Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan 9819932386, 9789819932382

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Masafumi Yokemoto Miho Hayashi Mayuko Shimizu Keiji Fujiyoshi   Editors

Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan

Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan

Masafumi Yokemoto · Miho Hayashi · Mayuko Shimizu · Keiji Fujiyoshi Editors

Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan

Editors Masafumi Yokemoto Graduate School of Business Osaka Metropolitan University Osaka, Japan Mayuko Shimizu Faculty of Policy Science Ryukoku University Kyoto, Japan

Miho Hayashi Foundation for Environmental Rehabilitation and Redevelopment of Mizushima Kurashiki, Okayama, Japan Keiji Fujiyoshi Faculty of Sociology Otemon Gakuin University Ibaraki, Osaka, Japan

ISBN 978-981-99-3238-2 ISBN 978-981-99-3239-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3239-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

This book explores Japan’s experience of environmental pollution in modern times. It mainly focuses on the second half of the twentieth century when Japan emerged as a strong industrial state after its surrender in World War II. It also addresses the early stage of industrialization in Japan, and takes a brief look at the current situation of environmental pollution such as Fukushima disaster. It is well known that environmental pollution is often called kougai in Japanese. The word has not only an objective and scientific meaning, but also an emotional and political meaning. In this sense, environmental pollution in Japan should be examined not only from a scientific cause-and-effect perspective, but also from the viewpoint of social science. Why a particular environmental pollution incident occurred and how it harmed people can be explained by chemistry and medicine, but that is not enough. It is more important to examine why such pollution was left to continue and why the harm to people was neglected for a long time. This book attempts to answer those questions using the knowledge and perspective of social science. Each chapter broadly describes the damage caused by a particular pollution incident, the associated victims’ movement for relief and compensation, residents’ activities which restore communities damaged by the pollution, and archives which preserve the memory of suffering caused by pollution and pass it on to succeeding generations. Chapter 1 overviews the history of environmental pollution in Japan from the late nineteenth century to the present. It also discusses the importance of the lawyers and academics in the civil movement to assign liability to the polluting companies and to demand relief for the victims. Chapter 2 describes the Ashio Copper Mine Mineral Pollution Incident of the late nineteenth century, which can be regarded as the first incident in Japan’s history of environmental pollution caused by modern industry. Chapter 3 describes how Minamata disease ruined and rent the community of calm and peaceful villages in the Minamata area, and then discusses how people have endeavored to regenerate the devastated community by making their “difficult past” into their heritage. Chapter 4 explains how the area severely damaged by itai-itai disease recovered from soil contamination. It also explains the efforts victims have v

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made to achieve reconciliation between polluters and victims. Chapter 5 addresses the significance of “community development for environmental regeneration” in the case of Mizushima, a district in western Japan. It also discusses the relationship between the development of NPO activities and the development of civil society in Japan. Most of the pollution incidents recounted in the aforementioned chapters occurred in the process of industrialization on the initiative of the Japanese government, whose aim was economic recovery from the devastation of Japanese society in World War II. This postwar industrialization was fueled by the special procurement of the Korean War (1950–1953) and the Vietnam War (1960–1975). Air, water, and soil—in short, the environment—were contaminated by toxic substances emitted from factories, which in turn harmed the health of people living near those factories. In addition to those major pollution incidents, several others occurred in the process of modern industrialization and mass production. Chapter 6 describes druginduced suffering (DIS) and its associated victims’ movements in postwar Japan. It also explains how environmental pollution and DIS incidents were regarded as having the same root, and how the Japanese words kougai and yakugai came to be commonly used in Japanese society. Chapter 7 examines an industrial food pollution incident and argues that the incident revealed a political void. The victims and their supporters insisted that food pollution should be recognized as a kind of kougai, but the government refused. The chapter also discusses what should be done to resolve that dispute. Chapter 8 notes that the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident is a kind of environmental pollution which forced the whole population living near the damaged nuclear power plant to flee to other parts of Japan. It then considers what compensation the power utility and the government should provide to the people who have been deprived of their “hometowns,” and what policy should be formulated for reconstruction of the damaged region. Finally, Chapter 9 discusses the importance of pollution museums and archives. Eventually all victims grow old and pass away, and some of them take their memories of pollution damage to their graves. Museums and archives, large and small, are established to keep those memories alive and share them with the public and succeeding generations. We editors hope that this book will provide people around the world with insights on the causes of environmental, food, and drug pollution, and on how to prevent them. Osaka, Japan Kurashiki, Japan Kyoto, Japan Ibaraki, Japan

Masafumi Yokemoto Miho Hayashi Mayuko Shimizu Keiji Fujiyoshi

Contents

1 A Brief History of Environmental Pollution in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shun’ichi Teranishi 2 Ashio Copper Mine Mineral Pollution Incident: The Starting Point of Environmental Pollution History in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wakana Takahashi and Hiroe Sagisaka 3 Regeneration of Pollution-Devastated Areas Through Alternative Food Networks: A Case Study of Organic Farming by Minamata Disease Patients and Their Supporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Masafumi Yokemoto 4 How Do We Cope with Pollution, a Form of Environmental Damage? Learning from a Community Devastated by Itai-Itai Disease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aya Kubota 5 Air Pollution Lawsuit and “Community Development for Environmental Regeneration”: The Case of Mizushima District in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Miho Hayashi, Conrad Hirano, and Masafumi Yokemoto

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6 Victims of Drug-Induced Suffering: Their Movement and Its Research Archives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Keiji Fujiyoshi

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7 Health Damage and Politics of Kanemi Oil Poisoning: Industrial Food Pollution and the Political Void . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kazuko Uda

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8 Damage Relief, Reconstruction Policy in the Wake of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Masafumi Yokemoto 9 Network of Museums, Archival Centers for Remembering Environmental Pollution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Mayuko Shimizu and Miho Hayashi

Chapter 1

A Brief History of Environmental Pollution in Japan Shun’ichi Teranishi

Abstract The beginning of modern industrialization in Meiji era (1868–1912) Japan was accompanied by the occurrence of many severe environmental pollution problems1 that have continued to the present day. Thus the history of Japan’s modern industrialization, which started in the Meiji era, has coincided with the progression of intensifying pollution. This chapter surveys the history of pollution problems starting with premodern Japan, describes the upsurge of devastating pollution during the postwar period of rapid economic growth, provides an overview of the efforts to abate that pollution,2 and concludes with a brief discussion of the basic tasks and future outlook which are particularly important for the period from the second half of the 1990s and up to the present day, in the first half of the twenty-first century.

1.1 Pollution Problems in Japan Before the Meiji Era (Before 1868) Starting in the Meiji era, Japan aggressively pursued a national policy aimed at modern industrialization. In that time, the drive to industrialize was conducted under the slogans “Enrich the state and strengthen the military,” and “Boost production and promote industry.” But at the same time this endeavor also marked the historic commencement of worsening pollution in Japan. Needless to say, not a few pollution problems in the premodern sense had arisen before the Meiji era (pre-1868). Especially during the Edo period (1603–1868), damage of various kinds, known as “mining pollution,” arose from mine development that flourished throughout the country. According to the oldest record, in the early Edo years from 1640 to 1690 exploratory excavation at the Akazawa copper mine (opened in 1591 in present-day Ibaraki Prefecture) produced mining pollutants that contaminated water which caused severe damage to cropland in downstream Miyata Village. Fierce protests by farmers forced the temporary closing of the mine.3 S. Teranishi (B) Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Yokemoto et al. (eds.), Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3239-9_1

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Similar damage has occurred throughout Japan since that time, but such pollution problems in the pre-Meiji years involved damage to farming and fishing caused by the river dumping of untreated toxic mining waste effluent from extraction processes used in mining gold, silver, copper, iron, and sulfur. In other words, it can therefore be seen as clashes and disputes over inter-industry interests between the effluent process of the mining industry and the water-use process of the agriculture and fishing industries. Note that until the Edo period, basically agricultural production was considered more important than developing the mining industry. Owing to these circumstances, settling conflicts between the two industries almost always proceeded in a manner that gave priority to agricultural interests. Thanks at least to this state of affairs, pollution problems at that time arguably avoided the extreme severity and expansion of damage like that seen in Meiji and thereafter.

1.2 Worsening of Pollution Problems in the Meiji Era Starting in the Meiji era, however, the pollution from that same mining industry spread rapidly. And in addition to the mining industry as it existed until then, a variety of new pollution problems appeared in the context of newly rising manufacturing industries. Among the main pollution problems of the Meiji era, the damage caused by four major copper mines in particular—Ashio (present-day Tochigi Prefecture), Besshi (present-day Ehime Prefecture), Hitachi (present-day Ibaraki Prefecture), and Kosaka (present-day Akita Prefecture)—symbolizes the tragic legacy of modern industrialization in those days, which was promoted by Japan’s national policy. Pollution damage by these four major copper mines manifested itself from the mid-Meiji years through the late Meiji years, and its spread became an extremely grave social issue. Incidentally, this time period coincides with the period when the Meiji government emphasized domestic mine development, and even more vigorously expedited national policy for modern industrialization that was aimed at growing mining and manufacturing production leveraged by mine development. Further, an event during this period which cannot be disregarded is Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), which was the first foreign war in modern Japanese history. This victory was a springboard for the post-1895 Japanese government to strive single-mindedly toward building an imperialistic military state called “Post-Sino-Japanese War Management.” This means that the Meiji government, in order to further expedite the actions of “enriching the state and strengthening the military” and “boosting production and promoting industry” that buttressed “PostSino-Japanese War Management,” and then decided that its highest priority would be to rapidly increase the production of copper, which at that time was a vital source of foreign currency for Japan. And to achieve this national-policy priority task, major copper mines—typified by the aforementioned Ashio, Besshi, Hitachi, and Kosaka mines—played the leading role of vigorously expediting the production-first principle of “more and more production.” These copper mines caused damage from mining pollutants, smoke, and other emissions from the time they began operating,

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clearly causing public harm, but this was of no concern to mine operators or to the Meiji government, which was responsible for supervising the mining industry. If anything, the intensification and spreading of pollution damage by the four major copper mines during this period were openly sanctioned by the government under its special system for national protection of the copper mining industry. At that time Japan was truly a copper-based nation. As such, damage caused by mining pollutants, smoke, and other emissions, especially damage by the four major copper mines, was deemed to be something people must tolerate owing to Japan’s “national interests.” Movements against mining pollution and smoke damage by the farmers suffering from them were therefore seen as “rebellion and hostility toward the state itself.” Under these circumstances, the Ashio copper mine pollution incident came to symbolize how farmers were subjected to severe political suppression and unavoidably came to an extremely tragic end.4 Further, Ashio copper mine left a serious, long-term aftermath that continued even in the postwar years (1945 onward), and this historic scar has still not healed even now in the twenty-first century. Although the situation was basically the same at the Besshi, Hitachi, and Kosaka copper mines, there were a few noteworthy initiatives not seen so much at Ashio with regard to compensation for damage, technological abatement of mine pollutants and smoke damage, and other measures enacted against the backdrop of protest movements by victimized farmers. Especially the “Smoke Damage Compensation Agreement” concluded for Besshi, as well as the implementation of smoke damage abatement measures (mine operation adjustment) based on aerological observations trialed at Hitachi, were arguably pollution-control measures that deserve special mention as efforts in prewar Japan.

1.3 Diversification of Pollution Problems During the Taisho and Early Showa Period (1912–1945) The Meiji era then bade farewell, and the course of modern industrialization in Japan came to an “historic turning point.” In Japan at this time (especially in the 1920s) the proportion of the heavy and chemical industrial sector in the manufacturing industry was gradually increasing (called the “First Heavy and Chemical Industrialization”), while the transition from an agricultural to an urban society (“First Urbanization”) also proceeded rapidly. Also occurring at this time was the prewar-period rapid formation of the four major industrial zones: Keihin (TokyoYokohama), Chukyo (Nagoya City region), Hanshin (Osaka-Kobe), and Kitakyushu (Kitakyushu City region). In the context of the change in the times described above, Japan’s pollution problems likewise transitioned from the mining pollutants and smoke damage (“mining damage”) emitted by the Meiji-era mining industry, to the new principal polluter, which was problems arising from “factory pollution” whose source gradually became the manufacturing industry overall. For example, the “Table of Factory Pollution Problems Listed by Cause” (1927–1938), which was

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based on the Annual Factory Supervision Report issued in the early Showa-era years by the Home Ministry’s Social Bureau, affords a view of the many pollution-damage incidents occurring nationwide, such as waste liquid, gas vapor, and dust. What is more, pollutant sources ranged across a broad spectrum of manufacturing industries including cement, rayon, dyeing, coke, artificial fertilizer, papermaking, metal products, pharmaceuticals, porcelain, and miscellaneous manufacturing, thereby covering vast numbers and types of industries and sectors. It is said that around this time the concept of broader and more diverse “pollution” began establishing itself in Japan in place of the previously dominant “mining damage” and “smoke damage.”5 Also during this period, the chemical industry sector began to develop, and this underlay the emergence of a situation one might call “chemical pollution.” This was a consequence of the Japanese government’s attempt to accelerate the chemical industry while ignoring consideration for safety in the rush to use chemicals in production processes. At the same time, this was also the historic prelude to how Japan’s postwar chemical industry would cause one serious pollution incident after another. One more important characteristic of Japan’s pollution problems at this time was the beginning of what was called “urban pollution.” Especially in Osaka, from 1920 onward there was serious damage from dust fall, for which the city was called the “smoke capital.” Kujuro Fujiwara, who was then the director of the Osaka City Sanitation Laboratory, pointed out the grave health damage caused by this smoke to mainly the poor citizens of the inferior residential environment.6 To deal with the smoke problem in Osaka at that time, the “Smoke Abatement Research Committee” was formed in 1927 under the “Osaka City Association” that had been founded in 1925, and a public–private smoke abatement movement was conducted mainly with the participation of the Osaka Prefecture/City authorities, factory proprietors, experts on sanitation and fuel, and other entities. However, this movement saw no participation at all by the residents, who bore the brunt of smoke damage. This was an indication that even in urban areas that were representative of Osaka at that time, residents’ human rights awareness and civic consciousness were, from an historical standpoint, still immature. For this reason the smoke abatement movement was gradually downsized into a movement to improve fuel combustion methods, and ultimately it was transformed into a part of the industrial-rationalization campaign in the course of Japan’s subsequent rapid transition to a wartime economy. We have seen how, since the Meiji era, many pollution problems have seriously worsened in various ways from the time that Japan started down the road to modern industrialization. However, it is safe to say that progress toward initiatives meant to solve these problems was ultimately left to be dealt with after the Second World War.

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1.4 The Surge of Pollution Problems in Postwar Japan’s Period of Rapid Economic Growth At the conclusion of the Second World War in August 1945 Japan suffered a costly defeat, but in the 1950s it once again started working toward economic reconstruction, and beginning in the 1960s it established a trajectory of rapid economic growth that was termed a “miracle.” And in the course of this amazingly rapid postwar growth, Japan repeated the tragic flare-up of serious pollution damage which was worse than that in the prewar years. These pollution problems, which are typical of postwar Japan, are symbolized by the four major pollution incidents: two outbreaks of Minamata disease (Kumamoto and Niigata prefectures), itai-itai disease (Toyama Prefecture), and Yokkaichi Industrial Complex pollution (Mie Prefecture). All of them exert pressure for fundamental soul-searching about the state of Japan-style economic growth throughout the pre- and postwar periods. In particular, the state of Japan’s rapid economic growth in the 1960s and thereafter involves some extremely serious problems as detailed below. First, this was economic growth that involved structural distortion which magnified the imbalance between industrial sectors and regions. It is widely known that in 1960s Japan the construction of heavy and chemical industry complexes was pursued under national policy, and for this reason Japan carried out land-reclamation projects on a scale so large as to be rare internationally. Their purpose was to prepare industrial sites and build port facilities in the coastal zones of major urban areas including Tokyo Bay, Ise Bay, Osaka Bay, the Seto Inland Sea, and Kitakyushu. For example, during fewer than 20 years from 1960 to the late 1970s, land reclamation created as much as approximately 20,000 ha of land along the Tokyo Bay shore, and about 30,000 ha along the shore of the Seto Inland Sea as a whole. Creation of industrial sites and construction of port facilities by such reclamation projects contributed to the dramatic growth of industrial production capacity which overemphasized postwar Japan’s heavy and chemical industry sector, but after the 1970s oil shock this acted in reverse by worsening the structural excess problem in that same sector. Not only that, these reclamation projects also tragically destroyed precious natural ecosystems, as well as natural seacoasts and other scenic beauty such as the tidal flats and wetlands in Japan’s bays and coastal zones, thereby causing a variety of irreversible losses. The environmental value lost as a consequence is immeasurably large. Further, economic growth that placed undue weight on the heavy and chemical industry sector weakened “regional economic strength” driven by “national economic strength.” In particular, the foundation for the autonomy and endogenous development of “regional economies” throughout Japan was lost, and regional economies were weakened in the extreme. Especially Japan’s agricultural, mountainous, and fishing village sector, whose foundation rests on agriculture, forestry, fishing (the marine products industry), and other primary industries, experienced the structural “weakening and collapse of regional economies.”7 Second, the above situation produced a society in which “industrial pollution” and “urban pollution” occurred simultaneously and frequently in a zone of major cities

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and their environs called the “Pacific Belt Zone,” which joined Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka. In 1970, citizen complaints about severe pollution surpassed well over 3,000 per year (a daily average of about 10 complaints) in just the three major urban zones of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, and that is just according to the officially received complaints, which are merely the tip of the iceberg. At that time, citizens of Japan’s three major urban zones faced a terrifying situation in which their suffering, due to the extraordinary intensification and broadening of pollution damage, was an everyday occurrence. And third, as the tragic extreme of the situation described above, is the frequent occurrence of the “criminal pollution” symbolized by the aforementioned four major pollution incidents of postwar Japan. It was an extremely dire situation wherein “company profit” and “industry profit” were granted excessive priority, while basic human rights connected with the health and lives of local residents were violated.

1.5 Pollution Abatement Measures and Assessment Thereof in the Second Half of the 1960s and Thereafter, Forcussing on Yokkaichi Air Pollution As outlined above, Japan experienced the frequent occurrence of severe pollution damage starting in the Meiji era, but although the government and regional administrative authorities should have stemmed the damage, they were unable to take any effective measures. Certainly, measures by the government in particular were decisively delayed, but starting finally in the second half of the 1960s some reasonably good pollution abatement measures began to appear. Below the primary focus will be on measures to combat Yokkaichi air pollution because, as I will discuss in the following section (VI), this sounded the outset of a series of pollution lawsuits in postwar Japan, and also had a powerful influence on subsequent pollution-control measures by the national and local governments.8 It is widely known that at the beginning of the 1960s Japan’s initial petrochemical complex (First Complex) was built near the seacoast (Shiohama District) in Yokkaichi City, Mie Prefecture. It was the first of the petrochemical complexes that powered postwar Japan’s rapid economic growth. After beginning full-scale operation, the factories grouped there released heavy atmospheric emissions of sulfur oxides (SOx) because of their oil combustion. At that time the Yokkaichi First Complex concentrated the siting of factory groups in the heavy and chemical industry sector, including power production, petroleum refining, and petrochemicals, and the fuel mainly used was poor-quality heavy oil refined from Middle East sour crude with a high sulfur content of about 3%. Moreover, the factories had no air pollution-control equipment at all. High-concentration SOx gases were discharged directly into the atmosphere, thereby damaging many nearby citizens’ respiratory systems, and leading to serious damage to their bronchi and pulmonary function. Their malady was called “Yokkaichi

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asthma.” The question arises as to what measures were taken to deal with this severe air pollution damage. As everyone knows, the 1962 Smoke and Soot Regulation Law marked the start of legal regulations on air pollution in postwar Japan. Under this law, legal regulations for the first time targeted “soot and smoke” (soot and other particulates plus SOx), hydrogen sulfide, ammonia, and other specified substances that are harmful to humans. Additionally, the law designated air pollution zones and established emission regulatory standards for each type of “soot- and smoke-emitting facility.” But the actual emission regulatory standards based on the law are very lax. For example, the standard for sulfur dioxide (SO2 ) was a level that could be easily attained even if a facility emitted, without treatment, the combustion gas from fuel oil C with a sulfur content of 3–3.5%. As such, the standard had no effect at all on the severe air pollution caused by SOx emitted by the Yokkaichi complexes at the time. In 1968 the Air Pollution Control Law was enacted, and the following year saw the establishment of Japan’s first “desirable environmental standard” for SO2 . That standard was “the annual average of the one-hour value does not exceed 0.05 ppm,” but it was extremely lax in view of the “levels that are safe for human health” set forth by the World Health Organization. However, even that lax standard could not be met at all by Japan’s major cities in the second half of the 1960s by Yokkaichi of course, but also by Tokyo, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Osaka, and others. Further, in addition to the “individual source control” of the concentration of emissions from each “soot- and smoke-emitting facility” used theretofore, this 1968 Air Pollution Control Law introduced a new method called “K-value control,” which means attempting to control the permissible emission amount in accordance with the height of the exhaust vent (i.e., smokestack) of a “soot- and smoke-emitting facility.” The reason for instituting this new K-value control was that, under the “individual source control” system for emission concentration from a soot- and smoke-emitting facility, in places such as the Yokkaichi petrochemical complex zone, where many soot- and smoke-emitting facilities are concentrated, it is impossible to prevent a situation in which severe, highly concentrated pollution arises in a small locality owing to the clustering of facilities, even if the emission concentration of each such facility satisfies the regulatory standard. Additionally, at that time it was thought that, to alleviate air pollution, it was more important to regulate not only the emission concentration from individual soot- and smoke-emitting facilities, but also the ground-level concentration of air pollutants in a way that also takes topography, wind direction, and other geographical and climatic conditions into consideration. But a major problem was that the rationale of “dilution and diffusion” was adopted in place of reducing pollutants. The thinking behind dilution/diffusion is obvious in K-value control because of the decisive significance of effective stack height (He), and it can be explained thus: Even when a quite strict K value is set, if at the same time effective stack height (He) is raised by making the physical smokestack higher, then a larger emission amount (Q) will be permitted. In fact, after the K-value control method was adopted, companies in the heavy and chemical industry complex zones in Japan, where relatively strict K values had been set, all at once invested in higher smokestacks. This resulted in the bizarre spectacle of smokestacks over 100 m, or

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even over 200 m, springing up like gigantic mushrooms. Addressing the problem by raising stack height ended up spreading air pollution damage over broader areas. As the foregoing discussion shows, measures were taken to abate SOx, which were the main cause of air pollution in Yokkaichi, but whether those measures were “individual source control” of emission concentration from each soot- and smokeemitting facility, or K-value control, they both suffered from the limitation of being mere “concentration control.” But to overcome this limitation, authorities eventually considered measures to limit the very amount of atmospheric SOx emissions. First was fuel desulfurization, or reducing the sulfur content of fuel, second was flue gas desulfurization, or removing SOx at the point of atmospheric emission, and third was the more fundamental approach of “encouraging energy conservation and switching to an industrial structure generating little pollution.” Actually, the reason that measures like those described above finally came under consideration was the sequence of events in which, in response to the landmark court decision of July 1972 in the Yokkaichi pollution lawsuit, the Air Pollution Control Law was amended in 1974, and areawide total emission control on SOx was introduced. Here areawide total emission control means calculating, in accordance with the environmental quality standard (EQS), the permissible total amount of pollutants emitted within a certain designated area, and then providing for the strengthening of controls on individual emission sources so as to hold total emissions in that area below the EQS. It is safe to say that in later years areawide total emission control played a major role in substantially reducing SOx emissions in Japan. Further, and especially in Japan’s case, there was great significance in measures aimed at “encouraging energy conservation and switching to an industrial structure generating little pollution,” which is the third way of reducing SOx emissions mentioned above. As everyone is aware, the entire global economy suffered from the first and second oil shocks. Both had devastating impacts on Japan’s economy and put heavy pressure on government policy to deal with them. For this reason initiatives for “energyconservation measures” were considered more important than “pollution-control measures” in the latter half of the 1970s. During this time period, in fact, programs offering substantial tax breaks for energy-conservation investments (such as special depreciation programs) were created starting in FY1975, and many efforts were made for their expansion. At the same time, companies in the oil-consumptive heavy and chemical industry sector became “industries in structural recession,” and from the 1980s and onward Japan’s industrial structure itself was pushed toward transition. The response to these oil shocks subsequently led to the relative curbing of the Japanese economy’s oil dependence, and at the same time helped greatly decrease SOx emissions arising from oil use.

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1.6 The Forces Behind Japan’s Pollution-Control Measures: (1) The Significance of Postwar Local Autonomy The previous section focused on air pollution-control measures for Yokkaichi pollution, but that section also noted that such measures in Japan—especially those by the national government—got off to a decisively late start. In that context, the two forces described below played an important role in facilitating measures against the kinds of severe pollution damage which started in the mid-1960s and extended beyond the 1970s. The first force is the initiatives by local governments (municipalities) which were pressured by the campaigns of pollution victims themselves, and the community movements and citizens’ movements that supported them; the second was the struggle that arose via the succession of pollution lawsuits.9 It must be emphasized that in each case, the movements by victims themselves played a vital role. Following is a brief discussion which begins with the first force. From the second half of the 1960s through the first half of the 1970s, there were surging community movements and citizens’ movements against the increasingly severe pollution damage in Japan’s major urban areas including Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, and Kawasaki. With the support of those movements, candidates who consider pollution-control measures important started winning local elections. In this way, there was a spate of victories by local governments called “progressive local governments,” and this has given rise to a political situation in which various pollutioncontrol measures were pursued on the municipal level ahead of the national government, which had gotten off to a decisively late start. The implementation of sundry pioneering initiatives by these progressive local governments had great significance. One of those initiatives was the conclusion of “pollution-control agreements.” This started when the mayor of Yokohama, Ichio Asukata (elected in 1964) conducted direct negotiations seeking advance pollution-abatement measures with the Electric Power Development Co., which was planning to build a coal-fired thermal power plant in the Negishi district of Yokohama’s Isogo Ward. As noted above, pollution regulation by the national government in those days was exceedingly lax, while at the same time local governments like Yokohama City were not given adequate authority to regulate pollution. Given this state of affairs, this inevitably lead local governments to the independently conceived method of pollution-control measures using agreements which are not based on laws or other such means. Using such agreements later spread to local governments throughout Japan, and were known as the “Yokohama system.” Such “pollution-control agreements” played an important role in preventing pollution damage in many places. Another one of those initiatives was the enactment of “pollution-control ordinances.” The enactment of ordinances independently by local governments was an attempt to maximize the use of the municipal authority guaranteed by postwar Japan’s Local Autonomy Act in the area of pollution-control measures as well. It is of great significance that enacting such ordinances made it possible to use the authority vested in local governments (called “augmented regulations” and “additional regulations”)

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to regulate the standards and targets that cannot be adequately regulated with the pollution-control measures of the national government using laws and other legal means. In particular, the “Metropolitan Tokyo Pollution-control Ordinance” enacted in July 1969 was an important starting point for these initiatives by local governments. Thereafter, initiatives by local governments to independently enact ordinances spread throughout the nation, and that in turn served to spur, and somewhat advance, pollution-abatement measures on the national-government level.

1.7 The Forces Behind Japan’s Pollution-Control Measures: (2) The Role Played by Successive Pollution Lawsuits The second force was pollution lawsuits. Especially in Japan’s case, it is safe to say that the flurry of pollution lawsuits was the biggest motive force which advanced measures to combat the various kinds of pollution damage. In every one of the aforementioned four major pollution incidents of postwar Japan—Yokkaichi pollution, Minamata disease in Kumamoto and Niigata prefectures, and itai-itai disease— victims became the plaintiffs, filed one lawsuit after another demanding compensation and injunctions that sought redress for severe pollution damage, and were victorious. In relation to Yokkaichi pollution, for example, nine victims in the Isozu district became plaintiffs in a lawsuit against six defendant companies (Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Chubu Electric Power Co., Showa Yokkaichi Sekiyu Co., Mitsubishi Yuka, Mitsubishi Kasei Kogyo, and Mitsubishi Monsanto Kasei) of the First Complex in September 1967. The suit, which was filed in the Yokkaichi Branch of Tsu District Court, demanded compensation for respiratory-system health damage caused by sulfurous acid gas. The court’s decision, issued on July 24, 1972, recognized the joint tortious act and “siting negligence” by the six defendant companies, and ordered them to pay damages totaling ¥88.21 million to the plaintiffs (12 people comprising seven of the original nine plaintiffs, and five bereaved family members of the two deceased plaintiffs). This was a landmark decision (famous as the “Yonemoto decision”) that sternly questioned the six defendant companies’ responsibility for their emissions, and subsequently served as powerful leverage for advancing pollution-abatement measures in Japan.10 This Yokkaichi decision was followed by a spate of major lawsuits over airpollution damage: The Chiba Pollution Lawsuit (filed 1975), Osaka Nishiyodogawa Pollution Lawsuit (filed 1978), Kawasaki Pollution Lawsuit (filed 1982), KurashikiMizushima Pollution Lawsuit (filed 1983), Amagasaki Pollution Lawsuit (filed 1988), Nagoya-Nambu Pollution Lawsuit (filed 1989), and Tokyo Air Pollution Lawsuit (filed 1996). Many lawsuits have also been filed over Minamata disease. These include the Niigata Minamata Disease Lawsuit (filed 1967), First Kumamoto Minamata Disease Lawsuit (filed 1969), and Minamata Disease Criminal Lawsuit (filed 1975), as well as lawsuits inquiring into the administrative responsibility

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of the central government and prefecture, including the Third Kumamoto Minamata Disease Lawsuit (filed 1980), Minamata disease Kansai Lawsuit (filed 1982), Minamata Disease Shiranui Sea Lawsuit (filed 2005), and the Congenital Minamata Disease Lawsuit (filed 2007). Further, while the resolute struggle of victims themselves played an exceedingly important role in this series of pollution lawsuits, the efforts of counsels organized for each lawsuit performed an equally important part. In January 1971 these counsels organized the National Committee of Pollution Opposition Counsels (NCPOC), and since then have furthered cooperation and collaboration based on mutual informationsharing.11 Additionally, the role of researchers and experts who have actively cooperated with these counsels in pollution lawsuits is also highly commendable. In this respect, one must especially emphasize the founding of the Japan Environmental Council (JEC) in June 1979 mainly by researchers and experts working on solutions to pollution and environmental problems in Japan and other countries, the leaders of various citizens’ movements, and others. JEC is a unique network-type organization aspiring to be (1) an open academic society, (2) an interdisciplinary academic society, and (3) an advocacy academic society. It deserves special mention that since its founding, JEC has proclaimed “the defense of basic human rights” and “the establishment of environmental rights” that transcend generations and national borders, and it has taken an active role in the many pollution and environmental lawsuits of this period, as well as in environmental-conservation initiatives in Japan and abroad.12

1.8 Basic Tasks and Outlook for the Future Above, this chapter has surveyed the history of Japan’s pollution problems during the period starting before the Meiji era and up to the mid-1990s, and the chapter will conclude with a brief discussion of the basic tasks and future outlook which are particularly important for the period from the second half of the 1990s and up to the present day in the first half of the twenty-first century. First of all, initiatives for “environmental regeneration” are increasingly important as a basic task for the future.13 Environmental regeneration here primarily signifies efforts that start with total relief for all types of pollution damage, as well as taking back clean air, water, soil, and the like for the purpose of eradicating pollution damage, but it does not stop there. It also signifies a comprehensive approach to the “restoration” and “regeneration” of the environment in a broad sense, aiming to restore and regenerate natural environments which have been damaged; as well as to restore and regenerate environmental livability, including each locality’s inherent history, culture, scenery, and other characteristics; and to bring about the qualitative richness of the overall local living environment including education, healthcare, and welfare. Especially in Japan it was the second half of the 1990s and thereafter when environmental regeneration in this sense emerged as a new basic task, and a pioneering initiative of this type was that of the polluted Nishiyodogawa district of Osaka.

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As noted previously, the Nishiyodogawa Pollution Lawsuit in Osaka was filed in 1978 and reached a court-mediated settlement in March 1995 after a hard court battle. The settlement’s provisions specified the task of “regenerating polluted localities” and included this important sentence stipulating that part of the compensation payment made by the defendant companies “be used to protect the plaintiffs’ environment, to improve the living environment, and to regenerate and otherwise better the polluted Nishiyodogawa area.” As a result, in September 1996 the Center for the Redevelopment of Pollution-damaged Areas in Japan (known informally as the Aozora Foundation) was founded, mainly by people who had been plaintiffs in the Nishiyodogawa Pollution Lawsuit. This gained prominence as the founding of a new kind of nonprofit organization (NPO), the first in Japan and without precedent even worldwide, which was formed with pollution victims playing the leading role. 14 Also after the Nishiyodogawa victory, and inspired by how it was achieved, there were similar new developments in the polluted areas of Kawasaki, Mizushima, Amagasaki, and Southern Nagoya, where court battles had sought compensation and injunctions over severe air pollution. In response to the turning point created by a settlement in that lawsuit spanning many years, all of these lawsuits saw newly started initiatives aimed at the new task of “community regeneration” via “environmental regeneration.” There are strong expectations that efforts to undertake such basic tasks will henceforth achieve steady progress. Important as the second basic task, which also includes the aforementioned task of “community regeneration” via “environmental regeneration,” is the comprehensive pursuance of policy integration aimed at achieving “environmentally sustainable communities” (ESC) and “environmentally sustainable societies” (ESS).15 As everyone knows, 2022 is an historic juncture that marks 50 years since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference) was held in June 1972. This conference kick-started international initiatives aimed at environmental conservation, an important task shared by the whole world. At about the same time, Japan too was confronted by severe pollution, and its pollution/ environment policy got off to a start in its own way: In late 1970 the “Pollution Diet Session” passed 14 environment-related bills all at once, and in July 1971 the Environment Agency (the present Ministry of the Environment) was created. But in those days Japan’s pollution/environment policy suffered from the fundamental limitation of being a type called “react-and-cure.” Such a policy does nothing to examine and essentially remedy the structural causes of pollution problems arising one after another; instead, it is a “reactive” policy which sees structural causes as “an unalterable given,” and just implements after-the-fact measures against the individual pollution problems that arise from those causes. Owing to this limitation, Japan’s pollution/environment policy during those years was fundamentally flawed when seen from the viewpoints of radical-cure policies, and of the preventive approach, which prevents a series of problems from happening. As such, there is an acute need for initiatives geared toward devising pollution/environment policies on a new level that will overcome such limitations and flaws.16 That will require policies which go beyond the conventional, narrow area of pollution/environmental policy, and move into policy areas such as economics and industry, including energy, as

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well as urban, transportation, and land-development policy, plus tax/fiscal policy, financial policy, and more. In other words, our new pollution/environmental policies going forward must to the full extent strive toward consistent “eco-friendliness” (greening) in all areas touching upon “the economy” and “society,” and by that means achieve “policy integration” which facilitates “green reform” of the existing socioeconomic system. That is to say, pressing ahead with “policy integration” that aims to achieve ESC and ESS—including the above-mentioned “community regeneration” via “environmental regeneration”—has now become an inescapable basic task.17 The third basic task, which has in recent years become increasingly important, is to steadily link initiatives such as those described above, to the realization of ESC and ESS throughout the whole of Asia, not just in Japan. It is well-known that, especially in the 1990s and thereafter, China and other Asian countries and regions achieved dizzying economic growth one after the other, but unfortunately in that process they hardly benefited from the lessons of severe pollution which Japan had experienced in years previous. In fact, these problems have spread to all parts of Asia, and there is a recurring tragedy in which old and new pollution problems, as well as irreparable environmental damage of all kinds, are occurring frequently. Owing to this situation, the Japan Environmental Council (JEC, described briefly above in section VII) has performed the leading role in building the framework for mutual cooperation (Asian environmental cooperation) meant to achieve environmental conservation throughout the entire Asian region. This task requires the development of a multi-faceted and multi-tiered mutual cooperation network comprising not only the central governments of countries and regions, but also entities on other levels such as local governments (municipalities) and private enterprises, as well as the various NGOs (nongovernmental organization) and NPOs (nonprofit organizations) that have emerged in Asia during this time period, including the citizens, researchers, and experts who support those organizations’ activities. That is why JEC has long endeavored to build this kind of network for Asian environmental cooperation, an effort that started in December 1991 with the first “Asia–Pacific NGO Environmental Conference” (APNEC-1) in Bangkok, which was followed by APNEC-2 (Seoul, 1993), APNEC-3 (Kyoto, 1994), APNEC-4 (Singapore, 1998), APNEC-5 (Agra, India, 2000), APNEC-6 (Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 2002), APNEC-7 (Kathmandu, Nepal, 2005), APNEC-8 (Sydney, Australia, 2007), APNEC-9 (Kyoto, 2009), APNEC-10 (Taipei, Taiwan, 2011), and APNEC-11 (Jeonju, South Korea, 2013). Additionally, based on the network-building described above, another effort has been to compile and publish a series of NGO-focused books titled The State of the Environment in Asia.18 The future succession and development of such projects will be necessary, and this entails the close exchange of information among Asian countries and regions, learning from each other about the history and reality of various pollution problems, and—above all—“mutual interaction” that involves the persistent facilitation of extensive interpersonal exchanges and other activities, which are of the utmost importance. It will require a number of steps to raise “mutual interaction” to the level of “mutual cooperation.” First is mutual interaction, through which the parties deepen their understanding of each other, i.e., they proceed to

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mutual understanding. Having achieved that, they must build a relationship of mutual trust. Only after going from mutual interaction to mutual understanding, and then to mutual trust, can they achieve the mutual cooperation by which they combine their strengths. “Asian environmental cooperation” cannot become a reality without firmly taking each of the four steps described above. “Asian environmental cooperation” will grow increasingly important in the future, but like Rome, it will not be built in a day. Nevertheless, it will expand unfalteringly step by step. Such untiring effort is needed now more than ever before. End Notes 1. “Environmental pollution problems” here include direct exposure to toxic drugs, chemicals, and other substances without passing through what we usually know as “the environment,” or various problems such as drug-induced diseases and food pollution caused by the direct ingestion of such substances. Chapters on this subject are Chap. 6 (Fujiyoshi K) and Chap. 7 (Uda K). 2. Parts I though IV are based on Teranishi (1993). 3. See the account by Kaya (1952). 4. The Ashio Copper Mine pollution incident is regarded as the starting point of pollution problems in Japan, and it has been extensively documented. A fine work that provides a complete picture of this pollution incident is Shoji and Sugai (1984). In this book, Chap. 2 (Takahashi W) examines the incident in detail. 5. See Oda (1983). 6. See Fujiwara (1932). 7. The economies and societies of regions based on primary-industry sectors such as agriculture, forestry, and fisheries are called “natural resource-based economies.” See Teranishi (2018) for proposals based on their desirable form of sustainable development and policy research that supports it. 8. In mind here is the statement on p 145 of Miyamoto (2014): “If Minamata disease is the starting point of pollution, then Yokkaichi pollution is the starting point of pollution-control measures.” The following account is based on Teranishi (2015, 2021). 9. See Miyamoto (2014). 10. Miyamoto (2022) provides valuable historical testimony on this matter. 11. These NCPOC endeavors and experience were steadily carried over into, and put to practical use in, the 21st-century lawsuits seeking compensation for asbestos pollution and harm from the Fukushima nuclear accident. For details see Tokushuu: Kougaibenren hossoku 50-shuunen kinen shuukai ‘Higaisha to tomoni 50 nen’ Kougaibenren no tatakai no keishou to mirai e no tenbou (“Special Feature: NCPOC 50th Anniversary Commemorative Gathering, ‘50 Years with the Victims’: The Succession of NCPOC’s Struggle and Its Future Outlook”) in Hou to Minshushugi (Law and Democracy) No. 566, Japan Democratic Lawyers’ Association, February/March 2022.

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12. On JEC’s history and endeavors, see Nihon kankyo kaigi jimukyoku (2011) and Miyamoto et al. (2014). The latter in particular briefly describes the characters and achievements of the main 12 members (Shigeto Tsuru, Hikaru Shoji, Michitaka Kaino, Takeo Suzuki, Tsunahide Shidei, Muneaki Tajiri, Makoto Shimuzu, Jun Ui, Masazuni Harada, Nobuko Iijima, Yuzuru Hanayama, and Toshiko Akiyama) of the “Pollution Research Committee” (established in July 1963, chaired by Shigeto Tsuru), which was the interdisciplinary group of researchers that played the core role in establishing JEC. For information on JEC’s latest endeavors, see the JEC website: http://www.einap.org/jec/ (in Japanese). 13. For more detailed information see Teranishi (2001, 2002). 14. For more detailed information see Chap. 5 (Hayashi M et al). 15. For more detailed information see Teranishi (2003a, b). 16. For more detailed information see Teranishi and Ishi (2002). 17. For more detailed information see Teranishi (2003a, b). 18. This NGO-focused book series in Japanese, and English translation, are as follows. (1) Ajia kankyou hakusho 1997/98, Toyo Keizai, Tokyo, 1997. The State of the Environment in Asia 1999–2000, Springer, Tokyo, 1999. (2) Ajia kankyou hakusho 2000/01, Toyo Keizai, Tokyo, 2000. The State of the Environment in Asia 2002–2003, Springer, Tokyo, 2002. (3) Ajia kankyou hakusho 2003/04, Toyo Keizai, Tokyo, 2003. The State of the Environment in Asia 2005–2006, Springer, Tokyo, 2005. (4) Ajia kankyou hakusho 2006/07, Toyo Keizai, Tokyo, 2006. The State of the Environment in Asia 2006–2007, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2009. (5) Ajia kankyou hakusho 2010/11, Toyo Keizai, Tokyo, 2010. English-language version unpublished.

References Fujiwara K (1932) Toshi no kuuchuu jouka mondai (The problem of cleaning urban air). Toshi Mondai (urban Problems) 15(1):59–84 Kaya M (1952) Hitachi kouzanshi (Hitachi mine history). Nippon Kogyo Kabushikigaisha Hitachi Kogyosho. Japan Mining Industry Co., Hitachi Mining Station, Hitachi Miyamoto K (2014) Sengo Nihon kougai shiron (A critical history of environmental pollution in postwar Japan). Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo Miyamoto K (2022) Yokkaichi kougai hanketsu 50-nen ni omou (Thoughts on the 50th anniversary of the Yokkaichi pollution court decision). Kankyou to Kougai (Res Environ Disrupt) 52(2):2–7 Miyamto K, Awaji T (eds) (Chief editor: Teranishi S) (2014) Kougai, kankyou kenkyuu no paioniatachi (Pioneers of pollution and environmental research). Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo Nihon kankyo kaigi jimukyoku (ed) (Chief editor: Teranishi S) (2011) Nihon kankyou kaigi 30-nen no ayumi: kiroku, shiryou-shuu (30-year history of the Japan Environmental Council: an archive of records and reference materials) (CD-ROM version)

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Oda Y (1983) Kindai Nihon no kougai mondai: shiteki keisei katei no kenkyuu (Pollution problems in modern Japan: research on the course of historical formation). Sekaishisosha, Kyoto Shoji K, Sugai M (1984) Tsuushi: Ashio koudoku jiken 1877–1984 (A general history of the Ashio Mine poisoning incident, 1877–1984). Shinyosha, Tokyo Teranishi S (1993) Nihon no kougai mondai, kougai taisaku ni kansuru jakkan no seisatsu: Ajia NIES e no kyoukun toshite (A bit of self-reflection on Japan’s pollution problems and abatement measures as a lesson for Asian NIES). In: Kojima R, Fujisaki S (eds) Kaihatsu to kankyou: Higashi Ajia no keiken (Development and environment: East Asia’s experience). Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, pp 225–251 Teranishi S (2001) ‘Kankyou saisei’ no tame no sougoutekina seisaku kenkyuu wo mezashite (Working toward comprehensive policy research for achieving ‘environmental regeneration’). Kankyou to Kougai (Res Environ Disrupt) 31(1):2–6 Teranishi S (2002) Kankyou saisei no kadai to tenbou: korekara no seisaku teigen ni mukete (Environmental regeneration’s trials and outlook: steps toward policy proposals for the future). In: Nagai S, Teranishi S, Yokemoto M (eds) Kankyou saisei: Kawasaki kara kougai chiiki no saisei wo kangaeru (Environmental regeneration: considering the regeneration of pollution-devastated areas with Kawasaki as the reference point). Yuhikaku, Tokyo, pp 321–337 Teranishi S, Ishi H (eds) (2002) Kankyou hozen to koukyou seisaku (Environmental conservation and public policy). Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo Teranishi S (2003a) Korekara no kankyou hozen ni motomerareru mono (What is needed from environmental conservation from now on). In: Teranishi S, Hosoda E (eds) Kankyou hozen e no seisaku tougou (Policy integration for environmental conservation). Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, pp 1–8 Teranishi S (ed) (2003b) Atarashii kankyou keizai seisaku: sasuteinaburu ekonomii e no michi (New environmental economics polity: the path to a sustainable economy). Toyo Keizai, Tokyo Teranishi S (2015) Sengo 70 nen to Nihon no kougai keiken: Ajia shokoku chiiki e no kyoukun toshite (The postwar 70 years and Japan’s pollution experience: lessons for Asian countries and regions). J Takasaki City Univ Econ 58(2):31–46 Teranishi S, Ishida N, Yamashita H (eds) (2018) Nouka ga kieru: shizen shigen keizairon kara no teigen (Farmers are disappearing: proposals from natural resource-based economics). Misuzu Shobo, Tokyo Teranishi S (2021) History and Lessons of Pollution in Postwar Japan. In: Oshima K, Teranishi S, Suzuki K (eds) (2021) Towards a sustainable Japanese economy: beyond the triple failures of market. Government and Institutions, Impress R&D, Tokyo, pp 14–23

Chapter 2

Ashio Copper Mine Mineral Pollution Incident: The Starting Point of Environmental Pollution History in Japan Wakana Takahashi and Hiroe Sagisaka

A true civilization shall not destroy mountains, ravage rivers, break villages, or kill people

Tanaka Shozo, who lived with the remaining residents of Yanaka Village, which was destroyed by mining pollution, wrote these words in his diary on June 17, 1912, the year of his death. What kind of history and pollution from the Ashio Copper Mine were behind Shozo’s words? What are the lessons that the Ashio Copper Mine’s environmental destruction have left us for today? This chapter focuses on the Ashio Copper Mine mineral pollution incident, which is viewed as the first incident of massive environmental pollution in Japan. Section 2.1 outlines the history of the Ashio Copper Mine, and Sects. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 clarify the multifaceted damage caused by its pollution from a chronological and constructive perspective. Section 2.5 explores how the mine poisoning incident has been remembered or forgotten. The final section discusses lessons learned from the Ashio Copper Mine.

W. Takahashi (B) School of International Studies, Utsunomiya University, Mine 350, Utsunomiya, Tochigi 321-8505, Japan e-mail: [email protected] H. Sagisaka Graduate School of International Studies, Utsunomiya University, Utsunomiya, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Yokemoto et al. (eds.), Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3239-9_2

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2.1 History of Ashio Copper Mine1 The Ashio Copper Mine was developed under the direct control of Tokugawa Ieyasu, the first shogun of the Edo Shogunate, in 1610. By the mid-seventeenth century, the annual production was estimated at 1,500 tons. Bronze produced at the mine was offered to Edo Castle, the center of the Edo shogunate, and Nikko Toshogu Shrine, where Tokugawa Ieyasu is enshrined. Thanks to the copper mine, the Ashio area enjoyed a booming economy. There are almost no records of damage caused by mining pollution during this period. However, there is an ancient song that says, “Daiku rokunen, fuki hachinen, kakaa bakariga gojuunen.”2 This roughly translates that miners have a life expectancy of only 6 years, and those who smelt 8 years, while only their wives will live 50 years longer. The miners’ lungs were affected by inhaling dust from the excavation work, and they gradually developed “yoroke,” a state of respiratory failure. Miners developing “yoroke” were considered to have deserved it, and were not adequately compensated.3 One imagines how hard the miners were forced to work and how their health suffered. Thereafter, toward the end of the Edo period, the Ashio Copper Mine’s output gradually declined. It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century, when Japan embarked on a program of modernization, that the Ashio Copper Mine was revived. In the midnineteenth century, the overwhelming military might of Western powers ended the isolationism of the Edo shogunate and forced Japan to conclude unfavorable treaties. There was no extraterritoriality or tariff autonomy. In Japan, where domestic instability resulted from foreign pressure, the Edo shogunate collapsed in 1867, and the Meiji government was established. The Edo Shogunate was a decentralized system in which politics was conducted by about two hundred clans on a regional basis, but the Meiji government changed to a centralized system. The 1889 Constitution of the Japanese Empire concentrated power in the hands of the Emperor, while severely limiting the power of the Imperial Diet and the people.4 The Meiji government aggressively pursued policies of “industrial reproduction and development” to become a “wealthy nation and strong military power,” reform unequal treaties, and catch up with and surpass the Western powers. The mining industry supported these two policies, along with the textile and iron manufacturing industries. Copper was the keystone of this industry. At the time, Japan was one of the world’s leading copper producers. In other words, copper was an indispensable raw material for Meiji Japan, whether as a means of obtaining foreign currency, as a material for various everyday items such as copper pots and copper wire, or as a material for weapons and ammunition. The Ashio Copper Mine was transferred from the national government to the prefectural government in 1868, and then to private operators. In 1877 the industrialists Ichibei Furukawa and Naomichi Shiga acquired the almost-deserted mine from the former owner, Kinichi Soeda, at a low price.5 Furukawa took control of the Ashio Copper Mine and, despite initial difficulties, discovered a new vein of ore in 1881. The subsequent discovery of copper-rich veins led to a rapid increase in copper production. In 1884, to meet the demand for smelting with the increase in

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copper production, the company introduced a state-of-the-art smelter. Other measures included importing chiseling machines from abroad, installing electric locomotives to transport ore through the tunnels, and introducing mechanical dressing to efficiently sort copper-bearing ores. A hydroelectric plant was opened to power these machines, and the business was rapidly modernized. Ashio thus developed into one of Japan’s leading copper mines, with copper production and smelting as its two main businesses. 1884 saw Ashio become Japan’s largest copper producer, and by 1907, Ashio’s copper production was estimated to have reached 17,387 tons. In 1917, it produced nearly 40% of Japan’s copper. As its operations took off, Furukawa grew as a Zaibatsu (financial clique), enjoying a privileged position with strong ties to politicians. The town of Ashio also prospered. The population grew as copper mine workers, their families, and merchants settled in the area. Ashio was then known as Little Tokyo. Ichibei Furukawa opened a Western-style guest house called the Kakemizu Club to entertain distinguished guests. Furukawa also established a private Ashio Copper Mine Elementary School in 1892,6 and the Ashio Copper Mine Business School in 1913. In 1925, the transportation of ore was shifted from horse-drawn wagons to gasoline-powered cars that ran on a track laid at the site. Besides transporting ore, the cars also transported the residents of Ashio Town. Residents received electricity and water produced by Furukawa free of charge. Furukawa had established Ashio’s infrastructure and provided a comfortable living environment for all Ashio residents, including those involved in the copper mine. When Ichibei Furukawa passed away in 1903, about 10,000 people from the town attended his funeral. It is clear that Furukawa was respected locally for building a strong “corporate castle town” (Fig. 2.1). Copper Production at Ashio Copper mine (ton/year)

1610 1688 1736 1814 1877 1881 1885 1889 1893 1897 1901 1905 1909 1913 1917 1921 1925 1929 1933 1937 1941 1945 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973

18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0

Fig. 2.1 Copper production at Ashio Copper Mine (unit: ton/year). Source Fukawa (2009), p. 26; Murakami (1998), p. 146 (Copper production before Furukawa management is the average of copper production described in “Copper Mines” and “Ashio Copper Mine”. (Copper production before Furukawa’s management is the average of the copper production listed in Copper Mine Volume and Ashio Copper Mine)

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2.2 The Beginning of Widespread Pollution The development and prosperity of the Ashio Copper Mine resulted in serious environmental destruction and pollution. In particular, the exhaust gas emitted from the smelter at Ashio Copper Mine polluted farming villages surrounding Ashio. The Ashio Copper Mine has more than 1,200 km of tunnels lined with timber poles. It required large quantities of wood and coal for power and smelting. Many trees in the vicinity of the copper mine were cut. The mountains, weakened by deforestation, were hit by sulfuric acid gas and other toxic fumes from the copper smelters. Trees died, rich forests were transformed into bald mountains, topsoil was stripped from steep slopes that had lost their water-absorbing function, and rivers were buried in sediment. Gases seeped through the mountains and reached pastoral rural villages. First, in Karafuro, in the southern part of Ashio Town, crops such as potatoes, soybeans, and wheat withered due to gases emitted from the smelter at Kotaki Kou, southwest of the copper mine. In 1895, the residents of Karafuro filed a court complaint against Furukawa. The residents calculated the difference in income between 1873 and 1888 for each type of crop to compute the amount of damage. They also asked an expert to prove that the causative agent was sulfuric acid gas emitted from the copper mines. As a result, the residents won their case in 1895, and the court ordered Furukawa to pay damages.7 Matsuki Village, northeast of the smelter, also suffered smoke damage. Until the smoke damage occurred, the village was relatively affluent with good crops and silk production. 8 The late-Edo period agriculturalist Sontoku Ninomiya wrote in his diary that when he toured the Matsuki-mura area, “The fields have been well taken care of, and the houses and sheds are quite good”.9 However, as the smoke pollution spread, game animals disappeared from the mountains, crops stopped growing, and people lost their livelihoods. Horses that ate grass died, mothers’ milk stopped flowing, and babies died prematurely.10 In 1887, a large fire broke out in Matsuki Village, leaving the land barren, devoid of crops and trees. Because of this damage, Matsuki Village signed a settlement agreement with Furukawa. However, the settlement was extremely small compared to the actual damage, so Matsuki village broke the agreement and filed a lawsuit against Furukawa’s acquisition of the land. After obtaining further settlement money, Matsuki Village was abandoned in 1902.11 Similarly, the residents of Nitamoto and Kuzura villages, which were directly hit by the gas, also dispersed after receiving a small amount of compensation provided by Furukawa. Thus, the rich farming villages on the upper reaches of the Watarase River became a wasteland where not a single plant grew. Poisoned water from the Ashio Mine discharged into the Watarase River caused extensive damage to the area that stretches several dozen kilometers downstream from Ashio. Originally, this area was fertile land where nutrient-rich sediment flowed in from the mountains. The area boasted a rich ecosystem and was blessed with crops and aquatic life. However, according to one newspaper report, fish have been dying in the Watarase River since about 1885.12 Deforestation in the upper reaches of the watershed also intensified the flooding. The contaminants brought by the

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flooding led rice, mulberry, and other agricultural products to wither, leaving the land barren. How much damage has copper contamination caused in the Watarase River basin? The Mainichi Shimbun of August 13, 1891 reported on an experiment conducted in Azuma Village, Ashikaga County. The landowners planted and raised upland rice, rapeseed, azuki beans, and sesame seeds in soil applied with lime to depths of 15 and 75 cm. Only the soil limed to 75 cm produced upland rice.13 This experiment demonstrates the significant damage. The farmers tried to overcome the crisis with various innovations. The floodwaters never subsided, and the contaminants accumulated, with the scale of the damage increasing year by year. The area affected is not precisely documented: in 1902, agronomist Kozai Yoshinao reported to the Second Mineral Contamination Survey Committee that approximately 23,130 ha were affected.

Fig. 2.2 Map of Ashio and Watarase. (1) Gengorosawa Deposit Site, (2) Ashio Copper Mine Sightseeing (Copper Mine Site), Ashio History Museum, Nakasai Water Treatment Plant, (3) Memorial to Korean victims of forced relocation, (4) Memorial to Chinese martyrs, (5) Motoyama Refinery, (6) Arikosawa Deposit Site, (7) Erosion Control Dam, (8) Matsuki Valley (Matsuki Village Site), (9) Morita Memorial Monument for the Eradication of Mining Poison, (10) Shozo Tanaka’s Birthplace, Shozo Tanaka’s Final resting place, Old Yanaka Village, Joint Cenotaph for the Former Yanaka Village, Yanaka Village Ruins Map: Takahashi (2022), p. 81. Originally made, based on several contamination map and data including Shozo Tanaka University and Aoki and Nagai (2010), p. 198

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1887

1885

45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0

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1877

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town population

Fig. 2.3 Ashio Town Population and Number of Workers. Source Murakami (1998), pp. 145, 147

The contaminated floodwaters not only caused food shortages due to crop failures, but also affected drinking water and other resources. This affected human health. Old people and children fell ill, and burned driftwood emitted blue flames of sulfuric acid. In 1899, the Tokyo office of the Ashio Copper Mine Mineral Contamination Section, which was working to help the local residents, compiled a report entitled “Ashio Copper Mine Poisoning Victims: Report on Survivors, Deaths, and Surveys and Statistics.” They compared the average number of births and deaths in a village in a mining-affected area between two five-year periods: 1883–1888 and 1894–1898. The report showed a higher death rate in the latter period.14 Eiko Matsumoto, a reporter for the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper who covered the affected areas, wrote “Everyone’s face was pale, with many cases of eye diseases, stomach ailments, and fever; there were many deaths, some rendered blind, and no one knew where to go for help.”15 The reports listed here were researched and interviewed by the victim residents and their supporters. The government also investigated, but their surveys were inadequate to capture the extent of the damage. The government’s interest in the enormity of the damage and restoring residents’ lives was low (Figs. 2.2, 2.3 and Photo 2.1).

2.3 The Victims’ Struggle and Shozo Tanaka By 1889, the Watarase River was devoid of fish and shellfish, and fishing was no longer possible. Frequent floods caused extensive crop damage. The great flood of 1896 damaged Gunma, Tochigi, Saitama, Ibaraki, Chiba, and Tokyo prefectures.16 Shozo Tanaka, a prominent local figure and member of the House of Representatives, became concerned about the Watarase, which had been ravaged by pollution. In 1896, victims in Gunma, Tochigi, Saitama, and Ibaraki established the “Ashio Copper

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Photo 2.1 Cenotaph for Chinese Martyrs (erected in 1972): photo by Hiroe Sagisaka, 201. It is recorded that 109 of the 257 POWs who were forcibly taken into captivity died.

Mine Petition Office” in Unryuji Temple in Watarase Village, Gunma Prefecture, to petition the government to stop pollution from the Ashio Copper Mine.17 They submitted numerous petitions to the Diet, hoping for the restoration of rich farmland and cessation of pollution, and continued to appeal for the suspension of the copper mine’s operations. In response, the Meiji government established the Mineral Contamination Investigation Committee in 1897 and surveyed the damage to the lower Watarase River. As a result, in May of 1897, the Meiji government issued an order to Furukawa for preventive construction work against mining pollution. The order contained 37 items related to the installation of sedimentation and filtration ponds for mining wastewater, smoke treatment, etc., and also stipulated deadlines for the work. The order also included the suspension of operations if the work was not carried out correctly. Furukawa invested considerable money to prevent mining pollution, and did so by the deadline. Unfortunately, the remediation work had little effect. The Meiji government ordered no significant measures after that. The vice president of the Furukawa Zaibatsu was Hara Takashi, who later became prime minister. The son of Mutsu Munemitsu, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and other posts, was adopted by Ichibei Furukawa. Some previous studies have described this situation as public–private collusion. Residents stood up against the irreversible damage. The right to petition the government was guaranteed to citizens under the Constitution of the Japanese Empire. The victims repeatedly petitioned Tokyo to stop mining at Ashio Copper Mine and demanded compensation. The first two oshidashi (protest demonstrations) were held in March 1897, just before the order for preventive measures was issued. A third one happened immediately after the great flood in September 1898, and the fourth one in April 1900. It is said that the number of protesters, mainly young people, was in the thousands and possibly over 20,000. However, in 1900, when the victims tried to come to Tokyo for the fourth time, the Meiji government sent more than 300 policemen and military police. The unarmed residents departed from Unryuji

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Temple, and upon entering Kawamata, were beaten, and arrested, resulting in some deaths. Shozo persuaded only 50 representatives to come to Tokyo, and the rest were pulled out, ending the fourth oshidashi. Those arrested were subsequently put on trial. This is called the Kawamata Incident.18 Immediately after the incident, Shozo was questioned by the Diet and said, “Killing the people is killing the nation. When you disrespect the law, you disrespect the nation. Everyone is damaging the nation. No nation has ever abused its resources, killed its people, or violated the law and not perished. What is this?” It is said to be one of the greatest speeches in Japan’s constitutional history. However, Aritomo Yamagata, then Prime Minister, replied that the purpose of the question was not to the point, and therefore no answer was given.” Shozo resigned from the Diet. In December 1901, In December 1901, Shozo attempted to pass a direct appeal to the Emperor, who was on his way to the Imperial Diet, describing the plight of the affected areas. However, Shozo was captured by government soldiers and his direct appeal ended in failure. Shozo’s action was widely reported in the media at the time. In addition, students and religious groups that visited the area held rallies and staged activities to help the victims, making the Ashio mine poisoning issue widely known in Japan.19 In 1902, the government established the Second Mineral Contamination Investigation Commission. Instead of responding to a request to halt operations at the Ashio Copper Mine, the committee decided to build a reservoir to hold the tailings, claiming that a flood that had caused previously accumulated mineral wastes to spill out.20 At the same time, the survey committee decided to make a major bend in the Watarase River, which flowed into the Edo River, to complete the “eastward shift” to the Tone River in Ibaraki. These two measures were more effective in preventing the poisoned water from reaching Tokyo than in remediating the disaster area, the Watarase watershed. The tailings dam was to be located in Yanaka Village. In 1903, when the Tochigi Prefectural Assembly voted on the plan to take over Yanaka Village, the unity of the villages downstream of the Watarase River, which had fought together as one, was shattered. Many Yanaka villagers received compensation and left, but some remained behind, refusing to accept the takeover. Shozo Tanaka moved to Yanaka Village to resist the reservoir project. In 1907, Tochigi Prefecture evicted the remaining residents under the Eminent Domain Law and forcibly destroyed their houses. Even so, the remaining residents continued to build temporary huts and live there. Shozo, along with the remaining residents, continued to protest, and through detailed research, came up with alternative flood-control measures that suited the topography and climate, until he died in poverty in 1913. Shortly after Shozo’s death, the government decided to implement the Yanaka Reservoir project. In the end, Shozo’s appeals were not heeded. However, Shozo’s words and ideas from his later years, “A true civilization shall not destroy mountains, ravage rivers, break villages, or kill people,” are still remembered today. Since Shozo’s death, the Ashio Copper Mine operated for decades without any visible damage from pollution. During World War II, the mine experienced a labor shortage as Japanese miners went to war. Thus, many Koreans were forcibly brought to Japan to work there. There is a record of 2,416 such Korean laborers.21 They were forced to adopt Japanese-style names and lived in dormitories and Korean residential

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Photo 2.2 Memorial to the victims of forced removal of Koreans (photo by Hiroe Sagisaka). There were 2,416 Korean laborers who were forced to work at the Ashio Copper Mine, and 900 after the war ended. It is said that there were 839 escapees, and 73 died of starvation due to food shortages

areas. Some Koreans emigrated with their families, and their children attended the same schools as the Japanese.22 Korean laborers were often assigned to unskilled heavy labor, and their wages were lower than those of the Japanese. Some Koreans, unable to bear the hard work in the mines, attempted to escape. However, some were caught by the guards and brutally beaten as an indication of what was to come.23 In addition to the Koreans, there were Chinese nationals who were captured and forcibly taken to Japan. Of these, 257 were forced to work in the Ashio mine. In addition to the Chinese, there were also Allied prisoners of war who were forced to work under strict surveillance. They were not given enough food and forced to endure poor living conditions, resulting in many deaths and missing persons.24 This is a testament to the harsh human rights violations that took place during this period. In later years, memorial rites have been held. A cenotaph was placed in the Kotaki area for the Korean victims of forced labor, and representatives of Japan–North Korea friendship groups hold a memorial service every year. In 1973, Tochigi Prefecture and the China Friendship Association erected the Cenotaph for Chinese Martyrs in Ginzandaira (Photo 2.2).

2.4 The Negative Legacy Left Behind In postwar Japan, which made a fresh start as a democratic nation, recovery from pollution began. In 1956, Furukawa Mining introduced flash smelting from Autokumpu in Finland, successfully controlling sulfuric acid gas emissions.25 Smelting technology improvements also reduced gas emissions.26 In 1973, the Ashio Copper Mine closed and copper production ceased, but gas emissions continued because smelting of other mines’ and foreign ores continued. Emissions of sulfuric acid gas did not completely cease until 1988, when the smelter closed. When copper production ceased in 1973, industrial population declined sharply. The depopulation

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of Ashio continued as both the industrial population and the resident population decreased.27 In response, Furukawa proposed several local development measures, such as hot spring leisure facilities and pottery production. However, the mayor of Ashio complained that Furukawa had “not implemented a single one” of the measures.28 With the town of Ashio in a difficult situation, 27 major construction companies and others proposed the “Gaia Ashio Plan” to “further revitalize the Ashio area.” At the time, the shortage of waste disposal sites in the Tokyo metropolitan area was a serious problem. The plan was to build a huge waste disposal facility with the latest equipment in the Matsukisawa area, where Matsuki Village had been abandoned due to smoke pollution, and to construct roads and a resort facility after the landfill. The total investment was estimated to be over 1 trillion yen from both the public and private sectors.29 Because the Matsukizawa area is a water source, the lower Watarase municipalities joined the Ashio area in the opposition movement.30 They claimed that the plan, if realized, would result in new pollution. Amid the strong opposition, the “Gaia Ashio Project” was shelved and effectively canceled in 1994.31 Ashio Town then came up with the idea of an eco-museum.32 The plan, formulated in 1994, proposed to “turn the entire town into a museum by networking Ashio’s rich natural and industrial heritage,” thereby promoting tourism.33 In 2006, after Ashio Town was merged with Nikko City, efforts to have the Ashio Copper Mine registered as a World Heritage site began. However, the remaining facilities in the Ashio area had not been well maintained and some were collapsing. Entry to the area has been prohibited, and demolition by Furukawa has been continuing. The Ashio area is filled with tailings dams. Polluted groundwater continues to flow from abandoned mines. These negative legacies are rarely discussed (Shudo 2012) (Fig. 2.3). The mountains around Ashio remain bald. Nature will not return easily to polluted lands. The erosion of mountain topsoil continues, and large amounts of taxpayer money are invested yearly into erosion control projects. Through the collaboration of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, NGOs, citizens, and volunteers, greening has been promoted, and some vegetation is on the way to recovery. In 1996, an alliance of citizen groups gathered to establish the “Ashio Green Growing Association” with the aim of revegetating Ashio’s mountains through tree planting. Along with the national greening program, many citizens and volunteers have participated in the group’s activities to raise awareness of greening and continue tree planting.34 On the other hand, Matsuki Valley is still barren, with only a few unmarked gravestones scattered throughout the valley and slag carelessly discarded on the mountain slopes. The mountainous areas further into Matsuki Village have not been restored, and aerial photographs confirm large areas of bald mountains (Photo 2.3). In the Watarase area, recovery from the effects of mining pollution began during the period of rapid economic growth after World War II. In 1958, the Gengorosawa sedimentation field in Ashio collapsed, blocking the Watarase River. The mineral toxins released caused severe damage to rice paddies in the lower Watarase River. In 1973, Itabashi Meiji and others, who were farmers from the Morita area in the Watarase basin, became members of the Ota City Council and filed a lawsuit against

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Photo 2.3 Karami dumped in Matsuki Valley (photo provided by Takahashi Wakana’s Office, Utsunomiya University, June 6th, 2018)

Furukawa Mining. This was at a time when plaintiffs were beginning to win pollution lawsuits in Minamata, Yokkaichi, and other areas. The Alliance proved the cadmium damage, and the company accepted responsibility, leading to compensation of over 1.5 billion yen in 1974 through mediation. The compensation money was used to help farmers. In addition, in 1981, a 315.1 ha land improvement project began at the expense of Furukawa Mining, the national government, Gunma Prefecture, and Kiryu and Ota cities. The improvement project was completed in 1999. Since then, water purification has progressed so that the Watarase River can be used for drinking water.35 However, the mine’s poisonous legacy is not over. The Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 caused a surface collapse of the ore deposit at the Gengorozawa Sedimation Site managed by Furukawa Machinery & Metal Co. The deposition site collapsed on the Watarase Riverside for approximately 100 m, blocking the Watarase Gorge Railway tracks. When Furukawa tested the water quality, lead levels exceeded the limits, causing contamination of rice in the downstream area.36 As of March 2021, the Arikosawa sedimentation site is also said to be in danger of collapsing. Therefore, the Watarase River Mineral Contamination Eradication Ota Alliance has requested Furukawa Machinery & Metal to take ongoing measures, saying that further efforts are necessary in the face of frequent natural disasters such as earthquakes and torrential rains. At the abandoned Yanaka Village, the Watarase River underwent repair work from 1910 to 1922.37 One of the projects was the Watarase Recreational Land project, which was completed in 1917. The Watarase Recreational Area, including the surrounding swamp land, was established on 29,751 ha.38 Furthermore, after WWII, the government promoted the conversion of flood control reservoirs to improve the function of the flood control area. Construction began in 1963. In this process, the Yanaka Village site was demolished and turned into recreational land by 1997, and the heart-shaped regulating reservoir was completed.39 The former Yanaka Village site remains in the core of the heart. This ruin was also slated to be submerged into the regulating pond, but descendants of the residents opposed and protected it. Today, the secondarily regenerated wetlands have become home to birds of prey and about

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Photo 2.4 Lake Yanaka (artificial lake) with students (photo provided by Takahashi Wakana’s Office, Utsunomiya University, May 27th, 2018)

1,000 plant species. In 2012 the area was even registered under the Ramsar Convention to preserve its rich ecosystem and wetlands.40 However, it is not widely known that a large amount of taxpayer money continues to be invested in the purification and maintenance of the artificial lake, which is crowded with cyclists and windsurfers on holidays. The only traces of the rich life of Yanaka Village remain in the joint cenotaph quietly located on the opposite riverbank and the old Yanaka Village site. Weathering and decay are progressing (Photo 2.4).

2.5 Legacy of the Ashio Copper Mine Poisoning Incident As discussed above, while copper production at the Ashio Copper Mine contributed to the modernization of Japan, it also caused tremendous damage in the Ashio and Watarase areas. It is important to emphasize that there were many undemocratic practices in the process, such as disregard for human life and oppression of the victims. How and by whom were these damages made visible and these historical lessons passed on? In the Watarase River basin, which was damaged by the mineral poisons flowing out of the Ashio Copper Mine, several organizations and institutions have been established to pass on the history of the area. The Shozo Tanaka College and the Watarase River Study Group have played a leading role in this effort. The Watarase River Study Group was established in 1975 by researchers, citizens, and others to carry on

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and study the activities and ideas of Shozo Tanaka. Tanaka Shozo College was established by citizens in 1986 and has held study sessions with invited lecturers and issued publications to disseminate Shozo Tanaka’s ideas to society at large. In addition, in the Watarase River basin, an association has been formed to protect and maintain the Yanaka Village site and provide learning opportunities for visitors. In the Morita area, the Morita Mining Eradication Alliance has erected a “Monument to Pray for the Eradication of Mining Poisoning.” Permanent facilities with exhibits include the Shozo Tanaka Memorial Hall for the Ashio Mine Poisoning Incident (NPO) and the Tanaka Shozo Birthhouse. In addition, the Sano Local History Museum and the Fujioka Town History and Folklore Museum have exhibits showing the damage to the Watarase River basin and Shozo Tanaka’s activities. Furthermore, the Ashio Mine Poisoning Incident has left monuments of pollution in various places that perpetuate the misery of the mining damage and the oppression of the people.41 Thus, there are many organizations in the lower Watarase River area that carry on the history of Shozo Tanaka and the mining poisoning incident. Each of these groups is connected and cooperates with the others. None of the organizations is directly managed by the government, and most are supported by voluntary activities. As time goes by, the aging of the inheritors has become an issue. In particular, Tanaka Shozo University, which had been a key institution, was closed in 2022 due to the aging of its members. The Watarase River Study Group was similarly disbanded after a symposium in December 2022. How to carry on the accumulated historical knowledge is an issue for the future. Compared to the Watarase River basin, the Ashio area has not inherited as much of the memory of pollution. In the past, a group of Ashio High School teachers and others formed a group to preserve both the light and shadow of Ashio. Their activities have long since been suspended due to aging and other factors. Currently in the Ashio region, there is more evidence of the high level of technology of the copper mines, the significance of copper production, and the former prosperity of Ashio Town. Its central facilities are Ashio Copper Mine Tourism. It was established in 1980 by Ashio Town as a tourist resource, and since 2006, it has been operated by Nikko City following a merger with Ashio Town. The exhibition route is built on the former copper mine site and covers the transition of excavation work from the Edo period to the Showa period, a model of the entire copper mine, and exhibits on copper production and copper smelting technology. The Ashio History Museum, a non-profit organization, was opened by local citizens in 2005. The museum has many exhibits that remind us of how prosperous Ashio used to be, and a gasoline-powered car from that time has been reproduced. This history museum has continued with huge efforts of its founder Nagai, but due to concerns about its continued operation as he aged, it was transferred to Furukawa in 2019. Since then the mining industry-related exhibits have increased. In addition, the Furukawa Kakemizu Club, a guesthouse built in the Meiji period for the visitors to the Ashio Copper Mine, was registered as a Tangible Cultural Property of Japan in 2006, is also preserved and open to the public. The richness of the Ashio Copper Mine during its prosperous period and the wealth of the Furukawa Mining Company can be seen there. In the above-mentioned museums, there are few exhibits on negative legacies such as air pollution, waste

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dumping, health hazards to residents, or human rights. In interviews with the author and other related parties, many people, not only Furukawa, but also the government and citizens, mention that Ashio has a strong negative image of pollution and Shozo Tanaka, but that more attention should be paid to the positive aspects of the area. This makes it difficult to pass on the understanding of the multifaceted environmental and livelihood damage of the Ashio region.

2.6 Conclusion People affected by the Ashio Mine Poisoning Incident, which began in the late nineteenth century, only received partial relief in the late twentieth century, when attempts at environmental rehabilitation began. The mining poisoning continued throughout the Meiji, Taisho, and early Showa eras. Victims who raised their voices were oppressed and divided. Throughout the process, the conglomerates with strong government connections could decide on the small amount of compensation to be paid to the displaced residents. The victims were diverse and included residents of the lower Watarase River, Matsuki Village, and Ashio, as well as health victims, Koreans, Chinese, and Allied POWs who were forcibly taken away from their homes. Was it because prewar Japan was an undemocratic country without recognition of fundamental human rights that so many layers of violations were perpetrated? No, this is not a complete explanation. Similar abuses are happening in postwar Japan, which is supposed to have made a fresh start as a democratic nation. Itaiitai disease, Kumamoto Minamata disease, Niigata Minamata disease, Yokkaichi asthma, etc. were all caused during the period of rapid economic growth. Air, water, and soil pollution intensified in various parts of Japan, especially in Kitakyushu, Ube, Amagasaki, Osaka, Kawasaki, and other industrial complexes in the Pacific Belt region. The intensification of pollution had a common structure: the common ideology of the government and corporations was to prioritize profit and disregard human life. Many previous studies have pointed out that inconvenient information was covered up, victims were discriminated against and suppressed, and their voices were ignored. Then, in 2011, the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident occurred. Ten years after the accident, tens of thousands of people cannot return to their homes, are deprived of a peaceful life, and still do not receive adequate compensation, feeling afraid to speak out about the damage for fear of discrimination and criticism. Many people are still dealing with the accident under harsh and dangerous conditions. The future of both the disposal of radioactive waste and the decommissioning of the nuclear reactors is uncertain. In the face of such repeated catastrophes, interest in Shozo’s view of civilization, that “a true civilization should not destroy mountains, ravage rivers, break up villages, or kill people,” is growing 100 years after his death. Shozo’s words have universality, even from an international perspective. Shozo’s words, “Tami, Koe sakebe (People, speak up and shout!)” (1909: Teihen no tami ni Manabu (Learn from the people at the bottom)), are common in the spirit of

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the Rio Declaration (1992), which states the environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level” and respect for the knowledge and traditions of indigenous peoples. His critique of “Jinmin wo sukuu Gakumon wo mizu (Never saw a study that would save the people)” (1907) is consistent with the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (1972) that “science and technology must be applied to the identification, avoidance and control of environmental risks and the solution of environmental problems and for the common good of mankind.” The “Yowaki no mama de yowaki wo sukuu (save the weak as they are)” (1901) is also in the spirit of the SDGs (2015), “no one will be left behind.” The time has come to learn from Shozo Tanaka’s philosophy, as modern civilization continues to wrestle with fundamental questions (Photo 2.5). Photo 2.5 Words of Shozo Tanaka (photo provided by Takahashi Wakana’s Office, Utsunomiya University, June 18th, 2017, Shozo Tanaka’s birthplace)

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End Notes 1. Section 1 is based on the authors’ field study, which has been conducted intermittently since 2013, as well as Murakami (1998), Murakami (2006), and Onozaki (2006). Murakami, who wrote the preceding literature, was evacuated from Tokyo to Ashio during World War II, graduated from Ashio High School amidst poverty, and worked for Furukawa Mining for many years. Kazunori Onozaki was commissioned by Ichibei Furukawa to document the modernization of Ashio Copper Mine. 2. Nikko Civil Engineering Office, Tochigi Prefecture (2010), “Ashio Lived with Copper,” [https://www.pref.tochigi.lg.jp/h53/system/desaki/desaki/118232745 5300.html] viewed November 27, 2022. 3. Matsui (1984), p. 3. 4. The concentration of power in the hands of the Emperor led to the creation of the Kansu Kikan, or the government’s advisory organs. Ichibei Furukawa had a strong connection with the assistance organs, as he adopted the second son of Mutsu Munemitsu, who later became Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, as his heir in 1884. 5. Institute of Business History of Japan Foundation (1976), p. 50. 6. In 1947, under the new school system, the school became Ashio Town Honzan Elementary School, ending the private school system by Furukawa. Honzan Elementary School was closed in 2005 due to a decrease in the number of students. 7. Tochigi Prefectural History Compilation Committee (1980), pp. 879–906. 8. Tochigi Prefectural History Compilation Committee (1980), p. 906. 9. Ninomiya (1977), p. 716. 10. Tochigi Prefectural History Compilation Committee (1980), p. 907. 11. Ashio Copper Mine Mineral Rescue Society (1902) “Ashio Mine Mineral Rescue Society Report”. The University of Tokyo Academic Property and Other Archives Portal [https://www.i-repository.net/il/meta_pub/detail] viewed February 8, 2023. 12. Kamioka (1987), p. 20. 13. Tochigi Prefectural History Compilation Committee (1980), p. 461. 14. Ashio Copper Mine Mineral Poisoning Petition Tokyo Office (1899) “Ashio Copper Mine Mineral Poisoning Victims: Report on the Surveys and Statistics of the victims and the dead” The University of Tokyo Academic Property and Other Archives Portal [http://ut-elib.sakura.ne.jp/digitalarchive_02/ashio/ 5500874408.pdf] viewed February 8, 2023. 15. Matsumoto (1902), “Mineral Poisoning Ground Disaster,” Kyobunkan. The University of Tokyo Archives Portal for Academic Assets and Other Archives [https://opac.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/opac/opac_details/?lang=0& amode=11&place=&bibid=2001194890] 2023 Viewed February 8. 16. Murakami (2006), p. 201. 17. Itakura Town History Compilation Committee (1983), p. 9. 18. Shoji and Sugai (2014), pp. 99–107.

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19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

33

Shoji and Sugai (2014), p. 111. Tochigi Prefectural History Compilation Committee (1980), pp. 943–988. Murakami (2006), p. 439. Akaruimachi, editor (2000), p. 168. Akaruimachi, editor (2000), p. 169. Murakami (2006), p. 447. Murakami (2006), p. 519. K. Murao (1967), pp. 392–394. Ashio Town merged with Nikko City in 2006 as it became difficult to maintain its administrative structure. On August 21, 1982, then Mayor Fujishige Tamura of Ashio Town made a statement at the “10th Symposium on Watarase River Mining Damage”. Seki and Yokemoto (2005), p. 66. The Gaia Project was planned to accept both general and industrial wastes, with an annual disposal volume of 10 million tons and a total disposal volume of 500 million tons. The estimated facility cost was 700 billion yen. Based on the “Gaia Plan Study Report” published by the Watarase Study Group in 1992. Akaruimachi “Newspaper (1991) “Akaruimachi (Bright Town)” June 16, 1991 edition, June 23 edition; Okamura, Ao (1993) “Gaia Keikaku’ to Shake Ashio Town” Technology and Humanity, 22 (4), pp. 76–84. Ashio Town, Ashio Town Council, “Public Relations Ashio & Council Newsletter,” November 1994. Miyamoto and Aoki (2019), p. 346. Shudo (2012) notes that the eco-museum concept in Ashio is somewhat strange because it focuses on the northern part of the city, which has become a bald mountain due to deforestation and smoke pollution, and where greening activities are being developed. Ashio Green Growing Association website [https://www.ashiomidori.com/] viewed Feb. 8, 2023. Tetsuro Takasaki (2004), pp. 175–189. Asahi Shimbun Tochigi edition, March 13, 2011. Watarase Yusuichi Acclimation Promotion Foundation (2012), p. 6. Watarase Yusuichi Acclimation Promotion Foundation (2012), p. 50. Watarase Yusuichi Acclimation Promotion Foundation (2012), p. 56. Kanto Regional Development Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, “Conservation and Restoration of the Wetland Environment of the Watarase Yusui River Basin for Regional Development” [https://www. ktr.mlit.go.jp/ktr_content/content/000622036.pdf] viewed February 11, 2023. Fukawa (2009) included 78 sites involved in the Ashio Copper Mine poisoning incident in his guidebook, spanning both the Ashio area and the Watarase River basin.

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References Akarui machi Henshubu (Bright town editorial department) (2000) Chomin ga tsudhuru Ashio no Hyakunen Dai nibu: Dozan ni ikita hitobito no rekisi (One Hundred Years of Ashio as Told by the Townspeople, Part 2: The History of the People Who Lived in the Copper Mine). Koyo Shuppansha Aoki T, Nagai M (2010) Historical transition of Miwa Goshi and its countermeasures at Ashio copper mine: a study on the preservation, restoration and utilization of the Matsuki district. Doboku Gakkai Ronbunshuu D 66(2):192–216 Ashio Town Local History Editorial Committee (1993) Ashio local history. Ashio Town Arahata K (1999) Yanaka-mura Metsuboshi (History of the destruction of Yanaka Village). Iwanami Shoten Fukawa R (2009) Revised: Tanaka Shozo and Ashio Mineral Pollution Incident, Zuishosha Hirose T (2009) Tedukurinomanabiya (Handmade Learning Center): What NPO Ashio Mineral Pollution Incident Tanaka Shozo Memorial Museum Aims for, Zuishosha Itakura-cho History Compilation Committee (1983) Materials related to the Ashio Copper Mine Poisoning Incident in Itakura-cho: Town History Supplement Volume 1. Itakura-cho Japan Institute for Business History (1976) 100 Year History of the Founding of Furukawa Mining Co Kamioka N (1987) A history of pollution in Japan. Sekaishoin Komatsu Y (2013) Shozo Tanaka: Mirai wo Tsumugu Shisotsujin (Shozo Tanaka: a thinker who weave the future). Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo Komatsu Y (2011) True civilization does not kill people: learning from Shozo Tanaka’s words, Japan of tomorrow. Shogakukan Matsui K, Matsui K (1984) 20 Years of Modern Pneumoconiosis. National Pneumoconiosis Patients League Miura K (2017) Tanaka Shozo to Ashio Koudoku Jiken: Tsuchi kara umareta liberal democracy (Tanaka Shozo and the Ashio Mineral pollution Issue: Liberal Democracy Born of Soil). Yushisha Miyamoto F, Aoki T (2019) Ashio Douzan Kakemizu chiku no Asio kogyojoato ni kansuru kenkyuuKindai Ashio Douzan no keiei nochukaku wo neratta isann (Study on the Ashio Mining Site in the Kakemizu District of Ashio Copper Mine: Heritage that played a central role in the management of the modern Ashio Copper Mine). JSCE Trans D3, I_327–I_346 Murao K (1967) Ashio Seirensho Jimetsu Seirensho no Genjo (Current status of Ashio Smelter & Refinery). J Jpn Min Ind Assoc 83(946) Murakami Y (2006) Ashio Douzan shi (Ashio Copper Mine History). Zuishosha Murakami Y (1998) Douzan no machi: Ashio wo aruku- Ashio no sangyo isan wo tazunete (Copper Mine Town: Walking in Ashio—Visiting Ashio’s Industrial Heritage). Watarasegawa Association Ninomiya S (1977) Ninomiya Sontoku Zenshu (The Complete Works of Ninomiya Sontoku), vol 5. Diary. Ryukeishosha Onozaki S (2006) Ashio Douzan Onozaki Ittoku Shashin cho (Ashio Copper Mine: Onozaki Ittoku Photo Album. Shinjusha Ota T (1992) Ashio Douzan no Shakai shi (Copper Mine Social History). Yukon Planning Co Seki K, Yokemoto M (2005) Watarase gawa ryuiki niokeru chiikiteki kankyo Keizai system no tenkaikatei (Transformation process of local environment and economic system in the Watarase Basin). J HumIties Nat Scis 119:51–70 Shoji Y, Sugai M (2014) Shinpan: Tsushi Ashio Kodoku Jiken 1877–1984 (New Edition: History Ashio Mine Poisoning Incident 1877–1984). Seori Shobo Shudo S (2012) 3.11 kara Ashio he: Kyuu Ashio Douzan niokeru < chi > no seiji no genzai (From 3.11 to Ashio: the politics of knowledge in the former Ashio Copper mine today). Waseda Soc Sci Rev 12(3):1–12

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Takasaki T (2004) Hyakusetsu Futo: Kodoku no Kawa wa Yomigaetta (Never waver in your ambition, no matter how many times you fail. The river of mineral poison has been revived). Shinzansha Scitech Takahashi W (2021) Ashio Kodoku Jiken (Ashio Mineral Pollution Incident). In: Ando T, Hayashi M, Tanno, H (eds) Kogai Studies: Modae, Kanashimi, Tatakai, Kataritsugu (Pollution Studies: Agonizing, grieving, fighting, passing on the story). Korokara, pp 80–85 Takeda K (ed) (2013) Rekishi no Nakano Kin, Gin, Dou, (Gold, Silver, Copper in History: Products of Mining Culture). Bensei Publishing Co Tanaka Shozo University (2022), Tanaka Shozo Daigaku: 35 nen no ayumi (Tanaka Shozo University: 35 Years of History). Zusosha Tochigi Prefectural History Compilation Committee (1980) Tochigi Kenshi Shiryou-hen: Kingendai (Prefectural History, Historical Documents: Modern and Contemporary) 9. Tochigi Prefecture Watarase Yusuichi Acclimation Promotion Foundation (2012) Watarase Yusuichi: Oitachi kara genjou (Watarase Field: From the origins to the present state). Watarase Yusuichi Acclimation Promotion Foundation

Chapter 3

Regeneration of Pollution-Devastated Areas Through Alternative Food Networks: A Case Study of Organic Farming by Minamata Disease Patients and Their Supporters Masafumi Yokemoto

Abstract In the second half of the 1970s, Minamata disease patients and their supporters began growing organic sweet pomelos in Minamata City and its affected environs to help rebuild the patients’ livelihoods. Consumers in the Tokyo area and other places gradually increased their support by purchasing the fruit, and that continues to the present. This linkage of producers and consumers can be seen as an example of alternative food networks (AFNs) which, by linking producers and consumers, provide foods having characteristics differing from mass-distribution products. Now that big corporations have gained certifications such as those for organic production, and large retail stores have come to stock organic produce and fair-trade merchandise, AFNs are seriously challenged with how to define their own alterity. To address this challenge, AFNs switch away from focusing on product qualities which are proved by means of a certification system, and instead use the criterion of “relationships” among producers and with consumers. In the case of Minamata as well, such relationships are very important. The case study in this chapter observes that the history of the Minamata disease incident informs the characteristics of goods, and shows what tests those characteristics undergo to be proved and valuated.

3.1 Introduction: Purpose of the Study The author describes a study on an organic agriculture initiative started in a Japanese regional industrial city in Kumamoto Prefecture. That city is Minamata, which is known worldwide as the site of devastating health damage caused by a chemical company’s methylmercury emissions (Fig. 3.1).

M. Yokemoto (B) Graduate School of Business, Osaka Metropolitan University, Osaka, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Yokemoto et al. (eds.), Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3239-9_3

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Fig. 3.1 Geographical area affected by the Minamata disease outbreak (Kumamoto Prefecture). Source Social Scientific Study Group on Minamata Disease (2001)

In the second half of the 1970s, Minamata disease patients and their supporters began growing organic sweet pomelos in Minamata City and its environs affected by the disease to help rebuild the patients’ livelihoods. Consumers in the Tokyo area and other places gradually increased their support by purchasing the fruit, and that continues to the present. This linkage of producers and consumers can be seen as an example of alternative food networks (AFNs), which provide foods having characteristics differing from mass-distribution products—characteristics such as organic cultivation, fair trade, local attributes, and high quality—by linking producers and consumers (Goodman, Goodman 2009). As such, the “quality” of goods is an important point, and in that respect AFN researchers have consulted convention theory. In particular, now that large retail stores too have come to stock organic produce and fair-trade merchandise, AFNs are seriously challenged with how to define their own alterity to differentiate themselves from these moves by big retail (Goodman et al. 2011). A case study (Varga 2019) says that one AFN strategy to address this challenge is to switch away from focusing on product qualities which are proved by means of a certification system, and instead use the criterion of “relationships” among producers and with consumers. Because big corporations have also gained certifications such as those for organic production, AFNs cannot use certification for differentiation. For that reason, a Sicilian farmers’ group has raised its own stature by building

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relationships among producers and with consumers based on the principle of the solidarity economy. For example, instead of using a certification system, producers review whether the organic production standard satisfies the demands of consumer groups, or whether the working conditions for seasonal workers are satisfactory. Additionally, instead of excluding nearby non-member producers, they invite them to join via the review process. Stories of such “relationships” gave producers a favorable reputation among affiliated consumer groups, and raised the stature of the farmers’ group. In this way, AFNs are “communities of practice” comprising producers and consumers (Goodman et al. 2011: 52), with producers and consumers jointly producing value. This study also finds that in the case of Minamata, the “relationships” between producers and consumers are very important. But as shown also by the case study of Sicily, it is difficult to confirm the quality of the good, i.e., “relationships,” by means of technical or pro forma tests carried out under a certification system. Hence this may create difficulties for coordination between producers and consumers over the “quality” of a good. This case study observes that the history of the Minamata disease incident informs the characteristics of goods, and shows what tests those characteristics undergo to be proved and valuated. Note, however, that this chapter is based on studies performed before the coronavirus pandemic.

3.2 Division of Communities by Pollution, and Subsequent Regeneration 3.2.1 Minamata Disease Incident Overview This section is a survey of the Minamata disease incident (Social Scientific Study Group on Minamata Disease 2001; George 2001). Minamata disease is methylmercury poisoning which gave rise to many victims in the Minamata Bay area of Kumamoto Prefecture in the mid-1950s. Symptoms included numbness in the extremities and around the mouth, speech disturbances, visual field constriction, ataxia, and hearing impairment. In serious cases the disease led to death. The chemical company Chisso Corporation discharged methylmercury into the sea, where it underwent bioaccumulation in the marine ecosystem, and harmed people who ate fish and shellfish. Many cases appeared in 1956, and a notification from Chisso Hospital to the municipal public health office resulted in the official record of the disease’s outbreak. This constituted the official discovery of Minamata disease. In December 1959, patients were pushed into signing an agreement with Chisso. Under the terms, patients would receive a small solatium, in exchange for which they acceded to conditions that, for example, they would seek no new compensation whatsoever even if they subsequently found that Chisso effluent was the cause. (A 1973 Minamata disease court decision found this agreement to be ineffective because

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it contravened public order and morals. But because the case was perceived as closed owing to the monetary payment, the media quickly lost interest in the issue, and to the public the matter was over, with the cause undetermined). In 1968, nearly 10 years after the agreement was signed, the government officially recognized that Minamata disease was caused by Chisso’s effluent, which engendered a major change in the situation. In 1969, 41 Minamata disease patients comprising 29 households filed a lawsuit against Chisso seeking payment of damages (the Minamata Disease Lawsuit). The plaintiffs were awarded victory in 1973, and because neither side appealed, Chisso’s liability was finalized. That same year, victims and Chisso entered into a compensation agreement. As this sharply increased Chisso’s compensation payment amount, in 1977 the government tightened the patient certification standards which determine compensation eligibility, and the following year it also initiated financial support for Chisso by lending the company funds for compensation. The struggle by Minamata disease patients peaked during the approximately 10 years between 1968 and 1978. Since that time, there have been many lawsuits with aims such as obtaining relief for uncertified patients, and pursuing the liability of the government and Kumamoto Prefecture. As a result, healthcare payments and other relief measures have expanded little by little. A 2004 Supreme Court decision also recognized the liability of the government and Kumamoto Prefecture. Despite that, the government still does not recognize many victims as Minamata disease patients, and for that reason several trials are still in progress.

3.2.2 Regenerating Communities by Making a “Difficult Past” into One’s Heritage Pollution is included in what we call the “difficult past” or “difficult history.” This involves slavery, colonial rule, war, and other complex relationships of causing/ suffering harm, which makes the past prone to divided historical interpretations. Conflict among multiple interpretations is also called “fights over meaning” (Cauvin 2016: 222; Gardner and Hamilton 2017: 11). But a difficult past shows universal value such as human rights and peace in a paradoxical manner, i.e., through the destruction of such value. If one can regard such value as one’s “heritage” and increase public interest in learning about pollution, one might be able to realize local economic benefit by linking with tourism or other initiatives. Kumamoto Prefecture’s Minamata City is a place which has endeavored to create “value of locality” based on the city’s “difficult past” (Yokemoto 2020).

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As stated above, in 1973 the plaintiffs in the Minamata disease lawsuit were awarded victory, and a compensation agreement was concluded. Because compensation payments ballooned due to the increased number of certified patients, Chisso’s financial situation rapidly deteriorated. Minamata disease patients demanded compensation and redress as restitution for the violation of life and health, but many Minamata citizens were concerned that Chisso’s decline would threaten their livelihoods. This created a serious conflict between the two groups. The reason for this clash is that Minamata City was Chisso’s company town. Not only did Chisso account for high proportions of local employment, commercial transactions, tax revenues, and more through the expansion of its business, but it also enjoyed strengthening political influence because a former Chisso factory manager became the city’s mayor, and company employees had seats on the city council. Minamata citizens began to think that the city owed its existence to the company. But subsequently changes appeared in the community framework due to a number of events such as: a lower position for Chisso in the local economy due to transformation of the industrial structure; completion of a pollution-control project (sludge landfilling) in Minamata Bay; and a push toward political solutions by lawsuits seeking state compensation and other remedies. In response to these changes, initiatives toward moyai-naoshi (“reconnecting”) started at the beginning of the 1990s, and its significance is that it propelled Minamata disease to the forefront of community development (Yokemoto 2016: 137–167). The first time the expression “reconnecting” was used in public in Minamata City was by then-Mayor Masazumi Yoshii in his address at the 1994 Memorial Ceremony for Minamata Disease Victims. Moyai means to tie boats together, or for people to come together and cooperate in doing something. The term is used on a daily basis locally, but Yoshii gave the word a symbolic meaning—that Minamata disease served as the prompt that connects the hearts of the citizens, who had grown apart from one another; that the citizens support their community while being united in helping one another; and in this way endeavor to expedite community development together (Yamada 1999). But that’s not all. “Reconnecting” reconceived Minamata disease, which has been seen as conflicting with community stability, as a locality-specific “value,” and put it in the spotlight in connection with community development. By this means it boosted community unity. Yoshii offers the following recollection of those days (Yoshii 2016: 74). Minamata’s individuality is the distinctive value that cannot be emulated by other localities. Minamata has much to be proud of. That includes its hot springs. While the city’s environs have any number of famous hot springs, they lack the distinctiveness of Minamata, and it’s hard to say that they have Minamata’s individuality. It was really hard to figure out why, but in the end I noticed that it was “Minamata disease.” It’s said that there’s nowhere else like it in the world, and I think that’s because it’s distinctively Minamata. It’s that individuality.

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M. Yokemoto But Minamata disease is the Bad Guy who drove Minamata into this tragedy. Many citizens say that they “don’t want to utter the word Minamata disease.” Although Minamata disease defines the city’s individuality, it’s a powerfully negative individuality that the citizens naturally detest. But my idea was to use a value change to transform that negative individuality into a positive one, a process that would be “building a new Minamata.” I decided to face this hated Minamata disease head-on.

As this shows, the aim of “reconnecting” is to reverse the meaning of the Minamata disease incident so as to confer a positive meaning of local individuality on the “difficult past,” thereby attempting to rebuild the “value of locality.” The next section describes two initiatives which positively reframe the “difficult past” and link it with victim support and local development (for detailed treatment, see Yokemoto 2020). Both originated with Minamata Disease Center Soshisha (below “Soshisha”), which has provided support for Minamata disease patients since its founding in 1974.

3.2.3 Learning About Minamata Disease and Promoting Tourism The first initiative links learning about Minamata disease with promoting tourism. In 2017 Minamata City was visited by about 510,000 tourists, which is about 20 times the city’s population. If many people visit the city and learn about pollution, that will increase the exchange population and benefit the local economy. Kanshiranui Planning is an organization that has long worked to attract school trips to Minamata City. Its predecessor was an NPO founded by a person who formerly worked at Soshisha. In 2017 the numbers of visitors who came via Kanshiranui were 2,292 on school trips and 622 on training tours (those who lodged locally numbered 925 and 73, respectively). More visitors could be accommodated during the offseason, but there are limited facilities, and Kanshiranui’s three staffers seem to have their hands full already. Unfortunately, efforts to link learning about Minamata disease with promoting tourism have so far been limited to Minamata disease victim supporters and to those who carry on their work. Although Soshisha and other organizations engage in similar activities (Soshisha hosted 570 visitors in 2017), there are hopes for further broadening of this effort. The creation of knowledge and emotions by means of learning about Minamata disease leads to the contemporary production of value. Soshisha obtains monetary value through means such as guide fees paid by visitors, subscriptions to its journal, merchandise sales, and contributions.

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3.3 Telling People About Minamata Disease and Its History via Sales of Organically Grown Produce 3.3.1 Revitalizing Patients’ Livelihoods and Growing Farm-Fresh Sweet Pomelos The second initiative informs people about Minamata disease and its history via sales of organically grown produce. In 1975 Soshisha started selling the sweet pomelos grown by patients. Many of the patients had been fishermen, but because marine pollution and damaged health had ruined their livelihoods as fishers, they switched to growing sweet pomelos. Explaining that “these pomelos were grown by patients,” Soshisha made an appeal for their purchase to people who were mutually linked through their support of Minamata disease patients. At that time, pesticides and chemical fertilizers were being used on the sweet pomelos handled by Soshisha. For that reason, when Soshisha members visited one of the Seikatsu Club Consumers’ Co-operatives (below “Seikatsu Club”) in Tokyo about selling the pomelos, they were asked about Soshisha’s indifference to pesticides despite its movement opposing pollution. This induced patients to organize the “Minamata Disease Patients and Families Fruit [Production] Society” (MDPFFS) in 1977, and to undertake organic cultivation with reduced pesticide use (Yanagida 1988: 69–70). In those days, anti-pollution movements such as the Minamata disease struggle expanded nationally. Especially in the 1970s and thereafter, there was gradually a heightening interest in nature protection, townscape preservation, and other movements, and pollution came to be recognized as an “environmental problem” along with these others. For example, in 1970 the International Symposium on Environmental Disruption in the Modern World was held in Tokyo with the participation of social science researchers, and the principle of environmental rights was proposed with Japan’s grave pollution in mind. The “Tokyo Resolution,” which summed up the symposium’s results, stated: “It is important that we urge the adoption in law of the principle that every person is entitled by right to the environment free of elements which infringe human health and well-being and the nature’s endowment, including its beauty, which shall be the heritage of the present to the future generations” (Tsuru 1970: 319–320). Seikatsu Club was founded in 1968. It started with more than 1,200 member households, which increased to over 15,000 in 1973 as the organization grew. There is also great interest in environmental problems. For example, the co-op initially carried detergent, but because it was shown that detergent is harmful to human health and the environment, the co-op worked with businesses to develop powdered laundry soap in 1974. The following year Seikatsu Club launched a “soap movement” using the slogan “Let’s stop being polluters” to call on members to switch from detergent to powdered soap (Ozawa 2019).

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Seikatsu Club calls the products it purchases “consumer materials,” not “commodities.” This term signifies that, with respect to the sustainability of production, the products are reasonably priced and properly sourced. In the 1970s Seikatsu Club presented the following “requirements for consumer materials and their producers” (Ozawa 2019: 56–57). Requirements for consumer materials 1. Unless they satisfy the “needs” which consumers truly seek to fill, and are materials which are socially fair and useful, there is no value in their existence. 2. An effort has been made for their use value. 3. Fair prices ensure reproduction of producers. 4. Information disclosure at all stages: raw materials, production stage, distribution, and disposal. 5. “Usefulness” in daily life, “safety” for health, “soundness” for the environment. 6. Equivalent reciprocity, mutual understanding, and solidarity between producers and consumers is a condition. 7. Striving for domestic self-sufficiency and natural recycling: there is no theft or exploitation of the world’s limited food and resources, and no further increase in the crises of “hunger” and global resources. Requirements for producers of consumer materials 8. 9. 10. 11.

Must be motivated to solve problems in partnership with consumers. Must make information freely available. Must have appropriate production systems and capabilities, or can obtain them. Must be able to socially extend production systems in cooperation with other producers. 12. Must not invest in other businesses which are unfair. 13. From production to disposal, actions must keep the natural environment and global resources in mind. Although Seikatsu Club places conditions on producers, it also always supports producers with purchases. In 1978 Seikatsu Club started buying sweet pomelos from MDPFFS. But in 1983, it was revealed that a few members had treated their orchards with herbicides that MDPFFS had decided to ban. The MDPFFS made this public, and also held repeated internal discussions. This experience led to more vigorous interaction such as members visiting each other’s orchards (Minamata Disease Center Soshisha 2004: 176–181).

3.3.2 “Relationships” Between Producers and Consumers As Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) write, capitalism has gradually changed by means of critiques. This applies also to agricultural production and food distribution (Goodman et al. 2012: 90).

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The critiques of agriculture-induced environmental problems and food safety, which were expressed by the organic-agriculture movement, consumer movement, and other movements, prompted responses by businesses and brought about advances in the certification systems which guarantee quality that is based on consideration for the environment and food safety. This enabled businesses to incorporate new types of worth—specifically the environment and food safety—into the process of capital accumulation. But certification systems signify the codification of merchandise, which in turn involves sorting for specific properties of the objects to be commercialized, and discarding the other properties (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 444– 445). For example, if one takes only the property “organic production,” then other properties, such as the ties between production sites and producers, are discarded. As noted above, the fact that AFNs attach importance to “relationships” and try to prove alterity means that they are attempting to spotlight the properties that businesses discarded owing to codification. Likewise in the organic-agriculture initiative by Minamata disease patients and their supporters, one can find proof of quality that is based on “relationships.” In 1990 Soshisha’s sweet pomelo-related business became a spin-off called GAIA Minamata (below “GAIA”), which handles the processing, sales, and other tasks associated with the pomelos. Although it takes the form of a limited liability company, it gives the impression of a community of families. Pomelos are grown by Producer Group Kibaru (below “Kibaru”), whose predecessor was the aforementioned MDPFFS. Kibaru members’ orchards are located in Minamata City, Ashikita Town, Tsunagi Town, and Amakusa City. Orchards spanning these two cities and two towns produce 6,310 t of pomelos annually, of which Kibaru-grown pomelos account for 394 t, or 6.2% (2017 harvest) (Yokemoto 2020). Even now Seikatsu Club is a major buyer of sweet pomelos. In the past, Kibaru had obtained certification from Kumamoto Prefecture, but the group discontinued it after only one year owing to the troublesome procedure. Therefore, as in the AFN case study described above, Kibaru and GAIA guarantee quality by means of “relationships” among producers and with consumers, instead of by means of a certification system. The first means is disclosing information to Seikatsu Club, and improvements in production. Every year Kibaru reports its planned and actual use of fertilizer and pesticides to Seikatsu Club, and has, through dialog with Seikatsu Club, made a number of improvements such as stopping the use of certain pesticides. Kibaru also hosts Seikatsu Club farm volunteers twice a year. Although information disclosure is not a primary purpose of hosting volunteers, it is meaningful to have consumers see the production site firsthand. Second, every year Kibaru members visit the Tokyo area and other consumer localities for get-togethers to meet Seikatsu Club members. At these meetings Kibaru members talk about Minamata disease and encourage the joint purchase of sweet pomelos. In the talks about Minamata disease, speakers describe Kibaru’s predecessor MDPFFS, and explain how producers are linked by “Minamata disease” as their common attribute. They also emphasize the slogan “victims don’t become polluters,”

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which evinces Kibaru’s determination to tackle reduced pesticide use and organic cultivation. And because production reduces but does not eliminate pesticide use, speakers also explain the types of chemicals and rules on their frequency of application. Because Kibaru uses reduced pesticides, its pomelos have a poor appearance due to disease and insect damage, but that is also a selling point saying that consumers can eat even the rind without worrying. The get-togethers also feature recipes for and samples of foods made with the rind. In this way the get-togethers test the quality of Kibaru’s sweet pomelos. Specifically, this is accomplished through a process in which consumers who concur with Seikatsu Club principles gather, learn as a group while listening firsthand to what producers have to say, and sample the products. Kibaru pomelos are not cheap in comparison with similar organically grown products. Therefore, there is little reason for Seikatsu Club members to choose them if the historical “story” associated with Minamata disease is not taken into consideration. This indeed is the special feature which distinguishes Kibaru pomelos from other organically grown products. The story of how Seikatsu Club catalyzed the switch to reduced pesticides and organic cultivation, and of how joint purchasing has supported the revitalization of patients’ livelihoods, appears to stir strong emotions in get-together participants. The act of buying the pomelos signifies that buyers themselves participate in writing the story. In addition to Kibaru, there was another organization called “Minamata Fukuro District Association of Producers Opposing Agrochemicals” (Hannoren) which was launched in 1979 as a group that began organic farming with Minamata disease patient support as its starting point (Tsurumi 1996: 184–186). While deepening interaction among producers, Hannoren started direct sales of chemical-free sweet pomelos based on the desire to inform people throughout the nation about the Minamata disease incident using Minamata farm produce as the vehicle, thereby providing a catalyst for people to change the course of their daily lives. In October 2006 the organization became “Econet Minamata Agricultural and Marine Products Division, Hannoren.” In 2016 a group called Karatachi split off from this organization, but like Kibaru and GAIA Minamata, Hannoren and Karatachi likewise sell sweet pomelos and other items accompanied by an explanation of the Minamata disease incident, which is the historical background of the business. But the deeply rooted mindset of the locals is that they want to forget the Minamata disease incident. This is likely associated closely with the city’s still-existing company-town anatomy. Even though Chisso’s position in Minamata City’s local economy is considerably smaller than during its zenith, it still maintains an appreciable level (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Perhaps this is the reason that the Chisso “company town” still has its place in the local citizens’ consciousness. In the Chisso company town, many residents do not perceive a connection between the history of the Minamata disease incident and future community development. But if many citizens come to terms with Minamata disease and accumulate collective

3 Regeneration of Pollution-Devastated Areas Through Alternative Food … Table 3.1 Minamata city’s gross regional product by industry (FY2016) (¥million, %)

Primary industries Minamata City 1,058 Kumamoto Prefecture

Secondary industries

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Tertiary industries

29,141

55,489

(1.2)

(34.0)

(64.8)

209,429

1,502,439

4,198,504

(3.5)

(25.4)

(71.0)

Source Prepared from Kumamoto Prefecture, “2016 Municipal Resident Accounts”

Table 3.2 Minamata city manufacturing of chemical and allied products (¥million)

Year

Value of manufactured goods shipments

Gross added value

1980

16,990

3,306

1985

21,424

7,562

1990

21,191

9,127

1995

23,070

10,902

2000

25,610

11,760

2005

25,344

7,436

2010

62,063

11,630

2015

44,788

10,630

2016

43,033

15,487

2017

40,508

14,909

Source Prepared from “Manufacturing Census” and “Economic Census”

symbolic capital, that would be a very important means of liberating the city from being a company town, and seeking a new kind of community development. In the context of the organic agriculture initiative described here, GAIA sought sales channels in the Tokyo area and other places away from Minamata City owing to the anatomy of the local society, which had long turned its back on patient relief. Thus the task which awaits is to widely promote Kibaru produce within the community, and, for that purpose, to collaborate with local businesses.

3.4 Conclusion This chapter described initiatives to link the “difficult past,” i.e., the Minamata disease incident, with positive value and to attempt community regeneration and the rebuilding of patients’ livelihoods. Exploration of the subject by this chapter revealed the importance of reversing the meaning of that difficult past, while actively facing it instead of avoiding it. In places which suffered pollution damage, people

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have often clashed over how to interpret their “difficult past,” but this chapter found that it is possible to negate the meaning assigned to the past, and to rebuild “value of locality.”

References Boltanski L, Chiapello È (2005) The new spirit of capitalism. Verso, London Cauvin T (2016) Public history: a textbook of practice. Routledge, London Gardner JB, Hamilton P (2017) The past and future of public history: developments and challenges. In: Gardner JB, Hamilton P (eds) The Oxford handbook of public history. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 1–22 George TS (2001) Minamata: pollution and the struggle for democracy in postwar Japan. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass Goodman D, DuPuis EM, Goodman MK (2011) Alternative food networks: knowledge, practice, and politics. Routledge, London Goodman D, Goodman M (2009) Alternative food networks. In: Kitchin R, Thrift N (eds) International encyclopedia of human geography, vol 4. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 208–220 Minamata Disease Center Soshisha (ed) (2004) M¯o hitotsu no konoyo wo mezashite: Minamataby¯o Sent¯a S¯oshisha 30-nen no kiroku (Working toward an alternative world: 30-year record of Minamata Disease Center Soshisha). Minamata Disease Center Soshisha, Minamata Ozawa S (2019) Nihon-ichi y¯oky¯u no o¯ i sh¯ohisha tachi: hij¯oshiki wo j¯oshiki ni kae-tsuzukeru Seikatsu Kurabu no bijon (The consumers with the most requirements in Japan: the vision of Seikatsu Club, which continues turning the absurd into common sense). Diamond Publishing, Tokyo Social Scientific Study Group on Minamata Disease (2001) In the hope of avoiding repetition of the tragedy of Minamata disease: what we have learned from the experience. National Institute for Minamata Disease, Minamata Tsuru S (ed) (1970) Proceedings of international symposium environmental disruption. Tokyo. Asahi Evening News, Tokyo Tsurumi K (1996) Naihatsuteki hattenron no tenkai (Implementation of Endogenous Development Theory). Chikuma Shobo, Tokyo Varga M (2019) From the qualities of products to the qualities of relations: value conventions in the solidarity economy in Sicily. Valuat Stud 6(1):63–86 Yamada T (1999) ‘Moyainaoshi’ no genjou to mondaiten (Current state and problems of ‘Reconnecting’). Ann Minamata Dis 1:31–44 Yanagida K (1988) Minamata soshite Cherunobuiri: watashi no d¯ojidai n¯oto (Minamata and Chernobyl: my contemporary notes). Komichi Shobo, Tokyo Yokemoto M (2016) K¯ogai kara Fukushima wo kangaeru: chiiki no saisei wo mezashite (Fukushima in terms of pollution: working toward regional revitalization). Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo Yokemoto M (2020) Gendai shihonshugi to chiiki no kachi: Minamata no chiiki saisei wo jirei toshite (Value production and regional economies in contemporary “cognitive” capitalism: a case study on the regeneration of Minamata City). Ann Jpn Assoc RegNal Econ Stud 38:1–16 Yoshii M (2016) Minamata-by¯o hakken kara 60-nen: kaiko to temb¯o (60 years after the official discovery of Minamata disease: retrospect and prospect). J Minamata Stud 7:35–86

Chapter 4

How Do We Cope with Pollution, a Form of Environmental Damage? Learning from a Community Devastated by Itai-Itai Disease Aya Kubota

4.1 The Involved Parties and Societies of Pollution-Damaged Areas 4.1.1 Causes of Pollution The heavy and chemical industries, which flourished during Japan’s era of rapid economic growth, wreaked egregious damage to the environment and caused severe human health damage. In the first half of the 1960s, laws were created for the symptomatic treatment of air and water pollution, which in particular required measures for abatement. But businesses, for instance, limited themselves to calculating which would be cheaper: dispute settlement or actually doing something about environmental pollution (Miyamoto 2014). Still, in consideration of the all-too-severe conditions of patients, a number of local governments began using ordinances to establish environmental standards and patient-relief systems. In the course of these initiatives, the 1967 Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control defined the abovementioned air and water pollution, in addition to five more—soil contamination, noise, vibration, ground subsidence, and offensive odors—as seven types of pollution. Although there was indeed a reduction in atmospheric sulfur dioxide, society seemingly lacked a perspective by which people would link the state of pollution with their own daily lives. In 1993, when the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control and the Basic Law on the Natural Environment were superseded by the Basic Environment Law, it was said that the Age of Pollution had given way to the Age of the Environment, seemingly as if pollution was understood as a product of the A. Kubota (B) Tohoku University, Sendai, Miyagi, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Yokemoto et al. (eds.), Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3239-9_4

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rapid-growth era, i.e., something from a bygone time. But in reality pollution harm still occurs throughout Japan, and there are pending lawsuits. With this critical awareness in mind, this chapter focuses on the widespread environmental pollution from fine particulate matter released by business activities. It follows that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, which resulted from the dispersal of radioactive material due to hydrogen explosions in the reactors and other causes, is likewise pollution. And Minamata disease, which damaged people’s health in ways including harm to their nervous systems with methylmercury discharged from chemical plants, is also pollution. Because such substances are very small particles, they are invisible to the naked eye, and their presence cannot be verified. Decontamination and removal are extremely difficult because the particles are dispersed in huge numbers, and therefore remain in the environment indefinitely. This situation was characterized in the following way by Timothy S. George (2012), who wrote a book on Japan’s severe pollution in Minamata: “To return to the question of when a disaster can be over: even if we wanted to, we cannot recreate or rebuild the past.” It is also impossible to determine how health damage was caused: When did the victim come into contact with particles of what contaminant, or by what extent of contaminant accumulation? In other words, such substances were made possible by science, but there is no threshold value telling us what level is safe. In characterizing such substances, Timothy Morton discusses them as “hyperobjects” (2013), to which he gives five characteristics: (1) viscosity, (2) non-locality, (3) temporal undulation, (4) phasing, and (5) interobjectivity. Radioactive substances, for example, can be explained as follows using these five characteristics. (1) As seen in the debate over interim storage or final disposal, even if radioactive substances are removed from our immediate presence, they cannot be easily disposed, and their existence is hard to forget; therefore they have viscosity. Invisible radioactive substances which are dispersed over broad areas by nuclear power disasters cannot be completely removed. (2) Even if those substances affect humans, animals, or plants some several days or several years later, it is impossible to know when and where that occurred. (3) This is because although each radioisotope is changing by undergoing probabilistic radioactive decay, the radioisotopes as a whole exist over an ultra long term, and thereby transcend the three-dimensional and present-time space-time phase. (4) Radioactive substances appear as a result of the past, and coexist with other objects including human beings. Hence the result of their coexistence relationship can only be understood at a point of time in the future. (5) The environment is finite but unknowable. Thus, in their relationship with radioactive substances, humans do not have the option of disposal. The relationship between humans and radioactive substances is one of interobjectivity. Such substances come about through advances in chemistry and physics, and humans came to use them as things which are necessary for their convenient daily lives. There are indeed cases in which these substances are dispersed because of accidents and improper emissions, but in the first place, society decided to use them after weighing human desire against the anticipated damage. If we have awareness as members of society, then we are pollution perpetrators.

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4.1.2 Society as Non-involved Parties of Pollution-Damaged Localities Here I want to define terms. Much pollution research is based on the division into victims and perpetrators, but here I take a different approach. An involved party of a pollution-damaged locality means a victim. On the other hand, society means noninvolved parties. The reason that I use expressions such as “our society” is because i do not perceive myself as a pollution victim. Using the term non-involved party to expressly show the difference in circumstances with involved parties may foster division between the two. Timothy S. George emphasizes that in the case of Minamata, the company and administrative authorities colluded, dominating the locality and thinking nothing of residents’ lives, while the victims fought against them; it was in other words a battle to win democracy (2001). And with regard to a reoccurrence of the Fukushima nuclear accident, he pointed out that the responsibility of the offending company and of administrative authorities is obscure. In that context, debating the circumstances of non-involved parties could further obscure responsibility. But there are two reasons why I venture to use the term non-involved party. First is the existence of the locality as one of the things sustaining damage in a pollution-damaged area. Locality (chiiki) means a fairly large land area and its people; it is also a unit of livelihood. A locality has not only air and water, not only things such as land, lifestyles, schools, and hospitals, but also customs, traditions, and the like. These all come together to form a commons. Even if it is very difficult for a commons to have achieved a state of internal autonomy, such a state is desirable in one possible way of thinking (Dietz et al. 2003). In society’s relationship with the commons, it is evident that society is not a member of the commons as victims are; it also has no direct involvement such as polluting the commons. However, all non-involved parties also have relationships, as involved parties, with one or another commons. Such aspects are overlooked when we see non-involved parties only as perpetrators. There is a possibility that non-involved parties will become future victims, i.e., involved parties. Due to the nature of locality (chiiki), it is expressed as either “community” or “area” below. The second reason is the expectation that, by establishing the circumstance of the non-involved party in lieu of an injured/injurer division, there could perhaps be an approach to pollution which consists in the understanding of involved party-nature, which does not converge in debates on environmental justice. The concept of environmental justice arose in the United Station especially during the mid-1980s based on an understanding of the situation in which certain attributes of environmental pollution concentrated harm in populations such as Black Americans and the poor (Mohai et al. 2009). Environmental justice poses the issue of racism expressed via the environment, and it definitely applies to Japan, where such racism has already arisen. Conversely, another possible understanding is that nothing changed in Japanese society owing to the concept of environmental justice. Precisely because some people were noninvolved parties, weren’t there things that should have been considered and actions

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that should have been taken? I do not think that non-involved parties can truly understand the feelings and situations of involved parties, but I do think that they are capable of sharing involved party-nature, and are capable of actions that make society respect involved parties. So what kind of actions should be taken? Although we can perhaps conceive of various actions, it is important to have a norm for how society should respond when environmental contamination (pollution) arises.

4.1.3 How Do We Respond to Environmental Contamination (Pollution)? Based on the above problem awareness, this chapter’s objective is to get hints from the responses to pollution in communities afflicted with itai-itai disease, which was an early example of pollution, and which was exceptional for the victims winning a complete victory in court. Communities afflicted with itai-itai disease not only won clear victories in court. As I will detail below, continuing efforts by involved parties for the ensuing 40-odd years, and the perpetrators’ response to those efforts, built a relationship between the two sides. The next section will review the pollution response to itai-itai disease-afflicted communities. Section 4.3 will discuss the needed changes in society’s response to pollution based on change in the concept of pollution, and Sect. 4.4 will propose an orientation for the response to pollution.

4.2 Pollution Response of Itai-Itai Disease-Afflicted Communities 4.2.1 Overview of Itai-Itai Disease-Afflicted Communities in the Jinzu River Watershed1 (Kubota 2019a) Starting in the Meiji Period (1868–1912), the Kamioka Mine on the upper reaches of the Jinzu River caused soot and smoke damage in the factory vicinity, as well as environmental damage in the downstream Toyama Prefecture region. Owing to requests from Toyama Prefecture and other entities, the mine proprietor responded to the pollution and carried out other efforts, but after the Second World War the mine reached its zenith, mainly in its lead and zinc operations. Wastewater was

1

Descriptions of the itai-itai disease-damaged area are based on Kubota (2019a, b), which readers should see for detailed references. Although this chapter does not go into detail about the current state of decontamination in the area ravaged by itai-itai disease, one view is that cropland has not recovered its expected quality. Because my investigation is still insufficient, this is a subject for future study.

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cloudy white and rice plant growth was impaired, for which farmers were compensated, but no causal link with health damage was established. Affected municipalities created a Countermeasure Council that was joined with an Agricultural Cooperative organization, and the Jinzu River Mineral Poison Countermeasures Council was formed. In 1961 a local physician named Noboru Hagino announced his theory that cadmium was responsible, but society was unreceptive. For that reason, people in the affected communities banded together more tightly. Meanwhile, Toyama Prefecture was planning to be designated a New Industrial City, and therefore made no move to recognize pollution by businesses, but it did start its own prefectural system for patient certification and payment of healthcare relief at public expense. At about that time in pollution-damaged areas where people were suffering from Niigata Minamata disease and Yokkaichi asthma, victims had begun filing lawsuits. Similarly in the community affected by itai-itai disease, 28 victims filed a lawsuit against the Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co.’s Kamioka Mining Site in March 1968. In May of that year the Ministry of Health and Welfare certified that itai-itai disease is a pollution-induced disease. Proving that cadmium causes itai-itai disease was one of the issues disputed in the trial. The plaintiffs’ allegation was proved by the epidemiological finding that, when the state of contamination and disease prevalence were mapped to show the geographical localization of itai-itai disease, there was no other way to explain the relationship between the two. Considering the powerful faction of the medical science community which at that time did not recognize this relationship, this represented a significant advance for pollution litigation (Fig. 4.1). Plaintiffs won a complete victory on June 30, 1971 in Toyama District Court, and were also totally victorious in the appeal on August 9, 1972 in Nagoya Appellate Court. Additionally, the plaintiffs and the defendant entered into two written pledges and one agreement: “Pledge Concerning Payment of Itai-itai Disease Damages,” “Pledge Concerning the Soil Contamination Problem,” and “Pollution Control Agreement.” The first dealt with health damage, the second with environmental decontamination and regeneration of the local environment, and the third with preventing the reoccurrence of pollution. But the victims did not accept the perpetrator’s apology, i.e., there was no reconciliation. The victims’ feeling was that just because they had won a lawsuit did not mean the damage has disappeared, nor did it mean that their living environment had suddenly been cleaned up. Court victory is a mere transit point. Victims have continued to expend a great deal of effort in order to actually realize the three compacts (two pledges and agreement) they won in the courtroom. Kamioka Mining Site, the perpetrator of itai-itai disease, has responded to those efforts by the victims, who in turn came to show that they to a certain extent see Kamioka’s attitude in a positive light. Kunihiro Takagi, the then representative of the victims’ group, said that he gradually came to feel that they had built “a tense relationship of trust” through their persistent post-victory initiatives. And as generational succession proceeded, in 2013, 40 years since the court victory, the victims resolved to accept Kamioka’s apology, which led to reconciliation. But just because reconciliation was achieved in the 40th year, that does not mean that it is acceptable to stop the process of relationship-building, and

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Fig. 4.1 Geographical distribution of cadmium by concentration (left) and itai-itai disease symptom prevalence rate among patients. Studies are for 1967 and 1968, which cover women 50 years and older. Reproduced from Miyamoto (2014), whose source is No 23 Vol 2 of Kono S, Hokuriku Journal of Public Health

it is also necessary to continue “a trustful relationship of tension.” Tentative steps have already begun on the front lines: there are fewer people who are direct acquaintances of the victims, while Kamioka’s situation is that none of the new employees have ever experienced severe criticism. Under these circumstances, one imagines that continuing the relationship will be difficult. Nevertheless, the process leading to reconciliation started because of the court victory, and the three compacts won there. What efforts were made to implement these three compacts over the 40 years leading to reconciliation?

4.2.2 Three Responses to Pollution in the Area Devastated by Itai-Itai Disease 4.2.2.1

Health Damage

By the day on which the “Pledge Concerning Payment of Itai-itai Disease Damages” was concluded, the plaintiff group had increased its membership for the seventh time. The pledge said that Kamioka Mining Site would from then on pay damages as demanded in appellate court “also to people newly certified as itai-itai disease patients and people requiring observation,” and the company would therefore have to pay the full amounts of treatment and recuperation costs.

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As noted above, Toyama Prefecture had been running its own system of healthcare relief from before the lawsuit was filed, but after the plaintiff court victory it also came to certify patients under a government commission based on the 1972 “Concerning the Certification of Itai-itai Disease Pursuant to the Special Measures Law on Relief for Pollution-caused Health Damage.” It was deemed that some of the victims were not eligible for government certification under this system. In a recent instance from July 2022, the Toyama Prefecture Pollution-caused Health Damage Certification Screening Committee recognized that the patient certification application of a 91-year-old woman was judged “eligible.” That made 201 certified patients. One could hardly say that itai-itai disease has ended. In that context and on the occasion of reconciliation, Kamioka made the criteria for symptoms and time span broader than under government certification, and implemented a system for paying treatment costs and other recuperation costs in full. This system was called the Jinzu River Watershed Residents Health Management Support System. In a situation where the local residents considering applications for certification are growing older, one can perhaps regard Kamioka more highly than public administration for more thoroughly accommodating victims’ need for health damage compensation. The system does not, however, enjoy active use. And from that fact one can infer that, precisely because Kamioka was able to anticipate such a situation, the company thought it could shoulder the costs. Between 500 and 600 patients were expected when the system was first implemented, but as of 2016 there were 137.

4.2.2.2

Environmental Contamination and Community Revitalization

In the “Pledge Concerning the Soil Contamination Problem” Kamioka stated that soil contamination was the cause of damage, including that to agriculture, which it had denied in court. The pledge stated, “Kamioka will take responsibility for past and future agriculture damage and soil contamination in the part of the Jinzu River watershed in which itai-itai disease has occurred.” To deal with cadmium-contaminated cropland, it was decided to implement a farmland restoration measures project based on the Act to Prevent Soil Contamination on Agricultural Land. The state of contamination was investigated on 3,130 ha of farmland, and agriculture compensation was determined based on the severity of contamination. With the standard value for cadmium (0.4 ppm) according to the Food Sanitation Law in mind, category 1 land had a cadmium concentration of 1.0 ppm or higher in brown rice; category 2 land is that near category 1 land, and may yield contaminated rice; category 3 land produced rice contaminated between 0.4 and 1.2 ppm. Land that cannot be planted was compensated by Kamioka; the government purchased rice harvested from categories 2 and 3, and designated it inedible. Land in categories 1 and 2 totaled 1500.6 ha, and category 3 land was 185.6 ha. About one-half of the investigated land attained actual category designations. The decontamination method was primarily cover soil, which requires no large-scale removal

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of contaminated soil. A series of experiments concluded in March 2012. Decontaminating soil in this way reduced the brown rice cadmium concentration to an average of 0.08 ppm from a 0.99 ppm average before the farmland restoration project. Farmland was divided into carryover farmland, which continued to be cultivated as before, and land converted to residential land, which would no longer be farmed. Irrigation and drainage facilities were improved for the carryover farmland. The converted residential land, totaling 624 ha, was used for building public and commercial facilities and for building homes, as a rehabilitated pollution-damaged area. Although the cadmium contamination was extremely serious, apparently the victims never entertained the idea of moving away from the area, and had to room to consider anything but making the best of the stable industry base for producing rice. Far from declining, the population of the former Fuchu Town, which corresponds to this area, has actually risen since 1970. The population of Yao Town, which lies adjacent to the south, was stagnant during the same time period. Restoration of farmland and conversion to residential land, which were prompted by decontamination, arguably increased the population. What is more, from questions about the descriptions of construction projects to measures dealing with dump truck traffic, the courteous explanations and responses to problems by administrative officials built cordial trust with local residents.2 The cadmium-emitting mine was far from the polluted area, whose main industry of rice production continued, and hence a divide did not arise between local residents and public administration. Their shared and clearly articulated vision was for a community allowing efficient agriculture and a very convenient residential zone located five to 10 km from Toyama Station. It is safe to say that, with regard to this future vision, urban planning, and construction projects were to an extent realized thanks to social circumstances.

4.2.2.3

Preventing the Reoccurrence of Pollution

Based on the Pollution Control Agreement, which stipulated that Kamioka “would never again cause pollution,” the victims secured agreement that, in response to victim requests, Kamioka would conduct on-site inspections with the participation of experts, gather and provide data and documents, and carry out studies, in addition to covering all costs for them. The victims formed an inspection team with the cooperation of legal and scientific experts, and since 1972 have conducted annual on-site inspections at the Kamioka Mine. As a result of this continuous initiative, the inspection team acquired information, expert knowledge, understanding of soil and water contamination mechanisms, and legal knowledge at the same levels as Kamioka. During those years, the mine’s

2

This information is based on interviews with Kunihiro Takagi, museum documents, and other source materials.

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ore production peaked in the latter half of the 1970s, and extraction ceased completely in 2001. As an example of inspection team activities, in the 2017 on-site inspection the victims’ organization asked the company for measures to deal with heavy rain, owing to the frequent heavy-rain disasters throughout Japan. On-site inspections have continued at a reduced scale due to the Covid pandemic, but in October 2022 the 51st inspection with 60 participants was conducted as usual.

4.2.3 Hints from the Area Devastated by Itai-Itai Disease Reconciliation does not come about because victims are satisfied. Reconciliation may not have been the will of all victims including those who had already passed on, but the fact that the pollution-damaged community came to think that it was alright to accept the apologies of the polluter perhaps suggests a state which should be the minimum achieved in the pollution-damaged community (even if it was the bare minimum). The three elements of the minimum-achieved state are: (1) Compensation for future health damage, above that specified for certified pollution victims; (2) decontamination and recovery from the ill effects of contamination on industry and residences; and (3) continuation of efforts meant to prevent pollution reoccurrence.

4.3 Discussion: Working Toward the Minimum State in Pollution-Damaged Communities 4.3.1 Current State of Pollution-Damaged Communities There are differences between communities in their responses to pollution, for example in the way damage is expressed and its geographical extent when pollutants are released into the environment; the perceptions of damage by afflicted areas, polluters, and society; the courses taken by lawsuits and the particulars of court decisions; and the certainty of the relationship between the causative substance and damage. As a result of these differences, the relationship between victim and perpetrator is totally different. But as stated at the beginning of this chapter, whether it is a community damaged by itai-itai disease, a community damaged by Minamata disease, or—even more so—a community afflicted by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, the damage from pollution is not over. That feature is common in pollution-damaged communities. Another similarity is that pollutant-emitting companies have no intention of admitting the causal relationship between causative substances and damage, and in some cases even administrative authorities take the side of the companies. Yet another

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similarity is that victims are subject to discrimination. It seems that at the basis of these similarities lies a characteristic of society which cannot recognize the existence of the other, while at the same time it cannot extricate itself from the mistaken perception that impracticable engineering has applicability even in the natural environment, but I shall leave this for future consideration. Because of these similarities, I arrived at the idea that the path taken by the itai-itai disease-afflicted community should be taken by pollution-damaged communities that have yet to win their lawsuits. This is because I think that the three compacts they should ordinarily win in the courtroom must be obtained beforehand. If they wait for victory in time-consuming lawsuits, the victims will die off, and society will do nothing about the harm suffered by victims. Therefore what should society, as a non-involved party, do in order to share involved party-nature and not deny the existence of involved parties, instead of abandoning them? And further, what should society do to build “a tense relationship of trust” between damaged communities and itself?

4.3.2 How “Pollution” Has Changed Over Time This section attempts to reconsider the concept of pollution based on the above critical awareness. The Japanese word for “pollution” (kougai) is written with two ideograms: the first means “public,” and the second means “harm” or “damage.” The term pollution (kougai) was used when defining river projects in the 1896 River Act. It appears in a context saying that river improvement work is necessary to improve the public benefit (kouri, the opposite of kougai) from the flowing water of rivers, or to remove or diminish pollution. Pollution is conceived in a way which contrasts it with the public benefit yielded by flowing river water. But in the rapid economic growth period, when there was little regulation, widespread environmental pollution was caused especially by commercial enterprises in the heavy-industry sector. That this led to the loss of life and health was broadly recognized by society, and the 1967 Basic Act for Environmental Pollution Control defined seven types of pollution: air pollution, water pollution, soil contamination, noise, vibration, subsidence, and offensive odors. It also imposed the responsibility to conserve the environment on the central government, local governments, businesses, and citizens. But in the Fukushima nuclear accident, pollution arose owing to negligence of a public utility closely associated with government administration. Formerly, attracting a nuclear power plant or agreeing to its construction was arguably done in accordance with urban planning in the broad sense. In 1967 a member of the Fukushima Prefectural Assembly said that the Futaba district was the “Tibet” of Fukushima Prefecture, and that a nuclear plant should be brought there to revitalize the district. In 1968 the prefectural governor stated in answer to questions that building a nuclear plant would enable the prefecture to attract and develop related industries. Additionally, a “Study on the Futaba Nuclear Power Zone Development Vision” was prepared. One could not say that the planning and projects of that time achieved their goals.

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4.3.3 Urbanization and Pollution Caused by Urban Planning If one takes the view that it is rather urban planning in the broad sense that has caused plan-anticipated disasters, that would perhaps also include decisions to attract polluting factories. How are urban planning and pollution related? The original purpose of urban planning was to facilitate appropriate urbanization. Amid the storm of modernization, “urbanization” was the process coming before villages transformed into cities, and was a means of pursuing economic affluence. With the reality of urbanization going unquestioned, the whole Earth is now undergoing planetary urbanization. As Henri Lefebvre declared in his 1968 Right to the City, urbanization is the simultaneous implosion and explosion of the city (Lefebvre 1996). Implosion means, for example, the formation of a space which alienates the individual, while explosion means becoming part of environmental pollution and infrastructure (being turned into resources). Succeeding to this discussion, Neil Brenner used words which call to mind a specific place called the hinterland, in that way carefully examining the concept of the hinterland (Brenner 2019). It is the hinterland that is affected by severe pollution. But even the development of privately owned land, which may bring about such a situation, is allowed by urban planning under certain conditions. That is, urban planning’s role is to serve as the device which is used to weigh human desire against anticipated damage, as stated at the beginning of this chapter. Urban planning is seen as something which promotes the public welfare, but actually it brings about both public benefit and pollution.

4.3.4 Achieving the Minimum State Public utilities are scaling up in terms of both time and space. And yet, public administration is on the side that causes pollution owing to the mistaken perception that the artificial knowledge known as engineering is valid in nature, which is an unknown environment. In other words, we live in a time when we cannot expect public administration to perform the roles of removing pollution, and of monitoring so that pollution does not arise. We must think about how these things can be achieved by what entities and what kind of systems. Although it might be possible to demand changes in public administration, perhaps on-site examples can be found where non-administrators are performing such roles. Further, in light of the situation in which society is unaware of such changes in public administration’s role, structural reform is needed so that all pollution-damaged areas will achieve the current state of progress seen in the itai-itai disease-afflicted community. But at the time before structural reform occurs, it is imprisoned within the structure. For that reason reform does not easily come using the procedures

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envisioned by the legal system, thereby necessitating a paradigm shift3 (Kubota 2021a, b). But at pollution locales, a paradigm shift is in fact already occurring, and we must understand the emerging signs with that in mind. There are initiatives such as looking for activities that do not depend on engineering technology, the monetary economy, or administrative intervention, that is, activities which seek a new way of thinking; have a constant understanding of the state of, and changes in, pollution locales; and make efforts for organizing assemblies (people coming together for shared purposes, or the very act of coming together; gatherings; organizations; meetings) between pollution locales (Butler 2015; Hardt and Negri 2017). An example is the Pollution Resource Center Network, which started as a collaboration among pollutiondamaged communities that gradually obtained project funding and launched vibrant activities.4 Resource centers and other facilities are often built in pollution-damaged communities; some are public and some private, they come in various sizes, and deal with various kinds of pollution. In connection with the Fukushima nuclear accident, the “Nuclear Power Disaster Research Center furusato”5 has joined the network. Mr. Yoshio Satomi, proprietor of the Furutakiya Hotel, provided the planning, management, and space, and also serves as director of the center. One cannot understand the situation without knowing the views of the involved parties in pollution-damaged communities.

4.4 Conclusion 4.4.1 How Should We Deal with Pollution? After fellow involved parties have attained mutual understanding: (1) If the effects of pollution-caused health damage are suspected, but administrative authorities claim there are none, then authorities should demonstrate the absence of impacts instead of victims having to prove the existence of impacts; (2) the desirable forms of decontamination and community revitalization should first be discussed thoroughly by the community, and then undertaken through practical action on a trial basis, instead of unquestioningly adopting the plans of administrative authorities; and (3) concerning

3

I feel that the situation is serious enough to require use of the exaggerated term “paradigm shift.” Especially in urban planning in the broad sense, there is no thorough examination of the publicinterest/public-harm balance invested in the objective of the entity declaring it, and the planning is mere immature engineering technology in every sense, such as the justifiability of the means used to attain objectives, and the soundness of post-construction assessment. It seems there is a shallow understanding of time, humans, space, and other elements. On this matter see Kubota (2021a, b). 4 Pollution Resource Center Network: https://kougai.info. 5 Nuclear Power Disaster Research Center furusato: Iwaki Yumoto Hot Spring, https://furusatondm. mystrikingly.com/#furusato.

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the prevention of pollution reoccurrence, counteraction measures should be considered on the assumption that pollution is occurring or will occur again, and if those measures are unacceptable by the community6 (Kubota 2022a), then for the time being it might be possible to work on and achieve, by the use of assemblies, the prevention of pollution reoccurrence by having society give up public utilities that might pollute (and at the same time look for other possible practical action to use instead). “Assembly” here means people who share the attitude of dealing with pollution from the victims’ standpoint. It is the sharing of involved party-nature by involved parties and non-involved parties. But involved party-nature does not signify symptoms of tangible damage. In describing assembly, Butler says little about whether individuals have the same view; rather, she emphasizes the importance of an attitude wherein people feel empathy about something, and then in line with their intention they gather, even for a short time, in a public place and make themselves visible (Butler 2015). And on the question of whether performativity by such embodiment will change society, one will not necessarily obtain the desired result every time. As society becomes more governed by law, assemblies such as demonstrations will sometimes be seen as antisocial behavior. But if pollution does not arise just because it is illegal, that society indeed should be changed, and in that sense we are all involved parties. And then there is making oneself visible, i.e., embodiment, which confirms that we are all vulnerable existences. Our bodies are all invaded by environmental pollution. In the crisis of the global environment, we are all the victims of pollution, i.e., involved parties. We do not know when we will become victims, or, if we already are, we do not know when we became so. The only way we will know what kind of assembly is effective is to keep watching the results as we continue practical action. It seems to me that practical action does not arise because there are assemblies; rather, assemblies happen in the process of practical action.

4.4.2 Future Research Up to this point I have used the large and broad category called pollution-damaged community, but situations differ greatly depending on the individual, family, village, and municipality. Sometimes victims have conflicting opinions, and sometimes a

6

If something is unacceptable to the involved parties, then to the entity promoting a public works project, it is likewise unacceptable and will be abandoned when the burden of coping with damage is included, especially when the economic cost is too great. On the other hand, citizens at risk of becoming victims will think about how much in compensation they will need if they suffer harm, or if they will use that public service even at a high price, or wonder if there are other means to be used instead, and if, after having considered those, they feel the project is still unacceptable, one imagines they will give up that public service. I discussed such situations not with respect to Fukushima after the nuclear accident, but with respect to the still uncompleted maglev train in Kubota (2022a).

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single person’s intent and action diverge. Therefore, a task for future research is how to avoid using this large and broad category. How should decontamination be done? Whom is community revitalization done for? What do these mean? Although one can perhaps say that local governments are more capable than the national government in responding to the circumstances of individuals, one could indeed also say that local governments have not often taken such action. This too is a subject for future investigation. Further, intermediate organizations such as neighborhood associations and youth associations, which arose from resident autonomy, have not been given a clearly defined status in Japan. Even in city areas where urbanization proceeded, and in outlying regions where primary industries declined, it will be important to investigate—not only in polluted communities, but universally, and without considering the foundation of people’s livelihoods—how interpersonal relationships can continue even as they become tenuous, or if those relationships can be recreated if they have already disappeared (Kubota 2022b).

References Brenner N (2019) New urban spaces: urban theory and the scale question. Oxford University Press Butler J (2015) Notes toward a performative theory of assembly. Harvard University Press. Japanese translation (2018) Seidosha Dietz T, Ostrom E, Stern P (2003) The struggle to govern the commons. Science 302: 1907–1912 George TS (2001) Minamata: pollution and the struggle for democracy in postwar Japan. Harvard University Asia Center George TS (2012) Fukushima in light of Minamata. Asia-Pacific J 10(11): 1–10 Hardt M, Negri A (2017) Assembly. Oxford University Press. Japanese translation (2022) Iwanami Shoten Lefebvre H (1996) The rights to the city (originally in French, Japanese translation). Chikuma Shoten Mohai P, Pellow D, Roberts JT (2009) Environmental justice. Ann Rev Environ Resour 34: 405–430 Kubota A (2019a) Study of process from Winning Lawsuit to conciliation in the disaster area of itaiitai disease: How should we recover from the disaster of land contamination by environmental disruption? Jpn Archit Rev. https://doi.org/10.1002/2475-8876.12142 Kubota A (2019b) Research on zoning in nuclear accident disaster areas, with the focus on three time periods in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident disaster area: evacuation, sheltering, and refuge. Jpn Archit Rev 84(763): 1947–1956 (in Japanese) Kubota A (2021a) Restoration as paradigm shift from reconstruction after the disaster. Jpn Soc Disaster Recovery Revital 9: 11–19 (in Japanese) Kubota A (2021b) Spatial ethics as paradigm shift from spatial planning. TOSHI MONDAI (Munic Probl) 112: 64–72 (in Japanese) Kubota A (2022a) Use of deep underground space as a good opportunity to envision new and different urban planning: a preliminary principle acting as responsibility for safety and the public interest. Res Environ Disrupt 52: 26–31 (in Japanese) Kubota A (2022b) Different form of public and common nature in urban planning. TOSHI MONDAI (Munic Probl) 114: 56–63 (in Japanese) Miyamoto K (2014) A critical history of environmental pollution in postwar Japan. Iwanami Shoten (in Japanese) Morton T (2013) Hyperobjects: philosophy and ecology after the end of the world. University of Minnesota Press

Chapter 5

Air Pollution Lawsuit and “Community Development for Environmental Regeneration”: The Case of Mizushima District in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture Miho Hayashi, Conrad Hirano, and Masafumi Yokemoto

Abstract This chapter aims to consider the significance of “community development for environmental regeneration” (kanky¯osaisei no machizukuri) after the 1990s from the perspective of the development of civil society in Japan. Japan saw the rise of the civic sector as a result of the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake and the 1998 enactment of the NPO Law. During the same time, Japan’s air pollution lawsuits reached settlements, and the victims formed NPOs and began “community development for environmental regeneration.” This chapter examines the case of the Mizushima district in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture to describe their air pollution lawsuit and its aftermath and consider this historical development as one of the driving forces behind the development of civil society in Japan.

5.1 Introduction This chapter aims to situate the sequence of events from postwar Japan’s antipollution movement to “community development for environmental regeneration” (kanky¯osaisei no machizukuri) in the history of the development of civil society in Japan. Previous studies have not adequately addressed this aspect of postwar Japanese society.

M. Hayashi Foundation for Environmental Rehabilitation and Redevelopment of Mizushima, Kurasiki, Okayama, Japan C. Hirano Department of History, Northwestern University, Evanston, USA M. Yokemoto (B) Graduate School of Business, Osaka Metropolitan University, Osaka, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Yokemoto et al. (eds.), Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3239-9_5

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By considering the development of the civic sector such as private nonprofit organizations as an indicator of civil society, the growth of civil society in postwar Japan can be said to have two phases: the 1970s and the 1990s. The 1970s witnessed the intensification of tendency for “de-industrialization” and “post-industrialization,” and the 1990s was the age of globalization. Through these two decades, the Japanese civic sector had made significant progress (Aoki 2007; Avenell 2010; Imada 2005). The development of the civic sector strengthens the ability of citizens to have their interests reflected in the policymaking process. In Japan, however, the policymaking process is closed. In other words, the power of the government and private corporations is strong, and the system for reflecting citizens’ interests in the policymaking process is very weak. Under these conditions, social movements tend to be accusation-and resistance-oriented, and are unlikely to present policy alternatives. This is also true in numerous ways in the Japanese environmental movement (Hasegawa 2004). However, Japan also saw the rise of the civic sector as a result of the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, which generated a flurry of volunteer activities in support of the disaster-stricken areas, and the 1998 enactment of the NPO Law. During the same time, Japan’s air pollution lawsuits reached settlements, and the victims formed NPOs and began “community development for environmental regeneration.” This chapter examines the case of the Mizushima district in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture to describe their air pollution lawsuit and its aftermath and consider this historical development as one of the driving forces behind the development of civil society in Japan. Mizushima’s experience is significant because, as a rare case in areas that experienced pollution incidents in the past, its movement has focused on building collaboration among various stakeholders, including pollution victims, local businesses, and the governments.

5.2 Air Pollution Lawsuit in Postwar Japan’s Civil Society 5.2.1 Severe Pollution Damages, and Lawsuits to Protest Against Them Postwar Japan’s rapid economic growth started in the mid-1950s, and with it, industrial pollution caused by companies’ economic activities intensified, as exemplified by the four major pollution incidents (Itai-itai disease, Kumamoto Minamata disease, Niigata Minamata disease, and Yokkaichi asthma). Regional development policies of the national and local governments led to the aggravation and proliferation of pollution through the expansion of industrial zones and the transformation of regional structures (Miyamoto 1973). First, industrial areas for material-based heavy and chemical industries (steel, petrochemicals, etc.) and energy industries (electricity, etc.) were built one after another on the periphery of

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major cities such as Keiy¯o (Chiba Prefecture), Kawasaki and Yokohama (Kanagawa Prefecture), southern Nagoya (Aichi Prefecture), Yokkaichi (Mie Prefecture), and Sakai and Senboku (Osaka Prefecture). Moreover, the National Comprehensive Development Plan approved by the Cabinet in 1962 was an attempt to expand the base development method that had been promoted in the Pacific Belt region to the entire country. The base development method was to create development centers such as new industrial cities in key locations and expect the effects of development to spread to the surrounding areas. Okayama Prefecture, which this chapter examines, also promoted postwar development by attracting heavy and chemical industries to the prefecture and, in 1964, designated the southern area of the prefecture, including Kurashiki City, as a new industrial city. However, this led to the destruction of fishing grounds due to reclamation construction work, damage to marine life due to water pollution, and damage to agriculture such as soft rush due to air pollution, as well as a high incidence of respiratory diseases. Finding ways to successfully combat these pollution incidents was a major challenge for civil society in Japan, which had transformed itself into a democratic nation following its defeat in the Second World War (George 2001). As mentioned earlier, political decision-making in Japan is centralized and closed. In other words, it is difficult for the objections of pollution victims and others to be reflected in the central decision-making system. In such a situation, filing a lawsuit, as represented by the four major pollution lawsuits, was chosen as one means of raising objections (Hasegawa 2004). The Yokkaichi Pollution Lawsuit, filed in 1967, was a lawsuit concerning air pollution. The Yokkaichi case was about industrial pollution caused by petrochemical complexes, and the companies that generated the pollution were named as defendants. In this lawsuit, the victims won and the judgment was finalized in 1972. All four major pollution lawsuits, including this one, ended in victory for the victims.

5.2.2 Social Movements Concerning Pollution in the 1970s The victory of the victims in the four major pollution lawsuits, on the one hand, succeeded in extracting concessions from the government and corporations, but on the other hand, failed to break the centralized and closed system of Japanese policymaking (George 2001). Examining the transition of social movements and environmental policies concerning pollution since the 1970s requires to take both aspects into account. First, regarding the former aspect, in the first half of the 1970s, the national and local governments strengthened their pollution control measures. In particular, the Yokkaichi lawsuit provided a direct impetus for Mie Prefecture to begin regulating the total amount of sulfur oxides in 1972, which was later incorporated into the national system. Also, in 1973, the government enacted the Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law, Japan’s own victim relief system. These represented concessions

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by the government and corporations to the objections of victims and enabled victims to be involved in policy formation. However, with the onset of the oil crisis, pollution control measures began to regress in the mid-1970s. This indicates that the four major pollution lawsuits and other objections did not lead to fundamental changes in Japan’s policymaking mechanisms. Both of these aspects influenced the direction of subsequent social movements. The first was the direction of “participation and proposal” in the policymaking process. This also meant that social movements were incorporated into the policymaking process of the national and local governments. The second direction was to continue “resistance and prosecution.” Michiba Chikanobu criticized the understanding which treated the history of social movements in Japan during the 1960s and 1970s as a shift from “resistance and prosecution” style resident movement to “participation and proposal” style citizen movement, and pointed out that, depending on the specific situation, these two directions still coexist today (Michiba 2006). The centralized and closed nature of political decision-making in Japan makes such coexistence possible.

5.2.3 Air Pollution Lawsuits and Settlements Air pollution victims’ movements since the late 1970s can be characterized as follows, using the contrast between “resistance and prosecution” style and “participation and proposal” style. As the government’s pollution countermeasures were in retreat, the victims’ movements had no choice but to strengthen their “resistance and prosecution” character. Then, as the means of the movement, they again chose litigation. However, in the process of resolving the lawsuits, in order to gain broad support from the public, the victims went beyond their own relief and began to raise more universal demands, such as improvement of the environment, and to propose “community development for environmental regeneration” (Yokemoto and Hayashi 2013). From the mid-1970s onward, air pollution victims filed lawsuits in various locations (Table 5.1). This is partly because the victims, who felt threatened by the regression of pollution control measures, such as the 1978 relaxation of environmental standards for nitrogen dioxide, filed lawsuits to stop the regression. These lawsuits not only sought compensation for the victims, but also demanded the polluters to meet environmental standards prior to the relaxation. These air pollution lawsuits were successively settled in the 1990s. In the process, the plaintiffs contributed a portion of the settlement money obtained from the defendant companies for the realization of “community development for environmental regeneration.” This meant that, mainly in urban areas, local residents and other local entities take the lead in solving pollution and environmental problems, regenerate the destroyed local environment and communities, and aim for “sustainable communities” (Yokemoto and Hayashi 2013). The pollution victims decided to use the

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Table 5.1 Air pollution lawsuits in various locations after the Yokkaichi case (Shinohara 2002) with some additions 1st round of appeals

Defendants

Settlement date

Chiba

May 26, 1975

Kawasaki steel works

August 10, 1992

Nishiyodogawa, Osaka

April 20, 1978

Kansai electric power company and 9 other companies, the national government, Hanshin expressway public corporation

Companies March 2, 1995; the national government and public corporation July 29, 1998

Kawasaki

March 18, 1982

Nippon Kokan Ltd. and 11 other companies, the national government, Metropolitan expressway public corporation

Companies December 25, 1996; the national government and public corporation May 20, 1999

Kurashiki

November 9, Kawasaki steel works and 7 1983 other companies

December 26, 1996

Amagasaki

December 26, 1988

Kansai electric power company and 8 other companies, the national government, Hanshin expressway public corporation

Companies February 17, 1999; the national government and public corporation December 8, 2000

Nagoya

March 31, 1989

Nippon steel corporation and 10 other companies, the national government

August 8, 2001

Tokyo

May 31, 1996

The national government, Tokyo August 8, 2007 prefecture, Metropolitan expressway public corporation, 7 car makers

settlement money they received to compensate for the damage they suffered for this public purpose. The activities of “community development for environmental regeneration” included both “resistance and prosecution” against the government’s pollution countermeasures and “participation and proposal” to propose what kind of community to create and how to advance air pollution countermeasures. However, because the victims’ groups are self-help organizations and their members are elderly people who have suffered from health problems, they needed new hands to advance “community development for environmental regeneration,” an activity that had never been done before. The victims’ group in Nishiyodogawa Ward, Osaka City pioneered “community development for environmental regeneration.” In the Nishiyodogawa air pollution lawsuit, settlements were reached with the polluting companies in 1995 and with the national government and Expressway Public Corporation in 1998, but before these settlements, in 1991, the victims’ group announced the “Nishiyodogawa Regeneration Plan” (Part 1), a proposal for community development. In 1996, based on part of the settlement money, the Center for the Redevelopment of Pollution-damaged

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Areas, or the Aozora (Blue Sky) Foundation, was established as a new leader in community development. Formed as an incorporated foundation, the Aozora Foundation can be considered as an NPO in a broad sense. This was the period when Japan witnessed the increase of new NPOs, and the air pollution victims’ establishment of the Aozora Foundation also followed this trend.

5.3 Deepening Collaboration in “Community Development for Environmental Regeneration”: The Case of Mizushima District in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture 5.3.1 Creation and Reconstruction of the “Mizushima Regeneration Plan” In the “community development for environmental regeneration” efforts in various locations after air pollution lawsuits, collaboration among diverse stakeholders has been sought in the Mizushima district (Fig. 5.1) (Yokemoto and Hayashi 2022). At the same time as Nishiyodogawa, the victims’ group in Kurashiki began to work toward “community development for environmental regeneration.” In 1995, the victims’ group formed a community development executive committee to prepare and publish the “Mizushima Regeneration Plan” (Fig. 5.2). This encouraged the negotiation of the settlement, which was reached in 1996. The Mizushima district faces the Seto Inland Sea and partially consists of agricultural land reclaimed since the Edo period (1603–1868). Also, the Higashi-Takahashi River originally flowed through the central area of Mizushima but was abandoned as a result of renovation work that started in 1910. Today a waterway called the Hakken River retains remnants of the former Higashi-Takahashi River. The transformation of the Mizushima district into an industrial zone began during the Asia–Pacific War. The local administration invited the Mizushima Aircraft Works of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to the coastal area to manufacture military aircrafts. In conjunction with this, the company built housing and other facilities on the former site of the Higashi-Takahashi River, and the area became urbanized. Although the abandoned river site is a new urban space, the surrounding farming and fishing villages have a much older history. Furthermore, the postwar regional development policy led to land reclamation and the construction of industrial complexes. Okayama Prefecture promoted base development by attracting heavy and chemical industries, and in 1964 designated the southern area of the prefecture, including Kurashiki City, as a new industrial city. However, damage to fisheries and agriculture became a problem, and the incidence of respiratory diseases became more frequent. Although the Mizushima district was

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Fig. 5.1 The map of Mizushima (Created from the Kurashiki City website): the six districts form the Kurashiki city

chosen as a designated area under the Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law in 1975, as mentioned earlier, environmental policies began to regress at that time. In 1983, pollution victims in Kurashiki filed a lawsuit against eight companies in the city’s industrial complex to clarify their responsibility for pollution and, in 1994, won a district court decision. In 1996, the pollution lawsuit was settled, and in 2000, the Foundation for Environmental Rehabilitation and Redevelopment of Mizushima (the Mizushima Foundation) was established with a portion of the settlement money to start “community development for environmental regeneration.” Then, in 2020, 25 years after the announcement of the “Mizushima Regeneration Plan,” the Mizushima Foundation re-examined the results of its efforts to date and considered the reconstruction of the plan. As a result, the foundation produced a

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Fig. 5.2 The Mizushima regeneration plan (provided by the Mizushima Foundation)

new plan (Table 5.2) by organizing evaluation indicators and an action plan toward 2030 in relation to the “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).” As clear from the table, Mizushima’s “community development for environmental regeneration” covers a variety of areas, including reducing the environmental impact of industrial factories, improving the health and welfare of residents, enhancing public transportations, restoring the landscape, and creating a cultural town. They are all aimed at overcoming pollution and improving the environment and quality of life, and are therefore an anticipation of the SDGs.

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Table 5.2 The outline of the new plan (Yokemoto and Hayashi 2022) Proposal

Mizushima in 2030, I wish this would happen

1. Encompass the − Promote the creation of a greener industrial complex Mizushima by turning underutilized spaces with green belt in the shopping district and the main park into tree-covered green spaces − Promote the renewal of facilities utilizing existing technology and the introduction of renewable energy and energy-saving equipment in order to achieve a significant reduction of CO2 emissions in the industrial sector

Evaluation indicators SDGs CO2 emissions in Okayama Prefecture − Today (2015): 49.39 million tons − 2030: 19.75 million tons

15 13

2. A bustling hub for the town

− Enable young people studying in Mizushima to learn from history and past experiences, discover local attractions, and create new values − Ensure to gather people, resources, and information that support learning. Promote the development of learning centers (museums and exchange centers) that create the future

Number of 11 educational programs 4 locally offered in Mizushima − Today (2019): 12 − 2030: 30

3. Community development for health and welfare

− Create a community where people can live healthily by learning about COPD and respiratory rehabilitation through lung age measurements and other measures proactively conducted by local residents, and by promoting early detection and treatment efforts − Create a system of mutual support to prevent isolation of people moved from other areas, elderly people living alone, and families with small children

Awareness of COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) − Today (2016): 38.7% − 2030: 50.0%

4. Emphasis on art − Mizushima Residential Learning and science Consortium will develop a long-term residency program. Companies will help young people from Japan and abroad study science and environmental countermeasure techniques − Increase the number of people moving-in and settling down through the activities of young artists who collaborate with universities and make the area known as a place where creative activities can take place − Promote the dissemination of new technologies and culture from the area

3 11

Number of college 4 and international 9 students accepted for 17 training − Today (2018): 275 − 2030: 600

(continued)

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Table 5.2 (continued) Proposal

Mizushima in 2030, I wish this would happen

5. Cherish original − Create a system to connect producers (farmers and fishery workers) and landscapes and consumers. Enable small-scale farming experiences and fishing in the region to become economically viable by, for example, purchasing at a fair price − In the Mizushima Studies lectures, people will learn about the history of land reclamation and other aspects of the region’s characteristics, such as its low elevation, to raise awareness of disaster prevention and disaster mitigation, such as by reviewing daily preparedness measures

Evaluation indicators SDGs Number of the Mizushima Studies lectures held − Today (2017): 7 − 2030: 12

12 4 15

6. Extension of the Mizushima Waterfront Railway

− Help everyone, including the elderly, get around easily by using the Mizushima Waterfront Railway as the region’s core transportation system and developing community cabs connecting within the region in an easy-to-use manner − As a countermeasure to climate change, low-emission (electric vehicle) buses will be introduced to provide a means of transportation with less environmental impact

Number of people 11 using community 13 cabs − Today (2019): 234 − 2030: 360

7. Return the seashore and waterfront to residents

− Ensure that the seaside and waterfront areas around Mizushima are utilized as a field of learning. Create a system in which the national and local governments, businesses, and NPOs cooperate to support such efforts − Widen the Hakken River and create a sloping revetment to ensure its function as a waterfront space and as a retarding area in the event of heavy rains or other disasters − Promote reduction of trash entering the sea from the Takahashi River

Number of people 14 learning about trash 17 in the ocean − Today (2019): 450 − 2030: 720

5.3.2 Collaborative Initiatives for Community Development by the Mizushima Foundation The prospectus of the Mizushima Foundation states that the foundation will be “a base for collaboration among various stakeholders and experts in the Mizushima area, including local residents, administration, and businesses, to develop activities to create a better living environment based on the landmark settlement of the Kurashiki

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pollution lawsuit.” The foundation emphasizes citizen-participatory research and learning activities, and its policy recommendations based on seabed litter research activities have resulted in the realization of a collection and treatment system by the local administration (Yokemoto and Shiwaku 2021). In addition, the foundation’s activities on environmental learning have been introduced as a model case in collaborative efforts (Sat¯o and Shimaoka 2020). When it was first established, the Mizushima Foundation also conducted activities in the form of proposals and requests to the local administration and other entities. Soon, however, the foundation began to engage in dialogue-based activities. For example, the foundation encouraged Kurashiki City to provide opportunities for discussion between citizens and administration and held “Discussion Meetings with Kurashiki City during Environmental Month” for about 10 years from 2003. The foundation has, since 2006, held study meetings with citizens about once a month in conjunction with the revision of the Kurashiki City Basic Environmental Plan and Basic Green Plan and attended the Kurashiki City Environmental Council meetings. In 2007, the foundation established the Kurashiki Citizens’ Environmental Conference to create a place where citizens and the local administration can learn together and engage in dialogue through workshops and other activities. The Mizushima Foundation has also made efforts to deepen relationship with the people of the local shopping district, such as Mizushima Okamisan-kai1 and Mizushima Shopping District Promotion Federation, by exhibiting Tanabata decorations at the Mizushima Port Festival, a popular annual event, since 2004. This effort expanded the human network for community development beyond the traditional supporters of pollution lawsuits. Furthermore, in 2007, the foundation attempted to engage in dialogue with companies through hearings and questionnaires. This effort continues to this day, but it is not easy to maintain the dialogue, and the foundation is searching for a better approach.2 At any rate, as a result of these efforts, in 2010, the Mizushima Foundation was selected for a Ministry of the Environment project to support business-type environmental NPOs and social enterprises (the FY2010 Model Demonstration Project for the Intermediate Support Scheme for Business-type Environmental NPOs and Social Enterprises for Building a Sustainable Society), and from 2013 to 2015, chosen for a collaborative project by the Ministry of the Environment. Through these projects, the Mizushima Foundation has created a system that brings together the local administration, businesses, residents, NPOs, and others to promote environmental learning and community development.

1

A group of women running businesses in the shopping district. During the trial, the sued companies denied the existence of pollution and the victims, and therefore there existed heated confrontations between the companies and pollution victims. See “Shinjitsuga kattahi” kank¯o iinkai (1988).

2

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5.3.3 Activities Toward the Creation of a Pollution Museum The above Table 5.2 contains the creation of a “museum” in “2. A bustling hub for the town.” This project aims to convey the original landscape of Mizushima before heavy and chemical industrialization, such as root (renkon) fields and shallow-water fishing, and to preserve war remains and pass on the experience of pollution. In 2021, the Mizushima Foundation, as part of its activities to create a pollution museum, launched the “Mizushima Community Café” initiative with a grant from the Japan Fund for Global Environment. This is a place where residents and outside experts gather to learn about local history and discuss the future direction of community development based on the newly gained knowledge. This initiative was possible only because the foundation spent more than two decades to build trust relationship with local residents. 2021 saw the “Mizushima Community Café” held three times. Serving as the secretariat, the foundation’s staff selected the topics for each session, conducted preliminary research and coordination with related parties, and carried out interviews and site tours with fewer than ten participants. Each session lasted about three to four hours. The participants were not necessarily a fixed group but included people interested in community development, current and former employees of local companies, researchers at universities, and reporters from local newspapers. The Mizushima Foundation takes the lead in producing booklets based on the information obtained at each session. Mizushima Memories (Mizushima Memor¯ızu) is a compact A5-size, 16-page color booklets that include a wealth of photos, explanations of the local history used for each session, key points from the discussions, and thoughts on future community development. The media, including the Sanyo (Inagaki 2021; Nobusada 2022a, b) and Mainichi (Kobayashi 2022) newspapers, have covered Mizushima Memories and given high praises for it. The “Mizushima Community Café” is consciously pursuing the following three points from the perspective of practicing public history. Public history is a theory and practice that aims to open up the “authority” of historical interpretation to nonspecialists, create collaboration among various actors, including specialists and nonspecialists, and use history for present and future purposes and needs through such collaboration (Cauvin 2016). The first is to encourage the “thawing of memory” (Watanabe 2019). In other words, the café initiative strives to connect various people and activate communication, while keeping local history at its core. The reactions of participants at the “Mizushima Community Café” indicate that they enjoyed learning about local history. It is an opportunity for residents to recognize their own roots and experience the dynamism of the community that has changed over time. If participants do not share their joy with others, however, the initiative’s significance would be diminished by half. Therefore, the foundation is, through the creation and distribution of Mizushima Memories, actively disseminating the newly gained knowledge and sharing them with many people.

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Around 5,000 copies of Mizushima Memories are printed each time and placed free of charge at tourist spots and community centers in Kurashiki City. The Mizushima Foundation staff also distribute the booklets when they attend events, in an effort to get a lot of eyes on the publication. Some people who picked up the booklets talked about their personal connections to Mizushima, including memories of visiting the district in the past and memories of Mizushima as their hometown. In addition, the process of creating Mizushima Memories elicited more stories from the individuals who had already told their stories at the “Mizushima Community Café.” When the authors asked the participants to confirm the content of the draft, they recalled various memories that they did not share at the “Mizushima Community Café.” The dialogue also unfolded with other residents in attendance who described what Mizushima used to be like in the past. Even a single photo can be understood by only those who have experienced the area at that time, and creating such opportunities for dialogue is indispensable to pass the knowledge on to future generations. Mizushima Memories is gradually encouraging the “thawing of memory.” As Mizushima Memories continues to be published, local residents use the booklets as a resource when explaining Mizushima to tourists. In the cases where Hayashi and Yokemoto, two authors of this chapter, came in contact with local residents, they naturally incorporated their experiences with pollution into their explanations of Mizushima. The second point on how the “Mizushima Community Café” practices public history is that the cafe initiative does not view history as a fact of the past only but treats history as a story to pass on to the future. Yagi Ek¯o, an expert on Science and Technology Studies (STS), suggests that “stories” with interpretations are more effective than mere transmission of facts in imparting memories of accidents and disasters (Yagi 2021). Here, “effective” refers to effectiveness as a means to the end of not repeating the tragedies. In this sense, story construction is an activity to reconstruct the past from the perspective of a means to some end. Of course, in such cases, it is necessary to clarify and comply with ethical requirements, such as the validity of the assumed end, sufficient consideration for the affected parties, and consensus building. The “Mizushima Community Café” also aims to reconstruct positive values, the goal of community development, from local history. The goals of the community are certainly not to be determined by the small group of people who participated in the initiative. Rather than rushing to conclusions, the emphasis is on stimulating communication among people. The third point is that the café initiative does not avoid the “difficult past” but rather actively tries to face it. The first session of the “Mizushima Community Café” touched on the 1884 flood damage caused by high tides and destruction created by the Asia–Pacific War. The relationship between this war and Mizushima is the underlying theme of the second and third sessions. The urban area of Mizushima was formed on the abandoned riverbed of the East Takahashi River when the local administration attracted the Mizushima Aircraft Works of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to the area to manufacture military aircrafts during the Asia–Pacific War. For its construction,

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the company brought workers from the Korean Peninsula, which Japan ruled as a colony. The present Mizushima Waterfront Railway served exclusively for the plant and became the foundation for the development of the postwar industrial complex. Because of this background, Mizushima had the largest number of Korean residents in Okayama Prefecture and is home to the only Korean school in the prefecture. Pollution is an extension of this regional development. Although the lawsuit ended in settlement, reactions to the term “pollution (k¯ogai)” still vary depending on one’s position. However, many people share the sentiment that they should mourn pollution victims and prevent the environmental poisoning from happening again. Damage caused by pollution paradoxically demonstrates the importance of human rights and environmental preservation through the history of their violation and destruction. Then, what are the current goals that the Mizushima area should strive for? The highest priority goes to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. It is impossible to solve the issue of “coexistence” with the industrial complex, which was raised after the end of the pollution lawsuit, without decarbonization. In order to achieve “coexistence,” the industrial complex must transform its value from a source of pollution to a center of decarbonization and environmental regeneration. In addition, given the historical background of the large Korean community, it is precisely in Mizushima that “multicultural conviviality in the community” must be promoted. One can define this phrase as “people of different nationalities and ethnicities living together as members of the local community, recognizing each other’s cultural differences and trying to build equal relationships” (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2006). While this principle is good, it is meaningless to advocate it while leaving discrimination and indifference toward minorities in Japanese society unchecked. In order to realize this principle, concrete efforts must be initiated in the local communities where each person resides.

5.3.4 Significance and Role of Pollution Museum One of the significances of a museum that exhibits the “difficult past” is that it becomes a place for learning and education to transform society (Rose 2016). The Mizushima Foundation’s goal of creating a pollution museum is also an attempt to promote community development by linking the “difficult past” with positive values. In the abstract, the values that an area should aim for are sometimes universal goals, such as decarbonization. However, by learning about the “difficult past,” visitors can position these issues as an extension of the area’s unique history. Furthermore, making universal issues “personal” and seeing them as issues to be tackled by each person demand the construction of appropriate stories. These efforts make local history “flow” and activate communication. The Mizushima Foundation’s museum will play the role of an intermediary to facilitate this process. This series of processes constitute environmental learning based on the history of pollution and also provide opportunities for tourism. “The Kurashiki City Tourism Promotion Program (Phase 2)” in March 2021 indicates that the city does not consider

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the experience of pollution as a tourism resource. Nonetheless, the experience of pollution, as a history unique to the area, is an element that creates “value of locality” (Yokemoto and Hayashi 2022).

5.4 Conclusion This chapter has surveyed the historical background of air pollution lawsuit in postwar Japan and “community development for environmental regeneration” after settlements. This history can be seen as part of the formation of civil society in postwar Japan. In the Mizushima District of Kurashiki City, which has emphasized collaboration among various stakeholders in its “community development for environmental regeneration,” there has been a deepening of collaboration through the creation of a pollution museum at its core. Yet, the tension between the two directions of “resistance and prosecution” and “participation and proposal” regarding the “difficult past” of pollution continues to this day. It remains to be seen how the pubic history practice of the “Mizushima Community Café” can promote dialogue within the area.

References Aoki T (2007) Nihonshakai no k¯oz¯ohenka to shiminshakai no taid¯o (Structural changes in Japanese society and the emergence of civil society). In: Japan NPO Center (ed) Shiminshakai s¯oz¯o no 10 nen: shiensoshiki no shiten kara (10 years of civil society creation: from the perspective of support organizations). Gyosei, Tokyo, pp 2–32 Avenell SA (2010) Making Japanese citizens: civil society and the mythology of the shimin in postwar Japan. University of California Press, Berkeley Cauvin T (2016) Public history: a textbook of practice. Routledge, New York George T (2001) Minamata: pollution and the struggle for democracy in postwar Japan. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Hasegawa K (2004) Constructing civil society in Japan: voices of environmental movement. Trans Pacific Press, Melbourne Imada M (2005) Shinsai NPO to atarashii shiminshakai (Earthquake disaster NPOs and new civil society). Nonprofit Rev 5(2):73–79 Inagaki S (2021) Kibi wo meguru, dai3bu: Takahashigawa, 1) f¯uka suru k¯ogai (Get around Kibi, the 3rd session: the Takahashi River, 1) pollution fading away). The Sanyo Shimbun, December 6, p 1 Kobayashi K (2022) Mizushima no kioku tsumugu bashoni: Kurashiki no zaidan k¯ogaishiry¯okan kaisetsu e (A place to weave the memory of Mizushima: Kurashiki’s foundation opening a pollution museum). The Mainichi Shimbun, September 9, p 20 Michiba C (2006) 1960–70 nendai “shimin und¯o” “j¯umin und¯o” no rekishiteki ichi: ch¯udan sareta “k¯oky¯osei” rongi to und¯oshiteki bunmyaku wo tsunagi naosu tameni (The historical position of the “civic movements” and “resident movements” of the 1960s and 1970s: reconnecting the interrupted “publicness” debate with the context of movement history). Shakaigaku Hy¯oron (Sociol Rev) 57(2):240–258

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Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2006) Tabunkaky¯osei no suishin ni kansuru kenky¯ukai h¯okokusho: chiiki ni okeru tabunkaky¯osei no suishin ni mukete (Report of the study group on the promotion of multicultural conviviality: toward the promotion of multicultural conviviality in local communities) Miyamoto K (1973) Chiikikaihatsu wa korede yoika (Is this the right way for regional development?). Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo Nobusada Y (2022a) Mizushima no miryoku hakkutsu wo: Mizushima zaidan, shiry¯okan setsuritsu e “chiiki kafe” (Discover the charm of Mizushima: the Mizushima Foundation, “community café” for building a museum). The Sanyo Shimbun, March 11, p 27 Nobusada Y (2022b) Kurashiki k¯ogaisosh¯o shiry¯ok¯okai e: manabi to k¯ory¯u no kyoten ni (Publicly disclosing resources for the Kurashiki air pollution lawsuit: a center for learning and exchange). The Sanyo Shimbun, September 22, p 31 Rose J (2016) Interpreting difficult history at museums and historic sites. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham Sat¯o M, Shimaoka M (2020) Ky¯od¯o gabanansu to ch¯ukan shienkin¯o: kanky¯ohozenkatsud¯o wo ch¯ushin ni (Collaborative governance and intermediary support functions: focusing on environmental conservation activities). Tsukuba Shobo, Tokyo Shinohara Y (2002) Jid¯osha haigasuosen tono tatakai (Fighting automobile exhaust pollution). Shinnihon Shuppan, Tokyo “Shinjitsuga kattahi” kank¯o iinkai (ed) (1998) Shinjitsuga kattahi: Kurashiki k¯ogaisosh¯o wo tatakatta ishitachi no kiroku (The day the truth won: a record of the doctors who fought the Kurashiki pollution lawsuit). “Shinjitsuga kattahi” kank¯o iinkai, Kurashiki Watanabe H (2019) “Kioku no kait¯o”: shiry¯o no “fur¯o” ka to komyunik¯eshon no s¯ohatsu niyoru kioku no keish¯o (“Thawing of memory”: passing on memories through “flow” of resources and emergence of communication). In: Suga Y, H¯oj¯o K (eds) Paburikku hisutor¯ı ny¯umon: hirakareta rekishigaku eno ch¯osen (Introduction to public history: challenge toward open historiography). Bensei Shuppan, Tokyo, pp 388–412 Yagi E (2021) Kagai to higai no aida: taiwa no kan¯osei to kioku no ky¯os¯o (Between assault and damage: the possibility of dialogue and the co-creation of memory). In: Shineha R (ed) Saika wo meguru “kioku” to “katari” (“Memory” and “narrative” about disaster). Nakanishiya Shuppan, Kyoto, pp 153–187 Yokemoto M, Hayashi M (eds) (2013) Nishiyodogawa k¯ogai no 40 j¯unen: ijikan¯o na kanky¯otoshi wo mezashite (40 years of Nishiyodogawa pollution: toward a sustainable environmental city). Minerva Shobo, Kyoto Yokemoto M, Hayashi M (eds) (2022) “Chiiki no kachi” wo tsukuru: Kurashiki Mizushima no k¯ogai kara kanky¯osaisei he (Creating “value of locality”: from pollution to environmental regeneration in Mizushima of Kurashiki). Toshindo, Tokyo Yokemoto M, Shiwaku T (2021) Setonaikai ni okeru umigomi mondai to seisaku keisei: Mizushima chiiki kanky¯osaisei zaidan no torikumi ni chakumokushite (The marine litter problem and policy formation in the Seto Inland sea: focusing on the efforts of the Mizushima Foundation). Keieikenky¯u (Bus Rev) 72(3):217–225

Chapter 6

Victims of Drug-Induced Suffering: Their Movement and Its Research Archives Keiji Fujiyoshi

Abstract This chapter describes the occurrence of drug-induced suffering (DIS) incidents and how they promoted the improvement of Japan’s system to ensure the effectiveness and safety of pharmaceuticals. It also describes what problems lie behind DIS incidents. Those incidents happened not only because there is no system to control the development and distribution of drugs, but also because the formal and informal ties among people in the medical field, both in hospitals and governmental institutions, affected drug security. The chapter concludes by discussing the efforts by DIS victims to establish the DIS Research Archives.

6.1 Introduction This chapter surveys past movements by drug victims and their supporters, and then briefly describes the archiving of those movements. First, I want to contrast the harms of environmental pollution and those of pharmaceutical drugs. One of the major ways that environmental pollution harms people is that poisonous substances discharged from factories enter the body through various routes and damage human health. One of the major harms caused by pharmaceutical drugs is that the toxic ingredients of drugs administered to patients sometimes have acute and harmful effects on human health. In the former case, people usually ingest poisonous substances by breathing air, drinking water, and eating foods while unaware of the hidden dangers. In the latter case, people usually ingest toxic components of drugs which they expect will aid their recovery from diseases or simply promote good health. Those two types of harm are different in this sense but they are often regarded as similar kind of damage in Japan. This chapter addresses this point briefly. First, the chapter describes several important health-damage incidents caused by drugs in postwar Japan. More than 10 such events have happened during the approximately eight decades since World War II (Sect. 6.2). Second, it explains K. Fujiyoshi (B) Faculty of Sociology, Otemon Gakuin University, Ibaraki, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Yokemoto et al. (eds.), Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3239-9_6

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that the Japanese word yakugai often refers to drug-induced suffering (DIS), which implies a particular meaning in Japan. The English-language term “environmental pollution” generally refers to air pollution caused by factory smoke or water pollution caused by factory wastewater, and the Japanese equivalent term was sometimes used, but the word kougai has been more popular for that meaning in Japan. Some terms such as yakka (drug plague) were employed and discarded when referring to DIS after World War II, after which the words yakugai and kougai gained popularity. That will be covered in Sect. 6.3. The chapter then surveys the DIS victims’ movements demanding remedies and compensation, and the responses of the government and pharmaceutical companies. Section 6.3 describes how most victims’ movements first demanded remedies and compensation from the pharmaceutical companies for the damage they suffered, and from the government because it failed to ensure that drugs are safe and harmless. Some movements, however, eventually adopted a longer and wider perspective envisioning a “better world,” which sometimes included a critical view of the modern affluent and capitalist society, in addition to pursuing remedies and compensation for the damage they suffered (Sect. 6.4). In 1999, seven DIS victims’ groups formed a national consortium of DIS victims’ groups called Yakuhi-ren,1 which has endeavored to both preserve the memory of past DIS experiences, and to create effective measures to prevent DIS in the future (Sect. 6.5).

6.2 Drug-Induced Suffering in Postwar Japan 6.2.1 Major Fifteen Drug-Induced Suffering Incidents In 2013, the Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Regulatory Science Society of Japan (PMRJ) edited and published Drug-Induced Suffering in Japan, which listed and briefly described the 15 DIS incidents in postwar Japan given below. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 1

Diphtheria Immunization Incident (1948) Penicillin Shock Incident (1953) Thalidomide Incident (1959) Cold-Medicines-in-Ampoules Incident (1965) SMON Incident (1955) Muscle Contracture Incident (1973) Dialyzer-Induced Ophthalmologic Disorders Incident (1982) AIDS Incident (1985) Blood Product (Fibrinogen) Induced HCV Infection Incident (1987) Labor-Inducing Drugs Incident (1978) MMR Vaccine Incident (1989) Sorivudine Incident (1993) Human Dried Dura Mater-Induced Prion Infection (CJD) Incident (1996)

http://hkr.o.oo7.jp/yakugai/

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14. Incident of Bovine Pericardium-Induced Infection with Probably Acid-Fast Bacilli (1999) 15. Gefitinib Incident (2002). The order is not necessarily chronological because it is “difficult to exactly determine the duration of drug-induced suffering since it may have already expanded substantially when eventually discovered or acknowledged by society” (PMRJ, 2013, 9). In the case of the SMON incident, for example, a study group organized by the Japanese government identified the possible causative substance (clioquinol) in 1970, but identification of patients affected by clioquinol went back as far as 1955. PMRJ’s book has sections titled “Summary of the Incident” and “Lessons Learned from the Incident,” which describe how and why those incidents happened, and how to prevent similar tragedies from recurring due to each cause. This section investigates those which served as a reason to reexamine the then-existing rules and arrangements to regulate the distribution of pharmaceutical drugs. It is difficult to precisely identify when health damage caused by any drug started. The date is usually determined according to news reports or lawsuit filings by victims, which made society recognize a DIS. The following sections briefly describe some DIS incidents from the viewpoint of what measures the government revised for drug manufacturing and distribution.

6.2.2 Unstable Manufacturing Technology and Inaccurate National Test The Diphtheria Immunization Incident happened in Kyoto and Shimane prefectures in western Japan in 1948, three years after Japan’s surrender in World War II. General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), that were in charge of ruling Japan after its unconditional surrender, issued the “Memorandum on Diphtheria Immunization” in 1946. In response, the Diet of Japan enacted the extremely draconian Preventive Vaccination Law, which required vaccination and exacted a fine of 3,000 Japanese yen (JPY) from violators at a time when the average monthly salary of national public servants was only 13,000 JPY. A study revealed that 100,000 infants were vaccinated in Kyoto, while the number of vaccinated in Shimane is unknown. As a consequence, in total for both prefectures 854 infants had severe symptoms and 84 eventually died. The rest of them survived but with sequela. There are two serious problems: (1) Unstable manufacturing technology. The diphtheria toxoid used for the vaccination had been manufactured in Japan. In the production process, some lots of the toxoid had not been completely detoxified with formalin, which is indispensable for safe inoculation. (2) Inaccurate national test. In hindsight, it could have been possible to detect the defective lots if sufficient random sampling had been conscientiously conducted, but in fact many incomplete lots were distributed with tragic results. Diphtheria immunization was mandatory

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for Japanese people, with huge fines for failure to be vaccinated, but it severely harmed many infants. The incident critically undermined people’s confidence in the government, which is responsible for the health and welfare of the population. There is yet another problem. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (currently the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) filed a criminal lawsuit against the manufacturer of the diphtheria toxoid that had violated the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law. At the same time, however, it decided to pay solatia, not compensation, to the victims and the bereaved at an early stage of the incident, thereby seeking to put an end to the affair because it anticipated an inevitable loss in court if the victims filed a lawsuit.2 In many DIS incidents, victims sued the drug manufacturer and the ministry in charge of pharmaceutical administration. In this case, on the contrary, the then Ministry of Health and Welfare sued the manufacturer, as if it intended to evade the victims’ accusations by doing so. Additionally, it seems that the ministry intended to stave off victims’ lawsuits by providing them with solatia before the victims took legal action. This incident occurred fewer than five years after the end of WWII, at a time when most victims were among those Japanese people who were desperate to extricate themselves from a hand-to-mouth existence. What is more, it was considered beyond the ability of laypeople to sue their government in the authoritarian climate of that time in Japan. Society’s interest in the incident faded over time as a consequence. The Japanese government might have learned from this experience how to avoid legal liability by protecting the people’s health and welfare. Instead, the incident seems to have strengthened the government’s tendency to conceal the flaws of its pharmaceutical administration.

6.2.3 Low Interest in Drug Safety It is an undeniable fact that the government was often reluctant to investigate how and why a DIS incident had occurred and also reluctant to disclose the findings of their investigation. This means that there was a predisposition to conceal the truth of an incident, which was one of the major reasons why Japanese people have lost confidence in their government. It is the same with several environmental pollution incidents addressed in this book. There is one thing, however, which should be recognized even when the government’s mistakes and misconduct are in focus as a principal reason for incidents: expertise in drug development and manufacturing. Drug development and manufacturing have long been regarded as the practice of experts, and therefore laypeople have had no intention of challenging their expertise. And also, though it may not be proper to Japanese society, the feudal class system of the Edo Period, which lasted from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, nurtured a submissive attitude among Japanese people toward their social and hierarchical 2

http://pha.jp/shin-yakugaku/doc/40-155-156_2011_kurihara.pdf.

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superiors. Another factor that helps us understand the attitude of Japanese people is the influence of the early modern society of authoritarianism under the Constitution of the Empire of Japan. In the latter half of nineteenth century, Japan established itself as a modern constitutional monarchy, but in reality it was so severely authoritarian, especially in the late stage of WWII, that the people were not accustomed to democracy; they were instead conformist even after the collapse of the Japanese Empire.3 In such a social atmosphere, it was almost impossible for the Japanese public to see themselves as capable and qualified to demand social transparency with regard to pharmaceutical drugs and medical treatment from a legal and institutional viewpoint, even though transparency was critical for their health and welfare. This tendency of the public can be observed in the case of environmental pollution and food pollution, also discussed in this book. The problem was who took responsibility for the safety of pharmaceutical and food industry products, and who took care of the environment, which was often regarded as something out of human control like typhoons, droughts, and earthquakes. In this sense, the damage caused by such things was often recognized as an unlucky accident by the people who suffered because of them, and the remedies and compensation were therefore the best they could hope for. Hence, two factors caused the many repeated DIS incidents: both the pharmaceutical companies and the government tended by nature to conceal compromising facts, and the public lacked sufficient consumer awareness enabling them to pay reasonable attention to what products they used for their health. Public awareness drastically changed after the Penicillin Shock Incident, the Thalidomide Incident, and the SMON Incident. It is now common sense that we should use pharmaceutical drugs with caution, but it was not so just a few decades ago. It was the sacrifice of many people which endowed the public this awareness.

6.2.4 Revision of Conventional Drug Regulations After WWII Japan gained the capacity to manufacture penicillin domestically, and since then it has come to be used as a drug with dramatic efficacy against many infections. The death toll due to pneumonia was 100,000 in 1947, but it fell to half that the following year thanks to this miraculous drug. As more people relied on penicillin as a cure, the number of manufacturers and the production volume both increased, which brought about intense sales competition. Eventually the drug came to be used for minor ailments, but in 1956 there were two high-profile tragic incidents. A University of Tokyo professor who was a leading figure in judicial circles went to the dentist and got a shot of penicillin to prevent suppuration after treatment. Some five minutes after the shot, he displayed anaphylactic shock symptoms and fell into a coma which was followed by death. Some weeks after the incident, a medical doctor

3

Murakami S (1974) Consolation and Evocation, Iwanami Shoten. [HL61-88].

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in the northern island of Hokkaido tried to administer himself an intradermal test for penicillin, and died from shock in an hour. There were other deaths from shock by penicillin before the above two incidents because penicillin had come to be prescribed in more and more cases, but they were generally recognized as unfortunate accidents which did not require close investigation by experts. However, because the above two incidents were extensively reported by the media, the public began to realize the need for attention to safer drug usage. People understood that penicillin is very effective when used properly, but also that it is antigenic. This newfound awareness paved the way for regulations and procedures that medical practitioners use to prescribe and use antibiotics. It is widely known that thalidomide preparations cause fetal teratogenicity when taken by pregnant women. It was distributed as a safe sleeping pill in Germany in 1957 and in Japan in 1958. It was later used for pregnant women because of its efficacy against morning sickness, which damaged more fetuses.4 A Japanese pharmaceutical company developed and succeeded in manufacturing thalidomide preparations by itself, and in 1957 applied to the then Ministry of Health and Welfare for permission to distribute the preparations. The authorization review procedure for drug distribution in use at that time was ill-devised, and there was a convention that popular drugs already used in foreign countries could be permitted for distribution with a simple examination. Hence, thalidomide preparations were approved for distribution after a 90-min examination, without carefully designed animal testing or clinical trials conducted in Japan. Distribution of thalidomide preparations continued after approval. A warning by Professor W. Lenz in 1961 was given little consideration, and the withdrawal of preparations from circulation was prevented until 1969. Eventually, over 300 babies suffered ill effects and some 1,000 babies were stillborn.5 Some parents of ailing and deformed babies jointly filed a claim with the Legal Affairs Bureau, demanding remedies for human rights violations and seeking compensation from the pharmaceutical company, but both demands were rejected. Subsequently some of them filed a collective lawsuit in 1963 and a court-mediated settlement was reached involving the victims, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the pharmaceutical company. This was followed by eight lawsuits in several district courts. This was the first civil trial for a DIS case. Japan’s Pharmaceutical Affairs Law focused on regulating the manufacture and import of drugs, and it did not place great importance on assuring the distribution of safe and effective drugs in the 1960s when the Thalidomide Incident occurred. The Ministry of Health and Welfare issued the “Basic Policy on Approval for the Manufacture of Drugs” in 1967 to improve administrative practices pertaining to drugs. The policy clearly indicated what documents pharmaceutical companies should prepare, and it set forth standards for animal testing and clinical trials to be included in such documents when companies submit requests for approval to sell the drugs they manufacture. Considering the occurrence of several serious DIS incidents even after 4 5

Sato, T. https://www.gaiki.net/yakugai/ykd/lib/thalidomide_sato.pdf Sato, T. https://www.gaiki.net/yakugai/ykd/lib/thalidomide_sato.pdf

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that reform, the regulatory regime was inadequate, but the important point is that the policy imposed responsibility on the government to assure the production and distribution of safe and effective pharmaceutical drugs. The SMON incident has made the public more aware of the government’s responsibility to guarantee the safety of drugs. SMON is the abbreviation of clioquinolcaused “subacute myelo-optico-neuropathy,” and it refers to a refractory disease with systemic effects such as gastrointestinal symptoms, severe numbness, and blindness. The first case was reported at an academic meeting in 1958, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare decided to impose a ban on selling and manufacturing clioquinol in 1970. It therefore took 12 years from the first report until the ban. Clioquinol was classified as a powerful drug6 in 1936 and used then to treat amebic dysentery. When the Japanese army was deployed to China and Southeast Asia, clioquinol’s prescription range was expanded to various types of bacterial and parasitic bowel diseases, and the limitations on its usage and dosage were largely relaxed. Eventually clioquinol’s “powerful drug” classification was lifted. Regulation was still lax in the second half of twentieth century even after WWII, and clioquinol continued to be compounded in some 180 kinds of gastrointestinal drugs, most of which were distributed as over-the-counter drugs. It took a long time to identify clioquinol as the cause of SMON, and for that reason many SMON victims were thought to be infected with an unknown contagious disease, thereby subjecting them to frequent discrimination and social marginalization. In 1970 a clue was coincidentally found to identify clioquinol as the cause of SMON, and in response the Ministry of Health and Welfare finally banned the distribution and prescription of drugs containing clioquinol. After the ban, the death toll fell to 36 in 1971, and then to two in 1972. A single death in 1973 was the last victim diagnosed with SMON. The Ministry of Health and Welfare acknowledged 10,007 patients as SMON victims and started to offering them livelihood support, but some researchers and journalists thought the total number of victims was actually between 12,000 and 16,000. The first SMON-related lawsuit was filed in 1971, followed by more lawsuits filed in 33 district courts and appealed in eight appellate courts. There were 7,562 plaintiffs in total. Some researchers persisted in attributing SMON to an unknown virus even after identification of clioquinol as the cause and after its ban. Some drug companies likewise stuck to that hypothesis. Those factors prolonged the trials. Owing to successive plaintiff victories in several district courts, the government and three major defendant companies finally admitted their liability for the incident and reached settlements with victims via court mediation in September 1979. District court judgments found various points in favor of the plaintiffs. Maebashi District Court handed down its decision in August 1979 and organized the points at issue concerning the liability of the government with respect to drug manufacturing and distribution as follows: (1) pharmaceutical drugs are indispensable to the wellbeing of the people; (2) on the one hand, lay patients had no way to check drug safety; (3) on the other hand, drug manufacturers tended to be negligent in assuring drug 6

Meaning it should be administered to a patient under a doctor’s supervision.

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safety in pursuit of commercial profit; therefore, (4) the government was expected to adopt an impartial stance, and to have advanced technologies and organizations to administer and assure the production and distribution of safe and effective drugs. The summary of this subsection is as follows. Owing to the Penicillin Incident, the public found that remarkably effective drugs were not necessarily effective in all patients, and that they sometimes fatally damage human health and even cause death. Thanks to the Thalidomide and SMON Incidents, the public found that the Japanese state lacked necessary legal and administrative systems to assure the production and distribution of safe and effective drugs, that there was great risk if full responsibility to guarantee safety is imposed on pharmaceutical manufacturers, and that therefore the government should take responsibility from a standpoint of fairness. The incident eventually paved the way for the government to establish the necessary measures to administer drug production and distribution. The SMON Incident had another consequence. After the incident, the government started to set up a relief system for victims of drug side effects. No regulatory system to assure drug safety is able to completely prevent serious drug side effects. There will be cases in which most patients enjoy benefits from drugs, whereas a few exceptional patients may suffer from serious side effects due to reasons such as their physical constitutions. The relief system was designed from that point of view. It might appear that the drug safety situation in Japan was drastically improved by the measures described above, but it was not that simple. In incidents such as Thalidomide or SMON, patients suffering ill effects and their families, as well as the bereaved families of victims who died, sought relief and compensation from the government and the concerned drug companies many times, but got no sincere response. This is why they decided to file lawsuits, which impose a heavy cost burden and require great spiritual stamina. The problem was not just that harmful drugs were being distributed on the market. Pharmaceutical companies continued to sell drugs while they recognized their harmfulness, and yet the government did nothing but let it continue. Distrust and resentment grew among DIS victims owing to that reality. The ingredients in drugs which caused harm, and the symptoms patients developed, were different from one incident to another, but most victims had a shared recognition of two facts. First, pharmaceutical companies were often reluctant to guarantee drug safety; they manufactured for the sake of profit and they sometimes did not hesitate to expose lay patients to risks to their health and even their lives. Second, the government often sought to evade its responsibility to assure the people’s health and welfare by means of guaranteeing safe drug production and distribution. These observations were also eventually shared by media such as newspapers and TV broadcasters. The public became increasingly aware that pharmaceutical damage was not just an unfortunate accident, but that it was also man-made harm caused by the actions or omissions of drug manufacturers and the government. In this sense, the word yakugai became popular for referring to drug-induced suffering. This happened at the same time as when the word kougai became popular for referring to environmental pollution in postwar Japan. Japan was at that time enjoying high economic growth based on the processing trade. Many heavy industrial factories and complexes were

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operating at full tilt to produce much and realize high profits. The concomitant was huge environmental emissions of harmful substances and wastes, which caused serious health damage to people in many parts of Japan. This kind of environmental pollution began to be called kougai, which means “harm to the public.”

6.3 Yakugai (DIS) and Kougai (Environmental Pollution) Although the English term “environmental pollution” refers to air, water, and soil pollution caused by toxic substances in waste water and exhaust from industrial factories and complexes, in Japan, the word kougai has been used for over six decades to refer to such pollution. At the dawn of the industrial age, few people were concerned about the waste from production processes, yet people living near pollution sources sometimes suffered from the harmful substances emitted from those factories. That situation holds not only in Japan, but also in many other countries which have experienced modern industrial development. In some cases, relief and compensation were provided with care and sincerity for unexpected health damage, and appropriate measures were taken to prevent future reoccurrences based on knowledge of the incident. In those cases, the incident could be considered a one-time and unfortunate occurrence. However, this was usually not the case, as addressed in other chapters of this book. Emissions of toxic substances were never stopped as soon as a causal relationship was established between a certain substance and health damage. Moreover, the government and the industrial companies that were accused of toxic substance emissions stubbornly refused to admit their faults or listen to victims. In other words, kougai victims finally concluded that polluting industrial companies were fully aware that their own pursuit of profit would result in damaging the health and even taking the lives of ordinary citizens. This awareness was increasingly intensified by the large number of lawsuits against offending companies. This was also the case with DIS victims. They eventually understood that drug manufacturers put profit before people’s health and welfare. In 1946 the Imperial Diet enacted the current Constitution of Japan, which replaced imperial sovereignty with sovereignty of the people. Public attention began focusing on kougai and yakugai about two decades later.7 In those days the authoritarian and militaristic regime under the name of the Emperor was abandoned, and a democratic society was in the process of formation. It was a time when the Japanese still had vivid and traumatic memories of the war. The bombings of mainland Japan by US B-29 s from the Mariana Islands commenced in 1944 and increased in 1945, resulting in more than 450,000 casualties, most of whom were ordinary citizens.8

7

National Diet Library, Birth of the Constitution of Japan. https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/out line/04outline.html. 8 Aerial Bombardment in wartime Japan, https://wararchive.yahoo.co.jp/history/.

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Atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 finally forced Japan to surrender. It is true that Japan invaded and brought harm to neighboring countries in the early period of World War II, but the period of intensive bombings covering almost all of Japan informed the reality of war for those Japanese who experienced it within Japan. In this sense, many Japanese people remember the war as suffering from the bombings induced by the colossal blunder of the Imperial government. People readily equated the feelings they had about the tragedy of kougai and yakugai with those of the wartime bombings that continued for over half a year just 20 years before by the bombing victims and their families. There were several situational factors that worked in favor of the victims who voiced their opinions and demands at the time. The democratic atmosphere that was gradually spreading over the nation encouraged people to express their own feelings and opinions in public. The loss of family members, especially of fathers, who were usually the main source of financial support for families, made many people feel they had had enough of both intended and unintended misgovernment. That situation encouraged not only the victims, but also the general public, to see that kougai was an intentional and conspiratorial crime committed by the government and commercial enterprises. In the meantime, the Vietnam War continued to intensify. Japan served as a rear base for US Forces. This irritated the populace, which was sick of war, and that was one source of anti-government sentiment among the Japanese people. The new Constitution of Japan had three principles: (1) sovereignty of the people, (2) pacifism including renunciation of war, and (3) basic human rights, all of which came about as a consequence of WWII. The government and companies had no hesitance toward involvement in wars overseas, and were also eager to pursue economic profit by sacrificing the people’s health and welfare. In other words, the newly established Constitution did not change the government’s attitude toward its people even after the devastating war. In this context, the Japanese public and media were in favor of using words such as kougai, which had an emotional and political sense, instead of objective and scientific words such as air pollution and water pollution. This usage of kougai could be seen as having popularized the word yakugai as well. Actually, the DIS victims’ movements were often in solidarity with the kougai victims’ movements.9 It was one of several reasons why the word yakugai became so popular with the Japanese public. Hence, “drug-induced suffering (DIS)” also became popular as an English word for pharmaceutical damage to people’s health. There are certainly several drugs which caused people a great deal of distress, and the damage is different from one drug to another, but a root cause of all this suffering can be identified. In this sense, all this suffering should be covered by the word yakugai, meaning drug-induced suffering. Using one word to cover all DIS types is not common in other countries, where each type of suffering is named after the causal drug. As Chap. 7 observes, some people maintain that health damage caused 9

DIS victims join the rally of National Public Action Day for Environmental Pollution Victims. https://www.erca.go.jp/yobou/saiban/abstract/soukoudo.html.

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by toxic substances accidentally mixed into food should be classified as kougai, but the government will not yet admit this. As seen above, the public as well as victims and their families eventually realized that the physical, mental, and social damage caused by environmental pollution or harmful drugs did not happen accidentally; rather, it was deliberately done and neglected by the manufacturing companies and even by the government, which intentionally protected those companies with legal and institutional measures. In short, it was regarded as a collective crime and it frustrated the public.

6.4 Victims’ Movements as an Engine of Social Improvement The main aim of the DIS victims’ movements was compensation for the damage caused by drugs, and lifetime support for those who had to live with damaged health. This aim is the same as that of the environmental pollution victims’ movements. These movements had another shared viewpoint: There were many cases in which the victim received compensation for damage, while at the same time the legal and administrative structure which had mistakenly allowed damage to occur remained unchanged. Victims in both types of movements were dissatisfied with compensation alone because they felt that they should do something to change and improve the system which had made them suffer intolerable ordeals, thereby ensuring that no one else would experience such a tragedy. In August 1968 a short letter appeared in the readers’ column of the Mainichi Shimbun, one of Japan’s major daily newspapers. It was posted by a citizen whose mother was suffering from SMON, and it advocated the urgent necessity for SMON victims to organize a victims’ and families’ association for exchanging information about cures and care for victims. The letter provoked a considerable response from SMON victims and their families, who felt totally hopeless and isolated because they lacked knowledge of the cause and cure. Soon after that, they organized the “Association of SMON Patients and Families,” which expanded throughout the nation. In the following year the “National Association of SMON” was established in Tokyo with over 200 victims and their family members. At that time a theory which argued that SMON was caused by an infectious unknown virus was already widespread. For this reason the victims were subject to social marginalization and discrimination, while also suffering from health problems and physical difficulties in their daily lives. After establishment of the national association, members conducted a series of discussions about litigation. As a result, two members and three lawyers decided to file a lawsuit. In 1971 they sued drug manufacturers and the doctors who had prescribed the drugs for their patients, which was followed by similar lawsuits filed

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in 32 district courts throughout the country. In 1980, 5,982 victims joined the plaintiff groups and some 100 lawyers were involved in those lawsuits.10 Such large-scale trials finally made it possible to judicially demonstrate the liability of the government and pharmaceutical companies for the efficacy and safety of drugs. Thanks to the court judgments in favor of victims, the government started the planning of damage compensation and lifetime support for victims, as well as the improvement of appropriate systems to control the production and distribution of effective and safe drugs, as seen in Sect. 6.2.4. Victims and family members of plaintiff groups were divided over whether to sue doctors as defendants in SMON cases. A doctor’s medication certificate was necessary to prove that a specific drug had caused damage to a patient, but it was easy to predict that certification would be difficult to obtain if victims sued doctors involved in their cases. What is more, victims needed physical examinations and treatment by doctors in addition to their help in lawsuits. Thus, as a practical and psychological matter, it was almost impossible for victims to face daily-life situations in which they sue their doctors while at the same time getting treatment from them. In the mid-twentieth century in Japan, doctors’ paternalistic control over patients was absolute, and it was beyond the imagination of patients to doubt or oppose their doctors’ diagnoses or prescriptions. And aside from drug-induced damage, at that time lay people as patients generally respected doctors both for their medical expertise and for their personal integrity. This trust in doctors as professionals was severely diminished by the LaborInducing Drugs Incident. In the early twentieth century it was common in Japan for births to take place at home or at a midwifery clinic with the help of midwives, but in the late 1970s, over half of them took place in the hospital, and nowadays 99% of babies are born there. In midwifery clinics, the number of births according to time of day gradually changes, reaching a maximum around 6 a.m. and a minimum around 6 p.m., which is regarded as natural. However, in hospitals the number peaked at about 2 p.m., which was double that of nighttime. This indicates that the timing of births was artificially controlled to accommodate the convenience of hospital management. Labor-inducing drugs were used for that purpose. Labor-inducing drugs were primarily used in cases of assumed trouble for a fetus or the mother, or for high-risk births, but sometimes they were used to control the time of birth presumably for the convenience of doctors. It was already acknowledged that there was a great deal of individual variation in drug susceptibility depending on the mother. In 1974 the Japanese Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists circulated a pamphlet to inform its members of these drugs’ risk and of the frequent occurrence of accidents caused by them, but the number of incidents did not decrease. In previous DIS cases, pharmaceutical companies and the government were the main targets of criticism and lawsuits, while doctors, even though accused of wrongdoing, were regarded as having made comparatively slight errors such as mistaking the prescribed drug dosage. But this is not quite true. Doctors used labor-inducing 10

Kawana, H (1989) Document: kougai in Japan, vol. 3, DIS and Food Pollution, Ryokufu Publishing, p 40-45. [EG283-372].

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drugs in inappropriate cases for their convenience. This incident attracted public attention to the liability of doctors who prescribe and use these drugs. Pharmaceutical drugs are developed, manufactured, and provided by experts in the field, and medical services are also provided by experts such as doctors and nurses. In those days, doctors in particular took pride in their healthcare expertise, and regarded drug prescriptions to be among their exclusive bailiwick. The LaborInducing Drugs Incident eventually restricted their authority over drug prescriptions, and led to a legal requirement that each package of pharmaceutical products include a set of detailed instructions about the on-label usage and dosage of drugs for doctors to prescribe. Supposedly quite a few doctors saw this as an infringement of their exclusive domain because in 2005 after the set of instructions appeared, 127 pregnant mothers and babies died due to the improper use of labor-inducing drugs, according to news reports. As seen in Sect. 6.2.1, there were several DIS incidents, in addition to that of laborinducing drugs, which threatened even human lives. It was under these circumstances that the AIDS incident occurred and attracted public attention, which eventually led the public to distrust doctors as much as they distrusted drug manufacturers and the government. There are several aspects of the incident that must be addressed, but from a pharmaceutical point of view the focus should be on “blood coagulation factor concentrate products.” These products were used for hemophiliacs, and Japan consumed one-third of world production due to its enormous imports from the United States around 1975. In 1978, National Health Insurance began to cover the selfinjection of concentrate products by patients. It was very effective for the treatment of hemophilia, and demand for the products increased. Concentrate products at that time were non-heat-treated. Concentrate products imported from the United States from 1982 to 1986 were contaminated with HIV and about 2,000 out of some 5,000 hemophiliacs were infected with HIV by the products, which lead to death. AIDS was first reported as a mysterious disease in the United States in 1981. In 1983 the Ministry of Health and Welfare organized the AIDS Research Group and tasked it with determining whether there were any AIDS patients in Japan at the time. The ministry designated an expert in hemophilia treatment as the group leader. He initially insisted on banning the use of all non-heat-treated concentrate products but later, for some unexplained reason, he decided to allow continued use of these products.11 AIDS cases were tried in both civil and criminal courts. The problems were uncovered not only by victims’ groups and defense counsels, but also by many journalists and medical experts. They uncovered problems involving drug manufacturers, professional groups of doctors, and government institutions in charge of the citizens’ health. Moreover, there were problems of collusion which centered on human relations and interests existing among the above-mentioned groups and institutions. The findings in part are that some important figures in the companies that caused the AIDS incident were involved in the human experimentation conducted in China during WWII; many pharmaceutical companies hired retired bureaucrats from the 11

Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency (2013) Drug-Induced Suffering in Japan, p 49.

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Ministry of Health and Welfare and gave them posts as high-ranking executives with high salaries even though that ministry was the relevant authority for those companies; and many pharmaceutical companies granted subsidies to doctors for medical research at high-level institutions such as university hospitals. These findings could be seen as historical and structural problems of drug manufacturing and medical treatment. At the same time, the Blood Product (Fibrinogen)-Induced HCV Infection Incident was increasing its broadness and severity. Usually called the Hepatitis C Incident, it was caused by imported contaminated blood. To make matters worse, it was used not only for hemophiliacs, but also for other general patients as a styptic for childbirth and operations, thereby harming far more people. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare estimates that there are between 900,000 and 1,300,000 patients suffering from hepatitis C at present. Company executives, doctors, and government officials involved in the AIDS incident have been found guilty at trial. As described in Sect. 6.2.4, the court clearly stated in the judgment that the government was responsible for the production and distribution of effective and safe drugs. In accordance with that recognition, the government took the initiative in creating and improving the system to properly control the development, approval, and distribution of drugs, as well as the usage and dosage of doctors’ prescriptions. The problem remained, however, outside of the pharmaceutical and medical field. There were, and still are, strong personal connections in the world of doctors. Sometimes they are from the same university, or belong to the same academic society. Additionally, their ties are not only between masters and disciples, but also, for example, between seniors and juniors and bosses and subordinates. Those ties form informal relationships that work across fields such as the medical-care industry, pharmaceutical industry, administration, and politics. When the dynamics of communitybased mutual aid work in this strictly closed relationship, it is almost impossible to examine them from the outside. It is undeniable that contaminated drugs were allowed to spread and harm many patients under this social structure. We can recognize a similar case in the nuclear industry in Japan which caused a devastating damage in Fukushima after the great earthquake on March 11, 2011.12 It is an appalling fact that a group of experts behind the scenes colluded to pursue criminal interests and endangered patient safety and lives both intentionally and unintentionally. It instilled a deep-seated distrust of medicine and pharmaceuticals among the general public as well as DIS victims. This grim distrust forced some patients to give up doctors’ treatments and drug prescriptions.

12

Koide H, et al. (2011) Deadly Sins of Nuclear Village. Bestsellers [EG77].

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6.5 Cooperative Movement of DIS Victims and the DIS Archives Project Section 6.2.4 described how, in the cases of the Thalidomide Incident and the SMON Incident, victims and their families formed organizations for information sharing and mutual aid. Victims of several subsequent DIS incidents followed their example by forming organizations for the same purposes, as well as for negotiations with the drug manufacturers and the government for relief and livelihood support. Generally they named their organizations after the drugs which had caused harm. Members of those organizations included not only victims and their families, but also lawyers and supporters. Those organizations came together in 1999 to form Yaku-hi-ren, a national consortium of DIS victims’ groups.13 . The consortium now includes 12 organizations representing 10 DIS incidents. It states its aim thus: “We DIS sufferers describe our experience of suffering to society and communicate it to the next generation. We are united in creating a society where all people benefit from effective and safe drugs and medical services without fear of DIS. For that purpose, we continue to perform research, make proposals, and carry out other activities necessary to achieving our aims.”14 Yaku-hi-ren negotiated with the then Ministry of Health and Welfare and had it install a “Pledge Monument” near the entrance of its government building. It proclaims that the government will do its best to ensure that tragic damage caused by pharmaceuticals such as thalidomide, SMON, and HIV infection never occurs again.15 On August 24, 1999 the monument was unveiled and the Yaku-hi-ren designated that date as “DIS Eradication Day.” Since then it has hosted several conferences and symposiums related to the occurrence and prevention of DIS on that day every year. The Ministry of Health and Welfare took Hepatitis C suffering seriously and organized a committee aimed at verifying incidents and preventing recurrences. The committee published its final recommendation on April 28, 2010. It recommended the establishment of the DIS Research Archives and asserted that it was important to educate all citizens about pharmaceutical drugs and medical treatments to make sure that medical personnel keep DIS prevention in mind in order to prevent recurrences, and to generally raise public awareness of drug safety. For this purpose, it recommended the establishment of a system to gather informational materials related to DIS incidents and to make them available to the public.16

13

http://hkr.o.oo7.jp/yakugai/. A flyer of the “DIS Eradication Day” in 2019. 15 https://www.osakayakugaihiv.org/blank-6. 16 https://www.mhlw.go.jp/shingi/2010/04/dl/s0428-8a.pdf, p 46-47. 14

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In response to the recommendation, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare organized a research group to prepare the DIS Research Archives in 2015.17 The Archives have yet to be established, but the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) dedicated a room in its building for an exhibition on the history of DIS incidents. Related materials and artifacts of DIS incidents are available there.18 The Ministry also prepared teaching materials for junior high and high school students in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, as well as with Yaku-hi-ren. Some of those materials have been made accessible online.19 What kind of information is needed to prevent DIS? First, it should include information that is related to development and distribution by the company, but it is difficult to disclose such information because it is often protected by claiming that disclosure comprises industrial secrets. Second, information requiring government permission to release is important because it allows us to see whether procedures were properly followed, but the government’s record management and archival system are not welldesigned, and the bureaucracy tends to be highly secretive. This makes the records and documents of the victims’ groups all the more important because they sometimes obtained the internal documents of companies, hospitals, and the government. Although it is true that those documents are mere fragments compared to the volume of complete archives, it is also true that those fragments indicate the existence of more related documents which reveal the problems that caused DIS tragedies. The standard in the medical field for the relationship between doctors and patients has been shifting from paternalism to informed consent, and the shift from evidencebased medicine (EBM) to narrative-based medicine (NBM) is in progress. However, trust in doctors and medical drugs is indispensable for the health and safety of the people. This has been revealed by the emergence and spread of COVID-19. Although the government pleaded with the populace again and again to be vaccinated, there were quite a few people who were not only reluctant to do so, but also actively voiced their doubts about vaccine safety. Certainly the government takes responsibility for guaranteeing that the people enjoy healthy lives, but that is not achievable without their understanding and cooperation. In this sense, DIS incidents suggest what lay people can do, and how they should do it, in order to exercise control over the activities of experts such as drug manufacturers and doctors, while at the same time being dependent on experts in specialized fields, which is a characteristic of modern society. Acknowledgements This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 20H01590 and MHLW Research Grant Number 20KC2006.

17

Summary of the research (in Japanese) is available by putting the name of the research group leader on the MHLW Grants System (https://mhlw-grants.niph.go.jp/). Akira Suzuki (2015), Keiji Fujiyoshi (2016–2021), and Masatake Hongo (2022-). 18 https://www.pmda.go.jp/about-pmda/exhibition-room/0001.html. 19 https://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/iyakuhin/yakugai/index.html.

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References Committee on the Pharmaceutical Administration for Verification of Drug-Induced Hepatitis Cases and Prevention of Recurrence (2010) Revision of drug administration, etc. to prevent recurrence of drug-induced injury. https://www.mhlw.go.jp/shingi/2010/04/dl/s0428-8a.pdf DIS Eradication Day flyer (2019) https://www.gaiki.net/yakugai/ykd/lib/15824yhr.pdf Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency (2020) DIS victims join the rally of National Public Action Day for Environmental Pollution Victims. https://www.erca.go.jp/yobou/saiban/ abstract/soukoudo.html Given in brackets (ex. [EG283–372]) are the National Diet Library Call Number, which gives you Japanese bibliographic information. https://iss.ndl.go.jp/ Hongo M, Sato A (eds) (2023) What is drug-induced suffering? Mineruva Shobo [yet to be registered on NDL] Kawana H (1989) Document: kougai in Japan, vol. 3, DIS and Food Pollution, Ryokufu Publishing [EG283–372] Koide H et al (2011) Genshiryoku-mura no taizai (Deadly Sins of Nuclear Village). Bestsellers [EG77] Kurihara A (2007) Diphtheria Immunization Incident in Kyoto and Shimane, 1948 (part 1) http:// pha.jp/shin-yakugaku/doc/40-155-156_2011_kurihara.pdf Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2023) Let’s learn about DIS. https://www.mhlw.go.jp/ bunya/iyakuhin/yakugai/index.html MHLW Grants System. https://mhlw-grants.niph.go.jp/ Murakami S (1974) Irei to shoukon (Consolation and Evocation). Iwanami Shoten [HL61–88] National Diet Library. Birth of the Constitution of Japan. https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/out line/04outline.html Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency (ed) (2013) Drug-induced suffering in Japan. Yakuji Nippo, LTD., [EG283-L82] PMDA, DIS Exhibition Room. https://www.pmda.go.jp/about-pmda/exhibition-room/0001.html Sato T (2015) Overview of the Thalidomide Incident and today’s patients. Presentation at DIS Eradication Day. https://www.gaiki.net/yakugai/ykd/lib/thalidomide_sato.pdf Yahoo! Japan. Nenpyou de miru kuushuu (Aerial bombardment in wartime Japan). https://wararc hive.yahoo.co.jp/history Yaku-hi-ren. http://hkr.o.oo7.jp/yakugai/All webpages were accessed 2023/2/11.

Chapter 7

Health Damage and Politics of Kanemi Oil Poisoning: Industrial Food Pollution and the Political Void Kazuko Uda

Abstract This chapter clarifies the current situation of and issues concerning food pollution, using the 1968 Kanemi oil disease incident, in which cooking oil was contaminated with PCBs and dioxins. Particular attention is directed at the period following the trial in 1989, and to the consequences of the prolonged problem. Victims have inadvertently amplified their health damage in the process of seeking relief, such as by incurring debts as a result of withdrawing their court cases. Victims are still unable to leave the victims’ movement even today because the perpetrator company, Kanemi Warehouse, lacks sufficient financial resources for compensation, and also because of the political void which hampers public redress. Moreover, the government adheres to the polluter pays principle and has defended Kanemi Warehouse. It also excludes food pollution from the environmental pollution (kougai) framework and rejects the popular definition of these problems as industrial food pollution, which is a kind of kougai. Hence, there is no system to remedy food pollution damage, as there is for kougai. Solving this problem necessitates recognizing the problem of industrial food pollution and establishing a relief fund system.

7.1 Industrial Food Pollution You go to a store and buy some food which is contaminated with a toxic substance. You eat the food without noticing the contamination, your health deteriorates, and when you go to the hospital, the doctor cannot diagnose your disease. You do not know what symptoms you will experience in the future, and have no prospects for treatment. Moreover, several other people have suffered health damage from the same

K. Uda (B) Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Yokemoto et al. (eds.), Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3239-9_7

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food that you ate. The cause of such incidents is called “industrial food pollution”1 (IFP). In a narrow sense, IFP refers to health damage to consumers that is often difficult to cure due to the ingestion of toxic foodstuffs. One representative example of IFP is Morinaga arsenic milk poisoning, which occurred in 1955. About 13,500 infants and small children were poisoned by arseniccontaminated powdered milk made by Morinaga Milk Industry Co., Ltd. In the following year, the former Ministry of Health and Welfare (currently the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) determined that there was little concern about the aftereffects of the disease, and the health damage was left untreated for 14 years until 1969, when a follow-up investigation conducted, as volunteers, by public health nurses revealed cerebral palsy and other aftereffects (Morinaga Milk Poisoning PostInvestigation Committee ([1969]1988). Parents of the victims filed a lawsuit and campaigned against buying and selling Morinaga products. In 1973 they concluded a “tripartite letter of confirmation,” under which Morinaga Milk promised to pay compensation to the victims. Another representative case is Kanemi oil poisoning (Kanemi yushou in Japanese, “Yusho” below), which occurred in 1968. Cooking oil made from rice bran was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and dioxins, which are highly toxic. The producer of the oil was Fukuoka Prefecture-based Kanemi Warehouse Corporation. At that time, about 14,000 consumers reported health damage throughout western Japan (Sugiyama 1969). PCBs and dioxins were passed from mothers who consumed the oil to their children via the placenta and breast milk, and so-called “cola babies” (Nagayama 2005) with black skin coloration were born in many places, shocking the public. Parents concealed the health damage to themselves and their children because they feared discrimination against their children due to rife prejudice against unusual skin color in Japanese society. After victims failed to reach a resolution even after filing a total of 10 lawsuits in their respective regions, they campaigned for government relief. This led to the passage of the Act on the Comprehensive Promotion of Measures Concerning Yusho Patients (Promotion Law) in 2012. IFP damage includes not only health injury caused by the consumption of harmful food, but also the denial of damage as prognostic symptoms, the lack of access to necessary treatment and compensation, negative impacts on relationships with neighbors, and involuntary changes in life plans. IFP is therefore more precisely defined as “the destruction of life and livelihoods by toxic food and beverages produced by the food industry.” It took Morinaga victims 18 years since the poisoning to win relief. As in the case of Yusho, the victims waited 44 years for the Promotion Law, which is too many years considering the length of a human life. Moreover, even in the 2000s, Morinaga and Yusho victims are still campaigning and filing lawsuits to obtain adequate compensation. Participating in the movement as a victim making efforts despite illness, paying 1 There is no fixed English translation for the word shokuhin kougai (food product pollution), but I think IFP is appropriate because, as discussed below, food contamination is a disaster caused by the food industry, as opposed to ordinary food poisoning.

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expenses out of one’s own pocket, and sometimes having to reveal one’s identity and face, exact a heavy physical, financial, and psychological toll. Victims’ health damage may become known to those around them, leading to new discrimination and perhaps also threatening the employment and marriage of their children and grandchildren. Despite this, why should victims continue to complain about their situation even after certain relief measures have been taken? Why have IFP problems gone unsolved? This chapter will answer these questions in regard to Yusho. IFP such as the chemical contamination of food occurs frequently all over the world. For example, rice bran oil poisoning with the same chemical factors as Yusho also occurred in 1979 in Taiwan, where it was known as Taiwan Yucheng, and in 2008 melamine was found in food products in China. As these cases suggest, it is impossible to prevent all food-poisoning incidents from occurring, and therefore we must consider ways to remedy the damage.

7.2 Data and Viewpoint This chapter uses the following two perspectives to describe and analyze Yusho. First is the sociological approach to understanding the extent of the damage. Environmental sociologist Nobuko Iijima has studied numerous cases of artificially caused health damage such as environmental pollution, industrial disasters, occupational diseases, and drug-induced suffering. Iijima found that they have a common mechanism, in which physical damage is amplified or mitigated through social relations (Iijima 1993). For example, if victims are financially well-off, they often have connections who can obtain information related to the disease. In addition, such victims have the wherewithal to pay for treatment, which enables them to receive appropriate medical care sooner. This is an example of how damage can be mitigated through social relationships (Iijima 1993). On the contrary, victims with limited means find it difficult to obtain information about the disease and to receive treatment, possibly leading to worsening symptoms. As another example of social relations, community prejudice against victims subjects them to discrimination and prevents them from receiving care, which amplifies the damage. In the case of Yusho, it was because of social discrimination against dark-skinned babies that being born with that skin color was regarded as a “problem” and “health damage.” Pollution health damage thus needs to be considered not only as physical damage, but also as a totality that includes problems derived from it. The second perspective is the “aftermath” of prolonged IFP problems. Political scientist Michael R. Reich examined three toxic chemical disasters: Yusho in Japan, PBB poisoning in Michigan, United States, and dioxin pollution from a factory explosion in Seveso, Italy. Reich found that victims of toxic pollution suffer more from toxic politics, which concerns itself with pollution issues, than from toxic substances themselves (Reich 1991). He also pointed out that there are three common stages in the process by which such damage becomes social problems and appears on

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the political agenda: non-issue, public issue, and political issue (Reich 1991). Nonissue is the stage in which the physical condition is perceived as a personal problem and the issue is latent. The second, public issue, is the stage in which the cause of the physical illness is identified, victims’ groups are organized, and the problem is perceived as a social one. Finally, political issue is the stage in which the movement for damage relief is joined by actors other than the victims, such as political parties, mass media, and supporter citizens, in which resistance by the victims is shared by the broader society, and the problem becomes political. According to Reich, the Yusho problem has evolved from the “non-issue” stage, in which the symptoms of Yusho were considered a “strange disease” and the cause was not identified, to the “public-issue” stage, in which the causative agent was identified and victims’ groups were formed. The problem then became a political issue, with victims filing lawsuits and political parties getting involved in victims’ movements. However, the victims eventually withdrew their lawsuits against the government, and reached settlements with the companies responsible for the pollution, which was not the desired outcome for the victims (Reich 1991). The closing years of the trials were 1987–1989. What happened after that? This chapter follows events after the political-issue stage. As many cases of pollution in Japan have shown, even when an issue has once reached the political-issue stage, it is often pushed back to a personal issue when the government and the companies responsible for the pollution suppress victims’ movements. For example, in the cases of Minamata disease and Morinaga arsenic milk poisoning, damage was denied in the early period of the incidents, but was later admitted and became a social issue. However, the “second oppression of the victims” (Kurihara 2003:690), in which both the government and the corporations forced the victims to be silent again, is called “a common grammar of suffering” (Kurihara 2003:693). Similarly, environmental sociologist Ken Fujikawa found that “repeated processes of problem revelation and pollution denial” (Fujikawa 2008:178) occurred in pollution incidents such as Minamata disease, cadmium pollution, air pollution, and asbestos pollution. He also suggested that restoring public and political problems to the status of private problems (Fujikawa and Watanabe 2007) delegitimizes the damage caused by pollution-related diseases. In short, when discussing prolonged pollution problems, it is necessary to observe what is happening after the politicalissue stage has been reached. This chapter focuses on the “aftermath” of the political issue and describes the damage caused by the IFP and the victims’ movements. To determine the reality of health damage, I conducted an interview survey of patients, lawyers, doctors, public officials, journalists, and supportive citizens from 2006 to 2012. In total there were 55 formal interviews. Since 2013, I have continued conducting informal interviews of involved people. In addition, I obtained copies of 45 testimony transcripts and six final briefs of various lawsuits filed by the victims during the 1970s and the 2000s.

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7.3 Health Damage In this section, I present basic data on the Yusho incident.

7.3.1 Physical Symptoms and Other Damage Why was the oil contaminated? Rice bran, the feedstock for the oil, has a distinctive odor that makes it unsuitable for sale. Kanemi Warehouse deodorized it by filling large vats with the oil, putting stainless steel pipe coils in the vats, and circulating high-temperature PCBs through the pipes to heat the oil indirectly, but PCBs leaked through holes in the pipes. Furthermore, because PCBs generate dioxins when heated to high temperatures, the oil was contaminated with both PCBs and dioxins. There are two theories on the cause of the leaks: Either Kanemi employees accidentally punctured the pipes when repairing the deodorizer vats, or the chlorine in the PCBs corroded the pipes and caused them to rupture. Both hypotheses were adopted as theories of the cause in past lawsuits, and no settlement has been reached on which is correct. Official records were kept on health damage discovered from October 1968 through July 1969, after which 14,627 people in 7,704 households reported their health damage to public health centers, although the health centers had stopped releasing their records after July 1969. During the same period, prefectural governors certified 913 people as Yusho patients.2 After that, some people later realized that they were victims or were certified after their applications had been repeatedly rejected, bringing the total number of certified patients to 2,355, including deceased patients as of December 2021 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2022). The prefectures with particularly large numbers of patients are Fukuoka, Nagasaki, and Hiroshima (Division of Public Health and Food Safety Planning, Pharmaceutical and Consumer Health Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2021), and as of 2021, patients live in 36 of Japan’s 47 prefectures. Presently the number of certified patients continues to increase, with new patients being certified each year. Characteristic symptoms of Yusho are pimples all over the body (chloracne), hair loss in certain seasons, black streaks on nails, tooth loss, and bone bending, but overall, the disease is “characterized by its lack of features” (Harada et al. 2011:25). Because victims suffer from numerous diseases that can afflict anyone, such as cancer, disorders of the reproductive organs, and internal organ diseases, they are also called full-body diseases or “department stores of diseases” (Harada et al. 2011:25). Victims became unable to carry out household chores or work at jobs as before. They were unable to continue hobbies such as sports. They were burdened in terms of finances and time by their medical treatment. Victims suffered from a variety of 2

Patient certification is based on diagnostic criteria developed in 1968 by the “Yusho Study Group,” which was organized mainly by doctors at Kyushu University. The medical criteria are based on PCBs and dioxin concentrations in the blood.

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illnesses, but the inability of doctors to predict victims’ future conditions left victims feeling insecure about their futures. They were forced to change their life plans by, for example, giving up higher education or resigning from their jobs. Relationships with family members, neighbors, and colleagues deteriorated. They suffered discrimination due to the misunderstanding that the disease is contagious. Negotiations with Kanemi Warehouse resulted in smaller estimates of the health damage they were actually suffering. Despite their symptoms, their applications for certification were rejected for not meeting the diagnostic criteria. As Iijima (1979, 1993) found through her research of many social disasters, these various types of damage are the result of physical injuries amplified by social relationships. Damage extends across generations as mentioned above. While the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare estimated that at least 1,200 children of Yusho patients have certain symptoms, the exact number of second-generation victims has not been investigated (The Nishinippon Shimbun, June 20, 2015). In a collective context, damage was characterized by low regional agglomeration. Each victim bought oil at a rice shop or grocery store. At that time, cooking oil was sold in large packages of one-dozen cans or bottles, so it was sometimes shared with neighbors. However, the unit of consumption was the household, and households were not concentrated in any one geographical area. Except for the Goto islands in Nagasaki Prefecture, residential areas with patient concentrations are rare, and therefore community disruption is not common. Rather, the low recognition of the disease has resulted in victims not being given the information they need, and over the years this lack of information has resulted in victims who are unaware of the damage they have suffered.

7.3.2 Lawsuits and Ironic Consequence From the outbreak of the disease in 1968 to the conclusion of lawsuits in 1989, victims formed organizations in various regions and campaigned for relief. This was the first phase of the movement.3 After the damage was brought to light in October 1968, Kanemi Warehouse denied its responsibility. However, when investigation revealed the cause of the illness, the company changed its attitude and promised to provide compensation to the victims in November. In December, Kanemi Warehouse notified the certified patients that it would pay their medical expenses. In addition to pursuing the criminal liability of Kanemi Warehouse,4 victims’ groups in various regions filed civil lawsuits demanding an apology and compensation from Kanemi Warehouse. The lawsuits were filed in different regions and at 3

See Reich (1991) for details. In a criminal lawsuit, the president and the plant manager of Kanemi Warehouse were charged with professional negligence, and the former was acquitted, while the latter was sentenced to one year and six months in prison in 1982.

4

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different times, resulting in a total of eight collective lawsuits in the 1990s because the victims’ places of residence were spread over a wide area, and the times when they were certified as patients differed from person to person. Some of the lawsuits included not only Kanemi Warehouse, but also Kaneka Cooperation (below, Kaneka; formerly Kanegafuchi Chemical Industry Co., Ltd.), which manufactured and sold PCBs; the government, which failed to prevent the sale of toxic foods; and Kitakyushu City, the municipality in which Kanemi Warehouse is located. Victims sought relief in ways other than lawsuits. For example, they staged sitins in front of the main gate of Kanemi Warehouse, lobbied central government offices, and distributed leaflets to citizens on the streets of Fukuoka, Osaka, and other urban areas to inform the public of the damage. Some patients accepted individual settlements offered by Kanemi Warehouse. Kanemi Warehouse uses the following procedure for certified patients. First, a Kanemi employee visits the homes of patients, apologizes, and pays each patient 230,000 yen in compensation. In addition, the company gives a “Yusho Patient Care Pass” to each patient. Although it can be used at only a very limited number of hospitals, it allows those hospitals to bill Kanemi Warehouse for medical expenses when the patients present it. If patients visit hospitals that do not accept the pass, patients have to pay the medical bills upfront and later send the receipt to bill the cost to Kanemi Warehouse.5 Kanemi Warehouse was unable to provide all medical expenses due to financial limitations. Therefore, in 1985 the three ministers of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries signed a confirmation agreement in which they promised to outsource the storage of government-owned rice grain to Kanemi Warehouse and to pay approximately 200 million yen per year as a consignment fee. Kanemi Warehouse was able to undertake this business because it was not only in the oil refining business, but also in warehousing, as its name implies. Collective lawsuits found Kanemi Warehouse liable for damage, and it paid partial compensation. Kaneka and the government were found liable in some judgments and not liable in others. In the district and high-court judgments in which Kaneka and the government were found liable, both judgments provisionally enforced compensation for damage caused to the plaintiffs. Finally, most of the plaintiffs accepted the recommendation of the Supreme Court and settled with Kaneka and Kanemi Warehouse in 1987. In addition, only the government, which was expected to prevail in the Supreme Court, refused to settle, so the plaintiffs had no choice but to withdraw their lawsuit. At that time, there were three plaintiffs who refused to settle and withdraw, but they agreed to do so in 1989, thereby ending the series of court battles. The outcome of the suit further amplified the damage. First, in the settlement with Kanemi Warehouse, the plaintiffs had to promise that they would not claim any more than the approximately 5 million yen per person, which was unpaid compensation, 5

This procedure of medical expense payment was not well known to patients; about 40% of certified patients did not have the pass and did not know the procedure in 2012 (Panel on the Analysis of the Health Status Survey of Yusho Patients 2010).

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in exchange for the continued payment of medical expenses. Second, in settling with Kaneka, the plaintiffs had to agree not to pursue Kaneka’s liability in the future in exchange for a settlement of approximately 3 million yen per plaintiff. Finally, the withdrawal of the lawsuit against the government obligated the plaintiffs to return the compensation that the government had paid under provisional execution in the district and the high court. This situation is known as the repayment of provisional execution compensation. Each of the 829 plaintiffs owed approximately 3 million yen, for a total of 2.7 billion yen. Because many of the plaintiffs suffered financial difficulties, they had spent their provisional execution money, making repayment almost impossible. Furthermore, since the debts were inherited even after the plaintiffs died, their heirs were saddled with the debt. Thus, as a result of the lawsuits brought in order to redress the damage, the plaintiffs lost their right to claim damages from Kanemi Warehouse, could no longer pursue Kaneka’s liability, and were even in debt to the government. In addition, since medical expense payments by Kanemi Warehouse are a lifeline for patients, victims must now take care not to bankrupt the offender. The result of the trial was the breakup of victim organizations in various regions. Victims were unable to speak out and demand relief because they felt guilty for being in debt to the government. The irony is that victims worsened the damage instead of mitigating it through the lawsuits. Under the Civil Code, the statute of limitation for debts is 10 years. In 1996, the year before the time limit, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries sent notices demanding restitution to plaintiffs’ homes, which caused confusion among the patients’ families because they were unaware of the debt. Eventually, the limit was postponed by a promise of a 10-year extension of restitution through mediation. It was clear that the problem would reemerge in 2007 after another 10 years, but the victims remained silent and the government did not help them.

7.4 Victims’ Movements and Their Achievements How has the unresolved state of the problem brought about in the 1990s been resolved since then? This section describes the second phase of the movement, from 2000 to the present.

7.4.1 Resolving the Issue of Repaying Provisional Execution Compensation In the 2000s a new patient supporter emerged. At the time of the incident, it was believed that Yusho was caused solely by PCB contamination, but in 1975 several scientists revealed that dioxins were the main cause. In 2001 Minister of Health,

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Labour and Welfare Chikara Sakaguchi made this fact public in a speech to the House of Councillors. This attracted attention to Yusho from citizens concerned about dioxin air pollution by waste incineration, but who were theretofore unaware of Yusho dioxin. In 2002 a citizens’ group called the “Kanemi Yusho Support Center” (YSC) was organized in Tokyo to help victims. The YSC encouraged victims in various regions to reorganize and to file a petition for human rights relief with the Japan Federation of Bar Associations. The victims, who were children in 1968, were now in their 40 s or 50 s and had replaced their aging parents as the new leaders of the movement. There were still many problems, such as the lack of a known treatment method, and that the second-generation victims were denied certification. Victims have taken every possible measure to resolve these problems, including holding meetings in various regions, seeking out politicians and media who would become their allies, and petitioning Diet members. Among these initiatives was the “Law Concerning Exceptions to the Exemption of Claims for the Return of Provisional Payments Related to Yusho,” passed in June 2007 to deal with the reimbursement of provisional payments. It was a particularly urgent matter, and it exempted the plaintiffs from their debts (Uda 2015).

7.4.2 Establishment of the Promotion Law The focus of the victims’ movement shifted to gaining public redress because it was clear that Kanemi Warehouse did not have the requisite financial resources, and because the victims had no choice but to give up on a judicial solution. Patients who had been certified after the series of lawsuits ended filed a lawsuit against Kanemi Warehouse and the heirs of its president in 2008, but the Supreme Court dismissed the suit, claiming that the right to claim damages had expired 20 years after the incident occurred. The Promotion Law was finally passed in August 2012. With its enactment, the “Basic Guidelines for the Promotion of Measures Concerning Yusho Patients” were established, and the following policies were implemented. First, the diagnostic criteria were revised. Patients who prove that they were living with certified patients in 1968 when the incident happened can be certified without medical examinations. As a result, 335 patients were certified under this new criterion by the end of 2021. Second is the expansion of compensation to patients. Under the guidelines, Kanemi Warehouse has to pay certified patients 50,000 yen per person per year. In addition, the government provides 190,000 yen per person to the victims who cooperate with the health research conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.6 6

This allowance is not “compensation” for damage, but an acknowledgment of their “gratitude” to the victims for their cooperation. In other words, the government does not accept responsibility for the incident, but charitably pays money to the victims.

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Third, a forum for negotiation was created. The victims, Kanemi Warehouse, and the government (the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) decided to hold “tripartite consultations” to discuss relief measures. Until then, the victims had only been able to request individual negotiations with Kanemi Warehouse and the government, but the Promotion Law set up a system for public meetings for the first time. The Promotion Law did not provide the public compensation for damage which victims were demanding. However, it at least made progress toward a solution.

7.5 Gap Between Damage and Relief Measures This section examines the problems with the Promotion Law, and notes the policy issues common to IFP.

7.5.1 Remaining Compensation Although the enforcement of the Promotion Law has expanded compensation, the following problems remain. First, there is no agreement between the victims and Kanemi Warehouse regarding the policy of medical-expense payment. Whether or not to pay for a certain treatment is determined by Kanemi Warehouse’s unilateral policy. The victims have repeatedly asked for an agreement on medical expense benefits, but Kanemi Warehouse has not responded. Moreover, when victims requested benefits for food expenses during hospitalization, the president of Kanemi Warehouse refused and said, “We can only offer such benefits in exchange for a reduction in the portion (of other medical expenses). The size of the pie is limited.”7 Second, the government increases the financial support for Kanemi Warehouse rather than for victims. After implementation of the Promotion Law, Kanemi Warehouse’s expenses increased when certified patients claimed more medical expenses and started to receive 50,000 yen per year. In a bid to help Kanemi Warehouse, the government increased the amounts of government rice for storage at the company, and raised the unit price. Eventually, as the Kanemi Warehouse facilities became full, the government adopted a circuitous procedure of outsourcing the storage business to other warehouse companies through Kanemi Warehouse and paying commissions to Kanemi Warehouse. Furthermore, this system reinforced the rationale of Kanemi Warehouse and the government for avoiding responsibility. Kanemi Warehouse claims that it has paid compensation to patients to the greatest extent possible. The government also claims that it is kindly helping Kanemi Warehouse to avoid bankruptcy, even though its own 7

Remarks at the 11th Tripartite Consultation and Press Conference, January 20, 2018.

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responsibility was not admitted in court. In this way, both Kanemi and the government have been able to stifle victims’ demands through the expedient of saying that they have already done their best (Uda 2020). Finally, the Promotion Law contains no provision for compensation should Kanemi Warehouse go bankrupt, so if that were to happen, there would be no actor responsible for compensation. Therefore, the victims have to scale back their demands in consideration of Kanemi Warehouse’s finances. Current compensation is problematic not only because of the low monetary amounts and absence of agreements, but also because it is structured in such a way that victims refrain from demanding rights that should be granted to them as victims (Uda 2020).

7.5.2 Political Void There are two reasons why Kanemi Warehouse is well protected by the government. First, the government is adamant about polluter pays principle (PPP) compliance, and it wants to keep polluters in business. PPP is a fundamental environmental policy concept which states that the costs of preventing and cleaning up environmental pollution should be borne by polluters. In the case of Yusho, remedies based on the PPP are impossible because the polluter, Kanemi Warehouse, has inadequate resources. Nevertheless, the government is obsessed with PPP compliance and has given priority to keeping Kanemi Warehouse viable rather than to meeting the victims’ demands. Hence, the company was able to receive financial support from the government despite its status as an offender. The government is shouldering higher costs for patient relief than Kanemi Warehouse is bearing, thereby implementing PPP in a way that was never intended. Second, the government regards food poisoning or IFP as a matter to be settled privately between private companies and citizens, not something to be remedied publicly. The continuation of Kanemi Warehouse is essential if the government is to solve the problem without being held responsible. From a legal point of view, the term IFP is not mentioned in any law. According to Katsumi Kanamitsu, the director-general of Environmental Health of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, environmental pollution and IFP are “undoubtedly similar in form,” but “administratively speaking, we do not call it ‘IFP’” (Kanamitsu et al 1970:15). This is because pollution as defined in the Basic Environment Law (formerly the Basic Law on Pollution Control) is limited to environmental pollution such as air and water pollution, namely the seven typical pollution types,8 and does not include damage caused by the ingestion of food. Hazards caused by food and drink, excluding pharmaceuticals, are all defined as food poisoning under the

8

Air pollution, water pollution, soil contamination, noise, vibration, subsidence, and offensive odors.

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Food Sanitation Law. The main purpose of the law is to prevent the occurrence of food poisoning, and there is no provision for damage relief. While the law has been repeatedly amended to prevent food poisoning, the system for remedying damage has not been systematized. As such, there is a political void with regard to IFP-caused damage, and therefore victims had no choice but to seek relief on their own. Furthermore, even if a certain degree of compensation is obtained after long years of campaigning, victims must keep up the pressure to prevent Kanemi Warehouse from unilaterally reducing or abandoning compensation because it is based on the PPP and is contingent on the offending company’s continued existence. The IFP political void not only fails to provide relief for victims, it even prevents them from dropping out of the movement and quietly going about their lives.

7.5.3 Lack of Political Recognition of IFP Health damage relief is in the political void because the government does not recognize IFP. The term “IFP” was first used in the food-safety consumer movement in the 1960s, when mislabeled food and sales of harmful products (such as those with excessive coloring or additives) became rampant as mass production of food products began. The consumer movement and the media felt that “this is a kind of public nuisance (kougai),” and that is why they used IFP to describe incidents such as the Morinaga arsenic milk poisoning and Yusho. Their choice of terminology was based on their recognition of a peculiar situation that could not be described by the term “food poisoning” as it is ordinarily used. From a sociological perspective, the same can be said about the intuition of consumers. That is, although there certainly are dissimilarities between the damage caused by environmental pollution and IFP, they are both artificially caused social disasters, and are similar in their basic structure of damage and the mechanism of victimization. In the context of damage structure, there is collective occurrence and social derivation of damage. On the other hand, the mechanism of harm comprises the prioritization of economic growth under capitalism; industrialization that enables mass production, consumption, and disposal; the neglect and lack of damage recognition; and the denial of victims’ rights. What are the differences between typical food poisoning and IFP? Table 7.1 summarizes the distinction between environmental pollution, IFP, and typical food poisoning. The main causes of poisoning are food deterioration, bacterial growth, and contamination with pathogens (Nishimura 2002). Outbreaks caused by chemical agents, such as Yusho, are extremely rare, accounting for less than 1% of all poisoning cases each year (Shinagawa 2010). In addition, even a single victim is counted as an incident. Some poisonings are severe enough to cause death, but most are cured in a short period of time. In contrast, incidents regarded as IFP are caused by toxic chemicals such as arsenic, PCBs, and dioxins. These are difficult to eliminate, are highly persistent, and remain in the victim’s body, resulting in chronic disease. Moreover, the toxic

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Table 7.1 Three types of damage caused by food and beverages Public nuisance (kougai) disease

Industrial food pollution

Food poisoning

Pollution process

Deterioration of environment by wastewater and smoke emissions from factories

Contamination of manufactured food products in factories

Failure to maintain sanitation, lack of knowledge about toxins

Etiological agents

Persistent toxic chemicals (can be passed on to next generation)

Natural toxins, bacteria, viruses, etc

Health damage

• Lifelong chronic disease (sometimes transgenerational) • Mass outbreaks • Socially derived

• Most heal in a short period • Single or mass outbreaks

Damage compensation law

Act on compensation for pollution-related health damage

None

Source Author

substances can be passed on to children. In these cases, the victims are large groups of people. Food poisoning is mainly caused by lack of knowledge about food and by unsanitary conditions in restaurants, while IFP is caused by the industrialization of food and inadequate food hygiene management. It is important for the government and administrative organizations to recognize that the phenomenon of IFP is similar to environmental pollution and is distinguished from typical food poisoning. Based on this recognition, and from the perspective of how to provide relief from IFP damage, it is necessary to look for a cost-bearing principle for appropriate compensation to replace the PPP (Uda 2020), and to create a system to provide relief for IFP damage (Uda 2015). Otherwise, the Yusho problem will become more protracted. In the same way, future IFP victims will be unable to obtain relief under public systems and, like previous victims, will be forced to go through a prolonged campaign that will last for decades.

7.6 Proposal for Relief Fund Policies for IFP Victims Every food company can potentially cause IFP because it is impossible to prevent all food from poisoning during production, processing, packaging, and delivery. Moreover, scientists cannot guarantee that chemical substances are definitely safe in the age of uncertainty (Fujigaki 2003). Therefore, every food company is a potential polluter and runs the risk of being asked to compensate for its pollution. In turn, it is possible that all people are potential IFP victims because all consumers purchase food products from companies whose manufacturing processes, importation procedures, and storage practices are unknown to the public. In some food poisoning cases the etiological agent cannot be identified. There are also cases in which health

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effects are not clear, even if the food has been identified as toxic. In Japan, frozen dumplings made in China were found to be contaminated with pesticides in 2007, and a cooking oil designated as healthful by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare was revealed to present a carcinogenic risk in 2009, but even now their health effects remain unclear. If the cause of damage is in “stock (accumulated) pollution” (Miyamoto [1989] 2007), by which damage occurs after a long incubation period of exposure to the causative substance, it will be more difficult to identify the causative food and responsible company. In addition, the Japanese food industry is characterized by the regional decentralization of operators and micro-sized enterprises (Kase 2009). It is therefore likely that many businesses would not be able to fully bear the cost of compensation even if they caused the contamination. Furthermore, if the damage is large-scale and longlasting as in the span of several generations, even large companies find it difficult to fully compensate the victims without assistance. One example is Kumamoto Minamata disease, in which the offender, Chisso Corporation, was unable to bear the costs of compensation for damage and environmental restoration, and for that reason received financial support from the government and Kumamoto prefecture. Given this situation, a redress mechanism is needed to provide relief to consumers in cases where IFP offenders cannot be identified or cannot bear the cost of compensation. Here I propose an IFP damage relief fund system whose purpose would be to provide prompt and reliable relief for deaths, incurable diseases, and lasting difficulties spanning the lives of victims because of harmful food and beverages. The system would have a fund created with contributions from a wide range of responsible actors, including indirect and potential polluters, from which compensation for damage would be paid. It would be based on the concepts of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (Formerly the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act), known as the Super Fund Act in the United States; and the Act on Asbestos Health Damage Relief in Japan. Both systems share the concept of a fund that facilitates rapid compensation for victims. They secure financial resources for compensation in cases in which the polluter remains unidentified or does not have sufficient finances for compensation. The cost should be borne firstly by businesses involved in the manufacture, import, storage, and sale of food products, containers, and food production equipment, and secondly by businesses that manufacture and sell food additives or chemical substances used in the production of food products. The first kinds of businesses number approximately 2.4 million facilities, even if narrowly defined as facilities licensed under the Food Sanitation Law (end of FY2020; Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2022). If each facility were to pay 1,000 yen per year, the fund would receive about 2.4 billion yen per year. Furthermore, in order to avoid the exemption of companies that caused IFP, punitive and additional charges would be levied on those companies directly, indirectly, or potentially involved in the occurrence of existing IFP as third parties to bear the burden, so that they would retroactively fulfill their responsibilities. The reason for imposing cost burdens on such a wide range of entities is the adoption of the “liability principle” as a cost-bearing principle that differs from the

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PPP. The liability principle focuses on the structural unity between those directly and indirectly involved in environmental pollution, and requires entities that are considered to have some relationship to the pollution problem to bear the costs (Teranishi et al 1998; Yokemoto 2007). How far should the scope of responsible parties extend? In the case of Yusho, the direct polluter is Kanemi Warehouse. Kaneka was indirectly involved in causing the damage and has been questioned in court as to its responsibility. Furthermore, the former Ministry of International Trade and Industry (currently the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), which expanded the uses of PCBs and allowed them to be used in food manufacturing processes, as well as Sanwa Oil and Fat Corporation, which provided Kanemi Warehouse with the technology to deodorize oil by using PCBs, are also considered indirect polluters. In addition, there are potential polluters which by chance were not involved, but could have been offenders if they had taken a wrong step. These include, for example, Mitsubishi Monsanto Chemicals Corporation (currently Mitsubishi Chemical Agri Dream Co., Ltd.), which is the other domestic PCB producer besides Kaneka, several businesses that used PCBs in rice oil production, and manufacturers of chemicals used in food production. The compensation mechanism is conceived so that when people suffer damage believed to have been caused by ingesting contaminated foods or beverages, the fund would pay medical and other expenses to the victims, even if the causal factors have not yet been clarified. Once the cause is identified, the fund would compensate the victim for the damage, and the fund would be reimbursed for the prior payment of compensation. If the causal entity cannot be identified, or if it can be identified but is incapable of compensating the victim, or has gone bankrupt, or cannot pay for some other reason, compensation would continue to be paid from the fund. If this fund becomes a reality, victims will be able to obtain compensation without years of campaigning, and they will be able to demand their rights without worrying about keeping offending companies economically viable.

7.7 Conclusion This chapter provides an overview of Yusho health damage and the victims’ movement, and describes the reasons why compensation is still inadequate. Those reasons are the limitations of the PPP, the political void surrounding IFP, and the lack of political recognition of IFP. Even if the definition of the problem changes from a non-issue to a public issue and then to a political issue (Reich 1991), industry and the government will repeatedly pressure the victims to “roll back” the progress they have achieved, which makes the damage latent. Victims then have to start their campaigns all over again by complaining about the damage and organizing groups. If this repeating process is not stopped, victims will not be able to leave the citizens’ movement. By turning the damage structure theory (Iijima [1984] 1993) around, damage that is amplified through social relations can be mitigated through them. Damage can be

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lessened or increased depending on what kind of medical treatment is provided, what kinds of systems are used, what kind of compensation is available, how doctors and local governments respond, and whether the people surrounding the victims—such as doctors, public officials, colleagues, and neighbors—are understanding. Certainly it is true that some damage is irreversible and cannot be remedied by society. However, damage can be mitigated by replacing “lack of understanding” with “understanding,” and “reduced income” with “adequate compensation and livelihood security” through victim movements, environmental policies, and the efforts of those around them. As part of this process, the government needs to accept the perception of IFP as a problem shared by the public. It is necessary to distinguish between typical food poisoning and IFP, and then to fill the political void and create policies for means such as a relief fund system to remedy the damage.

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and number of facilities under inspection and monitoring guidance). www.e-stat.go.jp/statsearch/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=00450027&tstat=000001031469&cycle=8&tcl ass1=000001161547&tclass2=000001161548&tclass3=000001161551&stat_infid=000032 155788&tclass4val=0. Accessed 1 Apr 2022 Miyamoto K (2007) Kankyou Keizaigaku (Environmental economics), 2nd edn. Iwanami shoten, Tokyo Morinaga Milk Poisoning Post-Investigation Committee (1988) 14 nenme no houmon: Morinaga hiso milk chuudoku tsuiseki chousa no kiroku (14 years later visit: records of follow-up investigation of Morinaga arsenic milk poisoning), reprinted edn. Seseragi shuppan, Osaka Nagayama J (2005) Cola baby: aru Kanemi yusho kanja no hansei (Cola baby: half-life of a victim of Kanemi oil disease). Nishinippon shimbun, Fukuoka Nishimura M (2002) Hokenjo no katasumi kara: aru shokuhin kakarichou no jissenroku (From a corner of the health center: a practical record of a food section chief). Ashi shobo, Fukuoka Panel on the Analysis of the Health Status Survey of Yusho Patients (2010) Yusho kanja ni kakaru kenkou jittai chousa kekka no houkoku (Report on the results of health status survey report on health research on Yusho patients). www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000005hks-img/2r9 8520000005hp7.pdf. Accessed 20 Dec 2022 Reich MR (1991) Toxic politics: responding to chemical disasters. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Shinagawa K (2010) Wagakuni no shokuchuudoku no rekishi: tokuni biseibutsu shokuchu’udoku wo chu’ushin ni (History of Japanese food poisoning: especially focusing on microbial food poisoning). Food Hyg Saf Sci 51(6):274–278 Sugiyama T (1969) Rice oil chu’udoku jiken (Rice oil poisoning case) (I). Food Sanit Res 19(8):43– 57 Teranishi S et al (1998) Kankyou hiyou no futan mondai to kankyou kikin: kokusai yudaku hoshou kikin no bunseki wo chuushin ni (Environmental cost allocation problems and environmental funds: a case study of international oil pollution compensation funds). Discussion paper series 1988–06. Graduate school of economics, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo Uda K (2015) Shokuhin kougai to higaisyah kyuusai: Kanemi yusho jiken no higai to seisaku katei (Industrial food pollution and victim’s relief: damage caused by Kanemi oil poisoning and political process). Toshindo, Tokyo Uda K (2020) Kankyou seigyo system ron to higai hoshou ron no setsugou: PCB osen seigyo katei ni okeru system no gyakurendou (Connecting environmental control systems theory and damage compensation theory: reverse linkage of systems in PCBs contamination control process). In: Chino T, Yuasa Y (eds) Kankyou mondai no shakaigaku: kankyou seigyo system no riron to oyo (Sociology of environmental problem: theory and application of environmental control systems). Toshindo, Tokyo, pp 143–166 Yokemoto M (2007) Kankyou higai no sekinin to hiyou futan (Environmental responsibility and cost sharing issues). Yuhikaku, Tokyo.

Chapter 8

Damage Relief, Reconstruction Policy in the Wake of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Masafumi Yokemoto

Abstract The March 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Accident was a pollution incident caused not only by a natural disaster, but also by the government and an electric utility. Because the accident left local municipalities with no choice but evacuation, nine towns and villages transferred their municipal office functions to other municipalities. Evacuees were cut off from the localities where they had been living, which completely deprived them of the local conditions that enabled their production and everyday lives. This is called the “loss/deprivation of hometown,” but it is not reasonably assessed as solatia eligible for compensation paid by the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO). The same goes for the government’s reconstruction policy. Since April 2014 the government has been canceling evacuation orders, and in such areas an emerging task is revitalizing the communities which serve as people’s communality. In this respect, the government’s reconstruction policy measures are inadequate. Starting in December 2012, collective lawsuits by nuclear accident victims have been filed in many places throughout Japan. These court challenges revealed the problems with reconstruction policy and compensation, and sought rectification.

8.1 Fukushima Nuclear Accident Overview 8.1.1 Accident and Mass Evacuation of Residents The Fukushima nuclear accident seriously contaminated the environment over a vast region, and also caused severe socioeconomic damage. On March 11, 2011, in accordance with the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the government declared a nuclear emergency situation and directed that the nuclear plant vicinity be evacuated. On March 12 the evacuation area was widened to a 20-km radius from Fukushima Daiichi. On April 22 an exclusion area was added to the 20-km area around Daiichi, M. Yokemoto (B) Graduate School of Business, Osaka Metropolitan University, Osaka, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Yokemoto et al. (eds.), Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3239-9_8

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and the government instituted restrictions that were more stringent than just generally prohibiting entry. Also on April 22, the government assigned the designation of “deliberate evacuation area” to locales which are more than 20 km from Daiichi and whose annual dose attains 20 mSv. It also decided upon evacuations of about one month (Fig. 8.1).

Date City HobaramachiTomizawa RyozenmachiShimooguni

Soma City RyozenmachiIshida

Fukushima City

TsukudatemachiTsukidate

RyozenmachiKamioguni

Iitate Village

Jisabara, Kashima Ward

Deliberate Evacuation Area Kawamata Town

Ohara, Haramachi Ward Ogai, Haramachi Ward

(Area with concern that) (an) cumulative dose might reach 20mSv within 1 year period after the accident. Residents were requested to evacuate in a planned manner (approx. within 1 month).

Takanokura, Haramachi Ward Oshigama, Haramachi Ward Baba, Haramachi Ward Katakura, Haramachi Ward

Minami Soma City

Nihonmatsu City

Restricted Area Motomiya City

Katsurao Village Namie Town

Entry (into the area) is prohibited for all except emergency response work and temporary entry which is granted (by mayors of the region’s municipalities).

Futaba Town Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Tamura City

Miharu Town

Okuma Town

Tomioka Town

Koriyama City Kawauchi Village

Fukushima Dai-ni NPS

Ono Town Naraha Town Shimokawauchi

20km Hirono Town

Hirata Village Iwaki City

Restricted Area Deliberate Evacuation Area Regions including Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation

Fig. 8.1 Evacuation areas (as of November 25, 2011). Source Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/evacuation_map_ 111125.pdf)

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The number of nuclear accident evacuees exceeded 160,000 at its peak in 2012. Evacuation is divided roughly into “compulsory evacuation” and “voluntary evacuation” depending on where evacuees were living. Evacuees from the two areas shown in Fig. 8.1 (the restricted area covering a 20-km radius from Fukushima Daiichi, and the deliberate evacuation area) are “compulsory evacuees,” and those from other places are “voluntary evacuees” (extra-area evacuees). Fukushima Prefecture’s Nakadori region, which includes cities such as Fukushima City (the prefectural capital) and Koriyama City, was mostly outside these two designated areas, but many voluntary evacuees also left the Nakadori region because of encroaching contamination. There are large differences in compensation and support measures inside and outside of these designated areas (there are also differences within the areas). Many of the voluntary evacuees are children, who are highly susceptible to contamination, and their families. Many families were separated because fathers had to stay at their jobs in Fukushima, while their wives and children evacuated. As noted previously, the government set the benchmark for ordering evacuations at a cumulative annual dose of 20 mSv. In the region affected by the Chernobyl accident, residents of places with 5-mSv annual doses were required to relocate, but in Japan the issuance of evacuation orders is limited. This is supposedly meant to reduce victim compensation and assistance costs arising from evacuation orders (Fujimoto 2017). Because of the nuclear accident, nine towns and villages transferred their municipal-office functions to other municipalities, and socioeconomic functions were paralyzed over a broad spectrum. Even if all residents evacuate, their absence is only temporary if the effects of contamination disappear, and it is perhaps comparatively easy to recover from the damage on a local level. But if evacuation is protracted, recovery is that much more difficult because buildings deteriorate and land returns to nature. Additionally, residents will disperse if there is variance in decision-making (such as in choosing relocation destinations) among individuals and households which constitute a community, about returning to their original homes or rebuilding their livelihoods. If communities break down, the traditions, cultures, and other features passed on from one generation to the next are also lost. Municipalities likewise face a crisis of continuance. To municipalities which have pursued local development in which residents take center stage, this means the loss of people who play the sustaining role in community development, and the loss of what those people achieved. As a corollary, also at risk of loss are local development potentials or visions for the future which are anticipated as extensions of past initiatives. Since April 2014 the government has been canceling evacuation orders, and in the spring of 2017 orders were canceled for 32,000 people from four towns and villages. This has been followed by the phased and partial cancellation of evacuation orders in difficult-to-return zones and other zones. Although evacuated municipalities are gradually bringing their municipal-office functions home, it is unclear how many former residents will return. Even now damage from the nuclear accident is ongoing.

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8.1.2 “Loss/Deprivation of Hometown”: Grave Damage Resulting from the Nuclear Accident Fukushima Prefecture’s Hamadori region, where the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is sited, is a farming region with a bountiful natural environment where “minor subsistence,” by which people enjoy gathering mushrooms and edible wild plants, catching river fish, and hunting game animals, plays an important role in an abundant livelihood. Through activities such as local festivals and performing farming tasks together, local people have led their lives while maintaining close ties and helping one another (Seki 2019). This kind of lifestyle has a richness which does not immediately manifest itself as monetary value. In recent years, urban consumers had come to highly regard these features, which were beginning to lead to economic value through farm-direct marketing, urban–rural exchange, and other means. But the nuclear accident deprived the rural people of the everyday lives and hometowns that were part and parcel of this exchange. This is theorized in sociology and economics as damage that is called “loss/deprivation of hometown” by the author and by the environmental sociologist Reiko Seki. However, compensation paid by TEPCO does not include loss/deprivation of hometown among types of damage eligible for solatia (Yokemoto 2016; Seki 2019). The environmental contamination and extensive evacuations induced by the nuclear accident wrecked the way of life in localities of the disaster-stricken region: Bonds between people and the relationship between people and nature were broken, and people were dispossessed of the conditions that had undergirded their lives and livelihoods (the conditions for production and everyday life) in the evacuated areas. The conditions for production and everyday life encompass everything that humans have built through their activities (i.e., the metabolism between humans and nature) day after day and year after year, including private assets such as homes and cropland, foundational conditions such as infrastructure, economic and social relationships, and the environment and natural resources (Yokemoto 2016). Within these conditions we can find elements characterized by long-term generational succession and local identity. Elements having these two characteristics cannot be easily replaced by the reproduction of substitutes, which means that they recover from damage with difficulty. For example, one cannot easily obtain substitutes for cropland and family businesses built up during a century by three generations, and the same holds for local traditions, cultures, communities, and the like. We should not conceive the conditions for production and everyday life without seeing their individual elements. It is important to understand that they combine into a unified whole which supports people’s livelihoods. The following paragraphs describe the reality of “loss/deprivation of hometown,” using the example of a business operator in a former evacuation order zone (Mr. K.W.), whom I interviewed on January 10, 2017. Before the disaster, K.W. ran a business which produced and sold miso, and he described his occupation and livelihood as “agricultural life,” which means that he took advantage of the surrounding

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natural environment to link the natural bounty of each season and scenic value with his family business. The natural bounty of the surrounding area of course includes in-season vegetables, but also a large variety of other items such as butterbur sprouts, Japanese ginger, mugwort, bamboo shoots, apricots, figs, Chinese quince, blueberries, persimmons, and chestnuts, which K.W. included among his merchandise. Although these items entailed little expense, they were greatly appreciated by customers. K.W. also prepared an herb garden, a landscape garden, a bamboo forest, and other places where visitors could take walks. Making ingenious use of the surrounding natural environment gave customers a heightened feeling of satisfaction. K.W.’s family business has been passed down through several generations, and he himself actively participates in community activities. He therefore has the trust of the locals, and that trust has also been useful for his business. The local community is his market area, which is backed by generations of trust. Buyers were not limited to Futaba County where he lived, for he also had transactions with restaurants in Tokyo and other places. What is more, family members also had their respective roles, and cooperated by applying themselves diligently to the family business. This too was a source of happiness for K.W. An occupation which combines diverse elements in this way cannot be completely compensated by payment of damages for lost profits and assets, and it is likely impossible to resume the same business at an evacuation destination. Three measures are needed to recover from the damage due to “loss of hometown.” First are recovery measures on the local level, meaning the reconstruction policies of the national government and municipalities. Primarily these consist of public works such as decontamination and the restoration and building of infrastructure. However, radioactive contamination cannot be completely removed, and combined with other factors this has delayed the restoration of jobs, medical care, welfare, schools, and other living conditions. This has in turn hindered the recovery of predisaster livelihoods by means of these measures. Second is that if restoration to the original state is difficult on the local level, each individual resident will suffer “loss of hometown” damage, but the portion of that which is proprietary damage (including decreased value of property, increased expenditures, and lost profits) is recoverable by means of monetary compensation. For example, if we see land and houses as places for economic activities and dwelling, they are recoverable through compensation equal to the price of reacquisition. Third, however, there is also much damage for which restoration to the original state is difficult by means of monetary compensation. In other words, absolute losses that are irrevocable and irreplaceable occupy an important position, and that is a characteristic of “loss of hometown” damage. Compensation for this absolute loss is a “solatium for hometown loss.” “Solatium for hometown loss” is not limited to the solatium in a narrow sense for emotional suffering. “Loss of hometown” damage should be regarded as compensation for all damage (proprietary/nonproprietary damage) for which restoration to the

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original state is difficult by means of reconstruction policy and monetary compensation. Compensation that is “solatium for hometown loss” has become a major issue in collective lawsuits by victims throughout Japan. Table 8.1 presents the measures described above. The items “land and buildings,” “scenery,” and “community” are just examples of elements which make up the conditions for production and livelihood. But as stated below, these elements feature long-term succession and local uniqueness, and therefore restoration to the original state is difficult by means of monetary compensation. These elements are shown in the table because they arguably are typical of the elements having such characteristics. “[A] Damage-recovery measures on the local level” and “[B] Measures meant for individual victims” shown in the table can substitute for one another. If restoration to the original state is possible on the local level, [B] is unnecessary. But as noted above, because total restoration to the original state is difficult on the local level, [A] and [B] must both be implemented. And because [B1] and [B2] have different purposes, they complement each other. As such, recovery from damage must be attempted by implementing the [A], [B1], and [B2] measures concurrently. Table 8.1 “Loss of hometown” damage recovery measures [A] Damage-recovery measures on the local level (next-best measures for restoration to original state)

[B] Measures meant for individual victims [B1] Compensation for damage that is comparatively easy to recover from by paying for the damage

[B2] Compensation for absolute loss

Solatium for hometown loss

Land and buildings

Decontamination

Compensation for cost of reacquisition

Scenery

Maintenance/management

Compensation for income loss when, for example, scenery is reflected in the profits of a business

Community

Second towns, dual domicile Compensation for costs of registration, return policy goods and services that replace community functions

Unity of elements

Decontamination, return policy, etc

New towns established by evacuees at their evacuation destinations are called “second towns” Source Prepared by author

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8.1.3 Liability of the National Government and TEPCO The Fukushima nuclear accident was not a mere natural disaster; it was rather a human-caused disaster and pollution incident which happened because the government failed to exercise its regulatory authority and because the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) response was deficient. Fukushima Daiichi was in the first place built on a site that was highly vulnerable to tsunamis. This is because a 30-m elevation was cut down to 20 m in order to facilitate the transport of the reactor pressure vessel and other components onto the site. In 2002 the government’s Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion released a long-term assessment which stated that there was a 20% probability that a magnitude 8-class earthquake would occur within 30 years in the region from Sanriku-oki to Boso-oki along the Japan trench. But TEPCO took no appropriate preventive action against tsunamis in response to this prediction. The government not only promoted nuclear power policy, but also failed to regulate TEPCO as it should have (Kaido 2020; Shimoyama 2018; Soeda 2021).

8.2 Problems of the Compensation System and Reconstruction Policy 8.2.1 Problems of Compensation by the Direct-Claim System Compensation for nuclear power accidents is done in accordance with the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage. Based on this law, the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation (DRCNDC), whose secretariat is located in the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, can issue guidelines on the extent of loss to be compensated by TEPCO. Interim guidelines were completed on August 5, 2011, and supplemented four times up to December 2013. The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage prescribes no-fault liability for nuclear operators. This arrangement provides for victim relief by obviating the need to prove intent or negligence. Compensation paid by TEPCO until now has been based on no-fault liability. At the same time, however, this is undeniably a barrier to determining accident liability. TEPCO has paid a total of over ¥10 trillion in compensation. Although this compensation has indeed played a role in helping victims rebuild their livelihoods and recover from damage, there are some serious problems as detailed below (for details, see Yokemoto 2013). The DRCNDC’s guidelines (including supplements) set forth the minimum losses which TEPCO must compensate, but that does not mean that unspecified losses are outside the scope of compensation. Practically, however, the guidelines largely prescribe what compensation covers.

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Since the formulation of the interim guidelines, TEPCO has proceeded with compensation by using self-prepared claim forms. The system by which victims claim compensation directly from TEPCO is called a direct claim. Under this system, the very same TEPCO that is the offender “assesses” victims’ compensation claims. TEPCO therefore pays only the compensation amount that the utility itself approves, but because payments come quickly, the direct-claim system is the most-used procedure in comparison with the courts and other means. The biggest problem with the direct-claim system is that not a little damage went uncompensated because the compensation guidelines and criteria do not adequately reflect the actual state of damage. There are large disparities in the compensation provided to evacuees depending on, for example, whether or not the government ordered them to evacuate. Specifically, in areas where evacuation orders or other orders are issued, compensation for evacuation costs, solatia, compensation for reduced income, and the like are commensurate with losses and damage. On the other hand, compensation is zero or very small in places where the government issued no orders for evacuation or other actions. The government uses a 20-mSv cumulative annual dose as the benchmark for ordering evacuation. Figure 8.1 shows the two areas where the government has issued evacuation orders. There are large compensation disparities between the inside and outside of area borders. Compensation disparity created divisions among residents. With respect to solatia paid to evacuees, compensation is divided into a number of grades such as evacuation order areas within 20 km and other distances from Fukushima Daiichi and a 30-km area outside of that (former emergency evacuation preparation areas), as well as voluntary evacuation areas, such as the Nakadori region and Iwaki City. Another distinct difference is that whether or not people receive compensation for dwellings and household effects depends on whether they live inside or outside an evacuation order area. Such inter-area disparities in compensation are unacceptable to residents because compensation does not match the true state of damage suffered, and they create serious divisions among residents. Although compensation paid to people who evacuated under government orders (i.e., residents of evacuation order areas) could be seen as comparatively generous, this does not mean there are no problems. “Loss/deprivation of hometown” such as through the collapse of communities is serious damage, but it is not covered by solatia.

8.2.2 What is Lacking from Fukushima Reconstruction Policy? With more than eleven years having passed since March 2011, reconstruction from the nuclear disaster requires a long-term policy response (Kawasaki 2021). Much work remains to be done, such as decommissioning Fukushima Daiichi and dealing with its

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contaminated water, the interim storage and permanent disposal of decontamination waste, decontamination of vast forests that has been excluded from decontamination policy, rebuilding industries and livelihoods in localities to which residents may return, decontamination and lifting of evacuation orders in difficult-to-return zones, and rebuilding the lives of long-term evacuees. This is not just because radioactive substances have long half-lives, but also largely because of the serious flaws in reconstruction policy to date. Although substantial progress was made in lifting evacuation orders in the spring of 2017, more than five years have elapsed since then, and once again it has become evident what is missing from reconstruction policy. Residents are indeed being allowed to return, but the recovery of their livelihoods is making little progress. Commercial facilities and other necessities have been built, giving the impression that livelihood infrastructure has been provided, but recovery is delayed in ways not visually apparent, such as the ties among people, i.e., community. As noted previously, the region stricken by the nuclear accident has an abundant natural environment that is strongly agricultural. Communal work by community members played a vital role in tasks such as managing irrigation water. Tradition and culture were passed down through the community, and the spiritual value of these things served as mutual bonds among people. But because not many people have returned, cropland management, communal work, and other tasks must be accomplished with fewer people than before. Further, the government’s reconstruction policy is inadequate to the task of revitalizing communities as the foundation for communal activities. Problems like these arise due to the narrow understanding of damage caused by the nuclear accident. In other words, we tend to direct our attention to just a few of the conditions for rebuilding people’s daily lives, such as housing. This also holds for TEPCO compensation. “Minor subsistence,” such as collecting edible wild plants and mushrooms, was an important activity firmly rooted in the lives of community members, and the forests were their livelihood sphere. However, because that is not considered important, hardly any forest decontamination has been done. To recover people’s occupations and livelihoods, and to revitalize their hometowns, it is essential to first determine the sum total of what was lost, and then reaffirm its importance.

8.2.3 Reconstruction Finance Problems and “Unequal Reconstruction” Reconstruction finance for the Great East Japan Earthquake is characterized by its emphasis on public works for infrastructure, and the low proportion of funds earmarked for disaster victim support. From FY2010 through FY2017, ¥5.7 trillion (19.3%) were spent on public works and other undertakings, and ¥3.9 trillion (13.3%) were spent on decontamination

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and other tasks. Additionally, ¥3.0 trillion (10.4%) were disbursed as Great East Japan Earthquake Reconstruction Grants and ¥0.5 trillion (1.6%) for the Fukushima Revitalization Acceleration Subsidy Program. If one adds in the local allocation tax grants and other transfers which supplement the local burdens of these grants and subsidies, that brings the total to ¥18.1 trillion (61.3%). On the other hand, the proportion of funding for rebuilding the lives and livelihoods of victims—what might be called “human reconstruction”—is very small. Disaster relief and related expenses are ¥1.0 trillion (3.5%), and support for rebuilding victims’ lives, plus assistance for education, healthcare, nursing care, welfare, employment, agriculture/forestry/fisheries, and small and medium enterprises is ¥2.5 trillion, bringing the total to a mere ¥3.6 trillion (12.0%) (Fujiwara and Yokemoto 2018). Public works-driven reconstruction policy generates disparities of various kinds. Reconstruction demand is biased toward the construction industry, and likewise with respect to employment, job offers are concentrated in construction-related fields. Even if progress is realized in decontamination and in infrastructure restoration and construction, there are people who cannot return because healthcare, education, distribution, and other livelihood conditions have not recovered to their pre-disaster levels. Further, the attraction of labor by public works projects from outside of the affected communities changes the resident makeup, resulting in communities that are different from before the disaster. Proprietors whose businesses served local residents lose their customers and cannot restart their businesses. As this shows, reconstruction policy has unequal effects depending on geographical areas, business types, individuals, and other factors. I have termed these disparities “unequal reconstruction” (or the “inequality of reconstruction”) (Yokemoto and Watanabe 2015; Yokemoto 2016). Additionally, Fukushima is subject to the unique circumstances of a nuclear accident. Demarcation of evacuation order areas in response to the nuclear accident brought about inter-area inequality. Inter-area compensation disparity is a representative example. Areas established by demarcation sometimes do not coincide with the actual damage. Because differences between areas do not necessarily correspond to the real state of radioactive contamination, the inter-area disparities in compensation and in the extent of contamination combined to bring about divisions among residents. Radiation exposure may cause health effects in the future, and weighting will differ depending on an individual’s attributes (such as age, gender, and family makeup), values, normative consciousness, and other factors (Hirakawa 2017). For instance, it is known from studies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombing victims that the younger people are, the higher their radiosensitivity. The young and child-rearing generations must be very careful about contamination. A certain radiation dose will have varying effects because evacuees subjected to it demonstrate different awareness and behavior, and because factors such as individual attributes and values also influence radiation effects. But there is a tendency toward not necessarily valuing diverse risk-response actions, and toward suppressing the voices of those who express anxiety. There are concerns that damaging effects will be shifted especially toward women and children (Ulrich 2017).

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8.3 Collective Lawsuits Raise Questions About Compensation and Reconstruction Policy 8.3.1 Proliferation of Collective Lawsuits Underlying the divergence between damage and compensation is that the victims— who have a direct interest in the matter—are not guaranteed a process by which they can participate in devising compensation guidelines and criteria. Although TEPCO officials often attend DRCNDC meetings and present their views, there have been hardly any opportunities for victims to state their views and participate. From the victims’ perspective, it is as if compensation specifics and monetary amounts are arbitrarily presented and imposed. Collective lawsuits by victims constitute objections to these compensation problems. Since December 2012, people from inside and outside evacuation order areas have filed collective lawsuits in 20 district courts and branches, and plaintiffs now number over 12,000 (Table 8.2). Victims are using lawsuits to call the government and TEPCO to account, and to seek compensation for damage that is not compensated by the direct-claim system. By means of these lawsuits, the plaintiffs aim not only to win compensation for themselves, but also to reform the compensation system, thereby obtaining relief for a larger number of victims (Yoshimura et al. 2018). Table 8.2 Collective lawsuits by Victims of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident (as of March 2016) District court

No. of lawsuits

No. of plaintiffs

District court

No. of lawsuits

No. of plaintiffs

Sapporo

1

256

Niigata

1

807

Sendai

1

93

Nagoya

1

132

Yamagata

1

742

Kyoto

1

175

Fukushima

9

7,826

Osaka

1

240

Maebashi

1

137

Kobe

1

92

Saitama

1

68

Okayama

1

103

Chiba

2

65

Hiroshima

1

28

Tokyo

5

1,535

Matsuyama

1

25

Yokohama

1

174

Fukuoka

1

41

Totals

31

12,539

Note Fukushima District Court includes two branches Source Mainichi Shimbun, March 6, 2016

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8.3.2 Steps Toward Reassessing Fukushima Reconstruction Policy Collective lawsuits aim not only to deal with compensation problems, but also to reassess reconstruction policy. “Hometown revitalization” is a crucial task in nuclear accident-stricken areas. An especially serious challenge is rebuilding agriculture-based livelihoods. With the return of residents making little headway, it will perhaps be necessary to consolidate farmland, introduce new technologies, and take other measures. But at the same time, it is essential that agricultural practices and the value of life that were rooted in nuclear-disaster areas be passed on to future generations. It is necessary to rebuild not only agriculture as an industry, but also people’s occupations and livelihoods (Fujikawa and Ishii 2021). The Fukushima nuclear accident was not just a natural disaster, but also a humancaused disaster and pollution incident. Despite that, the government recognizes its “social liability” in relation to nuclear power policy, but it does not recognize its legal liability (state liability) which arises from its failure to properly exercise its regulatory authority on electric utilities. The government’s position is that it should not provide compensation for damage to homes and other personal assets due to natural disasters because as a rule this falls under personal responsibility. Rebuilding the lives of disaster victims is left to compensation under TEPCO’s problem-riddled direct-claim system, while under Fukushima’s reconstruction policy as well, there is a tendency as in past disasters for decontamination, industrial infrastructure building, and other public civil-engineering works to be given higher priority. As such, the viewpoint on completely rebuilding occupations and livelihoods fades into the background. A reassessment of this matter is crucial. There is an urgent need to implement carefully tailored support measures in order to rebuild each disaster victim’s life and revitalize disaster-stricken areas. The collective lawsuits raise questions about the liability of the government and TEPCO in order to demand such a policy change. Note This chapter was written in September 2022.

References Fujimoto N (2017) Decontamination-intensive reconstruction policy in Fukushima under governmental budget constraint. In: Yamakawa M, Yamamoto D (eds) Unravelling the Fukushima disaster. Routledge, London, pp 106–119 Fujiwara H, Yokemoto M (2018) Fukushima fukkou seisaku wo kenshou suru: zaisei no tokuchou to juumin kikan no genjou (Scrutinizing Fukushima reconstruction policy: finance characteristics and the current state of resident return). In: Yoshimura R, Shimoyama K, Osaka E, Yokemoto M (eds) Genpatsu jiko higai kaifuku no hou to seisaku (Law and policy pertaining to recovery from nuclear accident damage). Nippon Hyoron Sha, Tokyo, pp 264–277

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Hirakawa H (2017) Hinan to fuan no seitousei: kagaku gijutsu shakairon kara no kousatsu (The justifiability of evacuation and anxiety: an exploration based on science and technology studies). Horitsu Jiho 89(8):71–76 Kaido Y (2020) Touden keiji saiban: Fukushima genpatsu jiko no sekinin wo dare ga toru no ka (TEPCO criminal trial: who will bear liability for the Fukushima nuclear accident?). Sairyusha, Tokyo Kawasaki K (2021) Fukushima fukkou junenkan no kenshou: genshiryoku saigai kara no fukkou ni muketa chouki-teki na kadai (An appraisal of Fukushima reconstruction at the 10-year mark: long-term challenge aimed at reconstruction after the nuclear disaster). Maruzen, Tokyo Fujikawa K, Ishii H (eds) (2021) Fukushima fukkou, nou to kurashi no fukken (Fukushima reconstruction, resurgence of agriculture and livelihood). Toshindo, Tokyo Seki R (2019) Tochi ni nezashite ikiru kenri: Tsushima genpatsu soshou to ‘furusato soushitsu/ hakudatsu’ higai (The right to live in place: Tsushima nuclear plant lawsuit and ‘the loss/ deprivation of hometown’). Res Environ Disrupt 48(3):45–50 Shimoyama K (2018) Kuni no genpatsu kisei to kokka baishou sekinin (The government’s nuclear power regulation and state liability for compensation). In: Yoshimura R, Shimoyama K, Osaka E, Yokemoto M (eds) Genpatsu jiko higai kaifuku no hou to seisaku (Law and policy pertaining to recovery from nuclear accident damage). Nippon Hyoron Sha, Tokyo, pp 22–42 Soeda T (2021) Touden genpatsu jiko: 10-nen de akiraka ni natta koto (TEPCO nuclear accident: what’s become apparent after 10 years). Heibonsha, Tokyo Ulrich K (2017) Unequal impact: women’s & children’s human rights violations and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Greenpeace Japan, Tokyo Yokemoto M (2013) Genpatsu baishou wo tou: aimai na sekinin, honrou sareru hinansha (Raising questions about nuclear accident compensation: liability ill-defined, evacuees get played). Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo Yokemoto M (2016) Kougai kara Fukushima wo kangaeru: chiiki no saisei wo mezashite (Fukushima in terms of pollution: working toward regional revitalization). Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo Yokemoto M, Watanabe T (eds) (2015) Genpatsu saigai wa naze fukintou na fukkou wo motarasu no ka: Fukushima jiko kara ‘ningen no fukkou’, chiiki saisei e (Why do nuclear disasters result in unequal reconstruction?: from the Fukushima accident to ‘human recovery’ and regional revitalization). Minerva Shobo, Kyoto Yoshimura R, Shimoyama K, Osaka E, Yokemoto M (eds) (2018) Genpatsu jiko higai kaifuku no hou to seisaku (Law and policy pertaining to recovery from nuclear accident damage). Nippon Hyoron Sha, Tokyo

Chapter 9

Network of Museums, Archival Centers for Remembering Environmental Pollution Mayuko Shimizu and Miho Hayashi

Abstract This chapter describes the network of museums and archival centers meant to keep the memory of environmental pollution alive, and explains its significance, which is to reconstruct the collective memory of pollution (kougai) and to provide places that pass the “living history” of pollution on to future generations. In today’s Japan, the diverse and complex realities contained in the word “pollution,” and its universal connotations such as human rights and fairness, have gradually faded away. The year 2013 saw the formation of the Pollution Museum Network, an informal group of pollution museums from around Japan. The network regularly hosts a forum to describe past pollution occurrences from diverse perspectives based on museum holdings. Creating a society that can prevent pollution makes it important to continue a conversation about pollution so that it remains a collective memory.

9.1 Why Remember Environmental Pollution? 9.1.1 Pollution as a Collective Memory In the latter half of the twentieth century, environmental pollution (kougai) in Japan caused severe damage to human health and the natural environment to a degree unparalleled in the world at that time. It was the result of national policies that prioritized industrialization and urbanization during the period of rapid economic growth. As described in Chap. 1 of this book, progressive local governments and successive pollution lawsuits were forces that promoted pollution control by the government and corporations. Underlying these forces was a pollution victims’ movement which for many years urgently appealed for pollution prevention and remediation, and finally M. Shimizu (B) Faculty of Policy Science, Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan e-mail: [email protected] M. Hayashi Foundation for Environmental Rehabilitation and Redevelopment of Mizushima, Kurashiki, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 M. Yokemoto et al. (eds.), Environmental Pollution and Community Rebuilding in Modern Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3239-9_9

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gained public support thanks to a court ruling in favor of the victims in the early 1970s. Public opinion at the time supported the local governments’ pollution countermeasures and the court’s landmark ruling because there was a shared understanding in society that pollution was a violation of human rights. Yasunori Oda, a historian who studies pollution in modern Japan, states that pollution during this period was a human rights issue, and that the anti-pollution movement was recognized as advocating human rights (Oda 2017). Ryoichi Terada, an environmental sociologist, stated that the term “environmental justice” was not used in the Japanese anti-pollution movement, but only because the destruction of people’s lives and livelihoods and the delay in solution efforts by corporations and the central and local governments were environmental injustices that were obvious to all (Terada 2016). Damage caused by environmental pollution was concentrated among poor workers, farmers, fishermen, and others who were relegated to the margins of society during the waves of industrialization and urbanization. In postwar Japanese society, pollution was a symbol of the negative byproducts brought about by rapid economic growth. Pollution victims filed lawsuits, held rallies to inform people of their plight, and appealed to public opinion through the media to support them. In addition, pollution victims’ organizations in various regions have persevered in joint efforts aimed at pressuring the government to continue these achievements. This is because if pressure is not maintained, the compensation arrangements and environmental measures won by the victims could be abolished by those who do not agree with them. One example is the National Pollution Victims Joint Actions (Zenkoku kougai higaisha sou-koudou), which the National Pollution Victims Joint Action Executive Committee has been holding since 1976 to the present. This is an initiative in which victims from different regions and suffering from different types of environmental pollution form a nationwide network, jointly formulate demands to the government on policy issues, and negotiate directly with the government. The significance of these victims’ efforts can be also seen in Western scholars’ assessments of the victims’ movement in the history of the Japanese environmental movement. One example is: “The environmental movement in Japan, however, had arisen primarily as a victim’s movement” (Schreurs 2002, p. 75). Or it can be argued that the pollution victims’ movement was a fundamental critique of Japan’s contemporary social order. [The antipollution movement] challenged not only the closed and consensus-based style of traditional politics but also self-image of the Japanese as preferring harmony to conflict. In addition to exposing latent social divisions, the experience of pollution victims showed that rights assertion and litigation could be valuable tools in achieving justice and protecting one’s self-interest. (Upham 1993, p. 342)

Environmental pollution (kougai), which became a public issue via the victims’ movement, encompassed a variety of appeals that led to social change, and were not limited to the personal experiences of the victims. However, as discussed in the next section, the word “pollution” and the memory of the opportunity for social change are fading. Now we should consider the pollution experience as a legacy to be passed

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on to the next generation, and see it as a reference point for those of us living today to consider our future policies. This chapter discusses the role that pollution museums and their networks can play in reconstructing the “collective memory” of pollution, based on the activities of the Pollution Museum Network described in Sect. 9.3. Maurice Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory (Halwbachs 1950) is “a living history (une histoire vivante)” in the continuum of past, present, and future time, a memory that has a common meaning for the group, or a common meaning that is constantly being renewed through interaction between personal memory and itself. It is a “living” memory that evokes a variety of personal memories and emotions.

9.1.2 Why Is Collective Memory Fading? Even after experiencing severe pollution damage that spread nationwide and on a daily basis, Japanese society did not undergo a complete structural shift to a society free of environmental injustice. In the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, from the mid1970s through the 1980s, political pressure from industrial groups trumped the antipollution measures won by the victims. There were reports of expert opinions that cast doubt on the causal relationship that had been confirmed in pollution trials. The government relaxed the NO2 standard for environmental standards (1978), and relief for pollution victims (Pollution Health Damage Compensation Law) was partially suspended (1988). Even today, the social structure which produces pollution damage has not disappeared. Air pollution from automobile emissions in large urban areas, noise and pollution from military installations, health hazards to workers and residents in and near factories that use asbestos, and radioactive contamination from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 are just a few examples of the pollution-producing society that remains today. Even though the phenomenon of pollution is still real, it is no longer a collective memory that dwells in the Japanese consciousness. This has allowed people to be blinded to and acquiesce in environmental injustice. The word pollution (kougai) is no longer used in our everyday life, and people dislike it because it calls to mind a tragic history that occurred long ago, in a distant place. People think that even though the history of pollution is written in school textbooks, it has nothing to do with their lives and communities today. Why is this? Here are two possible reasons to consider. The first possible reason is that a wide variety of issues has come to be discussed as environmental problems in a broader sense. Environmental policy issues such as nature conservation and preservation of urban amenities have come to be widely recognized. The term used to describe this new situation was not “pollution,” but “environment.” Although administrative authority over pollution had been distributed among several ministries and agencies, the Environment Agency (Kankyou-chou) was newly established in 1971 as an administrative agency whose function was planning and coordinating environmental policy. The Basic Law on

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Pollution Control was then abolished and replaced by the Basic Environmental Law (1993). People no longer felt the need to use the word pollution (kougai). As a result, they gradually lost the will to seek environmental justice expressed by kougai, actual injustices became invisible, and people had to undertake the difficult task of establishing an ethic for future generations. The second reason is that pollution is inherently difficult to talk about. For pollution victims, their families, and those who experienced pollution, it is not a memory they are willing to talk about. It is not easy to talk about tragic events and painful experiences of any kind, not just pollution. Only a small percentage of pollution victims have become plaintiffs in trials and have shared their experiences in court. Many victims suffered in silence because they could not make their experiences public. There have been situations in which neighbors were forced by circumstances to confront each other as perpetrators and victims, as in factory workers versus pollution victims. Children living in places labeled “pollution towns” have found it difficult to feel attachment to and pride in their local communities. And those who hear about the painful experiences of others may also imagine and vicariously relive the pain and anger, and suffer secondary trauma injuries. Trauma related to pollution is not exclusive to health victims. In reconstructing the collective memory of pollution, it is necessary for people other than the apparent victims who once contributed to the construction of the collective memory of pollution to speak out about it. However, the diverse types of damage caused by pollution are a “difficult past” (see also Chapters 3 and 5) that is difficult to talk about while at the same time having a positive attitude toward the future. Under these circumstances, society no longer talked about pollution, and time passed while it remained buried deeply in the personal memories of those who experienced it. School textbooks tell students that there was severe pollution damage, but that is not enough for them to understand what the experience of pollution means to present and future generations. Pollution represents an important aspect of postwar Japanese society and is a catalyst for change. If it ceases to be a collective memory and becomes the historical past, it will be difficult for us to see the important implications for our own lives from that past. How can we reconstruct the collective memory of pollution?

9.2 Museums and Archival Centers for Remembering Environmental Pollution 9.2.1 Pollution Museums in Recent Years Since the 1990s, there has been a growing movement to build museums and archival centers for remembering environmental pollution (below, “pollution museums”) in many pollution-affected areas of Japan (Table 9.1). The Pollution Museum Network (kougai shiryoukan network) was formed in 2013. This enabled all such museums

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and archival centers throughout Japan to learn from each other. Although there is no legal definition of a pollution museum at this time, the Pollution Museum Network defines a pollution museum as follows.

Table 9.1 Pollution museums in Japan Pollution type

Name

Location

Establishment history Year Established

Air Pollution (Yokkaichi)

Yokkaichi Pollution and Environmental Future Museum

Mie Prefecture (Tokai area) Yokkaichi City

Yokkaichi City

2015

Air pollution Nishiyodogawa (Nishiyodogawa) Pollution and Environment Museum (Eco-Muse), Aozora Foundation

(Kinki area) Aozora Foundation Osaka City Nishiyodogawa Ward

Air pollution (Amagasaki)

Amagasaki Archives, Amagasaki City Museum of History

Hyogo Prefecture (Kinki area) Amagasaki City

Amagasaki City 2020 (taking over the business of Amagasaki Municipal Museum of Area Studies and Archives)

Air pollution (Amagasaki)

Amagasaki Southern Area Regeneration Laboratory (Amaken)

Hyogo Prefecture (Kinki area) Amagasaki City

Established with a portion of the settlement from the Amagasaki Pollution Lawsuit

Air pollution (Kurashiki)

Mizushima Interactive Archives (Asagao Gallery)

Okayama Prefecture (Chugoku area) Kurashiki City

Established with the 2022 Mizushima Foundation, which was established with a portion of the funds from the settlement of the Kurashiki pollution lawsuit, as its parent organization

Air pollution (Kitakyushu)

Kitakyushu Museum of the Environment

Fukuoka Prefecture (Kyushu) Kitakyushu City

Kitakyushu City

Minamata disease Kumamoto Gakuen University Minamata Research Center

Kumamoto Kumamoto Gakuen Prefecture University (Kyushu) Kumamoto City

2006

2001

2002

2005

(continued)

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Table 9.1 (continued) Pollution type

Name

Location

Establishment history Year Established

Kumamoto Prefecture (Kyushu) Minamata City

Kumamoto Gakuen University

2005

Minamata disease Minamata City Kumamoto Minamata Disease Prefecture Museum (Kyushu) Minamata City

Minamata City

1993

Minamata disease Minamata Disease Information Center, National Center for Minamata Disease Research, Ministry of the Environment, Japan

Kumamoto Prefecture (Kyushu) Minamata disease

home (i.e. hometown, 2001 home country)

Minamata disease Minamata Disease Center Soshisha Minamata Disease History and Archaeology Museum

Kumamoto Prefecture (Kyushu) Minamata City

mutual admiration society

Minamata disease Kumamoto University Archives

Kumamoto Kumamoto Prefecture University (Kyushu) Kumamoto City

2016

Niigata Niigata Minamata disease Prefectural Museum of Environment and Human Contacts -Niigata Minamata Disease Museum

Niigata Niigata Prefecture Prefecture (Hokuriku area) (Hokuriku area) Niigata City

2001

Niigata General Minamata disease Incorporated Association Aganogawa Environmental School

Niigata Prefecture (Hokuriku area) Agano City

2011

Minamata disease Kumamoto Gakuen University, Minamata University Minamata Studies Field Research Center

(Established as an organization to continue the field museum program in the prefecture)

1988

(continued)

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Table 9.1 (continued) Pollution type

Name

Location

Establishment history Year Established

Itai-itai (“it hurts”) disease

Toyama Prefectural Itai-itai Disease Museum

Toyama Toyama Prefecture Prefecture (Hokuriku area) (Hokuriku area) Toyama City

2012

Itai-itai (“it hurts”) disease

Seiryu Kaikan

Toyama Prefecture (Hokuriku area) Toyama City

Jinzu River Basin Cadmium Damage Group Liaison Council, Itai-itai Disease Prevention Council

1976

Kanemi oil PCB poisoning

Goto City Kanemi Oil Syndrome Damage Materials Exhibition Corner

Nagasaki Prefecture (Kyushu) Goto City

Goto City

2007 (The exhibition corner was removed in 2022 and replaced by a mobile exhibition)

Ashio mine and smoke pollution

NPO Ashio Mine Poisoning Shozo Tanaka Memorial Hall

Gunma Prefecture (Kanto area) Tatebayashi City

(The museum was opened after a petition drive for the construction of a memorial hall)

2006

Ashio mine and smoke pollution

Ota City Ashio Mine Poison Exhibition and Reference Room

Gunma Prefecture (Kanto area) Ota City

Ota City

2015

Illegal dumping of industrial waste

Teshima’s Heart Museum

Kagawa Prefecture (Shikoku) Shodo-shima island

Teshima Residents’ Council for Waste Management

2002 (Renovated in 2021)

Asbestos

Atelier Sen-nan Asbestos House

Osaka Prefecture (Kinki area) Sennan City

Individuals (The family of a doctor who alleged the dangers of asbestos installed it in a room of their home.)

2019

Fukushima nuclear accident

Nuclear Disaster Archives furusato

Fukushima Prefecture (Tohoku area) Iwaki City

Steering Committee for the Nuclear Disaster Research Center (opened in a renovated room of a hot spring inn)

2020

(continued)

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Table 9.1 (continued) Pollution type

Name

Location

Establishment history Year Established

Arsenic poisoning

Torokyu Historical and Folklore Reference Room, University of Miyazaki

Miyazaki Prefecture (Kyushu) Miyazaki City,

University of Miyazaki

2020

General Pollution Environmental Archives, Ohara Institute of Social Research, Hosei University

Tokyo (Kanto area) Machida City, Tokyo

Hosei University

2013

General Pollution Rikkyo Research Center for Cooperative Civil Societies, Rikkyo University

Tokyo (Kanto area) Toshima Ward

Rikkyo University

2010

Source Prepared by the authors based on the Pollution Museum Network website and Ando et al. (2021)

A pollution museum is a facility or organization in a polluted area that seeks to communicate the experience of pollution. A pollution museum can function in one of three fields: exhibits, archives, or onsite learning (field museum), and it does not necessarily have to have a building as a physical component. Also, there are various operating entities both public and private, such as the national government, local governments, universities, and NPOs” (Pollution Museum Network 2016).

According to this definition, the requirement for a pollution museum is to “communicate the experience of pollution,” and there is a great variety of ways and forms of doing so. There is also wide variation in the circumstances of pollution museum founding. Some were established by the settlement of a pollution lawsuit, some were established by victim/supporter groups or related organizations, some were established by local governments in response to requests from victim/supporter groups, and some were established by the university or municipal libraries or archives to store, organize, and hold pollution-related materials donated by the public. Some are mainly exhibition facilities, while others are archives without exhibition facilities, or focus on on-site learning. In some cases, pollution-related materials may be part of the collection, and in other cases part of a public facility complex may be used as a pollution archive. Not all of the pollution museums in Japan participate in the Pollution Museum Network, but many of them do. Pollution-related materials can be roughly divided into primary sources and publications in terms of form. Primary source materials include (1) newspaper and magazine clippings, (2) self-published materials such as research reports, (3) academic papers, (4) other academic research materials, (5) administrative documents and related materials, (6) court-related materials, (7) documents and meeting minutes

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prepared by businesses, organizations, their employees, and other people, (8) personal notes and diaries, (9) photographs and videos, (10) practical articles such as tools, household goods, and equipment, (11) biomedical specimens and environmental materials, (12) paintings and craftworks, (13) photographs and videos, and (14) artifacts. In addition to these, there are oral materials created by parties involved in pollution incidents (Shimizu 2021). At present, pollution museums are not “registered museums” or “facilities equivalent to museums” as defined by Japan’s Museum Law, which stipulates registration requirements (a museum must be established by a public institution) and establishment prerequisites (such as the need for curators), but pollution museums are “museum-like facilities.” Pollution-related museums are currently not legally recognized, and many do not have qualified curators, archivists, or other specialized staff. One of the challenges facing pollution museums is that they are founded using a bottom-up approach, and therefore have unstable organizations and inadequate funding. What kind of people visit pollution museums? Most public pollution museums function mainly as exhibits and are expected to be used for school education. In particular, fifth-grade elementary school students study pollution and environmental issues in their social studies curriculum, and teachers take their students to visit pollution museums. Pollution museums are also actively involved in helping elementary school students learn about pollution history by producing supplemental reading materials and providing them for pre- and post-learning purposes. Private pollution museums and archives which hold pollution-related materials are often used by university students and researchers for research purposes.

9.2.2 Functions of Pollution Museums Although pollution museums have the potential to become places for reconstructing the collective memory of pollution, there are still issues that need to be addressed in the future. The following is a partial inventory of the issues that need to be considered in order to renew the collective memory of pollution with regard to the three functions of pollution museums: exhibitions, onsite learning, and archives. Exhibits are designed to make it easy for everyone to understand the pollution incidents. The exhibits include panels that use photographs and charts as well as text, maps, and dioramas that geographically represent the relevant places, and displays of practical items that were in use at the time. An exhibition presents a pollution museum’s biased interpretation of an incident. Even if the facts are stated plainly, it is not possible to include all of them. Therefore a museum must choose what to include and what not to include. How should a museum explain not only the direct causes of pollution, but also the situation of the company which caused the pollution, and the reason that it could not prevent the pollution? What, how, and to what extent should the museum express the various experiences

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of damage? These choices will reflect the interpretation of the pollution museum as a storyteller. Many pollution museums are created either by administrative agencies or politicians at the request of victims’ groups or groups of people who have supported victims, or at the initiative of victims’ groups. Therefore, victims’ interpretations of pollution incidents are largely projected onto the exhibits in pollution museums. In cases where several victims’ groups are involved, the interpretation may be slanted toward the standpoints of some of the groups. In this sense, what the exhibition at a pollution museum shows is just one of many possible interpretations. On the other hand, some publicly operated pollution museums have been criticized by researchers for being one-dimensional in their exhibits (Kaneko 2011; Hirai 2015). We should take care to create latitude for multi-perspective interpretation. As one can see from the foregoing, learning activities that require only a superficial understanding of exhibit content do not lead to the reconstruction of collective memory, which is because collective memory, unlike static history “written” by historians, is pluralistic and fluid, always being rewritten as memories are recalled and recounted from multiple perspectives. Activities are needed to learn about pollution incidents from different perspectives than the interpretations offered by pollution museums, such as by actively seeking alternative viewpoints and talking to people who were actually involved in pollution incidents. Exhibits at pollution museums should be designed to take visitors on an exploratory journey that seeks out many points of view. Onsite learning is basically a face-to-face meeting between visitors and the lecturers or staff members of pollution museums. Visitors learn about pollution cases through a combination of victims’ talks, fieldwork such as tours and experiences, and dialogues among participants.1 In addition to explanations using explanatory materials and panel displays, many museums provide opportunities for victims and their supporters and families to serve as lecturers (storytellers) who talk directly with visitors. Such efforts create bilateral communication, which allows greater freedom in interpreting the significance of pollution incidents. They also open up the possibility of constructing a collective memory of pollution. Onsite learning consists of fieldwork such as walking around the site of a pollution incident and having the staff members tell the story of the place’s past. Visitors are shown clinics, some closed and some still operating, where the victims used to, or still receive treatment, and visitors also see monuments honoring those who worked hard to clean up the environmental pollution. They learn how past pollution incidents manifested themselves in the current landscape. By seeing the present state of once-polluted land, rivers, oceans, skies, and other natural features, visitors can become sensitized to understand the continuity and discontinuity between the past

1

Human mobility was severely restricted by preventing the spread of COVID-19, which spread rapidly in Japan after March 2020. The number of visitors to pollution museums also declined sharply. To cope with this situation, some pollution museums hosted online seminars using Internetbased video streaming services and videoconferencing systems.

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and the present. Such a diachronic grasp of pollution is an important resource for reconstructing the collective memory of pollution in the present day. Archives provide a material basis which evokes diverse memories of pollution incidents, and which reconstructs collective memory through a series of tasks that comprise collecting, organizing, preserving, and using diverse materials related to pollution incidents. Regarding the archiving of pollution materials, Yoshihito Shimizu, a historian studying pollution material archives, points out the importance of understanding pollution from multiple perspectives, because pollution materials come in a variety of forms and are produced by diverse people (Shimizu 2021). In particular, materials such as victims’ memoirs and leaflets made by victims’ groups have the power to intuitively convey the emotions and sentiments of the people involved in pollution incidents. Shimizu relates an anecdote in which manga author Eriko Yada drew a manga about a girl who had died from air pollution caused by the Yokkaichi industrial petrochemical complex. While Yada was still working on the manga, she saw the actual picture diary drawn by the girl and sensed her physical presence from the diary’s well-preserved condition and the tactile quality of the paper, which enabled her to perceive the girl as a three-dimensional image (Shimizu 2023). This is one example of how diverse materials inspire expressive activities that update collective memory. Pollution museums face challenges in fulfilling their potential archival functions. Archival work requires specialized knowledge, skills, and funding, making it an important but difficult task for pollution museums, which have weak organizational and financial bases. Since there are no legal provisions for the preservation of pollution-related materials, the materials will be scattered and lost if the owners of the materials do not recognize the significance of preserving them and do not donate them to archival institutions such as pollution museums. Another problem is that some archives do not have rules regarding the time period and criteria for the public release of personal information contained in materials. Still another is that methods for non-specialists to participate in the use and interpretation of pollution materials have not yet sufficiently matured (Shimizu 2023; Yamamoto 2023).

9.3 Networking Pollution Museums and Archival Centers 9.3.1 Pollution Museum Network Since 2013 As pollution museums of various kinds were being established throughout Japan, the director of one museum expressed a desire to promote exchange among pollution museums. Author Hayashi, then an archivist at the Nishiyodogawa Pollution and Environment Museum (Aozora Foundation), took the lead in efforts to form a network of pollution museums, and the Pollution Museum Network was formed in 2013 (Hayashi 2023). The main activity of the Pollution Museum Network is to hold “Collaboration Forum of Pollution Museums” where all parties involved in pollution

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museums meet and learn from each other through mutual exchange. Hayashi acted as the hub of the network by connecting pollution museums based on her experience, as described below. At that time there were opportunities for exchange among the public pollution museums dealing with the “four major pollution incidents” (Minamata City Minamata Disease Museum, Niigata Prefectural Museum of Environment and Human Contacts—Niigata Minamata Disease Museum, Toyama Prefectural Itai-itai Museum, and Yokkaichi Pollution and Environmental Future Museum Preparation Office), but other pollution museums had only one-on-one exchanges. It was not even clear how many pollution museums there were in Japan. Many museums had few staff members, and they struggled alone with the problems described above. It was an essential task for the functioning of the Pollution Museum Network to build a relationship of trust among the disparate pollution museum personnel so that they could learn from each other. An important initiative in the networking process consisted of interviews conducted at pollution museums and archival institutions. Authors Hayashi and Shimizu, along with other members of the network, visited pollution museums scattered across Japan, as well as pollution victims’ organizations and archival institutions that preserve pollution-related materials, and interviewed museum staff members about common problems such as their efforts to collect, preserve, and use pollutionrelated materials, exhibition and interpretation activities, training programs, organizational management challenges, cooperation with stakeholders, and other matters. We compiled the results of these interviews into a report (Aozora Foundation 2013). Thus, activities common to all pollution museums, and the museums’ problems, were identified and used for planning the “Collaboration Forum of Pollution Museums.” These interviews established a “face-to-face relationship” among the people involved in pollution museums in each geographical area, and enabled them to share awareness to some extent, which in turn facilitated the subsequent networking process. Another initiative, the network conference, was a direct meeting of people involved with pollution museums from different regions to discuss common goals, which helped clarify the purpose of networking among pollution museums. The network conference was a closed-door meeting attended only by those involved with each pollution museum, prior to the “Collaboration Forum of Pollution Museums,” which is an event open to the public. In the Japanese context, the word “kougai” (pollution) is included in one’s “difficult past/history.” It is thus difficult to discuss the nature of pollution in a place where psychological safety is not ensured. Staff members of publicly owned pollution museums, in particular, tend to be defensive in their words and actions in order to avoid criticism in their capacity as public officials. Therefore, to allow participants to speak frankly, efforts were made to encourage their active participation, such as by holding group discussions among various pollution museum officials in the form of workshops. One result of these efforts is the “Collaborative Vision for the Pollution Museum Network,” which was created in 2015. The vision is centered on the statement, “Within the Pollution Museum Network, we will share the efforts that have been made in various areas to communicate pollution, and together, in coordination and collaboration with diverse actors, disseminate the

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wisdom to build a future in which pollution will never again occur in Japan and the world.” This is the Constitution of the Pollution Museum Network, which expresses the Network’s commitment to henceforth collaborate with diverse entities having different standpoints.

9.3.2 Features of the Pollution Museum Network Here we try to characterize the activities of the Pollution Museum Network from several perspectives. The Network’s first feature is the creation of a place to learn from the places where pollution incidents occurred. The Network has regularly held the “Collaboration Forum of Pollution Museums,” with the venue changing each time, thereby traveling to pollution museums throughout Japan and to places with “difficult pasts” (see Table 9.2). Topics of discussion at the forums include, for example, the kinds of stories that local pollution museums are trying to tell, the objectives and content of local educational programs on pollution history, what has been accomplished in efforts to revive local community bonds, and the challenges that local communities face. The themes and speakers for keynote speeches and individual sessions should be designed so that participants can also learn about the context of the local community in which a pollution incident occurred, including the incident’s background and the local residents’ perceptions of the incident. The emphasis is on learning from the pollution experiences of people in each region. By doing so, the Collaboration Forum of Pollution Museums sheds new light on the experience of pollution in communities, thereby generating new interest in Table 9.2 Collaboration forum of pollution museums since 2013 Year

Venue

Keynote speech theme

1

2013

Niigata

Exhibits that inspire you to keep learning: Hands-On and Minds-On

2

2014

Toyama

Possibility of dialogue with companies

3

2015

Yokkaichi

How to Create Learning Opportunities in the Community

4

2016

Minamata

The Publicness of the Unknown: About My Small Influence

5

2017

Osaka

Connecting Memories: The Power of Place and Memorials

6

2018

Tokyo

Harnessing the power of citizens to leverage the SDGs

7

2019

Kurashiki

Community and human development based on learning: People are animals that live stories

8

2021

Nagasaki

Museums as Sites for Memory: In Light of International Trends

9

Scheduled for 2023

Fukushima

Scheduled to be held in 2023

Source Prepared by the authors based on the Pollution Museum Network website

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pollution and motivating people to talk about their experiences. The Mizushima Foundation, which had been engaged in activities to pass on the experience of pollution mainly through fieldwork, recognized the need for a place to convey the experience of pollution on a permanent basis, and created a place for the preservation and publication of materials, and for exchange. Another feature of the network is that its purpose is not to learn about the facts of specific pollution incidents. In the Collaboration Forum of Pollution Museums, speakers who are active in related fields are invited to speak, or to give lectures on topics not directly related to pollution. If anything, we have invited people who have imparted the “difficult past” of discrimination and war, and we have learned from them. In addition, we hope that learning about pollution will help people overcome divisions and conflicts, and encourage them to participate in society with an eye to realizing the public good. For that reason we have also learned how to create public spaces and how to run participatory exhibitions and provide explanations. In this way, the Collaboration Forum of Pollution Museums functions as a forum for discussion to draw general meaning from specific pollution incidents. The third feature is to record and preserve the activities of the Pollution Museum Network. All lectures and exchanges of opinions at the collaborative forums are recorded and transcribed. By clarifying the ideas and common understandings generated at the forum, and making them traceable later with written reports, we hope that the forum will not be limited to ad hoc exchanges among the participants, but will rather lead to collaboration and coordination in specific activities. The records of the Pollution Museum Network may also become an archive which shows how to reconstruct the process of collective pollution memory for future generations. Networking at the pollution museums creates opportunities for people from diverse backgrounds to learn from each other. For this reason, there are many young pollution museum staff and students who have not physically experienced pollution. The word “pollution” is perceived from a variety of perspectives. Each pollution victim has suffered a different form of damage, and the degree to which victims are compensated for their injuries varies. The stories they tell about their pollution incidents vary widely. Among the perpetrators, there are those who were directly involved in committing the action, and those who were indirectly involved; their stories may be quite different from those of the victims. And then there are a small number of people who are unaware of their own involvement in pollution, both as victims and perpetrators. They may find that pollution has insinuated itself into their own stories by finding themselves in other people’s stories. The network is a place to gain awareness of such diverse and complex realities. Such diversity in perceptions of pollution will be forgotten and dissipated over time if we do not ask the question, “What can we learn from pollution”? Reconstructing the collective memory of pollution is a process of repeatedly uncovering such diverse perceptions, sharing them with people from diverse perspectives, exchanging opinions on their meanings, recording them, and passing them on to someone else.

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9.4 Inheriting Kougai as Living History In Japan, pollution museums have emerged in a variety of forms. This is because those who need them have created them in the required forms. However, it is difficult to create a collective memory of pollution—a living history—by simply telling the facts about individual pollution incidents. Today, environmental pollution as a phenomenon is declining as fewer people are directly affected. It is difficult to maintain collective memory by means of the voices of only the affected parties. Places for people to learn from each other are necessary in order for the next generation, which cannot directly see the damage, to draw new knowledge from museums’ holdings, and to find, in the pollution experience, a crucial awareness about the nature of a society which does not cause pollution. Pollution museums contribute to creating such a learning space and place. As fragile organizations, individual pollution museums have the opportunity through networking to learn from pollution: they find out what kinds of public good and what kinds of social participation are important for living in modern society. It is not learning that is given “from above,” as is often the case in Japanese society. Public support for pollution museums is necessary, but it is not the only way to enhance the activities of pollution museums. The network aims to generate learning that individuals grasp on their own by shining a rainbow-colored light on the past of the communities in which they live. The recognition of pollution as “living history” reconstructed through such mutual learning will form the cognitive foundation of a society that aims to never repeat pollution again.

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