Environmental Performance in Democracies and Autocracies: Democratic Qualities and Environmental Protection 303038053X, 9783030380533

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Environmental Performance in Democracies and Autocracies Democratic Qualities and Environmental Protection Romy Escher Melanie Walter-Rogg

Environmental Performance in Democracies and Autocracies

Romy Escher · Melanie Walter-Rogg

Environmental Performance in Democracies and Autocracies Democratic Qualities and Environmental Protection

Romy Escher Institut für Politikwissenschaft University of Regensburg Regensburg, Bayern, Germany

Melanie Walter-Rogg Institut für Politikwissenschaft University of Regensburg Regensburg, Bayern, Germany

ISBN 978-3-030-38053-3 ISBN 978-3-030-38054-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38054-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

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1

Introduction

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Disentangling the Effect of the Regime Type on Environmental Performance

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Democratic Qualities and Environmental Performance in Democracies

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Democratic Qualities and Environmental Performance in Autocracies

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Democracy Quality, Political Corruption and Environmental Performance

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Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications

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Index

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About the Authors

Romy Escher is a research assistant and Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Regensburg. Her research interests include climate policy, comparative policy analysis, and empirical research methods. Melanie Walter-Rogg is Professor of Political Science and Methodology at the University of Regensburg. She has co-edited the Political Ecology of the Metropolis (ECPR Press, 2013) and authored a number of articles and book chapters on public policy analysis, metropolitan governance, urban democracy as well as political culture and political behaviour.

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List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2

Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. 3.6 Fig. 3.7 Fig. 3.8 Fig. 3.9 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

Local air pollution levels worldwide Global air pollution levels worldwide Development of local air pollution levels in world regions Development of global air pollution levels in world regions Democracies and autocracies Democracy quality by democracy model in democracies Democracy model and local air pollution levels in democracies Democracy model and global air pollution levels in democracies Global variation in democratic qualities Variation in democratic qualities among democracies Democratic qualities and local air pollution levels in democracies Democratic qualities and local air pollution development in democracies Democratic qualities and global air pollution levels in democracies Democratic qualities and global air pollution development in democracies Local air pollution levels in autocracies Global air pollution levels in autocracies Democracy quality by democracy model in autocracies Democracy model and local and global air pollution in autocracies

18 19 19 20 21 65 67 68 70 75 78 79 80 81 88 89 90 91

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6 Fig. 4.7 Fig. 4.8 Fig. 4.9 Fig. 4.10 Fig. 4.11 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 5.4 Fig. 5.5 Fig. 5.6 Fig. 5.7 Fig. 5.8 Fig. 5.9 Fig. 5.10 Fig. 5.11 Fig. 5.12 Fig. 5.13 Fig. 5.14

Variation in democratic qualities among autocracies Democratic qualities and local air pollution levels in autocracies Democratic qualities and local air pollution levels in autocracies (simultaneous analysis) Democratic qualities and local air pollution development in autocracies Democratic qualities and global air pollution levels in autocracies Democratic quality aspects and global air pollution levels in autocracies (simultaneous analysis) Democratic qualities and global air pollution development in autocracies Variation in political corruption in democracies and autocracies Political corruption and global and local air pollution in democracies and autocracies Social equality, legislative corruption and local air pollution levels in democracies Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption and local air pollution levels in democracies Local and regional democracy quality, dimensions of political corruption and local air pollution levels in democracies Social equality, legislative corruption and local air pollution levels in democracies Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption and local air pollution levels in democracies Local and regional democracy quality in democracies with below and above average levels of political corruption Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption and local air pollution levels in autocracies Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption dimensions and local air pollution levels in autocracies Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption and local air pollution development in autocracies Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption and global air pollution development in autocracies Social equality, legislative corruption and global air pollution levels in autocracies The equal distribution of socio-economic resources, legislative corruption and global air pollution levels in autocracies

93 97 98 99 100 101 102 114 116 120 121 123 126 127 128 132 133 135 140 141 142

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 4.1

Measurement of democratic qualities The quality of democracy by democracy model in democracies The quality of democracy by democracy model in autocracies

43 66 90

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter introduces the core theme of the book and outlines its structure. There are considerable differences in environmental performance across democracies, and environmental outcomes vary among autocracies as well. There is little knowledge about how democracy influences environmental performance, though multiple features of democracy are emphasized in the literature. Democracies vary in nonelectoral aspects. Autocracies differ in the extent to which they hold competitive elections and implement non-electoral traits of democracy. Thus, this book examines whether analysing the effects of each democratic feature separately contributes to a better understanding of crossnational variance in environmental performance across democracies and across autocracies. Political corruption affects a country’s ability to adopt and implement environmental policies. Therefore, this book also studies the joint influence of different democratic qualities and political corruption. Keywords Climate policy · Democracy · Autocracy · Environmental performance

© The Author(s) 2020 R. Escher and M. Walter-Rogg, Environmental Performance in Democracies and Autocracies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38054-0_1

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Environmental degradation is a major challenge of our time. Local pollution, e.g., of air and water, affects our health, our economy and our culture as well as fellow species on earth. Global pollutants such as greenhouse gas emissions endanger coastal areas and small island states with accelerated sea level rise; affect agriculture and fisheries with ocean warming and acidification and droughts; endanger human life with extreme weather events; and contribute to species extinction. Scholars and political decision-makers emphasize the security consequences of global warming (Detraz 2011; Hartmann 2010). Since the 1970s, nation-states have adopted policies to protect the environment, and currently, most states regard environmental protection as state responsibility (Duit 2014, p. 1). In the early 1990s, global environmental change was also recognized as a political problem on the international level. However, environmental performance varies considerably between countries and over time. This book examines whether an analysis of the effects of different democratic qualities improves our understanding of cross-national variation in environmental performance among democracies and among autocracies. General performance is differentiated into procedural performance, i.e., “the capability, stability, and efficiency of the government” (Hanusch 2018, p. 31) and substantive performance, i.e., a country’s performance in specific policy fields (e.g., Roller 2005; Weaver and Rockman 1993). Environmental performance is defined as the degree to which a society attains environmental goals (Meadowcroft 2014; Roller 2005). There are two approaches to studying environmental performance: the first studies the adoption and stringency of environmental policies (environmental outputs), while the second examines the results of these policies, i.e., their impacts on air pollution (environmental outcomes) (e.g., Roller 2005; Scruggs 2003). This book contributes to academic research on the determinants of environmental outcomes. Green political theorists have been debating about the nature of the relationship between democracy and the environment since the 1970s. Policy-makers and journalists hope that democracy contributes to environmental and climate protection (Petherick 2014). The former VicePresident of the United States (US) Gore (1992, p. 179) regarded “the spread of democratic government to more nations of the world … [as] an essential prerequisite for saving the environment.” By contrast, green political theorists in the 1970s argued that democracy would hinder the solution of environmental challenges (Heilbroner 1974; Ophuls 1977; Ophuls and Boyan 1992) because the focus on individual rights

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would undermine efforts to protect the environment. Similarly, scholars of the eco-authoritarian school of political theory argue for less democracy or favour autocracy when addressing global environmental change (e.g., Beeson 2010, 2016; Gilley 2012; Shearman and Smith 2007). These scholars question the assumption that participation and decentralization contribute to environmental protection. However, only a small number of scholars see democracy as undermining environmental performance. Observing environmental degradation in communist countries in Eastern Europe as well as in autocracies in the developing world in the 1980s, scholars linked democracy positively to environmental performance (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006, p. 334). Most scholars currently believe that democracy is compatible with environmental protection (e.g., Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2002; Payne 1995; Walker 1999). Referring to the theoretical debate, numerous statistical studies have examined the relationship between regime type and environmental performance (e.g., Barrett and Graddy 2000; Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Congleton 1992; Farzin and Bond 2006; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Neumayer 2002; Wurster 2013). Empirical research partly indicates that democracies perform better in solving local and regional environmental problems (e.g., Barrett and Graddy 2000; Bernauer and Koubi 2009; Li and Reuveny 2006; Ward 2008; Winslow 2005; Wurster 2013) than their autocratic counterparts (see also Fiorino 2011, pp. 375ff.). However, some studies find no effect of democracy on environmental policy stringency (e.g., Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006). The academic literature is also ambiguous about the relevance of the regime type for environmental problems that demand considerable behavioural changes such as climate change (e.g., Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013, 2016; Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2002; Kneuer 2012; Li and Reuveny 2006; Midlarsky 1998; Policardo 2016; Spilker 2012, 2013; Wurster 2013, see also Christoff and Eckersley 2011; Wurster 2013, p. 89). Previous quantitative research has mainly focused on regime type divides in environmental performance. However, there are considerable differences in environmental performance among democracies as well as among autocracies. Moreover, environmental protection also varies over time. Despite high levels of democracy, established democracies show considerable differences in their climate performance (Christoff and Eckersley 2011, p. 439; Clulow 2018, p. 2; Povitkina 2018, p. 411).

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For example, recently, there has been a decline in environmental performance in the US, one of the first countries to introduce environmental policies. Not only democracies but also autocracies engage in environmental protection (Sonnenfeld and Taylor 2018, p. 518). While the US government has been weakening environmental regulations and withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, China has been adopting measures to reduce air pollution and support international climate cooperation. China has reduced coal use per capita and, to this end, closed or relocated pollution-intensive firms (Beeson 2018, p. 39). In fact, China urged the Trump administration not to leave the Paris agreement, as in doing so, the US would act against the policy preferences of global society (Clark 2016). In earlier stages of the climate change regime, the positions of China and the US contributed to the failure of the Copenhagen summit (Christoff 2010). Thus, the democracy-environment literature lacks an explanation of country differences in environmental performance among democracies as well as among autocracies. There has been little research in this regard (e.g., Escher and Walter-Rogg 2018; Hanusch 2018; Kim et al. 2019). To explain country differences in environmental performance among democracies and among autocracies, empirical research has examined the role of the type of democracy and autocracy, institutional constraints and electoral systems (e.g., Madden 2014; Poloni-Staudinger 2008; Scruggs 2003; Wurster 2013). More recently, empirical research has examined whether the specific traits of democracy (e.g., Escher and Walter-Rogg 2018) contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between the regime type and environmental performance. In fact, there is no consensus in the theoretical literature on how democracy influences environmental performance. Green political theory discusses the environmental consequences of different models of democracy (e.g., liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, participatory democracy). Moreover, the literature emphasizes particular aspects of these democracy concepts as being crucial for the environment, including competitive elections, political rights, checks and balances, civil rights, deliberation quality, social equality and non-electoral forms of participation, including direct democracy, civil society participation and local and regional democracy. There is also no agreement on the direction of the effect of these democratic qualities on environmental outcomes (Burnell 2012; Held and Hervey 2011; Payne 1995). Therefore, it remains to be determined which inherent features of democracy affect the environment (see also Burnell 2012,

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p. 823). Democracies vary in their non-electoral aspects. For instance, in numerous democracies, access to power depends on gender and socioeconomic status (Lührmann et al. 2018). Meanwhile, autocracies also differ in the extent to which they hold competitive elections and implement non-electoral features such as political and civil liberties (Lührmann et al. 2018). This book, therefore, examines the following research question separately for democracies and autocracies: Does the analysis of individual democratic qualities help explain country differences in environmental performance among democracies and autocracies? Our main argument is that a uniform effect cannot be expected for all democratic qualities. The use of measures that summarize data on multiple aspects of democracy might therefore contribute to the mixed findings in the existing literature. We expect that an analysis of specific democratic qualities could contribute to a better understanding of crossnational variation in environmental performance among democracies and among autocracies. Among the democracy dimensions, social equality and local and regional democracy should contribute to environmental performance. When analysing features of democracy and environmental performance, it is important to consider political corruption (e.g., Fredriksson and Millimet 2007; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006). Institutional quality affects the ability of democratic and autocratic governments to adopt and implement environmental policies. Recent empirical research suggests that a country’s level of political corruption moderates the effect of the regime type on environmental performance (Povitkina 2018). This book, therefore, also investigates whether the effects of democratic qualities on environmental performance are dependent on political corruption. The positive effects of democratic qualities on environmental protection should be limited in the presence of corruption in both democracies and autocracies. It is an empirical question whether specific forms of political corruption, such as corruption among political decision-makers or public officials, are decisive (e.g., Wilson and Damania 2005). To our knowledge, this has not been considered in previous research. To fill this research gap, this book examines whether a disaggregated analysis of the moderating effect of the institutional traits of democracy and political corruption improves our understanding of the joint effect of democracy and corruption on environmental policy. The research questions addressed in this book are relevant from both scientific and policy perspectives. As explained above, environmental

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change is a major challenge of our time. Thus, it is important to analyse cross-national variance in environmental performance. Our study contributes to the democracy-environmental literature. First, compared to previous research (e.g., Escher and Walter-Rogg 2018), this study conducts a comprehensive analysis of the effect of democratic qualities on environmental performance that should contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between them. It examines individually the effect of competitive elections, political rights, checks and balances, civil rights, deliberation quality, social equality, direct democracy, civil society participation and democracy quality at the local and regional levels on environmental performance. Second, different from similar research, this study examines the relative importance of democratic qualities for two different environmental problems: local and global air pollution. Previous research has shown that the explanatory factors vary with environmental problems. Thus, it is important to examine each dimension of environmental performance separately. What democratic qualities are decisive for better performance in solving local environmental problems and what democratic qualities contribute in any way at all to climate protection? Former studies on the environmental consequences of democracy focus mainly on climate performance (e.g., Escher and Walter-Rogg 2018; Hanusch 2018). Third, this study contributes to comparative environmental policy research focused on autocracies by examining the effect of domestic political institutions on environmental performance in democracies as well as in autocracies. Previous research has focused on democracies, and there has been little quantitative research on variation in environmental performance among autocracies (e.g., Ward et al. 2014; Wurster 2013). Those studies that do exist on differences in environmental outcomes among autocracies have examined autocratic regime subtypes. Finally, we contribute to the literature on political corruption and environmental performance. In comparison to previous research, our analysis distinguishes between the joint effect of corruption and democracy for multiple dimensions of democracy and political corruption. To answer our research questions, this study conducts separate regression analyses of data on local and global air pollutants for democracies and autocracies. The statistical analyses are complemented by short case studies that enable us to examine the mechanisms leading to our results. As described above, this study defines environmental performance as environmental outcomes, which is in accordance with similar studies worldwide and makes our results comparable to previous results. While it is

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important to study environmental performance with regard to policy outputs as well, there is a lack of comparable data across years, particularly for non-OECD countries. This book focuses on domestic and global air pollution—sulphur emissions and carbon dioxide emissions—which enables us to examine differences between domestic and global pollutants. Environmental outcomes are considerably affected by non-political factors. Our multivariate analysis controls for economic, social and geographical variables that have been applied in similar studies. As explained above, we examine both regime types separately. To identify democracies and autocracies, we use data from Cheibub et al. (2009). Their classification is based on a minimalist democracy concept, which is in accordance with the regime type–environment literature studying whether democracies or autocracies perform better in environmental policy (Wurster 2013). We then extend this research and apply measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project to investigate the effects of specific democratic qualities and political corruption dimensions on environmental performance in our separate analyses of democracies and autocracies. Previous research has mainly applied democracy measures that summarize data on different democratic qualities and prevent us from studying them separately (e.g., political rights and civil liberties from Freedom House, Polity 2 from Polity IV). Moreover, these democracy quality measures are often based on a liberal understanding of democracy. Similarly, research on the environmental consequences of political corruption has applied composite measures of political corruption. The use of disaggregated data from V-Dem first enables us to study democracy quality dimensions and political corruption dimensions separately and in detail. With regard to democracy quality, the V-Dem data and measures from Lührmann et al. (2017) based on the V-Dem indicators enable us to examine the separate effects of contested elections, checks and balances, political and civil liberties, democracy on the local and regional levels, deliberation and social equality, i.e., the equal access of social groups to the political decision-making process. With regard to political corruption, based on V-Dem data, McMann et al. (2016) developed separate measures of legislative and public sector corruption. In addition, V-Dem offers indicators of legislative and judicial corruption. Democratic qualities and political corruption vary among democracies as well as among autocracies. The detailed V-Dem indicators enable us to capture these country differences. In contrast, democracy measures from Freedom House and Polity IV, which are frequently used

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in the democracy-environment literature, cannot distinguish differences between established democracies. Thus, we apply the same measures of democratic qualities and political corruption dimensions in our separate analyses of democracies and autocracies. Third, the measures from VDem perform better with regard to validity and reliability than other frequently used measures. Finally, the political corruption measures applied in this study do not overlap with our indicators of democratic qualities in their conceptualization and measurement. Using data from Cheibub et al. (2009), in our analysis of democracies, we control institutional differences among types of democracies (parliamentary and presidential democracies) and in the analysis of autocracies, we control institutional differences among types of autocracies (civil, military and royal dictatorships). The effect of electoral accountability is dependent on whether supporters or opponents of environmental performance are elected. Checks and balances ensure that more policy preferences are considered in the political decision-making process, but sometimes a single veto player is able to block environmental protection efforts. The rule of law might contribute to the implementation of environmental regulations, but it is dependent on the stringency of environmental policies. Political rights make it possible to consider environmental policy preferences in the political decisionmaking process, but previous research has found that it has no effect on environmental performance. It is an empirical question whether deliberation quality matters for environmental protection. Equality among social groups should make it more likely that diffuse interests such as environmental protection are considered in the domestic political decisionmaking process. In autocracies, social equality should be associated with lower levels of environmental performance. While there are autocracies that perform well in social equality, this does not mean that all social groups have equal influence on political decisions. However, improvements in social equality might contribute via consumption to environmental pollution. Local and regional democracy should contribute to environmental performance in democracies as well as autocracies, as these enable citizens and ENGOs to express their environmental policy preferences, support participation and deliberation and contribute to the effectiveness of environmental policy via local knowledge and information. The findings of this study demonstrate that the separate analysis of democratic qualities contributes to the explanation of country differences in environmental performance among democracies as well as among autocracies.

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Specific aspects of democracy explain cross-national variation in environmental performance. First, our findings suggest that the separate analysis of democratic qualities contributes to the explanation of environmental performance in terms of the reduction in both local and global air pollution. The quality of democracy has no effect on environmental performance in democracies and autocracies independent of the underlying democracy concept. Second, we find differences in the effects of democratic qualities on environmental performance in democracies and autocracies. We also find that political corruption moderates the effect of democratic qualities on environmental performance in democracies and autocracies. Third, the relationship between democratic qualities and environmental performance varies with the type of environmental problem. Neither the degree nor specific features of democracy can explain cross-national variation in global air pollution in democracies. However, democratic qualities affect local air quality in democracies and non-democracies and, to some extent, global air quality in autocracies. As expected, social equality contributes to environmental performance in democracies. However, this only applies to local air quality. In democracies with below average levels of legislative corruption, social equality is associated with lower local air pollution levels. As expected in autocracies, the equal distribution of socio-economic resources among social groups contributes to higher levels of global air pollution in autocracies. However, it only applies to non-democracies with below average and average levels of legislative corruption. In accordance with our theoretical expectations, local and regional democracy affects environmental performance differently between democracies and autocracies. Local and regional democracy is associated with better local air quality levels in democracies with below average levels of political corruption. In contrast, local and regional democracy has a negative effect on local air pollution levels and development in autocracies with above average levels of political corruption. The different levels of the political system make it more difficult for special interests to bribe political authorities. In addition, competition within those levels of the political system that increase accountability and efficiency might weaken the negative effects of political corruption on environmental performance. Finally, local and regional democracy contribute to global air pollution growth in autocracies with average levels of legislative corruption.

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This book is structured in six chapters. In the next chapter, we revisit the academic literature on regime type and the environment and formulate hypotheses on the relative importance of democratic qualities for environmental performance. This chapter argues that the regime type independent of the underlying notion of democracy cannot explain cross-national variation in environmental performance. However, specific democratic qualities contribute to the understanding of environmental performance. Finally, the next chapter explains our research design. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the importance of democratic features for local and global air pollution in democracies and autocracies. These chapters show that the analysis of specific democratic qualities shows how they contribute to environmental performance in democracies and autocracies. Chapter 5 studies the joint influence of political corruption and democratic qualities on environmental performance in democracies and autocracies. The final chapter summarizes the findings and presents our conclusions.

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Petherick, Anna. 2014. Seeking a fair and sustainable future. Nature Climate Change 4: 81–83. Policardo, Laura. 2016. Is democracy good for the environment? Quasiexperimental evidence from regime transitions. Environmental and Resource Economics 64: 275–300. Poloni-Staudinger, Lori M. 2008. Are consensus democracies more environmentally effective? Environmental Politics 17: 410–430. Povitkina, Marina. 2018. The limits of democracy in tackling climate change. Environmental Politics 27: 411–432. Roller, Edeltraud. 2005. The performance of democracies: Political institutions and public policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scruggs, Lyle. 2003. Sustaining abundance: Environmental performance in industrial democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shearman, David J., and Joseph W. Smith. 2007. The climate change challenge and the failure of democracy. Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Publishing Group. Sonnenfeld, David A., and Peter L. Taylor. 2018. Liberalism, illiberalism, and the environment. Society & Natural Resources 31: 515–524. Spilker, Gabriele. 2012. Helpful organizations: Membership in intergovernmental organizations and environmental quality in developing countries. British Journal of Political Science 42: 345–370. Spilker, Gabriele. 2013. Globalization, political institutions and the environment in developing countries. New York and London: Routledge. Walker, Peter A. 1999. Democracy and environment: Congruencies and contradictions in southern Africa. Political Geography 18: 257–284. Ward, Hugh. 2008. Liberal democracy and sustainability. Environmental Politics 17: 386–409. Ward, Hugh, Xun Cao, and Bumba Mukherjee. 2014. State capacity and the environmental investment gap in authoritarian states. Comparative Political Studies 47: 309–343. Weaver, Kent R., and Bert A. Rockman. 1993. Assessing the effects of institutions. In Do institutions matter? Government capabilities in the United States and abroad, ed. R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, 1–41. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Wilson, John K., and Richard Damania. 2005. Corruption, political competition and environmental policy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 49: 516–535. Winslow, Margrethe. 2005. Is democracy good for the environment? Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 48: 771–783. Wurster, Stefan. 2013. Comparing ecological sustainability in autocracies and democracies. Contemporary Politics 19: 76–93.

CHAPTER 2

Disentangling the Effect of the Regime Type on Environmental Performance

Abstract This chapter explains the motivation for this study of the effects of specific features of democracy on environmental performance. It formulates hypotheses and explains the research design of the subsequent empirical analyses. It cannot be expected that democracies are generally more environmentally friendly than autocracies. Instead, specific institutional traits of democracies contribute to environmental protection, while others presumably have no or, under certain conditions, even negative consequences for the environment. Social equality should contribute to environmental performance in democracies, as broad representation makes it more likely that diffuse interests are considered in the political decision-making process. Stronger local and regional democracy should contribute to environmental performance in democracies and autocracies, as it supports political participation, local acceptance of environmental policies and the efficiency of environmental protection. Keywords Regime type · Democracy · Environmental theory · Democratic qualities · Environmental policy · Climate change

Previous empirical research on democracy and the environment uses statistical data to estimate the effect of the regime type or the quality of a democracy on environmental outcomes. This chapter explains our main

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argument that we should focus instead on analysing the effects of specific aspects of democracy on environmental performance in democracies and autocracies. To answer our research question regarding the effects of specific democratic qualities and to contribute to our understanding of environmental performance in democracies and autocracies, this chapter discusses the existing literature and formulates hypotheses on the importance of democratic qualities for environmental performance. It concludes with an explanation of the research design of the subsequent empirical analyses.

2.1

Environmental Performance

Studies on the environmental consequences of democracy examine state participation in international environmental cooperation, i.e., the ratification of international environmental agreements (e.g., Neumayer 2002a), environmental performance (e.g., Bättig and Bernauer 2009), environmental quality or compliance with international environmental agreements (e.g., Carbonell and Allison 2015) as a dependent variable. As explained in the introduction, this study examines environmental performance, i.e., the degree of societal attainment of environmental goals (Meadowcroft 2014; Roller 2005). Comparative environmental policy research conceptualises and measures environmental performance based on environmental policy outputs (e.g., the adoption or stringency of environmental policy) or environmental outcomes (e.g., air pollution and water pollution) (Fiorino 2011, p. 369f.; Meadowcroft 2014, p. 29; Saretzki 2007, p. 427). This study captures environmental performance by environmental outcomes (e.g., Roller 2005; Scruggs 2003). Following Scruggs (2003, p. 6), environmental outcome indicators are “the true test of environmental policy” (see also Jahn 2014, p. 83). Environmental policy outputs can be attributed to political authorities (Saretzki 2007) and are not affected by non-political factors or intermediate variables (Christoff and Eckersley 2011, p. 432; Compston and Bailey 2014, p. 2; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2016, p. 334; Tosun 2012, p. 441). However, environmental performance cannot be evaluated based on environmental policy outputs alone. The number of environmental policies does not necessarily mean more environmental protection. Moreover, the adoption and the stringency environmental policies tell us nothing about their implementation and effectiveness (Welsch 2004, p. 665), for instance, the US government undermines environmental policies by limiting financial

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resources for environmental authorities (Cao and Prakash 2012, p. 70f.). Finally, environmental policy measures vary across countries. Thus, it is important to study both policy output and environmental outcomes. Data on environmental policy output are limited for a worldwide analysis, so due to data availability and comparability, the following empirical analysis focuses on environmental outcomes. Effects of democracy might be, in general, less prevalent for environmental outcomes than environmental policy outputs. Several scholars believe that democracies are more committed to international environmental and climate cooperation, but note that this does not mean that they are more likely to comply and implement them (e.g., Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Jacobson and Brown-Weiss 1998, p. 533; Weiss and Jacobson 1999, p. 39). It is presumably more difficult for the public to control the implementation of environmental policies than their adoption (Cao and Prakash 2012). Thus, environmental outcomes constitute a hard test for analysing the relationship between democratic qualities and the environment. This book examines data on air pollution: SO2 emissions and CO2 emissions. We have decided against using a summary measure of environmental performance (see also, for instance, Iwinska ´ et al. 2019, p. 5; Cao and Prakash 2012). The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the relationship between democracy and the environment should be studied separately for different environmental problems. From a theoretical perspective, it is plausible to expect that the effects of democratic qualities vary for different environmental problems. The visibility of environmental problems should affect public pressure on the government as well as incentives for the governments to become active (Cao and Prakash 2012). In accordance, political decision-makers have more incentives to solve those environmental problems with immediate local consequences (e.g., domestic air pollution from SO2 emissions) in comparison to longterm global environmental problems (e.g., global warming from CO2 emissions). Moreover, there are likely to be differences between environmental problems that can be easily solved and those that require considerable socio-economic changes. Midlarsky (2001, p. 177) concludes from his analysis of democracy and different environmental outcomes “that there is no uniform relationship between democracy and the environment.” Winslow (2005, p. 781) argues that democracies should perform better in response to immediate and local environmental problems than to long-term, global and uncertain environmental problems.

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It is important to study local and global air pollution levels and changes. As previous research on democracy and the environment has shown that democracy affects both differently (Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Hanusch 2018), they should be analysed separately. Scholars emphasize that pollution is not necessarily lower in democracies than in autocracies but only that democracies are more likely to adopt environmental protection policies (e.g., Bättig and Bernauer 2009, p. 293; Murdoch and Sandler 1997; Neumayer 2002a, p. 144). The following empirical analysis examines SO2 and CO2 emission levels and their long-term change. Democracy should influence emissions only in the long term (Scruggs 2003, p. 19), whereas short-term changes in emission levels are often caused by non-political variables (Scruggs 2003, p. 19) and associated with uncertainty (Macknick 2011, p. 194). SO2 emissions per capita as well as CO2 emissions per capita vary considerably among countries (see Figs. 2.1 and 2.2). It is important to consider differences in economic development between countries. Developed countries show higher CO2 emissions per capita than developing countries. Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that CO2 and SO2 emissions are the highest in North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand. Nonetheless, there are country differences within both country groups.

Fig. 2.1 Local air pollution levels worldwide (Note The map displays average levels of SO2 emissions per capita from 1990 to 2000.)

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Fig. 2.2 Global air pollution levels worldwide (Note The map displays average levels of CO2 emissions per capita from 1990 to 2000.)

Fig. 2.3 Development of local air pollution levels in world regions (Note SO2 emissions per capita by world region from 1990 to 2000.)

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Fig. 2.4 Development of global air pollution levels in world regions (Note CO2 emissions per capita by world region from 1990 to 2010.)

2.2

Regime Type and Environmental Performance

As has been explained in the introduction, most scholars currently believe that democracy is compatible with environmental protection. Empirical research on democracy and environmental performance relies predominantly on quantitative methods. While some studies suggest that democracies deal better than autocracies with local environmental problems, there is no clear support for either democracies or autocracies performing better in environmental protection (see also Christoff and Eckersley 2011; Wurster 2013, p. 89). Previous quantitative research has mainly focused on differences between democracies and autocracies in environmental performance. However, there are considerable differences in environmental performance among democracies as well as among autocracies. Figure 2.5 shows countries from 1990 to 2000 based on whether they were electoral democracies or autocracies for the majority of years in the period. When we compare this map with the maps of SO2 and CO2 emissions in Figs. 2.1 and 2.2, it can be seen that the levels of both air pollutants vary among democracies and autocracies.

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Fig. 2.5 Democracies and autocracies (Note Blue = Countries that have been democracies most years from 1990 to 2000, red, countries that have been autocracies most years 1990–2000, classification of democracies and autocracies based on data from Cheibub et al. [2010].)

2.3 Models of Democracy and Environmental Performance Following Dahl (1971), participation and competition is decisive for electoral democracies. By participation, he refers to the election of political authorities, and with regard to competition, he emphasizes political rights. The democracy-environment literature also discusses the importance of political parties (Fredriksson et al. 2005, p. 350; List and Sturm 2006, p. 1259; Wilson and Damania 2005). There is no agreement in the academic literature on what characterizes democracies aside from competitive elections (Coppedge et al. 2011, pp. 248, 258; Geissel et al. 2016, p. 574; Merkel 2016, p. 444), although the literature distinguishes models of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2011; Cunningham 2002; Held 2006). These models differ in their inclusion and emphasis on attributes such as civil rights, participation, socio-economic equality and deliberation (Coppedge et al. 2016, p. 581): electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian democracy. Green political theory discusses the relationship between different models of democracy and environmental performance. There is no agreement among green political theorists on which type of democracy is more environmentally friendly. The discussion

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mainly focuses on the implications of deliberative and participatory versus liberal democracy for environmental performance (Hochstetler 2012, p. 202). The liberal model emphasizes the importance of civil rights that protect the citizens against the state and horizontal accountability, i.e., checks and balances for democracy (Coppedge et al. 2016, p. 582f.). While several scholars argue for the ability of liberal democracy to address environmental problems (e.g., Sagoff 2008; Wissenburg 1998), most green political theorists question the assumption that liberal democracy promotes environmental protection (e.g., Eckersley 1995; Hausknost 2011), many adopting the perspective of deliberative democracy theory. From this perspective, liberal democracies focus on the policy preferences of individual social groups (Dryzek 1992). In this way, they are not able to consider diffuse, long-term and generalized interests such as environmental protection (Dryzek 1992; Eckersley 1995; Sjöstedt and Jagers 2014). Moreover, liberal democracies give the industry sector and trade unions too much influence on the political system (Eckersley 1995; Sjöstedt and Jagers 2014). Industry and labour interests have more possibilities to influence democratic governments than environmental interest groups, as the latter are often not centrally organized, have fewer financial resources and have less access to information (Dryzek 1992; Eckersley 1995). Additionally, corporatist bargaining processes contribute to the focus on short-term labour and capital interests (Dryzek 1992; Eckersley 1995). The literature also emphasizes that governments in liberal democracies focus on their re-election and therefore on short-term labour and capital interests (Dryzek 1992; Eckersley 1995). The reliance of the state on economic growth increases this problem (Dryzek 1992; Eckersley 1995). Overall, liberal democracy would thus be unable to represent the long-term environmental interests as well as the policy preferences of non-humans (Eckersley 1995; Hayward 1998). Green political theorists as well as green movements and parties demand more democracy (Jagers 2007, p. 14f.). They favour participatory and/or deliberative democracy (Eckersley 1995; Sjöstedt and Jagers 2014). Parties also reflect the importance of democracy at the local and regional levels for the environment. Deliberative democracy models emphasize that in the political decision making process, different policy preferences should be equally considered on the basis of a “respectful and reasonable dialogue at all levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interest, or coercion” (Coppedge et al. 2016,

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p. 583). Participatory democracy is defined differently. In common, they both emphasize the importance of non-electoral forms of political participation, including forms of direct democracy and the participation of civil society organizations in the political process (Coppedge et al. 2016, p. 583). Green political theorists, green movements and finally, the literature on democracy and the environment discuss the importance of equality among social groups. The egalitarian notion of democracy is based on the idea that political power should be equally distributed among citizens independent of economic, social, sexual and ethnic differences among them (Coppedge et al. 2016, p. 583). A broad representation of socio-economic interests in the political system should contribute to the consideration of diffuse interests such as environmental protection. The discussion on the environmental consequences of democracy also includes arguments regarding economic development and international cooperation (e.g., Burnell 2012; Desai 1998; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002b; Payne 1995). Several scholars assume that the effect of the political regime type is conditional on a country’s level of economic development. Desai (1998, p. 11) maintains that high levels of economic development for democracies contribute to pollution. Farzin and Bond (2006) show that socio-economic variables moderate the effect of democracy on CO2 emissions. Spilker (2012, 2013, see also Ruoff 2009, pp. 3, 5) expects no independent effect from the regime type on environmental quality in low-income countries. She assumes that there is little public demand for environmental protection in the developing world, as the poor prioritizes their socio-economic survival (see also Neumayer 2002a, p. 150). The environment-democracy literature also emphasizes democracy’s relationship with international cooperation (e.g., Midlarsky 1998, p. 345f.; Payne 1995, p. 46f.). Democracies would be more responsive to demands from IGOs and NGOs that demand the implementation of international treaties (Payne 1995, p. 47). Midlarsky (1998, p. 345f.) offers arguments that relate democracy to environmental performance, emphasizing, as democracy peace theory, mutual identification among democracies, cooperation in IGOs and representative institutions. In addition, governments might learn from the environmental policies of other democracies (Midlarsky 1998, p. 346; see also Midlarsky 2001, p. 161). In the following discussion, we focus on institutional aspects of democracy and consider other relevant variables as controls in the multivariate analysis.

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In sum, the academic literature on regime type and environmental performance discusses whether democracies or autocracies perform better in environmental protection. Empirical research suggests that the regime type has no clear effect on the environment. In green political theory, there are debates on the environmental consequences of different models of democracy. In contrast, quantitative research has mainly used democracy measures based on a liberal understanding of democracy (such as Polity2 from Polity IV and the political rights and civil liberties indicators from Freedom House) and has, therefore, neglected to consider other democracy concepts (Kim et al. 2019, p. 4; Hochstetler 2012, p. 206). Therefore, there is a need to examine the environmental consequences of different models of democracy.

2.4 Democratic Qualities and Environmental Performance However, with regard to the relationship between models of democracy and environmental performance, it must be remembered that there is no agreement that specific democratic qualities have a uniform effect on environmental outcomes (Burnell 2012; Held and Hervey 2011; Payne 1995; Winslow 2005, p. 781). Therefore, the question is which inherent features of democracy affect the environment (see also Böhmelt et al. 2016, p. 1273; Burnell 2012, p. 823). Our argument is that an analysis of specific democratic qualities might contribute to a better understanding of cross-national variation in environmental performance among democracies and among autocracies. Democracies vary in their non-electoral democratic features. For instance, in numerous democracies, access to power depends on gender and socio-economic status (Lührmann et al. 2018). Autocracies differ in the extent to which they hold competitive elections and implement non-electoral features such as political and private civil liberties (Lührmann et al. 2018). In the following section, we discuss the effect of specific democratic qualities on environmental performance. As the discussion above has shown, there is no agreedupon definition of democracy in the democracy-environment literature. Therefore, we consider the democratic qualities of multiple democracy models, including electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory democracy. With regard to electoral democracy, the democracyenvironment literature discusses the importance of electoral accountability

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and political rights for the environment. Based on a liberal understanding of democracy, the literature addresses the relationship between civil rights and horizontal accountability and its effect on environmental performance. Green political theorists and feminist theorists, based on an egalitarian notion of democracy, discuss the relevance of social equality among social groups for the environment. Finally, from the perspective of deliberative and participatory democracy, scholars focus on deliberation quality, direct democracy, civil society participation and democracy at the local and regional levels of the political system. 2.4.1

Electoral Accountability

Numerous publications refer to electoral accountability when theorizing about the relationship between democracy and environmental performance. Scholars expect electoral accountability, i.e., the right to participate in the free and fair election of political authorities (Merkel 2004, p. 42) to contribute to environmental protection. First, democratically elected governments are responsive to their citizens’ policy preferences (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992). The median voter should be more willing to accept stricter environmental regulations because they are less costly for citizens compared to political and economic elites, who possess a larger part of the national income (Bernauer and Koubi 2009, p. 1356; Congleton 1992, pp. 416f, 421; Policardo 2015, p. 2; Winslow 2005, p. 772). Winslow (2005, p. 772) notes that electoral accountability reduces the possibility that political decision-makers will enrich themselves through environmental pollution. Additionally, non-elected governments might not adopt long-term environmental policies because their power is uncertain (Congleton 1992, p. 417). Second, democracies presumably provide more environmental public goods to stay in power (De Mesquita et al. 2003), as the price of public good provision relative to private goods falls with the size of the winning coalition (Cao and Ward 2015, p. 265). Finally, Fredriksson et al. (2005, p. 350), List and Sturm (2006, p. 1259) and Wilson and Damania (2005) emphasize the importance of competitive elections. Governments will only consider citizens’ policy preferences if such consideration makes a difference. The underlying assumption that citizens are environmentally friendly is questionable (Spilker 2013; Ward 2008, p. 389). The policy preferences of the majority of voters in elections are often not in accordance with

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sustainability (Blühdorn 2011). This applies especially to long-term environmental problems such as global air pollution. Climate change mainly affects future generations, and climate policies will only impact emissions in the long term (Bernauer and Koubi 2009, p. 1357; Cao and Ward 2015, p. 271; Wurster 2011, p. 546f.; 2013, p. 90). Moreover, democratic governments are accountable to citizens within the nation-state and might not be willing to address global environmental pollution (Held and Hervey 2011, p. 90). Electoral democracy neglects long-term interests and the interests of future generations (Blühdorn 2011). The diffuse character of the climate problem makes it unlikely that emissions are relevant in most citizens’ decisions in elections. Empirical research finds that climate concern varies among countries (e.g., Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014). Political decision-makers might, therefore, focus on the immediate well-being of their citizens to secure their re-election (Povitkina 2018, p. 412). Democratic governments might find themselves confronting citizens who are unwilling to accept the socio-economic costs of environmental protection (Holden 2002, p. 10) and who prioritize economic development (Shearman and Smith 2007, pp. xivf, 83). The challenge for democratically elected governments lies therein: they need to adopt and implement policies that increase costs for individuals or limit their rights to address environmental problems (Blühdorn 2011). This applies to local and global air pollution. For instance, there were citizens’ protests in 2019 in Germany and in France against policy measures taken to reduce local air pollution. Green political theorists (e.g., Ophuls 1977) of the eco-authoritarian school argued in favour of technocratic and expert government (Barry 1999, p. 198). However, non-elected governments also might not pursue environmentally friendly policies, as their legitimacy rests on their socio-economic performance. In sum, we expect that competitive elections cannot explain cross-national variation in environmental performance (Hypothesis 1). Instead, performance depends on whether supporters or opponents of climate protection are elected (see also Wurster et al. 2015, p. 183f.). Green parties and movements have low support in the general elections in many countries (e.g., in Latin America, Hochstetler 2012, p. 217), but they might become more influential given greater awareness of global environmental change.

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Political Rights

Many political scientists link democracy to environmental protection via political rights, i.e., freedom of expression, association, and the media and the autonomy of civil society (Merkel 2004, p. 39). Political theorists that prefer liberal democracy stress the importance of political rights (e.g., Sagoff 2008; Wissenburg 1998). These institutional traits enable citizens to inform themselves regarding pollution (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Bernauer et al. 2013; p. 93f.; Payne 1995, p. 43; Winslow 2005, p. 772), to express their environmental policy preferences (Bernauer et al. 2013, p. 93), to form environmental interest groups (ENGOs), to mobilize public support (Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013, p. 12; Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2002, p. 48), and to influence the government’s decisions (Burnell 2009, p. 6; Payne 1995, p. 43; Winslow 2005, p. 772). An independent civil society makes it more likely that citizens will express their policy preferences (Böhmelt et al. 2016, p. 1277). Free media enables citizens, journalists, and scientists to monitor government policy (Payne 1995, p. 45), raise awareness of environmental problems and support technological innovation as well as the spread of scientific knowledge (Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2002, p. 47). Democratic freedoms ensure that diffuse interests such as environmental protection are at least considered as part of the political process. Thus, political rights are an important precondition of environmental performance. Autocracies also vary in the extent to which they enable citizens and interest groups to express their policy preferences. Based on case studies, Jänicke and Weidner (1997, p. 306) argue that political rights such as freedom of association are a condition for the development of influential ENGOs in democracies and autocracies. Case studies have shown that these rights enable ENGOs to influence environmental policy in autocracies (e.g., Simpson and Smits 2018). In China, ENGOs contribute to environmental awareness (Mao 1997, p. 249f.). Finally, case studies find that information on environmental degradation in the media in democracies (Japan, Germany) as well as in autocracies (e.g., China, Chile) is important for environmental protection (Jänicke and Weidner 1997, p. 304; Mao 1997, p. 247f.). As the reduction in air pollution is associated with considerable short-term social and economic costs, environmental performance is dependent on public awareness of and support for environmental protection. With regard to global air pollution, the argument from Giddens (2015, p. 158) should be considered. He argues that a problem is that humanity has not yet

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experienced such a problem as climate change; therefore, the public might not be able to understand its risk and urgency. In general, political rights also enable powerful special interest groups to block environmental policy reforms (e.g., Bernauer and Koubi 2009, p. 1357; Never and Betz 2014, p. 12; Shearman and Smith 2007, pp. 89, 91) or undermine their implementation (Midlarsky 1998, p. 344). They can use political rights to question environmental problems. For instance, the fossil fuel industry spent money disinforming the public about climate science (e.g., Frumhoff and Oreskes 2015). To conclude, there should be no clear effect of political rights on environmental performance (Hypothesis 2). In a previous study, we found no effect of political rights on CO2 emissions per capita (Escher and Walter-Rogg 2018). 2.4.3

Civil Rights

The so-called ‘eco-authoritarian’ school of green political theory in the 1970s argued that democracy hinders the solving of environmental challenges (Heilbroner 1974; Ophuls 1977, 1994; Ophuls and Boyan 1992). Civil rights, i.e., constitutional rights that protect the individual against the state (Merkel 2004, p. 39) lead individuals to follow their self-interest instead of the common interest of environmental protection (e.g., Hardin 1968; Ophuls 1977, p. 145ff.; Ophuls and Boyan 1992). These scholars regarded reductions in individual liberty as necessary to solve this ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Heilbroner 1974, p. 137f.). These arguments can also be found in the more recent literature on environmental authoritarianism (e.g., Beeson 2010; Gilley 2012; Shearman and Smith 2007). Empirical research has shown that environmental and climate policy preferences vary among citizens (e.g., Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014). However, the use of repression to enforce environmental policies is of limited effectiveness (Stehr 2015, p. 450; Wurster 2013, p. 80). Civil rights might also contribute to environmental performance. Depending on existing environmental regulations, civil rights can enable citizens to demand the implementation of environmental policies via the courts (Spilker 2013, pp. 55, 59; Winslow 2005, p. 772), such as the court decisions in Germany to tackle local air pollution based on EU environmental policies. However, case studies indicate that the importance of rule of law for the environment varies considerably across countries (e.g., Jänicke and Weidner 1997, p. 306). Rule of law makes democratic governments more likely to implement international environmental treaties (Povitkina

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2018; Weiss and Jacobson 1999). Berge (1994) argues that both human rights and democracy are needed for sustainable resource use. Moreover, human rights should lead democratic governments to consider the health effects of environmental change (Burnell 2012, p. 823; Payne 1995, p. 43). With regard to climate change, the impacts of global warming vary across countries and take time (Neumayer 2002a, p. 141). Overall, no clear effect of civil rights on environmental performance can be expected (Hypothesis 3). 2.4.4

Horizontal Accountability

Checks and balances make it more likely that alternative policy choices are discussed and that the public is informed about environmental policies and their implementation (Burnell 2012, p. 823; Held and Hervey 2011; Wurster 2013, p. 83). The concentration of power enables political decision-makers to profit from environmental degradation in autocracies (Winslow 2005, p. 772). The environmentalist authoritarian literature emphasizes that the democratic decision-making process limits the ability to take rapid action to tackle environmental challenges such as climate change. Democratic governments must find agreement with veto players with divergent economic and social interests (Beeson 2010, p. 289; Fliegauf and Sanga 2010, p. 2; Gilley 2012, p. 289; Wurster 2011, p. 547; 2013, p. 79). Empirical research finds no clear indication as to whether institutional constraints support or impede environmental performance (e.g., Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Garman 2014; Madden 2014; Wurster 2013). Overall, we believe that the positive and negative effects of horizontal accountability balance each other out and assume no effect of checks and balances on the cross-national variation in environmental performance (Hypothesis 4). 2.4.5

Deliberation Quality

Many green political theorists assume that deliberative democracy is the best democracy model for environmental protection (Arias-Maldonado 2007, p. 234). Rational discursive processes of deliberative democracy would make it possible for citizens and political actors to consider long-term and generalized environmental values and policy preferences in the political decision-making process (Arias-Maldonado 2007, p. 236;

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Eckersley 1995). In contrast to liberal democracy, the discourse in deliberative democracy does not privilege short-term social and economic interests (Arias-Maldonado 2007, p. 236). In fact, deliberation can contribute to the transformation of self-interest into generalized attitudes (Miller 1992, p. 61), which is expected to contribute to the solution of collective action problems such as environmental pollution (Dryzek 1987, p. 211; Miller 1992, p. 61). Deliberative democracy enables citizens to take into account environmental interests (Goodin 1996; Smith 2001). Participation in deliberation makes it possible for citizens to internalize environmental norms and ideas (Aria-Maldonado 2007, p. 235; Goodin 1996; Smith 2001). Deliberation also involves expert knowledge as well as citizen perspectives in the democratic political decision-making process (Arias-Maldonado 2007, p. 243; Smith 2001). Additionally, deliberative institutions also generate information about environmental problems through the involvement of multiple social groups and citizens (Smith 2001). They are better able to address the complexity and uncertainty of environmental problems than liberal institutions (Dryzek 1987; Smith 2001, p. 72f.). In discourse, the different participants are able to represent the complexity of environmental problems, understand the different perspectives on environmental problems and develop cooperative-problem solutions (Dryzek 1992). In sum, deliberation quality should contribute to environmental and climate performance. However, it must remembered that deliberation takes place in the context of liberal institutions. Therefore, it is an empirical question whether deliberation contributes to the explanation of cross-national environmental and climate performance (Hypothesis 5). 2.4.6

Social Equality

Democracies and autocracies differ considerably in how they address social equality (Lührmann et al. 2018, p. 2). The egalitarian democracy model stresses the importance of equal access to political power independent of class, religion, culture or socio-economic resources. Green political theorists emphasize the importance of social equality for environmental performance. In this respect, the democracy-environment literature partly overlaps with research on social (in-)equality and the environment. The latter research area applies a broad understanding of social

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equality (e.g., economic, political, cultural equality) as well. Both studies assume that equal representation of social groups in the political system leads to environmental performance. Social equality contributes to a better representation of social groups in the political system (Cushing et al. 2015, p. 194). Following Midlarsky (2001, p. 160), environmental policies with unequal consequences among social groups motivates their involvement in the political decision-making process. In accordance, Böhmelt et al. (2016, p. 1265) maintain that inclusiveness in a broad sense contributes to environmental sustainability. The poor are often more vulnerable to environmental problems (Agyeman et al. 2002, p. 78; Cushing et al. 2015, p. 196; Desai 1998, p. 6f.). In addition, they will likely be less willing to pay for environmental protection under conditions of high social inequality (Policardo 2016, p. 287). Therefore, the reduction of poverty is a condition of environmental protection (Cushing et al. 2015, p. 196; Desai 1998, p. 6f.). Walker (1999) argues that empirical research has shown that rural people in Africa contribute to sustainability when they have the necessary economic resources and political liberties. A similar argument can be found in feminist political theory. Feminist theorists emphasize the importance of gender equality for environmental performance (e.g., Norgaard and York 2005). Empirical research shows that women hold more environmentally friendly attitudes and are more aware of environmental risks (Davidson and Freudenburg 1996; McCright 2010; McCright and Dunlap 2011; Norgaard and York 2005, p. 507). Moreover, the representation of women in parliaments and governments affects policy outcomes (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2014; Clots-Figueras 2012; Hicks et al. 2016; Mavisakalyan 2014; Svaleryd 2009). Feminist political theorists assume that women are more environmentally friendly because of their socialization to be more cooperative and careful than men (Beutel and Marini 1995; Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi 2019). Moreover, women are more vulnerable to the consequences of (global) environmental change because of their role in society (UNEP 2016, p. 13). The majority of members of US ENGOs are women (Seager 1996, p. 271). Ecofeminist theory follows that gender inequality and environmental degradation are both caused by the same factors (e.g., Merchant 1983; Norgaard and York 2005; Seager 1993). The underlying assumption is that the social structure is hierarchical and exploits women and nature. Gender inequality supports the logic of domination, lower concern about environmental protection and the devaluation of women

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and the environment (Norgaard and York 2005, p. 510). Therefore, Norgaard and York (2005, p. 508) argue that the participation by women in the political system and civil society should contribute to environmental protection policies because it leads to the perception that environmental protection is positive. They find support for their assumptions in their analysis of the effect of women representation in parliament on the ratification of environmental treaties. Fredriksson and Wang (2011) show that women in the US House of Representatives prefer stricter environmental policies than men. Finally, Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi (2019) observe that the proportion of women in parliament is associated with stricter climate change policies and that this contributes to lower CO2 emissions. In sum, equality among social groups should contribute to environmental performance. Another argument in the literature on social (in-)equality and the environment links social equality to environmental quality via consumption. Social inequality undermines environmental quality, as it contributes to more consumption (Cushing et al. 2015). First, the aim for wealth implies more consumption (Cushing et al. 2015, p. 196). Second, in unequal societies, the lifestyles of wealthy people also serve as a standard for the poorer classes (Cushing et al. 2015, p. 196). Third, the spatial segregation of poor and rich people contributes to more consumption (Cushing et al. 2015, p. 197). Finally, inequality hinders the spread of more environmentally friendly technologies (Cushing et al. 2015, p. 197). However, inequality might also have a positive effect on environmental quality depending on the country’s economic development. With low levels of income, social equality contributes to more consumption and pollution, while with higher levels of income, citizens are more likely to demand environmental quality (environmental Kuznets curve theory, EKC-theory) (Cushing et al. 2015, p. 195). Overall, the literature argues that the equality-sustainability relationship should apply in particular to pollutants with direct effects on human health, such as SO2 emissions (Cushing et al. 2015). Empirical research comes to varied conclusions regarding the relationship between inequality and air pollution (Cushing et al. 2015, p. 198). There is some support for the argument that social inequality is associated with lower levels of local air pollution. In contrast, the findings regarding global air pollution are mixed (Cushing et al. 2015). Based on the literature review, we expect that social equality in democracies contributes to environmental performance (Hypothesis 6). This

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should apply more to local than to global air pollution. Not only do democracies vary in social equality, but some autocracies such as Rwanda, Bolivia and Cuba show higher levels of women’s representation in parliament than democracies (Stockemer 2018, p. 3). In autocracies, social equality might contribute to local and global air pollution (Hypothesis 7). First, autocracies are often poorer than democracies, so any improvements in social equality might undermine environmental performance via consumption. Second, in comparison to democracies, the better inclusion of social groups might not affect policy output in autocracies (Schmitter and Sika 2017, p. 2). 2.4.7

Non-electoral Participation

Many political theorists and green parties stress the importance of nonelectoral participation, including local and regional democracy, for environmental performance (Arias-Maldonado 2000, p. 48; Böhmelt et al. 2016, p. 1273). There is also a separate stream of literature on decentralization and environmental policy output and outcome. Therefore, we discuss this relationship separately in the next section. Few scholars assume that participation undermines environmental performance. For instance, environmental authoritarianism argues that participation in the environmental policy decision-making process should be limited to scientists and experts (Gilley 2012, p. 288). The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development emphasized the importance of participation (Böhmelt et al. 2016, p. 1272). Hamilton (2010, p. 223ff.) also argues that democracy must be changed so that it considers long-term citizen interests over the short-term interests of political and economic elites to solve the climate crisis. Leggewie and Welzer (2008) argue that fundamental changes to people’s way of life and the economy are only possible with citizens agreement and identification with policies via their participation. The shift of power from political and economic elites to citizens is believed to be necessary for environmental protection (Blühdorn 2011, p. 2). Similarly, Böhmelt et al. (2016, p. 1275) argue that citizen participation contributes to their support of environmental policies (see also Kneuer 2012, p. 882). This is especially important for environmental policies that are associated with considerable costs for citizens such as climate change mitigation (Böhmelt et al. 2016, p. 1275). Public support of climate change mitigation would make it harder for special interest groups, such as economic

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sectors that lose from environmental protection, to oppose environmental policies (Böhmelt et al. 2016, p. 1257). Considering the knowledge of citizens might also contribute to successful environmental policies (Böhmelt et al. 2016, p. 1276). Case studies have shown that the participation of different interests contributes to the sustainable use of local common pool resources (e.g., Ostrom 1990). In addition, political participation contributes to the awareness, identification and solution of environmental problems (Winslow 2005, p. 772). Thus, participation should be associated with higher environmental performance levels. Different forms of political participation are emphasized. Numerous green political theorists favour forms of direct democracy for environmental performance (e.g., Leggewie and Welzer 2008). On the one hand, direct democracy makes the government better able to consider citizen preferences (Stadelmann-Steffen 2011, p. 488). On the other hand, it might hinder the ability to implement long-term environmental solutions that address collective action problems (Stadelmann-Steffen 2011, p. 488). Moreover, the support of environmental protection in public referenda is conditional on other factors, such as the costs associated with the policies and the policy type (Stadelmann-Steffen 2011). Thus, we expect no general positive or negative effect of direct democracy on environmental performance (Hypothesis 8). In addition to direct democracy, civil society should contribute to environmental performance (e.g., Hausknost 2011). Carbonell and Allison (2015, p. 84) argue that in democratic civil society, actors have more possibilities to influence environmental policy than in autocracies. This would ensure that multiple policy preferences and approaches to solving environmental problems would be considered in the political decision-making process. A strong civil society contributes to ENGO influence because citizen membership lessens their dependence on external donors (Rootes 2013, p. 703). Finally, state cooperation with ENGOs increases the effectiveness of environmental protection efforts (Jänicke and Weidner 1997, p. 308; Kneuer 2012, p. 870). However, Hayward (1998, p. 155) observes that civil society organizations/NGOs might also only represent particularistic interests. In sum, it is an empirical question whether the participation of civil society contributes to environmental performance (Hypothesis 9).

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Local and Regional Democracy

Green political theory and green political parties emphasize the importance of decentralization and participation on the local and regional levels for environmental performance. Decentralization refers to “the transfer of powers from the central government to lower level actors and institutions (Agrawal and Ribot 1999)” (Tacconi 2007, p. 339). Thus, democratic decentralization implies the transfer of power to political authorities on the local, regional or federal level who are democratically elected by citizens in their local or regional community and able to adopt and implement political decisions that fall in their jurisdiction (Larson and Soto 2008, p. 216; Tacconi 2007, p. 339). In established democracies, local governments are often responsible for environmental quality (Assetto et al. 2003, p. 250; Thomas 2010, p. 122). In addition to the local level, the literature stresses the importance of the regional level for environmental and climate performance (Galarraga et al. 2011, p. 165). In many countries, regional governments are responsible for policies that are important to environmental protection and climate change mitigation (e.g., transportation and industry) (Galarraga et al. 2011, p. 168). In the US, climate performance varies among US federal states. California’s climate policy is more ambitious than federal efforts to protect the global atmosphere (Selin and Vandeveer 2012, p. 342). To answer the challenges of financial crises and political transformation after the end of the Cold War, many developing countries introduced decentralization in multiple policy fields, including environmental management, during the 1980s and 1990s (Ribot et al. 2006, p. 1864). Green political theorists in the 1970s argued that the concentration of power is needed to tackle environmental changes (e.g., Hardin 1968). Moreover, they emphasized the need for expert government to tackle environmental problems (Hochstetler 2012, p. 201). Similarly, the environmental authoritarianism literature regards autocracies as better able to address global environmental change (e.g., Beeson 2010, 2016; Gilley 2012; Moore 2014; Shearman and Smith 2007), as decentralization and participation would undermine the ability to solve environmental challenges. These scholars assume that a central technocratic state would lessen environmental problems (e.g., Beeson 2010; Gilley 2012, p. 289; Shearman and Smith 2007). To illustrate, they cite China, which follows a top-down, technocratic, non-participatory interventionist and centralized

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approach to solving environmental challenges (e.g., the South-NorthWater Transfer Project) (e.g., Beeson 2010, 2016; Chen and Lees 2018, p. 226; Gilley 2012; Moore 2014). This approach reduces the number of veto players to enforce and implement environmental policies (Chen and Lees 2018, p. 226). Most scholars criticize the assumptions of authoritarian environmentalism. According to many green political theorists, decentralization contributes to sustainable development (Ward 1996, p. 139). First, the distribution of power supports the discussion of alternative policies and makes it more likely that the public is informed about environmental policies (Burnell 2012, p. 823). It enables local citizens to express their environmental policy preferences (Tacconi 2007, p. 344) and implies increased possibilities for local environmental protection initiatives and ENGOs (Burnell 2009, p. 3). Local and regional authorities are better able to consider local environmental problems (Kim and Yoon 2018). The broader decentralization-environment literature also notes that local and regional units might help special interests to gain more influence (Kim and Yoon 2018). Decentralization also offers industry interest groups more influence, as they have access to more resources that allow them to be present in multiple cities and regions (Esty 1997, p. 611f.; Sigman 2007). Thus, business interests and local decision-makers can use decentralization to hinder environmental protection (Tacconi 2007, p. 341). Decentralization might also undermine environmental performance because it enables local actors to follow their policy preferences and neglect regional and national environmental consequences (Alkon and Wong 2018, p. 4). Tensions between the policy preferences and interests of the central government and those of subnational governments are likely (Alkon and Wong 2018, p. 4). Alkon and Wong (2018) show that local governments in China undermine climate performance by focusing on their economic interests. Second, environmental policies are associated with public participation and public accountability. Green political theory argues that decentralization makes citizen participation on the local and regional levels, local democracy and deliberation possible and thus contributes to environmental performance (Eckersley 1995; Larson and Soto 2008, p. 217; Ward 2008, pp. 139, 406). Democracy on the local and regional levels is important for the decentralization of environmental policy (Assetto et al. 2003, p. 250). Numerous scholars emphasize that the positive effect of decentralization on environmental performance depends on the accountability

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of local governments (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Andersson et al. 2004, p. 421), stating that it only contributes to policy performance in a context of vertical accountability for local authorities (Pepinsky and Wihardja 2011, p. 360). Local governments that are responsible for the implementation of public policy only protect the environment when they are held accountability by citizens (Pepinsky and Wihardja 2011, p. 360). Moreover, via participation, democracies are better able to consider local policy preferences and knowledge (Walker 1999). Greens emphasize that local and direct democracy enables the affected to advocate for themselves (Ward 1996, p. 148f.). Thus, democratically elected local authorities are better able to consider the interests of their citizens (Larson and Soto 2008, p. 217). Accountability enables the poor to express environmental policy preferences (Tacconi 2007, p. 344). Related studies find that local elections contribute to efficient policy outcomes (Andersson et al. 2004, p. 422). Azuela (2004, p. 93ff.) emphasizes that policies that govern forests are associated with social conflicts among local actors, so that local governments must accept these policies if they are to be implemented. In democracies, more information on local conditions is available via vertical accountability, rule of law, and political rights (Alkon and Wong 2018, p. 3). Third, the involvement of local citizens is expected to improve the management of environmental resources (Larson and Soto 2008, p. 214). In many countries, local authorities implement environmental and climate policies (Galarraga et al. 2011, p. 164). In a decentralized system, it is easier to involve citizens in the adoption and implementation of environmental policies on the local and regional levels (Galarraga et al. 2011, p. 168). Moreover, decentralization, along with local and regional democracy, supports environmental protection because it considers citizens’ knowledge in addition to scientific knowledge (Larson and Soto 2008, p. 229). Local citizens have relevant knowledge about the ecological conditions in their own region (Ward 1996, p. 135). Thus, local and regional governments might be better able to implement climate change policies because they have more knowledge about local requirements and needs (Galarraga et al. 2011, p. 168). Participation in small communities also reduces the likelihood of free-riding on environmental protection efforts (Ward 1996, p. 136f.): local involvement makes citizens less self-interested, in part because they are more affected by environmental degradation (Ward 1996, p. 135f.). From their case studies of Hungary and Mexico, Assetto et al. (2003, p. 266f.) find that democratization

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contributes to the decentralization of environmental policy. However, it is not the only explanatory factor. Decentralization can also undermine environmental performance because of competition between local units and regions (Kim and Yoon 2018; Levinson 2003; Sigman 2007, p. 3), though some local and regional governments are able to coordinate environmental policies with other policies (Galarraga et al. 2011, p. 168). Galarraga et al. (2011, p. 165) follow from the literature that coordination between the local, regional and national levels is important for any policies aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. National governments need local and regional governments to reach their commitments within international climate cooperation (Galarraga et al. 2011, p. 168). Finally, decentralization is assumed to be associated with lower levels of corruption and higher levels of governance, accountability, transparency, efficiency and equity in resource allocation (Larson and Soto 2008, p. 217). This should contribute to lower levels of environmental degradation (Tacconi 2007, p. 344). There is, however, little empirical support for the claim that decentralization contributes to improvements in governance (Francis and James 2003; Tacconi 2007, p. 341). Moreover, decentralization might contribute to environmental degradation via economic growth (e.g., deforestation) (Tacconi 2007, p. 344). Because of data availability, we focus our empirical analysis on the effect of local and regional democracy on environmental performance. Based on the literature review, we expect that local and regional democracy contributes to environmental performance. In such context, citizens should be better informed and concerned about local and regional environmental problems, and local and regional democracy offers more possibilities for citizen participation and ENGOs by enabling participation and deliberation. Finally, it makes it possible to consider local requirements and supports the decentralization of environmental policy. Local and regional democracy should also contribute to the explanation of environmental performance in autocracies. Decentralization is necessary for successful environmental performance because autocratic governments lack local knowledge and flexibility (Alkon and Wong 2018, p. 2). Therefore, local governments can reduce environmental performance for the central government in autocracies (Alkon and Wong 2018, p. 2). Autocracies use aspects of democracy such as political rights to obtain information (Alkon and Wong 2018, p. 3). Sowers (2012) illustrates that decentralization influences water management effectiveness in Egypt.

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Possible positive effects should be stronger for local than global environmental problems. Decentralization might also contribute to a lack of state efforts to reduce pollution spill-over (Sigman 2007, p. 3), especially for regional and global pollutants. Dryzek (1992) emphasizes that in contrast to the solution of local environmental problems, the solution of global environmental problems requires global political institutions. In sum, we expect that local and regional democracy should contribute to environmental performance in democracies as well as in autocracies (Hypothesis 10). The effect should be stronger for local than for global air pollution. 2.4.9

Conclusion

To conclude, a uniform effect from the different aspects of democracy cannot be expected. Our argument is that the analysis of specific democratic qualities might contribute to a better understanding of crossnational variation in environmental performance among democracies as well as among autocracies. There has been little research in this regard (Escher and Walter-Rogg 2018; Kim et al. 2019), and their results are ambiguous. Escher and Walter-Rogg (2018) find no effect of vertical, horizontal accountability or political and civil rights on global air pollution (CO2 emissions). Kim et al. (2019) examine the importance of the electoral system, civil liberties, political participation and public democracy. Their results indicate that the electoral system and civil liberties contribute to environmental equality in developed countries. The effect of electoral accountability is dependent on whether supporters or opponents of environmental performance are elected. On the one hand, checks and balances ensure that more policy preferences are considered in the political decision-making process. On the other hand, a single veto player may be able to block environmental protection efforts. The rule of law might contribute to the implementation of environmental policies, but it is dependent on the stringency of environmental policies. Political rights make it possible for environmental policy preferences to be considered in the political decision-making process, but previous research has found no effect on environmental performance. Based on the literature view, we expect that among the dimensions of democracy quality, local and regional democracy and social equality among social groups should contribute to the explanation of country differences in environmental performance. The effects might vary between local and

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global environmental performance as well as between democracies and autocracies. Local and regional democracy enables citizens and ENGOs to express their environmental policy preferences, supports participation and deliberation and contributes to the effectiveness of environmental policies by considering local knowledge and information on local conditions. As citizens and local governments should be more concerned with immediate environmental problems, this relationship should be stronger for local than for global environmental performance. Social equality among social groups should make it more likely that diffuse interests such as environmental protection are considered in the democratic decision-making process. In contrast, in autocracies, social equality increases environmental pollution via consumption. Chapters 3 and 4, therefore, address democracies and autocracies separately to examine the effect of specific democratic qualities on environmental and climate performance. Based on this discussion, local and global air pollution are also studied separately.

2.5

Research Design

Before we present our results in the following chapters, this section describes the measurement of the dependent and independent variables. To answer our research question, we examine local and global air pollution levels as well changes in local and global air pollution. To examine the relevance of democratic institutional traits for country differences in emission levels, we use a cross-sectional OLS regression based on country averages for SO2 and CO2 emissions from 1990–2000 as well as country averages for CO2 emissions from 2001– 2010. Data on our indicator of domestic pollution (SO2 ) are only available for most countries until 2000. Data availability enables us to examine global air pollution until 2010. With regard to changes, we examine the average changes across the research period in SO2 and CO2 emissions. For this purpose, we estimated the slope of the regression of SO2 /CO2 emissions from 1990–2000 for each country. Thus, the slopes are our indicators of average changes in SO2 and CO2 emissions per capita for each country. We use this approach because, first, cross-country variations are of primary interest in this analysis. Second, the institutional traits of democracy are relatively stable over time. Finally, political institutions affect climate policy only in the long term. For instance, Sjöstedt and Jagers (2014, p. 143) emphasize that it is important to distinguish democracy and democratization

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in the analysis of environmental protection. There will only be a positive effect in established democracies because political institutions must be consolidated and civil society developed, which takes time, for vertical accountability and participation to work (Sjöstedt and Jagers 2014, p. 143ff.). The focus in young democracies still lies in the policy preferences of political and economic elites (Sjöstedt and Jagers 2014, p. 144f.). These two authors argue that electoral democratic institutions would not contribute to public good provision in young democracies (Sjöstedt and Jagers 2014, p. 143f.). Walker (1999) also stresses that democratization might have no positive effects on environmental quality, as a lack of local political institutions might undermine the legitimacy of national environmental policies (Walker 1999). Furthermore, economic policy preferences might dominate among citizens (Walker 1999). The selected period is relevant because global environmental problems such as climate change have only been recognized at the end of the last century on the international level as a global environmental problem. First, we examine domestic air and global air pollution from 1990 to 2000. Second, we study global air pollution from 2001 to 2010. The empirical analysis only includes independent countries, which have been identified based on data from indicator v2svindep from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2017; Pemstein et al. 2017) that extends the codings from Gleditsch and Ward’s (1999). Following previous research, we only examine countries with more than 500,000 inhabitants. As indicators of air pollution, we use data on per capita SO2 and CO2 emissions. Because CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas, CO2 emissions per capita can be used to measure climate performance. The data are taken from the online database of the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) (data access in 2017). Following previous research (e.g., Cao and Prakash), domestic air pollution is captured by SO2 emissions. These data come from Stern (2005, 2006, no year). We use per capita emissions to consider differences in population size. The V-Dem data enables us to examine the effects of the quality of democracy based on multiple models of democracy, specific democratic features, and environmental performance (see also Coppedge et al. 2016, p. 584). Following previous research, we use summary measures of democracy based on different relevant concepts. V-Dem provides data on electoral, liberal, egalitarian, deliberative and participatory democracy. As explained above, we assume that it is not the degree of democracy overall but specific democratic features that might affect environmental

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performance. The V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2017; Pemstein et al. 2017) allow us to separately capture vertical and horizontal accountability, political and civil rights, deliberation quality, social equality, direct democracy, civil society participation, and local and regional democracy. The indicators of vertical and horizontal accountability and political rights are captured by indicators developed by Lührmann et al. (2017) and the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al. 2017; Pemstein et al. 2017) (see also Table 2.1). All indicators are based on expert evaluations. We measure the effect of the dimensions of democracy quality in separate regression models as well as side-by-side in a single regression model. Several studies apply multiple democracy measures with different underlying democracy conceptions in separate regression models (e.g., Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002a). However, the democracy dimensions should be tested simultaneously because specific democratic feature indicators might only show a significant effect because they are highly correlated with the other democratic features. Unfortunately, some of our measures of democracy indicators overlap in their data (political rights and deliberation quality, political rights and civil society participation). These measures are, therefore, not tested simultaneously. Finally, the V-Dem data make it possible to examine the effect of specific indicators for democratic features on environmental performance. This enables us to study whether specific aspects of democratic qualities are decisive. For instance, do local and/or regional democracy affect environmental performance? Is freedom of expression or civil society decisive for environmental performance? Our indicator of electoral accountability is the Vertical Accountability Index of Lührmann et al. (2017, p. 11ff.). This index focuses on the mechanisms of formal political participation via elections and political parties in the exercise of accountability. It summarizes indicators of the quality of free and fair elections, the percentage of the population that is enfranchised, whether the chief executive is elected, and whether there is the right to organize and participate in political parties. This latter aspect enables us to consider the assumption that competitive elections are crucial. These data mean that we can separately test the effect of suffrage (v2x_suffr), free and fair elections (Clean Elections Index), freedom of association (Freedom Of Association Index) and elections for members of the government and parliament (Elected Officials Index). Checks and balances are captured by the Horizontal Accountability Index (Lührmann et al. 2017, p. 13), which represents the extent to

Electoral democracy

Political rights

Electoral accountability

Democratic quality

Measurement of democratic qualities

Model of democracy

Table 2.1

Alternative information

Freedom of expression

Elected officials

Freedom of association

Free and fair elections

Suffrage

Democratic quality disaggregated

(continued)

Electoral democracy index (2x_polyarchy) Vertical Accountability Index (v2x_veracc) Percent of population with suffrage (V2elsuffrage_mean) / share of population with suffrage (v2x_suffr) Clean Elections Index (V2xel_frefair_mean) Freedom of Association Index (v2x_frassoc_thick): including CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression (v2csreprss) Elected Officials Index (v2x_elecoff) Diagonal Accountability Index (v2x_diagacc) including engaged society (v2dlengage) Freedom of Expression Index (v2x_freexp) Alternative Sources of Information Index (v2xme_altinf)

Measurement

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(continued)

Deliberative democracy

Liberal democracy

Model of democracy

Table 2.1

Deliberation

Horizontal accountability

Civil rights

Democratic quality

Core Civil Society Index (v2xcs_ccsi): including CSO entry & exit (v2cseeors), CSO repression (v2csreprss), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt) Liberal democracy index (2x_libdem) Equality Before the Law and Individual Liberty Index (v2xcl_rol) Private civil liberties (v2x_clpriv) Rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct) Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw) Horizontal Accountability Index (v2x_horacc) Legislative Constraints on the Executive Index (v2x_jucon) Judicial Constraints on the Executive Index (v2xlg_legcon) Deliberative democracy index Deliberative Component Index (v2x_delib): including engaged society (v2dlengage)

Civil society

Judicial constraints

Legislative constraints

Transparent laws and enforcement

Private civil liberties Impartial public administration

Measurement

Democratic quality disaggregated

44 R. ESCHER AND M. WALTER-ROGG

Participatory democracy

Egalitarian democracy

Model of democracy

Local & regional democracy quality

Civil society participation

Direct democracy

Equality

Democratic quality Reasoned justification (v2dlreason) Common good justification (v2dlcommon) Respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr) Engaged society (v2dlengage) Range of consultation (v2dl_conslt) Egalitarian democracy index Egalitarian Component Index (v2x_egal) Equal Protection Index (v2xeg_eqprotec_mean) Equal Access Index (v2eg_eqaccess_mean) Equal Distribution of Resources Index (v2xeg_eqdr_mean) Participatory democracy index Direct Popular Vote Index (v2xdd_dd) Civil Society Participation Index (v2x_cspart): including CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt) Division of Power Index (v2x_feduni) Local Government Index (v2xel_locelec) Regional Government Index (v2xel_regelec)

Reasoned justification

DISENTANGLING THE EFFECT OF THE REGIME TYPE …

Regional democracy quality

Local democracy quality

Equal distribution of resources

Equal protection regarding civil liberties Equal access to power

Engaged society Range of consultation

Respect for counterarguments

Common good justification

Measurement

Democratic quality disaggregated

2

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which state institutions are able to hold the executive branch of the government to account. Three institutions are considered: the legislature, the judiciary, and special bodies designed for this purpose (e.g., ombudsman). In the disaggregated analysis of democratic features, we test the effect of legislative constraints (Legislative Constraints on the Executive Index) and judicial constraints (Judicial Constraints on the Executive Index). We use the “equality before the law and individual liberty index” from V-Dem to measure the democratic sub-dimension of civil rights. This index captures the extent to which laws are transparent and rigorously enforced, whether their public administration is impartial, the extent to which citizens enjoy access to justice, the ability to secure property rights, freedom from forced labour, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion. The data enable us to test the following civil rights separately. First, private civil rights are captured by the private civil liberties measure, which is based on indicators of freedom from forced labour, property rights, freedom of domestic movement and oppression by religious organizations. Second, the impartial public administration measure is based on rigorous and impartial public administration indicators. Third, the transparent law and enforcement measure is based on transparent laws with predictable enforcement indicators. Finally, for the operationalisation of political rights, we apply the Diagonal Accountability Index (Lührmann et al. 2017, p. 15), which captures the extent to which citizens are able to hold a government accountable outside of formal political participation. It summarizes information on media freedom, civil society characteristics, freedom of expression, and the degree to which citizens are engaged in politics. In our separate analysis of the effect of political rights, we consider freedom of expression (Freedom Of Expression Index), the availability of information (Alternative Sources Of Information Index) and civil society development (Core Civil Society Index). Our indicator of deliberation quality is the V-Dem Deliberative Component Index, which is based on indicators that evaluate the deliberation quality of public discourse and policy. It first considers whether reasoned justifications are used in policy debates (reasoned justification indicator), whether politicians refer to the common good to explain policy proposals (common good justification indicator), whether counterarguments are considered (respect for counterarguments indicator), range of consultation in the political decision-making process (range of consultation indicator) and the degree to which public deliberation is independent and considers interest groups and citizens in addition to

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elites (engaged society indicators). The data enable us to examine these indicators separately. As explained above, green political theorists who favour participatory democracy emphasize different non-electoral forms of participation, including direct democracy, civil society and democracy on the local and regional levels. The Direct Popular Vote Index measures the use of the popular vote. The Civil Society Participation Index captures the consultation of civil society organizations by politicians, the participation of citizens in civil society organizations, the participation of women in civil society organizations and whether party candidates are chosen by political parties or via primaries. The Division Of Power Index measures whether local and regional political authorities are elected and whether they can act autonomously from non-elected political authorities. In our disaggregated analysis of democratic qualities, we examine the effects of democracy at the local and regional levels separately (Local Government Index and Regional Government Index). Social equality is measured by the Egalitarian Component Index, which aims to measure the realization of the egalitarian principle. It is based on an indicator that evaluates whether political power is dependent on socio-economic resources (Equal Access Index), an indicator that evaluates whether the civil rights of different social groups are protected by the state (Equal Protection Index), i.e., equality among social classes, equal access to resources (Equal Access Index) and whether socioeconomic resources are distributed equally across society (Equal Distribution Of Resources Index). In the disaggregated analysis, all three indicators are tested separately. These variables enable us to measure the dimensions of democratic quality separately and test their effects on climate policy simultaneously. In contrast to the disaggregated data from Freedom House and Polity IV, which have been applied often in previous research, these data are more valid and reliable. Both Freedom House indicators and the Polity2 index have validity and reliability problems with regard to conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation (e.g., Munck and Verkuilen 2002). In contrast to the indicators from the Democracy Barometer, our variables are not based on policy output and outcome indicators. Finally, compared to data from the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index, the Democracy Barometer and Freedom House, V-Dem indicators cover our country sample and our entire research period. In our analysis of the joint effect of democratic qualities and political corruption, we apply indicators of executive, legislative, judicative and

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political sector corruption as well as a summary measure of political corruption from McMann et al. (2016) and V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2017; Pemstein et al. 2017). In contrast to the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International and the Control of Corruption data from the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2010), which are applied in similar studies, the indicators we apply demonstrate good performance for validity and reliability. The Political Corruption Index summarizes V-Dem data on the corrupt behaviour of the executive, members of the legislative, judicative and public sector branches of government. Moreover, it offers V-Dem data providing separate measures for executive, legislative, judicative and public sector corruption. Thus, it makes it possible to distinguish the corrupt behaviour of specific public officials in our quantitative analyses. As will be explained in Chapter 5, the academic literature suggests distinguishing the corrupt behaviour of political decision-makers from that of bureaucrats. Our statistical analyses control for additional variables that have been applied in similar studies. Population density is included because it is associated with natural resource use (Spilker 2012). As emissions result mainly from economic activities, we consider the level of economic development (GDP per capita) and economic growth (GDP growth). Countries that export fossil fuels should be less likely to participate in climate cooperation and the mitigation global warming. Thus, we control for the percentage of merchandise exports that are fossil fuel exports. The effect of international trade is theoretically ambiguous. Our indicator is the percentage of the sum of exports and imports in a country’s GDP. Data on our socioeconomic variables come from the WDI online database (data accessed in 2017). At the domestic level, ENGOs pressure governments to consider environmental issues. Therefore, ENGO strength is captured by data from Bernauer et al. (2013) on the number of ENGOs registered in a country with the International Union for Conservation of Nature. We consider a country’s vulnerability to the consequences of global warming using the Climate Change Index from Baettig et al. (2007) in Bättig and Bernauer (2009), which covers climate variability due to global warming in comparison to natural developments on a scale from 0–1 with higher values indicating higher climate variability. Vulnerable countries should be more active in this policy area (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994). Following the EKC theory (Grossman and Krueger 1995), a curvilinear effect of GDP per capita is considered. We use the mean-centred variable GDP per capita

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to avoid problems with non-essential multicollinearity. The Political Corruption Index from McMann et al. (2016) is used as a control variable in our analyses of the linear effects of democratic qualities on environmental performance in Chapters 3 and 4. As explained in the introduction, we study democracies and autocracies separately in the following analyses. In accordance with the regime type–environment literature that studies whether democracies or autocracies perform better in environmental policy (Wurster 2013), we use data that are based on a minimalist democracy concept to distinguish within democracies and autocracies. To identify democracies and autocracies, we use data from Cheibub et al. (2009, 2010).

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Stern, David I. 2005. Global sulfur emissions from 1850 to 2000. Chemosphere 58: 163–175. Stern, David I. 2006. Reversal of the trend in global anthropogenic sulfur emissions. Global Environmental Change 16: 207–220. Stern, David I. no year. Global sulfur emissions by country 1850–2003. http:// sterndavidi.com/datasite.html. Accessed 1 January 2018. Stockemer, Daniel. 2018. Explaining women’s parliamentary representation: Are there differences between democracies and autocracies? Representation 54: 221–240. Svaleryd, Helena. 2009. Women’s representation and public spending. European Journal of Political Economy 25: 186–198. Tacconi, Luca. 2007. Decentralization, forests and livelihoods: Theory and narrative. Global Environmental Change 17: 338–348. Thomas, Ian G. 2010. Environmental policy and local government in Australia. Local Environment 15: 121–136. Tosun, Jale. 2012. Environmental monitoring and enforcement in Europe: A review of empirical research. Environmental Policy and Governance 22: 437– 448. UNEP. 2016. Global gender and environment outlook 2016. https://repository. ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/176245/176245.pdf. Accessed 2 May 2019. Walker, Peter A. 1999. Democracy and environment: Congruencies and contradictions in southern Africa. Political Geography 18: 257–284. Ward, Hugh. 1996. Green arguments of local democracy in the United States. In Rethinking local democracy, ed. Desmond King and Gerry Stoker, 130–157. Houndmills: Macmillan Press. Ward, Hugh. 2008. Liberal democracy and sustainability. Environmental Politics 17: 386–409. Weiss, Edith Brown, and Harold K. Jacobson. 1999. Getting countries to comply with international agreements. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 41: 16–20. Welsch, Heinz. 2004. Corruption, growth, and the environment: A cross-country analysis. Environment and Development Economics 9: 663–693. Wilson, John K., and Richard Damania. 2005. Corruption, political competition and environmental policy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 49: 516–535. Winslow, Margrethe. 2005. Is democracy good for the environment? Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 48: 771–783. Wissenburg, Marcel. 1998. Green liberalism: The free and the green society. London: UCL Press. Wurster, Stefan. 2011. Sustainability and regime type: Do democracies perform better in promoting sustainable development than autocracies? Zeitschrift für

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Staats- und Europawissenschaften (ZSE)/Journal for Comparative Government and European Policy 9: 538–559. Wurster, Stefan. 2013. Comparing ecological sustainability in autocracies and democracies. Contemporary Politics 19: 76–93. Wurster, Stefan, Benjamin Auber, Laura Metzler, and Christian Rohm. 2015. Institutionelle Voraussetzungen nachhaltiger Politikgestaltung. Zeitschrift für Politik 62: 177–196.

CHAPTER 3

Democratic Qualities and Environmental Performance in Democracies

Abstract Both new and established democracies vary considerably in their efforts to protect the environment. This chapter examines whether analyses of the effects of individual democratic qualities improves our understanding of differences in environmental performance among democracies and over time. Unlike previous academic research, a wide array of institutional qualities of democracy are considered. The central argument of this chapter is that it is not the general quality of democracy but specific democratic qualities that contribute to differences in environmental outcomes among democracies. The empirical results support the claim that the quality of democracy independent of the underlying democratic model cannot explain differences in environmental performance among democracies. However, democracy contributes to environmental outcomes in democracies through equality among social groups and local and regional democracy. Keywords Regime type · Democracy quality · Political institutions · Environmental policy · Climate change

Scholars and policy-makers expect democracies to be more environmentally friendly than autocracies. In accordance, empirical research studies the effects of democracy and democratic qualities on the environment. However, environmental performance varies considerably among © The Author(s) 2020 R. Escher and M. Walter-Rogg, Environmental Performance in Democracies and Autocracies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38054-0_3

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democracies, including among established democracies. Green political theory discusses the environmental consequences of different conceptions of democracy. In accordance with the conclusion of the previous chapter, this chapter assumes that the general quality of democracy independent from the underlying democracy model cannot explain differences in environmental performance among democracies. In Chapter 2, we have shown that a uniform effect does not exist from the individual aspects of the democracy model–meaning, electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory democracy. This chapter argues that it is not the quality of democracy but specific democratic aspects that can explain the differences in environmental performance among democracies. The analysis of specific democratic qualities might, therefore, contribute to a better understanding of cross-national variation in environmental performance among democracies. Therefore, in contrast to earlier research, this chapter examines whether the separate analysis of democratic qualities contributes to the explanation of cross-national variation in environmental performance among democracies. For this purpose, it tests the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 using cross-sectional and time-series data on democratic qualities and local and global air pollution. The V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2017; Pemstein et al. 2017) allows us to examine the effect of electoral and horizontal accountability, political rights and civil rights, social equality and local and regional democracy on environmental performance. The central argument of this chapter is that among the democratic quality dimensions, local and regional democracy quality and equality among social groups should contribute to the explanation of differences in environmental performance among democracies. The effect of electoral accountability depends on whether supporters or opponents of environmental performance are elected. Political rights make it possible for environmental policy preferences to be considered in the political decision-making process. Previous research has found no effect of electoral accountability on environmental performance (see Chapter 2). On the one hand, checks and balances ensure that more policy preferences are considered in the political decision-making process. On the other hand, a single veto player can block environmental protection efforts. The rule of law might contribute to the implementation of environmental policies, but it depends on the stringency of environmental policies. Social equality as well as local and regional democracy should contribute more to the explanation of local and global air pollution. Social equality among social groups should make it more likely that diffuse interests

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such as environmental protection are considered in the domestic political decision-making process. Local and regional democracy enables citizens and ENGOs to express their environmental policy preferences, supports participation and considers local knowledge. As explained in Chapter 2, we distinguish between local and global pollutants in our analysis. We expect that social equality as well as local and regional democracy quality will explain more differences in local than in global pollutants among democracies, because the visibility of the former issue is higher. To answer our research question, we first examine whether the general quality of democracy contributes to the explanation of cross-national variation in environmental performance among democracies. In contrast to previous research, we analyse the effect of the degree of democracy based on different understandings of democracy—the electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory conceptions of democracy—on environmental performance. Second, we investigate the effect of democratic features on environmental performance. As explained in Chapter 2, the V-Dem data allow us to examine whether specific individual aspects of democracy are decisive. Environmental performance is measured separately by domestic air pollution (SO2 emissions per capita) and global air pollution (CO2 emissions per capita) (see Chapter 2). We use an OLS regression to examine the country averages from 1990–2000 and 2001–2010 of our independent and dependent variables. In comparison to the SO2 emissions, data availability allows us to test our CO2 emissions regression models for both research periods. As explained in Chapter 2, our focus lies on SO2 and CO2 emissions levels. We complement these findings by an analysis of long-term trends in SO2 and CO2 emission changes from 1990–2000 and 2001–2010. The control variables of our multivariate models have been described in Chapter 2. In addition to regime type, comparative environmental and climate policy research investigates whether environmental performance varies among types of democracies. There is a separate literature that discusses whether presidential or parliamentary democracies are better at addressing environmental challenges. Therefore, we control for democracy types in our multivariate analysis. For this purpose, we apply data from Cheibub et al. (2010) that distinguish presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies. Our models include dichotomous variables capturing presidential and semi-presidential democracies, and the reference category is parliamentary democracies. The results support our assumptions from Chapter 2. First, the general quality of democracy cannot explain country differences in environmental

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performance. In contrast to previous research, we show that this lack of explanation is independent of the underlying democratic model (electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory democracy). Second, as expected, specific democratic qualities are found to contribute to variation in environmental performance among democracies. In accordance with our theoretical expectations, local and regional democracy contributes to environmental performance. We also find support for the hypotheses that social equality is associated with environmental performance. The statistical findings support our argument that these relationships should apply to local rather than to global environmental performance, as citizens and political decision-level focus on immediate environmental problems.

3.1 Democratic Models and Environmental Performance Chapter 2 argued that the general quality of democracy cannot explain the variation in environmental performance among autocracies, as specific democratic qualities cannot be expected to have a uniform effect. This chapter tests this hypothesis. Green political theorists disagree not only as to whether democracies or autocracies are better for the environment but also in reference to the underlying understanding of democracy. Previous quantitative studies have mainly used measures of liberal democracy to study the environmental consequences of democracy (Hochstetler 2012, p. 206). Based on V-Dem data, we are able to study the environmental consequences of the electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory democracy models. In this section, we examine whether the quality of democracy differentiated by the five democracy models contribute to the explanation of environmental performance. To better understand of our regression results, we first examine the univariate distribution of our democracy model variables. Figure 3.1 presents the variation between democracies on our indicators for the quality of democracy. Most democracies perform very well as regards electoral democracy. The concept of an electoral democracy is the least demanding, and nearly half of all democracies show very high values for the electoral model (approximately 0.8 or higher on a scale from 0 to 1). There is more variation among democracies with regard to liberal democracy. The liberal democracy model emphasizes horizontal accountability and civil rights, and more than a quarter of all democracies can be found on the lower half of the liberal democracy scale. Democracies vary even more

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Fig. 3.1 Democracy quality by democracy model in democracies (Note Units of analysis are the country averages from 1990 to 2000. Higher values indicate higher quality of democracy.)

with regard to deliberative and egalitarian characteristics. No democracy achieves high values for the participatory democracy model, and half of all democracies exhibit values on the lower half of the scale. This measure considers multiple forms of participation (e.g., direct democracy, civil society participation and democratic qualities on the local and regional level). The mean comparison in Table 3.1 confirms that more democratic countries fulfil the criteria of electoral democracy than the criteria of any other model of democracy. Democracies perform the worst in providing participatory democracy. There is considerable variation among democracies with regard to the deliberative and egalitarian understandings of democracy. In sum, previous studies neglect a considerable area of differences in the democratic qualities of countries when they focus on their analysis of the environmental consequences of democracy based on a liberal understanding. This emphasizes the importance of studying the environmental consequences of different models of democracy in accordance with the theoretical discussion.

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Table 3.1 The quality of democracy by democracy model in democracies (Note Units of analysis are country averages from 1990 to 2000. Higher values indicate higher quality of democracy.) Democracies

Electoral democracy Liberal democracy Deliberative democracy Egalitarian democracy Participatory democracy

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

N

0.705 0.588 0.575 0.556 0.458

0.176 0.216 0.223 0.217 0.158

0.326 0.212 0.168 0.181 0.120

0.909 0.875 0.889 0.872 0.689

73 73 73 73 73

In the following section, we examine whether the electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and/or participatory democratic models affect environmental performance in democracies. The results for the five democracy models are based on separate multivariate regression models with control variables. As their underlying concepts and measurement overlap (see Chapter 2), we study the effect of our quality of democracy measures in separate regression models. Figure 3.2 presents the effect of democratic quality on country averages for local air pollution in democracies from 1990 to 2000, and Fig. 3.3a, b, respectively, display the relationship between democratic models and global air pollution levels from 1990–2000 and 2001–2010. The plots present the direction, strength and significance of effects of democracy quality by democracy model. When the confidence interval includes zero, there is no significant association between democracy quality and environmental performance. The regression models suggest that the democracy model cannot explain cross-national variation in SO2 or CO2 emissions among democracies from 1990 to 2000. There is also no support for the claim that models of democracy can explain variation in average CO2 emissions from 2001 to 2010. While the regression coefficients mostly indicate that democracy quality is associated with lower SO2 and CO2 emission levels, all effects are nonsignificant. This result is in accordance with earlier findings that the regime type and democracy quality cannot explain environmental performance (see Chapter 2). To conclude, independent of the underlying concept of democracy and local and global air pollution, democracy quality cannot explain the environmental performance levels of democracies. As explained in Chapter 2, the environmental benefits of democracy might not take place in young democracies. Therefore, our regression

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Fig. 3.2 Democracy model and local air pollution levels in democracies (Note Country averages in SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. The figure displays unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models. 90% confidence interval.)

models were also estimated separately for established liberal and developing democracies. We come to the same conclusion as above. The quality of democracy model, independent from the overall understanding of democracy, is not associated with environmental performance in established or developing democracies. Overall, our result is in accordance with our conclusion in Chapter 2 that the general quality of democracy cannot explain cross-national variation in environmental performance. This justifies our main argument that we should study the environmental consequences of specific democratic qualities and not the overall effect of the democracy model.

3.2 Democratic Qualities and Environmental Performance Based on the result that the democracy model cannot explain variation in environmental performance among democracies, this section examines whether democratic qualities affect local and global air pollution. As

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Fig. 3.3 Democracy model and global air pollution levels in democracies (Note Units of analysis are country averages from 1990 to 2000 (a)/2001 to 2010 (b). The figures display unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models.)

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explained in Chapter 2, we consider electoral accountability, political and civil rights, horizontal accountability, deliberation quality, social equality, civil society participation, direct democracy and democracy quality at the local and regional levels. Before presenting the multivariate results, we examine the univariate distributions of democratic qualities. Figure 3.4 illustrates that democratic qualities vary considerably among countries worldwide. Moreover, democratic qualities are highly but not perfectly correlated. Our indicators of democratic qualities correlate highly with each other. In particular, there are high correlations between the vertical accountability and political rights, political and civil rights, political rights and deliberative democracy components as well as between political rights and civil society participation. Nonetheless, high levels on one aspect of democracy are not necessarily associated with high levels on others. Thus, it is appropriate to distinguish them in the analysis of democratic qualities and environmental performance. Democracies vary considerably with regard to specific democratic qualities (see Fig. 3.5). In accordance with the results in the previous section, democracies perform well with regard to aspects of electoral democracy (electoral accountability and political rights). Compared to other democratic qualities, there is little variation with regard to electoral accountability among democracies, and the values of all democracies on our indicator of the electoral system lie in the upper half of the scale. Nearly all democracies perform well regarding the implementation of political rights. In fact, half of all democracies show very high values (above 1 on a scale from −2 to 2) for electoral accountability and political rights. In accordance with our findings above, democracies vary more with regard to aspects of liberal democracy—horizontal accountability and civil rights. While most democracies are characterized by high levels of civil rights, a considerable number of countries can be found on the lower part of the scale. Democracies also vary with regard to horizontal accountability, and a notable number of democracies show values lower than 0 on a scale from −2 to 2. More than half of all democracies have very high values for deliberation quality. Nonetheless, approximately one-quarter of all democracies considered vary on the lower half of the scale. Democracies vary considerably in the egalitarian aspects of democracy and in the strength of regional and local democracy. While most democracies perform well in terms of social equality, a considerable number of countries can be found on the lower half of that scale. There is little variation among democracies with regard to non-electoral forms of participation. Nearly all democracies can

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(a) Vertical accountability

(b) Political rights

Fig. 3.4 Global variation in democratic qualities (Note Units of analysis are country averages from 1990 to 2000.)

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(c) Horizontal accountability

(d) Civil rights

Fig. 3.4 (continued)

be found on the lower half of the scale of direct democracy, except for a few outliers that exhibit high values for this indicator. In contrast, most democracies perform well in civil society participation. With regard to local and regional democracy, democracies differ considerably, and 50% have values below 0.6 on a scale from 0 to 1. In sum, there is little variation in democracies with regard to aspects of electoral democracy and non-electoral forms of participation. Democracies do vary with regard

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(e) Deliberation quality

(f) Social equality

Fig. 3.4 (continued)

to social equality and democracy at the local and regional levels. These country differences might contribute to the explanation of environmental performance. In the following section, we examine the relationship between specific democratic qualities and environmental performance. The correlation between political rights and civil rights is higher, at 0.8; thus, this could be a sign of multicollinearity. To consider this, we first examined

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(g) Direct democracy

(h) Civil society participation

Fig. 3.4 (continued)

the effect of democratic qualities in separate regression models. Next, we tested them simultaneously in multiple combinations. We were also careful to not include our indicators of political rights and deliberative quality in the same model, as they share one indicator (Engaged society, v2dlengage).

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(i) Local and regional democracy

Fig. 3.4 (continued)

3.2.1

Local Air Pollution

We first turn to local air pollution and examine the relationship between democratic qualities and the local air pollution levels captured by SO2 emissions. In a separate analysis of democratic qualities and SO2 emissions, only democracy at the local and regional levels has a significant negative effect on SO2 emissions (see Fig. 3.6). Local and regional democracy is associated with lower SO2 emissions, while the effects of all other democratic qualities are nonsignificant. Thus, we find no support that electoral, liberal, deliberative and/or egalitarian democratic models are decisive nor do we find that specific aspects of these democracy models are influential. This finding remains stable in the simultaneous analysis of democratic qualities and SO2 emissions (results are not shown here). When we examine our democratic quality measures on a disaggregated level, as explained in Chapter 2, we come to the same conclusion. Local and regional democracy is associated with lower levels of local air pollution.1 Figure 3.7 summarizes the effects of democratic qualities on the longterm linear trend in SO2 emissions from 1990 to 2000 in democracies.

1 In contrast, a significant negative effect from the deliberation quality indicator for an engaged society becomes nonsignificant in simultaneous analysis with our measure of local and regional democracy quality.

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Fig. 3.5 Variation in democratic qualities among democracies (Note Units of analysis are country averages from 1990 to 2000.)

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Fig. 3.5 (continued)

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Fig. 3.5 (continued)

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Fig. 3.6 Democratic qualities and local air pollution levels in democracies (Note Country averages in SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. The figure displays unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models. 90% confidence interval.)

Social equality has a negative effect on SO2 emission growth, but there is no support that other democratic qualities explain long-term changes in local air pollution in democracies. While local and regional democracy is associated with SO2 emissions levels, it does not affect long-term changes in SO2 emissions. In sum, among specific democratic qualities, only social equality and local and regional democracy affect local air pollution in democracies. There are differences between SO2 emissions levels and changes. Social equality is associated with lower SO2 emissions growth in democracies, and local and regional democracy is associated with lower levels of local air pollution. 3.2.2

Global Air Pollution

This section examines whether democratic qualities are important for global air pollution. Figure 3.8 shows that democratic qualities cannot explain global air pollution levels in democracies, and we find the same results when we examine effects simultaneously. Moreover, the results apply to both research periods 1990–2000 and 2001–2010. There is a

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Fig. 3.7 Democratic qualities and local air pollution development in democracies (Note The dependent variable is the slope of country-years in SO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990 to 2000. Country averages of independent variables from 1990 to 2000. The figure displays unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models. 90% confidence interval.)

significant negative effect of direct democracy on CO2 emission levels in the earlier research period. However, this effect becomes nonsignificant in the robustness (jack-knife) analysis. It must be considered that there is little variation in direct democracy among democracies, aside from a few outliers that might have affected the regression model. There is also no stable support across models for the argument that democratic qualities matter for global air pollution levels when we study them on disaggregated levels. This also applies to both research periods. As these indicators are partly highly correlated, we first tested their effects in separate models, and second, tested their significant effects simultaneously. The statistical data analysis also does not support the claim that democratic qualities affect long-term trends in CO2 emissions from 1990 to 2000 in democracies (see Fig. 3.9). The significant negative effects of horizontal accountability, social equality and local and regional democracy on CO2 emission growth become nonsignificant in the simultaneous and robustness (jack-knife) analyses. To conclude, we find no support that democratic qualities contribute to the explanation of cross-national variation in global air pollution as measured by CO2 emission levels among democracies. Neither the quality

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(a) CO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990–2000, 95% confidence interval

(b) CO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 2001–2010, 90% confidence interval

Fig. 3.8 Democratic qualities and global air pollution levels in democracies (Note Units of analysis are country averages from 1990 to 2000 (a)/2001 to 2010 (b). The figures display unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models.)

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Fig. 3.9 Democratic qualities and global air pollution development in democracies (Note The dependent variable is the slope of country-years in CO2 emissions (ln) per capita from 1990 to 2000. Country averages of independent variables from 1990 to 2000. The figure displays unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models. 90% confidence interval.)

of being a democracy nor specific democratic qualities affect global air pollution.

3.3

Conclusion

Most scholars and policy-makers agree that democracy is beneficial for the environment. However, environmental performance varies considerably among countries. Previous empirical research has focused on the relationship between the liberal democracy model and the environment. However, there is no agreement on whether liberal democracy or egalitarian, deliberative, egalitarian or participatory democracies are more environmentally friendly nor on the uniform effects of specific aspects of these understandings of democracy. This chapter, therefore, argued that the general quality of democracy cannot explain country differences in environmental outcomes. To test this assumption, we examined the effects

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of different models of democracy (electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory democracy) on local and global air pollution in democracies. Our statistical results support our theoretical expectation. Democracy models can be independent of the underlying democracy conception and cannot explain country differences in environmental performance. Based on this conclusion, this chapter next asked whether specific democratic qualities contribute to differences in environmental performance among democracies. Data from the V-Dem project allowed us to consider specific features of electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory democracy: electoral accountability, political rights, horizontal accountability, civil rights, deliberation quality, social equality, direct democracy, civil society participation and local and regional democracy quality. Based on our discussion in Chapter 2, we argue that among these institutional traits, only social equality and local and regional democracy should contribute to environmental performance. Social equality ensures the representation of diffuse interests in the political system, and democracy on the local and regional levels supports environmental performance via political participation and local knowledge. Following the literature, we argued that these democratic qualities should matter more for local air pollution than for global air pollution. Our analysis offers support for our hypotheses. Social equality is associated with lower increases in local air pollution measured by SO2 emissions. Democracies with high levels of local and regional democracy quality perform well in environmental performance measured by SO2 emissions levels. In accordance with previous research, there is no support that democratic qualities affect global air pollution.

References Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice 143: 67–101. Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Joshua Krusell, Anna Llhrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Constanza Sanhueza, Johannes von Roemer, Laura Saxer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, and Steven Wilson. 2017. VDem[country-year/country-date] Dataset v7.1. Varieties of democracy (V-Dem) project. https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/ data-version-7-1. Accessed 10 August 2017.

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Hochstetler, Kathryn. 2012. Democracy and the environment in Latin America and Eastern Europe. In Comparative environmental politics: Theory, practice, and prospects, ed. Paul F. Steinberg and Stacy D. Van Deveer, 199–229. Cambridge and London: MIT Press (American and Comparative Environmental Policy). Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri. 2017. V-Dem measurement model: Latent variable analysis for cross-national and cross-temporal expert-coded data. Working Paper, No. 21, 2nd ed. V-Dem Working Paper. Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

CHAPTER 4

Democratic Qualities and Environmental Performance in Autocracies

Abstract Autocracies vary in the extent to which they hold competitive elections and implement the non-electoral traits of democracy such as equality among social groups in access to political power and democracy on the local and regional levels. This chapter examines whether these institutional differences contribute to the explanation of cross-national variation in state efforts to tackle local and global air pollution in autocracies. It argues that social equality should be associated with higher levels of air pollution. In contrast, democracy at the local and regional levels should contribute to environmental performance. It examines time-series data from non-democracies worldwide. The findings show that social equality contributes to air pollution in autocracies, and local and regional democracy is associated with higher levels of environmental performance. Keywords Autocracy · Environment performance · Climate change · Democratic quality · Political institutions

In this chapter, we examine whether democratic qualities contribute to the explanation of cross-national variation in environmental performance among autocracies. Global environmental change is a major challenge of our time and requires international cooperation. Conventional wisdom tells us that democracies have better environmental performance than autocracies. Nonetheless, autocracies also engage in environmental © The Author(s) 2020 R. Escher and M. Walter-Rogg, Environmental Performance in Democracies and Autocracies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38054-0_4

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cooperation and protection. There has been little quantitative research on explanatory factors based on political institutions for the differences in environmental outcomes among non-democracies. Previous studies of environmental performance in autocracies have focused on differences among autocratic regime types (e.g., Ward et al. 2014; Wurster 2013). These analyses have no clear findings regarding whether monarchies, military regimes and party regimes differ systematically in environmental outcomes. Autocracies also vary in the extent to which they hold competitive elections and implement non-electoral democratic traits such as equality among social groups in access to political power (Lührmann et al. 2018) and democracy on the local and regional levels. In contrast to previous research, this chapter examines whether these institutional differences among non-democracies contribute to the explanation of crossnational variation in state efforts to tackle local and global air pollution in autocracies. To fill the research gap, this chapter examines time-series data from non-democracies worldwide. We examine the effect of democratic qualities—vertical accountability, political rights, horizontal accountability, civil rights, deliberation quality, social equality, non-electoral participation and local and regional democracy—within autocracies on environmental performance. Data on democratic qualities from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project are applied. As in the analysis of democracies in Chapter 3, we study local and global air pollution measured by SO2 and CO2 emissions separately. Data availability enables us to examine SO2 emissions from 1990 to 2000 and CO2 emissions from 1990–2000 and 2001–2010. This chapter argues that country differences in democratic qualities should contribute to the explanation of cross-national variation in environmental performance among autocracies. The effect of contested elections on environmental performance is dependent on whether supporters or opponents of environmental protection come to power. Case studies have shown that freedom of expression enables environmental interest groups to influence the environmental and climate policies of autocratic governments (e.g., Simpson and Smits 2018). However, political rights also offer possibilities for industry lobbying groups. While checks and balances and civil rights vary across autocracies, they should both have positive and negative effects on environmental performance. Horizontal accountability contributes to a better representation of diffuse interests while

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also enabling a single veto player to hinder environmental protection efforts. On the one hand, civil rights contribute via the rule of law to the implementation of environmental regulations. On the other hand, this effect depends on the existing level of environmental stringency. It is an empirical question whether deliberation contributes to environmental protection in autocracies. Based on our discussion in Chapter 2, we expect that among the democratic qualities, equality among social groups as well as local and regional democracy should affect environmental performance in autocracies. Democracies and autocracies vary in the access of social groups to political power (Lührmann et al. 2018). For example, autocracies such as Rwanda, Bolivia and Cuba show higher levels of women’s representation in parliament than democracies (Stockemer 2018, p. 3). Social equality should contribute to environmental performance via the representation of diffuse interests in the political system. We have found support for this hypothesis in our analysis of democracies (Chapter 3). In contrast, this chapter argues that social equality should increase local and global air pollution in autocracies (see Chapter 2). First, autocracies are often poorer than democracies, and thus improvements in social equality might undermine environmental performance via consumption. Second, in comparison to democracies, the better inclusion of social groups might not affect policy output (Schmitter and Sika 2017, p. 2). A better representation of women in parliament in non-democracies does not mean that they have an influence on environmental policies. Environmental authoritarianism argues that centralist and nonparticipatory environmental policies contribute to environmental performance based on case studies of China. In contrast, we argue that local and regional democracy supports environmental performance in autocracies. Local and regional democracy enables autocratic governments to consider local policy preferences and knowledge, supports the local acceptance of environmental policies through political participation of local citizens and contributes to the more efficient implementation of environmental regulations. Moreover, the decentralization of environmental management and local and regional democracy is necessary for successful environmental performance in non-democracies because autocratic governments lack knowledge on local conditions and preferences (Alkon and Wong 2018, p. 2f.). Democratic governments are more informed about local needs because of a free media and electoral accountability.

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Fig. 4.1 Local air pollution levels in autocracies (Note The map displays average levels of SO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990 to 2000.)

Our multivariate analysis considers relevant control variables in accordance with previous research (see Chapter 2). In addition, we consider types of autocracies. For this purpose, we apply data from Cheibub et al. (2010) that distinguish military, civil and royal dictatorships. In the following section, we first examine the relationship between democratic qualities and environmental performance in autocracies. The second section of this chapter analyses the effect of specific democratic qualities on local and global air pollution. The last section presents our conclusions. The findings support our expectations: democracy on the local and regional levels contributes to environmental performance in autocracies, while in contrast, social equality is associated with higher air pollution levels in non-democracies. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate that global and local air pollution varies considerably among autocracies. Moreover, global and local air pollution do not necessarily go hand in hand.

4.1 Democracy Models and Environmental Performance As in the analysis of the environmental performance of democracies (see Chapter 3), we first examine whether the quality of democracy, in general, contributes to environmental protection. There has been little

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Fig. 4.2 Global air pollution levels in autocracies (Note The map displays average levels of CO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990 to 2000.)

quantitative research on democracy models and environmental performance in autocracies. In contrast to studies that pool democracies and autocracies, we test, as in Chapter 2, the environmental consequences of democracy based on different models of democracy (electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory democracy). While electoral democracy quality varies among autocracies, nearly all non-democracies are found on the lower half of the scales for liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory democracy (see Fig. 4.3 and Table 4.1). Autocracies also perform, on average, best on the electoral democracy quality measure. These results are in accordance with the observation that most non-democracies are currently electoral autocracies (Lührmann et al. 2018, p. 66f.). Nonetheless, only a few countries perform very well in terms of competitive elections. As in Chapter 3, we estimate the effects of electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory democracy on SO2 and CO2 emissions in separate models (see Fig. 4.4). As explained in the introduction, the multivariate models consider the relevant controls. As in the analysis of the quality of democracy and environmental performance in democracies, we find no support that democracy model affects environmental performance as captured by SO2 emissions. There are no significant effects of our democracy measures independent from the respective democracy models. Yet, countries with higher values on the

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Fig. 4.3 Democracy quality by democracy model in autocracies (Note Units of analysis are country averages from 1990 to 2000. Higher values indicate higher quality of democracy.)

Participatory Democracy Index share lower CO2 emissions. This effect only stays stable for the period from 1990 to 2000 and does not apply to the period from 2001 to 2010. Does non-electoral participation in general contribute to lower global air pollution in autocracies, or are specific aspects of participatory democracy decisive? We examine this question in the next section. Table 4.1 The quality of democracy by democracy model in autocracies (Note Units of analysis are country averages from 1990 to 2000. Higher values inidcate higher values of democracy quality.) Autocracies

Electoral democracy Liberal democracy Deliberative democracy Egalitarian democracy Participatory democracy

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

N

0.276 0.170 0.151 0.200 0.145

0.143 0.117 0.130 0.094 0.093

0.019 0.014 0.003 0.058 0.022

0.696 0.594 0.604 0.492 0.448

69 69 69 69 69

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(a) SO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990–2000, 90% confidence interval

(b) CO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990–2000, 90% confidence interval

Fig. 4.4 Democracy model and local and global air pollution in autocracies (Note Units of analysis are country averages from 1990 to 2000 (a, b)/2001 to 2010 (c). The figures display unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models.)

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(c) CO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 2001–2010, 90% confidence interval

Fig. 4.4 (continued)

4.2 Democratic Qualities and Environmental Performance We turn now to the analysis of democratic qualities and environmental performance in autocracies. Before presenting the results, we examine the univariate distributions of our main independent variables. While no autocracy shows very high values with regard to aspects of electoral democracy, vertical accountability and political rights vary considerably among them (see Fig. 4.5). A total of 50% of all considered autocracies can be found in the upper part of the scale for contested elections and political rights. As explained above, the election of political authorities takes place in a considerable number of autocracies. The analysis suggests that many non-democracies also accept freedom of expression to a certain extent. Non-democracies also differ in aspects of liberal democracy. With regard to horizontal accountability, the majority (75%) share low values on our measure of checks and balances. In contrast, civil rights vary considerably among

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Fig. 4.5 Variation in democratic qualities among autocracies (Note Units of analysis are country averages from 1990 to 2000. Higher values indicate higher quality of democracy.)

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Fig. 4.5 (continued)

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them. In accordance with the previous section, social equality and deliberation quality vary considerably among autocracies. The univariate analysis suggests that it is important to separately examine the effects of individual aspects of participatory democracy on environmental performance. There is little variation with regard to direct democracy among autocracies, and all share very low values. Autocracies vary considerably with regard to civil society participation, and more than half of all autocracies can be found in the upper part of the scale. While most autocracies show very low values for local and regional democracy, a considerable number shows values between 0.4 and 0.8 on a scale from 0 to 1, and several outliers show even higher values. To conclude, autocracies vary considerably in their democratic qualities, and this variation differs across the democratic quality dimension. In the following section, we examine whether democratic qualities explain environmental performance in autocracies. In this analysis, there are no problematic high correlations between aggregated democracy qualities, but as in the analysis of democracies, deliberative quality and political rights are not included in the same model, as they share one indicator. 4.2.1

Local Air Pollution

Figure 4.6 visualizes the results of the separate analysis of democratic qualities and SO2 emissions in autocracies. Equality among social groups is positively associated with local air pollution in non-democracies. However, this effect becomes nonsignificant when we consider the interrelationship between local and regional democracy and political corruption in Chapter 5. The positive effect of civil rights on local air pollution levels is not stable in the robustness (jack-knife) analysis. In the simultaneous analysis of democratic qualities, we find that local and regional democracy is associated with lower SO2 emissions (see Fig. 4.7). In the analysis of the effects of specific democratic qualities on SO2 emissions in autocracies, there is a positive effect from the equal protection of individual rights and freedoms across social groups and the equal distribution of socio-economic resources on local air pollution levels. In the simultaneous analysis, the reasoned justification of the common good and the equal protection of the rights and freedoms of social groups are associated with higher levels of local air pollution, while regional democracy is associated with lower levels of SO2 emissions. The former two become nonsignificant in the final model (see Chapter 4). Thus, when we further disaggregate these democratic qualities, we find that regional

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Fig. 4.6 Democratic qualities and local air pollution levels in autocracies (Note Country averages in SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. The figure displays unstandardized regression coefficients of multivariate regression models. 90% confidence interval.)

democracy has a negative effect on SO2 emissions. In the analysis of the joint effect of local and regional democracy and political corruption in Chapter 5, we find that the interaction effect applies to both local as well as regional democracy. In contrast to the analysis of local air pollution levels, we find no significant effect of democratic qualities on the long-term development of SO2 emission levels (see Fig. 4.8). To conclude, local and regional democracy quality explains differences in local air pollution levels among autocracies. There is no support for the argument that democratic qualities matter for changes in SO2 emissions levels. 4.2.2

Global Air Pollution

Will we also observe that democratic qualities matter for global air pollution in autocracies? In the separate analysis of democratic qualities and

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Fig. 4.7 Democratic qualities and local air pollution levels in autocracies (simultaneous analysis) (Note Country averages in SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. The figure displays unstandardized regression coefficients. Multivariate regression. 95% confidence interval.)

global air pollution levels in autocracies, social equality is positively associated with CO2 emissions levels. This effect is stable in simultaneous analysis with other democracy qualities. The analysis of democratic qualities and environmental performance has shown that participatory democracy is associated with lower global air pollution levels in autocracies during the 1990s. In the disaggregated analysis, we find that civil society participation is negatively associated with CO2 emissions (Fig. 4.9). This finding holds in the simultaneous analysis of democratic qualities but becomes nonsignificant in the robustness analysis. The negative effect of local and regional democracy on global air pollution levels is not stable across models when other democratic qualities are controlled. The positive effect of direct democracy on CO2 emissions levels becomes nonsignificant in the jack-knife analysis. When we examine specific aspects of democratic qualities, we find in both the separate and the simultaneous analysis of democratic qualities that the equal distribution of resources, i.e., the equal distribution of basic goods and services (water, housing, education and healthcare) between

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Fig. 4.8 Democratic qualities and local air pollution development in autocracies (Note The dependent variable is the slope of country-years in SO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990 to 2000. Country averages of independent variables from 1990 to 2000. The figure displays unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models. 90% confidence interval.)

social groups and low levels of poverty are decisive for CO2 emission levels (see Fig. 4.10). While the negative effect of democracy at the local and regional levels on global air pollution levels has not been stable, we find that local and regional democracy contributes to CO2 emission growth in autocracies (see Fig. 4.11). In sum, analysis of the data from 1990 to 2000 indicates a positive effect of social equality on CO2 emissions. With regard to social equality, the equal distribution of socio-economic resources across social groups is clearly important. In addition, democracy at the local and regional levels is associated with an increase in global air pollution.

4.3

Conclusion

Autocracies vary considerably in their environmental performance. Previous findings on types of autocracies and environmental outcomes are

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(a) CO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990–2000, 95% confidence interval

(b) CO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 2001–2010, 90% confidence interval

Fig. 4.9 Democratic qualities and global air pollution levels in autocracies (Note Units of analysis are county averages from 1990 to 2000 (a)/2001 to 2010 (b). The figures display unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models.)

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Fig. 4.10 Democratic quality aspects and global air pollution levels in autocracies (simultaneous analysis) (Note Country averages in CO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. The figure displays unstandardized regression coefficients. Multivariate regression. 90% confidence interval.)

ambiguous. This chapter has examined whether differences in democratic qualities explain differences in local and global air pollution among autocracies. Autocracies also vary in the extent to which they hold competitive elections and implement non-electoral traits of democracy such as equality among social groups in access to political power (Lührmann et al. 2018) and local and regional democracy. This chapter has argued that differences in social equality and local and regional democracy should explain variation in environmental performance among autocracies. In our analysis of democracies, we found that social equality is associated with environmental performance: it contributes to environmental protection via the representation of diffuse interests in the political system. In contrast, this chapter argues that social equality should increase local and global air pollution in autocracies. Improvements in social equality might undermine environmental performance in autocracies that are, on average, poorer than democracies. Moreover, in comparison to democracies, the better representation of social groups does not mean that they

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Fig. 4.11 Democratic qualities and global air pollution development in autocracies (Note The dependent variable is the slope of country-years in CO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990 to 2000. Country averages of independent variables from 1990 to 2000. The figure displays unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models. 90% confidence interval.)

have influence on environmental policy outputs in autocracies (Schmitter and Sika 2017, p. 2). In contrast to environmental authoritarianism, we argued based on the literature that local and regional democracy should contribute to environmental performance in autocracies. Via information on local conditions and preferences and political participation, it contributes to the acceptance and efficient implementation of environmental regulations. To test our hypotheses, we examined cross-national data on local and global air pollution in autocracies. Our findings illustrate that the analysis of democratic qualities improves our understanding of crossnational variation in environmental performance among autocracies. In accordance with our expectations, social equality and local and regional democracy quality matter for local and regional air pollution in autocracies. The results vary with the pollutant. Social equality is associated with higher levels of global air pollution. Local and regional democracy quality contributes to lower SO2 emissions but is associated with CO2 emissions growth. Therefore, as expected, the positive effect of democracy quality

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is more prevalent for local than global pollution. A reason for the finding that local and regional democracy increases global pollution might lie in the fact that local and regional democracy increases a country’s attractiveness to foreign investment, which increases pollution by increasing the scale of economic activity.

References Alkon, Meir, and Audrye Wong. 2018. Authoritarian environmental federalism. SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957002. Accessed 1 July 2019. Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice 143: 67–101. Lührmann, Anna, Valeriya Mechkova, Sirianne Dahlum, Laura Maxwell, Moa Olin, Constanza Petrarca, Rachel Sigman, Matthew Wilson, and Staffan Lindberg. 2018. State of the world 2017: Autocratization and exclusion? Democratization 25: 1321–1340. Schmitter, Philippe C., and Nadine Sika. 2017. Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa: A more ambidextrous process? Mediterranean Politics 22: 443–463. Simpson, Adam, and Mattijs Smits. 2018. Transitions to energy and climate security in Southeast Asia? Civil society encounters with illiberalism in Thailand and Myanmar. Society & Natural Resources 31: 580–598. Stockemer, Daniel. 2018. Explaining women’s parliamentary representation: Are there differences between democracies and autocracies? Representation 54: 221–240. Ward, Hugh, Xun Cao, and Bumba Mukherjee. 2014. State capacity and the environmental investment gap in authoritarian states. Comparative Political Studies 47: 309–343. Wurster, Stefan. 2013. Comparing ecological sustainability in autocracies and democracies. Contemporary Politics 19: 76–93.

CHAPTER 5

Democracy Quality, Political Corruption and Environmental Performance

Abstract The analyses conducted in the previous chapters have shown that social equality and local and regional democracy are decisive for environmental performance in democracies and autocracies. This chapter is based on the assumption that legislative corruption should limit the positive effects of social equality in democracies, as it undermines the positive effects of a broad representation within the political system of societal interests on the environment. Whether political corruption strengthens or weakens the positive effects of local and regional democracy on the environment is an empirical question. The statistical findings support the argument that legislative corruption limits the positive effects of social equality in democracies. The direction of this interaction effect between local and regional democracy and political corruption varies between democracies and autocracies. Keywords Democracy · Corruption · Institutional quality · Environmental performance · Climate change

5.1

Introduction

Recent research indicates that political corruption, i.e., corruption among political authorities and bureaucrats, moderates the relationship between democratic qualities and environmental performance (Povitkina 2018). © The Author(s) 2020 R. Escher and M. Walter-Rogg, Environmental Performance in Democracies and Autocracies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38054-0_5

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The positive effects of democratic quality on environmental performance are weakened by political corruption. The previous chapters have shown that it is not democracy in general but specific democratic qualities— democracy at the local and regional levels and social equality—that have an effect on environmental performance in both democracies and autocracies. This chapter, in contrast to previous research, examines whether the effects of these specific democratic qualities on environmental performance in democracies and autocracies are dependent on political corruption, aiming to improve our understanding of the effects of local and regional democracy and social equality on environmental performance. In the analysis of corruption, scholars distinguish between grand and petty corruption, i.e., corruption among political decision-makers and corruption by bureaucrats (Pellegrini 2011, p. 19; Wilson and Damania 2005, p. 517). Thus, we examine whether political corruption in general or specific dimensions of political corruption are decisive for the relationship between democratic qualities and political corruption. The data from VDem enable us to distinguish executive, legislative, judicative and public sector corruption. The central argument of this chapter is that political corruption should moderate the effect of local and regional democracy and social equality on environmental performance. With regard to the relationship between social equality and environmental performance, we expect that political corruption should undermine the effects of social equality on environmental performance in democracies. Therefore, legislative corruption should be decisive. Social equality supports the representation of diffuse interests such as environmental protection within the political system, but this effect should be limited when politicians are open for bribes. We expect that political corruption undermines the positive effects of local and regional democracy on environmental performance, as local and regional participation will make little difference when political corruption leads political decision-makers to focus on the policy preferences of polluters, and public officials take bribes in exchange for refusing to implement environmental policies. However, local and regional democracy could also contribute to environmental performance in countries with very high levels of political corruption. The different levels of the political system make it more difficult for special interests to bribe the political authorities. In addition, competition between levels of the political system could increase accountability and efficiency and thereby weaken the negative effects of political corruption on environmental performance.

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It is important to note that other variables might also affect the relationship between democratic qualities and environmental performance: political capacity might affect the relationship between democracy and the environment (e.g., Carbonell and Allison 2015, p. 81; Povitkina 2018). Democracies perform better because they have more effective government institutions (Kneuer 2012, p. 867). This chapter focuses on political corruption following Povitkina (2018). First, empirical research has shown that political corruption affects environmental performance (Povitkina 2018) and, moreover, administrative capacity (Povitkina 2018). It undermines the ability of democratic governments to adopt and implement environmental policies (Povitkina 2018). To answer our research question, as in the previous two chapters, we examine data on SO2 and CO2 emissions. As the previous chapters have shown that democratic qualities differently affect environmental performance in democracies and autocracies, we also examine the interactions between political corruption and democratic qualities separately for democracies and autocracies. As we are interested in the effect of democratic qualities on environmental performance, we focus on political corruption and do not consider corruption in the private sector. The corruption-environment literature distinguishes grand from petty corruption, i.e., corruption by political decision-makers and corruption by bureaucrats (Pellegrini 2011, p. 19; Wilson and Damania 2005, p. 517). As explained in Chapter 2, the data from McMann et al. (2016) and VDem (Coppedge et al. 2017; Pemstein et al. 2017) enable us to examine the environmental consequences of political corruption in general and the specific corrupt behaviour of members of the executive, legislative, judicative branches and the public sector. Empirical studies thus far have not distinguished forms of political corruption. This chapter focuses on the democratic qualities of local and regional democracy and social equality because the previous chapters have shown that only these affect environmental performance. Moreover, the statistical analysis has shown no stable effects for the other democratic qualities when their interrelationship with political corruption is considered. In the following, we first summarize the conclusions from the literature on political corruption and environmental performance. On this basis, the next sections discuss possible moderating effects of political corruption on the relationship of local and regional democracy and social equality with environmental performance and formulate hypotheses for the empirical analysis. The following two sections examine our theoretical expectations

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separately for democracies and autocracies. The last section presents our conclusion.

5.2 Political Corruption and Environmental Performance Most scholars define political corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain” (Treisman 2000, p. 399; see also Knack 2006, p. 5; McMann et al. 2016, p. 8; Rothstein and Teorell 2008, p. 17; Treisman 2007, p. 211). Misuse includes bribery, nepotism and misappropriation (Pellegrini 2011, p. 17). Political corruption has positive and negative effects on environmental performance but implies that governments and public sector officials accept bribes to refrain from adopting, implementing or enacting environmental regulations (Holmberg et al. 2009, p. 152; Miller 2011, p. 51; Robbins 2000, p. 430; Smith and Walpole 2005, p. 251f.; Wilson and Damania 2005, p. 516). Thus, political corruption constitutes a potential method for polluters to influence the adoption and implementation of environmental policy (Hahn 1990, p. 23; Halkos et al. 2015). Public officials that do not implement and enforce environmental regulations might make it also unlikely that politicians undertake efforts to introduce environmental policy proposals (Dahlström et al. 2013; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2016, p. 454). In accordance, numerous studies argue that institutional quality contributes to policy performance (Kim and Yoon 2018, p. 1). Political corruption also has indirect effects on environmental performance. By undermining political trust, it reduces the compliance of firms and citizens with environmental regulations (Povitkina 2018, p. 415; Rothstein and Eek 2009, p. 82f.). Moreover, political corruption affects environmental performance via economic growth (Cole 2007, p. 637f.; Holmberg et al. 2009, p. 152; Welsch 2004, p. 664). On the one hand, corruption undermines economic growth (e.g., Kaufmann et al. 1999) and thus might lower pollution levels. On the other hand, it delays the positive effects of economic development (López and Mitra 2000, p. 149f.) on environmental performance. Political corruption reduces the state income that is available to tackle environmental problems (Povitkina 2018, p. 412; Tanzi and Davoodi 1998, p. 51). As the negative effects of political corruption outweigh its positive effects on environmental performance, we expect that political corruption undermines environmental performance.

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Finally, the literature expects that political corruption undermines the positive effects of democratic qualities on environmental performance. Following Winslow (2005, p. 781), political corruption contributes to environmental degradation in democracies because it undermines the functioning of democracy. Political corruption should also undermine the positive effects of specific democratic qualities and environmental performance. While electoral accountability and political rights enable citizens and ENGOs to express their environmental policy preferences, political corruption increases the influence of polluters (Povitkina 2018). It also undermines deliberation quality, as it leads governments to focus on short-term interests to secure their re-election. In the presence of political corruption, horizontal accountability cannot ensure that multiple policy preferences are considered (Povitkina 2018, p. 416). The corruption of public officials and judges limits the potential for citizens to demand the implementation of environmental policies via the courts. As the previous chapters have shown that democracy on the local and regional levels as well as social equality are associated with environmental performance, we focus on the possible moderating effects of political corruption on these institutional traits.

5.3

Social Equality, Political Corruption and Environmental Performance

Chapter 3 has argued that social equality contributes to environmental performance in democracies. The underlying assumption is that inclusiveness makes it more likely that diffuse interests are considered in the political decision-making process. For instance, inclusiveness ensures that poor people, who are the most vulnerable to environmental change, are represented in the political system. Ecofeminist theorists further expect that gender equality in the political system will contribute to environmental performance. The literature on inequality and political corruption suggests that the positive effects of social equality should be stronger in countries with low levels of political corruption. Political corruption contributes to inequality and poverty because it enables corrupt elites to influence the distribution of resources (Gupta et al. 2002, p. 24). In turn, inequality is associated with poverty through a reduction of social policies and economic growth (Gupta et al. 2002, p. 24f.). In their empirical analysis, Gupta et al. (2002) find support for the claim that corruption contributes to poverty and inequality. Gender equality has been shown to

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contribute to lower political corruption levels (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). However, inequality could also contribute to political corruption (You and Khagram 2005). Inequality makes it more likely that the rich have an interest in protecting their wealth. Political corruption offers them more possibilities for securing their wealth. In unequal societies, corruption is also more accepted (You and Khagram 2005, p. 139f.), and You and Khagram (2005) argue that income inequality affects corruption differently in democracies and autocracies. In democracies, elites must use corruption to protect their wealth (You and Khagram 2005, p. 139), while in autocracies, they can use oppression. In addition, the poor in democracies vote for elites in exchange for bribes (You and Khagram 2005, p. 139). On this basis, they argue that inequality should be particularly associated with political corruption in democracies, and they find support for their argument in their empirical analysis. In sum, we expect that the positive effects of social equality on environmental performance are weaker in countries with high levels of political corruption (Hypothesis 11). The literature suggests that this should be especially the case in democracies. In Chapter 4, we illustrate that social equality contributes to local and global air pollution in autocracies via consumption. We do not believe that political corruption makes a difference in this relationship.

5.4 Democracy on the Local and Regional Levels, Political Corruption and Environmental Performance Is the effect of local and regional democracy dependent on political corruption? To answer this question, we refer to the literature on decentralization, political corruption and environmental performance. The literature suggests that political corruption might either strengthen or weaken the positive effects of democracy on local and regional environmental performance. As we have explained in Chapter 2, local and regional democracy should contribute to environmental performance. Citizens should be better informed and concerned about local and regional environmental problems, and local and regional democracy offers more possibilities for citizen

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participation and ENGOs. It also enables deliberation among local participants. Finally, it makes it possible to consider local requirements and supports the decentralization of environmental policy. Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that democracy at the local and regional levels contributes to environmental performance in both democracies and autocracies. This section argues that political corruption moderates the effects of local and regional democracy on environmental performance. The literature on institutional quality suggests that the positive effect of democratization on economic and social performance depends upon institutional quality (Easterly and Levine 2003; Kim and Yoon 2018, p. 3f.; Rothstein and Teorell 2012, p. 15f.). It is plausible to expect that the positive effects of local and regional democracy on the environment also depend on institutional quality, including the absence of political corruption. Local and regional participation makes little difference when political corruption leads political decision-makers to focus on the policy preferences of polluters, and public officials take bribes in exchange for not implementing environmental policies. In accordance, Pepinsky and Wihardja (2011, p. 360f.) argue that political corruption should undermine this mechanism. They illustrate that in Indonesia, corruption and decentralization together undermined economic performance (see also Edwards and Heiduk 2015). In accordance, Kim and Yoon (2018, p. 4) state that the positive effect of decentralization on environmental performance should depend on the quality of government institutions. They argue that decentralization will not contribute to environmental performance if government institutions are unable to implement policies effectively (Kim and Yoon 2018, pp. 1, 4), and they offer a statistical analysis that supports their hypothesis. In sum, political corruption should limit the positive effects of local and regional democracy on environmental performance. However, it is also possible that local and regional democracy contribute to environmental performance despite high levels of political corruption. First, decentralization in general and democratic decentralization in particular imply more potential for citizens to influence environmental policy (Shah 2006, p. 6). Moreover, citizens have more information on government policies at the local and regional levels (Seabright 1996; Shah 2006, p. 21). Thus, it should be more difficult for specific interests to influence local and regional governments via bribes (Shah 2006, p. 20). Second, democratic decentralization implies that the responsibilities for environmental policy decisions are more transparent and thus might lower

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the influence of political corruption (Shah 2006, p. 21). Competition among local and regional political units might also support accountability and efficient environmental policies and thus reduce opportunities for political corruption (Shah 2006, p. 20; Treisman 2000, p. 407). As local and regional authorities are generally more effective in solving local environmental problems, the interaction with political corruption should also be weaker (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005; Shah 2006, p. 21). Finally, decentralization can contribute to environmental performance when governments at the national level lack the political capacity to deliver environmental policies (Oosterveer and Van Vliet 2010, p. 284). Thus, democratic qualities at the local and regional levels might contribute to environmental performance despite high levels of political corruption. The literature on decentralization and political corruption also suggests that decentralized systems such as the federal system contribute to political corruption. Scholars in this research area argue that decentralization offers more possibilities for local interest groups to bribe political decision-makers and public officials at different levels of the system (Prud’homme 1994, p. 10f.; Shah 2006, p. 17f.; Treisman 2000, p. 407). Shah (2006, p. 19) notes that corruption may be greater at the local level, as local political processes are less often followed by the public, and personal contact with public officials offers more potential for corruption (Prud’homme 1994, p. 10f.; Shah 2006, p. 17; Tanzi 1995, p. 301). Public officials may have more opportunities for corrupt behaviour also, as they will perceive that there is less monitoring from the national level (Prud’homme 1994, p. 11; Shah 2006, p. 17). Treisman (2000) finds that federal political systems are more corrupt. However, the argument that decentralization contributes to political corruption does not necessarily apply to the relationship of local and regional democracy with political corruption. For instance, Shah (2006, p. 23) argues that decentralization contributes to political corruption in developing countries through a lack of participation, accountability and rule of law at the local level. Competition among political decision-makers due to electoral accountability also implies that corruption will be less efficient (Montinola and Jackman 2002, p. 150). Political decision makers in democracies are less likely to be corrupt, as they must face the corrupt behaviour of other politicians, and the bribes are smaller (Montinola and Jackman 2002, p. 150; Rasmusen and Ramseyer 1994).

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In sum, the joint effect of local and regional democracy and political corruption on environmental performance is an empirical question (Hypothesis 12). On the one hand, the positive effects of local and regional democracy on environmental performance depend on the absence of political corruption. On the other hand, local and regional democracy could still contribute to environmental performance despite high levels of political corruption at the national level.

5.5

Empirical Analysis

In the following section, we first examine the effect of political corruption on environmental performance. As in the previous chapters, democracies and autocracies are studied separately. The next two sections analyse whether political corruption moderates the effect of social equality and local and regional democracy on environmental performance in democracies and in autocracies. 5.5.1

Political Corruption and Environmental Performance

Compared to democracies, most autocracies show high levels of political corruption (see Fig. 5.1). This finding applies to all considered dimensions of political corruption—executive, legislative, public sector and judicative corruption. More than 50% of the autocracies examined show higher than average levels of executive and public sector corruption. In addition, there is no autocracy characterized by a complete absence of corruption. Most democracies exhibit low levels of executive and public sector corruption on a scale from 0 to 1, but more than 25% of them still fall in the upper half of the scales of executive and public sector corruption. Legislative and judicial corruption varies less among autocracies, though not all autocracies have a parliament. In accordance, democracies differ more with regard to legislative and judicial corruption. The different forms of political corruption are highly correlated in our democracy sample, while the autocracy sample shows lower correlations among the forms of political corruption. We find no support for the argument that political corruption has an independent effect on environmental performance as captured by SO2 or CO2 emissions levels or long-term changes in democracies (see Fig. 5.2). In our analysis of autocracies, legislative corruption is positively associated with global air pollution levels,

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Fig. 5.1 Variation in political corruption in democracies and autocracies (Note Units of analysis are country averages from 1990 to 2000. Higher values indicate higer levels of political corruption.)

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(a) Democracies: CO2 emissions per capita (ln), 95% confidence interval

(b) Democracies: SO2 emissions per capita (ln), 95% confidence interval

Fig. 5.2 Political corruption and global and local air pollution in democracies and autocracies (Note Units of analysis are country averages of CO2 and SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. The development of CO2 and SO2 emissions per capita (ln) refers to the slope of country-years of CO2 and SO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990 to 2000. The figures display unstandardized regression coefficients of separate multivariate regression models.)

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(c) Autocracies: CO2 emissions per capita (ln), 90% confidence interval

(d) Autocracies: SO2 emissions per capita (ln), 90% confidence interval

Fig. 5.2 (continued)

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(e) Democracies: development of CO2 emissions per capita (ln), 95% confidence interval

(f) Democracies: development of SO2 emissions per capita (ln), 95% confidence interval

Fig. 5.2 (continued)

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(g) Autocracies: development of CO2 emissions per capita (ln), 95% confidence interval

(h) Autocracies: development of SO2 emissions per capita (ln), 95% confidence interval

Fig. 5.2 (continued)

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but political corruption has no impact on the development of local or global air pollution in autocracies (see Fig. 5.2). In sum, we find little support for the statement that political corruption or its sub-dimensions affect local or global air pollution. In autocracies, legislative corruption is associated with global air pollution levels. In the next section, we examine whether it affects the relationship between democratic qualities and environmental performance in democracies and autocracies. 5.5.2

Democracy Qualities, Political Corruption and Environmental Performance in Democracies

Chapter 3 found that social equality levels contribute to lower SO2 emission growth and that local and regional democracy is associated with lower SO2 emission levels in democracies. These effects might be moderated by political corruption. This chapter visualises joint effects of democracy qualities and political corruption with marginal effect plots. They display the direction and significance of democracy qualities at different levels of political corruption. When the confidence interval includes zero, there is no effect of democracy quality aspects at these levels of political

Fig. 5.3 Social equality, legislative corruption and local air pollution levels in democracies (Note Country averages of SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. Multivariate regression. Marginal effect plot. 90% confidence interval.)

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Fig. 5.4 Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption and local air pollution levels in democracies (Note Country averages of SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. Multivariate regression. Marginal effect plot. 95% confidence interval.)

corruption. In contrast to our additive analysis, we find that social equality also affects local air pollution levels and specifically find a significant negative effect of social equality on SO2 emissions levels in countries with low levels of legislative corruption (see Fig. 5.3). This interaction effect remains significant in the robustness analysis. There is no stable interaction effect between social equality and general political corruption, executive, public sector or judicative corruption on local air pollution levels.1 In addition, neither political corruption in total or the different forms of political corruption moderate the negative relationship between social equality and SO2 emission growth.2 The negative effect of local and regional democracy on SO2 emission levels is only significant in democracies with below average levels of political corruption (see Fig. 5.4).3 This result is not dependent on a specific 1 The negative effect of social equality on SO emission levels in countries with low 2 levels of political corruption becomes nonsignificant in the jack-knife analysis. 2 The negative effect of social equality on long-term SO emissions growth in coun2 tries with above average levels of political corruption remains nonsignificant when liberal democracies are excluded from the analysis. 3 This effect becomes nonsignificant without East Asia. But the model without East Asia is significant when model complexity is reduced, i.e., when the other democratic qualities are dropped from the analysis.

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form of political corruption: local and regional democracy quality has a negative effect on local air pollution emission levels in democracies with below average levels of executive, public sector, judicative and legislative corruption (see Fig. 5.5). We find no significant interaction between political corruption and democratic qualities on long-term changes in local air pollution. When the interaction between corruption and social equality and that between legislative corruption and local and regional democracy are tested simultaneously, both interaction effects remain significant. Both interaction effects are compared to controls relative important drivers of local air pollution levels in democracies. Their inclusion improves significantly the explanatory power of the regression model. The analysis supports the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis. In addition, trade openness and country size are positively associated with local air pollution levels. We find no support for the argument that political corruption moderates the effect of local and regional democracy on changes in SO2 emissions. Economic growth increases local air pollution in democracies. Chapter 3 concluded that specific democratic qualities have no significant effect on global air pollution in democracies. There is also no support for a moderating effect of political corruption or specific forms of political corruption on the relationship between democratic qualities and CO2 emission levels (1990–2000, 2001–2010) and long-term changes in CO2 emissions. Economic development and growth, trade openness, fuel exports and country size are positively associated with global air pollution levels. GDP per capita and GDP growth as well as trade openness also contribute to CO2 emissions growth. In sum, there is no support for a linear effect of democratic qualities on global air pollution levels and changes or for an interaction effect with political corruption. However, political corruption does moderate the effect of local and regional democracy and social equality on local air pollution levels: local and regional democracy is negatively associated with SO2 emission levels in democracies with below average levels of corruption, and social equality contributes to lower levels of local air pollution in countries with below average and average levels of legislative corruption. The negative effect of social equality on the development of local air pollution (see Chapter 3) is independent of both political corruption overall and the various forms of political corruption. Our analysis shows that there is a negative relationship between social equality and local air pollution in countries with below average values of

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Fig. 5.5 Local and regional democracy quality, dimensions of political corruption and local air pollution levels in democracies (Note Country averages of SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. Multivariate regression. Marginal effect plots. 95% confidence interval.)

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Fig. 5.5 (continued)

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legislative corruption (see Fig. 5.6). For instance, Scandinavian countries such as Norway and Sweden that share high values around social equality perform well in environmental performance. This supports the theoretical expectation that inclusiveness contributes to environmental performance. However, it only applies to democracies with below average levels of legislative corruption. For instance, Italy that has above average values of legislative corruption and performs poorly in local air quality despite its high levels of social equality. In the following section, we study the interaction of local and regional democracy with political corruption in more detail. We observe that in most countries with below average levels of corruption and below average regional and local democracy, this democratic quality is associated with high local air pollution levels (see Fig. 5.7). This includes Cyprus, Ireland, Israel, Poland, United Kingdom, Jamaica, Lithuania, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, Chile and Estonia. In comparison, countries with high levels of regional and local democracy and low levels of political corruption share low levels of SO2 emissions. This includes, for instance, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Denmark, New Zealand, Switzerland Netherlands and Costa Rica. There are exceptions: Australia, Canada and the US have high levels of local air pollution despite low levels of political corruption and high levels of regional and local democracy. Country size and natural resource exports might be independent of the relationship between local and regional democracy and domestic air pollution (Brown 2012, p. 325; Christoff and Eckersley 2011, p. 438). Moreover, federalism has been described as an obstacle to environmental protection in Canada and the US. Most democracies with above average levels of political corruption have below average values of SO2 emission levels (see Fig. 5.8) with only a few exceptions: Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine. In the following, we complement our statistical results with an analysis of the relationship between local and regional democracy, political corruption and environmental performance in Costa Rica. In addition to the central government, there are democratically elected municipal governments in Costa Rica (Keller et al. 2013, p. 90). During the research period, the country performed very well in its provision of local democracy. There is no regional level in the political system of Costa Rica, and thus the V-Dem data show that Costa Rica is characterized by low levels of regional democracy quality during the research period. Costa Rica has undertaken efforts to protect its environment, especially its forests (BTI

SO2 emissions by social equality

Fig. 5.6 Social equality, legislative corruption and local air pollution levels in democracies (Note Country averages of SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1900 to 2000.)

SO2 Emissions per capita

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SO2 Emissions per capita

Fig. 5.7 Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption and local air pollution levels in democracies (Note Country averages of SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1900 to 2000.)

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(a) Countries with below average levels of political corruption

Fig. 5.8 Local and regional democracy quality in democracies with below and above average levels of political corruption (Note Units of analsyis are country averages of SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000.)

SO2 Emissions per capita

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(b) Countries with above average levels of political corruption

Fig. 5.8 (continued)

SO2 Emissions per capita

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2003a). Deforestation was high until the 1980s, and there have been considerable successes in reforestation since then (Calvo-Alvarado et al. 2009, p. 931f.): in 1981, approximately 20% of the country was forest area, while by 2014, it was 52% (von Dehmer 2015). Costa Rica also uses nature parks and reserves to protect the environment (BTI 2003a), its electricity supply currently comes completely from renewable energies (von Dehmer 2015), and it supports ecologically sustainable tourism. Does local democracy contribute to environmental performance in Costa Rica? Local governments have little authority over environmental policies such as forest management (Larson 2003). Moreover, there are challenges to the implementation of environmental policies because the local governments in Costa Rica have limited resources (Keller et al. 2013, p. 90). However, Costa Rica promotes public participation at the local level (Martin 2004, p. 160); for example, it introduced policies for local participation in the governance of protected areas at the end of the 1980s (Basurto 2013, p. 17). In many Latin American countries, there have been efforts to include citizens in environmental political decisionmaking and in the implementation of environmental policies at the local and national levels of the political system (Hochstetler 2012, p. 218). For this purpose, citizens can participate in local government elections as well as in local town hall meetings (Martin 2004, p. 160), which, as noted in Steinberg (2005), contributes to environmental performance. For instance, citizens contribute via information and monitoring to environmental protection (Steinberg 2005). These observations also apply to Costa Rica. Costa Rica involves citizens in the implementation of environmental policies to improve environmental protection, and citizens report violations of environmental regulations (Steinberg 2001, p. 157). There is another link between local democracy quality and environmental performance in Costa Rica: among the public, environmental protection is sometimes favoured over economic development (BTI 2003a), and civil protests at the local level have contributed to environmental performance (Steinberg 2001, p. 158). For example, public opposition stopped offshore oil production and prevented the construction of hydro electronic plants in national parks (BTI 2003a). There have also been protests against a highway company that contributed to the creation of a national park in Costa Rica (Steinberg 2001, p. 158). Finally, local governments have undertaken efforts to protect the environment in response to pressure from ENGOs and citizens (Larson 2003, p. 213). Utting (1993, p. 112) describes how local communities were able to

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pressure the government to offer financial incentives to all landowners, not merely those with large holdings, to protect forests. In contrast, the lack of local participation in the early establishment of protected forest areas undermined the implementation of environmental policies in Costa Rica (Utting 1993, p. 112). Utting (1993, p. 169) argues that the participation of local communities contributes to the protection of forests. Therefore, the government of Costa Rica has, over time, given more consideration to local pressures (Utting 1993, p. 169). Democracy has been important for environmental protection in Costa Rica because it enables ENGOs and social movements to express their policy preferences and pressure political decision-makers. Utting (1993, p. 171) also emphasizes the low economic inequality in Costa Rica. In sum, the findings do not support either a linear effect of democratic qualities on global air pollution levels and changes or an interaction effect with political corruption. However, political corruption does moderate the effect of local and regional democracy and social equality on local air pollution levels. Local and regional democracy is negatively associated with SO2 emission levels in those democracies with below average levels of corruption, and social equality contributes to lower levels of local air pollution in countries with below average levels of legislative corruption. Finally, the negative effect of social equality on the development of local air pollution is independent of both political corruption overall and the individual forms of political corruption. 5.5.3

Democracy Qualities, Political Corruption and Environmental Performance in Autocracies

In our analysis of the linear effects of democratic qualities on local air pollution in autocracies, we found that local and regional democratic qualities are associated with lower levels of local air pollution levels, whereas social equality contributes to local air pollution levels. We also found that local and regional democracy has a negative effect on SO2 emissions in autocracies with high levels of political corruption (see Fig. 5.9), and this result remains stable in the separate analysis of executive, public sector, judicative and legislative corruption (see Fig. 5.9). The interaction between local and regional democracy and general political corruption remains significant when other democratic qualities are dropped from the analysis. The inclusion of the interaction effect contributes significantly to the explanation of differences in SO2 emissions levels among autocracies. It is

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Fig. 5.9 Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption and local air pollution levels in autocracies (Note Country averages of SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. Multivariate regression. Marginal effect plot. 95% confidence interval.)

also of relative importance for local air pollution levels. Economic development is the most important driver. In addition, the statistical analysis finds support for the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis. Chapter 4 indicated that regional democracy is decisive for SO2 emission levels. However, when we examine the interrelationship with political corruption separately for local and regional democracy, a negative effect occurs for local as well as regional democracy on local air pollution levels in countries with above average levels of political corruption (see Fig. 5.10). Chapter 4 shows that there is no effect of local and regional democracy on the development of local air pollution. However, we observe that political corruption moderates the effect of local and regional democracy on the development of SO2 emissions (see Fig. 5.11). There is a significant negative effect of local and regional democracy on local air pollution growth in autocracies with high levels of political corruption. This effect

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Fig. 5.10 Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption dimensions and local air pollution levels in autocracies (Note Country averages of SO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables. Multivariate analysis. Marginal effect plots. 95% confidence interval.)

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Fig. 5.10 (continued)

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Fig. 5.11 Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption and local air pollution development in autocracies (Note The dependent variable is the slope of country-years in SO2 emissions per capita (ln) from 1990 to 2000. Country averages of independent variables from 1990 to 2000. Multivariate regression. Marginal effect plot. 95% confidence interval.)

remains significant in the jack-knife analysis.4 It is also relative important for the development of SO2 emissions. In addition, economic growth contributes to local air pollution growth in autocracies. In sum, there is strong support for the argument that democracy on the local and regional levels is associated with lower local air pollution in non-democracies with high levels of political corruption.

4 There is a positive effect of civil society participation on SO emissions in countries 2 with low levels of public sector, judicative and legislative corruption. However, this effect becomes nonsignificant in the simultaneous analysis. Civil society participation also has a positive effect on SO2 emissions in countries with low levels of public sector, judicative and legislative corruption. The interaction between civil society and public sector, judicative or legislative corruption is not stable in the simultaneous analysis with the interaction of local and regional democracy and public sector, judicative, legislative or general political corruption.

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We find no stable interactions of other democratic qualities with political corruption. The interaction between social equality and political corruption becomes nonsignificant in the simultaneous analysis with the interaction between local and regional democracy quality and political corruption. In addition, in the disaggregated analysis, there is a positive effect of reasoned justification of the common good on local air pollution levels emissions, but this effect is not significant in the final model that includes the interaction between local and regional democracy and political corruption. In the final analysis, there is also no independent effect of social equality on SO2 emissions levels in autocracies. The data analysis indicates that there is no relationship between local and regional democracy quality and domestic air pollution in autocracies with low levels of political corruption. While countries with high levels of political corruption and low levels of regional and local democracy have high SO2 emissions (e.g., Tunisia and Turkmenistan), autocracies with above average levels of regional and local democracy and above average levels of political corruption have relatively low levels of SO2 emissions. This includes, for instance, Djibouti, Haiti, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, the Republic of Congo, and Uganda. It has been argued that decentralization can contribute to environmental performance in African countries where governments on the national level are unable to deliver environmental policies (Oosterveer and Van Vliet 2010, p. 284), creating a need for environmental protection measures by local communities (Oosterveer and Van Vliet 2010, p. 284). It is assumed that participation on the local level and decentralization contribute to development and efficient resource management (Ribot 2003, p. 53). We study one country with above average levels of political corruption in more detail: Uganda. Since the end of the 1980s, there have been efforts in Uganda to reduce political corruption with mixed results (BTI 2003b; Flanary and Watt 1999). For our complete research period, the data from V-Dem indicate high levels of political corruption (see also BTI 2003b). With regard to environmental performance, Uganda shows low levels of domestic and global air pollution and performs relatively well in the protection of biodiversity and habitat (Esty et al. 2008). There have been state efforts to protect the environment in this country (BTI 2003b), and Uganda is active with regard to national parks and the protection of animals that are important for tourism (BTI 2018). In comparison to other Sub-Saharan countries, resource efficiency is higher in

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Uganda (BTI 2003b) and there has also been an increase in the use of renewable energy sources. Nonetheless, forest area has declined since the 1990s (BTI 2018). As in many developing countries, Uganda decentralized its environmental policy and natural resources in the 1990s (Oosterveer and Van Vliet 2010, p. 284; Ribot 2003, p. 53). The decentralization process began at the end of the 1980s during the civil war (Awortwi 2011, p. 362; Ribot et al. 2006, p. 1869). The National Resistance Movement became the military rulers after the civil war recognized the resistance councils as local governments (Ribot et al. 2006, p. 1869). Their responsibilities included, for instance, the management of forests (Coleman and Fleischman 2012, p. 838; Ribot et al. 2006, p. 1869). However, Uganda centralized the management of national parks and forests in the middle of the 1990s (Ribot et al. 2006, p. 1869) along with further important decentralization reforms (Awortwi 2011, p. 362) that included finances and staff (Oosterveer and Van Vliet 2010, p. 284). At the end of the 1990s, the responsibility for forests was divided between the national and local government levels (Ribot et al. 2006, p. 1869), but most forests are under the control of the central government (Ribot et al. 2006, p. 1870), and the local authorities only implement national environmental policy decisions (Oosterveer and Van Vliet 2010, p. 288). This lowers participation. While local authorities are responsible for natural resource management, they are limited by the national environmental authorities (Ribot 2003, p. 56f.). Local governments in Uganda have must ensure that local environmental regulations are consistent with the central government regulations (Nkonya et al. 2008, p. 81). However, Nkonya et al. (2008, p. 81) note that the national level does not control this condition, so that environmental regulations and protection vary across local communities. At the end of the 1990s, local governments received some control with regard to the management of certain forests (Ribot et al. 2006, p. 1869), and there has been a shift of power to locally elected authorities with regard to forests (Ribot et al. 2010, p. 37). Initially, decentralization was about increasing local revenues and supporting development (Oosterveer and Van Vliet 2010, p. 287). Later, governments of donor states and international institutions pressured Uganda to manage environmental issues at the local level and improve participation and accountability in the management of environmental resources (Oosterveer and Van Vliet 2010, p. 287f.). “Uganda’s policy of decentralization is officially focused on empowering local populations via

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democratization, participation, accountability, responsibilities, efficiency, and effectiveness” (Oosterveer and Van Vliet 2010, p. 287; see also Coleman and Fleischman 2012, p. 838). Oosterveer and Van Vliet (2010, p. 293) observe that the decentralization of natural resource management contributed to more participation and accountability at the local level. In fact, decentralization contributed more to local participation in Uganda than in any other Sub-Saharan African country (Awortwi 2011, p. 365; Watt et al. 1999, p. 57). The indicators from V-Dem show that local and regional democracy quality improved during the 1990s. Moreover, Uganda performs better with regard to local and regional democracy than it does for the other democratic qualities. Decentralization and local democracy in Uganda have not contributed to lower levels of political corruption. Watt et al. (1999) conclude that these features instead led to a dispersion of political corruption. Thus, political corruption also takes place on the local level. Nonetheless, for this country, it can be shown that local democracy contributes to environmental performance. While Uganda is active in environmental policymaking, not all environmental policies are adopted (BTI 2018, Uganda). However, Nkonya et al. (2008, p. 96) find that compliance with natural resource management regulations is higher when they are implemented on the local level. Turyahabwe et al. (2007, p. 590) conclude from their empirical analysis that local authorities contributed to forest protection because it prevented illegal logging. With regard to the interrelationship between local democracy and political corruption, the interplay between local authorities and the central government is also important. Local politicians sometimes use their control over forests to obtain re-election, and for this purpose contribute to deforestation (Turyahabwe et al. 2007). While there is public awareness of environmental problems, some segments of the local population are against environmental protection efforts and prefer to use the land for economic purposes (BTI 2018, Uganda). Local elected authorities do not implement environmental regulations to become re-elected (Nkonya et al. 2008, p. 96); for instance, they reduce forest area to gain revenues (Coleman and Fleischman 2012, p. 838). The central government of Uganda recognized and addressed this problem (Coleman and Fleischman 2012, p. 838). In sum, the example of Uganda illustrates that local democracy contributes to environmental performance in a country with high levels of

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political corruption. The interplay between the levels of the political system is important. It must be considered, though, that environmental governance by local governments has been weakened in more recent years (Awortwi 2011; Kantel 2019). We find no stable support for the claim that political corruption moderates the effect of local and regional democracy on CO2 emissions levels.5 The negative effect of local and regional democracy on CO2 emissions in autocracies with high levels of executive, public sector, judicative and legislative corruption becomes nonsignificant in the jack-knife analysis. The analysis of the development of CO2 emissions in autocracies has shown a positive effect of local and regional democracy. Our data suggest that this effect is only significant for average levels of political corruption and becomes weaker at greater levels (see Fig. 5.12). Social equality has a positive effect on CO2 emissions in autocracies with average levels of political corruption, and this effect remains significant in the jack-knife analysis.6 This democratic quality is associated with high levels of CO2 emissions in autocracies with low levels of judicative and legislative corruption (see Fig. 5.13). However, the interactions with executive, public sector and judicative corruption become nonsignificant in the jack-knife analysis, and the interaction between legislative corruption and social equality is not significant for the development of CO2 emissions. In addition, the positive linear effect of economic development on global air pollution levels is more important than the interaction effect. There is also support for a curvilinear effect of GDP per capita in accordance with Environmental Kuzents Curve theory. Trade openness and country size are positively associated with CO2 emissions. The analysis of political corruption, democratic qualities and CO2 emissions in autocracies indicates a positive effect of social equality on CO2 emission levels only in countries with below average and average levels of legislative corruption. Chapter 4 concluded that among the indicators of social equality, the measure based on the equal distribution

5 The negative effect of local and regional democracy in autocracies with high levels of political corruption becomes nonsignificant in the jack-knife analysis. This effect also becomes nonsignificant in the analysis without East and Central European countries and in that without North African and Middle Eastern countries. Both models are significant or nearly significant when other democratic qualities are excluded. 6 In the analysis without Sub-Saharan African countries, social equality becomes significant for below and average levels of political corruption.

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Fig. 5.12 Local and regional democracy quality, political corruption and global air pollution development in autocracies (Note The dependent variable is the slope of country-years of CO2 emissions per capita from 1990 to 2000 (ln). Country averages of independent variables. Multivariate regression. Marginal effect plot. 90% confidence interval.)

of socio-economic resources affects global air pollution. When we estimate the interaction with this indicator, we reached the same results (see Fig. 5.14). However, we find no significant interaction between legislative corruption and social equality on global air pollution levels in autocracies from 2001 to 2010. In sum, there is some support for social equality having a positive effect on CO2 emissions in countries with below average and average levels of legislative corruption. The effect of the equal distribution of socioeconomic resources is decisive. Moreover, local and regional democracy contributes to CO2 emissions growth in countries with average levels of political corruption. We see that local and regional democracy is associated with lower local air pollution and local air pollution development in autocracies with high levels of political corruption. Local and regional democracy has a positive effect on CO2 emissions growth in countries with average levels of political corruption, but it becomes weaker as political corruption grows.

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Fig. 5.13 Social equality, legislative corruption and global air pollution levels in autocracies (Note Country averages of CO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. Multivariate regression. Marginal effect plot. 95% confidence interval.)

Social equality is associated with global air pollution levels in autocracies with below average and average levels of legislative corruption, and the association becomes weaker with increased legislative corruption. Therefore, the equal distribution of socio-economic resources is decisive. This latter interaction does not apply to the research period from 2001 to 2010.

5.6

Conclusion

Existing research suggests that the positive effect of democratic qualities on environmental performance is conditional on institutional quality. Political corruption undermines the positive effects of democratic qualities on environmental performance. The previous two chapters have shown that it is not democracy in general but specific aspects of democracy—social equality and democracy on the local and regional levels— that explain differences in environmental performance among democracies as well among autocracies. This chapter examined whether the effects

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Fig. 5.14 The equal distribution of socio-economic resources, legislative corruption and global air pollution levels in autocracies (Note Country averages of CO2 emissions per capita (ln) and independent variables from 1990 to 2000. Multivariate regression. Marginal effect plot. 95% confidence interval.)

of these specific democratic qualities are moderated by political corruption. We argued that legislative corruption should undermine the positive effects of social equality in democracies. The representation of social groups in the political system ensures that diffuse interests such as environmental protection are considered in the political decision-making process. However, corrupt policy-makers in parliaments are likely to follow narrower interests. In contrast, in autocracies, political authorities do not rely on bribery to realize their policy preferences. Social equality does not necessarily affect political decisions because leaders can use repression to secure their wealth. Political corruption should undermine the positive effects of local and regional democracy on environmental performance in democracies. Corrupt politicians might hinder the implementation of environmental policies. However, local and regional democracy could contribute to environmental performance in autocracies with high levels of corruption, as the multiple political levels would make it harder for interest groups to bribe political authorities, and they contribute to accountability and efficiency. In addition, in countries that lack the

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national political capacity to protect the environment, local and regional democracy can adopt and implement environmental policies. In our analysis, we find support for our theoretical expectations. In Chapter 3, we found only a negative effect of social equality on SO2 emissions growth, and this negative effect is independent of political corruption. However, social equality contributes to local air quality in democracies with below average levels of legislative corruption. As expected, we find no such interaction effect in autocracies. The equal distribution of resources is associated with higher global air pollution levels in those autocracies with low and average levels of legislative corruption, but it becomes weaker as legislative corruption increases. In contrast to our theoretical expectations (Hypothesis 11), this finding suggests an interaction between social equality and political corruption. Both social equality in terms of socioeconomic resources and low levels of legislative corruption lead to an increase in consumption that in turn increases global air pollution. With regard to the interrelationship between local and regional democracy and political corruption, we formulated two competing hypotheses. Chapter 3 concluded that local and regional democracy contributes to local air quality in democracies. In our analysis of democracies, we found support for our hypothesis (Hypothesis 12), but this result only applies to democracies with below average levels of political corruption. In our analysis of autocracies, we find support for the competing hypothesis that local and regional democracy quality supports environmental performance in non-democracies with very high levels of political corruption. Thus, the negative effect of local and regional democracy on local air pollution that we found in Chapter 4 is conditional upon political corruption. The different levels of the political system make it more difficult for special interests to bribe political authorities, and competition among levels of the political system increases accountability and efficiency, and might therefore weaken the negative effects of political corruption on environmental performance. However, political corruption moderates the positive effect of local and regional democracy on global air pollution growth. Local and regional democracy has a positive effect on CO2 emissions growth in autocracies with average levels of political corruption, but the positive effect becomes weaker with political corruption.

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CHAPTER 6

Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications

Abstract This chapter concludes our study. It provides a short summary of the analysis of democratic qualities and environmental performance in democracies and autocracies described in previous chapters. It next evaluates the implications and limitations of these results for future research. Empirical research, in accordance with green political theory, should not focus on the environmental consequences of liberal democracy. As the results vary between local and global air pollution, it might be beneficial to study other dimensions of environmental performance as well. This work concludes by reflecting upon possible policy implications. The findings suggest that policy-makers should support social equality and local and regional democracy to improve local environmental problems in particular. Keywords Democracy · Corruption · Social equality · Environmental performance · Climate change · Local democracy · Regional democracy

Numerous studies examine the relationship between democracy and environmental performance but find no clear effect of the regime type or the quality of democracy on environmental outcomes. Moreover, environmental performance varies among democracies and autocracies. This

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book examined whether an analysis of the effects of democratic qualities on local and global air pollution in both democracies and autocracies improves our understanding of the environmental consequences of democracy. Previous results suggest that the effect of the quality of democracy is conditional on political corruption. In accordance, our empirical analysis considered the interrelationship between aspects of democracy and political corruption and studied whether political corruption moderates the effects of democratic qualities. This chapter provides a short summary of our book. It next discusses the limitations of our findings as well as implications for future research. The final section reflects upon possible policy implications.

6.1

Summary

Environmental outcomes vary considerably among countries, and it is therefore important to establish their explanatory factors. Numerous political science studies examine the environmental consequences of democracy. More recently, many governments have reduced state efforts to protect the local and global environment (e.g., Brazil, the US). Simultaneously, we can observe a decline in democratic qualities in these countries. For instance, the Trump administration has not only weakened environmental regulations but also cut funding for climate monitoring and research and questions global warming. Environmental performance varies among autocracies as well. Therefore, case studies discuss whether aspects of democracy, such as participation at the local and regional levels, contribute to environmental performance in non-democracies (Gilley 2012, p. 293). To contribute to the literature on democracy and the environment, this book has examined the effect of specific aspects of democracy on local and global air pollution in democracies and in autocracies. Our main argument is that the general quality of democracy, independent of the underlying model of democracy, cannot explain environmental outcomes. The reason lies in the fact that no uniform effect can be expected from the institutional traits of democracy. In contrast, the analysis of specific democratic qualities might contribute to a better understanding of cross-national variation in environmental performance among democracies and among autocracies. Based on the literature

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review, Chapter 2 explained that among the examined democratic qualities, social equality between social groups and local and regional democracy should contribute to environmental performance. The effect of electoral accountability depends whether supporters or opponents of environmental performance are elected. Political rights make it possible for environmental policy preferences to be considered in the political decisionmaking process, but previous research has found no effect on environmental performance. The rule of law might contribute to the implementation of environmental policies, but this depends on the stringency of environmental policies. Checks and balances ensure that more policy preferences are considered in the political decision-making process, but a single veto player could be able to block environmental protection efforts. It is an empirical question whether deliberation quality explains cross-national variation in environmental performance. Direct democracy and civil society participation both have potential positive and negative effects on environmental outcomes. Social equality among social groups in democracies should make it more likely that diffuse interests such as environmental protection are considered in the domestic political decision-making process. In autocracies, improvements in access to political power might not affect policy outcomes. However, via consumption, social equality might undermine environmental performance in autocracies. Local and regional democracy enables citizens and ENGOs to express their environmental policy preferences, encourages participation and considers local knowledge. Chapters 3 and 4 examined the effects of democratic qualities on local and global air pollution for democracies and autocracies, respectively. Our results find that social equality as well as local and regional democracy explain country differences in environmental performance. In accordance with our hypotheses, we find differences between local and global air pollution as well as between democracies and autocracies. As expected, social equality is associated with lower increases in local air pollution measured by SO2 emissions in democracies. Democracies with high levels of local and regional democracy perform well in environmental performance measured by SO2 emissions levels. In accordance with our expectations, social equality and local and regional democracy matter for air pollution in autocracies as well. The results vary with the pollutant. As expected, social equality is associated with higher global air pollution levels and growth. Autocracies vary in social access to power. Thus, social equality in autocracies does not necessarily influence political decisions. Nonetheless, social

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equality should affect environmental performance, and indeed, improvements in social equality contribute via consumption to local and global air pollution. In accordance with our expectations, local and regional democracy contributes to lower SO2 emissions in non-democracies but is associated with CO2 emissions growth. Recent research suggests that the effect of democracy quality is conditional on institutional quality. Political corruption undermines the positive relationship between democracy quality and environmental performance. Chapter 5 examined whether political corruption moderates the effects of social equality and local and regional democracy on environmental performance in democracies as well as in autocracies. We argued that in democracies, the positive effects of social equality and local and regional democracy should be conditional on low levels of political corruption. We find support for our theoretical expectations. Social equality and local and regional democracy are only associated with lower levels of local air quality in those democracies with below average levels of political corruption. With regard to corrupt non-democracies, we argued that local and regional democracy might contribute to environmental performance, and we find support for this expectation in our analysis of local air pollution. The negative impact of local and regional democracy on local air pollution described above applies only to autocracies with high levels of political corruption, and its positive effect on global air pollution growth applies to countries with below average and average levels of political corruption. Both local and regional democracy and low levels of political corruption might contribute via economic growth and consumption to global air pollution. Our analysis above has indicated that social equality contributes to local and global air pollution. In this respect, the equal distribution of socio-economic resources is decisive for global air pollution. When we consider political corruption, the effect on global air quality only applies to autocracies with average levels and below average levels of legislative corruption. In conclusion, the general quality of democracy cannot explain country differences in environmental performance. Importantly, this finding is independent of the underlying democracy model. In addition to competitive elections, models of democracy identify additional aspects as decisive for democracy, including political and civil rights, horizontal accountability, deliberation quality, social equality and non-electoral forms of participation, such as direct democracy, civil society participation and democracy on the local and regional levels of the political system. However,

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no uniform effects on the environment of these quality dimensions can be expected. Our findings indicate that among democratic qualities, only social equality and democracy on the local and regional levels affect local and global air pollution. In accordance with previous research on democracy and environmental performance, we find that these effects are conditional on political corruption.

6.2

Implications and Limitations of the Findings

This section discusses the implications for future research and the limitations of our research results. Our study contributes to the regime type– environment literature. Empirical research on the environmental consequences of democracy consists of large-N studies of the effect of the regime type or democracy quality on environmental output and outcomes. In contrast to the theoretical discussion, previous research has focused on measures that are based on liberal understandings of democracy. This finding has three implications. First, in accordance with the literature, the general degree of democracy cannot explain cross-national differences in environmental performance. Our study adds that this also applies to the separate analysis of democracies and autocracies. Second, we find that there is no difference between local and regional air pollution. This conflicts with results from previous research finding that democracies perform better than autocracies in the solution of local environmental problems. The quality of democracy is not associated with lower levels of either global air pollution or local air pollution. Third, we add to the literature by confirming that irrespective of the underlying democracy model, the quality of democracy is not associated with better environmental performance. There is no support that the effect of democracy depends on the underlying democracy model. Moreover, this research adds to the literature by finding that specific democratic qualities are associated with environmental performance. Green political theory discusses multiple models of democracy that emphasize aspects of democracy beyond competitive elections. In contrast to similar studies (e.g., Escher and Walter-Rogg 2018), this book has considered a wide array of democratic qualities based on electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian and participatory democracy. It illustrated that among democratic qualities, only social equality and local and regional democracy are decisive for local and global air pollution in democracies and autocracies. This finding has several implications for future research.

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First, it is important to disaggregate the effect of democracy on the environment in statistical studies. In accordance with the theoretical discussion, democratic qualities do not have a uniform effect on environmental outcomes. Thus, the use of summary measures of democracy might lead to misleading results, as the individual effects of democratic qualities could balance each other out in the statistical analysis. This also applies to the institutional traits that are emphasized by the democracy models. We find, for instance, no effect from the egalitarian democracy quality that considers competitive elections or from social equality. Second, the analysis has shown that, in accordance with the theoretical literature, it is fruitful to study the effects of aspects that are not only present in liberal democracies but also in other democracy models on environmental performance. In particular, social equality is often neglected in quantitative studies of democracy and the environment. Recent developments in the measurement of democracy quality offer us more possibilities, in accordance with green political theory, to study the consequences of multiple democracy models. At the same time, we should consider the limitations of quantitative studies in this research area. In contrast to the theoretical literature, we find no positive effects of deliberation quality on environmental quality. However, it should be taken into account that deliberation takes place in electoral or liberal democracies. Finally, future research should study the relationship between democratic qualities and the environment for other dimensions of environmental performance, such as biodiversity loss (see also Rydén et al. 2019). In accordance with previous research, our results vary between local and global air pollution as well as in the levels and changes in environmental pollution. This study also focused on outcome indicators of environmental performance, and the results might be different for output indicators. Previous research has shown that the relationship between democracy and environmental commitment and performance varies (e.g., Bättig and Bernauer 2009). This finding also applies to the analysis of specific aspects of democracy (e.g., Escher and Walter-Rogg 2018). Moreover, as explained in Chapter 2, outcome data have disadvantages as indicators of environmental performance because they are also influenced by nonpolitical factors. Our study contributes to the comparative analysis of environmental performance in autocracies. As explained, the previous quantitative research on differences in environmental outcomes in non-democracies

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has focused on types of autocracy. There are elections of political authorities in most autocracies today, and non-democracies also vary with regard to other democratic qualities. Case studies have shown that democratic qualities matter for environmental policy in autocracies. Our analysis indicates that these differences contribute to variation in environmental performance among autocracies. Therefore, we find that social quality affects environmental outcomes differently in non-democracies than in democracies. It follows first that it is beneficial to study the relationship between democratic qualities and the environment separately for democracies and autocracies. Moreover, future research on the environmental performance of autocracies should consider the differences in democratic qualities among them. A limitation of our study is that while we have considered types of autocracies in our multivariate models, we have not discussed their possible interrelationship with democratic qualities. This could, for instance, shed more light on the mechanism that links social equality to environmental pollution in autocracies. The finding that local and regional democracy contribute to environmental performance links this study to research on the environmental consequences of decentralization. As explained in Chapter 2, this literature discusses the positive and negative effects of decentralization. Our results suggest that local and regional democracy are important. However, our statistical analysis did not consider the jurisdiction of local and regional units in environmental matters. It is, therefore, important to examine whether decentralization matters for the relationship between democracy on the local and regional levels and environmental performance. With regard to both social equality and local and regional democracy, it is necessary to study the causal mechanisms using case studies that link these features to environmental performance. Our study has shown that both have multiple effects on environmental performance. For instance, while social equality contributes to environmental performance in democracies, it is associated with air pollution in autocracies. With regard to local and regional democracy, our brief case studies indicate that the interrelationship with the central government is important. Finally, our findings add to the literature on democracy, political corruption and the environment. Previous research has shown that it is important to consider institutional quality in the analysis of regime type and environmental performance (e.g., Povitkina 2018). Recent research suggests that political corruption weakens the positive effects of democracy. We observed that democracy, via social equality and local and

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regional democracy, affects environmental outcomes. Our analysis reveals that political corruption moderates the effects of these specific democratic qualities. In accordance with previous research on democratic qualities and environmental performance, political corruption weakens the positive effects of social equality and local and regional democracy on environmental performance. This study adds that this does not apply to autocracies. Local and regional democracy is associated with environmental performance in highly corrupt autocracies. Moreover, it has been beneficial to distinguish forms of political corruption in accordance with the theoretical literature. Our focus is on political corruption. There is a need to study whether other variables, such as government capacity, moderate the effect of democratic qualities as well. To conclude, we would like to briefly discuss the policy implications of our findings. In accordance with results, the quality of being a democracy is not associated with global air pollution. In contrast to the relationship between democratic qualities and local air pollution, the data analysis illustrates that neither democracy in general nor specific democratic qualities improve global air pollution. Thus, the effects of democratic qualities are more prevalent for environmental problems that have greater visibility. This implies that the positive effects of democratic qualities on climate performance might become more prevalent with the visible consequences of global warming. On the contrary, the data suggest that social equality and local and regional democracy contribute to greenhouse gas emissions. Given the urgency of the climate crisis, our findings imply that citizens and policy-makers have to actively support efforts to mitigate climate change. Democratization alone will not solve the climate change problem. Instead, to solve local environmental problems such as local air pollution, it is necessary to strengthen democracy at the local and regional levels and include all social groups in the political process. Our findings illustrate that the positive environmental effects of local and regional democracy also apply to autocracies with high levels of political corruption. This conclusion is in accordance with the demands of ENGOs to support democracy and the participation of local communities to tackle the environmental consequences of political corruption in less developed countries (e.g., Kalenga and Böhmer 2019, no page numbers). This relationship can also be illustrated by the wildfires in Brazil during the summer of 2019, Brazil being a country that has recently seen high levels of political corruption, a decline in public support for democracy and the election of an illiberal president (Hunter and Power 2019).

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While the central government of Brazil supports deforestation for economic growth, regional political authorities have shown their willingness to protect forests by directly contacting donor governments such as Germany and Norway to access their financial environmental aid. Moreover, some regional political authorities are generally opposed to the environmental policy of the central government (Phillips 2019).

References Bättig, Michèle B., and Thomas Bernauer. 2009. National institutions and global public goods: Are democracies more cooperative in climate change policy? International Organization 63: 281–308. Escher, Romy, and Melanie Walter-Rogg. 2018. Does the conceptualization and measurement of democracy quality matter in comparative climate policy research? Politics and Governance 6: 28. Gilley, Bruce. 2012. Authoritarian environmentalism and China’s response to climate change. Environmental Politics 21: 287–307. Hunter, Wendy, and Timothy J. Power. 2019. Bolsonaro and Brazil’s illiberal backlash. Journal of Democracy 30: 68–82. Kalenga, Marie-Ange, and Brice Böhmer. 2019. Stronger democracy means stronger forests. https://www.fern.org/de/ressourcen/stronger-democracymeans-stronger-forests-955/. Accessed 31 August 2019. Phillips, Tom. 2019. ‘Worst of wildfires still to come’ despite Brazil claiming crisis is under control. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2019/aug/28/brazil-amazon-wildfires-worst-to-come. Accessed 28 August 2019. Povitkina, Marina. 2018. The limits of democracy in tackling climate change. Environmental Politics 27: 411–432. Rydén, Oskar, Alexander Zizka, Sverker C. Jagers, Staffan I. Lindberg, and Alexandre Antonelli. 2019. Linking democracy and biodiversity conservation: Empirical evidence and research gaps. Ambio 1–15. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s13280-019-01210-0.

Index

A Accountability, 9, 25, 36–38, 42, 46, 62, 69, 106, 109, 112, 137, 138, 142, 143. See also Horizontal accountability, Vertical accountability air pollution, 4, 16, 17, 27, 32, 63, 88 Autocracy, 3, 4, 92, 113, 155

B Brazil, 150, 156, 157

C Carbon dioxide emissions. See CO2 emissions checks and balances, 4, 6–8, 22, 29, 39, 62, 86, 92 China, 4, 27, 35, 36, 87 civil liberties, 5, 7, 24, 39, 44–46 civil rights. See civil liberties

civil society, 27, 32, 34, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 135. See also civil society participation civil society organizations, 23, 34, 47 civil society participation, 4, 6, 25, 42, 45, 47, 65, 69, 71, 82, 96, 98, 135, 151, 152 climate change. See global warming CO2 emissions, 17, 18, 20, 23, 28, 32, 39–41, 63, 66, 79, 86, 89, 90, 98, 99, 102, 107, 113, 122, 139, 140, 143, 152 collection action problem, 30, 34 consumption, 8, 32, 33, 40, 87, 110, 143, 151, 152 corruption. See also executive corruption judicative corruption, 47, 48, 106, 113, 121, 131, 135, 139 legislative corruption, 9, 106, 113, 121, 122, 125, 131, 139–143, 152

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 R. Escher and M. Walter-Rogg, Environmental Performance in Democracies and Autocracies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38054-0

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INDEX

political corruption, 5–10, 47, 49, 96, 97, 105–113, 120–122, 125, 131, 132, 135, 136, 138–140, 142, 143, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156 public sector corruption, 7, 48, 106, 113 Costa Rica, 125, 130, 131 D decentralization, 3, 33, 35–39, 87, 110–112, 136–138, 155 Deliberation, 7, 8, 21, 30, 36, 38, 40, 44, 46, 87, 111, 154. See also deliberation quality discourse, 30, 46 deliberation quality, 4, 6, 8, 25, 30, 42, 46, 69, 74, 82, 86, 96, 109, 151, 152 deliberative democracy, 4, 22, 29, 30, 66 Democracy. See also deliberative democracy democracy model, 24, 29, 30, 62, 64, 66, 67, 74, 81, 89, 90, 152–154 direct democracy, 4, 6, 23, 25, 34, 37, 42, 47, 65, 69, 71, 79, 82, 96, 98, 151, 152 egalitarian democracy, 21, 66, 154 electoral democracy, 24, 26, 64–66, 69, 71, 89, 90, 92 liberal democracy, 4, 22, 27, 30, 64, 66, 69, 81, 90, 92 local democracy, 36, 69, 125, 130, 136, 138 participatory democracy, 4, 23–25, 41, 47, 62, 64–66, 82, 89, 90, 96, 98, 153 quality of democracy, 9, 41, 62–64, 66, 67, 81, 88, 89, 149, 150, 152, 153

regional democracy, 4, 5, 8, 9, 33, 37–39, 42, 62–64, 71, 74, 78, 79, 82, 86, 87, 96, 98, 99, 101, 102, 106, 107, 110–113, 120, 122, 125, 131, 132, 136, 138–140, 142, 143, 151–153, 155, 156 E economic development, 18, 23, 26, 32, 48, 108, 130 economic growth, 22, 38, 48, 108, 109, 152, 157 EKC, 32, 48 elections, 4, 6, 7, 21, 24–26, 37, 42, 86, 92, 130, 152–155 electoral accountability, 8, 24, 25, 39, 43, 62, 69, 82, 87, 112, 151 electoral systems, 4, 39, 69 ENGOs, 8, 27, 31, 34, 36, 38, 40, 48, 63, 109, 111, 130, 131, 151, 156 environmental authoritarianism, 28, 33, 35, 87, 102 environmental concern, 31 environmental interest groups. See ENGOs environmental Kuznets curve. See EKC environmental outcome, 2, 4, 6, 7, 15–17, 24, 81, 86, 99, 149–151, 154–156 environmental output, 2, 153 environmental performance, 2–10, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23–25, 27–34, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 49, 62–64, 66, 67, 69, 72, 81, 82, 85–89, 96, 98, 99, 101, 102, 105–113, 125, 130, 136, 138, 141–143, 149–156 environmental policy, 3, 5–8, 16, 17, 27, 28, 33, 34, 36–40, 49, 62,

INDEX

63, 102, 108, 109, 111, 137, 151, 155, 157 environmental protection, 2–5, 8, 16, 18, 20, 22–29, 31–37, 39–41, 62, 86–88, 101, 106, 125, 130, 131, 136, 138, 142, 151 environmental sustainability, 31 equality among social groups, 8, 23, 32, 62, 86, 87, 96 executive corruption, 47, 106, 107, 113, 121, 131, 139

F feminist theory, 31 free media, 27, 88

G gender, 5, 24, 31, 109 gender inequality, 31 global air pollution, 6, 7, 9, 10, 18, 26, 32, 33, 39–41, 62, 63, 66, 67, 78, 79, 82, 86–88, 97–99, 101, 102, 110, 113, 120, 122, 131, 136, 140, 141, 143, 150–154, 156 global environmental performance, 40, 64 global warming, 2, 17, 29, 48, 150, 156 government, 2, 4, 5, 16, 17, 22, 23, 25–29, 31, 34–38, 42, 46, 48, 86, 87, 107–109, 111, 112, 125, 131, 136, 138, 150, 155–157. See also local authorities, local government national government, 38 green political theorists, 2, 21–23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 34–36, 47, 64 green political theory. See green political theorists

161

H Horizontal accountability, 22, 25, 29, 39, 42, 44, 62, 64, 69, 79, 82, 86, 92, 152. See also checks and balances Human rights, 29 I Inequality, 32, 109, 110, 131. See also gender inequality social inequality. See equality among social groups, socio-economic inequality institutional constraints, 4, 29 institutional quality, 5, 108, 111, 141, 152, 155 L local air pollution, 9, 26, 28, 32, 66, 74, 78, 82, 88, 96, 97, 121, 122, 125, 131, 132, 135, 140, 143, 152, 153, 156 local authorities, 37, 137, 138 local government, 35–38, 40, 130, 137, 139 M media. See free media P participation, 3, 4, 8, 16, 21, 23, 30, 32–37, 40–42, 46, 63, 69, 86, 102, 106, 111, 112, 130, 131, 135–138, 150, 151, 156 performance. See also environmental performance climate performance, 3, 6, 30, 35. See global environmental performance, 36, 40, 41, 156 procedural performance, 2

162

INDEX

substanial performance, 2 political liberties, 31 political parties, 21, 35, 42, 47 political power, 23, 30, 47, 86, 87, 101, 151 Political rights. See political liberties Pollution, 2, 8, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32, 39–41, 103, 108, 154, 155. See also air pollution, global air pollution, local air pollution public good, 25, 41

sulfur dioxide emissions, SO2 emissions, 17, 18, 32, 41, 63, 74, 78, 82, 86, 89, 96, 102, 121, 122, 125, 131, 132, 135, 136, 143, 151, 152 sustainability. See environmental sustainability U Uganda, 136–138 United States. See US US, 2, 4, 16, 31, 35, 125, 150

R regime type, 3–5, 7, 10, 15, 23, 24, 63, 66, 149, 153, 155 representation, 23, 31, 33, 82, 86, 87, 101, 106, 142 rule of law, 8, 28, 37, 39, 62, 87, 112, 151

V Vertical accountability, 37, 42, 43, 69, 86, 92. See also elections, electoral accountability Veto player, 8, 29, 36, 39, 62, 87, 151

S socio-economic inequality, 30

W winning coalition, 25