English Modality: Core, Periphery and Evidentiality 9783110286328, 9783110286212

Citation preview

Marín-Arrese, Carretero, Arús Hita, van der Auwera (Eds.) English Modality

Topics in English Linguistics

Edited by Elizabeth Closs Traugott Bernd Kortmann

Volume 81

English Modality

Core, Periphery and Evidentiality

Edited by Juana I. Marín-Arrese Marta Carretero Jorge Arús Hita Johan van der Auwera

ISBN 978-3-11-028621-2 e-ISBN 978-3-11-028632-8 ISSN 1434-3452 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. 6 2013 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Typesetting: RoyalStandard, Hong Kong Printing and binding: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ♾ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

Acknowledgments We would like to thank Ronald Langacker, Geoffrey Leech and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen for their contributions to this volume, based on their plenaries at the “4th Modality in English Conference” (ModE4), Universidad Complutense de Madrid, September 9-11, 2010. We would also like to express our gratitude to our invited contributors: our thanks to Bas Aarts, Jill Bowie, Frank Brisard, Peter Collins, Roberta Facchinetti, Dirk Noël, An Van linden, Sean Wallis and Astrid De Wit, who generously agreed to contribute to this volume. We are grateful to the authors of the remaining articles in the volume, all peerreviewed extended versions of their papers presented at ModE4. We owe our gratitude to the general editors of the series “Topics in English Linguistics”, Elizabeth Closs Traugott and Bernd Kortmann, for their interest in the topic of the present volume and their support. We also thank the staff at Mouton De Gruyter, and especially Julie Miess and Wolfgang Konwitschny, for their professional help and their patience in guiding us through the editing and proofreading process and in dealing with all the technical intricacies. Finally, thanks are due to the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation) for the grant awarded for the organization of ModE4 (FFI2009-08190-E), which contributed decisively to the quality of the conference, much to the benefit of most of the research presented in this volume. Modality is a thriving area of linguistics, with a long tradition of studies from different approaches. The unifying thread of this volume is modality in English, which is approached from diverse perspectives. The volume addresses issues such as the conceptual nature of modality, and the evolution and current status of the modal auxiliaries and other modal expressions. It also attempts to shed new light on the relationship between the domains of modality and evidentiality, and with neighbouring grammatical categories, such as TAM systems. In addition, the volume examines the use of modal and evidential expressions and the variation whereof in different discourse domains and genres, in the modelling of discourse identities, and in the expression of stance and evaluation.

Table of contents Acknowledgements List of contributors

v ix

Part I: Core modality Ronald Langacker Modals: Striving for control

3

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English: mapping the 57 impact of “genre” Geoffrey Leech Where have all the modals gone? An essay on the declining frequency of core 95 modal auxiliaries in recent standard English Part II: Peripheral modality Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation Peter Collins Grammatical colloquialism and the English quasi-modals: a comparative 155 study Lucía Loureiro-Porto Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit Modal uses of the English present progressive Debra Ziegeler On the generic argument for the modality of will

171

201

221

Part III: Evidentiality and Modality Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen REALIT Y and related concepts: towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs 253

119

viii

Table of Contents

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

281

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla Annotating English adverbials for the categories of epistemic modality and evidentiality 317 Part IV: Evidentiality and Modality in Discourse Roberta Facchinetti Modal verbs in news-related blogs: When the blogger counts

359

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance: Intersubjective 379 positioning and construction of public identity in media interviews Juana I. Marín-Arrese Stancetaking and inter/subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown Subject index

447

411

List of Contributors Bas Aarts University College London London, UK

Dirk Noël University of Hong Kong Hong Kong, China

Jill Bowie University College London London, UK

Begoña Núñez Perucha Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, Spain

Frank Brisard University of Antwerp Antwerp, Belgium

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen Ghent University Ghent, Belgium

Marta Carretero Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, Spain

Jolanta Šinkūnienė Vilnius University Vilnius, Lithuania

Peter Collins University of New South Wales Sydney, Australia Roberta Facchinetti University of Verona Verona, Italy Laura Hidalgo Downing Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Madrid, Spain Ronald Langacker University of California at San Diego La Jolla, U.S.A. Geoffrey Leech Lancaster University Lancaster, UK Lucía Loureiro-Porto Universitat de les Illes Balears Palma de Mallorca, Spain Juana I. Marín-Arrese Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, Spain

Aurelija Usonienė Vilnius University Vilnius, Lithuania Johan van der Auwera University of Antwerp Antwerp, Belgium An Van linden University of Leuven Leuven, Belgium Sean Wallis University College London London, UK Astrid De Wit University of Antwerp Antwerp, Belgium Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, Spain Debra Ziegeler Université Sorbonne-Nouvelle Paris 3 Paris, France

I Core modality

Ronald W. Langacker

Modals: Striving for control Within the broad topic of modality, the grammaticized English modals – the basic forms may, can, will, shall, must, and the derived forms might, could, would, should – stand out as a clearly delimited set with specific grammatical properties. The descriptive problem they represent is, however, neither simple nor self-contained. There are numerous facets to their characterization, involving more general phenomena that are less than fully understood. I will focus here on three primary issues that tend to be confounded: the distinction between effective (i.e. “root” or “deontic”) and epistemic modals; the transparency of modals (allowing them to occur with any kind of subject); and their grammatical status (e.g. as “main verb” vs. “auxiliaries”). A key to resolving each issue is a conceptual factor reasonably described as the “striving for control”.

1 Control In cognitive linguistics, it is generally accepted that modals are properly characterized in terms of Talmy’s notion of force dynamics (Talmy 1988; Sweetser 1982, 1990; Langacker 1991: §6.3). At the two extremes, for example, may indicates the absence of a barrier (hence permission or possibility), while must specifies a force that is irresistible (obligation or necessity). Thus modals are one of many ways in which conceptions of physical or abstract force are reflected in linguistic structure. Force is one component of a more elaborate cognitive model that is equally pervasive in language: the very general conception of a cyclic process involving the striving for control (Langacker 2002a, 2009). Referred to as the control cycle, this conception is inherent in and abstracted from many aspects of experience. Indeed, it could hardly be more fundamental, with manifestations at the physical, perceptual, mental, and social levels. There is little exaggeration in saying that to be alive is to engage in cyclic activity of this sort. Physical manifestations of the control cycle range from the uptake of nutrients by the simplest organisms, to neurally guided feats of acquisition (such as a frog catching a fly), to complex, mentally directed activities involving planning, multiple phases, and a final goal (e.g. gathering materials and building a house). A perceptual manifestation of the control cycle is the directing of visual attention: a target is “captured” by being brought within the focal area, where it is apprehended with full acuity. At the mental level, the striving for control is

4

Ronald W. Langacker

ubiquitous in the form of categorization (e.g. recognizing a rose as such), or more generally, in understanding new experience with respect to established knowledge. More elaborate cases include the process of arriving at a conclusion or the writing of a dissertation. The control cycle is manifested socially whenever interactive activity has the outcome intended. In the longer term, control is established by forming stable relationships with expected patterns of behavior. Obviously, many phenomena involve multiple instances of the control cycle, at different levels. To physically capture a mouse, for example, a cat must first perceive it and categorize it as a potential prey. The control cycle is represented abstractly in Figure 1. Its elements are an actor (A), the actor’s dominion (D), a field (F), and a target (T). The actor is any kind of entity that in some sense “strives” for control. The actor’s dominion comprises the elements currently under its control. To some extent these form an established structure, where elements have a particular place or role. As a special case, the dominion includes the actor itself, with its own internal structure. The field is the actor’s present range of potential interaction. When an element enters the field, it offers itself as a target for such interaction.

Figure 1

The control cycle is both dynamic, in the sense of unfolding through time, and also force-dynamic. It has four temporal phases, each characterized by a forcedynamic situation. The initial, baseline phase is static: momentarily stable and

Modals: Striving for Control

5

devoid of forces (other than those involved in maintaining the dominion). When a target enters the field, it produces the potential phase, where the actor faces the prospect of dealing with it in some manner. It is thus a state of tension, a force-dynamic situation of opposing tendencies where neither has yet prevailed. One possible outcome is an action, in which the actor exerts force in order to capture the target and bring it under control. Alternatively, the actor can resolve the situation by avoidance, an action (or lack of it) that effectively removes it from the field. Either sort of action induces the result phase, which is once more static. Depending on the action, the dominion now incorporates the former target (as shown) or else excludes it. The control cycle figures in the characterization of numerous linguistic phenomena. For instance, it provides the abstract basis for a general description of possessive constructions (Langacker 2004). It is also quite relevant for lexical semantics. Many lexical predicates can be partially described in reference to particular phases of the control cycle. With respect to acquisition, for example, the verbs want, get, and have pertain respectively to the potential, action, and result phases. With respect to propositional attitude, the verbs suspect, learn, and know likewise reflect these stages. In regard to perception, look reflects the potential phase, while see designates either the act of perceptual capture, as in I finally managed to see it (cf. catch sight of ), or else the stable situation that results, e.g. I see it very clearly. The grammaticized English modals all pertain to the potential phase. They indicate varying degrees of force tending toward realization of the target process, as opposed to designating either the action of its realization or the situation that results. Their characterization in terms of the control cycle is a prime concern in what follows. If we are to appreciate its role in linguistic phenomena, the notion of control must be broadly and flexibly interpreted. I have already noted its manifestation at different levels of experience: physical, perceptual, mental, social. The level determines what sorts of entities can function as targets, and thus what kinds of control are possible. The options are so numerous and varied that I will merely suggest their range by citing some basic cases. In the physical realm, we control an object when we grasp it, manipulate it, modify it, or keep it somewhere. We control a substance when we gather it, store it, apply it, or ingest it. We control a living creature when we catch it, kill it, chase it away, or constrain its movement. In addition to these sorts of “things”, we exercise control over occurrences, e.g. by causing an event, maintaining a situation, or carrying out an action. Perception can be thought of as the interface between the physical and mental levels. The various sorts of physical entities function as its targets: objects, creatures, events, etc. One kind of perceptual control is simply the registration of

6

Ronald W. Langacker

an external stimulus, in any of the senses. I will refer to this as perceptual “contact”. More actively, we achieve control by establishing or maintaining a target as the focus of perceptual attention. Perception mediates between physical and mental phenomena by providing the basis for recognition (or categorization). Also reflecting its intermediate status is imagery. Actual perception is limited to targets that are not just physical but also real and immediate in space and/or time. As the simulation of perceptual experience, comprising its mental (internal) aspects, imagery does not share these latter constraints. Merely conceiving of some entity constitutes a minimal sort of mental control (“mental contact”). As with perception, we achieve greater control by making it the focus of attention, hence more fully apprehended. The variety of entities we are capable of conceiving is vast and open-ended: concrete and abstract; real and imaginary; things, occurrences, and propositions. We transcend direct experience through abstracted generalizations and mental constructions produced by imaginative capacities (e.g. simulation, metaphor, blending, mental space configurations). Because so much of our mental universe is related only indirectly to immediate physical experience, the position and status of conceived entities becomes an issue. We each have a conception of “reality” comprising both things and occurrences. Accepting an entity as real – incorporating it in our reality conception – is another kind of mental control. An essential aspect of our mental world is our apprehension of other conceptualizers and the conceptions they entertain (Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner 1993). This provides the basis for social interaction. As social creatures, we learn and use an array of intersubjectively established mental constructions constituting social reality, whose importance in our lives rivals that of physical reality. We achieve various forms of social control by reading intentions, attracting or directing attention, and by influencing the behavior, thoughts, or feelings of others. We do so as well by forging relationships, engaging in successful interactions, and enforcing the observation of social conventions and obligations. Naturally, much of this is effected through language, as both a product and an essential instrument of social interaction. As this brief survey already indicates, the control obtaining at the result phase (for a given level and target) can vary in degree. We observe the highest degree of control when the actor (A) fully determines the activity, experience, or state of the target (T). For example, a frog controls a fly to this degree by having caught it, ingested it, and assimilated its nutritive elements. A person controls a proposition to this degree by having incorporated it in a structured body of knowledge (e.g. a theory) in such a way that it can neither be challenged nor modified. A lesser degree of control consists in A constraining or influencing T’s activity, state, or experience without completely determining it. When I throw

Modals: Striving for Control

7

a baseball, I do not control its path of motion with total accuracy. When an object appears at the periphery of my visual field, I perceive it only partially, in coarse-grained fashion. In terms of resolution or visual apprehension, I control it more fully by making it the focus of attention. Weaker still is control consisting merely in “contact” or access, hence the potential for exerting influence. Canonically, the application of physical force requires that A and T be in contact. A face-to-face encounter makes possible a social interaction. Though it creates potentiality, contact is commonly a result of A’s activity. Often A reaches T physically by moving along a spatial path. We think of vision in terms of a perceptual path – a line of sight or gaze – by means of which A “reaches” T. Likewise for mental contact: often A “reaches” T conceptually by “moving” along a path-like structure (e.g. a chain of associations). It is not essential that A itself be conceived as traversing such paths. Described more neutrally, A controls T in the sense of being the locus of the perceptual or mental activity responsible for the contact. Control is not equivalent to activity, however. Kinds and degrees of control can be recognized for entities that are mainly passive. Although an agent controls a typical action, like cracking an egg, the patient has a secondary influence on how it unfolds, if only because of its inherent nature (it is easier to crack an egg than a rock or a wisp of smoke). Perception is notable for being a two-way street. While the perceiver controls it by being the locus of the activity constituting the perceptual experience, the stimulus does so in the sense of affording this experience – either more actively as the source of an emission (e.g. sound, odor), or passively by exhibiting a property (e.g. color, texture). A minimal but essential kind of passive control is just a matter of A providing access to T, i.e. anchoring a path that another actor follows in reaching T. The Strait of Gibraltar controls the Mediterranean in the sense that ships traverse the strait in order to reach the sea. In a chain of associations, each item affords mental access to the one that follows. Control is thus a factor in reference point relations, where a conceptualizer invokes one entity to establish mental contact with another (Langacker 1993). Serving as a conceptual reference point represents the degenerate case of control. I have cited a broad variety of phenomena as instances of control. Despite their great diversity, I see them as having an abstract commonality as divergent manifestations of the control cycle. In its level of abstraction and wide range of applications, the control cycle is not unlike the kindred notion of force dynamics. Its conceptual components are generally recognized as being fundamental to language and cognition. In its archetypal manifestation as physical capture, the control cycle incorporates the basic conceptions of motion, force, and causation. As an abstract model of broad (even ubiquitous) applicability, it incorporates

8

Ronald W. Langacker

the schematic conceptions of directionality, level of activity, and asymmetry. Thus I do not regard the control cycle as being in any way implausible. It has in fact been suggested by language, allowing varied phenomena to be handled in a coherent, unified manner. Its primary motivation is thus its utility for linguistic analysis and description.

2 Control and language The striving for control relates to language in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it figures pervasively in the conceptions that we describe or express by linguistic means. On the other hand, it is inherent in the acquisition, use, and structure of language itself. In principle, at least, we can therefore distinguish between objective control – its role as an object of description – and the subjective control exercised by the interlocutors – the subjects of conception – in speaking and understanding. In practice the distinction is less than clearcut. One reason is that the interlocutors and the speech event may themselves figure to some extent in the situation being described. Another reason is the importance of mental simulation as a factor in conceptualization. In global terms, language is both a product and an instrument of control, at both the mental and social levels. From an individual perspective, we achieve control of a language by learning it; language in turn is instrumental in constructing our mental world. But all of this transpires in a social context. From this standpoint, language learning is an aspect of socialization, with the learner as target of control. Social reality is also a target, in the sense of being largely constructed via language. And in everyday use, language serves as a primary means of influencing the behavior of others. Here our interest lies in particular manifestations of control in language structure. They are prevalent in both lexicon and grammar. I have briefly noted its relevance for lexical semantics (treated more extensively in Langacker 2009: ch. 10). Quite significant in this regard is the general tendency for verbs to select controllers as their subject. The tendency is strongest for salient types of control with a clear asymmetry between participants. In particular, verbs designating physical actions with a definite agent-patient asymmetry almost invariably specify the actor as their subject (e.g. The thief broke a window), and subjects of this sort are usually considered prototypical. Subject choice is more flexible in cases where the control asymmetry is less pronounced. When the participants are equally agentive, they can sometimes function jointly as subject: The truck and the bus collided; The brothers quarreled viciously. With verbs of perception and mental experience, the participants may be roughly comparable in their status

Modals: Striving for Control

9

as controller. In this case there are often lexical options, allowing either the experiencer or the stimulus to function as subject: I taste salt vs. The soup tastes salty; She liked it vs. It pleased her. Both options are motivated by the subject’s role as controller – either the experiencer as locus of activity, or the stimulus via its affordance. Needless to say, even asymmetrical events can perfectly well be construed in alternate ways, resulting in alternate choices of subject. When lexical options are not available, grammatical constructions can serve this purpose. Two such constructions are the passive and the “middle”: The window was broken by a thief; The window broke easily. These non-default means of expression serve various discourse functions (van Oosten 1986). More relevant here is the point that the grammatically determined subject is still reasonably characterized as a controller, albeit in a secondary sense. If nothing else, it has an influence on the action through its affordances. Adverbs like easily make this especially evident in the middle construction. There is another sense in which grammatical subjects and objects function as controllers. As analyzed in Cognitive Grammar (CG), subject and object nominals respectively specify the trajector and the landmark of a profiled relationship, i.e. its primary and secondary focal participants. Their status as foci of attention makes them targets of subjective control by the interlocutors. Owing to this prominence, however, they also serve as reference points for purposes of mentally accessing the profiled occurrence. I have argued, in fact, that the trajector/ landmark asymmetry has a temporal basis: a number of considerations suggest their description as the first and second reference points accessed (on a small time scale) in building up to a full conception of the profiled relationship (Langacker 1999a, 2008: §14.1.5). By virtue of providing mental access to a target (the relationship), reference points are passive controllers, anchoring a path traversed by the subjects of conception. For reasons of cognitive efficiency, it is natural that focal prominence should tend to be conferred on entities which also qualify as objective controllers. Linguistic interaction is a means of striving for control. It may be aimed at achieving particular results, either directly or indirectly. Minimally, producing an utterance serves the purpose of attracting, directing, and focusing the hearer’s attention. It may further be intended to elicit an overt response, either a linguistic response (such as answering a question) or a non-linguistic action (like carrying out an order). Or it may be aimed at achieving some result more indirectly, e.g. by establishing a plan of action to be followed subsequently. The intent in each case is to produce some effect, to have some influence on the world, so these can all be described as the striving for effective control.

10

Ronald W. Langacker

Linguistic interaction is also a means of striving for epistemic control, i.e. knowledge of the world, as opposed to influence over it. A basic difference is that epistemic control is always mental, whereas effective control may be manifested physically. But although the distinction is essential, these two kinds of control are closely related and not always easy to separate. For one thing, epistemic control serves the more basic purpose of effective control. We are constantly engaged in constructing what we accept (at least provisionally) as being an accurate view of the world in all its aspects (physical, mental, social, abstract). We rely on this body of accepted knowlege – our conception of reality – as a guide for further activity, allowing us to cope with the world successfully. Also, one’s state of knowledge is itself a facet of the world subject to influence, so exerting such influence is a kind of effective control. For example, an informative statement is intended to achieve the effect of augmenting the body of knowledge under the listener’s epistemic control. Discourse can thus be characterized as an intersubjective process of striving for effective and epistemic control. By using particular linguistic expressions, the interlocutors establish joint effective control in regard to their current scope of awareness and the focus of attention within it. And in so doing, they usually achieve a greater measure of alignment in their conceptions of reality, an increase in the body of knowledge that they jointly control epistemically. Our mental world provides an inexhaustible supply of diverse things and occurrences involving them. Achieving either effective or epistemic control via language requires that the interlocutors direct their joint attention to particular things and occurrences, out of all those we are capable of conceiving. Lexical nouns and verbs are generally insufficient for this purpose, as they specify types of which there may be many instances. The function of singling out a particular instance of a type, as a joint focus of attention, is referred to in CG as grounding (Langacker 2002b, 2008: ch. 9). The ground comprises the speaker and hearer, their interaction in a speech event, and the immediate circumstances. Grounding singles out an instance of a type by relating it to the ground in regard to time, space, reality, and discourse status. Starting from a lexically specified type, grounding produces a nominal (“noun phrase”) in the case of things, a finite clause in the case of occurrences. This is usually accomplished by a system of highly grammaticized elements. In English, nominal grounding is effected by determiners and certain quantifiers, clausal grounding by tense and the modals. An alternate means of nominal grounding is afforded by possessive constructions (Langacker 2004; Taylor 1996; Willemse 2005). Whereas a lexical noun such as laptop evokes a type with an open-ended set of instances, the nominal

Modals: Striving for Control

11

Sally’s laptop identifies the intended discourse referent as the one associated with Sally. By invoking Sally as a point of reference, the speaker directs the hearer’s attention to a particular instance of laptop out of all those that might conceivably be referred to. The laptop is thus a target of joint, subjective, mental control by the interlocutors, in both the weaker sense of mental contact and the stronger sense of being the focus of attention. This intersubjective control has both epistemic and effective aspects. It is epistemic by virtue of having no objective impact on the target or the world. With respect to the speaker-hearer interaction, it is effective in the sense that the speaker directs the hearer’s attention to the target. And regarding the laptop as a mental entity (an object of thought), the control is also effective in that the interlocutors “capture” it and momentarily “hold” it in the focus of attention. Possessive locutions involve both subjective control by the interlocutors and objective control on the part of the possessor. In some way, to some extent, the referent of the possessor nominal (Sally) controls the target (laptop) objectively, as a facet of the situation described. This objective control has both effective and epistemic components. In terms of effective control, Sally controls her laptop physically when she holds it, operates it, cleans it, or merely keeps it in a certain place. She controls it socially through ownership or the privilege of access. In epistemic terms, she controls it perceptually whenever she sees, hears, or feels it. She controls it mentally by knowing how it functions or just by thinking of it. Possession, of course, is not just a matter of ownership, which at best is prototypical. Other central uses are for kinship and whole-part relations, which also involve control on different levels. With the former, knowing a relative’s place in the system of kinship relationships is a kind of epistemic control at the mental level. This affords effective control at the social level through expected attitudes and behavior. A whole controls its parts in various ways and to different degrees. In one way or another, a sentient creature has both physical and sensory control of its body parts, even its internal organs: only Sally can feel a pain in her stomach (she has exclusive sensory access to it), and when she moves around her stomach moves with her. Possessive constructions are notorious for allowing a great variety of relationships between the possessor and the possessed. But even most non-central uses exhibit some form or vestige of active objective control. In a case like Sally’s pain, Sally may not be able to make the pain go away, but she does control it in the sense of being the locus of mental activity and sensory experience. In the puzzle’s solution, the possessor does not engage in activity of any sort. By its very nature and structure, however, it constrains the activity of the puzzle solver by determining what will count as a solution. The possessor’s active con-

12

Ronald W. Langacker

trol diminishes to the vanishing point in examples like the building’s height. We can say that The puzzle affords a solution, but hardly that *The building affords a height. Yet it does have vertical extension, permitting measurement to ascertain its height. Both physically and conceptually, a building controls its height by providing access to it – without the building, there is no height. Such examples illustrate the gradual transition from active to passive control, from activity to affordance to merely anchoring a path of access. Moving from central to more peripheral cases of possession, we thus observe a progressive attenuation in the control exercised by the possessor, with respect to both kind (physical > sensory > mental) and degree (activity > affordance > access by another). At the extreme, the possessor serves only as a conceptual reference point, a point of mental access allowing the interlocutors to jointly establish mental contact with a nominal referent. This I take to be the schematic meaning shared by all possessive expressions. As subjects of conception, the speaker and hearer exercise active, subjective, mental control over the thing possessed, invoking the possessor as a reference point for this purpose. To varying degrees, then, the possessor’s objective control of the target provides the basis for the path the interlocutors follow in achieving subjective control of it. I make the further suggestion that their subjective control is immanent in – “lies within” – their apprehension of the possessor’s objective control. Since the objective control relationship is asymmetrical, with a path of influence or access leading from possessor to possessed, the subjects of conception must follow such a path as an inherent aspect of their conceptualization: the conception of Sally holding, using, owning, or seeing her laptop involves a mental progression from Sally to the laptop, and thus requires that Sally first be invoked to anchor it (at some level of processing). The CG characterization of possessives as a reference point construction is sketched in Figure 2. For prototypical cases, a double solid arrow indicates that the possessor (R) controls the possessed (T) objectively in some fashion, hence T is in R’s dominion (DR ). This allows the conceptualizers (C) to gain subjective control of T by making it the joint focus of attention. Dashed arrows represent their path of mental access. They first “capture” R by making it their focus of attention. Incorporating R in their attentional dominion (DC) creates the possibility of establishing mental contact with the elements R controls, including T – by virtue of R’s association with T, T now lies in the conceptualizers’ range of potential interaction, i.e. their field (FC). They realize this potential by shifting their attention to T, so what was formerly the field is now their locus of attention (FC > DC ).

Modals: Striving for Control

13

Figure 2

We obtain the possessive schema just by abstracting away from the objective control relationship. Though part of the objective situation, R controls T only in the degenerate sense of anchoring a path of mental access on the part of C. The relation between the prototype and the schema is an instance of subjectification as I myself use that term (Langacker 1998, 1999b; cf. Traugott 1989): for cases where basic mental operations that are immanent in a complex conception gain sufficient autonomy to be manifested independently of it. So defined, subjectification is a recurrent factor in grammaticization. It is reflected synchronically in the relationship between more specific and more schematic meanings of many elements, as in diagrams (a) and (b). Possessives illustrate a general claim of CG (Langacker 2008: §14.3): that certain fundamental grammatical notions – minimally including noun, verb, subject, object, and possessive – are susceptible to semantic characterization at both the schematic and the prototype levels. Serving as their prototypes are experientially grounded conceptual archetypes, such as ownership, kinship, and whole-part relations. Their schematic import consists in basic mental operations immanent in (and initially manifested in) those archetypes. Thus the prototypes and schemas are related by subjectification. For clausal subjects and objects, the archetypal notions agent and patient serve respectively as their prototypes. In canonical agent-patient interactions, the subject is the primary controller by virtue of being a willful actor and a source of energy that affects the patient. But as a patient, the object is also a secondary controller in the sense of either experiencing the interaction or having some influence on it through affordances. So in addition to the agent controlling the patient, they both control the event by playing their respective roles in its occurrence. The schematic characterizations proposed for subject and object in

14

Ronald W. Langacker

CG – first and second reference points mentally accessed in apprehending the profiled occurrence – represent the subjectification of these control relationships. Moreover, since both participants are reference points for the target event, they both qualify as possessors when the event undergoes nominalization to derive an abstract thing. This explains the cross-linguistic prevalence of possessive locutions like Sally’s complaint or the city’s destruction.

3 Effective and epistemic levels I have dwelt on control and its many linguistic manifestations because it provides the basis for understanding modals and their behavior. We will start with a general consideration of English modals, including the nature of the effective vs. epistemic opposition (Langacker 2010). Each type of modal will then be examined in more detail.

3.1 General characterization For the grammaticized English modals, either their presence or their absence has epistemic import. The absence of a modal indicates that the occurrence profiled by a finite clause is accepted by the conceptualizer (C) as being “real”, i.e. as something that C actually knows. The inclusion of a modal denies it that status. This is true not only for epistemic modals, as in (1)(b), but also for effective (root or deontic) modals, as in (1)(c). It is also true whether the profiled occurrence – or process, to use the technical CG term – is imagined as occurring at present or in the future. Both interpretations are possible in (1)(b): likely (but not yet known) is Jane’s attendence at either a future wedding or one going on right now. Matters are a bit more subtle in (1)(c). Once more it can either be a future or a present wedding, and in both cases Jane’s attendence is denied the status of being real, but for different reasons. A future event cannot yet be known because we cannot predict the future with total confidence – there is always a veil of uncertainty. The present can be known, but should in (1)(c) is counterfactual: it indicates that Jane is not in fact there despite her obligation to attend. (1) a.

Absence of a modal: Jane is at the wedding. [occurrence is known, accepted as real]

b.

Epistemic modal: Jane should be at the wedding. [likely but not actually known]

c.

Effective modal: Jane should be at the wedding. [social obligation as yet unfulfilled]

Modals: Striving for Control

15

We see, then, that the expressions in (1)(b) and (c) are not just formally identical but are also equivalent in meaning at a certain level of abstraction: in highly schematic terms, effective and epistemic modals have the same effect on the meaning of a clause, indicating that the profiled occurrence is not accepted as real. This schematic characterization invokes an idealized cognitive model pertaining to fundamental aspects of our experience in the world. According to the reality model, affairs in our world have unfolded in a particular way, out of all the ways conceivable. There has been a certain course of events, whereby certain events and situations have occurred, while countless others have not. Reality (R) is the history of occurrences, up through the present moment. This history cannot be changed; what has happened has happened. Reality is thus the established course of events. Future events are excluded from reality (so defined) because they have not yet occurred and thus have not been either established or fully determined. Moreover, our knowledge of reality is only partial and imperfect. Each of us has our own “take” on it, our own reality conception (RC). For a given conceptualizer (C), RC comprises what C accepts as real – i.e. as having occurred, or having been realized. This conception is always incomplete, and C is bound to be mistaken in many respects. But rightly or wrongly, RC is what C knows. In terms of the control cycle, it constitutes C’s epistemic dominion. The basic pattern for English finite clauses is thus as sketched in Figure 3. The absence of a modal indicates that the conceptualizer accepts the profiled clausal process (p) as being real, as in (1)(a). It is under control as part of C’s epistemic dominion. By default, this is subjective control by the speaker. On the other hand, the presence of a modal places the profiled occurrence outside C’s conception of reality. C does not now accept p as being real. Because C is making this assessment, however, p does appear in C’s field (F), or scope of awareness for this purpose. Its presence there creates a state of tension, consisting in the need to resolve its status. The different modals specify various kinds and degrees of force – represented by a double arrow – tending toward its incorporation in RC. But they all instantiate the schematic characterization in Figure 3(b), where p is not yet part of C’s dominion.

Figure 3

16

Ronald W. Langacker

If Figure 3(b) represents their abstract commonality, what distinguishes epistemic and effective modals? One suggestion is that the difference resides in whether the modal force applies at the mental or the social level: should pertains to knowledge in (1)(b), to social obligation in (1)(c). This is not bad as a first approximation, since most effective modals do convey force in the social realm. Not all of them do, however. A notable case is the use of can for physical ability, e.g. (2)(a). Thus Sweetser (1990: ch. 3) comes closer in describing the two kinds of modals as pertaining respectively to the “sociophysical” domain and the “epistemic” domain of reasoning. But the ability conveyed by can need not be physical – it may be purely mental, as in (2)(b). And “reasoning” is perhaps too strong a term for the assessments reflected in the everyday use of epistemic modals, such as (2)(c). (2)

a.

She can lift that rock quite easily. [physical ability rather than social force]

b. She can calculate square roots in her head. [mental (not physical) ability] c.

Spain might win the World Cup – I really feel they have a chance. [not “reasoning”]

The schematic commonality in Figure 3(b) is further indication that the effective/epistemic opposition is not just a difference in levels. Effective modals have an epistemic component. In uttering (1)(c), the speaker conveys not only a social obligation but also that the occurrence is unrealized. Likewise, in (2)(a) the speaker portrays the lifting as merely potential: it is not happening now, nor is it directly specified that it has ever actually occurred. So with both kinds of modals the speaker assesses the epistemic status of the target process (p), starting along a path of mental control without arriving at the result phase, where p is accepted as real. The difference, then, is whether the force inheres solely in C’s epistemic assessment, affecting only what C knows, or whether it also operates outside this realm, with the potential to influence what happens in the world. Epistemic modality is therefore immanent in effective modality, being what remains when all vestiges of effective control fade away. The diagrams in Figure 4 show this immanence relation. The position of the arrows is meant to indicate location of the modal force. For effective modals, in diagram (a), the small arrow represents the force inherent in C’s epistemic assessment. As an aspect of C’s mental processing, this internal force has no potential to affect the outside world directly. The large arrow represents some external force which does have such potential. The force itself is accepted by C

Modals: Striving for Control

17

as being real –it belongs to the portion of reality (R) that C knows about (RC). But while it tends toward realization of the target process (p), the process itself is usually conceived as lying outside reality. Observe, now, that diagram (b) is obtained just by removing the larger arrow from diagram (a): being immanent in effective modality, epistemic modality remains when effective force fades from the picture.1 The essential force is now C’s mental striving for epistemic control, in assessing whether p should be incorporated in RC.

Figure 4

Reality is depicted by a dashed-line ellipse in 4(b) to indicate that p does not necessarily lie outside it in the case of epistemic modals. This contrast with effective modals reflects a difference in the locus of modal force as well as the dominion. For effective modals, the relevant dominion is reality itself – the modal force is aimed at influencing the actual course of events. The realization of p is thus a matter of its occurring, which brings it into the established history of events (R). By contrast, for epistemic modals the dominion is C’s conception of reality (RC), and the modal force is C’s internal striving for knowledge. Because RC is just the “known” portion of R, potential targets (p) include not only occurrences outside of R, but also those which are part of R but not yet known. The alternate dominions entail a difference in temporal relationships. Reality comprises past occurrences as well as present situations, and once established this history cannot be changed. So when R is the dominion, a specific target outside it must lie in the future. Construed effectively, as imposing an obligation, (3)(a) can only pertain to a future occurrence. But when the dominion is merely a reality conception (RC), an occurrence can be outside it either because it has not yet transpired or else because it has and C does not yet know it. So as an epistemic assessment of possibility, (3)(b) pertains to either a future or a present situation. 1 The difference represents a special case of the development from “event-oriented” to “speaker-oriented” meanings, which Narrog (2005) argues to be an overarching tendency of semantic change in modals.

18 (3)

Ronald W. Langacker

a.

She must be at the wedding. [effective; obligation; future occurrence only]

b.

She may be at the wedding. [epistemic; possibility; future or present]

c.

Possibly she was at the wedding. [possibility of a past occurrence]

d.

She might be at the wedding. [tenuous possibility; future or present]

e.

She may have been at the wedding. [present situation reflecting a past occurrence]

While this basic picture seems clear enough, let me briefly note some complications. There is first the question of why epistemic modals cannot pertain to the past, since we can perfectly well learn of past occurrences not known previously. Indeed, we can express a comparable notion adverbially, as in (3)(c). The reason may simply be that English tense and modals are closely bound up with one another in the grammaticized system of clausal grounding, with forms like might having specialized meanings. Being strongly associated with tenuous possibility, as in (3)(d), might is generally not available to indicate the possibility of a past occurrence.2 Instead we use the present perfect, as in (3)(e). In the CG analysis, such expressions describe the past occurrence only indirectly, in reference to a present situation that reflects it. The rationale for effective modality being limited to the future holds only for specific occurrences. When can describes general ability, as in (2)(a)–(b), the profiled event is a virtual entity representing any number of actual instances, so it has no particular temporal location. The same is true for generics, habituals, and other generalizations about the world (Langacker 1997, 2005): (4) a.

A waiter will always accept a generous tip.

b.

When they’re gone, my neighbors’ dog will bark for hours on end.

c.

Zinc will dissolve in hydrochloric acid.

There are also certain cases where an effective modal grounds a specific occurrence temporally located in the present, as in (5)(a)–(b). The implication is that the obligation has been in effect for some time, culminating in the present situation. There are also uses like (5)(c)–(e), in which the expectation of a present occurrence remains unfulfilled. These are actually in conformity with 2 It is however used for describing a previous epistemic assessment, as in the following: I thought she might be at the wedding – I said to myself “She may be here” (Langacker 2009: ch. 7).

Modals: Striving for Control

19

Figure 4(a), since p is external to R – not in regard to time, but by virtue of counterfactuality. (5)

a.

She’s at the wedding, as well she should be.

b.

She’s here because she must be.

c.

She should be at the wedding, but she isn’t.

d.

She could be at the wedding if she wanted.

e.

She would be at the wedding if she could.

3.2 Effective control With effective modals, the modal force consists in something more than the striving for knowledge by the subject of conception. It is objective in the sense of being aimed at influencing (not just apprehending) the evolution of reality. The control being sought is likewise objective rather than subjective: incorporation of the target process in reality itself (not just the conception of reality). Who, then, is the controller? There is no single or simple answer to this question. A schematic characterization, valid for all instances, is limited to what is shown in Figure 4(a). All we can say in general is that some kind of force, impetus, or potency tends toward the target’s realization. This potency varies greatly in regard to its locus, strength, and level of manifestation. Two factors in the locus of the potency are its source and its target. While these can basically be identified as the controller and the target process, a finergrained analysis reveals certain subtleties. Central issues include the extent to which the source and target can be localized, as well as the extent of their objectivity. In CG, the terms subjective and objective are understood as pertaining to the subject and object of conception. Their linguistic application pertains to the canonical “viewing arrangement” for the apprehension of expressions, represented in Figure 5. The speaker and hearer function as subjects of conception. Through their interaction in the ground, they achieve a measure of coordination in their scope of awareness and directing of attention. The maximal scope of awareness (MS) includes the ground as well as the objective scene (OS), i.e. the situation being described. At a given moment, the interlocutors attend to a certain portion of OS, the immediate scope (IS), and focus their attention on a particular entity within it, the profile (p) – a thing in the case of nominals, an occurrence (or process) in the case of clauses. The subject/object asymmetry is

20

Ronald W. Langacker

Figure 5

strongest in the canonical circumstance where the objective scene and the ground are clearly distinct: the profile is maximally prominent as the focused object of conception, while the interlocutors remain offstage as implicit conceptualizing subjects. Usually, though, the distinction is blurred because the ground figures to some extent in the situation being talked about. The interlocutors may then function as objects of description in addition to their tacit role as subjects. Let us now consider the locus of the modal impetus with respect to its degree of objectivity. For both the source and the target of effective potency, we can observe a spectrum of possibilities roughly described in (6). Overall they range from maximal to minimal objectivity. Maximal objectivity attaches to the central participants of the relationship profiled by a lexical predicate or a finite clause, who are made explicit and put onstage as foci of attention. At the other end of the scale are epistemic modals – lacking effective force, their (noneffective) potency resides in the subject of conception. The source and target of effective modals lie in between these two extremes, which are thus parenthesized but included for sake of comparison. (6) (Focal Participant) > Interlocutor > Specific/Identified > Diffuse > (None) A range of options for the source of the modal impetus are exemplified in (7) and sketched in Figure 6. Examples (a) and (f ) represent the endpoints on the scale of objectivity, with effective modals corresponding to the intermediate cases. In (a), the lexical predicate (be) able describes an effective control relationship comparable to that expressed by can, putting it onstage as the profile of a matrix clause whose complement designates the target event. A dotted correspondence line identifies the controller as also being the main participant in this event. Represented by a double arrow, the effective force is only latent: the control inherent in her being able to program a computer is not now being

Modals: Striving for Control

21

exercised, but merely has that potential. Its source is maximally objective by virtue of being clearly identified and highly prominent as the trajector (primary focal participant) of the profiled occurrence (i.e. as clausal subject). At the other extreme, in (f), the effective controller is minimally objective because there is none – might is an epistemic modal. It represents the degenerate case of effective control, the controller having the limiting value (zero) in regard to both prominence and identification. When the last vestige of effective control fades away, we are left with an epistemic modal, where the only force involved is the speaker’s striving for knowledge. Because the speaker remains implicit as the subject of conception, the controller and the force are maximally subjective. (7)

a.

She is quite able to program a computer. [clausal subject (lexical predicate)]

b.

She can run a marathon in under four hours. [clausal subject]

c.

She must attend the wedding – I insist. [speaker]

d.

She may go to the concert, her mother says. [specific individual]

e.

She should be more considerate. [diffuse]

f.

She might be angry. [speaker (epistemic modal)]

Figure 6

22

Ronald W. Langacker

Examples (b)–(e) illustrate the range of possibilities for effective modals. Respectively, they show that the original source of impetus can be the clausal subject, the speaker, another specific individual, or something more diffuse that may or may not be identifiable. In the case of (e), for instance, the source might be the speaker, something less tangible like social expectations, or something even harder to pin down (e.g. the overall circumstances being such that she would benefit from being more considerate). In all cases, I take the modal force as being intermediate in regard to objectivity. On the one hand, it is part of the objective situation, with potential influence outside the speaker’s mental realm. On the other hand, the force has a lesser degree of objectivity than it does with a lexical predicate like able, first because it is not made salient as the clausal profile, and second, because the controller is usually implicit and often not clearly delineated. Various considerations support the claim that the modal force is unprofiled in English finite clauses. It is a special case of the general claim (argued for in Langacker 2002b) that English grounding elements profile the grounded thing or process, not the grounding relationship. Reflecting its unprofiled status is the fact that the interlocutors remain implicit – they participate as subjects (rather than objects) of conception.3 Another consideration relates to the fact that English modals belong to a highly grammaticized grounding system. For the modal force to be unprofiled is thus in accordance with a general proposal by Boye and Harder (2009), namely that grammatical (as opposed to lexical) status is a matter of an element’s meaning being coded as “secondary information”. One can also make an argument based on the function of finite clauses as a means of achieving effective or epistemic control. At the most basic level, they serve this function by allowing the interlocutors to direct their joint attention to a particular occurrence (instance of a process type) out of all those conceivable. A natural proposal, then, is to analyze clauses with modals as aligning with their function: modals represent the offstage striving for control of the profiled occurrence. This is merely suggestive, however, since effective or epistemic striving may itself be the focus of interest and attention, put onstage and profiled by predicates like want, able, know, believe, etc. That a finite clause profiles the grounded process, rather than the grounding relationship, seems quite evident in the case of tense: we clearly want to say that She lifted the rock designates the act of lifting, not the relation of temporal precedence. It is not so evident with modals, owing to their more elaborate conceptual content. And since modal force is essential to the meaning of a clause, 3 This does not preclude their being made overt as part of a larger expression serving to elaborate on the stance conveyed by a clause, as with I insist in (7)(c).

Modals: Striving for Control

23

one might argue that it has to be profiled. By definition, however, profiling is a matter of reference rather than importance; an expression’s profile is what it designates, or refers to, not its essential content.4 So it is perfectly coherent to claim that She must attend the wedding refers to the act of attending – the object of description and focus of attention – even though the point of the utterance is to impose the obligation. Admittedly, the “ability” sense of can is potentially problematic in this regard. She can lift that rock seems directly parallel to She is able to lift that rock, which profiles effective control localized in the trajector. Such examples most closely resemble the diachronic source construction, and should perhaps be analyzed as a vestige of it. I am open to the possibility that they might differ from other modal uses in regard to profiling, or even that the profiling of modal force might in general be a matter of degree. But since can belongs to a cohesive system of modals grammatically distinct from lexical predicates, I want to pursue the feasibility of a uniform analysis. I believe, in fact, that such an analysis is both possible and reasonable. Accordingly, the modal force is shown as being unprofiled in Figure 6(b), just as it is in 6(c)–(e). The ‘ability’ sense of can seems different because it is harder to separate the effective force from the effected occurrence – the ability to perform an action is inherent in the actor and arguably in the action itself. Since it is not clearly distinct from the target occurrence, in Figure 6(b) I have shown the effective force as being within the immediate scope (the general locus of attention). This does not imply that it is profiled, however.5 Its status in 6(b) is perfectly consistent with the general characterization offered for effective modals: the modal force is somewhere within the objective situation (OS), but it is unprofiled and its locus is variable. As special case, then, it can perfectly well inhere in the clausal subject, making it parallel to a predicate like able apart from profiling. Indeed, the ‘ability’ sense of can shades off into others in which the modal force is harder to localize and resembles that of other modals. In (8)(b), physical ability is less important than lifting and the willingness to do it. In (8)(c), the control exercised by the house is at most a matter of affordance. And in (8)(d)– (e) the source of potency is quite diffuse, to the extent that can verges on being epistemic. Still, all these cases do involve effective force (the potential for realization in R, not just RC).

4 Note, for instance, that uncle designates a person (a kind of thing), while its essential content consists in the kinship relationship between the referent and another individual. 5 Analogously, the kinship relationship falls within the immediate scope of uncle but is not its profile (the specific focus of attention). Note that profiling is just one kind of attentional focusing, with a referential function. Nothing prevents the unprofiled modal force from being the informational focus, e.g. She CAN lift that rock.

24

Ronald W. Langacker

(8) a.

She can lift that rock. X She is able to lift that rock.

b.

I can lift that bag, if you like.

c.

A house can be destroyed by termites.

d.

It can rain in the desert.

e.

There can be acrimony in faculty meetings.

Let us now consider the target of effective force. In one sense, the target can always be identified as the profiled occurrence, effective control consisting in its realization. But often the force is directed at (and channeled through) a particular individual who is in some way responsible for its realization. That individual is also a kind of target, which varies in objectivity as described in (6). Some examples are given in (9) and sketched in Figure 7. With a lexical verb like force, as in (a), the source and target of potency are both construed with maximal objectivity, specific individuals made prominent as focal participants in the causal event. The source is coded as (grammatical) subject of the matrix clause, the target as its object. In contrast to a lexical verb, a modal leaves the effective force unprofiled. The source of the potency is variable and may be indeterminate; it is not necessarily the speaker, who may simply be reporting the obligation imposed by another individual or just by social expectations. (9)

a.

He forced her to attend the wedding. [clausal object (lexical predicate)]

b.

You must attend the wedding. [hearer (as clausal subject)]

c.

She must attend the wedding. [specific individual (as clausal subject)]

d.

Beer must be served at the wedding. [diffuse]

Here, though, our concern is with the target. Commonly the target is the hearer, as in (b). It may also be another specific individual, as in (c). In either case it tends to coincide with the clausal subject, which typically codes the individual who carries out the profiled event and in that sense is responsible for it. This is merely typical, however. The force may instead be directed at some unmentioned intermediary (possibly the hearer), who is expected to induce the occurrence. And sometimes, as in (d), the subject is incapable of responsibility. Especially in such examples, there may in fact be no identifiable target – the target is maximally diffuse, hence indistinguishable from the profiled occurrence itself. As a notational device, I show this in (d) by extending the force arrow only to the box representing the occurrence as a whole, not to the circle representing its trajector, as in (a)–(c).

Modals: Striving for Control

25

Figure 7

This subtle notational distinction represents a subtle but important conceptual distinction. Causation in general is often vague in regard to whether the effective force is directed at the caused event as a whole or specifically at its controlling participant. With verbs like force, compel, and induce, the target is normally specific, whereas cause itself is more flexible. In each case the main participant in the caused event (its trajector) is coded grammatically as object of the matrix verb (its landmark), as indicated by the bracketing in (10)(a). The difference shows up in (10)(b), where the matrix clause is passivized. The passive is quite acceptable with force, compel, and induce, but problematic with cause. The reason, I suggest, is that the causal force is specifically directed at the object only in the former, as shown in Figure 8. Since cause is less specific in this respect, it has a lesser degree of transitivity, which in English is a major determinant of passivizability (Rice 1987a, 1987b). For the same reason only cause is fully compatible with objects not interpretable as controllers with respect to the infinitival complement, as seen in (10)(c)–(d). While the object is focused by cause as its landmark, it is not construed as the target of force – the target is diffuse (non-distinct from the event as a whole).

26 (10)

Ronald W. Langacker

a.

I {forced / compelled / induced / caused} her [to attend the wedding].

b.

She was {forced / compelled / induced / ??caused} [to attend the wedding].

c.

I {*forced / *compelled / *induced / caused} beer [to be served at the wedding].

d.

I {*forced / *compelled / *induced / caused} there [to be beer at the wedding].

Figure 8

An analogous distinction can be made for control at the perceptual level. A sentence like (11)(a) is ambivalent (actually, amtrivalent) in regard to what is seen. Though often neutralized, the distinctions can be made prosodically, most clearly in response to a question. The target of perception can be the global situation, in which case the answer is uttered without a pause. Alternatively, there are two objects of perception: Sheila and the activity she engages in. Indicating this duality is a slight hesitation (/) between them. Under a final interpretation, only Sheila is specifically construed as the perceptual target, the activity functioning merely as the context in which it appears. This is marked by setting off the nominal with final, falling intonation (↓). These respective options are sketched in Figure 9, the object(s) of perception being drawn with heavy lines.

Figure 9

(11) a. b.

I saw Sheila working in the yard. A: What did you see? B: (i) Sheila working in the yard. (ii) Sheila / working in the yard. (iii) Sheila↓ / working in the yard.

3.3 Epistemic control As effective control fades away through attenuation and diffusion in its locus, its epistemic component comes to the fore. The striving for epistemic control occurs

Modals: Striving for Control

27

at the mental level, being aimed at p’s incorporation in a body of accepted knowledge. The epistemic dominion is thus a conception of reality (RC), as opposed to reality itself. The modal force is internal to the conceptualizer (C), an aspect of C’s mental activity. But who is C? The short answer is that C is the speaker, as shown in Figure 6 (f). By default, the epistemic assessment expressed by might in (7)(f), She might be angry, is taken as reflecting the current speaker’s actual view. But obviously the short answer greatly oversimplifies matters. In a wide range of cases, use of a modal to ground a finite clause does not imply that the speaker subscribes to the modal assessment. As a general characterization, the conceptualizer invoked by epistemic modals is a virtual entity not identified with any particular individual; its specific identity, should it have one, is determined by the overall context. Particular individuals, including the speaker, can identify with C to varying degrees, assuming the role of C in making the assessment. From this perspective, the default situation – where the speaker fully identifies with C – is just a special case. In (12) I give a few cases where the speaker produces a finite clause but does not subscribe to the modal assessment. The initial clause in (a) is echoic, reflecting the hearer’s view rather than the speaker’s. In (b), the adverb perhaps insulates the speaker from the epistemic stance expressed by will; circumstances warranting the prediction of a US victory can be imagined but are not too likely. For the judgment expressed by might in the complement clause of (c), the conceptualizer is identified as the matrix subject. And in (d), the identity of C (the source of the idea) is indeterminate. (12) a.

She may be angry, you say. Well, I know for a fact she’s not.

b.

Perhaps the US will win the next World Cup.

c.

Racquel mistakenly claims that it might rain tomorrow.

d.

The idea that I must be jealous is just erroneous.

Of course, the need to distinguish C from the actual speaker is not limited to epistemic modality, but holds for grounding in general. We see this in (13), where the speaker rejects the position expressed by grounding in the complement clause, whether it be a matter of epistemic modality, effective modality, or acceptance in RC. (13) a.

It’s not the case that she will be at the wedding. [epistemic modal]

b.

It’s not the case that she should be at the wedding. [effective modal]

c.

It’s not the case that she was at the wedding. [absence of modal]

28

Ronald W. Langacker

Examples like (12)–(13) involve the striving for epistemic control at a higher level, with a special kind of target. In the case of clausal grounding, the target is an occurrence (i.e. an event or situation). The grounding of an occurrence produces a finite clause, which expresses a proposition. Because it incorporates both an occurrence and an assessment of it, a proposition is necessarily abstract: it is not itself the sort of thing that occurs, nor can it be caused, so it is not per se subject to effective control. It can however be apprehended and assessed for validity, so it is subject to epistemic control. Assessing its validity constitutes the striving for control – the potential phase of the control cycle – at this level. Accepting it as valid (i.e. as being in conformity with reality) constitutes the action phase. The result phase finds the target proposition (P) established in the conceptualizer’s epistemic dominion, which at this level consists in a set of propositions (grounded occurrences). While they cannot per se be caused, propositions can be formulated, entertained, evaluated, and negotiated. Crucially, the same proposition can be entertained by multiple conceptualizers, who may well disagree in their assessment of its validity. And because its acceptance is at issue, a given conceptualizer may or may not subscribe to the judgment expressed by clausal grounding. Hence the virtual conceptualizer invoked by clausal grounding – internal to a proposition – has to be distinguished from an external conceptualizer who apprehends the proposition and assesses its validity. Only as a special case does the latter fully identify with the former. A clear understanding of these complexities is essential for conceptual, semantic, and grammatical analysis. For present purposes, we need to distinguish at least three conceptualizers and levels of assessment. Unsubscripted C will indicate the virtual conceptualizer invoked by clausal grounding. C0 will indicate the current speaker, the “original” conceptualizer who apprehends the others as well as the nature of their conceptions. Additional conceptualizers (notably onstage participants) can then be represented as C1 , C2 , etc. Let me also underscore the notational distinction between p, a profiled process (or occurrence), and P, the proposition derived from a process by grounding. Still, these layers of complexity are best thought of as optional elaborations of a simpler, baseline situation where only one level of assessment comes into play (Langacker 2012). In this default situation, the speaker is simply making a statement about an occurrence; its status as a proposition subject to evaluation and negotiation by other conceptualizers remains in the background.6 So there is not yet any basis for distinguishing C and C0: as shown in 6 In the baseline situation, it remains in the background for the hearer as well. The hearer is merely expected to apprehend the expression, resulting in momentary alignment of the interlocutors’ scope of awareness and focus of attention. Explicitly viewing it as a proposition to be assessed and negotiated constitutes an elaboration of the baseline situation.

Modals: Striving for Control

29

Figure 10(a), the grounding of p reflects the speaker’s actual assessment. Note that the dashed arrow is neutral as to the type of assessment involved; it may indicate acceptance in RC (as in the example She is angry), but it can also stand for effective or epistemic striving (She should be angry; She may be angry).

Figure 10

The distinction between C and C 0 becomes significant with the addition of an insulating adverb like perhaps. It establishes some “distance” between the assessment conveyed by grounding and the speaker’s actual assessment. Without necessarily disagreeing with C’s position, the adverb gives explicit indication that the speaker views it from “outside” as a proposition requiring evaluation, and that its outcome is not assured. In other words, perhaps corresponds to the potential phase of the epistemic control cycle for propositions. If perhaps represents the potential phase, certainly represents the result phase: the speaker accepts P as valid. This acceptance has the consequence that C0 subscribes to the stance of C in regard to p. To this extent, at least, C0 identifies with C, as indicated by the dotted line in Figure 10(c). Adverbs like perhaps and certainly do not imply a conceptualizer other than C and C0 (although they may allow this interpretation). By contrast, many lexical predicates do have this feature, notably predicates of “propositional attitude”. Two such cases are suspect and (be) certain, which introduce an additional conceptualizer, C1, as their trajector. Like perhaps and certainly, they correspond respectively to the potential and result phases of the epistemic control cycle. But unlike the adverbs, they profile the process of epistemic assessment (in this case, a stable situation), and this process can be grounded to form a finite clause – the matrix clause, with the proposition as its complement. In Figure 11

30

Ronald W. Langacker

(a)–(b), I have shown this as a baseline clause, where the grounding conceptualizer is simply the speaker (C0). In both cases, the speaker accepts the matrix occurrence as real (there being no modal). However, the speaker need not subscribe to the grounding assessment of the complement. In stating He suspects she is angry or He is certain she is angry, the speaker is not committing to the view that she actually is.

Figure 11

With suspect in 11(a), the three conceptualizers are clearly distinct. Unlike C, C1 has not yet accepted her anger as being real, and the speaker’s position in this regard is left unspecified. The situation is different in 11(b) because certain is a result-phase predicate, indicating that C1 accepts the complement proposition (P1 ) as being valid. Accepting P1 as valid implies that C1 identifies with C in accepting p (her anger) as being real. The same holds in 11(c), with realize: by judging P1 to be valid, C1 effectively assumes the role of C in the complement. Here, though, the speaker also identifies with C. Realize is a factive predicate (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970), i.e. it presupposes the truth of its complement. What this amounts to, in the present perspective, is that the identification of C0 with C is included as an aspect of its meaning. Thus C, C0 , and C1 all have the same stance in regard to p.

4 Transparency An important feature of language design is a kind of “fractal” arrangement, where analogous phenomena occur at multiple levels of semantic and grammatical organization. In regard to effective and epistemic control, we have noted certain parallels in the distinctions made by clausal grounding and, at a higher level, by complementation and matrix predicates. Also manifested at both levels is the phenomenon known as “raising”, for which a more neutral term is transparency.

Modals: Striving for Control

31

4.1 The phenomenon In certain non-finite complement constructions, the matrix clause exhibits transparency in the sense that it imposes no restrictions on what can appear as its subject or, alternatively, as its object: anything allowable as the subject of the complement can instead appear, in lieu of the complement, as subject or object of the matrix. For instance, the subjects in (14) are not compatible with likely outside this construction (*There is likely; *Offense is likely). They are however appropriate as subject of the complement clause, reflecting the existential there construction (There will be beer at the wedding) and the passivized lexical phrase take offense at (Offense will be taken at her remarks). Similarly, the objects in (15) are not compatible with expect outside this construction (*He expected there; *He expected offense). Once more they owe their appearance to their appropriateness as complement subject. (14)

Subject complements a. There is likely [to be beer at the wedding]. (cf. *There is likely; [That there will be beer at the wedding] is likely.) b. Offense is likely [to be taken at her remarks]. (cf. *Offense is likely; [That offense will be taken at her remarks] is likely.)

(15)

Object complements a. He expected there [to be beer at the wedding]. (cf. *He expected there; He expected [that there would be beer at the wedding].) b. He expected offense [to be taken at her remarks]. (cf. *He expected offense; He expected [that offense would be taken at her remarks].)

In a derivational framework, an obvious approach is to posit a rule that raises the complement subject into the matrix clause, where it assumes the complement’s grammatical role; devoid of a subject, the complement takes infinitival form and is moved to final position (Postal 1974). Though it has a certain elegance, a movement analysis is problematic from both the descriptive and theoretical standpoints. A non-derivational CG alternative was outlined in Langacker 1995. The main point here is that English modals exhibit a comparable transparency. As shown in (16), a modal imposes no restrictions on a subject that

32

Ronald W. Langacker

appears with it, allowing anything permissible as subject of the grounded verb. Observe that this is true for both effective and epistemic modals, so transparency cannot be taken as the basis for distinguishing them. (16) Modal transparency a. Effective: Should there be beer at the wedding? Yes, there should. b.

Epistemic: Will offense be taken at her remarks? Yes, it will.

4.2 Lexical predicates In standard accounts, raising predicates are distinguished from control predicates, which do not show transparency. So in contrast to raising predicates such as likely and expect, the control predicates able and persuade impose their own restrictions on what can appear as their subject or object, as seen in (17). Rather than being “raised” into the matrix clause, the nominal in question is analyzed as being its “true”, “logical”, “underlying”, or “base-generated” subject or object. Hence sentences that appear to be structurally parallel are given very different grammatical analyses, as shown in (18). With a control verb like persuade, the surface object is also the underlying object, and the coindexed complement subject is either deleted (“equi-NP deletion”) or is simply taken to be a pro form with no phonological realization. By contrast, the surface object of expect is raised from its underlying position as complement subject. (17)

(18)

a.

*There is able [to be beer at the wedding].

b.

*Offense is able [to be taken at her remarks].

c.

*He persuaded there [to be beer at the wedding].

d.

*He persuaded offense [to be taken at her remarks].

a.

Control: she persuaded himi [hei resign] % she persuaded him i [Øi to resign]

b. Raising: she expected [he resign] % she expected him [to resign] In the CG analysis, on the other hand, the evident grammatical parallelism of “control” and “raising” constructions is accepted at face value. There being no derivations from underlying structures, the “surface” subject or object is indeed the “true” subject or object of the matrix predicate. The transparency of

Modals: Striving for Control

33

certain predicates is a consequence of their meaning. The key factor is effective control in the matrix clause: “raising” predicates represent the limiting case where the referent of the pivot nominal – the one with a role in both clauses – engages in no such relations. We can usefully start by considering a path of semantic extension involving verbs like promise and threaten (Traugott 1993; Verhagen 2000). Prototypically, promise designates a linguistically manifested social act in which the actor commits to a subsequent course of action, one viewed positively by the person to whom the commitment is made. In this sense, exemplified in (19)(a), the subject has an effective role in the matrix clause, as the locus of an impetus tending toward realization of the complement event. And because it involves a social interaction, this sense of promise allows overt expression of the promisee. The subject’s effective role is diminished in the other examples, which no longer profile an action or commitment on its part. Instead they designate an epistemic assessment by an implied conceptualizer concerning the likelihood of the complement event’s realization. In (b) the subject’s effective role is greatly attenuated but not altogether absent, the assessment being based on observed properties of the subject which have causal influence with respect to the event. But in (c), the abstract subject there has no such influence. The extended verbal meaning represents the limiting case of effective subject control (none), resulting in transparency. (19) a.

She promised (him) to attend the wedding. [effective]

b.

She promises (*him) to become a great musician. [effective/epistemic]

c.

There promises (*him) to be a brighter future ahead. [epistemic]

The diagrams in Figure 12 show this in more detail. In its prototypical sense, promise profiles an effective verbal act of commitment on the part of its trajector (tr), the matrix subject. A double arrow represents the effective force associated with this act, a certain impetus toward the complement event’s occurrence. Since the trajector is also the one who will carry out the act, the subject is the pivot (its referent having a role in both clauses). C is a conceptualizer, the person to whom the commitment is made. Based on this commitment, C is able to make an epistemic assessment with the complement event as its target: with varying degrees of confidence, C can project its future realization. The plus sign indicates the positive emotive import of this prospect for the promisee. And since the pivot does indeed engage in a relation of effective control in the matrix clause, promise is not transparent with this meaning: the subject has to be capable of making a promise. Thus one cannot say *There promises him to be a brighter future ahead.

34

Ronald W. Langacker

Figure 12

In the other two senses, the profile shifts to C’s epistemic assessment, which is immanent (but non-salient) in the basic meaning. The trajector no longer engages in a social act, its active role (if any) being confined to the one it has in the complement process. But it may still have some effective influence on the realization of that process. In sense (b), C’s assessment is based primarily on observed properties of the trajector that should contribute to its realization. To some extent the trajector has passive control of the target event via these affordances. The source of the effective potency is however harder to pin down than in the prototype; it is more diffuse, being centered on the trajector but not specifically identified with it. Of course, the contributing factors are not limited to properties of the subject. They also include specific and more general circumstances, whose importance as a basis for assessment can rival or surpass the trajector’s. And as the source of potency becomes more and more diffuse, we eventually reach the stage where the trajector per se no longer contributes – the assessment is based on C’s awareness of the global circumstances. At this stage, where effective influence cannot be localized, we have the situation in Figure 12(c): the only control at issue is epistemic control on the part of C, who assesses the likelihood of the complement event’s realization. In terms of effective control, the subject has reached the zero end of the scale; it is not at all a locus of potency, but merely a reference point for C in making the epistemic judgment. Hence the trajector’s role in the matrix clause is reduced to the bare minimum, that of serving as a point of access for apprehending the complement process. When the pivot’s role is reduced to this extent, the matrix predicate is transparent. Anything can serve as a point of access, since nothing more is involved than mental contact. Thus the only restrictions on the matrix subject stem from its role in the complement. It is not an accident that it functions as trajector of the complement: this follows from the CG characterization of trajector as initial reference point in mentally accessing a profiled relationship. As a consequence,

Modals: Striving for Control

35

anything allowable as complement subject (trajector) can also appear as subject of the matrix clause, even the abstract location profiled by existential there, as in (19)(c). Promise is not an isolated case. It is quite common for “control” predicates to develop into “raising” predicates through a loss of effective control involving the pivot (Langacker 1999b). But irrespective of their diachronic source, predicates exhibit transparency when the pivot is not engaged in relations of effective control in the matrix clause. For example, we see in (20) that able functions as a control predicate, and likely as a raising predicate. These are in fact directly comparable to effective and epistemic promise in relevant respects, as shown in Figure 13. Since able describes ability, it is limited to subjects plausibly viewed as having this kind of potency; beer and existential there are thus excluded. They are however perfectly acceptable as the subject of likely, whose trajector has no effective role in the matrix clause. As a predicate of epistemic assessment, likely invokes a conceptualizer (though not as a focused participant). C’s assessment represents a striving for control, but only at the mental level; it has no influence on the evolution of reality itself. Thus C makes mental contact with the pivot, which serves as point of access to the complement, but does not engage it at the effective level. It is not precluded that the assessment might be based on properties (affordances) of the subject – e.g. her likelihood of attending the wedding might hinge on her dependability and known desire to attend – but this is not required. Likely is therefore transparent. (20)

a.

She was able to attend the wedding.

b.

*Beer was able to be served at the wedding.

c.

*There is able to be beer at the wedding.

d.

She is likely to attend the wedding.

e.

Beer is likely to be served at the wedding.

f.

There is likely to be beer at the wedding.

Figure 13

36

Ronald W. Langacker

Likely illustrates “raising” from a subject complement. What this means, from the CG standpoint, is that the pivot functions as trajector of the matrix predicate. But raising is also observed with object complements, in which case the pivot functions as the matrix landmark (lm). For object complements, persuade and expect are standard examples of control and raising predicates. Persuade is not transparent because its landmark, the clausal object, does engage in effective relationships. As shown in Figure 14(a), its landmark actually engages in two such relations: it is both the target of social force and a locus of subsequent intention, so it has to be capable of both. A person qualifies, but existential there does not. By contrast, expect is transparent because its landmark has no effective involvement in the matrix clause. It profiles a relationship that is only epistemic: the subject’s expectation of the complement event occurring does not per se have any influence in this regard. So rather than being a target of effective force, the pivot functions only as point of access for the conception of that event. Once more, it is not precluded that the pivot might have some effective potency, e.g. the expectation in (21)(c) could be based on her known sense of duty. But since this is not required, even existential there is permitted as matrix object. (21) a.

He persuaded her to attend the wedding.

b.

*He persuaded there to be beer at the wedding.

c.

He expected her to attend the wedding.

d.

He expected there to be beer at the wedding.

Figure 14

Effective force does not itself prevent the matrix predicate from showing transparency. The key factor is whether that force engages the pivot. Recall that force and cause differ in this regard, as was shown in Figure 8: with the former, the causal force is specifically directed at the pivot (the matrix landmark and complement trajector); but with cause the target of force is diffuse, hence non-distinct from the complement event. Thus only cause is transparent: He {caused / *forced} there to be beer at the wedding.

Modals: Striving for Control

37

4.3 Transparency of modals Let us now address the English modals. To some extent, the relation between a modal and the verb it grounds is analogous to the relation between a matrix predicate and its complement. A feature common to modals and many matrix predicates is the semantic importance of effective force and epistemic assessment. This force or assessment pertains to a schematic process that the complement or grounded verb spells out explicitly in more detail. One difference, in the CG analysis, is that the force or assessment is unprofiled in the case of modals, which instead profile the grounded process. As a consequence, the modal and grounded verb profile the same occurrence, characterized at different levels of specificity. And since they profile the same occurrence, they have the same trajector – expressed by the clausal subject – which is thus a kind of pivot. As noted in (16), modals exhibit transparency by allowing as their subject anything permissible as subject of the grounded verb. Otherwise stated, they do not themselve impose restrictions on the pivot nominal. Modals are transparent for the same reason that raising predicates are: the relations of effective control they introduce do not engage the pivot. This is not to deny that they do engage the pivot in certain modal uses, and these are non-transparent. But all the modals have transparent uses where the pivot is not so engaged. We have already surveyed the range of options for effective control with English modals. By abstracting relevant features from Figures 6 and 7, we obtain the four basic configurations in Figure 15. Double arrows stand for effective force, and dashed arrows for epistemic assessment. The latter figures to some extent in all the modals, despite being overshadowed by the former whenever present. Even the ability sense of can, as in She can lift that rock, has an implicit epistemic component: if she is able to lift the rock, it is possible that she will. Epistemic modals represent the limiting case where effective influence fades away entirely, allowing epistemic assessment to emerge in all its glory. There being no effective force, it cannot engage the pivot, so epistemic modals are consistently transparent.

Figure 15

38

Ronald W. Langacker

With effective modals, the pivot can either be the source of potency, its target, or neither. Examples of the former include the ability sense of can and certain uses of shall and will (e.g. I shall return!). All the effective modals allow the pivot (clausal subject) to be construed as the target of force (e.g. You must help them). So interpreted, they are non-transparent. Additionally, however, they all permit the reading in 15(c), where the pivot is engaged as neither source nor target. Under this interpretation they are all transparent. The range of options is exemplified in (22), for can. The pivot (clausal subject) can be the source of potency in either the active sense of ability (a) or the weaker sense of affordance (b). When can indicates permission, the subject is commonly the target (c). But it need not be, in which case the reading is transparent (d), as attested by the possibility of there (e). I could be convinced that can is never purely epistemic. Examples like (22)(f), which verge on being epistemic, might instead be regarded as cases of affordance where the source is diffuse and not easily identifiable. Be that as it may, from there it is just a small step to the epistemic could (g). (22)

a.

She can lift that rock. [pivot as effective source, ability]

b.

The door can be opened now – it’s been fixed. [pivot as effective source, affordance]

c.

You can open the door now, if you like. [pivot as effective target, permission]

d.

The door can be opened now – the meeting is over. [transparent, permission]

e.

There can be beer at the party, since you insist. [transparent, permission]

f.

There can be snow next month. [transparent, diffuse affordance]

g.

There could be snow next month. [transparent, epistemic]

5 Grammatical status What is the grammatical status of modal elements, in English or other languages? Do they qualify as grounding elements? Are they main or auxiliary verbs? Posing such questions tends not to be very useful, since key notions like “modal”, “grounding”, and “auxiliary” are neither clearly defined nor well

Modals: Striving for Control

39

understood. It cannot be presumed that standard terms of this sort correspond to natural, well-delimited linguistic categories waiting to be discovered; not only does their range of application depend on how we define them, but their optimal characterization will likely show them to be matters of degree. More important than categorization is an in-depth analytical understanding sufficient for describing the full spectrum of cases: the semantic and grammatical properties of particular cases, as well as how they compare to one another.

5.1 The place of English modals Clauses are basic units of discourse that allow interlocutors to jointly focus attention on actual and imagined occurrences. For a clause to serve an epistemic function, contributing to one’s knowledge of reality, it must give some indication of how the occurrence it profiles relates to the ground (the interlocutors, the speech event, and their immediate circumstances). As employed in CG, the term grounding refers to certain highly grammaticized, clause-internal means of doing so, English tense and modals being a prime example. They produce a finite clause with potential epistemic import: it both describes an occurrence and situates it vis-à-vis the speaker’s conception of reality (the established history of occurrences). But an English-type system is just one linguistic option for relating occurrences to the ground. It lies toward one end of a spectrum representing various degrees of structural and conceptual elaboration. Found at the other end are complex sentences with predicates of propositional attitude taking finite clauses as complements. The place of English modals is best understood in the context of a functional characterization that posits multiple levels, or strata, involving progressively greater complexity (Langacker 2012). The initial stratum is minimally complex, a baseline that is elaborated step by step to form the other strata; since each incorporates its predecessor, they can be thought of as successive layers around an inner core (the baseline). In coordinated fashion, each layer introduces further conceptual and structural complexity: the additional structural options accommodate the more elaborate conceptions, which in turn provide the basis for their meanings. The global epistemic function of finite clauses decomposes into the more specific functions of directing attention to an occurrence and relating it to the ground. The baseline for finite clauses comprises the minimum needed for each. Since possible occurrences vary indefinitely, evoking one requires explicit symbolic description – minimally, a predicate (to specify a process type) and one or more nominals (to specify its focal participants). Grounding requires less

40

Ronald W. Langacker

because the options are far more limited. And indeed, nothing at all is required in a circumstance plausibly identified as the baseline viewing arrangement, where the epistemic status of the profiled occurrence is not an issue. But as the epistemic possibilities become more varied and more complex, to accommodate a wider range of viewing circumstances, conceptual elaboration of the grounding system is accompanied by its formal elaboration. The baseline viewing arrangement represents a special case of the canonical viewing arrangement in Figure 5, where the interlocutors, as offstage subjects of conception, focus their attention on some entity (the profile) within the objective scene. In the baseline arrangement, the interlocutors are together in a fixed location, their activity consisting in the observation and description of actual occurrences. Baseline speech consists of simple descriptive statements, aimed at nothing more than intersubjective awareness and the joint focusing of attention. There is no indication of speech acts or illocutionary force, since the baseline arrangement includes and defines a minimal speech act (statement) with respect to which all the others constitute elaborations. Likewise, there is no explicit indication of epistemic status, since that too is inherent in the viewing arrangement: the descriptions pertain to actual, observed occurrences. Explicit grounding being superfluous, a baseline clause consists of nothing more than a predicate and its nominal arguments. It is however grounded, because the baseline viewing arrangement is part of the conceptual substrate supporting its meaning (Langacker 2008). As shown in Figure 16(a), this implicit baseline grounding presupposes that the profiled occurrence is part of reality. Indeed, this initial stratum – limited to the description of observed occurrences – affords no basis for distinguishing reality (R) and a reality conception (RC). It is unlikely that any language would content itself with implicit grounding of this sort. But some languages do have baseline expressions, reflecting what I take to be the core stratum within a more elaborate grounding system. In Hopi, for instance, a clause with no explicit grounding locates the profiled occurrence in present or past reality: Pooko qöötsa (dog white) ‘The dog is white’; Pam wari (he run) ‘He ran’. While this arrangement is too simplistic for baseline expressions to be typical, it can certainly be argued that statements describing real occurrences represent the unmarked situation, departures from which tend to be marked explicitly. Of interest here are departures pertaining to the status of the profiled occurrence. Along this axis, a minimal elaboration consists in making distinctions within reality. One possibility is to distinguish between occurrences on the basis of whether or not they are directly observed, producing an incipient evidential system. An alternative, the first step toward an epistemic system (Cornillie 2007), distinguishes occurrences in immediate experience from those accessed via

Modals: Striving for Control

41

Figure 16

memory. Because we experience only the present and can only recall the past, this epistemic distinction is tantamount to a temporal one. Apart from the anomaly of third-person singular -s, the English tense system neatly reflects this stratum: to locate an occurrence in immediate reality (IR) the verb is left uninflected (e.g. They like her); whereas overt marking (“past tense” inflection) indicates the greater epistemic distance of elements outside IR, as in Figure 16(b). In another departure from the baseline arrangement, English tense is oblivious to whether the grounded occurrence is directly observed or known through other means. This more expansive notion of reality – characterized in terms of knowledge rather than direct observation – foreshadows the clear distinction, at the next stratum, between reality (R) and one’s conception of reality (RC). It consists in the recognition that we have only partial and limited access to what transpires. A crucial limitation is that we have no prior knowledge of the future; reality continues to “grow” through the accretion of new occurrences, but much of what will eventually constitute it is currently inaccessible. With varying degrees of confidence, however, we can make certain projections based on what has already been established. While it is no substitute for omniscience, this epistemic striving affords at least a measure of control, which is better than none at all. One means of handling this level of epistemic complexity is by incorporating modals in the clausal grounding system. As shown in Figure 16(c), the process grounded by a modal lies outside RC but is nonetheless situated with respect to it. By indicating various kinds and degrees of potentiality, a grammaticized modal system allows unrealized occurrences to be brought at least partially under epistemic control. English, of course, is a case in point. The special grammatical properties of core modals gives clear evidence that they

42

Ronald W. Langacker

combine with tense to form a grammaticized, closely integrated grounding system (Langacker 2012). Note in particular that the immediate/non-immediate opposition is manifested on a modal (when present) rather than the lexical verb: may vs. might, can vs. could, will vs. would, shall vs. should.7 The inflected forms are at best only partially analyzable, either morphologically or semantically. And the modals have all developed specialized meanings and carved out their own semantic niche. The non-immediate modals (as well as negation) reveal another layer of conceptual elaboration. Observe that all of them can be used counterfactually: (23)

a.

He might have done it if he had wanted to, but he didn’t.

b.

He could do it if he wanted to, but he doesn’t.

c.

He would do it if he could, but in fact he can’t.

d.

He should do it, but he won’t.

Such uses imply an expansion of the “epistemic landscape” to encompass not only potential occurrences being considered for inclusion in RC, but also those which lack this potential.8 The non-immediate modals can thus be characterized, schematically, in terms of a path of access through this expanded landscape (Langacker 2009: ch. 7). As shown in Figure 16(d), the target occurrence cannot be accessed directly from RC, i.e. it lies beyond the epistemic “reach” of a basic modal (may, can, will, or shall). The non-immediate modals provide a two-step path for reaching it. The second step consists in the modal projection coded by the basic form (e.g. “possibility” for may, “prediction” for will). But since the target cannot be projected directly from RC in this manner, one must first invoke an alternative conception of reality – RC' – from which it can. Details vary greatly: RC' may represent just a slight modification of RC or it may be quite distinct; the implied conceptualizer (C) can be the current speaker (C0) or another individual, but need not have any specific identity. The common feature is simply that the basis for modal projection, RC', does not represent the speaker’s actual view (RC). In the last analysis, certain basic linguistic notions are defined in terms of discourse functions rather than any specific formal properties. Finite clauses are characterized by two essential functions: grounding and description of the grounded process. In English, tense and modals form a cohesive system that 7 For an argument that must simply lacks a non-immediate form, see Langacker 1991: 260. 8 The latter is itself a kind of epistemic control, based on avoidance rather than capture.

Modals: Striving for Control

43

fulfills the grounding function. Hence the force conveyed by a modal does not constitute the occurrence being described (the clausal referent), but is rather an aspect of its assessment, an offstage indication of its relation to the ground. Conceivably this is a matter of degree. Nor is it denied that the striving for control can be put onstage as a profiled occurrence by otherwise comparable elements, in English or other languages; grammaticized modals are not distinguished from lexical predicates on the basis of conceptual content, but rather on the basis of their clausal function. In the CG analysis, their offstage grounding function is reflected in their profiling: a modal profiles the grounded process, not the grounding relationship. This process, only schematic within the modal, is identified with the specific process designated by the verb it combines with. So although a modal does qualify as a verb (because it profiles a process), it is part of a single clause which profiles just one occurrence.

5.2 A path through other minds It is helpful to think of grounding in terms of an epistemic path followed by a conceptualizer in order to “reach” a nominal or clausal referent. By reaching the target, C controls it at least in the sense of making mental contact with it. Grounding is achieved when a thing or process instance is singled out and related to the ground in this fashion. A grounding path is sometimes indirect, as we saw with non-immediate modals. Another case is the possessive grounding of nominals, e.g. the waiter’s necktie, where the conceptualizer invokes one nominal referent (the waiter) as the first step in a path of mental access leading to another (a particular instance of necktie). Note that there are two levels of grounding and nominal organization. At one level, the grounding of waiter singles out an instance of that type. The resulting nominal is then incorporated in the possessor phrase the waiter’s, on the basis of which an instance of necktie is singled out, at the higher level. The direct grounding of waiter allows the indirect grounding of necktie. A clausal analog of this indirect nominal grounding is found in complementation, e.g. She is likely to succeed. While the analogy only goes so far, such expressions are parallel to possessive nominals in relevant respects. By virtue of being directly grounded, the finite matrix clause (she is likely) is analogous to the possessor nominal (the waiter). The infinitival complement (to succeed) is comparable to the possessed noun (necktie) in that neither is grounded directly. And in both cases, the grounded element allows the other one to be grounded indirectly. Just as the waiter lets us access and identify an instance of necktie, so she is likely lets us access an instance of succeed and relate it epistemically

44

Ronald W. Langacker

to the ground: the matrix both specifies the person who succeeds and assesses the prospects of this happening. Infinitival complement constructions represent another stratum of conceptual and formal elaboration vis-à-vis the baseline. For one thing, they presuppose the capacity for apprehending complex occurrences whose description requires a combination of predicates (likely to succeed). Also, predicates such as likely expand the range of describable occurrences to the sorts of assessments that figure in clausal grounding, putting them onstage as the focused object of conception (clausal profile). To the extent that they semantically resemble grounding elements, they provide a periphrastic alternative to the grammaticized grounding system. Thus the biclausal She is likely to succeed is roughly comparable to She should succeed. Periphrastic expressions of this kind are susceptible to two analyses in regard to their functional organization. The first one, sketched in Figure 17(a), reflects the basic organization for infinitival complementation generally. Here the profiled occurrence is the assessment coded by likely, which is thus the focus of attention within objective scene (OS), the situation being described. As noted in Figure 13(b), likely implies a conceptualizer (C) responsible for the assessment. The speaker (C0) identifies with C, as well as the virtual conceptualizer invoked by clausal grounding (GR ), which locates the profiled process (be likely) in immediate reality. That process is directly grounded by the grammaticized grounding system.

Figure 17

Despite the assessment’s grammatical prominence, it would usually not be presented for its own sake, as the primary object of interest, but as a means of indicating the status of the complement occurrence (Thompson 2002; Verhagen 2005). This discourse purpose implies the alternate functional organization in 17(b), where the event of her succeeding is the real object of description. In this alternate organizational scheme, the objective scene (OS') encompasses just that event, and everything else – including the assessment of likelihood – functions

Modals: Striving for Control

45

as an elaborated grounding specification (GR'). Through the direct grounding of be likely, GR' effects the indirect grounding of succeed. Which of these options is correct? I see no reason why they cannot coexist as simultaneous and complementary levels of understanding. If the first is more salient from the standpoint of overt grammatical structure, the latter may well be primary from the discourse standpoint – what we ultimately want to know is whether she succeeds. The possible coexistence of these organizational schemes has obvious implications for grammaticization, which I merely note in passing. The tension between grammatical and discourse prominence might facilitate a structural reanalysis serving to bring them into alignment, minimally by shifting the composite-structure profile to the complement process (succeed). This defocusing of the matrix predicate (likely) could be a first step in its eventual grammaticization as a clause-internal grounding element. Turning now to finite complementation, we have to recognize yet another stratum of conceptual elaboration. Allowed as objects of description at this level, besides processes of assessment, are propositions in which an offstage conceptualizer makes such assessments in regard to an onstage occurrence. Moreover, these abstract entities are themselves conceived as targets of assessment by another conceptualizer, often put onstage as focal participant in a profiled relationship of propositional attitude. This implies the explicit recognition of other conceptualizers who not only have their own conceptions of reality and engage in assessments giving rise to propositions, but also – at a higher level – participate in formulating, evaluating, communicating, and negotiating propositions, and then – at a higher level still – describe these activities by means of predicates like possible, suspect, know, believe, claim, convince, true, deny, etc. These too can be grounded to form propositions pertaining to the status of other propositions. This sometimes results in chains of propositional assessments with no inherent limit on their length, as in (24), diagrammed in Figure 18. (24) Perhaps Joe suspects that Alex hopes that Megan will succeed.

Figure 18

46

Ronald W. Langacker

This is quite impressive when you think about it. Finite complementation accommodates an epistemic landscape of open-ended complexity and convoluted topography. The epistemic path from the speaker to the target event, like that of Megan succeeding, can lead through any number of conceptualizers. These include not only the speaker (C0) and sentient clausal participants, but also the virtual conceptualizers (C) implied by clausal grounding at the various levels. Each makes a mental assessment pertaining to another such assessment, locating it either in conceived reality or in another mental space (Fauconnier 1985). This complex epistemic landscape involves a sophisticated notion of “reality” several steps removed from R, the established history of occurrences. Modals presuppose the distinction between R and RC, a particular conceptualizer’s partial knowledge of R. With finite complementation, reality is characterized more abstractly: rather than the accepted history of occurrences, RC is a set of propositions accepted as being valid. And finally, chains of finite complements reflect the potential for one reality conception to include a proposition invoking the divergent reality conception of another individual, and so on indefinitely. So if C1 knows that C2 believes that P, and C1 further knows that P is invalid, it is still the case that P figures in C1’s conception of reality, albeit indirectly: P may not itself be accepted as real by C1, but it is accepted as real that C2 believes it. Reality is thus a complex, multilevel affair comprising mental spaces linked by particular paths of mental access (Cutrer 1994; Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996). The various conceptualizers represented in (24) are all distinct. The predicates suspect and hope imply that Joe and Alex do not subscribe to the judgment indicated by the grounding of their complements (e.g. Alex is not prepared to state that Megan will succeed, since he merely hopes so). Also, the adverb perhaps insulates the speaker from the judgment conveyed by the grounding of the matrix clause. As a consequence, reaching the target occurrence (Megan succeed) involves such a long path through the epistemic landscape that the prospects of its realization are exceedingly tenuous. It is, in fact, so far removed from the speaker’s conception of reality that making the journey hardly seems useful. But left to their own devices, the formal mechanisms of complementation would extend these paths indefinitely. Fortunately, structural elaboration is subject to conceptual control. Although we can certainly negotiate epistemic paths of this length, we are not continually forced to do so by a runaway autonomous syntax. We construct such expressions only when the path they define is one we comprehend and have reason to want to follow. And it usually requires fewer steps than expected given the number of clauses and assessments involved. Several kinds of “shortcuts” afford a greater measure of control by effectively shortening the path of access to downstream elements.

Modals: Striving for Control

47

For one thing, the speaker has a global awareness of the epistemic landscape and the target’s location within it. Being responsible for constructing the full expression, the speaker is not confined to the epistemic path spelled out by a chain of complements. The speaker thus apprehends the target occurrence, and the proposition containing it, independently of the path that specifies its epistemic status. Reflecting this global awareness is a basic feature of finite complementation in English: by and large, a complement clause describes the profiled occurrence from the speaker’s vantage point even when the propositional assessment is due to another conceptualizer. For example, in (25) the complement proposition assesses the profiled occurrence – his depression – as being real. This proposition is formulated by the matrix subject (she), who accepts its validity and thus subscribes to the assessment it incorporates. The speaker need not subscribe to it (e.g. the speaker may know for a fact that he is not now and never has been depressed). But without assuming responsibility for it, the speaker does express the proposition and describe the occurrence. And at least in terms of temporal location, the description reflects the speaker’s vantage point, not that of the matrix subject. The subject probably said to herself “He’s depressed”, with present tense, accepting the then-current reality of the profiled situation. Yet the speaker would describe this using the past tense, reflecting its temporal location vis-à-vis the speech event. Using the present indicates that the speaker construes the proposition as pertaining to an enduring situation that extends through the current moment. (25)

a.

She concluded that he was depressed. She thought: “He is depressed [now]”. I report: “. . . he was depressed [then]”.

b. She concluded that he is depressed. She thought: “He is depressed [now]”. I report: “. . . he is depressed [(then and) now]”. What this shows is that the same proposition can be apprehended by multiple conceptualizers, who naturally view it from their own vantage point and make their own assessments regarding its validity. In English, the deictic component of grounding (tense for clauses, demonstratives for nominals) normally reflects the speaker’s vantage point, irrespective of whether the speaker subscribes to the proposition and the epistemic component of clausal grounding. The speaker’s global awareness affords the direct access which makes this possible.

48

Ronald W. Langacker

In another kind of shortcut, an external conceptualizer identifies with the conceptualizer (C) implicit in clausal grounding, and thus assumes the role of C in making the grounding assessment. Matrix predicates indicating acceptance of the complement proposition entail this identification: if Joe is certain she is angry, then Joe suscribes to the proposition She is angry. The key factor, as shown in Figure 19, is that the complement proposition is part of C1’s reality conception, RC1. Identification effectively merges C1 with C, hence RC1 with RC, so that C1 adopts C’s stance in regard to the complement process (in this case, accepting it as real). As a consequence, upstream conceptualizers have greater control of the process because the path connecting them is shorter by one step.

Figure 19

As a special case, the speaker can identify with C and thus assume direct responsibility for a complement grounding assessment, independently of the epistemic path specified by matrix predicates. Factive predicates have this import, as previously shown in Figure 11(c). If Joe realizes she is angry, then the speaker, as well as Joe, subscribes to the proposition She is angry. And even if Joe does not, the speaker still does: Joe doesn’t realize she is angry.

5.3 Structural control Finite complementation reflects our capacity for treating propositions as autonomous objects of thought independent of any particular conceptualizer. They can thus be apprehended by multiple conceptualizers who assess them differently and negotiate their validity. Identification reduces their autonomy by merging the grounding assessment, on the part of C, with that of a particular external conceptualizer, C1. As a result the profiled clausal process is subject to the direct epistemic control of C1, hence indirect control by the interlocutors. Roughly, at least, degree of conceptual autonomy correlates with degree of structural autonomy. This is not evident from identification: merging C with C1 has no visible impact, since C is merely implicit in a finite complement clause. It is however quite apparent, and often noted, in regard to infinitival complements. Structurally, they are less autonomous than a finite clause – which can stand alone as a sentence – because they lack both a subject and a grounding

Modals: Striving for Control

49

element. They are conceptually non-autonomous because, accordingly, they depend on the matrix clause for both the identification of their trajector and an indication of their epistemic status. Thus they do not themselves represent propositions, but rather occurrences whose specific nature and status hinges on their apprehension in relation to the matrix clause.9 We can think of structural and conceptual autonomy as a matter of control: a complement “struggles” to be independent of the matrix clause, while the latter “strives” to control and incorporate it. Now obviously, this metaphorical construal of the clauses as willful agents is not to be taken seriously. Invoking the control cycle is however quite appropriate, I suggest. Typical cases of infinitival complementation, e.g. She tried to lift the rock, instantiate the control cycle at several different levels. The verb try describes a striving for effective control on the part of its subject, the target being execution of the complement event. At the epistemic level, apprehending this effort provides the interlocutors with information bearing on the event’s realization. The third level pertains to what is meant in describing a verb like try as a control predicate and its subject as a controller. I will refer to this as participant control. It is usually conceived in purely formal terms: the controller is the matrix nominal to which the implicit complement subject is coreferential. But from the CG perspective, this formal property reflects the other levels of control resulting in the complement’s lack of independence from the matrix. More specifically, I propose that participant control is precisely analogous to identification with a grounding conceptualizer. Both are instances of a matrix clause controlling its complement through a conceptual overlap that prevents the latter from being fully autonomous. In each case, a matrix participant also fills a role in the complement, making it a pivot. And in each case the role usurped by the pivot serves as a main point of access to the complement. With identification the pivot fills the implicit role of grounding conceptualizer, point of access for epistemic assessment; it is therefore limited to finite complements. In the absence of grounding, the main point of access is the complement trajector (initial reference point for apprehending the profiled occurrence). Through the pivot, the matrix thus controls the complement at the effective level (pertaining to the occurrence itself) rather than the epistemic level (pertaining to knowledge of the occurrence).

9 In the CG analysis, that marks a finite complement as being an autonomous object of conception, whereas infinitival to marks an occurrence apprehended at the mental (as opposed to perceptual) level (Langacker 2009: ch. 10). I believe this latter characterization to be compatible with the description in Duffley 1992.

50

Ronald W. Langacker

The choice of pivot is a classic problem that I cannot pursue here in any detail. As a basic generalization with a good chance of proving viable, I suggest that the pivot can be characterized as the participant which, in accordance with the semantics of the matrix clause, most directly controls the complement either epistemically or effectively. Be that as it may, the parallelism of identification and participant control is shown in Figure 20, for the specific case of promise (cf. Figure 12). The matrix trajector, as the one who promises, controls the complement both epistemically (by apprehending the promise) and effectively (by committing to its realization). In 20(a), the trajector presents the complement proposition as being valid, and thus identifies with C: if She promised he would behave, she was prepared to say He will behave.10 But in 20(b) the trajector commits to an occurrence, not the validity of a proposition, so there is no grounding conceptualizer. It thus identifies with the complement’s trajector, the main point of access to the process it describes.

Figure 20

The pivot’s dual role is less apparent in 20(c), representing the use of promise for making an epistemic assessment. Because no commitment is involved, the pivot has no effective role in the matrix, so in this use promise is transparent (a “raising” predicate). Grammatically the pivot is still the matrix subject, and it does still have a semantic role in the matrix clause, albeit one that is much attenuated. As a matrix participant, it controls the complement process only passively, in the minimal sense of serving as point of access for the tacit conceptualizer who assesses its likelihood. Raising can thus be seen as the degenerate case of participant control.

10 The modal shows up as would because the basis for assessment, the trajector’s then-current conception of reality, is non-immediate to the speaker, who describes the proposition from his own vantage point.

Modals: Striving for Control

51

The form of a complement clause directly reflects these conceptual factors. Being internally grounded, a finite complement has all the elements needed to stand alone as an independent statement. The fact that the pivot is expressed in the matrix has no impact on its form, since its role as grounding conceptualizer is always implicit (C being the subject of conception). Infinitival complementation, where there is no grounding, is just a matter of conceiving the matrix relationship as engaging an occurrence rather a proposition. The complement lacks a subject when its trajector is identified with a matrix participant. Although the pivot has a dual role, it need be mentioned only once – the fact that the same element fills both roles allows economy of expression.11 The shading in Figure 20 indicates that portion of the overall conception which the matrix clause fails to “cover”, leaving it for the complement to express. Infinitival complements lack a subject when the matrix covers its trajector. In many languages – including French, Spanish, and German – infinitival constructions occupy a semantic niche comparable to that of the more highly grammaticized English modals (Achard 1998; Cornillie 2006; Mortelmans 2006; Athanasiadou, Canakis, and Cornillie 2006). We see from Figure 20(b)–(c) that in such constructions the modal force can either be effective or epistemic, and we have further seen that either kind of predicate can be transparent. While they tend to correlate, these two parameters are basically independent because they depend on different factors. The effective/epistemic opposition is a matter of level: at issue is whether the activity has the potential to influence what happens, as with persuade, or merely pertains to knowledge of what happens, as with expect. By contrast, the opaque/transparent opposition depends on whether or not the matrix relationship engages the pivot at the effective level. Purely epistemic predicates are thus transparent: He expected there to be beer at the wedding. But while effective predicates are generally opaque (*He persuaded there to be beer at the wedding), they too exhibit transparency when the effective force does not engage the pivot directly. We saw this previously with predicates of causation: *He forced there to be beer at the wedding vs. He caused there to be beer at the wedding. Moreover, both oppositions are independent of degree of grammaticization. The examples just cited all involve ungrammaticized matrix predicates, which profile a relationship distinct from the complement process. We observe the same range of options with the clause-internal English modals, which arguably profile the grounded process (rather than the modal force). Obviously, an 11 For the same reason, we say He put the box on the table, not *He put the box it on the table. The box has a dual role, as landmark of put and trajector of on the table, but it need be expressed only once.

52

Ronald W. Langacker

English modal can either be effective or epistemic – She must be at the wedding has both interpretations – and if epistemic it is also transparent: There must be 100 people in line for beer. Effective modals are opaque under the interpretation that the clausal subject is expected to carry out the action: {You / *there} must serve beer at the wedding. They can however be used transparently, interpreted as meaning that the force is directed at some other party: There must be beer at the wedding. In Figure 21 I show the difference between a matrix predicate with modal force, like Spanish poder and deber, and a clause-internal grounding modal, like English can and must. It basically comes down to whether the modal assessment is onstage as a profiled object of description, or is offstage and subjectively construed, leaving the grounded process as the clausal referent and focus of attention. The transition from the former to the latter represents a final step in the imaginary struggle to curb the autonomy of a complement clause and bring it under control by assimilating it to the matrix. The first step is to limit the autonomy of a finite complement through identification of its grounding conceptualizer with a matrix participant. Further, more drastic steps reduce a finite complement to an infinitival one: identification of the complement trajector with a matrix participant; and the elimination of independent grounding, so that the complement process is grounded only indirectly, via the matrix. The final step is to merge the matrix and the complement into a single clause representing just a single instantiation of the grounding and descriptive functions. Previously an object of description, the erstwhile matrix relationship assumes an offstage grounding role. With its removal from the stage, the erstwhile complement occurrence has the limelight all to itself.

Figure 21

If the contrast in Figure 21 is clear in principle, in practice it represents a gradation rather than a categorical distinction. Many subtle factors figure in the analysis of particular predicates and the interpretation of particular examples. Although on functional grounds we need to distinguish the situation being described (OS) from the circumstances of its apprehension, the boundary between them is fuzzy at best. Profiling, being a kind of prominence, might well be a

Modals: Striving for Control

53

matter of degree. Also, as we saw in Figure 17, an expression may be susceptible to competing analyses, possibly coexisting as complementary levels of understanding within a single interpretation. It would thus be simplistic to propose either structure in Figure 21 as the sole characterization of basic modal expressions in a given language. I do not pretend to have offered either a definitive analysis of English modals or a comprehensive description. Prerequisite to such a task is knowing know how to characterize the full range of options, how they relate to one another, and likely paths of development. By elucidating some of the factors involved, I have striven to achieve a measure of epistemic control.

References Achard, Michel. 1998. Representation of Cognitive Structures: Syntax and Semantics of French Sentential Complements. (Cognitive Linguistics Research 11.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Athanasiadou, Angeliki, Costas Canakis and Bert Cornillie (eds.). 2006. Subjectification: Various Paths to Subjectivity. (Cognitive Linguistics Research 31.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Boye, Kasper and Peter Harder. 2009. Evidentiality: linguistic categories and grammaticalization. Functions of Language 16: 9–43. Cornillie, Bert. 2006. Conceptual and constructional considerations on the subjectivity of English and Spanish modals. In: Angeliki Athanasiadou, Costas Canakis and Bert Cornillie (eds.), Subjectification: Various Paths to Subjectivity, 177–205. (Cognitive Linguistics Research 31.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Cornillie, Bert. 2007. Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality in Spanish (Semi-)Auxiliaries: A Cognitive-Functional Approach. (Applications of Cognitive Linguistics 5.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Cutrer, Michelle. 1994. Time and tense in narrative and in everyday language. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego. Duffley, Patrick J. 1992. The English Infinitive. (English Language Series.) London and New York: Longman. Fauconnier, Gilles. 1985. Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press/Bradford. Fauconnier, Gilles and Eve Sweetser (eds.). 1996. Spaces, Worlds, and Grammar. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Kiparsky, Paul and Carol Kiparsky. 1970. Fact. In: Manfred Bierwisch and Karl Erich Heidolph (eds.), Progress in Linguistics, 143–173. The Hague: Mouton. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Volume 2, Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1993. Reference-point constructions. Cognitive Linguistics 4: 1–38. Langacker, Ronald W. 1995. Raising and transparency. Language 71: 1–62.

54

Ronald W. Langacker

Langacker, Ronald W. 1997. Generics and habituals. In: Angeliki Athanasiadou and René Dirven (eds.), On Conditionals Again, 191–222. (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 143.) Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Langacker, Ronald W. 1998. On subjectification and grammaticization. In: Jean-Pierre Koenig (ed.), Discourse and Cognition: Bridging the Gap, 71–89. Stanford: CSLI Publications. Langacker, Ronald W. 1999a. Assessing the cognitive linguistic enterprise. In: Theo Janssen and Gisela Redeker (eds.), Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and Methodology, 13– 59. (Cognitive Linguistics Research 15.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 1999b. Losing control: grammaticization, subjectification and transparency. In: Andreas Blank and Peter Koch (eds.), Historical Semantics and Cognition, 147–175. (Cognitive Linguistics Research 13.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2002a. The control cycle: why grammar is a matter of life and death. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Japanese Cognitive Linguistics Association 2: 193–220. Langacker, Ronald W. 2002b. Deixis and subjectivity. In: Frank Brisard (ed.), Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference, 1–28. (Cognitive Linguistics Research 21.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2004. Possession, location, and existence. In: Augusto Soares da Silva, Amadeu Torres, and Miguel Gonçalves (eds.), Linguagem, Cultura e Cognição: Estudios de Linguística Cognitiva, volume I, 85–120. Coimbra: Almedina. Langacker, Ronald W. 2005. Dynamicity, fictivity, and scanning: the imaginative basis of logic and linguistic meaning. In: Diane Pecher and Rolf A. Zwaan (eds.), Grounding Cognition: The Role of Perception and Action in Memory, Language and Thinking, 164–197. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 2008. Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 2009. Investigations in Cognitive Grammar. (Cognitive Linguistics Research 42.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2010. Control and the mind/body duality: knowing vs. effecting. In: Elżbieta Tabakowska, Michał Choiński, and Łukasz Wiraszka (eds.), Cognitive Linguistics in Action: From Theory to Application and Back, 165–207. (Applications of Cognitive Linguistics 14.) Berlin and New York: De Gruyter Mouton. Langacker, Ronald W. 2012. Substrate, system, and expression: aspects of the functional organization of English finite clauses. In: Mario Brdar, Ida Raffaelli, and Milena Žic Fuchs (eds.), Cognitive Linguistics between Universality and Variation, 3–52. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Mortelmans, Tanja. 2006. Langacker’s “subjectification” and “grounding”: a more gradual view. In: Angeliki Athanasiadou, Costas Canakis, and Bert Cornillie (eds.), Subjectification: Various Paths to Subjectivity, 151–175. (Cognitive Linguistics Research 31.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Narrog, Heiko. 2005. Modality, mood, and change of modal meanings: a new perspective. Cognitive Linguistics 16: 677–731. Postal, Paul M. 1974. On Raising: One Rule of English Grammar and Its Theoretical Implications. (Current Studies in Linguistics 5.) Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. Rice, Sally. 1987a. Towards a cognitive model of transitivity. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego.

Modals: Striving for Control

55

Rice, Sally. 1987b. Towards a transitive prototype: evidence from some atypical English passives. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society 13: 422–434. Sweetser, Eve E. 1982. Root and epistemic modals: causality in two worlds. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society 8: 484–507. Sweetser, Eve E. 1990. From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure. (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 54.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Talmy, Leonard. 1988. Force dynamics in language and cognition. Cognitive Science 12: 49– 100. Taylor, John R. 1996. Possessives in English: An Exploration in Cognitive Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press/Clarendon. Thompson, Sandra A. 2002. “Object complements” and conversation: towards a realistic account. Studies in Language 26: 125–164. Tomasello, Michael, Ann Cale Kruger and Hilary Horn Ratner. 1993. Cultural learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16: 495–552. Traugott, Elizabeth C. 1989. On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: an example of subjectification in semantic change. Language 65: 31–55. Traugott, Elizabeth C. 1993. The conflict promises/threatens to escalate into war. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society 19: 348–358. van Oosten, Jeanne. 1986. The Nature of Subjects, Topics and Agents: A Cognitive Explanation. Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club. Verhagen, Arie. 2000. “The girl that promised to become something”: an exploration into diachronic subjectification in Dutch. In: Thomas F. Shannon and Johan P. Snapper (eds.), The Berkeley Conference on Dutch Linguistics 1997: The Dutch Language at the Millenium, 197–208. (Publications of the American Association for Netherlandic Studies 12.) Lanham, NY and Oxford: University Press of America. Verhagen, Arie. 2005. Constructions of Intersubjectivity: Discourse, Syntax, and Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Willemse, Peter. 2005. Nominal reference-point constructions: possessive and esphoric NPs in English. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leuven.

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English: mapping the impact of “genre” 1 Introduction In this paper we report on changing patterns of use of the core modal auxiliaries in present-day spoken British English. We examine variation over recent time (1960s–1990s), for the modals as a group and for individual modal auxiliary verbs.1 Previous studies have focused on written English and only occasionally have they considered the question of whether these changes are affected by text type. The default assumption appears to be that change over time in written English is representative of changes more generally and that, if text type makes a difference, the effect of this variation is minor. However, synchronic studies in both written and spoken English have shown that text type affects the likely use of a particular core modal. In this paper we therefore go one stage further: we investigate whether different spoken text types (sometimes referred to as spoken genres) yield different results.2 We use data from the Diachronic Corpus of Present-Day Spoken English (DCPSE), a corpus of British English material drawn from a range of spoken text types. Aarts, Wallis, and Bowie (forthcoming 2013) report diachronic findings from DCPSE with a comparison of change in various modal verb phrase patterns (involving combinations with other auxiliaries, declarative and interrogative structures, and so on). This paper extends our investigations in another direction by examining whether patterns of change over time vary across different types of spoken text.

1.1 The modals in recent corpus studies The English modal auxiliaries share a number of well-known grammatical properties that distinguish them from other auxiliary verbs. These include a lack of 1 The research reported here stems from a project supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council under grant AH/E006299/1. We gratefully acknowledge their support. 2 In this paper (and despite the title) we prefer the term “text type” as a neutral descriptor covering distinct sociolinguistic categories of text, since “genre” is variously used and defined in the literature.

58

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

non-tensed forms, a lack of person–number agreement and occurrence with a following verb in bare infinitival form. The core modals surveyed in this paper are those modals which have been identified as “central” on the basis of such grammatical properties: can, could, may, might, shall, should, will, would and must (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985: 137; cf. Collins 2009: chapter 2). Apart from must, these are usually paired as present and past tense counterparts of single lexemes (can/could, may/might, shall/should, will/would), although the relationships between the counterparts are complex. For present purposes it is useful to treat them as individual items, as each has its own profile of changing usage. The aim of this paper is to survey changing usage in the grammatically delimited group of core modal auxiliaries. We therefore exclude several other modals identified by Quirk et al. as more “marginal” members of the set in terms of their grammatical behaviour (dare, need, ought to, used to). We also exclude a range of “quasi-modals”, described by Collins (2009: 15) as “periphrastic modal forms . . . formally distinguishable from, but semantically similar to, the modal auxiliaries”, such as have got to, have to, be to, had better. See van der Auwera, Noël and Van linden (this volume) for a study of diachronic and regional variation in the use of (had) better, and for references to the literature on marginal modals and quasi-modals. Recent diachronic trends in the use of the modals have been studied by Geoffrey Leech and colleagues, focusing mainly on written English. Their main findings are reviewed below; see Leech (this volume) for further discussion. Leech and colleagues also report some findings for spoken English, based on selected subsamples of DCPSE (whereas in this paper we report detailed findings drawn from the full corpus). Leech (2003) and Leech et al. (2009) report findings from the “Brown quartet” of corpora: four one-million-word corpora representing printed written British and American English from the 1960s and 1990s. The British corpora are the LOB (Lancaster–Oslo–Bergen) corpus (containing material from 1961) and its Freiburg counterpart FLOB (with 1991 material), while the American corpora are Brown (1961) and Frown (1992). These four corpora include a range of matching categories of printed text. Leech et al. (2009) measure modal frequencies per million words (pmw), and report a significant overall decline of around 10% in modal frequency in both British and American English writing.3 They also report results for individual 3 Leech et al. include in their study the more peripheral modals ought (to) and need(n’t) in addition to the core modals listed above. However, as the frequencies of these forms are extremely low, they have little effect on the overall results (cf. the reanalysis of the data in Aarts, Wallis and Bowie forthcoming 2013). In terms of results for individual modals, these two are found to decrease significantly in British English, while their declines in American English are not significant (perhaps because their frequencies are already very low in 1961).

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

59

modals. In British English significant declines are found for all core modals except can, could and will, which show no significant change. In American English the pattern is slightly different, with all core modals showing significant decline except can, could and might, which show no significant change. Leech et al. (2009) also compare trends for the modals among four written “subcorpora” groupings in the British English data. They find significant declines (ranging from about 8% to 14%) in three of these categories: press, general prose and fiction. In contrast, the learned category shows no decline (rather, a small non-significant rise). They do not give a breakdown of data by text type for individual modals. These four groupings in the corpora are more finely categorised into 15 text categories (for example, press comprises reportage, editorial and reviews). Leech (2003: 227) comments that, in the British English data, modal pmw frequencies decrease in 13 out of 15 categories, with the percentage decline ranging from 31.2% to 0.5%, and the remaining two categories are nonsignificant. Leech (2011) has recently extended this diachronic study backwards to 1901 and forwards to the first decade of the 2000s, based on further (mainly written) corpora for both British and American English. The British English corpora (designed to match the earlier “Brown quartet”) are BLOB-1901 (covering 1898– 1904), BLOB-1931 (1931), and BE06 (2005–8). The 1901 corpus is still incomplete, so Leech’s initial results are based on a one-third representatively sampled crosssection. For American English, Leech reports results from COHA (Corpus of Historical American English), covering the 1910s to the 2000s, and COCA (Corpus of Contemporary American English), covering 1990–2010 and including spoken material (on these corpora, see Davies 2009, 2010). Leech’s additional findings support the general picture of declining frequency of the modals from the middle of the twentieth century (British English) or earlier (American English), and show that significant decline continues into the 2000s in both varieties. He also finds, for both varieties, that the patterns of decline for a number of individual modals (such as may, shall and must) apply not just from 1961 to 1991 but over longer periods. The importance of considering genre differences in diachronic change is highlighted when we compare these results with those of Millar (2009) in his restricted-genre study of modal verb frequencies in the Time magazine corpus. Time is, in his words, “a popular American weekly news journal” (2009: 197), and the corpus gives continuous coverage from 1923 to 2006, with around 1 to 1.5 million words per year. He reports results which in some ways differ surprisingly from those of Leech (2003). Using data grouped per decade, he finds a 22.9% increase in pmw frequencies of the core modals4 from the 1920s to the 4 Millar includes ought but not the very infrequent need(n’t) in his study.

60

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

2000s – although the figures show a great deal of fluctuation over the decades. Comparing just 1961 and 1991 data to more closely resemble Leech’s (2003) methodology, he finds a smaller increase of 2.81%. Millar does find, like Leech, clear patterns of decline for shall and must, both from 1961 to 1991, and over the longer term. However, he finds a strikingly different result for may. For this modal, Leech consistently finds patterns of decline. For American English, Leech finds a significant decline of around 32% in the Brown corpora from 1961 to 1991; a significant decline in COCA from the 1910s to the 2000s, with a mostly steady pattern of decline per decade; and a significant decline in COHA from 1990 to 2010, with a steady pattern of decline per five-year interval. In contrast, Millar finds an increase of 54% from 1961 to 1991, and his per-decade figures show a steady increase from the 1950s to the 1990s. As Leech’s data samples a wider range of genres, it seems reasonable to conclude, as does Leech (2011), that his findings are more indicative of patterns in the language as a whole, while Millar’s contrasting finding for may appears to be specific to the genre of Time magazine. Millar himself notes an apparent “surge in epistemic modality” in the magazine, which may reflect “a shift towards greater speculation in reporting” (2009: 213). The “epistemic surge” is suggested by large increases in frequency not only of may but also of could and of modal adverbs such as maybe, and additionally by an increase in the proportion of occurrences of may which are epistemic. Synchronic corpus studies have also exposed another factor which complicates the picture: the differing density of modals across text types. For example, Biber et al. (1999: 486–9) compare the registers of conversation, fiction, news and academic prose in the Longman Spoken and Written English Corpus, which includes both American and British English (they present graphs, but not exact figures or significance tests). They find that modals are most common in conversation and least common in news and academic prose. They report “strikingly different distributions across registers” (1999: 487) for most individual modals. For example, can and will are most common in conversation, while may is least common in conversation and most common in academic prose. Finally, Collins (2009) presents a detailed synchronic corpus study of the modals and quasi-modals in British, Australian and US English, drawing data from the one-million-word British and Australian components of the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB and ICE-AUS), and from a smaller, specially assembled corpus of US English. He cites pmw frequencies for each lexical item, and for the ICE corpora provides a breakdown into four broad genre groupings: written printed, written non-printed, spoken dialogue and spoken monologue (while written and spoken figures are given for the US data).

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

61

We have carried out a simple re-analysis of Collins’ data collating the nine core modal forms in ICE-GB (Appendix 1 presents raw figures). Contrasting spoken and written frequencies, we find that the overall modal pmw density is not significantly different,5 but individual modals vary significantly. Can, could and would are more frequent in spoken English, whereas may, must and should are less frequent.6 Within the written texts, the printed/non-printed distinction obtains a similar pattern, with no overall significant change, but can, will and would are more frequent in non-printed texts and may, must and should are more frequent in printed texts. This variation between individual modals is assessed as a proportion of the set of modals, i.e. by considering whether an individual modal changes its share of the total number of modals used. The pattern of variation is rather different when we focus on Collins’ spoken groupings. There are 26% (±3.5%) fewer modals per million words in the monologues than the dialogues. The share of the modal set taken up by individual modals is also different across spoken genres. May and will have a significantly larger share (110% ±30% and 22% ±8% respectively) of modals in the monologues than in the dialogues, whereas would’s share is significantly smaller (–30% ±6.5%).7 Of the four groupings, dialogues have the highest pmw frequency of modals while monologues have the lowest, and for modal use at least, spoken genre variation appears to be wider than written. Given that corpus research has tended to focus on written data, due to its availability, this suggests that a focus on spoken English would be rewarding. ICE-GB is a synchronic corpus collected over a brief timespan (1990–92). DCPSE, the corpus used in the present study, provides the opportunity to study change over time and how such change might differ between spoken text types. This corpus is described in the next section.

1.2 DCPSE The Diachronic Corpus of Present-Day Spoken English (DCPSE) is a parsed (fully grammatically analysed) corpus of over 849,000 words of spoken British English. DCPSE is, to our knowledge, the largest available single corpus of parsed and 5 Using a 2 × 1 “goodness of fit” chi-square test at an error level p < 0.05. 6 This analysis is by share of set, although as the overall frequency is stable, the outcome would be similar were we to use a pmw baseline. We return to these concepts in our main exposition (see in particular section 3). 7 These ± figures are 95% (i.e. error level p < 0.05) confidence intervals, i.e. we are 95% confident that the true population value is within this range. See Section 1.3.

62

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

checked spoken English. It comprises two subcorpora containing material from different periods. One subcorpus contains texts from the London–Lund Corpus (LLC) dating from the late 1950s to the 1970s (Svartvik 1990); the other, texts from the British Component of the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB) collected in the early 1990s (Nelson, Wallis, and Aarts 2002). The corpus therefore allows the investigation of recent change across a period of around thirty years. The spoken data is divided into “parsing units” (roughly, sentences), each of which is grammatically analysed in the form of a labelled phrase structure tree. An example is given in Figure 1, where the tree is displayed branching from left to right for compactness. Each node of the tree is labelled in terms of (i) function (top left, e.g. subject, noun phrase head), (ii) category (top right, e.g. noun phrase, adverb), and (iii) additional features where applicable (bottom section, e.g. singular, intransitive).

Figure 1: An example of a tree diagram in the DCPSE corpus, I couldn’t quite see DI-F05 #68 PU = parsing unit, CL = clause, intr = intransitive, SU = subject, NP = noun phrase, NPHD = noun phrase head, PRON = pronoun, pers = personal, sing = singular, VB = verbal, VP = verb phrase, OP = operator, AUX = auxiliary, A = adverbial, AVP = adverb phrase, inten = intensifying, AVHD = adverb phrase head, ADV = adverb, MVB = main verb, V = verb, infin = infinitive.

This parse analysis is not merely descriptive. The entire treebank can be systematically searched and explored using software called ICECUP 3.1 (International Corpus of English Corpus Utility Program 3.1), which was specifically developed for the exploration of parsed corpora. This means that we can reliably identify instances of modals and – subject to the accuracy of the analysis – limit results to those within a particular grammatical context. ICECUP has a flexible facility for searching grammatical structures. So-called Fuzzy Tree Fragments or “FTFs” (Aarts, Nelson, and Wallis 1998; Nelson, Wallis, and Aarts 2002) are a diagrammatic query representation of search elements in a 8 The text code “DI-F” indicates that this example is from the spontaneous commentary in the ICE-GB (1990s) subcorpus.

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

63

tree. The idea is fairly intuitive: put a label like “VP” in a category slot and the query will obtain verb phrases, extend the query into a mini tree and that configuration must be found, and so on. Figure 2 shows an example of an FTF used to search for any VP containing a modal auxiliary immediately followed by an adverb phrase. This will match examples such as the VP shown in Figure 1 (where the matching nodes are shaded).

Figure 2: An example of a Fuzzy Tree Fragment

Figure 3 shows an example of a single-node FTF with lexical material specified. This FTF searches for any instance of the forms would, ’d, or wouldn’t classed as a modal auxiliary. The inclusion of grammatical category and feature information in searches for the modals excludes irrelevant instances of identical forms which would be retrieved in a simple lexical search (e.g. ’d as a perfect auxiliary, will as a noun).

Figure 3: An FTF to find examples of modal auxiliaries taking one of the set of forms {would, ’d, wouldn’t}

The spoken language data in DCPSE is sampled over a broad range of text types. The two subcorpora are sampled from ten matched categories. There are some unavoidable differences between the samples, however. Note that LLC texts consist of 5,000 words each while ICE-GB texts are 2,000 words each, so that proportionately fewer texts were taken from the LLC than from ICE-GB to obtain similar subcorpus sizes. Table 1 shows the number of words and individual speakers per text category in the two subcorpora. The text

64

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

Table 1: Numbers of words and identified speakers (in brackets), in the two subcorpora of DCPSE 9 Text category

LLC

ICE-GB

Total

formal face-to-face conversations informal face-to-face conversations telephone conversations broadcast discussions broadcast interviews spontaneous commentary parliamentary language Legal cross-examination assorted spontaneous prepared speech

46,291 207,852 25,645 43,620 20,359 45,765 10,081 5,089 10,111 30,564

(51) (146) (110) (47) (12) (50) (14) (4) (8) (14)

39,201 176,244 19,455 42,002 21,385 48,539 10,226 4,249 10,767 32,180

(58) (398) (30) (101) (26) (60) (58) (5) (5) (71)

85,492 384,096 45,100 85,622 41,744 94,304 20,307 9,338 20,878 62,744

(109) (544) (140) (148) (38) (110) (72) (9) (13) (85)

Total

445,377

(450)

404,248

(818)

849,625

(1,268)

categories also differ in size. Informal face-to-face conversation is the largest category, and the highly specialised category of legal cross-examination is the smallest. There are also differences in the time distribution of samples. The material in ICE-GB is from 1990–92, whereas LLC spans the years from 1958 to 1977, and the text categories in LLC are not evenly distributed across these years. For example, the single text in the legal cross-examination category comes from 1967, whereas texts within the parliamentary language and assorted spontaneous categories come from the 1970s. Other text types contain material from both decades in varying proportions. This means that while categories within LLC show some temporal variation as well as text type variation, each category can still be compared across LLC and ICE-GB as representative of earlier and later material for that category. We do, however, need to take care in attributing variation simply to “time” or “genre”, as the two variables may not be strictly independent within the sample. Finally, the categories of spontaneous commentary, assorted spontaneous and prepared speech consist mainly of monologue.

1.3 Baselines for modal frequency In the literature, as we saw in section 1.1, frequencies of modals are typically cited as per million words (pmw) as a method of “normalisation”. However, a 9 The data presented in this paper have been obtained from a revised version prepared by the authors and others at the Survey of English Usage. The word counts exclude “ignored” material, i.e. material excluded from the structural analysis because it represents nonfluencies such as repetitions and reformulations.

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

65

word frequency baseline is often far from optimal. When comparing results, the authors have argued (see e.g. Aarts, Close, and Wallis, 2013) that it is preferable to select a baseline for comparison which eliminates as much extraneous variation as possible. Why is this important? Consider the question from the speaker’s point of view. The decision to use a modal auxiliary verb represents a grammatical choice made within a verb phrase. Text categories may differ in their “VP density”, that is, in the frequency of VPs per million words. Ergo, the frequency of modals per VP is likely to obtain more reliable and precise results for changes in use than frequency per word. By a simple process of division we can factor out variation due to VP density. Indeed, we can further narrow the baseline to tensed VPs (henceforth “tVPs”), as modals cannot occur in non-tensed VPs (e.g. *He wants to can drive to work, cf. He wants to be able to drive to work). Below we demonstrate that the text categories in DCPSE vary considerably in tVP density, and this underlines the importance of selecting an informative baseline.10 To search for tVPs in the corpus, the single-node FTF shown in Figure 4 was used. This FTF retrieves any auxiliary or main verb which bears the tense feature “present” or “past”. As each VP can include at most only one tensed AUX or V, this gives us a reliable count of tensed VPs in each category.11

Figure 4: A Fuzzy Tree Fragment which searches for auxiliaries or main verbs with the tense features “present” or “past”

10 For frequencies of individual modals, the total set of modals provides another useful baseline. See Section 3. 11 An alternative way to search for tensed VPs would be to search for VP nodes with the features “present” or “past”. Because of the parsing system used in the corpus, this method excludes certain instances where tensed AUX or V nodes occur directly under a clausal (CL) node rather than under a VP node, for example in tag questions (e.g. He saw her, didn’t he?) and interrogatives where a copular verb acts as operator (e.g. Is she angry?). For present purposes, we prefer to use the more inclusive search, as the modal/non-modal distinction applies to these contexts (cf. He could see her, couldn’t he?; Will she be angry?).

66

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

Table 2: Tensed VPs pmw, by text category, compared across the two subcorpora of DCPSE. Values of χ2 in bold indicate that the given percentage swing is significant (i.e. not zero) at p < 0.05 Text category

LLC

ICE-GB

Change in frequency %

χ2

formal face-to-face informal face-to-face telephone conversations broadcast discussions broadcast interviews spontaneous commentary parliamentary language legal cross-examination assorted spontaneous prepared speech

118,922 134,312 125,795 121,091 111,351 88,474 91,261 145,412 129,562 107,152

128,849 136,589 130,558 118,947 127,753 93,924 99,550 114,851 101,700 88,875

8.35% 1.70% 3.79% –1.77% 14.73% 6.16% 9.08% –21.02% –21.50% –17.06%

16.94 3.65 1.96 0.82 23.43 7.67 3.66 16.45 35.14 53.55

Total

122,348

122,232

–0.09%

0.02

Table 2 lists pmw frequencies of tVPs in LLC and ICE-GB (the earlier and later subcorpora respectively), broken down by text category. (For raw frequencies see Appendix 2.) The table also shows the percentage change in frequency across the two subcorpora, and a “goodness of fit” χ2 test checks whether a change is a significant one. Figures 5 and 6 visualise pmw frequencies and the percentage differences in these frequencies, respectively. In Figure 5 we simply plot the number of tensed VPs per million words in each text category and subcorpus (LLC and ICE-GB). Note that the labels for the text categories are abbreviated from the full forms given in Table 2 (e.g. s commentary is used for spontaneous commentary). We can see that the “Total” normalised frequency is almost perfectly constant over time, but the same cannot be said of individual text categories. It can also be seen that there is considerable variation in what we might call “tensed VP density” (the rate of tVPs pmw) between text categories. For example, spontaneous commentary and parliamentary language have a relatively low tVP density in both LLC and ICE‑GB. In Figure 6 we further explore change over time by plotting percentage swing figures (the % column in Table 2) with 95% confidence intervals on these changes. This is a way of estimating the accuracy of a given observation: a 95% interval means that there is a 1 in 20 chance that the observation would be outside this range were we to repeat the experiment. This is another way of expressing a significance test: if the interval does not cross the zero axis, the

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

67

Figure 5: Synchronic and diachronic variation in evidence. The graph shows the frequency of tensed VPs pmw, by text category, across the two subcorpora of DCPSE

change is more or less than zero, which is another way of saying that the difference is “significant”. Here again we see that, whereas tVP density overall (“Total” column) does not change significantly over time (i.e. from LLC to ICE-GB), the individual categories do show variation. Three categories exhibit a significant increase (formal face-to-face conversation, broadcast interviews, and spontaneous commentary) while another three show a significant decrease (legal cross-examination, assorted spontaneous, and prepared speech). What is happening? There are two possible explanations, both potentially true, for this variation in tVP density over time. One is that this is the result of sampling differences; the other that it results from changes in language use within text categories. The particular reason does not concern us here, although it may be worthy of investigation in its own right. This leads us inexorably to the conclusion that any comparison in terms of modal frequency set against a pmw baseline cannot address this source of variation. With a pmw baseline, we simply cannot say whether a change in the frequency of modal tensed VPs is due to a change in frequency of tensed VPs, or a change in the use of modals, or both. As tVP variation is significant and

68

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

Figure 6: Percentage change in pmw frequencies of tVPs between LLC and ICE-GB subcorpora. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Where the line does not cross the zero axis, the change may be said to be significant (at p < 0.05)12

sizeable, a pmw baseline is likely to mislead.13 We therefore factor out this extraneous variation by considering the frequency of modals per tVP instead of per million words.

1.4 Plotting change over time At this point it is useful to briefly note that changes over time can be plotted by a number of different measures. Figure 6 plotted a change expressed in terms of

12 We calculate accurate confidence intervals on these measures using Newcombe’s (1998) method, giving us a more precise 2 × 2 χ2 test of significance. Confidence intervals allow us to do two things: visualise certainty and test for significance at the same time. Throughout this paper we use a 95% confidence level (error level p < 0.05) as standard. 13 Recall that in section 1.1 we observed that Leech’s and Millar’s results, calculated per million words, showed a rise in modal use in the Time magazine corpus but a decline in the more broadly sampled Brown quartet. Since DCPSE subgenres show substantial variation in tensed VP density over time, it seems likely that similar variation would exist between Time and Brown, and we may hypothesise that the pmw baseline itself contributes to these apparently very different results.

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

69

percentage swing, which can be defined in the following way. First, we define simple swing as the difference: swing = p2 – p1, where p1 and p2 represent proportions from subcorpus 1, 2, etc. These proportions are proportions of a baseline, e.g. per million words, or per tensed VP. Ideally they should represent the probability of selecting an item (e.g. a modal tensed VP) from the set of items covered by the baseline (e.g. a tensed VP). Percentage swing is calculated as a fraction of the starting point, p1: percentage swing = ( p2 – p1 ) / p1. The idea with percentage swing is that we obtain a single value which combines both an absolute starting point (p1) and the change over time. While this is useful and fairly intuitive, and therefore commonly used (we quoted percentage swings in section 1.3, for instance), this measure has some important limitations. Figure 6 presents positive or negative percentage swing from a zero axis: it does not show the start and end points of the change (cf. Figure 5) or the absolute size of the change. Percentage swing does scale the difference as a proportion of the starting point, which can be an advantage in comparing high and low frequency terms. However, it is difficult to compare the changes between two categories (such as broadcast interviews and spontaneous commentary) using percentage swing: if the starting point p1 differs between these categories (as is likely), then the lengths of each bar (a function of p1 ) are not on the same scale. In Figure 7 we employ an alternative visualisation based on start and end points, p1 and p2 , to plot the simple swing for the tVP data in Figure 5. The absolute height of columns in Figure 5 become start points and end points for any given change (e.g. legal cross-examination, indicated). The length of the bar represents the simple swing (difference), with the shading indicating the direction of the change, from LLC start points (lighter) to ICE-GB end points (darker). Confidence intervals are calculated for the difference p2 – p1 using Newcombe’s (1998) method, as previously. Thus in the case of legal cross-examination we can read this interval as saying that, at a 95% confidence level, the normalised frequency of tensed VPs falls by between 17,000 and 44,000 per million words. For convenience we attach the confidence interval to the end point (this also makes the direction of change clearer). This does not imply that the start

70

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

Figure 7: Plotting simple swing of tVPs pmw (from LLC to ICE-GB). Shading indicates the direction of travel, from LLC starting points (lighter) to ICE-GB end points (darker). Where the error bar does not cross the tail (starting point) of the column, the change is considered to be significant (at p < 0.05)

point is certain and the end point uncertain, rather that the difference between start and end is within this range. In order to decide which intervals represent a significant change, note that the relevant error bar is interior to the column, against the direction of change. Where the error bar does not cross the start point, the change is significant (at a 95% error level, i.e. p < 0.05). Thus, in broadcast interviews, the frequency of tVPs increases significantly (from around 111,000 pmw in LLC to around 128,000 pmw in ICE‑GB), whereas in prepared speech the frequency decreases significantly (from around 107,000 pmw in LLC to around 89,000 pmw in ICE‑GB). Contrastingly, it can be seen, for example, that the increase in the telephone conversations category is not significant, as the error bar crosses the start point of the column. This strategy allows us to capture a considerable amount of information in a single graph. Furthermore, it allows us to compare changes between categories which differ in their starting points. For example, we can clearly see that the values for broadcast interviews and spontaneous commentary are separated out, something that Figure 6 fails to illustrate.

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

71

In conclusion, both simple and percentage swing can be used to indicate the degree of observed change, and each metric has its advantages. Percentage swing has the advantage that it places differences of larger or smaller quantities on approximately the same scale, but it is not easy to compare terms which may be moving in opposite directions and it obscures differences in scale. For this reason, we use simple swing graphs in sections 2 and 3 below. In sections 4 and 5 we use percentage swing as figures become increasingly complex.

2 All modals by text category over time We report findings on the core modals can, could, may, might, must, shall, should, will and would. Negative and shortened forms (e.g. won’t and ’ll) are included in the data. To search for the modals we used a set of FTFs like the one shown in Figure 3 above, with lexical material specified. First we will consider the frequencies of all core modals. We begin by comparing their pmw frequencies in the different text categories of the two subcorpora of DCPSE. We consider pmw frequencies to allow comparison (i) with other studies which report pmw frequencies; and (ii) with the results per tVP to be presented later. The pmw results are given in Table 3, and changes are visualised in Figure 8. The table gives both simple and percentage changes in

Table 3: All modals pmw by text category, compared across subcorpora of DCPSE. The bold figures in the χ 2 column indicate significant changes over time (cf. Table 2) Text category

LLC

ICE-GB

Change in frequency simple

%

χ2

formal face-to-face informal face-to-face Telephone conversations Broadcast discussions Broadcast interviews spontaneous commentary parliamentary language legal cross-examination assorted spontaneous prepared speech

18,557 17,464 26,867 18,890 19,304 9,177 25,394 11,004 18,198 14,003

18,520 18,049 18,093 14,809 14,356 10,919 22,101 22,358 11,702 13,021

–37 584 –8,774 –4,082 –4,948 1,742 –3,294 11,354 –6,496 –983

–0.20% 3.35% –32.66% –21.61% –25.63% 18.98% –12.97% 103.18% –35.69% –7.02%

0.00 1.84 36.89 21.11 15.23 7.09 2.32 18.46 14.82 1.12

Total

17,376

16,287

–1,089

–6.27%

14.91

72

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

Figure 8: Modals pmw by text category, showing simple swing from LLC to ICE-GB

frequencies, and the graph shows simple swing along with start and end points (cf. Figure 7). (For the raw frequencies of the modals, see Appendix 2). Overall, the modals as a group show a significant fall of around 1,000 pmw or 6% of the LLC figure (see Total row, Table 3). However, this overall decline is not the end of the story. We can see considerable variation between text categories. Spontaneous commentary has a comparatively low frequency of modal verbs, while parliamentary language shows a comparatively high frequency. The effect of the diachronic dimension is also very different between categories. Significant decreases are found in four categories (telephone conversations, broadcast discussions, broadcast interviews, and assorted spontaneous speech), whereas significant increases are found in two categories (spontaneous commentary and legal cross-examination). These two text categories appear to “buck the trend”. The obvious question is, what is going on? We have already seen in section 1.3 that tensed VPs vary per million words by text category and time. As modal tensed VPs are a subcategory of tVPs, we first need to remove this variation from our analysis. We factor this variation out very simply by computing proportions p1 , p2 , etc. as a proportion of tensed VPs. This obtains the results shown in Table 4.

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

73

Table 4: Modals per tVP by text category, compared across subcorpora of DCPSE. The χ2 column compares the ratio of modals (LLC:ICE-GB) to the ratio of tVPs for significant difference Text category

LLC

ICE-GB

Change in frequency simple

%

χ2

formal face-to-face informal face-to-face telephone conversations broadcast discussions broadcast interviews spontaneous commentary parliamentary language legal cross-examination assorted spontaneous prepared speech

0.1560 0.1300 0.2136 0.1560 0.1734 0.1037 0.2783 0.0757 0.1405 0.1307

0.1437 0.1321 0.1386 0.1245 0.1124 0.1163 0.2220 0.1947 0.1151 0.1465

–0.0123 0.0021 –0.0750 –0.0315 –0.0610 0.0125 –0.0563 0.1190 –0.0254 0.0158

–7.89% 1.62% –35.11% –20.19% –35.18% 12.07% –20.22% 157.25% –18.08% 12.10%

2.66 0.44 44.27 18.11 32.91 3.05 6.15 33.86 2.98 2.77

Total

0.1420

0.1332

–0.0088

–6.18%

14.48

This table shows the rates of modals per tVP. The overall rate is around 0.14 per tVP: that is, around 14% of tensed VPs contain a modal auxiliary verb. This rate for modals as a category is of interest in itself and more intuitively meaningful than a pmw rate.14 The proportion of tVPs containing a modal auxiliary ranges widely across text type and time, from around 8% to 28%, as Figure 9 illustrates. Table 4 reports simple and percentage changes in modal frequency per tVP from earlier to later subcorpora. The overall frequency declines significantly from LLC to ICE‑GB by 0.0088 per tVP (simple swing). This is a percentage swing of –6.18% – an overall decline which is similar to that for pmw frequencies (–6.27%). (Recall that percentage swing is the difference between ICE-GB frequency and LLC frequency as a proportion of LLC frequency.) The figures cited in the text below are also percentage swing figures. The proportion of tensed VPs containing a modal has declined significantly in four categories, and increased significantly in one (legal cross-examination). The “assorted spontaneous” category no longer reports a significant change. For most categories, the results are similar to those obtained using pmw measures. Both methods find significant decreases in the categories of telephone conversations, 14 Biber et al. (1999: 456) report a roughly similar rate of 10–15% in their four registers of conversation, fiction, news, and academic writing in the LSWE (Longman Spoken and Written English) Corpus, which includes both American and British English. (Their rate is for modals, which they consider as untensed forms, as a proportion of finite verb phrases; this in effect corresponds to our proportions.)

74

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

Figure 9: Modals per tVP by text category, showing simple swing from LLC to ICE-GB

broadcast discussions, and broadcast interviews, and a significant increase in the legal cross-examination category. However, the size of the change observed differs considerably in some of these cases. For example, the decrease in the broadcast interview category is 35% (±11%) in the tVP results as against 26% (±13%) in the pmw results.15 This category is one where tVP density pmw was found to increase significantly, hence the greater decline in modal frequency once this increase in tVP density is taken into account. Elsewhere, the two baselines obtain different results. Spontaneous commentary shows a significant increase (19% ±14%) in the pmw results, but this increase is not significant in the tVP results; and as already noted, “assorted spontaneous” shows a significant decrease (36% ±18%) in the pmw results, but the decrease is not significant in the per tVP results. The pmw results seem to be due to changing frequencies of tensed VPs pmw (an increase for spontaneous commentary, and a decrease for assorted spontaneous; see Figure 7), rather 15 These ± figures represent approximate confidence intervals cited at the 95% level. See section 1.3.

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

75

than to changing patterns of modal usage. On the other hand, parliamentary language exhibits a significant decrease (20% ±14%) in the tVP results, yet set against a pmw baseline, the decrease is not significant. It should be clear to the reader by now that this choice of baseline is extremely important, and, it seems, especially so when results are compared across text categories (and, by extension, between differently sampled corpora). When considered per tensed VP, legal cross-examination is the only text category which shows a significant increase in modal frequency. The size of this increase is quite dramatic at 157% (±54%). However, this is the smallest category in terms of number of words (see Table 1) and is drawn from only nine speakers in total; the raw numbers of modals are also relatively small. Therefore these results should be treated with caution. We mentioned in the introduction that the text categories in the earlier subcorpus, LLC, are not evenly distributed across the 1960s and 1970s. It is worth noting, therefore, that the categories which show a significant decline are not all ones with a preponderance of earlier over later material: one (broadcast discussions) does have more earlier (1958–61) material than 1970s material, but the other three are weighted towards 1970s material and indeed one of them (parliamentary language) has only 1970s material. It is also noteworthy that not all text categories show a decline in overall modal frequencies. No overall decline is seen in informal conversation, for example, much the largest text category in the corpus and one which might be expected to be at the head of changes unfolding in the language. To gain a fuller picture, it is necessary to look at the patterns of change among individual modals.

3 Individual modals over time So far we have considered the frequencies of all core modals taken together. However, previous research has shown not only considerable synchronic variation in frequency among individual modals, but also varying diachronic trends over recent decades (e.g. Leech 2003; Leech et al. 2009; Aarts, Wallis, and Bowie forthcoming 2013). We now turn to consider the frequencies of individual modals, first with all text categories taken together, and then (in the next section) within different text categories. Again, see Appendix 2 for modal frequency data. Table 5 summarises the results for individual modals, against a tensed VP baseline. Simple and percentage swing per tVP are listed, along with the results of two “goodness of fit” χ2 tests. Column A evaluates whether each modal changes

76

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

Table 5: Proportions of individual modals per tensed VP, including negative and truncated forms. Columns A and B test for significant variation from tVPs and all modals respectively Lemma

LLC

ICE-GB

simple

%

A: χ2 (tVPs)

B: χ2 (modals)

can could may might must shall should will would

0.0297 0.0157 0.0072 0.0055 0.0086 0.0035 0.0091 0.0274 0.0354

0.0317 0.0139 0.0043 0.0058 0.0039 0.0018 0.0078 0.0309 0.0329

0.0020 –0.0018 –0.0028 0.0003 –0.0046 –0.0017 –0.0012 0.0035 –0.0025

6.87% –11.18% –39.77% 5.17% –54.19% –48.31% –13.61% 12.94% –6.98%

3.52 5.36 36.18 0.37 87.85 27.66 4.65 11.20 4.62

13.53 1.14 27.51 1.92 73.50 22.42 1.48 26.06 0.06

Total

0.1420

0.1332

–0.0088

–6.18%

14.48

significantly against a tensed VP baseline. Column B considers each modal as a member of the overall set of modals, i.e. whether the modal significantly increases or decreases its relative proportion (share) of the overall set.16 We can visualise these changes using simple swing graphs. Figure 10 plots simple swing against two baselines: as a proportion of tensed VPs17 (using the left-hand axis) and as a fraction of the modal set (in effect, the set of modal tensed VPs, right axis). Thus we can see that the modal auxiliary can is found in around 0.03 of all tensed VPs and this figure does not increase significantly, but its share of the modal set (i.e. of modal tensed VPs) does increase significantly over the same period. Figure 10 and Table 5 also confirm the expected finding that frequencies of individual modals vary synchronically in this corpus, with will, would, and can being by far the most frequent. Each of those items comprises over 20% of the total modal figures, while could comprises over 10%. Examining diachronic change over time, considered per tVP, may, must, and shall show significant and substantial declines in use (ranging from 40% to 16 Note that in employing a tVP baseline we do not claim that every tensed VP could take a given modal verb (can, could, etc.). We are not claiming that the baseline set represents a set of alternate forms, merely that it is a more reliable baseline than a word count. Similarly, in comparing can, etc., against the modal set we are identifying statistically significant variation within the modal set, rather than explaining this as arising by speaker choice. 17 The results for percentage change measured per tVP are very similar to those reported in Aarts, Wallis, and Bowie (forthcoming 2013: Table 2) for percentage change measured per million words (recall that, when all texts are taken together, tVP density does not differ significantly between the earlier and later subparts of DCPSE).

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

77

Figure 10: Changes in the use of the core modals (A, left axis) as an absolute proportion of tensed VPs and (B, right axis) as a relative proportion of the set of modals, measured as simple swing from LLC to ICE-GB

54%). We might say that these modals are “atypical” in that they show trends which are significantly different from the overall trend of decline for the modal set (cf. Table 5, Column B, and Figure 10). That is, not only are they declining in use in circumstances where they might be used, they are also decreasing their share of the modals. By contrast, the modals could, should, and would all show significant declines of a smaller magnitude (from 7% to 14%), and they are “typical” modals in the sense that these trends are not statistically separable from the behaviour of the modal set. (In other words, they do not significantly change as a proportion of the modal set.) Only one modal, will, exhibits a significant increase in frequency per tensed VP (13% ±7.5%). The increase for can per tVP is not statistically significant. However, both can and will behave “atypically” compared to the modal set and increase their share significantly (note the contrasting results for can in Columns A and B of Table 5, and see also Figure 10). Finally, might shows no significant change, whether measured per tensed VP or as a proportion of the modal set.

78

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

4 Individual modals by text category over time So far we have examined change in modal frequency over time by considering two different variables independently: the spoken “genre” or text type, and the particular core modal used. In this section we investigate the interaction between these two variables: whether particular core modals change at different rates depending on the text type. This implies a more complex experimental design, which we discuss below. As in section 3, we analyse changes in the rate of individual core modal use for different text types as a proportion of tensed verb phrases (tVPs), and as a proportion of core modals. This allows us to differentiate what we referred to as “typical” and “atypical” change. For simplicity we will record changes in terms of percentage swing (rather than simple swing) where these are significant. The first thing we can do is try to summarise significant change over time in a table. Table 6 colour-codes percentage change (black = fall, grey = rise, ns = non-significant) for each cell against a tensed VP baseline. In this table the modals have been reordered to place potential alternates (e.g. can/may, shall/will) side by side for ease of comparison. We know that modals are falling in use generally (final column), which explains the preponderance of black cells expressing negative change, but it should also be immediately clear that actual changes differ according to the particular verb and spoken text type. Table 6 views change against tensed VP frequency, where each tVP could conceivably include a core modal. However, as we have seen, changes within the set of core modals are inevitably obscured by the overall decline in modals. We examined how text categories differ in changes in frequency of all modals in section 2 (see Figure 9 in particular). The column marked All summarises these changes, where they are significant. Thus we know that in telephone conversations and broadcast interviews we are seeing a significant fall of around 35%, whereas broadcast discussions and parliamentary language have around 20% fewer core modals. (We also saw a major increase in the use of modals in legal cross-examination texts.) On the other hand, the two face-to-face conversational categories do not provide evidence of significant change. Table 7 focuses on individual changes within the set of core modals and factors out the effect of this modal-set variation. As in section 3, we employ the total number of core modals as a baseline. This allows us to more easily contrast adjacent columns, such as can and may, and shall and will. Table 7 reveals something else in comparison with Table 6: by only examining change within the core modal set we discount some variation, such as that seen in legal

304.37% ns

legal cross-examination assorted spontaneous

ns

ns

parliamentary language

All genres

ns

spontaneous commentary

ns

ns

broadcast interviews

prepared speech

ns

–58.63% –60.69%

–41.20%

broadcast discussions

ns ns ns –11.18%

–63.36% –39.77%

ns

ns

ns ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

–36.50%

telephone conversations

–44.17%

ns ns

ns –42.48%

ns

27.19%

could

informal face-to-face

may

formal face-to-face

can

ns

ns

ns ns

ns

ns

–58.51%

ns

ns

47.34%

ns

might

–48.31%

ns

ns ns

12.94%

327.21%

ns ns

–13.61%

ns

1,264.75% ns

ns

–39.38%

ns

ns

57.97%

–92.60%

–55.32%

ns

ns

–6.98%

–31.73%

253.83% ns

–29.83%

ns

–31.97%

ns

–44.36%

ns

ns

–60.04% ns

would

should

–41.49%

ns

–29.50%

ns

ns

will

ns

–83.31%

–56.04%

–31.54%

ns

shall

–6.18%

ns

–47.65% –54.19%

157.25% ns

–20.22%

ns

–35.18%

–20.19%

–35.11%

ns

ns

All

ns ns

ns

–64.47%

–56.97%

–54.12%

ns

–52.84%

–74.85%

must

Table 6: Significant changes in the proportion of individual core modals out of tensed verb phrases, expressed as a percentage swing from LLC (black = fall, grey = rise, ns = non-significant at p < 0.05)

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

79

ns

–35.80%

All genres

13.91%

ns

ns –67.31%

53.93%

–28.94%

prepared speech

assorted spontaneous

ns ns

ns

116.25%

ns

ns

ns

legal cross-examination

ns ns

parliamentary language

ns ns

ns

61.98% ns

–48.16%

–26.33%

broadcast discussions

ns

broadcast interviews spontaneous commentary

ns

ns ns

ns

could

–43.40%

ns

informal face-to-face

may

telephone conversations

ns

25.15%

formal face-to-face

can

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns ns

ns

ns

44.98%

ns

might

–44.90%

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns –93.40%

–79.08%

ns

–32.63%

ns

shall

20.38%

281.09%

ns

ns

ns

ns 40.95%

43.31%

ns

ns

ns

will

ns

–43.25%

ns

ns

115.22%

ns ns

ns

ns

ns

–39.10%

ns

ns

ns

ns ns

39.88%

ns

ns

ns

–56.62% ns

would

should

–51.17%

–53.30%

ns

ns

ns

ns –68.30%

–42.51%

ns

–53.60%

–72.70%

must

Table 7: Significant changes in relative frequency of use (DCPSE: 1960s to 1990s) of core modals, expressed as a proportion of the 1960s data (black = fall, grey = rise, ns = non-significant at p < 0.05)

80 Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

81

cross-examination texts, where few participants are found, and where variation may be attributable to individual speaker “styles”.18 One problem with Table 7 is that it is not easy to objectively determine which columns or rows are the most similar or distant. In other words, we cannot easily spot where core modals behave similarly across text categories, or where text categories appear to be similar in their modal use. Among the core modals, we placed potential alternates side by side, but these are the cases we expect to differ. A more objective algorithmic approach employs a computational method borrowed from psychology, termed Repertory Grid Analysis (RGA; Kelly 1955).19 RGA takes a grid like Table 7 as input after each difference value is translated into a simple ranked score. In our case, we use a five-point scale, where 1 represents a significant fall and 5 a significant rise in the usage of a particular modal. The centre value 3 is non-significant, and we assign intermediate values to cells that would be significant if we relaxed the error level to p < 0.1, providing some additional information to improve the matching. We then use an algorithm which creates a similarity score for each pair of rows or columns by adding the differences in ranked scores, and then uses this to pair the most similar rows or columns together repeatedly, creating a binary cluster tree or “dendrogram”. This procedure results in two cluster trees, one for modals (Figure 11) and one for text categories (Figure 12). We will discuss each of these figures in turn. They are best interpreted in combination with the grid in Table 8, which has been reorganised using the clustering information: the modals and text categories have been reordered to match the ordering in the cluster trees, and the dotted lines indicate major groups identifiable in the trees. This means that the table now groups together those modals which show more similar patterns of change across each of the text categories, and those text categories which show more similar patterns of change across each of the

18 Note that even with a focus on within-set variation in the core modals, this paper is not an alternation study (see, e.g. Aarts, Close, and Wallis 2013), which would consider whether one modal was being replaced by a semantically related form. Rather, the present paper can be characterised as a survey of the pattern of change over time in a corpus. The fact that can significantly increases by 25% per modal set in the informal face-to-face category whereas may significantly declines by 43%, for example, does not mean that we can say with any certainty that they are alternating in this category, although this hypothesis would be worth further investigation. Were we to wish to do this we would need to (a) consider can and may against a baseline of can + may, and (b) restrict the data to cases where alternation was feasible. This issue is discussed further in 5.3 below. 19 We are concerned here not with Kelly’s psychological theory, but with the algorithm for clustering similar patterns.

82

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

Figure 11: RGA cluster tree of relative (within-modal) changes over time: modals are paired for their similarity of rises and falls over text categories. The most similar terms are grouped lower down the tree. Heavy lines indicate greater differences (similarity score > 10)

Figure 12: RGA cluster tree of text categories, grouped by similarity of diachronic within-modal change

modals. Table 8 also includes an indication of the intermediate change values used in the RGA analysis, shown as shaded boxes marked ns (non-significant at p < 0.05). If you compare Tables 7 and 8 you can see, for instance, how this reorganisation has placed most of the decline in the share of modals in the lower right quarter of the table. The power of the cluster analysis can be seen when we examine the cluster trees in more detail. Consider first the modals cluster tree in Figure 11. The algorithm identifies the patterns of change of could and should, and shall and must, as being the most similar, and so on up the tree. Conversely, we can say that the set {shall, must, may, can} are distinct from the remaining core modals in their patterns of change (and within this group, can differs from the rest, as the

ns ns

–43.25%

ns

ns

prepared speech

informal face-to-face

ns

44.98%

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

–56.62%

broadcast discussions

ns ns

ns

ns 115.22%

ns

ns

legal cross-examination parliamentary language

ns ns

ns

ns 116.25%

telephone conversations

ns ns

might

spontaneous commentary

ns

assorted spontaneous

should

formal face-to-face

ns

ns

broadcast interviews

could

ns

–39.10%

39.88%

ns

ns

ns ns

ns

ns

ns

would

ns

281.09%

43.31%

40.95%

ns

ns ns

ns

ns

ns

will

–53.30% –53.60%

ns

–42.51%

–79.08% –32.63%

–72.70% –68.30%

ns

ns ns

ns

ns

ns

must

–93.40%

ns ns

ns

ns

ns

shall

–43.40%

–67.31%

–48.16%

ns

ns

ns ns

ns

ns

ns

may

25.15%

–28.94%

–26.33%

ns

ns

ns ns

ns

53.93%

61.98%

can

Table 8: Result of the Repertory Grid Analysis of Table 7 clustering core modals and text categories, employing intermediate change values (shaded, but marked ns, with dark grey showing a fall and light grey a rise). Dotted lines represent major groups identified by the algorithm

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

83

84

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

heavier line indicates). Table 8 illustrates what this means in practice: members of this set (grouped together on the lower right) significantly decline in number over several categories. Consider next the cluster tree of text categories in Figure 12. This reveals two groups and one outlier: informal face-to-face conversation. A glance at Table 8 reveals that the upper group is mostly an area of non-significant change. The second group – formal conversation, spontaneous commentary, broadcast discussions and prepared speech – is where most of the changes over time are to be seen, and their patterns of change are mostly distinct. Finally, informal faceto-face conversation, the largest category in the corpus (see Table 1), exhibits a different pattern again. The cluster tree for the text categories does not suggest any obvious sociolinguistic explanations for the groupings. For example, the three categories which consist mainly of monologue – assorted spontaneous speech, spontaneous commentary and prepared speech – do not form a cluster. Nor do we see separate groups of public and private categories (where “public” categories are taken as those with an audience other than the immediate participants). The outlying category of informal face-to-face conversation could be said to represent one end of a spectrum, with other categories distinct from it along one or more of the dimensions of formal vs. informal, public vs. private, or monologue vs. dialogue. The telephone conversation category is not so clearly distinct in this regard, although it does seem to differ from informal conversation in including some material from formal contexts alongside that from informal contexts. The text categories in the upper group, where few significant changes are found, are also the categories which are smaller in terms of word counts. For the most part they are also those with the lower raw frequency counts of modals. A further visualisation of the data is provided in Figure 13. This graph allows us to show the confidence intervals for each change, which have not so far been presented. Here we limit the range to ±100% and plot 95% confidence intervals as I-shaped error bars. The text categories and modals are displayed in the same order as in the cluster trees and Table 8, with the modals shown in two columns which match the two major groupings revealed by the cluster analysis. As with the reorganised Table 8, these orderings more clearly reveal the patterns in the data.

5 Discussion In the course of this study, we have examined changing modal usage against several different baselines, moving from the general to the more specific: from words, to tensed VPs, to the set of core modals (or modal tensed VPs). We have shown that the move from words to tensed VPs allows us to eliminate confounding

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

85

Figure 13: Percentage swing within the core modal set (1960s to 1990s) by text category, with I-shaped 95% confidence intervals. Where an interval crosses the zero axis, the change is not significant

86

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

variation in tensed VP density across time and text category. We therefore reported results against a baseline of tensed VPs. However, we then saw that patterns of change for individual modals were obscured by the overall pattern of modal decline. Our final step was to examine these changes against a modal-set baseline. Repertory grid cluster analysis was used as a way to summarise the major patterns in this final data. In the following subsections we summarise our findings, first from the perspective of text category (5.1) and then from the perspective of groups of modals which show somewhat similar behaviour (5.2). We then discuss the issue of possible alternations between forms (5.3).

5.1 Findings considered by text category We first consider our results from the perspective of text category. We summarise by noting for each text category, first, the overall trend for all modals per tensed VP (Table 6, final column; also Table 4 and Figure 9), and second, which individual modals increase or decrease as a proportion of the set of core modals (Tables 7 and 8, and Figure 13). The second type of variation concerns individual modals which behave “atypically” with regard to the overall trend for each category (variation of the first type). In the largest category, informal face-to-face conversation, total modal frequencies are stable. The pattern of individual modal change in this category is revealed by the cluster analysis as identifying an “outlier”, a category showing different patterns of change from the others. Three modals (must, may and shall) decrease their share of the modal set, while two (might and can) increase their share. Most of the remaining changes for individual modals are seen in a group of four text categories: formal face-to-face conversation, spontaneous commentary, broadcast discussions and prepared speech. With one exception, each of these categories shows stable total modal frequencies per tVP. The exception is broadcast discussions, where modal frequency declines by 20% (±8.5%). In terms of individual modals, must decreases its share of the modal set in all four of these categories. The remaining significant within-set changes are as follows: – In formal conversations, should decreases its proportion of the set. – In spontaneous commentary, shall decreases; whereas will increases its share. – In broadcast discussion, may, shall and can decrease; will and would increase their shares. – In prepared speech, may, would, can and should decrease; while will increases its share.

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

87

The remaining five text categories show far fewer significant changes for individual modals, although several categories show changes in total modal frequencies: – In broadcast interviews, total modal frequencies decline by 35% (±11%), and can increases its share of the modal set. – In assorted spontaneous speech, total modal frequencies are stable, but can again increases its share of the modal set. However, as only 13 speakers are represented in this category, the results should be treated with some caution. – In parliamentary language, total modal frequencies decline by 20% (±14%), and could and should increase their shares of the modal set. – In telephone conversations, total modals decrease by 35% (±9%), with no modals behaving “atypically” (i.e. they appear not to change in proportion to each other). – The final category, legal cross-examination, is alone among the ten text categories in reporting a significant increase in total modal frequencies. It has no “atypical” modals. However, as mentioned earlier, this is the smallest text category in the corpus (with a total of 9,338 words, representing only 9 speakers); the total modal frequency is also low at 151. Therefore the results should be interpreted with caution.

5.2 Findings for modals considered in groups To simplify our summary, we group together modals which show partially similar patterns. We focus here on statistically significant patterns of change within the modal set. Findings for all text categories taken together are compared with data from Leech et al. (2009) for written British English in the LOB and FLOB corpora, as reanalysed against a modal-set baseline by Aarts, Wallis, and Bowie (forthcoming 2013).

5.2.1 The modals must, shall and may The modals must, shall and may are the only ones which decline as a proportion of the core modal set when all text categories are considered together. They show substantial declines: 51% (±11%) for must, 45% (±19%) for shall, and 36% (±13%) for may. In our other study mentioned above (Aarts, Wallis, and Bowie forthcoming 2013), we performed a within-set analysis of the same core modals in the British written English corpora LOB/FLOB and compared these with DCPSE. In LOB/FLOB the comparable figures are declines of 22% (±8%) for must,

88

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

38% (±13%) for shall and 9% (±7.5%) for may. Moreover, the results for must and may were found to be statistically separable. That is, the relative declines for those two modals are significantly greater in the spoken corpus, suggesting that spoken English is “leading the way” for these changes. It is notable that must, shall and may are low-frequency modals (cf. Table 5 and Figure 10). Leech et al. (2009: 90, cf. also 269–270), comparing frequency changes in individual modals and in particular uses of modals, suggest “a general principle that ‘losers lose out’ (the infrequent suffer loss more than the frequent do)”. This idea draws on arguments by functional and cognitive linguists that greater usage strengthens cognitive representations (e.g. Evans and Green 2006: 114, 118–120). It seems likely that this principle is implicated in the patterns of change we observe. However, it cannot fully explain them: for one thing, other low-frequency modals such as might and should do not share this pattern of steep decline. Must, shall and may are also identified as similar in the RGA tree, showing that a comparable pattern is observed across several individual text categories. They all decline per modal set in the largest category of informal conversations, and they are the only modals to do so. They all also decline per modal set in broadcast discussions. In addition, may and must fall per modal in prepared speech; must and shall in spontaneous commentary; and must in formal conversation. Figure 13 reveals that in every single text category without exception, shall declines in its share of the modals in numerical terms, although this is not significant in some categories. These three modals thus behave quite consistently across text categories. They show no significant increase in any text category, and each shows a significant decline in several text categories. With their steep overall falls in number, they appear to be “leading the trend” of modal decline. 5.2.2 The modals could, should, might and would The four items could, should, might and would are usually considered to be the past-tense counterparts of present-tense can, shall, may and will, respectively. However, the relationships are not straightforward, as noted, for example, in the recent corpus study by Collins (2009): should has various specialised uses with no counterpart in shall (2009: 48–51); may and might now seem to function as separate lexemes for many speakers (2009: 117–118); and hypothetical uses are more frequent than past time uses for would (2009: 139) and could (2009: 108). In our data, none of these modals changes its share of the modal set when all text categories are taken together. Although they are similar with regard to this overall diachronic pattern, it should be borne in mind that their frequency profiles are distinct. Would is the highest-frequency modal in our data, surpassing

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

89

even can and will: would comprises 25% of all modals, as against 11% contributed by could, 6% by should and 4% by might (Figure 10). The reanalysed data for the written British English corpora shows a different pattern for could from that in DCPSE: it increases its share of the modal set by 12.5% (±6.5%), a result which is statistically separable from that for DCPSE (see also Aarts, Wallis, and Bowie forthcoming 2013). These four modals group together in the cluster analysis, although there are differences in their patterns across text categories. Could changes its share of the modal set in only one category, parliamentary language, where it shows an increase. Should also increases its share in that category; however, it decreases its share in two categories, formal conversation and prepared speech. Would also decreases its share in prepared speech, but increases its share in broadcast discussions. Finally, might increases its share in the largest category of informal conversations, but otherwise shows no significant changes. 5.2.3 The modals will and can The items will and can stand out as the two modals which increase significantly as a proportion of the modal set – will by 20% (±7%), and can by 14% (±6.5%). Both are high-frequency items (although would is of slightly higher frequency in our data). These two modals also increase their shares of the modal set in the reanalysed data for the written British English corpora, where the figures are 6% (±5%) for will and 14% (±7%) for can. The proportional increase for will is significantly greater in the spoken data than in the written (Aarts, Wallis, and Bowie forthcoming 2013). However, in terms of patterns across text categories in DCPSE, the two modals behave quite differently from each other, as their separation in the cluster analysis indicates. Will increases its share of the modal set in three categories: spontaneous commentary, broadcast discussions, and prepared speech. It does not decrease its share in any category. Can, by contrast, decreases its share in broadcast discussions and prepared speech, showing an inverse pattern to will in these two categories. It increases its share in three categories where will’s share seems stable: broadcast interviews, assorted spontaneous, and the large category of informal conversation.

5.3 Patterns of alternation This study is not an alternation study. In an alternation study, one would consider whether one modal was being replaced by a semantically related form, whether another modal or a quasi-modal form. For example, Close and Aarts

90

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

(2010) find that the quasi-modal have to shows a significant increase over time in DCPSE in contexts of possible alternation with must, supporting the idea of a replacement process (though only for root meanings; both epistemic and root must are found to decline significantly, but epistemic have to remains rare). Table 7, which displays results per modal, is, therefore, at best indicative. It allows us to identify areas where further investigation of alternation would be worthwhile. We placed potentially alternating modals in adjacent columns deliberately to try to draw out where a decline in one type may lead to an increase in another. First, consider can and may, both “possibility” modals, which have a complex relationship of semantic overlap and distinction (see, e.g. Collins 2009). They show inverse patterns for all genres together and for the largest category of informal face-to-face conversation: a significant increase in the share of can, and a significant decrease in the share of may. (We can further note that the possibility modal might increases its share in the informal category). This suggests there may be some degree of replacement of may by can, a possibility which is worthy of further investigation. On the other hand, in two categories (broadcast discussions and prepared speech) both can and may decrease their share. In addition, we can compare the per modal results for shall and will. These show an inverse pattern both overall, and in the two genres of broadcast discussions and spontaneous commentary: significant and substantial declines in shall and increases in will. Again, this suggests there may be a trend for will to replace shall in some contexts. In fact, a detailed alternation study of these two modals in DCPSE (Aarts, Close, and Wallis 2013) has provided clear evidence of a shift in use from epistemic shall to will in first-person declarative contexts.

6 Conclusion The overall trend of modal use in spoken British English over the period 1960– 1990 is downwards. This trend is significant and can be identified against a number of baselines, including the common per-million-word baseline. However, this does not mean that modals are all declining in use at the same rate, or even that all core modals are declining in use! Nor does it mean that the same trend that might be found when analysing a broad range of spoken transcripts is found in subcategories of these transcripts. The first conclusion one might make, therefore, is that different types of texts may be undergoing different changes, and that the assumption that a particular type of text, such as written material, is “representative” of current change may well be flawed. We have seen that the frequency of some individual modals appears to be changing more rapidly in DCPSE than in the LOB/FLOB

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

91

pair. Were we to assume that LOB/FLOB “represented” English of the time period concerned for this change, therefore, we would be misled, at least as far as changes in core modal frequency were concerned. Our study highlights the importance of taking care in corpus sampling (with an ideal of a “balanced” and “representative” corpus in mind) and in experimental design (to make the best use of this corpus). In order to explore the more complex picture which results, we demonstrated that it is necessary to first refine the baseline from one which is proportionate to the number of words in texts to one based on tensed verb phrases. The argument goes that only such verb phrases could conceivably contain a modal verb. This procedure draws out differences between text categories which would otherwise be missed or conflated with varying ratios of tensed VPs to words, a ratio which for our purposes constitutes “noise”. This experimental design can also be modified to consider relative variation within the modal set. Here we are not claiming that the set of modals represents an alternation set, but merely a repertoire of available modal forms. This procedure allows us to differentiate between two types of change: absolute use of the modals by text category, discussed in section 2, and change in the relative share of the modal set taken by a particular core modal. The patterns in the various spoken text categories present a complex picture. There is considerable variation among text categories synchronically and diachronically. Nevertheless, some diachronic trends emerge quite clearly from this complex picture, and are broadly in accord with those found by Leech et al. (2009) and Aarts, Wallis, and Bowie (forthcoming 2013) for the core modals in written corpora of British and American English. We used a repertory grid method to help us summarise this data, but the clustering of texts did not suggest a “neat” explanation of an underlying factor, apart from the fact that it identified a group of texts as showing little significant within-set change. The remaining larger text categories appeared to present quite different patterns of relative modal change. Millar (2009) questions the robustness of results based on comparing two particular years (or periods) as “points” in time, as done in work by Leech et al. (2009) using the Brown family of corpora and in the present study. Commenting on his data on modal frequencies from the Time Magazine corpus from 1923 to the present day, he notes that there is some year-to-year variation in frequencies that does not reflect the longer-term trends he found in his data. This result is not surprising. Unless we are looking at the spread of neologisms from their invention, it would be unlikely for us to be able to plot serial incremental change year on year! Within a closed set such as the core modals, we would expect to find considerable “noise”, with frequencies increasing and decreasing annually. In order to compensate for this we employ sound statistical methods

92

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

which estimate the likely error margins of change. For more on this see Aarts, Close, and Wallis (2013). We have been careful to recognise the limitations of our own data. In our analysis we noted that some sub-categories of text are relatively small (particularly legal cross-examination) and have few participants. Here we must avoid overstating the case for particular changes. In corpus linguistics we make two important assumptions to permit statistical inference to be employed. We assume that a sample is representative of the data from which it is drawn. However, if we rely on a small number of continuous-text samples, this claim may be difficult to justify. We also assume that every time a speaker makes a decision to employ a particular expression within a text they do so independently from previous decisions. Although this is an idealisation, it is less problematic for large samples made up of many texts. Indeed, the significant within-modal results outlined in the discussion primarily concern the larger text categories with many participants (see Table 1), where such objections are minimised. One way that the present study could be improved would be to extend the timescale. Obviously it is desirable to have multiple time points or periods for comparison where possible. The trends found in Leech et al. (2009) are supported by further data presented in Leech (2011), which extends the picture both forwards and backwards in time. Ideally we would wish to extend DCPSE in a similar way, although the accurate transcription and reliable parsing of speech data are costly to undertake.

Appendix 1: Raw frequency data for modals in ICE-GB by broad genre groupings lemma

dialogue

would will Can could may should must might shall

1,682 1,432 1,539 693 196 400 199 314 92

353 454 378 137 142 106 56 52 30

791 1,116 900 466 677 392 303 210 62

578 859 748 326 203 226 117 126 39

3,404 3,861 3,565 1,622 1,218 1,124 675 702 223

6,547 360,000

1,708 100,000

4,917 300,000

3,222 240,000

16,394 1,000,000

Total all words

non-print

These data are collated from Collins (2009).

print

monologue

all genres

Contemporary change in modal usage in spoken British English

93

Appendix 2: Raw frequency data for modals by text category, 1960s and 1990s subcorpora of DCPSE 1960s

can may could might shall will should would must Total

formal face-to-face informal face-to-face telephone conversations broadcast discussions broadcast interviews spontaneous commentary parliamentary language legal cross-examination assorted spontaneous prepared speech

187 35 99 796 125 428 132 14 91 196 92 65 49 19 57 122 14 31 27 15 11 3 10 7 37 16 18 69 50 46

All genres 1990s formal face-to-face informal face-to-face telephone conversations broadcast discussions broadcast interviews spontaneous commentary parliamentary language legal cross-examination assorted spontaneous prepared speech All genres

1,618 390

853

53 122 35 22 16 19 7 2 6 20 302

12 83 26 19 10 12 5 2 7 16

105 669 227 110 78 122 82 9 39 52

60 198 36 88 26 20 10 1 19 36

192 1,493

494

269 968 105 179 111 50 85 21 38 104

39 859 5,505 241 3,630 27,917 23 689 3,226 53 824 5,282 27 393 2,267 30 420 4,049 14 256 920 1 56 740 4 184 1,310 35 428 3,275

1,930 467 7,739 54,491

can may could might shall will should would must Total 182 873 66 109 62 151 30 8 39 48

24 62 13 36 9 21 16 7 9 16

82 350 40 54 47 35 21 7 11 40

37 155 21 27 8 13 8 2 4 13

5 49 9 3 7 1 4 0 2 10

112 611 126 119 55 217 55 11 29 194

22 185 19 62 14 25 19 9 12 20

1,568 213

687

288

90

1,529

387

tVP

253 798 46 189 91 55 66 49 19 62

9 98 12 23 14 12 7 2 1 16

tVP

726 5,051 3,181 24,073 352 2,540 622 4,996 307 2,732 530 4,559 226 1,018 95 488 126 1,095 419 2,860

1,628 194 6,584 49,412

The table above summarises raw frequencies in each spoken subcategory or genre, from left to right, for each core modal, the total number of core modals and tensed VPs (tVP column).

94

Jill Bowie, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts

References Aarts, Bas, Joanne Close and Sean Wallis. 2013. Choices over time: methodological issues in current change. In: Bas Aarts, Joanne Close, Geoffrey Leech and Sean Wallis (eds.), The Verb Phrase in English: Investigating Recent Language Change with Corpora. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aarts, Bas, Gerald Nelson and Sean Wallis. 1998. Using Fuzzy Tree Fragments to explore English grammar. English Today 14: 52–6. Aarts, Bas, Sean Wallis and Jill Bowie. forthcoming 2013. Profiling the English verb phrase over time: modal patterns. In: Irma Taavitsainen, Merja Kytö, Claudia Claridge and Jeremy Smith (eds.), Developments in English: Expanding Electronic Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad and Edward Finegan. 1999. The Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. London: Longman. Close, Joanne and Bas Aarts. 2010. Current change in the modal system of English: a case study of must, have to and have got to. In: Ursula Lenker, Judith Huber and Robert Mailhammer (eds.), The History of English Verbal and Nominal Constructions, 165–181. Volume 1 of English historical linguistics 2008: Selected papers from the fifteenth International Conference on English Historical Linguistics (ICEHL 15), Munich 24–30 August 2008. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Collins, Peter. 2009. Modals and Quasi-Modals in English. Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi. Davies, Mark. 2009. The 385+ million word Corpus of Contemporary American English (1990– 2008+): design, architecture, and linguistic insights. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 14: 159–190. Davies, Mark. 2010. More than a peephole: using large and diverse online corpora. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 15: 405–411. Evans, Vyvyan and Melanie Green. 2006. Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Kelly, George. 1955. The Psychology of Personal Constructs. New York: Norton. Leech, Geoffrey. 2003. Modality on the move: the English modal auxiliaries 1961–1992. In: Roberta Facchinetti, Manfred Krug and Frank Palmer (eds.), Modality in Contemporary English, 223–240. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Leech, Geoffrey. 2011. The modals ARE declining: reply to Neil Millar’s “Modal verbs in TIME: frequency changes 1923–2006”. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 16(4): 547– 564. Leech, Geoffrey, Marianne Hundt, Christian Mair and Nicholas Smith. 2009. Change in Contemporary English: A Grammatical Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Millar, Neil. 2009. Modal verbs in TIME: frequency changes 1923–2006. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 14(2): 191–220. Nelson, Gerald, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts. 2002. Exploring Natural Language: Working with the British Component of the International Corpus of English. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Newcombe, Robert G. 1998. Interval estimation for the difference between independent proportions: comparison of eleven methods. Statistics in Medicine 17: 873–890. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik. 1985. A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language. London: Longman. Svartvik, Jan (ed.). 1990. The London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English: Description and Research. (Lund Studies in English 82.) Lund: Lund University Press.

Geoffrey Leech

Where have all the modals gone? An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries in recent standard English 1 Introduction In the first volume in this series (Facchinetti et al. 2003) I published a chapter in which I presented evidence for the decline in frequency of the English core modal auxiliaries as a class1 during the period 1961–1991/2. (The decline was of 12.2% in AmE and of 9.5% in BrE). This was the period covered by the four corpora of the Brown Family (see below) known for convenience as the Brown, LOB, F-LOB and Frown corpora. Although the findings reported in that chapter have since been challenged by Millar (2009) (see 2.1 below), they have more recently been confirmed by more extensive corpus evidence, as I showed in Leech (2011). In this chapter I will briefly review that evidence, drawing on corpus data from American, British, spoken and written resources. I will then seek an explanation for this decline. The most obvious hypothesis is that the modals as a class are gradually being encroached upon by the emergent modals (otherwise called semi-modals)2 – a class of verb idioms including be going to, have to, and want to which, in association with grammaticalization (see Hopper and Traugott 2003), have been increasing in frequency. However, the Brown Family corpora 1 The term core modals is used in the introduction to Facchinetti, Krug, and Palmer (2003). I use the term to apply not only to the well-known group of auxiliaries will, would, can, could, may, might, shall, should, must but also to need (as a verb morphosyntactically patterning as a modal auxiliary) and ought (to), described in Quirk et al. (1985: 138–140) as “marginal modals”. The full verb construction need to, in contrast, is treated here as an emergent modal (see fn. 2). Need as a core modal has become rare in present-day English, whereas the frequency of need to has been increasing dramatically. 2 In Leech (2003) and other more recent publications, I used the term semi-modal for verbal idioms semantically similar to the modal auxiliaries. However, in this paper I use the term emergent modals partly modeled on Krug’s (2000) term emerging modals. The slight difference in the label reflects a difference in the set of verbal idioms included in this rather ill-defined category. The idioms I have included here are BE able to, BE going to, HAVE to, HAVE got to, WANT to, NEED to, BE supposed to, had better (including also reduced versions represented in writing as gotta, gonna, wanna, better) – for some justification of this list, see Leech et al. (2009: 92–98). I have omitted BE to, included as a semi-modal in Leech (2003), as it goes completely against the trend of increasing frequency, and has been argued to be a (core) modal auxiliary by Declerk (2010).

96

Geoffrey Leech

show that the increase of emergent modals is far from commensurate with the decline of core modals. After discussing some alternative hypotheses, I will conclude, while recognizing that other factors may well be involved, that the most plausible explanation for the decline of frequency is a combination of the two diachronic processes of grammaticalization and colloquialization.

2 The Brown Family of corpora of written English The Brown Family of corpora, which provides most of the evidence for this study, is named after the Brown Corpus (compiled at Brown University in the 1960s), which was the first of this group of corpora to be created, and was indeed the first electronic corpus of the English language. The Brown Corpus contains just over a million word tokens of published American English (AmE) textual material, and was joined in the 1970s by a matching corpus of British English (BrE), known as the LOB [Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen] Corpus. Both corpora consist of text samples first published in the year 1961. Later, in the 1990s, two new corpora were compiled at the University of Freiburg, matching Brown and LOB in all manageable details, and were therefore called the Freiburg-Brown [Frown] Corpus and the Freiburg-LOB [FLOB] Corpus. These were compiled according to precisely the same corpus design as Brown and LOB, except that they were sampled from texts first published in 1991 and 19923 respectively. For all intents and purposes, these have been regarded as a representative sample of written (published) English for 1991/2, exactly comparable to the Brown and LOB corpora respectively. Hence significant differences observed between the 1961 corpora and the 1991/2 corpora can be reasonably attributed to linguistic change during the 30-year period 1961–1991/2. Because of the separation by a 30-year period, it is a natural metaphor to think of the four corpora as forming a nuclear family, and so the label the Brown Family of corpora has stuck. Since the 1990s, the Brown Family has been extended by the further addition of BLOB19314 (a matching corpus of British text samples from the period 1928–1934, centering on 1931 – BLOB standing for ‘before LOB’). An equivalent corpus of AmE known as B-Brown (‘before Brown’) is still under development, as is a BrE corpus of an even earlier generation, BLOB-1901, sampled from the seven-year period 1898–1904. A yet more recent development has been the creation at

3 The slight time discrepancy between FLOB (1991) and Frown (1992), caused by difficulties in collecting the US data, is small enough to be ignored for the purpose of diachronic change. 4 BLOB-1931 was originally called the Lancaster-1931 corpus.

An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries

97

Lancaster of two matching corpora AmE06 and BE06 – respectively of AmE and BrE of the period of five years centring on 2006. These two corpora were collected from web-based text materials, but were in all other respects equivalent to the other members of the Brown Family in design. The Brown Family as a whole, as it is at present, is summarized in Table 1.5 Table 1: The current state of the Brown Family of corpora 1901±3

1931±3

1961

1991, 1992

2006±2

British English

BLOB-1901 Corpus

BLOB-1931 Corpus

LOB Corpus

FLOB Corpus

BE06

American English

(no corpus yet)

B-Brown Corpus

Brown Corpus

Frown Corpus

AmE06

Notes: The shaded squares on the left represent corpora at present incomplete. The shaded corpora on the right are collected from text materials on the World Wide Web. It will be noticed that these, the most recent corpora, are separated in time from the preceding pair of corpora by only 15 years, compared with double that length of period separating the earlier corpora.

The consequence of this considerable extension of the Brown Family from the four corpora analysed in Leech (2003) is that the corpora can be used for tracking the history of English grammatical forms and features over a period of more than a century – though the data from the shaded corpora have to be used with caution, because of their incompleteness or web origin. In practice, in this essay I do not make use of the B-Brown Corpus, and my use of the BLOB-1901 Corpus will mean scaling up the frequencies of this incomplete corpus from a balanced sample only roughly one-third as large as a full-sized corpus, to a normalized figure of “per million words”. As a general rule, frequencies will be cited in this essay as normalized to “per million words” ( pmw). Although the corpora of the Brown Family are small by contemporary standards, their “added value” is in a strict adherence to principles of comparability between the corpora: not only are the corpora equivalently subdivided into 15 genre categories, but within each genre, the make-up of the sample is matched in sub-corpus groupings down to one-to-one equivalence of individual text samples of 2000 words. The composition of each corpus, in summary, is as in Table 2:

5 It would be impossible to give full acknowledgement here to those who have played a part in the creation of the Brown Family corpora, but the names of those chiefly concerned with the development of individual corpora are as follows: Brown (W. Nelson Francis and Henry Kučera), LOB (Stig Johansson and Geoffrey Leech), Frown and FLOB (Christian Mair and Marianne Hundt), BLOB-1931 (Nicholas Smith and Geoffrey Leech), BLOB-1901 (Nicholas Smith, Geoffrey Leech and Paul Rayson), B-Brown (Marianne Hundt), BE06 (Paul Baker), AmE06 (Paul Baker, Amanda Potts and Matteo Di Cristofaro).

98

Geoffrey Leech

Table 2: The genres of the Brown family of corpora, and the number of text samples of 2000 words each contains Identifying letter

Genres

Subcorpora

A B C

Press: reportage Press: editorial Press: reviews

Press

44 27 17

D E F G H

Religion Skills and hobbies Popular lore Belles letters, biography, memoirs etc. Miscellaneous [mostly government documents]

General Prose

17 36 48 75 30

J

Learned [academic writing]

Learned

80

K L M N P R

General fiction Mystery and detective fiction Science fiction Adventure and western fiction Romance and love story Humour

Fiction

29 24 6 29 29 9

Total

Number of text samples

500

Because the genre sections are relatively small, it has been found that more meaningful comparisons can be made by grouping the genres into four subcorpora, comprising a set of related genres (Press, General Prose, Learned and Fiction), as shown in the third column of Table 2. The limitations of channel (written, printed) and size (just over a million words) of the Brown family corpora mean that it makes sense to extend the range of this study where possible by using other corpora. In particular, it is important to find out what we can from electronic spoken English corpora of the same or similar periods, in so far as they exist. The Diachronic Corpus of Present-day Spoken English [DCPSE]6 offers itself for this purpose, as well as approximately matching 4-to-5 million word corpora of American and British speech – the Longman Corpus of Spoken American English [LCSAE] and the demographic subcorpus of the British National Corpus [BNCdemog] – which

6 The DCPSE, developed by Bas Aarts and others at University College London, is available as a licensed package with dedicated ICECUP software on CD. Part of the corpus consists of the Survey of English Usage corpus (SEU) and part of the British component of the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB). The use of this corpus and the associated software is detailed in Nelson et al. (2002).

An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries

99

(although synchronic) can also be useful, because of their close comparability.7 For AmE in particular, there are the immense Corpus of Contemporary American English [COCA] and the Corpus of Historical American English [COHA], which can be searched on-line at Mark Davies’s website at BYU.8 COHA represents an even longer diachronic span than the Brown Family. Nevertheless, in studying frequency changes of relatively common grammatical (morphosyntactic) categories, because of their exact comparability, the 1-million word corpora of the Brown Family are usually sufficient, and statistically highly significant results can be obtained.

3 The declining core modal frequency Figure 1 shows the overall frequencies of the core modals and the semi-modals in AmE and BrE included in the present study, as shown in the Brown Family

Figure 1: Core Modal Auxiliaries and Emergent Modals: Overall frequencies in BrE and AmE 1901–2006

7 Both LCSAE and BNCdemog consist of data collected by informants who carried a mobile tape-recorder and recorded spontaneous talk in which they engaged over a set period. The spoken material is almost all spontaneous dialogue (“conversation”), and the design was for speakers to be representative of the English-speaking populations of the USA and the UK in terms of age, gender, social class and region of domicile. 8 Brigham Young University. See Mark Davies’s corpus website http://corpus.byu.edu/.

100

Geoffrey Leech

corpora from 19019 to 2006. (Note that here and in other charts, frequencies will be normalized to occurrences per million words (pmw): this usually means a slight adjustment to the raw frequencies of the Brown Family, because each of the Brown Family corpora exceeds a million words by a small margin.10 This chart shows not only the declining pattern of the core modals, but the increasing profile of the so-called semi-modals or (as I will call them) emergent modals.11 The converging lines are still far apart: that is, the overall frequency of core modals is several times that of the emergent modals. On the whole, the core modals are declining proportionately faster than the emergent modals are increasing. Another difference is between AmE and BrE: the decline in American usage of modals is steeper and is roughly one generation in advance of the British decline, which is following in its wake. The increasing frequency of the emergent modals, on the other hand, shows no significant difference between American and British English. Figures 2 and 3 reveal the declining trend in a different way, focusing on the consistent decline between 1961 and 1991/2 of individual core modals. It can be seen in Figure 2 that every single modal in AmE shows a decline in frequency: but some modals, in particular modals of middle-order or low frequency, such as may, must, and shall, register proportionately the biggest fall. A very similar pattern can be seen for BrE in Figure 3, except that two common modals – can and could – show a slight rise.

9 Since the 1901 corpus (BLOB-1901) was less than half complete at the time of analysis, we (Nick Smith and I) carefully selected from the already collected texts a sample that was proportionately equivalent to a complete Brown Family corpus although consisting of only of one-third (167 out of 500) of the texts forming what would comprise the whole corpus. Hence the 1901 frequencies, calculated per million words, are derived from a smaller body of texts, and scaled up to a per-million-word normalized frequency. To this extent, the 1901 normalized frequency figures are less reliable than those from the other Brown family corpora. The 2006 corpora (both BrE and AmE), for a different reason already explained, may also be considered less reliably equivalent to the corpora from 1931–1992, because they were collected from web sources – although we have so far no evidence leading us to distrust their comparability to other members of the Brown Family. 10 This is because in each of the Brown family corpora, the ideal length of each text sample (2000 words) is exceeded to include the remaining part of the sentence in which the 2000th word occurs. 11 See fn 2 for an explanation of this term.

An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries

101

Figure 2: Declining use of core modals in written AmE, 1961–1992

Figure 3: Declining use of core modals in written BrE, 1961–1991

It may be helpful here to quote one or two examples from the corpora, illustrating the individual modal auxiliaries which have declined more than others, and the kinds of meaning that are becoming less frequent if not obsolescent: (1)

There seems always to have been what may be termed “fashions” in names. . . (BLOB G51)

(2)

And, being Judy, she decided she must do something about it. (LOB P20)

(3)

However, it is Mark I blame for the way you behaved. I shall never forgive him. (LOB P24)

(4) The Prime Minister’s concern may be understandable. Yet need he worry? (FLOB B13) (5)

She looked at him, and frowned. He ought not to have been there to be counted. (LOB L13)

102

Geoffrey Leech

3.1 Other corpus evidence supporting the findings from the Brown Family of corpora The findings I reported in Leech (2003) on the decline of modals in 1961–1991 were challenged by Millar (2009), who analysed the frequency of the core modals in the TIME Corpus – a complete textual record of the American news magazine TIME between 1923 and 2007. (This corpus, like COCA and COHA, is available for searching on Mark Davies’s corpus website at Brigham Young University, Utah [BYU]). Millar observed that in TIME during that period of 84 years the modals as a whole increased significantly (although some modals, such as must, shall and need(n’t), decreased). He argued that this cast doubt on the analysis in Leech (2003), particularly because the TIME results used annual data points, giving a much more fine-grained analysis, whereas I used only two data points – 1961 and 1991/2. Since Leech (2003) was published, as already shown, the Brown Family has been extended, and five data points (1901, 1931, 1961, 1991 and 2006) are now available (with some reservation) for BrE, and three for AmE. These have confirmed the downward direction of core modal frequency, as Figure 1 shows. For AmE, however, more substantial confirmation of the decline has been provided by the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) and the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), both available for online access, like the TIME Corpus, on Mark Davies’s website at BYU. The COHA Corpus enables searches to be made decade by decade back as far as the beginning of the nineteenth century, and Figure 4, which tracks core modal frequency for the last 100 years, shows an overall gradual decline in the frequency of the core modals, flattening out in the mid-century, but accelerating during the most recent thirty years:

Figure 4: Declining frequency of the core modals in the COHA corpus of written AmE

An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries

103

The twentieth-century record of gradual decline can actually be attributed to the steady frequency loss of the seven lower-frequency modals, may, should, must, might, shall, ought (to) and need(n’t): the four most common modals, would, will, can and could, have on the whole maintained the same frequency over the century, as can be seen in Figure 5:

Figure 5: Declining frequency of the seven less frequent modals in 1910–2010, contrasted with the persisting frequency of the four most frequent modals (AmE data from COHA)

As this chart suggests, the decline which has affected the less common modals over the century has in the last decade or so begun to impinge on the four commonest modals, so that the overall picture is of accelerating decline of frequency. For a close-up view of what has been happening in the last two decades, we now switch to the COCA corpus, which provides four data points (each consisting of five year periods) to produce a finer-grained record. Another advantage of COCA is that a quarter of the data of this corpus comes from spoken language (albeit mainly from the public media). To a diachronic linguist used to studying the history of languages in centuries rather than decades, it is no doubt surprising that systematic change should be detectable over a period as short as twenty years. However, Figure 6 does indeed show a noticeable and rather consistent decline, especially in regard to the most frequent modals will and would, and the lower-frequency modals may, should, and must whose decline now has a longish history. (The bottom three modals shall, need(n’t) and ought (to) are also declining, but the trend is almost invisible on Figure 6 because of their increasing infrequency). Overall, the loss of frequency over the period of 15 years between the first data point (1990–4) and the last data point (2005–2010) is more than 7 per cent.

104

Geoffrey Leech

Figure 6: Frequency change of modals in the later 20th and early 21st century (AmE data from COCA)

It is intriguing that the three modals can, could and might, all expressing the weak modality of ability/possibility/permission, have survived at roughly the same level of frequency over the twenty years. In this connection, let us go back to Millar’s (2009) article, and reconsider may. In Millar’s study of the TIME corpus, may had shown the biggest increase of all modals – quite contrary to the general and regular decrease of may in written AmE as shown in COHA (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Increase in the frequency (pmw) of may in the TIME corpus, contrasted with frequency decline of may (pmw) in COHA over the same period

An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries

105

The evidence appears to be that the news magazine TIME underwent an atypical increase in the use of may, as well as some other modals, for reasons which are unclear. One possible explanation, hazarded by Millar himself, is that news magazines in recent decades, or perhaps TIME in particular, have moved away from reporting news and have given more space to speculating about the uncertainties of the present and future, hence the increasing call for possibility modality. As was already established in Leech (2003), epistemic possibility, illustrated in the following examples from TIME, had by 1991 become by far the dominant meaning of may: (6045)

. . . the crisis may be even more acute.

(6087)

Though the US may eventually launch military reprisals. . .

(6098)

The drug may be less effective than other well-known bone-builders. . .

(These examples date from 2000, and the numbers of the examples are taken from the temporally-ordered KWIC concordance of the TIME corpus interface at BYU). More research would be needed to explain properly the divergence of the frequency increase of may in TIME from the overall steady decline of may shown in COHA. However, one thing is clear: the TIME pattern of increase, which partly led Millar to question the findings of Leech (2003), is a marked deviation from the more general pattern of decline attested in COHA and other corpus evidence. Surely a genre-specific explanation has to be sought for this strange result, which amply warns us that findings based on just one genre or (in this case) just one publication cannot be generalized to the written language as a whole.

4 Are the core modals declining in spoken as well as written English? The evidence for the declining frequency of the core modals in the previous section was based entirely on written English corpora. Before considering the possible reasons for this decline, it would be useful to find out how far the same pattern of decline can be observed in the spoken language. Unfortunately, we lack corpora of spoken English which have a diachronic dimension, except for the relatively small Diachronic Corpus of Present-day Spoken English (DCPSE), which was created by amalgamating the spoken material from two corpora of BrE, one collected in the 1958–1977, and the other collected in the early 1990–1992. DCPSE is a valuable and unique resource, but regrettably it

106

Geoffrey Leech

cannot be regarded as a spoken equivalent of the LOB and FLOB corpora, the BrE corpora of the Brown Family which approximate to it in date. The main reason for this is that its two subcorpora (consisting of spoken material from respectively the Survey of English Usage [SEU] Corpus and the British component of the International Corpus of English [ICE-GB]) had a somewhat different composition. (In particular, the transcribed texts of the SEU Corpus were around 5000 words in length, compared with texts of 2000 words in the ICE-GB. The subdivisions of the two subcorpora in terms of spoken genres were also rather different, and the transcriptions of the SEU Corpus were collected over a longer period of time than the ICE-GB). However, Nicholas Smith and I were able to use subsamples of the SEU and ICE-GB spoken material which matched each other as closely as possible in terms of date range, genres and size. On this basis of approximate comparability, we could make diachronic comparisons between the earlier and later DCPSE mini-corpora, which we named the DSEU and the DICE. These corpora consisted of no more than 135,892 and 129,096 words respectively,12 and therefore truly deserved the label mini-corpora. Despite their small size, they were able to yield significant results. Using the Log Likelihood (LL) test of statistical significance,13 the LL score for the loss of core modals was 18.73, i.e. more significant than the p < 0.0001 critical value in a chi-square test. The gain in emergent modals reached an even higher degree of significance (37.39). The comparison of the two mini-corpora yielded the results seen in Figure 8, showing, like Figure 1, the converging lines of frequency for core modals and emergent modals. In the spoken corpora, moreover, both the decline of the core modals and the increase of the emergent modals were steeper than in LOB and FLOB: a loss of 11.8% of core modals in DCPSE (compared with 9.8% in LOB/FLOB) and a gain of 38.5% of emergent modals in DCPSE (compared with 9.0% in LOB/FLOB). For the written corpora LOB and FLOB, adding together the frequencies of the core modals and emergent modals revealed a highly significant decline of these modal verbs overall (LL score 48.71, a higher significance than p < 0.00001): an overall “modality deficit”, so to speak. There was likewise a “modality deficit”

12 NB These “mini-corpora”, though small, are larger than the “mini-corpora” SEU-mini and ICEGB-mini used to track diachronic change in spoken English in Leech (2003), and therefore the results are marginally different. 13 On the preference for the log likelihood measure of significance over chi-square, see Paul Rayson’s UCREL website http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/llwizard.html, and Rayson, Berridge, and Francis (2004) which may be downloaded there.

An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries

107

Figure 8: The loss of core modals (pmw) compared with the gain of emergent modals in the DCPSE through the 1960s to the 1990s, making use of the approximately equivalent minicorpora DSEU and DICE

for the spoken mini-corpora DSEU and DICE, but it was too small to be significant (LL score 0.54). In other words, although the loss of core modals and gain of emergent modals are both very highly significant, the “modality deficit” observed when both core and emergent modals’ frequencies are counted for the 1960s and 1990s is too small to be significant. The conclusion is that the “modality deficit” is present in both the written and spoken corpora of the 1990s as compared with the 1960s, but is much reduced in the spoken data, indeed non-significant, so we must assume that the case for a “modality deficit” in the spoken data (particularly given the small size of the mini-corpora being compared) is unproven.

5 A tentative look at possible explanations for the apparent “modality deficit” in written English I have used scare quotes in referring to “modality deficit”, because this term can be misleading. It seems to suggest that – as a result of the declining frequency of core modals, and the failure of emergent modals to fill this frequency gap –

108

Geoffrey Leech

English writers have somehow been finding fewer opportunities to express modality, presumably exercising stronger preference for unmodalized clauses such as The cake has been eaten rather than (say) The cake must/may have been eaten. It is possible that this is true – in which case, an investigation into social or psychological factors causing the “modality deficit” would be of great interest. However, there are other possible explanations, of which the most plausible is that writers of English have increasingly preferred using other means of expressing modality, such as be obliged to, perhaps, requirement, it is possible. Such words or expressions, in contrast to the core and emergent modals under investigation, which have undergone grammaticalization and auxiliation in the history of English, may be referred to as lexical expressions of modality (see Perkins 1983 for a treatment of these). Lexical modality devices are so numerous that it is scarcely possible to list them exhaustively. As a tentative first step to investigate their frequency over recent time, I made a substantial list of such expressions, and recorded their frequency in four British corpora of the Brown Family – BLOB-1931, LOB, FLOB and BE06. The list with frequencies is reproduced as Table 3. The surprising result of this exercise, seen at the bottom of Table 3, is that over this 75-year period, there has actually been a decline of 11.93% in the use of the lexical expressions listed. This appears to strengthen the “modality deficit” theory that writers are simply tending to resort less to expressions of modality. However, another reason, not inconsistent with this, may be that this decline is linked to the trend of colloquialization (see Hundt and Mair 1999, Leech et al. 2009: 20): i.e. the tendency over time (including the 1931–2006 period) for written English to become more informal and to move closer to speech. This process has been seen as a likely explanation for a variety of increase-of-frequency trends (see Leech et al. 2009: 239–249) observed in the Brown Family, such as the increase of verb and negative contractions. It can also be applied to decreasing frequency trends where the phenomena under consideration – such as the passive voice – are biased towards more formal written registers (such that their decrease can be seen as a negative consequence of informalization). It is noticeable that many of the declining lexical modal expressions in Table 3 are the opposite of colloquial: e.g. the first four items on the list be (im)possible/ probable/(un)certain/necessary. The colloquialization argument, however, does not explain why the frequency of modal expressions seems to have been diminishing overall. A further possible explanation is that finite modalized clauses are being increasingly rivalled by non-finite modalized clauses. The core and emergent

An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries

109

Table 3: Lexical modal expressions and their (approx.) frequency per million words in written British English members of the Brown family of corpora 1931–2006 1931 BLOB

1961 LOB

1991 FLOB

2006 BE06

Total

BE ( im)possible BE (im)probable BE (un)certain BE (un)necessary BE (un)sure BE bound to BE compelled to BE essential BE forced to BE obliged to BE required to Certainly Compulsion Compulsory Definitely Doubtless Doubt (n, v) Guess (I) Know Likelihood (Un)likely Maybe Necessarily Necessity Need (n) Need (v) No doubt (adv) Obligation(s) Obligatory Perhaps (Im)possibility Possibly Probably Requirement Seem Surely Think (I/we) Undoubtedly

223 21 37 110 83 33 18 24 24 10 21 252 6 10 85 29 245 9 1518 6 149 27 61 67 176 239 97 37 0 377 83 98 242 40 829 110 227 53

176 12 34 124 89 26 9 34 16 17 31 235 5 31 22 19 248 8 1632 5 237 85 59 37 262 303 1 39 1 407 92 93 279 58 934 126 196 46

114 1 32 76 106 22 3 29 29 15 47 202 5 17 29 13 181 12 1430 7 310 101 65 33 264 366 45 29 5 389 76 103 239 107 762 75 192 38

102 2 19 40 78 11 4 21 31 10 30 145 2 16 41 9 116 12 1502 26 324 166 44 10 235 376 30 16 2 240 86 84 193 86 647 61 162 20

615 36 122 350 356 92 34 108 100 52 129 834 18 74 177 70 790 41 6082 44 1020 379 229 147 937 1284 173 121 8 1413 337 378 953 291 3172 372 777 157

Total

5676

6028

5569

4999

Total loss of frequency 1931–2006: –11.93% Note: The frequency for need as a verb excluded the need to construction which has been counted as an emergent modal in this paper.

110

Geoffrey Leech

modal constructions are normally finite, but in dependent clauses can sometimes be replaced, with little change of meaning, by a to-infinitive construction: (6) Besides, it gives us all something to talk about. (Frown A24) (7)

She turned and smiled frostily, wondering what to do. (Frown R02)

In each of these sentences the to-infinitive clause could substitute for a modal auxiliary construction: . . . something we can talk about; wondering what she should do. Since the OE period, there has been a tendency for finite dependent clauses to give way to the to-infinitive, another product of grammaticalization. Los (2005) has studied this development of the to-infinitive in OE and ME, at the expense of the finite that + subjunctive, and evidence in Rohdenburg (1995) and Leech et al. (2009: 181–205) indicate that similar developments have been happening in ModE, up to and including PDE. However, this is an extremely slow process restricted to certain dependent clause types and certain modals such as could, can, may and should. It could scarcely account for the relatively recent decline of modal frequency as we have observed it in this study.14 The last hypothesis I put forward to account for the “modality deficit” is that the rather limited increase in emergent modals, as compared with the loss of core modals, is explicable by a combination of the processes of grammaticalization and colloquialization. The case for explaining the rise of emergent modals by grammaticalization is a very familiar one. Grammaticalization is particularly associated with the spoken language, where emergent modals’ increase of frequency is associated with phonetic reduction, word merger, and word elision, so that the nonstandard spellings gonna, wanna, gotta together with better signal the auxiliation of these forms in transcribed speech. Colloquialization, in its turn, extends the increasing use of emergent modals to the written language, but this takes place gradually, and can be inhibited by a “prestige barrier”, the taboo that discourages the use of highly colloquial forms in written (especially printed) texts. (The prestige barrier seems especially relevant to the avoidance of (have) got to and (had) better in the Brown Family corpora, where they are rare).

14 This obviously merits further research, but to provide some justification of my cursory treatment of the “to-infinitive replacement theory”, I examined a random sample of 200 core modals in the Brown Family (excluding AmE06), and found 2 convincing examples and 4 uncertain examples of modal constructions that could be replaced by to-infinitive constructions. According to this rough experiment, then, 1% (or, counting uncertain cases, 3%) of modals could be considered replaceable by to-infinitives.

An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries

111

If colloquialization, combined with the postulated “prestige barrier”, is to account for the lower and slower rise of emergent modals in the printed texts of the Brown Family, then we need some further contrasting evidence that the rise of the emergent modals has been greater in the recent history of conversational English. The evidence from diachronic corpora, as already explained, is limited to DCPSE, which in practice leaves us with the two mini-corpora, DSEU and DICE, apparently showing a significant rise in the use of emergent modals, though not a rise commensurate with the fall in the use of core modals. (The evidence of DSEU and DICE is less dramatic probably because of its restriction to BrE and the considerable proportion of public speech – including radio broadcasts, proceedings of Parliament, law court discourse, etc. – that these mini-corpora contain). There are, however, two more indirect forms of corpus evidence which help to substantiate a more dramatic increase in the use of emergent modals in spontaneous conversational dialogue. One of these additional forms of evidence comes from the frequency data provided by the two approximately comparable corpora of conversation already described (see fn. 7), the LCSAE (AmE) and the BNCdemog (BrE). These two corpora are, of course, synchronic (both dating from the early to mid 1990s), but we can learn something of importance from them: they show a much higher incidence of emergent modals than is found even in the 1990–1992 DICE minicorpus, as is shown in Tables 4 and 5. Tables 4 and 5 show comparable frequency patterns for AmE and BrE conversation, except that in AmE (Table 5) the trend is more extreme. In AmE, the differential of frequency between the core modals and emergent modals, which was so vast in Figure 1, has narrowed to the extent that the approximate frequency pmw of emergent modals is 55% of the approximate frequency of core modals. (This compares with only 14% of core modals in the Brown Corpus – written AmE of 1961). It is striking that in AmE conversation the frequencies of the three most common emergent modals (BE going to, HAVE to and WANT to) have here “outperformed” all but the three most common of the core modals (can, will and would). If we focus for a moment on AmE conversation and on the semantic field of obligation/necessity, it is worth noting that the canonical core modal must here is less common than three competing emergent modals HAVE to, NEED to and HAVE got to. We can conclude that in AmE conversation of the 1990s, although we have no diachronic evidence of recent change, the emergent modals have been seriously rivaling the core modals, particularly in certain semantic areas, so that the thesis that the loss of frequency of core modals has been influenced by rise in the frequency of emergent modals is far more persuasive for

112

Geoffrey Leech

Table 4: Approximate frequencies of core modals and emergent modals in BrE conversation (in the demographic subcorpus of the BNC) Modals (full and reduced forms) raw frequency

Semi-modals (full and reduced forms) raw frequency

Approx. frequency per million words

to HAVE to NEED to ( HAVE ) got to BE suppose(d) to BE able to (had) better

10,145 6,352 6,796 880 5,116 952 883 692

2,412 1,510 1,616 209 1,216 226 210 165

Total

31,816

7,564

approx. frequency per million words

can will would could should might may must ought (to) shall need(n’t)

23,447 28,301 15,712 8,075 4,396 3,602 637 3,014 454 1,652 76

5575 6729 3736 1919 1045 856 151 717 108 393 18

Total

89,366

21,247

( BE ) going to WANT

Table 5: Approximate frequency count of modals and emergent modals in AmE conversation (in the Longman Corpus of Spoken American English) Modals

Emergent modals approx. raw frequency a

estimated frequency per million words b

can will would could should might may must ought (to) shall need(n’t)

25,607 25,312 24,848 10,545 5,946 3,188 1,981 1,485 343 251 2

5121 5062 4970 2109 1189 638 396 297 69 50 0

Total

99,508

19,901

a

(Numbers show combined rank-ordering

approx. Raw frequency a

( BE ) going to to WANT to NEED to (HAVE ) got to BE supposed to BE able to ( had) better

19,709 12,944 11,548 3,874 3,244 1,819 1,357 641

3942 2589 2309 775 649 364 271 128

Total

55,136

11,027

HAVE

estimated frequency per million words b

As the LCSAE corpus was untagged, and it was impracticable in most cases to undertake a manual count of occurrences, for most items it was necessary to estimate raw frequency by a “thinning” procedure whereby a representative subset of concordance examples was examined, and the resulting count scaled up. b The estimate size of the Longman Corpus of Spoken American English is 5,000,000 words.

An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries

113

AmE conversation (often regarded as a “bell wether” variety in the vanguard of English language change globally) than for other varieties we have examined. The lack of diachronic evidence can be partially overcome by my second kind of corpus evidence that helps to support the “grammaticalization + colloquialization” theory. This is the evidence of an apparent time study of the BNCdemog conversational subcorpus. The BNCdemog data (albeit not complete) on the ages of speakers are segmented into age-bands 0–14, 15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–59 and 60+. It is possible to plot the frequencies of core modals and emergent modals on an apparent time scale, on the assumption that the ages of speakers will relatively closely reflect the state of the language at the time when they were acquiring it.

Figure 9: Apparent time chart of core modals and emergent modals, based on the BNC (BrE) demographically-sampled (conversational) subcorpus

Figure 9 shows a rather convincing picture of how the frequency of use of emergent modals is negatively correlated with age. From the oldest to the youngest age group, the frequency pmw climbs steadily to 50%. The upper part of the chart showing frequency of core modals is, however, less regular: the expected decline of the core modals is only evident in the later part of the time-line, where speakers at time of the BNC recordings (in the early 1990s) were younger than 35. From this it appears15 that the decline of core modals set 15 There are various reasons why the application of the BNC age-bands to apparent time studies is not entirely reliable: for details see Leech et al. (2009: 104n).

114

Geoffrey Leech

in only around the 1960s – a tentative conclusion not at variance with the profile given by Figure 1. However, the important point about Figure 9 is that it shows a consistently climbing frequency of emergent modals – and therefore provides indirect evidence of the rise in emergent modal use that would account for the competition that would lead to a declining use of core modals.

6 Summary and conclusion The most plausible explanation I have been able to provide for the decreasing use of core modals is that grammaticalization of the emergent modals in speech has been associated with increasing frequency, progressively leading to competition with the core modals, which consequently have been undergoing decline in recent English. Through colloquialization, the rise in emergent modals has been gradually filtering into the written language, but this process involves a time lag, and is probably impeded by a “prestige barrier”. Hence in the Brown Family of written corpora, the increase in emergent modals has been slow, and has not offset the increasing decline of core modals. Other explanations I have suggested have not been dismissed. Although the hypothesis that lexical expressions have filled up the “modality deficit” seems to have no empirical support, the hypothesis that infinitive clauses have been (to some extent) replacing modalized finite clauses may account for part of the “modality deficit”. Also, the hypothesis that writers of English are modalizing their clauses less is still worth considering. The research described here is tentative and based on some challengeable assumptions. It is obvious that there is a great deal more research to be done in these areas. “Where have all the modals gone?” remains a puzzling question.

References Declerk, Renaat. 2010. Future time reference expressed by be to in Present-Day English. English Language and Linguistics 14(2): 271–291. Facchinetti, Roberta, Manfred Krug and Frank Palmer (eds.). 2003. Modality in Contemporary English. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Hopper, Paul J. and Elizabeth Closs Traugott. 2003 [1993]. Grammaticalization. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hundt, Marianne and Christian Mair. 1999. “Agile” and “uptight” genres: The corpus-based approach to language change in progress. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 4: 221–242.

An essay on the declining frequency of core modal auxiliaries

115

Krug, Manfred. 2000. Emerging English Modals: A Corpus Study of Grammaticalization. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Leech, Geoffrey. 2003. Modals on the move: The English modal auxiliaries 1961–1992. In: Roberta Facchinetti, Manfred Krug and Frank Palmer (eds.), Modality in Contemporary English, 223–240. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Leech, Geoffrey. 2011. The modals ARE declining. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 16(4): 191–220. Leech, Geoffrey, Marianne Hundt, Christian Mair and Nicholas Smith. 2009. Change in Contemporary English: A Grammatical Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Los, Bettelou. 2005. The Rise of the to Infinitive. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Millar, Neil. 2009. Modal verbs in TIME. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 14(2): 191– 220. Nelson, Gerald, Sean Wallis and Bas Aarts. 2002. Exploring Natural Language: Working with the British Component of the International Corpus of English. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Perkins, Michael R. 1983. Modal Expressions in English. London: Frances Pinter. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik. 1985. A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language. London: Longman. Rayson, Paul, Damien Berridge and Brian Francis. 2004. Extending the Cochran rule for the comparison of word frequencies between corpora. In: Gérald Purnelle, Cédrick Fairon and Anne Dister (eds.), Le poids des mots: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Statistical analysis of textual data (JADT 2004), Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, March 10–12, 2004, Volume 2, 926–936. Louvain: Presses universitaires de Louvain. Rohdenburg, Günter. 1995. On the replacement of finite complement clauses by infinitives in English. English Studies 16: 367–388.

II Peripheral modality

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation 1 Introduction The first decade of the 21st century has seen a number of interesting developments in the study of modality in English.1 First, there has been a strong interest in recent changes in the frequency of use of different members of the English verbal modal system, with the observation of a general decline in the frequency of the core modals (can, could, may, might, shall, should, will/’ll, would/’d and must) and a rise in the frequency of so-called semi- or quasi-modals, such as have to, be able to, be going to, and be supposed to. A key author in this domain is Geoffrey Leech (Leech 2003; Leech et al. 2009: 71–117; Leech this volume), but see also Millar (2009) and Aarts (in print, this volume), who brings also nonverbal modal constructions into the picture. Second, more so than before, there have been studies of verbal modal constructions in varieties of English other than British English. In this domain a central figure is Peter Collins (Collins 2009a, 2009b, 2009c), but there is also work by Dollinger (2008), Biewer (2009), Bao (2010), Deuber (2010), van der Auwera, Noël, and De Wit (2012), and others. Third, more than before, and as a consequence perhaps of an awareness of the frequency shifts already referred to, attention has gone to markers of modality other than the core modal auxiliaries. Manfred Krug has done pioneering work on have (got) to and want to in his book on emerging English modals (Krug 2000). Since then, detailed studies have been done on marginal modals such as need (Taeymans 2006; Loureiro-Porto 2009; van der Auwera and Taeymans 2009) and quasi-modals such as need to (Nokkonen 2006), be to (Goldberg and van der Auwera 2012) and be supposed to (Noël and van der Auwera 2009), and also on non-verbal expressions of modality – Van linden (2012), for example, concentrates on expressions with “modal-evaluative” adjectives such as essential, necessary, and appropriate, and verbo-nominal expressions of modality (e.g. have need, there is need) have been explored by Loureiro-Porto (2010) and Van linden, 1 This work was made possible through the financial assistance of the Belgian Federal Science Ministry (within the programme of interuniversity attraction poles, Grant P6/44), the University of Hong Kong (Seed Funding Programme for Basic Research, contract no. 200911159051), the Research Foundation Flanders – FWO (postdoctoral fellowship no. 1.2.767.11.N.00), and the Research Council of the University of Leuven (project GOA 12/010). Special thanks are due to Jeroen Vanderbiesen (Antwerp) for access to his work on German and to Erik Hoekstra (Leeuwarden) and Paul Gybels (Antwerp) for their help on West Frisian and Yiddish.

120

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

Davidse, and Brems (2011). Finally, more so than before, English expressions of modality have been studied from a cross-linguistic perspective (e.g. Mortelmans, Boye, and van der Auwera 2009). The present study on had better, ’d better and better fits all aspects of this picture in the following way. First, we will examine these three modal constructions2 from a historical point of view: we will review the earlier work by van der Auwera and De Wit (2010) on frequency changes in the second half of the 20th century and we will place these changes in a wider time frame, that is, we will go back to the start of the 18th century. The timely arrival of the study by Denison and Cort (2010) obviated the need to go back further in time, because they established that though the constructional history of had better can be traced back to Old English, it was only in the 18th century that the pattern began to be combined with inanimate and dummy NP subjects, read “began to be used in an auxiliary-like fashion” (Denison and Cort 2010: 354–355). Second, we will add an English-internal comparative perspective. As in van der Auwera and De Wit (2010), we will compare British and American English, but in the present contribution we will do so on the basis of data from much larger corpora. The pilot study was based on the Brown family of corpora, i.e., LOB, Brown, FLOB and Frown, whereas the current study will get its present-day data from the British National Corpus (BNC) and the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), which have the additional advantage that they also contain spoken data. Third, the had better, ’d better and better constructions are, of course, peripheral modal constructions. That is to say, they are traditionally classified as falling outside the “core modal” category and even the “marginal modal” category (dare, need, ought to and used to), and are often listed instead together with have to, be able to, be going to, be supposed to, be bound to, etc. as members of “a somewhat open-ended category” referred to as semi-modals, quasi-modals or periphrastic modals (Depraetere and Reed 2006: 272). Fourth, we will briefly look at the English constructions from a crosslinguistic, more specifically West Germanic perspective. We will not deal with all four aspects separately or in consecutive sections, however. Our main aims in this chapter are to document the frequency of the three constructions in present-day English more accurately3 than has so far been achieved (by Leech 2003, Leech et al. 2009 and van der Auwera and De 2 Here, and throughout this chapter, we are using the term construction in a non-theoretical sense. It is not part of our objectives to argue either in favour or against treating had better, ’d better and better as three separate constructions in a Construction Grammar. 3 However, like in the previous studies, our ambition is not aimed at statistical sophistication, largely for its lack of relevance: in most cases the frequency differences are big enough to make statistics unnecessary or they would concern details that detract from the generalizations. We will therefore only make sparing reference to test results for statistical significance.

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

121

Wit 2010) and to complement Denison and Cort’s (2010) diachronic study with “older” frequency data, which will be sourced from the “Extended Version” of the Corpus of Late Modern English Texts (CLMETEV) (De Smet 2005, 2008), so as to trace the development of had better from the time it had become grammaticalized as a modal construction. The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 2 we will review some of the literature on had better, ’d better and better, and take a position in the debate on their meaning. Section 3 discusses the difference in frequency between the BETTER group of constructions and a parallel BEST group in present-day British and American English, as well as their frequency development in British English from the start of the 18th century. Section 4 compares the frequencies of the three BETTER constructions in the two geographical present-day varieties and again historically in the British variety. Section 5 looks at the frequency distribution of the person category of the subjects of the BETTER constructions, serving as a preamble to section 6, where we consider the incidence of subjectless better and its place in the history of the BETTER constructions. In section 7 we reflect on the word class of the word better and of the verb following it in the three constructions. Section 8 examines the extent to which the BETTER constructions are still accompanied by a than clause. Section 9 contains a short postscript on BETTER constructions in other West Germanic languages. Section 10 is the conclusion.

2 Some background: BETTER as a deontic and optative comparative modal Van der Auwera and De Wit (2010: 127) coined the term comparative modals for a family of morphosyntactic configurations with a moderate degree of formal and semantic homogeneity, cf. (1). The family has two superlative members (with best), a handful of comparative ones, in the more narrow sense of “comparative” (with better, rather or sooner), and also some equative ones (with as or just as). (1) “Comparative modals” (van der Auwera and De Wit 2010) a. had best, ’d best b.

had better, ’d better, better would rather, ’d rather, had rather, should rather would sooner, ’d sooner, had sooner, should sooner

c.

would ( just) as soon as may ( just) as well might ( just) as well

122

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

The homogeneity is far from perfect, but van der Auwera and De Wit (2010: 127) argue that this classification is better than the ones that have been proposed, (as in 2) or assumed, as in (3) and (4) in the literature. (2)

“Modal idioms” (Quirk et al. 1985: 141–142) had better, ’d better, better would rather, ’d rather, had rather, should rather have got to, be to and “might be placed in the same category” (idioms) (Quirk et al. 1985: 142): had best, ’d best would ( just) as soon as may ( just) as well might ( just) as well

(3)

Palmer (1979: 164–165) had better, ’d better, better would rather, ’d rather, had rather, should rather let’s

(4) Mitchell (2003) had better, ’d better, better might ( just) as well These other groupings all leave out a few constructions (e.g. the sooner ones) or include constructions that are more distantly related (have got to and be to for Quirk et al. 1985; let’s for Palmer 1979). All of the constructions in (1) are rather rare, but the three with better are among the least rare. If we put had better, ’d better and better together – and we will then refer to them with small capitals, this BETTER family is the most frequent one. Van der Auwera and De Wit (2010: 130–131) report on frequencies found in the corpora of the Brown family, documenting written British and American English of the 60s and 90s. These frequencies are reproduced in Table 1. This paper focuses on the BETTER constructions, though we will include observations on the BEST constructions (had best, ’d best, and best) as well. The BETTER part of Table 1 overlaps with the (had) better parts of Table 4 in Leech (2003: 229)4 – and of the bar chart in Figure 5.2 in Leech et al. (2009: 97) – and van der Auwera and De Wit (2010: 130) consequently agree with Leech (2003: 230) that there is a decline in the frequency of BETTER , both in the UK 4 Leech’s (2003) figures are (unexplainably) different, though.

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

123

Table 1: Frequencies of the comparative modals, clustered on the basis of the adverbial LOB UK 60s

FLOB UK 90s

Brown US 60s

Frown US 90s

Total

SOONER

40 22 11 0 1 1

31 18 10 0 0 0

36 12 10 0 0 0

33 15 12 2 0 0

140 67 43 2 1 1

Total

75

59

58

62

254

BETTER RATHER

( JUST )

AS WELL

BEST AS SOON AS

and the US, in the latter half of the 20th century. This is at odds with “an overall significant increase in the use of semi-modals” (Leech et al. 2009: 98), but the BETTER numbers in Table 1 are small and it will therefore be interesting to see whether the Late Modern English data can confirm that they are indicative of a longer downward trend. Before we turn to our observations on past and present frequencies of the BETTER constructions, however, a few words on their meaning might be in order. Linguists that have worked on BETTER agree that they express advice and the majority also explicitly say that at least the typical use involves advice given by the speaker (or writer) (Palmer 1979: 69, 1990: 82; Jacobsson 1980: 52; Perkins 1983: 63; Declerck 1991: 355; Westney 1995: 181; Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1996; Denison and Cort 2010: 366; van der Auwera and De Wit 2010: 132). A clear example is shown in (5). (5)

“You had better go,” he said. (BNC HWA 3747)

There is, however, a second use, illustrated in (6). (6)

Helen Mirren stars in this week’s biggie: Prime Suspect about a female detective who gets her big break chasing a murderer. It dominates the schedules with two, two-hour slots on Sunday and Monday, so it had better be good. For once, it seems it will be. (BNC H84 142)

In our opinion, there is no sense in which the speaker gives advice here and we consequently do not agree with those, like Collins (2009a: 77), who consider better to be “essentially monosemous”. Instead, we agree with Mitchell (2003:

124

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

145) that in examples like this one (but (6) is not one that Mitchell discusses) what is at stake is not the speaker’s advice but the speaker’s hope. In (6) the writer expresses his/her hope that a scheduled two-part TV show will be worth watching. Van der Auwera and De Wit (2010: 133) called this an “optative” use, to distinguish it from the advice use, which they considered to be “deontic”. We will adopt the same terminology here. Optative is the accepted term for a grammatical mood that indicates a wish or hope. Mitchell (2003: 145) makes reference to wishes as well, saying that what is involved in such cases is “a wish that a proposition whose truth is unknown turns out to be true”. We disagree with him, however, when he connects this with epistemic modality, calling it epistemic volition. To our mind, this is too much of an extension of the notional category of epistemic modality, which we would like to restrict to judgements of the (un)certainty or probability of a proposition (cf. van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 81). Wishing something to be true is quite different from judging it to be true. Denison and Cort (2010: 370) disagree with Mitchell as well, but in a different way, holding that examples of what we have termed the optative use “incorporate simultaneously an epistemic and a deontic element”. Discussing a longer version of an example Mitchell selected from the BNC, which we will reproduce here as (7), they detect – in addition to “I hope it’s important”, which they agree with Mitchell is epistemic in nature – “two linked meanings: that someone (here the addressee) is in some way responsible for the situation, and that that person should endeavour – or should have endeavoured – to produce a favourable outcome (plus perhaps the suggestion that they will suffer adverse consequences otherwise)”. (7)

“Kurt here. I have urgent information. There have been serious developments. Can we meet? You’d want to know at once.” [. . .] “I’ll meet you in the lobby of the Frankfurter Hof half an hour from now. It had better be important.” (BNC ARK 2630)

We do not want to dispute the presence of such a “deontic element”, which Denison and Cort (2010: 371) further characterize as a “retrospective obligation” – note, not as a piece of advice. In the case of our example (6) the writer probably holds the programmers of a particular television network responsible for ensuring an enjoyable programme, but of course the show has long been scheduled and (6) is not a piece of advice addressed to the programmers to replace it if a certain condition is not met. We are disputing, however, that the hope or wish element is epistemic, for the reason we have specified.

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

125

Denison and Cort (2010: 374) note that what, no doubt for convenience, they continue to call epistemic uses – but which according to them also incorporate a deontic element – come later than the deontic ones, “a classic symptom of grammaticalization among modals”. They call an example dating from 1712 an “unusually early” one, but they do not provide any evidence for this. Testing this hypothesis constitutes another reason for why we will include data from a Late Modern English corpus.

3 The present and past frequency of BETTER and BEST When one compares the frequencies of the BETTER and BEST constructions in the second half of the 20th century, it is very clear that the BETTER constructions are overwhelmingly more frequent than the BEST ones. Table 1 in section 2 shows this to be the case in each of the four Brown family corpora. As a matter of fact, the BEST construction is attested only in Frown, i.e. in American English of the nineties, with two instances. Given the overall extreme rarity of BEST, and the size of the corpora in this family (one million words each), this need not, of course, mean that BEST only occurs in American English, and not in British English, nor that it showed up in American English only very recently. Instead, it is a very clear invitation to study the spread and relative frequency of BETTER and BEST in larger corpora. For a synchronic comparison with the FLOB and Frown frequency data in Table 1, we turned to the BNC (close to 100 million words overall, roughly 90% written and 10% spoken) and the COCA (close to 400 million words, roughly 80% written and 20% spoken).5 Tables 2 and 3 present the frequencies of the BETTER and BEST constructions in the spoken and written parts of the BNC and the COCA, respectively. We include absolute frequencies (n) as well as normalized frequencies (per million words), to allow easy comparison of the frequency data sourced from all the corpora used in this study.6 5 The COCA keeps expanding. At the time the data for this chapter were sourced (June 2010) it counted 402 million words. At the time of writing (September 2011) the counter stood at 425 million. The version of the COCA used covers the period 1990–2010. The BNC covers the period 1980–1993. 6 The absolute frequencies were arrived at through queries in both the BNC and the COCA for had/’d better/best (not) immediately followed by an infinitive, and for better/best (not) immediately followed by an infinitive and not preceded by either a verb or to. The BNC was searched using the Zurich BNCweb Query System. Both tables will contain some noise. The normalized frequencies in the Total columns of Tables 2 and 3 naturally come quite close to the normalized Written frequencies because in both the BNC and the COCA the proportion of written texts is much larger than the proportion of transcripts of spoken discourse.

126

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

Table 2: Frequencies of BETTER and BEST constructions in the BNC Spoken

had better ’d better better Total BETTER had best ’d best best

Written

Total

n

n/million

n

n/million

n

n/million

31 483 405

3.00 46.70 39.16 88.86 0 0.97 0.10

449 1491 295

5.14 17.08 3.38 25.60 0.38 1.19 0.09

480 1974 700

4.92 20.22 7.17 32.31 0.34 1.17 0.09

0 10 1

Total BEST

33 104 8

1.07

33 114 9

1.66

1.60

Table 3: Frequencies of BETTER and BEST constructions in the COCA Spoken

had better ’d better better Total BETTER had best ’d best best Total BEST

Written

Total

n

n/million

n

n/million

n

n/million

166 630 1499

2.03 7.71 18.35 28.09 0.04 0.06 0.05

1093 3055 4170

3.41 9.53 13.00 25.94 0.30 0.70 0.14

1259 3685 5669

3.13 9.16 14.09 26.38 0.25 0.57 0.12

3 5 4

0.15

97 226 45

1.14

100 231 49

0.94

The data from the BNC (Table 2) and the COCA (Table 3) show, first, that the BETTER constructions are indeed vastly more frequent than the BEST constructions and, second, that the latter do not just occur in American English but also in British English. British examples are (8), illustrating had best, and (9), illustrating both ’d best and best. (8) “Well, well! Now my clerk and I,” he trumpeted, “would like to question each of you alone. Though,” he smiled at the girl, “Mistress Philippa and Geoffrey had best stay together. Master Colebrooke, there’s a chamber below. Perhaps our guests could wait there?” (BNC written K95 180) (9)

he’s ever so posh, and we’re chatting away telling me all about pension, telling me all about the pension and that you see so I said to him would you like a tea? Oh I should love one, ooh, so I thought, best not give him a bleeding mug I’d best get my best china out, you know? (BNC spoken KCP 6270)

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

127

Other observations are that both BETTER and BEST are significantly more frequent in British than in American English according to Fisher’s exact tests (p < 0.0001)7 and that the higher frequency of BETTER in British English compared to American English is purely attributable to a much higher frequency in the spoken register. In both geographic varieties there is very little difference between the overall frequencies of BEST in the spoken and written registers (1.07 vs. 1.66 per million in the BNC; 0.15 vs. 1.14 in the COCA). In American English there is also very little register variation in the case of BETTER (28.09 spoken vs. 25.94 written). In British English, however, the frequency difference between the two registers is huge in the case of BETTER (88.86 spoken vs. 25.60 written). This is not equally true of all three forms of BETTER , but we will postpone being more precise about this until the next section. Something that Tables 2 and 3 do not reveal, but which becomes immediately apparent when scrolling through the corpus concordance lines, is that in written language both BETTER and BEST mainly occur in represented speech. To show this, we have quantified the BNC data for this parameter. The results are presented in Table 4. Table 4: Spoken language vs. reported and unreported written language in the BNC (based on samples of 200 if total n in Table 2 >200)

had better ’d better better BETTER

had best ’d best best BEST

spoken

written unreported

written reported direct

written reported indirect

written reported free indirect

Total

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

12 50 128 190 0 10 1 11

6 25 64 31.67 0 8.77 11.11 7.05

50 7 14 71 4 2 2 8

25 3.5 7 11.83 12.12 1.75 22.22 5.13

93 131 49 273 23 102 6 131

46.5 65.5 24.5 45.5 69.7 89.47 66.67 83.97

26 6 2 34 5 0 0 5

13 3 1 5.67 15.15 0 0 3.21

19 6 7 32 1 0 0 1

9.5 3 3.5 5.33 3.03 0 0 0.65

200 200 200 600 33 114 9 156

Notice that only just over 5% of all written instances of the BEST construction and less than 12% of the written instances of BETTER occur outside reported speech contexts in written texts and that 84% of all instances of BEST and 45.5% of all instances of BETTER occur in directly reported speech in written texts. If one adds the percentages of the instances in spoken language to the latter two percentages, this results in very high figures for both BETTER and 7 We use Fisher’s exact tests (Pedersen 1996) to test for statistical significance because they are reliable for low frequency data and do not make distributional assumptions that are not justified in dealing with natural language data (see Stefanowitsch and Gries 2003: 217–218).

128

BEST

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

(77% and 91%, respectively). One cannot conclude from them that BETTER

and BEST are more typical of spoken language than of written language, because reported speech is an inherent part of written language, but one could conclude that they are both cognitively entrenched as conversational features. Collectively, language users clearly use the comparative modal constructions most when representing speech in their writing. Interestingly, some of the British had best constructions occur in represented speech in “historical fiction”, i.e. present-day fiction set in the past, as in (8) above, and some represented speech examples of ’d best have a distinct dialectal flavour, as in (10). (10)

“Whatever th’thinks, th’d best mind th’self. Miss Jarman’s gaffer now old Mister’s dead.” (BNC written C85 1162)

This might suggest that BEST constructions are “signs of the past”, i.e. that they were once more frequent than they are now. To answer this question, as well as the one formulated in section 2 about whether the recent decline in the frequency of BETTER (Table 1) might be part of a longer downward trend, we have studied the frequency of BETTER and BEST constructions in the CLMETEV, a corpus of Late Modern English data, containing slightly over 15 million words. Table 5 presents their absolute and normalized frequencies in the three components of this corpus, roughly covering the 18th century, the first half of the 19th century and the second half of the 19th century. Table 5: Frequencies of BETTER and BEST constructions in the CLMETEV 1710–1780

1780–1850

n

n/million

n

n/million

n

n/million

had better ‘d better Better Total BETTER had best ‘d best Best Total BEST

59 2 3

19.42 0.66 0.99 21.07 1.98 0.00 0.00 1.98

234 30 13

40.88 5.24 2.27 48.39 2.80 1.22 0.17 4.19

290 120 47

46.39 19.19 7.52 73.1 2.88 1.28 0.48 4.64

Total

70

23.04

301

52.59

486

6 0 0

16 7 1

1850–1920

18 8 3

77.74

The normalized totals for BETTER and BEST in Table 5 clearly show a rise in the frequency of both constructions in the course of the Late Modern English Period

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

129

(respectively, from 21.07 to 73.1 tokens per million words, and from 1.98 to 4.64). However, when compared with the normalized frequencies for the written part of the BNC in Table 2 (25.60 for BETTER and 1.66 for BEST ), the normalized figures in Table 5 indicate that both the BETTER and the BEST constructions were more frequent in the 19th century than they are now (with 19th-century figures of 48.39 and 73.1 for BETTER and 4.19 and 4.64 for BEST ), though in the case of extremely low-frequency BEST the difference is of course small. The ascent of the two constructions must therefore have been halted at the start of the 20th century, followed by a fairly steep decline, especially in the case of BETTER . A comparison of the frequency of BETTER in the CLMETEV (Table 5) and the LOB (Table 1) indeed suggests that the late-20th-century decline in the frequency of BETTER , which is obvious from a comparison of the LOB and FLOB figures in Table 1, is likely to have started before the second half of the 20th century, given the comparatively large difference between the frequency in the last CLMETEV subcorpus (73.1), which spans the period from 1850 to 1920, and in the LOB (40), which contains early-1960s data. Note, however, that the relative shares of BETTER and BEST constructions remained relatively constant across the 18th– 20th centuries; none of the changes in the proportion of BETTER vs. BEST constructions proved statistically significant. In sections 4 to 8 below we will leave extremely low-frequency BEST behind and zoom in on better, ’d better and better.

4 The present and past frequency of had better, ’d better and better Biber et al. (1999: 487) claim that the BETTER modals are “considerably more common” in UK English than in US English. We observed in the previous section, on the basis of a comparison of Tables 2 and 3, that this is true only of spoken language. While the differences between the totals for the written parts of the BNC and the COCA are negligible (25.60/million for the BNC and 25.94/million for the COCA), the differences between their spoken parts are significant (88.86/ million for the BNC and 28.09/million for the COCA). In this section, however, we want to have a closer look at the frequencies of the individual BETTER constructions. Does Biber et al.’s claim hold for each of them and do they occupy the same frequency rank in both registers in each variety? For convenience, we have extracted the normalized frequencies of the BETTER constructions from Tables 2 and 3 and we repeat them here in Table 6.

130

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

Table 6: Normalized frequencies of the BETTER constructions in the BNC and the COCA BNC written

COCA written

BNC spoken

COCA spoken

had better ’d better better

5.14 17.08 3.38

3.41 9.53 13

3 46.7 39.16

2.03 7.71 18.35

Total

25.6

25.94

88.86

28.09

Table 6 reveals that the higher British than American frequency claim only holds for ’d better in both registers (written BNC 17.08 vs. COCA 9.53; spoken BNC 46.7 vs. COCA 7.71). Better is considerably more frequent in American than in British writing (COCA 13 vs. BNC 3.38), and had better is more or less equally rare in both registers in both geographic varieties. The table also shows that there are intervarietal differences between the relative frequency positions of the three constructions. In the COCA, in both written and spoken data, the better construction is most frequent, whereas in the BNC, again in both written and spoken data ’d better is most frequent. In American English the three constructions occupy the same frequency rank in both registers, while in British English, had better is slightly more frequent than better in writing, but drastically less frequent than it in speech. Tables 7 and 8 rearrange the numbers from Table 6 to make this clearer, arranging them from left to right in descending order of frequency. Table 7: Normalized frequency of better, ’d better and had better in the COCA

Written Spoken

better

’d better

had better

13 18.35

9.53 7.71

3.41 2.03

Table 8: Normalized frequency of ’d better, better and had better in the BNC

Written Spoken

’d better

had better

better

had better

17.08 46.7

5.14

3.38 39.16

3

For British English, these frequencies correspond to what was found in the LOB and FLOB corpora. Table 9 juxtaposes the BNC frequencies with those in LOB and FLOB. Since the latter are written corpora, the BNC figures to compare them with are those for the written part.

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

131

Table 9: Frequency of ’d better, better and had better in LOB, FLOB and the BNC ’d better LOB FLOB BNC written BNC spoken

27 19 17.08 46.7

better

had better

better 5 6 3.38

39.16

8 6 5.14 3

For American English, the Brown and Frown figures show a different hierarchy, but it should be kept in mind that these figures are very low. Table 10 contrasts them with the COCA frequencies. Table 10: Frequency of better, ’d better and had better in Brown, Frown and the COCA better Brown Frown COCA written COCA spoken

had better 12

13 18.35

’d better

had better

better

15 11 9.53 7.71

11

10 10

3.41 2.03

The relevance of the frequency ranking of the individual BETTER constructions resides in the extent to which they provide confirmation for the grammaticalization cline represented in Figure 1, which Denison and Cort (2010: 354) suggest to be observable diachronically.

Figure 1: The history of BETTER

As a potential textbook case of the phonological reduction that is often involved in grammaticalization, had better would be the older form and better the younger one, the had part having become reduced to Ø with ’d as an intermediate form. In Britain, the language now prefers the mid stage construction ’d better, both in the written and the spoken register, while written and spoken US English favours the youngest form better. If frequency can be related to grammaticalization, the frequency ranking of the individual BETTER constructions in American English represented in Table 7 (when read from right to left) suggests that American English has gone furthest down the grammaticalization path shown in

132

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

Figure 1 in that the oldest construction is used the least and the youngest one the most. The frequency ranking for British English in Table 8, on the other hand, suggests that British English is lagging behind. In spite of the fact that compared to Americans the British make much more use not only of ’d better but also of better in spoken language, they use better less often than ’d better, unlike Americans. In addition, better is the least frequent construction in written English in Britain, while it is the most frequently used one in American written English. The grammaticalization scenario shown in Figure 1 is still in need of diachronic empirical substantiation, however. For British English, we have tested it on the Late Modern English data from the CLMETEV. Table 11 adds relative frequencies to the absolute and normalized ones given in Table 5. The data tentatively confirm the proposed scenario, in that the supposed source construction, had better, starts off with the highest relative frequency (92.19%) and is steadily encroached upon by the constructions that form later stages on the grammaticalization path, viz. ’d better and better respectively. Figure 2 shows these developments in a graph, with the vertical axis indicating the relative share of each of the three constructions (%). It adds the present-day English data to the picture, which continue the tendencies observed for the Late Modern data to such an extent that ’d better has overtaken had better. Fisher’s exact tests indicate that the changes from the first to the second Late Modern English subperiod are not statistically significant for any of the BETTER constructions, but the changes from the second to the third subperiod are significant (highest p-value < 0.008), as are those from the third subperiod to present-day English (highest p-value < 0.03). Table 11: Frequency of had better, ’d better and better in the CLMETEV 1710–1780 n

n/mil

had better ‘d better better

59 2 3

19.42 0.66 0.99

Total BETTER

64

21.07

1780–1850 %

n

n/mil

92.19 3.13 4.69

234 30 13

40.88 5.24 2.27

100.00

277

48.39

1850–1920 %

n

n/mil

%

84.48 10.83 4.69

290 120 47

46.39 19.19 7.52

63.46 26.26 10.28

100.00

457

73.1

100.00

It is interesting to point out that the data in Table 11 reveal that the dominance of ’d better in British English (Table 9) only came about in the second half of the 19th century, the frequency in the third CLMETEV period being almost quadruple that in the second period (a rise from 5.24 to 19.19 tokens per million words).

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

133

Figure 2: Evolution of the share of had better, ’d better and better in the total of BETTER constructions in written British English (from 1710)

Noteworthy, too, when comparing the frequencies for the individual constructions in the written register in Table 2 with those for the third period in Table 11, is that the observation made in section 3 on the frequency drop of BETTER between the turn of the 20th century and the second half of that century also holds for each of the three constructions, but that it is especially had better which has seen a quite spectacular fall in its frequency (from 46.39 tokens per million words in the last CLMETEV period to 5.14 tokens in the written part of the BNC). The decrease in the frequencies of ’d better and better is much smaller (respectively, from 19.19 to 17.08 and from 7.52 to 3.38). Finally, having discussed the frequency and the frequency development of the various formal variants of BETTER , we can now briefly turn to the frequency and the diachrony of the meanings of the BETTER constructions. In section 2, we noted that BETTER is basically used to express advice, but that it is also used to express the speaker’s hope that some state of affairs be realized. The three sets of 200 manually-checked BNC instances that already provided part of the input for Table 4 confirm that this latter, optative, use occurs much less frequently than the deontic use. Only 9 of the 200 had better cases are optative, only 2 of the ’d better cases, and only 5 of the better cases. (11) to (13) provide an example of the optative use of each of the three constructions, supplementing the ones for had better already supplied in (6) and (7). (11) As Philip ran across to her he heard a crash. It sounded like his bike falling over. Lee must have banged into it in the dark. It had better be that and not him having another of his scenes. (BNC written ABX 3083)

134

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

(12) “Take my hand. That’s it. They won’t be long.” The pain came and crushed her away. “My God,” said Emma, “they’d better be quick. Just hold on. Hold on, darling. It’s going to be all right.” (BNC written GUM 1982) (13) Is this on pause, I better be on pause. Oh my god, it isn’t. (BNC spoken KNY 1718) In the Late Modern English data this optative use is even less frequent; in fact, we found only one example, which is given in (14). (14) I haven’t any energy left. I don’t understand things. This had better be the end of it. Let’em sell the stock and take him down,” said the old man, pointing feebly to the wooden midshipman, “and let us both be broken up together.” (CLMETEV 1848 Dickens, Dombey and son[s]) The data thus show that the deontic advice meaning is diachronically prior to and invariably more frequent than the optative meaning, which is in line with Denison and Cort’s (2010: 374) findings.

5 The subjects of had better, ’d and better The semantic-pragmatic value of advice that is typical of the BETTER constructions can be directed at a first, second or third person, either singular or plural, as illustrated in (15) to (19). (15)

“Poor darling, I’d better go and put her out of her misery.” (BNC written JYC 3382)

(16) The figure to keep in mind is 12. Below this value the F.I. indicates that the text is comprehensible; above 12 the F.I. indicates that you had better shorten your sentences or use less elaborate words or both. (BNC written FEU 1704) (17)

Now anybody who er who would like to see more sex on television better give us a ring now I suppose O nine O four six four six four one. (BNC spoken HV0 1552)

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

(18)

135

The voice at the other end was slightly husky but very clear. “It’s Tristram. He’s been arrested in New York. Better not talk on the phone, had we?” (BNC written AB9 40)

(19) They’d better get their act together first. (BNC written A99) The optative use of BETTER most naturally combines with 3rd-person subjects, as in (20) and (21), since hopes or wishes addressed at either oneself or the hearer will usually amount to advice. It is not impossible for a “retrospective obligation” (see above) to be directed at a 1st or 2nd person, however, as (22) and (23) show. (20)

Somewhere behind the east wing of the castle glass shattered. Menzies had better come out soon. (BNC written A0N 629)

(21) “It’s come quick, the winter.” “And it better not go quick.” (BNC written B1N 1345) (22)

“For all our sakes, I had better be wrong.” (internet example; http://www.suspensemagazine.com/ReligionDebunked. html, accessed on 1 October 2011)

(23)

I’d walked away to check the markers and I had 127 to the hole and Lee said it was 147 – and that’s a difference between an eight and a seven – so I said, “You got it wrong.” Now Trevino’s eyesight is great, but his eyeballing isn’t as good as mine. He says, “You’d better be **** right.” He dug into the bag and pulled out an 8-iron. (BNC written ASA 869)

Contrary to what one might expect (van der Auwera and De Wit 2010: 136), inanimate 3rd-person subjects are not restricted to the optative use of BETTER of the kind illustrated in (6), (7) and (21). The it had better sentence in (24) is an unmistakable piece of advice. (24) “Well, as long as it’s put back where you found it. Come to that, it had better go straight into the soiled linen. But I don’t want any of your chaps taking it away. Laundry disappears fast enough as it is.” (BNC written G3E 2560)

136

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

The pilot study suggests that the choice with respect to person is also related to the choice between had better, ’d better and better (van der Auwera and De Wit 2010: 137–138). This is shown in Table 12, which contains figures that were mined from Tables 6, 8 and 9 in that study and which conflates the figures for LOB and FLOB and those for Brown and Frown in an attempt to make the frequencies observed there more illuminating (but note that they are frequencies per two million words). Table 12: Frequency of 1st, 2nd and 3rd-person subjects with had better, ’d better and better in LOB/FLOB and Brown/Frown 1SG

1PL

2 SG and PL

3 SG and PL

Totals

had better LOB + FLOB Brown + Frown

2 1

3 1

2 8

7 13

14 23

’d better LOB + FLOB Brown + Frown

15 6

9 2

20 14

2 4

46 26

better LOB + FLOB Brown + Frown

0 3

1 1

10 14

0 2

11 20

Table 12 suggests that there are no major differences between British and American English. In both varieties at least half of all subjects of had better are 3rdperson ones, both 1st and 2nd person subjects are more usual with ’d better, and 2nd-person subjects overwhelmingly predominate with better. In spite of the conflation of the 1960s and 1990s data, some of the cells in this table still contain extremely low figures, however, which urges us once again to look at frequency data from the two larger corpora. Tables 13 and 14 present a breakdown per person of the subject of the numbers presented in Tables 2 and 3.8

8 The figures for 1st and 2nd-person subjects were arrived at by adding I, we and you immediately before the search strings mentioned in note 5. In the case of had better and ’d better the figures for 3rd-person subjects are the difference between the totals in Tables 2 and 3 and the sums of 1st and 2nd-person subjects. Since this difference also includes zero 1st and 2nd subjects in the case of better (see below), the figures for 3rd-person subjects in this case are the outcome of searches for he, she, it, this and they, immediately followed by better and an infinitive. The 3rd-person figures for better are therefore a (very probably only slightly) low approximation (compare the frequencies for better in Table 13 with those in Table 16 below).

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

137

Table 13: Frequency of 1st, 2nd and 3rd-person subjects with had better, ’d better and better in the BNC 1SG n had better written spoken

1PL n/mil %

n

64 0.64 14.25 4 0.33 12.9

n/mil %

2SG/PL

3SG/PL

Totals

n

n

n

n/mil %

n/mil %

%

47 0.47 10.47 86 0.86 19.15 252 2.51 56.12 449 100 1 0.08 3.23 4 0.33 12.9 22 1.84 70.97 31 100

’d better written spoken

475 4.73 31.86 266 2.65 17.84 617 6.14 41.38 133 1.32 203 16.98 42.03 96 8.03 19.88 163 13.63 33.75 21 1.76

8.92 1491 100 4.35 483 100

better written spoken

22 0.22 16.79 116 9.7 36.71

9.16 131 100 5.38 316 100

20 0.2 15.27 77 0.77 58.78 33 2.76 10.44 150 12.55 47.47

12 0.12 17 1.42

Table 14: Frequency of 1st, 2nd and 3rd-person subjects with had better, ’d better and better in the COCA 1SG n

1PL n/mil %

had better written 90 0.28 spoken 7 0.09

n

n/mil %

8.23 140 0.44 12.81 4.22 24 0.29 14.46

2SG/PL

3SG/PL

Totals

n

n

n

n/mil %

n/mil %

%

167 0.52 15.28 696 2.17 63.68 1093 100 38 0.47 22.89 97 1.19 58.43 166 100

’d better written spoken

776 2.42 25.40 573 1.79 18.76 1229 3.83 40.23 477 1.49 15.61 3055 100 115 1.41 18.25 116 1.42 18.41 275 3.37 43.65 124 1.52 19.68 630 100

better written spoken

341 1.06 14.98 238 0.74 10.46 1349 4.21 59.27 348 0.9 15.29 2276 100 103 1.26 9.80 147 1.8 14.00 627 7.68 59.71 173 2.09 16.48 1050 100

Tables 13 and 14 confirm for both British and American English that only had better has a high proportion of 3rd-person subjects and that both 1st and 2ndperson subjects are very normal for ’d better. They also confirm that in the case of better there is a predominance of 2nd-person subjects in American English, but in British English only in written texts. In British spoken English the combined share of singular and plural 1st-person better is roughly the same as that of 2nd-person better. Both tables also disconfirm the possible conclusion from the numbers in Table 12 that 3rd-person subjects are extremely unusual with ’d better and better. In American English they even account for 15 to almost 20% of all instances.

138

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

The Late Modern English data for had better and ’d better are presented in Table 15; the data for better are not included as these all have a zero subject in the CLMETEV (see section 6). Table 15 shows that the low frequency of 3rdperson subjects with ’d better in the BNC (8.92% in written data) goes back to even lower frequencies in the CLMETEV (to maximally 6.67%). The CLMETEV numbers also indicate that with ’d better 1st-person subjects rose gradually in frequency in the course of the Late Modern English period, from 0% up to a combined share of 43%, with plural forms (34 out of 120 instances, 28.33%) being twice as frequent as singular forms (17 out of 120, 14.17%). The high share of 3rd-person subjects with had better in the BNC reflects an increase in frequency with regard to the Late Modern English period, in which the three person categories take up similar shares. What seems to have happened is that ’d better, whose share of BETTER has risen quite dramatically since the end of the Late Modern English period (see Figure 2), started to favour 1st-person and 2nd-person subjects to 3rd-person ones, whereas – conversely – had better “specialized” for 3rd-person subjects. Table 15: Frequency of 1st, 2nd and 3rd-person subjects with had better and ’d better in the CLMETEV 1SG n

1PL n/mil %

n

n/mil %

2SG/PL

3SG/PL

Totals

n

n

n

n/mil %

had better 1710–1780 8 2.63 13.56 3 0.99 5.08 22 7.24 1780–1850 40 6.99 17.09 56 9.78 23.93 64 11.18 1850–1920 61 9.76 21.03 53 8.48 18.28 89 14.24 ’d better 1710–1780 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 2 1780–1850 1 0.17 3.33 3 0.52 10.00 25 1850–1920 17 2.72 14.17 34 5.44 28.33 61

n/mil %

n/mil %

37.29 26 8.56 44.07 59 19.42 100 27.35 74 12.93 31.62 234 40.88 100 30.69 87 13.92 30.00 290 46.39 100

0.66 100.00 4.37 83.33 9.76 50.83

0 0.00 1 0.17 8 1.28

0.00 2 0.66 100 3.33 30 5.24 100 6.67 120 19.19 100

6 The zero subject better construction In the pilot study (van der Auwera and De Wit 2010: 138–139) it was noted that 2nd-person instances of the better construction often have no explicit subject.9 9 Zero subjects are possible for best structures, too. Of the total of 9 best attestations in the BNC 6 are without subject, as illustrated in (a) – see also (9). (a) He looked up at the sky. It had suddenly become darker. “Best be movin,” he said and they swung open the gate and set off at a jaunty pace back up the lane towards the main road. (BNC written CAB 197)

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

139

This was the case for all of the LOB, FLOB and Brown constructions (5, 5 and 8 attestations), though not for any of the Frown cases (6 attestations). An example presented there is (25). (25)

Drewitt hesitated. “I would like to go on.” “I wouldn’t like you to. So that’s it! Better get your uniform on and report to the duty sergeant.” (FLOB L07 67)

Zero subjects were not included in the frequency counts in Tables 13 and 14 (since these counts were performed automatically and something that is not realized cannot be found and counted automatically). We will therefore return to the sample of 200 BNC instances of better that provided part of the input for Table 4 to get an idea of the proportional share of zero subjects and to test the hypothesis that they are restricted to 2nd person. The result of the manual analysis can be found in Table 16. Table 16: Frequency of 1st, 2nd and 3rd-person zero subjects with better in a sample of 200 instances from the BNC 1SG

1PL

2SG/PL

3SG/PL

Unclear

Total

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

19

21.11

13

14.44

42

46.67

6

6.67

10

11.11

90

100

Table 16 tells us that the better construction indeed often leaves the subject unexpressed, more precisely in almost half of all cases in the sample (90 of the 200 instances). They do not do so exclusively for the second person, however. Indeed, 2nd-person instances, though they represent the largest share, account for less than 50% of the instances in the sample. The combined share of 1stperson singular and plural cases amounts to 35%. (26) to (29) illustrate 1st and 3rd-person cases. (26)

They talked a bit more, but Harry was tiring quickly. He seemed to be having difficulty with the second pint, and had only drunk a third of it when he looked at his watch. “Better be on my way, you know, Charlie. Not as young as I was.” (BNC written GUF 524)

(27)

“Come here, m’dear. Don’t like to see you upset like this. Better do something about it, hadn’t we?” (BNC written EVC 3086)

140

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

(28)

Better put her seat-y belt on hadn’t she? (BNC spoken KB7 15869)

(29)

The dedication to their appearance of stars such as the luminous, fiftyish, Catherine Deneuve, sixtyish socialites such as Marie Helene de Rothschild or Helene de Mortemart and political wives such as Bernadette Chirac and Claude Pompidou, may be much more than simple vanity and may involve no self-admiration at all. It is more a standard, a form of self-reliance, a determination that if one has to go in the end, better be correctly dressed. (BNC written AJU 1043)

What is the origin of the zero subject better construction? Theoretically, one could conceive of it as a fourth stage in the grammaticalization path in Figure 1, repeated as Figure 3 with indications of the subjects and with Ø for unexpressed auxiliary and/or subject.

Figure 3: A possible origin of the zero subject better construction

From an “ontogenetic” angle, it is not to be denied that speakers with a constructional repertoire containing SUBJECT had better, reduced SUBJECT ’d better and more reduced SUBJECT Ø better could take the reduction one step further and produce Ø Ø better. However, from a “phylogenetic” perspective the hypothetical development represented in Figure 3 has no obvious empirical backing. Table 17 shows that all of the early better attestations have zero subjects (Ø Ø better). (30) and (31) are two examples. Table 17: Zero subjects for Ø better in the CLMETEV Explicit subject

1710–1780 1780–1850 1850–1920

Zero subject

Total

n

%

n

%

n

%

0 0 0

– – –

3 13 47

100.00 100.00 100.00

3 13 47

100 100 100

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

(30)

141

If such the plague and pains to write by rule, better, say I, be pleased and play the fool. (CLMETEV 1733–34 Pope, An essay on man)

(31) Malooney’s ball missed the red on its first journey up the table by about a foot, but found it later on and sent it into a pocket. “Ninety-nine plays nothing,” said Dick, who was marking. “Better make it a hundred and fifty, hadn’t we, Captain?” “Well, I’d like to get in a shot,” said the Captain, “before the game is over. Perhaps we had better make it a hundred and fifty, if Mr. Malooney has no objection.” (CLMETEV 1909 Jerome, They and I) Better therefore did not occur with a subject before it occurred without one (see also the listing of the “main stages” in the history of BETTER in Denison and Cort 2010: 364) and there must consequently be some other causal factor explaining the development of subjectless better. Denison and Cort (2010: 358–362) provide us with a plausible one. They draw attention to the it is better to pattern, which occurs in a clipped format (without it is and with the bare infinitive) in proverbs from the 17th century onwards. (32) and (33) are two of the clipped examples, both dating from 1742, the first with a to-infinitive and the second with a bare infinitive. (32) Better to die a beggar than live a beggar. (33) Better have it than hear of it. Arguably, the example in (30) has a proverbial touch to it too, as does one more example from the 1710–1780 subperiod (out of 3 examples in total). In the 1780– 1850 subperiod, 3 out of 13 examples are clearly proverbial, and in the final 1850–1950 subperiod, only 2 out of 47 examples. The diachronic hypothesis is that the non-proverbial Ø Ø better structures were generalized from the Ø Ø better proverbs. Denison and Cort (2010: 362) phrase this as follows: “[i]t seems plausible that the pattern of sentence-initial better in proverbs may have helped to license the superficially identical structure for modal BETTER”. After that, better was combined with subjects, just like had better and ’d better. Figure 4 offers a correction to Figure 3, switching around the temporal order of SUBJECT Ø better and Ø Ø better, and including the two hypothesized analogical operations (the horizontal arrows).

142

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

Figure 4: The history of BETTER

It is important to keep in mind that Figure 4 does not show us the full story of BETTER . Going back further in time might well show a general it is better origin for both developments. For the proverbial pathway this is obvious: proverbial it is better just uses a general it is better pattern. As to had better, Poutsma (1928: 159) is confident that it “stands for” were better, “which in its turn represents a still older me were better”, and the OED s.v. better (adj. and adv.), sense 4, suggests that this ultimately goes back to it is better. For some hypotheses on how early had better relates to early it is better, see Denison and Cort (2010: 351–354).

7 The category of better, and of the verb that follows it Though for most speakers the kind of better we are considering in this paper is now likely to be a relatively non-transparent component of the verbal BETTER constructions, one would assume that the word better going back to SUBJECT had better was originally an adverb, because of its position in the middle field, between a finite and a non-finite verb. The better of it is better, on the other hand, is obviously an adjective. In zero better proverbs like (33) above, on the other hand, better precedes a bare infinitive, just like it does in the had/’d better constructions, so it was already more of an adverb there, and this is likely to have facilitated the first of the two analogical operations referred to in the previous section. In the present section we will offer a few more considerations on the categorial status of better and the following verb. Consider, first, example (34), which goes back to Sturtevant (1947: 104), who heard it from a “neighbor boy”, and which lived on in the linguistic analyses of Palmer (1965: 49), Visser (1969: 1827) and Jacobsson (1980: 49). (34) I better go now, bettn’t I?

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

143

In (34) better must be an auxiliary. This is a sensible analysis: the typical modal construction has a modal auxiliary followed by an infinitive and the had and ’dless construction only has better in front of the infinitive. Consequently, speakers – and learners – could analyse better as a verb. But interestingly, further examples like (34) have not been documented in any corpus and they are also extremely rare on the ever so generous internet (cp. Denison and Cort 2010: 380). Nevertheless, the example of the “neighbor boy”, and the importance attributed to it by linguists, suggests that the potential of analysing better as a verb is real.10 Other analyses are possible as a result of the fact that English makes no morphological distinction between an infinitive, an imperative, and an indicative present other than a third person singular form. In all patterns discussed so far the verb that follows better is taken to be an infinitive. However, if the base form get is an imperative in (35a), why could speakers not take it as an imperative in (35b), or in (25) above? (35)

a.

Get your uniform on.

b. Better get your uniform on. Note also that English imperatives allow explicit subjects and that get is an imperative in (36a), too. Hence, speakers could consider get as an imperative in (36b) as well. (36)

a.

You get your uniform on.

b. You better get your uniform on. Of course, under this analysis better would be an adverb again. To decide on the categorial status of get in (35b), one could look at the negation. If get is an infinitive, one expects not, as in (37a), and if get is an imperative, one expects don’t, as in (37b) or (37c). (37)

a.

Better not get your uniform on.

b. Don’t better get your uniform on. c.

Better don’t get your uniform on.

If the type shown in (37c) occurs, it does not actually prove that get is an imperative though. It could also be a clipped version of (38) and semi-clipped (39), in which case (don’t) get in (37c) would be an indicative. 10 Denison and Cort (2010) call their paper “Better as a verb”, but this is a little misleading. What they mean is that all of the BETTER constructions are like modal verbs.

144

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

(38) It is better that you don’t get your uniform on. (39) Better you don’t get your uniform on. It turns out that the corpora consulted only have attestations of the type shown in (37a). This means that at least in these corpora there is no evidence for the imperative and indicative analyses. Interestingly, the type illustrated in (37c) is widely attested on the internet, yet the one shown in (37b) is not found at all. (40) presents two examples of the (37c) type. (40)

a.

http://sebastians-pamphlets.com/better-dont-run-a-web-server-underwindows/Accessed on Oct 10, 2009

b. Better Don’t Talk! http://www.dosinc.org.au/reviews14.html, Accessed on Oct 10, 2009 The fact that only the type shown in (37c) is found favours seeing it as a clipped version of it is better that. Otherwise, there should have been at least some attestations of the type in (37b). There are also no better doncha V attestations, with a prohibitive doncha that would suggest that the verb in the positive counterpart, better V, is imperative. Further evidence for the possibility of the indicative analysis is a you better don’t pattern, frequently found on the internet, also in the first and third person. (41)

a.

You better don’t go there without us. http://www.steptalk.org/node/49294, accessed on Sept 28, 2011

b. You better don’t fuck with me. http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/snoopdogg/signs.html, accessed on Sept 28, 2011 (42) so I better don’t do anything. www.education.miami.edu/isaac/public_web/ignore.htm, accessed on Sept 28, 2011 (43) he better doesn’t wear street clothes. http://www.thewrestlinggame.com/wrestling/news/cm_punk_ unrecognisable.asp. accessed on Sept 28, 2011

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

145

For some internet users ’d better allows a non-infinitival analysis of the ensuing verb too, but apparently only for the second person, in which case it is unclear whether don’t V is imperative or indicative. (44)

you’d better don’t take unnecessary risks. http://www.catplaza.org.uk/preparation_delivery, accessed on Sept 28, 2011

Many of the structures briefly discussed in this section are of course considered substandard, but that appreciation does not disqualify us from indicating BETTER’s potential for change.

8 The standard of comparison When one offers advice with a BETTER construction, can one express what it is the advisable state of affairs is better than? According to Jacobsson (1980: 52), Mitchell (2003: 140) and Denison and Cort (2010: 355), this was perfectly possible in the earlier history of the language, but it has become ungrammatical in present-day English. Judging from van der Auwera and De Wit (2010: 140) and Collins (2009a: 78), this statement is probably too strong. Of the 140 BETTER sentences in the Brown family corpora two sentences express the standard of comparison. Such sentences also occur in the BNC and the COCA, but they are no less rare there. Only eight examples were found in the BNC (in a total of slightly over three thousand BETTER expressions), and sixteen in the COCA (in a total of over ten thousand relevant expressions). (45) and (46) are two examples. (45)

“I’m sorry, Mr Beamish, but he’ll be away all day and I thought I’d better come along rather than leave it till tomorrow.” (BNC written G3S 2565)

(46)

Let’s say violating sovereignty, all of those are the roots of the feeling of humiliation that is generating hate, criminal tendencies, violence in the region. So I think that we’d better try to solve those problems rather than fighting against the selection and expression and the result of those roots. (COCA, spoken)

The Late Modern English data are more in line with what has been observed in the literature. Table 18 presents the diachronic development of the expression of the standard of comparison for the three BETTER constructions.

146

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

Table 18: Frequency of the standard of comparison in the CLMETEV Standard of comparison

No standard of comparison

Total

n

n

n/million

%

n

n/million

had better 1710–1780 20 1780–1850 13 1850–1920 6

6.58 2.27 0.96

33.90 5.56 2.07

39 221 284

12.84 38.61 45.43

66.10 94.44 97.93

’d better 1710–1780 1780–1850 1850–1920

0 0 8

0.00 0.00 1.28

0.00 0.00 17.02

2 30 39

0.66 5.24 6.24

100.00 100.00 82.98

2 30 47

0.66 5.24 7.52

100 100 100

better 1710–1780 1780–1850 1850–1920

1 6 8

0.33 1.05 1.28

33.33 46.15 17.02

2 7 39

0.66 1.22 6.24

66.67 53.85 82.98

3 13 47

0.99 2.27 7.52

100 100 100

Total BETTER 1710–1780 21 1780–1850 19 1850–1920 22

6.91 3.32 3.52

32.81 6.86 5.73

43 258 362

64 21.07 277 48.39 384 61.42

100 100 100

14.2 45.1 57.9

%

67.19 93.14 94.27

n/million %

59 19.42 234 40.88 290 46.39

100 100 100

The data in Table 18 bear out an overall decline of the expression of the standard of comparison over time, from 32.81% to 5.73% of all the BETTER constructions. It appears that it is especially the had better construction that is responsible for this downward trend; the decrease from the first subperiod to the second is statistically significant, with Fisher’s exact p < 0.005. The data for the better construction show some fluctuation across the three subperiods, but none of the changes are significant (Fisher’s exact p > 0.05). For ’d better, we can note even an increase in the expression of the standard of comparison to 17.02% in 1850–1920, which is significant (Fisher’s exact p < 0.02). Figures 5 to 7 visualize these developments for each of the BETTER constructions. In addition, it can be noted that throughout the 1710–1920 time frame the bare better form was much more hospitable to the standard of comparison than the full had better form (see Table 18, first versus third set of data). This ties up nicely with the hypothesis that one of the source constructions of bare better is that of the proverbial better expressions since these, judging from the examples given in Denison and Cort (2010: 360–361), always expressed the standard of comparison.

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

Figure 5: The share of the standard of comparison with had better in the CLMETEV

Figure 6: The share of the standard of comparison with ’d better in the CLMETEV

147

148

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

Figure 7: The share of the standard of comparison with better in the CLMETEV

9 A West Germanic postscript The expression of advice with a modal construction containing the concepts of “better” or “best” is not unique to English. In the languages of Europe the strategy is also found in other West Germanic languages (but see also Patard 2011 for French). (47) and (48) illustrate BETTER and BEST constructions in Dutch, West Frisian, German and Yiddish. Afrikaans does not seem to allow this strategy (except as calques from English) and neither do North Germanic languages (they use “rather” type constructions). (47)

a.

We

kunnen

dat

b.

Wy we

kinne can

c.

Wir sollten we should

d.

Mir voltn dos beser nisht geton. we would that better not done ‘We had better not do that.’

dat that das that

beter niet

doen.

beter net dwaan. better not do besser better

nicht tun. not do

[DUTCH ] [WEST FRISIAN ] [GERMAN ] [YIDDISH ]

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

(48)

a. Je you

zou best should best

b. Do you

kinst can

met with

it bêst the best

de the

mei with

am besten at.the best

trein reizen. train travel de trein the train

c.

Du fährst you travel

mit with

dem the

d.

Du forst tsum bestn mit der you travel to.the best with the ‘You had better travel with the train.’

149

[DUTCH ]

reizgje. travel

[WEST FRISIAN ]

Zug. [GERMAN ] train ban. railroad

[YIDDISH ]

These few illustrations by no means show all the relevant construction types and the area of comparative modals in the other Germanic languages has been studied even less than the English ones (but see Byloo, Nuyts, and van der Auwera 2010 for Dutch, Vanderbiesen 2011 and Vanderbiesen and Mortelmans 2011 for German, and Mortelmans and Vanderbiesen 2010 for a comparison of English, Dutch and German). Nevertheless, it is clear that the other languages use auxiliaries other than have and that the superlative type allows phrasal patterns (“the best”, “at best”, “to best”). It is also clear that the superlative type is not as marginal as it is in English. In addition, none of these languages shows anything like successive stages on a grammaticalization path the way English does. So even here, in this very marginal corner of the grammar of English modality, it would seem that modality is more grammaticalized in English than in the other West Germanic languages (see Mortelmans, Boye, and van der Auwera 2009).

10 Conclusion In this chapter, we have looked at and contrasted the English comparative modals from a present-day synchronic and a diachronic perspective. We have observed that constructions with better (had better, ’d better and better) are invariably more frequent that those with best (had best, ’d best and best), both across geographic varieties (British and American) and time (Late Modern English and present-day English). Homing in on the BETTER constructions, we found that there is now considerable geographic variation in the case of the ’d better and better constructions, but not in the case of the had better construction, which is the least frequent construction in both British and American English. Detailed corpus counts revealed that the ’d better construction is much more frequent in

150

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

British English than in American English, in spoken language even more so than in written language. The better construction is also more frequent in British English in spoken language, but in written data it is about four times less frequent in British English than in American English. In this way we have qualified Biber et al.’s (1999) general claim that the BETTER modals are much more common in UK than in US English. The Late Modern English data revealed that all three BETTER constructions increased in frequency from the 18th to the start of the 20th century. On the other hand, their comparison with present-day data suggests that the drop in the frequency of BETTER that previous research established to have taken place in the latter half of the 20th century was part of a longer downward trend. The comparison of the historical and present-day synchronic data also showed that the dominance of ’d better among the BETTER constructions in present-day British English is a recent development. The evolution of the relative frequencies of the three BETTER constructions in the diachronic corpus adduced evidence for the grammaticalization scenario proposed in Denison and Cort (2010), i.e. had better > ’d better > better. The absence of expressed subjects with better in our historical data supports the claim that this is not a mere case of phonological reduction, but that analogy with a subjectless, explicitly comparative, proverbial construction was involved in the development of better. This is substantiated by the incidence of an expressed standard of comparison in these data. Present-day distributional evidence suggests that language users are still divided on the categorial status of better and that this may be a cause for further reanalysis and change. In the postscript it was suggested that the BETTER and BEST constructions fit the general picture of the higher grammaticalization of modality in English as compared to the other West Germanic languages.

References Aarts, Bas. In print. Modal patterns over time: Structures and genres. In: Merja Kytö, Irma Taavitsainen, Claudia Claridge and Jeremy Smith (eds.), Corpus linguistics and the development of English. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bao, Zhiming. 2010. Must in Singapore English. Lingua 120: 1727–1737. Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad and Edward Finegan. 1999. Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. London: Longman. Biewer, Carolin. 2009. Modals and semi-modals of obligation and necessity in South Pacific Englishes. Anglistik 20: 41–55. Byloo, Pieter, Jan Nuyts and Johan van der Auwera. 2010. Beter en best. In: Johan De Caluwe and Jacques Van Keymeulen (eds.), Voor Magda. Artikelen voor Magda Devos bij haar Afscheid van de Universiteit Gent, 93–109. Gent: Academia Press.

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

151

Collins, Peter. 2009a. Modals and Quasi-Modals in English. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Collins, Peter. 2009b. Modals and quasi-modals in world Englishes. World Englishes 28: 281– 292. Collins, Peter. 2009c. Modals and quasi-modals. In: Pam Peters, Peter Collins and Adam Smith (eds.), Comparative Studies in Australian and New Zealand English. Grammar and beyond, 73–87. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Declerck, Renaat. 1991. A Comprehensive Grammar of English. Tokyo: Kaitakusha. Denison, David and Alison Cort. 2010. Better as a verb. In: Kristin Davidse, Lieven Vandelanotte and Hubert Cuyckens (eds.), Subjectification, Intersubjectification and Grammaticalization, 349–383. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Deuber, Dagmar. 2010. Modal verb usage and the interface of English and a related creole: A corpus-based study of can/could and will/would in Trinidadian English. Journal of English Linguistics 38: 105–142. Depraetere, Ilse and Susan Reed. 2006. Mood and modality in English. In: Bas Aarts and April McMahon (eds.), The Handbook of English Linguistics, 269–290. Oxford: Blackwell. De Smet, Hendrik. 2005. A corpus of Late Modern English Texts. ICAME Journal 29: 69–82. De Smet, Hendrik. 2008. Diffusional change in the English system of complementation: gerunds, participles and for . . . to-infinitives. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leuven. Dollinger, Stefan. 2008. New Dialect Formation in Canada. Evidence from the English Modal Auxiliaries. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Goldberg, Adele and Johan van der Auwera. 2012. This is to count as a construction. Folia Linguistica 46: 109–132. Huddleston, Rodney and Geoffrey K. Pullum. 2002. The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jacobsson, Bengt. 1980. On the syntax and semantics of the modal auxiliary had better. Studia Neophilologica 52: 47–53. Krug, Manfred. 2000. Emerging English Modals: A Corpus-based Study of Grammaticalization. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Leech, Geoffrey N. 2003. Modality on the move: The English modal auxiliaries 1961–1992. In: Roberta Facchinetti, Manfred Krug and Frank R. Palmer (eds.), Modality in Contemporary English, 223–240. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Leech, Geoffrey, Marianne Hundt, Christian Mair and Nicholas Smith. 2009. Change in Comtemporary English. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Loureiro-Porto, Lucía. 2009. The Semantic Predecesors of need in the History of English (c750– 1710). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. [Revision of 2005 Ph.D. dissertation] Loureiro-Porto, Lucía. 2010. Verbonominal constructions of necessity with þearf n. and need n.: competition and grammaticalization from OE to eModE. English Language and Linguistics 14: 373–397. Millar, Neil. 2009. Modal verbs in TIME. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 14: 191–220. Mitchell, Keith. 2003. Had better and might as well: On the margins of modality. In: Roberta Facchinetti, Frank Palmer and Manfred Krug (eds.), Modality in Contemporary English, 131–149. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Mortelmans, Tanja, Kasper Boye and Johan van der Auwera. 2009. Modals in the Germanic languages. In: Bjoern Hansen and Ferdinand De Haan (eds.), Modals in the Languages of Europe. A Reference Work, 11–69. Berlin: Mouton.

152

Johan van der Auwera, Dirk Noël and An Van linden

Mortelmans, Tanja and Jeroen Vanderbiesen. 2010. Grammaticalization and (inter)subjectification: Comparative Modal Constructions in English, (Dutch) and German. Paper presented at the Conference on Grammaticalization and (Inter)Subjectification, Brussels. Noël, Dirk and Johan van der Auwera. 2009. Revisiting “be supposed to” from a diachronic constructionist perspective. English Studies 90: 599–623. Nokkonen, Soili. 2006. The semantic variation of NEED TO in four recent British English corpora. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 11: 29–71. Palmer, Frank R. 1965. A Linguistic Study of the English Verb. London: Longman. Palmer, Frank R. 1979. Modality and the English Modals, 1st edition. London: Longman. Palmer, Frank R. 1990. Modality and the English Modals, 2nd edition. London: Longman. Patard, Adeline. 2011. Valoir mieux, faire mieux, falloir mieux. Modal comparative constructions in French. Paper presented at the Conference on Grammaticalization and (Inter)Subjectification, Brussels. Pedersen, Ted. 1996. Fishing for exactness. Proceedings of the South Central SAS(c) User Group 96: 188–200. Perkins, Michael R. 1983. Modal Expressions in English. London: Frances Pinter. Poutsma, Hendrik. 1928. A Grammar of Late Modern English. Part 1. The Sentence. First Half. The Elements of the Sentence. Groningen: Noordhoff. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik. 1985. A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language. London: Longman. Stefanowitsch, Anatol and Stefan T. Gries. 2003. Collostructions: Investigating the interaction of words and constructions. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 8(2): 209–243. Sturtevant, Edgar H. 1947. An Introduction to Linguistic Science. New Haven: Yale University Press. Taeymans, Martine. 2006. An investigation into the emergence and development of the verb need from Old to Present-Day English: A corpus-based approach. PhD dissertation, University of Antwerp. van der Auwera, Johan and Astrid De Wit. 2010. The English comparative modals – A pilot study. In: Bert Cappelle and Naoki Waka (eds.), Distinctions in English Grammar, Offered to Renaat Declerck, 127–147. Tokyo: Kaitakusha. van der Auwera, Johan, Dirk Noël and Astrid De Wit. 2012. The diverging need (to)’s of Asian Englishes. Marianne Hundt and Ulrike Gut (eds.), Mapping Unity and Diversity of New Englishes World-Wide. 55–76. Amsterdam: Benjamins. van der Auwera, Johan and Vladimir Plungian. 1998. Modality’s semantic map. Linguistic Typology 2: 79–124. van der Auwera, Johan and Martine Taeymans. 2009. The need modals and their polarity. In: Rhonwen Bowen, Mats Mobärg and Sölve Ohlander (eds.), Corpora and Discourse – and Stuff. Papers in Honour of Karin Aijmer, 317–326. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg. Vanderbiesen, Jeroen. 2011. Welches Outfit sollte man am besten anziehen? A corpus study of comparative modal constructions in German. Master thesis, University of Leuven. Vanderbiesen, Jeroen and Tanja Mortelmans. 2011. Welches Outfit sollte man am besten anziehen? Eine Korpusstudie komparativer Modalkonstruktionen im Deutschen. Germanistische Mitteilungen: 65–85. Van linden, An, Kristin Davidse and Lot Brems. 2011. Verbonominal expressions with need: the interaction between negation and modality. Presentation at the International Conference of Historical Linguistics 20. University of Osaka, 25–30 July 2011.

Had better, ’d better and better: Diachronic and transatlantic variation

153

Van linden, An. 2012. Modal Adjectives: English Deontic and Evaluative Constructions in Diachrony and Synchrony. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Visser, Frederikus Th. 1969. An Historical Syntax of the English Language. Part three. First Half. Syntactical Units with two Verbs. Leiden: Brill. Westney, Paul. 1995. Modals and Periphrastics in English: An Investigation into the Semantic Correspondence between Certain English Modal Verbs and their Periphrastic Equivalents. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Corpora BNC = The BNC Consortium. 1994. British National Corpus, Oxford University, Oxford. Brown = Kucera, Henry and W. Nelson Francis, compilers. 1961. Brown University Standard Corpus of American English, Brown University, Providence RI. CLMETEV = De Smet, Hendrik, compiler. 2005, 2008. Corpus of Late Modern English Texts – Extended Version, University of Leuven, Leuven. COCA = Davies, Mark, compiler (n.d.) Corpus of Contemporary American English, Brigham Young University, Provo UT. FLOB = Mair, Christian, compiler. 1997. Freiburg/LOB Corpus of British English, University of Freiburg, Freiburg. Frown = Mair, Christian, compiler. 1999. Freiburg-Brown Corpus of American English. University of Freiburg, Freiburg. LOB = Leech, Geoffrey N., Stig Johansson and Knut Hofland, compilers. 1978. Lancaster/ Oslo-Bergen Corpus, Norwegian Computing Centre for the Humanities, Bergen. http:// longmanusahome.com/dictionaries/corpus.php, accessed on September 4, 2011.

Peter Collins

Grammatical colloquialism and the English quasi-modals: a comparative study 1 Introduction: “grammatical colloquialism” This paper examines the distribution of four members of the class of “quasimodals” (have to, have got to, be going to, and want to) across nine World Englishes. Four of these Englishes are members of Kachru’s (1985) Inner Circle (IC), namely British English (BrE), American English (AmE), Australian English (AusE), and New Zealand English (NZE), while the other five are members of the Outer Circle (OC), namely Singapore English (SingE), Philippine English (PhilE), Hong Kong English (HKE), Indian English (IndE), and Kenyan English (KenE). The primary goal of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the distribution of the four quasi-modals is influenced by the different levels of tolerance that speakers of these Englishes display towards grammatical colloquialism. The term grammatical colloquialism is narrower in its application than colloquialism. While the latter is commonly used to denote the primarily lexical choices associated with a type of conversational or oral style, the focus in this paper will be on grammatical rather than lexical features. Arguably the most uncontroversial grammatical marker of colloquialism so-defined is contraction. For this reason the first stage of the study, as reported in Section 5 below, involved calculating the ratios for a set of uncontracted versus contracted grammatical items – will vs ’ll, am vs ’m, are vs ’re, is vs ’s, and not vs n’t – across the nine corpora used in the study (as a preliminary measure of the extent to which colloquialism has established itself in the Englishes represented). Colloquialism normally results from the process of “colloquialisation”. This process is generally characterised as an evolutionary shift in English writing styles that has been operating to make written registers more like spoken registers (see, e.g., Fairclough 1992). Such a definition, focusing as it does on the shifting, or spreading, of features from spoken to written genres, is somewhat problematical, because it fails to address the multiplex and scalar nature of the differences between spoken and written language (cf. Biber and Conrad 2009: see further Collins and Yao forthcoming). It is preferable, I believe, to conceptualise colloquialisation as a process in which linguistic features spread from casual conversation to other genres, not merely written. Even if one were to accept as valid the generally received definition of colloquialisation there would be good reason to avoid invoking the process in the present study. This is because, being synchronic, the study does not enable us

156

Peter Collins

to directly observe the process itself. For this reason I shall avoid using -isation process-oriented terms in favour of -ism state-oriented terms. Thus, additionally, the term Americanisation (the process by which other varieties are influenced by and/or take on AmE features) will be avoided in favour of Americanism (the extent to which such features are evident in a given variety or varieties), and grammaticalisation (the transformation of periphrastic lexical units into more grammatical ones, subsequently developing new grammatical functions: see Hopper and Traugott 2003: xv) in favour of grammaticalism (the reflection in a given form or forms of the process of grammaticalisation). Colloquialism is known to interact with such factors. Its interrelationship with grammaticalism is reflected in the tendency for newly grammaticalised forms to be accepted more rapidly in informal styles than formal ones. Colloquialism also interacts with Americanism, in particular as it manifests the tendency for AmE to be in the lead in particular changes. The relevance of these interrelationships to the quantitative findings for the quasi-modals will be investigated.

2 Extralinguistic factors This section considers several extralinguistic factors that, it is predicted, will also have a role to play in determining the distributional patterns of the quasimodals in the present study. One factor is the level of evolutionary advancement of the (postcolonial) Englishes. In his dynamic model for the postcolonial Englishes Schneider (2007) posits five evolutionary phases to measure the progression of their identity construction and linguistic development: (1) foundation (transportation); (2) exonormative stabilisation; (3) nativisation; (4) endornormative stabilisation; and (5) differentiation. The three IC postcolonial Englishes, AmE, AusE and NZE (BrE is excluded because it does not qualify as a postcolonial English) are all in Schneider’s Phase 5, but can be differentiated according to the extent of their time in this phase (over a century in the case of AmE, which can also boast attainment of the status of a major “reference” variety, about three decades for AusE and about two decades for NZE which has more recently begun to display regional, social and ethnic diversification). Of the five OC Englishes, SingE is the most evolutionarily advanced with signs that it is moving into the final phase, followed by PhilE arguably (see Borlongan 2011) becoming extablished in Phase 4. The remaining three varieties, HKE, IndE and KenE, are all in Phase 3, with KenE differentiated from the other two in lacking any signs of the onset of Phase 4 and thus ranking below them.

Grammatical colloquialism and the English quasi-modals: a comparative study

157

A second extralinguistic factor of potential relevance to the study is prescriptivism (another -ism), an inhibiting influence involving attempts to change the language habits of speakers by prescribing, and proscribing, a range of usages aimed at preserving and reinforcing supposed standards of “correctness”. The two major reference varieties of English world-wide, BrE and AmE, have both been and continue to be subject to close prescriptive surveillance. Despite claims that prescriptivism is moribund (Crystal 2004: 523), it is likely that at least some continuing effect is being exerted upon language use by the “rulings” encoded in such sources as grammar checkers, usage guides, freshman English textbooks (in the USA), and press columns written by “language experts”. In the evolution of new Englishes, prescriptivism may manifest itself in the development of a complaint tradition targeting local usages that are considered to flout appropriate norms of correctness, as for example in Hong Kong where there is an extremely vociferous tradition of complaint targeting allegedly falling English standards (Bolton 2002: 14–18). The third and final type of extralinguistic influence that will be invoked in interpreting the finding of the present study is socio-historical. For instance, in comparing results for grammatical colloquialism across the two Antipodean varieties, AusE and NZE, it is undoubtedly important to note the reputation of the former for persistent and pervasive informality, and relevant to consider whether this might be explained in terms of the socio-demographic composition of the Australian population. As a second example, consider whether, if differences emerge between the three South-East Asian (SEA) varieties (SingE, PhilE, and HKE) on the one hand, and the two non-SEA varieties (IndE and KenE), on the other, there might be a socio-historical basis for this. One striking historical similarity shared by the two non-SEA OC varieties, IndE and KenE, is that both emerged in “exploitation colonies” where “the British pursued their classic “divide-and-rule” policy, i.e. they trained a small indigenous elite as administrators but essentially were not interested in disseminating the English language” (Schneider 2007: 191). Consequently, English in both India and Kenya has to the present day had a utilitarian and elitist character, functioning as an indicator of education and employability. While it continues to provide a strong normative influence in both communities, acceptance of local forms is still at a comparatively low level.

3 Diachronic change with the quasi-modals Relevant background to this study is provided by the findings of the corpusbased research conducted by Leech and his associates (Leech 2003; Mair and

158

Peter Collins

Leech 2006; Leech et al. 2009) on recent diachronic changes in the grammar of English. This research focuses on written language in late 20th century BrE and AmE – more specifically, the thirty-year period between the early 1960s and the early 1990s – using the “Brown Family” of corpora, with some supplementation from various spoken corpora. Changes in the frequency of grammatical items are measured by calculating the difference between the frequencies of items in the 1960s corpora, and those in the 1990s corpora, as a percentage of the former. In the case of the quasi-modals, Leech et al. (2009: 286) find want to to have undergone the sharpest rise across the two varieties, and particularly in AmE (+72.4%; compared to +18.6% in BrE), while have to has had a smaller rise in the two varieties (+2.8% in AmE and +9.1% in BrE). The two remaining quasi-modals have risen in AmE but declined in BrE: be going to (+55.0% in AmE and –1.1% in BrE) and have got to (+16.6% in AmE and –34.1% in BrE). Leech et al. did not have parallel spoken corpora at their disposal, but to compensate for this they extracted quasi-modals from non-parallel spoken British corpora (derived from the Diachronic Corpus of Present-Day Spoken English). Interestingly the results were similar to, but more exaggerated than, those that they report for the written corpora: want to (+34.9%), have to (+31.6%), be going to (+63.0%), and have got to (–2.1%).

4 The data The data for the present study were derived from parallel corpora representing the nine Englishes selected. Eight of the corpora were from the International Corpus of English (ICE) collection: ICE-GB, ICE-AUS, ICE-NZ, ICE-PHI, ICE-SIN, ICE-HK, ICE-IND and ICE-EA(Ken). ICE corpora are designed to contain approximately one million words of text, dating from the early 1990s, and conform to a common design, comprising 500 2,000-word texts sampled in the early 1990s (300 spoken texts – 180 dialogic and 120 monologic; and 200 written texts – 50 non-printed and 150 printed). At one million words apiece, the ICE corpora are relatively small, but the comparability of the data and wide range of text types incorporated make it ideal for such intervarietal and cross-generic studies as the present one. In the absence of an ICE-US corpus, whose compilation is yet to be completed, I made use of the first four parts of the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBC) totalling around 256,000 words as a representation of spoken AmE. To facilitate comparison with written AmE, I used the 80,000-word written

Grammatical colloquialism and the English quasi-modals: a comparative study

159

corpus which was compiled from a selection of text categories in the Frown corpus for the purpose of matching the ICE text types as closely as possible (see Collins 2009: 3–4 for the design of this corpus). All of the data were part-of-speech tagged with the C7 tagset using the Wmatrix corpus analysis tool (Rayson 2003, 2008).1 Search routines for the grammatical categories were developed, tokens extracted, and manual post-editing applied to weed out irrelevant cases (such as those involving lexical going with motional meaning in combination with a to-infinitival expressing purpose, and have got with possessive meaning). All raw frequencies were then normalised to tokens per one million words. The overall frequencies for each of the specific linguistic items were derived by calculating the average of the respective normalised spoken and written figures. Figures under the headings of IC and OC were also achieved by calculating the average figures on the basis of normalised figures.

5 Colloquialism and contraction In this section, as foreshadowed above, I present – as a preliminary measure of colloquialism levels in the nine Englishes – ratios for the uncontracted versus contracted forms of a set of verbs, plus not: see Table 1. For the latter there is independent evidence of an association with spoken language: see Biber et al. (1999: 476). In fact Leech et al. (2009: 240), who note that such contractions have become strikingly more frequent in English in recent decades, observe that they “might be considered the paradigm case of colloquialisation: it is so easy to count contractions automatically and calculate their frequency”. The extent of the popularity of the contracted forms is seen to be more than two and a half times greater in the IC varieties (0.89) than in the OC (0.34). It is furthermore overwhelmingly greater in AmE (1.30) than in any of the other varieties, the closest rivals to AmE being the two Antipodean IC varieties, AusE (0.82) and NZE (0.79). BrE (0.63), despite being the most conservative of the four

1 I wish to thank Xinyue Yao for her generosity in organising the part-of-speech tagging, developing search routines and extracting relevant quasi-modal tokens from the corpora. The regular expressions used for retrieving the quasi-modals were as follows. have to: \b((has|have|had|having) to)\b|\b(hasta|hafta|havta)\b have got to: \b((got to)|gotta)\b want to: \b((want|wants|wanted|wanting) to)\b|\bwanna\b be going to: \b(going_VVGK to_TO \w*_V.I)|\b((gonna|gunna)_\w*

160

Peter Collins

Table 1: Contracted vs full form ratios of selected verbs and not GB

US

AU

NZ

IC

SIN

PHI

HK

IND

KEN

OC

’ll/will ’m/am ’re/are ’s/is n’t/not

0.38 8.25 0.30 0.58 1.04

1.08 34.37 0.67 1.14 1.98

0.64 10.13 0.45 0.76 1.23

0.57 10.45 0.36 0.77 1.20

0.67 15.80 0.45 0.81 1.36

0.27 4.65 0.20 0.44 0.66

0.21 6.42 0.28 0.46 0.60

0.17 3.97 0.12 0.41 0.76

0.22 1.33 0.04 0.14 0.41

0.14 2.34 0.07 0.16 0.28

0.20 3.74 0.14 0.32 0.54

Total

0.63

1.30

0.82

0.79

0.89

0.44

0.47

0.42

0.19

0.18

0.34

IC varieties, is still more accepting of contraction than any of the OC varieties.2 Within the OC there is a clear distinction between the three SEA varieties on the one hand and the two non-SEA varieties on the other. The former are remarkably similar, averaging 0.44, over twice the figure for the non-SEA pair, which average 0.19. These findings are broadly in line with our prediction in Section 2 of a correlation between our colloquialism-relevant findings and evolutionary status (in the results for IC vs OC, for AmE vs AusE vs NZE, and for SEA vs non-SEA).

6 Analysis of the quasi-modals The quasi-modals of English form a somewhat heterogeneous set of periphrastic forms that are formally distinguishable from, but semantically similar to, the modal auxiliaries. Most of the quasi-modals – as main-verb constructions that are progressively evolving towards auxiliary-verb constructions – display such well-attested signs of grammaticalisation as phonological weakening (hafta/ hasta, gotta, gonna/gunna, wanna, gonna), and semantic bleaching (the loss of the originally possessive meaning of have in have to, of the originally possessive meaning of got in have got to, of the originally motional meaning of go in be going to, and the incipient development of new modal meaning for the volitional want of want to, as described in Section 7.4: see further Krug 2000). It is widely agreed that there is a close semantic affiliation between a number of quasimodals and modals, but it is also recognised that there may be subtle differences between them (for instance have to tends to be more “objective” than must): see further Westney (1995). The quasi-modals analysed here were selected 2 BrE has emerged as similarly conservative in other studies of colloquial features: for example, in singular agreement in the existential-there construction (Collins 2011), and in get-passives (Collins and Yao forthcoming).

161

Grammatical colloquialism and the English quasi-modals: a comparative study

Table 2: Frequencies of the quasi-modals3 GB have to

speech writing Total

US

1254 2049 820 782 1037 1416

AU

NZ

IC

SIN

PHI

HK

IND

KEN

OC

1672 646 1159

1436 793 1115

1603 760 1182

1663 930 1297

1597 757 1177

1756 777 1267

1732 763 1248

1273 757 1015

1604 797 1201

258 33 145

93 16 55

32 2 17

62 2 32

26 2 14

34 2 18

49 5 27

have got to speech writing Total

246 14 130

85 50 68

413 34 224

287 33 160

want to

speech writing Total

1457 537 997

2536 807 1672

1770 575 1173

1557 505 1031

1830 2264 606 721 1218 1493

1716 627 1172

1825 748 1287

1281 444 863

1503 707 1105

1718 649 1184

going to

speech writing Total

1386 144 765

3232 348 1790

1616 180 898

1589 226 908

1956 225 1090

1296 103 700

771 197 484

605 88 347

673 192 433

861 147 504

Total

speech 4343 writing 1515 Total 2929

958 153 556

7902 5471 4869 5646 4978 4641 4414 3644 3483 4232 1987 1435 1557 1624 1820 1489 1724 1297 1658 1598 4945 3453 3213 3635 3399 3065 3069 2471 2571 2915

on the basis of their semantic association with particular modals (notably must and will), and on the basis of a frequency of occurrence suggesting that they may be making inroads into the semantic territory of their modal counterparts. Let us first consider the overall frequencies of the quasi-modals in the nine Englishes. Table 2 indicates that AmE has a considerably higher total number of quasi-modal tokens than the other eight varieties (and, within the IC, leads in the frequency of every quasi-modal selected except have got to), and has approximately twice as many tokens as the least “advanced” varieties, IndE and KenE. The IC varieties as a group have a stronger predilection for the quasi-modals overall than do the OC varieties. Within the IC group BrE is the most “conservative” and least similar to AmE, followed by NZE, and then AusE. Within the OC varieties, KenE and IndE are considerably more conservative than the three SEA varieties (where SingE is in the lead over PhilE and HKE). The finding reported in Section 3 above that the quasi-modals are on the rise (in BrE and AmE) more sharply in speech than in writing might prompt us to predict that when we compare the findings for speech and writing in this study we will find the former to be more consonant with those for colloquialism reported in Section 5 and with those for speech and writing combined. And this is in fact what we do find: the generalisations that we have made with respect to the complete corpora apply equally well to speech, but slightly less so to 3 The total frequencies in Table 2 represent the means between speech and writing.

162

Peter Collins

Table 3: Speech vs writing ratios for the quasi-modals

have to have got to want to going to Total

GB

US

AU

NZ

IC

SIN

PHI

HK

IND

KEN

OC

1.53 10.66 2.81 9.64

2.84 10.76 3.45 10.00

2.59 11.45 3.24 9.00

1.81 8.04 3.02 7.03

2.19 10.23 3.13 8.92

1.79 4.94 3.03 6.26

2.11 5.25 2.86 12.59

2.26 5.93 2.49 3.92

2.27 6.88 2.98 6.85

1.44 3.56 2.36 5.40

1.97 5.31 2.75 7.00

2.64

4.38

3.39

2.77

3.29

2.51

3.01

2.32

2.71

1.91

2.49

writing. In the spoken data we again find that AmE is strikingly more advanced than all the other varieties, that the same ordering (AmE > AusE > NZE > BrE) obtains in the IC, that the IC varieties as a whole are more advanced than the OC, that the SEA group is ahead of the non-SEA, and that within the SEA varieties SingE is ahead of the other two. In the written data AmE leads the way, just as it does in the spoken data, its affinity for be going to and want to being strikingly stronger than any other variety’s. The IC varieties are again ahead of the OC, and the SEA varieties are on average ahead of the non-SEA. However the modest frequency for AusE writing is contrary to expectation (a by-product of the comparative unpopularity of have to in written AusE), as is the ordering of HKE before PhilE in the OC, and the ordering of KenE before IndE in the nonSEA. The speech versus writing ratios for the quasi-modals are presented in Table 3. The highest ratio (4.38) is found in AmE which, as noted above, also enjoys an overall frequency of quasi-modals superior to that of the other Englishes. In fact the correlation between the overall frequency of items and the extent of their popularity in speech as against writing is not restricted to AmE. It is attested consistently across the IC varieties, whose ranking is identical on both measures (AmE > AusE > NZE > BrE). In the case of the OC varieties, however, the correlation is only partial. IndE, for instance, has the smallest overall frequency in the OC (2471), and yet the second highest ratio (2.71). The OC variety with the highest ratio is PhilE, suggestive perhaps of continuing exonormative allegiance to its colonial parent, AmE. Finally, it may be noted that, as for the contraction figures presented in Table 1 and the frequency figures in Table 2, the IC varieties evidence a much wider range of ratios than do the OC varieties (one which sees the most conservative IC variety, BrE, barely above the OC average in Tables 2 and 3). The magnitude of the difference between the ratios for the two supervarieties, which lie at the extremes for the IC, suggests that for the quasi-modals studied colloquialism may have advanced considerably further in AmE than BrE. The moderate

Grammatical colloquialism and the English quasi-modals: a comparative study

163

extent of the variation in the OC ratios may suggest that the various factors that differentiate the OC varieties historically, culturally and linguistically are not as significant as the properties that they share as new postcolonial Englishes.

7 The individual quasi-modals In this section we focus on the individual quasi-modals, noting similarities to and departures from the general trends discussed in the last section.

7.1 have to The average frequency for have to in the IC varieties (1182) is very close to that for the OC (1201). However, there is more fluctuation in the IC, where have to follows the general trend for AmE (1416) to be the most advanced variety in the frequency of the quasi-modals and for BrE (1037) to be the most conservative (the only variety with a smaller frequency being KenE), and for the SEA varieties to outstrip the non-SEA. Speech versus writing ratios for have to align AmE (2.84) and AusE (2.59) as the most colloquialism-sensitive varieties in the IC, against BrE (1.53) and NZE (1.81) as the least. Of the three quasi-modals examined that have comparable frequencies, have to has the smallest speech versus writing ratio, marginally smaller than for want to, and considerably smaller than that for be going to. This suggests that have to has a weaker association with colloquialism than the other items, and is in turn compatible with Leech et al.’s (2009: 97–99) finding for recent BrE and AmE that have to has been increasing less rapidly than want to and be going to. The primary meaning of have to is (strong) deontic necessity, or “obligation” (see Collins 2009: 34, 60). It has been suggested (Myhill 1995) that one reason for the increasing popularity of have to at the expense of its semantically closest modal auxiliary rival must might be the more “democratic” tone that is generated by its typically more objective deontic meaning. Compare the objectivity of deontic have to with the subjectivity of must in the following two representative examples: (1)

All you have to do is walk around and check. [ICE-SIN:S2A-038]

(2)

I give you ten dollar you must give four dollar. [ICE-SIN:S2A-040]

164

Peter Collins

7.2 have got to Have got to is the least popular of the four quasi-modals studied, and particularly in the written data (with an average frequency of only 33 in the IC, and 5 in the OC). This finding is unsurprising in view of the censure of got by prescriptivists that continues to be voiced throughout the IC, and variably across the OC Englishes. Have got to is also the only quasi-modal for which AmE does not have the highest frequency (AmE, with a total of 68, in fact having by far the lowest frequency of the four IC varieties). Like have to, have got to, serves primarily to express strong deontic necessity, but the two expressions differ in that have got to is less consistent in its expression of objectivity. Thus in (3), where the speaker is the deontic source, substitution of have to might suggest that there is a deontic source other than the speaker. (3)

you have got to start running budget surpluses. [ICE-NZ:S1B-022]

Have got to is far more popular, and more closely associated with colloquialism, in the IC than the OC. The ratios presented in Table 3 reveal a dispreference for have got to in writing that is far stronger in the IC (10.23) than it is in the OC (5.31), suggestive of a greater awareness of and sensitivity to traditional proscriptions of the verb get amongst IC speakers.

7.3 be going to Be going to is about twice as common in the IC varieties as the OC (1090:504), and within the IC AmE is strongly in the lead over the other three varieties (with a total frequency of 1790, approximately twice that of the others). The far greater affinity for the spoken word than the written word evidenced by be going to in the present study, in both the IC (where the average speech versus writing ratio is 8.92) and the OC (7.00), is suggestive of a strong association with colloquialism. Be going to resembles its modal auxiliary counterpart will to the extent that the two primary meanings it expresses are futurity, as exemplified in (4), and volition, as exemplified in (5): (4) and it’s hard to predict what it’s going to be like in future. [ICE-NZ:S1B-016] (5)

are you going to shout them all or do they pay? [ICE-NZ:S1A-035]

The parallelism between be going to and will is, however, disrupted by the inability of epistemic be going to to refer to present or past situations (so it could

Grammatical colloquialism and the English quasi-modals: a comparative study

165

not be substituted for will in (6)), and by its expression of weak intentionality rather than strong willingness or insistence (so substitution of won’t for ’s not gonna in (7) would boost the strength of the volitionality), and by the typically greater degree of immediacy that it expresses (as in (8) where, as it commonly does, it collocates with just): (6) former president Joseph Estrada will have been appended to college history. [ICE-PHI:W1A-005] (7)

She’s not gonna go back to go she she doesn’t want to go to back to Petersham C E S to get a job from them anymore ’cause she you know every time she gets a job from them it’s really temporary. [ICE-AUS:S1A-013]

(8) But you can have the the cashier situated somewhere inside so that when he is just going to pay he’ll still be passing through amidst some other books So he can be seeing other possible copies which can. [ICE-KEN:S1B-009]

7.4 want to The total average frequencies for want to in the IC (1218) and OC (1184) corpora are similar, with the familiar IC pattern once again of AmE exhibiting by far the highest frequency, followed by AusE, NZE and BrE. The greater affinity of want to for the spoken word than the written word, by an approximate ratio of three to one (3.13 in the IC, and 2.75 in the OC), indicates an association with colloquialism, and is compatible with Leech et al.’s (2009: 97–99) finding for BrE and AmE that this quasi-modal is on the rise. Not all writers regard want to as a quasi-modal. However there are at least two pieces of evidence that support this classification. One is its occasional orthographic representation in informal written styles as wanna. The second is the emergence of modal meaning additional to its dominantly volitional meaning (as exemplified in (9), where it is paraphraseable by wish to, be willing to), namely deontic modality as in (10), where it means “are advised to”, “ought to”. (9)

But if we have to keep our oral tradition really you know the stories should be kept the way the way they were they were told. So I don’t see much particularly for my stories changing. People may want to but I don’t think I will encourage that. [ICE-KEN: S1A-023]

166

Peter Collins

(10) So you wanna think about what’s my hypothesis and how am I gonna how am I gonna attempt then test that hypothesis and what’s the best way to do it. [ICE-AUS:S1B-019]

8 Conclusion The findings of this study point to a number of strong tendencies. The frequency of contracted verbs and negative forms, whose status as colloquial features is confirmed in Biber et al. (1999: 476), was used as an initial measure of the extent of grammatical colloquialism across the Englishes. It was revealed that the IC varieties overall were considerably more advanced than the OC on this measure, and that within the OC the three SEA varieties were more advanced than the two non-SEA varieties. Within and beyond the IC we found colloquialism, grammaticalism and Americanism to be interconnected, with AmE more advanced than all the other varieties. By contrast, BrE was the most conservative within the IC, with the two Antipodean varieties in-between. There was no departure from these trends when we considered the frequency of quasi-modal tokens and very little departure for the ratio of tokens occurring in spoken versus written discourse. The ranking (averaging out the various contributing results) in the IC is AmE > AusE > NZE > BrE, while for the OC it is SingE > PhilE > HKE > IndE > KenE (with a clear quantitative distinction between the IC and the OC, and between the SEA and the non-SEA varieties). Several extralinguistic factors may be suggested to have played a role in determining these patterns. The hypothesis that the frequencies of selected quasimodals in the various (postcolonial) Englishes, and their relative frequencies in speech and writing in these varieties, may reflect their levels of evolutionary advancement, is confirmed by the findings. BrE, which is not a postcolonial English, is of course a special case: it ranks as the most conservative of the IC Englishes, as it has been observed to do with respect to several colloquial features. BrE aside, not only is the relative ranking of the three major groupings that emerges from the findings – IC > SEA > non-SEA – consistent with the Schneider-based evolutionary rankings discussed in Section 2 above, but the ordering of varieties within each grouping is also in line with our evolutionary predictions. There is mild support for the hypothesis that prescriptivism has had some role to play in our quantitative results. As noted in Section 2, in postcolonial Englishes prescriptivism may be in evidence in a complaint tradition targeting local usages deemed “incorrect”. This phenomenon can have different consequences for colloquialism: where the complaints serve to generate negative

Grammatical colloquialism and the English quasi-modals: a comparative study

167

attitudes towards informal local usages, the effect may be to disfavour the use of colloquial features; on the other hand, where the effect is to generate positive community attitudes in defiance of the complaints, the effect might be to favour the use of colloquial features. The first scenario is typified by IndE, the second by SingE, and it is therefore not surprising that there should be a sharp contrast in their quasi-modal frequencies (SingE having the highest total frequency of quasi-modals, 3399, in the OC and IndE the lowest, 2471; and the most extreme difference reserved for the quasi-modal that is subject to the greatest prescriptive censure, have got to, with 55 tokens in SingE as opposed to only 14 in IndE). Thirdly consider some socio-historical factors. How can we explain the finding that two Antipodean IC Englishes, AusE and NZE, differentiate themselves both generally in their tolerance of contraction and specifically in their frequencies of quasi-modals, NZE being apparently more conservative in its tolerance of colloquialism than its “big trans-Tasman brother”? A possible factor here is the sociodemographic composition of the early Australian and New Zealand settlements. The English spoken in both settlements originated in a set of dialects transplanted by immigrant Anglo-Celtic settlers of comparable social and regional backgrounds. The main difference lay in the sizeable convict component in Australia, a feature that may have had some role to play in the persistent and pervasive informality of AusE, a widely-acknowledged characteristic that is manifested in – inter alia – the use of familiar hypocoristics (Simpson 2008; Bardsley and Simpson 2009), coarse and irreverent words and expressions (Allan and Burridge 2009), and non-standard grammatical features (Collins forthcoming; Pawley 2008). Consider finally some relevant socio-historical aspects of the OC varieties. The two non-SEA varieties, IndE and KenE, differentiate themselves from the other varieties in their results for contraction and quasi-modal frequency. This is unsurprising given – as we have noted in Section 2 – that they have a common historical origination as “exploitation colonies”, a fact that explains the utilitarian and elitist nature of English in India and Kenya. The three SEA varieties in this study pattern similarly to each other, diverging from both the IC varieties as a whole and from the non-SEA varieties. Within the SEA we have noted that the results for SingE and PhilE indicate a greater level of advancement than that for HKE. This finding is compatible with both the evolutionary differences between the varieties and with other extralinguistic factors. In both there is extensive code-switching between English and local languages (see Gupta 1998; Bautista 2004), in both there is a high percentage of the population who claim speaking or writing ability in English, and in both there is a colloquial local vernacular – Singlish and Filipino – that is used in informal intimate contexts.

168

Peter Collins

References Allan, Keith and Kate Burridge. 2009. Swearing. In: Pam Peters, Pam, Peter Collins and Adam Smith (eds.), Comparative Studies in Australian and New Zealand English Grammar, 361– 386. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Bardsley, Dianne and Jane Simpson. 2009. Hypocoristics in New Zealand and Australian English. In: Pam Peters, Peter Collins and Adam Smith (eds.), Comparative Studies in Australian and New Zealand English: Grammar and Beyond, 49–69. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Bautista, Maria Lourdes S. 2004. Tagalog-English code-switching as a mode of discourse. Asia Pacific Education Review 5(2): 226–233. Biber, Douglas and Susan Conrad. 2009. Register, Genre and Style. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad and Edward Finegan. 1999. The Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. London: Longman. Bolton, Kingsley. 2002. Hong Kong English: autonomy and creativity. In: Kingsley Bolton (ed.), Hong Kong English: Autonomy and Creativity, 1–25. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Borlongan, Ariane M. 2011. Relocating Philippine English in Schneider’s Dynamic Model. Paper presented at the 17th International Association of World Englishes Conference, Melbourne, Australia. Collins, Peter. 2009. Modals and Quasi-Modals in English. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Collins, Peter. 2011. Singular agreement in there-existentials: An intervarietal corpus-based study. English World-Wide 33(1): 53–68. Collins, Peter. forthcoming. Australian English. In: Harold Koch and Rachel Nordlinger (eds.), The Languages and Linguistics of Australia: A Comprehensive Guide. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Collins, Peter and Xinyue Yao. forthcoming. Colloquial features in World Englishes. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics. Crystal, David. 2004. The Stories of English. Woodstock and New York: Overlook Press. Fairclough, Norman. 1992. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. Gupta, Anthea Fraser. 1998. The situation of English in Singapore. In: Joseph A. Foley, Thiru Kandiah, Bao Zhiming, A. F. Gupta, L. Alsagoff, Ho Chee Lick, Lionel Wee, I. S. Talib and W. Bokhorst-Heng (eds.), English in New Cultural Contexts: Reflections from Singapore, 106–126. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hopper, Paul and Elizabeth Traugott. 2003. Grammaticalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kachru, Braj. 1985. Standards, codification, and sociolinguistic realism: the English language in the outer circle. In: Randolph Quirk and Henry Widdowson (eds.), English in the World, 11–30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krug, Manfred. 2000. Emerging English Modals. A Corpus-Based Study of Grammaticalization. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Leech, Geoffrey. 2003. Modality on the move: the English modal auxiliaries 1961–1992. In: Roberta Facchinetti, Manfred Krug and Frank Palmer (eds.), Modality in Contemporary English, 223–240. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Grammatical colloquialism and the English quasi-modals: a comparative study

169

Leech, Geoffrey, Marianne Hundt, Christian Mair and Nicholas Smith. 2009. Change in Contemporary English: A Grammatical Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mair, Christian and Geoffrey Leech. 2006. Current changes in English syntax. In: Bas Aarts and April McMahon (eds.), Handbook of English Linguistics, 318–342. Oxford: Blackwell. Myhill, John. 1995. Change and continuity in the functions of the American English modals. Linguistics, 33: 157–211. Pawley, Andrew. 2008. Australian Vernacular English: some grammatical characteristics. In: Kate Burridge and Bernd Kortmann (eds.), Varieties of English 3: The Pacific and Australasia, 362–397. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Rayson, Paul. 2003. Matrix: a statistical method and software tool for linguistic analysis through corpus comparison. Ph.D. dissertation, Lancaster University. Rayson, Paul. 2008. Wmatrix: A Web-based Corpus Processing Environment. Computing Department, Lancaster University. Software available at http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/. Schneider, Edgar. 2007. Postcolonial English: Varieties around the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Simpson, Jane. 2008. Hypocoristics in Australian English. In: Kate Burridge and Bernd Kortmann (eds.), Varieties of English 3: The Pacific and Australasia, 305–340. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Westney, Paul. 1995. Modals and Periphrastics in English: an Investigation into the Semantic Correspondence between certain English Modal Verbs and their Periphrastic Equivalents. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician1 1 Introduction 1.1 Motivation and justification The relationship between the expression of modal necessity and impersonality is well attested (cf., for example, Pocheptsov 1997; Pantaleo 2002; Loureiro-Porto 2009). The underlying link between both phenomena is the fact that necessity usually affects an unvolitional experiencer. Ample evidence of this relationship can be found in the history of English (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2010a); the Present-Day English (modal) verb need used to be found in constructions involving an impersonal experiencer in Old English, as in sentence (1) below, and so did its semantic competitors ( þurfan in Old English, and thurven, misteren and bihoven in Middle English). One of these, behove, which was personal in Old English (cf., for example, we soðlice ne behofiað þyssera eorðlicera æhta ‘we truly do not need this/these earthly wealth/possessions’), evolved into Modern English as an exclusive impersonal verb (cf. Allen 1997; Loureiro-Porto 2010a), as seen, for example, in (2): (1) ðonne þe martirlogium geneodie. then you-ACC martyrology is-necessary ‘then, martyrology is necessary for you.’ (OE example from Visser 1963–1973: 1424, §1345) (2)

It behooves us to know as much as possible about this problem. (1955, example from the OED s.v. behove v., 4)

Cross-linguistic evidence also supports such a relationship. Galician, for example, a Romance language spoken in NW Spain, has a defective verb of necessity which is only inflected for the third person (singular and plural), 1 I would like to thank the audience at Modality in English 4 as well as two anonymous reviewers for their fruitful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Likewise, for generous financial support thanks are due to the Autonomous Government of Galicia (INCITE grant 08PXIB204016PR) and the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation and the European Regional Development Fund (grants HUM2007–60706 and FFI2011-26693-C02-02).

172

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

cómpre2 ‘it is necessary’ (infinitive cumprir, literally ‘to comply’), semantically close to Spanish cabe and Catalan caldre, both meaning ‘be necessary’. A preliminary overview of its use reveals that its meanings include, at least, weak internal obligation, ‘should’, as in sentence (3); absence, ‘lack’ (very much like early English want, cf. Krug 2000), as in sentence (4), and general necessity, as in sentence (5): (3)

A nosa memoria, polo tanto, é quen de provocar choiva para que the our memory therefore is who of provoke rain for that afogue o que non nos cómpre ouvir. drown the that not us is-necessary hear ‘Our memory, therefore, is able to provoke rain so that what we should not hear will drown out.’ (Estévez, Xosé, A lagoa da memoria, 2002, from TILGA)

(4) Ao Manifiesto só lle cómpren unhas palabras, aquelas de to-the manifest only it-acc are-necessary some words those by Antonio Machado. . . Antonio Machado ‘the Manifest only lacks (and needs) some words, those by Antonio Machado. . .’ (Blog Días estranhos, 22 July 2008, http://pawley.blogalia.com/historias/58633) (5)

Cómpre unha economía que non precise medrar. is-necessary a economy that not needs grow-up ‘the world needs a sort of economy that does not need to grow up.’ (Xornal de Galicia, 14 June 2009, http://www.xornal.com/artigo/2009/05/30/ suplementos/contexto/enric-duran-%EF%BF%BDcompre-economia-nonprecise-medrar/2009053023260527834.html)

1.2 English need, behove and Galician cómpre The etymological ancestors of need are OE neodian v.1 and OE neodian v.2, which mean ‘to compel’ and ‘to be necessary’ respectively (on the differences and similarities between them, see Loureiro-Porto 2008). Over the course of time, these 2 For practical reasons, in what follows the form cómpre is used to refer to all the possible third person singular and plural forms of cumprir ‘to be necessary’ inflected for any tense and mood.

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

173

two verbs converge syntactically and semantically (subperiod M3,3 1350–1420, cf. Loureiro-Porto 2008: 112) and they give rise to need in the sense we know it today, and whose complex (modal and non modal) status has made it the subject of many studies (cf., among them Krug 2000; Leech 2003; Smith 2003; Taeymans 2006; Nokkonen 2006; Polge 2010; Leech 2010; Nokkonen 2010). Behove, in turn, goes back to OE behofian, a personal verb belonging to weak verb class 2, which meant ‘need’ and which could feature with NPs or sentential complements. Over time, and especially in early Modern English, behove evolves as a verb of appropriateness, meaning ‘it is appropriate / fitting for you to . . .’ (for further details on the diachronic evolution of need and behove from Old English to 1700, see Loureiro-Porto 2009). The survival of need and behove as personal and impersonal in Present-Day English is claimed to have been caused (at least partially) by the different modal meanings they came to express over the course of time: while need survives expressing different necessity meanings (volition, external obligation, general need, etc.), behove develops an exclusive preference for meanings related to appropriateness, i.e. ‘circumstances are such that the experiencer would be better off if he/she. . .’ (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2010a). Likewise, this syntactic-semantic difference appears to have played a role in the development of need as a modal auxiliary, while behove never enters the group of grammaticalized verbs. Galician cómpre is the third person singular present indicative form of the verb cumprir, literally ‘to comply’, which can also be inflected for the third person plural in all possible verbal tenses (as opposed to the claim in the 1991 Diccionario de dúbidas da Lingua Galega, in which the entry for *cumprir states that the ‘be necessary’ meaning is only found in the singular)4. According to the main dictionaries of the Galician language, the etymology is Latin complere ‘to fill in’ (cf., for example, Gran Diccionario Século 21 da Lingua Galega, 2005, and Gran Diccionario Xerais da Lingua, 2009). In this sense, the meaning is related to some Romance modals of necessity which have their roots in verbs related to space (such as Spanish cabe, which also means ‘be necessary’ and which has evolved from the meaning ‘to fit in’, see Cornillie et al. 2009). Some of the Present-Day meanings of Galician cumprir are ‘comply’, as in cumprir o seu deber ‘to do their duty’, and ‘turn, become’ as in cumpriu 15 anos ‘s/he turned/ 3 The label M3 is taken from the Helsinki Corpus (Rissanen et al. 1991), according to which Middle English (1150–1500) is subdivided into four subperiods: M1 (1150–1250), M2 (1250–1350), M3 (1350–1420) and M4 (1420–1500). 4 This mistake is amended in the 2004 Diccionario Galaxia de Usos e Dificultades da Lingua Galega (s.v. cumprir), which avoids any reference to number: “coa acepción de ‘ser necesario’ só se conxuga en terceira persoa”, i.e. when meaning ‘to be necessary’ it is only inflected for the third person.

174

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

became 15’. Also, in impersonal uses in which the verb is only inflected for the third person, its meaning is ‘be necessary’, which some dictionaries record as a different meaning of the same lexeme (e.g. Diccionario da Lingua Galega, Diccionario da Real Academia Galega, Gran Diccionario Século 21 da Lingua Galega), while a recent and highly respected dictionary considers that the two meanings belong to two different lexemes (e.g. Gran Diccionario Xerais da Lingua), as seen in Table 1. The entry includes the following information: (6) C UMPRIR 2 : v.i. Ser conveniente, preciso ou necesario; convir (cómpre facelo ben). OBS . É un verbo impersoal que se conxuga conforme ó modelo de fuxir. ETIM . de cumprir.1 [C UMPRIR 2 : intransitive verb. To be fitting, wanted or necessary; to behove (it behoves to do it properly). Observation. It is an impersonal verb that inflects according to the paradigm of fuxir ‘to flee’. Etymologically from cumprir 1.] Table 1: Galician cumprir: one or two lexemes? Evidence from dictionary entries Year

One entry

1986 1997 2005 2009

Diccionario da Lingua Galega Diccionario da Real Academia Galega Gran Diccionario Século 21 da Lingua Galega

Two entries

Gran Diccionario Xerais da Lingua

Indeed, the two-lexeme interpretation is accounted for not only in semantic terms, but also in morphological terms. As stated in the entry, the radical -uvowel changes into -o- only when the meaning of the verb is ‘to be necessary’ (hoxe cumpre 15 anos ‘today s/he turns 15’ vs. hoxe cómpre mercar auga ‘today it is necessary to buy water’).5 When meaning ‘to be necessary’, cómpre is usually followed by an infinitive which conveys the main meaning of the clause and which is the head of the VP. Such a preference for infinitival complements points towards the grammaticalization process of decategorialization. Surprisingly enough, though, none of the main Galician grammars list cómpre + infinitive as a verbal periphrasis, as Romance linguistics calls these constructions (Mariño-Paz 1998; Ferreiro 1999; Freixeiro-Maton 2000; Álvarez and Xove 2002; Hermida-Gulías 2004). It is widely held that the status of modal auxiliaries in Germanic languages is not equivalent to the status of homologous words in Romance languages, as noted 5 Although this vowel alternation is the general tendency, sometimes forms with radical -u- are also found to mean ‘be necessary’, as seen in Figure 1 below.

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

175

by Mortelmans, Boye, and van der Auwera (2009): “In contrast to e.g. Romance [. . .] and Slavonic [. . .] modals, the Germanic modals can be claimed to stand out – morphologically, syntactically and semantically – such that they can be said to build a grammatical paradigm” (2009: 11). Indeed, Romance modals cannot be said to form a coherent paradigm (see Cornillie et al. 2009: 131), but some of them indeed exhibit semantic and morphosyntactic features that show that they have entered the realm of grammaticalization. Thus, even if the processes of cliticization and erosion cannot actually be applied to any of them (Cornillie et al. 2009: 122), some of these verbs do appear to have undergone several processes related to grammaticalization, such as desemanticization and decategorialization. Desemanticization (including (inter) subjectification, metaphor/metonymy, semantic layering, etc.) is exemplified by Spanish deber, which has undergone the changes ‘to owe’ > ‘deontic must’ > ‘epistemic must’, cf. Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994: 200–201; Cornillie et al. 2009: 108–109). Decategorialization, in turn, is clearly observed in Italian dovere, which may occur with the perfect auxiliary essere if that is the auxiliary taken by the complement verb, instead of the expected avere (Cornillie et al. 2009: 123–124). For these reasons, Cornillie et al. (2009: 132) also claim that, even if Romance modals cannot be said to form a paradigm, they can indeed be grouped together as expressing typical modal meanings (such as obligation or necessity) and as exhibiting different degrees of grammaticalization. Galician cómpre expresses a modal meaning, that is, necessity, but it is not known whether its absence from Galician grammars is due to its lack of grammaticalization into a modal periphrasis, like English behove, or whether it exhibits auxiliary features, in a similar way to English need.

1.3 Aim and structure The common origin and different evolutions of English need and behove from Old English to 1700, as well as the absolute lack of information on the evolution of Galician cómpre, lead to a series of research questions that this preliminary paper aims to answer: i) Is Galician cómpre semantically closer to need (‘necessity’) or to behove (‘appropriateness’)? ii) What is the correlation between the semantic and pragmatic implications of need, behove and cómpre and the syntactic preference for an impersonal construction in their late history (1700–Present-Day)? iii) Is there a relationship between the preference for personal contexts (i.e. nominative experiencers) and the grammaticalization of lexical verbs into modal auxiliaries?

176

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

In order to answer these questions, the present paper adopts a corpus-based approach to the diachronic study of English need and behove and of Galician cómpre from 1700 onwards, using data from the British English section of ARCHER (A Representative Corpus of Historical English Registers) and TILGA (Tesouro Informatizado da Lingua Galega). The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains some methodological aspects and presents a brief summary of the theoretical background; Section 3 analyses the corpus data; finally, Section 4 draws conclusions.

2 Methodological aspects and theoretical foundations 2.1 Corpora used and sample selected The corpora used for this analysis are ARCHER (A Representative Corpus of Historical English Registers), for British English, which includes some 1.3 million words from 1700 to 1990, and TILGA (Tesouro Informatizado da Lingua Galega), for Galician, which includes some 20 million words from 1612 to 2002. The reasons for using these particular corpora are that, first, ARCHER constitutes the perfect continuation to the Helsinki Corpus (Rissanen, Ihalainen, and Kytö 1991), which, together with other corpora, I used for a previous, thorough study of need and behove (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2009). Second, TILGA is the most representative diachronic Galician corpus available, and as such it must provide an accurate first approach to the study of cómpre.6 Finally, both ARCHER and TILGA cover approximately the same time span and include different registers and text-types, which makes their comparison viable, valid and reliable. Since TILGA is 15 times larger than ARCHER, I would ideally like to randomize the texts in TILGA so as to obtain a selection of comparable size to that of ARCHER. However, the TILGA interface does not allow for the manipulation of the texts themselves, but only the examples obtained. The only option, then, is to select a random sample of examples of cómpre which parallels the numbers of need and behove. Thus I first extracted all the examples of the verbs from ARCHER and from TILGA. The results are: 4 examples of behove, 212 of need, and 3,322 examples of cómpre. Interestingly enough, the normalized frequencies of need and behove together in ARCHER are exactly the same as those of cómpre in TILGA: ca. 16 words per 100,000 words. 6 The form cómpre is used to refer to all the possible third person singular and plural forms of cumprir ‘to be necessary’ inflected for any tense and mood.

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

177

I then chose to make a selection of the examples of cómpre similar to that which would be obtained if the randomizing of the texts were possible. Since TILGA is 15 times larger than ARCHER, the procedure was to divide the 3,322 examples by 15, which gives us 221. Thus the 3,322 examples were randomly selected with the help of Microsoft Excel, before selecting 221. In order to make sure that this random selection is representative, I took into account two measures: 1) That the time span covered by the sample (1843–2000) roughly corresponded to the time span covered by the whole corpus (1836–2002), even if there are very few examples recorded in the 19th century. 2) That the percent representation of each word form in the random sample (221) corresponded to that of each word form in the whole corpus (3,322), as can be seen in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Representativeness of the random sample from TILGA

The sample selected, therefore, is fully representative of the totality of examples found in TILGA.

178

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

2.2 Theoretical foundations In previous studies of need, behove and also of verbo-nominal constructions related to them, I have followed the cognitive approach to modality posited by Sweetser (1990) and Talmy (2000), according to which necessity is described in terms of forces (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2009, 2010b). So as to be consistent with those studies, and so that the data analysed here for English need and behove may be seen as a continuation of these earlier studies as well, the same approach will be followed in this paper. According to this approach, forces may originate inside or outside the experiencer undergoing the necessity, hence they may be internal (I need to eat – because there is a force within me that leads me to eat) or external (I must pay taxes – because, regardless of my own wishes, an external requirement obliges me to do so). Also, forces may have an ambiguous general origin, one which is neither internal nor external for the experiencer (e.g. I need to use the flash for this picture), but which is exerted by a “nebulous, generalized authority” (Langacker 1999: 308), which may sometimes refer to the general circumstances (as in some examples below). From an evolutionary point of view, I will consider that external and internal forces, as they are concrete meanings, precede general forces, which appear in a developed stage as a result of desemanticization (one of the processes of grammaticalization, cf. Heine 1993) and which constitutes a bridge between root modality and epistemic modality, as seen in Figure 2 (itself an expansion of Loureiro-Porto 2009: 26):

Figure 2: Meanings conveyed by modal verbs in the history of English

The information in Figure 2 is backed up by the data in Loureiro-Porto (2009: 205, 214), where it is seen that the referential, social meanings conveyed by external and internal forces (at least as far as verbs of necessity are concerned) occur earlier in time than general meanings, which originate in a nebulous authority, and which pave the way for root meanings to develop into epistemic meanings (e.g. he need not be in the library, he may be somewhere else). Epistemic meanings constitute a further step in the semantic development of modals, implying loss of referential meaning (as general forces) and pragmatic enrichment (cf. Hopper and Traugott 2003: 94). External and internal meanings may vary along a gradient of strength, and therefore they may be strong (if the failure to comply would have severe conse-

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

179

quences for the experiencer) or weak (if no severe consequences would follow) (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2009: 30). As for general forces, since they originate in an ambiguous authority, the consequences of non-compliance are very difficult to measure, and therefore they will not be considered strong or weak, but simply neutral. They correspond, broadly speaking, to Nordlinger and Traugott’s (1997) wide scope of deontic modals, because the scope of the modal is the whole proposition, rather than a particular agent (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2009: 29).

3 Data analysis 3.1 Frequencies of the three verbs Table 2 includes the actual number of occurrences of need, behove and cómpre in ARCHER and in TILGA respectively. As mentioned, the time span covered by both corpora is roughly equivalent and, since ARCHER is divided into six subperiods, the same periodization is used for TILGA with an additional seventh subperiod for the span between 1991 and 2002: Table 2: Number of examples of each verb per subperiod 1 1700– 1749

2 1750– 1799

3 1800– 1849

4 1850– 1899

5 1900– 1949

NEED BEHOVE CÓMPRE

22 2 0

13 0 0

21 1 1

29 1 8

45 0 39

82 0 92

81

212 4 221

Total

24

13

23

40

86

175

81

437

Period Verb

6 1950– 1990

7 1991– 2002

Total

In order to quantify the frequency of occurrence of each of the verbs, normalized frequencies would ideally be used. However, since the actual number of words included in each of the subperiods of TILGA is not available, such a proportional measure cannot be offered. For this reason, the frequencies presented in Table 1 must be considered merely orientative. The following sections, instead, examine the exact linguistic features of the verbs rigorously, so as to answer questions i)–iii) as laid out in Section 1.3.

180

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

3.2 Semantics of the three verbs 3.2.1 Semantics of English behove and need Behove occurs only four times in ARCHER (between 1700 and 1900), all four examples with the meaning of necessity born out of a general force, and all in affirmative contexts, as seen in (6): (6)

I was about to have cut out the whole tumor, to measure and weigh it, but was opposed by the relations; and therefore behooved to content myself with examining its substance as it lay in the body. (1735 Jamieson, James. A large steatom passing with the Oesophagus, from the. . .)

The meaning of behove in this sentence is ‘had to’, i.e. the circumstances were such that that I was forced to content myself with examining its substance as it lay in the body. This meaning was expected, since in the eModE period behove had already become specialized in the expression of general forces, which has been seen as a sign that the verb was evolving towards its appropriateness meaning it exhibits today (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2009: 125–126). The meanings of need, in turn, are more varied, since it conveys external, internal general and also logical forces, as shown in Table 3 and graphically illustrated in Figure 3, which presents the percent values of each type of necessity per subperiod: Table 3: Meanings of need in ARCHER per subperiod Period Meaning

1 1700– 1749

2 1750– 1799

3 1800– 1849

4 1850– 1899

5 1900– 1949

6 1950– 1990

Total

EXTERNAL INTERNAL GENERAL LOGICAL

9 2 11

4 4 5

5 5 11

5 6 17 1

10 12 22 1

9 39 34

42 68 100 2

Total

22

13

21

29

45

82

212

Figure 3 shows no clear definite evolution in the meanings of need, since internal, external and general forces oscillate insignificantly in the six subperiods. The only exception concerns the expression of logical forces (i.e. epistemic necessity), which are only recorded (and scarcely) in the second half of the 19th century and first half of the 20th. All of these occur in negative contexts, confirming Sweetser’s (1990: 154, note 17) comment, as seen in example (7):

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

181

Figure 3: Percentage value of the meanings of need per subperiod

(7)

And if we reflect that breathing an atmosphere containing only four per cent. of carbolic acid soon brings on intense headache, (. . .) it need not appear wonderful that similar symptoms present themselves, when, as occurs in heat apoplexy, . . . (1864, Bonnyman, J. Observations on heat apoplexy)

It must be recalled, though, that epistemic need is also found in earlier stages of the language, not covered in ARCHER. As shown in Loureiro-Porto (2009: 167), the first example of epistemic need in the history of English is recorded in 1649, also in a negative environment. Concerning the frequency of external, internal and general forces, perhaps the most significant finding is that external meanings appear to decrease, but this is more so in affirmative contexts than in negative ones. In affirmative contexts, it is used in a similar way to must from the very beginning of the period covered in ARCHER, in the same way observed for Present-Day English (cf. Nokkonen 2006), as seen in sentence (8): (8) Captain Fustian (. . .) was inquisitive to know how he should be paid for her passage. The messenger told him he need only signify his demand and she would draw a bill on her father, that it would not only be discharged at sight. (1720, Pitts, William. The Jamaica Lady; or The Life of Bavia) Again, this meaning of affirmative need is actually recorded from earlier periods of the language, as seen in the following example (from Loureiro-Porto 2009: 153):

182 (9)

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

and God lovith wol tenderly us while (we) be in synne, and so us nedyth to doe our neybor. and God loves well tenderly us while (we) be in sin and so us needs to do our neighbour ‘and God loves us tenderly while we are in sin, and so we must do to our neighbours (lit.: so it is necessary to do to our neighbours).’ (1373 A Revelation of Love)

Nevertheless, the data in ARCHER appear to show that need is more likely to express external forces in negative contexts. A representative example is (10): (10)

{=f SOPHIA.} (. . .) Besides, you know too one must not be in love! (. . .) {=m HARRY.} Love they say cannot be resisted. {=f SOPHIA.} Ah, but I have been taught better! It may be resisted. Nobody need be in love unless they like; (1792, Holcroft, Thomas. The road to ruin)

Sentence (10) implies that there is no external obligation for anyone to be in love, but that this kind of feeling is governed by internal forces (unless they like). This meaning is found on 29 occasions in the corpus, as opposed to 11 examples of affirmative external force. Conversely, when need expresses internal forces, it is most commonly found in affirmative contexts (10 to 51 examples). A double example of this use is shown in sentence (11): (11) I’ve been helped before, in the past, and that was wonderful. But I’ve never needed it as I need it now. (1952, Selected letters of Dylan Thomas) Indeed, the apparent increase of internal forces with need (see Figure 3) correlates with an increase of the frequency of this verb in affirmative contexts, as seen in the following table and figure: Table 4: Affirmative and negative need in ARCHER 1

2

3

4

5

6

Total

AFFIRM. NEGAT.

3 19

2 11

7 14

8 21

25 20

68 14

113 99

Total

22

13

21

29

45

82

212

Period Need

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

183

Figure 4: Percentage of affirmative and negative examples of need

It must be noted that need here includes both need + bare infinitive / NP and need to. In other words, no distinction is made in Table 4 and Figure 4 as regards the auxiliary or non-auxiliary status of need in the analysis of polarity. For a comprehensive view of the relationship between both aspects from a diachronic point of view, see van der Auwera and Taeymans (2009). Section 3.3 below, in turn, pays attention to the auxiliary and non-auxiliary features of need in the ARCHER examples.

3.2.2 Semantics of Galician cómpre Table 5 and Figure 5 below summarize the main meanings of cómpre as found in the TILGA randomly selected sample, following the cognitive approach described in section 2.2: Table 5: Meanings of cómpre in TILGA per subperiod Period Meaning

1 1700– 1749

2 1750– 1799

EXTERNAL INTERNAL GENERAL LOGICAL Total

0

0

3 1800– 1849

4 1850– 1899

5 1900– 1949

6 1950– 1990

7 1991– 2002

Total

1

2 3 3

2 4 33

2 7 83

1 4 76

7 18 196 0

1

8

39

92

81

221

184

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

Figure 5: Percentage value of the meanings of cómpre per subperiod

With the exception of subperiod 3 (for which only 1 example is recorded and, therefore, the percentage value is not representative), the number of general meanings of cómpre increases over time and is definitely larger than that of need. This might, of course, be related to the increasing preference for the absence of the experiencer, as seen in Figure 6: if the person who is to experience the necessity is not identified, then the necessity tends to be general. Thus the low number of examples of cómpre expressing external necessity in subperiod 4 (see example 12) reduces to almost nothing by the beginning of the 21st century, surviving only in a handful of formulaic expressions such as the following: (12) que é a hora das ánimas e que cómpre rezar as that is the time of-the souls and that is-necessary pray the correspondentes oracións. corresponding prayers ‘. . .that it is the souls’ time and it is necessary to (we must) pray the corresponding prayers.’ (1998, Guía da Galiza máxica, mítica e lendaria, Vítor Vaqueiro) Something similar occurs with examples of internal necessity, although they survive to a greater degree, an example being sentence (13): (13) ós qu’andamos polo mundo, todo nos cómpre saber. those who wander-1. PL in-the world everything us is-necessary know-INF ‘Those of us who wander in the world need to know everything.’ (1881, Literatura popular de Galicia, Juan Antonio Saco y Arce)

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

185

Conversely, the main meaning of cómpre in the last subperiod studied is that of a general force of unknown, ambiguous origin, as seen in sentence (14): (14)

non tiven case relación con xente. Adoito falar só not had-1.sG almost relationship with people I-usually talk only do que cómpre facé-lo e procuro non saír÷me of-that what is-necessary do-it and try-1.SG not go-out do profesional. of-the professional-things ‘. . . I didn’t socialize with people. I usually talk only about what is necessary to talk about and I try not to transcend professional matters.’ (1997, Carne de can, Isidro Novo)

This meaning of cómpre is notably similar to the general necessity meaning conveyed by behove from earlier periods of the language, as in sentence (15), an example from the 14th century in which behove is, like cómpre in (14), followed by an infinitive of a ‘saying’ verb: (15)

Þerof anoþre time we habbeþ yspeke ine þe chapitle of uices. an thereof another time we have spoken in the chapter of vices and þeruore hit ne behoueþ naӡt to reherci. therefore it not behoves not to repeat ‘Thereof we have spoken another time (i.e. previously) in the chapter of vices, and therefore it is not necessary to repeat it.’ (fl1340 Dan Michel’s Ayenbite of Inwit)

The increasing preference for the expression of general forces and the progressive decay of external and internal forces is, without doubt, related to the decay of the experiencer in constructions with Galician cómpre. In fact, when cómpre does have an experiencer it expresses other sorts of necessity with more frequency. In the 30 examples of cómpre with an experiencer (recorded from 1843 to 1998) the meanings observed diachronically are those shown in Table 6 and Figure 6, which contrast radically with Table 5 and Figure 5:

186

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

Table 6: Meanings of cómpre + experiencer in TILGA per subperiod Period Meaning

1 1700– 1749

2 1750– 1799

EXTERNAL INTERNAL GENERAL Total

0

0

3 1800– 1849

4 1850– 1899

5 1900– 1949

0 0 1

1 3 0

2 4 6

1

4

12

6 1950– 1990

7 1991– 2002

Total

0 5 5

0 2 1

3 14 13

10

3

30

Figure 6: Percentage value of the meanings of cómpre + experiencer per subperiod

The same contrast can be found if the meanings of cómpre without an experiencer are taken into account, as shown in Table 7 and Figure 7: Table 7: Meanings of cómpre without an experiencer in TILGA per subperiod Period Meaning

1 1700– 1749

2 1750– 1799

3 1800– 1849

EXTERNAL INTERNAL GENERAL Total

0

0

0

4 1850– 1899

5 1900– 1949

6 1950– 1990

7 1991– 2002

Total

1 0 3

0 0 27

2 2 78

1 2 75

4 4 183

4

27

82

78

191

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

187

Figure 7: Percentage value of the meanings of cómpre without an experiencer per subperiod

Even if the 8 examples of cómpre without an experiencer which express meanings other than general necessity are all cases in which an experiencer is easily understood (as in sentence (12) above, in which the force of religious origin is inflicted from an external entity on everybody), the comparison of Figures 5 and 6 makes it clear that there is an obvious influence of the explicit presence of the experiencer and the meaning conveyed by the verb cómpre. Thus, based on Figures 5 and 6, it could be concluded that Galician cómpre is closer to need when it occurs with an experiencer (because it exhibits a preference for external and internal forces, rather than general) and closer to behove when it occurs without one (because it mostly conveys general forces as early as the eModE period, cf. Loureiro-Porto 2009: 116). In this sense, it could be hypothesized that Galician cómpre without an experiencer is close to Spanish cabe and Catalan caldre, because they never feature an explicit experiencer and they appear to have a preference for the expression of general forces. A detailed study of them, however, should be carried out before drawing definite conclusions. When polarity is taken into account, however, all resemblance between cómpre and need disappears, as seen in Figure 8. Contrary to the case of need (see Figure 4 above), cómpre exhibits a preference for affirmative contexts in all subperiods and no distinction need be made on the type of complement following it.

188

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

Figure 8: Percentage of affirmative and negative instances of cómpre per subperiods

3.3 Syntactic features and evidence for grammaticalization This section analyses the syntactic features of need, behove and cómpre, paying special attention to those characteristics which may point towards an auxiliary status of the verbs, i.e. those typical of grammaticalization processes. Three main aspects are considered: 1) presence and absence of the experiencer, 2) the type of complement selected (paying special attention to the preference for bare infinitives), and 3) the occurrence of the verbs in specific formulaic expressions or formulae.

3.3.1 Presence and absence of the experiencer Table 8: Presence and absence of the experiencer with need, behove and cómpre Period

EXP?

1 1700– 1749

2 1750– 1799

3 1800– 1849

4 1850– 1899

5 1900– 1949

+ – + – + –

2 0 22 0

0 0 12 1

1 0 19 2 1

1 0 27 2 4 4

0 0 41 4 12 27

0 0 61 21 10 82

3 78

4 0 182 30 30 191

23

38

84

174

81

437

Verb BEHOVE NEED CÓMPRE Total

24

13

6 1950– 1990

7 1991– 2002

Total

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

189

Table 8 shows the number of occurrences with each of the verbs with and without an explicit experiencer in the period studied. Let us first deal with behove, the least recorded verb in the corpus, whose analysis serves as a follow-up to Loureiro-Porto (2009: chapter 4). In all four examples behove occurs with an explicit experiencer (which contrasts sharply with the data for need and behove). This is a tendency already observed in early Modern English, specifically from 1540 onwards, when it is no longer found without an explicit experiencer (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2009: 127). The case that the experiencer is inflected for is always oblique or unmarked, as in sentence (16) below, in which medical men is an unmarked NP, as expected for the period: (16) Till it has been so tested it behoves medical men to be cautious how they employ or recommend the employment of a new medicine. (1864 Observations on some new remedies) There is, however, one exception in which the experiencer is nominative, which is surprising since findings in Loureiro-Porto (2009: 130) suggest that behove ceases to occur with a nominative experiencer at the end of the ME period (i.e. 1500). Such an example is sentence (6) above, in which the nominative form I is the experiencer of the force expressed by behooved. Regardless of the type of experiencer selected by behove, it is always found with a to-infinitival complement, its favoured pattern when found with an experiencer from 1500 onwards (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2009: 128),7 as seen in sentences (6) and (16). The second verb in Table 8, need, exhibits a strong preference for the presence of the experiencer and, of course, all of them are nominative or unmarked in the period studied, as opposed to earlier recordings of this verb (see sentence (1) above). The apparent increase of occurrences of need without an experiencer is the result of its presence in passive constructions, which, of course, only render the theme or thing needed (e.g. I believe that my services are more needed here than elsewhere, 1848, Madeleine: A Tale of Auvrgne). If we set aside examples of passive need and of middle voice need (e.g. This is always a problem. The voices in your head need sorting out. It’s not always easy to distinguish who is saying what, and so in the first drafts one gives words belonging to one character to another, 1971, A Journal of “The Journalists”), the examples of need without an experiencer decrease dramatically, as seen in Table 9 and Figure 9: 7 Interestingly enough, when eModE behove is found without an experiencer, it mostly selects that-clauses, as shown in Loureiro-Porto (2009: 128). Unfortunately, this is a finding that cannot be confirmed or denied for the period studied in this paper, because no instances of behove without an experiencer have been found.

190

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

Table 9: Presence and absence of the experiencer with active need 1

2

3

4

5

6

Total

+ exp. – exp.

22

12

19 1

27 1

39 2

57 4

176 8

Total

22

12

20

28

41

61

184

Period Need

Figure 9: Percentage of the presence of the experiencer with active need

In fact, in subperiod 6 in ARCHER (1950–1990), need is only found without an experiencer in fiction texts from the 1950’s with the meaning ‘be necessary’, as in the following sentence: (17)

{=m MACCARTHY} My dear fellow, even in your profession it needs influence to be a hero. How often have you been allowed to try? (1958, The scythe and the sunset, by Denis Johnston)

This use of need is highly infrequent, but it comes to be a parallel of the main use of cómpre, which, as opposed to need, exhibits an increasing tendency to occur without an experiencer, as seen in Figure 10:

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

191

Figure 10: Global percentage of the presence of the experiencer with cómpre

The increasing preference of cómpre for contexts without an experiencer constitutes clear evidence of its different status from need, but does not actually constitute a claim against its possible grammaticalization, which can be considered by taking into account its syntactic preferences and its occurrences in formulaic expressions.

3.3.2 Occurrences with bare infinitive Something which behove, need and cómpre have in common is their preference for sentential complements, a feature which brings them close to the auxiliary group both in English and Galician, since, as is well-known, “[t]he moment a verb is given an infinitive complement, that verb starts down the road of auxiliariness” (Bolinger 1980, as cited in Heine 1993: 27). However, a difference among them concerns the nature of the sentential complement. Thus, on the one hand, behove always occurs with a to-infinitival complement, which neglects any possible interpretation of its auxiliarihood. Need and cómpre, on the other hand, do exhibit a strong preference for bare infinitival complements when they choose a sentential complement. Bare infinitives are, as is well-known, the only possible type of complement of English auxiliaries (cf., for example, Quirk et al. 1985: 137; Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 108). Likewise, Romance modals are also characterized by the preference for bare infinitives (rather than content clauses introduced by that-particles), as stated in Lamiroy (1999: 38) The possible

192

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

sentential complements with need and cómpre are sketched in Tables 10 and 11 respectively: Table 10: Sentential complements found with active need 1

2

3

4

5

+ Bare inf. + Bare pass. inf. + Bare perfect inf. + Other sent. c. (to-inf, to-pass. inf., that-cl.)

16

6

10 3

1

2

0

15 1 1 1

14 4 1 3

12

68 8 2 19

Total

17

8

13

18

22

19

97

Period

6

Total

Compl. 7

Table 11: Sentential complements found with cómpre Period

3 1800– 1849

4 1850– 1899

5 1900– 1949

6 1950– 1990

7 1991– 2002

Total

+ bare inf. + that-cl.

1

1 1

22 5

70 5

68 6

162 17

Total

1

2

27

75

74

179

Compl.

1 1700– 1749

2 1750– 1799

The proportion of bare infinitival complements with need only decreases in subperiod 6 in ARCHER (as illustrated graphically in Figure 11 below), but here again a distinction must be made between affirmative and negative contexts. Figure 4 above already shows how precisely in this subperiod the number of affirmative examples of need increase exponentially and, as is well known, PDE affirmative need is not normally followed by a bare infinitival complement – although van der Auwera and Taeymans (2009: 320) do show some early 20th c. examples). Therefore, so as to obtain a clear picture of the auxiliarihood of need in the period under study, focus must fall on negative sentences, as shown in Figure 12.

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

193

Figure 11: Percentage of bare infinitival complements of active need (vs. other sentential complements)

Figure 12: Percentage of bare infinitival complements of active negative need (vs. other sentential complements)

Figure 12 clearly shows that, when confined to negative contexts, the favourite sentential complement of need in the last subperiod of ARCHER is still the bare infinitive (almost 70% of cases), so it could appear that, in principle, there are no reasons for discussing its possible degrammaticalization, other than its progressive decrease in frequency. Nevertheless, the size of ARCHER is not the optimal one for a study of this sort, therefore no definite conclusions should be reached without exploring larger corpora, on the lines of Leech (2003), Smith (2003) and Nokkonen (2006), for example.

194

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

Regarding Galician cómpre, its almost exclusive selection of the bare infinitive, shown in Table 11 above, can be seen even more clearly when illustrated graphically, as in Figure 13 below:

Figure 13: Percentage of bare infinitival complements of cómpre (vs. other sentential complements)

Figure 13 shows that only rarely does cómpre occur with a that-clause (the only sentential alternative to bare infinitives) and does so increasingly less and less often. The (almost) exclusive pattern with an infinitival complement and its above mentioned semantic characteristics make it suitable for inclusion in the list of Galician modal periphrases, since it is a candidate for the modal classes described from Romance languages in Cornillie et al. (2009): it has undergone both desemanticization (it no longer means ‘to comply with’) and a loss of subcategorization frames (it exhibits a strong preference for infinitival complements). Nevertheless, as already mentioned, Galician grammars do not list cómpre as a particular grammatical item. No reasons for such an omission seem evident, especially if the information in section 3.3.3 is taken into account.

3.3.3 Occurrences in constructions / formulae The last syntactic feature I would like to discuss in this preliminary approach to the comparison between English need and behove and Galician cómpre involves their occurrence in particular contexts and constructions. The reason for such an analysis is to be found in the relationship between grammaticalization and

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

195

formulae, which is well-attested in the literature (cf., for example, Corrigan et al.’s 2009 volume). One of the papers in that volume is particularly enlightening regarding the effects of formulae on the grammaticalization of modal auxiliaries, namely Bybee and Torres Cacoullos (2009). They show that prefabs (or formulae) contribute to grammaticalization because, (i) they are accessed holistically, (ii) they are responsible for the high frequency of grammaticalizing constructions, and (iii) they grammaticalize earlier than the general construction. In the analysis of need and behove from 1700 to 1990 no particular contexts were found as particularly frequent or idiomatic. However, cómpre is actually very often recorded in combination with verbs (bare infinitives, as seen in section 3.3.2) of saying, such as those meaning ‘say, add, highlight’, as seen in the following pair of examples: (18)

Falaremos dela no próximo apartado. Mais cómpre dicir We-will-talk about-it in-the next section But is-necessary say tamén algo sobre determinadas obras realizadas. also something about certain works done ‘We’ll talk about this in the next section, but it is necessary to say something about certain works done. . .’ (1992, Manuel Cabada Castro, A rapa das bestas de Sabucedo, historia e antropoloxía dunha tradición)

(19) Compría, pois, expoñer aquí dúas posicións ben contrapostas. It-was-necessary then present here two positions well opposed ‘It was necessary, then, to present here two completely different views.’ (1985, Xosé Luís Franco Grande, Os anos escuros) Thus, in 68 instances in which cómpre is followed by a bare infinitive and without an experiencer (which represents over 45% of its occurrences in this context), the bare infinitive is a verb of saying, meaning ‘say, add, highlight’, etc., as shown in Figure 14. Following Bybee and Torres Cacoullos’ (2009) assumptions regarding the grammaticalization of can in English, therefore, I claim that the development of incipient auxiliary features of cómpre (i.e. its almost exclusive preference for bare infinitival complements) is intimately related to its high frequency of occurrence in formulae or constructions involving verbs of saying.

196

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

Figure 14: Percentage of constructions involving cómpre + bare infinitive of saying

4 Conclusions This paper has provided a preliminary comparison of English behove and need and Galician cómpre from the double perspective of modality and grammaticalization. The point of departure has been their partial semantic overlap and that they can be found in so-called impersonal contexts, i.e. without a nominative experiencer, a syntactic pattern in which they all feature in different periods of the language. The approach adopted was corpus-based: concretely, the BrE section of ARCHER and a random selection of TILGA were explored, with the aim of answering three main questions i)–iii) in Section 1). The first question regards the semantic overlap between Galician cómpre, on the one hand, and English need (which mainly conveys ‘[lack of ] necessity’) and behove (confined to the meaning of ‘appropriateness’) on the other. The results show that when cómpre does not have an experiencer it is clearly closer to English behove, because both have a preference for general forces in affirmative contexts. This seems to be in tune with other related Romance verbs such as Spanish cabe or Catalan cal (caldre), which also seem to express general types of necessity. Nevertheless, when cómpre has an explicit experiencer, it is semantically closer to need, because in some 60% of its occurrences it expresses either external or internal types of forces. The second question was the correlation between the semantic and pragmatic implications and the syntactic preference for an impersonal construction in the history of need, behove and cómpre. The answer to question i) clearly leads to an affirmative answer to question ii), since there is an obvious relationship between impersonal constructions and the lack of implication of the experiencer, which leads to an increase in the expression of general forces.

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

197

Finally, question iii) concerned the relationship between the preference for personal contexts (i.e. nominative experiencers) and the grammaticalization of lexical verbs into modal auxiliaries. This question is more difficult to answer in light of the examples analysed, but it is without doubt the case that in the English data examined, only the personal verb grammaticalizes into a modal auxiliary, namely need, while behove never enters the grammaticalization path (which is not a finding of this paper, but of Loureiro-Porto 2009, among others). Concerning the auxiliary status of Galician cómpre, we must constrain ourselves to the limited degree of grammaticalization exhibited by modals in Romance languages (cf. Cornillie et al. 2009), but even then, it is possible to affirm that the Galician verb cómpre shows enough features to be considered a candidate for inclusion in the group of modal periphrases in Galician grammars, probably in line with other parallel verbs in Spanish (cabe) and Catalan (caldre), also meaning ‘be necessary’. The reasons for this are that not only does it exhibit an (almost) exclusive preference for bare infinitival complements, but it also features in formulae involving verbs of saying with a striking frequency, which correlates with previous findings regarding the grammaticalization of English auxiliary can, for example (cf. Bybee and Torres Cacoullos 2009). The existence of Spanish cabe and Catalan caldre, all with the same meaning of general necessity and impersonal syntactic nature as Galician cómpre, raises questions regarding the typological structure of the languages, which, no matter how interesting they are, must be left for future research on the relationship between modality and impersonality.

References Allen, Cynthia L. 1997. The development of an “impersonal” verb in Middle English: The case of behoove. In: Jacek Fisiak (ed.), Studies in Middle English Linguistics, 1–21. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Álvarez, Rosario and Xosé Xove. 2002. Gramática da Lingua Galega. Vigo: Editorial Galaxia. ARCHER 3.1 (A Representative Corpus of Historical English Registers), at http://www.llc.manchester. ac.uk/research/projects/archer/. Bolinger, Dwight L. 1980. Wanna and the gradience of auxiliaries. In: Gunter Brettschneider and Christian Lehmann (eds.), Wege zur Universalienforschung: sprachwissenschaftliche Beiträge zum 60. Geburstag von Hansjakob Seiler, 292–299. Tübingen: Gunter Narr. Bybee, Joan, Revere Perkins and William Pagliuca. 1994. The Evolution of Grammar. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Bybee, Joan and Rena Torres Cacoullos. 2009. The role of prefabs in grammaticization. How the particular and the general interact in language change. In: Roberta Corrigan, Edith A. Moravcsik, Hamid Ouani and Kathleen M. Wheatley (eds.), Formulaic Language. volume 1: Distribution and Historical Change, 187–217. (Typological Studies in Language 82.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

198

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

Cornillie, Bert, Walter De Mulder, Tine Van Hecke and Dieter Vermandere. 2009. Modals in the Romance languages. In: Björn Hansen and Ferdinand de Haan (eds.), Modals in the Languages of Europe. A Reference Work, 107–137. (Empirical Approaches to Language Typology 44.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Corrigan, Roberta, Edith A. Moravcsik, Hamid Ouali and Kathleen M. Wheatley (eds.). 2009. Formulaic Language. volume 1: Distribution and Historical Change. (Typological Studies in Language 82.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Diccionario da Lingua Galega. 1986. (Authors: Xosé G. Feixó Cid [coord.], Xosé Manuel Enríquez Rodríguez, Ramón Rocamonde Gómez, Celso Parada Fernández). Vigo: Ir Indo Edicións. Diccionario da Real Academia Galega. 1997. (Directors: Constantino García, Manuel González. González). A Coruña: Real Academia Galega; Vigo: Edicións Xerais de Galicia. Diccionario de dúbidas da Lingua Galega. 1991. (Authors: Benigno Fernández Salgado [coord.], Xosé Antonio Fernández Salgado, Manuel Puga Moruxa, Xulio César Sousa Fernández). Vigo: Editorial Galaxia. Diccionario Galaxia de Usos e Dificultades da Lingua Galega. 2004. (Director: Benigno Fernández Salgado). Vigo: Galaxia. Facchinetti, Roberta, Manfred Krug and Frank Robert Palmer (eds.). 2003. Modality in Contemporary English. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Ferreiro, Manuel. 1999. [1995] Gramática Histórica Galega. I Fonética e Morfosintaxe. 4th edition. Santiago de Compostela: Laiovento. Freixeiro Maton, Xosé Ramón. 2000. Gramática da Lingua Galega II. Morfosintaxe. Vigo: Edicións A Nosa Terra. Gran Diccionario Século 21 da Lingua Galega. 2005. (Director: Xosé Antonio Pena. Authors: María Cruz López, Xosé Avelino Hermida, María do Carme Pampín, e Xosé Antonio Pena). Vigo: Editorial Galaxia, Edicións do Cumio. Gran Diccionario Xerais da Lingua. 2009. (Authors: Xosé Ma Carballeira Anllo [coord.] Carme Ares Vázquez, Carme Hermida Gulías, Primitivo Iglesias Sierra, Xosé Ma Lema Suárez, Rosa López Fernández. Edición: Xosé Cid Cabido). Vigo: Edicións Xerais de Galicia. Hansen, Björn and Ferdinand de Haan (eds.). 2009. Modals in the Languages of Europe. A Reference Work. (Empirical Approaches to Language Typology 44). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Heine, Bernd. 1993. Auxiliaries, Cognitive Forces and Grammaticalization. New York: Oxford University Press. Hermida Gulías, Carme. 2004. Gramática Práctica (Morfosintaxe). Santiago de Compostela: Sotelo Blanco. Hopper, Paul J. and Elizabeth C. Traugott. 2003 [1993]. Grammaticalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huddleston, Rodney and Geoffrey Pullum. 2002. The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krug, Manfred G. 2000. Emerging English Modals: A Corpus-Based Study of Grammaticalization. (Topics in English Linguistics 32). Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Lamiroy, Béatrice. 1999. Auxiliaries, langues romanes et grammaticalisation. Langages 135: 63–75. Langacker, Ronald W. 1999. Grammar and Conceptualization. (Cognitive Linguistics Research 14.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Modal necessity and impersonality in English and Galician

199

Leech, Geoffrey. 2003. The English modal auxiliaries 1961–1992. In: Roberta Facchinetti, Manfred Krug and Frank Robert Palmer (eds.), Modality in Contemporary English, 223– 240. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Leech, Geoffrey. 2010. Where have all the modals gone? – on the declining frequency of modal auxiliaries in American and British English. Plenary lecture delivered at the conference Modality in English 4. Madrid, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 9–11 September 2010. Loureiro-Porto, Lucía. 2008. The convergence of two need verbs in Middle English. In: Richard Dury, Maurizio Gotti and Marina Dossena (eds.), English Historical Linguistics 2006. Vol. II: Lexical and semantic change, 97–116. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. Loureiro-Porto, Lucía. 2009. The Semantic Predecessors of need in the History of English (c750– 1710). (Publications of the Philological Society 43.) Oxford: Blackwell. Loureiro-Porto, Lucía. 2010a. A review of Early English impersonals: Evidence from necessity verbs. English Studies 91: 674–699. Loureiro-Porto, Lucía. 2010b. Verbo-nominal constructions of necessity with þearf n. and need n.: Competition and grammaticalization from OE to eModE. English Language and Linguistics 14(3): 373–397. Mariño Paz, Ramón. 1998. Historia da Lingua Galega. Santiago de Compostela: Sotelo Blanco. Mortelmans, Tanja, Kasper Boye and Johan van der Auwera. 2009. Modals in the Germanic languages. In: Björn Hansen and Ferdinand de Haan (eds.), Modals in the Languages of Europe. A Reference Work, 11–70. (Empirical Approaches to Language Typology 44). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Nokkonen, Soili. 2006. The semantic variation of need to in four recent British English corpora. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 11(1): 29–71. Nokkonen, Soili. 2010. Modals of obligation/necessity in dialogic registers of British English. Paper delivered at the conference Modality in English 4. Madrid, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 9–11 September 2010. Nordlinger, Rachel and Elizabeth Closs Traugott. 1997. Scope and the development of epistemic modality: evidence from ought to. English Language and Linguistics 1: 195–317. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn. on CD-ROM Version 3.1.1. 1989. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pantaleo, Nicola. 2002. Impersonals as modals in Middle English religious literature. In: David Hart and Maria Lima (eds.), Modality in Late Middle English and Early Modern English: Semantic Shifts and Pragmatic Interpretations, 143–160. Naples (Italy): Cuen. Pocheptsov, George G. 1997. Quasi-impersonal verbs in Old and Middle English. In: Jacek Fisiak (ed.), Studies in Middle English Linguistics, 469–488. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Polge, Olivier. 2010. I want you to and I need you to in Present-Day English. Paper delivered at the conference Modality in English 4. Madrid, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 9–11 September 2010. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik. 1985 A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language. London: Longman. Rissanen, Matti, Ossi Ihalainen and Merja Kytö (compilers) 1991. Helsinki Corpus of English Texts: Diachronic and Dialectal. Helsinki: University of Helsinki. Smith, Nicholas. 2003. Changes in the modals and semi-modals of strong obligation and epistemic necessity in recent British English. In: Roberta Facchinetti, Manfred Krug and Frank Robert Palmer (eds.), Modality in Contemporary English, 241–266. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

200

Lucía Loureiro-Porto

Sweetser, Eve. 1990. From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure. (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 54.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taeymans, Martine. 2006. An investigation into the emergence and development of the verb need from Old to Present-Day English: A corpus-based approach. Ph.D. dissertation, Universiteit Antwerpen. Talmy, Leonard. 2000. Toward a Cognitive Semantics. Volume I: Concept Structuring Systems. Cambridge, MA.: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. TILGA (Tesouro Informatizado da Lingua Galega), at http://www.ti.usc.es/tilg/index.htm. van der Auwera, Johan and Martine Taeymans. 2009. The need modals and their polarity. In: Rohnwen Bowen, Mats Mobärg and Sölve Ohlander (eds.), Corpora and Discourse – and Stuff. Papers of Karin Aijmer, 317–326. Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis. Visser, Fredericus T. 1963–1973. An Historical Syntax of the English Language (4 vols.). Leiden: Brill.

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

Modal uses of the English present progressive 1 Introduction The semantics of the English progressive, which is used in a notoriously large variety of contexts, occupies a unique position from a cross-linguistic point of view (cf. Bertinetto et al. 2000).1 Within the paradigm of the present, moreover, its characteristic interaction with the simple present-tense form has been widely noted and debated, not in the least because it represents a feature that seems fairly exclusively linked to English, among the more familiar European languages. This is probably one of the main reasons why the English progressive has attracted a lot of scholarly attention in the past decades (e.g., Allen 1966; Scheffer 1975; Adamczewski 1978; Ljung 1980; Römer 2005; for an overview of recent studies of the progressive aspect in “outer circle” Englishes, see Collins 2008). Most often, however, these studies restrict their semantic analyses to purely aspectual notions of continuity and duration, as illustrated in the following quote from Palmer: “The progressive indicates activity continuing through a period of time. Activity with duration” (1968: 61). Definitions such as this can account for some uses of the English progressive, and as such it constitutes a viable characterization of a part of the progressive’s semantics. However, in a number of examples attested in the corpus we have studied, the Santa Barbara corpus of spoken American English (Du Bois et al. 2000), the use of the progressive does not seem to be primarily motivated by temporal or aspectual considerations: (1)

. . . Well he says minorities. .. He’s smart. He talks about minorities. But he’s really talking about African Americans.

The speaker in (1) first uses the simple present, indicating in this case a habitual action (on the part of Jesse Jackson), and then switches to the present 1 A more comprehensive account of the modal meaning and the various usage types of the English present progressive can be found in De Wit and Brisard (published online 8 July 2013). Thanks are due to the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO) for its financial support of the second author (grant 4740).

202

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

progressive, without there being any temporal or aspectual reasons for doing so: by using a progressive form, the speaker is still referring to what the subject does in general, not to what is actually going on at the time of speaking, and so objectively speaking there are no differences between the event (type) referred to by means of the simple present and the referent of the subsequent present-progressive form2. Examples such as this, we will argue, may only be accounted for in terms of the epistemic-modal meaning we propose for the present progressive, and which we define as contingency in immediate reality. In our view, this constitutes the most schematic meaning of the English present progressive, from which other, more specific usage types can be derived. Given the relatively wide range of usage types involved, such a unified analysis of the semantics of the English progressive is lacking in many studies of this construction. A noteworthy exception to this is Williams (2002), who proposes “susceptibility to change” as the most basic (abstract) meaning of the English progressive. And yet, though his analysis contains original and valuable insights, he does not always systematically explicate the relation between the various uses of the progressive, or between those uses and the progressive’s basic meaning (cf. also Kaltenböck 2003). Moreover, since Williams does not draw on corpus data, a number of usage types (for instance, the one illustrated in 1) are left unnoticed. In the present corpus-based study we attempt to fill these gaps, thereby assuming a modal foundation for the semantics of the English present progressive3. In the second section of this article we shall briefly introduce the approach to tense adopted in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991), the theory in which we have framed our analysis. Section 3 provides a characterization of the English present progressive in terms of contingency in immediate reality, drawing on Brisard (2002b) and Langacker (2011). In the fourth section, we show how various concrete usage types attested in our corpus can be shown to derive from the progressive’s epistemic schema. In section 5, finally, we submit our conclusions.

2 Out of context, an alternative interpretation would be possible, in which the speaker refers to a single action in the past, a kind of historical present. But even on this interpretation, the shift to the progressive form would again not appear temporally or aspectually motivated. 3 In formal-semantic analyses proposals have also been made for a basic modal meaning of the progressive operator, as one of “necessity” (Dowty 1977), in order to solve the problem of “successful completion” with accomplishments (what is called the imperfective paradox; see also Portner 1998). It will become clear further on that our own proposal for a modal semantics of the English present progressive in terms of “contingency” or “non-necessity” makes different theoretical assumptions and deals with different analytical problems.

Modal uses of the English present progressive

203

2 Tense and grounding in Cognitive Grammar Tense in Cognitive Grammar is defined as an epistemic notion at the most schematic level (Langacker 1991: 240–246). This means that tense markers (as well as certain modal auxiliaries) in English are considered as indicating the status of a situation (a state or an event) with respect to the speaker’s conception of reality at the time of speaking. Tense markers are thus regarded as grounding predications: they specify the relationship between a profiled situation and the socalled ground, defined as “the speech event, its participants and its immediate circumstances” (Langacker 2002: 7). Note that the ground, in this definition, does not only comprise situations that are actually going on at the time of speaking, but also part of the background knowledge of the speaker, which is “always, if implicitly, present at a pre-reflective stage” (Brisard 2002: 265) and may be mobilized to conjure up situations that do not strictly coincide with the present but nevertheless have some current relevance for the speaker’s conception of reality. The canonical temporal distinction between present and past tenses is reinterpreted schematically as “a proximal/distal contrast in the epistemic sphere” (Langacker 1991: 245). Put differently, a present tense indicates that the designated situation is immediate to the speaker, i.e., that it coincides with the ground. The past tense, on the other hand, conveys a meaning of non-immediacy (within the speaker’s model of reality). The English present-tense paradigm consists of two morphologically distinct constructions: the simple present and the present progressive. Both constructions incorporate the present tense as an essential component, and thus in both cases the grounding relation is one of epistemic immediacy. That is, the simple present as well as the present progressive are used to designate situations that the speaker considers to be real at the time of speaking. Still, as we will argue in the following sections, the simple and the progressive form each confer a subtly differing modal status upon a situation with respect to the ground.

3 The schematic meanings of the English simple present and the present progressive In this section we briefly discuss the basic tenets of our analysis of the modal semantics of the English progressive, in opposition to the simple present. Consider the following sentence, containing a simple-present form: (2)

I only watch television on Sundays.

204

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

In keeping with the conception of tense in Cognitive Grammar, the event of watching referred to in (2) belongs to the realm of the speaker’s immediate reality, since she is using a present tense. Indeed, the speaker refers to a habit, which is part of her structural world-knowledge and thus by definition also part of the ground. Crucial for our analysis is the precise modal status of situations construed by means of the simple present: the simple form, as opposed to the progressive, indicates that the designated situation constitutes a structural reality, i.e., a necessary part of what the speaker conceives of as currently real; it is expected and can be predicted on the basis of the speaker’s general knowledge of the world and of certain situation types in it (cf. also Hirtle 1967: 39). The present progressive, as in (3), is similarly used to refer to situations that are considered to be real at the time of speaking: (3)

Be quiet, I’m watching television.

In this case, however, the situation, real though it may be, does not constitute a necessary, structural part of the speaker’s ground, i.e., it is construed as being contingent (which is marked by means of the -ing form). In example (3), the speaker is indeed watching television at the time of speaking, but this event does not constitute a structural part of her conception of reality; on the whole, its occurrence at a specific moment in time could not have been expected, nor predicted. Events in general and even certain state-like activities, such as sleeping or wearing a shirt, that are explicitly presented as singular (taking place right now) and that are therefore non-structural, as in (4), cannot as a rule take the simple present in English: (4) * John writes a letter/sleeps/wears a nice shirt right now. This, too, is in line with the definition we propose for the (simple) present tense as marking a structural reality. As is well-known, the simple present can be used freely with real statives, which by definition denote structural situations. The semantic, essentially modal, opposition between the simple present and the present progressive is illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b, in which C stands for the conceptualizer (the speaker) and P for the profiled situation that belongs to the ground (the state or event rendered by means of the simple present or the present progressive). In Figure 1b, the unconsolidated/contingent position of P with respect to the ground is indicated by the use of a circle, instead of a square.

Modal uses of the English present progressive

205

Figure 1: a) Structural status of a simple-present construal (“structural reality”). b) Contingent status of a present-progressive construal

4 Usage types of the English present progressive In the previous section we have defined the basic meaning of the English present progressive as indicating contingency in actuality (i.e., immediate reality or reality “right now”). Since we propose a unified analysis of the semantics of the present progressive, it should in principle be possible to derive all of its more specific usage types – semantic categories that are frequently described in the relevant literature, such as Temporary Validity or the Futurate use of the progressive – from this more abstract characterization. To establish the various contexts in which the progressive is used in present-day English, we have collected 332 instances of present progressives from the Santa Barbara corpus of spoken American English. Each of these forms has then been classified as instantiating a particular category of use, on the basis of a set of strictly defined meaning criteria. In turn, these categories, or usage types, are related to one another to form the semantic network of the English progressive, presented in Figure 2. The basic epistemic meaning of “contingency in immediate reality” branches off into two different clusters: one cluster with temporal usage types, and the other relating to purely modal usage types. That is to say that we consider all temporal usage types (e.g., Current Ongoingness) as instantiations of a basic epistemic meaning, applied to the temporal domain. The relationships between the various usage types involve a number of independently motivated cognitive principles. For the more or less prototypical category of Current Ongoingness, we can say that the meaning of “contingency in immediate reality” is instantiated in the temporal domain by having an actual event simply coincide with the time of speaking (ground). Of course, a temporal overlap between an event and the current ground is also at issue, in one way or another, with the other “qualified” temporal uses. The latter can be distinguished from the progressive’s “unqualified” prototype, either on the basis of the relative prominence they

206

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

Figure 2: Semantic network of the English present progressive

confer upon one or both of the boundaries marking the designated event (Temporary Validity, Incompleteness, and Duration), by the fact that they invoke a higher-order construal of multiple events (Iteration, Repetition, and Habitual), and/or because they involve a virtual plane of representation (Futurate and Habitual) (cf. Langacker 2001)4. Finally, Shifted Ongoingness is very similar to Current Ongoingness, the only difference being that there is a temporal overlap between an event and some shifted reference point (i.e., a virtual ground), instead of the actual time of speaking. These temporal usage types all involve, in a more or less explicit way, instantiations of the prototypical temporal meaning of the English present progressive; that is, they all indicate situations that are going on at the time of speaking. At the same time, these usage types also incorporate the basic modal characterization that underlies all uses of the present progressive in English (i.e., we see Current Ongoingness as the most straightforward elaboration of the progressive’s epistemic schema: most dynamic events going on “right now” are contingent in the sense that they should not necessarily have occurred at a particular moment). In the purely epistemic usage types that we distinguish, on 4 The progressive in English may be used only to refer to “contingent habits” that are bounded in time in the conceptual background. Thus, “These days John is writing a letter every day” is perfectly fine, because the habit in question only lasts for a limited period of time. (see also Williams 2002: 169–171).

Modal uses of the English present progressive

207

the other hand, the use of the progressive is not primarily temporally motivated, given that it occurs in contexts where, on temporal grounds, one would typically have expected a simple present, as in (1). In section 4.1 we first illustrate a few temporal usage types – Current Ongoingness and its direct extensions, Temporary Validity and Duration –, showing how exactly they instantiate the meaning of epistemic contingency. Next, in section 4.2 we look into a number of epistemic connotations associated with the notion of contingency, such as “surprise” or “irritation”, that frequently accompany uses of the English present progressive. The presence of these connotations constitutes further evidence for the specific modal orientation of the progressive’s semantics proper. Section 4.3, finally, is devoted to the purely modal usage types, where any temporal motivation for using progressive forms is highly downplayed, if indeed at all present.

4.1 Temporal usage types of the English present progressive The most frequent and intuitively most salient temporal usage type is that of Current Ongoingness. This usage type involves examples in which the progressive is used to indicate that a singular event is actually going on at the time of speaking, without any further qualifications. This is illustrated in example (5): (5)

Do you want – You could use the lettuce washer, Cause Pete’s using the colander Where’s the lettuce washer You know, the salad spinner thing?

This meaning is claimed to elaborate the modal schema proposed for the present progressive in terms of epistemic contingency within the temporal domain. In non-technical terms, one might argue that Pete’s using the colander, in example (5), is not a structural part of the speaker’s conception of reality: even though he is indeed/really using the colander at the time of speaking, he need not necessarily have been. The event, in other words, could not have been predicted or expected at that particular moment. Let us now look at how the analysis of examples like (5) works technically in Cognitive Grammar. First, we need to establish a systematic semantic (i.e., conceptual) contrast between verb types that typically cannot take progressive marking in English (barring cases of special or “coerced” readings) and those that can, like use in (5). Langacker (2001: 255–258) divides the English verbs into two basic aspectual classes: dynamic verbs (called perfective by Langacker; watch, learn, sing) and stative verbs (called imperfective; know, need, want). This is done on the basis of their grammatical behavior in the present-tense

208

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

paradigm. Dynamic verbs involve a change of state and they are construed as bounded within the so-called immediate temporal scope5. Situations designated by stative verbs, on the other hand, are construed as internally homogeneous and unbounded within the immediate temporal scope. This means that stative processes are constant through time: the process persists indefinitely beyond the immediate scope and remains qualitatively identical throughout6. Figures 3a and 3b (taken from Langacker 2001: 257) illustrate these differences between dynamic and stative verbs.

Figure 3a: Dynamic verb

Figure 3b: Stative verb

In English, the use of the present progressive to refer to situations that are going on at the time of speaking (Current Ongoingness) is typical of dynamic, i.e., bounded, events, such as use in example (5), as opposed to states like know, need, etc. These stative verbs profile unbounded processes and therefore do not meet one of the semantic requirements for using the progressive, viz., that an internal perspective is created on an inherently bounded situation. Diagrammatically, this is rendered by having the implied boundaries fall within the expression’s MS, as in Figure 47. It is precisely the assumption of these boundaries, 5 The overall conceptual content invoked by an expression is called its maximal scope (MS) (Langacker 1987: 118–119). The immediate scope (IS) is that portion of the maximal scope that is immediately relevant for a given linguistic purpose. It delineates the onstage region or “general locus of viewing attention”. For instance, in the following set of expressions, body > arm > hand > finger > nail, each entity constitutes the immediate scope for the next. Thus, one cannot conceive of a nail without evoking, in the background, at least the conception of a finger. 6 Activity predicates like run or wear a shirt, which do not involve culmination or the attainment of an inherent end point, are traditionally regarded as unbounded, as opposed to other change-of-state predicates like accomplishments and achievements (Vendler 1957, 1967). Yet we argue that activities are still bounded in time – even those that have state-like properties, such as wear a shirt or sleep, which can be divided into identical sub-events. The fact that these “homogeneous activities”, similar to “heterogeneous activities”, cannot be combined with the simple present (except in habitual/generic contexts) is motivated by the fact that one cannot verify an activity unless one also has access to its points of inception and termination (Michaelis 2004: 10–11), which represents an epistemic restriction. Sleeping, for example, “is distinct both from being comatose and from nodding off for a second” (Michaelis 2004: 11; cf. also Langacker 1987: 261–262). 7 Statives can take the present progressive, but only if their semantics is reinterpreted in terms of a more dynamic and bounded configuration (a case of coercion).

Modal uses of the English present progressive

209

which is strictly speaking the contribution of the -ing participle, that yields the progressive construction’s basic meaning of contingency, given the apparent association (at least for speakers of English) between singular dynamic events and a feeling of general non-necessity accompanying their occurrence at any particular moment within the phenomenal world – and, conversely, between unbounded states and their perceived (relatively) stable and structural character.

Figure 4: Present progressive

As can be seen in Figure 4, the -ing form creates a first immediate scope on the designated situation (IS1), so that, with dynamic verbs, the boundaries of the original event are conceptually backgrounded. Resulting from this internal perspective is an imperfective expression, unbounded and essentially homogeneous within the boundaries of IS1 . Next, the present tense, as indicated on auxiliary be (a stative verb), grounds the event by imposing a second immediate scope (IS2) within IS1. Just like with statives taking the simple present, a representative sample of the resulting homogenized process (the profile in IS2 , in bold) is mentally made to coincide with the time of speaking, as required by the definition of the present tense in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 2001: 260). This profile is what the present-progressive construction is actually referring to, with the remainder of the relevant semantic material residing in the conceptual background. It should be clear that the basic epistemic meaning of the present progressive is always immanent in its concrete temporal instantiations. For the category of Current Ongoingness, depicted in Figure 4, the progressive (with its intimation of obligatory starting and end points) is the construction par excellence in English to render the typically contingent status of a singular bounded event occurring at, but not fully and exactly coinciding with, the time of speaking (e.g., using the colander in example 5). Using a simple present in these cases would imply a structural quality that most of these events do not have as a rule: it would imply that this specific use of the colander at a given moment in time could have been predicted for some reason by the speaker, who could then have her utterance coincide exactly with what it purports to describe, or that the use of the colander is construed as a kind of continuous and unbounded state

210

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

(as, for instance, with the description of particular habits). As mentioned before, the other temporal usage types all involve events that are going on at the time of speaking, as with the category of Current Ongoingness, yet these events are in some way qualified. Insofar as they can be seen as extensions from the progressive’s prototypical configuration, these uses also instantiate the epistemic schema for the present progressive by definition, while at the same time introducing slight modifications, usually in the degree of salience or prominence assigned to one or more meaning elements. Two brief examples should suffice to illustrate the type of cognitive operation at work in going from one node to another in the network of temporal meanings of the present progressive. First, in the case of Temporary Validity, both boundaries are attended to with maximal (background) prominence, as can be seen in Figure 5. Compared to Figure 4, it is thus only the level of prominence of two of its non-profiled meaning elements that differs, without anything being added to or subtracted from the original configuration.

Figure 5: Temporary validity

This usage type has been fairly frequently attested in our corpus. For some authors, it is actually the basic meaning of the progressive (cf. Binnick 1991: 284–285; Joos 1964). Only examples in which there are clear contextual indications of temporariness, such as this year in (6), have been classified as belonging to this category: (6)

So, . . . they’re kind of suffering that – from that this year.. Not having that on there

The relative prominence of the boundaries is equally important in the category of Duration, which Palmer (1968: 61) considers as central. In this case, the boundaries of the dynamic process are made highly non-salient (without however entirely disappearing from the background). It should be possible to paraphrase instances of this category by means of the collocation keep on.

Modal uses of the English present progressive

211

Figure 6: Duration

Again, attestations have been systematically classified as belonging to the category duration on the basis of contextual cues, such as the presence of adverbial still in the following example: (7)

. . . and I’m looking through the window and then he’s still making noises with the paper, . . . and then um. . . I kinda looked and then I didn’t and I. . . kept making like,

Note that there is a sense of irritation that can be made out from this example, whereas example (6) features an event that is construed as somewhat atypical in the speaker’s model of reality. In fact, connotations such as surprise or atypicality feature quite frequently among our corpus examples. We propose that this is to be expected, given the modal core of the progressive’s semantics: a contingent situation is one that cannot be predicted at a particular moment in time, possibly not representative of the structure of the world (the set of constant or regularly recurring situations that make up the speaker’s model of structural reality), and, in view of its unexpected/atypical nature, a potential cause of discomfort leading to irritation – since the situation is considered contingent, it might also not have occurred at that moment in time and thus might have been avoided. In the following section, we will argue that connotations such as these can be tied more systematically to the presence of progressive verb forms in the examples, and that these connotations are therefore in the relevant cases to be seen as grammatically marked (by the progressive), rather than being some vague property of the contexts in which progressives (may) appear, or of their interaction.8 8 This might be called a mirative meaning element, which is present in certain usage types of the progressive (more than in others). Mirativity is a semantic category for which many languages have developed dedicated grammatical markers (e.g., DeLancey 1997).

212

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

4.2 Modal connotations accompanying temporal usage types Given the unconsolidated status of the profiled situation in the speaker’s model of immediate reality (the element P in Figure 1b), as encoded by the present progressive, it is not unexpected that a considerable amount of the observations in the corpus have connotations related to the modal meaning of contingency or non-necessity, or to its implications (among which, the fact that a given situation marked as such could not have been predicted with absolute certainty at the time of speaking). That is, notions of surprise, atypicality or unexpectedness, irritation or indignation and tentativeness (about the actual reality of a situation) frequently accompany the temporal usage types we have distinguished. In the following example, for instance, speaker B interrupts speaker A to refer to a current event (Current Ongoingness) that is momentarily surprising to her. B’s use of the simple present in this context would have been very awkward indeed, whereas it is perfectly fine in A’s following reaction (also involving a dynamic verb), which states what A regards as a general fact, and thus typical/to be expected: (8) A: but she must only – B: What is m-. . . blowing out of there? A: Well, that’s what happens with that air conditioner. Similarly, in example (9), as well as in example (6) above, the profiled event is clearly an atypical one in the speaker’s conception of reality (that is to say, absent in the speaker’s conception of structural reality). And once again, using a simple present-tense form here, though grammatically appropriate, would amount to the speaker’s portraying the event in question in a neutral, almost detached, matter-of-fact way (there would, for instance, be no suggestion of temporariness and the possibility of the current situation ending at some point, as with the progressive variant): (9)

The fish weren’t running this year. It’s like everywhere. . . Nothing’s doing what it’s supposed to, . . . anymore.

Example (10), then, involves some manifest irritation on the part of the speaker, an emotion that is often associated with habits in the progressive, as also noted by Williams (2001: 104). The presence of this particular connotation is more understandable with dynamic, bounded (repetitions of) events, which

Modal uses of the English present progressive

213

still carry a potential for change, than with structural, stable situations which the speaker knows or suspects will not change: (10)

A: I mean,. . . what are they thinking? B: I don’t know. . .

Finally, situations that are construed as unexpected and difficult to predict may arguably be approached with some sense of reservation or tentativeness, as exemplified in (11): (11) If this thing goes like they think it is, next fall he’s wanting to, . . . start looking at expanding that. . . storage facility. In this example, the stative verb want is used with the progressive to indicate that the speaker is only making a tentative guess (or is presenting it as such) about the future occurrence of a situation (see also Note 7). This use of the progressive to express tentativeness is also relatively frequent with the stative verb hope. The presence of all these (epistemically driven) connotations with the use of the present progressive in English suggests a constant meaning element that may be held to motivate them. Seeing this meaning as part and parcel of the progressive’s core semantics, which we in fact characterize as being wholly modal in nature, in our eyes constitutes a more economical and in any case unified account of the progressive’s polysemy: modal meanings are not treated as being in any way secondary or exceptional, and temporal meanings are first and foremost motivated by an epistemic schema, in line with Cognitive Grammar’s general description of “grounding predications”. We find further support for this position in the way we interpret Kay and Fillmore’s (1999) findings with regard to the conventional meaning of the WXDY construction, as in What’s this fly doing in my soup?. This construction is analyzed as conveying that a situation is judged by the speaker “to be surprising, puzzling, inappropriate, or, as we will say, incongruous” (Kay and Fillmore 1999: 4; emphasis in the original). The authors remark that it is indispensable for this “constructional meaning” to arise that a progressive form be present, without which the utterance’s “pragmatic force”, i.e., the suggestion of incongruity, disappears: (12) a. b.

What’s this fly doing in my soup? ? What does this fly do in my soup?

214

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

At the same time, they explicitly deny that this force can be tied to any one constituent of the construction, including the present participle doing (which they deny gets a progressive reading here). Given the various nuances of something like “incongruity” showing up in many other contexts of use, it seems more reasonable to us, however, to attribute at least part of the constructional meaning of WXDY to the (obligatory) verb form appearing in it. This methodological note does not detract from Kay and Fillmore’s original argument concerning the relevance of a constructional level of interpretation, but it would perhaps address the need for a more ample motivation of where such a meaning comes from. Put differently, there is no intrinsic contradiction between having a meaning figure at the level of grammatical constructions, as an “idiomatic” feature, and simultaneously noting the contribution of one or more constituents (i.e., of the form doing, which seems to do more than serve as a dummy “way-station” between constructional elements). In line with our general characterization of the present progressive and the discussion above of the progressive’s modal connotations, then, we would propose to treat the “pragmatic force” of the WXDY construction as at least partly informed by the semantics of one of its constituents, viz., the present participle.

4.3 Modal usage types Thus far, we have discussed several usage types of the present progressive that specifically elaborate its basic meaning in the temporal domain, as they all involve situations that are going on at the time of speaking. We argue that, at the most schematic level, these usage types indicate that the designated situation is regarded as contingent with respect to the speaker’s conception of immediate reality. As we hope to have shown, this modal schema is immanent in the temporal usage types by virtue of the imposition of temporal boundaries upon the profiled situation in the background configuration of the present progressive, which in turn is responsible for its close association with the expression of dynamic, typically unstable and thus less than structural events. In section 4.2, then, we have discussed some modal connotations that frequently accompany certain temporal usage types. This is an issue that addresses an important tradition in research on the progressive’s semantics, in which this construction is seen as expressing a modal meaning, viz., that of an intention attributed to the grammatical subject (13) or to the speaker (14; these and the following examples come from or are based on Larreya and Rivière 2002): (13) Brian is leaving tomorrow. (14) You are not sitting in that armchair!

Modal uses of the English present progressive

215

These forms, too, are categorized by us as primarily temporal, because of their futurate reference (see Figure 2), with a modal connotation. Other usage types often characterized as modal, but treated by us as still basically temporal, include the use of the progressive form with temporary habituals (15), statives (16), and as a form of attenuation (17), all of which have already been touched upon above as well (in Notes 4 and 7 and section 4.2, respectively): (15) He is smoking huge cigars these days. (16) He’s being extraordinarily kind (for once). (17) I’m hoping to borrow some money. In some cases, however, the unconsolidated status of the profiled situation is really prominent and any temporal notions of current ongoingness (or duration, temporariness, etc.) are highly downplayed, if present at all. In these usage types, the modal meaning of contingency is the primary observable motivation for using a present-progressive form (that is, from the context there seems to be no temporal/aspectual reason not to use a simple present), yielding the “modal usage types” marked separately in Figure 2. This brings us back to example (1), repeated here in (18): (18)

. . . Well he says minorities. He’s smart. He talks about minorities. But he’s really talking about African Americans.

In this case, there is no temporal or aspectual motivation for the speaker’s switch to the progressive in the final sentence (there is, for instance, no notion of temporariness present, contrary to what is usually the case with habits in the progressive). It might be strange to see the progressive, which we argue is reserved for the expression of contingent realities, appear in a context which seems to present the exact opposite: the expression of a reality whose certainty the speaker actually wishes to emphasize. But in our view, the present progressive is used here to zoom in on an event represented as (virtually) ongoing, creating the impression of something that may be directly observed in the present (and recall that such directly observed events in the present are typically expressed in English using a progressive form). This event is thereby somehow construed with a greater sense of intensity (also present in iterative/repetitive uses), stressing its actual character (cf. also the epistemic adverb really) in spite of the fact that there is no singular event of talking going on at the time of speaking. Contrary to the events in the previous clauses, which are all construed by means of a simple present, the event in the final sentence has a qualified status

216

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

with respect to the ground: real though it is, the speaker signals that a situation is not to be taken for granted. Not incidentally, example (18) involves the verb talk: this use of the present progressive is frequently attested with verbs of communication (also in non-habitual contexts), as in: So what he’s saying is. . . or What I’m trying to say is. . . Similarly, in example (19), the speaker emphasizes what she is actually doing in a certain typical situation (presumably not going on at the time of speaking): (19) I always have somebody that really knows what they’re doing, For the horses that I’m really really using. Again, the speaker refers to a habitual action (cf. always in the first line) by means of a present progressive, instead of a simple present, so as to stress its actual nature (i.e., a reality that always holds now, like a state that is constantly “re-enacted”). Just like in (18), this example prominently features an element of intensification (witness the reduplicated epistemic adverb). Such intensifying uses again demonstrate the special connection of the English present progressive with bounded, dynamic events. Usually, these uses highlight the personal involvement and active investment on the part of the subject to keep the event going. Such active investment is not necessary with states (that are presented as such, i.e., without any element of re-enactment), since they maintain themselves, so to speak. We suggest the following diagram for representing those uses of the progressive where, in spite of this construction’s basic meaning, reference is made to an objectively structural series of events (e.g., a habit, as in 18 and 19):

Figure 7: An apparent paradox: The use of the progressive to refer to structural situations

Modal uses of the English present progressive

217

In Figure 7, the reference (indicated in bold within IS2 ) is situated in a virtual plane, since no actual occurrence (e.g., of using horses in 19) needs to coincide with the time of speaking. This reflects the fact that certain uses of the present progressive may not be temporally but modally motivated. The virtual/mental occurrence of the designated situation can be made to contain the time of speaking in exactly the way it is prescribed by the progressive’s semantics. The virtual profile in this configuration is connected via correspondence lines with multiple actual instantiations of the event type. This virtual plane can be interpreted as representing the speaker’s knowledge about the structure of the world (and about the structural status of certain event or state types that may not be perceptually accessible). The effect of a structural event being re-enacted at the time of speaking, for which the progressive is responsible, is achieved by using a grammatical construction that is usually reserved for describing (the perception of) momentary, singular, and contingent states of affairs; but in contrast with the latter category, the speaker may at any arbitrary point in time choose to conjure up a valid instantiation of the structural event, since there are no restrictions on its accessibility in the speaker’s model of structural reality. This analysis should also apply to cases involving verbs of communication, where typically a progressive form follows a simple form of the same verb (e.g., say, ask). In such cases, the second event of, for example, saying is really a repetition of the first and not a new event in its own right. This makes the second event, marked by the progressive, virtual in any case, since it elaborates on an event that is objectively speaking already past or whose starting point at the very least does not coincide with its own, and so it seems that we need to introduce some type of virtual or subjective element by virtue of the very fact that the saying (or asking etc.) in question always evokes earlier instances of which it is supposed to reveal some non-evident truth. These modal usage types, typically featuring epistemic adverbs such as really and actually,9 are often overlooked in overviews of the English progressive (cf. Scheffer 1976; Williams 2002). Mindt (2000) does mention them as instantiating one of the meanings of the progressive, viz. “highlighting/prominence”, but this is a purely descriptive study without any attempt to integrate the meaning types distinguished. In some other studies, these usage types of the English progressive are discussed more extensively. Larreya (1999: 147), for instance, has remarked that certain uses of the progressive with really and actually present “general truths” (as in So the bark is actually helping the plant to survive when 9 The presence of these adverbs suggests a strong affinity with certain grammatical markers dedicated to the expression of predication focus, as in the Bantu language Shangaci (Maud Devos, p. c.). It is not unreasonable, in our eyes, to assume that the present progressive has developed a specific meaning type for the indication of this type of focus, a meaning type that lies outside of the realm of TAM marking altogether.

218

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

there is absolutely no water around?) and thus violate the rule that these are expressed in English by means of the simple present. It seems, however, that this is true only for a minority of such uses (those appearing in scientific texts or vulgarizations). Still, Larreya makes a valid point when he describes them as involving the re-identification of a reality, a type of re-enactment as proposed for the analysis of the examples above: it is as if the speaker recreates the exact moment of discovering some true fact (before its consolidation as an accepted truth, i.e., it is still construed as contingent; cf. Figure 1), and is recreating it as she speaks, i.e., at the time of speaking. Though Larreya fails to include this particular usage in a more unified account, his description of it is in line with our own in terms of a virtual (called “subjective” by Larreya 1999: 148) event going on (possibly on a structural plane) right now10. What we add to this is that this use is motivated through various links in the network of the English present progressive with other usage types that include an element of intensity as a semantic feature (i.e., it is not just an arbitrary extension or the instantiation of a vague schematic meaning).

5 Conclusion In line with the approach to tense and grounding adopted within Cognitive Grammar, we have proposed a unified analysis of the semantics of the English present progressive. At the most schematic level, its meaning is best described in terms of epistemic contingency in the speaker’s conception of reality. That is, in contrast with the simple present tense – which indicates the epistemic necessity of a situation and thus refers to immediate reality in an unqualified way –, 10 It is not entirely correct to say that, e.g., Larreya and Rivière (2002: 42) do not present something of a unified account of what they call BE + -ING, but the schematic meaning they propose is either purely aspectual (in terms of an internal viewpoint), which does not (directly) cover certain modal usage types, or too vague (in terms of the grammatical subject “participating” or being “attached” to an event) to use to motivate all of the concrete meaning types we have distinguished here. Still within the enunciativist tradition, a more elaborate proposal for a unified analysis of the BE + -ING construction has been proposed by Adamczewski (1978). Adamczewski devotes considerable attention to examples similar to (18) in order to illustrate how the progressive, in his analysis, functions as an abstract “meta-operator”: a mechanism associated with thematized (topicalized) situations, i.e., situations that are co(n)textually given (while the simple present typically involves situations that are introduced for the first time). However, in our view, such an “anaphoric” function of the progressive seems quite implausible (after all, anaphoric reference can also involve a simple-present construal – cf. the third line of example 18–, as long as the subjects and predicates of the utterances are co-referential; cf. also Tharaud 2008) and difficult to reconcile with many of the other usage types we have encountered in our corpus.

Modal uses of the English present progressive

219

the present progressive is used to indicate situations that are real yet not felt to be structural by the speaker and, consequently, the relation between the ground and the profiled process does get qualified (which is marked morphologically by means of the -ing form). Linguistic data from the Santa Barbara corpus of spoken American English show that temporal as well as purely modal usage types can be derived from this schematic meaning, and that the unconsolidated status of events construed with the present progressive is often reflected in the presence of modal connotations such as “surprise” or “irritation”.

References Adamczewski, Henri. 1978. BE + ING dans la grammaire de l’anglais contemporain. Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion. Allen, Robert Livingston. 1966. The Verb System of Present-Day American English. The Hague: Mouton. Bertinetto, Pier Marco, Karen H. Ebert and Casper de Groot. 2000. The progressive in Europe. In: Östen Dahl (ed.), Tense and Aspect in the Languages of Europe, 517–558. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Binnick, Robert I. 1991. Time and the Verb: A Guide to Tense and Aspect. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brisard, Frank (ed.). 2002a. Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Brisard, Frank. 2002b. The English present. In: Frank Brisard (ed.), Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference, 251–297. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Collins, Peter. 2008. The progressive aspect in World Englishes: A corpus-based study. Australian Journal of Linguistics 28(2): 225–249. DeLancey, Scott. 1997. Mirativity: The grammatical marking of unexpected information, Linguistic Typology 1(1): 33–52. De Wit, Astrid and Frank Brisard. 2013. A cognitive grammar account of the English present progressive. Journal of Linguistics. Published online by Cambridge University Press, 8 July 2013. [To appear in print in Journal of Linguistics, 50, 2014] Dowty, David. 1977. Towards a semantic analysis of verb aspect and the English “imperfective progressive”. Linguistics and Philosophy 1: 45–78. Du Bois, John W., Wallace L. Chafe, Charles Meyer Sandra A. Thompson. 2000. Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English, Part 1. Philadelphia: Linguistic Data Consortium. Hirtle, Walter H. 1967. The Simple and Progressive Forms: An Analytical Approach. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Joos, Martin. 1964. The English Verb (Form and Meaning). Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. Kay, Paul and Charles J. Fillmore. 1999. Grammatical constructions and linguistic generalizations: The What’s X doing Y? construction. Language 75: 1–33. Kaltenböck, Gunther. 2003. Review of Progressive and Non-Progressive Aspect in English. English Language and Linguistics 7(2): 344–347.

220

Frank Brisard and Astrid De Wit

Langacker, Ronald W. 1987. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Volume 1: Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Volume 2: Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 2001. The English present tense, English Language and Linguistics 5: 251–273. Langacker, Ronald W. 2002. Deixis and subjectivity. In: Frank Brisard (ed.), Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference, 1–28. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2011. The English present: Temporal coincidence vs. epistemic immediacy. In: Adeline Patard and Frank Brisard (eds.), Cognitive Approaches to Tense, Aspect and Epistemic Modality, 45–86. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Larreya, Paul. 1999. BE + -ING est-il un marqueur d’aspect?, Anglophonia 6: 135–150. Larreya, Paul and Claude Rivière. 2002. Grammaire explicative de l’anglais. London: Longman. Ljung, Magnus. 1980. Reflections on the English Progressive. Gothenburg: Gotab. Michaelis, Laura A. 2004. Type shifting in construction grammar: An integrated approach to aspectual coercion. Cognitive Linguistics 15(1): 1–67. Mindt, Dieter. 2000. An Empirical Grammar of the English Verb System. Berlin: Cornelsen Verlag. Palmer, Frank. 1968. A Linguistic Study of the English Verb: London: Longman. Portner, Paul. 1998. The progressive in modal semantics. Language 74(4): 760–787. Römer, Ute. 2005. Progressives, Patterns, Pedagogy: A Corpus-Driven Approach to English Progressive Forms, Functions, Contexts and Didactics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Scheffer, Johannes. 1975. The Progressive in English. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Tharaud, François. 2008. Monosémie et diversité des emplois: Le cas de BE + V-ing en anglais. In: Audrey Lauze, Joan Barceló and Adeline Patard (eds.), De la langue au discours: l’un et le multiple dans les outils grammaticaux, 83–197. Montpellier: PULM. Vendler, Zeno. 1957. Verbs and times. The Philosophical Review 66(2): 143–160. Vendler, Zeno. 1967. Linguistics in Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Williams, Christopher. 2001. The progressive form and the non-progressive form in English: The theory of “susceptibility to change”. CAUCE, Revista de Filología y su Didáctica 24: 87–117. Williams, Christopher. 2002. Non-Progressive and Progressive Aspect in English. Fasano: Schena Editore.

Debra Ziegeler

On the generic argument for the modality of will 1 Introduction Previous research into the historical developments of the English modal verb categories have devoted little attention to the problems of explaining the semantic origins of the forms themselves, with notable exceptions of course being studies such as Traugott (1989) and Traugott and Dasher (2002) in which the problems were explicated using the mechanics of pragmatic inferencing methodologies. However, in spite of such studies, there is still a certain reluctance in presentday research to attribute to modal verbs such as will and can full modal status (see, e.g. Palmer 1986; Salkie 2010), and will has been the target of dispute over its status as either a modal or a tense operator. In a previous study on the origins of future prediction meanings in the modal verb will (Ziegeler 2006a), it was seen that the course of history has a great deal to contribute to what we know about modality in general, and that the original Old English functions of this modal were not, contrary to what had been previously claimed, found in volitional meanings of intention (see, e.g. Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994), but in those expressing a general tendency or proclivity (characterising uses), which were labeled, for the purposes of that study, generic. As such, they were found frequently with non-specific subjects or objects, in environments which could lend themselves readily to such interpretations, and it was out of these generic environments that speaker predictions could be said to emerge. In addition, the study had proposed a three-stage development of general modal meanings, using will as an example. In this way, a new description of modal functions was proposed, in order to accommodate the semantics of will within the same category distinctions as modals of obligation or permission such as may and must. This description and the three stages will be reviewed in more detail below.

1 It is not a prerogative of the present study to attempt to place measurable indices on the degrees of truth valuation potentially attributable to modal statements, as Cohen (1999) had endeavoured to do in his study of the truth values of generics. However, in any further exploration of this area, it may be considered that the semantic differences between epistemic necessity and epistemic possibility could contribute significantly to the different levels of speaker commitment towards modal predicates.

222

Debra Ziegeler

The present study aims to reinforce the category status of will as a modal verb, using the distinctions of Ziegeler’s (2006a) study, but within the parameters of a dual time dimension. In order to undertake such an analysis, it is presupposed from the outset that the development of modality may take place in more than one way: (i) historically, as we view the possible changes that may have contributed to the evolution of the language in its present-day form (and in such ways we are limited to a restricted pool of ancient texts to provide evidence); (ii) ontogenetically, in which we can observe the development of such categories from the point of view of child learning patterns; and (iii) neophylogenetically, in which we see the vague replication of certain historical developmental patterns in the creation of new varieties of the same language. In a number of recent studies, it was observed that the frequency of uses of will as a habitual modal were much greater in some new varieties of English than in more established varieties (see Deterding 2003, 2007; Deuber 2009). Given what is known about the historical development of the modal will, it seems possible that diachronic-neo-phylogenetic analogies can be postulated for its grammaticalisation paths. If so, it offers a different perspective on the modal status of will as having derived from similar sources in both cases, thus reinforcing the evidence for its categorisation as a marker of modality, rather than tense. Similar modal derivations apply to the generic origins of be supposed to (of belief, evidentiality) (see Ziegeler 2008), and have to (Ziegeler 2010); in both cases the generic sources were seen as providing the appropriate diachronic context for the derivation of modal meanings. The present study will examine arguments on the modal status of will, including those which claim that the presence of generic functions means that will is not modal since generics belong to other categories (e.g. Salkie 2010). The study finds that habitual functions are especially prominent in new varieties of English, providing a valid justification for the possibility that such functions may be replicating the generic origins of the old varieties of the same language, as habituals are a sub-category of generics. It will be further argued that the modality of will is the result of a metonymic association between genericity and prediction, forming an area of overlap between aspect and modality, and therefore that the habitual uses of will provide sufficiently strong evidence for reclaiming its status as a modal.

2 Categorising will 2.1 Predictive = epistemic? Until quite recently, it was believed that there was some relation of grammaticalisation between the lexical source meaning of volition in will and its present-

On the generic argument for the modality of will

223

day uses as a modal expressing futurity (e.g. Aijmer 1985; Bybee and Pagliuca 1987; Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994; Hopper and Traugott 1993/2003). What has taken more time to sort out has been the difficulty of associating will with the classical distinctions of either deontic or epistemic meaning, and further, of accounting for what are sometimes known as “dispositional” uses. In some of the historical accounts, e.g. Warner (1993), it was believed that future will appeared as early as in Old English, despite the claims by Traugott (1989) that such uses were associated mainly with subordinate clauses and therefore did not employ the speaker as the deictic point of reference. A closer examination of Warner’s examples reveals that they are indeed mainly restricted to either conditional or other subordinate clause scope, or co-occur with indefinite subjects (Ziegeler 2006a: 98). In addition, there were problems of time reference to disentangle: in some accounts, the predictive meanings of future will were labelled as equivalent to epistemic functions in other modals (cf. Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994; Coates 1983; Fleischman 1982; Givón 1994; Goossens 1982; Heine, Ulrike, and Hünnemeyer 1991; Palmer 1987, 1990; Ziegeler 2000), which entailed that the usual deontic-epistemic modal grammaticalisation pathway would need to be verified historically, something that had not been clearly demonstrated in any of the studies. However, in Ziegeler (2006a,b) it was proposed that predictive modality need not correspond to a form of epistemic modality, since the time reference of epistemic modal meanings was usually concomitent with the moment of speaking, while the time reference of deontic propositions is after the moment of speaking; i.e., predictive. Given such a framework, it was seen as impossible to continue associating prediction with a form of epistemic modality: epistemic modality is the result of deductive inferences on the part of the speaker relating to the existence of states and circumstances co-temporal with the moment of speaking, and it is this sharp pragmatic distinction which had invited a recategorisation of the nature of modality in will. This is why only examples such as the following (1a) may be considered epistemic: (1) a.

I’m sorry about Brandy – maybe he will be sitting on a cloud with all your hammies and Basil (the Gardener) by now. . .

(1a) was taken from the ICE-Corpus (GB); such examples, however, were infrequent. In epistemic uses, the predicate refers to a state co-temporal with the deductive inference made about it – it is the moment of speaking; for this reason, the example cannot be considered a prediction about a future event, as in (1b):

224

Debra Ziegeler

(1) b.

Here’s uhm I’ll just show you the actual setup we’re going to be using, The wizard will sit in one room here, in the room next door to the subject.

It has been argued, though, that in expressions like (1a) it is the factuality of the complement may be verifiable in the future and that this forms the source of a prediction as well. However, such verification is incidental to the expression itself, and does not need to be applied at the time of speaking. This could not be said of (1b), in which the event of the wizard’s sitting takes place after the moment of speaking, no matter what. It is the subjectification of epistemic expressions (e.g. Traugott 1989; Traugott and Dasher 2002) that orients their time reference to the moment of speaking. The temporal approach to the entire categorisation of modal verbs in English enabled, in Ziegeler (2006a,b), a re-categorisation of the core modal verbs to be in accord with differences of speaker knowledge of the possible truth value of the predicate, in the following way: (2)

a.

Deontic modality: K[~ pt(0)]

b. Epistemic modality: ~ K[pt(0)] In (2a) the symbol K represents the amount of knowledge attributed to the speaker over the realisation of the complement proposition, p, the superscript t representing the time reference, which in (2a–b) is equivalent to the time of speaking (marked as zero). Thus, (2a) can be read as “knowledge that p is not the case at the moment of speaking”, and (2b) can be read as “no (certain) knowledge that p is the case at the time of speaking”. (2b) could be criticised as underspecifying the true meaning of an epistemic modal expression, but the notation was intended to convey the fact that there is a difference between necessary truth or truth by definition, and factual truth known to the speaker – see Givón (1989: 129). The same observations have been made by Larreya (1984: 65) who notes that there is an implicature of uncertainty in epistemic expressions such as He may/must be at home which can be articulated as “I do not know (for sure) if he is at home or not”. If the modality expressed factual truth, there would be no need for a modal marker at all (including modal adverbs), so that (1a) would read: (3)

He is sitting on a cloud with all your hammies and Basil . . .

By formulating (2b), then, as an absence of knowledge of p at the moment of speaking, it also indicates that there is a level of absence of speaker commitment to the proposition expressed in the predicate. (3) would perhaps indicate

On the generic argument for the modality of will

225

that the level of speaker commitment could be indexed at 100%, while (2b) probably would rate it at around 75%–90%. The epistemic modals indicate that the speaker does not wish to make a fully committed, unmodalised statement, and indicates a degree of absence of knowledge pertaining to the total factual status of the complement proposition. The reformulation of the modal categories using a K(nowledge)-operator, with time reference indicators, provides ample justification for placing future will in the same category as a deontic modal rather than an epistemic modal: the predication refers to an event that is realisable only after the moment of speaking, not potentially realisable concomitent with the moment of speaking. The inclusion of will alongside deontic modals therefore leads to a recategorisation of the entire group of non-epistemic modals.

2.2 Non-epistemic will The term deontic is used, covering most of what have been described in previous traditional studies such as Palmer (1986/2001) and Lyons (1977) as non-epistemic uses. However, the term deontic requires further introspection, since it is mainly associated with modals used in expressing directive speech acts (see also Larreya 1984), or with the (sometimes ambiguous) reporting of such speech acts, e.g., You may go now/He may go now. As such, its appearance often requires a form of “orientation-switch”, in which the modal source switches from its orientation in the subject (for example, may was derived originally from an Old English verb expressing personal ability – see, e.g. Goossens 2000) to an orientation in the speaker, a shift to deonticity that appears to prelude the advent of later, epistemic meanings. In recent years, studies such as Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) have recategorised the non-epistemic uses according to whether or not the source of the modality is inherent in the subject (participant-internal) or not (participant-external). The difference between participant-internal and participantexternal is important to the present study, as examples were found in Ziegeler (2006a,b) of deontic as opposed to predictive will. However, in that study, all such cases were lumped together under the single category of “FutureProjecting” modality, since this term covers the objective temporal functions adequately without the need for further distinction, eliminating any kind of semantic ambiguity. The functions of predictive will, then, were categorised in the same modal class as those of deontic must, should, and may, as illustrated in (2a) in the following way, Future-Projecting replacing deontic: (4) Future-projecting: K[~ pt(0)] and epistemic will satisfied the same categorisation requirements as other epistemic modals, as illustrated in (2b).

226

Debra Ziegeler

Thus, the presence of possible deontic uses (as found in examples such as in: You will report to the orderly at 10 o’clock), in which the orientation-source of the modality comes from the speaker, and not from the subject, were not distinguished in Ziegeler (2006a,b) (these are equivalent to Van der Auwera and Plungian’s (1998) participant-external types).2 In the present study it could be suggested that (4) could be further subcategorised according to the orientation source of the modality (with the subject or with the speaker). For the moment, though, it is maintained that the category of Future-Projecting modality is a superordinate category, its description pertaining only to the combination of factuality level and time reference, while the categories of subject-internal modality and subject-external (deontic) modality may be located at a more specific level of description. These distinctions will become more obvious below.

2.3 Generic will The presence of examples in Old English that were not expressable in terms of the two categories summarised in (4) has also led to much discussion and disagreement. These examples referred to a type of use that did not emphasise prediction as the basis of its meaning, but a kind of dispositional quality attributable to a non-specific subject. The earliest one recorded in the former study (Ziegeler 2006a) was observed in Traugott (1989: 39): (5)

elpendes hyd wile drincan wæter. ‘elephant’s hide will absorb water.’ Orosius 230.26

This example was little discussed at the time, though later accounts repeated it, such as Warner (1993: 167), who described it as an extension of earlier meanings of ‘to will, wish, be willing’ and representing a kind of characteristic predisposition of the subject. Little more was done to attempt to tie it in with the semantic 2 The deontic meanings in will were argued by Kissine (2008: 153) to be simply a pragmatic product of adequate illocutionary force combined with the modal scope of “covert” epistemic necessity, so that, contrary to Ziegeler’s (2006a) claims, a deontic such as You will leave the town tomorrow morning with the first train can be replaced with It is the case that you leave the town tomorrow morning with the first train. However, the capacity for replacement with nonmodal forms remains questionable: nothing is the case until it has occurred, rendering such statements infelicitous if referring to the future. Moreover, Kissine’s claims for a “covert” epistemic necessity reading of will as underlying the deontic uses do not accord with the usual functions of epistemic modality as discussed above. Allusions to necessity meanings, however, are founded in the pragmatic extension of characterising generic senses to become universal, kind-denoting types, as discussed further below.

On the generic argument for the modality of will

227

changes that were taking place at the time, though Warner’s data, as mentioned earlier, does include mention of future uses of will as early as Old English. In more recent years, similar classic examples, such as: (6) Oil will float on water. have been described by Huddleston (1995) as examples of “propensity will”, and the same example was cited by Dahl (1995: 419) who suggested that future modals might be the sources for such propensity functions, which he called habituality uses. Comrie (1985) was also cited by Dahl as claiming that such uses followed the predictive future uses of will; if so, the future meanings must have been well established in Old English times to provide the basis for an extension to express propensity. However, according to Traugott (1989), they were not well established at the time. Palmer (1986) had lumped such uses together with the ability functions of can under the category of dynamic modality, and claimed (1990: 7) that since these uses were not subjective, they were not modal. Thus, for Palmer, modality was directly aligned with the notion of subjectivity. Later accounts such as Narrog (2005) have set subjectivity apart from modality, demonstrating that subjectivity and modality are not interdefinable in this way. This is not a problem, then, for definitions of modality that rank subjectivity as only a facet of modality, but not an essential ingredient. The development of speaker-subjectivity appears as a by-product of the switch of orientation of modal sources from those involving the subject alone to those that fall within the speaker’s domain of evaluation and control. Gisborne (2007) prefers to exclude dynamic modals from the modal paradigm, particularly since they do not reduce to necessity and possibility operators. However, this does not take into account the true meanings of the dynamic modals as expressing characterising attributes, as seen in (6), propositions that could well be implicated with a reading of modal necessity. Note also that there is no overlay of volition in (6) at all, nor even in (5), one of the earliest recorded uses of the modal will. Bybee (1988) notes that dynamic will can only be used to express changes of state (but examples like Boys will be boys are not accounted for under such restrictions).3 This means also that stative verbs are excluded from its contexts, e.g.: (7)

*Elephants will have long trunks.

3 Such tautologies are discussed by Kissine (2008: 147n) as having come to denote a property idiomatically. It is possible to paraphrase the expression as Boys will behave like boys, or similar, thus preserving the intended meaning and at the same time, introducing a change-of-state; it is doubtful whether such idioms are at all productive.

228

Debra Ziegeler

The reason for such restrictions could be hypothesised as due to the lexical origins of will, which would not permit any kind of volitional control over a state of being; this would be simply a case of lexical retention (persistence) in grammaticalisation (Bybee and Pagliuca 1987). However, examples such as (8) Elephants will often have long trunks. were seen in Ziegeler (2006a,b) to be more amenable to interpretation, mainly because the meanings of necessary, law-like states could be cancelled by the addition of a frequency adverb: having long trunks is not exceptionless in the elephant kingdom and universality is thus simply a pragmatic inference. In addition, the volitional retention in will is no longer present, for three reasons: (i) non-statives suggest a reading that refers to the temporal distribution of generic events, whereas with statives the reading is spatially distributed over participants (see below). A temporally-distributed generic created by volitional will, necessary for cases in which the predicate is non-stative, is thus ruled out in (7), leaving only the spatially- distributed generic meaning as a possible alternative; (ii) the co-occurrence of often with a spatially-distributed generic in turn affects the meaning of the temporal adverb, leaving as the only possible interpretation that the state of having long trunks is distributed frequently across multiple exemplars of the subject, not that the subjects can change the length of their trunks at will; i.e., the adverb has leftward-extending scope. Spatiallydistributed generics thus allow for stative predicates, with or without will, and are unaffected by the retention of volitional senses in will; (iii) the characteristic of having long trunks was always a characteristic, not an essential property, even in the absence of a modal – consider Kissine’s (2008: 148) example: ?Bears will be mammals, which cannot be rendered acceptable by the same means: ?Bear will often be mammals, for the reason that it refers to an essential characteristic, not a tendency. Kissine (2008: 149) rejects the claims made by Ziegeler (2006a) that examples like (8) are still generic, suggesting that such generics must not be instantiated at utterance time, and since having long trunks is an essential characteristic of elephants, it must have instantiation at utterance time.4 His argument defines 4 It is not only generics with stative predicates that are incompatible with will; an example such as: (a) In Britain, motorists will drive on the left side of the road is not a stative predicate, and yet is is not totally felicitous; it is also an “essential” generic. The addition of a frequency adverb makes the meaning even less felicitous, if not alarming: (b) In Britain, motorists will often drive on the left side of the road. This is because the choice of which side of the road to drive on, in most countries, is not a matter over which the agent may have any volitional choice, and the predicate is incompatible with the (characterising) meanings of generic tendency resulting from the insertion of a volition modal such as will into the generic context.

On the generic argument for the modality of will

229

a will-generic as a statement which expresses truths that are necessarily not instantiated at utterance time, and by implication, are therefore false at utterance time. However, such a definition of generics may be somewhat misleading, first, since Kissine does not discriminate between truth and actualisation. Nonactualisation does not entail falsity, whatever the time reference of an utterance; if it did, it would mean that any statement made that did not coincide with the actualisation of what it expresses would be false, including those refering to past events. To suggest that the non-instantiation of P at utterance time is equivalent to its falsity is the same as creating a bi-conditional out of a conditional: what is not known to be actualised at utterance time need not be implicated as known-not to be true. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Kissine is so persuaded by the notion of will as a future tense marker that he has misunderstood the meaning of generic modality as expressing atemporality, rather than omnitemporality, something which is essential to the understanding of generics and of the development of diachronic source modal meanings in will as well as in many other modal forms which began life functioning in the same way as today’s “dynamic” categories as described by Palmer. There may well be cases of oil floating on water at utterance time, as in (6), though it is not the case that the speaker may always know of such states of affairs; the knowledge of a scientific fact, however, is sufficient to enable the omnitemporal universality of the generic distribution of such predicates, which may or may not include utterance time. Kissine (2008), therefore, fails to take into account the diachronic data which indicate that the nature of generic will is simply to express a tendency affecting a general subset of all the cases its subject refers to, rather than a law-like statement. The interpretation of will as expressing necessity is a pragmatic inference, rendering as universal the distributional tendencies of the events it qualifies. That is, will may be defined in terms of genericity as having a characterising function rather than a kind-related generic use (see, e.g. Carlson 2006; Krifka et al 1995: 3–4), though this does not make it any less generic, according to Krifka et al.’s definitions. That is the very reason that a modal of volition was recruited for the function – as a volition modal, it is best equipped to deal with tendencies that are inherent in animate beings, and by extension, inanimate entities as well. Even the case of oil floating on water is subject to specific physical conditions which may only be defined by science. Speakers are unable to make exceptionless claims about the general nature of things in the world. Modals are used for generic purposes not because they must be applied to every relevant circumstance, but because they can be. Hence, Carlson’s (2006) definition of generics as information assumed to hold for any given relevant instance, unless specific

230

Debra Ziegeler

information is provided to the contrary, is important, and a definition which entails a role for generics as focusing elements: will in generic usage thus places a focus on the proclivities of its subjects. The observation of tendencies or proclivities is thus the evidential basis for the pragmatically extended implicatures of necessity (inductively derived from the observation of sufficient examples); that is, a tendency, observed with sufficient frequency, becomes reinterpreted as a universal distribution of the proposed event or state. What is meant by “sufficient” examples is open to interpretation: a universal statement will be made on the strength of a pragmatic Quantity 2 implicature in which only the speaker’s judgement will provide the basis for the extension of the distributional boundaries. Thus, the universality of the use of the modal will vary from one instance to another and from one speaker to another. Although Kissine (2008: 147) acknowledges the presence of disposition meanings in will, he alludes to the possibility that they are entailed by universal meanings, rather than that they are the pragmatic source of universal meanings. So, rather than regarding the meanings of universality as pragmatic extensions of the disposition meanings, he finds problems in the inability of the disposition meanings to account for universal, law-like statements, and takes this as evidence that will is not generic. Salkie (2010) argues for the absence of modality in generic uses of will, mainly from the point of comparison with French future tense, in which future morphology, having grammaticalised from a completely different lexical source (a verb meaning ‘have’), does not function to express generic meanings. The same could be said of many languages, but this does not need to affect the situation of functional overlap in English. He dismisses the functions of characteristic properties, as in (6), or persistent habits, as in (9) as belonging to the domain of genericity, not modality (2010: 192): (9) He’ll sit in his room all day staring at the TV. Clearly, such uses are a nuisance for proponents of the tense-only approach to the functions of will, since it is not clear whether the “domain of genericity” is aspectual or modal in character – it is certainly not a tense, and genericity does not comprise a morphological category in itself, being thus in need of description in accordance with existing morphosyntactic distinctions across languages.5 5 Radden (2009: 200n) notes that no language seems to have forms exclusively grammaticalised to mark generics, citing Dahl (1995: 425). Although generics cannot share the same meanings as tense, the use of the simple past tense in English may be construed generically, especially in the presence of a frequency adverb (see (10)).

On the generic argument for the modality of will

231

Langacker (1997: 191) described generics as “. . . expressions that ascribe a general property to all members of a class”, and habituals as expressions referring to customary and repeated events. In many ways, then, the difference is one of either spatially-distributed genericity or temporally-distributed genericity. In Ziegeler (2006a: 91), the definitions were taken as interlocking: generics referring to multiple participants over which a single event or property may hold, while habituals refer to a single participant to which multiple events may be attributed. However, even multiple events may be attributed to multiple participants, e.g. Dogs bark, enabling a double-generic reading. Carlson (2006) makes no distinction between generics and habituals, except in terminology. Givón (1994) had referred to habituals as a “swing category” cross-linguistically, between realis and irrealis meaning; hence, implying the generative onset of modality from such hybrid sources. Cristofaro (2004) has also noted the same ambivalence in the crosslinguistic expression of generics and habituals, and Dahl (1995: 418–419) finds that in many languages (e.g. Cebuano and Tamil), an irrealis form is used to express habituals or generics as well as futures. In the present study, it may be preferable to label generic modals as boundary modals, because of such ambiguity. Salkie goes on to admit that the potentiality expressable by examples such as (6) enables them to be considered as taking place in the future, but as generics, he considers that this does not make them refer to future time, in the same way as the use of the simple past in generic examples like (10): (10) He sat in his room all day staring at the TV. still has past time reference, in spite of its possible generic interpretation (which would, it must be admitted, require some sort of adverbial framing for genericity in order to be disambiguated from a single event reading). Salkie’s analysis, though, lacks the necessary pragmatics required to understand the way in which future time reference may be readily derived from modal potentiality meanings, and thus leaves open the question of the origins of future tense markers otherwise. In the historical account presented by Ziegeler (2004, 2006a), a high frequency of generic uses pre-dated the future, predictive functions of will, and led to the hypothesis that predictive functions arose out of the earlier generic uses in Old English; similar results were later found in Wischer (2006). Salkie’s (2010: 191) conclusion that generic uses arose out of future uses instead, an assumption shared by other accounts (as noted above), cannot be upheld from the diachronic perspective. These functions were originally volitional functions generalised over generic subjects; as such they acquired a predictive nuance

232

Debra Ziegeler

derived from the speaker’s observations of the subjects’ tendencies and characteristics, a nuance that eventually became the source for meanings of future time reference. The three modal types that can be associated with will in presentday usage were described in Ziegeler (2006a,b) in the following way: (11) Generic will: Future-projecting will: Epistemic will:

K[pt(n)] K[~ pt(0)] ~ K[pt(0)]

(example 6) (example 1b) (example 1a)

so that, in the case of generic will, the notation may suggest “knowledge of p at any time”, superscript n referring to the infinite number of times to which the proposition may apply. Generic will was thus seen to be a pre-modal stage of development and the categories of future-projecting and epistemic will were hypothesised to have developed out of generic uses, as seen below. The following data therefore summarises the findings of Ziegeler (2006a,b), in order to reposition the claims made within the debate on the modal status of will.

3 Historical evidence for generic sources of will The data obtained for Ziegeler’s (2006a,b) study were extracted from a number of texts in the Old and Middle English portions of the Helsinki Corpus, and were investigated for possible tokens of generic usage. The main criterion for determining generic usage was the presence of an indefinite or non-specific subject, but generics also included those appearing in the scope of a conditional clause, since they could also provide a typical environment for the use of generic functions. The sampling included tokens of volitional as well as future functions, since these overlapped with generics, and only instances with 3rd person subjects were used, since it is in the environments of 3rd person subjects that will was claimed to have begun to develop future meanings, according to Aijmer (1985). The data were sub-divided according to subject category and according to whether they occurred in the scope of a conditional. The following tables are adapted from those that illustrated the tendencies found in Ziegeler (2006a,b) (note that the tokens of will in these tables illustrate the presence of lexical source meanings as well as functional specifications).

On the generic argument for the modality of will

233

Table 1: Subcategorisation of third-person subject forms of will in the Old English texts in Ziegeler (2006a,b), according to function. (Scores for non-specific subjects/objects and scope of conditionals are proportions of the totals in the left vertical column; scores below 5 are not shown as percentages) Function

Environment

(N = 55)

Non-specific subject/object

Scope of conditional

6/12 = 50% 10/10 = 100% 13/18 = 72.2% 2 2 0

12/12 = 100% 7/10 = 70% 10/18 = 55.5% 1 9/9 = 100% 1

Volition Volition/Generic Generic Generic/Future Future Other

12 = 21.8% 10 = 18.1% 18 = 32.7% 5 = 9% 9 = 16.3% 1

From Table 1, it can be seen that the predominance of generic meanings of will, or generics with overtones of volition or future meanings in Old English was not trivial, reaching a total of 59.7% of all the uses. This was taken to be a strong indication that such uses must have formed the original source meanings for the grammaticalisation of will, since, as we move to Middle English, their frequency decreases relative to future, predictive uses, as shown in the following table. Table 2: Subcategorisation of third-person subject forms of will in the Middle English texts in Ziegeler (2006a,b), according to function. (Scores for non-specific subjects/objects and scope of conditionals are proportions of the totals in the left vertical column; scores below 5 are not shown as percentages) Function

Environment

(N = 34)

Non-specific subject/object

Scope of conditional

1 2 8/11 = 72.7% 0 1 0

2 2 5 /11 = 45.4% 0 4 1

Volition Volition/Generic Generic Generic/Future Future Other

2 2 11/34 = 32.3% 2 13/34 = 38.2% 4

The Middle English data in Table 2 shows a clear shift (from those in Table 1) in the frequency of meanings centred around volition and generic meanings, moving to future functions, with a more unambiguous future sense arising in many of the ME examples. Examples of the earlier generic function in Old English included the following, with a subject referring to a species or kind (the following examples are all from Ziegeler 2006a: 102–108):

234

Debra Ziegeler

(12) Hu ne meaht þu gesion þæt ælc wyrt & ælc wudu wile weaxan on þæm lande selest þe him betst gerist & him gecynde bið & gewunlic. . . ? ‘Can you not see that each plant and each tree will grow best on the land which suits it best, and is natural and habitual to it. . . ?’ (850–950). Alfred ’s Boethius. (Ed. Sedgefield). R 34.91.13.6 A similar example from Old English describes the habitual activities of farm animals: (13) Be ðæm is awriten ðæt se hund wille etan ðæt he ær aspaw, & sio sugu hi wille sylian on hire sole æfterðæm ðe hio aðwægen bið. ‘Therefore it is written that the dog will eat what he formerly vomited, and the sow will wallow in her mire after being washed.’ (850–950). Alfred’s Cura Pastoralis. (Ed. Sweet). R 54.419.26 Examples in the same study of generics with overtones of volition included the following, in which a negative appears: (14)

Sua is cynn ðæt sio halige gesomnung tæle ælces ðara god ðe hit him anum wile to gode habban, & nyle oðera mid helpan.’ ‘In the same way it is proper for the holy assembly to blame the advantages of those who will appropriate them to themselves alone, and will not help others with them.’ (850–950) Alfred’s Cura Pastoralis. (Ed. Sweet). R 5.45.5

An example in which generic senses overlapped with future senses was the following, with a non-specific subject, and at the same time appearing in the complement of a matrix clause of cognition, which gives rise to a time reference that is later than the time reference in the main clause (wundrian is taken here to be non-stative in the fact that the subject has control over the act of wondering). An unambiguously future example, with a specific subject, appears in Beowulf, which, incidentally, is the text used by Hopper and Traugott (1993/2003) to illustrate a diachronic progression from intention meanings to those of future prediction. The usage appears, nevertheless, in a time reference relative to another in the discourse: 6 Unless otherwise stated, the glosses for the Old English and Middle English examples are taken from the Early English Text Society’s parallel translations.

On the generic argument for the modality of will

(15)

235

Ic minne can glædne Hroþulf, þæt he þa geogoðe wile arum healdan, gyf þu ær þonne he, wine Scildinga, worold oflætest; wene ic þæt he mid gode gyldan wille uncran eaferan, gif he þæt eal gemon. ‘I know my festive Hrothulf, that he will piously maintain the youthful if you earlier than he, o friend of Scyldings, leave the world; I expect that he will repay with good our offspring, if he remembers all that.’7 (950–1050) Beowulf. (Ed. Dobbie). R 1180

Middle English examples continued to appear in the discourse in functions in which they could only mark relative futures, such as the following: (16) Besechinge also (to) oure liege lord that he wole haue compassion and pyte vp on vs. ‘Beseeching also to our dear Lord that he will have compassion and pity upon us.’ (1384–1425). A Book of London English. Petitions. (Ed. Chambers and Daunt). P. 204. From such examples, it was concluded in the earlier studies that the frequency of non-specific subjects or objects in the modal expressions using will in the Old English and early Middle English data could only illustrate the fact that the origins of will as a modal verb began in the semi-modalised domains of generic and habitual aspect, in which will served as one type of marker of genericity or habituality, rather than with specific subjects expressing meanings of intention. In the use of a modal such as will to express habitual activities, it could be argued that speakers were engaging a preference to emphasise the irrealis facet of an aspectual category which was vaguely defined in terms of factuality: as noted above, while the domain assumes the realis evidence of previously observed events, habituals and generic events may also be considered of reduced factivity compared with those for which a specfic time and place may be attributable: they refer to events that have no time reference. They function to illustrate the boundary of factuality with non-factuality, since their factuality levels are weakened by the absence of referential specificity to any event which can be grounded spatio-temporally. Thus they refer to events, as noted in Ziegeler (2008), but events that have no anchorage in space-time, and therefore are susceptible to conversion into the irrealis domains of modified factuality. While will expresses intention with a specific subject, with a non-specific subject 7 The glosses for Beowulf are slightly adapted from those of Thorpe (1889).

236

Debra Ziegeler

it can only refer to a proclivity, a tendency, and it is such a tendency which has lent itself most readily to reinterpretations of prediction (see also Staetzel 1994/ 5). It remains to be determined, then, whether will, insofar as it refers to unactualised events (generic or predictive) is the same as a modal form or a tense form. In the following section, data from newly-developing varieties of English will be compared with the historical evidence shown above, in order to provide further support to the modal argument for will.

4 Data from new varieties of English In more than one previous account of the use of modals in new varieties of English, it has been observed that there is also a distinct prominence in the frequency of uses of habitual will. As discussed earlier, habituals and generics are distinguished only by the fact that habituals refer to the temporal distribution of multiple, non-specific events, while generics refer to the spatial distribution of a single event (or state) across non-specific participants. From a typological point of view, the use of modal forms to express habitual aspect crosslinguistically is not unknown: modal verbs that have been cited include those listed by Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca (1994: 154) relating to meanings such as ‘know’, but there are also examples of habituals derived from sources meaning ‘live’, or ‘see’ (e.g. Yagara) in a few cases. Heine and Kuteva (2002: 331) list habitual aspect sources crosslinguistically as derived from lexemes with the meaning of ‘go’, ‘know’, ‘live’, ‘remain’, ‘sit’, and ‘use’, and from other grammatical aspects such as continuous and iterative, but they provide no data in which sources meaning ‘will’ or ‘want’ are seen to grammaticalise habituals. On the other hand, many of the cited lexical sources for marking habituals occur in creoles, indicating perhaps a higher functional need for marking habitual aspect in new, or contact languages. It is difficult to say why creoles might need more clearly defined marking for habituals where in other languages they are often found unmarked; it could be the case that the hybrid realis/irrealis character of habituals needs to be made more transparent in creoles. Many creole languages, especially the Atlantic creoles, use instead of a modal form the auxiliary do to mark habitual aspect (see Holm 1988; Rickford 1980). However, Singler (1990) refers to Kru, a West African, English-based creole, in which the forms ken and we, derived from English can and will, have not only irrealis functions but habitual ones as well. If so, there is a parallel with the data from new varieties of English, which will be illustrated below.

On the generic argument for the modality of will

237

Other studies included one in which the use of past tense was observed to mark present habituals in Colloquial Singapore English (CSE) (Ziegeler 2012). The percentage of such uses was quite low (12.5%) for one particular study, though it was also observed at the same time that 24.8% of the total finite forms used to express habitual aspect used the modal verb will. Curiously enough, the usage also occurred with first person subjects, indicating that the subject was reporting on her own tendencies and habits; such uses may be less significant in other dialects of English. The relatively high frequency of habitual will was again recorded in a complete study of Singapore English modal verbs by Guerti (2009). She considers the possibility that the influence of substrate languages could be attributed to its frequency; however, a more recent study by Deuber (2009) finds a similar high frequency of habitual uses of will and would in Trinidadian English, in a study mainly using the spoken section of Trinidad and Tabago component of the International Corpus of English (ICE). Deuber attributes the increased frequency of usage of habitual will to a need to mark an analogy with the Trinidadian Creole habitual aspect marker, does. However, this begs the question why use a modal form when the form does could have been borrowed from the Creole itself? Clearly, the reasons for will to be used in habitual aspect are not only related to substrate features, as its use appears in languages as unrelated as Singaporean English and Kru, a West African creole as well. In spite of this evidence, the use of habitual will has not been recorded in studies such as Sand (2005) as an “Angloversal”, though the free vacillation between will and would, frequently ascribed to the speakers’ needs to express “tentativeness”, or “politeness”, is listed as such, according to Deuber (2009). The following report demonstrates the presence of habitual will across more than one contact variety of English: CSE and Indian English, the latter selected also for the relatively high presence of habitual will in the dialect.

4.1 The surveys of new English data The variety most often under investigation in variational studies of Singapore English is Colloquial Singapore English (CSE), a sub-variety associated mainly with the contact situation.8 However, in the case of the present data, the feature of habitual will, while a prevalent feature of CSE, is also found in Singapore

8 Much of the history and description of CSE is carefully catalogued in accounts such as Bao (2010), Low and Brown (2003) and Gupta (1991, 1994, 1998), so will not be discussed further in the present study. Some of the data to follow below may also be found in more detail in Ziegeler (forthcoming).

238

Debra Ziegeler

Standard English (SSE) as well as in many other of the world’s standard varieties (albeit with relatively lower frequencies, as we shall see below), thus providing another reason that its frequency cannot therefore be ascribed solely to reasons of contact. A large part of the data used in the present surveys came from an internet corpus of Colloquial Singapore English known as the Flowerpod Corpus,9 the remainder of the survey covered the ICE-Singapore corpus, the ICE-India Corpus and the ICE-GB Corpus. In each of these ICE-corpora, the data surveyed were restricted to the files S1A-001 to S1B020, the reason being that these files served to represent the most informal spoken usage of all the ICE files, according to Sand’s (2005) break-down. The additional data from the ICE corpora were required in order to make a controlled comparison with the main data source in the internet corpus, since internet resources were not available for the other dialects. The ICE-GB was used as a dialectal control. The results are shown in the next section.

5 Results The results of the surveys are presented in Table 3. Total scores include the forms will, ‘ll (in all persons), and won’t. Wun (CSE won’t) is also searched in the Flowerpod Corpus (no examples of this form were obtained from the ICE-Singapore corpus). The data are presented in two functional categories: habituals and habitual conditionals. The latter category refers to the use of will and its paradigm in the apodoses of open conditionals, and conditional equivalents (including unmarked conditionals (juxtaposed clauses), and those introduced by conjunctions such as when/whenever/otherwise/unless); it was included because of the assumptions of Ziegeler (2006a) that it offered an optimum context for a diachronic functional shift between generic and modal will. Table 3: Results of the multi-corpora searches for habitual and conditional will, showing comparisons in percentage frequencies between data from new varieties of English and those of British English Corpus

Total will-forms

Habituals

Conditionals

Combined totals

Flowerpod ICE – Singapore ICE – India ICE – GB

1997 1593 1833 893

20.93% 11.67% 12.22% 3.13%

17.52% 10.98% 11.94% 11.64%

41.56% 22.66% 24.16% 14.78%

9 The Flowerpod Corpus, mentioned above, was composed during the period 2008–9 at the National University of Singapore, and was funded under the National University of Singapore Staff Research Support Scheme. It consisted of more than 700,000 words taken from various

On the generic argument for the modality of will

239

Table 3 illustrates the fact that the number of will-habituals used in the new varieties is proportionately much larger than in British English – at 20.93%, nearly 7 times greater in the data from the Flowerpod Corpus which is most likely due to the nature of the genre of chat-room forums encouraging the elicitation of personal habits and proclivities from the subscribers (there is thus a higher probability of functional need for using habituals in such forums). The figures for conditionals are much closer in frequency across the four samples, with the three ICE-corpora showing no more than 12% of total uses of will appearing in conditionals, though the Flowerpod Corpus again has a far greater proportion of usage, at 17.52%. What is interesting is that the use of habitual will in British English appears to be insignificant by comparison (only 3.13%), illustrating that it has a minor role to play in marking habituals. This also means that the remainder of uses (mainly predictive) will be much greater in British English compared with the other dialects. Examples of the data are shown below.

5.1 Singapore English: Flowerpod Corpus Habituals (17) but usually I will just eat it straight from the cup . . . don’t really bother to add some more fruits. [ 25 July 2008] (18) A little more info. Pure honey will not attract ants. [3 September 2005] Conditionals (19) If we sell 20% we will earn almost nothing liao.10 [16 January 2009] internet forum sites used in Singapore, the principle one being the Flowerpod site (comprising around 50% of the corpus), additional data was taken from other sites such as Hardwarezone, and another, Singapore Club. Details on sociolinguistic factors were naturally difficult to obtain, as the majority of contributors to the forums use pseudonyms to conceal their identities, many of the topics having a relatively intimate character. The topic interests, however, seemed to presume a fairly general coverage of ages and cultural backgrounds, and were selected for their capacity to represent such factors. The style of the language represented was generally informal, similar to what has been described colloquially as Singlish, though also peppered with text-messaging abbreviations and various discourse borrowings that are familiar to CSE (see, e.g. Lim 2007). As such, it represents a middle ground between CSE and SSE. 10 Liao is a discourse marker in CSE, borrowed from Hokkien (Southern Min Chinese). It has a similar function to lah, in expressing emphasis, denial, or epistemic certainty – see Lim (2007) for a full account of these particles. It could be argued that (19) is ambiguous between expressing habituality and prediction: the same could be said of any (decontextualised) conditional. The context of habitual conditionals was estimated in Ziegeler (2006a,b) to provide the optimum semantic environment for will to grammaticalise into a predictive modal.

240

Debra Ziegeler

(20) btw faber-castel looks very good also the wood one especially but got one feeling the metal part when scratched will be super obvious.11 [4 October 2008]

5.2 ICE Singapore Habituals (21) Now dienes will react with certain reagents uhm which are called dienophile. [ICE- SIN S1B005#81:1:A] Conditionals (22) That means whenever you test for blood they will test for HIV also. [ICE-SIN S1A-022#206:1:A]

5.3 Indian English: ICE India Habitual and conditional (23) Everyday I will have rice then curry then uh . . . when I go to sleep I will have a glass of milk . . . [ICE-IND:S1A-072#214:1:A] Habitual (24) Uh you know .. in Karnataka no .. usually people will prefer .. that roti what we’ll call roti it’s prepared of jowar .. and chapati rarely once in a week they will do it .. [ICE-IND:S1A-072#115:1:A]

5.4 British English: ICE Great Britain Habitual (25) From about the age of one children speak uh a child will speak one or two words not actually in a sentence or anything like that . . . [ICE-GB:S1B-003 #47:1:B] Conditional (26) Actually it’s not necessarily such a bad thing because the chances are that if they leave it they’ll never do it. [ICE-GB:S1A-005 #154:1:A] 11 One in got one feeling is a specific determiner, a typical characteristic of CSE grammar (see, e.g., Alsagoff and Ho 1998).

On the generic argument for the modality of will

241

6 Discussion In the historical data, then, as well as in the data from new Englishes, we see a parallel preponderance of uses of will in generic or habitual aspect functions. The clustering in the Old English and Middle English data, producing over 32% of purely generic functions in either time period is naturally not matched equally with the New English data, though the figures for the historical data may not be as reliable as for the New English data as they are much smaller in total (only 55 tokens in Old English and as few as 34 in the Middle English texts). The present-day frequencies of the New English data, though not as high as the diachronic survey had shown, are important for illustrating the relative distribution of such functions. The frequency of habitual will in the ICE-GB was negligible compared to the frequencies in the ICE-India and the ICE-Singapore, in which it occurred more than 3 times as frequently, and in the Flowerpod Corpus, in which it occurred more than 7 times as frequently, as noted above. The difference in frequency could be attributed to either (i) the possibility that will is being replaced or renovated by other ways of expressing its functions in older varieties of English such as represented in the ICE-GB; the lower total number of tokens (893) in the ICE-GB could indicate that forms such as be going to may be taking over many of its functions as a future marker (see, e.g., Nesselhauf 2010); (ii) otherwise, the increased number of tokens in the new varieties as shown in the present study could be indicating an increased functional load for the modal, as we see in the higher frequency of habitual uses. It remains to answer the question why this should be the case. Given the unusual presence of generic characterising uses in the early development of English, it is hypothesised that the higher frequency of habituals in the New Englishes is visible evidence of a type of replication of the grammaticalisation route of the diachronic development of the modal, but accelerated within a much shorter time frame, and under different communicative conditions. The diachronic route illustrates a slow and gradual shift from generic sources to future-projecting meanings; the same route is vaguely recapitulated in the neo-phylogenetic patterns of distribution in contact varieties. Thus, since such varieties are New Englishes, as new varieties of a language they should, in all probability, follow similar developmental pathways to those the old varieties have shown, with grammaticalisation routes commencing from the same functional source environments. This does not mean that the later stages of development of the modal (to express prediction) are not present at all, which would be impossible in a contact situation, but that the earlier stages of development are more pronounced statistically than in older varieties.

242

Debra Ziegeler

However, the question remains how these data constitute justification for the modal status of will. In Ziegeler (2006a,b) it was hypothesised from the historical evidence that intention meanings, which related to specific subjects, were not those most frequently associated with the early development of prediction senses in will, but instead volition meanings of a more generalised nature were associated with prediction meanings, since it was these that allowed inferences of probability and finally prediction to be derived from them. Thus, there were no clear examples found in that study in which an area of semantic overlap between intention and prediction could be seen to provide the “beach-head” for the advancement of meanings of future time reference. An overlap between intention and prediction meanings carries additional complications, as a prediction based on an observation of intention involves the speaker’s awareness of the subject’s intended actions (something that may require an intermediate stage of communication),12 whereas a prediction based on the observed tendencies and characteristics of the subject is already objectively oriented within the speaker’s domain of reference; i.e., the context implies a prediction right from the start. Thus the following semantic path of grammaticalisation was proposed in Ziegeler (2006a,b): (27) VOLITION → PROCLIVITY → PROBABILITY → PREDICTION According to this path, then, it was time-stable meanings of volition (referring to likes and dislikes, and general proclivities) that formed the sources of the prediction meanings eventually. Such meanings are still found associated with will today, as the examples above illustrate. Since they contain inferences of prediction, and at the same time a non-specific time reference, it was difficult to ascribe to them a purely tense-marking function: they were seen as genuinely modal, projecting an irrealis mood over the observations of actions and tendencies of the subject performed at any time, and at all (relevant) times. As noted above, Salkie argued (2010: 191) that generic functions cannot be taken as evidence for the modality of will as genericity is a separate category from modality (he does not provide any alternative suggestions for its categorisation). However, according to Krifka et al. (1995: 61) all generics are modal because they refer to open-ended sets of entities. In the case of habituals, in which one participant is attributed with a repeated series of events, we might extend the definition to refer to open-ended sets of events as well. Open-endedness (of sets of entities or of events) could be understood as a characteristic of modality, in that the events it refers to are, by the nature of the indefiniteness of the subject 12 Pierre Cotte (personal communication).

On the generic argument for the modality of will

243

or the indefiniteness of their occurrence, intrinsically potential and capable of undefined recurrence, and this is a pragmatic sense derived from the (spatial or temporal) distributional scope of generics – either over an indefinite range of subjects or an indefinite range of events, as noted earlier. Salkie’s account claims that the potentiality implicit in generics is not the same as “past and present generics”. However, this distinction (between past, present and potential generics) requires further definition in order to be taken with any degree of serious analysis. Although past generics refer to recurrent past events or truth conditions, which may or may not be still current at the moment of speaking (and as such they are capable of expressing counterfactual modal notions) it is difficult to understand how a “present generic” is conceived restrictively so that its functions are distinguishable from those referrring to any potential, hence future event. It must be remembered that generics are expressable equally without modal reinforcement, and in order for a present event to be expressed, absent of any sense of potentiality, the event referred to must be coinciding precisely with the moment of speaking, and such coincidences are restricted, in most grammars, to the use of present simple tense as expressing play-by-play accounts (as in sports commentaries in the media), or the progressive, which when used with certain verb types (such as Accomplishments or Achievements), also implies a certain degree of potentiality as to the outcome of the event it refers to (what Dowty 1979) referred to as the Imperfective Paradox). Thus a “present generic” is a virtual reality: only its truth conditions are pertinent to the present, not its actualisation. There can be no “present generic” that does not carry the likelihood of conveying modal nuances as any other modal verb.

6.1 Metonymy The mechanism by which generics interact with modal nuances in the history of will in Ziegeler (2006a,b) was attributed to the operation of inductive inferences generalising from the truth of p (at all times, including the future) to p as a unique future event. Gricean Quantity 2 inferences may be attributed to such developments, as Traugott (1989) and Traugott and Dasher (2002) have shown in other cases of modal grammaticalisation. Gricean Quantity 2 inferences can be analogised with the cognitive mechanism of metonymy, since in the use of such implicatures, the utterance of a minimal expression stands for a more informative one of which it is a part. The most familiar metonymies are referential, and associated with lexical shifts in meaning, such as The ham sandwich is waiting for his check – an example originally attributed to Nunberg (1978), but the field has expanded considerably in recent years to discuss grammatical metonymies as well (see, e.g. Panther, Thornburg, and Barcelona 2009).

244

Debra Ziegeler

Metonymy is highly prevalent in grammatical usage, and alongside reanalysis, has been established as a principle contributing factor underlying all grammaticalisation processes by Hopper and Traugott ([1993] 2003), mainly for the fact that it allows for slow, incremental stages of gradual development to take place between separate diachronic stages, providing a more plausible explanation for chronological stages of reanalysis than metaphor. Metonymy has been defined most recently by Barcelona (2011: 19) as: . . . an asymmetric mapping of a conceptual domain, the source, onto another domain, the target. Source and target are in the same overall domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated.

It is important to note that the source and target share the same conceptual domain, meaning that in diachronic cases, the later stages of development of a grammatical item must be linked conceptually with the earlier stages. Barcelona (2011: 23) cites Panther and Thornburg’s (2007) discussion of examples in which the grammatical metonymy ranges over the syntactic predicate, in examples such as: (28) The saxophone had to leave early an example which contains both the referential metonymy of the saxophone standing for the target reference, the saxophone player, but also the use of a POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy, in which the expression of modal obligation, had to, stands for the meaning of actuality, ‘s/he left early’. In earlier studies, e.g. Panther and Thornburg (1999), the same metonymy had been referred to in association with the use of periphrastic modals of ability, in both English and Hungarian, e.g. She was able to solve the problem standing for the actuality meaning ‘she solved the problem’. Such examples are an indication of the conventionalisation of inferences associated with the use of modals in certain contexts, in most cases, the inferences are derived by Gricean Quantity 2 implicatures, as are referential metonymies. Radden (2009) has extended the research into grammatical metonymy to the field of generic reference, including using metonymies such as GENERIC FOR POTENTIALITY (2009: 212), to explain the differences between kind-referring generics and characterising generics; for example: (29) Mosquitoes carry malaria. clearly is a characterising generic, since it cannot refer to all mosquitoes, but any potential mosquito that may carry malaria. What it does provide though is,

On the generic argument for the modality of will

245

as Carlson (2006) has suggested in defining generics, relevant information rather than universal truth – there is an implicit premise that the context somehow demanded the information, for example, on what insect can carry malaria, not information pertaining to identifying characteristics of all mosquitoes. Note though, that (29) may only be paraphrased using a modal of potentiality, can: Mosquitoes can carry malaria; if it were paraphrased using will: Mosquitoes will carry malaria, the meaning becomes more highly probable, if not quasi-universal. However, the seemingly universal sense associated with will was noted above as a conversational implicature as well, derived from the generalisation of tendency or proclivity meanings. The present study considers the shift of meaning focus from genericity to prediction in will to be also described as a type of metonymy, in which the source meaning (generic reference) can be seen as standing for the target meaning (future reference). In the case of will, then, it may be claimed that statements like (5) exemplify a type of GENERIC FOR POTENTIALITY metonymy, but it is perhaps the stronger inferences of modal probability, based on observed tendencies of repeated occurrences of an event, rather than modal potentiality, based on possible attributes of the subject, as in (20), which may lead some accounts to associate the meanings of prediction in will with a tense marker rather than a modal marker. Hence the metonymy linking generic and predictive will could be instead described as a GENERIC FOR PROBABILITY metonymy, in the fact that the expression of a tendency is used as a source for the mapping and activation of the target meanings of prediction, as examples such as (12) illustrate, repeated below as (30): (30)

Hu ne meaht þu gesion þæt ælc wyrt & ælc wudu wile weaxan on þæm lande selest þe him betst gerist & him gecynde bið & gewunlic. . . ? ‘Can you not see that each plant and each tree will grow best on the land which suits it best, and is natural and habitual to it. . . ?’ (850–950). Alfred’s Boethius. (Ed. Sedgefield). R 34.91.13.

In (30), the source meaning of genericity (describing the attributes of plants and trees) and the target meaning of probability (referring to the speaker’s prediction of such attributes) onto which it maps are in the same conceptual domain of prediction, and the target is mentally activated, in accord with Barcelona’s (2011: 19) definition above. Examples of the historical data may be readily construed as providing the source contexts for the grammaticalisation of future will, as the statistics over a diachronic time period indicate the decrease in frequency of generic uses compared with predictive ones (see Tables 1–2). In the same way,

246

Debra Ziegeler

the GENERIC FOR PROBABILITY metonymy may apply to the New English cases, as in (23), repeated below as (31): (31) Everyday [sic.] I will have rice then curry then uh . . . when I go to sleep I will have a glass of milk . . . [ICE-IND:S1A-072#214:1:A] The description of the speaker’s daily eating habits in the first use of will, qualified in the second use by the restriction of a temporal sub-clause, can readily be reinterpreted as coinciding in the same conceptual domain of genericity/habituality and probability together, the target domain of probability activated by the source domain of genericity and reference to frequently-occuring events: the activation therefore carries the additional meaning that the present generic uses of will are inferrable as future generics at the same time. The metonymic analysis suggests that will is unavoidably modal, since probability (and its weaker sense, potentiality) are modal meanings associated with other modal verbs. In the face of such evidence, it would be difficult to claim that the relationship of genericity to probability in the grammaticalisation of will has no reference to future time. Thus, since probability is a modal meaning referring to the future, will, if marking future time reference, must still be modal.

7 Conclusions The present paper has attempted to throw more light on the argument to retain the modal status of will, previously rejected in studies such as Kissine (2008), Salkie (2010), as well as Tsangalidis (2010) whose rejection is couched in the same argument as that of preserving the subjunctive as a category in English. It was shown that many of the arguments put forward by proponents of the tense-only club are not completely watertight; for example, Kissine’s rejection of the universality of will is not sufficient a justification to reject its generic categorisation, since will is an example of a characterising generic modal, predicating over events that are not necessarily exceptionless, and both characterising statements and kind-denoting generics are classifiable as generics (Carlson 2006; Krifka et al. 1995). Salkie’s rejection of generic will as not modal is not supported by the data or the pragmatic interpretations which may be attributed to the historical evidence shown above, and which explain the conceptual link between genericity and potentiality. The previous study of diachronic development of will (Ziegeler 2006a,b) in which the generic meanings were seen to provide the source contexts for the predictive uses of later periods has been reinforced with data from New English

On the generic argument for the modality of will

247

dialects, in which the same statistical prominence of generic uses is explained as an example of the vague replication of the historic route of grammaticalisation. Although the New English data does not presume that predictive will has not yet grammaticalised as it has in older varieties of English, its occurrence is reduced by comparison to the more established English varieties. The parallel data therefore provide sufficient argument to suggest that generics and habituals are significant in the development of predictive, modal meanings, since generics have been frequently associated with irrealis-marked categories (e.g. Cristofaro 2004; Dahl 1995), and have been claimed to represent a modal context, according to Krifka et al. (1995: 61) due to the nature of their indefinite subjects. The development of modal will, then, out of generic will, can be construed as a metonymy similar to the kind proposed by Radden (2009), a GENERIC FOR PROBABILITY metonymy, in which generic indefiniteness gives rise to prediction, the modal sense entailed in any reference to future time. Future research into the future of will may require a more detailed comparison of the relative frequency of predictive uses versus generic uses in the New Englishes, in order to verify that the predictive uses are not in a state of decline relative to the habitual uses: the contact situation would not imply that predictive uses are not part of the dialect at all (thus the historical situation cannot be replicated exactly), but at the same time, the direction of the statistical tendencies cannot be established with such a small sampling. Further, crosslinguistic research might also investigate whether demodalisation may present a viable consequence in tense categories that may be derived crosslinguistically from modal verbs (if will is grammaticalising to become a tense marker, it certainly has not forsaken its modal meanings as a result). Until such issues are approached, there remains insufficient evidence for rejecting the modal status of will in favour of tense on the basis of its behaviour in generic contexts; generic contexts are seen instead to be those most amenable to the development of modal senses. However, there still remain adequate theoretical and typological questions for more intensive scrutiny in the future.

References Aijmer, Karen. 1985. The semantic development of will. In: J. Fisiak (ed.), Historical Semantics and Historical Word-Formation, 11–21. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Alsagoff, Lubna and Ho Chee Lick. 1998. The grammar of Singapore English. In: Joseph A. Foley, Thiru Kandiah, Bao Zhiming, A. F. Gupta, L. Alsagoff, Ho Chee Lick, Lionel Wee, I. S. Talib and W. Bokhorst-Heng (eds.), English in New Cultural Contexts. Reflections from Singapore, 127–151. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Bao, Zhiming. 2010. A usage-based approach to substratum transfer: the case of four unproductive features in Singapore English. Language 86(4): 792–820.

248

Debra Ziegeler

Barcelona, Antonio. 2011. Reviewing the properties and prototype structure of metonymy. In: Réka Benczes, Antonio Barcelona, and Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza Ibañez (eds.), Defining Metonymy in Cognitive Linguistics. Towards a Consensus View, 7–57. (Human Cognitive Processing series, 28.) Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Bybee, Joan. 1988. The diachronic dimension in explanation. In: John A. Hawkins (ed.), Explaining Language Universals, 350–379. Oxford: Blackwell. Bybee, Joan and William Pagliuca. 1987. The evolution of future meaning. In: Anna G. Ramat, and Giuliano Bernini (eds.), Papers from the Seventh International Conference on Historical Linguistics, 527–570. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Bybee, Joan, Revere D. Perkins and William Pagliuca. 1991. Back to the future. In: Elisabeth Closs Traugott and Bernd Heine (eds.), Approaches to Grammaticalization, Volume 2, 17– 58. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Bybee, Joan, Revere D. Perkins and William Pagliuca. 1994. The Evolution of Grammar: Tense, Aspect and Modality in the Languages of the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Carlson, Gregory. 2006. Generic reference. Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd ed. Amsterdam: Elsevier (pre-print version). Carlson, Gregory N. and Francis J. Pelletier. 1995. The Generic Book. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Coates, Jennifer. 1983. The Semantics of Modal Auxiliaries. London: Croon Helm. Cohen, Ariel. 1999. Think Generic! Stanford: CSLI Publications. Comrie, Bernard. 1985. Tense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cristofaro, Sonia. 2004. Past habituals and irrealis. In: Yuri A. Lander, Vladimir A. Plungian and Anna Yu Urmanchieva (eds.), Irrealis and Irreality, 256–272. Moscow: Gnosis. Dahl, Östen. 1995. The marking of the episodic/generic distinction in tense-aspect systems. In: Gregory Carlson and Francis J. Pelletier. (eds.), The Generic Book, 412–425. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Deterding, David. 2003. Tenses and will/would in a corpus of Singapore English. In: David Deterding, Adam Brown and Ee Ling Low (eds.), English in Singapore: Research on Grammar, 31–38. Singapore: McGraw Hill. Deterding, David, Adam Brown and Ee Ling Low (eds.). 2003. English in Singapore: Research on Grammar. Singapore: McGraw Hill. Deuber, Dagmar. 2009. Modal verb usage at the interface of English and a related creole: a corpus-based study of can/could and will/would in Trinidadian English. Journal of English Linguistics XX(X): 1–38 (online first edition). Dowty, David R. 1979. Word Meaning and Montague Grammar. Dordrecht: Reidel. Fleischman, Suzanne. 1982. The Future in Thought and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Foley, Joseph A., Thiru Kandiah, Bao Zhiming, A. F. Gupta, L. Alsagoff, Ho Chee Lick, Lionel Wee, I. S. Talib and W. Bokhorst-Heng (eds.). 1998. English in New Cultural Contexts. Reflections from Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press [Singapore Institute of Management]. Gisborne, Nik. 2007. Dynamic modality. SKASE Journal of Theoretical Linguistics 4: 44–61. Givón, Talmy. 1989. Mind, Code and Context: Essays in Pragmatics. Hillsdale, NJ.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Givón, Talmy. 1994. Irrealis and the subjunctive. Studies in Language 18: 265–337. Goossens, Louis. 1982. On the development of modals and of epistemic function in English. In: Anders Ahlqvist (ed.), Papers from the 5th International Conference on Historical Linguistics, 74–84. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

On the generic argument for the modality of will

249

Goossens, Louis. 2000. Patterns of meaning extension, “parallel chaining”, subjectification, and modal shifts. In: Antonio Barcelona (ed.), Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads. A Cognitive Perspective, 149–169. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Guerti, Anissa. 2009. Colloquial Singapore English: A theoretical and corpus-based study. Contribution to the Study of “New Englishes”. Masters thesis, Department of Linguistics and Literature, University of Antwerp. Gupta, Anthea Fraser. 1991. Almost a creole: Singapore Colloquial English. California Linguistic Notes 23: 9–21. Gupta, Anthea Fraser. 1994. The Step-Tongue. Children’s English in Singapore. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Gupta, Anthea Fraser. 1998. The situation of English in Singapore. In: Joseph A. Foley, Thiru Kandiah, Bao Zhiming, A. F. Gupta, L. Alsagoff, Ho Chee Lick, Lionel Wee, I. S. Talib and W. Bokhorst-Heng (eds.), English in New Cultural Contexts. Reflections from Singapore, 106–126. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Heine, Bernd and Tania Kuteva. 2002. World Lexicon of Grammaticalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heine, Bernd, Ulrike Claudi and Frederike Hünnemeyer. 1991. Grammaticalization: A Conceptual Framework. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Holm, John A. 1988. Pidgins and Creoles. Vol 1. Theory and Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hopper, Paul J. and Elizabeth C. Traugott. 2003 [1993]. Grammaticalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huddleston, Rodney. 1995. The case against a future tense in English. Studies in Language 19: 399–446. The ICE Corpora = The International Corpus of English: http://ice-corpora.net/ice/avail.htm. Kissine, Mikhail. 2008. Why will is not a modal. Natural Language Semantics 16: 129–155. Krifka, Manfred, Francis Jeffrey Pelletier, Gregory N. Carlson, Alice Meulen, Godehard Link and Gennaro Cherchia. 1995. Genericity: An introduction. In: Gregory N. Carlson and Francis J. Pelletier (eds.), The Generic Book, 1–24. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1997. Generics and habituals. In: Angeliki Athanasiadou and René Dirven (eds.), On Conditionals Again, 191–122. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Larreya, Paul. 1984. Le Possible et le Nécessaire. Modalités et Auxiliaires Modaux en Anglais Britannique. Poitiers: Nathan Recherche. Lim, Lisa. 2007. Mergers and acquisitions: on the ages and origins of Singapore English particles. World Englishes 26: 446–473. Low, Ee Ling and Adam Brown. 2003. An Introduction to Singapore English. Singapore: McGraw Hill. Lyons, John. 1977. Semantics II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Narrog, Heiko. 2005. On defining modality again. Language Sciences 27: 165–192. Nesselhauf, Nadja. 2010. The development of future time expressions in Late Modern English: redistribution of forms or change in discourse. English Language and Linguistics 14(2): 163–186. Palmer, Frank R. 2001 [1986]. Mood and Modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Palmer, Frank. 1974. The English Verb. London: Longman. Reprinted as: Palmer, Frank R. 1987. The English Verb. Harlow: Longman. Palmer, Frank R. 1990. Modality and the English Modals. London: Longman. Panther, Klaus-Uwe, Linda Thornburg and Antonio Barcelona (eds.). 2009. Metonymy and Metaphor in Grammar. (Human Cognitive Processing series 25.) Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

250

Debra Ziegeler

Radden, Günter. 2009. Generic reference in English: a metonyic and conceptual blending analysis. In: Klaus-Uwe Panther, Linda Thornburg and Antonio Barcelona (eds.), Metonymy and Metaphor in Grammar. (Human Cognitive Processing series 25.), 199–228. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Rickford, John R. 1980. How does doz disappear? In: R. R. Day (ed.), Issues in English Creoles. Papers from the 1975 Hawaii Conference, 77–96. Heidelberg: Groos. Salkie, Raphael. 2010. Will: tense or modal or both? English Language and Linguistics 14(2): 187–215. Sand, Andrea. 2005. Angloversals? Shared morphosyntactic features in contact varieties of English. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Freiburg. Singler, John. 1990. The impact of decreolization upon T-M-A: Tenselessness, mood and aspect in Kru Pidgin English. In: John Victor Singler (ed.), Pidgin and Creole Tense-Mood-Aspect Systems, 203–230. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Staetzel, Virginie. 1994/5. Contribution à l’étude du WOULD dit fréquentatif. In: Travaux collectifs du séminaire de Janine Bouscaren. Cahiers de Recherche en Grammaire Anglaise, Tome 1. Online at: http://fm.chez.com/would1.htm. Thorpe, B. 1889. The Anglo-Saxon Poems of Beowulf. 3rd ed. London: Reeves and Turner. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1989. On the rise of epistemic meanings in English. Language 65: 31–55. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs and Richard Dasher. 2002. Regularity in Semantic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tsangalidis, Anastasios. 2010. Defining future and subjunctive in English. Plenary paper, 4th International Conference on Modality in English, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 11 September, 2010. Van der Auwera, Johan and Vladimir Plungian. 1998. Modality’s semantic map. Linguistic Typology 2: 79–124. Warner, Anthony R. 1993. English Auxiliaries. Structure and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wischer, Ilse. 2006. Will and Shall as markers of modality and/or futurity in Middle English. Paper presented at the 14th International Conference on English Historical Linguistics, University of Bergamo, Italy. Ziegeler, Debra P. 2000. Hypothetical Modality. Grammaticalisation in an L2 Dialect. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Ziegeler, Debra P. 2004. Where does modality come from?. Plenary paper, 2nd International Conference on Modality in English, University of Pau, 3 September, 2004. Ziegeler, Debra P. 2006a. Omnitemporal will. Language Sciences 28: 76–119. Ziegeler, Debra P. 2006b. Interfaces with English Aspect. Diachronic and Empirical Studies. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Ziegeler, Debra P. 2008. Propositional aspect and the development of modal inferences in English. In: Werner Abraham, and Elisabeth Leiss (eds.), Modality-Aspect Interfaces – Implications and Typological Solutions, 43–79. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Ziegeler, Debra P. 2010. Semantic determinism and the grammaticalisation of have to in English: a reassessment. Journal of Historical Pragmatics 11(1): 32–66. Ziegeler, Debra P. 2012. On the interaction of past tense and potentiality in Singapore Colloquial English. Language Sciences 34: 229–251. Ziegeler, Debra P. (forthcoming). Replica grammaticalisation as recapitulation. The other side of contact. Diachronica (2014).

III Evidentiality and Modality

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

and related concepts: towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs REALIT Y

1 Aims This article aims to establish the semantic and pragmatic connections between the English adverbs actually, in fact, truly and really. Especially actually, in fact and really, but also (to a lesser extent) truly have been studied from the point of view of their meaning development, using monolingual as well as contrastive methodologies. In a few studies some of them have also been compared to each other with regard to their usage in present-day English and with regard to their historical development. These studies are discussed further in this article. Previous research has shown that these adverbs are partially overlapping in their semantics and pragmatics. The present study focuses precisely on the relations between the four adverbs as well as between the semantic concepts which they express. The ultimate goal, which this article takes a first modest step towards, is the construction of semantic and pragmatic maps. It will be shown that the concepts of ACT, FACT, TRUTH and REALITY, but also of SINCERITY and ESSENCE are interconnected. The introduction of ESSENCE in the semantic map brings in the adverb basically for discussion. A pragmatic map aims to display which pragmatic functions are covered by which forms. Section 2 discusses the background to this research and its methodology and formulates specific research questions. In section 3 the classification of the adverbs in the major grammars of English is given, as well as their relative frequencies in corpora. Section 4 describes the characteristics of the four adverbs. In section 5 correspondences and divergences between the adverbs are examined using contrastive data from Dutch and French. Section 6 discusses the connections between the semantic concepts as expressed by the adverbs. The pragmatic connections are the subject-matter of section 7. Section 8 takes a closer look at the concept of ESSENCE as realised by the adverb basically. Conclusions and suggestions for further research are given in the final section 9.

254

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

2 Background, research questions and methodology 2.1 Background and research questions The question about the relations between the adverbs actually, in fact, really and truly and the semantic concepts they express was raised by the results of two types of previous research. First, diachronic comparative research into the processes of grammaticalization and (inter)subjectification of the English adverbs actually and in fact and of their French cognates actuellement, en fait/de fait/au fait demonstrates clear links between “acts”, “facts”, “reality” and “epistemic commitment to truth” (see Defour et al. 2010a, 2010b; Simon-Vandenbergen and Willems 2011). Semantic steps from “deeds” and “facts” to the conception of “what is real” and from there to epistemic commitment to the truth are shown to be small and predictable ones. These studies confirm research on the subjectification which took place in both actually and in fact (Schwenter and Traugott 2000; Traugott and Dasher 2002) and they provide evidence for patterns of development which go beyond those of individual items in a specific language. The findings raise the question how the concepts of ACT, FACT, TRUTH and REALITY relate to one another and how developments of lexical items in different languages can be plotted on a map of these semantic domains. Secondly, synchronic contrastive research has also shown connections. The study of translation equivalences contrasting English and French has shown that the most frequent French equivalent of English really is not réellement (which has the same origin and semantics as English really) but vraiment (which is a derivation from the adjective vrai, meaning “true”). The word réellement does occur as a translation correspondence, but much less frequently (Willems and Demol 2006). Willems and Demol (2006) shows interesting connections between the concepts of TRUTH and REALITY. Another study, contrasting English, Swedish and Dutch on the basis of translation equivalences, has demonstrated overlaps in translations of the adverbs actually, in fact and really (Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2004). Another intriguing finding is that translation equivalents bring in other semantic domains, viz. SINCERITY and ESSENCE , which are also connected to those of ACT, FACT, TRUTH and REALITY. The following translation network is based on dictionary translations contrasting English and Dutch. It displays the translations and back-translations of the words in the network, starting from the English adverbs in fact, really and actually.

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

255

Figure 1: Translation network of the adverbs in fact, really, actually, showing some translations in Dutch and their back-translations. Based on Van Dale (1984, 1986)

Figure 1 shows that when one goes back and forth between the English and Dutch correspondences there are connections between groups of words which can be seen as semantic clusters. The words essentially, basically and fundamentally express what is true “in essence”, while the words exactly, just, mainly, chiefly, and particularly are focusing adverbs. This indicates that the concepts of ESSENCE and FOCUS are also to be placed in the semantic map. In sum, both diachronic and synchronic research suggest connections between semantic concepts which deserve further investigation. The specific research questions dealt with in this article are the following: (1) Which concepts relate to one another and in what way? (2) Which semantic areas are covered by which English adverbs? (3) Which pragmatic functions are covered by which adverbs?

2.2 Methodology This study is corpus-based. Two types of data have been used: monolingual and cross-linguistic ones. For the study of the grammatical behaviour and of the pragmatic functions of the adverbs in present-day English the British National Corpus (BNC) has been consulted. These data have been added to complement the findings in earlier work on the English adverbs only, so that much of the discussion of the individual adverbs from a monolingual point of view relies on the rich literature, both synchronic and diachronic. The diachronic data have been taken from previous research on the electronic historical corpora of English, in particular the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts (HC), the Corpus of Early English

256

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

Correspondence (CEEC),1 the Corpus of English Dialogues (CD)2 as well as the Corpus of Late Modern English Extended version (CLMETEV). Examples are given from these corpora. The cross-linguistic comparison is used as a heuristic device to gather additional information about the meaning of the individual English adverbs (see Johansson 2007: 28–30 on the insights that can be gained from multilingual corpora research), to discover overlaps in usage between them and to establish connections between the concepts which are covered by them. The data are taken from a trilingual translation corpus, the Namur Corpus,3 which consists of extracts from original comparable texts in English, French and Dutch and their aligned translations into the other two languages. The data are passages from debates of the European parliament, from novels and from the Unesco Courier.

3 Classifications and frequencies of actually, in fact, really and truly In Quirk et al. (1985) and in Biber et al. (1999) the links between the four adverbs are simply implied by their appearance in the same classes. The grammatical and semantic description of the adverbs in Quirk et al. (1985) appears to suggest the greatest closeness between actually and really. They are classified as “content disjuncts” which “present a comment on the truth value of what is said, expressing the extent to which, and the conditions under which, the speaker believes that what he is saying is true” (1985: 620). More specifically, they belong to a subgroup of adverbs which “state the sense in which the speaker judges what he says to be true or false”. This subgroup contains adverbs which are said to often refer to “the “reality” or lack of “reality” in what is said” (1985: 621). The adverbs listed here as asserting the reality are actually, really and factually (the latter with the features ).4 Another subtype of this

1 The HC and CEECS data have been taken from the ICAME (The International Computer Archive of Modern and Medieval English) CD-ROM. 2 See Culpeper and Kytö (1997, 2000). 3 For a description of the Namur Corpus see http://www.kuleuven-kortrijk.be/~hpauluss/NC/ NC_descr.html. 4 The adverb factually is infrequent: only 50 instances were attested in the BNC. In contrast with in fact it has not lost its semantic weight and has not developed into a discourse marker. It will not be considered further in the present study.

257

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

class is formed by the adverbs basically, essentially, fundamentally (see further section 8). Further, Quirk et al. also mention actually and really as subjuncts: common emphasizers “which have a reinforcing effect on the truth value of the clause or part of the clause” (1985: 583). In contrast, truly is not classified as a content disjunct but as a style disjunct of the type “modality” (1985: 615). This means that it gives a comment on the language itself. In this view, really and actually comment on the truth value of the proposition, while truly comments on the sincerity of the speaker: “I am speaking truly”. As such it fits into a paradigm also containing words such as candidly, honestly, truthfully, confidentially. Simon-Vandenbergen and Taverniers (forthcoming) discuss the question whether truly is more properly called a conjunct or a disjunct. The arguments are not repeated here but it is clear that truly fits into both classes and is best situated somewhere in the overlap area between the two. Quirk et al. further note that both really and truly can be used as intensifiers. These are subjuncts which are “broadly concerned with the semantic category of degree” (1985: 589). The example given by Quirk et al. is He may have really injured innocent people, “in which the implication is of a high degree of injury as well as the assertion of certainty” (1985: 583). Many intensifying adjectives are said to be relatable to such intensifying adverbs, including true: truly (he is a true scholar: he is truly a scholar) (1985: 430). Strangely, in fact receives only passing references in Quirk et al. In these it is mentioned together with indeed as conveying “emphasis” (1985: 883) and with actually, which in a footnote is given as the meaning of in fact, which is said to be a phrase which has become fixed and functions as a “closed-class” adverb (1985: 663, note). Table 1 sums up the classification of the four adverbs as given in Quirk et al. (1985). Table 1: Classification of really, actually, truly, in fact in Quirk et al. (1985)

content disjunct style disjunct subjunct emphasizer intensifier

really

actually

x

x

truly

in fact ?

x x x

x

? x

While the distinctions between and the allocation of specific items to the classes of disjuncts, subjuncts, emphasizers and intensifiers are not always transparent in Quirk et al., if we bring the different references together we obtain a picture in

258

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

which truth and reality are strongly connected, and in which also force and degree have a place. In Biber et al. (1999) all four adverbs are put into the same class of “stance adverbials” of the subtype “actuality and reality” (1999: 854). These are said to “comment on the status of the proposition as real-life fact” (1999: 854). Further, really is said to function as an intensifier in medial position with gradable propositions, intensifying a verb or adjective (1999: 858). In contrast, in fact is also a linking adverbial “with a connective function” (1999: 858). It will be noted that Biber et al. also distinguish a class of style adverbials in which they mention for example truthfully and honestly but not truly. Table 2 sums up the classification. Table 2: Classification of really, actually, truly, in fact in Biber et al. (1999)

stance adverbials of actuality/reality intensifier linking adverbial

really

actually

truly

in fact

x x

x

x

x x

It appears that Biber et al. consider the four adverbs closely related as expressing the reality of the proposition. As stance adverbials their relative frequencies of occurrence in various types of corpora are compared. Table 3 presents the frequencies. Table 3: Frequencies of really, actually and in fact as stance adverbials in present-day English, from Biber et al. (1999: 869). In brackets are ambiguous instances of really which could be interpreted as expressing degree. The frequencies are per 1m words

really actually in fact

conversation

fiction

news

academic prose

1100 (plus 400) 700 100

500 100 100

100 (plus 100) 100 100

100 100 100

The most striking factor in Table 3 is the much higher frequency of really in conversation (where it is followed by actually in second position) as well as in fiction, which obviously also contains dialogue. In the more formal genres, on the other hand, really, actually and in fact are about equally frequent. Note that no figures are given for truly. In order to make sense of these frequencies and in order to include truly for comparison the frequencies were counted in the BNC. Table 4 gives the results.

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

259

Table 4: Frequencies of really, actually, in fact, truly in the BNC per 1m words

really actually in fact truly

written

spoken

319 141 147 33

1,700 1,200 283 17

Table 4 (in contrast with Table 3) presents all uses of really, including its use as a degree adverb. In spite of this difference, however, the two Tables provide complementary information and Table 4 confirms and sharpens the picture arising from Table 3. The following conclusions can be drawn: (i) really is the most frequent adverb in both speech and writing; (ii) in speech it is followed by actually, while in writing actually and in fact are about equally frequent; (iii) really, actually and in fact are more frequent in speech than in writing, and the greatest discrepancy is noted in the case of actually, which is 8.5 times as frequent in speech as in writing (versus 5 times for really and two times for in fact); (iv) not only is truly infrequent overall, it is less frequent in speech than in writing. These findings suggest that especially actually and really have pragmatic functions which are typical of spoken interaction. Scheibman (2002: 171) says this: “In interactive discourse, English-speaking participants are more likely to explicitly mark their contributions as based in their own viewpoints than in more formal genres”. We can therefore hypothesize that actually and really and to a lesser extent in fact have developed intersubjective meanings which are particularly exploited in informal dialogue. Truly seems to be almost restricted to formal language. This may mean that it has not developed such intersubjective meanings which are useful in the give and take of casual interaction. In section 4 we look at the meaning developments of the four adverbs.

4 The meanings of actually, in fact, really, truly: a brief overview 4.1 Actually The meaning and pragmatic development of the word actually has been dealt with extensively in the literature. Relevant publications include: Aijmer (2002),

260

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen (2004), Clift (2001), Defour et al. (2010a), Oh (2000), Powell (1992), Simon-Vandenbergen and Willems (2011), Smith and Jucker (2000), Taglicht (2001), Traugott and Dasher (2002). What follows draws on these earlier studies. The earliest instances of actually from the 16th C illustrate a very concrete sense of reality connected with deeds, a reference to things that have been attested in deeds or that are considered real in an empirical and objective sense. Example (1) shows this meaning: (1)

Albeit that our estate in this imperiall Crowne wherof we be actually and really possessed, as partely may appere by our Proclamacion wherin our tytle is published, is not ne can be in any wise doubtfull to all suche our good faithfull subjects as, [. . .] (CEECS, Original letters, illustrative of English history; [. . .]: 1520–1586) [from Defour et al. 2010a: 177]

In that period actually frequently collocates with really in contexts where there is explicit reference to what can be proven to be real, in contrast with what is imagined. Example (2) illustrates this. (2)

And therefore in answer to it, I desire these following particulars may be considered. First, That this which they say, rather proves what God should have done according to their fancy, than what he hath really and actually done. My Text expresly bids Christians to try the Spirits, which to any man’s sense does imply that they may judge of these matters: But the Church of Rome says they may not; [. . .] (HC, Tillotson, sermons: 1640–1710) [from Defour et al. 2010a: 182 ]. In present-day English actually can be clause-integrated, as in (3):

(3)

Alan [. . .] harboured for months the idea of telling her that he and Pam knew about Jeremy. But he knew that he never actually would. (BNC, written)

When clause-internal it often has the following element in its scope, selecting it in contrast with others. Example (4) demonstrates this focusing function. (4) So I think possibly a little more thought in the actual, I think the actual shape of the girl there, the way she’s actually sitting is fine but er it it looks as if she’s been propped up with, you know, you better put this stool under your foot to hold that up and put that crutch under your arm to hold that up It looks as if she’s had these things put there to support her rather than actually casually sitting on them. (BNC, spoken)

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

261

Such focusing function is also present in example (5), which has the additional implication of scalarity, indicating that the speaker “envisages a scale of properties with the content of that phrase at the top” and thus implying that “any property below it on the scale would make the expression too weak” (Taglicht 2001: 2). (5)

Then he took the clipping down again because the photograph made her look thin. Or perhaps she actually was thin now. (BNC, written)

In example (5) saying that somebody was thin is a stronger statement than that she merely looked thin (note the possibility of using merely in such contexts), as it contrasts reality with appearance. The development from a reference to reality to scalarity is thus a logical and predictable one. We shall come back to this point. Actually further functions as a propositional modifier, as in example (6). (6) Planning to despise the film as a poor substitute for classic drama, Comfort had actually found it touchingly romantic, but oddly disturbing too. (BNC, written) In (6) the reality as it turned out to be is contrasted with what was planned. A further development took actually on the cline towards loss of semantic content and an increase of pragmatic functions, both textual and interpersonal. Example (7) illustrates how actually is used to soften the abruptness of the introduction of a new (sub-)topic. (7)

“She said she’ll tell you a bit more about the Sunday, about the production we’re gonna put on.” Good. “But I hope it. . . Mum.” What? “Do er. . .aha. . . mm. . .actually, is this a paracetamol?” Mhm. You got a sore head have you? (BNC, spoken)

The textual/interpersonal function of actually has also been described as softening disagreement or introducing a diverging viewpoint, in sum announcing counter-expectation (Smith and Jucker 2000; Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2004). The frequency of actually in informal spoken discourse can be explained from its development into a discourse marker with various attitudinal meanings, which has turned into a hedging device conveying weak commitment. At least with some speakers it has become routinised. This is clear in example (8).

262

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

(8) Yeah I felt I feel a bit sorry for Hannah actually cos I do, I mean actually she’s alright but if she wa, if she wasn’t Hannah inside, she’s got a bit dodgy eyes though! Mm. She’s a bit Yeah. Oh I feel really sorry for her actually cos I’m I know if I had it I’d just feel really awful. (BNC, spoken)

4.2 In fact The meaning development of in fact has likewise been studied by a number of scholars, including Defour et al. (2010b), Oh (2000), Powell (1992), Schwenter and Traugott (2000), Simon-Vandenbergen and Willems (2011), Traugott and Dasher (2002). The summary below draws on these studies. The earliest occurrences of the noun fact (< Latin factum) are found in the 16th C. The noun referred to a physical action or deed (“a thing done or performed” – OED). Defour et al. (2010b) found the earliest occurrence of in fact in 1571. This is example (9). (9) [. . .] whether you have done any thing to the Destruction of the Prince’s Person, if the Lords, upon the Evidence already produc’d, do think the Matters true in Fact that are already alledg’d against you, surely the same must needs be constructed a compassing of the Queen’s Death; (CED, Trial of Thomas Howard Duke of Norfolk: 1571 [publication date 1730]) [Defour et al. 2010b: 451] The meaning in (9) is ‘in practice’, ‘as shown by factual evidence’. The data then show a development from reference to what is empirically witnessed to what is experienced as real. Example (10) illustrates that this epistemic meaning often occurred in contrastive contexts. (10) Here the reader may be apt to conclude that the bailiff, instead of being a friend, was really an enemy to poor Booth; but, in fact, he was not so. His desire was no more than to accumulate bail-bonds; (Clmetev: Fielding, H.: Amelia: 1751) [Defour et al. 2010b: 452] The further step is the development of an additive textual function, expressing rhetorical strengthening (‘what’s more’), as shown in (11). (11)

It is New Year’s Eve to-day, and nearly nine months since I came up to London. Tempus fugit! In fact tempus is fugit-ing most fearfully, considering that I am twenty-one on Sunday next, you know, and that I haven’t begun to do anything really. (Clmetev, Caine, H., The Christian: 1897) [Defour et al. 2010b: 452]

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

263

In present-day English in fact, like actually, can be clause-integrated (example 12), a propositional modifier (example 13) and a discourse marker (example 14). (12)

Humanity, comfortably engaged elsewhere in the business of living, is absent in fact but everywhere in feeling. [Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 11]

(13) Humanity is in fact absent. [Traugott and Dasher 2002: 157] (14) Humanity is not often present. In fact, it/humanity is usually absent. [Traugott and Dasher 2002: 158] Summing up, there are clear parallels between the developments of actually and in fact: both started as references to concrete acts, then developed into epistemic statements of reality and truth, and finally developed textual and interpersonal functions, following a cline towards subjectification and intersubjectification. There are also differences: clause-internal actually (but not in fact) is an emphasizer, while clause-internal in fact (but not actually) is a circumstantial adverbial meaning ‘in verifiable, visible practice’.

4.3 Really The earlier studies on really which the account below is based on are Bolinger (1972), Defour (2012), Lorenz (2002), Paradis (2003), Powell (1992), Stenström (1986, 2002), Simon-Vandenbergen (1988), Willems and Demol (2006). Powell (1992) sketches a diachronic development from an “externally situated” use to increasingly pragmatic and subjective uses. An early referential use is illustrated in (15). (15)

Þou arte in this sacramente not figurally but really and bodily (MED, realli adv. (a): 1450) [from Defour 2012: 86]

From this clause-internal use we note two parallel developments, one towards greater scope (towards a propositional modifier) and one towards lesser scope (towards an intensifier). The following situation obtains in present-day English, according to Paradis (2003): in fact functions at phrase level (example 16), as integrated at clause level (example 17) and as a propositional modifier (example 18).

264

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

(16) Hugh is apparently really rude about everyone especially when he gets drunk. (Paradis 2003: 7) (17)

I meant to go to the choir tonight but I really can’t be bothered. (Paradis 2003: 6)

(18) Really that’s quite good. (Paradis 2003: 5) It makes sense, though, to add the development into a discourse marker to this classification. Stenström (1986, 2002) notes several pragmatic functions in interaction, going from textual ones (such as “reopener”) to interpersonal ones such as softening the proposition. In (19) really is a move in interaction to elicit confirmation, in (20) it is a softener. (19) B: . . . and that was you know in times I can remember A: really A: good Lord B: oh yes A: yes (S.2.3.34) [from Stenström 1986: 160) (20) which is quite revealing really I think. (S.2.9.333) [from Stenström 1986: 157) Stenström notes this softening, face-saving and mitigating function especially in final position (1986: 157), in which position it can become “entirely void of meaning” and reflect a “mannerism” (1986: 159). What is interesting is the coexistence of two seemingly contradictory functions: “Due to semantic bleaching, really can either reflect strong commitment and be used as an intensifier or weak commitment and be used as a hedge” (Stenström 2002: 306). The mitigating function is especially found in spoken data, as illustrated in (21), (22), (23): (21)

We might not be able to use our shapes until tomorrow, which will be a pity won’t it really? (BNC, spoken)

(22)

Well I, I’d be wearing them at weekends so you know just just slouching around in really, well you know, perhaps cycling yeah. (BNC, spoken)

(23) And er there wasn’t much difference really. (BNC, spoken) In the written data there are clear instances of contrastive and counter-expectation really, as in (24) and (25).

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

265

(24) Men fear rejection, disdain and loneliness only because they have never experienced them or if they have experienced them, they have felt only the normal reactions of despair and unhappiness. But if these conditions are entered into with an open mind the reality is very different. A new emotion of tingling heat and cold intermingled, and this sensation is not despair but an austere joy. These emotions and conditions then that men fear so greatly are really very sweet and delightful. (BNC, written) (25) The so-called first published (English) edition is really the second edition. (BNC, written)

4.4 Truly In contrast with the other three adverbs, truly has received less attention. The following are relevant studies: Bolinger (1972), Lenker (2007), Defour (2012), Simon-Vandenbergen and Taverniers (forthcoming). The following summary draws heavily on Lenker (2007) for the diachronic account and on Simon-Vandenbergen and Taverniers (forthcoming) for the synchronic description. Lenker (2007) sketches the development of truly from a clause-integrated manner adverb with the meaning ‘faithfully’, ‘loyally’ (example 26) to a clauseintegrated emphasizer (27), an epistemic propositional modifier (28) to a discourse marker (29). This is an evolution very similar to that of the other three adverbs. Here are the examples taken from Lenker (2007). (26) He was also a lerned man, a clerk, /That Cristes gospel trewely wolde preche. (Chaucer, GP (1) 480–481) [from Lenker 2007: 91] (27) . . .and seiden, We camen to the lond, to which thou sentest vs, which lond treuli flowith with mylk and hony. . . (Wycliff Bible, Numbers XIII.27) [from Lenker 2007: 92] (28) For trewli, fader, I love oon. (Gower, Confessio Amantis, 5.2536) [from Lenker 2007: 92] (29)

And ye shall understonde that looke, by any wey, whan any man shal chastise another, that he be ware from chidynge or reprevynge. For trewely, but he be war, he may ful lightly quyken the fir of angre and of wratthe, which that he sholde quenche. (Chaucer, ParsT, (10) 628) Understand, in any case, that when a man has to chastise another, he should beware lest he chide or reproach him. For [Marker], unless he be wary, he may very easily kindle the fire of anger and wrath, which he should quench. [from Lenker 2007: 93]

266

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

Simon-Vandenbergen and Taverniers (forthcoming) show how truly behaves in present-day English on the basis of a sample of 200 instances from the BNC. It appears that the adverb is frequently used at phrase level, as a premodifier before adjectives. In this function it occurs before different types of adjectives with the meaning ‘having characteristic x in the proper sense of the term’, ‘having characteristics which justify the use of the term’. Example (30) illustrates this. (30) To suggest that delegates from a conference of existing trades would reflect a truly national view, would be misleading. (BNC, spoken) Truly national means ‘national in the proper sense of the term’ or ‘national in its prototypical sense’. Such adjectives as national, unique, federal are not gradable. What truly adds is the focus on the quality in its most “basic” sense, thereby implicitly contrasting its applicability with other cases which are more marginal. Another class of adjectives frequently modified by truly consists of words describing evaluations with extreme force, such as great, magnificent, massive, outstanding, radical, shameful, significant, spectacular, staggering, terrible, wonderful. Again, truly adds that all the conditions for the use of such an extreme term are fulfilled. Thirdly, there are cases – though less frequent – of truly premodifying gradable adjectives, such as good, happy, honest, knowledgeable, modern. How does premodifying truly compare with really in such cases? Bolinger (1972: 95) claimed that: “[Truly] has become a virtual intensifier, but has yet to attain the full status that its synonym real(ly) has in some dialects”. This is still the case in the BNC sample. While really before gradable qualities can be paraphrased by “very”, truly signifies “in a genuine way”. Both adverbs are identifiers, but only really has become an intensifier. However, it is clear that the meanings of focus and degree are very close to each other and that the development from focus to degree in gradable contexts is pragmatically predictable (See further section 7). Truly is also used within the clause with limited scope. The sense is the same, viz ‘in the real sense of the word’, as in example (31). (31) the roar of the engines that meant their journey had truly begun. (BNC, written) In (31) above truly can be replaced by really without any great difference in meaning, and the implication of (31) is that until the roar of the engines was heard their journey had “not really begun” (even though preparations had been already been made which could in a broader sense be interpreted as part of the “beginning”).

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

267

In contexts where truly focuses on emotions the implication is not only that they are “really” felt but also that they are sincere. Compare example (32). (32) She didn’t apologize, though; there was no point unless you truly regretted hurting the person your poison was aimed at. (BNC, written) The original meanings of ‘loyal’, ‘faithful’ and hence ‘sincere’, ‘honest’ are still part of the semantic make-up of true/truly and distinguish it from real/really. As a propositional modifier Quirk et al. (1985) classify truly as a style disjunct while Biber et al. (1999) see it as a “stance adverbial” (see section 3 above). As example (33) shows, the distinction between I am speaking the truth and It is the truth is subtle and often hard to make. (33) I’m sorry you’re so bitter about it all, but truly it was none of my doing. (BNC, written) Nevertheless, there are arguments for considering truly to occupy a position in between content and style disjuncts, unlike really, actually and in fact. These arguments are given in Simon-Vandenbergen and Taverniers (forthcoming) and are not repeated here. Finally, Lenker (2007) mentions discourse marker truly especially in the collocation for truly. This use is now archaic. It is illustrated in (34). (34) For truly I say to you, if you have faith as a grain of mustard seed, you will say to this mountain, move from here to there and it will move. (Sermon, BNC spoken) The BNC sample has few cases where truly can be unambiguously identified as a discourse marker. Those cases, however, are instances of the collocation really and truly, as in (35). (35) But I know I could remember being taken round this school and in the main hall he’d got a glass fronted cupboard, and he’d got all sorts of well really and truly they were just pretty pebbles. I don’t think they were anything much more than that. (BNC, spoken) Summing up, we find parallels between the four adverbs, both in the developmental paths they have covered and in their present-day behaviour. We also find subtle differences which are partly the result of their core semantic senses, partly of the stages in the grammaticalization process they have reached. Let us now take a look at the cross-linguistic data for more insight into the overlaps and differences.

268

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

5 Evidence from the translation corpora: cross-linguistic correspondences in Dutch and in French 5.1 The prototypical equivalents Table 5 shows the most frequent Dutch equivalents of each of the four adverbs. The figures in bold indicate which Dutch word can be considered the prototypical equivalent. Table 5: The most frequent Dutch translation correspondences of actually, in fact, really, and truly in the Namur corpus Dutch

in fact Total = 83

actually Total = 76

really Total = 100

truly Total = 22

in feite (‘in fact’) eigenlijk (‘in essence’) inderdaad (‘indeed’) werkelijk (‘really’) echt (‘really’)

14 (17%) 8 (9.5%) 7 ― ―

8 (10.5%) 14 (18.5%) ― 6 5

4 8 1 22 (22%) 21 (21%)

― ― ― 10 (45.5%) 3

There are two types of questions that are relevant in this context. The first is that of similarities/differences between the four adverbs as they can be deduced from shared as well as from non-shared translations. It appears that the closest similarities exist between in fact and actually on the one hand and between really and truly on the other hand. Nevertheless, there are also overlaps between in fact, actually and really and between actually, really and truly. The greatest distance obtains between in fact and truly. The second question is what the correspondences tell us about the connections between the semantic concepts denoted by the adverbs in the two languages. This question comes down to connecting the core senses of the adverbs, disregarding their pragmatic uses for the purpose. This gives the following realisations of the semantic concepts (note that only the prototypical equivalents appearing in Table 5 are considered here, less frequent realisations are given in brackets where relevant). FACT:

E in fact, D in feite E actually, (D daadwerkelijk) REALITY: E really, D werkelijk, echt TRUTH : E truly, (D waarlijk, voorwaar) ESSENCE : D eigenlijk ACT:

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

269

The translations in Table 5 show that there are connections between the domains of ACT and ESSENCE : the prototypical equivalent of actually (ACT ) is eigenlijk (ESSENCE ). There are also connections between TRUTH and REALITY: the prototypical equivalents of truly (TRUTH ) are werkelijk and echt (both REALITY adverbs). Let us compare these findings with the French data, presented in Table 6. Table 6: The most frequent French translation correspondences of actually, in fact, really, and truly in the Namur corpus French

in fact Total = 163

actually Total = 131

really Total = 194

truly Total = 19

en fait (‘in fact’) vraiment (‘truly’) en réalité (‘in reality’) effectivement (‘effectively’) réellement (‘really’) en effet (‘indeed’) véritablement (‘truly’)

54 (33%) 1 10 (6%) 8 (5%) 2 12 (7.5%) –

27 (20.5%) 11 (8.5%) 8 (6%) 8 (6%) 6 (4.5%) 1 3

10 (5%) 65 (33.5%) 2 3 17 (9%) 1 7 (3.5%)

– 7 (37%) – – – – 2

The situation is partly similar and partly different in French as compared with Dutch. What is similar is that (i) the greatest closeness obtains between in fact and actually on the one hand (en fait covers both) and between really and truly on the other hand (vraiment covers both); (ii) there is overlap between in fact, actually, and really; (iii) the greatest distance is visible between in fact and truly, which share few equivalents. What is different from Dutch is that in fact and actually have the same prototypical equivalents (en fait) and so do really and truly (vraiment). The reason for the former is that the French cognate form of actually, viz. actuellement, only has a temporal sense in present-day French (see Defour et al. 2010a; Simon-Vandenbergen and Willems 2011). The high frequency of vraiment and corresponding low frequency of réellement as the equivalent of really was noted and discussed in Willems and Demol (2006). For a diachronic account of really and vraiment, see D’Hondt and Defour (2012). What does this mean for the connections between the semantic domains? The core senses of the prototypical French equivalents are given below, with the less frequent adverbs in brackets for comparison: FACT:

E in fact, F en fait ACT: E actually REALITY: E really (F réellement) TRUTH : E truly, F vraiment ESSENCE : (F à proprement parler, au fond) SINCERITY: (F sincèrement)

270

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

The prototypical translation equivalents in Table 6 show that there are overlaps between the semantic domains of ACT and FACT and between REALITY and TRUTH . When the less frequent equivalents are taken into account in both Dutch and French, connections are shown to exist between all semantic domains, though with varying degrees of distance. Let us consider example (36). (36)

But really and truly I must have answers to questions. (Namur, DBEN:007:001) Mais vraiment, sincèrement, il nous faut des réponses à nos questions. (English source)

In (36), even though the collocation really and truly might seem to call for the equivalent réellement for really, the translator opted for the prototypical one vraiment (which expresses TRUTH ) and contrasts it with sincèrement (SINCERITY ) to render the sense of truly. Example (37) shows that the domain of ESSENCE is also connected: (37)

The Topman report really involves two votes, namely . . . (Namur, DVEF:013:001) Wat betreft het verslag-Topman gaat het eigenlijk om twee stemmingen, namelijk . . . En ce qui concerne le rapport Topman, il s’agit à proprement parler de deux votes, à savoir . . . (Dutch source)

The Dutch adverb eigenlijk, which serves as the source item in (37) and which denotes ESSENCE is translated by really (REALITY ) in English and by à proprement parler ‘properly speaking’ (ESSENCE ) in French.

5.2 The less frequent correspondences Less frequent correspondences also give an insight into more contextually bound meanings and pragmatic interpretations of words. The more important of these infrequent translations are discussed below. They are important because they are not shared with the other adverbs and thus signal meanings which characterise the adverb in question uniquely. First, really is sometimes translated by degree words: French très (‘very’), tout à fait (‘totally’), (pas) trop (‘[not] too much’), parfaitement (‘perfectly’), super, Dutch heel erg (‘very much’), niet erg (‘not very’), echt (‘really’), zeer

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

271

(‘very’), erg (‘terribly’), helemaal (‘totally’). This type of equivalent does not occur for the other three adverbs. It has been shown (e.g. Lorenz 2002, Paradis 2003) that really indeed functions as a degree marker before words denoting gradable concepts. Example (38) illustrates this. (38) I really do understand, respect and indeed share the concern that the honourable gentleman has expressed about the widows he refers to. (Namur, DWEH:021:001) Je comprends parfaitement, je respecte et je partage vraiment les préoccupations qu’inspire à l’honorable parlementaire la situation des veuves de guerre. (English source) Second, in fact is sometimes translated by markers of elaboration, with the meanings ‘furthermore’ (addition) and rhetorical strengthening (‘what’s more’). This development has been described by Schwenter and Traugott (2000). Dutch equivalents are trouwens (‘besides’), zelfs (‘even’), ja (‘yes’: strengthening), bovendien (‘furthermore’). French translations in the data are d’ailleurs (‘besides’), meme (‘even’). These are not found as correspondences of the other adverbs. Example (39) illustrates this. (39)

I am surprised – in fact very surprised now – to hear that the Commission’s own Scientific and Veterinary Committee made recommendations on feeding and watering and that the Commission itself has chosen to ignore the advice of its own committee. (Namur, DBEK:002:001) Or, quelle n’a pas été ma surprise – ma très grande surprise même – d’ apprendre que . . .

Third, both actually and really are sometimes translated by markers of counterexpectation, such as Dutch toch eigenlijk (‘yet in fact’), toch wel (‘yet’, ‘even so’), uiteindelijk toch (‘nevertheless in the end’); French au contraire (‘on the contrary’), pourtant (‘yet’), quand meme (‘even so’). See Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen (2004) and Smith and Jucker (2000) on the function of signalling that the following utterance is not in line with expectations. Here is an example: (40)

I might add that price cuts resulting from CAP reform should actually provide the European feeding stuffs industry with a potential source of EC-grown ingredients whose price will be declining. (Namur, DBEI:007:001) Je me permettrai d’ajouter que la baisse des prix découlant de la réforme de la PAC devrait, au contraire, garantir à l’industrie européenne de l’alimentation animale une source potentielle de produits communautaires dont le coût chuterait. (English source)

272

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

The functions of boosting the force, elaboration/extension and counter-expectation are pragmatic functions which the adverbs have acquired to a greater or lesser degree. Lewis (forthcoming) for example points out that in fact also has a contrastive or antithetical meaning in some contexts but that it is only elaborative in fact which has been fully lexicalised and has become a discourse marker. In present-day English conversation elaborative in fact accounts, according to Lewis, for 72% of all occurrences.

6 Connections between the semantic concepts: towards a semantic map The link between reality and truth is formulated by Paradis (2003) in the following way: “Epistemic modifiers presuppose that there is some kind of evidence on which an assertion is based. The evidence that is presupposed by really is that of ‘reality’ and by implication ‘truth’” (Paradis 2003: 3). “[T]he content proper of really is [REALITY ] and by implication [TRUTH ]” (Paradis 2003: 4). As Paradis explains, epistemic modality markers express “the speaker’s judgement of the truth of the proposition based on what is known to be part of reality” (2003: 4). Most definitions of epistemic modality link the concepts of “reality” and “truth”. The following connections are here proposed: R EALITY is the central concept, to be known via evidence. All four adverbs express that a state of affairs is “real” and not “imagined”. ACTS provide empirical evidence of reality; they are phenomena, in contrast with FACTS which are mental projections of events and are in that sense metaphenomena, they are not material but semiotic (see Halliday 2004: 205). T RUTH is an intersubjective concept: it is dialogic and applies to attestations of reality. Fetzer (2007), discussing ways in which claims may be accepted or rejected by the interlocutor, distinguishes between claims which accept or reject the validity of prior claims on the basis of the “objective world” as true or not true; on the basis of the “social world” as appropriate or not appropriate; and on the basis of the “subjective world” as sincere or not sincere. I accept this distinction, but prefer to replace “objective world” by “intersubjective world” as far as TRUTH is concerned. Finally, there is ESSENCE as a related domain. E SSENCE and PROTOTYPICALITY are linked to REALITY: a real teacher, a true scholar are references to prototypical instances of the class of teachers and scholars respectively: they have the essential characteristics, they are teachers/scholars having the indispensable qualities that make someone a teacher/scholar. This means that when something is said to be “real”, it means firstly that it is not imagined, but secondly that it is

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

273

a central member of the class. X is really/truly Y thus means ‘X is centrally/ essentially Y’. Figure 2 shows the semantic connections and the areas covered by the individual adverbs as evidenced by the monolingual corpus data and the most frequent translations.

Figure 2: The English adverbs actually, in fact, really, truly in a semantic map: prototypical realizations (italics) and areas covered (circled areas)

How should we read this map? R EALITY as the central concept is prototypically expressed by really, of which it is the core sense. The vertical axis has ACT and FACT, two types of grounding for claims about reality: physical acts and mental projections. They are prototypically expressed by actually and in fact respectively. On the horizontal axis to the right of REALITY lie TRUTH and SINCERITY, intersubjective and subjective concepts respectively and prototypically expressed in English by truly and sincerely respectively. On the horizontal axis to the left we place ESSENCE as the concept linked to REALITY because the essence of things is considered its reality: X is not really bad means that “X may appear to be bad but in essence he/she is not”. It is prototypically expressed by essentially. The domain of ESSENCE is picked up again in section 8. The bounded areas reflect what is covered by the English adverbs. The most striking feature is the large amount of overlap between them. Important differences are the following: First, truly operates on the horizontal axis only, i.e. it does not express the grounding of the reality claim. Secondly, in fact operates on the vertical axis only, i.e. it primarily expresses textual coherence rather than the more subjective stances on reality. Actually is close to in fact but also expresses that something is “in essence” the case (see the focusing function

274

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

as illustrated in examples (4) and (5) above). Finally, really covers the largest domain: uses and cross-linguistic equivalents show that it has a wide applicability. It does, however, not seem to express the subjective concept of sincerity.

7 Pragmatic meaning extensions: towards a pragmatic map The link between reality and essence brings into the picture two related grammatical categories, viz. FOCUS and FORCE . These are two different types of grading. F OCUS is graduation according to prototypicality: by means of upscaling or sharpening of the specification prototypicality is indicated (real, true), while by means of downscaling or softening the instance is characterized as having marginal membership (kind of, sort of ). Thus a genuinely red carpet means a prototypical red carpet. F ORCE is graduation according to degree of intensity (very vs. a bit) (See Martin and White 2005). P ROTOTYPICALITY, FOCUS and FORCE are linked since sharpening the focus is close to expressing a high degree of something and vice versa. A real friend is focus (sharpening, “a prototypical friend”), really hurt (sharpening plus intensifying, “badly hurt”) (Quirk et al. 1985: 583). Development of degree modifiers from emphasizers has been well documented: really happy means both “happy in the true sense of the word” and “very happy” (see e.g. Lorenz 2002; Paradis 2003). Figure 3 presents the pragmatic developments of the four adverbs in a pragmatic map. We will ignore basically for the moment, but see section 8 on this adverb.

Figure 3: The English adverbs actually, in fact, really, truly and basically in a pragmatic map

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

275

Figure 3 shows the truth-averring function to be central and the starting point of further textual and interpersonal meanings of the adverbs. It is shared by all four adverbs and the only one of truly, which has not undergone the same pragmaticalization processes as the other three adverbs. On the vertical axis are textual functions: counter-expectation is particularly expressed by actually and really, while in fact conveys mainly elaboration (see section 4 above). On the horizontal axis are interpersonal functions of raising or lowering the FORCE : the adverb really has developed a boosting function as well as a downtoning function, while actually has acquired a softening function only (see section 4 above).

8 A closer look at ESSENCE The semantic concept of ESSENCE has been shown to be connected with that of REALITY. There were several findings to point to such a connection. One was the semantics of truly, which conveys the sense of “in essence”, “properly speaking”, hence prototypicality. Next, really and actually also have a focusing function in some uses, conveying that the item in their focus is to be interpreted in its prototypical sense (in such instances as I did not actually lie, I just did not tell the whole truth; Were her exams really good or just acceptable?). Further, evidence from translation data suggested a connection in that Dutch and French correspondences in some cases had ESSENCE as their core sense (see Figure 1). Figure 1 also shows that more words, which can be grouped as ESSENCE and FOCUS are brought into the picture. This section takes a closer look at those domains. The concept of ESSENCE is prototypically expressed in English by three adverbs which “state the sense in which the speaker judges what he says to be true or false” (Quirk et al. 1985: 621). These are basically, essentially and fundamentally. These adverbs have been dealt with extensively especially from a contrastive point of view in Butler (2008a,b,c). Simon-Vandenbergen (in press) examines their semantics and pragmatics in English making use of insights from the Namur translation corpus. This section briefly sums up the results of these studies as far as they are relevant to demonstrating the connections between REALITY and ESSENCE on the one hand and between ESSENCE and FOCUS on the other hand. First, it appears that basically has undergone pragmaticalization to an extent that fundamentally and essentially have not. It has acquired a textual function of summing up, especially in collocation with so. This textual extension can be called elaboration: summative (Halliday 2004). Example (41) is an illustration of this sense. (41) So basically what I’m saying is, get on the blower and call Jenny this afternoon from one o’clock. (BNC, spoken)

276

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

Further, basically has developed the pragmatic functions of softening, attenuating the force of the utterance and has even become a routine marker in casual spoken language. This pragmatic function brings basically close to really and actually. It is especially clear in collocations with well and just. Example (42) illustrates this. (42) Cos the rest of it is just basically straight across basically you’re just cutting across. Oh I see. Well you well basically all the ma, there’s like three or four main roads and we just cut straight across it like. (BNC, spoken) Basically thus has two seemingly opposite functions: “in the most fundamental, important respects”, sharpening the focus on the one hand; “by and large”, “more or less”, approximating and blurring the focus on the other hand. In that sense it follows the development of really, which likewise boosts and softens, heightening and lessening the speaker’s commitment depending on the semantic-pragmatic context. Dutch and French cross-linguistic equivalents of basically are of three main types: adverbs expressing ESSENCE , APPROXIMATION and PARTICULARIZATION . Table 7, which gives the French equivalents, also has one instance of an AMPLIFIER as an equivalent but this type of translation does not occur in the Dutch translation sample and it is a less important domain as far as basically is concerned. Table 7: French correspondences of basically (from Simon-Vandenbergen, in press). One x means that this correspondence was found, xx means that it occurred more than once in the data Equivalents

basically

ESSENCE en principe (‘in principle’) essentiellement (‘essentially’) pour l’essentiel (‘essentially’) fondamentalement (‘fundamentally’) au fond (‘at bottom’) en soi (‘in itself’)

x xx xx x xx x

PARTICULARIZERS principalement (‘mainly’) surtout (‘especially’)

xx x

APPROXIMATORS dans l’ensemble (‘in general’) environ (‘about’)

x x

AMPLIFIERS très (‘very’)

x

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

277

Figure 4 places basically in the semantic map.

Figure 4: Basically in the semantic map

The place of basically in the pragmatic map is indicated in Figure 3 (see section 7 above). Its pragmatic functions are, apart from the central truth-averring function, textual (elaboration: summative) and intersubjective (downtoning). The map shows that the function of boosting is indicated as being expressed by really only, because it is the only adverb which can be paraphrased by very in gradable contexts (see section 4.3).

9 Conclusions and suggestions for further research The main conclusions of the research presented in this article are to be summed up as follows. First, it has been shown how the semantic domain of REALITY, expressed in English by a number of epistemic adverbs which convey the speaker’s stance in this regard, is connected with a number of other domains, in particular TRUTH , but also ACT and FACT. Other domains which appear in the picture are those of ESSENCE and of SINCERITY. Second, pragmatic developments of the adverbs show that the grammatical categories of FOCUS (degree of prototypicality) and FORCE (degrees of intensity) are also explicable from the semantics of REALITY. This has led to the tentative construction of semantic and pragmatic maps on which the English adverbs are plotted, showing their core senses, their semantic extensions and their main pragmatic developments.

278

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

The methodology used here was corpus research, making use of monolingual and translation data. The cross-linguistic evidence used was restricted to Dutch and French, and the translation corpora were fairly small. Verification and elaboration are necessary, both using larger corpora (possibly bringing in more types of correspondences, possibly corroborating the results with more quantitative evidence) and more languages. It is not unlikely that more languages will introduce other semantic domains and pragmatic extensions in the maps. The connections between the semantic concepts were established on a purely empirical basis, looking at their expression in three languages. It is necessary to elaborate the concepts within a theoretical paradigm, preferably a cognitivefunctional one. The status of ‘essence’ and ‘prototypicality’ and their relation to ‘reality’ in particular need theoretical underpinning.

Acknowledgement The research reported in this article was carried out with the support of the IUAP grant P6/44 Grammmaticalization and (Inter)Subjectification, financed by the Belgian Federal Government.

References Aijmer, Karin. 2002. English Discourse Particles. Evidence from a Corpus. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Aijmer, Karin and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen. 2004. A model and a methodology for the study of pragmatic markers: The semantic field of expectation. Journal of Pragmatics 36: 1781–1805. Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad and Edward Finegan. 1999. Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. London: Longman. Bolinger, Dwight. 1972. Degree Words. The Hague/Paris: Mouton. Butler, Christopher S. 2008a. “Basically speaking”. A corpus-based analysis of three English adverbs and their formal equivalents in Spanish. In: María de los Ángeles Gómez González (ed.), Current Trends in Contrastive Linguistics. Functional and Cognitive Perspectives, 147–176. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Butler, Christopher S. 2008b. The subjectivity of basically in British English – a corpus-based study. In: Jesús Romero-Trillo (ed.), Pragmatics and Corpus Linguistics, 37–63. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Butler, Christopher S. 2008c. Three English adverbs and their formal equivalents in Romance languages. A corpus-based collocational study. Languages in Contrast 8(1): 107–124. Clift, Rebecca. 2001. Meaning in interaction: the case of actually. Language 77(2): 245–91.

Towards a semantic-pragmatic map of English adverbs

279

Culpeper, Jonathan and Merja Kytö. 1997. Towards a Corpus of Dialogues, 1550–1750. In: Heinrich Ramisch and Wynne Kenneth (eds.), Language in Time and Space: Studies in Honour of Wolfgang Viereck on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday. (Zeitschrift für Dialektologie und Linguistik (ZDL) – Beihefte 97), 60–73. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Culpeper, Jonathan and Merja Kytö. 2000. Data in historical pragmatics. Spoken interaction (re) cast as writing. Journal of Historical Pragmatics 1(2): 175–199. Defour, Tine. 2012. The pragmaticalization and intensification of verily, truly and really: A corpus-based study on the developments of three truth-identifying adverbs. In: Manfred Markus, Yoko Iyeiri, Reinhard Heuberger and Emil Chamson (eds.), Middle and Modern English Corpus Linguistics: A multi-dimensional approach, 75–92. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Defour, Tine, Ulrique D’Hondt, Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen and Dominique Willems. 2010 a. Degrees of pragmaticalization: The divergent histories of actually and actuellement. In: Peter Lauwers, Gudrun Vanderbauwhede and Stijn Verleyen (eds.), Special Issue Pragmatic Markers and Pragmaticalization: Lessons from false friends. Languages in Contrast 10(2): 166–193. Defour, Tine, Ulrique D’Hondt, Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen and Dominique Willems. 2010 b. In fact, en fait, de fait, au fait: A contrastive study of the synchronic correspondences and diachronic development of French and English cognates. Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 111(4): 433–463. D’Hondt, Ulrique and Tine Defour. 2012. At the crossroads of grammaticalization and pragmaticalization: A diachronic cross-linguistic case study of vraiment and really. Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 113(2): 169–190. Fetzer, Anita. 2007. Challenges in political interviews. An intercultural analysis. In: Anita Fetzer and Gerda E. Lauerbach (eds.), Political Discourse in the Media, 163–195. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Halliday, M.A.K. 2004 [1985]. An Introduction to Functional Grammar. 3rd edition. Revised by Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen. London: Arnold. Johansson, Stig. 2007. Seeing through Multilingual Corpora. On the use of corpora in contrastive studies. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Lenker, Ursula. 2007. Soƥlice, forsoothe, truly – communicative principles and invited inferences in the history of truth-intensifying adverbs in English. In: Susan Fitzmaurice and Irma Taavitsainen (eds.), Methods in Historical Pragmatics, 81–106. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Lewis, Diana. Forthcoming. Discourse patterns in the development of discourse markers in English. Paper presented at the IAUPE conference in Malta, 19–23 July 2010. Forthcoming in Functions of Language. Lorenz, Gunter. 2002. Really worthwhile or not really significant? A corpus-based approach to the delexicalization and grammaticalization of intensifiers in Modern English. In: Ilse Wischer and Gabriele Diewald (eds.) New Reflections on Grammaticalization, 143–162. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Martin, James. R. and Peter R.R. White. 2005. The Language of Evaluation. Appraisal in English. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Oh, Sun-Young. 2000. Actually and in fact in American English: a data-based analysis. English Language and Linguistics 4: 243–68. Paradis, Carita. 2003. Between epistemic modality and degree: the case of really. In: Roberta Facchinetti, Frank Palmer and Manfred Krug (eds.), Modality in Contemporary English, 197–220. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

280

Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen

Powell, Mava J. 1992. The systematic development of correlated interpersonal and metalinguistic uses in stance adverbs. Cognitive Linguistics 3(1): 75–110. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik. 1985. A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language. London: Longman. Scheibman, Joanne. 2002. Point of View and Grammar: Structural Patterns of Subjectivity in American English Conversation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Schwenter, Scott A. and Elisabeth C. Traugott. 2000. Invoking scalarity: The development of in fact. Journal of Historical Pragmatics 1(1): 7–25. Simon-Vandenbergen, Anne-Marie. 1988. What really really means in casual conversations and in political interviews. Linguistica Antverpiensia 22: 206–225. Simon-Vandenbergen, Anne-Marie. in press. English adverbs of essence and their equivalents in Dutch and French. In: K. Aijmer and B. Altenberg (eds.), Recent Trends in Contrastive Corpus-based Linguistics. Studies in Memory of Stig Johansson. (Series Studies in Corpus Linguistics.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Simon-Vandenbergen, Anne-Marie and Miriam Taverniers. Forthcoming. The adverb truly in present-day English. In: Gómez González, Ma.A., Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, F., Gonzálvez García, F. (eds.), Essays on Language Function and Language Form: Functional, Cognitive and Applied Perspectives. Dedicated to Christopher S. Butler. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Simon-Vandenbergen, Anne-Marie and Dominique Willems. 2011. Crosslinguistic data as evidence in the grammaticalization debate: The case of discourse markers. In: Liesbeth Degand and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen (eds.), Special issue Grammaticalization, Pragmaticalization and (Inter)subjectification: Methodological Issues in the Study of Discourse Markers. Linguistics 49(2): 333–364. Smith, Sara W. and Andreas H. Jucker. 2000. Actually and other markers of an apparent discrepancy between propositional attitudes of conversational partners. In: Gisle Andersen and Thorstein Fretheim (eds.), Pragmatic Markers and Propositional Attitude, 207–237. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Stenström, Anna-Brita. 1986. What does really really do? Strategies in speech and writing. In: Gunnel Tottie and Ingegerd Bäcklund (eds.), English in Speech and Writing, 149–163. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. Stenström, Anna-Brita. 2002. Taking another look at really. In: Sybil Scholz, Monika KlagesKubitzki, Evelyn Hantson and Ute Römer (eds.), Language: Context and Cognition. Papers in Honour of Wolf-Dietrich Bald’s 60th Birthday, 302–308. München: LangenscheiftLongman. Taglicht, Joseph. 2001. Actually, there’s more to it than meets the eye. English Language and Linguistics 5(1): 1–16. Traugott, Elizabeth C. and Richard B. Dasher. 2002. Regularity in Semantic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Engels-Nederlands. 1984. Edited by W. Martin and Guy A. J. Tops. Utrecht/Amsterdam. Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Nederlands-Engels. 1986. Edited by W. Martin and Guy A. J. Tops. Utrecht/Amsterdam. Willems, Dominique and Annemie Demol. 2006. Vraiment and really in contrast. When truth and reality meet. In: Karin Aijmer and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen (eds.), Pragmatic Markers in Contrast, 215–235. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem 1 Introduction 1.1 The story of seem The semantics and grammar of the English verb seem has deserved much attention in the linguistics world during the last century. Traditionally it has always been regarded as a (semi)copular verb which can be used in a broad range of patterns. Its semantics is very controversial, and has been the cause of much polemic among linguists. Among the first scholars to observe its multifunctional nature were Poutsma (1904, 1926), Austin (1962), and Aijmer (1972, 1980). The basic features discussed are concerned with the meaning of non-factuality, subjective opinion, and epistemic qualification of likelihood. Thus, Poutsma (1926: 6) claims that although the verb seem is included among the copulas, it can “express a purely adverbial notion, indicating . . . certain attitudes of uncertainty on the part of the speaker with regard to the predication”. Moreover, the scholar also stresses the fact that “to seem sometimes approximates to to think” (Poutsma 1904: 128), as in the following example: (1)

I seem to know these fields again. SWEET (Poutsma 1904: 128)

The epistemic nature of seem is explained in terms of semantic compatibility with “may be” (Austin 1962: 38), speaker’s non-commitment (Ransom 1986: 12– 13) and tentativeness of judgement (Wierzbicka 1988: 58). Along the same lines, Dixon (1992: 202) observes that seem can occur with “Judgement TO construction” when the author (the “Arbiter”) actually lacks evidence to assert factuality of the statement or description, as in “John seems to be a doctor”. Biber et al. (1999) develop this point of view by distinguishing a separate class of probability verbs with the key verb seem when used in the construction with a to-complement clause. The primary semantic domains that this verb is associated with are “likelihood” and “personal attitudes” (Biber et al. 1999: 439). Barron’s (1997) study of so-called “subject-to-subject raising verbs” draws on the historical development of this type of syntactic structure as triggered exclusively by meaning shift. She claims that “epistemic modals cognate with verbs of perception” like seem (English), videri (Latin), görünmek (Turkish),

282

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

sembrare (Italian), sembler (French), and can derive an epistemic reading and express the source of belief when three conditions are met: “(1) the presence of secondary predication, (2) the suppression of the perceiver argument through detransitivisation, and (3) cognitive shift from a physical to mental process”. The final generalization that Rooryck’s analysis of raising verbs (seem/sembler, believe/croire) and control verbs ( promettre ‘promise’, menacer ‘threaten’, etc.) in French and English leads to is that “verbs which ‘lose’ their canonical thematic structure to function as raising verbs receive a meaning which combines temporal properties with epistemic modality” (Rooryck 1997: 44). This happens exceptionally in the cases of raising when the modal property acquired by the verb imposes a modal interpretation of a CP complement. This does not hold true for control verbs because a CP retains the interpretation of a full argument in a thematic structure, hence there is no movement of the infinitival subject to the matrix clause (Rooryck 1997: 46). In Usonienė (2000), an attempt was made to show that different meanings of the English seem-type verbs are very much complement-type-dependent. The paper suggests making a distinction between directness and indirectness of experience expressed by the semi-copular seem followed by a phrasal category (seem + ØP) as opposed to a catenative seem taking a to (be)-complement clause. The former constructions are regarded as non-modal, subjective, and experiential (hence evidential), while the latter are modal and express the speaker’s assessment of the propositional content, as in the following examples: (2)

She seemed sound enough physically. (2000: 189)

(3)

Some children seem to be thin by heredity. (2000: 199)

Since the publication of the volume edited by Chafe and Nichols (1986) where evidentiality is interpreted very broadly as “any linguistic expression of attitudes toward knowledge” (Chafe 1986: 271) seem-type verbs have been predominantly regarded as evidentials (Chafe 1986; Mithun 1986; Anderson 1986; Aijmer 1996, 1997; de Haan 2007) as they can indicate either inference or hearsay, e.g.: (4) Inductive inference And she absolutely did not seem to know what was going on. (Chafe 1986: 267) (5)

Hearsay It seems that he has been abroad. (Aijmer 1997: 18)

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

283

Although the understanding and interpretation of the category of evidentiality varies (cf. Aikhenvald 2004, 2006) the key semantic content remains the same: coding of the speaker’s source of information on the propositional content. It has been established in the linguistics literature that there are two basic types of source of evidence: direct and indirect (Anderson 1986; Botne 1997; Willett 1988; Plungian 2001; Boye 2010). What seems to pose an array of problems is the content and realizations of the evidential value based on indirect evidence, namely inference. However, inference is also considered to be an epistemic modality value, which has actually led to the categorial confusion of evidentiality and epistemic modality. The complex nature of the interrelationship between the two has been accounted for “in terms of inclusion and overlap” (Cornillie 2009: 47). Cornillie regards evidentiality and epistemic modality as two distinct categories which have similar subdimensions, these being the reliability of knowledge (evidentiality) and speaker commitment (epistemic modality). The solution to the categorial confusion has been based on the following points. First, according to Squartini (2008: 924–926) and Cornillie (2009) there are at least three types of inferences: circumstantial, generic and conjectural. Only conjectures allow for epistemic evaluation, while generic inferential interpretation should be regarded as epistemically indeterminate. Second, Cornillie (2009: 58–59) introduces a notion of reliability of evidential values, based on the opposition of the shared and non-shared status of the evidence. The information is considered to be most reliable when it is based on “the shared (intersubjective)” access to the evidence and when it refers to states of affairs that have already happened. In their diachronic study of the English verbs of appearance, Gisborne and Holmes (2007: 26) claim that the development of evidential meanings preceded the rise of evaluative meanings. The grammaticalization process that these verbs have undergone demonstrates an increase in their syntactic complexity triggered by the acquisition of propositional arguments and semantic bleaching, leading to the development of evidential senses. Moreover, the authors claim that subjectivization is linked to a specific construction which “grammaticalizes subjectivity by making the speaker an argument of the verb” (Gisborne and Holmes 2007: 6). Thus, subjective meanings are said to be constructional and can even be measured. For instance, there is an increase in subjectivity in the following examples (Gisborne and Holmes 2007: 7) where the last construction in (c) with an assumed experiencer, i.e. a linguistically unexpressed argument of the verb is the most subjective as opposed to the third-person-experiencer in (a) and to the identified one in (b):

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

284 (6)

a.

Peter looks drunk to his boss.

b. Peter looks drunk to me. c.

Peter looks drunk.

Lampert and Lampert (2010: 315–316) tend to see the evidential meaning of seem as purely context-dependent, which allows them to postulate that this verb should be “re-conceptualized as a peripheral member of evidentiality” (Lampert and Lampert 2010: 319). Moreover, the construction-type the verb can appear in is not considered to play any role, which disagrees with the point of view which sees the syntax-semantics interface as an important factor in the meaning of the verb (cf. Aijmer 2009: 64; Usonienė 2000: 200). Lately, with the rise of multilingual corpus linguistics and parallel corpora much attention has been devoted to the analysis of correspondences of the verb seem in various languages. It has been claimed that mapping translation correspondences across languages “helps to throw the characteristics of the individual languages into relief” (Johansson 2001: 244) as correspondences are seen as mirror images reflecting meaning. Study findings have revealed that this method is a reliable and effective tool in disclosing the multifunctional nature of various pragmatic markers and modal expressions. Corpus-based cross-linguistic analyses of seem-class verbs in English, Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, Lithuanian (Johansson 2001; Usonienė 2006; de Haan 2007; Aijmer 2009) have shown that there is a significantly low percentage of lexical (congruent) correspondence between them across the languages contrasted. This phenomenon is directly related to the multifunctionality of seem and its high degree of grammaticalization as compared to the seem-class verbs in other European languages. As has been attested in the studies referred to above, crosslinguistically, linguistic items with non-propositional meaning (but with a textual or interpersonal one) have no one-to-one correspondences across languages, which runs in parallel to the observations made by Baker (1992: 85) who claims that it is difficult to find a grammatical category which can be expressed uniformly and regularly across languages. Another highly frequent feature observed in contrastive studies is a high percentage of zero-correspondences, which can be indicative both of meaning bleaching of seem and of the overuse (redundancy) of evidential-epistemic markers in English.

1.2 Seem cognates Lexical cognates of the English verb seem in other European languages are also considered to be multifunctional. We will begin our short overview by referring to

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

285

Bolinger’s (1991) insightful illustration of the search for universals and parallel developments in various languages by demonstrating the path of development of the verb parecer ‘seem’ in Spanish. The scholar observes that although the etymological sources of parecer and seem are quite different, “Yet once set on the path toward the common meaning of that which is evident to the senses, their developing grammars grow more and more alike” (Bolinger 1991: 27). Thus, the paper proposes to distinguish between two basic types of parecer ‘seem’ in Spanish: a copular taking noun complements as in Parece hombre de bien (‘He seems an honest man’) (Bolinger 1991: 31) and an auxiliary in the constructions with the infinitive as in Juan parece haber perdido el dinero (‘John seems to have lost the money’) (Bolinger 1991: 38), which runs in parallel to the English seem both syntactically and semantically. In their comparative analysis of English and Spanish newspaper discourse, Marín-Arrese, Hidalgo-Downing, and Molina-Plaza (2004: 133) find parecer ‘seem’ to be an “overwhelmingly” frequent marker of evidentiality. When dealing with the evidential meanings of Spanish parecer ‘seem’, Cornillie (2007) claims that the two constructions in which the verb occurs (parecer + infinitive and parece que) have two different types of evidential reading. Parecer + infinitive is inferential and subjective, while parece que can indicate two possible modes of knowing, namely hearsay or “inference from different types of evidence” which is intersubjective (Cornillie 2009: 53). Although the scholar admits the presence of a “specific degree of epistemic speaker commitment”, he makes a clear-cut distinction between the reliability of evidential values and the evaluation of likelihood which expresses an epistemic modal dimension. The multifaceted nature of the German verb scheinen ‘seem’ has been analyzed by de Haan (2007) and Diewald, Kresic and Smirnova (2009). Both papers can be seen as providing further evidence in support of the claim that the grammaticalization process of scheinen triggers subjectification, resulting in an inferential evidential meaning. According to Diewald, Kresic and Smirnova (2009: 202) evidential constructions like “scheinen and zu and infinitive” are “grammatical markers that (actively) modify propositions due to their grammatical – inferential evidential – function”. The final stage in the development of scheinen and its full subjectification (without “the slightest syntactic connection between the subject and the utterance”) is achieved when it is used parenthetically, as in the following example from de Haan (2007: 142): (7)

Er ist, scheints, nicht zuhause. ‘He is, apparently, not at home.’

Dutch cognates blijken ‘appear’ and lijken ‘seem’ are regarded as evidential predicates by Nuyts and Vonk (1999). In their study on French lexical evidential

286

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

markers, Dendale and Van Bogaert (2007: 78–79) regard the impersonal constructions with sembler ‘seem’ as “indirect evidence evidentials” expressing the speaker’s personal hypothesis based on reasoning. However, when used in personal copular constructions it “has a clear modal component expressing a certain degree of uncertainty, without being an evidential marker” which is semantically comparable to je crois que ‘I think that’: (8) Ce vin semble bon. ‘That wine seems good.’ (Dendale and Van Bogaert 2007: 78–79) The study also demonstrates that “often a mainly evidential marker has modal overtones” (Dendale and Van Bogaert 2007: 85), a fact which has been observed in grammatical evidentiality as well. Squartini’s (2009) semantic interpretation of the Italian constructions with the verb sembrare ‘seem’ is in line with the above observations made on the functions and meaning of seem-type verbs in other languages. The construction that combines epistemic and evidential qualification is copulative use of the verb as in “Carlo sembra alto” ‘Carlo seems tall’ (Squartini 2009: 219). Reportiveinferential reading dominates in “biclausal” constructions like “Sembra che Carlo sia alto” ‘It seems that C. is tall’ (Squartini 2009: 219) which correspond to the impersonal seem-that S constructions already discussed in this paper. A short excursion into the area of seem-type verbs in European languages, and their acquisition of a reportive function can be found in Wiemer (2010: 105, 115). The scholar relates the chances of acquiring this meaning basically to their parenthetical use. Thus, the current situation regarding the status of seem-type verbs is a classic example of their multifaceted nature, exhibiting semantic features which are characteristic of evidentiality and epistemic modality. Whatever the explanation offered, be it in terms of “inclusion and overlap” (Cornillie 2009: 47), the presence of some similar/common subdimensions or meaning extension, the fact is that it is very difficult (sometimes impossible) to disentangle the closely interrelated meaning bundles of seeming verbs in the languages overviewed. As a rule, inference based on indirect evidence is not considered to be a reliable source of information, just as predictions based on conjectural inference cannot be regarded as factual or true propositions. The constructions and their frequency of use is not the same in the languages that have seem-type verbs. As Usonienė (2003) shows, the Lithuanian cognate atrodyti ‘seem’ does exhibit many of the most prototypical features of seem-type verbs. One cannot speak of the auxiliarization of atrodyti ‘seem’ in Lithuanian because this verb does not occur in constructions with infinitive

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

287

forms. However, this gap seems to be compensated by the parenthetical functioning of the impersonal (third person) form atrodo ‘seem’PRS.3. Its scope is always over the clause, and it is independent of the position of atrodo ‘it seems’ in the sentence. The Lithuanian seem-verb atrodyti has evolved from the verb rodyti ‘show’, thus the origin is different from that of the Romance languages although semantically it has the same domain as in German. The scope of synchronic variation of the Lithuanian verb atrodyti ‘seem’ ranging from its use as a full lexical to an evidential-epistemic marker can be shown in the following examples: (9)

a. lexical verb in personal constructions followed by an AdvP Ar aš padoriai atrodau? Q I decently look.PRS.1SG ‘Do I look respectable?’ b. copular verb followed by an (as if ) NP/AP/PP Mes atrodom (kaip) tikri kvailiai. we look.PRS.1PL (like) real.NOM fools.NOM ‘We seem/look (like) real fools.’ c. impersonal constructions with a that-clause (a CTP) Atrodo, kad lis. seem.PRS.3 COMP rain.FUT.3 ‘It seems that it is going to rain.’ d.

parenthetical use Visi su skėčiais. Lyja, atrodo. all with umbrellas.INS rain.PRS.3 seem.PRS.3 ‘Everybody has got an umbrella. It seems to be raining/It’s raining, it seems.’ Rytoj, atrodo, lis pagal prognozę. tomorrow seem.PRS.3 rain.FUT.3 according to forecast.ACC ‘Tomorrow, it seems, it may rain/it seems like rain according to the forecast.’

The two parenthetical uses of atrodo ‘it seems’ in (9d) differ in their evidentialepistemic interpretation. The first one is circumstantial inferential based on observational data, while the second one is reportive and is based on hearsay.

288

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

What deserves special attention is the position of the parenthetical in the sentence. As Lithuanian is a language with a relatively free word order, the position does not play a crucial role in the so-called zero-complementation cases of the initially used atrodo ‘it seems’. Although Dixon (1992: 211) was very categorical regarding the initial position of a main clause, he did not exclude the chance of sentence-initial parenthetical use either, which is considered very much meaning and sentence prosody-dependent (also cf. Kaltenböck 2007; Boye and Harder 2007). Thus, the present study will not deal with differences in meaning and function as dependent upon the position of the seem-parenthetical in the sentence. Both cases of parenthetical use in (9d) are evidential with an epistemic overtone because the speaker is not utterly certain regarding the factuality of the situation described. In both cases, atrodo ‘it seems’ can be also considered to be used as a hedge, the function of which is to avoid full responsibility for what is being asserted. Certainly, open umbrellas are a sign of rain as well as weather forecast data; however all of us know how changeable the weather is and thus one cannot be utterly sure. In some cases of use, the Lithuanian atrodo ‘it seems’ can have a meaning nearly identical to the verb manyti ‘think-that’ for instance: (10) Nemanau, kad jie laimės. O kaip tau atrodo? NEG.think.PRS.1SG COMP they win.FUT.3 and how you.SG.DAT seem.PRS.3 ‘(I) don’t think that they will win. And how does it seem to you?/ And what do you think?’ The given type of atrodo ‘it seems’ can function as an epistemic marker and have a tone of uncertainty, (11) Kas dar ateis? – Tiksliai neatsimenu, Jonas, atrodo. ‘Who else will come? – I can’t remember exactly, John, it seems.’ Similarly, in English, the reading of seem is epistemic in the following example and the speaker chooses it to make his/her statement more tentative; it functions as a hedging device here: (12)

His mother was big in his life and she’s, well, she’s not long to live, it seems. It’s sad, actually, she’s a very respected woman in the village. (BNC)

The English verb seem is a multifunctional or a broad spectrum “epistential” verb, to use Faller’s term (2002: 87). Its Lithuanian cognate atrodyti ‘seem’ is also multifunctional; however it is not found in the same type of constructions

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

289

as its English correspondence. There are no constructions with the infinitive in Lithuanian, which is the most frequent construction of seem in English. Being polysemous these verbs are members of various other semantic domains, therefore “it does not mean that the constructions and their functions are the same in all languages which have verbs of the seem-class” (Aijmer 2007: 64). The purpose of the analysis is to see how the multifunctionality of seem is mirrored in the Lithuanian correspondences in translations from the English original. This analysis might also cast light on how the two domains of evidential and epistemic meanings match by looking at the correspondences in LT translations.

2 Material and method The data for the analysis have been collected from two corpora. The first one is a self-compiled bidirectional parallel corpus – ParaCorpE-LT-E the design of which follows the English-Norwegian Parallel Corpus (ENPC) model (Johansson and Hofland 1994; Johansson 2007). It contains two sub-corpora: a) the ParaCorpE-LT compiled from original English fiction texts and their translations into Lithuanian; and b) the ParaCorpLT-E compiled from original Lithuanian fiction texts and their translations into English. With a few exceptions, the texts included in the corpus were written, translated, and published in the period of 1980–2006. The size of the corpus is 1, 572, 498 words (see Table 1). Table 1: Size of the ParaCorpE-LT-E ParaCorpE-LT-E

Original

Translation

Total

ParaCorp E-LT ParaCorp LT-E

486, 871 296, 759

386, 640 402, 228

873, 511 698, 987

The main features and a detailed description of the ParaCorpE-LT-E can be found in Usonienė and Šolienė (2010). Only the first sub-corpus containing the English originals and their translations into Lithuanian was used for the purpose of this study. This sub-corpus includes full texts of 6 novels and 2 short stories, translated by 8 translators (5 women and 3 men). The second corpus, compiled for the cross-linguistic pilot study, is a special parallel one-direction corpus of the first book in the Harry Potter series by J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (1998), and its translations from English into Lithuanian (LT), Polish (PL) and Russian (RU). This corpus is further referred to as the HP corpus. The four language data contrasted belong to three

290

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

language groups: Germanic, Baltic and Slavic languages. The size of the corpus is 269, 027 words (See Table 2). Table 2: Size of the HP corpus the HP corpus

Number of words

English original Lithuanian translation Polish translation Russian translation

77, 796 54, 792 69, 494 66, 945

The search for the data was automatic, but the analysis of the data collected was carried out manually. All sentences with affirmative and negative occurrences of forms of the verb seem (except seemingly and seeming) as well as their translations to Lithuanian were analyzed and translation correspondences of seem identified. Only one case of seem was discarded as part of the sentence was missing in translation: (13) ENorig A very faint whimpering or squeaking, which seemed unconscious, came out of him. LTtrans Nuo tos pusės Ø sklido silpnas inkštimas ar spiegimas. Literal1: ‘A very faint whimpering or squeaking Ø came from that direction.’ The main methodological approach of this study is contrastive analysis. Issues of multifunctionality are increasingly addressed in the studies of discourse markers, modal auxiliaries and modal particles employing contrastive analysis based on translation corpora (Aijmer 2001, 2007; Johansson 2001; van der Auwera, Schalley and Nuyts 2005; Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2002– 2003). Even though Johansson (2007: 9–10) notes a number of problems related to translation corpora, source language influence, a restricted range of translated texts, translator idiosyncratic choices and mistakes being the ones typically mentioned, the significance of translation corpora in decoding the meaning of certain linguistic items is also emphasized by Noël, who observes that “the texts produced by translators can be treated as a collection of informants’ judgements” (Noël 2002: 158).

1 If a literal translation is not provided it means that it is semantically and formally analogous to the provided translation variant.

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

291

3 Findings The first part of the analysis (section 3.1.) will discuss the correspondences of the English verb seem in the fiction ParaCorpE-LT corpus, while the second part (section 3.2.) will touch upon seem correspondences in the multilingual HP corpus. Section 3.3. will discuss zero-translation cases in both corpora, and section 3.4. will focus on seem and its correspondences functioning as hedges.

3.1 Seem correspondences in the ParaCorpE-LT There were 606 cases of seem found in the ParaCorpE-LT . The normalized frequency of seem per 1000 words is 1.2 occurrences, which actually corresponds to the frequency distribution results obtained by Johansson who found in his data that seem was used almost once per 1000 words (Johansson 2001: 221) and proves that seem is generally a frequent word. Just as in the English-Swedish and English-Norwegian translations, seem has a wide range of correspondences in the Lithuanian translated texts. The overview of seem correspondences, both congruent and non-congruent as well as zero correspondence cases, together with their raw frequencies is presented in Table 3. All of the translation correspondences listed in Table 3 reflect the meaning of the English verb seem to a larger or smaller extent. Excluding zero cases in translation, there were 37 different correspondences of seem, out of which 16 were used only once. This is not an unusual result as there is a tendency for modal items to take a broad range of correspondences, some of which are not frequent. For example, Aijmer’s research into modal adverbs in English-Swedish translations has shown that out of 19 different correspondences to surely, 13 occurred only once, and in the case of 35 different correspondences to certainly, 20 were used only once (Aijmer 2001). Also, the results of the English-Lithuanian translations of seem are very much in line with Aijmer’s findings for seem correspondences from an English-Swedish perspective. The scholar identified 36 different seem correspondences in Swedish, 18 of which were used just once (Aijmer 2009). As noted by Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen in their study of Swedish and Dutch correspondences to well, modal and discourse particles are translated in many different ways and this fact “finds an obvious explanation in the polysemic nature and multifunctionality of such words” (Aijmer and SimonVandenbergen 2003: 1135). The same tendency is illustrated by seem translations.

292

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

Table 3: Overall seem correspondences in the Lithuanian translation Seem correspondence

Raw frequencies

atrodyti, (kad) ‘seem’ non-copular Ø atrodyti ‘seem’ copular regis ‘seemingly’ tarsi ‘as if/as though’ pasirodyti ‘appear’ copular rodos ‘it seems’ pasirodyti, (kad) ‘appear’ non-copular tartum/tarytum ‘as if/as though’ matyt ‘evidently’ lyg (ir) ‘as if’ (nu)skambėti ‘sound’ manyti ‘think’ rodytis ‘seem’ panašu/nepanašu ‘looks like/doesn’t look like’ berods ‘probably’ galima (pa)sakyti ‘it can be said’ pajusti ‘feel’ regėti(s) ‘see/behold’ sakytum ‘you’d say’ ko gera/ko gero ‘possibly’ gali būti ‘can/may be’ gal ‘perhaps’ paaiškėti ‘turn out’ numanyti ‘infer’ apskritai ‘generally’ atrodantis ‘seeming’ (agreeing active participle) bemaž ‘nearly’ bene ‘possibly’ padaryti įspūdį ‘make an impression’ pasivaidenti ‘see things’ susijusi ‘related’ turbūt ‘probably’ pagalvoti ‘think’ būtų ‘would be’ mano manymu ‘in my opinion’ įsivaizduoti ‘imagine’ mažiausiai ‘at least’ nepanašus ‘not alike/similar’ tikriausiai ‘most probably’

156 148 102 49 34 14 13 12 10 9 8 5 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

293

All the translation correspondences into Lithuanian where the cognate (at)rodyti(s) ‘seem’ was used were considered as congruent (lexical) correspondences and are illustrated by examples (14)–(17): (14)

copular use ENorig Still Fache seemed preoccupied. LTtrans Tačiau Fasas atrodė sunerimęs.

(15)

impersonal construction with a that-clause (a CTP) ENorig His heart seemed to be frozen. LTtrans Atrodė, kad širdis suledėjusi. Literal: ‘It seemed that his heart was frozen.’

(16) parenthetical use ENorig But rich and beautiful lives seem to be a discontinued line. Ttrans Bet sodrus ir gražus gyvenimas, atrodo, mūsų laikais nebegaminamas. Literal: ‘But rich and beautiful lives, it seems, are a discontinued line.’ (17)

parenthetical use ENorig It was also very hard to remember where anything was, because it all seemed to move around a lot. LTtrans Be to, negalėjai įsiminti, kur kas yra, nes viskas, rodos, judėjo ir keitėsi. Literal: ‘Besides, it was hard to remember where anything was, as everything, it seems, was moving and changing.’

According to Johansson, a translation correspondence can be considered congruent when it has “a lexical verb corresponding to seem and the same overall structure as the seem construction” (Johansson 2001: 223). Since Lithuanian and English are structurally very different languages, there are not many cases of equivalence in terms of both parameters in Lithuanian translations. Therefore, all uses of the semantic cognates of seem, regardless of the construction they occurred in, are considered as congruent correspondences here. Several forms of congruent correspondences were identified in the analyzed translations: noncopular atrodyti, (kad) ‘seem (that)’, copular atrodyti ‘seem’, parenthetical rodos ‘it seems’, non-copular rodytis, (kad) ‘seem (that)’, agreeing participle atrodantis ‘seeming’. As can be seen from Table 3, they constitute only 46% of all the translations of seem in the corpus.

294

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

Cases when translators chose a functionally or semantically close alternative to atrodyti ‘seem’ are considered non-congruent and constitute 30% of the correspondences of seem. In the ParaCorpE-LT very typical non-congruent correspondences of seem are modal words/particles. It should be noted that in Lithuanian grammars and dictionaries certain particles, modal words, adverbs, various word forms and word groups which express the speaker’s evaluative attitude are assigned to different word classes. For example, the most frequent non-congruent seem correspondence in Lithuanian regis ‘seemingly’ is considered a reflexive verb form in the online Dictionary of the Lithuanian Languagee (the DLL e ), but a modal word in the online Modern Lithuanian Dictionarye (the MLDe) even though modal words do not form a separate word class in Lithuanian linguistics. Similarly, gal ‘perhaps’ and turbūt ‘probably’ are defined as modal words in the DLL e , but are ascribed to particles in the MLDe and the Lithuanian Grammar (Ambrazas 1997), matyt ‘evidently’ is described as a modal word in the DLLe , but the MLDe refers to matyt ‘evidently’ as a parenthetical word, which is not a morphological but a syntactic category. Most of the modal items occurring as seem correspondences take scope over the whole clause, thus functioning as sentence adverbials; therefore, for the sake of terminological convenience they will all be further referred to as adverbials. In (18), a non-congruent correspondence of seem in Lithuanian is an adverbial matyt ‘evidently’: (18)

ENorig The chessmen seemed to have been listening, because at these words a knight, a bishop, and a castle turned their backs on the white pieces and walked off the board . LTtrans Figūros, matyt, klausėsi, nes sulig tais žodžiais žirgas, rikis ir bokštas atsuko baltiesiems nugaras ir nulipo nuo lentos . Literal: ‘The chessmen evidently have been listening, because at these words a knight, a bishop, and a castle turned their backs on the white pieces and walked off the board .’

Non-congruent correspondences of seem would also occasionally be mental and perception verbs and the perfective aspectual pa-si-rodyti (PFV-REFL-show. INF; ‘appear’) which also occurs in the same variety of constructions as atrodyti/ rodytis ‘seem’ as illustrated in Lithuanian translations (19)–(20): (19) parenthetical use ENorig It seemed the captain was more motivated than Sophie had anticipated. LTtrans Pasirodo, kapitonas turi daugiau motyvų, nei buvo galima pamanyti.

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

(20)

295

impersonal constructions with a that-clause (a CTP) ENorig It seemed to Clive that the main business of the police was to deal with the numerous and unpredictable consequences of poverty . LTtrans Klaivui pasirodė, jog 2 pagrindinė policijos veiklos sritis – kovoti su daugybe neprognozuojamų skurdo pasekmių . Literal: ‘It appeared to Clive that the main business of the police was to deal with the numerous and unpredictable consequences of poverty .’

As has already been mentioned, the semantic cognate of the verb seem in Lithuanian is atrodyti ‘seem’ whereas pasirodyti is the semantic cognate of the English verb appear. However, just as both seem and appear are very close semantically, their cognates in Lithuanian also share certain semantic features. In some contexts pasirodyti ‘appear’ becomes nearly identical to atrodyti ‘seem’ in its evidential-epistemic meaning, the only difference being perfective aspectuality. This meaning of pasirodyti ‘appear’ is illustrated in (20). In other contexts pasirodyti ‘appear’ does not necessarily have the epistemic reading of probability and its meaning becomes closer to that of the resulting copular verb turn out emphasizing the end-point of a process (Biber et al. 1999: 446) or indicating “that the proposition is simply an accepted fact/occurrence” (Biber et al. 1999: 708). Cases of no formal semantic correspondence of seem in translation were considered zero correspondences, as in the following example: (21) ENorig For some reason, the sight of the cat seemed to amuse him. LTtrans Kažkodėl katė jį Ø prajuokino. Literal: ‘For some reason the sight of the cat amused him.’ 24% of seem cases were omitted in Lithuanian translations, a result that is discussed in more detail in section 3.3. As shown in Aijmer (2009: 72), seem can appear in a variety of syntactic constructions such as seem + that-clause, seem + as if (like), seem + (like) NP, seem + infinitive, seem + adjective (participle), seem + adjective + that-clause, and parenthetical seem. This variety of seem constructions was also observed in the ParaCorpE-LT ; however, the distribution of the constructions was not homogeneous. The most common construction with the verb seem in the ParaCorpE-LT was seem + infinitive (56%). Seem + adjective/participle accounts for 26% of all 2 The complementizer jog ‘that’ used in (20) is interchangeable with kad ‘that’, the difference is in their use: jog ‘that’ is generally much less frequent than kad ‘that’ and is often only used for stylistic purposes to avoid repetition.

296

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

the constructions found and seem + NP constitutes 8%. The remaining 10% are made up of seem + as if (1%), seem + that-clause (4%), seem + adjective + thatclause (2%) constructions and parenthetical seem (3%). There were 33 instances of seem with an overtly expressed experiencer, mostly in the it seems to X that construction. As discussed in section 1, the semantics of seem may largely be determined by the syntactic structure it occurs in. Therefore, we have chosen the following two most frequent syntactic patterns for our analysis of seem correspondences in Lithuanian: seem + infinitive and seem as a copular verb.

3.1.1 The seem + infinitive construction In the ParaCorpE-LT, 337 instances of the seem + infinitive construction were found where seem is most frequently translated by atrodyti/rodytis, (kad) ‘seem that’, i.e. non-copular seem (33%). The number of Lithuanian correspondences of this type was 110, out of which 66 cases were impersonal constructions with a that-clause (examples 22–23) and 44 cases represented parenthetical use (example 24): (22)

ENorig There was a sound of trampling boots below, inside the house and outside. The yard seemed to be full of men. LTtrans Atrodė, kad kiemas pilnas žmonių.

(23)

ENorig She gave the tips of his fingers a quick squeeze that seemed to invite not desire but affection. LTtrans Ji greitai spustelėjo jo pirštų galiukus, ir atrodė, kad tai labiau išreiškia ne geismą, o prieraišumą.

(24) ENorig Tom could normally be relied upon to leap upon that kind of repetition and rip the repeater to shreds, but he seems to have given up: he merely rolls his eyes. LTtrans Normaliomis aplinkybėmis galima būti tikram, kad Tomas pasigaus pakartojimą ir sudraskys kartotoją į gabalus, bet jis, atrodo, nutarė pasiduoti: tik užverčia akis aukštyn. While Lithuanian atrodyti/rodytis ‘seem’ in such constructions retains its inherent evidential dimension, the predominant meaning is epistemic, emphasizing the element of uncertainty the speaker communicates regarding the truth of the proposition in the complement clause. The speaker is evaluating the available evidence and making a conclusion about the situation, but this conclusion

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

297

is tentative and preliminary. The inference that the speaker makes can be based on sensory evidence of various types – visual, tactile, mental, auditory, etc. which can be indicated (but not necessarily is) in the context. In (22), there is auditory evidence for the speaker’s tentative inference, while in (23) tactile evidence supports the preliminary conclusion of the speaker. In (24), there is a combination of several types of evidence: the speaker knows certain facts about Tom and observes his current reaction – all of this leads to a certain inference which is mitigated by the parenthetical atrodo ‘it seems’. 17% of seem + infinitive construction cases were translated by purely epistemic markers in Lithuanian, such as turbūt ‘probably’, sakytum ‘you’d say’, ko gero ‘possibly’ which all convey the speaker’s subjective assessment (probability) of the truth-value of the state of affairs. (25)

ENorig It was the type that seemed to flourish best under the dominion of the Party. LTtrans Šis tipas, ko gero, labiausiai klesti partijos valdose. Literal: ‘This type possibly flourishes best under the dominion of the Party.’

In (25) ko gero ‘possibly’ shows that the speaker is not fully committed to the proposition and only makes a speculative judgment. Within the category of purely epistemic markers which are used as translation correspondences of seem + infinitive, the synonymous words tarsi/tartum/ tarytum ‘as if/as though’ and lyg (ir) ‘like/as if’ were predominant (14%). According to the Lithuanian Grammar (Ambrazas, ed. 1997), the given comparative particles “are used to express ostensible comparison and uncertainty, doubt at the same time” (1997: 400). These epistemic comparative markers are almost never used as correspondences of seem in other seem constructions (only 5 cases of tarsi/tartum/tarytum/lyg (ir) ‘as if/as though’ are observed as translations of seem in other constructions, as opposed to 47 cases in the seem + infinitive construction). Aijmer (2009) notes that certain translation correspondences of seem + infinitive in Swedish and French highlight its meaning of similarity or approximation (Aijmer 2009: 75) which is also evident in seem + infinitive translations into Lithuanian using tarsi/tartum/tarytum ‘as if/as though’ as in (26) and (27): (26)

ENorig he had seemed to walk in the delirium induced by drugs. LTtrans eina tarsi klejodamas, apsvaigintas narkotikų.

298 (27)

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

ENorig Suddenly his heart seemed to turn to ice and his bowels to water. LTtrans Staiga jo širdis tarsi pavirto į ledą o viduriai – į vandenį.

Apart from marking an impressionistic comparison, tarsi/tartum/tarytum/lyg (ir) ‘as if/as though’ are used as translation correspondences when seem signals tentative observations of the speaker, as in (28): (28)

ENorig Her feet seemed to have grown broader, he noticed. LTtrans Jis pastebėjo, kad jos kojos lyg pastambėjusios.

This usage can be related to Usonienė’s (2006: 330) observation that tarsi/ tartum/tarytum/lyg (ir) demonstrate the speaker’s doubt primarily appearing due to the subjectivity of his/her reality interpretation based on senses. 12% of seem in the seem + infinitive construction were rendered into Lithuanian by two evidential epistemic markers regis ‘seemingly’ and matyt ‘evidently’ which are always used parenthetically. Both markers have been derived from perception verbs of seeing: regėti ‘see/behold’ and matyti ‘see’ and represent a meaning transfer from direct visual perception to mental perception (Usonienė 2003); hence an evidential element in their semantic content. Since both markers are inferential in nature, “self-inference, as an unreliable source of information, triggers the meaning of uncertainty” (Usonienė 2007: 10) and determines their epistemic values alongside the evidential one. Semantically, regis ‘seemingly’ is closer to the seem cognates atrodo ‘it seems/apparently’ and rodos ‘it seems’ used parenthetically. This marker has a flavour of speculative subjectivity (cf. the noun regėjimas ‘vision’ which is derived from the same verb regėti ‘see/ behold’ and which has a meaning of an ostensible sight, vision, to denote hallucinations), hence alongside the evidential meaning there is a strong epistemic overtone and subjective evaluation, as in (29) and (30): (29)

ENorig He stood on a street corner and breathed the mild Amsterdam air that always seemed to taste faintly of cigar smoke and ketchup. LTtrans Stovėdamas prie gatvės kampo, jis kvėpavo švelniu Amsterdamo oru, kuriame, regis, visuomet buvo juntamas silpnas cigarų dūmų ir pomidorų padažo aromatas.

(30)

ENorig Holy Grail is a woman, Sophie thought, her mind a collage of interrelated ideas that seemed to make no sense. LTtrans Šventasis Gralis yra moteris, pagalvojo Sofi; jos galvoje kirbėjo begalė minčių, kurios, regis, neturėjo jokios prasmės.

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

299

The other evidential epistemic marker matyt ‘evidently’ is a far less frequent correspondence to seem + infinitive if compared to regis ‘seemingly’ (7 vs 33 occurrences respectively). Usually in the context of matyt ‘evidently’ there is clear evidence for the inference the speaker is making as in (31) and (32): (31) ENorig But he did seem to realize he was being watched, because he looked up suddenly at the cat, which was still staring at him from the other end of the street. LTtrans Tačiau, matyt, pajuto, jog jį stebi, nes ūmiai pakėlė akis ir pažiūrėjo į katę, dėbsančią į jį iš kito gatvės galo. (32)

ENorig The driveling song seemed to have kept its popularity. You still heard it all over the place. LTtrans Ši primityvi dainelė, matyt, yra populiari.

As can be seen from (29)–(32), both regis ‘seemingly’ and matyt ‘evidently’ can be referred to as epistemic evidentials because the two meanings converge and cannot be separated. This feature, as noted by Aijmer (1996: 397) is typical of many modal items as “a modal element may be a combination of judgment and evidence”. Furthermore, 7% of seem + infinitive constructions were translated into Lithuanian with the cognate verb atrodyti ‘seem’ in its copular use. As has been discussed, it signals the speaker’s direct impression of the surrounding world and therefore marks evidentiality, for example: (33)

ENorig The creature’s face seemed to be protruded, because of its bent carriage. LTtrans Padaro galva nuo susikūprinimo atrodė atsikišusi.

Among other Lithuanian correspondences of seem + infinitive, 3% of translations rendered by mental/perception expressions have been found, such as padaryti įspūdį ‘make an impression’, numanyti ‘infer’, manyti ‘assume’, etc. To summarize, Lithuanian translation correspondences of seem in the seem + infinitive construction show the whole spectrum of seem meanings (see Table 4). As can be seen from Table 4, even though seem correspondences range from epistemic to evidential, the epistemic-evidential reading dominates when seem is used in the given construction.

300

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

Table 4: Meaning and frequency of Lithuanian correspondences of seem in the seem + infinitive construction Translation correspondences in LT

Raw frequency

Frequency

Evidential-epistemic Epistemic Evidential Other Zero correspondences

151 57 35 2 92

45% 17% 10% 1% 27%

3.1.2 Seem as a copular verb With 211 occurrences, seem as a copular verb (V + AP/NP) was the second most frequent seem construction in the ParaCorpEN→LT . 40% of those seem cases were translated into Lithuanian by the semantic cognate (at)rodyti(s) ‘seem’ used as a copular verb and by the aspectual perfective pasirodyti ‘appear’, the meaning of which in most of these cases is very close to the cognate of seem, for example: (34) ENorig Janet’s bedsit seemed enormous when I moved into it . LTtrans Kai įsikėliau į Dženetės butą, jis man atrodė milžiniškas . (35)

ENorig After the darkness the feeble light of the paraffin lamp had seemed very bright. LTtrans Po tamsos blausi parafino lempelės šviesa pasirodė akinanti.

These types of correspondences describe the impression of the speaker based on circumstantial inference and as a rule they do not contain information on his/her judgment concerning likelihood of the statement, hence they are purely evidential in nature. The same predominant evidential dimension is reflected in the copular seem when its Lithuanian correspondences are mental and perception verbs like skambėti ‘sound’, įsivaizduoti ‘imagine’ (3%) as illustrated in the following example: (36)

ENorig Already it was hard to capture what had seemed so clear a minute before. LTtrans Jau ir taip buvo sunku užfiksuoti tai, kas vos prieš minutę skambėjo taip aiškiai. Literal: ‘Already it was hard to capture what had sounded so clear a minute before.’

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

301

Evidential epistemic adverbials regis ‘seemingly’ and matyt ‘evidently’ constitute 7% of the correspondences of seem used as a copular verb, whereas the cognate atrodyti/rodytis ‘seem’ used as a parenthetical or followed by a kad (‘that’)-clause accounts for 19% of Lithuanian correspondences. As has already been discussed above, evidential-epistemic (at)rodyti(s) ‘seem’ in such constructions conveys predominantly epistemic meaning: (37)

ENorig There seemed only one logical answer. LTtrans Atrodo, kad yra vienintelis logiškas atsakymas.

Finally, 7% of seem used copularly have been translated into Lithuanian by purely epistemic modal markers, such as tikriausiai (‘most probably’), gal (‘perhaps’), ko gera (‘possibly’): (38) ENorig that seemed the sort of thing. LTtrans Ko gera, taip ir bus. Literal: ‘Possibly that will be the sort of thing.’ The quantitative distribution of the basic types of meaning of the copular seem as mirrored in the Lithuanian translation correspondences is given in Table 5. Table 5: Frequency of semantic types of Lithuanian correspondences of the copular seem Translation correspondences in LT

Raw frequency

Frequency

Evidential Evidential-epistemic Epistemic Other Zero correspondences

91 56 14 1 49

43% 26% 7% 1% 23%

Overall, the translation correspondences of seem used in the two most frequent constructions (seem + infinitive and copular seem) have yielded the following distribution of evidential, epistemic and evidential-epistemic readings in the given types of use of seem as shown in Table 6. As can be seen from Table 6, the predominant semantic element of the meaning of seem largely depends on the type of construction it occurs in. Diverse translation correspondences, ranging from unambiguously epistemic to evidential, in both given constructions shape the multifunctional profile of seem. The purely epistemic semantic property of seem is confirmed by epistemic

302

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

Table 6: The ratio of evidential and epistemic readings of seem as mirrored by LT correspondences in the ParaCorpEN→LT seem + infinitive translation correspondences Evidential-epistemic Epistemic Evidential Other Zero correspondences

seem-copular translation correspondences 45% 17% 10% 1% 27%

Evidential-epistemic Epistemic Evidential Other Zero correspondences

26% 7% 43% 1% 23%

possibility markers (3%) and epistemic comparative markers (9.5%) used in Lithuanian translations. The evidential meaning component is revealed by mental and perception expressions (3%) and verbs of appearance marking direct impression (seem/appear copular) (20%) identified as translation correspondences of seem. However, the largest group of translation correspondences of seem are epistentials having both epistemic modality and evidentiality values (38%). Another interesting aspect of the analysis of seem that is observed not only in the Lithuanian, but also in the Russian and Polish translations in the HP corpus, is its tendency to disappear in translation.

3.2 Seem correspondences in the HP corpus A total of 95 cases of the verb seem were identified in the English original, which makes its normalized frequency 1.2 per 1000 words (exactly the same frequency was observed in the ParaCorpE-LT). Again seem was used in a variety of constructions, but a clearly dominating one was seem + infinitive (71 cases out of 95). The range of seem correspondences in all three languages is quite diverse: seem was translated with 12 different markers in Lithuanian, 9 different markers in Russian and 14 different markers in Polish. Some of the correspondences in the three languages were used only once, but the semantic content of each contained either epistemic or evidential properties or reflected a combination of both. All translation correspondences in all three languages, regardless of the construction seem appeared in, are presented in Table 7. The highest number of congruent seem correspondences is observed in the Russian translation. The verb kazat’sja, which is the cognate of seem in Russian, in all its forms takes up 46% of all seem correspondences. In the Lithuanian and Polish congruent correspondences are used by translators to a much smaller extent. Atrodyti/rodytis ‘seem’ constitutes 16% of seem correspondences in Lithuanian and the two cognates of seem in Polish, zdawać się and wydawać się, make up 17% of all seem correspondences.

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

303

Table 7: Overall seem correspondences in Lithuanian, Russian and Polish translations Lithuanian Ø regis ‘seemingly’ atrodyti ‘seem’ tarsi ‘as though’ matyt ‘evidently’ rodos ‘it seems’

Russian 36 20 10 6 5 5

kazat’sja ‘seem’ Ø vidimo ‘evidently’ pokazat’sja ‘appear’ pohože ‘it looks as if ’ verojatno ‘probably’

Polish 44 32 5 4 3 2

lyg (ir) ‘as if’

5

budto ‘as if’

2

berods ‘probably’ pasirodyti ‘appear’ bemaž ‘nearly’ gal ‘perhaps’

2 2 1 1

s vidu ‘apparently’ po-vidimomu ‘apparently’ okazat’sja ‘turn out/appear’

1 1 1

pajusti ‘feel’

1

turbūt ‘probably’

1

Ø zdawać się ‘seem’ wyglądać ‘look’ chyba ‘perhaps’ wydawać się ‘seem’ sprawiać wrażenie ‘make an impression/appear’ wszystko wskazuje na to ‘everything shows that . . .’ najwyraźniej ‘evidently’ jakby ‘as if’ wyraźnie ‘evidently’ prawdopodobnie ‘possibly’ można by pomyśleć ‘one may think’ musieć ‘must’ okazać się ‘turn out/ appear’ jak widzę ‘as I see’

42 9 9 7 7 5 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1

The range of translation correspondences in all three languages confirms the semantic diversity of the verb seem. All of these languages have markers with overlapping epistemic and evidential values as well as purely epistemic and evidential correspondences. However, such cases in which the translation correspondences in the three languages are seem cognates, as in example (39), are quite rare: (39)

ENorig It seems only yesterday she was in here herself, buying her first wand. LTtrans Rodos, tik vakar pirko iš manęs savo pirmąją lazdelę. PLtrans Wydaje mi się, jakby była tu zaledwie wczoraj, żeby kupić swoją pierwszą różdżkę. RUtrans Kazalos’, tol’ko včera ona zahodila sjuda, kupit’ svoju pervuju volšebnuju paločku.

If we compare the choice of translation correspondences across the three languages, the dominating cases are the ones when translation correspondences are not directly matching, mainly because seem is omitted in one or two languages. There were 51 cases out of 95 when one or two translators chose to

304

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

omit seem. Occasionally, translators in different languages tried to capture the meaning of seem with correspondences that convey slightly different semantic nuances as in (40): (40)

ENorig Your platform should be somewhere in the middle, but they don’t seem to have built it yet, do they? LTtrans Tavasis turėtų būti vidury tarp jų, bet, matyt, dar nepastatytas, ką? PLtrans Twój peron powinien być gdzieś pomiędzy nimi, ale chyba go jeszcze nie zbudowali, co? RUtrans Tvoja platforma dolžna byt’ gde-to poseredine, no ee, kažetsja, ne postroili poka, ne pravda li?

In (40), we can see that the original seem + infinitive construction is rendered by an epistemic evidential adverbial matyt ‘evidently’ in Lithuanian, an epistemic chyba ‘perhaps’ in Polish and congruent parenthetical kažetsja ‘it seems’ in Russian. This shows that seem correspondences in the three languages all retain a certain aspect of the multifunctional seem, but which aspect is highlighted in translation is the individual choice of the translator. On the other hand, noncongruent epistential correspondences are synonymous to the congruent ones. This might be the reason why the number of congruent correspondences to seem is quite low, especially in Lithuanian and Polish. Another important feature, observable in translations across the three languages, is the frequent cases of zero correspondences, which has been already noted in the analysis of the data from the ParaCorpEN-LT .

3.3 Zero correspondences of seem One of the most broadly discussed issues in studies based on translation corpora is zero-translation correspondences, especially of various non-propositional linguistic items, such as discourse markers, modal expressions (cf. Aijmer 1996; Aijmer and Altenberg 2002). A high percentage of zero-correspondences of seem was also noted by both Johansson (2001) and Aijmer (2009). Both studies yielded similar results regarding zero correspondences of the verb seem: 11% of zero correspondences in English-Swedish translations (Aijmer 2009) and 13% in English-Norwegian translations (Johansson 2001). The number of zero correspondences for seem in Lithuanian translations in the ParaCorpEN-LT-EN is quite high and constitutes 24% of all seem cases. As noted by Johansson, “the general background for the occurrence of zero correspondences is the weakened meaning of seem” (Johansson 2001: 238). This is

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

305

perhaps clearest in seem + to be constructions which frequently are translated into Lithuanian just with the verb to be with seem lost, as in (41), or with some other verb unqualified by seem as in (42): (41)

ENorig For long periods the High seem to be securely in power . LTtrans Ilgus laiko tarpus aukštieji saugiai Ø būna valdžioje .

(42) ENorig Even Julia seemed to be impressed. LTtrans Net Džulijai jis Ø padarė įspūdį. In Lithuanian translations seem sometimes disappears when the copulative verb is simply omitted by the translator. In such cases it is not clear whether the translator’s intention was to keep the original seem or to use to be as a copular, as in (43): (43) ENorig Langdon had to admit, it seemed odd. LTtrans Lengdonas turėjo pripažinti, jog visa tai Ø – išties labai keista. As noted by Johansson (2001: 239), sometimes translators regard seem redundant when there are other mental or perception verbs in the context. This appears to be a strategy also used in Lithuanian translations. (44) and (45) are examples of such a choice by translators: (44)

ENorig She looked disappointed but seemed to know it was the right thing to do. LTtrans Ji atrodė nusivylusi, bet kartu Ø suprato, kad Lengdonas taip ir turi pasielgti. Literal: ‘She seemed disappointed but at the same time understood that for Langdon it was the right thing to do.’

(45)

ENorig Harry didn’t know whether he was imagining it or not, but he seemed to keep running into Snape wherever he went. LTtrans Haris nesuprato, ar jam tik taip atrodo, bet stačiai kiekviename žingsnyje Ø susidurdavo su Sneipu.

In (44), both look and seem in the original are merged into one atrodė ‘it seemed’ as it is the cognate of both of them and to use it twice probably seemed redundant to the translator; thus, suprato ‘(sb) understood’ is left unmodified in the translation. In (45), the verbs imagine and seem in the original are merged into one translation correspondence atrodo ‘it seems’. Similar cases are observed

306

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

with other mental verbs (especially with think or notice) and this phenomenon is also attested to in the English-Norwegian translations (Johansson 2001: 239). As was already mentioned, in the HP corpus, zero correspondences of seem is the most frequent choice by translators into Lithuanian and Polish, and the second most frequent choice in Russian. Throughout the whole corpus (95 occurrences of seem) there were 12 cases (13% of all seem correspondences) when all three translators chose zero correspondence to seem. In some cases, the same tendency of the semantic merge of two mental process/perception verbs into one to avoid semantic redundancy can be observed, as in (46) and (47): (46)

ENorig Yet sometimes he thought (or maybe hoped) that strangers in the street seemed to know him. LTtrans Bet kai kada jam atrodydavo (o gal to tikėdavosi), kad praeiviai gatvėje jį Ø atpažįsta. Literal: ‘Yet sometimes it seemed to him (or maybe he hoped so) that passersby in the street know him.’ PLtrans Czasami jednak myślał´ (albo raczej miał nadzieję), ze Ø znają go niektórzy spotykani na ulicy obcy ludzie. Literal: ‘Sometimes yet [he] thought (or rather hoped) that some strangers in the street know him.’ RUtrans Hotja inogda on dumal (ili nadejalsja), čto neznakomcy na ulice Ø znajut ego. Literal: ‘Yet sometimes [he] thought (or hoped) that strangers in the street know him.’

(47)

ENorig As he sat in the usual morning traffic jam, he couldn’t help noticing that there seemed to be a lot of strangely dressed people about. LTtrans Stovėdamas rytmetineje spūstyje, negalėjo nepastebėti, kad Ø aplinkui pilna keistai apsirengusių praeivių. PLtrans Kiedy utkwił w normalnym porannym korku ulicznym, nie mógł nie zauważyć, że Ø naokoło jest mnóstwo dziwacznie ubranych ludzi. RUtrans On ždal v obyčnoj utrennej probke i prosto ne mog ne zametit’ Ø ogromnogo količestva stranno odetyh ljudej.

In the Lithuanian translation of (46), seem used in the original disappears, whereas think is translated with the Lithuanian semantic cognate of seem, atrodyti. Since in Lithuanian atrodyti ‘seem’ can also be used in the meaning of think, apparently the translator considered using it twice redundant. The Polish and Russian translators kept the original think in the translation and did not use seem at all. Thus all three translations do not retain the original usage of seem.

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

307

In (47) in all three languages notice and seem from the original are blended into one notice to convey the subjective impression of the experiencer. However, in some cases it remains unclear why translators in some target languages have chosen to omit seem: (48)

ENorig But he seemed to REALLY hate me. LTtrans Bet jis manęs tiesiog Ø nekenčia. PLtrans Ale on mnie naprawdę Ø nienawidzi. RUtrans Mne kažetsja, on menja nenavidit.

It could be that the Lithuanian and Polish translators have found seem to be redundant because of the emphasizer really. In Russian, seem is translated by a congruent correspondence kažetsja ‘it seems’. The given cases of translation differences perhaps could be attributed to a culture-specific alternative conceptualization of seem or culture-specific understanding and realization of certain pragmatic functions, for instance, hedging, as is illustrated in the following section.

3.4 Seem and its hedging function Seem as a hedge was already mentioned in one of the first empirical studies on hedging in the spoken professional discourse of physicians by Prince, Frader, and Bosk (1982). The authors of the study attribute such expressions as I guess or it seems that to the so called shields, that is hedging devices that do not affect the truth conditions of the proposition itself, but help the speaker implicate that “s/he is not fully and personally committed in the usual or ‘unmarked’ way to the belief that the relevant state of affairs actually obtains” (Prince, Frader, and Bosk 1982: 89). In subsequent studies, seem is frequently mentioned as a hedge, especially in the context of academic discourse (Salager-Meyer 1997; Hyland 1998; Varttala 2001; Martín-Martín 2008, etc.). Though it is generally agreed that seem softens the assertion, which otherwise would be too categorical, the interpretation of the dominating component of the semantic content of the verb is not so straightforward. Varttala attributes seem to the tentative linking verbs category, the function of which is “to reduce assertiveness, implying limits as to the accuracy and applicability of the information presented” (Varttala 2001: 124). Salager-Meyer lists seem and appear as epistemic verbs which can be used to highlight “the speculative nature of the statements” (Salager-Meyer 1997: 116). Likewise, MartínMartín (2008) considers seem and its Spanish cognate parecer to be epistemic

308

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

modality markers used to realize various pragmatic strategies, for example, protecting the writer from criticism. Hyland (1998) employs the term epistemic evidential sensory hedge to refer to seem and this reference reflects the multifunctional nature of the verb as well as emphasizing its pragmatic function. Acting as a hedge, seem creates distance between the author and the proposition, thus establishing a strategic option for the author to avoid full responsibility for the statement. In his definition of hedging Hyland singles out two major functions of hedging devices. They either “indicate a lack of complete commitment to the truth value of an accompanying proposition or a desire not to express that commitment categorically” (Hyland 1998: 1). Both functions can be performed by seem and its correpondences in Lithuanian: (49)

ENorig So it seems reasonable to conclude that the curator knew his attacker. LTtrans Vadinasi, atrodytų logiška manyti, jog kuratorius pažinojo užpuoliką.

(50)

ENorig you told me you wanted to spread ashes, and yet you seem to be sightseeing. LTtrans jūs man sakėte, kad norite išbarstyti pelenus, o dabar atrodo, kad jūs apžiūrinėjate bažnyčią.

Seem in (49) signals the speaker’s lack of complete commitment to the proposition, which is perhaps due to uncertainty. The speaker interprets the available facts and draws a reasonable conclusion, but he cannot be absolutely sure that his interpretation is correct. Hence seem and its correspondence in Lithuanian atrodytų ‘it would seem’ which is even more tentative due to its subjunctive mood form, weakens the strength of the speaker’s assumption. In example (50) the speaker does not want to sound impolite and therefore uses seem to hedge the accusation (cf. the unhedged version and yet you are sightseeing). Those pragmatic functions of seem are reflected in its translation correspondences of various types. Non-copular atrodyti as well as modal adverbials and mental verbs which were used as translation correspondences of seem can perform the function of hedging in Lithuanian. The semantic content of all of these markers always retains the element of personal opinion or uncertainty, either natural or strategic, no matter whether it is backgrounded or foregrounded by other semantic values. It is precisely this tentativeness present in seem correspondences which confirms the hedging potential of seem. Aijmer (2009) also notes that seem, especially in the seem + infinitive construction is frequently

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

309

rendered into Swedish, German and French by markers with a clear hedging function. Translations of seem with the copulative use of atrodyti ‘seem’, on the other hand, may also be treated as hedges, even though they are mostly evidential in nature and record direct observations. Mithun has observed that seem can be an indicator that the statement is based on appearance and hence hedge probability, as in her example “Sam seems tired” (Mithun 1986: 90). As seem is not equivalent to is, the speaker’s commitment is always only partial, because what seems to one individual is not a universal truth, but his/her subjective impression, that can be denied later, for example: (51)

ENorig Sophie Neveu seemed far too solid of character to be mixed up in something that sordid. LTtrans Sofi Nevė atrodo per daug rimta, kad leistųsi į tokias niekingas avantiūras.

In (51) atrodo ‘seems’ indicates the direct impression of the speaker, but simultaneously signals that the speaker does not want full responsibility for the statement and therefore hedges (cf. unhedged version (51a) which is categorical): (51a)

Sophie Neveu was/is far too solid of character to be mixed up in something that sordid.

Some correspondences of seem, however, cannot be seen as performing the function of hedging. Such verbs as pajusti ‘feel’, skambėti ‘sound’, sudaryti įspūdį ‘make an impression’, įsivaizduoti ‘imagine’, paaiškėti ‘become clear’, some cases of the aspectual perfective pasirodyti ‘appear’ just record evidential perception and do not mitigate the content of the proposition. It is interesting to note that Aijmer (2009) in her analysis of parenthetical seem provides the definition from the OED that emphasizes the evidential aspect of seem when used parenthetically: Parenthetically. Now often with somewhat of the sense “So I am informed”, or “As it appears from rumour or report” (OED seem 7d, in Aijmer 2009: 79).

In Aijmer’s examples no intersubjective meaning of this kind is reflected by translation correspondences of parenthetical seem and as the scholar notes, seem functions as a “generalized hedge” (Aijmer 2009: 79). However, in our corpus there are examples of parenthetical constructions with seem where the evidential meaning defined in the OED appears to be realized. However, in those cases seem correspondences do not act as hedges, as illustrated in (52)–(54):

310

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

(52)

ENorig Winston read through the offending article. Big Brother’s Order for the Day, it seemed, had been chiefly devoted to praising the work of an organization known as FFCC . LTtrans Paaiškėjo, kad Didžiojo Brolio vedamasis beveik ištisai gyrė organizaciją CPPT .

(53)

ENorig But he lingered for some minutes more, talking to the old man, whose name, he discovered, was not Weeks-as one might have gathered from the inscription over the shop- front – but Charrington. Mr Charrington, it seemed, was a widower aged sixty-three and had inhabited this shop for thirty years. LTtrans Paaiškėjo, kad jis yra šešiasdešimt trejų metų našlys ir šioje parduotuvėje gyvena trisdešimt metų.

(54)

ENorig Hagrid was fuming. Malfoy, it seemed, had sneaked up behind Neville and grabbed him as a joke. LTtrans Pasirodo, Smirdžius prislinko Neviliui iš už nugaros ir sugriebė jį.

In all three examples the meaning of seem is close to turn out. It is clear from the extended context that seem indicates reported information. The translation correspondences, however, do not function as hedges in Lithuanian but emphasize the reportative nature of the propositions. The concept of hedging closely links with cases of zero correspondences in translation. Since hedging is considered to be culture specific, the question raised while dealing with translations is whether a translator can effectively interpret not only the meaning of the utterance, but also the writer’s original intention. Markkanen and Schröder raise the question as to whether a translator can affect the amount of hedging while translating the original text with his or her background cultural conventions in mind (Markkanen and Schröder 1989). Low claims that hedging or mitigation is a basic part of British culture (Low 1996: 23) and so it is only natural that this cultural trait is reflected in fictional literature as well. The same hedging conventions might not be shared by other cultures and this cultural variation in qualifying information may be reflected in translations. A special case study of the translation of the second Harry Potter series book into Lithuanian, Russian, Polish and Spanish3 revealed that in the Spanish language the number of cases of seem reduction was significantly lower than in the 3 We wish to thank Juana I. Marín Arrese from Universidad Complutense de Madrid for her valuable comments on the interpretation of some seem correspondences in Spanish translation.

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

311

other three languages (29 cases vs 53 [LT], 57 [RU], 45 [PL] cases respectively). Interestingly, research on hedging in Spanish demonstrates that this pragmatic strategy is used fairly frequently. For example, Martín-Martín (2008: 147) in a comparative study of English and Spanish research articles in the field of Clinical and Health Psychology observes that hedging “is favoured by the writers in both languages [Spanish vs English], although a slightly higher tendency was reported in the English research papers”. Likewise, in the contrastive analysis of English and Spanish architecture project descriptions Cabanes (2007: 154) concludes that “hedging strategies are signalled by a very heterogeneous range of lexicogrammatical items, of which almost parallel examples appear in both languages [Spanish and English]”. In (55), where seem in the original text clearly performs the pragmatic function of hedging, it is only the Spanish translation that transfers the same mitigating effect of seem into the target language: (55)

ENorig I noticed, in my search of the park, that considerable damage seems to have been done to a very valuable Whomping Willow. LTtrans Apžiūrėdamas parką pamačiau, kad Ø padaryta didelė žala labai vertingam Gluosniui Galiūnui. PLtrans Przeszukując park, zauważyłem, że bardzo cenna wierzba bijąca Ø została poważnie uszkodzona. RUtrans Pri osmotre parka ja zametil, čto značitel’nyj uŝerb Ø byl nanesen ves’ma cennoj Drakučej ive. EStrans He percibido, en mi examen del parque, que un ejemplar muy valioso de sauce boxeador parece haber sufrido daños considerables.

The cultural aspect of hedging could perhaps be one of the explanations for a frequent omission of seem in Lithuanian, Russian and Polish translations.

4 Conclusions The findings of the parallel corpus-based analysis carried out corroborate the multifunctionality of seem as mirrored in the Lithuanian, Polish and Russian correspondences in translations from the English original. This contrastive look at translation correspondences has also allowed us to cast light on how the two domains of evidential and epistemic meanings correlate by looking at the correspondences in Lithuanian translations, which have been further checked against Polish and Russian data. There are many cases of use where the two qualifications of evidentiality and epistemic modality are very closely interrelated and

312

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

inseparable. Much depends on the reliability of the source of evidence available for the speaker to draw his/her judgement. The high number of seem correspondences range from purely epistemic to purely evidential with overlapping epistemic and evidential values in between and reflect the complexity and multifunctionality of seem. As noted by SimonVandenbergen and Aijmer (2007), “the alternative translations of a lexical source item constitute a paradigm of specific meanings representing the semantic profile of a word as mirrored in another language” (Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007: 18). The cluster of different shades of meanings that seem possesses is reflected in the variety of correspondences that all together result in the multifunctional epistemic-evidential profile of seem. Both congruent and non-congruent correspondences of seem in translation highlight the semantic diversity of the verb. It can also be observed that the dominating semantic properties of seem depend on the construction the verb occurs in. Evidential reading is dominant in the copular-seem construction, while evidential-epistemic is more common in the seem + infinitive construction. Thus, following Boye (2010) who suggests mapping the two categories (evidentiality and epistemic modality) under the conceptual domain of epistemic expressions the verb seem can be regarded as a marker of epistemicity. Although the study mainly concentrated on seem correspondences in Lithuanian translations, a preliminary analysis of Russian and Polish translations confirms similar tendencies of frequent zero correspondence and varied semantic range of seem correspondences in these languages. A high number of seem reduction cases in Lithuanian, Polish and Russian translations might be an indication of different cultural behaviour conventions of directness and hedging. While hedging is a natural social norm in Anglo-Saxon culture, it could be much less characteristic to other cultures and this might be reflected in translations. The findings of the study also corroborate the claim made by many previous cross-linguistic studies that grammatical categories do not and cannot have identical straightforward correspondences across languages. Therefore, it is not plausible to speak of congruent correspondences in translation when dealing with grammaticalized expressions across languages. The English verb seem has undergone grammaticalization and it is most frequently used as a raising verb in the construction with the infinitive, which is associated with its evidential and epistemic qualifications. Seem cognates in the languages analyzed are not raising verbs and the range of their meaning shift is not identical across languages. Therefore it is natural to expect a great variety of correspondences reflecting differences in the lexical and grammatical architecture of the given functional domain.

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

313

Data Sources DLL e – Dictionary of the Lithuanian Language (Lietuvių kalbos žodynas: http://www.lkz.lt). MLDe – Modern Lithuanian Dictionary (Dabartinės lietuvių kalbos žodynas: http://www.lki.lt/dlkz/). ParaCorpE-LT – The English Lithuanian Parallel Corpus (see Usonienė and Šolienė 2010).

HP Corpus [English] Rowling, J.K. 1998. Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone. Arthur A. Levine Books / Scholastic. [Lithuanian] Rowling, J.K. 2000. Haris Poteris ir išminties akmuo. Translated by Zita Marienė. Vilnius: Alma Litera. [Polish] Rowling, J.K. 2000. Harry Potter i Kamien Filozoficzny. Translated by Andrzej Polkowski. Media Rodzina. [Russian] Rouling, Džoan Ketlin. 2001. Garri Potter i filosovskij kamen. Narodnyj perevod.

References Aijmer, Karin. 1972. Some Aspects of Psychological predicates in English. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. Aijmer, Karin. 1980. Evidence and the Declarative Sentence. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. Aijmer, Karin. 1996. Swedish modal particles in a contrastive perspective. In: Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt and Ken Turner (eds.), Contrastive Semantics and Pragmatics: Meanings and Representations, Volume 1, 393–427. Oxford/New York/Tokyo: Pergamon. Aijmer, Karin. 1997. I think – an English modal particle. In: Toril Swan and Olaf Jansen Westvik (eds.), Modality in Germanic Languages, 1–47. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Aijmer, Karin. 2001. Epistemic modal adverbs of certainty in an English-Swedish perspective. SPRIK Reports, No 5. http://www.hf.uio.no/forskningsprosjekter/sprik/docs/pdf/aijmer. pdf (accessed 10 April, 2011). Aijmer, Karin. 2007. The meaning and functions of the Swedish discourse marker alltså: evidence from translation corpora. Catalan Journal of Linguistics 6: 31–59. Aijmer, Karin. 2009. Seem and evidentiality. Functions of Language 16(1): 63–88. Aijmer, Karin and Bengt Altenberg. 2002. Zero translations and cross-linguistic equivalence: Evidence from the English-Swedish parallel Corpus. In: Leiv Egil Breivik and Angela Hasselgren (eds.), From the COLT’s mouth . . . and others: language corpora studies in honour of Anna-Brita Stenström, 19–41. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Aijmer, Karin and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen. 2003. The discourse particle well and its equivalents in Swedish and Dutch. Linguistics 41(6): 1123–1161. Aikhenvald, Alexandra. 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aikhenvald, Alexandra. 2006. Evidentiality in grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd edition, Volume 4, 320–325. Oxford: Elsevier. Ambrazas, Vytautas (ed.). 1997. Lithuanian grammar. Vilnius: Baltos lankos.

314

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

Anderson, Lloyd B. 1986. Evidentials, paths of change, and mental maps: Typologically regular asymmetries. In: Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 273–312. Norwood: Ablex. Austin, John Langshaw. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Clarendon. Baker, Mona. 1992. In Other Words: A Coursebook on Translation. London and New York: Routledge. Barron, Julia. 1997. LFG and the history of raising verbs. In: Miriam Butt and Tracy Holloway King (eds.), Proceedings of the LFG 97 Conference, CSLI Publications. http://www-csli. stanford.edu/publications/ (accessed 15 June, 2011). Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad and Edward Finegan. 1999. Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. Essex: Pearson Education. Bolinger, Dwight. 1991. The Syntax of parecer. In: Joseph Silverman (ed.), Essays on Spanish: Words and Grammar, 25–43. Newark: Juan de la Cuesta. Botne, Robert. 1997. Evidentiality and epistemic modality in Lega. Studies in Language 21(3): 509–532. Boye, Kasper and Peter Harder. 2007. Complement-taking predicates. Usage and linguistic structure. Studies in Language 31(3): 569–606. Boye, Kasper. 2010. Semantic maps and the identification of cross-linguistic generic categories: evidentiality and its relation to epistemic modality. Linguistic Discovery 8(1): 4–22. http:// journals.dartmouth.edu/cgi-bin/WebObjects/Journals.woa/2/xmlpage/1/article/344? htmlOnce=yes Volume 8 Issue 1 (2010) (accessed 30 April, 2011). Cabanes, Paloma Poveda. 2007. A contrastive analysis of hedging in English and Spanish architecture project descriptions. Resla 20: 139–158. Chafe, Wallace. 1986. Evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing. In: Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 261–272. Norwood: Ablex. Chafe, Wallace and Johanna Nichols (eds.). 1986. Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology. Norwood: Ablex. Cornillie, Bert. 2007. Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality in Spanish (Semi-) Auxiliaries: A Cognitive-Functional Approach. (Applications of Cognitive Linguistics 5.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Cornillie, Bert. 2009 Evidentiality and epistemic modality: On the close relationship between two different categories. Functions of Language 16(1): 44–62. de Haan, Ferdinand. 2007. Raising as grammaticalization: the case of Germanic seem-verbs. Rivista di Linguistica 19(1): 129–150. Dendale, Patrick and Julie Van Bogaert. 2007. A semantic description of French lexical evidential markers and the classification of evidentials. Rivista di Linguistica 19(1): 65–89. Diewald, Gabriele, Marijana Kresic and Elena Smirnova. 2009. The grammaticalization channels of evidentials and modal particles in german: integration in textual structures as a common feature. In: Maj-Britt Mosegaard Hansen and Jacqueline Visconti (eds.), Current Trends in Diachronic Semantics and Pragmatics, 189–209. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing. Dixon, Robert M. W. 1992. A New Approach to English Grammar, on Semantic Principles. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Faller, Martina T. 2002. Semantics and Pragmatics of Evidentials in Cuzco Quechua. Stanford University Dissertation. http://personalpages.manchester.ac.uk/staff/martina.t.faller/ documents/Thesis-AU.pdf (accessed 05 May, 2011).

A cross-linguistic look at the multifunctionality of the English verb seem

315

Gisborne, Nicholas and Jasper Holmes. 2007. A history of English evidential verbs of appearance. English Language and Linguistics 11(1): 1–29. Hyland, Ken. 1998. Hedging in Scientific Research Articles. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Johansson, Stig. 2001. The English verb seem and its correspondences in Norwegian: What seems to be the problem. In: Karin Aijmer (ed.), A wealth of English. Studies in Honour of Goran Kjellmer, 221–245. Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis. Johansson, Stig. 2007. Seeing Through Multilingual Corpora. On the Use of Corpora in Contrastive Studies. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Johansson, Stig and Knut Hofland. 1994. Towards an English-Norwegian parallel corpus. In: Udo Fries, Gunnel Tottie and Peter Schneider (eds.), Creating and Using English Language Corpora, 25–37. Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi. Kaltenböck, Gunther. 2007. Position, prosody and scope: the case of English comment clauses. Vienna English Working Papers 16(1): 3–38. Lampert, Günther and Martina Lampert. 2010. Where does evidentiality reside? Notes on (alleged) limiting cases: Quotatives and seem-verbs. In: Björn Wiemer and Katerina Stathi (eds.), STUF – Language Typology and Universals. Special Issue on the Data Base on Evidetiality Markers in European Languages, 63(4): 308–321. Low, Graham. 1996. Intensifiers and hedges in questionnaire items and the lexical invisibility hypothesis. Applied Linguistics 17(1): 1–37. Marín-Arrese, Juana I., Laura Hidalgo-Downing and Silvia Molina-Plaza. 2004. Evidential and deontic modality in English and Spanish: the Expression of writer stance in newspaper discourse. In: Roberta Facchinetti and Frank Palmer (eds.), English Modality in Perspective. Genre Analysis and Contrastive studies, 121–139. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Markkanen, Raija and Hartmut Schröder. 1989. Hedging as a Translation Problem in Scientific Texts. In: Christer Laurén and M. Nordman (eds.), Special Language: From Humans Thinking to Thinking Machines, 171–180. Multilingual Matters Ltd. Martín-Martín, Pedro. 2008. The Mitigation of Scientific Claims in Research Papers: A Comparative Study. International Journal of English Studies 8(2): 133–152. Mithun, Marianne. 1986. Evidential Diachrony in Northern Iroquoian. In: Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 89–113. Norwood: Ablex. Noël, Dirk. 2002. Believe-type matrix verbs and their complements. Corpus-based investigations of their functions in discourse. A collection of articles. Ph.D. dissertation, Ghent University. Nuyts, Jan and Wietske Vonk. 1999. Epistemic modality and focus in Dutch. Linguistics 37(4): 699–737. Plungian, Vladimir. 2001. The place of evidentiality within the universal grammatical space. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 349–357. Poutsma, Hendrik. 1904. A Grammar of Late Modern English. Part I The Sentence. Gröningen: P. Noordhoff. Poutsma, Hendrik. 1926. A Grammar of Late Modern English. Part II. Gröningen: P. Noordhoff. Prince, Ellen F., Joel Frader and Charles Bosk. 1982. On hedging in physician-physician discourse. In: Robert J. Di Pietro (ed.), Linguistics and the professions. Proceedings of the Second Annual Delaware Symposium on Language Studies, 83–97. Norwood: Ablex. Ransom, Evelyn N. 1986. Complementation: Its Meanings and Forms. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

316

Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

Rooryck, Johan. 1997. On the interaction between raising and focus in sentential complementation. Studia Linguistica 51: 1–49. Salager-Meyer, Françoise. 1997. I think that perhaps you should: A study of hedges in written scientific discourse. In: Tom Miller (ed.), Functional Approaches to Written Texts: Classroom Applications, 105–118. Washington: United States Information Agency. Simon-Vandenbergen, Anne-Marie and Karin Aijmer. 2002–2003. The expectation marker of course in a cross-linguistic perspective. Languages in Contrast 4(1): 13–43. Simon-Vandenbergen, Anne-Marie and Karin Aijmer. 2007. The Semantic Field of Modal Certainty – A Corpus-Based Study of English Adverbs. (Topics in English Linguistics 56.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Squartini, Mario. 2008. Lexical vs. grammatical evidentiality in French and Italian. Linguistics 46(5): 917–947. Squartini, Mario. 2009. Evidentiality, epistemicity and their diachronic connections to nonfactuality. In: Maj-Britt Mosegaard Hansen and Jacqueline Visconti (eds.), Current Trends in Diachronic Semantics and Pragmatics, 214–225. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing. Usonienė, Aurelija. 2000. On the Modality of the English verbs of seeming. Belgian Journal of Linguistics 14: 183–204. Usonienė, Aurelija. 2003. Extension of meaning: verbs of perception in English and Lithuanian. In: Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt and Ken Turner (eds.), Meaning Through Language Contrast: The Cambridge Papers, Volume 1, 193–220. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Usonienė, Aurelija. 2006. Tikimybės veiksmažodžiai anglų ir lietuvių kalbose: atitikmenų paieška [Probability verbs in English and Lithuanian: in search of equivalents]. Baltistica 46(2): 321–332. Usonienė, Aurelija. 2007. Degrees of confidence and modal words in Lithuanian. Mokslo žurnalas Lietuvių kalba (1). http://www.lietuviukalba.lt/index.php?id=71 (accessed 06 July, 2011). Usonienė, Aurelija and Audronė Šolienė. 2010. Choice of strategies in realizations of epistemic possibility in English and Lithuanian. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 15(2): 291–316. van der Auwera, Johan, Ewa Schalley and Jan Nuyts. 2005. Epistemic possibility in a Slavonic parallel corpus – a pilot study. In: Bjorn Hansen and Petr Karlik (eds.), Modality in Slavonic languages. New perspectives, 201–217. München: Sagner. Varttala, Teppo. 2001. Hedging in Scientifically Oriented Discourse: Exploring Variation according to Discipline and Intended Audience. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tampere. http:// acta.uta.fi (accessed 01 July, 2011). Wiemer, Björn. 2010. Hearsay in European languages: toward an integrative account of grammatical and lexical marking. In: Gabriele Diewald and Elena Smirnova (eds.), The Linguistic Realization of Evidentiality in European Languages (Empirical approaches to language typology 49.), 59–130. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter, Wierzbicka, Anna. 1988. The Semantics of Grammar. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Willett, Thomas L. 1988. A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticalization of evidentiality. Studies in Language 12: 51–97.

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

Annotating English adverbials for the categories of epistemic modality and evidentiality 1 Introduction This paper reports part of the research currently carried out within the CONTRANOT project,1 which aims at the creation and validation of contrastive functional descriptions through corpus analysis and annotation in English and Spanish, and at the production of an annotated bilingual corpus called CONTRASTES (Lavid 2008, 2012; Lavid, Arús, and Zamorano-Mansilla 2010). Modality and evidentiality are two of the categories to be annotated, together with appraisal, coherence relations and theme. The methodology used for the design of the annotation systems is aimed at producing annotation schemes that yield acceptable levels of inter-annotator agreement. The focus of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of epistemic modality and evidentiality as well as of their relationship with neighbouring categories, such as other modalities, manner or mirativity. The article also aims to develop the annotation system of epistemic modality and evidentiality in a number of English adverbials2 randomly selected from the British National Corpus (BNC). As will be seen throughout the article, the complexity of many of the adverbials often makes it necessary to include specifications for their individual annotation. The article is structured as follows: Section 2 specifies the concept and scope of epistemic modality and evidentiality that will be adopted as point of departure for the annotation system. Section 3 covers the methodology and data used for the design of this system, as well as the list of adverbials selected for annotation. Sections 4 to 6 describe the annotation process with different 1 Data of the project: “Creation and validation of contrastive descriptions (English-Spanish) through corpus analysis and annotation: linguistic, methodological and computational issues”. Ref. FFI2008-03384 (Ministry of Science and Innovation). Director: Prof. Julia Lavid, Universidad Complutense de Madrid. 2 The term adverbial, as it is used in this paper, encompasses epistemic and evidential adverbs as well as expressions of other syntactic categories that are similar in meaning and function to these adverbs, such as the Nominal Group no doubt or the Prepositional Phrases in all probability, in all likelihood or for sure.

318

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

types of adverbials: epistemic probability (Section 4), epistemic certainty (Section 5) and evidentiality (Section 6). All these types are treated in terms of preliminary considerations about the annotation of each group, lists of adverbials that are epistemic or evidential in all their occurrences, and specific accounts of the annotation experiments and resulting criteria set for the adverbials whose epistemic or evidential meaning coexists with one or more other meanings. Section 7 offers a synoptic view of the resulting annotation system, and Section 8 sums up the main conclusions.

2 Epistemic modality and evidentiality in the annotation system The areas of epistemic modality and evidentiality are a matter of disagreement in the literature, as regards the concept, the scope and the relations between them. Concerning epistemic modality, the concept adopted here will be in line with that used in work based on modal logic, concretely on the categories of possibility or necessity. The types of modality usually distinguished within this approach are the epistemic, the deontic and the dynamic (and less commonly others such as boulomaic modality). This concept of modality is widely used in the literature, as many references attest, such as Hermerén (1978), Palmer (1990), Perkins (1983), Nuyts (2001), Wärnsby (2006) or Collins (2009).3 Accordingly, epistemic modality may be defined as the linguistic expression of the estimation of the chances for a proposition to have been, be or become true (cf. Nuyts 2001: 21). The scope of epistemic modality in English includes expressions such as the following: the modal auxiliaries in their epistemic senses (must, may, might, will. . .); adverbials ( perhaps, probably, certainly, no doubt. . .), lexical verbs (know, believe, think. . .), adjectives (possible, probable, true. . .) and nouns (certainty, probability. . .). This approach to epistemic modality is more restricted than that of other proposals (Biber et al. 1999; Kärkkäinen 2003), which also include expressions that qualify the speaker/writer (sp/wr)’s commitment to the reliability of the information in different ways from probability in the strict sense, such as hedges of approximation (sort of, like. . .) or stance adverbials of degree (basically, largely, absolutely). It is true that the distinction between these expressions and 3 In these references, modal logic is only the point of departure: the definitions of the modalities are adapted to linguistics, and obviously modal expressions are treated in terms of their idiosyncratic semantic and pragmatic features.

Annotating English adverbials

319

prototypical epistemic expressions is often blurred in actual language use (see, for example, Carretero’s [2010] study of absolutely and its Spanish cognate absolutamente). However, we believe that, for the purposes of annotating a corpus, labels such as degree and approximation are best treated independently of epistemic modality. Therefore, the selection for annotation is restricted to those adverbials that have a semantic component of epistemic modality. With regard to evidentiality, there is (by and large) agreement in the literature about its notional definition: evidentiality concerns the linguistic expression of the kind, source and/or evaluation of the evidence for or against the truth of the proposition that the sp/wr has at his/her disposal. However, this high degree of consensus decreases when the scope of evidentiality is to be delimited (Boye and Harder 2009: 11–14): a number of references treat evidentiality as a grammatical phenomenon (Mithun 1986; Anderson 1986); others consider it as a semantic category (Chafe 1986), and finally others opt for a more inclusive view that does not discard cases in which evidentiality is pragmatically inferred (Ifantidou 2001). We agree with this last reference and also with Boye and Harder (2009) that the most inclusive approach has the advantage of offering a more comprehensive account of the role of evidentiality in language. But in order to consider evidentiality in a similar way to epistemic modality, all the adverbials selected have a component of evidentiality that has the status of a semantic meaning and not of a conversational implicature. At this point we must specify that we do not consider semantics and pragmatics as clearcut levels of meaning, but rather as end-points of a continuum made up of degrees of context dependence: epistemic modality and evidentiality count as a semantic feature of a given adverbial when it is context-independent or it occurs in a significant number of contexts (which need not be the majority). For example, the experiment done with perhaps and maybe led to the consideration that the epistemic meaning is pervasive in all the contexts in which they occur, while for possibly the epistemic meaning was found in some of the cases but not in others. Similarly, evidently turned out to be evidential in all the cases, while clearly was evidential in a substantial number of instances but not in others. All these adverbials were included in our annotation. Concerning the relationship between epistemic modality and evidentiality, there has long been a controversial issue on whether they are best approached as separate categories (de Haan 2000; Marín-Arrese 2004; Cornillie 2009) or as domains that display a high degree of overlap in their linguistic expression (Willett 1988; van der Auwera and Plungian 1998; Carretero 2004a). We believe that the two categories have the common feature of assessing the reliability of the information; in other words, they express the sp/wr’s commitment to the

320

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

truth of the proposition. This feature is also present in other categories that, as we will see throughout the paper, overlap with epistemic modality, such as degree or mirativity. However, epistemic modality and evidentiality are conceptually different in the way this reliability is assessed: in epistemic modality, the assessment is carried out through the expression of probability, and in evidentiality, through the specification of the kind, source or evaluation of the evidence for or against the truth of the proposition. In spite of this conceptual difference, we hold the view that there is a high degree of overlap in their linguistic expression, at least in English: there are expressions which have a semantic feature that assesses the probability and another that assesses the evidence. For example, the adverbials clearly, evidently and obviously have an epistemic semantic feature of high degree of probability (in other words, certainty) and an evidential semantic feature that points to the important role of the evidence in the assessment of the reliability of the information. This second feature is not present in other adverbials of certainty such as certainly or definitely (SimonVandenbergen and Aijmer 2007). Another “epistential” adverbial is allegedly, which has an evidential meaning of non-conclusive verbal evidence and an epistemic meaning of lack of total certainty. In this case, it may be argued that the evidential meaning is the primary one and the epistemic meaning is just implicated, but in any case both meanings are pervasive across contexts and consequently have the status of semantic features in this approach. This coexistence of epistemic and evidential meanings should not be problematic to assume: a quick glance at dictionary definitions or attempts to design the mental lexicon provides evidence that nearly all lexical items are described in terms of combinations of several meanings linked by complex relationships. Consequently, we believe that there is nothing odd about stating that certain words or expressions have two semantic features that qualify the reliability of the information, one epistemic and the other evidential. However, in spite of our position about the relationship between the two categories, we acknowledge that both may be treated separately for practical purposes. In the research context of this paper, which is part of a larger project that aims to provide schemes for annotating diverse categories in corpora (see Section 1), we consider that the distinction between epistemic modality and evidentiality as different means to assess the reliability of the information is useful for the stylistic characterization of the diverse texts of the corpora. Consequently, we opted for annotating both categories separately: the label evidential was assigned to those adverbials that have a semantic feature of evidentiality, no matter whether they also have an epistemic meaning or not, while the label epistemic was assigned to the adverbials that do not have an evidential meaning.

Annotating English adverbials

321

3 Methodology and data The design of an annotation scheme must start with the specification of the elements or items that are potential candidates for annotation. These are known as markables. In the case of an annotation scheme for epistemic modality and evidentiality, the markables are those categories mentioned in Section 2 which are typically associated with the expression of epistemic modality and evidentiality in English and other languages (verbs, nouns, adverbials, etc.). Due to space limitations, this paper focuses only on the results obtained for the category of adverbials. The second step in the design of an annotation scheme involves a definition of the possible tags that can be assigned to the markables. When dealing with the annotation of epistemic modality and evidentiality, the first and most basic tagging distinguishes between Epistemic and Non-epistemic expressions, or between Evidential and Non-evidential expressions. Classifying expressions in this binary way might seem a trivial task, but this is far from true. As previous studies have shown (Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007; Byloo, Kastein and Nuyts 2007; Maíz and Arús 2008; Tucker 2001; Hoye 1997; Swan 1988), and as will be shown throughout the remainder of this paper, the delimitation of modal and evidential categories is a rather complex issue. For the present study, a list of potential markables was designed with the aim of exploring the limits of both epistemic modality and evidentiality. Starting with prototypical adverbials of these categories found in the literature, new adverbials were selected due to their semantic connection with them. These additions were obtained with the help of dictionaries and thesauri. As was stated in Section 2, all the selected adverbials have an epistemic or evidential semantic component. The list of adverbials analyzed does not intend to be exhaustive; rather, the paper aims to provide sample analyses of epistemic and evidential adverbials of different types. Due to the extensive list of markables involved in the study, it was found convenient to break them down into more manageable groups, so that they were divided into the following broad categories: – Epistemic adverbials of probability and possibility: conceivably, impossibly, improbably, in all likelihood, in all probability, likely, maybe, perhaps, plausibly, possibly, predictably, probably. – Epistemic adverbials of certainty: assuredly, certainly, definitely, positively, surely, undeniably, unquestionably. – Evidential adverbials: apparently, clearly, evidently, obviously, plainly. Other kinds of adverbials that might have been included are epistemic adverbials of reality (actually, genuinely, in fact, in reality, really. . .) and a number of

322

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

adverbials that do not have propositional scope but might be argued to be evidential or to have evidential uses (distinctly, manifestly, visibly). These kinds of adverbials will not be analyzed here for reasons of space. Before proceeding to the analysis of the adverbials in each group, a preliminary study based on the references mentioned above was carried out in order to distinguish semantic factors that might have an influence on the annotation from pragmatic factors which were to be ignored but could well be distractors in the actual annotation. After the preliminary study, the authors started by annotating 20 examples of each markable. The level of acceptability was set in a percentage of 10% errors (i.e. a maximum of 2 errors in this experiment was acceptable, so that the criteria followed could be considered as valid for further annotation). If the level of agreement was not acceptable, the criteria for annotation were revised and a second experiment was carried out with 30 examples. If the agreement was still not satisfactory, the criteria were revised again and a third experiment was done with 35 examples. These different stages of the annotation process are schematized in Figure 1. In a few cases, the second or the third annotation experiment was carried out even with acceptable agreement to ensure the reliability of the criteria or to test new criteria set in the discussion of the results. The examples used in the annotation experiments were collected from the Brigham Young University version of the British National Corpus, available online at http://corpus.byu.edu/bnc/. Each group is dealt with separately in Sections 4, 5 and 6.

Figure 1: Methodology: steps of the annotation process

4 Annotation of the adverbials of probability 4.1 Preliminary considerations Under this category we have included those adverbials that express an estimation of the chances that an utterance is true which is lower than total certainty. This estimation varies from high probability (in all probability, in all likelihood)

Annotating English adverbials

323

through medium probability ( probably, likely, plausibly. . .) to low probability (maybe, perhaps, possibly, conceivably. . .). Probability adverbials can be considered as prototypical epistemic expressions: most definitions of epistemic modality in the literature are particularly relevant to their central meanings (see Nuyts 2001, 2005, for instance); additionally, they are always comments normally deriving from the sp/wr, to the point that they cannot be interpreted as adverbials of manner. That is, in an utterance like He’ll probably do it slowly the adverbial probably can never refer to the way in which the referent of “he” will do it, as is the case of slowly. During the preliminary study, a number of issues were solved. The first was the distinction between epistemic modality and other modalities (deontic and dynamic). Deontic modality may be defined, in a parallel way to the definition of epistemic modality proposed in Section 2, as the set of meanings that belong to the possibility-necessity axis in terms of social or institutional laws (Perkins 1983; van der Auwera and Plungian 1998). The main deontic meanings are obligation, recommendation, permission and prohibition. In its turn, dynamic modality may be defined as the set of meanings that belong to the possibilitynecessity axis and are determined by natural circumstances, which may or may not be inherent to a person or another entity. The main meanings included in dynamic modality are inevitability, tendency, ability and (lack of) potentiality due to internal properties of an entity or else to circumstantial properties (ZamoranoMansilla and Carretero 2010). (1)–(3) are examples of possibly with epistemic, deontic and dynamic meaning respectively. (1)

When he knocked, Jessica was lying on her bed lying on her bed. She was calm, her breathing even, she had possibly dozed off at some time, a thought she found quite odd. She got. (BNC HTS)

(2)

“This is a small cadeau for you, ma petite,” he said. “I happened to see it on my way back from the nursing-home and I thought it would go particularly well with the dress.” Alice unwrapped the parcel with a sense of unease. If this was jewellery, she could not possibly accept it, no matter how appropriate it might be for the gown she was wearing. (BNC FS1)

(3)

So remember to treat yourselves, perhaps slowly saving up and buying a present for yourself or doing things you enjoy, as rewards for your achievements. How Long Will it Take? Nobody could possibly offer a definite answer to this and say how long it may take to fully overcome anxiety and stress problems. (BNC EB1)

324

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

A case in point is generic statements, which commonly occur with some adverbials such as maybe, perhaps and possibly (4). These statements have the difficulty that, on the one hand, they express epistemic modality, since there is some probability for the event to occur in each individual case, and on the other they may be considered as dynamic, in the sense that the meaning of weak tendency is also expressed (Zamorano-Mansilla and Carretero 2010: 314–315). In cases such as this, the adverbial may be roughly paraphrased with an adverbial of frequency such as sometimes or in certain cases. For the annotation of generic cases, we decided to rely on the semantics of each adverbial as a whole: maybe and perhaps do not display dynamic modality apart from these cases, and therefore we have decided to consider them as epistemic. However, possibly displays other cases of dynamic modality apart from these, and hence the generic cases are considered as merger between epistemic and dynamic modality. (4) “Many companies are placing their main focus on the opportunities for intro-European trading after 1992 and rightly so. However, at British Airways Cargo it is the global implications of the Single Market which are receiving most attention,” says Peter White. He continues: “Currently, major manufacturers from the United States and Asia tend to have two or maybe three plants in Europe.” (BNC AMH) Other uses discussed were those in which these adverbials have meanings close to those of neighbouring semantic categories, such as approximation or opinion. In (5), probably could well be replaced by an adverbial of approximation such as about or approximately. However, the meaning of probability cannot be said to be eliminated: approximation means lack of exact knowledge about a quantity, so that in these contexts the meanings of probability and approximation may well be considered to be neutralized. These cases will be considered as epistemic. (5)

The most I have played at one time is probably seven hours and it becomes agonising, it tightens your arm up terribly. (BNC K4T)

More complex is the relationship between the meanings of probability and opinion. Opinion means lack of objective truth; statements that qualify as a matter of opinion are non-verifiable. The contrast between the use of epistemic expressions in verifiable statements and in opinions is illustrated in (6)–(7). (6) is a verifiable statement, since it concerns limitation of knowledge, and this occurrence of maybe is prototypically epistemic in that it serves the sp/wr to indicate that the content of the utterance is not completely reliable, due to poor

Annotating English adverbials

325

memory or any other problem related to knowledge and certainty. However, (7) is a non-verifiable statement: probably is not prototypically epistemic here, in that it does not primarily indicate a proper estimation of probability; instead, probably mainly serves interpersonal functions, such as the expression of tact and consideration of other possible viewpoints; that is, its use may be considered to be largely due to reasons of politeness. (6) Don’t know. Go and look for it for me then? Oh mum! Maybe it’s in the utility. I don’t want to. (BNC KE4) (7)

I wished he’d had the same confidence in front of audiences because he was probably the most talented actor of us all. (BNC A2Y)

The category opinion is semantically signalled by adverbials such as arguably, in my opinion, in my view or to my mind. However, the use of adverbials of opinion such as arguably occurs in what might be considered as verifiable statements (8). This example and (7) above lead to the observation that epistemic adverbials and adverbials of opinion may be used interchangeably, which indicates that the distinction between opinions and verifiable statements, in spite of its importance in some aspects of life such as scientific research or legal matters, is not always made clear in the everyday use of language. (8) Keith, the department head, is keeping quiet, but makes it plain that the second half of June is his, arguably having something to do with his secretary, Debbie, and a certain destination in Latin America. (BNC ASD) Concerning opinion, our decision was to exclude this factor from consideration in the annotation system. On the one hand, the boundaries between verifiability and non-verifiability are not always clear. For example, even though (7) is a matter of opinion, the existence of prestigious awards such as the Oscars hints that acting talent is somehow perceived as measurable, so that (7) might be considered to be verifiable in a sense. In other cases, many statements are theoretically verifiable but their verification is unlikely to take place. This is the case of (9), in which the truth of the statement that colossal waste is the real reason for Hollywood’s dominance in the cinema industry is difficult to prove. Therefore, the adverbials listed in this section will be considered as epistemic in the annotation even if they are used in non-verifiable statements mainly for reasons of politeness.

326

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

(9) The cinema industry has always thrived, or survived, on colossal waste, the worst-kept secret of the American film industry, if not of the American economy in general, and probably the real reason for the continued and apparently unshakable worldwide dominance of Hollywood. (BNC FB8) The presence of politeness overtones in the use of these adverbials is not restricted to the expression of opinion. In (10)–(11), it is evident that limitation of knowledge cannot be the main motivation for inserting the adverbial maybe. The content of these utterances does not lend itself to an estimation of their reliability, since it involves action and personal views rather than the transmission of information. Instead, the function of maybe can more accurately be described as indicating low assertiveness on the sp/wr’s part. Low assertiveness is a rather general notion that applies to different types of utterances with different effects: in utterances that are mainly about the transmission of information and predictions, epistemic expressions genuinely mean probability; on the other hand, in utterances that propose a course of action, epistemic expressions have a more vague effect of enhancing or lowering assertiveness, depending on their strength. In English-speaking cultures, this lowering of assertiveness is commonly associated with politeness. In fact, this use of epistemic adverbials is so conventionalized in English that dictionaries often refer to it. For example, the Cambridge Learner’s Dictionary describes a use of maybe as “used to politely suggest or ask for something”, and accompanies this description with the examples Maybe Ted would like to go and Maybe we should start again.4 (10) What I was gonna ask you actually erm or maybe I should ask Jean, I don’t know erm. (BNC KBD) (11)

“Maybe you should spend the night here with us,” Mum suggested. (BNC CHR)

The annotation of these adverbials as non-epistemic in such cases was considered. Nevertheless, a view of a larger number of examples led to the thought that, in actual language, the detection of lowering assertiveness as the main reason for using these adverbials would be far from easy: in (12), perhaps could well express genuine doubt about the best course of action for the referent of he to take, or else serve to mitigate an impolite thought (for instance, that he is a nuisance to work with). Consequently, the decision was made to annotate the adverbials as epistemic even in the case in which their use was perceived to be due to the sp/wr’s wish to lower assertiveness. (12)

Perhaps it’s for the best if he did take an early retirement. (BNC EF1)

4 http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/maybe?q=maybe accessed May 15, 2012.

Annotating English adverbials

327

The last point of the discussion were the occurrences in which the most important reason for using these adverbials is not to indicate a degree of probability, but to express a concessive relationship between the clause in which they occur and another clause. In some of these cases, the context indicates that the sp/wr does not have any doubt about the truth of the proposition (13), while in others the maintenance of the epistemic meaning is not clear (14). In view of this context-dependence, we decided not to distinguish the cases in which the adverbials express concession from the others. (13) When asked to sum up how he sees himself as a manager, Miller replies: As a player, maybe I wasn’t the best. I know that. But the managers I played for all said I was the best professional. (BNC K5J) (14) “I honestly don’t think he ever gave us anything. I’ve never held it against him, but I’ve always wondered why. I think he must have just looked at us as guys who could take care of themselves, no problem. “Maybe it was a compliment, though I’m sure the odd Cadillac wouldn’t have gone amiss. Did the band actually split up? (BNC C9L) To sum up this section, the following decisions were made: 1) to annotate the examples of generic statements with adverbs of probability as epistemic or as cases of merger between epistemic and dynamic modality, depending on the general semantics of each adverb; and 2) to annotate as epistemic those cases associated with other meanings such as approximation and opinion, and those in which the adverbials seem to be used mainly as downtoners of assertiveness or to express interclausal concessive relationships.

4.2 Pure epistemic probability Among the adverbials listed in the category of probability, the following produced total agreement between the annotators (100% of cases annotated as epistemic): probably, likely, in all likelihood, in all probability, maybe and perhaps. Consequently, these adverbials are suitable for automatic annotation as epistemic.

4.3 Probability combined with other categories Unlike the adverbials listed in 4.2., those treated in this subsection have other meanings apart from the epistemic. For their annotation, the criteria established in 4.1. were applied: the epistemic cases that showed closeness with the meanings of approximation and opinion, and those in which the adverbials seem to

328

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

be used mainly as downtoners of assertiveness or to express concessive relationships, were to be labelled straightforwardly as epistemic. However, these adverbials displayed cases whose meaning is clearly non-epistemic. In this respect, each adverbial has its own idiosyncrasy and for this reason it has been treated individually.

4.3.1 Possibly As was seen in 4.1., this adverbial can convey epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality. Tucker (2001) makes a distinction between the instances in which possibly is paraphraseable by perhaps/maybe, which he calls “possibly1”, and those in which this paraphrase is not possible, which he calls “possibly2”. These meanings correspond to the epistemic and non-epistemic meanings in our terminology. Even if the authors of this paper do not always agree with Tucker’s interpretation of possibly in all the cases that he discusses, we acknowledge that his study reveals the difficulties involved in the distinction between the two meanings. This difficulty affected the results of the first experiment, in which there was disagreement in 5 of the 20 occurrences of possibly (25% of the total). This result agrees with another experiment (Zamorano-Mansilla and Carretero 2010), for which 40 cases of possibly were annotated.5 In both experiments, the cases that produced disagreement involving epistemic modality may be divided into the following types: A) Generic statements. There were a few errors in applying the criteria stated in 4.1. about this kind of statements. B) Impossibility. In these cases, possibly was combined with the modals can and could in negative sentences. The impossibility is clearly dynamic when it is derived from natural circumstances and the sp/wr has no doubt about it (15); however, in other cases it is indirectly inferred from evidence, so that it could be considered as epistemic (16). Not all the cases are distinguishable: for example, in (17) it could be interpreted that the speaker knows for sure about his impossibility to do a career in the police, or that he infers it from the facts that he knows. For ease of annotation, we decided to consider all the cases of can and could with negative sentences as dynamic (nonepistemic). 5 In this experiment, possibly and other expressions were annotated in terms of the labels epistemic, deontic and dynamic. The distinction between deontic and dynamic modality turned out to be the most problematic, but the problems involved in this distinction do not affect the annotation of epistemic modality and consequently will not be treated in this paper.

Annotating English adverbials

(15)

329

A lot of people don’t want to be in the best band in the world because they don’t give a shit about themselves, he remarks flatly, still playing with his half empty bottle of water. I can’t possibly understand that. I want to be in the best band in the world, it’s simple! (BNC C9L)

(16) His car was found with bloodstains on the steering-wheel. “He couldn’t possibly do a thing like that,” his best friend said. (BNC H7A) (17)

He smiled and I felt the hairs on the back of my neck go rigid. “You’ve got a devious mind, Mr Angel. Ever thought of a career in the police?” “Blue’s not my colour.” “I’ve heard worse reasons.” “I can’t possibly be tall enough.” “They’re very flexible about that nowadays.” (BNC HTL)

C) Speculative questions about possibility. This kind of questions, an example of which is (18), could be interpreted as questions about naturally possible reasons (dynamic), or as speculative questions whose answer neither the sp/wr nor the addressee know (epistemic). As a criterion for facilitating agreement, these cases were considered as dynamic. (18) But Mill considers what, what reasons could there possibly be for having this two stage process. (BNC HUF) Given that the level of agreement reached in the first experiment was lower than 90%, a second experiment was done, with the result of only 3 out of 30 cases of disagreement (10% of the total number of examples annotated). In one of these cases (19), the implicitly negative word only changes modality from weak to strong in an analogous way to negative polarity. Consequently, it was agreed that occurrences with only with can / could possibly were to be classified as dynamic. (19) The important point about its location is that Cyprus has no wild cats and this means that the animal must have been brought over to the island by the early human settlers. We know that they brought other domestic animals with them but it is inconceivable that they would have taken a wild cat from the mainland. A spitting, scratching, panic-stricken wild feline would have been the last kind of boat-companion they would have wanted. Only tame, domesticated animals could possibly have been part of the goods and chattels of that early band of pioneers, striking out for a new island home. It seems almost certain, therefore, that cats had already been tamed and domesticated on the nearby mainland by 6000 B.C., and we should not be too surprised by this. (BNC BMG)

330

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

In order to test this new criterion, a third experiment was carried out, with only 2 out of 35 cases of disagreement. That is to say, the agreement reached a level of 94.29% of the cases.

4.3.2 Conceivably Most of the occurrences of conceivably express dynamic and epistemic modality, while no clear cases of deontic modality were found. In the majority of the examples, conceivably occurs in combination with the modals may, might and could. In the first experiment there was disagreement in only one case, since both annotators identified virtually all examples as epistemic. Subsequent discussion and consultation of dictionaries led to the observation that conceivably resembles possibly to a higher extent than maybe or perhaps: for instance, conceivably combined with negative can or could yields impossibility. The annotation criteria were drastically changed in order to correct the annotators’ overuse of the annotation as epistemic. The resulting criteria are the following: –

The cases in which conceivably does not occur with a modal auxiliary are to be classified as epistemic:

(20) the most likely year for Holy River therefore seems to be 1026, or conceivably, if operations were protracted, 1025. (BNC GTF) –

(21)

– (22)

–

All the non-generic occurrences of conceivably with may and with might (21) are also classified as epistemic: or he may conceivably have acted the part himself, for money he appeared to need, and plenty. (BNC ABF) Cases of impossibility are to be classified as dynamic: on the grounds that no reasonable jury properly directed could conceivably find er a anything other than reasonableness in the police acting upon the information they had. (BNC EEM) Generic statements are to be classified as both epistemic and dynamic (nonepistemic), in the same way as with possibly:

Annotating English adverbials

331

(23) When the radio is switched on, this voltage, stored on C1, is temporarily let loose on the circuitry, where it could conceivably do some damage. After a moment, of course, the voltage subsides to its on-load value, which is smaller. (BNC C92) –

In non-generic cases of conceivably combined with can or could, the adverbial serves to reinforce the same kind of modality as that expressed by the modal. This consideration is in line with Hoye’s (1997) view that this adverbial intensifies the meaning of the modal, even if his consideration is restricted to non-assertive contexts (1997: 176, 233–236). For example, (24) was classified as non-epistemic, since the use of could is dynamic (the company would not disappear with the reduction of staff ):

(24) Digital Equipment Corp chief executive Robert Palmer expects to see some “modest reductions” in the company’s workforce next fiscal, adding that the company could conceivably downsize to 85,000 to 90,000 employees. (BNC CM2) A second experiment took place. Not surprisingly, due to the higher complexity of the new criteria, the proportion of cases of disagreement increased, totalling 6 out of 30 (20% of the total). However, these occurrences were not problematic, since they all were accommodated in the criteria set above: we will only mention a case of could only conceivably, which was finally considered as dynamic, in an analogous way to only with could possibly in (19) above. The third experiment with 35 examples was carried out, and the rate of agreement was exactly the same as that of the third experiment with possibly (33 occurrences –94.29%), so that the criteria may be considered satisfactory as a means to ensure agreement in further annotation.

4.3.3 Plausibly Among the dictionaries consulted, plausibly is best described in the entry for plausible in the Merriam-Webster dictionary:6 1. superficially fair, reasonable, or valuable but often specious ; 2. superficially pleasing or persuasive 3. appearing worthy of belief 6 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plausible, accessed 19-5-2012.

332

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

The epistemic senses are 1) and 3). Concerning the first experiment with plausibly, the cases of disagreement are 9 out of a total of 20. There was agreement about the epistemicity of 4 cases, in which plausibly is used as a stance adverbial applied to the truth of the proposition (25). In 3 of these cases, plausibly is combined with an epistemic modal (26): (25) The larger troops, plausibly, were developed as protection from diurnal predators. (BNC AMG) (26) Genet joined these movements because asked by them to do so. But he made it clear that, in these identifications, desire and politics were inseparable. That might plausibly be thought to take us no further than Wilde in Algiers in 1895: “The beggars here have profiles, so the problem of poverty is easily solved” (Wilde, More Letters, 129). (BNC A6D) Seven cases were classified unanimously as non-epistemic. In some of them plausibly expresses a meaning of manner (“in a credible way”) with no epistemic implications, as in (27), in which plausibly is applied to the credibility of a false situation. In other cases, plausibly refers to the adequacy of a word or expression for an entity or situation (28). The modality may well be considered as merger between deontic and dynamic modality: there is an element of reasonability and common sense (deontic) but this element is dependent on adequacy to natural circumstances (dynamic), that is, on how reality actually is. Consequently, the modality is non-epistemic. (27) He knew they would just love to arrange a little’ accident’ with some spanner or brick falling from a building, or, more plausibly still, from some scaffolding. So he had worn that hard hat, since even before he left the home. (BNC H7F) (28) The novel can plausibly be labelled science fiction by virtue of the fact that it takes place in the future and involves “alien” life forms. (BNC G1N) Concerning the cases of disagreement, 7 out of the 9 occurrences concerned the reasonability of a statement made by someone else. The verb is most often one of verbal process (argue, propose, say, suggest, etc.). In these cases, the use of plausibly means epistemic modality on the part of the sp/wr; however, this modality does not affect the proposition in which plausibly occurs, but the following proposition: in (29), plausibly does not qualify the statement that the

Annotating English adverbials

333

proposal has been made, but the statement that the “blame” rests with Queensland sugar planters. We decided to consider these cases as epistemic, since the proposition within the epistemic scope of plausibly is explicit. The two remaining cases of disagreement were occurrences in which plausibly refers to the adequacy of a word or expression for an entity or situation, as in (28) above. (29) It has been proposed, for example – entirely plausibly – that the “blame” rests with Queensland sugar planters. (BNC AMS) The second experiment had a result of 4 out of 30 cases of disagreement (13.33%): these cases were easy to solve, since one involved a generic utterance and the other 3 referred to statements from a different source from the sp/wr. In the third experiment, the cases of disagreement were only 2 out of 35 (94.29%), so that, once again, the criteria were considered to be satisfactory.

4.3.4 Predictably This adverbial means agreement that a state or event occurred according to expectations (30); this meaning might be considered as mirative.7 An experiment was carried out in case epistemic examples were found; the only doubtful case was (31), in which predictably may be interpreted as giving an epistemic qualification about the results of attempting growth to maturity. However, it might also refer to the fact that the real solution is the expected one. Since no clear cases of epistemic modality were found among the 20 examples, we decided to exclude this adverbial from the scope of epistemic modality in the annotation system. (30) Informants were asked to circle the first SF element in the passage. Quite predictably there was unanimous agreement on the keyword “Martian.” (BNC J7F) (31) One of my arguments is that the mechanical relations of work can bring about this withdrawal. The real solution, predictably, is to attempt growth to maturity, i.e., “relationships of mature dependence in equal partnership” (Guntrip 1961). (BNC CBH)

7 In the literature, mirativity is often limited to disagreement with expectations. For example, DeLancey (2001: 369–370) defines it as “the linguistic marking of an utterance as conveying information which is new or unexpected to the speaker”. We believe that a more complete approach to mirativity may be achieved if it is considered as a two-sided category that comprises the linguistic marking of both agreement and disagreement with expectations.

334

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

4.3.5 Improbably Improbably is most often used as an adverbial of mirativity that expresses surprise or incredulity about propositions which are presented as true without any doubt, such as (32), although it may also be an epistemic expression that indicates that the sp/wr regards the state or event as unlikely to happen (33). In the initial experiment, improbably displayed 4 cases of disagreement (25%); two of these cases had the collocation however improbably (34). These occurrences could be considered as generic statements, similar to those described with perhaps, maybe, possibly and conceivably: improbably refers to the unlikelihood for something to happen whenever certain kind of situation holds. Consequently, these cases are to be annotated as epistemic-dynamic. Nevertheless, the collocation however improbably does not always occur in generic statements: the other occurrence found in the experiment, (35), was unanimously classified as nonepistemic (it may be paraphrased with unbelievably). The remaining two cases of disagreement might be considered as past improbability, but it was agreed that they really expressed unexpectedness. (32) and suddenly, improbably, out the thawing wind came the snow. (BNC EX4) (33) Mr Parretti paid $1.3 billion for MGM. If – most improbably – that figure still holds good, 40% would mean around $500m. (BNC AKL) (34) Suppose that, however improbably, a balanced slate could nevertheless be agreed on in one party. It is a safe bet that the other parties in contention would not make the same mistake. (BNC EW4) (35) Nine times out of 10, however improbably, he turns out to be right. (BNC AHC) Consequently, it was decided that the default annotation for improbably should be non-epistemic, but that special attention should be paid to the instances of most improbably, as well as to those of however improbably to see if they are generic. These criteria proved to be effective, since the second experiment, with 30 further examples, displayed agreement in 100% of the cases. 4.3.6 Impossibly This adverbial indicates counter-expectation, in a similar way to unbelievably and to the non-epistemic meaning of improbably (see above), although it is perhaps more oriented towards dynamic modality, in that the role of natural

Annotating English adverbials

335

circumstances is more prominent. There is even the sense that the unnaturalness makes things or facts not practical, as in (36), in which the length of the poems makes them impossible to memorize. Significantly, its scope is limited to an adjective in most cases. All the occurrences were classified by both annotators as non-epistemic, except for (37), which was unanimously annotated as epistemic, probably due to its reference to a potential fact that might occur in the future. (36) He would never understand how she could memorize all those complex, impossibly long poems, yet forget the words of a simple song. (BNC ACW) (37) Nor was a reckoning with her grandfather’s shade the only she knew that the ordeal to come must tax all her strength and, not impossibly, exceed it. (BNC H82) In order to detect possible epistemic occurrences of impossibly, a search was made on not impossibly, which occurs in 3 out of a total of 188 cases of impossibly in the BNC. The only epistemic case was (37) above: in the other cases, the negation applies to the mirative meaning (38). Additionally, a search of possible epistemic occurrences was made on the collocations however impossibly, most impossibly and more impossibly. Only one example of the last collocation was found, with a non-epistemic meaning. (38) Even so, together with the problems at Ely, they may reflect a somewhat hostile attitude to Cnut in this area, perhaps exploited by Thorkell, its earl, who was banished in 1021. Not impossibly there was a resistance movement in the Fens, as later under William the Conqueror, and ecclesiastics became involved. (BNC HXX) Epistemic cases are, thus, reduced to a subset of the uncommon collocation not impossibly. Due to this scarcity, the decision was made to discard this adverbial from the annotation system of epistemic modality.

5 Annotation of the adverbials of certainty 5.1 Preliminary considerations In a similar way to the procedure followed for the adverbials of probability, and in order to guarantee inter-annotator agreement, a preliminary study of these adverbials was carried out before their annotation so as to disentangle the

336

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

semantic meaning of certainty from pragmatic and discourse factors derived from it. These factors were found to be even more important for certainty than for probability. The reason is that certainty is a high, or even absolute, estimation of the chances for a proposition to have been, be or become true; however, we must remember that the unmarked way to express total certainty is by means of unmodalized sentences. More than once, the literature on modality has raised the question whether adverbials of certainty increase or decrease the degree of certainty in comparison to unmodalized clauses. Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 147) state that “even a high value modal [. . .] is less determinate than a polar form: that’s certainly John is less certain than that’s John [. . .] In other words, you only say you are certain when you are not” (2004: 147). A similar position is set forth in Lyons (1977: 808–809). However, Hoye (1997: 60–61) states that this position is contrary to intuition: adverbials of certainty reinforce the sp/wr’s commitment to what s/he states. We believe that neither of these positions is fully satisfactory: the strengthening or weakening effect on adverbials of certainty depends on both the individual adverbial and the context in which it occurs. Among the adverbials of certainty mentioned above, no doubt and surely have a semantic meaning of high but not total certainty (Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007: 145), so that they always express a slightly lower degree of certainty than that of the unmodalized clause. The rest of the adverbials can express both total and non-total certainty; these adverbials reinforce the certainty when the context makes it clear that the sp/wr knows the truth of the proposition (39), and slightly weaken it in other contexts, especially when they co-occur with other expressions of epistemic modality or irrealis, as is the case with future states of affairs (40). (39) Did you know Jos in those days, Grandma? “Certainly I did”, she said. (BNC ACV) (40) But the action was swiftly denounced by the radical Popular Front movement of Azerbaijan, which has supported the two-month blockade aimed at starving Armenia into capitulating on the issue. There will certainly be a strike across the republic if the military takes over the railway, said the movement’s spokesman, Nazim Ragimov. (BNC A2M) What is clearly the case for both total and almost total certainty is that these adverbials, like other expressions of certainty, are used when the sp/wr considers it necessary to lay emphasis on certainty, so as to be persuasive (and sometimes manipulative). In this sense, we must remember that these adverbials are commonly found “in precisely those areas where speakers have something

Annotating English adverbials

337

to gain or lose by their addressee’s acceptance or rejection of what they are saying” (Corum 1975: 134). The use of a certainty adverbial seems pragmatically inadequate in verifiable statements if there is evidence at the addressee’s disposal that leaves no room for doubt (41) or s/he has no reason to question the truth of the proposition (42). (41) ?You are certainly wearing a spotted blouse. (42) ?My grandma’s name is certainly Rosa. Consequently, expressions of certainty are often used with pragmatic motivations apart from the wish to express an estimation of (almost) certainty that the proposition has been, is or will become true. It might be stated that these motivations have a factor in common: all of them indicate a high degree of confidence on the part of the sp/wr towards the content of the utterance. Their epistemic meaning is bleached and not so clearly distinguished from the categories which point to the rising of assertiveness. We will mention some of them, together with adverbials associated with them: degree (absolutely, totally), opinion (unanimously), mirativity (of course), high evidentiality (evidently), intention (some uses of decidedly), etc. It may be easily seen that these categories by and large coincide with the categories which were shown in 4.1. to be bleached with expressions of probability in the sense that they are downtoners of assertiveness. A case of this bleach is (43), in which the epistemic adverbial certainly and the degree adverbial absolutely may be considered to have the same function, namely that of laying emphasis to the affirmative polarity of the answer to a question (Carretero 2010: 218). (43) But with all due respect is some of that not to do with the guidance their [sic] receiving from us as teachers? Certainly, I I’ve told you Absolutely! (BNC F7F) This pragmatic force of strengthening the sp/wr’s confidence, often at the expense of a bleach of the epistemic meaning, has consequences for the use of certainty adverbials in speech acts. For example, the default interpretation of (44) is a promise, and this illocutionary force is maintained if we replace assuredly with other adverbials of certainty listed above, such as certainly or for sure; however, if we replace it with probably, the default interpretation is a predictive statement (i.e. the sp/wr would state that he is not totally sure that they will meet soon again). In its turn, the clause without the adverbial (we shall meet again soon) is indeterminate in this respect, lying in between a promise

338

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

and a prediction. That is to say, epistemic adverbials of possibility or probability favour the interpretation of utterances about future states or events as predictions, i.e. representative speech acts, while adverbials of certainty favour the reading as a promises (commissive speech acts). (44) He scrambled to his feet, clutching the books to his chest. “It’s been a pleasure seeing you again, Officer,” said Melissa. “Assuredly, we shall meet again soon!” he said meaningfully and marched out, bowing to Iris as he passed. (BNC GVP) This possibility for the adverbials of certainty to have their epistemic meaning bleached into a more general meaning of rising assertiveness has contributed to their use for a number of speech acts and discourse functions, apart from promises. Some of these functions are: to reinforce the positive polarity of responses, which lay emphasis on agreement with the addressee (45) or else reinforce the sp/wr’s acceptance to comply with a request (46); and the expression of concession (47). (45) I talked to her about the 1931 crisis and said that I was convinced the King had been a determinant influence on that occasion. Yes certainly; he certainly was. (BNC A6G) (46) Could I have a copy of the letter, please, can I take it up? You certainly can, Anne, thank you. (BNC K51) (47) It certainly was a challenge to have to teach people stuff by Steve Vai or Yngwie Malmsteen, but the most difficult was Allan Holdsworth. (BNC C9K) Similarly to what happened with adverbials of probability, the epistemic meaning of adverbials of certainty is also bleached in non-verifiable utterances such as opinions (48). In these occurrences, even if the adverbials express certainty, the very fact that the statement is non-verifiable provokes a bleach between certainty and a more general effect of rising assertiveness, which has interpersonal consequences. That is to say, an opinion expressed with a lower level of confidence is felt to be more tentative and tolerant of the interlocutor’s view (as was stated in 4.1.), while a high degree of confidence can be felt as impolite and dogmatic in certain situations. (48) Certainly the sequence is the most elaborately and intricately shaped of all his poetry. (BNC EFX)

Annotating English adverbials

339

It must be noted that, among the adverbials of certainty, surely is perhaps the one whose lexically encoded meaning most underdetermines its overall contribution to the utterances in which it occurs. This is the reason why, as Downing (2001: 253) states, it is almost never interchangeable with any other adverbial of certainty. Downing (2001) treats surely in terms of evidentiality rather than epistemic modality; however, this treatment is due to Downing’s ascription of surely to the category of belief in Chafe’s (1986) broad approach to evidentiality, which includes expressions such as I think, I believe or I suppose (Chafe 1986: 266). In our view, these are expressions of epistemic modality, since they indicate an estimation of the chances for propositions to be true rather than the role, kind and/or source of evidence on which the proposition is based.8 Moreover, Downing (2001: 255–256) characterizes surely as expressing: 1) a difference in states of knowledge between the sp/wr and the addressee; 2) the sp/wr’s belief that his/her state of knowledge, which corresponds to the statement marked by surely, is “the only true, reasonable or acceptable one”; 3) the anticipation of fracturing of the common ground if the addressee does not accept the statement. It is the second feature that motivates our consideration of surely as an epistemic adverbial: features 1) and 3) have an influence on the pragmatic effects provoked by surely, which make this adverbial different in usage from other adverbials of certainty, but do not prevent it from being epistemic. It might be argued that the degree of certainty is not so high in certain contexts, such as self-questionings (Downing 2001: 261), but we believe that this weakening is not sufficient to set these examples apart from the rest (49). (49) It was probably some arrangement of S- and R-’s, but whenever I came into a room where they were, they trickled out! After a time it got me down, this continued evasion of me, it was like a form of torture. I began to wonder if I had halitosis or a snotty nose, or green eyes, or a squint – surely I am not so unattractive! (BNC ASC) As for undeniably and unquestionably, their difference with undoubtedly is largely restricted to the literal meaning: undoubtedly denies an epistemic state of doubt, while undeniably and unquestionably point to the non-adequacy of the hypothetical speech acts of denying and questioning. However, to state that 8 In the literature, these expressions are often classified as “inferential evidentials”, i.e. expressions that indicate that the source of the reliability of the information is a reasoning process. In line with van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), we believe that inferential evidentiality overlaps with epistemic modality.

340

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

something cannot be denied or questioned is tantamount to state that something is true. It is not surprising that the three adverbials are mutually paraphraseable: for instance, in (50) undeniably could be paraphrased by either of the other two adverbials. (50) There are, of course, complex social and cultural factors to consider. It is a common leftist belief that poetry is an “élitist” mode, precisely because of the cultural literacy it presupposes, which gives an unfair advantage to students from middle-class homes with books. The advantage is undeniably there; but what of the ever-increasing number from middleclass homes without books? (BNC A1A)9 To conclude this section, we consider that the bleach of the epistemic meaning of certainty into a more general meaning of rising assertiveness does not provoke the total loss of the epistemic meaning, so that it will not be considered in the design of the annotation system. This consideration is in line with the inclusion of the adverbials of probability as epistemic even when their epistemicity is bleached into a more general meaning of lowering assertiveness or overridden by the performance of certain discourse functions. That is to say, the pragmatic and discourse functions signalled above are not incompatible with the meaning of certainty; rather, they derive from it. For example, we do not share Byloo, Kastein and Nuyts’s (2007) distinction between epistemic and “strengthening” uses of adverbials of certainty. Even if we agree that concession is a different meaning from certainty, it is clear that, in the case of these adverbials, certainty is a way to lay emphasis on concession and consequently both meanings are not only compatible, but even support each other. In (47), for instance, certainly expresses certainty that the clause in which it occurs is true, precisely with the aim of highlighting that the truth of this clause, in contrast to what might be expected, is compatible with the truth of the second clause.

5.2 Pure epistemic certainty Under this category we have included those adverbials that, after the preliminary discussion, were unanimously annotated as epistemic in all the cases. These

9 Indisputably and unarguably could also be considered as epistemic, in the sense that they mean impossibility of alternative opinions, which also implicates that the proposition is true. However, their negative polarity contrasts does not contrast with weaker epistemic expressions, but with weaker expressions of opinion such as arguably. Consequently, in our view, their analysis as adverbials of opinion is more suitable.

Annotating English adverbials

341

adverbials are assuredly, certainly, doubtlessly, for sure, no doubt, surely, undeniably, undoubtedly and unquestionably. Consequently, they are suitable for automatic annotation in the system.

5.3 Certainty combined with other meanings The adverbials of certainty treated in this subsection, decidedly, definitely and positively, have a meaning of manner apart from the epistemic. Diachronically, this meaning is prior to the epistemic meaning.10 These adverbials, especially definitely, behave like the adverbials treated in 5.2. in that their meaning of certainty is bleached into a more general meaning of rising assertiveness when they perform certain speech acts or discourse functions: for example, definitely in (51) expresses a promise. These cases are considered as epistemic. (51)

The injury has totally cleared up and responded well to matches and I will definitely be as good as I ever was. (BNC CBG)

5.3.1 Decidedly This adverbial has an epistemic meaning (52) and a meaning of manner (53). Apart from these clear cases, there are others in which decidedly has a gradable Adjectival or Adverbial Group under its scope. In these occurrences, the epistemic meaning may be considered as merged with another of intensity: in (54), decidedly not only means that the flavour of the play is modern without any doubt, but also that it is very modern. None of the dictionaries consulted included intensity; consequently, these cases were classified straightforwardly as epistemic. (52) And the sheet with which he now tussled? Decidedly not the one she knew had been bought only recently from Laura Ashley. (BNC G1S) (53) “And will you stay here at Bishopstow? Or will you sell up?” She said decidedly, “I shall stay.” (BNC H8X)

10 Certainly also has its origins in an adverbial of manner, but this meaning does not seem to remain in contemporary English, or only in a residual way: no examples with this meaning were found in our experiments, nor do Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007) register this meaning in present-day English.

342

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

(54) the translation by David Johnston (for The Gate Theatre) goes on to incorporate a great many deliberate anachronisms which give the play a decidedly modern flavour. (BNC K4Y) In the first experiment, the annotators agreed in all the cases, which leads to infer that the meaning of manner is clearly distinguishable from the epistemic meaning. 5.3.2 Definitely This adverbial has a meaning of certainty and another of manner, “in a definite way”. The difficulty to distinguish these meanings may be seen in dictionary entries: for example, the Cambridge Dictionary11 and the Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners (2002) describe its meaning simply as “without any doubt”. The distinction between both meanings is far from clear in all the cases. In fact, they are strongly linked, as is stated in Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007: 101): The modal meaning “it is certain” is clearly linked with “it has been decided definitely”. The emergence of the modal meaning of definitely seems to be explicable as follows: when it occurs as a manner adverbial with such verbs as say, prove, decide (which it frequently does), it signals that the results of these processes are to be taken as permanent, not to be detracted from. If something is definite, it is not to be changed. If you can say/ prove/decide something definitely (manner) then it is definitely the case (epistemic). We see a movement of definitely from objective to subjective certitude.

Not surprisingly, the first experiment had a result of disagreement in 8 cases out of 20 (40%). 10 out of the 12 cases of agreement were clearly epistemic: these are short responses to statements, or else qualifications about statements that do not concern the sp/wr or the addressee and do not express or report decisions by the sp/wr, the addressee or a third party (55). The remaining 2 cases, one of which is (56), were classified as non-epistemic: both refer to a firm decision already made, and are not paraphraseable with certainly like the epistemic cases, but with finally. (55) Eating sand rice and stone peas, drinking small quantities of an unknown sticky orange substance, stopping off for re-fuelling at most airports in the world, taking crazed detours to Nowhereland through Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, what seemed like Iceland and what definitely was Cuba, . . . (BNC FBL) 11 http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/definitely, accessed May 20, 2012.

Annotating English adverbials

343

(56) Very few projects are definitely approved, with the Space Telescope the major exception. (B7N) The 8 occurrences that showed disagreement illustrate the fuzzy boundaries between manner and certainty. These cases may be divided into the following types: A) Cases which report a decision by the sp/wr, the addressee or a third party, but admit the paraphrase with certainly. These occurrences are not prototypical cases of epistemic modality (i.e. they are not qualifications about degree of certainty in the strict sense), since the truth of the proposition is controlled by a person (in these cases, the sp/wr). Some of these occurrences are responses to directives (57) or involve mental or verbal processes carried out by the sp/wr (58). These cases have been finally classified as epistemic, in accordance with the analysis of similar cases of certainly (see above). (57) Shut up gonna kill you with their massive great big swords Yeah definitely. But if he’s gonna fight me I’ll fight him. (BNC KPX) (58) I mean, well we clearly have general interest but we don’t have primary interest, additionally in Russia is that everybody, in the world have interest but I would definitely here say that Britain should clearly do nothing per (unclear). (BNC KJS) B)

Cases in which the scope of definitely is an Adjectival or Adverbial Group (59). It may be argued that definitely refers to the manner in which the quality is present in the entity concerned. These cases could be considered as merger between manner and certainty, since, as has been stated above, a quality that is present in a definite manner provokes certainty that this quality exists. For ease of annotation, these cases have been considered as epistemic.

(59) This finding is borne out by a study by Weinrich-Haste (1986) which found that, while some subjects were rated by schoolchildren and undergraduates as definitely masculine, and some as neutral, none was rated as definitely feminine. (BNC FA6) To sum up, the decision was made to annotate definitely as epistemic by default, except for the clearest cases of manner, which may be identified by the following features: a) paraphraseability by finally, while its replacement with certainly would provoke a semantic change; b) emphasis on the firmness of voluntary decisions; and c) tendency to occur with verbal processes (approve, say, state, decide).

344

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

In the second experiment, the rate of agreement increased significantly, with only 1 case of disagreement out of 30 (96.67%). Consequently, the criteria specified above were considered as satisfactory. 5.3.3 Positively This adverbial has two meanings: manner “in a favourable way” (60), and certainty (61). Positively displayed some cases (although not so many as decidedly) with a gradable Adjectival or Adverbial Group under its scope, such as (62). Once again, the epistemic meaning may be considered as merged with a meaning of intensity: in (62), positively emphasizes the certainty that the people concerned were attracted by controversy, and also that this attraction was strong. Since the dictionaries consulted did not specify any meanings of degree, the decision was made to annotate these examples as epistemic. (60) A white hole enthusiast may react to the above criticism both positively and negatively. (BNC B74) (61) What are the two colours used in the Ellesse half tennis ball logo on its clothes and shoes? Positively Pilkington Nelson Has One Eye on Seniors. (BNC A0V) (62) The third group consists of those who were positively attracted by the controversy. (BNC AD2) The result of the first experiment was 3 cases of disagreement out of 20 (15%). It was agreed that in all of them positively could be replaced by certainly, and consequently they were to be annotated as epistemic. In the second experiment, there were 2 cases of disagreement out of 30, so that agreement reached 93.33% of the cases. Even if the degree of agreement is satisfactory, the existence of some cases of disagreement provides evidence that the meanings of certainty and manner are not so easy to distinguish as the meanings of decidedly: the reason is, probably, that decidedly of manner focuses on the resolute attitude of the agent in carrying out the action, while positively tends to express an evaluation of the proposition as a whole rather than focusing on one participant.

6 Annotation of the evidential adverbials 6.1 Preliminary considerations for all the evidential adverbials The evidential adverbials treated in this paper have a meaning of manner, which, in our view, is not incompatible with their evidential meaning. For example,

Annotating English adverbials

345

clearly in (63) expresses manner (the improvement took place in a perceivable way) but also evidentiality (this perceivable way provides important evidence in favour of the truth of the proposition). However, as we will see in 6.2., some of these adverbials have occurrences that mean manner but not evidentiality. A test for detecting evidentiality is paraphraseability by “it + BE + cognate adjective (or synonym) + that”. This test proves that clearly in (63) is evidential, since the paraphrase by “it is clear that good practice has improved. . .” is possible. However, (64) is a non-evidential occurrence of clearly, since this paraphrase provokes a change of meaning. (63) Despite its limitations, the project has done something to open up the question of study skills, develop in service structures and practices, create a core of schools where good practice has been established and from which it might be disseminated, and has clearly improved secondary school library provision through (amongst other things) the quality of book selection. (BNC EV3) (64) The message was being clearly expressed that the students were increasingly dissatisfied with the Deng-led regime. (BNC CG0) As was stated in Section 3, the study of the evidential adverbials carried out here will be restricted to clause-oriented adverbials. According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 575–578), these adverbials differ from VP-oriented adverbials in that they are not infrequent in front position and have prosodic detachment. The evidential adverbials included in our analysis are apparently, clearly, evidently, obviously and plainly.

6.1.1 A discussion on obviously Obviously is, perhaps, the adverbial of this kind that deserves the most careful consideration. For a start, the dictionary definitions do not make it clear whether it has a non-evidential meaning of manner or not. The definitions often remind the non-evidential meaning of clearly in that they refer to clarity for people to see or understand something, but the examples they offer are evidential. This may be seen, for instance, in the entry of the Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners (2002), which describes its meaning as “in a way that is clear for almost anyone to see or understand”. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007: 148–149) do distinguish evidential and manner uses, and state that the manner uses can be identified because

346

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

they are preceded by words such as so, more and too, and that initial position is virtually restricted to the evidential adverbial. However, we believe that none of the examples that they classify as manner are non-evidential, since they can all be interpreted in the sense “it is obvious that”; in certain cases, the paraphrase is not easy, but the reasons are syntactic rather than semantic. For example, in (65), quoted in this reference from the ICE-GB, the speaker uses glaringly obviously in the sense “it is glaringly obvious that it is missing”. This agrees with the fact that, in our annotation experiments, no examples were found of obviously with a non-evidential meaning of manner. (65) Uhm is there anything that you noticed that is glaringly obviously missing. (ICE-GB) Another issue to be considered about obviously is the overlap between evidentiality and mirativity: this adverbial has been reported to indicate, in certain cases, agreement with expectations, in a similar way to of course or naturally, rather than strong basis on evidence (see, for instance, Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007). On the one hand, there are many clearly evidential cases in which obviously focuses on the strength of the (often explicit) evidence, in which its replacement with adverbials such as of course or naturally would be inadequate or would provoke a change of focus from evidence to agreement with expectations (66). However, there are other cases of obviously in which, unlike the other evidential adverbials included in this section, it is paraphraseable with of course, as in (67). In other cases, both evidence and agreement with expectations seem to play a role. This is the case of (68), in which the estimation that the proposition is true is based on the writer’s previous experience on horse riding as well as common sense. (66) These combined to produce a situation where users unable to obtain prescribed drugs began to develop other strategies for “coming off” such as the purchase of street methadone mentioned above. The final factor concerns the idea that “being known” should be avoided at all costs. Obviously, because the possession of heroin is illegal, users must maintain a low profile for fear of legal sanctions. (BNC EDC) (67) I am in regular contact with the programmer, who is using the “functional specification” to come to a fuller technical specification which we will agree. Obviously I will send this to both of you and if David is back in England at an appropriate time he might like to join me in discussions with the programmer. (BNC AP1)

Annotating English adverbials

347

(68) A lot of people say that you shouldn’t hack young horses out on their own for months, if at all, but I’ve always preferred the theory that if horses don’t learn to go out alone from the start you set up problems for later on. Obviously you need to take your horse’s temperament and your surroundings into account, but if you can get him working alone as soon as possible you are less likely to have to cope with him napping later on because he can’t bear to leave his friends. (BNC ASH) Given the interplay between evidence and agreement with expectations, together with the high frequency of obviously, the decision to annotate each occurrence as either evidential or non-evidential depending on the relative weight of each of these factors would provoke slowness and higher rates of disagreement in the annotation process. Moreover, there are arguments for characterizing obviously as evidential in all the cases. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007: 153) state that obviously indicates evidence based on common sense (“a common frame of reference, a shared knowledge of the world, shared attitudes”) when there is no explicit evidence, and from their examples it may be inferred that this characterization is applied to the cases in which obviously gets closer to mirativity. Additionally, in a later part of the book (2007: 312) in which obviously is compared with of course, they state that “[. . .] obviously primarily expresses “as evidence shows” and only secondarily “as we all know” in some contexts”, and specify that this difference can be seen in the speech acts of granting requests (2007: 313). To this explanation we would add a pragmatic implication triggered by this semantic difference: granting requests is compatible with the meaning of expectation, and of course in this kind of speech acts indicates that the request is granted in accordance with (what the sp/wr believes are or should be) the addressee’s expectations, so that the request is polite, as in (69). Obviously in its place would sound pragmatically inadequate: its evidential meaning is at odds with the expression of authority required for permission granting, and consequently it would trigger the implicatures that the addressee had evidence available at her disposal in favour of the permission and that this evidence should have led to the inference that the permission was granted, so that the request is out of place. (69) George felt uncomfortable at this declaration, especially as it was made in a steady and unemotional voice, far removed from the previous frantic outburst on the day she had left the farm., I just want you to know that I shall never change, but I also want you to allow me to come home now and again for a few days.I shall not act foolishly again. “Of course you can come home, Sarah,” he answered. (BNC C98)

348

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

In view of what has been stated above, we decided to consider all these cases of obviously as evidential, in principle. In any case, the first experiment was to be done in order to see whether there were unexpected non-evidential occurrences (for example, similar to those of non-evidential clearly), which turned out not to be the case.

6.2 Pure evidential adverbials Among the adverbials listed as clause-oriented evidentials, evidently and obviously displayed total agreement in the first experiment: all the cases were considered as evidential by both annotators, and therefore they can be automatically marked as such.

6.3 Adverbials of evidentiality coexisting with other meanings The adverbials of this subsection did not display total agreement in the first experiment; consequently, each will be considered individually in terms of annotation criteria.

6.3.1 Apparently The dictionaries consulted characterize the meaning of apparently as used for saying that something seems to be true according to evidence, but it is not certain. In the first experiment, both annotators considered 18 out of 20 examples unanimously as epistemic. One example, (70), was annotated unanimously as non-epistemic, and there was disagreement about another. These cases were annotated as non-epistemic because they referred to a proposition that, contrary to appearances, is not true: (70) Keegan, who ten days ago was boss of an apparently invincible Geordie side, said: “I know what people are thinking, but the only difference between our defeat at Leicester on Saturday and our early season results was that we gave away a silly goal.” (BNC CEP) In a subsequent discussion, we concluded that apparently is evidential in these cases. The epistemic meaning of lack of certainty is not context-independent, but has the status of a Generalized Conversational Implicature, that is to say, a

Annotating English adverbials

349

conversational implicature generated by default in all cases except those in which the context blocks it or there is contrary evidence to it (Levinson 2000: 11; Carretero 2004b: 68). The falsehood of the proposition does not mean that the adverbial loses its evidential meaning. Therefore, the decision was made to consider apparently as evidential in all the cases, so that it joins the list of evidential adverbs suitable for automatic treatment, together with evidently and obviously.

6.3.2 Clearly As was seen in the discussion of the examples in 6.1., clearly has an evidential meaning as well as a meaning of manner. In the first experiment, there were 4 cases of disagreement out of 20 (20%). 3 of them turned out to be nonevidential, while the fourth case, (71), is doubtful: the interpretations “the tokens of particular and actualized instances must be set in a clear way. . .” (manner) and “it is clear that the tokens of particular and actualized instances must be set. . .” (evidential) are both possible; in fact, they could even be considered to merge: the difference is neutralized from the pragmatic point of view, since the main aim of the sp/wr is to communicate the necessity to set these tokens in correspondence with their conventional meanings. (71)

The conventional meaning of linguistic signs, and their combinations in sentences, constitutes types of conceptualization codified as linguistic knowledge and the tokens of particular and actualized instances must clearly be set in correspondence with them. (BNC CBR)

Before embarking on the second experiment, we insisted on the detection of non-evidential clearly by considering the kind of process expressed by the verb. According to Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007: 163), non-evidential clearly commonly occurs with the following semantic kinds of verbs: mental processes of perception (see, hear. . .) or of cognition (understand); verbal processes of saying (express, say, state), as in (64) above, cited again as (72), or of defining or classifying (define, classify); and processes of showing (show, indicate, illustrate). Non-evidential clearly also combines with adjectives having these meanings, as in (73). In these cases, clearly indicates that the way in which the process is performed facilitates good perception, so that misunderstandings are avoided. We decided to annotate as evidential the cases in which the distinction between evidential and non-evidential meanings is unclear as (71) above.

350

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

(72) The message was being clearly expressed that the students were increasingly dissatisfied with the Deng-led regime. (BNC CG0) (73) The rabbits mostly came in of their own accord. The few that remained squatted out in the open or tucked themselves into tiny holes, often with their hindquarters clearly visible. (BNC BNY) In the second experiment, the cases of agreement were 29 out of 30 (96.67%), so that the refined criteria were considered to be satisfactory for further annotation.

6.3.3 Plainly Plainly has evidential and non-evidential meanings similar to those of clearly, illustrated by (74) and (75) respectively. In addition, it has another non-evidential meaning, “in a simple way, without much ornament” (76). The non-evidential examples display the same features as those of clearly: for example, in (75), putting the facts refers to a verbal action. (74) Because the taxi should not have been there, the car-driver expected it to move – even though it plainly could not. (BNC CR7) (75) He set to again, putting the facts as plainly as he could, though doubted that these words would save Estabrook’s life. (BNC CRE) (76) “Do you want to see the castle?” a plainly dressed girl of fifteen asked me, looking up from her job of sweeping her trailer entrance with a broom. (BNC ADM) In the first experiment, there was agreement in 19 cases out of 20 (95%), so that there was no need to do a second experiment. The case of disagreement was (77), which resembles (71) above: the interpretations “the terms state in a plain way. . .” (manner) and “it is plain that the terms state. . .” (evidential) are both possible, and may be considered to merge, the main point being that the terms leave no doubt that the carrier has contractual remedies against a subcontractor. (77) Therefore, the terms of any subcontract should be very carefully drafted. The terms plainly state that the carrier has contractual remedies against a subcontractor. (BNC CDP)

Annotating English adverbials

351

7 A synoptic view of the annotation system This section provides a synoptic view of the design of the annotation system proposed in this paper. Throughout the preceding sections, some adverbials have been considered to be epistemic or evidential in all the cases; consequently, they may be annotated automatically. These expressions are listed in Table 1. Other adverbials, however, are epistemic or evidential in certain occurrences but not in others, so that each case is to be examined individually. Table 2 specifies the adverbials of this kind that belong to the category of probability, together with the non-epistemic meanings that each adverbial can express and the main criteria to be applied for the annotation in each case. The adverbs of epistemic certainty and evidentiality are treated in the same way in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Table 1: Epistemic and evidential adverbials suitable for automatic annotation Category

Adverbials

Epistemic probability

in all probability, in all likelihood, likely (adverbial), maybe, perhaps, probably.

Epistemic certainty

assuredly, certainly, doubtlessly, for sure, no doubt, undeniably, undoubtedly, unquestionably.

Evidentiality (clause-oriented adverbials)

apparently, evidently, obviously.

Table 2: Adverbials of epistemic probability whose occurrences have to be considered individually, non-epistemic categories and main criteria for annotation Adverbials

Non-epistemic categories

Criteria for annotation

possibly, conceivably

– deontic and dynamic modality

– Combination with modal auxiliaries: same modality for both expressions. – Generic cases: epistemic + nonepistemic. – Impossibility: non-epistemic. – Speculative questions: nonepistemic.

plausibly

– deontic and dynamic modality – credibility with no epistemic implications

– Combination with modal auxiliaries: same modality for both expressions. can plausibly: reasonability (nonepistemic) – With verbal processes and the scope affecting the following proposition: epistemic.

improbably

– mirativity (surprise)

– Epistemicity is restricted to some cases of most improbably. – however improbably: some generic cases (epistemic + nonepistemic).

352

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

Table 3: Adverbials of epistemic certainty whose occurrences have to be considered individually, non-epistemic categories and main criteria for annotation Adverbials

Non-epistemic categories

Criteria for annotation

decidedly

manner

– No special criteria (easy distinction).

definitely

manner

– Non-epistemic with 2 or 3 of the following features: 1) paraphraseability with finally; 2) emphasis on firmness of decisions; 3) occurrence with verbal processes.

positively

manner

– Contrast with negatively: non-epistemic.

Table 4: Clause-oriented evidential adverbials whose occurrences have to be considered individually, non-evidential categories and main criteria for annotation Adverbials

Non-evidential categories

Criteria for annotation

clearly

– manner (may co-occur with evidentality)

– Paraphraseability by “it + BE + clear + that. . .”: evidential. – Attention to the process of the verb: mental processes of cognition and perception and verbal processes of saying tend to occur in nonevidential cases. The same applies to related adjectives.

plainly

– manner1: “in a way that is easy to perceive” (may co-occur with evidentality); – manner2: “simply, without much ornament”

– The same as for clearly.

8 Conclusions This paper proposes an annotation system for the categories of epistemic modality and evidentiality realized by a number of English adverbials, selected by the criterion of the presence of an epistemic or evidential feature in a significant number of contexts, which could therefore be considered as semantic. Even though we believe that epistemic modality and evidentiality have a high degree of overlap in their linguistic expression, both categories have been separated for practical purposes. The design of this system met a number of difficulties, due to the semantic and pragmatic fuzziness of both categories. The main distinctive feature of the system is that the annotation rules proposed here take into account semantic

Annotating English adverbials

353

factors, while pragmatic factors are ignored for the sake of efficiency. The pragmatic fuzziness of epistemic and (to a lesser extent) evidential adverbials is due to the fact that the sp/wr’s main purpose for using these adverbials is often not to provide an assessment to the reliability of the information, but to provoke a more general effect of rising or lowering assertiveness. This effect can also be created by linguistic expressions of other categories, such as degree, opinion or mirativity, with the consequence that there is overlap in the use of expressions belonging to all these categories. Related to this is the bleaching that epistemic expressions undergo in certain contexts, such as non-verifiable statements, promises or responses to statements and directives. In accordance with the decision to take semantics as the basis for the annotation system, and prior to doing the experiments, it was agreed that these phenomena would not be considered in the system. From the semantic viewpoint, the epistemic and evidential meanings of the adverbials concerned were often hard to disentangle from meanings belonging to other categories such as deontic or dynamic modality, manner or mirativity without epistemic implications. This fuzziness was considered in the annotation system. The annotation experiments carried out with the adverbials led to the conclusion that some adverbials could be considered as epistemic or evidential in all the cases and are therefore suitable for automatic annotation, while other adverbials were epistemic or evidential only in a subset of the occurrences, so that an individual analysis of each example was needed. The adverbials were subject to 1, 2 or 3 annotation experiments, depending on the degree of agreement reached in each case; for all the adverbials, the annotation experiments finally led to the establishment of criteria that made possible an acceptable degree of agreement (90% or more) between the two annotators involved in the experiments. Further research along these lines includes the enlargement of the list of epistemic and evidential adverbials by means of thesauri, the additional testing of the criteria by means of more annotation experiments including a larger number of annotators, and the elaboration of similar annotation systems for epistemic and evidential expressions of other syntactic or functional types, such as VP-oriented evidential adverbials, lexical verbs, adjectives or nouns.

References Anderson, Lloyd B. 1986. Evidentials, paths of change, and mental maps: Typologically regular asymmetries. In: Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 273–312. Norwood: Ablex.

354

Marta Carretero and Juan Rafael Zamorano-Mansilla

Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad and Edvard Finegan. 1999. Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. London: Longman. Boye, Kasper and Peter Harder. 2009. Evidentiality: linguistic categories and grammaticalization. Functions of Language 16(1): 9–43. Byloo, Pieter, Richard Kastein and Jan Nuyts. 2007. On certainly and zeker. In: Mike Hannay and Gerard J. Steen (eds.), Structural-functional Studies in English Grammar, 35–57. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Carretero, Marta. 2004a. The role of evidentiality and epistemic modality in three English spoken texts from legal proceeedings. In: Juana I. Marín-Arrese (ed.), Perspectives on Evidentiality and Modality, 25–62. Madrid: Editorial Complutense. Carretero, Marta. 2004b. Levinson’s Presumptive meanings: a neo-Gricean approach to pragmatics. In: Marta Carretero, Honesto Herrera-Soler, Gitte Kristiansen and Julia Lavid (eds.), Estudios de lingüística aplicada a la comunicación, 65–80. Madrid: Universidad Complutense. Carretero, Marta. 2010. “You’re absolutely right”: a corpus-based contrastive analysis of absolutely in British English and absolutamente in Peninsular Spanish, with special emphasis on the relationship between degree and certainty. Languages in Contrast 10(2): 194–222. Chafe, Wallace. 1986. Evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing. In: Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 261–272. Norwood: Ablex. Collins, Peter. 2009. Modals and Quasi-modals in English. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Cornillie, Bert. 2009. Evidentiality and epistemic modality: On the close relationship between two different categories. Functions of Language 16(1): 44–62. Corum, Claudia. 1975. A pragmatic analysis of parenthetic adjuncts. CLS 11: 133–141. de Haan, Ferdinand. 2000. The relation between modality and evidentiality. Linguistische Berichte. Sonderheft, 1–27. Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag. DeLancey, Scott. 2001. The mirative and evidentiality. Journal of Pragmatics 33(3): 369–382. Downing, Angela. 2001. “Surely you knew!” Surely as a marker of evidentiality and stance. Functions of Language 8(2): 253–285. Halliday, Michael A.K. and Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen. 2004. An Introduction to Functional Grammar. Third edition. London: Arnold. Hermerén, Lars. 1978. On Modality in English: the Study of the Semantics of the Modals. Lund: Gleerup. Hoye, Leo Francis. 1997. Modals and Adverbs in English. London and New York: Longman. Huddleston, Rodney and Geoffrey K. Pullum. 2002. The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ifantidou, Elly. 2001. Evidentials and Relevance. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Kärkkäinen, Elise. 2003. Epistemic Stance in English Conversation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Lavid, Julia. 2008. CONTRASTES: An Online English-Spanish Textual Database for Contrastive and Translation Learning. In: Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Barbara (ed.), Corpus Linguistics, Computer Tools, and Applications – State of the Art, 431–443. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag. Lavid, Julia. 2012. Corpus Annotation in CONTRANOT: Linguistic and Methodological Challenges. In: Isabel Moskowitz and Begoña Crespo (eds.), Encoding the Past: Decoding the Future: Corpora in the 21st Century, 205–220. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.

Annotating English adverbials

355

Lavid, Julia, Arús, Jorge and J.R Zamorano. 2010. Designing and exploiting a small online English-Spanish parallel corpus for language teaching purposes. In: M. Carmen Campoy, Begoña Belles-Fortuno and M. Lluisa Gea-Valor (eds.), Corpus-Based Approaches to English Language Teaching, 138–148. London: Continuum. Levinson, Stephen C. 2000. Presumptive Meanings. The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature. London, U.K. and Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press. Lyons, John. 1977. Semantics, Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maíz, Carmen and Jorge Arús. 2008. Towards a diachronic study of modal adverbs: a case study of certainly. Philologia 6: 27–36. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. 2004. Evidential and epistemic qualifications in the discourse of fact and opinion. In: Juana I. Marín Arrese (ed.), Perspectives on Evidentiality and Modality, 153– 184. Madrid: Editorial Complutense. Mithun, Marianne. 1986. Evidential diachrony in Northern Iroquoian. In: Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 89–112. Norwood: Ablex. Nuyts, Jan. 2001. Epistemic Modality, Language and Conceptualization: A Cognitive-Pragmatic Perspective. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Nuyts, Jan. 2005. The modal confusion: On terminology and the concepts behind it. In: Alex Klinge and Henrik Høeg Müller (eds.), Modality: Studies in Form and Function, 5–38. London: Equinox. Palmer, Frank R. 1990 [1979]. Modality and the English Modals. London and New York: Longman. Perkins, Michael R. 1983. Modal Expressions in English. London: Frances Pinter. Simon-Vandenbergen, Anne-Marie and Karin Aijmer. 2007. The Semantic Field of Modal Certainty. A Corpus-based Study of English Adverbs. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Swan, Toril. 1988. Sentence Adverbials in English: a Synchronic and Diachronic Investigation. Oslo: Novus Forlag. Tucker, Gordon. 2001. Possibly alternative modality. Functions of Language 8(2): 183–216. van der Auwera, Johan and Vladimir Plungian. 1998. Modality’s semantic map. Linguistic Typology 2: 79–124. Wärnsby, Anna. 2006. (De)coding Modality. The Case of Must, May, Måste and Kan. (Lund Studies in English 113). Lund: Lund University. Willett, Thomas. 1988. A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evidentiality. Studies in Language 12(1): 51–97. Zamorano-Mansilla, Juan Rafael and Carretero, Marta. 2010. An annotation scheme for dynamic modality in English and Spanish. Linguistics and the Human Sciences 6(1)–6(3): 297–320.

IV Evidentiality and Modality in Discourse

Roberta Facchinetti

Modal verbs in news-related blogs: When the blogger counts The United States and its allies need Russia’s cooperation in the international arena. Russia is and will remain a permanent member of the Security Council, which means that Washington must work with Moscow if there are to be even minimally effective multilateral responses to the full range of “threats to international peace and security”, from Afghanistan to Iran and Zimbabwe. We cannot “work around” this reality by championing a “concert of democracies” as an alternative forum for legitimating decisive international action – an idea that will only antagonize Russia (and China) without providing any strategic benefit. (Corpus of Newsrelated Blogs, INBs_TWN20)

1 Aim and scope of the study The text reported above is drawn from the Corpus of News-related Blogs compiled to analyze the language of this emerging textual type – blogs dealing with news events –, which has augmented its visibility over the last two decades though, so far, it has hardly been studied linguistically. Specifically, the following set of questions will be addressed in the present study. Once acknowledged that “all blogs are not made equal” (Kenix 2009: 815), is the textual type of News-related Blogs (NBs) to be bulked under one single category or, in turn, are NBs to be diversified among themselves? And if so, how? More specifically, to what extent does the professional identity of the blogger count in shaping the posts? Do texts posted by professional journalists voicing their media institution differ from those written by independent / freelance professionals or again by citizen-journalism bloggers? Most importantly for the present research, considering that in news-related publications one linguistic aspect diversifying reports from features and commentaries is the presence or absence of modalized utterances, can modality be of help in answering the questions above? How far are modalized constructs present in NBs? Indeed, considering the quotation above, one might be tempted to hastily conclude that modal verbs in particular are prevalent, but only a deep-down analysis will lead to evidence-grounded conclusions. To address these questions, I will investigate a Corpus of News-related Blogs focusing on an international news event occurred in August 2008, that is, the Russo-Georgian war in the Caucasus region. The quantitative study will be integrated by an analysis of the corpus data, with special reference to the central

360

Roberta Facchinetti

modals will/would, can/could, must/should, and may/might. While it is not my aim to discuss the semantic and pragmatic value of each and every modal occurrence, the study primarily intends to foreground those aspects that may help verifying how far, within the superordinate category of NBs, language – and specifically modality – can be diversified on account of the differing professional backgrounds of the bloggers.

2 Latest research trends on modal constructs Recent studies on modality focus on its logical aspects (John-Michael 2010) and on taxonomic categorizations (Van linden and Verstraete 2011) only to a limited extent; indeed, currently, the most treaded paths in the formal, semantic and functional features of modal constructs largely pertain to three fields: (1) translation studies, (2) native vs. non-native language use, and (3) genre analysis. The first and most productive one focuses on the translation of modality markers largely, though not exclusively, from the point of view of cross-cultural pragmatics. So, for example, Kehayov, Lindström and Niit (2011) have dealt with the imperative mood and the interrogative form in the Estonian subdialect Kihnu, Latvian and Livonian on the one hand and in Standard Estonian on the other. In turn, Chen, Chen and Chang (2011) have studied the speech acts of complaining as realized and interpreted by American and Taiwanese university students, with special attention to the strategies of opting out, interrogation, accusation, request for repair, and threat. Henry and Ho (2010) have investigated the English complaint speech act in Brunei Darussalam, in South East Asia, where English is the second language. Finally, Xiang (2011) has discussed the pragmatic particle lāh in Shishan, a dialect of Lingao of the Tai-Kadai language family, and has related its functions to a number of Southeast Asian languages’ pragmatic particles, including Singapore English lor. Half-away between this path of research and those studies focusing on Second Language Acquisition is Espada-Gustilo (2011), who has investigated a section of the Philippine component of the International Corpus of English to describe the semantic functions of nine modals and verify if there are any features in their use in the Philippine context that do not conform to the current usage taught in the textbooks largely mirroring American and British usage. Other scholars have studied the development of learners’ attention in the processing of modalized utterances (Hondo 2012), sentence-processing strategies adopted to express modalized tenses (Conroy and Cupples 2011) and the expression of modal verbs in language varieties resulting from contacts with other substratum languages, like Singapore English, strongly affected by Chinese (Zhiming 2010).

Modal Verbs in News-Related Blogs: When the Blogger Counts

361

Finally, with reference to genre studies, scholars have concentrated on a number of issues like the actualization of scientific writing and its popularized form both in English and in other languages (Kranich 2011), the language of court judgments in Hong Kong (Cheng and Sin 2011), and the modal semantics of imperfective aspect in Badiaranke, spoken in Niger-Congo (Cover 2011). In turn, Kanté (2010) has dealt with the use and the frequency of head nouns as they are distributed along different text genres, particularly academic and legal texts, and has discussed their role as modal expressions allowing the writer to mark stance in the text.

2.1 Recent studies of modality in newspaper discourse Despite the flourishing field of genre studies, the way modal structures are actualized in newspaper discourse, be it print or online, has not spurred a great deal of research in the very recent past. Among the extant investigations, some focus on the modalized language of newspapers within the broader field of pragmatic, socio-political and ideological issues. This is the case of Khan and Govindasamy (2011), who discuss the discursive field of Islamic militancy as it is constructed in Bangladeshi print newspaper editorials. In their study, along with a number of other discourse features, they focus on the modal verbs can/ could, may/might, should and on hedging devices like perhaps, possibly, surely, and necessarily, along with their corresponding realization in the Bangla language, exploited to express political leanings. Others have taken a cross-cultural perspective, like Bonyadi (2011), who has studied a corpus of editorials from The New York Times and Tehran Times; the data show that (a) both papers prefer will and would to the other modals and (b) when employing verbs of prediction and of necessity, the main concern of American editorialists seems to be the identification of what will happen in the future, while Iranian ones appear to be more interested in what should be done. Still dealing with commentaries, with special focus on newspaper sport pages, Timuçin (2010) analyzes four passages of the following British tabloids and broadsheets: The Telegraph, The Independent, The Times and The Guardian as quality papers and The Express, The Daily Mail, The Sun, The Mirror, and The Star as tabloids. The focus on a set of linguistic features, including modalized utterances, highlights that tabloids exploit a more biased and involved language than quality papers. To my knowledge, little has been done so far to tackle modality in online texts, with special reference to blogs; among the few studies, Chiluwa (2011) has focused on the actualization of modality in Nolitics, a Nigerian online political

362

Roberta Facchinetti

discussion forum providing an opportunity for social interaction and political participation through new media technologies. Nolitics is hosted by NaijaPals, whose members exchange information and engage in social analyses and criticisms of Nigerian political performances. Chiluwa has analyzed 104 posts in the framework of computer-mediated discourse analysis with insights and methods from pragmatics. His findings show that discursive/pragmatic strategies like modality, implicitness/implication, and directive speech acts function as a means of mobilizing people towards political participation. They are also used socially “as strategies for attacking corruption and political power abuse, initiating and practising political propaganda by politicians and as discourse tact of preventing offences” (Chiluwa 2011: 80). Unfortunately, though, specific research on modality in online news-related posts is still lacking. Indeed, the present paper intends to bridge this gap. To do so, it is crucial to provide first an overview of this textual type, which I intend to investigate.

3 News-related blogs: An overview Originally born as online personal diaries, blogs have now specialized and diversified their uses, so that they can be – also or exclusively – devoted to more public-interest topics, such as news, politics, economics, sport, health or hobbies. The range of bloggers has widened too, and now blogs are authored both by “everyday people”, who provide content of their interest outside their main professional activity, and by professionals and corporate organizations, whose provision of content is part of their “business”. Among them, journalists and media organizations have largely been attracted to this new format, due to its popularity and flexibility, while news-related blogs run by non-professionals have been heralded as a new type of journalism, offering a “radically different kind of news discourse than the one found in mainstream news media” (Haas 2005: 338). Both argumentative and empirical studies have tried to give grounds to the inevitable concerns and hopes generated by the news blogging phenomenon. So, on the one hand, blogs reporting or commenting on news might fruitfully function as the “watchdog on the watchdog” (Singer 2006: 28) and constitute an alternative to mainstream journalism (Lasica 2002); in turn, in a more complex way, they “could . . . be seen as a second tier to the news media system, acting as a corrective and companion to the traditional news media” (Bruns

Modal Verbs in News-Related Blogs: When the Blogger Counts

363

2006: 18). On the other hand, by relying heavily on, amplifying and reproducing the news provided by the major media organizations, blogs might actually strengthen the voice of mainstream media (Kenix 2009). Eventually, mainstream media might be even “normalizing” the blog format, by adopting and exploiting it to their purposes. So far, little or no investigation has been carried out on possible differences among news-related blogs on the basis of their authors’ relation to journalism. Hence, in the light of (a) the developments of the uses of blogs, (b) the abovementioned claims and arguments on their relationship with journalism, alongside with (c) the lack of specific research focused on the different status of the bloggers, the present study of modality in news-related blogging also aims at examining differences and similarities among news blogs in relation to the world of journalism, with special attention to the professional background of the writer.

4 The corpus Bearing in mind that readers can encounter news by accessing any sort of web source and blog (Gaber 2009: 42), be it a blog entirely devoted to international news reporting or somebody’s personal blog narrating casual conversations, the data constituting the Corpus of News-related Blogs have been selected on the basis of the topic of the posts – namely a news event – rather than on the basis of “news blogs” as a domain-specific sub-genre of blogs. Thus, the “blog post” has been regarded as the unit of analysis, while the “news event” as the criterion for retrieving the posts. The selected news event is the August 2008 “South Ossetia War”, otherwise called “Russo-Georgian War”, prompted by the South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s declaration of independence from Georgia. This led Georgia to attack the two regions between 7 and 8 August 2008, and Russia to invade Georgia as retaliation, in support of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After the intervention of the European Union, the cease-fire was declared and signed by Georgia and Russia between August 15 and August 16. The event has been chosen on account of its international scope, which enables the widening up of the geographical provenance of the data. Blog posts have been retrieved through keyword search on the main countries directly involved in the conflict, i.e., Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia. Keywords were searched in English as follows:

364

Roberta Facchinetti

(a)

on specialized search engines for blogs, like Google Blogs, Technorati blogs directory and Yahoo! Search Blog,

(b)

on blog portals/providers such as WordPress and Metafilter,

(c)

on English language newspaper websites (through the Lexis-Nexis newspaper database),

(d) by following the links to other blogs on any blog retrieved. All blog entries posted from 1 to 31 August 2008 resulting from the search were included, regardless not only of their blog domain type but also of their extent of readership/popularity. The search has resulted in a total of 705 posts, published in 65 different blogs, totalling 424,129 words. The token count includes the title and the body text of each post and excludes comments or default fields, such as the date of posting and the name of the author.

4.1 Blog classification The classification of the 65 blogs retrieved underwent a two-stage process. Firstly, by relying on the self-description given by the blogger on the profile section of the blog, blogs were initially grouped into the following typologies: – Mainstream media NBs (MNBs): blogs published on the websites of news media organizations operating also offline, such as print newspaper companies and TV news broadcasters; – Freelance NBs (FNBs): blogs published by professional journalists independently of any news media organization, that is, the blog is published independently, while the blogger may also be writing elsewhere for some news company; – Citizen NBs (CNBs): blogs published by bloggers who are not professional journalists. This first threefold grouping had to be re-categorized largely because a number of blogs could hardly fit any of the three groups. Such blogs gather multiple authors, both journalists and non-journalists, who present themselves as an organized entity, frequently as an online news outlet, with a detailed board of editors, a mission, and given roles for each contributor. Since these blogs place themselves somewhere in between MNBs and CNBs, it has been decided to group them together with the FNBs. This “mixed” group, renamed Independent NBs (INBs), thus collects all blogs that portray themselves as a form of independent journalism, being authored either by freelance professional journalists or by bloggers organized as an online independent media outlet. Therefore, the resulting three-fold classification considered for analysis is as follows:

Modal Verbs in News-Related Blogs: When the Blogger Counts

– – –

365

Mainstream NBs (MNBs), Independent NBs (INBs), Citizen Blogs (CNBs).

The raw figures shown in Table 1 testify to a discrepancy between the three subcorpora, deriving from the fact that the web yielded much more data from INBs than from CNBs and, even less, from MNBs. Table 1: No. of blogs, posts and tokens retrieved Blogs

Posts

Tokens

MNBs INBs CNBs

26 21 18

104 343 258

63,620 250,548 109,961

Total

65

705

424,129

Probably due to the language selected for the keyword search, most of the blogs retrieved are US- and UK-based. However, the corpus includes also: – international MNBs (e.g, those published on the International Herald Tribune, Reuters, and Radio Free Europe, legally US-based but with a headquarter in Prague, Czech Republic); – MNBloggers corresponding from outside the country of the news media outlet (e.g., The Times’ Paris correspondent Charles Bremner); – INBs and CNBs blogging from the Caucasus area (e.g., Georgia in Crisis, Registan, Nekka’s backlog); – collectively-authored INBs gathering international contributors (e.g., Global Voices Online, The Moderate Voice). The data were analyzed in a previous study (Facchinetti 2012) so as to identify if and to what extent the blogs from the three sections differ from one another with reference to the following aspects: – frequency, distribution and typology of time adverbials, to address the degree of timeliness of blog posts in hitting the headlines; – frequency and distribution of first and second-person pronouns, and their related verbal predicates, in order to highlight the degree of interactivity. In both cases, the figures showed a clear difference in results between MNBs on the one hand and INBs and CNBs on the other, with MNBs exploiting time adverbials much more than the other two categories, particularly CNBs. Indeed, MNBs exhibit an overwhelming majority of occurrences with specific time reference; in

366

Roberta Facchinetti

contrast, INBs and CNBs were found to exploit less precise temporal patterns and make a more limited use of numbers. Moreover, in all three sections of the corpus the first-person singular pronoun reference appears to be more frequent than the other forms, which is indeed indicative of the personal style of the blog as a genre and which might also suggest a move of professional journalists towards a more personalized register when they blog. However, once again, overall, CNBs and INBs were found to behave differently from MNBs, exhibiting a lower frequency of firstperson singular pronouns I and me and, in turn, a higher frequency of secondperson you and first-person plural us. This would indicate that CNBs and INBs are less self-referential and more participative/interactive than MNBs. In contrast, MNBs exhibit a high degree of self-referentiality, in so far as the authors refer more to themselves and less to their interlocutors. Particularly in MNBs we witness a high frequency of verbs referring to past situations or past actions carried out by those bloggers who report their personal experiences once back from the conflict zones. Finally, both quantitatively and qualitatively, INBs show a hybrid status, by placing themselves somehow in between the two extremes, since this type of blog shares features both with CNBs and with MNBs. So, these news-related blogs appear to be diversified according to the writer and the “channel” through which the blogger writes, be it mainstream, independent, or – so to say – “personal”. To complement the previous study, the present analysis of central modal verbs has been carried out on the same corpus in order to highlight possible differences in the distribution and use of modals in MNBs, INBs and CNBs; in so doing, I intend to draw attention to further aspects typifying each section of the corpus differing on account of the professional background of the blogger.

5 Modality in news-related blogging The corpus has been analyzed quantitatively by means of the software Wordsmith Tools 5.0, checking in the first place the occurrence and frequency of the modal verbs in each of the three subsections of the corpus. The quantitative data illustrated in Table 2 below show a great similarity in distribution of the modal verbs in each section of the corpus. Indeed, in all three, will, would, can, could, and should occur in the same decreasing order,1 will being the most exploited and should the least occurring. Moreover, in all three subcorpora, should occurs more frequently than must. 1 The 0.1 difference in occurrence between should (14) and could (13.9) in CNBs has not been deemed significant.

Modal Verbs in News-Related Blogs: When the Blogger Counts

367

Table 2: Central modal verbs (frequency /10,000w)

WILL WOULD CAN COULD SHOULD MUST MAY MIGHT Total

MNBs

INBs

CNBs

33.3 18.4 16.8 12.3 9.0 7.1 5.8 4.9

30.9 22.8 16.9 13.2 10.8 4.7 8.6 5.3

34.6 27.6 18.8 13.9 14.0 6.4 9.4 4.9

107.5

113.3

129.5

Overall, tentative modals are exploited to a greater extent by INBs and CNBs than by MNBs. So, would occurs much more frequently in CNBs (27.6) than in MNBs (18.4), while INBs place themselves somehow in between. Similarly, though with a less marked difference, could occurs more in CNBs (13.9) than in MNBs (12.3), with INBs in between. Finally, should occurs in CNBs with a frequency of 14 per 10,000 words, while only 9 in MNBs and 10.8 in INBs. In turn, may and might occur the least in MNBs, while in INBs they are more frequent than must; the same is for may in CNBs, while might exhibits the same frequency as in MNBs. This preliminarily suggests the preference of INBs and CNBs for modal markers indicating possibility rather than necessity (may more than must) as opposed to MNBs. The difference in distribution is less marked among the three subcorpora with reference to the base forms of the modals; so, for example, while must is more frequent in MNBs and the least frequent in INBs, may is most frequent in CNBs and the least in MNBs; in turn, can exhibits virtually the same frequency in MNBs and INBs (16.8 and 16.9 respectively) and it is most frequent in CNBs, and finally will is most frequent in CNBs and least in INBs. Overall, the data point to a gradually increasing occurrence of modal verbs from MNBs to INBs and mostly CNBs and to a higher use of tentative and possibility modals on the part of INBs as opposed to MNBs. I will now illustrate the main findings in detail with reference to each modal verb, with special attention to their semantic values.

5.1 Will and would The modal verb will is exploited in all three subcorpora largely to indicate futurity, the most frequent lexical verbs co-occurring with it being action verbs like continue, celebrate, re-build, take, travel, and arrive, as in (1).

368 (1)

Roberta Facchinetti

Dallas left Souda Bay, Crete on Thursday with more than 76,000 pounds of relief supplies and will arrive in Georgia within a week. (MNBs_FOX25)

The futurity value is sometimes accompanied by an epistemic overtone, though such cases are statistically insignificant in the corpus and confined to quotations, that is, the blogger reporting remarks made by others: (2)

“They will be more careful,” says the head of Georgia’s Foundation for Strategic and International Studies Alexander Rondeli. “They will be more balancing. But because Russia revealed it’s (sic) inner essence and the DNA of Soviet imperialism, now they will be very, very careful. “I think this was the message to Georgia and then to others – that Russia is still the master in the house and that everyone has to respect them.” (INBs_GIC22)

In turn, in all three sections of the corpus, would signals either tentativeness – largely in patterns like I would say/add/love (3), mostly occurring in CNBs – or the mere past/conditional form of will (4): (3)

I would love to see them do to the Georgian president what Amerikkka did to President Saddam Hussein, and see what the US, NATO or the UN hypocrites say about it. (CNBs_BBCMM27)

(4) If it wasn’t for the help of the Russian Army here, there would be thousands and thousands more victims. (MNBs_NYT22) The screening of the will/would data in colligation with personal pronouns shows similar distributions of the occurrences within each subcorpus, as indicated in Figures 1, 2 and 3; indeed, in all subcorpora, I would recurs more frequently than I will, suggesting the generalized tendency of the bloggers to express themselves tentatively rather than to indicate their future actions.

Figure 1: Subjects collocating with will and would in MNBs (%)

Modal Verbs in News-Related Blogs: When the Blogger Counts

369

Figure 2: subjects collocating with will and would in INBs (%)

Figure 3: Subjects collocating with will and would in CNBs (%)

The discrepancy in frequency between the two phrases is highest in MNBs, where no occurrence of I will is counterbalanced by six instances of I would (5%), all expressing a tentative opinion: (5)

We have striven to be as impartial as possible in reporting this conflict. But this has not been easy. As my colleague Jon Williams has blogged, it has been difficult for our reporters in the region to get a full picture of what has been going on, though I would say they have been coping with those difficulties very well. (MNBs_BBC22)

Moreover, in all three sections of the corpus will co-occurs more frequently with we than with any other subject; this is due to the fact that, in the corpus, we is generally exploited to refer to the inhabitants of the geographical areas at war or to groups of personal witnesses, including reporters; hence, statements referring

370

Roberta Facchinetti

to the situation in the area and to the future to be embraced by the countries and populations are frequent. In contrast, would collocates mostly with I, where the speaker, often the blogger, expresses his/her opinions, suggestions, remarks in a more tentative way, as a reporter, an external observer, an inhabitant, or a mere commentator. Finally, in MNBs no occurrence of would has been recorded with you, while the 2nd person subject occurs most in CNBs (2.3%), leading to a higher degree of interactivity in this type of blogs: (6) If you ever have been near dead humans by the dozens or hundreds (like I have), you would understand why you have to bury them and bury them quick. (MNBs_WtR2) Similarly, 3rd person subjects, both with will and with would, are less exploited in CNBs than in INBs and MNBs, thus confirming the higher degree of interactivity typifying this type of blog.

5.2 Can and could Three values are expressed by can: capability (7) possibility (8), and, though in one single case, permission (9): (7)

I can say that last night was the noisiest night since the bombing ended. Aside from the vehicles moving, you could hear fire from automatic weapons, and patrolling was intensified. (MNBs_RFE22)

(8) I am bewildered. It can’t be happening – for all their faults the Russian Government can’t be mad enough to be doing this, can they? (INBs_GCGL18) (9) Can I stop for a second? (INBs_MJT26) As anticipated, my main focus is not on the analysis of each single semantic occurrence, but rather on the identification of linguistic aspects highlighting possible differences between the three types of blogs produced by writers from different professional backgrounds. Indeed, the frequency of can in interrogative clauses, as summarized in Figure 4, does provide thought-provoking results:

Modal Verbs in News-Related Blogs: When the Blogger Counts

371

Figure 4: Frequency of can in interrogative clauses

Can occurs much more frequently in CNBs than in MNBs, which once again testifies to the greater degree of interactivity on the part of CNBloggers, while INBs confirm their status as a shaded, undefined category. (10) Who can the Russians turn to? China, the SCO, and the other ostracised countries; the Muslims, and all other energy exporters. And Germany, Austria, France and Italy, as this post will make clear. (CNBs_DTN16) As for could, all subcorpora exhibit two main values: tentative possibility on the one hand (11) and past possibility on the other (12): (11)

This could open the door to serious miscalculations. (INBs_RAJ18)

(12)

More than a dozen tanks roamed the center of Gori, a strategic city in the center of the country about 40 miles from Tbilisi, the capital. . . (. . .) Occasional gunfire could be heard around the city. (MNBs_WiNS13)

The main feature that has been noticed is that, while MNBs exhibit a higher number of past possibility values, in the other two sections, mostly CNBs, the number of conditional/tentative patterns increases, as illustrated in Figure 5. Once again, the higher degree of interactivity and specifically the need to discuss things with the interlocutor/reader leads to a change in language use. This confirms that not all news-related blogs can be treated in the same way and that the professional/mainstream ones are more prone to report news rather than to discuss or comment, and to make anticipations on the future rather than to look back onto past events.

372

Roberta Facchinetti

Figure 5: Frequency of could in interrogative clauses

5.3 Must and should As highlighted in section 5, must occurs most frequently in MNBs (7.1) than in INBs (4.7) and CNBs (6.4); moreover, of the two prevalent values – deontic obligation and epistemic necessity – MNBs largely favour the former: (13) THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. For more than a week, the people of the nation of Georgia have withstood assault from the Russian military. (. . .) We insist that Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity be respected. And Moscow must honor its pledge to withdraw its invading forces from all Georgian territory. (MNBs_SwMS16) This would suggest the preference for forceful subjective claims by this type of bloggers. Yet a more in-depth analysis shows that the totality of these occurrences are to be found in quotations, and that the MNBloggers are not presenting their point of view with reference to what must be done, but rather they are reporting other people’s words, mostly from officials and heads of state. Indeed, in (13) above, it is the President of the United States who is being quoted. In contrast, the occurrences of must in quotations are more limited in INBs and particularly, once again, in CNBs, where must conveys almost exclusively the blogger’s forceful opinion both deontically (14) and epistemically (15): (14)

Hello, Today while drinking my morning cup of coffee, I came across interesting articles from all over the world. Articles from Western press, that act in horror that Russia is not going to pull out of South Ossetia! The Western world has ignored Abkhazia and the fact that Russia will not be pulling out of Abkhazia either. (. . .) You must understand the reality, that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are no longer part of Georgia in Russians minds. (CNBs_WtR21)

Modal Verbs in News-Related Blogs: When the Blogger Counts

(15)

373

if anything, the prospect of NATO membership, combined with its renewed oil wealth and the ready possibility of intervention must have increased Russia’s resolve for swift and decisive action. (CNBs_SitC28)

Indeed, the overall number of quotations actually diminishes in the three subcorpora, lowering down in percentage from 2.6 per post to 1.6 in INBs and 1.5 in CNBs. In turn, should is never recorded in quotations and in all three sections is used exclusively to express the deontic value of tentative obligation, which however is less present in MNBs (9 /10,000w) and more recurrent in CNBs (14 /10,000w): (16) At The Huffington Post, Joe Lauria wonders if McCain – who, as we all know, burbled away about talking on the phone every day to his dear friend Mikheil Saakashvili and sent envoys over to Georgia – helped to enable this whole crisis. He’s taking stick for it from the right, but in light of McCain’s own boasts, it’s not an unreasonable question. If it’s discovered that he did, he should be well and truly disqualified from foreign policy vauntings ever again. No, scratch that. In fact, he should already be well and truly disqualified from foreign policy experience vauntings ever again. (INBs_TMVD18). Once again, the data confirm a higher degree of subjectivity conveyed by CNBs as opposed to MNBs.

5.4 May and might Both may and might exclusively convey epistemic possibility, while the value of deontic permission has not been recorded in CNBs. Might simply differentiates from may on account of its higher degree of tentativeness, as illustrated in (17) and (18). (17)

But it may not be over yet. The most disturbing news I have received since the guns fell silent is that Russia may still be attempting to force renewed violence by means of truly devious provocations, such as false-flag “volunteers” to the Georgian cause, getting Georgia to accept mercenary muscle in the form of Blackwater-like “private security companies,” and then exposing this in a propaganda coup. (INBs_UtS23.txt)

(18) Some younger readers might not remember. (INBs_TMVD20)

374

Roberta Facchinetti

It should be reminded that may occurs more frequently in INBs (8.6) and CNBs (9.4), while the least number of occurrences is recorded in MNBs (5.8). Indeed, opinions are expressed more freely by personal bloggers than by mainstream professionals. In contrast, might exhibits similar frequency in the three corpus sections (MNBs 4.9, INBs 5.3, CNBs 4.9) largely expressing the bloggers’ opinions, rather than reporting other people’s remarks. Bearing in mind its tentative specificity on the one hand and the limited number of forceful modalized comments recorded in MNBs on the other, the data suggest that, when expressing their opinion, MNBs tend to favour “weak” and tentative modal constructs rather than more forceful ones, like must or may.

6 Discussion and conclusion The linguistic analysis of the corpus has confirmed that news-related blogs cannot be bulked under one single textual type; indeed, the results indicate that they are diversified according not only to the subject matter, but also to the writer and the “channel” through which the blogger writes, be it mainstream, independent, or – so to say – “personal”. Specifically, while the quantitative data point to a similarity in distribution of the modal verbs in the three sections of the corpus – will being the most frequent and should the least – a set of aspects has also been highlighted that point to differences between the three sections. In the first place, I have recorded a general tendency of tentative modals to be exploited with more frequency than their present counterparts in CNBs, while in MNBs they (mostly could) occur largely with their past indicative values. Moreover, mostly CNBs (but also INBs) appear to favour epistemic possibility modals rather than deontic necessity ones, which occur more frequently in MNBs, though exclusively in quotations. Indeed, while MNBloggers tend to voice their media institutions and maintain a role of reporters without indulging in the expression of their opinions, but rather reporting other people’s thoughts and claims, CNBs are more personallywritten and express freely their subjectivity. When, however, MNBloggers do express their point of view, they favour very tentative modalized patterns, particularly by means of might. Secondly, when analyzed in colligation with personal pronouns, it has been noticed that you would is particularly prevalent in CNBs, while “3rd pers. subj. + will/would” is more typical of MNBs. Similarly, interrogative can is largely ex-

Modal Verbs in News-Related Blogs: When the Blogger Counts

375

ploited in CNBs. This points to a higher degree of interactivity in CNBs than in MNBs, while INBs place somehow in between. Hence, my data portray news-related blogs as a diversified, flexible and adapting category, where well-defined structures give way to free practice and rigid rules of genre give way to the fluidity of language use, depending on the “writing platform”. The present linguistic analysis confirms that, while all three types of blogs are open access on the web and consequently they all share the same potential audience, still their diversification with reference to the channel from which they write, be it institutional or not, accounts for the structural and linguistic choices of each one of the three. The present study has also allowed me to provide further elements to the extant research on news-related blogs. The current debate on news-related blogs seems indeed to be somewhat stuck on conflicting positions, while trying to ascertain whether blogs are undermining traditional journalism, whether they are its watchdog and its democratic grass-and-root alternative, or, on the contrary, they are rather instrumental to and being instrumentalized by it. My analysis has shown that these questions can be better contextualized by distinguishing news-related blogs according to the degree of their institutional relation to journalism. So, judging from my results, MNBs are the fruit of the entering of the journalistic institutions into the realm of blogs, using this genre to their purposes and reflecting all their interests, structural constraints and conventions in their blogging. In turn, CNBs are rather the result of the entering of bloggers into the realm of journalism, thus reflecting all the characteristics of web communication in their news-reporting, but mostly commenting. The most hybrid type of news-related blog is the one authored by freelance journalists and independent online media outlets, which can combine more freely the skills and conventions of their profession with the new possibilities offered by the blog format. Undoubtedly, the analysis reported here was carried out on a relatively small sample of blogs (65), which does not give account of the wide array of (news-related) blog typologies. One of my future goals is to refine my data and to widen up the scope of my analysis, in so much as it is hoped to produce a more complete mapping of different types of news-related blogs, including, for example, political news blogs and blogs related to investigative journalism.

References Bonyadi, Alireza. 2011. Linguistic manifestations of modality in newspaper editorials. International Journal of Linguistics 3(1): 1–13.

376

Roberta Facchinetti

Bruns, Axel. 2006. The practice of news blogging. In: Axel Bruns and Joanne Jacobs (eds.), Uses of Blogs, 11–22. New York: Peter Lang. Chen, Chun-Yin Doris, Yuan-Shan Chen and Miao-Hsia Chang. 2011. American and Chinese complaints: strategy use from a cross-cultural perspective. Intercultural Pragmatics 8(2): 253– 275. Cheng, Le and King Kui Sin. 2011. A sociosemiotic interpretation of linguistic modality in legal settings. Semiotica: Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies 185: 123– 146. Chiluwa, Innocent. 2011. On political participation: Discursive pragmatics and social interaction in Nolitics. Studies in Literature and Language 2(2): 80–92. Conroy, Mark A. and Linda Cupples. 2011. We could have loved and lost, or we never could have love at all. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 32(04): 523–552. Cover, Rebecca T. 2011. Modal aspects of Badiaranke aspect. Lingua 121(8): 1315–1343. Espada-Gustilo, Leah. 2011. Modal auxiliaries in Philippine English newspapers: A corpusbased analysis. Philippine ESL Journal 6: 81–109. Facchinetti, Roberta. 2012. News writing from the 1960s to the present day. In: Nicholas Brownlees, Roberta Facchinetti, Birte Bös and Udo Fries (eds.), News as Changing Texts: Corpora, Methodologies and Analysis, 145–196. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Gaber, Ivor. 2009. Them and us: Is there a difference? British Journalism Review 20(1): 41–46. Haas, Tanni. 2005. From “public journalism” to the “public’s journalism”? Rhetoric and reality in the discourse on weblogs. Journalism Studies 6(3): 387–396. Henry, Alex and Debbie G. E. Ho. 2010. The act of complaining in Brunei – Then and now. Journal of Pragmatics 42(3): 840–855. Hondo, Junko. 2012. Unveiling learners’ attention during language processing: The case of epistemic meanings of a modal verb. Language Awareness: 1–17. Available online: 10 Nov 2011. John-Michael, Kuczynski. 2010. Intensionality, modality, and rationality: Some presemantic considerations. Journal of Pragmatics 42(8): 2314–2346. Kanté, Issa. 2010. Head nouns as modal stance markers – Academic texts vs. legal texts. Revue de Linguistique et de Didactique des Langues 41: 121–135. Kehayov, Petar, Liina Lindström and Ellen Niit. 2011. Imperative in interrogatives in Estonian (Kihnu), Latvian and Livonian. Linguistica Uralica 47(2): 81–93. Kenix, Jean L. 2009. Blogs as alternative. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 14: 790–822. Khan, Mahmud Hasan and Subramaniam Govindasamy. 2011. Islamic militancy in Bangladeshi newspaper editorials: A discourse analysis. Multilingua: Journal of Cross-Cultural and Interlanguage Communication 30(3): 357–376. Kranich, Svenja. 2011. To hedge or not to hedge: The use of epistemic modal expressions in popular science in English texts, English-German translations, and German original texts. Text and Talk: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language, Discourse and Communication Studies 31(1): 77–99. Lasica, Joseph Daniel. 2002. Blogging as a form of journalism. In: John Rodzvilla and Rebecca Blood (eds.), We’ve Got Blog: How Weblogs Are Changing Our Culture, 163–170. Cambridge: Perseus.

Modal Verbs in News-Related Blogs: When the Blogger Counts

377

Singer, Jane B. 2006. Journalists and news bloggers: Complements, contradictions, and challenges. In: Axel Bruns and Joanne Jacobs (eds.), Uses of Blogs, 23–32. New York: Peter Lang. Timuçin, Metin. 2010. Different language styles in newspapers: An investigative framework. Journal of Language and Linguistic Studies 6(2): 104–126. Van linden, An and Jean-Christophe Verstraete. (2011). Revisiting deontic modality and related categories: A conceptual map based on the study of English modal adjectives. Journal of Pragmatics 43(1): 150–163. Xiang, Xuehua. 201. Constraint reality: Linguistic expressions of restrictivity and emotive stances. A discourse-pragmatic study of utterance-final lāh in Shishan (Hainan Island, China). Lingua 121(8): 1377–1400. Zhiming, Bao. 2010. Must in Singapore English. Lingua 120(7): 1727–1737.

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance: Intersubjective positioning and construction of public identity in media interviews 1 Introduction In this article we examine the role of markers of Engagement and of personal pronouns as two complementary dimensions of the expression of stance, together with their role in the construction of identity and intersubjective positioning in three interviews.1 While personal pronouns and stance markers have traditionally been analysed separately (see, for instance, Wilson 1990; Martin and White 2005, respectively), we believe that a combined analysis of personal pronouns and stance categories may provide relevant insights into the way different speakers construct their identities in interaction. With regard to the relation between modality and stance, this complex phenomenon has been approached from various perspectives which share in very broad terms the interest in studying the expression of beliefs, attitudes and feelings in discourse (see, for example, Biber and Finegan 1989; Biber et al. 1999; Chafe 1986; Hunston and Thompson 1999; Marín-Arrese 2004; Martin and White 2005; Englebretson 2007, among others). While different models imply different relations of overlap between the concepts of modality, stance and evaluation, what is shared by all proposals is the direct relation between the role of modality and these associated concepts and the interpersonal function of language. In the present article, we follow Martin and White’s approach to the concept of stance and adopt their model of Appraisal Theory for the analysis of Engagement stance categories. In this model, the linguistic expressions which are traditionally regarded as “modal” are subsumed mostly under the category of Entertain, as is explained below. However, it may be argued that the concept of Engagement is modal in itself, as it proposes various categories in which the speaker/writer situates himself/herself with regard to the proposition or to his/ her interlocutor. The choice of this framework is motivated by the fact that it allows us to analyse pronouns in connection with well-established categories of the expression of intersubjectivity. Besides, as Martin and White (2005: 40) note, the concept of appraisal is closely connected to Biber’s notion of stance. 1 This study has been carried out within the research project funded by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (FFI-2008-01471FILO), to whom we are grateful.

380

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

As far as personal pronouns are concerned, extensive research has been carried out on the functions of personal pronouns in political discourse, with particular attention to the pragmatic function of pronouns and their contribution to the ideological construction of subject positions and group relations (Chilton 2004; van Dijk 1998; Wilson 1990). However, these studies have mainly focused on the referential aspects of the pronominal system but have not explored the implications of pronominal use in the expression of stance. Thus, more work needs to be carried out on the pragmatics of pronominal expressions as deictic indicators of different social roles, on the concept of deictic centre and on the co-occurrence of deictics with other linguistic features in discourse, such as modal stance markers. Following recent research on indexicality and stance (see, for example, Chilton 2004; de Fina, Schiffrin, and Bamberg 2006; Englebretson 2007; Hanks 2009; Marín-Arrese 2009; Cockroft et al. 2013), we consider that both personal pronouns and modal markers are indexical in nature, and, as such, do not only provide information regarding personal reference, possibility, probability and evidentiality, among others, but they contribute to the active and dynamic creation of contexts in spoken and written discourse. On this basis, the objectives of the present article are to analyse (i) the role of modality in the expression of stance understood in terms of the domain of engagement (cf. Martin and White 2005), (ii) the use of the pronominal forms I, you and we as linguistic choices of intersubjective positioning, and (iii) the co-occurrence of personal indexicals and engagement categories along with their possible implications in the construction of identity. The type of discourse event selected for our analysis is the interview, which was chosen because of the interest of this genre as an example of what Fairclough (1992: 216) describes as a “discourse technology”, that is, a type of discourse which is consciously designed and staged in order to influence an audience, and which influences and cuts across other types of discourses. As such, interviews are a good example of hybrid genres, in the sense that they typically display a combination of resources which are aimed partly at informing and partly at persuading the audience (Fairclough 1992: 222). Political interviews represent a case in point in this regard (see Fairclough 1992: 216–217). At the same time, it may also be argued that the interview is a genre in which intersubjective positioning and identity construction play crucial roles2. Indeed, identity construction can be understood as a process of positioning (see, for instance, de Fina, Schiffrin, and 2006: 8). In this sense, as White (2003: 275) notes, the analysis of intersubjective positioning makes it possible not only to 2 For a pragmatic analysis of political interviews, see, for example, Chilton (2004).

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

381

analyse how text producers adopt particular stances but also how they construct an imagined or model readership/audience. In particular, the interviews selected for this study address a controversial topic such as global warming, which is likely to demand a clear positioning from politicians, environmentalists and scientists with regard to the causes and consequences of global warming and with regard to the actions, if any, that should be undertaken to mitigate this phenomenon. The relation between stance, positioning and attitude to the topic of discourse is pointed out by du Bois, who defines stance as follows: “A public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field” (2007: 163). In brief, we hope to contribute not only to the study of the relation between modal markers of stance and pronominal variation in the expression of stance and identity construction, but also to the exploitation of the appraisal system in the genre of interviews. In this regard, of particular interest is the analysis of spoken scientific discourse, as research into this type of discourse has mainly focused on scientific writing (see Halliday and Martin 1993). The present article is organised as follows. After this introduction, section 2 describes the interviews selected for analysis and the methodology used in the study. Section 3 focuses on the main areas of analysis in the study of pronouns and describes Martin and White’s (2005) model of Appraisal Theory. Section 4 presents the analysis and interpretation of results. Here we analyse the expression of stance in the domain of Engagement as well as the functions of pronouns and their occurrence within Engagement categories in connection with the issue of public identity. Finally, section 5 offers the main conclusions drawn from the analysis.

2 Data and methodology 2.1 Data The data consists of the transcriptions of three interviews which address the topic of global warming: 1. A video recorded interview to ex- British Foreign Secretary David Milliband3 (1475 words). The interview was conducted by Jeremy Paxman on the BBC2 3 At the time the interview was conducted, David Milliband was Foreign Secretary (2007–2010). Previously, he had been Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

382

2.

3.

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

programme Newsnight on 7th May 2008. In this interview, Milliband discusses the effects of a low-carbon economy in relation to climate change. The interview was transcribed by the authors of the present paper. An interview to environmentalist Bill McKibben, who became popular for organising in 2006 the biggest demonstration against global warming in the US (3071 words). Here McKibben addresses the connection between studying abroad and the development of an environmental consciousness, especially as far as global warming is concerned. The transcription is taken from the Internet magazine Abroad View, Spring 2008. An interview to researcher and public health expert Dr. Jonathan Patz (1504 words), accessible on the web page of Scientific American (Section Science Talk), November 7 2007. In this interview Patz talks about the ethics of climate change.

These interviews will be referred to in the analysis section as follows: P (politician), EN (environmentalist), EX (expert).

2.2 Methodology The three interviews were tagged manually with labels indicating the relevant categories of engagement. A search of occurrences of these categories was carried out by means of a concordancer (MonoConc). Likewise, pronominal occurrences were searched using the same method. Next, the frequency and distribution per 1,000 words of each engagement category and pronoun was calculated in order to make the three interviews comparable. Given that among all the pronominal forms identified only the forms I, we, and you co-occur with engagement categories, it was decided that the analysis would focus on these pronominal forms, thus leaving out other pronominal variants (e.g. my, our, their, etc.). Once the quantitative analysis was conducted, a qualitative analysis was carried out with the aim of identifying the functions of the engagement devices, the referents of each pronoun, their occurrence within verbal clusters associated with stance categories, and, finally, possible changes in pragmatic meaning of a particular pronoun in context.

3 Theoretical background The present section presents Martin and White’s (2005) model of Appraisal Theory, focusing on the description of the domain of engagement, followed by a

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

383

brief overview of different approaches to the analysis of the pronominal system as indexical markers.

3.1 Modality within Engagement in Appraisal Theory Within Systemic Functional Linguistics, Martin and White’s Appraisal Theory (2005) addresses the study of the interpersonal function in language and develops the Hallidayan approach to modality into a theory in its own right. Appraisal Theory proposes a model for the study of the interpersonal function by focusing on those evaluative devices whereby speakers/writers adopt a particular stance towards both the material they present and the interlocutors with whom they interact: Among other things, appraisal is concerned with the construction by texts of communities of shared feelings and values, and with the linguistic mechanisms for the sharing of emotions, tastes and normative assessments. It is concerned with how writers/speakers construe for themselves particular authorial identities or personae, with how they align or disalign themselves with actual or potential respondents, and with how they construct for their texts an intended or ideal audience. (Martin and White 2005:1)

From an interpersonal perspective, the concept of modality overlaps with other concepts such as evaluation, stance and intersubjective positioning, as already pointed out in the introduction to this article. Although modality can also be studied narrowly as referring to the linguistic devices which express speaker’s attitudes to the content of a proposition (typically, epistemic and deontic modal markers), we argue that a discourse-based approach benefits from a broad view of modality which addresses this linguistic phenomenon as a more general function of language and which situates current discourse along various dimensions. Appraisal Theory, and more specifically the system of Engagement, offers in our view, an adequate model for the analysis of the complex interplay of modal meaning in discourse understood as a set of features which relativise the strength of the proposition and situate utterances along clines of intersubjective positiong and stance with regard to real or possible interlocutors.4 The domain of Engagement encompasses those resources that “provide the means for the authorial voice to position itself with respect to, and hence to 4 For an overview of Appraisal Theory and its relation to other concepts such as stance and evaluation, see, for example, Thompson and Hunston (1999); White (2003); Martin (2003), and the special issues in Functions of Language and Text: Davidse and Simon-Vanderbergen (2002); Martin (2003); Bednarek (2008).

384

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

“engage” with, the other voices and alternative positions construed as being in play in the current communicative context” (Martin and White 2005: 94). This idea of positioning with respect to other voices and alternative positions is the centre of the “modal” or “interpersonal” view of discourse in the Appraisal system. That is, speakers can reject or suppress alternative views or invoke dialogic alternatives by presenting the proposition being advanced in the text as one among a range of possible positions (White 2003; Martin and White 2005). According to Martin and White (2005), engagement devices can be dialogically contractive or dialogically expansive. That is, they either foreground the speaker’s subjectivity by closing down the space for dialogic alternatives (dialogic contraction), or allow for other possible positions by opening up the space for them (dialogic expansion). Table 1 summarises the categories for Engagement within the model of Appraisal Theory (adapted from Martin and White 2005: 134). Table 1: Dialogic Contraction and Expansion in Martin and White’s (2005) model of Appraisal Theory Engagement Dialogic Contraction

Dialogic Expansion

Disclaim

Proclaim

Entertain

Attribute

– Deny – Counter

– Concur – Pronounce – Endorse

– Possibility/Probability – Obligation – Evidence/Appearance – Cognition

– Acknowledge – Distance

As can be seen from Table 1, under the Appraisal Theory model, the notion of Engagement encompasses, first of all, those formulations used to take an explicit stance. We can observe that the distinction between the categories of Contraction and Expansion encompasses discursive phenomena which illustrate the tension between what other authors have called the cline from REALIS to IRREALIS (assertion, probability, possibility, negation, see for example Givón 1993), or from yes to no (yes, probable, possible, no; see Halliday 1994). Modality is thus understood as a complex system which includes a cline from positive assertion (realis) to negative assertion (irrealis) with a series of categories in between expressing different degrees or types of commitment of the speaker to the content of the proposition and to his/her interlocutor. It is also worth mentioning that the category of Entertain includes the classical markers of modality and, additionally, markers of evidentiality (see Chafe 1994 for a view of modality as part of evidential meaning; see, for example, Hidalgo Downing

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

385

2004 for a discussion of the relation between modality and evidentiality), and that the category Attribute includes typical markers of speech representation or reporting speech, in which the distinction direct vs. indirect speech can also be interpreted in terms of modal distance (see Werth 1999). Within Dialogic Contraction, the category Disclaim refers to expressions whereby the speaker/writer either positions him/herself as at odds with an alternative position (denials, such as “you don’t have to earn a lot of money to buy a decent house”) or rejects it (expressions of counter expectation or concession, as in “they are still in love although they do not see each other very often”). Proclaim refers to the presentation of the information as reliable, valid or generally agreed, thus overruling alternative positions. The types of formulations that fall into the category Proclaim are grouped into three different subcategories: Concur, or expressions whereby the textual voice presents itself as supporting a particular view presented in the text (“obviously/ of course the government will take actions. . . .”); Pronounce, or formulations that insist on the validity of the proposition expressed (“There is no doubt that. . .”), and, finally, Endorse, whereby the information presented is attributed to a reliable source (“As studies have shown/demonstrated. . . .”). In contrast to these categories that constrain the dialogic space, the categories Entertain and Attribute open up the space for alternative positions. Specifically, Entertain refers to the presentation of the proposition as one among a range of different dialogic alternatives. Martin and White (2005: 104) view Entertain as “the dialogistic expansiveness of modality and evidentiality”, as it accounts for those expressions that have traditionally been analysed as markers of modality (Bybee and Fleischman 1995) and evidentiality (Biber and Finegan 1989). Following Halliday’s view, also shared by Palmer (1986), the Entertain category includes formulations expressed by mental verbs such as I think, I believe inasmuch as these “structures are “modal” rather than experiential or informational in their communicative functionality” (Martin and White 2005: 105). As a result, Entertain encompasses the following modal and evidential meanings: – Epistemic modality (possibility, probability) – Deontic modality: (obligation) – Evidentiality (e.g. It seems that, I hear, apparently) – Cognition (e.g. I think, I believe) The last category in the domain of Engagement is that of Attribution, which accounts for those formulations that present the information as attributed to an external source from which the speaker may distance himself (category of Distance, as in “X party claims that. . .”) or adopt a neutral position (category of

386

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

Acknowledge, as in “X said that. . .”). In other words, the category of Attribution captures such concepts as extra-vocalisation and heteroglossia (Bakhtin 1986) or intertextuality (Kristeva 1986)5. As can be seen from the above description, these dimensions can be linguistically realised through a wide range of lexical and grammatical devices. For the purpose of our study, we will focus on those patterns that co-occur with the pronominal forms I, you and we.

3.2 The interpersonal dimension of the pronominal system Few studies have been carried out on the way in which modal markers and personal pronouns complement each other in the expression of stance and intersubjective positioning, although Chilton (2004) clearly proposes that by means of both modal markers and deictics speakers establish scales of distancing and of evaluation. Our aim is to explore in depth this relation between modal markers and personal deictics, considering both types of linguistic features as indexical markers that construct subject positions. A great part of the research on referentiality and deixis has gone into the explanation of the complex question of referentiality and existence in relation to Noun Phrases, definiteness and indefiniteness. Otherwise, the most relevant research on deixis has focused on the characteristics of deictic systems in various languages (see Hanks 1992, 2009; Levinson 2004; Etelämäki 2008). Within the field of discourse analysis, the study of pronouns has been particularly relevant in the study of political discourse (Wilson 1990; Chilton and Shäffner 1997; van Dijk 1998; Chilton 2004). Precisely, Chilton (2004: 56) describes pronouns as “one class of words that can perform deictic functions” and, as such, they may contribute to the reinforcement of group identity. From a critical perspective, and as explained in the introductory section above, pronouns serve an interpersonal function and contribute to the ideological construction of subject positions and group relations (Chilton 2004; Fairclough 1989; van Dijk 1998) and, as such, they complement the meanings expressed by other stance markers such as those proposed by the Appraisal Theory model described above. The study of pronouns as linguistic devices 5 Following Marín-Arrese and Núñez-Perucha (2006: 230), these four categories of Engagement can be interpreted in terms of a continuum that progresses from the speaker/writer’s subjective evaluations (as in the case of the categories of Proclaim and Disclaim) to evaluations that can be intersubjectively shared by speaker/writer and addressee (category of Entertain), to, finally, a shift in perspective represented by the inclusion of some other textual voice (category of Attribution).

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

387

whereby speakers indicate their ideological position with regard to certain groups or issues implies an analysis of the pronominal system from a pragmatic perspective. As Wilson (1990: 47) notes, the pragmatic analysis of the pronominal system is concerned with the possible effects that pronominal choice has on the hearer/reader’s perception of the speaker/writer. It follows then that speakers may select particular pronouns in an attempt to position themselves and the audience in a particular way. For instance, in the case of political discourse, Wilson (1990: 45–77) provides a detailed analysis of the pragmatic effects and the manipulative possibilities of the pronominal system. Two aspects of Wilson’s approach to pronouns are particularly relevant for our analysis. First, the classification and distribution of pronominal categories in political discourse, together with the distancing scale for pronouns; and second, the distinction between inclusive and exclusive uses of pronouns. With regard to the first aspect, Wilson distinguishes the following types of pronominal forms and their distribution with regard to the grammatical category of person: Table 2: Pronominal distribution (From Wilson 1990: 57) First person

Second person

Third person

Singular

I One You

You

He/she/it One (indefinite) You (indefinite)

Plural

We

You

They Those

An interesting aspect of this distribution for the purposes of our analysis is that in this system, the pronoun you has been allocated in first and third person, in addition to second. With regard to the use of you for first person reference, Wilson observes that “It can be argued that you is what is referred to as a “situational insertion”, the conversion of one’s own personal experience into experiences which might be, or can be, shared by the addressee” (1990: 56). The interpretation of you as indicating merely first person is pragmatic and determined by the context and co-text. This use of you contrasts with what Wilson defines as “indefinite you”, which has also been described by other authors as impersonal or non-referential you. Wilson (1990: 57) argues that the pronoun you is used in the latter category “to reflect upon a kind of conventional wisdom as opposed to actual experience”. He provides the following example: (1)

Money can’t buy you a loving family.

388

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

Reference in this example is to people in general and “Any reference to self, or to addressee, occurs only in so far as they are members of the wider categories mentioned” (Wilson 1990: 58). With regard to the distinction between inclusive and exclusive uses of the pronoun we, Wilson establishes a distinction between uses of we which include the speaker, as in the example of two doctors saying “Shall we get started?”, and uses which exclude the speaker, as in a doctor saying to a patient “How are we feeling today?” (Wilson 1990: 48). Wilson argues that this second strategy can be used by politicians as a distancing effect to avoid responsibility on certain issues. The distinction between inclusive and exclusive uses may be applied to the uses of the pronoun you. Thus, while the use of you as direct address to the addressee excludes the speaker, the uses of you to indicate a shared experience and “indefinite you” include the speaker as part of the referent, as is explained below. In this sense, these uses of you are similar to the indefinite one, which also includes the speaker but brings the audience into the referential domain in a general way. Wilson establishes a distancing scale for pronouns and observes that “When considering personal pronouns, we begin from the most fundamental and subjective form I (and its variants, me, my or mine) and then progressively move outward, or away from this deictic centre” (Wilson 1990: 58, emphasis in original). Although not explicitly stated, it can be assumed that the use of you to indicate a shared experience can be found in a position in between you used to express direct address and “indefinite you”. Prototypically, first person pronouns indicate self-reference, whereas second and third person pronouns tend to refer to the addressee or other participants. Thus, the form I (and its variants, me, mine or my), represents the most subjective form or deictic centre, the rest of the forms being placed either closer or farther from this centre, depending on how the speaker positions him/herself with respect to other individuals (Wilson 1990: 58). In this sense, pronominal choices reflect not only how close/distant speakers position themselves ideologically with respect to others but also how they conceptualise this relation in schematic and metaphorical terms alike (Núñez-Perucha 2001). It is worth pointing out that, while in the traditional, or egocentric, view of deixis, the origo or deictic centre is situated in the speaker or the I-here-andnow, recent studies on deixis (see Levinson 2004; Hanks 2009; Stirling and Maderson 2011; Myers and Lampropoulou 2012) have questioned this approach, together with the fact that deictic orientation should be based on spatial proximity. Hanks (2009: 11) explains this very clearly as follows:

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

389

The tacit background picture depicts deictic utterances as one-man acts that pick out objects distributed according to relative closeness to the Spr. Yet it is an empirical question whether the origo of a given utterance, a given linguistic form, or a set of forms in a given language is actually the Spr, the Adr or some other aspect of context.

3.2.1 A revision of the functions of you: you as a displaced deictic From this perspective, it may be argued that the second person pronoun you, when used to express a shared experience and also when used as indefinite you, can function as a displaced deictic centre. This is manifested explicitly for the you as shared experience in those cases in which it co-occurs with the first person pronouns I and we in the same stretch of discourse. Here the presence of the first person pronoun seems to set up a frame for the projection of the deictic centre to an intermediate space of reference which includes both the speaker and the addressee together with the ideally constructed audience. The use of the pronoun you thus situates the origo or deictic centre in a position half way between the speaker and the addressee, and invites the addressee and the possible audience to identify with the position represented by the speaker (for a similar argument, see Stirling and Maderson 2011, Myers and Lampropoulou 2012). As can be seen in example (2) below the speaker chooses to use the second person pronoun you instead of using the first person pronoun I to construct the aforementioned intermediate space of reference. (2)

I was in Tibet in the summer of 2006. Every time [[you]] would turn a corner in the road you would see in the distance someone prostrating himself on the. . . . (EN)

Example (3) below illustrates the use of you which has traditionally been classified as impersonal. In our corpus, the pronoun you in this use is framed within the occurrence of a general referent, such as “people”, “travellers”, “the country”, etc., thus appealing to this common wisdom mentioned by Wilson (cf. example [1] above). We argue that in this indefinite use there is also a displacement of the deictic centre. In this case, the displacement is from a general, impersonal referent, for example, “people”, to a deictic point closer to the speaker and to the addressee as in example (3) below: (3)

. . .If people don’t come home changed, then it was a waste of money and a waste of carbon. If [[you]] can travel to someplace different and not have it change you, there’s something wrong . . . (EN)

390

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

It follows then that apart from the use of you as referring to the interlocutor, we also need to account for those referential uses of you which indicate a shared experience and indefinite reference. The full potential of the effects of pronominal functions in discourse has to be examined, therefore, in context. The following section offers a brief overview of the appraisal devices, and more specifically, engagement expressions, which, as indexical markers, will be studied in conjunction with the pronouns I, you and we.

4 Analysis and discussion of data 4.1 The expression of stance in the domain of Engagement In our corpus, the three speakers use resources belonging to all the four main categories of engagement. However, differences emerge as regards the frequency and distribution of engagement markers used in each of the subcategories. Regarding the category of Dialogistic Contraction, Figure 1 below shows that Proclaim and Disclaim markers are significantly more frequent in the politician’s discourse. This seems to point to high subjective involvement of the speaker towards the information conveyed and more contracted space for other alternatives.

Figure 1: Frequency and distribution of the categories of Dialogistic Contraction

In the politician’s discourse, Proclaim is mainly used to reflect the speaker’s concern with authorial appreciation in terms of what is good or bad, and with

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

391

judgements of social sanctions evaluating the rightness of the actions carried out by the speaker or by his political party. (4) It doesn’t matter how we get the carbon reductions down, what matters is that they come down in total, remember, aviation is actually 6% of the total. (P) (5)

. . .today carbon is trading at 24–25 euros a ton, that’s a good thing. (P)

(6) Because he [Gordon Brown] was the right leader last year, he’s the right leader this year and he’ll be the right leader to lead us into the general election. (P) It is worthy of remark that the co-occurrence of instances of Proclaim in the same stretch of discourse, as in example (6), provides authorial emphasis on the proposition being advanced while closing down the space for some opposed alternative viewpoint. A recurrent pattern in the politician’s discourse is the use of Disclaim devices followed by self-reference in an attempt to challenge the interviewer’s view. That is, negation seems to be used here as a mechanism of both self-defence and selfaffirmation, as illustrated by examples (7) and (8) below: (7)

JP: Well, you can’t do it on set aside. DM: No, but I’m making, I’m making the point that there are bad ways of promoting bio-fuel and there are sensible ways of doing it. . . . (P)

(8) JP: . . . are are you to be really taken seriously as a government that cares about reducing carbon emissions if you are not prepared to do something which may be electorally unpopular? DM: But Hang on, hang on, the test is our greenhouse gas emissions going down. (P) By contrast, in the discourses of the environmentalist and the expert, the propositions signalling Proclaim and Disclaim exhibit a lower frequency of authorial evaluations and tend to contain elements of appreciation and judgments of veracity. Both Proclaim and Disclaim are used by the speakers to position themselves with respect to what they think are relevant issues in connection with climate change.

392

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

(9) You get to India, or to Tibet, or any number of places where people have a different set of senses about what’s important. It’s unsettling, and it should be unsettling. The only point of education is to be unsettling. (EN) (10) (. . .) poor countries in the developing world that are experiencing the most impacts from climate change. This is especially true in the area of health. (EX) (11)

Travel that just allows you to replicate your life here in America but in a warmer climate is no longer a really supportable idea. (EN)

(12)

Even, you know, there is a lot on economics and impact, but fairness – it’s an important issue. (EX)

With regard to Dialogistic Expansion, the main differences concern the categories of Possibility, Obligation and Cognition, as can be seen from Figure 2 below. Such differences may be explained in terms of the dissimilar speaker’s communicative purposes and their different public identities. Thus, in the scientist’s discourse there is a higher frequency of epistemic markers of Possibility, which are used to refer to the possible causes and consequences of global warming in a tentative manner. By contrast, the environmentalist’s and the politician’s discourses show a higher number of instances of Obligation. This appears to be consistent with their focus on the current need for social action together with the promotion of environmental awareness, and the advancement of actions required of the government in a particular situation, respectively.

Figure 2: Engagement. Dialogistic Expansion

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

393

More specifically, choices within the modality system range from epistemic expressions conveying a predictive meaning that shows a medium-to-high degree of certainty, as in (14) and (15), to more tentative expressions of probability and possibility, as in (13) and (16). (13) It turns out that this is probably an ecologically inefficient way to run a society. (EN) (14) We’ll be the preeminent cause of this for many decades to come no matter what China does. (EN) (15)

and if climate is changing, a lot of these diseases will be changing as well. (EX)

(16) increases in disease in any region of the world really can affect all of us. (EX) Interestingly, most of the markers of possibility in the politician’s discourse contain repetition of the modal verb used by the interviewer, as can be seen from example (17): (17)

JP: But could new coal fire power stations be built in this country without an integral immediately operational carbon capture facility [in them]. . . DM: Well, well, they could. (. . .)

In the case of deontic modals as instantiations of the category Obligation, they are practically absent in the expert’s discourse. What is more, here the only instance found has been mitigated by means of the imperative let’s: “let’s be very deliberate and very careful in the energy policies that we plan” (cf. “we have to be. . .”). By contrast, Obligation has the highest frequency in the environmentalist’s discourse, closely followed by the politician’s discourse. As shown in examples (18)–(21), while the environmentalist mainly uses instances of the modal need, thus emphasising the need for social action and presenting this as inescapable requirement, the politician combines the form have to, which also expresses inescapable obligation, with forms such as cannot, indicating an impediment to action, or should, expressing the course of action as advisable. In all cases, the subject of the verb is presented as a morally responsible (potential) agent. (18) [As] global warming becomes a more pressing and pinching problem. . . one of the things people need to see when they go abroad is the effects of that on people around the world. (EN)

394

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

(19) Most countries have some mix of both, and we need to train students to look for this . . . the use of energy in the world is the single most important question we have. (EN) (20) if we cannot mitigate the effects of climate change then we should help them adapt if that means they can’t live where they were living we have to help and support life somewhere else. (P) (21)

Because it’s good sense that what we should try and do is that if we cannot mitigate the effects. (P)

With regard to markers of Cognition, their predominance in the politician’s discourse may be explained by the fact that they allow him to express his/her political views in a highly subjective way (e.g. “I think. . .”) and appeal to knowledge shared with his political party (“we believe. . .”). As is further discussed in the next section, markers of Cognition tend to co-occur with the personal pronouns I and we, and as such become part of rhetorical strategies of positive self-presentation and avoidance of blame: (22)

I think that’s the right thing. (P)

(23) (. . .) we believe that the climate change bill which has got cross party support which the Prime Minister’s led through the House of Commons is gonna require that our carbon emissions come down by about 60% least 60% by 2050. (P) The extensive use of the self-referential pattern found in the politician’s discourse, where 13 of the 15 examples representing the category of Cognition contain the pattern “I think”, “I don’t think”, “I can’t remember”, contrasts with the more common uses of cognition markers with the pronoun we as referring to the whole country in the scientist’s and the environmentalist’s discourses. (24) Well, certainly we know that the industrialized world is causing global warming. (EX) (25) We all know what Third-World cities that triple in population are supposed to look like. (EN) Another interesting feature regarding markers of Dialogistic Expansion involves differences in the way evidentials are used. Specifically, although the

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

395

category of Perception appears in the three interviews at a similar frequency, in the discourse of the politician there is a higher use of evidential expressions which explicitly designate the speaker as the sole experiencer (see example 26). This contrasts, for instance, with the use of impersonal constructions in the environmentalist’s discourse. (26) I see someone who’s actually making the right decision. (P) (27) and it’s not completely clear we’ll be able to keep doing it all that much longer. (EN) Instances of Attribution are noticeably less frequent when compared to the frequency of the categories discussed above. The analysis reveals that the three speakers avoid showing Endorsement and prefer neutral insertions of other textual voices by means of Nonendorsement. Of the three speakers, the politician is the one who makes more frequent use of attribution devices showing nonendorsement and only the expert and the politician make use of disendorsement devices – see examples (31) and (32) below. (28) If people come back and say “I got sick while I was on study abroad and went to the hospital. . . .” (EN) (29) . . . according to the World Health Organization, . . . they estimate over 200,000 people are killed every year from just the warming that has occurred between 1970 and 2000. (EX) (30) . . . when I’m in California next week, the week after next, they’ll be saying we want to join the European emissions trading scheme, not pour scorn on it. (P) (31) . . . you could make the counter argument that in fact our market, where we are actually importing market goods from China and other parts of the world, then in fact, our energy contribution may be even greater, so could be on the contrary to what you’re suggesting, but that’s another analysis. (EX) (32) Well, no, I set out in my speech tonight five ways in which we are going to make progress and, I think what’s important you call it aspirational and I plead guilty to that, but remember people are paying 1 pound 24 for a litre of petrol. (P)

396

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

4.2 Frequency and function of pronouns As far as the frequency and function of pronouns are concerned, Figure 3 below shows the frequency of the pronouns I, you and we in the three speakers. Significant differences can be observed in the use of the pronoun I in the politician, which contrasts with a preference for the pronoun you in the environmentalist and the expert, and the use of the pronoun we in the politician and the expert.

Figure 3: Personal pronouns in the three speakers

If we consider the uses of the pronouns in each speaker, it is worth noticing that while the politician shows a clear preference for the use of first person pronouns, especially the pronoun I, the environmentalist shows a preference for the pronoun you, while the two first person pronouns are used with similar frequencies in his discourse, and the expert shows a preference for the use of we and you, with a lower frequency of I.

4.2.1 First person pronouns The pronoun I is used typically by the three speakers to express their identity as representatives of their social roles, as in examples (33), (34) and (35): (33) [[I]] believe we are better off in the European Union and we can achieve through a market of 475. . . (P) (34) [[I]] do think that it is the most legitimate use of jet fuel that we’ve got, and . . . It’s not complet. . . (EN)

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

397

(35) And [[I]] am talking about energy policy to reduce greenhouse gases. If we reduce greenhouse gases to. . . (EX) In the use of the pronoun we, we can appreciate an alternation between reference to the social (or political) group the speakers represent, such as the government, environmentalists or scientists (examples 36 to 38), and a more general kind of reference, as in the case where we refers to the country and the people of their country (“national we” and “social we”). Examples (39) to (41) illustrate this latter use. (36) That depends on the progress that we make with the demonstration plan that [[we]] are making. (P) (37) . . . so [[we]] organized this march up the western side of Vermont to Burlington. . . (EN) (38) And what’s unique about our paper – that’s I think, the real important message here – is that [[we]] took those numbers from the World Health Organization. (EX) (39) . . . at least 60% the carbon emissions by 2050 and that can come, remember on housing, which is 35%, [[we]] are moving to essentially carbon neutral housing by 26. (P) (40) Most countries have some mix of both, and [[we]] need to train students to look for this. . .the use of energy in the world is the single most import. . . (EN) (41) And I am talking about energy policy to reduce greenhouse gases. If [[we]] reduce greenhouse gases to reduce global warming, think of the co-benefits. (EX) These two uses of we, the national and social we, on the one hand, and, the more restrictive use referring to the speaker’s own group, on the other hand, correlate with the distinction between “inclusive we” (speaker + audience) and “exclusive we” (speaker’s group). This difference in the use of the referents of we is summarised in Table 3.

398

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

Table 3: Referents of the pronoun we Speaker/referent

Politician

Environmentalist

Expert

People/nation Group

18 5

19 2

18 8

Total

23

21

26

In the case of the politician, reference to the people/nation includes references to the British in general terms, and reference to his group includes references to the government and his political party. In the environmentalist, the use of we alternates between reference to the American people or the US, and reference to the environmentalists as a group. Finally, in the case of the expert, the reference of the pronoun we alternates between reference to the American people and experts on climate change and his own research group. In all three cases, the use of “national we” allows the speaker to adopt a referential item which is sufficiently vague to permit both the marking of distance and avoidance of responsibility and solidarity. The use of we as referring to the group the speaker belongs to allows the speaker to move from I to we to avoid responsibility. Finally, other interesting uses of the pronoun we concern its use to refer to the speaker’s own group as a rhetorical strategy to share responsibility for actions regarding the climate change issue. This can be observed in examples (42) (43), where the politician prefers the use of the plural form over the first person singular I, even if the interviewer seems to be eliciting an answer from him as individual: (42) JP: What do YOU want to do in our government? DM: We, we, we want to ensure that we meet the commitments of our climate change bill, which are to reduce by 50% about at least 60% the carbon emissions by 2050. (43) JP: Should, should they. . .? DM: because that’s a separate question. . . JP. Should they be? I’m asking you. DM: That depends on the progress that we make with the demonstration plan that we are making. As will be shown in subsection 4.3., further differences regarding the use of we arise from its different distribution with engagement categories.

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

399

4.2.3 The pronoun you Figure 4 below shows the frequency per 1,000 words of the three uses of you in the three speakers. Following Wilson, we use the notation you1 to refer to the you used for direct address to the interlocutor, you2 for the use of “shared experience” and you3 as “indefinite you”. As argued in section 3.2. above, while you1 is exclusive, since it excludes reference to the speaker, you2 and you3 are inclusive, that is, they include the speaker as a referent and, additionally, constitute displaced deictic centres to a shared space between speaker and addressee/ audience.

Figure 4: Frequency of types of you in the three speakers

The results show that while the politician uses more frequently you1, that is, the form that indicates direct address to the addressee, the environmentalist uses more frequently you3 or indefinite you, and, finally, the expert uses more frequently you2 or the you of shared experience. The pronoun you is used to address the interviewer either directly, mostly in the case of the politician, as in example (44), or as part of discourse markers, as in example (45). (44) . . .and, I think what’s important [[you1]] call it aspirational and I plead guilty to that, but remember people are paying 1 pound 24 for a. . . (P)

400

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

(45) They are the opposite of a supermarket, [[you1]] know the sort of sterile place with packages of corn syrup in different shapes. (EN) Additionally, the pronoun you appears in the role of a displaced deictic as described in section 3.2., which allows the speaker to move from the use of I to indicate personal reference to a position closer to the addressee and the constructed audience. The politician uses this second person pronoun on one occasion to displace the deictic centre when moving to a dispreferred topic, the possible loss of his job, as illustrated in example (46): (46) DM: N’ n’ (denial gesture) I want to be a really good Foreign Secretary. What makes me get up in the morning is actually the job I’ve got and the best rule in politics if [you2] start worrying about [your2] next job [you2] lose [your2] current one and I I want to do the job I’m doing at the moment. (P) The environmentalist uses the shift from first person pronoun to second person you2 on numerous occasions in a shift which seems to allow the addressee and audience to position themselves from the perspective of the environmentalist. Thus, this seems to be a strategy designed to create alignment between speaker and addressee, as illustrated by examples (47)–(48) below. In all these cases there is a shift from the first person pronoun I to the second person pronoun you, which we have called you2: (47) . . .important work I’ve done not just because of the things that I’ve seen but because of the way it allows [[you2]] to come back and look at your own place and understand its strengths and weakness, and escape from. . . (EN) In the case of the expert, it is clear that at times he is discussing the results of his study but using the second person pronoun you2 instead of a first person plural we as in examples (48) and (49): (48) . . . that time it was 160,000 deaths every year from climate change. We mapped those diseases and [[you2]] see regional differences. For example, malaria and malnutrition really occur in Africa, poor parts. . . (EX) (49) Then when you put that up against the map of climate-sensitive diseases determined by WHO, what [[you2]] see is in Africa, where you have 70 to 80 percent of the world’s malaria and a large amount of mal. . . (EX)

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

401

In these examples, the speaker creates an intermediate space between the I of the speaker and the you of the addressee and constructed audience, a shared space of experience in which both addressee and audience are invited to position themselves. Finally, both the environmentalist and the expert seem to use the pronoun you3 (i.e. indefinite you) instead of the third person pronoun they, them or the indefinite one in order to bring closer to speaker and addressee the third person entities that they are referring to in their discourse, as in examples (50) to (52). In these examples we find the presence of general referents such as “other places”, “people”, “the rich countries”: (50) In most other places in the world, when you need food, if you’re not growing it yourself, [[you3]] go to the market – and they’re wonderful. They are the opposite of a supermarket, you know the sort. . . (EN) (51)

If people don’t come home changed, then it was a waste of money and a waste of carbon. If [[you3]] can travel to someplace different and not have it change you, there’s something wrong with the ped. . . (EN)

(52) . . . is clear: The rich countries producing greenhouse gases on the one hand; and on the other hand [[you3]] have countries, poor countries in the developing world that are experiencing the most impacts from. . . (EX) It is interesting to observe that while the politician shows a preference for the non-ambiguous first person reference, I or we, thus focusing the conversational exchange on the perspective of the speaker as politician and representative of the government, the environmentalist shows a clear preference for one of the displaced deictic centres, the pronoun you3, thus minimising the imposition of the speaker’s perspective and inviting the addressee/audience to establish alignment with the speaker on the basis of a common experience; the expert shows a preference for both the third person we and the displaced deictic you2, thus alternating between reference to the community of experts to which he belongs, and the second person constructed shared space. Table 4 shows the distancing scale for the three speakers. The politician moves from I as the preferred deictic form to we, you of direct address and, finally, to the you2 of shared experience; the environmentalist moves from indefinite you (you3) to the you of shared experience (you2), to the first person pronominal forms and, finally to direct address you (you1); and, the expert moves from we and the you of shared experience (you2) to direct address you (you1), to indefinite you (you3) and finally to I.

402

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

Table 4: Distancing scales for the three speakers Politician

0 I

1 we

2 you1

3 you2

Environmentalist

0 You3

1 you2

2 I/we

3 you1

Expert

0 We/you2

1 you1

2 you3

3 I

These results illustrate very different positioning strategies in the three speakers, with a preference for first person positioning in the politician, which emphasizes the attitudes and actions carried out by the politician and the political party he belongs to. This contrasts with the preference of the environmentalist for second person positioning and the expert’s preference for a positioning which includes the third person plural and the you of shared experience. In the case of the environmentalist, the frequency of indefinite you and the use of shared experience you stress a strategy of solidarity with the audience, while the similar use of we and shared experience you in the expert seem to indicate both a strategy of solidarity with the audience as in the environmentalist and the need to situate the speaker’s responsibility within the work of the experts and the group the speaker belongs to. The next section examines the co-occurrence of the pronominal forms discussed above with the categories of engagement described in Martin and White (2005), with the aim of analysing its effects on the construction of subject positions and public identities.

4.3 Co-occurrence of Engagement markers and pronominal forms: Implications for the expression of subject positioning and identity construction The analysis of the co-occurrence of engagement categories with the pronominal forms I, we and you shows that the frequency is not very high, though there are some interesting cases which are worth discussing. Table 5 shows the cooccurrence of pronominal forms with each of the engagement categories. As can be observed, there is a relevant frequency of co-occurrence of the personal pronoun I with markers of Disclaim (5 instances) and Cognition (10 instances) in the politician, while the pronoun we co-occurs with markers of cognition also in the politician (4 instances) and with cognition and possibility in the expert, and finally, the pronoun you co-occurs with possibility in both the environmentalist and the expert (4 and 3 instances, respectively). These results are discussed in further detail below.

403

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

Table 5: Co-occurrence of personal pronouns and stance categories in the three speakers Categories

Disclaim Proclaim Obligation Possibility/Probability Evidence/Appearance Cognition Attribution

I

We

You

P

EN

EX

P

EN

EX

P

EN

EX

5 1 – – 1 10 –

– – – – – 2 –

– – – – – 5 –

3 – 4 1 – 1 –

– – 2 – – 2 –

– – 1 3 – 4 –

2 – 1 – – – 2

1 1 1 9 – 1 –

1 – – 3 2 – –

4.3.1 First person pronouns The frequent use of the first person pronoun I with the stance category of Cognition shows high subjective involvement of the speaker, as illustrated by examples (54)–(56): (53)

JP: Do some of these things strike you as the sign of a man who’s got a tight grip on his party? DM: It speaks to a man who actually believes that we’ve got to get the right relation between Westminster and the nations of Britain. I think that’s the right thing we’ve got leaders of the Scottish party articulating policy. It’s a good thing. (P)

(54) [[I]] do think that it is the most legitimate use of jet fuel that we’ve got. (EN) (55) I think that it would be premature, it will be wrong to think that industrialized nations are actually immune to these problems. (EX) In example (53) it is interesting to observe the politician’s movement from the more impersonal referent “a man who actually believes” to the concrete subjective form I. As pointed out above, instances of Cognition are the most numerous in the politician. In this connection, Wilson (1990: 62) observes that the cluster “I think” is a common feature in Mrs. Thatcher’s discourse, and reflects intrinsic attitudes, especially sincerity. Of particular interest is the co-occurrence of I with the category Disclaim. The speaker positions himself as challenging the interviewer’s view in a dialectical battle. That is, negation seems to be used here as a mechanism of both selfdefence and self-affirmation, as illustrated by examples (56) and (57) below:

404

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

(56)

JP: Well, I put it to you that this is all very good, you know, and and aspirational stuff, but none of it, is remotely practical. DM: Well, no, I set out in my speech tonight five ways in which we are going to make progress and, I think what’s important you call it aspirational and I plead guilty to that, but remember people are paying 1 pound 24 for a litre of petrol because demand for oil far outstrips supplies. (P)

(57)

JP: Well, DM is gonna answer most of those on our website I believe tomorrow, aren’t you? But let me take just one of them first of all, Graham Nixon. He says you believe in a low carbon economy, you can’t therefore believe in a third runway at Heathrow airport. DM: I don’t think that’s right we believe that the climate change bill which has got cross party support which the Prime Minister’s led through the House of Commons is gonna require that our carbon emissions come down by about 60% least 60% by 2050 (P).

With regard to the plural first person pronoun we, the three speakers use this pronoun with the categories Obligation and Cognition, as shown by examples (58)–(59) and (60)–(62), respectively. Interestingly, whereas the politician’s discourse exhibits a higher use of the cluster “we+ Obligation”, the scientist’s discourse shows a preference for the cluster “we+ Cognition” and no instances of this pronoun with the category of Obligation, thus avoiding the expression of an authoritative stance. This is consistent with the fact that scientific discourse is prototypically characterised by tentativeness in the presentation of new hypotheses and results. In fact, the expert’s discourse shows a higher use of we with the category Possibility (see example 63): (58) . . . if we cannot mitigate the effects of climate change then we should help them adapt if that means they can’t live where they were living they we have to help and support life somewhere else. (P) (59) The scale of the problem is so large that [[we]] need to get change first out of Washington, and then internationally, in some forum. . . (EN) (60) I don’t think that’s right, [[we]] believe that the climate change bill which has got cross party support. . . (P) (61) [[We]] all know what Third-World cities that triple in population are supposed to look like. . . (EN)

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

405

(62) [[we]] know that the industrialized world is causing global warming with all the greenhouse gas. . . (EX) (63) And in fact of the leading causes of death in this country, most of them are related to either sedentary lifestyle, air pollution or motor vehicle accidents and if [[we]] could begin to confront climate change and have greener cities and more walkability and bikeability, we would have increased level of fitness, reduced air pollution, and reduced greenhouse gases. (EX) As can be observed from examples (58)–(59) above, although both the politician and the environmentalist use a national or social we with verbs expressing deontic modality, there are differences as regards the meaning expressed by the modal verb. Whilst the politician uses mild obligation (“we should”, “we have to”) within a hypothetical framework, which occasionally is linked to “good sense”, the environmentalist focuses on the current need to change social action (“we need to”, “people need”). Another major difference concerns the co-occurrence of the pronoun we with Disclaim. This cluster is only present in the politician’s discourse and it might be interpreted as the speaker’s attempt to justify the views of his political party: (64)

DM: This is something I addressed in the lecture that I gave tonight and that you referred to. The EU has a commitment to ensure that 15 power stations around Europe are built with carbon capture and storage technology and Britain actually has one of the only competitions that have been run with public funding to ensure that’s achieved. JP: But IT CANNOT begin producing power without carbon capture being operational there, can it. DM: ..O. . .In respect of this competition for a carbon capture ‘n storage facility with a new power station the Kings Norton, Kings North thing is a separate decision obviously. But we have an energy mix which includes. . . JP: All right. Could we have new coal fire power stations without their being integral and operational carbon capture facility from the day 1.

4.3.2 Second-person pronouns With regard to the second person pronoun you, it is interesting to observe that the three speakers use this pronoun with Disclaim and Denial, as illustrated by examples (65), (66) and (67) below. This use may suggest that the three speakers

406

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

opt for a displacement of the deictic centre to a position closer to the addressee in order to avoid responsibility in dispreferred speech acts with indicate denial or counterargumentation. (65)

JP: . . . are are you to be really taken seriously as a government that cares about reducing carbon emissions if you are not prepared to do something which may be electorally unpopular? DM: [[But]] Hang on, hang on, the test is our greenhouse gas emissions going down. They’ve gone down in this country over the last ten years, they’ve gone down by about 8%, by their deeds shall ye know them indeed, and what [[you1]] should know is the greenhouse gas emissions have gone down. . . (P)

(66) It’s just obvious that this is what you would do. But as soon as [[you2]] are exposed to the idea that it is not obvious and there are other ways of doing things, then you. . . (EN) (67) . . .there will be fewer deaths from cold-related mortality, that’s true, but when [[you2]] take these in aggregate and you look across all of the climate-sensitive outcomes. . . (EX) As previously discussed, whereas in the discourse of the politician you refers to the interviewer, in the discourse of the environmentalist and the expert you is used by the speakers to present their own experience or expectations as something that can be shared by the audience. This tendency could be interpreted as in line with their aims to make society aware of the problems, causes and consequences of global warming. Likewise, the politician’s discourse exhibits uses of you that co-occur with the Attribution category, in which the politician distances himself from the interviewer’s perspective, as in example (32), renumbered here as (68): (68) I set out tonight five ways in which we are going to make progress and I think what’s important [[you]] call it aspirational and I plead guilty to that, but remember people are paying. . . (P) With regard to the co-occurrence of the pronoun you with other categories, it can be pointed out that both expert and environmentalist use you2 with possibility markers, which is consistent with the speakers’ interest in treating the problem of global warming as one that concerns everybody.

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

407

(69) [I was also] in village India [where [[you2]] can’t travel far] without running across reminders of Gandhi. (EN) (70) you think about agriculture and other means of, you know, energy and what we are actually using, [[you2]] could make the counter argument that in fact our market, where we are actually importing. . . (EX) As can be observed from the previous analysis, relevant differences in the co-occurrence and distribution of pronouns and engagement markers concern mainly the use of the I and you forms. While the politician shows a higher use of the pronoun I, typically followed by verbs of cognition, the environmentalist and the expert exhibit more uses of the pronoun you, which function often as a displaced deictic centre aimed at constructing a space of shared experience, that is, as a you2.

5 Conclusions This article has explored the role of modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers in the construction of subject position and identity. The analysis of three interviews to public social figures (a politician, an environmentalist and a scientist) shows differences in the distribution and use of these features. Regarding the expression of stance markers within the domain of Engagement, the analysis has shown differences related to the speakers’ communicative goals. Thus, the politician’s discourse shows the highest frequency of Engagement resources in all categories, with a preference for markers of Dialogic Contraction, which seems to point to high subjective involvement of the speaker towards the information proferred and more contracted space for other alternatives. Within the subcategories of Dialogic Expansion, the main differences concern the categories of Possibility, Obligation and Cognition. Whereas the scientist’s discourse shows a higher frequency of epistemic markers of Possibility, thus tentatively expressing possible causes and consequences of global warming, the environmentalist’s and politician’s discourses show a higher number of instances of Obligation, deontic modals being mainly used to express the need for social action or an advisable course of action, respectively. Furthermore, modal markers of Cognition are more frequent in the politician’s discourse and introduce the speaker’s own political views or his party’s beliefs. As far as the distribution and use of pronouns in combination with engagement markers, major differences concern the use of first person pronouns and

408

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

their occurrence with verbs of cognition. Whilst the politician’s discourse exhibits more instances of the cluster “I think”, the environmentalist’s and the scientist’s discourses show a more frequent use of verbs of cognition with the pronoun we (e.g. “we know”), which is found to refer either to people or to the scientific community, respectively. By contrast, in the politician’s discourse, we mainly represents the speaker’s party or the whole nation and tends to collocate with modal verbs expressing deontic modality (e.g. “we have to”). With regard to the use of the pronoun you, our data suggest that in the discourse of the environmentalist and the expert this form is used to displace the deictic centre to an intermediate position that is closer to the addressee and which creates a space where both addressee and constructed audience are invited to enter. When using the pronoun you, the politician tends to do so with verbs of saying (e.g. “you call it aspirational”, “you referred to”), thus distancing himself from the interviewer’s point of view or presenting this information in a neutral way. On the other hand, the environmentalist and the expert seem to make extensive use of what we have called the displaced deictic centre you, thus presenting the issue of global warming as one that affects everyone and focusing mainly on what can or cannot be done (Possibility/Probability). These findings lend support to Chilton’s (2004) view of personal pronouns as indexical markers and Hanks’ (2009) argument in favour of a revision of the concept of deictic centre. All in all, the analysis suggests that the use and distribution of stance markers of modality and pronominal forms seem to correlate with differences in the way that speakers construct their public identities. These different representations are, in turn, in accordance with the particular aims of their social/political group, namely, present themselves in positive terms and legitimise a political position, raise environmental awareness or draw attention to the causes of global warming and its effects on health.

Primary sources Interview to David Milliband http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/7390068.stm Interview to environmentalist Bill McKibben http://www.abroadview.org/avmag/2008spring.htm Interview to public health expert Dr. Jonathan Patz http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode.cfm?id=173BE356-E7F2-99DF3E8DA11E99F7F3BE

Modality and personal pronouns as indexical markers of stance

409

References Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1986. Speech Genres and Other late Essays. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (eds.), trans. Vern W. McGee. Austin: University of Texas Press. Bednarek, Monika (ed.). 2008. Functions of Language 15(1), special issue on appraisal, evaluation and stance. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad and Edward Finegan. 1999. The Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. London: Longman. Biber, Douglas and Edward Finegan. 1989. Styles of stance in English: Lexical and grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect. Text 1: 93–124. Bybee, Joan and Suzanne Fleischman (eds.). 1995. Modality in Grammar and Discourse. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Chafe, Wallace L. 1986. Evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing. In: Wallace Chafe and JohannaNichols (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 261–272. New York: Ablex. Chilton, Paul. 2004. Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge. Chilton, Paul and Christina Shäffner. 1997. Discourse and Politics. In: Teun van Dijk (ed.), Discourse as Social Interaction. Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Volume 2, 206–210. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage Publications. Cockroft, Robert, Susan Cockroft, Craig Hamilton and Laura Hidalgo Downing. 2013. Persuading People. An Introduction to Rhetoric, 3rd revised edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave, MacMillan. Davidse, Kristin and Anne Marie Simon-Vandenbergen (eds.). 2002. Functions of Language 8(2), Special issue on interpersonal grammar. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. de Fina, Anna, Deborah Schiffrin and Michael Bamberg. 2006. Introduction. In: Anna de Fina, Deborah Schiffrin and Michael Bamberg (eds.), Discourse and Identity, 1–23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Du Bois, John. 2007. The stance triangle. In: Robert Englebretson (ed.), Stancetaking in Discourse, 139–182. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Englebretson, Robert (ed.). 2007. Stancetaking in Discourse. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Etelämäki, Marja. 2008. The Finnish personal pronouns in the light of interaction. Journal of Pragmatics 41: 25–46. Fairclough, Norman. 1989. Language and Power. London: Longman. Fairclough, Norman. 1992. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hanks, William F. 1992. The indexical ground of deictic reference. In: Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin (eds.), Rethinking Context. Language as an Interactive Phenomenon, 43–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hanks, William F. 2009. Fieldwork on deixis. Journal of Pragmatics 41: 10–24. Halliday, Michael A.K. 1994. An Introduction to Functional Grammar, 2nd edition. London: Edward Arnold. Halliday, Michael A.K. and James R. Martin (eds.). 1993. Writing Science: Literacy and Discursive Power. London: The Falmer Press. Hidalgo Downing, Laura. 2000a. Alice in Pragmaticland: Reference, deixis and the delimitation of text worlds. CLAC 2. Available from http://www.ucm.es/info/circulo/no2/hidalgo.htm Hidalgo Downing, Laura. 2000b. World creation in advertising discourse. Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 13: 67–88. Reprinted in CLAC 13. Available from http://www.ucm.es/ info/circulo/no13/hidalgo.pdf

410

Laura Hidalgo Downing and Begoña Núñez Perucha

Hidalgo Downing, Laura. 2004. Non-verbal markers of modality and evidentiality in a comparable corpus of English and Spanish editorials and news articles. In: Juana Marín-Arrese (ed.), Perspectives on Modality and Evidentiality, 205–228. Madrid: Editorial Complutense. Hunston, Susan and Geoff Thompson (eds.). 1999. Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kristeva, Julia. 1986. Word, dialogue and novel. In: Toril Moi (ed.), The Kristeva Reader, 34–61. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Levinson, Stephen. 2004. Deixis. In: Lawrence Horn and Gregory Ward (eds.), The Handbook of Pragmatics, 97–121. Oxford: Blackwell. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. (ed.). 2004. Perspectives on Modality and Evidentiality. Madrid: Editorial Complutense. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. 2009. Effective vs. epistemic stance and subjectivity/intersubjectivity in political discourse: A case study. In: Anastasios Tsangalidis and Roberta Facchinetti (eds.), Studies on English Modality. In Honour of Frank R. Palmer, 23–52. Berlin: Peter Lang. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. and Begoña Núñez-Perucha. 2006. Evaluation and Engagement in Journalistic Commentary and News Reportage. Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 19: 225–248. Martin, James R. 2003. Introduction. Text. Special Issue on Stance and Appraisal 23(2): 171–181. Martin, James and Peter White. 2005. The Language of Evaluation. Appraisal in English. New York: Palgrave. Myers, Greg and Sofia Lampropoulou. 2012. Impersonal you and stance-taking in social sciences interviews. Journal of Pragmatics 44(10): 1206–1218. Núñez-Perucha, Begoña. 2001. Aportaciones de la Lingüística Cognitiva a un análisis pragmático del sistema pronominal. In: Ana Isabel Moreno and Vera Colwell (eds.), Perspectivas Recientes sobre el Discurso / Recent Perspectives on Discourse. CD-ROM Edition. León: Universidad de León and AESLA. Palmer, F.R. 1986. Mood and Modality in English. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stirling, Lesley and Lenore Manderson. 2011. About you: empathy, objectivity and authority. Journal of Pragmatics 43(6): 1581–1602. Thompson, Geoff and Susan Hunston. 1999. Evaluation: An Introduction. In: Susan Hunstonand and Geoff Thompson (eds.), Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse, 1–26. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van Dijk, Teun A. 1998. Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage. Werth, Paul. 1999. Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse. London: Longman. White, Peter. 2003. Beyond modality and hedging: A dialogic view of the language of intersubjective stance. Text 23(2): 259–284. Wilson, John. 1990. Politically Speaking. Oxford and Cambridge, M.A.: Basil Blackwell.

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

Stancetaking and inter/subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown1 1 Introduction The multifaceted nature of stance has been associated with concepts such as evaluation, inter/subjectivivity and positioning in the discourse. Stancetaking is a form of social action, involving the expression of the speaker/writer’s personal attitudes, beliefs or assessments concerning events and their commitment with respect to the communicated proposition. Stance is indexical of the speaker/ writer’s subjective or intersubjective construal of the stance object, and their positioning and alignment with other voices in the discourse. Stance is also consequential in that it involves responsibility for the evaluated information and consequences for the stancetaker in social terms (Biber and Finegan 1989; Hunston and Thompson 2000; Berman 2004; Du Bois 2007; Englebretson 2007; Marín-Arrese 2007a, 2009). This paper draws on a model for the analysis of stancetaking in discourse on the basis of two macro categories of stance, the effective and the epistemic, which are systematically related with the indexing of inter/subjectivity (MarínArrese 2009). These stance categories are based on Langacker’s (2007, 2009, this volume) distinction between the effective and the epistemic level, which involves a systematic opposition manifested in the language between those expressions pertaining to the conceptualizer’s striving for control of relations at the level of reality and of control of conceptions of reality. Effective stance acts are aimed at determining or influencing the course of reality itself, and play a direct role in persuasion and in the legitimisation of actions. They include speaker/ writer’s expression of norms, obligations and compelling or enabling circumstances, and in his/her inclination, decision or intention to carry out an event. Epistemic stance acts pertain to epistemic control of the conception of reality, to the degree of certainty of the speaker/writer regarding the occurrence, and/ or to his/her assessment of the validity of the proposition describing the event, and are aimed at the legitimisation of assertions, thus playing an indirect role in

1 Research for this paper has been carried out with the support of Research Project FFI201123181, funded by the Spanish Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness).

412

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

legitimising actions. Epistemic stance resources include modal auxiliaries, evidentials, and a variety of expressions of cognitive attitude, assessment, and factivity (Chafe 1986; Willett 1988; van der Auwera and Plungian 1998; Dendale and Tasmowski 2001; Plungian 2001; Palmer 2001; Aikhenvald 2004; Marín-Arrese 2004, inter alia). The focus in this paper is on the category of epistemic stance, which pertains to the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to knowledge. Epistemic stance expressions index the way speakers/writers position themselves (subjectivity), both explicitly and implicitly, with regard to the validity of their assertions, and how they align/disalign with potential addressees or text external voices (intersubjectivity). Meanings expressed by these linguistic elements involve both contentful and procedural aspects (Blakemore 1987; Traugott and Dasher 2002). Epistemic modals express speaker/writer’s differing degrees of certainty regarding the event, and are also indexical of the speaker/writer’s subjective positioning. Similarly, evidential expressions indicate the source of information, while reflecting speaker/writer’s subjective/intersubjective estimation of the validity of the information on the basis of its source and mode of access (Mushin 2001; Marín-Arrese 2006, 2011b). Epistemic stance expressions and the dimensions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity also relate to the responsibility of the stancetaker (Nuyts 2001, 2012; Englebretson 2007). Nuyts (2001) conceives the dimension of subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity in terms of the degree to which the speaker assumes personal responsibility for the evaluation of the state of affairs (subjectivity), or whether the assessment is potentially shared by others (intersubjectivity). On the basis of the notions of subjective construal, intersubjective positioning, and responsibility of the stancetaker, a set of categories of subjectivity and intersubjectivity is proposed resulting from the interaction of two parameters: degrees of “salience and explicitness of the role of the conceptualizer” and “degree to which the speaker/writer assumes personal responsibility for the information or presents the information as intersubjectively shared”. The use of stance resources may also index the speaker/writer’s interactional identity and his/her use of rhetorical strategies in the discourse, and their ideological positionings. Bucholtz and Hall (2005: 585) define identity as “the social positioning of self and other”, and argue that identity is a sociocultural phenomenon, which is intersubjectively produced and constituted discursively. They point out that among other linguistic expressions, identities may be linguistically indexed through specific stances. In a similar vein, Johnstone (2007: 52) argues that although little attention has been paid to individual speakers in the literature on identities, “a repeated stancetaking move or pattern of moves may emerge as an identity”.

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

413

This paper aims to characterize the stancetaking discursive patterns of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and make visible their preferred legitimising strategies, in their oral evidence in the Iraq War Inquiry (2009). The paper presents results of a case study on the presence and distribution of epistemic stance markers and the indexing of inter/subjectivity by the two former British Prime Ministers. It will be argued that their interactional identities will emerge strategically in this communicative situation, mediated by their social role and the perceived responsibility for the decisions and events under investigation in the inquiry. Their intended discursive legitimisation of the events will be reflected in their epistemic stance strategies and their expression of inter/subjectivity. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the domain of epistemic stance, and includes some observations on legitimising strategies in discourse. The notions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity are discussed in section 3. The case study is described in section 4. The results and discussion are presented in section 5. The final section is devoted to the conclusions.

2 The domain of epistemic stance 2.1 Stancetaking and legitimising strategies in discourse The framework presented here is based on a model of stance (Marín-Arrese 2009) which integrates Langacker’s (2007, 2009, this volume) distinction between the effective and epistemic levels in language with work on stance (Du Bois 2007; Englebretson 2007) and engagement (White 2003; Martin and White 2005). As Martin and White (2005: 92) observe, there is a tradition in discourse studies in which “all utterances are seen as in some way stanced or attitudinal”. Engagement resources “provide the means for the authorial voice to position itself with respect to, and hence to “engage” with, the other voices and alternative positions construed as being in play in the current communicative context” (Martin and White 2005: 94). Though the classification differs, expressions of engagement identified by Martin and White also include epistemic modals and evidentials. Within the various perspectives on stance, Englebretson (2007: 6) observes that there are five key conceptual principles in common: (1) stancetaking occurs on three (often overlapping) levels – stance is physical action, stance is personal attitude/belief/evaluation, and stance is social morality; (2) stance is public, and is perceivable, interpretable, and available for inspection by others [. . .]; (3) stance is interactional in nature – it is collaboratively constructed among participants, and with respect to other stances [. . .]; (4) stance is indexical (cf. Haviland 1989; Silverstein 1976), evoking aspects of the broader sociocultural framework or physical contexts in which it occurs; (5) stance is consequential – i.e., taking a stand leads to real consequences for the persons or institutions involved [. . .].

414

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

The model posits two macro-categories of stance, the effective and the epistemic (Marín-Arrese 2009, 2011a): Effective stance pertains to the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the realization of events, to the ways in which the speaker/writer carries out a stance act aimed at determining or influencing the course of reality itself. Epistemic stance pertains to the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to knowledge concerning the event and their commitment to the validity of the information. These are stance acts assessing the reality of the event designated or the likelihood of its realization, and/or specifying the sources whereby the speaker/writer feels entitled to make an assertion, which may involve an estimation of their evidentiary reliability.

Stancetaking resources may serve the strategic function of legitimisation in discourse. The use of effective stance markers signal the speaker/writer’s position with regard to the necessity or desirability of the realization of events; they are intended to have an effective or coercive persuasive effect. In the case of epistemic stance markers, the speaker/writer’s concern is with the acceptance on the part of the hearer of the knowledge of events, and of the validity status of the information; they involve an epistemic legitimising strategy. As Chilton (2004: 117) observes, one basic type of legitimising strategy is essentially epistemic in that it has to do “with the speaker’s claim to have better knowledge, recognition of the ‘real facts’”. The acceptance of potentially fallacious arguments as true draws on a set of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al. 2010), which the speaker/writer may strategically exploit. Hart (2011: 6) makes the point that “the legitimisation of assertions is then characterised as a process by which speakers, in order to overcome the epistemic safeguards of their audience, offer ‘guarantees’ for the truth of their assertions in various forms of evidence”. The use of epistemic legitimising strategies counts as an attempt by the speaker/writer to influence the hearer/reader’s exercise of epistemic vigilance and accept the assertion as true. Epistemic stance resources may thus serve ideological purposes in the management of hearers/readers’ acceptance of information in the discourse. By exploiting “epistemic legitimising strategies”, speakers/writers may manipulate hearers/readers’ acceptance of the veracity of their assertions, as a prior condition for the discursive legitimisation of actions, in the latter case through “effective legitimising strategies” (Marín-Arrese 2011b). A related strategy pertains to the evocation of responsibility for assertions, which crucially involves the domain of subjectivity/intersubjectivity (MarínArrese 2011a). By means of these resources, speakers/writers not only manage their interests with respect to their goal of persuasion, but also manage their responsibility for the use of legitimising strategies, through strategies of mystification of responsibility such as implicitness and the appeal to shared knowledge or assessments.

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

415

2.2 Epistemic modals, evidentials, and other epistemic legitimising strategies Epistemic stance involves the kind of meaning that refers to the belief, knowledge or evidence that supports the truth of a proposition; as such it comprises evidential, epistemic modal and factive meanings (Biber et al. 1999; Boye 2006, 2010a; Boye and Harder 2009; Marín-Arrese 2009, 2011a). The domains of epistemic modality and evidentiality have been amply discussed in the literature, but various issues still remain largely unresolved, such as the status and relation of these domains, and the criteria for differentiation of evidential and modal meanings (Givon 1982; van der Auwera and Plungian 1998; de Haan 1999, Palmer 2001; Aikhenvald 2004; Carretero 2004; Marín-Arrese 2004; Boye and Harder 2009; Wiemer 2010, inter alia). Epistemic modality pertains to speaker/writer’s assessments concerning the epistemic status of events. Epistemic modals express different degrees of speaker/ writer certainty regarding the reality or likelihood of the event designated in a proposition, the profiled process (Langacker 1991, 2008). Evidentiality pertains to the sources of knowledge or evidence whereby the speaker/writer feels entitled to make an assertion; evidentials may also involve indications regarding the reliability of the source, and thus speaker/writer attitude towards the validity of the communicated proposition (Marín Arrese 2009). Dendale and Tasmowski (2001: 341–2) note that three kinds of relations between these domains can be found in the literature: “disjunction (where they are conceptually distinguished from each other), inclusion (where one is regarded as falling within the semantic scope of the other), and overlap (where they partly intersect)”. The first position, which establishes a semantic distinction between both domains, holds that evidentiality is restricted to the identification of the source and means whereby information is available to the speaker/writer, and is devoid of any epistemic judgement (De Haan 1999; Aikhenvald 2004). A broader conception of evidentiality includes both the source of information and an estimation of its reliability (Chafe 1986). The relation of inclusion differs according to which domain is considered the superordinate category. Some, like Papafragou (2000) and Ifantidou (2001), view epistemic modality as a subordinate category to evidentiality. Others, like Willett (1988) and Palmer (2001), consider that evidentiality should be subsumed under the domain of modality. The position that both domains partly intersect is held by van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), who note that the interface between the two domains is that of inferential evidentiality and epistemic necessity, as in the case of English must. Squartini (2008: 922, 924) also observes that a characteristic feature of epistemic modal must is that it very often involves circumstantial or generic inferential

416

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

meaning, in common with evidentials, in addition to its epistemic modal meaning of degree of certainty. (1) a.

[Pointing to two people] They must be brother and sister. They are so alike.

b.

[The doorbell rings] That must/will be the postman.

c.

[The doorbell rings] I was not expecting anybody. It may be the postman.

The type of reasoning process in (1a), with a high certainty modal such as must, based on external sensory evidence, has been defined as a circumstantial inference (Anderson 1986: 274). In (1b), where either a high or a medium certainty modal is acceptable, external sensory evidence is lacking, and the generic inferential process is based on previous personal experience of the speaker/writer or general world knowledge. Inferential processes also comprise conjectures, which are neither based on external evidence or on previous knowledge, as in (1c), which is typically found with modals may or might, involving low certainty. The three inferential processes, as Squartini (2008: 925) observes, . . .are differentiated along a parameter that is connected to the balance between the speaker’s involvement as opposed to the import of external evidence. While in one of the two poles (circumstantial inferences), the speaker’s own reasoning is heavily suplemented by external sensory evidence, in the opposite pole, all external evidence is missing, the speaker being solely responsible for the reasoning process. In between, the intermediate area of generic inferences can be found with a balanced proportion of the speaker’s own reasoning and external information deriving from general world knowledge.

This inferential gradient posited by Squartini (2008), and previously by Anderson (1986), is distinct from a similar scale in terms of strength of knowledge, the epistemic scale. The inferential gradient and the epistemic scale can be considered two independent dimensions (Anderson 1986: 284), though there are obvious connections between the two, as can be seen in the examples in (1). As Squartini (2008: 926) notes, “an inferential process based on external sensory evidence corresponds to a stronger epistemic commitment, while the speaker’s conjectures, lacking any sensory support, are intrinsically weaker if evaluated on an epistemic scale (Givon 1982)”. Thus circumstantial inferences are characteristically linked to epistemic certainty, while conjectures are related to epistemic possibility. The modal must, however, shares the same functional-conceptual substance domain (cf. Boye and Harder 2009) as the other modals (will, may, might), which is reflected in the overlap with the modal will in the intermediate area of generic inferences.

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

417

A further distinctive feature between the two scales, the inferential and the epistemic, involves the specification of the source of evidence and the dimension of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The epistemic scale is intrinsically subjective, and the reasoning process is internal with respect to the speaker. However, in the inferential gradient we find a distinction between conjectures, which involve an internal source and subjective reasoning, and circumstantial inferences, based on external evidence, which might be potentially intersubjectively shared with the audience, and which motivate a more objective kind of reasoning. In the intermediate area of generic inferences, we find an overlap between subjective, internal experience and a more intersubjective world knowledge (cf. Squartini 2008). Since inferential meaning may be present in the use of all the epistemic modals, the criterion of inferentiality is not sufficient to warrant classifying modal must as an evidential marker. There are thus obvious connections between epistemic modality and evidentiality, though the two domains are formally and functionally distinct. Boye (2006) argues that both domains are subcategories of the same superordinate category, namely a category of epistemicity. As Boye (2010a: 10) observes, “epistemic expressions are taken to comprise linguistic items and constructions (grammatical as well as lexical) that express either source of information or degree of (un)certainty, or both”. He makes the point, however, that there is linguistic evidence that both semantic regions are clearly distinct: “Expressions are found that indicate degree of certainty but not source of information, and expressions are found that indicate source of information but not degree of certainty” (Boye 2010a: 16). Different subdivisions of the domain of evidentiality can be found in the literature. Chafe (1986: 263) identifies four characterising features within the evidential system: the reliability of the information or the probability of its truth, the modes of knowing or the ways in which knowledge is acquired (belief, induction, hearsay, deduction), and the sources of knowledge (language in the case of hearsay, evidence in the case of induction, hypothesis for deduction). Plungian (2001: 353), for his part, distinguishes between sources and forms of access to the information (direct vs. indirect evidence) and speaker’s involvement (personal vs. mediated evidence). The combination of these parameters results in a three-way distinction of evidential values: (a) Direct personal evidence, which includes visual and sensoric evidence, as well as an endophoric category to express “speaker’s inner state”; (b) Reflected evidence, that is, personal indirect access to the evidence through “Synchronous inference: ‘P, because I can observe some signs of P’ [P at T0]”, “Retrospective inference: ‘P, because I can observe some traces of P’ [P before T0]”, or “Reasoning: ‘P, because I know Q, and I know that Q entails P’”; (c) Mediated evidence, involving indirect access to the

418

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

information through some other person’s statements or beliefs (Plungian 2001: 354). In the category of reflected evidence, both synchronous inference and retrospective inference, as in (2a) and (2b), are cases of circumstantial inferences. In both cases, we may substitute modal must for the inferential evidential seem. However, in (2c), which exemplifies reasoning presumably corresponding to a generic inference, substitution by seem does not appear to be so straightforward. Inferential evidential seem appears to be restricted to circumstantial or reportive inferences, whereas the use of modal must is somewhat awkward in a reportive context. (2)

a.

He must be/seems to be hungry (because he shows signs of it, etc.)

b.

He must have/seems to have slept there (because we see his untidy bed, etc.)

c.

Today there must be/?seems to be a fair in Salzburg (because I know the routines of this region, etc.)

d.

From what I’ve heard there ?must/seems to be a fair in Salzburg today.

More recently, Aikhenvald (2004: 367) has identified the following semantic parameters for grammatical evidentiality: I. VISUAL which covers evidence acquired through seeing; II. SENSORY which covers evidence acquired through hearing, and is typically extended to smell and taste, and sometimes also touch; III. INFERENCE based on visible or tangible evidence or result; IV. ASSUMPTION based on evidence other than visible results: this may include logical reasoning, assumption, or simply general knowledge; V. HEARSAY, for reported information with no reference to whom it was reported by; and VI. QUOTATIVE, for reported information with an overt reference to the quoted information.

Squartini (2008: 918) argues for the need to distinguish between “the mode of knowing or type of evidence as opposed to the source of evidence”. The source of evidence refers to the locus of information, as internal or external to the speaker/writer. The modes of knowing refer to the process whereby the information is accessed, whether directly perceptual or indirectly through inferences or through reports. The present study proposes a classification of epistemic stance strategies which takes into account, in a non-hierarchical way, the following parameters: (i) domain of evidence2 (experiential, cognitive, communicative); (ii) modes of 2 The domains of evidence are related to the different levels of experience: perceptual, mental, social (cf. Langacker 1991).

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

419

knowing (direct vs. indirect); (iii) source (internal vs. external to the speaker/ writer). The combination of the three parameters would yield the following categories of evidentials and pseudo evidential strategies of stance which include instances where the profiled occurrence is immediate to the ground (I can see), as well as cases of non-immediacy (We had seen) (cf. Langacker 2009). Examples from the oral evidence by Tony Blair (TB) and Gordon Brown (GB) in the Iraq War Inquiry (IWI) are given for each category: (a)

Experiential, Direct, External (EDE), which includes direct access to visual and other sensory evidence, external to the speaker/writer.

(3)

. . . that we had already seen how much instability could be caused by individual states that were either failed states or rogue states, . . . (IWI, GB)

(b)

Experiential, Indirect, External (EIE), which indicates inference on the basis of “evidence after the fact” (De Haan 2001), or knowing through circumstantial inferences inferred on the basis of external sensory evidence.

(4) We were obviously worried that, after him, his two sons seemed to be as bad, if not worse. (IWI, TB) (c)

Cognitive, Direct, Internal (CDI), which includes cognitive factives (I know) and involves recourse to personal knowledge and encyclopaedic knowledge (cf. Plungian’s (2001: 352) “endophoric value”).

(5)

– and I know you have gone through this in enormous detail with Peter Goldsmith, (IWI, TB)

(d) Cognitive, Indirect, Internal (CII), which groups together speaker/writer’s generic inferences, on the basis of knowledge of the world and encyclopaedic knowledge, and conjectures or personal assumptions, on the basis of personal experience or knowledge. (6)

Therefore, you can still argue, I guess , that this sanctions framework would have been successful, (IWI, TB)

I argue here, and elsewhere (Marín-Arrese 2006, 2009), that evidential strategies which have direct bearing on the expression of speaker/writer’s epistemic stance also include markers in the communicative domain, as in the following categories:

420

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

(e)

Communicative, Direct, Internal (CMI), where the speaker/writer shifts from the basic, unmarked enunciational position to assume an overt phatic or emphatic mode by the use of performatives (Brandt 2004).

(7)

All I’m saying is that all the intelligence we received in, even after the September dossier, was to the same effect, that it wasn’t against that. (IWI, TB)

(f)

Communicative, Indirect, External (CME), which involves speaker/writer’s inferences on the basis of knowledge originating in some text external voice(s).

(8) It is absolutely clear from the Iraq Survey Group, and indeed the Butler Report deals with this, that he was concealing material he should have delivered up to the UN, . . . (IWI, TB) Within the domain of epistemic stance, reference must also be made to Mediated evidentiality, that is, non-personal evidence where the mode of access is through some other persons (this category is beyond the scope of the present study). Mediated, Communicative, Direct, External (MCDE), these are stance expressions which correspond to the category termed the Quotative in most classifications of evidentiality, that involves information explicitly attributed to a specific external source or text external voice(s), as in (9). Within this category we might also group the category Hearsay, which reproduces knowledge originating in some external voice(s), and includes, as Plungian (2001: 352) observes, “generalized, second-hand information (presupposing an unknown or non-definite ‘anonymous’ author)”, as well as access to information on the basis of “tradition or common knowledge (where no personal author is invoked)”. (9) . . . and actually, towards the end of October, I think Geoff Hoon said to me, “You have got to come and take certain decisions”. (IWI, TB) (10) So the very thing that, even back then, people were warning me, even with this tightening of the borders, it might work, it might not, that tightening restriction had been dropped by the time you get to May 2002. (IWI, TB) (11)

I think it is at least arguable that he was a threat and that, had we taken that decision to leave him there with the intent, with an oil price, not of $25, but of $100 a barrel, he would have had the intent, he would have had the financial means and we would have lost our nerve. (IWI, TB)

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

421

A hybrid category, which has been included in the study, is that where the speaker/writer refers to some personal prior utterance; these expressions are non-immediate and self-quotative: Personal/Mediated, Communicative, Direct, Internal (MCMI), where the speaker/ writer refers (textually or intertextually) to some prior utterance of his/hers. (12)

In the Chicago speech, in 1999, what I was doing was setting out very clearly what I thought the consequences were of an interdependent world, and what I was really saying was this: that whereas in the past people might have thought that a security problem in one part of the world can be divorced from its impact on another part, in the world that was developing, we were no longer able to do that, not financially, not in terms of security, not in terms, actually, of the cultural issues. (IWI, TB)

Evidential meanings have propositional scope, and as Boye (2010b: 292) argues, scope is understood “in the specific sense of a meaning upon which evidential meaning is conceptually dependent” (cf. Langacker 1991, for the notion of conceptual dependence). Epistemic stance expressions comprise both lexical and grammatical elements, the most common forms being modals and sentence adverbs (evidently), complement-taking predicates (CTPs) involving perception verbs (I hear), mental attitude verbs (I think), utterance verbs (I have to say), and appearance verbs typically occurring in impersonal constructions (It seems that). Within CTPs, Boye and Harder (2007: 583) argue that the most central or prototypical cases are those which have undergone a process of grammaticalization, and which are “predominantly present tense, indicative and declarative”. Boye and Harder (2007: 589) point to the following syntactic-distributional phenomena which mark the grammatical and secondary status of these epistemic CTPs: “adverbial or NEG raising, semantically unrelated tag questions and the occurrence of CTP clauses medially or finally with respect to the complement clause”. However, due to the nature of the communicative situation and activity type, involving oral evidence with regard to past events, it was considered essential to include all those stance markers which might not be prototypical evidentials, but which reflect the use of epistemic legitimising strategies on the part of the witnesses. Epistemic stance comprises factive predicates, which are generally defined as presupposing the truth of the proposition designated by their complement clause (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970). Impersonal factive predicates such as It is true, It is a fact, are included in a separate category of Factivity. The class of cognitive factives such as know, be aware of, remember are included in the category Cognitive, Direct, Internal, since they refer to knowledge available to the

422

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

speaker/writer. Predicates such as notice, discover, find out, which indicate some external source, would be grouped together with the subclass of sensory factives, such as see, hear, observe, within the category of Experiential, Direct, External. The use of emotive factive verbs, which focus on the emotional attitude towards the information, regret, be glad, will not be addressed in this paper. Likewise, both factive and non-factive instances of cognitive predicates used in thought representation, as in “many people believe that”, or “the Americans were aware that”, are beyond the scope of the present paper.

2.3 Commitment, responsibility and inter/subjectivity Within the literature there has been considerable discussion on the issue of certainty regarding the event designated, as expressed by epistemic modals, or the reliability of the evidential sources, that is, the ways in which the information may be assigned an estimation of its validity. Observational evidence has traditionally been associated with a higher degree of reliability (Willett 1988), whereas evidence based on reasoning suggests a more subjective, and lower degree of reliability of the source, and thus less validity of the information expressed. This will, of course, depend on the status of the source as expert or otherwise prestigious position. Matlock (1989: 215) correlates type of speaker/ writer experience to degree of validity: “direct experience corresponds to a high degree of certainty, indirect experience of the reported type corresponds to less certainty, and indirect experience of the inferred type corresponds to even less certainty”. Weber (1986: 137), however, refers to the notion of speaker/writer’s perspective, which would include both an evidential value, where evidential markers are used to indicate the source of the information, and a validational attitude, which refers to speaker/writer’s commitment to the truth of the proposition, the degree to which s/he is convinced or unconvinced about the evidence. It is here argued that the degree of commitment of the speaker/writer with respect to the communicated proposition is reflected in their assessment of the reality of the event designated, or in the validity of the information, which will depend on the reliability (conventionally) assigned to the source of evidence, not only by speakers/writers but also by hearers/readers. The different modes of access to the information correlate with different values on a scale of speaker/writer’s commitment towards the validity of the information. The various ways of framing a proposition (P) present a highly complex system of epistemic positioning strategies that speakers/writers have at their disposal for legitimising assertions. Within the domain of epistemic stance assigning validity to the information involves a set of variables such as:

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

423

(i) whether the form of access to the information is direct or indirect: Direct evidence (I saw P) would rank higher in evidentiary validity than indirect circumstantial inferences (It seems P) and indirect generic inferences or conjectures (I think); (ii) whether the form of access to the information is designated by a predicate involving higher or lesser degree of control on the part of the “actor” (cf. the “potential”, “action” and “result phases”, Langacker 2009, this volume): Factive attributions of knowledge (I know P), which reflect the result phase, typically imply the truth of the proposition, in contrast with nonfactives (I think P), which reflect the potential phase; (iii) whether the mode of access to the evidence invokes experiential (I saw P), cognitive (I know P), or communicative events (I say to you P): The reliability assigned by hearers/readers to cognitive and reportive evidentials would depend of the “evidential standing” of speaker/writer as source (White 2006: 64). Experiential and cognitive factives, which presuppose the truth of the information asserted, would rank higher on the scale of validity. Direct perceptual evidence might seem to be afforded higher evidentiary reliability by the hearer/ reader than cognitive or communicative evidence. I thus tentatively suggest a continuum along the following lines:

Figure 1: Evidentiary Reliability

The variation observed in these dimensions would result in a wide range of (co-constructed) assessments of the validity of the information, assigned by the speaker/writer partly also on the basis of estimations of how this will be perceived by the reader/hearer. The various epistemic and evidential expressions can thus be associated with different values of these dimensions. In the case of mediated evidentiality, which as mentioned above is beyond the scope of the present paper, the presumed validity of the information would rely to a great extent on the reliability of the original source of the information, whether s/he is considered an expert in the relevant field, or s/he has a prestigious social status, or whether the information is considered warrantable on the basis of its widespread or universal acceptability (It is believed P, Everybody knows P). These are cases of what White (2006: 64) has termed “evidential

424

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

standing”, a mechanism frequently used in journalistic discourse whereby the speaker/writer frames the proposition as highly warrantable, and at the same time avoids taking responsibility for the information or assessment. Degree of speaker/writer commitment to the credibility or plausibility of the attributed information may also be reflected overtly by means of the mechanisms of “authorial endorsement”, where the authorial voice simultaneously aligns with the “reported value position” and “by implication, construe(s) it as true or otherwise warrantable”, and “authorial distancing”, where the authorial voice overtly distances him/herself from the “reported value position” and “provide(s) a signal that alternative or contrary viewpoints may be valid” (White 2006: 58–59). There is an additional dimension involved, that of responsibility and accountability for the veracity of the information, which by default rests on the speaker/ writer. In this respect, it is also in the interest of speakers/writers to manage their interests not only in regard to the legitimisation of assertions but also with respect to the mystification of their responsibility and accountability in making such assertions, which involves choices in the expression of subjectivity or intersubjectivity (Marín-Arrese 2009, 2011a): (i) whether the evidential expression indexes subjectivity (I think P), which involves personal responsibility for the information, intersubjectivity (We all know P), where information is presented as involving shared responsibility, or more objective positioning (It is clear P): Information presented as intersubjectively shared, or as more objetively valid is more warrantable. (ii) whether the speaker/writer as conceptualizer (C) is overtly designated (I assume P, We remember P), and thus explicitly assumes personal responsibility for the information; or whether the speaker/writer as conceptualizer is implicitly invoked (maybe P), or is invoked as a virtual or generalized (V/G) conceptualizer (It seems P, It is obvious P), thus mystifying personal responsibility for the information in the latter two cases. The category of epistemic stance3, as the notion of a superordinate discourse category of epistemicity, is here taken to include a wide range of expressions which are attested in discourse as markers of epistemic legitimising strategies. Table 1 aims to capture the subdomains of epistemic modality, personal evidentials and other evidential strategies, degrees of speaker/writer certainty concerning the event and degrees of reliability typically assigned to evidential sources. The table also captures the subjective/intersubjective values of modals and evidentials. As mentioned above, stance resources are indexical of the speaker’s subjective and intersubjective positioning (Langacker 1991, 2002; Marín-Arrese 3 Abbreviations used in Table 1: C = Conceptualizer; p = profiled process; P = proposition

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

425

2006, 2007a, 2011b). Traugott and Dasher (2002: 11) note that an epistemic modal like may “contributes to the contentful structure of the utterance (possibility on a scale between high probability (must) and low probability (might), but it also indexes subjective attitude (I think it is possible . . .)”. De Haan (2005: 1) has argued that evidentiality is a deictic category and not a modal one, since it fulfils “the same function for marking relationships between speakers and action/events”. Evidential strategies may be considered deictic in that they index the evidence to the conceptualiser, who is responsible for the evidential stance act (cf. Mushin 2001: 33). The semantic proximity to epistemic modals, however, still holds since modals are grounding predications that situate “the profiled relationship with respect to the speaker’s conception of reality” (Langacker 2008: 259). Table 1: Epistemic Stance EPISTEMIC STANCE (Adapted from Marín-Arrese 2011b) EPISTEMIC MODALITY

EVIDENTIAL STRATEGIES

SUBJECTIVE

INTERSUBJECTIVE

SUBJECTIVE

INTERSUBJECTIVE

High Certainty Implicit C must p Certainly P

High Certainty Implicit V/G C It is certain P

External/Internal, Direct High Reliability Explicit C I can see P I know P I say to you P

External/Internal, Direct/Indirect High Reliability Explicit C We have witnessed P We all know P

Explicit C I am sure P

Explicit C We are certain P

Implicit V/G C It is a fact that P It was clear/obvious P Clearly/obviously P Medium Certainty Implicit C will p probably P

Medium Certainty Implicit V/G C It is probable P

External/Internal, Indirect Medium Reliability Explicit C I think P I infer P My experience is P

External/Internal, Indirect Medium Reliability Explicit C We think P We conclude P We could see P Implicit V/G C It seems P

Low Certainty Implicit C may p perhaps P Explicit C I am not sure P

Low Certainty Implicit V/G C It is possible P Explicit C We are not sure P

Internal, Indirect Low Reliability Explicit C I suppose P I feel P

External/Internal, Indirect Low Reliability Explicit C We suppose P Implicit V/G C You get the feeling P apparently/supposedly/ allegedly P

426

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

3 Stance and inter/subjectivity in discourse 3.1. Subjectivity and intersubjectivity The formulation of subjectivity as the capacity of the speaking self to view him/ herself as subject of enunciation (sujet d’énonciation) is found in the seminal work by Benveniste (1966 [1958]). He drew attention to the fact that the relationship of intersubjectivity between the speaker/writer and hearer/reader is a basic condition for linguistic communication. As Finegan (1995: 1–2) defines the notion, subjectivity involves “the expression of self and the representation of a speaker’s (or, more generally, a locutionary agent’s) perspective or point of view in discourse – what has been called a speaker’s imprint”. The subjectivity of discourse is a crucial factor or facet of language, since it concerns “language as an expression – an incarnation, even – of perceiving, feeling, speaking subjects”. An objective use of language has been typically associated with linguistic expressions where the speaker/writer’s viewpoint is not explicitly invoked (i.e. nominalization, passive, etc.). The use of more subjective language is associated with various ways in which the speaker/writer is present in the discourse, either explicitly through the use of personal predicates (I suppose. . .), or implicitly in the use of epistemic modals. Lyons (1977) and Traugott (1995) are concerned with the expression of self, with how the semantics of an expression relates to the speaker (subjectivity) or whether it is non-speaker-related (objectivity). For Traugott and Dasher (2002), the most objective expressions are those which lack any form of spatial, temporal or social deixis, as well as any marker of speaker/writer’s (SP/W’s) attitude or attention to addressee/reader (AD/R); the most subjective expressions are those which explicitly mark the speaker/writer (I think . . .). The gradient between subjectivity and objectivity is thus based on the notion of speaker-relatedness (De Smet and Verstraete 2006). Traugott and Dasher (2002: 22) also draw a distinction between subjectivity, which relates to expressions in which the speaker/writer’s point of view is explicitly encoded (e.g. attitudinal markers, including epistemic attitude, discourse deixis, etc.), and intersubjectivity, which pertains to the relation between speaker/writer and addressee/reader concerning “the explicit, coded expression of SP/W’s attention to the image or ‘self’ of AD/R in a social or an epistemic sense” (e.g. hedges, honorification, politeness markers). Langacker’s (1991, 2000, 2002) conception of subjectivity vs. objectivity always involves a connection to the speaker/writer as subject of conception. Subjectivity is explained drawing on perceptual notions, such as the maximal asymmetry between the viewer or subject of perception and the scene viewed or object of perception, which is the default situation in an optimal viewing arrangement.

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

427

The “viewer” remains “offstage”, thus being implicit and construed with maximal subjectivity, whereas the object of perception is “onstage”, salient and objectively construed. In departures from the default situation, as in an egocentric viewing arrangement, the viewer goes “onstage”, thus becoming more salient and objectified. The conceptual analogues of these perceptual notions involve the subjects of conception or primary conceptualizers, by default the speaker and hearer, and the object of conception, that is the entity which an expression puts “onstage” and profiles. Langacker (2002: 17) describes subjectivity and objectivity in the following terms: An entity is construed objectively to the extent that it is distinct from the conceptualizer and is put onstage as a salient object of conception. Being the focal point within the onstage region, an expression’s profile has a high degree of objectivity. An entity receives a subjective construal to the extent that it functions as the subject of conception but not as the object. The highest degree of subjectivity thus attaches to the speaker and hearer, specifically in regard to those expressions that do not in any way include them within their scope.

The ground elements, the speaker and hearer, are by default implicit in their tacit role as subjects of conception, and are thus construed with maximal subjectivity. However, they may function as objects of conception, to varying degrees. Langacker (1991: 93) identifies a continuum in terms of degrees of salience that the ground elements, the speech-act participants, have in a particular predication. Thus, in the case of pronouns like I or you, which profile the speech-act participants, the speaker or hearer is “rendered maximally salient and minimally subjective”. In epistemic modals, in deictics, and in the deictic construal of some prepositional phrases, the speaker or hearer remain implicit, and thus non-salient and maximally subjective. The dimension of subjectivity thus involves the parameter salience or overtness of the role of the conceptualizer. This is a gradient parameter, since we may identify a continuum ranging from cases where the conceptualizer is part of the object of conceptualization and is thus encoded in the expression of stance as the explicit source of the evaluation or assessment, to those cases where the conceptualizer is implicit and non-salient, and those where the role of the current speaker as source of the evaluation is opaque. When explicitly mentioned, in expressions of stance (I saw, I think, . . .), the speaker/writer is objectified since, in addition to the role of conceptualizer, s/he is also part of the object of conception. In the case of modals, the conceptualizer is implicit, so that his/her role is less prominent and more subjectified. Nonetheless, as Sanders (1999: 473) argues, to the extent that the conceptualizer functions as an implicit point of reference, the speaker’s “active consciousness” is also evoked. With impersonal evidential

428

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

expressions (it seems), where the presence of the subject of conception is opaque; there is only covert reference to the ground and the role of the conceptualizer is almost maximally subjective. Langacker (2000: 350) notes that with an expression such as it seems, the conceptualizer may be “only potential” or “is construed generically or in a generalized fashion”. An additional dimension of subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity concerns the degree to which the speaker/writer assumes personal responsibility for the evaluation of the evidence (subjectivity) or whether the assessment is potentially shared by others (intersubjectivity) (Nuyts 2001). In a recent paper, Nuyts (2012: 58) defines the distinction between “subjectivity” and “intersubjectivity” in the following terms: “A modal evaluation is ‘subjective’ if it is presented as being strictly the assessor’s sole responsibility. A modal evaluation is ‘intersubjective’ if it is presented as being shared between the assessor and a wider group of people, possibly (but not necessarily) including the hearer”. Expressions designating the speaker/writer explicitly (I think, I am sure, . . .) indicate that s/he is solely responsible for the epistemic assessment, since s/he has access to the evidence or is the sole source of knowledge, whereas those expressions that refer to a collectivity (We all know, We have all seen, . . .) explicitly indicate that the evidence is known to, or accessible to a group of people, and thus invoke shared responsibility. Epistemic modals, which implicitly invoke the subject of conception, also index speaker/writer’s personal responsibility for the assessment. Impersonal evidential expressions, which do not designate the speaker/writer explicitly (It seems, That suggests, . . .), may be interpreted as involving shared responsibility. These expressions are opaque in that they evoke a virtual or generalized conceptualizer, which by default is interpreted as the speaker/writer, but they also leave open the possibility of potentially sharing the evaluation with other voices in the discourse.

3.2 Subjectivity/intersubjectivity and responsibility This framework posits a set of categories of subjectivity/intersubjectivity – Subjective-Explicit (SE), Subjective-Implicit (SI), Intersubjective-Explicit (IE), Intersubjective-Virtual-Explicit (IVE), Intersubjective-Virtual-Implicit (IVI) – on the basis of the syncretism between different values of the following two parameters of subjectivity/intersubjectivity: (i) Degree of salience or overtness of the role of conceptualizer, which refers to the degree of explicitness, implicitness or opaqueness of the presence of the conceptualizer, and (ii) Responsibility: personal vs. shared responsibility for the communicated information.

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

429

(i) Salience: With respect to the parameter salience or overtness of the role of the conceptualizer, a continuum may be identified involving the degree of salience of the speaker/writer as subject of conception, and the degree to which there is foregrounding of speaker/writer’s consciousness.

Figure 2: Degree of salience of the conceptualizer

(a) Explicit reference to conceptualizer: The speaker/writer is designated in the expression of stance as the source of knowledge or as having personal access to the evidence. When explicitly mentioned (I saw, I think, . . .), the speaker/writer is objectified, since in addition to the role of conceptualizer, s/he is also part of the object of conception; in effect the speaker/writer has a dual role as both subject and object of conception. The high degree of salience of the conceptualizer in these expressions has an effect on the construal of the conceptualization, such that the information communicated is maximally subjective, while the speaker/writer as conceptualizer is objectified to the extent that s/he becomes part of the object of conceptualization. (13) I can’t recall exactly when we were given the responsibility for Basra, but I know that for us it then involved economic, social and political measures, including big measures in economic development. (IWI, GB) (b) Conceptualizer invoked implicitly: Epistemic modal expressions only invoke the speaker/conceptualizer as the implicit point of reference. The speaker/writer is implicit and non-salient and the role of conceptualizer is less prominent and more subjective, but, as Sanders (1999: 473) observes, expressions with modal auxiliaries create subjectivity by foregrounding the speaker’s attitudes or estimations of certainty, so that “what is expressed by the sentence is subjectified”. Epistemic expressions are essentially subjective since they evoke the speaker/ writer’s active consciousness. (14) That may have happened, but, you know, I wasn’t the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister. The contacts that would be had with the French would be through them. (IWI, GB)

430

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

(c) Virtual or generalized conceptualizer: Expressions with impersonal predicates (it seems, it is clear, . . .) invoke an implicit conceptualizer, which may be construed as a generalized or virtual entity. As Langacker (2009: 286) notes, these impersonal predicates “defocus the mental activity of any particular conceptualizer” by evoking the conceptualizer in generalized fashion. He further makes the point that “evoking the conceptualizer in generalized fashion, abstracting away from any particular individual, gives C the status of a virtual entity”. In contrast with personal predicates and modal auxiliaries, in these expressions the conceptualizer may be only potential, so that there is a lesser degree of subjectivity attached to the conceptualization. With impersonal modal predicates (it is possible, it is likely, . . .) the conceptualizer is further backgrounded, and a more objective stance towards the communicated information is evoked. (15)

We were obviously worried that, after him, his two sons seemed to be as bad, if not worse. (IWI-TB)

(16) I think, after September 11, it was clear that this whole thing was in a different framework. (IWI-TB) (17)

Having said that, my whole construct was to get as broad a coalition as possible, and I thought that if we managed to get the peace process really pushing forward, we were more likely to get a broader and deeper coalition. (IWI-GB)

(ii) Responsibility: With regard to the parameter of responsibility, we also find a parallel set of distinctions, which involve the degree to which the speaker/writer claims personal responsibility for the communicated proposition, or presents the information as shared or co-constructed.

Figure 3: Degree of Speaker/Writer Responsibility

(a) Personal responsibility: Expressions designating the speaker/writer explicitly (I think, I am sure, . . .) indicate that s/he personally subscribes to the assertion, that the communicated information is part of their conception of reality. As Sanders and Spooren (1996: 246) note, evidential expressions designating the speaker/writer “explicitly encode the speaker/writer’s personal limitation of the

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

431

validity of information”. Epistemic modals, which implicitly invoke the subject of conception, also involve personal responsibility, however covert this may be. (18) – I was given information by the intelligence services which led me to believe that Iraq was a threat that had to be dealt with by the actions of the international community. (IWI-GB) (19) I think there had been some press coverage about the Foreign Office. I may be wrong on that, but I think there may have been some press coverage. (IWI-GB) (b) Shared responsibility: Expressions with inclusive we, (We all know, We saw, . . .) explicitly designate a collectivity which typically includes the speaker/writer and others, though very often it refers to an “incompletely defined collectivity” (Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990: 745). In some cases, the speaker/writer strategically uses the pronoun as an exclusive we. These expressions index shared responsibility. (20) We know Saddam had effectively corroded the support for the previous sanctions. (IWI-TB) (c) Opaque responsibility: Evidential expressions not designating the speaker/ writer explicitly may be interpreted as indexing either personal or shared responsibility. These expressions present the communicated information as part of the epistemic dominion of some virtual or generalized conceptualizer, and potentially accessible to the interlocutor or audience, so that the responsibility for the evidence is tacitly shared with others. A variety of linguistic resources are found in this case: impersonal modal predicates (It is possible, It is likely, . . .), impersonal evidential predicates (It seems, It sounds like, It is clear, It is palpable, . . .), impersonal factive predicates (It is true that. . .). In other cases, we find mystification of agency or of experiencer, as in agentless passives (It was felt that), and nominalizations (The conclusion was), where responsibility for the epistemic stance act is diffuse. (21)

Yes, it was obviously a possibility that military action would be the outcome of what was going to happen, and so there was a general discussion of the possibility of going down the military route, but, obviously, we were arguing very much for that to be if the UN route failed. (IWI-TB)

432 (22)

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

But it was also obvious , I am afraid, that some countries were making it clear that they would not support action under any circumstances. (IWI-GB)

(23) Now, it is true that we were dealing with the Iraqi army that had existed under Saddam Hussein and politicians and bureaucrats who worked under Saddam Hussein, but it is also true , I think – and we learned this lesson from other past conflicts – that unless you can quickly involve the people of the country in a sense that they have or are about to get more control over the country, then you become very quickly an army of occupation rather than an army of liberation, and we never wanted to be an army of occupation. (IWI-GB) (24) As I say, I think the conclusion was , in the end, you certainly couldn’t rely on it. (IWI-TB) This category also includes impersonal or “vague” uses of pronouns (Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990), where the speaker/writer’s voice and responsibility is diffuse (You would think). (25) As I say, anybody who knows Peter knows he would not have done it unless he believed in it and thought it was the correct thing to do, and that was – for us and for our armed forces, that was sufficient. (IWI-TB) (26) . . . you couldn’t be sure that the United Nations route was going to work – in fact, the likelihood is that it wouldn’t – (IWI-TB)

4 The case study 4.1 The texts The Iraq War Inquiry (IWI), also referred to as the Chilcot Inquiry after its chairman, Sir John Chilcot, was announced on 15 June 2009 by Gordon Brown, and the open sessions commenced on 24 November 2009, at QE2 Conference

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

433

Centre. The IWI is a public inquiry, by a committee of Privy Counsellors4, which investigated the role of the United Kingdom in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the UK’s involvement in Iraq from mid-2001 to July 2009. Tony Blair strongly supported George W. Bush’s policy of War on Terror, with the UK’s participation in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In the UK, there was widespread public opposition to the invasion of Iraq, and a substantial number of Labour MPs openly opposed it. Blair also faced serious criticism over the circumstances in which the policy was decided upon, and very specifically, in relation to the issue of the weapons of mass destruction, which according to intelligence reports Saddam Hussein was developing. The purpose of the inquiry was to establish the way decisions had been made, to determine what had happened and to ascertain whether the UK government had responded in the most effective manner in the best interests of the country. This paper examines the transcripts of the oral evidence given by: – The Rt. Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 2001–June 2007. Oral evidence: Friday, 29 January 2010. 32, 616 words (320 answers). – The Rt. Hon Gordon Brown, MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1997–2007, Prime Minister, June 2007–May 2010. Oral evidence: Friday, 5 March 2010. 26,245 words (231 answers). The contextual features, or variables, of the discourses are the following: Discourse Domain: Public Inquiry Topic: UK’s involvement in the Iraq war Genre: Oral evidence Discourse Modes or ‘types of text’: Expository and Argumentative Medium: Spoken interaction. Participants: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Committee members. Subject/Role in the Inquiry: Tony Blair and Gordon Brown as witnesses 4 The committee of inquiry included the following members: Sir John Chilcot (chairman), a career diplomat and senior civil servant. Sir Lawrence Freedman, a military historian, and Professor of War Studies at King’s College London. Sir Martin Gilbert, a historian. Sir Roderic Lyne, former Ambassador to Russia and to the United Nations in Geneva, and private secretary to Prime Minister John Major. The Baroness Prashar, member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and chairwoman of the Judicial Appointments Commission.

434

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

Social Roles: Blair, ex-Prime Minister; Brown, Prime Minister. Dialogic dimensions: Non-collaborative interaction (vs. default interactional collaboration); Personal responsibility for testimony (vs. default shared responsibility between conversational co-participants). Goal: Epistemic control and management of interests.

4.2 Hypothesis and procedure The general hypothesis is that variation in the contextual features of discourses, i.e., speakers/writers engaging in a particular social role, and their corresponding personal and political goals in the particular discourse domain, genre and activity type, will reveal characteristic differences in the use of epistemic stance resources, and in the indexing of inter/subjectivity, and thus in speakers/writers’ interactional styles. Variation will also reveal characteristic differences of discourse practices across languages and cultures. Though the study of intercultural features is beyond the scope of the present paper, it is relevant to note that significant differences between English and Spanish have been found in case studies on public or parliamentary inquiries (Marín-Arrese 2012), in previous studies of journalistic discourse (Marín-Arrese 2007b), and in political discourse (Marín-Arrese 2007a). The paper examines the presence and distribution of epistemic stance expressions and the indexing of inter/subjectivity in the oral evidence given by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in the Iraq War Inquiry. The texts were examined in the first instance to identify the tokens of the different categories of epistemic stance and subjectivity/intersubjectivity. Various electronic searches using Monoconc were carried out to ensure that all the instances present in the texts had been identified. The tokens found were then analysed and tagged manually according to the parameters of epistemic stance and the dimensions of subjectivity/intersubjectivity identified above. Further electronic searches involving the labels used for the different categories were carried out for the quantitative results, which are presented together with the qualitative analysis in the following section.

4.3 The categories Within the domain of epistemic stance (EP), the paper focuses on the use of verbal expressions: (a) epistemic modal verbs; (b) personal evidential and pseudo evidential expressions; and (c) factive predicates. The categories of epistemic stance, the tagging conventions adopted in this paper, and some token expressions are the following:

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

–

– – –

– –

–

–

–

435

Epistemic modality (EM): Epistemic modals and predicates expressing certainty or likelihood (may, might, could, will, must, going to, It was likely, I’m not sure, I was very sure that, You couldn’t be sure, . . .). Factivity (FTV): Impersonal factive predicates (The fact is that, It is (absolutely) true that, It is correct that, . . .) Experiential, Direct, External (EDE): Personal predicates of the experiential domain (When I look at, I found, We discovered, . . .). Experiential, Indirect, External/Internal (EIE): Personal and impersonal predicates expressing evidence after the fact (circumstantial inferences) (I could see, You can see, It seems, It appeared to be, It was clear/obvious, . . .) Cognitive, Direct, Internal (CDI): Personal cognitive factive predicates (I know, We knew, I don’t know, I am aware, I remember, As I recall, . . .). Cognitive, Indirect, Internal (CII): Personal predicates involving beliefs, reasoning-motivated knowledge or general assumptions (generic inferences and conjectures) (I think, I don’t think, I guess, I believe, I don’t believe, I felt, I would say, I seem to, . . .) Communicative, Direct, Internal (CMI): Performative utterances involving personal predicates of communication (I just simply say to you, As I say, I have to say, It is fair to say, All I’m saying is, I would say to you, All I’m trying to say, I just want to make this clear, Let me tell you, I can assure you, Let me emphasise to you, I emphasise, The point that I’m making is this, All I’m pointing out, . . .) Communicative, Direct/Indirect, External (CME): Personal and impersonal predicates involving access to knowledge on the basis of inferences originating from some external source of communication (I read, I got a sense, It seems, We can see, You see this clearly from, It indicates, It is clear from, It looks like from, It emerges, . . .). Personal/Mediated, Communicative, Direct, Internal (MCMI): Information explicitly attributed to self, previous intra- and intertextual references (selfquotative or self-reportive) (I said, I have said before, I made it clear that, . . .)

With regard to the indexing of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the following categories are identified on the basis of the parameters of salience of the conceptualizer and responsibility: – Subjective, Explicit (SE): Personal predicates (I saw, I think, . . .), and other expressions which include explicit mention of the speaker/writer as conceptualizer (It seems to me, I am sure, I am aware, . . .). The speaker is designated explicitly as the sole subject of the epistemic judgement, thus highlighting his/her personal responsibility for the epistemic stance.

436 –

–

–

–

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

Intersubjective, Explicit (IE): Personal predicates (We know, It seemed to us, . . .), and modal or evidential adjectival predicates (We are sure, We are clear, . . .). The speaker overtly presents the communicated information as intersubjectively shared with other specific or unspecified subjects, or as universally shared. Subjective, Implicit (SI): Modal auxiliaries (must, will, may, . . .). The speaker is the sole conceptualizer, the implicit subject of the epistemic judgement. These expressions index personal responsibility. Intersubjective, Virtual/Generalized, Explicit (IVE): Expressions which invoke a generalized conceptualizer (You would think, You find, Everybody knew, . . .), which by default is interpreted as the speaker, or which may refer to a nonspecific collectivity that also includes the speaker. The speaker thus presents the information as potentially shared with the addressee/reader and/or others. Intersubjective, Virtual/Generalized, Implicit (IVI): Modal, evidential and factive impersonal predicates which evoke an implicit conceptualizer which may be construed as virtual (It is likely that, It seems that, It is true that, . . .), as well as expressions which invoke an implicit conceptualizer, which may be indeterminate or unknown, or is presented as unknown, as in passives (It was thought that, . . .), or nominalizations. These expressions index shared responsibility in varying degrees, though in the default situation, it is assumed that the speaker/writer subscribes to the validity of the proposition (Langacker 2009).

5 Results and discussion 5.1 Epistemic stance: Results Table 2 shows the results for the different categories of epistemic stance in the discourse of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in the IWI. Results are given in raw numbers (N), and frequency per thousand words (R) in order to normalise the data, since the number of words in each text differs considerably. The results for epistemic stance are similar for both speakers, in terms of the frequency and distribution of tokens per category. Both Blair and Brown rely basically on the use of stance resources characterised by the parameters Cognitive, Indirect, Internal, that is, mostly personal predicates involving beliefs, reasoning-motivated knowledge or general assumptions (generic inferences and conjectures), including self-attribution of past beliefs.

437

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

Table 2: Epistemic stance categories and results EPISTEMIC STANCE

IWI-BLAIR 32,026 words

IWI-BROWN 26,245 words

N

R

N

R

EM FTV EDE EIE CDI CII CMI CME MCMI

118 30 11 35 71 460 133 7 66

3.68 0.94 0.34 1.09 2.22 14.36 4.15 0.21 2.06

117 26 16 15 87 270 64 4 44

4.46 0.99 0.61 0.57 3.31 10.28 2.44 0.15 1.68

Total

931

29.07

643

24.49

There are, however, some subtle differences which are worth mentioning: (i) The total ratio of epistemic stance markers is considerably higher in the case of Blair. In rhetorical terms, the high frequency of use of these markers reflects the speaker’s concern with the acceptance of the validity of the information on the part of the hearer. However, it is important to note that the higher the ratio of epistemic modal markers in the discourse the lower the commitment to the truth of the proposition on the part of the speaker. As Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca (1994: 179) observe concerning epistemicity and truth, “markers of epistemic modality indicate something about less than a total commitment by the speaker to the truth of the proposition”. Similarly, Langacker (2008: 302) argues that “the absence of a modal indicates that C accepts the profiled process as being real”, as part of the conceptualizer’s conceived reality (Rc), whereas the presence of a modal places the profiled process “outside conceived reality, in a region we can refer to as irreality (the complement of Rc )”. In this category of epistemic modals, Brown shows the higher ratio. (ii) Blair’s second preferred category of epistemic stance resources is that of Communicative, Direct, Internal, that is, those where he relies on performative acts of communication (As I say), as the preferred mode of legitimising his assertions. In the third place, he makes recourse to the use of epistemic modals and other epistemic predicates expressing certainty or likelihood. Relatively significant figures are also found in the category Cognitive, Direct, Internal, mostly involving cognitive factive predicates and self-attribution of knowledge in the past. In this respect, it is interesting to note that within this category there is a considerable number (N = 26) of tokens of “ignorative” markers (cf. Donaldson 1980) such as I don’t know, even though the

438

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

figure does not include tokens in interrogative, counterfactual or virtual contexts (for the notion of “aphonic” stance, see Brandt 2004), or cases of implicit contrast (What we know now, As we now know, . . .). (iii) Brown also shows a clear preference for the category Cognitive, Indirect, Internal. His second preferred category, however, is that of epistemic modals and predicates. Significant figures are also found in the category Cognitive, Direct, Internal, involving present knowledge and self-attribution of knowledge in the past. The ratio of tokens in this category is considerably higher to that of Blair’s, with the added feature that the number of tokens of ignorative stance (I don’t know) is significantly lower (N = 7). The figures for the category Communicative, Direct, Internal (I have to say) are substantially lower than those of Blair’s. Figure 4 illustrates the results for the categories of epistemic stance in the discourse of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in the IWI (ratio per thousand words, totals excluded).

Figure 4: Categories of Epistemic Stance

As we have seen, Blair’s discoursal identity is characterized by the following epistemic legitimising strategies: I think > As I say > may/might. In the case of Brown, we find the following scale of preferred strategies: I think > will/would > I know.

5.2 Subjectivity and intersubjectivity: Results Table 3 presents the results for subjectivity/intersubjectivity in the IWI. Results are given in raw numbers (N), and frequency per thousand words (R).

439

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

We find very few differences in the pattern of distribution of subjective and intersubjective values between the two speakers. The highest frequencies for both Blair and Brown are found in the category Subjective, Explicit Conceptualizer (SE), (I think), by means of which the speakers explicitly assume personal responsibility for the stance act. Table 3: Inter/Subjectivity categories and results SUBJECTIVITY/ INTERSUBJECTIVITY

IWI-BLAIR 32,026 words

IWI-BROWN 26,245 words

N

R

N

R

SE SI IE IVE IVI

644 123 67 15 82

20.11 3.84 2.09 0.47 2.56

374 110 102 12 45

14.25 4.19 3.88 0.46 1.71

Total

931

29.07

643

24.49

There is, however, a marked difference in the figures, in that Blair’s use of markers with an explicit subjective value is significantly higher than that of Brown’s. For both speakers, the second most frequent category is that of Subjective, Implicit Conceptualizer (SI) (may/might/will/would). There are also some minor differences between the speakers in two categories of intersubjective values. Brown uses a considerable amount of markers in the category Intersubjective, Explicit Conceptualizer (IE), (We know), which involve explicitly shared responsibility for the information with other specific or unspecified subjects. Blair also makes frequent use of these markers, but seems to prefer the category Intersubjective, Implicit virtual or generalized conceptualizer (IVI), (It was clear/ obvious, The fact is), where responsibility for the stance act is presented as potentially shared with some virtual or generalized conceptualizer. Figure 5 illustrates the results for subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the discourse of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in the IWI (ratio per thousand words, totals excluded). The pattern of distribution of preferred inter/subjective strategies is the following for Blair: I think/As I say > may/might > it is true/it is obvious. For Brown, we find the following scale: I think/I know > will/would > We knew/We have learned.

440

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

Figure 5: Categories of Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity

5.3 Legitimising strategies: Discussion This section aims to suggest possible explanations for the variation in the use of strategies of legitimisation and in managing responsibility in the case of both speakers. Tony Blair was Prime Minister, and personally responsible for Britain’s intervention in the Iraq war. At the time of the Iraq War Inquiry, however, he is no longer PM, though his obvious rhetorical goal is the justification of the intervention, through the use of a set of epistemic legitimising strategies, which involve appeal to knowledge about the events. This is particularly reflected in his explicit reference to his beliefs and conjectures (I think), and in his assessment concerning the reality or likelihood of the events (may/might). Also interesting to note is the relatively high amount of ignorative stance markers, when he tries to avoid admitting that he had knowledge or information about certain facts or decisions. Another significant feature in the results may be explained in terms of the activity type or genre. In an inquiry, the witness is being questioned about personal decisions and motivations for actions, and of utmost importance are his personal justification for those decisions and actions. This perhaps motivates Blair’s substantial number of performative acts of communication (As I say, All I would say to you), where the speaker is trying to persuade the Committee of Inquiry of the validity and truth of his assertions. Similar explanations may be provided for Brown. During the Iraq War, Brown was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and had limited responsibility in the decision-taking process, as he repeatedly mentions in his intervention. But when the Iraq War Inquiry was announced, Gordon Brown was Prime Minister

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

441

and had an obvious stake in the proceedings. He employs the same type of strategies as Blair, but the lower use of epistemic stance markers points to a higher commitment to truth in his statement, and there are very few cases of ignorative stance. Also noteworthy is the fact that the number of performative acts of communication is significantly lower, presumably since he does not feel so much need to back up his asertions. In the realm of subjectivity/intersubjectivity, the use of expressions with a subjective value, which explicitly designate the speaker (I), are predominant in both speakers. This feature, as mentioned above, may be attributed to the intrinsically dialogic nature of the activity type, where the witnesses are basically involved in answering questions addressed to them concerning their knowledge or responsibility for the decisions and actions leading to the Iraq War. Both speakers also display a common feature in that their second preferred strategy (may/might/will/would) involves mystification of responsibility for the information proffered, since the speaker/conceptualizer is only implicitly invoked. A significant difference between the two speakers lies in the third preferred strategy, where Blair further mystifies responsibility by recourse to stance resources which evoke a generalized or virtual conceptualizer (It is a fact), whereas Brown opts for a strategy of shared responsibility (We).

6 Conclusion In this paper I have discussed the domain of epistemic stance, and presented a proposal for the classification of evidentials and evidential strategies on the basis of a set of parameters inherent to evidentiality. It has been argued that any stancetaking act simultaneously involves an evaluative act and dialogical positioning of the subject of conception, by default the speaker/writer, which is strategic in nature, as well as the indexing of the conceptualizer’s inter/ subjectivity in the discourse, which indicates the extent to which s/he assumes responsibility for his/her stancetaking acts. Subjectivity has been discussed in terms of the degree of salience attached to the role of conceptualizer, which involves a continuum from cases where there is explicit reference to the conceptualizer, through cases where the conceptualizer is invoked but remains implicit, and finally to cases where the role of the conceptualizer is opaque since what is invoked is some generalized or virtual conceptualizer. The dimension of intersubjectivity has been examined in terms of the notions of personal vs. shared responsibility for the information.

442

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

The framework described here aims to integrate the cognitive and the discourse perspective in the study of how these linguistic resources of stance and subjectivity/intersubjectivity vary in the discourse with respect to different contexts of interaction and discourse domains (judicial discourse), and across genres and text types. Variation in the use of stance resources, and in indexing subjectivity/ intersubjectivity, is also found in relation to speaker/writer’s interactional styles, and their management of interests and rhetorical goals in the different communicative situations. In this respect, the paper has presented a case study on the oral evidence given by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in the Iraq War Inquiry. Further research is necessary with respect to other dimensions of stance, such as the degree of speaker/writer commitment to the validity of the information, and the use of strategies of dialogicality in discourse. Finally, the contrastive perspective needs to be pursued more extensively in order to explore the possible cultural variations in interactional identities in different discourse domains and genres (Marín-Arrese 2007a, b).

References Aikhenvald, Alexandra. 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anderson, Lloyd B. 1986. Evidentials, paths of change, and mental maps: Typologically regular asymmetries. In: Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 273–312. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Benveniste, Émile. 1966[1958]. De la subjectivité dans le langage. Problems de Linguistique Générale, 258–266. Paris: Gallimard. (Orig. publ. in Journal de psychologie 55: 267f., 1958). Berman, Ruth A. 2004. Introduction: Developing discourse stance in different text types and languages. Journal of Pragmatics 37: 105–124. Biber, Douglas and Edward Finegan. 1989. Styles of stance in English: Lexical and grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect. Text 1: 93–124. Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad and Edward Finegan. 1999. Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. London: Longman. Blakemore, Diane. 1987. Semantic Constraints on Relevance. Oxford: Blackwell. Brandt, Per Aage. 2004. Evidentiality and Enunciation. A Cognitive and Semiotic Approach. In: Juana I. Marín-Arrese (ed.), Perspectives on Evidentiality and Modality, 3–10. Madrid: Editorial Complutense. Bucholtz, Mary and Kira Hall. 2005. Identity and interaction: A sociocultural linguistic approach. Discourse Studies 7(4/5): 585–614. Boye, Kasper. 2006. Epistemic meaning: A cross-linguistic study. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Copenhagen. Boye, Kasper. 2010a. Semantic maps and the identification of cross-linguistic generic categories: Evidentiality and its relation to epistemic modality. Linguistic Discovery 8(1): 4–22. Boye, Kasper. 2010b. Evidence for what? Evidentiality and scope. STUF 63(4): 290–307.

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

443

Boye, Kasper and Peter Harder. 2007. Complement-taking predicates: Usage and linguistic structure. Studies in Language 31(3): 569–606. Boye, Kasper and Peter Harder. 2009. Evidentiality. Linguistic categories and grammaticalization. Functions of Language 16(1): 9–43. Bybee, Joan, Revere Perkins and William Pagliuca. 1994. The Evolution of Grammar: Tense, Aspect, and Modality in the Languages of the world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Carretero, Marta. 2004. The role of evidentiality and epistemic modality in three English spoken texts from legal proceeedings. In: Juana I. Marín-Arrese (ed.) Perspectives on Evidentiality and Modality, 25–62. Madrid: Editorial Complutense. Chafe, Wallace. 1986. Evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing. In: Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 261–272. New York: Ablex. Chilton, Paul. 2004. Analysing Political Discourse. London: Routledge. Dendale, Patrick and Liliane Tasmowski. 2001. Introduction: Evidentiality and related notions. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 339–348. De Smet, Hendrik and Jean-Christophe Verstraete. 2006. Coming to terms with subjectivity. Cognitive Linguistics 17(3): 365–392. Donaldson, Tamsin. 1980. Ngiyambaa: the Language of the Wangaaybuwan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DuBois, John W. 2007. The stance triangle. In: Robert Englebretson (ed.), Stancetaking in Discourse, 139–182. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Englebretson, Robert. 2007. Introduction. In: Robert Englebretson (ed.), Stancetaking in Discourse, 1–26. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Finegan, Edward. 1995. Subjectivity and subjectivisation: An introduction. In: Dieter Stein and Susan Wright (eds.), Subjectivity and Subjectivisation: Linguistic Perspectives, 1–15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Givon, Talmy. 1982. Evidentiality and epistemic space. Studies in Language 6(1): 23–49. de Haan, Ferdinand. 1999. Evidentiality and epistemic modality: Setting boundaries. Southwest Journal of Linguistics 18: 83–101. de Haan, Ferdinand. 2001. The place of inference within the evidential system. IJAL 67(2): 193– 219. De Haan, Ferdinand. 2005. Encoding speaker perspective: Evidentials. In: Zygmunt Frajzyngier and David Rood (eds.), Linguistic Diversity and Language Theories, 377–396. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Hart, Christopher. 2011. Legitimising Assertions and the Logico-Rhetorical Module: Evidence and Epistemic Vigilance in Media Discourse on Immigration. Discourse Studies 13(6): 751–769. Hunston, Susan and Geoff Thompson (eds.). 2000. Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ifantidou, Elly. 2001. Evidentials and Relevance. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Johnstone, Barbara. 2007. Linking identity and dialect through stancetaking. In: Robert Englebretson (ed.), Stancetaking in Discourse, 49–68. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Kiparsky, Paul and Carol Kiparsky. 1970. Fact. In: Manfred Bierwisch and Karl E. Heidolph (eds.), Progress in Linguistics, 143–73. The Hague: Mouton. Kitawaga, Chisato and Adrienne Lehrer. 1990. Impersonal uses of personal pronouns. Journal of Pragmatics 14: 739–759.

444

Juana I. Marín-Arrese

Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Volume 2. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1997. Consciousness, Construal, and Subjectivity. In: Maxim I. Stamenov (ed.), Language Structure, Discourse and the Access to Consciousness, 49–75. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Langacker, Ronald W. 2000. Grammar and Conceptualization. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2002. Deixis and subjectivity. In: Frank Brisard (ed.), Grounding. The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference, 1–28. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2007. Control and the Mind/body Duality: Knowing vs. Effecting. Plenary lecture presented at the 10th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, July 15–20, 2007, University of Krakow, Krakow. (Published in: Elzbieta Tabakowska, Michael Choinski and Lukasz Wiraszka (eds.), Cognitive Linguistics in Action: From Theory to Application and Back, 165–207. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter). Langacker, Ronald W. 2008. Cognitive Grammar. A Basic Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 2009. Investigations in Cognitive Grammar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Lyons, John. 1977. Semantics, Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. 2004. Evidential and epistemic qualifications in the discourse of fact and opinion: A comparable corpus study. In: Juana I. Marín-Arrese, (ed.), Perspectives on Evidentiality and Modality, 153–184. Madrid: Editorial Complutense. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. 2006. Commitment and subjectivity/intersubjectivity in discourse. In: Marta Carretero, Laura Hidalgo, Julia Lavid, Elena Martínez Caro, JoAnne Neff, Soledad Pérez de Ayala and Esther Sánchez-Pardo (eds.), A Pleasure of Life in Words: A Festschrift for Angela Downing, 647–671. Madrid: CERSA. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. 2007a. Stance and subjectivity/intersubjectivity in political discourse: A contrastive case study. Belgian Journal of English Language and Literatures 5: 113–132. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. 2007b. Commitment and Subjectivity in the Discourse of Opinion columns and Leading articles. RAEL. Volumen: 1. Special issue: Different Approaches to Newspaper Opinion Discourse. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. 2009. Effective vs. epistemic stance and subjectivity/intersubjectivity in political discourse: A case study. In: Anastasios Tsangalidis and Roberta Facchinetti (eds.), Studies on English Modality. In Honour of Frank R. Palmer, 23–52. Berlin: Peter Lang. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. 2011a. Effective vs. Epistemic Stance and Subjectivity in Political Discourse: Legitimising Strategies and Mystification of Responsibility. In: Christopher Hart (ed.), Critical Discourse Studies in Context and Cognition, 193–223. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Marín-Arrese, J. 2011b. Epistemic Legitimising Strategies, Commitment and Accountability in Discourse. Discourse Studies 13(6): 789–797. Marín-Arrese, Juana I. 2012. Epistemic Stance in the Discourse of Public and Parliamentary Inquiries: A cross-linguistic study. Plenary lecture at the Modality, Corpus, Discourse Conference, 7–8 June 2012, Lund University, Lund. Martin, James R. and Peter R. White. 2005. The Language of Evaluation. Appraisal in English. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Matlock, Teenie. 1989. Metaphor and the grammaticalization of evidentials. Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society 15: 215–225. Mushin, Ilana. 2001. Evidentiality and Epistemological Stance. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Stancetaking and Inter/Subjectivity in the Iraq Inquiry: Blair vs. Brown

445

Nuyts, Jan. 2001. Epistemic Modality, Language, and Conceptualization: A Cognitive-Pragmatic Perspective. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Nuyts, Jan. 2012. Notions of (inter)subjectivity. English Text Construction 5(1): 53–76. Palmer, Frank. 2001. Mood and Modality. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Papafragou, Anna. 2000. Modality: Issues in the semantics-pragmatics interface. Oxford: Elsevier. Plungian, Vladimir. 2001. The place of evidentiality within the universal grammatical space. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 349–357. Sanders, José. 1999. Degree of subjectivity in epistemic modals and perspective representation. In: Leon G. De Stadler and Christoph Eyrich (eds.), Issues in Cognitive Linguistics, 471–489. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Sanders, José and Wilbert Spooren. 1996. Subjectivity and certainty in epistemic modality: A study of Dutch epistemic modifiers. Cognitive Linguistics 7(3): 241–64. Sperber, Dan, Fabrice Clément, Christophe Heintz, Olivier Mascaro, Hugo Mercier, Gloria Origgi and Deidre Wilson. 2010. Epistemic vigilance. Mind and Language 25: 359–393. Squartini, Mario. 2008. Lexical vs. grammatical evidentiality in French and Italian. Linguistics 46(5): 917–947. Traugott, Elizabeth C. 1995. Subjectification in grammaticalisation. In: Dieter Stein and Susan Wright (eds.), Subjectivity and Subjectivisation: Linguistic Perspectives, 31–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Traugott, Elizabeth C. and Richard B. Dasher. 2002. Regularity in Semantic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. van der Auwera, Johan and Vladimir Plungian. 1998. Modality’s semantic map. Linguistic Typology 2(1): 79–124. Weber, David J. 1986. Information perspective, profile and patterns in Quechua. In: Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols. (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 137–155. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. White, Peter R.R. 2003. Beyond modality and hedging: a dialogic view of the language of intersubjective stance. Text 23(2): 259–284. White, Peter R.R. 2006. Evaluative semantics and ideological positioning in journalistic discourse: A new framework for analysis. In: Inger Lassen, Jeanne Strunck and Torben Vestergaard (eds.), Mediating Ideology in Text and Image, 37–67. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Wiemer, Björn. 2010. Hearsay in European languages: toward an integrative account of grammatical and lexical marking. In: Gabriele Diewald and Elena Smirnova (eds.), Linguistic Realization of Evidentiality in European Languages, 59–129. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Willett, Thomas. 1988. A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticalization of evidentiality. Studies in Language 12: 51–97.

Subject index 253–254, 268–270, 272–273, 277 actually 253–263, 267–269, 271, 273–277 adverbial 281, 294, 301, 304, 308 American English 120–122, 125–127, 130– 132, 136–137, 149–150 Angloversal 237 annotation 317–319, 321–322, 324–328, 330–331, 333–335, 340–341, 343–344, 346–348, 350–353 apparently 321, 345, 348–349, 351 Appraisal (Theory) 379, 381–384, 386, 390

ACT

baseline 61, 64–65, 67–69, 74–76, 78, 81, 84, 86–87, 90–91 basically 253, 255, 257, 274–277 be going to 155, 158–164 behove 171–176, 178–180, 185, 187–189, 191, 194–197 better 119–123, 125–144, 146, 148–150 British English 119–122, 125–128, 130, 132– 133, 136–137, 149–150 can/could 58, 360–361 Catalan 172, 187, 196–197 central modal verbs 366–367 certainly 318, 320–321, 336–338, 340–344, 351 citizen journalism 359 clearly 319–321, 345, 348–350, 352 Cognitive Grammar 9, 202–204, 207, 209, 213, 218 colloquialism 155–157, 159–167 colloquialization 96, 108, 110–111, 113–114, 155, 159 commitment 224–225, 254, 264, 283, 308, 319, 384, 411, 422–424, 437 comparative modality 120–121, 123, 128, 149 complement 281–282, 285–296 complementation 30, 43–49, 51 cómpre 172–177, 179, 183–188, 190–192, 194–197 conceivably 321, 323, 330–331, 334, 351 conceptualizer, 6–7, 12, 14–15, 27–30, 33,

35, 42–52, 204, 411–412, 424, 427– 430, 435–437, 439, 441 contextual features 433–434 contraction 155, 159–160, 162, 167 contrastive 284, 290, 311 control 3–17, 19–26, 28–29, 32–37, 41–43, 46, 48–50, 52–53 copular 281–282, 285–287, 292–293, 295– 296, 299–302, 305, 308, 312 core modals 95–96, 99–102, 105–108, 110– 114 corpus/corpora 95–111, 113–114, 284, 289– 291, 293, 302, 304, 306, 309, 311, 313, 317, 319–320, 322 – Brown Family of corpora 95–100, 102, 106, 108–111, 114 – Diachronic Corpus of Present-Day Spoken English (DCPSE) 57–58, 61–68, 71, 73, 76, 80, 87, 89–90, 92–93 – Santa Barbara corpus of spoken American English 201, 205, 219 creole 236–237 cross-linguistic 281, 284, 289, 312 'd better 119–122, 125–134, 136–138, 140– 142, 145–147, 149–150 decidedly 337, 341–342, 344, 352 definitely 320–321, 341–343, 352 degree 318–320, 337, 344, 353 deictic centre 380, 388–389, 399–401, 406–408 deontic modal/modality 3, 14, 121, 124–125, 133–134, 165, 224, 226, 318, 323, 328, 330, 332, 351, 353, 385, 405, 408 dynamic modality 227, 229, 318, 323–324, 327–332, 334, 351, 353 emergent modals 95–96, 99–100, 106–114 Engagement 379–386, 390, 392, 398, 402, 407, 413 epistemic 41, 281–282, 284, 287–289, 295– 304, 307–308, 311–312 epistemic connotations 207, 211–214, 219 epistemic contingency 207, 218

448

Subject index

epistemic modal/modality 16, 223–224, 272, 281–283, 285–286, 301–302, 304, 311–312, 317–321, 323–330, 332–344, 351–353, 415, 425, 435 epistemic stance 411–415, 418–422, 424– 425, 434, 436–438, 441 ESSENCE 253–255, 268–270, 272–277 evaluation 379, 383, 386, 391, 411 evidential 40, 282–289, 295–296, 298–304, 308–309, 311–312 evidential strategies 419, 424–425 evidentiality 283, 286, 317–321, 337, 339, 345–346, 348, 351–352, 385, 415–418 experiencer 171, 173, 175, 178–179, 184–191, 195–197 253–254, 268–270, 272–273, 277 factivity 412, 421–422, 435 force 3–5, 7, 15–17, 19–25, 27, 33, 36–38, 40, 43, 51–52 future-projecting modality 225–226, 232, 241

FACT

Galician 171–176, 183, 185, 187, 191, 194, 196–197 genre 57, 59–61, 64, 77–78, 80, 90, 92–93 grammaticalization 95–96, 108, 110, 113– 114, 125, 131–132, 140, 149–150, 174– 175, 178, 188, 191, 193–197 grammaticization 13, 45, 51 grounding 10, 18, 22, 27–30, 38–52, 203, 213 habitual (aspect) 231, 235–237, 240–241 had better 119–124, 126–138, 140–142, 146–150 have got to 155, 158–162, 164, 167 have to 95, 111–112, 155, 158–164 hedge 288, 291, 307–310 identity 379–381, 386, 396, 402, 407 Imperfective Paradox (Dowty 1979) 243 impersonal verb 171, 174 in fact 253–259, 262–263, 267–269, 271– 275 indexicality 380

Indian English 237, 240 inference 223, 228–229, 242–245, 282– 283, 285–286, 297–300, 416–418 intersubjective positioning 379–380, 383, 386, 411–412, 424 legitimising strategies 413–415, 421, 424, 438, 440 manner 317, 323, 332, 341–346, 349–350, 352–353 may/might 58, 360–361, 438–439 mirativity 317, 320, 333–334, 337, 346–347, 351, 353 modal 281–286, 290–291, 294, 299, 301– 302, 304, 308, 311, 312 modal auxiliaries 57–58, 63, 65, 73, 76, 95, 99, 101 modal/modality, effective vs. epistemic 3, 14–24, 27, 32, 37–38, 51–52 modality 3, 104, 106–108, 119, 178, 221– 226, 242, 257, 360–362, 379–380, 383–385, 393, 405, 407, 408 multifunctional 281, 284, 288–291, 301, 304, 308, 311–312 must 95, 100–103, 108, 111–112 must/should 360 necessity 171–173, 175, 178, 180, 184–185, 187, 196–197 need 171–173, 175–176, 178–184, 187–197 need to 95, 109, 111–112 newspaper discourse 285, 361 news-related blogs 359, 362–366, 371, 374– 375 non-specific nouns 221, 226, 232–236 obviously 320–321, 345–349, 351 opinion 324–327, 337–338, 340, 353 optative 121, 124, 133–135 orientation-switch 225 parenthetical 285–288, 293–298, 301, 304, 309 percentage swing 66, 69, 71, 73, 75, 78–79, 85

Subject index

personal pronouns 368, 379–380, 386, 388, 394, 396, 403, 407–408 plainly 321, 345, 350, 352 plausibly 321, 323, 331–333, 351 positively 321, 341, 344, 352 possibly 319, 321, 323–324, 328–331, 334, 351 Postcolonial Englishes 156, 163, 166 pragmatic map 253, 274, 277 prescriptivism 157, 166 present tense 201, 203–204, 207, 209, 212, 218 progressive aspect 201–219 proverb 141–142, 146, 150 quasi-modals 155–167 raising 30, 32–33, 35–36, 50, 281–282, 312 253–254, 268–270, 272–273, 275, 277 reality conception 6, 15, 17, 40–41, 46, 48 really 253–260, 262–277 recent change 62 register variation 127, 129–131, 133 responsibility 47–48, 388, 398, 411–412, 414, 422, 424, 428, 430–431, 435–436, 439 Romance languages/verbs/modals 171, 173–175, 191, 194, 196–197

449

simple swing 69–73, 75–78 253–254, 269–270, 273, 277 Singapore English 237–241 Spanish 172–173, 175, 187, 196–197 spoken English 57–58, 61–62, 88, 90 stance 258, 379–384, 386, 390, 403–404, 407–408, 411–414, 426–427 stancetaking 411–414, 441 Standard English 95 standard of comparison 145–148, 150 subjective/intersubjective 10–11, 40, 272– 273, 281–283, 285, 297–298, 307, 309, 388, 403, 411–412, 424–425, 428, 435– 436 subjectivity/intersubjectivity 227, 283, 379, 384, 411–414, 417, 422, 424–430, 435– 436, 438–439, 441–442 surprise 207, 211–212, 219

SINCERIT Y

REALIT Y

semantic map 253, 255, 272–273, 277 semantic network 205–206, 210, 218 simple present 201–205, 207–209, 212, 215–216, 218

tensed verb phrases 65–69, 72–79, 84, 86, 91, 93 text category 63–64, 66–67, 71–75, 78, 84– 88, 91, 93 translation (zero) correspondence 284, 289–312 transparency 3, 30–33, 35–38, 51 truly 253–254, 256–259, 265–270, 273–275 TRUTH 253–254, 268–270, 272–273, 277 want to 95, 111–112, 155, 158–163, 165 will/would 58, 360, 368, 374, 438–439 zero subject 136, 138–140