Epistemology as Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Religious Epistemology (Routledge New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies) [1 ed.] 0754638324, 9780754638322

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EPISTEMOLOGY AS THEOLOGY Alvin Plantinga is arguably one of the most influential philosophers of our time. Much of his career has been devoted to explaining and defending the intellectual acceptability of Christian belief. Recently he has developed a comprehensive, rigorous, and distinctively Christian religious epistemology. This book presents the development of Plantinga's religious epistemology before considering Plantinga's mature religious epistemology in detail. Locating Plantinga's most recent work in the context of his theological assumptions, his previous work on religious epistemology, and in the context of the current debate over how knowledge should be characterized, Beilby blends theological and philosophical discussion to offer a unique perspective on Plantinga's influential proposal.

ASHGATE NEW THINKING IN RELIGION, THEOLOGY AND BIBLICAL STUDIES The Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies series brings high quality research monograph publishing back into focus for authors, international libraries, and student, academic and research readers. Headed by an international editorial advisory board of acclaimed scholars spanning the breadth of religious studies, theology and biblical studies, this open-ended monograph series presents cutting-edge research from both established and new authors in the field. With specialist focus yet clear contextual presentation of contemporary research, books in the series take research into important new directions and open the field to new critical debate within the discipline, in areas of related study, and in key areas for contemporary society. Series Editorial Board:

Jeff Astley, Professor, NEICE, UK DavidJasper, University of Glasgow, UK James Beckford, University of Warwick, UK Raymond Williams, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, USA Geoffrey Samuel, University of Newcastle, Australia Richard Hutch, University of Queensland, Australia Paul Fiddes, University of Oxford, UK Anthony Thiselton, University of Nottingham, UK Tim Gorringe, University of Exeter, UK Adrian Thatcher, College of St Mark and StJohn, UK Alan Torrance, St Mary's College, University of St Andrews, UK Judith Lieu, Kings College London, UK Terrance Tilley, University of Dayton, USA Miroslav Volf, Yale Divinity School, USA Stanley Grenz, Baylor University and Truett Seminary Waco, USA Vincent Brummer, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands Gerhard Sauter, University of Bonn, Germany Other Titles in the Series:

Metaphysics as Christology An Odyssey of the Selffrom Kant and Hegel to Steiner

Jonael Schickler Ernan McMullin and Critical Realism in the Science-Theology Dialogue

Paul Laurence Allen

Epistemology as Theology An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga' s Religious

Epistemology

JAMES BEILBY Bethel College, USA

I� ��o�;��n��:up LONDON AND NEW YORK

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Beilby, James K. Epistemology as theology: an evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's religious epistemology.-(Ashgate new critical thinking in religion, theology and biblical studies) l.Plantinga, Alvin 2.Knowledge, Theory of (Religion) I.Title 230'.092

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Beilby,James K. Epistemology as theology: an evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's religious epistemology I James Beilby. p. cm.-(Ashgate new critical thinking in religion, theology, and biblical studies) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and indexes. ISBN 0-7546-3832-4 (hardcover: alk. paper) 1. Plantinga, Alvin. 2. Knowledge, Theory of (Religion) I. Title. II. Series. B931.P454B45 2005 210'.92-dc22 ISBN 13: 978-0-7546-3832-2

2005012663

(hbk)

Contents

Preface Acknowledgements Abbreviations PART I:

vii xi xiii

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANTINGA'S RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY

1 The Background to Plantinga's Religious Epistemology

3

2 Plantinga's Early Religious Epistemology

33

3 The Warrant Trilogy: Plantinga's Current Proposal

69

PART II:

AN EVALUATION OF PLANTINGA'S RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY

4 Plantinga on the Task of Religious Epistemology 5

Plantinga's Theory of Epistemic Warrant

103 143

6 The Extended A/C Model and Warranted Christian Belief

179

Bibliography Part I: Works by Alvin Plantinga Part II: Works on Plantinga's Religious Epistemology Name and Subject Index

217 217 226 243

Preface

Alvin Plantinga is undoubtedly one of the world's most respected philosophers. Time Magazine has called him 'America's leading philosopher of God' and a fellow philosopher has called him 'the greatest philosopher of the last century. ' This praise might seem extravagant, but it is well-founded. Plantinga's has not only written a prodigious amount on many topics, his work in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and epistemology is considered by most philosophers to be both ground­ breaking and definitive. Consequently, a consideration of his thought might take many different directions, all of them worthwhile. This book, however, is a consideration of his religious epistemology. Beyond its excellence, Plantinga's philosophical work is distinctive because it is written from an unabashedly Christian point of view. Plantinga has sought to counter the prevailing mind set that religious beliefs are irrational in the absence of propositional evidence or arguments. This presupposition gives rise to what Plantinga calls 'the evidentialist objection to belief in God. ' His strikingly original (and highly contentious) response is that belief in God can be 'properly basic'; it does not need to be based on arguments or propositional evidence in order to be rational, justified, or warranted. Consequently, Plantinga deems the task of producing arguments for God's existence-a task usually called 'natural theology' -to be neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemically acceptable Christian belief. For Plantinga, the epistemic viability of the evidentialist objection to belief in God is not a merely philosophical curiosity. His countering this objection flows from a single over-arching theme that pervades all of his academic work: the defense of the historic Christian worldview. One of the fundamental burdens of this volume is to demonstrate the fundamentally apologetic focus of all of his work. A second burden is to show that Plantinga's philosophical work is driven primarily by theological assumptions and commitments. Plantinga is not a philosopher who works on religious topics, he is a Christian that uses the tools of philosophy to clarify his faith. The title of this volume was chosen in an effort to convey this fundamental fact about Plantinga's work. Those that misunderstand or fail to appreciate the theological roots of Plantinga's philosophy will invariably misconstrue his arguments, claims, and conclusions.

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Epistemology as Theology

Despite the fact that Plantinga himself is as personally gracious as any person I've ever met, and despite the fact that harsh rhetoric and biting sarcasm are wholly absent from his writing, his scholarship has provoked the ire and incredulity of many in the academic world. Undoubtedly, this is caused by Plantinga's willingness to question ideas and values taken by many in the academy to be beyond question. But many of the allergic reactions scholars have to Plantinga's work are based on misconceptions of his project. In a typically gracious move, Plantinga is always willing to blame these on 'expository inadequacy' on his part rather than 'hermeneutical inadequacy' on the part of his detractors. Nevertheless, most of the misunderstandings of Plantinga's project arise because of the uniquely interdisciplinary nature of his work. Often philosophers fail to fully appreciate the theological context of Plantinga's assumptions and theologians/religious scholars fail to understand the philosophical content of his arguments. Because of the ubiquitous misunderstandings of Plantinga's thought, given the choice between spending too much time on exposition and too much time on critique, I have erred on the side of the former. While this project is ultimately evaluative and critical, I must make it clear that I am sympathetic with the basic contours and many of the details of Plantinga's project. This is perhaps not surprising for a number of reasons. First, and most obviously, Plantinga is a careful philosopher; he does not make obvious mistakes and the depth and rigor of his argumentation often leaves even his critics impressed. Second, I share many of his basic philosophical commitments. Like Plantinga, my philosophical training has been largely in the analytic tradition. As a result, the style of this book mirrors Plantinga's analytical approach. For example, I occasionally utilize numbered propositions and propositional variables (person S believes belief B... ). I do so because I believe this is the clearest way to treat the issues raised by Plantinga's religious epistemology. I have, however, refrained from using logical symbols-these can be written in prose with no loss of clarity and with minimal wordiness. The final reason I am sympathetic with Plantinga's work is that I share his religious commitments; I find the Christian worldview to be both intellectually viable and existentially satisfying. There is, I believe, no good, all-things­ considered reason to reject Christianity and many good reasons to accept it. Theologically, while the term 'broadly evangelical' probably applies to my theology, I dislike using it as it is often misused and frequently misunderstood, both by those who happily use the term of themselves and those who anathematize the label. (It is interesting that Plantinga too eschews the label 'evangelical.') But listing agreements is neither interesting nor productive. Consequently, in this book I will develop a

Preface

ix

critique of Plantinga's religious epistemology, albeit a sympathetic critique. I will argue that there are a range of successful and substantive objections to Plantinga's religious epistemology. The six chapters of this volume can be grouped into two sections each representing a different task. In Chapters 1, 2, and 3, my primary focus is to understand the antecedents to and development of Plantinga's religious epistemology. In Chapter 1, I provide the context for understanding Plantinga's religious epistemology. I discuss his personal and professional development, his major areas of research and writing, and the central features of his thought that have endured throughout his academic career. Chapter 2 is a discussion of Plantinga's early religious epistemology, as seen primarily in God and Other Minds and 'Reason and Belief in God.' I examine and evaluate the various important aspects of his treatment of the epistemic status of belief in God, including his critique of evidentialism and classical foundationalism, his claim that belief in God can be properly basic, and his construal of the role of 'defeaters' for belief in God. I conclude with some initial observations on the nature and task of Plantinga's 'Reformed Epistemology' at this stage. Chapter 3 is a description of Plantinga's current religious epistemology. I begin the chapter with a consideration of the transition Plantinga's epistemology underwent in the mid to late 1980s. I then provide the contextual background for my discussion of his epistemology by discussing some of the essential aspects of the debate in contemporary epistemology. Having 'set the stage,' I discuss Plantinga's 'Warrant Trilogy.' Volume 1, Warrant: The Current Debate, is Plantinga's critique of the most popular theories of knowledge; volume 2, Warrant and Proper Function, is a presentation of Plantinga's preferred epistemology; and volume 3, Warranted Christian Belief, is the application of that epistemology to the topic of belief in God. Two of the most important aspects of his thought that emerge in the course of this discussion are his contention that belief in God is properly basic and his claim that there is parity, epistemically speaking, between belief in God and other commonly accepted belief forming processes. The purpose of Chapters 4, 5, and 6 is primarily evaluative. In Chapter 4 I survey the variety of possible critiques of Plantinga's work and discuss his methodology. In other words, I discuss why Plantinga's approaches religious epistemology as he does and specifically why he eschews natural theology. In Chapter 5, I consider in greater depth some of the details of Plantinga's epistemology. While I discuss and analyze the intemalism­ extemalism distinction, my purpose is not to adjudicate this debate, but to understand Plantinga's motivation for endorsing an extemalist epistemology. I then discuss the nature of Plantinga's brand of epistemic

X

Epistemology as Theology

externalism and consider a couple of the most significant objections to his theory. I argue that there are resources in Plantinga's epistemology to withstand the most pressing of these objections. Chapter 6 is a discussion of the explanatory fruitfulness of Plantinga's Extended A/C Model, his explanation about how beliefs about God are formed. I analyze whether this model can accomplish Plantinga's purpose: to show how belief in God can be warranted. I offer three arguments against Plantinga's model and conclude with a sketch of how it might be modified.

Acknowledgements

In writing this book, I have received many different kinds of help from many different people. In its adolescence, this book was my Ph.D. dissertation, written at Marquette University. Special thanks goes to my advisor, Fr. Phil Rossi, who provided encouragement and clear guidance. The current volume, however, has changed significantly from its childhood; the final three chapters especially. Here again I received assistance from many. My teacher's assistants, Shelli Poe and Eric Helleloid caught many of the silly mistakes that writers invariably make, David Clark and Bruce Reichenbach graciously read large portions of the manuscript and provided helpful suggestions, and Chelsea DeArmond kindly helped with the production of the final manuscript. I am also thoroughly aware of how much this current volume has been influence by others who have done work on Plantinga's religious epistemology. The work of Michael Bergmann, John Greco, and Michael Sudduth stand out as particularly helpful. In addition, Bergmann and Greco made comments on an early draft of Chapter 5 and Bergmann, Sudduth and Keith DeRose have graciously granted me permission to cite their unpublished works on aspects of Plantinga's thought. Among all of the people to whom I am indebted, two deserve special mention. First, my friend and colleague Paul Eddy talked through many aspects of the book with me. The helpfulness of his advice is exceeded only by his gracious spirit. Second, Al Plantinga's influence on this book has been much more than merely formal. In 1995 the Pew Foundation provided me with an opportunity to study with Plantinga for a month at the University of Notre Dame (for which I am very grateful). Not only was this event one of the formative events of my academic career, in recent years he has encouraged and assisted me not only on my dissertation but on other academic projects, and has made himself available to me for numerous conversations about the content of this book. In all respects, his encouragement, advice, and (when needed) critique has always been gracious, deeply beneficial, and very much appreciated. My greatest debt of gratitude, however, lies with my family. My children, Sierra, Madeline, Zachary, and Malia are a joy. My worst day with them is still better than my best day doing just about anything else. My wife Michelle has not only supported me through this entire project, she deserves consideration for sainthood not only for her herculean efforts

xii

Epistemology as Theology

in trying give me opportunities to research and write, but also for all the times she realized that I was not listening to her but was instead lost in thought on some arcane aspect of this project. Words fail to express my love and appreciation. Finally, my parents, Jerry and Kris Beilby, have tirelessly and lovingly encouraged me in every aspect of my education, from my early childhood to this very day. In appreciation and with love, I dedicate this book to them. St. Paul, Minn. December 16, 2005

Abbreviations

GOM RBG

God and Other Minds. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1967. 'Reason and Belief in God. ' In Faith and Rationality, ed. Alvin

WCB WCD WPF

Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 16-93. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983. Warranted Christian Belief New York: Oxford, 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford, 1993. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford, 2000.

PART I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANTINGA'S RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY

Chapter 1

The Background to Plantinga's Religious Epistemology

Introduction Before launching a discussion of Plantinga's religious epistemology, it is appropriate (and necessary) to place Plantinga's work in context. In this case sketching the relevant context will involve much more than analyzing Plantinga's philosophical commitments, for, as we shall see, not only does his philosophical work address theological questions, it is affected at a deep conceptual level by his theological commitments. Consequently, it is also necessary to look at Plantinga's personal and ecclesiological background in order to gain some understanding of his religious and theological commitments. To this end, in this chapter I will focus on three issues: (1) Plantinga's personal and professional development, (2) his major writings, and (3) themes which have endured in his work throughout the years. I will close this chapter with a brief appraisal of Plantinga's influence in the academic world. The task for this chapter, therefore, in barest terms, is to get to know Alvin Plantinga both personally and professionally, both as eminent analytic philosopher of religion and as committed believer in God.

Alvin Plantinga: A Brief Personal and Professional Biography Alvin Plantinga was born on November 15, 1932 in Ann Arbor, Michigan to Cornelius and Lettie Plantinga. Both sets of Plantinga's grandparents were reared in Calvinist churches originating in the so-called Afscheiding or succession of 1834 in which many congregations seceded from the Dutch state church and created the Gereformeerde Kerken, dedicated to the practice of historic Calvinism. 1 Despite significant persecution, the Seceders held 1 . 'Self-Profile,' in Alvin Plantinga, ed. James Tomberlin and Peter van lnwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985) 3-97; 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' in Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers, ed. Kelly James Clark (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1993) 47.

4

Epistemology as Theology

fast to their ideals-especially the idea that religion w.as not just 'a private matter' or 'something done on Sundays' but was the central reality of all life. They were also committed to the idea of Christian education, holding that there was no such thing as education that is simultaneously reasonably full-orbed and religiously neutral. Plantinga's grandparents brought their emphasis on education, particularly higher education, and their conviction that religious beliefs are the central reality of life from the Netherlands when they emigrated to the United States. The value placed on education, and specifically religious education, was demonstrated by Plantinga's grandfather, Andrew Plantinga. After seeing that his son Cornelius (Alvin's father) was not interested in following in his footsteps as a farmer in Sheldon, Iowa, but was instead more interested in books, Andrew (Alvin's grandfather) made the decision to move the entire family to Holland, Michigan so Cornelius could attend a Calvinist Christian High School. After graduating, Cornelius attended Calvin College, studied under William Harry Jellema, decided to become a philosopher, and eventually went on to do graduate work at the University of Michigan and Duke University. After graduating with a Ph.D. in philosophy (plus an M.A. in psychology and a degree in education thrown in for good measure) Cornelius was offered a position at Huron College, a small Presbyterian college in South Dakota. There Alvin grew up with his brothers, Leon, Terell, and Cornelius, Jr. At fourteen, after his father introduced him to Plato, Alvin decided that he wanted to become a philosopher. To this end, in January of 1950, and with his entire family along for the ride (as Cornelius had just been offered a position in the psychology department), Alvin Plantinga enrolled at Calvin College. During his first semester at Calvin (in the Spring of 1950), on a whim Plantinga applied for and was awarded a 'nice fat scholarship' to attend Harvard. He later characterized his time at Harvard as 'enormously impressive and very much to my liking.'2 While attending Harvard two important and formative events occurred. First, Plantinga encountered serious and ardent non-Christians for the first time. He recounts being struck by the 'enormous diversity of opinions about [religious] matters, some of them held by highly intelligent and accomplished people who had little but contempt for what I believed. '3 This diversity caused him to evaluate and question his own beliefs, but as he did so he began to wonder whether the objections to traditional Christian belief had the substance they 2. 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 50. 3. 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 51.

The Background to Plantinga's Religious Epistemology

5

appeared to have on the surface. He viewed the objection that 'it is impossible for "modern man" to believe in God given what we know now' (a la Bultrnann) with particular disdain. Consequently, his time at Harvard began his continuing interest in answering objections to the Christian faith. Secondly, while at Harvard, Plantinga had an experience that 'resolved his doubts' and has profoundly affected his approach to belief in God ever since. One evening, on his way back to his dorm from dinner he had a profound religious experience: Suddenly it was as if the heavens opened; I heard, so it seemed, music of overwhelming power and grandeur and sweetness; there was light of unimaginable splendor and beauty; it seemed I could see into heaven itself; and I suddenly saw or perhaps felt with great clarity and persuasion and conviction that the Lord was really there and was all that I thought.•

Compared to this experience, the significance of arguments for and against God's existence seemed 'merely academic, of little existential concern.'5 Since then, Plantinga records many other occasions on which 'I have felt the presence of God, sometimes very powerfully.'6 Plantinga might have completed his college years at Harvard had he not made a routine trip horne to visit his parents during the Spring of 1951. During his visit he sat in on the class of William Jellerna, his father's former professor. Plantinga found Jellerna's teaching, particularly the way he handled objections to Christianity, 'enormously impressive.' The result of this experience was that despite the fruitfulness of his time at Harvard, Plantinga decided to return to Calvin. He recounts: 'That was as important a decision, and as good a decision, as I've ever rnade.'7 At Calvin College, a place Plantinga cites as 'the major intellectual influence in my life,'8 he studied philosophy under Jellerna and Henry Stob. Under their tutelage, Plantinga received a heavy dose of the history of philosophy as well as a good deal of language study, for in those days at Calvin translations were deemed to be inadequate for the task of doing serious work in the history of philosophy. In addition to philosophy, Plantinga also majored in psychology and English literature. Most importantly, in all of his academic training at Calvin, the idea that there is

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 5 1 . 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 51-52. 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 52. 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 53. 'Self-Profile,' 9; 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 53.

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Epistemology as Theology

no such thing as a 'serious, substantial and relatively complete intellectual endeavor that is religiously neutral' was continually emphasized.9 While at Calvin, Plantinga met and eventually married Kathleen De Boer, who was also of Dutch Christian Reformed immigrant lineage. Kathleen, being raised in Lynden, Washington, introduced Plantinga to the mountains and thus instigated his love affair with the mountains and with mountain and rock climbing in particular. After graduating from Calvin in 1953, Plantinga enrolled in graduate work at the University of Michigan where he studied under William Alston, Richard Cartwright, and William Frankena. While at Michigan, Plantinga further fostered his enduring interest in the various objections to traditional theism: the problem of evil, the Freudian claim that belief in God is a product of wish-fulfillment, the positivistic claim that religious language is meaningless, and Bultmann's claim that traditional belief in God was 'outmoded' in the age of the 'electric light and the wireless. '10 While Plantinga found his time at Michigan 'pleasant and instructive. ' In September of 1955 he entered a Ph.D. program at Yale. At Yale, Plantinga studied under Paul Weiss and Brand Blanshard and wrote his dissertation on the relationship between ethics and metaphysical naturalism. 11 His own comments suggest that while his graduate work at both Michigan and Yale was beneficial and stimulating in a variety of ways, it was not completely satisfactory. Part of the reason for Plantinga's dissatisfaction can be found in his desire-a desire founded and fostered at Calvin-to connect philosophy to one's big questions of life, to connect his philosophy to his religious and theological commitments. While neither Michigan nor Yale partook in the au courant positivistic mind set-in fact, Plantinga remembers that most people at Yale displayed a certain scorn for positivism12-neither school really dealt with the questions Plantinga deemed to be the most important. At Yale, if one raised a philosophical question, the standard response would involve cataloging the various possible perspectives: rationalist, idealist, empiricist, etc. But what Plantinga considered to be the more important question-'what is the truth about this matter?'-was often greeted with disdain and treated as unduly naive.1 3 I n 1957, Plantinga began teaching in the Directed Studies Program at Yale. However, his teaching at Yale was short-lived, for in response to 9. 'Self-Profile,' 13; 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 47. 10. 'Self-Profile,' 18. 11. Ethics and Metaphysical Naturalism, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1958. 12. 'Self-Profile,' 20-21. 13. 'Self-Profile,' 21.

The Background to Plantinga's Religious Epistemology

7

numerous and ardent solicitations by George Nakhnikian, Plantinga accepted a position in the philosophy department at Wayne State University. His time at Wayne State was incredibly fruitful, largely due to the interaction of the members of the philosophy department. Plantinga characterized the philosophy department at Wayne State as 'less of a philosophy department than a loosely organized but extremely intense discussion society.'1 4 (Plantinga recounts the attitude toward teaching as 'it might be important, but it certainly did tend to break up the day.'15) Plantinga and his new colleagues, George Nakhnikian, Edmund Gettier, Robert Sleigh, Hector Neri-Castefieda, Richard Cartwright, and Keith Lehrer, delved deeply into many important philosophical questions, such as Wittgenstein's private language argument and the relationship between modality and propositions. It is also interesting to note that Plantinga was involved in the conversations surrounding the publication of what is probably the most famous two page paper in contemporary epistemology, Edmund Gettier's 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?'16 While at Wayne State, Plantinga was introduced, through Cartwright and Sleigh (both of whom studied at Brown), to the work of Roderick Chisholm, a philosopher who greatly influenced the development of Plantinga's epistemology.1 7 Despite the incredibly fertile intellectual soil of Wayne State, and after rejecting numerous very attractive offers in order to stay there/8 in 1963 Plantinga accepted an offer to replace Harry Jellema at Calvin. The reasons behind such a move were not apparent to many of his colleagues and friends, but they are probably the same reasons that caused his grandfather to move from Iowa to Michigan, the same reasons Plantinga's father moved his family from North Dakota to Michigan, and the same reasons Plantinga decided to leave Harvard for Calvin College-namely, his commitment to the Christian Reformed Church and the Reformed theology it practiced. For Plantinga, the value of working at Calvin was that it afforded him the opportunity to do philosophy with those who shared his theistic, ecclesiological, and theological commitments. In Plantinga's own words: I thought of scholarship in general and philosophy in particular as in large part a communal enterprise: promising insights, interesting connections, subtle difficulties-these come more easily and rapidly in a group of like-minded

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

'Self-Profile,' 23. 'Self-Profile,' 23. Analysis 23 (1963) 121-123. 'Self-Profile,' 29. 'Self-Profile,' 30.

8

Epistemology as Theology people than for the solitary thinker. The topics I most wanted to work on were the topics I'd been introduced to in college: the connection between Christian faith and philosophy (as well as the other disciplines) and the question of how best to be a Christian in philosophy. 19

At Calvin, starting in 1964, 'communal philosophical work' came in the form of the Tuesday colloquium, the 'most penetrating and helpful' members of which were Peter de Vos, Kenneth Konyndyk, Del Ratzsch, and Nicholas Wolterstorff.20 Plantinga stayed at Calvin for nineteen years. In 1982, however, he made a move that was even more surprising to his friends and colleagues than his decision to move from Wayne State to Calvin. He accepted a position at the University of Notre Dame as the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy. Given the value he ascribed to Calvin College and the community of believers there, this move warrants an explanation. Typical and mundane explanations abound and were undoubtedly part of Plantinga's motivation: the desire for an increased salary/' to be the Director of the Center for Philosophy of Religion, and to teach Ph.D. students rather than undergraduates.22 But the most pressing motivation for Plantinga was his desire to share some of what he had learned about the philosophy of religion, Christian philosophy, and the nature of Christian scholarship with graduate students of a high level of ability, and thus profoundly influence the next generation of students.23 At the time of the completion of this book, Plantinga is still at Notre Dame and, in all likelihood, will finish his professorial career there.

Major Works At the time of the writing of this book, Plantinga has published 162 articles, essays, and books (see Part I of the Bibliography for an exhaustive list of Plantinga's publications). While Plantinga has certainly received acclaim for his work in religious epistemology, this is only one of the areas to which he has devoted himself. In fact, for a significant portion of his career he was best known for his work in metaphysics. (This explains the fact that the 'new and enlarged edition' of William L. Reese's Dictionary of Philosophy

77.

19. 'Self-Profile,' 30. 20. 'Self-Profile,' 3 1 . 2 1 . Plantinga acknowledges this motivation in 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 22. See his comments regarding teaching in 'Self-Profile,' 33. 23. 'Self-Profile,' 33; 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 77, 8 1 .

The Background to Plantinga's Religious Epistemology

9

and Religion includes only his work on metaphysics, particularly his work on possibility and necessity, and his application of those ideas to the Free Will Defense and the Ontological Argument.24) His publications have addressed a wide range of topics including ethics, contemporary theology, historical theology, philosophical theology, biblical theology and hermeneutics, epistemology, philosophy of religion, and, of course, religious epistemology. Despite the fact that Plantinga has written on a wide range of topics, it would be a mistake to see his philosophical work outside the context of his enduring desire to articulate, explain, and defend Christian belief. The telos behind all of his academic work is apologetic in nature. To establish this claim, and to thereby acquire a clearer picture of Plantinga's motivations and commitments as a Christian philosopher, I will summarize Plantinga's major academic works. Of course, my discussion will necessarily be terribly cursory. I will, as one might say, only 'touch the mountaintops'; there will be no lingering amidst the interesting details in the valley, or even below the tree-line. Moreover, since Plantinga's works on religious epistemology will receive full treatment in Chapter 2 (his early religious epistemology) and Chapter 3 (his mature religious epistemology), I will discuss them in this chapter only very briefly, in order to place them in the context of Plantinga's entire academic corpus. Plantinga's first major academic project, his dissertation, addressed the relationship between ethics and naturalism. His central contention was (and is) that there is no such thing as a genuine moral obligation if naturalism is true and there is no such person as God. Naturalism, according to Plantinga, can account for why we value certain behaviors more than others, and why we are horrified by certain behaviors, but it cannot account for a genuine moral 'ought.' After completing his dissertation, Plantinga began working on a complex of issues such as the ontological argument, verificationism, and the problem of evil. These issues became part of Plantinga's first major monograph: God and Other Minds.25 In God and Other Minds, Plantinga considered the rational acceptability of belief in God. After an in-depth consideration of the traditional arguments for belief in God (teleological, cosmological, and ontological), he argued that none of them are ultimately successful. In addition, Plantinga argued that the traditional atheological arguments (the problem of evil, verificationism, the paradox of omnipotence, and the ontological disproof of God's existence), are all 24. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980; 2nd ed. 1 996. 25. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967.

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equally flawed. In the absence of successful arguments either for or against belief in God, Plantinga suggested that belief in God should be viewed as analogous to belief in the existence of other minds. Despite the lack of positive arguments for their existence, both belief in the existence of other minds and belief in the existence of God could be rational. In addition to launching his career in religious epistemology, God and Other Minds furthered Plantinga's interest in various metaphysical issues: the concept of necessity, especially as applied to the notion of a 'necessary being,' and the ontological argument which invokes that notion.26 Considering these topics led him to a series of questions relating to the metaphysics of modality-an inquiry into the nature of necessity, possibility, possible worlds, essential properties, and the like. This line of research culminated in his acclaimed book The Nature of Necessity. While The Nature of Necessity constitutes the most in-depth analysis of the metaphysics of modality in print and is arguably one of the most important works on metaphysics written in the last fifty years, for Plantinga it was a tool. Of course, I don't mean to suggest that Plantinga had no purely philosophical interest in these metaphysical questions, but rather that his interest was not solely philosophical-answering these metaphysical questions allowed him to unravel some of the key issues surrounding the ontological argument and even more importantly, the problem of evil. Plantinga has admitted that one of the matters he finds to be 'deeply troubling' about belief in God is the problem of evil.27 His work on the metaphysics of modality gave him the tools necessary to articulate an answer to the logical or deductive problem of evil, his 'Free Will Defense. '28 This argument utilizes 'possible worlds' semantics and a Molinist account of God's foreknowledge.29 The central insight of the Free Will Defense is 26. See the volume Plantinga edited: The Ontological Argument: From Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books I Doubleday, 1 965) . 27. 'Self-Profile,' 34. See also 'Afterword' in James Sennett, The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1 998). 28. Simultaneous with the publication of The Nature of Necessity, Plantinga published a somewhat simplified (though still quite dense) version of his Free Will Defense in God, Freedom, and Evil (New York: Harper & Row, 1 974; 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1977) . 29. Interestingly, Plantinga developed his account of God's knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom independently,· without knowledge of Luis de Molina's previous work. Plantinga recounts giving a paper on his Free Will Defense at a Council for Philosophical Studies Summer Institute (held at Calvin College in 1973). Anthony Kenny was present at the conference and, upon hearing Plantinga's paper, declared that he was 'a Molinist. ' Plantinga had no idea what he meant. 'I wasn't sure whether that was commendation or condemnation' ('Self-

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that while there may be many possible worlds which have a better overall balance of good as compared to evil, because of the existence of significantly free creatures in at least some of those worlds, it is possible that even an omnipotent being could not create (or, to use Plantinga's terminology, 'actualize') any of them. While some continue to believe that the logical problem of evil is unscathed by Plantinga's argument, the vast majority have accepted Plantinga's argument as successful.30 Perhaps the best evidence for the success of Plantinga's Free Will Defense is that since the publication of his argument, the vast majority of atheists who employ the problem of evil do so inductively, not deductively; evil is claimed to be evidence against God's existence, not a decisive refutation of God's existence. In the 1980s, Plantinga turned whole-heartedly to the topic of religious epistemology. Three essays signaled the direction his thought would take: 'Is Belief in God Rational?'31 'The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,'32 and 'Is Belief in God Properly Basic?'33 In these works, Plantinga returned to the argument originally laid out in God and Other Minds, that belief in God could be entirely rational even in the absence of propositional evidence like that traditionally thought to be the result of natural theology. To bolster this claim, Plantinga sought to show that evidentialism-the supposition that beliefs require propositional evidence (usually given in the form of an argument) to be rational-was rooted in

Profile,' 50). His later response to Kenny's remark was: 'Did he perhaps mean that my way of doing philosophy was earthbound, uninspiring, sort of like tunneling through the ground?' ('Kinesis Interview with Alvin Plantinga,' Kinesis 25/1 [Summer 1998] 9). 30. Some of those who question Plantinga's argument are John O'Leary­ Hawthome and Daniel Howard-Snyder, 'Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense,' International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44/1 (Aug. 1998) 1 -21; and Quentin Smith, 'A Sound Logical Argument from Evil,' in Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy of Language (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997) 148-157. On the other hand, the noted atheist philosopher of religion, William Rowe has recently defended Plantinga's Free Will Defense against O'Leary­ Hawthome and Howard-Snyder's objections. See his: 'In Defense of the Free Will Defense,' International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44/2 (Oct. 1 998) 1 15-120. 31. In Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney, 7-27 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979). 32. In Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 54, Philosophical Knowledge, ed. John B. Brough, Donald 0. Dahlstrom, Henry B. Veatch, 49-62 (Washington, D.C .: Catholic University of America, 1980). 33. Nous 15 (1981) 41-5 1 .

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Classical Foundationalism and that Classical Foundationalism was untenable in that it was self-referentially incoherent. In 1983, Plantinga published a comprehensive discussion of these themes in 'Reason and Belief in God,' an essay included in Faith and Rationality, co-edited by Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff.34 Also included in Faith and Rationality are essays by William Alston, George Mavrodes, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, all of whom shared important aspects of Plantinga's epistemological intuitions. In recognition of the Reformed theology which motivated crucial aspects of his theory, Plantinga labeled this stance toward religious epistemology: Reformed Epistemology.:�.� In addition to his work on religious epistemology, the 1980s saw the publication of the first festschrift dedicated to Plantinga and his work, entitled Alvin Plantinga.36 In this volume Plantinga wrote 'Self-Profile' which includes an account of his early years and education and a summary of his research and writing. Essays by noted philosophers such as Robert Adams, William Alston, Philip Quinn, and Peter van Inwagen, coupled with Plantinga's responses, make this volume the clearest and most helpful analysis of Plantinga's philosophy up to that point in his career. In addition to being a first-rate Christian philosopher, Plantinga has spent a great deal of time reflecting on what it means to be a Christian philosopher. In 'Advice to Christian Philosophers,'37 he challenges

34. Notre Dame, Ind . : University of Notre Dame Press, 1983. These essays arose out of a year-long project of the Calvin (College) Center for Christian Studies on the topic of 'Toward a Reformed View of Faith and Reason' (RBG, 9). 35. It is interesting to note that not all of the contributors to Faith and Rationality have embraced the term 'Reformed Epistemology.' For example, both William Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff have expressed some displeasure with the term. In recent years, Plantinga himself regretted choosing that label, worrying that it might have been taken as an affront to Catholics. 36. Edited by James E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985). Other festschrifts include Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays on Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, ed. James Beilby (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 2002); and Knowledge and Reality: Essays Presented to Alvin Plantinga on his 70th Birthday, ed. Matthew Davidson and Thomas Crisp (Dordrecht: Kluwer, forthcoming) . 37. Faith and Philosophy 1 /3 Uuly 1984) 253-271 . This paper w a s also his inauguration speech given upon accepting the John A. O'Brien Professorship of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. Regarding the 'advice' offered in this volume, Plantinga displays characteristic humility and humor: '"Who are you," you say, "to give the rest of us advice?" That's a good question. I shall deal with it as

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philosophers to not merely be Christians who happen to do philosophy, but to be Christian philosophers: to allow their Christian commitments to impact and affect their philosophical work.'38 This seminal article has been credited by Kelly James Clark as one of the most significant catalysts behind the recent resurgence in Christian philosophy.39 In this article, Plantinga issues a clarion call to philosophers who are Christians to do philosophy from a self-consciously Christian perspective: to work on the questions, issues, and concerns of the Christian community, rather than only on those matters the broader academic community finds 'important' or 'interesting.' The price of looking to the broader academic community for approval, Plantinga believes, is significant, if for no other reason than there being a host of important questions that never get addressed, or at least are not addressed from a Christian point of view. Behind Plantinga's advice are two fundamental convictions: (1) that there is no reasonably complete intellectual endeavor that is religiously or theologically neutral and (2) that the trends and fads of the broader academic community are guided to a significant degree by non-theistic or non-Christian ideals and worldviews. Since the mid 1980s Plantinga has focused his scholarly attention on two main areas. The first is the matter just addressed-the nature of Christian scholarship in general and Christian philosophy in particular. The second is religious epistemology. In the late 1980s, Plantinga published a series of works on epistemology and religious epistemology that signaled a transition in his approach to religious epistemology. Rather than merely defending the rationality or justification of religious belief, Plantinga began to ask a prior question: What is the nature of rationality or justification? Attempting to answer that question led to another: What is it that converts merely true beliefs into knowledge? And once that question was answered, the original question could then be posed: Can belief in God constitute knowledge? Answering these provocative questions has occupied Plantinga's attention up to the current day. 'Justification and Theism' was Plantinga's first step on this joumey.40 In this article, he outlined the structure of his new approach to religious epistemology. Central to this new approach was the notion of proper one properly deals with good questions to which one doesn't know the answer: I shall ignore it.' 38. Kelly James Clark makes a similar comment in 'Introduction: The Literature of Confession,' in Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers, ed. Kelly James Clark (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1 993) 10. 39. Kelly James Clark, 'Introduction: The Literature of Confession,' 10. 40. Faith and Philosophy 4 (Oct. 1 987) 403-426.

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function; belief in God according to Plantinga could count as knowledge if it was produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties. This represented a fundamental step away from his previous approach to epistemological questions. Before, Plantinga had discussed rationality and justification as deontological notions, involving the keeping of one's 'epistemic duties.' In Plantinga's new account, however, epistemic duties take a back seat to the reliability of cognitive faculties or belief-producing mechanisms. Beliefs accrue 'positive epistemic status'-Plantinga's new term, borrowed from Roderick Chisholm-for a person if they are produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties. Plantinga defended his new epistemology against other accounts of knowledge in 'Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function (1988)"1 and 'Justification in the 20th Century (1990)"2 In the time between the publication of these articles, Plantinga changed the name of the 'conversion property'-that which converts ordinary true belief into knowledge--to 'warrant,' the term he currently uses. These works were eventually expanded to become the first two volumes of his Warrant trilogy, both published in 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate critiqued the reigning epistemologies of the day and Warrant and Proper Function laid out his own theory of knowledge.43 Finally, having articulated his theory of knowledge, and having benefited from a host of articles and essays critiquing various aspects of his theory,44 Plantinga applied his account of knowledge to belief in God and wrote his magnum opus in religious epistemology, Warranted Christian Belief.45 This volume follows the basic theory laid out in 'Justification and Theism' with a couple of important revisions and many refinements. The quality of the argument, the importance of the topic, and the breadth of issues addressed make this arguably the most significant book of Plantinga's distinguished career. It will undoubtedly play a major role in the discussion of belief in God for many years to come.

41. Philosophical Perspectives, 2: Epistemology, ed. James Tomberlin, 1 -50. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1988. 42. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (Fall 1990) supplement, 45-71 . 43. Both were published by Oxford University Press. 44. Notable examples are William Alston, 'Epistemic Warrant and Proper Function,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55/2 Gune 1 995) 397-402 and James E. Taylor, 'Plantinga's Proper Functioning Analysis of Epistemic Warrant,' Philosophical Studies 64/2 (Nov. 1991) 1 85-202; idem, 'Plantinga on Epistemic Warrant,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55/2 Gune 1995) 421 -426. 45. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

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Enduring Themes in Plantinga's Work The purpose of the previous discussion of Plantinga's works was to acquire some understanding of the nature and development of his academic efforts. Having done so, I now shift from a diachronic analysis to a synchronic analysis. There are a number of fundamental convictions which can be seen throughout Plantinga's scholarly corpus, convictions that exert an enormous amount of influence on the direction and tenor of his thought. The following discussion of these themes highlights several theses which comprise the backbone of Plantinga's approach to religious epistemology. My purpose here, however, is not to critique or defend these aspects of Plantinga's thought, only to explicate them. These themes are: (1) Plantinga's understanding of the nature of Christian scholarship, (2) his (excuse the pun) unapologetically apologetic approach to questions about God, and (3) his appraisal of the relationship between evidence and epistemically acceptable belief in God. As will become evident, these themes are interconnected in deep and important ways. Plantinga's stance on (and critique of) evidentialism has received significant attention from scholars. Many have also pointed to the apologetic motivations for Plantinga's writing. But most have overlooked the implications of his view of Christian scholarship.

The Nature of Christian Scholarship Plantinga's understanding of the nature of Christian scholarship has deep theological roots. While Plantinga has worked to make explicit some of the theology underlying this matter, much remains implicit, inchoate, and unclear. In one sense, this should not be surprising. After all, Plantinga is a philosopher, not a theologian-a theologically astute philosopher who draws on a deep reservoir of theological conviction, but a philosopher nonetheless. He has not made theological topics a primary area of research and, therefore, has not sought to make explicit the theological roots of his stance on the nature of Christian scholarship. In addition, questions regarding (what might be called) a 'theology of scholarship' are incredibly complicated. Regarding his position on the nature of Christian scholarship, he says: 'it isn't easy to see how to establish it, or how to develop and articulate it in detail.'46 The central theological idea behind Plantinga's account of the nature of Christian scholarship is that: 'There is no such thing as a religiously neutral endeavor--or rather, there is no such thing as a serious, substantial and 46. 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 56.

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relatively complete intellectual endeavor that is religiously neutral.'47 Understanding this notion of 'religious neutrality' requires a look at the thought of Abraham Kuyper, who was not only by most accounts the most influential Dutch Calvinist theologian, he was also the 'spiritual eminence' behind Calvin College.48 Kuyper believed that one's nationality, social class, and especially one's religious perspective were not neatly separable from one's academic work. According to Plantinga's fellow Dutch Calvinist and long-time friend, Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'A person's religion, on Kuyper's view, was not an inference or a hypothesis but a fundamental determinant of that person's hermeneutic of reality.'49 This is not to say that persons of two different religions will disagree on everything, or even on every religiously significant matter. Kuyper's contention is merely that one's religious beliefs and the implications of those beliefs make a real difference in how one approaches academic questions. But what kind of a difference? Plantinga's answer is helpful. The primary area where one's religious beliefs make a difference in one's academic work is in the specification of what it means to be a human. 'Science, philosophy and intellectual endeavor generally-the attempt to understand ourselves and our world--enters into this conflict in a thousand ways. And the closer the science in question is to what is distinctively human, the deeper the involvement.'50 In addition, Plantinga believes that the theist and nontheist have fundamental differences in their approach to epistemology. What sorts of beliefs are possible objects of knowledge? Are there 'truths' that are, by definition, beyond the ken of human beings? One's answer to these questions will be affected by many things: whether or not you think reality is solely materialistic, what sort of beings you think humans are, what kind of cognitive faculties they have, and what sorts of beliefs are properly thought of as arising from those cognitive faculties. And one's answer to these questions will affect your appraisal of what counts as a 'suitable explanation' of a given range of facts. Of course, philosophy is more than just expressing in philosophical form the content of one's theological 47. 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 56. 48. See I. John Hesselink, 'The Future of a Distinctive Dutch/ American Theology in the Reformed Church in America and the Christian Reformed Church,' in Perspectives on the Christian Reformed Church: Studies in Its History, Theology, and Ecumenicity, ed. De Klerk, Peter and Richard R. De Ridder (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1983) 273-296, especially 286ff. 49. Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'The Grace That Shaped My Life,' in Philosophers Who Believe, 270. 50. 'A Christian Life Partly Lived,' 78.

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convictions. The point is, rather, that one's philosophy i s shaped b y one's theological convictions-how you approach philosophy, what questions you think are worth answering and what sorts of answers you deem to be adequate are all affected by your stance toward religious matters. Therefore, for Plantinga, philosophy is 'an arena for the articulation and interplay of commitments and allegiances fundamentally religious in nature; it is an expression of deep and fundamental perspectives, ways of viewing ourselves and the world and God.'51 Plantinga's stance on the nature of academic inquiry and scholarship­ what I will call his Scholarship Thesis (abbreviated ST)-