Environmental Harm: An Eco-Justice Perspective 9781447300427

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STUDIES IN SOCIAL HARM

ENVIRONMENTAL HARM An eco-justice perspective

ROB WHITE

Environmental Harm An eco-justice perspective Rob White

First published in Great Britain in 2013 by Policy Press University of Bristol 6th Floor Howard House Queen’s Avenue Bristol BS8 1SD UK t: +44 (0)117 331 5020 f: +44 (0)117 331 4093 [email protected] www.policypress.co.uk

North America office: Policy Press c/o The University of Chicago Press 1427 East 60th Street Chicago, IL 60637, USA t: +1 773 702 7700 f: +1 773-702-9756 [email protected] www.press.uchicago.edu

© Policy Press 2013 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested. ISBN 978 1 44730 040 3 hardcover The right of Rob White to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Policy Press. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Policy Press. The University of Bristol and Policy Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Policy Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by Policy Press Front cover: image kindly supplied by www.alamy.com

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Contents List of tables, figures and boxes v About the author vii Acknowledgements ix Introduction Environmental harm and social harm approaches Green criminology and environmental harm An eco-justice perspective Conflicting views and moral dilemmas

1 1 4 6 7

one

Justice-based approaches to environmental harm 11 Introduction 11 Components of an eco-justice perspective 11 Contentious concepts 16 Key questions about harm 27 The moral calculus: weighing up the harm 36 Conclusion 39

two

Environmental justice and harm to humans 43 Introduction 43 Contentious concepts: environmental justice 44 Social patterns of harm and risk 51 Harm, place and the local 60 Transborder conflicts over land 68 Conclusion: measuring the value of human life 73

three

Conservation, ecological justice and harm to nature 75 Introduction 75 Contentious concepts: ecological justice 76 Transforming nature 83 Land, property and the global commons 94 Conservationism and social division 100 Conclusion: measuring the value of nature 107

four

Species justice and harm to animals 111 Introduction 111 Contentious concepts: species justice 112

iii

Environmental harm Categorising animals Crime, criminology and animals Animals, particular species and individuals Conclusion: measuring the value of animals five

117 124 131 143

Toward eco-justice for all 145 Introduction 145 Contentious concepts: eco-justice 147 Nature, species and culture 156 Socio-economic context of environmental harm 160 Eco-justice in practice 164 Conclusion: where to from here? 173

References 177 Index 197

iv

List of tables, figures and boxes Tables 1.1 Scale 4.1 Fishing and related harmful activities

35 123

Figure 1.1 Contextual model for weighing up harm

37

Boxes 1.1 An eco-justice perspective: three approaches to justice, rights and harms 1.2 Conceptual framework for environmental horizon scanning 1.3 Value 1.4 Measuring harm 2.1 Features of different types of spaces 4.1 Animal categories 4.2 Motivations to engage in poaching 5.1 Notions of justice

14 31 35 35 65 117 129 164

v

About the author Rob White is Professor of Criminology in the School of Social Sciences at the University of Tasmania,Australia. He has published extensively in the areas of criminology and youth studies. Recent publications include Transnational environmental crime (Routledge, 2011); Climate change from a criminological perspective (Springer, 2012); and Youth gangs, violence and social respect (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). He has special interest in environmental forensic studies as this pertains to contaminated communities, the dynamics of environmental law enforcement and adjudication processes at domestic and international levels, and climate change and social conflict.

vii

Acknowledgements This book is the culmination of years of research and scholarship involving much thinking about and mulling over of many different ideas and conundrums. I am thankful for the assistance of Chris Baker who in the early phases compiled background materials from which a number of illustrations and examples for this book were drawn. Many thanks go as well to Avi Brisman for his insightful comments and queries as the manuscript began to take shape.Throughout the project, Di Heckenberg provided intellectual contributions and editorial suggestions of the highest order. Indeed, Di’s constructive criticism and detailed feedback played a major role in helping to clarify key concepts and arguments, and for this I am especially grateful. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the ongoing support and encouragement of  Alison Shaw from Policy Press over the life course of this book.

ix

Introduction

Environmental harm and social harm approaches Environmental harm is a highly contested concept. This is because much actual harm is perceived to be legitimate and lawful. This is achieved through a combination of embedding harmful practices into everyday activities (such as animal food production and clearfellbased forestry), pervasive propaganda efforts about the value of certain types of environmental and human exploitation (such as income generation and job opportunities), and political manoeuvring around and manipulation of legislation, regulations and rules that allow the destruction and degradation of the environment (such as exceptions that deny animal cruelty provisions being applied to farm animals).This conjunction of forces results in many transgressions against humans, specific biospheres, and animal and plant species to assume the status of simply being ‘the way things are’. One of the hallmarks of the development of ‘social harm’ as a concept is that it directs writers critically to consider wider social contexts and the limitations of conventional approaches, particularly criminological, to harm (Hillyard and Tombs, 2007; Hillyard et al, 2004; Hillyard et al, 2005). For some, a standard criminological approach to harm is inherently limiting and should be eschewed in favour of an alternative discipline, sometimes referred to as ‘zemiology’ (Hillyard and Tombs, 2007). Others are less convinced that criminology ought to be left behind, highlighting the long tradition within criminology of challenges to legalistic, narrow definitions of crime and harm (Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2007; Friedrichs and Schwartz, 2007). For present purposes, the concern is not to directly address the fraught relationship between criminology and social harm except to acknowledge that a social harm approach lends itself well to the study of environmental harm. This is so for several reasons. As outlined by Pemberton (forthcoming), the analytical focus on social harm has tended to highlight three important issues. First, social harms are ubiquitous precisely because they stem from and are ingrained in the structures of contemporary societies. Second, social harms are generally not caused by intentional acts as such, but result from the omission to act or societal indifference to suffering and exploitation. Third, such harms are entirely preventable in that the consequences of 1

Environmental harm

certain social actions or inactions are generally foreseeable.What makes a social harm ‘social’ is the fact that it does not stem from natural causes (for instance, a cyclone or an earthquake causes harm). It is intrinsically caused by humans. It is humans, in concert, who are responsible for the harm. How they do so, however, is a social process embodying relations of power, domination and resistance. As an overarching approach, therefore, social harm analysis makes sense in regards to the study of specific types of harm such as environmental harm. Indeed, much of the discussion and debate presented in this book is implicitly if not explicitly grounded in a social harm approach. The concern is with the health and wellbeing – the needs and ontological integrity – of humans, specific environments and animals. From the point of view of intervention, the question is how best to achieve justice by ensuring that potential to grow and develop (as defined in relation to the nonhuman as well as the human) is realised as far as is practicable, and suffering and degradation diminished.This frequently requires going beyond conventional definitions of harm and legal definitions of crime. As highlighted in social harm analysis, it is also important to discuss issues surrounding the measurement of harm and as part of this to concretise analysis by developing suitable indicators and audit processes that allow for evaluation and quantification of harm (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Pemberton, forthcoming). What complicates and distinguishes the following account, however, is that whereas social harm is generally defined in terms of human needs, rights and being, the subject matter of the present work is concerned with the nonhuman as well as the human. To approach and appreciate this demands a different kind of analytical framework than is usually provided within the social harm literature. While resonating with and sharing common concerns with the usual social harm approach, some variation is also necessary. Accordingly, this book provides an overview of differing approaches to understanding environmental harm from beneath the umbrella of green criminology rather than social harm per se. At the core of the book lie three interconnected justice-based approaches to harm, pertaining to humans, eco-systems and animals. These approaches are the main components or elements that together constitute a broader eco-justice perspective. Each approach is presented in terms of how harm is defined, how harm is measured, and what needs to be done to promote justice.The tensions within and between the three approaches are systematically explored and analysed throughout the book. The present work builds upon the theoretical foundations provided in Crimes against nature: environmental criminology and ecological justice (White, 2

Introduction

2008a).The purpose of that book was to provide an overview of green criminology. Green criminology refers to the study by criminologists of environmental harms (that may incorporate wider definitions of crime than that provided in strictly legal definitions), environmental laws (including enforcement, prosecution and sentencing practices) and environmental regulation (systems of civil and criminal law that are designed to manage, protect and preserve specified environments and species, and to manage the negative consequences of particular industrial processes).The key focus of green criminology is environmental crime. This is, however, conceptualised in several different ways within the broad framework of green criminology. For some scholars, environmental crime is defined narrowly within strict legal definitions – it is what the law says it is. For others, environmental harm is deemed to be a (social and ecological) crime, regardless of legal status: if harm is done to environments or animals, then from the point of view of the critical green criminologist this ought to be considered a ‘crime’.This is a crucial area of overlap with the social harm approach. This present book is dedicated to discussing how ‘justice’ (and thereby, ‘harm’) is framed differently within green criminology, although each approach in its own way contributes to a wider eco-justice perspective. Environmental injustice (or victimisation) is considered from the point of view of transgressions against humans, specific bio-spheres or environments, and nonhuman animals.This is conceptualised in terms of three broad areas of analytical interest: environmental justice (here the main focus is on differences within human populations: social justice demands access to healthy and safe environments for all, and for future generations); ecological justice (here the main focus is on ‘the environment’ as such, and to conserve and protect ecological wellbeing, for example, forests, is seen as intrinsically worthwhile); and species justice (here the main focus is on ensuring the wellbeing of both species as a whole, such as whales or polar bears, and individual animals, which should be shielded from abuse, degradation and torture). Strategic and policy responses to environmental harm have generally been inadequate. In terms of government action, for instance, the criminal justice system generally has a highly circumscribed role in addressing the harms described in this book, and there are major limitations and contradictions in the existing mechanisms of conflict resolution and harm reduction in relation to eco-justice considerations. These issues are discussed at length in the book Transnational environmental crime: toward an eco-global criminology (White, 2011). It is important to acknowledge that while most pressures for change in regards to environmental reform have emanated from civil society, 3

Environmental harm

much of this activity rests upon fairly narrowly delineated political ecojustice agendas. As demonstrated in the present book, environmental social action has been accompanied by profound differences between and within different activist groups, many of which hinge upon how ‘harm’ is conceptualised in the first place.A basic argument of the book is that effective action on matters pertaining to environmental harm demands clarity as to the substantive nature of the harm (for example, who or what is being harmed) and the interrelationships between different harms (for example, human and nonhuman).

Green criminology and environmental harm Green criminology is premised on the need to take environmental harm seriously. For some exponents, this translates into conceptualisations of harm that go beyond conventional understandings of crime (see Beirne and South, 2007; South and Brisman, 2013). Green criminologists generally agree that destructive and damaging human activities that harm environments warrant greater attention than has hitherto been the case within criminology. There are already a plethora of laws and conventions that deal with environmental crimes and harms.Yet, until recently, very little criminological attention had been given to analysis of how these are actually working, or how best to apply criminological insights from areas such as crime prevention to environmental crime matters. As noted above, if ecological (and social and economic) welfare is to be maximised, then there is a need to expand notions of what actually constitutes environmental crime. Harm, as conceived by critical green criminologists, demands more encompassing definitions than that offered by mainstream law and criminology. This is so insofar as the most ecologically destructive activities such as clearfelling of old growth forests remain quite legal, while more benign practices such as growing of hemp for fibre are still criminalised. Green criminology therefore provides an umbrella under which to theorise and critique both illegal environmental harms (that is, environmental harms currently defined as unlawful and therefore punishable) and legal environmental harms (that is, environmental harms currently condoned as lawful but which are nevertheless socially and ecologically harmful). How harm is conceptualised is thus partly shaped by how the legal–illegal divide is construed within specific research and analysis. Overall, green criminology does encompass environmental harms as described in law. Specific types of harms include activities such as 4

Introduction

the illegal transport and dumping of toxic waste, the transportation of hazardous materials such as ozone depleting substances, the illegal traffic in real or purported radioactive or nuclear substances, the proliferation of ‘e’-waste generated by the disposal of tens-of-thousands of computers and other equipment, the disposal of old ships and airplanes, the illegal trade in flora and fauna, and illegal fishing and logging. Within green criminology there is a more expansive definition of environmental crime or harm that includes (White, 2011): • transgressions that are harmful to humans, environments and nonhuman animals, regardless of legality per se; and • environmental-related harms that are facilitated by the state, as well as corporations and other powerful actors, insofar as these institutions have the capacity to shape official definitions of environmental crime in ways that allow or condone environmentally harmful practices. The definition of an environmental ‘wrong’ therefore varies. Much depends upon who is defining the harm, and what criteria are used in assessing the nature of the activities so described. This is one of the key themes of the present book. Another factor that influences the study of environmental harm relates to the specific interests that count the most when conceptualising the nature and seriousness of the harm. For example, when criminalisation does occur, it often reflects human-centred (or anthropocentric) notions of what is best (for example, protection of legal fisheries, legal timber coups) in ways that treat ‘nature’ and ‘wildlife’ simply and mainly as resources for human exploitation. The intrinsic value of specific ecological areas and particular species tends to be downplayed or ignored. Nevertheless, recent years have seen greater legislative and judicial attention being given to the rights of the environment per se, and to the rights of certain species of nonhuman animal to live free from human abuse, torture and degradation. This reflects both the efforts of eco-rights activists (for example, conservationists) and animal rights activists (for example, animal liberation movements) in changing perceptions, and laws, in regards to the natural environment and nonhuman species.This, too, is of substantial interest to this book. Drawing upon wide-ranging ideas and empirical studies, green criminology has ventured across many different areas of concern. For example, it has documented the existence of law-breaking with respect to pollution, disposal of toxic waste and misuse of environmental resources (White, R., 2009; Gibbs et al, 2010a, b). Other work has examined the distribution of environmental ‘risk’ particularly as these 5

Environmental harm

affect poor and minority populations (Bullard, 1994, 2005a, b; Julian, 2004), and the claims of nonhuman nature to ecological justice (Halsey, 1997; Halsey and White, 1998). Scholars have also considered the specific place of animals in relation to issues of ‘rights’ and human– nonhuman relationships on a shared planet (Benton, 1998; Beirne, 2009, 2007, 2011). Environmental victimisation is similarly a growing area for concerted analytical and practical attention (Williams, 1996; White, 2010a; Hall, 2013).

An eco-justice perspective An eco-justice perspective refers to the broad orientation of green criminology directed at exposing different instances of substantive social and environmental injustice. From an eco-justice perspective, environmental harm is best framed in terms of justice, which in turn is based upon notions of human, ecological and animal rights, and broad egalitarian principles. A key issue is the weighing up of different kinds of harm and violation of rights, that involves stretching the boundaries of conventional criminology to include other kinds of harm than those already deemed to be illegal. As previously indicated, within green criminology there are three broad approaches to justice, each with their own specific conceptions of what is harmful (see White, 2008a). These include: • human rights and environmental justice – in which environmental rights are seen as an extension of human or social rights so as to enhance the quality of human life, now and into the future. • ecological citizenship and ecological justice – in which it is acknowledged that humans are merely one component of complex ecosystems that should be preserved for their own sake via the notion of the rights of the environment. • animal rights and species justice – in which environmental harm is constructed in relation to the place of nonhuman animals within environments and their intrinsic right to not suffer abuse, whether this be one-on-one harm, institutionalised harm or harm arising from human actions that affect climates and environments on a global scale. For many green criminologists the greatest threat to environmental rights, ecological justice and nonhuman animal wellbeing are systemlevel structures and pressures that commodify all aspects of social existence, that are based upon the exploitation humans, nonhuman 6

Introduction

animals and natural resources, and that privilege the powerful over the interests of the vast majority. These considerations are intrinsic to a social harm approach and likewise feature throughout the book. Language shapes how ‘harm’ and ‘value’ are constructed in regards to (specific groups of) humans, specific biospheres and specific nonhuman animals, so a word about terminology is warranted before proceeding. To take one example of the importance of language consider how criminologists and others speak about ‘animals’. From a conservation criminology perspective (see for example, Gibbs et al, 2010a; Herbig and Joubert, 2006) the language used in referring to animals tends to be anthropocentric and instrumental (see Chapter Four).Thus, animals are categorised in terms of ‘wildlife’ and ‘fisheries’. Environmental laws and laws specifically about animals likewise tend to define animals in ways that describe their existence and ‘value’ through reference to human conceptions and human uses (Sankoff and White, 2009). By contrast, those criminologists who write primarily about animal rights and animal welfare issues describe such anthropocentric descriptions as a form of ‘speciesism’ (see Beirne, 2007; Sollund, 2008). From their perspective, it is the suffering of nonhuman animals – whether construed as wild, domestic or commercial – that is of central concern, not whether the suffering stems from illegal criminal acts or not (since much animal suffering is linked to legal activities such as abattoirs and factory farms that rely upon animals as food sources). Accordingly, the language they use to frame the issues is informed by animal-centred rather than human-centred considerations.

Conflicting views and moral dilemmas A number of intersecting dimensions need to be considered in any analysis of environmental harm. These include consideration of who the victim is (human or nonhuman); where the harm is manifest (global through to local levels); the main site in which the harm is apparent (built or natural environment); and the timeframe within which harm can be analysed (immediate and delayed consequences). Many of the key features pertaining to environmental harm are inherently international in scope and impact. As stated, the aim of this book is to provide a detailed examination of three key justice-based approaches to the study of environmental harm.There are significant tensions between and within the approaches. One such tension was recently signalled in the following observation:

7

Environmental harm

The [green environmentalists] rarely champion the sites of their concerns with rights talk, whereas for [animal rights advocates] their very focus is the criterion for moral standing and holding of rights.This crucial deep-seated difference is already present in green criminology in environmentalist notions such as ‘fisheries’ and ‘harvests’ and ‘conservation’, all of which are the stuff and fodder of animal welfare and sustainability but mostly anathema to animal rights. (Beirne, 2011: 354) To put it differently, some green criminologists view nature instrumentally and harm is viewed through the lens of legality; others view the exploitation of nature, particularly in relation to animals, as intrinsically bad and harmful. How, or if, this ‘moral fissure’ can be overcome is of major interest to the present project. It is not possible in this short book to explore every facet of environmental harm, nor to review the many different perspectives on environmental harm (or harm more generally) within the social sciences. Rather, from the point of view of eco-justice, the core concern is with the object of harm or victimisation. In other words, the emphasis is on identifying issues pertaining to the victims of harm, including how to define who or indeed what is an environmental ‘victim’ (Williams, 1996). As mentioned above, many green criminologists believe that the concept of harm ought to encapsulate those activities that may be legal and legitimate but which nevertheless have a negative impact on people, eco-systems and nonhuman animals (Lynch and Stretesky, 2003; Beirne and South, 2007). The latter are precisely the fulcrum upon which rest many of the major differences within the eco-justice perspective. Chapter One provides an outline of the three distinct justice-based approaches to harm: environmental justice, ecological justice and species justice. General questions are raised about how harm is or ought to be defined, about the measurement of harm, and about developing strategies that respond to environmental harm. The next three chapters explore the three justice-based approaches in greater depth. Chapter Two focuses on issues of environmental justice. Here the main consideration is the health and wellbeing of humans in relation to the environment, and how this is impacted upon by such things as environmental racism, social disadvantage and biocolonialism. Chapter Three focuses on issues of ecological justice.The main consideration is ecological sustainability and the ways in which eco-systems are preserved or degraded. Chapter Four focuses on the 8

Introduction

health and wellbeing of (nonhuman) animals.The main consideration is to differences between animal welfare and animal rights approaches, and the various ways in which animals are categorised, exploited and valued. Chapter Five summarises the tensions between these three justicebased approaches and considers the question of moving toward ecojustice for all.The first approach tends to put the emphasis on specific oppressed or exploited groups. The second tends to prioritise places over people. The third is concerned with animals rather than with humans or specific environments. How eco-justice considerations can be balanced is an important consideration of this chapter. Development of an eco-justice perspective requires both appreciation of the wider political economic context within which exploitation of the human and the nonhuman occurs, and practical strategies that can be used to navigate complex and problematic moral and ethical dilemmas.

9

One

Justice-based approaches to environmental harm Introduction How we understand the relationships between humans, the environment and nonhuman species is crucial to defining and responding to environmental issues. Embedded within different interpretations of these (inter)relationships are particular notions of harm.These notions, in turn, are reflected in specific conceptions of victimisation including who or what is subjected to which kinds of harm. This chapter elaborates on the three approaches that singly and collectively contribute to and underpin an eco-justice perspective: environmental justice, ecological justice and species justice. Ecojustice is itself a complex notion that incorporates elements from all three justice approaches. Fundamentally, applying an eco-justice perspective involves weighing up the nature and degree of harm, in specific situations, in relation to humans, eco-systems and nonhuman species (including plants). Action outcomes and specific interventions can and should only proceed on the basis of detailed knowledge and discussion of these three types of injustice, and how they ‘fit’ together and overlap in any given circumstance. This is both the starting point and the end conclusion of the present book.Why this is the case forms the substantive contribution of the chapters that follow. After briefly outlining these approaches, the main part of this chapter explores the conceptual and methodological challenges associated with defining and measuring ‘harm’, including environmental harm. The purpose is to raise issues and provide a background framing for the analysis of eco-justice concerns in subsequent chapters.

Components of an eco-justice perspective Eco-justice conceptions of harm include consideration of transgressions against environments, nonhuman species and humans (White, 2008a). For this kind of analysis the first question to ask is ‘what harm is there in this particular activity?’ rather than whether the activity is legal or not. 11

Environmental harm

Different philosophical perspectives on the nature–human relationship shape definitions of ‘crime’, and what are deemed to be appropriate responses to environmental issues. As will be seen shortly, eco-philosophy has a major impact on how researchers and activists define crime and the varying ways in which they understand the victimisation of humans, specific environments and nonhuman animals. A considerable disjuncture exists between what is officially labelled environmentally harmful from the point of view of criminal and civil law, and what can be said to constitute the greatest sources of harm from an ecological perspective. For example, there are profound, long-term adverse environmental effects flowing from such historically legitimate practices as using long-lines and drift-nets to catch fish, injecting cyanide and arsenic into the earth to mine precious metals, or destroying nonhuman nature in the course of building freeways and mega-cities. Indeed, many conventional, and legal, forms of human production and interaction do far worse things to the natural environment than those activities which are deemed illegal. Although the philosophies employed to explicate the nature of the relation between the ‘social’ and the ‘natural’ worlds are numerous (see, for example, Lane, 1998; Halsey, 2004), a useful analytical distinction can be made between anthropocentric (human-centred), biocentric (species-centred) and ecocentric (socio-ecological centred) perspectives (see Halsey and White, 1998). The anthropocentric perspective emphasises the biological, mental and moral superiority of humans over other living and non-living entities. Biocentrism views human beings as simply ‘another species’ to be attributed the same moral worth as such organisms as, for example, whales, wolves and birds. Ecocentrism refuses to place humanity either above or below the rest of nature. However, the unique capacity for human beings to develop and deploy methods of production which have global consequences, means that humans also have an explicit responsibility to ensure that such production methods do not exceed the ecospheric limits of the planet (White, 2007). Moreover, this responsibility extends to human and nonhuman life. Issues of eco-justice and accountability are discussed further in Chapter Five. For many of those studying and taking action on environmental issues, the question of broad philosophy is grounded in specific concerns about eco-human rights and the responsibilities of ecological citizenship (see for example, Halsey, 1997; Smith, 1998). What does this mean in practice? It means that present generations ought to act in ways that do not jeopardise the existence and quality of life of future generations. It also means that we ought to extend the moral community to include 12

Justice-based approaches to environmental harm

nonhuman nature. By doing so, it is argued that we enter a new politics of obligation: In ecological thought, human beings have obligations to animals, trees, mountains, oceans and other members of the biotic community.This means that human beings have to exercise extreme caution before embarking upon any project which is likely to have the possibility of adverse effects upon the ecosystems concerned. (Smith, 1998: 99) This particular notion of ecological citizenship centres on human obligations to all living things, and the need to carefully assess the impacts of human activity across the human and nonhuman domains. It also incorporates notions of risk and taking precautions in order to minimise potential harm. However, such considerations are not without their challenges.The conceptualisation of ‘rights’, for example, is contentious when extended to the nonhuman, whether this refers to specific eco-systems or particular animals (see Christoff, 2000). Similar difficulties and problems are apparent when it comes to defining environmental harm. Environmental harm can be distinguished on the basis of who or what precisely is being harmed or victimised. As indicated in Box 1.1, there are three broad theoretical approaches (within green criminology) that frame how specific writers view the nature of environmental issues, including harm and responses to harm. These approaches present different dimensions of injustice which are relevant to an overarching eco-justice perspective. Each approach is concerned with particular conceptions of rights and different types of harmful transgression.

13

Environmental harm Box 1.1:  An eco-justice perspective: three approaches to justice, rights and harms Environmental justice and human rights Focus: Environmental rights as an extension of human or social rights so as to enhance the quality of human life. Concepts: Intergenerational responsibility: the present generation is responsible to ensure environmental equity for future generations. Environmental justice: everyone has the right to a healthy environment and there ought to be environmental equity for present generations. Emphasis: Environmental harm is constructed in relation to human-centred notions of value and use. Ecological justice and ecological citizenship Focus: Human beings are merely one component of complex ecosystems that should be preserved for their own sake via the notion of the rights of the environment. Concepts: Ecological citizenship: humans are responsible for the preservation and conservation of nature. Ecological justice: is concerned with the quality of the biosphere and rights of nonhuman species. Emphasis: Environmental harm is constructed in relation to notions of ecological harm and destructive techniques of human intervention. Species justice and animal rights Focus: Nonhuman animals have rights based upon utilitarian notions (maximising pleasure and minimising pain), inherent value (right to respectful treatment) and an ethic of responsible caring. Concepts: Anti-speciesism and animal rights: addressing the discriminatory treatments of animals as Other. Animal welfare: dealing with issues of animal abuse and suffering, and the nurturing of respectful relationships. Emphasis: Environmental harm is constructed in relation to the place of nonhuman animals within environments and their intrinsic right to not suffer abuse, whether this be one-on-one harm, institutionalised harm or harm arising from human actions that affect climates and environments on a global scale. Source: modified from White, 2008a.

14

Justice-based approaches to environmental harm

The following synopsis of each justice-based approach provides initial insight into the broad concerns of each. These will be discussed more fully in subsequent chapters.

Environmental justice Environmental justice refers to the distribution of environments among peoples in terms of access to, and use of, specific natural resources in defined geographical areas, and the impacts of particular social practices and environmental hazards on specific populations (for example, ethnic minorities). In other words, the concern is with humans, who are at the centre of analysis. The focus is on human health and wellbeing and how these are affected by particular types of production and consumption. A distinction is usually made between environmental issues that affect everyone, and those that disproportionately affect specific individuals and groups (see Williams, 1996; Low and Gleeson, 1998). In some instances, there may be a basic ‘equality of victims’, in that some environmental problems threaten everyone, as in the case, for example, of ozone depletion, global warming, air pollution and acid rain (Beck, 1996). However, as extensive work on specific incidents and patterns of victimisation demonstrate, it is also the case that some people are more likely to be disadvantaged by environmental problems than others (Bullard, 1994, 2005a, b; Chunn et al, 2002; Julian, 2004). Within the environmental justice framework, it is humans that matter.

Ecological justice Ecological justice refers to the relationship of humans generally, to the rest of the natural world, and includes concerns relating to the health of the bio-sphere, and more specifically plants and animals that also inhabit the biosphere (Smith, 1998; Cullinan, 2003). The main concern is with the quality of the planetary environment (which is frequently seen to possess its own intrinsic value) and the rights of other species (particularly animals) to live free from torture, abuse and destruction of habitat. Specific practices, and choices, in how humans interact with particular environments present immediate and potential risks to everything within them. Ecological notions of justice and rights see humans as but one component of complex ecosystems that should be preserved for their own sake, as supported by the notion of the rights of the environment. In this framework, all living things are bound together and environmental matters are intrinsically global and trans-boundary in nature. Ecological justice demands that how humans 15

Environmental harm

interact with their environment be constantly evaluated in relation to potential harms and risks to specific creatures and specific locales as well as the biosphere generally.Within the ecological justice framework, it is environments and specific eco-systems that matter.

Species justice Species justice includes the particular consideration that animal welfare and rights ought to be of relevance to eco-justice (Benton, 1998; Beirne, 2007). In specific terms, concepts such as speciesism may be invoked.This refers to the practice of discriminating against nonhuman animals because they are perceived to be inferior to the human species in much the same way that sexism and racism involve prejudice and discrimination against women and people of different colour (Munro, 2004). The animal-centred discourse of animal rights shares much in common with the environment-centred discourse of ecological justice, but certain differences are also apparent (Beirne, 2007). For example, nonhuman animals are frequently considered in primarily instrumental terms (as pets, as food, as resources) in conventional criminology, or categorised in mainly anthropomorphic terms (such as ‘wildlife’, ‘fisheries’) that belie the ways in which humans create and classify animals as Other. Within the species justice framework, it is animals that matter. These three broadly different but connected approaches to justice together constitute the eco-justice perspective.They overlap in varying ways but ultimately have distinctive foci around which scholars and activists tend to mobilise their efforts (that is, stopping toxic waste dumping, saving forests, protecting animals). Within the particular conceptual and action frameworks of each approach there are important differences based upon how specific ‘interests’ are conceptualised.These divisions, too, will be discussed more fully in subsequent chapters.

Contentious concepts As this book focuses on conceptualisations of environmental harm it is important to outline both general philosophical perspectives and the foundational concepts that inform matters of environmental harm.This section is divided into two sub-sections.The first deals with conceptual issues, including discussion of concepts such as the environment, environmental crime, harm, risk, victimisation and justice.The second considers issues pertaining to measurement. Here the concern is with

16

Justice-based approaches to environmental harm

questions of data and definitions, and what kind of information is collected by whom.

Conceptual Issues Environment is defined differently depending upon the frame of reference. For an ecologist, for example, environment is inseparable from notions of ecology.The concept of ‘ecology’ refers to the complex interactions of nonhuman nature, including its abiotic components (air, water, soils) and its biotic components (plants, animals, fungi, bacteria). Humans are implicated in these interactions as the relationship between humans and the environment is crucial to understanding how environments change over time, for better or for worse (Merchant, 2005). Legal definitions of the environment include not only ‘nature’, ‘natural resources’ and ecological communities, but built environments and cultural heritage as well (Al-Damkhi et al, 2009). Cities and urban life can thus be included in conceptualisations of environment, as well as archetypal places of obvious conservation interest.What happens in ‘wilderness’ or in the ‘metropolis’ can nonetheless have major ecological and social consequences across territorial distances. Environmental crime is typically defined on a continuum ranging from strict legal definitions through to broader harm perspectives (see also Bricknell, 2010). For example: ‘an unauthorized act or omission that violates the law and is therefore subject to criminal prosecution and criminal sanction’ (Situ and Emmons, 2000: 3) ‘an act committed with the intent to harm or with a potential to cause harm to ecological and/or biological systems and for the purpose of securing business or personal advantage’ (Clifford and Edwards, 1998: 26) ‘criminal conduct that may have negative consequences for the environment’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011: 95) ‘environmental harm is a crime’ (White, 2011: 1) The social construction of legal and illegal is far from trivial when it comes to the study of environmental harm. From a criminal justice

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perspective, this issue goes to the heart of why environmental crime itself is consistently under-valued in law: Of note is the consistent use of the preface ‘illegal’ in the listed activities constituting environmental crime, a preface not regularly employed when describing other categories of crime. This reflects the fact that some component or level of these activities is still condoned and that it only becomes illegal once a set boundary has been passed. The tipping point of illegality contrasts environmental crimes with other established criminal offences. (Bricknell, 2010: 4) The label of environmental crime tends to be applied to specific activities that are otherwise lawful or licensed (for example, illegal cutting down of trees) but rarely if ever to environmental harms involving widescale regional environmental destruction, such as warrelated degradation (for example, deforestation due to use of Agent Orange) (see Al-Damkhi et al, 2009). Environmental destruction has long been a recognised consequence of war.The environment has been described as both a casualty and a method of warfare: ‘Scorched earths in Norway, defoliated jungles in Vietnam, ignited oil fields in Kuwait, emptied marshes in southern Iraq – the environment is often both a victim and a tool of armed conflict’ (Weinstein, 2005: 698).Yet, for all the various types of environmental destruction associated with war, no State and no individual has ever been held accountable for this kind of harm.This is for a wide variety of legal, political and economic reasons (Weinstein, 2005;White, 2008b; Al-Damkhi et al, 2009). Nevertheless, the harms associated with military activity demands some type of response, including redefining these harms as environmental crimes. Green criminology’s broader conceptualisations of environmentally adverse activities are essential in evaluating systemic, as well as particularistic, environmental harms (Beirne and South, 2007). For example, the current environmental regulatory apparatus, informed by the ideology of ‘sustainable development’, is directed at bringing ecological sustainability to the present mode of producing and consuming – one based upon the logic of growth, expanded consumption of resources, and the commodification of more and more aspects of nature. Harm, in this case, is built into the system. This is a foundational feature of social harm generally (Pemberton, forthcoming). To summarise, it is important to distinguish (and make the connection between) specific instances of harm arising from imperfect operational practices (such as pollution spills), and systemic harm which is created 18

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by normatively sanctioned forms of activity (such as clearfelling of Australian, Brazilian and Indonesian forests). The first is deemed to be ‘criminal’ or ‘harmful’, and thus subject to coercive social control. The second is not considered a criminal matter, although subject to regulation. The overall consequence is for the global environmental problem to get worse, in the very midst of the proliferation of a greater range of regulatory mechanisms, agencies and laws. This is partly an outcome of the way in which environmental risk is compartmentalised: specific events or incidents attract sanction, while wider legislative frameworks may set parameters on other ecologically harmful practices, but nevertheless still permit them to continue. The critical questions – applicable to each of the justice-based approaches offered above – is what criteria can be used to substantiate specific claims that something is harmful, and whether it is harmful to the extent that warrants application of the label ‘criminal’. These are questions of measurement in terms of the scale and seriousness of the harm. Harm has been described as a ‘normative concept that reflects underlying social judgements about the good and the bad’, and environmental harm specifically has been defined as ‘a setback to human interests that community norms have deemed to be significant’ (Lin, 2006: 901). The varied dimensions of harm are demonstrated in the contemporary proliferation of information about chains of causation that generate direct, indirect, immediate and cumulative harms (Lin, 2006; Heckenberg, 2010). Harm is complex and transferable. Given that harm is a normative concept, specific forms of harm need to be analysed in ways that offer specific facts about their nature and extent, the uncertainties associated with their occurrence and the societal priorities that exist in relation to them.This is both a technical and philosophical exercise that requires tools for the measurement and evaluation of harm in specific contexts, circumstances and situations. For instance, how do we distinguish between a minor harm and a major harm? How do we reconcile situations in which two different forms of harm are at play involving risk tradeoffs? For example, public health in regards to the West Nile virus, which is spread by mosquitoes, may be advanced by an aerial spraying campaign using chemical pesticides, but this may, in turn, generate harm to the environment and to people (see Scott, 2005a). Harm can also be defined, negatively, in terms of loss or diminishment. A key concept here is that of sustainability, which refers to notions of ongoing ecological and environmental balance over time (Merchant, 2005; Al-Damkhi et al, 2009). A loss of environmental resources or 19

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biological diversity can thus be construed as harmful if ‘sustainability’ is the yardstick by which harm is measured.The deliberate destruction or depletion of resources that have a significant impact on a region’s economic or ecological stability would therefore be considered an environmental crime (Al-Damkhi et al, 2009: 121). Risk is a multidimensional concept generally incorporating several key elements. One notion of risk sees it as a prediction or expectation that involves: a hazard (the source of danger); uncertainty of occurrence and outcomes (expressed by the probability or chance of occurrence); adverse consequences (the possible outcome); a timeframe for evaluation; and the perspectives of those affected about what is important to them (Leiss and Hrudey 2005, p. 3). In law, risk of environmental harm is an important component of what constitutes harm (rather than ordinary tort law which requires actual injury as a prerequisite to recovery).This is because preventative environmental regulation is intended precisely to regulate the risk of harm occurring, that is, to prevent environmental harm before it occurs. Risk incorporates notions of both probability and harm (Lin, 2006: 961), thereby raising issues relating to the certainty of knowledge (about environments, about harms) and how best to measure or ascertain likely outcomes. Intervention is premised upon taking the right precautionary measures to suit the perceived risk of harm. Assessment of risk is not solely based upon probability, since the potential magnitude of harm must also be taken into account. Victimisation is central to the notions of ‘risk’ and ‘precaution’, since each is interpreted in terms of potential threat to human and environmental wellbeing. Particularly in regards to human victims (although this observation may well extend to many nonhuman animals as well), analysis of the nature of environmental harm has to take into account objective and subjective dimensions of victimisation. The question of agency (that is, understandings, feelings, decisionmaking of discrete subjects, capacity to change one’s circumstances) is also relevant to the processes of environmental victimisation within the context of the wider political economy. That is, the dynamics of environmental harm cannot be understood apart from consideration of who has the power to make decisions, the kinds of decisions that are made, in whose interests they are made, and how social practices based on these decisions are materially organised. Issues of power and control also need to be contextualised in the light of global economic, social and political developments. Harm is not necessarily equated with victimisation, especially if the latter is interpreted as applying strictly to humans. For example, environmental victimisation has been defined as specific forms of harm 20

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which are caused by acts (for example, dumping of toxic waste) or omissions (for example, failure to provide safe drinking water) leading to the presence or absence of environmental agents (for example, poisons, nutrients) which are associated with human injury (see Williams, 1996). Management of these forms of victimisation is generally retrospective (after the fact), and involves a variety of legal and social responses.What is important is that the central actor in this definition is humans (not nonhuman animals or eco-systems). Much the same can be said of reconceptualisations of environmental rights as ‘human rights’ in that the selfsame concept is premised upon notions of humanity. Nonetheless, the law does allow for a modicum of protection for the nonhuman as well as the human (even if they do not have legal standing as ‘victims’ in their own right). This is reflected in legislation pertaining to endangered species (for example, particular animals such as tigers) and to conservation more generally (for example, in the form of national parks). Harm is central to these forms of social regulation as well, however; whether ‘harm to the environment’ is of consequence unless it is measured with reference to human values (for example, economic, aesthetic, cultural) is of ongoing concern in regards to legal decision-making (see Lin, 2006). In essence, natural objects (such as trees and forests) lack legal rights (and agency or volition) and so must rely upon humans to bring actions to protect them. Some argue that the inherent interests of ‘natural objects’ ought to be protected through legal actions by the objects themselves, with humans serving as their guardians or trustees (Stone, 1972; Lin, 2006). Intervention in environmental matters depends in part upon how harm and risk are conceived and whether assessment of these subsequently leads to action. Responding to environmental harm is not only about reacting to specific events or incidents but also includes predicting and evaluating potential threats or risks into the future. Precaution is central to protecting the planet, humans and nonhuman animals from projected harms. This involves weighing up and recognising which harms and risks actually exist, and for whom. What gets defined as ‘harm’ or ‘risk’ is contingent upon the capacity of sectional interests to secure measures for generalising and implementing action against what is deemed to be ‘harmful’ behaviour, primarily via the state. Harm is rendered invisible to the extent that it can be externalised to more vulnerable population groups who do not have access to the social and political networks of influence available to the powerful. Harm is rendered unproblematic when nonhuman animals (of particular types) and specific bio-spheres are exploited or damaged without an advocate to stand up for their specific interests. Evidence 21

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of harm and wrongdoing is vital to proving injustice and mobilising social movements for change. It has been observed that – in relation to humans – the notion of harm necessitates an understanding of the human condition and the prerequisites for human well-being (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). One way to assess harm according to these criteria is through consideration of the concept of ‘need’ in relation to human life. For green criminology and the eco-justice perspective, the obvious challenge is how best to conceptualise ‘need’ in regards to the nonhuman and, indeed, to collectivities and systems, rather than solely to individuals.At least part of the answer to this is provided in literature that examines closely the notion of ‘justice’. Justice in political practice is articulated and understood as a balance of numerous interlinked elements. Schlosberg (2007) identifies the key categories or dimensions of justice as including distribution, recognition, participation and capability. • The notion of justice as fairness is associated with questions of distribution. Justice, according to this conception, defines how we distribute various rights, goods and liberties and how we define and regulate social and economic equality and inequality. What matters are the rules of distributive justice and how these are constructed. The rules may be procedure-based, such as providing equal opportunities for everyone to attain valued goods; or they may be oriented toward consequentialist and substantive conceptions of justice that ensure equal outcomes. Differences of opinion occur over the principles governing those proposed distributions (for example, need, desert, entitlement). Such principles are relevant to both human and nonhuman, particularly in the context of extending the notion of rights to environments and particular animals. • Recognition refers to the equal dignity accorded to all, as well as the politics of difference where everyone is recognised for their particular distinctiveness. It is observed that ‘A lack of recognition in the social and political realms demonstrated by various forms of insults, degradation and devaluation at both the individual and cultural level inflicts damage to oppressed individuals and communities in the political and cultural realms’ (Schlosberg, 2007: 14). Derogatory language used in relation to animals provides one illustration of subordinated and disrespected identity as this applies to the nonhuman (see Beirne, 2009). Here it is argued that contemporary practices of cultural domination are such that the rights, interests and needs of eco-systems and animals are rendered invisible in ordinary 22

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life, and accordingly fewer legal, social and economic resources are put into acknowledging, supporting and respecting the nonhuman. • The need for participation is also defined as an important component of justice. Participation generally refers to a person’s membership and engagement in the greater community, and is supported by the institutionalisation of democractic and participatory decisionmaking procedures.As applied to the nonhuman world, participation involves human advocacy, where the voice of animals or trees or eco-systems is ‘heard’ via the human third party. Humans speak ‘on behalf of ’ that and those which cannot participate directly in human affairs that affect them. • Capability is important to justice as well.This refers to the ability to achieve valuable functionings within the context of one’s essential character and setting. For humans, capabilities are about a person’s opportunities to do and to be what they choose in the context of a given society. Wellbeing is about ‘doing’ (activities) and ‘being’ (states of existence). Enhancing capability means concentrating on the opportunity to be able to have combinations of functionings and for the person to be free to make use of this opportunity or not (Schlosberg, 2007).Translated into an eco-justice context, capability means that each thing should be able to flourish as the thing it is. It is argued, for example, that ‘Every component of the Earth Community has three rights: the right to be, the right to habitat, and the right to fulfil its role in the ever renewing processes of the Earth Community’ (Berry, quoted in Cullinan, 2003). What this means in practice is difficult to determine, however, since nature by definition is complex, uncertain, interconnected and ever changing. Capabilities (as possibilities) are therefore changing, open-ended, dynamic and subject to ongoing deliberation. The close association of justice principles with conceptions of harm is not without controversy (see Pemberton, forthcoming). Social harm accounts tend to view harm as reflective of ‘what is’ in the context of ‘what ought to be’ (a fusion of ‘fact’ and ‘value’), especially since in this framework the criteria for determining harm necessarily includes extra-legal criteria and informed opinion regarding what is deemed to be ‘wrong’. Analysis proceeds on the basis of acts and omissions that are generative of some type of negative consequence and these are deemed to be morally wrong on the basis that someone or something is thereby harmed. Justice is not only concerned with ‘what is/what ought to be’, but ‘what could be’. In other words, as described above, it encapsulates, as well, the idea of potentials – potentials that in many 23

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cases are stifled, prevented or diminished by systemic pressures and limits of the society as a whole. Harm and injustice co-exist within the context of injurious social relationships that perpetuate wrongness. It is not only with the concepts reviewed in this sub-section that many questions emerge vis-à-vis eco-justice. The same applies to matters pertaining to the measurement of harm.

Measurement issues The overall aim of criminal law is to prevent and punish certain kinds of behaviour – both acts and omissions – regarded as harmful or potentially harmful. The purposes of criminal law vary, however, and involve a constant weighing up of moral wrongness, individual autonomy, and community welfare (Findlay et al, 1994).What falls within the ambit of criminal law (and what does not) is the outcome of a social process that is ongoing and inherently political, since it embodies basic principles and visions of the kind of society in which people prefer to live. A primary task of criminal law is to stipulate the degree of seriousness of criminal conduct.This involves assessing such factors as the physical impact of the conduct on the victim, psychological trauma, the monetary value of crimes and so forth. Social scientists who study crime argue that it is ‘harm’ that needs to be measured and assessed, and that in doing so the study of crime must go beyond existing legal definitions and criteria for several reasons. First, wrongdoing is perpetrated by states themselves, yet it is nationstates that define what is criminal, corrupt or unjust. There is a need to develop definitions of crime and criteria by which harm can be measured that are not restricted to specific state’s laws but that are more universal in nature (for example, appeal to ‘human rights’ or ‘environmental rights’ or ‘animal rights’). Second, harms perpetrated by powerful groups and organisations, such as transnational corporations, are frequently dealt with by the state as civil rather than criminal matters.This reflects the capacity of the powerful to shape laws in ways that do not criminalise their activities, even when they are ecologically disastrous. Third, extra-legal concepts and factors need to be studied if we are to fully capture the nature of environmental harm, and this requires a different way of framing the issues.An ecology-based analysis of wrong-doing will provide a different picture of ‘harm’ than an economic-based analysis. What is defined as criminal harm, and the measure of the seriousness of that harm, are contingent upon the social interests bound up with the definitional process.

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The history of crime and punishment reveals how the definitions, purposes and applications of the law change over time.What is defined as ‘a criminal act’, and how the ‘criminal’ is socially and legally portrayed shifts according to particular socio-economic circumstances (White and Perrone, 2010).What is deemed to be a serious social problem, and who is deemed to be the proper target for state intervention, is contingent upon the material conditions that shape the formation of identifiable groups (for example, corporations, environmental activists), and the resources available to particular groups. ‘Crime’ is thus a construct of society – at the level of definition, causal factors, types of offences, and state intervention. To fully appreciate and understand the nature of crime and criminal law requires examination of the wider society.The degree to which environmental crime is considered harmful has a major bearing on how and why perpetrators do what they do, and on how criminal justice institutions respond to such harms (see White, 2011). The concept of environmental harm is built into various statutes and guidelines pertaining to environmental crime and justice. In general, distinctions are made on the basis of seriousness, material environmental harm and level of nuisance. In commenting on Australian environmental laws, Bricknell (2010: 13) observes: There is some variation in how harm is defined but ‘serious’ and ‘material’ environmental harms are basically distinguished by the intensity and extent of the environmental impact and the actual or potential loss of (or damage to) property. The harm incurred is referenced to a predetermined monetary threshold and further differentiated as to the willfulness or intentional nature of the act. Research into US legal systems has demonstrated that environmental criminal statutes and environmental sentencing guidelines represent two very different ways of defining and assessing the social harm addressed by environmental crimes (Mandiberg, 2009). Federal environmental crimes contained in legislation such as the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act tend to utilise criminal provisions mainly to punish failure to abide by these regulatory systems. The point of each regulatory system is to manage contact between a pollutant and the air, water or soil, not to prevent it.The net result is that the focus is not on environmental harm as such, but rather on unacceptable (or significant) environmental harm – as measured by predetermined technical and administrative thresholds.

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By contrast, federal environmental crime sentencing guidelines focus more on matters of actual harm rather than risk reduction concerns. There is evidence here of the importance of graduated punishments based on the seriousness of the social harm being addressed, and support for increased punishment for violators who actually harm the environment. Interestingly, in both sets of legal instruments there is little formal definition of ‘environmental harm’, and the lack of clarity gives rise to different interpretations of to what this might refer. There are also difficulties with conceptualisations of ‘seriousness’ and ‘causality’ (see Mandiberg, 2009). Environmental crime is socially constructed both through definitional processes and by the ways in which environmental law enforcement is carried out in practice. As noted elsewhere, ‘The ways in which we “measure crime” are thus intertwined with both “how crime is defined” (and what is deemed to be serious and harmful) and “how it is responded to by institutions of criminal justice” (through specific campaigns, programs, and interventions)’ (White and Habibis, 2005: 10). Of concern to green criminologists is how best to measure the dark figure of environmental crime – those harms presently unreported or undocumented or unacknowledged as environmental crimes. Also of concern is how best to gauge institutional biases in what is deemed to be worthy of official attention and what is not. It is important, as well, to consider the question of victims and to establish some kind of baseline criteria that can be used to measure who or what suffers which kinds of environmental victimisation. The measurement of environmental crime is difficult for a number of reasons. In part, this relates to the paucity of consolidated data on environmental crimes.There has been little sustained effort for instance to bring together official and alternative sources of information, much less data between different government departments and criminal justice agencies (such as police, non-government organisations, activist groups, animal welfare providers, journalist accounts and so on). Who is collecting what, for whom, and why are essential questions when it comes to data on environmental crime. Even if such data were readily available, offences would need to be clearly defined, and categories of offence would have to be standardised across jurisdictions to allow for comparability (for example, wildlife offences grouped separately from pollution offences). More sophisticated analysis would allow researchers to count the number of offences (incidence), as well as the number of offenders (prevalence). Compilation of adequate statistics on environmental prosecutions and convictions is still in its infancy in many jurisdictions around the 26

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world. Part of the difficulty lies in determining which offences will be dealt with via regulatory agencies such as licensing bodies and local government authorities, and which through formal courts or specific environmental protection tribunals. Moreover, depending upon how cases are proceeded against, different agencies will keep different records, have different types of follow-up procedures, and will vary in whether or not the information is easily and publicly accessible. Countries that have better reporting and tracking systems will be those that are economically most developed, and that simultaneously produce the most amounts of waste and pollution. Data on environmental crime and harms, for example, is compiled by such agencies as the US Environmental Protection Agency, the Environment Agency in the UK, and similar bodies in other countries. Relevant information, especially of a comparative and regional nature, can also be garnered from organisations such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).The quantity and quality of data collected is determined by the capacity and resources available to agencies and/or countries for its collection, as well as by the political priority attached to the gathering and disseminating of such data. Non-government organisations such as Traffick, the Environment Investigation Agency and Greenpeace gather important data on a wide range of illegal activities, as well as keeping the pressure on governments and enforcement bodies to address environmental crime. It is evident that detailed study of specific offences, particular types of harm and individual agency responses is required in order to both obtain a better picture of environmental harm, and to monitor how institutionally the state and community is responding to this type of harm. The problem of data collection is compounded by difficulties in ascertaining the nature of the harm itself. In other words, the definitions and experiences of environmental crime can also be linked into different kinds of expertise and experience.

Key questions about harm At a technical rather than strictly legalistic level, there are problems associated with trying to ascertain the precise nature of harm. Consider for example the matter of ‘uncertainty’. This concept has been used to both justify and critique potential policy responses to perceived environmental issues, often defined in accordance with the ‘precautionary principle’. The terms of the precautionary principle are likely to be contested across several dimensions when 27

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applied in practice. This is because each part of the principle involves interpretation of some kind: It is clear that beyond the question of threshold of scientific evidence of potential harm, the application of the precautionary principle will be influenced by a number of other factors.These include perceptions of what constitutes a threat to the environment, what we regard as serious and irreversible and what type and level of precautionary measures are appropriate. (Harding and Fisher, 1999: 15, emphasis in original) Disputes over the terms of the precautionary principle are further complicated by how ‘uncertainty’ is linked to the notion of ‘threshold’ in environmental management and environmental law. Moreover, objective and subjective conceptions of risk tend to further complicate assessments of how best to respond to real and potential risks. The objective interpretation of risk refers to the relative frequency with which a particular outcome occurs, given a class of events of relatively similar conditions. The subjective interpretation of risk refers to a degree of belief or confidence about the likelihood of a certain event occurring. (Lin, 2006: 962) With most phenomena, however, there is limited knowledge and thus a degree of uncertainty – and hence we operate in terms of subjective risk (as defined above). As Lin (2006: 968) points out:‘risk refers to the probability that harm will occur. Uncertainty, in contrast, refers to the potential for error in estimating a risk.’ How we deal with ‘uncertainty’, therefore, has enormous implications for policy development and legal practice in regards to environmental harm and risk. Indeed, the anticipatory role of environmental risk assessment is complicated from the start by the ingrained difficulties of prediction in relation to the environment. Ecological systems are by their very nature complex. Furthermore, given the focus on ‘nature’, any criteria of prediction will be based upon speculative, indefinite criteria. What is important is that such assessments rarely, if ever, take into account the past record of companies and individuals that plan to undertake activity affecting particular environments. Action or inaction on environmental threats has been legitimated one way or the other by claims of scientific uncertainty. The uncertainty 28

Justice-based approaches to environmental harm

has been due to both lack of data, and a more general problem of indeterminacy. The latter refers to processes and systems that cannot readily be captured by the methods of science as such: When nutrients accumulate in shallow waters, or when toxic chemicals bioaccumulate in tissues, systems approach a phase-change threshold where conditions can suddenly and dramatically change.This chaotic, inherent unpredictability in natural processes, combined with the conditional and erratic influences of social behaviour, creates contingency in all scientific assessment. (Scott, 2005b: 60) Moreover, research on scientific decision-making makes it clear that there are inherent political choices being made in risk assessment (see Scott 2005a, b). The scientific method is complemented by social decisions that cannot be reduced to technical questions. Once again the question of values arises when it comes to determinations of what is an environmental harm and what is not. Research into environmental harm involves a number of practical, scientific, empirical and political challenges (see, for examples, White 2011). One useful methodological approach to the study of potential environmental harm is horizon scanning (White 2011, see also White and Heckenberg 2011). Looking over the horizon to identify potential developments is not a new activity. Standard evaluation methods, for example, generally incorporate varying forms of SWOT analysis – strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats – that speak to analysis of risks and potential harms now and into the future. Within a criminological context such methods are increasingly evident. For instance, they are intrinsic to the UK government’s Foresight Programme that is aimed at investigating future crime risks (see for example, United Kingdom Government Office for Science, 2009), and are central to the Australian Crime Commission’s Horizons series that particularly targets organised criminal exploitation (see, for example, Australian Crime Commission, 2009). Similarly, a form of horizon scanning is regularly used by corporations and governments as part of general strategic planning. Such planning is based not only on what is ‘known’, but also on consideration of uncertainties (of present knowledge), trends (in existing patterns) and unknown contingencies (setting aside monies for ‘just in case’ circumstances). The use and need for horizon scanning as an intellectual exercise and planning tool is related to the idea that many threats and opportunities are presently poorly recognised. Accordingly, a more 29

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systematic approach to identification and solution of issues is required rather than reliance upon ad hoc or reactive approaches. For example, Sutherland et al (2009: 1) point out that ‘the need for horizon scanning of environmental issues is illustrated by the recent failure to foresee both the widespread adoption of the range of biofuels currently in use, and the environmental consequences of biofuels production’. Horizon scanning can provide insight into risks (potential problems) and harms (actual outcomes). Coupled with concepts such as paradoxical harm (that refers to apparently contradictory yet consciously chosen forms of harm), and the mobility of harm (transference), horizon scanning provides a mechanism to discern where emerging threats (and positive opportunities) may arise and potential strategies for mitigating or adapting to these. Collectively there are nine analytical signposts – three dealing with substantive issues, three dealing with justice, and three dealing with looking to the future – that provide a conceptual framework for assessing and analysing risks and harms as part of the exercise of looking over the horizon (see White and Heckenberg 2011). This framework simultaneously incorporates the key values of eco-global criminology, with its focus on the ecological, the transnational, and social and ecological justice (White, 2011). Box 1.2 provides a summary of these key ideas. The various orientations in the model – substantive, justice, futures – are intended to provide conceptual building blocks for more detailed analysis of specific ecological issues and trends. As a whole, they constitute the basis for the particular questions that are relevant to an environmental horizon scanning exercise. The study of environmental harm – whether retrospective or prospective – demands a systematic approach to data collection and analysis. The challenge is to marshal ideas and evidence from many different sources and disciplines in order to identify where harms and risks are emerging as matters of possible social and political importance, and to develop pre-emptive strategies to begin to address potential problems before they create further harms and risks pertaining to humans, environments and animals.

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Justice-based approaches to environmental harm Box 1.2: Conceptual framework for environmental horizon scanning Substantive orientation • Risk – a prediction or expectation that includes the perspectives of those affected about what is important to them, concerning a potential hazard or danger in which there is uncertainty over occurrence but which may involve adverse consequences as the possible outcome within a certain time period • Harm – an actual danger or adverse effect, stemming from direct and indirect social processes, that negatively impinges upon the health and wellbeing and ecological integrity of humans, specific biospheres and nonhuman animals • Cause – analysis of causal chains that may involve many interrelated variables but which ultimately are linked to specific practices and human responsibility for environmental harm Justice orientation • Environment justice – in which environmental rights are seen as an extension of human or social rights so as to enhance the quality of human life, now and into the future • Ecological justice – in which it is acknowledged that human beings are merely one component of complex ecosystems that should be preserved for their own sake via the notion of the rights of the environment • Species justice – in which harm is constructed in relation to the place of nonhuman animals within environments and their intrinsic right to not suffer abuse, whether this be one-on-one harm, institutionalised harm or harm arising from human actions that affect climates and environments on a global scale Futures orientation • Intergenerational equity – refers to the principle of ensuring that the generations to follow have at least the same or preferably better environments in which to live than those of the present generation • Precautionary principle – when an activity raises threats of harm to human health, nonhuman animals or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically • Transference over time – refers in this context to the transfer of harm involving both cumulative impacts and compounding effects Source: White 2011

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What happens in one country can, in many cases, inevitably affect people, ecosystems and animals well beyond that country’s borders. Harm and risk of harm are frequently and increasingly transnational in character. How to interpret, respond to and prevent such events is part of the mandate of those social scientists with an interest in analysing existing and future threats to environmental wellbeing. Certainly matters of time, space and scale are relevant. Risks and harms may be direct or indirect, and their consequences may be felt in the immediate or in the long-term. Harm may be specific to local areas (such as threats to certain species, like coral in the Great Barrier Reef) yet manifest as part of a general global pattern (such as being an effect of widescale temperature changes affecting coral everywhere). Harm is central, but this may be non-intentional (in the sense of being a byproduct of some other agenda) or premeditated (insofar as the negative outcome, for some, is foreseen).The demise of the polar bear due to the impact of global warming in the Arctic is an example of the former. The displacement of local inhabitants from their land due to carbon sequestration schemes is an example of the latter. At the heart of investigations of transnational environmental victimisation is the question of whose knowledge of ‘wrong’ is right? In other words, whose voices are heard, and to what kinds of evidence do we lend credibility? It is rare that scientific evidence is uncontested or that proof of environmental harm is simply a matter of ‘let the facts decide’. What counts as ‘science’, what counts as ‘evidence’, who counts as being a ‘scientific expert’ and what counts as ‘sensible’ public policy are all influenced by factors such as economic situation, the scientific tradition within a particular national context, the scientific standards used in relation to specific issues, and the style and mode of government (White 2008a). In responding to environmental harm and victimisation there are inevitably a range of vested interests and ‘discourses’ that contribute to the shaping of perceptions and issues (see Hannigan 2006).This implies differences in perspective and a certain contentiousness of knowledge about the nature of the harm or crime. Assessment of victimisation usually involves responding to a series of interrelated questions (see Heckenberg and White, 2013): • how are ‘harm’ and ‘risk’ defined, and by whom? • how do we distinguish ‘risk’ (potential outcome) from ‘harm’ (actual outcome)? • at what point does ‘risk’ or ‘harm’ actually occur?

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• at what point does ‘risk’ or ‘harm’ occur to an extent warranting action or intervention? • what is the origin and fate of the harm? • what are the histories of ‘risk’ or ‘harm’? • why and how did the harm occur? • who are the perpetrators and why and how did they do it? • is responsibility for responding in the hands of those harming, or of those being harmed? • who has responsibility for proof? • what is acceptable as evidence? • what were the triggers for the harm? • what were the immediate signs of ‘danger’ or ‘harm’? • what strategies were invoked to diminish or mitigate the harm? • how do we stop the harm from occurring again? Answers to these questions frequently vary depending upon stakeholder perspective. Consider, for example, the variety of players who might be associated with disputes over toxic landfill or stockpiled mining tailings in a residential community adjacent to a mining operation. Because victimisation is a contestable social process that involves a wide range of individuals it is important to identify stakeholders and their specific interests (for example, workers and jobs; residents and amenity). It is useful to explore the diverse and often conflicting discourses around ‘risk’ and ‘harm’ by different stakeholders (for example, medical practitioners’ consciousness of risk in relation to the health department; loss of livelihood in the case of farmers; limited perception that there is a problem from local miners). Moreover, the marshalling of particular types of evidence is typically driven by very specific criteria requirements (and forms of evidence) dictated by institutions and groups. Who says what and why is linked to specific social purposes and interests, and particular discursive domains. The language of crime and victimisation is reflective of how an environmental problem (in this case toxic landfill) is socially constructed depending upon how it is being considered and by whom, and who is potentially affected and how. Just as environmental victimisation differs concretely in its manifestation, so too do victim responses vary greatly. In broad terms, different events, in different countries, give rise to responses that vary from the passive to the confrontational, and from those involving collaborative activities aimed at redress to those based upon violence (Williams, 1996).

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Detailed analysis of specific events, over time, reveals stages in victims’ struggle for justice, involving both spontaneous and organised actions, usually centred upon justice and/or on relief. The effectiveness of specific struggles, such as those related to events in Bhopal, India or the Cape region in South Africa (Waldman, 2007) can also be analysed in terms of who defines the issues, who fights for or against the issues, who owns the struggle and how the struggle is shaped and carried out by local and international participants (see Sarangi, 1996; Waldman, 2007; Engel and Martin, 2006). Examination of victim responses needs to take into account the type and extent of networking and coalitionbuilding, but also the lack of participation and the marginalisation of some victim groups within a wider victim movement (Waldman, 2007). What about, however, instances when victims do not have a ‘voice’ such as animals, plants and particular eco-systems that are under threat? Proof of harm necessarily rests with human protectors and advocates in these types of situation. Even so, there is still scope to take into account stakeholder interests, and even to some extent stakeholder ‘perspectives’, in cases involving nonhuman victimisation and exploitation. This discussion around conceptualising the placing of a value on harm alerts us to the complexities of defining and measuring environmental harm. There are major theoretical and methodological challenges associated with the investigation of such harms. Underpinning most of the discussions, however, are a series of important philosophical questions. These pertain to the value attached to humans, bio-spheres and nonhuman animals, and the concepts that underpin how particular values are assigned (including in relation to each other). From the point of view of eco-philosophy, value is assigned in terms of anthropocentric, biocentric and ecocentric conceptions of the relationship between humans and nature (see White, 2008a). As we have seen, this translates at a practical eco-justice level into different emphases that we have described here as environmental justice, ecological justice and species justice.The focus thus varies depending upon the privileging of humans, specific environments or animals. How ‘harm’ is conceived very much depends upon the yardstick by which worth is determined. To assess the severity of harm requires criteria linked to value, scale and measure.A clear divide exists between extrinsic and intrinsic value. The notion of ‘intrinsic’ value only makes sense relative to some idea of ‘extrinsic’ value. The common denominator in each case is who does the valuing, namely, humans. Here value is measured through quantitative assessments (the extent and type of harm) and moral or qualitative assessments (whether to include some types of activities as harm) (see Box 1.3). 34

Justice-based approaches to environmental harm Box 1.3:  Value • •

Extrinsic – for example, harm is measured in terms of human interests mediated by what happens to the environment, animals and plants Intrinsic for example, harm is measured according to criteria that says that certain things done to the environment and to animals and plants are inherently bad

This assessment of ‘worth’ is partly dependent upon the scale at which evaluation occurs (see Table 1.1). Is the focus on individual species or entire eco-systems? Should value also be applied to individual organisms, and if so, should this apply to every and all plants and animals? Eco-systems incorporate the biotic (plants, animals) and the abiotic (water, soil) that, arguably, have value in their own right as selfmaintaining and self-perpetuating systems. How does one determine the relative value of an individual organism, a particular species and overarching biotic communities, relative to each other? Table 1.1 Scale Individuals (for example…) person plant animal

Particular species (for example…) homo sapiens hemp apes

Biotic community and abiotic context (for example…) Arctic eco-systems grasslands eco-systems mountain eco-systems

At the same time, harms to specific eco-systems threaten all within them, human and nonhuman alike. Melting glaciers have implications for future flows of fresh water, and thus affect many different biotic communities in diverse territories and climates. Interconnection and overlapping interests are as important to consider as discrete needs, rights and concepts of justice. Box 1.4: Measuring harm • • • •

Form of harm – for example, immediate and direct impact, indirect and diffuse Seriousness of harm – for example, injury, fatality Wider effects of harm – for example, spatial (local or transboundary), temporal (short or long term) Characteristics of harm – for example, cumulative effects, specific incidents

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The value of human, eco-system and nonhuman species is reflected in how and why we measure harm. The ‘why’ of measuring harm may be informed by both intrinsic and instrumental criteria – a farmer’s crops being contaminated by genetically modified organism (GMO) products may combine elements of both considerations. The ‘how’ of measurement refers to efforts to put a value – monetary, ecological, aesthetic, cultural – on the harm. This involves attempts to make the harm visible and assess the magnitude of the harm (for example, as minor, major or catastrophic, and in relation to what or whom). This can take the form of ‘harm audits’ (see Pemberton, forthcoming). Key questions here are who is doing the valuing and what tools are utilised to assign value.

The moral calculus: weighing up the harm There are concrete links between the health of natural environments, diverse human activity and the exploitation of animals.As we have seen in the eco-justice perspective, increasingly the language of rights is being used to frame responses to harm and abuse across the three areas of concern.This can sometimes lead to conflicts over which rights ought to take precedence in any given situation – human rights, rights of the environment or animal rights (White, 2007).This necessitates moving beyond initial considerations of how to define harm (‘what is harmful?’) to consider how we might best debate harm (‘what is harmful relative to other harms?’). Defining harm is ultimately about philosophical frameworks as informed by scientific evidence, ethics and traditional knowledges; debating harm is about processes of deliberation in the ‘real world’ and of conflicts over rights and the making of difficult decisions. Figure 1.1 provides a model of decision-making which signals that information in each of the three areas ought to be weighed up in regards to any specific issue (White, 2008a).Thus, the various conceptualisations of harm within green criminology that typically involve reference to different justice-based approaches – pertaining to humans, animals and the environment itself – can be put into an analytical model that can be used to weigh up harm in relation to humancentric, animalcentric and ecocentric considerations. Of central importance to the model is a contextual understanding of the relationship between the interests of humans, animals and the environment in specific given circumstances. Overlapping and competing interests, in the context of ‘real world’ decision-making, alerts us to the need for a model of action that will enhance deliberations in cases where interests seem at cross-purposes. To put it differently, there is a need for a model that is ‘open-ended’, 36

Justice-based approaches to environmental harm Figure 1.1: Contextual model for weighing up harm

Ecocentric approach to justice

Weighing up harm

Humancentric approach to justice

Animalcentric approach to justice

Source: White (2008a)

one that does not assume that we know the right or correct answers in advance.This recognises that in any discussion of harm (particularly within an eco-justice framework), there are always going to be conflicting interests and conflicting rights. These are exacerbated as conflicting conceptualisations of harm develop and positions become more clearly defined – as in the case of Beirne’s (2011) sense of a moral fissure within green criminology. We return to these issues again in Chapter Five but they form a thematic core to all the discussions to follow. As discussed elsewhere (White, 2008a), from a green criminology perspective the key questions are: how do we engender a system of regulation and human intervention that will provide the best outcome for human and nonhuman, and what criteria do we use to conceptualise the nature and value of harm arising from human actions? To answer these questions, we need to understand why it is that human societies simultaneously respect and protect certain creatures (especially animal companions such as dogs and cats) while allowing and even condoning the utterly dreadful treatment of others (as in the case of factory farming of battery hens to produce eggs) (see Beirne, 2004).We need to understand why it is that we strive to preserve some environments (via creation of national parks), while at the same time devastating particular 37

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ecosystems (such as clearfelling of old-growth forests). Responding to these issues demand some type of criteria to weigh up the interests, options and consequences of particular courses of action. This is the substantive concern of the rest of this book. Environmental social movements have a huge role to play in shaping the moral calculus (as do researchers and scholars, journalists and academics). Environmental activism involves many different individuals, groups and organisations, with diverse aims, missions and interests, employing a wide variety of tactics and strategies. Key international non-government organisations (NGOs) include for example: • • • • • • • • • • • •

Friends of the Earth Greenpeace World Wide Fund for Nature Sea Shepherd Bird Life International Climate Action Network Biodiversity Action Network Humane Society International Sierra Club Environmental Investigations Agency Basel Action Network Environmental Justice Foundation.

This list of named organisations extends into the hundreds (and indeed, the thousands), and includes local neighbourhood action groups through to transnational or global NGOs. The focus of activists varies greatly (White, 2008a). ‘Brown’ issues tend to be defined in terms of urban life and pollution (for example, air quality),‘green’ issues mainly relate to wilderness areas and conservation matters (for example, logging practices), and ‘white’ issues refer to science laboratories and the impact of new technologies (for example, genetically modified organisms). There is generally a link between environmental action (usually involving distinct types of community and environmental groups), and particular sites (such as urban centres, wilderness areas or seacoast regions). For present purposes it is notable that groups are also demarcated by particular notions of justice, including those relating to environmental justice (for example, specific human communities), ecological justice (for example, protection and conservation of particular ecosystems) and species justice (for example, animal rights and welfare). As will be seen, what is considered ‘bad’ or ‘good’ in regards to defining environmental harm is generally reflective 38

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of NGO engagement around particular issues. Not surprisingly, there are also major tensions between and within environmental social movements (White, 2008a; Pezzullo and Sandler, 2007; Pellow, 2013), due to differences in ideology, as well as contrasting views regarding which tactics and strategies are most suitable or effective in any given circumstance. Environmental and animal rights activism deals with acts and omissions that are already criminalised and prohibited, such as illegal fishing or illegal dumping of toxic waste. It also, however, come to grips with events and activities that have yet to be designated officially as ‘harmful’ but that show evidence of exhibiting present or potential negative consequences. It thus deals with different kinds of harms and risks, as these affect humans, local and global environments, and nonhuman animals. Hence what NGOs and activists do and what they say is of considerable importance to green criminology, and to the themes of this book. The social construction of environmental activism is a process involving many different players and interests. The justification for legal and illegal actions around environmental and animal issues relates to perceptions that many presently legal activities in fact constitute crimes against nature (whether this be a forest or in relation to animals or humans). Conversely, some of types of protest against these alleged crimes are themselves subject to considerable criticism on the basis of their present illegality (and, indeed, the harm they bring to others). For the purposes of this book, environmental activism is of concern mainly from the point of view of how environmental harm is framed by different activist groups.

Conclusion My previous writing in this area has explored the key concepts and practices of green and eco-global criminology (see especially White, 2008a, 2011). This work has provided a framework of analysis for understanding ecological degradation and environmental destruction. The challenge of the present work is to develop further a moral basis for intervention. This requires appreciation of different conceptions and principles of justice. It also demands attention to the idea of a moral calculus – that is, a means by which priority values can be drawn upon in cases of conflicting interests. There is also a longstanding concern that substantive measurement of harm and value needs to be established if we are to weigh up competing claims adequately and justly. Put simply, there is a need to provide the basis upon which to privilege 39

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some interests over others, in given circumstances and situations (that is, rather than all species being treated the same or as having in essence the same rights or worth). Finally, I think it is important to comment on the ethical limitations of approaches that reinforce rigid definitions and absolutist positions, such as pronouncements that the Earth is more important than humans or animals, or that any harm to animals is bad. This kind of moral posturing tends to do two things. First, it locks people into protagonist positions by declaring that there is no alternative to the position taken. Everything is ‘black or white’.There is thus no shading or uncertainty when it comes to dealing with real-life situations requiring difficult and practical moral choices.Yet, in the end, someone or something will suffer the negative consequences of such sureties. Second, taking such absolutist positions diminishes the centrality of humans – including precisely those of us writing about and advocating on behalf of these issues – in the greater scheme of things. Humans can be conceived as both destroyer and protector of all that we value and cherish. We are also the originators of the moral and ethical systems by which we judge ourselves and our behaviour.We are also the main protagonists acting upon what we believe is right and good.The goat, the rose and the river do not exercise this kind of volition, this sort of agency. This is what makes humans the most important participant in shaping the world. Arguably, the idea that humans come first is likewise an absolutist statement.Actually, I suppose it is. It also happens to be one with which I am largely in agreement. It is far too easy, especially as one traverses the literature dealing with ecological justice and animal rights, to feel that we should equate each notion of rights, each species and each environmental concern as if they were all the same. Assuredly they all should be discussed with equal regard when it comes to attention to detail, logical argument and robustness of evidence.While it is important that the different approaches of the eco-justice perspective be respected, however, this should by no means compel us to necessarily agree with all the propositions being put forward (even if this was possible, which it is not, as evidenced by the disputes within as well as between the approaches). For my part, after contemplation of the issues and trusting in my own ‘gut feelings’, I cannot subscribe to the view that human life is contingent upon a flip of a coin, because it is worth no more and no less than that of an animal (see Francione, 2008, and Chapter Five). Humans are (more) important to me for a number of reasons, including immediate species affinity through to the fact that it is humans who are 40

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capable of mobilising around their suffering as well as that of animals and the degradation of eco-systems. If it came to lifeboat choices, I would not hesitate to save the person over the nonhuman animal. Better still, it is my view that the main task is to intervene now to make sure that the need for a lifeboat – the destruction of our planet Earth – does not occur. In the process perhaps we can find enough space for all to live more peacefully and safely together.

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Two

Environmental justice and harm to humans Introduction Analysis of environmental harm is premised on the idea that someone or something is indeed being harmed. Environmental justice refers to the distribution of environments among peoples in terms of access to and use of specific natural resources in defined geographical areas, and the impacts of particular social practices and environmental hazards on specific human populations (for example, as defined on the basis of class, occupation, gender, age, ethnicity). In other words, humans are at the centre of analysis. The focus of analysis is on human health and well-being and how these are affected by particular types of production and consumption. Within these broad parameters a series of important questions can be asked. For example, who, precisely, is victimised and why? Are there specific patterns to environmental victimisation affecting individuals, groups and communities? Is everyone affected by environmental harm? Is everyone equally exposed to risk of harm, or is victimisation solely related to social divisions such as class, gender and race? Part of the answer to these questions lies in how the particular questions are framed and in how particular events shape public perceptions and actual experiences. Global warming and climate change, for example, have implications for everyone on the planet even if those first and most profoundly affected are the poor and marginalised. Incidents such as the emission explosions at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, and at the BP oil rig off the coast of the USA in the Gulf of Mexico, are non-discriminatory at one level. These events had an impact in some way on every person within range of them, even though company directors and people living outside of such ‘production’ zones were not directly affected. In many cases it is the actions of activist groups and environmental social movements that bring to public attention specific types of environmental harm, including knowledge about which individuals and groups suffer the most in particular places around the world. 43

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The main focus of this chapter is to explore how environmental harm is constructed in relation to specific groups of people. In other words, the concern is with matters of social justice in relation to environmental harm. This is a motivating factor for activists to take action. The overarching political and theoretical framework can usefully be described therefore as environmental justice, an approach to environmental harm that has a specific interest in harm to humans. This is different from a broader concept of the environment and justice that incorporates harm to specific eco-systems and plant and animal species. The activist defense of environmental justice takes the form of the environmental justice (EJ) movement. Since human health and wellbeing are at the centre of EJ movement activism, as informed by social justice principles, the concept of rights is central to the development of the overall environmental social justice perspective or approach.

Contentious concepts: environmental justice This section presents the concepts which underpin analysis and action in regards to the pursuit of environmental justice. These include the idea of social justice, and the notions of environmental rights, justice, equity, discrimination and racism.The precautionary principle is then discussed, as is environmental victimisation. Key elements of social justice generally include dignity and respect for the person, and protection of human rights; economic egalitarianism and social equality, such that each person enjoys the same rights, opportunities and services as all other citizens; and active engagement in social institutions, and in decision-making that affects individuals and the groups or collectivities of which they are a part (White, 2008c: 50). Environmental justice applies these general propositions to the relationship between specific groups and the environment, including issues pertaining to the quality of environmental amenities and access to healthy environments. Environmental rights are seen as an extension of human or social rights, because they see the goal as one of enhancing the quality of human life (for example, access to clean air, water, space and a sustainable supply of natural resources valued in relation to human health and amenity). This is reflected, for example, in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (see Thornton and Tromans, 1999).

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Principle 1: Man (sic) has a fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he (sic) bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. This principle encapsulates two key obligations: first, intergenerational responsibility such that present generations do not act in ways which jeopardise the existence of future generations (intergenerational equity); and second, environmental justice in the here and now such that access to and use of specific natural resources in defined geographical areas, and the impacts of particular social practices and environmental hazards are ‘shared out’ on an equal rather than discriminatory basis (social equity). Environmental harm is thereby constructed in relation to perceptions of ‘value’ that place humans at the core. As such, the point is to protect and preserve particular environments and/or species for the ‘greater good’ of humans. Should, however, environmental rights be seen as an extension of human or social rights (for example, related to the quality of human life, such as provision of clean water), or should human rights be seen as merely one component of complex eco-systems that should be preserved for their own sake (that is, as in the notion of the rights of the environment) (see Thornton and Tromans, 1999; Christoff, 2000)? For present purposes we need simply to acknowledge that a narrow conceptualisation of environmental justice focuses predominantly on human welfare and interests. This translates into propositions such as, for instance, that present generations ought to act in ways that do not jeopardise the existence and quality of life of future generations. As discussed in the next chapter, other conceptions of environmental rights are broader than this, being premised on the idea that we ought to extend the moral community to include nonhuman nature. Within an EJ framework, environmental issues are thus examined in terms of effects on human populations, including the ramifications of certain practices on competing industries (for example, negative impact of clearfell logging on tourism). The use of pesticides, to take another example, may have dramatic impacts on animal species (in that they seem to have coincided with the spread of a fatal tumour disease among the Tasmanian devil population in recent years) and on specific environments (the pollution of coastal waters in north eastern Tasmania).The damage, however, is often framed in terms of human loss 45

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(of a Tasmanian tourism icon; of the destruction of oyster farms), rather than biosphere or nonhuman animal per se. Not surprisingly, then, environmental justice movements are largely focused on redressing the unequal distribution of environmental disadvantage, and in particular with preventing environmental hazards being located in their local area. If the notion of environmental justice is simply confined to this ‘not in my back yard’ (NIMBY) approach, then issues of justice to the wider, nonhuman environment will be largely ignored. The term environmental justice originated in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s and it is from the US that social movements worldwide have taken their inspiration and, to some extent, their direction.The social movements associated with the environment can trace their lineage back to at least the early 1830s when already there were calls to preserve wilderness for future generations and for its own sake. From this time onwards, efforts toward the conservation of natural resources (for the economic and social benefit of later generations) were also matched by movements which argued the protection of the natural world (and not its exploitation, however well managed) (Edwards, 1998). It was within the context of the growth of the wider environmental movements from the 1960s onwards that the EJ movement, as a specific movement, emerged. The so-called ‘age of ecology’ during this period was also an age of ‘environmental inequality’ (Hurley, 1995) in that the rise and influence of the environmental movements during the post-war period up to the 1980s saw the public interest in environmental reform mainly driven by the white middle class – not African Americans and the poor. This led to reforms, such as the federal Clean Water Act (1972) and the creation of the US Environmental Protection Agency (in 1970) that ostensibly was of benefit to everyone regardless of social background. Nonetheless, specific government efforts to curb pollution and preserve endangered landscapes reflected deep race and class divides, and the differential capacity of specific population groups to win space for certain reforms and to protect their immediate amenities and interests. This was to change as minority communities began to mobilise around their particular interests in places such as Warren County, North Carolina and Gary, Indiana (Brisman, 2007; Hurley, 1995). Concern about these issues was also sparked by the release of a 1984 study commissioned by the California Waste Management Board that identified the demographic characteristics of neighbourhoods most likely and least likely to oppose the local placement of a hazardous waste facility (Edwards, 1998: 47).This general finding is borne out in a case study of pollution practices and environmental movements in Gary, 46

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Indiana which found that ‘Because politics reflected the relative power and divergent concerns of various groups within Gary, the cumulative effect of environmental regulation was the movement of industrial pollution towards neighbourhoods inhabited by minorities and the poor, where resistance was weakest’ (Hurley, 1995: 174). Thus, in the moment that a ‘universal’ problem (that is, pollution) became contested as a significant social issue, the solution was to make it into a ‘particular’ problem for specific groups, communities and neighbourhoods. The politics of place is intertwined with the politics of race, and class. One outcome of this legacy of discriminatory waste disposal practices was the environmental justice movement itself (see also Pellow, 2007). The focus of the environmental justice movement is environmental injustice.This is basically defined in terms of human health within the context of specific environments. Health is the main focus of the environmental justice movement in the United States. Here, ‘environment’ is generally defined as being where we live, work, play, worship, and go to school, as well as the physical and natural world. The World Health Organization defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being, not just the absence of disease or infirmity‘. These definitions of environment and health capture the essence of the struggles for environmental justice being fought by communities made up of people of color and low-income groups. (Bullard, 2005a: 2) The concept of environmental equity refers to attempts to reduce environmental hazards, risks and harms for all sections of the human population and all types of communities. It basically encapsulates a concern with discrimination and efforts to ensure that no particular community (especially those featuring people of colour and from low incomes) is subject to disproportionate environmental disadvantage. Research in this area has demonstrated not only inequalities related to race and class, but also factors such as gender, disability and immigration status (Agyeman and Carmin, 2011).There are many different categories of vulnerable groups throughout the world, and notably indigenous peoples and traditional cultures have been especially prone to bearing the brunt of environmental burdens. Matters of social power and social interests are intrinsic to consideration of justice and equity in relation to the environment.

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Environmental discrimination is at the heart of the EJ project.According to Stretesky and Hogan (1998) environmental justice researchers try to do at least two things: first, analysis of the placement of active waste facilities in minority and poor areas; and second, analysis of the social and political processes that shape racial, ethnic and economic demographic patterns around existing hazardous waste sites. Direct discrimination relates to the ‘prejudice leads to discrimination’ model, in which there is express intent to deny or harm another individual or group based on some characteristics that the targeted individual or group possesses (for example, put the hazard where ‘certain’ people do not find it so offensive). Indirect discrimination relates to practices that result in negative and differential impacts on minorities even though the policies or regulations guiding those actions were established and carried out with no intent to harm (for example, economic and social forces may serve to constrain the choices of minorities and the poor when compared to the choices available to whites and the affluent – that is, what school to attend, where to live, what kind of work is available, and so on). Researchers assess broad patterns of urban settlement in order to establish whether or not there are social inequalities related to the siting of waste facilities.They also evaluate the social reasons why this may be the case, incorporating into the analysis consideration of both direct and indirect discrimination. Risk is never socially neutral. Environmental justice explores why and how this is the case. Environmental racism has been used to describe the ways in which, within the United States context in particular, minority communities comprised of people of colour (for example, African Americans) have suffered denial of basic human rights and environmental protection, and have generally and disproportionately had to live and work close to polluting industries and toxic dumping grounds. As a concept, environmental racism refers to ‘any policy, practice, or directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities because of their race or color’ (Bullard, 2005b: 32).Those who live in proximity to contaminated land, air and water tend to be those with less overall social and economic power, and this, in turn is associated with ‘race’ and ethnicity (Hurley, 1995; Bullard, 2005a). It may well be that the rich get richer, and the poor get prison (Reiman, 2000), but people of colour get poison. The environmental social justice framework seeks to prevent environmental threats and is premised upon a series of interlinked propositions and principles (see Bullard, 2005b). These principles emphasise values such as social equity (in which all individuals should 48

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have a right to be protected from environmental degradation) and harm prevention (the focuses on eliminating a threat before harm occurs). Each of these areas requires considerable resources be devoted to measuring things such as human exposure to environmental chemicals, and sociological analysis of harm and risk distributions among diverse population groups. An important part of the environmental social justice framework is ideological and practical support for the adoption of the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle refers to the idea that official action be taken to protect people and environments in cases where there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature of the potential damage or the likelihood of risk.Two definitions of the precautionary principle are frequently mentioned in the literature. The first is from a United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in 1992 in Brazil. The second is from the Wingspread conference dealing specifically with the precautionary principle held in 1998 (National Toxics Network Inc., no date). 1992 Rio Declaration In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities.Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 1998 Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof. The process of applying the precautionary principle must be open, informed and democratic and must include potentially affected parties. It must also involve an examination of the full range of alternatives, including no action.

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The precautionary principle has been integrated into the regulatory and legal frameworks of the European Union, but has been less popular in the US. From a social movement perspective the preferred emphasis when it comes to precaution is to err on the side of human safety and wellbeing rather than industrial development. As Bullard (2005b: 28) observes: It asks ‘How little harm is possible?’ rather than ‘How much harm is allowable?’ This principle demands that decision makers set goals for safe environments and examine all available alternatives for achieving the goals, and it places the burden of proof of safety on those who propose to use inherently dangerous and risky technologies. Moreover, the environmental social justice framework requires that those ‘parties applying for operating permits for landfills, incinerators, smelters, refineries, chemical plants, and similar operations must prove that their operations are not harmful to human health, will not disproportionately affect racial and ethnic minorities and other protected groups, and are nondiscriminatory’ (Bullard, 2005b: 28–9). Environmental victimisation can be defined as specific forms of harm that are caused by acts or omissions leading to the presence or absence of environmental agents which are associated with human injury (Williams, 1996). It is important to distinguish between environmental issues that affect everyone, and those that disproportionately affect specific individuals and groups (see Williams, 1996; Low and Gleeson, 1998). As mentioned above, in some instances, there may be a basic equality of victims, in that some environmental problems threaten everyone, as in the case, for example, of ozone depletion, global warming, air pollution and acid rain (Beck, 1996). Even here, though, research has shown disproportionate negative effects according to factors such as class, caste, race and gender (Shiva, 2008). Patterns of differential victimisation are also evident with respect to the siting of toxic waste dumps, extreme air pollution, chemical accidents, access to safe clean drinking water and so on (see Chunn et al, 2002; Saha and Mohai, 2005; Williams, 1996). Basically it is the poor and disadvantaged who suffer disproportionately from such environmental inequalities. Another dimension of victimisation relates to the subjective disposition and consciousness of the people involved. The specific groups who experience environmental problems may not always describe or see the issues in strictly environmental terms.This may be 50

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related to lack of knowledge of the environmental harm, alternative explanations for the calamity (for example, an act of God) and socioeconomic pressures to ‘accept’ environmental risk (see Harvey, 1996; Julian, 2004;Waldman, 2007). Alternatively, certain types of events may be perceived as disasters that are ‘natural’ rather than ‘human-induced’ (unusual weather events, for example), and this likewise influences how people respond emotionally and strategically, including how they interpret victimhood itself.

Social patterns of harm and risk It is corporations and nation-states that define environmental risk and harm in ways that prop up existing profit-based modes of production and consumption (see Chapter Five). In so doing, transgressions against particular groups of people, specific environments and other species occur as a ‘natural’ consequence of systemic pressures and elite choices. Exploitation of both the human and the nonhuman is built into the very fabric of dominant constructions of natural resource management and the national interest. Sectional class interests and the interests of state elites are privileged over and above both universal human interests (such as for an ecologically sustainable environment) and the particular needs and rights of specific population groups, nonhuman species and biospheres. Wealth, power and influence are not pluralised, but are increasingly concentrated into fewer and fewer hands, typically in the form of the transnational corporation. The state is not independent of the general power relations of a society, and therefore the exercise of state power generally reflects the interests of those who have the capacity to marshal significant economic and legal resources (for example, large mining companies, agricultural corporate giants). Nonetheless, there is a relative autonomy to state power insofar as the nation-state must rule in favour of the system-as-a-whole (which periodically means intervention in the affairs of specific companies). Likewise, for the sake of the wider political economy the nation-state has an interest in maintaining a modicum of public order (which may require addressing the most obviously harmful social and environmental practices of private business). The capitalist state is located squarely at the structural nexus of class antagonism and reproduction. Insofar as this is the case, the expanding role of the state in social control becomes central, as does its role in legitimating the status quo. Concretely, then, the nation-state must operate and be seen to protect the interests of capital-in-general (which includes reining in those environmental activists who impinge upon 51

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production processes in industries such as forestry, coal and uranium production). Simultaneously, the state must respond to the most extreme, overt and undeniable changes in social and environmental conditions, and to specific incidents (which may mean dealing negatively and coercively with specific capitalists, specific organisations and specific breaches of law). What gets socially defined as environmental ‘harm’ or as a ‘risk’ is contingent upon the capacity of sectional interests to first garner consensus about how to interpret what is happening, and second to secure measures for generalising and implementing action against what is deemed to be ‘harmful’ behaviour, primarily via the state. Material differences in social power, and in social and ecological interests, mean that state action is skewed in favour of powerful individuals and companies. Most of the harm they do, therefore, is not defined as such, or is redefined as ‘accidental’ or ‘unintentional’. Moreover, harm can be rendered invisible to the extent that it is externalised to more vulnerable population groups that do not have the social and political power to match that of the powerful. The net result of corporate action, which is facilitated and defended by particular nation-states, is global environmental destruction and degradation.This is happening across a broad range of areas, from global warming through to diminishment of biodiversity.Waste and pollution (of air, water and land) continue to be a major problem. Simultaneously, ‘natural resources’ are being used up at alarming rates with significant implications for both biotic (for example, plants, animals) and abiotic (for example, soils, water) constituents of the planet. As extensive work on specific incidents and patterns of victimisation demonstrate, some people are more likely to be disadvantaged by environmental problems than others. For instance, studies have identified disparities involving many different types of environmental hazards that especially adversely affect people of colour, ethnic minority groups and indigenous people in places such as Canada, Australia and the US (Bullard, 1994; Pinderhughes, 1996; Langton, 1998; Stretesky and Lynch, 1999; Brook, 2000; Rush, 2002). People from poor and non-English speaking backgrounds may also suffer disadvantages through their lack of participation in decisionmaking forums, as well as lack of information about potential hazards and risks. For example, methylmercury is a potent neurotoxin that can have serious health impacts, particularly for fetal growth. Apparently a large proportion of canned tuna fish sold in the United States contains unsafe levels of methylmercury.Yet, the populations at risk of overconsumption – namely minorities and low-income groups – are 52

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most likely to be uninformed of the risks, and less likely to be aware of fish advisories and to change consumption habits (Pallo and Barken, 2010). The subjective disposition and consciousness of people is crucial to perceptions of threat, risk and imminent danger. The specific groups who experience environmental problems may not always describe or see the issues in strictly environmental terms. In our communities, the smell coming from sewage plants was never perceived as an environmental issue but as a survival issue…In workplaces, when workers are being poisoned or contaminated…we do not refer to them as environmental issues but as labour issues. Again, the same thing for farmworkers and the issue of pesticides. In the 60s and 70s, there was organizing around the lead-based paints used in housing projects. When the paint curled up and chipped off, children in the projects were eating it and getting sick.When we dealt with this issue, we perceived it as an issue of tenant’s rights. (Moore, 1990: 16) The unequal distribution of exposure to environmental risks, whether it is in relation to the location of toxic waste sites or proximity to clean drinking water, may not always be conceived as an ‘environmental’ issue, nor indeed as an environmental ‘problem’. For instance, Harvey (1996) points out that the intersection of poverty, racism and desperation may occasionally lead to situations where, for the sake of jobs and economic development, community leaders actively solicit the relocation of hazardous industries or waste sites to their neighbourhoods.Waldman (2007), on the other hand, describes a local community in South Africa that saw the contamination effects of asbestos as ‘natural’.This was due to a combination of religious beliefs (that stressed a passive stance to the world around them) and the fact that harms that are imperceptible to the senses often only exist as a problem if they are constituted as such in public discourse (and in particular, the public discourse of the village community). Otherwise, what is, simply is. Consciousness of risk can also be studied from the point of view of differential risk within at-risk populations. In others words, a particular suburb or city may be placed in circumstances that heighten risks to wellbeing and health for everyone (for example, dumping of toxic waste in Abidjan, Ivory Coast; the spraying of chemical pesticides in New York City). Particularly, however, where heightened risk is deemed to be ‘acceptable’ in terms of cost-benefit analysis, as in the use of 53

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pesticides to prevent the spread of disease borne by mosquitoes, there are ‘hidden’ costs that may not be factored in. For instance, children and those with chemical sensitivities will suffer disproportionately if chemicals are sprayed, since they are more vulnerable than others to ill effects arising from the treatment. In such circumstances, the crucial questions are not only, ‘how many will be harmed?’ but also, ‘who will be harmed?’ (Scott 2005a: 56). To appreciate this, we need to be conscious of differences within affected populations. To take another example of how distribution of risk has an impact upon different groups within at-risk populations, consider the case of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards in the United States that limit the level of dioxin releases from paper mills into rivers and streams. These releases are known to contaminate fish, and so the EPA based its release levels on the average consumption of such fish.Yet Native American consumption is well known to be higher than the average American, making the dioxin release a much greater health risk to Native Americans. (Schlosberg, 2007: 60) Vulnerability to environmental harm, therefore, is also due to social differences in how people utilise or interact with nature.All those who consume fish under the above circumstances may be at risk of dioxin poisoning, but certain groups are more so because of their particular cultural prescriptions and traditions. On the other hand, it may well be that it is local residents, local workers and laypeople generally who are more conscious of environmental risk than the scientist or the politician. Some indication of this is provided in a study of interaction between scientists and English sheep farmers in the wake of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Ukraine (Wynne, 1996). The study highlighted the accurate, detailed and contextual knowledge of the local farmers, even though the scientists considered this layperson knowledge to be lacking in precision.Those who are closer to the ‘coal face’ and who have lived and worked in the same area for years, are frequently those who notice the small changes that are the harbingers of things to come. Consciousness of risk is also influenced by the visibility of the potential harm. For example, Beck (1996) observes that many risks in contemporary society are largely invisible to human senses. Radioactivity, for example, cannot be smelt, heard, seen, touched or tasted. Often we do not really know what is in our drinking water. 54

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Nevertheless, over time many people have come to appreciate the risks associated with radioactivity, and indeed nuclear energy generally, as well as to be suspicious about everyday consumables such as water (hence, the huge and growing market in bottled water).This reflexivity about risk has been made possible by mediated sources of knowledge, whereby people draw upon multiple sources in order to assess potential threats (for example, TV programmes, government statements, campaigns by environmental groups).They also draw upon their own experiences, as indicated above (see also Macnaghten and Urry, 1998).There are more ways in which to ‘know’ than simply through the direct senses per se. Exposure to risk scenarios is an integral part of raising consciousness about risk. In recent years this has occurred in ways that have seen the globalisation of risk (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998) through the actions of EJ organisations in many different cities and countries around the world. Who is a victim is also reflective of differing degrees of harm, injury and suffering. Death from environmental catastrophe is only one example of how victimisation is made manifest. Whether the affliction is or incorporates a disease or permanent injury or prolonged mental illness and psychological distress, a large proportion of ‘victims’ are simultaneously ‘survivors’. They sometimes sustain injuries that significantly alter the course and quality of their lives and that are economically onerous in terms of healthcare. So too, the breaking up of communities, the displacement of individuals, the loss of economic livelihood and dispossession of land all constitute varying forms and degrees of harm and victimisation of human populations. Environmental victimisation generally involves, on the one hand, powerful players such as corporations and nation-states and, on the other, less powerful groups such as indigenous people, ethnic minorities, the poor and those less able to take care of their own interests (such as the elderly and the very young). The practical outcome of corporate and government action has been to ensure that disadvantaged groups end up living in the most hazardous and environmentally poor areas (Pellow, 2007). This is so whether it is in the United States (Bullard, 1994), Canada (Chunn et al, 2002), India (Engel and Martin, 2006) or Australia (Walker, 2006). Moreover, it is these kinds of communities that also suffer most from the extraction of natural resources. Specifically, in many places around the globe where minority or indigenous peoples live, oil, timber and minerals are extracted in ways that devastate local ecosystems and destroy traditional cultures and livelihoods (Schlosberg, 2004, 2007).

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Global warming describes the rising of the earth’s temperature over a relatively short time span, while climate change describes the interrelated effects of this rise in temperature: from changing sea levels and changing ocean currents, through to the impacts of temperature change on local environments that affect the endemic flora and fauna in varying ways (for instance, the death of coral due to temperature rises in sea water or the changed migration patterns of birds) (White, 2011; Lever-Tracy, 2011). The context of global warming, declining oil resources and food crises puts even more of the world’s ecological and economic burdens on the backs of the poor. As Shiva (2008: 5–6) observes: First, they are displaced from work; then they bear a disproportionate burden of the costs of climate chaos through extreme droughts, floods, and cyclones; and then they lose once more when pseudo-solutions like industrial biofuels divert their land and their food. Whether it is industrial agriculture or industrial biofuels, car factories or superhighways, displacement and forced evictions of indigenous peoples and peasants from the land are an inevitable consequence of an economic model that creates growth by extinguishing people’s rights. When it comes to climate change, there is a major rift between those countries most contributing to global warming and those most at risk from its effects. In a nutshell, ‘Many nations facing rising oceans, increased droughts, or extreme disasters are those least responsible for the problem and with the lowest levels of resources available to cope with the resultant challenges’ (Anguelovski and Roberts, 2011: 19). The problems are compounded by a combination of population growth and geographical location. For example, a growing proportion of both the world’s total population and its urban population also lives in low elevation coastal zones, a trend that is particularly evident in the developing countries of Africa and Asia. Those who are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change are the same groups who are vulnerable to events such as droughts, floods and cyclones. The conventional approach to disasters is to see them as ‘natural’ (and to include such things as earthquakes, volcanoes and floods) or human-caused (relating to fires, explosions and oil spills) (see Picou et al, 2009). In the context of major global changes in climate, biodiversity and pollution, this presumption may no longer

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be warranted, especially in the light of the anthropogenic causes for much of this harm (Williams, 1996; Shiva, 2008). Developing countries play host to a disproportionate number of environmental victims due to the influence of international trade regimes and natural resource extraction at the hands of multinational companies (MNCs). Not everyone within developing countries suffers or loses out under such arrangements, however. Disparities in environmental justice also exist within these countries: ‘Within many developing countries, indigenous peoples and other vulnerable and impoverished communities including subsistence peasants, fishing communities, and nomadic groups generally bear the brunt of negative environmental change that is mostly caused by the resource extractive operations of MNCs’ (Adeola, 2000: 688–9). Study of environment related conflicts in the Amazon involving subsistence farmers, agribusinesses, mining companies and governments confirm how social inequalities are reflected in the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in such conflicts (see Boekhout van Solinge, 2010a, b). Ecological imperialism is not just about foreign transnational corporations. As suggested above, it also involves local elites and, in some cases, war lords. It can also involve ‘tribal’ divisions and social divisions that are perpetuated precisely because they give advantage vis-à-vis resource extraction. Such appears to be the case, for instance, in Nigeria. The three critical elements germane to internal colonialism in Nigeria include (a) an ethnic-centered political hegemony, tactically used to control and exploit the natural resources of oil-rich minority communities for the benefit of the dominant ethnic groups; (b) the union between the core ethnic groups, MNOCs [multinational overseas companies], political elites, the military, and other state enterprises that generally represses the opportunity structures for the minorities; and (c) devastating ecological disruption and the subsequent destruction of the basic modes of subsistence of the minority groups. (Adeola, 2000: 693–4) Empirically, this is demonstrated by the political and economic administration, and destructive environmental condition, of Ogoniland, a situation in which the ethnic minorities have seen their human and ecological rights eroded to the point of crisis. Against these trends international NGOs are putting pressure on governments and companies worldwide to uphold human and 57

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environmental rights (Clark, 2009).This is not without its ironies. For example, while western (northern) companies dump toxic waste and exploit people and resources in the South precisely because of the differences in environmental (and labour) regulation in the advanced developed countries compared with the peripheral nations, the reverse can also happen. For example, in part due to pressure from NGO activists (among other factors), China’s environmental related practices in some regions of the world are better than those at home in China. To put it differently, ‘China’s global operations may be governed by a social and environmental commitment that is greater than even their domestic practices, unlike northern corporations whose standards slip when operating abroad’ (Widener, 2011: 176). Again, this is related to political and economic considerations that relate directly to specific regions (for example, South America compared with Africa) in which Chinese corporations are operating. Different political regimes and local social conditions thus shape the contours of environmental and human rights, and respect or otherwise for these, depending upon place and time. Certain groups of people have experienced histories of victimisation relating to the imposition of colonial power. This is intrinsically a matter of resource colonisation, a phenomenon that affected many different indigenous peoples in places such as South America, North America and Australasia, as well as the native inhabitants of Africa, Asia and beyond. In countries such as Australia, indigenous territories were considered frontier lands that were un-owned, under-utilised and therefore open to exploitation. The prior ownership rights, interests and knowledges of indigenous inhabitants were treated as irrelevant by the European invaders. Such disregard for the physical and cultural wellbeing of indigenous people and their connection to ‘country’ was also evident in how they and their lands were treated when it came to nuclear testing, as well as in establishing mining interests (White and Habibis, 2005). Environmental victimisation is central to dispossession and maltreatment of indigenous peoples across many continents and over a period of several centuries. The resource wars against indigenous peoples are significant in regards to scope, scale and impact. Forty percent of the world’s countries (72 of 184) contain peoples defined as native or indigenous. Worldwide, there are over 350 million indigenous people representing some 5,250 nations. The invasion of these resource frontiers by multinational corporations and nation-states has resulted 58

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in the systematic displacement, dispossession, and, in some cases, destruction of native communities. (Gedicks, 2005: 168–9) What is at threat is not only the immediate physical needs of indigenous and traditional peoples, but a whole way of life that frequently includes hunting, fishing and small-scale agriculture. In the United States, for example, the Chippewa people have fought against mining operations on their lands, knowing that mining on their ceded lands would lead to environmental destruction of the land and water, thereby destroying their means of subsistence (Clark, 2002). As with similar activities elsewhere, contamination of the natural world constitutes an assault that goes to the heart of indigenous culture and identity. These kinds of struggles are symptomatic of a long historical process of internal colonisation of which confiscation of land and natural resources has been a central feature. This was evident, for example, in the early days of European global dominance, which saw specific trading companies (for example, Hudson Bay Company) given exclusive monopolies to plunder the New World of animal and mineral products. Resource colonisation threatened every facet of traditional indigenous life. The broad ethos was that the environment was there to be exploited; this, in turn, ran counter to a concept that understood the environment in terms of a balanced relationship between humans and the ecosystem. Similar disrespect and exploitation continues today. In Canada, governments are eager to allow extraction industries to enter into and fully work lands occupied by indigenous peoples, regardless of the wishes of the local people (Rush, 2002). Mining and logging operations create major environmental damage, a process that directly affects the indigenous population’s health and well-being. Meanwhile, in the United States, the history of repression of indigenous people is such that they were forcibly relocated to previously unwanted lands that contain some of the richest mineral deposits and other natural resources in the country (such as uranium and low-sulphur coal). One consequence of their forced removal to lands that are now wanted is that ‘The quest for natural resources, then, imposes specific environmental risks on peoples such as Native Americans who reside near, and are dependent on, natural resources’ (Field, 1998: 80). On the other hand, pollution and contamination of water and fish in some regions directly undermines the capacity of Native American culture and people to continue to function and thrive (Schlosberg, 2007).

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In summary, there are different types of environmental victimisation. Environmental victimisation may be direct or indirect, immediate or long-lasting, local or regional. It may involve lead in soils, dioxins in water, radioactivity in the atmosphere. It may be based upon routine industrial practices or stem from specific events such as climate-related disasters.The threat may be realised (due to actual presence or absence of something in the environment) or be potential (for example, the proposed privatisation of drinking water, or development plans to build a dam or pulp mill). Children are much more vulnerable to some types of environmental harm (for example, toxic chemicals) than are adults. In other cases, victimisation is more a question of proximity to the harm (for example, death and maiming related to explosions, poisoning related to industrial emissions). To fully gauge the nature, extent and dynamics of environmental victimisation would demand systematic data collection and analysis. For example, it has been suggested that an annual list should be compiled of countries and transnational corporations engaged in the illicit dumping of toxic and dangerous wastes in Africa and other developing countries, and an annual list of persons killed, maimed or otherwise injured in the developing countries through the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes (see Gwam, 2010). Similar lists could be prepared with respect to other types of environmental harms.

Harm, place and the local To appreciate fully the nature of environmental social injustice it is essential to consider the physical location and scale of the harm within particular geographical contexts. There are myriad different types of harms, some of which are common across the world, while others are specific to particular locales, regions and countries. The production of global environmental harm is partly determined through complex processes of transference (Heckenberg, 2010). Harm can move from one place to another.The recent toxic incident in Hungary provides a tragic illustration of this, when a thick red torrent of sludge burst from a reservoir at an aluminium plant 100 kilometres south of Budapest in early October 2010. At least nine people died as a result of the sludge surge, some went missing and over one hundred people were physically injured as the toxic substance flowed into nearby villages and towns, subsequently threatening the Danube and the countries that border it. The transformation of environments, and the interplay between water, air and land, provides interesting challenges for interpretation and analysis of environmental risk. For a start, it is essential to conceive 60

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of risk in dynamic rather than fixed terms. Environmental harm may originate in a specific location, but due to natural processes of water and air movement and flow, it can spread to other parts of a city, region, country or continent. A localised problem thus contains the seeds of a global dilemma. Environmental harm such as dioxins in water is both temporal and spatial in nature. That is, the harm itself actually moves across time and space, covering wide areas and with long lasting effects. Moreover, toxins accumulate over time. In other words, there is a cumulative impact on waterways and aquatic life, and small amounts of poison may eventually lead to great concentrations of toxicity in fish and other living creatures of the water, with major social consequences for fishers and human consumers of fish. The transference of risk also manifests in other ways. For example, we can refer to the monetarisation of risk – structural inequalities exploited by risk producers (for example, pressures placed on communities to accept toxic landfills on their land in return for financial compensation). At issue here is what to do about LULUs (locally unwanted land uses), and how the poor and disadvantaged are especially vulnerable to waste transfers relating to these.The traffic in risk also occurs at the global level where developing countries play the same role as poorer communities within developed nations (for example, ‘business-friendly’ countries that accept hazardous industries and toxic wastes) (see Pellow, 2007). Also at issue is how to respond to NIMBY opposition within developed countries (Julian, 2004).This is important because the direct result of the NIMBY effect is to transfer the problem somewhere else. Increasingly, the right to a safe environment has gained currency in the United States and in other advanced industrial states due largely to the proliferation of grassroots activism (for example, the mainstream environmental movement, toxic waste movement, environmental justice movement, and so on), public awareness, efforts of environmental organisations, media exposure of environmental disasters, and strong legislative responses. Paradoxically, these factors promoting the rights of citizens to a safe and sound environment in core nations are the same forces contributing to the violation of indigenous people’s rights to a safe and ecologically balanced environment in noncore nations.The flight of many MNCs to the interior of Third World countries to avoid visibility, regulations, liability, and environmental pollution accountability directly

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contributes to human rights and ecological rights violation. (Adeola, 2000: 701) Globalisation means that we are connected in many different ways. It also means that producers and consumers are linked up through complex commodity chains. In many cases, making one’s own home safe contributes to making someone else’s a hazard. Harm is a consequence of intended actions as well as general negligence. In either case, there is little consideration for the actual people who are victimised by acts or omissions, nor is there any sense of a duty of care. Who is exploited is partly a function of what is to be exploited, and where it is located. Multinational mining, oil, and logging corporations are now using advanced exploration technology, including remote sensing and satellite photography, to identify resources in the most isolated and previously inaccessible parts of the world’s tropical rain forests, mountains, deserts, and frozen tundras.What the satellites don’t reveal is the fact that native peoples occupy much of the land containing these resources. (Gedicks, 2005: 168) In a shrinking world, the search for new development green fields and for additional natural resources is intensifying and brings into play new technologies that allow ever greater extraction and processing of the Earth, as well as exploitation and victimisation of its people (Klare, 2012; Le Billon, 2012; Tsing, 2005). Who is affected by activities carried out by powerful industries is also partly a matter of where and when. For example, the Arctic region is inhabited by some 4 million people including more than 30 indigenous peoples. Eight states – Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States – have territories in the Arctic region.While ostensibly a pristine environment where local peoples rely upon traditional food sources, for decades numerous pollutants have been making their impact on the Arctic and the people and animals that live there (UNEP, 2007; EEA, 2010). This pollution originated elsewhere, especially in industrial heartlands such as the US, but the effect of transference has been devastating. In some parts of the Arctic, for example, breastfeeding mothers have been advised to supplement breast milk with powdered milk in order to reduce their baby’s exposure to noxious chemicals.

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Specific places demand specific analysis, yet these are intrinsically linked to considerations that are universal in their relevance and application. For instance, transnational environmental harm is always located somewhere. That is, while risk and harm can be analysed in terms of movements and transference from one place to another, it is nonetheless imperative that threats to the environment be put into specific regional and national contexts. This is important for several reasons. First, environmental threats originate in particular factories, farms, firms, industries and localities. Second, the political and policy context within which threats to the environment emerge is shaped by the nature of and interplay between local, national, regional and international laws and conventions. What happens at the local and regional level counts – whether we are referring to Nordic countries, those of South Eastern Europe, Australasia or Latin America. What happens at the local level is likewise implicated in decisions and processes that transcend the merely local, given the complex ties and international connections between businesses, governments, workers and activists. For example, externalising harm frequently takes the form of transferring waste from Europe, the United States and Japan to non-metropole countries and regions such as Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and South and Southeast Asia (Pellow, 2007). Place is defined in many different ways, and this shapes the transference of harm across various types of boundaries. Some of these are geographical, others are conceptual. For instance, consider the distinction between ‘built’ and ‘natural’ environments. Pollution from cars and factories in cities ends up in countrysides, while animal waste from sprawling farms release odours in the air and toxic materials into waterways that affect city dwellers downstream. A red sandstorm generated off the land in South Australia ends up in the streets of Sydney, many thousands of kilometers away. While there are broad similarities in the types of environmental crimes that traverse borders – such as pollution, the international transfer of hazardous wastes, and the illegal trade in wildlife – it is still necessary to examine such crimes in the context of their immediate geographical and criminal specificity.The export of e-waste to SouthEast Asia and to Africa, for example, has the same general drivers as does the export of hazards, especially related to agriculture and mining, to Latin America, but has quite different specific dynamics (Elliot, 2007; Cifuentes and Frumkin, 2007). Illegal fishing varies greatly depending upon location, and particular types of illegal fishing, such as abalone (Australia), lobster (Canada) and toothfish (Southern Ocean), show great variation in motives, techniques, local cultures 63

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and scale of operation (Tailby and Gant, 2002; McMullan and Perrier, 2002; Lugten, 2005). Elephant poaching in Africa is very different to bio-prospecting in South America, while the taking of ‘bush meat’ is a distinctive African phenomenon very different to illegal fishing by Indonesian fishers off the coast of Australia (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009; UNEP, 2007; White, 2008a). There are, then, issues that are specific to particular regions of the world. Huge tropical forests are found in the Amazon, an area that encompasses several different countries such as Brazil and Colombia. Similarly forests also cover parts of South-East Asia, spanning Indonesia, Malaysia,Thailand and Burma, among other countries. Africa is home to elephants, reptiles, giraffe and other creatures, that are unique to particular parts of that continent, and not the preserve of any one country. Desertification and drought are phenomena associated with the dry lands of northern Africa and the island continent of Australia. Meanwhile, cross-border pollution in Europe, and between China and Russia, are matters that demand a regional rather than simply national response. Acid rain traverses provincial and state demarcations and can affect environments, animals and humans many kilometers away. A nuclear accident in the Ukraine makes its presence felt in Britain, as well as the immediate vicinity of Chernobyl.An explosion at a nuclear power plant in northern Japan transfers radioactive materials worldwide via air and ocean currents. The ‘natural’ and the ‘social’ are conjoined in very specific ways in particular geographical contexts. The study of environmental justice can be enhanced by appreciation of different types of spaces. These are summarised in Box 2.1, which outlines features pertaining to geographical, political economic, and globalising spaces. How and why particular groups suffer from environmental victimisation is framed by matters of location. Geographical spaces are defined here by reference to key features of the natural environment.These determine the kinds of environmental harms that possibly and usually take place. For example, the nature of local air currents will bring in and prevent the flow of acid rain into a particular valley. Political economic spaces refer to features of the social environment, within which a range of stakeholders go about their business and live their lives.This includes such factors as transportation, technological devices and regulatory apparatus in a particular locale. Globalising spaces refers to the vertical integration of many different relationships and processes across the local–global continuum. People and places are interconnected in different ways, by social and business

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networks and through various human interactions. Spaces are unique and specific, but simultaneously conjoined and universal. Box 2.1: Features of different types of spaces Geographical spaces: features of the ‘natural environment’ • local and regional ecologies (for example, biotic and abiotic characteristics) • type of species (for example, specific plant and animal species) • topography and land form (for example, mountains, valleys) • flows and connections within and between areas (for example, ocean currents, air currents, rivers and streams) • climatic conditions (for example, monsoonal rains, hours of sunlight) Political economic spaces: features of the ‘social and cultural environment’ • local and regional industries (for example, agriculture, fishing, mining, tourism) • role of local and transnational companies (for example, business interests) • role of local and national state, namely regulation and governance (for example, neoliberal policy, fiscal constraints) • instrumental and intrinsic valuing of land, air, water, energy (for example, commodification and profit, communal access and use) • mechanisms for transference (for example, technology, free trade zones, shipping). Globalising spaces: key stakeholders dealing with localised issues • integration of local, regional, national, international, transnational levels • transnational drivers (for example, systemic imperatives of global capitalism) • transnational actors (for example, corporations,World Trade Organization) • transnational activists (for example, NGOs, governments in alliance) • global networks (for example, social networking, environmental law enforcement agencies)

Specific incidents, trends and issues can be analysed in terms of local conditions and international influences.We might consider, for example, issues pertaining to the ownership and control over heavily polluting factories in Mexico, the transfer of toxic waste to the Ivory Coast due to lax regulation and state corruption, the impact of forest sequestration schemes on local communities in Africa, the involvement of eco-Mafia in waste and pollution control in Naples, and the BP oil spill off the coasts of Louisiana and Florida in the Gulf of Mexico. Each case deserves close attention to specific factors arising from the particular ‘spaces’ in which they have emerged. Such analysis also provides the 65

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context for the emergence of specific types of criminal activity. For instance, the decline of fisheries off the coast of Somalia, due to overfishing by many different nations and groups of fishers, has robbed the local people of their main traditional livelihood. One consequence of this has been the move into another line of work – the most notorious being piracy on the high seas (see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). We need to ask why this has happened, and why here? Two brief case examples can be used to illustrate the importance of linking harm and place.The first involves assessment of a hot mud flow that occurred in East Java, Indonesia in 2006. From 29 May of that year, a mud volcano began emitting ‘hot mud’ in the Sidoarjo district. As a consequence, nearly 7,000 people were displaced from their villages and over 12,000 medical treatments were carried out, mainly for people affected by the release of hydrogen sulphide gas (United Nations, 2006). The question for investigators was whether the mud flow was generated by a natural disaster (earthquake) or was due to anthropogenic causes (drilling).The mud started to flow two days after an earthquake had struck Yogyakarta, Indonesia, killing almost 6,000 people. On the other hand, another possible explanation for the cause of the mud volcano eruption was that a pressurised mud layer, which also contained hydrogen sulphide, was pierced by the Banjar Panji I gas drilling well, which was situated just 200 metres from the first and largest flow.To interpret this event, one has to gather information about the local geographical spaces, the local political economy and international influences. From one scientific point of view, it was suggested that the mud volcano was mainly triggered by the energy released by the earthquake rather than the drilling activity (Mazzini et al, 2007). This was based on systematic study of the dynamics of mud volcanoes, and of the nature of seismic and mud volcano in the specific region in question. However, this finding has been disputed by other scientists who have studied similar phenomenon (Davies et al, 2007). Furthermore, it has been suggested that studies of this specific event were hindered by the fact that the oil-drilling company, PT Lapindo Brantas, kept much of the drilling data under wraps (see Cyranoski, 2007). Moreover, it is notable that claims that this was just another ‘natural disaster’ were actively proffered by one of the country’s most powerful and richest men, who not only was a Minister in the Indonesian government but a member of the family which part owns Lapindo. Alternative explanations point to the workers at the well withdrawing their drill too quickly thereby losing control of the pressure in the hole, and thus precipitating the mud volcano.There were many vested interests linked 66

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to the company and the event, including international partners in the joint venture. Local geographical seismic conditions were conducive to the event occurring, but so too was the presence of the drilling well. The event has been variously interpreted by overseas observers, national leaders and local community residents – depending upon their backgrounds and circumstances. The second case relates to the question of radioactivity in Sellafield, England and Fukushima, Japan.The issue here is whether the spread of radioactivity should be seen as a ‘natural disaster’ or simply a moment waiting to happen. Sellafield made the news recently when a report by the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority concluded that if only 1 per cent of the liquid radioactive waste stored at the Sellafield nuclear power plant in Britain was released to air, the radioactive fallout in western Norway could be five times higher than in the areas of Norway that were worst affected by the Chernobyl accident (Norway Ministry of the Environment, 2011).The Norwegian concern was not unfounded. Sellafield has been subject to much criticism over the years due to discharges of radioactive material, some accidental and some allegedly deliberate. Prevailing sea currents transport any radioactive materials leaked into the sea at Sellafield along the entire coast of Norway.The Norwegian concern is to prevent further potential environmental harm, knowing the risks and likelihood of just such harm occurring is high. The explosion and melt down at the Daiichi nuclear power plant in Fukushima has been described as the most significant radioactive event since Chernobyl.The lead-up to the event saw a massive tsunami devastate the northern Japanese coastline. Again, the question has been posed as to how and why this major leak was able to happen, and whether the cause was anthropogenic or natural. The short answer is that the nuclear power industry in Japan has a terrible reputation when it comes to health and safety provisions, for sharing of essential knowledge about nuclear facilities, and for planning and responding to nuclear power plant events (Takemura, 2012). In essence, this was a nuclear disaster that was waiting to happen, as those who have long objected to the placement of such plants near earthquake fault lines have tirelessly pointed out.The local geography makes the construction of such plants intrinsically dangerous; but it is local and international politics (including the support of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency) that ensured that Fukushima was, eventually, to hit the world headlines. Environmental victimisation thus ought to be examined within the context of specific places and spaces. The precise nature of 67

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environmental harm will vary depending upon the mix of physical, social, political, cultural and economic features that characterise a particular location.

Transborder conflicts over land While environmental harm is localised in many respects (in that it originates somewhere specific and spreads out from there), this is not always the case. For example, borders do not have much material relevance when it comes to the environmental harm associated with global warming. Climate change affects us all, regardless of where we live, regardless of social characteristics. However, the effects of climate change, while felt by everyone, are not the same for everyone (White, 2012). There are crucial differences in how different groups and classes of people are situated quite differently in relation to key risk and protective factors. Indeed, it has been estimated that over half the world’s population is potentially at risk (Smith andVivekananda, 2007). The consequences of global warming will have the greatest impact on those least able to cope with climate-related changes. The conflicts pertaining to diminished environmental resources, to the impacts of global warming, to differential access and use of nature, and to friction stemming from the cross-border transference of harm are overlaid by questions of class and state power, and the histories and contemporary manifestations of imperialism and colonialism. At the centre of contemporary and future conflicts are land and people, and basic questions about ownership, control and access. When water for drinking dries up and natural disasters destroy productive lands, when subsistence fishing, farming and hunting withers due to overexploitation and climate change, and when present systems of aquaculture and agriculture fail to meet actual need, then great shifts in human populations and in resource use will take place (see, for example, Refugee Studies Centre, 2008). From the point of view of national interests and international security, the mass movement of peoples is generally presented as a significant problem (Solana and Ferrero-Waldner, 2008). In particular, there is a popular inclination to view third-world ecological ruin as first and foremost a threat to firstworld stability and existing wealth. Typically, for the ‘rich’ nations the first response to asylum seekers has been containment and coercive law enforcement (Pickering, 2005). As environmental conditions deteriorate due to global warming, the size and extent of migration will be shaped by geography, global power relations and political struggles over human rights. Some people will 68

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flee and be criminalised for seeking asylum; others will stay, to fight for dwindling resources in their part of the world. Communities will be pitted against each other, and industries against communities. Law and order will be increasingly more difficult to maintain, much less enforce in other than repressive ways. Border control, in this case, is about restricting the movement of the vulnerable into the domain of those who ‘have’. On the other hand, there is considerable transborder movement, of a particular kind, by those who have the power and resources to do so. Indeed, a key area of conflict is around land use and ownership involving international forces and parties. Here we can already see a series of developments that put into sharp focus the vested interests of specific industries, companies and nation-states – over and above the interests and needs of local communities.The contemporary food and financial crises have worked in tandem to trigger substantial changes in global land ownership (Share The World’s Resources, 2009; Grain Briefing, 2008). Much of this is being driven by both the direct impacts of climate change (that is, the search for new sources of food production) and policy responses to climate change (for example, carbon emission trading schemes). Systematic forms of injustice are being perpetrated under the guise of ‘free market’ opportunities, purported conservationoriented agendas and strategic development.

Land grab for food There has been a rush to control land outside of one’s own national borders insofar as it is needed to supply food and energy to sustain one’s own population and society into the future. For example, it has been observed that the world food price crisis of 2007–8 shocked some national governments of countries that cannot produce sufficient food of their own, and the response of Middle East and northern African countries, South Korea and India was to secure their own national food security by finding other lands that would support them (Borras and Franco, 2010). Large-scale agricultural investment is of benefit to transnational agribusiness (as opposed to small and medium sized farmers and pastoralists) and to governments such as China which import the food for its own population. Foreign countries become the directly controlled source of food for the country of origin. The result is a commodification of food production, for export, involving industrial farming and mono-cropping.The ‘winners’ are big companies and foreign governments. The ‘losers’ are local communities, small farmers and consumers in the host country. 69

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Displacement from homelands is accelerating through the acquisition by foreign governments and private companies of large areas of arable land in developing countries. Thus Parcels of several hundred thousands of hectares are being bought or leased in Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe by food-importing countries with domestic land and water constraints but abundant capital, such as the Gulf States, and by countries with large populations and food security concerns, such as China, South Korea and India. (Sutherland et al, 2009: 5) These land acquisitions are having major negative impacts on local people who are losing access and control over the resources on which they depend, and which are the rightful inheritance of future generations.

Land grab for biofuels At the same time, communal lands are under threat due to private and government pressures to introduce income-generating crops such as biofuels in countries such as Brazil and Argentina (Robin, 2010; Engdahl, 2007; Shiva, 2008). The problem here is twofold. First, lands are being converted from food production to biofuel production, thereby reducing the amount of food available and leading to escalating prices for crops such as soya and corn (White, 2011). Second, formerly communal lands are being forcibly seized by companies and/or governments and transferred into private hands.The ‘ownership’ as well as the use of the land is being rejigged in favour of private interests and private profits. This is achieved not only by direct force, but by policies that reward biofuel production through subsidies and quota systems.The ‘winners’ are the new energy barons and their partners in government. Again, local consumers and communities lose out.

Land grab for carbon emission trading The issue of carbon colonialism is emerging as a form of climate injustice. This relates to the harnessing of forests as carbon sinks (on the part of commercial interests in developed countries) for which credits can be earned and finance provided to developing countries, particularly biodiverse countries such as those in Latin America. The governments of such countries stand to gain financially from such 70

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arrangements, often at the expense of local communities. It has been alleged, for example, that a Norwegian company operating in Uganda leased its lands for a sequestration project that is said to have resulted in 8,000 people in 13 villages being evicted (Bulkeley and Newell, 2010: 48). The effects of the commodification of carbon (that is, its extraction from local contexts and circulation in global markets) will thus put pressure on communities that are home to these resources. Lands in less developed countries are also being taken over by governments, companies and conservation groups ostensibly for purposes of ecological sustainability and climate change mitigation. For example, there are businesses that are keen to secure money as part of carbon sequestration schemes, usually involving companies based in Europe offsetting their pollution by buying carbon credits in the form of forests in other parts of the world. For others, the motivation is less financial than ecological, at least in intent. Here we can include western conservation groups and movements that both historically and today are usurping the lands of traditional and indigenous peoples in the name of conservation (Jacoby, 2001; Duffy, 2010). Corporate funding largess to mainstream conservation groups also contributes to the overall strategy, one that disenfranchises traditional owners and users from their own lands.

Land grab for toxic waste disposal As noted above, pollutants, such as e-waste, are being shipped to peripheral areas and countries for processing and disposal.There is also a land grab for toxic waste disposal. For instance, the forced or co-opted acquisition of indigenous land is not only related to carbon emission trading schemes and the push to plant biofuels, but is also associated with the establishment of nuclear waste dumps and disposal of hazardous wastes more generally (Boylan, 2010). As with the general pattern, it is the most vulnerable who are likely to suffer from both take-over of land and radical transformation of existing land use. Likewise, this type of ‘garbage imperialism’ feeds upon those who seek fiscal relief in the very moment that it sustains a racist and classist culture and ideology that views toxic dumping on poor communities of colour as perfectly acceptable (Pellow, 2007).

Land grab for alternative commercial purposes Deforestation is another example of changing land uses. It is not just that grain production is changing in form (toward industrial) and 71

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content (toward biofuels), but so-called ‘unproductive’ or forested lands are being transformed into profit-making ventures.These are not only agricultural in nature. Big disputes are occurring in the Amazon over the impact of mining and pastoral industries in regards to deforestation (Boekhout van Solinge, 2010a, b). Meanwhile in developed countries there is much consternation over the environmental impact of ‘fracking’, a technique that involves the use of toxic chemicals to extract coal seam gas (Cleary, 2012). The main protagonists are, on the one side, companies, and on the other farmers and environmentalists. Profit and power are the key determinants in these debates, as is the extent of community mobilisation and politicisation of the issues. There are different cultural understandings and meanings attached to ‘land’ and ‘country’ that reflect traditional, cultural and livelihood interests. However, where the dominant social construction of ‘property’ is a relationship of exclusive use based upon documented ownership, then any sense of a ‘commons’ and community interests is diminished (see Chapter Five). Moreover, in the context of rhetoric supporting the ‘national interest’, there is also impetus for commercial production to take place on what is formally considered ‘public lands’, including in some cases what has ordinarily been treated as ‘traditional’ shared lands. Indeed this is the biggest target for worldwide land grabs and includes, for example, the majority of land in Africa, Indonesia and the Philippines. The land grabs described above are for all intents and purposes not simply about governance, but about the very basis of land sovereignty – the effective control over the nature, pace, extent and direction of surplus production, distribution and disposition (Borras and Franco, 2010). It is about ownership and control over land resources. Land grabbing is occurring at the hands of many different agents, and for different purposes worldwide. Not all of the changes to land use are ‘bad’; in exceptional circumstances, for example, industrial production has been transformed back into small-scale production designed for local consumption and sustainable living (Borras and Franco, 2010). It is also important to acknowledge the complexities of changes in land use by closely considering how land is being reconfigured, by whom and for what purposes.Transnational corporations and ‘foreign’ governments are not the only or even necessarily always the central players in the land use shuffle. National bourgeoisie and state elites are frequently willing partners in the plunder, and may well encourage foreign investment and take-overs as a key platform of economic development. The ‘national interest’ is linked with the idea of ‘biosecurity’ in ways that ideologically and materially tend to prop up the most powerful sectors of state and private enterprise. 72

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Conclusion: measuring the value of human life Environmental victimisation is not a socially neutral process, but is constructed at the intersection between social inequality, unequal power relationships and the subjective experience of victims. The majority of victims of environmental degradation – stemming from industrial and commercial activities, global warming, loss of biodiversity and increased waste and pollution – are very often the poor and the dispossessed.While all are threatened by global environmental disaster, there remain large social differences in the likelihood of exposure and subsequent resilience to injury, harm and suffering. For those who disproportionately bear the brunt of global patterns of environmental transformation, degradation and victimisation, big questions arise as to who will compensate them for their often prolonged suffering, now and into the future. When it comes to measuring the value of human life some people count more than others and in some circumstances the health and wellbeing of certain people will be sacrificed on the altar of profit.This can be quantified in terms of United Nations figures on world poverty, on disease, on illnesses related to air pollution, on life expectancy and other similar measures. It is also measurable in terms of production processes worldwide in which destruction of local environments is part and parcel of resource extraction and the recycling of commodities. The open burning, acid baths and toxic dumping pour pollution into the land, air and water and exposes the men, women and children of Asia’s poorer peoples to poison.The health and economic costs of this trade are vast and, due to export, are not born by the western consumers nor the waste brokers who benefit from the trade. (Basel Action Network/Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, 2002: 1) In this example, the atrocity and suffering related to environmental harm is linked a basic denial of human rights.This is not only evident in disparities in access to resources or in environmental living conditions; it is also found in the activities of regimes and companies that use violence against those who would dare threaten their economic and political interests.This has led some to argue that since environmental injustice and human rights are inextricably interwoven, the former should be recognised as a major component of the latter (Adeola, 2000: 687). This story is familiar the world over, including within developed countries. It is a story of lack of care for those who are culturally and 73

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socially constructed as Other, and therefore free of the obligations of compassion and compensation. Denial of harm on the part of the advantaged and socially privileged is easier when stereotypes, denigrating images and self interest are mobilised in order to ignore. The fact that environmental victims are frequently drawn from the ranks of the poor, the disadvantaged and the minority has significant ramifications. Such victims fit into the category of ‘socially expendable victims’ (Fattah, 2010). That is, no one really cares what happens to these specific individuals and groups, since they are already devalued in wider community terms. As Engel and Martin (2006: 479) put it: ‘If victims are perceived as degraded in some sense, then it does not seem so unfair when bad things happen to them.’ The ‘value’ of human life is thus constructed in social and economic terms. Environmental injustice is accomplished precisely through the devaluing of those who suffer the consequences of decisions made somewhere else, for purposes not of their own making, and in the interests of those who will never share their environmental risks and harms.

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Three

Conservation, ecological justice and harm to nature Introduction The notion of ecological justice refers to the health and wellbeing of ‘nature’, that is comprised of specific eco-systems and plants and animals that together constitute the environment as a whole, and the intrinsic value of the natural environment. Analysis in this instance is directed at environmental harm that is directly linked to specific eco-systems. Global environmental harm is not new. For many centuries humans have done things to the environment that have fundamentally transformed local landscapes and regional biodiversities. From bringing plants and animals from the ‘homeland’ to new parts of the world, to polluting rivers and seas with industrial outfall, to fire burning in particular local biospheres, ecological change has been part and parcel of how humans have worked with each other, and nature, for millennia. Not all such activities have been viewed as harmful, and the transformation of environments has not always been seen as a negative. In ecological terms, however, there are, today, several areas of acknowledged harm that are garnering ever greater attention and concern from the scientific community and from the population at large.The main reason for this is a consensus that the relationship between human activity and environmental wellbeing is essentially toxic – we are killing the world as we know it. (White, 2010a: 3) If this is indeed the case, then the purpose of ecological justice moments is to expose the ways in which ecological health and wellbeing is being undermined by human practices. Such exposure has a number of relevant dimensions and reflects quite different foci when it comes to environmental protection and preservation. Key questions that arise include which environments 75

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are destroyed and why, and which are not? There is, for instance, both selective destruction of eco-systems and bio-spheres (for example, the clearfelling of forests), and selective protection of such (for example, preservation of national parks and marine sanctuaries). Which ecosystems and bio-spheres are privileged or valued above others is an important consideration in critical evaluation of environmental harm as this pertains to ecological justice. Among the many environmental social movements, groups such as Earth First!, Greenpeace, Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth advocate on behalf of threatened environments and threatened species (including plant life). Other types of intervention, particularly via wildlife and forestry governance organisations such as Parks and Wildlife Services, may be concerned less with ‘preservation’ as such than with ‘management’ of the natural world and what it has to offer to humans. The drivers of engagement around ecological justice issues is thus variable, and can be motivated by strategic instrumental concerns (to use natural resources wisely) as well as considerations of intrinsic worth and value (to leave natural environments untouched).

Contentious concepts: ecological justice The response to environmental degradation and destruction is to address the manifest and worst aspects through various policy interventions. These take the form of environmental management schemes, environmental impact assessments, and protection of high value conservation areas by creating marine parks or national parklands. How and why intervention takes place varies according to ecophilosophy.Within criminological circles, at least two main approaches can be identified: conservation criminology and an ecological justice perspective. This section outlines these perspectives in the light of concepts such as natural resource management, environmental crime, sustainable development, ecological notions of rights and justice, ecocide, and pristine nature. Conservation criminology is concerned with natural resource management as its main priority (Gibbs et al, 2010a; Herbig and Joubert, 2006).This has several different dimensions. On the one hand, nature in general is viewed as something to be protected and cherished insofar as air, land and water pollution negatively affect humans and community life (see Mesko et al, 2011).The problem of air pollution, for example, is of growing concern and is basically one that has an impact on humans in ways that fundamentally undermine their health and wellbeing, as evidenced in millions of premature deaths worldwide each year 76

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(Walters, 2009, 2013). Likewise, the global trade in electronic waste is viewed as problematic, not only because of the scale of the problem but the terrible damage it does to communities and local environments (Gibbs et al, 2010b; Interpol, 2009). What is important is that it is the victimisation of people that frequently generates the original concern with activities that cause systematic pollution. Sometimes public and governmental action is called for under the activist banner of environmental justice insofar as some groups may be disproportionately affected by air pollution than others (see Hurley, 1995; Bullard, 2005a). In other cases a ubiquitous problem (pollution clouds over Beijing or London) may call forth action linked to special events such as the summer Olympics. While the emphasis may be on cleaning up the environment, this is not necessarily driven by concerns about or for the environment per se. Rather, environmental health is seen to be a precondition for the health of humans. Legality – how the law defines a particular harm – tends to be a major consideration in assessing environmental harm from the point of view of conservation criminology.This reflects conventional criminological concerns over illegal fishing, logging, traffic in wildlife and hazardous wastes (Liddick, 2011). A limitation of this approach is that it relies upon legal definitions as the benchmark for analysis of environmental harms. Thus, the focus is on legal conceptions of harm as informed by laws, rules and international conventions. The key issue is legality, and the separation of activities into legal and illegal. Unauthorised acts or omissions that are against the law and thus subject to criminal prosecution and criminal sanctions are the main concern: • illegal taking of flora and fauna – which includes activities such as illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, illegal logging and trade in timber, and illegal trade in wildlife • pollution offences – which relate to issues such as flytipping (illegal dumping) through to air, water and land pollution associated with industry • transportation of banned substances – such as the illegal transport of radioactive materials and the illegal transfer of hazardous waste. The overarching paradigm is mainstream criminology (often incorporating insights from sub-areas such as situational crime prevention) as applied specifically to the topic of environmental crime.This sort of criminological enterprise rarely deviates from statist or legalistic conceptions of ‘what is wrong’: it is the focus of the criminological gaze 77

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that marks it off from other areas of criminology (such as penology, street crime, white-collar crime and so on). Underpinning this and other conventional criminological approaches to environmental crime is the notion that nature is first and foremost a resource for human use, and that such use should be rule-guided for the sake of fairness and sustainability. Hence, illegal trade in timber or fish is criticised because of the way it distorts efforts to ensure that future generations have access to trees and aquatic species. The instrumental use of plants and animals in not in question, it is the patterns of use that count. Conservation criminology is thus inherently and unapologetically anthropocentric or human-centred. Indeed, when it comes to environmental harm, what actually gets criminalised by and large reflects an anthropocentric perspective on the nature of the harm in question. In part this stems from the ways in which ‘environmental rights’ are framed in law, particularly in relation to broader developments vis-à-vis human rights legislation (see Thornton and Tromans, 1999). It also relates to the strategic interests of industries and indeed humanity as a whole to protect and preserve particular environments and/or species for the ‘greater good’. Nonhuman nature is therefore viewed instrumentally, as something to be appropriated, processed, consumed and disposed of in a manner which best suits the immediate needs and interests of humans. Fundamentally, the integrity of nonhuman entities (both biotic and abiotic) is of concern only insofar as these stand to benefit humans, whether this is economically, aesthetically or however ‘worth’ is to be measured (as long it is done so relative to what humans set as the standard). Natural resource management is concerned with dealing with matters of productivity and scarcity in relation to nonhuman resources, risk assessment relative to potential future trends, and incorporating notions of social equity in relation to natural resource use and access. However, as discussed further below, the conservation ethic is not always socially neutral. Certain human interests, including those of large NGOs, may be privileged in the process of ensuring that future generations will gain the benefits from things such as forest preservation and animal sanctuary. The notion of sustainable development reflects the human-centred idea that instrumental use of nature needs to be carried out in ways that ensure future exploitation as well as present entitlements.This can be contrasted with ecological sustainability that refers to eco-system needs rather than human needs. In the former, the strategic choices revolve around how best to manage natural resources in ways that help to alleviate outcomes such as loss of biodiversity, pollution of air and 78

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water, and land degradation because otherwise the whole system will be put into jeopardy. In the latter, the emphasis is on intrinsic values and protection of nonhuman nature for its own sake. Both these concepts may be apparent in contemporary discussions of ecological wellbeing and health. Specific practices, and choices, in how humans interact with particular environments present immediate and potential risks to everything within them. For example, the practice of clearfelling old growth forests directly affects many animal species by destroying their homes. Similarly, human practices that destroy, re-channel or pollute existing fresh water systems have a negative impact on local natural environments, and nonhuman inhabitants of both so-called wilderness and built environments. If we pollute our rivers, streams and waterways, we are not simply affecting human beings but also living creatures, such as the platypus. When we destroy the habitat of the platypus, we simultaneously destroy the biosphere. Ecological notions of rights and justice see humans as only one component of complex ecosystems that should be preserved for their own sake, as expressed in the notion of the rights of the environment. As Smith (1998: 99) puts it: By extending the moral community we are attributing intrinsic value to creatures and other natural things, as ends in themselves rather than the means to some set of human ends…In ethical terms, any set of moral rules should consider these duties toward nonhuman animals, the land, forests and woodland, the oceans, mountains and the biosphere. Translated into the language of rights, it has been argued by Berry (in Cullinan, 2003: 115) that every component of the Earth Community has three rights: ‘The right to be, the right to habitat, and the right to fulfil its role in the ever-renewing processes of the Earth Community.’ What this might concretly mean is difficult to assess, however, since any decision about a particular environmental issue very much depends upon situational factors, community norms and values, and available technologies and techniques (see Chapter Five). Even given the ambiguities of practice, what necessarily follows from an ecological perspective are notions of interconnectedness and human obligations to the nonhuman world around them. All living things are bound together, and environmental matters are intrinsically global and trans-boundary in nature (as witnessed, for example, by 79

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the spread of the bird flu virus worldwide, across national borders). Ecological justice demands that how humans interact with their environment be evaluated in relation to potential harms and risks to specific creatures and specific locales as well as the biosphere generally. From this perspective, clearfelling of old growth forests, accompanied by the laying of poison baits to kill animals and the burning of remnants, is inherently wrong and deviant. Acknowledgement of harm according to ecological justice criteria also has concrete criminological application. For instance, ecocide has been defined as ‘the extensive damage, destruction to or loss of ecosystems of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been severely diminished’ (Higgins, 2012: 3). Where this occurs as a result of human agency, then it is purported that a crime has occurred. Ecocide as a concept has been used to refer to ‘natural’ processes of ecosystem decline and transformation, as well as human-created destruction of ecosystems. The former includes instances where, for example, kangaroos denude a paddock of its grasses and shrubs to the extent that both specific environment and the kangaroo mob are negatively affected. The migration and/or transportation of ‘invasive’ species, such as the crown of thorns starfish off the east coast of Australia or the introduction of trout into the central highland lakes of Tasmania, can lead to diminishment or death of endemic species of fish and coral – again a form of ecocide. The term has also been applied to extensive environmental damage during war, as in the case of the use of defoliants (for example, Agent Orange) in the Vietnam War, and the blowing up of oil wells and subsequent pollution during the first Gulf War in Iraq and Kuwait (see for example,Al-Damkhi et al, 2009).These actions involved intent to actually produce environmental destruction in pursuit of military and other goals. Recent efforts have been directed at making ‘ecocide’ the fifth international crime against peace (Higgins, 2010, 2012). It describes an attempt to criminalise human activities that destroy and diminish the wellbeing and health of ecosystems and species within these, including humans. Climate change and the gross exploitation of natural resources are leading to our general demise – hence increasing the need for just such a crime. The urgency and impetus for this has been heightened by inadequate responses by governments, individually and collectively, to global warming. Climate change is rapidly and radically altering the basis of world ecology; yet very little action has been taken by states or corporations to rein in the worst contributors to the problem. 80

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Parallel developments in the legal field complement calls for ecocide to be recognised as a crime. For example, the recent Manual on Human Rights and the Environment produced by the Council of Europe (2012) provides a platform for the exercise of both procedural and substantive rights in regard to the environment.Worldwide, public trust and public interest law have been used to establish future generations as victims of environmental crime with the victims including human as well as the environment and nonhuman biota, for which surrogate victims (such as parents or NGOs) have provided representation (Preston, 2011; Mehta, 2009).These developments are challenging many longstanding assumptions about the nature–human relationship. However, within the broad ecological justice approach there may be philosophical differences in terms of the value put on the interests of humans and on the environment itself. Humans may be placed on the same footing as other species, and cherished and valued as part of the ecological whole. In some cases, however, the fate of specific individuals is less important than the prospects facing the biosphere generally. For some exponents of a deep green or biocentric perspective, for example, AIDS or famine may be seen as nature’s way of controlling population growth and thus as good for the planet as a whole (see White, 1994). If radical environmentalists were to invent a disease to bring human population back to sanity, it would probably be something like AIDS…the possible benefits of this to the environment are staggering…just as the Plague contributed to the demise of feudalism, AIDS has the potential to end industrialism. (Earth First! journal, quoted in Dobson, 1990: 64) From this vantage point, an act or omission is not harmful if it ultimately benefits the biosphere generally. This fundamentally misanthropic (anti-human) perspective frequently sees humans as the problem, and therefore it is humans who need to be controlled or in some cases even eradicated. Related to this attitude, members of the environmental justice movements are critical of some mainstream environmental groups precisely because of their ‘focus on the fate of “nature” rather than humans’ (Harvey, 1996: 386; see also Sandler and Pezzullo, 2007). To put it differently, taking action on environmental issues involves choices and priorities. Many communities who suffer from the ‘hard end’ of environmental harm feel that their well-being ought to take priority over particular natural environments or specific plants and animals as such. 81

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The reverence for and privileging of nonhuman nature sometimes translates into a concern for the ‘righteous management’ of nature, and manifests in an agenda that advocates for the mass preservation of wilderness, protection of endangered nonhuman species and restoration of disturbed areas towards a pristine nature or pristine condition (Devall and Sessions, 1985). There are two immediate problems with this view. First, it implies a separation of humanity and nature as if this was and always has, empirically, been the case. The notion of ‘pristine nature’ implies precisely this kind of rigid separation, yet historical and cross-cultural study indicates exactly the opposite – namely, constant and continuous living in nature by humans (Plumwood, 2004; Merchant, 2005; Tsing, 2005), including within the most inhospitable environments possible from a human perspective (Robyn, 2002). Second, the notion of ‘pristine nature’ implies immutable or unchanging conditions. Yet, nature is inherently changeable. If we recast the issue into the language of ‘harm’, then it becomes even more complicated. To protect against intrinsic harm to the environment requires an understanding of what the environment is and how it can be harmed. If ‘environment‘ refers to the natural world, and if the source of value in the natural world is its self-maintaining properties, then harm to the environment involves setbacks to these self-maintaining properties. Harm to the environment, in other words, might be defined as a change from the environment’s ‘natural‘, self-maintaining state. The problem with this view, however, is that the environment is not in static equilibrium; rather, it is a dynamic entity undergoing constant change. Preserving the environment in its natural state is likely an impossible, and perhaps undesirable, mission. (Lin, 2006: 981) Yet, some efforts to establish forest reserves or marine parks are based upon total exclusion of humans from these areas under any condition. This is based upon ideas that humans do not have an ethical right to alter the ‘natural’ integrity of forests or ocean spaces, or that they cannot be trusted to do the right thing when entering and experiencing such places. For traditional users especially, exclusionary policies ignore historical realities and are puzzling from the point of view of Earth care principles that often inform these historical relationships. Defining the contours of ‘ecological justice’ and ‘conservation’ is a political process.The biggest players in this process include the big four 82

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conservation NGOs: The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Conservation International (CI),World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). These groups are influential in shaping how conservation is perceived, understood and defined in today’s world. Such portrayals simultaneously reflect specifically western notions of conservation, and frequently ignore or attempt to ‘reform’ other ways of living and being in the natural world (see Duffy, 2010). For example, some interpretations of ‘biodiversity’ assume this means no people – thus biodiversity as an objective provides ‘a rationale for the creation and maintenance of areas where wildlife is protected, but people are forced out’ (Duffy, 2010: 53).Translated into practice, this results in the creation of manufactured national parks which, among other things, are people-free wildernesses precisely made by the eviction of previous human occupiers. Environmental activists and conservationists have been charged with ideological ecological elitism insofar as attention is directed at ‘nature’ not ‘people’. Environmental action and reform directs resources toward the affluent and away from issues and problems that are important to the poor. Issues of wilderness, wildlife and natural preservation are privileged over and above the interests and needs of humans, and especially those who are not members of elite groupings (see Brisman, 2009; Duffy, 2010; Rivers III and Gibbs, 2011). Those who can afford to be ecologically virtuous or to push for causes that are oriented toward protecting and conserving ‘nature’ are portrayed as ‘good’ – those who express different interests or who cannot afford to take the most preferable ecological action are seen as part of the problem. In part, the criticism here is that ecological justice, as distinct from environmental justice, has tended to attract the affluent and the white, those from privileged socio-economic strata.

Transforming nature Conventional understandings of human intervention in the environment can be analysed in terms of collective changes over time in areas such as land use; resource extraction; external inputs (fertilisers, chemicals, irrigation); emissions (pollutants and waste); and modification and movement of organisms (plants and animals) (see for example, UNEP, 2007: xii). The drivers behind how these interventions manifest in specific terms include such things as:

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• • • • •

demographics (human population size and dynamics) economic processes (consumption, production, markets and trade) scientific and technological innovation distribution pattern processes (inter- and intra- generational) cultural, social, political and institutional (including production and service sectors) processes.

Within this science-based technical framework the environmental changes taking place and their impacts on human well-being are more or less abstracted from the global political economy and the real politic of transnational capitalism (see White, 2010, 2013; and Chapter Five). Yet, even a cursory examination of dominant world political economic trends reveals close links between capitalism as a system and environmental degradation and transformation generally. Environmental harm is about what humans do to and with nature. It involves the actions of humans working in concert with each other to meet their needs in particular ways. To understand environmental harm, therefore, it is essential to ask basic questions about the mode of production in any given society. Built in to the logic and dynamics of contemporary global capitalism is the imperative to expand (White, 2002).This expansionary dynamic – the extended reproduction of capital accumulation – has several major implications for the environment. First, it implies that ‘natural resources’ are themselves subject to varying processes of commodification, that is, the transformation of existing or potential use-values into exchangevalues.Water becomes valued according to how much it can be traded for, not simply because it is essential to human health and wellbeing. Second, the appropriation of nature does not merely involve transforming it into commodities, it also frequently involves capital actually remaking nature and its products biologically and physically. Examples include genetic changes in food crops, the destruction of biological diversity through extensive use of plantation forestry, and so on. The generative principle behind such transformations is the search by capital to lower costs, create new markets and reconfigure the productive use of diminished natural resources. Some key transformations characteristic of the contemporary time period include (White, 2010b): • resource depletion – extraction of non-renewable minerals and energy without development of proper alternatives, over-harvesting of renewable resources such as fish and forest timbers

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• disposal problems – waste generated in production, distribution and consumption processes, pollution associated with transformations of nature, burning of fossil fuels and using up of consumables • industrialisation of nature – genetic changes in food crops, use of plantation forestry that diminishes bio-diversity, preference for large-scale, technology-dependent and high-yield agricultural and aquaculture methods that degrade land and oceans and affect species’ development and wellbeing • species decline – destruction of habitats, privileging of certain species of grains and vegetables over others for market purposes, super-exploitation of specific plants and animals, due to presumed consumer taste and mass markets. These transformative processes, however, are not treated as the key problem from the point of view of hegemonic states (such as the United States and China) and the dominant transnational corporations (such as mining companies, pharmaceutical companies, water and waste treatment companies, and agribusiness). Profit is made, precisely through this exploitation of humans and nature. Profit, furthermore, is enhanced through scarcity, not plenty. These transformations not only capitalistically transform nature, but they simultaneously transform human relationships and the habitats of human and nonhuman alike. Consider for example the fact that agriculture in the United States has not only become heavily corporatised (resulting in a smaller number of farms, but larger in size), but heavily subsidised over the years. To take one of the top crops, for example, it is notable that ‘between 2000 and 2004 an average of $4.5 billion a year in federal subsidies went to support corn production’ (Baur, 2008: 87).This corn production was, in turn, mainly directed at producing feed for animal farms, another huge growth area in terms of agribusiness and production outcomes (see Chapter Four). The ecological impact of large scale food animal production is enormous, as indicated by water use under such regimes. We are draining or diverting rivers and aquifers by raising animals and growing crops where we shouldn’t be to meet the industry’s seemingly relentless demand for resources. Large slaughterhouses that kill cattle use between 250,000 and 500,000 gallons of water each day. Poultry plants use even more, about 1.5 million gallons per day (about 6 gallons per bird). (Baur, 2008: 88)

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The corporatisation of agriculture has also been accompanied by significant changes in land use, such as a major expansion in cropland worldwide: ‘Viewed in a wider historical context, more land was converted to cropland in the 30 years after 1950, than in the 150 years between 1700 and 1850’ (UNEP, 2007: 86).The environmental impact is loss of habitat and biodiversity; soil water retention and regulation; disturbance of biological cycle; increases in soil erosion, nutrient depletion, salinity and eutrophication. For humans, there is greater exposure to agrochemicals in air, soil and water. Using nature for the purposes of profit-making involves many different industries – from mining to agriculture, logging to fishing – and involves exploitation of so-called natural resources on a huge scale. In ecological terms, there are several key areas of environmental harm that are especially apparent and that are directly and indirectly related to the global capitalist mode of production. These relate to climate change, biodiversity, pollution and waste, plastics and pollution in the ocean, and plants and forests.

Climate change A key problem identified by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP 2007, 2012) is climate change. According to the UNEP there are several interrelated dimensions to the problem.These include ozone depletion, climate change linked to various kinds of emissions, and the impact of air pollution on global warming. In large measure, the problem of climate change is directly related to how humans across the globe produce and consume, distribute and exchange the fruits of their labour. While, to date, the impact of climate change on humans has been felt disproportionately in developing countries, the more affluent countries of the West are now beginning to experience climate-related disasters (see UNEP, 2007). Plants and animals are affected not only by global warming (for example, through threats to habitat and weather changes), but by human efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change (for example, deforestation linked to planting of GMO crops).

The problem of biodiversity Commodification is taking place in all aspects of human life, and in all parts of the globe. The global political economy of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) provides a case in point, insofar as the promotion of GMOs by large transnational corporations has continued 86

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apace, regardless of serious reservations being raised about significant potential risks to human health and safety, antibiotic immunity and contamination of the environment (Walters, 2011). These kinds of developments ultimately lead to reliance upon fewer species (of plant and of animal) for food production for humans. The transformation of genetic material via science and bio-technology tends toward homogenisation of species composition – it is more profitable to reduce variety at the same time as increase quantitative productivity by focusing on the ‘winners’. The overall result is an attitude of ‘fewer species is better’ (and more profitable), especially if control over these is vested in private hands.

The problem of waste Waste and effluent from production processes and consumption practices, including most recently the proliferation of ‘e-waste’ generated by the disposal of tens-of-thousands of computers and other equipment, are contributing to widespread pollution of air, land and water. Much of the transfer of waste has been from advanced industrialised countries to developing countries (Clapp, 2001). Likewise, the most polluted places on earth tend to be developing countries. Meanwhile, hazardous residues and contaminated sludge are most likely to find a foreign home in a third world country. Moreover, threats to health posed by smog, and indoor and outdoor pollutants, have been shown to have a major impact on human and animal health and wellbeing, and the negative health consequences are apparent in both developing and the more developed countries (UNEP, 2007: 55; see also Walters, 2013).Air pollution also adversely affects agriculture, among other things, which has an impact on food quality and quantity. It is specific eco-systems and bio-spheres, and the creatures that inhabit these, that are threatened by these interlinked phenomena. This is occurring, now, in every part of the planet and across many different types of terrain. Ecological destruction is not limited to the air or the land. It also finds its place within the oceans. Indeed, it is not only cities that are being polluted. Inland rivers, oceans and seas are also filling up with highly toxic pollutants. International waters that suffer pollution have no respect for national borders or national interests. The pollution affects all.

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Plastics and pollution in the ocean There are five gyre or high pressure zones – slow, deep vortexes of air and water – in the world’s oceans: in the North Pacific, the South Pacific, the North and South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.Together these cover some 40 per cent of the sea.What distinguishes these gyres is that they are places where plastic gathers in currents. The amassing of plastic waste across hundreds of kilometres of sea is having dramatic negative impacts. It has been pointed out that ‘More than a million seabirds, 100,000 marine mammals, and countless fish die in the North Pacific each year, either from mistakenly eating this junk or from being ensnared in it and drowning’ (Casey, 2007: 3).The permeation of plastics throughout the food chain (including highly toxic chemicals) means that humans, too, are being affected by their ubiquitous distribution through land and sea environments. The plastic debris deposited in the planet’s oceans is generating increasing concern because of the potential impact of releases of persistent bio-accumulating and toxic compounds (PBTs). Much of the plastic takes the form of microplastics, plastic particles smaller than 5 millimetres in diameter. This also means that the plastic debris in the ocean may not be distinguishable on satellite images where the concentrations consist of fragments that are small in size. While the greatest technological development of modern plastics took place during the first half of the twentieth century, their use accelerated greatly in the period after the Second World War with increasing reliance upon and growth of chemical and synthetic products. This has been subsequently accompanied by new problems and complexities in waste disposal, especially in relation to toxicity as well as extent of waste (Field, 1998).The emergence of e-waste (computers, mobile phones, and so on) has only added further to existing waste management problems (White, 2008a; Gibbs et al, 2010a, b). Chemicals and other toxic waste such as peristent organic pollutants (POPs) have proliferated over the past 60 years. Specifically, the rise and rise of the chemical industries means that many different types of toxic waste are produced, gathered up and put together into the same dump sites (for example, rivers and lakes and ocean outlets, landfills). Much of this occurs without adequate precaution or scientific testing. This accelerated in the post-war period (until people like Rachel Carson (1962) start to write about the ‘silent spring’ and the environmental movements begin to crank up).The extent of the chemical revolution cannot be underestimated:

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Every living thing on the earth has been exposed to some level of human-made toxic substances. Lead, strontium-90, pesticides, and persistent organic pollutants (POPs) pervade our environment and reside in all of our bodies. This is a relatively new phenomenon, occurring mainly after World War II, as the production and use of hazardous substances increased exponentially in warfare, agriculture, electronics, and a range of industries, including transportation and housing. (Pellow, 2007: 26) The phenomenon of ‘e’-waste is another waste type that requires critical scrutiny (as does the notion of ‘recycling’ when it comes to its international transfer). Just as nylon represents the front end of the chemical revolution (and the pervasive presence of plastics in the environment) so, too, the microchip initiates a whole new era of commodity production (and its expansion into every realm of social life). Electronic waste or e-waste consists of discarded computers, TV sets and mobile phones. Indeed, ‘The electronics industry is the world’s largest and fastest growing manufacturing industry, and as a consequence of this growth, combined with rapid product obsolescence, discarded electronics or E-waste, is now the fastest growing waste stream in the industrialized world’ (Basil Action Network and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, 2002: 5). According to the United Nations, about 20 million to 50 million tons of e-waste is generated worldwide annually (UNEP, 2006).The waste contains toxins such as lead and mercury or other chemicals that can poison waterways if buried or release toxins into the air if burned. Much of this waste ends up as transfers from rich countries to the poor. Plastics are used in the manufacture of electronic devices through to shopping bags. The use of plastic materials reached approximately 100 kg per year per capita in North America and Europe in 2005 and is expected to increase to 140 kg by 2015. The rest of the world, particularly Asia, is likewise set to increase its use of plastics (UNEP, 2011: 22). Plastic is not going to go away in the near future. Plastics have been found on beaches, in coastal waters and their sediments, and in the open ocean on the surface as well as in seabeds including the continental shelf. Debris has been found in deep water canyons, at abyssal depths. The environmental harm stemming from plastics in the ocean varies according to size and composition of the material. Threats to biodiversity and individuals manifest in physical damage through 89

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ingestion and entanglement in plastic and other debris, and through chemical contamination by ingestion.The importation of alien species can also alter endemic community structures of animals. In general, ‘potential chemical effects are likely to increase with a reduction in the size of plastic particles while physical effects, such as the entanglement of seals and other animals in drift plastic, increase with the size and complexity of the debris’ (UNEP, 2011: 25). Fish, seabirds, sea turtles and marine mammals have all been affected by ingestion of plastics. A key concern is the biochemical and physiological response of organisms to ingested plastics contaminated with PBTs. Not only are there issues associated with the potential impacts of the releases of chemical additives that were part of the plastic’s original formulation, but as plastic breaks down into fragments (plastic particles of small size) it accumulates PBTs that are already present in seawater and sediments. Many of these specific pollutants cause chronic effects such as endocrine disruption affecting reproduction, increases in the frequency of genetic mutations (mutagenicity) and a tendency to cause cancer (carciogeniticy). According to UNEP (2011: 28): We know that microplastics are ubiquitous in the ocean, contain a wide range of chemical contaminants, and can be ingested by marine organisms. However, the lack of certainly about the possible role of microplastics, as an additional vector for contaminants taken up by organisms, calls for caution and further research. Compounding these continuous processes of contamination by plastics are other types of contamination, some of which are systemic, others the outcome of extraordinary events. For example, there is evidence that the nitrogen-based fertiliser used in (the increasing) corn production is causing environmental harm in its own right. Millions of kilogrammes/pounds of those nitrates end up in the Gulf of Mexico each year, where it is causing a massive algae bloom. This bloom has a negative impact on the ecology of the Gulf: ‘When the algae dies it sinks to the bottom, where it absorbs oxygen as it decays. In recent years that oxygen depletion has created an aquatic ‘dead zone’ covering about 8,000 square miles in which shrimp, fish, oysters and crabs cannot survive’ (Reliable Plant, 2007). Meanwhile, on 20 April 2010, the oil rig ‘Deepwater Horizon’ exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in the largest ‘accidental’ marine oil spill in the petroleum industry’s history and causing damage to wildlife and marine habitats, and to the fishing and tourism industries. 90

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Five million barrels of oil flowed into the Gulf before the well was finally permanently sealed on 19 September (UNEP, 2011). The world’s oceans, and the creatures within them, are under serious threat from a variety of negative forces and influences.

Plants and forests Any particular ecosystem is made up of both abiotic components (air, water, soils, atoms and molecules) and biotic components (plants, animals, bacteria and fungi). Changes to an ecosystem through human intervention occur through manipulation, contamination or destruction of these components (for example, through mining or land clearance or use of pesticides). It is not only human intervention that can lead to change (for example, the spread of invasive species can transform local ecologies). It was recently reported that ‘over 22 per cent of the world’s plants are at risk of extinction, in large part due to loss of habitats through conversion of natural areas for agricultural use, including food and biofuel production’ (UNEP, 2011: 12). The loss of biodiversity – in all three of its main components, namely, genes, species and ecosystems – continues at a rapid pace today and the five principal pressures directly driving biodiversity loss (habitat change, overexploitation, pollution, invasive alien species and climate change) are either constant or increasing in intensity (SCBD, 2010). Biodiversity is generally defined as the variety of all species on earth. It refers to the different plants, animals and micro-organisms, and their genes, that together make up life on the planet. It also includes the terrestrial (land), marine (ocean) and freshwater (inland water systems) ecosystems of which they are a part. Many different forces and factors are involved in potential biodiversity loss in relation to plants. For example, unregulated and inappropriate bioprospecting (the worldwide search for plants with special properties, such as for medicinal use) can be considered a form of over-exploitation which has the potential to degrade ecosystems and increase biodiversity loss, as well as having an impact on the rights of the communities and states from which the resources are taken (see, for example, Mgbeoji, 2006). Probably the greatest threats to biodiversity are those associated with contemporary agricultural methods and climate change. It has been estimated that 75 per cent of crop diversity has been lost over the past century (French, 2000: 61). In other words, there is a tendency toward monoculture, since uniformity means ease of cultivation and harvest, and higher yield, which translates into higher profit. This simplification of production generates paradoxical harm 91

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from the point of view of biodiversity and potential threats to future food production. That is, to feed the world (at least in this scenario) means depleting the genetic plant pool and prioritising certain species over others, which, in turn, creates further problems. One consequence of the erosion of plant genetic diversity is that the capacity of the economically preferred plants to resist pests and diseases is compromised. The marketability of plant produce is not necessarily coterminous with the inherent superior quality of the plants to be marketed or selected for mono-cropping. Given the potential utility of plants that market forces may erroneously dismiss as economically useless, the short-sighted depletion of the plant genetic pool can be both costly and dramatic. (Mgbeoji, 2006: 181) Put simply, ‘over the ages farmers have relied upon diverse crop varieties as protection from pests, blights and other forms of crop failure’ (French, 2000: 61). Reducing this diversity affects the inbuilt mechanisms that helped to protect the soil and the vitality of the overall agricultural process. Moreover, intensive use of land and soils that rely upon chemical additives to ensure productivity, rather than, for example, traditional methods of crop rotation, further diminishes longer term agricultural viability. Biodiversity is lessened due to the replacement of food crops, and the diversity of food crops, with monoculture designed for an export market (for example, Argentina and soybeans). Moreover, the intensive use of the herbicide Roundup tends to make the earth sterile by destroying the microbial flora essential for soil fertility and the disappearance of certain bacteria makes the earth inert (see Robin, 2010: 265). In countries like Indonesia and Brazil, the profitability of biofuel production is leading to the establishment of large-scale plantations, the clearing of rainforests and in some instances the forcing of indigenous people off their lands. This deforestation process has been going on for a number of years, supported by organisations such as the International Monetary Fund. Clearing of land for export-oriented cash crops has been touted as a key strategy to lift the economic performance of developing countries (see French, 2000). Biofuels provide yet another avenue to accelerate this process. Cutting down trees also has a direct bearing on global warming. It has been estimated that by 2022, biofuel plantations could destroy 98 percent of Indonesia’s rainforests and that ‘Every ton of palm

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oil used as biofuel releases 30 tons of CO2 into the atmosphere, ten times as much as petroleum does’ (Shiva, 2008: 79). Key issues surrounding land use and management include soil contamination and soil loss, agro-biodiversity, deforestation, habitat damage, coastal erosion and wetlands conservation. Moreover, given the focus of the UN mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) on minimising carbon emissions caused by the destruction of living forest biomass, there will be greater pressures to convert or modify other ecosystems, especially savannahs and wetlands, for food or biofuel (Sutherland et al, 2009). Thirteen per cent of the world’s total forest area is under formal protection and almost 75 per cent of forests are covered by a national forest programme. Yet, despite progress in the regulatory sphere, and net gains in forest areas in Europe and Asia, total loss of forest cover during the last decade still averaged around 13 million hectares per year. Most deforestation is occurring in tropical forests, with substantial biodiversity impacts:‘Although the global rate of net forest cover loss has slowed, partly due to the expansion of plantations and to natural forest restoration, forest biodiversity loss continues to occur disproportionately since the highest levels of deforestation and of forest degradation are reported for biodiversity-rich natural forests in developing countries (UNEP, 2011: 48). Net losses are especially significant in South America and Africa. Factors affecting deforestation, and reduction in forest biodiversity, include unsustainable harvesting of forest products for industrial use and livelihood needs, deforestation for agriculture, and severe drought and forest fires. Every year some 10 million hectares of forest are destroyed, industrial timber exports total around US$150 billion per year, and estimates are that illegal logging accounts for about 25 per cent of removals worldwide (Setiono, 2007: 27). Deforestation is not only due to logging. Land clearance is also due to agricultural exploitation, cattle farming, mining, oil and gas installations, and hydroelectric dams (see Boekhout van Solinge, 2008ab, 2010a, b; Khagram, 2004; Boekhout van Solinge and Kuijpers, 2013).There is also the phenomenon of ‘conflict timber’, associated with West Africa, for example, in which deforestation is linked to the funding of civil wars and armed conflicts (Boekhout van Solinge, 2008a). Vast amounts of forest are subject to destruction in many different locations – from Peru and Brazil, Liberia and Sierra Leone, to Indonesia and Australia. The purposes and motivations may vary, depending upon the social context and industry interests, but the result is further depletion of many different kinds of trees and variety of forests. 93

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Climate change as manifest in changed weather patterns, combined with monoculture planting, may also have an impact on forest health and wellbeing. For example, the mountain pine beetle outbreak in North America has killed over 14 million hectares of mature pines in Canada alone since 2000.This is due to the presence of an abundance of mature lodgepole pine (as a result of forestry management practices), the preferred host tree of the mountain pine beetle, and unusually high beetle survival during a series of mild winters. Previously, harsher winters and greater diversity of tree species had ensured that the pine beetle was unable to spread across the landscape to the same extent (UNEP, 2011: 50). One consequence of the pine beetle outbreak has been to change the net carbon balance of Canada’s forests, from that of carbon sink to carbon source. In other words, forest-based climate mitigation strategies are based upon sequestration of carbon within ‘living’ forests – the direct impact of the pine beetle outbreak was to contribute to rather than reduce overall carbon emissions, from the decay of the dead trees (UNEP, 2011).

Land, property and the global commons At the heart of many discussions of ecological justice is the question of land and land use. To put contemporary disputes and discussions into context, it is useful to briefly consider the nature of property as a social phenomenon. Laws relating to the protection of property are largely a modern phenomenon and are closely tied to the evolution of capitalism as a political and economic system. Before the seventeenth century there were few goods to steal and most wealth was held in the form of land. In Europe the class that owned the wealth also controlled the administration of justice and the formulation of law. Its members employed servants to protect them and their goods. Consequently, they had little interest in developing property laws even though groups lower down the social scale would have benefited from this, especially those in trade, manufacturing, and farming. The industrial revolution changed this by creating a new class of industrialists for whom legal protection of property was essential. Machinery production made portable goods available in large numbers and expanded the opportunities for theft.A succession of laws designed to protect private ownership was gradually enacted (Hall, 1952). Over time the notion of individual ownership was extended to information and ideas, so that knowledge and ideas could be owned.

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Property as a concept does not have one particular meaning – the concept is very much bound up with social context, and its meaning has changed over time as society has changed (see Macpherson, 1978). At one level,‘property’, as such, simply refers to a relationship between humans. The content of this relationship is nonetheless variable depending upon circumstances. This is perhaps most evident in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe. In the feudal regimes of England in the fourteenth century, for example, property was directly tied to a certain social status and to social functions (see Fine, 1984). When it came to property, ownership was attached to the performance of definite social functions. Owners had neither the absolute rights to use and abuse their property according to their will nor exclusive rights under all circumstances to bar others from use of their property. There were, therefore, certain paternalistic constraints on the rights pertaining to private property. For example, an obligation to meet the needs of the poor must predominate over the rights of ownership: social responsibility was tied to property. Feeding those who worked your land was a duty and obligation, even if it meant opening your lands to harvest and hunting by the peasantry. According to ‘natural law’ there existed an obligatory collection of rights and duties.These implicated various classes in different ways. For instance, not only did property owners have paternalistic duties to the poor, but the poor were subjected to all kinds of personal obligations to the propertied. These obligations expressed relations of personal dependence, servility and bondage. The transition from feudalism to capitalism entailed changes in the mode of production generally (for example, industrialisation, new applications of science and technology, the creation of a new wealth class – the bourgeoisie).As part of this transition great social changes also had to occur. In particular, social change was to see the emancipation of the peasantry from their traditional ties and obligations to the landed gentry, and the release of the nobility from their traditional duty toward those who shared their lands.This entailed the relocation of the obligations of the poor from individual property owners to the state, because otherwise it was oppressive:‘for the poor because it reinforced their personal dependence, and for the rich because it imposed upon them arbitrary restrictions’ (Fine, 1984: 18). Under feudalism, traditional obligations attached to property served to exclude the majority from new forms of property.This was relevant, for example, for access to private property (in the case of peasants, who were excluded from substantive property ownership) and international trade (in the case of private businesses which were confronted by 95

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state monopoly charters that excluded them from trade in certain overseas markets). The acquisition of property was therefore a major activity associated with the emergence of a new type of social order. Moreover, from the point of view of technical innovation and broader cultural development, the stagnant, narrow and backward character of economic relations based on personal obligation became a problem. A new sort of ‘property’ thus had to come into being if feudalism was to be superseded by capitalism. Indeed, the protection of private property, as defined within a bourgeois rights framework, came to be equated with the goal of universalised justice. The notion of private property, in the new understanding of the concept, was closely linked to liberal ideas of ‘freedom’, ‘equality’ and ‘consent’. It was identified with individual freedom (of mobility, of labour), with private rights (of conscience, of religion) and the notion of equality, in that every property owner was seen to be equal to every other (in that exclusive access, the same rules of trespass, and so on, applied to all regardless of social and economic background). Property was no longer tied to obligation – its new foundation was that of selfinterest and individual propriety considerations. In the specific case of communal lands, control was divested from the local village level and centralised in the hands of the emergent nation-state. The landed aristocracy had gained its wealth and power from ownership and control over agriculture and pastoral industries, but even so the notion of communal places to hunt, fish and forage was ingrained by custom. The combined advent of mercantile capitalism (and attendant notions of private interest and private property) and the modern nation-state (including the concentration of political power into bureaucratic institutions that were, in turn, protected by large bodies of armed men) transformed the relationship between land and peasant, land and noble, and serf and lord. For present purposes, the most profound change was the movement away from the obligations of ‘duty’ and ‘responsibility’ to the concept of the exclusive power to alienate one’s possessions in any manner one desired, without the binds of custom or traditional responsibility. This shift in the legal and social status of property relations allowed for several interrelated phenomena (White and Perrone, 2010): • the commodification of the countryside: that is, the transformation of production into commodity production (for example, wool) and sale of ‘privately’ owned goods on luxury markets (for example, pheasant); thereby displacing peasants off the land;

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• the movement of labour: that is, the emancipation of the peasant from traditional ties and obligations to the landed aristocracy; thereby freeing them as a workforce of ‘free’ labourers for the emergent capitalist class; • the shift in the responsibility of the rich for the poor via a customary obligation to the notion of ‘state’ responsibility for social welfare; thereby severing the connection between wealth (and wealth generation) and (privatised) social responsibility. Thus a massive change occurs in the nature, definition and dynamics of ‘property’ in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. In the midst of these changes came a shift in attitude and policy toward common lands of the people. Such lands became the property of kings and queens, and what happened on the land was subject to royal fiat and the dictates of the ruling elite.The mythic story of Robin Hood alerts us to the days when the unauthorised hunting of deer in the king’s forest was a punishable offence, regardless of need, prior access rights or circumstance on the part of the hunter.This represented a major change from customary use of such common lands. The issue of what is ‘common’ land, and how best to care for the ‘commons’, has in recent years been transposed to the international level in several different ways. This not only entails ownership issues (as to whether the property is to be held communally, privately or by the state), but extends as well to the conditions under which land is to be carved up, managed and governed (see Chapter Two). Who exactly is going to, or should, care for the global commons is a longstanding and contentious issue.The ‘tragedy of the commons’ was a dilemma identified by Hardin (1968) who argued that individuals working independently of one another will over-use a common property resource for short-term benefits while decimating the resource for longer-term use. The answer in this case was to argue for the privatisation of nature, since it was assumed that an interest in one’s own private property would secure beneficial ecological outcomes.This also implies that more structured engagement and focused control, by property owning individuals and groups, is needed if the ‘commons’ is to be protected and maintained adequately. Whether informed by notions of self-interest and profit-motives, or paternalistic notions ‘that certain people know best’ about land management, there has been a general movement toward breaking down traditional ownership and management schemes around the world. This occurs in several different ways, and involves a variety of international actors. For present purposes, the concern is to elucidate 97

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those strategies that ostensibly are aimed at benefiting ecological spaces by introducing measures designed to lessen environmental harm of specific types. For their part, transnational corporations vary in how and under what circumstances they take over, monopolise and utilise the natural resources of the planet. In some places, the appropriation of formerly communal or traditional lands is at the point of a gun, as companies hire thugs to remove and bulldoze people’s homes and villages (Robin, 2010; Boekhout van Solinge and Kuijpers, 2013). Governments are also implicated in the systematic abuse of human rights involving the redesignation of traditional lands for the purposes of the ‘national interest’ (Clark, 2009; see also Chapter Two). Common property is thus being transformed into private or state-owned property, and land use is linked to capital accumulation and profit rather than subsistence and ecological balance. In addition to straight out coercive measures such as these, reforms in environmental management and regulation are perceived to be closely linked to efforts made by transnational corporations to further their hegemonic control over the planet’s natural resources (Goldman, 1998ab; Pearce and Tombs, 1998). The ideological shift toward self-regulation under neo-liberal policies has been manifest in new forms of market relations as well as environmentally destructive activities. Different factions of capital have divergent orientations to the environment depending on their market focus – for example, public relations firms, newly emerging environmental protection industries and/or forestry companies. International competition among capitalist sectors and among communities for access to healthy resources, including clean water, has also intensified because the natural resource base has shrunk. In this competition, the dominance of western capital has been sustained partly through ‘environmental regulation’ itself: ironically, this has sometimes been used as an entry card to new international markets. For example, markets may be protected through universalising environmental regulation (developed in and by the private sector, sometimes with NGO collusion, and later enforced by governments in the form of preferred contracts, and business legal requirements) that themselves advantage the high-technology companies of advanced industrialised countries (Goldman, 1998a, b).The largest companies are most likely to be capable of being environmentally ‘virtuous’; they also have disproportionate influence when it comes to redesigning the rules of international standarisation through environmental management. In addition, it has been argued that the cleaning up of old dirty industries and the rewriting of property laws in accordance with 98

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new international standards of environmental management and trade liberalisation (particularly in the third world) is a precursor to capitalist penetration and exploitation of nature (Goldman, 1998a). To see environmental regulation in this light is to acknowledge the economic rather than ecological rationale behind the actions of global regulatory bodies like the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (see Friedrichs and Friedrichs, 2002). Such ‘regulation’ is about facilitation of the exploitation of nature and humans, not about human interests and needs and ecological wellbeing as such. Enhanced ‘environmentally friendly’ production and extraction of natural resources do not change the status quo – such enhancements still collectively degrade the global ecological commons. Non-government organisations are divided as to how they should intervene in major world conservation and protection issues, and they are split as to whether they take action in collaboration with, or against, transnational corporations and hegemonic nation-states. Duffy (2010) points to the increasingly close relationships between large transnational NGOs and transnational corporations, international organisations such as the World Bank, and particular national governments.There is funding to be attained and kudos found in many such arrangements. Conservation under these circumstances is, however, redefined as supporting a particular kind of development rather than taking precaution by preventing development. Thus: As new dam projects, oil fields, mines and tourism facilities threaten to engulf and destroy habitats and the wildlife they contain, conservation NGOs have spotted a new opportunity to push their agendas forward. Instead of resisting these new and potentially damaging initiatives, they work with developers on ‘mitigation’ projects. These revolve around deals with developers to ‘offset’, mitigate or compensate habitat loss by paying for or setting aside land for new conservation schemes and protected areas. (Duffy, 2010: 69) This, too, is not a new phenomenon. Jacoby (2001) describes how conservationists in the mid to late 1800s saw a strong link between their goals and development. The name of the game was efficiency and sustainable development, and the promise of conservation was to provide the continuous supply of the necessities of life. Corporations likewise soon discovered that conservation could be an ally in pursuit of their goals. 99

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At the Grand Canyon, this close relationship between forestry officials and business interests began to take shape not long after the forest reserve’s creation in 1893. By the early twentieth century, the canyon’s new federal managers had reached a series of accommodations with the local mining, railroad, and lumber companies that allowed these businesses access to the reserve’s natural resources. (Jacoby, 2001: 169) In the twenty-first century new opportunities for conservation NGOs to work hand in glove with transnational corporations have emerged. Climate change, for example, has opened up new doors for profitable offsets (for example, forest as repositories for carbon sequestration under carbon emission trading schemes), many of which involve the larger NGOs.

Conservationism and social division There are those who criticise mainstream environmental and conservation groups precisely because of their ‘focus on the fate of “nature” rather than humans’ (Harvey, 1996: 386).To put it differently, taking action on environmental issues involves choices and priorities. Many communities who suffer from the ‘hard end’ of environmental harm feel that their wellbeing ought to take priority over ‘natural environments’ or specific plants and animals as such. Others feel hard done by due to the way in which environmental movements have moved in to take charge of their traditional lands. Several trends are of note in regard to conservation and the environmental social movements that support and promote it. First, while it is the case that ‘Currently, 13 per cent of land and less than 1 per cent of oceans are protected for conservation’ (UNEP, 2011: 12), there is great pressure to lock up more lands for conservation purposes worldwide. Second, there is increasing concern about how NGOs from ‘outside’ (that is, the metropoles of the North) have an impact on the status and livelihoods of those in certain parts of the world (that is, those who actually live in the South). Duffy (2010) recounts how in a number of cases transnational NGO action has translated into the criminalisation of local residents and alienation from their own lands and natural resources.There is a ‘dark side’ to conservation that is based upon cultural ignorance and that can, in its own right, create more harm than good and lead to both human misery and unsustainable ecological solution. 100

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In many cases, conservationists have been pitted against traditional users of forests and lands.There appears to be a different ‘moral ecology’ (Jacoby, 2001) between the two: one based upon customary practices and the experience of living in and with nature; the other on technical scientific knowledge (the field of ecology) and/or romanticised notions of ‘nature’ which set it apart from humans. The social construction of nature varies considerably depending upon particular social interests, political power and personal experiences (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998). Historically, in places such as the United States, there were synergies between ‘conservationists’ and industrialist and developers insofar as the former provided a predictable framework for natural resource extraction, especially relative to the ad hoc practices of traditional users. Under the conservationist conceptual and interventionist umbrella, hunting and fishing and natural resource use was to be strictly regulated according to particular definitions of what is good and bad in relation to the human–nature nexus. The seeds of this conflict (between conservationist and traditional users) were sowed during the time of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe (with the advent of bourgeois notions of private property, the commodification of nature, and the rise of industrialism). It was in the context of this transition from one mode of production to another that conservationism as a movement and a model spread from Europe to the US, Australia, Russia, Japan and China. The re-conceptualisation of land and land use was not without its conflicts.This was especially so since overarching transitions had a direct impact on the present-day activities of those who lived and worked in the areas earmarked by urban dwellers for conservation. For many rural communities, the most notable feature of conservation was the transformation of previously acceptable practices into illegal acts: hunting or fishing redefined as poaching, foraging as trespassing, the setting of fires as arson, and the cutting of trees as timber theft. In many cases, country people reacted to this criminalization of their customary activities with hostility. Indeed, in numerous regions affected by conservation, there arose a phenomenon that might best be termed ‘environmental banditry,’ in which violations of environmental regulations were tolerated, and sometimes even supported, by members of the local rural society. (Jacoby, 2001: 2)

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Echoes of this resonate in many places around the world today. In Africa, for instance, traditional practices are being undermined by imposition ‘from above’ of national parks in ways that disenfranchise locals from their customary lands. These land acquisitions are having major negative impacts on local people who are losing access and control over the resources on which they depend, and which are the rightful inheritance of future generations. Specific places are associated with the needs of multiple stakeholders. This pertains to water-based resources such as rivers, coastal waters and ocean stretches (and associated utilities and activities such as drinking water, fisheries, recreation uses, transportation and oil production), and land-based resources such as forests, mountains and grasslands (and associated utilities and activities such as hunting, mining, tourism and gathering of medicinal ingredients). The particular perspective of stakeholders varies greatly as do their specific social interests. The ecologist may view nature through scientific lens; the naturalist through the lens of wonder and enjoyment; the local resident via their experiences of personal biography and community history; the developer according to possibilities of commercial exploitation; and the conservationist in terms of conservation of species. Friction occurs when particular models of natural resource management are imposed in ways that do not acknowledge or engage the spectrum of stakeholders, especially those at the local level (Abel and Blaikie, 1986; Tsing, 2005; Rivers III and Gibbs, 2011). For example, the take-over and take-away of land are compounded by the ways in which ‘conservation’ regulations are being foisted upon these same communities. As Duffy (2010: 11) points out: When wildlife reserves are established, local communities can suddenly find that their everyday subsistence activities have been outlawed and they have been redefined as criminals… Some of the world’s best-known pristine wilderness areas are, in fact, engineered environments. Creating a national park means drawing up new conservation rules which outlaw the everyday subsistence activities of local communities, such as hunting for food and collecting wood. Victims can thus be transformed into offenders, a phenomenon that is by no means novel or restricted to any one continent or time period. The person with no land and no natural resources already faces a huge and daunting task to survive – to be subjected to ill-treatment and placed in prison constitutes an additional harm that further violates 102

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their basic rights. As Abel and Blaikie (1986: 748) so aptly put it: ‘We do not accept the social value of maintaining islands of ecological integrity in a sea of social and ecological degradation, particularly if the islands are maintained at the expense of the sea.’ Much of the groundwork for present day expulsions from traditional lands was laid during the European colonial era, which saw numerous groups pushed off their ancestral lands to make way for new foreign settlers. Colonial rule, however, was not just about land ownership and land use, it also involved the re-conceptualisation and relabelling of traditional practices associated with living on the land. In contrast to their own activities, colonial authorities often outlawed hunting with the use of snares and traps, which effectively criminalized the subsistence hunting practices of local communities. For example, in British colonies hunting using traps and snares was outlawed. In effect this meant that hunting by African communities was instantly redefined as a criminal act (poaching) while hunting for sport, leisure and trade by Europeans was defined as legal and acceptable. European hunters were presented as sportsmen engaged in noble activities; it could be said that they were proto-conservationists because they wanted wildlife to be conserved so they could hunt it for pleasure. (Duffy, 2010: 85) Ironically, such processes of re-conceptualisation also work in reverse as well, especially when it comes to (lack of) acknowledgement of indigenous technologies and knowledge. For example, the notion of bio-piracy is premised upon racist and colonialist interpretations and portrayals of traditional people. Biopiracy refers to exploitation of third world resources and third world peoples and knowledge, and specifically the usurpation of ownership and control over plants using western legal and political institutional mechanisms and forums. As explained by Mgbeoji (2006), corporate interests have used two methods to take what they want: institutional and juridical mechanisms (such as patents) and gendered and racist constructions of non-western contributions to plant development and use (such as ‘traditional’ methods versus ‘scientific’). Most important, the legal and policy factors that facilitate the appropriation of indigenous peoples’ knowledge operate within a cultural context that subtly but persistently 103

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denigrates the intellectual worth of traditional and indigenous peoples, especially local women farmers. Cultural biases in the construction of knowledge provide the epistemological framework within which plant genetic resources developed by indigenous peoples are continually construed as ‘free-for-all’ commodities – commodities that are just waiting to be appropriated by those with the cunning and resources to do so. (Mgbeoji, 2006: 6) A traditional relationship with nature is subjected to dual processes of criminalisation and systematic denigration insofar as particular western and corporate interests are to be maintained and extended.This has not happened peacefully and without resistance, either today or in eras past. Nor is the push-back to corporate, state and conservationist agendas confined to the third world or non-western settings. For example, contemporary resistance to the conservation agenda is reflected in places such as the Maritime Provinces of Canada, where lobster poaching is generalised across the community – with social approval (see also Chapter Four).The interface between legal and illegal practices, players and purchasers in the lobster industry means that a hidden economy flourishes. Sellers and purchasers of illegal lobsters engage in a win–win situation for themselves, but that is to the disadvantage of governments in terms of tax revenue. Thus, Outlaw poachers enter into alliances with hotels, restaurants, community groups, and private citizens to dispose of their illegal catches, and business poachers sell their illegal catches through the normal distributors and retailers.These arrangements amount to an underground economy, in that restaurants and hotel operators, for example, buy lobsters cheap from outlaw poachers and sell them at a greater profit. Lobster pounds and fish companies purchase lobsters from business poachers on a cash-only basis without providing receipts. (McMullan and Perrier, 2002: 710) Profits are there to be made from activities that span the legal and illegal divide. As demonstrated in cases such as the lobster industry in Canada, there may be strong cultural support and popular engagement in activities that are at a formal level illegal (McMullan and Perrier, 2002). Traditions of hunting and fishing that have become embedded in local communities and cultures can thus facilitate the continued 104

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transgression of environmental and criminal laws. Again, this is not a new phenomenon. Those living and working in the Adirondack Mountains in the late 1880s held to a common-rights ideology that maintained that undeveloped lands, whether private or public, were open to hunting and foraging (Jacoby, 2001). As with many people living in or visiting the bush today (in Australia, for example, there is a longstanding ‘shack culture’ involving regular trips to wilderness and semi-wilderness areas), certain informal rules guide what is allowable and what is not when it comes to the natural surrounds. This could be in the order of ‘Never kill anything that you do not need’ through to not disturbing fish, fowl or forest creatures when in the midst of breeding season (see Jacoby, 2001: 24). In colloquial terms, the directive to ‘not poo in your own nest’ eloquently reflects a conservation ethic to which many who live in such areas already and always have subscribed. Important moral distinctions are sometimes made in regards to how to interpret activities such as the cutting down of trees. For example, Jacoby (2001) describes how taking wood from a state forest was not necessarily seen by local residents as a ‘crime’ but rather as quite legitimate if done for the purposes of subsistence (such as for firewood, buildings materials and the like). This ‘theft’ of trees from state forests (that is, protected conservation areas) was seen to be perfectly OK if not done for the purposes of future market gain (as with selling firewood). Moreover, local people in the Adirondacks also distinguished between different types of wood according to subsistence and market activities, only taking the more acceptable nonmarketable hardwoods for their own personal uses. Interestingly, a study of the role and attitudes of the United States Forest Service police toward tree theft in the 1990s showed an active accommodation to this deviance. It was observed that patterns of accommodation on the part of the police preserved the cultural closeness between the Forest Service and the forest community by withholding the formal label of crime. The accommodation of tree theft thus served to preserve the image of the forest community as a desirable place, frequented by honest people, requiring minimal policing (Pendleton, 1997). The question of subsistence use is highlighted as well when considering contemporary policy initiatives such as the forest conservation and REDD programme of the UN, an international policy mechanism whose purpose is to mitigate climate change by reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and to enhance forest carbon stocks through activities such as forest conservation and sustainable forest management. The programme involves paying developing countries to conserve forests. 105

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Carbon emission trading schemes may be oriented toward similar ends. How this is to be achieved, however, is of considerable importance to those who already live in the forests and have done so for generations. Traditional knowledge includes forest-related knowledge associated with the use and management of forest species, and the broader understanding and management of forest eco-systems. Examples of such knowledge include use of herbal medicines, nutraceutical products, food and beverage. For many, the forest exists as a site of not only wood products (for cooking, for furniture, for musical instruments) but non-wood products such as medicines, foods, spices, fodder for animals and for a multitude of other purposes including aesthetic and spiritual. Interestingly, fuel wood constitutes up to more than 70 per cent of wood removals in the Asia and the Pacific and 90 per cent in Africa (FAO, 2011). Traditional management of forested environments affects the composition of flora and fauna, and the biological diversity of these areas. This is captured in the notion of ‘biocultural diversity’ which merges concerns with cultural diversity and biological diversity into one unified framework for understanding the links between nature and culture (FAO, 2011). It is claimed that traditional forest management not only has shaped the structure and composition of forests around the world, but it has done so in ways that have enhanced biodiversity beyond that of the so-called pristine conditions with no human presence (FAO, 2011) – a point that is especially important in regards to particular definitions of conservation and conceptions of the benefits of conservation. It is important that traditional users of forests not be excluded from what is, for many, the key source of their livelihood and subsistence. This means allowing traditional activities and harvests to occur, in part since these have historically been central to the overall ecological health and wellbeing of regions. Governmental schemes such as REDD and the like, as well as NGO and private business driven conservation schemes, need to acknowledge the ‘invisible’ uses of the forest, and the longstanding ecological benefits arising from this. The potential contribution that a multifunctional, multiplevalue forest resource might make to climate change cannot be realized unless REDD arrangements are better aligned with broader forest governance reform. REDD and carbon capture could reduce multiple functions to a single function – to the great disadvantage of local users. (FAO, 2011: 95)

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In other words, conservation without acknowledgement of traditional human users, and their systemic contribution to biological diversity and ecological wellbeing, is oppressive and counter-productive.

Conclusion: measuring the value of nature The value of specific environments is measured differently according to differing purposes and priorities. In most instances the beneficiary and yardstick of such valuing is human interest.This occurs whether or not the value of environments is based upon conservation principles, whether it is gauged in relation to natural resource extraction, or whether the value is determined in relation to loss of amenity. For example, conventional criminological accounts of environmental crime tend to see value in terms of natural resources, with measurement calculated in terms of industries and the value of illegal income generated by various environmental black markets related to wildlife smuggling, illegal fishing, illegal logging and illegal garbage/hazardous waste trafficking (see Liddick, 2011). While occasionally reference is made to intrinsic values, it is human benefit that is a key driver in environmental law enforcement and regulation. In addition to the inherent value of the natural world and its denizens for their own sake, concern for the severe environmental damage caused by these illegal industries implicates human health and prosperity across a number of dimensions. Overharvesting, the decimation of species, improper disposal of hazardous wastes, and loss in biodiversity will negatively impact humans not only by making the planet less habitable, but also by eliminating or reducing natural resources that, when used prudently, advance the human condition – the development of medicines being one prominent example. (Liddick, 2011: 5) Ecological wellbeing is thus construed primarily in terms of what nature can do for us rather than what we can do for nature. Value assessments are also made in relation to general rather than specific environmental damage. For example, the impact of plastic in the oceans can be measured in monetary and other quantitative terms.The impact to human communities includes costs related to loss of fishing opportunities due to time spent cleaning litter from nets, propellers and blocked water intakes; navigational hazards and expenses related

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to coastguard rescues; cleanup of beaches and waterways; and loss of tourism revenue because of perceptions of pollution (UNEP, 2011). The work of ecological economics provides multiple criteria by which to evaluate the value of natural resources, wilderness, animals, fish and other species, and although once again anthropocentric or human-centred benefits of protecting species are generally drawn upon, biocentric values may also be incorporated into such valuations (see Orr, 1991; Richardson and Loomis, 2009). In the context of global warming and massive environmental transformation, key problems persist, such as rising carbon dioxide emissions and rapid biodiversity loss. The conception of certain forests as exemplars of ‘pristine nature’ (without human presence) and their value as carbon sinks is reshaping the relationship between traditional users and their environments. This, too, involves a revaluing, including for profit, of the environment, especially in relation to indirect uses such as carbon sequestration and watershed protection. In terms of climate change there are suggestions that the developed world should pay forest dwellers to ‘protect’ forests – another form of valuation. In the context of courts, both economic and nonmarket valuation constitutes part of the deliberations over the nature of harm and potential damage claims against perpetrators (Duffield, 1997). In determining the seriousness of environmental harm, for example, courts may examine criteria such as: • •

immediate and direct impact of the environmental crime – environmental impact (for example, dead fish from polluted water) – social impact (for example, air pollution and health problems) – economic impact (crops damaged by pollution) wider effects in environmental, social and economic terms – global, transboundary (for example, pesticides into watercourses) – diffuse impact (for example, water pollution in rivers, the sea and on beaches) – cumulative effects (for example, multiple sources of pollution) – long-term effects (for example, health impact from radiation) • human fatality, serious injury or ill health – human fatality – serious injury (for example, loss of limb or loss of sight) – ill health (for example, persistent respiratory problems) • health of flora and fauna – animal health (for example, endangered species killed or poisoned) – flora health (for example, air pollution affecting crops and plants). (Magistrates’ Association, 2009) 108

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Without assigning a value to environmental harm, courts are hamstrung in dealing adequately with perpetrators of the harm. Until recently, this deficiency has been more than evident in the light sentences handed down for environmental crime generally (White, 2011).There is a need for both quantitative measures (for example, monetary values) and qualitative recognition (for example, intrinsic values that acknowledge the ‘worth’ of something in its own right). Some of the key indicators used by the United Nations to evaluate the ‘state of the world’ include (UNEP, 2011): • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

consumption of ozone depleting substances carbon dioxide emissions carbon dioxide emission per capita concentration of particulate matter mountain glacier mass balance renewable energy supply index annual marine fish catch global tuna catches proportion of land area covered by forest ratio of roundwood production and growing stock in forests forest area FSC-certified threatened species index ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area municipal waste collection proportion of water withdrawn for human use from renewable resources levels of dissolved oxygen in surface waters proportion of population with sustainable access to improved water source and with access to improved sanitation number of parties to multilateral environmental agreements number of certifications of the ISO 14001 standard.

It is claimed that ‘this type of “global environmental snapshot” can serve to draw attention to the most pressing issues and monitor major trends in areas such as climate change, freshwater quality, use of natural resources, biodiversity loss and environmental governance’ (UNEP, 2011: 61). Global assessments using these types of indicators alert us to the scale and scope of the environmental problems facing the world today. As this chapter has demonstrated, however, study of environmental harm – as conceptualised within an ecological justice approach – must incorporate sociological analyses if it is to provide an adequate 109

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interpretation of cause–effect and problem–solution when it comes to present and looming environmental disasters. To do otherwise is to formulate policies and practices in ways that bring injustice to those already vulnerable to hardship and disadvantage.

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Species justice and harm to animals Introduction The matter of animal rights and animal welfare is encapsulated in that work concerned with species justice (Benton, 1998; Beirne, 2007). In specific terms, concepts such as speciesism may be invoked.This refers to the practice of discriminating against nonhuman animals because they are perceived as inferior to the human species in much the same way that sexism and racism involve prejudice and discrimination against women and people of different colour to the discriminator (Munro, 2004).Animal rights supporters argue that there are two kinds of animals – human and nonhuman – and that both have rights and interests as sentient beings; they believe, however, that the dominant ideology of speciesism enables humans to exploit nonhuman animals as commodities to be eaten, displayed, hunted and dissected for human benefit. From the point of view of species justice the kinds of questions that need to be asked include which species are threatened and why. In concrete terms, we need to know why some species are favoured by human communities and some are non-valued.Animals are categorised and utilised by humans in many different ways that range from factory farming through to laboratory animals. Depending upon human use, animal welfare (and rights) is protected differentially depending upon species and circumstance. Animal protection laws operate strongly when it comes to companion animals, for instance, but are much less restrictive in the case of pigs grown for eventual slaughter. Animal rights advocates call for reforms such as the banning of cage production of chickens and the live export trade of sheep, and an end to whale hunting. Groups such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), Sea Shepherd, Animal Liberation, the World Wide Fund for Nature (formerly the World Wildlife Fund), American Animal Legal Defense Fund, Animals Australia, Voiceless, People and Animal Welfare Society (PAWS) and People for the Ethical Treatment

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of Animals (PETA) are among the prominent supporters of animal welfare and rights. It has been observed that nonhuman animals are frequently considered in primarily instrumental terms (as ‘pets’, as food, as resources) in mainstream and conservation criminology, and are categorised in mainly anthropomorphic terms (such as ‘wildlife’, ‘fisheries’) that belie the ways in which humans create and classify animals as Other (Beirne, 2007, 2009; Sollund, 2012a). From an animal rights theoretical framework, one key issue revolves around how rights are constructed: via utilitarian theory that emphasises the consequential goal of minimising suffering and pain; via rights theory that emphasises the right to respectful treatment; and via feminist theory that emphasises the ethic of responsible care (Beirne 2007; Adams, 1996; Singer, 1975). Traditional theorising about animals, within an animal concern paradigm, can largely be characterised as lying on a scale ranging from a welfarist approach to a rights-based approach. The focus of the welfarist approach is the humane treatment of animals (Ibrahim, 2006). This model advocates for the protection of animals through increased welfare-based interventions but not the prohibition of animal exploitation.The model is focused on improvements to the treatment of animals but does not challenge the embedded exploitation of animals that is a consequence of their social and legal status (Ibrahim, 2006). Implicit in this is that animals may still be exploited for their flesh, fur and skin provided their suffering is not ‘unnecessary’, or as often put, the animals are treated humanely. At the other end of the spectrum is the rights-based approach. At the extreme end this approach contends that animals have rights to live free from human interference.This approach argues for the abolition of animal exploitation through both legal and non-legal change and for the legal recognition of rights for animals. Central to this approach is changing the legal character of animals from property to legal, rightsbearing entities (see Wise, 2001, 2004; Francione, 2010). How harm to animals is conceptualised thus very much depends upon the perspective one has on the ontological status of animals (their essential ‘nature’ or ‘being’), and how one views the relationship between humans and nonhuman animals.

Contentious concepts: species justice This section provides an overview of concepts that frame debates over the status of animals and the harms to which they are subjected within the context of this framing. It includes discussion of speciesism, 112

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definitions of animals, animal cruelty, animal welfare and the notion of animals as property. Further contentious concepts are discussed in the next section as well, where issues pertaining to categorisations of animals, including the branding of some as ‘pests’ and ‘invasive species’, are considered. Speciesism was first coined in the 1970s as part of animal rights and animal liberation campaign work in the UK. It refers to the discrimination against or exploitation of certain animal species by humans, based upon an assumption of human superiority (Ryder, 2010). The concept has been equated with racism and sexism, insofar as these likewise refer to forms of arbitrary discrimination. However, debate continues regarding the precise relationship – and differences – between humans and animals, and under what conditions, if any, it is right to privilege human interests over that of animals. For some, there is no dividing line; for others, ultimately it is the health and welfare of specific humans that ought to take precedence over that of specific nonhuman animals. There are several ways in which speciesism can be interpreted and understood. For many, it basically refers to an individual prejudice, a matter of interpersonal (human–animal) relationships. How each individual thinks and acts towards animals becomes the main focus for activist intervention since the problem is in essence reduced to individual feelings and attitudes. For others, however, speciesism is best understood as deeply ingrained in the economic, political and ideological structures of global capitalism. It manifests in individual behavior and ideas, but fundamentally animal (and human) exploitation is built into the very fabric of contemporary social and economic life (Torres, 2008). How we view speciesism has important consequences for action around animal welfare and animal rights issues. Groups such as PETA tend to mobilise exclusively and solely on the issue of animal suffering, and in ways that individualise the problem.This allows them to recruit even quite conservative people into their campaigns insofar as the idea that ‘everyone loves animals’ is inclusive of everyone and does not threaten the status quo. Alternatively, groups such as the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front challenge the basis of animal exploitation through actions that directly threaten the bottom line – the profits associated with the operations of an animal enterprise. One strategy is informed by notions of changing how individuals think and act in their daily life; the other by the idea that the denial of animal rights is intrinsic to ‘doing business’ across a range of industries involving

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the use of animals, and that the status quo requires revolutionary transformation if animals are to be liberated. Legal definitions of animals vary greatly (see Beirne, 2009), but most reflect anthropocentric conceptions of what it is to be an animal and most categorise animals according to presumed human-related uses and purposes. Across the Australian jurisdictions, for example, which includes six states, two territories and federal government, various legislation guides human–animal interaction (Gullone and Clarke, 2010; Sankoff and White, 2008). Embedded within these laws are conceptions of animals based upon physiological characteristics (for example, a live member of the vertebrate species, which includes amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals, and which includes, in some states, fish and crustaceans) and/or human-related constructions of use (for example, domesticated farm animals, animals used for recreational purposes and animals used in research and educational institutions). Defining animals has generally started from a human-centred basis even where the intent of discussion is to address issues of speciesism and animal rights. Thus, for example, key writers in this area (such as Singer, 1994; Regan, 1985) use the phrase ‘nonhuman animals’ which reproduces to some extent the very duality they wish to overcome. Animals other than humans, it is argued, should not be defined through a human negation, but rather in terminology such as ‘humans and other animals’ (see Cazaux, 1999). Be this as it may, for pragmatic reasons authors such as Beirne (2007, 2009) and Sollund (2008, 2011) have adopted the shorter version after contexualising its meaning and usage via preliminary comment. In part the resistance to such a phrase is due to the idea that it reproduces the dichotomy of humans as opposed to animals (and thereby diminishes thought of the similarities between them, or establishing nonhuman yardsticks by which to judge and value what is different or dissimilar). However, as seen below, where to ‘draw the line’ is of perennial and considerable importance to questions surrounding species justice and matters of harm pertaining to animals. Animal cruelty is also variously defined depending upon the jurisdiction. It can also vary depending upon the ‘use’ context within which the animal is located, as certain types of cruel activity may be accepted in some situations (for example, killing of farmed animals for food). In many cases animal cruelty is described through a list of acts of omission or commission rather than through a specific legal definition of cruelty. In South Australia, for example, cruelty is defined in these terms (Gullone and Clarke, 2010: 306):

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• deliberately or unreasonably causes the animal unnecessary pain • fails to provide it appropriate and adequate, food, water, shelter, or exercise • fails to take reasonable steps to alleviate any pain suffered by the animal • abandons the animal • neglects the animal so as to cause it pain • releases the animal from captivity for the purpose of it then being hunted or killed by another animal • organises, participates in, or is present at an event at which the animal is encouraged to fight with another animal • having injured the animal, fails to take reasonable steps to alleviate any pain suffered by the animal • kills the animal in a manner that causes the animal unnecessary pain • unless the animal is unconscious, kills the animal by a method that does not cause death to occur as rapidly as possible. Animal welfare laws aim to provide legal protection for animals in two ways. General animal welfare laws – those relating to animal cruelty for example – provide broad prohibitions against animal abuse and require the humane treatment of animals. Specific animal welfare laws may also be in place that requires the protection of animal interests in specific ‘use’ contexts, such as the use of animals in experiments or the slaughter of animals for food (Francione, 2010; Francione and Charlton, 2010). A key part of animal welfare is the prevention of animal suffering. Animals are not simply construed as property (with which the owner can do as they wish), but are deemed to be sentient creatures that, as such, demand a certain ‘duty of care’ on the part of humans. Human use thus should not reduce the status of animal to solely that of commodity. Rather, there are obligations that flow from a conception of animals that view them as having feelings that matter (Webster, 2010). Put simply, the aim should be to give animals under human protection a sense of wellbeing in life and a humane death, as part of positive welfare. Animal welfare can be conceptualised as having three distinctive dimensions (see Fraser, 2010): • the affective state of animals: how animals feel, as reflected in their experiences of comfort and being free from prolonged or intense pain or hunger • the biological condition of animals: how animals function, as reflected in their growth and reproduction, and being reasonably free from disease and malnutrition 115

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• the nature of animals: how animals live, as reflected in natural environments that provide for fresh air, sunshine and natural vegetation, and that allow them to express their natural behaviour. While often agreeing in practice, the distinctions do represent views of welfare that may not necessarily coincide. A pig farmer using criteria based on biological functioning might conclude that the welfare of a group of confined sows is high because the animals are well fed, reproducing efficiently, and free from disease and injury. Critics using other criteria might conclude that the welfare of the same animals is poor because they are unable to lead natural lives, or because they show signs of frustration and discomfort. (Fraser, 2010: 48) Arguments about animal welfare often hinge upon these distinctions. Debate thus occurs within the welfare sector, as well as between welfare and rights campaigners.This debate is also reflected in attempts to reform animal welfare legislation, particularly in regards to mass farmed animals. The human–animal relationship is basically constructed around the notion of animals as property. They are used for private purposes or commercial purposes, or considered as owned by the state and held in trust by the people in the case of ‘wildlife’ animals. Thus, ‘The animal in question is always a pet or a laboratory animal, or a game animal, or some other form of animal property that exists solely for our use and has no value except that which we give it’ (Francione, 2010: 355). Be this as it may, there are nevertheless important distinctions in regards to the functional use of this ‘property’ and in regards to the instrumental and affective ties that humans have with animals. For example, there is a difference in the treatment of animals for personal ‘use’ value (for example, as an animal companion) and as ‘capital’ (that is, to generate profit), and this has an impact on the cultural and social contexts within which the animal exists.The animal sharing my house may be ‘my’ dog, but it has a different ontological status to the dog which is trained to race or to fight for the purposes of making money for the owner. Being ‘part of the family’ means sharing a certain space within the family, one in which both humans and animals seem to gain benefit and emotional reward. Affective ties are forged that bond each to the other; where these do not exist, whether due to instrumentalism in the relationship between human and animal or lack of empathy on 116

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the part of the human, then animal abuse is much more likely to both occur and to be prevalent.

Categorising animals The ontological standing of nonhuman animals is largely a status conferred by humans. Unsurprisingly, such conferred status is generally based upon a calculus of human needs and wants combined with statistical data on the prevalence or number of nonhuman animals.The calculus changes over time and varies according to social and cultural context. Nonetheless, it establishes the ground rules which guide how specific animals and specific species are valued and acknowledged by particular societies of humans at any point in time. Attempts to categorise animals according to environment and/ or human service are difficult to do well due to the complexities involved. Different criteria inevitably provide different ways in which to categorise different types of species (see O’Sullivan, 2009; Herbig and Joubert, 2006). While not unproblematic, Box 4.1 provides an attempt to distinguish animals according to two main criteria (wildlife/ domesticated), and within each of these categories according to how the animal is perceived relative to human needs (service to/service for). These are inherently anthropomorphic categorisations in the sense that the ways in which animals are classified reflect human interventions over time, and human notions of usefulness. Yet, regardless of their human-centric origins and character, such descriptions are essential in assessing matters of animal rights and animal welfare as these are presently constituted in law and social practices. Box 4.1: Animal categories Wildlife • Introduced wild: – invasive/pests (for example, cane toad in Australia) – valued (for example, trout in Tasmania) – ambiguous (for example, camels and wild donkeys in central Australia). • Native species with a value of their own: – avian (for example, kookaburras, cockatoos) – marine (for example, whales, sharks) – aquatic (for example, Murray river cod, marron) – terrestrial (for example, koala, kangaroo). • Economic wild animals: recreation (for example, fish)

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Environmental harm – food (for example, mutton birds) – eco-tourism (for example, birdlife, crocodiles) – collectables (for example, lizards, exotic fish). • Wild animals as threat/pest – to agriculture (for example, kangaroos) – to pastoral industry (for example, dingos) – to surfing/recreation (for example, sharks) – to angling (for example, galaxia fish). Domestic animals • Economic animals [humans doing something to them]: – farm animals (for example, pigs, cows, chickens) – aquaculture animals (for example, fish, prawns, oysters) – research animals (for example, rats, mice) – exhibited animals (for example, lions, tigers, bears). • Economic animals [them doing something for humans]: – law enforcement (for example, dogs) – industrial/transportation animals (for example, oxen, horses) – recreation/racing/rodeos (for example, horses, dogs) – performing animals/circuses (for example, lions, monkeys). • Non-economic animals [other human purposes]: – companion animals (for example, cats, dogs, exotic fish, rabbits) – hunting/sport companions (for example, horses, dogs). Source: White, 2011: 65.

Domesticated animals are a separate category of animal to those considered wild. This categorisation is based upon historical relationships between certain species and humans, which have over time transformed the basic nature of the animals in question. ‘Domestication is an evolutionary process that results in animals such as our companion dogs and cats undergoing substantial behavioral, anatomical, physiological, and genetic changes during the process’ (Bekoff, 2010: xxxi). Any movement to introduce wild animals into a domestic environment (such as adopting chimpanzees as household pets) or domesticated animals into the wild (for example, release of cats) inevitably carries with it certain risks and problems, from unexpected episodes of violence against humans through to the creation of feral predators that threaten endemic species of birds and other animals. The concepts of ‘pests’ and ‘invasive species’ are contested notions insofar as each reflects human interpretations of value and worth. The idea of ‘pest’, for example, reduces the life, energy, activity and wellbeing of creatures to that of threat, worthlessness and nuisance 118

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relative to human objectives. It tends to portray targeted species in ways that foster eradication and fear of species rather than understanding or appreciation of broader ecological and zoological processes and imperatives. Similarly the use of ‘invasive species’ is highly charged as it relies upon emotive language to again convey the sense of unwanted intrusion. Of course, some ‘alien’ species are in fact welcomed regardless of harmful impact on existing local species (see below on the galaxia fish versus trout). However, the present point is not that certain trends may prove harmful in wider ecological terms or in relation to concerns about biodiversity, for this is surely the case (see, for example, UNEP, 2012: 143). Rather, the language of this threat reinforces human categorisations of species that present them as somehow inherently evil rather than as bona fide sentient creatures in their own right. This, in turn, can lead to diminishment of ‘normal’ standards of treatment in the rush to get rid of them. It can thus lead to and/or reinforce the inhumane treatment of animals. This is particularly evident in the case of action taken to deal with ‘feral’ animals. For example, in Australia certain animals are deemed ‘wild pest’, including feral cats, wild dogs, foxes, feral goats, feral pigs, feral horses, rabbits, donkeys, camels, cattle, buffalo and rabbits. It is estimated that there are 2.6 million feral goats, one million donkeys, 200 million rabbits, and 300, 000 feral camels, among other feral animals (McEwen, 2008: 31). The sheer numbers of these animals, combined with the predatory and/or competitive nature of their presence relative to ‘native’ species is considered a major problem. The threat posed by these animals to other animals and to habitats is enormous.Therefore, an attempt to control their presence is not the main bone of contention. Rather, the question is how should these animals be controlled and managed? In current practice, cruelty is often ingrained in the mass methods of control that are utilised, thereby illustrating and reflecting the degraded status of those animals covered under the rubric of ‘feral’. Many millions of animals, particularly rats, mice, birds and guinea pigs, are used for scientific research, but the biggest category of animals, numerically, is that of animals used by humans for food. Consider the size and growth in the animal food industry in the last few decades for example. In 1950 the United States had 3 million pig farms and 55 million pigs.That’s an average of nineteen animals per farm. By 2005, the number of pig-producing farms had dropped to 67,000, less than 3 percent of what existed in 1950.These farms housed 60 million pigs, with some massive industrial 119

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production facilities confining many thousands. Over the same period, the number of farms or ranches with beef cattle fell from 4 million to less than 1 million, even as the number of cattle in the United States rose from 77 million to 95 million…In 1950, 50,000 farms produced 630 million meat chickens. That’s an average of 12,630 birds per farm. By 2005, the United States had 20,000 fewer farms, but the average number of birds per farm had risen to nearly 300,000, for an astonishing total of 8.7 billion meat chickens. (Baur, 2008: 10–11) Intensive farming carries with it a wide range of potential harms to the animals themselves as well as to humans who eat them. For example, slaughterhouse conditions in the meat industry (cows, pigs, chickens, sheep) are appalling and animal suffering is endemic to the whole enterprise. Moreover, the process is so toxic that the product is not unusually riddled with dangerous bacteria and contaminants guaranteed to make the meat-eater sick (see Eisnitz, 2007; Baur, 2008). Animal suffering is ingrained in the mass production of animals for food and is evident in poor living conditions, terrible transportation situations (as seen in the live export trade), cruel slaughterhouse techniques and conditions, and overall disregard and disrespect of so-called food animals. The lack of intrinsic value of farmed food animals is indicated as well in the fact that, for instance, some six million farmed animals, mostly chickens, lost their lives in Hurricane Katrina’s path.While the media latched on to heart-tugging stories about companion animals and struggling children, the plight of the lesser valued creatures was largely ignored. It was difficult to get the attention of state agricultural authorities or corporate managers for the chickens’ plight. The birds’ value to the industry is very low, and our society in general doesn’t value them much higher. In any case, the chickens in the hurricane zone were property and, like some of the homes and possessions lost to Katrina, they were insured. This meant the corporate owners could collect on their damaged or destroyed ‘goods’. (Baur, 2008: 169) Value lies in profit-making, not in intrinsic worth when it comes to food animals.As long as the money comes in, the value is realised – regardless of the health and welfare of the animals generating the income. 120

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Protecting one’s investment in food farm animals has implications for other animals as well. For example, the issue of animals used for food and food production also has a bearing on those animals treated as ‘pests’ or competitors with domesticated animals earmarked for food processing.Accordingly, kangaroos, foxes, rabbits, gophers and wild dogs may be targeted for shooting or poisoning since they threaten more ‘valuable’ animal stock. The corporatisation of animal production, so evident in egg and poultry production, piggeries and cattle production, and in aquaculture, is rapidly changing the conditions under which animals are born, live and die. For example, ‘while Australia’s “beef ” cows have traditionally been raised by small town farmers on vast grasslands, almost one-third now spend part of their lives confined in feedlots owned by large corporations, where they can be efficiently fattened and prepared for market’ (Sharman, 2009: 39). Many are also being fed diets of genetically modified grains, which likewise have health implications for both animal and those who consume the animal (Smith, 2003). The status of animals is not only reflected in how they are labelled and treated in domestic circumstances pertaining to human needs and wants. Status is also conferred on the basis of prevalence or number of animals. For example, the notions of endangered and threatened species essentially speak to the survival status of particular species. Some are extinct (as with the thylacine, the dodo and the passenger pigeon), while others hover on the brink of extinction (orangutan, polar bear). Human intervention in the form of zoos or conservationist policies reflect varying conceptions of animal rights and welfare, including differing perspectives on which animals ought to be saved, the urgency of the action needed and which species are prioritised over others when it comes to activist campaigns. Saving the tiger is publicly popular, for example; stopping the killing of sharks less so. Indeed, when assessing ‘value’ on the basis of ecological criteria such as biodiversity and the place of different species in the chain of being, a different picture emerges to the usual anthropocentric and populist ones. For example, animal companions such as cats and dogs are highly valued in legal proceedings and in public discourse.Yet, from an ecological point of view, species such as bees and bats are more valuable for the crucial role they play in the wider ecosystems of the planet. On the other hand, the decline and potential extinction of species is put into the ‘too hard’ basket if the cause is not direct as in the case of poaching of fish or rhino or elephant. Here the solution is apparent, immediate and targeted (if not always successful). Specific culprits are

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seen to bear the responsibility for the demise of certain species, and law enforcement action is constructed accordingly. In other cases, however, the problem is systemic and global, with major implications for possible remedies. The polar bear, for example, is quickly disappearing. Climate change is the key reason in that it is indirectly causing weight loss among polar bears due to the loss of its sea ice habitat because the ice starts to thaw earlier and earlier each spring, cutting off access to traditional feeding grounds (it doesn’t eat, so it gets thin!). In certain parts of the Arctic, the average female now weighs only 225 kg, which is 25 per cent less than two decades ago. If this trend continues, the species will be lost, forever (EEA, 2010). Insofar as the structural conditions which give rise to the threatened habitat are not addressed, the solution is to ultimately accept extinction in the wild but to try to ensure the survival of captive individuals in human-prepared ‘homes’. Survival, here, is on human terms, or not at all. Ironically, it is the laws that humans design to protect certain species that may, in effect, put them most at jeopardy. For example, measures put in place to prevent the illegal trade in endangered species can make that species even more attractive to criminal syndicates or private collectors, since it confirms their scarcity (and thus increases the commercial and collectible ‘value’) of the species in question. The damage that is manifest in phenomena such as over-fishing and destruction of habitat (both of which may be legally undertaken) also affects the subsequent market prices for the commodity in question. Scarcity is a major motivator for illegal as well as legal forays into particular kinds of harvesting and production activity. The losers are animals and their environments. From the animal’s perspective, rather than an anthropocentric viewpoint, it matters little to their welfare whether or not the harm being done to them is legal or illegal. Either way they suffer. Fishing, for example, is associated with a wide range of potentially harmful activity. Legally provided fishing, such as aquaculture and the ‘scientific’ harvesting of whales, can engender great harm. The essential question, from an animal rights and welfare point of view, is ‘what harm is there in fishing?’ When considering the many different types of fishing it becomes apparent that harm can stem from and be associated with many different kinds of practice. Fishing for profit can be distinguished from fishing for subsistence, and each of these can be distinguished from fishing for pleasure.Yet each kind of fishing entails different kinds of threat, risk and potential harm. Table 4.1 provides a brief outline of different kinds of fishing, and the activities related to each that can be described as illegal, criminal and 122

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harmful. The point of the figure is that harm – to fish – stems from diverse activities and is not determined solely by whether the activity is legal or not. Table 4.1: Fishing and related harmful activities Type of fishing Potential type of harmful activity Commercial Criminal: illegal, unreported, excess to quota, false declarations Damage to seabed and marine environment, and to other creatures such as birds Destruction of by-catch and marine pollution Over-exploitation of vulnerable species Recreational Regulatory: unlicensed, excess to quota Over-fishing Sport kills such as giant marlin Litter and pollution Indigenous Illegal: fishing in (traditional) but foreign waters, fishing without permit Over-fishing Non-selective fishing Aquaculture Regulatory: unlicensed, unregulated Conditions of penning and disease Fish feed and contamination Use of chemicals in fish farming Scientific Regulatory: excess to quota Depletion of vulnerable species such as whales Illegal Criminal: illegal, unreported Over-fishing Super-exploitation of particular species for selective food markets (for example, shark fin) Specialist Criminal: illegal, unreported Super-exploitation of particular species for purposes of medicine or private collections such as seahorses and aquarium fish Source: White, 2008a: 245

Different scales, motivations and techniques underpin each of these types of fishing. The impact on the fish can be devastating. More generally, human intervention has had a profound influence on the lives and wellbeing of fish in many different ways besides fishing. For instance, studies are now showing that the behaviour of fish actually changes when ‘adults’ are taken away via over-fishing. The young fish do not return to their usual breeding sites and they 123

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exhibit different habits compared to their older counterparts (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2007). On the other hand, intensive fish farming involving over-population of fish-farming ponds leads to a rise in bacterial infections that affects the rate of growth of the fish and may cause death (Gearin, 2005). Recent studies are also indicating that exposure to sewerage leads fish to change their gender to female, due to chemicals (that is, female hormones associated with the female contraceptive pill) in river water (in the case of the UK) and sewerage outfalls into the ocean (in the case of the US) (Pyper, 2005; Cone, 2005). Similar types of analyses can be undertaken with other types of animals. Getting to know more about the influence of human intervention on nonhuman animals is vital to understanding the nature of harm against animals. For most criminologists, however, such questions are yet to be on the agenda.

Crime, criminology and animals An animal welfare approach is the perspective most reflected in criminological work surrounding animals. Closely associated with this perspective is the notion of protection of endangered species, and efforts to maintain the sustainability of animals in certain industries. For example, the poaching of abalone or lobster is prohibited insofar as it impinges upon the property rights of licensed fishers and taxation powers of the state, while simultaneously depleting species numbers (Tailby and Gant, 2002; McMullan and Perrier, 2002). Legislation that prohibits the illegal trade of wildlife, particularly endangered wildlife, is meant to protect species from criminal exploitation although why and how species become endangered is less frequently addressed (for example, degradation of habitats generally and destruction of local ecology through, for instance, clearfell forestry). Intervention is mainly pitched at the species level, with efforts being put into conserving and maintaining viable numbers of particular species. Contemporary zoos sometimes justify their practices on the basis of this kind of conservation ethos. In recent years much of the criminological scholarship in regard to animals has been motivated by an interest in conventional environmental crimes such as illegal fishing rather than species justice as such. For instance, work over the past decade has been carried out in respect to: • the illegal theft and trade in reptiles in South Africa (Herbig, 2010) • fishing related crimes, including the poaching of abalone and of lobster (Tailby and Gant, 2002; McMullan and Perrier, 2002) 124

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• crime prevention and the illicit trade in endangered species involving many different kinds of animals (Wellsmith, 2010; Schneider, 2008, 2012) • the illegal wildlife market in Africa (Warhol et al, 2003), and in particular the trade in elephant ivory (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009) • the linkages between illicit markets involving trade in wildlife and drugs (South and Wyatt, 2011). For much of this burgeoning literature the key or central category of analysis is that of legality rather than harm. If the latter, then ‘harm’ is generally constructed in relation to the specific species, rather than animals as a whole. In this regard research and law enforcement efforts (especially Interpol) have been concerned with trade in endangered species – a matter of biodiversity protection – rather than animal rights and animal welfare per se. International instruments such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) aims to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. CITES works by subjecting international trade in specimens of listed species to certain controls, based upon where the roughly 5,000 species of animals and 28,000 species of plants are situated in the three Appendices to the Convention that reflect the extent of the threat to it, and the controls that apply to the trade. From an animal rights perspective, CITES merely legitimates anthropocentric interests. This is because the intent of CITES is to regulate the trade in species, not to prevent the trade itself. Moreover, the mechanisms of the Convention – the Appendices that assign survival and scarcity values – create and help to sustain the illegal market for endangered and threatened species. Illegality raises prices, so banning the trade of certain animals creates a lucrative black market for such expensive ‘commodities’. Yet, regulating such trade perpetuates the instrumental use of animals for human consumption (metaphorically as well as literally). Beirne (2009) observes that rarely have animals been understood in criminology other than in terms of their legal status as the property of human masters. That is, laws against poaching – of deer, pheasants, rabbits and partridges – in England were designed not to protect animals, but the rights of the rich and powerful to do with these creatures as they willed at their exclusive command. The point was to protect one’s property, not to protect the animal as such. Much the same logic applies to law pertaining to animals and primary industry. The illegal trade in wildlife involves not only the threat to 125

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endangered species directly but, as well, to the economic viability of industries such as agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Illegal exports of wildlife and wildlife products from Australia pose a threat to the protection of endangered species. Illegal imports are accompanied by the potential for the introduction of pests and diseases which could have a dramatic impact on agriculture, conservation of the environment, and specialist industries, such as aviculture. (Halstead, 1992: 1) Thus, the smuggling of wildlife across national borders has the potential to threaten the viability of endangered species, whether flora or fauna, as well as to provide a potential vehicle for the introduction of pests and diseases into formerly unaffected areas (Herbig, 2010; Ferrier, 2010; Rosen and Smith, 2010). Illegal trade is not the only threat to particular ‘wild’ animal species. Very often it is the legal trade that provides the basis for species decline. The intense competition for food worldwide, for example, is having major impacts on the ways in which commercial fishing takes place.The issue here is not only that of biodiversity, but of wholesale destruction of major breeding grounds and fishing beds. The greatest negative impact to the long-term sustainable management of global fisheries is a combination of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (see Wilson and Tomkins, 2007). IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing may involve huge factory-ships that operate on the high seas, and which process thousands of tons of fish at any one time. Alternatively, it may be organised around dozens of smaller vessels, each of which is contracted to provide a catch that ultimately brings reward to the originating contractor. In other words, such production can be organised according to the economies of scale (for example, factory ships) or the economies of scope (for example, small independent fishers). In each case, however, there is a link to legitimate markets (for example, for abalone, for lobsters, for Patagonian toothfish) for the value of the commodity to be realised in dollar terms. Regardless of whether the activity is legal or illegal, or a combination of the two, it is the overall scale of fishing that is the problem. The other major threat to animals besides over-use by humans is the demise of their habitats. Here, too, profit-making is at the fore. The conversion of land for commercial purposes is directly relevant to the wellbeing and survival of animals. For example, the native woodlands demolished for cash crops such as GMO soybeans in Argentina have a 126

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major impact on the habitats of animals such as pumas, jaguars,Andean cats and tapirs, which cannot live outside this particular ecosystem (Robin, 2010: 271). Similar events are happening in places such as Indonesia, where deforestation is putting pressure on the Sumatran tiger and the orangutan (Boekhout van Solinge, 2008b). Property rights, in this instance, refer to the priority given over to land tenure and use over and above consideration to the welfare of its animal inhabitants. Law and criminology have not only been oriented toward illegal animal trade issues and matters of protecting property. Historically, as well, laws have been enacted to forbid cruel and improper treatment of certain animals, although criminologists have seldom considered animal suffering as the explicit focus of study. Moreover, in practice, law enforcement was at best haphazard and the ‘crime’ did not rate highly in public consciousness or as a serious concern. However, phenomenon such as arranging dog fights for entertainment and betting sport have in recent years drawn much public condemnation in places such as the United States. The rise of both anti-cruelty movements (such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) and animal rights movements (such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) has been instrumental in raising awareness of animal abuse issues, and promoting alternative ways of thinking about such abuse. Regulations and laws pertaining to animals tend to approach the issues from the point of view of protecting the integrity of specific animals from abuse (that is, individual animal welfare), protecting the integrity of markets involving animal products (for example, by fixing access and limits to fish catches), protecting human health and wellbeing from inappropriate animal products (for example, slaughterhouse production rules), and protecting endangered species (that is, collective existence of certain animals). Within criminology, there are two main strands of concerted research on animals. One deals with matters of illegal trade, and subjects such as illegal fishing, abalone poaching, illegal trade in endangered species, elephant poaching and threats to the tiger population (see for example, White, 2008a; Beirne and South, 2007;White, 2009, R.; Lemieux and Clark, 2009; Pires and Moreto, 2011). The other area makes the link between animal abuse and interpersonal violence, including the cooccurrence of child abuse, family violence and cruelty to animals (see for example, Beirne, 2004, 2009; Acione, 2001, 2010; Flynn, 2011). More broadly, writers have also identified a series of potential topics that deserve further attention, such as the prosecution and execution of animals, bestiality as a form of sexual assault, the use of animals such as 127

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dogs in police enforcement tactics, and the use of animals in prisoner rehabilitation schemes (see Agnew, 1998; Cazaux, 1999; Beirne, 2011). Considerable research has also recently been carried out on the social processes associated with offending and the characteristics of offenders in regards to specific types of animal-related crimes. For instance, in a landmark study that explores why people harm and kill animals, Nurse (2013) has developed a new typology of offender motivations. The classification of offenders is based upon systematic research undertaken in the United Kingdom (and the United States) that examined offender justifications for what they do. Nurse (2013) identified five discrete, although not mutually exclusive, categories of offenders: • traditional criminals – personal benefit from crimes such as wildlife trafficking • economic criminals – employment-related crime (for example, killing protected birds to ensure safety of local game and habitats) • masculinities criminals – exercise of stereotypical masculine nature (for example, linked to sport and gambling) • hobby criminals – collection and acquisition (for example, egg collector) • stress offenders – involved in animal harm as a result of their own stress or abuse (for example, children who suffer abuse). The importance of this typology is not only that it provides more detailed knowledge about offenders. Nurse (2013) also observes that understanding different motivations has major implications for how we might respond to these kinds of animal harms. Specifically, he argues that calls for harsher penalties for animal cruelty, often spearheaded by NGOs such as the RSPCA, are too simplistic and generally ineffective if and when translated into policy and practice. This is because such demands generally fail to account for the lack of success of the traditional criminal justice system already in dealing with serious crime (much less animal harms). Moreover, they miss the point that a ‘onesize-fits-all’ response is neither appropriate nor effective in the face of diverse motivations for and circumstances of animal harm crimes. Similar observations and conclusions are evident in recent studies of poaching (see McMullan and Perrier, 2002; Forthsyth et al, 1998; Bell et al, 2007; Zhang et al, 2008; Green, 2011; Piries and Clarke, 2011; Kahler and Gore, 2012).These studies establish that people are engaged in poaching for a variety of reasons, and these reasons are partly related to immediate social context (for example, exotic consumer products for the new middle classes in China; traditional hunting practices in 128

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Greece; community and commercial collusion in the taking of lobster in the Canadian Maritime provinces; income supplementation in Bolivia). In some instances, poaching is perceived as a sort of ‘folk crime’ – something that everyone knows about, and that everyone allows to happen since it is not perceived to be ‘really’ wrong in most respects (unless certain informal protocols and boundaries are violated, such as being seen to be ‘greedy’, too ‘commericially-oriented’ or ‘not leaving enough for other people’). Poaching therefore exists with considerable community support in some locales and under some conditions. In summary, and as indicated in Box 4.2 (which, in particular, draws upon Forsyth et al, 1998, and Kahler and Gore, 2012), poaching is frequently embedded within local communities in ways that belie the possibility of imposing harsher sanctions without considerable resistance and pushback from local people.Working with people and communities is generally seen as a more viable way to respond to animal harms such as poaching rather than punishing and/or alienating them. The ‘attractions’ of poaching need to be counter-balanced in some way, and this will usually involve adoption of social, cultural, educational and economic measures that make sense to the local people themselves. Box 4.2: Motivations to engage in poaching Instrumental Food (for example, nutrition, taste) Money (for example, on-sale, income source) Animals as status symbol (for example, trophy or exotic consumable) Entertainment (for example, leisure activity, fun) Medicine (for example, remedy) Affective Tradition (for example, cultural practices over generations) Exhilaration (for example, buzz and excitement of the activity) Animals as ‘Other’ (for example, an object, rather than subject, not deserving empathy) Rebellion (for example, disagreement with rules)

An emerging area of research deals with animal abuse directly, as a core topic. The concern is with both systematic uses of animals, such as factory farming, and one-on-one abuses of animals (Beirne, 2009; Sollund, 2008). However, what counts as animal ‘abuse’ varies enormously within and between cultures and societies. Is locking up chickens in small coops a form of abuse? What counts as ‘animal’ abuse likewise varies depending upon the type and status of the animal to 129

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which one is referring. Is fishing a form of abuse? There are many questions that can be asked regarding which animals ‘deserve’ protection and freedom from abuse, and how abuse itself is to be defined in legal and social terms (see for example, Sunstein and Nussbaum, 2006; Beirne, 2009; Sollund, 2012). Legislation can cover a broad range of acts, such as protection from cruelty, from abandonment and from poisoning, and ensuring that animals are provided with necessary sustenance and shelter. There are nevertheless major ambiguities in terms of how laws are framed, and how they are translated into practice. For instance, the use of animals in laboratory testing may involve systematic mutilation; yet, this type of action is legally allowed as long as the animals are provided ‘humane care and treatment’ generally (see Beirne, 2009; Sankoff and White, 2009). Beirne (2009) asserts that the politics of selectivity is always at the heart of any given criminalisation process, and this pertains to animal abuse as well. He asks the questions, ‘Which species are positively valued? Which are deemed worthy of legal protection? Which species are excluded from the circle of moral consideration?’ The answer to these leads us to consider some of the debates and differences within the movements supportive of animal protection (Benton, 1998; Beirne, 2007). Investigation of harm involving nonhuman animals generally begins with the premise that the central issue is harm to animals, and that humans are implicated in this process in varying ways and to varying degrees. Within mainstream criminology, the so-called progressive thesis, for example, inquires into how young people who abuse animals progress to other types of criminal acts, including harm against humans (Dadds et al, 2002; Ascione, 2001, 2010). Animal cruelty is linked to anti-social behaviour generally. Thus, the one feeds the other. Other research has argued that systematic abuse of animals via factory farms ought to be considered at the same time as specific instances of harm to particular animals (Cazaux, 1999; Beirne, 2004). Indeed, recent criminological commentary on the social impact of working in abattoirs suggests that those whose job it is to kill animals are probably disproportionately more likely to be less empathetic towards their fellow humans (see Beirne, 2004; MacNair, 2002). In other words, where cruelty is in a sense built into the job (such as working in a slaughterhouse), the ramifications are that the job itself perverts the ordinary sensibilities of workers and takes them psychologically and socially in an unhealthy and negative direction. The animal rights approach argues for the abolition of animal exploitation through both legal and non-legal change and for the legal 130

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recognition of rights for animals. Central to this approach is changing the legal character of animals from property to legal, rights-bearing entities (see Wise, 2001, 2004; Svard, 2007).The intention is to prevent the exploitation of nonhuman animals, both in regards to their products (such as milk, eggs and wool) and their lives (as in the case of animals killed for food). Any type of poisoning, trapping or hunting is seen as wrong, even where justified in terms of certain species impinging upon others (for example, attempts to eradicate foxes in Tasmania). In essence, veganism is set as the baseline for politics and the moral rights of each individual animal is asserted (Svard, 2007). In addressing the issue of animal abuse, Beirne (2009) argues that if the violation of animals’ rights is to be taken seriously, then we need to examine why some harms to animals are defined as criminal, others as abusive but not criminal, and still others as neither criminal nor abusive. In pointing this out, Beirne (2009) emphasises that exploring these questions necessarily leads to a more inclusive concept of harm. It also means that much more empirical work needs to be done to examine how laws are actually put into practice, where specific human interests fit into the picture, and how the social control of animal abuse ought to be carried out at an institutional level. The basic argument is that animals should count: the animal protection cause simply asks that animals not be treated like things but respected as creatures with inherent rights. It also maintains that we have an ethical responsibility not to abuse them. Asserting the rights of animals to be protected from human cruelty is just the affirmative version of the timeless principle that it is wrong to treat them cruelly. (Baur, 2008: 190) How animals currently count and how they should count, though, is part of the conundrum raised by Beirne (2009). It is also part and parcel of wider debates within the animal rights and welfare literature on how best to conceptualise the relationship between humans and nonhuman animals generally.

Animals, particular species and individuals There is a parallel to be drawn between criminal justice as an institution and the fact that most animal welfare cases continue to involve specific acts of cruelty and abuse. In both cases the emphasis is on the individual animal, rather than the social structures, processes and patterns of power 131

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that shape what is deemed to be criminal and harmful and what is not. In terms of animal rights and welfare, this means that the ‘tree’ is indeed more important than the ‘forest’. Individual instances of animal abuse mostly refer to animals considered as individuals (companion animals, pets) with a visible and acknowledged personality and biography. On the other hand, the subjectivity of the millions of animals being exploited in animal husbandry, laboratories and other large scale processes of animal abuse, is invisible and is concealed behind the anonymous production quotas and mortality rates. (Cazaux, 1999: 120–1) However, the emphasis on the individual within institutionalised animal welfare regimes is turned on its head when considering animal protection as this pertains to species as a whole. For the latter it is the population that matters, not the individual. Welfarists take the view that using animals to satisfy human desires is acceptable, and they emphasise the need to treat animals well in the process of using them.Abolitionists, on the other hand, see any such uses of animals as a fundamental violation of their right not to be ‘property’, and they argue that all uses of animals to satisfy human desires must cease altogether. Francione (2008) argues that the primary focus of animal welfare is the regulation of animal treatment whereas the animal rights position seeks to abolish all animal use:‘The abolitionist position rejects regulation on theoretical grounds (even “humane” animal use cannot be justified morally) as well as practical grounds (regulation does not sufficiently protect animal interests and even facilitates the continued social acceptance of animal use)’ (Francione, 2008: 2). Francione’s solution is veganism, which means not eating meat, dairy, eggs, honey and other animal products, or wearing or using animal products or products tested on animals. As explained by Regan (2010), the recurring challenges raised against the animal rights view commonly include questions about where to draw the line that separates animals, including humans and other animals, from each other. To put it differently, which class of animals ‘deserve’ the rights and respect accorded to humans? One response is that: basic rights are possessed by those animals who bring a unified psychological presence to the world – those animals, in other words, who share with humans a family of cognitive, 132

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attitudinal, sensory, and volitional capacities. These animals not only see and hear, not only feel pain and pleasure, they are also able to remember the past, anticipate the future, and act intentionally in order to secure what they want in the present. They have a biography, not merely a biology. (Regan, 2010: 37) While the great ape obviously qualifies under the terms of this description, the status of fish, such as salmon, are bound to be more controversial. It is notable in this regard that People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) have recently been organising campaigns intended to raise the status of fish (equivalent in some respects to ‘humanising’ animals via anthropomorphic representations). This is done primarily through the strategy of relabelling fish as ‘sea kittens’, presumably on the premise that people are less inclined to eat the cute and cuddly (as implied in the descriptor). After all,‘who could possibly want to put a hook through a sea kitten?’ (PETA, 2009).This is part of a concerted effort to create a positive image for fish that is intended to deter people from using them for food and to present them in a completely new way. Where to draw the line has other implications as well. For instance, in cases where there may be conflict over interests – who gets the lifeboat spaces when only four spaces are available, yet five beings (four humans and one dog) need to be saved – what criteria ought to be invoked in order to make the decision? The issue here is the difference between humans and nonhuman animals (parenthetically, we might also ask what if the lifeboat has three humans, a cat and a dog? How do we choose between species beyond the human?). For some, the answer is that human and nonhuman animals are morally equivalent. Neither is to be privileged over the other when it comes to questions of value and worth. Thus, in the opinion of a leading animal rights advocate: In situations of true conflict – and not when we have manufactured the conflict by bringing animals into existence to use as our resources – we may decide to break a difficult tie and choose the human over the nonhuman because we simply do not know what death means to the nonhuman. Conversely, we may also choose the nonhuman over the human in a situation of genuine conflict. Either choice, or a coin flip, is morally acceptable. (Francione, 2008: 14) 133

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For many others, indeed for most of us, however, it is humans who, ultimately, do and must count. This is so for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we are interconnected to each other, and different from the nonhuman. We have shared affinities that are essential to the very notion of humanity. Hardcore animal rights advocates can at times convey the impression that they have more empathy for nonhuman animals than humans. Misanthropy is the name given to those who, in effect, hate humans. This is sometimes manifest in animal protectionist campaigns designed to prevent the use of animals for food. It is also evident in the rhetoric of some conservationists who view humans as just another species – the same as any other – on the earth, and who, accordingly, need to be culled occasionally (through disasters, droughts and famine) for the sake of the planet as a whole (see Chapter Three). Misanthropy is evident among individuals, but is also demonstrated in activist groups that ignore the suffering of humans. It is alleged, for example, that ‘PETA is interested exclusively in the suffering of nonhuman animals’ (Torres, 2008: 10).This type of allegation sometimes is aligned with the idea that such movements tend to be comprised mainly of middle class whites who have little direct interest or knowledge of the link between animal suffering and human suffering. The net result, however, is estrangement from the wider issues of social structure and unequal power (see Pellow, 2013). As Torres (2008: 106) observes: In my few years in animal activist circles, I have met genuine misanthropes in ‘the movement’, who either think that humans ‘get what they deserve’, who naively assume that all humans possess the agency to overcome the problems they face, or who think that animal suffering is qualitatively more important than human suffering. It seems that, at least for some, not only are humans biologically and ontologically separate from animals, but as a class or species they warrant less favourable treatment than other nonhuman animals. Moral equivalence between species, however, can go against real, immediate needs of human communities. From an animal rights perspective the eating of the flesh of animals is problematic and is seen to constitute major social harm. In practical terms, though, what do we say to people who traditionally eat fish, for example, as their main source of protein? How realistic is veganism in regional environments such as Arctic tundra and Australian desert within which humans 134

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have survived for millennia by eating a wide range of protein sources including animals? One of the critiques of both conservation and animal rights movements is that they can privilege ‘the need to save wildlife over the rights of people who live with it’ (Duffy, 2010: 82). From the point of view of endangered species, for example, there is a big difference between subsistence use of nature and over-kill. Subsistence poaching is commonly thought of as ‘hunting for the pot’, where rural communities hunt small amounts of wildlife for food; good examples of this are when fishermen in Guatemala hunt manatee (sea cows/dugongs) or villagers in Zambia hunt impala for food. Subsistence poaching is used only to meet the food needs of local communities and is usually a continuation of a historical practice of using certain types of wildlife for food. It relies on the use of low-technology traps and snares, so it tends to be quite small-scale and has a minimal impact on wildlife populations when compared with larger-scale commercial poaching. (Duffy, 2010: 87) Nonetheless, from both an animal rights and animal welfare perspective, traditional practices such as these are subject to condemnation insofar as the animal is used instrumentally (and, perhaps, cruelly). Debates occur not only in terms of how we make choices between humans and animals in certain situations, but which animals are valued over others when it comes to other kinds of survival dilemmas. This is reflected in part in the ways in which animal rights activists tend to privilege images and support for some types of animals over others. The ‘poster animals’ for wildlife campaigns, for example, are tigers, elephants, rhinoceros and polar bears. Sometimes wolves are included in this list, as is the Tasmanian devil in places such as Australia. Not all wild animals are seen as ‘good’ as is often the case with perceptions of sharks and grizzly bears, and consequently these may not be featured in quite the same way as other animals. Abuse of some wild animals is not necessarily visible and so this, too, must be taken into account. The classic case of this is the hundreds of thousands of whales, dolphins and porpoises that die worldwide each year through entanglement in fishing nets. Some of the leading issues in regards to wild animals include hunting and trapping, poisoning, habitat degradation, feral animals and endangered species. A big concern, from the point of view of human 135

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intervention, is what if any levels of management ought to be engaged in? The absolutist position is that non-intervention, full stop, should be the name of the game. The animal rights position does not mean releasing our domesticated nonhumans to run wild in the street. If we took animals seriously and recognized our obligation not to treat them as things, then we would stop producing and facilitating the production of domestic animals altogether. We would care for the ones whom we have here and now, but we would stop breeding more for human consumption. And with respect to nondomesticated nonhumans, we would simply leave them alone. (Francione, 2008: 13) More realistic and situationally relevant appraisals, however, view intervention as a matter of contingency and ‘doing the right thing’ within specific social and ecological contexts (see Anderson, 2004). In some cases, for example, it is argued that non-interference or hands-off management should be strictly adhered to, from the point of view of environmental ethics: Animals live in the wild, subject to natural selection, and the integrity of the species is a result of these selective pressures. To intervene artificially is not to produce any benefit for the good of the kind, although it may benefit an individual bison or whale. (Rolston, 2010: 604) This ethic may shift in cases where wild animals are affected by humaninduced changes. It can change as well where an endangered species is involved: ‘Duties to wildlife are not simply at the level of individuals; the ethic is that one ought to rescue individual animals in trouble where they are the last tokens of a type’ (Rolston, 2010: 605). In general though it is expected that individual animals living in the wild ‘do not have a moral right to our direct protection and provision, even if they need it to survive’, nor do they have a right to our assistance to protect them against animal predation (Anderson, 2004: 284). The rescue and protection of endangered species involves new types of ethical decisions and complex issues relating to individual and species harm. Wolves have recently been reintroduced to Yellowstone National Park, having been exterminated there early [last] 136

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century. The restoration earned protests from some in the ranching community. Such restoration arises, according to most advocates, from a duty to the wolf as a species, coupled with the fact that the wolf was historically, and ought to be again, the top predator in the Yellowstone ecosystem. Conservationists also realize that problem wolves will have to be relocated, sometimes killed, and believe this is an acceptable killing of individuals in order to have the wolf species present. It removes wolves who turn to killing not their natural prey, but sheep or cattle; it also protects ranchers against losses. In the recommended mix of nature and culture, if we are to have wolves, we must kill wolves. (Rolston, 2010: 605) Such a view may seem to be anathema to animal rights advocates who believe in the sanctity of animal life as an absolute value rather than circumstantial privilege. The debates over the ways in which ‘feral’ and ‘sick’ animals are approached provide a useful summary of conflicting views pertaining to human intervention. Invasive species are seen as a threat to local species in the same way that ill animals are seen as a threat to local animal populations. More generally, from the perspective of humans, certain creatures are by their very nature hostile to human interests. As such, they demand action directed against them in order to protect ourselves. This applies to ‘vermin, pests and parasites’ that cannot adjust their behaviour and with which there is no possibility of communication or compromise. If left unchecked, they would create ecological havoc and harm to humans (Anderson, 2004). It is nonetheless acknowledged that ‘Even vermin have some degree of moral considerability’ (Anderson, 2004: 289). A key debate when it comes to feral animals, therefore, is over ‘what works’ when it comes to methods of eradication and control.Animal welfare advocates generally express a concern about cruelty in the control regime, sparked by a sense of urgency in the light of the exemption of feral animals from the protections of animal welfare legislation and current eradication practices. They argue for ‘humane’ methods of numbers management in the face of methods such as use of poison bait, steel-jawed trapping, shooting from ground or helicopter, biological control with disease and exclusion fencing (McEwen, 2008). As an alternative, it is argued that fertility control offers real hope as a long-term measure, a strategy that would involve a shift in emphasis from ‘kill rate to birth rate’ (McEwen, 2008: 30). 137

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Others argue that animals have an intrinsic right to life and as an expression of this, to reproduce (Coetzee, 2008; see also Francione, 2008).The implication is that we should let ‘survival’ be up to Nature, a principle that makes sense within specific social and ecological contexts (Anderson, 2004), but not in others. This generalised stance is part of the basis for resistance to the idea of the badger cull in the United Kingdom, a strategy prompted by the transmission of illness within and from the badger population. Yet, this moral basis for inaction is countered by farmers’ arguments that allowing infected animals to live is itself equally morally suspect. Enticott (2011: 206) refers to farmers rhetorically asking: ‘Why should my cows be allowed to die from bTB when wild badgers are allowed to remain free? If conservationists cared about animal welfare then they would not complain about a badger cull because it would improve badger welfare.’ Clearly there are many sides to each story when it comes to human decisions regarding when and how to intervene in regards to feral and sick animals. Again, this makes an absolutist position on these issues problematic at the level of complicated real-world problems and decisions.Animals have rights, but which and how these are enforced are variable depending upon natural and social contexts (Anderson, 2004). As has been observed by some writers (Cazaux, 1999), consideration of human practices that are detrimental to the wellbeing of animals, such as loss and fragmentation of habitat, tend to focus on the effects regarding animal populations of a certain species (matters pertaining to the threat of extinction). Less attention is paid to the consequences of broad trends to the wellbeing of animals as individual subjects. It is not only the recalcitrant and uncontrollable wolves who may end up being killed.The logic of species protection, over and above respect for the individual animal, means that in some instances animals are killed for no apparent reason or justification. In Norway, for example, efforts to protect the endangered species of polar fox, has nonetheless been accompanied by the killing of individual creatures which were guilty of the ‘crime’ of not fitting into the existing breeding programme (see Sollund, 2012b). Their deaths served no apparent purpose, but their value (or lack thereof) was reflected in the actions taken to put them down. Respect and acknowledgement of the right of these individual creatures to live is confounded by the human emphasis on collective survival. 138

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How humans deal with recalcitrant wolves or ‘unnecessary’ foxes mirrors decisions made in regard to domesticated animals as well.This is especially evident when considering ‘dangerous dogs’. Companion animals refer to those animals primarily kept for companionship. It differs from the broader term of ‘pet’ which includes animals used for ornamental purposes and those kept for competitive or sporting activities (Serpell, 2010: 133). The prevalence of companion animal ownership in the western world is high, particularly in relation to cats and dogs. Birds are also kept as companion animals, as are fish and horses. The economic value of companion animals is reflected in the huge industries that have developed in relation to the feeding, grooming, health, training, provision of daycare and longer-term temporary lodging, availability of specialist beaches and play areas, designer products including clothes and hats, and the list goes on.The enormous expansion of the pet and companion animal industries has left many animals vulnerable to abuse and exploitation in their human homes. It has also contributed to the endangerment of many species, such as parrots, which are abducted, trafficked and traded through both legal and illegal means (Sollund, 2011). As the population of some species reduce in size, their scarcity itself will generate lucrative markets for what is left in the wild. Not all companion animals generate good press however. For example, dog attacks and dog bites, particularly in relation to children in the 1–4 years age group, is considered a major potential risk in relation to companion animals (Gullone and Clarke, 2010) and high profile cases in Australia and the UK in recent years have seen legislative efforts to ban certain dog breeds altogether (see Halsworth, 2011). In the media, the ‘blame’ has been put squarely on the backs of the ‘beasts’, although poor human handling has also been cited. Nonetheless, the implication is that there are innately ‘bad’ kinds of dogs that require extra special care and control. Inevitably this is accompanied by regular calls to destroy ‘dangerous’ breeds and to limit traffic of such animals worldwide. Ethical and moral dilemmas involving animals – in life and death situations – also extend to instances where individual animals of one species are sacrificed for the sake of the preservation of an entire other species, which can be either plant or animal. What is at stake here is an either/or choice, not one based upon simple human expediency as with the case of the Norwegian polar fox. In a 1996 case, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service moved to poison 6,000 gulls at Monomoy National Wildlife Refuge off Cape Cod, in order to save 35 piping plovers, an 139

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endangered species…San Clemente Island, off the coast of California, has both endemic plant species and a population of feral goats, introduced by Spanish sailors two centuries ago. To protect plants numbering in the few hundreds, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the U.S. Navy have shot tens of thousands of feral goats. (Rolston, 2010: 605–6) This represents cases where the so-called ethic of species has triumphed. The death of individual creatures has been weighed up against the potential demise of whole species.While objectionable from the point of view of killing animals, unless suitable alternatives for relocation are possible or available, there is a moral justification for such acts insofar as they allow future and more diverse life to flourish.The contemporary treatment of refugees offers a poignant human parallel to these kinds of decisions. Who suffers and who benefits is always complicated by immediate circumstance and longer-term prospects. Endemic species are not always the species that are most valued and most likely to gain support from human backers when it comes to situations of species competition. Consider the case of the galaxias fish for example.A number of types of this species of fish are strictly unique to the island state of Tasmania in Australia. Due to the destruction of habitat and the introduction of non-native species they are, however, now under serious threat.The key problem is introduced trout species. Galaxias are not only forced to compete for food (insects that fall or land on the surface of the water), but are also preyed upon by nonnative predators such as the brown and rainbow trout (Threatened Species Unit, Parks and Wildlife Service Tasmania, 1998). Trout were introduced into Tasmania in the mid-1800s, primarily for the purposes of recreational fishing.Today they are also a valued part of the aquaculture industry. Almost all of government and private attention has been on protecting the trout, regardless of the consequences of this for the galaxias. This is because the trout is deemed a valued and valuable species (for tourism, for commercial food markets), while the plight of the galaxia is ignored since they have no economic value. Laws have been designed to protect the trout (for example, catch limits, closed seasons, licences). While officially the galaxia is classified as ‘protected’, the fact is that its main predator has been encouraged to flourish regardless of ecological outcome and its impact on the future viability of the galaxia species. Human intervention in the lives of both wild and domesticated animals has major ramifications for species survival and biodiversity. The phenomenon of assisted colonisation involves the moving of 140

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species to sites where they do not currently occur or have not been known to occur in recent history.The introduction of ‘alien’ species was not uncommon during the course of European settlement outside of Europe, as the example of trout in Tasmania exemplifies (see Franklin, 2006).Today, however, this is happening in response to climate change, and usually is directed at species in the wild. ‘In the UK, two native species of butterfly were recently translocated approximately 65 km northward into areas identified by modelling as climatically suitable for occupancy by the butterflies’ (Sutherland et al, 2009). The problem is that non-native species moving into new ecosystems are already recognised as a major conservation problem (see SCBD, 2010). This is evidenced, for example, by the rapid expansion in the numbers of Indo-Pacific lionfish along the east coast of the United States and in the Caribbean to the detriment of native coral reef fish (Sutherland et al, 2009). Assisted colonists could be viewed as invasive and as constituting a potential danger to existing ecosystems and their inhabitants. Classic cases where considerable damage has resulted include the introduction of the cane toad into Australia. Its subsequent spread has had colossal impacts on native species.With no or few natural predators, it has proliferated and continues to take over more and more territories previously held by other endemic species. The status and value of animals, of particular species, and of individual animals varies greatly therefore according to circumstance and larger ecological patterns and trends. The moral and legal status of animals (as reflected in law and popular folklore) is captured to some extent through the application of a sociozoological scale that ranks animals according to how well they ‘fit in’ to society (Arluke and Sanders, 1996: 169–70). At the top of the scale are humans, followed by companion animals (such as dogs and cats), animals in service (such as guide dogs and assistance dogs) and instrumental animals (such as cows and laboratory mice). At the bottom of the scale are animals considered pests and vermin such as rats. Animals perceived to be dangerous to humans such as sharks and snakes occupy a lower rank than those that serve humans and do so in a mainly safe manner such as horses and chickens. Much of the work of animal rights activists is intended to challenge such hierarchies of value and to affirm the intrinsic value of animals, albeit in the light of disputes over where to draw the line between human and nonhuman. The struggle to come to grips with the place of animals (in both the human and natural worlds) is also increasingly reflected in the ‘value’ or ‘worth’ attached to animals by government agencies, which are likewise becoming ever more complicated and sophisticated. For 141

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instance, the ‘wildlife value formula’ used by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources assesses value in terms of the following criteria: • Recreation – the extent to which a species is actively sought by users with wildlife interests • Aesthetic – these values represent wildlife species’ beauty and unique natural history • Educational – materials and media displays about the species for educational programming • State-list designation – as categorised under endangered, threatened or species of concern • Economics – direct or indirect economic benefit related to recreational, food, medicinal use • Recruitment – reproductive and survival potential of a species as it relates to the capability for replacement of its population following decrease or loss • Population dynamics – impact of the loss of the individual animal to its local or sub-population. Extra weighting is granted depending upon whether the species is abundant, common or a species of concern, threatened or endangered. From the point of view of measuring harm, while this sort of evaluation is inherently anthropocentric it nonetheless taps into matters pertaining to animal welfare and preservation. The way in which animals are valued is complicated and depends upon circumstance and behaviours (of both animals and humans). As mentioned above, there are often distinctions made between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ invasive/native species, as illustrated by the welcome and protection afforded to (introduced) trout to the lakes of Tasmania, to the detriment of their local cousins. How they are defined, and what is valued, when it comes to animals is highly variable and subject to ongoing contestation at the level of philosophy as well as at the level of legislative practice (see Beirne, 2009; Sankoff and White, 2009). This has important consequences for the way in which harm against different species of animal is socially constructed. Fundamentally, it would seem that the ‘value’ of a species is shaped by its utility in regards to human needs and services, and its relative abundance as a species. For example, certain types of fish, and elephants, may be assessed in terms of their value as a resource.The central issues are those of scarcity and appropriate regulation of trade. The problem is construed in terms of illegal (or unreported or unregulated) use of the species as resource (for example, as a food, as an ornament). In 142

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other cases, the status of the species is defined in terms of biodiversity. For example, for polar bears the key issue is that of extinction or diminishment of habitation, associated with climate change (for example, the melting of Arctic ice in ways that affect the environment of the polar bear). Different animal species are also valued in terms of general service to humanity. This applies especially to companion animals such as dogs and cats, but also, to some extent to domesticated animals used for food such as chickens and cows. Here the key issue is not one of preservation or conservation but prevention of abuse. It is animal suffering and animal welfare that is of concern. The response of the law and criminal justice system, therefore, is to regulate human–animal interaction in ways that are welfare enabling for the animal, but that do not necessarily challenge the logic of using animals in particular kinds of human service. The ‘value’ of animals is thus largely constructed according to human interests, whether this is in regard to commercial benefit, psychological wellbeing or safety and security. Indeed, the legitimacy of harm to animals is subject to specific contexts and circumstances. Harm is justified according to instrumentalism (for example, food, trade, medicine, leisure), for the purposes of protection (for example, animal attacks on humans), on the basis of national security (for example, navy uses of sonar that have unintended harmful consequences for marine animals), and for ecological and biodiversity management purposes (for example, invasive species, bio-security).The status of a particular animal may therefore also be subject to change. A dog that bites its master is no longer a trusted companion but a threat; a mouse that escapes the lab is now a pest to be eradicated not a tool in research; a racing horse that goes lame in the leg may be destined for the glue factory if not the stud farm.The situational use-value of animals therefore determines its status – and frequently its individual fate.

Conclusion: measuring the value of animals From the point of view of species justice, animals should be accorded respect and acknowledgement as creatures embodying their own intrinsic worth.This means carefully appraising the human–nonhuman animal relationship and adjusting social practices to take into account the welfare and rights of animals. Disagreement exists over how far to go with this, and the types of interventions that are justifiable when it comes to the lives of animals.

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Harm is not only defined variously in law (depending upon the status, use and behaviour of the animal in question), but there are contentious issues surrounding whether harm to an individual animal is warranted under certain conditions. For the most part, animal welfare and protection has been construed from a largely instrumental perspective, one that basically sees animals as property. The commodification of animals means that harm is basically constructed in relation to human needs, wants and desires, rather than from an animal perspective. This translates into policies that address issues such as illegality in the trading and harvesting of animals for human use. It is also manifest in legislation designed to prevent animal abuse and cruelty insofar as this does not interfere with certain productive activities (for humans) such as research and farming. At a pragmatic and concrete level, numerous dilemmas are posed by the unproblematic acceptance of the notion of animal rights. If this is accompanied by the prescription to ‘do no harm’, then we have no moral compass to navigate muddied ethical waters involving human versus animal interests, animal versus animal interests, and animal versus plant interests. As discussed previously in this chapter, there are many instances in which certain animals have to be killed in order that the needs and interests of other species (including humans) are maintained or extended. This is a separate matter from welfare per se, where the main consideration is to reduce and eliminate animal suffering. Who decides what, and on what basis, remain crucial considerations.

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Toward eco-justice for all Introduction A hallmark of a social harm approach is that it locates harm fundamentally within social structures.To put it succinctly, harm is the product of harmful societies (Pemberton, forthcoming). Not only is much harm embedded in normal everyday practices, rarely questioned at a conscious level, but it is preventable – alternative courses of action are possible. While the object of analysis is different, the study of nonhuman interests and needs (in contradistinction to the usual social harm approach) nonetheless shares these key propositions. As with the social harm approach, action to prevent and remedy harm ultimately must be directed at dominant power arrangements and toward fundamental social change. Humans are responsible for much of the destruction of ecological systems and animal cruelty in the world today, not to mention the terrible things we do to each other. It is what humans do en masse that reshapes landscapes, pollutes air, water and soil, leads to species decline among plants and animals, and changes the contours of the atmosphere and the level of the seas.The moral responsibility for this rests with we humans (White, 2007). The idea of blaming the human species, however, can be subjected to counter-factual analysis that questions whether in fact all humans are equally to blame (White, 2011).That is, if all humans are implicated in the harm, then all humans must by their own ‘human’ nature be destructive.Yet we know from accounts of indigenous relationships with nature that, to take one example, some humans have lived countless years in harmonious relationship with their local ecosystems (see Robyn, 2002). We also know that some contemporary communities in places such as India are actively reconfiguring their relationship with nature in ways that are ecologically sustainable and that promote biodiversity (see Shiva, 2008). It is only at a very high level of abstraction, then, that we can place blame on humans. The more grounded the analysis becomes – the more reflective it is of specific groups and communities – the more tenuous the sweep of the generalisation.

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Just as the responsibility for bad or wrong behaviour is not equally shared, so too the effects are experienced differently, including among human communities.This is reflected, for example, in the ways in which various environmental issues present in different parts of the world. In the First World, much energy is directed toward mitigating the effects of toxic pollutants (for example, chlorofluorocarbons, petroleum spills, PCBs, pesticides, and nuclear and hazardous wastes), preserving endangered species, saving wilderness, and promoting recycling. In the Third World a primary emphasis is on obtaining food, clean water, and adequate clothing for basic subsistence, developing appropriate technologies for cooking, heating, and farming, countering the effects of pesticide poisoning on human health, and preserving the lands of indigenous peoples. (Merchant, 2005: 252) In among these differences are fundamental common interests – universal human interests – through which these specific differences find purchase. The survival of the human species is contingent upon how we, collectively, address climate change and ecological degradation. There are thus common human interests that need to take priority over any other kinds of interests if we as a species are to survive. Within this framework of universal human interests, the relationship between the human and nonhuman ought to be informed by the notion of the enlightened self-interest of humans.This is captured in the one short statement: respect for nature is integral to the wellbeing of humans. This sentiment is, in one sense, a human-centred or anthropocentric viewpoint.What makes it different from the dominant anthropocentric perspective (which is about human domination and purely instrumental conceptions of nature) is sensitivity to the dialectical nature of change, including those constant changes in the relationship between humans and nature over time. Nonetheless, when dealing with environmental harms as described and examined in this book, there are tensions both within and between the three approaches to justice. These are due, in part, to differences in how ‘nature’ and ‘humans’ are constructed in the relevant discourses, and what gets privileged in subsequent analyses. The place of humans objectively, subjectively and theoretically in discussions of environmental harm lends itself to considerable variation in terms of preferred courses of action and the assessment of human worth itself.

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In their extreme versions, the weighing of certain elements within the particular approaches skew the moral compass in certain directions: for example, toward an environmental justice that is socially exclusive to specific oppressed human communities and downplays or ignores ecological and species interests; an ecological justice that prioritises places over people and sacrifices specific community interests for the sake of conservation ideals; and a species justice that hold the rights of animals over those of human need and the requirements of specific environments. Competing conceptions of justice are associated with conflicts and debates that are beginning to feature ever more greatly in our everyday affairs. This chapter attempts to grapple with these tensions by illuminating key dilemmas and identifying possible pathways for their resolution.

Contentious concepts: eco-justice This section reviews eco-philosophies such as anthropocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism and their relationship to justice-based approaches such as environmental justice, ecological justice and species justice. The section then raises a series of questions and dilemmas that illustrate once again the conundrums associated with the need to weigh up diverse interests and needs. Different conceptions of environmental harm can be evaluated on the basis of different perspectives on the nature–human nexus. Diverse perspectives conceive of the relationship between humans and the environment in different ways, which have major implications when it comes to defining and responding to instances of environmental harm. Key considerations include how each perspective: • conceives of social and ecological problems • depicts the role of humans in the production of the problems • views prevention, regulation and law enforcement in relation to these problems. Consider, for example, how different eco-philosophies (or philosophies of the relationship between nature and humans) might approach the practice of clearfelling of old-growth forest (Halsey and White, 1998). An anthropocentric perspective views old-growth forests instrumentally, as a means to satisfy the demands of human beings. Economically, the philosophy views forests as exploitable for their commercial potential and that the production methods used are those which incur the least cost to producers – such as clearfelling. The aim of legislation 147

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is to facilitate the extraction and processing of particular resources (for example, laws relating to the conditions whereby companies are guaranteed long-term access to particular geographical sites for the purposes of commercial activity such as mining, forestry or farming). Legislation is directed at conserving particular natural resources through prohibiting over-use or over-extraction of specific resources (for example, imposition of quotas on logging or fishing), or dealing with conflicts between certain industries (for example, farming and mining), or between certain industries and specific population groups (for example, mining companies and indigenous people). From a biocentric perspective old-growth forests (and the organisms which dwell within them) are seen as having intrinsic worth, whereby such forests have significance independent of any value placed on them by human beings. Biocentrists consider old-growth forests to be significant because they are suitably diverse in structure and age as to provide the only habitat for certain forest dependent species. In terms of conservation, biocentrism demands that there be no human impact on old-growth forests since such ecosystems are considered too fragile to tamper with. Legislation is ideally framed in terms of first and foremost preserving the natural environment, particularly those sites identified as being ‘wilderness’ in order to protect bio-diversity and species integrity. An ecocentric perspective views old-growth forests as crucial to the long-term survival of humans and nonhumans. Ecocentrism attempts to strike a balance between the need to utilise resources for human survival, and the need to develop rules which facilitate the benign use of the ecosphere. From this perspective, ensuring the preservation of biocentric values (such as providing for the widest possible spectrum of species within a forested area), becomes integral to maintaining long-term human needs (such as the continued existence of clean air, unpolluted rivers and fertile soils). Ecocentrism advocates methods of production (such as selective logging techniques) which privilege the long-term wellbeing of ecosystem well-being over short-term economic demands. Legislation is ideally framed by the limits of ecology (of which humans are an integral part), instead of instrumental goals relating to economic growth and wealth accumulation. An eco-justice perspective draws upon some of the ideas ingrained in philosophical analysis of the nature-human relationship. It asks the question – ‘justice for whom?’ and then attempts to distill the moral principles that can guide us in dealing with conflicting interests and contradictory situations. Environmental justice, as one dimension or strand of eco-justice, demands that specific population groups 148

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and individuals be respected and that their rights be protected in relation to environmental access and goods. It is ‘anthropocentric’ in that it is human focused. However, unlike dominant anthropocentric ideologies which basically justify present socio-economic arrangements, environmental justice revolves around matters of human health and wellbeing, and concepts of social justice. An animal welfare stance is also anthropocentric in that it allows for instrumental use of animals for humans albeit under strict conditions. The ecological justice approach mirrors the concerns of biocentricism to the extent that the main concern is with eco-system health and matters of biodiversity. Humans are nonetheless central to the tasks of conservation and preservation in that wilderness areas and ocean ecosystems not only ‘deserve’ to be protected through concerted human intervention, but in doing so some human population groups and individuals may have to have their particular interests subordinated to that of the greater good of the eco-system in question. Species justice based upon an animal rights orientation likewise privileges the interests of animals insofar as each species is seen to have substantial worth or status simply by virtue of it being a living creature. There is less of a place here for anthropocentrism, although the advocates and protectors are, of course, humans. From the point of interests, welfare needs and rights, animals are seen to be equally worthy of respect and freedom from suffering. An ecocentric philosophy is critical of those perspectives that see all species as equal while simultaneously advocating policies and practices that diminish the wellbeing of humans, or that give priority to one aspect of the nonhuman (that is, environments, animals) over others (including humans). In some respects the justice considerations that flow from an ecocentric perspective are close to those of ‘total liberation’ advocates, who wish to merge ‘animal, earth, and human liberation in a total liberation struggle against global capitalism and domination of all kinds’ (Best, quoted in Pellow, 2013: 337; see also Best and Nocella II, 2006). A key aspect of this approach is not to reduce matters to single-issue politics, but to highlight the importance of pursuing social, ecological and species justice in tandem. This type of thinking is also reflected in the moves toward ‘critical environmental justice studies’ (Pellow and Brulle, 2005), and is of central importance to the present work. Obvious conflicts and tensions follow from specific conceptions of justice. For example, within the animal rights framework, it is animals that matter, but how, specifically? A radical animal rights perspective privileges the intrinsic rights of animals to live regardless of conditions 149

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of the biosphere and human interests. However, an animal welfare perspective is one that views nonhuman animals as part of a web of relationships involving humans and the biosphere. There is a link to species justice, since each animal has ‘value’ – but this, in turn, is contingent upon specific times, places and activities. Nonhuman animals are part of the symbolic, instrumental and value universes of human beings. Not surprisingly, tensions exist between both animal rights and environmental justice, and animal rights and ecological justice, approaches. Where do we draw the line when it comes to which animals should receive rights, and if there is a conflict between animal rights and the rights of humans? Trees and rocks and streams are not sentient beings capable of suffering, so where do they fit into the animal rights or environmental justice moral universe? Very often, of course, conceptualisation and direct experience of environmental harm encapsulates the concerns of all three strands – protection of biodiversity within our forests is compatible with sustaining localised environments, protecting endangered species and ensuring human happiness. Conversely, the clearfelling of old-growth forests can be highly problematic from the point of view of human enjoyment, nurturing of nonhuman animals, and conservation of complex ecosystems. There are many concrete links between the health of natural environments, diverse human activity and the exploitation of animals. This is acknowledged in recent work examining the relationship between the environmental justice movement (dealing primary with issues of social justice and discrimination) and the wider environmental movement (dealing primarily with ecological justice and conservation/ preservation issues). Based upon the premise that we need to go beyond either/or political choices, it is asserted that:‘What is ultimately at issue is not whether one movement has more worthwhile goals or moral authority over the other, but, rather, how the goals of both movements might be achieved together effectively’ (Pezzullo and Sandler, 2007: 2, emphasis in original). Similar arguments are being put forward in regards to the relationship between the animal rights movement (dealing primarily with issues of species justice and the health and wellbeing of animals) and the EJ movement, namely, that common ground needs to be recognised and built upon both in terms of mission objectives and tactical and strategic alliances (Pellow, 2013). Some of this common ground is already apparent with respect to notions of responsibility for harm on the part of humans, and human responsibility for care of the nonhuman. In the former, concepts such 150

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as ‘superior responsibility’ and ‘strict liability’ are meant to convey the fact that regardless of motivation, rationale or excuse, someone should always be held responsible for environmental harm and/or harm to animals – the issue is one of ‘consequence of ’ rather than ‘caused by’ (see Williams, 1996: 26). In the latter, attention turns to general protections that ought to be afforded to that which cannot protect itself. This is projected via the language of ‘rights’ (which in itself is not unproblematic – see for example,Anderson, 2004; Sollund, 2012a). For instance, an Earth Jurisprudence is rapidly gaining traction among many of those with an interest in ecological sustainability and environmental justice (Cullinan, 2003). A growing part of this is the push for the acceptance of ‘ecocide’ as a bona fide crime (Higgins, 2012). These concerns are also finding their way into institutionalised statements and protections. For example, in 2008 the people of Ecuador voted by a 63 per cent majority for a new Constitution, the first in the world to comprehensively recognise ecosystem rights and nature rights (Walters, 2011). Article 71 provides: Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution. Every person, people, community or nationality, will be able to demand the recognition of rights for nature before the public organisms. Progressive developments such as these are premised on the idea of Earth stewardship. Paradigms of trusteeship, of stewardship, are very different to those based upon private property conceptions of ownership (see Chapter Three). As Walters (2011: 266) points out,‘Ownership implies that you can use land but don’t have responsibility to others to care for it.’ The Earth is seen to be ‘held in trust’, and it is humans who have the responsibility to provide the requisite stewardship. Meanwhile, in the United States the Animal Legal Defense Fund argues that animals are sentient beings and entitled to basic legal rights (Animal Legal Defense Fund, 2007). In petitioning the US Congress, the ALDF states that Congress should pass legislation in support of the following basic rights for animals: • the right of animals to be free from exploitation, cruelty, neglect and abuse 151

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• the right of laboratory animals not to be used in cruel or unnecessary experiments • the right of farm animals to an environment that satisfies their basic physical and psychological needs • the right of companion animals to a healthy diet, protective shelter, and adequate medical care • the right of wildlife to a natural habitat, ecologically sufficient to a normal existence and self-sustaining species population • the right of animals to have their interests represented in court and safeguarded by the law of the land. Translated into a practical model of advocacy, this construction of animal rights implies human guardianship (Pollard, 2008). As with notions underpinning Earth Law, there is the presumption that human intervention – on the side of animals and as embedded in law – is necessary in order to protect them against exploitation and abuse. Guardianship and stewardship are thus two sides of the same moral coin. The overarching approaches, of course, do have major consequences with regard to where individual scholars and researchers put their time and energy.The study of environmental harm, including issues such as toxic discrimination involving humans, destruction of forests and animal cruelty, is greatly influenced by the perspective one applies to the natural world generally, and influences which issues ought to receive specific priority. This does not preclude collaboration and interaction with fellow travellers across the movement and theoretical divides (Beirne, 2007), but the gulfs between those writing about environmental, ecological and species justice can nonetheless be profound and troubling (Beirne, 2011; Pellow, 2013). Part of the problem is due to that fact that some analysis is pitched at too high a level of abstraction, which only reinforces rigid definitions and absolutist positions (for example, humans come first; the earth is most important; any harm to animals is bad).This can preclude closely considered analysis of specific situations. For example, an absolutist approach may contend that humans should not, in any way, interfere with animals. This approach may be appropriate when dealing with a situation involving dingos and kangaroos in the wilds of the Northern Territory in Australia, but inappropriate when dealing with wandering polar bears in Churchill, Manitoba. The more specific and situational the problem, the more likely a reasonable solution and/or compromise can be worked out. The working through of issues is only ‘successful’ to the degree that participants are willing to talk with each other, appreciate alternative 152

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or opposing viewpoints, and listen to what is actually being said. This endeavour is frustrated by drawing hard lines in advance, thus prejudicing potential outcomes. Ideological rigidity (or moral steadfastness, depending on one’s outlook) can create barriers within and across movements. Moreover, the emotive nature of the protection of human rights, eco-systems and animals can serve to further entrench positions – love of one’s neighbour, a tree, a dog can be a powerful motivator. It can also sway opinion on the basis of affective factors rather than science or rationality. Impasses remain and important questions arise. Consider for example the following contemporary dilemmas:

What about plants? Issues of biodiversity and protection from destruction by humans and animals also extend to species other than animals. While great attention is granted to the 5,000 species of animals covered in the CITES appendixes, and to particular animals on these lists, much less attention is paid to the 28,000 species of plants identified as being at threat. Periodic conflicts occur in Australia, for example, when action is taken to cull mobs of kangaroos in order that local eco-systems (and the plant life within them) are not destroyed by them. Criticisms range from ‘not interfering with nature’ through to removing rather than killing the animals. Such intervention, however, always occurs in the context of entrenched human impacts on both plants and animals.

What about traditions and post-colonial relationships? Issues of indigenous use of plants and animals, and land use practices, do not simply revolve around matters of corporate and state exploitation, repression and marginalisation. Debates have taken place over the ‘rights’ of indigenous people to hunt game or catch fish in relation to notions of ecological limits and the need for the regulation of such activities. Sometimes this reflects very different conceptions of ‘sustainability’: The concept of sustainability may be viewed slightly differently by non-Aboriginal people than by Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders.To many non-Aboriginal people, the concept broadly implies the maintenance of maximum economic productivity of lands and seas. For Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders, it often means the continuance of use of wildlife resources for subsistence. 153

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This small but important difference can lead to confusion over the ‘sustainability’ or otherwise of wildlife use.There is also an important distinction to be drawn between concerns over declines in the local abundance of a species, which may reduce its short-term availability as a resource for harvest, and declines in abundance which are sufficiently widespread and diverse to be a cause of concern for species’ survival. Local declines in abundance associated with harvesting will not threaten a species with extinction unless the rate of offtake is unsustainable in the longer term. (Caughley et al, 1996: 8, emphasis in original) Be this as it may, there are tensions stemming from different interpretations as to what is acceptable to take from the wild, as measured in specific cultural or ecological terms. Traditional food sources are important to indigenous peoples for a wide range of reasons, but access to these may be hindered due to non-indigenous prejudice (‘why should they have more rights than I do?’) and concerns about ecological wellbeing (‘wildlife harvests should be restricted in numbers and types’).

What about food and religious prescriptions? Eating animals is already a contentious and heavily politicised subject as reflected in animal rights activists’ prescriptions that veganism is the only ethical method of subsistence. For indigenous people and others this creates a conundrum, given millennia of established eating habits and practices. To further complicate things, there are issues relating to hallal and kashrut slaughter methods that immediately raise alarm bells in relation to animal welfare. According to some religious codes, there are specific protocols of the slaughtering of animals for food that must be followed by adherents. Such methods may be associated with cruelty in several ways. The live sheep trade from Australia to Indonesia or the Middle East is premised upon the idea that the sheep must be slaughtered in certain ways and under certain local conditions. The cruelty lies in both the conditions of transport, and the ways in which sheep are butchered. Yet, these are foundational to religious requirements associated with the killing and bleeding of animals.

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What if crime prevention causes problems? There are contradictions arising from the introduction of situational crime prevention measures in relation to animal protection. For example, wildlife tourism can provide an alternative to and revenue for anti-poaching strategies (Wellsmith, 2010). However, infrastructure such as roads can lead to habitat destruction and loss of biodiversity. The construction of wildlife parks can distort local species distributions, involve relocating animals across vast distances, and present a narrow view of which animals ought to be protected and how. Moreover, the establishment of wildlife tourist parks may exclude traditional users of local areas, and result in the criminalisation of what were traditional means of subsistence (Duffy, 2010, see also Chapter Three). An eco-justice perspective posits these kinds of questions as important and complex. There is no simple answer to them.Whose interests and whose rights ought to be protected, and under what conditions? – are implicated in these debates. Action based upon perceived interests (including the interests of the nonhuman) generally reflects particular social circumstances. In concrete terms, for example, much of the EJ movement begins with an anthropocentric view insofar as the main concern is with the quality of environments for humans. The poor living conditions experienced by those living in poverty and minorities are themselves a key source of contention, not necessarily ‘the environment’ as such. The political agenda is set by the unequal environmental quality that is evident in specific locales and by local people’s responses to this. Struggle is directly related to survival and immediate self-interest. By contrast, those who are economically better off have the choice to be concerned with issues of general ecological equity, since their immediate living circumstances are generally not disagreeable or threatening to their health.The economically well-off are in a position to use environmental justice issues (that is, social inequality relating to who lives next to polluting factories) strategically in order to promote ecocentric over anthropocentric concerns (that is, acknowledging the wellbeing of environments as well as human interests, demands implementation of anti-pollution measures across the board). Not surprisingly, the better off are also more likely to speak about ecological, rather than environmental, justice.

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Animal rights activism has similarly been labelled as activism of the privileged since, like the mainstream environmental activist movements, its memberships has favoured the economically and socially better off (Pellow, 2013; Edwards, 1998). Arguably, the movement of people into cities and the consequent separation of the rural from the urban have heightened differences in how different people perceive and interact with animals.What historically was seen as ‘natural’ on the small family farm in regards to the keeping, butchering and eating of chickens, cows and pigs, and dealing with predators and pests (from the point of view of domesticated animals) such as foxes and wallabies, is considered ‘unnatural’, harsh and cruel by those who do not live side-by-side on a daily basis with animals. Is the rise of animal rights ethics at least in part a city phenomenon?

Nature, species and culture The tensions between the three justice-based approaches dealt with in this book reflect a central debate within environmental philosophy ‘between positions extending ethical concern only to (some) animals and positions emphasising ethical concern for ecological systems and all living things’ (Plumwood, 2004: 51). Rather than basing action and prescription on absolute moral positions or pronouncements, this position asserts that we must recognise the full diversity of people’s lives in diverse cultures where the meaning of eating and using animals is variable.As Benton (1993) observes, humans are socially interdependent with animals and also ecologically interdependent. There is a material co-dependency of humans, animals and environments which is grounded in time, place and cultural space. Fundamentally, human cultural practices and the dynamics of natural environments are historically moulded in and by, and are part of, local ecologies. Rather than viewing humans as somehow ‘outside nature’, this particular perspective affirms an ecological universe of mutual use between humans and animals which necessarily varies in different ecological contexts and in which different cultures and individuals will have differing nutritional situations and needs (Plumwood, 2004). In other words, there are contexts within which hunting (and fishing) should not be condemned since it is part and parcel of how humans ‘live in nature’ and are constituent parts of natural ecosystems. This is particularly salient in regards to indigenous people and their patterns of hunting and gathering food. Historically and for many people still today, the ways in which indigenous people live in nature is informed by a particular value system and code of ethics.These are based 156

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on tenets of reciprocity and cyclical thinking, that define responsibilities and ways of relating between humans and the world around them (for example, by ensuring methods of harvesting resources that will not deplete supplies needed for survival). The notion that ‘you take only what you need and leave the rest’ is central to this. So, too, is the concept of ‘reciprocity’ that defines the relationship and responsibility between people and the environment (all parts – plants, animals, fish, rocks):‘This precarious balance still exists, and the relationship between plants, animals, the elements, the air, water, wind and earth are all equally and evenly placed within the whole’ (Robyn, 2002: 202). Integration of the ecological and the cultural, of nature and society, finds expression in all facets of life. As every good farmer knows, if we take from the soil we must replenish and nourish it or it will become barren. In indigenous tribal cultures this principle is recognised and honoured by means of many rituals, particularly in relation to hunting and harvesting. Hunters all over the world have small rituals to thank the dead or dying animal for its sacrifice of life so that the hunter’s family might live, and to acknowledge that one day it will be the hunter’s turn to surrender the nutrients and energy in his or her body back to the Earth system. Practices such as these not only keep these principles present in the minds of people, they are also expressions of the respect and humility necessary to function as an integral member of the Earth Community. (Cullinan, 2003: 132–3) The emphasis here is the relationship of humans to nature by being part of nature. Difference and unity are both aspects of this complex relationship.What is important is that it is the size and scale of human settlement that ensures that ecosystems have continuous sustainability. For indigenous people, social systems are usually decentralised, communal and self-reliant:‘These societies live closely with and depend on the life contained in that particular ecosystem. This way of living enabled indigenous communities to live for thousands of years in continuous sustainability’ (Robyn, 2002: 199). Small is indeed better from an ecological and social point of view. We also, however, have to be aware of how traditional indigenous ways are subject to continuous change. For example, if we consider the word ‘traditional’ in relation to fishing, this can in fact refer to quite different aspects of traditional fishing, such as: 157

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• who specifically [indigenous Australian, Indonesian, Papua New Guinea, Torres Strait Islander] • how specifically [methods, techniques and technologies] • where specifically [traditional fisheries for particular coastal groups]. Conflicts can arise when modern technologies are utilised for what used to be simply subsistence fishing.The use of motor boats, nets and fishing rods, and sonar equipment allows for overexploitation to occur (Caughley et al, 1996). Moreover, overexploitation may be generated in the new methods of production themselves. For example, on the one hand, the mobility, range, and efficiency of ‘traditional’ fishing are all enhanced through modern methods and technologies. On the other hand, these technologies generate the need for cash to supplement subsistence for example, buying the boat and petrol for the boat. The net effect is pressure to fish beyond immediate consumption needs. In such ways, the ‘traditional’ is both affirmed and challenged at the same time. The specific relationship that humans have with nature requires ongoing scrutiny. It also requires a sense of complex relationships, and that things do indeed change over time. Conventional animal r ights proponents and conventional conservationists have tended to place emphasis on only one part of the relationship between the human and the nonhuman. This is well captured in the following passage (Plumwood, 2004: 56): Although each project has a kind of egalitarianism between the human and nonhuman in mind, their partial analyses place them on a collision course.The ecology movement has been situating humans as animals, embodies inside ecological systems of mutual use, of food and energy exchange, just as the animal defence movement has been trying to expand an extension to animals of the (dualistic) human privilege of being conceived as outside these systems. Many vegans seem to believe that ecology can be ignored and that the food web is an invention of hamburger companies, while the ecological side often retains the human-centred resource view of animals and scientistic resistance to seeing animals as individuals with life stories of attachment, struggle and tragedy not unlike our own, refusing to apply ethical thinking to the nonhuman sphere.

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Animals eat animals; humans eat animals.The ethical issue is under what conditions and according to what justifications ought this to occur. The answer, according to Plumwood (2004) is to resituate humans in ecological terms, while simultaneously situating nonhumans in ethical terms. This must be done according to the specific context of both nature and culture, however. Similar conclusions are apparent in other discussions of these issues as well. Ecological inclusion, for example, refers to the idea of establishing the foundations for a new interrelationship between humans and animals that is more respectful and caring on the part of humans from within the perspective of the ecological totality. Conflicts of interest – between environments, humans and animals – ought to be evaluated not only from the point of view of moral criteria (such as animal rights or animal welfare) but ecological criteria and by considering the total environment. The perspective is inherently contextual. The practical application of the concept of ecological inclusion will always be dependent upon place, time, and context and, therefore, solutions will vary. For example, killing domesticated animals that have escaped and established themselves in ecologically destructive nonendemic wild populations should only occur if it can be justified scientifically, culturally, ethnically, and morally. That justification is dependent on the protection of, for example, an endangered species in an area where that species has little chance of survival, and only upon ensuring that the nonhuman animals killed would not suffer in any way. Taking the life of any individual is in reality a denial of their intrinsic value, and denying such value in any individual should not be taken lightly. (Bennison, 2010: 194–5) Underpinning this concept is the idea that the entire planetary ecology must form part of the understanding we have of the relationship between humans and nature; that we are all a community of interdependent parts. Ecological inclusion implies respect for the entire ecological community that includes all biotic and abiotic elements. From soil to salamander, water to walrus, plant to platypus, the health and wellbeing of the individual resides in the health and wellbeing of the whole, and vice versa. All life forms have an intrinsic value and inherent worth, and even the non-living (that is, rocks, waters) contribute to the greater whole.Thus,‘all individuals should have the right to have their inherent worth or intrinsic value up-held, while having the ability to pursue 159

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their individual ecological and evolutionary paths, as long as that does not impinge on the biological and ecological integrity of the greater whole (Bennison, 2010: 197). Part of the critique put forward by animal rights activists is that animals are only treated as commodities and/or in relation to human use. Opposed to this, it is argued that animals should be respected on the basis of intrinsic value. For some writers, this means leaving them alone (Francione, 2008). For others, intervention is necessary under certain circumstances (Rolston, 2010; Anderson, 2004; see also Chapter Four).The discussions above, however, pose the question as to whether or not it is possible and legitimate to ‘value’ animals on both an instrumental and intrinsic basis.What matters most is the ecological and cultural context within and through which animal welfare and human needs are constituted.

Socio-economic context of environmental harm Environmental harms that we encounter in ordinary life are not inevitable, but are largely determined by the ways in which contemporary societies are organised (see Pemberton, forthcoming). For example, analysis of Canadian environmental law and policies reveals a patchwork of legislative and regulatory measures that fundamentally fail to protect the environment (Boyd, 2003). At its broadest level, the way in which regulation works or does not work is fundamentally shaped by systemic imperatives and philosophical vision. For instance, Boyd (2003) contrasts a model of regulation designed to mitigate the environmental impacts of an energy and resource intensive industrial economy, with that based upon ecological principles oriented to reducing the consumption of energy and natural resources. The laws and regulations in the first scenario, however complex, cannot succeed in achieving sustainability because the system as a whole is inherently geared to growth in energy and resource consumption. In the latter case, the emphasis is on restructuring the economy to incorporate ecological limits, and thereby reduce environmental harm over time. A social harm approach alerts us to the crucial importance of societal context in understanding the definitions and dynamics of harm. The key question addressed by this book is how to conceptualise the causes and nature of environmental harm arising from human actions. In responding to this question, it quickly becomes clear that political economy is at the heart of the exploitation of humans, nonhuman animals and environments – that capitalism, in particular, demands profitable use of such as a means to assign value. The perspective of 160

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political economy is grounded in recognition of different social interests, different forms and types of social power, and clear distinctions between exploiter and exploited, and oppressor and oppressed. Harm varies according to how capitalism is translated into institutional policy and practice in particular social formations (for example, collectivist welfare states of Scandinavia compared with individualist states like the US). It also varies according to local and regional norms, values and cultures relating to the environment, social inequality and species rights. The overarching modus operandi and raison d’être of global capitalism have dire consequences across the planet, but the specific impact will manifest differently depending upon particular social, economic and political context. Environmental harm takes place within the overarching context of a distinct global political economy. In today’s world, the capitalist mode of production presents as the foundation of global economic development, a phenomenon that inexorably bears within it the imperative to expand, and in so doing exploit in every way imaginable the natural and human resources of the planet. The moments of our mutual destruction lie within the social and technical relations of advanced capitalism.This is especially so in regards to the causes of and responses to global warming and climate change. Sectional class interests are overriding planetary wellbeing and the future of all living things. What people do in and with their lives and their environments is dominated by the production of commodities, advances in information technology and bio-technologies, and the exploitation of labour in the mass production of goods and services that, in turn, demand a high turnover rate. For example, internationally, food production is dominated by a small number of corporations which control all parts of the food chain (Croall, 2013). Four giant transnationals (ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfus) account for most of the global grain trade. A similarly small number of corporations (such as Monsanto, Dupont and Syngenta) control the bulk of the seed and agro-chemical industry. At international and domestic levels, the animal food arena is likewise dominated by a few huge companies which control the pork, chicken, beef and lamb industries (such as Baiada Poultry and Ingham Enterprises in Australia, which dominate the poultry industry). These producers work hand-in-hand with commercial retailers – the supermarkets – which themselves are heavily concentrated into a shrinking number of large domineering companies (such as Tesco and Sainsbury’s in the UK, and Coles and Woolworths in Australia). The bottom line for all of these corporations is profit. In the pursuit of profit, animals are mistreated, frequently with the explicit support 161

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of specific legislation, industry standards and guidelines that allow exceptional (that is, cruel) treatment to occur in relation to food animals (such as teeth clipping and castration without pain relief of pigs). Codes of practice are, in effect, serving to entrench the cruelty associated with industrialised farming practices by normalising such cruel practices (see Sharman, 2009; Dale, 2009). Humans, too, are caught up in the profitseeking efforts of companies to reduce costs at the expense of the health and welfare involved in production processes. It has been observed, for example, that there is widespread abuse of workers’ statutory rights and entitlements in the Australian poultry industry: Rather than reduce their overall profit in order to lower poultry prices, poultry producers have instead shifted the risk to workers by employing more of the workforce indirectly and relying on contractor networks inside processing facilities to cope with increasing labour demands. A great deal of employment inside poultry facilities is now insecure, indirect and unsafe. (Whyte, 2012) Pressures for cost-cutting measures leading to further exploitation of both human and nonhuman is ingrained in systems of production that demand profitable outcomes for their corporate shareholders. Production systems are, in turn, linked to distribution networks and consumption practices. Extensive and intensive forms of consumption are essential to the realisation of surplus value – that is, profit depends upon a critical mass of buyers purchasing the mass produced commodities. The link between production and consumption occurs through specific distribution processes (for example, transportation of goods and services, retail outlets, storage, roads, railways, bridges, and ships) and exchange mechanisms (for example, finance capital, credit availability) that sustain and contribute to extensive use of natural and human resources. Economic efficiency is measured in how quickly and cheaply commodities can be produced, channelled to markets, and consumed. It is a process that is highly destructive of environments due to heightened levels of pollution and waste, and the designed obsolescence of food (as well as goods and services). Nothing is meant to last for too long in an era of rapid commodity turn-over, and the ostensible value-adding offered by ‘new and improved’ processed foods feeds this consumption treadmill. In essence, the competition and the waste associated with the capitalist mode of production have a huge impact on the wider environment, 162

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humans and nonhuman animals (for example, in the form of pollution and toxicity levels in air, water and land).The processes and technologies that enhance production can pose major threats to bio-diversity and shrink numbers of plant and animal species. This occurs through the legal and illegal trade in species, as well as large-scale industrial production and extensive use of genetically modified organism (GMO) technologies (White, 2011). Meanwhile, one impact of unsustainable environmental practices is that it puts even more pressure on companies to seek out new resources (natural and human) to exploit as existing reserves dwindle due to over-exploitation and contamination from already produced waste (Klare, 2012). Production and consumption within the capitalist mode of production are subversive of basic needs, and disrespectful of the subject status of humans, of nonhuman animals and of specific environments. The ‘value’ of animals, specific eco-systems and distinct groups of people is measured instrumentally and anthropocentrically, from the point of view of corporate profit rather than inherent rights. As part of this, humans are alienated from nature, from themselves, and from taking responsibility through the routinised and largely unconscious everyday regimes of work and shopping. Individualised guilt and blame that exist generally do so within the wider field of structured patterns of consumption that intertwine at the existential level to promote a deep desire to consume in particular ways (White, 2002, 2013). Not surprisingly, then, social movements based upon environmental justice, ecological justice and species justice spend a lot of time exposing the falsehoods and injustices of contemporary global systems that perpetuate precisely the harm that many take for granted as simply ‘normal’. Developing counter-hegemonic strategies and propaganda is essential to challenging the ruling ideas of the present era. Environmental harm is symptomatic of basic divisions in society that at their core revolve around the private ownership and control of the means of production.Within the context of political economy and the different forms and types of social power, the justice-based approaches to harm at the very least provide insight into how and why things are as they are, if not how best to resolve key moral and ethical issues. Environmental harm, from the point of view of political economy, is related to exploitation of environments, animals and humans by those who control the means of production. Profitability very often means adopting the most unsustainable practices for short-term gain, with negative consequences for all. Challenging the logic of existing systems of production and consumption – of capitalism – is a central task of the radical social movements (Pellow, 2013). In the social harm approach, it 163

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is the structural features of a society from which flow particular harms. Dealing with harm therefore means changing the society.

Eco-justice in practice Addressing environmental harm means that we have to acknowledge and address key aspects of global political economy that dominate our everyday ‘commonsense’ and that structure how we live our lives at a practical level. In doing so there is a need for a moral compass to guide us along the way.This takes us back once again to considerations of ‘justice’. Two initial considerations inform the discussion to follow. First, there is the importance of establishing a moral basis for action.The bulk of this book has discussed the various theoretical foundations and dimensions of eco-justice. In the context of the doing of justice we still need to pinpoint those principles of justice that will most likely lead to desired outcomes – in this case, eco-justice. It will be suggested that the notion of maximising dominion or positive liberty is a useful starting point in this regard. Second, there is the matter of establishing an institutional basis for action. This refers to implementing strategies that embody the justice principles we wish to adopt. Here it is suggested that repairing harm and restoration are practical ways in which justice can be achieved at a concrete level. As discussed in Chapter One, there are various dimensions to the concept of justice that are relevant to an eco-justice perspective.These have been discussed at length by Schlosberg (2007), and are summarised again in Box 5.1. Consideration of these contributing notions of justice, especially in the light of conventional criminological and legal discussions of justice, allows us to distill the discussion of the moral basis of justice down to one or two key observations. Box 5.1: Notions of justice Distribution – justice as fairness/equality (need, desert, entitlement) Recognition – justice as acknowledgement (subordination, non-recognition, disrespect) Participation – justice as engagement (decision-making procedures, protecting interests) Capacities – justice as functionings (opportunities to ‘do’ and to ‘be’) Source: Schlosberg, 2007.

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Specifically, the practices of justice ought to be informed by a moral statement that encapsulates what it is that we want to achieve by the doing of justice (see White and Graham, 2010). Here, the republican theory of justice (Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990) is particularly insightful and useful.This theory is premised on the idea that if every act of crime represents damage to liberty and wellbeing, then the system’s task is to promote positive liberty, by rectifying or remedying the damage caused by the crime. The theory incorporates many of the notions of justice cited in Box 5.1 in that it is interested in addressing harm as evident at different levels, examining the institutional consequences of intervention, and supporting restorative practices that foster individual and overall health and wellbeing. The core concept of republican theory is the notion of ‘republican liberty’ or dominion. This refers to a form of ‘negative liberty’ where non-interference in our lives by other people (including state officials) is protected by law and general community norms. According to the authors of republican theory, Braithwaite and Pettit (1990), the prime goal of any society should be to maximise the enjoyment of dominion (personal liberty). In this framework, crime is seen as the denial of personal dominion. This is so at three different levels. • The first is a negative challenge to the dominion status of the victim. A threat to, or disregard for, the dominion of an individual is an attack on the status of that individual as someone who holds a protected dominion status in society. If someone commits a crime against an individual, then the criminal act asserts the vulnerability of the victim to the will of the criminal, nullifying the protected status of the victim. • Second, if successful, the criminal attempt not only disregards the victim’s dominion, but also directly undermines, diminishes and perhaps even destroys the victim’s dominion. For example, kidnapping or murdering someone will destroy that person’s dominion, while stealing a person’s property will diminish his or her dominion by undermining certain exercises of dominion that person might otherwise have pursued (for example, it diminishes the liberty to use that property). • Third, every crime also represents communal evil; it does an evil to the community as a whole. A crime not only affects the dominion status of the individual victim, but also endangers the community’s dominion generally. This is because the fear of crime, or lack of

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action taken to assist the victim, can have the impact of reducing the liberty of those who fear possible victimisation of themselves. While the focus is on human liberty and human societies, the basic approach to justice outlined here seems to make sense and have some application to justice as applied to the nonhuman. For example, when republican theory is translated into practice it usually takes the form of restorative justice (see Braithwaite, 1989). This refers to a justice process in which action is informed by two main considerations: repairing the harm, and ensuring widespread participation in justice decision-making. The point of intervention is to seek to heal and put right the wrongs (Zehr, 1990). The concept of harm, as in republican theory, is extended to include not only direct victims (which in the context of this book ought to include eco-systems and animals and plants) but affected communities.The obligation to repair the harm is likewise a communal as well as individual obligation. Furthermore, the process of justice ought to maximise the opportunities for exchange of information, participation, dialogue and mutual consent as much and as far as possible, and thereby ought to belong to the community as a whole (not just vested interests, specific advocates or particular activist voices). Such justice also needs to be mindful of the outcomes, intended and unintended, of responses to harm and victimisation – on people, eco-systems and animals. Taking these ideas into account, and integrating them with both the notions of justice outlined above as well as general propositions about what should be the key philosophical drivers of justice as a form of practice (see also White and Graham, 2010: 27–8), we end up with four propositions that are of direct relevance to an eco-justice framework.

Proposition 1: Justice ought to be an active process The complexities of environmental harm in terms of spatial and temporal dimensions, divergent opinions surrounding how to conceptualise injustice in regards to the human and the nonhuman, and the difficulties associated with measuring the extent, seriousness and scale of wrongdoing dictate that justice needs to be a free flowing but grounded process. Something needs to be done in the here and now, but very often the ‘what is to be done’ requires a blend of expertise and ideas from many different quarters (including experts, traditional users of land, advocates and laypeople among others). Increasing dialogue and deliberative democracy is essential. This also means inclusion of advocates who can speak on behalf of those who cannot – that is, those 166

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who voice concern about what is happening to trees, to soils, to bees, to orchids.This, in turn, should also involve active listening, by humans, to the nonverbal communication from nature, the signals emanating from the natural world and its inhabitants, that denote things such as the impacts of climate change (for example, oceans warming, insect eggs hatching earlier) (see Schlosberg, 2007; Besthorn, 2013). There is much to learn by bringing the nonhuman into the dialogue about ecological health and wellbeing that affects all. A creative interpretation and implementation of restorative justice principles allows for recognition of particular categories of victims of environmental harm that may not normally be considered. For example, in the context of an environmental court, Preston (2011: 143) describes how future generations or nonhuman biota may be considered victims: Environmental harm may require remediation over generations and hence the burden and the cost of remediation is transferred to future generations. Remediation of contaminated land and restoration of habitat of species, populations and ecological communities are examples of intergenerational burdens passed from the present generation to future generations. Where intergenerational inequity is caused by the commission of an environmental offence, the victims include future generations…The biosphere and nonhuman biota have intrinsic value independent of their utilitarian or instrumental value for humans.When harmed by environmental crime, the biosphere and nonhuman biota also are victims. The harm is able to be assessed from an ecological perspective; it need not be anthropocentric. Identification of victims is only part of the restorative process, however. The voice of the victim needs to be heard as well as part of restorative justice proceedings. From the point of view of eco-justice, this provides an opening for the extension of justice across the human, environment and animal domains. As it stands, the law already does allow for a modicum of protection for the nonhuman as well as the human (see Chapters 3 and 4). The definition of ‘victim’ is however evolving and expanding. Public interest law, for example, has been utilised to give standing to human representatives of nonhuman entities such as rivers and trees. For example, a river was represented at a restorative justice conference in New Zealand by the chairperson of the Waikato River Enhancement Society (Preston, 2011: 144, fn53). In increasing number of cases 167

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there are ‘surrogate victims’ who are recognised as representing the community affected (including harms to particular biotic groups and abiotic environs) for the purpose of the restorative process. Who speaks for whom is nevertheless still controversial; especially when it comes to natural objects such as trees, rivers and specific bio-spheres. Critics, for example, argue that there is a danger that if agencies such as courts adopt environmental restoration within a particular framework of understanding – both in regards to sanctioning processes, and constructions of ‘nature’ – then more harm could result. Katz (quoted in Besthorn, 2004: 41) is particularly scathing, writing that restoration policy presents: the message that humanity should repair the damage that human intervention has caused the natural environment. The message is an optimistic one, for it implies that we recognize the harm we have caused in the natural environment and that we possess the means and will to correct these harms.These policies also make us feel good; the prospect of restoration relieves the guilt we feel about the destruction of nature.The wounds we have inflicted on the natural world are not permanent; nature can be made ‘whole’ again. Our natural resource base and foundation for survival can be saved by the appropriate policies of restoration, regeneration and redesign. Part of what is being expressed here is the idea that the ‘voice’ that gets heard, when it comes to restoration policy (including one might presume, restorative justice proceedings) is too often that of the human, not that of the nonhuman (Besthorn, 2013). This raises important and fascinating issues regarding the criteria by which judgements around restoration are to be made, and the kind of ecological and zoological expertise required to adequately be a surrogate victim for the nonhuman. Assessment of environmental harm necessarily involves discussion of, and disputes over, the evidence to be drawn upon, the interpretations of impact, and the courses of action advocated.This is an ongoing process. A flexible approach to environmental harm would include elements such as documenting the uncertainties (for example, being aware of chaotic unpredictability), examining a wide range of alternative courses of action (that is, going beyond an either/or approach to consider a wider range of options), engaging in broad public deliberation (that is, allow a plurality of voices and expertise), considering risks in the 168

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context of benefits (that is, analyse the trade-offs), and instituting continuous monitoring and evaluation systems (that is, evaluate and re-evaluate in the light of different perspectives and new evidence) (see Scott, 2005a). Justice as an active process does not have a defined end-point.

Proposition 2: Justice is about maximising liberty In the context of environmental harm as this pertains to humans, eco-systems and animals, to maximise liberty is to maximise general functioning, the ‘to be’ and the ‘to do’ of life. This depends to a large degree on being recognised as being of worth and significant status (from the point of view of humans, since it is they who confer ‘value’ upon themselves and elements of the world around them). From the point of view of species justice, this is often considered a core or fundamental right, even from more circumscribed animal welfare perspectives.That is, each animal ought to be given the opportunity to, as far as possible, fulfill its potential as a sentient being.This might take the form of enshrining in law an ‘Animal Bill of Rights’, as discussed earlier in the chapter. This concern with ‘essence’ (that is, that all things have the right to be and do in ways that reflect a core defining trait or characteristic) can also be extended to the abiotic or non-living. For example, consider the following conception of ‘rights’ applied to a river. A fundamental river right (that is, the riverine equivalent of a human right) would be the right to flow. If a water body couldn’t flow it wouldn’t be a river, and so the capacity to flow (given sufficient water) is essential to the existence of a river.Therefore, from the perspective of the river, building so many dams across it and extracting so much water from it that it ceased to flow into the sea, would be an abuse of its Earth rights. (Cullinan, 2003: 118) What is ‘essence’ can and does change over time, however. This, too, complicates our understanding of maximisation of dominion or liberty. For instance, domesticated animals such as dogs and cats have a contemporary ‘way of life’ and ‘way of being’ that reflects thousands of years of evolution and human relationships and engagement.To be and to do for dogs is immediately contextualised by their role and status relative to their human counterparts, and what they have been bred and trained to be and do over time (for example, animal companions, racing 169

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dogs, hunting dogs). Their ‘essence’ (as with the essence of humans) is a social and historical product. Supported and enhanced functioning requires the material necessities that allow for both subsistence and more-than-subsistence.This basically rests upon having an adequate habitat within which to flourish. Again, this is about the nature of home (that is, quality of living) as well as finding a home in nature (that is, being embedded in life sustaining environments). Agency and structure, choice and necessity, are always intertwined and contingent upon local conditions and circumstances. Justice is about enhancing opportunities within the limits of what is possible to achieve within certain spaces.

Proposition 3: Justice deals with issues holistically Acknowledgement of ‘victim’ status is crucial to understanding the ways in which environmental harm affects both human and the nonhuman. This means locating creatures and environments within their unique ecological niche and context. It also means examining events and contemporary human practices from the vantage point of history and geography. Jacoby (2001), for example, describes how traditional users in the Adirondack Mountains responded to their exclusion and criminalisation by turning to arson and burning the forests that previously had sustained them. Certain types of offending are directly attributable to changes in the definition of culturally embedded practices (for example, using snares to hunt, gathering wood from forests), rather than being harmful in and of themselves.They are malum prohibitum, acts that are criminal not because they are inherently bad, but because the act is now prohibited by law. Responding to this criminalisation of particular practices may, in turn, take the form of behaviour destructive to various stakeholders. Those who kill others include animals that hunt other animals for food. Are those animals that are devoured ‘victims’? Humans also kill animals for food. Under what circumstances ought these food animals to be considered ‘victims’? In the first instance, death can be cruel, slow and agonising. The same can happen in regards to the second type of killing. Humans are animals, thus predation upon other animals in one sense may be seen as perfectly ‘natural’, simply part of the human–nature (human in nature) nexus.What rules should determine whether or not the killing of animals by humans is legitimate or not? Can ‘respect’ for an animal be maintained in the act of killing that same animal? A holistic approach to justice asks these kinds of questions and attempts to locate the answers concretely by reference to culture, history, geography and 170

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need – and by comparing what happens between and within diverse eco-systems, and between different species. A holistic approach is also needed in order to ensure clarity over purpose. Human intervention premised upon restorative justice, while laudable in its intent to redress environments left in a degraded state, may in fact reproduce narrowly conceived instrumental views of nature. As Besthorn (2013: 240) points out: [T]he argument is that restoration based on human benefit and interests alone fails to provide an adequate ethical justification for the restoration of ecosystems. The moral dilemma is the fashioning of environmental responses purely on human grounds. The real temptation is that environmental restoration becomes an unassailable justification for degrading ecosystems in the first place because humans can restore them to their original, untrammeled perfection. The philosophical argument about human benefit and interests is worth unpacking and subjecting to critical scrutiny, given the anthropocentric nature of ‘justice’ and institutions such as courts to begin with. Nonetheless, if restorative justice translates into ‘business as usual’ or simply assists in assigning value to the ‘costs of doing business’, then it will not contribute to the kinds of fundamental changes that underpin an eco-justice perspective.

Proposition 4: Justice has temporal and spatial dimensions The world – including natural and human – is ever changing. So too, it is important that decisions made yesterday be reviewed today, and that today’s decisions be reassessed in the light of future knowledge. Plantation forests may serve to diminish the amount of clearfelling of old growth forests, but the reduction in biodiversity represented in monoculture plantings bears with it new implications for ecological health and wellbeing. Everything we do to and for eco-systems, human populations, and animals and plant species reverberates and impacts upon everything else. The butterfly effect has real consequences. Environmental harm originates in particular places, and affects somebody or something in particular places. The harm may not always be apparent immediately, but only surface much later. Harm accumulates. Harm moves. Harm stays for long or short periods of time. To forestall harm we need to have a sense of risk of harm. To act 171

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upon these understandings of risk, we need a framework whereby we can implement the precautionary principle. All of these observations point to the necessity of analysing harm and risk in relation to time and space. This brings us back to the question of measurement and assessing how it is that we know what we know.What baseline criteria and tools can be drawn upon in order to measure harm? What evidence can be marshalled in support of preventing certain forms of harm? From which perspective is harm to be assessed, particularly if conflicting interests are at stake? Whose harm is deemed to be greater in any given situation? These are moral as well as technical questions (see Chapter One), but part of the solution to practical problems lies in asking the right questions to begin with. Close scrutiny also needs to be given to matters of thresholds and limits. For example, Mandiberg (2009: 1185–6) describes the difference between technology-based limits, and quality-based limits in the context of pollution regulation and notions of environmental harm. Technology-based limits focus on pollution emerging from a particular source.They require a source to adopt the best mechanisms practically available to reduce or eliminate the pollution…These limits do not, however, reflect an assessment of how the pollutants in question affect a particular water body or air quality control region. Quality-based limits, on the other hand, are more stringent and do focus on the health of the water body or air quality control region in question. In setting these limits, the agency begins with quality goals and works backwards to impose limits on all sources contributing pollution to that water body or air quality control region. Each approach implies a different starting point for analysis, and each has different implications for any conclusions that are made in relation to the extent and nature of harm.While there is benefit to be gained in drawing upon each approach, the nature and extent of environmental harm nonetheless requires a contextual interpretation based upon specific trends and incidents: ‘For example, a discharge that is slightly over a water-quality-based limit might not actually harm the health of the water body, depending upon discharges from other point sources. On the other hand, a discharge that is significantly over a technologybased limit might cause substantial environmental harm’ (Mandiberg,

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2009: 1186). Hence, the importance of ‘thresholds’ vis-à-vis the level of environmental harm acceptable or allowable. What we need to weigh up, therefore, is not only the type and degree of harm as this pertains to humans, eco-systems and animals. We also need to assess the type and degree of harm, in particular places (including global spaces), and how these harms have an impact on humans, eco-systems and animals over time.To not kill the seal at point A, is to ensure the demise of fish at point B, and the desolation of human communities at point C.To kills seals may be ‘wrong’ in absolutist terms, but what if the failure to cull seal herds compounds the suffering of human and nonhuman alike into the future, including members of the seal colony itself? Justice demands answers to such questions.The four propositions outlined above provide some indication of the principles by which this might be achieved.

Conclusion: where to from here? This book has explored the topic of environmental harm by examining three interrelated but different approaches to justice. Environmental justice is primarily concerned with humans and issues of social justice in regards to healthy environments. Ecological justice is oriented toward eco-systems and biospheres, and the health of the biotic and abiotic in particular geographical and ecological spaces. Species justice is driven by considerations of animal welfare and animal rights. Each justice-based approach has much to offer to our understanding of the moral and ethical issues surrounding human practices that do harm. We began by noting a major moral fissure as identified by Piers Beirne (2011). This is that, namely, different writers within the broad green criminology camp view their projects in distinctive ways, and in ways that inevitably conflict with each other. Specifically, it can be seen that the natural resource management focus of conservation criminology presents environmental issues in instrumental terms that belie the rights focus of those concerned with species justice and the welfare of animals. This is a divide that at the very least needs to be explicitly acknowledged rather than steadfastly ignored as appears to some to presently be the case (see Beirne, 2011). Tensions also exist within and across the justice approaches examined in this book.This is illustrated by disputes between animal welfare and animal rights activists. It is also apparent in discussions of ecological justice, in which there are disagreements over whether humans are part of nature or apart from nature and, concretely, whether it is sensible or not to talk of a ‘pristine nature’. Some of these debates are based 173

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upon prejudice and ignorance. Others are grounded in deeply held ideological and philosophical views that generate fierce emotional responses on all sides. Some of the conflict is contested at the level of the abstract and conjecture; in other cases the conflict emerges out of immediate practical contradictions that demand answers in the here and now. Among other things, this chapter has also briefly attempted to situate these tensions and conflicts within the wider social context of global political economy. That is, exploitation of humans, eco-systems and animals is problematic for the Earth generally – but it occurs because of systemic practices and economic imperatives.This is a central point and contribution of the social harm approach. Who is to blame for environmental harm, therefore, is not reducible to simple answers or fixable by simply coming up with the right slogans.There are powerful groups and sectional interests that manipulate, lie and coerce to maintain the socio-economic status quo, and specific groups of people, specific eco-systems and specific animals benefit or lose depending upon struggles around environmental harm issues. In navigating through the minefields and fissures of ethical decisionmaking in relation to environmental harm, it can be anticipated that the complexities of doing justice will not get any easier. Perennial questions remain over how best to deal with specific aspects of eco-justice: • Rights (conflicts over) intrinsic versus instrumental rights; human interests, ecological sustainability and animal rights for example, defining the limits to the right to life • Harm (degrees and dimensions of) extent of damage or destruction; greater good; species survival for example, determining when to intervene and why • Value (measuring harm) worth, what counts as evidence; thresholds and hierarchies of harm for example, establishing criteria for measuring what is harmful and to what extent • Power (decision-making processes) voices, inequalities, differential victimisation for example, incorporating diverse interests, perspectives and types of participation. Observations about the complexities surrounding environmental harm and the introduction of specific propositions about justice are intended 174

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to help guide debate over substantive issues, not provide ready-made solutions to them. While not providing definitive answers to all of the questions surrounding these contentious issues, at the very least it is hoped that the moral calculus is made easier by the discussions contained in this book. The preferred balance of humans within the web of life demands new understandings of the world around us. This includes ways of seeing that are informed by a social harm type of approach. An ecojustice perspective puts harm at the centre of analysis and in so doing asserts that the fate of humans is inextricably bound up with that of eco-systems and the varied species that inhabit these. This is our life.

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195

Index

Index a abattoirs, working in 130 abolitionist positions 132 absolutist positions 40, 136, 152 action, bases for 164 activists 4 animal rights 5, 39, 156 EJ movement 44, 46–7, 48, 150, 155 environmental 38–9 Adeola, F. 57, 62 advocates, nonhuman entities 23, 166–7, 167–8 agency 20 agriculture 85, 91–2 air pollution 76, 77 ALDF (Animal Legal Defense Fund) 151–2 alternative commercial purposes, land use 71–2 animal-centred considerations 7 animal food industry 119–21 Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) 151–2 animal rights activism 5, 39, 156 focus of 132, 133–4, 135 rights 6, 112, 149–50 species justice 14, 16, 111, 130–31 United States 151–2 animal welfare criminology 124 focus of 112, 132, 137, 150 laws 115–16 species justice 16 animals see humans; nonhuman animals anthropocentric perspective 12, 146, 147–8 Arctic region 62 assisted colonisation, species 140–41

b badgers 138 Baur, G. 119–20 Beirne, P. 8, 131, 173

Bennison, R. 159 Besthorn, F. 171 Katz quoted in 168 bio-piracy 103 biocentrism 12, 148 biocultural diversity 106 biodiversity 83, 86–7 loss of 91–2, 93 biofuels 70, 92 bioprospecting 91 Bricknell, S. 18, 25 ‘brown’ issues 38 built environments 17 Bullard, R. 47, 50

c Canada 59, 94, 104 capability, justice 23 capitalism 84–6, 96–7, 113, 160–63 capitalist states 51 carbon emission trading 70–71 cats 169 Caughley, J. 153–4 Cazaux, G. 132 chemicals 88–9 children 60 China 58 CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) 125 cities 17 civil society 3–4 climate change 56, 68, 80, 86 colonial power 58, 103 colonisation, assisted 140–41 commodification 6–7, 18, 84, 86, 144 communal lands 96, 97 companion animals 139 conflicts, transborder 68–72 conservation criminology 7, 76–8 conservationism 100–107 Constitution, Ecuador 151 consumption, capitalism 162–3 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 125 197

Environmental harm corporations 51–2, 161–2 transnational 24, 51, 57, 85, 98–9 crime, republican theory of justice 165 crime prevention 155 criminal harm 24–5 criminal law 24–6 criminalisation of customary activities 102 criminology conservation 7, 76–8 green criminology 3, 4–7, 18 nonhuman animals 124–31 and social harm 1 critical environmental justice studies 149 Cullinan, C. 157, 169 cultural domination 22 cultural heritage 17 cultural practices 156–60 customary activities, criminalisation of 102

d Daiichi nuclear power plant 67 data 27, 60 decision-making 29, 174 deforestation 71–2, 92–3, 127 developing countries 57, 87 differential risk 53–4 dioxin 54 disadvantaged people 52–3 see also vulnerable groups disasters 56 discriminatory waste disposal practices 46–7 distribution, justice 22 dogs 139, 169 domestic animals 118, 139, 169–70 dominion 165 Duffy, R. 102, 135

e e-waste (electronic waste) 63, 71, 77, 87, 88, 89 Earth Jurisprudence 151 Earth stewardship 151 East Java 66 eco-justice perspective 6–7, 145–75 bases for action 164 components of 11–16 198

concepts 147–56 dilemmas 153–5 harm, approaches to 2, 3 nature, species and culture 156–60 overview 173–5 in practice 164–73 propositions 166–73 socio-economic context 160–64 eco-philosophies 12, 147–56 eco-rights activists 5 ecocentrism 12, 148, 149 ecocide 80–81, 151 ecological citizenship 6, 12–13, 14 ecological communities 17 ecological imperialism 57 ecological inclusion 159–60 ecological justice 75–110 concepts 76–83 conservationism 100–107 focus of 3, 6, 147, 149, 173 land use 94–100 overview 14, 15–16 transforming nature 83–94 value of nature 107–110 ecological sustainability 78 ecology 17 ecosystems 35, 91 Ecuador 151 EJ (environmental justice) movement 44, 46–7, 48, 150, 155 electronic waste (e-waste) 63, 71, 77, 87, 88, 89 electronics industry 89 elites 72 endangered species 121, 122, 124, 125, 136 England 67, 95 environment definitions 17 destruction of 18, 80 ecological justice focus on 3 issues not conceived as environmental 53 rights of 5 see also environmental phrases environment discrimination 48 environmental activism 38–9 environmental crime assessing 108–9 criminology 4 definition 5, 17–19 focus of green criminology 3

Index measurement issues 24–7, 172 nonhuman animals 124–31 place 63 see also environmental harm environmental equity 47 environmental harm definition 19 eco-justice perspective 174 externalising 63 global 60, 63 and green criminology 4–6, 18 intersecting dimensions 7 key questions 27–36 legal-illegal social construction 4, 12, 17–18 political economy 163 responsibility for 150–51 and social harm approaches 1–4 socio-economic context 160–64 study of 152 transnational 32 weighing up harm 36–9 see also environmental crime environmental injustice 3, 47 see also environmental victimisation environmental justice 43–74 concepts 44–51 and environmental movement 150 main focus of 3, 147, 148–9, 173 overview 6, 14, 15 place 60–68 social patterns 51–60 transborder conflicts 68–72 value of human life 73–4 environmental justice (EJ) movement 44, 46–7, 48, 150, 155 environmental laws 3, 7 environmental movement 150 environmental racism 48 environmental regulation 3, 20, 99 environmental rights 44–5, 78 environmental risk compartmentalisation 19 consciousness of 53, 54–5 distribution 5–6 and harm 20 risk assessment 28 transference 61 environmental social justice framework 48–9 environmental social movements 38, 76

environmental victimisation definition 20–21, 50–51 disadvantaged people 15 ecological justice 77 environmental justice 57–60 future generations 81 manifestations 55 overview 3, 6, 8, 20–22 patterns of 43 restorative justice 167 transnational 32 victim responses 33–4 equality of victims 15 essence, of things 169 ethic of species 140 evidence, credibility of 32–3 exclusionary policies 82 exploitation of humans 62 of natural resources 86 of nonhuman animals 112 externalising environmental harm 63 extractive industries 55, 57, 62 extrinsic value 34

f feral animals 119, 137 feudalism 95 fish 133, 140 see also fishing Fisher, E. 28 fishing 63, 122–3, 126, 157–8 see also fish food 69–70, 154, 161 forests 64, 93–4, 105–6, 147–8 deforestation 71–2, 92–3, 127 Francione, G. 133, 136 Fraser, D. 116 Fukushima, Japan 67 future generations 81

g galaxias fish 140 garbage imperialism 71 Gedicks, A. 62 genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 86–7 geographical spaces 64, 65 global assessments 109 global commons 97 global environmental harm 60, 63 199

Environmental harm global warming 56, 68, 80, 86 globalisation 62 globalising spaces 64–5 GMOs (genetically modified organisms) 86–7 green criminology 3, 4–7, 18 ‘green’ issues 38 guardianship 152 Gulf of Mexico 90–91

h habitats, nonhuman animals 126–7, 138 Hardin, G. 97 Harding, R. 28 harm conceptualising 4 criminological approach 1 environmental victimisation 20–22 measuring 2, 24–7, 172 as normative concept 19 social harm approach 145 see also criminal harm; environmental harm; social harm harm audits 36 health issues 87 Heckenberg, D. 32 holistic approach 170–71 horizon scanning 29–31 humans anthropocentric perspective 5, 12 centrality of 40–41 consumption 163 ecological inclusion 159 ecological justice 15, 81 environmental justice focus on 3, 15 nature–human relationship 12 responsibility of 2, 145 rights 6, 14 species justice 134 survival of 146 value of human life 73–4 see also eco-philosophies; environmental justice

i ideological ecological elitism 83 ill animals 137 illegal actions see legal and illegal actions illegal environmental harm 4 200

illegal fishing 63, 126 illegal trade, nonhuman animals 127 illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 126 indeterminacy 29 indigenous peoples environmental justice 47, 58–9, 61 knowledge 103–4, 106 sustainability 153–4 way of life 156–7 see also vulnerable groups individuals, nonhuman animals 131–43 industrialisation of nature 85 institionalised statements 151 institutional basis for action 164 interconnectedness 79–80 intergenerational responsibility 45 interpersonal violence 127 intrinsic value 34 invasive species 118, 119 issues, working through 152–3 IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing 126

j Jacoby, K. 101 Japan 67 justice achieving 2 conceptions of 147 eco-justice framework 166–73 elements of 22–3, 164–6 framing 3 justice-based approaches 11–41 conceptual issues 17–23 eco-justice perspective, components of 11–16 harm, key questions 27–36 measurement issues 24–7 weighing up harm 36–9

k Katz (quoted in Besthorn, F.) 168 knowledge, credibility of evidence 32–3

l land, transborder conflicts 68–72 land management 97 land use 86, 94–100

Index legal environmental harm 4 legal and illegal actions 4, 12, 17–18, 39, 77 legality 77 legislation, nonhuman animals 130 liberty 165, 169–70 Liddick, D. 107 limits, pollution 172 Lin, A. 28 lobster industry 104 local and regional levels 60–68 LULUs (locally unwanted land uses) 61

m management of natural world 76 Mandiberg, S. 172 McMullan, J. 104 measurement issues, environmental crime 24–7, 172 Merchant, C. 146 methylmercury 52–3 Mgbeoji, I. 92, 104 migration 68 military activities 18 misanthropy 134 monetarisation of risk 61 moral basis for action 39, 164 mountain pine beetle outbreak 94 mud volcano, East Java 66–7 multinational companies (MNCs) see transnational corporations

n nation-states 51–2, 85, 96 national interest 72 Native Americans 59 native peoples see indigenous peoples natural objects 21 see also nonhuman world natural resource management 76, 78, 102 natural resources 17, 86 nature eco-justice perspective 156–60 ecological justice 6, 75, 78, 79, 82 environment definitions 17 nature–human relationship 12 transforming 83–94 value of 107–110 views of 8, 146

see also eco-philosophies; ecological justice nature–human relationship 12 need, concept of 22 negative liberty 165 NGOs (non-government organisations) 27, 38–9, 57, 83, 99–100 Nigeria 57 NIMBY (not in my back yard) approach 46, 61 nitrates 90 non-government organisations (NGOs) 27, 38–9, 57, 83, 99–100 nonhuman animals abuse of 127, 129–30 categorising 112, 117–24 criminology 124–31 cruelty towards 114–15, 128, 162 domestic animals 118, 139, 169–70 ecological inclusion 159 feral animals 119, 137 food production 161–2 legal definitions 114 particular species 131–43 as property 116–17, 160 rights of 5 species justice 3, 16 suffering 127 terminology 7, 114 value of 143–4, 160, 163 wild animals 125, 135–7 see also animal phrases; species justice nonhuman nature see nature nonhuman world 2, 21, 23, 34, 166–7, 167–8 see also nature; nonhuman animals normatively sanctioned activities 18–19 Norway 67, 138 not in my back yard (NIMBY) approach 46, 61 nuclear power 67 Nurse, A. 128

o obligation, politics of 13 oceans 87, 88, 89–91 offenders, animal-related crimes 128 Ohio Department of Natural Resources 142 oil spills 90–91 201

Environmental harm

p parasites 137 participation, justice 23 PBTs (persistent bio-accumulating and toxic compounds) 88, 90 Pellow, D. 89 Pemberton, S. 1 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 133 Perrier, D. 104 personal liberty 165 pests 118–19, 121, 137 place 47, 60–68 see also spaces plants 91–2, 153 plastics 88–90 Plumwood,V. 158–9 poaching 128–9 polar bears 122 polar foxes 138 policy interventions 76 political economic spaces 64, 65 political economy 160–63, 174 see also capitalism politics of obligation 13 politics of place 47 pollution 64, 76–7, 90–91, 172–3 see also waste disposal population 56 power relations colonial power 58, 103 decision-making 174 environmental victimisation 55 legislation 24 state power 51, 52 see also vulnerable groups precaution 21 precautionary principle 27–8, 49–50 Preston, B. 167 pristine nature 82 production, capitalist mode of 162–3 property 72, 94–7, 116–17 public perceptions 43, 53 punishments 26

r radioactivity, nuclear power 67 reciprocity 157 recognition, justice 22

202

REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) 93, 105, 106 Regan, T. 132–3 regional and local levels 60–68 regulatory mechanisms 19 regulatory systems 25 religious prescriptions, food 154 republican liberty 165 republican theory of justice 165 resource depletion 84 restorative justice 166, 167–8, 171 rights conceptualisation 13 eco-justice perspective 6, 36, 174 ecological justice 79 language of 151 species justice 112 risk 20, 28, 53–4 see also environmental risk rivers 169 Rolston, H. 136–7, 139–40

s Schlosberg, D. 22, 164–6 Scott, D. 29 Sellafield, England 67 Shiva,V. 56 sick animals 137 Smith, M. 13, 79 social change 145 social division 100–107 social harm and environmental harm 1–4, 18 environmental justice 51–60 justice 23 political economy 174 social justice 3, 44 socially expendable victims 74 socio-economic context 160–64 soil 92 spaces (place) 64–5, 171–3 see also place species competition 140 decline 85 endangered 121, 122, 124, 125, 136 ethic of species 140 invasive 118, 119 particular 131–43 species justice 111–44 categorising animals 117–24

Index concepts 112–16 criminology 124–31 focus on 3, 6, 147, 149, 173 liberty 169 overview 14, 16 particular species 131–43 value of animals 141–4 speciesism 7, 16, 111, 113–14 stakeholder perspective 33 state power 51 stewardship 151, 152 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 44–5 sustainability 19–20, 78, 153–4 sustainable development 18, 78

t Tasmania 140 temporal dimensions, justice 171–3 terminology 7 threatened species 121 thresholds, pollution 172–3 Torres, B. 134 total liberation 149 toxic waste disposal 71 trade, endangered species 125 traditional cultures 47, 82, 101–3, 106 see also vulnerable groups traditional fishing 157–8 traditional shared lands 72 transborder conflicts, land 68–72 transference of risk 61 transnational corporations 24, 51, 57, 85, 98–9 transnational environmental victimisation 32 trout 140 trusteeship see stewardship

u uncertainty 27–9 United Kingdom 138 see also England United Nations 93, 105, 106, 109 United States agriculture 85 animal food industry 119–20 animal rights 151–2 environmental racism 48 forests 105

indigenous peoples 59 legal systems 25–6 species justice 136–7, 142 urban life 17

v value assigning 34–6, 174 of human life 73–4 of nature 107–110 of nonhuman animals 141–4, 163 veganism 131, 132, 154 vermin 137 victim responses 33–4 victimisation see environmental victimisation violence, interpersonal 127 vulnerable groups 21, 47, 57, 71, 73 see also disadvantaged people; indigenous peoples; power relations; traditional cultures

w war 18, 80 waste disposal disposal problems 85, 88 e-waste 63, 71, 77, 87, 88, 89 ecological justice 87 land grabs for 71 radioactive 67 water, fresh 79 wellbeing 23 ‘white’ issues 38 White, R. 2–3, 5, 6, 75 Heckenberg, D. and 32 Whyte, D. 162 wild animals 125, 135–7 wildlife 117–18 wildlife tourism 155 wildlife value formula 142 wolves 136–7 working through issues 152–3 worth see value

203

STUDIES IN SOCIAL HARM

STUDIES IN SOCIAL HARM

“Rob White has been at the forefront of green criminology, developing frameworks of analysis for understanding ecological degradation. In this book, he blazes an important new trail, establishing a moral basis for action.” Avi Brisman, Eastern Kentucky University, USA

rob white is Professor of Criminology in the School of Social Sciences at the University of Tasmania, Australia. He is author of Transnational environmental crime: Towards an eco-global criminology (2011) and Crimes against nature (2008), as well as editor of Climate change from a criminological perspective (2012), Global environmental harm (2010) and Environmental crime: A reader (2009).

www.policypress.co.uk

Environmental harm_PPC.indd 1

This unique study of social harm offers a systematic and critical discussion of the nature of environmental harm from an eco-justice perspective, challenging conventional criminological definitions of environmental harm. The book evaluates three interconnected justice-related approaches to environmental harm: environmental justice (humans), ecological justice (the environment) and species justice (non-human animals). It provides a critical assessment of environmental harm by interrogating key concepts and exploring how activists and social movements engage in the pursuit of justice. It concludes by describing the tensions between the different approaches and the importance of developing an eco-justice framework that to some extent can reconcile these differences. Using empirical evidence built on theoretical foundations with examples and illustrations from many national contexts, Environmental harm will be of interest to students and academics in criminology, sociology, law, geography, environmental studies, philosophy and social policy all over the world.

ENVIRONMENTAL HARM • ROB  WHITE

"Rob White provides a magisterial overview of the promise and the performance of recent green writing about environmental, ecological and species justice. His insight is keen and genuine, his commentary on difficult and troubling issues always fair-minded." Professor Piers Beirne, University of Southern Maine, USA

ENVIRONMENTAL HARM An eco-justice perspective

CRIMINOLOGY / Social studies

ISBN 978-1-44730-040-3

9 781447 300403

ROB  WHITE

8/7/2013 10:48:08 AM