its support to terrorist groups in Af­ghan­i­stan, the intense security competition in Kashmir, and even nuclear exchanges with India (Kargil War, 1999). Fi­nally, the War of the Pacific (1879–1884) is another good example of territorial disputes that escalated b ­ ecause of fear of encirclement by a minor power.62 In this, war followed Chile’s discovery that Peru and Bolivia—­the states located on its north and northeastern borders, respectively—­had signed a secret defense pact that would guarantee Peruvian support for Bolivia in its border dispute with Chile. Another potential direction of research on encirclement is the analy­sis of ancient major wars. Structural theories often claim that they have analytical traction across space and time, but they fail to evaluate their arguments in cases that predate the Peace of Westphalia and, due to an unfortunate recent trend in IR, even cases occurring prior to 1816. One major war that could prove a hard test for my theory is the Peloponnesian War, which is often considered to be the foundational case for power transition theory.63 Rather than Spartan fear about the rise of Athens, a more compelling explanation suggests that Sparta was afraid that the Athenian growth would 164

The ­Future of Major War

engender a two-­front-­war prob­lem. As Robert Gilpin himself notes, “While the Athenians grew in power through commerce and empire, the Spartans fell ­behind and found themselves increasingly encircled by the expanding power of the Athenians.”64 Another impor­tant extension of my research would be the analy­sis of major wars outside Eu­rope in ancient times. The Eurocentrism of IR can certainly be justified by the fact that for most of international history, ­g reat powers emerged in Eu­rope; yet, broadening the current scholarly approach ­w ill enrich our understanding of extra-­ European ancient major wars as well as our perspective on Eu­ro­pean case studies. ­Future directions of this research should also assess the evolution of the geographic landscape. It is impor­tant to understand the impact of extraregional bases for the creation of a situation of encirclement. Does the two-­ front-­war prob­lem require the presence of two g ­ reat powers at the borders of the encircled ­great power? My preliminary argument is that the presence of a credible extraregional force can still create a situation of encirclement. This issue is particularly impor­tant b ­ ecause of the global presence of US bases and their impact on the encirclement of China. Moreover, the Cold War shows that a g ­ reat power’s increase of military bases close to the borders of its immediate rival could be tantamount to encirclement. Indeed, Nikita Khrushchev justified the placement of missiles in Cuba as a response to the American strategy of using medium-­range ballistic missiles and intermediate-­range ballistic missiles on the Rus­sian border: “We w ­ ere not inventing anything new. We ­were just copying the methods used against us by our adversaries when they encircled us with bases.”65 Fi­nally, additional research ­will focus on other technological innovations that could alter the logic of crisis escalation. Some scholars could argue that cyber warfare reduces the importance of conventional attacks, and in turn, it decreases the importance of change in the invasion ability of the immediate rival.66 I argue that cyber warfare is not effective on its own and it does not change the dynamics of war initiation. Cyberattacks can be used as a prelude to ground offensives b ­ ecause they maximize their effectiveness if they are conducted at the initial stage of a conflict to paralyze (at least momentarily) the opponent’s ability to conduct conventional operations. B ­ ecause of the short duration of the benefits of a cyberattack (days or even hours), the attacker needs to act quickly and exploit the temporary vulnerability of its opponent by striking in a decisive manner in order to force negotiations from a position of strength or to influence the outcome of a protracted conflict. However, this use of cyber warfare undermines its main advantage: the surprise effect. This implies that cyberattacks are effective only if used as part of a greater plan for invasion. In turn, the decision to escalate a crisis ­will not be driven by the nature of technology but by changes in the “threat environment”—­ namely, increases in the invasion ability of the immediate rival. 165

chapter 6

Conclusion This book provides a new argument on a fundamental topic of international relations: the origins of major wars. Encirclement theory shows the importance of understanding history to give a sense of the pre­sent and f­ uture directions of international politics. A look at the past shows the recurrence of fundamental patterns across centuries and casts doubt on all ­t hose who claim that the nature of international politics has been revolutionized. ­After all, the long absence of major wars that has characterized international politics since World War II is not unique. This research seeks to provide a compelling story on the origins of major wars. More than being proven correct, it seeks to challenge the conventional wisdom on this subject. Most importantly, it pushes readers to reflect on their understanding of major wars and to create their own explanation of this impor­tant topic of international relations. ­After all, theories should provide guidance for our conduct, not just in foreign policy, but in everyday life. As Marc Trachtenberg points out: It is that when we study international politics, we have to deal with very difficult issues, in intellectual terms and in moral terms as well. It is an illusion to think that ­there are solutions to ­those prob­lems “out ­there” just waiting for us to discover them. It is the journey that ­matters, even if it does not lead to any par­tic­u­lar destination, or even to any destination at all. We grapple with the core issues of the field as honestly and as carefully as we can, and in ­doing so we almost automatically develop a deeper understanding of how ­things work; just working in that way, we somehow end up seeing beyond our own preconceptions.67

This period of history is likely another quiet before the next storm. This realization should not lead to resignation or nihilism. As much as this book seems to have a pessimistic outlook, it also hopes to stimulate our intellectual engagement and to push us to take ­actual steps that ­will make small improvements and eventually a profound impact. Change or, better still, transformation can happen at the international level. But such change can only be a by-­product of shifts at vari­ous levels: in our communities, in our small circles, within ourselves. A ­ fter all, war is merely a symptom of a disease that affects humankind. The solution cannot be but the essential one: to break the taboo of knowing what we r­ eally are.68

166

Notes

Introduction 1. ​Victor D. Hanson, A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War (New York: Random House, 2005), 125. In the first part of the quote, Hanson refers to the First Peloponnesian War. 2. ​Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 6–9, 44–46. See also Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 12–16. 3. ​Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 134. 4. ​John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of ­Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2014), 209. 5. ​Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 235. 6. ​Stephen  M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 267–268. 7. ​­There are two pos­si­ble examples of encirclement: first, two ­g reat powers, both of which share a border with the encircled ­g reat power; second, one g ­ reat power that shares two separate and distinct borders with the encircled ­g reat power. See chapter 1. 8. ​The determination of the immediate rival is a function of geographic proximity and relative power of the other ­g reat powers in the region. Each ­g reat power has its own immediate rival, but not all g ­ reat powers share the same one.

1. A Theory of Encirclement and Major War 1. ​I do not suggest that relative power shifts are inconsequential. I merely claim that they are not dynamic enough to explain the decision of the encircled g ­ reat power to risk a two-­ front war. 2. ​Lester W. Grau, Fighting with an Encirclement: A Comparison of National Concepts (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1991); Robert J. Curran, Shutting the Door: U.S. Army Doctrine for Encirclement/Envelopment Operations at the Operational Level of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College SAMS, 1986). 3. ​Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1989), 233.

167

NOTES TO PAGES 10–21

  4. ​Curran, Shutting the Door, 1.   5. ​I shorten the term strategic encirclement to encirclement in the rest of the book.   6. ​I adopt Mearsheimer’s definition of survival, considered in terms of territorial integrity and foreign policy autonomy. See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of G ­ reat Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2014), 31.   7. ​My theory accepts the rational actor assumption and refuses the psychological explanations for war. On the role of misperception, see Arthur  A. Stein, “When Misperception ­Matters,” World Politics 34, no. 4 (1982), 505–526; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1976), 58–113.   8. ​Richard N. Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, “Lost in Transition: A Critical Analy­sis of Power Transition Theory,” International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): 389–410.   9. ​Copeland defines them as “the simultaneous interaction of the differentials of relative military power between g ­ reat powers and the expected trend of t­ hose differentials.” Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 15. 10. ​Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern G ­ reat Power System, 1495–1975 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 50–76. 11. ​Levy, War in the Modern G ­ reat Power System, 75. 12. ​Copeland, Origins of Major War, 27. 13. ​Tanisha M. Fazal, “Dead Wrong? ­Battle Deaths, Military Medicine, and Exaggerated Reports of War’s Demise,” International Security 39, no. 1 (2014): 95–125. 14. ​In this study, regions are synonyms of continent. Therefore, t­ here are seven regions in the world: Eu­rope, Asia, Africa, North Amer­i­ca, South Amer­i­ca, Oceania, and Antarctica. 15. ​States might temporarily lose their status of g ­ reat power due to internal conditions that prevent an active foreign policy. For instance, the Rus­sian Federation cannot be considered a ­g reat power right ­after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, I include ­these periods in the classification for simplicity and clarity. 16. ​Nuno Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 43. 17. ​Levy, War in the Modern G ­ reat Power System, 8–49. The exclusion of nonmaterial capabilities leads to the following changes from Levy’s classification. First, I consider the Ottoman Empire a Eu­ro­pean ­g reat power only ­after the ­Battle of the Mohács (1526), when Suleiman the Magnificent defeated the Hungarian kingdom. This decisive victory created the opportunity for Ottoman advances in central Eu­rope, thereby creating a credible threat to the Hapsburg. Second, I criticize the extension of great-­power status for declining states like Spain ­after the War on the Spanish Succession (1713). Third, Prus­sia suffered a period of extreme weakness since 1807 (decisive French victory in the War of the Fourth Co­ali­t ion). Fourth, Austria could no longer be considered a g ­ reat power a­ fter its stunning defeat against Prus­sia, which at the time was not a ­g reat power yet (Austro-­Prussian War, 1866). Fi­nally, I dispute the idea that Italy can ever be considered a ­great power a­ fter its unification and the inclusion of France, ­Great Britain, China, and West Germany since 1945. 18. ​Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the ­Battle against Fate (New York: Random House, 2013), 60. 19. ​Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 30–32. 20. ​For the concept of immediate rival, see William  R. Thompson, ­Great Power Rivalries (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999). 21. ​Robert Jervis, “Cooperation ­u nder the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no.  2 (1978): 202. 22. ​Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organ­ization 42, no. 3 (1988): 485–508. 23. ​Jervis, “Cooperation,” 195. 24. ​For a full account of Richelieu’s “wars by diversion,” see chapter 3. 25. ​Jervis, “Cooperation,” 194. 26. ​Jean Bérenger, “An Attempted Rapprochement between France and the Emperor: The Secret Treaty for the Partition of the Spanish Succession of 19 January 1668,” in Louis XIV and Eu­rope, ed. Ragnhild M. Hatton (London: Macmillan, 1976), 121–123.

168

NOTES TO PAGES 22–27

27. ​Jervis, “Cooperation,” 169. 28. ​Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 345 (emphases added). 29. ​John Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1991), 15. 30. ​Poland was nominally in­de­pen­dent, but its foreign policy had been controlled by Rus­ sia since the succession to the throne of Augustus III at the end of the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1738). For more details on this major war, see chapter 5. 31. ​The encircled g ­ reat power does not initiate an attack against one of the surrounding ­great powers ­unless they are about to increase their invasion ability by ­either concentrating their forces for a simultaneous attack or by annexing territory along the borders of the encircled ­great power. The risk of triggering the retaliation of the surrounding g ­ reat powers restrains the encircled ­great power’s foreign policy, which tries to eliminate its two-­front-­war prob­lem by less costly options such as creating buffer zones. Despite the aggressive mea­sures that the encircled ­great power adopts, the surrounding ­great powers do not have an incentive to escalate the rivalry ­because they can contain their shared immediate rival without resorting to war. 32. ​As the empirical chapters ­will show, the leaders of encircled ­great powers ­were often pessimistic about the prospects for attacking the surrounding ­great powers, but change in the threat environment that actualized encirclement entailed compelled them to risk a two-­front war. 33. ​Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2002), 68. 34. ​Conventional wisdom makes the following distinction: “Preemption involves striking now in the anticipation of an imminent adversary attack. . . . ​Prevention is the response to a ­f uture threat rather than an immediate threat. It is driven by the anticipation of an adverse power shift and the fear of the consequences.” Jack S. Levy, “Preventive War and Domestic Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008): 4. On the concepts of preemptive and preventive wars, see Dan Reiter, “Explaining the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive War Almost Never Happen,” International Security 20, no. 2 (1995): 5–34; Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987): 90–92; Levy, “Preventive War,” 1–24; Jack S. Levy, “Preventive War: Concepts and Propositions,” International Interactions 37, no. 1 (2011): 87–96; Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics 44, no. 2 (1992): 235–269. 35. ​The immediate rival differs across the ­g reat powers in the system. States, however, sometimes agree on a common immediate rival when one state achieves clear preponderance and has the possibility of dominating the system. 36. ​Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 462. 37. ​Alliances can entail ­either formal or informal cooperation. Sometimes the network of alliances might not be completely formed before the attack of the encircled ­g reat power, but the territorial changes that are the result of the dyadic war leads to a quick formation of two opposing blocs. 38. ​S ee “Arthasastra” (Science of Politics) in Paul A. Seabury, ed., Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 8. 39. ​Each g ­ reat power competes with its own immediate rival, and it becomes willing to wage war to prevent changes in its invasion ability. However, this security competition does not spread to other ­g reat powers ­because it does not generate a rival-­based network of alliances that could extend the logic of separate dyadic antagonisms to the ­whole region. This is not to say that external balancing is absent, but since g ­ reat powers can guarantee their survival without relying on allies, they prefer to rely on internal balancing to check their immediate rival. Conversely, the encircled ­g reat power must seek external support to keep the surrounding g ­ reat powers occupied and to prevent them from increasing their invasion ability. Therefore, in the absence of encirclement, a zero-­sum game between two opposite alliance blocs does not emerge and dyadic military conflicts can remain geo­g raph­i­cally ­limited. 40. ​I consider the loss of allies that are not g ­ reat powers and territorial expansion that does not threaten the borders of the other ­great power to be insufficient to alter the balance of power between two rivals. Accordingly, ­these power shifts do not meet the threshold beyond which ­g reat powers decide to attack their immediate rivals.

169

NOTES TO PAGES 28–31

41. ​Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gang and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organ­ization 44, no. 2 (1990): 137–168. 42. ​Dominic Lieven, Rus­sia against Napoleon: The ­Battle for Eu­rope, 1807 to 1814 (London: Penguin, 2009). 43. ​The lit­er­a­t ure on the ­causes of war and peace is too vast to be covered in a single chapter. For an overview of the main explanations on the ­causes of war and peace, see Jack S. Levy, “Theories of General War,” World Politics 37, no. 3 (1985): 344–374; Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, ­Causes of War (Chichester, UK: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2010); Stephen Van Evera, ­Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). 44. ​Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History,1660–1783 (Boston: L ­ ittle, Brown 1890); Colin S. Gray, “Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 6 (2015): 873–897; Francis P. Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st  ­Century (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002); Halford  J. Mackinder, “The Geo­graph­i­cal Pivot of History,” Geo­graph­i­cal Journal 23, no. 4 (1904): 298–321; Jon Sumida, “Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 2 (1999): 39–62; Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944). 45. ​Nicholas J. Spykman, “Geography and Foreign Policy I,” American Po­liti­cal Science Review 32, no. 1 (1938): 29–30. 46. ​For research on the impact of territory on balancing dynamics, see Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 7–43; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 23–24. For research on the impact of territory on the likelihood of war, see David B. Car­ter, “The Strategy of Territorial Conflict,” American Journal of Po­liti­cal Science 54, no. 4 (2010): 969–987; Harvey Starr and Dale G. Thomas, “The Nature of Borders and International Conflict: Revising Hypotheses on Territory,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (2005): 123–140; Jonathan N. Markowitz and Christopher J. Fariss, “Power, Proximity, and Democracy: Geopo­liti­cal Competition in the International System,” Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 1 (2018): 78–93; Lucian M. Ashworth, “Mapping a New World: Geography and the Interwar Study of International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 57, no.  1 (2013): 138–149; Monica D. Toft, “Territory and War,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 185–198; Paul F. Diehl, “Contiguity and Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816–1980,” Journal of Politics 47, no. 4 (1985): 1203–1211; Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). 47. ​Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 126–128; Jervis, “Cooperation,” 183–185. 48. ​John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Paul D. Senese and John A. Vasquez, The Steps to War: An Empirical Study (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2008). 49. ​This vagueness is evident in Vasquez’s account for what increases the probability of war in a militarized dispute: “A set of risk f­ actors for war that operate in a dynamic and non-­linear fashion.” Vasquez, War Puzzle, 609. 50. ​For its original formulation, see John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950); 157–180. See also Andrew H. Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies 7, no. 1 (1997): 114–155; Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171–201; Jervis, “Cooperation,” 167–214; Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analy­sis,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 587–623. 51. ​Jervis, “Cooperation,” 169. 52. ​Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 62–67. 53. ​For an overview of the differences between offensive realism and defensive realism, see Jeffrey  W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking ­ under Anarchy,” International Security 25, no.  3 (2000/2001): 128–161; Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” Internalization Organ­ization 51, no. 3 (1997): 445–477. 54. ​Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 29–40. 55. ​Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 334–347.

170

NOTES TO PAGES 31–35

56. ​Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore. K. Rabb (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 40. 57. ​Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2010); Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing,” 114–155. 58. ​For other critiques of including unit-­level variables, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994–1995): 22–24; Sebastian Rosato, “The Inscrutability of ­Great Power Intentions,” International Security 39, no.  3 (2014–2015): 76–78. 59. ​Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-­Defense Balance and Can We Mea­sure It?” International Security 22, no.  4 (1998): 44–82; Sean  M. Lynn-­Jones, “Offense-­Defense Theory and Its Critics,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (1995): 660–691; Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense and the ­Causes of War,” in Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader, ed. Michael  E. Brown et  al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 55–93; Ted Hopf, “Polarity, the Offense-­Defense Balance, and War,” American Po­liti­cal Science Review 85, no. 2 (1991): 475–493. 60. ​See Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analy­sis,” International Studies Quarterly 28, no.  2 (1984): 219–238; James W. Davis et al., “Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-­Defense Balance,” International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): 179–206; Kier A. Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-­Defense Balance and International Security,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 71–104. 61. ​Van Evera, ­Causes of War, 185. 62. ​James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organ­ization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414. For other relevant works on the bargaining model of war, see James D. Morrow and Woosang Kim, “Why Do Power Shifts Lead to War?” American Journal of Po­liti­cal Science 36, no. 4 (1992): 896–922; Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Prob­lem,” International Organ­ization 60, no. 1 (2006): 169–204; Thomas Chadefaux, “Bargaining over Power: When Do Shifts in Power Lead to War,” International Theory 2, no. 3 (2011): 228–253. 63. ​I disagree on the logic of the commitment prob­lem since I consider a scenario of complete information to be unrealistic. 64. ​Kirschner rightfully claims that Fearon is downplaying the number of strategic issues that cannot lead to a compromise between two states. Jonathan Kirschner, “Rationalist Explanations for War?” Security Studies 10, no. 1 (2000): 144–145. 65. ​Powell, “War as a Commitment Prob­lem,” 172–176. 66. ​Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 408. 67. ​Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Hegemonic Threats and Great-­Power Balancing in Eu­rope, 1495–1999,” Security Studies 14, no.  1 (2005): 1–33; Richard L ­ ittle, Balance of Power in International Relations: Meta­phors, Myths, and Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); William C. Wohlforth et al. “Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History,” Eu­ro­pean Journal of International Relations 13, no. 2 (2007): 155–185. 68. ​Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 267–333; Kenneth  N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-­Wesley, 1979). 69. ​Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43; Walt, Origins of Alliances, 17–49. 70. ​Balance-­of-­power and balance-­of-­threat theorists also make the same prediction in the presence of a preponderant state. 71. ​Alan N. Sabrosky, “Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War,” in The Correlates of War, vol. 2, ed. David  J. Singer (New York: F ­ ree Press, 1980), 161–198; Alastair Smith, “Alliance Formation and War,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4 (1995): 405–425; Glenn  H. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” International Organ­ization 45, no. 1 (1991): 121–142; Ido Oren, “The War Proneness of Alliances,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 2 (1990): 208–233; Jack S. Levy, “Alliance Formation and War Be­hav­ior: An Analy­sis of the G ­ reat Powers, 1495–1975,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 4 (1981): 581–613; John A.

171

NOTES TO PAGES 35–39

Vasquez and Ashlea Rundlett, “Alliances as a Necessary Condition of Multiparty Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 8 (2016): 1395–1418; Woosang Kim, “Power, Alliance, and Major Wars, 1816–1975,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 2 (1989): 255–273. 72. ​I include u ­ nder this label ­those scholars who consider major wars to be the result of the most power­f ul state’s attempt to ­either preserve or achieve hegemony. It is not a distinction between power transition and balance-­of-­power arguments. Moreover, I do not refer to hegemonic stability theorists. 73. ​Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 29–42. 74. ​Bi­polar­ity is more stable than multipolarity ­because a system with two g ­ reat powers is characterized by fewer conflict dyads, deterrence is easier b ­ ecause asymmetries of power are rare, miscalculations over power and resolve of the opponent are reduced, and the main pathologies of alliances (buck-­passing, flexibility, collective action prob­lem) are absent. John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the ­Future: Instability in Eu­rope ­after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 13–19; Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 334–347. 75. ​For other views on power transition at the origins of hegemonic wars, see. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); George Modelski, “The Long Cycles of Global Politics and the Nation-­State,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 20 (1978); Joshua Shifrinson, Rising Titans, Falling G ­ iants: How G ­ reat Powers Exploit Power Shifts (New York: Cornell University Press, 2018); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 186–210. 76. ​Levy, War in the Modern G ­ reat Power System, 50–76. Levy considers the entire period (1792–1815) to be a single major war, whereas Copeland’s definition excludes the French Revolutionary Wars. This classification pre­sents the prob­lem of treating Napoleonic France not as a potential hegemon; quite the contrary, I consider the years between 1802 and 1815 the few periods in modern history that ­were characterized by power preponderance of one state. The decision on how to draw the line for the aggregation of wars is a thorny one. Even in major wars that do not pose a temporal challenge, such as World War II, g ­ reat powers did not constantly fight. In the end, I de­cided to rely on the conventional terminology and to treat the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as a single major war. 77. ​Vasquez, War Puzzle, 136. 78. ​I concede that Napoleonic France had the absolute goal of becoming the Eu­ro­pean hegemon. Nonetheless, the origins of the French Revolutionary Wars lie in the encirclement of France by Prus­sia and Austria. For more details, see chapter 5. 79. ​Levy, “Preventive War and Domestic Politics,” 3. 80. ​History shows variation in the interaction between a rising state and a declining hegemon, ranging from hegemonic war to the formation of alliances. The “­g reat rapprochement” between the United States and the United Kingdom at the turn of the nineteenth ­century is a case in point. See John A. Vasquez, “When Are Power Transitions Dangerous?” in Parity and War: Evaluations and Extension of the War Ledger, ed. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 44–45. Moreover, MacDonald and Parent challenge the claim that the primary outcome of declining states’ acute decline is preventive war. Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of ­Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 7–44. 81. ​Copeland, Origins of Major War, 24–25 (emphasis added). 82. ​Alexander Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War,” International Organ­ization 68, no. 1 (2014): 4–5. 83. ​Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 335. 84. ​For a discussion on the origins of the modern great-­power system, see Levy, War in the Modern G ­ reat Power System, 19–24. 85. ​Chapter 5 provides an overview of the remaining seven major wars in modern Eu­ro­ pean history.

172

NOTES TO PAGES 42–48

2. France and the Italian Wars   1. ​The Ottoman Empire achieved great-­power status only in 1526.   2. ​During the Burgundian Wars (Siege of Neuss, 1474–1475), the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick III, compelled Charles the Bold of Burgundy to give his ­daughter Mary as wife to Maximilian.   3. ​The other surrounding g ­ reat power (Spain) emerged as a ­g reat power in 1469, ­after the ­u nion of the Kingdom of Castille and the Kingdom of Aragon.   4. ​Francesco Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia (Bologna: Einaudi, 1997); H. Lemonnier, La Lutte contre la maison d’Austriche: La France sous Henry II (Paris: Tallandier, 1904); Jeremy Black, War in Eu­ro­pean History, 1494–1660 (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006), 33–48; Karl Brandi, The Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World-­Empire (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969).   5. ​Brendan Simms, Eu­rope: The Strug­gle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Pre­sent (New York: Basic Books, 2014); Christine Shaw, The Italian Wars 1494–1559 (London: Routledge, 2019), 6–8, 12–14; David Potter, Re­nais­sance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480–1560 (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 2008), 2–3; Geoffrey Parker, Emperor: A New Life of Charles V (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019), 164; Martyn Rady, The Emperor Charles V (London: Routledge, 1988).   6. ​Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of G ­ reat Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1989), 33 (emphasis added).   7. ​D. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 214–216.   8. ​Copeland, Origins of Major War, 214 (emphasis added).   9. ​Before 1526, the Ottoman Empire could not be considered a main actor in the Eu­ro­pean system. Only when it achieved decisive victory over the Kingdom of Hungary (­Battle of Mohács, August 29, 1526) could it be considered so. 10. ​­Until 1499, the Republic of Genoa was held by the House of Sforza, ruler of the Duchy of Milan. Genoa was invaded and controlled by France u ­ ntil 1528. 11. ​Potter, Re­nais­sance France at War, 1–7. 12. ​John M. Currin, “ ‘The King’s Army into the Partes of Bretaigne’: Henry VII and the Breton Wars,” War in History 7, no. 4 (2000): 379–412. 13. ​G. A. Bergenroth, Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers Relating to the Negotiations between E ­ ngland and Spain Preserved in the Archives of Simancas and Elsewhere, Volume 1: Henry VII, 1485–1509 (Burlington, ON: Tanner Ritchie, 2006), 5–25. 14. ​Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile to Rodrigo De Puebla (Spanish ambassador at the En­glish court), December 17, 1488. Bergenroth, Calendar of Letters, 17–18. The willingness to form an alliance and to resort to war against France was endorsed by Henry VII, as the En­glish Commissioners reassured De Puebla, “It is the w ­ ill of the King of E ­ ngland, first to conclude the alliance and the marriage, and afterwards to make war upon the King of France, according to the bidding of Ferdinand and Isabella.” Bergenroth, Calendar of Letters, 9. 15. ​Potter, Re­nais­sance France at War, 255. As historian Giuseppe de Leva pointed out, “Well before Ludovico il Moro called the French, Charles VIII started to design to claim inheritance over Naples and the Eastern Roman Empire. It is proven by the treaties signed at Étaples, Barcelona, Senlis (Dec. 13, 1492, Jan. 19 and May 23, 1493), by which to have his hands ­free, traded peace from Henry VII of E ­ ngland at the price of 745,000 scudi, given back to Ferdinand the Catholic Roussillon and Cerdaña, keys to the Pyrenees, and to Emperor Maximilian the Franche-­Comté, Artois, Charolois, and Novers.” Giuseppe de Leva, Storia documentata di Carlo V in correlazione all’Italia, Volume I (Venice: Naratovich, 1863), 43. 16. ​The existing lit­er­a­t ure considers three ­l imited conflicts that occurred in this period (1494–1498, 1499–1504, and 1508–1516) as part of the Italian Wars. However, they fail to meet the criteria of my definition of major wars ­because they did not involve all the ­g reat powers in the region and did not escalate to sustained all-­out conflict. 17. ​David Abulafia, The French Descent into Re­nais­sance Italy, 1494–95: Antecedents and Effects (London: Routledge, 1995); Didier Le Fur, Charles VIII (Paris: Perrin, 2006); Marino Sanuto,

173

NOTES TO PAGES 48–54

La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia (Venice: M. Visentini, 1883); Potter, Re­nais­sance France at War, 27–29; Shaw, The Italian Wars, 6–30. 18. ​In Parker, Emperor, 4. 19. ​Leva, Storia documentata, Volume I, 77. 20. ​King Ferdinand of Spain, September 1, 1502. Bergenroth, Calendar of Letters, 286–287. 21. ​Shaw, The Italian Wars, 42–75. 22. ​Leva, Storia documentata, Volume I, 88–91; Shaw, The Italian Wars, 88–91. 23. ​Shaw, The Italian Wars, 121–123. 24. ​Charles reluctantly agreed to the treaty but remained willing to reverse it as soon as the situation would allow him to retake the territories that France obtained from the Burgundian War and the Franco-­Breton War: “I wish that this treaty had been more to my honour and advantage than it is, but I accepted what I could get, recognizing that at pre­sent a good peace is worth more to me than a war, however just.” Parker, Emperor, 50. 25. ​Shaw, The Italian Wars, 144 (emphasis added). 26. ​R. J. Knecht, Francis I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 33–50; Shaw, The Italian Wars, 145–149. 27. ​Maximilian to Bartolomeo Ticioni (September 9, 1516). In Leva, Storia documentata, Volume I, 237. 28. ​Leva, Storia documentata, Volume I, 47. 29. ​Hayward Keniston, “Peace Negotiations between Charles V and Francis I (1537–­1538),” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 102, no. 2 (1958): 147 (emphasis added). 30. ​Parker, Emperor, 87–94. 31. ​The Holy Roman Empire was a po­liti­cal institution that included several semiautonomous states. Since 1438, the House of Hapsburg emerged as the predominant actor and controlled the title of Holy Roman Emperor. In addition to the Hapsburg, the other main states ­were Saxony, Brandenburg, Bavaria, Palatinate, Hesse, Trier, and Württemberg. 32. ​Charles V had four dif­fer­ent inheritances to compose his reign: the Kingdom of Castile from his maternal grand­mother, Isabella; the Kingdom of Aragon, including the Kingdom of Naples, from his maternal grand­father, Ferdinand; the Duchy of Burgundy and the Low Countries from his ­father, Philip, Duke of Burgundy; and the Holy Roman Empire through his election in 1519. 33. ​Francis I to his ambassadors in the Holy Roman Empire (April 16, 1519). In Leva, Storia documentata, Volume I, 416. 34. ​The remaining three prince-­electors who would elect Maximilian’s successor ­were Cologne, Bohemia, and Saxony. In addition, Francis I had secured papal support to his candidacy as the Holy Roman Emperor. Henry J. Cohn, “Did Bribes Induce the German Electors to Choose Charles V as Emperor in 1519?” German History 19, no. 1 (2001): 1–27. 35. ​In Gonzalo de Illescas, Segunda parte de la historia pontifical y cathólica, en la qual se prosigven las vidas y hechos de Clemento Quinto y de los demás pontifíces sus pre­de­ces­sores hasta Pio Quinto (Madrid: Melchor Sanchez, 1652), 196. 36. ​In Rebecca A. Boone, Mercurino di Gattinara and the Creation of the Spanish Empire (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014), 91–92. 37. ​The same logic underlines the Hapsburg strategy ­after the abdication of Charles V up to the end of the War of the Spanish Succession (1713), which ended the encirclement of France. An extension of this analy­sis w ­ ill be provided in the next chapter on the origins of the Thirty Years’ War. 38. ​By February 1519, the chances of Francis I being elected started to dwindle ­because of Charles’s ability to outbid him. 39. ​Charles to Margaret of Austria, Duchess of Savoy (March 5, 1519). In Parker, Emperor, 91. In addition to France, Ottoman advances in southern Eu­rope started to become a prob­lem for Ferdinand. Charles on Francis’s proposal to elect his ­brother as Holy Roman Emperor (March 5, 1519). In Leva, Storia documentata, Volume I, 405–406. 40. ​Charles V had less control over the territories that w ­ ere not part of the Hapsburg inheritance ­because he could not raise taxes or an army. Nonetheless, all the states that ­were part of the Holy Roman Empire would expect to follow Charles V’s ­will.

174

NOTES TO PAGES 54–60

41. ​Shaw, The Italian Wars, 155. 42. ​Francis I to En­glish ambassadors (November 18, 1521) noted that Charles V “has not placed obstacles on the truce with the hope to take Tournai, conquer Burgundy and connect [his territories] to the Swiss. B ­ ecause I am the e­ nemy of the emperor, I want to be his most frightening ­enemy.” In Giuseppe de Leva, Storia documentata di Carlo V in correlazione all’Italia, Volume II (Venice: Naratovich, 1863), 17. 43. ​Potter, Re­nais­sance France at War, 26. 44. ​William Fitzwilliam, En­g lish ambassador at the French court. In Knecht, Francis I, 105. 45. ​Charles V (June 15, 1520). In Leva, Storia documentata, Volume II, 45. 46. ​Leva, Storia documentata, Volume II, 45–46. 47. ​Parker, Emperor, 141–144. 48. ​Gattinara to Charles (November 1523). Parker, Emperor, 144. 49. ​By 1523, the anti-­French alliance included several other Italian states: Venice, Florence, Siena, Lucca, and Genoa. 50. ​Francis I (August 23, 1523). In Leva, Storia documentata, Volume II, 184–185. 51. ​Knecht, Francis I, 160–175; Parker, Emperor, 146–148; Shaw, The Italian Wars, 172–175. 52. ​Specifically, all t­ hose had attacked Charles through French support: the Duke of Guelders and Robert de la Marck. 53.  In Parker, Emperor, 156. 54. ​Parker, Emperor, 164. 55. ​The Duke of Milan was driven out by the French victory of Marignano in 1515. 56. ​The league included Savoy, Venice, Pope Clement VII, the Republic of Florence, and Francesco Sforza of Milan. 57. ​Francis I to the Venetian ambassador Giorgio Gritti (March 1531). In John H. Elliot, “Ottoman-­Habsburg Rivalry: The Eu­ro­pean Perspective,” in Suleyman the Second (i.e. the First) and His Time, ed. C. Kafadar and H. ĪnalcIk (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993), 155. 58. ​In Parker, Emperor, 189 (emphasis added). 59. ​Shaw, The Italian Wars, 183–186. 60. ​Parker, Emperor, 183–191; Shaw, The Italian Wars, 195–196. 61. ​Potter, Re­nais­sance France at War, 24. 62. ​Leyva to Charles V (December 3, 1535). In Parker, Emperor, 248. 63. ​Francis I signed a formal treaty with Suleiman, who would have launched an invasion of Hungary to divert some of the imperial forces away from the western front. 64. ​Potter, Re­nais­sance France at War, 30–37. 65. ​Francis I on April 24, 1540. Giuseppe de Leva, Storia documentata di Carlo V in correlazione all’Italia, Volume III (Venice: Naratovich, 1863), 295. 66. ​Charles V would continue to be the sovereign of the Low Countries ­u ntil his death, and if Maria died without heirs, ­these territories would remain ­u nder Hapsburg rule. 67. ​R.  J. Knecht, Re­nais­sance Warrior and Patron: The Reign of Francis I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 394–395. 68. ​This was Charles V’s response (June 9, 1540) to a previous consideration of the French ambassador at the imperial court (Francesco Bonvalot) on how the possibility of conflict was imminent: “It is public knowledge h ­ ere that the king [Francis] dislikes the offers made by the emperor, and the common p ­ eople ­here believe talks have broken down and some already fear the outbreak of war.” In Parker, Emperor, 267. 69. ​Denmark, Saxony, Sweden, and the Duke of Jülich-­Cleves-­Berg. 70. ​Leva, Storia documentata, Volume III, 450–454. 71. ​Parker, Emperor, 281–282. 72. ​Shaw, The Italian Wars, 229–230. 73. ​Parker, Emperor, 309–310. 74. ​The control of the Duchy of Parma would improve the connection of the Duchy of Milan to the Kingdom of Naples. 75. ​E. Armstrong, “The Italian Wars of Henry II,” En­glish Historical Review 30, no.  120 (1915): 602–612.

175

NOTES TO PAGES 60–68

76. ​The goal was “to light fires in the Netherlands so that the e­ nemy w ­ ill need to put them out, forcing him to divide his forces.” Parker, Emperor, 430. 77. ​Rady, Emperor Charles V, 38 (emphasis added). 78. ​Due to the scope of my theory, I analyze only the be­hav­ior of ­g reat powers. Nonetheless, the same logic applies to less power­f ul states, too. For instance, Venice often changed its assessment of the immediate rival and, in turn, intervened against the ­g reat power (­either France or the United Hapsburg) that could become more power­f ul in northern Italy, thereby threatening its survival. The arrow between France and the United Hapsburg symbolizes the attack that started their dyadic conflict. The line that connects two dif­fer­ent squares symbolizes the rivalry. The lines above squares symbolize the alliance among ­g reat powers. 79. ​Glenn Richardson, The Field of Cloth of Gold (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013); Peter Gwyn, “Wolsey’s Foreign Policy: The Conferences at Calais and Bruges Reconsidered,” Historical Journal 23, no. 4 (1980): 755–772. 80. ​Parker, Emperor, 107. 81. ​Leva, Storia documentata, Volume III, 242–247. 82. ​Leva, Storia documentata, Volume II, 91. 83. ​The Ottoman Empire ended a ­century of confrontation and had restrained the rise of the Persian Empire in the B ­ attle of Chaldiran in 1514. Charles V’s support could have led to the reemergence of the Persian threat. 84. ​James Reston, Defenders of the Faith: Charles V, Suleyman the Magnificent, and the ­Battle for Eu­rope, 1520–­1536 (London: Penguin, 2009); Parker, Emperor, 225–230. 85. ​Pál Fodor, “Ottoman Policy ­towards Hungary, 1520–1541,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 45, no. 2/3 (1991): 273–345. 86. ​A. Anievas and K. Nişancioğlu, How the West Came to Rule: The Geopo­liti­cal Origins of Capitalism (London: Pluto, 2015), 106–116. 87. ​The pattern of alliances is rival based also in the case of the counterhegemonic co­ali­ tion against Charles V in 1526, ­because the United Hapsburg was the common immediate rival a­ fter becoming the potential hegemon. 88. ​Parker, Emperor, 167. 89. ​Parker, Emperor, 152. 90. ​Another clear example of this be­hav­ior is shown by his confidence to Marie, regent of the Netherlands, before the outbreak of the fourth round of the Italian Wars (1541): “As you know . . . ​I want to avoid war [but Francis I] intends to attack wherever he can cause me the most damage [Navarre and Netherlands]. I need to defend myself by thwarting his designs.” Parker, Emperor, 284. 91. ​Parker, Emperor, 253. 92. ​Francis I commanded twenty-­four thousand to twenty-­six thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry, while Charles V commanded twenty-­t wo thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry. Knecht, Francis I, 170. 93. ​Leva, Storia documentata, Volume II, 112. 94. ​Parker, Emperor, 102. As Knecht (Francis I, 78) notes, “Whereas in the past t­here had been four major powers in Europe—­France, Spain, E ­ ngland, and the Empire—­now t­ here ­were only three, Spain and the Empire having become united in the person of Charles. Of ­these, France and the new Habsburg state seemed of roughly equal weight.”

3. France and the Thirty Years’ War 1. ​I justify the temporal bound­aries of this decision below. I w ­ ill show that the other two ­ reat powers (­England and the Ottoman Empire) became incapable of conducting an active g foreign policy and, in turn, to participate in the major war ­because of paralyzing internal instability. 2. ​The Spanish Netherlands correspond to t­oday’s Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. They ­were referred to as the Low Countries or Flanders. I use ­these terms interchangeably in the rest of the chapter. This region currently borders with Switzerland. N. M. Sutherland,

176

NOTES TO PAGES 68–71

“The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of Eu­ro­pean Politics,” En­glish Historical Review 107, no. 424 (1992): 591.   3. ​Sutherland, “Origins of the Thirty Years War,” 594.   4. ​ The other two states that are generally considered major powers in this historical period—­England and the Ottoman Empire—­were incapable of fighting due to internal instability. Since the decisive victory of France in 1629, the British monarchy started facing a period of internal instability that culminated in the En­glish Civil War (1642–1651). The Ottoman Empire had been active in the first phase of the Thirty Years’ War, when Sultan Mustafa offered Frederick V of Palatinate a force of sixty thousand cavalry and planned an invasion of Poland to divert imperial troops. However, the Protestant defeat in the ­Battle of White Mountain prevented an active participation in the conflict. Since 1623, the Ottoman Empire lacked the means for an offensive on Austria’s eastern border ­because of the frequent internal rebellions of the Janissaries and of the threat of Safavid Persia over the control of Mesopotamia (Ottoman-­Safavid War, 1623–1639), thereby impeding to put pressure on Austria’s eastern border during the French attack in western Germany.   5. ​Greg R. Lawson, “A Thirty Years’ War in the M ­ iddle East,” National Interest, February 8, 2018; John T. Kuehn, “Is Syrian-­Related Vio­lence the Beginning of the Muslim World’s Thirty Years’ War?” Foreign Policy, June 27, 2013; Ralph Peters, “The Real Lesson of the Thirty Years’ War for ­Today,” Military History in the News, Hoover Institution, April 16, 2014.   6. ​M. P. Gutmann, “The Origins of the Thirty Years War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988): 749–770; Peter H. Wilson, “The C ­ auses of the Thirty Years War 1618–48,” En­glish Historical Review 123, no. 502 (2008): 554–586. Brendan Simms, Eu­rope: The Strug­gle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Pre­sent (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 7–41; Charles Wilson, The Transformation of Eu­rope, 1558–­1648 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 221–246; J.  H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 119; Mark Konnert, Early Modern Eu­rope: The Age of Religious War, 1559–­1715 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 154–156; Richard Bonney, The Thirty Years’ War 1618–1648 (Oxford: Osprey, 2002), 50; S. H. Steinberg, The “Thirty Years War” and the Conflict for Eu­ro­pean Hegemony 1600–­1660 (London: Edward Arnold, 1966), 1; Sutherland, “Origins of the Thirty Years War,” 594; Peter  H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: Eu­rope’s Tragedy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 375.   7. ​­After the designation of Ferdinand of Styria, known proponent of the Catholic Counter-­ Reformation, as the heir of the Holy Roman Emperor Matthias, on May 23, 1618, Count Heinrich von Thurn mobilized Protestants to oppose this solution and ordered to throw out of the seventy-­foot-­high win­dow three of the four Catholic regents who went to Prague to negotiate the dispute. Even though the governors survived unharmed by landing on a large pile of manure, this incident is usually considered the official beginning of the Thirty Years’ War.   8. ​Carl J. Burckhardt, Richelieu: His Rise to Power (London: Allen & Unwin, 1940); J. H. Elliott, “War and Peace in Eu­rope 1618–1648,” in 1648: War and Peace, ed. Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling (Strasbourg: Council of Eu­rope, 1998), 23–39; R. Bireley, “The Thirty Years War as Germany’s Religious War,” in Krieg und Politik 1618–1648, ed. K. Repgen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 85–106; Ronald G. Asch, The Thirty Years’ War: The Holy Roman Empire and Eu­rope, 1618–­1648 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997). For an IR analy­sis of the impact of religion at the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War, see Daniel H. Nexon, The Strug­gle for Power in Early Modern Eu­rope: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2009).   9. ​Richard Bonney, The Eu­ro­pean Dynastic States, 1494–­1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 188. Wilson takes a m ­ iddle stance between t­ hese two camps by arguing that the war had a po­liti­cal, rather than religious, character but by also stressing that it was not a Eu­ ro­pean contest. See Wilson, Thirty Years War, 8–11. 10. ​Bonney, Eu­ro­pean Dynastic States, 188–241; Cicely  V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (New York: Anchor Books, 1961); Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 220; Geoffrey Parker, The Thirty Years’ War (London: Routledge, 1984); Peter Brightwell, “The Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years’ War,” Eu­ro­pean Studies Review 9 (1979): 409–431; Sutherland, “Origins of the Thirty Years War,” 587–625.

177

NOTES TO PAGES 71–75

11. ​Conventional division of the Thirty Years’ War reflects the focus on events in Germany: the Bohemian phase (1618–1625), the Danish phase (1625–1630), the Swedish phase (1630–1635), and the French phase (1635–1648). 12. ​Steinberg, Thirty Years War, 1; Sutherland, “Origins of the Thirty Years War,” 587. 13. ​Steinberg concurs with Sutherland in calling into question the conventional view on the origin and termination of the war, but he suggests that the starting point of the conflict should be considered the War of the Jülich Succession in 1609. See Steinberg, Thirty Years War, 30–33. 14. ​The Peace of Westphalia ended the military involvement of two Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers: Austria and Sweden. 15. ​Cicely V. Wedgwood, “The Futile and Meaningless War,” in The Thirty Years’ War: Prob­ lems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, ed. Theodore K. Rabb (Boston: Heath, 1964), 15. 16. ​Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organ­ization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251–287; David Boucher, Po­liti­cal Theories of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Derek Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” International History Review 21, no. 3 (1999): 569–591; G. N. Clark, The Seventeenth ­Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), ix; Hendrikm Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1994); Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948,” American Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (1948): 20–41; Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System: ­Toward a Theory of the World Polity (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Spencer  C. Tucker, Wars That Changed History: Fifty of the World’s Greatest Conflicts (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-­CLIO, 2015), 161–181; Stephen  D. Krasner, “Westphalia and All That,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Po­liti­cal Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 235–264. 17. ​Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Strug­gle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1978), 294. 18. ​Copeland, Origins of Major War, 216 (emphases added). 19. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War, 151–160. 20. ​Lettres, vol. 3, 181–182. See pt. 3, n. 72 and text. See William F. Church, Richelieu and Reason of State (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1972), 296–297. 21. ​John C. Rule, “The Enduring Rivalry of France and Spain ca. 1462–1700,” in ­Great Power Rivalries, ed. William R. Thompson (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 31–59. 22. ​AGD, Estado 2331 f. 126, Olivares in the Council of State, November 10, 1630. Parker, The Thirty Years’ War, 104. 23. ​See AGS, Estado, K. 1416, f. 56, consulta, September 17, 1633. 24. ​Letter from Henry IV to François Savary de Brèves, French envoy to the Papal Court, August  31, 1609. In Vincent  J. Pitts, Henri IV of France: His Reign and Age (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 304. 25. ​German states ­were at times more concerned about each other rather than of the Holy Roman Emperor. Likewise, France could not bring in the same co­ali­tion of ­England, Denmark, and Sweden in the first phase of the Thirty Years’ War ­because they competed for supremacy in northern Eu­rope. 26. ​T his support remained informal u ­ ntil the French declaration of war on Spain in May 1635, ­because secrecy (although it was acknowledged by the Hapsburg) reduced the likelihood of escalation. On secrecy as a communication signal and on the concept of “public secrets,” see Austin Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics (New York: Prince­ton University Press, 2018), 27–41. 27. ​R ichard Bonney, “France’s ‘War by Diversion.’ ” in The Thirty Years’ War, ed. Geoffrey Parker (London: Routledge, 1984), 129–137. 28. ​Cardinal Richelieu, “Po­liti­cal Statement,” in The Thirty Years’ War: Prob­lems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, ed. Theodore K. Rabb (Boston: Heath, 1964), 129. 29. ​The Treaty of Münster and the Treaty of Osnabrück formed the Peace of Westphalia. The Dutch rebels and Spain ­were at war between 1568 and 1648 (Eighty Years’ War). The conflict was not fought in all ­those years and with the same level of intensity. Historians, however, usually consider it a single war rather than a series of separate conflicts. See Wilson, Thirty Years War, 161–167.

178

NOTES TO PAGES 75–78

30. ​The Dutch Republic is a term that ensued from the settlement that favored the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621), by which the Dutch rebels gained autonomy (but not in­de­pen­dence) from the Spanish monarchy. 31. ​The text does not clarify the Austrian provinces, on which the two sides would have likely agreed if the Bohemian revolt had not robbed their attention. Yet, the provinces that ­were to be transfer w ­ ere likely to be Alsace and Tyrol. Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 30–32; Tryntje Helfferrich, The Thirty Years War: A Documented History (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009), 2–3; Wilson, Thirty Years War, 259–260. 32. ​­After the election of Ferdinand II of Austria as king of Bohemia, Protestant estates deposed him and proclaimed Frederick V, Elector of the Palatinate. The quick spread of the revolt to other states of the Holy Roman Empire seemed to undermine the ability of Ferdinand II to retain control of this conglomerate of states and to guarantee the election of the head of the House of Hapsburg as Holy Roman Emperor. See Wilson, Thirty Years War, 269–313. 33. ​The Protestant Union was the creation of the Elector of Palatinate that since 1608 coalesced few Protestant states in the south of Germany. Wilson, Thirty Years War, 225–226. 34. ​David Maland, Eu­rope at War, 1600–50 (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980), 64. 35. ​R. A. Stradling, Spain’s Strug­gle for Eu­rope, 1598–­1668 (London: Hambledon, 1994), 72. The willingness of the Hapsburg to keep Bohemia was known also by other leaders, as the archbishop-­Elector of Cologne commented at the beginning of the revolt, “If it be true that the Bohemians intend to depose Ferdinand and choose another king . . . ​, we may except a war of twenty, thirty or forty years; for Spain and the House of Austria ­will take all they hold in this world sooner than relinquish Bohemia.” Maland, Eu­rope at War, 64. 36. ​­There was an almost unan­i­mous agreement within the Spanish kingdom that the cessation of hostilities had worsened the Spanish position and that u ­ nless a more favorable settlement was reached, the resumption of the Dutch Revolt would have been inevitable. See J. I. Israel, “A Conflict of Empires: Spain and the Netherlands 1618–1648,” Past & Pre­sent 76 (1977): 34–74. 37. ​Israel, “A Conflict of Empires,” 68. 38. ​The network was extended to other minor powers, such as the Dutch Republic and German states. Since major wars are by definition military conflicts that involve all the g ­ reat powers in the system, I limit my analy­sis to great-­power alliances. 39. ​The Duke of Lorraine had attempted several times to overthrow Richelieu and Louis XIII with covert support from the Hapsburg. 40. ​They w ­ ere two dif­fer­ent routes along the Spanish Road in the Rhineland, but they w ­ ere both connected to northern Italy. 41. ​Church, Richelieu, 103–125; Wilson, Thirty Years War, 381–384. 42. ​They w ­ ere controlled by Spain and Austria, respectively. 43. ​Wedgwood, Thirty Years War, 33. 44. ​France had stipulated an alliance with Venice and the Duchy of Savoy in response to the Spanish invasion of the Valtelline (Treaty of Paris, 1623). The Valtelline belonged to the Protestant Grison Leagues (a French ally) u ­ ntil 1620, when the repression of local Catholics provoked a Spanish invasion. The crisis did not escalate due to French domestic weakness, and it was resolved by the mediation of Pope Urban VIII, who replaced Spanish troops in the control of the passage in exchange for local Catholics’ protection. Nevertheless, French ability to interrupt the Spanish Road was seriously undermined ­because the pope allowed ­free passage to Spanish troops on the march to the Spanish Netherlands. 45. ​Genoa constituted the first portion of the Spanish Road. Spanish forces sailed from Spain to the harbors of Genoa before proceeding to the Duchy of Milan and the Valtelline into the Rhineland. 46. ​J. H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 119 (emphasis added). 47. ​David Parrott, “The Mantuan Succession, 1627–1631: A Sovereignty Dispute in Early Modern Eu­rope,” En­glish Historical Review 112, no. 445 (1997): 20–65; David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–­1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 84–109; Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares, 86–112; R. A. Stradling, “Prelude to Disaster: The Precipitation of the War of the Mantuan Succession, 1627–1629,” Historical Journal 33, no. 4 (1990): 769–785.

179

NOTES TO PAGES 79–82

48. ​The Duke of Mantua also controlled Casale Montferrat, which bordered the Duchy of Milan on its western frontier. The Duchy of Mantua was on the eastern border of the Duchy of Milan. 49. ​R. A. Stradling, “Olivares and the Origins of the Franco-­Spanish War, 1627–1635,” En­ glish Historical Review 101, no. 398 (1986): 68–94. 50. ​Spinola was the primary opponent to any military action in northern Italy ­because he considered a diversion from the primary foreign-­policy goal—­namely, a victory against the Dutch Republic. 51. ​Richelieu considered the control of this fortress in high regard in case of war with Spain (April 1630): “It is impossible fully to describe the importance of the conquest [of the fortress of Pinerolo]. If we make war [on Spain], it ­will be undertaken safely for the conquest of Savoy and the conservation of Pinerolo.” In Richard Bonney, Society and Government in France ­under Richelieu and Mazarin 1624–­61 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988), 13. 52. ​R ichelieu estimated that he would need 35,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalries to rescue the Duchy of Milan, while he could only assem­ble 18,000 men, who w ­ ere reduced to 12,000 ­after passing the Alps and meeting the re­sis­tance of Savoy. The size of the army that France could deploy against the imperial troops in September  1630 waned to 7,000. See Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, 94–98. 53. ​Parrott, “The Mantuan Succession,” 64 (emphasis added). 54. ​R ichelieu’s diplomacy is also evident b ­ ehind the Swedish intervention. Trying to divert imperial troops from the campaign in northern Italy, he mediated a truce between Sweden and Poland. In this way, he enabled the Swedish king to attack the Austrian emperor by removing the possibility of a two-­front war against both Poland and the Hapsburg. Ferdinand II made the ­m istake of issuing the Edict of Restitution (March 1629). The goal, like the successful attempt with the Peace of Prague in 1635, was to capitalize on the victory over Denmark to pacify the empire. Conversely, this potential settlement reignited the Protestant rebellion. Moreover, due to the diplomatic action of Richelieu’s representative (­Father Joseph), Ferdinand II tried to contain the revolt by removing imperial commander Wallenstein and to disband his army from one hundred thousand to forty thousand men. 55. ​The unfavorable concessions that the Austrian emperor was willing to make to end his campaign in Italy shows the seriousness of the Swedish threat. Indeed, Ferdinand II tried unsuccessfully to include a clause that would forbid France from forming alliances with Germany against the Holy Roman Emperor. Being unexpectedly in a position of strength, Louis XIII refused t­ hese terms. 56. ​Stradling, Spain’s Strug­gle, 96. 57. ​France and the Duke of Lorraine, Charles IV, had been at loggerheads since 1631. Richelieu had increasingly undermined the authority of Lorraine, ­u ntil French complete control of the territory in 1634. AGS Estado, legajo 2151, “voto del Conde Duque,” January 9, 1633. See Stradling “Olivares,” 80. 58. ​In addition to t­ hese two mea­sures, Olivares also tried to destabilize the French kingdom by supporting conspirators within the French nobility. For instance, Spain signed a secret treaty with Gaston, Duke of Orléans, for supporting his invasion of France with six thousand men with the goal of toppling Richelieu and Louis XIII (May 1634). 59. ​Philip IV to Archduchess Isabel, January 17, 1632, Archives du Royaume de Belgique, Brussels, Sécrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre, livre 204, f. 236; Stradling, Olivares, 80; Olivares to Aytona (? September 1630), BN 2362, f. 11; Stradling, Olivares, 80. 60. ​The Dutch refused ­because they ­were in a favorable situation ­after the end of the war for the succession of the Duchy of Mantua. Ferdinand II was occupied with the internal rebellion of the Protestant states and with the stunning advances of Sweden. In turn, Spain could not use the external support of the imperial troops; rather, it had to divert troops to guarantee the security of the Holy Roman Emperor. 61. ​Parrot, Richelieu’s Army, 100–109. 62. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 140–142. 63. ​In Stradling, Spain’s Strug­gle, 98.

180

NOTES TO PAGES 83–85

64. ​In March 1635, the cardinal-­infante, governor of the Spanish Netherlands, informed Olivares that the Army of Flanders would concentrate on the Dutch war. 65. ​He was captured by Spanish troops on March 26, 1635. 66. ​The decision to launch an attack against Spain was taken by Louis XIII on April 5, 1635. Church, Richelieu, 284–287; David Parrott, “The ­Causes of the Franco-­Spanish War of 1635– 1659,” in The Origins of War in Early Modern Eu­rope, ed. J. Black (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987), 72–111; Helfferrich, Thirty Years War, 151–165. 67. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War, 545–551. 68. ​The Swedish king guaranteed the assistance of the Duke of Pomerania for allowing a safe transfer of his troops. 69. ​France had signed a secret treaty of neutrality with the Elector of Bavaria, guaranteeing to assist him in case of an attack. Richelieu’s goal ­behind the Treaty of Fontainebleau (May 1630) was to turn Bavaria against Ferdinand II. Gustavus Adolphus’s advances in Bavaria and the French failure to intervene on the side of the Elector increasingly pushed him ­toward the emperor. 70. ​Wilson, Thirty Years’ War, 549. 71. ​Wilson, Thirty Years’ War, 565–572. 72. ​Article 77: “All u ­ nions, leagues, federations and suchlike agreements, as well as all oaths and duties sworn on the same, are totally null and void.” In Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 204. Article 66: “All armies are to be combined into a single main army to be called His Roman Imperial Majesty’s and the Holy Roman Empire’s Army.” Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 202. Article 44: “It is agreed to Conjunctis viribus [use combined forces] to liberate the Upper and the Lower Saxon Kreise . . . ​from foreigners, especially the Swedes . . . ​a nd remove them from imperial soil.” Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 199. Article 76: “In no ­matters, including ­those agreed in this Treaty or not, and above all t­ hose concerning the Palatinate affair, s­ hall any armed foreign power be tolerated to come onto imperial soil, . . . ​a nd if this should occur then all effort ­shall be directed against it.” Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 204. 73. ​It was an alliance between Sweden, France, and Protestant states in western Germany. The Elector of Bavaria had signed a treaty of neutrality with France in 1631, where Richelieu also guaranteed that his Swedish ally would not attack the German state. However, in the heyday of Gustavus Adolphus’s advances in the empire in 1632, Richelieu had less leverage and could not prevent Swedish forces from attacking Munich (part of the Bavarian state). The greater threat posed by Sweden ­until Nördlingen led to the Bavarian decision to come to terms with Ferdinand II and dissolve the alliance of Protestant states that resisted the Hapsburg. 74. ​Wilson, Thirty Years’ War, 194–206. 75. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War, 574. 76. ​Wedgwood, Thirty Years War, 380. 77. ​Olivares started to consider a war against France b ­ ecause Richelieu’s attempts to eliminate France’s two-­front-­war prob­lem by supporting Sweden and creating buffer zones w ­ ere considered initial moves for a joint attack with the Dutch rebels. 78. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War, 554–559. 79. ​The decision to openly commit with Sweden was to also prevent internal factions that opposed Chancellor Oxenstierna and pushed him to come to terms with the emperor, even if that meant loss of territories. See Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 209–211. 80. ​Helfferrich, Thirty Years War, 151–152 (emphases added). 81. ​Parrott, “The C ­ auses,” 95. 82. ​The arrow between France and Spain symbolizes the attack that started their dyadic conflict. The line that connects two dif­fer­ent squares symbolizes the rivalry. The lines above squares symbolize the alliance among g ­ reat powers. 83. ​In addition to the ­g reat powers, most Eu­ro­pean states intervened in the conflict. France coordinated its military actions with the Dutch rebels b ­ ecause their long-­term b ­ attle for in­de­ pen­dence from Spain (its immediate rival) would have been undermined if France had been defeated by the Hapsburg (loss of great-­power ally). Moreover, France could receive support

181

NOTES TO PAGES 86–94

from Savoy and Venice, who tried to prevent a victory from their immediate rival (Spain and Austria, respectively). Other smaller states within the Holy Roman Empire intervened on the side of the Hapsburg, as the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony b ­ ecause they w ­ ere concerned about a potential resurgence of Swedish presence within the Holy Roman Empire.   84. ​Parker, Thirty Years War, 156–161; Wilson, Thirty Years War, 459–564.   85. ​Sigismund III inherited the Kingdom of Sweden in 1592, but he was deposed in 1599. The war with Gustavus Adolphus aimed to regain control of this territory.   86. ​Sweden faced a two-­front attack but not encirclement, ­because Poland was not a ­g reat power.   87. ​Helfferrich, Thirty Years War, 89–90 (emphasis added).   88. ​This alliance was hostile to Denmark and its members became increasingly concerned with their survival when the Danish king declared war on the emperor in 1625.   89. ​Gustavus Adolphus also needed to gather support or at least not elicit the antagonism of German states to guarantee safe passage of his troops across the empire.   90. ​The document listed the reasons for the Swedish king’s decision to declare war on the emperor.   91. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 122–130.   92. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 211.   93. ​The Hapsburg had been at war with the Ottoman Empire since Charles V. Peace was achieved in 1606 ­after the Long Turkish War, but relations remained strained and the pos­si­ble resumption of war remained a major concern of Ferdinand II.   94. ​The governor of Moravia was Cardinal Franz von Dietrichstein. He was prince of Transylvania. He had been at peace with the emperor since the Peace of Pressburg (December 30, 1626) in which he committed not to provide assistance to the Ottomans against the emperor. Helfferrich, Thirty Years War, 88.   95. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 109.   96. ​Richelieu formed an alliance with this German state in November 1634.   97. ​Wilson, Thirty Years’ War, 288 (emphases added).   98. ​Helfferrich, Thirty Years War, 242–245 (emphases added).   99. ​French acquisition of Alsace, Lorraine, and Pinerolo was ratified in the Peace of Westphalia. With the Treaty of the Pyrenees, France restored its possession of Catalonia in exchange for the acquisition Roussillon and Artois along the northern Spanish border. 100. ​Aldous Huxley, “The Lust for Power and Money,” in The Thirty Years’ War: Prob­lems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, ed. Theodore  K. Rabb (Boston: Heath, 1964), 79–82; Cicely  V. Wedgwood, Richelieu and the French Monarchy (New York: Collier Books, 1962); Louis Batiffol, “A Policy of Justice, Necessity, and Tradition,” in The Thirty Years’ War: Prob­lems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, ed. Theodore K. Rabb (Boston: Heath, 1964), 83–85; V. L. Tapié, “The Overburden Statesman Driven by Events,” in The Thirty Years’ War: Prob­lems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, ed. Theodore K. Rabb (Boston: Heath, 1964), 86–88. 101. ​Mark Greengrass, France in the Age of Henri IV: The Strug­gle for Stability (London: Routledge, 1984); Michael J. Hayden, “Continuity in the France of Henry IV and Louis XIII: French Foreign Policy, 1598–1615,” Journal of Modern History 45, no. 1 (1973): 1–23. 102. ​Peter H. Wilson, “Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession: The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years War,” International History Review 30, no. 3 (2008): 513. 103. ​Spain was more power­ful than France, but it could not be considered a hegemon, ­either in decline or in ascendancy. 104. ​Bonney, Eu­ro­pean Dynastic States, 131–144. 105. ​Peter Pierson, Philip II of Spain (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981), 131. 106. ​Richelieu, “Po­liti­cal Statement,” 130. 107. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War, 150. 108. ​Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, 190. 109. ​Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, 220. The size of the imperial army in 1635 is estimated at 61,000 infantry and 39,500 cavalries. The Army of Flanders alone included about 90,000 infantry men. In Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–­1659: The Logistics

182

NOTES TO PAGES 94–101

of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 24. 110. ​Richard Bonney, The King’s Debts: Finance and Politics in France 1589–­1661 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 145–148. 111. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War, 580. 112. ​As I explained in the theory chapter, the logic of war initiation is not well captured by the existing distinction between preemptive and preventive war. 113. ​Parrott, “The C ­ auses,” 92. 114. ​Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 214–215 (emphases added). 115. ​Parker, Army of Flanders, 110. 116. ​The success in northern Italy increased Philip IV’s optimism: “Last year, 1625, we had nearly 300,000 infantry and cavalry in our pay, and over 500,000 men of militia u ­ nder arms. . . . ​ The fleet . . . ​­rose at one time in 1625 to 108 ships of war at sea. . . . ​This year of 1626 we have had two royal armies in the Flanders and one in the Palatinate, and yet all the power of France, ­England, Sweden, Venice, Savoy, Denmark, Holland, Brandenburg, Saxony, and Weimar could not save Breda from our victorious arms . . . ​and yet, with all this universal conspiracy against us, I have not depleted my patrimony.” See Wilson, Thirty Years War: Sourcebook, 80–81. 117. ​Olivares’s voto in consulta of the consejo de Estado, March 3, 1635, AGS E 2050, no. 32 (emphasis added). Olivares’s voto in consulta of the consejo de Estado, April 19, 1635, AGS E 2050, no. 43. In Stradling, “Olivares,” 83. 118. ​Stradling “Prelude to Disaster,” 770 (emphasis added).

4. Germany and World War I 1. ​David Calleo, The German Prob­lem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Pre­sent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 206. 2. ​Richard N. Rosecrance and Steven E. Miller, eds. The Next ­Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risk of U.S.-­China Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014). 3. ​The Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University was the first department to establish a chair on international relations in 1919. Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez, “Introduction: Historians, Po­liti­cal Scientists, and the ­Causes of the First World War,” in The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-­Making, ed. Jack  S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 4. 4. ​Andreas Gestrich and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, eds., Bid for World Power? New Research on the Outbreak of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (London: Routledge, 2002); Annika Mombauer, “Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-­Year Debate on the Origins of World War I,” Central Eu­ro­pean History 48, no.  4 (2015): 541–564; Holger  H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-­Hungary, 1914–1918 (London: Bloomsbury, 1996); James Joll, “The 1914 Debate Continues: Fritz Fischer and His Critics,” in The Origins of the First World War: G ­ reat Power Rivalry and German War Aims, ed. H. W. Koch (London: Macmillan, 1972), 30–45; John A. Moses, The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography (Brisbane, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1975); John A. Vasquez, “The First World War and International Relations Theory: A Review of Books on the 100th  Anniversary,” International Studies Review 16, no.4 (2014): 623–644; John  C.  G. Röhl, “Goodbye to All That (Again)? The Fischer Thesis, the New Revisionism and the Meaning of the First World War,” International Affairs 91, no. 1 (2015): 153–166; Mark Hewitson, Germany and the ­Causes of the First World War (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 1–20; Samuel R. Williamson, “July 1914 Revisited and Revised: The Erosion of the German Paradigm,” in The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-­M aking, ed. Jack Levy and John Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Thomas  G. Otte, “ ‘Outcast from History’: The Fischer Controversy and British Historiography,” Journal of Con­temporary History 48, no. 2 (2013): 376–396.

183

NOTES TO PAGES 101–102

  5. ​Several arguments within this school of thought have been advanced, from the role of economic interests to the impact of German militarism. Eckart Kehr, “Anglophobia and Weltpolitik,” in Economic Interest, Militarism and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History, ed. Gordon A. Craig (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 22–49; Fritz Fischer, World Power or Decline (New York: Norton, 1974); Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1967); Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions (New York: Norton, 1975); Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Prob­lem of Militarism in Germany, Vol. 2: The Eu­ro­pean Powers and the Wilhelminian Empire, 1890–1914 (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1972); Immanuel Geiss, “The Outbreak of the First World War and German War Aims,” Journal of Con­temporary History 1, no. 3 (1966): 75–91; Jack Snyder, “Civil-­Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security 9, no. 1 (1984): 108–146; John C. G. Röhl, ed., From Bismarck to Hitler: The Prob­lem of Continuity in German History (London: Longman, 1970); Michael R. Gordon, “Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Cases,” Journal of Modern History 46, no. 2 (1974): 191–226.   6. ​Although this explanation is often associated with all Fischer’s works, in his first book, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, he only claims that the Septemberprogramm (the war aims that ­were articulated ­after the outbreak of the war) ­were the result of German decision makers’ aggressive intentions. Only in his subsequent books does Fischer contend that Germany planned a preventive war in the War Council of December 8, 1912. Frederick A. Hale, “Fritz Fischer and the History of World War I,” History Teacher 9 (1976): 273.   7. ​In the first structural explanation of the outbreak of the war, Dickinson does not hold any state to bear a ­great responsibility, but he stresses how the conflict was sparked by Germany. Other structural arguments, such as Mearsheimer’s offensive realism and Copeland’s dynamic differential theory, put a greater emphasis on the actions of Germany as a catalyst for World War I. Goldsworthy L. Dickinson, The Eu­ro­pean Anarchy (New York: Macmillan, 1917).   8. ​John J, Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of ­Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2014), 181–190.   9. ​Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 56–117. 10. ​Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Bernadotte  E. Schmitt, ­Triple Alliance and ­Triple Entente (New York: Howard Fertig, 1961); Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Eu­rope Went to War in 1914 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2014); Jack S. Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914,” International Security 15, no. 3 (1990–1991): 151–186; Konrad Jarausch, “The Illusion of ­Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg Calculated Risk, July  1914,” Central Eu­ro­pean History 2 (1969): 48–76; Luigi Albertini, The Origins of War of 1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 2: 577–580; Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, a­ fter Sarajevo, Vol. 2 (New York: F ­ ree Press, 1966). 11. ​John  F.  V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1983); Paul W. Schroeder, “World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak,” in The Origins of the First World War: G ­ reat Power Rivalry and German War Aims, ed. H. W. Koch (London: Macmillan, 1972), 101–127; Dominic Lieven, ­Towards the Flame: Empire, War, and the End of the Tsarist Empire (London: Penguin, 2015); Sean McMeekin, The Rus­sian Origins of the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2013). 12. ​Albertini, Origins, 479–483; David Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Eu­rope before 1914,” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 125–161; David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World War as Po­liti­cal Tragedy (New York: Basic Books, 2004); L.C.F. Turner, Origins of the First World War (New York: Norton, 1970); Thomas G. Otte, July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 13. ​George Quester, Deterrence before Hiroshima (New York: Wiley, 1966), 17. 14. ​H. W. Koch, introduction to The Origins of the First World War: ­Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims, ed. H. W. Koch (London: Macmillan, 1972), 11. 15. ​The German two-­front-­war prob­lem is mentioned in almost all relevant accounts of the origins of World War I. The following is a se­lection of the most relevant works that discuss the role of this variable. Copeland, Origins of Major War, 34; Dennis E. Showalter, “Total War for ­Limited Objectives: An Interpretation of German ­Grand Strategy,” in ­Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul M. Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 109; Fischer,

184

NOTES TO PAGES 104–106

Germany’s Aims, 47; Geiss, “The Outbreak,” 80–82; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 205–210; Hermann Kantorowicz, The Spirit of British Policy and the Myth of the Encirclement of Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932); J. L. Brierly, Encirclement (London: Oxford University Press, 1939); John  A. White, Transition to Global Rivalry Alliance Diplomacy and the Qua­dru­ple Entente, 1895–1907 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 81–119; John C. G. Röhl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Laurence Lafore, The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I (Philadelphia: Critical Periods of History, 1965), 111–140; McMeekin, Rus­sian Origins, 13, 72; Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 209; Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (London: Penguin, 1998), 68; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 68. 16. ​Gerhard  P. Gross, The Myth and Real­ity of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 51. 17. ​Xu Qiyu, Fragile Rise: ­Grand Strategy, and the Fate of Imperial Germany, 1871–­1914 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017), 33–94. 18. ​Bismarck opposed the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, fearing that it would provoke f­ uture wars. Karl Marx even envisioned that this would create a two-­front-­war prob­lem for Germany: “If Alsace and Lorraine are taken, then France ­will l­ ater make war on Germany in conjunction with Rus­sia. It is unnecessary to go into the unholy consequences.” Karl Marx, The Po­liti­cal Writings (London: Verso, 2019), 862. However, Kaiser Wilhelm I and the chief of the German general staff, Moltke the Elder, pushed for acquiring t­ hese two provinces for their strategic value in a potential ­f uture war with France. C. C. Eckhardt, “The Alsace-­Lorraine Question,” Scientific Monthly 4, no. 5 (1918): 431–443; Richard Hartshorne, “The Franco-­German Boundary of 1871,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950): 209–250. 19. ​The Eastern Question was a po­liti­cal and military competition among Eu­ro­pean ­g reat powers regarding the ­f uture of the Ottoman Empire and the control of the Straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles. Alexander Lyon Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774–1923 (London: Routledge, 1996). The ­Great Game was a competition between Rus­sia and ­Great Britain for control of Central Asia during the nineteenth ­century. Peter Hopkirk, The ­Great Game: The Strug­gle for Empire in Central Asia (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994). 20. ​Confidential letter from Chancellor Bismarck to the British State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Clarendon, February 1870. Lord Newton, Lord Lyons: A Rec­ord of British Diplomacy, Vol. I (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 1913), 254. 21. ​Otto von Bismarck, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, Vol. 2 (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2007), 255. See T. S. Hamerow, ed., The Age of Bismarck: Documents and Interpretations (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). 22. ​E.T.S. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, 1871–­1914 Volume I: Bismarck’s Relations with E ­ ngland, 1871–­1890 (London: Methuen, 1928), 55. The War Scare of 1875 shows how Germany was concerned about a Franco-­Russian rapprochement, as the trip to Petrograd by the French ambassador to Berlin for a meeting with the Rus­sian chancellor Alexander Gorchakov pushed Germany to threaten an unprovoked attack on France and risked triggering a Eu­ro­pean conflagration. James Stone and Winfried Baumgart, The War Scare of 1875: Bismarck and Eu­rope in the Mid-1870s (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010); Joseph V. Fuller, “The War-­ Scare of 1875,” American Historical Review 24, no. 2 (1919): 196–226; Winifred Taffs, “The War Scare of 1875 (I),” Slavonic and East Eu­ro­pean Review 9, no. 26 (1930): 335–349. 23. ​James Stone, “Bismarck and the ­Great Game: Germany and Anglo-­Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1871–1890,” Central Eu­ro­pean History 48, no. 2 (2015): 151–175; Xu, Fragile Rise, 33–37. 24. ​As Rus­sian foreign minister Sazonov stated, “The state which possess the Straits ­will hold in its hands not only the key to the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea, but also that of penetration into Asia Minor and the sure means of hegemony in the Balkans.” McMeekin, Rus­sian Origins, 31. See also B. H. Sumner, Rus­sia and the Balkans, 1870–­1880 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937); Barbara Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the G ­ reat Powers and the Straits Question, 1870–­ 1887 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–­1974 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974); R. Boroff, Roads to Glory: Late Imperial Rus­sia and the Turkish Straits (London: Tauris, 2006).

185

NOTES TO PAGES 106–109

25. ​­After the Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878), which concluded the ­g reat eastern crisis, Bulgaria was assigned a smaller portion of territory than what it received from the Treaty of Santo Stefano (March 3, 1878) b ­ ecause of the creation of Romania, Serbia, and Macedonia. Bulgaria’s dissatisfaction, increased by the proposal of Rus­sian minister of defense Dimitrii Miliutin to create a confederation of Balkan states that included Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece (October 5, 1880), drew it closer to Austria-­Hungary and increased the motive for tensions between the dual monarchy and Rus­sia. Lora Gerd, Rus­sian Policy in the Orthodox East: The Patriarchate of Constantinople (1878–­1914) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 5. 26. ​Barbara Jelavich, “British Means of Offense against Rus­sia in the Nineteenth C ­ entury,” Rus­sian History 1, no. 2 (1974): 119–135; R. W. Seton-­Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question (London: Norton, 1972); W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Eu­rope (London: Athlone, 1956). 27. ​John R. Vincent, ed., The Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826–­1893) between 1878 and 1893: A Se­lection (Oxford: Leopard’s Head, 2003), 769. 28. ​Jelavich, “British Means,” 122. 29. ​Gábor Demter, Diplomatic Strug­gle for Supremacy over the Balkan Peninsula 1878–­1914, Collected Studies (Sofia: Publications of the Bulgarian-­Hungarian History Commission, 2017), 24. 30. ​Demter, Diplomatic Strug­gle, 13–38; F.  R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-­Hungary, Vol. 6 (London: Routledge, 1972), 60–153. 31. ​Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, 103. 32. ​The treaty consisted of mutual aid to a league member if attacked by a member and benign neutrality if one of the three states was involved in a conflict with a nonmember state. 33. ​The g ­ reat eastern crisis ended the League of the Three Emperors. Although the alliance was renewed in 1881 and lasted ­u ntil its expiration in 1887, Bismarck found it increasingly difficult to balance the interests of Rus­sia and Austria-­Hungary in the Balkans. J.  Y. Simpson, The Saburov Memoirs: Or Bismarck and Rus­sia: Being Fresh Light on the League of the Three Emperors, 1881 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929); W.  N. Medlicott, “Bismarck and the Three Emperors’ Alliance, 1881–87,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 27 (1945): 61–83. 34. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 54–55. 35. ​Kaiser Wilhelm I strongly opposed this use of coercive diplomacy and a bilateral alliance with Austria-­Hungary, fearing that this would facilitate a rapprochement between Rus­ sia and France. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 101–125; Hannah Pakula, An Uncommon ­Woman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 378–386; William L. Langer, Eu­ro­pean Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890 (New York: Knopf, 1931), 217–250. 36. ​Busch, of the German Foreign Office, to Prince Henry VII of Reuss, in Vienna, February 28, 1882. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 114–115. 37. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 324–361. 38. ​Radowitz, German Foreign Office, to Count Münster, in London, October 8, 1879. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 148. 39. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 370. 40. ​Sir Francis Bertie, secret memorandum in autumn of 1901. In Röhl, Wilhelm II, 57 (emphasis added). 41. ​The treaty was signed ­after the collapse of the League of the Three Emperors, which was caused by the exacerbated security competition between Austria-­Hungary and Rus­sia in the Balkans as result of the Bulgarian crisis. A.J.P. Taylor, The Strug­gle for Mastery in Eu­rope, 1848–­1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 316–319; George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck’s Eu­ro­pean Order: Franco-­Russian Relations, 1875–­1890 (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1979), 223–330; Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow, 201–212. 42. ​Stone, “Bismarck and the ­Great Game,” 152. 43. ​Rus­sia had received significant financial aid from Germany in its war against the Ottoman Empire (Russo-­Turkish War, 1876–1877), and by 1887, two-­thirds of Rus­sian foreign debt was owned by Germany. German refusal to finance Rus­sia ­because of the complications of their relations on the ­g reat eastern crisis was exploited by France, who tried to convince Rus­ sian rulers to establish a new financial connection with Paris. Charles P. Kindleberger, A Fi-

186

NOTES TO PAGES 109–111

nancial History of Western Eu­rope (London: Routledge, 1984), 226–227; Kennan, The Decline, 398–410; Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow, 212–221. 44. ​Memorandum by the chancellor, Count Caprivi, March 28, 1890: German rulers came to the “unan­i­mous conclusion . . . ​that the provisions of the [Reinsurance] Treaty, in spirit, if not in letter, could not well be harmonised with the ­Triple Alliance . . . ​or with the influence that Germany exercises upon ­England. Leakage of the Treaty . . . ​would endanger the ­Triple Alliance and tend to alienate E ­ ngland from us.” Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 2. 45. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 1–24; Xu, Fragile Rise, 97–100. 46. ​The treaty of the Franco-­Russian alliance was publicized in 1894. Jennifer Siegel, “The Rise of the Franco-­Russian Financial Alliance, 1894–1903,” in For Peace and Money: French and British Finance in the Ser­vice of Tsars and Commissars, ed. Jennifer Siegel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 12–49; Keiger, France, 11–13; Xu, Fragile Rise, 103–105; William L. Langer, The Franco-­Russian Alliance, 1890–­1894 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929). 47. ​William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–­1902 (New York: Knopf, 1960), 27 (emphases added). 48. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume III, 417. 49. ​Xu, Fragile Rise, 112–119. 50. ​Xu, Fragile Rise, 168; Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 142–143. 51. ​Röhl, Wilhelm II, 444. 52. ​It was announced in December 1897, but its origins trace back to the ratification of the Franco-­Russian alliance in 1894. Ferguson, Pity of War, 32–55; George W. Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900–1907 (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1963); Xu, Fragile Rise, 155–172. 53. ​Germany received worrying signs of a rapprochement between France, G ­ reat Britain, and even Rus­sia since 1902. Chancellor von Bülow stated that “we ­shall shortly have to reckon with a British-­French-­Russian understanding [which] is to initiate the new T ­ riple Entente.” Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume III, 171. See also J. D. Hargreaves, “The Origin of the Anglo-­French Military Conversations in 1905,” History 36, no. 128 (1954): 244–248; Keiger, France, 115–117; P.  J.  V. Rolo, Entente Cordiale: The Origins and Negotiation of the Anglo-­ French Agreements of 8 April 1904 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1969). 54. ​The consolidation of a network of alliances, which was confirmed by the British support of France in the first Moroccan crisis, confronted German officials with the unlikelihood of British neutrality in case of continental war. It is not by chance that the earliest draft of the Schlieffen plan was finalized and operationalized on December 31, 1905. However, the first memorandum of the plan harked back to April 1891, when German military officials received the first revelations of secret negotiations between France and Rus­sia to form a defensive alliance. Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958); Hans Ehlert et al., The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014); Robert T. Foley, “The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan,” War in History 10, no. 2 (2003): 222–232. On a critique of the importance of the Schlieffen plan, see Terence Zuber, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning, 1871–­1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 55. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume III, 285. 56. ​Xu, Fragile Rise, 182–189. 57. ​Xu, Fragile Rise, 175. 58. ​Röhl, Wilhelm II, 329–353. 59. ​Röhl, Wilhelm II, 263–293; David Walter, The Short Victorious War: The Russo-­Japanese Conflict, 1904–5 (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). 60. ​Roderick R. Mclean, “Dreams of a German Eu­rope: Wilhelm II and the Treaty of Björkö of 1905,” in The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in Imperial Germany, ed. Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 119–142; Röhl, Wilhelm II, 354–380; Sidney B. Fay, “The Kaiser’s Secret Negotiations with the Tsar, 1904–1905,” American Historical Review 24, no. 1 (1918): 48–72. 61. ​Röhl, Wilhelm II, 270 (emphasis added). 62. ​Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Pre­sent State of British Relations with France and Germany,” in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–­1914. Volume Three: The Testing of

187

NOTES TO PAGES 111–115

the Entente, 1904–­1906, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1928), 405. 63. ​Schmitt, ­Triple Alliance; George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Rus­sia, and the Coming of the First World War (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1984); Röhl, Wilhelm II, 437–463. 64. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume III, 417 (emphases added). 65. ​Speech in the Reichstag (November 4, 1906), in Immanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy 1871–­1914, Volume IX (London: Routledge, 1976), 121 (emphases added). 66. ​Henry A. Kissinger, “The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck,” Daedalus 97, no. 3 (1968): 920. 67. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume IV, 273. 68. ​Bosnia-­Herzegovina was occupied and administered by Austria-­Hungary since the Treaty of Berlin (1878). 69. ​In addition to Rus­sia’s response, the annexation of Bosnia-­Herzegovina alienated Italy and contributed to undermine the T ­ riple Alliance. Indeed, the Italian decision to go to war against the Ottoman Empire (Italo-­Turkish War, 1911–­1912) resulted from the Bosnian crisis. Xu, Fragile Rise, 262–270; Röhl, Wilhelm II, 696–728. 70. ​Xu, Fragile Rise, 269. 71. ​E. C. Elmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan War, 1912–1913 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938); Hewitson, Germany, 195–222; Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars, 1912– 1913: Prelude to the First World War (London: Routledge, 2000). 72. ​The league was formed by Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro. 73. ​R. J. Crampton, “The Balkans as a F ­ actor in German Foreign Policy, 1912–­1914,” Slavonic and East Eu­ro­pean Review 55, no. 3 (1977): 370–390; Röhl, Wilhelm II, 889–893. 74. ​Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Diplomatic and Military Documents (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2013), 79–81. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger was chief of the German general staff from 1906 to 1914. In the rest of this chapter, von Moltke ­will refer to the younger. 75. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume IV, 124. 76. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume IV, 120–122 (emphases added). 77. ​Rus­sia mobilized troops in Rus­sian Poland and Ukraine, targeting Galicia. The mobilization of t­ hese regions aimed to avoid German mobilization. Rus­sia mobilized its troops in response to the partial mobilization of Austria-­Hungary in Galicia. ­After World War I, the former Rus­sian foreign minister Sazonov even suggested that Rus­sian military preparations in late 1912 could not be considered “real mobilization.” Bruce W. Menning, “The Mobilization Crises of 1912 and 1914 in Rus­sian Perspective: Overlooked and Neglected Linkages,” in Bid for World Power? New Research on the Outbreak of the First World War, ed. Andreas Gestrich and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Michael T. Florinsky, “The Rus­sian Mobilization of 1914,” Po­liti­cal Science Quarterly 42, no.  2 (1927): 209–­210; Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 81–­83. 78. ​Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume IV, 122. 79. ​The conviction of the need to intervene in support of Austria-­Hungary in case of a Rus­ sian attack had been a constant theme in German foreign policy since Bismarck. As he clearly stated in January 1880, “We hope and desire to remain at peace with Rus­sia; but if Rus­sia makes this impossible by attacking us or Austria, t­ here w ­ ill follow a strug­gle, accompanied by very serious consequences, with Rus­sia alone or e­ lse with Rus­sia in alliance with France and Italy, and with no promise of any prizes worth consideration, even if we are victorious.” Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume I, 106. 80. ​Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg in a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee (November 28, 1912). In Röhl, “Goodbye to All That (Again)?” 164. 81. ​Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 83. 82. ​Claparède’s report of a conversation with Kaiser Wilhelm II (December 10, 1912). Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 88 (emphasis added). 83. ​Lichnowsky’s account of a conversation with Sir Edward Grey (December 4, 1912). In Keith M. Wilson, “The British Démarche of 3 and 4 December 1912: H. A. Gwynne’s Note on

188

NOTES TO PAGES 115–117

Britain, Rus­sia and the First Balkan War,” Slavonic and Eastern Eu­ro­pean Review 62, no.  4 (1984): 555 (emphasis added).   84. ​David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Eu­rope, 1904–1914 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 231–­328.   85. ​David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Eu­rope and the Making of the First World War (Prince­ ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1997), 191–­192.   86. ​W hen German general Liman von Sanders was sent on a mission to reor­ga­n ize the Ottoman army (August 1913), Rus­sian rulers considered the Ottoman Empire to be a de facto German protectorate.   87. ​David M. Keithly, “Did Rus­sia Also Have War Aims in 1914?” East Eu­ro­pean Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1987): 137–­145.   88. ​McMeekin, Rus­sian Origins, 22; I.  V. Bestuzhev, “Rus­sian Foreign Policy February–­ June 1914,” Journal of Con­temporary History 1, no. 3 (1966): 93–­112; McMeekin, Rus­sian Origins, 6–­40.   89. ​Galicia was a northern region of the Austro-­Hungarian Empire, which was adjacent to Rus­sia’s southern border.   90. ​Extending control over Austro-­Hungarian Galicia would have increased Rus­sia’s ability to protect the weak Polish flank against a German attack. Paléologue to Doumergue, May 3, 1914, in QO Russie Politique Etrangère, vol. 46. McMeekin, Rus­sian Origins, 22.   91. ​Alan Mitchell, The ­Great Train Race: Railways and the Franco-­German Rivalry, 1815–1914 (Oxford: Berghahn, 2000); D. N. Collins, “The Franco-­Russian Alliance and Rus­sian Railways, 1891–1914,” Historical Journal 16, no. 4 (1973): 777–­788; David A. Rich, The Tsar’s Col­o­nels: Professionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in Late Imperial Rus­sia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 78–­103; David Stevenson, “War by Timetable? The Railway Race before 1914,” Past & Pre­sent 162 (1999): 163–­194; J. N. Westwood, A History of Rus­sian Railways (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964), 74–­76.   92. ​France estimated that Rus­sia would require three years to recover from the Russo-­ Japanese War. ­After visiting the Rus­sian front, French general Louis-­Etienne Moulin was puzzled by the inefficiency of the Rus­sian army and skeptical that Rus­sia could return a credible threat to Germany in the short term: “Anything we at home or the Germans would do in one year takes two years in Rus­sia.” Sidney  B. Fay, Documents diplomatiques français (1871– 1914). 2e série (1901–1911), tome VIII (Paris: Alfred Costes/L’Eu­rope nouvelle, 1935), 235.   93. ​Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming War, 151–­159; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation u ­ nder the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 194.   94. ​Ministère des affaires étrangères. Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914, Documents diplomatiques français, 1871–1914. Série 3 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1929–­1959), 81–­82.   95. ​Gerd Krumeich, Armaments and Politics in France on the Eve of the First World War: The Introduction of Three-­Year Conscription, 1913–1914 (Oxford: Berg, 1984); Mark Hewitson, “Images of the E ­ nemy: German Depictions of the French Military, 1890–1914,” War in History 11, no. 1 (2004): 4–­33.   96. ​Patrick J. McDonald, The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 187.   97. ​Conventional wisdom wrongly refers to six weeks as the time for Rus­sian mobilization against Germany; this was based on Schlieffen’s calculations in 1905. The Rus­sian general staff estimated that Rus­sian armies ­were lagging thirteen days ­behind Germany in April 1914. According to the German general staff, in 1914, Rus­sian officials could deploy numerous army corps along the German western border. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger to Theobald von Bethmann-­ Hollweg, July 11, 1914, in Stevenson, “War by Timetable?” 186. Indeed, Rus­sian armies launched a rapid attack on the eastern border of Germany on August 14. Bruce W. Menning, Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Rus­sian Army, 1861–1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 252.   98. ​Jarausch, “Illusion of ­Limited War,” 57 (emphasis added).   99. ​The crisis started with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (June 28, 1914) and ended with Germany’s declaration of war on Rus­sia (August 1, 1914). 100. ​This meeting was not the precursor of a premeditated strategy of preventive war. The council was rather inconclusive, and no plan was orchestrated. The only official who was

189

NOTES TO PAGE 118

inclined to the preventive war logic was General von Moltke. This rhe­toric had already been used since the stipulation of the Anglo-­Russian entente in August 1907. For instance, informed over reports of the creation of a military alliance between G ­ reat Britain and Rus­sia, German ambassador Friedrich von Pourtalès declared to the Rus­sian foreign minister that “such an alliance would mean the closing of the ring which would make Germany’s position in Eu­rope intolerable. At the very first sign that such an alliance was impending . . . ​Germany would press for an aggressive policy to break up the ring if pos­si­ble, before it was completed.” Pourtalès’s to Bülow, December 11, 1908, Große Politik, 26/1, no. 9152. In Röhl, Wilhelm II, 710. 101. ​Volker Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1973). 102. ​Even General von Moltke, the most belligerent among military and civil officials, hoped to keep the conflict localized between Serbia and Austria-­Hungary and to avoid a continental war: “Austria must beat the Serbs and then make peace quickly.” Berghahn, Germany, 190. 103. ​The aim of the German attitude b ­ ehind the July crisis was recognized by its adversaries. For instance, France was convinced that the “German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, b ­ ecause e­ very interference of another Power would, owing to the natu­ral play of alliances, be followed by incalculable consequences.” French Yellow Book no. 28. M. Bienvenu-­ Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 24, 1914. In Edmund von Mach, Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the Eu­ro­pean War (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 80. 104. ​Report of meeting between Kaiser Wilhelm, Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg, Secretary of State Gottlieb von Jagow, and Minister of War Erich von Falkenhayn, July 5, 1914. In Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic 194–195. Secretary of State Jagow, who is often considered an advocate for preventive war, reiterated the intention and belief that the conflict could remain localized: “The Russians—­although friends of Serbia—­will not join in” (July 5); “I do not desire a preventive war, but if we are called upon to fight, we must not funk it” (July 5); “In all circumstances, we want the conflict to be localized” (July 7). In Kautsky, Outbreak of the World War, 131–132; Röhl, Wilhelm II, 1025–­1026; Jarausch, “Illusion of L ­ imited War,” 61. 105. ​The realization that the win­dow of opportunity to localize the Austro-­Serbian conflict was closing accelerated the plan to pre­sent the ­Triple Entente with a fait accompli, but it did not lead to an incentive to escalate the crisis into a continental war. “­Here e­ very delay in the beginning of the military operations is seen as signifying danger that other powers might interfere. We are urgently advised to proceed without delay and to place the world before a fait accompli.” Tele­g ram 285, Confidential, Berlin, July 25, 1914. In Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 351. 106. ​Tele­gram 146, Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg to Kaiser Wilhelm II, July 26, 2014. In International Co­ali­t ion, Documents of the American Association for International Conciliation, 1920 (London: Forgotten Books, 2017), 230 (emphases added). 107. ​Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg, July 12, 1914. In Jarausch, “Illusion of L ­ imited War,” 59. 108. ​Matscheko memorandum to Kaiser Wilhelm II, July 5, 1914. Mombauer, Origins: Dipomatic, 188. 109. ​Kaiser Wilhelm II, July 5, 1914. Jarausch, “Illusion of L ­ imited War,” 55. 110. ​Germany considered Rus­sia to unlikely intervene in a Serbian-­Austrian conflict ­because Rus­sia backed down in the First Balkan War and it was weakened by the Second Balkan War. Moreover, Germany considered France and ­Great Britain to be unwilling to risk a major war over the Balkans. The logic b ­ ehind the German strategy was clearly explained by Foreign Minister Jagow to the German ambassador to ­Great Britain (July 18, 1914): “The maintenance of Austria, and, in fact, of the most power­f ul Austria pos­si­ble, is a necessity for us both for internal and external reasons. . . . ​The more determined Austria shows herself, the more energetically we support her, the more quiet Rus­sia w ­ ill remain. . . . ​Some blustering at Petersburg w ­ ill not be wanting, no doubt, but Rus­sia is not r­ eally prepared now. Neither France nor ­England w ­ ill want a war now.” Karl Kautsky et  al., Outbreak of the World War: German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), 131–­132. Germany tried to break Rus­sia’s influence in the Balkans by creating a counterbalancing co­ali­tion (Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria) that would isolate Serbia. Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg, July 15, 1914. In Jarausch, “Illusion of L ­ imited War,” 62.

190

NOTES TO PAGES 119–120

111. ​R. J. Crampton, The Hollow Detente: Anglo-­German Relations in the Balkans, 1911–1914 (London: George Prior, 1977); Sean  M. Lynn-­ Jones, “Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-­ German Relations, 1911–­1914,” International Security 11, no. 2 (1986): 121–­150. 112. ​Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg identified cracks in the British participation of the ­Triple Entente since the First Balkan War. In December 1912, he was convinced that “the British attitude [in the Balkan crisis] is only one of several symptoms which suggest that the Entente has passed its climax and that we may look forward to a re-­orientation of British policy.” In Immanuel Geiss, July  1914, the Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents (New York: Scribner’s, 1967), 44. 113. ​Lieven, ­Towards the Flame, 215. 114. ​Turner, Origins, 58–­59. 115. ​Rus­sia intervened on the side of Serbia, but the deep-­rooted c­ auses of conflict with Germany and Austria-­Hungary revolved around the question of the straits. Partial mobilization, which had already been used as a diplomatic mea­sure during the First Balkan War (November 21, 1912), entailed the preparation of armed forces on the southern border, targeting Austria-­ Hungary in Galicia. This tactic aimed to prevent German mobilization by attempting “to complete concentration without beginning hostilities, in order not to deprive the ­enemy irrevocably of the hope that war can still be avoided. Our mea­sures for this must be masked by clever diplomatic negotiations, in order to ally the apprehension of the other side.” General Sukhomlinov, November 1912. In Alfred von Wegerer, “The Rus­sian Mobilization of 1914,” Po­ liti­cal Science Quarterly 43, no. 2 (1928): 227 116. ​Draft report of the Rus­sian Foreign Minister Sazonov to Nicholas II, July 25, 1914. In Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 343. 117. ​Jack S. Levy et al., “Correspondence: Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis,” International Security 16, no. 1 (1991): 189–­203; Marc Trachtenberg, “The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914,” International Security 15, no. 3 (1990–­1991): 130–­137; McMeekin, Rus­sian Origins, 41–­75. 118. ​Notably, the chancellor undermined the kaiser’s effort to mediate a resolution to the Austro-­Serbian conflict with the help of ­Great Britain. The “Halt in Belgrade” plan entailed that Austria-­Hungary would have s­ topped its advance in the Serbian capital and participated in a conference with Serbia and the other Eu­ro­pean g ­ reat powers. The kaiser aimed to guarantee a diplomatic victory like in the Balkan crises in order to reduce Serbian aspirations and potentially split the T ­ riple Entente. Albertini, Origins, 431–­4 45. Tele­g ram from Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg to Ambassador Tschirschky in Vienna, July 30, 1914. In Trachtenberg, “Meaning of Mobilization,” 134. 119. ​According to McMeekin, general mobilization was already planned in a meeting of July 28, shortly ­after the order of partial mobilization. The decision was driven by the conviction that in case of war, both British and French support was assured. McMeekin, Rus­sian Origins, 73. 120. ​M. F. Schilling, ed., How the War Began in 1914: Being the Diary of the Rus­sian Foreign Office from the 3rd to the 20th (Old Style) of July, 2014. 2 vols. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1925), 571–­572. 121. ​The full logic of escalation b ­ ecause of general mobilization is as follows: “The Rus­sian general mobilization was the decisive calamity. This is true even given the excuse that it was merely forestalling German action of the same kind. It is not certain that the Rus­sian partial mobilization was in fact inducing a German ­counter move despite Moltke’s tele­grams to Conrad. . . . ​ ­There was no question in 1914 but that general mobilization by a ­great power must be followed by hostilities. The position was too competitive for the professionals to entertain the politicians’ pretence that the Rus­sian army could stay inactive on a war footing in­def­initely. The German government’s immediate declaration of a state of war emergency (Kriegsgefahrzustand) on 31 July, followed by their ultimatum demanding the cessation of Rus­sian military preparations, constituted only technically the initiative in aggression.” John M. K. Vyvyan, “The Approach of the War of 1914,” in The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume XII: The Shifting Balance of World Forces, 1898–1945, ed. C. L. Mowat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 165. 122. ​Riezler diary, July 23. In Jarausch, “Illusion of L ­ imited War,” 63. 123. ​German intelligence redacted twenty-­eight separate reports between July  26 and July 30, sixteen of which related to secret military preparations on the Rus­sian frontier with

191

NOTES TO PAGES 120–122

Germany. T ­ hese mea­sures had already alarmed German officials, as the urgency of the following tele­g ram from Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg to the imperial ambassador in London shows (July 26): “According to news received h ­ ere, Rus­sia is about to summon several bodies of reservists also against us. If this news proves correct; we ­shall be forced to countermea­ sures very much against our own wishes. Our desire to localise the conflict and to preserve the peace of Eu­rope remains unchanged.” In Mach, Official Diplomatic Documents, 191. See also McMeekin, Rus­sian Origins, 66–­69. 124. ​Germany’s concern about the increase in Franco-­Russian invasion ability was recognized by French military officials (July 19): “It is not unreasonable to suppose that Berlin is alarmed at the Franco-­Russian alliance’s apparent display of practical efficiency. With danger appearing to increase in such a short time, Kaiser Wilhelm may consider it necessary to act first.” In Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 290. 125. ​Based on Hoth’s recollections, upon receiving news of Rus­sian general mobilization, General von Moltke “turned t­ oward the win­dow, took a deep breath, and said: ‘It c­ an’t be helped then; w ­ e’ll have to mobilize too.’ ” In Ulrich Trumpener, “War Premeditated? German Intelligence Operations in July 1914,” Central Eu­ro­pean History 9, no. 1 (1976): 82. 126. ​Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 447 (emphasis added). 127. ​Tele­g ram 189, German ambassador in St. Petersburg Pourtalès to Foreign Secretary Jagow, July 30, 1914. Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 455–­456: “Now that Rus­sia had de­cided to take the fateful step of mobilization . . . ​the automatic effect that the mobilization h­ ere would have to have on us in consequence of the German-­Austrian alliance.” Germany’s willingness to avoid a continental war remained strong u ­ ntil the last hours. When Germany received the erroneous August  1 tele­g ram suggesting that Britain would not intervene if Germany spared France, it caused “­g reat, but delighted astonishment” in German circles. The kaiser even instructed Moltke to turn the entire army to the east, abandoning the Schlieffen plan: “Of course we must go along with this and therefore stop the deployment in the West for the time being.” Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 513. 128. ​Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 457 (emphases added). 129. ​Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gang and Passed Bucks,” 150–­156; John  A. Vasquez, Contagion and War: Lessons from the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, eds., Decisions for War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For a critical view, see Dominic Tierney, “Does Chain-­ Ganging Cause the Outbreak of War?” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): 285–­304. 130. ​Prince Lichnowsky, in London, to the German Foreign Office, November 21, 1912. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume IV, 145. 131. ​Based on the definition in chapter 1, Austria-­Hungary could not be considered a ­g reat power. Indeed, it was incapable of opposing Rus­sia without German support. Nevertheless, I analyze Austria-­Hungary’s decision to intervene since it was tied with the German failed ­gamble to localize the conflict in the Balkans. 132. ​The arrow between Germany and Rus­sia symbolizes Germany’s declaration of war on Rus­sia, which officially initiated the major war on August 1, 1914. The line that connects two dif­fer­ent squares symbolizes the rivalry. The lines above squares symbolize the alliance among g ­ reat powers. 133. ​Unfortunately, we do not possess documents about the French visit to Saint Petersburg (July 20–­23). Nonetheless, the increase in military preparations and the order of partial mobilization in the days that followed the visit would prob­ably not have occurred if President Poincaré had not guaranteed French support over the Balkan crisis. The implications of the French blank check w ­ ere also recognized by the British government, which recognized that if Rus­sia “feels secure of the support of France, she ­will face all the risks of war.” British Blue Book no.  17, July  25, 1914. In Mach, Official Diplomatic Documents, 196. See also Marc Trachtenberg, “French Foreign Policy in the July Crisis, 1914: A Review Article,” H-­Diplo/ISSF 3 (December 1, 2010); Troy R. E. Paddock, Contesting the Origins of the First World War: An Historiographical Argument (London: Routledge, 2019). 134. ​J.F.V. Keiger, Raymond Poincaré (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 191.

192

NOTES TO PAGES 122–126

135. ​Prominent French general de Castelnau, July 30. In Trachtenberg, “French Foreign Policy,” 8. For the argument that France considered the July crisis a favorable moment for the final reckoning with Germany, see Clark, Sleepwalkers, 482; Jack Snyder, “Better Now than ­Later: The Paradox of 1914 as Every­one’s Favored Year for War,” International Security 39, no. 1 (2014): 71–­94; Jack S. Levy and Jack Snyder, “Correspondence: Every­one’s Favored Year for War—or Not?” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 208–­217. 136. ​Keiger, Poincaré, 186. 137. ​Before Germany embarked on building a fleet that could challenge the Royal Navy, the main rivals ­were France and Rus­sia due to the conflict of interest in the colonies (in Africa in the case of France, in Central Asia and on the Eastern Question in the case of Rus­sia). 138. ​Francis Harry Hinsley, British Foreign Policy ­under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 56. 139. ​The ambiguity over Britain’s commitment to Rus­sia in case of a war that would not involve France was shared by prominent German officials. Prince Lichnowsky, in London, to Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg, December 9, 1912: “I may say that we ­shall not be attacked ­u ntil a­ fter we have marched into France and won the first victorious ­battle. But a declaration of war on France or by France on us would of itself be followed by mobilization of the British fleet, whereas war with Rus­sia alone, if such ­were conceivable, would not necessarily be followed at once by British naval intervention.” Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume IV, 126. See Wilson, “The British Démarche,” 552–­559. 140. ​Gustav Schmidt, “Contradictory Postures and Conflicting Objectives: The July Crisis,” in Escape into War? The Foreign Policy of Imperial Germany, ed. Gregor Schollgen (New York: St. Martin’s, 1990), 139. 141. ​Prince Lichnowsky, in London, to Chancellor Bethmann-­Hollweg, December 3, 1912. Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 84. 142. ​Günter Bischof et al., 1914: Austria-­Hungary, the Origins, and the First Year of World War I (New Orleans, LA: University of New Orleans Press, 2014); Samuel R. Williamson, Austria-­ Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991). 143. ​McMeekin, Rus­sian Origins, 22, 150. 144. ​Schroeder, “World War I as Galloping Gertie,” 101–­127. It is impor­tant to underline that this would not constitute encirclement based on my definition ­because Austria-­Hungary could no longer be considered a ­g reat power a­ fter its defeat in the Austro-­Prussian War (1866). 145. ​Berthold Molden’s memorandum, July 6. Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 198. 146. ​Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 219. 147. ​I ­will articulate the differences among dif­fer­ent authors in the rest of the section. The argument that Eu­ro­pean ­great powers competed against one another by maximizing their relative power is based on Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. Other prominent scholars who analyzed this case study, such as Copeland, focus on the dynamics of war initiation rather than on the logic b ­ ehind the security competition that characterized the Eu­ro­pean system. Furthermore, authors who embrace this explanation disagree on the timing of war initiation. For instance, Copeland argues that Germany launched a preventive war when it was a declining hegemon, whereas Mearsheimer claims that Germany was a potential hegemon in its ascendancy. 148. ​Mearsheimer acknowledges that offensive realism cannot predict the timing of the outbreak of World War I: “The emergence of Germany as a potential hegemon in the early 1990s made it likely that t­ here would be a war involving all Eu­ro­pean ­g reat powers. But the theory cannot explain why war occurred in 1914 rather than in 1912 or 1916.” Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 335. 149. ​Erich Brandenburg, From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870–1914 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1927), 20–52; Xu, Fragile Rise, 33–­66, 95–­126; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Domestic F ­ actors in German Foreign Policy before 1914,” Central Eu­ro­pean History 6, no. 1 (1973): 3–­43. 150. ​“My map of Africa lies in Eu­rope. H ­ ere lies Rus­sia and h ­ ere lies France, and we are in the ­m iddle. That is my map of Africa.” Xu, Fragile Rise, 76. Baron von Rotenhan, in Berlin, to Baron von Heyking, July 9, 1914. In Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 303.

193

NOTES TO PAGES 126–130

151. ​Upon hearing of British fears that the German High Sea Fleet was constructed for expansion and for the defeat of the Royal Navy, Kaiser Wilhelm abruptly reacted, “We s­ hall never be so stupid. It would be Hara-­k iri!” Count von Metternich, in London, to the chancellor, Prince von Bülow, July 10, 1908. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume III, 282. 152. ​Memorandum to German Foreign Office, November 27, 1886. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume II, 263 (emphases added). 153. ​German conviction that it was not militarily prepared for a conflict with France and ­Great Britain undermines Mearsheimer’s claim that Germany was a potential hegemon since 1903. 154. ​Röhl, Wilhelm II, 327. 155. ​Scholars disagree on the mechanism that led to Germany’s decision to launch a preventive war. In the rest of the analy­sis, I w ­ ill show how Copeland’s dynamic differential theory and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism are incorrect. In addition, proving that Germany did not orchestrate a plan for a continental war undermines all ­those authors who emphasize the importance of domestic politics for the outbreak of hostilities. 156. ​Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 188. 157. ​Postponement of the war was necessary to complete the enlargement of the Kiel Canal, scheduled for the summer of 1914. 158. ​For a detailed analy­sis of the fallacies of the Fischer thesis, see Marc Trachtenberg, “New Light on 1914?” H-­Diplo/ISSF 16 (September 5, 2017). 159. ​In his account of the meeting, Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller remarked that “the result amounted to almost 0.” Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 86. 160. ​General von Moltke complained about the lack of funding in 1913. Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 150–­156; Nial Ferguson, “Germany and the Origins of the First World War,” Historical Journal 35, no. 3 (1992): 742–­752; Stig Förster, “Dreams and Nightmares: German Military Leadership and the Images of ­Future Warfare, 1871–­1914,” in Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914, ed. Manfred F. Boemeke et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 368–­373; Trumpener, “War Premeditated?” 83–­85. Only when war became imminent did Germany ask Austria-­Hungary to concentrate its forces against Rus­ sia instead of attacking Serbia; but its ally refused. This lack of coordination is even more remarkable if compared with the thorough military connection between Rus­sia and France since the First Balkan War. Norman Stone, “Moltke and Conrad: Relations between the Austro-­ Hungarian and German General Staffs, 1909–1914,” Historical Journal 9, no. 2 (1966): 201–­228. 161. ​The document, which was drafted on September 9, outlined Germany’s war aims. 162. ​Wayne C. Thompson, “The September Program: Reflections on the Evidence,” Central Eu­ro­pean History 11, no. 4 (1978): 348–­354. 163. ​On the Treaty of Brest-­Litovsk, see Borislav Chernev, Twilight of Empire: The Brest-­ Litovsk Conference and the Remaking of East-­Central Eu­rope, 1917–1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017); John W. Wheeler-­Bennett, “From Brest-­Litovsk to Brest-­Litovsk,” Foreign Affairs 18, no. 2 (January 1940): 196–­210; Judah L. Magnes, Rus­sia and Germany at Brest-­Litovsk: A Documentary History of the Peace Negotiations (New York: Rand School of Social Science, 1919). Rus­sia lost several provinces at the border with Germany and Austria-­Hungary: Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, Finland, and part of Belarus. 164. ​Chancellor, Bethmann-­Hollweg, to the emperor, December 18, 1912. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume IV, 262. 165. ​Trachtenberg, “Meaning of Mobilization,” 134–­137. 166. ​Von Mach, Official Diplomatic Documents, 542–­543. 167. ​Keir A. Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security 32, no. 2 (2007): 167–­183; Snyder, Ideology, 107–­156. 168. ​Förster, “Dreams and Nightmares,” 363–­364. 169. ​Förster, “Dreams and Nightmares,” 364–­365 (emphasis added). 170. ​Kenneth Macksey, Why the Germans Lose at War: The Myth of German Military Superiority (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), 39–­47. 171. ​Keiger, France, 79; William C. Wohlforth, “The Perception of Power: Rus­sia in the Pre1914 Balance,” World Politics 39, no. 3 (1987): 360–­363.

194

NOTES TO PAGES 130–132

172. ​Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 138–­139 (emphases added). 173. ​Ritter, Sword and the Scepter, 246. 174. ​Röhl, Wilhelm II, 710. Count von Pourtalès, in Saint Petersburg, to the chancellor, Bethmann-­Hollweg, June 16, 1910. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume III, 393. 175. ​Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 142. 176. ​Trachtenberg, “French Foreign Policy,” 9. The military already advocated for war during the First Balkan War, fearing that France would not receive Rus­sian support in a war between Germany and France, but the French government refused to escalate the crisis (February 24, 1913): “Soldiers are of the opinion that it would be far better for France if a conflict ­were not too long postponed. Their reasons are that if it would come now it would be in consequence of the Balkan difficulties, and therefore they would be able to secure the ­wholehearted support of Rus­sia. . . . ​They impressed upon Wilson that Rus­sia was now exceedingly strong. . . . ​Rus­sia was now well able to look ­after herself and might be inclined to take a line of her own.” Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 97. 177. ​McMeekin, Rus­sian Origins, 32. 178. ​Kieger, France, 125–­128. 179. ​Albertini, Origins, 479–­483 180. ​In a conversation with General von Moltke, the kaiser laid out an ultimatum to France to stop intervention over Austria-­Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-­Herzegovina that clearly outlined the dynamics of crisis escalation in the Balkans (February 24, 1909). “In view of the serious situation, we must immediately get in touch with Paris and demand that France joins with us in putting pressure on Rus­sia to force her to adopt a clear position about Serbia (joining in pressure on Belgrade). It must be made clear to France that in the event of Rus­sia’s intervening against Austria, the casus foederis arises for us immediately, i.e., mobilisation. France must be forced to make a binding and clear declaration that it w ­ ill in this case not go to war with us at all. Not at the start of the war, nor l­ ater. A declaration of neutrality is not sufficient. If France refuses to make this declaration, that is to be taken by us as a casus belli, and the Reichstag and the world informed, that France, despite our invitation to tread together with us the only pos­si­ble path to maintain the peace of Eu­rope, has refused and has therefore willed the war. This clarification, in this form, is necessary so that we can start our mobilisation in the first instance against France and finish her off. In no case can the army get into the position where one half is engaged against Rus­sia and the other half standing guard against an unreliable France. We must throw every­thing against the West or every­thing against the East. In the former case, if France refuses to declare that she w ­ ill in no event intervene in a Russo-­ Austro-­German war. In the latter case if France declares that she w ­ ill join us in pressing Rus­ sia to keep the peace, and should Rus­sia refuse to back down, w ­ ill refrain from attacking us if we support Austria against Rus­sia.” Röhl, Wilhelm II, 720. 181. ​Trachtenberg, “Meaning of Mobilization,” 129–­143. 182. ​He had long been an advocate of preventive attack in ­every crisis since 1905. For instance, his suggestion to initiate war during the first Balkan crisis was not supported by German civilians and by most of the military. As General Falkenhayn remarked in January 1913, “Moltke is on his own.” Mombauer, Origins: Diplomatic, 94. In order to hasten German mobilization, Moltke had to secretly communicate with the chancellor and green-­l ight Austria-­ Hungary to mobilize against Rus­sia. 183. ​Albertini, Origins, 172–­176. “As I stood ­there the Kaiser, without asking me, turned to the aide-­de-­camp on duty and commanded him to telegraph immediate instructions to the 16th Division at Trier not to march into Luxembourg. I thought my heart would break. . . . ​I was snubbed with the remark that I should use other railroads instead. The order must stand. Therewith I was dismissed. It is impossible to describe the state of mind in which I returned home. I was absolutely broken and shed tears of despair.” 184. ​Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and The Conduct of Foreign Relations (Whitefish, MT: Literary Licensing, 2011), 398. 185. ​Albertini, Origins, 107. 186. ​Albertini, Origins, 428. 187. ​Vasquez, “The First World War,” 13.

195

NOTES TO PAGES 133–137

188. ​In the previous two de­cades, both Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm had tried to foster a rapprochement with G ­ reat Britain, if not to bring it within the T ­ riple Alliance. 189. ​Count von Metternich, in London, to the chancellor, Prince von Bülow, July 10, 1908. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents Volume III, 281. 190. ​A lliance with Japan (January 1902), entente cordiale with France (April 1904), and Anglo-­Russian convention (August 1907).

5. The Origins of Modern Major Wars   1. ​A. Lossky, “France in the System of Eu­rope in the Seventeenth ­Century,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 1 (1974): 35.   2. ​Darryl Dee, Expansion and Crisis in Louis XIV’s France: Franche-­Comté and Absolute Monarchy, 1674–1715 (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2009), 1–14; François Bluche, Louis XIV (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).   3. ​John Langdon-­Davies, Carlos: The King Who Would Not Die (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963), 50–57.   4. ​Lossky, “France in the System of Eu­rope,” 32–­48; Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the ­Great Powers: 1648–1815 (London: Longman, 1983).   5. ​The infanta Maria Theresa, ­daughter of Philip IV, married Louis XIV but also waived her rights to the throne as part of the Treaty of Pyrenees. However, the French king claimed his right to the throne ­because Maria Theresa’s renunciation was tied to the payment of a dowry that was never paid.   6. ​Jeremy Black, “Louis XIV’s Foreign Policy Reassessed,” Seventeenth- ­Century French Studies 10, no. 1 (1988): 199–212; John A. Lynn, The War of Louis XIV 1667–­1714 (London: Routledge, 1999).   7. ​France and the Dutch Republic forged a defensive alliance in 1662 by which Louis XIV promised support to the Dutch in case of an En­glish attack. However, France had tried to avoid the escalation of the Anglo-­Dutch maritime rivalry ­because it diverted its resources from the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. Gijs Rommelse, The Second Anglo-­Dutch War (1665– 1667): Raison D’état, Mercantilism and Maritime Strife (Hilversum: Verloren, 2006), 15–­35.   8. ​­England, Sweden, and the Dutch Republic formed the ­Triple Alliance in January 1668, a defensive alliance that also included the external support of Spain and of the Austrian emperor.   9. ​Lynn, War of Louis XIV, 32; Rommelse, Second Anglo-­Dutch War, 28. 10. ​Paul Sonnino, “Louis XIV and the Dutch War,” in Louis XIV and Eu­rope, ed. Ragnhild M. Hatton (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), 156. 11. ​France would obtain the Spanish Netherlands, Franche-­Comté, Navarre, Naples, Sicily, and the Philippines (article 3). Sonnino, “Louis XIV and the Dutch War,” 144. 12. ​The ­Triple Alliance was a marriage of con­ve­n ience among countries that ­were still rivals and had been at war multiple times. Louis XIV exploited their differences to divide them. In par­tic­u­lar, the Swedish commitment to the alliance was tied to subsidies that Spain refused to provide a­ fter the end of the War of Devolution. The cooperation between France and Sweden was solidified by an open alliance ­after the beginning of hostilities between France and the Dutch Republic (Treaty of Stockholm, April 1672). 13. ​R. Hutton, “The Making of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668–­1670,” Historic Journal 29, no. 2 (1986): 297–­318. 14. ​The distribution of power was multipolar with seven g ­ reat powers that had similar military capabilities: France, Spain, Austria, E ­ ngland, Sweden, the Dutch Republic, and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire did not become directly involved in the war b ­ ecause it was fighting against Poland, which was supported by the Austrian emperor (Polish-­Ottoman War, 1672–­1676). 15. ​The arrow between France and the Dutch Republic symbolizes the initiation of the Franco-­Dutch War. The line that connects two dif­fer­ent squares symbolizes the rivalry. The lines above squares symbolize the alliance among ­g reat powers.

196

NOTES TO PAGES 138–141

16. ​France had to return multiple towns of the Spanish Netherlands that w ­ ere controlled at the beginning of the military campaign. However, Louis XIV obtained Franche-­Comté from Spain. 17. ​Lynn, War of Louis XIV, 37. 18. ​Louis XIV sent secret emissaries to the Ottomans to encourage their advances in Eu­rope. 19. ​McKay and Scott, Rise of the ­Great Powers, 41. 20. ​The agreement that ended the War of the Reunions. 21. ​J. Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1991), 15; Geoffrey Symcox, “Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years War,” in Louis XIV and Eu­rope, ed. Ragnhild Hatton (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 179–­212; George N. Clark, “From the Nine Years War to the War of the Spanish Succession,” in The New Cambridge Modern History, ed. J. Bromley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 381–­409; Wouter Troost, “Leopold I, Louis XIV, William III and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession,” History 103, no. 357 (2018): 545–­570. 22. ​­After the Glorious Revolution (1688), William III of Orange, the ruler of the Dutch Republic, received the crown of E ­ ngland. 23. ​The only exception was the Ottoman Empire, which continued its fight against its immediate rival (Austria) ­u ntil its complete defeat and relegation from great-­power status (1699). 24. ​Henry Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain 1700–15 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969); James Falkner, The War of the Spanish Succession 1701–1714 (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2015); John  B. Hattendorf, “Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition: British ­Grand Strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–­1713,” in ­Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. P. Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 185–­214; M. A. Thomson, “Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 4 (1954): 111–134. 25. ​Gremonville to Louis XIV, June 4, 1665, in J. Bérenger, “An Attempted Rapprochement between France and the Emperor: The Secret Treaty for the Partition of the Spanish Succession of 19 January 1668,” in Louis XIV and Eu­rope, ed. R. M. Hatton (London: Macmillan, 1976), 136. 26. ​­England supported the French claim in the Treaty of Dover of 1670 and the Austrian claim in the treaty that led to the formation of the League of Augsburg in 1686. 27. ​Hatton, “Louis XIV and His Fellow Monarchs,” 178 (emphasis added). 28. ​The French succession to the Spanish throne made Spain an ally of France. However, Spain was divided between ­those who supported the French claim and ­those who wanted the Austrian emperor to inherit the throne. The Ottoman Empire was no longer a ­great power. Sweden was at war with Rus­sia with the support of ­England (­Great Northern War, 1700–­1721). Although not directly at war against France, it should be considered on the side of the G ­ rand Alliance. 29. ​Spain controlled the Duchy of Milan and the Duchy of Mantua. 30. ​Andrew Lossky, Louis XIV and the French Monarchy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 278. 31. ​Prus­sia was divided into Brandenburg and eastern Prus­sia, an enclave within the Polish-­ Lithuanian Commonwealth. Moreover, Prus­sia had few duchies in the eastern side of the Holy Roman Empire, along the Rhine (the Duchy of Cleves and the County of Mark). H. M. Scott, “Prus­sia’s Emergence as a Eu­ro­pean ­Great Power, 1740–­1763,” in The Rise of Prus­sia, 1700–1830, ed. Philip G. Dwyer (London: Routledge, 2000), 177–­200; H. W. Koch, A History of Prus­sia (London: Routledge, 1978), 35; M. Shennan, The Rise of Brandenburg Prus­sia (London: Routledge, 1997); Sebastian Haffner, The Rise and Fall of Prus­sia (Lexington, MA: Plunkett Lake, 2019); Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 27. 32. ​­Great Britain, France, Austria, Prus­sia, and Rus­sia. 33. ​The Austrian emperor received the Spanish Netherlands (renamed Austrian Netherlands) at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. 34. ​The first Duke of Courland and Semigallia, Ernst Johann von Biron, was appointed by Anna of Rus­sia, in 1737. To illustrate how this part of Poland was controlled by Rus­sia, von Biron became for a short time the Rus­sian regent at the death of Anna in 1740. A ­ fter falling in

197

NOTES TO PAGES 141–145

disgrace, the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia was given to a council controlled by Rus­sia. John L. Sutton, The King’s Honor and the King’s Cardinal: The War of the Polish Succession (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1980). 35. ​In 1714, George, ruler of House of Hanover, also became king of ­England. Although ­England did not deploy large troops in continental Eu­rope, its presence on the western border of Prus­sia created a new security threat. This alliance, which lasted ­u ntil 1756, had the goal of limiting French influence in eastern Eu­rope. As the years passed, Austrian and British interests became increasingly at odds. Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire (London: Penguin, 2008), 215–­221. 36. ​Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon: The Fate of a G ­ reat Power (London: UCL Press, 1999), 82; Robert  B. Asprey, Frederick the ­Great: The Magnificent Enigma (Boston: Ticknor & Fields, 1986), 129. 37. ​Reed Browning, “New Views on the Silesian Wars,” Journal of Military History 69, no. 2 (2005), 521–­534; Scott, “Prus­sia’s Emergence,” 159–­164. 38. ​Karl A. Roider, “The Pragmatic Sanction,” Austrian History Yearbook 8 (January 1972): 153–­158. 39. ​In addition to having a ruler who was heavi­ly supported by Rus­sia, this solution would have raised Saxony-­Poland to great-­power status. David Fraser, Frederick the G ­ reat: King of Prus­sia (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 70–­71. 40. ​Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1648–1840 (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1982), 213. 41. ​Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prus­sia, 1600–1947 (London: Penguin, 2007), 192. 42. ​Rus­sia was at war with the Turks in 1735. Accordingly, the decision not to take advantage of the situation was not caused by the fear of triggering the reaction of Rus­sia in support of Austria. Moreover, Prus­sian military might has improved in ­those years, as the invasion of Silesia proved, showing that internal reasons w ­ ere not an explanation for their lack of action. 43. ​The arrow between Prus­sia and Austria symbolizes the initiation of the conflict with the invasion of Silesia. The line that connects two dif­fer­ent squares symbolizes the rivalry. The lines above squares symbolize the alliance among g ­ reat powers. 44. ​Daniel Marston, The Seven Years’ War (London: Routledge, 2001); Franz Szabo, The Seven Years’ War in Eu­rope 1756–1763 (London: Routledge, 2007); Patrice  L. Higonnet, “The Origins of the Seven Years’ War,” Journal of Modern History 40, no. 1 (1968): 57–­90. 45. ​Herbert  J. Redman, Frederick the G ­ reat and the Seven Years’ War, 1756–1763 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015), 3–­6. 46. ​The renewal of the alliance between the two ­g reat powers in 1746 already included a secret clause to retake Silesia. 47. ​Claude Michaud, “French-­Austrian Relations in the Second Part of the Eigh­teenth ­Century: On the Reversal of Alliances,” Revue historique 683, no. 3 (2017): 567–­588; Jeremy Black, “Essay and Reflection: On the ‘Old System’ and the ‘Diplomatic Revolution’ of the Eigh­ teenth ­Century,” International History Review 12, no.  2 (1990): 301–­323; Karl  W. Schweizer, ­England, Prus­sia, and the Seven Years War: Studies in Alliance Policies and Diplomacy (Lewiston, UK: Edwin Mellen, 1989); Richard Waddington, Louis XV et le renversement des alliances: Préliminaires de la guerre de sept ans 1754–1756 (Paris: Libraire de Firmin-­Didot, 1896). 48. ​Michael Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence: War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797 (London: Routledge, 2003), 330–­348. 49. ​Hamish M. Scott, The Birth of a ­Great Power System, 1740–1815 (Hoboken, NJ: Taylor & Francis, 2014), 92. 50. ​Fraser, Frederick the G ­ reat, 310; Herbert  H. Kaplan, Rus­sia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years’ War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 57–­66. 51. ​Hamish M. Scott, “Aping the ­Great Powers: Frederick the ­Great and the Defence of Prus­ sia’s International Position, 1763–86,” German History 12, no. 3 (1994): 286. 52. ​The arrow between Prus­sia and Austria symbolizes the initiation of the conflict with the invasion of Silesia. The line that connects two dif­fer­ent squares symbolizes the rivalry. The lines above squares symbolize the alliance among g ­ reat powers.

198

NOTES TO PAGES 145–149

53. ​The Treaty of Versailles of 1756 established that in case of war against Prus­sia, France would have aided its ally in exchange for the acquisition of the Austrian Netherlands. 54. ​Herbert H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1962); Jerzy Lukowski, The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London: Routledge, 1999), 52–­81. 55. ​Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence, 364–­369. 56. ​This major war was characterized by distinct phases based on the ability of French opponents to form alliances (seven Co­ali­t ion Wars), but like Levy, I treat it as a single case study. Although ­there ­were some pauses in hostilities, they ­were armistices triggered by war fatigue rather than a lasting peace. Alfred Cobban, The Debate on the French Revolution, 1789–1800 (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1960); Gregory Fremont-­Barnes, The French Revolutionary Wars (Chicago: Osprey, 2001); Gunther E. Rothenberg, “The Origins, ­Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no.  4 (1988): 771–­793; Mark L. Hass, The Ideological Origins of G ­ reat Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 40–­72; Owen Connelly, The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1792–1815 (London: Routledge, 2012); Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of Eu­ ro­pean Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 53–­99; T.C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (London: Routledge, 1986). 57. ​The Spanish Netherlands became the Austrian Netherlands a­ fter the War of the Spanish Succession. 58. ​Holland J. Rose, “­Great Britain and the Dutch Question in 1787–­1788,” American Historical Review 14, no. 2 (1909): 262–­283. 59. ​Matthew  Z. Mayer, “The Price for Austria’s Security: Part II. Leopold II, the Prus­sian Threat, and the Peace of Sistova, 1790–1791,” International History Review 26, no. 3 (2004): 473–­514. 60. ​Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume II: The Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich, 1648–1806 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 555–­574. 61. ​Fremont-­Barnes, The French Revolutionary Wars, 24. 62. ​Thomas E. Kaiser, “A Tale of Two Narratives: The French Revolution in International Context, 1787–­1793,” in A Companion to the French Revolution, ed. Peter McPhee (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 170. 63. ​It is impor­tant to remember that all the Eu­ro­pean ­g reat powers ­were not involved in ­every year of the French and Revolutionary Wars b ­ ecause of war fatigue, military defeat, or the presence of other security threats. For instance, Rus­sia could not intervene in the war in 1792 b ­ ecause it was embroiled in a military conflict with Poland (May–­July 1792). Philip G. Dwyer, “Self-­Interest versus the Common Cause: Austria, Prus­sia and Rus­sia against Napoleon,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 4 (2008): 605–­632. 64. ​For a brief period, Rus­sia sided with France against ­Great Britain. This alliance is a puzzle for all the major explanations of the war, in par­t ic­u­lar theories of hegemonic war. Since France had emerged as a potential hegemon, all the ­great powers should have joined their efforts in a counterhegemonic co­ali­t ion. On the other hand, the military defeat of Prus­sia in the ­Battle of Jena (October 1806) eliminated Prus­sia as a military threat for Rus­sia (Prus­sia was relegated from great-­power status and would regain it only de­cades ­later). The presence of a vast buffer zone with Napoleonic France could justify the decision of focusing on the British threat by sea (Anglo-­Russian War, 1807–­1812). 65. ​British concerns w ­ ere valid since French armies annexed the Austrian Netherlands and made the Dutch Republic a vassal state (renamed the Batavian Republic). 66. ​Although the result was the same (an alliance of all the Eu­ro­pean ­g reat powers against France), the logic of contagion was based on concerns about the immediate rival. 67. ​­There ­were seven Co­ali­tion Wars (1792–­1797, 1798–­1802, 1803–­1806, 1806–­1807, 1809, 1813–­ 1814, 1815) with the longest pause between the War of the Fourth Co­ali­t ion and the War of the Fifth Co­ali­t ion. To consider the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars two separate major wars, we need a clear logic to define when this international phenomenon occurs. Other­ wise, the division would be purely arbitrary, an explanation ad hoc for this case. For instance, it is unclear why we should mark the change in major war in 1802 instead of 1807. 68. ​Few scholars have called into question w ­ hether Nazi Germany should be a near-­ preponderant state in 1939. For an overview of this claim, see Adam J. Tooze, The Wages of

199

NOTES TO PAGES 149–150

Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Penguin, 2008). On the debate on the nature of German foreign policy before the outbreak of World War II, see A.J.P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamilton, 1961); D. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 118–­145; Geoffrey Stoakes, Hitler and the Quest for World Dominion (Leamington Spa, UK: Berg, 1986); Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Norman Rich, Hitler’s War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion (New York: Norton, 1973); Victor Rothwell, The Origins of the Second World War (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001); Wilhelm Deist et al., Germany and the Second World War: Volume I: The Build-up of German Aggression (London: Abacus, 1982); Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 69. ​Talbot C. Imlay, “A Reassessment of Anglo-­French Strategy during the Phony War, 1939–­ 1940,” En­glish Historical Review 119, no. 481 (2004): 333–­372; Tom Shachtman, The Phony War, 1939–1940 (New York: Harper & Row, 1982). 70. ​France formed a military alliance with Poland in 1921 and with Czecho­slo­va­k ia in 1924 with the aim of containing Germany, still its immediate rival. Additionally, France expanded its influence in eastern Eu­rope by supporting the creation of the ­Little Entente (1921), an alliance between Czecho­slo­va­k ia, Romania, and Yugo­slavia. 71. ​Based on my definition, Germany was not encircled ­because Czecho­slo­va­k ia, Poland, and the Baltic States w ­ ere not g ­ reat powers. 72. ​Adolf Hitler, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April  1922–­August  1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), 1669–­1670. 73. ​Hitler considered the Baltic States vassal states of Rus­sia. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925), 951. 74. ​Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Secret Book (New York: Grove, 1962), 46. The following remarks on the extreme geographic vulnerability of both the eastern and western borders, elaborated since the mid-1920s (the book was published in 1928), show even more clearly how Hitler was fully cognizant of the two-­front-­war prob­lem that Germany faced and deserve to be quoted at length: “Germany lies wedged between ­these States, with completely open borders. What is especially threatening thereby is that the western border of the Reich runs through Germany’s greatest industrial region. This western border, however, in consequence of its length and of the lack of all real natu­ral barriers, offers only a few possibilities for defence by a State whose military means seem most extremely l­ imited. Even the Rhine cannot be viewed as a fully effective line of military re­sis­tance. Not only ­because the possibility of finding the necessary technical preparations for this has been taken away from Germany by the peace treaties, but ­because the river itself offers even fewer obstacles to the passage of armies with modem equipment than the slight means of German defence which must be dispersed over too long a front. Moreover, this river runs through Germany’s greatest industrial area, and consequently a strug­gle over it from the outset would mean the destruction of the industrial areas and factories technically most impor­tant for national defence. Whereas on the one hand the German borders are militarily indefensible and are surrounded openly in long lines by enemies, our North Sea coast is especially small and confined. The naval power for its defence is laughable, and completely worthless as such. . . . ​Thus, in case of a conflict with any naval power, not only would German trade be ended in a moment, but ­there would also be the danger of landings. The entire unpropitiousness of our military situation stems from this other consideration: Berlin, the Reich’s capital, is barely 175 kilo­meters from the Polish border. . . . ​Thus, this means that Berlin can be reached by modem aircraft in less than one hour from t­ hese borders. If we draw a line stretching 60 kilo­meters east of the Rhine River, within it ­will lie almost the entire western German industrial region. . . . ​As long as France occupies a part of the left bank of the Rhine, she is in a position to push forward by aircraft into the heart of our western German industrial region in hardly 30 minutes. . . . ​Hence France must be considered as the most dangerous e­ nemy b ­ ecause she alone, thanks to her alliances, is in a position to be able to threaten almost the w ­ hole of Germany with aircraft, even an hour ­after the outbreak of a conflict.”

200

NOTES TO PAGES 150–151

75. ​A detailed analy­sis of the similarities and differences of German foreign policy during the Republic of Weimar, ­under the leadership of Chancellor Gustav Stresemann, and Nazi Germany is not pos­si­ble ­here. Hence, I focus on the decision of Hitler. On the continuity of German foreign policy since 1919, see Henry A. Turner, “Continuity in German Foreign Policy? The Case of Stresemann,” International History Review 1, no. 4 (1979): 509–­521; John Hiden, Germany and Eu­rope 1919–1939 (London: Routledge, 1993), 63–­167; Marshall M. Lee and Wolfgang Michalka, German Foreign Policy 1919–1933: Continuity or Break? (Leamington Spa, UK: Berg, 1987). 76. ​Hitler, Mein Kampf, 664. 77. ​Based on the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was not allowed to increase its army more than one hundred thousand men. Hitler secretly allowed the German army to grow rapidly and reintroduced the military conscription (May 16, 1935), making public his program of rearmament. The justification ­behind the massive increases in military spending was the need of having the military means to thwart the attacks of two ­g reat powers: “In Eu­rope Germany should have to ­counter the two-­power standard on land to the two-­power standard on the seas. And just as ­England with an iron determination saw a reason for ­going to war at e­ very violation of this standard, so did Germany have to prevent ­every attempt in Eu­rope to outflank her army through France and Rus­sia by a military decision, even one which had to be precipitated, and for which more than one favorable opportunity had to pre­sent itself” (Hitler, Secret Book, 145). His attempts w ­ ere driven by the need to reduce its strategic vulnerability without triggering military escalation: “Germany cannot bring about a change in her pre­ sent situation by herself, as far as this must ensue by means of military power. . . . ​Germany cannot hope to change her pre­sent situation through a combination of powers which brings her into conflict with the French system of alliances surrounding Germany, without first acquiring the possibility of eliminating her sheer military powerlessness so that in case the commitments of the alliance go into effect, she may be able to come forward immediately with the prospect of military success” (Hitler, Secret Book, 145). 78. ​In addition to the French bilateral alliances with Poland and Czecho­slo­va­k ia, the Soviet Union formed a series of nonaggression pacts with all its neighboring countries (Soviet-­ Lithuanian Non-­Aggression Pact, September  1926; Soviet-­Latvian Non-­Aggression Pact, February  1932; Soviet-­Estonian Non-­Aggression Pact, May  1932; and Soviet-­Polish Non-­ Aggression Pact, July 1932) for securing the western frontier against Japa­nese encroachment on its eastern border. Indeed, the German ambassador to the Soviet Union warned Maxim Maximovich Litvinov of a “French initiative for surrounding Germany with the aid of the Soviet Union” (January 16, 1934). German Foreign Ministry, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–­1945. Series C, Vol. II (Washington, DC: Government Print Office, 1959), 367; R. J. Crampton, Eastern Eu­rope in the Twentieth ­Century and ­After (London: Routledge, 1997), 95–106. To ­counter the Soviet and French influence in eastern Eu­rope, Germany and Poland signed a nonaggression pact in January 1934. This diplomatic move also aimed to hinder the formation of a bloc of Poland and the Baltic States ­u nder the control of France and the Soviet Union. Zach Shore, “Hitler’s Opening Gambit: Intelligence, Encirclement, and the Decision to Ally with Poland,” Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 3 (1999): 103–122. 79. ​In 1934, the domestic instability that characterized the last years of the government of Engelbert Dollfuss threatened the German southeastern border and pushed Hitler to affirm “with ­g reat emphasis that he would not consider yielding on the Austrian question, even if the conflict w ­ ere to last 10 years more.” Memorandum Hüffer, April 19 (1934). German Foreign Ministry, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 757. 80. ​Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-­Berlin Axis: A History of the Relations between Hitler and Mussolini (London: Oxford University Press, 1949). 81. ​The Soviet-­British rivalry reached its peak in 1936 with the Convention of Montreux (July 20, 1936), when the United Kingdom tried to exclude the Soviet fleet from the Mediterranean Sea for securing its shipping lanes to India through Egypt. Anthony  R. De Luca, “Montreux and Collective Security,” The Historian 38, no.  1 (1975): 1–20; D.  C. Watt, “The Anglo-­German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment,” Journal of Modern History 28, no. 2 (1956): 155–175.

201

NOTES TO PAGES 151–156

82. ​Germany and the Soviet Union would compete u ­ ntil the outbreak of World War II for control of Poland and the Baltic States, potential buffer zones for both g ­ reat powers. See German Foreign Ministry, Documents. Series C, Vol. II, 318–324. 83. ​John E. Dreifort, “The French Popu­lar Front and the Franco-­Soviet Pact, 1936–37: A Dilemma in Foreign Policy,” Journal of Con­temporary History 11 (1976): 217–236; William E. Scott, Alliance against Hitler: The Origins of the Franco-­Soviet Pact (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1962). 84. ​French prime minister Georges Clemenceau, 1919. In Taylor, Origins, 37. 85. ​This policy, which is at the foundation of the concept of the lebensraum (living space), harks back to the Septemberprogramm and to the Treaty of Brest-­Litovsk (March 1918). 86. ​On the use of secrecy for avoiding escalation, see M. A. Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics (New York: Prince­ton University Press, 2018), 39–41. On the German intervention in the Spanish Civil War, see Robert H. Whealey, Hitler and Spain (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005); Stanley G. Paine, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). 87. ​Geoffrey Roberts, “The Alliance That Failed: Moscow and the T ­ riple Alliance Negotiations, 1939,” Eu­ro­pean History Quarterly 26, no. 3 (1996): 383–­414; Michael J. Carley, “End of the ‘Low, Dishonest De­cade’: Failure of the Anglo-­Franco-­Soviet Alliance in 1939,” Europe-­Asia Studies 45, no. 2 (1993): 303–341. 88. ​German chargé d’affaires in Paris telegraphed (April 13, 1939). In Copeland, Origins, 134. German Foreign Ministry, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–­1945. Series D, Volume VI (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959), doc. 188. 89. ​German ambassador to London, Leopold von Hoesch, noted (August 15, 1935). In German Foreign Ministry, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–­1945. Series C, Vol. IV (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959), 558. 90. ​For alternative explanations for the failure to form an alliance against Nazi Germany, see Christopher Layne, “Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain’s G ­ rand Strategy Revisited,” Security Studies 17, no.  3 (2008): 397–­437; Norrin  M. Ripsman and Jack  S. Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s,” International Security 33, no. 2 (2008): 148–­181; Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 159–­201. 91. ​Anthony Read and David Fisher, The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin, and the Nazi-­Soviet Pact 1939–1941 (New York: Norton, 1999); Roger Moor­house, The Dev­ils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939–1941 (London: Basic Books, 2014). 92. ​Some explanations for this puzzling decision could be the August 1939 failed negotiations to form an alliance or the military weakness that the Soviet Union faced ­after the end of the Winter War (November 1939–­March 1940).

6. The ­Future of Major War 1. ​John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Michael Mandelbaum, “Is Major War Obsolete?” Survival 40, no. 4 (1998): 20–38; Martin van Creveld, “The Waning of Major War,” in The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (London: Routledge, 2006), 97–112; Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Vio­lence Has Declined (London: Penguin, 2012). For a critique, see Bear F. Braumoeller, Only the Dead: The Per­sis­tence of War in the Modern Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019); Paul W. Schroeder, “The Life and Death of a Long Peace, 1763–1914,” in The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (London: Routledge, 2006), 33–63; and Tanisha M. Fazal and Paul Poast, “War Is Not Over: What the Optimists Get Wrong about Conflict,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 6 (2019): 74–83. 2. ​Nuno Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); William  C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 5–41; John G. Ikenberry, ­After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order ­after Major Wars (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2000); Patrick M.

202

NOTES TO PAGES 156–158

Morgan, “Multilateral Institutions as Restraints on Major War,” in The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (London: Routledge, 2006), 160–184; Michael Mousseau, “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual Peace,” International Security 44, no.  1 (2019): 160–196; Richard  N. Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2005). Christopher  J. Fettweis, Dangerous Times? The International Politics of ­Great Power Peace (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010); Hendrik Spruyt, “Normative Transformations in International Relations and the Waning of Major War,” in The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (London: Routledge, 2006), 185–206; Daniel Deudney, “Geopolitics and Change,” in New Thinking in International Relations Theory, eds. Michael Doyle and John G. Ikenberry (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 91–123.   3. ​Kenneth  N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Po­liti­cal Realities,” American Po­liti­cal Science Review 84, no. 3 (1990): 731–746; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).   4. ​Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 45.   5. ​Mueller, Retreat, 11; Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-­Use,” International Organ­ization 53, no. 3 (1999): 433–468.   6. ​Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 19–20.   7. ​For the formulation of the stability-­i nstability paradox, see Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in The Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 185–201.   8. ​Robert Jervis, “Arms Control, Stability, and ­Causes of War,” Daedalus 120, no. 1 (1991): 175.   9. ​Jervis, “Arms Control,” 177. 10. ​Jervis, “Arms Control,” 96. 11. ​Richard  K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1987); Robert Powell, “Nuclear Brinkmanship, L ­ imited War, and Military Power,” International Organ­ization 69, no.  3 (2015): 589–626; Thomas  C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 92–125. 12. ​Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 39. 13. ​Kier A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st ­Century: Understanding Adversary Incentives and Options for Nuclear Escalation, PASCC Report number 2013-001 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March  2013); Richard  K. Betts, “Nuclear Peace and Conventional War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 1 (1988): 79–95; Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2014). 14. ​Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-­Defense Balance and Can We Mea­sure It?” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 58. 15. ​Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 136. 16. ​Kier A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020); Stephen M. Walt, “Rethinking the ‘Nuclear Revolution,’ ” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2010. 17. ​Lieber and Press, The Myth, 120. 18. ​Lieber and Press, The Myth, 66–93. 19. ​Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 42–54; Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority ­M atters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Niccolò Petrelli and Giordana Pulcini, “Nuclear Superiority in the Age of Parity: US Planning, Intelligence Analy­sis, Weapons Innovation and the Search for a Qualitative Edge 1969–1976,” International History Review 40, no. 5 (2018): 1191–1209; Nina Tannenwald et al., “Book Review Roundtable: The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution 30 Years ­Later,” Texas National Security Review, April 30, 2020. 20. ​Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, “The MAD Who ­Wasn’t ­There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” Security Studies 26, no. 4 (2017): 621.

203

NOTES TO PAGES 159–161

21. ​For Clausewitz’s analy­sis of the differences between ­limited and unlimited war, see Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1989), 577–637. 22. ​All the peaceful (in terms of absence of major wars) periods in modern history ­were characterized by the lack of an encircled g ­ reat power. The only exception is the case of Nazi Germany (see chapter 5). 23. ​Aaron L. Friedberg, “The F ­ uture of U.S.-­China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 7–45; Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing ­toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia-­Pacific and the Security Dilemma,” International Security 39, no. 2 (2014): 52–91; Allison T. Graham, Destined for War: Can Amer­i­ca and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); John  J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 381–396; Øystein Tunsjø, The Return of Bi­polar­ity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy ­toward East Asia,” International Security 31, no.1 (2006): 81–126. 24. ​For a debate on the plausibility of nuclear escalation involving China, see Avery Goldstein, “First ­Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-­China Relations,” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 49–89; Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security 41, no. 4 (2017): 50–92; Fiona Cunningham and Taylor M. Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-­China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no.  2 (2015): 7–50; Thomas  J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and US-­China Security Relations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (2012): 447–487. 25. ​Colin Elman, “Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and Amer­i­ca’s Rise to Regional Hegemony,” American Po­liti­cal Science Review 98, no. 4 (2004): 563–576; Jonathan Kirshner, “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China,” Eu­ro­pean Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (2012): 53–75. 26. ​This does not imply that the United States ­will remain passive, but other strategies short of direct military attack ­will be employed to advance the US strategic interests in the Asia-­ Pacific region. 27. ​Fazal and Poast, “War Is Not Over,” 80. 28. ​On the prospects for India’s rise, see Nicholas Kitchen, ed., India: The Next Superpower (London: London School of Economics, 2012), 23–27; and Sumit Ganguly, “Think Again: India’s Rise,” Foreign Policy, July 5, 2012. 29. ​For an analy­sis of the impact of the concept of encirclement on Chinese strategic thinking, see David Lai, Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004); Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011), 23; and Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-­Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace Amer­i­ca as the Global Superpower (Chicago: Griffin, 2016), 31–79. 30. ​Odd A. Westad, 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–­1977 (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Proj­ect, 1998), 130. 31. ​This is not a case study for my theory ­because China was not a ­g reat power during the Cold War. Nicholas Khoo, “Breaking the Ring of Encirclement: The Sino-­Soviet Rift and Chinese Policy ­toward Vietnam, 1964–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 1 (2010): 3–42. 32. ​John Reed, “Surrounded: How the U.S. Is Surrounding China with Military Bases,” Foreign Policy, August  20, 2013; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: Amer­i­ca and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2013). 33. ​In par­tic­u­lar, the presence of American troops in Kyrgyzstan, with which China shared 1,100 kilo­meters, risked destabilizing the region of Xinjiang. Chien-­peng Chung, “China’s ‘War on Terror’: September 11 and Uighur Separatism,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 8 (2002): 8–12. 34. ​This strategy was developed during the George W. Bush administration and expanded with Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia. President Bush confirmed the US commitment to its allies in the region (Japan and South K ­ orea) and he improved the relations with several states in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore). In par­tic­u­lar, the use of Sem-

204

NOTES TO PAGES 161–162

bawang naval base and Changi air base in Singapore gave the United States the ability to control the strategic choke point of the Strait of Malacca, through which most natu­ral resources (oil and gas) ­were transported from the Persian Gulf to Chinese ports through the South China Sea. Likewise, the Obama administration strengthened the military coordination with Indonesia and India, increased US military personnel in the region (2,500 units by 2017), forged new defense agreements with Australia and the Philippines, and improved the naval and air military capabilities of US forward presence in the possibility of conducting an air-­sea b ­ attle strategy. 35. ​In 2005, the two countries signed a ten-­year defensive alliance (New Framework for the US-­India Defense Relationship), which entailed the sharing of ballistic missile technology and the conduct of joint military exercises between the two countries. Alan K. Kronstadt, U.S.-­India Bilateral Agreement in 2005 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Ser­v ice, 2005), 1–19. Statement of President Hu Jintao, in Bruce Gilley and Andrew Nathan, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files (New York: New York Review of Books, 2003), 207–208. 36. ​J. J. Singh, The McMahon Line: A C ­ entury of Discord (New York: HarperCollins, 2019). 37. ​John W. Garver and Fei-­ling Wang, “China’s Anti-­encirclement Strug­gle,” Asian Security 6, no. 3 (2010): 238–261; Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Biggest Fear: U.S.-­Indian Encirclement,” National Interest, February 11, 2015; Sergio Maricola, “The Indo-­Pacific ‘Encirclement’: How Is China Reacting?” ISPI, June 4, 2018. 38. ​China has already consolidated its presence in the ports of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, in the Maldives, and in Tanzania. Christopher Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power across the Asian Littoral (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2006); Gurpreet Khurana, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ and Its Security Implications,” Strategic Analy­sis 32, no. 1 (2008): 1–39; Chris Devonshire-­Ellis, “China’s String of Pearls Strategy,” China Briefing, March 18, 2009. 39. ​Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, Chinese ­Grand Strategy—­A Net Assessment: Cooperation, Competition and/or Conflict (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018), 190–210; David Shambaugh, “U.S.-­China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence?” International Security 42, no. 4 (2018): 90; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the P ­ eople’s Republic of China 2019 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019), 120. 40. ​The Shanghai Cooperation Organ­ization is an economic and security alliance among China, Rus­sia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 41. ​Robert Bedeski and Niklas Swanström, Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership for China, Rus­sia and Central Asia? (London: Routledge, 2012). 42. ​The Chinese Communist Party would not tolerate the collapse of Kim Jong-­u n’s regime ­because it would allow the United States to pose a threat of territorial invasion on China’s northeastern border. Alton Frye, “China Should Send 30,000 Troops into North ­Korea,” Foreign Policy, November 28, 2017; Eleanor Albert, “The China-­North ­Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 25, 2019. 43. ​Davis Scott, “The ­Great Power ‘­Great Game’ between India and China: ‘The Logic of Geography,’ ” Geopolitics 13, no. 1 (2008): 1–26; Koh S. L. Collin, “China-­India Rivalry at Sea: Capability, Trends, and Challenges,” Asian Security 15, no. 1 (2019): 5–24; Mark Rosen and Rebecca Wolfson, “How to Break the ­Legal Logjam in the South China Sea,” National Interest, November 3, 2019; Zella Carroll, Pakistan-­China: Strategic Encirclement of India’s Core Interests (New Delhi: Alpha Editions, 2018). 44. ​India currently f­ aces a two-­front-­war prob­lem, but this situation w ­ ill not lead to a major war ­because India is not a ­g reat power yet. When it achieves this status, it ­will still not face encirclement b ­ ecause Pakistan is not a ­great power. Nonetheless, the possibility of a two-­front war lies at the foundation of India’s foreign policy. Rupakjyoti Borah, “Qinghai-­Tibet Railway. China’s Strategic Masterstroke,” Peace & Conflict 9, no. 8 (2006): 17–18; Amit Kumar, “China-­ Pakistan Nexus: The Aim Is to Encircle India,” The Tribune, December 6, 2006; Hong Zhao, “China and India: Competing for Good Relations with Myanmar,” Journal of East Asian Affairs 22, no. 1 (2008): 175–194; Subhash Ka­pi­la, “Bangladesh-­China Defence Cooperation: Strategic Implication,” South Asian Research Group Papers 582 (January 14, 2003).

205

NOTES TO PAGES 162–163

45. ​John  F. Burns, “India’s New Defense Chief Sees Chinese Military Threat,” New York Times, May 5, 1998. Raja Menon, “India’s Response to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean,” Asia Policy 22 (July 2016): 41–48. 46. ​Raja Menon, “India’s Response to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean,” Asia Policy, No. 22 (July 2016), 41–48. 47. ​Anindya Batabyal, “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India’s Look East Strategy,” China Report 42, no. 2 (2006): 179–197; Christopher K. Colley and Sumit Ganguly, “The Evolution of India’s Look East Policy and China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative,” in China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Southeast Asia: Dilemmas, Doubts, and Determination, ed. Jean-­Marc F. Blanchard (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 219–246. 48. ​Nick P. Walsh, “India Flexes Its Muscles with First Foreign Military Base,” The Guardian, April 27, 2006. 49. ​Ajai Shukla, “How China and India Came to Lethal Blows,” New York Times, June 19, 2020; Jin Wu and Steven Lee Myers, “­Battle in the Hi­ma­la­yas,” New York Times, July 18, 2020; Sumit Ganguly, “The Doklam Dispute in Context: China Is Drawing India’s Neighbors Closer to Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, August 9, 2017; Thomas Kellogg, “The China-­India Border Standoff: What Does Beijing Want?” Foreign Policy, September 1, 2017. 50. ​James Bellacqua, ed., The ­Future of China-­Russia Relations (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010); Jeanne Wilson, Strategic Partners: Russian-­Chinese Relations in the Post-­Soviet Era (London: Routledge, 2004); Paul J. Bolt and Sharyl N. Cross, China, Rus­sia, and Twenty-­ First C ­ entury Global Geopolitics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 51. ​Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-­Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2008). 52. ​Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-­Russian Strategic Partnership (London: Routledge, 2004); John Herbst, “The Coming Russian-­Chinese Clash,” National Interest, August 21, 2020; Lyle J. Goldstein, “A Russian-­Chinese Fight over Damansky Island Almost Started World War III,” National Interest, August 20, 2020. 53. ​China’s increasing presence in Central Asia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organ­ ization has been seen as an attempt to extend its influence in an area that is considered by Rus­sia its “backyard,” as t­ hese countries w ­ ere u ­ nder the control of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, China’s activity in Central Asia was not driven by expansionist goals but rather by the need to prevent the United States to extend its network of military bases to the western border of China and to have a reliable neighboring state close to the Xinjiang region. Moreover, Chinese immigration in Siberia has created tensions with Rus­sia due to concerns about long-­term ambitions in the region. Dmitri Trenin, True Partners? How Rus­sia and China See Each Other (London: Center for Eu­ro­pean Reform, 2012); James Jay Carafano, “Why the China-­ Russia Alliance ­Won’t Last,” National Interest, August  5, 2019; Zachary Keck, “To Hedge Its Bets, Rus­sia Is Surrounding China,” The Diplomat, November 5, 2013. 54. ​The expansion of NATO to Georgia or Ukraine would create a two-­f ront-­war prob­ lem for Rus­sia. It is not surprising that Putin a­ dopted aggressive mea­sures in both countries to prevent this outcome from materializing. On NATO expansion and the prospects for the encirclement of Rus­sia, see Sean T. Cowley, “NATO ‘Encirclement’ May Be Creating a New Crisis with Rus­sia,” National Interest, August 2, 2018; John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 77–84; Robert Hunter, “The Ukraine Crisis: Why and What Now?,” Survival 64, no. 1 (2022): 7–28. 55. ​Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, eds., The Stability-­Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2001). 56. ​Anita Inder Singh, “India’s Relations with Rus­sia and Central Asia,” International Affairs 71, no. 1 (1995): 69–81; C. Uday Bhaskar, “Why India’s Relationship with Rus­sia Is So Special,” South China Morning Post, September 12, 2019; Carl Jaison, “Is Asia Ready for an Indo-­Russian Order?” The Diplomat, September 6, 2019; Nirmala Joshi and Raj K. Sharma, “India-­Russia Relations in a Changing Eurasian Perspective,” India Quarterly 73, no. 1 (2017): 36–52.

206

NOTES TO PAGES 163–166

57. ​The increase in their invasion ability w ­ ill occur when Pakistan stops being a “distraction” on the western Indian border. 58. ​Yoon Young-­kwan, “Only a ­Grand Compromise between U.S. and China Can Reduce East Asian Tensions,” New Perspective Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2014): 49–51. 59. ​Michael Howard, The Franco-­Prussian War: The German Invasion of France 1870–1871 (London: Rupert Hart-­Davis, 1961), 1–60. 60. ​As Walt suggests, “The formation of the Egyptian-­Syrian-­Saudi alignment increased Israel’s fears of Arab encirclement.” Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 61. 61. ​India’s cooperation with the post-­Taliban regime in Af­ghan­i­stan has in turn alarmed Pakistan, which considers this po­liti­cal development to undermine its foreign policy goal to create “strategic depth” against an Indian conventional attack and to even create the possibility of a two-­front-­war prob­lem. Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (London: Routledge, 2011); Sumit Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein, “India-­Pakistan Rivalry in Af­ghan­i­stan,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009): 127–140. 62. ​William F. Sater, Chile and the War of the Pacific (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985). 63. ​Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591–606. 64. ​Gilpin, “Theory of Hegemonic War,” 598 (emphasis added). 65. ​Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: L ­ ittle, Brown, 1990), 174 (emphasis added). 66. ​Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Thomas Rid, “Cyber War ­Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012): 5–32. 67. ​Marc Trachtenberg, “Robert Jervis and the Nuclear Question,” in Psy­chol­ogy, Strategy and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations, ed. James  W. Davis (London: Routledge, 2013), 116. 68. ​Alan Watts, The Book: On the Taboo against Knowing Who You Are (London: Vintage Books, 1999).

207

Bibliography

Abulafia, D. The French Descent into Re­nais­sance Italy, 1494–95: Antecedents and Effects. London: Routledge, 1995. Albert, E. “The China-­North ­Korea Relationship.” Council on Foreign Relations, June 25, 2019. Albertini, L. The Origins of War of 1914. 3 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1952–1957. Allison, G. T. Destined for War: Can Amer­i­ca and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. Anderson, J. The Limits of Sino-­Russian Strategic Partnership. London: Routledge, 2004. Anderson, M. S. The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations. New York: St. Martin’s, 1966. Anievas, A., and K. Nişancioğlu. How the West Came to Rule: The Geopo­liti­cal Origins of Capitalism. London: Pluto, 2015. Armstrong, E. “The Italian Wars of Henry II.” En­glish Historical Review 30, no. 120 (1915): 602–612. Asch, R. G. The Thirty Years’ War: The Holy Roman Empire and Eu­rope, 1618–1648. New York: St. Martin’s, 1997. Ashworth, L. A. “Mapping a New World: Geography and the Interwar Study of International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 1 (2013): 138–149. Asprey, R.  B. Frederick the ­Great: The Magnificent Enigma. Boston: Ticknor & Fields, 1986. Bartholomew, J.  G. David Rumsey Historical Map Collection. London: The Times, 1922. Batabyal, A. “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India’s Look East Strategy.” China Report 42, no. 2 (2006): 179–197.

209

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Batiffol, L. “A Policy of Justice, Necessity, and Tradition.” In The Thirty Years’ War: Prob­lems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, edited by T. K Rabb, 83–85. Boston: Heath, 1964. Bell, M. S. “Nuclear Opportunism: A Theory of How States Use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics.” Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 1 (2019): 3–28. Bellacqua, J., ed. The ­Future of China-­Russia Relations. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010. Bély, L. Les secrets de Louis XIV: Mystères d’état et pouvoir absolu. Paris: Texto, 2013. Bérenger, J. “An Attempted Rapprochement between France and the Emperor: The Secret Treaty for the Partition of the Spanish Succession of 19 January 1668.” In Louis XIV and Eu­rope, edited by R. M. Hatton, 116–132. London: Macmillan, 1976. Bergenroth, G. A. Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers Relating to the Negotiations between E ­ ngland and Spain Preserved in the Archives of Simancas and Elsewhere, Volume 1: Henry VII, 1485–1509. Burlington, ON: Tanner Ritchie, 2006. Berghahn, V. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914. New York: St. Martin’s, 1973. Bestuzhev, I.  V. “Rus­sian Foreign Policy February–­June  1914.” Journal of Con­ temporary History 1, no. 3 (1966): 93–112. Betts, R. K. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1987. —­—. “Nuclear Peace and Conventional War.” Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 1 (1988): 79–95. —­—. “Suicide from Fear of Death?” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1 (2003): 34–43. Bhaskar, C. U. “Why India’s Relationship with Rus­sia Is So Special.” South China Morning Post, September 12, 2019. Bireley, R. “The Thirty Years War as Germany’s Religious War.” In Krieg und Politik 1618–1648, edited by K. Repgen, 85–106. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988. Bischof, G., F. Karlhofer, and S. R. Williamson. 1914: Austria-­Hungary, the Origins, and the First Year of World War I. New Orleans, LA: University of New Orleans Press, 2014. von Bismarck, O. Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, Volume 2. New York: Cosimo Classics, 2007. Black, J. “Essay and Reflection: On the ‘Old System’ and the ‘Diplomatic Revolution’ of the Eigh­teenth ­Century.” International History Review 12, no.  2 (1990): 301–323. —­—. From Louis XIV to Napoleon: The Fate of a G ­ reat Power. London: UCL Press, 1999. —­—. “Louis XIV’s Foreign Policy Reassessed.” Seventeenth-­Century French Studies 10, no. 1 (1988): 199–212. —­—. War in Eu­ro­pean History, 1494–1660. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006. Blanning, T.C.W. The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars. London: Routledge, 1986. Bluche, F. Louis XIV. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. Bolt, P. J., and S. N. Cross. China, Rus­sia, and Twenty-­First C ­ entury Global Geopolitics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Bonney, R. The Eu­ro­pean Dynastic States, 1494–­1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. —­—. “France’s ‘War by Diversion.’ ” In The Thirty Years’ War, edited by G. Parker, 129–137. London: Routledge, 1984.

210

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—­—. The King’s Debts: Finance and Politics in France 1589–1661. Oxford: Clarendon, 1981. —­—. Society and Government in France u ­ nder Richelieu and Mazarin 1624–61. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988. —­—. The Thirty Years’ War 1618–1648. Oxford: Osprey, 2002. Boone, R. A. Mercurino di Gattinara and the Creation of the Spanish Empire. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014. Borah, R. “Qinghai-­Tibet Railway: China’s Strategic Masterstroke.” Peace & Conflict 9, no. 8 (2006): 17–18. Boroff, R. Roads to Glory: Late Imperial Rus­sia and the Turkish Straits. London: Tauris, 2006. Boucher, D. Po­liti­cal Theories of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Brandenburg, E. From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870–­1914. New York: Fertig, 1927. Brandi, K. The Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World-­ Empire. London: Jonathan Cape, 1969. Braumoeller, B.  F. Only the Dead: The Per­sis­tence of War in the Modern Age. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. Bridge, F. R. From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-­Hungary, Vol. 6. London: Routledge, 1972. Brierly, J. L. Encirclement. London: Oxford University Press, 1939. Brightwell, P. “The Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years’ War.” Eu­ro­pean Studies Review 9 (1979): 409–431. Brooks, S.  G. “Dueling Realisms.” Internalization Organ­ization 51, no.  3 (1997): 445–477. —­—. Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2005. Brown, S. International Relations in a Changing Global System: T ­ oward a Theory of the World Polity. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992. Browning, R. “New Views on the Silesian Wars.” Journal of Military History 69, no. 2 (2005): 521–534. Brzezinski, Z. Strategic Vision: Amer­i­ca and the Crisis of Global Power. New York: Basic Books, 2013. Burckhardt, C. J. Richelieu: His Rise to Power. London: Allen & Unwin, 1940. Burns, J. F. “India’s New Defense Chief Sees Chinese Military Threat.” New York Times, May 5, 1998. Calaprice, A. The New Quotable Einstein. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2005. Calleo, D. The German Prob­lem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order. 1870 to the Pre­sent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Carafano, J.  J. “Why the China-­Russia Alliance ­Won’t Last.” National Interest, August 5, 2019. Cardinal Richelieu. “Po­liti­cal Statement.” In The Thirty Years’ War: Prob­lems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, edited by T. K. Rabb, 129–135. Boston: Heath, 1964. Carley, M. J. “End of the ‘Low, Dishonest De­cade’: Failure of the Anglo-­Franco-­ Soviet Alliance in 1939.” Europe-­Asia Studies 45, no. 2 (1993): 303–341.

211

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carroll, Z. Pakistan-­China: Strategic Encirclement of India’s Core Interests. New Delhi: Alpha Editions, 2018. Carson, M.  A. Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics. New York: Prince­ton University Press, 2018. Car­ter, D. B. “The Strategy of Territorial Conflict.” American Journal of Po­liti­cal Science 54, no. 4 (2010): 969–987. Chadefaux, T. “Bargaining over Power: When Do Shifts in Power Lead to War?” International Theory 2, no. 3 (2011): 228–253. Chernev, B. Twilight of Empire: The Brest-­Litovsk Conference and the Remaking of East-­ Central Eu­rope, 1917–1918. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017. Childs, J. The Nine Years’ War and the British Army. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1991. Christensen, T. J. “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy t­ oward East Asia.” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 81–126. —­—. “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and US-­China Security Relations.” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (2012): 447–487. Christensen, T. J., and J. Snyder. “Chain Gang and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity.” International Organ­ization 44, no.  2 (1990): 137–168. Chung, C. “China’s ‘War on Terror’: September 11 and Uighur Separatism.” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 8 (2002): 8–12. Church, W.  F. Richelieu and Reason of State. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1972. Clark, C. Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prus­sia, 1600–1947. London: Penguin, 2007. —­—. The Sleepwalkers: How Eu­rope Went to War in 1914. New York: Harper Perennial, 2014. Clark, G. N. “From the Nine Years War to the War of the Spanish Succession.” In The New Cambridge Modern History, edited by J. Bromley, 381–409. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. —­—. The Seventeenth ­Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960. von Clausewitz, C. On War. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1989. Cobban, A. The Debate on the French Revolution, 1789–­1800. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1960. Cohn, H. J. “Did Bribes Induce the German Electors to Choose Charles V as Emperor in 1519?” German History 19, no. 1 (2001): 1–27. Colley, C. K., and S. Ganguly. “The Evolution of India’s Look East Policy and China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative.” In China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Southeast Asia: Dilemmas, Doubts, and Determination, edited by J.  F. Blanchard, 219–246. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Collin, K.S.L. “China-­I ndia Rivalry at Sea: Capability, Trends, and Challenges.” Asian Security 15, no. 1 (2019): 5–24. Collins, D. N. “The Franco-­Russian Alliance and Rus­sian Railways, 1891–1914.” Historical Journal 16, no. 4 (1973): 777–788. Connelly, O. The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1792–1815. London: Routledge, 2012. Copeland, D. The Origins of Major War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.

212

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cordesman, A.  H., and A.  A. Burke. Chinese ­Grand Strategy—­A Net Assessment: Cooperation, Competition and/or Conflict. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018. Cowley, S. T. “NATO ‘Encirclement’ May Be Creating a New Crisis with Rus­sia.” National Interest, August 2, 2018. Crampton, R.  J. “The Balkans as a ­Factor in German Foreign Policy, 1912–1914.” Slavonic and East Eu­ro­pean Review 55, no. 3 (1977): 370–390. —­—. Eastern Eu­rope in the Twentieth ­Century and ­After. London: Routledge, 1997. —­—. The Hollow Detente: Anglo-­German Relations in the Balkans, 1911–­1914. London: George Prior, 1977. van Creveld, M. “The Waning of Major War.” In The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, edited by R. Vayrynen, 97–112. London: Routledge, 2006. Crowe, E. “Memorandum on the Pre­sent State of British Relations with France and Germany.” In British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–­1914. Volume Three: The Testing of the Entente, 1904–­1906, edited by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, 402–406. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1928. Croxton, D. “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty.” International History Review 21, no. 3 (1999): 569–591. Cunningham, F., and T. M. Fravel. “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-­China Strategic Stability.” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 7–50. Curran, R.  J. Shutting the Door: U.S. Army Doctrine for Encirclement/Envelopment Operations at the Operational Level of War. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College SAMS, 1986. Currin, J. M. “ ‘The King’s Army into the Partes of Bretaigne’: Henry VII and the Breton Wars.” War in History 7, no. 4 (2000): 379–412. Danilovic, V. When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. Davis, J. W., B. I. Finel, S. E. Goddard, S. van Evera, C. L. Glaser, and C. Kaufmann. “Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-­Defense Balance.” International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): 179–206. Debs, A., and N. P. Monteiro. “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War.” International Organ­ization 68, no. 1 (2014): 1–31. Dee, D. Expansion and Crisis in Louis XIV’s France: Franche-­Comté and Absolute Monarchy, 1674–1715. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2009. Deist, W., M. Messerschmidt, H. Volkmann, and W. Wette. Germany and the Second World War: Volume I: The Build-up of German Aggression. London: Abacus, 1982. De Luca, A. R. “Montreux and Collective Security.” The Historian 38, no. 1 (1975): 1–20. Demter, D. Diplomatic Strug­gle for Supremacy over the Balkan Peninsula 1878–­1914, Collected Studies. Sofia: Publications of the Bulgarian-­Hungarian History Commission, 2017. Deudney, D. “Geopolitics and Change.” In New Thinking in International Relations Theory, edited M. Doyle and J.  G. Ikenberry, 91–123. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999. Deutsch, K. W., and D. J. Singer. “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability.” World Politics 16, no. 3 (1964): 390–406.

213

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Devonshire-­Ellis, C. “China’s String of Pearls Strategy.” China Briefing, March 18, 2009. Dhondt, F. “From Contract to Treaty: The L ­ egal Transformation of the Spanish Succession 1659–1713.” Journal of the History of International Law 13 (2011): 347–375. Dickinson, G. L. The Eu­ro­pean Anarchy. New York: Macmillan, 1917. Diehl, P. F. “Contiguity and Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816–1980.” Journal of Politics 47, no. 4 (1985): 1203–1211. Dreifort, J. E. “The French Popu­lar Front and the Franco-­Soviet Pact, 1936–37: A Dilemma in Foreign Policy.” Journal of Con­temporary History 11 (1976): 217–236. Dugdale, E.T.S. German Diplomatic Documents, 1871–­1914 Volume I: Bismarck’s Relations with ­England, 1871–1890. London: Methuen, 1928. —­—. German Diplomatic Documents, 1871–1914 Volume II: From Bismarck’s Fall to 1898. London: Methuen, 1928. —­—. German Diplomatic Documents, 1871–1914 Volume III: The Growing Antagonism, 1898–­1910. London: Methuen, 1928. —­—. German Diplomatic Documents, 1871–1914 Volume IV: The Descent to the Abyss, 1911–­1914. London: Methuen, 1928. Dwyer, P. G. “Self-­Interest versus the Common Cause: Austria, Prus­sia and Rus­sia against Napoleon.” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 4 (2008): 605–632. Ehlert, H., M. Epkenhans, and G. P. Gross. The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014. Elliott, J. H. “Ottoman-­Habsburg Rivalry: The Eu­ro­pean Perspective.” In Suleyman the Second (I.e. the First) and His Time, edited by C. Kafadar and H. ĪnalcIk, 153–162. Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993. —­—. Richelieu and Olivares. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. —­—. “War and Peace in Eu­rope 1618–1648.” In 1648: War and Peace, edited by K. Bussmann and H. Schilling, 23–39. Strasbourg: Council of Eu­rope, 1998. Elman, C. “Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and Amer­i­ca’s Rise to Regional Hegemony.” American Po­liti­cal Science Review 98, no. 4 (2004): 563–576. Elmreich, E. C. The Diplomacy of the Balkan War, 1912–1913. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938. Falkner, J. The War of the Spanish Succession 1701–1714. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2015. Fay  S.  B. Documents diplomatiques français (1871–1914). 2e série (1901–1911), tome VIII. Paris: Alfred Costes/L’Eu­rope nouvelle, 1935. —­—. “The Kaiser’s Secret Negotiations with the Tsar, 1904–1905.” American Historical Review 24, no. 1 (1918): 48–72. —­—. The Origins of the World War, a­ fter Sarajevo, Vol. 2. New York: F ­ ree Press, 1966. Fazal, T.  M. “Dead Wrong? B ­ attle Deaths, Military Medicine, and Exaggerated Reports of War’s Demise.” International Security 39, no. 1 (2014): 95–125. Fazal, T. M., and P. Poast. “War Is Not Over: What the Optimists Get Wrong about Conflict.” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 6 (2019): 74–83. Fearon, J.  D. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organ­ization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414.

214

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ferguson, N. “Germany and the Origins of the First World War.” Historical Journal 35, no. 3 (1992): 725–752. —­—. The Pity of War. London: Penguin, 1998. Fettweis, C.  J. Dangerous Times? The International Politics of G ­ reat Power Peace. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010. Fischer, F. Germany’s Aims in the First World War. New York: Norton, 1967. —­—. World Power or Decline. New York: Norton, 1974. Florinsky, M. T. “The Rus­sian Mobilization of 1914.” Po­liti­cal Science Quarterly 42, no. 2 (1927): 203–227. Fodor, P. “Ottoman Policy ­towards Hungary, 1520–1541.” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 45, no. 2/3 (1991): 271–345. Foley, R. T. “The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan.” War in History 10, no. 2 (2003): 222–232. Förster, S. “Dreams and Nightmares: German Military Leadership and the Images of ­Future Warfare, 1871–1914.” In Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914, edited by M.  F. Boemeke, R. Chickering, and S. Förster, 343–376. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Fraser, D. Frederick the ­Great: King of Prus­sia. London: Allen Lane, 2000. Fremont-­Barnes, G. The French Revolutionary Wars. Chicago: Osprey, 2001. Friedberg, L. A. “The F ­ uture of U.S.-­China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 7–45. Fritz, F. War of Illusions. New York: Norton, 1975. Frye, A. “China Should Send 30,000 Troops into North ­Korea.” Foreign Policy, November 28, 2017. Fuller, J.  V. “The War-­Scare of 1875.” American Historical Review 24, no.  2 (1919): 196–226. Ganguly, S. “The Doklam Dispute in Context: China Is Drawing India’s Neighbors Closer to Beijing.” Foreign Affairs, August 9, 2017. —­—. “Think Again: India’s Rise.” Foreign Policy, July 5, 2012. Ganguly, S., and N. Howenstein. “India-­Pakistan Rivalry in Af­ghan­i­stan.” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009): 127–140. Garver, J. W., and F. Wang. “China’s Anti-­encirclement Strug­gle.” Asian Security 6, no. 3 (2010): 238–261. Geiss, I. German Foreign Policy 1871–­1914, Volume IX. London: Routledge, 1976. —­—. July 1914, the Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents. New York: Scribner’s, 1967. —­—. “The Outbreak of the First World War and German War Aims.” Journal of Con­temporary History 1, no. 3 (1966): 75–91. Gerd, L. Rus­sian Policy in the Orthodox East: The Patriarchate of Constantinople (1878– 1914). Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. German Foreign Ministry. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series C. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959. —­—. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–45, Series D. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959. Gestrich, A., and H. P. von Strandmann, eds. Bid for World Power? New Research on the Outbreak of the First World War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

215

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gibbons, H. A. The New Map of Eu­rope (1911–1914): The Story of the Recent Eu­ro­pean Diplomatic Crises and Wars and of Eu­ rope’s Pre­ sent Catastrophe. New York: ­Century, 1916. Gilley, B., and A. Nathan. China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files. New York: New York Review of Books, 2003. Gilpin, R. “The Theory of Hegemonic War.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591–613. —­—. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Glaser, C. L. Rational Theory of International Politics. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2010. —­—. “The Security Dilemma Revisited.” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171–201. Glaser, C. L., and C. Kaufmann. “What Is the Offense-­Defense Balance and Can We Mea­sure It?” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 44–82. Goldstein, A. “First ­Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-­ China Relations.” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 49–89. Goldstein, L. J. “A Russian-­Chinese Fight over Damansky Island Almost Started World War III.” National Interest, August 20, 2020. —­—. “China’s Biggest Fear: U.S.-­Indian Encirclement.” National Interest, February 11, 2015. Gordon, M. R. “Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Cases.” Journal of Modern History 46, no. 2 (1974): 191–226. Grau, L. W. Fighting with an Encirclement: A Comparison of National Concepts. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1991. Gray, C.  S. “Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order.” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 6 (2015): 873–897. Green, B. R. The Revolution That Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Green, B. R., and A. Long. “The MAD Who ­Wasn’t T ­ here: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance.” Security Studies 26, no. 4 (2017): 606–641. Greengrass, M. France in the Age of Henri IV: The Strug­gle for Stability. London: Routledge, 1984. Grieco, J. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organ­ization 42, no. 3 (1988): 485–508. Gross, G.  P. The Myth and Real­ity of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016. Gross, L. “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948.” American Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (1948): 20–41. Guicciardini, F. Storia d’Italia. Bologna: Einaudi, 1997. Gutmann, M. P. “The Origins of the Thirty Years War.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988): 749–770. Gwyn, P. “Wolsey’s Foreign Policy: The Conferences at Calais and Bruges Reconsidered.” Historical Journal 23, no. 4 (1980): 755–772. Haffner, S. The Rise and Fall of Prus­sia. Lexington, MA: Plunkett Lake, 2019. Hale, F. A. “Fritz Fischer and the History of World War I.” History Teacher 9 (1976): 258–279. Hall, C.  R. The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War. London: Routledge, 2000.

216

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hamerow, T. S., ed. The Age of Bismarck: Documents and Interpretations. New York: Harper & Row, 1973. Hamilton, R. F., and H. H. Herwig, eds. Decisions for War, 1914–1917. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Hanson, D. V. A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War. New York: Random House, 2005. Hargreaves, J. D. “The Origin of the Anglo-­French Military Conversations in 1905.” History 36, no. 128 (1954): 244–248. Hartshorne, R. “The Franco-­German Boundary of 1871.” World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950): 209–250. Hass, M.  L. The Ideological Origins of G ­ reat Power Politics, 1789–1989. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. Hattendorf, J. B. “Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition: British ­Grand Strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–1713.” In ­Grand Strategies in War and Peace, edited by P. Kennedy, 185–214. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991. Hatton, R. M. “Louis XIV and His Fellow Monarchs.” In Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship, edited by J.  C. Rule, 155–195. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969. Hawkins, C., and R. R. Love. The New ­Great Game; Chinese Views on Central Asia. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2006. Hayden, M. J. “Continuity in the France of Henry IV and Louis XIII: French Foreign Policy, 1598–1615.” Journal of Modern History 45, no. 1 (1973): 1–23. Helfferrich, T. The Thirty Years War: A Documented History. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009. Herbst, J. “The Coming Russian-­Chinese Clash.” National Interest, August 21, 2020. Herrmann, D. G. The Arming of Eu­rope and the Making of the First World War. Prince­ ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1996. Herwig, H. H. The First World War: Germany and Austria-­Hungary, 1914–­1918. London: Bloomsbury, 1996. Herz, J. H. “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950): 157–180. Hewitson, M. Germany and the ­Causes of the First World War. London: Bloomsbury, 2004. —­—. “Images of the ­Enemy: German Depictions of the French Military, 1890–1914.” War in History 11, no. 1 (2004): 4–33. Hiden, J. Germany and Eu­rope 1919–­1939. London: Routledge, 1993. Higonnet, P. L. “The Origins of the Seven Years’ War.” Journal of Modern History 40, no. 1 (1968): 57–90. Hildebrand, K. The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Hillgruber, A. Germany and the Two World Wars. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. Hinsley, F.  H. British Foreign Policy ­under Sir Edward Grey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Hitler, A. Hitler’s Secret Book. New York: Grove, 1962. —­—. Mein Kampf. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925.

217

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—­—. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922–­August 1939. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942. Hochedlinger, M. Austria’s Wars of Emergence: War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797. London: Pearson Education, 2003. Holborn, H. A History of Modern Germany: 1648–1840. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1982. Hopf, T. “Polarity, the Offense-­Defense Balance, and War.” American Po­liti­cal Science Review 85, no. 2 (1991): 475–493. Hopkirk, P. The ­Great Game: The Strug­gle for Empire in Central Asia. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994. Howard, M. The Franco-­Prussian War: The German Invasion of France 1870–1871. London: Rupert Hart-­Davis, 1961. Hunter, R. “The Ukraine Crisis: Why and What Now?,” Survival 64, no. 1 (2022): 7–28. Huth, P. K. Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. Hutton, R. “The Making of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668–1670.” Historic Journal 29, no. 2 (1986): 297–318. Huxley, A. “The Lust for Power and Money.” In The Thirty Years’ War: Prob­lems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, edited by T. K. Rabb, 79–82. Boston: Heath, 1964. Ikenberry, J.  G. ­After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order a­ fter Major Wars. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2000. de Illescas, G. Segunda parte de la historia pontifical y cathólica, en la qual se prosigven las vidas y hechos de Clemento Quinto y de los demás pontifíces sus pre­de­ces­sores hasta Pio Quinto. Madrid: Melchor Sanchez, 1652. Imlay, T. C. “A Reassessment of Anglo-­French Strategy during the Phony War, 1939–1940.” En­glish Historical Review 119, no. 481 (2004): 333–372. International Co­ali­tion. Documents of the American Association for International Conciliation, 1920. London: Forgotten Books, 2017. Israel, J. I. “A Conflict of Empires: Spain and the Netherlands 1618–1648.” Past & Pre­sent 76 (1977): 34–74. Jaison, C. “Is Asia Ready for an Indo-­Russian Order?” The Diplomat, September 6, 2019. Jarausch, K. “The Illusion of ­Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’s Calculated Risk, July 1914.” Central Eu­ro­pean History 2 (1969): 48–76. Jelavich, B. “British Means of Offense against Rus­sia in the Nineteenth ­Century.” Rus­sian History 1, no. 2 (1974): 119–135. —­—. St.  Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974. —­—. The Ottoman Empire, the ­Great Powers and the Straits Question, 1870–1887. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. Jervis, R. “Arms Control, Stability, and ­Causes of War.” Daedalus 120, no. 1 (1991): 167–181. —­—. “Cooperation ­under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214. —­—. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1976.

218

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—­—. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the prospects for Armageddon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. Joll, J. “The 1914 Debate Continues: Fritz Fischer and His Critics.” In The Origins of the First World War: ­Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims, edited by H. W. Koch, 30–45. London: Macmillan, 1972. Joshi, N., and R. K. Sharma. “India-­Russia Relations in a Changing Eurasian Perspective.” India Quarterly 73, no. 1 (2017): 36–52. Kaiser, T. E. “A Tale of Two Narratives: The French Revolution in International Context, 1787–1793.” In A Companion to the French Revolution, edited by P. McPhee, 162–180. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Kamen, H. The War of Succession in Spain 1700–15. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969. Kantorowicz, H. The Spirit of British Policy and the Myth of the Encirclement of Germany. New York: Oxford University Press, 1932. Ka­pi­la, S. “Bangladesh-­China Defence Cooperation: Strategic Implication.” South Asian Research Group Papers 582 (January 14, 2003). Kaplan, H. H. The First Partition of Poland. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1962. —­—. Rus­sia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years’ War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. Kaplan, R. D. The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the B ­ attle against Fate. New York: Random House, 2013. Kautsky, K. Outbreak of the World War: German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky and Edited by Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking. Translated by the Car­ne­gie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924. Keck, Z. “To Hedge Its Bets, Rus­sia Is Surrounding China.” The Diplomat, November 5, 2013. Kehr, E. “Anglophobia and Weltpolitik.” In Economic Interest, Militarism and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History, edited by G. A. Craig, 22–49. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Keiger, J.F.V. France and the Origins of the First World War. London: Macmillan, 1983. —­—. Raymond Poincaré. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Keithly, D. M. “Did Rus­sia Also Have War Aims in 1914?” East Eu­ro­pean Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1987): 137–145. Kellogg, T. “The China-­India Border Standoff: What Does Beijing Want?” Foreign Policy, September 1, 2017. Keniston, H. “Peace Negotiations between Charles V and Francis I (1537–1538).” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 102, no. 2 (1958): 142–147. Kennan, G.  F. The Decline of Bismarck’s Eu­ro­pean Order: Franco-­Russian Relations, 1875–­1890. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1979. —­—. The Fateful Alliance: France, Rus­sia, and the Coming of the First World War. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1984. Kennedy, P. M. The Rise and Fall of ­Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1989. Khoo, N. “Breaking the Ring of Encirclement: The Sino-­Soviet Rift and Chinese Policy ­toward Vietnam, 1964–1968.” Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 1 (2010): 3–42.

219

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Khrushchev, N. Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Boston: ­Little, Brown, 1990. Khurana, G. “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ and Its Security Implications.” Strategic Analy­sis 32, no. 1 (2008): 1–39. Kim, W. “Power, Alliance, and Major Wars, 1816–1975.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 2 (1989): 255–273. Kindleberger, C.  P. A Financial History of Western Eu­rope. London: Routledge, 1984. King, G., R. O. Keohane, and S. Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1994. Kirshner, J. “Rationalist Explanations for War?” Security Studies 10, no. 1 (2000): 143–150. —­—. “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China.” Eu­ro­pean Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (2012): 53–75. Kissinger, H. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. —­—. On China. New York: Penguin, 2011. Kitchen, N., ed. India: The Next Superpower. London: London School of Economics, 2012. Knecht, R. J. Francis I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. —­—. Re­nais­sance Warrior and Patron: The Reign of Francis I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Koch, H. W. A History of Prus­sia. London: Routledge, 1978. —­—. Introduction to The Origins of the First World War: G ­ reat Power Rivalry and German War Aims, edited by H. W. Koch, 1–29. London: Macmillan, 1972. Konnert, M. Early Modern Eu­rope: The Age of Religious War, 1559–­1715. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006. Krasner, S. D. “Westphalia and All That.” In Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Po­liti­cal Change, edited by J. Goldstein and R.  O. Keohane, 235–264. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. Krepon, M., and C. Gagné, eds. The Stability-­Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia. Washington, DC: Henry  L. Stimson Center, 2001. Kroenig, M. The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority ­Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Kronstadt, K. A. U.S.-­India Bilateral Agreement in 2005. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Ser­vice, 2005. Krumeich, G. Armaments and Politics in France on the Eve of the First World War: The Introduction of Three-­Year Conscription, 1913–­1914. Oxford: Berg, 1984. Kuehn, J. T. “Is Syrian-­Related Vio­lence the Beginning of the Muslim World’s Thirty Years’ War?” Foreign Policy, June 27, 2013. Kumar, A. “China-­Pakistan Nexus: The Aim Is to Encircle India.” The Tribune, December 6, 2006. Kupchan, C. A. The Vulnerability of Empire. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. Kydd, A. H. “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other.” Security Studies 7, no. 1 (1997): 114–155. Lafore, L. The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I. Philadelphia: Critical Periods of History, 1965. 220

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lai, D. Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004. Lake, D. A. “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War.” International Security 35, no. 3 (2010/11): 7–52. Langdon-­Davies, J. Carlos: The King Who Would Not Die. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963. Langer, W. L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902. New York: Knopf, 1960. —­—. Eu­ro­pean Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890. New York: Knopf, 1931. —­—. The Franco-­Russian Alliance, 1890–1894. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929. Lawson, G. R. “A Thirty Years’ War in the ­Middle East.” National Interest, February 8, 2018. Layne, C. “Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain’s G ­ rand Strategy Revisited.” Security Studies 17, no. 3 (2008): 397–437. Lebow, R. N., and B. Valentino. “Lost in Transition: A Critical Analy­sis of Power Transition Theory.” International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): 389–410. Lee, M.  M., and W. Michalka. German Foreign Policy 1919–­1933: Continuity or Break? Leamington Spa, UK: Berg, 1987. Le Fur, D. Charles VIII. Paris: Perrin, 2006. Lemonnier, H. La Lutte contre la maison d’Austriche: La France sous Henry II. Paris: Tallandier, 1904. de Leva, G. Storia documentata di Carlo V in correlazione all’Italia, Volume I. Venice: Naratovich, 1863. —­—. Storia documentata di Carlo V in correlazione all’Italia, Volume II. Venice: Naratovich, 1863. —­—. Storia documentata di Carlo V in correlazione all’Italia, Volume III. Venice: Naratovich, 1863. Levy, J. S. “Alliance Formation and War Be­hav­ior: An Analy­sis of the G ­ reat Powers, 1495–1975.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 4 (1981): 581–613. —­—. “Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design.” In Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, edited by J. A. Vasquez and C. Elman, 128–153. Upper ­Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2002. —­—. “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War.” World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987): 82–107. —­—. “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analy­sis.” International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1984): 219–238. —­—. “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July  1914.” International Security 15, no. 3 (1990–1991): 151–186. —­—. “Preventive War and Domestic Politics.” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008): 1–24. —­—. “Preventive War: Concepts and Propositions.” International Interactions 37, no. 1 (2011): 87–96. —­—. War in the Modern G ­ reat Power System, 1495–1975. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983. Levy, J. S., T. J. Christensen, and M. Trachtenberg. “Correspondence: Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis.” International Security 16, no. 1 (1991): 189–203. Levy, J. S., and J. Snyder. “Correspondence: Every­one’s Favored Year for War—or Not?” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 208–217. 221

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Levy, J. S., and W. R. Thompson. “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 7–43. —­—. ­Causes of War. Chichester, UK: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2010. —­—. “Hegemonic Threats and Great-­Power Balancing in Eu­rope, 1495–1999.” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 1–33. Levy, J. S., and J. A. Vasquez. “Introduction: Historians, Po­liti­cal Scientists, and the ­Causes of the First World War.” In The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-­Making, edited by J. S. Levy and J. A. Vasquez, 3–29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Lieber, K. A. “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-­Defense Balance and International Security.” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 71–104. —­—. “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory.” International Security 32, no. 2 (2007): 155–191. Lieber, K. A., and D. G. Press. Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st ­Century: Understanding Adversary Incentives and Options for Nuclear Escalation. PASCC Report no. 2013-001. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2013. —­—. The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020. —­—. “The Rise of Nuclear Primacy.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 42–54. Lieven, D. Rus­sia against Napoleon: The ­Battle for Eu­rope, 1807 to 1814. London: Penguin, 2009. —­—. ­Towards the Flame. Empire, War, and the End of the Tsarist Empire. London: Penguin, 2015. Liff, A. P., and G. J. Ikenberry. “Racing ­toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia-­Pacific and the Security Dilemma.” International Security 39, no. 2 (2014): 52–91. ­Little, R. Balance of Power in International Relations: Meta­phors, Myths, and Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Lossky, A. “France in the System of Eu­rope in the Seventeenth ­Century.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 1 (1974): 32–48. —­—. Louis XIV and the French Monarchy. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994. Lukowski, J. The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795. London: Routledge, 1999. Lüthi, L. M. The Sino-­Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2008. Lynn, J. A. The War of Louis XIV 1667–1714. London: Routledge, 1999. Lynn-­Jones, S. M. “Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-­German Relations, 1911–1914.” International Security 11, no. 2 (1986): 121–150. —­—. “Offense-­Defense Theory and Its Critics.” Security Studies 4, no.  4 (1995): 660–691. MacDonald, P. K., and J. M. Parent. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of ­Great Power Retrenchment.” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 7–44. Macfie, A. L. The Eastern Question 1774–­1923. London: Routledge, 1996. von Mach, E. Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the Eu­ro­pean War. New York: Macmillan, 1916. Mackinder, H.  J. “The Geo­g raph­i­cal Pivot of History.” Geo­graph­i­cal Journal 23, no. 4 (1904): 298–321. 222

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Macksey, K. Why the Germans Lose at War: The Myth of German Military Superiority. London: Greenhill Books, 1999. Magnes, J. L. Rus­sia and Germany at Brest-­Litovsk: A Documentary History of the Peace Negotiations. New York: Rand School of Social Science, 1919. Mahan, A.  T. The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783. Boston: L ­ ittle, Brown 1890. Maland, D. Eu­rope at War, 1600–50. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980. Mandelbaum, M. “Is Major War Obsolete?” Survival 40, no. 4 (1998): 20–38. Maricola, S. “The Indo-­Pacific ‘Encirclement’: How Is China Reacting?” ISPI, June 4, 2018. Markowitz, J. N., and C. J. Fariss. “Power, Proximity, and Democracy: Geopo­liti­cal Competition in the International System.” Journal of Peace Research 55, no.  1 (2018): 78–93. Marston, D. The Seven Years’ War. London: Routledge, 2001. Marx, K. The Po­liti­cal Writings. London: Verso, 2019. Mayer, M. Z. “The Price for Austria’s Security: Part II. Leopold II, the Prus­sian Threat, and the Peace of Sistova, 1790–1791.” International History Review 26, no. 3 (2004): 473–514. McDonald, P. J. The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and International Relations Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. McKay, D., and H. M. Scott. The Rise of the G ­ reat Powers: 1648–1815. London: Longman, 1983. Mclean, R. R. “Dreams of a German Eu­rope: Wilhelm II and the Treaty of Björkö of 1905.” In The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in Imperial Germany, edited by A. Mombauer and W. Deist, 119–142. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. McMeekin, S. The Rus­ sian Origins of the First World War. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2013. Mearsheimer, J. J. “Back to the ­Future: Instability in Eu­rope ­after the Cold War.” International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 5–56. —­—. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, no. 3 (1995): 5–49. —­—. “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia.” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 381–396. —­—. The Tragedy of ­Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2014. —­—. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 77–84. Medlicott, W. N. “Bismarck and the Three Emperors’ Alliance, 1881–87.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 27 (1945): 61–83. —­—. Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Eu­rope. London: Athlone, 1956. Menning, W. B. Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Rus­sian Army, 1861–1914. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. —­—. “The Mobilization Crises of 1912 and 1914 in Rus­sian Perspective: Overlooked and Neglected Linkages.” In Bid for World Power? New Research on the Outbreak of the First World War, edited by A. Gestrich and H. P. von Strandmann, 223–262. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Menon, R. “India’s Response to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean.” Asia Policy 22 (2016): 41–48. 223

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Michaud, C. “French-­ Austrian Relations in the Second Part of the Eigh­ teenth ­Century: On the Reversal of Alliances.” Revue historique 683, no. 3 (2017): 567–588. Miglani, S. “And Now the Strategic Encirclement of Pakistan.” ­Reuters, January 15, 2009. Ministère des affaires étrangères. Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914, Documents diplomatiques français, 1871– 1914. Série 3. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1929–1959. Mitchell, A. The ­Great Train Race: Railways and the Franco-­German Rivalry, 1815–1914. Oxford: Berghahn, 2000. Modelski, G. “The Long Cycles of Global Politics and the Nation-­State.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 20, no. 2 (1978): 214–235. Mombauer, A. “Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-­Year Debate on the Origins of World War I.” Central Eu­ro­pean History 48, no. 4 (2015): 541–564. —­—. The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus. London: Routledge, 2002. —­—. The Origins of the First World War: Diplomatic and Military Documents. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2013. Mommsen, W. J. “Domestic ­Factors in German Foreign Policy before 1914.” Central Eu­ro­pean History 6, no. 1 (1973): 3–43. Monger, G.  W. The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900–1907. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1963. Monteiro, N. Theory of Unipolar Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Moor­house, R. The Dev­ils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939–1941. London: Basic Books, 2014. Morgan, P. M. “Multilateral Institutions as Restraints on Major War.” In The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, edited by R. Vayrynen, 160–184. London: Routledge, 2006. Morgenthau, H. J. Politics among Nations. New York: Knopf, 1978. Morrow, J. D., and W. Kim. “Why Do Power Shifts Lead to War?” American Journal of Po­liti­cal Science 36, no. 4 (1992): 896–922. Moses, J. A. The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography. Brisbane, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1975. Mousseau, M. “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual Peace.” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 160–196. Mueller, J. Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books, 1989. Narang, V. Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2014. Nexon, D. H. The Strug­gle for Power in Early Modern Eu­rope: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2009. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the ­People’s Republic of China 2019. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019. Oren, I. “The War Proneness of Alliances.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 2 (1990): 208–233.

224

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Organski, A. F. K., and J. Kugler. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Osho. The Book of Secrets: 112 Meditations to Discover the Mystery Within. New York: St. Martin’s, 2010. Osiander, A. “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth.” International Organ­ization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251–287. Otte, T. G. July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. —­—. “ ‘Outcast from History’: The Fischer Controversy and British Historiography.” Journal of Con­temporary History 48, no. 2 (2013): 376–396. Paddock, T.R.E. Contesting the Origins of the First World War: An Historiographical Argument. London: Routledge, 2019. Paine, S. G. Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008. Pakula, H. An Uncommon ­Woman. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. Pande, A. Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India. London: Routledge, 2011. Pant, H. V., and Y. Joshi. “The American ‘Pivot’ and the Indian Navy.” Naval War College Review 68, no. 1 (2015): 47–69. Parker, G. The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–­1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. —­—. Emperor: A New Life of Charles V. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019. —­—. The Thirty Years’ War. London: Routledge, 1984. Parrott, D. “The ­Causes of the Franco-­Spanish War of 1635–1659.” In The Origins of War in Early Modern Eu­rope, edited by J. Black, 72–111. Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987. —­—. “The Mantuan Succession, 1627–1631: A Sovereignty Dispute in Early Modern Eu­rope.” En­glish Historical Review 112, no. 445 (1997): 20–65. —­—. Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pehrson, C. String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power across the Asian Littoral. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2006. Peters, R. “The Real Lesson of the Thirty Years’ War for T ­ oday.” Military History in the News, Hoover Institution, April 16, 2014. https://­www​.­hoover​.­org​/­research​ /­real​-­lesson​-­thirty​-­years​-­war​-­today. Petrelli, N., and G. Pulcini. “Nuclear Superiority in the Age of Parity: US Planning, Intelligence Analy­sis, Weapons Innovation and the Search for a Qualitative Edge 1969–1976.” International History Review 40, no. 5 (2018): 1191–1209. Pierson, P. Philip II of Spain. London: Thames & Hudson, 1981. Pillsbury, M. The Hundred-­Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace Amer­i­ca as the Global Superpower. Chicago: Griffin, 2016. Pinker, S. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Vio­lence Has Declined. London: Penguin, 2012. Pitts, V. J. Henri IV of France: His Reign and Age. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

225

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Potter, D. Re­nais­sance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480–1560. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 2008. Powell, R. “Nuclear Brinkmanship, ­Limited War, and Military Power.” International Organ­ization 69, no. 3 (2015): 589–626. —­—. “War as a Commitment Prob­lem.” International Organ­ization 60, no. 1 (2006): 169–204. Quester, G. Deterrence before Hiroshima. New York: Wiley, 1966. Rady, M. The Emperor Charles V. London: Routledge, 1988. Read, A., and D. Fisher. The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin, and the Nazi-­Soviet Pact 1939–1941. New York: Norton, 1999. Redman, H. J. Frederick the ­Great and the Seven Years’ War, 1756–1763. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015. Reed, J. “Surrounded: How the U.S. Is Surrounding China with Military Bases.” Foreign Policy, August 20, 2013. Reiter, D. “Explaining the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive War Almost Never Happen.” International Security 20, no. 2 (1995): 5–34. Reston, J. Defenders of the Faith: Charles V, Suleyman the Magnificent, and the ­Battle for Eu­rope, 1520–1536. London: Penguin, 2009. Rich, D. A. The Tsar’s Col­o­nels: Professionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in Late Imperial Rus­sia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. Rich, N. Hitler’s War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion. New York: Norton, 1973. Richardson, G. The Field of Cloth of Gold. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013. Rid, T. “Cyber War W ­ ill Not Take Place.” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012): 5–32. Ripsman, N. M., and J. S. Levy. “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s.” International Security 33, no. 2 (2008): 148–181. Ritter, G. The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth. London: Oswald Wolff, 1958. —­—. The Sword and the Scepter: The Prob­lem of Militarism in Germany, Vol. 2: The Eu­ro­ pean Powers and the Wilhelminian Empire, 1890–1914. Miami: University of Miami Press, 1972. Roberts, G. “The Alliance That Failed: Moscow and the T ­ riple Alliance Negotiations, 1939.” Eu­ro­pean History Quarterly 26, no. 3 (1996): 383–414. Röhl, J.C.G. From Bismarck to Hitler: The Prob­lem of Continuity in German History. London: Longman, 1970. —­—. “Goodbye to All That (Again)? The Fischer Thesis, the New Revisionism and the Meaning of the First World War.” International Affairs 91, no. 1 (2015): 153–166. —­—. Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Roider, K.  A. “The Pragmatic Sanction.” Austrian History Yearbook 8 (1972): 153– 158. Rolo, P.J.V. Entente Cordiale: The Origins and Negotiation of the Anglo-­French Agreements of 8 April 1904. New York: St. Martin’s, 1969. Rommelse, G. The Second Anglo-­Dutch War (1665–­1667): Raison d’état, Mercantilism and Maritime Strife. Hilversum, the Netherlands: Verloren, 2006. Rosato, S. “The Inscrutability of ­Great Power Intentions.” International Security 39, no. 3 (2014–2015): 48–88.

226

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rose, H. J. “­Great Britain and the Dutch Question in 1787–1788.” American Historical Review 14, no. 2 (1909): 262–283. Rosecrance, R. N. Rise of the Trading State. New York: Basic Books, 1986. Rosen, M., and R. Wolfson. “How to Break the ­Legal Logjam in the South China Sea.” National Interest, November 3, 2019. Rothenberg, G. E. “The Origins, ­Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no.  4 (1988): 771–793. Rothwell, V. The Origins of the Second World War. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001. Rule, J. C. “The Enduring Rivalry of France and Spain ca. 1462–1700.” In ­Great Power Rivalries, edited by W. R. Thompson, 31–59. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999. Rumer, E., and R. Sokolsky. Thirty Years of U.S. Policy t­ oward Rus­sia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken? Washington, DC: Car­ne­gie Endowment for International Peace, June 20, 2019. Sabrosky, A. N. “Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War.” In The Correlates of War, vol. 2, edited by D. J. Singer, 161–198. New York: ­Free Press, 1980. Sanuto, M. La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia. Venice: M. Visentini, 1883. Sater, W. F. Chile and the War of the Pacific. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985. Schelling, C. T. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966. Schilling, M. F., ed. How the War Began in 1914: Being the Diary of the Rus­sian Foreign Office from the 3rd  to the 20th  (Old Style) of July, 2014. 2 vols. London: Allen & Unwin, 1925. Schmidt, G. “Contradictory Postures and Conflicting Objectives: The July Crisis.” In Escape into War? The Foreign Policy of Imperial Germany, edited by G. Schollgen, 135–160. New York: St. Martin’s, 1990. Schmitt, B. E. ­Triple Alliance and ­Triple Entente. New York: Howard Fertig, 1961. Schroeder, P. W. “The Life and Death of a Long Peace, 1763–1914.” In The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, edited by R. Vayrynen, 33–63. London, Routledge, 2006. —­—. The Transformation of Eu­ro­pean Politics, 1763–1848. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994. —­—. “World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak.” In The Origins of the First World War: ­Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims, edited by H. W. Koch, 101–127. London: Macmillan, 1972. Schweizer, K. W. ­England, Prus­sia, and the Seven Years War: Studies in Alliance Policies and Diplomacy. Lewiston, UK: Edwin Mellen, 1989. Schweller, R. L. Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. —­—. “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics 44, no. 2 (1992): 235–269. —­—. “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing.” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 159–201. Scott, D. “The G ­ reat Power ‘­Great Game’ between India and China: ‘The Logic of Geography.’ ” Geopolitics 13, no. 1 (2008): 1–26.

227

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Scott, H. M. “Aping the G ­ reat Powers: Frederick the G ­ reat and the Defence of Prus­ sia’s International Position, 1763–86.” German History 12, no. 3 (1994): 286–307. —­—. The Birth of a ­Great Power System, 1740–­1815. Hoboken, NJ: Taylor & Francis, 2014. —­—. “Prus­sia’s Emergence as a Eu­ro­pean G ­ reat Power, 1740–1763.” In The Rise of Prus­sia, 1700–1830, edited by P. G. Dwyer, 177–200. London: Routledge, 2000. Scott, W. E. Alliance against Hitler: The Origins of the Franco-­Soviet Pact. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1962. Seabury, P. A., ed. Balance of Power. San Francisco: Chandler, 1965. Sempa, F. P. Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st ­Century. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002. Senese, P. D., and J. A. Vasquez. The Steps to War: An Empirical Study. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2008. Seton-­Watson, R. W. Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question. London: Norton, 1972. Shachtman, T. The Phony War, 1939–1940. New York: Harper & Row, 1982. Shambaugh, D. “U.S.-­China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence?” International Security 42, no. 4 (2018): 85–127. Shaw, C. The Italian Wars 1494–1559. London: Routledge, 2019. Shennan, M. The Rise of Brandenburg Prus­sia. London: Routledge, 1997. Shifrinson, J. Rising Titans, Falling G ­ iants: How G ­ reat Powers Exploit Power Shifts. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018. Shore, Z. “Hitler’s Opening Gambit: Intelligence, Encirclement, and the Decision to Ally with Poland.” Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 3 (1999): 103–122. Showalter, D. E. “Total War for ­Limited Objectives: An Interpretation of German ­Grand Strategy.” In ­Grand Strategies in War and Peace, edited by P. M. Kennedy, 105–124. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991. Shukla, A. “How China and India Came to Lethal Blows.” New York Times, June 19, 2020. Siegel, J. “The Rise of the Franco-­Russian Financial Alliance, 1894–1903.” In For Peace and Money: French and British Finance in the Ser­vice of Tsars and Commissars, edited by J. Siegel, 12–49. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Simms, B. Eu­rope: The Strug­gle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Pre­sent. New York: Basic Books, 2014. —­—. Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire. London: Penguin, 2008. Simpson, J. Y. The Saburov Memoirs: Or, Bismarck and Rus­sia: Being Fresh Light on the League of the Three Emperors, 1881. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929. Singer, D. J., S. Bremer, and J. Stuckey. “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” In Peace, War, and Numbers, edited by B. Russett, 19–48. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972. Singh, A. I. “India’s Relations with Rus­sia and Central Asia.” International Affairs 71, no. 1 (1995): 69–81. Singh, J. J. The McMahon Line: A ­Century of Discord. New York: HarperCollins, 2019. Smith, A. “Alliance Formation and War.” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4 (1995): 405–425. Smith, W. D. The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

228

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Snyder, G.  H. “Alliances, Balance, and Stability.” International Organ­ization 45, no. 1 (1991): 121–142. —­—. “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror.” In The Balance of Power, edited by Paul Seabury, 185–201. San Francisco: Chandler, 1965. —­—. “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 461–495. Snyder, J. “Better Now than ­Later: The Paradox of 1914 as Every­one’s Favored Year for War.” International Security 39, no. 1 (2014): 71–94. —­—. “Civil-­Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984.” International Security 9, no. 1 (1984): 108–146. —­—. The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. —­—. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. Sonnino, P. “Louis XIV and the Dutch War.” In Louis XIV and Eu­rope, edited by R. M. Hatton, 153–178. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969. Spruyt, H. “Normative Transformations in International Relations and the Waning of Major War.” In The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, edited by R. Vayrynen, 185–206. London, Routledge, 2006. —­—. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1994. Spykman, N. J. “Geography and Foreign Policy I.” American Po­liti­cal Science Review 32, no. 1 (1938): 29–30. —­—. The Geography of the Peace. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944. Starr, H., and D. G. Thomas. “The Nature of Borders and International Conflict: Revising Hypotheses on Territory.” International Studies Quarterly 49, no.  1 (2005): 123–140. Stein, A. A. “When Misperception ­Matters.” World Politics 34, no. 4 (1982): 505–526. Steinberg, S.  H. The “Thirty Years War” and the Conflict for Eu­ro­pean Hegemony 1600–1660. London: Edward Arnold, 1966. Stevenson, D. Armaments and the Coming of War: Eu­rope, 1904–1914. Oxford: Clarendon, 1996. —­—. Cataclysm: The First World War as Po­liti­cal Tragedy. New York: Basic Books, 2004. —­—. “Militarization and Diplomacy in Eu­rope before 1914.” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 125–161. —­—. “War by Timetable? The Railway Race before 1914.” Past & Pre­sent 162 (1999): 163–194. Stoakes, G. Hitler and the Quest for World Dominion. Leamington Spa, UK: Berg, 1986. Stone, J. “Bismarck and the ­Great Game: Germany and Anglo-­Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1871–1890.” Central Eu­ro­pean History 48, no. 2 (2015): 151–175. Stone, J., and W. Baumgart. The War Scare of 1875: Bismarck and Eu­rope in the Mid1870s. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010. Stone, N. “Moltke and Conrad: Relations between the Austro-­Hungarian and German General Staffs, 1909–1914.” Historical Journal 9, no. 2 (1966): 201–228. Stradling, R. A. “Olivares and the Origins of the Franco-­Spanish War, 1627–1635.” En­glish Historical Review 101, no. 398 (1986): 68–94.

229

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—­—. “Prelude to Disaster: The Precipitation of the War of the Mantuan Succession, 1627–1629.” Historical Journal 33, no. 4 (1990): 769–785. —­—. Spain’s Strug­gle for Eu­rope, 1598–1668. London: Hambledon, 1994. Sumida, J. “Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician.” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 2 (1999): 39–62. Sumner, B. H. Rus­sia and the Balkans, 1870–1880. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2002. Sutherland, N.  M. “The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of Eu­ro­pean Politics.” En­glish Historical Review 107, no. 424 (1992): 587–625. Sutton, J. L. The King’s Honor and the King’s Cardinal: The War of the Polish Succession. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1980. Symcox, G. “Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years War.” In Louis XIV and Eu­rope, edited by R. Hatton, 179–212. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976. Szabo, F. The Seven Years’ War in Eu­rope 1756–1763. London: Routledge, 2007. Taffs, W. “The War Scare of 1875 (I).” Slavonic and East Eu­ro­pean Review 9, no. 26 (30): 335–349. Taliaferro, J. W. “Security Seeking ­under Anarchy.” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000/2001): 128–161. Talmadge, C. “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States.” International Security 41, no. 4 (2017): 50–92. Tang, S. “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analy­sis.” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 587–623. Tannenwald, N. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-­Use.” International Organ­ization 53, no. 3 (1999): 433–468. Tannenwald, N., C. L. Glaser, A. Long, L. Freedman, and R. Jervis. “Book Review Roundtable: The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution 30 Years L ­ ater.” Texas National Security Review, April 30, 2020. Tapié, V. L. “The Overburden Statesman Driven by Events.” In The Thirty Years’ War: Prob­lems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, edited by T. K. Rabb, 86–88. Boston: Heath, 1964. Taylor, A.J.P. Origins of the Second World War. London: Hamilton, 1961. —­—. The Strug­gle for Mastery in Eu­rope, 1848–1918. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Thompson, W. C. “The September Program: Reflections on the Evidence.” Central Eu­ro­pean History 11, no. 4 (1978): 348–354. Thompson, W. R. ­Great Power Rivalries. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999. Thomson, M. A. “Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 4 (1954): 111–134. Tierney, D. “Does Chain-­Ganging Cause the Outbreak of War?” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): 285–304. Toft, M. D. “Territory and War.” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 185–198. Tooze, A. J. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy. London: Penguin, 2008.

230

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Trachtenberg, M. “French Foreign Policy in the July Crisis, 1914: A Review Article.” H-­Diplo/ISSF, December  1, 2010. https://­issforum​.­org​/­essays​/­3 ​-­f rench​ -­foreign​-­policy​-­in​-­the​-­july​-­crisis​-­1914. —­—. “New Light on 1914?” H-­Diplo/ISSF, September 5, 2017. https://­issforum​.­org​ /­forums​/­newlight1914. —­—. “Robert Jervis and the Nuclear Question.” In Psy­chol­ogy, Strategy and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations, edited by J.  W. Davis, 101–120. London: Routledge, 2013. —­—. “The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914.” International Security 15, no.  3 (1990–1991): 120–150. Trenin, D. True Partners? How Rus­sia and China See Each Other. London: Center for Eu­ro­pean Reform, 2012. Troost, W. “Leopold I, Louis XIV, William III and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession.” History 103, no. 357 (2018): 545–570. Trumpener, U. “War Premeditated? German Intelligence Operations in July 1914.” Central Eu­ro­pean History 9, no. 1 (1976): 58–85. Tucker, S. C. Wars That Changed History: 50 of the World’s Greatest Conflicts. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-­CLIO, 2015. Tunsjø, Ø. The Return of Bi­polar­ity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. Turner, H. A. “Continuity in German Foreign Policy? The Case of Stresemann.” International History Review 1, no. 4 (1979): 509–521. Turner, L.C.F. Origins of the First World War. New York: Norton, 1970. —­—. “The Rus­sian Mobilization in 1914.” Journal of Con­temporary History 3, no. 1 (1968): 65–88. Vagts, A. Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations. Whitefish, MT: Literary Licensing, 2011. Valeriano, B., B. Jensen, and R. C. Maness. Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. van Evera, S. ­Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. —­—. “Offense, Defense and the C ­ auses of War.” In Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader, edited by M. E. Brown, O. R. Coté Jr., S. M. Lynn-­ Jones, and S. E. Miller, 55–93. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. Vasquez, J.  A. Contagion and War: Lessons from the First World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. —­—. “The First World War and International Relations Theory: A Review of Books on the 100th  Anniversary.” International Studies Review 16, no.4 (2014): 623–644. —­—. The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. —­—. “When Are Power Transition Dangerous?” In Parity and War: Evaluations and Extension of the War Ledger, edited by J. Kugler and D. Lemke, 44–45. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. Vasquez, J. A., and A. Rundlett. “Alliances as a Necessary Condition of Multiparty Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 8 (2016): 1395–1418. Vincent, J. R., ed. The Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826–­1893) between 1878 and 1893: A Se­lection. Oxford: Leopard’s Head, 2003.

231

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vyvyan, J.M.K. “The Approach of the War of 1914.” In New Cambridge Modern History, Volume XII: The Shifting Balance of World Forces, 1898–1945, edited by C. L. Mowat, 140–170. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Waddington, R. Louis XV et le renversement des alliances: Préliminaires de la guerre de sept ans 1754–1756. Paris: Libraire de Firmin-­Didot, 1896. Walsh, N. P. “India Flexes Its Muscles with First Foreign Military Base.” The Guardian, April 27, 2006. Walt, S.  M. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43. —­—. “The Donald Trump–­Kaiser Wilhelm Parallels Are Getting Scary.” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2017. —­—. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987. —­—. “Rethinking the ‘Nuclear Revolution.’ ” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2010. Walter, D. The Short Victorious War: The Russo-­Japanese Conflict, 1904–5. New York: Harper & Row, 1974. Waltz, K. N. Man, the State and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. —­—. “Nuclear Myths and Po­liti­cal Realities.” American Po­liti­cal Science Review 84, no. 3 (1990): 731–746. —­—. “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.” In The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, edited by R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Rabb, 39–52. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. —­—. “The Stability of a Bipolar World.” Daedalus 93, no. 3 (1964): 881–909. —­—. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-­Wesley, 1979. Watt, D. C. “The Anglo-­German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment.” Journal of Modern History 28, no. 2 (1956): 155–175. Watts, A. The Book: On the Taboo against Knowing Who You Are. London: Vintage Books, 1999. Wedgwood, C.  V. “The Futile and Meaningless War.” In The Thirty Years’ War: Prob­lems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, edited by T. K. Rabb, 15–31. Boston: Heath, 1964. —­—. Richelieu and the French Monarchy. New York: Collier Books, 1962. —­—. The Thirty Years War. New York, Anchor Books, 1961. von Wegerer, A. “The Rus­sian Mobilization of 1914.” Po­liti­cal Science Quarterly 43, no. 2 (1928): 201–228. Westad, O. A. 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977. Washington, DC: Cold War International History Proj­ect, 1998. Westwood, J. N. A History of Rus­sian Railways. London: Allen & Unwin, 1964. Whaley, J. Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume II: The Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich, 1648–1806. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Whealey, R. H. Hitler and Spain. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005. Wheeler-­Bennett, J.  W. “From Brest-­Litovsk to Brest-­Litovsk.” Foreign Affairs 18, no. 2 (1940): 196–210. White, J.  A. Transition to Global Rivalry Alliance Diplomacy and the Qua­dru­ple Entente, 1895–1907. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Williamson, S. R. Austria-­Hungary and the Origins of the First World War. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991.

232

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—­—. “July 1914 Revisited and Revised: The Erosion of the German Paradigm.” In The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-­Making, edited by Jack Levy and John Vasquez, 30–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Wilson, C. The Transformation of Eu­rope, 1558–1648. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. Wilson, J. Strategic Partners: Russian-­Chinese Relations in the Post-­Soviet Era. London: Routledge, 2004. Wilson, K. M. “The British Démarche of 3 and 4 December 1912: H. A. Gwynne’s Note on Britain, Rus­sia and the First Balkan War.” Slavonic and Eastern Eu­ro­pean Review 62, no. 4 (1984): 552–559. Wilson, P. H. “The ­Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618–48.” En­glish Historical Review 123, no. 502 (2008): 554–586. —­—. “Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession: The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years War.” International History Review 30, no. 3 (2008): 473–514. —­—. The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. —­—. The Thirty Years War: Eu­rope’s Tragedy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. Wiskemann, E. The Rome-­Berlin Axis: A History of the Relations between Hitler and Mussolini. London: Oxford University Press, 1949. Wohlforth, W. C. “The Perception of Power: Rus­sia in the Pre-1914 Balance.” World Politics 39, no. 3 (1987): 353–381. —­—. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” International Security 24, no.  1 (1999): 5–41. Wohlforth, W. C., R. ­Little, S. J. Kaufman, D. Kang, C. A. Jones, V. T.-­B. Hui, A. Eckstein, D. Deudney, and W.  L. Brenner. “Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History.” Eu­ro­pean Journal of International Relations 13, no. 2 (2007): 155–185. Wortzel, L., and A. Scobell. Shaping China’s Security Environment: The Role of the ­People’s Liberation Army. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2006. Wu, J., and S. L. Myers. “­Battle in the Hi­ma­la­yas.” New York Times, July 18, 2020. Xu, Q. Fragile Rise: ­Grand Strategy, and the Fate of Imperial Germany, 1871–1914. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017. Yoon, Y.-­K. “Only a ­Grand Compromise between U.S. and China Can Reduce East Asian Tensions.” New Perspective Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2014): 49–51. Zhao, H. “China and India: Competing for Good Relations with Myanmar.” Journal of East Asian Affairs 22, no. 1 (2008): 175–194. Zuber, T. Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning, 1871–1914. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

233

Index

Adriatic Sea, 113 Af­ghan­i­stan, 106, 161–162, 164 African, 132, 168n14, 193n137, 193n150, 205n38 Aksai Chin, 163 Albania, 114, 186n25 Alexander III (czar), 106, 108, 131 Alfonso II (king of Naples), 48 Alps, 79 Alsace, 90–91, 104, 122, 132, 146–147, 182n99 anarchy (international), 18, 31, 35, 127 Ansbach (principality), 146 Antarctica, 168n14 Apulia, 49 Arras, 48, 55 Artois, 56 Arunachal Pradesh, 163 Asia, 69, 101, 111, 132, 160, 163, 168n14; Asia-­Pacific, 161, 204n26; Central Asia, 105–106, 111, 132, 161–163, 193n137, 206n53 Athens, 1, 160, 164–165 Augsburg (Peace), 70 August II (king of Poland), 141 August III (king of Poland), 141–142 Australia, 162 Austria, 5, 22, 27, 39, 105, 135–148; Italian Wars, 42–48, 50–51, 53, 56, 60–61, 66; Thirty Years’ War, 68–73, 75–77, 79–85, 87–90, 92–93, 95, 97, 98; World War I, 99, 102–103, 106–109, 112–121, 124, 127, 129, 132–133. See also Austria-­Hungary Austria-­Hungary, 11, 99–100, 102–103, 106–109, 112–121, 124, 127, 129, 132–133

Austrian Netherlands, 143, 146–148. See also Low Countries Austro-­Prussian War, 105, 168n17 Austro-­Turkish War, 142, 147 balancing, 13, 31, 35, 43, 169n39 Balfour, Arthur James, 133 Balkans, 63, 103–104, 106–107, 112–115, 117–119, 124, 133, 138 Baltic Sea, 68, 80, 85, 87, 137 Bangladesh, 162 bargaining model of war, 33–34 Bavaria (Elector), 84, 90, 138; War of Bavarian Succession, 146 Belgium, 129 Berlin (Treaty), 107 Bernhard of Saxe-­Weimar, 84 Bethlen Gábor, 88 Bethmann-­Hollweg, Theobald von, 114, 117–120, 129–131 Bismarck, Otto von, 6, 20, 101, 104–105, 107–109, 111, 126–127 Black Sea, 106 Bohemia, 76, 145 Bolivia, 164 Brandenburg (Elector), 53, 84–85, 136, 138 Brittany (Duchy), 44, 47–48, 50, 52; French-­Breton War, 47–48 Buda, 62 Bulgaria, 107, 115, 186n25 Bülow, Bernhard von, 109, 111, 127 Burgundy (Duchy), 44–45, 48–49, 53, 55–58, 91; War of Burgundian Succession, 44, 47 Buthan, 162

235

INDEX

Calabria, 49 Calais, 58, 61 Cambresis, 147 Canada, 11 Caprivi, Leo von, 109 Casale, 79 Caspian Sea, 162 Catalonia, 59, 91 Cerdaña, 48–49 Charles (duke of Nevers), 79–80 Charles I (king of ­England), 15 Charles II of Spain (king), 139 Charles IV (duke of Lorraine), 180n57 Charles V (Holy Roman Emperor), 5, 11, 36, 39, 42–46, 49–64, 66–68, 96; “situation,” 68, 73, 78, 80, 84, 91, 135, 137, 139–140 Charles VI (Austrian emperor), 142 Charles VIII (king of France), 48–50, 64 Charles Emmanuel (duke of Savoy), 77, 79 Charles the Bold (duke of Burgundy), 44, 55 Chile, 164 China, 2, 5–6, 43, 69, 100–101, 153, 156, 161; Chinese Communist Party, 160–161; latent encirclement, 5–6, 42, 44, 101–102, 104, 154, 156, 159–161, 164–165 Claude d’Annebault, 59 Clausewitz, Carl von, 10, 159 Clemenceau, Georges, 202n84 Clement VII (Pope), 57 Cold War, 158–161, 163, 165 Cologne (Elector), 136, 138 Conflans, 55 Constantinople, 106, 108 Corbie, 91, 94 Cordoba, Gonzalo Fernandez de, 79 Count von Trauttmannsdorff, 90 Courland (Duchy), 141 Cremonese, 79 Crowe memorandum, 111 Cuba, 165 cyber warfare, 165 Czecho­slo­va­k ia, 150–151, 200n70 d’Albert, Henry, 54 Dalmatia, 107 Delcassé, Théopile, 119 Denmark, 86, 88, 149 Djibouti, 205n38 Dutch Republic, 135–141, 143, 147–148; Dutch rebellion, 52, 68, 71, 73–76, 79–84, 86, 88, 90–91, 93, 95–96 dynamic differential theory, 2, 12–14, 31, 35–38, 43, 65–66, 72, 92, 96, 101–102, 126, 172n80, 193n147 Egypt, 106, 201n81 encirclement theory, 4, 30, 37–38, 43, 69–70, 91, 134, 149, 153, 159, 166; actualized

236

encirclement, 5, 8, 12, 16, 22–25, 30, 40, 42–43, 155–156; alliance blocs, 3–4, 8, 19, 26, 28–30, 35, 38, 156; buffer zone, 3, 7, 16, 18, 20–22, 33, 40; closure of the circle, 24–25, 33, 40; concentration of forces, 16, 23, 25, 30, 40–41; definition, 10; double security dilemma, 3–5, 7–8, 12, 16, 19, 23, 26, 29–30, 34, 39–40, 134, 155; encircled ­great power, 1–4, 7–8, 10–13, 16, 19–27, 29, 32–36, 39–41, 134, 155–156; increases in invasion ability, 2–13, 16, 19–20, 22–32, 34, 37, 40–41, 155; latent encirclement, 8, 11–12, 16, 23, 39–40, 134, 144, 152, 155, 167n7; mea­sure of last resort, 4–5, 8, 24–25, 30, 33, 36–37, 155–156; rival-­based network of alliances, 3–5, 7–8, 16–17, 23, 26–27, 30, 35, 156; simultaneous invasion, 1, 3–4, 7–8, 12, 16, 19–20, 23, 25, 34; surrounding ­great powers, 1–4, 7–8, 10–13, 16, 19–27, 29–30, 33–34, 36, 39–41, 134, 155; two-­front war prob­lem, 1–4, 6–8, 10–12, 16, 19, 20–26, 28–30, 32–35, 39, 40, 134, 155; war contagion, 3–5, 8, 12–13, 16–17, 26–30, 34–35, 38, 40–41, 134, 155; war initiation, 3–5, 7–8, 12–13, 16, 23–25, 29–30, 33, 35, 37, 40, 134, 155 ­England, 15, 27, 77, 96, 111, 120, 135–137, 139–141, 143–149, 153; En­glish Channel, 61–63, 74, 123, 133, 143, 148; En­glish Civil War, 177n4; Italian Wars, 42–44, 46–50, 55, 58–59, 61–63, 65–66; World War I, 37. See also ­Great Britain Eu­rope, 36, 39, 43, 46, 48, 51–54, 65–67, 79–80, 93–96, 106–115, 125–128, 133–145, 148, 160, 163–165; central, 62, 143, 151–152; eastern, 28, 62–63, 123, 129, 149–151; northern, 76, 141; southern, 71, 107, 129; western, 62, 74, 82, 88, 129, 147 Ferdinand (king of Hungary), 53, 56, 60, 65 Ferdinand II (Holy Roman Emperor), 70, 79–84, 86 Ferdinand III (Holy Roman Emperor), 70, 76, 90 Ferdinand of Aragon, 48, 52 Ferdinand of Styria, 177n7 Ferrara, 56 Flanders, 45, 56, 60, 74, 76, 91, 135; Army of, 71, 73, 75–77, 81, 92. See also Low Countries Florence, 50, 56, 59 France, 5–6, 11, 14, 18–21, 24, 28, 37, 39, 134–153, 164; Italian Wars, 42–55, 57–62, 64–67; Thirty Years’ War, 68–85, 87–97; World War I, 99–133 Francesco II Sforza (duke of Milan), 55–57 Franche- ­Comté, 55, 60, 68, 73, 138, 197n16

INDEX

Francis I (king of France), 44–45, 48, 50, 52–62, 64, 66 Francis II (duke of Brittany), 47 Francisco Franco, 151 Francis Joseph (Austrian emperor), 118 Franco-­Dutch War, 6, 36, 134–138, 140; actualized encirclement, 135, 137; concentration of forces, 136; latent encirclement, 134; League of the Rhine, 21; Second Anglo-­Dutch War, 135; Spanish encirclement, 134–137; Treaty of Aix-­la-­Chapelle, 136; Treaty of Dover, 136; Treaty of Nijmegen, 137; Treaty of Vienna, 136–137; ­Triple Alliance, 136; two-­front war prob­lem, 135–137; war contagion, 137; war initiation, 136–137; War of Devolution, 135–137, 140 Franco-­Prussian War, 104–105, 122, 164; Treaty of Frankfurt, 104; ­Battle of Sedan, 112 Franz Ferdinand (archduke of Austria), 113–114, 121 Frederick V of Palatinate, 86, 179n32 Frederick the ­Great (king of Prus­sia), 24, 134, 142–146 Frederick William I (king of Prus­sia), 141 French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 6, 14, 28, 36, 134, 146, 148, 172n76; actualized encirclement, 147; Anglo-­ Russian War, 199n64; ­Battle of Jena, 28; ­Battle of Waterloo, 148; concentration of forces, 147; Declaration of Pillnitz, 147; French Revolution, 146; latent encirclement, 134, 146, 148; Treaty of Paris, 148 Galicia, 114, 116, 124, 188n77 Gaston (duke d’Orléans), 180n58 Gattinara, Mercurino Arborio de, 53, 55–56 Genoa (Republic), 47, 49–51, 54–55, 57, 77 George of Hanover, 198n35 Georgia, 206n54 Germany, 2, 5–6, 10–11, 16, 18–19, 24, 28, 37, 164; Nazi Germany, 2, 11, 19, 149–152; region, 59, 65, 68–69, 71, 73–74, 76–77, 83, 85, 89, 91, 96; Weimar Republic, 149–150 Global War on Terror, 161 ­Great Britain, 27, 99, 102, 104–111, 113–115, 118, 121, 123–124, 126–129, 131–133, 141–143, 145–147, 149, 151 ­Great Game, 111 ­Great Northern War, 141, 197n28 ­great power, 11; continental, 11, 20; insular, 11–12; status, 10–11, 15, 19–20, 160–161, 164 ­Great Turkish War, 138 Greece, 186n25 Grey, Edward sir, 111, 114, 123 Guelders (Duchy), 50, 54, 57

Guienne (Duchy), 47 Gustavus Adolphus (king of Sweden), 70, 83–84, 86–87, 89 Hainault, 60, 147 Hammond, Edmund, 106 Hanover, 144–145 Hanseatic League, 87 Hapsburg, 5, 20, 22–23, 25, 45, 53–54, 68, 73–74, 76, 81, 83, 85, 88–91, 96, 135, 137, 139; United, 11, 36, 39, 42–43, 51–52, 55–67, 80 Heilbronn League, 84 Henry II (king of France), 59–60 Henry III (count of Nassau), 54 Henry IV (king of France), 75, 93, 135 Henry VII (king of E ­ ngland), 47–48 Henry VIII (king of E ­ ngland), 44, 54, 60–63 Hi­ma­la­yas, 163 Hitler, Adolph, 2, 11, 149–153 Holstein (Duchy), 86 Holy League, 50 Holy Roman Empire, 14, 42, 51–54, 56, 60, 64, 66–68, 70–71, 75–78, 80–89, 91, 97, 137, 174n31 Huguenot revolts, 93, 96 Hundred Years’ War, 44, 46, 61 Hungary, 56, 63, 147 India, 5, 44, 101, 106, 153, 156, 160–164, 201n81 Indonesia, 162 Isabella of Castille, 45 Israel, 2, 164 Italian Wars, 5, 14, 36, 39–40, 42–43, 45, 47, 51–52, 54, 56–66, 68, 78–79, 93; actualized encirclement, 46–47, 51, 57, 60, 64, 66–68; alliance blocs, 43, 61; alternative explanations, 63–66; buffer zone, 42–43, 45, 47–48, 63, 66–67; double security dilemma, 44–46, 51–52, 60, 64; B ­ attle of Bicocca, 54; ­Battle of Marignano, 42, 50, 61, 64; ­Battle of Mohács, 63, 168n17; B ­ attle of Pavia, 28, 55, 58, 62, 64–65; closure of the circle, 42–43, 46, 52, 54, 57, 60; comuneros, 52; double security dilemma, 44–46, 51–52, 60, 64; Edict of Worms, 54, 70; encircled ­great power, 42–43, 66; Franco-­Ottoman alliance, 57; hegemony, 42–44, 46, 57, 60, 62–67; increases in invasion ability, 43, 46–47, 52, 62, 64, 66–67; latent encirclement, 44–45, 60, 64, 66; League of Cognac, 56; mea­sure of last resort, 45, 60, 66; Peace of Cateau-­Cambrésis, 60, 73; Peace of Étaples, 48–49; simultaneous invasion, 45, 48–49, 55, 66; surrounding ­great powers, 43–47, 50–51, 66; Treaty of Arras, 45; Treaty of Barcelona, 48; Treaty of Bruges,

237

INDEX

Italian Wars (continued) 55, 61; Treaty of Brussels, 50; Treaty of Cambrai, 56, 58; Treaty of Crépy, 59; Treaty of Gravelines, 61; Treaty of Lyon, 49; Treaty of Madrid, 55–56, 58, 63, 65; Treaty of Noyon, 50–52; Treaty of Paris, 50; Treaty of Senlis, 48; Truce of Nice, 57–58; two front-­war prob­lem, 43–45, 47, 50–51, 58, 62, 64, 67; Venice League, 49; war contagion, 44, 60–64, 67; war initiation, 43–45, 51, 54, 64 Italy, 56–57, 59, 64, 74, 89, 91, 107, 109, 134, 151; Italian Peninsula, 47–51, 54, 56, 75, 93; northern Italy, 22, 42–43, 47–51, 54–68, 71–77, 80–82, 89, 91 James V (king of Scotland), 62 Japan, 2, 28, 149, 151, 162 Joanna the Mad, 48 Joffre, Joseph, 130 Joseph II (Austrian emperor), 147 Julius III (Pope), 59 Kabul, 164 Kargil War, 164 Kashmir, 162 Kazakhstan, 162, 205n38 Khrushchev, Nikita, 165 Kim Jong-un, 205n42 Korean War, 14 Kyrgyzstan, 204n33, 205n40 Laguíche, Pierre de, 115 Leo X (Pope), 50, 54 Leopold I (Austrian emperor), 21, 23, 135–140 Leyva, Antonio de, 57 ­Little Entente, 200n70 Lodi, 56 London (Treaty), 115, 123, 129 Lorraine, 104, 147, 182n99; Duchy, 75, 77, 81–82, 90–91 Louis XII (king of France), 48–50 Louis XII (king of Hungary), 63 Louis XIII (king of France), 79, 82, 84 Louis XIV (king of France), 6, 21, 44, 134–140 Louis XVI (king of France), 147 Low Countries, 50, 52, 55, 57–62, 71, 75, 77, 80, 89, 91, 93, 95–96, 135–136, 140, 145–147 Ludendorff, Erich, 130 Luther, Martin, 54, 56 Luxembourg, 54, 59–60, 91 Macedonia, 186n25 Madrid, 80 Mainz (Elector), 53, 138, 147 major war (definition), 13–15

238

Malacca (strait), 161–162, 205n34 Maldives, 205n38 Manchuria (occupation), 151 Mantua (Duchy), 79–80 Mao Tse-­t ung, 160 March, Robert de la, 54 Maria Theresa (empress of Austria), 142–145 Marie-­Antoniette (queen of France), 147 Mary of Austria (governor of the Netherlands), 65 Mary of Burgundy, 44 Matthias, (Austrian emperor), 177n7 Maurice of Hesse-­Kassel, 75 Maximilian I (Austrian emperor), 42, 44–45, 48–53, 61 Mazarin (cardinal), 21, 90 Mecklenburg, 87 Mediterranean Sea, 42, 63, 106–107, 109; Agreements, 108 Metz, 73, 90 Mexico, 11 ­Middle East, 69 Milan (Duchy), 42, 47–61, 64, 67, 77, 79 Moltke, Helmut von the Elder, 104 Moltke, Helmut von the Younger, 114, 120, 129–131 Montferrat, 79–80 Moravia, 88 Morocco, 110 Moscow, 122 Münster (Elector), 136 Mustafa (sultan), 177n4 Myanmar, 161–162 Naples (kingdom), 47–51, 55, 59, 65, 76 Napoleon, 17, 148 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ ization), 163, 206n54 Navarre, 54, 73 Neklyudov, Anatoly, 119 Nepal, 162 Nicholas II (czar), 110, 112, 114, 116, 119, 121, 124, 128 Nicholson, Arthur Sir, 123 Nine Years’ War, 6, 23, 25, 36, 134, 137–140; ­Battle of Buda, 138; ­Battle of Mohács, 138; ­Battle of Vienna, 138; concentration of forces, 138; Edict of Fontainebleau, 138; ­Grand Alliance, 140; League of Augsburg, 139; Siege of Belgrade, 138; Spanish encirclement, 137; Treaty of Reichenbach Treaty, 147; Treaty of Ryswick, 139; Truce of Ratisbon, 138; war initiation, 138; War of the Reunions, 21, 138–139 Normandy (Duchy), 44, 47, 58 North Amer­i­ca, 146, 168n14 North ­Korea, 16, 162

INDEX

North Sea, 42, 105, 110 nuclear revolution, 2, 6, 19, 156–160; MAD, 156, 158; stability-­i nstability paradox, 157 Obama, Barack Hussein, 204n34 Obruchev, Nikolai, 106 Oceania, 168n14 offense-­defense balance, 32–33 offensive realism, 2, 31–32, 43, 65–66, 92–93, 102, 126, 128, 193n147, 194n153 Olivares (count-­duke), 69, 74, 78–83, 87, 95–96 Ottoman Empire, 23, 88, 101, 106, 108, 115, 138–139, 143, 173n1; Italian Wars, 42–44, 56–63, 65–67; Ottoman-­Safavid War, 177n4 Oxenstierna, Axel, 70, 84, 87–88, 97 Pacific (War), 164 Pakistan, 161–164 Palatinate, 53, 76, 88, 147 Paléologue, Maurice, 115 Paris, 80, 91, 94, 123, 145 Paul III (Pope), 57, 59 Peloponnesian War, 164 Peronne, 55 Peru, 164 Petersburg, 118 Peysonnel, Claude-­Charles de, 147 Philip II (king of Spain), 57–58, 60, 68, 93 Philip III (king of Spain), 75 Philip IV (king of Spain), 79, 81, 83, 95–96, 135–136 Philippines, 204n34 Philip the Handsome, 48 Picardy (Duchy), 48 Piedmont, 57–58 Pier Luigi Farnese (duke of Parma), 59 Pinerolo, 79–80, 182n99 Pisa, 50 Pitt, William, 146 Pivot to Asia, 204n34 Poincaré, Raymond, 112, 114, 122 Poland, 2, 6, 11, 24, 83, 86–88, 99–100, 103, 112, 116–117, 120–121, 128–129, 141–147, 149–152; partition, 146 polarity, 36, 39, 43, 65; bi­polar­ity, 36; multipolarity, 35–36, 65; tripolarity, 65 Pomerania, 117 power imbalance, 31, 37, 39. See also preponderance (power) preponderance (power), 36–39, 64, 97, 130, 132, 142, 148, 156 Princip, Gavrilov, 113 Prus­sia, 24, 27, 87, 121, 134, 141–148 Pyrenees, 49 Question (Eastern), 105–109, 115, 126–127, 132, 193n137

relative gains, 18, 26 Rhineland, 21, 68, 73–75, 77, 83, 91, 135–136, 138–139, 146–147 Richelieu (cardinal), 20, 69, 73, 75, 77–85, 88–90, 94–95, 135 Rincon, Antoine de, 58 Romania, 107, 186n25, 200n70 Roussillon, 48–49 Royal Navy, 126, 132–133 Rus­sia, 5–6, 11, 18, 27, 44, 141–146, 153, 156, 160, 162–163; Sino-­Soviet Conflict, 163; Soviet Union, 2, 11, 14, 28, 149–153, 158, 163, 206n54; World War I, 99–133 Russo-­Turkish War, 132, 186n43 Sack of Rome, 56 Santo Stefano (Treaty), 186n25 Savoy (Duchy), 52, 54–55, 57, 77, 80, 145 Saxe-­Weimar (Duchy), 85, 89 Saxony, 24, 84, 138, 142 Sazonov, Sergey, 115, 119, 124, 131 security dilemma, 2, 17–18, 21, 31–32, 34, 37, 127, 157, 159 Semigallia (Duchy), 141 Serbia, 102, 113–115, 117–121, 124, 126, 133, 186n25 Seven Years’ War, 6, 36, 143–145; actualized encirclement, 144–145; Anglo-­Austrian alliance, 143–144; concentration of forces, 145; Diplomatic Revolution, 144–145; invasion of the Netherlands, 146; latent encirclement, 144, 146; Treaty of Hubertusburg, 146; Treaty of Paris, 146; Treaty of Versailles, 144; Treaty of Vienna, 141; war contagion, 145; Westminster Convention, 144–145 Sforza, Ludovico, 48–49 Shanghai Cooperation Organ­ization (SCO), 161 Siberia, 150, 206n53 Sigismund III (king of Poland), 86 Silesia, 24, 27, 87, 107, 142–145 Singapore, 205n34 South ­Korea, 204n34 Spain, 5, 14, 22–23, 39, 135–140, 164; Italian Wars, 42–43, 45–51, 53, 59–61, 66; Thirty Years’ War, 68–98 Spanish Civil War, 151 Spanish Netherlands, 22, 43, 45, 68, 71, 73, 80–81, 90–91, 135–140, 176n2. See also Low Countries Sparta, 160, 164–165 Spinola, Ambrogio di, 76, 180n50 Sri Lanka, 205n38 Stalin, Joseph, 151 Stanislaus I of Poland, 141 Stanley, Edward Henry, 106 Stralsund, 87

239

INDEX

Strasbourg, 73, 138 Suez canal, 106 Sukhomlinov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, 115–116, 130 Suleiman the Magnificent (sultan), 28, 56, 58, 62, 168n17 Sun Tzu, 24 Suvolov, Pyotr, 106 Sweden, 5, 68–69, 72–73, 76, 81–89, 92, 97–98, 137, 141 Swiss forces, 61, 64, 75 Syrian civil war, 69 Tahmāsp (Persian shah), 62 Tajikistan, 205n38 Tanzania, 205n38 Thirty Years’ War, 5, 14, 19, 22, 25, 36, 39–40, 67–72, 78, 90–91, 93, 95–96, 134; actualized encirclement, 71–74, 78, 82, 84, 96–97; alternative explanations, 91–97; “Baltic Design,” 89, 98; ­Battle of Lutter, 86, 88; B ­ attle of Lützen, 84; ­Battle of Nördlingen, 68, 78, 82–85, 87, 97; ­Battle of Rocroi, 90; B ­ attle of White Mountain, 76, 88, 177n4; buffer zone, 68–69, 72–74, 77–78, 82, 92, 97; concentration of forces, 68, 72, 78, 80, 83, 92, 96–97; declaration of war, 22, 69–71, 73, 78, 82–83, 85, 94; defenestration of Prague, 70; double security dilemma, 68–70, 73–74, 78–81, 85, 89–91, 93, 97; Edict of Restitution, 180n54; encircled ­g reat power, 68, 97; hegemony, 92–97; increases in invasion ability, 69, 72, 76, 85, 89, 92, 94; latent encirclement, 78, 97; mea­sure of last resort, 78, 96; Peace of Prague, 68, 78, 83–85, 89; Peace of Regensburg, 80, 96; Pirna note, 84; Peace of Westphalia, 71, 91, 134, 164, 182n99; Protestant rebellion, 52, 68, 70, 76, 80–82, 84–85, 87, 89, 93, 98; rival-­based network of alliances, 64, 66, 68, 73, 76, 78, 85, 93, 97; simultaneous invasion, 72–73, 78, 83–85, 90, 96; Spanish encirclement, 5, 39, 60, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72–74, 82, 89–91, 93; Spanish Road, 68–69, 71–72, 77–80, 91, 97; surrounding ­g reat powers, 68, 73, 78, 97; Treaty of Bärwalde, 82; Treaty of Cherasco, 80–81, 96; Treaty of Compiègne, 84; Treaty of Ebersdorf, 96; Treaty of Münster, 75; Treaty of Oñate, 75, 88, 96; Treaty Pyrenees, 71, 91, 134, 182n99; Treaty of Stuhmsdorf, 88; Treaty of the Hague, 86; Truce of Altmark, 83; two front-­war prob­lem, 68–70, 72–78, 83, 90–91, 94, 97; “war by diversion,” 20, 75–76, 78, 82–85, 94; War of the Mantuan Succession, 69, 78–82, 89, 94, 96; war contagion, 69–70,

240

76, 85, 89–90, 92, 97; war initiation, 69–70, 79–80, 83–84, 90, 92, 94 Tibet, 162 Toul, 90 Trier (Elector), 53, 77, 82–83, 85, 138, 147 Turkish Straits, 106, 108, 115, 119, 149, 151 Turkmenistan, 162 Turn, Heinrich von, 177n7 Tyrol, 47, 51, 54, 77, 79 Uighur separatist movement, 161. See also Xinjiang Ukraine, 120, 188n77, 206n54; annexation of Crimea, 159; crisis, 163 uncertainty of intentions, 17–18, 22, 31, 35, 127 United States, 2, 5, 100–101, 158–161, 163 Urban VIII (Pope), 179n44 Uzbekistan, 205n40 Valois, 44–45, 54, 60 Valtelline, 73, 77–78, 95 Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre de, 134 Venice, 50, 54, 56, 77 Verdun, 90 Verona, 51 Vienna, 80, 119 Vietnam, 161–162; Sino-­Vietnamese War, 160; War, 160 Vincenzo II (duke of Mantua), 79 Wallenstein, Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von, 83, 86–89, 180n54 Warbeck, Perkin, 48 War of the Austrian Succession, 2, 6, 24, 27, 36, 91, 142–145; actualized encirclement, 142; latent encirclement, 134, 141; Treaty of Aachen, 143–144; Treaty of Vienna, 141 War of the Polish Succession, 141–142, 169n30 War of the Spanish Succession, 134, 139–140, 168n17; Peace of Utrecht, 140–141; Spanish encirclement, 139–140; two-­front war prob­lem, 140; war contagion, 140 wei qi, 160 Wilhelm I (kaiser), 186n35 Wilhelm II (kaiser), 6, 105, 109–112, 114, 117, 120–121, 126–127, 130–131, 133, 164 Wilhelmina of Prus­sia, 146 World War I, 2, 18–19, 36, 39–40, 99–103, 117–118, 121–126, 128, 130–131, 133, 145, 152, 160, 164; actualized encirclement, 99–100, 103–104, 112, 116, 128, 130, 133; alliance blocs, 105, 121, 132–133; alternative explanations, 101–104, 125–133; Anglo-­German détente, 118; Anglo-­ Russian Convention, 111, 190n100;

INDEX

Austro-­Serbian conflict, 118–120, 190n105, 191n118, 192n131; Balkan crises, 40, 99–101, 112–115, 117, 119, 121–123, 128–131, 133; Balkan League, 113–115, 124; “blanck check” (France), 112, 119, 121–122, 133; “blanck check” (Germany), 114, 118, 121; Bosnian crisis, 113, 116, 122, 124, 131, 195n180; British-­Japanese Alliance, 110; British neutrality, 123, 129, 187n54, 195n180; buffer zone, 99, 104, 109, 121, 129; coercive diplomacy, 99, 101–102, 105, 110, 112, 115, 118, 121, 124, 126, 128, 131, 133; concentration of forces, 111–112, 117–118, 120–121, 127, 133; declaration of war, 99, 101, 112, 122–123, 133; double security dilemma, 100–102, 104–105, 111, 121, 125–127, 132; Dual Alliance, 107, 132; encircled ­great power, 99, 133; entente cordiale, 110–111, 128; erroneous tele­gram, 23, 131; Fischer (thesis), 101, 117, 119, 126, 128; Franco-­Russian alliance, 6, 18, 28, 99, 101, 104, 109–112, 116, 118–119, 122, 125–128, 132–133; ­great eastern crisis, 106; hegemony, 100, 102, 104, 125–129, 132–133; “inadvertent war,” 102, 126, 128, 131; increases in invasion ability, 100–101, 103–104, 115–117, 123, 125, 132; July crisis, 24, 28, 99–103, 112, 115–126, 128–131, 133; Kiel Canal, 194n157; latent encirclement, 5, 10–11, 111, 113, 116–118, 120, 127, 129; League of the Three Emperors, 11, 107; mea­sure of last resort, 100, 102, 125, 127, 130; Moroccan crises, 110, 122, 128; Peace of Brest-­Litovsk, 129; Reinsurance Treaty, 108–109; rival-­based network of alliances, 99, 103, 111, 125, 133; Rus­sian mobilization, 100, 112, 114–117, 119–121, 124, 128–129, 133; Russo-­Japanese War, 40, 110, 116, 122, 128, 130; Schlieffen Plan, 119, 128–131, 187n54; Septemberprogramm, 129; simultaneous invasion, 99–101, 104, 110,

113, 116–117, 120–121, 125, 127, 133; strategic railroads, 6, 99–100, 102, 112, 115–117, 121, 126–127, 129, 133; surrounding g ­ reat powers, 99, 104, 111, 115–117, 121, 125, 130, 133; Three Year Law, 116; Treaty of Björkö, 110, 122, 128, 132; Treaty of Portsmouth, 111; Treaty of Versailles, 150; ­Triple Alliance, 107, 109, 112, 114, 120–121, 126; ­Triple Entente, 2, 102, 112–114, 116–121, 123, 126; two front-­war prob­lem, 99–100, 102, 104–105, 109–112, 114–117, 120–121, 126–128, 130–132; war contagion, 99–100, 102–103, 115, 121–124, 132; War Council, 128, 184n6; war initiation, 100–101, 112–113, 115, 128; Weltpolitik, 109, 126; “Willy-­Nicky” tele­gram, 120 World War II, 1, 6, 19, 36, 134, 145, 148–151, 153, 156–159, 166; actualized encirclement, 149, 151, 153; Anglo-­German Naval Agreement, 151; appeasement, 152; ­Battle of Britain, 153; ­Battle of France, 149, 153; concentration of forces, 152; Convention of Montreux, 201n81; Czechoslovak-­Soviet Treaty of Alliance, 151; double security dilemma, 99, 152; Franco-­Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 149, 151; invasion of Czecho­slo­va­kia, 149; invasion of Poland, 2, 149, 152; latent “encirclement,” 11, 150, 152; military conscription (re­introduction), 201n77; Munich Agreement, 149, 151; Operation Barbarossa, 153; Ribbentrop Molotov Pact, 149, 152; Rome-­Berlin Axis, 151; Winter War, 202n92 Wosley (cardinal), 55, 61 Xinjiang, 161–162, 204n33, 206n53 Yugo­slavia, 200n70 Zhou Enlai, 160

241