Table of contents : Contents......Page 10 Preface......Page 12 1 Games and Solutions......Page 16 1.1. MISSING EQUILIBRIA......Page 17 1.2. NORMAL-FORM GAMES......Page 21 1.3. GAMES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIONS......Page 29 1.4. SOLUTIONS DEFINED......Page 35 1.5. CONDITIONAL RATIONALITY......Page 39 2.1. THE CRITERION FOR IDEALIZATIONS......Page 44 2.2. THE IDEALIZATION ABOUT RATIONALITY......Page 46 2.3. PRESCIENCE......Page 52 2.4. EXISTENCE OF SOLUTIONS......Page 58 3.1. EQUILIBRIUM DEFINED......Page 63 3.2. STRATEGIC REASONING......Page 66 3.3. THE CASE AGAINST NASH EQUILIBRIUM......Page 76 3.4. DEFENSES OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM......Page 84 4.1. FUTILE PURSUIT OF INCENTIVES......Page 89 4.2. SUFFICIENT INCENTIVES......Page 94 4.3. TERMINATION IN A TREE OF INCENTIVES......Page 102 4.4. TERMINATION WITH RESPECT TOPURSUED INCENTIVES......Page 110 4.5. COMPARISON OF DECISION PRINCIPLES......Page 129 5 Strategic Equilibrium......Page 145 5.1. PATHS OF RELATIVE INCENTIVES......Page 146 5.2. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA......Page 159 5.3. THE EXISTENCE PROOF......Page 169 6 Finding Equilibria......Page 174 6.1. GROUP PATHS OF INCENTIVES......Page 176 6.2. PARTIAL VERSIONS OF GAMES......Page 181 6.3. COMPLETE VERSIONS OF GAMES......Page 193 6.4. A SEARCH PROCEDURE......Page 202 7.1. RETURN TO THE PROBLEM CASES......Page 206 7.2. ASSORTED EXAMPLES......Page 217 8.1. STRATEGIC AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM......Page 226 8.2. ALTERNATIVES TO NASH EQUILIBRIUM......Page 228 8.3. STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUMAND NONDOMINATION......Page 232 References......Page 244 Index......Page 248