Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks: Historical Case Studies, New Paradigms and Future Directions 3031295285, 9783031295287

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Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks Historical Case Studies, New Paradigms and Future Directions Edited by Thomas Walker · Jane McGaughey · Gabrielle Machnik-Kekesi · Victoria Kelly

Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks

Thomas Walker · Jane McGaughey · Gabrielle Machnik-Kekesi · Victoria Kelly Editors

Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks Historical Case Studies, New Paradigms and Future Directions

Editors Thomas Walker Department of Finance Concordia University Montreal, QC, Canada

Jane McGaughey School of Irish Studies Concordia University Montreal, QC, Canada

Gabrielle Machnik-Kekesi Emerging Risks Information Center Concordia University Montreal, QC, Canada

Victoria Kelly Emerging Risks Information Center Concordia University Montreal, QC, Canada

ISBN 978-3-031-29528-7 ISBN 978-3-031-29529-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29529-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

We acknowledge the financial support provided through the Jacques Ménard—BMO Centre for Capital Markets, the Government of Québec, and the Canadian Irish Studies Foundation. We appreciate the excellent copy-editing and editorial assistance we received from Meaghan Landrigan-Buttle, Miles Murphy, and Eimear Rosato.

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Contents

Part I Introduction 1

Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks: An Introduction Thomas Walker, Jane McGaughey, Gabrielle Machnik-Kekesi, and Victoria Kelly

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Part II Patterns and Legacies: Historical Case Studies 2

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Infusing the Globe: Yerba Mate, Polish Immigration, and Creolization in Southern Brazil (c.1870–1920) Fabiana Carla Guarez and Diogo de Carvalho Cabral Coffee Plantations and Irish Migration to Santiago de Cuba: A Historical Case Study of Radical Environmental Transformation Giselle González García

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Part III Methodological Interventions and Models 4

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The Need for Better Data: Climate-Induced Mobility, Urbanization, and Procedural Injustices in Zambia Sennan D. Mattar and Neil J. W. Crawford

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Leveraging Labor Migration and Migrant Remittances in Nepal Santosh Adhikari and Joanna Vince

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CONTENTS

The Impact of Sea-Level Rise on Existing Patterns of Migration Roland Smith, Robert J. Nicholls, Mark G. L. Tebboth, and Avidan Kent

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Part IV Risk and Vulnerability: Intersecting Migration Studies 7

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Climate Migration and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Kristine Perry

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Compounding Risks and Increased Vulnerabilities: Climate Change, Conflict, and Mobility in East Africa Lisa Thalheimer

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Building a Critical, Place-Based Approach to Climate Displacement: A Future Agenda for Research, Planning, and Practice Stacia Ryder and Michael Mikulewicz

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Santosh Adhikari is a passionate researcher in public policies in agriculture development and youth engagement in agriculture. He was recognized as the 2015/16 Employee of the Year for his innovative policymaking and implementation. Public policies and return-migration reintegration are his new areas of research, including his Ph.D. research on “Labour Migration as a Development Strategy: Policy Lessons from the Philippines and Kerala (India) for Nepal”. He obtained his Ph.D. degree from the University of Tasmania. Diogo de Carvalho Cabral is Assistant Professor in Environmental History at Trinity College Dublin (Republic of Ireland) and a member of the Trinity Centre for Environmental Humanities (TCEH). He is the author of Na Presença da Floresta: Mata Atlântica e História Colonial (Rio de Janeiro, 2014) and co-edited Metamorfoses Florestais: Culturas, Ecologias e as Transformações Históricas da Mata Atlântica (Curitiba, 2016) with Ana Bustamante. He also published over thirty articles in prestigious peer-reviewed journals such as Environmental History, the Journal of Historical Geography, Landscape History, and Applied Geography. Some of these were awarded prizes such as the 2016 Journal of Historical Geography Best Paper Prize. He is currently co-editing a collection with André Vital and Margarita Gascón on nonhuman agencies in Latin American history (to be published by the University of London Press) and working on a monograph that examines the role of leafcutter ants in Brazilian nation-building. ix

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Neil J. W. Crawford is a Research Fellow in Climate Action at the School of Geography at the University of Leeds (United Kingdom) and a Research Associate at the Refugee Law Project, Makerere University (Uganda). He works on the UK Research and Innovation-funded project, “Gender, Generation and Climate Change (GENERATE): Creative Approaches to Building Inclusive and Climate Resilient Cities in Uganda and Indonesia”, leading work in Uganda. He is the author of a number of publications including the monograph, The Urbanization of Forced Displacement: UNHCR, Urban Refugees, and the Dynamics of Policy Change (McGill–Queen’s University Press, 2021), and is the co-editor of The Climate Connection—Cultural Relations Collection (British Council, 2021) and Climate Justice in the Majority World (Routledge, 2023). Giselle González García obtained her B.A. in History at the University of Havana in 2016 and her M.A. at Concordia University in 2020. She is currently a third year Ph.D. student at Concordia University’s School of Irish Studies. She is member of the Executive Committee of the Society for Irish Latin American Studies (University College Cork, Ireland), and of the Canadian Association of Irish Studies. Her main subject of scholarly interest is Irish migration to Cuba during the nineteenth century. Fabiana Carla Guarez is a doctoral student in Global History at the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), Brazil, in the research line Migrations and Environment: Spatialities and (Post) Colonial Contexts. She holds a scholarship from the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES). She graduated with a Master’s degree in Cultural History from the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC) and obtained a Licentiate Degree in History and Scientific Initiation from the Laboratory of Environmental History and Gender at the State University of the Midwest (UNICENTRO/PR). Her current research is carried out together with the Laboratory of Immigration, Migration and Environmental History of the Federal University of Santa Catarina (LABIMHA/UFSC). Victoria Kelly holds a B.Sc. in Biology with an additional major in Irish Studies. She has worked with the Emerging Risks Information Center at Concordia University since 2020, where she has been involved in numerous book projects and research papers in the area of sustainability, fintech, and climate change, and has assisted with the center’s administration. Victoria is embarking on a master’s degree at Concordia

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University in the fall of 2023 in the field of history, examining the 1832 Cholera epidemic in Montreal and its management on a social, urban, and economic levels, drawing parallels with the recent COVID-19 pandemic. Avidan Kent (Cantab) is an Associate Professor in Law, the Law School’s Director of Research, and the Founder and Convenor of UEA’s International Law Research Group. He has written/edited books, reports, journal articles and chapters on a varied list of topics, including Environmental Law, Economic Law, International Courts, Public Participation and Climate-Induced Migration. He has written reports/papers for IGOs, governments, think tanks and one museum. Gabrielle Machnik-Kekesi is a research associate at the Emerging Risk Information Center (ERIC) at the John Molson School of Business, Concordia University, Montreal, and a Hardiman Research Scholar (2021–2025) at the University of Galway, Ireland, where she works on her doctoral studies in Irish Studies. She holds an Individualized Program Master’s degree in Gender Studies and Modern Irish History from Concordia University, Montreal, and a Master’s in Information Studies from McGill University, Montreal. Her research interests include sustainability, food history, and cultural heritage. Sennan D. Mattar is a Postdoctoral Researcher and Lecturer on Climate Justice at the Mary Robinson Centre for Climate Justice, Glasgow Caledonian University (GCU). He lectures in GCU’s M.Sc. in Climate Justice, with a focus on international development, climate migration, just transition, and climate litigation and finance. His research portfolio at the Centre includes investigating Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) implementation in Africa, global climate migration and displacement, urban climate justice and informal settlements, and studies on climate justice in the Arctic. His recent works include the UKRIfunded project Climate Change & COVID-19 (CCC19): Achieving a Sustainable and Equitable Recovery in Rwanda and Malawi, and a commentary Climate Justice: Priorities for Equitable Recovery from the Pandemic (Climate Policy, 2021). Jane McGaughey is the Johnson Chair of Québec and Canadian Irish Studies and an Associate Professor of Diaspora Studies at Concordia University. She is the author of Ulster’s Men: Protestant Unionist Masculinities and Militarization in the North of Ireland, 1912–1923 (2012), Violent Loyalties: Manliness, Masculinities, and the Irish in the

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Canadas, 1798–1841 (2020), and is a co-editor of Ireland and Masculinities in History (2019). She is the principal investigator of two ongoing research projects: “Gender, Migration & Madness,” and “Mothers in the Time of Cholera: Motherhood, Migration, and Pandemics in the Canadian Colonial Medical System, 1817–1867.” Michael Mikulewicz is an assistant professor in the College of Environmental Science and Forestry at the State University of New York. He uses human responses to climate change as the basis to study issues of inequality, exclusion and exploitation, with his research firmly embedded within critical social theory. Michael obtained his Ph.D. in Human Geography from the University of Manchester, UK, with his thesis investigating the post-politics of adaptation to climate change in sub-Saharan Africa. Before that, he received an M.A. in Politics and International Relations from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, and an M.Sc. in Environmental Studies from California State University, Fullerton. Robert J. Nicholls is Director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research at the University of East Anglia. He has experience of analysing long-term coastal problems. Much of this work has focused on sea-level rise and climate change, necessitating an interdisciplinary approach. He has extensive international and global experience, especially in coastal cities, deltas and small islands and was a lead author to five reports of the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change assessment process. Most recently he co-led the World Climate Research Programme Grand Challenge on Regional Sea-Level Change and its Impacts and organised Sea Level 2022 in Singapore. Kristine Perry is a qualified US lawyer, admitted to practice in the State of Ohio, with experience in the intersection of international human rights and environmental rights, and with an emphasis on policy development, disability rights, gender, and strategic litigation. She has previously worked in international NGOs and public institutions where she focused on Latin America and the Caribbean, the MENA region, Europe, Africa, and North America. She holds a JD from the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law and a B.A. in Spanish and Creative Writing from Denison University. She is disabled and approaches her work on disability with lived experience. Stacia Ryder is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Utah State University. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology in 2019

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from Colorado State University and worked as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Geography at the University of Exeter from 2019 to 2023. Her dissertation work explores how power exacerbates issues of environmental justice in shale development in Colorado. As a postdoctoral researcher, she focused on issues of community engagement and procedural justice in proposed shale and geothermal energy projects, as well as proposed just transition decarbonization schemes in the UK. Currently, she is exploring research related to planning for disaster and climate displacement. She uses a critical approach to examine how power dynamics create justice issues in environmental, energy, and climate contexts. She has authored or co-authored fourteen journal articles, three book chapters, and three book reviews on these subjects. She is also the lead editor of the edited volume Environmental Justice and the Anthropocene: From Unjust Presents to Just Futures. She aims to create concrete social change by working with communities to center just and equitable transitions as essential components of climate planning and policy. Roland Smith is a Leverhulme Trust Doctoral Scholar at the University of East Anglia and Tyndall Centre for Climate Change, as part of the Critical Decade for Climate Change program. His research employs transdisciplinary approaches to further understanding the impact of climate change on patterns of human mobility and population displacement, particularly through utilizing and developing new modeling techniques. He is also a writer, theater director, script editor, and cultural festival curator and has been Visiting Lecturer at the National Centre for Circus Arts and Rose Bruford College of Theatre Performance. Mark G. L. Tebboth is an Associate Professor in Environment and international Development at the School of Global Development, University of East Anglia. He leads the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change’s research on overcoming poverty through climate actions and is Deputy Director of the Leverhulme-funded Critical Decade for Climate Change Doctoral Scholars Programme. He is an interdisciplinary social scientist whose research interests focus on how populations respond and adapt to risks arising primarily from global environmental change with specialisms in issues linked to human migration and mobility.

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Lisa Thalheimer is a climate economist with a focus on extreme weather events and human mobility at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. Her research seeks to disentangle the underlying drivers of human mobility, e.g., conflict and food insecurity, and attribute extreme weather-driven human mobility to human-induced climate change. Dr. Thalheimer is an associate researcher at Oxford University’s Climate Econometrics and the World Weather Attribution Initiative. She received her D.Phil. (Ph.D.) from the Environmental Change Institute at the University of Oxford, and an M.S. in Sustainability Management from Columbia University. Her doctoral research developed a method to quantitatively assess the contribution of climate change to human mobility, combining methods from climate science and econometrics. Prior to joining Princeton, Dr. Thalheimer worked in a variety of roles at international organizations and NGOs such as the World Bank, the IMF and The Earth Institute, which provided her with a multifaceted, international background in environmental economics and climate policy. Joanna Vince is an Associate Professor of Public Policy at the School of Social Sciences in the College of Arts, Law, and Education at the University of Tasmania. She publishes extensively in international academic journals and across disciplinary areas on oceans governance issues. Her research focuses on international, domestic, and comparative oceans governance; marine resource management; marine plastic pollution and governance solutions; hybrid and non-state, market-driven governance in fisheries and aquaculture; and the effectiveness of governance arrangements in deterring illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing. She is a recipient of the 2016 Harold D. Laswell Prize for her contribution to theory and practice in the policy sciences. Thomas Walker is a full professor of finance, the director and academic lead of the Emerging Risks Information Center (ERIC), the inaugural director for the Jacques Ménard/BMO Center for Capital Markets, and the Concordia University Research Chair in Emerging Risk Management (Tier 1) at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. He previously served as an associate dean, department chair, and director of Concordia’s David O’Brien Centre for Sustainable Enterprise. Prior to his academic career, he worked for firms such as Mercedes Benz, KPMG, and Utility Consultants International. He has published over 70 journal articles and books.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 3.1

Fig. 3.2

Fig. 3.3 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 5.4 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2

Polish women beside carts in Largo Coronel Eneas A settler’s farm Location of the coffee plantation “Concepción de La Idalia” owned by Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan and Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey Layout of the coffee plantation “Concepción de la Idalia” owned by Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan and Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey 3D reconstruction of the “Concepción de la Idalia” coffee plantation Trends in the overseas recruitment of Nepali migrant workers (2012–2021) The relationship between labor migration, farm production, and household income Trends in labor permits to major destination countries (2008/09–2018/19) Remittance for future investment and reintegration Map showing the study area, including political boundaries and East African geographical region, used in this chapter Top five needs of IDPs across Somalia from 2016 to 2021

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41 42 79 80 86 91 139 145

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 5.1

Estates owned by the Kindelán-Mozo de la Torre-Garvey family Minimum wage rate for migrants in selected countries

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PART I

Introduction

CHAPTER 1

Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks: An Introduction Thomas Walker, Jane McGaughey, Gabrielle Machnik-Kekesi, and Victoria Kelly

Introduction Human migration and population movement are subjects as vast and varied as the disciplinary and methodological lenses that academics, artists, activists, and policymakers have employed in seeking to make sense of them. Recent scholarship has couched discussions of the movements of people (voluntary or forced, across or within national and regional

T. Walker · J. McGaughey · G. Machnik-Kekesi · V. Kelly (B) Concordia University, Montreal, Canada e-mail: [email protected] T. Walker e-mail: [email protected] J. McGaughey e-mail: [email protected] G. Machnik-Kekesi e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Walker et al. (eds.), Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29529-4_1

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borders, relocation or displacements, and anticipatory or reactive) within the frame of human-earth relationships. Both the acceleration of climate change and the “global rise of xenophobia, racism, and nationalism” (Armiero & Tucker, 2017, p. 1) have inspired significant interest in the umbrella term “environmental migration.” According to the Migration Data Portal, “at the end of 2020, around seven million people in 104 countries and territories were living in displacement as a result of disasters that happened not only in 2019, but also in previous years” (Migration Data Portal, 2021). Yet, for the large number of people displaced in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Sudan, China, Syria, and the Philippines to name but a few, isolating a natural disaster or extreme weather event as the “cause” for the movement of people obscures more than it reveals with respect to political, economic, and social influences. The United Nations Human Rights Council (2018) highlights that “decisions to move, even when the adverse effects of climate change are the predominant driver, can be compounded by violations of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, some of which may themselves be caused or exacerbated by climate change” (UNHRC, 2018, p. 4). Indeed, the conceptualization of the interaction between ecological, political, economic, and social factors as a complex nexus rather than a causal sequence has repositioned natural disasters as social issues, and war, “racism, religion and politics of commodities, land markets and currency circulation” as ecological concerns (Oliver-Smith, 2012, p. 1063). The United Nations’ International Organization for Migration (IOM) summarizes the intersection of migration and environment as “a multicausal phenomenon, yet one in which environmental drivers play a significant and increasingly determinative role” (IOM, 2022). Studies of this complex entanglement must not only consider the mass migration events which are caused by natural disasters, but also the more gradual migration which stems from the slow deterioration of our natural environment. In addition, it is imperative to consider not only that migration itself has a profound impact on the environment of destination and host countries, but also the far-reaching consequences that historical mass migrations have had on our natural and lived environments. The multifaceted nature of the environment-migration nexus “calls for a comprehensive approach in research, policy and practice” (IOM, 2022). This recently redefined approach to the study of environmental migration differs greatly from those conversations which arose when the topic first gained global and academic interest in the 1980s. Displaced persons

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were often “highly problematized” and their situation was seen to be the result of their “failure to adapt in situ” (Wiegel et al., 2019, p. 2). The term “environmental refugees” soon became widely popularized, with migrants becoming negatively associated with global safety and security. Though this narrative still has traction, it has been criticized by many scholars for its lack of consideration for existing patterns of migration, its over-simplicity, and its lack of concern for the human rights of migrant populations (Arnall & Kothari, 2015; Klepp & Herbeck, 2016). Scholarship in the early 2000s saw a significant shift in the mindset adopted with regard to displaced people and the concept of migration as a form of adaptation became increasingly prevalent: no longer viewed a simple reaction to the sudden onset of climatic events, proactive migration and the economic impacts of displacement began to be considered as an important adaptation strategy in the climate change debate (Wiegel et al., 2019, p. 3). In considering this radical shift in the discourse surrounding the environment-migration nexus, recent scholarship has attempted to challenge the established definition of climate migration as consisting solely of forced displacements and has begun to explore the more complex nuances that motivate displacement (Arnall & Kothari, 2015). However, there remain several understudied dimensions of this complex and pressing subject. For example, although migration has historically been used as an adaptation strategy, the effects of large population displacements on host countries, the human rights implications of both voluntary and forced displacements, as well as the political and economic frameworks necessary for the management of such an adaptation strategy, among many others, remain largely unexplored. This edited collection aims to contribute to closing this gap within the environmental migration literature.

Overview of Content Part I: Patterns and Legacies—Historical Case Studies This first section explores the lasting environmental impacts of human migration from an environmental, economic, and social standpoint. The section begins with Chapter 2, “A Shared Territory: The Yerba Mate and Polish Immigration in Paraná, Brazil,” in which Fabiana Carla Guarez and Diogo de Carvalho Cabral explore the relationship between late nineteenth-century Polish migrants to Paraná and the development of

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an herb-based economy in the region. The authors argue that this historical case study provides insights on extractivist colonialism and allows us to learn lessons from the impact of migration patterns on human and plant ecologies. Next, in Chapter 3, “Coffee Plantations and Irish Migration to Santiago de Cuba: A Historical Case Study of Radical Environmental Transformation,” Giselle González García examines the nineteenthcentury Cuban coffee plantation economy’s legacy of ecological devastation. The author’s historical study offers important insights regarding Irish migrant planters’ social networks and their integration into Cuba’s society. Part II: Methodological Interventions and Models This section explores methodological advances in the study of the migration-climate change nexus. It highlights the need for better data and critical frameworks to ensure that policymakers have the necessary information to implement climate-mobility action. In Chapter 4, “The Need for Better Data: Climate-Induced Mobility and Procedural Injustices in Zambia,” Sennan D. Mattar and Neil J. W. Crawford use a country-specific case study to illustrate the temporal, spatial, and socio-economic challenges to collecting census data as well as the difficulties involved in analyzing this type of data from the perspective of climate-induced migration and displacement. The authors contend that greater international efforts are required toward standardizing censuses; this standardization, per Mattar and Crawford, might be achieved through a methodology informed by procedural justice. The section continues with Chapter 5, “Leveraging Labor Migration and Migrant Remittances in Nepal,” in which Santosh Adhikari and Joanna Vince highlight Nepal’s response to sudden onset climate events and explore how these events are intricately linked to migration. The authors examine data and practices on an international scale in order to determine which actions Nepali policymakers might take to reduce Nepal’s reliance on migrant labor, while sustaining economic growth in the face of extreme climate events. The section ends with Chapter 6, “The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Existing Patterns of Migration,” where Roland Smith explores the limitations of current approaches to research on the relationship between sea level rise and migration. Smith uses the resultant insights to devise

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recommendations for future modeling and policy directions. The author’s review of the extant literature and his own methodological suggestions focus on underrepresented issues toward developing adaptation resilience and strengthening the support for migrants. Part III: Risk and Vulnerability: Intersecting Migration Studies This section explores the intersection of risk and vulnerability in migration studies and highlights how exacerbated risks ultimately affect vulnerable populations. It offers a critical approach to ensuring populations which are the most vulnerable are protected in the face of climate-induced mobility. This section begins with Chapter 7, “Climate Migration and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,” in which Kristine Perry draws our attention to the under-explored and crucial intersection of climate migration and disability. Perry surveys the literature related to climate change and migration to determine how disability is, or is not, addressed therein. Based on observed trends and patterns in the literature, the author offers recommendations as to how the human rights of people with disabilities can be ensured in the context of climate-related migration. The section continues with Chapter 8, “Compounding Risks and Increased Vulnerabilities: Climate Change, Conflict, and Mobility in East Africa,” where Lisa Thalheimer examines how both climate change and armed conflict impact migration in East Africa, particularly Somalia. Thalheimer looks at how compounding risks affect already vulnerable population segments and offers recommendations for anticipatory policy directions that could tackle how these risks exacerbate existing vulnerabilities in the area and increase migration. Chapter 9, “Advancing Critical Approaches to Environmental Migration and Climate Displacement,” concludes the section and the collection. In this chapter, Stacia Ryder reveals how the establishment of a critical approach to climate displacement is essential to environmental migration research. Ryder’s chapter suggests how we should center considerations related to vulnerability, risk, and capability in multi-scalar decision-making and planning. The author demonstrates the application of such an inclusive approach by examining coastline displacements in Wales.

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References Armiero, M., & Tucker, R. P. (2017). Environmental history of modern migrations. Routledge. Arnall, A., & Kothari, U. (2015). Challenging climate change and migration discourse: Different understandings of timescale and temporality in the Maldives. Global Environmental Change, 31, 199–206. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.01.011 International Organization for Migration. (2022). A complex nexus. https:// www.iom.int/complex-nexus Klepp, S., & Herbeck, J. (2016). The politics of environmental migration and climate justice in the Pacific region. Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, 7 (1), 54–73. Migration Data Portal (2021). Environmental migration. https://www.migrat iondataportal.org/themes/environmental_migration_and_statistics Oliver-Smith, A. (2012). Debating environmental migration: Society, nature and population displacement in climate change. Journal of International Development, 24(8), 1058–1070. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2887 United Nations Human Right’s Council (UNHRC). (2018). Addressing human rights protection gaps in the context of migration and displacement of persons across international borders resulting from the adverse effects of climate change and supporting the adaptation and mitigation plans of developing countries to bridge the protection gaps. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/rep orts/addressing-human-rights-protection-gaps-context-migration-and-displa cement Wiegel, H., Boas, I., & Warner, J. (2019). A mobilities perspective on migration in the context of environmental change. WIREs Climate Change, 10(6). https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.610

PART II

Patterns and Legacies: Historical Case Studies

CHAPTER 2

Infusing the Globe: Yerba Mate, Polish Immigration, and Creolization in Southern Brazil (c.1870–1920) Fabiana Carla Guarez and Diogo de Carvalho Cabral

Introduction This chapter offers an environmental historical interpretation of Polish migration to southern Brazil in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The study of environmental history assumes that natural beings and things are not merely a stage for of the unfolding of human dramas, rather that they are actors whose powers influence economic, cultural, and political dynamics (de Carvalho Cabral, 2021). The long-distance movement of human populations is often linked to ecological processes such as climate change and natural disasters. Rather than simply examining

F. C. Guarez (B) Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianopolis, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] D. de Carvalho Cabral Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Walker et al. (eds.), Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29529-4_2

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the cause of human migrations, environmental history looks to understand the intricate entanglement of ecological and human factors (Wright, 2017). Eminent environmental historians Armiero and Tucker claim that “the point is not to depart from the relevance of ‘nature,’ but to subvert the common-sense assumption that in order to see nature we need to separate it from the ‘rest,’ be it culture, economy, or society” (Armiero & Tucker, 2017, p. 53). Thus, our most general assumption is that the biophysical environment in which migrations occur also influences their outcome, in addition to social and cultural contexts. In this sense, yerba mate (Ilex paraguariensis ) becomes central to our analysis. Native to southern South American forests, this tree’s leaves have been used in an infusion appreciated by locals since pre-Columbian times. Growing to a height of four to six meters under cultivation, it may grow to be ten, twenty, or even thirty meters tall, with trunks of up to 70 to 80 cm in diameter in the wild. Its dark green leaves are three to twenty centimeters long and two to nine centimeters wide. Wild trees might live up to 100 years, though cultivated ones do not generally last more than 30 years, even when carefully handled. Their harvesting involves cutting branches of trees with a machete or other tool and can be done every three or four years, beyond which the tree’s life is reduced (Porter, 1950). The species occurs naturally in a region of about 540,000 km2 , between 21°S and 30°S of latitude and 48°30' W–56°10' W of longitude, encompassing areas in Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. This region is characterized by altitudes between 500 and 1000 meters above sea level, a temperate climate with no dry season, and an average annual rainfall of 1500 mm. The yerba mate thrives in deep soils with low natural fertility and grows even in degraded soils (Oliveira & Rotta, 2012). It co-occurs with Araucaria angustifolia, another key species in Southern Brazil’s socio-ecology. The wood of this pine—whose distribution recent research associates with landscape domestication by late-Holocene native populations (Reis et al., 2014; Robinson et al., 2018)—would also be intensively exploited from the late nineteenth century. What was the immigrants’ attitude toward yerba mate? How did they appropriate—if at all—the pre-existing extractive cultures and economies that made yerba mate leaves available for consumption? The available historiography has considered these issues only tangentially. Gerhardt (2013) highlights that during nineteenth-century colonization in southern Brazil, most settlers were directly or indirectly involved in mate extraction despite being much more often employed in agriculture

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and cattle raising. Weber et al. (2016) mention unsuccessful attempts to export mate from the Polish colonies in Paraná. In any case, the literature suggests that the settlement of Poles in the region where I. paraguariensis occurs had a direct impact on yerba mate production, with settlers appropriating native techniques and consumption patterns (Linhares, 1969). This chapter contributes to this historiography by investigating the role of yerba mate in the creolization of Polish immigrants. Geographers and environmental historians have explored creolization as a process of landscape-making in which human mobility and the associated introduction of plant species create novel ecosystems (McNeill, 2010; Rangan, 2019). Here, however, we approach creolization from the perspective of both humans and plants. We argue that both yerba mate and Polish immigrants were creolized in a complex, unfinished process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Although it helped immigrants take root in southern Brazil, yerba mate itself was “produced” as a socionatural hybrid (Swyngedouw, 1996) through the circulation of ideas and materials between Brazil and Europe. Immigrants established intellectual, political, and commercial networks in their attempts to create a yerba mate export business, and these transnational networks—regardless of how successful the initiative ultimately was—operated by transforming Polish practices and identities. The chapter has two parts; the first describes the more general aspects of Polish immigration to Brazil, while the second addresses the global history of the Polish appropriation of yerba mate.

From Eastern Europe to Southern Brazil Polish immigration to Brazil began in 1870 when fourteen families settled in the Province of Santa Catarina. At the request of Edmundo Wos Saporski, the precursor of the migratory movement to Brazil and political representative of Polish immigration, these families were transferred the following year to the neighboring province of Paraná, which had already received other European immigrants. As a result, the first colonies were founded near the capital of Curitiba. The project of these colonies to cultivate the lands and was legitimized by a discourse of progress and modernity. That same year, the vice president of the province, Agostinho Ermelindo Leão (1870), presented a report on the project’s progress to the Provincial Assembly of Paraná, highlighting the need to develop transport infrastructure that would allow for large-scale agriculture.

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Several factors within Poland encouraged migration and it is essential to examine these to understand decisions to migrate. Among these factors are population growth, industrialization, and urbanization. At the end of the nineteenth century, Poland had around 30 million inhabitants, with 65% of them employed in agriculture, although most were not landowners; they were considered rural proletarians, or what in Brazil is conventionally called aggregates (Special Bulletin of the Instituto Histórico, Geográfico e Etnográfico Paranaense, 1971, p. 313). Ruy Wachowicz wrote that “the peasant, greedy for land, from which he made all his living, comes to look for it where it is abundantly available: in America” (Annals of the Brazilian Polish Community, 1970, v. I. p. 27).1 Most Polish immigrants had rural roots, and the main objective was not to get rich but to become the owner of enough land for subsistence. The most significant periods of immigrant influx were 1872–1889, 1890–1894, and 1894–1900; the second is known as “Brazilian fever” (Gluchowski, 2005). The state of Paraná received the most significant number of immigrants. State authorities sought to settle the first wave of immigrants in the vicinity of the capital—which sits near the edge of the Brazilian southern plateau—but later expanded the colonization zone further west. However, to integrate migrants into local communities, the colonies mixed different ethnic groups. The documents that guided this colonization phase were created when Adolpho Lamenha Lins was president of the province. According to the report he presented to the Legislative Assembly of Paraná in 1876, the settlement of immigrants near the capital would facilitate the trade in agricultural products for domestic supply. However, at that time, some problems were already in evidence, the main one being the tiny size of the lots: they were not enough for subsistence, as topography and soil fertility were not considered. According to Lamenha Lins, the colonization project needed to change. He argued it was necessary to tell the colonists the truth:

1 The Anais da Comunidade Brasileiro Polonesa (Annals of the Brazilian Polish Commu-

nity) began to be published to commemorate the centenary of Polish immigration to Brazil from the 1970s onward. It consists of different types of documents, translated historical sources, historiographical texts, and indications of sources regarding Poles in Brazil. In the following citations, we use the acronym ACBP, indicating the volume and year of publication.

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instead of poetic descriptions and exaggerated promises, convincing them that fertile land is within their reach and promoting the construction of good communication routes. [We must] [f]acilitate transport, preventing the immigrant from suffering deprivation and poor treatment until the end of his trip. [We must] [d]ivide up good plots of land in the vicinity of populous centers and make them communicable by highways. [We must] [m]ake the settlers adhere to the land they inhabit, through property rights, making it easier for them to acquire it. [We must] [p]revent that, upon arriving, immigrants suffer vexations that weaken their spirits at their first steps in unknown regions. [We must] [e]stablish the colonists well, with all the favors promised, and then release them from guardianship, leaving them to themselves and given over to the development of their own initiative. (Lamenha Lins, 1876, p. 79)

A guide entitled “Information for Immigrants in the Province of Paraná,” printed in 1875, served this purpose. It aimed to provide helpful information to settlers, especially on the local landscape, such as the main hydrographic basins, the urban network, industrial opportunities, and natural resources. The document also mentions the advantages of establishing colonies on the outskirts of the capital and reiterates that “the main condition, which a good plot of land must satisfy, is the ease of communication, that is, the ease of putting the immigrant in communication with the markets in which agricultural products will be sold, or European products will be purchased” (Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works, 1875, p. 118). According to this document, some of the colonies were not developing well for land and logistical reasons. One example was Assunguy, founded in 1860 as a mixed colony of Brazilians, Germans, Italians, Spanish, French, and English. In 1876, the population was 1824 individuals, but many left for the capital in search of work. In this sense, the aforementioned Lamenha Lins stated that it would be more prudent to “emancipate the colony by handing it over to the nationals who are undoubtedly more apt to cultivate that region” (Lamenha Lins, 1876, p. 83). Of the Polish colonies of the 1870s, Santa Cândida stood out. According to Lamenha Lins, the land lots had already been demarcated and planted. In addition, the proximity to the capital facilitated the flow of agricultural produce to the province’s primary urban market. These products probably traveled in Slavic-type carts, which were an essential part of the technological contributions of the Poles to the Brazilian countryside,

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accustomed to traditional ox carts (Wachowicz, 1967). Figure 2.1 shows Polish women beside one of these carts at Largo da Ordem, a marketplace in the central district of Curitiba. The women carry baskets and chat on the sidewalk while the men lie on the carts. The source indicates that they were Poles, but it is worth keeping in mind that other groups also shared the same marketplace, such as Italians, Germans, and Ukrainians. Therefore, the initial project was to settle the immigrants in an agricultural belt to supply the capital. Nevertheless, the immigrants continued to arrive, and the settlement area expanded westward. The second migratory phase, characterized by a more intense flow, created colonies further away from the capital. According to the Map of the Colonizing Zone, organized by Manoel

Fig. 2.1 Polish women beside carts in Largo Coronel Eneas (Source Acervo Casa da Memória/Fundação Cultural de Curitiba Curitiba-PR)

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Francisco Ferreira Correia and Vicenzo Giorgi in 1890,2 the occupation nuclei on the right bank of the Iguaçu River stand out. The occupation of the Iguaçu basin was only possible after the development of river navigation in 1882. Maria Augusta, the first colony, was created in 1890 (Riesenberg, 1973, p. 93). The area was divided into 323 lots, 245 of which were rural and 78 were urban. The demarcation of these lands was led by Edmundo Wos Saporski himself, who in 1876 was licensed by the Ministry of Agriculture as a land surveyor; between 1890 and 1892, he held the position of head of the colonization project (ACBP, v. I, 1970, p. 90). In a third-person publication under the pseudonym Eti, Saporski recorded his deeds as both immigrant and agent of the migratory process. In this account, written in the 1920s, he records the process of reconnaissance and measurement of the lands of the Iguaçu valley, which he describes as “uninhabited and wild” (ACBP, v. VI, 1972, p. 83). However, the Iguaçu valley was the central producing region of yerba mate, which was exported through steamships that went up and down the river. Reconciling these two pieces of information involves recognizing how Europeans (and neo-Europeans) saw areas occupied and cultivated by indigenous and mestizo communities. For example, in the Message of the President of the State, in 1892, President Francisco Xavier da Silva justified the need for colonial centers far from the capital on the grounds of enabling the development of areas considered “demographic voids.” The colonization of the Iguaçu valley demonstrates the participation of Polish settlers in the mate economy, given that native forests, including extensive ervais (natural yerba mate stands), were still preserved in the region. Local mestizo populations managed the forests with indigenous practices, which would later be incorporated by European immigrants (Carvalho, 2006). Several historical accounts mention the proximity and establishment of relationships between Poles and native inhabitants. Among the central cultural appropriations by immigrants are food staples (beans and corn) and the houses, whose construction was adapted to local resources. In this way, these immigrants’ lifeways started to look more and more like those of indigenous and mestizo peoples. Despite the desire to reproduce a European way of life, the Polish settlers were forced to adapt to southern

2 Available online from: https://www.iat.pr.gov.br/Pagina/Coletanea-de-Mapas-Histor icos-do-Parana.

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Brazilian ecology, re-signifying practices, introducing new techniques and crops, and absorbing local customs (Guarez, 2019). Since the early years of colonization in the Iguaçu Valley, Polish authorities organized expeditions to investigate the problems of Polish immigration in Brazil. One of the institutions involved in these expeditions was the Polish Geographical Commercial Society, which aimed to promote trade relations between Poland and Polish settlement areas abroad (Puchalski, 2021, p. 225). One of the most prominent travelers was Estanislau Klobukowski, who was in Brazil between 1895 and 1897. Klobukowski published his memoirs in 1909 in Poland, in which he describes the landscape and its transformation, the colonies’ agricultural situation, and the estates’ structure. At the time of Klobukowski’s travel through the Iguaçu valley, the estates were being established, a large part of the forest had already been cleared, and the land was being prepared for planting. Contemporary narratives about the development of agriculture and extractivism are controversial. Wachowicz (1981) mentions that the Poles retained a certain cultural conservatism, particularly in agriculture. Sources such as the agricultural production statistics for the Province of Paraná’s colonies in 1887 corroborate this, showing that the settlers planted rye and vegetables such as cabbage, among other foods used in traditional Polish cuisine. On the other hand, to settle in the new territory the immigrants had to draw heavily on knowledge acquired from local indigenous and mestizo populations, especially about the forest ecosystem. Key parts of the immigrants’ agricultural practices quickly adapted to the new material surroundings, the best example being slash-and-burn agriculture, which consists of cutting down the forest understory and then burning the vegetation in preparation for planting. Both in pre-colonial and colonial Brazil, this had been the standard method to transform forest patches into farmable land, using the ashes as fertilizer (de Carvalho Cabral, 2014). Another instance of ecological adaptation was the habit of sparing A. angustifolia while clearing. These trees were a source of pinhão (the nut’s kernel), a traditional food for the Amerindian populations, whose reliance on it had probably helped shape the species distribution. This ethnobotanical influence on Polish settlement is represented in Fig. 2.2, a photograph of a house and what is probably a stable, with an open area for crops in the surroundings and A. angustifolia trees still standing. The species would acquire an outstanding commercial value as timber in the regional neo-European economy.

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Fig. 2.2 A settler’s farm (Source Chrostowski, 1922, p. 97)

˜ Yerba Mate and the Caboclizac ¸ ao of Polish Immigrants The extraction of yerba mate was the economic mainstay of Paraná. The primary revenue of the provincial government came from mate production. According to the production records of the Directorate of Public Archives and Statistics of the State of Paraná, recorded from 1854 to 1924, mate exports increased precisely during the establishment of the Polish colonial nuclei in the Iguaçu valley. From 1895 to 1904, the amount exported was 248,800 tons, and in the following decade, it reached 406,800 tons. Economic historians emphasize the link between this activity and the installation of infrastructure, such as railways and river navigation, and the stimulus to developing other industrial sectors, such as the timber industry. According to the Report of the President of the

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Province Joaquim d’Almeida Faria Sobrinho, in 1886, the population of Paraná was 200,000 inhabitants, of which 10,000 were directly employed in the mate industry (Faria Sobrinho, 1887, p. 38). However, Riesenberg (1973, p. 70) estimates that approximately 50,000 individuals, or a quarter of the province’s total population, derived their livelihood from activities related to yerba mate. How did Polish immigrants enter this economy? The available evidence is scarce and fragmented, but an effort to connect different types of sources can shed some light on this. One of the most critical sources here is letters sent by immigrants to relatives in Poland. In letters written by immigrants newly settled in the colony of São Matheus, they describe practical aspects of opening farms, the beginning of agricultural activities, and the landscape in general. For example, José Jaczynski, a settler in São Mateus do Sul, sent a letter to his parents in 1891. He describes the main trees in the region, including palms, pines, walnuts, and cedars, stating that they were all cut and burned—the only species spared was yerba mate (ACBP, v. VIII, 1977, p. 52) Another letter sent in 1891 from the same colony, written by Martim Miler and his wife, conveys similar information, emphasizing the value of yerba mate in their homeland: “here only yerba mate grows, but of such quality that in Poland a kilo costs 7 rubles” (ACBP, v. VIII, 1977, p. 72). Writing in the same year but from another location, in the municipality of Rio Negro, which is approximately 100 km from São Matheus do Sul, Francisco Skurczynski reported that “in these lands there is a lot of bush and yerba mate” (ACBP, v. VIII, p. 91). It is interesting to observe how mate differed from the “bush” in the perception of this settler: the latter is cut down and burned, but the former is left standing for profit. Another essential source for studying the relationship between Poles and yerba mate is the memoirs written by immigrants and their descendants. Romão Wachowicz, a descendant of immigrants who settled in São Mateus do Sul, gathered several reports, by himself and others, in a publication titled “Suor em São Mateus” (“Heavy Lifting”). Wachowicz portrays the immigrants as agents of “progress,” often in opposition to the native inhabitants of the Iguaçu valley. In a chapter titled “Nobreza Verde” (“Green Nobility”), he describes the attitude of immigrants toward the forest landscape, including the production of mate. Sometimes the yerba mate was removed as the plants grew too close together. This management practice was called adensamento and consisted of spreading out the yerba mate plants in the understory, so they had more room to

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develop, and the harvest was facilitated. In these memoirs, Wachowicz claims that “it was the immigrants who took the yerba to its greatest flourishing, in the golden period” (Wachowicz, 1981, p. 18). Saporski mentions in his memoirs that his traveling companion Teófilo Rudzki had the habit of consuming sweetened yerba mate, which he considered a better drink than Indian tea. Saporski also reports that Rudzki tried to promote yerba mate commercially in Poland “with the support of doctors who […] would announce that they consider the product beneficial to the [human] organism” (ACBP, v. VI, 1972, p. 71). In publications resulting from expeditions carried out by Polish authorities and intellectuals, yerba mate almost always appears as a product with economic potential. For example, the published journals of Polish ornithologist Tadeusz Chrostowski briefly reference mate from Paraná and his relationship with another traveler, Estanislau Klobukowski. According to Chrostowski, Klobukowski was considered a yerba mate enthusiast, referring to an article by Klobukowski in a magazine entitled “Kolonist” published in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Chrostowski reproduces an excerpt from this article, in which Klobukowski advocates the use of mate, based on its health benefits, noting that mate “gives a much greater boost than alcohol without any ill effects, immediately removes physical and moral weakness, […] and sheds light in the brain and optimism in the heart. It should definitely replace vodka” (Chrostowski, 1922, p. 160). Several studies on yerba mate’s uses and chemical properties indicate that its consumption brings positive health effects. In addition to being a powerful stimulant due to the concentration of caffeine, it produces beneficial antimicrobial and diuretic effects in the human body (Cardozo et al., 2021). In his 1898 “Recordações de Viagem,” Klobukowski included a chapter dedicated to yerba mate from Paraná. He mentions that there were still many completely unknown herbs on the banks of the Iguaçu River and that in that region, “one has the impression that it was the human hand that formed an enchanted park” (ACBP, v. IV, 1971, p. 69). He also mentions a yerba mate producer from the Iguaçu valley named Mr. Marques, who would have developed a new technique for producing unsmoked mate (A Pole named Mazzgalo had already ordered an exemplar of this machine.) This prototype—a drying machine that did not apply fire directly to the leaves—would have been transported by boat, and Klobukowski even mentions that all the employees of that Mr. Marques were Poles. In another chapter, Klobukowski states that

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the preparation of mate was a primitive practice that directly influenced the infusion’s taste. He argues that unsmoked mate had more space in the Plate River market and would have greater chances in the European market. In addition to mate’s taste, he points out that “in view of its price and its almost miraculous effects, the Geographical and Commercial Society of Lwów sought to introduce it in Galicia and as its delegate, I asked them to send only unsmoked mate” (ACBP, v. IV, p. 87). In the same passage, the source highlights that mate was already known in Warsaw thanks to samples sent by Saporski and that “the largest batches exported in 1895 must be attributed to Saporski and Onofre Flizikowski from S. Mateus. In Lwów, it can be purchased at Casa Comercial dos Círculos Agrários, Rua Panska, n° 21” (ACBP, v. IV, p. 89). In a letter addressed to Saporski, José Okolowicz, representative of the Polish Immigration Society and one of the enthusiasts of the diffusion and commercialization of yerba mate in Eastern Europe, presented some strategies for its popularization in Poland. In addition to the economic agreements between Brazil and Poland—which at that time was tripartite, with its administration fragmented in Russian, Austrian, and German domains—intense advertisement was necessary for mate consumption to become daily. For Okolowicz, this promotion had to target the right countries in Europe. He remarked, for example, that in France, “nobody even drinks tea.” According to him, advertizing would only have a chance of success in countries where tea was consumed regularly. Another mistake was the free distribution of samples, given that “whoever tastes the herb just once does not approve of it” (ACBP, v. VI, 1972, p. 110). In this sense, the process of captivating the consumer, according to Okolowicz, ended up having the opposite effect: “it was rejected as a ‘disgusting’ drink. One should also consider its poor preparation” (ACBP, v. VI, p. 110). To solve this problem, Okolowicz made some suggestions through a project for a shop specializing in selling “Brazilian mate tea” on one of the busiest streets in Krakow. The project describes the shop’s structure, which would initially be divided between “rich and poor,” and the product’s presentation would be different for the two audiences: luxurious and exotic; simple and vulgar. The elegant, bourgeois aspects would attract attention through leaflets and information, concerts, and pianos. The working-class part would attract consumers due to the price: compared to a cup of tea, mate would cost half, considering what was charged in the city’s tea houses. According to the project’s author,

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this would establish the custom of drinking mate in Polish daily life. Furthermore, the preparation and consumption of mate at home would familiarize it among Polish families, making it a substitute for Chinese tea, its strongest competitor. The distribution point would be Krakow, where the Polish Emigration Society would have a warehouse to meet the demands of other locations (ACBP, v. VI, p. 110). The interest in promoting the exportation of yerba mate to Europe predated the beginning of Polish immigration to Brazil in decade 1870, as advertizing in Europe had been on the national political agenda since at least the 1860s. Although Brazil was not the only country producing yerba mate, it was only exhibited on the Brazilian stand during the 1862 Universal Exhibition in London. The President of the Province, André Augusto de Pádua Fleury, provided this information in his 1865 report, highlighting that it would be necessary to make the product attractive to European tastes in order to conquer that market (Pádua Fleury, 1865, p. 50). In 1886, state deputy José Ribeiro de Macedo, also a yerba mate entrepreneur, proposed a bill to encourage the export of yerba mate to Europe and the United States. According to Macedo, “while yerba mate is not yet used in Europe, it is already known in a small part of it, Poland according to an honorable dealer” (December 19, 1886, Ed.00221, p. 2). The project suggested that the European public become familiar with mate through the main taverns and cafes in European capital cities. It would be up to the provincial government of Paraná to offer the product to the shops, selling the mate and the infusion already prepared for free or at low prices. Shop owners would be responsible for publishing advertisements in prominent newspapers, and to other forms of commercial promotion to popularize the product. These attempts to introduce yerba mate abroad, both at the initiative of national producers and Polish organizations, had evident economic motivations. Moreover, considering that Brazilian entrepreneurs dominated the market, it was only natural that they would lead these initiatives. However, the progress of Polish colonization and its geographic expansion gradually altered this scenario; in 1912 Okolowicz and Saporski exchanged letters about a shop project—it is unclear if it materialized—signalling that a structure of relations with several layers developed since the 1870s. The main objective of the interpretation proposed here is to advance the understanding of this structure, unpacking the relations between migration, extractive economy, cultural dynamics of consumption, and the biophysical properties of yerba mate.

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Conclusion In this chapter, the focus on the relations between migration and extractivism led us to take an approach at the interface between environmental history and global history. It is interesting to note that, since its beginnings, in the 1970s and 1980s, environmental history has proposed to think globally, explicitly transgressing political-administrative boundaries (intra or international). Since climate, fauna, flora and other nonhuman beings and phenomena do not recognize these boundaries—which are the result of political and cultural abstractions—environmental historians must pursue past socioecological dynamics wherever they have manifested themselves and exerted their influence. Interdisciplinarity is also fundamental here, as these manifestations and influences have diverse and interconnected aspects. An example of this type of work is that of Gerhardt (2013), who analyzed landscape transformations and the disappearance of native ervais. Through the common thread of yerba mate, the author considers the entire area of endemic occurrence, and the different uses, interpretations, and practices of/surrounding mate and its economy. Yerba mate is analyzed in its two major facets, as the plant species I. paraguariensis and as a beverage with cultural value, expanding the analysis to the social, political, economic, and cultural relations that orbit this common thread. However, a global environmental approach can go even further. One option is to observe commodities and their processes, which involve many dynamics beyond commercialization. According to Marques (2021), a focus on exports allows for analyzing the modes of production and extraction from which the commodity emerges at regional and local levels, as well as the technological and market changes that determine demand at a global level. This type of analysis is an interesting tool for understanding the ecological transformations of the affected spaces, how extractivism shapes social organization, and the emergence of new legal and political arrangements. Currently, the yerba mate market tends to value new paths for this economy, considering the need for forest conservation and the valorization of traditional knowledge about yerba mate production. Some tools for sustainable extractivism are the Geographical Indication and organic production, which seek to integrate production for the foreign market with forest conservation.

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This chapter sought to contribute to the environmental literature on migration with a historical perspective that helps us understand the appropriation of local resources by immigrants in a broader, dialectical way, in which both commodities and people are subject to transformations. The dimensions of research objects take on different, unexpected proportions if we consider methodologically the interconnections that crisscross people, their ideas, and their products. In this way, the study of migratory flows needs to include the exchanges established in these contacts and more: to pay attention to these transits considering mutual influences, demystifying the unilaterality of the relationships between humans and the rest of the so-called nature.

Sources Anais da Comunidade brasileiro polonesa v. I (1970). Anais da Comunidade brasileiro polonesa v. IV (1971). Anais da Comunidade brasileiro polonesa v. VI (1972). Anais da Comunidade brasileiro polonesa v. VIII (1977). Boletim Especial do Instituto Histórico, Geográfico e Etnográfico Paranaense, 1971—Curitiba/PR. Dados estatísticos para os emigrantes, publicados por ordem do Ministério dos Negócios da Agricultura, do Commercio e das obras públicas. Rio de Janeiro, 1875. Estatística da produção agrícola das colônias da Província do Paraná, 1887. Guia do Imigrante para o Império do Brasil, 1884. Disponibilizado pelo acervo Brasiliana Digital—USP. Relatório do Presidente da Província do Paraná, Adolpho Lamenha Lins, 1876. Relatório do Presidente da Província do Paraná, Adolpho Lamenha Lins, 1877. Relatório do Presidente da Província do Paraná, André Augusto de Pádua Fleury, 1865. Relatório do Presidente da Província do Paraná, Joaquim d’Almeida Faria Sobrinho, de 1887. Relatório do Vice-Presidente da Província do Paraná, Agostinho Ermelindo Leão, 1870.

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Riesenberg, A. (1973). A instalação humana no vale do Iguaçu. Curitiba: s. ed. Robinson, M., De Souza, J. G., Maezumi, S. Y., Cárdenas, M., Pessenda, L., Prufer, K., Corteletti, R., Scunderlick, D., Mayle, F. E., De Blasis, P., & Iriarte, J. (2018). Uncoupling human and climate drivers of late Holocene vegetation change in southern Brazil. Scientific Reports, 8(1). https://doi. org/10.1038/s41598-018-24429-5 Swyngedouw, E. (1996). The city as a hybrid: On nature, society and cyborg urbanization. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 7 (2), 65–80. https://doi.org/10. 1080/10455759609358679 Wachowicz, R. (1967). A História do Paraná. Wachowicz, R. (1981). O camponês polonês no Brasil. Fundação Cultural Casa Romário Martins. Weber, R., & Trindade, Z., & Targino, R. (2016). Imigrantes poloneses no Brasil no contexto da dominação austríaca. Revista del CESLA, 19, pp. 269–289. Wright, A. (2017). Environmental degradation as a cause of migration. Environmental History of Modern Migrations, 159–176. https://doi.org/10.4324/ 9781315731100-13

CHAPTER 3

Coffee Plantations and Irish Migration to Santiago de Cuba: A Historical Case Study of Radical Environmental Transformation Giselle González García

Introduction Coffee is often claimed to be Cuba’s national drink par excellence. Its consumption has persisted over time and even survived the complete collapse of the industry, first in the late 1840s due to hurricane impact (Stubbs, 2021) and later due to the Wars of Independence (1868–1898) (García Álvarez, 2008). Cuban coffee and the cultural practices around it are an important identity marker for Cuban people and it has become a common cultural signifier that unites today’s widespread Cuban diaspora (O’Reilly Herrera, 2014). However, the plant Coffee arabica, the fruits of which are used to make the popular beverage, is not indigenous to the

G. González García (B) Concordia University, Montreal, Canada e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Walker et al. (eds.), Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29529-4_3

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Cuban archipelago. It was brought over by José Gelabert around 1748 from Saint Domingue (García Álvarez, 2008). As a result, coffee planting became one of the main causes of deforestation and soil erosion in colonial Cuba, leaving its imprint on the soil and causing the clearance of the forests (Pérez de la Riva, 1944). Alongside the cultivation of other staples, it radically and irreversibly transformed the Cuban landscape, especially between the 1790s and 1868 (Herrera & Menéndez, 1988). Historically, the rise of coffee planting has been linked to the numerous French-Domingoise refugees that fled to Cuba in the aftermath of the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804). These immigrants chose the mountains of Eastern Cuba due to its similarities in climate conditions and morphology to those in Cibao, Saint Domingue (Vasallo Rodríguez, 2019). However, Irish immigrants to Cuba, although they were less numerous, were also an important part of the process of expansion of an Atlantic-oriented plantation complex which was highly dependent on enslaved labor. The adoption of the plantation complex reorganized Cuba’s natural world. Devised by a small group of intellectuals who were members of the Creole elite, the plantation system took hold of the island’s economy, and shaped its destiny. Through the lens of Irish migration, and by adopting a comparative approach between different cases, this chapter examines Cuba’s late shift to an economic model that set the basis for the radical transformation and destruction of the island’s natural ecosystems. This paper identifies those Irish families that settled in Cuba’s eastern province, analyzes the patterns of land acquisition to which they resorted, the social networks they established, and the legacies of their enterprises still visible today.

From Irish Migrants to Cuban-Creole Landowners and Planters Established in 1515, Santiago de Cuba was a small urban enclave of little political relevance to the Spanish American Empire (Andreo García & Provencio Garrigó, 2008). However, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, its port gained strategic importance due to its access to the eastern Caribbean region (Andreo García & Provencio Garrigó, 2008). During the second half of the eighteenth century, a modernization process took place as Santiago’s local elite aspired to compete with the port-city of Havana. To achieve this, they transformed the region into an important economic hub that specialized in coffee cultivation and the

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export of tropical staples. This process was accelerated by the influx of thousands of French-Domingois immigrants who settled in Santiago after the revolutionary events that transformed the French colony of Saint Domingue into the Haitian Republic. As a result, this group is largely credited for economically boosting Cuba’s eastern region (González Estévez, 2009). Their presence in this region has not only over-shadowed that of other migrant groups, including the Irish, but also Cornish and Welsh laborers, and English and Catalan entrepreneurs. From a quantitative point of view, Irish families represented only a small fraction of Santiago’s population. Some of the most prominent Irish immigrants and their descendants in the city beared the surnames: Bell, Boylan, Creagh, Duany, Garvey, Kavannagh, Kindelan, Morrison, O’Callaghan, O’Fallon, O’Gavan, O’Naghten, Wanton, and Wright. The appearance of many of these surnames among the Black and mixed parts of the population is an indication of these Irish families’ participation in slavery, some even made their early fortunes in the slave trade. This group dominated all aspects of life in Santiago, becoming an intrinsic part of the landed elite, and the main promoters of an economic model dependent on the labor of enslaved West Africans. In this way, Irish surnames became not only identity markers, but also markers of property. An Irish presence in Cuba and the Spanish Caribbean is a direct result of their migration to France, then Spain, and later on to the Spanish American Empire in the early modern-period, especially during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. After the Battle of Kinsale (1601), large numbers of Irish migrants sought refuge within the vast Spanish dominions. They became widely known as the “Wild Geese” (O’Scea, 2015). Although most academic studies focus on the Irish presence in Spanish European enclaves, recent scholarship has turned to examine Irish connections with Spain’s American Empire (BrownriggGleeson Martínez, 2018; Chinea, 2007; Fanning, 2018; Recio Morales, 2012) and the Caribbean. Some of the first immigrants of Irish origin who settled in Cuba were those who arrived in Santiago in the seventeenth century (Fernández Moya, 2007), and their presence dates back to at least 1665. In their pursuit of acceptance into the host society, Irish families in Santiago de Cuba employed different strategies to maintain ethnic cohesion, to promote group solidarity, to exert power and influence, and to purchase vast tracts of land. These ranged from effecting strategic marriages to penetrating and controlling key local institutions such as

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the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País (The Economic Society of Friends of the Country, SEAP, a sort of local intellectual think tank and lobby) and the Roman Catholic Church. Traditional Spanish historiography has interpreted Irish migration to Spain only in confessional terms—that is, portraying the Irish solely as “victims of religious persecution who fled to Spain for refuge” (Recio Morales, 2006, p. 241). Cuban historiography has uncritically replicated this version of events (Fernández Moya, 2007; Marrero, 1978). In many cases, Irish claims for “political asylum” in Spain, and therefore access to naturalization, were based solely on religious grounds; but being a Roman Catholic was one of two main requirements. The second was to be “friends of the Spanish crown” (González Beltrán, 2003, p. 381), which was an ambiguous stipulation and could result in expulsion if geopolitical alliances shifted—as they often did. In the context of the Counter-Reformation, in which the Spanish Crown presented itself as defender of the Catholic faith, the Irish frequently petitioned for aid and protection (Recio Morales, 2006). This dynamic is key to understanding the construction of a “special status” or a “special relationship” that the Irish developed with the Spanish Monarchy (Rodgers, 2008). Within the Spanish dominions, the Irish adopted an identity as Catholic refugees and exiled people who were thereby entitled to protection from a Catholic monarchy, and they made sure to reaffirm this identity over time. Throughout the eighteenth century, the formation of an oligarchy in Santiago de Cuba, rested on three main pillars. First, its members publicly promoted their nobility and “purity of blood”. This implied that they had not mixed with the indigenous population or with enslaved African people (Provencio Garrigó, 1994). Second, they began to monopolize all public office appointments and to penetrate the main structures of power in Cuba: the military, the Catholic Church, the Cabildo (city council), and economic institutions, such as the treasury, customs, and merchants’ guilds. Third, they promoted a series of alliances through marriage seeking to consolidate and connect their families (Provencio Garrigó, 1994). Irish families in Santiago de Cuba closely followed these pillars to assimilate and integrate into a socioeconomic elite that was shaping itself. In Spain, the Irish had acquired a reputation as católicos viejos (Old Catholics), a status that suggested their pureza de sangre (the purity of their blood) and attested to the fact that they did not practice Judaism or followed the precept of Islam, nor had they been forced to convert to Catholicism after 1492. This was the essence of the Irish “special

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status” which facilitated their integration into all ranks of Spanish society. However, in Spanish America, the Irish became “subjects of a Protestant monarch, and clients of a Catholic one” (Rodgers, 2008, p. 30), which led them to occupy often ambiguous positions. In reality, they were pursuing access to the American trade or paid positions in the large, multinational, Spanish armies (Recio Morales, 2006). The Irish clearly adopted what Theodore McLauchlin (2010) has called “strategies of ethnic preference” to construct an identity with an affixed claim of loyalty toward the Spanish Crown. This strategy facilitated their access to salaried military positions and guaranteed the advancement of many of their careers. It was these military deployments that brought them to Cuban shores where they saw enormous economic potential in acquiring and developing land. Take, for example, the Creagh and Kindelan-Garvey-Duany families: in just one generation these families went from purchasing modest commissions in the Spanish armies, to marrying into the Creole elite, and acquiring vast pieces of land in Santiago. The first of the Creagh family to arrive, Juan Francisco Creagh Sarsfield (1702–?) came to Santiago before 1727 where he married Catalina Serrano de la Torre. The couple had two surviving children. By 1777, his first-generation Irish son Tomás José Creagh Serrano (1730–?), a lawyer who had worked for the local Audiencia (court), was one of the biggest landowners in Santiago. His land amounted to 25 leguas, or 3334 caballerías, which is approximately 110,560 acres (Expediente, 1849). On November 25, 1777, Creagh created a mayorazgo (majorat or entail), also known as vínculo, binding several of his properties together into one indivisible chunk of land equivalent to almost half of today’s Guantánamo province. His motivations were “to preserve the family’s wealth and perpetuate the memory of their House and their Forebearers” (Expediente, 1849). When he first set up the entailment in 1777, these properties were worth 42,000 pesos, already a significant fortune, and consisted of the haciendas (estates) “Guantánamo” and “La Zarza,” the corrales (cattle ranches) “Cabañas” and “Maca,” the coffee plantation “El Rincón,” the sitio (agricultural farmland) “Yguanabana,” and other areas named “El Corralillo,” “El Mangle,” and “La Palma.” Within these properties, the Creaghs had 2000 ganado mayor (older cattle, i.e., cows, bulls, etc.), 200 ganado menor (i.e., goats and pigs), and 300 horses. To tend to all these animals, the Creaghs held between 36 and 40 enslaved laborers. By 1847, their land alone was worth 200,000 pesos (Expediente, 1849).

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What became known as the Hato San Juan de Guantánamo and Hato San Andrés, had several repercussions for all members of the Creagh family. First, only one person could inherit the family’s wealth, which made the remaining relatives economically dependent on the holder of the mayorazgo. Unlike others of its kind, the Creagh’s entailment was not passed down to the eldest male child. Instead, it was inherited based on the principle of merit, but female members of the family could only become inheritors in the absence of male relatives. Nonetheless, due to natural causes, two generations after it was created, it was inherited by a woman, María Gertrudis Creagh Mancebo (Expediente, 1849). The entailment also had a clause demanding that the holder had to be Roman Catholic and had to acquire some knowledge of Latin and the sciences. The holder of the vínculo also had the prerogative of approving the marital partner of the entailment’s heir. When these conditions were not met, financial disownment ensued. María Gertrudis, who must have been between 25 and 35 years of age in 1849, was concerned about handing over her wealth to a spouse after their marriage and so she did not marry and ensued no heirs (Expediente, 1849). As legal instruments, mayorazgos can be seen as one of several institutions that preserved a patriarchal order in Cuban society even after their abolition in continental Spain in 1820. Mayorazgos have generally favored male descendants over females and have thus perpetuated an imbalanced power-dynamic within the family structure, in which men have dominated over women in both private and public life. In the Creagh family, there were three female members of the landowning and slaveholding elite who were excluded from the family’s wealth and forced to depend upon the generosity of their sister. However, one of them, María Gertrudis, tried to dismantle the entailment and divide the inheritance among her sisters Loreta, Ana María, and María Dolores. It appears she was unsuccessful, nonetheless. The Creagh mayorazgo kept the land underdeveloped, and for the most part, untouched. By choosing not to participate fully in the plantation boom, they significantly reduced the damage done to the environment, at least prior to the first half of the nineteenth century. In contrast, the Kindelán-Garvey family’s land, meanwhile, was used in such a way that was incredibly detrimental to the environment. One of the main promoters and beneficiary of the coffee plantation boom in the province of Santiago was first-generation Irish Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan (1757–1826). Kindelán occupied the top political

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position in the region when he was appointed Political and Military Governor of the Province and the City of Santiago de Cuba and took office on March 28, 1799. His administration was key to the establishment and naturalization of immigrants and refugees from Saint Domingue, and to the expansion of the plantation economy that radically transformed Santiago’s landscape. Among the strategies that the Irish developed for their survival as a group within the Spanish Empire was marriage (Power, 2011; Salvucci, 1984). Through this means Irish families managed to develop a complicated kinship network (Provencio Garrigó, 1994) giving them acceptance into the socially dominant group. In turn, local families benefited from a union with people established as Old Catholics, free from suspicion of mixed ancestry. Their economic success went hand-in-hand with their upward social mobility. As Lucía Provencio Garrigó (1994) suggests, they wielded a large degree of influence over other members of the governing elite to whom they were related. By the end of the eighteenth century, this cohort was politically conservative, mostly leaning toward reformism, not independentism. They were also concerned with the spread of republicanism and ideas about abolishing slavery. These were the values that Kindelán embodied. Kindelán had been born in Ceuta, a Spanish colonial enclave on the north coast of Africa, to an Irish father and a first-generation Irish mother, María Francisca O’Regan MacManus (1725–1783) (Hayes, 1943). His father, Vincent (Vicente) Kindelán Luttrell (1710–1786) had been born in Castlerickard, County Meath; and, on his maternal side, he was connected to the prominent Luttrell family from Luttrellstown, County Dublin. Other sources link this family to Ballynakill townland, also in County Meath, and geographically close to Castlerickard parish. Richard Hayes (1943) claims that “[t]he Kindelan family, whose ancient patrimony lay round Ballynakill, County Meath, has had a distinguished history in the Spanish military service from their exile in 1691” (p. 531). In the Civil Survey (1654–1656) of County Meath, there appears a townland named of Ballinikill [sic] located in the Parish of Rathcoore (now Rathcore) where a man named Edward Kindelan held 216 acres of land. According to genealogical data and archival records, Vincent Kindelan’s grandfather was also named Edward O’Kindelan (1625–1691) (Pruebas, 1789) and it is highly likely that they were the same person. In 1641, Edward had a profitable land mass of 458 acres, of which 400

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were forfeited to Cromwellian colonists (Down Survey, 2020). By 1654– 1656, Edward’s remaining land was made of 100 acres of arable terrain, 100 acres of pasture, 6 acres of meadow, and 10 acres of “bogg” for a total of 216 acres. Moreover, Edward was recorded as an “Irish Papist” (Simington, 1940). The Kindelán family suffered from the systematic process of land dispossession that took place after the Cromwellian invasion of Ireland (1649–1653). The Kindelán family first arrived in Cuba, specifically in Havana, between 1769 and 1771, under the command of Alexander (Alejandro) O’Reilly McDowell (1723–1794). Governor Kindelán’s sister, María de la Concepción, died in Havana on August 2, 1771, and is buried in the city’s Cathedral. She was married to Felipe O’Sullivan, Count of Berehaven, member of the O’Sullivan Beare branch of this prominent and old Cork-native family. By 1788, Sebastián Kindelán had already reached the rank of Captain of the Irlanda Regiment. His brother, Juan Ambrosio (Jean) became a close ally of Joseph Bonaparte in 1808 (Hayes, 1943). Irish families in Santiago married into the elite and intermarried with each other. Sebastián Kindelán promptly joined this group after securing permission to marry third-generation Irish Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey (1781–1840) (Matrimonio, 1801). She was the daughter of the Spanish-born Colonel Antonio Mozo de la Torre (1745–1822) and Mariana Garvey López del Castillo (1755–1827). Mariana was a descendent of Irish-born James (Santiago) Garvey (1695–?). James Garvey became a Spanish naturalized subject in 1728, which indicates his arrival in the early years of the eighteenth century (Fernández Moya, 2007; Marrero, 1978; Santa Cruz Mallen, 1950). The Mozo de la Torre Garvey family dedicated themselves principally to tobacco farming and, to a lesser degree, sugar production (Provencio Garrigó, 1994). By 1764, James’s son, first-generation Juan Francisco Garvey Hechavarría (c.1720–1769), who was also Mariana’s father, was an influential member of Santiago’s Cabildo (city council) and acted temporarily as Mayor. In only one generation, the Garveys went from being newly-arrived immigrants to holding one of the top administrative positions in the city. Thanks to their modest economic success, they paid their way into the City Council. They also allied themselves with Mozo de la Torre, and later with Kindelán, which were important steps for their upward mobility. Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey (1780–1840) was the key to the strategic alliance between these families. Limited research has been done on Irish women or women of Irish descent in Cuba. In general,

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there is little archival documentation of women’s lives in Cuba’s extremely patriarchal culture and society. The sources that still exist are fragmented. However, Ana Manuela is a notable exception. As historian María Elena Orozco Melgar (2007) shows, Ana Manuela was a lot more than merely Kindelán’s wife. The two manuscripts that she wrote in 1812 provide sufficient evidence of how her influence and power extended beyond the domestic realm and into the political life of the region (Orozco Melgar, 2007). Orozco Melgar describes Ana Manuela as a Santiago-born Creole and the quintessential embodiment of the local elite’s traditional values as a member of one of its most distinguished families. She had been taught the basics of how to read and write, but the main goal of her education, according to Orozco, was to prepare her for a strategic marriage. The Kindelán-Mozo de la Torre Garvey alliance came only a few months after he had secured the governorship of Santiago. Local experts have referred to this marriage as “very advantageous” (Bandera Merlet, 1982, pp. 6–7), but for whom? Ana Manuela’s dowry consisted of 3000 pesos in jewelry, servants (most likely enslaved West Africans), and monies. In addition to the 9500 pesos she received from her paternal inheritance, she also obtained the sugar plantations “Marcos Sánchez” and “La Lima.” This was a considerable fortune. In their nuptial agreement it is recorded that Kindelán only contributed 2000 pesos (Orozco Melgar, 2007). Governor Kindelán was an outsider, and this union not only guaranteed his integration into Cuban society, but also gave him access to the wealth and land that the Mozo de la Torre Garvey clans had accumulated and the political influence they wielded. In return, these families secured for Kindelán’s administration a network of support. This combination of his political interests with his personal ones has been seen as “a happy coincidence of economic interests and administrative duties” (Bandera Merlet, 1982, p. 9) given that any measures taken by Kindelán to secure the economic progress of the province were also to guarantee his own. However, this was far from coincidental: it was the purposeful strategy of a well-defined group of families that had a political, social, and economic agenda. Kindelán represented the ideas of a group of Spanish colonial administrators that promoted enlightened reforms or, as it is also known, enlightened despotism (Bandera Merlet, 1982). His administration perpetuated the policies of his predecessor, Juan Bautista Vaillant (1788–1796), who improved the city socio-economically. Both Vaillant and Kindelán recognized the strategic position of the port and bay of Santiago de Cuba in the oriental Caribbean Sea, and its potential for trade. They also

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acknowledged the richness of the soil, and its potential for growing a number of exportable products, such as sugar, coffee, indigo, and cotton (López Segrera, 2010). For the first time, under Vaillant, Santiago had an official policy that prioritized local interests aimed at emulating, and competing, with Havana (López Segrera, 2010). This ambitious program was continued under Kindelán. By the time of his governorship, there was also a well-established official interest to promote the creation of coffee plantations throughout the island, as well as to attach its cultivation to the economic and commercial interests of the white land-owning elite (López Segrera, 2010). His governorship has been portrayed favorably in Santiago’s historiography for having supported French-Domingois mass immigration and having overseen both the subsequent economic boom and the modernization of the city. The economic renaissance of Santiago is credited to these immigrants and their experience in coffee cultivation in Saint Domingue, their investment in the creation of plantations in La Sierra Maestra, and their importation of enslaved African workers. However, very little has been written on how Kindelán’s policies negatively impacted the natural landscape, contributed to the destruction of the forest, and the impoverishment of the soil quality that is still measurable today (Vasallo Rodríguez, 2019, p. 26). Moreover, although local historiography has portrayed Kindelán in a generally positive light, a more critical approach to his policies shows his direct involvement in promoting the settlement and establishment of a white, planter, and slave-owning class in Santiago (Andreo García & Provencio Garrigó, 2008). This was part of an island-wide whitening policy (blanqueamiento), explained by the reactions to the revolutionary upheavals in Saint Domingue. Cuba’s elite became concerned with being a racial minority and actively created schemes to import white free laborers (Brehony, 2013). However, West Africans continued to be trafficked into the island in growing numbers. The census of 1817, the first after the end of Kindelán’s administration, shows that Santiago had a total population of 126,922 of which only 30,587 were classified as “white” (Vives, 1829). Whites represented only 24.09% of the total population. The Irish diaspora, however wealthy and powerful, amounted to less than 1% of the provincial inhabitants. This numerical imbalance made the “white” minority feel even smaller and more vulnerable, which in turn significantly racialized Cuban society. “Here [in Cuba] there is no blood aristocracy, but a racial one. Nobody can claim to be noble, nor commoner, only white or coloured,” wrote the Creagh’s family lawyer to Madrid in 1847 (Expediente, 1849).

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Sebastián Kindelán’s role in the success of the implantation of a coffee culture in the region should not obscure the fact that this industry was sustained by an enslaved work force that started to be massively imported to Santiago under his leadership. By the end of his life in 1826, Kindelán himself owned 372 enslaved peoples. When his spouse Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey died in 1840, she was the owner of 550 African laborers and the family’s worth was 313,419.00 pesos (Orozco Melgar, 2007). They managed to own ten different plantations, the majority of which were dedicated to coffee (Table 3.1). In a short period of time between 1800 and 1807, French-Creole immigrants bought large tracts of land, imported thousands of enslaved Africans, and built the first coffee plantations in the mountains of La Sierra Maestra (Andreo García & Provencio Garrigó, 2008). By 1807, 138 coffee plantations had been established, 120 of which were owned by the newly-arrived French-Creole immigrants (Andreo García & Provencio Garrigó, 2008). Twenty years later, in 1827 there were 725 cafetales in Table 3.1

Estates owned by the Kindelán-Mozo de la Torre-Garvey family

Family group

Owner

Plantation name

Product

Value (in pesos)

Kindelán

Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey

Santa Ana

Coffee

128,691.00

Trinidad del Olimpo Santa Bárbara del Guayabal La Caridad de las Gracias San Cayetano de Aguadores Humanidad

Coffee

62,676.50

Coffee

1058.00

Coffee

86.313.00

Sugar

2792.00

Concepción de la Idalia La Lima

Coffee

22,535.00

Marcos Sánchez

Sugar

Trinidad del Olimpo

Coffee

Kindelán Kindelán Kindelán Kindelán Kindelán Kindelán Garvey Garvey Garvey

Sugar

Compiled from Archivo Provincial de Santiago de Cuba (Protocolos Notariales, 1814, 1819, 1845)

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the whole province (Vives, 1829). As a direct consequence, a part of the old Cuban-Creole elite was displaced from economic power, and some of its members turned against Kindelán. After over a decade in power, in 1810 he was forced to leave Cuba to take the governorship of East Florida. He died in Santiago de Cuba in 1826. By the end of Kindelán’s life, the value of the land was five times higher than what it had been in the mid-eighteenth century (López Segrera, 2010). Kindelán’s sole merit was to provide the newcomers with enough economic incentive in the form of tax breaks for them to want to remain in the area and rebuild what they had lost in Saint Domingue. According to historian Olga Portuondo, in less than five years almost all of the available land in the eastern province was sub-divided and sold (López Segrera, 2010). This explains the Creagh’s family eagerness to undo their mayorazgo. As long as the prices of coffee and sugar remained high in the global markets, land would continue to be more valuable than the cattle they were ranching on it. In 1790, a year before the Haitian revolution, only five or six estates existed in eastern Cuba, and they barely produced enough for local consumption (López Segrera, 2010). Eastern Cuba lacked the knowledge, the workforce, and the technology to properly invest in the large-scale development of industry. By 1807, this had changed dramatically. There were 191 coffee plantations, a considerable number that

Fig. 3.1 Location of the coffee plantation “Concepción de La Idalia” owned by Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan and Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey

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Fig. 3.2 Layout of the coffee plantation “Concepción de la Idalia” owned by Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan and Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey. (Source https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1008/)

would continue to expand until the 1840s (Vasallo Rodríguez, 2019, p. 29). Coffee plantations signified the implantation of an industrial complex in a remote and difficult-to-access location, in this case the mountains of Eastern Cuba. They required the creation of a network of roads and passages for the transportation of the produce from the hacienda to the port, and an intricate hydraulic system to sustain the wet method of coffee producing. Planters had to harness the natural environment (Tomich et al., 2021). Reynaldo Funes (Tomich et al., 2021) and his collaborators have interpreted the natural landscape’s modifications that accommodated coffee plantations as an ideological projection of the landowner’s power. This ideology translated into the “physical organization of landscape itself” (p. 7). Unlike Funes, I focus not on the process of land transformation, but on the actors involved in the transformation itself: planters and the slaveholding elite. In this way, Irish immigrants and their

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Fig. 3.3 3D reconstruction of the “Concepción de la Idalia” coffee plantation (Source/Author: Lourdes Rizo Aguilera [2009]. La Producción Cafetalera en Santiago de Cuba. Paisaje Cultural y Expresión Tipológica. Arquitectura y Urbanismo, Vol. 30, No. 2–3).

descendants contributed to the region’s subordination to a monocrop, coffee. This restructuration of the use of the land “simplified biologically complex ecologies with devastating environmental consequences” (p. 13). “Concepción de la Idalia,” Kindelán’s coffee plantation (see Fig. 3.1), is situated on a piece of elongated terrain 2 km west of the biggest landmark in the area, La Gran Piedra (the Big Rock). Although found today in ruins, the main industrial components inserted into the landscape can be easily accessed and observed (Fig. 3.2). It was constructed respecting the natural inclination of the region, and its waterways (still visible today) used gravity to supply the different coffee-producing areas (Fig. 3.3). The inclination of the terrain also conditioned planters like Kindelán to introduce the use of “thick retaining walls, buttresses, ramps, stairs and bridges, with a predominance of the use of masonry for the

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conformation of the walls” (Rizo Aguilera, 2008, p. 17). These constructions replaced the natural canopy of trees and are today associated with eroding processes and the degradation of soil quality (Espinosa, 2004).

Conclusion French-Domingois immigrants were involved in the process of knowledge transfer that facilitated Cuba’s coffee boom between the 1790s and the 1840s. In turn, Irish immigrants and their descendants led this process and benefited economically and socially from it. By the 1830s, “Cuban coffee planters employed around 50,000 slaves and were producing almost 30,000 metric tons of coffee annually” (Tomich et al., 2021, p. 51). When a new wave of immigration brought other Irish families to Santiago de Cuba there was already an old and well-established cohort of Irish Catholic “Wild Geese” families. These families had suffered from the dispossession of their land in Ireland, had enrolled in the military armies of continental Europe, and had worked and married their way up eastern Cuba’s social, political, and economic ladders. They demonstrated highly strategic behavior as can be seen in the marriages they made and in the social networks they developed. By forging marital alliances with other Irish-Hispanic families, and renewing generation after generation their genetic bonds to Ireland, they secured some degree of ethnic cohesion. From the seventeenth to the first half of the nineteenth centuries, there was an alignment of interests and intermarriage between Irish-Hispanic and Cuban-Creole families. This chapter is a preliminary inquiry into their histories of migration, settlement, acculturation, and their struggles through land dispossession and acquisition in a diasporic Hispanic setting. Santiago’s “Wild Geese” families social and economic mobility is connected to a centuries-old strategy of the Irish in Spain and the Spanish American Empire. These families remained a distinctively unique and cohesive group. These Irish “Wild Geese” were the quintessentially loyal Spanish subjects. The land they acquired in today’s provinces of Santiago, Granma, Las Tunas, and Guantánamo was ideal for coffee planting due to favorable environmental conditions, mostly fertile and uncultivated lands, abundant vegetation, untouched forests, and cool temperatures given the mountainous elevations (Godínez Mendoza, 2013). The presence of wood, one

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of the main elements in the construction of the production facilities essential for coffee plantations, was also an important factor. Although wood was considered less durable than stone given Cuba’s tropical climate, it was still widely used in windows and doors, for the floors and interior walls, as well as for architectural support for the roofs. Between 1820 and 1840, at the time of its golden era, as many as 725 cafetales existed in the mountains of eastern Cuba. Today, the archaeological remains of 171 of those are an essential part of a cultural landscape protected as a UNESCO World Heritage site (López Segrera, 2010). Although they represented less than one percent of the population, these Irish families played an intrinsic role in the transformation of Santiago’s landscape from a natural to a cultural one. Unequivocally, coffee planting and the plantation complex brought heavy deforestation, the modification of the natural landscape to open roads, the creation of irrigation canals, and the construction of all the production buildings required for coffee production, including housing for the planters and their families (Godínez Mendoza, 2013). This process led to the fragmentation of the terrain, and its division into lots (Godínez Mendoza, 2013). The expansion of the plantation complex entailed the necessary destruction of the natural ecosystem. The “cleaning up” of forested areas, the “opening up” of roads to speed up the transportation of goods to the ports, the extensive use of wood as an energy source, and the replacement of indigenous species for imported ones, such as coffee, were all associated with this phenomenon. From this perspective, the plantation complex had not only economic, cultural, and social repercussions, but also a long-term environmental impact which continues to shape the current state of the island.

Archival Sources Archivo General de Indias . Fondo Secretaría de Guerra (1801), 6867/8; 6883/27 “Matrimonio Sebastián Kindelán”. Archivo Histórico Nacional . Fondo Ultramar (1849), 1656, No. 13 “Expediente promovido por María Gertrudis Creagh y Mancebo”. . Fondo Órdenes Militares (1789), 5802 & 5803 “Pruebas para ser admitidos como Caballeros de Santiago Juan O’Kindelan y O’Regan y Sebastián O’Kindelan y O’Regan”.

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Archivo Provincial de Santiago de Cuba . Fondo Protocolos Notariales (1814, 1819, 1845).

Bibliography Andreo García, J., & Provencio Garrigó, L. (2008, September 17). Tan lejos de La Habana y tan cerca de Saint-Domingue: Santiago de Cuba durante la crisis de 1808. IX Congreso de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea. Bacardí Moreau, E. (1925). Crónicas de Santiago de Cuba (Vol. 2). Tipografía Arroyo Hermanos. Bandera Merlet, I. (1982). El Gobierno de Sebastián Kindelán en el Departamento Oriental, 1799–1810 (Bachelor thesis). Universidad de Oriente. Brehony, M. (2013). Free labour and “whitening” the nation: Irish migrants in colonial Cuba. Saothar, 38, 7–18. Brownrigg-Gleeson Martínez, J. (2018). ‘La regeneración de América’: El exilio irlandés en los Estados Unidos ante los procesos de independencia en la America Hispana (1815–20). In A. Baena Zapatero & I. Álvarez Cuartero (Eds.), De imperios a naciones en el mundo ibérico (pp. 253–278). Ediciones Doce Calle. Campuzano, L. (2016). Revolución haitiana y emigración a Cuba (1791–1804), en textos de escritoras de las Américas (ss. XIX, XX y XXI). In I. Bajini, E. Perassi, & L. Campuzano (Eds.), Mujeres y Emancipación de la América Latina y el Caribe en los siglos XIX y XX (pp. 27–40). Ledizioni. https:// doi.org/10.4000/books.ledizioni.309. Chinea, J. L. (2007). Irish indentured servants, papists and colonists in Spanish Colonial Puerto Rico, ca. 1650–1800. Irish Migration Studies in Latin America, 5(3), 171–181. Cronin, J. J. (2007). The Irish royalist elite of Charles II in Exile, c.1649–1660 (Doctoral thesis). European University Institute. Down Survey. (2020). Trinity College Dublin, The Down Survey of Ireland. http://downsurvey.tcd.ie/index.html. Espinosa, M. (2004). Ayuda urgente para el patrimonio de la Gran Piedra y su entorno. Arquitectura y Urbanismo, XXV (1), pp. 40–45. Fanning, T. (2018). Paisanos: The forgotten Irish who changed the face of Latin America. University of Notre Dame Press. Fernández Moya, R. (2007). The Irish presence in the history and placenames of Cuba. Irish Migration Studies in Latin America, 5(3), 189–198. García Álvarez, A. (2008). Auge y decadencia del café en Cuba colonial. Stvdia Zamorensia, 8, 293–312. Godínez Mendoza, L. (2013). Del paisaje natural al paisaje cultural: Concepción de Tí Arriba y la presencia francesa (Bachelor thesis). Universidad de Oriente.

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González Beltrán, J. M. (2003). Extranjeros en el siglo XVIII: procesos de integración y de solidaridad interna. In M. B. Villar García & P. Pezzi Cristóbal (Eds.), Los Extranjeros en la España Moderna (pp. 379–389). Portadilla. González Estévez, V. (2009). La implantación francesa en el medio urbano en Santiago de Cuba (1800–1868): El barrio de ‘La Marina’; el antiguo ‘Quartel Francés’ y el ‘Tivolí’/L’implantation Française en milieu urbain à Santiago de Cuba (1800–1868): Le ‘Quartier de La Marina’, l’ancien ‘Quartier français’ et le ‘Tivolí’ (Doctoral thesis). Universidad de Oriente en co-tutelle Université Michel de Montaigne Bordeaux 3. Hayes, R. (1943). Biographical dictionary of Irishmen in France: Part VIII. Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 32(128), 523–531. Herrera, R. A., & Menéndez, L. (1988). Historia del uso de las tierras en Sierra del Rosario. In R. A. Herrera, L. Menéndez, M. E. Rodríguez, & E. E. García (Eds.), Ecología de los bosques siempre verdes de la Sierra del Rosario, Cuba. Proyecto MAB No. 1, 1974–1987 . Instituto de Ecología y Sistemática. Academia de Ciencias de Cuba. López Segrera, Y. (2010). Del Paradigma Tecnológico al Paisaje Arqueológico: Presencia francesa y cultura del café en el sudeste cubano en la primera mitad del siglo XIX (Doctoral thesis). Universidad de Oriente. Marrero, L. (1978). Cuba, economía y sociedad: Del monopolio hacia la libertad comercial, 1701–1763. Playor. McLauchlin, T. (2010). Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion. Comparative Politics, 42(3), 333–350. O’Connor, T. (2016). Irish voices from the Spanish inquisition: Migrants, converts, and brokers in early modern Iberia. Palgrave Macmillan. O’Reilly Herrera, A. (2014). Cuban artists across the diaspora setting the tent against the house. University of Texas Press. O’Scea, C. (2015). Surviving Kinsale: Irish emigration and identity formation in early modern Spain, 1601–40. Manchester University Press. Orozco Melgar, M. E. (2007). Los acentos de una mujer. Editorial Oriente. Pérez de la Riva, F. (1944). El Café: Historia de su cultivo y explotación en Cuba. Jesus Montero, Editor. Power, O. (2011). Irish planters, Atlantic merchants: The development of St. Croix, Danish West Indies, 1750–1766 (Doctoral thesis). National University of Ireland, Galway. Provencio Garrigós, L. (1994). “Clase”, poder y matrimonio: Configuración de un élite dirigente: La Sociedad Económica de Cuba de Amigos del País. Contrastes: Revista de historia moderna, 9, 49–90. Recio Morales, Ó. (2006). Irish émigré group strategies of survival, adaptation and integration in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Spain. In T. O’Connor & M. A. Lyons (Eds.), Irish communities in early modern Europe (pp. 240–266). Four Courts Press.

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Recio Morales, Ó. (Ed.). (2012). Redes de nación y espacios de poder: La comunidad irlandesa en España y la América española, 1600–1825/Power Strategies: Spain and Ireland, 1600–1825. Albatros Ediciones. Rizo Aguilera, L. (2008). El Batey en la Hacienda Cafetalera del Siglo XIX en Santiago de Cuba, su expresión tipológica. Ciencia en su PC, 1, 10–20. Rizo Aguilera, L. (2009). La Producción Cafetalera en Santiago de Cuba. Paisaje Cultural y Expresión Tipológica. Arquitectura y Urbanismo, 30(2–3). Rodgers, N. (2008). Ireland, slavery and anti-slavery: 1645–1865. Palgrave Macmillan. Salvucci, L. K. (1984). Anglo-American merchants and stratagems for success in Spanish imperial markets, 1783–1807. In J. A. Barbier & A. J. Kuethe (Eds.), The North American role in the Spanish imperial economy (pp. 1760–1819). Manchester University Press. Sánchez Méndez, J. (2019). Alfredo Kindelán y Duany. Ejército: Revista del Ejército de Tierra Español, LXXX (937), 89–98. Santa Cruz y Mallen, F. X. de. (1950). Historia de Familias Cubanas (Vol. 6). Editorial Hércules. Simington, R. C. (1940). The civil survey A.D. 1654–56 with returns of Tithes for the Meath Baronies (Vol. 5). Stationery Office. https://www.irishmanuscr ipts.ie/product/the-civil-survey-a-d-1654-56-county-of-meath-vol-v-with-ret urns-of-tithes-for-the-meath-baronies-10-vols-1931-61/ Stubbs, J. (2021). Cuba between hurricanes: Commodity frontiers and environmental challenges. Diálogos Revista Electrónica de Historia, 22(2), 187–217. https://doi.org/10.15517/dre.v22i2.46955 Tomich, D. W., Marquese, R. B., Funes Monzote, R., & Venegas Fornias, C. (2021). Reconstructing the landscapes of slavery: A visual history of the plantation in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world. University of North Carolina Press. Vasallo Rodríguez, L. (2019). La crisis de la producción del sistema agroforestal cafetalero en Cuba y su relación con la conservación de la biodiversidad (Doctoral thesis). Universidad de Alicante. Vives, F. D. (1829). Cuadro estadístico de la siempre fiel isla de Cuba correspondiente al año de 1827 . Arazoa y Soler.

PART III

Methodological Interventions and Models

CHAPTER 4

The Need for Better Data: Climate-Induced Mobility, Urbanization, and Procedural Injustices in Zambia Sennan D. Mattar and Neil J. W. Crawford

Introduction Climate change is expected to provoke greater climate-induced mobility, whether displacement, migration, or relocation, predominantly within states in the Global South. Between 2008 and 2019, nearly 300 million people have been internally displaced by weather-related events (IDMC, 2016, 2018a, 2019, 2020a). The latest Ecological Threat Register states that 141 countries of 157 are at risk of ecological threat and projects that this risks the displacement of approximately 1.2 billion people by 2050

S. D. Mattar (B) Mary Robinson Centre for Climate Justice, Glasgow Caledonian University (GCU), Glasgow, UK e-mail: [email protected] N. J. W. Crawford School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Walker et al. (eds.), Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29529-4_4

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(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020). This dramatic movement of people was recognized in the Paris Agreement 2015, which highlights the “importance of averting, minimizing and addressing” the adverse consequences of climate change for migration and displacement (UNFCCC, 2016, p. 12). However, a significant challenge in understanding climate-induced mobility lies in an inability to obtain accurate and relevant data on migration and displacement because of limitations in census data. National statistical agencies primarily use census data to generate statistics on mobility (United Nations, 1970; United Nations Statistics Division, 2017a). This chapter demonstrates that census data is subject to severe temporal and spatial limitations as census officers are rarely in the right place at the right time to capture the mobility of displaced individuals and those engaged in temporary or circular migrations. Additionally, hostility toward migrants and displaced persons and limited resources to monitor migration and collect census data prevent equitable decision-making and creates injustices. As such, this chapter outlines the growing body of work on climate-induced mobility and the gaps in knowledge regarding who, when, and where people move according to census data and the problematic over-reliance on census data, with Zambia as a case study to illustrate these challenges.

Three Problems of Datasets for Internal Climate-Induced Mobility The most significant challenges for better data on climate-induced mobility can be summarized as follows: temporal (when data collection happens), spatial (where data collection happens), and socio-economic (political and economic barriers to data collection). This section describes how each challenge manifests itself within censuses and census data, and the consequences for accuracy in depicting climate-induced mobility. Temporal Limitation of Census Data A significant limitation of census data is the lengthy periods between censuses. Census data is periodically gathered, on average every 5 or 10 years (United Nations Statistics Division, 2017a). The extended time period between data sets makes it difficult to record events, from circular migration (i.e., a temporary but repetitive movement, which is a historical

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coping strategy adopted by the poorest peoples across much of subSaharan Africa) to environmental or economic shocks (Annez et al., 2010; IOM, 2016; Oliver-Smith, 2009; Parnell & Walawege, 2011; Potts, 2010; Tacoli et al., 2015). The difficulty in recording temporary migrations within census data stems from how censuses collect residence data. The United Nations Statistics Division (2017a) recommends two thresholds to determine the “usual place of residence” of an individual in a census, by asking if an individual has lived, or plans to live, continuously in a place for either 6 or 12 months. Some censuses may purposely ask an individual their “current place of residence” in addition to their “usual place of residence”, if a country is intending to produce internal migration statistics, but this is rare as “current place of residence” and “usual place of residence” are often treated synonymously (United States Census Bureau, 2019). Based on this information, census data can be used to determine changes in residence of a population, i.e., where people are currently found compared to where they were born, or whether they recently moved. However, one caveat is that temporary absences, examples including holidays or work assignments, are omitted when recording usual places of residence in censuses (e.g., see United Nations Statistics Division, 2017a). This omission means temporary movements are not recorded, such as displaced persons who have been forced to move due to natural disasters but usually attempt to return to their usual place of residence (Perch-Nielsen et al., 2008). Similarly, a person or household might move multiple times over the course of a year or multiple years before returning to a usual place of residence, such as those who engage in circular or temporary migration during periods of environmental stress (Potts, 2010; Tacoli et al., 2015). These changes in residence are likely to go unrecorded by a census that only occurs every 5 or 10 years, and only records changes in residence within a 6-to-12-month period. Given there is growing evidence that climate change is forcing movement away from historical norms, both in terms of scale and permanency (Mastrorillo et al., 2016; Mattar & Mbakwem, 2019; Tacoli et al., 2015), the limited residence data window results in the strong possibility that climate-induced mobility will not captured by censuses. The concern that lengthy periods between censuses may undermine migration analysis based on census data is not new. Census-based migration analyses have long been characterized by under-estimation of migration volumes and misleading directional trends, in part due to the lengthy

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periods between censuses (Banda et al., 2015; Shryock & Siegel, 1976). There have been calls for more nuanced questions on motivations for migration (e.g., displacement, livelihoods, ecosystems, and the impacts of slow-on set events) to be included in censuses to better depict why people move (IDMC, 2018c). While understanding the motivation behind a migration will assist with projecting directional trends, a fundamental barrier to depicting internal migration is that censuses do not record the migration history of an enumerated individual from the last census, and therefore, any recorded motivation can only be applied to a single migration. Spatial Limitation of Census Data The principal spatial challenge of census data stems from a lack of standardization on how to discern between spatial units, e.g., sub-divisions within an administrative area. The use of census data to determine internal migration patterns can be misleading depending on the scale of a spatial unit within a dataset. For example, the 2010 census in Brazil found that 10.1% of the population migrated within the five major regions over their lifetime, but when regions were broken down into 1520 smaller sub-divisions, 37.5% of the population was shown to have migrated over their lifetime (Lucas, 2015). There is considerable difference in the spatial framework used by different nations for dividing up their administrative areas into sub-divisions for the purpose of monitoring migration, e.g., Armenia uses 11 sub-divisions compared to over 7000 sub-divisions in Thailand (Bell et al., 2020). As such, a smaller, migration-defining spatial unit would capture a greater number of internal migrations (Skeldon, 2018). Yet, even with smaller spatial units, cross-national comparisons of migrations based on census data are limited by differing spatial frameworks, e.g., Vietnam has more major regions (61) than there are minor regions in South Africa (52) (Bell & Muhidin, 2009). In addition, the ability to discern boundaries between spatial units is also affected by differing classifications of spatial units, namely “urban” and “rural” areas. The definition of what constitutes “urban” varies considerably between countries, and such variation has plagued urban policymakers for many years as attempts have been made to make urban data more suitable for internationally comparable statistics (de Vries, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2015; Zhou & Ma, 2005). The United Nations (2014) states outright that there is not “a single definition [of urban]

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that would be applicable to all countries”. The classification of an area as “urban” in Zambia, for instance, is established by a local administration declaring a municipal area to be either “urban” or “rural” depending on the function of the land at that time (CSO, 2003). The United Kingdom, on the other hand, uses spatial units which distinguish between “rural” and “urban” based on the physical characteristics of an area (Defra, 2013). While both classification systems have drawbacks, Zambia’s own statistical institution acknowledged there were often overlaps of settlements between areas declared “urban” and “rural” as municipal boundaries are rarely changed or reviewed (CSO, 2013). The ability to confidently distinguish between rural and urban areas within census data is significant, not only because accurately monitoring migration between rural and urban areas is a vital tool for urban planners and policymaking on urbanization (Awumbila, 2017; Lohnert, 2017; Mberu et al., 2017; Teye, 2018). It is also a necessary procedural step to identify migration patterns of vulnerable groups, namely migrants from rural communities, and allocate appropriate resources and interventions. The vulnerability of rural communities is evident by the scale of assistance often required to mitigate the risk of climate-induced migration and displacement, as well as to meet material needs once displacement occurs (Mattar & Mbakwem, 2019). A particular vulnerability is the potential for forced migration as demonstrated by Zambia’s Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZVAC, 2016) which found 16% of rural households would consider migrating in the face of prolonged dry spells. There is growing evidence that smallholder rural farmers employ migration of varying degrees of permanency as an adaptive strategy in periods of drought and dryness (Antwi-Agyei & Nyantakyi-Frimpong, 2021; Bahta, 2020; Hassan & Tularam, 2018; Lottering et al., 2021). Subsequently, employment and educational opportunities in cities, as well as the prospect of diminishing crop yields and cattle deaths, are found to be motivators for rural–urban migration (Agan et al., 2019; Etana et al., 2022; Farley-Kiwanuka & Farley-Kiwanuka, 2020; Moses et al., 2017; Munishi, 2013). To sum up, the ability to discern movement between spatial units not only suffers from a lack of standardization in how spatial units are divided, but also how they are classified. Overcoming this challenge is a matter of standardizing the division of administrative units, as well as a greater breakdown of spatial units into smaller and smaller sub-divisions

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to account for differences in rural and urban landscapes within an administrative unit. This call for standardization has been made before, however, with limited success (Tomas, 2009). Socio-Economic Limitations Beyond temporal and spatial limitations, which are largely methodological, the robustness of census data to depict mobility is undermined by poor census coverage, caused by social and economic barriers, which can lead to migrants and displaced persons being unaccounted for within census data. In terms of social barriers, the poorest and most vulnerable of migrants have long been known to settle in urban areas, particularly informal settlements (Crawford, 2021; Fielden, 2008; IDMC, 2015), but inhabitants of informal settlements are often not adequately enumerated by formal censuses (WHO, 2015). Informal settlements are typically characterized as poorly regulated, vulnerable, and marginalized communities but are common destinations due to their affordability (Mattar & Mbakwem, 2019). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has found displaced persons who move to informal settlements face hostility from urban authorities, and this creates a situation where it is unclear who is responsible for recording (and safeguarding) their presence (IDMC, 2018b). As a related consequence, the IDMC also acknowledges that displacement figures likely underestimate or often miss the majority of internally displaced persons (IDP) who take refuge outside of official displacement camps, and this creates a reporting bias, as there is a greater availability of information obtainable from displacement camps (IDMC, 2020b). This social barrier to adequate census coverage is borne from a rejection, reluctance, or, at the very least, an unsympathetic engagement by urban authorities to acknowledge the rights of those moving to informal settlements to own or occupy land. This hostility has affected data collection in the form of researchers being actively blocked by city officials from accessing data on informal settlements (e.g., Chakraborty et al., 2015). In addition, informal dwellers themselves avoid censuses due to fear of drawing attention to themselves and facing the prospect of eviction (e.g., Lucci et al., 2018). Crucially, climate-induced mobility and economic migration are often intertwined (Black et al., 2011; Lilleør & Broeck, 2011; Marchiori et al., 2011; Suhrke & Hazarika, 1993); however, the

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latter is less politically charged, without the same potential for rightsbased claims or assistance. In the case of those forced to move to informal settlements, social injustice can be seen to manifest with data collection that is, arguably, purposefully inadequate. City authorities are not motivated to quantify a social issue they view as beyond their duties or because they are actively trying to discourage migration to poorer, urban areas. Understandably, these limitations of the traditional census have led to the exploration of alternative methodologies and data sources to record human demographic change and mobility. For example, georeferenced addresses, or the use of mobile data to track movement, have been recommended, and pursued, as means of analyzing or recording internal migration (Rees, 1998; Wesolowski et al., 2013). The latest manual for the 2020 population and housing censuses by the United Nations Statistics Division (2017b) acknowledges the potential usefulness of alternative methodologies and data sources, and even suggests alternative approaches for difficult to enumerate groups, but remarks that most countries will continue to use a traditional census in 2020. This may seem like a technical limitation, but the motivation to seek alternatives highlights an economic barrier. Censuses are costly, and likely to become even more so, as populations grow, and technological solutions are prohibitively expensive (BBC News, 2020; Leete, 2001; McMorrow, 2016). Developing nations are particularly disadvantaged as many are seeing their population grow rapidly, while their capacity to train and retain census officers, as well as afford technological solutions required for more complex coverage by censuses, is limited by economic constraints (Leete, 2001).

Datasets and Internal Migration in Zambia Zambia is often used as an example of migration patterns in sub-Saharan Africa because of the availability and quality of census data pertaining to the region (Borel-Saladin, 2017; Crankshaw & Borel-Saladin, 2019; Mususa, 2012; Potts, 1995, 2005, 2009). Migration data is incomplete or lacking across many nations in sub-Saharan Africa and this has been the case for a long time (Black et al., 2006; Mercandalli et al., 2019; Stoddard et al., 2009). Where migration data is available, it comes from a variety of sources (e.g., census, registers, work permits) that lack uniformity (Uberti et al., 2015). As a result, researchers often use modeling to project migration flows to compensate for missing and non-standardized

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data (Garcia et al., 2015; Mastrorillo et al., 2016; Nawrotzki & DeWaard, 2018; Sorichetta et al., 2016). Zambia’s Central Statistical Office (CSO), however, carries out censuses every 10 years and produces analytical migration reports—and focuses on the migration between provinces, the largest of the spatial units of the country (CSO, 2003, 2013). The availability of data makes it easier to ascertain migration patterns, but 10-year intervals remains a temporal limitation. Climate-Induced Mobility in Zambia In Zambia, mobility patterns are deeply tied to climate patterns. Many rural communities are reliant on rain-fed agricultural practices and the availability of natural grazing land to provide subsistence and sustain their livelihoods (Chapoto et al., 2018). Climate change is projected to increase rainfall variability and reduce the number of rain days across Zambia, and this change is already being felt by farming communities in Southern Province who struggle with the current variable and dry climate conditions (Kasali, 2007; Milimo et al., 2002). Under such circumstances, extreme weather and the unavailability of water for agriculture and livestock are considered strong factors that might displace or provoke migration. This was the case for 30 rural households in Southern Province who migrated to another rural area in Central Province between 2003 and 2010 in response to extreme weather and dry conditions (Simatele & Simatele, 2015). More recent papers by Nawrotzki and DeWaard (2018) and Mueller et al. (2020) explore the relationship between climate change and migration based on the 2000–2010 census period. This period remains the most recent available period for analysis as the planned 2020 census was delayed until 2021 due to the Coronavirus Pandemic, and then delayed once more until 2022 due to a lack of preparedness. As such, quantitative studies on climate change and migration continue to be published based on census data from 2000 to 2010 in order to be able to draw conclusions on wider national and international trends (e.g., Feng et al., 2010; McLeman, 2013). This temporal limitation of censuses, i.e., infrequency, is directly related to a lack of published quantitative analysis on climate mobility beyond 2010 in Zambia, but this also creates a necessity for qualitative research to validate the projected mobility trends. An analysis of Zambian census data from 2000 to 2010 by Nawrotzki and DeWaard (2018) concluded that individuals from wealthier districts

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in Zambia were more likely to engage in internal migration under adverse climatic conditions, in contrast to individuals from poorer districts who were more likely to be immobilized. It has been theorized that climate shocks may undermine the ability of poorer households to finance migration and cause immobilization (Foresight, 2011). This conclusion may be affected by the limitations of the Zambian census with regards to its capture of data on temporary or circular migrations. A qualitative study by Simatele and Simatele (2015) directly surveyed households in 2010 which were part of an earlier study in 2003 and arrived at the conclusion that climate change was a motivator for migration among some of the poorest populations in Zambia. Older studies have suggested that circular or temporary migration, rather than immobilization, was the typical adaptive strategy adopted by the poorest households (Henry et al., 2003; Hoang et al., 2008; Potts, 2010; Tacoli et al., 2015). This is not to say that immobilization is not a reality, but there are limited qualitative studies to validate such migration trends. In addition, there are legitimate concerns surrounding analyses based on dated census data that warrant the need for further validation. Limitations in Current Data Collection Methods in Zambia The CSO calculates lifetime migration between administrative areas of Zambia by subtracting a “native-born” population from the total population of an administrative area and comparing the change with previous censuses (CSO, 2003, 2013). The population of “native-born” is derived from household surveys where individuals are asked for their place of birth and place of residence. The “place of residence” is defined by where a person has lived in the last 12 months prior to the census. If the place of birth of an individual is the same as their place of residence, then that individual is considered “native-born” for that administrative area. This method conforms with international standards as set out by the United Nations Statistics Division. This method exemplifies the temporal limitation of censuses because, given the 10-year gap between the most recent censuses in Zambia, it is possible for a surveyed individual to travel and live across Zambia but be identified as a “native-born” and “non-migrant” if they returned to their place of birth within 12 months of the next census. While the CSO migration reports do not discuss this limitation, the organization acknowledges the potential for mortality of migrants to undermine the robustness of

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their migration calculations and, thus, they apply survival ratios for the 10-year gaps between censuses. That is to say, CSO does not directly collect data on the movement of an individual over time, but extrapolates from census data based on current residency and place of birth. The ability to capture temporary or circular migration is important for understanding the temporal dimension of mobility, because such movement is considered a typical response among poorer households to economic and environmental stresses and shocks (Henry et al., 2003; Potts, 2010). A temporary or circular migration is, by definition, not a permanent migration; therefore, censuses which do not record movement over time cannot capture this type of mobility. Regarding spatial dimensions, the units of scale in the 2022 census have yet to be published, but migration analytical reports by CSO express migration trends to urban areas at the “Province” scale. However, the CSO (2013) states there are overlaps of human settlements between areas declared “urban” and “rural”—and this distorts the spatial dimension of census data. The CSO (2013) gives the example of Ndola, Copperbelt Province, as an area where rural and urban areas overlap. The city of Ndola is concentrated in a roughly 140 km2 area (Google Maps, 2021), but the Ndola District, the administrative boundary that Ndola city is part of, covers an area of 965 km2 (City Population, 2021). For the purpose of the census, the entire district is considered “urban”. Poor Population Monitoring of Informal Settlements In global terms, statistics on the populations of informal settlements are broadly incomplete: The United Nations Statistics Division (2020) possesses country-level estimates for only 95 out of 149 countries as part of its monitoring process for Millennium Development Goal 7, Target 7.D. This target aims to improve the lives of slum dwellers, but the available dataset lacked approximately a third of the data points for what was an already limited selection of years (i.e., 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2010, and 2014). The poor census coverage in urban areas stems from a global hostility toward informal settlements, and Zambia is no exception. Zambia’s Urban and Regional Planning Act (2015) describes informal settlements as “groups of people living on land they have no legal claim to”. Researchers have found city officials in Zambia are hesitant to discuss, or disclose, information on informal settlements for fear of highlighting

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governance failures, and have actively sought to block access to information on informal settlements (Berrisford, 2011; Simposya, 2010). Subsequently, informal dwellers also fear forced evictions due to their legal status and the hostility of officials to their residency. They are, therefore, hesitant to disclose their information in censuses or studies. This behavior has also been observed in previous Zambian censuses (Lucci et al., 2018).

Improving Datasets on Internal Migration with a Procedural Justice Approach Ultimately, the shortcomings of censuses discussed so far can be summarized as a disconnect between who is included in data collection, when and how often data collection happens, and where data collection happens. The consequence is an unreliable portrayal of mobility. The approach to improving the dataset on internal migration, therefore, lies in a purposeful effort to tailor data collection methods to account for the temporal, spatial, and socio-economic factors that intersect to exclude some modes of migration. In this regard, procedural justice as an approach to data collection is extremely relevant. Procedural justice requires the provision of comprehensive data on the drivers, impacts, and implications of climate change for the poorest and most vulnerable individuals and communities, in order to inform decision-making and create equitable climate action (Meikle et al., 2016). Climate or Economic Migration? Given that most migrations in response to climate change will be internal (Rigaud et al., 2018), the lack of adequate data on internal migration undermines the ability to effectively monitor climate-induced mobility, and subsequently, define the harm it causes. This issue was recognized in the 2015 Paris Agreement (paragraph 50) as part of the goal to “avert, minimi[z]e and address” the impacts of climate-induced mobility by setting up a task-force to develop recommendations under the UNFCCC’s Loss and Damage mechanism.1

1 This mechanism being the policy tool used by the UNFCCC to define economic and non-economic losses caused by sudden climatic events, e.g., cyclones, and slow onset climate change, e.g., sea-level rise (UNFCCC, 2020).

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That said, international treaties on climate-induced mobility are known for their ambiguous wording (Wilkinson et al., 2016) and this ambiguity can be problematic when discerning “climate-induced” migration from other types of migration (Ferris, 2020; Perch-Nielsen et al., 2008). The estimated scale of climate-induced mobility varies by hundreds of millions between migration studies because there is no agreement on the meaning of “climate-induced” mobility in international policy frameworks (Mattar & Mbakwem, 2019). International policy frameworks have long been unable to effectively distinguish climate mobility from other types of mobility, voluntary or forced movements, temporary or permanent migration, and internal or international displacement (Luetz & Merson, 2020; McAdam & Saul, 2010; Stapleton et al., 2017; Zetter, 2011). As a result, the rights of individuals displaced or forced to migrate due to climate change are not recognized, which causes individuals to receive inadequate assistance, protection, or access to the necessary resources to restore loss rights (Fatima et al., 2014). Overcoming the issue of ambiguity surrounding the definition of what is “climate-induced” migration requires addressing temporal and spatial limitations of census data. When and where did a person move? How does this movement relate to climate patterns? Some studies have sought to overcome this challenge by disregarding census data altogether, and instead directly survey individual motivations for migration compared to meteorological trends (e.g., De Longueville et al., 2020; ZVAC, 2016). However, the applicability of such findings are (i) limited to a point in time and (ii) limited to a geographical area, rather than as part of an ongoing national and international monitoring of climateinduced mobility. Other researchers have used census data (recognizing the strength of national coverage), but have also relied on indirect indicators such as agricultural income, to compare with meteorological trends (e.g., Delazeri et al., 2021). The approach by Delazeri et al. (2022) highlights the potential of census data to depict climate mobility when compared with meteorological data, but such analysis requires validation as a result of the current and common temporal and spatial limitations found in census data. Achieving comprehensive data on climate-induced mobility means creating deeper nuances within census data on migration to distinguish climate-induced mobility from other types of migration, as well as consistent methods across nations for capturing these nuances. In practical terms, this will mean the (i) international standardization of census

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methods for capturing migration patterns and motivations and (ii) greater allocation of resources to statistical agencies to improve census coverage and technical capacity to capture spatial data and migration history. This would allow for more in-depth accounts of an individual or household motivations and movements across place and time, which can then be compared with meteorological data. This will allow analysis on the effects of extreme weather, as well as the effects of slow-onset climate events on migration. Technical Implications of Standardization for Census Methods on Migration A first step toward standardization would be for censuses to include a series of questions to capture migration history for the period between censuses, ascertaining whether migrations are permanent or temporary, forced or voluntary, as well as to record motivations for migration (e.g., livelihoods, marriage, natural disasters). A greater nuance of census data on migration would allow an international consortium of migration researchers and statistical agencies to better understand climate-induced mobility as well as other motivations for mobility. The process of developing and standardizing census questions should be the responsibility of an international consortium. A practical example to illustrate what this process might entail is the Zambian “Draft 2020 Census of Population and Housing Questionnaire”. The census question “How long has (NAME) been living continuously in (NAME OF CURRENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE)” could be followed with an expanded line of questions on previous residence and time spent in that location. If these questions on previous residence are repeated until the census officer reaches the date of the last census, then a complete migration history from the last census periods can be obtained. In addition, a column with a list of motivations for each change in residence would allow a motivation to be assigned to each migration. Lastly, the census question “In the last 30 days did (NAME) do anything to find a paid job or start own business” could be followed with a question about whether the respondent has temporarily migrated for work during the last year and record their most common destination. These additional questions would address the temporal and spatial limitations that have been discussed. However, it should be stressed that these additional questions would also increase the amount of time spent by

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census officers with respondents. That is to say, asking the right questions is not the only challenge that needs to be overcome for better migration data. There is also the issue of the resources allocated to enable more frequent censuses to reduce the volume of data requested, the use of modern data collection tools to speed up data collection (such as the use of georeferenced census data), and the employment of more census officers, in order to make a more detailed census feasible. Financial and Political Implications of Standardization for Census Methods on Migration Ultimately, a greater allocation of resources to statistical agencies in the Global South will be necessary in order to make nuanced censuses, training of personnel, and new technologies more widely available (Leete, 2001; McMorrow, 2016). This becomes an inherently political issue, as research funding, development assistance, and aid mechanisms are tied to the decisions of governments, local authorities, and international bodies. A recent review by the Conference of European Statisticians (CES, 2020) confirmed there are gaps in the knowledge tying together migration and climate change, as well as underfunding of statistical agencies and a lack of a dedicated financial streams to build statistical capacity. As a result, the CES highlighted the poor state of data gathering of climate-related statistics, and the challenge this poses to effectively mapping and addressing the impact of climate change on vulnerable populations. This situation requires that a consistent allocation of resources and a technical exchange be established between statistical agencies worldwide in order to maintain a level of expertise for larger and more complex censuses, and international aid and climate finance should be specifically directed for this purpose. Skill-sharing and secondment programs between statistical agencies would be effective avenue to direct climate aid and finance, and build statistical capacity, especially given that many countries are already funding technical exchange programs focused on climate action, such as the UK PACK (Partnering for Accelerated Climate Transitions). Whereas overcoming political barriers to better migration data requires adopting procedural justice and recognizing the rights of the individual to development regardless of their origin, individuals displaced by climate change often fall “outside organized camps or IDP sites” as they migrate to informal settlements. This makes their movements more difficult to document and limits their ability to receive international aid (Christian

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Aid, 2018, p. 1; IDMC, 2020b). The exact scale of displacement to urban areas is difficult to measure, but one estimate suggests over 60% of refugees and 80% of IDPs live in cities (UNHCR, 2020). While the UN Refugee Agency, since 2009, has clearly affirmed refugee rights in urban areas (Crawford, 2021), questions remain over state approaches to refugees outside of camp settings (d’Orsi 2019; UNHCR, 2009, 2014). As a result, the approaches of city authorities and their decision-making on climate-induced mobility are not data, but politically driven. This situation underscores the necessity to recognize the right to development as a prerequisite for integrating policy on building climate resilience and addressing issues of climate-induced mobility (Bulkeley et al., 2014; Mary Robinson Foundation, 2016). The implication of this argument is that the international community, national governments, and city authorities must be encouraged to recognize a moral obligation to safeguard vulnerable groups, particularly displaced people in urban settings, and reflect this in their policy and resource allocation. Otherwise, the risk is for the continued exclusion of vulnerable individuals from the state apparatus (including official censuses), as well as the underfunding of statistical agencies, which will, in turn, undermine data collection and monitoring of migration of vulnerable groups. This situation constitutes a grave procedural injustice. There have been some significant international efforts in recent years to involve urban authorities as key stakeholders for the protection and assistance of displaced people in urban settings (UNHCR, 2018). However, recognizing and allocating resources to accurately monitor the impact of climate change on the poorest and most vulnerable migrants and displaced persons have continued to be absent from international treaties (Mattar & Mbakwem, 2019), including the Glasgow Climate Pact 2021. This underlines that the best hope for standardization of the census will come from an international consortium of willing nations that will need better data to inform their decisions.

Conclusion The spatial limitations of census data, lengthy periods between censuses, and poor coverage of the censuses in urban areas are significant barriers to effectively monitoring climate-induced mobility, as well as the equitable application of climate policy and aid assistance. This is a procedural injustice that blocks progress on accurately monitoring climate-induced

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mobility, and the harm caused by it. This urgency for better data will continue to intensify as climate change displaces and forces migrations on an unprecedented scale. The challenges identified in this chapter point to the need for a renewed effort to achieve international cooperation in standardizing censuses, as well as stronger political efforts to allocate resources and adopt inclusive policies to enable greater coverage and more nuanced census data on migration. Standardized and adequately resourced censuses could provide nuanced migration data over an extended period, and benefit from a national and international coverage, that would allow robust and valid analysis of climate-induced mobility. Better data would pave the way for the realization of procedural justice through the provision of comprehensive data for informed and equitable decision-making on climate-induced mobility.

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CHAPTER 5

Leveraging Labor Migration and Migrant Remittances in Nepal Santosh Adhikari and Joanna Vince

Introduction Nepal has had a history of overseas migration for more than a century. Nepali workers have since varied their preferences in terms of destination country but have maintained a common reasoning: to escape from traditional and less productive agriculture, which is dominantly rain-fed (Awale, 2019). Climate change and increasing seasonal extremes such as erratic rainfall and drought, flash flooding, forest fires, and the emergence of epidemic diseases and pests have declined agricultural production and pushed households to explore other livelihood alternatives (Bhattacharyya & Werz, 2012). To cope with the issues of climate change and low productivity, Nepali farmers choose to migrate

S. Adhikari (B) · J. Vince School of Social Sciences, College of Arts, Law, and Education, University of Tasmania, Launceston, Australia e-mail: [email protected] J. Vince e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Walker et al. (eds.), Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29529-4_5

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internally and externally for employment and livelihood means. The introduction of the Foreign Employment Act (FEA) in 1985 and then another FEA in 2007 initiated a formal labor migration policy in Nepal (Zwager & Sintov, 2017). The FEA encourages private sectors to recruit aspiring Nepali youths for foreign employment. As a result, the number of overseas migrants has increased by more than three-fold in the last three decades, from less than 750 thousand in 1990 to 2.5 million today (IOM, 2020; MOLESS, 2020). Consequently, the annual inflow of remittances has also increased dramatically in this period, from $55 million to over $8 billion today (World Bank, 2019b). However, Nepal has leveraged only a minimum from foreign employment and remittances. Moreover, limited investment in productive sectors, like agriculture and small industries, has done little to improve Nepal’s resilience to occasional economic and natural crises. As a result, Nepal is still exporting labor at an increasing rate, but has gone through no significant economic changes. This chapter explores the relationship between environmental degradation and Nepal’s household income with overseas migration. Also, this chapter analyzes labor migration issues in Nepal and recommends policy lessons for the sustainable management of migrant workers and migrant remittances.

Relationship with Agriculture, Environmental Migration, and Labor Migration The agricultural sector is the largest employer in Nepal’s domestic economy, providing employment opportunities to more than two-thirds of Nepali households (Adhikari, 2015). However, it is dominated by the rain-fed and traditional farming system which consists of low-yield and subsistence farming (Khatri et al., 2016). Further, global warming and climate change impacts such as glacial retreat, reduced water table, receded snowline, drying natural springs, droughts, floods, landslides, and pest incidences have contributed to reducing farm productivity (Awale, 2019). A sluggish growth of agriculture, i.e., less than 3% annual growth rate, cannot feed the increasing population in Nepal (Adhikari, 2020). As a result, and coupled with population pressures, many households are forced to migrate to escape climate change and its consequences, these individuals are often referred to as “environmental refugees” (Massey

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et al., 2010, p. 110). Farmers are also rarely connected in agribusiness linkages, their contribution is often understated, and agriculture has seen a decline in recent years. Agriculture was the largest contributor to Nepal’s national gross domestic product (GDP) until last decade, when it was surpassed by the service sector and agriculture’s contribution shrunk to a third of the country’s GDP (MOF, 2011, 2019). In 2015, Nepal experienced a 7.8 Richter scale earthquake that took almost 9000 lives, destroyed nearly 900,000 houses and infrastructure, and displaced 2.8 million individuals (NPC, 2015; Shneiderman et al., 2020). Interestingly, the earthquake caused many overseas migrant workers to return home and more than half of them (55%) did not return to their overseas employment (Sijapati et al., 2015). The aftermath of the disaster pushed many houses and schools to repair and reconstruct, increasing labor demand and raising the wage rate. It eventually declined overseas recruitment (see Fig. 5.1) because of the returned migrants’ house construction obligations. The returned migrants mobilized their overseas income and savings, or remittance, to repair/reconstruct and buy their immediate needs (Sijapati et al., 2015), thereby leaving only a limited share of their income in productive investment. In recent decades, the globalization of trade and services has increased access to information and opportunities for overseas employment. When

Fig. 5.1 Trends in the overseas recruitment of Nepali migrant workers (2012– 2021) (Sources DOFE [2022], MOLESS [2020])

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Fig. 5.2 The relationship between labor migration, farm production, and household income

the domestic labor market is limited, and the employment growth rate is just around 3%, many new entrants to the local economy aspire for foreign employment (NPC, 2020). Labor migration is further increased due to a decline in agriculture’s growth as a major employment sector as many households turn away from farming (Tuladhar et al., 2014). Moreover, the recent COVID-19 pandemic raised new concerns for migrant workers with regards to their confidence in the domestic labor market (Joshi et al., 2021). As a result, many farmers have shifted from agriculture to other sectors such as foreign employment, which further exacerbates problems of labor scarcity. This leads workers to fall into a migration trap, which we illustrate in Fig. 5.2.

Benefits of Migration Nepal has benefited from migration on three levels: the macro- or national level, the community or local level, and the micro- or household level. At the macro-level, remittances have been a more reliable source of foreign exchange earnings than other external flows in several developing countries, including Nepal (World Bank, 2016). The volume of remittances to Nepal was 4.5 times larger than the combined contribution of FDI and ODA in 2017 (MOF, 2017; World Bank, 2019b) and more stable

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than either source (MOF, 2019). Moreover, remittances sent by migrant workers have contributed to raising Nepal’s foreign exchange reserve status to counter increasing trade deficits (Sapkota, 2013; World Bank, 2016). At the community level, remittance receiving households have experienced improved purchasing capacity, investment capacity, and consumption behaviors to tackle with climatic and economic issues (IFAD, 2015; Sapkota, 2013) and buffer occasional economic and climate crises (World Bank, 2016). For example, remittance transfers into Nepal increased by more than 14.3% in 2015 compared to a 5.6% increase the previous year (MOF, 2017) in response to economic hardships triggered by the 2015 earthquake. Moreover, migrants have contributed to improvements in the socio-economic status of their households by providing resources for better housing, safer drinking water, better climate resilience, and higher levels of literacy (CBS, 2012). At the household level, per capita remittance inflow has increased dramatically from 2004 when it was Nepali Rupees (NPR) 2100 (around USD28 at the exchange rate of USD1 = NPR74) (Tuladhar et al., 2014) to NPR24,500 (around USD240 at the exchange rate of USD1 = NPR102) in 2017 (CBS, 2014; World Bank, 2019b). Further, the household poverty rate in Nepal decreased from 42% in 1992 to 21.6% in 2016 (CBS, 2011; MOF, 2017), for which remittances were a major contributor along with other factors such as rises in wages, urbanization, and increases in other income sources (MOF, 2017; Pant, 2008). Remittances were crucial in enabling households to afford basic needs such as food, shelter, clothes, health services, and child education (World Bank, 2008). Indicators such as increased primary school enrollment, reduced child mortality, and increased life expectancy are the evidence of the improved socio-economic status of Nepali households (ADB, 2019).

Drawbacks of Migration Along with the benefits of migration, various shortcomings are associated with the increasing remittance inflow into Nepal. Pant (2008) suggests that increasing the inflow of remittances has adverse effects on receiving countries, such as exchange rate volatility, inflation, incompetency in international trade, and appreciation of the real estate sectors. These impacts are often labeled the “Dutch disease” syndrome at a macro-economic level. Dutch Disease describes how the rise of one sector negatively affects

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other sectors. The Economist originally used this terminology in 1977 to describe how the rise of the Groningen natural gas field in 1959 affected the manufacturing industries in the Netherlands (The Economist, 1977). The drawbacks of remittances are discussed in the following sub-sections. Discouraged Growth of the Local Economy Even though increasing remittance inflows improved the purchasing power and investment capacity of the average migrant household (IFAD, 2015; MOF, 2017), only a negligible portion of remittances is mobilized in productive investments. Government studies show that the expenditure rate of Nepali households increased by 12.5% between the 2001 and 2011 population censuses (Sapkota, 2013), and most of the remittance income (i.e., 79%) was spent on consumption and family maintenance (CBS, 2011). These results conclude that migrant households have a negligible portion of remittance (2%) allocated to savings and investments. Moreover, investments are not directed toward productive sectors like manufacturing and production, but instead toward real estate and rental markets (ADB, 2019; Sapkota, 2013). The 2015 earthquake also forced many remittance receiving households to spend more than 20% of their overseas income on housing reconstruction and repairs (Manandhar, 2016). An Asian Development Bank (ADB) study reports that the increasing inflow of remittances in Nepal inhibits industrial growth due to elevated levels of consumptive spending on imported goods and food (ADB, 2019). As a result, Nepal witnessed an increasing trade deficit in foods by more than 16 folds in a decade. In 2007/08, Nepal’s trade deficit in food products was NPR11 billion and it soared to NPR173 billion in 2018/19 (MOF, 2019). Incentives to reform remittance legislation and policies are currently low because those who are well-off gain from asset price rises and capital gains. A 2011 World Bank study claims this situation constitutes a policy failure due to the high accumulation of remittances in Nepal, and that it contributes to a vicious cycle of high remittance (World Bank, 2011). Nepal’s objective to promote trade diversification and increase its export sector through accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2004 failed and intensified dependency on India for trade (Adhikari, 2020). A low level of investment in productive activities cannot support the creation of employment opportunities at the local level. Consequently,

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minimal growth in the employment sector has forced many unemployed youths to migrate abroad (NPC, 2013), thereby causing labor scarcity problems for plantation, harvesting, and inter-cultural activities. Moreover, the labor scarcity has forced farmers to either import labor from India or leave their lands uncultivated (Zwager & Sintov, 2017). Workplace Casualties and Exploitations As the number of overseas recruitments increases every year, workplace injuries and fatalities also increase. An International Labor Organization (ILO) study reported over 340 million workplace accidents and diseases that killed more than 2.3 million workers annually (ILO, 2021). However, a lengthy bureaucratic process and variable benefits for their injuries have discouraged migrant workers and their families from claiming death and disability benefits. This has resulted in an underreporting of cases, which coupled with a lack of field studies has hindered the obtention of an accurate figure for workplace casualties (Global Burden of Disease Collaborative Network, 2018; Pant et al., 2021; PSA, 2018). Based on the claims for benefits which have been submitted, every day 3–5 people die overseas, which is equivalent to one in every 700–800 recruitments from Nepal (MOLESS, 2020). Unfortunately, workplace casualties have increased every year, from 54 cases in 2012 to 335 in 2019 (MOLESS, 2020). Studies also show that workplaces for Nepali migrant workers are unsafe. The risk of dying overseas is more than double that of the domestic workplace, with 56.3 casualties for every 100,000 recruitments in the domestic market compared to 134.1 in overseas workplaces (Global Burden of Disease Collaborative Network, 2018; Pant et al., 2021). The GCC member states and Malaysia are the most common destinations of Nepali migrant workers. However, these countries do not have an encouraging wage rate when compared to other developed countries like the United States of America (USA) and Australia (Table 5.1). More than 75% of Nepali workers are unskilled (MOLE, 2017), a fact which leads to lower wages and exploitation (ILO, 2021).

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Table 5.1 Minimum wage rate for migrants in selected countries

Australia USA Nepal

India

Minimum wage rate (US$)

Full time working hours

Minimum monthly income (US$)

$14/hour (or AU$19.81/hour) US$7.25/hour $0.88/hour (or NPR15,000/month) $1.10/hour (or INR675 per day)

37.5 hours/week

$2340

30+ hours/week 35–40 hours/week

$2750 $140

48 hours/week

$240

Oman Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Malaysia

$1.11/hour (or MYR1000/month)

42 48 42 48 42 48 42 48 48

hours/week hours/week hours/week hours/week hours/week hours/week hours/week hours/week hours/week

(public) or (private) (public) or (private) (public) or (private) (public) or (private)

$845 $798 $247 $206 $245

Sources ILO (2017), Rajan et al. (2015), Tajuddin (2021)

Uncertainty of Foreign Employment Foreign employment has long served to sink the increasing number of surplus labor in the domestic market and supported most Nepali households and the country’s economy. However, occasional economic crises have risked Nepal’s labor market for foreign employment. For example, after the recent COVID-19 crisis in the world labor market, many Nepali migrant workers lost their jobs and consequently reduced their remittances significantly in terms of amount and share to GDP. In 2015, the share of personal remittance was equivalent to 28%, this reduced to 24% in 2020 (World Bank, 2019a, 2019b). India dominated as a labor migration destination for quite some time. It accounted for more than 93% of migrant destinations in 1981, this figure shrinks to just 38% in the latest census from 2011 (CBS, 2012; Kansakar, 2003). Various other countries, especially the GCC member states and Malaysia, emerge as new destinations for Nepali workers. However, since the Government keeps records based on labor permits,

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migration to India is excluded in data maintained by the Department of Foreign Employment (DOFE). There are 110 countries listed for foreign employment for institutional recruitment, while 167 (including 110 institutional recruitment countries) countries are approved for foreign employment if migrants choose to go on their own personal initiatives (DOFE, 2016; MOF, 2017). However, Nepali labor migrants are concentrated in Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (DOFE, 2022; MOLESS, 2020). These four countries shared more than 90% of the total labor permits issued by the DOFE (MOLESS, 2020). This means that migrants are at risk due to the limited diversity of the labor market. Unfortunately, these four countries are notorious for workers’ welfare and protection. For example, one Nepali migrant worker dies every day in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia and every other day in Qatar (Acharya, 2022; Amnesty International, 2019; DOFE, 2022; Sedhai, 2017). Further, in recent years, these destination countries have reformed their immigration policies to be more restrictive to foreign workers and encourage nationals to take up local employment (Sadi, 2015). The “nationalization” policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states, especially Saudi Arabia, have begun to cause the deportation of migrants, this, at a rate of more than 50,000 per year. These policies have also decreased new labor recruitment, thereby negatively impacting remittance outflows (Hertog, 2014; Ratha et al., 2017; Sadi, 2015). In addition, conflict among the member states in GCC has resulted in a loss of confidence in migrants regarding the employment security of this region (Rai, 2017). Nepal has not yet made a bilateral agreement for labor supply with many migration destinations, including major host countries such as Malaysia and Saudi Arabia (MOLE, 2017; Sijapati et al., 2015). The migration trends to these countries are therefore inconsistent (see Fig. 5.3). Moreover, other labor-sending countries such as India (MEA, 2019) and Bangladesh have already negotiated agreements with the GCC member states (Holland, 2016), thereby increasing uncertainty for many Nepali migrant workers. Poor safety, menial wages, and the uncertainty of job security in major host countries for Nepali migrant workers have pushed many skilled workers with high aspirations to migrate beyond the traditional destinations. Australia and the USA have attracted a considerable number of migrants. These migrants travel initially as students and explore avenues to stay as permanent residents (MOEST, 2020).

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Fig. 5.3 Trends in labor permits to major destination countries (2008/09– 2018/19) (Source DOFE [2022])

Policies and Programs in Migrant Remittance Management Nepal has few remittances management programs, and these are usually embedded in other programs rather than being focused program. Below is a list of major programs that the government initiated to manage remittances. a. Remittance-transfer facilities: Following the Nepal Rastra Bank Remittance Bylaw in 2011, several commercial banks and remitters acquired a license to transfer remittances. Similarly, the manpower agencies who recruit labor for work abroad can also undertake remittance-transfer activities with their foreign currency account in commercial banks (Pant, 2011). Migrants from GCC member states and Malaysia prefer to transfer their remittances through formal channels (banks and money transfer agencies). The Saudi Arabia-Nepal remittance corridor was the least expensive corridor for sending remittances in 2015 at just 0.6% compared to the 8% global average (World Bank, 2016). However, bringing earnings in person is a popular practice for migrants, especially from India (CBS, 2011). Transferring through an informal channel such as South Korea (Shah, 2018) has obscured the real picture of earning abroad or the size of the remittances. The rise in the inflow of remittances has encouraged banks and financial institutions to expand their services even in remote areas

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(ILO, 2017). Moreover, increased access to banking services has created opportunities for rural people in both migrant and nonmigrant households to deposit their income and borrow to invest in their enterprises. As a result, the deposits in the banks of rural areas rose from NPR700 million in 2004 to NPR24.1 billion in 2016 (MOF, 2018). Similarly, the loan amount has increased from NPR2.82 billion in 2004 to NPR77.23 billion in 2016 (MOF, 2018). b. Foreign Employment Bond: The Government of Nepal (GON) has issued Foreign Employment Bonds since 2010 to incite migrant workers and their households from select host countries to invest the earnings they acquire abroad in developmental activities at home (ILO, 2016; Sapkota, 2013; The Kathmandu Post, 2014). Despite their limited success, the government has continued to issue bonds. However, the government raised only 0.6 and 0.5% of the targeted amounts in 2010 and 2011, respectively (Sapkota, 2013), and the collected amount reached around NPR215 million in 2015 (NRB, 2015). Poor publicity, short time for buying bonds after notice, lack of trust of the government bodies (ILO, 2016) along with lower interest rates offered by bonds than other financial institutes (Sapkota, 2013) were issues that hindered the raising of targeted bonds to financial development endeavors. c. Foreign Employment Welfare Fund (FEWF): In accordance with article 32 of the 2007 FEA, the government of Nepal established a Foreign Employment Welfare Fund under the Foreign Employment Board (FEB) for the social security and welfare of individuals employed abroad, returned migrants, and their family members (GON, 2007). Nepali migrant workers leaving for foreign employment contribute NPR1500 (about USD14) for a three-year labor permit or NPR2500 (about USD25) for longer permits as members of the FEWF (MOLE, 2015). The FEWF is active in several welfare activities for migrants, including pre-departure orientation, repatriation, employment orientation for returned migrants, promotion of foreign employment, bringing back the dead bodies of the deceased migrants, and providing financial assistance to the family members of migrants (GON, 2007; ILO, 2016; MOLE, 2015). In addition, the FEWF paid nominated beneficiaries of migrant workers who died or were injured during foreign employment and provided scholarships for the children of these migrants (MOLE, 2015). However, issues

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of fund misuse by those concerned with its management (Sedhai, 2014) have undermined confidence in the fund. d. Climate change adaptation: The Nepalese government has initiated projects and policies to make livelihoods more resilient to climatic and natural disasters. The National Adaptation Program and Action (NAPA) and Local Adaption Plans of Actions (LAPA) along with the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) have informed vulnerable people and stakeholders on the potential risks associated with climate change. However, the annual death rate due to disasters remains uncontrolled; it has in fact increased from 460 in 2013 to 968 in 2017 and 2018 together (MOHA, 2019) which has consequently displaced many households. Moreover, remittances are not invested in fostering climate-resilient agriculture and livelihoods. e. Others: In 2015, the government of Nepal also announced the “remit hydro” scheme to pool migrant remittances (HIDCL, 2021; MOF, 2015, p. 30). In this scheme, the government owned Jalbidyut Lagani tatha Bikas Company Limited (HIDCL) would invest 51% of the cost to the project while the migrants could invest up to 24% in the project for hydroelectricity generation in Nepal. This scheme has yet to attract substantial investment from migrants but still displays potential (Dhakal & Maharjan, 2018). In the same year, the government announced the “Free visa, free ticket” scheme for overseas recruitment in GCC countries and Malaysia to relieve the financial burden of the new emigrants (ILO, 2016, p. 13; Mandal, 2019). Under the scheme, recruiting agencies bear the costs of tickets and visas for the migrants while the migrants pay no more than NPR20,000 as processing fees (Migrant-Rights, 2016). However, thousands of migrants are still paying substantial fees for foreign employment due to a low level of government commitment to implementing the scheme (Mandal, 2017, 2019) and recruitment agencies’ hostility (Migrant-Rights, 2016). We have explored some of the issues that Nepal faces in remittance management amid an increasing population and deteriorating environment. Problems with relevant programs and policies are apparent and numerous including non-compliance (NHRC, 2018), the poor welfare and protection of migrants (Karki, 2018; NHRC, 2018), low investments in productive sectors (CBS, 2011; ILO, 2016; Pant, 2008), poor coordination among key stakeholders (IOM, 2018; Karki, 2018),

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limited investments in climate resilience (Awale, 2019) and an inadequate regulation of stakeholders in program and policy implementations (NHRC, 2018). In addition, irregular migration, ambiguity in defining foreign employment, and the informal channel to transfer remittances have hindered the estimation of the actual size of the remittance economy (Jha, 2018; World Bank, 2016). Moreover, there are no separate policies and acts to manage remittances, rather, blanket policies and acts cover multiple issues of migration, including remittances.

Ways Forward Nepal has received remittances in an increasing sum over the last 25 years but has yet to leverage these to boost its local economy. Nevertheless, remittances in Nepal have an enormous potential to drive the national economy. Similar experiences in some sending countries would help design effective policies and programs in Nepal. Following are the key areas where Nepal can improve its existing practices based on the experiences of other countries. a. Recognition: Though migrant workers and their remittances significantly influence the national economy, their contributions are not appropriately recognized by the government. Nepali migrant workers display anger and anxiety toward a government that shows little concern for their welfare despite the enormous benefits they bring (Karki, 2018). In the Philippines, the Filipino government praises the contribution of its overseas workers every year, coining these as “national heroes or heroines”. This motivates migrants and diasporas to support the local Filipino economy (Carlos, 2002). Similar recognition efforts may incite Nepali migrant workers to similarly contribute to their home country’s economy. b. Institutional arrangements: Almost half of the total working-age population migrate for foreign employment, and many of them originate from rural areas. However, Nepal has poor institutional arrangements, mostly city-centric. The existing institutions also have insufficient staff and budget to work for an increasing number of migrant workers. DOFE and FEB are established in the capital cities. The rural population benefitted from the 53 employment service centers and migrant resources centers, but these agencies

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are operated by non-government agencies, and government agencies regulate their activities. There are also limited overseas offices to assist migrant workers. Nepal has established 30 embassies overseas and only eight of them have a labor attaché. The functions, duties, and powers of the labor attaché are defined by the Foreign Employment Act 2007, mainly involved in informing and supporting migrant workers while abroad. In contrast, migrant workers from the Philippines and India are more privileged due to stronger institutional structures at home and abroad. India has diplomatic missions in almost all countries, and some states like Kerala have well-rooted institutions to provide services to migrant workers and their families. Similarly, the Philippines have appointed more than 35 labor attachés based on the number of workers. In addition, the Philippines mobilize separate agencies to support migration management. For example, the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration is responsible for overseas recruitment. In addition, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration works for workers’ overall welfare, and National Reintegration Centre for OFWs is active in providing reintegration supports to overseas Filipino workers. c. Reintegration and investment opportunities: Nepali migrant workers have limited investment opportunities in the domestic economy. As a result, they tend to spend their overseas income on luxuries. In contrast, when invested or saved, remittances can contribute to financing for future consumption and development (Fig. 5.4; Carling, 2004). Moreover, encouraging the investment of remittances in the climate and disaster responsive local development would be more beneficial than seeking foreign aid because investing their hard-earned currency makes people more concerned about their investments. The policies and programs to mobilize diaspora remittances, along with the reintegration of returned migrants, could maximize the developmental endeavors of the local economy. Studies show that migrant remittances are not rationally mobilized into productive sectors (CBS, 2011; Pant, 2016). However, when migrant workers and their families are encouraged to invest their overseas income in their individual or group enterprises, it will support the local economy and create employment opportunities at home.

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Fig. 5.4 Remittance for future investment and reintegration (Sources Adapted from Carling [2004], Pant [2011])

In addition, adopting public-private partnerships in various developmental endeavors would result in better and more sustainable outcomes (MOF, 2019). In Nepal, a public-private partnership is considered one of the best developmental endeavors. There are already a few countries that have successfully managed migrant remittances to boost their local economy, and Nepal can learn from their experiences. For example, through the Employment Permit System (EPS), the Korean recruitment model encourages migrant workers to reintegrate foreign employees into the country (Cho et al., 2018). In addition, EPS provides incentives to the returning workers and the necessary training as part of the Happy Return Program, which was reflected in a study mentioning the largest portion (42.5%) of returned workers wanting to run their own businesses. d. Regulating recruitment and diversifying destinations: After the Foreign Employment Act of 2007 encouraged private sectors to recruit for overseas employment, the number of migrant workers surged significantly, until a slight decline in recent years. These private recruitment agencies (PRA) have ample information on

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foreign employment, and nine out of ten migrant workers are recruited through these PRAs (MOLESS, 2020). However, PRAs are profit-oriented agencies that are recruiting workers in selected countries, and for selective skills, they do not bother exploring other destinations for additional recruitment. As a result, PRAs heavily recruit for unskilled jobs, mainly in the GCC member states and Malaysia. Moreover, PRAs are poorly regulated by governments, as such, they perpetuate many wrong doings (Karki, 2017). e. Technology-assisted remittance transfer: Technology has advanced so much in recent times that it has assisted in remitting money. The World Bank Data portal has listed several money sending options for overseas remittances, and Internet-based service providers such as DirectRemit, Remitly, InstaRem, Ria, Remit2India remitted with no or low service charge (World Bank, 2019a). Most of these remittances transfer money within a few hours to overnight and give a better exchange rate than the bank transfer, which charges costs and takes time to process (Singh, 2009; World Bank, 2019a).

Conclusion Migration is a natural phenomenon, and people always tend to migrate from their usual residence for various reasons, including employment opportunities, better wages, higher education, climate hazards, wars, and political conflicts. Migration for employment has been a prominent feature in Nepal for the last three decades and the involvement of PRAs has fostered increasing overseas recruitment. However, despite increasing overseas recruitment and an increasing inflow of remittances, the socioeconomic status of the Nepali economy has not improved significantly. Instead, major economic sectors like agriculture and small and micro enterprise industries have witnessed stagnant growth due to labor scarcity in peak seasons. This situation is further exacerbated by the impacts of climate change on agriculture practices and the livelihoods of the people. As a result, these sectors created limited employment opportunities for many new entrants in the labor market. Limited employment opportunities in the home country have left no option for most of the working population other than migration.

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However, foreign employment has released the pressure on the government to some extent by employing almost half a million people annually. Because of increasing unemployment and uncertainty of foreign employment in major host countries, Nepal should consider reintegrating returned migrants and mobilizing their remittances in future developments.

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The Kathmandu Post. (2014, April 13). Foreign employment bond issue falls flat. The Kathmandu Post. Retrieved from https://kathmandupost.ekantipur. com/news/2014-04-13/foreign-employment-bond-issue-falls-flat.html Tuladhar, R., Sapkota, C., & Adhikari, N. (2014). Effects of migration and remittance income on Nepal’s agriculture yield (ADB South Asia Working Paper Series No. 27). Retrieved from Asian Development Bank (ADB) https:// www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/42886/south-asia-wp-027.pdf World Bank. (2008). Beyond aid: New sources and innovative mechanisms for financing development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank. World Bank. (2011). Large-scale migration and remittance in Nepal: Issues, challenges and opportunities (55390-NP). Retrieved from The World Bank. World Bank. (2016). Migration and remittances factbook 2016. The World Bank. World Bank. (2019a). An analysis of trends in cost of remittance services: Remittance prices worldwide. Retrieved from The World Bank https://remittanc eprices.worldbank.org/en World Bank. (2019b). Annual remittances data (updated as of April 2019b). Migration and remittances data. Retrieved from https://www.knomad.org/ sites/default/files/2019-04/Remittance%20Inflows%20Apr%202019.xlsx Zwager, N. D., & Sintov, R. (2017). Maximizing the development impact of migration in Nepal: Comprehensive market study. Retrieved from International Organization for Migration (IOM) https://www.think-asia.org/bitstr eam/handle/11540/9692/Report-IOM.pdf?sequence=1

CHAPTER 6

The Impact of Sea-Level Rise on Existing Patterns of Migration Roland Smith, Robert J. Nicholls, Mark G. L. Tebboth, and Avidan Kent

Introduction Rising sea levels pose an escalating threat to human societies across the globe, and for the populations, settlements, and cultural heritage of low-lying coastal zones and island nations this is potentially existential. Such was the stark message of the sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which highlighted that even if global warming were to be limited to between 2 °C to 2.5 °C “…coastlines will continue to reshape over millennia, affecting at least 25 megacities and drowning low-lying areas ” (Cooley et al., 2022, pp. 3–127). Against a net flow of migration toward coastlines and lowlying coastal areas, particularly in Asian deltas (Safra de Campos et al.,

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2020), projections suggest that the number of people living in lowelevation coastal zones1 is likely to swell to more than one billion by 2050 (Oppenheimer et al., 2019). Sea-level rise threatens to expose these ever-growing populations to increasing environmental stressors and shocks, including loss of land through permanent inundation (Nicholls et al., 2011). Migration will be a crucial adaptive response for these populations and given the large numbers of people potentially at risk, this could mean a radical reshaping of existing patterns of population mobility. For governments and agencies tasked with supporting and protecting exposed populations, the scale of the challenge is exacerbated by the uncertainty around how the impacts of sea-level rise will affect future flow of migration and wider demographic change. The main obstacle in assessing the impacts on populations and their mobility is the lack of historical analogue for the scale and scope of threat posed by sea-level rise. Much of our insight into the potential impact of sea-level rise on migration is drawn from empirical studies that analyze population responses to past environmental shocks and stressors, which are assumed to be analogous to the future impacts of climate change and variability (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Lincke & Hinkel, 2021). There is, however, a question as to the limitations of inferring future population mobility responses from past events given that the hazards triggered by sea-level rise are yet to be experienced by significant numbers of population and their impacts are likely to exceed those experienced historically. Most notably, the effect of complex and cumulative environmental phenomena associated with sea-level rise may be to trigger migration “thresholds”, leading to sudden shifts in the patterns of population mobility that have not been observed previously (Duijndam et al., 2021). At the same time, there has been an increased use of model approaches to provide forecasts of the human impact of sea-level rise, and how this could shape future patterns of migration. These models derive and extrapolate projections of sea-level rise under differing scenarios, and thereby forecast the impact these will have on exposed populations (Conway et al., 2019; Kniveton et al., 2011). Commonly, these utilize demographic data

1 Low-elevation coastal zones are defined as those below 10 m elevation (Oppenheimer et al., 2019).

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to estimate populations who are at risk and thereby produce an estimate of population mobility (Hauer et al., 2021). The results of such studies have provided a wide range of indicators for at risk populations—from exposed coastal populations of 411 million by 2060 (Neumann et al., 2015) to as relatively few as 17–72 million coastal migrants (Lincke & Hinkel, 2021)—as each draws on differing datasets, definitions of populations at risk and timescales (Hauer et al., 2020). Perhaps more fundamentally, these modeling techniques rely on reducing the relationships between the impacts of sea-level rise and resulting population mobility to simple causal chains that do not reflect the dynamic interrelation of drivers of migration, nor the range of adaptive responses that can be undertaken by individuals, households, communities, agencies, and governments in response to the threats associated with sea-level rise. Thus, each makes differing assumptions around human behavior in response to the increasing threat. For policymakers, these models provide a generalized indication of future risks but their utility for defined specific policy responses at a local level is limited (Conway et al., 2019). The limitations of existing approaches suggest that new methodologies are required to synthesize the differing approaches and to further our understanding of the impact of sea-level rise on patterns of migration. This chapter aims to identify new relevant research directions through addressing and exploring some of the assumptions on which previous approaches have been founded. In doing so, this chapter draws on previous studies that focus on two regions that are widely to considered to be most vulnerable to the impacts of sea-level rise—small island developing states (SIDS) and the Asian deltas. SIDS are understood to be uniquely vulnerable to sea-level rise due to the combination of their geophysical characteristics, remote location, and demography (Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019). The physical variance of SIDS means that each will experience the effects of sea-level rise at varying levels of severity. All these nations, however, share high levels of exposure to climate and environmentally-related hazards combined with limited adaptive capacity. Therefore, it is likely that climate change will pose an existential risk to at least some of the states and societies that comprise the Pacific SIDS. Across the Asian delta regions, the combination of the geophysical— densely populated, low-lying coastal plains—with the socio-economic conditions, means that their populations are particularly vulnerable to the

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impact of sea-level rise. At the same time, migration flows have resulted in a net population growth in Delta regions over the last 50 years, with many drawn to the ever-expanding Asian coastal cities and megacities (Safra de Campos et al., 2020). As a result, deltas provide a home for around 7% of the global population, while only accounting for 1% of global land area, which means that even the most modest impacts of sea-level rise could have significant repercussions for millions of people (Szabo et al., 2016).

Exposure and Vulnerability The fundamental consideration in modeling the influence of sea-level rise on migration is to identify future populations at risk from sea-level rise and its associated impacts. A common approach is to define the “spatial zone”—the inland area that is at risk relative to a specific coastline—and utilize demographic data and projections to estimate exposed populations in the future2 (Hauer et al., 2020). The definitions used most frequently to define populations “at risk” are (i) low-elevation coastal zones (LECZ) (ii) 100-year flood plains, or (iii) those who would experience inundation under pre-determined scenarios of sea-level rise (Hauer et al., 2021, p. 29). The divergence in estimations of numbers of people potentially affected by sea-level rise is therefore partly related to which definition of population at risk forms the foundation of the model. What such definitions do not necessarily capture is that the numbers of people who are exposed to sea-level rise are not the same as those who are vulnerable to its impacts. Whereas the exposure of a population is determined by its relationship—usually proximity—to the severity and frequency of an external stressor or shock, vulnerability considers this exposure in the context of the population’s sensitivity to that stressor or shock, and its capacity to adapt to or cope with its impacts (McLeman & Smit, 2006). Therefore, although millions of people currently live below mean high tide in densely populated delta cities such as Tokyo and Shanghai, they can do so in relative safety as coastal adaption measures reduce their vulnerability to environmental shocks and stressors (Lincke & Hinkel, 2021). 2 As Hauer et al. (2021) highlight, the definition of the “spatial zone” will often depend on a temporal component, as in their example of the 100-year flood plain which although spatial in nature is derived from the temporal concept of the probability of flooding being 1% in any given year (Hauer et al., 2021, p. 2).

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The question as to whether a given population will be able to adapt in situ to the impact of sea-level rise will in part depend on their capacity, particularly financial, to implement measures that will meet the scale of the threat—and whether this will be preferable to retreat, relocation, abandonment, or advance. Lincke and Hinkel (2021) attempt to account for this by basing their model on local cost benefit analysis (CBA) of coastline segments to identify the proportion of coastlines where adaptive coastal protection would be, from the CBA perspective, preferred over retreat. Although under their different projection scenarios this would mean protection for around only 3% of global coastline, the impact on displaced populations would be significant, resulting in projections of 17– 72 million vulnerable people migrating in response to sea-level rise, as opposed to the hundreds of millions suggested by other studies where protection is not considered.

Pre-Inundation Impacts of Sea-Level Rise A common assumption—or at least, simplification—across many modeling approaches is that the impact of sea-level rise on migration will be driven by frequent, persistent, or permanent inundation. For example, if projections of sea-level rise suggest a land area will lie below the 1in-1 year flood return level—and therefore experience inundation at least annually—the assumption is that the resulting impact on buildings and infrastructure will render this land uninhabitable and those populations currently living there will be displaced (Nicholls et al., 2011). There are, however, instances where highly exposed and vulnerable communities can adapt in situ to severe and repeated inundation. Jamero et al. (2017) detail the experiences of the populations of four small Philippine islands that suffered land subsidence of around one meter following the 2013 Bohol Earthquake, which led to these islands experiencing inundation with each high tide. Although the local municipal government has attempted to engage the community in a government-funded relocation plan, these plans have been rejected by islanders, primarily due to their concerns around potential loss of livelihoods. Instead, the islanders have implemented local adaptation strategies so that they can remain in place, including “hard measures” (permanent fixtures), such as stilted houses and raised floors, and “soft measures” (actions undertaken in times of flood) including elevating belongings and evacuation to designated zones within the islands. Examples such as this

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offer a challenge to the assumption that even land falling below a 1in-1 year flood return level will trigger population displacement in all communities. Perhaps more crucially, exposed populations will begin to experience environmental degradation due to sea-level rise well in advance of inundation through increased storm surge, coastal erosion, and saltwater intrusion into agricultural soils and freshwater (Hauer et al., 2020). By focusing on the impact of inundation alone, these projections are likely to provide a conservative estimate of the impact on migration, both in terms of numbers and in terms of timescale (Davis et al., 2018). Thus, understanding the relationship between sea-level rise on mobility, particularly at a specific local level, demands consideration of these pre-inundation impacts.

Extreme Sea-Level Events Even modest sea-level rise could have a significant impact on both intensity and frequency of extreme sea-level events that result from the cumulative impacts of storm surges and tides (Oppenheimer et al., 2019). Storm surges are temporary rises in sea level, generated by tropical and extra-tropical storms, which can result in flooding of low-lying coastal areas especially when accompanied by strong onshore waves and high winds. The potential for greater damage when surges occur on top of high tides, with the impact being most severe when occurrence coincides with spring tides (Nicholls, 2006). The increased threat is exemplified in atoll islands, where ordinarily coral reefs offer a degree of natural protection against storm surge. The consequence of sea-level rise is increased water level over the reef flat and reduced wave breaking at the reef crest, allowing larger waves to reach the shoreline, and thereby increasing wave-induced overwash and flooding. Therefore, while studies that focus on modeling “passive” inundation due to sea-level rise suggest that many atoll islands will remain habitable until 2100 and beyond, the non-linear interaction between sea-level rise and wave-driven extreme sea-level events indicates that most will be susceptible to large-scale inundation events annually, and will thereby rendered uninhabitable, within decades (Storlazzi et al., 2018).

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Erosion The intensification of storm surge experienced by SIDS is exacerbating increased rates of coastal erosion and shoreline recession that are already affecting wider coastal communities (Martin et al., 2018). This is highlighted in a study of the Solomon Islands undertaken by Albert et al. (2016), who identified that eleven islands have experienced severe erosion or disappeared over recent decades. This included severe coastal recession on the eastern shoreline of Nuatambu village that occurred between 2011 and 2014 resulting in ten houses being lost to the sea. In Bangladesh, this impact is felt further inland as rising sea levels lead to increases in the river tide and storm surges. These river systems are highly dynamic and complex, but these impacts of sea-level rise can be associated with increased riverbank erosion. Bernzen et al. (2019) highlight that the loss of arable land due to riverbank erosion is a driver of migration, with those experiencing arable land loss 2.5 times more likely to migrate. As well as the loss of land and protection from flood events, the erosion leads to siltation in the riverbeds which causes further rises in water level, increasing the exposure of settlements to future flooding and storm surge (Roy et al., 2022).

Flooding Of particular note in terms of understanding the effect on migration of pre-inundation impacts of sea-level rise is that many studies conclude that increased flooding is not associated with increased levels of long-term migration. Although populations may be forced to evacuate their lands in anticipation or response to flooding, this displacement is characterized as being “short term, short distance” with populations returning to their homes once the threat has passed. Hajra et al. (2017), in their study of the Indian Sundarban Delta (ISD), propose that this may be because inundation events often last less than a day and are therefore limited in impact. Bernzen et al. (2019) also suggest that freshwater flooding can have the effect of boosting local crop yields, which stimulates local employment and discourages migration. Studies focusing on Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Pakistan find that more severe floods in terms of deaths, destroyed houses, or exposed households are also associated with a decrease in long-term migration. In these cases, it is possible that severity of the flood leads to the depletion

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of household assets, which in turn reduces the capacity to fund migration. Consequently, these populations are “trapped” by their lack of financial resources (Duijndam et al., 2021).

Salinization A potential impact of flooding that is associated with increasing rates of migration, however, is where seawater inundation leads to the salinization of land and freshwater sources. As well as driving coastal flooding events, sea-level rise can stimulate saltwater intrusion into freshwater aquifers from below, thereby reducing the availability of freshwater (Iese et al., 2020). Salinization also significantly decreases soil quality leading to reduced vegetation growth and crop yield (Bernzen et al., 2019). This is particularly damaging to low-lying islands and atolls where crop agriculture is located close to the coast and with most of the crops grown on these islands having a relatively low tolerance to salinity (Iese et al., 2020). Consequently, the lack of fresh water, and salinization of soil is likely to render these locations uninhabitable well in advance of the timescales associated with long-term inundation (Hauer et al., 2020). Salinization is equally problematic in delta regions, where levels of salinity intrusion are dependent on river discharges, land water storage capacity following flood seasons and water usage, as well as coastal sea levels (Tran et al., 2021). In Bangladesh, a study undertaken by Ahsan et al. (2022) across rural villages in the southwest reports that around 73% of respondents had experienced problems due to salinity intrusion, and that this had affected their livelihoods. Consequently, Chen and Mueller (2018) found that in Bangladesh a rise in salinity led to increased migration because of the significant impact that it had on agricultural income. These results were reflected in those of Tran et al. (2021) whose study of the Soc Trang province in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta found that 35% of households had family members who had migrated to local cities in response to saltwater intrusion.

Pre-Existing Drivers of Migration and Patterns of Population Mobility The consideration of pre-inundation impacts of sea-level rise highlights that the relationship with population mobility is not direct or linear. The influence of climate change and variability on migration is a

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complex, multi-causal phenomenon. Environmental and climatic impacts are moderated by the interwoven pre-existing political, economic, demographic, social, and environmental drivers of mobility. These themselves are muted or amplified by the specific livelihoods and circumstances of the affected populations (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Foresight, 2011). Correspondingly, it is not any specific impact of sea-level rise that triggers a shift in migration. Rather, it is how these cumulative and complex phenomena exacerbate pre-existing drivers of migration—for example, through diminishing livelihoods and thereby increasing the economic incentive to migrate. A study undertaken by Adger et al. (2021) across four deltaic regions— Ganges–Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) Delta, Bangladesh and India; Mahanadi Delta, India; Volta Delta, Ghana—found that the primary reason for migration given by 60% households was seeking employment and economic opportunities, with education cited as the second reason. This was also reflected in migration intention, with 78% of the 2,183 households surveyed reporting an intention to migrate citing economic reasons as the main driver, as opposed to 1.3% suggesting environmental concerns (Adger et al., 2021, p. 148). These results are echoed across the literature, indicating that although populations across deltas are experiencing accelerating environmental degradation, and increasing instances of climatic rapid-onset events, they consider economic and livelihood factors to have the greatest influence over mobility decision-making. Equally, a focus on a direct or causal relationship between the impacts of sea-level rise and migration can obscure that influence of social and political influences on patterns of mobility. Across the Bangladesh delta there has been a shift in rural livelihood away from agriculture to aquaculture since the 1980s—specifically toward shrimp farming. To facilitate this transition, landowners and shrimp farmers would often open sluice gates to force the overtopping of rivers or create gaps in embankments, to enable ingress of saltwater. Inevitably, this led to accelerated salinization of surrounding lands and the degradation of agricultural soils (Roy et al., 2022). This process of salinization was aggravated by increased drawing of freshwater for use domestically, in industry and for irrigation. At the same time, the construction of the Farakka Barrage in India, and the resulting diversion of the Ganges, reduced the flow of freshwater into southwest Bangladesh (Bernzen et al., 2019). The environmental impact and degradation of salinization was therefore intensified by human intervention at local, national, and international levels. Thus, any resultant shift

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in population mobility is arguably as much due to social and political interventions as the direct impact of sea-level rise. For any given population perhaps, the most critical non-environmental influences on the relationship between sea-level rise and migration are the pre-existing patterns of mobility. Conceptual and empirical models often implicitly characterize migration as a discrete and singular atypical action that is undertaken in response to a specific external stressor or shock. For those populations that are most vulnerable to sea-level rise, mobility is already an established strategy for pursuing economic opportunities, as well as for coping with socio-economic and environmental shocks and stressors. Migration, therefore, forms an essential part of social and cultural traditions (Foresight, 2011; Martin et al., 2014). For example, mobility has historically been a vital part of life across Pacific SIDS. As early as, the eighteenth-century islanders were employed as seafarers on European and American vessels (Shen & Binns, 2012). This reliance on mobility continues into the present day, for example in Kiribati, where 6.5% of the population lives overseas, and roughly 14% of the adult workforces are engaged as merchant seafarers (Murphy, 2015). Equally, the conception of populations as either “static” or “migrating” does not reflect the dimensions that “migration” can take. Population mobility can be permanent or temporary, and it can represent a relocation of an entire household or “fragmentary” migration, where households deploy a proportion of their labor—a member of the household with a high earning potential—to other labor markets (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010). In rural Bangladesh, whereas the incomes of previous generations relied predominantly on farming, supplemented by fishing or foraging, younger people are now more likely to be engaged in disparate livelihoods, such as aquaculture or running vegetable stalls, as well as pursuing work in local towns, either as commuters or seasonal migrants (Martin et al., 2014). Consequently, Bangladeshi families are structured around dynamic livelihoods, including international migration. This is demonstrated by the results of a survey undertaken by Siddiqui et al. (2018) across the Bangladeshi GBM Delta, where 30% of households included at least one migrant—and of these, one third had migrated internationally while two-thirds had remained within the country. More widely, migration in coastal regions reflects contemporary patterns of population mobility which are dominated by a flow from rural to urban centers, reflecting the general trend toward mobility as nations experience increasing levels of development (Safra de Campos

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et al., 2020). This is driven primarily by the pull of future economic and educational opportunities, with the resulting consolidation of population acting as a “pull” for subsequent migrants. In Vietnam, this has led to the formation of domestic migration corridors that channel migration from the rural hinterlands of the Vietnamese Mekong Delta toward economic centers, particularly Ho Chi Minh City (Nguyen et al., 2021). In SIDS, this flow toward cities has led to increased urbanization of islands around the capitals, which is accompanied by declining populations in outer lying islands. In the Maldives, this has led to the construction of Hulhumalé Island on an existing reef flat. This expansion of “Greater Malé” aims to release population pressure on the capital Malé and to stimulate economic growth. In turn, this may, act as an incentive to encourage further migration. Consequently, modeling of future population distribution suggests that even without the added pressures of sea-level rise impacts, it is highly likely that this flow of population to the capital would lead to the abandonment of some outlying islands in the Maldives (Speelman et al., 2021). Pre-existing patterns of mobility establish and reinforce pathways for subsequent migration. A manifestation of this is the “beachhead effect” of established migrant communities who provide support and expertise for others who follow in their wake, through reducing financial and social obstacles to mobility (Ahsan et al., 2022). Correspondingly, Duijndam et al. (2021), in their review of empirical studies exploring the impact of sea-level rise on migration, conclude that “people with social networks outside of their place of residence are more inclined to migrate” (Duijndam et al., 2021, p. 13). The influence of the impacts of sea-level rise will, therefore, be additional to these pre-existing patterns of mobility and demographic change (Nicholls et al., 2020). At the same time, the presence of social networks at place of origin can have a strong influence over non-migration decisions, particularly, if these are related to individuals holding a respected or influential position in society (Mallick et al., 2020). More widely, established relationships with local groups including peer groups and wider family networks, alongside agencies such as regional government officials and NGOs provide support in managing the impact of environmental shocks (Ahsan et al., 2022). There is also evidence that initial migration—particularly if it is fragmentary or circular—can have a dampening effect on subsequent mobility from the place of origin. The resulting flow of remittances can serve to bolster household adaptive capacity, and thereby, reduce subsequent

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migration in response to future sea-level rise impacts (Birk & Rasmussen, 2014). Therefore, even when longer term forecasts suggest that a location may become uninhabitable, the resilience afforded by adapting in situ can slow subsequent large-scale mobility as populations are able make the decision to relocate “…at a time and to a location of their own choosing ” (Jamero et al., 2017, p. 6).

Thresholds---And the Limits of Historic Analogy Even extremely exposed and vulnerable populations can adapt in situ to severe inundation. This is demonstrated by the earlier example of the Philippine islands that suffered land subsidence—and thereby, relative sealevel rise—as result of seismic activity (Jamero et al., 2017). If we consider this as a proxy for the future impacts of sea-level rise, it could suggest that forecasts of population mobility should be tempered, under the assumption that other populations may prove equally resilient. The limitations of such an analogy are, however, that this was a singular discrete event, and notwithstanding the possibility of further seismic events, islanders were able to adjust and adapt to a new normality. This contrasts with the complex and cumulative impacts of sea-level rise that will pose an ever-increasing threat to exposed populations. There is a limit to the adaptive capacity of any household or community, and the cumulative impact of sea-level rise may exceed this. Thus, as rates of erosion and salinization escalate, and the severity and frequency of floods intensify, it is likely that populations will approach new thresholds of mobility (Duijndam et al., 2021). Such threshold conditions are not necessarily limited to climate or environmental conditions but can also result from political or social decisions and interventions. A notable example of how collective social decisions can trigger threshold conditions is Holland Island in Chesapeake Bay, USA, which was threatened by relative sea-level rise in the nineteenth century, leading to accelerated land loss. Ultimately, however, the abandonment of the island took place well in advance of the island becoming physically uninhabitable. Instead, the “tipping point” resulted from cumulative socio-economic factors, specifically when population numbers dropped below the level necessary to sustain community services including the school and church (Arenstam Gibbons & Nicholls, 2006). Therefore, while past events can provide useful analogies for the specific phenomena associated with sea-level rise, there is a limit to how

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much they can tell us about how the cumulative and interrelated impacts will affect patterns of migration in the future. This is particularly relevant in understanding how future migration may relate to pre-existing patterns of migration. Past instances of livelihood collapse as a result of salinization, for example, suggest that such impacts of sea-level rise may simply contribute, exacerbate, and reinforce pre-existing patterns of mobility and demographic change. However, it is possible—perhaps even probable— that the cumulative effect of phenomena associated with rising sea levels will lead to threshold conditions where those pre-existing patterns of mobility break down.

Modeling Complex Systems of Population Mobility The relationships between the impacts of sea-level rise, the pre-existing drivers of mobility and demographic change, and migration represent a dynamic system which evolves in response to shifting influences and drivers. Historic empirical studies and the deterministic modeling approaches employed to date are limited in their ability to represent and provide insight into these complex relationships. Modeling techniques that have been developed in other fields to simulate complex and dynamic systems are, however, being used increasingly in studies to explore the impact of climate change and variability on migration. Of these, studies utilizing Agent-Based Models (ABMs) and systems dynamic analysis show particular potential to offer new perspectives on the relationship between sea-level rise and migration. Researchers are increasingly utilizing ABMs to explore migration in response to the impacts of climate change and variability, including sealevel rise (for example, Bell et al., 2021; Kniveton et al., 2011; Speelman et al., 2021). In the ABM approach, households or individuals are modeled as agents who have the properties of being able to respond to events, pursue objectives and, crucially, interact with other agents. In doing so, this approach aims to simulate decision-making processes that are influenced not only by the environmental shock or stressor, but also past experiences and the behavior of, and interaction with, other agents (Speelman et al., 2021). Consequently, the ABM approach has the potential to model the emergence of demographic trends and the conditions under which social thresholds of migration could occur, even when this well in advance environmental conditions leading to land becoming uninhabitable—as was the case historically in Holland Island.

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In systems dynamic modeling, the aim is to map the factors and causal relationships that connect the environmental shock or stressor with migration outcomes. Crucially, the systems model will reflect the complex relationships between different climatic, environmental, and human factors with migration—including both reinforcing and balancing feedback loops. The systems dynamic model, therefore, embodies a theory of the working of the system (Barlas & Carpenter, 1990). By demonstrating and illustrating the interplay between these indirect and direct influences, the systems dynamic model can provide greater insight into how differing factors impact on one another, and what the cumulative impact will be on changes in patterns of migration (Ginnetti & Franck, 2014). Both approaches have their own limitations. ABMs are heavily reliant on historical data to parameterize the models, and as they do not situate the agents in space, offer limited definition of migration pathways. Systems dynamic models can offer an array of future scenarios, but do not provide specific indicators, such as numbers of future migrants (Ginnetti & Franck, 2014). The importance of such approaches, however, is that they offer researchers and policymakers the opportunity to study different scenarios, particularly those determined by local conditions, to test theories around population responses to differing shocks and stressors. In doing so, they demonstrate the potential to identify opportunities for change, and the framework to test the impact of specific policy interventions on the wider system (Ginnetti & Franck, 2014).

Conclusion In the popular imagination, sea-level rise is associated with large-scale inundation that will lead to loss of land and trigger the displacement of coastal populations. Exposed populations, however, will begin to experience environmental degradation as a result of sea-level rise well in advance of permanent inundation through increased storm surge, coastal erosion, and saltwater intrusion into agricultural soils and freshwater. These impacts will lead to intensification of environmental degradation, thereby exerting heightened stress on livelihoods, particularly, those related to agriculture, and this could trigger waves of migration well in advance of the timescales suggested by models that focus on inundation. Advancing our understanding the effect of sea-level rise on migration depends on increasing our knowledge of the complex system through

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which the associated environmental shocks and stressors affect preexisting drivers of mobility. At the same time, further research is required into understanding social network effects, particularly, how the decisionmaking of some will influence the actions of the wider population, and how this will affect pre-existing patterns of migration. Finally, future approaches should provide opportunities to identify, model, and evaluate potential policy interventions that will assist vulnerable populations in responding to the impacts of rising sea levels. For many, migration will remain an effective and positive adaptive response, offering potential benefits for wider populations as well as the migrants themselves. For others, local adaption measures could offer the opportunity to live with, and alongside, rising sea levels. However, it is only through developing new approaches to studying associated phenomena and modeling the responses of populations that researchers and policymakers will gain the necessary insight to support vulnerable populations in meeting the threats associated with sea-level rise.

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Oppenheimer, M., Glavovic, B. C., Hinkel, J., van de Wal, R., Magnan, A., Abd-Elgawad, A. K., Cai, R., Cifuentes-Jara, M., DeConto, R. M., Ghosh, T., Hay, J., Isla, F., Marzeion, B., Meyssignac, B., & Sebesvari, Z. (2019). Sea-level rise and implications for low-lying islands, coasts and communities. In H.-O. Pörtner, D. C. Roberts, V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, M. Tignor, E. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Nicolai, A. Okem, J. Petzold, B. Rama, & N. M. Weyer (Eds.), IPCC special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate (pp. 321–445). Cambridge University Press. https:// doi.org/10.1017/9781009157964.006 Piggott-McKellar, A. E., McNamara, K. E., Nunn, P. D., & Sekinini, S. T. (2019). Moving people in a changing climate: Lessons from two case studies in Fiji. Social Sciences-Basel, 8(5). https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050133 Roy, B., Penha-Lopes, G. P., Uddin, M. S., Kabir, M. H., Lourenço, T. C., & Torrejano, A. (2022). Sea-level rise induced impacts on coastal areas of Bangladesh and local-led community-based adaptation. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 73, 102905. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr. 2022.102905 Safra de Campos, R., Codjoe, S. N. A., Adger, W. N., Mortreux, C., Hazra, S., Siddiqui, T., Das, S., Atiglo, D. Y., Bhuiyan, M. R. A., Rocky, M. H., & Abu, M. (2020). Where people live and move in deltas. In R. J. Nicholls, W. N. Adger, C. W. Hutton, & S. E. Hanson (Eds.), Deltas in the anthropocene (pp. 153–177). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-030-23517-8_7 Shen, S., & Binns, T. (2012). Pathways, motivations and challenges: Contemporary Tuvaluan migration to New Zealand. GeoJournal, 77 (1), 63–82. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41431191 Siddiqui, T., Bhuiyan, M., Alam, R., Das, P. K., Chakraborty, G., & Hasan, M. (2018). Accommodating migration in climate change adaptation: A GBM delta Bangladesh perspective. Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), Dhaka. Speelman, L. H., Nicholls, R. J., & Safra de Campos, R. (2021). The role of migration and demographic change in small island futures. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 30(3), 282–311. https://doi.org/10.1177/011719682 11044082 Storlazzi, C. D., Gingerich, S. B., Van Dongeren, A., Cheriton, O. M., Swarzenski, P. W., Quataert, E., Voss, C. I., Field, D. W., Annamalai, H., Piniak, G. A., & Mccall, R. (2018). Most atolls will be uninhabitable by the mid-21st century because of sea-level rise exacerbating wave-driven flooding. Science Advances, 4(4), eaap9741. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aap9741 Szabo, S., Brondizio, E., Renaud, F. G., Hetrick, S., Nicholls, R. J., Matthews, Z., Tessler, Z., Tejedor, A., Sebesvari, Z., Foufoula-Georgiou, E., da Costa, S., & Dearing, J. A. (2016). Population dynamics, delta vulnerability and

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environmental change: Comparison of the Mekong, Ganges-Brahmaputra and Amazon delta regions. Sustainability Science, 11(4), 539–554. https://doi. org/10.1007/s11625-016-0372-6 Tran, D. D., Dang, M. M., Du Duong, B., Sea, W., & Vo, T. T. (2021). Livelihood vulnerability and adaptability of coastal communities to extreme drought and salinity intrusion in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 57 , 102183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ijdrr.2021.102183

PART IV

Risk and Vulnerability: Intersecting Migration Studies

CHAPTER 7

Climate Migration and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Kristine Perry

Introduction The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that rapid onset weather-related hazards displace 21.5 million people annually (UNHCR, 2016). Moreover, the UNHCR also identifies that thousands more are displaced by slow-moving events such as droughts. By 2050, one model of thought predicts that more than 143 million people in three regions—sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America— will move within their countries due to these events (Rigaud et al., 2018). Climate change and other environmental factors are also a “threat multiplier” meaning they exacerbate existing tensions, in many conflicts around the world such as Darfur, Somalia, Iraq, and Syria. The effects of climate change and other environmental factors not only create a catalyst for migration, but for a more dangerous type of migration and displacement (UNHCR, 2016).

K. Perry (B) Environmental Law Institute, Washington, DC, United States e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Walker et al. (eds.), Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29529-4_7

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Internationally, there is a dire need for human rights inclusive and disability-responsive laws and standards to govern climate migration. Attempts at a binding document have so far been unsuccessful in this realm. This is a challenging endeavor as climate change and other environmental factors are seldom the only cause for migration; there are usually a wide variety of interconnected reasons why a person migrates. Since the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD), there has been growing recognition that persons with disabilities should be consulted on issues such as those discussed above. However, of the work done in the climate migration space, none of the produced documents are binding and not all of them include the perspectives, experiences, and rights of persons with disabilities in a meaningful way. Persons with disabilities make up one of the most impacted communities when it comes to climate change and other environmental factors while also being a community that is very susceptible to human rights violations while migrating. This chapter examines the intersection of climate migration and the rights of persons with disabilities. Looking at populations who migrate due to climate change and other environmental factors is not a new area of research, but there has been less of a focus on persons with disabilities who migrate under these circumstances. That is not to say that there is no research on the topic. There are excellent sources of research with some very important work coming from disabled authors. Additionally, many of these articles place an emphasis on removing ableist and harmful framing when discussing persons with disabilities migrating due to climate change and other environmental factors. However, the overwhelming study of migration due to climate change and other environmental factors tends to silo or outright ignore disability-related topics. This chapter first examines existing models of disability and then explores international instruments, that include treaties, conventions, outcome documents, etc., that address climate change and disaster preparedness. Finally, the chapter highlights the experience of persons with disabilities when migrating due to climate change and other environmental factors and offers recommendations on how to protect, respect, and fulfill their human rights. This chapter should be seen as an entry point into the topic and non-exhaustive as this is a rapidly changing space. The lack of meaningful inclusion of persons with disabilities in climate migration plans,

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and the exacerbation and/or creation of new disabilities during climate emergencies, threatens the fulfillment of the rights of persons with disabilities. Brief Introduction to Disability and the Human Rights Model Roughly, one billion people worldwide have some form of disability, which is around 15% of the global population. Disability, while a broad term encompassing many different impairments, is understood to include “long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others” (UN General Assembly, 2007, Article 1). Persons with disabilities often face structural, societal, and institutional barriers to the full enjoyment of their human rights (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018). This discrimination leads to adverse socio-economic outcomes, such as higher rates of poverty, lack of access to information, community life, and other human rights violations. In forced displacement contexts, the percentage of persons with disabilities is likely higher than in populations that are not forcibly displaced. This is due to a lack of access to various services, additional barriers, and other factors (Human Rights Council [HRC], 2020a). While there are several approaches and models surrounding disability, this chapter uses the human rights model. The human rights model, most notably found in the CRPD, centers persons with disabilities as rights holders (UN General Assembly, 2007).1 It would be an error not to mention the social model of disability, which has great value when looking at discrimination and other structures of inequity, but for the purposes of this chapter, the human rights model is used.

1 This differs from the medical or charity models of disability that perpetuate the falsehood that disability is a “deficit” and needs to be “fixed” or “cured”. Medical and charity models of disability are outdated and do not represent the experience of persons with disabilities.

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Impact of Climate Change and Other Environmental Factors on Persons with Disabilities Climate change and other environmental factors disproportionally impact already vulnerable communities. In disaster events, persons with physical disabilities are two to four times more likely than persons without disabilities to sustain injuries or die (Quail, 2018). Due to intersecting factors including poverty, lack of access to education and training, as well as a host of other factors, persons with disabilities experience the effects of climate change and other environmental factors more intensely than persons without disabilities (UN General Assembly, 2016). Both rapid and slow onset climate disasters substantially impact persons with disabilities’ access to food and nutrition and health services, as well as medications, potable drinking water and sanitation, education, adequate housing, and decent work (HRC, 2020a, 2020b). Climate change and other environmental factors also contribute to ill-health2 and the exacerbation or creation of new disabilities (World Health Organization [WHO], 2011). Intersecting forms of discrimination also put persons with disabilities at a higher risk of human rights violations due to climate change and other environmental factors. Women and girls with disabilities are most affected by these negative effects when forced to migrate. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities outlines these heightened risks in its General Comment Three. The Committee recognizes that while women and children are given priority in disasters and humanitarian relief, this does not always extend to women with disabilities. Moreover, the information or aid given is not always accessible (Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2016). These risks must be addressed in any laws, standards, and frameworks that govern climate change migration. While climate change and other environmental factors pose a threat to all people, persons with disabilities will experience these dangers differently. For example, social and support systems are disrupted by climate change and other environmental factors, necessary medical therapies may be delayed or discontinued, and warnings and alerts may be inaccessible to persons with disabilities. This is only a sampling of issues facing persons with disabilities due to climate 2 The use of ill-health should not be construed to mean that disability is the opposite of health.

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change and other environmental factors. Since the disability community is not homogenous, the perspectives of persons with different and multiple disabilities as well as other identities must be incorporated into any framework.

Literature Related to Climate Migration and Persons with Disabilities The ability to move due to climate change and other environmental factors is largely dependent on mobility and resources. Persons most impacted by these effects, including persons with disabilities, may be unable to migrate and forced to remain in unsafe locations that are susceptible to environmental harms. If people can migrate due to climate change and other environmental factors, they will often be migrating irregularly,3 which opens them up to significantly more human rights violations than if they were able to migrate regularly4 (HRC, 2016; UN General Assembly, 2018). It is difficult to directly tie climate change and other environmental factors to migration since the decision to migrate is often based on several interrelated factors. The UN argues that, Decisions to move, even when the adverse effects of climate change are the predominant driver, can be compounded by violations of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, some of which may themselves be caused or exacerbated by climate change. (UN General Assembly, 2018, para. 9)

Various international instruments mention climate migration and/or the rights of persons with disabilities; however, few mention both. The following is a look at instruments related to migration and/or climate change but should not be seen as an exhaustive list. 3 Irregular migration refers to “[m]ovement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination” (International Organization for Migration (IOM), Key Migration Terms, available at https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms). The fact that persons migrate irregularly does not mean States do not have an obligation to protect their rights. 4 Regular migration refers to “[m]igration that occurs in compliance with the laws of the country of origin, transit and destination” (IOM, Key Migration Terms, available at https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms).

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The CRPD contains several obligations for States to help ensure persons with disabilities’ human rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled when and if they migrate, for any reason, including due to climate change and other environmental factors. Article 18 holds that persons with disabilities have the same freedom of movement and freedom to choose their residence and nationality on an equal basis with others. Article 11 contains the obligation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities during emergency situations, including natural disasters. Additionally, the CRPD provides provisions for the right to access food, water, and shelter in post-conflict and/or post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. The CRPD also obliges that there is the proper collection of appropriate statistics and data (Article 31) about persons with disabilities in humanitarian situations. Additionally, Article 33 requires government focal points, coordination mechanisms, and national human rights institutions, to involve all important actors in preparation, response, and recovery efforts (UN, 2007). The HRC has stressed for the basic principle of equity to be applied in climate migration assistance. This reinforces the need for this assistance to incorporate human rights principles and that “[c]limate assistance should be adequate, effective and transparent, should be administered through participatory, accountable and non-discriminatory processes, and should benefit those most in need, including persons on the move” (UN General Assembly, 2018, para. 50). The Committee went on to say that, Read collectively, the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Declaration on the Right to Development, and other instruments, including those related to international labour standards, reinforce that States have human rights obligations to cooperate and mobilize the necessary means of implementation to ensure the safety and dignity of all persons, including those crossing borders in response to the adverse effects of climate change. These efforts should respect basic principles of climate justice, including the commitments of parties to protect the rights of persons disproportionately affected by climate change and future generations. (UN General Assembly, 2018, para. 51)

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This assessment includes persons with disabilities, both because they are rights holders, but also because they are disproportionately impacted by climate change and other environmental factors. Most of the following instruments mention participation, but prior to discussing the specifics, it is essential to discuss participation as a right. Multiple human rights treaties and instruments position participation in public life as a fundamental human right, most notably in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Considering their already at-risk position, persons with disabilities also have considerably less access to meaningful participation in decision-making and preparations for climate-related events. This exclusion negatively impacts society as a whole (UN Disability Inclusion Strategy, 2014). The disabled community is not homogenous and different disabilities require different accommodations and support to allow individuals to participate in decision-making processes. Persons with disabilities such as intellectual disabilities, deafblindness, multiple disabilities, psychosocial disabilities, among others “are less likely to be included in cross disability work and are usually underrepresented in decision-making. Policymakers often make decisions on behalf of them as if they do not have an opinion nor ability to decide” (UN Disability Inclusion Strategy, 2014, p. 9). However, even when persons with disabilities and their organizations5 are consulted, it does not mean that the participation is meaningful. Persons with disabilities and their organizations are often consulted on disability-specific issues and not cross-cutting matters. In a survey conducted by the International Disability Alliance (IDA) on the participation of persons with disabilities and their organizations, responses indicated that the groups were most often consulted on “social and economic issues in the areas of education, health, employment, social protection” (IDA, 2020, p. 33). The second group of topics persons with disabilities and their organizations were most often consulted on were “gender equality, access to justice, participation in political life, protection against violence, poverty and disaster risk reduction and humanitarian action” (IDA, 2020, p. 33). The areas that persons with disabilities and their organizations were least likely to be consulted on include “water and 5 It is important to note that these organizations should be “of” persons with disabilities and not “for” persons with disabilities, meaning that they are led by persons with disabilities.

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sanitation, urbanization and housing, nutrition, environment and climate change” (IDA, 2020, p. 33). However, participation is not the end goal. The objectives and priorities of persons with disabilities must be incorporated into the final product. Several international treaties and agreements specifically related to climate change and other environmental factors mention persons with disabilities, however, most do so in a cursory manner. For example, the Paris Accord and the Cancun Agreement, both international instruments concerning climate change, mention persons with disabilities, but only in their preambles and when discussing groups most impacted by climate change and other environmental factors. Conversely, other international instruments related to climate change and other environmental factors do include persons with disabilities in a more meaningful way. One such instrument is the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. This framework sets out priorities to prevent new and reduce existing disaster risks. It calls on governments to engage meaningfully with relevant stakeholders, including persons with disabilities (Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2018). It further states that when considering stakeholder engagement, “[p]ersons with disabilities and their organizations are critical in the assessment of disaster risk and in designing and implementing plans tailored to specific requirements, taking into consideration, inter alia, the principles of universal design” (Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2018, para. 36 (a)(iii)). While the inclusion of persons with disabilities in a meaningful way should be celebrated, it should also be noted that persons with disabilities should be consulted on topics beyond disability-specific issues. The Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action Pathway Outcome document takes this consultation a step further and includes persons with disabilities throughout the document. This document came out of the Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States in 2014. It calls on States to “strengthen and support contingency planning and provisions for disaster preparedness and response, emergency relief and population evacuation, in particular for people in vulnerable situations, women and girls, displaced persons, children, older persons and people with disabilities” (United Nations General Assembly, 2014, para. 52(c)). This is to be done in consultation with these groups and building upon their experiences.

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Although not binding, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration reaffirms the need to “[e]stablish comprehensive policies and develop partnerships that provide migrants in a situation of vulnerability, regardless of their migration status, with necessary support at all stages of migration, through identification and assistance, as well as protection of their human rights” (Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 2018, para. 23(b)). The Compact was agreed upon by 192 UN Member States after six rounds of negotiations. The document specifically addresses persons with disabilities and affirms the need for access to services for all migrants, including persons with disabilities. The Compact and its goals include both a disability-responsive approach, as well as a human rights approach (Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, 2018). Furthermore, the Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action provides guidance on how to incorporate persons with disabilities into emergencies, including natural disasters. The Charter was developed by more than 70 stakeholders from States, UN agencies, and civil society actors from international, regional, and national organizations of persons with disabilities. It was created in advance of the World Humanitarian Summit held in May 2016, in Istanbul. While not binding, this document should serve as a starting point for States when incorporating disability-responsive and human rights-focused elements into their laws governing climate change and other environmental factors and response plans for migration due to these events (Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action, 2016).

Good Practices Case studies on various migration needs due to climate change and other environmental factors for persons with disabilities are lacking. There is a wealth of experience and information on the evacuation of persons with disabilities during rapid onset environmental disasters and emergencies, but less information is available on migration due to slow onset events and climate change. Even when responding to natural disasters and not looking at the climate change and other environmental factor migration component, persons with disabilities are often not included in a meaningful way. A 2016 academic study found through a robust search of factors associated with climate change vulnerability and adaptive capacity,

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that only 34 papers citing 28 studies included persons with disabilities. Of these 28 studies, persons with disabilities were intentionally recruited for less than half of the studies and the studies themselves focused on a deficits-based model of disability rather than a human rights-based approach to disability (Gaskin et al., 2017). This lack of case-specific research correlates with the lack of information available on the topic in general. It was not until September 2020 that the HRC issued a decision on persons seeking refugee status due to climate change (HRC, 2020a, 2020b). While migration due to climate change and other environmental factors is not new, a unified response to the challenges it presents is still developing. However, this response should look to good practices from environmental emergencies and disasters that incorporate and center the rights of persons with disabilities. In response to rapid onset emergencies, local communities and States are using innovative and cost-effective ways to alert persons with disabilities to oncoming danger. A village in the Philippines located in the path of an active volcano has an alarm system in place that incorporates both visual and audible warnings. The community incorporated both audio and visual warnings, studied past disasters in the region, mapped out social support systems in the area, and spoke with persons with disabilities to better improve its preparedness to help persons with disabilities (Handicap International, 2014). One way to coordinate this communication and response for persons with disabilities is to incorporate the use of registries. These registries must respect the privacy and rights of persons with disabilities while ensuring they are given the assistance they need in emergency situations. Registries must also not be used outside the scope of their purpose as there is a real danger to persons with disabilities if this information is obtained by outside parties. Additionally, in States such as the U.S., registries have presented further issues, such as being too costly to maintain, containing inaccurate information, and providing a false sense of reassurance to persons included on them (Gerber et al., 2011). In disaster emergencies, persons with disabilities often have developed support networks where they checkin on each other, exchange information, provide necessary supplies, etc. (Engelman et al., 2022). These registries could be used as an extension of these networks and would be best managed by persons with disabilities or by organizations of persons with disabilities. At the very least, persons

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with disabilities must be consulted on the creation, maintenance, and use of these registries. Accessible transportation is another issue that should be addressed in this type of planning. A 2011 study funded by the United States Department of Education’s National Institute on Disability Rehabilitation and Research identified good practices for evacuating persons with disabilities in emergency or disaster situations. One example comes from California and respondents stated that they are working to keep an active database of the types of vehicles needed in an evacuation emergency and what types of vehicles are available (Gerber et al., 2011). Another issue that will arise when persons with disabilities migrate for any reason is the availability of accessible shelter, both long-term and short-term. Respondents to the aforementioned survey advised that agreements for both long- and short-term shelter is needed, as well as support staff in the shelters to provide necessary accommodations. These groups advise that persons with disabilities should know the location of the shelter prior to an emergency. Once the location and shelter are identified, organizations in charge of evacuation/migration plans should reach out to local service providers to support persons with disabilities if and when needed (Gerber et al., 2011). This is also applicable in long-term planning for migration for persons with disabilities due to climate change and other environmental factors; when the persons know where they will be migrating to, they should be given support finding local service providers. Ideally, this should happen before migration occurs. These issues and responses to them represent a selection of challenges that will occur during migration due to climate change and other environmental factors for persons for disabilities. There are a plethora of other issues that need addressing in any framework that deals with this topic. The issues discussed above were addressed since there was available information on them. Disability issues are often underreported or not reported at all, making it hard to capture the wide variety of needs and experiences. While these local efforts and identified good practices demonstrate the importance of incorporating persons with disabilities into immediate disaster and emergency plans, there still is not a unified effort to include them into long-term planning associated with migration, both internal and external, related to climate change and other environmental factors.

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Recommendations If and when persons with disabilities need to migrate due to climate change and other environmental factors, they must be engaged in meaningful consultation on the laws and standards that will govern climate migration. At this time, there are no binding climate migration treaties and if one were to be adopted, persons with disabilities must be consulted on the entire document, not only provisions relating to persons with disabilities. The creation of a binding agreement on climate migration that includes disability-responsive policies and engages in meaningful consultation with persons with disabilities and their organizations is very much needed. International, regional, and local laws and standards need disabilityspecific protections when addressing climate migrants. In lieu of a binding international instrument on climate migration, States should review and revise laws that address internal and external migration, climate change and other environmental factors, preparedness, disaster relief, and resiliency plans. They should work to repeal discriminatory laws that may currently govern migration. They should also uphold their obligations under various human rights treaties to ensure the protection, respect, and fulfillment of persons with disabilities’ human rights. To bolster these efforts to protect climate migrants with disabilities, States should adopt measures to prevent displacement and migration due to climate change and other environmental factors. Resiliency planning is critical and should engage persons with disabilities and their organizations. In any of these efforts, international, regional, or local, there must be meaningful consultation with persons with disabilities and their organizations. Participation is a human right and must extend beyond disability-specific topics. Instruments, standards, and laws should not merely mention persons with disabilities in preambles but include their unique perspectives and experiences when drafting responses to climate migration.

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References Bell, S. L., Tabe, T., & Bell, S. (2020). Seeking a disability lens within climate change migration discourses, policies and practices. Disability & Society, 35(4), 682–687. https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2019.1655856 Handicap International. (2014). Empowerment and participation: Good practices from South & South-East Asia in disability inclusive disaster risk management. Handicap International. https://www.preventionweb.net/files/38358_ 38358hiempowermentandparticipationi.pdf Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action (2016). https://humanitariandisabilitycharter.org/wp-content/themes/hum anitarian-disability-charter.org/pdf/charter-on-inclusion-of-persons-with-dis abilities-in-humanitarian-action.pdf. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. (2016). General comment No. 3 on women and girls with disabilities, UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/3, para. 13. Engelman, A., Craig, L., & Iles, A. (2022). Global disability justice in climate disasters: Mobilizing people with disabilities as change agents: Analysis describes disability justice in climate emergencies and disasters, mobilizing people with disabilities as change agents. Health Affairs, 41(10), 1496–1504. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2022.00474 Gaskin, C. J., Taylor, D., Kinnear, S., Mann, J., Hillman, W., & Moran, M. (2017). Factors associated with the climate change vulnerability and the adaptive capacity of people with disability: a systematic review. Weather, Climate, and Society, 9(4), 801–814. https://doi.org/10.1175/wcas-d-16-0126.1 Gerber, B., Norwood, F., & Zakour, M. Promising practices for evacuating people with disabilities. (2011). https://frdat.niagara.edu/assets/ListPage/ Promising-Practices-final-1-21-2011.pdf Human Rights Council, Analytical study on the promotion and protection of the rights of persons with disabilities in the context of climate change. (2020). UN Doc. A/HRC/44/30, para. 5. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/ files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/regularsession/session50/2022-0627/A_HRC_50_57-Plain-EN.docx Human Rights Council. (2020a). Persons with disabilities in the context of internal displacement, UN Doc. A/HRC/44/41. Human Rights Council. (2020b). Human rights of internally displaced persons, UN Doc. A/75/207. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-rep orts/a75207-report-internal-displacement-context-slow-onsetadverse-effects Human Rights Council. (2016). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/52, para. 28.

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UN. (2018). Disability and development report: Realizing the sustainable development goals by, for and with persons with disabilities, pp. 236–237. UNHCR. (2016). “Frequently asked questions on climate change and disaster displacement.” https://www.unhcr.org/enus/news/latest/2016/11/581f52 dc4/frequently-asked-questions-climate-change-disaster-displacement.html United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Disability and Development Report. (2018). https://social.un.org/publications/UN-flagsh ipreport-disability-7June.pdf United Nations General Assembly. (2014). SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway, UN Doc. A/RES/69/15, para. 52(c). https:// undocs.org/A/RES/69/15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). WHO, disaster risk management for health fact sheets. (2011). Global Platform. www.who.int/hac/events/drm_fact_sheet_overview.pdf World Health Organization. (2011). The World Bank, World Report on Disability, p. 29. www.who.int/disabilities/world_report/2011/report.pdf

CHAPTER 8

Compounding Risks and Increased Vulnerabilities: Climate Change, Conflict, and Mobility in East Africa Lisa Thalheimer

Introduction Many communities in East Africa are vulnerable to weather and climaterelated events because their pastoral livelihoods form a substantial basis of economic security. Recurring droughts and floods, paired with an ongoing humanitarian emergency, poverty, and conflict are drivers of migration and changes in human mobility. However, the processes involved in mobility changes are not yet understood, prompting the need for a comprehensive overview of the knowledge base. The purpose of this chapter is to review existing knowledge on complex interlinkages of vulnerability and human mobility in East Africa in order to propose policy interventions and research synergies on addressing compounding vulnerabilities. I review the precursor and present how

L. Thalheimer (B) School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, NJ, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Walker et al. (eds.), Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29529-4_8

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vulnerability elements can compound and exacerbate adaptation capacities, adversely affecting vulnerable populations. I argue that, following decades of a hazard-by-hazard risk reduction paradigm, compounding vulnerabilities need to be addressed in three pillars: effect, complexity, and interventions. The structure is as follows: First looking at effects on human mobility, I provide a background on the weather and climaterelated events and conflict in East Africa. Highlighting that human mobility is the outcome of complex interactions between individual and contextual factors, I proceed by examining key contexts and issues that have compounded in recent years, disrupting human mobility in the context of extreme weather events and conflict situations. Specifically looking into compounding elements of vulnerability in Somalia, a country with a traditionally mobile population of pastoralists, an embedded case study serves the purpose of exemplifying the complex interlinkages driving internal displacement. This second pillar also discusses the role of weather and climate-related stress on food security. In the third pillar, I discuss the evidence presented and propose a set of integrated policy and science actions to address the nature of compounding vulnerabilities, and thus, move toward addressing this complexity. Study Area East Africa as referred to in this chapter covers an area that contains part or all of the following countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda (see Fig. 8.1). Geographically, it covers the broad East African region, ranging from 29°E to 52°E and 27°S to 15°N. For simplicity, I will use “East Africa” to describe the broad region and “Somalia” to describe the country case area to illustrate how specific elements of vulnerability might compound, exacerbating the adaptive capacity of already vulnerable populations on the move. For simplicity, I will use the term “weather and climate-related events” to describe extreme weather and associated events and climate variability. East Africa has recently experienced a series of extreme weather and climate-related events including a series of recurrent droughts and extreme precipitation that led to flash floods. To provide a sense of the time scale: these extreme events range from the Ethiopia drought in 2015 (Philip et al., 2017), the 2016/2017 drought (Uhe et al., 2018), and the

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Fig. 8.1 Map showing the study area, including political boundaries and East African geographical region, used in this chapter (Note [orange; 29°E to 52°E, 27°S to 15°N; blue]. The region of the case study is highlighted in the blue box [41°E to 52°E, 2°S to 12°N])

2018 extreme precipitation (Kilavi et al., 2018) in Kenya. Recent estimates show that around 17.5 million people are at risk from food shortages in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (Funk, 2020) and interlinks have been suggested between drought and conflict in Somalia (Maystadt & Ecker, 2014; Thalheimer & Webersik, 2020), leaving much of the region vulnerable to socio-economic impacts and restricting people’s adaptive capacity. The Effects of Climatic Change on Human Mobility East Africa is not only one of the most vulnerable regions to climate variability and the impacts from weather and climate-related events (Collier et al., 2008; Kew et al., 2021), but it is also characterized by a traditionally mobile population. Human mobility, especially economic migration and pastoralism is part of many livelihoods across East Africa, with populations

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in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia heavily relying on rain-fed agriculture and water for pastoralism (Lyon, 2014; Puma et al., 2018). In recent years, major weather and climate-related events, such as floods and droughts, have had led to social and economic disruptions in this region, notably in food security. The 2015 drought in Ethiopia put an estimated 22 million people in need of food aid (Philip et al., 2017) and the 2016 Kenya drought led to over three million people in need of food aid (Uhe et al., 2018). In the context of recent droughts in the region, several studies have assessed whether and to what extent human-induced climate change played a role in the hazards. These studies come to different conclusions: For the 2011 East Africa drought, a study found a contribution of anthropogenic climate change to the increase in probability of dry or drier than 2011 long rains (Lott et al., 2013). In contrast, no humaninduced influence was found for a 2014 drought in the Horn of Africa (HOA) region (Marthews et al., 2019). The evidence base remains a mix of uncertainty, pinpointing to the scale of extreme weather which turns impacts into humanitarian disasters. A number of East African countries are also affected by recurrent conflict, internal displacement, and political instability (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020), which adds even more elements of vulnerability to the mix. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over 8 million people have been internally displaced in the HOA region alone (UNHCR, 2020). Political dimensions including conflict and violence and economic factors are well-known drivers of migration in the region. Indeed, migration is also a traditional adaptation strategy in the context of environmental change (Groth et al., 2020; Owain & Maslin, 2018). Zooming out toward a global picture, many weather and climaterelated events have become more frequent and intense, leading to widespread and disastrous impacts for populations globally (HoeghGuldberg et al., 2019), as the latest IPCC report emphasizes (Pörtner et al., 2022). So far, we know that changes in the climate might enhance or reduce human mobility flows depending on the geography and policy measures in place (Benveniste et al., 2020). For example, weather and climate-related events are estimated to have caused 30 million new internal displacements in 2020 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2021). In extreme cases, populations have previously migrated away from locations frequently impacted by weather and climate-related events (Gray & Mueller, 2012). However, this is not always the case as

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communities may be pushed to move toward areas of increased risk. For example, populations in Bangladesh are projected to migrate toward sealevel rise affected coastal cities that provide ample livelihood alternatives and income options beyond agriculture (Bell et al., 2021). Interestingly, prior literature has portrayed climate-related human mobility as a key impact of anthropogenic climate change (e.g., Biermann & Boas, 2008; Myers, 2002; Rigaud et al., 2018). Despite the increasing abundance of qualitative evidence (e.g., Groth et al., 2020; Wiederkehr et al., 2018) on how and where populations migrate due to the impacts of weather and climate-related events, surprisingly little research has causally linked such evidence to anthropogenic climate change (Borderon et al., 2019; Cattaneo et al., 2019). The effects of climate change on human migration are notoriously difficult to tease out. As such, the attributable effects to human-induced climate change on extreme weather events remain elusive (Thalheimer, Otto, et al., 2021). In fact, causal evidence is not well understood and has suffered from disciplinary hurdles to date (Abel et al., 2019). Evidence from probabilistic attribution science might be useful to bridge the gap between extreme weather and the link to climate change and societal impacts such as migration, conflict, and economic development. Since 2003, climate scientists have been assessing how anthropogenic climate change alters the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events by applying probabilistic event attribution methods simulating the likelihood and intensity of weather and climate-related events with and without human-caused climate drivers (Otto, 2016). The impacts of anthropogenic climate change are projected to materialize disproportionately in the “Global South”, with African countries particularly vulnerable to socio-economic effects from weather and climaterelated events (Harrington & Otto, 2020; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019). Progress on analytical techniques which include qualitative empirical research methods or ethnographies (e.g., Morrissey, 2013), mixedmethod and meta-analysis approaches (e.g., Hoffmann et al., 2020; Scheffran et al., 2012), and statistical approaches (e.g., Bohra-Mishra et al., 2014; Hsiang, 2016) have improved our understanding of environmental drivers for human mobility (Klepp, 2017). To date, little to no research has been conducted on the attributable link between anthropogenic climate change and human mobility in the region of East Africa (Carbon Brief, 2022). This raises the question of how sound the lines of evidence on direct climate change links in East Africa are to date.

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Using a range of interdisciplinary methods, recent evidence seeks to disentangle mobility drivers, and thus, takes on the problem of teasing out weather and climate-related drivers in mobility. There are crucial nuances in weather and climate-related impacts on different types of human mobility that highlight uncertainties in drawing causal conclusions (Groth et al., 2020; Thalheimer, Otto, et al., 2021). For East Africa, environmental and climatic shocks have consistently played a role in human mobility (Thalheimer, Williams, et al., 2021). With a focus on human mobility typology, weather and climate data as well as estimates on human mobility, non-climatic drivers encourage mostly voluntary migration. These factors include social norms, migration for development such as education but also taking up job opportunities in urban areas (Hoffmann, 2022; Thalheimer, Otto, et al., 2021).

Characterizing Human Mobility in East Africa Human mobility comprises a variety of human movements. In East Africa, human mobility takes different forms and is influenced by various factors, ranging from weather and climate-related events to poverty and conflicts (Afifi et al., 2012, 2014; Owain & Maslin, 2018). It is important that there is some prior understanding of which processes influence decisions to move or stay, as this will help assess the extent to which weather and climate-related events contribute to such processes. Therefore, it is critical for this chapter to lay a foundation of the term “human mobility”. There are several types of human mobility relevant to East Africa, including (i) temporary or seasonal migration, (ii) internal displacement, and (iii) refugees. Situations of immobility can also occur, such as voluntary immobility and entrapment. However, these latter are beyond the scope this chapter. Contrary to modality in existing research (Adger et al., 2018; Boas, 2020; Farbotko et al., 2016), I restrain from a use of “human mobility” as a synonym for migration in this chapter to show various facets of human mobility including its spatial and temporal components. Human mobility decisions are often multi-causal and rarely due to weather and climate-related events alone. Climate change may influence human mobility both directly and indirectly through various channels ranging from economic, demographic, social, political, and environmental factors (Black et al., 2011). These factors ultimately lead to a family or individual’s decision between staying or going—and where to migrate to if the decision is made. In this context, there are several climatic factors

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that can both enhance and reduce human mobility (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Hoffmann et al., 2020). Individuals can be forced to leave their homes and communities due to sudden-onset events such as tsunamis, landslides, and flood events, or slow-onset processes such as desertification and sea-level rise (Bell et al., 2021; Feng et al., 2010). Push (e.g., unemployment or conflict) and pull (e.g., economic opportunities or better healthcare) factors of human mobility may change significantly with the inputs of anthropogenic climate change; however, whether and to what extent these changes may manifest is unknown, for the reasons outlined. In regions such as East Africa, which experience recurring weather and climate-related events, affected populations could run out of resources requiring them to migrate voluntarily. Taking migration, a form of human mobility as an example, recent literature (Abel et al., 2019) discusses mixed evidence on the extent to which climatic factors drive economic and socio-political crises and in turn, influence migration. Further, with an expected increase in average global temperature by 2100 (IPCC, 2018), there is little consensus regarding the direction and the extent to which these factors will influence migration and other types of human mobility (Hoffmann et al., 2020). Re-emphasizing the gaps in the evidence landscape and the potential large-scale impacts from climate change, it is critical to assess implications for climate-related human mobility based on empirical data-driven evidence now; inertia is not an option (Hoffmann et al., 2021; Thalheimer, Williams, et al., 2021).

Complex and Compounding Vulnerability in Somalia Having laid out the effects of weather and climate-related events on human mobility both conceptually and with an empirical focus on East Africa, it comes clear that there is a need to better understand how weather and climate dynamics interact with and drive other elements of vulnerability such conflict and forced migration in a country context. This section uses this opportunity to further drill down on existing vulnerabilities and how these spatially and temporally compound, ultimately adding pressure on the adaptive capacity of those who migrate. Heavy floods, desert locusts, and the COVID-19 pandemic—the triple threat—have contributed to a deterioration of the humanitarian conditions since the beginning of 2020, alongside drought and conflict (Salih et al., 2020). The prolonged humanitarian crisis in Somalia critically

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hinders the pursuit of long-term recovery and durable solutions for the more than 2.6 million internally displaced people (IDPs) present in the country. In 2020, Somalia’s multiple shocks caused a 1.5% contraction in GDP (World Bank, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has also changed the previously positive economic outlook. The economy is estimated to contract by 2.5% in the coming years. Growth has also been affected by reduced foreign direct investment, a shrinkage in remittances caused by the global recession, and bans on livestock exports by the Gulf countries (World Bank, 2020). Internal displacement in the context of extreme weather events have been a prominent chapter of Somalia and the wider region since the 2011 East African drought. Two consecutive below average rainfall seasons in 2010 and 2011 devastated livestock and crop production, causing an increase in food prices and a worsening humanitarian situation in East Africa. The country is recovering from the 2011 drought, which resulted in 260,000 deaths in Somalia alone and affected 13 million people in the wider Horn of Africa region, and can, in part, be attributed to humaninduced climate change (Lott et al., 2013). More recent droughts in the Horn of Africa may not generally be attributable but resulted in largescale displacement as a result from one or more extreme weather events (Marthews et al., 2019). With barely enough time to recover, the 2016/2017 drought added yet another dimension to internal displacement and the already fragile humanitarian situation (van Oldenborgh et al., 2017). Still, food has consistently remained a humanitarian need for populations displaced by droughts and floods across Somalia, as illustrated in Fig. 8.2. In recent years, food security and links to global food supply systems have been a critical issue that has been increasingly recognized in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis (Gaupp, 2020; Pörtner et al., 2022). In Somlia, the pandemic has contributed to a spike in food needs in 2020, adding yet another burden on displaced populations and illustrating limits to their adaptive capacity. The COVID-19 dimensions illustrate a risk driver of compounding vulnerabilities in Somalia. Many individuals faced a double edged sword during extreme weather events. On the one hand side, there were lockdown measures and travel restrictions hindering migrants and pastoralists from moving. On the other hand, people needed to get out of harm’s way. Even though the full picture of COVID-19 impacts has yet to be analyzed, flash floods, desert locusts, along with the impacts from the

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Fig. 8.2 Top five needs of IDPs across Somalia from 2016 to 2021 (Source Open-source data: UNHCR Somalia, 2022)

pandemic have contributed to a deterioration of the humanitarian conditions since the beginning of 2020, alongside drought and conflict. A comprehensive approach to COVID-19 recovery demands an emphasis on interdisciplinary cooperation and systems thinking. It also requires a strengthening of the science policy interface. This way, feedback loops between (climate change) impacts and scenario analysis, data-driven policy design, and implementation are improved. Coupled with an emphasis on open and improved data and information sharing, scientific contributions to decision-making processes include two key areas of monitoring and integrated assessment: (1) strengthening of near real-time monitoring capabilities across the development and environmental dimensions of food systems and (2) providing integrated assessments of strategic choices and implications for sustainable development pathways in a post-COVID-19 world (Sperling et al., 2020).

Interventions In the previous sections, I have taken stock of the context-specific factors that prompt human mobility in the first place and different elements of vulnerability. Here, I outline, in the context of extreme weather events

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and internal displacement, some steps toward minimizing or averting crisis situations. As a theoretical foundation, I rely on the conceptual framework that seeks to employ an approach of anticipation instead of reaction. Anticipatory action approaches, such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ (IFRC) forecast-based action mechanism, present a unique opportunity for humanitarian actors to reduce the likelihood of people being displaced by a disaster. For example, such approaches can increase people’s mobility, meaning they can avoid the worst impacts of climate-related hazards by moving themselves and their assets away from the hazard temporarily. This reduces the risk of them being displaced in the longer term. Feasibility studies, which ideally take place during the early stages of setting up an anticipatory action initiative, already consider the risk of disaster displacement. For example, these studies note which populations are at the greatest risk of displacement and why, as well as the risk of arbitrary displacement. Anticipatory action can contribute at other stages, including determining the risk of disaster displacement and subsequently contribute to preparedness and response efforts. Anticipatory action can also significantly contribute to protecting vulnerable communities, as well as facilitating their short-term mobility when required. Weather forecasts along with the framework of forecast-based financing and integrated insurance options protecting against extreme weather, livestock disease, and crop failure should be incorporated in decisionmaking to better support those displaced by floods, heatwaves, and other extreme events that affect Somalia. In Mongolia, pastoralists face impacts from recurring severe winters (locally referred as dzud). Here, anticipatory actions protect vulnerable livelihoods through reducing livestock mortality from extreme cold temperatures. They also include the distribution of livestock nutrition kits and unconditional cash transfers. Cash is an option for vulnerable persons to experience some degree of freedom in prioritizing items needed in order to survive the hazard and to protect livestock assets through the purchase of hay, fodder, or medicine (Gros et al., 2020; IFRC, 2020). Somalia’s pastoralists could well benefit from a similar setup during droughts and heatwaves. An anticipatory pilot was implemented in 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (Gettliffe, 2021). With the ongoing triple threat (COVID-19, the desert locust infestation, and weather shocks), formalized anticipatory actions are urgent even though their success in the long term is far from an easy win.

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From the embedded case study, we can derive that the strengthening of preparedness, including early warning systems, contingency planning, evacuation planning, and resilience building strategies and plans, along with the development of innovative approaches, such as anticipatory action, to avert, minimize, and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change is of crucial matter. Somalia is highly susceptible to the impacts of climate change and extreme weather events. Without anticipatory action approaches, these factors are likely to exacerbate existing compound vulnerabilities and reduce the people’s livelihood options under additional global warming (Thalheimer et al., 2022). Inertia will have adverse impacts for stability and security in Somalia and the East African region.

Conclusion In our mobile world that is always changing, “conclusions” might appear an oxymoron. Nevertheless, a summary of the story of compounding vulnerabilities and human mobility in East Africa can be done. This chapter contributes to better understanding how different elements of vulnerability can compound and adversely affect human mobility by shedding light into three areas: effects, complexity, and interventions. From these three areas, we can derive that the importance of human mobility in East Africa is undisputed. Nevertheless, there is still important work to be done to improve the understanding of complex drivers of East African human mobility in a changing climate. Priorities for future research should focus on integrating societal data in attribution approaches, improving human mobility data, connecting with humanitarian actors, and consider the complexity of climate-related human mobility. Regarding the effects, this chapter has shown that weather and climaterelated events differ geographically, and in their impact on human mobility. Even though, the current evidence landscape on climate-related human mobility is sparse for East Africa, more can already be done in terms of interventions to address vulnerabilities. Future work, both of researchers and practitioners alike, should also focus on a stronger link between knowledge dissemination and humanitarian work. Harnessing anticipatory action presents a unique opportunity to contribute to preventing or reducing displacement risks among vulnerable communities in East Africa. Forecast-based financing as a tool of anticipatory action

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could be a first step in the direction of the usage of weather forecasts informing actions for practitioners and the humanitarian aid community on the ground. Acknowledgements This book chapter benefited from feedback by Dorothy Heinrich, Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre and Rohit Gupta, Center for Policy Research on Energy and the Environment at Princeton University, as well as the editors of this book.

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Kew, S. F., Philip, S., Hauser, M., Hobbins, M., Wanders, N., van Oldenborgh, G. J., van der Wiel, K., Veldkamp, T. I. E., Kimutai, J., Funk, C., & Otto, F. E. L. (2021). Impact of precipitation and increasing temperatures on drought trends in Eastern Africa. Earth System Dynamics, 12(1), 17–35. https://doi. org/10.5194/esd-12-17-2021 Kilavi, M., MacLeod, D., Ambani, M., Robbins, J., Dankers, R., Graham, R., Titley, H., Salih, A. A. M., & Todd, M. C. (2018). Extreme rainfall and flooding over central Kenya including Nairobi city during the longrains season 2018: Causes, predictability, and potential for early warning and actions. Atmosphere, 9(12), 472. https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos9120472 Klepp, S. (2017). Climate change and migration. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/978019022 8620.013.42 Lott, F. C., Christidis, N., & Stott, P. A. (2013). Can the 2011 East African drought be attributed to human-induced climate change? Geophysical Research Letters, 40(6), 1177–1181. https://doi.org/10.1002/grl.50235 Lyon, B. (2014). Seasonal drought in the greater horn of Africa and its recent increase during the March–May long rains. Journal of Climate, 27 (21), 7953– 7975. https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-13-00459.1 Marthews, T. R., Jones, R. G., Dadson, S. J., Otto, F. E. L., Mitchell, D., Guillod, B. P., & Allen, M. R. (2019). The impact of human-induced climate change on regional drought in the horn of Africa. Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 124(8), 4549–4566. https://doi.org/10.1029/201 8JD030085 Maystadt, J.-F., & Ecker, O. (2014). extreme weather and civil war: Does drought fuel conflict in Somalia through livestock price shocks? American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 96(4), 1157–1182. https://doi.org/10. 1093/ajae/aau010 Morrissey, J. W. (2013). Understanding the relationship between environmental change and migration: The development of an effects framework based on the case of Northern Ethiopia. Global Environmental Change, 23(6), 1501–1510. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.07.021 Myers, N. (2002). Environmental refugees: A growing phenomenon of the 21st century. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 357 (1420), 609–613. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb. 2001.0953 Otto, F. E. L. (2016). The art of attribution. Nature Climate Change, 6(4), 342–343. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2971 Owain, E. L., & Maslin, M. A. (2018). Assessing the relative contribution of economic, political and environmental factors on past conflict and the displacement of people in East Africa. Palgrave Communications, 4(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0096-6

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Philip, S., Kew, S. F., van Oldenborgh, G. J., Otto, F. E. L., O’Keefe, S., Haustein, K., King, A., Zegeye, A., Eshetu, Z., Hailemariam, K., Singh, R., Jjemba, E., Funk, C., & Cullen, H. (2017). Attribution analysis of the Ethiopian drought of 2015. Journal of Climate, 31(6), 2465–2486. https:// doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-17-0274.1 Pörtner, H. O., Roberts, D. C., Adams, H., Adler, C., Aldunce, P., Ali, E., Begum, R. A., Betts, R., Kerr, R. B., & Biesbroek, R. (2022). Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. IPCC. Pörtner, L. M., Lambrecht, N., Springmann, M., Bodirsky, B. L., Gaupp, F., Freund, F., Lotze-Campen, H., & Gabrysch, S. (2022). We need a food system transformation—In the face of the Russia-Ukraine war, now more than ever. One Earth.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2022.04.004 Puma, M. J., Chon, S. Y., Kakinuma, K., Kummu, M., Muttarak, R., Seager, R., & Wada, Y. (2018). A developing food crisis and potential refugee movements. Nature Sustainability, 1(8), 380–382. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41 893-018-0123-z Rigaud, K. K., De Sherbinin, A., Jones, B., Bergmann, J., Clement, V., Ober, K., Schewe, J., Adamo, S., McCusker, B., Heuser, S., & Midgley, A. (2018). Groundswell: Preparing for internal climate migration. World Bank. Salih, A. A. M., Baraibar, M., Mwangi, K. K., & Artan, G. (2020). Climate change and locust outbreak in East Africa. Nature Climate Change, 10(7), 584–585. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0835-8 Scheffran, J., Marmer, E., & Sow, P. (2012). Migration as a contribution to resilience and innovation in climate adaptation: Social networks and codevelopment in Northwest Africa. Applied Geography, 33, 119–127. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2011.10.002 Sperling, F., Havlik, P., Denis, M., Gaupp, F., Krisztin, T., Valin, H., & Visconti, P. (2020). Bouncing forward sustainably: Pathways to a post-COVID world resilient food systems (p. 13). Thalheimer, L., Otto, F., & Abele, S. (2021). Deciphering impacts and human responses to a changing climate in East Africa. Frontiers in Climate, 3, 84. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2021.692114 Thalheimer, L., Simperingham, E., & Jjemba, E. W. (2022). The role of anticipatory humanitarian action to reduce disaster displacement. Environmental Research Letters, 17 (1), 014043. https://doi.org/10.1088/17489326/ac4292 Thalheimer, L., & Webersik, C. (2020). Climate change, conflicts and migration. In Environmental conflicts, migration and governance (pp. 59–82). Bristol University Press. Thalheimer, L., Williams, D. S., van der Geest, K., & Otto, F. E. L. (2021). Advancing the evidence base of future warming impacts on human mobility in

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African drylands. Earth’s Future, 9(10), e2020EF001958. https://doi.org/ 10.1029/2020EF001958 Uhe, P., Philip, S., Kew, S. F., Shah, K., Kimutai, J., Mwangi, E., van Oldenborgh, G. J., Singh, R., Arrighi, J., Jjemba, E., Cullen, H., & Otto, F. E. L. (2018). Attributing drivers of the 2016 Kenyan drought. International Journal of Climatology, 38(S1), e554–e568. https://doi.org/10.1002/joc. 5389 UNHCR. (2020). Situation horn of Africa Somalia situation. https://data2. unhcr.org/en/situations/horn UNHCR. (2022). Horn of Africa Somalia situation. https://data.unhcr.org/ en/situations/horn/location/192 van Oldenborgh, G. J., Philip, S., Cullen, H., Singh, R., van Aalst, M., Otto, F. E. L., & Kimutai, J. (2017). Rapid analysis of drought in Somalia, 2016. World Weather Attribution. https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/som alia-drought-2016-2017/ Wiederkehr, C., Beckmann, M., & Hermans, K. (2018). Environmental change, adaptation strategies and the relevance of migration in Sub-Saharan drylands. Environmental Research Letters, 13(11), 113003. https://doi.org/10.1088/ 1748-9326/aae6de World Bank. (2020). Somalia-economic-update-impact-of-COVID-19-policies-tohttps://openknowl manage-the-crisis-and-strengthen-economic-recovery.pdf . edge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34239/Somalia-EconomicUpdate-Impact-of-COVID-19-Policies-to-Manage-the-Crisis-and-Streng then-Economic-Recovery.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y

CHAPTER 9

Building a Critical, Place-Based Approach to Climate Displacement: A Future Agenda for Research, Planning, and Practice Stacia Ryder and Michael Mikulewicz

Introduction Displacement can be defined as a movement that is involuntary or forced, or as Esnard and Sapat stated, the “long-term uprooting of people from a home territory in response to physical, economic, or environmental danger or harm such as a natural hazard” (2014, p. 19; Oliver-Smith, 2001). Displacement can be conceived across a variety of categories and spectrums; in terms of the degree to which it is a choice or a necessity, whether it is voluntary or forced, the scale at which it occurs (e.g., mass

S. Ryder (B) Department of Sociology, Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA e-mail: [email protected] M. Mikulewicz College of Environmental Science & Forestry, State University of New York, Syracuse, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Walker et al. (eds.), Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29529-4_9

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displacement), and its temporal (sudden or slow-onset events, permanent or temporary displacement) and spatial implications (i.e., domestic or international movement) (Esnard & Sapat, 2014). Forced migration or displacement is complex and often caused by multiple intersecting factors (Bandiera, 2021; Nygren & Wayessa, 2018). Environmental displacement can result from environmental degradation, disasters, climate change, or environmental changes tied to a large-scale development project. In the context of climate migration and displacement, specifically, movements are a direct or indirect result of a changing climate (Kälin, 2010) or the related environmental degradation (Esnard & Sapat, 2014). Many observers consider migration and voluntary displacement as a viable (and sometimes the only remaining) strategy for climate change adaptation (Black et al., 2011; Cernea & McDowell, 2000; Felli, 2013; McLeman & Hunter, 2010), though displacement is not always framed as an adaptation measure at all (Arnall, 2019; McAdam, 2010; Nishimura, 2015). What is more important here is that while population movements have been an integral part of life on earth for human and non-human species alike, both voluntary and forced displacement in the Anthropo*cene1 will unfold under environmental conditions that are more dynamic, volatile, and unpredictable than in any recent period. In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2009) (GAO) found that at least 12 Native Alaskan villages were considering relocation. While estimates can vary widely, Oxfam (2019) suggests that over 20 million people were displaced by climate-related disasters and catastrophes between 2008 and 2018, with over 80% of the impacted population living in Asia. In 2020, more people became internally displaced by climate disasters than by war (Dehgan, 2021). The 2021 IPCC Sixth Assessment Report estimates that over the next three decades, between 31 and 72 million people in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America will face climate-induced displacement due to water stress, drought, sea-level rise, and crop failure. Thus, environmental displacement, and climate-induced displacement, in particular, has already led to injustices (Maldonado, Shearer et al., 2014; Maldonado, Maldonado et al., 2021;

1 The term “anthropocene” is rightly criticized for failing to account for differential historical responsibility for climate change, and alternative terms such as the capitalocene, chthulucene, and plantationocene have been coined. We use “anthropo*cene to acknowledge these differential responsibilities for the current era” (see Ryder et al., 2021).

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Whyte, 2017), which are likely to grow as the impacts of climate change intensify. However, as a result of limited knowledge on the issue and the collective responses to climate change being fraught with disagreement, Mastaler (2019) suggests that we are ill-prepared to address the social challenges of climate displacement. Precisely, how climate migration, displacement, and resettlement transitions occur will at least partly depend on how society plans for them. However, thus far, there has been little successful subnational, place-based planning to reckon with the scale of migration and displacement we face. Further, critical justice questions about climate displacement decisionmaking—including who becomes displaced, who and what places are deemed worthy of preservation, and who makes these decisions—remain underdeveloped. On the contrary, we discern a tendency in climate displacement planning to adopt depoliticized, technocratic approaches rooted in an economic cost–benefit analysis that elides these thorny political questions under the guise of technical expertise. However, given the possible disruptions to social, place-based bonds (Browne, 2015; Weber & Peek, 2012), the potential for post-migration stressors and trauma (Chen et al., 2017; Porter & Haslam, 2005; Versey, 2021), links between migration and inequality (Burzynski ´ et al., 2022), and the considerable risk of environmental injustice and human rights violations, it is essential that climate-induced displacement is studied and the responses to it designed with their justice and equity implications in mind. In this chapter, we chart what a critical research agenda for climate-induced displacement could look like. In the next section, we demonstrate the importance of critical approaches to displacement by exploring place attachment in two coastal communities; both facing climate displacement but within two distinct national and cultural contexts. First, we examine planning failures in the case of Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana. Next, we discuss the case of Fairbourne, a coastal village in Wales, which was slated for mid-century decommissioning due to rising sea levels. Finally, we outline what a critical, place-based planning and research agenda for climate displacement might entail, paying particular attention to intersectionality as a theoretical, methodological, and practical tool for achieving it. In conclusion, we suggest topics and questions to guide further critical climate displacement research.

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Place Attachment & Place Disruption in Climate Displacement Understanding the role of place and place-based bonds is a crucial component of climate displacement planning. Place can be understood broadly as “people and communities hav[ing] particular affective relationships” (Adger et al., 2011; Hess et al., 2008). Place can form both individual and collective identity, and “sense of place” focuses on the complexities of an embodied, intricate relationship between humans and place in a particular geographic location, (Convery et al., 2014) that are experienced through the senses (Relph, 2009; Simms et al., 2021). But what does that mean in the context of those places that are at risk of being devastated or even destroyed by climate impacts? Adger et al., (2011, p. 2) argue that climate policies and decisionmaking typically fail to include considerations of place and place connections, including “the symbolic and psychological aspects of settlements, places, and risks to them.” Further, relocation and resettlement rarely capture the crucial elements of the relationships between place and culture (Simms et al., 2021). This is true despite the broad recognition in the literature that processes of place change, including how changes to the physical environment can impact identity and place-based bonds, or even lead to the loss of a particular way of life (Browne, 2015; Burley, 2010; Simms et al., 2021; Weber & Peek, 2012). This is why in planning for relocation, a community’s unique “histories, traditions, priorities and needs” should be considered ( et al., 2021, p. 301; see also Thomas et al., 2019). In the US, millions are at risk from sea-level rise (Hauer et al., 2016). Along coastal Louisiana, it is estimated that over 500,000 people will have moved by 2100 due to sea-level rise (Chavez, 2022). An example from this region—the Isle de Jean Charles—demonstrates why successful planning for displacement and resettlement must be centered on place, place attachment, and the role of place-based bonds and cultural identity. The Jean Charles Choctaw nation (JCC nation, formerly known as Isle de Jean Charles Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw Indians of Louisiana or the Band of Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw Indians) have called the island home since the early 1800s (Baurick, 2020). The JCC nation has undergone various relocation efforts as their ancestral homelands are sinking in the Gulf of Mexico. Simms et al. (2021) demonstrate the degree to which cultural identity and place are two of the primary values threatened by climate

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and climate displacement (Palinkas, 2020; Simms et al., 2021). For the members of the JCC nation, their relationship to the island and the land and potential loss of culture have been significant concerns (Palinkas, 2020). The state of Louisiana made an effort to reflect these connections within a resettlement scheme, which was initially developed in partnership with the JCC nation. In the resettled area, for example, residents would develop community and housing which captured and replicated elements of sense of place and way of life from the island, such as communal spaces and the elevation of the properties (Simms et al., 2021). However, while some elements of this planning process have incorporated the importance of place and place attachment, these efforts have failed to incorporate place and cultural recognition in other ways. For example, a primary concern for residents was what would happen to their homes on the island and the extent to which they would retain the rights to the land there (Simms et al., 2021). The conditions for securing a mortgage through the resettlement program failed to account for these ties, as it was stipulated that if participants took on a mortgage through the program, they would have to agree only to visit the island for recreational purposes and never to take up residency there again unless they sell their new home in the resettlement area (Simms et al., 2021). In addition, Simms et al. (2021) describe a sense of community distrust and fear that the state government may return on the promise of allowing them access to their land. There are also fears about how the land may be sold and developed by outsiders for commercial or recreational purposes (Setyawan, 2021). The loss or potential loss of access to the island threatens community members’ way of life and culture. Crucially, these concerns are situated within long-standing historical practices where the federal government has repeatedly stolen Indigenous lands and broken land promises. Similar concerns about loss of culture have emerged in other coastal places, including predominantly Native American or Alaska Native villages where relocation proposals have been rejected (Palinkas, 2020). Furthermore, other historical, place-based injustices emerge when one pays attention to the discourse around displacement planning. In particular, words often used to support displacement include “necessary,” “unavoidable,” or “forced.” In the case of the JCC nation, the impacts of climate change are likely to be exacerbated by adaptation planning processes, such as the Army Corps of Engineers’ (USACE) decision to construct a 98-mile levee system that omits the island. When citing the

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reasons that the levee system could not be planned to wrap around the island, one was that to do so would be too costly. In an analysis of the decision-making process around the levee Wright (2020) finds that USACE ignored Tribal Environmental Knowledge in their cost–benefit analysis and highlights the degree to which the associated risks to the island are at least partially the result of the choices made by USACE, and not merely caused by naturally occurring events. Taken together, the Isle de Jean Charles resettlement process is rife with issues of environmental injustice where recognition of place-based bonds and culture was not fully incorporated into decision-making. The JCC Tribal Leadership’s vision that drove state-partnered funding applications were deviated from during the post-funding planning process, which Chief Albert Naquin has described as “hijacked” by the state (Maldonado, Maldonado et al., 2021). Contesting & Resisting Planned Displacement with Place-Based Community Action & Science: The Case of Fairbourne, Wales Globally, other coastal communities face similar issues, and some are levying their place-based knowledge to contest decisions made about them without them. The ongoing—at the time of writing—situation in the coastal village of Fairbourne, Wales, demonstrates the unintended consequences of climate adaptation (or maladaptation) and the importance of place-based and community-led planning in the context of climate displacement and relocation. In the UK, about 530,000 properties are at risk of climate-driven coastal flooding, and around 1/5th of those properties are in Wales (Committee on Climate Change, 2018). In England and Wales, the coastal hazards and impacts of climate change are addressed via Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs) (Ballinger & Dodds, 2020). SMPs were developed as a move away from short-term hard defenses, which, while historically the preferred solution, have actually exacerbated risk, particularly as they reach the end stages of their design life (Ballinger & Dodds, 2020). Seeing the need for a regional, riskbased approach to local coastal strategies, the UK SMPs became “the first attempt within Europe … to provide planning based on large-scale assessment of shoreline management processes over long-term timeframes” (Ballinger & Dodds, 2020, p. 2). In Wales, SMPs have been developed by Coastal Groups, including Natural Resource Wales (NRW), local maritime authorities, government bodies, and other stakeholders relevant

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for managing the coast. There are four SMPs for different areas of Wales, each laying out management strategies across the short-, medium-, and long-term. Further, four broad strategies will be adopted in different areas across these phases: . Hold the line (HTL) by maintaining or changing the existing standard of protection. . Advance the line (ATL) by building new defenses on the seaward side of the original defenses (although none applied in Wales). . Managed realignment (MR), which allows the shoreline to move backward and forward, with management to control or limit the movement. . No active intervention (NAI) where there is no investment in coastal defenses, and natural processes are allowed to continue to create an evolving coastline. Natural Resource Wales (NRW) states that decisions about which strategies to pursue depend on several factors, including coastal processes, coastal flood and erosion risks, coastal defense conditions, policy development testing and appraisals, environmental impacts, social factors, economic appraisal, climate change, local factors, and interactions with neighboring areas. In the West Wales SMP, the village of Fairbourne, Wales, sits in an area where the long-term strategy has been categorized as no active intervention. As a result, in 2013, the Gwynedd County Council (GCC) adopted an SMP that recommended that in the long term, no active intervention for climate adaptation would be pursued and that the sea defenses would no longer be maintained after 2054. This was reported as a decision to “decommission” the village of Fairbourne, though the GCC maintains that there has not been a definitive decision. While the Council points to efforts to consult communities, including Fairbourne, there is no evidence that any consultation was conducted until after the SMP was adopted, for which the Council faced considerable criticism (Gwynned Council FAQs). Residents lamented not only that this decision could be reached without consulting them or the local Arthog Community Council (ACC) but also that it was made without any actual planning in place for supporting or compensating the community through this transition (Harries, 2020; Martinez, 2021).

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This decision vaulted the village into the national spotlight and, subsequently, economic chaos. Deemed by the media as the UK’s “first climate change refugees,” (Wall, 2019) property values plummeted, and fears rose that houses would be unsellable. Estimates have suggested a drop in home values by 40%, which left residents concerned about their economic security. The situation has remained tumultuous, with fluctuating prices caused both by lenders refusing to offer mortgages to locals and by incoming cash buyers (Wall, 2019). As a result of the latter, property values were up 35% in early 2022 leading to locals being pushed out of the housing market and the community (Forgrave, 2022). Thus, experiences of displacement have become indirect but acute, and residents who remain may also experience changes to the social fabric of the community that disrupts their existing attachment to place even before the local environment is physically altered by climate change. In the long term, those who stay will experience physical changes to the landscape, potentially leading to in-place displacement (e.g., see Hochschild, 2016). As the ACC put it, alongside economic impacts, it is also essential to measure how this decision has led to “crushed hopes and smashed plans” (ACC, 2022). Residents of Fairbourne have taken various forms of action, including the pursuit of £100 million in compensation (Shaw, 2016). Most recently, there has been a motion to reject the plan by Fairbourne Council, wherein local experts contest the science and decision-making. Moreover, alternative plans for climate adaptation to protect the village have just been put forth by the Arthog Community Council. The ACC unanimously passed and adopted the motion “to reject the plans by Gwynedd County Council to decommission Fairbourne village.” The motion was based on several justifications which critique both the Royal Haskoning report that the plan was based on and the actions of the GCC (ACC, 2022). The criticisms of the Royal Haskoning report include: (1) the lack of field data from Fairbourne, (2) the datedness of the data, and (3) and the existence of three other reports which contradict its findings. In addition, the Arthog Community Council allege bias on the part of both the report authors and the GCC and the failure of GCC to consider: (1) Fairbourne residents’ rights, (2) the potential cost of compensation and re-housing for residents, and (3) the risk to railways and the socioeconomic impacts for local communities if the railway were to close. It is worth noting that these criticisms are not rooted in climate denialism. Instead, a local resident notes that: “We do not dispute that

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climate change is happening, however, some of the data that we are quoted is suspect to say the least” (personal comm). This assertion points to questions about the relationship between climate science and policy decisions, where residents are questioning both the accuracy of climate predictions and the decision-making processes that determine which places and communities are worth saving and which are deemed too expensive to protect (Wall, 2019). For example, residents cannot help but wonder why other places with similar predicted climate-induced flooding impacts are not subject to the same relocation and decommissioning plans as Fairbourne, noting that in 2014 storms that led to flooding in nearby coastal villages in western Wales such as Barmouth and Aberystwyth did not result in flooding in Fairbourne (Forgrave, 2022). Furthermore, the ACC likens the states of Fairbourne to major urban areas like sections of East London and Rotterdam where embankments protect the cities despite their positioning below high tide and storm wave levels (ACC, 2022). In their efforts to contest the GCC’s decision, the ACC has established a counter-plan for defending (as opposed to decommissioning) Fairbourne and its future. Drawing on several reports–including a pro bono peer-reviewed report they commissioned, the ACC demonstrates how it will be technologically feasible and reasonably affordable to protect the village from flood risk through 2065 and potentially beyond. Based on the evidence in these reports, the ACC suggests that both the risks to Fairbourne and the cost of protecting the village are grossly exaggerated. Given this, they have requested that GCC conduct a “thorough review and ultimately a reversal of the decision to decommission Fairbourne in 2054.” While the media may continue to refer to Fairbourne residents as “climate refugees,” (see Gerretsen, 2022), the ACC instead describes itself as “the victim of good intentions” (ACC, 2022). This demonstrates the unintended consequences of climate adaptation (Cash et al., 2020), which can exacerbate issues of inequality and result in maladaptation. The situation in Fairbourne points to a multitude of issues in climate adaptation planning which fails to account for place-specifics and excludes community members who will be affected by those plans. One resident, for example, notes: “We’ve asked Gwynedd Council if they’ll be moving people to accommodation in the area and if people will be kept together and they’’ve got no answers at all. If they’re going to demolish Fairbourne and turn it back into salt marsh, we need to know what’’s going to happen and who’s

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going to pay for it” (Owen, 2022). In effect, there is no coherent management plan in place if indeed at some point movement was necessary. Additionally, this also means that the differential needs of community members–for example, renters vs. homeowners or the differential risks for the mobile home park at the south of the village as opposed to permanently-fixed houses–are ignored. Another essential element is that the primary language of Fairbourne residents is English, whereas most of the surrounding areas are Welsh speaking. Given this, relocation could pose a challenge to cultural integration. This has been acknowledged as an issue by the actors in charge of the potential decommissioning, who ask whether “those [potential resettlement] places [are] capable of absorbing that number of people? […] Do people want to go there, and do people want to receive people from Fairbourne?” (Wall, 2019). However, there has been no plan made clear for addressing these questions. On the other hand, Fairbourne residents’ resistance demonstrates what happens when those who are excluded contest the decision-making process and its conclusions by countering place-based scientific evidence and climate adaptation planning. Still, a glaring issue is that the capacity to contest plans on the grounds that are accepted by decision-makers is not equally shared across and within communities impacted by climate change. For example, the two community examples we draw on highlight disparities in terms of their historic responsibility for climate change and their power to challenge injustices in displacement processes. Thus, this brings us back to questions of inequality in displacement and resettlement: Who gets to move? Where do they move? Moreover, how will this be funded? (Simms et al., 2021). In the case of Fairbourne, the adaptation strategies in the SMP have seemingly failed to address these questions, leading to a resident-led, anti-displacement movement. The funding issue also draws on more significant financial questions tied to climate change and displacement: To what degree should those who experience the burdens of climate change, particularly displacement, be supported through climate reparations? To what degree can and should we move away from displacement and instead pursue anti-displacement (Cash et al., 2020) or re-emplacement (Farbotko, 2022) approaches? We see these questions as imperative for the future of a climate displacement research agenda.

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Pursuing Critical Place-Based Planning for Climate Displacement Given the degree to which planned climate displacement and resettlement disrupt communities, it should be—as in the case of Fairbourne—considered a worst-case scenario and the last resort (Cernea & McDowell, 2000). Too often these decisions over-rely on economic assessments and arguments (Adger et al., 2011) while fundamental questions about how, when, and where displacement becomes “unavoidable” or a place becomes “unsaveable,” as well as how displacement differentially impacts people within a community, remain under-scrutinized. Further, little space is left for community agency in decision-making—an issue which IDJC Tribal Leadership and Fairbourne residents pushed back on by withdrawing from the state resettlement scheme to create their own (JCC nation) and refusing to be displaced (Fairbourne). In planning for climate displacement and relocation, a more critical approach to analyzing discourse and decision-making processes can reveal who makes these evaluations and on what basis, disclosing the economic or technical justifications of displacement as effects of political power and underlying social inequalities. Critical approaches tend to foreground underlying processes and power arrangements to uncover inequities that otherwise might be glossed over or ignored. Therefore, we propose that applying critical theoretical lenses and methodological approaches is crucial for advancing climate displacement studies that would allow the establishment of inclusive, equitable, and place-based decision-making practices and outcomes. Critical lenses borrowed from climate justice and adaptation research, for instance, offer to move displacement planning from the techno-managerial and econometric paradigm toward more humancentered approaches and reveal it as a highly political and politicized process. Critical Climate Displacement Research: Multidisciplinary, Multi-Scalar, and Situated We argue that successfully studying and planning for climate displacement requires multidisciplinary, multi-scalar, and situated research and planning. Climate sciences are necessary to identify—through modeling, for instance—places that may need to develop migration, displacement, and resettlement plans. However, planners are essential for incorporating

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this science into city and land use planning, particularly regarding climate mitigation and adaptation. In turn, disaster and emergency management research is useful for understanding how displacement is experienced on the ground. Legal, human rights, and refugee scholarship and activism are essential for establishing the rights of persons who face climate migration, displacement, and resettlement, particularly when movements are international. Psychologists can help us identify and address the stressors and trauma tied to disruptions to a sense of place and place attachment that emerges in the wake of climate migration and displacement (Versey, 2021). While relevant, we need better integration of all these and other insights to build an agenda for a fairer and more just approach to climate “displacement,” specifically. Furthermore, we need to draw across these disciplines to move beyond quantitative data approaches and enhance mixed-method and qualitative research which is lacking in the broader area of migration studies (Zapata-Barrero & Yalaz, 2018). Of course, the fields of relevance in studying climate displacement are climate science and migration studies, research that has historically focused on issues at the international and global scale of action. Arnall (2019, p. 665) notes that most approaches for studying climate-induced displacement and resettlement are top-down, where “international justice, legal and humanitarian frameworks are extended ‘downwards’ by policymakers and governments to local populations.” Meanwhile, relatively little is done to highlight how solutions can be developed by potentially impacted people from the bottom-up. Where efforts to incorporate planning for climate displacement policies have been made at the international level, the focus has been on the responsibilities and burdens the international community and nation-states should bear in accommodating people’s needs (Johnson, 2012). Some global governance organizations like the European Court of Human Rights have adopted stances that suggest that states must take action to protect human rights in the case of foreseeable disasters (Kälin, 2010). At the nation-state level, essential questions around plans for climate displacement have largely been aimed at small island developing states (SIDs), particularly those in the Pacific, which face the most immediate risk (Folkebrant, 2021; Pill, 2020; Thomas & Benjamin, 2018). However, because the decision to migrate—however constrained the choice maybe—is a very personal one, community-level resettlement requires decision-making across multiple scales (Simms et al., 2021). However, climate displacement remains relatively absent from national

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and subnational plans for climate change, even though, in the majority of cases, migration and displacement occur internally. Finally, as demonstrated above, even in the case of displacement plans that are highly localized, efforts tend to gloss over important aspects of place, equity, justice, and inclusion, particularly in coastal areas where Indigenous or otherwise marginalized communities are grappling with resettlement schemes ( et al., 2021; Palinkas, 2020; Simms et al., 2021). Given this, there is a need to develop a more holistic, contextualized approach to climate displacement planning and research (Esnard & Sapat, 2014; Weber & Peek, 2012) that incorporates localized, place-based, and justice considerations and puts communities in control of their own futures (Mastaler, 2019; Maldonado, Shearer et al., 2014; Maldonado, Maldonado et al., 2021; Simms et al., 2021). This finding is consistent with the critical literature that recognizes the need for analyzing adaptation as an unequal and often stratifying process that requires situated, context-specific solutions (Mikulewicz, 2017; Mikulewicz & Taylor, 2019; Nightingale et al., 2020; Taylor, 2014). While necessary, the integration of place considerations alone is not enough for successful displacement planning. In the broader scheme of Louisiana, a failure to adequately compensate for material and immaterial losses such as culture, community, livelihoods, and social bonds compounds existing historical environmental justice issues for the Isle de Jean Charles tribe and beyond (Simms et al., 2021). et al. (2021) demonstrate similar threats of loss of culture, identity, and place connection for Indigenous coastal communities across the globe; and the need for community-led resettlement efforts to combat the long line of historical environmental injustices perpetrated against these frontline communities. In both the case of the JCC nation and Fairbourne, residents’ agentic capacities and ability to influence decisions that impact themselves, their families, their communities, and their homes are limited, leaving feelings of day-to-day uncertainty about future livelihoods. Crucially, both within and across these communities, residents will not be impacted equally. This is precisely why communities must have the power and capacity to shape and lead these processes and plan according to community members’ differential needs and capacities. Intersectionality as a Tool for Critical Climate Displacement Planning Our underlying argument when proposing the above research agenda is that power and difference play a crucial role in shaping climate

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displacement-related decisions and outcomes, which carries implications for how displacement planning should be studied and practiced. While acknowledging that there are several approaches in critical theory that recognize power and difference and could be applied to the context of climate displacement, here we propose intersectionality as a theoretical, methodological, and practical tool for pursuing the critical climate displacement planning we charted above. Intersectionality is a novel approach that explores how systems of power are enacted to create differences in opportunity and disadvantage across and within groups of people with shared identities (Crenshaw, 1991). Environmental scholars use intersectionality to study how systems of power create differential experiences of environmental inequalities in the context of disasters, climate change, and energy development (Malin & Ryder, 2018; Ryder, 2017). For example, Ryder and DevineWright (2021) demonstrate how residents facing potential shale gas development express concerns about the proposed project being sited closest to residents who sit at the intersection of multiple vulnerabilities— poverty, disability, old age, poor health, and lack of mobility. Similarly, an intersectional lens on Hurricane Katrina reveals that gender, race, class, and citizenship influenced how the disaster impacted residents in terms of displacement and post-disaster recovery (Luft & Griffin, 2008; Versey, 2021). As climate change increases the frequency and intensity of disasters, these intersectional vulnerabilities and capacities must be accounted for in planning climate-induced migration, displacement, and resettlement. Moreover, an intersectional approach to climate governance unveils the role of power and inequality in shaping adaptation policies (Kaijser & Kronsell, 2014). While critical adaptation studies provide a rich literature, intersectional analyses of planned climate adaptation efforts–let alone climate displacement and resettlement policies and programs–have not been systematically undertaken. We, therefore, see intersectionality as a tool to achieve multidisciplinarity, multi-scalarity, and contextualization necessary for critical climate displacement studies. First, as an approach without a well-defined academic home itself, intersectionality has recognized the need for interand multi-disciplinarity from its very beginnings (Carbado et al., 2013; Cho et al., 2013). However, it is important that multidisciplinary work does not end up being superficial and reductionist, as some critical climate scholars have cautioned (Schipper et al., 2021). Second, intersectionality is theoretically compatible with cross-scalar analysis that defies the

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entrenchment of mainstream displacement studies at the international level. We argue that applying a critical lens to historically forced climate displacement and resettlement schemes (Mcdowell, 2013), including situating them in the broader political and political-economic context, is necessary to develop more just planning processes and solutions. Third, intersectionality’s roots lie in the emancipation and liberation of marginalized groups, and in the need to understand their unique experience of oppression and inequality (Cho et al., 2013; Collins & Bilge, 2016; Crenshaw, 1991). For the goal of contextualizing displacement, this translates both into a more community-led focus of research and planning through methodologies such as participatory action research, ethnography, or citizen science, and—on the other hand—paying close attention to local community efforts that resist the dominant structures of power and domination, as in the case of Fairbourne. The benefits of an intersectional approach are particularly visible when we think about how disasters and climate change disproportionately impact multiply-marginalized individuals. As we mentioned at the start of this chapter, people living in Asia have disproportionately faced climate displacement over the last decade. At the same time, estimates suggest that women are disproportionately displaced, accounting for 80% of those displaced by climate change despite possessing less adaptive capacity than their male counterparts (Gaynor, 2020; Halton, 2018). What does this mean for women living in Asia? How do the needs and capacities of women in Asia also vary by class, caste, race, nationality, sexuality, religion, language, caregiving roles, and so on? Moreover, what global, national, and local decision-making processes and underlying power structures have led to these individuals facing displacement in the first place? To avoid retraumatization or exacerbation of inequality, any plan for displacement and resettlement must account for these various intersections and ensure that proactive planning secures relocation sites that foster existing cultural identities and a sense of place. It cannot leave anyone—especially the multiply marginalized—behind.

Conclusion Displacement is both a sign and a driver of inequality. Frequently, displaced people belong to marginalized groups or simply lack alternatives to moving. Moreover, displacement can further exacerbate their marginalization. Given the IPCC’s predictions of millions of people being

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displaced as a direct or indirect consequence of climate change impacts, it is not difficult to imagine the effects of displacement on the already wide social disparities across the planet–especially in the Majority World where climate change will be felt most acutely. Combined with displaced communities’ usually negligent level of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions, the uncertain future of millions of soon-to-be displaced individuals is a matter of climate injustice. As we mentioned above, however, how this potentially stratifying process pans out, in reality, depends at least partly on how we plan and manage it. We share the concerns of critical climate scholars about the overly top-down and undemocratic nature of climate-induced displacement planning. If planning for displacement relies solely on technological, technical, and economic analysis while glossing over issues of place attachment, belonging, and local politics, it is likely that we will witness many more cases like Isle de Jean Charles or Fairbourne. On the other hand, we see the proposed critical climate displacement planning outlined here as a step toward ensuring that displacement—while at the very least disruptive and frequently disastrous for local lives, livelihoods, and cultures—can avoid becoming yet another driver of inequality in the context of our planet’s rapidly changing climate. This is not an easy task. In this chapter, we attempted to lay out what we believe to be the benchmarks for minimizing the injustices associated with forced or voluntary climateinduced displacement. These were: multi-disciplinarity, multi-scalarity, and contextualization. These, of course, are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. This initial contribution intends to spur debate among scholars, activists, and decision-makers on how displacement can be done “right.” As a first step, we proposed intersectionality, with its rich intellectual history of investigating the unequal experiences of environmental change and our responses to it, as one of the first ports of call for anyone willing to make climate displacement planning more inclusive and equitable in its outcomes. To aid further debate, we propose future research on the following topics: (1) place attachment in climate-impacted areas and what constitutes feelings of being “dis”placed, (2) the socioecological and political factors which determine why some people and places become targets for displacement planning, (3) who is included in and excluded from displacement decision-making processes, and (4) the differential capacities and needs of residents targeted for displacement who face multiple marginalizations. Some potential questions for these inquiries include:

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. Who becomes displaced and who does not? . Who and what places are deemed worthy of preservation? Who makes these decisions, and what values are enshrined in the decisionmaking process? . When and where is planning for displacement pursued out of necessity, and where is it a result of cost-effectiveness, convenience, or other interests? . What are other critical approaches useful for advancing how we study and understand climate displacement? How might they be applied? . Collectively across multiple scales and geopolitical boundaries, what do existing strategies for climate displacement look like? To what extent are these planning processes inclusive and reflective of the intersectional understandings of the needs and capacities of climatedisplaced persons and communities? . How can climate displacement and relocation policies become more equitable, inclusive, and just? . What is the importance of maintaining place-based bonds in a just approach to climate displacement? . What is the relationship between displacement as an adaptation measure and processes of domination, oppression, and marginalization? . To what degree do potentially impacted populations retain agency in deciding when, where and how to go, or, to stay? To what degree is any displacement “voluntary”? . What are the needs and experiences of displacement among different groups and individuals within the same localities? . How does resistance to displacement emerge, and what determines whether it is successful or not? By exploring questions around these and other issues, we can pursue more collaborative, place-based solutions to climate change which account for and address power differentials and inequality.

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Index

A Abandonment measures, 103, 109, 110 Adaptation strategies, 103, 164 climate change adaptation, 88, 156 ecological adaptation, 18 retreat measures, 103 Advance measures, 103, 110 Agent-Based Models (ABMs), 111, 112 Agriculture, 12–14, 18, 58, 77–80, 88, 92, 106, 107, 112, 140, 141 Anticipatory Action Initiative, 146, 147 Asian deltas, 99

B Beachhead effect, 109 Blanqueamiento, 38 Bohol Earthquake, 103 Brazilian fever, 14

C Cancun Agreement, 128 Catholic, 32–34, 43 católicos viejos , 32 Roman Catholic Church, 32 Católicos viejos . See Catholic Census data, 6, 52–54, 56–60, 62, 64–66 Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action, 129 Climate change anthropogenic climate change, 140, 141, 143 climate displacement, 157, 160, 164, 166, 169 climate emergencies, 123 climate-induced displacement, 156 climate-induced mobility, 51, 53, 58, 61, 66 climate-related events, 127, 141, 142 environmental degradation, 156 erosion, 105, 161

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Walker et al. (eds.), Environmental Migration in the Face of Emerging Risks, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29529-4

179

180

INDEX

extractive cultures, 12 flooding, 77, 105 food security, 140 humanitarian disasters, 140 natural disaster, 4, 11, 129 Paris Accord, 128 rapid onset, 121, 129 salinization, 106 slow onset, 124, 129 Coastal coastal communities, 105, 157, 160, 167 coastal flooding, 106, 160 colonial centers, 17 Coffee, 29, 41 coffee plantation, 6, 33, 34, 38–42, 44 coffee planting, 30, 43, 44 Colonization, 12, 14, 17, 18, 23 colonial Cuba, 30 Commuters, 108 Concepción de la Idalia, 42 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD), 122, 123, 126 COVID-19, 80, 84, 143–146 Creolization, 13 Creole, 30, 33, 37, 39 Cuban-Creole, 30, 40, 43 Cultural appropriations, 17 D Data cost benefit analysis (CBA), 103 critical place-based planning, 165 data collection, 52, 56, 57, 61, 64, 65 social and economic disruptions, 140 socio-economic limitations, 56 spatial limitations, 52, 56, 62, 63, 65

spatial units, 54, 55, 58 standardization, 54, 62, 65 Systems Dynamic analysis, 111 urban data, 54 Deficits-based model, 130 Deforestation, 30, 44 Ana Manuela Mozo de la Torre Garvey, 36, 37, 39 Ana Manuela, 36, 37, 39 Diaspora Cuban diaspora, 29 diasporic, 43 Irish diaspora, 38 Disability(ies), 7, 83, 122–132, 168 Disability Inclusion Strategy, 127 disabled, 127 models of disability, 122 Discrimination, 123, 124 Displacement critical approaches to, 157 environmental displacement, 156 forced displacement, 5, 123, 156 internal displacement, 138, 140, 142, 144, 146 physical disability, 124 voluntary displacement, 3, 5, 62, 63, 155, 156, 171 Durable solutions, 144 E Ecosystem, 13, 18, 30, 44, 54 Educational opportunities, 55, 109 Entrapment, 142 Environment, 34, 41 Environmental history, 11, 12, 24 Erosion, 30 eroding, 43 F Fairbourne, 157, 160–165, 167, 169, 170

INDEX

Foreign employment, 78, 80, 84, 85, 87–89, 92, 93 Foreign Employment Bond (FEB), 87, 89 Foreign Employment Welfare Fund (FEWF), 87 Foreign exchange, 80, 81 French-Domingois, 30, 31, 38, 43

G Global Compact, 129 Global environmental approach, 24 Gross domestic product (GDP), 79, 84, 144 Guantánamo, 33, 43

H Haitian Republic, 31 Haitian Revolution, 30, 40 Havana, 30, 36, 38 Human Rights Declaration on the Right to Development, 126 Human Rights Council (HRC), 4, 123 human rights model, 123

I Industrial complex, 41 Institutional arrangements, 89 Intellectual disability, 127 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 126 International Disability Alliance (IDA), 127 Intersectionality, 157, 168–170 Interventions, 55, 108, 110, 112, 113, 137, 138, 145, 147 Inundation, 100, 102–106, 110, 112 Irish, 30–32, 34–36, 38, 41, 43, 44

181

Irish-Hispanic, 43 Irish immigrants, 30, 31, 41, 43 Irish surnames, 31

L Labor migrant, 85 Limitation(s), 6, 52, 54, 57–59, 100, 101, 110, 112

M María Gertrudis Creagh Mancebo, 34 Mayorazgos , 34 Measures, 37, 102, 103, 113, 132, 140, 144 Migrants, 5, 7, 14, 31, 52, 55, 56, 59, 65, 78, 79, 81, 85–90, 93, 109, 112, 113, 129, 132, 144 Migration, 30–32, 43 circular migration, 52, 59, 60 climate migration, 5, 7, 122, 125, 126, 132, 156, 157, 166 domestic migration corridors, 109 drivers of migration, 101, 106, 107, 137, 140 economic migration, 56, 61, 139 environmental literature on migration, 25 forced migration, 55, 143, 156 fragmentary migration, 108, 109 human mobility, 13, 137–143, 145, 147 internal migration, 53, 54, 57, 59, 61 international migration, 108 labor migration, 78, 80, 84 migration data, 57, 64, 66 migration patterns, 6, 55, 57, 58, 63 migration trap, 80 mobility, 52, 56, 62, 63, 108

182

INDEX

natural causes of migration, 4, 63, 92 non-climatic drivers, 142 Orderly Migration, 129 overseas migration, 77, 78 Polish migration, 11 population mobility, 100, 101, 106, 108 pull factors, 109, 143 push factors, 143 Regular Migration, 129 rural to urban migration, 108 rural-urban migration, 55 seasonal migrants, 108 temporary migration, 53, 59 temporary or seasonal migration, 142 N Nepal, 6, 77–82, 84–89, 91–93 P Pastoralism, 139, 140 Place-based, 157–160, 164, 165, 167, 171 place attachment, 158, 159, 170 Place-based knowledge, 160 Plantation, 30, 34, 35, 37, 39, 44, 83 plantation complex, 30, 44 plantation economy, 35 Polish colonies, 13, 15 Polish immigration, 5, 13, 18, 23 Pureza de sangre, 32 R Refugees, 30, 35, 65, 142

Reintegration, 90 Relocation measures, 103 Remittance(s) remittance inflow, 81, 82 remittance transfers, 81 technology-assisted remittance, 92 World Humanitarian Summit, 129

S Saint Domingue, 30, 31, 35, 38, 40 Santiago. See Santiago de Cuba Santiago de Cuba, 6, 30–32, 35, 37, 40, 43 Sebastián Kindelán O’Regan, 34, 36, 39 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 128 Slavery, 31, 35 enslaved, 30–33, 37–39 Small island developing states (SIDS), 101, 166 Soil, 30, 38, 43 Spain, 31, 32, 34, 43 Spanish America, 33 Spanish American Empire, 30, 31, 43 Spanish Crown, 32, 33 Spanish dominions, 31, 32 Spanish Monarchy, 32 Strategic marriage, 31, 37 Sugar, 36–38, 40

T Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States, 128

INDEX

U UNESCO World Heritage, 44

Y Yerba mate, 5, 12, 13, 17, 19–24

W Wales, 7, 157, 160, 161, 163 West African, 31, 37, 38 Wild Geese, 31, 43

Z Zambia, 52, 55, 57–60

183