Ernst Cassirer: The Swedish Years [1 ed.] 3039106880, 9783039106882

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Peter Lang

Ernst Cassirer: The Swedish Years

Jonas Hansson & Svante Nordin

Ernst Cassirer: The Swedish Years

PETER LANG Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Oxford • Wien

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ISBN 3-03910-688-0 US-ISBN 0-8204-7555-6

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Contents

Introduction: Ernst Cassirer's Philosophical Development in Sweden - An Unknown Chapter in Intellectual History, John Michael Krois .........................................................................

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Preface...................................................................................................

31

The Swedish Years.............................................................................

33

The Philosophical Scene in Sweden at Cassirer's time ..... 105

Konrad Marc-Wogau and the Logic of Symbolic Forms .... 121 Axel Hägerström and Uppsala Philosophy................................. 135 Descartes and Queen Christina....................................................... 175

Thomas Thorild and 18th Century Philosophy ........................ 189 Cassirer in Göteborg ........................................................................... 195 Appendix 1: The Manuscript of Das Erkenntnisproblem, Volume 4 ............................................ 229 Appendix 2: Chronology................................................................ 237 Appendix 3: Cassirer's Lectures in Sweden............................. 243 Appendix 4: Cassirer's Lectures and Seminars at Göteborg 1935-1941 ................ 245

Appendix 5: Cassirer's Academic Writings during his Swedish Years ............. 247

Bibliography.......................................................................................... 251 5

Introduction Ernst Cassirer's Philosophical Development in Sweden An Unknown Chapter in Intellectual History John Michael Krois

1. Introduction Ernst Cassirer was the most famous of the many distinguished scholars who sought a haven in Sweden during the 1930s from Nazi Germany.1 Internationally known for his work in philoso­ phy, he had lectured throughout Germany as well as in Austria, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and England.2 He was twice invited to teach at Harvard in 1913 (he declined twice, to his later regret), and he had been elected rector of the University of Ham­ burg, where he had taught since 1919. During his years at Göteborg (1935 to 1941), he was especially prolific, with 24 texts appearing between 1936 and 1942.3 The first was his most extensive treat­ ment of the philosophy of science - an interpretation of causality in quantum physics entitled Determinism and Indeterminism in 1 2

3

See the classic study of this topic by Helmut Müssener, Exil in Schweden: Politische und kulturelle Emigration seit 1933 (München 1977), 284f. Cassirer was twice offered a guest professorship at Harvard (in March and in July, 1913). He gave lectures from October 31 to November 4 at King's College, University of London. In 1929 he was named "membre associé étranger" of the "Société française de psychologie" in Paris. Toni Cassirer gives an indication of her husband's many lecture invitations in her book, Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2003). See the appendix for a list of these publications.

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Modern Physics.4 Before it appeared, he discussed its contents with Erwin Schrôdinger at Oxford and Nils Bohr in Copenhagen, both Nobel prize winners in physics. Cassirer final publication in Swe­ den was his book on The Logic of the Cultural Sciences,5 which dealt with historical and structural knowledge in the humanities. To­ gether, these two publications gave a comprehensive explication of Cassirer's conceptions of historical and causal knowledge. In between (1939), he published the first systematic explication of his theory of ethical values, in his book Axel Hägerström: Eine Studie zur Schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart.6 This was the only book that Cassirer ever published about a contemporary. It revealed his familiarity with all of Hägerström's writings and with the problems that concerned the Uppsala school of philosophy, which Hägerström founded, while also serving as a vehicle for Cassirer to present his own ideas on ethics and law. In this regard it was like all of Cassirer's so-called "historical" studies, which always contained as many systematic arguments as historical interpreta­ tion. Cassirer's work from his years in Sweden has never attracted as much attention as his work in Germany or his later, briefer, stay in America. Historians have sometimes claimed that Cassirer turned his attention to Swedish topics during his years in Göteborg 4

5

6

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Ernst Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. Historical and Systematic Studies of the Problem of Causality, trans. O. Theodor Benfey, with a preface by Henry Margenau (New Haven and London: Yale Univer­ sity Press, 1956). Texts are indicated in English translation, if available. Ori­ ginally published as: Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der moder­ nen Physik: Historische und systematische Studien zum Kausalproblem. In: Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 42. Nr. 3. (1936). Ernst Cassirer, The Logic of the Cultural Sciences: Five Studies. English transla­ tion by S.G. Lofts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften: Fünf Studien. In: Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 48. Heft 1 (1942). Ernst Cassirer, Axel Hägerström: Eine Studie zur Schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart, in Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 45 (1939:1). To date this has never appeared in either English or Swedish translation.

out of gratitude for the haven from Nazi Germany.7 Cassirer surely felt such gratitude, but this was not why he turned to the topics he did. This is particularly evident in his interactions with the Uppsala school of philosophy, however the depth of the effects which this encounter had on Cassirer's philosophy has never been recognized, nor could it have been, for the most important texts that Cassirer wrote in response to this encounter remained un­ published. They began to appear in 1995 in the edition of Cassirer's unpublished manuscripts and texts and most are still to appear. Nine volumes with texts and correspondence from Cassirer's years in Sweden are to appear, making his stay in Sweden Göteborg from September 1935 to May 1941 (and in Uppsala in September and October 1934) into the most intensive period of writing of his career.8 He wrote on many topics, some of which he had worked on before - such as the philosophy of science but others he dealt with for the first time. These new areas of research included, but were not limited to, his publications on "Swedish" themes. One of these Swedish topics was the poet and philosopher Thomas Thorild, and one of Cassirer's two publications on this topic (Thorild and Herder) was his inaugural lecture at the Vitterhetsakademien (Royal Swedish Academy).9 Thorild, Cassirer emphasized, was part of the 18 th century Sturm und Drang move­ ment. It was important to Cassirer that this was a European move­ ment, and not just a German episode. "Werther fever" was as common in France as in Germany, and Goethe's novel itself was deeply indebted to Rousseau's apotheosis of feeling. Cassirer's first intellectual effort was a highly readable (recently published) 7

8 9

I thank Gunnar Broberg of the University of Lund for bringing this inter­ pretation to my attention. See the Appendix for a listing of these texts. See Ernst Cassirer, "Thorilds Stellung in der Geistesgeschichte des acht­ zehnten Jahrhunderts," Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens Handlingar 51 (1941:1): 1-125; cf. Cassirer, "Thorild und Herder". In: Theoria. 7 (1941): 75-92.

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text which he wrote as a 19-year old dealing with the Sturm und Drang.10 He returned to this early intellectual interest during his years in Sweden, not only in his research on Thorild but also in a year-long public lecture series at Göteborg on "Der junge Goethe" which he also gave in a summary version at Lund. In those lec­ tures he explicitly recalled his early text about the Sturm und Drang. Thorild represented the literary and philosophical world­ view that first captured Cassirer's interest; his interest in Thorild was not coincidental. The Sturm und Drang topics of passion and freedom occu­ pied Cassirer in his other writings in Göteborg as well. Cassirer's studies on Queen Christina focused upon her relationship to Descartes, about whose philosophy he had written his doctoral thesis. In particular, Cassirer was interested in Christina and Descartes with reference to the theory of ethical emotions. Over the years Cassirer had become increasingly interested in the role that emotions play in ethics. Indeed, if one believes in the notion of seminal ideas, then Cassirer's life's work goes back to his early student essay on emotion and freedom in the Sturm und Drang. Emotion and freedom are also the focus of his book on Hägerström. Cassirer took an untraditional philosophical view of the topic. He was not interested in the psychology of emo­ tions, their particular momentary manifestation, but their cultural embodiment and objectification. For example, he linked Descartes' philosophy of the passions with Corneille's dramas of ethical heroism and both of these with Christina's self-willed actions as a political ruler. He saw all three figures as examples of a cultural constellation that focused upon the heroism of individual self­

10 Cassirer, "Brahm: Das deutsche Ritterdrama des 18.ten Jahrhunderts. An­ hang: Tendenzen der Sturm und Drangperiode (Referat)" (1893), GoetheVorlesungen, in Cassirer - Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte, ed. by Klaus Christian Köhnke, John Michael Krois, and Oswald Schwemmer (20 vols., 1995 ff., hereafter "ECN" with volume number), vol. 11 (Ham­ burg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2003), S. 348-357.

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reliance. It was not just a historical interest, but a systematic one that led him to study Christina's life. In his work on Christina, the concept of ethical heroism served as the link between 17th century philosophy, drama, and politics. The spectacle of individuals taking a moral stance of their own, rather than doing what was expected of them clearly must have appealed to Cassirer at the time. In a later publication about Albert Schweitzer's ethics of civilization, which Schweitzer had pre­ sented as Olaus-Petri lectures in Uppsala, Cassirer emphasized Schweitzer's call for individual self-responsibility in opposition to "collective thought."11 When Cassirer took Christina as an ex­ ample of ethical heroism, it probably was not her famous conver­ sion to Catholicism that most impressed him as much as her re­ markable tolerance of Judaism.12 Certainly this was a further as­ pect of her personality that fascinated him.13 His research on Christina and 17th century history was neither purely academic nor a token of gratitude, but an attempt to recreate what he took to be lost intellectual and ethical forces. I am not going to enter into any of the other publications from Cassirer's six years in Sweden, although some are of consider­ able importance - such as his paper on Naturalism and Human­

Cassirer, "Albert Schweitzer as Critic of Nineteenth-Century Ethics," The Albert Schweitzer Jubilee Book, ed. by A. A. Roback (Cambridge, Mass.: SciArt Publishers 1946), pp. 241-257. 12 See chapter 10: "Christina and the Jews," in Susanna Åckerman, Queen Chris­ tina of Sweden and her Circle: The Transformation of a Seventeenth-Century Lib­ ertine (Leiden: Brill, 1991), pp. 178-195. Cf. Cassirer, "Descartes und Königin Christina von Schweden," Descartes: Lehre - Persönlichkeit - Wirkung (Stock­ holm: Bermann-Fischer 1939), 177-278. The Swedish translation (Drottning Christina och Descartes. Stockholm 1940), Svante Nordin discovered, repro­ duces a different German manuscript than the Descartes book. 13 Cassirer's wife, Toni Cassirer, gives a revealing description of her husband's fascination with Christina in Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2003). See her description of how he stood in marvel at Christina's portrait in the Uppsala Castle.

11

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ism in the theory of culture in which he argued against the possi­ bility of predictive philosophies of history.14 Instead, I want to focus on what he wrote but did not publish during those years.

2. Cassirer comes to Sweden Cassirer was among the first to leave Germany after Hitler's as­ sumption of power, departing only five weeks later - something that surprised even Cassirer's closest associates but which soon proved to be an indication of great foresight. He had already de­ cided to accept an offer to go to Oxford when the first invita­ tion to be a guest professor at Uppsala reached him, but he was able to accept an offer the following year, and so Cassirer taught philosophy for the first time in Sweden at Uppsala in Septem­ ber and October 1934.15 He was under consideration to replace Axel Hägerström, who retired in 1933 from his professorship at Uppsala. When this possibility did not materialize, Cassirer was offered a position at Göteborg, which he accepted and where he taught from 1935 to 1941, when he turned 65. During these years, he gave regular lecture courses and seminars at Göteborg and numerous guest lectures at the other Swedish universities. He was a prolific contributor to Swedish journals (see the appendix below). Cassirer learned Swedish quickly and sometimes wrote correspondence in Swedish. On June 2,1939 he became a Swed­

14 Cassirer, "Naturalistische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilo­ sophie," Göteborgs Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhälles Handlingar. Femte följden. Ser. A. Bd. 7. Nr. 3 (1939): 1-28. 15 Cassirer's first letter to Jacobsson, thanking him for the invitation to come to lecture in Sweden, is dated "21.X.27." Various difficulties prevented him from making the trip until 1934. The Jacobsson-Cassirer letters are housed at the Landsarkivet in Göteborg.

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ish citizen. After his retirement from teaching in Göteborg he was offered a guest professorship at Yale. When he and his wife de­ parted for the United States in May of 1941 he left behind a large collection of unpublished manuscripts he had written in Swe­ den. He and his wife intended to come back in two years, but the war led them to postpone their return. Cassirer wrote from America to his friend and former student, Malte Jacobsson, then Landshövding in Göteborg, that he was looking forward to re­ turning to live there again. He planned upon his return to see his unpublished texts through to publication. However, on April 13, 1945 he suddenly died of a heart attack in New York City, and his manuscripts remained unknown for decades. Despite Cassirer's substantial publications after he left Ger­ many, scholars have always considered his émigré years as merely a postscript to his previous achievements. Recently (1996), one of the best experts on Cassirer's philosophy, Massimo Ferrari, pub­ lished an outstanding, detailed study of Cassirer's intellectual development. He stopped, however, with the state of Cassirer's philosophy when he left Germany.16 By then, Cassirer's magnum opus, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms17 had been published, and his departure from Germany in March of 1933, seemed to mark the end of his creative period. In the remaining 12 years of his life he seemed only to fill in details of his previous work - adding new historical writings and a few further systematic studies which, although important enough, simply built upon his earlier

16 That is, the book does not examine the problem of the Basisphänomene. This would have been difficult since it first appeared in 1996 in Italy. The German translation makes references to subsequent Nachlass publications in the bibliography. See Massimo Ferrari, Ernst Cassirer - Stationen einer philosophischen Biographie: Von der Marburger Schule zur Kulturphilosophie, Cassirer-Forschungen, Vol. 11 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2003). 17 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953,1955,1957). Originally published as Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 3 vols. (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1923,1925,1929).

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work.18 They added to what Cassirer had not managed to com­ plete before leaving Germany. Hence, a study of Cassirer's intel­ lectual development, such as Ferrari's could for all practical pur­ poses end with the state of Cassirer's philosophy in Germany. An exception to this rule was sometimes granted for Cassirer's last two books, which were published in America: An Essay on Man (1944) and The Myth of the State (1946). These received wide attention. The Essay on Man offered a compressed statement, it seemed, of his earlier, formidable three-volume Philosophy of Sym­ bolic Forms, which was unavailable in translation until the 1950s, while The Myth of the State offered his views on political philoso­ phy, which previously had to be culled from various essays. But the great era in Cassirer's work seemed to remain his time in Germany. The year and a half he had spent at Oxford before mov­ ing to Göteborg was dedicated largely to re-organizing his life and resulted in almost no new publications. His six years in Swe­ den saw him publish prolifically, but unlike the years in America, where he took up the topic of philosophical anthropology in An Essay on Man, nothing really new seemed to emerge. Today we know that these assumptions were wrong. Research on Cassirer's Nachlass began in the early 1970s, and now an international group of scholars is preparing a 20-volume edition of these texts. We know now that during his years in exile Cassirer neither simply coasted along his previous paths of thought nor did he hibernate intellectually - and that this was especially true of his years in Sweden. Cassirer's unpublished writings are voluminous, especially from his time in Sweden. The 20-volume edition of this Nachlass will consist primarily of work from those years.19 These texts deal in many cases with topics 18 A case in point is Cassirer's essay on "Naturalistische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilosophie" (1939), to which Ferrari refers in his book. There Cassirer argues against the possibility of a predictive philoso­ phy of history. 19 See the listing in the appendix. The other volumes contain texts from through­ out his entire career.

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that Cassirer had either never dealt with before or never in such detail.20 For example, Cassirer wrote a sympathetic but critical examination of the Vienna Circle philosophy of Logical Positiv­ ism, a topic he had previously barely mentioned, but most sur­ prising of all, the first five volumes of these writings contain his explications of a new fundamental approach to philosophy un­ known from his previous writings. Cassirer called it the doctrine of Basisphänomene or "basis phenomena." More about this previ­ ously unknown doctrine follows below (parts 3.1 and 3.2). All of the unpublished texts from Cassirer's Swedish years are written in German. With the outbreak of World War Two, Cassirer's native tongue was beginning to be a detriment to his efforts to publish his writings. The loss of the chance to use German, as people who knew him in England attest,21 was hard for him to bear, but not just for personal reasons. Cassirer was appalled by the state of the German language as it was being used in the new regime.22 An indication of what he thought about this change can be found in his yearlong public lecture in Göteborg about Goethe. Over the years Cassirer had published a score of essays about Goethe, but the Göteborg lectures are his most extended and de­ tailed study by far. One of the topics in these lectures is the impor­ tance of the state of language in a country. He made it plain that he continued to write German rather than to change to another tongue because he did not want to abandon the language that Goethe perfected to the propagandists of the Third Reich. 20 The Vienna Circle is discussed in ECN 4: Über symbolische Prägnanz, Aus­ drucksphänomen und 'Wiener Kreis', in preparation. On this topic see John Michael Krois: "Ernst Cassirer und der Wiener Kreis," Elemente moderner Wissenschaftstheorie, ed. by Friedrich Stadler (Vienna / New York: Springer, 2000), pp. 105-121. 21 Personal communication from Raymond Klibansky. 22 See Cassirer's comments on "Nazi-deutsch" in The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 283 f. His discusssions of the Ger­ man language in his Goethe-Vorlesungen (ECN 11) all reflect an undercurrent of revulsion at the new German.

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It would be wrong to assume, however, that Cassirer's chief intellectual concern was preservation. When his interpretation of quantum theory appeared in 1936, reviewers were taken aback by what they considered to be its inexplicable independence from his supposed philosophical school of thought. In the review in the Physikalische Zeitschrift, Cassirer was criticized for upholding views that could no longer be reconciled with Neo-Kantianism, in fact, he no longer seemed to uphold Kantianism at all because he abandoned the causal principle that was appropriate for clas­ sical mechanics in which Kant believed.23 The reviewer implied that Cassirer was "not allowed as a Neo-Kantian" to think the way he did. But the book on Indeterminism offered only hints at what actually was going on in Cassirer's philosophizing since he came to Sweden.

3. The Swedish Phase of Cassirer's Philosophy Upon his arrival in Sweden Cassirer was confronted with the "Uppsala school" of philosophy, headed by Axel Hägerström. The Uppsala school sought to establish a logical and realistic philoso­ phy opposed to the subjective orientation typical of Idealism. The antagonisms between the Uppsala school and philosophers at Stockholm ran deep, but Cassirer was able at first to mediate a kind of truce on his visits to Stockholm and Uppsala. He wrote in 1937 to his friend Åke Petzäll24 with some pride that members of both groups sat next to one another at his lecture. Things were different two years later, however, when he returned and spoke 23 C.F. von Weizäcker: Review of “Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik" by Ernst Cassirer," Physikalische Zeitschrift 38 (1937): 860-61. 24 Cassirer to Petzäll, "Göteborg, 27.10.37."

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on the question "What is Subjectivism?" - a topic that went to the heart of the Uppsala position. In another letter to Petzäll after that visit, Cassirer described the newspaper reports of the ensu­ ing debate as overly dramatic.25 In fact, however, the two-hour discussion after his lecture was so heated that it was continued the next day for two more hours. Cassirer commented in his letter to Petzäll that a mutual un­ derstanding about Realism appeared finally to have been reached, when he remarked that "Realität" should not simply be asserted in a naive and dogmatic way. The philosopher Hedenius reacted by objecting that the Uppsala school was "consciously-dogmatic" ("bewusst dogmatisch") to which Marc-Wogau added that it was even "consciously naive" ("bewusst naiv"). Cassirer commented to Petzäll with playful irony that he was not sure if this last conception would stand up to a strict conceptual analysis, but, he continued, in any case this was then all just too much for Oxenstierna, who energetically contradicted both Hedenius and Marc-Wogau, so that the argument started anew. Cassirer con­ cluded his letter to Petzäll by writing that everything ended with no conclusion, but with a fine lunch. However, this was by no means the end of this confrontation. In the late 1930s Cassirer was also writing a critical study of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivism.26 Cassirer disagreed with the Vienna Circle philosophers on specific issues (such as their physicalism), but he praised their critical attitude.27 Many phi­ losophers whom Cassirer had known in Germany had done noth­ ing to oppose the rise of National Socialism while others embraced 25 Cassirer to Petzäll, February 28, 1939. Cassirer mentions enclosing news­ paper clippings from the "Nya Dagligt Allehanda" and the "Handels­ tidning." (Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning). 26 This text will appear in ECN 4: Über symbolische Prägnanz, Ausdrucksphänomen und 'Wiener Kreis'. TI See John Michael Krois: "Ernst Cassirer und der Wiener Kreis". In: Friedrich Stadler (ed.): Elemente moderner Wissenschaftstheorie. (Vienna/New York: Springer, 2000), pp. 105-121.

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it.28 The fact that so many of Cassirer's former philosophical colleagues could so readily abandon humanistic ethics for racist doctrines was one of his greatest disappointments after he left Germany.29 In the German-speaking world only the Vienna Circle had remained immune to enthusiasm for the Nazi world view.30 So too, the critical attitudes of the Uppsala school, such as Häger­ ström's rejection of attempts to hypothesize the state or a general will made it difficult to opt for the fanaticism of Volksgeist-thinking. It was their dedication to clearheaded thought and skepti­ cism about metaphysical world-views that drew Cassirer to these intellectual movements during his years in Sweden.

3.1 Cassirer's New Program for Philosophy In Cassirer's inaugural lecture at Göteborg on the 19th of October 193531 about "The Concept of Philosophy as a Philosophical Prob28 See Cassirer's letter to Albert Görland ("Göteborg, 26. November 1938") was published in Toni Cassirer, Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2003), pp. 264-66. 29 See the comments in Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State. (New Haven 1946), p. 286 about the "most dreadful" experience of the last years. 30 To quote one of the Vienna School's chief proponents, Otto Neurath: "No­ body can use logical Empiricism to establish an argument for totalitarian­ ism. It does not offer a single hiding place for dogmatism. Pluralism is the backbone of my thinking. Metaphysical attitudes often lead to totalitarian­ ism, but I do not know a single logical Empiricist, who as such has arrived at a totalitarian outlook". (Niemand kann den logischen Empirismus zur Begründung eines totalitären Arguments benutzen. Er bietet nicht ein ein­ ziges Schlupfloch für Dogmatismus. Pluralismus ist das Rückgrat meines Denkens. Metaphysische Haltungen führen oft zum Totalitarismus, aber ich kenne keinen einzigen logischen Empiristen, der als solcher zu einer totalitären Auffassung gelangt ist.). Cited after Horace M. Kallen: "Post­ script - Otto Neurath 1882-1945," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (1946), p. 533. 31 See "Göteborgs Högskolas Matrikel, 1916-1941". In: Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 6 (1942), 16.

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lem/'32 he announced that he was going to embark on a new pro­ gram of research. He stated that he now regarded philosophy dif­ ferently than he did before, asserting that philosophy had a duty to examine social and political reality, to which he had himself given too little attention, and that among other things he would examine the question whether there are trans-cultural ethical claims. Two things caused Cassirer to rethink his philosophy during his years in Sweden - one was the state of European politics, and the other was his exposure to contemporary Swedish philosophy. The Uppsala school, like the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivism, radically op­ posed traditional metaphysical philosophy and drew far-ranging consequences from this. But unlike the Vienna Circle, which gave pride of place to the philosophy of science, the Uppsala school, and Hägerström in particular, focused upon ethics and legal philosophy. Hägerström's conception of reality was logical while the Vienna Circle's was more oriented to sensation and language, but both held that "objectivity" or definiteness was limited to the sphere of spatially extended physical objects. This meant that the phenom­ enological (observable) difference between things and persons fell by the wayside, even though the perception of expression (such as seeing a smile or a frown) is an undeniable fact. This strictly physicalistic conception of objectivity led Hägerström to conceive of ethics and normative claims as matters of momentary feeling: like and dislike. Hägerström's position became known as value nihilism, yet Hägerström did not deny the social importance of values, only the kind of metaphysical underpinnings that phi­ losophers usually offered for them, such as a "general will."33 32 An English translation of the lecture appeared under this title in Ernst Cassirer: Symbol, Myth, and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer 19351945, ed. by Donald Phillip Verene (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 49-63. 33 See Axel Hägerström, "Is Positive Law an Expression of Will?", in Axel Hägerström, Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals, ed. by Karl Olivecrona (Stockholm 1953), pp. 17-55; Cf. Cassirer's assessment in Axel Hägerström, 1939, pp. 106-108.

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On Cassirer's view, just as written law prejudices the future, so too individual value judgments are not momentary events, but relational in nature34 because they must involve temporality: a view of the past, the future, and an overview of both.35 By con­ trast, feelings are simply momentary events.36 Cassirer's insis­ tence on the irreducibility of value judgements to momentary feel­ ing depended upon his claim that the perception of persons was different from the perception of things.37 For Cassirer, perceiving was never mere sensation, but always exemplified types of natu­ ral symbolism, either expressive or representational. Now he wanted to base ethical claims upon this difference. This required him to talk about the "objectivity" of the perception of expres­ sion as our insurance of the "reality" of persons as distinguished from things. The ability to recognize emotion and the Other was a presupposition of ethics, but instead of claiming that this is a matter of immediate intuition, Cassirer argued that it was a sym­ bolic process that took place without conscious interpretative ac­ tivity. It was an aspect of reality. In his Hägerström book Cassirer countered the reduction of ethics to momentary feelings by offering an alternative analysis of evaluation and developing a conception based upon commit­ ments expressed by the oral and written use of language. But in 34 See Cassirer, Axel Hägerström, 1939, pp. 53 ff. Cassirer's began his work in philosophy with a criticism of tradtional logic, which was based upon the principle of subsumption and the concept of classes, arguing that relations and the concept of function are the true basis of logic. See "Substance and Function," in Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity, au­ thorized trans, by William Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins Swabey (New York: Dover, 1953). 35 Ibid., 65. 36 Cassirer's book on Hägerström is sympathetic but critical, and his argu­ ments there, as he wrote in the preface, deal with matters he had neglected before (Ibid., 6-7). 37 The distinction between the perception of expression and the perception of things is the topic of the first study in his book on The Logic of the Cultural Sciences.

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Cassirer's (soon to be published) texts on the objectivity of ex­ pression,38 he offers an even more fundamental dimension for his conception of the objectivity of ethics, not derived from cul­ tural symbolism, but from the natural symbolism - and hence objectivity - of emotional expression. Against physicalism, Cassirer claimed that both our perception of "the Other" and of physical objects are equally real, basic phenomena. In other words, Cassirer no longer depended like Kant upon a rational subject as the source of moral law nor did he take subjectivity (a transcen­ dental ego) as his starting point. He took the expressive phenom­ enon of the "Thou" to be as basic as that of the "I" and of the world or "It." That is, life processes are visibly different from merely physical ones. Expressions of anticipation (fear or joy) are temporal in a way that natural processes are not, and hence these phenomena can provide a basis for a philosophy of evaluation.

3.2 Cassirer's unpublished philosophy: the doctrine of Basis Phenomena During his years in Sweden Cassirer worked out his philosophy of these basis phenomena. The first five volumes of the Nachlass edition contain writings outlining his conception of reality or "Wirklichkeit." One of the manuscripts he completed was entitled Ziele und Wege der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis (published as ECN 2). The first sentence set the tone for his approach: Thomas Hobbes once said that of all the phenomena that surround us, the most remarkable and wonderful is this fact of 'appearing' itself.39 38 39

"Zur 'Objektivität der Ausdrucksfunktion.'" These are appearing in ECN 5. "Thomas Hobbes hat einmal gesagt, daß von allen Erscheinungen, die uns umgeben, das 'Erscheinen selbst' die merkwürdigste und wunderbarste Tatsache sei." Ernst Cassirer, Ziele und Wege der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis, ECN 2, ed. by Klaus Christian Köhnke and John Michael Krois (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1999), p. 3.

21

This claim, Cassirer adds, was remarkable coming from Hobbes, who was perhaps the most consistent materialist and mechanis­ tic thinker in the history of philosophy. Cassirer's point was that a phenomenological approach was compatible with even the most radical empiricism. In Ziele und Wege and other texts from the late 1930s Cassirer introduced his own phenomenology with its three Basisphänomene, which he most often referred to by means of the personal pronouns of Ich, Du, Es (I, Thou, It). This is a striking development, unknown from his writings before he came to Swe­ den. Whereas Cassirer's earlier philosophy of symbolic forms transformed Kantianism into a philosophy of inter-subjective media, Cassirer's doctrine of Basis phenomena was not Kantian at all. It did not permit raising Kant's "transcendental question" of the conditions of the possibility of the phenomena at hand for basis phenomena are existential facts, and if such a question could be raised about them, then we would, by definition, not be talking about basic phenomena. The Basisphänomene doctrine was a "realism", for it was the real processes, not our words or thoughts about them, that Cassirer thematised. Cassirer is explicit about the reality of the Basisphänomene, for he stated that "They are 'prior' to all thought and inference and are the basis of both".40 To understand the force of this statement, taken from his text "On Basis Phenomena" from the late 1930s, it is necessary to re­ call the basic doctrine of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, the intellectual position that historians of philosophy have always associated Cassirer with. For the Marburg school, philosophy

40 See Cassirer, Ernst: "Über Basisphänomene". In: Zur Metaphysik der sym­ bolischen Formen., ECN1, ed. by John Michael Krois, Krois (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1999), p. 132: "Sie sind 'vor' allem Denken und Schließen, liegen diesem selbst zu Grunde." An English translation of this text ap­ peared as "On Basis Phenomena" in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Vol­ ume 4: The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, ed. by John Michael Krois and Donald P. Verene, translated by John Michael Krois (New Haven: Yale Uni­ versity Press, 1996), 137.

22

begins with the view that "Nothing is given to thought except thought itself".41 In his unpublished philosophy of the late 1930s we find Cas­ sirer saying: Without the second and third person we do not have the first either - and even "in thought" we cannot isolate the first person for thoughts must al­ ways be thoughts about something.^2

And: Knowing about 'me' is not prior and independent of knowing about 'You' and 'It,' rather all this is only constituted together.43

Whereas the Marburg school position was a type of logical sub­ jectivism in the tradition of German idealism, Cassirer's philoso­ phy of basis phenomena is a kind of realism. The Basisphänomene doctrine formulated what everybody was familiar with but which was incapable of explanation because explanations always pre­ suppose these phenomena.44 Cassirer did not return to traditional "Nichts ist dem Denken gegeben außer dem Denken selbst" was the credo of the Marburg school. 42 This text will appear in ECN 4. The orignal (Bacon 119, section 5,2) reads: Ohne die zweite und dritte Person haben wir auch die erste nicht - / und selbst "in Gedanken" können wir die erste Person nicht isolieren / denn Gedanken müssen eben immer schon Gedanken von Etwas sein. 43 Ibid. The original reads: Das Wissen von "mir" ist nicht vor und unabhängig vom Wissen des "Du" und "Es", sondern dies alles konstituiert sich nur miteinander 44 Cassirer distanced himself from Husserl, who as a follower of Descartes granted subjectivity the main role in philosophy. Cassirer wanted with his phenomenology neither to create a new kind of philosophical science or first philosophy outfitted with special methods as Husserl did nor did he conceive phenomenology as Heidegger did, with the aim of establishing a philosophy of existence in opposition to empirical natural or cultural sci­ ences. See "Über Basisphänomene," ECN 1,171 f. Cf. "On Basis Phenom­ ena," in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 4: The Metaphysics of Sym­ bolic Forms, pp. 171 f. 41

23

realism (going back to Aristotle) and take these basis phenomena as kinds of things or substances. Rather, he stated that, "Life, real­ ity, being, existence are nothing but different terms referring to one and the same fundamental fact. These terms do not describe a fixed, rigid, substantial thing. They are to be understood as names of a process."45 Moreover, Cassirer regarded human existence as always sub­ ject to different conflicting symbolic interpretations. This view made it imperative for him to investigate whether there could be an ethics which could claim applicability in a world of different, conflicting cultures. Here the doctrine of the Basisphänomene was to come to his aid, with the reality of the Thou and the objectivity of the perception of expression as an invarient in the flux of cul­ tural variations. Hägerström46 and the positivists regarded metaphysical lan­ guage as meaningless, insofar as it was not true or false,47 but for Cassirer metaphysical statements were problematic for a differ­ ent reason: they were reductionistic in the sense that they took some particular perspective to offer a characterization of reality in general.48 In this way Hägerström and the Vienna Circle phi­ losophers themselves fell into metaphysics by taking the basis phenomenon of the Es or "It" to be the only one that is truly real - at the expense of the other basis phenomena, especially that of the Other or the Thou. It is not possible here to explicate Cassirer's philosophical project during his years in Sweden or even to outline his unpub­ lished texts, which range from the topic of the objectivity of ex45 Ernst Cassirer, "Language and Art II/' Cassirer, Symbol, Myth, and Cul­ ture, ed. by Donald Philip Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 193-194. 46 For a survey of the Uppsala school and philosophy in Sweden generally, see Svante Nordin, Från Hägerström till Hedenius. Den Moderna Svenska Filosofin (Lund 1983). 47 Cassirer, Axel Hägerström 1939,16f. 48 Ibid., 18 and ECN 1,150-165.

24

pression,49 historicity and myth,50 to philosophical anthropology51 and his new theory of basis phenomena.52 This last topic, how­ ever, demands a comment. The doctrine of basis phenomena presents a major problem for the interpretation of Cassirer's philosophy. It does not ap­ pear to follow from - or even to fit - his earlier thought, at least not under the long-prevailing assumption that Cassirer's philo­ sophy always represented the Marburg school of Neo-Kantian. The thinkers of the Uppsala school not only assumed this, they also took this to mean that Cassirer's philosophy was "subjectiv­ istic." The doctrine of Basisphänomene, as Cassirer presented it, was not a subjectivism; it was directed against any monistic theo­ retical philosophy. It showed why a pluralistic philosophy of dif­ ferent "symbolic forms" was needed to explicate "reality" (Wirk­ lichkeit): the three irreducible symbolic functions of expressive, representative, significative meaning were not simply matters of semiotic convention, but related to dimensions of reality: the ex­ pression of life, natural things, and cultural "works." Cassirer now clearly stated that these were all co-relative and jointly emergent processes. This meant not only that he was no subjectivist, but that his philosophy ultimately was not even a type of Kantianism. Given the history of Cassirer interpretation, that seems like an incredible prospect. However, recent interpretations of Cassirer take his reception of Goethe to be the decisive factor in his devel­ opment, determining even his view of Kantianism.53 On this view, Idem., and ECN 5, in press. See ECN 3 (Hamburg 2002). ECN 6, in preparation. The Basisphänomene are discussed in ECN 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and indirectly in vol. 6. 53 Supporters of this reading, to which I also subscribe, include Cyrus Hamlin, "Goethe as Model for Cultural Values: Ernst Cassirer's Essay on Thomas Mann's Lotte in Weimar," in Symbolic Forms and Cultural Studies, ed. by Cyrus Hamlin and John Michael Krois (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 185-199; Barbara Naumann, Philosophie und Poetik des Symbols: Cassirer und

49 50 51 52

25

the Basisphänomene doctrine does not constitute a radical break in Cassirer's philosophical development, but its completion. In any case, Cassirer's texts on the Basisphänomene, all written dur­ ing his years in Sweden, will require scholars to rethink Cassirer's philosophy. At this writing, about half of Cassirer's texts on the topic of Basisphänomene have appeared (ECN 1-3, ECN 4-6 are in preparation). The doctrine of Basisphänomene should not be regarded in isolation, as something special, divorced from his other concerns in the late 1930s. As indicated above, the Basisphänomen doctrine was important for Cassirer's approach to ethics, and it also en­ tered into his philosophical anthropology as well. Cassirer began work on his philosophical anthropology while he was still in Hamburg, under the influence of Jakob von Uexküll's theoretical biology after Uexküll came to Hamburg in 1926. Cassirer's earliest statement of his philosophical anthropology, dates from 1928, "The Problem of the Symbol as the Basic Problem of Philosophical Anthropology," and was based upon a conception of the organism acting in its "world" (Umwelt).54 Cassirer wrote an extended ex­ plication of the importance of theoretical biology while he was in Sweden, in the chapter on "biology" in The Problem of Knowledge,

Goethe (München 1998); Oswald Schwemmer, "The Variety of Symbolic Worlds and the Unity of Mind" in Symbolic Forms and Cultural Studies, 3-18; Roger Stephenson, "'Eine zarte Differenz': Cassirer on Goethe on the Sym­ bol," in Symbolic Forms and Cultural Studies, 157-184. Cf. Krois, "Urworte Cassirer als Goethe-Interpret," Kulturkritik nach Ernst Cassirer. CassirerForschungen. Vol. 1. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995), pp. 297-324 and "Die Goethesche Elemente in Cassirers Philosophie," Cassirer und Goethe: Neue Aspekte einer philosophisch-literarischen Wahlverwandtschaft, ed. by Bar­ bara Naumann and Birgit Recki (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003), pp. 159172. See also the other contributions to the Naumann and Recki volume. 54 This text was found together with his text "Über Basisphänomene" in en­ velope 184 of his papers. They were published together in ECN 1 (both were translated).

26

volume four.55 This chapter showed that biology was no passing interest in Cassirer's philosophy for it reflects his interests both in Uexküll's and Goethe's conceptions of life, especially the matter of the evolution or emergence of species. Cassirer generalizes his conception of emergence in the fourth study included in The Logic of the Cultural Sciences, "The Problem of Form and the Problem of Cause," which was written about the same time. There Cassirer extrapolates from the emergence of species in biology in order to claim that nature and culture both depend upon processes of development that cannot be explained causally.56 In his doctrine of the basis phenomena Cassirer analyzed the components of the interaction between individuals and their world, while the actual processes themselves were the subject of his writings on biology and philosophical anthropology. Cassirer was deeply interested in history, so much so that he has some­ times been regarded exclusively as a historian. But his writings on history and on historiography from his years in Sweden show that he also regarded history in terms of his process philosophy of basis phenomena. His text "Geschichte" (published in ECN 3, pp. 4-174) begins with the assertion that "Also historical know­ ledge must be considered in regard to the three Groundphaenomena (Basis phaenomena) and they acquire their full content only by equal consideration in respect to these different Dimensions.''57

55 Cassirer wrote the manuscript of this book between July 9 and November 26, 1940. See Charles W. Hendel: Preface to The Problem of Knowledge, trans, by William Wbglom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950,) p. ix. The original German text was not published until 1957. The new edition (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000) of this volume in Cassirer's works (ECW) includes a complete bibliography of the large literature on biology cited in the book. 56 The Logic of the Cultural Sciences, p. 102. 57 ECN 3, p. 3: "Auch historische Erkenntnis muss in Rücksicht auf die drei Grundphaenomene (Basisphaenomene) betrachtet werden und erhält erst ihren vollen Gehalt durch die glecihmässige Berücksichtigung aller dieser verschiedenen Dimensionen My translation.

27

Cassirer's various interests during his years in Sweden - theo­ retical biology and philosophical anthropology - and his (seem­ ingly) new conception of Basisphänomene were not ad hoc reac­ tions to the criticisms of the Uppsala philosophers. They derived from his earliest intellectual interests, especially the work of Goethe, whose morphological conception of form and theory of the symbol were key influences on his thought. One cannot read Cassirer's Göteborg Goethe lectures without sensing the impact which Goethe's work had on Cassirer - which is not to say that he was a blind follower (he did not agree with Goethe's rejection of mathematics nor his denigration of interventional experiments, or his reliance upon imaginative vision over historical study). But Goethe's morphological conception of form and the symbol left an indelible mark on his philosophy.58 The Basisphänomen doc­ trine was not a kind of sudden mutation in Cassirer's thought, and the fact that he did not mention it by this name before or after his years in Sweden (at least not as far as I know) does not mean that it was merely an incidental reaction to the Uppsala charge of subjectivism. It can be found even in his earlier work, where he sometimes used Goethe's term "Urphänomen."59 None­ theless, Cassirer did not explicitly formulate this doctrine until he came to Sweden. His efforts were detailed and wide-ranging. It is too early to evaluate this Basis phenomena doctrine, but it is clear what Cassirer was trying to accomplish with it, and I speak now about philosophy in what Kant called its "world 58 See Krois, "Urworte - Cassirer als Goethe-Interpret," Kulturkritik nach Ernst Cassirer, Cassirer-Forschungen. Vol. 1 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995), pp. 297-324. 59 In his earlier works Cassirer appealed to Goethe's notion of the Urphänomen again and again without ever explicating its place in his own thought. The expressive function of meaning is an Urphänomen (PSF 3: 87; PsF 3: 102), the experience of the living human body is an Urphänomen (PSF 3: 99-103; PsF 3:116-21), so too is the "person" (Cassirer, "William Stern, Zur Wieder­ kehr seines Todestages," Acta Psychologia 5 (1940): 9. Time is an Urphänomen (PSF 3: 205; PsF 176).

28

conception" - as it matters to everyone, rather than its "school conception," as it concerns academic standpoints. In these texts, Cassirer sought to exhibit a basis of the different dimensions of civilization - art, science, morality and politics, history, and phi­ losophy - at a time when they appeared to be disintegrating as never before. In doing so he tried to avoid the pathos of philo­ sophical Romanticism (Heidegger) and the confinements of Posi­ tivism (Carnap).60 His attempts to "answer" his Swedish col­ leagues' criticisms forced him to write with new definiteness, so that what in the past was often only vaguely recognizable now became evident: that he was a philosopher in his own right, be­ longing to no school of thought. At no time in his life was Cassirer's originality as clearly expressed as it was during his Swedish years. From the point of view of his philosophy, they were the most important in his life.

60 For a discussion of this direction in Cassirer's philosophy see Michael Fried­ man, AParting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer, Heidegger (Chicago: Open Court, 2000).

29

Preface

Ernst Cassirer spent seven years in Sweden, more than his four in the United States and his two in England. But these Swedish years have been the least known of his time in exile. The purpose of this book is to render a picture, as true and as detailed as pos­ sible, of Ernst Cassirer's exile and resettlement in Sweden 19351941. These were important years in Cassirer's personal life and in his philosophical development. They were also years of achieve­ ment. In Sweden Cassirer wrote several books - Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik (1936), Descartes: LehrePersönlichkeit-Wirkung (1939), Axel Hägerström (1939), Thorilds Stellung in der Geistegeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts (1941), Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften (1942), and Das Erkenntnisproblem IV-.as well as numerous articles and extensive unfinished manuscripts. Ernst Cassirer's life in Sweden was quiet, but the times were dra­ matic. They included Nazi Germany's tightening grip over Eu­ rope, the outbreak of the World War, the German invasions of Denmark and Norway, the tragedy of the Jews. Ernst and Toni Cassirer, their family, friends and relatives were part of that trag­ edy. At the same time Ernst Cassirer tried to find roots in his new home country - he became a Swedish citizen in 1939. His studies of Swedish culture and Swedish philosophy were many and farreaching. Archives in Sweden contain a lot of material pertinent to Ernst Cassirer's life and activities during his Swedish years. This book is based on private letters, official papers, newspaper articles and other material mainly from Swedish archives. Together with Cassirer's books and articles they give a more detailed picture than has previously been available of the philosopher's intellec­ tual and personal life.

31

Svante Nordin is the author of chapters two, three, four, five, and six. Chapters one and seven were written by Jonas Hansson, who also made the appendices (Appendix 5 with John Michael Krois), including the presentation of the manuscript of Das Erkenntnisproblem, Volume 5, which appear as Appendix 1. We thank Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Stockholm) for gener­ ous grants that made possible our research work into the Swed­ ish Cassirer material, and Erik och Gurli Hultengrens fond för filosofi (Lund), which supported the publication of this book. We also thank Professors Bernd Henningsen and John Michael Krois for their support and co-operation in our project. We have also had the benefit of Dr Peter Cassirer's insightful comments on the manuscript. Dr Agnes Rodhe has generously let us publish two private photos of Ernst Cassirer from his Göteborg years. We especially thank Professor Krois for writing an introduction for this book. Lund April 2004 Jonas Hansson Svante Nordin

32

The Swedish Years

As rector of the University of Hamburg in 1929-1930 - the first Jewish rector of a German university - Ernst Cassirer publicly supported the waning German republic. When Hitler was named Reich Chancellor on 30 January, 1933, Ernst Cassirer told his wife Toni: "People of our sort have nothing further to look for in Ger­ many and nothing more to hope for." (T. Cassirer, p. 189.) He was ready to leave Germany already before the result of the March 5 elections was known. Massive radio propaganda and SA violence against the Left paved the way for the 44 percent voter support for National Socialism (Fritzsche 1999, pp. 139-148). Exactly a week later, on March 12, he and his wife boarded a train for Switzerland. The Cassirers stayed for a while in Italy, until they received the news that their eldest son, Heinrich (Heinz) Walter Cassirer, would be leaving Germany too and come to Switzerland. About the same time their daughter Anne and her husband the pianist Kurt Appelbaum fled to Sweden and later to England. The younger son Georg Cassirer and his wife Vera decided to wait and see how things turned out in Germany. In Switzerland Ernst Cassirer was one of the German refugee scholars who formed the Notgemeinschaft deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland, with the object "to place about 300 unabsorbed intellectuals in the universities of the world" (Bentwich 1953, p. 17). The philosopher Karl Joël and Cassirer had a meeting in Basle as soon as Cassirer had left Germany in March. Thanks to Joël, in July 1933 Cassirer was put at the top of the Academic Assistance Council's list for an invitation to England (Bodleian, SPSL, letter to AAC 7/3/33). Toni Cassirer tells us in her memoirs of her husband that he contemplated writing "a philosophical refutation of the National Socialist movement." His wife strongly opposed this plan how­

33

ever. "As long as our children and many close relations were in Germany, such an attack could end with their annihilation," she told him. Cassirer listened to his wife and never touched upon the subject in public until his son Georg and his uncle, Max Cassirer, had left Germany 1939. This is important to remember in regard to his Swedish years when he on many public occa­ sions refused to say anything whatsoever about the current situ­ ation in Germany. But in private conversation he felt free to talk about politics. His efforts to convince politicians in Oxford of the danger posed by Hitler's Germany met with little success. "Again and again he returned home depressed. They would not or could not realize what was going on." (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 216) From Zürich Cassirer requested the rector of the University of Hamburg for a leave of absence. The Cassirers returned to Ham­ burg at the end of April, where they procured travel permits for Austria. On May 2, they finally left their home in the Blumen­ strasse (T. Cassirer, p. 199). However, Cassirer still regarded him­ self a member of the University of Hamburg until 1935, perhaps in order to be able to bring out his library and other belongings from Germany (Meran 1991, p. 460). They were staying in Vienna over the summer with Toni's family, the Wallers. In Vienna Cassirer worked on a historical and systematic study of the prin­ ciples of natural science when he received an invitation from the Swedish philosopher Malte Jacobsson to give lectures in Göteborg, Lund, and Stockholm. Three years later Cassirer would dedicate the book he was working on to Jacobsson. He replied that he could not give a definite answer since he already had other invitations to consider, but he would make allowance in his plans for a trip to Sweden in the autumn (letter to Jacobsson 5/22/33). About the same time he was invited by the Rabbi of Göteborg, Hermann Löb, to lecture in the Jewish Literary Society in Sweden (letter to Jacobsson 7/18/33; Löb to Cassirer 7/14/33). In further letters Jacobsson described the arrangements he had made for Cassirer's lectures. He underlined that it was the rector of the University of Göteborg who invited him through Jacobsson (7/15/33). The lec­ 34

tures were preferably to be held in October, two would be at the university, one in the Swedish-German Society, and one in the Philosophical Society. Cassirer would also be invited to lecture in the Philosophical Societies in Stockholm and Lund (7/27/33). Malte Jacobsson (1885-1966) had asked Cassirer to lecture in Göteborg twice before, in 1927 and 1929 (letters Cassirer to Jacobsson 10/21/27 and 2/19/29). Jacobsson studied in Berlin during the spring of 1909. Of the lecturers there, Cassirer espe­ cially impressed him. He soon became acquainted with Cassirer. In his memoirs he writes that he found Cassirer to be a charming man and about how they became very good friends (Jacobsson 1964, pp. 73-74). In Berlin he met a Jewish girl from Vienna, Emma Stiasny, whom he married. She was a botanist and art historian. In Göteborg Emma Jacobsson became well-known as the founder of a knitting-industry. Jacobsson came to the University of Göte­ borg as a teacher in 1912. His stance in moral philosophy has been labeled "value idealistic" and was inspired by the Danish philosopher Harald Höffding. This put him in opposition to the "value nihilism" of Axel Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy. As a professor 1920-1934 Jacobsson took an interest in sociology. This mirrored his political activities as a member of the Social Democratic Party. His charge as Chairman of the town council 1927-1934 affected his office as professor, and a solution to the dilemma was found when he was appointed "landshövding" ("Governor") of Goteborg's and Bohus' County in 1934. During World War II Jacobsson supported the Norwegian resistance. Against the councel of his jurists and the wish of the foreign min­ ister Günther, he rejected the request from the Quisling-regime in Norway for an embargo on Norwegian ships in the harbour of Göteborg. Later the ships made an effort to escape to England through the German blockade, with the unfortunate result that most of them were sunk. Jacobsson was a man of practical affairs and the pages of his memoirs Minnesbilder (1964) dealing with the 1930s are filled with accounts of his many duties as a Gover­ nor rather than the doings of Ernst Cassirer. 35

About the same time as the letters of invitation from Jacobsson and Löb reached him, Cassirer received invitations from All Souls College in Oxford and from the New School of Social Research in New York. In her book Toni Cassirer writes in passing that "Lederer wanted an answer" (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 205). Emil Lederer had been a professor of economics in Heidelberg and Berlin and was now dean of the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research, also known as the "Univer­ sity in Exile." Alvin Johnson was founder of the "University in Exile" as well as associate editor of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. "When Hitler came to power in early 1933 and a number of the German scholars who had contributed to the Encyclopedia lost their positions, Johnson immediately started thinking of ways tohelpthem come to America." (Coser 1984, pp. 103-105.) Among these scholars was also Cassirer, who had penned the entries on "Enlightenment" (1931) and "Kant" (1932). But America was out of the question at this time, in Toni Cassirer's view, being too far away from the children and from the environment that they had been used to. Her wish to go to Palestine was met by Ernst with much the same argument. He feared that he would never be able to become acclimatized there. Finally, the decision fell on Oxford (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 210). Cassirer told Jacobsson that he was con­ sidering an invitation from Oxford to come as Visiting Professor (in fact it was a Chichele lectureship) and that in case he accepted, which was still undecided, the Swedish plans would have to be put off until spring 1934 (letter 7/29/33). For some reason Jacobsson was firmly intent on getting Cas­ sirer to Sweden with no delay, so he immediately started to work for a better bid. Before we proceed further, a remark about the political situa­ tion in Sweden is necessary. Since the "democratic breakthrough" in 1917, the Social Democratic Party had been the most important factor in Swedish politics. During the 1920s, however, the execu­ tive power was mostly in the hands of a liberal minority govern­ ment. In the years of economic crisis the time was finally ripe for

36

the Social Democratic Party (SAP) to establish a lasting hold on government power in Sweden. From 1932 onwards, with the ex­ ception for some months around the summer of 1936, the SAP was in charge of Swedish affairs. In regard to foreign policy this meant a definite ideological opposition to Hitler's Germany in combination with a cautious and pragmatic attitude towards the increasing bullying by the mighty southern neighbour, an atti­ tude partly provoked by a disillusionment concerning an effec­ tive international order (cf. Johansson 1997, p. 166). For Cassirer, as it turned out, the situation was completely reversed in comparison with the one in Germany. In Sweden the new leadership was on his side, and actually did all it could to help him continue his philosophical work under the changed circum­ stances. The helping hand extended to Cassirer represented the ideological strand of Swedish policy in the 1930s, the commitment to internationalism and humanitarianism, while the cautious strand of national Realpolitik was seen in the restrictions on immigration that kept the border closed to the bulk of Jewish refugees. A heated debate about the possibilities of helping GermanJewish kulturpersonligheter (prominent scientists, writers etc.) was held in the First Chamber of the Swedish parliament in the months of April and May in 1933. The minister of education Arthur Engberg answered his critics that cases where political refugees could be given appointments at state institutions would be con­ sidered "with benevolence," but also that in the present times of depression the possibilities of giving foreign kulturpersonligheter the opportunity of an income in Sweden were "strictly limited" (Svanberg and Tydén 1997, pp. 82-87). Jacobsson presented his idea to acquire Cassirer to Martin Lamm, professor of literary history at the University of Stockholm. He asked Lamm if there was any possibility of Stockholm offer­ ing him a professorship. The "Eneroth professorship", a founda­ tion professorship, was newly created, but Lamm answered him that there was no possibility of Cassirer coming into consider­ ation for this (letter, Lamm to Jacobsson 4.8.33). The professor­ 37

ship went in 1937 to another German-Jewish refugee, the psy­ chologist David Katz (1884-1953, professor in Rostock 1919-1933; professor at the University of Stockholm 1937-1951). His appoint­ ment was followed by an anti-Semitic campaign and National Socialist demonstrations at his inauguration. Katz's Swedish years were very different from Cassirer's in so far as his creativity dur­ ing his time in Stockholm waned, even though he published a work on Gestalt psychology in 1942 (Nilsson 1990). Cassirer re­ fers to his works in Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Vol. III, and in the essay "Zur Logik des Symbolbegriffs." Katz and Cas­ sirer came in contact in Sweden but there is no correspondence extant. Jacobsson then called Uppsala's attention to Cassirer (T. Cas­ sirer, p. 225), and this time he was more successful. An arrange­ ment was made with the rector of the University of Uppsala that he would invite Cassirer. To help him in this project Jacobsson was aided by Östen Undén, professor in Uppsala, who was mar­ ried to Jacobsson's sister Agnes. Östen Undén (1886-1974, pro­ fessor of civil law and international civil law 1917-1937) was one time rector of the University of Uppsala, secretary of state, and an expert on international law at the foreign office. He was for­ eign minister 1924-1925 (and would return to that position for a second period 1945-1962). From 1937 to 1951, he was University Chancellor. Undén was in some respects critical of the Swedish policy towards Germany, including the policy towards the refu­ gees (Segerstedt Wiberg 1995, p. 200). Just like Jacobsson and many other Swedish students before World War I, Undén had studied in Germany (Berlin). One can surmise that he already at this time heard of Cassirer. His reception of Cassirer's Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff is demonstrated in an essay from 1928, where he tries to apply Cassirer's notion of the functional concept in juris­ prudence (as has been noticed in Thomasson 2001, pp. 40-41). Through the Swedish foreign office Undén sent a cipher tele­ gram to the Swedish consulate in Hamburg: The rector of the University of Uppsala Engströmer wanted to meet Cassirer in 38

Hamburg to discuss an appointment in Uppsala (telegram 8/7/33). The consul in Hamburg replied the following day that Cassirer was away, and that consul Max Waller, Dreihufeisengasse 11, Vienna VI was his address, whereupon Undén sent a cipher tele­ gram to the Swedish embassy in Vienna: One should ask Cassirer if he would accept an offer to lecture in Uppsala the academic year 1933-34 under the same conditions as for a Swedish pro­ fessor and with a salary of 14 000 kronor (per annum) (telegram 8/8/33). The ambassador immediately contacted Cassirer, who seemed to be delighted with the offer, although he regretted to say that he had in principle already accepted a similar offer from Oxford, but at the same time he did not hide that he had second thoughts about lecturing in English. The Swedish ambassador pointed out that he of course could use his mother tongue in Uppsala. Cassirer asked if he could rely upon the possibility of an invitation the following academic year. At the moment he was waiting for the German authorities' permission to go to Oxford. He would contact the embassy as soon as the negotiations with Berlin and Oxford were finished (telegram Swedish legation in Vienna to Undén 8/9/33). The Cassirers then stayed at the sanatorium in Schweinburg, Wickmarstal, in Czechoslovakia (letter, Swedish legation in Vienna to Undén 8/9/33) where they met their son Georg, his wife Vera, and the newly born grandson Peter (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 205). When Cassirer came back from Czechoslovakia he visited the Swedish embassy on August 23. He hoped to be able to postpone his so­ journ in Oxford until May 1934 and was desirous to receive a formal invitation from Uppsala as soon as possible (letter Swed­ ish legation in Vienna, to Undén 8/23/33). But in Uppsala the matter was not considered to be that ur­ gent. An offer was made through the secretaries of state Engberg and Undén of an invitation to Cassirer to lecture in Uppsala. Some unknown persons had pledged themselves to put at the uni­ versity's disposal the sum equivalent to one year's salary for a professor in order to make it possible for Cassirer to teach at 39

the university of Uppsala during the academic year 1933-1934. Among them was probably Olof Aschberg. (See his memoirs, Aschberg 1955, p. 218.) Engberg and Undén paid him a visit and asked him to help Cassirer to obtain a position in Sweden. The date given by Aschberg, just before the outbreak of World War II, is wrong, however. Aschberg, who was Jewish, was a banker with a special relationship to the labour movement, having started the movement's bank in 1912. (See Andersson 2000, 330-332.) The rector, Engströmer, asked the section of humanities if it approved of this and if it would give him the commission to invite Cassirer. The section first wanted to hear what the professor of practi­ cal philosophy Axel Hägerström had to say on the matter. Häger­ ström was retiring that year, and he displayed certain worries about his legacy in Uppsala. Since Hägerström for reasons of health was unable to come to the section's meeting he announced his opinion in a letter. According to Hägerström's letter it would at a first glance be of profit to the University of Uppsala if such a distinguished researcher as Cassirer gave instruction in philoso­ phy. But seen in the long run he was not sure that it would not harm the younger Swedish philosophers. Hägerström was con­ vinced that Cassirer's appointment would be prolonged after a year and he feared that this would lead to a reduction of the grant from the state, to the detriment of younger Swedish philosophers, who already found themselves in a most precarious situation. In addition, the younger philosophers had to a large extent been critical of the philosophy represented by Cassirer, and to a cer­ tain degree also of his method in the history of philosophy. Cassirer himself had of course insufficient knowledge of this Uppsala criticism and could not be expected as a fully mature researcher to have any appreciation of it. It could therefore be feared that the great authority which he had would work oppres­ sively on the younger students of philosophy at the University of Uppsala, and that those who already had obtained teaching posi­ tions in philosophy would have to stand in the shadow of a teacher of such importance. In spite of these concerns Hägerström came 40

to the conclusion that he could not discountenance the proposal from the rector because of the gain afforded through the instruc­ tion by a researcher of Cassirer's learning and general capacities (Hum. sek. prot. 9/4/33 + bil. A and B). Presumably as a result of Hägerström's apprehensions, the matter was postponed until the next meeting of the section, when two of the younger philosophers hinted at by Hägerström, do­ cents Meurling and Oxenstierna, were added to the board during the discussion of Cassirer's invitation. Now, with the proviso that the proposal would not have a position in view, the section of humanities approved that Cassirer be invited as the University's guest during the academic year 1933 -1934 to give public lectures or conduct seminars (Hum. sek. prot. 9/12/33 + bil.). The newspaper Social-Demokraten expressed satisfaction at Cassirer's invitation (the debate on German-Jewish refugee in­ tellectuals in Parliament was in fresh memory). Arthur Engberg was editor-in-chief of Social-Demokraten until 1932, and he is the likely author of the unsigned article. To us Swedes it is a pleasure and pride to be able to some small extent make good the bloody injustice inflicted on a number of brilliant German research­ ers and at the same time have our scientific tuition profit by their eminent talent and competence.

The reason for the intolerance shown against Cassirer and his philosophy was explained by Cassirer's view of the state as a Vernunftstaat, embodying the highest ideals, which was contrasted in the article with Germany's present culturally ruinous Machtstaat of masters and servants, with violence and "racial superstition" as substitutes for "the free and living thought, which is the sign of nobility of all true culture." (SD 9/16/33) Cassirer finally received an invitation to lecture and conduct seminars at the University of Uppsala from October to May from rector Engströmer. A fee would be given him in keeping with a professor's salary, 14 000 kr per annum (letter, Engströmer, Uppsala, to Cassirer 9/13/33). However, by the time Uppsala was

41

ready to acquire Cassirer the opportunity was gone. Cassirer had already arrived in London when, on September 22, he informed Jacobsson and rector Engströmer that he had finally settled upon Oxford. But he would like to come to Sweden in 1934 to lecture and conduct seminars (letter Cassirer to Engströmer 9/22/33; cf. Engströmer to Cassirer 9/30/33). For one academic year Cassirer lectured in Oxford. H. W. Cassi­ rer and his family joined his parents there for a while before he got a position at Glasgow. But Cassirer's future was uncertain, since he was not sure if his lectureship would be prolonged (T. Cassirer 1981, pp. 209-214). As was agreed upon, Cassirer returned to Uppsala in 1934. In a letter of May 26 he asked rector Engströmer about the chance of a position in Uppsala (letter Cassirer to Engströmer 5/26/34). But this time Engströmer was not equally interested in his com­ ing. Because of the situation in Uppsala they could not offer him a lasting appointment, he told Cassirer. They had difficulties in retaining even their regular professorships. (The professorship in practical philosophy was vacant from 1933 to 1938, see Nordin 1983, p. 72.) Instead, Engströmer proposed that Cassirer come and lecture from September 15 to October 15 or November 1 (letter Engströmer to Cassirer 6/22/34). Cassirer answered that the pe­ riod September 15-October 15 would be best, since he had to take up teaching at Oxford on October 20 at the latest (Cassirer to Engströmer 7/5/34). For it was finally settled that his Chichele lectureship would be prolonged for a year. The Cassirers spent June-August in Switzerland and Austria. They arrived in Basle on June 30,1934, where they met with their old friend, the philosopher Ernst Hoffmann. From Zürich they continued to Vienna (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 217). Cassirer celebrated his sixtieth birthday on July 28 in Kirchberg am Wechsel (Krois, "Zum Lebensbild Ernst Cassirers 1874-1945"). From Vienna Cassirer wrote a letter informing Jacobsson in Göteborg that he had accepted an invitation from the University of Uppsala to lecture and conduct seminars for the period of Sep­

42

tember 15 till October 15. He was not sure if it would be possible for him to lecture also in Göteborg, but he hoped they could re­ new their acquaintance (letter to Jacobsson 8/8/34). The same day he wrote to the professor of theoretical philosophy at Uppsala, Anders Karitz, and requested him to give suggestions for lectureand seminar-subjects. He preferred as subject for the lectures the relation between philosophy and the exact sciences, and wished to conduct seminars on Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft. He proposed to hold four lectures a week in Uppsala (letter 8/8/34). In his reply Karitz asked Cassirer to refrain from conducting seminars, since he already had scheduled two seminars a week. Among the subjects for lectures proposed by Cassirer Karitz preferred the philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment (letter 8/17/ 34). Cassirer thanked Karitz for his advice. He expected to arrive in Uppsala between September 8 and 10, and would like to reserve a room at an inexpensive hotel for him and his wife (letter 8/19/34). Before they went to Sweden, the Cassirers once again met with Georg, Vera, and Peter in Bad Karlbrunn, Czechoslovakia (T. Cas­ sirer 1981, p. 221). From there they travelled via Danzig and Gdynia, and over the Baltic Sea to the Swedish port of Karlskrona. On September 5, they arrived in Stockholm. A German couple welcomed them, Svend Riemer and Ingeborg Müller-Riemer. The Cassirers knew Ingeborg Müller-Riemer since their first years in Hamburg, when she was a little girl (T. Cassirer, p. 222). She died only 30 years of age in 1938. Cassirer's book Rousseau Kant Goethe was dedicated to her: "To the memory of my young friend Inge­ borg Müller-Riemer February 14,1908-September 20,1938." Her mother Mrs. Müller was also living in Stockholm and was appar­ ently acquainted not only with the Cassirers but also with Fritz Saxl (see letter T. Cassirer to Saxl 3/13/36). Svend Riemer was Emil Lederer's student, had written a doctoral thesis on the dy­ namics of the business cycle, and became a distinguished scholar in sociology in the United States (Krohn 1996, p. 185). In Stockholm Cassirer wrote Karitz that he intended to meet with scholars with whom he already had had professional con-

43

tacts. He also wished to talk to Karitz and the rector about his lectures and seminars before he left Stockholm for Uppsala (let­ ter 9/5/34). According to Toni Cassirer the academic colleagues were all still "på landet" (in the countryside), however. Ingrid Müller-Riemer enthusiastically showed them around in Stock­ holm and turned their stay into a pleasure-trip (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 222ff.). They also visited the Nationalmuseum, September 8, on a "pilgrimage," as Ernst Cassirer described it to Saxl, to see Rembrandt's painting Claudius Civilis (postcard to Saxl 9/8/34). In 1926 Aby Warburg had a copy made in Stockholm for the Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek of this painting. It symbolized to Warburg the "morally compelling cult image," and was the starting-point of his picture atlas Mnemosyne (Warburg 2001, pp. xxv-xxvi, 38,170). Cassirer made a quick visit to Uppsala on September 13 to reconnoitre. Professor Karitz invited him to lunch at Stadshotellet, Engströmer as well as Hägerström were present, together with other professors. During this visit he also agreed to an interview for the local newspaper, Upsala Nya Tidning. The newspaper was naturally curious to know what he thought of the situation in Germany. But Cassirer cautiously avoided saying anything about the matter. He had been away for so long that he could no longer estimate the situation with any certainty. Concerning Sweden he told the newspaper that he had earlier had certain contacts with Uppsala through his work. But generally Swedish philosophical works were little known in Europe - he especially regretted that Hägerström's works were not better known. He hoped to have the opportunity to learn enough Swedish during his time in Uppsala to be able without pains to profit by the Swedish philo­ sophical literature. He stressed that he would like to conduct semi­ nars in Uppsala with graduate students, if there was any interest in it. He would leave Uppsala at the beginning of the term in Oxford where he would lecture one more year, and then he prob­ ably was going to accept an offer from one of the Scottish univer­ sities (UNT 9/14/34).

44

In Stockholm, three days prior to the departure to Uppsala, the Cassirers were invited to the patrician home of the Jewish literary historian Martin Lamm where they also met the minister of education Arthur Engberg - who schocked Toni Cassirer by appearing in a workman's blouse - rector Engströmer, and other academics (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 224f.). Cassirer told Lamm later that he and his wife were the first to receive them, making them feel at home in their house (letter to Lamm 4/17/41). Martin Lamm (1880-1950, professor of literary history at the University of Stockholm) specialized in the Age of Enlightenment, the para­ doxical romanticism of which he had uncovered in a two-volume work. He also wrote books on Emanuel Swedenborg and August Strindberg. His wife Greta Lamm worked most assidu­ ously for the refugees from Hitler's Germany (Segerstedt Wiberg 1979, p. 16). Arthur Engberg (1888-1944), studied under Axel Hägerström in Uppsala, and is said to have belonged to the philosopher's favourite disciples. As head of "ecklesiastikdeparte­ mentet" 1932-1936 and 1936-1939, he was responsible for educa­ tional, cultural, and ecclesiastical questions. Engberg was remem­ bered as a patron of the arts and a supporter of the humanities, as well as an enemy of National Socialism. Lately, however, his antiSemitic articles in the 1910s and 1920s have received attention (Blomqvist 2001). Confronted with the rising tide of National Socialism, Engberg seems to have changed his mind on the Jews altogether. He was friendly with Chief Rabbi Marcus Ehrenpreis and he saw to it that Ehrenpreis was made professor honoris causa in 1935 (Ehrenpreis 1946, pp 390-391). The Cassirers moved to Uppsala September 18, and the fol­ lowing day Cassirer began his series of lectures on the philoso­ phy of the Age of Enlightenment at the University of Uppsala. In Uppsala they were invited to the house of Östen Undén, who asked him if he would like to lecture in Göteborg when the lec­ tures in Uppsala had been brought to a close. Cassirer agreed to this and presently Malte Jacobsson came to Uppsala to arrange the matter (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 227). 45

During his stay in Uppsala he twice went to Stockholm to give lectures. The first on "Goethe und Platon" was held in Humanistiska Föreningen ("The Society of Humanities") at the University of Stockholm, September 24 (Gaudeamus October 1934, p. 20; cf. letter to Lamm 4/8/35). The second was on October 1, when he lectured in the Philosophical Society, on "Prinzipien einer Philosophie der symbolischen Formen." Cassirer gave this lec­ ture on three occasions in Sweden (in Stockholm, Uppsala, and Göteborg). Since there is no manuscript or even draft of it extant, the content will be summarised here, in so far as it is possible from the newspaper reports. According to the report in Dagens Nyheter (10/2/34) he stressed that the philosophy of symbolic forms was not a finished system, deduced from one supreme prin­ ciple. Rather it was about certain tasks of research within the re­ gions of language, myth, and art, among others. In all these re­ gions one encountered the same problem of symbolisation that was of fundamental importance to any philosophy of culture. Cassirer himself was characterized by Dagens Nyheter as a man of sixty, perhaps best known for his acute examinations of the phi­ losophy of Kant. The philosopher John Landquist celebrated Cassirer after the lecture and then took up the discussion with him. He next delivered this lecture on October 9 in the Philosophi­ cal Society in Uppsala. The lecture in the Philosophical Society was advertised in the Uppsala Nya Tidning on the same day along with a summary presentation of his philosophical career and of his works. The newspaper also praised his brilliant and animated lectures in Uppsala on the Enlightenment. Cassirer was welcomed in the evening to the Philosophical Society by the chairman do­ cent Gunnar Oxenstierna, one of the philosophers supposed to be critical of Cassirer's philosophy. Cassirer's lecture lasted for al­ most two hours. It was described in the Uppsala Nya Tidning (10/ 10/34) as an outline of the philosophy of symbolic forms: The philosophy of symbolic forms is not a new system, a world pic­ ture, instead it deals with concrete problems in relation to the

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actual phenomena of the world of human thought: the general concept of culture, language, myth, religion, and art. From these regions the philosophy of symbolic forms seeks to extract the com­ mon moment. Only when one succeeds in reaching an overview of the whole region, is it possible to proceed further to the ques­ tion of the essence of man. The answer to the question about the common moment is that man in all these areas uses signs and symbols, to express his ideas. These symbols are connected with each other and comprise our world. Cassirer subsequently ex­ panded upon this connection within different fields: logic, math­ ematics, physics, as well as in language, myth, and art. The news­ paper report from the lecture ended with Cassirer's hobby-horse during his stay in Sweden: the need for co-operation between philosophy and the special sciences. Cassirer was reported to have said that the philosophy of symbolic forms covered fields that the philosophers could not master on their own. It was dependent on other scientific disciplines, their achievements and methods. The Cassirers left Uppsala on October 10, i.e. the day after the lecture in the Philosophical Society. They returned to Stockholm and then went on to Göteborg. On Friday, October 12, they arrived in an autumnal Göteborg. It was rainy and 11 degrees. They were staying at Kontoristföreningens hotell. In the evening Cassirer once again lectured on "Prinzipien einer Philosophie der symbo­ lischen Formen" at the University of Göteborg. The docent of philosophy Ake Petzäll had met the Cassirers at the railway sta­ tion (letter T. Cassirer to Petzäll 8/25/51) and now welcomed Cassirer to the meeting of the Psychological-Philosophical Soci­ ety. A couple of years earlier Rudolf Carnap had been invited, and, in the same year as Cassirer, Otto Neurath lectured in the Society (Lindberg and Nilsson 1996, p. 170). The following day he gave an interview for the newspaper Göteborgs Handels- och sjöfartstidning (10/13/34). The reporter found him reading a local newspaper in the hotel lobby and Cassirer astounded him with the information that he had learnt Swedish "to the extent that he had finished two philosophical 47

treatises and considered reading newspapers child's play." Cassirer enjoyed the acquaintance with the Swedish philosophers. He was of course not wholly unfamiliar with Hägerström and Phalén earlier on, but now he realised that many important works were beyond reach for him and his colleagues on the Continent due to the language barrier. He had read Hägerström's work on the Roman concept of obligation, among other works. To the ques­ tion of the standing of philosophy among the sciences he replied that one was going back to the situation of Plato's days when he gathered experts from different fields in his academy and used their knowledge in constructing his own philosophical system. And today just like then mathematics and physics were the sci­ ences of the greatest consequence to philosophers. In this con­ nection he told the reporter about the stimulating personal con­ tact with Erwin Schrödinger who lived next door in Oxford. He wished that mathematicians, physicians, and astronomers would be invited to philosophical conferences, and believed that our knowledge was furthered through co-operation rather than through the formation of schools. Philosophers in particular were liable to be deprecatory towards everything that did not fit into their ready-made systems, and to be fairly uninterested in what was going on outside their country's borders - this, he courte­ ously added, applied to a lesser extent to the Swedish philoso­ phers than to any other philosophers he had encountered (GHT 10/13/34). That same day the Cassirers were invited to Malte Jacobsson's house, where they were introduced to the high society of Göteborg. It was on this occasion that Cassirer's future would be decided. Jacobsson told him that he wanted Cassirer as his successor in Göteborg, since he would leave his chair to take up the position as "landshövding" (Governor) of Goteborg's and Bohus' County. (Jacobsson was appointed on October 29, 1934.) Cassirer asked him, however, to create a personal chair for him, so that a Swedish philosopher may have the vacant chair. The reason for this was the "Zondek case," which the Cassirers had learnt about in Stockholm.

48

The famous Jewish gynaecologist Bernhard Zondek from Ger­ many had requested the right to practise in Sweden. But against this there was a strong opposition among Swedish doctors. More than 1000 doctors supported the protest of "The Swedish Associa­ tion of Younger Doctors" against Zondek. Zondek withdrew his request and went to Palestine instead. (See Valentin 1964, p. 174.) In the press the opinion was expressed that Zondek's stay in Sweden must not infringe on the means of support of Swedish doctors. (For an example of this, see Aftonbladet 10/3/34.) This may have been a topic in the society at Jacobsson's house that day. Among the guests was Torgny Segerstedt, the editor-inchief of the liberal Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning (or for short, Handelstidningeri) who according to his daughter more than once expressed his view that the medical students' action was a shame to Sweden (Segerstedt Wiberg 1995, p. 151). In Segerstedt Cassirer made the acquaintance of the leading political and moral figure in Göteborg, which was to be of consequence. In Göteborg the Cassirers would be living in the same street as Segerstedt. Toni Cassirer notes that they would visit Segerstedt every now and again (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 229). According to Segerstedt's daughter, Ingrid Segerstedt-Wiberg, Cassirer and Segerstedt did not have any close relation, however. They were two different personalities, yet equally aloof. She confirms that Segerstedt was very interested in getting Cassirer to Göteborg (personal com­ munication to the author). Torgny Segerstedt (1876-1945, Profes­ sor of the general history of religion at the University of Stockholm 1913-1917, editor-in-chief of Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning 1917-1945) became famous for his column "I dag" ("Today"), in which he daily from 1933 chastised the Third Reich. One such column, on February 3,1933, he ended with the words "Herr Hitler is an insult," whereupon Hermann Göring (who had been mar­ ried to a Swedish woman) sent him a telegram in protest. Handelstidningen was soon banned in Germany. During World War II Segerstedt was in a constant feud with the Government over Swedish concessions to Germany and the policy on the press. A

49

campaign against him was started in Göteborg in December 1939, when tradesmen and ship-owners protested in newspapers against Handelstidningen's "irresponsible writings," and advertise­ ment in Handelstidningen was stopped. Soon more groups in Göteborg and Lund joined in the protest against what was con­ sidered to be writings harmful to the country. But Segerstedt also received expressions of sympathy from the whole country and the labour movement in Göteborg supported him (Segerstedt Wiberg 1995, pp. 191-196). As Toni Cassirer relates in her book, he was at one time in the autumn 1940 called up to the King, where he was exhorted to stop driving the country into a war with Germany. In the eyes of many people he was Sweden's moral conscience during the war, and no doubt his columns helped to boost the morale in Sweden as well as abroad in the days of deep­ est distress. Cassirer used to read Segerstedt's columns, and even in America he was able to keep track of his writings, as he wrote to Jacobsson: "Many of Segerstedt's statements from T dag' I have in my hand here not much later than was the case in Göteborg." (Cassirer to Jacobsson, undated). Jacobsson and Segerstedt knew each other from their student days in Lund, but they were not intimate friends (Jacobsson 1964, p. 99). Moreover, Segerstedt grew up in the same small town as Osten Undén and constantly re­ ferred to him as "little Östen" (Segerstedt Wiberg 1995, p. 25). Sweden's leading circles in the 1930s were narrow, and thanks to Jacobsson, Cassirer during his first short two-month visit became adopted by them. The Cassirers departed from Göteborg the same day, October 13, with the boat for London. Jacobsson immediately following Cassirer's departure started a subscription in Göteborg on behalf of a professorship (GHT 14.6.1935). The wealthy commercial town had for centuries been an exceptional case among Swedish towns in regard to donations. Göteborg was during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a city of donations and of donors, run by a patriarchy with a strong public spirit and feeling of "noblesse oblige." With the political

50

changes brought about by "the democratic breakthrough," the financial and social basis for that culture also disappeared (Romdahl 1951, p. 15). Though much of the old spirit remained in the 1930s when Cassirer came to Göteborg. Indeed, it was a precon­ dition for his being there in the first place. As chief guarantor the head of the Jewish community Carl Mannheimer stepped in. Mannheimer (gynaecologist, head of the community 1933-1944) was a generous patron of the arts. He be­ longed to a prominent family in Göteborg and it was on behalf of a family fund that the contribution was made. Mannheimer paid for half the sum of Cassirer's professorship (7000 kronor per an­ num during five years). Most of the other donors were Jewish, the men of affairs Jules Cohen (1000), H.G. Turitz (1000), and M. Schwartzman (1000), as well as the lawyer Mårten Henriques (1000). Turitz and Henriques were also leading men in the Jewish community. Mrs. Ann-Ida Broström, from a family of ship-own­ ers, and Torgny Segerstedt made contributions of 2000 and 1000 kronor per annum, respectively. The deed of gift was finally drawn up on June 12,1935. It stated that Cassirer would be appointed as teacher with the same teaching obligation as a regular profes­ sor at the University of Göteborg and be guaranteed a salary of 14000 kronor per annum, but no right to pension (GLA, FIV a: 2: Ernst Cassirers professur). From England Cassirer corresponded with Jacobsson about the measures that had to be taken in order to move from Ger­ many to Sweden. Cassirer had up to this point formally been working abroad with the permission of the German authorities. The position in Göteborg entailed that the Reichsfluchtsteuer would become due, since the Cassirers would be giving up their perma­ nent address in Hamburg. This taxation, introduced by Reich Chancellor Brüning, amounted to 25 percent of the property, what was impossible for them to pay in ready money. Only subjects that could prove that their stay abroad would serve German in­ terests could be exempt from tax (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 240f.; cf. Der Präsident des Landesfinanzamts Hamburg to E. Cassirer 6.5.35,

51

in Jacobsson's papers, A 335 vol 2). This problem, as well as other drawbacks, the lack of pension and the salary of 14000 kronor, at first made Cassirer apprehensive about going to Göteborg. Jacobsson wrote back, telling Cassirer that he was disappointed. He explained that a pension would be unthinkable, and pointed out that professors in Lund and Uppsala earned just about 13000 kronor. Jacobsson also declared that he would do all that he could to relieve Cassirer from taxation, but he did not think it likely that the German authorities would be moved by testimonials from Sweden about the great value for German philosophy of his com­ ing to Göteborg (letter from Jacobsson to Cassirer 1/11/35). Jacobsson contacted the Swedish foreign minister Richard Sandler, who told him that he was prepared to give all feasible support. A joint testimonial by the rector of the University of Göteborg and Jacobsson was sent to Germany - with no result. Jacobsson went himself in the middle of April to the German Embassy in Stockholm to request that they further the appoint­ ment. "But in all likelihood the opinion there too is that German culture only can be furthered by Aryans," he told Cassirer (letters Jacobsson to Cassirer undated [January?]; 5/12/35). Cassirer stub­ bornly ignored the talk of Aryans and non-Aryans and had his mind firmly set upon being exempt from tax (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 241). He collected testimonials from the places where he had lectured that he had treated German philosophy and literature; from Germany, Oxford, and from two Swedish scholars, Profes­ sors Lamm and Tegen. (Einar Tegen was professor of philosophy in Lund at the time; it was Lamm who asked him to help Cassirer, draft of letter, Tegen to Cassirer 5/14/35). To Lamm he wrote April 8 that the decision to leave England was hard to make - still he found the prospect of being able to lecture in German, and the possibility of five years of free time for work, attractive. In May, before any definite answer from Germany had arrived, the Cassirers began planning to move to Sweden. He told Lamm that they were looking forward to meeting him and his wife again. He asked Lamm to give them suggestions for easy to read short

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stories, so that they could prepare themselves for the Swedish language (letters to Lamm 4/8/35 and 5/16/35). Meanwhile the personal chair was prepared at the University of Göteborg. In order to be able to call Cassirer to a professorship, the university first had to ask experts to testify that he possessed the necessary first-rate qualifications. Once again Hägerström was consulted, together with two other professors emeriti from Lund, Hans Larsson and Efraim Liljeqvist. They all avered that Cassirer's work was first-rate (GLA, A II: 30 + bil., 5/4/35; 5/31/35). Fi­ nally, June 14, the Board of the university took the decision to announce the call to Göteborg publicly, as Jacobsson told Cassirer, since they had to go to the government to get a ratification of the appointment, which would take some time (letter Jacobsson to Cassirer, undated; His Royal Majesty's ratification of the Board's decision is dated September 20,1935). The University of Göteborg appointed Cassirer professor of theoretical philosophy for a pe­ riod of five years, starting from September 1. His teaching obliga­ tion would be the same as a regular professor's but he was ex­ empt from the obligation to give examinations (GLA, Göteborgs Högskola A I: 37). The reason why Cassirer was made professor of theoretical philosophy, Jacobsson later told the philosopher Konrad MarcWogau, was that his production mainly lay in that field (MarcWogau to Petzäll 9/2/35). It was of consequence to Marc-Wogau, because he applied for the chair in philosophy that Jacobsson had vacated 1934, and he now feared that that chair would be reserved for a philosopher with a practical orientation, while his orienta­ tion was theoretical. Jacobsson's former chair went in fact to a practical philosopher from Lund, Gunnar Aspelin. Cassirer answered Jakobsson that he was firmly determined to accept the call to Göteborg. But on the other hand the question mark concerning the standpoint of the German authorities, from whom he still had not heard anything, remained. In case the an­ swer was negative he suggested that he would in his reply give the impression that he only was going to accept a temporary in­

53

vitation. To Jacobsson he confessed that he would come to Göte­ borg hungry for a possibility to work: "To think that my life will begin anew in Sweden makes me happy. I hope that outer and inner circumstances will permit me to do the work that you ex­ pect from me, and that I myself wish to do." (Letter to Jacobs­ son 6/19/35.) But Toni Cassirer writes that when they presently left Oxford, it was in a state of despondency, since there was no answer from Germany, and they were leaving their children and friends without knowing when they would see them next (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 242). They spent most of the summer in Vienna. Here Cassirer at last received notification that he would be exempt from Reichs­ fluchtsteuer. Jacobsson was both surprised and happy when he got the news from Cassirer (letter Jacobsson to Cassirer, undated). Thereby nothing stood in the way for him to accept the five-year invitation to Göteborg. Jacobsson gave him detailed instructions on how to reply to the invitation (letter Jacobsson to Cassirer, undated). In a formal letter from Vienna of July 15 to the Univer­ sity of Göteborg, Cassirer thanked the rector for the call to a pro­ fessorship and declared that he was prepared to take the "new and splendid (schöne) task" upon himself (letter 7/15/35). According to Peter Cassirer ("On my Grandfather Ernst Cas­ sirer") his grandmother was wrong in the assumption that there was no anti-Semitism in Sweden. Although Toni Cassirer meant "hardly any" anti-Semitism (T. Cassirer, p. 247), his correction of her account is significant. There is, moreover, no mention in her book of the attempt in Göteborg to start a campaign against Cassirer's professorship. The simple explanation for this could be that she and her husband were not aware of the event, occur­ ring as it did before they arrived in Sweden. In the social and cultural life of Göteborg at the beginning of the twentieth century, Jews played an important part. Jewish per­ sons were largely responsible for the major cultural institutions, such as Goteborg's museum of art, the theatre, and the concert hall. The members of the Jewish community, it is said, were com­

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pletely assimilated by the town's Christian majority already at the time of the Parliament decree about complete emancipation of the Jews in 1870. Consequently, the Jews of Göteborg had no inclinations towards either orthodoxy or Zionism. According to one historian of the Jewish community, Carl Vilhelm Jacobowsky, they were leavened with irreligious kulturradikalism, i.e. liberal­ ism. Jacobowsky also speaks of a Friedhofsjudentum in Göteborg (Jacobowsky 1955, pp. 85,101). Conrad Pineus notes in his mem­ oirs from the 1940s that Yiddish expressions were the only rem­ nants of Jewish customs and precepts. Assimilation and marriages to non-Jews had brought this about (von Rosen 1946, p. 53). Toni Cassirer found it noteworthy that so many Jews were married to non-Jews (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 247). While the leading and academic circles of Göteborg were more liberal and pro-British than was usual in Sweden at the time, there were also momentous popular anti-liberal currents, especially within the Church of Sweden. Moreover, Göteborg was the head­ quarters of the Swedish National Socialist Party. But admittedly National Socialism never became a significant political force there or anywhere else in the country. On the other hand the National Socialist movement was rooted in the kind of popular antiSemitism propagated by the magazine Vidi, also published in Göteborg. The important Jewish element in Goteborg's economical and cultural life, in industry and commerce, in banking and the press, in the art- and music­ circles, the large fortunes which the old Jewish families had gathered, the great reputation they enjoyed and the comparably high number of Jews in the city council,

is pointed out by Jacobowsky as the fertile soil for anti-Semitism in Göteborg. According to his account most Jews resigned their commissions of trust during the 1930s, and Jews were at this time repeatedly advised to use a small street and avoid big crowds when leaving service during the great solemnities. The overt antiSemitic magazine Vidi had ceased to appear 1931, but anti-Semitic

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jeers and blows in the streets could often occur (Jacobowsky 1955, pp. 101,102,105). The same day and in fact even before it was made by the Board, the decision to appoint Cassirer was announced in Handelstidningen. The newspaper also underlined that the question of whom was going to replace Malte Jacobsson on the chair of philosophy in no way was affected by the personal professorship for Cassirer (GHT 6/14/35). The next day the conservative newspaper Göte­ borgs Morgonpost sounded the alarm and attacked the decision to create a personal chair for the "Jewish, German, exiled professor Ernst Cassirer." The headline translates as "An unnecessary pro­ fessorship." The newspaper made an appeal to the general pub­ lic as well as to the world of science. It found it hard to believe that it was only a scholarly interest that lay behind the associa­ tion of the 66-year-old professor (Cassirer had not yet celebrated his sixtyfirst birthday) with the university. To call an aged for­ eign researcher in this way was not at all in accordance with Swed­ ish academic tradition. Given that Cassirer's scholarly career was over since he left Germany, and that his philosophy in the neo­ Kantian spirit represented a closed chapter in modern philosophi­ cal research, he would not be able to contribute as an academic teacher to the study of philosophy. In order to find somebody for a professorship there was no need to go abroad and there was furthermore no need for two professorships in philosophy at the university. To an impartial observer the professorship seemed more like a personal subsidy for a refugee intellectual. Göteborgs Morgonpost finally issued a warning that if in this way the doors were opened for private interests, they would threaten to trans­ form an institution of learning authorized by the state into an asylum for international humanitarian activities (GMP 6/15/35). (In fact, the University of Göteborg was a foundation university, supported by the town, which through all the years had relied heavily on private donations.) No official reply came from the university. The donor and the head of the Jewish community Mannheimer wrote a letter to the

56

rector Karlgren telling him that he was very much displeased at the silence of the university in what he referred to as "the [Cassirer] case", i. e., in the same terms as had been used in the debate about Zondek the previous year in Stockholm. It is said that Mannheimer was very upset by the Zondek affair (Jacobowsky 1955, p. 107). He no doubt had reasons to fear a repetition of that affair in Göteborg. Mannheimer wanted the university to publicly state that Cassirer was called solely because he was the number one researcher in his field. The rector or Malte Jacobsson should sign the statement. "How does it appear now? You have largely with 'Jewish' money acquired [Cassirer] and the only judgment about this that has been publicly made is a reproach against the univer­ sity, which is supposed to have run the contemptible Jews' er­ rands." This view was given the public not least due to the university's silence, according to Mannheimer: Look, now the Jews, with their financial power, have once again smuggled in one of their own; the Swedish Christian philosophers have to starve for the sake of the Jew [Cassirer], (Letter Mannheimer to the rector 6/15/35.)

However, a week later, an article was published in Göteborgs Mor­ gonpost, which was a rebuttal of the criticism levelled at Cassirer and the university's decision to appoint him, but without deign­ ing to polemics. The author was Folke Leander, a 25-year-old philosopher who had just finished his licentiate treatise at the university. Leander had visited Cassirer in Oxford on June 4, ac­ cording to the article. Of Leander's visit, Cassirer wrote to Jacobs­ son: "If I just find a few auditors of this kind, the work in Göteborg will be a great pleasure." However, he also told Jacobsson that he did not have any use for Leander in Oxford, since they were in the middle of breaking up, which suggests that Jacobsson had sent Leander as a helper (letter to Jacobsson 6/19/35; apparently Leander stayed for several weeks in Oxford). Leander reported in Göteborgs Morgonpost on his visit in Oxford and his meeting with Cassirer. The readers were told that Cassirer, as soon as he was forced to leave Germany, had received an invitation to

57

Oxford, that he had been dismissed only because of his being a Jew, and that he was one of the foremost contemporary thinkers. Leander opposed the international and civilized Oxford to the nationalist and racist Germany that drove Cassirer into exile. He did not hide his adverse feelings towards the German regime. Leander was already well versed in Cassirer's philosophy. So much so, that the newspaper added to the headline, "a disciple on Cassirer and his philosophy." He touched upon Cassirer's major works and gave a brief review of the philosophy of sym­ bolic forms. He finished by declaring that although Cassirer's set of problems were limited, he had within this set made a contri­ bution that hardly would be forgotten, neither tomorrow nor the day after tomorrow (GMP 6/21/35). During the summer Cassirer corresponded with Jacobsson and his successor pro tempore Petzäll about the autumn term in Göte­ borg. The Göteborg philosophers had agreed that they would ask Cassirer to lecture on the philosophy of religion. As Petzäll wrote him, the philosophy of religion would be desirable for the stu­ dents of theology who in Sweden were obliged to pass a prepara­ tory examination in philosophy (Petzäll to Cassirer 7/20/35; cf. Jacobsson to Cassirer, undated). But neither did Cassirer adopt this proposal for the autumn, nor did he ever treat this subject in his Swedish years. The lecture course on Plato and Platonism which he gave the first autumn in Göteborg can be seen as a com­ promise however, since he there touched upon neo-Platonism and Augustine. Furthermore Petzäll sent Cassirer two of his books, one of them in Swedish. Cassirer thanked him, saying that he was able to read Swedish without essential difficulty, although it was somewhat taxing (letter to Petzäll 8/5/35). The month of August was spent in Czechoslovakia, at Bad Karlsbrunn near the German border, where they met with Georg Cassirer and his family. Toni Cassirer tells us in her book about how she tried to convince him to come with them to Sweden, but to no avail (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 243). Cassirer and his wife went on to Berlin, whence they took the night-train embarking on the

58

boat to Trelleborg, Sweden. The Cassirers arrived in Göteborg on August 23, with a train from Malmö. The following day one could read an interview with Cassirer in Göteborgs Handels- och Sjofarts-Tidning. "Ernst Cassirer has ar­ rived" the headline announced. The reporter submitted that he found it hard to interview somebody who absolutely did not want to pronounce on any current problem. Cassirer declared that he had just read through Gösta Berling's Saga (by Selma Lagerlöf), in Swedish. - Naturally I have read Scandinavian literature before, but only in transla­ tion. To renew the acquaintance in the original language with what you got to know in your youth is amusing. When I was a freshman I saw Strindberg's 'Miss Julie' and 'The Father' at a small club theatre in Berlin. In those days it was prohibited to play him in public. Since then much has changed. Strindberg was, you know, later played everywhere in Germany, the cast of mind became freer [...] Well, yes, much has changed since then... - How do you mean? - O dear, the professor answered with an abstracted look in his blue eyes. - I mean, how have things changed? What way? - Well, yes, concerning the plans for my lectures here, nothing is as yet decided. I first have to consult with my colleague Mr. Jacobsson about the courses and about what is expected of me.

He also told the newspaper that he was happy to be able to lec­ ture in German again. He tried this at first in Oxford but that did not turn out well. The students did not understand him, he had to change into English and that also entailed certain difficulties (GHT 8/24/35). Jacobsson arranged for the Cassirers to lodge the first week with a friend of his, Conrad Pineus, Viktoriagatan 17 (letter to Cassirer, undated). They stayed in his home until September 1 (RA, Mapp 33, Justitiedep. 1939,2 juni, Sv. Medborgarskap Ernst Cassirer). Conrad Pineus (1872-1945), bore the title of average adjuster (shipping), and had made a fortune on speculation. He was an important collector of art, mainly contemporary Scandi­ navian painting. The Pineus home, "Darjeeling", was the centre of Goteborg's art-circles (Romdahl 1951, pp. 61-64). In addition

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Pineus had a great interest in theatre, and was Chairman of the board of the Stadsteatern ("Municipal theatre"). He was also wellknown for his esprit, which is demonstrated in his memoirs. In them he also makes brief mention of the Cassirers staying with him and his wife (von Rosen 1946, p. 199). According to the mem­ oirs he never missed an opportunity to express his disgust at the persecution of the Jews, instigated by the Nazi regime. During the war Pineus' home became a meeting-place for many of the Englishmen, Americans, and later in the war, Russians, who vis­ ited the town (von Rosen 1946, pp. 196,212). First of all on arrival, the Cassirer's went seeking for an apart­ ment, Toni Cassirer writes. "Ernst wanted unconditionally to put up his entire library, and I appreciated a good guest-room, be­ cause I was hoping for many visitors from abroad, and for the day when I could receive Georg in the house." (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 245.) It did not take long before they had found a suitable apart­ ment in a yellow wooden villa not too far from of the university building. Pending their new residence, they stayed at the Savoy Hotel. From the hotel Toni Cassirer wrote a letter to Saxl, telling him how well things had turned out. Cassirer's works were even better known among his colleagues in Göteborg than in Germany, she wrote. The housing problem had been solved with unexpected promptness. Now there would be a new Blumenstrasse for them (letter T. Cassirer to Saxl 9/ 6/35). They moved to their new home in Föreningsgatan 11, on the 9th of September. The same date Cassirer began his lectures at the university on Plato and Platonism. Two weeks later his seminars on the first part of Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft started. "The acclimatization in Sweden was child's play in compari­ son with that in England," Toni Cassirer comments on this stage in her biography. In some weeks their Hamburg property had arrived. Cassirer could lecture in German once again which meant more time for his own work, and with the library in place in a new home, some of the lost peace was retrieved.

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The small provincial town1 in the small provincial area, in which we now lived, captured him. The beautiful site of the town, the modern, very origi­ nal buildings, the art collections and libraries, all this pleased him very much. The cultural standard of his colleagues and students astounded and delighted him, and he criticised only what he deemed necessary from a philosophical point of view. (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 246 f.)

Even if he now could lecture in German, Cassirer immediately started to learn Swedish "like a school-boy." In his last years in Sweden he had mastered the language to such an extent that he was able to write letters and give interviews in Swedish. Cassirer was inaugurated as professor of the University of Göteborg on October 19, together with the new professor of Ger­ man, Axel Lindqvist. The day preceding the inauguration, an ar­ ticle by Jacobsson was published in Handelstidningen. The article was the "official" presentation of Cassirer to the public of Göteborg. Jacobsson described Cassirer's inauguration as a sig­ nal event in the history of the university: Ernst Cassirer was the foremost contemporary philosopher and the university had, in competition with England and America, succeeded in convinc­ ing him to choose Sweden as his place of work. It would surely be of the greatest importance for philosophy in Sweden that Ernst Cassirer was going to work in close proximity as a teacher and author. Furthermore he arrived at a moment when they most needed him. The dominant Uppsala philosophy had, especially among the epigones, debouched into a sterile conceptual analy­ sis. Now, Ernst Cassirer's philosophy could also be described as a conceptual analysis but it did not make halt at the individual concept, instead it aimed at an analysis of the nature of the scien­ tific formation of concepts as a whole. This kind of conceptual analysis demanded intimate knowledge of the methods of both the natural and the cultural sciences. It was precisely this close contact with creative research that gave force to Cassirer's philo­ 1

Göteborg was Sweden's second town with about 280000 inhabitants at the time.

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sophy. The following account of Cassirer's works centred on his demonstration of the functional character of concepts. Jacobsson underlined its wide-ranging significance beyond logic and the theory of science. Indeed, our entire world view was affected by this new perspective on the concept-formation in the sciences (GHT 10/18/35). In the published invitation to the inaugural lectures, rector Bernhard Karlgren drew attention to the background of Cassirer's professorship, claiming that they had witnessed a backlash of civi­ lization more devastating than the bloodiest wars: the refusal of mighty groups to recognize the liberty of thought, their violent attempt to force their political and cultural doctrines on each and everyone. When Sweden made an effort to defend the threatened liberty of thought and research, it fulfilled its duty as a truly civi­ lized nation. Thanks to liberal and courageous citizens of Göte­ borg, the rector continued, the university had been able to call one of the foremost and most renowned contemporary philos­ ophers. It had thereby acted in accordance with Sweden's tradi­ tions of freedom and civilization. Furthermore, Swedish philos­ ophy had received an added force that would bring about a new era in that discipline (Karlgren 1935, pp. vii-viii). This forceful statement from the rector of the university also reads as a reply to the criticism of Cassirer's professorship in the press. The inaugural ceremony, installation, took place at 2 p.m. at the university hall. The University of Göteborg was a modern högskola (German Hochschule), only dating back to 1891, but it had appropriated much of the traditional academic pomp and circum­ stance. The orchestra started to play. The students' procession was followed by the Board, the Governor Jacobsson, with the Bishop by his side, and the lärareråd (faculty), with the Rector and the Vice Rector behind the new Professors, Ernst Cassirer and Axel Lindqvist, respectively. In the wake of the procession came the other teachers. The secretary of the Board read His Royal Majesty's ratification of the Board's decision to appoint the professors, whereupon Cassirer entered the podium. 62

Cassirer's inaugural lecture was called "Bedeutung und Auf­ gabe der Philosophie" (GHT 10/19/35). As an extant draft indi­ cates, an alternative title, "Der Begriff der Philosophie als Problem der Philosophie," was contemplated by Cassirer. This title has been employed in Donald Phillip Verene's English translation (Cassirer 1979; cf. editors note, p. 49). The moral strain of the lecture was very much in keeping with the Göteborg milieu that Cassirer had been introduced to. The note was already sounded in Karlgren's invitation, when he spoke of the backlash against free thought and of the duty to defend the values of our civilization. This note was familiar in Göteborg from Segerstedt's articles. When Cassirer spoke of the "essential moral issue" and called for an awareness of the "menacing danger," these would in Sweden have been recognized as "Segerstedtian" statements. And just as Karlgren in his invita­ tion, Cassirer in his lecture underscored the need - within the discipline of philosophy - to take up a stand on of the fundamental values of our civilization at a time when they were questioned. Is there really something like an objective theoretical truth, and is there something like that which earlier generations have understood as the ideal of morality, of humanity? Are there general binding supra-individual, supra-state, supra-national ethical claims? In a time in which such questions can be raised, philosophy cannot stand aside, mute and idle. (Cassirer 1979, pp. 59-61)

The "elective affinity" between Cassirer and his new milieu was emphasized by him at the end of the lecture, having first thanked the board, and especially Malte Jacobsson, the rector, and the faculty, for the invitation: Everywhere among you I encountered, especially in the circle of colleagues, a personal confidence and genuine good will which has made me happy; everywhere a willingness was present to advise me, to encourage me in my activity, and to help me over the first difficulties. I know now that I will not stand alone here in my work and can hope thus to carry it on, as any philo­ sophical work must be carried on and as it only can succeed in closest con­ nection with the particular disciplines, in lively community, in close per­ sonal touch with their representatives. (Cassirer 1979, p. 63)

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Finally, the new professor of German, Axel Lindqvist, ended his inaugural lecture in the same vein, saying that in a time when the gains of civilization had been discarded as being worthless, both teachers and students of the cultural sciences had a special responsibility, a duty to resist this development (värnplikt, i.e. compulsory military service). According to Lindqvist, the words Gedankenfreiheit and Kulturkampf had taken on a new impor­ tance. The high esteem in which the scholars and scientists of Göte­ borg held Cassirer was affirmed when he in the autumn of 1935 was made honorary member of Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets­ samhället ("The Royal Society of Arts and Sciences") in Göteborg. From another point of view it can be interpreted as a political gesture. A similar motive lay behind the election during World War II of prominent Norwegians to the Society in protest against the German occupation (Eriksson 1985, p. 97). When Cassirer arrived in Göteborg, he was welcomed by the Judisk Tidskrift ("Jewish Review"), which praised him for having lent lustre to the Jewish name (JT 1935: 190, p. 314). About that there is no doubt, and yet his explicitly Jewish engagements were few before he came to Sweden. The Swedish years seemingly brought no change in this relation. Cassirer did write an article for Judisk Tidskrift. In 1933 he published an essay on Bergson in the Jewish review Der Morgen. The essay was re-worked by Cas­ sirer in Sweden and published in Judisk Tidskrift 1941 (Vol. XIV, No. I, pp. 13-18) as "Henry [sic] Bergsons etik och religions­ filosofi." This was his only public "Jewish" appearance in Swe­ den. This is not a translation of the German paper. In fact it is the only Swedish publication by Cassirer that may have been writ­ ten by him in that language. As Cassirer states in the introduc­ tion his aim is not to present a philosophical analysis of Bergson's Les deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion (for which he refers to the German essay) but to clarify the fundamental ideas of that book. This article is of specific interest in a Jewish connection be­ cause the starting-point, in contrast with the German Bergson-

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essay, is taken in monotheism and the problem of reconciling "the order of existence" with "the order of value." The Rabbi in Göteborg was Hermann Löb (Rabbi in Göteborg 1919-1962). Löb came from Berlin, Charlottenburg. He was also a teacher of German at the University of Göteborg. Löb was known to be stern and it is said that on one occasion he criticized Cassirer for having lectured on a holiday (personal communication to the author from Peter Cassirer). Cassirer must have lectured on more than one occasion in a Jewish community. It is likely that he made the acquaintance of the Chief Rabbi of Sweden Marcus Ehrenpreis. Ehrenpreis studied at the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums in Berlin, where he came in contact with Hermann Cohen (Ehrenpreis 1946, p. 69). In 1914 he was called to Sweden from Bulgaria. There is no record of any encounter between Ehrenpreis and Cassirer. But in a letter to Ehrenpreis (11/5/35), Löb writes that Cassirer in principle had agreed to lecture in the Jewish community in Stockholm as well as in the Judiska lit­ teratursamfundet ("Jewish Literary Society"), and he leaves it to Ehrenpreis to get in touch with him. For the lecture in Judiska litteratursamfundet Cassirer had offered any of three papers: on Lessing and Mendelsohn, Spinoza's place in the history of ideas, and Hermann Cohen's philosophy and its relation to Judaism. Judiska litteratursamfundet was founded by Ehrenpreis in 1919 together with Axel Hirsch, Ragnar Josephson, and Martin Lamm (Ehrenpreis 1946, p. 358). In addition to many other cultural projects Ehrenpreis also edited Judisk Tidskrift. Prior to 1933 Cassirer saw himself as a Jewish German, and not, like his teacher Hermann Cohen, as a German Jew (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 94). Mostly out of piety to Cohen he became a founding member of the Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums in 1920, the only time in his life he held an official position in a Jewish institution (Schwarzschild 1991, p. 331, note 8). "If a Jew had become christianized or not, was totally indifferent to him," Toni Cassirer notes in her book. But she also continues to say that after 1933 Ernst became "almost intolerant" towards Jews being 65

christianized, seeing it as a sign of moral weakness. He was at an early stage convinced that the persecution of the Jews in Ger­ many aimed at their complete annihilation. In this sense the "Jew­ ish problem" was never absent from his mind. A "Jewish prob­ lem" in the sense that Cohen had recognized it, as the problem of Jewish identity, first confronted him when he met with Jews in America, and even at that point, his wife writes, they both could not "really understand it" (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 298). Nonetheless it was in America that he finally would take on the question con­ cerning "the historical and religious mission" of Judaism. This he did in an essay, "Judaism and the Modern Political Myths," (Con­ temporary Jewish Record, Vol. VII, 1944, pp. 115-125) subsequently published in Swedish translation in Judisk Tidskrift ("Judendomen och de moderna politiska myterna," Vol. XIX, No. 9 (1946), pp. 266-274). The atmosphere in Göteborg was agreeable in every respect and the working conditions excellent, Cassirer wrote in October 1935 to Saxl (postcard to Saxl, 10/29/35). In March 1936, Toni Cassirer told Saxl that her husband worked like in the good old days and had found peace of mind, in so far as it was possible. Although people in Göteborg were friendly the town itself was uninteresting and like anywhere else. In short, she added, the surroundings were just perfect (T. Cassirer to Saxl 3/13/36). In Göteborg Cassirer attended trial lectures for the Chair of philosophy on November 19 and 20,1935. The philosopher Torgny T. Segerstedt (Segerstedt Jr.) later remembered how Cassirer had approached him after his lecture and asked him some questions. "I then realized that he had misunderstood much of what I had said, because he did not know enough Swedish." (Bengtsson and Molander 1998, p. 35.) Of course, Cassirer had then been in Swe­ den for three months. A couple of days later, on November 22, Cassirer was fined 10 kronor by the police court of Göteborg for an offence against the "law concerning the rights of aliens to stay in the country," the offence being that Cassirer had housed an alien citizen without 66

notifying the police authorities in due time. According to the po­ lice report Cassirer had only handed in a notification subsequent to an investigation, carried out on November 7. The alien in ques­ tion was the housekeeper from Hamburg, Anna Maria Stelzig, referred to as "Fräulein" in Toni Cassirer's book. According to the report she stayed between September 29 and October 6 (GLA, Poliskammaren i Gbg/ Utlänningsavdelningen D VI: 6: Rapport 11.11.35; Stämning 11/12/33; cf. RA, Mapp 33, Justitiedep. 1939, 2 juni, Sv. Medborgarskap Ernst Cassirer). Her visit in Göteborg was probably occasioned by the transfer of Cassirer's property from Hamburg. The question remains, however: who alerted the police? In his Swedish years Cassirer regularly made lecture journeys to the other Swedish universities in Stockholm, Uppsala, and Lund. When he first lectured in Sweden in 1934, he did not visit the University of Lund. But soon after arriving in Göteborg he received an invitation from Lund to lecture in the Philosophical Society. The chairman of the Philosophical Society, docent Elof Åkesson, told him that he would be happy to revive their old relation (letter from Elof Åkesson 10/24/35). In 1930 Åkesson had invited Cassirer to contribute to a Festschrift for the philoso­ pher Efraim Liljeqvist in Lund, but since Cassirer had assumed the post as rector in Hamburg, he replied that he was much too preoccupied to be able do any other work (letter Cassirer to Åkesson 11/1 /30). Cassirer first requested that the lecture in Lund be postponed from November, because he was overwhelmed with work (letter to Åkesson 10/31/35). In November 1935 he had re­ ceived an invitation to Copenhagen from the philosopher Jörgen Jorgensen and told Åkesson that he would like to combine the lecture in Copenhagen with the one in Lund (letter to Åkesson 11/24/35). On February 4, Cassirer left Göteborg early and arrived in Lund at half past four. In the evening he gave a lecture in the Philosophical Society, on "Die Funktion der Sprache im Aufbau der naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis." No manuscript or draft

67

of this paper is known. According to a brief summary of the lec­ ture in the local newspaper Lunds Dagblad it would have been an early version of the essay "The influence of language upon the development of scientific thought" (The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXIX, No. 12. June 4,1942). Cassirer emphasised, according to the newspaper, the ten­ dency of science in Western history of thought to free itself from the domination of language. The fundamental idea in Aristotle's writings is the unity of physis and logos. This bond is severed by the scientists of the Renaissance, who insist on the logic of objec­ tive reality distinct from a mere logic of language. The predicative proposition still exercised a great influence on scientific thought, however. But later logical investigations have shown that this is not the normal and normative propositional structure and that it cannot offer a foundation for the propositions of mathematics. It is only with the theory of relativity that a real liberation from the bondage of the predicative proposition in physics occurred. Here the demand of language for substantiality and identity is forgone. The report ended with Cassirer's remark that one gets a fair idea of the essential epistemological and linguistic problems of phys­ ics from contemporary quantum theory (LD 2/5/36). In Lund Cassirer spent the night at the Grand Hotel. The fol­ lowing day he was invited to the Åkessons for lunch, where he also met with the other philosophers in Lund. Cassirer had espe­ cially asked to see the older philosophers Hans Larsson and Axel Herrlin. In the afternoon Cassirer took the train to Malmö and thence the boat to Copenhagen (letter Åkesson to Cassirer 1/28/ 36; letter Cassirer to Akesson 1/29/36; Åkesson to Cassirer 2/2/ 36). Apart from delivering his lecture in Copenhagen he also had a "thorough" dicussion with Niels Bohr. Niels Bohr would later that month go to London and lecture at the Warburg Institute on "Some Humanistic Aspects of Natural Science." It was the first lecture in a series at the Institute that was to end with Cassirer's lecture "Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture" on May 26 (letter to Åkesson 2/6/36; Cassirer 1979, p. 64).

68

When he started to teach in Göteborg in September 1935, Cassirer was concerned that the lectures would take on the form of a kind of monologue. But he would not let himself be disheart­ ened by this, according to Toni Cassirer in a letter to Saxl (9/6/ 35). She added: "the auditors derive up to now mainly from the town itself, so it cannot be expected that there will be a great many philosophers among them." The University of Göteborg was a small institution of learn­ ing and the number of students during the 1930s was just above 400. The number of auditors at Cassirer's lectures and seminars in Göteborg each year can easily be counted. The seminars were attended by between 3 and 7 students, the lectures by between 4 and 12 students each term (GLA, Göteborgs Högskola, F III b: 1719). The first term's forty students was the conspicuous excep­ tion. This term many seem to have come out of curiosity to listen in. Toni Cassirer noted in her book how Cassirer in Oxford wor­ ried over only having some forty auditors at his lectures (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 212). On the other hand his seminars attracted a devoted group of students, with the odd doctor coming to visit now and then. Despite Toni Cassirer's apprehensions, some avow­ edly philosophical minds of post-war Sweden attended his lec­ tures and seminars in Göteborg, such as Thorild Dahlquist (lec­ tor at the University of Uppsala), Håkan Törnebohm (professor at Göteborg 1963-85), and Manfred Moritz (professor at Lund 1959-75). Moritz was instrumental in preparing the manuscript of Das Erkenntnisproblem, Volume 4, for publication. This will be investigated in Appendix 1. In the attendance lists one also finds the name Käte Ham­ burger (1896-1992; assistant to the philosopher Paul Hoffmann in Berlin 1928-1932; professor of literature in Stuttgart 1959-1976). She attended Cassirer's lectures the first term, and gave a Referat during a seminar on Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft in the spring term of 1936. A Jewish refugee from Germany, she lived in Göte­ borg since 1934. In her Swedish years she wrote several books, among them two on Thomas Mann {Thomas Mann: humanitetens 69

diktare, 1945 and Thomas Manns Roman "Joseph und seine Brüder", 1945, published by Bermann-Fischer in Stockholm). Hamburger was to review the Swedish translation of The Myth of the State in Handelstidningen (GHT 2/10/49). She never obtained a posi­ tion at the University of Göteborg, in spite of testimonials from Thomas Mann and Cassirer. In his testimonial of March 23, 1940, Cassirer refers to lectures for an intimate circle that he had recently attended and appreciated as proof of her didactic and pedagogical talent. Unfortunately for Hamburger the pro­ fessor of German Axel Lindqvist took a dislike to her (Miissener 1974, pp. 97-98, 421). She was forced to earn her livelihood through giving private lessons and publishing articles in period­ icals. In Göteborg she lived almost in poverty, according to Ingrid Segerstedt-Wiberg (Segerstedt Wiberg 1995, p. 153). The contrast with Cassirer is glaring. The case of Hamburger underlines how extremely privileged Cassirer was in comparison with other German-speaking refugee intellectuals in Sweden. (One further thinks of Bertolt Brecht, who between April 1939 and April 1940 lived in Lidingö. Brecht went after the German attack on Denmark and Norway to Finland and later the Soviet Union.) Among the Jews who fled from Germany and came to Göte­ borg, special mention was made in Jacobowsky's book on the Jewish community in Göteborg, apart from Cassirer, to Moritz Mayer-Mahr, musician and composer, professor at the KlindworthScharwenden Conservatoire in Berlin; Hans Taub, author of Strind­ bergs "Traumspiel": Eine metaphysische Studie (1917) and Strindberg als Traumdichter (published in Göteborgs Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhälles handlingar, 1945); and Rabbi Albert Kahlberg (Jacobowsky 1955, p. 105). Hans Taub was an auditor at Cassirer's lectures on the fundamental problems of the philosophy of culture in the autumn term of 1939. Apart from the group of Jewish refu­ gees mentioned by Jacobowsky, there was Konstantin Reichardt, professor of Germanistik at the University of Leipzig. Reichardt was lector in German in Göteborg in the spring term of 1938. He later came to Yale University and contributed a paper to the vol­ 70

ume on Cassirer in the Library of Living Philosophers ("Ernst Cassirer's Contribution to Literary Criticism," pp. 661-688). Cassirer also gave a series of public lectures at the university during the month of March on "Die Idee der 'inneren Form' in Goethes Dichtung und Naturanschauung". This would be Cas­ sirer's first series of public lectures at the university. Later he held lectures on Descartes and Queen Christina (1938) and on "Der junge Goethe" (1940-1941). The extension lectures played an im­ portant role at the university, more so in Göteborg than in Lund and Uppsala, because of the intimate relations to the town, and they always attracted large crowds. The heavy burden of lectur­ ing circulated within the faculty (Lindberg and Nilsson 1996, p. 49, 81-83). Some of the lecture series, for example Cassirer's lectures on Descartes and Queen Christina (translated into Swed­ ish), were later published in a series of popular scientific lectures at the university. When Drottning Christina och Descartes was published in 1940 the series was called Göteborgs Högskola, Forsk­ ningar och föreläsningar ("Researches and lectures"). During the first academic year in Göteborg Cassirer finished Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik, a book he had started working on at the time he left Germany (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 189). In February he requested the Yearbook to publish this work (letter Cassirer to Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, 2/12/ 36). The manuscript was finished in April of 1936, according to the preface. In September that year he wrote to Saxl that he wanted Schrödinger to read it "once again", although he had not been able to reach him (letter to Saxl 9/11 /36). Cassirer was also asked to review Konrad Marc-Wogau's study Inhalt und Umfang des Be­ griffs (1936) for Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy and Psycho­ logy. He wrote on March 28 to the editor of Theoria, Petzäll, that his review essay was finished (letter, Petzäll, to Marc-Wogau 3/ 28/36; cf. "Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs. Bemerkungen zu Kon­ rad Marc-Wogaus gleichnahmiger Schrift," Theoria, Vol. II. 1936). During their first year in Sweden Ernst and Toni Cassirer fre­ quently received guests from Germany and Austria in their house.

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Klaus Hauptmann from Hamburg and Hans Cassirer, the son of Cassirer's brother Richard, were on a visit from Germany in No­ vember (postcard Toni Cassirer to Saxl 11 /21 /35). In the new year of 1936 Georg Cassirer and his family spent some time in Göteborg. In Germany the anti-Jewish Nuremberg Laws had recently been promulgated (in September 1935). Toni Cassirer confided to Saxl that she would try to convince Georg to make a new start in Goteborg (postcard T. Cassirer to Saxl, Göteborg, 10/21/35). This was not going to happen until two years later. Georg's refusal to leave Germany caused a lot of anxiety. On the other hand he was of good service to them in Germany, Toni Cassirer writes in her book (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 201). On Cassirer's invitation the phi­ losopher and friend Ernst Hoffman came to give lectures in Göteborg at the beginning of April (letter Hoffmann to Cassirer, 2/16/36). It was Cassirer's colleague Petzäll who made the prac­ tical arrangements and also saw to it that Hoffmann was given a substantial fee, since he lived meagrely in Germany. Hoffmann and his wife lodged with the Cassirers in Göteborg (Petzäll to Marc-Wogau, undated [February 1936]). Furthermore Hoffmann delivered lectures in Stockholm and Lund (Hoffmann to Cassirer 4/14/35,4/23/35). Thereafter, on April 15, Toni Cassirer's sister Edith Waller came to Göteborg (Letter, Petzäll, undated, to Ernst Hoffmann). Toni travelled some weeks thereafter with her sister to Hamburg to visit a friend (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 248). Cassirer arrived later in Hamburg (on May 13 his lecture course in Göte­ borg ended) and together they continued to England. In London Cassirer delivered a lecture at the Warburg Insti­ tute, May 26, on "Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture." During this stay in England he also visited Oxford. In Oxford he talked to the philosopher W.D. Ross about a plan to edit manu­ scripts concerning the medieval platonic tradition. When he re­ turned to Sweden he asked Gunnar Rudberg, professor of Greek at Uppsala, if any Swedish learned society would be interested in participating in this work (cf. letter to Gunnar Rudberg 9/29/ 36). From London they continued to Scotland. According to Toni 72

Cassirer's book, Cassirer in the first weeks of their Göteborg pe­ riod learnt that he would be made honorary doctor of law in Glasgow (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 247). Cassirer had lectured in Glasgow in the previous spring. Furthermore, the Glasgow phi­ losopher H. J. Paton was one of the editors of the Festschrift on the occasion of Cassirer's sixtieth birthday and H.W. Cassirer was working in Glasgow as his assistant. On June 17, Cassirer was made honorary doctor of laws (L.L.D. hon. c.). When they came back to London, Toni fell ill. In Berlin on their way home she had to have an operation. They lodged with "Onkel" Max Cassirer and Toni's sister Edith came to Berlin. Toni had already in Glasgow noticed that her husband's gait and bearing had changed. His breathing was not good and a physical examination in Berlin dis­ closed a weakness of the heart (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 252). The Cassirers returned from Berlin to Sweden in August. Soon after the return to Göteborg, Hendrik J. Pos came to visit from Holland (cf. postcard Pos to Petzäll 5/31/36). With Pos Cassirer discussed a co-operative volume about the influence of the Greek language on philosophy (Pos 1949, pp. 70-71). Later in the autumn a "privatissime circle" was formed in Göteborg, as Petzäll wrote in a letter to Marc-Wogau. The circle met once a fortnight. According to Petzäll at one meeting they discussed Marc-Wogau's paper "Der Symbolbegriff in der Philo­ sophie Ernst Cassirers," which was introduced by Cassirer him­ self (Petzäll to Marc-Wogau 11/25/36). The philosophical privatissima met in Cassirer's house in Föreningsgatan. In his farewell speech to the students in 1940 the circle was given centre stage (Cassirer 1940, p. 2). To some extent the meetings of the circle were able to compensate for the small seminars at the university and they gave him intellectual stimulus. They spurred him, he said in the speech, because at these meetings problems were treated that lay outside the more general subjects of study and that he never or only occasionally had dealt with himself. All ages and sciences were represented, and the differences of age were soon forgotten. Cassirer said that he did not in this circle feel like 73

a teacher, only as "primus inter pares." Of those singled out by Cassirer as participants in the privatissima, three were younger graduate students, Folke Leander, Tor Fernholm, and Bertil Nydahl. Only Leander completed a doctoral thesis. Fernholm wrote a licentiate treatise on Whitehead (1939), and Nydahl, at the time of the privatissima "still a tender young student," took the de­ gree of licentiate with a treatise on the epistemology of aesthetics in 1944, when Cassirer had left Göteborg. Alfred Svanqvist was a mature participator of the seminars as well as the privatissima. He is described by Cassirer as a schoolmaster with many years of teaching behind him. He finished a licentiate treatise in 1939 on the philosophy of D.F. Strauss. Other participators in the privatissima according to Cassirer's account were Rabbi Hermann Löb, the philosopher Sven Edvard Rodhe (docent in Lund 19381949, p.t. professor of Göteborg 1949-1951), and Allan Sjöding, lector at the Latin Gymnasium in Göteborg, and Chairman of the local branch of Folkpartiet, the Swedish liberal party. Sjöding was a frequent reviewer in Theoria. Though they were not students, Löb and Rodhe were also attending Cassirer's seminars at the university in 1935-1936 and 1937-1938 respectively. After Cassirer's death, Nydahl (Ny Tid 4/16/45) and Leander (Göteborgs Morgonpost 5/17/45) testified to Cassirer's tolerance and liberal-mindedness as a teacher. Through Cassirer the best of German culture had been kept alive during these hard years. End of December the Cassirers were back in Berlin on their way to Vienna. In Berlin a doctor examined Cassirer once again and diabetes was diagnosed. They stayed in Vienna until Janu­ ary. During this stay Cassirer went on at lecture trip to Prague, where he gave a lecture on "Kant und Rousseau," on December 13, a lecture he was going to repeat at a meeting of philologists and historians on February 14-151937 (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsredogörelse 1936-1937, p. 20; the full heading was "Kant und Rousseau. Ein Vergleich") and in November 1937 and February 1939 in Stockholm. In Vienna his condition worsened and he was confined to bed. Toni Cassirer tells of how he from now on had 74

difficulty in breathing. Walking the distance to lecture at the uni­ versity became a problem for him (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 257). It is said that it was thanks to Cassirer that one got the tramline to go up the hill to Föreningsgatan. According to Toni Cassirer he held a lecture on the theory of group during this stay in Vienna, but it is likely that she confounds this lecture with a lecture on "Natura­ listische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilosophie," that he gave in Vienna December 17,1936. This paper would later (1939) be published in Sweden. In Vienna Cassirer talked to Eric (Erich) Voegelin, whom he interested in the Swedish scholar Johan Nordstrom's work (letter from Voegelin to Nordstrom, January 7, 1937). The following year, 1937, was the tricentenary of the publica­ tion of Descartes' Discours de la méthode. The interest in Descartes occasioned by the commemoration of this event would have a long-lasting influence on Cassirer's remaining years in Sweden. This will be expanded upon in a later chapter. Before he left Vienna he gave a radio lecture on "Descartes' Discours." In March he told Petzäll that he was working on a paper for Theoria in connec­ tion with the Descartes jubilee (Petzäll to Marc-Wogau 3/13/37). To Nordstrom he wrote the same month that he had undertaken to write two essays on Descartes, one for Revue de Synthèse and one for Theoria (cf. "Descartes et l'idée de l'unité de la science," Revue de Synthèse. Vol. XIV, No. 1,1937, pp. 7-28; "Descartes Wahr­ heitsbegriff," Theoria. Vol. III, pp. 161-187). In addition he was writing an essay on Galileo for Scientia (letter to Nordstrom 3/ 26/37; cf. "Wahrheitsbegriff und Wahrheitsproblem bei Galilei," Scientia, Sep.-Oct. 1937, pp. 121-130,185-193). In 1937, the work Cassirer had finished the previous year, Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik. Histo­ rische und systematische Studien zum Kausalproblem, was published in the university yearbook Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift (XLII, 1936:3; printed 1937), with a motto from Hippolyte Taine on the cover, "Renouveler la notion de cause, c'est transformer la pensée humaine." The work was dedicated to Malte Jacobsson. Accord75

ing to the preface, dated Göteborg, December 1936, "because of the interest he has shown through many years for my philosophi­ cal work, and because of the true friendliness with which he in the previous year received me and gave me advice when I was introduced to new circles of work and activity." He also thanked rector Bernhard Karlgren and the faculty, as well as the librarians of Göteborgs stadsbibliotek ("town library"). The town library was affiliated with the university and was functioning as the uni­ versity library. On February 11, Cassirer wrote to Niels Bohr and told him that a copy of his new work was going to be sent to Bohr in a couple of days (letter Cassirer to Bohr 2/11/37). The book was simultaneously sent to several philosophers and physicists. Soon Cassirer also started to receive replies from physicists like Bohr, Einstein, and Heisenberg. He told Petzäll about this, who in a letter to Marc-Wogau launched the plan to arrange a discussion between Cassirer and the physicists in Theoria (Petzäll to MarcWogau 4/14/37). This idea was never realized. Petzäll asked in­ stead the physicist and philosopher from the Vienna Circle Philipp Frank to discuss the book in Theoria (letter Petzäll to Cassirer 10/ 24/37; 10/29/37). Frank's discussion was published in Theoria, 1938 (Vol. IV, pp. 70-80), but Cassirer never replied, in spite of Petzäll's exhortation (letter Petzäll to Cassirer, 4/23/38). Cassirer also got a letter of thanks from Husserl, who congratulated him on the felicitous settling in Göteborg, and "that you in these times, so inimical to philosophical peace, were able to write such a book. I know these inner tensions." (Letter Husserl to Cassirer 3/11/ 37. Briefwechsel, Bd. 5. Die Neukantianer, pp. 8-9). The summer of 1937 was, as he later told Petzäll, quiet and peaceful, devoted to work (letter Cassirer to Petzäll, 10/27/37). But news reached him at the end of the summer of a philosophi­ cal storm blowing in Uppsala. The philosopher Karitz called at his house in Göteborg and asked him to give a testimonial con­ cerning a doctoral thesis by his disciple Magnus Selling. Karitz' enemies among the Uppsala philosophers - Hedenius, Marc76

Wogau and Wedberg - fiercely attacked Selling's thesis and tried to prevent Selling from getting a chance at a doctorate and be­ come Karitz' docent. This time it ended with Karitz' retreat, but he and Selling came back the next year (Nordin 1983, pp. 110— 111). Cassirer gave Karitz a diplomatic answer. If the faculty in Uppsala exhorted him to write a testimonial, then he would do it (letter Marc-Wogau to Petzäll 9/27/37). The incident demon­ strates how Cassirer tried to stay clear of the internal feuds among the Swedish philosophers in the 1930s. In this endeavour he was not without success. In 1938, when it was time to appoint a new professor of practical philosophy in Lund, Tegen suggested that Cassirer should be consulted as an expert. One reason for this choice was that Cassirer never had taken part in the conflicts in Sweden. Instead he had only answered when he was consulted, that he would give his opinion if the authorities exhorted him to do it (Tegen to Nordström, Easter Sunday 1938). More about these disputes will be said in a later chapter. Cassirer's unquestioned status among Swedish philosophers is seen in his election in Oc­ tober as the representative for Sweden to the permanent interna­ tional committee at the ninth International Congress in Paris (Petzäll to Cassirer 10/24/37). In October Cassirer made a lecture trip to Stockholm and Uppsala. The lectures delivered there were the same as the ones he had delivered in Prague and Vienna the previous year. At the Humanistiska föreningen ("Society of Humanities") at the Uni­ versity of Stockholm, he gave a lecture, October 13, on "Rousseau und Kant." The report in the Handelstidningen was headed "Lec­ turer protected by police," for present in the auditory of younger people were also the chief of the state police as well as a docent of criminology. The newspaper speculated about this having to do with the National Socialist demonstrations at professor David Katz' inauguration in September. In any event "no boots disturbed the philosophical peace in the hall" (GHT 10/14/1937). The stu­ dent journal Gaudeamus reporting on the lecture did not have anything to say about special protection. The only irregularity 77

noticed by the journal was that more academic teachers than usu­ ally joined the supper afterwards (N:o 7, October 1937, p. 18). Cassirer was rather amused - the protection reported by Handelstidningen was wholly superfluous, he told Petzäll (letter to Pezäll 10/27/37). On the subsequent days, October 14 and 15, he lec­ tured in the Philosophical Societies of Stockholm and Uppsala on "Naturalistische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilo­ sophie." In Uppsala his lecture was announced in Uppsala Nya Tidning. The newspaper noted Cassirer's unusually broad inter­ ests and competence, ranging from the humanities, including lit­ erary history and philology, to modern physics: Prof. Cassirer's originality as a philosopher and his broad learning within both the field of humanities and the field of natural science, naturally makes it very interesting to listen to what he has to say on the questions of cultural philosophy. (UNT 10/15/37)

In the audience in the evening were University Chancellor Undén and several of Uppsala's professors, including Hägerström and Nordström (UNT10/16/37). In Stockholm Cassirer told the evening paper Aftonbladet that he was preparing an epistemological work (AB 10/13/37). This was probably Ziele and Wege der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis, on which he worked that autumn. According to the manuscript he started writing down the first chapter in October. He then worked un­ interruptedly on it from October until December in Göteborg. When he went to Vienna in December the work was continued there. But for some reason it was left unfinished after the return to Sweden in 1938 (Cassirer 1999, pp. 183-184). About this time he disclosed to Saxl that he had written down some thoughts on the formation of concepts in the cultural sciences (letter to Saxl 10/14/37; wrong date, probably November). Once again Cassirer seems to be referring to the larger manuscript he was working on. Apart from this work he told Petzäll in October that he had finished the essay on Galileo as well as a "thorough" reply to Marc-Wogau's paper in Theoria on the concept of the 78

symbol in the Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (letter to Petzäll 19/27/37; cf. "Zur Logik des Symbolbegriffs," Theoria. Vol. IV, pp. 145-175). In December and January Cassirer and his wife travelled for the last time through Hitler's Germany on their way to and from Vienna. Toni Cassirer notes in her book that her relations in Vienna hoped that they would move there when the term in Göteborg had come to an end. Only a couple of months later it became intolerable for any Jew to live in Austria. Cassirer had another physical examination in Vienna. This time it showed a stable con­ dition (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 257). On December 22, according to a postcard from Toni Cassirer to Petzäll (2/22/37), he gave a lec­ ture "among the psychologists." It is likely that this was the lec­ ture on "group theory" that Toni Cassirer mentions in her book. Cassirer's paper on the concept of group was published in French in 1938 ("Le concept de groupe et la théorie de la perception," Journal de Psychologie, Juillet-Decembre 1938, pp. 368-414). The Cassirers left Vienna on January 18 (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 258). The first half of 1938 Cassirer dedicated to studies on Descartes and Queen Christina of Sweden. In this connection he had dur­ ing the spring and summer a long and intensive correspondence with the historian Nordstrom in Uppsala. The exchange of letters began when Nordstrom asked Cassirer to review A. C. Benjamin's An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science for Lychnos. Lärdomshistoriska samfundets årsbok ("Annual of the Swedish History of Science Society"). Cassirer's relation with Nordström will be dealt with in a later chapter. In May he told Petzäll about his extensive plans concerning his studies on Descartes and Christina. He was going to publish his study on Descartes and Christina in the university yearbook, at the suggestion of the historian and present rector of the uni­ versity Curt Weibull. He would furthermore present the results at the beginning of the next term in a series of public lectures. These lectures would then be printed in Swedish translation in the series of popular scientific lectures. Moreover, he wanted to 79

see a French edition of the first study, and counted on Petzäll's assistance (letter to Petzäll 5/11/38). Petzäll had initiated the Institut International de Collabora­ tion Philosophique in 1937, and in the years 1937-1939 he worked for the Institute in Paris. The Institute invited Cassirer in the spring of 1938 to give an account of the literature on the philosophy of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries (letter Cassirer to Petzäll 5/11/38; Petzäll to Cassirer 5/16/38). Cassirer's account was published in 1939 in the series of the Institute as Die Philosophie im XVII. und XVIII. Jahrhundert. On behalf of the Institute Cassirer furthermore received an invitation from Petzäll to a Hegel con­ ference in Amersfoort, Holland, in September. Cassirer declined participation due to his teaching obligations at the beginning of term in Göteborg (letter Cassirer to Petzäll 5/11/38; "for reasons of health," according to Pos 1949, p. 71). When the larger manuscript on Descartes and Queen Chris­ tina was finished, Cassirer immediately started working on two different papers concerning the dating of Descartes' dialogue Re­ cherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle, one he offered to Theoria and the other to Lychnos (letter to Petzäll 5/23/38; to Nordstrom 5/25/38; see "Über Bedeutung und Abfassungszeit von Descartes' 'Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle'," Theoria. Vol. IV, pp. 193-234; "Descartes Dialog 'Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle' und seine Stellung im Ganzen der Cartesischen Philosophie," Lychnos, 1938, pp. 139-179). The essay published in Lychnos was translated into French and published in the Revue Philosophique, 1939 (pp. 261-300). Judging from the output, the spring of 1938 was a time of in­ dustriousness for Cassirer, not different from the previous period in Sweden. But simultaneously a catastrophe had occurred in Aus­ tria when German troops invaded the country. The Anschluss was followed by a brutal persecution of the Austrian Jews. Cassirer wrote to Petzäll that since the annexation he and his wife had had a hard time trying to aid the many relatives and friends who pleaded for advice (letter to Petzäll 3/4/38; but probably it should

80

be May, since the Annexation occurred on March 13 and 14; cf. Petzäll's reply 5/16/38). In the summer many Jewish individu­ als as well as communities in Sweden received pleas for help (Lomfors 1996, p. 92). Toni Cassirer writes in her book: "Day and night, week after week, month after month passed, when the only thing we could think of was the salvation of our next of kind." After the annexation of Austria, Georg Cassirer started to plan his emigration (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 259). In the midst of this stressful situation Cassirer and his wife received Ernst Hoffmann as a guest. Hoffmann was in May once again on a lecture trip in Sweden. They attended his lecture in Göteborg on "Platonische Zahlenmystik im Mittelalter" (letter to Petzäll, 3/4/38; but probably May). Together with Hoffmann they had spent lovely days, Cassirer told Petzäll (letter 5/11/38). In the summer Cassirer arranged for the publication of his study of Descartes and Christina. He had changed his mind about a publication in the Yearbook and had sent the manuscript to the Bruno Cassirer Verlag (letter Bruno Cassirer Verlag to Nordstrom, 6/29/38). Later he offered it to the publisher Gottfried BermannFischer in Stockholm. The publisher Gottfried Bermann-Fischer belonged to the new wave of exiles from Austria. His publishing house was founded in Vienna 1936 and became re-established in Stockholm in 1938 with the aid of the Swedish Jewish publish­ ing family Bonnier. During the years in Stockholm 1938-1948 Bermann-Fischer published the Stockholmer Ausgabe of Thomas Mann's works. Usually, German-speaking refugee authors in Swe­ den were not published (Miissener 1974, pp. 359-360). As so of­ ten, Cassirer was an exception. The publishing house had inform­ ed him that it was going to extend its publishing activity beyond belles-lettres. Encouraged by this Cassirer wrote a letter in which he tried to interest Bermann-Fischer in some of his works (6/27/ 38). The study of Descartes and Christina was for the main part finished and he wrote that the question of publication was still undecided but that he preferred to have it published by BermannFischer. If the study were published in the Yearbook it would only

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be read by specialists. Cassirer's book Descartes: Lehre - Persön­ lichkeit - Wirkung was issued by Bermann-Fischer Verlag in 1939. The same year Bermann-Fischer issued Thomas Mann's Lotte in Weimar. Mann's book was the subject of an essay by Cassirer, written in Göteborg but first published in America in 1945. Cassi­ rer sent the essay to Mann from Sweden on the occasion of Mann's sixty-fifth birthday (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 329-330; "Thomas Manns Goethe-Bild. Eine Studie über Lotte in Weimar," Germanic Review. Vol. XX, No. 3, October 1945, pp. 166-194). Furthermore, as he explained to Bermann-Fisher, he was at the time preoccupied with two larger works that were going to deal with the problem of knowledge. One would be systematic, Ziele und Wege der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis, and the other historical: the fourth part of his history of the problem of knowledge. The work was already well under way, because he had had very good working conditions since he was called to Göteborg. But he still expected it to take a further 2 or 3 years. From Cassirer's letter to Bermann-Fischer one gets the impression that he was going to work on these manuscripts in the summer of 1938. But there is no evidence for this except for the letter. During July the Cassirers were on a seaside holiday at Båstad in southern Sweden. As he told Gertrud Bing (7/23/38) a journey to England was cancelled. From Båstad Cassirer wrote a letter to Petzäll and congratulated him on receiving the professorship in practical philosophy in Lund. He accepted Petzäll's offer to re­ view volume one of the complete works of Malebranche for Theoria (see Vol. IV, pp. 287-300). Paul Schrecker, one of the editors of the works of Malebranche, was the translator of Cassirer's essay "Descartes et l'idée de l'unité de la science"; the French version of his essay published in Lychnos on Recherche de la vérité; as well as co-translator of the French edition of the Descartes-book (cf. letter Cassirer to Bermann-Fischer 11/18/38). Petzäll made contact with Schrecker in Paris (letter Petzäll to Cassirer 10/22/38). When Cassirer returned to Göteborg he wrote in the postcard to Bing referred to above that he was planning a study on Giovanni 82

Pico della Mirandola and wanted to know if it could be published through the Warburg institute. The essay was later published in English translation in The Journal of the History of Ideas (Vol. Ill, No. 2, April 1942, pp. 123-144 and 319-346). In a note Cassirer writes: "This article here appears in the form in which it was writ­ ten some time ago, in the summer of 1938." According to the "Tillägg" ("Addition") Cassirer appended to his bibliography in the application for Swedish citizenship the paper were originally intended to be published as "The Philosophy of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola" in Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies. Vol. I, Lon­ don, 1939. Upon his return to Göteborg from the holiday in Båstad, Cas­ sirer celebrated his sixty-fourth birthday (July 28). As a present he was given Adam's biography of Descartes, which Petzäll had supplied from Paris (letter Toni Cassirer to Petzäll 7/6/38). After the German annexation of Austria the borders were prac­ tically closed for immigrants without relations in Sweden. In Oc­ tober immigration became even more difficult when Germany introduced the J-stamp in Jewish passports, in answer to Swed­ ish and Swiss demands. The Swedish authorities referred to Sweden's limited resources. There also existed a fear that a largescale Jewish immigration would bring about increasing antiSemitism (Svanberg and Tydén, p. 158). Among the Jewish refu­ gees arriving during this difficult time were Georg Cassirer and his family. In the middle of August they came to Föreningsgatan where they would remain for the remainder of Cassirer's Swed­ ish years. Georg Cassirer embarked on a new career as a photog­ rapher. In Göteborg he was to be an appreciated theatre photog­ rapher. Almost at the same time the eldest daughter of Toni Cassirer's sister Martha arrived. The child's parents were, as Toni Cassirer writes, "abtransportiert." She would be staying in Cas­ sirer's house for more than two years (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 264). Toni Cassirer does not say how it was arranged. But we know that after the so-called "Crystal Night" pogroms November 9-10 Jewish children came to Sweden in larger numbers. In Novem-

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ber 1938 the Jewish community in Stockholm requested that Jew­ ish children be allowed asylum in Sweden. The government granted the request for a quota of 500 children in December, but the Swedish Jews had to pay for their sustenance themselves. The majority of the children were placed in families they were related to or acquainted with (Lomfors 1996, pp. 93-95). Soon after Georg Cassirer's arrival in Göteborg, his brother H.W. Cassirer came to visit. Marc-Wogau went to see him in Göteborg (letter Marc-Wogau to Petzäll 8/25/38). H.W. Cassirer had in Glasgow accepted PetzälTs invitation to review MarcWogau's book Vier Studien zu Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft (letter Petzäll to H.W. Cassirer 3.8.39; letter H.W. Cassirer to Petzäll 8/ 7[?]/39). Marc-Wogau explained in a letter to Petzäll (11/6/38) that he wanted to publish an essay on Moore in an English re­ view and hoped to arrange it through H.W. Cassirer. Later in October Anne and Kurt Appelbaum came to Göteborg, shortly before their journey to America (cf. letter to Petzäll 10/21/38). In December Kurt Appelbaum was engaged for a series of radio concerts in New York (GHT 10/15/38). In Göteborg he was in­ vited by the Orkesterföreningen ("the Orchestral Society"), to play Mozart's piano concerto No. 23. During the Appelbaums' stay, Cassirer gave a series of public lectures, October 18,21 and 25 at the university, on "Königin Chris­ tina und Descartes. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte des siebzehn­ ten Jahrhunderts" (GP 10/17/38; the corresponding chapter in the Descartes-book is called "Descartes und Königin Christina von Schweden. Eine Studie zur Geistesgeschichte des 17. Jahr­ hunderts"). To Petzäll he wrote that he had about 400 auditors who seemed to be very interested in the problem he treated (10/ 24/38). Toni Cassirer tells us in her book about how the Cassirers with help from their "Swedish friends" succeeded in getting permits to enter Sweden for the Waller family as well as for Cassirer's doctor in Vienna, Harry Schreiber, and his brother. She gives a vivid picture of how she and her husband one night on the verge

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of exhaustion were filling in the forms from Socialstyrelsen (the authority responsible for immigration). Shortly afterwards Cas­ sirer fell ill and went through several weeks of suffering from shingles (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 263). This was the time of the "Crys­ tal Night." Soon afterwards Cassirer was to deliver a lecture in Stockholm on "Was ist Subjektivismus?" (letter to Petzäll 10/21/ 38), but owing to his illness the lecture was postponed. Later he wrote to Petzäll (11/15/38) that he had found work to be the best cure: "If only one could forget what is happening in Germany as quickly as personal problems. We daily get the worst and most intimidating news - and one gets the impression, that one rather stands at the beginning than at the end. But one must really not speak of it." About this time Cassirer received a letter from his old col­ league in Hamburg Albert Görland who asked him to help a Jew­ ish friend to emigrate. In his reply (11/26/38), printed in Toni Cassirer's book, he told Görland with a rare acrimony - the letter must be read against the background of recent events - what he had heard about his collaboration with the regime and how ashamed he was for him: "Because you cannot hide from yourself, that you through your comportment have taken upon yourself a terrible responsibility, - and that you cannot free yourself from blame for what now is happening ..." (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 263.) The Wallers settled in Föreningsgatan. The whole house was full of guests Cassirer wrote to Petzäll on a postcard of January 21. According to Toni Cassirer the Wallers left Göteborg and jour­ neyed to America at the end of 1939 (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 266). The work that Cassirer considered to be of benefit for his health dur­ ing this difficult period dealt with so-called "Uppsala philosophy." To Nordstrom he wrote in the beginning of December that he had been working hard for the last weeks (letter to Nordstrom 12/8/38). The result of this hard work was to be his paper on "Was ist 'Subjektivismus'?" published in Theoria 1939 (Vol. V, pp. 111-140), and his study on Axel Hägerström: Eine Studie zur Schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart, published in the Yearbook

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1939. These writings and the debates with the Uppsala philoso­ phers will be further elucidated in a later chapter. In a letter to Petzäll, on December 1, he wrote that the manuscript for the study on Axel Hägerström was already at the printers. However, he kept working on the "recent Swedish philosophy" according to a letter to Torgny T. Segerstedt at the end of the year (12/31/38). The preface to the study on Hägerström is dated January 1939. On February 13 Cassirer communicated the essay on "Natura­ listische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilosophie" to Göteborgs Kungl. Vetenskap- och Vitterhets-Samhälle. The Society published the essay in its proceedings on April 3 (titlepage; p. 28). Later that month he travelled to Stockholm and Uppsala on the invitations of the Philosophical Societies. In Stockholm on Feb­ ruary 23 he delivered the lecture that had been postponed from the autumn, "Was ist Subjektivismus? Bemerkungen zur Erkennt­ nislehre Hägerströms und Phaléns" (the latter part of the title was omitted when the paper was printed in Theoria). According to the report in the newspaper Nya Dagligt Allehanda (2/24/39), the very lively discussion between Cassirer and the philosophers of the Uppsala School, Tegen, Oxenstierna, Marc-Wogau, and Wedberg was continued the following day, when a further phi­ losopher, Hedenius, joined the debate. Ingemar Hedenius, a do­ cent thirty years of age, was also responsible for the invitation to Uppsala that same evening, and it was on his suggestion that Cassirer had chosen to lecture on "Descartes und Königin Chris­ tina." Moreover he was welcomed to Hedenius' home in Uppsala together with Oxenstierna and Segerstedt (letter to Hedenius 12/ 7/38; 2/28/39). Cassirer thereupon went back to Stockholm where he gave a lecture on the 25th at a cultural evening of the Emigrantenselbsthilfe on "Kant und Rousseau" (Müssener 1974, p. 113). This is one of the rare occasions when Cassirer's name is seen in a Jewish connection in Sweden. The Emigrantenselbsthilfe was founded 1938 on behalf of and by Jewish refugees. The aims of the organisation were social and cultural. Among the founders was David Katz. Katz had according to the newspaper report in 86

Nya Dagligt Allehanda also participated in the discussion at the Philosophical Society two days earlier. When Cassirer returned to Göteborg he gave an interview for Handelstidningen in which he confessed that the Uppsala School had enriched his own thinking and that much of its criticism must hold good in front of any scientific forum (GHT 2/27/39). Early in 1939 Cassirer received an invitation from Petzäll to entretiens in London late in the summer under the auspices of the Institut International de Collaboration Philosophique. Petzäll wanted him to speak on the subject of "science and expression" (letter Petzäll to Cassirer 1/25/39). Cassirer answered that he could not participate in a conference together with German "colleagues": The latest developments in Germany, of which I now have precise informa­ tion through reports from persons who themselves have experienced them, defy every description [-] I cannot keep up discussion with gentlemen who approves of this or have not protested against it. (Letter to Petzäll 2/28/39)

In his reply Petzäll assured him that no German "colleagues" of that kind would be invited. And, since the German philosophers probably would not be permitted to participate in their discus­ sions anyway, Cassirer would not risk anything. Cassirer was satisfied with this answer and proposed that they would keep a place free for him, but not put him up as a speaker (letter to Petzäll 3/9/39). Petzäll wanted a lecture from him, however, and sug­ gested that Cassirer send a lecture on the subject "science and language." If he could not himself come to London they would read it at the conference (letter Petzäll to Cassirer 3/4/39). The continuation of the discussion is unfortunately lost. After the German attack on Czechoslovakia in March, Petzäll reports that the organizers of the entretiens will have to take their bearings from Vaihingers philosophy of als ob and that he would like to be able say to his French collaborators that Cassirer at least in prin­ ciple had decided to participate (letter 4/26/39). Then there is a break in the correspondence until September. Clearly the confer­ 87

ence was cancelled due to the outbreak of war. In October he of­ fered Petzäll his paper "Vom Einfluss der Sprache auf die Ent­ wicklung des naturwissenschaftlichen Denkens/' intended for the suspended conference, for publication in Theoria (letter to Petzäll 10/5/39). The following month the editor of Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique J. Meyerson asked him for a contribution. To Petzäll he explained that the linguistic paper would be appro­ priate, since he had published an essay in the Journal before on a similar subject, "Le langage et la contruction du monde des objets." He would therefore like to send the manuscript to Meyer­ son (letter to Petzäll 11/26/39; cf. postcard 12/5/39). The paper was finally published in Journal de Psychologie normale et patho­ logique in 1946 (Vol. XXXV, pp. 129-152). In the bibliography in the Library of Living Philosophers volume it is mistakenly treated as a translation of the English essay, "The Influence of Language upon the Development of Scientific Thought" (Journal of Philoso­ phy. Vol. XXXIX, No. 12, June 4,1942, pp. 309-327). In the German translation of the English essay the title is "Der Einfluss der Sprache auf die Entwicklung des wissenschaftlichen Denkens" (Geist und Leben, pp. 287-316), i.e. it diverges on two points from Cassirer's original title. There are fewer reports from Cassirer during 1939 about his work in progress as compared to the previous years. There is a rare silence concerning any forthcoming larger work after the completion of the study on Axel Hägerström. To Petzäll he writes in March (3/9/39) that he has made a fair copy of his lecture in Stockholm for Theoria. Furthermore, the bibliography of the lit­ erature on the philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen­ turies was almost finished. There is no mention of any new work until July, however, when he offered Nordström an essay for Lychnos, "Mathematische Mystik und mathematische Natur­ wissenschaft" (letter to Nordstrom 7/7/39; it was published in Lychnos, 1940, pp. 248-265). The origin of this essay was an invi­ tation from Nordstrom to review Edward S. Strong's Procedures and Metaphysics. A Study in the Philosophy of Mathematical-Physical 88

Science in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, together with Dietrich Mahnke's Unendliche Sphäre und Allmittelpunkt. Beiträge zur Genealogie der mathematischen Mystik. Cassirer accepted to write a review (postcard to Nordstrom 6/3/39) but changed his mind because, as he told Nordstrom, the reading of the books had stimu­ lated reflections on the subject matter that he would prefer to treat in an essay (letter to Nordstrom 7/1 /39; 7/6/39). It remained unclear, however, if he would be able to finish it in time to pub­ lish it in the next volume of Lychnos, and he awaited Nordstrom's answer. In August he told Nordstrom that he had to begin writ­ ing the essay in any case due to other work. What work he does not say (letter to Nordstrom 8/1/39). The following month he was prepared to send the essay, but then it must have been too late for publication (to Nordstrom 9/16/39). He next wrote to Nordstrom in January, telling him that he had finished "Mathema­ tische Mystik und mathematische Naturwissenschaft" (letter to Nordstrom 1/7/40). According to Toni Cassirer's book the main part of the Cassirer family emigrated after March 15, 1939 (i.e. the German expan­ sion into Czechoslovakia). A brother survived in Germany, but several other relations became the victims of Hitler (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 264). Max Cassirer migrated in the spring of 1939 via Switzerland to London (Brühl 1991, p. 36). In this situation Cassirer took the final step into exile and applied for Swedish citizen­ ship for himself and his wife. He stated in his application to the Justice Department that he would make no effort to keep his Ger­ man citizenship if he got a Swedish citizenship. There was a major problem, however. Swedish law required that one had to live in the country for five years in order to be­ come citizen. Cassirer had, when he applied for citizenship on April 4,1939, only three and a half years in Sweden behind him. But once again his Swedish friends in high places helped him surmount every obstacle. There was a paragraph in the law about "particular reasons" for the acquisition of citizenship if it was of service to the national interest. One imagines the professor of law 89

Undén finding this loophole. Toni Cassirer writes in her book that they got the citizenship thanks to Undén (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 226). In any case this was the strategy that Cassirer, Jacobsson and Undén were to follow. Cassirer underlined in his application that he had directed his research interests to questions of a "spe­ cifically Swedish character." Jacobsson, as "landshövding" and head of the County-administration, supported the application and was of the opinion that there were particular reasons for Cassirer to become Swedish citizen, even though he had not lived in the country for five years. More important Undén in a formal letter asked Engberg, who was in office, to act so that Cassirer may be given Swedish citizenship. Undén wrote in his letter that he was of the opinion that it would serve the national interest to accept Cassirer as a citizen, with regard to his outstanding merits as a scholar and his position as professor at a Swedish university, and so this was motivated by "particular reasons" mentioned in the law. He pointed to the fact that Cassirer had continued his schol­ arly activity with undiminished energy, and lately also had given attention to philosophical problems of specific importance to Swedish philosophy, witnessed by his forthcoming book on Descartes and Queen Christina, and his recently published work on Axel Hägerström (RA, Mapp 33, Justitiedep. 1939, 2 juni, Sv. Medborgarskap Ernst Cassirer). Two months later, June 2, Cassirer became a naturalized Swed­ ish subject along with his wife. In the summer Cassirer celebrated his sixty-fifth birthday with Georg and his family and Heinz, who presented him with his first book in English, a commentary on the Kritik der Urteilskraft (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 326). The autumn term began in September almost simultaneously with the beginning of what was going to be World War II. To Petzäll Cassirer wrote that he had never in his life found it so difficult to work. Nor was he sure that he would be able to com­ plete his lectures as planned (to Petzäll 9/11/39). Cassirer's lec­ tures during the academic year 1939-1940 have a special interest 90

in so far as they seem to have treated new matters. This academic year also stands out because it was the only year Cassirer held two parallel lecture courses, one on philosophical anthropology, the other on the fundamental problems of the philosophy of cul­ ture. The lectures on philosophical anthropology were held back to back with the seminars on the philosophy of culture. The lec­ tures on philosophical anthropology started with a preamble on "Das 'Problem des Menschen' als Grundproblem der Philoso­ phie." According to the titles in the university diary the seminars on the philosophy of culture covered much the same ground as his later book Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften. To Cassirer's strain was added the worry about his son in Eng­ land, who, as he explained to Petzäll, was not an English citizen and whose future therefore was threatened at the outbreak of war (10/5/39). H.W. Cassirer was under the circumstances unable to finish a review of Marc-Wogau's book Vier Studien zu Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft. Cassirer took it upon himself to write a review­ essay on "Neuere Kant-Litteratur" about the book together with other new books on Kant by Vleeschauwer and Paton (letter to Petzäll 9/11/39; 11/1/39). The review of Marc-Wogau's studies, H.J. Paton's Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, H.J. Vleeschauwer's La deduction transcendentale dans l'oeuvre de Kant and L'évolution de la pensée kantienne, was published in Theoria 1940 (Vol. VI, pp. 87-100). From Lund Cassirer received an invitation to Petzäll's inau­ guration in November. At Moritz's suggestion he would also give a lecture in the Philosophical Society. Cassirer had two proposals for the lecture, "'Logos' und 'Dike' in der griechischen Philo­ sophie" and "Kant und die moderne Biologie (Bemerkungen zu Marc-Wogaus Buch über die Kr. d. Urteilskraft)" (letter to Petzäll 11/1/39). The Society chose the lecture on Greek philosophy. Cassirer held it on November 17, the day preceding Petzäll's in­ auguration. It would be printed in the university yearbook 1941 as Logos, Dike, Kosmos in der Entwicklung der griechischen Philosophie. It was published as part of the Festschrift on the occasion of the

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fiftieth anniversary of the University of Göteborg. According to Lunds Dagblad (11/18/39) Cassirer concluded the lecture with the words (to be found in the published text on p. 23) about the importance of justice and law in Greek civilization: "Hence we know today that it is not for purely scholarly reasons that we take an interest in Greek philosophy and in Greek culture. We do not just look back, what urges us on is the solicitude for our cul­ tural (geistige) future. We know that this future is utterly men­ aced if we cannot form a bond between truth and justice, logos and dike, as the Greeks did before anyone else in the history of mankind." Petzäll was inaugurated on November 18 as professor of prac­ tical philosophy in Lund. According to the report in the newspa­ per Sydsvenska Dagbladet (11/19/39), Cassirer participated in the solemn procession along with two other professors from Göteborg, Aspelin and Segerstedt. After his inaugural lecture on Samuel Pufendorf - Petzäll's seventeenth century predecessor at the uni­ versity - Petzäll thanked his colleagues, especially addressing himself to Cassirer. When Petzäll was appointed professor he would have less time for editing Theoria. In a letter to Petzäll (11/21/39), Cassirer declared himself ready to help him in his work with the review. In this regard he proposed changes in the section of reviews, up to then "a dark chapter." He called for a more unified and prin­ cipled selection of reviews. However, with the war going on it was difficult to launch a reform of the review section and not easy to get qualified contributions. Of Cassirer's further collabo­ ration there is no mention. In the same letter he offered the paper "Kant und die moderne Biologie" for publication in Theoria. But for unknown reasons it was never published. At the beginning of World War II Sweden pursued a policy of neutrality. Apart from the storm of pro-Finnish feelings during the Finno-Russian Winter War, the early months of the war were calm in Sweden. But the quiet months came to an abrupt end when Germany on April 9,1940 invaded Denmark and Norway. Sweden

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was suddenly in a state of shock. In Göteborg a German attack was expected any minute and Jacobsson was involved in an effort to block the airport of Torslanda with the help of 100 taxicabs. But the Germans did not invade. Soon streams of refugees came from Norway (Jacobsson 1964, pp. 145-147). A couple of days after the German attack on Denmark and Norway there was a false alarm in Göteborg, described in Toni Cassirer's book. Everyone rushed to the air-raid shelters - except for Cassirer, who refused to hide from the Germans pilots (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 269). The Swedish historian Alf W. Johansson notes that "the German invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9,1940 had created a widespread belief that Hitler was an irrational madman who could strike any­ where in response to some emotional impulse" (Johansson 1997, p. 167). The day after the German occupation of Norway, Toni procured poison in case they should fall into the hands of the Germans (T. Cassrier 1981, pp. 267-268). This was a standard pro­ cedure in Göteborg among persons who suspected that the Ger­ mans would show them no mercy. Segerstedt asked Jacobsson to help him get a license for a revolver, telling him that he "would not like to fall into the hands of the Germans alive." Furthermore, Jacobsson writes that he always carried a loaded revolver in his pocket during the war years (Jacobsson 1964, p. 101). Toni Cassirer tells of how they decided in this uncertain situ­ ation to leave Göteborg for a while after the last of Cassirer's lec­ tures at the university (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 269). The last lecture of his spring term course on April 24 was cancelled due to callingup orders. The course was scheduled to end at an unusually early date. Usually, Cassirer lectured until the end of May. A lecture on "Kant und die moderne Biologie" that was to be held the same date at the Institute for Oceanography was postponed until Oc­ tober 27 (MS. Facsim. repr. in Cassirer 1993). Cassirer and his wife went ("a few days" after the end of the lecture course) to the coun­ tryside near Alingsås, an hour's journey northeast of Göteborg. Together with other evacuated Swedes they stayed at a manor house by lake Mjörn, according to Toni Cassirer for five weeks. 93

She furthermore informs us that in spite of the anxiety in those days they enjoyed their stay - spring arrived and they could go for long walks in the woods, which were good for Cassirer's health - and that Cassirer regained his taste for work. He told his wife that he had begun a new work (this is the first mention of a new work since the Hägerström-study in the autumn of 1938) and that this work actually signified (bedeutete) the fourth vol­ ume of the symbolic forms (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 270). They returned to Göteborg at the end of May. In a letter to Paul Arthur Schilpp dated Göteborg May 26,1940, Cassirer thanked him for the dedi­ cation of a volume in the Library of Living Philosohers series to his works and he agreed to write an autobiography for the vol­ ume (letter to Paul Arthur Schilpp 5/26/40, facsim. repr. in Schilpp 1949). About this time Cassirer was asked to lecture on German lit­ erature in the autumn term. Since Cassirer after his retirement later the same year would have no further teaching obligations nothing prevented him from accepting the invitation. According to Toni Cassirer's book the lector in German had been dismissed because of National Socialist bias (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 272). The person in question, Johannes Klein, was Konstantin Reichardt's successor as lector in German. His dismissal led to German diplomatic protests, but with no avail. Instead, Klein was named lector at the Deutsche Akademie in Göteborg. Throughout the war he dutifully sent reports from Göteborg to Germany (Almgren 2001, 215-255). It was the rector, Curt Weibull, who came up with the idea that Cassirer could fill in for Klein. Weibull assumed that Cassirer would need an addition to his pension (Almgren 2001, 273). Toni Cassirer notes an unusual pace in Cassirer's mode of working after the return to Göteborg, in part as a way to flee the strain caused by the ongoing war and H.W. Cassirer's intern­ ment in England. It was the same routine that he had followed in the autumn of 1938. In quick succession he finished the manu­ script of Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften ("One week after our

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return to Göteborg", i. e. the first week of June). Then he immedi­ ately ("a few days later") started to write down the fourth vol­ ume of Das Erkenntnisproblem (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 271). However, according to a notation on the titlepage of the manuscript Cassirer started working on volume four of Das Erkenntnisproblem on July 9, i.e. a month later. He completed it on November 26. A further notation informs that he began writing Part three on October 15. The manuscript of Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften, Toni Cas­ sirer writes, was given to a typist as soon as it was finished. But at that stage the working process was far from complete. According to a note in the original edition published in the university year­ book the manuscript was handed in on the 25th of April, 1941. The process of printing a work in the university yearbook as a rule began with a tender from the printer Elanders based on the manuscript. In this case there are two tenders extant, one for a manuscript entitled "Studien zur Kulturphilosophie," dated Oc­ tober 23, 1940, and the other for "Zur Logik der Kulturwissen­ schaften," dated October 28,1941. The size of the earlier manu­ script is somewhat larger, 10 and 972 sheets, respectively. The title finally chosen is mentioned for the first time in an application of October 25, 1940, to Humanistiska fonden ("The Humanities Fund") for a contribution toward the printing of the manuscript. Cassirer, writing in Swedish, describes the work as "a sequel" to Philosophie der symbolischen Formen: The present writer has in 1923-1929 published a work: 'Philosophie der symbolischen Formen,' Volume I—III. I have now completed these inquiries and written a sequel to them, that I wish to publish under a separate title, tentatively Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften. Fünf Studien. (GLA, Göteborgs Högskola, F VIII: 2)

The sense of urgency that Toni Cassirer refers to in connection with his new work is borne out by his letters to colleagues in Sweden in 1940. To Nordström he wrote a postcard in the sum­ mer:

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Since I have to calculate leaving Göteborg presently for an extended pe­ riod, I am at the moment going through my manuscripts. I plan to commit most of them to the keeping of the town library. When I went through them I also found the manuscript on Mathematische Mystik u[nd] mathematische Naturwissenschaft] [-] do you want to have it? [-] I hope you make it through these hard times alright (to Nordstrom 1 /22/40; but probably July; Nordstrom replied 8/14/40).

Later that year he told Lamm that during the summer he had had occasion to study Lamm's recent book on Strindberg intensively: "I try myself, though it is sometimes hard, to keep up working under all circumstances and to finish things that have preoccu­ pied me for many years" (letter to Lamm 10/28/40). When the donation professorship ended on September 1, Cassirer became professor emeritus. According to the contract signed by the donators he would not have any right to pension. But from Toni Cassirer's book we learn that Jacobsson arranged for him to be given a pension for five years (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 272). On October 2 he started a series of public lectures at the uni­ versity on "Der junge Goethe." All in all it was to be 15 lectures, extending until March, 1941. In his introductory lecture he spoke of Goethe as a "liberator" with such enthusiasm that his wife felt concerned for his fragile health (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 273). The lec­ tures were much appreciated in Göteborg. The newspapers re­ ported that at his introductory lecture auditors had to stand up listening in the crowded hall, which meant more than 300 per­ sons attended (GMP10/3/40; GHT10/3/40). According to Petzäll in a portrait of Cassirer in Lunds Dagblad the following year it was a stroke of luck when the university gave Cassirer the task to lecture on Goethe. In those days, he wrote, one could not over­ rate the value of getting an account of Germany's greatest author from Germany's greatest living philosophically oriented histo­ rian of ideas (LD 3/18/41). Cassirer's lectures were a part of the regular tuition at the university as well, and Cassirer sometimes turned directly to the students and gave them advice as to the 96

literature. He recommended Salomon Hirzel's and Max Morris' bibliographical work Der junge Goethe as an outstanding aid. Since the seminary library did not have this book he had put his own copy at the students' disposal (GHT10/24/40). During the lecture course on the young Goethe the urge to influence younger people became strong in Cassirer. He had thoughts of emigrating once again in order to be able to continue as a teacher. Friends in America were asked to notify the more important universities that he was unattached and his children helped spreading the information. It did not take long before he received an invitation to the New School of Social Research in New York in 1940. But, as Toni Cassirer writes, it looked more like an attempt to rescue him. According to her he never consid­ ered going through such a violent change for safety's sake. Tho­ mas Mann tried to persuade Harvard University to invite Cassirer but was told that since Cassirer had declined an earlier invita­ tion - in 1913! - this was impossible (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 291). At a ceremony for the freshmen in the students' union, on October 11, Cassirer said his farewell to the students at Göteborg. His relationship with the students was cordial from the start, he told them, and yet his first days had not been without tribula­ tions and second thoughts. Time and again I had to tell myself that I was unable in all respects to fulfil the task I had set and that I could not entirely give to the University of Göteborg that which it expected and had the right to ask from me. I under­ stood that certain limits were set for my activity, and that it would be con­ fined to a narrow circle. But by and by I learnt to regard this as a blessing. I could treat many themes which one otherwise hardly dare to take on in academic tuition. And I experienced how I became more and more attached to my auditors. To the bonds that come with the subject matter itself soon personal ones were added. I had the pleasure of coming closer to my audi­ tors also on a human level. I could take part in their work and rejoice at their progress and scholarly maturation.

He then spoke of the current situation. The simple joy of life could never return as far as he was concerned and after all the hardship

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that he had experienced. But he hoped to find joy in others and in particular in his students, who to him were the promise of a newer, better and freer future: I cherish no hope of being able to enter this Promised Land of the future myself - although I am still able to receive greetings from it. But from the bottom of my heart I long for it - and I am sure that it will come and must come some day. It will come - for you yourself, for the academic youth and for all of Sweden, which to me has become a new home and that I now with pride and joy may regard as my second fatherland. (Cassirer 1940, pp. 1-3)

In December Cassirer received an invitation from Yale Univer­ sity to come as visiting professor. He accepted the invitation but feared that he would not be able to get to America at all. Toni made it an ultimatum for going to America that Georg's family would join them. Cassirer and his wife had no trouble as Swed­ ish citizens in procuring visa, but Georg and his family would have to wait. However, thanks to the helpful American consul all five had got their visa at the beginning of February. The consul William Corcoran belonged to Segerstedt's circle of special ac­ quaintances. Ingrid Segerstedt-Wiberg describes him as an ex­ ceptionally good-hearted man. One could always count on him when a needy refugee urgently had to be given a visa to get away from Europe (Segerstedt Wiberg 1995, p. 236). Cassirer started immediately to study English. It appealed to him to come to teach in America and he was eager to personally expound his philosophy to an American audience, Jacobsson later wrote in an article (GHT 7/28/54). But according to his wife he at first made no practical arrangements for the journey. He contin­ ued his lectures on Goethe and put the finishing touch to the last pages of Das Erkenntnisproblem (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 277). Further­ more Cassirer had some remaining duties to fulfil in Sweden. In February 1940 he had been elected to the Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien ("The Royal Academy of Letters, His­ tory and Antiquities") and would give his inaugural lecture, Feb­ 98

ruary 4, 1941, on "Thorild und Herder" (ATA, Vitterhetsakade­ mien, Protokoll 'll6/40; 2/4/41). This lecture he offered to Petzäll for publication in Theoria (letter 2/7/41; "Thorild und Herder," Theoria, Vol. VII. 1941, pp. 75-92). In the same letter to Petzäll he wrote that he was going to publish a more extensive work on Thorild in the proceedings of the Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Anti­ kvitets Akademien: Thorilds Stellung in der Geistesgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts (1941). The date for the inaugural address had been settled in a correspondence with Lamm in October 1940 and was coordinated with a lecture in the Philosophical Society in Stock­ holm, to which Marc-Wogau had invited him (letter to Lamm 10/28/40). The lecture in the Philosophical Society was held on February 3. It was a repetition of the lecture on "Kant und die moderne Biologie" at the Institute for Oceanography in Göteborg. The meeting in the Philosophical Society was nice and stimulat­ ing, Cassirer told Petzäll. They had as usual continued the dis­ cussion into the night and Hedenius had come from Uppsala (to Petzäll 2/7/41). After the return to Göteborg, Cassirer received an invitation to give a series of lectures at the end of March on Goethe in the Vetenskapssocieteten ("The New Society of Letters") in Lund. In a letter in Swedish to the praeses of the Society, art historian Ragnar Josephson, he explained that he hesitated to accept because he may leave for America in a couple of weeks. But should the jour­ ney to America be put off, then he would be delighted to come to Lund (letter to Josephson 2/7/41). The German blockade made the journey from Sweden to the West impossible for refugees. Instead nearly 300 refugees were forced to undertake the long journey via Russia to the United States. For a while there was an alternative route open via Lisbon and many refugees hoped to escape that way (Segerstedt Wiberg 1979, p. 104). To Josephson and Petzäll, Cassirer wrote that he was planning to journey via Lisbon - the route via Siberia and Japan was out the question owing to the hardship and duration, he told Petzäll (to Petzäll 2/7/41). The publisher Bermann-Fischer 99

made the journey from Sweden to America via Russia the previ­ ous year. He and his family first took an aeroplane from Stockholm to Moscow; they travelled on the Trans-Siberian railway for ten days to Vladivostock; then on a boat for three days over the Japa­ nese Sea to Tsuruga, Japan, and with the express through Japan to Yokohama. In Yokohama they stayed for three days, before embarking on a Japanese ship that within twelve days reached San Francisco; after a stay in Los Angeles they went by car to New York in ten days. (Letter, Bermann-Fischer to Hermann Hesse 3/10/41, printed in Pfäfflin and Kussmaul 1985, p. 549) In order to fly to Lisbon the Cassirers first had to have visa from the Ger­ man Consulate. However - maybe because the consulate was un­ willing to give them visa - they instead procured a visa for trav­ elling through Russia. But in a letter to Lamm in April he wrote that since he would not after all travel via Siberia and Japan, he could not visit him in Stockholm. It was in the end they decided that they were going to take a boat from Göteborg to New York, with "free escort" from both the German and the English sides. Cassirer thanked Lamm and his wife for the reception during the first stay in Stockholm and for his help with the work on Thorild, and he hoped to see them both after two years (letter to Lamm 4/17/41). According to Toni Cassirer's account it was Malte Jacobsson's daughter who informed them that a freighter of the Transatlantic Line was going to leave Göteborg for New York and take on 18 passengers (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 278). After having finished the lectures on Goethe and during prepa­ rations for the journey to America he was interviewed by Handelstidningen. The language was Swedish. "It is with astonishment one notes the professor's fluent Swedish and the perfect pronun­ ciation." Asked about the publication of the Goethe-lectures he could not give a definite answer. A précis or some chapters would probably be published as a book, if he could find an apt transla­ tor and a good publisher. As a philosopher he had never before got the chance to hold a series of lectures on Goethe. He had stud­ ied Kant, Leibniz and Plato systematically and methodically, but

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he had never had the occasion to study Goethe in this way, al­ though he of course had read him keenly and heartily for fifty years. That is why these lectures were not work to him, they were written con amore and were added to by the great benevolence of the audience. He called attention to the fact that his research during later years had centred on Swedish figures. Especially the ideas that constituted the historical background of the figure of Queen Christina had always interested him. He also declared that his inquiries concerning the problem of knowledge were brought to an end during the time he had been teaching in Göteborg. The fourth part of his work would presumably be published the fol­ lowing year. He could not say enough in praise of the free and genuine research-inspiring atmosphere surrounding this seat of learning. The town library was furthermore an excellent institu­ tion. You could actually get whatever you wanted from it. The invitation to Yale came as a big surprise to him, he told the news­ paper. He hoped with all his heart to return to Göteborg after his two years' academic visit to America, surely by then peace and quiet will have been restored to the world. (GHT 3/15/41) Since he would not take the first possible aeroplane to Lisbon, Cassirer had the opportunity to stay longer in Lund in March. He spent "pleasant days" in the Petzäll home, as he later wrote to Petzäll (3/27/41): "I will keep them always as the best of memories." Cassirer was scheduled to deliver five lectures in Lund, according to a letter from Petzäll to Marc-Wogau (3/19/ 41). In Vetenskapssocieteten he gave, on March 19, 21, and 24, a series of three lectures on "Goethes geistige Leistung." In an ar­ ticle about Cassirer's visit in Lunds Dagblad, Petzäll described the lectures as a "summary" of his successful lectures on Goethe in Göteborg (LD 3/18/41). Among the numerous auditors at his first lecture on Goethe were the rector and several prominent schol­ ars and scientists. Cassirer was welcomed to Vetenskapssocieteten by Ragnar Josephson, who reminded the audience about Cas­ sirer's research on Descartes. Descartes was the first foreign phi­ losopher of stature to visit our country, Cassirer the second, he

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said (SDS 3/20/41). Cassirer in his lecture characterized Goethe as the champion of spiritual liberty and the founder of a new epoch. As such it was only natural that he was contested, and the battle over him started already in his own time. He told the audi­ ence that they could not possibly overlook Goethe at that time in history they had to take up a position on Goethe and on his ideas (LD 3/20/41). Cassirer did not hide his own opinion and it was appreciated in Lund. In a letter to Josephson after his return to Göteborg he wrote that at a time when things weighed heavily upon them it was always a comfort to talk in a circle that was in full sympathy with the problems that concerned you (letter to Josephson, 3/27/41). The following evening Cassirer was invited to the Philosophi­ cal Society. Here he lectured on "Zur Erkenntnistheorie der Kulturwissenschaften." The same lecture was held some weeks later, on April 4, in Göteborg as "Zur Logik der Kulturwissen­ schaften." The theme was the conflict between the natural and the cultural sciences. Cassirer criticized both Rickert, for his lack of contact with the empirical cultural sciences, and Julius Kraft, for his methodological monism and refusal to recognize other kinds of order besides causality in natural science. There are other problems besides those of natural science. But the alternative between naturalism and historicism was not the only possibility. Cultural science was not history. The problem of the cultural sciences was a problem of structure, as Cassirer demonstrated through examples from Heinrich Wölfflin and Wilhelm von Humboldt. After the lecture there was a discussion with Nyman, Petzäll, Landquist, and Josephson (LD 3/21/41). A couple of days later Cassirer wrote to Petzäll from Göteborg about his preparations for the journey to America. Apart from the library, which would be stored at the university, he was mainly concerned about two manuscripts. He wanted Petzäll to take care of the manuscript of volume four of Das Erkenntnisproblem until its publication. The other manuscript, "Logik der Kulturphilo­ sophie" (sic), he had decided to rework "once again" as a result

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of the discussion with the scholars in Lund (letter to Petzäll 3/ 27/41). When Petzäll later wrote a memorial article on Cassirer he especially remembered his last visit to Lund. When, towards the close of his exile in Sweden, he was about to embark on his perilous voyage to the United States, to take up the Visiting Professor­ ship to which he had been appointed, he spent a last week with his friends here in Lund. It was no disillusioned dotard who turned his back on the Old World. He was looking forward ardently to the further prosecution of his mission as a scholar; fortunately, he felt neither the want of time nor lack of interest for the discussion and revision of his views and projects. (Theoria 1945 pp. 85-86)

From Petzäll's abovementioned letter to Marc-Wogau we learn that Cassirer was to give five lectures in Lund. There are only reports in the newspapers about four lectures. However, there is evidence that Cassirer held a lecture in the nearby city of Malmö on March 23. This is the date of some notes preserved among the Ernst Cassirer papers in the Yale University Library for a lecture on Hermann Cohen's relation to Judaism. In Malmö there was a Jewish community that may have invited him to give a lecture. The day of departure was set to April 26, he told Petzäll in a letter (4/14/40). He was going to send Petzäll his manuscript of volume four of Das Erkenntnisproblem the next day, on April 15. The departure was postponed, but finally on May 20 Cassirer and his wife left Göteborg on the freighter Remmaren, leaving Georg, Vera, and their son Peter behind. Toni Cassirer tells us that she reserved berths for Georg's family on the next Transatlantic Line steamer a fortnight later. But the voyage that Remmaren made was so perilous that the captain advised that no more steamers would make the trip. And so Georg Cassirer and his family remained in Göteborg (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 288). Later in 1941 Cassirer was made honorary doctor at the Uni­ versity of Göteborg. According to Toni Cassirer it made him very happy: "He was very fond of Sweden and was very proud of any recognition shown him by that country." (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 303)

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The ceremony in Göteborg coincided with the fiftieth anniver­ sary of the university and the rector Curt Weibull turned it into a manifestation of the will to independence and solidarity with the occupied Nordic countries. The university defied the Third Reich not only by honouring Cassirer. Alongside him the Swedish au­ thor Pär Lagerkvist, who had attacked the Hitler-regime in his novel Bödeln ("The Hangman"), as well as the Norwegian scholar (and Cassirer's former colleague in Göteborg) Georg Munthe af Morgenstierne, became honorary doctors. Morgenstierne was prevented by the Germans from receiving this distinction, how­ ever (Lindberg and Nilsson 1996, p. 280). Professor Axel Romdahl celebrated Cassirer at the dinner afterwards: Ernst Cassirer landed as a stranger on our coast, was received as our guest, and became our friend. His ingenious thought and brilliant oratory lent lustre to our university. When the laurel wreath was lifted on behalf of the absent, it bore witness over the ocean that we always with pride will count him as our own. (GLA, Göteborgs Högskola, F VI a: 4)

Toni Cassirer told Jacobsson after her husband's death that when they left Sweden their thoughts were going in two totally differ­ ent directions. They did not believe that Sweden could avoid war and thought that they would never see their children and friends again, but they also thought that everything would be all right and that after two years they would be able to return and Ernst was going to play his new collection of records in Göteborg every evening. It was her fantasy, she told Jacobsson, that Ernst would be buried on the university hill in Göteborg; it would be more fitting than in America where he was comfortable but did not belong (letter T. Cassirer to Jacobsson 6/23/45). Some years later Toni Cassirer declined Jacobsson's proposal to arrange for a burial place in Göteborg. If Ernst was to be buried in a protestant cem­ etery, it would hurt Jewish feelings, and she knew that Ernst would not want that to happen, she wrote him (T. Cassirer to Jacobsson 10/8/53).

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The Philosophical Scene in Sweden at Cassirer's Time

In his book Axel Hägerström. Eine Studie zur schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart ("Axel Hägerström. A Study of the Swedish Phi­ losophy of Today") Cassirer commented on the entirely new philo­ sophical scene that met a German philosopher in Sweden. In sci­ ences like physics and chemistry, he said, national differences are no longer apparent: But in the context of philosophy the borders that divide countries from each other are still very obvious. There is of course no lack of common prob­ lems that give unity to the philosophy of different nations. But the philo­ sophy of every country has also a character of its own that is peculiar to itself and through which it differs from all others. The conditions of the specific national culture, the historical tradition, the character and form of academic education have more importance here than in other fields. (Cas­ sirer 1939a p. 3 f.)

The philosopher who finds himself transplanted to a new country and a new philosophical environment has the not so easy task of making himself familiar with the changed landscape, Cassirer pointed out. As we shall see Cassirer for his part devoted himself with great energy to the study of contemporary Swedish philoso­ phy. He also met and talked with almost all living Swedish phi­ losophers, some of which became his friends. Eventually he inter­ vened in the debates going on within Swedish philosophy, taking his stand on some of the burning issues. And he made some epi­ sodes in the history of Swedish philosophy topics of learned re­ search, thereby competing with Swedish scholars in their own field. In order to understand all this we have to tread in his foot­ steps and follow him into that landscape of Swedish philosophy 1933-41, nowadays unfamiliar even to most Swedish academics. 105

There were in Cassirer's time four universities in Sweden, all with chairs or teaching positions in philosophy. The oldest uni­ versity, that of Uppsala, was founded in 1477 and refounded, af­ ter a long time of obliteration, in 1593. It had two chairs in phi­ losophy, one in theoretical philosophy (in older times called "logic and metaphysics"), one in practical philosophy (in older times called "ethics and natural law"). The chair in practical philoso­ phy was especially important. In the nineteenth century it had been held by Christopher Jacob Boström 1842-1863. Boström was the dominant Swedish philosopher of his times, his influence has often been compared to that of Hegel in Germany. Like Hegel who influenced his early development - Boström combined ide­ alism and rationalism. At the same time he conceived reality as an hierarchy of eternal ideas. His followers compared him to Plato and Leibniz. At the time of Cassirer's arrival in Sweden Bostrom's influence had been on the wane for decades. But it is a remark­ able fact that one of the "Boströmians" was still active. It was Efraim Liljequist (1865-1941), professor of practical philosophy in Lund 1906-1930. He was the last follower of Boström to hold a chair in philosophy. He also was the only professor of philoso­ phy in Sweden to show strong sympathy with German National Socialism. Perhaps surprisingly this didn't impede him from rec­ ommending the appointment of Cassirer to a visiting professor­ ship in Göteborg. Boström was succeded in the chair for practical philosophy by two followers - Carl Yngve Sahlin (1864-1894) and Erik Olof Burman (1896-1910). After them came a philosopher of a very different hue, Axel Hägerström. When Cassirer came to Sweden Hägerström was already retired (since 1933) But he was still the most controversial philosopher in Sweden because of his denial of the objectivity of values. As Cassirer devoted an entire book to the philosophy of Hägerström a more detailed exposition of his philosophical views will be postponed to the chapter where that book is presented ("Axel Hägerström and Uppsala philo­ sophy").

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With Hägerström a new philosophical "school" was estab­ lished in Uppsala. The Boströmians of Uppsala were by now dead or old. To the young absolute idealism seemed very dated. Häger­ ström offered a new type of radical thinking in step with the times. Most of the younger philosophers of Uppsala followed his ban­ ner. Most important among them was Adolf Phalén (1884-1931), who from 1916 till his early death was professor of theoretical philosophy in Uppsala. Phalén took an interest in Cassirer's philosophy and lectured on his epistemology. The two never met, however. Phalén was already dead when Cassirer first came to Uppsala. But Phaléns followers and pupils were the most vociferous crew among the Uppsala philosophers at Cassirer's time in Sweden. Harry Meurling, Einar Tegen, Gunnar Oxenstierna, Konrad Marc-Wogau, Ingemar Hedenius and Anders Wedberg were all deeply influenc­ ed by Phalén's ideas. Especially after the publication of Hägerström's Selbstdarstellung in 1929 the latent opposition between the followers of Hägerström and the followers of Phalén surfaced and the Uppsala school was divided into two hostile camps. Phalén's disciples argued that Phalén had originated the theo­ retical philosophy of the Uppsala school and especially its cri­ tique of "subjectivism". Hägerström was held to have originated only the school's practical philosophy, i.e. its view of ethics and its philosophy of law. Hägerström and his followers (Vilhelm Lundstedt, Karl Olivecrona, Martin Fries and others) claimed priority for Hägerström also within the field of theoretical phi­ losophy. When Hägerström himself stated that claim in no un­ certain terms in his Selbstdarstellung the Phalénians were enraged. What, then, were the most original points in Phalén's philo­ sophy? Where did he differ from Hägerström? As Phalén and Hägerström never openly criticized each other this is to some extent a subject of surmise. But it seems obvious that Phalén's epistemology was less "rationalistic", more "empiricist" and more "realist" than Hägerström's, especially as he argued in Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft 1908. 107

In his paper Kritik af subjektivismen ("Critique of subjectivism") from 1910 Phalén criticizes different types of philosophy which he characterizes as "subjectivistic". The core of "subjectivism" as understood by Phalén is that subject and object are identified. As soon as the two are identified it becomes impossible ever to break loose from the circle of subjectivism. The object, the real world, can never be reached. Phalén never states his own epistemologi­ cal position. But the drift of his argument against "subjectivism" would seem to presuppose that he conceives of the object as be­ ing something different from the subject, something existing in­ dependently from the subject. This would be a more or less real­ ist position. The same tendency could possibly be seen in what Phalén said in an article about his philosophy in Filosofiskt lexikon ("Philosophical dictionary" ed. by Alf Ahlberg 1931): In the thought of reality there will then always be an intimation to some­ thing not perceived in the judgement, although nothing unperceivable - no thing in itself - is assumed. (Phalén p. 479)

The existence of a "Ding an sich" is here denied, but only if taken as something unperceivable. Phalén distances himself from the attempt of those who "in assuming an absolute knowledge and an absolute concept or reality, explain the possibility of our knowl­ edge by saying that this knowledge is 'posited' in the absolute concept." (Phalén p. 478) This is an obvious hint at Hägerström's philosophy in Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft. If Phalén's epistemological position is extremely unclear his so called "dialectical method" is much more easy to grasp. It was conceived, as Phalén admitted, under inspiration from Hegel, on whom Phalén wrote his doctoral thesis (Das Erkenntnisproblem in Hegels Philosophie 1912). But in fact Phaléns dialectics differed very much from Hegel's. Hegel's dialectics were constructive, Phalén's were destructive. Hegel assumed that contradictions are mile­ stones on the Spirit's admittedly chequered path to truth. To Phalén, who assumed no dialectical logic, contradictions are sim­ ply marks of falsehood. They are nevertheless present everywhere

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in human thinking. Phalén explained his views in English in his paper "Our Common Notions and their Dialectic Movements in the History of Philosophy" (reprinted in Phalén p. 481-489). Phalén assumes, and takes it to be commonly agreed, that the dominating problems in the history of philosophy are rooted in prescientific, common conceptions of the world and of ourselves, conceptions which have unintentionally and unreflectingly arisen and in this somewhat vague sense may be termed 'natural'.

He also assumes "that our common notions, which constitute our system of 'natural' categories, involve contradictions such that without thoroughgoing revision they are necessarily devoid of scientific value." But even if this, as Phalén believes, is commonly admitted, it is relatively seldom that we have set ourselves the task of analysing them / our natural conceptions / with any great exactitude. Nevertheless, they are of such great interest in themselves that, independently of their truth-value, they may justly claim to deserve analysis.

As our common notions are found in their most developed form in philosophy we should go to the philosophers to find material for such an analysis: "It is, then, in the history of philosophy that we shall find our chief material for the investigation of the sys­ tem of 'natural'categories." These ideas provided a well-defined research program for Phalén and his followers - to go through the history of philoso­ phy looking for "contradictions" in the basic concepts used by the philosophers and to show how these contradictions had their roots in the 'natural'categories of common sense. Phalén had many more direct followers and disciples within Uppsala philosophy than had Hägerström. This had something to do with his per­ sonality but also with the fact that this research program attract­ ed young philosophers. Among those who belonged to the "Phalénian" tendency within Uppsala philosophy were Tegen, Oxenstierna, Marc-Wogau, Hedenius and Wedberg. 109

Einar Tegen (1884-1965) was professor of practical philoso­ phy in Lund 1931-1937 and in Stockholm 1937-1951. He was a follower of Hägerström,, whose theory of values he developed in an independent way, but even more so of Phalén, whose critique of "subjectivism" he adopted. Among foreign thinkers, Edmund Husserl, whose lectures in Freiburg he attended in the twenties, was especially important to Tegen. His main work, Moderne Willenstheorien ("Modern Theories of Will", two volumes 1924 and 1928), showed the influence of both Phalén and Husserl. Cassirer's discussions with Tegen in the great Stockholm debate on "sub­ jectivism" as well as Tegen's critique in his reviews of Cassirer's Axel Hägerström will be related later (in the chapter "Axel Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy"). Gunnar Oxenstierna (1897-1939), "docent" of philosophy in Uppsala since 1926 belonged to the great noble family whose most famous representative had been Axel Oxenstierna, the chan­ cellor of Gustavus II Adolphus and Queen Christina. Gunnar Oxenstierna however was no wealthy man, especially not since his acedemic career ran into difficulties. Oxenstierna applied for the chair of theoretical philosophy at Uppsala that became va­ cant when Phalén died. But through the influence of Hägerström a philosopher from Lund, Anders Karitz, was preferred to him. Among Oxenstierna's friends in Uppsala there was great bitter­ ness against Hägerström because of this. In his philosophy Oxenstierna was very critical of some of Hägerström's views. Like Phalén he was convinced that Häger­ ström still in many respects was a transcendental idealist and a "subjectivist". Oxenstierna was much closer to Phalén. But his scepticism was even more radical than Phalén's. Oxenstier­ na with great subtlety discovered implicit contradictions in all our common notions, not least in concepts such as "truth" or "reality". Like Phalén he was a sort of deconstructivist avant la lettre. Cassirer met Oxenstierna on several occasions, most impor­ tantly at the great Stockholm debate on "subjectivism" which will 110

be related later. After hearing the news of Oxenstierna's early death Cassirer wrote to Petzäll (10/5/1939): The sudden death of Oxenstierna made me very sad. Although I didn't agree with all his philosophical theses I liked him very much as a person and estimated him as a true philosopher.

Among the younger Uppsala philosophers (Marc-Wogau, Hedenius, Wedberg) Cassirer became involved in a long and interest­ ing debate with Marc-Wogau which we will discuss in our next chapter. But also his relationship to Hedenius is of some interest although he never wrote anything to answer Hedenius' criticism. Ingemar Hedenius (1908-1982, professor of practical philoso­ phy at Uppsala 1947-1973) wrote his doctoral thesis on George Berkeley. In the preface to his Sensationalism and Theology in Berke­ ley's Philosophy, published in 1936, Hedenius expressed his grati­ tude to Cassirer, "with whom I have had the privilege of discuss­ ing certain aspects of my investigation." Which aspects we may guess from Hedenius' book where Cassirer's work is mentioned several times. Cassirer's Das Erkenntnisproblem is called a "monu­ mental and inspiring work" (Hedenius 1936 p. 67). Hedenius quotes it, sometimes in agreement, sometimes preferring a dif­ ferent interpretation. Also, when he wrote a later essay, "Studies in Hume's Ethics" published in Adolf Phalén im memoriam 1937, Hedenius asked Cassirer for advise (Cassirer's letter to Petzäll 10/27/ 1937). Cassirer's most memorable later encounter with Hedenius was on the occasion of the Stockholm debate on "subjectivism" on the 23rd and 24th of February 1939. On the evening of the later day Hedenius had invited Cassirer to Uppsala where he lectured on "Descartes and Queen Christina". There are two letters extant from Cassirer to Hedenius (12/7/1938 and 2/28/1939) dealing with this invitation. In the letter from2/28/1939Hedenius is thanked for the welcome given to Cassirer by him and his wife at their home in Uppsala, where Cassirer also met Oxenstierna and Segerstedt.

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Hedenius expanded his remarks at the Stockholm debate into an article for Theoria in 1939 - "Begriffsanalyse und kritischer Idealismus (I)". In the same number of Theoria (1939/III) he pub­ lished some critical remarks ("Über den alogische Charakter der sog. Werturteile") on Cassirer's Axel Hägerström. (More will be said in a later chapter on these articles.) Cassirer intended to an­ swer Hedenius, whose articles he had read "with a certain inter­ est". He was waiting however for the second part of ''Begriffs­ analyse und kritischer Idealismus" where Hedenius intended to deal more elaborately with Cassirer's philosophy. (Letter to Petzäll 11 / 26/1939) But in his next letter (12/20/1939) Petzäll told Cassirer that Hedenius had been conscripted, was doing military duty somewhere in the north of Sweden and was unable at the mo­ ment to complete his article for Theoria. Instead, as we shall see, Marc-Wogau gave new impetus to the debate. Hedenius left his article unfinished and Cassirer never de­ bated with him in Theoria. They met probably for the last time at the Philosophical Society in Stockholm where Cassirer lectured (2/3/1941) on "Kant and modern biology". Hedenius had come up from Uppsala to listen and take part in the lively debate. (Let­ ter to Petzäll 2/7/1941) Anders Wedberg too was present at the Stockholm debate in February 1939 but otherwise Cassirer met him less often. MarcWogau, Hedenius and Wedberg were all to acquire philosophical chairs after the War (Wedberg, who was born in 1913, was profes­ sor of theoretical philosophy in Stockholm from 1949 until his death in 1978). They had by then left the Uppsala philosophy of Hägerström and Phalén for the more international analytical ori­ entation. Among the first signs of such a reorientation were some remarks by Marc-Wogau and Hedenius in the debate with Cas­ sirer, remarks which Oxenstierna disapproved of. In interwar Swedish philosophy it was usual to point out the difference between "Uppsala philosophy" and "Lund philoso­ phy". But the Lundian philosophers did not constitute a school, they had no common doctrine, no pretense of standing for some­ 112

thing unique and entirely new in the history of philosophy. There was only a certain family resemblance. Lundian philosophers de­ fended the meaningfulness of philosophical ethics, they took talk about values seriously and they read the great philosophers of the past looking for truth and wisdom, not only for contradic­ tions. In many ways their outlook was much closer to Cassirer's than that of the Uppsala philosophers. The leading and most re­ vered personality of this camp was Hans Larsson. Hans Larsson (1862-1944) was professor of theoretical phi­ losophy in Lund 1909-1926. He had been retired for nearly a de­ cade when Cassirer first came to Sweden. Larsson's many books, most of them popularly written, had made him known to a rather broad public. In 1925 he was elected into the Swedish Academy as a token of the esteem in which he was held not only by profes­ sional philosophers. When the Göteborg guest professorship for Cassirer was dis­ cussed Hans Larsson, although retired, was asked for a testimony. He wrote to the board of teachers of the Högskola (5/11/1935) that Cassirer was "one of the most reliable and instructive among contemporary philosophers and one of the leading figures within the field" and that his competence for the chair was undeniable. Cassirer was invited to Hans Larsson's home when he visited Lund in February 1936 (letter from Åkesson 2/2/1936). Other­ wise their personal contacts were few. But Larsson's influence like that of Hägerström - was everywhere present in the Swedish philosophy of the times. Hans Larsson left his chair to his disciple Alf Nyman (1884— 1968), professor of theoretical philosophy in Lund 1929-1949. The succession was not uncontested. The Uppsala philosophers were keen on getting the position in Lund for Einar Tegen. Hägerström in this context declared that Nyman was incomptetent for a pro­ fessorial chair in philosophy, thereby earning Nyman's lifelong enmity. The opinion of Larsson prevailed however. Nyman was appointed (although Tegen shortly later got the chair for practi­ cal philosophy in Lund, succeeding Liljequist).

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In his own philosophy Nyman was influenced by Larsson, but also by Hans Vaihinger and his "fictionalism". As we shall see in a later chapter Nyman had a high opinion of Cassirer's book on Häger ström and also on his work on the Descartes Queen Christina problem. There are a few, very cordial, letters from Cassirer to Nyman kept in Nyman's archive. Among the philosophers in Lund when Cassirer visited the town was Elof Akesson (1892-1979), "docent" of theoretical phi­ losophy in Lund 1933-1958. Åkesson began his philosophical career as a disciple of Vitalis Norström (1856-1916, professor of philosophy in Göteborg 1893-1916). But he also was attracted by the philosophy of Larsson and moved on to Lund. Åkesson was a slow writer and never acquired a professorship. He neverthe­ less was an important philosophical presence in Lund. As chair­ man of the Philosophical Society in Lund he invited Cassirer to hold a lecture there on a subject of his own choice. (Letter 10/24/ 1935) This Cassirer did on the 4th of February 1936, lecturing (in German) on "The Function of Language in the Development of Scientific Knowledge". The next day Cassirer was invited in the morning to Larsson and in the evening for supper to the Åkessons where he also met most of the other philosophers in Lund. On the 6th Cassirer went on to Copenhagen, where he had been in­ vited by Jörgen Jorgensen (professor of philosophy at Copenhagen university) and where he had a long conversation with Niels Bohr. Most of the letters to and from Åkesson extant in the Åkesson archive deal with these occasions. Norström's successor in Göteborg - after an interregnum became Malte Jacobsson (1885-1966, professor of philosophy at Göteborgs Högskola 1920-1934). As Jacobsson was the key per­ sonality in arranging for Cassirer to come to Sweden much has been said about him already. In this context it should only be pointed out that Jacobsson too was a disciple of Larsson and that he began his academic career as "docent" of philosophy in Lund in 1910. In this way a kind of philosophical alliance came to be established between Lund and Göteborg. In several cases people

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who began their philosophical career in Lund went on to Göteborg or the other way round. When Jacobsson left his chair of philosophy to become "lands­ hövding" he was succeeded by Gunnar Aspelin (1898-1977). Aspelin became Ph D and "docent" of practical philosophy in 1925 at the university of Lund with his thesis Hegels praktiska filosofi under åren 1800-1803 ("Hegel's practical philosophy during the years 1800-1803"). His main interest continued to be in the his­ tory of philosophy. In 1936 he became professor of philosophy in Göteborg. He held that position until 1949 when he returned to Lund to become professor of theoretical philosophy there. In this way Aspelin became Cassirer's nearest colleague in Göteborg. Both were unquarrelsome men and their cooperation went without any serious friction. At the end of Cassirer's term as visiting professor they had occasion to exchange compliments in public, thanking each other for good cooperation. At a party for the freshmen the 11th of October 1940 Aspelin honoured Cas­ sirer which a speech on behalf of the students. Cassirer answered, repeating what he had said to Aspelin at a former fare-well party in a smaller circle of colleagues. Cassirer remarked that the hap­ piness he had felt in his work in Göteborg could not have been the same without Aspelin's friendly helpfulness and appreciation: In our field, that of philosophy, it is not uncommon that at the same site of learning two different tendencies are represented that fiercely fight each other. Here in Sweden such fights tend to assume an especial acerbity. I will not deny that this kind of struggle between different philosophical schools may have a certain objective utility; but they seldom tend to make work more joyful and they often are a heavy obstacle to good teaching. We have been spared from this kind of struggle. We too have often had long dicussions of different problems. But the purpose of all these discussions was not struggle but mutual understanding. My impression is that we always reached this goal [...]. This was because even when we differed on specific questions we had the same ideas on the nature and tasks of philosophy.

They were both convinced that philosophy had to be rooted in empirical experience, Cassirer said. And they both agreed that 115

in the field of philosophy historical and systematic research intimately be­ long together and that they have to be mutually fruitful. (Cassirer 1940b)

Among younger colleagues in Göteborg the most important was Åke Petzäll. Petzäll (1901-1957) became Jacobsson's "docent" in 1928 after having written a thesis on the concept of innate ideas in 17th century philosophy (Begreppet medfödda idéer i 1600-talets filosofi). During his years as "docent" Petzäll took two initiatives which had an influence also on Cassirer. At the 8th International congress for philosophy at Prague in 1934 Petzäll proposed that an international philosophical institute should be founded with the task of promoting international cooperation within the field of philosophy. This resulted in the founding of the Institut Inter­ national de Collaboration Philosophique in Paris at the 9th Inter­ national congress which was held at that city in 1937. At that same congress Petzäll got Cassirer elected into the permanent inter­ national committee as the representative of Sweden, after the German philosophers, headed by Nicolai Hartmann, had declared that he could no longer be a representative of Germany. In the years 1937-1939 Petzäll lived in Paris as the director of the Insti­ tute. Another initiative of Petzäll's was the founding of Theoria in 1935 as the first learned journal of philosophy in Sweden. Gun­ nar Aspelin, Konrad Marc-Wogau and later on Torgny T. Segerstedt became his co-editors. When the Cassirers first arrived at Göteborg in 1934 they were met at the railway station by Petzäll who immediately told them about how Jacobsson forced his students to read Cassirer's books. (Letter from Toni Cassirer to Petzäll 8/25/1951.) A friendship between the Cassirers and the Petzälls (or "die Petzälle" in the plural word form that Toni Cassirer invented) developed rapidly. From the point of view of posterity this friendship became espe­ cially fruitful because Petzäll and his family lived away during most of the Cassirers' time in Göteborg, first in Paris, then in Lund, where Petzäll became professor of practical philosophy (after Tegen) in 1939. The many letters exchanged between Petzäll and 116

Ernst Cassirer (with an occasional letter from Toni) is the richest contemporary source extant about Cassirer's personal life dur­ ing his years in Sweden. We have often quoted from these letters, which convey Cassirer's private opinions and sentiments. Petzäll was very critical of the Uppsala school. When Cassirer was about to go to Stockholm to debate with the Uppsala philo­ sophers, Petzäll was enthusiastic (letter 10/22/1938) about pub­ lishing Cassirer's criticism in Theoria but sceptical about the pos­ sibilities for a serious debate: There is no doubt that we have need of a basic and thorough criticism of the so called Uppsala philosophy. But I am sceptical about publishing the sub­ sequent discussion. I myself have tried in Stockholm, that is in the Philo­ sophical Society, to debate with Marc-Wogau. But I found only such rockhard prejudices that I gave up any hope of reasoning with these fellows. It is a really important problem to contemporary Swedish philosophy to decide what should be done with these epigons of Phalén. If it were possible for you, dear Professor, to show these young fanatics that the history of phi­ losophy does not begin with Hägerström-Phalén I would love to publish the subsequent discussion in Theoria - but !!.

Petzäll and Cassirer were both critical of the Uppsala school. This does not mean that they agreed on all philosophical matters. In fact there are very few purely philosophical discussions in their letters to each other. At an early stage Petzäll felt the lack of close philosophical rapport. He wrote about this to Ernst von Aster (10/10/1935): Cassirer is here now and I sincerely enjoy cooperating with him. But I al­ ready believe I can state that really valuable 'dialogues'of the kind I partici­ pated in when you were here I cannot have with Cassirer. He seems to be, it cannot be helped, a bit too much of a 'Kantian'for my taste.

It should be said that Cassirer combined a certain aloofness with all his friendliness and it was not always easy to draw him in­ to discussion. That at least was the impression expressed many decades later, by a young German-Jewish philosopher, Manfred Moritz, who like Cassirer had left Germany for Sweden. Moritz

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(1909-1990) was later on, in 1951, to become Petzäll's "docent" in Lund. He met Cassirer on several occasions and took it on him­ self to type-write the voluminous manuscript of Cassirer's Das Erkenntnisproblem part four. Closest to Cassirer among the younger philosophers in Göte­ borg was Folke Leander. More about him and his relationship to Cassirer will be said in a later chapter. The Uppsala school was still the most conspicuous phenom­ enon on the Swedish philosophical scene. But in Uppsala itself its hegemony was crumbling. As has been mentioned Phalén's successor was a philosopher from Lund, Anders Karitz. Karitz (1881-1961, professor of theoretical philosophy in Uppsala 19341946) had been Larsson's "docent" in Lund. His most important research had concerned the philosophy of Thomas Thorild, a sub­ ject that would also interest Cassirer. Karitz's time as professor in Uppsala was tumultuous. The disciples of Phalén resented the fact that their master had been succeeded by an outsider. Karitz on his side manoeuvred to sidestep the Phalénians and to get tenure for his own disciples instead. Besides, Karitz was a para­ noiac. Especially since Moritz Schlick had been shot down and killed by one of his students in Vienna in 1936 Karitz feared that something of the kind could be in store for him. He suspected Hedenius of being dexterous with a gun, and Oxenstierna had a habit of fiddling with a penknife during lectures which on at least one occasion made Karitz very anxious. Karitz as the only holder at that time of a philosophy chair was the person formally responsible for Cassirer's invitation to Uppsala in 1934. In a few letters from August and September 1934 Cassirer thanked Karitz for the invitation and discussed his scheme of lec­ tures. At Cassirer's visit to Uppsala on the 13th of September Karitz gave a lunch for him at a hotel where among others Hägerström and the rector of Uppsala university were present. Cassirer also met Karitz on later occasions. In October 1937 Cassirer held a lecture in Uppsala. There were at the time two philosophical societies in Uppsala - that of Karitz and that of 118

Oxenstierna. Members were usually not on speaking terms with members of the rivalling society. Cassirer resolutely played blind and deaf and had the satisfaction of seeing members of both soci­ eties in his audience. He told Petzäll (10/27/1937): Friends and enemies - Hägerström, Oxenstierna, Hedenius, Karitz - sat during my lecture peacefully next to each other, and in private talks with the different individuals I tried to soothe the agitated minds.

Conciliatory efforts were of no avail, however. The struggle went on. In March of the next year (3/4/1938) Cassirer wrote to Petzäll that the latest news of the fighting in Uppsala overshadowed even the Homeric songs - though without the intervention of gods: "It is all 'human, too human'." As late as in a letter from his last months in Göteborg (3/27/1941) Cassirer asked Petzäll if he had heard any news from "the scene of war in Uppsala". But at that time there were other battlefields in the world that drew atten­ tion even from that of Uppsala philosophy. The last Lundian philosopher to join the ongoing war in Uppsala was Torgny T. Segerstedt (1908-1999) professor of prac­ tical philosophy in Uppsala 1938-1947). He was son of Torgny Segerstedt, chief editor of Göteborgs Handels- och sjöfartstidning and the most outspoken critic of Hitler and Nazi Germany in Sweden. The elder Segerstedt had contributed money to Cassirer's chair and he was very much admired by both Cassirers. Ernst Cassirer met the younger Segerstedt several times both in Lund and Uppsala but there was no close relationship. Among philosophers from Lund Alf Ahlberg (1892-1979) should also be mentioned. Ahlberg was a disciple of Larsson's. He made no academic career but left Lund after his Ph.D. degree becoming head master of Brunnsviks folkhögskola ("people's high school"), where young social democrats and trade unionists were educated. In the fifties Ahlberg wrote a couple of articles in which he agreed with Cassirer's criticism of Hägerström, which he took to be akin to Larsson's. In 1948 he translated Cassirer's The Myth of the State into Swedish. 119

Ernst Cassirer with Hans Pettersson in Bohuslän (Private collection)

Konrad Marc-Wogau and the Logic of Symbolic Forms

Among the Uppsala philosophers the one who wrote the most detailed criticism of Cassirer's theories was Konrad Marc-Wogau. Marc-Wogau's objections concerned one of the most important points in Cassirer's philosophy, the concept of the symbol. Cas­ sirer extensively answered Marc-Wogau's arguments, clarifying his own position. The debate, covering more than one hundred pages, is of considerable interest to the understanding of Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms. What Cassirer wrote in this con­ text are key texts for the interpretation of his central concept. Konrad Marc-Wogau (1902-1991) was born in Russia as the son of a merchant, but fled the country after the revolution (a brother stayed on and, although the Marc-Wogaus originally had a "von" in their name, became a functionary in the Bolshevik ad­ ministration). Marc-Wogau came to Uppsala where he studied philosophy with Hägerström and Phalén. Phalén became his most important teacher, whose dialectical method Marc-Wogau made his own. A dissertation on Kant's philosophy of space (Untersu­ chungen zur Raumlehre Kants 1932) made Marc-Wogau PhD and "docent" of theoretical philosophy. He obtained a position as teacher of philosophy at the Stockholms Högskola. In 1935, when Theoria was started, Marc-Wogau together with Gunnar Aspelin became sub-editors under the general editorship of Ake Petzäll. His rôle, at least from Petzäll's point of view, was to be a repre­ sentative of the Uppsala school. Marc-Wogau was at this time regarded as a rather orthodox proponent of Uppsala philosophy of the Phalénian observancy. In 1936 Marc-Wogau published his study Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs ("Intension and extension of the concept"). Here he 121

tried to show that philosophers usually think of concepts in a way that is "dialectical" in the Phalénian sense of the term, that is as contradictory. On one hand philosophers assume a necessary connection between the concept and what it denotes, its exten­ sion. On the other hand they regard the concept in terms of its intension, as defining properties. This same basic contradiction recurs in philosophers as different as Frege and Russell, Burkamp and Sigwart, Rickert and Cassirer. The only way to avoid the con­ tradiction, Marc-Wogau concludes, is to abandon the idea of the concept as necessarily connected with its extension and look at its internal, intensional properties only. One of the philosophers criticized in Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs is Ernst Cassirer. In the chapter "Begriff als Function" ("Concept as function") Marc-Wogau discusses Frege's ideas but also Cassirer's. There are also some pages on Cassirer in an ear­ lier chapter, "Die transzendental-logische Begriffslehre" ("The theory of concept in transcendental logic"). The books by Cassirer most pertinent to Marc-Wogau's analysis are Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff and Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. In both Marc-Wogau finds the same contradiction. Marc-Wogau stresses the fact that Cassirer saw a close rela­ tion between his transcendental epistemology and his theory of the concept. The idea of the concept as function is closely related in Cassirer's epistemology to his conception of "objectivity" and "reality". But more of that later. Marc-Wogau notes that the peculiarity of Cassirer's theory is that concepts are assumed to be concepts of function, that is, rules for the formation of a series or progress. The concept is not, ac­ cording to Cassirer, some property abstracted from existing indi­ vidual things. It is rather a rule for the formation of a series. The series is unthinkable without the rule, the rule cannot be under­ stood without the series. The "general" and the "individual" are correlative ideas. The general is the function that generates the individual, the individual is what is determined by that function. Marc-Wogau concludes that this theory involves a contradiction:

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If what Cassirer says were true the general would coincide with the indi­ vidual and the individual contents would coincide with each other. If the general, the rule or principle of the series, has sense only in relation to the series, and if the individual, that is the member of the series, only exists In relation to its context, then whenever we think of the rule of the series we have to think of the sum of the members of the series and whenever we think of one member of the series we have to think of the series as a whole. In both cases we think of the same thing; the principle and the individual members coincide. That is a necessary consequence of the correlative rela­ tionship that Cassirer assumes to hold between the concept and the indi­ vidual content. (Marc-Wogau 1936a p. 193)

Marc-Wogau's conclusion was that Cassirer, like all the other philosophers of his study, in a dialectical way both identifies the concept with its extension and distinguishes it from it. Cassirer answered Marc-Wogau's objections in an extensive review for Theoria (1936/2) of Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs. Cassirer underlined that he to a certain extent shared MarcWogau's view of the concept. Marc-Wogau was right in saying that the logical analysis of the concept must take its intension (content) as its point of departure, the purely extensional inter­ pretation is rejected. But Marc-Wogau takes a further step. He cannot admit that any relation to the individual or concrete can be an essential part of the concept. Every theory of the concept that assumes a necessary connection between intension and ex­ tension will according to Marc-Wogau lead to dialectical contra­ dictions. Here Cassirer declares himself unable to follow. Marc-Wogau's radical cure - to use the sharp knife of logical analysis to sever the bond between intension and extension - seems to him dan­ gerous to the patient: Even if it were conceded to Marc-Wogau that such a cut were necessary and unavoidable its is an open question whether it was undertaken at the right place. It seems to me that we have to undertake it in such a way that it contributes to the healing of the disease rather than to the destruction of the organism. (Cassirer 1936a p. 214)

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In fact Marc-Wogau's cure would be "the end of the concept". The very point of the concept is that it should denote something (or at least try to denote something), that it should be connected to the real world: Without this relation the concept would perhaps still in some sense be logi­ cally meaningful; but it could give us no objective knowledge; from the point of view of knowlege it would be 'empty'. (Cassirer 1936a p. 215)

Cassirer then makes an effort to explain and defend his own theory of the concept as function. He reminds us that his theory assumes a correlative relationship between the general and the individual and that Marc-Wogau finds this very idea of correlativity contra­ dictory. But Cassirer denies that correlative terms have to coin­ cide. Form and content mutually presuppose each other but are not the same thing: If we use a rule to generate a certain series of numbers, e.g. the series of squared numbers, we could not make the mistake of confusing the rule with that for which it holds. The rule is not itself a number as it means something wholly different and as it has quite another place in the architec­ ture of knowledge and in the order of concepts that it demands. (Cassirer 1936a p. 217)

But this does not mean that the rule is another thing or substance. The form has as it were a job to do and could do this job only in relation to its content, it has no independent existence. This is not understood by Marc-Wogau. Cassirer compares Marc-Wogau to the British idealist philosopher F.H. Bradley, whom indeed MarcWogau often cites with approval in Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs. There are in fact many similarities between Bradley's views and those of Phalén. Both found the notions of common sense and of science full of contradictions. Both concluded that concepts, such as those that science or common sense have of time, space, rela­ tions, reality or truth, are dialectical and should be abandoned. Cassirer does not agree with this. He concedes that the concepts of pre-scientific thinking might be confused and contradictory.

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But he does not think that the same holds of the concepts of mod­ ern science or of modern mathematical logic. Uppsala philoso­ phy not only rejected myth and old-fashioned metaphysics. It also rejected Einstein's theory of relativity, modern quantum mechan­ ics, the symbolic logic of Frege and Russell and the new math­ ematics of Hilbert. Everywhere it found contradictions and "dia­ lectical" concepts. Cassirer's attitude was different. He accepted modern science and modern logic more or less as they were. But he endeavoured to find their guiding principles as well as those of other fields of symbolical representation (art, religion etc.). Thus we find Cassirer defending his notion of the concept in making constant appeals to the practice of modern science. At the same time he argues that exactly the kind of connection between inten­ sion and extension that Marc-Wogau criticizes is necessary if the concept is to do its job: The essence of the concept can be defined only in terms of its function in the construction of knowledge. And this function will undoubtedly be impeded, yes it will be fundamentally put in question and bereaved of its real fruitful­ ness, if we cut the bond between intension and extension and declare that what the concept denotes is not part of the concept itself. (Cassirer 1936a p. 231)

Marc-Wogau gave his answer to Cassirer's defence in the next number of Theoria (1936: 3). Marc-Wogau thanked Cassirer for his review of Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs. He noted that Cas­ sirer's exposition of his own views did clarify them "in more than one respect". He also expressed his satisfaction at having this opportunity for discussion with Cassirer, whom he regarded as "one of the most important among thinkers and scholars of the present time". (Marc-Wogau 1936b p. 335). But despite these compliments Marc-Wogau agreed with very little of what Cassirer had said. He defended Bradley's critique of the concept of rela­ tion and he defended his own idea of the concept. Cassirer's ob­ jection that Marc-Wogau in depriving the concept of its neces­ sary connection with its extension deprived it of its empirical fruitfullness, did not hold water: 125

The objection assumes that the 'use' of a concept in knowledge is part of the concept itself. This seems to me to be a petitio principii. (Marc-Wogau 1936b p. 338).

The use of a concept as well as its extension may be as it were external to it, logically unconnected to it, Marc-Wogau contends. What he denies is not that there is some kind of connection be­ tween the concept and what it denotes, only that the determina­ tion of the concept delimits a certain extension or set. It would seem that Marc-Wogau generally is very sceptical of the tenability of set theory. In particular he doubts whether the idea of an "infinite set" can be formulated in a non-contradictory way. Cas­ sirer's acceptance of modern mathematics obviously seems a bit naive to Marc-Wogau. The same number of Theoria (1936:3) where this rejoinder was published also contained a long paper by Marc-Wogau, "Der Sym­ bolbegriff in der Philosophie Ernst Cassirers" ("The Concept of Symbol in the Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer"). Marc-Wogau had announced already in Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs (Marc-Wogau 1936a p. 195n) that he was soon to publish a small work on "the difficulties of Cassirer's interpretation of the concept of symbol". Cassirer had noted this announcement and said that he looked for­ ward to further discussion and to the opportunity it could give him for further clarification of his basic concepts. (Cassirer 1936a p. 214). In "Der Symbolbegriff in der Philosophie Ernst Cassirers" Marc-Wogau challenged the very foundations of Cassirer's phi­ losophy. He began with a very able and thorough exposition of Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms, pointing out that the "concept of symbol is the central concept of Cassirer's philoso­ phy" (Marc-Wogau 1936c p. 279). Marc-Wogau noted that Cas­ sirer's epistemological position could be characterized as one of "critical idealism" and that it gives the idea of functions primacy over the idea of things. Cassirer differs from Kant in that his phi­ losophy in an essential way extends our world view beyond that of theoretical science:

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Everywhere that we have a picture of the world, or of a whole made up of parts, this 'cosmos', according to Cassirer, is the result of a certain intelli­ gent forming of the 'chaos of immediate impressions'. We encounter such pictures of the world not only in scientific knowledge but also in myth, language and art, and all these different pictures of the world have differ­ ent functions of the mind as their foundation. The 'formation of a world' is thus, according to Cassirer, not only related to the pure function of know­ ledge. It takes place as well through the function of linguistic thinking, the function of mythic-religious thinking or the function of artistic intuition. [-] Cassirer speaks of three dimensions of intelligent forming. (Marc-Wogau 1936c p. 282f.)

For each of these dimensions, that of myth, that of language and that of science, there is a special symbolic function. They are the function of expression ("Ausdrucksfunktion"), the function of description ("Darstellungsfunktion") and the function of mean­ ing ("Bedeutungsfunktion"). What, then, does Cassirer mean by "symbol" and "symbolic"? The symbol is a sign and as such something sensuous. But this concrete and sensuous thing that is the sign, signifies something, it has a meaning. The meaning is so to say incarnate or embodied in the sign. According to Marc-Wogau this relationship consti­ tutes a duality, in fact a contradiction. Marc-Wogau finds the same contradiction here that he had formerly found in Cassirer's theory of the concept. He writes: A closer examination seems to me to have as a result that Cassirer's posi­ tive interpretation of the symbolic relationship is dialectical. Together with the idea of an opposition between the sensuous given and its meaning, between sign and signified, it would seem that the symbolic relationship, as Cassirer conceives it, also includes the idea of their identity. (Marc-Wogau 1936c p. 291)

Cassirer takes the relationship between sign and signified to be correlative. Marc-Wogau has the same objection to the idea of correlativity now as he had in his Inhalt und. Umfang des Begriffs. Correlativity as understood by Cassirer must have the identity of its terms as a consequence, Marc-Wogau argues. If that was true

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of Cassirer's theory of the concept it is true also of his theory of the symbolic function in general. And it is true of the functions of expression, of description and of signification as interpreted by Cassirer. Cassirer understands the function of expression as a close cor­ relation, a concrete unity between sign and signified. In myth the symbol and what is symbolized are not distinguished from each other, but are identified. But the very idea of a symbol presup­ poses that there is a difference, that the symbol stands for some­ thing different from itself. So Marc-Wogau concludes that the notion of the "Ausdrucksfunktion" is dialectical. The same goes for the notion of the "Darstellungsfunktion". Here, too, Cassirer's theory is made up of two incompatible ideas. The notion of "symbolic pregnance" gives this away. With "sym­ bolic pregnance" Cassirer indicates the way in which a sensuous experience symbolically represents some non-sensuous meaning: What is present is, according to Cassirer, already filled and saturated with something else that it represents, it goes pregnant with this other in the same way that the present moment to Leibniz is 'praegnans futuri'. But from this idea it seems to follow with necessity that what is present would be annihilated as such if it were not in some sense representation. (Marc-Wogau 1936c p. 318)

So in this case too the symbol and what is symbolized coincide at the same time as they are said to be two different things. In the "function of meaning" the same dialectic is at work. Here Marc-Wogau to a great extent repeats what he had said be­ fore on Cassirer's theory of the scientific concept. As he rightly stresses: The whole philosophy of the symbolic forms is as a matter of fact nothing else than a widening and deepening of the basic thoughts of Cassirer's theory of the concept. (Marc-Wogau 1936c p. 24)

Cassirer's theory of the "Bedeutungsfunktion" contains a "double thought", Marc-Wogau contends. Cassirer is not really able to 128

make the distinction that his theory demands. The concept and its extension coincide. The interdependency between the func­ tion and its domain of operation is so close that the distinction between them collapses. Again and again Marc-Wogau arrives at the same conclusion. According to Cassirer the symbol is "immanence and transcen­ dence in one", a sensuous form for a non-sensuous content. The symbol and its meaning are two different things, but Cassirer also says that the symbolic relationship shows us "the one in the other" and "the other in the one". But: Is not in this way an identity posited between the two moments of the sym­ bolic that contradicts the assumption of their polarity? (Marc-Wogau 1936c p. 331)

It would take some time before an answer was offered to MarcWogau's paper. Cassirer was now occupied with other tasks. But when he visited Stockholm in October 1937 he found Marc-Wogau eagerly waiting for a reply. Cassirer wrote to Petzäll (10/27/1937): In my conversations with Marc-Wogau in Stockholm I found that he would value a continuation of our discussion so much that I could not very well escape. I have now written an extensive reply and have asked him to get in touch with you directly to decide when it can be published.

Toni Cassirer met Marc-Wogau on the same occasion and wrote to "die Petzälle" of her impressions (10/27/1937): I was very much surprised at how nice and amusing he can be when he puts away that earnest demeanour, that I suppose is the fault of his Uppsala philosophy.

Cassirer's "Zur Logik des Symbolbegriffs" ("The Logic of the Concept of a Symbol") was published in Theoria 1938/2. It dealt with Marc-Wogau's objections in a very thorough way, trying to clarify both Marc-Wogau's position and that of Cassirer himself. Marc-Wogau's conception of logic was compared by Cassirer with that of Parmenides and the Eleatic school. Like the Eleatics the 129

Uppsala philosophers denied the possibility of relations and of change, Cassirer contended. Spying contradictions everywhere they never proceeded beyond the stage of a stale logic of identity. Cassirer pleads guilty to Marc-Wogau's accusation of harbouring a "duality" in his thinking. As soon as we admit relations into our thinking a kind of duality is unavoidable. A is something in itself but also something as related to B, and the same goes for B. But this is no contradiction. The philosophy of symbolic forms is not intended to be a meta­ physics of knowledge but a phenomenology of knowledge, Cassirer points out. Thereby it takes the word "knowledge" in its widest sense. "Knowledge" is not only scientific or theoretical explanation but "every activity of the mind whereby we build up a 'world' with its peculiar structure, its order and 'being-so'." (Cassirer 1938 p. 151). Far from taking the opposition between the "I" and the world as something given, this philosophy sets out to investigate what the presuppositions of this opposition are. The philosophy of symbolic forms studies all the forms of sym­ bolic worldmaking. But if objective reality can be given to us only through certain forms we can never go beyond these forms, we can never look at things as it were "from the outside": We can perceive, experience, imagine, think only in these forms; we are bound by their purely immanent meaning and achievement: But if this is so, it remains problematic to what extent we are entitled to create a counter concept or correlative concept to that of pure form. (Cassirer 1938 p. 152)

If there can be no pure unformed matter in our experience, how can form be contrasted to it? How can there be the pure sensuous sign as contrasted to its meaning? Those were Marc-Wogau's ques­ tions. Cassirer's answer takes the form of an example. We can look upon a drawing that we have before us as a simple play of lines which differs from others through certain visible qualities, through elemental properties of spatial form.

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But I will then find that suddenly this play of lines comes to life, that an aesthetic whole comes out of it, that it takes on the charac­ ter of an ornament. This ornament can then in its turn be regarded from different perspectives. I can look at it aesthetically as a piece of art to be enjoyed. I can analyse it historically as typical of a certain period. I can interpret it as carrying a certain religious or mythical significance. I can regard it as a mathematical curve rep­ resenting a trigonometric function. Cassirer says: I have used this example as the perhaps simplest way of explaining in what sense I use the concept of a 'matter'of experience - in what sense it seems to me to be permissible. [-] The 'matter'of perceptual experience as I under­ stand it is no real essence that could be isolated and as isolated apprehended as something purely given or as a psychological datum. It is rather a bor­ derline concept that we arrive at through epistemological reflection and epistemological analysis [...]. (Cassirer 1938 p. 154f.)

So according to Cassirer the sensuous sign is not there as some­ thing given, but it has to be assumed as constituting one pole in the whole of our experience, where the signified is the other pole. This idea of polarity within unity is what Cassirer defends and Marc-Wogau finds "dialectical". How could e.g. "a simple play of lines" take on different forms without being itself "unformed materia"? Does Cassirer not both pretend and deny the existence of such materia? This is Marc-Wogau's question that Cassirer tries to answer in pointing to the notion of a "limiting concept". Cassirer in a similar way defends the idea of "symbolic pregnance" through giving concrete examples. The shameful blush for example is not made up of shame added to the red colour of the cheeks: What we have here is not just one thing beside another but that relation­ ship that I have tried to characterize by the expression 'symbolic pregnance'. But however strongly the 'in one another' is stressed in comparison to the pure beside one another we can never understand this 'in one another' as complete congruence or coincidence. [-] The shameful blush is not a simple aggregate of red colour and shame; but neither 'is' the red colour the shame or the shame the red colour. In this case as well, our analysis leads

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us neither to naked identity nor to simple difference; it leads us in stead to a unity of differences and parts. (Cassirer 1938 p. 166 f.)

Again and again, in parading example after example, Cassirer endevours to illustrate his central idea of a unity that is neither pure identity, nor pure unity, but which nevertheless is not con­ tradictory. In the focal point of the discussion there is the difficult con­ cept of correlativity. Marc-Wogau rejected it but Cassirer is con­ vinced of its logical legitimacy. Cassirer in this context points out the importance of "implicit definitions" as used in Hilbert's ge­ ometry and in Schlick's theory of science. Here a concept is de­ fined within a mathematical system through a series of proposi­ tions. The concept is given its meaning only through the position it has within this system. But this does not mean that the differ­ ent concepts within the system can not be separated from each other: Marc-Wogau's idea that two members of a relationship who determine and presuppose each other have to coincide is here at once refuted. (Cassirer 1938 p. 171)

In this way Cassirer reaffirmed his view that Marc-Wogau's ob­ jections were founded on an obsolete conceptions of science and logic. In the conclusion of his paper he even predicted that MarcWogau in the future if he became more versed in the problematic would "have to revise his logical presuppositions and especially would have to give his theory of the concept a broader founda­ tion." (Cassirer 1938 p. 175) Cassirer's prediction came true in the sense that Marc-Wogau after the war abandoned Phalénian "dialectics" and was converted to a view of logic more in line with that of Frege, Russell or Hil­ bert. In the meantime the debate between Cassirer and the Uppsala philosophers went on. Marc-Wogau never answered Cassirer's "Zur Logik des Symbolbegriffs". But as we shall see in our next 132

chapter he took a lively part in a discussion on Cassirer's episte­ mology, which the Uppsala philosophers classified as "subjectiv­ ism". This debate in a way was directly related to that on the concept of symbol. The difficulties to a certain extent were the same. Cassirer's epistemology of "critical idealism" denied the existence of a "Ding an sich" in Kant's sense. At the same time Cassirer had a need to speak not only of the "forms" of knowl­ edge but also of its "matter". But this "matter" had to be some­ thing within, not something outside of, human experience. The duality between matter and form had to be upheld but upheld within a philosophy of immanence. In what sense, then, could an idealist (however critical) speak of "matter" without getting into contradictions? That's what the Uppsala philosophers asked. In this way Marc-Wogau's original questions were asked again by the Uppsala philosophers. But this time the point of departure was epistemology rather than the logic of concepts. The initiative this time came from Cassirer himself. To these later debates we shall devote our next chapter.

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The home of Ernst and Toni Cassirer in Göteborg (Photo: Jonas Hansson)

Axel Hägerström and Uppsala Philosophy

The dominating philosophical influence in Sweden at the time of Cassirer's arrival there was that of Axel Hägerström (1868-1939). Hägerström was the most well-known and the most controver­ sial among Swedish philosophers. His followers were intensely loyal, his enemies were outraged by his "nihilistic" teachings. The fact that Hägerström was professor of "practical" (that is moral and legal) philosophy in Uppsala made him part of the Swedish establishment. But his teachings seemed subversive and looked so to the young. To his disciples he was a prophet, destined to revolutionize not only philosophy but science, law and politics as well. Hägerström never said they were wrong in this estima­ tion. Early on in his Swedish career Cassirer encountered the influ­ ence of Hägerström. At first there had been an idea that Cassirer should take over Hägerström's chair in Uppsala. Hägerström re­ tired in 1933 so there was a convenient vacancy. Malte Jacobsson, who acted in the background, always hoped that Cassirer would function as a counterweight to Hägerström. It was proposed to invite Cassirer to Uppsala to teach philosophy during the aca­ demic year 1933-34. There is among the papers of H.S. Nyberg, then dean of the philosophical faculty, a statement by Hägerström on this proposal (1.9.1933). Hägerström is not against the invita­ tion to Cassirer, he says. But he is apprehensive that such an invi­ tation should not damage the chances of some younger Swedish philosopher to succeed to the chair in Uppsala. Would it not be better if Cassirer was invited to Stockholm where philosophers were scarce? A few days later (9/4/1933) Hägerström sent a state­ ment to the faculty (Humanistiska sektionen), which on that day was to decide whether to invite Cassirer or not. Hägerström again 135

said that he didn't reject the idea, but that there were many objec­ tions. It now became obvious that Hägerström feared Cassirer's possible influence on philosophical studies in Uppsala. The younger philosophers in Uppsala, he wrote, had to a large extent been critical of the philosophical tendency represented by Cassirer and also to the method used by him as a historian of philosophy. Hägerström was afraid that Cassirer's great authority would in­ timidate the younger philosophers and that they would come in the shadow of a famous figure like Cassirer. So Hägerström was not absolutely opposed to Cassirer's be­ ing invited to Uppsala (although he would have preferred an in­ vitation to Stockholm). But he didn't want to see Cassirer as his successor to the chair for practical philosophy. There were many young dons of philosophy in Uppsala eager for promotion, so Hägerström's apprehensions were widely shared. The idea that Cassirer should become professor in Uppsala was dropped. Toni Cassirer in her Life with Ernst Cassirer stresses that this made their six weeks in Uppsala easier for the Cassirers. It would have been very difficult for Ernst Cassirer to have come as an intruder: "to this came that Axel Hägerström, the recently retired philosopher, represented a philosophy that was spiritually opposed to that of Ernst, and that the whole of Sweden and especially Uppsala stood under his influence." (T. Cassirer p. 225) When Cassirer was instead offered a visiting professorship in theoretical philosophy in Göteborg Hägerström eagerly endorsed the invitation. As one of the three philosophers (together with Hans Larsson and Efraim Liljeqvist) who were asked by the Board of the University of Göteborg to testify as to Cassirer's suitability he wrote (7.5.1935) that he considered Cassirer to be eminently competent: As his outstanding achievements both as a thinker and as a historian of philosophy are well known and acknowledged any further arguments are unnecessary.

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During his years in Sweden Cassirer probably didn't meet Häger­ ström very often. Hägerström was rather a recluse and seldom left Uppsala. They met when Cassirer first came to Uppsala. Karitz gave a lunch at the Stadshotellet where Hägerström was also present (13 Sept. 1934). When Cassirer visited Uppsala in Octo­ ber 1937 for a lecture on "Rousseau und Kant" Hägerström was in the audience (letter to Petzäll 10/27/1937). But otherwise no meetings are recorded. There is only one letter extant exchanged between them. There Hägerström thanks Cassirer for sending him his book Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik and promises to read it when his work on Roman law gives him time (3/2/1937). We may safely conclude from this that there was little personal contact between the two philosophers. There were some reasons, however, why Cassirer should take an interest in the philosophy of Hägerström. Cassirer was now a professor of philosophy in Sweden and soon to become a Swed­ ish citizen. In his adopted country the philosophical landscape was dominated by the figure of Hägerström. Cassirer's students and fellow dons were sure to discuss Hägerström's views con­ stantly. Cassirer himself has commented upon the thorough study he made in 1938 and early 1939 of the writings of Hägerström and Phalén: I admit that my knowledge of these writings until shortly was very incom­ plete. But the necessity of aquiring a more profound knowledge was clear for me from my first days in Sweden. Both in reading, in personal conversation and in philosophical discussions I always encountered the main questions that Hägerström and Phalén had raised and I became convinced of the strong impact they had had on philosophical thinking in nearly all spheres, among adherents as well as among adversaries. (Cassirer 1939b p. Ill)

There was also the wish of Cassirer's benefactor, Malte Jacobsson. To repeat, Swedish philosophy at the time was divided between "the school of Lund" (headed by Hans Larsson) and "the school of Uppsala" (headed by Hägerström). Jacobsson began his philo­ sophical studies in Lund where Larsson became his most admired

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teacher It was Larsson who later supervised his thesis. During Jacobsson's years as professor of philosophy in Göteborg his dis­ cipline aquired a distinctly Lundensian flavour. Jacobsson's "do­ cent", Åke Petzäll, was certainly no great friend of the Uppsala philosophy. Gunnar Aspelin, who succeded Jacobsson at the phi­ losophy chair in Göteborg in 1936, came from Lund. So Cassirer was in a way through the very fact that he was Jacobsson's protégé enrolled in the Lundensian camp. Lundensian philosophy had a humanistic orientation and took a strong interest in the history of philosophy, so it was certainly less "spiritually opposed" to Cassirer's views than the Uppsala philosophy was. Toni Cassirer has told us how it occurred that the book on Hägerström was written. "One day we came to talk of modern Swedish philosophy", she writes. She had known for long that Malte Jacobsson nour­ ished the hope that Ernst Cassirer would work against the Uppsala philosophy. Cassirer had done so already, but only to the extent that he in an unpolemical way developed his own views. But something else was required: I told him that it perhaps would be better if he interrupted his own work for a short time to engage in a debate with Hägerström and his many fol­ lowers. He was not very willing to do this but he promised to tell Malte [...] about my proposal and to follow his judgement.

Shortly afterwards they met Jacobsson and Toni's idea came up. Jacobsson answered smiling a bit shyly that I was absolutely right. Ernst was immediately con­ vinced and shortly after that he plunged himself head on into Swedish philosophy. (T. Cassirer p. 258)

Hägerström and the other Uppsala philosophers wrote their most important works in German. Cassirer also by now had a good reading knowledge of Swedish and was able to study Hägerström's more popular writings in that language. But even if Cas­ sirer didn't encounter linguistic difficulties his work was not an 138

easy one. The most important writing to come out of Cassirer's studies was the book Axel Hägerström. Eine Studie zur schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart ("Axel Hägerström. A Study in Swedish Contemporary Philosophy" 1939, published in Göteborgs Hög­ skolas Årsskrift, that is Yearbook of the University of Göteborg). Here the author confesses that his labours had been very hard indeed. The work that Hägerström considered his most impor­ tant, Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft ("The Principle of Science"), Cassirer says "belongs to his most difficult writings, yes in my view it is one of the most obscure and unapproachable works of modern philosophical literature." (Cassirer 1939a p. 6) Cassirer was not alone in this appreciation. Another non-Swedish philosopher who took an interest in Hägerström, C.D. Broad, characterized Hägerström's prose style as "glue thickened with sawdust" (Broad p. Vllf.) Not even Hägerström's own disciples always found his philosophy easy to understand. Konrad MarcWogau said that Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft was "one of the most difficult" books of philosophical literature. (Marc-Wogau 1968 p.8). Ingemar Hedenius confessed that though he had followed Häger­ ström's lectures and private tutoring for many years he found Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft and Selbstdarstellung more difficult to understand than any other works of modern philosophy. (Hede­ nius 1941 p. 38) So before we explore Cassirer's interpretation of Hägerström's philosophy we had better say something about that philosophy itself. Although it is indeed very difficult it can be more easily understood when we understand Hägerström's philosophical background and philosophical development. What kind of prob­ lems did he try to solve? What kind of terminology did he use? Hägerström himself has told us something about his intellectual development in a philosophical autobiography published in 1929 as part of a German series - Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbst­ darstellungen. As a graduate, he informs us, he decided to devote his life to philosophy:

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In 1887 a book by the Uppsala philosopher Burman, Die Erkenntnislehre Kants, lead me to Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft which opened a new world to me. (Hägerström 1929 p. Ill)

What especially caught his attention in Kant's work was the idea that the unity of consciousness is the ultimate guarantee of the objectivity of knowledge. What Hägerström says here requires some comment. Erik Olof Burman was professor of theoretical philosophy in Uppsala. He was an idealist in the tradition of an earlier Uppsala philosopher, Christopher Jacob Boström. But he tried to combine the oldfashioned metaphysics of Boström with more modern neo­ Kantian ideas. The elusive problem of the objectivity of know­ ledge engaged him as it was later to engage Hägerström. A solution of this problem was attempted in Hägerström's Om filosofiens betydelse för människan ("On the Importance of Phi­ losophy to Man" 1898). What transforms a certain perception into knowledge, Hägerström asked. His answer was that a percep­ tion becomes knowledge when it has "a determined character and a certain necessity". (Hägerström 1898) This determination and necessity cannot have its origin in some objective Ding an sich (as realists thought) nor in the individual consciousness (as subjec­ tivists contended). It has its ground in a universal human con­ sciousness. This consciousness was identified by Hägerström with logical thinking. In other words, logical thinking is the principle of science, it is that which makes objective science possible. Ten years later when he wrote Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft Hägerström kept some of these ideas though he discarded oth­ ers. But before that he had made a more thorough study of the philosophy of Kant. Its result was an impressive book of more that eight hundred pages on Kants Ethik im Verhältnis zu seinem erkenntnistheoretischen Grundgedanken ("The Ethics of Kant in Re­ lation to its Epistemological Foundations") published in 1902. Here Hägerström tried to demonstrate the futility of current psychologistic and subjectivistic interpretations of Kant. Häger-

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ström's own interpretation had many similarities with the views of the Marburg neo-Kantianism, especially those of Hermann Cohen. What makes knowledge objective to Kant, according to this interpretation, is not some inner feeling of evidence but the necessary and valid content of the representation. Hägerström's previous works could be seen as steps to what he came to regard as his crowning achievement, Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft I Die Realität (1908, there never was a second part). In Selbstdarstellung Hägerström said of this book that it was his most important work and that he never saw any reason for "aban­ doning the main theses I proposed there". (Hägerström 1929 p. 115) At the same time he admitted that his book could easily be misunderstood because he had used the language and vocabu­ lary of transcendental idealism, which at the same time he tried to undermine. That inconsistency is indeed one of the reasons why Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft is such a difficult book. The fundamental problem of Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft is still the question how the objectivity of knowledge should be un­ derstood. Hägerström rejects epistemological idealism as well as epistemological realism. It is wrong to think, as idealism does, that we could find the criteria of truth or objectivity in conscious­ ness itself through some sense of "evidence" or "clarity". But it is also wrong to think, as realism does, that we could find these criteria in "the thing itself", in some objective reality indepen­ dent of consciousness. What, then, is the critérium veri that makes our knowledge objective? Hägerström answers by saying that the principle of science is determinateness /"Bestimmtheit"/, self-identity, logi­ cal necessity or freedom from contradiction. There is an absolute reality and that reality constitutes a system of logical necessity. There could be only one consistent reality and Hägerström as­ sumes that this must be the reality of time and space. Only a real­ ity in time and space could be "determinate" /"bestimmt"/ and wholly free from contradiction. Indeed freedom from contradic­ tion (consistency) is to Hägerström the ultimate criterion of truth. 141

Obviously Hägerström here took a step beyond Kant. Kant admits that the reality of time and space is the only determinate and the only possible object of empirical science. But he also as­ sumes that there is another, deeper, reality of noumena. The "archi­ tectonic" of reason in Kant has two objects, nature and freedom, two spheres, as it were, two kingdoms, one of what is, one of what ought to be. Hägerström will have none of this. There can be only one reality, he argues, the reality of time and space, the reality of mathematical science. And - as Kant himself would have readily conceded - within the reality of mathematical science there is no room for good or evil or for that which is not but ought to be. There is only one reality and you can think of no other. The very idea of a kingdom of what ought to be is inconsistent, non­ sensical. Hägerström didn't work out the implications for moral phi­ losophy of his epistemology in Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft. But he did so a few years later. Two texts have special importance as statements of Hägerström's mature moral philosophy. They were both used by Cassirer. One is Hägerström's inaugural lecture, Om moraliska föreställningars sanning ("On the truth of moral ideas" in Swedish), in 1911. The other is his Selbstdarstellung were the connections between epistemology, ontology and moral philoso­ phy are worked out. In his lecture Om moraliska föreställningars sanning Hägerström for the first time stated his revolutionary new views on moral ideas. He began by relating an anecdote from Herodotos. The Persian king Darius once asked some Greeks who lived at his court at what price they would be willing to eat the dead bodies of their ancestors. "For no price in the world", they answered. Darius then asked members of an Indian tribe that were present and where the eating of dead ancestors was customary at what price they would be willing to burn the bodies of their ancestors. They answered by denying that they could ever do such a horrible thing. The anecdote relates an argument of a type that was common among the Greek sophists. But Hägerström points out that the

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same kind of ethical disagreement is common in modern times. Utilitarianism, Christian ethics, Nietzschean superman morality are as incompatible as the moral habits described by Herodotos. So we are forced to ask the question which of these differing moral ideas are the right ones. How could we measure right and wrong? What measure is there? Hägerström can think of two kinds of measure. You could say that what is right is what favours development. Or you could appeal to some non-sensual reality of moral values. Both these possibilities Hägerström rejects. Development is valuable only when it is development toward some good end. But this begs the question. Non-sensual reality there cannot be. Kant supposed that there could be two spheres of reality, one sensual, one supersensual beyond time and space. But according to Hägerström's epistemo­ logical and ontological principles this is impossible. There can be only one reality, the reality of time and space. Is there then no objective difference between right and wrong? Hägerström answers the question by contending that "true" and "false" are inapplicable to moral ideas. We cannot ask whether gold is just or unjust. It would be as nonsensical to ask whether moral ideas are true or untrue, they are just an expression of emo­ tion or a reflection of the will. Listening to moral discourse could be compared to listening to military music. Certain emotions are evoked, perhaps a certain preparedness for action is induced. But there is nothing involved that could be true or false about reality. Hägerström didn't believe that moral anarchy would result from the insight that values lack objectivity. The social pressure on people to do the socially accepted things would be much the same even if the non-objectivity of values was generally realized. But moral fanaticism would recede, tolerance would be stronger. We will come to judge others more leniently when we have learned to regard things sub specie aeternitatis and as part of an "endless natural web where nothing in itself is higher or lower". (Hägerström 1911, p. 36.) The conclusions for moral philosophy are also important. Moral philosophy like any other science has to stand "beyond 143

good and evil". There could never be a science of morals, only a science about morals, that is, a science about people's moral ideas or their moral behaviour. In Selbstdarstellung Hägerström's views have not changed fun­ damentally. Value judgements are said to be metaphysical, even nonsensical from a theoretical point of view. When we judge that something is good or bad, right or wrong, we confuse our own emotions or acts of will with objective reality. In fact Hägerström's position in moral philosophy is not very clearly stated. You sometimes get the impression that he wants to say that all moral judgements are false, that they ascribe to the world properties (like being good or bad) which cannot belong to it. But at other times he seems to be saying that moral judge­ ments are neither true nor false, indeed not judgements at all but exclamations or imperatives clad in a misleading grammatical form. Among Hägerström's followers some (e.g. Einar Tegen) developed the theory that moral propositions are false while oth­ ers (e.g. Ingemar Hedenius) elaborated the theory that they are neither true nor false. In Selbstdarstellung and in many other writings Hägerström extended his view of moral philosophy to the field of philosophy of law. The idea that there can be no practical knowledge or prac­ tical reason is seen to have very revolutionary consequences also in this field. All talk of legal "rights" or legal "obligations", or of "justice" or "injustice", is said to be meaningless. There can be no natural right or natural law. The one thing that exists is the "machin­ ery of justice", that is the policemen, the law courts and so on. Every­ thing else is metaphysics or, as Hägerström is fond of saying, "super­ stition". Hägerström devoted one book, Der römische Obligationsbegriff im Lichte der allgemeinen römische Rechtsanschauung ("The Roman Concept of Obligation in the Light of Roman Legal Ideas in Gen­ eral" 1927, 1941), to showing that the fundamental concepts of Roman law had their origins in religious and animist ideas. It should be added that Hägerström's radically destructive analyses of conventional ideas were extended to the sciences.

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Hägerström rejected Einstein's theory of relativity as well as mod­ ern quantum mechanics as metaphysical. But also classical phys­ ics was said to use concepts like "thing" or "movement" which had no meaning at all. The same goes for the so called "Geistes­ wissenschaften" : In fact everything called 'Geisteswissenschaften'- whether dealing with the ego, society, the state, morality or religion - is only an intellectual game with expressions of feeling, as if they signified something real. (Hägerström 1929 p. 158)

Selbstdarstellung had a motto travestied from Cato the elder: "Praeterea censeo metaphysicam esse delendam". This could have been the motto for all of Hägerström's works. The term "metaphys­ ics", however, is notoriously ambiguous. Hägerström used it in a very wide sense. Traditional philosophy, moral and juridical dis­ course, everyday talk, the natural, social and humanistic sciences, everything was held to be "metaphysical". David Hume once fa­ mously wrote about books of divinity or school metaphysics which contained neither empirical facts nor mathematical rea­ soning: "Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." Hägerström, as Cassirer was aware, had he arranged such a bonfire, would have committed to the flames practically every book outside the field of belles lettres ex­ cept those written by himself or his few devoted followers. Uppsala philosophy was a sect whose members admitted no sal­ vation outside the chapel. Ernst Cassirer had himself been a member of a fairly tightly knitted brotherhood, the old Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. So he knew what he was up to in confronting the Uppsala phi­ losophers. When in October 1938 Marc-Wogau invited him to the Philosophical Society of the University of Stockholm to talk about the epistemology of Hägerström and Phalén, Cassirer wrote to tell Åke Petzäll about the expected occasion. He lamented: and all this among a throng of Uppsala philosophers, and perhaps in the presence of Hägerström himself, whom Marc-Wogau plans to invite. If I

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escape alive from this affair - that is by no means certain - I am asking myself if one couldn't publish the lecture and perhaps also the following discussion in Theoria. (10/21/1938)

But that time the lecture was postponed. Cassirer begins Axel Hägerström: Eine Studie zur schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart by relating the experience of a German philosopher coming to Sweden. He compares his own impres­ sions with those of Voltaire arriving in England. The French phi­ losopher discovered an entirely new intellectual landscape. He leaves the world filled up, he finds it empty. In Paris people think of the world as filled by vortexes of fine matter; in London one sees nothing of the sort. (Cassirer 1939a p. 3)

In the same manner the German philosopher arriving in Sweden discovers a new world: The philosophical researcher who finds himself transplanted to a new field of activity and a changed intellectual environment feels a new task before him that he is able to master only slowly and step by step. He will learn many new things; but he will also have to deliberately 'relearn' some things that he formely believed to be his secure property. Much that he held to be ascertained he begins to question once again, and even where he sticks to former results he feels a need for new orientations and new foundations. (Cassirer 1939a p. 4)

So Cassirer is not content to confront Hägerström's philosophy with his own and to criticize it from the point of view of the lat­ ter. He is also prepared for a reexamination of his own philoso­ phy and for a reappraisal of old positions. He takes on a "double" task of examination and self-examination: I have not been content to say again what I have said before. Instead I have used the impulses that the study of Hägerström's main works have given me to get a firmer grasp of the foundations of my own philosophy, espe­ cially as developed in my 'Philosophy of the Symbolic Forms' (3 volumes, 1923-29), and to use it in new fields of inquiry. My whole view of the prob­ lems of ethics and philosophy of law is much more fully developed here

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than in my previous writings which mainly dealt with theoretical philoso­ phy." (Cassirer 1939a p.7).

It may be doubted whether the writings of an internationally rather unknown Swedish philosopher were the best starting point for such a reappraisal of Cassirer's own philosophy. Cassirer ad­ mitted that he knew very little of Swedish philosophy before he came to Sweden and that he never had encountered a discussion of Hägerström's views in international epistemological literature. He also pointed out that his own thinking had moved along other paths than those of Hägerström and on important problems lead had to opposite results. It is of course true that Cassirer would never have taken on a study of the philosophy of Hägerström had his destiny not swept him away to the shores of Sweden. But that philosophy was per­ haps not as alien as it would first seem. The paths of Hägerström and Cassirer led to different goals. But the point of departure was the same for both, i.e. the philosophy of Kant. In fact Cassirer was well equipped to understand some of the more esoteric writ­ ings of Hägerström. He had like Hägerström been working for years with the philosophy of Kant, he was entirely familiar with the problems and terminology current in the environment of neo­ Kantianism, to which Hägerström in his youth had belonged. There were many similarities between Hägerström's interpreta­ tion of Kant, especially in Kants Ethik, and that of the Marburg school. As we shall see some of Hägerström's epistemological standpoints were quite acceptable to Cassirer. Cassirer's first chapter, "The struggle against metaphysics", gives an exposition of Hägerström's epistemological and onto­ logical views. Cassirer points out that Hägerström's struggle against metaphysics is very different from that of the Wiener Kreis. When the logical positivists talked of "metaphysics" they meant empirically unverifiable theories. But Hägerström was no empiri­ cist. His epistemological position is utterly rationalistic. To him the criterion of truth and meaningfulness is a purely logical one.

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Especially in his early writings, e.g. Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft, Hägerström's terminology is not unlike Hegel's, for instance in using terms like "absolute knowledge", "the absolute and in it­ self valid concept" and so on. To some extent this usage was mis­ leading, as Hägerström admitted in Selbstdarstellung. Hägerström rejected the idealism of Fichte and Hegel. But he accepted a kind of rationalism not entirely unlike theirs. He also took exception to epistemological realism and denied the existence of a "Ding an sich". To some extent Cassirer agreed with Hägerström's epistemo­ logical position. The neo-Kantians of the Marburg school too had tried to avoid epistemological realism on the one hand and "psychologism" or "subjectivism" on the other. Between his own epistemology and that of Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft there is, Cassirer concludes, "no fundamental, no really principal diver­ gence" (Cassirer 1939a p. 39) The most important difference lies in the field of logic. Hägerström thought that the principle of non­ contradiction in itself was enough as a criterion veri. He believed that he had found a concept that was valid in itself. "Both, con­ cept and reality, are determined through the same condition, the condition of inner consistency or 'self identity'". Cassirer finds this line of reasoning defective. The concept in itself according to him is of secondary importance. The theory of judgement should have priority: in every case where we really try to understand these concepts in a precise way, we have to scrutinize the whole complexes of judgements on which they are based and which they want to express. What we might call 'the objective reality'of a concept also depends on these complexes of judge­ ments. (Cassirer 1939a p. 48)

Cassirer here criticizes Hägerström from the point of view of the logic of Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Hägerström reifies the concept, he makes it into an independent being, Cassirer contends. But what we need is to connect individual things according to rules", not to have some real concept existing in­ 148

dependently along with the individual things. (Cassirer 1939a p. 50) When viewed in the light of Cassirer's functional logic Häger­ ström's favoured "principle of non-contradiction" is seen to be insufficient for the task allotted to it. At least in its first phase, Cassirer writes, Hägerström's analysis of the concept of reality is surprisingly simple: Then it turns out that the mere principle of identity and non-contradiction is enough to carry the entire building of not only purely logical knowledge but of knowledge of reality as well. (Cassirer 1939a p. 53)

However, the emphasis is later on slightly changed. In Häger­ ström's later writings the expression "self identity" is supplanted by that of "determination". The principle of identity is a neces­ sary but not a sufficient condition for "determination": From this it becomes clear that as soon as we turn to the determination of the content of experience, or empirical reality, the 'absolute'concept in itself is not sufficient. We have to go back to a complicated system of relative concepts, of concepts of order and relation. (Cassirer 1939a p. 54)

Cassirer concludes that when this once is seen we cannot use the ontological concept of an absolutely necessary being any more: "instead there is a universal rule that holds all knowledge of real­ ity together, that is a pure concept of function." (Cassirer 1939a p. 55). It cannot be said, perhaps, that Cassirer's examination of Hägerström's epistemology produces any great modification of his own. The problem of knowledge was Cassirer's chosen field about which he had written extensively. Here nobody would ex­ pect to find much more than a criticism of Hägerström's epistemo­ logy from the point of view of Cassirer's. The main contention of that critique is that Hägerström's logical tools are insufficient to grasp empirical reality in all its complexity. The principle of non-

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contradiction may constitute a necessary precondition for all knowledge, but it is not sufficient to define what reality or objec­ tive knowledge is. But there are other formulas in Hägerström's repertoire which Cassirer is more prepared to accept. When Hägerström in Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft says that: Only that is an objective basis for the statement of a fact that without excep­ tion it takes lawbound coherence as its critérium veri. (Hägerström 1908 p. 64 f.)

Cassirer can only agree (Cassirer 1939a p. 55). What Cassirer has to say on Hägerström's moral philosophy is even more interesting than his comments on the Swedish philosopher's epistemology. Hägerström's philosophy of value was the best known and most controversial part of his doctrine. Cassirer disagreed thoroughly with this part of Hägerström's thinking. At the same time he had to develop his own views on ethics and legal philosophy. The challenge from Hägerström made Cassirer think more deeply on these subjects. Cassirer had studied the theoretical philosophy of Hägerström with critical sympathy. But he admits to a certain feeling of alien­ ation in confronting his moral philosophy. It seems to Cassirer that Hägerström here suddenly changes his entire intellectual stance. As a theoretical philosopher Hägerström is a stern ratio­ nalist and objectivist: But all that is changed with one stroke as soon as we are move from the field of theoretical judgements to that of the so called practical judgements. (Cassirer 1939a p. 56)

Here Hägerström denies that there could be any objectivity or rational reasoning at all. Cassirer takes Hägerström to be a confirmed ethical relativist. He can find no real difference between the moral theory of Hägerström and that of the sophists of antiquity. Both seem to him to proclaim the equivalence of all moral views. But he ad­ mits that what he takes to be Hägerström's moral relativism has

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a very different philosophical foundation from that of the soph­ ists. Hägerström's theory of ethics is, as Cassirer sees it, based on his ontological and epistemological ideas. According to Häger­ ström the only existing, indeed the only possible reality, is that of time and space, the reality of mathematical science. In this reality there is no room for moral values. Cassirer does not deny that there is a certain consistency in Hägerström's reasoning. But he tries to show that you could adopt a rationalistic and objectivistic epistemology and then come to quite different conclusions within moral philosophy. The path that Kant and Cohen had taken is remains open. Is it not possible that there should be criteria of validity in the field of morals as well as in the field of theoretical science? Is not e.g. the criterion of consistency as important in ethics as it is in science? Could it not even be true that differing ethical opinions conceal a deeper consensus? The different funeral customs spo­ ken of by Herodotos may for instance mirror different ideas about life after death yet be founded on the same moral sentiment, pi­ ety for the ancestors. Cassirer takes on the difficult task of showing that there can be objectivity within the field of ethics and that Hägerström's objections can be met. His solution differs a great deal from that put forth by his old teacher Hermann Cohen in Ethik des reinen Willens (1904). Cohen's ethical theory had a Hegelian slant. Cas­ sirer is nearer to classical Kantianism although there are impor­ tant modifications. When we ask whether an "objective" morality is possible we are not asking whether moral judgements correspond to inde­ pendently existing qualities of value similar to physical qualities, Cassirer says. He agrees with Hägerström that no such substra­ tum could exist. Ethics does not deal with a Kantian "kingdom of ends" ("Reich der Zwecke"). Cassirer follows Hägerström in re­ jecting Kant's idea of a metaphysical difference between a mundus sensibilis and a mundus intelligibilis. But he points out that the methodological problem is not thereby solved. 151

The important question according to Cassirer is whether there could be a systematic order between the different expressions of moral consciousness. Can we talk of a possible "synthesis" within the practical field as we can within the field of theoretical know­ ledge? Hägerström found the principle of theoretical knowledge in "self identity". But it is possible to talk of something similar to self identity within the sphere of practical knowledge as well: The measure even here has to be unity and universality, but this universal­ ity is not related to representation but to will. It applies not to the logical unity of theoretical propostions but to the unity of ends. Every moral sys­ tem includes such ends and every system regards these ends as somehow objective and valid. (Cassirer 1939a p. 78)

We cannot allow contradiction among our moral ideas any more than we can allow it among our theoretical ideas. We look for system, order and hierarchy in the practical sphere as well as in the theoretical sphere. Even Hägerström in his own way admits this when he praises the philosopher's ability to regard the world sub specie aeternitatis. In this way Cassirer endeavours to vindicate the insights of Kant not only within theoretical philosophy but within practical philosophy as well. We can give a foundation to Kant's ideas of obligation and moral autonomy without speaking of two differ­ ent "worlds" or spheres of reality: Here too the functional meaning of the key concepts of ethics remains though leaving off their metaphysical-substantialistic interpretation and clothes. (Cassirer 1939a p. 83)

The basic move in Cassirer's attempt to refute Hägerström's phi­ losophy of values is a fairly simple one. Hägerström says in effect: "There can be no mundus intelligibilis, only a mundus sensibilis. But the mundus sensibilis, i.e. the world of mathematical science, can contain no values, as Kant would be the first to admit. So judge­ ments of value must be judgements about something that does not exist and cannot exist." Cassirer's answer is to say: True, there 152

is no mundus intelligibilis in the metaphysical sense. But there is the human will and its different ends. And there is the method­ ological question whether these ends contradict each other or can be seen to form a universal and consistent system. So there are criteria of objectivity in this sphere, i.e. consistency and universality, which are very similar to the criteria within the theoretical sphere. What Cassirer says here is sketchy. But it certainly does sketch the main lines of argument for the foundations of a moral philosophy. Cassirer goes on to consider Hägerström's philosophy of law under the chapter heading "Law and Myth" ("Recht und Mythos"). One work by Hägerström was of special interest to Cassirer, his Der römische Obligationsbegriff I (published in 1927, the second part being published posthumously in 1941). Cassirer had devoted the second volume of his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen to discussing mythical consciousness. But he had not then known Hägerström's book or even suspected that there was a book on the history of law which made this very problem its main topic. Now he had an opportunity to make up for this omission and to compare his own views on mythical consciousness with those of the Swedish philosopher. Cassirer did not disagree with Hägerström on the fundamen­ tal importance of mythical thinking. Myth is the deepest layer of all culture: "Language, art, religion, even theoretical knowledge have to slowly emerge from this layer before they can aquire in­ dependent form." (Cassirer 1939a p. 85) Hägerström has shown that the same thing is true of law. But Hägerström's conclusions were very different from Cassirer's. Hägerström was convinced that legal consciousness had its origin in superstition. His book was intended to show that Roman law was deeply embedded in animist and mythical ideas. Not least the handshake that sealed an agreement and the notion of obligation had their origin in magic. According to Hägerström this meant that modern legal thinking also was superstitious though less overtly so. Cassirer's answer is to concede that what Hägerström says about Roman law to a large extent is well founded but that his

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conclusions about modem legal consciousness do not follow. Modem thinking in various fields may have its origin in myth without being itself mythical. The history of thinking as seen by Cassirer is to a large extent the history of its emancipation from myth. This is true of the history of philosophy. Early Greek phi­ losophy was rooted in mythical consciousness. But its great achievment was to free itself step by step from myth. In the same way Roman law had much of its background in mythical ideas. But its form was logical: "This form then stands under the rule of a new principle, the principle of identity and non-contradiction." (Cassirer 1939a p. 93) Modern legal thinking has developed this rational element of law and freed itself from its mythical origins. So Hägerström's conclusions do not follow. There is no way to prove from the origins of things what their present character is. In the last chapter of his study of Hägerström's philosophy Cassirer takes on a problem to which he will later devote a whole book - the problem of the logic of the cultural sciences (the "Logik der Geisteswissenschaften"). Cassirer takes exception to Häger­ ström's view that mathematical natural science is the only valid kind of science. Would Hägerström really, like a more draconic Hume, burn all books about history or literature or art? Would he not in that case be burning his own books on the history of law as well, Cassirer asks rhetorically. On the other hand, if the human sciences in fact exist we may ask the Kantian question how this fact is possible. Dilthey sought to found these sciences on the concept of "Erlebnis" ("lived experience"). But that, according to Cassirer, would be sufficient only for a psychology of the cultural sciences. What we need is a logic of these sciences. Such a logic we can find only if we make form, not experience, our starting point. We can then also understand how the cultural sciences differ from the natural sciences: "we here are concernedwith forms, not things." (Cassirer 1939a p.114) We can analyse the different forms of the arts (aesthetics) or of language (linguistics) or of other areas of culture. In this way the traditional task of epistemology is ex­ panded. There is a possibility of reconciling the different quarrel154

ing schools of epistemology. They all make the mistake of trying to cast every kind of knowledge in the same mould: "In this way there have risen within epistemology a logicism, a psychologicism, a biologicism, a physicalism, a historicism, that fight for suprem­ acy." (Cassirer 1939a p. 119) But a "critical" philosophy should look for something else, for the "totality of possible forms of know­ ledge" whose relations to each other can be understood when we acknowledge the specificity of each. We can then also acknow­ ledge the value and prime importance of the natural sciences with­ out reducing the human sciences to "an intellectual game with expressions of feeling". (Cassirer 1939a p. 119) One way of describing the difference between Hägerström and Cassirer would be to say that they move in different direc­ tions from their common starting point in Kant's philosophy. Cas­ sirer retains Kant's "architectonic" but makes it an architectonic not of ontological spheres of reality but of epistemological/logi­ cal forms and functions. Hägerström on the other hand rejects every form of knowledge except theoretical (scientific) knowledge and every kind of reality except physical reality of time and space. Cassirer with supreme hospitality can find a place in his philoso­ phy for science, humanities, ethics, art, religion and myth. Hägerström only keeps natural science and "feelings", where "feelings" tend to become the waste basket where everything that is not natural science is thrown (and some science too, as Häger­ ström regarded most modern, post-Newtonian physics as trash). So Cassirer's book on Hägerström is valuable both because of the direct light it throws on Hägerström's philosophy and because of the indirect light it throws on Cassirer's own thinking. The very contrast between these two extremely different philosophers is illuminating. Cassirer's Axel Hägerström was published in the beginning of 1939. Cassirer awaited the reaction of the Swedish philosophers with some apprehension. Some of his feelings he uttered in a let­ ter (3/7/1939) to Alf Nyman. Nyman had written to Cassirer prais­ ing Axel Hägerström and Cassirer thanked him for his words:

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This study was for me no easy work - I had to wrestle not only with the difficulties of the subject but also with inner resistance. The objection lay near at hand that as an outsider I was neither competent nor entitled to judge on questions that for so long time had divided Swedish philosophy.

Cassirer emphasized his resolution to avoid all personal asperity in spite of the firmness of his arguments. As Nyman however detested Hägerström on personal as well as philosophical grounds any amount of asperity would probably have been welcome to him. From Hägerström's Swedish adversaries Cassirer could only expect praise. The exciting question was - what would the phi­ losophers of the Uppsala school say? And especially - what would Hägerström himself say? Ake Petzäll tried to find out. He wrote to Hägerström, inviting him to answer Cassirer in Theoria. In a letter from Paris (5/12/1939), where Petzäll was then living, he sent Hägerström proofsheets for Cassirer's lecture "Was ist 'Subjektivismus'?" (about which more will be said later). He also mentioned Heinz Lunau's review of Cassirer's Axel Hägerström for Theoria, emphazising Lunau's view that the book could be the occasion of an interesting debate between Cassirer and Hägerström. Petzäll writes: I would of course be very grateful if you were willing to debate with Cassirer in Theoria. As you know I am very keen on making Theoria a forum for philosophical discussion.

Hägerström answered: Thank you for your letter. I am not at all unwilling to have a discussion in Theoria with Cassirer, less perhaps related to his book on me than to the proof sheets you have sent me. But at the moment it is totally impossible since I have to devote all my time to the printing of the second tome of my book: Der römische Obligationsbegriff (about 700 pages). If you give me time to the end of this year or the beginning of next I believe I will be able to give a contribution to the discussion. (Undated)

That was not to be, however. Hägerström died on the 7th of July 1939. It is obvious from his answer to Petzäll that he had read

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Cassirer's book and his article on subjectivism and that he had things he wanted to say. What these were we shall never know (unless there emerges some hitherto unknown letter or manu­ script of Hägerström's). Possibly some idea of what Hägerström might have said can be had from Heinz Lunau's review of Cassirer's book in Theoria (11/1939). Lunau was an ardent admirer of Vilhelm Lundstedt, Hägerström's closest disciple, and is writing from a fairly ortho­ dox Hägerströmian point of view. Lunau begins by hailing the fact that a non-Swedish philoso­ pher has found occasion to make Hägerström the object of a seri­ ous examination. That this philosopher should be as renowned a thinker as Cassirer makes it certain that Hägerström's work from now on will be better known outside Sweden. Apart from these preliminary remarks however Launau's review is almost wholly negative. Without much argument he rejects Cassirer's objections, reiterating the well-known formula of Hägerströmian orthodoxy: Kant was a "subjectivist", Dilthey was too much a "subjectivist" to have to be taken seriously etc.. Although Lunau can find no real argument for Hägerström to answer he ends his review with inviting a discussion between him and Cassirer. It does not surprise us that Cassirer didn't like this review very much. When Petzäll had first told Cassirer (letter 4ITJol1939) that he would give Axel Hägerström to Lunau for reviewing he had said that Lunau was "very judicious and objective" and not some Hägerströmian "true believer". Because of this he had pre­ ferred Lunau to Einar Tegen who was too much a disciple of Hägerström. Now Petzäll had been proved wrong. Lunau turned out to be much more a "true believer" than Tegen. In fact Tegen wrote two different reviews of Cassirer's book, one for the daily paper Dagens Nyheter (3/13/1939) and one for Lychnos (1939). Both were much less dogmatic than Lunau's re­ view for Theoria, although Tegen also of course wrote from the point of view of "Uppsala philosophy". The Lychnos review was, as Tegen wrote to Nordström (3/15/1939), "somewhat more 157

elaborate" than the Dagens Nyheter review and concentrated on questions of principle. Tegen's most ambitious and most interesting review is the one he wrote (in English) for Lychnos. In tone it is very respectful to Cassirer but in content very critical. But where Lunau was con­ tent with dogmatic assertion Tegen makes an effort to argue. If the arguments are not in the end convincing they are at least well worth being considered. Tegen's review, written after Hägerström's death, begins by remarking that it is an event of marked importance in Swedish philosophy that the foremost living representative of modern Kantianism, and one of the best known philosophers of our time [...] should have published a work on the recently deceased Grand Old Man of Upsala philosophy, Axel Haegerstroem.

Tegen then mentions the lecture Cassirer held before the Philo­ sophical Society of Stockholm and later published in Theoria, of which we will have more to say below. His discussion of Cassirer's interpretation of Hägerström's philosophy makes use of this lec­ ture as well as of Cassirer's book. Tegen's purpose is to show that Cassirer has interpreted both Hägerström's theoretical and his practical philosophy wrongly. This is how Tegen describes the anti-subjectivism of the "Upsala school": For the Upsala school 'reality7must have a meaning in itself. And it is just by experience that knowledge of this reality is to be gained. It is part of the concept of knowledge that it presupposes the existence of a 'world', an 'ob­ ject' that we attempt to approach in the process of knowledge, and that in the last resort is the norm for truth and falsehood.

When Cassirer, taking his clue from Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft, interprets Hägerström as being a non-realist in the post-Kantian rationalist tradition, he is making a mistake according to Tegen. He has not seen that Hägerström after Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft developed his idea of what should be considered as subjectivism

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further: "His final standpoint approaches that which has been indicated above as characteristic for Upsala philosophy", although it has to be admitted "that Haegerstroem's usage testifies that some uncertainty remains in his conception."(Tegen p. 446f.) So, according to Tegen, Cassirer assumes that there is much greater similarity between Hägerström's position within theoreti­ cal philosophy and his own than is actually the case. The reason is that Cassirer has failed to see that Hägerström has changed his earlier subjectivistic position from Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft into an altogether different one. Is Tegen right? I would say no. Tegen himself was a disciple of Phalén more than of Hägerström. He had the idea, typical of Phaléns admirers but violently repudiated by Hägerström's, that Hägerström after Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft under the influence of Phalén had left his former position and adopted Phalens view of what should be considered subjectivism. But this interpreta­ tion is difficult to reconcile with Hägerström's texts. It might be true that Hägerström's ideas had changed a bit between Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft and Selbstdarstellung and that Phalén's criticism had contributed to that result. But not even in Selbstdar­ stellung had Hägerström adopted Phalén's somewhat more "real­ istic" epistemology. In fact he explicitly rejected epistemological realism. Epistemological realism was as untenable as epistemo­ logical idealism, he said there. He repudiated the common idea that the reality of a thing is something different from what is given in the apprehension of the thing. There can be no "Ding an sich". (Hägerström 1929 p. 116 ff.) So it would seem that Cassirer's interpretation of Hägerström's theoretical philosophy can after all be defended against Tegen's objections. Hägerström's non-subjectivism was not the same as realism, it did not presuppose the existence of an independently existing "Ding an sich". When Hägerström in Selbstdarstellung said that he still held the positions of Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft he was not concealing the truth, although perhaps he wasn't tell­ ing the whole truth.

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But what about Hägerström's practical philosophy? Here too Tegen is unsatisfied with Cassirer's interpretation. Tegen's main objection here is that Cassirer's interpretation makes out Häger­ ström's theory of values to be as it were emotivistic and noncognitivistic, as if Hägerström meant that value judgements were pure expressions of feeling. Tegen demurs: Thought, ideas, as well as feeling, play a decisive part in Haegerstroem's theory of value, and also in the concept of duty. And on this 'theoretical' imaginative or apprehensive element is built the whole theory that is in­ tended to explain how values can appear as objective. This appearance of objectivity, like the whole sphere of the theoretic manipulation of values, is explained by the development of the element of ideas, and by the reflection linked to the judgements, apparent as they may be, that occur here. (Tegen p. 447)

So according to Tegen the heart of Hägerström's moral theory is his explanation of how values can appear to be objective when they are not. As mentioned earlier Tegen was to develop these ideas in his own moral philosophy. Value judgements were there seen as theoretical judgements, but false ones. Tegen is right in assuming that one can find such a theory in Hägerström's writ­ ings too. But in Hägertröm's writings the theory that value judge­ ments are false co-exist with the incompatible theory that they are neither true nor false. Hägerström in fact, as we have earlier seen, oscillates between these two theories. So Cassirer's version of Hägerström's moral theory is not a misinterpretation. But it is true that it makes certain features of this theory more prominent than others. The same could however be said of Tegen's version. Tegen goes on with some brief remarks on Cassirer's treat­ ment of Hägerström's theory of rights. He concludes by finding Cassirer's account of Hägerström's philosophy unsatisfactory "in important points". At the same time Tegen admires Cassirer's "thorough and uniform account of his own theory and the way in which he has in this work applied the theory to the practical sphere too, which has not been done before". Tegen also admires 160

the way in which Cassirer "has put Haegerstroem's theoretical philosophy into a historical context." The fact that Cassirer has taken up Hägerström's work for such detailed treatment is said to "give great pleasure to every friend of Swedish philosophy". (Tegen p. 448) One further article on Cassirer's book by a member of the Uppsala school should be mentioned. In Theoria (1939/3) Ingemar Hedenius published a long critical examination of Cassirer's in­ terpretation of Hägerström's theory of value, "Über den alogischen Charakter der sog. Werturteile. Bemerkungen zu Ernst Cassirer: Axel Hägerström. Eine Studie zur schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart" ("On the alogical character of so called judgements of value. Remarks on..."). It was Petzäll who had asked Hedenius to write this article as a sort of substitution for the debate with Hägerström that was made impossible by Hägerström's death. (Letter to Hedenius 7/29/1939) Hedenius promised to do this, though limiting his remarks to one point, but an important one, "namely the meaning of Hägerström's theory of the a-logical char­ acter of value judgements, which I believe Cassirer to have misun­ derstood." (Letter to Petzäll 8/12/1939) Hedenius begins his article by remarking that Hägerström's recent death is a suitable occasion for an attempt to make a sur­ vey of his achievements. Hedenius believes that one of the most important among these achievements is Hägerström's theory of the alogical character of so called judgements of value. This theory has been misunderstood by Cassirer in his book on Hägerström. Hedenius takes it as his task to show how. Hedenius first makes an exposition of what he takes to be Hägerström's theory of so called judgements of value. He says that he will express this theory in a different way "than Häger­ ström himself has done". He also says that several philosophers outside Sweden have come to the same results as Hägerström (e. g. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards in The Meaning of Meaning1936 and A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth, and Logic the same year) but that Hägerström has the priority. (Hedenius 1939 p. 315n) 161

What, then, is Häger ström's theory of value according to Hedenius? Hedenius states two presuppositions: (a) only judge­ ments ("Urteile") can be true or false and (b) there are expres­ sions which are sentences in the grammatical sense but which do not express judgements. According to Hedenius Hägerström's theory says that sentences of the type "A is good" or "A is bad" and "A ought to B" or "A ought not to B" belong to this latter type. What is usually in everyday life and in traditional philoso­ phy taken to be judgements of value are not judgements at all. Hedenius also says that according to this theory expressions like "A is good" lack sense or are meaningless. They are neither true nor false. It would consequently be a contradiction to assume the truth of Hägertröm's theory and at the same time admit the pos­ sibility of false value judgements. If this intrepretation of Hägerström's theory of value is right, Cassirer's interpretation must be wrong. Cassirer compares Hägerström to the sophists of antiquity and interprets him to maintain the "equivalence of all moral values". He takes Häger­ ström's theory to be "relativistic". But this way of describing Hägerström's theory is certainly very misleading if the point of that theory is to deny that there are any values at all (whether relative or absolute) and to say that every "judgement of value" (even "A and B are equally good") is meaningless. Was Hedenius right in his interpretation of Hägerström? Was he right in his criticism of Cassirer? In Uppsala, where Hedenius was to be professor of philosophy for more than two decades, it has very much been taken for granted to this day that Hedenius was right on both accounts. In fact things are a bit more compli­ cated. According to Hedenius, Hägerström's theory of value is in­ compatible with the view that all (or some) value judgements are false. But in his Selbstdarstellung Hägerström uses expressions which would seem to imply that value judgements are false or at least in some necessary way accompanied by false ideas. "A is good" is an expression of feeling. But when "the expression of 162

feeling together with a representation can take the form of judge­ ment one believes that 'value' is a real determination of the thing, which means that one does not observe how meaningless these words are from the point of view of thought". (Hägerström 1929 p. 154). In another place Hägerström says: "the judgement of value, which determines the value as in reality valid [...] cannot possibly be true", implying that it must be false. (Hägerström 1929 p. 153). So according to Hägerström whenever you utter a sentence like "A is good" you make a theoretical mistake and have a false idea of reality. So Hägerström's moral philosophy as interpeted by Hedenius differs very much from the same philosophy as inter­ preted by Hägerström. You might say that Hedenius does not so much interpret Hägerström's moral philosophy in a historically scrupulous way as he proposes a reform of it. That became clearer in Hedenius' book Om rätt och moral ("On Law and Morals") pub­ lished in 1941. There he admitted that his version of Hägerström's theory differed from that of its original author not only in the way it is expressed but in substance also - he there criticized some­ thing he called "the Hägerström-Lundstedt fallacy". In fact Hägerström's theory of morals is not identical with that of Richards and Ogden or of Ayer. Cassirer was right in seeing this. What about Cassirer's contention that Hägerström's theory of morals is similar to that of the ancient sophists? The answer to that question very much depends on whether one takes at face value certain expressions in Om moraliska föreställningars sanning. There Hägerström seems to endorse ethical relativism. On the other hand it is also possible to see the statements in Om moraliska föreställningars sanning as Hedenius does (Hedenius 1939 p. 315n) as immature and misleading. The extreme obscurity and ambiguity of Hägerström's lan­ guage made it very difficult to interpret his philosophy. The mem­ bers of the Uppsala school disagreed between themselves on the right interpretation and they all disagreed with Cassirer. In fact the debate on Cassirer's Axel Hägerström ran parallel with an­ other debate on his lecture at Stockholms Högskola where some 163

of the same questions were discussed. We have to say something on that lecture and that discussion as well. As mentioned before, Cassirer was invited in October 1938 by Marc-Wogau to speak before the Philosophical society of Stock­ holms Högskola. The lecture was postponed and held instead on the 23rd of February 1939. Its title was "Was ist 'Subjektivismus'?" and it was later published in Theoria (1939/2). Cassirer's lecture was followed by a very lively debate, some of which later emerged as contributions to Theoria. This time the relation between the Uppsala philosophy and the philosophy of Cassirer was even more the focus of the discussion than on the occasion of the book about Hägerström. Cassirer began his lecture by pointing out a paradoxical diffi­ culty. Hägerström and Phalén both very strongly stressed the im­ portance of conceptual analysis. Only through the scrupulous analysis of concepts could philosophers avoid confusion and mistake. Hägerström and Phalén also agreed in making "subjec­ tivism" their main enemy in philosophy. But they seldom made an attempt to give a careful definition of what "subjectivism" is. In this they were not alone. Modern philosophy offered the re­ markable show of several fighting schools and tendencies mutu­ ally accusing each other of "subjectivism". One example was the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl which was strongly critical of "subjectivism" but would itself undoubtedly be accused of "subjectivism" by the Uppsala school. So it seemed to Cassirer very important to analyze what is meant by "subjectivism". When that was done he was prepared to answer the question whether his own philosophy was "sub­ jectivistic". He was aware of course that the Uppsala philosophers who sat in his audience were convinced that he was an out and out "subjectivist". Indeed as far as anybody knew Uppsala phi­ losophers recognized no non-subjectivistic philosophy except Uppsala philosophy itself. Cassirer said that he himself had often been called a "neo­ Kantian". He accepted that label in the sense that all his own work

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in theoretical philosophy presupposed the foundation laid by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. But there were many currents of mod­ ern neo-Kantianism that were wholly alien to him. So he would leave the debates within neo-Kantianism aside: I will put before you my own epistemological position in its main outlines as briefly and as precisely as I can and then, at the end of this exposition, ask you the question whether this position should be seen as 'subjectivistic' and so fall foul of those objections which the Uppsala school has made to every form of subjectivism. (Cassirer 1939b p. 114)

Cassirer had, he said, in all his epistemological works made it his point of departure that you can speak of "objects" only as objects of experience. What an object would be outside of the conditions of experience is a meaningless question. At the same time all ex­ perience is an experience of something, all empirical judgements are judgments of some objective fact. In that respect Cassirer is an "objectivist". He is critical only of the kind of "objectivism" that assumes the existence of things independent of every conceiv­ able experience. What, then, constitutes objectivity? We have to make clear ac­ cording to Cassirer that "subjective" and "objective" are correla­ tive concepts. We can understand their meaning only in respect to the whole to which they both belong. If we say, e.g., that a dream is "subjective" we have to take this into account. In a way, of course, a dream is objective, that is, it is really a dream. But when we wake up we realize that we cannot fit the dream experi­ ence into our normal reality. We are forced to say: "That was only a dream". In that sense the dream is "subjective": When the opposition between the subjective and the objective is under­ stood in this way it makes no sense to ask whether our experience as a whole is 'subjective'or 'objective'. (Cassirer 1939b p. 127)

Cassirer goes on comparing his own views to those of the Uppsala school. He finds an important agreement with the epistemology of Hägerström. Hägerström too repudiates epistemological realism: 165

The assumption of epistemological realism that a reality in itself [eine Wirklichkeit an sich] is revealed in knowledge is decidedly repudiated by him. (Cassirer 1939b p. 130)

But if "subjectivism" according to Hägerström and Phalén (Cas­ sirer takes them to be in agreement on this) is not non-realism, what is it? Cassirer discerns two criteria of "subjectivism" put forward by the Uppsala philosophers. The first criterion says that "subjectivism" is to assume that only what is "immediatly given" constitutes the data of conscious­ ness so that everything else is known to us only mediately by way of reasoning. Is Cassirer's philosophy "subjectivistic" in that sense of the word? Cassirer answers no. His own criterion, as we have seen, is very different: The necessary condition for calling a certain experience 'subjective' is that it is contrasted with some other that in comparison is seen as wider, more universal, more 'objective'. (Cassirer 1939b p. 131)

If this is assumed it becomes meaningless to say that all experi­ ence is subjective. So Cassirer cannot be a "subjectivist" in the sense of maintaining that "my experiences are all there is". Neither can he be a "subjectivist" according to the second cri­ terion. This criterion is taken from Phalén's article "Kritik af subjektivismen i olika former" ("Critique of subjectivism in its different forms" inFestskrift tillägnad E. O. Burman 1910). In a foot­ note to Axel Hägerström (Cassirer 1939a p. 7 n. 2). Cassirer said that if he could find time and leisure for the task he would write a separate study on the philosophy of Phalén. He never found that time. But he had, as he mentioned in "Was ist ''Subjektivis­ mus'?" (Cassirer 1939b p. 119), made a thorough study of the main writings of Phalén as well as of those of Hägerström. The lecture became the most important result of his labours. The problems of Phaléns "Kritik af subjektivismen" are de­ rived from the idealist tradition in metaphysics. At the turn of the 166

century the idealist philosophy of Christopher Jacob Boström was still very much discussed in Sweden. Phalén himself wrote his doctoral thesis on another great idealist metaphysician, Hegel. It was published in 1912 as Das Erkenntnisproblem in Hegels Philosophie ("The Problem of Knowledge in Hegel's philosophy"). This was the kind of philosophy both he and Hägerström were trying to refute (although they were also to a not unimportant extent influ­ enced by it). This background should be kept in mind when we hear that according to Phalén the main problem of "subjectivism" is how the object could be derived from the subject, or the "many" from the "one". How can the empiricial world of manifold phe­ nomena be explained through the undifferentiated One? That, according to Phalén, is the problematic that constitutes "subjectiv­ ism". But is Cassirer a "subjectivist" in that sense of the word? Cassirer points out that the Phalénian "subjectivism" is a rather unwieldy concept from the historian's point of view. Phalén ac­ cuses philosophers as different as Augustine and Descartes, Ber­ keley and Kant, Hume and Hegel of being "subjectivists". So it would seem that the concept can not be useful to the historian in making distinctions between different kinds of philosophers. (Of course from Phalén's point of view its main use was to make a distinction between Phalén and his followers and everybody else.) But even if Phalén's concept of "subjectivism" is not very use­ ful to the historian of philosophy, it might have other advantages. This Cassirer admits. But can he himself be said to be a "subjec­ tivist" as defined by that concept? Cassirer answers: That is, it seems to me, impossible as I have used the expressions 'subjec­ tive' and 'objective' as referring to both moments of a relation, that is as designations of a certain functional relationship. (Cassirer 1939b p. 134)

It follows that we cannot hypostasize "subject" and "object" and consequently that we cannot derive the one from the other. The "subject" cannot be the foundation of the "object" nor the "ob­ ject" of the "subject". Both appear for Cassirer's position to be equally meaningless claims. "Subject" and "object" are not things 167

but categories. If this is understood, Cassirer's positions can never be seen as "subjectivist" in the second sense. So Cassirer pleaded "not guilty" to the accusation of being a "subjectivist" in either of the senses of the word that he had been able to find in the writings of the Uppsala philosophers. It re­ mained for him to answer some arguments that Tegen had put forward in the discussion after Cassirer's lecture. Accepting the label "critical idealism" for his own position Cassirer denies that every kind of "idealism" must be a form of "subjectivism". Cas­ sirer is prepared to defend a kind of "logical idealism" or episte­ mological immanentism. He does not maintain of course that thinking is the cause of being: what we maintain is only that being, the 'object of knowledge', is related to a system of logical 'forms', among which the form of causality is a special case. If one objects that we then remain in the sphere of immanence, only that this immanence cannot any more be understood as immanence-in-con­ sciousness but as immanence-in-principles, I concede this. (Cassirer 1939b p. 136)

But are Hägerström and Phalén really able or willing to give an alternative to this kind of immanentism? Cassirer cannot find in their writings nor in those of Tegen any clear answer to that ques­ tion. The only possible alternative to some kind of immanentism would seem to be outright realism. But Hägerström denied being a realist and Phalén gave no clear answer on this matter. Cassirer looks for such an answer in a paper by Tegen published some years previously in Theoria, "Kritisk objektivism" ("Critical ob­ jectivism", Theoria 1936). He concludes that Tegen's position is not one of epistemological realism either and that he does not leave the sphere of "logical immanence". For Tegen also "it does not make sense to ask for an object outside the logical conditions for the possibility of experience" (Cassirer 1939b p. 139). As we have seen Tegen in his review for Lychnos of Cassirer's Axel Hägerström expressed himself in a way that could possibly be interpreted as an endorsement of epistemological realism. But even 168

there he was ambiguous. So Cassirer can be excused for not having been able to dispel the fog that always surrounded the question of what the Uppsala philosophers really meant by "subjectiv­ ism". The ever present danger of "subjectivism" was their mantra, but what "subjectivism" was no outsider ever understood and the Uppsala philosophers themselves always quarrelled about it. When Tegen in "Kritisk objektivism" says that what is real is what can be integrated into an unambiguous and identical whole, Cassirer agrees. His only objection is that "identity" is not suffi­ ciently defined by the logical principles of identity and non-con­ tradiction. Old fashioned rationalists, e.g. Christian Wolff, could still believe that. But after the criticisms of Hume and Kant it should be impossible. Non-contradiction is a necessary condi­ tion of knowledge, but not a sufficient one. Modern, post-Kantian epistemology sets itself the task of analysing the system of all the different forms of knowledge that work together and delimits them, so that every moment has its foreordained place. Cassirer's lecture was followed by a very lively discussion which went on for two days (Thursday the 23th and Friday the 24th). The lecture and the discussion were reported in the news­ paper Nya Dagligt Allehanda (2/25/1939). In a letter (2/28/1939) where Cassirer told Petzäll of the events in Stockholm he called the report of Nya Dagligt Allehanda "lively" though a bit too "sensationally coloured". Cassirer had, he wrote, tried to give a more correct picture of the proceedings in an interview in Göte­ borgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning (2/27/1939). The headline of Nya Dagligt Allehanda was "Great philosophi­ cal battle at the Högskola". Arranged against Cassirer, the paper reported, were the philosophers of the Uppsala school - Tegen, Oxenstierna, Marc-Wogau, Hedenius and Wedberg. After his lec­ ture Cassirer was attacked by these philosophers. Cassirer de­ nied being a "subjectivist" while the others argued that he was exactly such an animal. The official discussion broke off at half past eleven p. m., but went on unofficially at the supper that fol­ lowed. Next morning the discussion was resumed and went on 169

until lunch time. Nya Dagligt Allehanda wrote that Marc-Wogau, Hedenius and Wedberg "showed magnificent dialectical skill in weaving their web round professor Cassirer but he nevertheless again and again managed to escape." In his interview for Göte­ borgs Handelstidning Cassirer stressed that the discussion had been amicable. He confirmed that young Swedish scholars were skilful debaters and attributed this to the importance of the Dis­ putation to their careers. He also said that the encounter with the Uppsala school had enriched his own thinking very much. In his letter to Petzäll Cassirer also showed himself contented with the outcome of the discussion. He told Petzäll: The discussion was very lively and of course I had almost all the speakers against me; but when the discussion was resumed the next day I succeeded in disrupting the phalange by a few sly questions. To my objection that 'reality' should not be taken naively and dogmatically but has to be founded critically Hedenius answered that the Uppsala school was 'consciously dogmatic' and Marc-Wogau even said that it was 'consciously naive'. Whether that latter concept could withstand close conceptual analysis I do not know. In any case, all this was too much for Oxenstierna who energeti­ cally rejected both propositions.

The discussion had been very amiable, however, and the proofs of Swedish hospitality offered afterwards had contributed to blunting the edge of philosophical antagonism. Exactly what Hedenius and Marc-Wogau said in this discus­ sion we cannot know. But we may surmise that the younger mem­ bers of the Uppsala school at this time already were influenced by the "consciously dogmatic" and "consciously naive" common sense realism of G. E. Moore. This influence would later lead them to a break with the old Uppsala philosophy. What we do know for certain, however, is what Hedenius and Marc-Wogau wrote in Theoria where they both contributed answers to Cassirer's ar­ guments in "Was ist 'Subjektivismus'?". In Theoria 1939/3 Hedenius contributed the first part of an article called "Begriffsanalyse und kritischer Idealismus" ("Con­ ceptual Analysis and Critical Idealism"). This first part was mainly 170

concerned with the question what conceptual analysis is. Later Hedenius intended to come to grips with Cassirer's philosophy, showing that the kind of "critical idealism" that Cassirer represent­ ed did indeed presuppose "subjectivistic" assumptions (p. 288). Hedenius' article was broken off, however, when war broke out and its author was conscripted for military service. Cassirer waited with his answer for the later parts of Hedenius' article, which in fact never came. (Letter to Petzäll 11/26/1939) The somewhat older Marc-Wogau was not called up to mili­ tary service. He took over where Hedenius left off and wrote an article simply called "Was ist 'Subjektivismus'? Bemerkungen zum gleichnamigen Vortrag E. Cassirers" ("What is 'subjectiv­ ism'? Remarks on E. Cassirer's lecture of the same name" Theoria 1940/1). To an important extent Marc-Wogau's article is not directed against Cassirer at all but against Hägerström and his disciples. Marc-Wogau takes up the old Phalénian cudgels against Häger­ ström trying to make out that Phalén, not Hägerström, had been the first to formulate the typical Uppsala school critique of subjec­ tivism. Hägerström had misstated the case in Selbstdarstellung making out that his position there was the same as it was in Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft. In reality however, according to MarcWogau, Hägerström in Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft had been an out and out subjectivist. Only later, under the influence of Phalén, had Hägerström adopted what nowadays had become the posi­ tion of the entire Uppsala school. Cassirer had not understood this but had been a victim of the deception (or self-deception) used by Hägerström in Selbstdarstellung. We need not go deeper into the rights and wrongs of this piece of Uppsala school infighting. It is enough to say that Marc-Wogau argued that Cassirer was a subjectivist in the Phalénian sense of the word. Marc-Wogau mentions that Cassirer does not speak of "immanence-in-consciousness" but of "immanence-in-prin­ ciples". But he cannot find that anything is gained by that in re­ gard to the Phalénian critique of subjectivism. The target of that 171

critique, according to Marc-Wogau, is every kind of immanentism. It would seem, though this is never stated with any degree of clarity, that Marc-Wogau regards every non-realist position as subjectivist in the sense of the Phalénian critique. Cassirer did not answer Marc-Wogau's article. But what can be regarded as his last word in the debate on "subjectivism" came in an article that he published in the same number of Theoria (1940/1). Under the headline "Neuere Kant-Litteratur" ("Recent Literature on Kant") Cassirer there reviewed a couple of recent books on Kant. The book he gave most attention to was MarcWogau's Vier Studien zu Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft ("Four Stu­ dies of Kant's Critique of Judgement 1938). Marc-Wogau, in the style of Phalénian analysis, had argued that Kant's Critique of Judgement was through and through "dia­ lectical", that is inconsistent, and had tried to explain the causes of its contradictions. Cassirer in this review denies that Kant's epistemology, which to a large extent is his own, is inconsistent. Once again he tries to explain the fundamental assumptions of this epistemology. What Kant calls ideas is not the notion of some object outside the context of experience: it is rather the notion of the full determinateness of this context itself as only it can give the concepts of reason their utmost unity and utmost exten­ sion. That this doctrine is contradictory I cannot see; but that impression is easily evoked if you regard that doctrine as Marc-Wogau does. That is, from the point of view of a concept of the object that is not only foreign to the Kantian one but in many ways diametrically opposed to it. (Cassirer 1940c p. 100)

This argument - that the "contradictions" they discovered arose not from the texts they analysed but from their own conceptions can be regarded as Cassirer's Parthian shot against the Uppsala philosophers. Cassirer's departure for the United States put an end to further debates with them. It also ended his long debate with Marc-Wogau, the Swedish philosopher who had most tena­ ciously engaged him in discussion. 172

Phalén had a habit of eagerly attacking other philosophers while giving away very little of his own views. His disciples in­ herited this trait. This made it possible for them to make swift forays against their enemies, afterwards disappearing into the fog that surrounded their own positions. Cassirer had to struggle against these fighting habits. He tried to make his adversaries come out into the open field. To some extent he was successful. When the disciples of Phalén tried to explain their own positions they fell out among each other. The rift between Hägerström and Phalén was already well known to the cognoscenti. Now the dif­ ferences within the Phalénian camp as between Tegen, Oxenstier­ na, Marc-Wogau and Hedenius became obvious too. From Cassirer's point of view the debate with the Uppsala philosophers had the value of forcing him to state his own posi­ tion more clearly. He was not disingenuous when he said that the debate had enriched his own thinking. This is even more obvious in respect to his silent debate with Hägerström. In writing his book on the Swedish philosopher Cassirer had had to engage in moral philosophy and philosophy of law in a way he had not formerly done. The Uppsala philosophers had a reputation for destructive radicalism. Cassirer was very much a constructive philosopher, trying to make out the inner logic of every kind of enquiry. He had now had to defend the imposing castle of his philosophy of human culture and even to add a wing or two to it. He had to think anew of the epistemological problems which sim­ ultaneously engaged him in his work on the concluding volume of Das Erkenntnisproblem and on his unfinished manuscripts on the the so-called "Basisphänomene" (later published in his Nach­ lass). Cassirer didn't like "unfruitful polemics". In his debates with the philosophers of Uppsala he had engaged in polemics, but fruit­ fully so. Cassirer's interest in the philosophy of Sweden went deeper than only the contemporary scene. More and more Cassirer be­ came engaged in the study also of that philosophy's past. There was especially one episode in the intellectual history of Sweden

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that fascinated him. That was the encounter in 1649-50 between René Descartes and the Swedish Queen Christina. The episode had been intensively discussed by scholars and others ever since it occurred, but Cassirer believed that he had some new things to say.

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Descartes and Queen Christina

There was one episode in the intellectual history of Sweden that held a special attraction for Ernst Cassirer. That was the story of Descartes'visit to Sweden, his encounter with its young Queen and his tragic death in Stockholm at the height of his powers. Cassirer could compare Descartes' problematic position in Swe­ den to his own and he felt the drama of the meeting between those two strong personalities, that of the philosopher and that of the Queen. There was also the fascinating problem - to what extent had Descartes' teachings been an influence on Christina's conversion to Roman Catholicism and on her abdication? These were themes which could interest a European public in a way that Cassirer's debate with Uppsala philosophy could not. Toni Cassirer has told us in her memoir how Ernst on their very first visit to Sweden and Stockholm in the summer of 1934 already took an interest in what had happened to Descartes. When Toni and Ernst strolled about Stockholm looking at the town and its historical monuments they for the first time passed the bridge to the Old Town where the royal castle is. Ernst told me about the time when Descartes had passed this bridge every day at six o'clock in the morning in the cold winter to give Queen Christina lec­ tures in philosophy. At one time there was such stormy weather when we took this way that Ernst said to me that it would certainly be his death if he had to pass this bridge in such a storm in winter, but that he hoped that nobody would demand this from him even if we settled in Sweden. (T. Cassirer p. 224)

So it would seem that the parallel between his own situation and that of the French philosopher as exiles in Sweden impressed Cassirer from the beginning of his Swedish years. Later, when he lectured in Göteborg on Descartes and Christina, he told his au­ 175

dience about the impression made on him by the Christina memo­ ries in Uppsala. When at his first visit to Uppsala in the early autumn of 1934 he stood in the large hall in Uppsala castle where Christina's abdication took place and when he saw her portraits he was very much moved. These things had to make a "curious and strangely fascinating impression on every onlooker", he wrote, and it evoked his wish to have a "richer and deeper pic­ ture of Queen Christina". (Cassirer 1940a p. 8). Cassirer's knowledge of the Swedish Queen may have been superficial on his first visits to her country. His aquaintance of the French philosopher on the other hand was deep and of long standing. His first published work was his dissertation on Descartes: Descartes' Kritik der mathematischen und naturwissen­ schaftlichen Erkenntnis ("Descartes' Critique of Mathematical and Scientific Knowledge"), Marburg 1899. The dissertation was later republished as an introduction to Cassirer's work Leibniz' System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen (1902). Cassirer returned to the philosophy of Descartes in his Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neureren Zeit, of which the first part appeared in 1906. Nevertheless his interest in Descartes was rekindled during his Swedish years. In 1937 Cassirer published two articles on Descartes which were later to be incorporated into his book Descartes. Lehre - Persön­ lichkeit - Wirkung ("Descartes. Teachings - Personality - Impact") of 1939. On of these articles, "Descartes et l'idée de l'unité de la science" ("Descartes and the Idea of the Unity of Science"), was published in Revue de Synthèse (vol. XIV: 1) in Paris, the other, "Descartes' Wahrheitsbegriff" ("Descartes' Concept of Truth"), in Theoria (1937/3). In the following year, 1938, Cassirer devoted himself even more to the study of Descartes's philosophy and especially his relationship to Queen Christina. In a letter (3/4/1938) Cassirer told Petzäll how during the Christmas holiday he had read Curt Weibull's book Drottning Christina. Studier och forskningar ("Queen Christina. Studies and researches" 1931, second edition 1934). Thereby he had come to 176

think of a new way of tackling the old problem of Descartes' pos­ sible influence on Queen Christina's conversion to Roman Catholicism. Now he had just finished a long essay on "Descartes and Queen Christina", which he had shown to Weibull: I was happy that Weibull to whom I gave my manuscript for reading wholly accepted my views and we are now engaged in a lively discussion of the problems.

In a later letter to Petzäll (5/11/1938) Cassirer returned to the topic. Weibull had shown great interest in Cassirer's essay, he told Petzäll: He will publish it in Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift. Furthermore I will present my results in the beginning of next term in a series of public lec­ tures. These will then be printed in Swedish translation among the popular lectures of the Högskola. The two versions ["Fassungen"] will be different; the one more 'learned' and concerned with general history of ideas, the other intended for a wider public mostly interested in Christina and Swed­ ish history. It would be very good and very opportune if the first study could be published also in a French edition. The foreign circulation of the Årsskrift is not very great. So I would be eager to have my book presented to French readers. It will have very much to say on Cartesian philosophy and its impact in the 17th century as well as on French history of ideas and literature (especially on the relation between Descartes and Corneille).

Cassirer now hoped that Petzäll who at the time was living at Paris working for the Institut International de Collaboration Philosophique could help him with furthering this project. He assumed that Petzäll through the institute had contacts with French editors: It would be very kind if the Institut gave me its 'patronage' for this pur­ pose.

Petzäll answered (5/16/1938) that the Institute would be very much honoured and pleased if it could give some "patronage" in connection with a French edition of Cassirer's book. Later Petzäll reported (11/10/1938) that he had spoken to the editor Vrin:

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What Vrin will do it is impossible to predict. But he seems very interested in the matter. I will do the best I can.

Vrin in fact published Cassirer's Descartes, Corneille, Christine de Suède in 1942. It contained the third and fifth chapter of the Ger­ man book translated by Madeleine Francès and Paul Schrecker. Cassirer had himself recommended Schrecker. Schrecker lived in Paris, was one of the collaborators in the great current Malebranche edition and had already translated two of Cassirer's ar­ ticles on Descartes (the forementioned article for Revue de Syn­ thèse and another which will be mentioned later). (Letter 11/18/ 1938 to Bermann Fischer, who had contacts with Vrin) In the meanwhile Cassirer had somewhat changed his plan for the German publication. In a letter (6/27/1938) to Gottfried Bermann Fischer, the Jewish German publisher who had recently emigrated to Sweden where he was to reestablish his publishing concern, Cassirer wrote about his plans. His work on Descartes and Christina was now in the main finished, he said: I have tried to solve the much debated problem of what influence Descartes had on Queen Christina's spiritual development and to what extent he contributed to her change of faith. I have done this in discussing the gen­ eral instead of the individual and in putting it into the context of the entire history of ideas of the 17th century. In this way I came to write a larger study on this latter theme, that elaborately treats not only Descartes but the other main philosophical and literary tendencies, and especially classical French literature. In my public lectures that are due for the next autumn I will have to confine myself to the presentation of the main results: I can­ not there give the detailed grounds of the scholarly elaboration.

Cassirer goes on telling Bermann Fischer that the lectures will appear in Swedish translation in the series of lectures edited by Göteborgs Högskola and that the larger study will appear in Ger­ man. Discussions with Curt Weibull are going on concerning publication in Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift: Nothing is determined, however, and if there is now a possibility that it could be published by you I would perhaps prefer that. The theme is one

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that evokes a great deal of interest in Sweden and the publications of the university never reach more than a limited circle of scholars.

So it was agreed that the Bermann-Fischer Verlag in Stockholm it had its headquartes at Stureplan 19 - should publish Cassirer's German book on Descartes. Its exact titel came to be a topic of discussion between the author and the publisher. In a letter (11 / 23/1938) Cassirer reminds Bermann Fischer of his plan to call the book "René Descartes - Seine Lehre, seine Persönlichkeit, sein geistiger Einfluss". That is also what he calls his forthcoming book when he announces it in an article in Theoria (Theoria 1938/3 p. 198 nl. Cf Rainer A. Bast's comments in Cassirer 1995 p. IX n7). Now after he has talked to Swedish friends it appears to him that the titel should mention the relation to Queen Christina: Because it is this problem that at least here in Sweden will call forth the greatest interest. The main contents of the book would also be covered by such a title.

Bermann Fischer answered in two letters (6 and 12/7/1938). He didn't approve of changing the titel. Even if the relationship Descartes-Christina would evoke a special interest in Sweden the most important sale of the book would be in the German­ speaking areas, in Holland and in the US where the more gen­ eral theme would have more appeal. Bermann Fischer suggests the title: "René Descartes - Lehre - Persönlichkeit - Wirkung". We may note that it was the editor who first suggested this shorter title. In a letter (12/9/1938) Cassirer accepts Bermann Fischer's view. Descartes. Lehre-Persönlichkeit-Wirkung was published in 1939. It contained five chapters, the fifth and longest of which was called "Descartes und Königin Christina von Schweden. Eine Studie zur Geistesgeschichte des 17. Jahrhundert" ("Descartes and Queen Christina. A Study in the History of Ideas of the 17th Century"). As we have seen Cassirer regarded this as the most important part of the book, containing its "main contents". 179

In October 1938 Cassirer held three public lectures at Göteborgs Högskola on the theme "Queen Christina and Descartes". The audiences were crowded. Not only students and teachers from the Högskola, many people from Göteborgian society as well came to listen to the famous German professor. Cassirer himself was delighted and reported to Petzäll (10/24/1938) that more than 400 people had turned up to listen. The lectures were then trans­ lated into Swedish and published as a book - Drottning Christina och Descartes. Ett bidrag till 1600-talets idéhistoria ("Queen Chris­ tina and Descartes. A Contribution to the History of Ideas of the 17th Century", Göteborgs Högskola Forskningar och föreläsningar ("Researches and lectures"), Albert Bonniers förlag 1940). There has been a certain amount of disagreement about the relation between Cassirer's two books on Descartes. The bibliog­ raphy in P. A. Schilpp's The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer classifies the Swedish book as a translation of the third chapter of Descartes. Lehre-Persönlichkeit-Wirkung (p. 903). The Cassirer bibliography of Eggers/Meyer (New York/London 1988) makes the same as­ sumption (p. 27f.). Rainer Bast in his edition of Descartes. LehrePersönlichkeit- Wirkung has pointed out that this is wrong (Cassirer 1995 p. LV n7). But he obviously assumes that the Swedish edi­ tion has been abbreviated and rewritten by the Swedish trans­ lator, although in a way "authorized" by Cassirer (Cassirer 1995 p. LV). But this is not correct either. In fact the Swedish translator, Bengt Wall, explicitly says that he has made the translation from "the manuscript of the author". Cassirer's German manuscript for the lectures does indeed constitute a different version of the Descartes-Christina work. The arguments are the same but they are often expressed in a different way or in a different order. Some passages have no counterparts in Descartes. Lehre Persönlichkeit - Wirkung. The manuscript, never published in Ger­ man, has been found in the Cassirer Archive in Yale. According to a note by Cassirer the chapter "Descartes und Königin Chris­ tina von Schweden" (published in Descartes. Lehre - Persönlichkeit - Wirkung) was written in Göteborg in March and April 1938. It 180

was then reworked for the lectures (and for the Swedish publica­ tion) in May 1938. One important difference between Cassirer's two books on Descartes, Drottning Christina och Descartes and Descartes. LehrePersönlichkeit-Wirkung, is that the latter contains four texts, mostly previously published papers, which are not included in the former. "Descartes et l'idée de l'unité de la science" (tranlated from the German by Paul Schrecker) was published in Revue de synthèse in 1937. "Descartes Wahrheitsbegriff" appeared in Theoria in the same year. The chapter "Descartes und Corneille" was previously unpublished. But the paper on "Descartes' 'Recherche de la Véri­ té par la lumière naturelle'" had been published in Lychnos. Lärdomshistoriska samfundets årsbok (Annual of the Swedish his­ tory of science society) in 1938. Another version of the same paper, "Über Bedeutung und Abfassungszeit von Descartes' 'Recherche de la Vérité par la Lumière Naturelle'", appeared in Theoria in the same year. Cassirer's relation to Johan Nordstrom, the founder and edi­ tor of Lychnos, is interesting. Nordstrom was professor of the his­ tory of ideas and science ("idé- och lärdomshistoria") since 1932 at the university of Uppsala. Cassirer met him on his first visit to Sweden. In a letter to Fritz Saxl (10/5/1934) Cassirer told his friend of an interesting acquaintance he had made in Uppsala. This was Johan Nordström who was working on the philosophy of the 16th century and who knew all Cassirer's publications as well as those of the Warburg Institute. (This letter, now at the Warburg Insti­ tute, London, has been noticed by Adrian Thomasson in his ar­ ticle "Ernst Cassirer and Johan Nordström, Personhistorisk Tid­ skrift 1994/2 and in his book Thomasson p. 170ff.) In 1929 Nordstrom's Medeltid och renässans ("Middle Ages and Renaissance") was published as part of a general history in many volumes and by many hands (Norstedts världshistoria). There Nordström polemized against Jacob Burckhardt's idea of the Re­ naissance. The real Renaissance, Nordström contended, was the revival of learned literary studies that had taken place in 12th 181

century France; the development in 15th century Italy was only a sequel to that event. Nordström sent Cassirer the French transla­ tion of that book, Moyen âge et renaissance. Cassirer thanked him in a letter from Oxford (10/25/1934). He praised the book al­ though he confessed that the gulf between the Quattrocento and what went before at least from the point of view of the history of philosophy appeared to him to have been deeper than Nordstrom admitted. On the other hand Cassirer conceded that if the Renais­ sance was taken as the "revival of classical antiquity" Nordstrom was right in placing it very much earlier than was usually done. The friendly exchange of letters between Cassirer and Nord­ strom went on during Cassirer's years in Göteborg. Nordström asked Cassirer to review books for Lychnos, the learned journal for the history of ideas that he founded in 1936. With a letter (4/8/1938) Cassirer sent Nordström a review for Lychnos of A.C. Benjamin's An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, that appeared in the 1938 volume. A few weeks later (5/25/1938) Cassirer sent a proposal of his own that he had all reason to be­ lieve would be interesting to Nordström as it concerned the Descartes-Queen Christina relationship. - Cassirer certainly knew that Nordström had worked intensively also on the cultural his­ tory of the 17th century and had done his doctor's thesis on the philosophy of Georg Stiernhielm, a figure of the Christina era. Cassirer told Nordström that he for some time had been work­ ing on a study of the relation between Descartes and Christina and that Curt Weibull had encouraged this work: Related to this study a short paper came to be written on Descartes' work 'Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle'. I believe that I am able to show that this work, whose date has hitherto been unknown, belongs to Descartes' very last time in Stockholm. If I succeed in this new light would be shed on Descartes' relationship to Christina and a great deal would be won for the interpretation of 'Recherche de la vérité.'

In his next letter (6/2/1938) Cassirer thanks Nordstrom for his readiness to publish the paper on "Recherche de la vérité" in 182

Lychnos. He also asks the Swedish professor to read his manu­ script and comment on it. This Nordström evidently did in a very conscientious way because in a later letter (6/17/1938) Cassirer thanks him for his "extensive letter": To me it is a great joy and an important confirmation that you have been able basically to agree with my view. It is only natural that many details remain to be supplemented or bettered. Because this article is really a child of accident.

It was, he said, the result of an observation that Cassirer had made when working on the Descartes-Christina study. He had written it down in two days without recourse to books other than the great Descartes edition by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. This edition Cassirer owned and made use of for all his Descartes stud­ ies, quoting it after modernizing the spelling of Descartes' French texts. In the same letter Cassirer asked Nordström to read and com­ ment also on the manuscript of the greater Christina study. Nordström saw the manuscript but made no comments until later when he wrote a devastating critique in his review of the pub­ lished books in Lychnos. We will return to this critique later on. Two days before he first wrote to Nordström on the subject (5/23/1938) Cassirer wrote to Petzäll to propose that a study of his on Descartes' "Recherche de la vérité" should be published in Theoria. Petzäll too accepted with alacrity. Hence two versions of Cassirer's study on "Recherche de la vérité" appeared, one in Theoria ("Uber Bedeutung und Abfassungszeit von Descartes' 'Recherche de la Vérité par la Lumière Naturelle'", Theoria 1938/4) and one in Lychnos ("Descartes' Dialog 'Recherche de la Vérité par la Lumière Naturelle'und seine Stellung im Ganzen der Cartesischen Philosophie, Lychnos 1938). The latter version was also published as a chapter in Descartes. Lehre - Persönlichkeit - Wir­ kung and, in French translation, in Revue Philosophique 1939. The argument of both versions was the same. "Recherche de la Vérité par la Lumière Naturelle" was an unfinished philoso­

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phical dialogue found among Descartes' papers after his death in Stockholm. The dating of the dialogue had been debated among scholars. Cassirer argued that it had been written in Stockholm and was intended to be read by Queen Christina as part of her philosophy studies for Descartes. The situation de­ scribed in the dialogue corresponded according to Cassirer to that found at Christina's court where Descartes competed for influ­ ence on the Queen with Isaak Vossius and other representatives of a more traditional learning. In this way the question of the dating of the dialogue was connected with that of Descartes' rela­ tion to Christina. That relation is the subject of the longest chapter, "Descartes und Königin Christina von Schweden", in Descartes. Lehre - Per­ sönlichkeit - Wirkung and of the whole Swedish book. Cassirer had here the audacity, as he indicated in his letters to Petzäll and Bermann Fischer, of trying to solve a hotly debated question of Swedish historiography - to what extent did Descartes contribute to Christina's conversion to Roman Catholicism and to her abdica­ tion? It was Curt Weibull's book on the Queen, which in Sweden was hailed as epoch-making, that had stimulated Cassirer's in­ terest in this old question - indeed he dedicated Drottning Chris­ tina och Descartes to Weibull "with upright thanks for the first impulse to this book and for active help with my work on it". It cannot be said however that Weibull directly influenced the argument of Cassirer's work. True, Cassirer accepted Weibull's picture of the Queen as a very determined monarch who worked to achieve her ends with all the stratagems of subtle statecraft. He also was convinced by Weibull that Christina's chief political end had been the strengthening of the power of the monarch. But the encounter with Descartes was only discussed on a few pages in Weibull's book. Weibull adopted the view, based on what the Queen herself had said on a few occasions, that Descartes had contributed to Christina's conversation. In him she had met Ca­ tholicism "in its noblest form" and learned that a radical doubter could be a "convinced, pious Catholic". (Weibull p. 106ff.) These

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were rather conventional views. Cassirer accepted them, but added hypotheses of his own that were much more daring and original. Cassirer's starting point was an apparent paradox. Christina had testified - several years after her abdication - that Descartes had contributed to her "glorious conversion". But how was that possible? Descartes had certainly not preached Catholicism to her, he was in Stockholm as a philosopher, not as a priest. Then it must have been something in his philosophy that had influenced the Queen. Cassirer compares the problem to an equation where two factors are unknown: Unknown, or at least only an object of hypotheses and indirect arguments, is the kind of philosophical tutoring given by Descartes to Christina. Un­ known also is the first and immediate impact that this tutoring had on the Queen. She herself never said anything about that. The solution to our equa­ tion is consequently entirely dependent of what values we assume for the two known quantities: Descartes and Christina. (Cassirer 1940a p. 10)

Cassirer solves his equation by assuming that Descartes' influ­ ence was indirect and philosophical rather than direct and reli­ gious. Descartes didn't preach Catholicism to Christina. But he convinced her that natural religion was not enough - as she had been inclined to believe before - and that some kind of religious revelation was needed. He also made her see that completeness and unity were necessary conditions for a true view of reality. Christina concluded that only the Catholic church could give her this unity. The different schismatic and fighting protestant churches and sects could not represent true faith. But Descartes' influence was not only important for Christina's religious development. His teachings also and in a more direct way had an impact on her ethical convictions. Descartes' ethical philosophy very strongly emphasized moral autonomy, the dig­ nity of man and the freedom of the will. To some extent his views coincided with the stoic tradition which had been revived dur­ ing the previous century. But Descartes gave a much more posi185

tive rôle to the emotions than the stoics had done. His ideal of the "honêtte homme" and his high opinion of the importance of honour was very much of his time - Cassirer stresses the parallel with Pierre Corneille - and very much appealed to Christina. Cassirer's Descartes. Lehre-Persönlichkeit - Wirkung and Drott­ ning Christina och Descartes were well received in Sweden. But there was one important exception to this rule. There was an attack from Nordström in Lychnos, probably quite unexpected to Cassirer who had continued a friendly correspondence with Nordström right up to 1940. Cassirer had contributed an article on "Mathema­ tische Mystik und mathematische Naturwissenschaft" to Lychnos in 1940. Nordstrom's demolishing review of Cassirer's books on Descartes and Queen Christina was published in Lychnos in 1941 ("Cartesius och drottning Kristinas omvändelse" pp. 248-290). Nordstrom's detailed critical examination-more than40 pages is interesting as it came from a scholar who was familiar with the sources but who accepted none of Cassirer's conclusions. His most important points shall be related here. Nordström admits that Cassirer was the first scholar to have systematically taken up the problem of Descartes' influence on Christina's conversion. He also concedes that there may be some truth in what Christina later testified - that Descartes had had an important influence on that conversion, though he is much less sure of this than Cassirer was. Nordström is on the whole much less inclined that Cassirer to take the truth of Christina's test­ monies for granted. He reverts to the picture of Christina's char­ acter as fickle and unstable than Weibull and Cassirer had tried to refute. But Nordström entirely rejects Cassirer's hypothesis about the nature of Descartes' influence. Contrary to what Cassirer asserts Christina was never an ad­ herent of the idea of a purely natural religion, Nordström argues. Cassirer's arguments are contemptuously rejected. Christina can­ not have been influenced by Bodin as she never read him until after her conversion. Chanut's testimony is related in a unsatis­ factory way by Cassirer. There is evidence for Christina's respect

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for revealed religion which Cassirer ignores. There can be "no doubt left" that Cassirer's conclusion is untenable. But if Chris­ tina at the time of Descartes' arrival in Stockholm was a faithful Christian who believed in the word of the gospel, Descartes' in­ fluence must have been different from what Cassirer assumed. There is evidence - again ignored by Cassirer - of what this influence was. According to Nordström Descartes was much more of an active proselyte maker than Cassirer is willing to ad­ mit. Descartes, educated by the Jesuits, had much fewer scruples against direct religious propaganda than Cassirer believed. This is not the place to discuss the rights and wrongs of Cas­ sirer's and Nordstrom's different interpretations of the DescartesChristina relationship. That could be done profitably only in the context of a discussion of that relationship and of all the relevant sources. But it should be stressed that Cassirer's argument is highly hypothetical and that he himself admitted it to be so. Di­ rect sources as to what was said between the Queen and the philosopher are lacking. Cassirer attempted to solve the problem by a construction founded on the general history of ideas of the 17th century. There were indeed other possible solutions to his equation. Later Swedish researchers as a rule did not accept Cassirer's solution to the Christina-Descartes problem. Sven Ingemar Olofsson in his Drottning Christinas tronavsägelse och trosförändring ("The Abdication and Religious Conversion of Queen Christina" 1953) agrees with Norström's conclusions and his criticism of Cassirer (p. 247f.). Sven Stolpe in Från stoicism till mystik. Studier i drottning Christinas maximer ("From Stoicism to Mysticism. Stu­ dies into the Maxims of Queen Christina" 1959) also agrees with Nordström and furthermore finds that Cassirer "misjudged Chris­ tina's religiosity" (p. 299f.). Susanna Åkerman in Queen Christina of Sweden and her Circle (1991) finds that "Cassirer's conclusion is not in itself convincing" (p. 9, cf. p. 44 ff.). Among Swedish schol­ ars the one most positive about Cassirer was the philosopher Alf Nyman. He reviewed Drottning Christina och Descartes very

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favourably for Theoria (1941/2). And he dedicated his book En drottnings visdom: Christina av Sverige som moralist och människo­ kännare ("The Wisdom of a Queen. Christina of Sweden as Mor­ alist and Knower of Men" 1942) to "Curt Weibull and Ernst Cas­ sirer, the great revivers of Christina studies in our country". In this book Nyman wholeheartedly accepted Cassirer's conclusions on the nature of Descartes' influence on the Queen. Cassirer's experience of Sweden was a more happy one than that of Descartes. He not only escaped with his life, he had the time to familiarize himself with the philosophy of his new coun­ try and to immerse himself in its intellectual history. His DescartesChristina studies is one example of this. Another is his work on the Swedish 18th century philosopher and poet Thomas Thorild.

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Thomas Thorild and 18th Century Philosophy

On the 3rd of February 1941 Ernst Cassirer took his place in Kungl. historié-, antikvitets- och vitterhetsakademien ("Royal Academy of History, Antiquities and Letters") to which he had been elected. The academy was one of the academies instituted by Gustavus III. Cassirer choose to speak on "Thorild and Herder" as the subject of his inaugural lecture. Thorild was a Swedish philosopher and poet of Gustavus' time. The lecture was later published in Theoria. Cassirer wrote to Petzäll when he sent him the MS (7/2/1941): I send you my lecture 'Thorild and Herder' with this letter and would be grateful if you gave it a glance. If you think it suitable for 'Theoria' you can have it. But make the decision exclusively from the point of view of 'Theoria'. I am in no hurry to have it published. I made an agreement in Stockholm that a much larger work on Thorild, that will contain the detailed grounds for my view, will be published in the Proceedings of the Academy.

Petzäll answered (2/9/1941) that he greatly valued the opportu­ nity to publish Cassirer's lecture in Theoria. "Thorild und Herder" appeared in Theoria 1941/2. Later on Cassirer's argument was repeated at greater length and with many additions in Thorilds Stellung in der Geistesgeschichte des 18. Jahr­ hunderts ("Thorild's Place in the History of Ideas of the 18th Cen­ tury", Proceedings of the Royal Academy of History, Antiquities and Letters 1941). Both works should therefore be treated together. Thomas Thorild (1759-1808) was born on a farm in Bohuslän not far from Göteborg. He went for studies to Göteborg and for academic studies to Lund. His period at the university was brief, however, and Thorild went on to Stockholm, hoping for a liter­ ary career. His great poem Passionerna ("The Passions") was writ­ ten in 1781 but failed to win the prize he had hoped for. Thorild's aesthetic ideas can loosely be characterized as pre-romantic and

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reminiscent of contemporary German "Sturm- und Drang", bring­ ing him into conflict with the prevailing classicism. His radical politics made him suspect in the eye of the authorities. Thorild was even arrested and sent into exile, suspected of revolutionary sympathies. At last he was given a position as librarian and pro­ fessor at the University of Greifswald, then under the Swedish crown. In Greifswald Thorild wrote philosophical tracts in Ger­ man and Latin, one of which was favourably reviewed by Herder. Thorild died in Greifswald and lies buried at the nearby Neuen­ kirchen church-yard. At Cassirer's time Thorild's work, and especially his philoso­ phy, was hotly debated among Swedish scholars. Several of the scholars whose acquaintance Cassirer had made in Sweden had been involved. Anders Karitz had devoted most of his research on the history of philosophy to Thorild. Torgny T. Segerstedt had written on Thorild in a book on the Moral Sense school in Swed­ ish philosophy (Moral sense-skolan och dess inflytande på svensk filosofi 1937). The literary historians Martin Lamm and Albert Nilsson had opposing views on Thorild's early philosophical de­ velopment. A young scholar, Stellan Arvidson, who was much later to write the standard biography on Thorild, had also stud­ ied Thorild's youthful ideas. Cassirer was aware of the fact that Thorild scholarship was a mine-field where fools might rush in but where angels would presumably fear to thread. He excused his temerity in entering it: I had not had the daring for this excursion into foreign terrain, the terrain of Swedish literature and history of ideas, had I not been encouraged by an observation that emerged immediately from my own sphere of work and research.

Many of the Swedish Thorild scholars had discussed Thorild's epistemology. Different views had been proposed, the combat had often been fierce. And Thorild's epistemology was admittedly obscure and extremely unsystematic:

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But the historian of the problem of knowledge will at once be reminded of problems with which he is acquainted and familiar from other areas. Even before he has mastered all the details of this doctrine he will feel himself immerced in a special atmosphere of thought. Thorild's epistemology is no isolated phenomenon. It is part of a great movement that sets in during the 1770s, i.e. in the years of Thorild's early education, and that tries to give the entire philosophical world view a new direction, only to be stifled after a short while. [-] Once we have seen that Thorild belongs to this general type of epistemology [...] we have found the thread of Adriadne into the laby­ rinth of Thorild's philosophy. ( Cassirer 1941a p. 9 f.)

Cassirer had in mind the philosophy of the so called pre-romantics, and especially that of Herder. Indeed, his inaugural lecture to the Vitterhetsakademien had been devoted entirely to the rela­ tionship between Thorild and Herder. Here Cassirer tries to make probable that Thorild in his youth read Herder's Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele ("On the Knowledge and Feel­ ing of the Human Soul" from 1778). He has no direct proof of this but contends that what Thorild wrote in private manuscripts at the time so nearly parallels Herder's argument that there can be no coincidence. Cassirer also thinks that his conjecture would provide an explanation for Thorild's Spinozism. Spinoza's ideas were rediscovered in Germany at this time and were interpreted by Herder and others in the new spirit of Sturm und Drang. Cas­ sirer concludes that if we can assume that Thorild had read Herder's "Vom Erkennen und Empfinden” at this time and that he had been deeply impressed by it we would have in our possesion ‘"the missing link'" that could explain Thorild's special brand of Spinozism. (Cassirer 1941b p. 88 f.) The focal point of the epistemology of both Thorild and Herder is their concept of feeling ("Gefühl", "känsla"): To both of them feeling (känsla) is not a faculty beside others, but the ground of all consciousness. (Cassirer 1941b p. 81)

Feeling is not a province of the "I". It is this "I" itself, an immediate unity of life and fullness. Thorild's epistemology is neither sensu­

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alist nor rationalist. It is vitalist. In this it is similar to Herder's. That is also the explanation why both philosophers would later reject Kant's critical philosophy. Kant's careful distinctions between sensibility, understanding and reason and his delimitation of the domain of experience did not appeal to either Herder or Thorild. Cassirer himself was of course a Kantian of a sort in episte­ mology as in other matters. But he was a Kantian free from any orthodoxy. We can well understand that he took a sympathetic interest in Thorild's philosophy. There was in that philosophy many points that could not avoid impressing the author of the philosophy of symbolic forms. These points became clearer, Cassirer argued, through a comparison with Herder. In Herder much can be read 'in big letters'- to use the metaphor from Plato's Repub­ lic - that appears in Thorild only in 'small letters' that are difficult to read. (Cassirer 1941a p. 78)

Cassirer quotes some lines from Thorild's Passionerna which he then interprets in the light of Thorild's and Herder's philosophy: Hvarje kreatur har sin krets af godhet och skönhet: Ar i sit stoft Gud! Sä til sig han förer allting: Skapar omkring sig en Verld: en egen ordning af tingen: "Every creature has its own sphere of goodness and beauty:/Is in its flesh God! In this way he brings everything to himself:/Creates a world around himself: his own order of things:"

The soul is no tabula rasa according to Thorild's philosophy. It is creative. Human language does not just mirror the world. It cre­ ates its world. Every man is an artist who creates nature anew. That is why Thorild could never accept the classicist aesthetics of imitation and "mimesis". The artist of genius is never an imita­ tor, but a creator. But the artist of genius is different from other men only through the depth of his inspiration. In this sense Thorild too believed in man's capacity to create his world through symbolic forms. Cassirer could feel in Thorild a reflection of the inspiration he found in Herder's theories of 192

language and expression when he developed his own philoso­ phy of symbolic forms. But Cassirer found Thorild interesting also from a purely historical point of view. Thorild was more than an epigone, more than an eclectic. He got impulses from Spinoza and Rousseau, Shaftesbury and Herder, but the use he made of them was deeply determined by his own personality. He has a place not only in Swedish literature, but in the history of philoso­ phy as well. He should be regarded above all as one of the think­ ers "in whom the great movement of the mind that takes place at the end of the 18th century finds its characteristic and typical ex­ pressions." (Cassirer 1941a p. 125) In what has been written on Thorild since the early forties Cassirers contributions have always been taken into account. But his central contention that Thorild read Herder's Vom Erkennen und Empfinden at its first appearance in 1778 has not been readily accepted. Stellan Arvidsson is sceptical in the first part of his great Thorild biography, Passionernas diktare (1989). He there doubts on chronological grounds that Thorild could have read and been in­ fluenced by Herder's work already before writing his early philo­ sophical texts. Arvidsson might have been a bit resentful in his attitude to Cassirer, who severely critizised his early studies on Thorild (cf. Cassirer 1941a p. 12). But it is more charitable to at­ tribute his criticism to the circumstance that Cassirer never really could prove that Thorild had actually read Herder's work (he admitted as much). Cassirer, in the case of Thorild as in the case of Queen Christina, had a habit of referring to general movements in the history of ideas instead of making detailed study of sources, a habit that has not always won the approval of the more cau­ tious Swedish scholars. What everyone has to admit however is that Cassirer succeed­ ed in placing Thorild in his proper European context and that he convincingly described the moment in the history of philosophy to which Thorild belongs. Cassirer's Thorild studies belong to the author's last year in Sweden. During his few remaining years Cassirer never returned 193

to Swedish themes. In the US there were other things to occupy his mind. But what Cassirer actually wrote on Swedish philosophy and its history was very imposing both from a quantitative and from a qualitative point of view. There were three studies the length of short books (on Descartes and Queen Christina, written in two different versions, on Hägerström and on Thorild). And there were more than half a dozen papers of greater or lesser length. Some of these writings were concerned with rebutting attacks by Swed­ ish philosphers on Cassirer's own theories, especially his answers to Marc-Wogau and other Uppsala philosophers. But most were studies that Cassirer had undertaken on his own initiative on dif­ ferent topics of Swedish philosophy. Cassirer was planning for a future in Sweden, even during his American years he was think­ ing of going back for retirement. His research into Swedish philo­ sophy was a way of getting used to a new philosophical climate to which he knew he would have to adapt. But there was also the enchantment of mere intellectual curiosity. Even in his sixties Cassirer had a zest for new discoveries. The Nordic philosophi­ cal landscape, with what Descartes called its "frozen thoughts", held its allurements to the always curious German thinker, al­ though only the accident of exile had originally brought him into contact with it. On that landscape on the other hand Cassirer left little lasting imprint. Only today, more that sixty years since Cassirer left Sweden are there certain signs of a new interest in his philosophy.

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Cassirer in Göteborg

At the start, in 1891, there was only a faculty of humanities in Göteborg. It was not a university according to Swedish standards, since Göteborgs Högskola had neither faculties of natural science, medicine nor law. The first professorships in natural science were established in the early 1930s, but it was not until 1954, when Göteborgs Högskola merged with a medical institution, that it changed its name to "Göteborgs Universitet." At Cassirer's time, the rector used "University" in English correspondence, but usu­ ally "die Hochschule zu Göteborg" in the German correspondence (Lindberg and Nilsson 1996, pp. 34,103-104). It therefore seems natural that Cassirer in the overwhelmingly humanist environment at Göteborg would take up the theme of the logic of the cultural sciences. Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften was the mature fruit of his term at Göteborg and also the last work by him to be published by the university yearbook. In those days, there were only about twenty professors at the university, and according to Jacobsson's memoirs the solidarity was firm in the faculty (Jacobsson 1964, p. 93). With two of the professors Cassirer was especially friendly: the historian Curt Weibull (1886-1991) and the physicist and oceanographer Hans Pettersson (1888-1966). Among the colleagues were also Gustav Stem (1882-1948), professor of English and author of the well known Meaning and Change ofMeaning (1931), and Bernhard Karlgren (18891978), professor of East Asian languages and one time rector, who laid the foundation for the scientific description of Chinese. The classical philologist and later famous Aristotle-scholar Ingemar Düring (1903-1984) was in Cassirer's time a young teacher. Curt Weibull was in his double office as rector and professor of a weighty discipline an authoritative person. In Sweden his 195

name is even today synonymous with a school of historiography that lays stress on sober objectivity and source criticism. Like his brother Lauritz Weibull - the real founder of the programme of "weibullianism" - he worked mainly in the field of early Scandi­ navian history. In the 1930s he also published several books on Queen Christina, thereby continuing studies begun by his father Martin Weibull on the French diplomat Chanut at the court in Stockholm. It was Curt Weibull who inspired Cassirer's work on Queen Christina and Descartes. Hans Pettersson, head of the Institute of Oceanography, was a close friend of Jacobsson's. It has been claimed that Pettersson brought an air of natural science into the humanistic rooms of the university (Lindberg and Nilsson 1996, p. 210). Before the First World War he studied under Sir William Ramsey in London, and in the 1920s he was part of a group that investigated atomic dis­ integration at the Institut für Radiumforschung in Vienna. Build­ ing on experiments made at the Institute, Pettersson challenged the theoretical model of the atomic nucleus constructed by Ernest Rutherford at the Cavendish laboratory in Cambridge. The re­ pute of the ambitious young scientist was dealt a serious blow when it was proved that the experimental results reached by the so-called Vienna School were erroneous. Much due to the out­ come of the controversy with Cambridge, he lost the competition for the chair of physics at Stockholm (Rehn 2001). Defeated, Pettersson was forced to withdraw to Göteborg, where he instead became a successful institution-builder. In 1935, with the aid of donated means, an independent Institute of Oceanography was set up, directed by a special board. Chairman of the board was the omnipresent Jacobsson (Lindberg and Nilsson 1996, p. 212). In 1940 Cassirer lectured at Pettersson's Institute on Kant and modern biology. Pettersson regarded philosophy as lying within his area of competence. He wrote a very appreciative review of Determinis­ mus und Indeterminismus in Theoria (Vol. Ill 1937, pp. 343-345), in which he expressed the opinion that there was a more serious 196

threat in modern physics, viz. wave-mechanics, to the principle of causality than the ones refuted by Cassirer. He later took it upon himself to evaluate the newer Swedish philosophy as he made a stand against the appointment of Marc-Wogau's docent Ivar Segelberg to the chair at Göteborg left vacant by Aspelin. Pettersson had earlier found fault with the logical analysis of Segelberg's thesis, which Segelberg had submitted at Göteborg. Through Pettersson's intervention in the faculty, the thesis re­ ceived a lower grade than Aspelin had suggested, thus making it impossible for Segelberg to become a docent at Göteborg. Instead Marc-Wogau made him his docent at Uppsala. The battle over the professorship in Göteborg was a national cause célèbre in 1951, with Pettersson and Jacobsson supporting Segelberg's opponent Sven Edvard Rodhe through articles in the press and the Uppsala philosophers defending Segelberg in a concerted effort. The fact that Rodhe was Pettersson's son-in-law lent a certain piquancy to the affair. When Segelberg finally was made professor by thé University Board, Jacobsson took the consequence and decided to step down from his position as chairman, thereby leaving the university for good (Nordin 1983 pp. 163-166; Lindberg and Nils­ son 1996, pp. 174-176). As has been pointed out elsewhere in this book, Cassirer had many and fruitful discussions with members of the Uppsala School like Marc-Wogau at Stockholm and Hedenius at Uppsala. It should perhaps be underscored that the Uppsala School did not hold sway at Göteborg - even if Hägerström was an impor­ tant influence on Aspelin. The philosophers there were more sym­ pathetic to Cassirer's philosophical approach, but that notwith­ standing, in many respects critical of his philosophy. When Cassirer joined the philosophers at Göteborg in 1935, he at first worked together with Petzäll, who temporarily held the professorship during 1935-1937. Writing a year earlier to MarcWogau (11/19/34), at a time when the plan to create a personal professorship had become known, Petzäll exhibited moderate ex­ pectancy at the prospect of Cassirer's coming to Sweden: "It seems 197

to me that he could be quite beneficial to us, even though his philosophy is in need of a rather fundamental revision. Acting as a stimulant he can be of use." But as soon as he arrived in Göte­ borg, Cassirer won Petzäll's heart. To Marc-Wogau, Petzäll re­ ported about how well Cassirer had started, "We have had an exceedingly agreeable cooperation in planning his working pro­ gramme here." (Petzäll to Marc-Wogau 9/11/35). A further indi­ cation of Petzäll's esteem is that he was the only Swedish sub­ scriber to the Cassirer Festschrift. From the many letters they exchanged over the years, it appears that the appreciation was mutual. When Petzäll moved to Paris in 1937, the collaboration continued in connection with Theoria, the Swedish philosophical review that Petzäll edited and to which Cassirer was a major con­ tributor. After two years, Gunnar Aspelin from the University of Lund was appointed successor to Jacobsson. With him Cassirer would have an equally unproblematic working relationship. At the end of Cassirer's term at Göteborg, in 1940, he told Aspelin in a speech, cited in an earlier chapter, that as he looked back on his years of work at Göteborg he was aware that much of what had particu­ larly satisfied and pleased him would never have turned out in this way if I had not all the time been sure of your friendly understanding of my work and your participation in this work. (Cassirer 1940, p. 1)

One finds a distinctive attitude towards philosophy at Göteborg at Cassirer's time, a family of interests, shared to varying degrees by the individual philosophers. This pertains in the first place to Jacobsson, Petzäll, and Leander; but the philosophical inclina­ tion of the outsider Aspelin is in many respects similar to the others. Notably, there was a common interest among the philoso­ phers in epistemological and methodological questions, in soci­ ology, and in the history of ideas. Furthermore, all attended to the big moral issues, Jacobsson and Petzäll in political philoso­ phy, and Leander in the philosophy of culture. In this regard,

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Aspelin, with his historicism and his detachment of outlook had a markedly different disposition. Malte Jacobsson left his professorship in 1934, but remained present at the university as Chairman of the Board. Being com­ pletely engrossed in his new work as Governor, Jacobsson did not publish any philosophical work during Cassirer's period in Göteborg. He did make an important intervention, however, when he incited Cassirer in 1938 to write the book on Axel Hägerström (T. Cassirer 1981, p. 258). Jacobsson's thesis, Pragmatismen: Särskilt i dess förhållande till kriticismen ("Pragmatism: With special reference to its relation to Critical Philosophy"), was submitted at Lund in 1910, a year af­ ter he had met Cassirer in Berlin. In the thesis he attempted to strike a balance between the philosophy of pragmatism, in the first place represented by William James and by F.C.S. Schiller, and Critical Philosophy, seen through the lens of the Marburg School. Jacobsson perceived the contrast between pragmatism vs. intellectualism as a part of the fundamental conflict in contem­ porary culture and society between tendencies towards the ab­ stract and the concrete, between general concepts and personal feelings - a conflict analysed from a sociological perspective by Tönnies and Simmel. These were the thinkers that had made the strongest impression on him in Berlin, in addition to Cassirer. Jacobsson was later able to invite Tönnies for a lecture at Göteborg (Jacobsson 1964, p. 80). In philosophy a reaction against the ab­ stract systems of neo-Hegelianism and materialism was evident at the time. Various philosophers were in search of ethical unity, among them the pragmatists. Pragmatism sought to make room for human values and human action, its foundation was, accord­ ing to Jacobsson, to be found in a moral dualism as opposed to the encompassing reality of the older systems. "Pragmatism de­ mands a human reality and a dualism, where action has a mean­ ing" (Jacobsson 1910, p. 4). Jacobsson finds much to sympathize with in the pragmatic view of truth as "man-made": "This is the 'humanism' of pragma­ 199

tism: 'truth' and 'reality' are always of human utility they are built upon human values" (p. 10). Pragmatism may underesti­ mate thinking but, on the other hand, the value of thinking can­ not be demonstrated on its own basis, Jacobsson claims. The cul­ tivation of the intellect must become a personal matter for the thinker. The problem which he sets out to examine concerns whether there is a purely logical ideal by which one can judge what is true and what is false, or in other words: if there is a purely logical utility, which cannot be strengthened through utility from other points of view (pp. 24-25). His conclusion is that personal belief, as an act of will, never can replace intellectual belief, based on acts of verification and logical norms, i.e. the rules of thought (p. 38). For example, the propositions of geometry are not true because they are useful. In his discussion of geometry Jacobsson shows an influence from Cassirer, when he says that a triangle is not an abstraction from every triangle, but a construction from a rule (p. 52). The unprag­ matic element in "truth" and "reality" is best exemplified in math­ ematics, according to Jacobsson (p. 53). On the other hand, reality cannot be explained through logi­ cal consistency alone. Reality has "intensity" and a meaning, which are rooted in the life of will and action. The strength of the will is the upholder of reality - here Jacobsson can point to in­ sights of Indian philosophy (p. 68-69). (The emphasis on the will, again with reference to Indian philosophy, would later turn up in the philosophy of Jacobsson's disciple, Folke Leander.) But the proof of reality and truth, Jacobsson argues, is in the satisfaction of rules of causality and identity. An experience can be emotion­ ally satisfying but still not give any warranty to its reality (p. 70). This rejoinder to pragmatism has a similarity to Bertrand Russell's criticism put forward the same year in his Philosophical Essays. At least partly, then, pragmatic interests must determine the use of a principle, like that of consistency. Kant may be an intellectualist, but his search for universality is in fact motivated by social and moral values. Values are only valuable in a society. 200

Jacobsson concludes that the demand for the unity of experience, the insistence on logical rules, never can be at odds with a prag­ matic moral dualism (p. 81). Jacobsson's next work, Psykisk kausalitet ("Psychical causality") from 1913, was considered by him to be his most important work (Ahlberg and Regnéll 1974). It was a contribution to the "phi­ losophy of mind," avant la lettre. Psychical phenomena, Jacobs­ son showed, are not determined by prior psychical states, but always, with Bergson, new creations - and thus irrational. The principles of natural science are therefore not applicable to psycho­ logy. Jacobsson concluded that psychical causality could never be achieved, even if it was a necessary method in science (Jacobs­ son 1913, p. 217). For the discussion of the fundamental concepts of science, Jacobsson relied to a large extent on Cassirer's inter­ pretations in Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: he declared that the principle of causality was to be seen as a "symbol for all scien­ tific understanding and explanation", and he concurred with the Kantian view of science as an "reinterpretation" of immediate experience (pp. 19-20). Jacobsson writes in his memoirs that during his years as pro­ fessor, in addition to philosophy, he started to dedicate himself to work in sociology (Jacobsson 1964, p. 80). In this new field of research he continued to apply a way of thinking that he had learnt from Cassirer. Jacobsson tried to overcome the hard and fast dichotomy between individuals and society by pointing to their necessary interrelation. In the work Om statsmoral ("On state morality," 1925), he found that only within an ordered society could human beings give free reins to their creative abilities. But this required a society organized with an aim to the free develop­ ment of individuality. Jacobsson referred in this connection to Cassirer's Freiheit und Form. A couple of years later, in one of his last writings before his change of career, "Bidrag till vänskapens sociologi" ("A contribution to the sociology of friendship," 1928), Jacobsson again dealt with the problem of the foundation of soci­ ety. In his view society could neither be founded on isolated indi­ 201

viduals nor on a super-individual unity. He rejected both alterna­ tives. Instead he chose to describe society as a functional relation between individuals. During his time as professor of philosophy at Göteborg be­ tween 1920-1934 Jacobsson supervised Petzäll's thesis and he was also Leander's first teacher. To some extent Jacobsson's students inherited his philosophical interests. This was the case with prag­ matism. Among philosophers studied at Göteborg we find John Dewey (Nordin 1983 p. 204), whose philosophy Leander was going to examine in a couple of works. Furthermore, both Petzäll and Leander laid a stress on the import of practical concerns in philosophy. Coupled with a critical attitude towards "intellectu­ alism," this approach could perhaps be attributed to an influence from pragmatism. Even more conspicuous was their frequent uti­ lization of Cassirer's works, in particular the ones dealing with the history of philosophy and the philosophy of culture. Cassirer's works were even better known in Göteborg than in Germany, according to Toni Cassirer (letter to Saxl 9/ 6/35). But Petzäll and Leander were not equally impressed by Marburg neo-Kantianism: Cassirer was too much of a Kantian for Petzäll's taste, as he wrote in a letter to Ernst von Aster (10/10/35). And Leander was ulti­ mately going to take his bearings from neo-Hegelian philosophers such as Croce and Litt. Åke Petzäll was docent at Göteborg between 1928-1939. His thesis, Begreppet medfödda idéer i 1600-talets filosofi. Med särskild hänsyn till John Lockes kritik ("The concept of innate ideas in sev­ enteenth century philosophy. With special reference to John Locke's criticism," 1928), treated a historical subject: the doctrine of innate ideas in Herbert of Cherbury, Descartes, and the Cam­ bridge Platonists, as well as Locke's criticism of innatism. The background for the seventeenth century discussion of the con­ cept of innate ideas was found partly in Renaissance neo-Platonism, as interpreted by Cassirer in the Erkenntnisproblem, but partly also in the renewed Stoicism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Here, Petzäll relied chiefly on Dilthey's conception of 202

the "natural system" in jurisprudence, ethics, and theology, put forward in the study "Das natürliche System der Geisteswissen­ schaften im 17. Jahrhundert", reprinted in Volume 2 of his Ge­ sammelte Schriften. Dilthey regarded the emergence of natural law, morality, and religion as caused by the need for consolidation against the background of religious and philosophical dissension during the sixteenth and the earlier part of the seventeenth cen­ tury. The struggle between the different creeds created a need to go back to what was believed to be man's original nature as a common ground. Dilthey's study, together with related studies in Volume 2 of his works, plays a very important part in Descartes: Lehre Persönlichkeit - Wirkung. Dilthey's account of Neo-stoicism and the "universal theism" of the seventeenth century provided Cas­ sirer with the key to the solution of the historic problems he dealt with in the chapters "Descartes und Corneille" and "Descartes und Königin Christina von Schweden." Did Petzäll's work stimu­ late this renewed interest in Dilthey's seventeenth century-stud­ ies? A reference to it is found in Cassirer's book on Descartes, concerning the influence on Descartes of Herbert of Cherbury's doctrine of lumen naturale (p. 279, note 2). There is furthermore a letter extant that in a very substantial way connects Cassirer with Petzäll's interest in Dilthey's work. In a letter to Petzäll (10/25/ 43) one of Cassirer's disciples at Göteborg, Bertil Nydahl, writes: I usually keep an eye on Cassirer's library, which, as you know, is kept at the university, and there I have found Dilthey: Gesammelte Schriften, II. Band, in which your name is written in pencil.

In his thesis, Petzäll often cited Cassirer's studies of seventeenth­ century philosophy in the Erkentnisproblem. He agreed with Cassirer's judgement that the fundamental flaw of Locke's sys­ tem was the failure to interrelate the rational and the empirical element in knowledge (134-137, 162). He disagreed with Cas­ sirer's view of the development of innatism in Descartes' phi­ losophy (cf. the summary in Petzäll 1933, p. 10). According to

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Cassirer's interpretation, the opinion that all of the contents of consciousness are innate, belonged to Descartes' earliest phase, while Petzäll associated it with his later thinking (pp. 39-62). Moreover, the understanding of the development of Des­ cartes' doctrine of innate ideas has some bearing upon the dat­ ing of Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle. Petzäll assumed it to be an early work. Its conception of the innate as "seeds" was in line with Descartes' earliest view, he maintained. Cassirer would later in the 1930s venture to demonstrate that Recherche de la vérité actually was written during Descartes' last years in Sweden. This episode has been dealt with in a previous chapter. Suffice it to add that if Cassirer were right about the date of the dialogue, then it would eo ipso have confirmed his thesis about the development of Descartes' innatism. No discussion about this is to be found in the correspondence between Petzäll and Cas­ sirer, however. In a sequel to his thesis, Der Apriorismus Kants und die „Philosophia Pigrorum" (1933), Petzäll examined Kant's view on innate ideas. There is a copy of this work in Cassirer's library. (Informa­ tion about Swedish books in Cassirer's library has kindly been provided by John Michael Krois.) This was Cassirer's home ground, and Petzäll could hardly avoid taking up a stand on Cassirer's interpretations. Nevertheless he called into question some of Cassirer's conclusions. For example, he was not convinced by Cassirer's argument in Kants Leben und Lehre for the crucial influence on Kant of Leibniz' Nouveux essais sur l'entendement humain, which was published in 1760s (p. 26, note 2). In the years between 1935 and 1937, during which Petzäll and Cassirer were colleagues at Göteborg, Petzäll produced two works in the history of philosophy that focussed on the part played by Christian speculation in the history of ethics and epistemology. At the same time they set forth the inquiries of his thesis into the emergence and significance of innatism. The first of these works, Etikens sekularisering. Dess betingelser inom kristen spekulation med särskild hänsyn till Augustinus (The secularization of ethics. Its pre-

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conditions in Christian speculation with special reference to Au­ gustine, 1935), dealt with the natural preconditions of morality in the thought of Augustine and his scholastic followers. Petzäll sent it to Cassirer in 1935. There is a reference in Cassirer's essay "Descartes Wahrheitsbegriff", reprinted in the book on Descartes (cf. Cassirer 1939, chapter 1, note 29), to the chapter in Petzäll's book where he discusses what he calls the "extra-theoretical" dominating element in Augustine's thought, viz. revelation. Cas­ sirer referred to Petzäll for the crucial difference between the "firstpersonal" perspective of Descartes and of Augustine, respectively. Whereas Descartes was talking of knowledge, Augustine alluded to the will and religious certainty (Cassirer 1939, p. 28). Petzäll moreover discussed the mediaeval concept of synderesis, the in­ nate knowledge of the good and the natural law of the fallible conscience. Henceforth, the investigation of this concept would be one of his major concerns. Petzäll's next work, in which he undertook to examine the influence of the classical and Christian tradition on the philoso­ phy of the seventeenth century, was the 1937 English-language publication Ethics and Epistemology in John Locke's Essay Concern­ ing Human Understanding. Already in Begreppet medfödda idéer, Petzäll had observed that the chief interest of Locke's entire philo­ sophical endeavour was practical (Petzäll 1928, p. 149). This ob­ servation is the point of departure in the book on Locke: In Locke the criticism of knowledge is so closely connected with his practi­ cal philosophy that it becomes essential to make a special simultaneous study of his epistemology and his ethics and of their interrelations with each other.

Petzäll furthermore expresses the hope that the study may throw light upon the general relation between the questions of ethics and the problem of knowledge (p. 7-8). The "epistemologicalethical problem" in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understand­ ing is governed by his aim to reach such knowledge of the life of ideas that benefits the life of action (p. 11).

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Locke tries to carry through his method of empirical observation, though retaining all the time the dogmatic prejudices of rationalism. His final solu­ tion of the problem of knowledge takes its character from the practical pur­ pose to which he aims in his study: to establish the possibility of math­ ematical proof of the idea of God and of the moral truths (pp. 19-20).

In order to explain the contradiction in Locke's method Petzäll turns to the historical setting of the seventeenth century. He had recently read in manuscript Cassirer's essay "Wahrheitsbegriff und Wahrheitsproblem bei Galilei," in which Cassirer showed how Galileo defended a new conception of nature against the opposition of the clerical tradition. Petzäll considers it to be very interesting, but at the same time he challenges Cassirer's view that the demand for a new scientific method independent of tra­ dition also implied a criticism of dogmatism. Instead, he contends that the mathematical method was a new support for uncritical dogmatism (p. 18), and he charges Locke with dogmatically be­ lieving in the rationality of nature, a belief held in common with his contemporaries. The source of dogmatism is to be found in what Dilthey had called the natural system, which according to Petzäll only partly stood in opposition to the Christian scholastic tradition. A reference to nature and to man's natural moral and rational faculties was a necessary and very important part of the whole Christian doctrine. Man's natural susceptibility to grace was a necessary part of this system, (p. 23; Cf. Etikens sekularisering)

Petzäll next tries to establish which were the direct influences on Locke's philosophy, though he admits that the task is difficult: Locke informs us only very scantily about the relation of his views to those of others, and the conception of nature is so vague in Locke and his contem­ poraries that it is very difficult to prove any direct influences.

But, since Petzäll assumes that Locke uncritically accepted the conception of man's natural endowment that was widespread in his time, he goes to Hooker, Grotius and Pufendorf to get an idea

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of the development of this conception at the time (p. 25). A simi­ larity between their ideas and Locke's is recognized, and particu­ larly Pufendorf is regarded - with a surprising positiveness, given the lack of evidence - as the chief inspiration for Locke's dog­ matic belief in natural reason (pp. 38-39, 81). Petzäll's method is not dissimilar to the "way of the pure his­ tory of ideas," later invoked by Cassirer in his study of Descartes and Queen Christina (Cassirer 1939, p. 183), which Cassirer con­ sidered legitimate when empirical research, due to lack of sources, could not deliver any answers. Even if it has to be admitted that the parallels drawn by Cassirer - e. g. between Descartes, Chris­ tina and Corneille - betray a greater inventiveness, they are at the same time equally, if not more, vulnerable to criticism, as is demonstrated by Nordstrom's devastating critique of Cassirer's book on Descartes in Lychnos. Apart from occasional discussions in his works of Cassirer's interpretations in the history of philosophy, Petzäll also pub­ lished a critical discussion of Cassirer's philosophy of culture. This was in a German-language review-article in Theoria of Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften (Theoria 1943, Part I, pp. 39-67). In the same review he also dealt with Theodor Litt's Das Allgemeine im Aufbau geisteswissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis (1941), as well as a work by the Norwegian Ingjald Nissen. Of specific interest is the comparison between Cassirer's discussion of the epistemology of the humanities with that of Litt. Litt contributed to the Cassirer Festschrift and his earlier Individuum und Gemeinschaft had been discussed at Cassirer's seminar during the autumn term of 1939. Litt's 1941 work was important when Leander formulated his criticism of Cassirer's philosophy in the 1940s (Leander 1950, pp. 212-213). Petzäll identified a point of divergence in Litt's and Cassirer's views on language. Whereas Litt in positing language as the tie between the individual and the general tended towards a "Meta­ physik der Geisteswissenschaften," Cassirer was in search for the ultimate factors underlying the symbolic function of language 207

(Petzäll 1943, p. 42). Petzäll was in full sympathy with Cassirer's project, while Leander was going to side with Litt. But if Petzäll agreed with Cassirer's focus on the primary func­ tion of knowledge itself, he was critical of what he termed Cas­ sirer's "intellectualistic" concept of perception. Against this out­ look, Petzäll maintained that perception must not be regarded solely as an act of knowledge. As had been shown in recent re­ search, effort (Streben) was the fundamental character of an expe­ rience and every psychical act was to be seen as purposive. We do not passively perceive "objects" and "expressions"; we rather construe objects and supply them with expression. A fruitful dis­ cussion of the problem of human self-knowledge demanded in Petzäll's view the confrontation of concrete psychological research with the critique of knowledge (p. 65-67). Petzäll was a many-sided man with a, for a Swedish philoso­ pher of his time, rather uncommon international orientation. He sat in on meetings of the Vienna Circle in 1930 and 1931, and he also produced one of the earliest presentations of its philosophy: Logistischer Positivismus: Versuch einer Darstellung und Würdigung der philosophischen Grundanschauung des sog. Wiener Kreises der wis­ senschaftlichen Weltauffassung (1931). He returned to logical posi­ tivism in Zum Methodenproblem der Erkenntnisforschung (1935). There are copies of both these works in Cassirer's library. Whereas Petzäll in 1931 set his hopes on the Vienna Circle as a model of collective philosophical cooperation and welcomed its effort to revise scientific language, he emerged as a pro­ nounced opponent in 1935, i.e. at a time when the rift between Carnap and Neurath, on one side, and Schlick, on the other, had become manifest. He reviewed at length Neurath's and Carnap's theory of "physicalism" and the vision of a unified language. In a footnote to the aforementioned review-article of Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften, Petzäll remarked that the criticism of physi­ calism in Cassirer's work was similar to what Petzäll had put forth in Zum Methodenproblem, as well as in a subsequent debate with Neurath, published in Theoria 1936. Petzäll sent his work 208

to Cassirer in the summer of 1935 (cf. Petzäll to Cassirer 20.7. 1935). Cassirer apparently never touched upon Carnap's physicalism prior to receiving Petzäll's book. The first published refer­ ence to writings of Carnap, after his turn to physicalism in the early 1930s, can be found in his 1941 Zur Logik der Kulturwissen­ schaften. But Cassirer mentions Carnap's "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft" in his Nachlass from the Göteborg years: in Ziele und Wege der Wirklichkeits­ erkenntnis (Cassirer 1999, p. 7) as well as in his manuscript on Basisphänomene (Cassirer 1995, p. 119). The logical positivists, Petzäll argued, had started off from an abstract definition of knowledge, disregarding that the word "know" has different meanings in different contexts. Instead, in Petzäll's opinion, only provisional directions should be sought, the value of which would be determined by their efficacy in put­ ting the inquiry on the right track. The proper aim of epistemol­ ogy would be to elucidate what we mean when we say we "know something." Every claim to meaning, raised in varying contexts, should be considered: in religion, in morals, in law etc. Petzäll defended a functional concept of knowledge against a hidden "metaphysics" of substantialism, which was seen by him as a chief source of misconceptions in contemporary epistemology. How­ ever, even the conception of function could lead to "metaphysics" when construed as "a spontaneous creative factor, a super-indi­ vidual norm, and so on." To avoid an insufficient understanding of knowledge, the form of knowledge must be taken in its broad­ est sense, as covering also e. g. gestures, signals, works of art, cult ceremonies. The question whether there was an invariant element of form in all knowledge could be answered on the basis of com­ parative studies of various claims to valid knowledge (Petzäll 1935, pp. 66-79). It would seem that Petzäll, in spite of his disavowal of Cas­ sirer's "Kantianism" (cf. the abovementioned letter to Ernst von Aster 10.10.1935), pretty much followed his lead in epistemol­ ogy209

During Cassirer's time in Göteborg, Petzäll began a work on the fundamental concepts of morals and of law, a work that would be left unfinished. As professor of practical philosophy in Lund 1939-1957, he devoted himself especially to the problem of pun­ ishment, applying methods from criminology and using data he had himself gathered from French and Belgian prisons (Ahlberg and Regnéll 1974). In the shadow of Hitler's New Order during the Second World War, he published a work that critically exam­ ined contemporary German jurisprudence, Makt och rätt ("Might and right," 1942). Petzäll rejected the current cult of power in Germany and argued that the legal order ultimately was based on individuals. He was critical of both the "metaphysical" con­ cept of right and the "magic" surrounding might in Germany. In Petzäll's view, the critique of knowledge had demonstrated that concepts in the history of ideas like synderesis, lumen naturale etc, did not belong in science. But still there was something in indi­ vidual minds that motivated our speaking of a judicial conscience and of right. This was palpable in the reactions of individual hu­ man beings, and these reactions could be investigated with em­ pirical methods. Folke Leander (1910-1981, docent of philosophy at the Uni­ versity of Göteborg 1938-1946, teacher at the gymnasium of Norrköping 1945-1975) is described in Toni Cassirer's book as Cassirer's disciple. She mentions that on May 20,1941 he saw the Cassirers to the boat for America. Leander has not been intro­ duced in previous chapters. His father, Pontus Leander, was pro­ fessor of Semitic studies at the university of Göteborg and the first student ever in the rolls of the university. Leander's thesis, Humanism and Naturalism. A Comparative Study of Ernest Seillière, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More (English-language publication, 1937) is dedicated to the memory of his father. He worked on his thesis during the interim period between Jacobsson and Aspelin. It would seem from his acknowledgements in the preface that Cassirer became involved in the thesis at a later stage, when the manuscript was getting ready for printing: 210

For generous and delightful assistance in the preparation of this book I am especially grateful to my teacher Professor Ernst Cassirer. His encourage­ ment and interest have been of the highest value to me.

Leander was the first among the philosophers in Göteborg to make reference to Cassirer's Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Sim­ plifying somewhat, one could say that to Jacobsson, Cassirer was in the first place the originator of the path-breaking conceptual analysis in Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, while Petzäll - not counting his rather sketchy epistemology - foremost dealt with the historian of the problem of knowledge. Only Leander would reflect more profoundly on the philosophy of symbolic forms as a "critique of culture." This is not palpable in his thesis, however, since it does not contain any discussion of Cassirer's philosophy in its own right. Cassirer's work is cited in the context of a summary of Ludwig Klages' thought, which serves as an illustration of romantic na­ ture mysticism. To put Seillière's thought in relief, Leander dis­ cusses his study of the philosophy of Klages. As a believer in reason and moral self-discipline, Seillière's philosophy is consid­ ered to be Klages' turned upside down. In particular, Leander wants to elucidate a contrast between the Ausdruckswelt and Dingwelt, to be found in Klages' speculations. He draws on Cassirer's work, "disengaging the facts from every kind of philosophical interpretation." The contrast between the world of objects and the world of expressional qualities, from which "German neo­ romanticism" starts out, is according to Seillière "another variety of that naturistic [sic] mysticism that has dominated modern thought from Rousseau onwards" (pp. 20-23). In the analysis of the development of naturalism in modern times, Leander refers to Dilthey's Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation, i.e. Volume 2 of his Gesammelte Schriften, so often utilized at Göteborg: "It should be evident how Dilthey's work here links up with that of the Ameri­ can humanists." The "natural system," analysed by Dilthey, the

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idea of the rationality of the universe, paved the way, Leander argues with the American humanists, for Rousseau's "emotional pantheism", as rationalism slowly became subrationalism. This, Leander shows, is confirmed by Dilthey's account, according to which the dualistic teleology of the Middle Ages is supplanted by rationalism, utilitarianism, and ultimately pantheism (p. 114). The chief corrective to "naturalism" is in Leander's view the thought of American "humanism." He calls it the "philosophy of will," and in order to make clear what this means, he compares it to William James' theory of will, and in particular to his concep­ tion of "mental effort." But even if Babbitt's thought has an af­ finity with pragmatism, this is not systematically brought out by Leander's discussion. At the centre of Babbitt's and More's thought, Leander finds the doctrine of the "ethical imagination": "By way of a general definition it may be said that the ethical imagination is the imagination which in some form or other em­ braces the idea of a human telos" (p. 142). The ethical imagination is said to be "a function of the spirit in continuous action." At the same time the essence of the ethical imagination is, in a confus­ ing manner, identified as contemplation, or, more specifically, the intuition of the "higher will" (p. 144). The critical attitude towards intellectualism, expressed, albeit in wholly different contexts, by both Jacobsson and Petzäll, was brought to the fore in Leander's thesis. He opposed Oriental voluntarism to Occidental intellectualism and sympathized with Babbitt's criticism of Stoicism, from the perspective of voluntas superior intellectu: By making reason the highest element in the soul of man, a reason that was believed to coincide with the cosmic order, the wrong starting-point was chosen, for volition is the highest element in the soul, and reason pertains to the illusory part of human nature (p. 177).

The ethical imagination has according to Leander an intrinsic claim to validity, corresponding to a specific ethical experience, but in Western philosophy, owing to its intellectualism, the epis­

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temological problem has been reduced to the problem of how the intellect could attain truth, or become a matter of emotion. With Babbitt, Leander reaches the conclusion "that modern philoso­ phy is bankrupt since Descartes, inasmuch as it has failed to dis­ engage the ethical imagination, and in general the truths of the higher will, from theology" (p. 223f.). Leander concludes that: For Babbitt the epistemological problem finally runs into the ethical prob­ lem. It is scarcely surprising that this should be so: I have tried to show in this concluding chapter that a valuation always coincides with the positing of reality. We ourselves chose the world in which we are going to live, and the choice is ultimately based upon faith - or credulity (Ibid.).

The final statement is reminiscent of what Jacobsson said in his thesis on pragmatism: "This is the "humanism" of pragmatism: "truth" and "reality" are always of human utility, they are built upon human values." A good case can be made for the claim that Leander's thesis formed the backdrop for two of Cassirer's essays. They were both delivered as lectures in December 1936, but printed much later under very different circumstances: "Naturalistische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilosophie," was submit­ ted in 1939 to a scholarly society in Göteborg, and printed in their series the same year, while "Kant und Rousseau" was published in an English version in the American book Rousseau, Kant, Goethe (1945). At the time of these lectures, Cassirer had just been reading Leander's thesis in manuscript. We have evidence of this thanks to the Yearbook Committee, which asked Cassirer to give his opin­ ion on Leander's thesis. In the written testimonial, dated Novem­ ber 25,1936, Cassirer said that he regarded the thesis as an "able and promising effort" ("tüchtige und vielversprechende Leis­ tung"). Leander had mastered a difficult material and with a keen eye identified the problem. Therefore Cassirer did not hesitate to recommend it for publication in the Yearbook (GLA, Göteborgs Högskola, F VIII: 2). But Cassirer was not only well acquainted with the account given by Leander of the problem - he had more­ 213

over read some of the primary works discussed in the thesis. This is clear from the same testimonial, where Cassirer also testifies to Leander's accuracy in the representation of the principal doctrines, "as far as I have been able to verify it in the sources." There are no references to Leander's Humanism and Natural­ ism in Cassirer's essays. But it is possible to reconstruct at what points Cassirer in the 1945 "Kant and Rousseau," and "Naturalisti­ sche und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilosophie," re­ spectively, enters into dialogue with Leander's book. Leander stated his problem as follows: "how does the reaction of naturism [sic] against the various aspects of reason-experience take place?" (Leander 1937, p. 61). He expounded on Seillière's view of Rousseau as the prophet of "God-Nature." Rousseau's work was taken to be the portal to a new era of nature mysticism: "'Feeling' has been regarded as the divine element, whereas 'rea­ son' is the ordinary, prosaic element." The naturist dreamt of a vegetative felicity and was an enemy of all conventions and all morality (pp. 7-9). Babbitt's criticism of Rousseauistic morality, Leander showed, agreed with Seillière's criticism of naturism, but was different in that it focussed on the denial of the ethical effort of the will and of moral dualism (p. 64). Let us compare this view of Rousseau with the one put for­ ward by Cassirer. In "Kant and Rousseau," Cassirer explained that Rousseau's influence on Kant provided more than a bio­ graphical interest: It offers an important clue in the history of ideas, for it reveals an aspect of Rousseau's influence unjustifiably neglected in the traditional view we are accustomed to hold of his effect on modern intellectual history. This tradi­ tional view was molded historically by the 'Age of Genius' and by Roman­ ticism (Cassirer 1945, p. 13).

Cassirer's line of argument, on the basis of his superior knowl­ edge of the historical context, is that the romantic generation had at most a one-sided view of Rousseau.

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This generation regarded him as the prophet of a new gospel of nature and as the thinker who had rediscovered the primitive power of the emotions and passions and had emancipated them from all restrictions, from the re­ striction of convention as well as that of 'reason.' Modern criticism also has not infrequently accepted this conception, and based on it all the charges it has brought against Rousseau, the visionary, dreamer and enthusiast (ibid.).

Now, during the 1760s, Cassirer argues, men saw his teaching in another light. He was, as Kant calls him, "the restorer of the rights of humanity." Cassirer cites both the criticism of Babbitt and of Seillière, but concludes that their picture of Rousseau is unfair. His religion was not an "emotional Deism" or pantheism, but a religion of freedom and of conscience, its source of motivation is not to be found in the feeling for nature and in aestheticism, but in the "primacy of the practical" (p. 54). Kant possessed a much simpler and a consistent picture of Rousseau, which in just this simplicity was not less but more true than that which modern interpretation has often drawn for us (p. 58).

The main thread in Leander's thesis was of course the opposition between the "classicism" and "humanism" of Seillière, Babbitt and More, on the one hand, and the "naturalism" of Rousseau and of romanticism, on the other. Furthermore, the repercussion of naturalism or naturism was studied in Klages' "strange phi­ losophy", with its strain of "racial mysticism" and affinity with Blut und Boden (Leander 1937, p. 27). Against Karl Joël's interpre­ tation of romanticism as a nineteenth-century phenomenon, Leander defended the view of Seillière that the naturistic current remained predominant, especially in the cultural life of Germany. In his effort to characterize naturalism Leander cited now and then Cassirer's studies in German intellectual history in Freiheit und Form. For example, he took the poetry of the young Goethe as an illustration of the gulf between naturalistic feeling and the "higher will." He quoted Cassirer as saying that to Goethe "world and self has not yet separated - for the world is nothing but the living flow and motion of the All which can be grasped and per­

215

ceived as such only from the flow and motion of the Self. In this basic feeling, not in any abstract philosophical influences, lies the core of the 'pantheism' of this epoch" (p. 206; Leander translates from Freiheit und Form, 2nd ed., pp. 281-282). Whereupon Leander commented: "What is this if not the opposite pole from the inner unity and peace of the great religions?" Would this not have pro­ voked a response from Cassirer? Naturalistische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilo­ sophie is reminiscent of the title of Leander's book. The term "hu­ manistisch," used out of the Renaissance context, is rare in Cassi­ rer's works, and on the first occasion in which he uses it in the essay he puts quotation marks around it (Cassirer 1939, p. 15). For Cassirer it was in German "classicism" around 1800 that a foundation for a philosophy of man, expressed in the idea of humanitas, was laid down, although the beginnings of a philoso­ phy of culture could be found already in the seventeenth century. Cassirer mentions in this connection Dilthey's "natürliche Sys­ tem der Geisteswissenschaften," much discussed by the Göteborg philosophers. However, via Spinoza's monism, renewed by ro­ manticism, this natural system issued in the naturalism of the French critics of the nineteenth century. Interestingly, Cassirer relies partly for his exposition of this current on Babbitt's The Masters of Modern French Criticism (pp. 10,24). The upshot of Cas­ sirer's essay is that there is a gulf between the "will to form" which encompasses Leander's "moral dualism" but at the same time exceeds this narrow ethical definition of the self - of the humanistic cultural philosophy associated with Kant, Humboldt, Goethe, and others - and, on the other hand, the fatalism and historical determinism of the cultural philosophy of romanticism, including its continuation in Hegel, the French positivists, and Spengler. In sum, Cassirer's two essays of 1936 can be read as rebuttals of Leander's wholesale dismissal in Humanism and Naturalism of the "modern spirit." There was according to Cassirer more to mod­ ern thought, and especially German thought, than romantic pan­ 216

theism and naturalism, as German classicism and critical philo­ sophy demonstrated. Leander was as a matter of fact going to qualify his harsh judgement of every modern current of thought in a short popular study, Nya synpunkter på romantiken ("New perspectives on Romanticism," 1944). With explicit reference to Croce, but very likely also drawing inspiration from Cassirer, he here introduced a distinction between "higher" and "lower" ro­ manticism. The "higher romanticism," which covered what Cas­ sirer termed "classicism" and "humanism," was now seen by Leander as an advance on the classicism of the seventeenth cen­ tury, by virtue of its new sense of the eternal value of the indi­ vidual self. Leander became doctor in January 1937. It was Aspelin who acted as supervisor and proposed the grade, non sine laude approbatur, which was insufficient to make him docent. Aspelin found serious fault with Leander's method on several points, which made him inclined to propose only approbatur. But since Leander showed potential as a researcher, the thesis could merit the higher grade. Together with the professor of literature, Sverker Ek, Cassirer was called upon by the faculty to give his opinion of the thesis. Cassirer wrote an eight-page evaluation in which he praized Leander's command of the material and his independence as researcher. Even so, Leander had failed to demonstrate that Seillière's central concept, "imperialism", could be given a clear, philosophically determined meaning. Furthermore he had not given the theological problems involved in the writings of the American "Humanists" their proper elucidation. Many of the flaws pointed out by Aspelin could in Cassirer's view be attrib­ uted to the unfinished state of the thesis, to misleading expres­ sions rather than bad thinking. In the end, Cassirer did not object to the grade assigned by Aspelin, but stressed that, despite it's technical flaws, he considered Leander's thesis a promising and valuable work (GLA, AII: 31 + bil., 1/30/1937). In order to qualify for a university appointment, Leander was now forced to write an additional work. 217

An idea of how Leander's thesis was judged by his colleagues is given by the faculty opponent, Petzäll, in his review of Human­ ism and Naturalism in Theoria (III 1937, pp. 359-361). The review was in the main a laconic summary of Leander's argument. Petzäll remarked that the thesis contained analyses of the history of lit­ erature and noted the difficulty to square it with a scientific ter­ minology. Although the subject-matter was "very interesting," Petzäll found it to be "unfortunate that the author has chosen the form of a philosophical dissertation for his book, as this form does not do justice to the fascinating subject" (p. 361). A scholarship from the American-Scandinavian Foundation enabled Leander to visit the United States during February-De­ cember 1937, a time he mainly spent at the University of Princeton. In the United States a couple of articles were published, dealing with the American Humanists and the philosophy of John Dewey. "The Materialistic and the Humanistic Interpretations of His­ tory," published in The American Review 1937 (Vol. IX, No. 3, pp. 380-406), was a contentious discussion of current views of history. The title bears a close resemblance to Cassirer's afore­ mentioned essay. Leander had a strong view about the deficiency of the materialistic interpretation of history. He objected to its disregard of the ideal factor in history - "namely, a will to justice, to human dignity, and to a fullness of life transcending the satis­ factions of material desires" - which he countenanced "pace all Deweyites." Rather all that we saw, according to the materialistic interpretation, from the dawn of history down to our own times was but one thing, "in Hobbes' famous words, 'a desire for power after power that ceaseth only in death'" (p. 381). Leander further­ more took statements from Huizinga and Cassirer as validation of his claim that a valuation always coincided with the positing of historical reality. It is interesting to note, in view of Cassirer's later work on the logic of the cultural sciences, that Leander ulti­ mately touched upon the subject of the "logic of the Geisteswissen­ schaften" - although he disapproved of the word "logic" in this connection (p. 406). 218

As a result of his stay in the United States, Leander produced The Philosophy ofJohn Dewey: A Critical Study (1939), through which he in December 1938 was made docent of philosophy. When, in the prefatory note, he thanked those who had helped him in his work, he gave Cassirer the pride of place: In the attempt, the results of which are here being presented in print, to understand and to evaluate critically the work of Professor John Dewey, I have derived much profit from the study of Ernst Cassirer's philosophy. It is a pleasure to acknowledge this very comprehensive indebtedness and to thank him for his generous assistance in the preparation of this book.

Even if Leander was partly very critical of his philosophy, Dewey showed his appreciation of the work in a letter to the AmericanScandinavian Foundation, calling Leander "a man of unusual capacity" (Ryn 1980, p. 13). A new direction of thought is visible in Erfarenhetsbegreppet från estetikens utgångspunkter ("The Concept of Experience in the Light of Aesthetics," 1941). In this work Leander argued for the "panaesthetic" view: aesthetics should be considered the funda­ mental science, an idea he sought support for in Croce's and Dewey's analyses of experience. In the beginning of the 1940s Benedetto Croce became Leander's lodestar. Cassirer at the same time criticized Croce's aesthetic theory in Zur Logik der Kultur­ wissenschaften, in the essay on the "Die 'Tragödie der Kultur'" (pp. 129-133). The polemic against Croce is arguably given more room than is motivated by the theme of the essay. This could con­ veniently be explained, however, by an ongoing discussion with Leander about the merits of Croce's aesthetic ideas. Three years after Cassirer's departure from Göteborg, in spring term 1944, Leander taught parallel courses on "Ernst Cassirer's theory of knowledge" and "Benedetto Croce's aesthetics" By that time the philosophical confrontation between Cassirer and Croce had grown into a large manuscript. Estetik och kunskapsteori. Croce, Cassirer, Dewey ("Aesthetics and Epistemology. Croce, Cassirer, Dewey"), was finished in 1944, but remained unpublished until

219

1950, which mirrored Leander's difficulties in achieving a posi­ tion in Swedish philosophy. Of the three thinkers in the title, Leander declared that he had found Croce to be the most acute and perspicacious, and that he was guided throughout his book by Croce's understanding of logic (p. 3). The subject-matter of the study is the contribution of imagi­ nation to our knowledge. A critique of Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms is the main thread, but since Estetik och kunskaps­ teori contains discussions of much besides that, we have to try to lay bare this thread while ignoring Leander's treatment of the subject-matter in its full complexity: In this work of criticism, we have especially had Ernst Cassirer's Philosophie der symbolischen Formen in mind, because his problems are deeply related to our own, even if the outcome is different in crucial regards, (p. 248)

Leander declares moreover that he passes over the more impor­ tant distinction between an "ethical imagination" and different types of romantic-naturalistic imagination. An immanent criticism of Cassirer's philosophy is aimed at, with regard to the idea of different forms of activity: theoretical (aesthetic, logical) and practical. Leander obviously also wants to give a reply to Cassirer's criticism of Croce in Zur Logik der Kultur­ wissenschaften, where, according to Leander, Cassirer in a mis­ leading way implies that Croce regards art as non-cognitive. The starting-point is taken in Croce's criticism of Kant. The Italian philosopher argues that where Kant located his transcendental aethetics, he should rather have located the whole of aesthetics, understood as the theory of sensibility in general, and the place occupied by the treatment of space and time should be given over to the imagination (p. 69). Aesthetics is understood as the science of the pre-scientific formation of experience, or of pre-logical in­ tuition. Now, according to Leander, the obstacles to this pre-logical aesthetic synthesis of experience a priori can be studied in Cas­ sirer's work. In particular he objects to Cassirer's false "aphoristic 220

differentiations" between empirical concepts: language, myth, and art etc., a point on which Cassirer criticized Croce in Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften. Secondly, he directs attention to Cassirer's rationalistic interpretation of the symbolic function, which he finds underlying the rationalistic tendency in the philosophy of language. There are, however, different and conflicting concep­ tions in Cassirer's philosophy of language. Leander is of the opin­ ion that the contradiction runs through the whole of "the phi­ losophy of symbolic forms" (pp. 74-76). From the perspective of his own presuppositions, Cassirer cannot circumvent the need for a general science of "expression" (p. 81). Cassirer points himself to a pre-logical intensification as a common function, more fundamental than the rules and laws of science. His objection to Croce would then be no more than a question of terminology, since he tries to avoid using the term "aesthetic" for the intuitive or pre-logical activity (p. 84). Moreover, Cassirer's "phenomenon of expression" is much too undifferentiated, and confuses aesthetic expressive qualities and practical stimuli. In spite of his fundamentally Kantian out­ look, he fails to make a distinction between the theoretical and the practical moments of the phenomenon of expression, between the authentic phenomenon of expression, which is aesthetic, and stimuli or practical qualities (pp. 86, 98-99). With Dewey, Leander sees no difference in kind between big and small intuitions, between the intuition of the artist and our everyday intuition, little more than there can be a science of each, but only one science of both, namely aesthetics. Contrariwise, "the museum conception of art" (Dewey) is to be found in Cassirer's philosophy. Cassirer is of the opinion that the chief forms of art and genres are a priori, inherent in the idea of art. Leander be­ lieves that Cassirer is right when he says that Beethoven's intu­ ition is musical, Phidias' is plastic, Milton's epic etc., that is, that the medium is a part of the conception of the artwork. But this is not something Croce overlooks. What he contends is something different: that the number of media in principle is inexhaustible, 221

that historic traditions are not a priori, and that the logical status of classifications of media and historic traditions are different from the truly universal concepts. On his part, Cassirer cannot iden­ tify a principle that would determine which genres and art-forms are a priori and which are not (pp. 102-110). Between Croce's and Cassirer's philosophies of language Leander finds striking similarities. They both agree that logical thought presupposes an original, prelogical classification through the "intensifying" activity (Leander refers to Sprache und Mythos). But another, incompatible strain of thought presents itself in Cassirer, viz. that language is a creation of logical thought (Leander here quotes from Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, III). The same logos which is at work in mathematical science brings forth lan­ guage-concepts. A sliding towards panlogicism, says Leander, is pronounced in Cassirer. The same Cassirer who shows that lin­ guistic classifications stem from various propensities towards the concrete - that the universal moments are here only accidental later on maintains that even these classifications are products of a propensity towards the abstract. These contradictions would not arise, had he realized, as Litt has done, that significations can be simultaneously concrete and individual, that linguistic concepts are nothing but universal traits of something concrete. But Cassirer is only interested in the general moment in every particular intuition. It is wrong to believe, however, that there is no reference to the particular in language. Individually orientated activity must be sharply separated from the abstract reference (pp. 223-229). The symbolic function, Leander maintains, is aesthetic and not logical. It is a rationalistic misapprehension that hampers the emergence within modern philosophy of the idea of an intuitive organization of experience as a precondition for the logical orga­ nization. This is evidenced by the difficulties Cassirer runs into when he separates "Ausdruck" from "Darstellung". He thereby dissolves the intuitive function and lets the latter merge with logi­ cal thinking. Leander instead wants to underscore the identity of 222

"Ausdruck" and "Darstellung" on the basis of the unity of an intuitive activity (p. 241). But intuitive activity is regarded by Cassirer as an undeveloped form of discursive logical activity, and consequently the activity of the poet and the artist is regarded as a lower, undeveloped form of the activity of the scientist. Leander's critique of Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms was summarized in his contribution to The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, "Further Problems Suggested by the Philosophy of Sym­ bolic Forms," (1949) and again in a revised version in the German edition of that volume, "Uber einige offene Fragen, die aus der Philosophie der symbolischen Formen entspringen: CassirerCroce-Litt" (1966). In the German-language essay, the comparison with Croce is made explicit, and another of Leander's neo-Hegelian masters, Litt, is also involved in the discussion. Section I and II in the version of 1949 corresponds to the discussion of Cassirer's philosophy in Estetik och kunskapsteori, but leaves out Croce as the main source of Leander's objections. The argument of Section III, "An Analysis of the Logic of History and the Logic of Philosophy" has no immediate counterpart in the Swedish book. Leander claims in this section that Cassirer neglects the logic of philosophy, and that he always means mathematical science when he speaks of Wissenschaft. In this respect, Cassirer remains a neo-Kantian, to whom exact science, and not self-knowledge, is the highest form of logos. In Leander's view philosophy is selfknowledge, and self-knowledge is the basis of all other forms of knowledge. "The basic idea is that freely developing life finds its own law within itself." Leander contrasts philosophical knowl­ edge with science: "Only science is in substance impersonal." In­ dividuality is no part of the results. Therefore, Leander concludes, "Freedom and form," as the Leitmotiv of Cassirer's philosophy, cannot come into its own as long as mathematical science is taken to be the apex of our cognitive life (p. 357). Real understanding is possible in the human world - this cannot be rivalled by the ex­ ternal approach of science. But even if Cassirer has not worked out a theory of freedom and form in their philosophical progress, 223

he has, according to Leander, given us a brilliant illustration of it in his work. Leander's criticism of Cassirer's philosophy was later restated in a work by Leander's pupil Claes G. Ryn, Will, Imagination, and Reason: Irving Babbitt and the Problem of Reality (1986). Gunnar Aspelin was the only regular professor of philosophy at Göteborg and as such Cassirer's closest colleague. In Cassirer's speech to the students at Göteborg, discussed in an earlier chap­ ter, he praised him for his friendly interest in Cassirer's work. Although they differed on many points, they were agreed that philosophy should be guided by the tasks, problems, and meth­ ods of the special sciences (Cassirer 1940, p. 1). In Aspelin's view a challenge to philosophy issued from the social sciences. It was decided during Aspelin's time as professor that sociology should become an integral part of philosophy at Göteborg (Lindberg and Nilsson 1996, p. 173). Sociology was now introduced in Aspelin's teaching. For example in the autumn 1939, he gave lectures on general sociology and at his seminars prob­ lems in modern sociology were treated. On the other hand, the history of ideas was the "science" that Aspelin devoted his chief efforts to elucidating, for example in his essay in Lychnos on "Idéhistorien som vetenskap" ("The His­ tory of Ideas as a Science," 1949). It was the history of ideas to which Aspelin mainly contributed, especially the history of En­ lightenment and evolutionary ideas. In this field his Hegelian emphasis on the context of philosophical thought was conjoined with his interest in sociology. He became well known for his large synthetic works, the first of which was published during Cassi­ rer's time in Göteborg, Tankelinjer och trosformer ("Lines of thought and forms of belief," 1937), in a series called Vår tids historia, 18801930 ("The history of our time, 1880-1930"). Cassirer was asked to review this book for Theoria, but he apparently never found time to do it (Petzäll to Cassirer 4/23/38; Cassirer to Petzäll 3/4/ 38 [!]). The introduction contained a programmatic statement about the history of ideas. The division of the topics shows a simi­ 224

larity with Volume 4 of the Erkenntnisproblem: Aspelin first deals with the exact sciences, then biology, followed by "the problem of the knowledge of man" as well as "the problem of the knowl­ edge of society." Finally, a subject-matter not covered in Cassirer's book is treated, viz. religious ideas. At Aspelin's courses and seminars philosophical problems were usually approached from a historical perspective. In partic­ ular, he was a pioneer of the materialistic interpretation of his­ tory. Already in his early book, Historiens problem: Utvecklingsfilosofiska studier ("The problem of history: Studies in evolutionary philosophy," 1926), Aspelin dealt with the thought of Marx and Engels. The book gives a good idea of his philosophical interests, dealing with theories of evolution from Comte to Spencer, the problem of knowledge in historiography, and the controversy between the idealistic and materialistic interpretations of history. Late in life and inspired by the New Left, Aspelin wrote books on Karl Marx. This is not to say that he was a Marxist. His work in the philosophy of history does not bear the stamp of historical materialism, and class struggle is not a key concept in his inter­ pretations. Aspelin put forward his views on the history of philosophy in the paper "Aktuella problem inom filosofihistorisk forskning" ("Current problems in the history of philosophy," 1940), published in a book about contemporary Swedish science and scholarship, Vetenskap av i dag, co-edited by Aspelin. Cassirer owned a copy of this book. In this paper, the philosophers' close relation to the social realities, which determined their daily lives, was stressed. The relation between forms of thought and social forms was seen as a fruitful field of work for a modern history of philosophy. In a characteristically magisterial tone, Aspelin added that the mate­ rialistic interpretation of history "must not be given an offhand treatment by a historical science of ideas that wants to get in touch with the social realities" (p. 26). Aspelin exemplified with the age of French classicism, the similarities between Descartes' method­ ology, Boileau's aesthetic doctrine, the politics of Richelieu and

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Colbert etc. In every area one encountered the same tendency towards rational organisation, symmetry, austerity and rigid dis­ cipline. The task was, Aspelin contended, to understand the type of social life that expressed itself in these different fields. A socio­ logical twist was thus given to a historical subject-matter that re­ cently had preoccupied Cassirer in his book on Descartes, to which Aspelin made reference. In the aforementioned speech to the students, Cassirer told them about how he and Aspelin often and continuously had dis­ cussed various problems. He also gave a hint that they differed on specific questions. This was obviously the case with Marx's view on historical development. Cassirer and Aspelin further­ more had different opinions of Hägerström's emotivism or moral non-cognitivism. Aspelin wrote a bland review of Cassirer's Axel Hägerström in Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning (5/3/39) in which he avoided engaging in any argument with Cassirer. According to his autobiography, Lärospån i Lund: Minnen frän studentåren (Aspelin 1973, pp. 97-98), Aspelin was early on im­ pressed by Hägerström's philosophy. His commitment to emoti­ vism, in Sweden branded "value nihilism", was unorthodox at Lund when he started his career. This commitment is most evi­ dent in his work on French progressivism, Framstegsidén i franskt tankeliv från Descartes till Condorcet. Ett bidrag till sociologiens problemhistoria ("The idea of progress in French thinking from Descartes to Condorcet. A contribution to the history of socio­ logical problems," 1929), where he set out from the theory of emotivism, declaring valuation to be unjustified in research. He concluded that the concept of progress was inseparable from an emotional point of view, and stressed, in words that evoke the approach of the Uppsala School, the need for a logical analysis of evaluative concepts (pp. 171-172). This programme of concep­ tual analysis was not followed up by Aspelin himself, however. During his years as professor in Göteborg, Aspelin did not produce any major work in philosophy. His inaugural lecture, in spring 1937, dealt with Descartes' Discours de la méthode, a topic 226

suggested by the anniversary of that book. In his inaugural Aspelin made the point that the philosophy of Descartes issued in the ethical question, thereby laying the foundation for a philosophy of culture. From French thought, Aspelin's teaching and research interests in Göteborg turned to English philosophy, both past and contemporary. It was primarily to the philosophy of Locke that Aspelin directed his attention during these years. The outcome was a couple of essays and a short popular work, John Locke: Tänkaren och upplysningsmannen ("John Locke: The thinker and man of En­ lightenment," 1948). The book is a fine example of Aspelin's method in the history of ideas, treating the historical background to Locke's Essay as well as the polemics of that work. Aspelin's interest in seventeenth century English philosophy also bore fruit in Ralph Cudworth's interpretation of Greek philosophy: A study in the history of English philosophical ideas (1943, original in English). Likewise in his teaching Aspelin showed a predilection for British empiricism. His students were obliged to read Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic and he conducted seminars on Locke's theory of knowledge and on both Hume's epistemology and ethics. In his article "Idéhistorien som vetenskap," Aspelin made the claim that empiricism went hand in hand with progressive social ideologies. At least this was true in Aspelin's case. During World War II he was also a leading figure in the Swedish anti-Nazi movement. Unfortunately, Aspelin never wrote anything about his rela­ tionship with Cassirer in Göteborg. Nor did his autobiography reach this stage of his life. But he did write an article in Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning (5/16/45) after Cassirer's sudden death during the war, which captures something of the mutual appre­ ciation that developed between Cassirer and Göteborg: Cassirer found a home in our town and valued the atmosphere of intellectual and civic liberalism he met there. His time in Göteborg became a time of extraordinary scientific productivity, and he penetrated thoroughly into Swedish thought. His intention was to return and re-establish the connections with the friends he had made. He felt that he was not regarded as a stranger but as a man, whom we with pride and pleasure counted among our own.

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Appendix 1: The Manuscript of Das Erkenntnisproblem, Volume 4

For a long time the manuscript of Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit. Vierter Band. Von Hegels Tod bis zur Gegenwart (1832-1932), was lost. Charles W. Hendel once told the story of the manuscript in the preface to the English translation: When Ernst Cassirer left Sweden in May, 1941, to come to Yale University as Visiting Professor of Philosophy he left behind in Sweden an important work in manuscript form, fulfilment of a lifetime project, the fourth and final volume of the series on the 'Problem of Knowledge in Philosophy and Sci­ ence in Modern Times.' It would have been hardly wise for him to bring this newly completed manuscript with him on the voyage to America - the ship on which he traveled was the last one permitted by the German Government to come from Sweden to the United States, and it was stopped and searched. Cassirer's intention was to have typewritten copies made and dispatched later; but with the entry of the United States into the war that, too, was postponed. It was only after his death that the copy of the manuscript was obtained by Mrs. Cassirer on a visit to Sweden in 1946. (Cassirer 1950, p. vii)

It is important to note that Toni Cassirer only brought the type­ script with her back to the United States. What, then, had hap­ pened to the original manuscript? From extant letters it is pos­ sible to recreate the history of the manuscript until the editio princeps of the book in English 1950. The first mention of Volume 4 is in a letter from Cassirer to the publisher Gottfried Bermann-Fischer of June 27,1938: ... as a conclusion to my history of the problem of knowledge, I will write a fourth volume, which will treat the evolution of the problem in the last 100 years, that is from Hegel's death until today. (See Appendix to Cassirer 1999, p. 186)

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Cassirer estimated that it would take another 2 or 3 years before he was finished with the book. In this estimation he was amaz­ ingly correct, as it was finally written between July and November 1940. The situation in which the manuscript of Volume 4 was written is most vividly described in Toni Cassirer's Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer, and has been dealt with in a previous chapter. In an interview with the local daily Göteborgs Handels- och Sjö­ fartstidning March 15, 1941, Cassirer announced that Volume 4 would run up to about 400 pages and probably would be pub­ lished in 1942. About this time Cassirer made preparations for the sojourn in the United States. In a letter to Petzäll he explained that the library could be stored at the university: It is more difficult to find a safe keeping for the finished, but still unpub­ lished, manuscripts. If you, my dear Petzäll, would like to help me, then it would perhaps be best if I could send the sizeable MS of volume 4 of the 'Erkenntnisproblem' to you in Lund, so that it could be copied there, under Dr Moritz's survey and care. Then it could stay in your custody until its later publication, while I received a copy of the typescript, sent to America. It would be much to be preferred, if this work could begin soon and com­ pleted as swiftly as possible. In that case, I would also have the occasion to check at least a part of the copy myself before my journey. I hope that I will not burden you yourself through this arrangement. For the moment the whole thing could just be left lying - but later it would be a great relief to me if I could count on your help and your advice concerning publication. In the meantime, I ask you to put me into contact with Dr Moritz and the bureau, which could take on the copying, and then let me know your opin­ ion. (Letter to Petzäll 3/27/41)

The philosopher Manfred Moritz, briefly mentioned in earlier chapters, was born in Berlin and received the doctoral degree from the university there in 1933. Among his teachers at Berlin were Nicolai Hartmann and David Baumgardt. In 1934 he went into exile in Sweden. Moritz started as a neo-Kantian but in Sweden became converted to Hägerström's view on the nature of propo­ sitions in ethics and jurisprudence (Ahlberg and Regnéll 1974). At Göteborg in the 1930s he occasionally taught logic and attended Cassirer's lectures and seminars. Later he moved to Lund, where

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in 1951 he submitted another thesis and became Petzäll's docent, and in time also his successor as professor of practical philosophy. Petzäll agreed to Cassirer's proposal and within a couple of weeks he received the manuscript of Volume 4 in Lund. He con­ firmed the reception of the manuscript in a letter to Cassirer, writ­ ten in Swedish: I have today collected the manuscript from the post office. I am glad to have been entrusted to receive it. [Moritz] was here right now and picked it up. The idea struck him, that he just as well as the bureau could make the copy. He will write you himself about the copying. I think, that it will be done as quickly, and naturally also better, since he stands a better chance at reading the handwritten text correctly than a Swedish copyist. Otherwise we shall be careful to follow the instructions we have got about the various manuscripts. (Petzäll to Cassirer 4/17/41)

Moritz started the arduous work of copying the manuscript, but Cassirer was probably never able to check any part of the copy before he left Sweden. It would take Moritz almost three months to finish the typewriting. Finally, at the beginning of July, he was relieved to write to Petzäll: "The copying of the Cassirer-manu­ script is finished! 517 typewritten pages!" (Letter Moritz to Petzäll 7/7/41). Later in 1941 Petzäll told Marc-Wogau that Cassirer was thinking of publishing Volume 4 in the United States. "Moritz has typewritten his MS here in Lund. We have deposited the copy at the university library." (Petzäll to Marc-Wogau 8/30/41) After Cassirer's death in April, 1945, his wife continued pre­ paring the publication. She told Jacobsson in a letter that she con­ ducted discussions about the translation of Volume 4: Ernst explicitly wanted that the book should first appear in English. I do not wish to make any changes in this respect, but it seems somewhat strange to me, that we will then have neither a complete German, nor a complete English edition [of the Erkenntnisproblem series]. (T. Cassirer to Jacobsson 6/23/45)

As Hendel wrote in the preface to the English edition, Toni Cas­ sirer collected the typescript when she visited Sweden in 1946. 231

Moritz wrote to Petzäll during Toni Cassirer's visit that she asked about the manuscript, and that he, Moritz, was going to write to her (Moritz to Petzäll 7/26/46). For some unknown reason, Toni Cassirer did not take the manuscript with her when she returned to the United States. In 1950 the Yale University Press published the book in an English translation as The Problem of knowledge. Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel. Toni Cassirer informed Petzäll about it: Have you seen, that the fourth volume of the Erkenntnisproblem, now in English version - with the title "The Problem of Knowledge", has been released by the Yale Press? I think the translation is good. In any case, it has been three years in the making. (T. Cassirer to Petzäll 5/9/50).

It would last another seven years before the first German edition was published by Koihammer Verlag in Stuttgart with the title Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit. Band IV. Von Hegels Tod bis zur Gegenwart (1832-1932). Toni Cassirer sent a copy to Jacobsson and asked him about the where­ abouts of Moritz, so that she could send him a copy too (T. Cassirer to Jacobsson 12/6/57). In spite of later inquiries, the original manuscript was not found. It was only recently, during a research project in connec­ tion with the Ernst Cassirer Nachlass edition, that it was redis­ covered in the library at the University of Göteborg. The last per­ son connected with the fate of the manuscript in Sweden proved to be Cassirer's disciple Bertil Nydahl, who, according to an ex­ tant note, handed it over to the library in October 1947, i.e. more than a year after Toni Cassirer's visit in Sweden.

***

The manuscript consists of v + 573 numbered pages, written in black ink on both sides of the sheets. There are a lot of passages that have been struck through, but it must be left to a future analy­ sis to judge of their importance. From the look of it they are mostly alternative versions of the printed text.

232

4M -

W

■

3

Title page of the MS of Das Erkenntnisproblem, Vol. 4 (Göteborg University Library)

233

Final page of the MS of Das Erkenntnisproblem, Vol. 4 (Göteborg University Library)

234

A systematic collation of the printed text with the manuscript must await a critical edition of the work. On looking through the manuscript and comparing it with the first German edition of 1957 it became clear that Moritz had made certain emendations. In the following only the principal types of emendations will be indicated. The reading of the manuscript disclosed that Moritz indeed was conscientious when copying it. Still, there are some errors in the printed text that probably was caused by a misun­ derstanding of the corrections Moritz signalled in the text: 1. Several grammatical errors have been corrected. For ex­ ample in the following passage in the introduction: Denker wie Spencer versuchen noch den Entwurf einer wahrhaft synthe­ tischen Philosophie; aber gerade bei ihnen spürt man besonders deutlich die einseitige Abhängigkeit, in die sie von einzelnen wissenschaftlichen Fakten und Theorien, wie z. B. der Evolutionstheorie, geraten. (Cassirer 1957, p.22)

Here Moritz emended Cassirer's original (p. 11) "Abhängigkeit, in der sie von einzelnen wissenschaftlichen Fakten" etc. 2. Sometimes Moritz added a missing word. For example in the third chapter of the first book, near the end: Axiome sind jetzt nicht mehr inhaltliche Behauptungen von absoluter Gewissheit, sei es, dass man diese Gewissheit als eine rein intuitive oder als eine rationale fasst, dass man sie aus der Natur der Anschauung oder aus der Vernunft ableitet. (Cassirer 1957, p. 53)

In this case, Moritz added the crucial "nicht" to the sentence (cf. MS, p. 80). 3. Moritz also corrected factual errors, as in the following sen­ tence from the first chapter of the second book: In Newtons 'Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica' hat er das erste grosse System der Naturerkenntnis vor sich, das ihm in seinen Fundamenten als unerschütterlich gilt." (Cassirer 1957, p. 132).

235

Cassirer in the manuscript (p. 235) happened to write "Philosophiae naturalis principia systematica". 4. In order to make the spelling uniform, Moritz changed "Zweites Capitel" into "Zweites Kapitel", since Cassirer earlier had written "Erstes Kapitel." (MS, p. 65) 5. In cases of doubt Moritz checked a quotation against the original. As when Cassirer quotes Burckhardt's Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen in the fifth chapter of the third book (Cassirer 1957, p. 282): "die Künste ... Die Künste sind ein Können, eine Macht und Schöpfung" etc, Moritz noted in the margin: "so bei Burk­ hardt!". In the following sentence Moritz emended the quotation by supplying the word „wirkt", once again noting "so bei B.!" (MS, p. 490). Unfortunately, some emendations have been misinterpreted. When Moritz wanted to bring attention to an inadvertent repeti­ tion in the first chapter of the first book of the words "überhaupt synthetische Erkenntnisse", he put them in brackets (MS, p. 46). But in the German edition of the book the next word of the sen­ tence "a priori" was also put in Moritz' brackets and the sentence was thus wrongly reproduced as: "Kant hatte in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft erklärt, dass die Philosophie auf den stolzen Namen einer Ontologie, welche sich anmasst, von Dingen über­ haupt synthetische Erkenntnisse (überhaupt synthetische Er­ kenntnisse a priori) in einer systematischen Doktrin zu geben, Verzicht leisten müsse" etc. (Cassirer 1957, p. 34). The brackets are correctly omitted from the English translation, however: In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant declared that philosophy would have to renounce the proud name of an ontology that presumed to furnish in a systematized doctrine synthetic a priori judgments on all existence (Cassirer 1950, p. 26).

In the second chapter of the first book, Cassirer was going to quote from Poincaré - probably La Science et l'Hypotèse which is referred to later - but changed his mind, stroke through some words of the quotation, leaving the following words standing:

236

"man ... kann ..., da sie von Gebilden sprechen, die sich als solche der Möglichkeit des Experiments entziehen." He began anew, gave up a second attempt to quote, and paraphrased a part of the quotation in the following sentence: "Man kann niemals mit geometrischen, mit 'Idealen' Graden oder Kreisen Versuche anstellen" etc (MS, p. 77). Moritz later put the lines in square brackets. Even so, in both the English and the German edition the partly deleted quotation from Poincaré has been reproduced. In the English translation this has been done while rightly omit­ ting the quotation marks, whereas in the German edition the quotation marks has been kept. But since the sentence as it stands in the manuscript does not make sense, it has been altered, giv­ ing the impression of an accurate rendering in German of Poincaré's words: " 'Man kann da von Gebilden sprechen, die sich als solche der Möglichkeit des Experimentes entziehen'." (Cas­ sirer 1957, p. 52; cf. Cassirer 1950, p. 44).

237

Appendix 2: Chronology

July 28,1874:

Cassirer is born in Breslau (today Wroclaw, Poland)

November 1929November 1930:

Rector of the University of Hamburg

January 30,1933:

Hitler is appointed Reich Chancellor

March 12,1933:

Cassirer leaves Germany together with his wife.

April 5,1933:

Requests the rector of the University of Hamburg for a leave of absence.

May 1933:

Invited by the philosopher Malte Jacobsson to lecture in Sweden. At the same time invitations from New School, N. Y., and Oxford reach him.

July 28,1933:

In compliance with an anti-Jewish law, the University of Hamburg informs Cassirer that he is pensioned off.

August 1933:

Invited to lecture and conduct seminars at the University of Uppsala, but declines in favour of Oxford.

June 1934:

Agrees with the rector of the University of Uppsala to lec­ ture there, from September 15 to October 15.

September 5,1934:

Arrives with his wife in Stockholm. A couple of weeks later they move to Uppsala. Lectures on the philosophy of the Enlightenment.

October 12-13,1934: Lectures in Göteborg, on Jacobsson's invitation, where­ upon he and his wife leave Sweden by boat.

January-June 1935:

Correspondence with Jacobsson about an appointment at the University of Göteborg. A major problem is the Reichs­ fluchtsteuer, which Cassirer finally succeeds in being ex­ empted from.

June 14,1935:

The University of Göteborg appoints Cassirer professor of theoretical philosophy for a period of five years, start­ ing September 1.

August 23,1935:

Arrives with his wife in Göteborg.

239

September 9,1935:

Moves to Föreningsgatan 11, Göteborg, henceforth his per­ manent address in Sweden.

October 19,1935:

Inaugural lecture: "Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Philo­ sophie."

February 6,1936:

"Thorough" discussion with Niels Bohr in Copenhagen.

March 1936:

Delivers public lectures at the University of Göteborg un­ der the heading of "Die Idee der 'inneren Form' in Goethes Dichtung und Naturanschauung."

April 1936:

Finishes the manuscript of Determinismus und Indetermi­ nismus.

Summer 1936:

Visits England and Scotland.

December 1936:

Lectures in Prague on "Kant und Rousseau" and in Vienna on "Naturalistische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilosophie. "

OctoberDecember 1937:

Works on Ziele and Wege der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis.

October 1937:

Writes a reply to Marc-Wogau for Theoria: "Zur Logik des Symbolbegriffs."

March 1938:

After the annexation of Austria by Germany, he labours at helping relatives and friends who approach him and ask for advice. Finishes an extensive article on the topic "Descartes und Königin Christina von Schweden."

August 1938:

Son Georg arrives with his family in Göteborg.

October 1938:

Gives a series of public lectures at the University of Göteborg on Descartes and Queen Christina of Sweden.

November 9:

Crystal Night pogroms

November:

Works on Axel Hägerström.

November 26:

Writes a letter to Albert Görland.

February 23, 1939:

Lectures in the Philosophical Society, Stockholm, under the heading "Was ist Subjektivismus? Bemerkungen zur Erkenntnislehre Hägerströms und Phaléns."

June 2,1939:

Becomes Swedish citizen along with his wife.

September 1,1939:

Germany attacks Poland.

240

September:

Begins two lecture series, one on philosophical anthropol­ ogy, and the other on the philosophy of culture.

November 17,1939: Lectures in the Philosophical Society, Lund on "Logos und Dike in der griechischen Philosophie." April 9, 1940:

German attack on Denmark and Norway. He evacuates Göteborg with his wife, going to the countryside near Alingsås.

July 9,1940:

Begins to write Volume 4 of Das Erkenntnisproblem.

September 1,1940:

Becomes emeritus.

October 1940March 1941:

Gives public lectures at Göteborg on "Der junge Goethe."

February 4,1941:

Inaugural speech in Kungl. Historie- Antikivitets- och Vitterhets-Akademien: "Thorild und Herder."

March-April 1941:

Makes preparations for the journey to America.

April 25,1941:

Hands over the manuscript of Zur Logik der Kulturwissen­ schaften to Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift.

May 20,1941:

Leaves Göteborg together with his wife on the freighter Remmaren.

October 11,1941:

Honorary doctor at the University of Göteborg.

April 13,1945:

Dies in New York.

241

Appendix 3: Cassirer's Lectures in Sweden

1.

"Die Philosophie der Aufklärung," Uppsala, September to October, 1934.

2.

"Goethe und Platon," Stockholm, September 23,1934.

3.

"Prinzipien einer Philosophie der symbolischen Formen," Stockholm, Oc­ tober 1,1934. (Repeated in Uppsala, October 9,1934 and Göteborg, October 12,1934.)

4.

"Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Philosophie," Göteborg, October 19, 1935. (Inaugural lecture.)

5.

"Die Funktion der Sprache im Aufbau der naturwissenschaftlichen Erkennt­ nis," Lund, February 4, 1936.

6.

"Kant und Rousseau," Göteborg (?), February 14 or 15,1936. (First given in Prague December 13,1936; also in Stockholm October 13,1937 and Febru­ ary 25, 1939.)

7.

"Die Idee der 'inneren Form' in Goethes Dichtung und Naturanschauung," Göteborg, March, 1936.

8.

"Naturalistische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilosophie," Stockholm, October 14,1937. (First given in Vienna December 17,1936; also in Uppsala October 15,1937.)

9.

"Königin Christina und Descartes. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts," Göteborg, October, 1938.

10. "Descartes in Stockholm," Göteborg, 1938 or 1939.

11. "Was ist Subjektivismus? Bemerkungen zur Erkenntnislehre Hägerströms und Phaléns," Stockholm, February 23, 1939. (Also in Göteborg 1938 or 1939.) 12. "Descartes und Königin Christina," Uppsala, February 24,1939.

243

13.

14. 15.

'"Logos' und 'Dike' in der griechischen Philosophie," Lund, November 17, 1939. "Der junge Goethe," Göteborg, October 2,1940 to March 12,1941. "Kant und die moderne Biologie," Göteborg, October 27,1940. (Repeated in Stockholm, February 3,1941.)

16.

"Thorilds Erkenntnislehre," Göteborg, 1940 or 1941.

17.

"Thorild und Herder," Stockholm, February 4,1941.

18.

"Goethes geistige Leistung," Lund, March 19, 21, and 24,1941.

19.

"Zur Erkenntnistheorie der Kulturwissenschaften," Lund, March 20,1941. (Repeated in Göteborg as "Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften," April 4, 1941.)

20.

Lecture on Hermann Cohen's relation to Judaism, Malmö, March 23,1941 (?).

244

Appendix 4: Cassirer's Lectures and Seminars at Göteborg 1935-19412

Autumn term 1935 L: "Geschichte und System des philosophischen Idealismus, I: Platon und die geschichtliche Fortbildung des Platonismus." S: "Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, I."

Spring term 1936 L: "Geschichte und System des philosophischen Idealismus, II: Begründung und Entwicklung des metaphysischen Idealismus." S: "Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, II." (Public lectures: "Die Idee der inneren Form in Goethes Dichtung und Natur­ anschauung.") Autumn term 1936 L: "Geschichte und System des philosophischen Idealismus, III: Kants Sys­ tem." S: "Leibniz' Hauptschriften."

Spring term 1937 L: "Geschichte und System des philosophischen Idealismus, IV: Kant und die Nachkantischen Systeme, I: Die Grundlegung des Kantischen System."3 S: "Leibniz' Hauptschriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik."

Autumn term 1937 L: "Grundprobleme der Logik und Erkenntniskritik." S: "Grundfragen der Logik (Die Lehre vom Begriff)."

2

3

The table is based on the printed University catalogue for each term (Göteborgs högskolas katalog) and Cassirer's handwritten record (GLA, F III: b 17-19). "Lectures" is abbreviated L, "seminars" S. The lectures were announced in the University catalogue under the head­ ing of: "Kant und die Nachkantischen Systeme (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer)."

245

Spring term 1938 L: "Die Philosophie der Griechen, als historische Einleitung in die Philosophie." S: "Platons Ideenlehre."4 Autumn term 1938 L: "Philosophie und allgemeine Ideengeschichte der Aufklärungsepoche." S: "Platons Ideenlehre II (Republik, Theaitet, Sophistes)." (Public lectures: "Königin Christina und Descartes. Ein Beitrag zur Ideen­ geschichte des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts.") Spring term 1939 L: "Die Philosophie Kants."5 S: "Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft."

Autumn 1939 L: "Grundzüge der philosophischen Anthropologie: die „Lehre vom Men­ schen" in ihrer philosophischen6 Entwicklung, I." L: "Grundprobleme der Kulturphilosophie, I." S: "Kulturphilosophie." Spring term 1940 L: "Grundzüge der philosophischen Anthropologie: die 'Lehre von Menschen' in ihrer philosophischen Entwicklung, II: Von der Renaissance bis zur Gegenwart." L: "Grundprobleme der Kulturphilosophie, II." S: "Probleme der Kulturphilosophie in Anschluss and Th. Litt Individuum und Gemeinschaft (3. Auf!., 1926)."

Autumn term 1940 L: "Der junge Goethe." Spring term 1941 L: "Der junge Goethe."

4

5

6

246

The seminars were announced in the University catalogue under the head­ ing of: "Platons Dialoge (Menon, Phaidon, Republik Buch VI u. VII)." The lectures were announced in the University catalogue under the head­ ing of: "Die Philosophie Kants (Erfahrungslehre, Ethik, Aesthetik)", but ac­ cording to the handwritten record Kant's ethics and aesthetics were never treated. In the handwritten record: "geschichtlichen."

Appendix 5: Cassirer's Academic Writings during his Swedish Years

I.

Published Texts

1936 1. Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik. Historische und systematische Studien zum Kausalproblem. In: Göteborgs Högskolas Års­ skrift 42. Nr. 3. (1936). 2. Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs. Bemerkungen zu Konrad Marc-Wogau: Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs. In: Theoria. Göteborg 2 (1936): 207-232.

1937 3. Descartes et l'idée de l'unité de la science. Übersetzt von P. Schrecker. In: Revue de Synthèse. Paris. 14. Nr. 1 (1937): 7-28. 4. Descartes' Wahrheitsbegriff. Betrachtungen zur 300-Jahresfeier des "Dis­ cours de la Méthode". In: Theoria. Göteborg 3 (1937): 161-187. 5. Wahrheitsbegriff und Wahrheitsproblem bei Galilei. In: Scientia. Bologna. (Sep.-Okt. 1937): 121-130, 185-193. 1938 6. Descartes' Dialog "Recherche de la Vérité par la lumière naturelle" und seine Stellung im Ganzen der Cartesischen Philosophie. Ein InterpretationsVersuch. In: Lychnos. Lärdomshistoriska Samfundets Årsbok. Uppsala/ Stockholm. (1938): 139-179. 7. Le concept de groupe et la théorie de la perception. Trans, by P. Guillaume. In: Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique 35 (1938): 368-414. 8. Review of: A. Cornelius Benjamin: An Introduction to the philosophy of science. New York: Macmillan 1937. In: Lychnos. Upsala/Stockholm. (1938): 456-461. 9. Über Bedeutung und Abfassungszeit von Descartes' "Recherche de la Vérité par la lumière naturelle". Eine kritische Betrachtung. In: Theoria. Göteborg 4 (1938): 193-234. 10. Review of: Friedrich Dannenberg: Das Erbe Platons in England bis zur Bil­ dung Lylys. Studien einer Spiegelung. Berlin: Juncker und Dünnhaupt 1932. In: A Bibliography on the Survival of the Classics. Second Volume. The Publica­ tions of 1932-1933. Edited by the Warburg Institute. London: The Warburg Institute. 1938: 282.

247

11. Review of: Oeuvres complètes de Malebranche. Édition critique par Désiré Roustan en collaboration avec Paul Schrecken Tome 1. Paris: Boirin et Cie 1938. In: Theoria. Göteborg 4 (1938): 297-300. 12. Zur Logik des Symbolbegriffs. In: Theoria. Göteborg 4 (1938): 145-175. 1939 13. Axel Hägerström. Eine Studie zur Schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart. In: Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 45 (1939:1): 1-119. 14. Descartes. Lehre - Persönlichkeit - Wirkung. Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer Verlag 1939. 15. Die Philosophie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. Paris: Hermann & Cie 1939. (= Chronique Annuelle, publiée par l'institut International de Collabora­ tion Philosophique). 16. Naturalistische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilosophie. In: Göteborgs Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhälles Handlingar. Femte följden. Ser. A. Bd. 7. Nr. 3 (1939): 1-28. 17. Was ist "Subjektivismus"? In: Theoria. Göteborg 5 (1939): 111-140.

1940 18. Drottning Christina och Descartes. Ett bidrag till 1600-talets idéhistoria, Stock­ holm, 1940. 19. Mathematische Mystik und mathematische Naturwissenschaft. Betrach­ tungen zur Entstehungsgeschichte der exakten Wissenschaft. In: Lychnos. Upsala/Stockholm (1940): 248-265. 20. Neuere Kant-Litteratur. In: Theoria. Göteborg 6 (1940): 87-100. 21. Tal till Studenterna. In: Götheborgske Spionen. Organ för Göteborgs högskolas studentkår. No 2 Juni 1940:1-3. 1941 22. "Henry [sic] Bergsons etik och religionsfilosofi," In: Judisk Tidskrift. Stock­ holm 14:1 (1941): 13-18. 23. Logos, Dike, Kosmos in der Entwicklung der griechischen Philosophie. In: Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 47: 6. (1941): 1-31. 24. Thorilds Stellung in der Geistesgeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. In: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens Handlingar 51: 1. Stockholm (1941): 1-125. 25. Thorild und Herder. In: Theoria. Göteborg 7 (1941): 75-92. 1942 26. Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften. Fünf Studien. In: Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 48. Heft 1 (1942): 1-139.

248

II. Manuscript prepared for publication and printed posthumously 1940:

1950:

1957:

Completion of the manuscript of Das Erkenntnisproblem, vol. 4 (see Appendix 1 of this volume). Publication in English translation as The Problem of Knowledge: Philoso­ phy, Science, and History since Hegel. With a Preface by Charles W. Hendel. Translated by William H. Woglom, M.D. and Charles W. Hendel. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. First publication of the German text: Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit. Volume 4: Von Hegels Tod bis zur Gegenwart (1832-1932). Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.

III. Unpublished Texts written in Sweden to appear in the edition of Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995ff.) ECN 1: Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen. Edited by John Michael Krois. 1995. Available in English translation as Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 4: The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms. Including the text of Cassirer's manu­ script on Basis Phenomena. Edited by John Michael Krois and Donald Phillip Verene, translated by John Michael Krois (New Haven: Yale Uni­ versity Press, 1996).

ECN 2: Ziele und Wege der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis. Edited by Klaus Christian Köhnke and John Michael Krois. 1998. ECN 3: Geschichte, Mythos. Edited by Klaus Christian Köhnke, Herbert KoppOberstebrink and Rüdiger Kramme. 2002. ECN 4: Über symbolische Prägnanz, Ausdrucksphänomen und 'Wiener Kreis'. In Pre­ paration. Includes: [Ausdrucksphaenomenund "Wiener Kreis".] Göteborg. 1935/ 36.

ECN 5: Kulturphilosophie. Vorlesungen und Vorträge. Edited by Rüdiger Kramme. 2004. Includes: "Probleme der Kulturphilosophie." Lecture course at Göte­ borg, Höstterminen 1939/40.

249

"Zur Erkenntnistheorie der Kulturwissenschaft." Lecture given 20.3. 1941 at the Filosofiska föreningen Lund, repeated in April in Göteborg. "Zur 'Objektivität der Ausdrucksfunktion'." Text supplement to the above lecture course "Probleme der Kulturphilosophie." ECN 6: Zur philosophischen Anthropologie. Edited by Gerald Hartung and Herbert Kopp-Oberstebrink. In Press. Includes the Göteborg lecture course "Geschichte der philosopischen Anthropologie." Teil I. Zur Antike und Mittelalter. [Höstterminen 1939/40.] "Geschichte der philosophischen Anthropologie." Teil II. Renaissance und Mittelalter. [Vårterminen 1940.] ECN 11: Goethe-Vorlesungen. Edited by John Michael Krois. 2003. ECN 17: Zur Philosophie Kants. In Preparation. Includes "Kant und die moderne Biologie." Lecture held in Stockholm 3.2.1939 and at the Oceanografiska Institutet in Göteborg, 27.10.1940. (Two manuscripts) Briefwechsel von und an Cassirer. Edited by John Michael Krois. In Preparation. This volume will include Cassirer's correspondence with Swedish scholars.

250

Bibliography

I.

Manuscript Sources

Antikvarisk-topografiska arkivet (ATA), Stockholm Protocols from the meetings of Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Aka­ demien, 1940-1941

Bodleian Library MS S. P. S. L 475/3, fol. 419: Karl Joël to A. A. C July 3,1933.

Göteborgs landsarkiv (GLA) Malte Jacobsson A 335, Vol. 2: Letters from Ernst Cassirer; from Toni Cassirer. Göteborgs Högskola, E 1:6: Styr. prot. 14 juni 1935, bil. (Cassirer's appointment) Göteborgs Högskola, E III: 5: Letter Cassirer to Curt Weibull, Göteborgs högskolas rektor, October 12,1938. Göteborgs Högskola, F III b: 17-19: Records of lectures and seminars Göteborgs Högskola, FIV a: 2: Ernst Cassirer's professorship Göteborgs Högskolas, F VI a: 4: Göteborgs Högskolas 50-årsfest (Axel Romdahl's speech to the Honorary Doctors October 11,1941) Göteborgs Högskola, F VIII: 2: Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift Poliskammaren i Gbg, Utlänningsavdelningen D VI: 6: Report November 11, 1935 concerning Ernst Cassirer; Summons served on Ernst Cassirer.

Göteborgs universitetsbibliotek Elof Åkessons samling: Letters from Ernst Cassirer; copies of letters to Ernst Cassirer. Axel Boëthius' papper: Letters from Toni Cassirer. Brev till Per Johan Vising, Utländska korresp.: Letter from Cassirer September 28,1939.

251

The Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana

Fischer Mss: Letters Gottfried Bermann-Fischer to Cassirer Letters Cassirer to Gottfried Bermann-Fischer

Kungliga biblioteket, Stockholm

Letters to Martin Lamm, R 48: Letters from Ernst Cassirer.

Lund universitetsbibliotek Sami. Alf Nyman: Letters from Ernst Cassirer. Sami. Ragnar Josephson: Letters from Ernst Cassirer. Brevsaml. Åke Petzäll: Copies of letters to Ernst Cassirer; Letters from Ernst Cassirer; Letters from Toni Cassirer; Copy of letter to Ernst Hoffmann, un­ dated; Letters from Manfred Moritz; Letter from Bertil Nydahl October 25, 1943; Postcard from H. J. Pos May 31,1936. Brevsaml. Åke Petzäll, Theoria: Letters from Ernst von Aster; Copies of letters to Ernst von Aster; Letters from Ernst Cassirer; Copies of letters to Ernst Cassirer; Copy of letter to Heinrich Cassirer August 3,1938; Copy of letter to Ernst Hoffmann August 3,1936; Letters from Ingemar Hedenius; Copies of letters to Ingemar Hedenius; Letters from Konrad Marc-Wogau; Copies of letters to Konrad Marc-Wogau.

Niels Bohr Arkivet, Copenhagen Gen. Corr.: Letter from Ernst Cassirer February 11,1937.

Riksarkivet (RA), Stockholm Judiska församlingen, Ehrenpreis, ink. brev 36-37,1G 37: Letter Herman Löb to Ehrenpreis November 5,1935. Mapp 33, Justitiedep. 1939, 2 juni, Sv. Medborgarskap Ernst Cassirer (Swedish citizenship, Ernst Cassirer). UD 1920 års dossiersystem, P 984, Föreläsningar av utlänningar (Foreign office correspondence about invitation to the University of Uppsala 1933).

252

Uppsala universitetsbibliotek Ingemar Hedenius arkiv: letters from Cassirer Anders Karitz samling: Anders Karitz to Cassirer Anders Karitz brevsamling, brev till Karitz frän A-G: Letters from Cassirer G194 h: 26, Brev till N. J. Nordström från svenskar T-Va: Letter from Einar Tegen Easter Sunday 1938. G 194 h: 30, Brev till N.J. Nordström från utlänningar A-Ca, nr 210-245: Letters from Cassirer Brev till N. J. Nordström från utlänningar Th-Ö etc.: Letter from Erich Voegelin January 9, 1937. G194 h: 43, N. J. Nordströms samling etc.: Letter from Cassirer September 7,1936 Gunnar Rudberg 11: Letter from Cassirer September 29,1936. Okat. T. Segerstedt 3: Letter from Cassirer December 31,1938. Universitetsarkivet, Fil. Fak., Hum. sek. prot., A1 b: 40: September 4,1933 + bil. A and B; September 12,1933 + bil. (Invitation to the University of Uppsala). Universitetsarkivet, E III C: Letters Cassirer to Tore Engströmer, Uppsala uni­ versitets rektor

The Warburg Institute, London Letters and postcards Ernst Cassirer and Toni Cassirer to Fritz Saxi and Gertrud Bing.

Yale Beinecke Library Gen Mss 335, Box 3, folder 72: Letters from Tore Engströmer, Uppsala universitets rektor Gen Mss 335, Series II, Box 2, folders 52-59: Letters Ernst Hoffmann to Cassirer. Gen Mss 355, Box 2, folder 60: Letters Malte Jacobsson to Cassirer 1933-1935 Gen Mss: 355, Box 3, folder 77: Letter Hermann Löb to Cassirer July 14,1933.

II. Printed sources Aschberg, Olof, Gästboken, Stockholm, 1955. Aspelin, Gunnar, "Aktuella problem inom filosofihistorisk forskning," in G. Aspelin and G. Turesson, eds., Vetenskap av idag, Stockholm, 1940, pp. 11-32.

253

Aspelin, Gunnar, Framstegsidén i franskt tankeliv frän Descartes till Condorcet: Ett bidrag till sociologiens problemhistoria (Lunds universitets årsskrift: Första avdelningen, Teologi, juridik och humanistiska ämnen, 25: 2), Lund, 1929. Aspelin, Gunnar, Historiens problem: Utvecklingsfilosofiska studier, Stockholm, 1926. Aspelin, Gunnar, "Idéhistorien som vetenskap," Lychnos 1948-49, pp. 129-143. Aspelin, Gunnar, Lärospån i Lund: Minnen frän studentåren, Lund 1973. Aspelin, Gunnar, John Locke. Tänkaren och upplysningsmannen (Göteborgs Hög­ skola: Forskningar och föreläsningar), Lund, 1948. Aspelin, Gunnar, Tankelinjer och trosformer: Huvudriktningar i vår tids idéhistoria (Vår egen tids historia, 6), Stockholm, 1937. Cassirer, Ernst, review of "A. Cornelius Benjamin: An introduction to the phi­ losophy of science. New York: Macmillan 1937," Lychnos, 1938, pp. 456461. Cassirer, Ernst, Axel Hägerström. Eine Studie zur schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 45:1), Göteborg, 1939a. Cassirer, Ernst, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit, Band IV: Von Hegels Tod bis zur Gegenwart (1832-1932), Darm­ stadt, 1995. Cassirer, Ernst, "Descartes et l'idée de l'unité de la science," Revue de Synthèse, Vol. XIV, 1937, pp. 7-28. Cassirer, Ernst, Descartes. Lehre - Persönlichkeit - Wirkung, edited by Rainer A. Bast. Hamburg, 1995. Cassirer, Ernst, "Descartes' Recherche de la Vérité par lumière naturelle und seine Stellung im Ganzen der Cartesischen Philosophie: Ein Interpretations­ versuch," Lychnos, 1938, pp. 139-179. Cassirer, Ernst, "Descartes' Wahrheitsbegriff: Betrachtungen zur 300-Jahresfeier des 'Discours de la Methode'," Theoria, Vol. Ill 1937, pp. 161-187. Cassirer, Emst, Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik: Histo­ rische und systematische Studien zum Kausalproblem (Göteborgs Högskolas Års­ skrift 42: 3), Göteborg, 1936. Cassirer, Emst, "Die Philosophie im XVII. und XVIII. Jahrhundert," Chronique Annuelle, publiée par l'institut International de Collaboration Philosophique, Paris, 1939. Cassirer, Ernst, Drottning Christina och Descartes. Ett bidrag till 1600-talets idéhistoria, Stockholm, 1940a. Cassirer, Ernst, Geist und Leben: Schriften zu den Lebensordnungen von Natur und Kunst, Geschichte und Sprache, Leipzig, 1993. Cassirer, Ernst, "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: A Study in the History of Re­ naissance Ideas," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. Ill, No. 2, April 1942, pp. 123-144, 319-346. Cassirer, Ernst, "Henry [sic] Bergsons etik och religionsfilosofi," Judisk Tidskrift, Vol. XIV, 1941:1, pp. 13-18.

254

Cassirer, Ernst, "Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs. Bemerkungen zu Konrad MarcWogau's gleichnamiger Schrift," Theoria, Göteborg, Vol. II, 1936, pp. 207232. Cassirer, Ernst, "Judendomen och de moderna politiska myterna," Judisk Tidskrift, Vol. XIX, 1946: 9, pp. 266-274. Cassirer, Ernst, "Kant and Rousseau," in: Rousseau, Kant, Goethe: Two Essays (The History of Ideas Series, No. 1), Princeton, 1947, pp. 1-60. Cassirer, Ernst, "Le concept de groupe et la théorie de la perception," Journale de Psychologie normale et pathologique, Vol. XXXV, 1938, pp. 368-414. Cassirer, Ernst, Logos, Dike, Kosmos in der Entwicklung der griechischen Philosophie (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, 47: 6), Göteborg, 1941. Cassirer, Ernst, "Mathematische Mystik und mathematische Naturwissenschaft. Betrachtungen zur Enstehungsgeschichte der exakten Wissenschaft," Lychnos, 1940, pp. 248-265. Cassirer, Ernst, Naturalistische und humanistische Begründung der Kulturphilosophie (Göteborgs Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhälles Handlingar, Ser. A, Humanistiska skrifter, Följd 5, 7: 3), Göteborg, 1939. Cassirer, Ernst, "Neuere Kant-Litteratur," Theoria, Göteborg, Vol VI 1940c, pp. 87-100. Cassirer, Ernst, review of "Oeuvres complètes de Malebranche. Edition critique par Desir Roustan en collaboration avec Paul Schrecker. Tome 1. Paris: Boirin et Cie 1938," Theoria, Vol. IV, 1938, pp. 297-300. Cassirer, Ernst, "Tal till studenterna," Götheborgske Spionen, Vol. V, 1940: 3, pp. 1-3. Cassirer, Ernst, "The Concept of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem," in Symbol, Myth, Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer 1935-1945. Ed­ ited by D.P. Verene. New Haven and London, 1979, pp. 49-63. Cassirer, Ernst, "The Influence of Language upon the Development of Scientific Thought," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXIX, No. 12, June 4,1942, pp. 309327. Cassirer, Ernst, The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel, New Haven, 1950. Cassirer, Ernst, "Thomas Manns Goethe-Bild: Eine Studie über 'Lotte in Wei­ mar'," Germanic Review, Vol. XX, No. 3, October 1945, pp. 166-194. Cassirer, Emst, Thorilds Stellung in der Geistesgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens Handlingar 51: 1), Stock­ holm, 1941a. Cassirer, Ernst, "Thorild und Herder," Theoria, Göteborg, Vol. VII 1941b, pp. 7592. Cassirer, Ernst, "Über Bedeutung und Abfassungszeit von Descartes' 'Recherche de la Vérité par la lumière naturelle': Eine kritische Betrachtung," Theoria, Vol. IV, 1938, pp 193-234.

255

Cassirer, Ernst, "Wahrheitsbegriff und Wahrheitsproblem bei Galilei," Scientia, Sept.-Oct. 1937, pp. 121-130, 185-193. Cassirer, Ernst, "Was ist 'Subjektivismus'?," Theoria, Göteborg, Vol. V, 1939b, pp. 111-140. Cassirer, Ernst, Ziele und Wege der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis, edited by K. C. Köhnke and J.M. Krois. In Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte, 2. Hamburg, 1999. Cassirer, Ernst, Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften: Fünf Studien (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, 47:1), Göteborg, 1942. Cassirer, Ernst, "Zur Logik des Symbolbegriffs," Theoria, Göteborg, Vol. IV, 1938, pp. 145-175. Cassirer, Ernst, Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen, edited by J. M. Krois, in Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte, 1. Hamburg, 1995. Cassirer, Toni, Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer, Hildesheim, 1981. Ehrenpreis, Marcus, Mitt liv mellan öster och vaster, Stockholm, 1946. Hedenius, Ingemar, Sensationalism and theology in Berkeley's philosophy, Uppsala, 1936. Hedenius, Ingemar, "Über den alogischen Charakter der sog. Werturteile. Be­ merkungen zu Ernst Cassirer Axel Hägerström," Theoria, Göteborg, Vol V, 1939a, pp. 314-329. Hedenius, Ingemar, "Begriffsanalyse und kritischer Idealismus," Theoria, Göte­ borg, Vol V, 1939b, pp. 281-313. Hedenius, Ingemar, Om rätt och moral, Stockholm,1941. Husserl, Edmund, Briefwechsel, Vol. 5: Die Neukantianer, Dordrecht, 1994. Hägerström, Axel, Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft, Uppsala, 1908. Hägerström, Axel, Om moraliska föreställningars sanning, Stockholm, 1911. Hägerström, Axel, Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen/Axel Hägerström, Leipzig, 1929. Hägerström, Axel, Der römische Obligationsbegriff im Lichte der allgemeinen römi­ schen Rechtsanschauung I (Skrifter utgivna av K. Humanistiska vetenskaps­ samfundet i Uppsala, 23), Uppsala, 1927. Jacobsson, Malte, "Bidrag till vänskapens sociologi," in Festskrift tillägnad Axel Hägerström den 6 september 1928 av filosofiska och juridiska föreningarna i Uppsala, Uppsala, 1928, pp. 178-183. Jacobsson, Malte, Minnesbilder, Stockholm, 1964. Jacobsson, Malte, Om statsmoral: Är staten bunden av individualmoralens regler?, Stockholm, 1925. Jacobsson, Malte, Pragmatismen: Särskilt i dess förhållande till kriticismen, Lund, 1910. Jacobsson, Malte, Psykisk kausalitet, Göteborg, 1913. Karlgren, Bernhard, Inbjudning till åhörande av de offentliga föreläsningar varmed Axel Lindqvist och... Ernst Cassirer komma att tillträda sina ämbeten vid Göteborgs Högskola, Göteborg, 1935.

256

Leander, Folke, Erfarenhetsbegreppet från estetikens utgångspunker (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, 47:16), Göteborg, 1941. Leander, Folke, Estetik och kunskapsteori. Croce, Cassirer, Dewey, Göteborg, 1950. Leander, Folke, "Further Problems Suggested by the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer (Library of Liv­ ing Philosophers). Evanston, 1949, pp. 337-357. Leander, Folke, Humanism and Naturalism. A Comparative Study of Ernest Seillière, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More (Göteborgs Högskolas Årskskrift, 43:1), Göteborg, 1937. Leander, Folke, Nya synpunkter på romantiken (Studentföreningen Verdandis småskrifter, 469), Stockholm, 1944. Leander, Folke, "Über einige offene Fragen, die aus der Philosophie der symbo­ lischen Formen entspringen: Cassirer-Croce-Litt," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., Ernst Cassirer. Stuttgart, 1966, pp. 229-247. Leander, Folke, Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften: Fünf Studien (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, 48:1), Göteborg 1942. Marc-Wogau, Konrad, Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs, Uppsala/Leipzig, 1936a. Marc-Wogau, Konrad, "Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs. K. Marc-Wogaus Bemer­ kungen zu der Besprechung Ernst Cassirers in Theoria," Theoria, Göteborg, 1936b, pp. 335-342. Marc-Wogau, Konrad, "Der Symbolbegriff in der Philosophie Ernst Cassirers," Theoria, Göteborg, 1936c, pp. 279-332. Marc-Wogau, Konrad, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi, Stockholm, 1968. Nordstrom, Johan, "Cartesius och drottning Christinas omvändelse," Lychnos, Uppsala 1941, pp. 248-290. Petzäll, Åke, Begreppet medfödda idéer i 1600-talets filosofi: Med särskild hänsyn till John Lockes kritik (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, 34: 3), Göteborg, 1928. Petzäll, Åke, Der Apriorismus Kants und die „Philosophia Pigrorum" (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, 39: 3), Göteborg, 1933. Petzäll, Åke, Etikens sekularisering. Dess betingelser inom kristen spekulation med särskild hänsyn till Augustinus (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, 41:2), Göte­ borg 1935. Petzäll, Åke, Logistischer Positivismus. Versuch einer Darstellung und Würdigung der philosophischen Grundanschauung des sog. Wiener Kreises der wissenschaft­ lichen Weltauffassung (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, 37:3), Göteborg, 1931. Petzäll, Åke, Makt och rätt (Årsbok, Vetenskapssocieteten i Lund: 1941), Lund, 1942. Petzäll, Åke, Zum Methodenproblem der Erkenntnisforschung (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, 41:1), Göteborg, 1935. Phalén, Adolf, Mindre arbeten, Lund, 1979. Pos, Hendrik J., "Recollections of Ernst Cassirer," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Phi­ losophy of Ernst Cassirer (Library of Living Philosophers), Evanston. 1949, pp. 61-72.

257

Romdahl, Axel L., Som jag minns det: Göteborgsären, Göteborg, 1951. Rosen, Ingeborg von, Conrad Pineus: Minnen och dagboksanteckningar, Stockholm, 1946. Ryn, Claes G., Will, Imagination and Reason: Irving Babbitt and the Problem of Real­ ity, Chicago, 1986. Segerstedt Wiberg, Ingrid, Den sega livsviljan: Flyktingöden under förintelsens och förvirringens tid, Stockholm, 1979. Tegen, Einar, review of Cassirer Axel Hägerström, Lychnos, Uppsala, 1939, pp. 444-448. Warburg, Aby, Tagebuch der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Bibliothek Warburg. Edited by K. Michels and C. Schoell-Glass. In Gesammelte Schriften, 7: 7. Berlin, 2001. Weibull, Curt, Drottning Christina. Studier och forskningar, Stockholm, 1931,2nd ed., 1934.

III. Secondary literature Almgren, Birgitta, Illusion und Wirklichkeit. Individuelle und kollektive Denkmuster in nationalsozialistischer Kulturpolitik und Germanistik in Schweden 1928-1945 (Södertörn Academic Studies 7), Huddinge, 2001. Bengtsson, Jan and Anders Molander, Den svenska sociologins födelse: Historiska samtal med Torgny T. Segerstedt, Bertil Pfannenstill, Joachim Israel och Edmund Dahlström, Göteborg 1998. Bentwich, Norman, The Rescue and Achievement of Refugee Scholars: The Story of Displaced Scholars and Scientists 1933-1952, The Hague, 1953. Blomqvist, Håkan, Socialdemokrat och antisemit?: den dolda historien om Arthur Engberg, Stockholm, 2001. Broad, C.D, "translator's preface" to Axel Hägerström, Inquiries into the nature of law and morals, Uppsala, 1953, pp. VII-IX. Brühl, Georg, Die Cassirers: Streiter für den Impressionismus, Leipzig, 1991. Cassirer, Peter, "On My Grandfather Ernst Cassirer," http://home.swipnet.se/cassirer/ecengl.htm. Coser, Lewis A., Refugee Scholars in America: Their Impact and Their Experiences, New Haven & London, 1984. Eriksson, Nils, Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhället i Göteborg 1875-1953, Göteborg, 1985. Fritzsche, Peter, Germans into Nazis, Cambridge, Mass., 1999. Jacobowsky, Carl Vilhelm, Göteborgs mosaiska församling 1780-1955, Göteborg, 1955.

258

Johansson, Alf W, "Neutrality and Modernity: The Second World War and Sweden's National Identity," in S. Ekman and N. Edlin, eds., War Exper­ ience, Self Image and National Identity: The Second World War as Myth and His­ tory. Stockholm, 1997, pp. 163-185. Krohn, Claus-Dieter, "Dismissal and Emigration of German-Speaking Econo­ mists after 1933," in M.G. Ash and A. Söllner, eds., Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Émigré German-Speaking Scientists and Scholars After 1933. Cambridge, UK, 1996, pp. 175-197. Krois, John Michael, "Zum Lebensbild Ernst Cassirers (1874-1945)," http://www.cassirer-society.com. Lindberg, Bo and Ingemar Nilsson, Göteborgs universitets historia, Vol. I: På hög­ skolans tid, Göteborg, 1996. Lomfors, Ingrid, Förlorad barndom - återvunnet liv: De judiska flyktingbarnen frän Nazityskland (Avhandlingar från Historiska institutionen i Göteborg, 12), Göteborg, 1996. Meran, Josef, "Die Lehrer am Philosophischen Seminar der Hamburger Uni­ versität während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus," in E. Krause, L. Huber, and H. Fischer, eds., Hochschulalltag im „Dritten Reich": Die Hamburger Univer­ sität 1933-1945, Berlin & Hamburg, 1991, pp. 458-477. Müssener, Helmut, Exil in Schweden: Politische und kulturelle Emigration nach 1933 (Stockholmer germanistische Forschungen, 14), München and Stockholm, 1974. Nilsson, Ingemar, "David Katz som professor vid Stockholms högskola 19371951," in Utbildningshistoria (Årsböcker i svensk undervisningshistoria), Uppsala, 1990, pp. 80-100. Nilsson, Ingemar, Göteborgs universitet 1891-1995: Data över professorer, docenter, avhandlingar och befordringsärenden, Vol. I: Befordringsärenden, personregister, Göteborg, 1996. Nordin, Svante, Från Hägerström till Hedenius: den moderna svenska filosofin, Bodafors, 1983. Oredsson, Sverker, Lunds universitet under andra världskriget: Motsättningar, debatter och hjälpinsatser, Lund, 1996. Paetzold, Heinz, Ernst Cassirer - Von Marburg nach New York. Eine philosophische Biographie, Darmstadt, 1995. Pfäfflin, Friedrich and Ingrid Kussmaul, S. Fischer, Verlag: Von der Gründung bis zur Rückkehr aus dem Exil: Eine Ausstellung des Deutschen Literaturarchivs im Schiller-Nationalmuseum Marbach am Neckar, Marbach, 1985. Rehn, Martin, "Auktoritet och atomsprängning: Hans Pettersson och CambridgeWienkontroversen," Lychnos, 2001, pp. 103-131. Ryn, Claes G., "Om Folke Leander," introduction to Leander, Romantik och moral, Stockholm, 1980, pp. 7-19.

259

Schilpp, P. A., ed., The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer (Library of Living Philosophers), Evanston, 1949. Schwarzschild, Steven S., "Judaism in the Life and Work of Ernst Cassirer," il cannocchiale, n. 1-2, gennaio-agosto 1991, pp. 327-344. Segerstedt Wiberg, Ingrid, Torgny Segerstedt: En dotters skildring, Stockholm, 1995. Svanberg, Ingvar and Mattias Tydén, Sverige och Förintelsen: Debatt och dokument om Europas judar 1933-1945, Stockholm, 1997. Thomasson, Adrian, En filosof i exil: Ernst Cassirer i Sverige 1935-1941, Uppsala, 2001. Valentin, Hugo, Judarna i Sverige, Stockholm, 1964.

260

Index

Ahlberg, A. 119 Åkerman, S. 187 Åkesson, E. 67, 68, 114,251 Appelbaum, A. 33,84 Appelbaum, K. 33,84 Arvidson, S. 190 Aschberg, O. 40,253 Aspelin, G. 53, 92,115,116,121,138, 197,198,199, 210, 217, 224, 225, 226, 227, 253, 254, 260 Aster, E. von 117, 202, 252 Ayer, A.J. 161, 163,227 Babbitt, I. 210,212,213,214, 215,216, 224, 257, 258 Baumgardt, D. 230 Bergson, H. 64,201,248,254 Bermann Fischer, G. 81, 82, 99,178, 179, 229, 252 Bing, G. 82,253 Bohr, N. 8, 68, 76,114, 240, 252 Boström, C.J. 106, 140, 167 Bradley, F.H. 124,125 Brecht, B. 70 Broström, A.-I. 51 Burckhardt, J. 182, 236 Burman, E.O. 106,140 Carnap, R. 29,47,208, 209 Cassirer, G. 33,39,43,58, 60, 72, 81, 83, 84, 90, 98,103,240 Cassirer, H. 72 Cassirer, H. W. 33,42,73,84,90,91,94 Cassirer, M. 34, 73, 89 Cassirer, P. 32,39,43, 54, 65,103 Cassirer, R. 72 Cassirer, T. 7,11,18,31,33,36,44,45, 49,50,54,55,58,60,65,66,67,69,

71,72,73, 74,75, 79,81,83,84, 85, 89, 90, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 103, 104, 117, 129, 136, 138, 175, 202, 211, 230, 231, 232, 235, 252, 254, 256 Cassirer, V. 33,39,43 Christina, Queen 5, 10, 11, 71, 79, 80, 81, 84, 86, 90, 101, 110, 114, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 194, 196, 203, 207, 240, 246, 248, 254, 258 Cohen, H. 65, 66,103,141,151, 244 Cohen, J. 51 Corcoran, W. 98 Croce, B. 202, 219, 220, 221, 222,223, 257 Dahlquist, T. 69 Dewey, J. 202, 218, 219, 221, 257 Dilthey, W. 154,157,202,206,211,212, 216 Düring, I. 195 Ehrenpreis, M. 45, 65, 252, 256 Einstein, A. 20, 76,125,145 Ek, S. 217 Engberg, A. 37,39,40,41,45, 90, 258 Engströmer, T. 38,40,41,42,44,45, 253 Fernholm, T. 74 Francès, M. 178 Frank, P. 76 Frege, G. 125,132 Fries, M. 107 Günther, C. 35 Hägerström, A. 5,8,10,12,16,18,19, 20,24,31,35,40,41,44,45,48,53,

261

78,86,88,90,94,105,106,107,108, 109,110,112,113,114,117,118,119, 121, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 171, 173, 194, 197, 199, 226, 227, 230, 240, 244, 248, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259 Hamburger, K. 69, 70 Hartmann, N. 116, 230 Hauptmann, K. 72 Hedenius, I. 17,24,76,86,99,107,109, 111, 112, 118, 119, 139, 144, 161, 162, 163, 169, 170, 171, 173, 197, 252, 253, 256, 260 Heisenberg, W. 76 Hendel, C.W. 27,229,231,249 Henriques, M. 51 Herrlin, A. 68 Hilbert, D. 125,132 Hirsch, A. 65 Höffding, H. 35 Hoffmann, E. 42, 72, 81, 252, 253 Hoffmann, P. 69 Huizinga, J. 218 Husserl, E. 23, 76,110,164,256 Jacobowsky, C.-V. 55, 70, 258 Jacobsson, E. 35 Jacobsson, M. 12,13,34,35,36,37,38, 42,45,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,56, 57,58,59, 61,62,63, 75,90,93,96, 98,100,104,114,115,116,135,137, 138,195,196,197,198,199,200,201, 202, 210, 211, 212, 213, 231, 232, 239, 251, 253, 256 James, W. 199,212 Joël, K. 33,215,251 Johnson, A. 36 Jorgensen, J. 67,114 Josephson, R. 65, 99,101, 102, 252

262

Kahlberg, A. 70 Karitz, A. 43, 44, 76, 77, 110,118,119, 137,190, 253 Karlgren, B. 57, 62, 63, 76, 195, 256 Katz, D. 38,77,86,259 Klages, L. 211,215 Klein, J. 94 Lagerlöf, S. 59 Lamm, G. 45 Lamm, M. 37,45,52, 65, 96, 99,100, 190, 252 Landquist, J. 46,102 Larsson, H. 53, 68,113,114,118, 119, 136, 137, 138 Leander, F. 57, 58, 74, 118, 198, 202, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224,257,259 Leander, P. 210 Lederer, E. 36,43 Liljeqvist, E. 53, 67,106,136 Lindqvist, A. 61, 62,64, 70,256 Litt, T. 202,207,208,222,223,247,256 Löb, H. 34,36,65,74,252,253 Lunau, H. 156,157,158 Lundstedt, V. 107,157,163 Mann, T. 25, 69, 70, 81,82, 97, 255 Mannheimer, C. 51, 56,57 Marc-Wogau, K. 5, 17, 53, 71, 73, 76, 77,78,84,86,91,99,101,103,107, 111, 112, 116, 117, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 139, 145, 164, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 194, 197, 198, 231,232, 240, 247,252,255, 257 Mayer-Mahr, M. 70 Meurling, H. 41,107 Meyerson, J. 88 Moore, G. E. 84,170 More,PE. 210,212,215,257 Moritz, M. 69, 70, 91,117,230, 231, 232, 235, 236, 237, 252

Müller-Riemer, I. 43,44 Munthe af Morgenstierne, G. 104 Neurath, O. 18,47,208 Nilsson, A. 190 Nordström, J. 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 85, 88, 89, 95,157,181,182,183, 184,186, 187, 207, 253, 257 Norström, V. 114 Nydahl, B. 74, 203, 232, 252 Nyman, A. 102,113,114,155,156,187, 188, 252 Ogden, C. K. 161,163 Olivecrona, K. 19,107 Olofsson, S.I. 187 Oxenstierna, G. 17, 41, 46, 86,107, 109,110,111,112,118, 119, 169, 170,173 Pettersson, H. 120,195,196,197, 260 Petzäll, Å. 16,17,47,58,71,72,73,75, 76,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 96, 99, 101, 102, 103,111,112,116,117,118,119,121, 129, 138, 145, 156, 157, 161, 169, 170, 176, 177, 178, 180, 183, 184, 189, 197, 198, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 218, 230, 231, 232, 252, 257 Phalén, A. 48, 86,107,108,109,110, 111,112,117,118,121, 124,137, 145,159, 164,166,167,168, 169, 171, 173, 240, 243, 257 Pineus, C. 55,59,60,258 Pos, HJ. 73,252,257 Ramsey, W. 196 Reichardt, K. 70, 94 Richards, I. A. 161,163 Riemer, S. 43 Rodhe, S.E. 74,197 Romdahl, A. 104,251,258 Ross, W.D. 72 Rudberg, G. 72,253 Russell, B. 122,125,132, 200

Ryn, C.G. 224,258,259 Sahlin, C. Y. 106 Sandler, R. 52 Saxi, F. 43, 44, 60, 66, 69, 71, 72, 78, 181, 253 Schiller, F. C. S 199 Schilpp, P.A. 94,180,257,260 Schlick, M. 118,132,208 Schrecker, P. 82,178,247,248,255,256 Schreiber, H. 84 Schwartzman, M. 51 Segelberg, I. 197 Segerstedt, T. 49,50,51, 63, 93, 98, 119, 260 Segerstedt, T. T. 66, 86,111,116,119, 190, 253, 258 Segerstedt Wiberg, I. 49, 70, 98, 258 Seillière, E. 210,211,214,215,216,217, 257 Selling, M. 76,77 Simmel, G. 199 Sjöding, A. 74 Stelzig, A.M. 67 Stern, G. 195 Stiernhielm, G. 182 Stolpe, S. 187 Strindberg, A. 45,59, 70, 96 Svanqvist,A. 74 Swedenborg, E. 45 Taub, H. 70 Tegen, E. 52, 77,86,107,109,110,113, 144, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 168, 169,173, 253, 258 Thorild, T. 5,9,10,31,69,99,100,118, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 244, 248, 255 Tönnies, F. 199 Törnebohm, H. 69 Turitz, H. G. 51 Undén, Ö. 38, 39,40,45, 50, 78, 90 Vaihinger, H. 87,114 Voegelin, E. 75, 253

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Waller, E. 34,72,84,85 Waller, M. 34,39,84,85 Warburg, A. 44, 258 Wedberg, A. 77, 86,107,109,110, 111, 112,169,170

264

Weibull, C. 79, 94,104,176,177,178, 183,184,188,195, 196, 251, 258 Weibull, L. 196 Weibull, M. 196 Zondek, B. 48,49,57

Ernst Cassirer was professor in Göteborg from 1 93 5 to 1 941. This episode of his life is little known, even though the Swedish years were very important. During that time of political turmoil he wrote several books and most of the papers that are now being published posthumously. This book - based on recently discovered sources - gives a detailed picture of Cassirer’s life and work in Sweden. It explains how he was invited to Sweden and why he be­

came a Swedish citizen. The analyses show how Cassirer’s exchange with Swedish philosophers influenced his work and shed new light on his development during exile. This study also contains an introduction by John Michael

Krois, a chronology of the Swedish years and a description of the long lost manuscript of Das Erkenntnisproblem, volume four.

Jonas Hansson, born in 1 967, is Lecturer in the History of Science and Ideas at the universities of Lund and Halmstad.

Svante Nordin, born in 1946, is Professor of the History of Science and Ideas at the University of Lund.

ISBN 3-03910-688-0

9 783039 106882