Energy Resilience and Climate Protection: Energy systems, critical infrastructures, and sustainability goals 3658375639, 9783658375638

Citation preview

Heinz-Adalbert Krebs · Patricia Hagenweiler

Energy Resilience and Climate Protection Energy systems, critical infrastructures, and sustainability goals

Energy Resilience and Climate Protection

Heinz-Adalbert Krebs · Patricia Hagenweiler

Energy Resilience and Climate Protection Energy systems, critical infrastructures, and sustainability goals

Heinz-Adalbert Krebs Green Excellence GmbH Düsseldorf, Germany

Patricia Hagenweiler Green Excellence GmbH Düsseldorf, Germany

ISBN 978-3-658-37563-8 ISBN 978-3-658-37564-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37564-5 © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Responsible Editor: Daniel Froehlich This Springer Vieweg imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

For better readability, the masculine form is used when referring to roles and persons. Corresponding terms apply in principle to all genders for the purposes of equal treatment. The abbreviated form of language is for editorial reasons only and does not imply any judgement.

Eine neue Art von Denken ist notwendig, wenn die Menschheit weiterleben will. A new kind of thinking is necessary if humanity is to continue to live. Albert Einstein (1879–1955)

Was wir heute tun, entscheidet darüber, wie die Welt morgen aussieht. What we do today determines what the world will look like tomorrow. Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach (1830– 1916)

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2 Energy Transition and Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

3 Risk Factors of the Power Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Extreme Natural Events and Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Energy Transition and Digitization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Technical and Human Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Cybercrime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Threat of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 11 13 15 16 18

4 Emergency Planning Power Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Stakeholder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Risk Management Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Communication Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21 22 27 35 39

5 Resilience Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Sustainable Energy Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Climate Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Energy Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Structural and Infrastructural Adaptations to Climate Change . . . . 5.6 Innovative Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.1 Artificial Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.2 Unmanned Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.3 Warning Systems and Warning Apps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41 42 44 46 50 54 57 58 60 63

xi

xii

Contents

5.7 Central Platforms and Data Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 Data Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 IT and Cyber Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69 71 76

6 Resilience in Smart Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

7 Conclusion and Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

List of abbreviations

acatech AGEB AI ASB BABZ BBK BCM BDEW BECCS BET BGR BIS BIWAPP BKA BMBF BMG BMI BMU BMWi BNetzA BOS BPA BSI

Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen e. V. Artificial Intelligence Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Bundesakademie für Bevölkerungsschutz und Zivile Verteidigung Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe Business Continuity Management Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e. V. Bio-Energy and CCS Büro für Energiewirtschaft und technische Planung Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe Bank for International Settlements Bürger Info- & Warn-App Bundeskriminalamt Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung Bundesministerium für Gesundheit Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit Bundesminsterium für Wirtschaft und Energie Bundesnetzagentur Behörden und Organisationen mit Sicherheitsaufgaben Bundes-Presse-Amt Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

xiii

xiv

BSIG BVerfG BZgA CBRN CCS CCU CDR CFSP CHP CI CO2 DAB+ DACCS DAS Destatis DIN DLRG DNS DPMS DRK DSGVO DSK DSO DWD EAS EASAC EEG ENISA EnRicH EnSiG ENTSO-E EnWG ERNCIP EU EWF EY

List of abbreviations

Gesetz über das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Bundesverfassungsgericht Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Carbon Capture and Storage Carbon Capture and Utilization Carbon Dioxide Removal Common Foreign and Security Policy Combined Heat and Power Critical Infrastructures Carbon Dioxide Digital Audio Broadcasting Direct Air Capture and CCS Deutsche Anpassungsstrategie an den Klimawandel Statistisches Bundesamt Deutsches Institut für Normung Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft e. V. Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie Data Protection Management System Deutsches Rotes Kreuz Datenschutz-Grundverordnung Datenschutzkonferenz Distribution System Operator Deutscher Wetterdienst ENTSO-E Awareness System European Academies Science Advisory Council Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz European Network and Information Security Agency European Robotics – Hackathon Energiesicherungsgesetz European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity Energiewirtschaftsgesetz European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection European Union Emergency Warning Functionality Ernst & Young

List of abbreviations

GDP GDPR GG GHG GIS GMLZ IASS ICT IfSG IFSH IoE IoT IPCC IRENA IT IT-SiG ITU JUH KSG KWKG LBEG LOEWE MHD MoWaS NATO NINA NIS OT PLS Pro-PK PVC RKI RPA SAIDIEnWG SatWaS SCADA SDG

xv

Gross Domestic Product General Data Protection Regulation Grundgesetz Greenhouse Gas Geographical Information Systems Gemeinsames Melde- und Lagezentrum Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies Information and Communication Technologies Infektionsschutzgesetz Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik Internet of Everything Internet of Things Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change International Renewable Energy Agency Information Technology IT-Sicherheitsgesetz International Telecommunication Union Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz Landesamt für Bergbau, Energie und Geologie Landes-Offensive zur Entwicklung Wissenschaftlichökonomischer Exzellenz Malteser Hilfsdienst e. V. Modular Warning System North Atlantic Treaty Organization Notfallinformations- und Nachrichten-App Network and Information Systems Operational Technology Plattform Lernende Systeme Programm Polizeiliche Kriminalprävention des Bundes und der Länder Polyvinyl Chloride Robert Koch-Institut Robotic Process Automation System Average Interruption Duration Index Satellite-based Warning System Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Sustainable Development Goals

xvi

SPOC SR1.5 SRCCL SROCC THW TSM TSO UAS UBA UN VDE VDE-FNN VDMA VKU WLAN

List of abbreviations

Single Points of Contact Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C Special Report on Climate Change and Land Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate Technisches Hilfswerk Technical Safety Management Transmission System Operator Unmanned Aircraft Systems Umweltbundesamt United Nations Verband der Elektrotechnik Elektronik Informationstechnik e. V. Forum Netztechnik/Netzbetrieb im VDE Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau VDMA e. V. Verband kommunaler Unternehmen Wireless Local Area Network

1

Introduction

As social, technical and economic hubs, and as centers of industry and infrastructure, cities are particularly frequently affected by technology-related disasters, political and social conflicts, and hazards such as pandemics, extreme natural events and terrorist attacks, as numerous events in recent years have made clear. The protection of urban areas and their population is associated with numerous challenges, such as the supply and possible evacuation of many people in high-density urban areas in the event of an accident at a nearby nuclear power plant. Dealing with vulnerable groups affected by catastrophic events, such as financially weak families, immigrants, or elderly people living alone, is also a particular challenge, making effective and timely risk communication increasingly important, as was evident and confirmed in the Corona pandemic (2020/2021). Due to increasing urbanization and natural and man-made changes, urban disaster preparedness and population protection as well as crisis management will become increasingly important in the coming years. For example, people in coastal cities will be increasingly affected by the increase in storm surges and extreme heat waves due to the consequences of climate change. In addition, digitization and the associated complexity of infrastructure systems and services, as well as the dependence on these systems, will continue to increase, so that social and economic life can come to a standstill across the board if information and communication systems fail. Last but not least, an increase in social unrest, cyberattacks and terrorist attacks can also be expected. Against this background, increased investment in urban disaster preparedness is an important contribution and a “conditio sine qua non” for overall societal resilience to strengthen the ability to resist and adapt to the challenges of the future.1

1

Cf. Maduz/Roth (2017) p. 1.

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-A. Krebs and P. Hagenweiler, Energy Resilience and Climate Protection, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37564-5_1

1

2

1

Introduction

During the Corona crisis, the global lack of preparedness for pandemics became apparent, even though the probability of epidemic outbreaks and their global spread has increased significantly in recent decades and was thus to some extent predictable. Also, warnings about and exercises to cope with pandemics were taken seriously only in small circles of experts, and most countries were poorly prepared for the social and economic consequences of the pandemic. Moreover, it can be assumed that even rich countries will reach the limits of their financial capacities in similar crisis situations, provided they occur in shorter periods of time, if they in turn have to contain the economic consequences with extensive financial resource. In particular, it became obvious that even states with large and differentiated economies are clearly dependent on supplies of goods, the so-called supply chains, which were not substitutable at the national level in the short term, and this led to (unequal) competition for imports of important good. Moreover, it has been shown that in a globally interconnected world, complex crisis phenomena can mutually reinforce each other within a short period of time and thus escalate. In the wake of the Corona pandemic, existing deficits in preparedness for major risks have become apparent, which cannot be managed by nation-states alone, especially since the probability of such events has risen continuously in recent decades and will continue to increase with growing globalisation and urbanisation, as well as through climate change and species extinction. Awareness of hitherto underestimated or suppressed risks, such as climate change, global pandemics or long-term power outages, has also increased.2 According to the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, IFSH), there is an urgency to reevaluate the expected existential risks for the population and society in Germany as well as the resulting requirements for their short-term and long-term protection and to take a holistic view of security threats, which includes not only economic but also constitutional, medical and psychological consequences and requires regular stocktaking. In addition, precautionary measures and resilience to existential risks must be fundamentally further expanded. This also includes reducing dependencies in the supply chains from abroad that are relevant for the security of the population, in order to guarantee the emergency supply of necessary goods, as well as ensuring sufficient infrastructure to supply the population in crisis situations, such as pandemics or nuclear accidents. In the context of global solidarity, it is also necessary to strengthen the European Union (EU) and existing multilateral agreements and institutions in the area of comprehensive risk prevention and

2

Cf. Brzoska/Neuneck/Scheffran (2021) p. 2 ff.

1

Introduction

3

resilience in the event of a crisis, such as (global) climate change (Paris Agreement) and (global) health prevention,3 especially since the crisis has made it clear how much humanity is interdependent and dependent on each other. It is also necessary to recognize that there will be an even longer-term and much deeper crisis in which the Corona pandemic is embedded: Like a pandemic, climate change and the loss of biodiversity are crises that know no national boundaries and can only be prevented or mitigated if effective measures are taken in good time, especially since not only will the costs of managing the crisis already be many times higher than those that would have been incurred if timely action had been taken to prevent it.4 The National Pandemic Plan of the Robert Koch Institute (Robert KochInstitut, RKI) from 2017 points out the special importance for the maintenance of the state community in the course of possible effects of an influenza pandemic on organizations and facilities of the so-called critical infrastructures, which include the sectors energy, information technology and telecommunications, transport and traffic, water, food as well as finance and insurance. The aim is to maintain operations within the framework of business continuity management (BCM), to preserve the operational infrastructure, to limit economic damage and to supply the population with important products and services.5 In dealing with future unexpected events, such as pandemics or natural disasters, which will have unexpected developments and effects on critical infrastructure facilities, the concept of resilience has proven its worth, with the aim of maintaining all relevant social and economic functions through system adjustments and ensuring their functionality.6 While the ability to respond to unexpected disruptions was initially associated with human skills alone, due to digital connectivity and the use of artificial intelligence (AI), the ability of technical solutions is increasingly coming to the fore which makes it possible to react to new unexpected situations, thus creating a new level of potential resilience. For example, the use of digital technologies can prevent inefficient structures, e.g. in delivery, and improve resilience and efficiency at the same time. In addition, the ability to analyze networks and predict potential weaknesses, especially in complex network structures, is a key aspect of resilience, as the development of algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI) can identify patterns and dependencies that only become visible in a crisis using traditional methods. During the Corona pandemic, not only did the value 3

Cf. Brzoska/Neuneck/Scheffran (2021) p. 5 ff. Cf. Rosenberger (2020) p. 207 ff. 5 Cf. RKI (2017) p. 43. 6 Cf. Streibich/Winter (2020) p. 6; Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 24. 4

4

1

Introduction

of digital technologies become apparent in the context of telecommunications, but many processes were only digitized in the wake of the crisis, often making them more agile and flexible than before and thus better equipped to withstand future crises. In this framework, digital sovereignty, which ensures a reliable and independent telecommunications, cloud and data infrastructure even in crises, is seen as a key competence. It is therefore essential to drive forward the digital transformation in Germany in relevant areas of society and to solve the associated challenges of cyber security, data security and data protection, as well as to develop reference architectures and standards in order to be able to implement scalable solutions for digitization.7

7

Cf. Streibich/Winter (2020) p. 6 f.

2

Energy Transition and Climate Change

The energy transition adopted by the German government in 2011 was aimed in particular at a gradual shutdown of nuclear power plants by 2022, the development and use of renewable energies, and a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 ) by 40% by 2040 and by 80 to 95% by 2050, primarily through the phaseout of coal. In addition to renewable primary energy sources, which include wind energy, biomass, solar energy, hydropower and geothermal energy in particular, hydrogen is also becoming increasingly important as a versatile energy carrier, energy storage medium and element of sector coupling in the context of the energy transition.1 The energy transition is being driven at the local level in particular by the municipal utilities, which are primarily active in the fields of electricity, gas, heating, water, wastewater, waste recycling and waste disposal, as well as local public transport, by installing wind and solar plants, modernizing distribution networks, operating combined heat and power (CHP) plants and heating networks, expanding charging infrastructure for electromobility, offering efficiency services, and implementing flexibility options.2 In addition to their core business, they also provide services in the areas of telecommunications and Internet, city cleaning, street lighting, electromobility, pool operation and parks as well as, depending on the location, in other areas of logistics, e.g., airports and ports, or in specific fields of activity related to services of general interest, such as housing supply and project development. New areas of interest include broadband supply and electromobility, as well as car sharing and smart homes. Municipal utilities are not only active in various markets, they also frequently own the infrastructure, 1

Cf. Doleski (2017) p. 7; Radtke/Kersting (2018) p. 3 f.; Ohlhorst (2019) p. 98; BMWi (2020) p. 2 f., p. 5; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 2. 2 Cf. Jenner/Schmitz-Grethlein (2017) p. 10. © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-A. Krebs and P. Hagenweiler, Energy Resilience and Climate Protection, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37564-5_2

5

6

2

Energy Transition and Climate Change

in particular the municipal electricity, gas and heating networks, the water and wastewater networks, and increasingly also the digital infrastructure.3 With their portfolio, they can efficiently combine electricity, heat, water, wastewater, waste and transport and turn ideas into real projects on the ground as well as support public or non-profit institutions to participate in the opportunities of the energy transition. In addition, they have the opportunity to let citizens participate in the energy transition. Through citizen cooperatives and other forms of participation, they can offer small-scale private investments in renewable energy, efficiency projects, CHP plants, or storage. Furthermore, they can work with local housing developers to develop concepts for energy retrofits as well as renewable energy supplies for both homeowners and rental properties. As mobility providers (sharing) and operators of charging stations, they can also sustainably drive forward the transformation of transportation. Last but not least, their decentralization and on-site knowledge enables them to test and market precisely tailored ideas.4 The endangered competitive position and the accompanying energy transition have created an economic necessity for the traditional energy supply business to develop new (digital) business ideas that offer customers not only electricity and water, but also a comprehensive service and expanded products based on innovative developments in the context of the energy and transport turnaround, in order to exploit cost-cutting potential and growth opportunities and to be able to withstand increasing competitive pressure and implement adaptation measures in the wake of climate change.5 The increasing pressure to act on climate protection is closely linked to the energy transition. Anthropogenic climate change, caused primarily by the increased proportion of carbon dioxide (CO2 ) due to the burning of fossil fuels and the associated increase in global warming, is changing the frequency, intensity and regional occurrence of extreme weather events with gradual climatic changes.6 The global consequences of climate change are already being felt in Germany, as evidenced by the dry summers in 2018 and 2019 and the heavy rainfall events in 2016 and 2017. This has consequences not only for human health, agriculture and forestry, and private and public buildings and infrastructures, but also and especially for nature, which manifests itself in the displacement or immigration of animal and plant species and in turn has implications for humans and

3

Cf. Jenner/Schmitz-Grethlein (2017) p. 4. Cf. Jenner/Schmitz-Grethlein (2017) p. 10 f. 5 Cf. Doleski (2017) p. 9; EY/BET (2018) p. 5, p. 50. 6 Cf. UBA (2020) p. 13. 4

2

Energy Transition and Climate Change

7

their economic activities. These impacts call for urgent action at all levels of government, both in terms of climate protection and adaptation to the consequences of climate change in Germany, in order to effectively address the environmental, social and economic risks associated with the unavoidable impacts and to mitigate damages and adaptation costs. In this context, the German government presented a German Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change (Deutsche Anpassungsstrategie an den Klimawandel, DAS) in 2008, which has been continuously developed since then with the aim of reducing the vulnerability of German society, economy and environment and increasing adaptive capacity. A total of fifteen fields of action were identified, in which the essential requirements for action and measures are described. These are as follows: Construction, biodiversity, soil, energy, finance, fishery, forestry and silviculture, industry and commerce, agriculture, human health, tourism, transport and transport infrastructure, water balance, water management, coastal and marine protection, as well as the crosscutting fields of action of civil protection and regional planning, regional and urban land use planning. Even if global warming is limited in accordance with the Paris Climate Agreement, further climate change can be expected.7 Even if the consequences of climate change are regionally limited, they extend across political borders due to global physical and economic interdependencies, so that the Paris Agreement also made it clear that adaptation to climate change must be approached as a global challenge. According to a study by the German Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt, UBA), it was shown that the consequences of climate change that arise outside Europe have a significantly greater impact on the German economy via global trade than those that arise within Europe, since EU regions are comparatively less affected by the direct consequences of climate change than other regions of the world. The transnational impacts of global climate change cannot be mitigated by a general reduction of international trade relations, especially since global trade and the division of labor in the production of goods and services not only build on the relative strengths of all countries, but in particular lead to interconnectedness, which is of central importance for the social and political stability of the world. Instead, it is important to optimize the resilience of the German economy through greater diversification of global trade relations and value chains, and to support adaptation measures in the severely affected regions of the world, which are important in terms of supplier and sales markets and are difficult to substitute, such as emerging economies in South and Southeast Asia and China in particular, especially since industries such as Germany, as the main cause of climate change, 7

Cf. UBA (2019) p. 6; DAS (2020) p. 4 f.

8

2

Energy Transition and Climate Change

have a central responsibility to support climate protection and climate adaptation in the more severely affected regions of the world. In addition, it is important to maintain technological competitiveness in machinery and electronic equipment in order to minimize welfare and production losses. On the basis of the study by the German Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt, UBA) study results and in view of the experience of the Corona pandemic, trade integration strategies should be reviewed and opportunities identified to diversify the risks of climate-related exposure of intermediate inputs and to minimize the considerable dependencies on single commodities from highly climate-exposed countries.8

8

Cf. UBA (2020) p. 13 ff.

3

Risk Factors of the Power Supply

The increasingly interconnected, fast-moving, unmanageable and unpredictable world brings with it an unprecedented variety of known and as yet unknown challenges as well as risks. Among the world’s most influential analyses of the global risks of our time is considered the Global Risks Report of the annual World Economic Forum held in Switzerland. The January 2021 report, as a result of the approximately 1,000 risk experts surveyed worldwide, lists for the first time seven instead of five hazards that are most likely to occur (in the order shown), including extreme weather events, failure of climate change mitigation measures, human-caused environmental damage, infectious diseases, loss of biodiversity, digital power concentration, and digital inequality. While infectious diseases and the digital aspect are mentioned for the first time, the identified threats of data misuse and theft, as well as cyberattacks from 2017 to 2019, are no longer listed. Environmental aspects have become increasingly important as potential hazards in recent years. The respondents listed infectious diseases, the failure of climate protection measures, weapons of mass destruction, the loss of biodiversity, the raw materials crisis, man-made environmental damage and the livelihood crisis among the most dangerous and thus most consequential dangers.1 Some aspects can be traced back to the Corona pandemic (2020/2021). In the Allianz Risk Barometer, an annual survey of the most important business risks among approximately 2,700 global risk experts, business interruption, pandemic outbreak, cyber incidents, market developments, changes in legislation and regulation, natural disasters, fires/explosions, macroeconomic developments, climate change/perceived weather volatility, and political risks and violence are listed as probable risks for 2021. In this study, environmental risks and cyber risks are also considered to be very significant, as they are causes of business interruptions, with risks related 1

Cf. Fathi (2019) p. 5 ff., p. 14 ff.; World Economic Forum (2021) p. 7, p. 14 fig. IV.

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-A. Krebs and P. Hagenweiler, Energy Resilience and Climate Protection, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37564-5_3

9

10

3

Risk Factors of the Power Supply

to the Corona pandemic (2020/2021) coming to the fore in 2021.2 The potential danger with a relatively high probability of occurrence of a global pandemic has already been pointed out in older studies (since 2007).3 Some of these global risks also have an impact on critical infrastructures and, in particular, on those of the energy supply. A high level of functionality of critical infrastructures (CI), which include the sectors of energy, information technology and telecommunications, transport and traffic, health, water, food, finance and insurance, government and administration, as well as media and culture, is indispensable for a modern industrial society. The above sectors can be grouped into 29 industries, with the energy sector subdivided into electricity, gas, petroleum and district heating.4 In particular, the reliable provision and supply of energy services is an indispensable part of the basic supply of German households and companies.5 As a critical service, the power supply is to be classified as particularly important in that all other critical infrastructures mentioned depend on it.6 Today’s society depends more than ever on a reliable power supply, not least due to increasing digitization. With the Internet of Things (IoT), the vulnerability of infrastructures in the event of power failures is increased even further and extends far into the private sphere (smart home). Despite a high level of electricity supply, major power outages due to natural events, technical faults or attacks in Germany and Europe cannot be ruled out.7 Prolonged and widespread power outages can have serious economic and political-social consequences, endangering public safety and severely limiting the supply of basic necessities such as drinking water, heating or cooling, medical services, food and cash transfers. Since the German and European power supply is and has been very reliable up to now, it is important for politicians to ensure the reliability and safety of the electrical energy system in the long term by creating suitable framework conditions in the course of the energy transition.8 The hazard potential for critical infrastructures can be differentiated according to its focus on natural hazards and anthropogenic hazards. Natural hazards include 2

Cf. Fathi (2019) p. 8; Allianz (2021). Cf. Fathi (2019) p. 15. 4 Cf. § 2 (10) BSIG (2021); BMI (2011) p. 8; Schläger/Thode (2018) p. 494 f.; BBK (2019e) p. 16 f., p. 38 table 2; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 285. 5 Cf. acatech (2020) p. 15. 6 Cf. Bartsch/Frey (2017) p. 301 ff.; BBK (2019a) p. 17 ff. 7 Cf. BBK (2018) p. 9; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 285 f. 8 Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 11. 3

3.1 Extreme Natural Events and Climate Change

11

extreme weather, earthquakes, fire, epidemics/pandemics, and extraterrestrial hazards, while anthropogenic hazards include accidents/disasters, technical/human error, system failure, sabotage, and terrorism/organized crime/wars. Here, the greatest risks are considered to be a longer-term area-wide power supply failure, an IT failure, a pandemic, cascading effects, unknown situations and the behavior of the population.9

3.1

Extreme Natural Events and Climate Change

In the context of severe weather conditions, the recent onset of winter in November 2005 had a massive impact on the power supply in the western Münsterland region, where a heavy snowfall combined with strong gusts of wind caused 50 high-voltage pylons to collapse, resulting in a power outage that lasted for days, the largest in Germany’s post-war history, affecting more than 250,000 people in cities and towns in the districts of Steinfurt, Coesfeld, Borken (parts of North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony). Due to climate change and the associated global warming, an increase in further extreme weather events in Germany and worldwide can be expected in the future, which will become even more severe in the future, such as floods, inundations or hurricanes. For example, the hurricane Kyrill in 2007 not only led to power outages in parts of Germany, but also had catastrophic consequences for forest stands, especially in parts of North Rhine-Westphalia.10 Moreover, impacts on infrastructures can already be anticipated today by taking climate change into account. For example, higher temperatures, more irregular precipitation and drier summers will have a negative impact on the operation of energy conversion plants and facilities, as well as on the performance of hydroelectric, coal-fired, natural gas and nuclear power plants, which require an adequate supply of cooling water, and on energy transport and supply. As a result, supply shortages, energy price increases, and supply disruptions are already being recognized, with effects primarily on the supply and demand for electricity and heat, but also on the supply of raw materials, electricity transmission, and distribution. Also, in the future, utilities may increasingly be forced to reduce the output of river-cooled power plants to comply with water law and safety requirements or to increase the temperature of the discharged water, but this will adversely affect river ecosystems in addition to the already elevated 9

Cf. Voßschmidt/Karsten (2019) p. 22 f. table 1. Cf. Menski/Gardemann (2011) p. 1 f.; Zettl/Nell (2019) p. 227.

10

12

3

Risk Factors of the Power Supply

water temperature during hot spells. Furthermore, the electricity consumption of households and companies increases during hot spells due to the more intensive use of air-conditioning and other systems for cooling buildings. Moreover, higher temperatures will also reduce heating requirements and thus expenditure on heating energy and increase the need for cooling. The greatest damage caused by extreme events, however, will occur in the transportation infrastructure on roads and rails, which will require concepts and investments in roadways that are as heat resistant as possible. The avoidance and consequential costs arising from the effects of climate change must be borne by various players, including rail infrastructure companies, municipalities and the federal government. In addition, a reliable supply of raw materials to conventional power plants may also be impaired, e.g. by supply bottlenecks no longer being possible via shipping during prolonged high or low water. In Switzerland, for example, goods have often had to be transferred from ships to trains during hot spells in the recent past because the water level was too low. Conversely, there is less cold-related damage to roads and rails. In the event of extreme weather events such as storms and lightning strikes, power grids are damaged, as already happened in the Münsterland region in 2005, and electricity transmission and distribution are thus put at massive risk. Climate change can also affect renewable energy plants. In the context of biomass production, the condition of the soil can hardly be protected, so that this can have an impact on the yield of biomass plants. Changes in precipitation levels are also already having an impact on the output of hydropower plants and dams, as demonstrated in 2020 in North Rhine-Westphalia, for example. In addition, the requirements for the stability of solar and wind power plants will also increase in the future in view of the threat of strong winds. Besides the transport and energy sectors, industrial infrastructures are also affected.11 In order to reduce the future costs of infrastructures, the results of a Swiss study see as consequences, on the one hand, mitigating climate change and, on the other hand, preparing for climate change with targeted adaptation measures, for which precise knowledge of climate change and its effects on infrastructures is required. In the context of energy meteorology, research is being conducted into how energy generation from the temporally and spatially changing energy sources of wind and sun can be adapted to changing climatic conditions in order to identify possible risks and determine measures to be taken. In this context, the energy supply companies are already taking precautions against extreme weather events on their own responsibility. These include the high proportion of cable lines as protection against high winds, emergency water connections for power 11

Cf. Bundesregierung (2008) p. 33 f.; Jaag/Schnyder (2019) p. 3 f.

3.2 Energy Transition and Digitization

13

plants if river water cooling is no longer possible due to drought, and reinforcement of the wastewater network in central power plants to improve the drainage of rainwater as protection against heavy rain. Crisis teams have also been formed in order to be able to react as quickly and promptly as possible to damage and outages in the event of extreme weather events.12

3.2

Energy Transition and Digitization

In addition, the energy transition poses major challenges for the power grids. Due to the energy transition that has been initiated in Germany, it is assumed that the probability of large-scale “blackouts” and smaller power failures will increase massively.13 The causes of a widespread power blackout in Germany can essentially be traced back to two aspects. On the one hand, physical destruction of or damage to facilities of the electricity supply system, such as power plants, transformer stations or transmission lines, can be cited as a cause, 43% of which were caused by extreme weather events in the years 1992 to 2002, and on the other hand, grid overloads and disturbances of the system balance can lead to a large-scale power blackout. One of the reasons for this is the future increase in the feed-in of electrical energy from renewable energy sources, in that increased electricity trading together with the energy transition will put a strain on the performance of the electricity grid.14 In the course of digitization, the electrical energy system will undergo massive change, making it more difficult in the future to maintain security of supply at the level to which we are accustomed, as new and unpredictable risks of major blackouts may arise. For example, a study by the National Academy of Science and Engineering (Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften, acatech) identified four basic causes of risk factors in addition to conventional causes of faults, such as transmission line failure, human error in grid management or faults initiated by the market. One root cause is the large number of small, actively controllable generation and consumption systems, such as heat pumps, home storage, electric heaters, or electric cars, which are system-relevant due to their potential undesirable simultaneous behavior. Simultaneous shutdown or reduction of power, as well as simultaneous use of the grid infrastructure by many generating or consuming plants, can have an impact on system stability. In addition, in the 12

Cf. Bundesregierung (2008) p. 35; Jaag/Schnyder (2019) p. 3. Cf. BBK (2018) p. 13; Zettl/Nell (2019) p. 227 f. 14 Cf. BBK (2018) p. 17 ff. 13

14

3

Risk Factors of the Power Supply

future nearly all consumer devices will be connected to the Internet and provided with local computing power. Unregulated and uncertified Internet access thus creates a potential point of attack for cyberattacks, which can influence the power consumption or output of the devices.15 Another basic cause is errors in information and communication technologies (ICT), such as (functional) software errors and cyberattacks due to security vulnerabilities, which can lead to massive threats. This particularly affects the ICT of the actual energy systems. In addition, faulty ICT systems cannot simply be shut down if they are critical for system operation, such as those for monitoring and controlling the grids. Furthermore, large platforms form nodes for many business processes, such as the control of IoT devices, so that a malfunction of such a system would have far-reaching consequences for the functionality of the connected devices.16 The third basic cause is the technical complexity of the system, which makes it more difficult to predict the effects during operation. For example, events in the power grid will develop a greater momentum of their own because the interdependencies between different parts will increase, e.g., due to the growing number of generation units and the resulting increasing complexity, which will make the system in the power grid even more difficult to predict. In addition, the interdependence between the electrical power system and the ICT system can lead to complex, unpredictable incident sequences and, in the event of a blackout, also make it difficult to create a situation picture. This makes a resilience concept that takes all conceivable disturbances and interactions into account from the outset almost impossible. It can also be assumed that many of the networked generation plants will be controlled by artificial intelligence (AI) and learning systems in the future, which may lead to undesirable or unpredictable behavior of consumers or generators. Last but not least, small-scale markets in combination with small-scale consumption and generation systems, such as heat pumps and photovoltaic roof systems, which are automated by learning systems, may threaten system stability due to unexpected behavior.17 The last basic cause is uncertainty about future developments, which makes optimal system design difficult. In the context of regulation and system design, assumptions are made about future developments, e.g., the location and type of 15

Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 13, p. 84 ff. Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 13, p. 86 ff.; search engines such as Shodan, Censys or ZoomEye, which search the Internet for open IP ports, are used to detect security vulnerabilities, cf. Luber/Schmitz (2019). 17 Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 13, p. 89 f. 16

3.3 Technical and Human Failure

15

power generation capacities or disruptive innovations, which, however, usually cover only a small section of possible developments. In particular, implemented technologies and constructed infrastructures, but also different development speeds of energy technology infrastructure and ICT could represent path dependencies, so that the energy system is difficult to adapt to new developments. Furthermore, it can be problematic if system stabilization measures are limited to known patterns and sequences of disruptive events. Finally, undefined responsibilities between network operators, suppliers and other relevant actors as well as the difficult-to-predict development of societal attitudes and framework conditions also harbor risks.18 Based on the risk factors listed, it is clear that the network operators responsible for system security will have to adjust to significantly more uncertainty and unforeseen and unpredictable events in the future, to which they will have to respond and manage critical situations and also be able to quickly return to normal system operation in the event of a blackout. For such critical situations, resilience measures have proven to be effective in mitigating the effects of a disruptive event – even with a brief decline in the quality of supply – without causing the system to collapse, and then quickly returning to normal operations. (cf. Sect. 5.4).19

3.3

Technical and Human Failure

Further physical damage to the power system can be caused by technical failure due to aging, wear and tear, design faults or inadequate maintenance, or by human error.20 Thus, previous nuclear accidents did not result from unforeseeable events beyond the “limits of human cognition” (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany/Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG), but even the severe and catastrophic accidents in Three-Mile-Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) were based on human error and technical inadequacies that were avoidable.21 While the Fukushima nuclear accident was caused by an earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the effects have been exacerbated by human error and technical inadequacies in its aftermath.22 In this context, the reliability of the systems 18

Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 13, p. 90 f. Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 13 f. 20 Cf. BBK (2018) p. 17 ff. 21 Cf. Laufs (2018) p. 1. 22 Cf. Voßschmidt/Karsten (2019) p. 286. 19

16

3

Risk Factors of the Power Supply

is a key factor for operational planning and optimization, even in the case of everyday events. Studies have shown that serious events are mainly caused by human error and that human factors lead to hidden weaknesses in technical systems. These latent faults, such as incorrectly performed maintenance work, design or conceptual errors in a software or inefficient management in the operation, play a decisive role in the occurrence of events, as they are present in a system for years and only lead to serious consequences when the faulty subsystem is requested. The human factor plays a crucial role in all systems in their functioning as operator, product designer, constructor, supervisor or policy maker. In the first instance, only the function of the human as operator is considered, but the problem of human reliability must be considered in the interaction of work level (system scope), context (importance of the work environment) and system complexity between the system elements. In particular, the automation factor, which replaces the human actor, does not necessarily create a safe system. As soon as an automated system cannot control a certain damage scenario, it will enter an unsafe state, which cannot be reversed by humans within a short period of time. Consequently, the resilience of a system depends not only on the human being, but also on the other three aspects mentioned above and their interactions.23 Even events that are considered unlikely because they could not be foreseen by humans (so-called black swans) can have serious consequences, such as the reactor accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima. It is important to be prepared for future events based on these past scenarios. In addition, there are also events that can be predicted to a certain extent (so-called grey swans), such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, but which cannot be determined in concrete terms. Last but not least, technological development is also unpredictable, as can be seen from the example of the Internet, which has changed the world more than any other factor and has been driven by people (technicians). A similar, if not even more serious development can be expected in the field of artificial intelligence.24

3.4

Cybercrime

In addition to the power supply, a properly functioning and secure information technology (IT) is required. Due to the strong interconnection between people, systems and machines (Internet of Things) and the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI), almost everything can be manipulated, damaged and destroyed 23 24

Cf. Sträter (2019) p. 11 ff., p. 36 f. Cf. Voßschmidt/Karsten (2019) p. 222 ff.

3.4 Cybercrime

17

as a result, and in the course of Big Data and Industry 4.0, the threat situation will continue to increase.25 For example, according to the IT security status report of the Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI) in Germany, a total of 419 notifications of critical infrastructures were made to the BSI in the period between June 1, 2019, and May 31, 2020, compared with 252 notifications in the previous year, with the majority coming from the healthcare sector (134) and information and communications technology (75); the energy sector came third with 73 notifications (compared with 29 notifications in the previous year). Operators of nuclear facilities did not report any vulnerabilities; in the previous year, there were two reports. Operators in the electricity sector in particular identified active scanning, such as by the Shodan and Censys search engines, to identify existing vulnerabilities in systems directly connected to the Internet. In addition, the tapping of access and contact data via spying on third parties associated with the electricity industry was observed. There were several incidents that were attributable to malfunctions in the control components required to operate the critical infrastructures, some of which had to be remedied at considerable expense in terms of time, although none of the incidents has yet resulted in a supply interruption. These malfunctions in the components can only be remedied in cooperation with the manufacturers and service providers in order to achieve the greatest possible protection.26 In particular, the failure of the information technology and telecommunications sector can cause greater damage and subsequently pose a greater threat to public safety, order and supply than operators from other sectors due to cascading effects. Extensive legal regulations on IT security have been created for this purpose, such as the Cyber Security Strategy, the IT Security Act 2.0 (IT-Sicherheitsgesetz 2.0), the European NIS Directive and the Act Implementing the EU Directive on Network and Information Security (cf. Sect. 5.9).27 In addition to the failure of control systems, which can lead to power outages or disruptions to processes in logistics or production, other threats to critical infrastructures include cybercrime and cyberespionage, whereby complete defense is not possible. Attack surfaces are provided by the software used (e-mails) as well as hardware, WLAN networks and the use of cloud services. Although cloud services increase resilience because data can be stored in different locations and thus protected against terrorist attacks and natural disasters, there is a dependency

25

Cf. Voßschmidt/Karsten (2019) p. 309. Cf. BSI (2020) p. 54 f. table 1. 27 Cf. Voßschmidt/Karsten (2019) p. 309 f.; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 6 f., p. 474 ff. 26

18

3

Risk Factors of the Power Supply

on the security measures of the cloud operator, who may also have access to the data.28

3.5

Threat of Terrorism

In addition, the power grid may fail due to terrorist attacks and sabotage, which must be classified as increasing in the future.29 In Germany and Europe, a threat from Islamist terrorism has reached historic proportions in recent years. Since 2004, over 89 attacks have been carried out or prevented, resulting in 790 deaths and over 3,740 injuries. According to the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA), nine Islamist attacks have been prevented in Germany alone since 2016, two of them in 2019. In the process, numerous counterterrorism measures have been carried out in recent years and months, and more than 40 Islamist attacks have been prevented in Germany and Europe. Islamist terrorist organizations pose two main threat scenarios for the Western world. These are, on the one hand, large-scale attacks by international Islamist terrorist organizations, such as the “Islamic State” and Al-Qaida, as a result of which significantly more people being killed and injured, as was recently the case in Madrid, London, Paris, Brussels, as well as Barcelona and Cambrils, and, on the other hand, attacks by individual Islamist perpetrators. Targets may also include critical infrastructure of high importance to the civilian population, such as power utilities or nuclear power plants, among others. An analysis of the attacks carried out and prevented shows that explosives, firearms and vehicles in particular were used. Since biological weapons have already been recovered from thwarted attacks in Paris, Cologne and Sardinia, it must be assumed that chemical or nuclear weapons will also be used in the future.30 The newer means of action also include unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), so-called drones, which on the one hand have a variety of benefits for industry, police authorities and fire departments, and on the other hand, when equipped with explosive devices, can also pose threats through terrorist attack scenarios, since their access is easy and inexpensive. Drones can also be used to carry out terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures such as energy

28

Cf. Voßschmidt/Karsten (2019) p. 310 ff. Cf. BBK (2018) p. 17 ff. 30 Cf. Goertz (2020) p. 1 f., p. 20 f., p. 60 f. 29

3.5 Threat of Terrorism

19

suppliers or nuclear power plants. Conversely, drones can also be used for perpetrator observation by police and military special forces to scout and exploit tactical weaknesses.31

31

Cf. Goertz (2021).

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

Dependence on the power supply has risen continuously over the past decades, with more and more processes in business, administration and the private sector requiring electricity. The quality of power supply in Germany is considered to be very high, especially since there have been no large-scale and prolonged power failures in Germany so far, but with the increasing risk factors, such a scenario becomes more likely, whereby the impact of such a power failure would be farreaching for society.1 In particular, extreme weather events with very hot and dry summers can cause critical situations in the power supply. Blackout and crisis preparedness expert Herbert Saurugg, like the Austrian Armed Forces, expects a Europe-wide power, infrastructure and supply failure, a so-called blackout, within the next five years. The power blackout is not the only problem that network operators have been preparing for a long time, but also the telecommunications supply, which will only function again after one to several days, even after the power supply has been restored. This will have a massive impact on production and the distribution of goods, so that people will have to be self-sufficient during this phase. In contrast to a power failure, in which the power supply is restored within minutes or hours by a backup circuit, a blackout means the complete collapse of the power grid, whereby power plants shut down for self-protection and the grid is gradually rebuilt by so-called black-start capable power plants. According to the experts, it can take at least a week to restore a stable power supply within Europe after a blackout. This means that the population will have to provide for itself during this time. In addition, a blackout will cause enormous economic damage, especially in the production environment. So far, there has not been a blackout in the entire system in Europe. However, the Corona pandemic showed 1

Cf. Mayer/Lauwe (2019); BBK (2019a) p. 17, p. 20 f. table 1.

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-A. Krebs and P. Hagenweiler, Energy Resilience and Climate Protection, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37564-5_4

21

22

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

that we had not been prepared enough for such a crisis and that major unexpected shock events can occur more quickly than is imaginable, so that preparedness and resilience must once again be regarded as self-evident components of social life.2 The crisis situation of a power blackout and the development of measures involve numerous actors in the emergency planning of the federal government, the federal lands, local authorities and the operators of critical infrastructures in their respective areas of responsibility. According to the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG), emergency response in the event of a disaster is the responsibility of the federal lands, while the federal government is responsible for civil defense, for the protection of the population in the event of defense, and also supports the federal lands.3

4.1

Stakeholder

The Federal Government is responsible for the protection of the civilian population (civil defense) in the event of defense and provides the federal lands, which are responsible for all other disasters and major emergencies (disaster control), with disaster assistance in the event of catastrophes and damage (disaster relief), e.g. by providing fire-fighting vehicles and vehicles for protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards (CBRN-protection). The tasks of the federal and land governments are governed by their respective laws. The operational area of the civil hazard prevention system is the responsibility of the municipal fire departments and governmental units as well as the private aid organizations, such as the Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB), the German Red Cross (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, DRK), the Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft e. V. (DLRG), the Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe (JUH), the Malteser Hilfsdienst e. V. (MHD) and the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (Technisches Hilfswerk, THW).4 In addition to state and municipal actors, private sector actors are also important partners in power blackout contingency planning, which is especially true for critical infrastructure (CI) protection, where both the state and CI operators have a warranty responsibility to the population and there are numerous interdependencies between the individual critical infrastructure sectors and industries. The population also has a personal responsibility to protect itself, e.g. by stockpiling its own emergency supplies, as was once again communicated by politicians in 2

Cf. Hermes (2021). Cf. Art. 35, Art. 70, Art. 73 GG (2020); Mayer/Lauwe (2019). 4 Cf. Geier/Etezadzadeh (2020) p. 698, p. 699. 3

4.1 Stakeholder

23

the wake of the Corona pandemic. This interplay of different responsibilities is outlined below.5 Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance The Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK), as the central technical agency, maintains, among other things, a warning system for the population (cf. Sect. 5.6.3), a joint reporting and situation center of the federal and state governments (Gemeinsames Melde- und Lagezentrum, GMLZ), the Federal Academy for Civil Protection and Civil Defense (Bundesakademie für Bevölkerungsschutz und Zivile Verteidigung, BABZ), which is responsible for the training and advanced training of civil defense managers, a research and development department for innovative civil defense technology, and analysis and consulting facilities, e.g. for the protection of critical infrastructures, to support the federal and state governments, local authorities and companies.6 In the context of the Corona pandemic, the BBK issued recommendations for action explicitly for operators of critical.7 The BBK has summarized its activities in the event of a large-scale power blackout in the “Gesamtkonzept Notfallplanung Stromausfall”, which offers the federal lands and municipalities technical building modules, concepts and methods that are then implemented in the respective areas of responsibility. In order to carry out resource planning in the event of a prolonged, widespread power blackout and to organize the distribution of fuel stocks, for example, it is first necessary to identify and prioritize critical infrastructures, for which the BBK has developed a seven-step identification guide. In addition, there is a recommendation for civil protection and disaster management authorities on fuel supply in the event of a power blackout, which was developed by the BBK together with stakeholders from the federal lands, local municipalities and the petroleum industry. The solutions described therein include technical, legal and organizational measures for fuel supply in the event of a power blackout. While planning and organization are carried out in advance through joint activities by the federal government, the federal lands, municipalities and players in the petroleum industry, distribution and supply are implemented in the federal lands and municipalities within the scope of their responsibilities. Within the framework of the “Gesamtkonzept Notfallplanung Stromausfall” by the BBK, a minimum concept for the provision of goods and services essential for survival at start-up stations is being developed, mobile emergency power generators in the 5

Cf. Geier (2017) p. 94; Mayer/Lauwe (2019). Cf. Geier/Etezadzadeh (2020) p. 699. 7 Cf. BBK (2021a). 6

24

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

private sector and their availability in the crisis are being assessed, as is the evaluation of possible emergency measures, such as the establishment of island networks at the level of municipal utilities.8 Federal Lands The individual federal lands have already developed their own (different) planning aids or (model) emergency plans on the subject of power failures, such as BadenWürttemberg, Hessen or Saxony. Some of the planning aids are based on conducting a land-wide risk analysis, such as in Brandenburg, after which concrete measures can be planned and implemented on the basis of knowledge of risks, consequences and available resources. Some federal lands also offer the provision of grid replacement facilities for districts and independent cities, such as in Schleswig-Holstein.9 Municipalities In this context, districts and independent cities play a particularly important role as the bodies responsible for disaster protection, in that they determine the disaster situation and are responsible for directing the defense measures, including responsibility for the deployment of forces and the operation of a control center. In addition, they are responsible for implementing the federal government’s technical concepts as they are further developed and adapted by the federal lands.10 The Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK) provides a method for risk analysis in civil protection and supports it in its implementation, accompanied by regular exercises for preparation in the event of a crisis. In the context of risk management and emergency planning, the exchange of findings and results from the respective risk analyses and risk assessments between municipal authorities and operators of critical infrastructures is an essential aspect, since only energy suppliers can estimate the extent of energy failures that are possible under the assumption of certain scenarios. For this purpose, the BBK has developed a strategic approach “Integriertes Risiko- und Krisenmanagement”, which is to be expanded and offered as widely as possible and standardized according to DIN.11

8

Cf. BBK (2017); BBK (2019e); Mayer/Lauwe (2019). Cf. Mayer/Lauwe (2019). 10 Cf. Mayer/Lauwe (2019). 11 Cf. Lauwe (2018); Mayer/Lauwe (2019); BBK (2019d). 9

4.1 Stakeholder

25

Transmission System Operators Interventions in the energy supply are reserved to the grid operators according to the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG). With the regulations on system responsibility, the operators of the transmission grids (50 Hz, Amprion, TenneT, TransnetBW) are authorized and obligated to eliminate disturbances and threats to the safety or reliability of the electricity supply system in the respective responsible control area through grid-related measures such as, in particular, grid switching, through the use of control energy, disconnectable and connectable loads of large industrial operations with very high electricity consumption, as well as through additional reserves, such as grid reserve and capacity reserve.12 This also applies to all distribution system operators (DSOs) downstream of the transmission system operators (TSOs) as part of their distribution tasks to ensure the security and reliability of electricity supply in their networks. The German Association of Energy and Water Industries (Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e. V., BDEW) and the German Association of Local Public Utilities (Verband kommunaler Unternehmen, VKU) have developed a guideline, which contains comprehensive measures for adapting all power feed-ins, power transits and power purchases to the requirements of secure and reliable operation of the power supply networks. In particular, it describes the statutory requirements of the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG) for ensuring cooperation between TSOs and DSOs, including operators of other downstream distribution networks. In addition, by describing the specific tasks of the respective upstream and downstream network operators as well as the cooperation and mutual support, hazards or disruptions of the supply systems are to be identified at an early stage and measures are to be initiated, which are to be carried out to eliminate hazards and disruptions as part of a cascade. The recommendations for action contained in the guideline serve to provide the operational ability to act when taking adjustment measures by coordinating the network operators, especially in time-critical situations, for which the responsibilities as well as the relevant technical, commercial and legal rules are explained.13 In January 2020, the European power grid under the leadership of the transmission system operator Amprion passed a test, the largest disturbance in a decade and a half. The grid frequency suddenly dropped by 0.25 Hz, stabilizing after a few seconds at around 49.85 Hz. 200 MHz is already a large deviation from the nominal frequency, and leaving the frequency corridor of 49.80 to 50.20 Hz is considered 12

Cf. § 13 EnWG (2021); on the system services, cf. Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 75 f., p. 202 f., p. 266 ff. 13 Cf. BDEW/VKU (2014) p. 6.

26

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

a serious disturbance in the continental European network. As a result, frequency regulation measures are automatically triggered in the European power grid from a deviation of just 0.01 Hz. On January 8, 2020, weather conditions meant that a lot of electricity was consumed in the northwest and little in the southeast, with the result that a lot of electricity flowed from the Balkans to central Europe. As a result, a transformer station near the town of Ernestinovo in Croatia was overloaded and the connection was shut down. In the course of this, neighboring lines were tripped in a very short time due to excessive load, resulting in a complete disconnection of the interconnected grid. Thus, the drop in network frequency in the northwestern subnetwork was countered by a similarly rapid increase in frequency in southeastern Europe. A comparable event occurred in November 2006, where an extra-high voltage line across the Ems river had to be shut down and disconnected due to the transfer of a cruise ship from the Meyer shipyard in Papenburg, Lower Saxony, to the North Sea, causing the European power grid to break up into three parts, with automatic load disconnections and extensive power outages across Europe due to the massive frequency deviation, affecting millions of households and rail traffic. As a consequence of this incident, the ENTSO-E Awareness System (EAS) was introduced as a central platform for the bundled exchange of data in real time, enabling continental European transmission system operators to share and use relevant data in real time. In addition to the introduction of the centralized platform, automatic procedures for grid stabilization were improved and responsibilities and communication were defined and standardized. During the incident in January 2020, this platform played a decisive role in solving the problem by enabling the control centers in Germany and abroad to quickly obtain a comprehensive and detailed picture of the situation. Power plants were automatically ramped up, industrial customers in France and Italy were taken off the grid, and additional balancing power was fed in from neighboring grids in Great Britain and Scandinavia that were not part of the European interconnection. As a result, the grid frequency was stable within the frequency corridor after just a few minutes. The power supply was guaranteed at all times. After a little more than an hour after the separation, both subnetworks could be synchronized and reconnected. In addition to Amprion and Swissgrid as Coordination Centre North and South, the transmission system operators RTE (France), REE (Spain) and Terna (Italy) were responsible for this.14

14

Cf. BDEW (2021).

4.2 Risk Management Measures

27

Federal Network Agency The Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur, BNetzA), as an authority in the portfolio of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, BMWi), collects figures on power supply interruptions every year, which are reported to it annually by the operators of the energy supply companies. All supply interruptions that occur in their networks and last longer than three minutes are recorded. Thus, in 2019, the lowest outage times and lowest number of supply interruptions have been observed since the surveys began in 2006, according to which the increasing share of decentralized generation capacity has not had any negative impact on the quality of supply so far. Accordingly, the average duration of interruptions per connected end consumer fell by 1.71 min year-on-year to 12.20 min. In 2019, 859 network operators transmitted a total of 159,827 supply interruptions in low and medium voltage. The reports of the energy supply companies contain the time, duration, extent and cause of the supply interruptions. On this basis, the Federal Network Agency can determine the so-called System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDIEnWG) from all unplanned interruptions that are not due to force majeure events. The unplanned interruptions are due to atmospheric effects (storms, floods or snow), third party effects, the responsibility of the network operator, and retroactive disturbances. The index (SAIDIEnWG) reflects the average supply interruption per connected end consumer and voltage level within a calendar year.15

4.2

Risk Management Measures

The energy supply system in Germany is in a state of upheaval due to various factors, including political decisions such as the liberalization of the energy markets, laws on climate protection or renewable energies, as well as social trends and technological developments such as the introduction of smart grids and smart meters, which are changing the framework conditions and thus also supply security. In addition, the highly dynamic nature of the changes and adjustments to the system makes it difficult to make statements about their consequences. The power supply is one of the critical infrastructures (CI) which, in the event of its failure or impairment, would lead to lasting supply bottlenecks, significant disruptions

15

Cf. BNetzA (2020b).

28

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

to public safety or other dramatic consequences.16 In recent years, operational risk and crisis management in critical infrastructures has been strengthened and established, including the Act to Increase the Security of Information Technology Systems – IT Security Act 2.0 – (Gesetz zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme, IT-Sicherheitsgesetz 2.0) and the protection target of being able to maintain the facility’s emergency power supply for at least 72 h without any further supply of fuel.17 The new IT Security Act 2.0 (IT-Sicherheitsgesetz 2.0) updates the IT Security Act of 2015. In future, operators of critical infrastructures will have to implement certain IT security measures and will be involved in the exchange of information with the Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI) as the central cyber security authority (cf. Sect. 5.9).18 The population’s own precautions and risk awareness must also be increased with regard to prolonged power outages, as a study by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK) has shown, especially since the recommended stockpiling of water and food for ten days in households has not yet been achieved.19 As part of a project funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, BMBF), a system for reducing the risk of power supply failure, taking into account the impact on the population, was developed in order to be able to carry out risk management consisting of scenario building, criticality analysis, vulnerability analysis and risk assessment.20 Scenario Building The basis for scenario building is hazard identification, which consists of various methods. This includes an initial brainstorming session and a summary of the results of hazard identification using a literature search. In the next step, criteria for ordering the hazards (risk factors) are defined, with which an associative completeness check is made possible or a complete list of hazards can be created.21 16

Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 18; on the definition of critical infrastructures, cf. BMI (2009) S. 3; on critical infrastructures and services in the energy sector, cf. Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 285 ff. 17 Cf. Mayer/Lauwe (2019); BBK (2019b) p. 17; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 475 f. 18 Cf. IT-SiG (2015); BMI (2021b). 19 Cf. Mayer/Lauwe (2019); BBK (2019c); BBK (2019h) p. 11, p. 61 f. 20 Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 25 ff. 21 Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 51 ff.

4.2 Risk Management Measures

29

In addition to the occurrence of individual hazards, there is also the possibility that several events or hazards can occur simultaneously (hazard scenario), the combined occurrence of which is still not sufficiently taken into account in the context of protective measures. For the determination of relevant scenarios, the assumption is that a power failure can only occur if a scenario encounters a critical structure that is vulnerable to the scenario and that can cause a power failure, such as a fire in a critical infrastructure (power plant) caused by lightning generated by severe weather. Thus, a hazard leads to the failure of a structure via an effect mechanism, whereby the effect mechanism of a hazard can only have an influence on the structure if it is vulnerable to the effect mechanism or effect mechanisms. When considering hazard scenarios, scenarios are considered in which a further effect mechanism occurs in relation to a single hazard and it is necessary to clarify whether the structures classified as critical are also resistant to a scenario with a combination of effect mechanisms or single hazards that have not yet been considered. Thus, relevant scenarios can be determined by all possible direct acting hazards with their effect classes (mechanical, kinematic, thermodynamic, radiological, electrical, chemical etc.) and subsequently with their effect mechanisms (pressure, velocity, voltage, conductivity etc.) and divided into three types. These are scenarios of hazards with different mechanisms of action from different classes of action, scenarios of hazards with different mechanisms of action from one class of action, and scenarios of hazards with the same mechanism of action from the same class of action.22 In order to reduce the number of identified scenarios and thus the list of possible hazards, scenarios (or the underlying hazards) can be differentiated in terms of their occurrence as “already occurred”, “currently possible but not yet occurred” and “not yet occurred but possible in the future” or categorized for integration into a risk management system. Furthermore, not all hazards that have already occurred in Germany can also occur everywhere in Germany, so that the number of possible scenarios can be further reduced if regional conditions are taken into account. Further reductions of the scenarios can be achieved by considering only hazards with a special significance, such as hazards that are difficult to control regardless of their mechanism of action due to the lead time/possible reaction time as well as the spatial and temporal extent. Individual hazards as well as combined scenarios, which are long-lasting, large-scale and short-term, are more difficult to control than others. The extent to which relevant scenarios can actually lead to a power outage depends on the criticality of the structures they encounter, as well as the strength of the

22

Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 54 ff.

30

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

scenarios’ impact mechanisms and the structure’s level of vulnerability (occurrence probabilities for inclusion in risk management).23 In addition to the technology, people also play a central role in the context of a reliable power supply, in that they intervene in the technical processes of the power supply system through active action, but can also trigger faults through a lack of action, whereby in both cases these are indirect effects that do not trigger a directly acting hazard (cf. Sect. 3.3). As an elementary system component, it is also necessary to consider the effect mechanisms that affect people or personnel. This can be divided into the four impact categories of availability, reliability, loyalty and qualification with regard to personnel. A lack of employees with the right qualifications, for example, due to illness, can impair power supply processes by disrupting operations or making it impossible to adequately rectify any faults that occur, which could lead to a widespread or prolonged power outage. In addition, strikes, destroyed infrastructures, e.g. due to extreme natural events, accidents or attacks, are possible dangers that influence the availability of employees. Besides the availability, the reliability of employees plays a central role for the failure-free power supply, which is influenced by external boundary conditions, including motivation, seriousness in the performance of tasks, as well as over- and under-demand. Other possible hazards that can influence the reliability of employees are loss of reputation of the facility, a threat to social security, legal disputes and dissatisfaction in the employment relationship. A lack of employee loyalty can result from a shaken relationship of trust, the departure of employees, the weakening of social security and a lack of identification with the company. These risks have an impact on the quality and quantity of employee performance and, as a result, can jeopardize business operations. Finally, the impact class qualification considers the deficits of skills and knowledge of the employees, which cannot be provided. Demographic change, fluctuation and a shortage of skilled workers pose a challenge to recruiting and training qualified personnel. A lack of qualified personnel can at least favor a prolonged and large-scale power outage.24 Criticality Analysis After scenario building, which represents the relevant effects on the power supply system, a system survey and criticality analysis must then be carried out. Within the scope of the system identification, a list of the processes to be considered and their respective sub-processes/partprocesses is created, to which the necessary elements can be assigned, so that all components of the processes and their dependencies 23 24

Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 58 ff. Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 61 ff.

4.2 Risk Management Measures

31

become visible. The information of the processes to be considered in the risk determination includes input, result, description of the function/operational objectives, organizational unit and person responsible, the elements relevant for the process as well as interfaces to other internal and external processes. If no suitable business process model is available and the system identification has to be carried out again, the identification and description of the processes can be carried out in parallel with the criticality analysis. The system inventory provides a systematic overview of all processes and sub-processes up to the nth order, whereby the relevant elements (tangible and intangible resources) are assigned at the level of the sub-processes, which are divided into eight risk elements according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, BMI). These are people, terrain, buildings, facilities and equipment, facility-specific special facilities and special equipment, data and documents, operating resources and the environment.25 The criticality analysis considers the relevance of the failure of a process or element of the electricity supply for the supply of the population, if it can cause “lasting supply shortages, significant disruptions to public safety or other dramatic consequences”.26 It consists of the sub-steps definition of criteria, class limits and threshold values, system detection, criticality determination of the business processes and criticality determination of the elements. With the criticality analysis, neither statements can be made about the risk and the effects of the scenarios that go beyond the interruption of the power supply, nor about the probability of a failure. Since there are too few historical events and figures for the consequences of individual processes or elements of a disruption or failure to be able to determine them statistically, the only source of information available is the assessment of experts and the classification of processes and elements according to their criticality in five (impact) classes from very low to very high.27 Vulnerability Analysis The vulnerability of a critical infrastructure to an event is an essential component of a risk analysis, and the analysis considers personnel, information technology (IT), black start capability, network control, systematic failures, and facilities.28 The power supply system consists of components and processes in which the personnel as a process element is exposed to internal and external influences and at 25

Cf. BMI (2011) p. 15 f.; BBK (2019a) p. 67 ff. Cf. BMI (2009) p. 3. 27 Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 71 ff. 28 Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 81 ff. 26

32

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

the same time influences the processes. The personnel-specific vulnerability arises as an inherent element of partly also critical processes in the system of electricity supply, in that the availability of the personnel has a considerable influence on the guarantee of a continuous power supply as well as on the rapid rectification of possible faults and also grants the personnel room for maneuver. Furthermore, boundary conditions under which people intervene in processes and thus help to shape them must be included. Reliable systems are characterized by their ability to take human error into account, to recognize it and to avoid harmful consequences so that they are protected from failure. In addition, the implementation of a technical safety management (TSM) can ensure the requirements for the qualification of personnel and the organization of the safe operation of the power supply network. Besides the internal personnel, the vulnerability of the power supply associated with the process of outsourcing must also be examined.29 The failure of IT or Operational Technology (OT), such as SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems in particular, has a direct impact on the power flow and thus on the (IT) hardware, just as it affects the user’s ability to carry out necessary applications. Both the user and the hardware thus influence the vulnerability of the power supply structures, so that both factors must be equally protected.30 Black start capability has no relevance to the vulnerability of a structure, but it strengthens the resilience of the overall system against the backdrop of widespread power failures, whereby a power plant or grid can be restarted on its own without the need for power to be supplied from outside. This protective mechanism kicks in when a power outage has already occurred to prevent it from developing into a prolonged outage. However, data on the available or required black-start capable power after a large-scale power outage is not available. The German power supply is part of the European interconnected grid with a common frequency of 50 Hz AC. Depending on the imbalance between power generation and connected load, the grid frequency between generation and demand may decrease or increase with respect to the set point (50 ± 0.05 Hz), which must be compensated by increasing the power or reducing the load.31 In the context of network control, the provision of system services, such as frequency maintenance, voltage maintenance, supply restoration and operational management, is particularly crucial to ensuring a stable power supply.32 Since the 29

Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 85 ff. Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 90 ff. 31 Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 94 ff.; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 268. 32 Cf. Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 200 ff., p. 266 ff. 30

4.2 Risk Management Measures

33

growing number of fluctuating-generation photovoltaic and wind power plants cannot provide any or only very limited system services under uneconomic conditions according to the current state of the art, technical vulnerability issues arise in this respect. Frequency maintenance ensures a power balance between injection and withdrawal in each control zone of the interconnected grid, so that damage to the connected electrical systems cannot occur. Since power generation from wind and photovoltaic plants is weather-dependent, they are not able to further increase generation in the event of higher demand. In order to provide voltage maintenance, it is necessary to keep the line voltage within an acceptable band in terms of voltage quality and to ensure that voltage dips occur to a limited extent when a short circuit occurs. The provision of reactive power ensures that the power voltage is within acceptable limits so as not to damage the equipment connected to the grid. Due to the increased feed-in to the low voltage grid, the provision of reactive power to maintain voltage is made more difficult, increasing the risk of supply problems and vulnerability to grid control. In the event of a large-scale power blackout, transmission and distribution system operators must be able to restore the power supply within the shortest possible time by rebuilding the supply. For this purpose, the transmission system operators must have sufficient blackstart capable generation capacities available in their own supply areas, whereby the renewable energy plants are not technically capable of offering the system service blackstart capability at the present time. In operational management, the so-called redispatch for congestion management and the identification of faults via so-called short-circuit power, among others, are used to stabilize the system. Due to the increase in fluctuating generators, congestion management is becoming more difficult, as they cause network bottlenecks and cannot contribute to congestion management. The increase in feed-in to medium and low-voltage grids, which reduces the provision of short-circuit power, will also make fault identification more difficult in the future, increasing the overall system vulnerability.33 In addition, unbundling and electricity generation in the distribution networks represent an increased vulnerability. Due to the unbundling of the electricity market in terms of company law, operations and information, the responsibility for the system no longer lies with vertically integrated companies in accordance with the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG); instead, the transmission system operators are responsible for the stability of the supply system, and their direct sphere of influence is now limited only to transmission. With the separation of generation and transmission, the communication and coordination effort of

33

Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 99 ff.

34

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

the transmission system operators has thus increased in order to ensure grid stability. Increased injection by generation plants into distribution systems also leads to an increasing need for information and coordination between system managers and other system participants to monitor and maintain stability, which at the same time leads to increasing vulnerability in grid control. With the possibility of minimizing vulnerability through the implementation of so-called smart grids based on real-time status information or control capabilities of facilities, the vulnerability to targeted attacks on these infrastructures increases at the same time. Possible measures to reduce the vulnerability of network control include backup capacities, electricity storage, disconnectable loads, the expansion of transmission networks, superconductors, digital solutions for an increased communication effort and smart grids.34 Another aspect of vulnerability is systematic faults that are present during operation and remain undetected until a hazard occurs, so that they affect the resilience of the power supply system and increase vulnerability to hazards. These include product serial defects, erroneous or incomplete requirements, changing conditions, and an erroneous or incomplete specification.35 The former power generation from controllable large-scale power plants is increasingly losing importance and is increasingly being replaced by power generation from fluctuating generators. Thus, transmission system operators can no longer use system services as they did before the energy transition, which has given statements regarding the vulnerability of individual elements of the supply infrastructure even greater weight, as grid utilization has become highly dynamic. Numeric methods allow a quantitative assessment of the vulnerability of many elements of the critical infrastructure to the hazards of the mechanical, thermodynamic or electromagnetic impact classes, under the precondition of an exact description of the impact mechanism.36 Risk Assessment Finally, after the scenario development and the criticality and vulnerability analysis, the risk identification and assessment of the failure risk of the power supply follows. For example, the Bow-Tie analysis can be used to visually depict the interrelationships between the influencing hazard scenarios, the critical processes and the potential impacts. The Bow-Tie analysis focuses on existing as well as missing measures (barriers) that can prevent a certain event or mitigate its effects. As part of 34

Cf. § 13 EnWG (2021); BBK (2019a) p. 103 ff. Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 106 ff. 36 Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 112 ff. 35

4.3 Communication Measures

35

risk identification, all combinations of the hazard scenarios classified as relevant and the processes classified as critical, which are vulnerable to the scenarios, must be listed. This is followed by the risk assessment. Based on the company’s protection goals, the remaining risk can be assessed and it can be determined whether further measures need to be taken. If this is the case, the Bow-Tie representation can be used to develop suitable barriers to close existing gaps. This allows the identified measures to be implemented in a continuous process and the analysis to be run again and again, so that adequate protection can be guaranteed as conditions change.37

4.3

Communication Measures

In order to be able to cope with a long-lasting, large-scale power blackout, both comprehensive risk communication as part of precautionary measures and crisis communication to manage the crisis of all stakeholders involved are required. While risk communication serves to exchange and bundle information about risks for risk avoidance, minimization and acceptance, crisis communication is a management strategy that is used in acute crises on the basis of the preceding risk communication.38 Risk Communication In the context of risk communication, the results of the criticality analysis of the companies, which include relevant scenarios, vulnerabilities and possible or already applied protective measures, are passed on to those government agencies with which cooperation is required in the event of a disaster, enabling the emergency response agencies to better assess the risks for the territorial unit and to identify necessary measures also for the need for self-protection of the population. Conversely, the government agencies also pass on their information to the companies, for example about relevant scenarios, districts or facilities that are particularly vulnerable in the event of a power blackout, in order to achieve comprehensive risk management.39 Crisis Communication With the help of the communication technology available at the time of this study, different information can be exchanged promptly and over long distances, but due to 37

Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 121 ff. Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 132. 39 Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 133. 38

36

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

the increasing complexity, the digital technologies used are becoming increasingly dependent on a secure power supply. The effects of a power blackout primarily affect the availability of communication channels between the responsible authorities, the operators of the power supply and the affected population, whereby the latter is generally based on a one-way flow of information via mass media. For network operators, for example, the requirements for technical information infrastructures can be found in the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG) and for uniform and multiple redundant systems in the ENTSO-E Operational Handbook. Measures to maintain communication in crisis management have been compiled by the Forum Netztechnik/Netzbetrieb im VDE (VDE-FNN), such as the provision of two independent means of communication for the exchange of sensitive data within the network operators and the creation of a common resource database among network operators to support local crisis management for repair, replacement and restoration equipment and facilities, with which, among other things, means of communication, such as satellite telephones, can be requested.40 Various recommendations for crisis communication have been published by the authorities. These include the “Krisenkommunikation” guideline of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, BMI), which provides information on communication between the authorities and the population, the BSI Standard 100-4 “Notfallmanagement”, which requires liaison persons between the local crisis teams for crisis management, as well as the crisis manual for power failures of the Ministry of the Interior in BadenWürttemberg, which contains crisis plans and catalogs of measures as well as the establishment of so-called information coordinators in the responsible crisis teams in order to facilitate the flow of information within the framework of crisis management. Appropriate checklists have been drawn up for communication with operators and the public. With appropriate adaptations, this manual is also used in other federal lands. To ensure communication between the authorities, emergency-powered communication equipment and a battery-backed telecommunications infrastructure are provided for a limited time. Various flyers on emergency preparedness exist for the population, but this does not guarantee whether and to what extent they are prepared for a corresponding crisis situation. The BMI’s “Empfehlungen zur Sicherstellung des Zusammenwirkens zwischen staatlichen Ebenen des Krisenmanagements und den Betreibern Kritischer Infrastrukturen” serve as a basis for cooperation between the various authorities and the energy supply companies. Among other things, these recommendations emphasize the need for a small number of central contacts, socalled single points of contacts (SPOCs), to simplify the exchange of information. 40

Cf. § 11 EnWG (2021); ENTSO-E (2010); VDE-FNN (2011); BBK (2019a) p. 134 ff.

4.3 Communication Measures

37

These central points of contacts also inform the population via the essential information media, such as radio and information leaflets. In this context, the communication measures and action plans of the on-site crisis management also play an essential role. The Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur, BNetzA) works closely with the transmission system operators. In the event of a major power blackout, in accordance with the Energy Security Act (Energiesicherungsgesetz, EnSiG), the Federal Network Agency is represented as a load dispatcher in the interconnected control center of the German transmission system operators and coordinates its actions jointly with them.41 For crisis management, the available information must be as up-to-date as possible, i.e., it must be transmitted in a timely manner. Webbased platforms can be used for this purpose, for example. Due to the complexity and dependency of a secure power supply, digital means of communication will probably no longer be available in the event of a prolonged and widespread power outage, since the backup power supplies often available for protection are only functional for a limited period of time. In addition, IT-based systems can be attacked by hackers, e.g., through the use of standardized transmission protocols. In the event of a failure of digital means of communication, the players involved must therefore use long-term available means of communication, such as personal reporting systems.42 The federal lands and municipalities each have their own disaster management plans, which are tailored to local events and, when transferred to other federal lands, require regional adaptations, e.g. the “Krisenhandbuch Stromausfall” of the Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Württemberg. In addition, the resources to be held in reserve for crisis management, such as mobile emergency power generation plants, are not geared to a national catastrophe on the part of official emergency response. Consequently, the measures to be taken and the efficient use of the available resources within the federal lands and authorities must be coordinated within the framework of crisis communication. Authorities and organizations with security tasks (Behörden und Organisationen mit Sicherheitsaufgaben, BOS) use a non-public radio service, whereby the involvement of contacts from the telecommunications and IT infrastructure sector in crisis management is recommended in order to ensure the availability of the communications infrastructure. The technical notes S 1002 of the VDE-FNN recommend, among other things, in addition to the resource database already mentioned, a three-level concept for the means of communication, so that besides the emergency level, a fallback level is also guaranteed to ensure communication within the power supply companies, provided that the power supply is ensured by their own means. This concept should also be applied to the authorities in order to be able to 41 42

Cf. § 11 EnWG (2021); ENTSO-E (2010); VDE-FNN (2011); BBK (2019a) p. 134 ff. Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 137 ff.

38

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

maintain communication with each other, with the energy supply companies and with other infrastructure operators. In the course of the energy transition and the associated change in the national power supply due to the Renewable Energies Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), it is also necessary to involve the operators at the medium-voltage level in the event of a large-scale power outage. In the initial phase of a widespread and prolonged power blackout, the population will initially still be able to be informed via electronic media such as television, radio and the Internet, which will, however, only be available for a few hours to a few days at most, especially as battery-powered receivers such as car radios can be used. Since the information technology and telecommunications sector will also be massively affected by a power blackout, landline and cell phones will also be unusable after a short time. In the event of a crisis, local contact points of the authorities will then step in, which can determine and control the local need for aid and replacement resources and also inform the population.43 As the duration of the power blackout increases, concrete information is required not only for purely factual information for all stakeholders involved, including the population, but also for managing the crisis and restoring normal operations. For example, grid operators and authorities need technical information for mutual coordination during a prolonged power blackout, e.g. regarding the connection of power plant capacity for grid stabilization during the reconstruction of the supply grids. In addition to the above-mentioned concept of so-called single points of contacts (SPOC), also involving the telecommunications industry, alternative communication methods that are largely independent of the power supply must be planned. Besides messengers, these can also be unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that are battery-controlled, for which the necessary transport infrastructure must be available. In addition to the situation, the population must be informed about measures, places and times for supply, e.g. with food and drinking water, with sufficient lead time, e.g. via print media, which must also be coordinated with the responsible institutions on site. Besides the instructions over the radio, information regarding local points of contact and priorities in joint crisis management can also be transmitted on mobile councils.44

43 44

Cf. VDE-FNN (2011); BBK (2019a) p. 140 ff. Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 142 ff.

4.4 Conclusion

4.4

39

Conclusion

On the basis of the current well-established power blackout emergency planning, the staff of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK) highlighted further aspects for the future. This concerns the expansion of integrated risk and crisis management, which requires a stronger linkage of the different actors at all levels by bundling the information from the respective risk and crisis management processes and making it available to all actors, such as estimates of possible damage or information on special resources and capabilities. In addition, emergency planning can only be managed effectively and efficiently in close cooperation with non-police emergency response, supervisory authorities and operators of critical infrastructures. Beyond this, a legal basis is needed for the expansion of fallback levels, especially for companies, so that emergency measures are mandatory and the requirements for emergency planning are standardized. Furthermore, there is a lack of the necessary technical solutions for redundant communication systems for secure, overarching crisis communication between all the players involved.45 In principle, the effects of a prolonged and widespread power blackout on the communication processes between the stakeholders involved (authorities, operators and the population) are difficult to assess. In addition, due to the interdependence of communication infrastructures based on the power supply, communication is severely limited if there is insufficient reserve and replacement power supply, so that communication methods that are largely independent of a secure power supply should be available in the event of a prolonged power outage to ensure a minimum supply of information. Moreover, the reliability and temporal availability of a necessary backup power supply can be optimized. Within the framework of existing emergency planning, it is also important to optimize the communication processes between the stakeholders involved in crisis management, whereby the communication process can be improved by coordinating the contacts with each other already during risk communication and not only during the crisis. Besides the use of common communication tools, such as a central platform, measures can be developed in cooperation with all stakeholders that can mitigate risks and improve management over the course of the crisis.46 Due to increasing digitization and the associated new developments of digital technologies as well as the expanded use of artificial intelligence (AI), companies and public authorities will be able to use numerous additional possibilities for risk 45 46

Cf. Mayer/Lauwe (2019). Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 146.

40

4

Emergency Planning Power Failure

and crisis management in the future, whereby various unmanned AI-supported (robotic) systems as well as technologies for visualization and simulation, such as virtual and augmented reality, and in particular the continuous monitoring and improvement of IT security (“critical vulnerability”) in critical situations are already being used.47

47

Cf. Mayer/Lauwe (2019); Krebs/Hagenweiler (2019) p. 173 ff.; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 509 ff., p. 555 ff., p. 569 ff.

5

Resilience Measures

Critical infrastructures, digitization, and an increasing number of extreme events are making society increasingly vulnerable. The networking of vital infrastructures and ICT systems that goes hand in hand with digitization means that even small disruptions can have a serious impact on the entire supply system as the possible start of a causal chain. It is therefore necessary to invest more in the development of resilient systems in the future in order to be better equipped to deal with systemic risks. The concept of resilience encompasses the ability to reliably maintain the function of a system despite unexpected disruptions or events, to fend them off, to cope with them, and to return them to a functional state as quickly as possible. In this context, it is important to take unexpected events into account in advance of possible crisis situations, to learn lessons from these crises and to take precautions for further crises. To this end, resilient societies make use of digital technologies, social instruments such as education or dialog at eye level with the population, and economic incentives. The Corona pandemic has shown that digital technologies can make a significant contribution to strengthening the resilience of companies, authorities and other institutions in order to overcome a crisis. At the same time, the current deficits became obvious, so that targeted solutions for future crises have to be developed in order to secure the basis of life.1 With increased resilience, the global and national sustainability goals, greenhouse gas neutrality and a reduction in biodiversity loss can also be pursued and achieved through increased nature conservation and environmental protection. In this context, nature-based solutions should be considered as far as possible, as they ensure robust basic functions of existence for health, supply and

1

Cf. acatech (2020) p. 21; PLS (2020) p. 4.

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-A. Krebs and P. Hagenweiler, Energy Resilience and Climate Protection, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37564-5_5

41

42

5

Resilience Measures

disposal and thus maintain the functionality of the overall system even in the event of a temporary failure of individual components.2

5.1

Sustainability

Germany has had a national sustainability strategy since 2002, which was presented at the United Nations (UN) World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg and has been developed every four years since 2004. Since 2015, the 2030 Agenda with its seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has formed the basis of the German government’s sustainability policy, which was adopted by the heads of state and government of the 193 member states of the United Nations in New York on September 25, 2015. Against this backdrop, a revised new edition of the German Sustainable Development Strategy (Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, DNS) was adopted on January 11, 2017 as a framework for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in which individual indicators and targets in particular were supplemented. In 2020, the content of the German Sustainability Strategy was further developed, which at the same time postulated the need for increased implementation of the strategy and its goals, especially in key transformation fields, and focused attention on the central role of social actors in the sense of a community sustainability.3 The aim of the global sustainability strategy is to fundamentally reduce differences and inequality in opportunities and quality of life. Thus, policy measures to implement the Sustainable Development Goals in response to the Corona crisis must be aligned at the international, national and regional levels. In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the entire world has been thrust into a situation of upheaval, making the principle of sustainability a central political resilience strategy to be used in response. In this context, the discussion about resilient communities has reemerged. Thus, the implementation of the 2030 Agenda requires efforts not only at the international, national and regional level, but also at the local level, whereby the municipalities are of particular importance insofar as, on the one hand, sustainability problems become particularly visible in the cities, 2

Cf. DAS (2020) p. 4. Cf. DNS (2021) p. 22; on the Sustainable Development Goals: no poverty, zero hunger, good health and well-being, quality education, gender equality, clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy, decent work and economic growth, industry, innovation and infrastructure, reduced inequalities, sustainable cities and communities, responsible consumption and production, climate action, life below water, life on land, peace, justice and strong institutions, partnerships for the Goals.

3

5.1 Sustainability

43

districts and municipalities and, on the other hand, it becomes apparent locally whether and how sustainable solutions can be effectively initiated. In this context, municipalities should orient themselves more strongly to regional and circular economy approaches in order to be able to continue to guarantee basic supplies in the wake of pandemics and other (unforeseeable) crises. From the point of view of resilience, municipalities should also develop their own regional economic and circular economy approaches from a global and sustainable perspective.4 In addition to the Corona pandemic and its consequences, the global challenges for economic, social and ecosystems remain present and have become even more visible. It has become apparent that the actions taken so far (at all levels) are not sufficient to embark on sustainable development. In order to implement the Agenda, the German government is committed to binding international agreements and other forms of international cooperation, to strengthening international organizations, and to strategic alliances and issue-specific partnerships. A culture of sustainability and a sustainable future can only be achieved in Germany if they are aligned with the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and at the same time are linked to greater quality of life, future viability, intergenerational justice and social cohesion, with a focus on resilience and the involvement of all relevant actors. The existing pressure to achieve the global sustainability goals has intensified in the wake of the massive effects of the Corona pandemic. In addition, the rapid global spread of the Corona virus has clearly shown how interconnected the world is. Not only pandemics, but also political conflicts, migration movements and climate change show that the future in Germany and Europe is inextricably linked to the development of other countries in the world, so that the sustainability goals apply equally to all countries worldwide. Furthermore, it also became clear how closely interlinked the global sustainability goals are in the world and that no sustainability goal can be considered in isolation. The Corona pandemic not only reflected but also amplified systemic crises, such as the transgression of ecological planetary boundaries and human encroachment on natural spaces, the neglect of public infrastructures in many countries, precarious working conditions and increasing social inequality within many societies, and populist challenges to pluralist democracies. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda is making a significant contribution to the collective management of world-wide crises, with sustainability strengthening resilience, i.e., increasing the resilience of system and infrastructure to pandemics, climate change and other challenges. In the wake of the Corona pandemic, the demand for resilience has come to the fore as a guiding health policy, economic and social goal, with the core issue 4

Cf. Liedtke/Kühler et al. (2020) p. 5; DNS (2021) p. 27.

44

5

Resilience Measures

being the property of a defined system to respond as “unscathed” as possible to disturbances and crises from outside as a system, to remain stable or to be able to offer resistance. Above all, the ability to anticipate, manage and recover from unexpected events, as well as to protect and preserve human development gains, are brought to the fore. In addition to the principles of precaution, democratic participation, recognition of ecological limits and human rights, resilience is thus also seen as an important and more prominent element of the guiding principle of sustainable development.5

5.2

Sustainable Energy Supply

One of the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda is “Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all” (SDG 7), which corresponds to the energy policy triangle of security of supply, environmental compatibility and affordability, which was supplemented by the goal of social acceptance in the course of the energy transition.6 This goal describes the essential requirements for the development of a global sustainable energy supply, which is closely linked to the issues of poverty (SDG 1), health (SDG 3), clean water (SDG 6), economy (SDG 8), sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11), and climate protection measures (SDG 13). With universal, affordable and reliable access to modern energy services, a significant increase in the share of renewable energies in the global energy mix and a doubling of the global rate of increase in energy efficiency are also targeted. The national implementation of SDG 7 will take place with the energy transition initiated in Germany, which sets the framework for a sustainable energy policy with longterm goals. With the energy transition adopted by the German government in 2011, which aimed in particular at a gradual shutdown of nuclear power plants by 2022 and primarily involves the development and use of renewable energies and a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, Germany has paved the way to a sustainable energy supply based on the efficient use of energy, a reduction in energy consumption and a further expansion of renewable energy generation. In this way, the energy transition is making a significant contribution to climate protection, in conjunction with the achievement of the 2050 climate protection targets that have been set.7 5

Cf. DNS (2021) p. 10, p. 26 f. Cf. DNS (2021) p. 209; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 4 f. 7 Cf. DNS (2021) p. 209, p. 306. 6

5.2 Sustainable Energy Supply

45

The Energy Efficiency Strategy 2050 aims to halve primary energy consumption by 2050 compared with 2008 levels in order to implement the energy transition and climate protection effectively and cost-efficiently. In addition to lower energy consumption, energy efficiency is to be achieved through sustainable production, the use of renewable energies in all sectors, energy-efficient integration of renewable energies and lower energy imports. To this end, priority is to be given to technologies that consume little electricity and use as few fossil fuels as possible.8 In recent decades, energy consumption has fallen while economic output has grown, and at the same time the share of renewable energies in gross final energy consumption has increased significantly. Thus, the most important primary energy source in Germany in 2019 was, as it has been for decades, mineral oil (33.9%), followed by natural gas (23.6%), coal (10.9% hard coal, 11.2% lignite), renewable energies (13.8%) and nuclear energy (6.3%).9 At the same time, the net dependence on fossil energy imports from abroad has decreased due to the increasing supply of renewable energies and increased efficiency. Nevertheless, Germany has to import a considerable amount of energy due to the limited domestic resources as well as the given high energy demand, which is caused by the population size, climatic conditions, a modern standard of living and the economic performance. These are mainly mineral oil, natural gas and hard coal. In addition, the fuels required to operate the nuclear power plants are imported in their entirety.10 The transformation of the energy system, which is gradually replacing the conventional energy sources oil, natural gas and coal as well as nuclear energy with renewable primary energy sources in the interests of sustainability, including in particular wind energy, biomass, solar energy, hydropower and geothermal energy, is at the same time opening up new value creation potential for Germany as a business and industrial location. Hydrogen, for example, is becoming increasingly important as a versatile energy carrier, energy storage medium and element of sector coupling in the context of the energy transition. The goal of greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050 and the decarbonization of the energy supply required to achieve this is a key guiding principle of national and European climate and energy policy. The gradual replacement of conventional energy sources with renewable energies in Germany has at the same time contributed to cost reductions in energy technologies, also on a global level. In addition, the German government is working at national, European and international level to reduce 8

Cf. BMWi (2019b) p. 6. Cf. BGR (2020) p. 21; LBEG (2020) p. 44 tab. 20. 10 Cf. AGEB (2019) p. 16 f.; DNS (2021) p. 207. 9

46

5

Resilience Measures

subsidies for fossil fuels in order to create a fair competitive environment for all energy sources besides the goal of decarbonization.11 In terms of sustainable energy supply, the aim is to save energy and use it more efficiently, which is also an essential prerequisite for achieving the binding climate protection targets by 2030. At the same time, energy efficiency contributes to growth and prosperity in Germany by saving energy costs for private and industrial consumers and by investing in the development of particularly energy-efficient products and processes. However, there are further opportunities for savings and the need for action, e.g. in the context of building renovation measures. Besides the energy efficiency, other measures need to be implemented to achieve the climate targets. These include the efficient, grid-synchronous and increasingly market-oriented expansion of renewable energies, the replacement of coal-fired CHP (combined heat and power) with gas-fired CHP, and the gradual reduction and phasing out of coal-fired power generation.12 The amendment to the Renewable Energies Act (Erneuerbare-EnergienGesetz, EEG 2021), in addition to the goals of sustainable development of energy supply and increasing the share of electricity generated from renewable energies to 65% in 2030, sets a further target that all electricity generated or consumed in Germany before 2050 should be generated in a greenhouse gas-neutral manner. It also sets the expansion path every two years until 2030 and the electricity quantity path annually until 2029. The amendment to the Combined Heat and Power Act (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz, KWKG 2020) will support the coal phaseout by increasing net electricity generation from combined heat and power plants to 120 TWh by 2025 in the interests of energy conservation and environmental and climate protection.13

5.3

Climate Protection

Climate change is one of the greatest global challenges of this century. Within the framework of the 2030 Agenda, “Climate Action” has therefore been defined as one of the goals to combat climate change and its effects (SDG 13). In Germany, for example, the average air temperature has already risen by more than 1.6 °C compared to preindustrial times. In addition to the rapid implementation of measures to reduce climate-damaging emissions and to adapt to the consequences of 11

Cf. DNS (2021) p. 207; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 2. Cf. DNS (2021) p. 207 f. 13 Cf. §§ 1, 4, 5 EEG (2020); § 1 KWKG (2020); DNS (2021) p. 208. 12

5.3 Climate Protection

47

climate change, international cooperation and a strengthening of the local and regional level are necessary to make Germany resilient to the consequences of climate change and to implement the ambitious climate targets.14 With the Paris Agreement in 2015, the participants agreed on various measures. The aim is to keep global warming well below 2 °C compared with the preindustrial era and to limit the rise in temperature to 1.5 °C. Furthermore, in the second half of this century, the aim is to achieve a balance between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and CO2 sequestration by sinks and reservoirs, such as forests or underground carbon stores, should be achieved. The self-imposed targets are to be reviewed and tightened every five years from 2023. In addition, reporting obligations and transparency rules were agreed, according to which each country must submit balance reports on its CO2 emissions, taking into account the different conditions and capabilities of the countries, and ensuring that developing countries, for example, do not have to meet the same requirements as industrialized countries. Within this framework, developing countries threatened by climate change should be assured of support, e.g. through early warning systems and climate risk insurance. Furthermore, the industrialized countries are to support poor countries in climate protection and in adapting to global warming. The joint pledge by the industrialized countries to provide $ 100 billion a year from 2020 to poor countries by 2025 was reaffirmed.15 According to the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C (SR1.5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the current climate protection plans of the Paris Agreement are likely to result in a global temperature increase of 3 °C on average by the end of the twenty-first century, which means a very high risk of irreversible climate change and thus significantly reduced adaptation options for both humans and ecosystems. If global warming continues at the same rate, the temperature increase is likely to exceed 1.5 °C already between the years 2030 and 2050. At the same time, it is confirmed that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C compared to the preindustrial era is possible, provided that global CO2 neutrality is achieved by 2050, otherwise the above-mentioned Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) measures will require a much stronger effort. Current technical options for CO2 capture include Direct Air Capture and CCS (DACCS) and Bio-Energy and CCS (BECCS), which are not yet available for industrial use. In the case of DACCS, CO2 is extracted directly from the atmosphere and then stored, although the process is still very costly in terms of energy 14

Cf. DNS (2021) p. 303. Cf. Art. 2, Art. 4, Art. 5 EU (2016); DNS (2021) p. 303, p. 304; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 404 f.

15

48

5

Resilience Measures

and is not yet available on a large scale in technical terms. The BECCS method involves the energetic use of biomass with CO2 storage. Both methods represent significant interventions in ecological processes and land use changes, which contradicts sustainable development goals. In addition, risks and acceptance problems must be taken into account in the technical storage of carbon, which is why CO2 removal must be limited as far as possible.16 The IPCC Special Report also points out that due to expected climate change and its consequences, such as increased warming, sea level rise, weather extremes, species extinction, regionally restricted water availability and increased erosion hazards, current adaptation measures are insufficient (cf. chap. 2, Sect. 5.4, 5.5). The consequences can lead to a worsening of social and economic inequality, combined with social conflict, migration, poverty and hunger, which also impairs sustainable development. With the special reports “On the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate” (SROCC) and “On Climate Change and Land” (SRCCL), the IPPC has once again emphasized the urgent need for action against the consequences of climate change and for ambitious climate protection, and has explicitly pointed out that climate change will proceed faster than was documented in the previous reports.17 In order to achieve the national climate protection targets, the Federal Government has drawn up the Federal Climate Protection Act (Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz, KSG), the Climate Protection Program 2030 and the Climate Protection Plan 2050. The Federal Climate Protection Act (KSG), as adopted on December 12, 2019, stipulated that the maximum permissible annual emission volume for 2020 across all sectors must not exceed 813 million metric tons of CO2 equivalents. This value corresponds to an overall reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 35% compared to 1990, which was already achieved in 2019 according to the previous year’s estimate by the German Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt, UBA). The climate protection program adopted on October 9, 2019, and the climate protection plan adopted on November 14, 2016, are intended to ensure that the reduction target for 2030 is achieved and that all sectors (energy, industry, buildings, transport, agriculture, waste management and other) make their contribution.18 In May 2021, in the wake of the ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG), according to which the previous Federal Climate

16

Cf. IPPC (2018) p. 4 ff.; DNS (2021) p. 303, p. 304. Cf. IPPC (2019); IPPC (2020); DNS (2021) p. 303 f. 18 Cf. App. 2 to § 4 KSG (2019); BMU (2019) p. 8 ff.; BMU (2020) p. 147 ff; DNS (2021) p. 304; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 717. 17

5.3 Climate Protection

49

Protection Act (Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz, KSG) falls short of the mark, as measures for further emission reductions are lacking, particularly from 2031 onwards, and due to the new European climate target for 2030, the German government presented a Climate Protection Act 2021, which tightens up the previous climate protection targets and anchors the goal of greenhouse gas neutrality by 2045. Accordingly, the targets for reducing CO2 emissions by 2030 are to be raised from 55% to at least 65% compared with 1990 levels. In addition, a reduction target of at least 88% is to be set for 2040 and greenhouse gas neutrality is to be achieved in Germany by 2045 instead of 2050. Finally, the permissible annual CO2 emissions for individual sectors, such as the energy industry, industry, transport or buildings, are to be reduced, with specific targets for improving the CO2 binding effect of natural sinks, such as forests and moors, which can bind unavoidable residual emissions of greenhouse gases, to be anchored in the law. The implementation of the Climate Protection Act is also to be supported by an immediate action program, which is to include numerous supporting measures in the various sectors, such as industry, mobility, agriculture and buildings. In addition, the amended Climate Protection Act provides for an evaluation in 2022 in accordance with European requirements, so that a well-coordinated mix of instruments can be created at European and national level.19 Besides the energy sector, large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG emissions) are released in the industrial sector. Since, according to the current state of knowledge, a consistent reduction of energy consumption in all sectors as well as the switch to renewable electrical energy will not be sufficient to achieve the agreed targets of the Paris Agreement, all possible options for the reduction of GHG emissions must be considered. For the industrial sector, these are the avoidance of CO2 emissions through higher efficiency, increasing electrification as well as energy, process and material substitution, the recycling of CO2 emissions by prolonging material use (Carbon Capture and Utilization, CCU) and finally the permanent geological storage of the remaining CO2 quantities (Carbon Capture and Storage, CCS), which are to be recovered as raw material if required.20 The Carbon Capture and Utilization (CCU) method involves the multiple utilization of carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emitted by industry, combined with the production of synthetic fuels. Since major industries in Germany continue to rely on carbon, which is currently mainly supplied by fossil raw materials such as oil, natural gas and coal, CO2 is generally considered to be an alternative carbon source 19 20

Cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht (2021); Bundesregierung (2021). Cf. acatech (2018) p. 5.

50

5

Resilience Measures

in addition to biomass, although the utilization of CO2 is usually associated with a high energy input. In the context of the energy transition, CCU technologies can be integrated for raw material security, resource efficiency and circular economy. There are various possibilities to permanently bind CO2 , for example in polyvinyl chloride (PVC) products or by mineralizing CO2 into an aggregate for concrete. In addition, carbon fibers could be used in the future in composite materials as a substitute for steel, aluminum and cement. Removal of CO2 from the atmosphere on the basis of renewable energy could pave the way for entry into a CO2 -neutral circular economy. In contrast to Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies, many potential CCU applications are still at the experimental or development stage. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology can be used to store large quantities of CO2 in the geological subsurface and thus sustainably remove it from the atmosphere. It thus makes no contribution to the transformation of energy systems. These measures can be used primarily in industries that have no possibility of further reducing their CO2 emissions after exhausting all other options. However, the infrastructure for transporting and storing CO2 must still be provided, while ensuring the highest economic and ecological safety standards. Based on the development of GHG concentrations to date, it is assumed that considerable efforts will have to be made by the second half of the twenty-first century at the latest in order to prevent global warming from exceeding 2 °C. A European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC) study identifies seven different technologies as options for negative emissions, including afforestation and reforestation, land management, Bio-Energy and CCS (BECCS), forced weathering, Direct Air Capture and CCS with Geological Storage (DACCS), Ocean Fertilization, and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), so there is an urgent need to invest in research and development of the use of CCU and CCS as building blocks for climate change mitigation in industry.21

5.4

Energy Systems

As part of the National Academy of Science and Engineering (Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften, acatech) study on resilient energy systems, four basic causes of risk factors in the power system were identified that need to be effectively countered with the help of the resilience approach. A total of seven fields of action were described for this purpose in order to ensure the resilience of

21

Cf. acatech (2018) p. 5 ff., p. 55 ff.; EASAC (2018) p. 7 ff.

5.4 Energy Systems

51

the future, digitized energy system and maintain a high level of supply security.22 The cyber security field of action is also addressed in a separate chapter in this study, as new strategies will emerge in the course of the development and use of artificial intelligence, but new threats may also arise (cf. Sect. 5.9). Field of action 1 involves understanding and managing the interaction between ICT and energy. In the future, the power and ICT systems will form a complex cyber-physical system in which the dependency between the energy infrastructure and public communications networks must first be analyzed and then their dependency minimized so that cascading failures become less likely. The resilience of the communication systems of the power supply is to be achieved on the one hand by the use of redundant systems, which do not all fail at the same time in the case of a blackout, on the other hand a part of the communication network should be able to hold out for a significantly longer bridging period, e.g. by batteries. In addition, the system states of the ICT components (IT/OT) used by the network operators should be monitored more closely and integrated into operational management, besides electrotechnical parameters.23 Field of action 2 involves the systemic development of cyber security. Here, it is important to strengthen and increase the power supply against threats from ICT, since the Internet of Things, smart homes and cloud services are increasingly connecting more and more devices in their entirety, making them potentially system-critical. This means that security standards are required for all relevant players, including small network operators, aggregators, platforms and device manufacturers. In addition, the handling of security vulnerabilities must be adapted and the operational technologies (OT) must become more resistant to IT failures so that they are still functional even if the IT no longer works.24 Field of action 3 describes the strengthening of technical resilience by grid operators and grid users. Weather-dependent power generation in combination with the increasing number of players involved and new digital business models will lead to unpredictable events in the operation of the grids with incident sequences that will differ significantly from the previous disruptions. This will also require operators of small generation plants and distribution grids to make a much greater contribution to supply security throughout Europe, provided that there is comprehensive digitization of the distribution grids. In addition, small players, such as municipal utilities, must also build up both the necessary technical equipment and the know-how for proactive system operation. To 22

Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 14 ff., p. 98 ff. Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 14, p. 100 ff. 24 Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 108 ff. 23

52

5

Resilience Measures

this end, interdisciplinary training and stress tests must be established and conducted regularly to practice behavior during critical situations and to remedy a blackout, involving not only network operators but also other players such as telecommunications network operators or specialized security experts. Furthermore, decentralized structures are able to strengthen the resilience of the system if they are designed in such a way that they can maintain a limited power supply to individual network sections in island mode during a disruption and/or supply critical infrastructures with power on a preferential basis.25 Field of action 4 covers the grid-supporting design of ICT integration of small systems. In the future, the majority of small generation plants, storage facilities and energy-consuming devices, such as charging stations for electric vehicles or home storage units, will be connected to the Internet, which offers great potential for stabilizing the power supply in that these plants can provide system services in the future, such as frequency and voltage maintenance and short-circuit power, as well as support the reconstruction of the power supply after a blackout. However, in the event of simultaneous undesirable behavior, these systems can also destabilize the system as a whole, so that minimum standards for devices must be introduced, with the stipulation that the systems must be adapted to new requirements through software updates. Moreover, grid operators must be able to influence the operation of these systems in order to exploit the potential of small systems for system stabilization. In addition, platforms and standards for interoperability are required to efficiently integrate the large number of plants. In the future, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) will also play a role for small generation plants and controllable consumer plants as part of defense systems against faults or attacks.26 Field of action 5 involves strengthening incentives for network operators to increase resilience. In the event of a major power blackout, the costs are borne by the electricity consumers, not the network operators, who therefore have little economic incentive to minimize the damage caused by major power blackouts. The introduction of a resilience component in the so-called incentive regulation for network operators, which ensures that they operate cost-efficiently and do not make inappropriate profits, could ensure that network operators do not suffer any economic disadvantages as a result of measures to increase resilience. In addition, a reform of the Grid Charges Ordinance could allow for resilienceimproving, spatially and temporally differentiated grid charges, so that grid users are incentivized to take greater account of the grid efficiency of their plants when 25 26

Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 117 ff. Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 126 ff.

5.4 Energy Systems

53

making siting and operating decisions. Flexible grid connection conditions for generators also help to provide grid operators with additional flexibility for grid congestion management. These so-called smart connection agreements, which are already being tested in some European countries, should be expanded to include resilience criteria.27 Field of action 6 serves to ensure the participation of private actors in the design and implementation of resilience. In the course of the energy transition, more and more private actors are gaining influence on the electric energy system, such as prosumers who operate their own solar systems and battery storage, or act as users of flexible consumption systems, such as heat pumps or electric cars. Thus, in the future, these plants must also be able to support the security of supply and improve the resilience of the energy system, which requires interventions in the private environment of the actors, which must be explained to the private actors in a comprehensible and transparent manner. Various measures are available for the participation of private actors in the resilience of the electric power system. These can be mandatory contributions, such as via technical connection conditions of private generation plants, financial and market incentives, such as variable electricity tariffs, and voluntary self-restraint by consumers in case of emergency. To achieve broad acceptance of these measures, all relevant stakeholders must be involved in the decision-making process for new regulations and a greater awareness of the systemic relevance of the actions of private actors must be generated.28 Finally, action area 7 comprises the institutionalization of long-term risk and resilience assessments. Since it is not possible to predict all future trends in digitization and energy supply, and since there may be surprising developments that endanger system stability, the resilience concept must be continuously adapted to current developments if the resilience measures introduced prove to be insufficient. To this end, a risk and resilience assessment could be established by a governmental or government-supervised independent institution, which would develop an early warning system with risk indicators, such as market risks or technical disruptions, monitor long-term developments and design adaptation strategies, from which options for policy action could be derived. In addition, it would be beneficial to establish a national and European information and reporting center for disruptive events and cyber security vulnerabilities relevant to the power grid, which would make knowledge about risks, disruptive events and possible countermeasures available to grid operations in an updated form. 27 28

Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 132 ff. Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 139 ff.

54

5

Resilience Measures

Furthermore, suitable quantitative and qualitative parameters for resilience and standards must be developed in order to be able to assess resilience measures in terms of their effectiveness. Based on the developed parameters and the institutionalized risk assessment, the resilience strategy and its implementation can be evaluated in an accompanying monitoring process according to the state of the art with regard to their effectiveness and efficiency in preventing blackouts.29 Since the digitization of both energy supply and society as a whole is progressing rapidly, the measures presented in the resilience strategy must also be adapted to this pace in order to effectively exploit the potential of digitization for an efficient, secure and sustainable energy supply while at the same time limiting possible risks.30

5.5

Structural and Infrastructural Adaptations to Climate Change

The expansion of renewable energies and their integration into an intelligent grid, as well as the phase-out of nuclear energy and coal-fired power generation, require far-reaching structural and infrastructural adjustments that have not yet been completed and affect all areas of the energy industry value chain, such as the expansion of transmission and distribution grids, the modernization and decarbonization of the power plant fleet, and the development of marketable energy storage facilities. In addition, energy industry planning must also take into account the requirements of climate adaptation in order to be able to guarantee a secure and stable supply even under the changed climatic conditions. Numerous companies in the energy industry have already experienced the consequences of extreme weather events, which are likely to intensify and become more frequent as a result of climate change. These consequences can impact all levels of the energy value chain, from resource extraction and logistics to energy conversion and distribution to customer supply. In concrete terms, this was demonstrated during the hot spells in 2003, 2006 and 2018, when electricity production in nuclear and thermal power plants was massively restricted in some cases due to a lack of cooling water capacity or restricted coal supplies due to low water. In the environment of the grid operators, this was particularly evident during the onset of winter in 2005. Within the framework of the Germany-wide climate impact and vulnerability analysis, the vulnerability of the energy industry 29 30

Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 146 ff. Cf. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) p. 17 ff.

5.5 Structural and Infrastructural Adaptations to Climate Change

55

to the effects of climate change has so far been assessed as low due to its high adaptive capacity, apart from the assessment of the availability of cooling water for thermal power plants. In Germany, the energy industry is the largest user of water, with more than half of the groundwater and surface water abstracted in the energy supply being used primarily for cooling purposes in thermal power plants using once-through or recirculating cooling systems. However, as thermal power plants will contribute a smaller share to electricity generation in the course of the energy transition, the importance of cooling water demand will also decrease in the course of the energy transition.31 Depending on the energy source and its infrastructure, the possible consequences of climate change are different and also require correspondingly different adaptation measures. In order to minimize the risks of future consequences of climate change for a reliable energy supply system, it is necessary to reduce the absolute final energy consumption (sustainability), to spatially distribute the energy infrastructures and to build up an energy supply structure that uses many energy sources and power plant types. In terms of power generation, the energy supply is already spread over more shoulders than was the case in the early 1990s. In addition, the future energy carrier mix in Germany from renewable energies must also be optimally designed for the effects of climate change, the implementation of which is still under development. In this context, energy carrier-specific climate risks must be analyzed and integrated into the development concepts for a future energy landscape. Furthermore, the integration of green hydrogen will also play a role in the future, which must also be included in the consideration of current plans with regard to the effects of climate change. The growth of renewable energy sources, both in electricity generation and in final energy consumption for heating and cooling, has already led to a more diversified energy source mix, which not only contributes to climate protection by avoiding greenhouse gas emissions, but also supports adaptation to climate change by spreading the risks more widely.32 The global networking of plants and power plants from different operators with each other and with overarching production planning, energy management or storage systems will enable energy savings, higher capacity utilization and greater flexibility. The required flexibilization of the overall system is achieved through the expansion and improved utilization of the power grids as well as competition between flexible generators, consumers and storage facilities on the

31 32

Cf. UBA (2019) p. 170 f., p. 174, p. 180 f. Cf. UBA (2019) p. 176 f.

56

5

Resilience Measures

electricity market. The flexibilization of the electricity system also supports climate adaptation, as many flexible generators, loads and storage facilities compete on the electricity market to meet the demand for electricity, thereby reducing the risk of individual outages and allowing the most cost-effective provider to take advantage. Furthermore, the expansion of (pumped) storage capacity is an essential aspect in this context, since the storage function (reservoir and/or pumped storage) provides crucial system services, especially as reserve power, which can flexibly provide peak load in the short term or act as a black start after a total power outage. Depending on the size of the storage facility, pumped storage power plants can also compensate for power plant outages within a certain period of time and, as a result of the predictable and controllable availability of electricity, can participate in the driving plan energy markets. Last but not least, they are able to contribute decisively to grid stabilization as a result of the highly fluctuating availability of wind energy and solar energy/photovoltaics. Against this background, the importance of the storage function as well as its technological further development will strongly increase in addition to a further flexibilization of power generation and demand in the course of the expansion of renewable energies.33 In order to prevent interruptions in the power supply due to extreme weather events, the networks are appropriately equipped and maintained. Besides the maintenance status, the quality and age of the technical components used in the network also play a role in the condition of the power grids. Since 2010, investments and expenditures for the expansion, new construction, extensions and maintenance of the grids have risen continuously, as a result of which the lines, transformers and circuit breakers of the German transmission grid are considered to be in good working order.34 The extra-high and high-voltage networks are mainly above ground, so they are directly exposed to wind and weather, and their high degree of intermeshing contributes to high supply reliability. In addition, the undergrounding of new lines in the extra-high and high-voltage grid can provide effective protection against storms, snow or ice loads and, besides increasing the acceptance of grid expansion, also contribute to better resilience of the grid to climate change-related influences. However, in the extra-high voltage range, little is known about the durability and long-term reliability of the

33

Cf. UBA (2019) p. 178 f.; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 83 f., p. 137 f. Cf. UBA (2019) p. 172 f.; on grid expansion and its investments, cf. BNetzA (2020a) p. 128 ff.; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 84 ff., p. 105 ff.

34

5.6 Innovative Technologies

57

cables and their effects on the power grid, which currently precludes the implementation of all power lines planned in the course of the energy transition using underground cabling.35

5.6

Innovative Technologies

Innovative technologies in the field of data capturing, which have developed in the course of digitization, are of enormous importance for the energy industry and the implementation of the energy transition. The Corona pandemic also made it clear that digitization is penetrating more and more areas of life in the economy and society, but also how important digital sovereignty is as a key to competitiveness and individual freedom by increasing efficiency, accelerating processes and systems, increasing the robustness of the economy and society, and expanding their ability to act. It is also a key enabler for AI technologies. Innovative technologies, especially using artificial intelligence (AI), strengthen resilience and support digital sovereignty. For example, digital technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) helped maintain the basic functions of the state, economy, and society during the Corona crisis, and innovation and adaptability, especially by companies, proved to be essential elements for resilience.36 In the age of smartphones, Big Data and artificial intelligence, the Corona pandemic led to a massive spread of digital technologies to combat it. They have been used to observe and monitor physical distance and quarantine measures, to track chains of infection (contact tracing) or to detect clusters of infection. However, they do not achieve their effect in isolation as a single measure, but in the context of many analogous measures as part of an overall strategy to manage the pandemic. Due to the rapid escalation in the number of infections and the lack of experience in dealing with such a pandemic, digital technologies in Germany and Europe initially played only a minor role in the first phase of the crisis response. Their use was not discussed until the second phase, against the background of analyzing the mobility behavior of the population in the so-called lockdown and thus paving the way for a new normality. In addition, there were controversial discussions about the development and use of a pan-European contact tracing app, with regard to a central solution, in which user data is primarily stored on smartphones, vs. a decentralized solution, in which data is also stored on a central 35

Cf. UBA (2019) p. 173; for underground cabling in the extra-high voltage range, cf. Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 85. 36 Cf. PLS (2020) p. 1, p. 4.

58

5

Resilience Measures

server, among other things. However, it became clear that none of these technological solutions alone can be decisive in the fight against the pandemic, so that all possible analog and digital measures must be considered as part of an overall strategy for future pandemics and other crisis situations in order to achieve the most adequate combination of effective measures possible and to develop robust concepts or an overall concept.37 The following is an excerpt of some technological developments in the course of the pandemic, which will also be important for future crisis situations in the energy supply environment and therefore require further research and development after the pandemic.

5.6.1

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) is developing as a basic innovation to drive digitization and autonomous systems in all areas of life in our society, economy, administration and science. The progress of artificial intelligence (AI), especially in the field of machine learning, is primarily due to the exponential increase in hardware performance and its use for processing large data sets.38 Artificial intelligence (AI) compresses, among other things, the use of machine learning, natural language processing, and computer vision, whereby computers learn to make predictions and recognize patterns, such as in the context of self-driving (automated) vehicles, which can recognize objects and predict driving behavior. In the context of artificial intelligence, large amounts of data are required and their quality is essential, as biased and inaccurate data can lead to errors in predictions and pattern recognition. In addition, the data-driven network economy is leading to a market concentration of Big Data (huge amounts of data) by a few large companies in North America, the European Union (EU), and China, which account for more than 90% of patent applications and raising risk capital in artificial intelligence (AI). Last but not least, the value of data has increased, impacting privacy, cyber security, and surveillance. As pandemics and other crises unfold, there is a need to build large public databases on which artificial intelligence can be trained to help with prediction, tracking, and diagnostics, especially as containment strategies based on better data analytics should enable the resumption of economic activity and prevent further waves of infection.39 37

Cf. Fischer/Kohler/Wenger (2020) p. 1 ff. Cf. Bundesregierung (2018) p. 10; for the AI in detail, cf. Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 496 ff. 39 Cf. Naudé (2020) p. 311, p. 313 f., p. 319 f. 38

5.6 Innovative Technologies

59

Artificial intelligence (AI) can be applied to many different risks and used at all stages of the disaster management cycle. For example, AI models are already being applied to dynamic risk analysis, which can help identify vulnerabilities, detect risks early, and predict their evolution. These include, for example, regular local forecasts of flood and landslide risk, which can be used to issue early and location-specific safety warnings. In the field of critical infrastructures, such as smart grids, artificial intelligence (AI) applications are increasingly being used for the decentralized control and optimization of microgrids, the classification of the type and severity of grid failures, and the forecasting of electricity demand, electricity prices and electricity generation by photovoltaic and wind power plants.40 In the context of the Corona pandemic, numerous new applications using artificial intelligence have emerged, but their usefulness cannot yet be assessed, especially since the artificial intelligence (AI) currently in use is based on statistical learning from large data sets. Against this background, the ability of artificial intelligence is still limited in that learning abstract concepts from a small number of examples, understanding causality, transferring what has been learned to other domains, and dealing with hierarchical structures is not yet possible. Without the presence of appropriate historical data or virtual training environments, AI systems are not yet able to produce a good result. For example, the accuracy and resolution of demand forecasting in the power grid depends on the availability of granular data from smart meters. In particular, for use in critical situations, there is a lack of training data for scenarios with a low probability of occurrence but a large impact, as well as for risks associated with emerging technologies. In addition, the collection and standardization of data on hazards or population protection services are still a major challenge, as they are currently primarily stored in data silos. In order to create training sets from sufficient and high-quality data, it must be shared and collected and labeled according to the same standard. This data is then made available anonymously on a cloud-based platform so that performance analyses can be carried out for a common goal, e.g., data from different fire department locations, using a centralized and standardized data set and clear workflows. In addition, there is still a lack of data science and machine learning experts working in large technology companies and universities rather than in the public sector, as well as a lack of capacity to build their own AI models, so as a consequence the public sector needs to collaborate with universities and private sector companies to make relevant data sets available to these actors.41 40 41

Cf. Kohler/Scharte (2020) p. 1 f. Cf. Kohler/Scharte (2020) p. 2, p. 3 f.

60

5

Resilience Measures

As part of the pandemic response, the Bundeswehr’s Territorial Tasks Command (Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben), based in Berlin, is responsible for the practical implementation of official assistance. In order to be able to assess the situation quickly, up-to-date and reliable information is required. For this purpose, since the end of the first quarter of 2021, the Prometheus AI disaster warning system has been used in the operations center of the Territorial Tasks Command to test whether and how artificial intelligence (AI) can support this process. This system can be used to obtain and clearly process relevant information for a faster and more targeted response capability of the troops deployed to provide assistance. The previous time-consuming process of manually searching and evaluating selected open information, such as Twitter accounts of the major police departments and professional fire departments as well as traffic and weather news, is to be automated by Prometheus. This system is capable of learning, whereby the intelligent algorithms become better and better through the interaction between software and user. In addition, the quality and timeliness of the information will be increased by monitoring the news tickers of all relevant editorial offices and crisis teams nationwide and in real time instead of in selected agencies and media houses, with the aim of always having an up-to-date situation picture of events and crises in Germany in order to be able to react even faster. Provided the system is successfully completed, it can provide operations centers with continuous information on the current situation picture in Germany. For future crisis or disaster situations, the Territorial Tasks Command would already have a large amount of relevant information available for situation assessment.42

5.6.2

Unmanned Systems

Unmanned systems are used not only for monitoring and reconnaissance of terrain, transport pipelines, roads and buildings, but also for search and rescue missions (disaster control and prevention) and for police hazard prevention and defense. With the help of mobile robotics, cameras, measuring devices or other systems can be deployed quickly and in hard-to-reach places on land, in the air and above/under water.43 In combination with robotic process automation (RPA) and artificial intelligence (AI), processes will not only be automated in the future, but also executed autonomously, which will open up new fields of application.

42 43

Cf. Schulenburg (2021). Cf. Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 511, p. 513 f., p. 569 ff.

5.6 Innovative Technologies

61

For example, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) were used in the Corona pandemic worldwide for new applications to monitor and enforce Corona measures by police and law enforcement, for disinfection tasks, and for the transport and delivery of medical samples and medicines, or to deliver daily necessities to quarantined people and during curfews.44 Other possible uses of unmanned robotic systems in the context of the energy industry are revealed by previous nuclear accidents, such as in Chernobyl or Fukushima in particular, as well as the dismantling of formerly active nuclear power plants. Robots can thus work safely in radiation-contaminated environments, under extreme heat, with imminent explosions or danger of collapse, take samples, measure radiation exposure of the environment, search for radiation sources and transmit their findings to the control center in real time. In this context, the European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP) has analyzed the current state of the art of mobile robotic platforms as well as unmanned systems, especially with regard to the tasks of radiation measurement and sampling as well as with regard to the actual use of robots both in nuclear accidents and in disaster relief. Thus, robot systems can be used for control and monitoring tasks on the one hand to detect incidents or malfunctions as early as possible and to prevent the spread of radiation and radioactive material, and on the other hand after incidents and disasters. It turned out that robot systems have so far only been used to a limited extent in this environment and that there are no norms, standards or “best practices” for the use of robots for the scenarios mentioned. This is in line with the use of unmanned aircraft systems, which are already being used for inspection in various areas and for which there is still a lack of standards compared to conventional inspection methods. In a worldwide written survey among robotics experts and experts in radiological and nuclear applications as well as target groups from the field of disaster relief, they agreed in principle with the above-mentioned task categories and areas of application for robots as well as the identified weaknesses of the available systems, such as maneuverability, user interfaces, radio/communication, autonomous functions and decontamination capability, but so far there is a lack of interest in large areas of robotics in scenarios with radiological and nuclear tasks. In the course of the dismantling of nuclear power plants in Germany with a simultaneous worldwide benefit or even increased entry of nuclear energy, as in Asia and Europe, among others, including Finland, France, Romania, Sweden and Spain,45 an important (civilian) market for robotics applications is beginning to emerge. 44 45

Cf. VDMA (2020). Cf. BGR (2020) p. 59, p. 61 f., p. 84 f.

62

5

Resilience Measures

In particular, the use of such systems in the context of disaster management must be integrated on the basis of previous nuclear accidents. Up to now, there is still a lack of experience among robotics experts in radiological and nuclear applications, especially with radioactive measuring devices and the correct interpretation of the measured values supplied. The European Robotics Hackathon (EnRicH) offers a good opportunity to present innovative solutions, to put the current state of research and technology to the test in real application scenarios and to identify weak points.46 Previous nuclear disasters have shown that, despite decades of experience, well thought-out emergency plans and continuously developed technologies, an accident with devastating consequences for people and the environment can occur at any time in any nuclear power plant, and that there is a great need for acute support from robotic systems in nuclear application areas, such as Chernobyl and Fukushima, or in the decommissioning of old nuclear facilities. In addition to partly obsolete plants, (partly unpredictable) natural disasters and the unpredictable human factor, the situation has been aggravated by the increasing threat scenario of terrorist attacks (cf. Sect. 3.5), especially since there is already a list of almost 40 incidents in European nuclear plants since the year 2000. In the Austrian nuclear power plant Zwentendorf, which has never been put into operation, realistic tasks under real radiation, such as exploration, reconnaissance and mapping of the infrastructure of radiation sources and radiation intensity, which are based, among other things, on real operational scenarios of past nuclear accidents, are practiced during the EnRicH. In the events held so far, it became clear that extensive research is still needed to find solutions that can provide real reliable support in an emergency. In particular, movement on uneven surfaces as well as steep and narrow staircases, which are common in older facilities, still pose great difficulties or are insurmountable. In addition, the difficult communication conditions that are to be expected in the event of a real disaster still represent a major challenge for most robots. At the third EnRicH in October 2021, which will again take place at the Zwentendorf nuclear power plant in Austria, the use of drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will supplement the existing tasks.47 Mobile ground and aerial robot systems are already being used for situational awareness in crisis situations. In order to gain an overview of the current status and future developments in the use of drones (unmanned aircraft systems)

46 47

Cf. Schneider/Wildermuth (2019). Cf. Schneider/Wildermuth (2021).

5.6 Innovative Technologies

63

by authorities and organizations with security tasks (Behörden und Organisationen mit Sicherheitsaufgaben, BOS) in civil protection, the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK) is currently preparing a “Statusbericht über den Einsatz von Drohnen im Bevölkerungsschutz in Deutschland”, for which the experiences and findings of various organizations and associations active in civil protection, which use or would like to use drones, are to be collected. For this purpose, an online survey was conducted in April 2021, which is aimed in particular at authorities and organizations with security tasks (Behörden und Organisationen mit Sicherheitsaufgaben, BOS) in Germany. The results will be used to identify and evaluate potentials and challenges.48 For the use of drones in civil protection, recommendations for common regulations were published by the BBK, which are currently being evaluated and revised after a period of two years.49

5.6.3

Warning Systems and Warning Apps

In the context of natural disasters, political tensions, international terrorism and other crisis situations, effective means of alerting the population are required to ensure safety and well-being. Thus, in the course of digitization, new technologies have also developed in the context of alerting and warning.50 Modular Warning System In order to guarantee centralized alerting of the population in the event of danger from weapons effects, which falls within the federal government’s area of responsibility for civil defense, there was originally a nationwide siren network with the central triggering devices and the associated risk communication. Following the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 in New York, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, BMI), commissioned the development of a nationwide satellite-based warning system (SatWaS), thus abandoning the previous siren network. In the years that followed, this system underwent continuous technical development, starting with a modular warning system (MoWaS) in 2013 and culminating in a web-based MoWaS 2.0 in 2020, in order to meet the strategic requirements of a modern warning system. The current version enables the transmission of multilingual warning messages 48

Cf. BBK (2021b). Cf. BBK (2020). 50 Cf. Rechenbach (2017) p. 254 f. 49

64

5

Resilience Measures

(English, French, Spanish, Russian, Polish, Arabic or Turkish) to warn the situation centers in the countries, medical institutions and the population, with each MoWaS station being assigned a defined area of responsibility. The warning process includes the definition of a hazard area, the determination of a warning level depending on the urgency and hazard situation, the selection of recipients, the description of the event, the definition of recommendations for action and the forwarding of information to contact points, hotlines or websites. The predefined categories (e.g., civil defense, fire, human and animal health), hazards (e.g., air raid, forest fire, infection hazard), and the appropriate assignment of recommended actions in each case are based on international standards and were coordinated in cooperation with various authorities and organizations from the field of civil defense and police emergency response. In addition, MoWaS 2.0 takes into account the requirements of different warning channels, since warnings must be adapted to the respective target group and to the respective warning means. For example, motorists must be able to absorb the most important information (danger, danger area, recommended action) in the shortest possible time, e.g. on digital display panels in road traffic. Furthermore, the system automatically supplies MoWaS users with warnings that can only output a small amount of text, such as information about the publisher, danger area, danger, recommendations for action, date and time.51 A dedicated exercise mode is currently being developed that will be available within the operational MoWaS application in order to train with it in the environment in which an operation would actually be conducted. In addition, the web-based MoWasS training system (MoWaS Academy) is to be expanded into a training platform so that training can be conducted both centrally at the Federal Academy for Civil Protection and Civil Defense (Bundesakademie für Bevölkerungsschutz und Zivile Verteidigung, BABZ) and decentrally at control center level. Furthermore, efforts are being made to further secure the system against possible cyberattacks with the help of BSI certification of the entire MoWaS system environment. In addition, further system capabilities are to be expanded, for which the data formats used must also be further developed. Besides the further development of the MoWaS input systems and the control centers of the modular warning system, the focus is also on the connected warning multipliers and warning terminals. For example, the output of warning messages in vehicle navigation and in-car computer systems is currently being developed, as well as the addressing of so-called smart lanterns, which are to be able to output changing light signals, audio signals and speech by means of corresponding modules. Furthermore, a concept for the control of sirens via the modular warning system as well as the area of the so-called smart 51

Cf. Rechenbach (2017) p. 254; Feldmann/Hollstein (2020) p. 24 f.

5.6 Innovative Technologies

65

home, where warning messages can be sent directly into the house at the request of the user, are currently under development. In this context, warning messages are to be triggered via DAB+ (Digital Audio Broadcasting) and its EWF (Emergency Warning Functionality) capability, in that DAB+ radios can switch on automatically in the event of a warning message and change to the warning channel. In addition, the MoWaS network is to be expanded by connecting further users from civil protection and disaster control and the police, as well as connecting neighboring countries.52 Warning App NINA The Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK) has developed the warning app NINA (Notfallinformations- und Nachrichten-App). For this, the owner of a smartphone must install the app on his cell phone and activate the status detection. The system is used for civil defense alerts and for disseminating notices and information related to civil defense and civil protection. For this purpose, the local emergency response authority uses the web-based MoWaS 2.0 of the federal government to control the warning app NINA and thus transmit information and alerts to the cell phones.53 The warning app NINA can be used to receive all warnings issued by the federal, state and local governments via the web-based MoWaS 2.0. It can also be used to receive civil protection warnings issued by the authorities from the BIWAPP (Bürger Info- & Warn-App) and KATWARN warning systems, as well as weather warnings issued by the German Meteorological Service (Deutscher Wetterdienst, DWD) and flood information from the joint flood portal of the federal lands. Version 3.0, which was developed in the early days of the Corona pandemic, introduced a new display of warning messages in the dashboard, where the warning messages are displayed depending on the warning level. In addition, a dedicated Corona information section has been added as part of the pandemic, which includes information on self-protection, precautions or proper behavior when an infection is suspected, as well as official Corona pandemic contact options. The information is produced in close cooperation between the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, BMI), the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bundes-Presse-Amt, BPA), the Federal Ministry of Health (Bundesministerium für

52 53

Cf. Feldmann/Hollstein (2020) p. 25. Cf. Rechenbach (2017) p. 253 f.

66

5

Resilience Measures

Gesundheit, BMG), the Robert Koch Institute (Robert Koch-Institut, RKI), the Federal Centre for Health Education (Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung, BZgA) and the Federal and State Police Crime Prevention Program (Programm Polizeiliche Kriminalprävention des Bundes und der Länder, Pro-PK). New reports on the Corona pandemic can also be viewed on the BBK website www.warnung. bund.de.54 Corona Warning Apps In the course of the Corona pandemic, apps have been developed to track contacts or chains of infection and thus interrupt them. The German government’s Corona warning app, created by T-Systems and SAP, has already been in use since June 2020. It is based on technologies with a decentralized approach and informs people who have been in contact with an infected person. Transparency is a key aspect in protecting the population and increasing acceptance. The app was initially downloaded by 26 million people and initially received positive reviews (including from the Chaos Computer Club). However, in the course of use, error messages accumulated and no further developments were initially made, so that it came in for massive criticism in terms of its use, but was praised by data protectionists. Unlike the Luca app, which was developed later, it did not initially have a QR code that stored personal data such as name and cell phone number, which meant that the Corona warning app lacked the cluster recognition function. The basic principle of digital contact tracing is simple. Infected persons report their infection in the app, so that other users who have recently been in contact with these infected persons for a longer period of time can be informed via their smartphone. The risk of infection is determined by distance measurement via Bluetooth, allowing users to protect themselves and others. With a wide distribution of the Corona warning app, necessary lockdown measures could be reduced, as a fast and as complete as possible digital contact tracing by the app would lead to a relief of the limited capacities of the public health departments for manual contact tracing. However, as the dissemination of the Corona warning app fell far short of expectations, it was not possible to pursue the intended goal and further lockdown measures became necessary. The Luca app, developed by neXenio GmbH, a spin-off of the Hasso Plattner Institute, is designed to ensure digital contact tracing without delay in order to quickly identify infected superspreaders. In contrast to the Corona warning app, the Luca app only registers contact data for visits to restaurants or establishments where documentation is required, and forwards this data to the health authorities. According to the manufacturer, data protection requirements, such as local and encrypted storage of 54

Cf. BBK (n.d.); Groneberg/Tuttenuj (2020) p. 26 f.

5.6 Innovative Technologies

67

data, are met. Unlike the Corona warning app, the system is based on a centralized approach, but the encrypted data is organized decentrally.55 As part of an analysis by scientists at the École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne, an initial review was conducted based on the security concept published by the developers of the Luca app. Two deficiencies were identified: firstly, the sensitive information on the backend server, which could be hacked or otherwise manipulated, and secondly, the risk of misuse of the generated real-time information due to the centralized data storage, which could enable monitoring and identification of certain individuals. The developers of the Luca system counter the criticism that the system does not have a central office that can decrypt the data on its own. Thus, even if a third party were to attempt to access the data, it should not be readable, according to the confirmation of an expert opinion by the State Commissioner for Data Protection in Baden-Württemberg. In addition, no test results would be stored on the backend server. The authenticity of the decryption is to be ensured by changing keys on a daily basis.56 Due to the cross-border pandemic, the Corona warning app is now available in all EU countries as well as Switzerland, Norway and Great Britain. The European Commission has also commissioned T-Systems and SAP to develop a software platform for linking European warning apps. Besides Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Latvia and the Czech Republic are among the countries participating in a test link. In this context, the compatibility of the national warning apps plays an important role. While Google and Apple also support decentralized warning systems at the European level with their operating systems, France and Hungary have decided against a centralized storage solution and can therefore not participate in the linking platform. But even in countries with a decentralized system, different concepts are being pursued. In Poland, for example, the use of the corresponding app, which is mandatory in contrast to Germany, also serves quarantine monitoring by using facial recognition and geolocation techniques. As part of the technical link between countries, it is therefore important to ensure that data protection-friendly settings, such as those in the German warning app, are not undermined by use in other countries with functions that are problematic from a data protection perspective. This also applies to the processing of health or movement data from Germany of citizens of other countries, which must be carried out in accordance with German and European data protection law, so the European Data Protection Committee and the European Commission are called upon to precise their published guidelines for mobile apps to contain the pandemic. In addition, the creation of a European 55 56

Cf. Rehse/Tremöhlen (2020) p. 1; Rzepka (2021); SAP (2020/2021); Culture4life. Cf. Geiger (2021).

68

5

Resilience Measures

legal basis for the use of digital technologies to combat cross-border threats is also desirable.57 In mid-April 2021, an update of the Corona warning app (version 2.0) was released, which includes the new function of the QR code (for event registration), which has contributed to a significant spread of the use of the British warning app in Great Britain. Provided a guest at the event tests positive for Covid-19 a short time later, the result can be transmitted to the Robert Koch Institute (Robert Koch-Institut, RKI) server and other guests will subsequently receive a warning from the Corona warning app. In contrast to the tracing app Luca, where registration of personal details such as name and phone number is a prerequisite and the data is transmitted collectively to the public health department in the event of a new infection, the check-in function of the Corona warning app does not require any personal details to be provided; instead, only the location of the event, the duration of the stay and the type of event are automatically stored in the Corona warning app’s own contact diary on the smartphone when an event is attended. In the event of an infection, all guests are warned via the app without the intervention of the public health department, as was previously the case with the risk encounter. In the case of the Luca app, the health authorities are supposed to take over contact tracking, but are currently already overloaded due to the large number of cases. To avoid scanning multiple QR codes, the different apps should be able to recognize one and the same code, so that other digital contact list tracking apps can integrate the code of the Corona warning app into their own QR code and a check-in of both apps with one QR code is possible. In Great Britain, the check-in function of the British government warning app “NHS Covid-19” has already been used since September 2020 by requiring a QR code to be scanned before visiting a public facility or private business, resulting in a higher download rate than the German app. According to a study by Oxford University, this has reduced the number of new infections by 0.8% to 2.3%. The federal states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Thuringia, and Baden-Württemberg have already signed fee-based usage agreements with the Luca app. The federal government is therefore considering a division of tasks between the two apps. Thus, the Corona warning app is to remain the means of choice for identifying unknown risks and warning contacts. The anonymous event registration is mainly used for private events, while the Luca app is to replace guest lists in restaurants and, in the event of Corona cases, the respective health authority is to be informed quickly about further contacts in an automated manner. Currently, the Corona protection ordinances of the sixteen federal states predominantly still prescribe manually managed guest lists, which are to be adapted in order to alternatively check in via QR code. The new 57

Cf. Dix (2020) p. 784 f.

5.7 Central Platforms and Data Access

69

version of the Corona warning app also displays current figures on the incidence of infection in Germany and the use of the app. Besides the integrated contact diary, the risk calculation has also been adapted. In addition, the app can now be installed on older smartphones. Furthermore, it is planned that the results of rapid tests can be entered into the Corona warning app and thus possible contacts can be warned via the app. Moreover, a digital vaccination passport is to be integrated before the summer of 2021. To date, the application has been downloaded approximately 26.5 million times, resulting in a total of more than 310,000 positive test results shared via the app.58 In principle, in the course of contact tracing to support the fight against a pandemic or another critical situation, a uniform portal, such as for health data, should be welcomed in the sense of overarching crisis communication, on which all data from the various warning apps converge, which can also be applied throughout Europe.

5.7

Central Platforms and Data Access

Since data form the basis of the digital society, coordinated platforms and processes are needed for accessing them, e.g., via trust models, in order to make better use of data and to be able to exchange them securely. Particularly in crisis situations, such as the Corona pandemic or power outages (cf. Sect. 4.3), it has become clear how important it is to bring together the diverse heterogeneous information centrally in order to obtain a comprehensive picture.59 High-performance, secure (data) infrastructures are a crucial prerequisite for data access. These infrastructures must be robust against external shocks and capable of handling sudden increases in usage.60 With access to a comprehensive database of detailed and real-time information from various sources, this can be collected and made available using artificial intelligence (AI) methods in order to identify and assess risks in advance with the help of developed algorithms. In this context, an information platform (smart data disaster management, sd-kama) was developed in a project funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Bundesministerium

58

Cf. Lauck (2021); Lamby-Schmitt (2021). Cf. Kagermann/Süssenguth et al. (2021) p. 38. 60 Cf. PLS (2020) p. 4. 59

70

5

Resilience Measures

für Wirtschaft und Energie, BMWi), which can provide a variety of data from different sources in real time for emergency response teams and disaster managers. The aim was to create a standardized information platform that enables up-todate, targeted, national- to local-specific disaster management in the context of flood hazards. The information platform combines and supplements information from satellite and aerial data with in situ sensing and crowdsourcing sources. This provides emergency management with an up-to-date and comprehensive picture of the situation based on an unprecedented density of information. In addition, the sd-kama platform includes an IT architecture that is capable of systematically integrating, processing and evaluating large volumes of data (big data) of heterogeneous origin in real time. Besides satellite images and aerial photographs, information on water levels, traffic flows, the psycho-physiological condition of emergency forces, and information from victims and helpers from social networks is also available.61 In the course of the Corona pandemic, a Corona data platform was developed by infas GmbH on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, BMWi). Since the beginning of March 2020, this platform has continuously collected regional Covid-19 measures and, in combination with epidemiological and socioeconomic variables and their analytical evaluations, has made them available to both the scientific community and the general public. Besides the compilation of baseline data, this includes the collection of containment measures at the regional level by county and incorporated city and over time, data review and evaluation, and the preparation of analyses to estimate the effects of containment measures and in economic activity. In addition to the data from the containment measures, data on infection incidence, mobility, economic incidence, regional structure, and health data outside the Corona complex are included.62 Since extreme events have effects beyond national borders, there is a particular need for a European infrastructure for the secure use and sharing of data. Furthermore, this will ensure technological sovereignty and prevent dependence on technology corporations from other economic areas.63 A first approach in this direction has been made with the GAIA-X project launched by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, BMWi), which has laid the foundation for the use of new applications with artificial intelligence (AI) and other digital innovations. The 61

Cf. Willkomm/Jäger et al. (2018). Cf. infas 360 GmbH. 63 Cf. Kagermann/Süssenguth et al. (2021) p. 38. 62

5.8 Data Protection

71

open digital ecosystem is designed to enable a network of developers, providers and users of digital products and services to store, exchange and use data according to predefined rules.64 In addition, due to the geographical distribution of the cloud infrastructure and a federated organization of the user ecosystems with a hybrid structure of decentralized data clusters and central databases, important resilience requirements can be met with this project. Besides the creation of international uniform standards and norms for the quality, integrity and interoperability of data, it is particularly important to design architectures, infrastructures, platforms and processes for the secure exchange and storage of data so that they are robust in the face of various shock scenarios, such as cyberattacks or failures of physical ICT infrastructures.65 In terms of electricity supply, following a large-scale blackout, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) launched the centralized European platform ENTSO-E Awareness System (EAS) for realtime pooled data exchange, allowing continental European transmission system operators (TSOs) to share and use relevant data in real time. In doing so, all operators enter a set of measurements, including frequency and cross-border exchanges, which are aggregated to create a pan-European view for each TSO on the platform.66

5.8

Data Protection

At the beginning of the Corona pandemic in April 2020, the Conference of the independent data protection authorities of the Federation and the States (Datenschutzkonferenz der unabhängigen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden des Bundes und der Länder, DSK) defined “Datenschutzgrundsätze bei der Bewältigung der Corona-Pandemie”. In doing so, it has made it clear that data protection principles offer sufficient scope for legally compliant processing of personal data, even and especially in times of crisis, and that compliance with them contributes to safeguarding freedom in a democratic society. Thus, the principles in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provide a guideline for government action which can also serve in times of crisis, which do not stand in the way of effectively combating a pandemic or other crisis, and which at the same time preserve fundamental rights in the handling of personal data. To this end, the 64

Cf. BMWi (2019a) p. 2 f.; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 10, p. 692, p. 701 ff. Cf. Kagermann/Süssenguth et al. (2021) p. 38 f. 66 Cf. ENTSO-E (n.d.). 65

72

5

Resilience Measures

DSK has pointed out five essential “Rechtmäßigkeitsvoraussetzungen für die Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten” in the context of crisis management, which applies in particular to the purpose limitation principle. Thus, regardless of a crisis situation, the processing of personal data must always be based on a legal basis, in particular by specifying as precisely as possible the purposes pursued by a processing operation. In addition, the planned measures must be critically reviewed with regard to their suitability, e.g. for recording infections, treating infected persons or preventing new infections. It is considered suitable, for example, to report medically trained personnel to the authorities responsible for health care, but not measures that are intended to track individual infection routes solely with the aid of telecommunications traffic data, e.g. via smartphone. Furthermore, the planned measures must be necessary. Accordingly, if suitable measures are available to achieve the purpose which interfere less or not at all with people’s rights, e.g. by making the data anonymous before processing, these must be implemented as a matter of priority. This also implies that the processing of personal data must not be disproportionate to the legitimate purpose pursued (adequacy), which means that particularly severe measures restricting freedom must be linked to special conditions, as in the context of the formal determination of a health emergency, which has been carried out in accordance with infection protection law in some federal lands. Finally, the measures taken specifically in the course of dealing with the Corona pandemic or in crisis situations must be designed in such a way that they can or must be revoked once the crisis is over. This means that personal (sensitive) data that is no longer needed for the specified purposes must be deleted immediately. To this end, measures taken should be limited in time, especially those that have a particularly strong impact on the fundamental rights of the persons concerned (storage limitation). In particular, health data, which belong to the category of sensitive data, require appropriate safeguards in the form of technical and organizational measures in accordance with the state of the art to protect the data subjects (integrity and confidentiality) in order to prevent misuse of data and to counteract errors in processing (accuracy). In addition, the data subjects must be informed about the processing of their data in an understandable form (transparency).67 A crucial actor during the Corona pandemic was the police as a general danger prevention authority, which had to enforce numerous measures and processed and examined data in this context. While the state’s handling of fundamental rights, such as freedom of assembly, has been widely discussed, European and German 67

Cf. Art. 5, Art. 25, Art. 32 DSGVO (2016); DSK (2020); Bremert/Hansen et al. (2020) p. 791.

5.8 Data Protection

73

data protection law, with the exception of the Corona warning app, has rarely been the focus of attention, despite the fact that numerous interventions under data protection law took place and the data protection principles of the Data Protection Conference listed above were formulated in the course of the pandemic. Thus, on the one hand, data protection is not perceived by many as significant when weighed against health issues; on the other hand, data protection considerations are essential, especially in a pandemic, because the risks to the processing of personal data are high with regard to contact tracing and other tools. To combat the spread of a pandemic, data such as movement or health data may be collected and analyzed to interrupt the spread, take protective measures, or obtain more information about the effect of a virus, especially when little knowledge about the effect and spread of the virus is available. Thus, there was also a great interest on the part of the government in a large amount of data in order to be able to meet the government’s protection mandate. However, it quickly became apparent that as the pandemic progressed, the authorities were less and less able to process the increasing amount of contact data in a meaningful way. Moreover, even during a pandemic, the protection of personal data does not automatically take a back seat to the state’s duty to protect; instead, a proportionate balance must be struck between the civil liberties of those affected and the state’s efforts to protect them. Due to the ever-increasing amount of data in society, the police have a great and growing interest in accessing personal data for the purposes of danger prevention and law enforcement, which can lead to a continuous expansion of police data processing powers. The more access the police have to large amounts of data, the better the security authorities are expected to function.68 However, the precautionary transmission of personal data on possibly infected or identified infected persons (from public health authorities) to police departments, irrespective of the reason, is unlawful, as this data is sensitive health data that may only be processed under certain conditions, as the persons concerned may suffer disadvantages if it is disclosed, especially as there is no concrete danger in the individual case. For example, a blanket transfer of data lists of potentially infected persons would constitute inadmissible data retention by the security authority, which could only contribute to infection control in exceptional cases. In this respect, the legislator is called upon to ensure that the protection of sensitive data is not subordinated to the interests of the police or other authorities, even in crisis situations.69 68

Cf. Fährmann/Arzt (2020) p. 801 f. Cf. Art. 9 DSGVO (2016); Bock/Kühne et al. (2020) p. 336 f.; Bremert/Hansen et al. (2020) p. 791 f., p. 793 ff.; Fährmann/Arzt (2020) p. 802 f.

69

74

5

Resilience Measures

In the course of the Corona pandemic and the respective regulations of the federal lands, contact data of guests, such as in restaurants or at events, had to be provided in part electronically or in paper form. This collection and storage of data represents a significant encroachment on the fundamental rights of those affected. For example, contact lists that are openly displayed or handed out to several guests can not only be viewed by third parties, but also photographed. Such an encroachment on fundamental rights, like the transfer of data lists to authorities, requires a legal basis, which has not existed to date, not even in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The subsequent collection and storage of guest data by police or other authorities also represents a new form of data retention, since personal data must be collected and stored for government use regardless of any concrete danger, solely for the purpose of government use and without any concrete reason. However, this represents a considerable encroachment on the fundamental right, since those affected can hardly escape these data collections. Thus, a legal regulation is subject to strict requirements with regard to its justification and design, also with regard to the intended use of the collected data; in this respect, precautionary data storage without a sufficient legal basis is inadmissible, especially since the corresponding legal basis for such data processing was not created even in the further course of the pandemic. In addition to a clear legal limitation of the purpose, i.e. a ban on changing the purpose, and the exclusive use of data processing by the public health authorities or another agency specifically responsible for the situation of a crisis, an explicit ban on the transfer, change of purpose, use and seizure of data for purposes of police law or criminal proceedings beyond the defense or prosecution of violations of the German Protection against Infection Act (Infektionsschutzgesetz, IfSG) must be enshrined in law.70 In the wake of the Corona pandemic, it can be stated that the processing of personal data was prevented from being fully monitored, at least in Germany and Europe, due to the existing data protection principles. However, improvements must be made to ensure compliance with fundamental rights, especially since it can be assumed that pandemics will most likely continue to accompany social life in the future.71 The use of the Corona warning app (tracing app) also requires the enactment of a law at the political level, as is generally the case for the use of digital technologies. As with the collection of contact data, the Corona warning app must also be prohibited from changing its purpose in order to prevent other access 70 71

Cf. Fährmann/Arzt (2020) p. 803 ff. Cf. Bremert/Hansen et al. (2020) p. 795.

5.8 Data Protection

75

by the police or other authorities or blanket transmission.72 In addition, only a combination of organizational, legal, and technical measures can effectively and irreversibly separate a personal reference from the uploaded data so that it is stored on the server as “infection-indicating data without a personal reference” using an anonymization process. These measures must also be continuously monitored by a data protection management system (DPMS). The Corona warning app currently available does not have such a separation process.73 The development of the German Corona warning app largely meets the requirements of the “privacy by design” principle and serves as a model. Thus, for the first time, a data processing project was developed with the support of the German federal government in which data protection was a priority, and thus the Corona warning app plays a major role in the development of data protection, particularly in the context of digital technologies. In particular, user numbers have certainly benefited from the decentralized and data-saving configuration. However, there are deficits in terms of data protection law with the two prevailing operating systems, whose contact recording function is a prerequisite for using the Corona warning app. On the one hand, Google and Apple must provide the necessary transparency regarding the data flows triggered from the user’s end device to their servers, and on the other hand, it must be possible to use the Corona warning app without transmitting personal data to Google or Apple. Europe-wide usability of the Corona warning app is not yet optimal due to the very different technical concepts in the individual states of the European Union (EU). According to the European Data Protection Board, the goal must be not to play off effective pandemic response and the protection of fundamental rights against each other, but to combine them. Last but not least, effective data protection can play an essential role in combating a pandemic.74 The necessary physical distancing during the pandemic has been accompanied by an enormous acceleration of digitization. In particular, the use of software for video communication has increased and become more important not only in companies and for activities that do not necessarily have to be performed on site (home office and mobile work), but also in public authorities and universities. The digital communication tools currently available, including e-mails, telephony, and messenger services, do not currently meet the requirements of data protection and are proving difficult to implement in practice. For example, many means of communication do not yet have enforced transport encryption or effectively 72

Cf. Bock/Kühne et al. (2020) p. 334; Fährmann/Arzt (2020) p. 805. Cf. Bock/Kühne et al. (2020) p. 334, p. 337. 74 Cf. Bock/Kühne et al. (2020) p. 336 f.; Dix (2020) p. 785. 73

76

5

Resilience Measures

implemented end-to-end encryption as standard, so that additional measures may have to be taken to protect the content of the communication depending on its need for protection. However, the introduction of protective measures requires the cooperation of the other communication subscriber or security measures must be implemented across providers, for which there is currently a lack of technical standards and concrete legal requirements to implement corresponding measures on the part of the service providers.75

5.9

IT and Cyber Security

The city of the future is expected to be based on a cyber-physical platform characterized by interconnected critical “systems of systems”. In smart cities, the traditional critical infrastructure network will be replaced by bidirectional information systems that connect critical service providers and consumers. Smart grids, through the Internet of Things (IoT), which is increasingly evolving into an Internet of Everything (IoE), rely on various devices placed in both critical infrastructure and consumer premises to monitor, analyze, and control the effectiveness, efficiency, reliability, safety, and sustainability of service delivery.76 With the Internet of Things (IoT), physical objects have evolved through microelectronic components into smart, networked devices that are connected via the Internet, enabling communication with each other and the generation and exchange of data. This development is further driven by the increasing purchase of networked devices by customers/end users on the one hand and the investments of the economy on the other hand.77 In addition to consumer devices in the smart home, industrial systems and critical infrastructures, such as grid-connected storage and modems, operational technologies, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and satellites, are also connected to the Internet. Thus, the energy industry, with its critical infrastructures, can leverage the IoT to significantly optimize risk management. The IoT generates huge amounts of data that can be used before, during, and after a critical incident to send detailed and timely information about the status of infrastructures, which can prevent the entire system from malfunctioning. During a critical incident, IoT systems, such as unmanned systems or satellites, can provide valuable situational awareness information to support crisis management and can be deployed in inaccessible 75

Cf. Venzke-Caprarese (2020) p. 796, p. 800. Cf. Baezner/Maduz/Prior (2018) p. 1 f. 77 Cf. Holland (2019) p. 52. 76

5.9 IT and Cyber Security

77

or unsafe areas. Due to real-time information, decision-making processes and overall response time can be accelerated, and resilience can be strengthened. In addition, IoT systems improve the automation of repetitive processes in critical infrastructures, reducing the risks associated with human error, thereby increasing safety and reducing costs.78 However, the disadvantage so far is that due to a lack of regulation, security and protection measures as well as lifecycle management are often ignored, so that the number of inadequately secured and unprotected IoT devices has increased alarmingly. Regulation, standardization, and certification of IoT have yet to mature, and few countries are integrating IoT into their national cyber security or cyber defense strategies. Great Britain is the only nation to have issued a set of rules on the IoT. In addition, the international organizations ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency), ITU (International Telecommunication Union), and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) have published recommendations on IoT. The lack of regulation has led to unsafe design and production practices, as well as insufficient lifecycle management, so that neither the compatibility between older and new devices is known, nor their security or lifespan, which are essential aspects for critical infrastructures that use numerous IoT devices that must be operational at all times. Since IoT devices can be misused in various ways, such as espionage, disruption, criminality, or hacking, if they are not properly secured, they not only represent a systemic vulnerability in all critical infrastructures, but can also stop sending false information or no information at all, which can have momentous consequences for critical infrastructures. This means that IoT systems can potentially be considered untrustworthy in the context of risk management if the principle of “security by design” has not been integrated throughout the product lifecycle. Often, companies also lack the knowledge and experience to manufacture secure IoT devices and/or the lack of contextual awareness about the IoT devices deployed, such as in a factory, hospital, or power grid, which require different security standards, which can lead to systemic malfunction of the IoT devices. Due to the increase in IoT attacks, the Japanese government decided in January 2019 to test all IoT devices present on Japanese soil to secure the 2021 Summer Olympics to be held in Tokyo. Since the functioning of critical infrastructures, such as power grids and gas pipelines, among others, is interdependent across countries, it is important not only to develop standards, but also to integrate the regulation of IoT into the European cyber security strategy.79 78 79

Cf. Crelier (2020). Cf. Crelier (2020).

78

5

Resilience Measures

In December 2020, the European Union (EU) presented a new EU strategy for cyber security and resilience, with the aim of strengthening resilience to cyberattacks and technological and digital sovereignty. Among other things, it identifies reform plans that will more closely link cyber security with the EU’s new rules on data, algorithms, markets and Internet services. In 2019, the EU recorded about 450 attacks on critical infrastructure (CI) in the energy and water supply as well as information and communication technologies in health, transport and finance. Especially during the Corona pandemic, the vulnerabilities of technologically interdependent societies have been exposed by numerous cyberattacks. The cyber security strategy includes, among other things, the establishment of a new joint cyber unit to strengthen IT capabilities as well as cooperation between EU institutions and Member State authorities responsible for prevention, deterrence and response with regard to cyberattacks. Furthermore, a cyber shield, a network of security operations centers across the EU using artificial intelligence (AI), will be established to detect threats of imminent cyberattacks at an early stage and take action before damage occurs. This will serve as a cooperation platform for EU civilian and military authorities responsible for cyber security, improving coordination in the event of major attacks. To protect critical infrastructures, regulations on network and information systems security are to be revised for a high common level of cyber security through a new EU Network and Information Systems Directive (NIS Directive) to enhance the defensibility of critical public and private sectors, such as hospitals, energy networks, railroads, data centers, public administrations, research laboratories, and the manufacture of critical medical devices and pharmaceuticals, as well as other critical infrastructure and services, by maintaining their impermeability in a rapidly changing and complex threat environment. In addition to the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, which has been in place since 2018 as a sanctions regime and to counter serious cyberattacks, proposals will also be made under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) to expand the EU’s cyber diplomacy to effectively counter attacks on critical infrastructure, supply chains, and democratic institutions and processes, as well as to further optimize cooperation in the field of cyber defense. Furthermore, the EU intends to intensify cooperation with international partners in the United Nations to promote international security and stability in cyberspace by advancing international norms and standards that reflect the EU’s core values. To

5.9 IT and Cyber Security

79

this end, cyber dialogues with third countries, regional and international organizations, and the multi-stakeholder community will be intensified, and a global EU cyber diplomacy network will be established.80 With the IT Security Act 2.0, the German government is continuing the second Act to Increase the Security of Information Technology Systems (Gesetz zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme) as the successor to the IT Security Act of 2015 (IT-Sicherheitsgesetz, IT-SiG) in order to be able to counter the increased threat to IT security due to increasing digitization. For example, the German Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI) has been given greater powers to detect security vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. In addition, the law contains a provision regarding mobile communications networks that prohibits the use of critical components to protect public order or security in Germany. Furthermore, network operators are obliged to meet specified high security requirements. Consumer protection is also strengthened by the introduction of a standardized IT security label that will make it clear in the future which products already contain IT security standards.81 In 2021, the federal government’s cyber security strategy formulated new key points for the previous cyber security strategy from 2016. The previous areas of action “Sicheres und selbstbestimmtes Handeln in einer digitalisierten Umgebung”, “Gemeinsamer Auftrag von Staat und Wirtschaft”, “Leistungsfähige und nachhaltige gesamtstaatliche Cyber-Sicherheitsarchitektur” and “Aktive Positionierung Deutschlands in der europäischen und internationalen CyberSicherheitspolitik” remain in place. New is the inclusion of the overarching guidelines “Digitale Souveränität” and “Sichere Gestaltung der Digitalisierung”. In addition, the strategies are to be effective and measurable, and this is to be achieved with the help of strategic controlling by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, BMI). The strategy does not address the specific protection of IoT devices. Moreover, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is only listed in the “Sicheres und selbstbestimmtes Handeln in einer digitalisierten Umgebung” action area, according to which AI systems should achieve a high level of IT security and their use should ensure a high level of security.82 80

Cf. EU-Kommission (2020b); Bendiek/Kettemann (2021) p. 1 f.; on the previous NIS Directive (NIS-Richtlinie) or NIS Act (NIS-Gesetz), cf. Richtlinie EU (2016); NIS-Gesetz (2017). 81 Cf. BMI (2021b). 82 Cf. BMI (2021a) p. 2 ff.

80

5

Resilience Measures

Three strategies can be identified in the context of cyber security. These are the prevention of attacks, the counteraction of attacks and the detection of attacks. In addition to Besides the existing cyber security early warning and situational awareness systems, which generate warnings when attacks are detected, there are now artificial intelligence (AI) methods that can be used in a variety of ways to increase cyber security, whereby it is necessary to prevent both classic attack vectors and new special attacks on AI. In addition, AI-enabled cyber systems must also be protected from cyberattacks in order to function reliably. Since artificial intelligence (AI) significantly increases the detection rate of network attacks and in IT end devices, thus preventing damage and minimizing risks in the digitization process, IT systems that do not use any form of artificial intelligence (AI) in the future will no longer be able to maintain a sufficient level of security and protection in the long term.83 Using artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning strategies and capabilities are applied to process large amounts of information, so that the derived insights influence the approach in the cyber security environment when attackers use artificial intelligence methods to attack IT systems. In addition, artificial intelligence (AI) can help analyze events in real time and make decisions based on the situation. Furthermore, identification and access management systems will be able to benefit from the automatic evaluation of user movement data, which will allow only authorized users to access IT systems.84

83

Cf. Pohlmann (2019) p. 26 ff., p. 281 ff., p. 521 ff., p. 557 f.; Bonfanti/Kohler (2020) p. 1 ff. Cf. Pohlmann (2019) p. 521 f.; Bonfanti/Kohler (2020) p. 3; Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 673 ff., p. 703 ff.

84

6

Resilience in Smart Cities

In recent years, risks and hazards have changed globally and nationally in the wake of digitization and climate change, with extreme natural events, technologyrelated hazards such as system failure or accidents, and man-made hazards such as terrorism and cybercrime playing an equally important role. In addition, vital dependencies on critical infrastructures, especially power supply and information and communication technologies (ICT), have made highly technical societies very vulnerable. In the event of a prolonged and widespread power blackout, which can be caused by the aforementioned risk factors, all other vital, so-called critical infrastructures would be disrupted or no longer able to function, so that public and private life would collapse. In the event of a blackout, other critical infrastructures that are dependent on electricity would gradually fail and the crisis situation would be exacerbated. Besides telecommunications, ICT, transport, drinking water and wastewater disposal, food supply, cash supply, fuel supply and healthcare could no longer be maintained as a result. In addition, people in elevators, parking garages and other places may be in distress, especially since fire departments, relief organizations and police are not unaffected by a blackout. Furthermore, not all major facilities are designed for permanent emergency power operation. With the exception of hospitals and certain agricultural operations, there are no legal requirements in Germany to maintain an emergency power supply for other important infrastructures; instead, they are part of a company’s own voluntary precautions. Besides the risk factors mentioned above, the complexity of technical systems, climate change and the changed security policy situation in Europe and the world also play a role in possible power failures. In the medium and long term, however, climate change with its increasing extreme

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-A. Krebs and P. Hagenweiler, Energy Resilience and Climate Protection, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37564-5_6

81

82

6

Resilience in Smart Cities

weather events and increasing warming poses a very central challenge for the future and for life in cities.1 The Corona pandemic, in particular, has highlighted the extensive consequences for each individual and for life together in cities. Within this framework, it is therefore a central goal to make communities and cities resilient and sustainable in the long term, and to make their societies resilient. On the one hand, this is the responsibility of the citizens themselves, who must have knowledge of self-protection and self-help in order to be able to act successfully in the event of disasters or crisis situations and to bridge periods of time through self-sufficiency until professional help arrives or to relieve emergency services. So far, these skills are not particularly well developed among the population, not only in Germany but also in Austria, for example, nor is there a willingness to become active themselves in terms of preparedness or to brush up on first aid, self-protection and self-help training. In addition, the local infrastructures, which are elementary for the municipality, the authorities, the companies and the population, must be made resilient. These infrastructures must first be identified, subjected to a risk analysis and equipped with an effective risk and crisis management system. Besides local infrastructures, regional and supra-regional infrastructures that are essential for the supply of the respective community, such as the electricity and drinking water supply, must also be included in risk management. In addition, emergency supply systems, such as emergency power and fuel supply for the essential elements of the infrastructures as well as emergency wells, must be kept available. Other elements of prevention and preparedness include local risk analysis, a new culture of conscious risk and hazard management, and effective risk and crisis communications that increase resilience. The Corona pandemic also made it clear that the greatest possible degree of self-sufficiency in supply infrastructures is risk-reducing, without having to fall back on external structures that cannot be accessed in the event of disasters.2 In this context, the memorandum “Urbane Resilienz – Wege zur robusten, adaptiven und zukunftsfähigen Stadt” was commissioned by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, BMI), in May 2021 at the 14th Federal Congress of the National Urban Development Policy, which shows ways to use the opportunities of transformation and to make cities and communities resilient to crises and disasters. In

1

Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 17; Geier/Etezadzadeh (2020) p. 697 f., p. 700 f.; BMI (2021c) p. 2. Cf. BBK (2017); BBK (2019b); BBK (2019c); BBK (2019g); BBK (2019h); Geier/Etezadzadeh (2020) p. 699 f., p. 706.

2

6

Resilience in Smart Cities

83

addition to the safety, well-being and quality of life of the people, the responsibility for sustainability and the global protection of the natural basis of life also come to the fore. This requires the cooperative interaction of various actors from different fields within the Memorandum, which assumes a coordinating role of integrated and sustainable urban development in the sense of the “New Leipzig Charter (2020)” under the focus of the three content dimensions green, just and productive city and in the context of the National Urban Development Policy. The international framework is provided by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda (cf. Sect. 5.1), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Reduction (2015–2030), in which countries worldwide have committed themselves to substantially reducing the impact of natural disasters over the next 15 years through precautionary measures, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change of 2015 (cf. Sect. 5.3) and the New Urban Agenda of 2016, which deals with the development, function and sustainable design of cities.3 At the European level, these are the European Green Deal (2019) for a sustainable EU economy and the Pact of Amsterdam with its Urban Agenda for the EU (2016).4 In the future, urban resilience must be integrated as a central component of sustainable urban development, which includes not only resilience but also active adaptation and change to meet future challenges, taking into account natural hazards as well as technological, biological, economic or social hazards.5 The urban planning model of a compact, mixed-use city of short distances has also proven itself in the course of the Corona pandemic, so that in the future, too, public spaces and green infrastructure in cities must not be reduced solely to their function of social encounter, as they are fundamental resources for confronting climate change. Thus, resilience to climate change can be increased through targeted climate protection and adaptation measures in cities. In this context, heat islands, possible adaptation and avoidance measures as well as precautions against increasing extreme weather events and the demand for inner-city greening measures to improve the urban climate and increase the quality of life in cities are mentioned in particular. To this end, cities and municipalities must focus on environmentally and climate-friendly mobility. In particular, the feeling of safety in

3

Cf. EU (2016); UN (2016); BBK (2019f); BMI (2020); BMI (2021c) p. 2 f.; DNS (2021) p. 9, p. 22. 4 Cf. EU-Kommission (2016); EU-Kommission (2019); BMI (2021c) p. 3. 5 Cf. BMI (2021c) p. 6.

84

6

Resilience in Smart Cities

public transport must be restored through visible measures to prevent contagion and strict hygiene measures.6 The increasing digitization processes make it clear that information and communication technologies (ICT) also belong to the critical infrastructures (CI). They form a central building block for shaping the future of cities and communities. In addition, the Corona pandemic revealed how heavily society relies on these systems and how the functioning of other critical infrastructures, such as the energy and transport sectors, is increasingly dependent on ICT. For example, finance, transport and logistics, food and healthcare are being organized with the help of ICT, and power grids and water supplies are increasingly being controlled with smart ICT. Furthermore, private households, individual transportation and the economy are also benefiting from digital infrastructures and are increasingly being penetrated by them. ICTs contribute in all relevant areas to the functioning, efficiency and facilitation of daily life in cities, but like energy systems that depend on ICTs, they can be endangered by natural disasters, such as floods, by crime or terrorism, as well as by human or technical errors (cf. chap. 3). Cities must be prepared for these potential hazards. As soon as ICT fails to withstand the aforementioned stresses, this leads to the collapse of critical infrastructures due to networking, which can lead to a cascading failure of several critical infrastructures. Thus, ICT as a key factor as well as the other critical infrastructures must be made as resilient as possible. The aim is to design ICT in cities in such a way that they can cope with functional disruptions and impairments during a crisis situation, maintain an emergency supply and enable a rapid return to normality. To this end, they must be able to cope not only with significant system impairments, such as overloads, technical faults or cyberattacks, but also with prolonged power outages or material damage. The crisis-proof functionality of ICT is vital, particularly during crisis management, e.g., through the use of disaster control.7 Within the framework of the LOEWE (Landes-Offensive zur Entwicklung Wissenschaftlich-ökonomischer Exzellenz) research center emergenCITY, which was launched in 2020, interdisciplinary research is being conducted in the four interlinked program areas of “Stadt und Gesellschaft”, “Information”, “Kommunikation” and “Cyber-physische Systeme”, involving not only the universities of Darmstadt, Kassel and Marburg, but also the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK), the city of Darmstadt and other partners from industry and science. 6 7

Cf. Hachmann (2020) p. 263; BMI (2021c) p. 8, p. 10. Cf. Hollick/Hofmeister (2021); BMI (2021c) p. 10 f.

6

Resilience in Smart Cities

85

The aim of the project is to prepare cities for crisis and disaster situations in the best possible way by researching measures relating to resilient information and communications technology and, among other things, legal and urban planning aspects of crisis management. ICT systems are to be made usable in a self-organizing manner on the basis of functional subsystems for all phases of the crisis process by continuously preparing them for crisis situations even in normal operation and detecting them as autonomously as possible. These can be intelligent ICT systems that can efficiently reconfigure network nodes. In addition, early detection and rapid analysis of the crisis situation from a wide variety of heterogeneous data sources must be made possible via platforms, whereby knowledge for improving the digital city can be derived from the information collected during other crises (cf. Corona pandemic). Mobile ground and aerial robotic systems will also be used for situational awareness in crisis situations. When designing ICT and other critical infrastructures, the aspects of resilience and efficiency will have to be given equal priority in the future and efficiency improvements will have to be carried out while maintaining sufficient resilience requirements. It is still possible to integrate resilience from the outset as part of the digital transformation in cities in order to adequately protect digital cities in the future.8 In the course of digitization, crisis situations such as a large-scale power blackout and its consequences are already being mapped in civil protection using simulation technology in order to better recognize and assess risk potentials and their effects and to gain new insights into the possible consequences of extreme events. However, the so-called black swans, unpredictable events, which are not known due to ignorance or difficult to estimate character, cannot be mapped with it, but they have to be found first and then analyzed with the help of the simulation. Furthermore, geographical information systems (GIS) play an important role for risk analysis, forecasting of situations and the creation of interactive maps. The use of artificial intelligence (AI) is still in its infancy and will replace traditional techniques in the future as part of intelligent analysis and forecasting tools. In addition, drones and robotic systems with learning capabilities can be used in particularly dangerous situations and can obtain good situation information and send it to the control centers. However, it is important to avoid too much dependence on such systems, because in the event of a failure or malfunction of digital,

8

Cf. Hollick/Hofmeister (2021).

86

6

Resilience in Smart Cities

automatic systems, it must always be possible for humans to intervene and prevent the worst, so that these complex systems should always be considered as an additional aid in crisis situations due to their particular vulnerability.9

9

Cf. Geier/Etezadzadeh (2020) p. 701 f., p. 706.

7

Conclusion and Outlook

The Corona pandemic, which broke out in 2020 as the biggest global crisis in decades, has been classified by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in the “green swan” category, by which it also means possible disastrous effects of climate change. In contrast to “black swans,” “green swans” are so radical in their destructive power that they require radically new political approaches. The banking world postulates that mankind must prepare for further major crises, referring to the financial crisis in 2008. The risks of so-called black and green swans are ignored by people because they focus only on known and immediate events instead of also considering unknown and improbable events, which means that in case of their actual occurrence only improvisation can be made. The immense importance of identifying and managing these unknown and improbable events requires dedicated consideration, which the authors will subject to scientific scrutiny in another publication. While the effects of so-called black swans are limited to stock markets and the economy, so-called green swans have massive complex effects on human life. Although there has been evidence of pandemics in international economic forecasts for many years, their outbreak has not been seriously considered, despite the appearance of AIDS, SARS, MERS and Ebola. Thus, even the Global Risks Report in 2020 included infectious diseases among the possible but rather unlikely threats, while in 2021 they are among the seven currently likely threats (cf. chap. 3).1 The Corona pandemic has not only resulted in 3,565,444 deaths worldwide to date (as of 02/06/2021),2 but since its onset in early 2020 has also had a massive impact on all areas of daily life and led to extraordinary developments in Germany in the economy and society, in the national budget and education, in 1 2

Cf. Müller (2020). Cf. Statista (2021).

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-A. Krebs and P. Hagenweiler, Energy Resilience and Climate Protection, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37564-5_7

87

88

7

Conclusion and Outlook

transport and in population figures. In the context of the economy, for example, Germany’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 4.9% year-on-year after ten years of growth. In addition, the Corona pandemic led to a financing deficit of 139.6 billion euros with a deficit ratio of 4.2%, making it the second-highest government deficit since German unification. In the mobility sector, 57.8 million passengers were registered in air travel, 74.5% fewer than in the previous year. Mobility also declined in the road transport sector, with fewer traffic accidents (16.4%) than in the previous year and 10.7% fewer traffic fatalities, which is the lowest level in 70 years.3 The distribution of transport volume due to the risks of infection has shifted to the disadvantage of public transport (subway, streetcar, bus), the use of which, however, should make a significant contribution in the context of climate protection and energy transition. While about a quarter fewer car trips were registered in Germany in long-distance traffic at the beginning of November 2020, the number of rail trips fell by about two-thirds. The energy sector also recorded a new high, according to which almost half (47%) of the electricity generated and fed into the grid in 2020 came from renewable energies, and wind power as a renewable energy source had the highest share (25.6%) of the amount of electricity fed into the grid in a year for the first time, at the same time replacing coal as the most important energy source and continuing the trend from 2019.4 In contrast to the so-called black swans, which have a low probability of occurring and originate mainly in the financial markets, so-called green swans, such as climate change, occur with near certainty, although it is not really possible to predict exactly when this will happen (e.g. meteorite impacts or volcanic eruptions) and they are a global threat. For example, a rapid rise in sea levels due to the greenhouse effect can cause floods and inundations around the globe, resulting in a cascading chain of destruction. Therefore, so-called green swans require changed models and ways of thinking to cope with the upcoming global risks in cooperation with all nations.5 In the course of the Corona pandemic, however, it became clear that each member state within the European Union (EU) initially managed its own affairs without regard for its European neighbors, and that the model of global cooperation was a long way off. Thus, a rethinking within the

3

Cf. Destatis (2021). Cf. Destatis (2021); Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) p. 133. 5 Cf. Müller (2020). 4

7

Conclusion and Outlook

89

European Union (EU) is demanded, which has more competencies (besides competition policy, trade policy and currency) and the EU Parliament and the EU Commission are to be significantly strengthened vis-à-vis the member states.6 Strengthening Europe’s Ability to Act In the event of crises, security of supply, border controls and regulatory issues, among others, cannot be solved at the national level alone. Various measures are needed to strengthen Europe’s ability to act in crisis situations and to make it faster and more effective. These include the establishment of a new, central European crisis unit under the direction of all member states of the European Union (EU), consisting of decision-makers and experts for specific crisis events (task forces), which can be called into action ad hoc in the event of future crises, such as environmental disasters or nuclear accidents. The crisis task force should be able to act according to clearly defined processes for individual scenarios and have crisis-related, comprehensive and immediate decision-making authority. Furthermore, the development of a European Resilience Council is advocated in order to anchor resilience at a central point and to bundle interdisciplinary expertise so that it can issue rapid and effective recommendations for all member states in the event of an emergency. Borders must be kept open within Europe, even in crisis situations, so that the movement of people and goods can be maintained and the effects of a crisis are not exacerbated. Finally, the ability of companies and other actors to act in times of crisis should be prepared through regulatory adjustments, such as shortened procedures and exemptions. To strengthen Europe’s resilience, the European Commission has already developed the Strategic Foresight, which for the first time focused on Europe’s capacity for resilience in the four dimensions of social and economic, geopolitical, green and digital.7 Strengthening Resilience In the wake of the Corona pandemic, the innovation policy debate on structural change and technological sovereignty has increasingly focused on the aspect of resilience. Accordingly, the resilience of economic structures must be ensured in order to safeguard value creation and employment in the long term and to guarantee the ability of Germany and the European Union (EU) to act in crises in order to be able to support a global approach. Resilience is proving to be an essential building block in times of crisis, such as pandemics or climate change, to be able to act in a self-determined manner. During the Corona pandemic, the weaknesses 6 7

Cf. Müller (2020); Brzoska/Neuneck/Scheffran (2021) p. 3 ff. Cf. EU-Kommission (2020a); Kagermann/Süssenguth et al. (2021) p. 40.

90

7

Conclusion and Outlook

regarding resilience were revealed, but also great agility and innovation potentials in companies, authorities and politics were made visible, which form the basis for the development and implementation of resilience strategies. Since other crises are likely to occur in the future, which will therefore affect sectors and areas of society in a different way, efforts with regard to resilience must be thought of in a conceptually broader way than is currently the case (cf. chap. 5). In addition, resilience is to be viewed as an ongoing process that cannot completely avoid negative effects, but rather resilience should prepare for crisis events in order to remain capable of action during the crisis and to be able to recover quickly in the aftermath, with the goal of a new, improved state instead of a return to the status quo or status quo ante, which is no longer feasible due to the increasingly noticeable acceleration caused by digitization. The aim is to achieve resilience by diversifying global suppliers and strengthening the company’s own position on the world market so that internationally competitive ecosystems can develop in future technological fields.8 The international standard for business continuity management DIN EN ISO 22301 serves as a basis for protecting companies against future threats, increasing resilience, and ensuring faster recovery from disruptions or reconstruction after crisis situations. It also establishes requirements to reduce the likelihood of, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disruptions. Furthermore, this standard can be used to assess the ability to meet one’s own requirements and obligations in relation to maintaining operational capability in companies.9 Advancing Digitization (in relevant areas) Natural disasters, pandemics and other extreme events have dramatic effects in a globally networked world, so that companies must better adapt their offerings and value creation systems to future crises with the help of a digital infrastructure and services. Although Germany is only in the middle of the pack in terms of digital transformation in an international comparison, it became clear in the course of the Corona pandemic that an accelerated digital transformation in Germany and Europe is definitely possible and of essential importance, especially since digitization has made companies and organizations adaptable, capable of action and thus able to survive in a crisis.10 Digital solutions are highly scalable and enable efficiency gains while at the same time making products more flexible. To overcome current crises and prepare for future ones, systems should be adapted, in particular high-performance, secure and sovereign telecommunications, cloud and data 8

Cf. Kagermann/Süssenguth et al. (2021) p. 6 f. Cf. DIN EN ISO 22301 (2020); BCI (2020). 10 Cf. Streibich/Winter (2020) p. 6; Velten (2020). 9

7

Conclusion and Outlook

91

infrastructures, with the aim of maintaining all relevant social and economic functions even in the event of external shocks. This digital resilience helps to ensure economic, political and social performance in crisis situations and to enable a new form of digital sovereignty throughout Europe as a central prerequisite for global competitiveness and prosperity.11 Digitization, combined among other things with automated processes, data-based predictions on an immense amount of data (big data) in the sense of better plannability and disruption avoidance as well as the control and analysis of distributed network structures, makes it possible to immunize oneself as far as possible against unforeseen crises and external influences and to build up digital resilience. In addition, the pandemic will change adaptation mechanisms of new and digital technologies, insofar as these help to organize work and everyday life under difficult conditions. For example, in the event of a reactor accident, these could be autonomous systems that take over the supply in heavily contaminated areas or the use of augmented and virtual reality for remote maintenance of production plants and machines when engineers are under quarantine. Digitization must continue to be driven forward even after the Corona pandemic, especially since in a hyper-connected world and in the wake of climate change, there will be similar crises or risks, such as large-scale power outages or highly infectious and dangerous malware that can attack critical infrastructures, among other things, or unforeseeable extreme weather events (so-called black swans). The integration of more secure communication, taking into account reliable identity recognition and up-to-date intelligent data protection (smart data protection generated by AI), can make many systems more resilient to unplanned events. In addition, the collection of process, machine, product or user data, suitable analysis tools and access to public databases are required, which must be secured against external disturbances and attacks in the best possible way.12 In this context, against the backdrop of advancing digitization, it is important to examine how the (digital) organizational models of companies will have to develop and integrate with IT in the medium and long term (vice versa). Besides the IT, intelligent, autonomous machines and systems as well as autonomous algorithms will be two further essential assets in the future, which will have to cooperate closely with IT on an equal footing.13 Further Development of Risk Management In order to be resilient in future crisis situations, it is essential for companies, especially for operators of critical infrastructures, to further develop and expand or 11

Cf. Streibich/Winter (2020) p. 6, p. 19. Cf. Streibich/Winter (2020) p. 19; Velten (2020). 13 Cf. Velten (2020). 12

92

7

Conclusion and Outlook

strengthen a risk management system consisting of scenario building, criticality analysis, vulnerability analysis and risk assessment, and to successively adapt it to current requirements, as was made clear once again in the case of the Corona pandemic (cf. Sect. 4.2), in order to be able to react appropriately in the event of an emergency. In this context, it is also important to form an agile crisis team that can make strategic decisions in crisis situations and is supported by artificial intelligence (AI). In addition, decision-makers for specific crisis situations must be appointed locally for the implementation of the strategic requirements in order to be able to quickly take on clearly defined tasks in the event of a crisis. Industry-specific best practice measures with concrete recommendations in crisis situations as well as overarching requirement catalogs can be made available more quickly via industry associations in addition to the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK).14 Sustainability and Climate Protection The Corona pandemic and the accompanying economic crisis pose huge challenges for companies in addition to the implementation of sustainability in the wake of climate change. However, due to the consequences of the pandemic, many investments are being cut back in terms of sustainability. As part of the “Climate Check 2021 Survey” conducted by Deloitte in cooperation with Oxford Economics, 750 executives of larger companies (250 million to 10 billion US$ in sales) from 13 countries were surveyed at the beginning of 2021 on the restrictions imposed by the pandemic and their plans for the future. The results show that the majority (85%) of companies surveyed are concerned about climate change and that climate change is already having a direct negative impact on companies, including operational constraints due to increased natural disasters (27%), resource scarcity (26%), regulatory uncertainty (26%), increased insurance costs (26%) and negative impact on corporate reputation (17%). In this context, the companies surveyed have already implemented measures such as the development of sustainability projects in politics and society (49%), preference for sustainably positioned suppliers and business partners (48%) and more sustainable materials management (46%). Thus, despite the Corona pandemic and its economic consequences, climate protection and sustainability have a high priority for the majority of companies (81%), with two-thirds of the companies surveyed (63%) intending to participate in the UN Climate Change Conference in November 2021, especially as climate change and

14

Cf. BBK (2019a) p. 25 ff.; Kagermann/Süssenguth et al. (2021) p. 37.

7

Conclusion and Outlook

93

the impending loss of species and biodiversity threaten similarly serious and farreaching consequences.15 In order to achieve the goal of a sustainable European economy and a climate-neutral Europe, the European Green Deal was developed in the form of an action plan. According to this plan, investments are to be made in new, environmentally friendly technologies and industry is to be supported in the development of innovations. In addition, environmentally friendly, cost-effective and healthier forms of private and public transport are to be introduced. Furthermore, the energy sector is to be decarbonized and the energy efficiency of buildings increased. Finally, to support these measures, environmental standards are to be improved worldwide in cooperation with international partners.16 According to statistics published in 2021 by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), despite the economic situation in the Corona pandemic, renewable energy additions worldwide reached a new high of more than 260 GW in 2020, exceeding the 2019 capacity increase by almost 50%. Of this, solar and wind energy accounted for 91%. This is due to the decommissioning of fossil fuel power plants in Europe, North America and, for the first time, Eurasia. The capacity of electricity production from renewable sources increased by 10.3% (2799 GW) in 2020, with hydropower accounting for the largest share at 1211 GW. At the same time, electricity production from fossil fuels still increased by 60 GW, compared to 64 GW in 2019. However, in order to achieve the 2050 energy target, significant planned investments in the energy sector still need to be shifted to renewable energy sources.17 A study by the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam has shown that the Corona pandemic in the energy sector has led to a reinforcement of existing trends, with the leading countries in the global energy transition continuing to expand renewable energy in line with the European Green Deal, with Poland, for example, being stimulated to accelerate the only beginning energy transition, whereas in middle- and low-income countries the Corona pandemic has prevented investment in renewable energy, as is the case in Latin America in particular. In some countries whose economies are dependent on fossil fuels, such as Indonesia, governments are supporting conventional power supply through tax breaks and lowering of regulatory requirements, while at the same time slowing down investments in renewable energies. In contrast, in the two large oil and gas exporters, the USA and Canada, or in China, the expansion of renewable energies is not being cut

15

Cf. Deloitte (2021). Cf. EU-Kommission (2019). 17 Cf. IRENA (2021). 16

94

7

Conclusion and Outlook

back. Particularly in the Global South (so-called developing and emerging countries), investments in renewable energies will be further reduced due to the Corona pandemic. On the one hand, there is a risk that these countries will fall into a debt crisis due to falling government revenues, and on the other hand, an increase in defaults on electricity bills can be assumed due to the economic emergency, so that in several countries the governments have suspended payments of electricity bills for consumers and reduced electricity prices, which has increased the already existing investment risks in the electricity sector. Thus, the Corona pandemic has shown that there is an urgent need to develop programs such as the European Green Deal, especially in fossil fuel dependent countries worldwide.18 Furthermore, in the course of climate change, it is important to support the Global South with strategic and technical know-how on the way to renewable energies and not to invest in the coal sector by providing China, Russia or France, among others, with finances and technology for this. Africa, for example, has a wide range of potential renewable energies, such as wind, solar and geothermal sources. In particular, a better implementation of policies and legislation can make the switch to renewable energies possible.19 Because climate change, like the pandemic, is a global crisis, there is an urgent need to work together in international frameworks and projects with interdisciplinary staffing to address the twin challenges of economic recovery from the Corona pandemic and the global fight against climate change.20

18

Cf. Quitzow/Bersalli et al. (2021); IASS (2021). Cf. Schwikowski (2021). 20 Cf. Quitzow/Bersalli et al. (2021); IASS (2021). 19

Bibliography

acatech (2018) acatech – Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften (Hrsg.): CCU und CCS – Bausteine für den Klimaschutz in der Industrie. Analyse, Handlungsoptionen und Empfehlungen. acatech POSITION. utzverlag, München 2018. www.acatech.de/wp-con tent/uploads/2018/09/acatech_POSITION_CCU_CCS_WEB-002_final.pdf. acatech (2020) acatech – Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften (Hrsg.): CoronaKrise: Volkswirtschaft am Laufen halten, Grundversorgung sichern, Innovationsfähigkeit erhalten. Intervenieren – stabilisieren – stimulieren. acatech AD HOC IMPULS, München, Stand: 03/2020. www.acatech.de/publikation/corona-krise-volkswirtsch aft-am-laufen-halten-grundversorgung-sichern-innovationsfaehigkeit-erhalten/. AGEB (2019) Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen e. V. (AGEB): Energie in Zahlen. Arbeit und Leistungen der AG Energiebilanzen. Griebsch & Rochol, Hamm in Westfalen 2019. www.ag-energiebilanzen.de. Aufruf am 02.06.2021. Allianz (2021) Allianz: Allianz Risk Barometer identifying the major business risks for 2021. www.allianz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/azcom/Allianz_com/economicresearch/publications/specials/en/2021/january/Allianz-Risk-Barometer-2021.pdf. Baezner/Maduz/Prior (2018) Baezner, Marie/Maduz, Linda/Prior, Tim: Intelligente Schutzsysteme für die Stadt der Zukunft. CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 235, 2018, S. 1 ff. Bartsch/Frey (2017) Bartsch, Michael/Frey, Stefanie: Digitalisierung des Bösen: Energiewirtschaft als Cyberopfer. In: Doleski, Oliver, D. (Hrsg.): Herausforderung Utility 4.0. Wie sich die Energiewirtschaft im Zeitalter der Digitalisierung verändert, S. 301 ff. Springer Vieweg, Wiesbaden 2017. BBK (n. d.) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): WarnApp NINA. www.bbk.bund.de/DE/NINA/Warn-App_NINA_node.html. Aufruf am 30.03.2021. BBK (2017) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Treibstoffversorgung bei Stromausfall. Empfehlung für Zivil- und Katastrophenschutzbehörden. Praxis im Bevölkerungsschutz, Bd. 18. Bonn, Stand: 07/2017. strohmeyer dialog.druck, Wehretal-Langenhain 2017. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Publik ationen/Praxis_Bevoelkerungsschutz/PiB_18_Treibstoffversorgung_bei_Stromausfall. pdf;jsessionid=CD46BC71D3B8187A7C6C0EC73A67D162.1_cid509?__blob=public ationFile. © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-A. Krebs and P. Hagenweiler, Energy Resilience and Climate Protection, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37564-5

95

96

Bibliography

BBK (2018) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Autarke Notstromversorgung der Bevölkerung unterhalb der KRITIS-Schwelle. Praxis im Bevölkerungsschutz, Bd. 19. Bonn, Stand: 12/2018. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/ Downloads/BBK/DE/Publikationen/Praxis_Bevoelkerungsschutz/PiB_19_Autarke_N otstromversorgung_der_Bevoelkerung.pdf;jsessionid=EAA747822CE00AC8A04FC D39DDA6755A.2_cid509?__blob=publicationFile. BBK (2019a) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK) (Hrsg.): Stromausfall. Grundlagen und Methoden zur Reduzierung des Ausfallrisikos der Stromversorgung. Wissenschaftsforum, Bd. 12. Bonn 2019. www.bbk.bund.de/Sha redDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Publikationen/Wissenschaftsforum/WF_Bd_12_Stroma usfall.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. BBK (2019b) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Notstromversorgung in Unternehmen und Behörden. Praxis im Bevölkerungsschutz, Bd. 13. 2. Aufl. Bonn, Stand: 01/2019. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Pub likationen/Praxis_Bevoelkerungsschutz/PiB_13_Notstromversorgung_Unternehmen_ Behoerden.pdf;jsessionid=B91DE7F4FE76A385A1D70ABFEB62C71B.2_cid509?__ blob=publicationFile. BBK (2019c) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Stromausfall. Vorsorge und Selbsthilfe. Bürgerinformation. Bonn, Stand: 01/2019. Bonifatius, Paderborn 2019. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Publikationen/ Broschueren_Flyer/Buergerinformationen_A4/Stromausfall_Vorsorge_und_Selbsthilfe. pdf;jsessionid=3F21DCB9A926FB1B079288E6C221167A.1_cid509?__blob=publicati onFile. BBK (2019d) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Risikoanalyse im Bevölkerungsschutz. Ein Stresstest für die Allgemeine Gefahrenabwehr und den Katastrophenschutz. Praxis im Bevölkerungsschutz, Bd. 16. 2. Aufl. Bonn, Stand: 02/2019. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Publikationen/Praxis_ Bevoelkerungsschutz/PiB_16_Risikoanalyse_im_Bevoelkerungsschutz.pdf;jsessionid= 787E8D0C5D13BBB541BF222D060758F5.2_cid345?__blob=publicationFile. BBK (2019e) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen – Identifizierung in sieben Schritten. Arbeitshilfe für die Anwendung im Bevölkerungsschutz. Praxis im Bevölkerungsschutz, Bd. 20. 2. Aufl. Bonn, Stand: 03/2019. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Publikati onen/Praxis_Bevoelkerungsschutz/PiB_20_Schutz%20Kritischer_Infrastrukturen_Identi fizierung%20in%20sieben%20Schritten.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. BBK (2019f) Nationale Kontaktstelle für das Sendai Rahmenwerk beim Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Sendai Rahmenwerk für Katastrophenvorsorge 2015–2030. Bonn, Stand: 05/2019. Primus international Printing, Dernbach 2019. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Publikationen/Bro schueren_Flyer/Sendai_Rahmenwerk_2015_2030.pdf;jsessionid=CE68FAB6B540148 90022D4014B9357CA.1_cid320?__blob=publicationFile. BBK (2019g) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Katastrophen Alarm. Ratgeber für Notfallvorsorge und richtiges Handeln in Notsituationen. 7. Aufl. Bonn, Stand: 07/2019. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Pub likationen/Broschueren_Flyer/Buergerinformationen_A4/Ratgeber_Brosch.pdf;jsessi onid=DAD42641D53CEE0457DCA4177B59EF87.2_cid345?__blob=publicationFile.

Bibliography

97

BBK (2019h) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Kapazitäten der Bevölkerung bei einem Stromausfall. Empirische Untersuchung für das Bezugsgebiet Deutschland. Praxis im Bevölkerungsschutz, Bd. 12. Bonn, Stand: 08/2019. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Publikationen/Praxis_ Bevoelkerungsschutz/PiB_12_Kapazit_Bevoelkerung_bei_Stromausfall.pdf?__blob= publicationFile. BBK (2020) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Empfehlungen für Gemeinsame Regelungen zum Einsatz von Drohnen im Bevölkerungsschutz. Fachinformation. Bonn, Stand: 05/2020. Hoehl-Druck medien + Service, Bad Hersfeld 2020. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Publikationen/Broschueren_ Flyer/Empfehlungen_Geme_Regelungen_Drohneneinsatz_BevS.pdf?__blob=publicati onFile. BBK (2021a) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Ausbreitung des Coronavirus (Covid-19) SARS-CoV-2. Handlungsempfehlungen für Unternehmen, insbesondere für Betreiber Kritischer Infrastrukturen. Information. Bonn, Stand: 02/2021. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Sonstiges/ Handlungsempfehlungen_Betreiber_KRITIS.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. BBK (2021b) Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Online-Umfrage zum Einsatz von Drohnen im Bevölkerungsschutz in Deutschland, 25.03.2021. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/BBK/DE/2021/03/Online_ Umfrage_zum_Einsatz_von_Drohnen_im_BevS.html. Aufruf am 30.03.2021. BCI (2020) BCI: BCI Horizon Scan Report 2021. Caversham, Berkshire, 2021. www.bsi group.com/localfiles/en-gb/iso-22301/resources/bci-horizon-scan-report-2021.pdf. BDEW/VKU (2014) BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e. V./VKU Verband kommunaler Unternehmen e. V.: Praxis-Leitfaden für unterstützende Maßnahmen von Stromnetzbetreibern. Kommunikations- und Anwendungs-Leitfaden zur Umsetzung der Systemverantwortung gemäß §§ 13 Abs. 2, 14 Abs. 1 und 14 Abs. 1c EnWG. Ausgabe 3.0, 31.10.2014. Berlin 2014. www.bdew.de/media/documents/Awh_ 20141031_BDEW-VKU-Leitfaden-Massnahmen-Stromnetzbetreiber-3-0.pdf. BDEW (2021) BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e. V.: Störfall im Netz: Der Kampf ums Gleichgewicht. Online-Magazin Zweitausend50, 25.05.2021. www.bdew.de/online-magazin-zweitausend50/schwerpunkt-netze/stoerfall-im-netz/. Aufruf am 27.05.2021. Bendiek/Kettemann (2021) Bendiek, Annegret/Kettemann, Matthias C.: EU-Strategie zur Cybersicherheit: Desiderat Cyberdiplomatie. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Berlin. SWP-Aktuell 12, 02/2021. www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2021A12_EUCy berdiplomatie.pdf. BGR (2020) Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR): BGR Energiestudie 2019 – Daten und Entwicklungen der deutschen und globalen Energieversorgung, Bd. 23. Hannover, Stand: 04/2020. www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Downloads/ energiestudie_2019.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6. BMI (2008) Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI): Krisenkommunikation. Leitfaden für Behörden und Unternehmen. Berlin, Stand: 07/2008. Silber Druck, Niestetal 2008. www.nmh-p.de/wp-content/uploads/BMI_Krisenkommunikation_Leitfaden-für-Beh örden-und-Unternehmen-2008.pdf.

98

Bibliography

BMI (2009) Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI): Nationale Strategie zum Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen (KRITIS-Strategie). Berlin, Stand: 06/2009. Bonifatius, Paderborn 2009. www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/bevoel kerungsschutz/kritis.pdf;jsessionid=060C270C1DAE3F6FEEA4DBF463EE6727.2_c id287?__blob=publicationFile&v=3. BMI (2010) Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI): Empfehlungen zur Sicherstellung des Zusammenwirkens zwischen staatlichen Ebenen des Krisenmanagements und den Betreibern Kritischer Infrastrukturen. Berlin 2010. www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/dow nloads/DE/publikationen/themen/bevoelkerungsschutz/kritis-empfehlungen-staat-wirtsc haft.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1. BMI (2011) Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI): Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen – Risiko- und Krisenmanagement. Leitfaden für Unternehmen und Behörden. 2. Aufl. Silber Druck, Niestetal, Stand: 05/2011. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/ BBK/DE/Publikationen/PublikationenKritis/Schutz_KRITIS_Risiko_und_Krisenman agement.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. BMI (2020) Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (BMI): Neue Leipzig Charta. Die transformative Kraft der Städte für das Gemeinwohl. Verabschiedet beim informellen Ministertreffen Stadtentwicklung am 30. November 2020. www.nationalestadtentwicklungspolitik.de/NSPWeb/SharedDocs/Publikationen/DE/Publikationen/die_ neue_leipzig_charta.pdf;jsessionid=9CFF6BF77E3E17FA76298444A05B8BC2.live11 314?__blob=publicationFile&v=7. BMI (2021a) Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (BMI): Eckpunkte für die Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie 2021. www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroef fentlichungen/2021/03/eckpunkte-cyber-sicherheitsstrategie-2021.pdf?__blob=publicati onFile&v=3. BMI (2021b) Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (BMI): Bundesrat billigt IT-Sicherheitsgesetz 2.0. Berlin, Pressemitteilung, 07.05.2021. www.bmi.bund.de/Shared Docs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2021/05/it-sicherheitsgesetz.html. Aufruf am 25.05.2021. BMI (2021c) Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (BMI): Memorandum Urbane Resilienz. Wege zur robusten, adaptiven und zukunftsfähigen Stadt. Berlin, Stand: 05/2021. www.nationale-stadtentwicklungspolitik.de/NSPWeb/SharedDocs/Pub likationen/DE/Publikationen/memorandum_urbane_resilienz.pdf;jsessionid=00EB0E B0126ECD6F601DA10E16C2496B.live11291?__blob=publicationFile&v=4. BMU (2019) Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (Hrsg.): Klimaschutzplan 2050. Klimaschutzpolitische Grundsätze und Ziele der Bundesregierung. Berlin, Stand: 11/2016. 2. Aufl. Zarbock, Frankfurt a. M. 2019. www.bmu. de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Klimaschutz/klimaschutzplan_2050_bf.pdf. BMU (2020) Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (BMU): Klimaschutzbericht 2019 zum Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 2020 der Bundesregierung. Berlin, Stand: 08/2020. www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_ PDF/Klimaschutz/klimaschutzbericht_2019_kabinettsfassung_bf.pdf. BMWi (2019a) Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi): Das Projekt GAIAX. Eine vernetzte Dateninfrastruktur als Wiege eines vitalen, europäischen Ökosystems. Berlin, Stand: 10/2019a. www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Digitale-Welt/dasprojekt-gaia-x.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=24.

Bibliography

99

BMWi (2019b) Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi): Energieeffizienzstrategie 2050. Berlin, Stand: 12/2019. www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Ene rgie/energieeffiezienzstrategie-2050.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=12. BMWi (2020) Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi): Die Nationale Wasserstoffstrategie. Berlin, Stand: 06/2020. www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikati onen/Energie/die-nationale-wasserstoffstrategie.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=20. BNetzA (2020a) Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA): Monitoringbericht 2019. Bonn, Stand: 01/2020a. www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Mediathek/Berichte/2019/Monitorin gbericht_Energie2019.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6. BNetzA (2020b) Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA): Versorgungsunterbrechungen Strom 2019. Bonn, Pressemitteilung, 22.10.2020b. www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downlo ads/DE/Allgemeines/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2020/20201022_SAIDIStrom.pdf?__ blob=publicationFile&v=2. Bock/Kühne et al. (2020) Bock, Kirsten/Kühne, Christian Ricardo/Mühlhoff, Rainer/Ost, Mˇeto R./Pohle, Jörg/Rehak, Rainer: Das Verfahren geht weit über „die App“ hinaus – Datenschutzfragen von Corona-Tracing-Apps. Einführung in DatenschutzFolgenabschätzungen als Mittel, gesellschaftliche Implikationen zu diskutieren. Informatik Spektrum 43, 2020, S. 334 ff. Bonfanti/Kohler (2020) Bonfanti, Matteo E./Kohler, Kevin: Künstliche Intelligenz für die Cybersicherheit. CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 265, 2020, S. 1 ff. Bremert/Hansen et al. (2020) Bremert, Benjamin/Hansen, Marit/Körffer, Barbara/Polenz, Sven: Pandemie und Datenschutz. Vielfältige Fragen aus aufsichtsbehördlicher Sicht. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 12, 2020, S. 791 ff. Brzoska/Neuneck/Scheffran (2021) Brzoska, Michael/Neuneck, Götz/Scheffran, Jürgen: Corona-Pandemie: Implikationen für die Sicherheitspolitik. IFSH Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg. Hamburg, Stand: 02/2021. www.cen.uni-hamburg.de/research/policy-briefs/bilder-docs/ifsh-corona-and-security. pdf. BSI (2008) Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI): BSI-Standard 100-4. Notfallmanagement. Version 1.0. Bonn 2008. www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downlo ads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/ITGrundschutzstandards/BSI-Standard_1004.pdf?__blob= publicationFile&v=2. BSI (2020) Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI): Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2020. Appel & Klinger, Schneckenlohe, Stand: 09/2020. www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/Lageberichte/Lagebe richt2020.pdf;jsessionid=EBA5146166723B38261C703D599B27A8.internet472?__ blob=publicationFile&v=1. BSIG (2021) Gesetz über das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSIGesetz - BSIG): BSI-Gesetz vom 14. August 2009 (BGBl. I S. 2821), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 18. Mai 2021 (BGBl. I S. 1122) geändert worden ist. www. gesetze-im-internet.de/bsig_2009/BSIG.pdf. Bundesregierung (2008) Die Bundesregierung: Deutsche Anpassungsstrategie an den Klimawandel vom Bundeskabinett am 17. Dezember 2008 beschlossen. Berlin 2008. www. bmu.de/fileadmin/bmu-import/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/das_gesamt_bf.pdf. Bundesregierung (2018) Die Bundesregierung: Strategie Künstliche Intelligenz der Bundesregierung. Berlin, Stand: 11/2018. www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Tec

100

Bibliography

hnologie/strategie-kuenstliche-intelligenz-der-bundesregierung.pdf?__blob=publicati onFile&v=10. Bundesregierung (2021) Die Bundesregierung: Klimaschutzgesetz 2021. Generationenvertrag für das Klima. Berlin, Artikel, 12.05.2021. www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/the men/klimaschutz/klimaschutzgesetz-2021-1913672. Aufruf am 25.05.2021. Bundesverfassungsgericht (2021) Bundesverfassungsgericht: Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen das Klimaschutzgesetz teilweise erfolgreich. Karlsruhe, Pressemitteilung Nr. 31/2021, 29.04.2021. www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilun gen/DE/2021/bvg21-031.html. Aufruf am 25.05.2021. Crelier (2020) Crelier, Alice: Sicherheit im IoT – eine Herausforderung. Sicherheitsforum, 01.09.2020. www.sicherheitsforum.ch/sicherheit-im-iot-eine-herausforderung/. Aufruf am 10.03.2021. Culture4life culture4life GmbH: luca. www.luca-app.de. Aufruf am 25.05.2021. DAS (2020) Die Bundesregierung: Zweiter Fortschrittsbericht zur Deutschen Anpassungsstrategie an den Klimawandel. Berlin, Stand: 10/2020. www.bmu.de/fileadmin/ Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Klimaschutz/klimawandel_das_2_fortschrittsbericht_bf. pdf. Deloitte (2021) Deloitte: 2021 Climate Check: Business´ Views on Environmental Sustainability. Disruptive 2020 slows climate action, but executives determined to act. München 2021. www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/risk/articles/2021-climate-check-businessviews-on-environmental-sustainability.html. Aufruf am 02.06.2021. Destatis (2021) Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis): Die Folgen der Corona-Pandemie in 10 Zahlen. Wiesbaden, Pressemitteilung Nr. N 023, 31.03.2021. www.destatis.de/DE/Pre sse/Pressemitteilungen/2021/03/PD21_N023_p001.html. Aufruf am 31.05.2021. DIN EN ISO 22301 (2020) Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN): DIN EN ISO 22301:2020-06. Sicherheit und Resilienz – Business Continuity Management System – Anforderungen (ISO 22301:2019). Beuth, Berlin 2020. www.beuth.de/de/norm/din-eniso-22301/311095091. Aufruf am 21.05.2021. Dix (2020) Dix, Alexander: Die deutsche Corona Warn-App – ein gelungenes Beispiel für Privacy by Design? Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 12, 2020, S. 779 ff. DNS (2021) Die Bundesregierung: Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie. Weiterentwicklung 2021. Stand: 12/2020. Kabinettsbeschluss vom 10.03.2021, Berlin 2021. www.bundes regierung.de/resource/blob/998006/1873516/3d3b15cd92d0261e7a0bcdc8f43b7839/ 2021-03-10-dns-2021-finale-langfassung-nicht-barrierefrei-data.pdf?download=1. Doleski (2017) Doleski, Oliver D.: Die Energiebranche am Beginn der digitalen Transformation: aus Versorgern werden Utilities 4.0. In: Doleski, Oliver, D. (Hrsg.): Herausforderung Utility 4.0. Wie sich die Energiewirtschaft im Zeitalter der Digitalisierung verändert, S. 3 ff. Springer Vieweg, Wiesbaden 2017. DSGVO (2016) Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO): Verordnung (EU) 2016/679 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 27. April 2016 zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten, zum freien Datenverkehr und zur Aufhebung der Richtlinie 95/46/EG (Datenschutz-Grundverordnung). eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679.

Bibliography

101

DSK (2020) Datenschutzkonferenz (DSK): Datenschutz-Grundsätze bei der Bewältigung der Corona-Pandemie. Entschließung der Konferenz der unabhängigen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden des Bundes und der Länder – 03.04.2020. cdn.netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/ 2020/04/datenschutzkonferenz_coronavirus.pdf. EASAC (2018) European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC): Negative emission technologies: What role in meeting Paris Agreement targets? EASAC policy report 35, 02/2018. easac.eu/fileadmin/PDF_s/reports_statements/Negative_Carbon/EASAC_ Report_on_Negative_Emission_Technologies.pdf. EEG (2020) Gesetz für den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz – EEG 2021): Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz vom 21. Juli 2014 (BGBl. I S. 1066), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 21. Dezember 2020 (BGBl. I S. 3138) geändert worden ist. EEG_2021.pdf (gesetze-im-internet.de). EnSiG (2015) Gesetz zur Sicherung der Energieversorgung (Energiesicherungsgesetz 1975): Energiesicherungsgesetz 1975 vom 20. Dezember 1974 (BGBl. I S. 3681), das zuletzt durch Artikel 324 der Verordnung vom 31. August 2015 (BGBl. I S. 1474) geändert worden ist. EnSiG_1975.pdf (gesetze-im-internet.de). ENTSO-E (n. d.) European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity ENTSO-E: ENTSO-E IT Platforms. European Awareness System. www.entsoe.eu/data/ it-platforms/. Aufruf am 17.05.2021. ENTSO-E (2010) European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E): Operational Handbook. Brüssel, 2010. EnWG (2021) Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz – EnWG): Energiewirtschaftsgesetz vom 7. Juli 2005 (BGBl. I S. 1970, 3621), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 25. Februar 2021 (BGBl. I S. 298) geändert worden ist. EnWG.pdf (gesetze-im-internet.de). EU (2016) Europäische Union (EU): Übereinkommen von Paris. Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union Nr. L 282/4, 19.10.2016. Paris, 12.12.2015. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22016A1019(01). EU-Kommission (2016) Europäische Kommission: Städteagenda für die EU. Pakt von Amsterdam. Vereinbart auf dem informellen Treffen der für städtische Angelegenheiten zuständigen EU-Minister am 30. Mai 2016 in Amsterdam, Niederlande. ec.europa.eu/fut urium/en/system/files/ged/pact-of-amsterdam_de.pdf. EU-Kommission (2019) Europäische Kommission: Was ist der europäische Grüne Deal? Brüssel, 2019. ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/fs_19_6714. Aufruf am 02.06.2021. EU-Kommission (2020a) Europäische Kommission: Strategische Vorausschau 2020. Strategische Vorausschau – Weichenstellung für ein resilienteres Europa. Brüssel, 09.09.2020. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0493&from=DE. EU-Kommission (2020b) Europäische Kommission: EU-Strategie für Cybersicherheit soll kritische Infrastrukturen stärken. Brüssel, 16.12.2020b. ec.europa.eu/germany/news/202 01216-eu-strategie-cybersicherheit_de. Aufruf am 19.05.2021. EY/BET (2018) Ernst & Young GmbH (EY)/BET Büro für Energiewirtschaft und technische Planung GmbH: Das Veränderungspotenzial digitaler Technologien in der Energiewirtschaft. Studie 2018. Berlin/Aachen 2018. www.bet-energie.de/fileadmin/red aktion/PDF/Studien_und_Gutachten/Studie_Digitale_Technologien_in_der_Energiebr anche.pdf.

102

Bibliography

Fährmann/Arzt (2020) Fährmann, Jan/Arzt, Clemens: Polizeilicher Umgang mit personenbezogenen Daten in der Corona-Pandemie. Datenschutz in der Krise. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 12, 2020, S. 801 ff. Fathi (2019) Fathi, Karim: Resilienz im Spannungsfeld zwischen Entwicklung und Nachhaltigkeit. Anforderungen an gesellschaftliche Zukunftssicherung im 21. Jahrhundert. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2019. Feldmann/Hollstein (2020) Feldmann, Alexander/Hollstein, Martin: MoWaS 2.0 – Die neue Generation der Bevölkerungswarnung. BBK Bevölkerungsschutz, Warnung der Bevölkerung 03/2020, S. 24 f. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/ Publikationen/Publ_magazin/bsmag_3_20.pdf;jsessionid=9B0924FCBCC78CE31FE13 DD3FDEDD556.2_cid345?__blob=publicationFile. Fischer/Kohler/Wenger (2020) Fischer, Sophie-Charlotte/Kohler, Kevin/Wenger, Andreas: Digitale Technologien im Corona-Krisenmanagement. CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 264, 2020, S. 1 ff. Geier (2017) Geier, Wolfram: Strukturen, Zuständigkeiten, Aufgaben und Akteure. In: Karutz, Harald/Geier, Wolfram/Mitschke, Thomas (Hrsg.): Bevölkerungsschutz. Notfallvorsorge und Krisenmanagement in Theorie und Praxis, S. 93 ff. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg 2017. Geier/Etezadzadeh (2020) Geier, Wolfram/Etezadzadeh, Chirine: Interview: Zu unserer Sicherheit und Resilienz müssen wir alle beitragen. Wolfram Geier (BBK) im Gespräch mit Chirine Etezadzadeh. In: Etezadzadeh, Chirine (Hrsg.): Smart City – Made in Germany. Die Smart-City-Bewegung als Treiber einer gesellschaftlichen Transformation, S. 697 ff. Springer Vieweg, Wiesbaden 2020. Geiger (2021) Geiger, Jörg: Luca muss nachgebessert werden: Kontaktverfolgungs-App im Security-Check. CHIP, 29.03.2021. www.chip.de/news/Luca-Kontaktverfolgungs-Appim-Security-Check_183380823.html. Aufruf am 29.03.2021. GG (2020) Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (GG): Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der im Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, Gliederungsnummer 100- 1, veröffentlichten bereinigten Fassung, das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 u. 2 Satz 2 des Gesetzes vom 29. September 2020 (BGBl. I S. 2048) geändert worden ist. GG.pdf (gesetze-im-internet.de). Goertz (2020) Goertz, Stefan: Terrorismusabwehr. Zur aktuellen Bedrohung durch den islamistischen Terrorismus in Deutschland und Europa. 3. Aufl. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2020. Goertz (2021) Goertz, Stefan: Drohnen – Benefits und Bedrohungen. Sicherheitsforum, 21.01.2021. www.sicherheitsforum.ch/drohnen-benefits-und-bedrohungen/. Aufruf am 30.04.2021. Groneberg/Tuttenuj (2020) Groneberg, Christoph/Tuttenuj, Daniel: Die Warn-App in der Corona-Lage. BBK Bevölkerungsschutz, Warnung der Bevölkerung. 03/2020, S. 26 f. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Publikationen/Publ_m agazin/bsmag_3_20.pdf;jsessionid=9B0924FCBCC78CE31FE13DD3FDEDD556.2_c id345?__blob=publicationFile. Hachmann (2020) Hachmann, Roland: Kommunales Grünflächenmanagement – ein wichtiger Beitrag auf dem Weg zur Smart City. In: Etezadzadeh, Chirine (Hrsg.): Smart City – Made in Germany. Die Smart-City-Bewegung als Treiber einer gesellschaftlichen Transformation, S. 259 ff. Springer Vieweg, Wiesbaden 2020.

Bibliography

103

Hermes (2021) Hermes, Ann Kathrin: Herbert Saurugg: „Bei einem Blackout ist sofort alles aus“. News, 11.01.2021. www.news.at/a/krise-herbert-saurugg-blackout-11551032. Aufruf am 11.05.2021. Holland (2019) Holland, Heinrich: Dialogmarketing und Kundenbindung mit Connected Cars. Wie Automobilherstellern mit Daten und Vernetzung die optimale Customer Experience gelingt. Springer/Gabler, Wiesbaden 2019. Hollick/Hofmeister (2021) Hollick, Matthias/Hofmeister, Anne: emergenCITY – Die resiliente digitale Stadt. Ein interdisziplinäres LOEWE-Forschungszentrum der Partneruniversitäten Technische Universität Darmstadt, Universität Kassel und PhilippsUniversität Marburg. CRISIS PREVENTION, Fachportal für Gefahrenabwehr, Innere Sicherheit und Katastrophenhilfe, 11.05.2021. crisis-prevention.de/innere-sicherheit/eme rgencity-die-resiliente-digitale-stadt.html. Aufruf am 18.05.2021. IASS (2021) Institut für transformative Nachhaltigkeitsforschung (IASS): Klimaziele. Pandemie verschärft Probleme bei der internationalen Energiewende. News, 23.03.2021. www.iass-potsdam.de/de/news/pandemie-verschaerft-probleme-bei-der-internationalenenergiewende. Aufruf am 31.05.2021. IM BW/BBK (2010) Innenministerium Baden-Württemberg (IM BW)/Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK): Krisenmanagement Stromausfall. Kurzfassung. Krisenmanagement bei einer großflächigen Unterbrechung der Stromversorgung am Beispiel Baden-Württemberg. M+M Druck, Heidelberg 2010. www.lfs-bw. de/fileadmin/LFS-BW/themen/kats/gemeinde/dokumente/Krisenhandbuch_Stromausf all_Kurzfassung.pdf. infas 360 GmbH infas 360 GmbH: Das Projekt. Aufbau einer Corona-Datenplattform und (regionale) Analysen zur SARS-COV-2-. corona-datenplattform.de/pages/projekt. Aufruf am 17.05.2021. IPPC (2018) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): Global Warming of 1.5 °C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. Summary for Policymakers. IPPC, Genf 2018. report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf?fbclid=IwAR19SpRNazZjMR12 082F_UxERWZg2PbpDL2gblaYcxGEqJDc_CzQb7Zhyf0. IPPC (2019) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate. Summary for Policymakers. IPPC, Genf 2019. rep ort.ipcc.ch/srocc/pdf/SROCC_SPM_Approved.pdf. IPPC (2020) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): Climate Change and Land. An IPCC Special Report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems. Summary for Policymakers. IPPC, Genf 2020. www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/ sites/4/2020/02/SPM_Updated-Jan20.pdf. IRENA (2021) International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA): Renewable Capacity Statistics 2021. Abu Dhabi 2021. www.irena.org/publications/2020/Mar/Renewable-Cap acity-Statistics-2020. IT-SiG (2015) Gesetz zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme (ITSicherheitsgesetz) vom 17. Juli 2015 (BGBl. I Nr. 31 S. 1324). www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/

104

Bibliography

start.xav#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl115s1324.pdf%27%5D__ 1622731803833. Jaag/Schnyder (2019) Jaag, Christian/Schnyder, Nina: Bedeutung des Klimawandels für die Infrastrukturen der Schweiz. Stand der Literatur. Bericht V2, 11.10.2019. Swiss Economics, Zürich 2019. swiss-economics.ch/files/content/dokumente/publikati onen/2019_JaagSchnyder_KlimawandelUndInfrastrukturen_UVEK_DE.pdf. Jenner/Schmitz-Grethlein (2017) Jenner, Steffen/Schmitz-Grethlein, Fabian: Das Stadtwerk der Zukunft. Progressive Ansätze für Stadtwerke und Politik. Discussion Paper 10/2017. Das Progressive Zentrum, Berlin 2017. www.progressives-zentrum. org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Discussion-Paper-Das-Stadtwerk-der-Zukunft_DPZ_ VKU.pdf. Kagermann/Süssenguth et al. (2021) Kagermann, Henning/Süssenguth, Florian/Körner, Jorg/Liepold, Annka/Behrens, Jan Henning: Resilienz als wirtschafts- und innovationspolitisches Gestaltungsziel. acatech IMPULS, München 2021. Kohler/Scharte (2020) Kohler, Kevin/Scharte, Benjamin: Der Einsatz von KI im Bevölkerungsschutz. CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 260, 2020, S. 1 ff. Krebs/Hagenweiler (2019) Krebs, Heinz-Adalbert/Hagenweiler Patricia: Inspektion von Brücken und Ingenieurbauwerken mit unbemannten Luftfahrzeugsystemen. Konzeptstudie. University Press, Kassel 2019. Krebs/Hagenweiler (2021) Krebs, Heinz-Adalbert/Hagenweiler Patricia: Innovationen und künstliche Intelligenz entlang der energiewirtschaftlichen Wertschöpfungskette unter Berücksichtigung der Datensicherheit und des Datenschutzes. University Press, Kassel 2021. KSG (2019) Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz (KSG): Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz vom 12. Dezember 2019 (BGBl. I S. 2513). www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ksg/KSG.pdf. KWKG (2020) Gesetz für die Erhaltung, die Modernisierung und den Ausbau der Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz – KWKG 2020): Kraft-WärmeKopplungsgesetz vom 21. Dezember 2015 (BGBl. I S. 2498), das zuletzt durch Artikel 17 des Gesetzes vom 21. Dezember 2020 (BGBl. I S. 3138) geändert worden ist. KWKG_2020.pdf (gesetze-im-internet.de). Lamby-Schmitt (2021) Lamby-Schmitt, Eva: Update für Corona-Warn-App. Im Restaurant einchecken per QR-Code. Tagesschau, 21.04.2021. www.tagesschau.de/inland/gesellsch aft/corona-warnapp-update-101.html. Aufruf am 18.05.2021. Lauck (2021) Lauck, Dominik: Update der Corona-Warn-App. Anonym einchecken per QR-Code. Tagesschau, 30.03.2021. www.tagesschau.de/inland/corona-warn-app-checkin-101.html. Aufruf am 06.04.2021. Laufs (2018) Laufs, Paul: Reaktorsicherheit für Leistungskernkraftwerke 1. Die Entwicklung im politischen und technischen Umfeld der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 2. Aufl. Springer Vieweg, Wiesbaden 2018. Lauwe (2018) Lauwe, Peter: Integriertes Risikomanagement: Ein strategischer Ansatz für eine intensive Zusammenarbeit im Bevölkerungsschutz. BBK Bevölkerungsschutz, Integriertes Risikomanagement 3/2018, S. 2 ff. www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/ BBK/DE/Publikationen/Publ_magazin/bsmag_3_18.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. LBEG (2020) Landesamt für Bergbau, Energie und Geologie (LBEG): Erdöl und Erdgas in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2019. Jahresbericht, Hannover 2020. www.lbeg.nieder

Bibliography

105

sachsen.de/erdoel-erdgas-jahresbericht/jahresbericht-erdoel-und-erdgas-in-der-bundes republik-deutschland-936.html. Liedtke/Kühler et al. (2020) Liedtke, Christa/Kühlert, Markus/Wiesen, Klaus/Stinder, Ann Kathrin/Brauer, Jana/Beckmann, Janpeter/Fedato, Cristina/El Mourabit, Xenia/Büttgen, Alexandra/Speck, Melanie: Nachhaltige Lieferketten. Global kooperative Regionalwirtschaften für Wohlstand und Resilienz. Zukunftsimpuls Nr. 11, 10/2020. Wuppertaler Institut für Klima, Umwelt Energie gGmbH, Wuppertal 2020. epub.wupperinst.org/frontd oor/deliver/index/docId/7635/file/ZI11_Lieferketten.pdf. Luber/Schmitz (2019) Luber, Stefan/Schmitz, Peter: Was ist Shodan? Security Insider, 31.07.2019. www.security-insider.de/was-ist-shodan-a-851150/. Aufruf am 02.06.2021. Maduz/Roth (2017) Maduz, Linda/Roth, Florian: Die Urbanisierung der Katastrophenvorsorge. CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 204, 2017, S. 1 ff. Mayer/Brunekreeft (2021) Mayer, Christoph/Brunekreeft, Gert (Hrsg.): Resilienz digitalisierter Energiesysteme. Blackout-Risiken verstehen, Stromversorgung sicher gestalten. Schriftenreihe Energiesysteme der Zukunft. München, Stand: 02/2021. energiesystemezukunft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Publikationen/PDFs/ESYS_Analyse_Digitalisierung. pdf. Mayer/Lauwe (2019) Mayer, Julia/Lauwe, Peter: Notfallplanung Stromausfall – Wo stehen wir? CRISIS PREVENTION, Fachportal für Gefahrenabwehr, Innere Sicherheit und Katastrophenhilfe, 18.02.2019. crisis-prevention.de/feuerwehr/notfallplanung-stromausf all-wo-stehen-wir.html. Aufruf am 20.03.2021. Menski/Gardemann (2011) Genski, Ute/Gardemann Joachim: Auswirkungen des Ausfalls Kritischer Infrastrukturen auf den Ernährungssektor am Beispiel des Stromausfalls im Münsterland im Herbst 2005. Empirische Untersuchung im Auftrag der Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung (BLE). Fachhochschule Münster, Münster 2011. www.fh-muenster.de/humanitaere-hilfe/downloads/Auswirkungen_des_Stromausf alls_05_im_Muensterland.pdf. Müller (2020) Müller, Henrik: Corona und die Folgen. Wer hat Angst vorm grünen Schwan? Der Spiegel online, 17.05.2020. www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/corona-unddie-wirtschaft-wer-hat-angst-vorm-gruenen-schwan-a-de5eec48-ccf0-426a-a41d-c903fa cbce03. Aufruf am 20.05.2021. Naudé (2020) Naudé, Wim: Intelligente Eindämmungsstrategien gegenCovid-19: Die Rolle von Künstlicher Intelligenz und Big Data. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 21(3), 2020, S. 311 ff. NIS-Gesetz (2017) Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie (EU) 2016/1148 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 6. Juli 2016 über Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung eines hohen gemeinsamen Sicherheitsniveaus von Netz- und Informationssystemen in der Union vom 23. Juni 2017 (BGBl. I Nr. 40 S. 1885). www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav? startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl117s1885.pdf#__bgbl__%2F%2F*% 5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl117s1885.pdf%27%5D__1622796673626. Ohlhorst (2019) Ohlhorst, Dörte: Biographie der Energiewende im Stromsektor. In: Radtke, Jörg/Canzler, Weert (Hrsg.): Energiewende. Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Einführung, S. 97 ff. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2019. PLS (2020) Plattform Lernende Systeme (PLS) (Hrsg.): Zukunftsfähigkeit mit KI sichern – Ansätze für mehr Resilienz und digitale Souveränität. Positionspapier, München, Stand:

106

Bibliography

11/2020. www.acatech.de/publikation/zukunftsfaehigkeit-mit-ki-sichern-ansaetze-fuermehr-resilienz-und-digitale-souveraenitaet/. Pohlmann (2019) Pohlmann, Norbert: Cyber-Sicherheit. Das Lehrbuch für Konzepte, Prinzipien, Mechanismen, Architekturen und Eigenschaften von Cyber-Sicherheitssystemen in der Digitalisierung. Springer Vieweg, Wiesbaden 2019. Quitzow/Bersalli et al. (2021) Quitzow, Rainer/Bersalli, German/Eicke, Laima/Jahn, Joschka/Lilliestam, Johan/Lira, Flavio/Marian, Adela/Süsser, Diana/Thapar, Sapan/Weko, Silvia/Williams, Stephen/Xue, Bing: The COVID-19 crisis deepens the gulf between leaders and laggards in the global energy transition. Energy Research and Social Science 74, 2021, S. 1 ff. Radtke/Kersting (2018) Radtke, Jörg/Kersting, Norbert (Hrsg.): Energiewende. Politikwissenschaftliche Perspektiven. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2018. Rechenbach (2017) Rechenbach, Peer: Information, Warnung und Alarmierung der Bevölkerung: In: Karutz, Harald/Geier, Wolfram/Mitschke, Thomas (Hrsg.): Bevölkerungsschutz. Notfallvorsorge und Krisenmanagement in Theorie und Praxis, S. 247 ff. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg 2017. Rehse/Tremöhlen (2020) Rehse, Dominik/Tremöhlen, Felix: Ein Reallabor für die CoronaWarn-App. ZEW policy brief Nr. 20–07, 12/2020, S. 1 ff. ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/pol icybrief/de/pb07-20.pdf. Richtlinie EU (2016) RICHTLINIE (EU) 2016/1148 DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS UND DES RATES vom 6. Juli 2016 über Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung eines hohen gemeinsamen Sicherheitsniveaus von Netz- und Informationssystemen in der Union. Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union Nr. L 194/1 vom 19.07.2016. eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016L1148&from=DE. RKI (2017) Robert Koch-Institut (RKI): Nationaler Pandemieplan Teil I. Strukturen und Maßnahmen. Druckhaus köthen, Köthen, Stand: 03/2017. edoc.rki.de/bitstream/handle/ 176904/187/28Zz7BQWW2582iZMQ.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Rosenberger (2020) Rosenberger, Michael: Zweieiige Zwillinge. Corona und die Umweltkrise. In: Kröll, Wolfgang/Platzer, Johann/Ruckenbauer, Hans-Walter/Schaupp, Walter (Hrsg.): Die Corona-Pandemie. Ethische, gesellschaftliche und theologische Reflexionen einer Krise, S. 199 ff. Bioethik in Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft, Bd. 10. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2020. Rzepka (2021) Rzepka, Dominik: Alternative zur Corona-Warn-App. 60 Gesundheitsämter setzen „Luca-App“ ein. zdfheute, 21.03.2021. www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/coronaluca-app-100.html. Aufruf am 29.03.2021. SAP (2020/2021) SAP Deutschland SE & Co. KG: Corona Warn-App. Open Source Project. 2020/2021. www.coronawarn.app/de/. Aufruf am 30.04.2021. Schläger/Thode (2018) Schläger, Uwe/Thode, Jan-Christoph (Hrsg.): Handbuch Datenschutz und IT-Sicherheit. Erich Schmidt, Berlin 2018. Schneider/Wildermuth (2019) Scheider, Frank E./Wildermuth, Dennis: Roboter für Aufgaben mit Strahlenexposition. CRISIS PREVENTION, Fachportal für Gefahrenabwehr, Innere Sicherheit und Katastrophenhilfe, 17.06.2019. crisis-prevention.de/katastrophen schutz/murphys-gesetz-das-risikomanagement.html. Aufruf am 17.05.2021. Schneider/Wildermuth (2021) Scheider, Frank E./Wildermuth, Dennis: European Robotics Hackathon (EnRicH) – Roboter üben für den Ernstfall. CRISIS PREVENTION, Fachportal für Gefahrenabwehr, Innere Sicherheit und Katastrophenhilfe, 06.04.2021. crisis-

Bibliography

107

prevention.de/innere-sicherheit/european-robotics-hackathon-enrich-roboter-ueben-fuerden-ernstfall.html. Aufruf am 17.05.2021. Schulenburg (2021) Schulenburg, Christin: Heimatschutz durch künstliche Intelligenz. Bundeswehr auf dem Weg der Zukunft. CRISIS PREVENTION, Fachportal für Gefahrenabwehr, Innere Sicherheit und Katastrophenhilfe, 29.04.2021. crisis-prevention.de/inneresicherheit/heimatschutz-durch-kuenstliche-intelligenz.html. Aufruf am 18.05.2021. Schwikowski (2021) Schwikowski, Martina: Afrika: Kohlekraft contra Klimaschutz. Deutsche Welle, 30.03.2021. www.dw.com/de/afrika-kohlekraft-contra-klimaschutz/a57054172. Aufruf am 02.06.2021. Statista (2021) Statista: Weltweite Zahl der Todesfälle in Zusammenhang mit dem Coronavirus (Covid-19) seit Januar 2020. Stand: 02.06.2021. de.statista.com/statistik/daten/ studie/1103240/umfrage/entwicklung-der-weltweiten-todesfaelle-aufgrund-des-corona virus/. Aufruf am 02.06.2021. Sträter (2019) Sträter, Oliver: Menschliche Zuverlässigkeit und Resilienz. In: Sträter, Oliver (Hrsg.): Risikofaktor Mensch? Zuverlässiges Handeln gestalten, S. 11 ff. VDIFachausschuss Menschliche Zuverlässigkeit und Sicherheit. Beuth, Berlin/Wien/Zürich 2019. Streibich/Winter (2020) Streibich, Karl-Heinz/Winter, Johannes (Hrsg.): Resiliente Vorreiter aus Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. acatech IMPULS, München 2020. www.acatech.de/ publikation/resiliente-vorreiter-aus-wirtschaft-und-gesellschaft/. UBA (2019) Umweltbundesamt (UBA): Monitoringbericht 2019 zur Deutschen Anpassungsstrategie an den Klimawandel. Bericht der Interministeriellen Arbeitsgruppe Anpassungsstrategie der Bundesregierung. Az Druck und Datentechnik, Kempten, Stand: 11/2019. UBA (2020) Umweltbundesamt (UBA): Folgen des globalen Klimawandels für Deutschland. Abschlussbericht: Analysen und Politikempfehlungen. Climate Change 15/2020. DessauRoßlau, Stand: 04/2020. www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/1410/pub likationen/das_monitoringbericht_2019_barrierefrei.pdf. UN (2016) United Nations (UN): Neue Urbane Agenda. Erklärung von Quito zu nachhaltigen Städten und menschlichen Siedlungen für alle. Habitat III. Quito 17–20 October 2016. habitat3.org/wp-content/uploads/NUA-German.pdf. VDE-FNN (2011) Forum Netztechnik/Netzbetrieb im VDE (VDE-FNN): Sicherheit in der Stromversorgung. Hinweise für das Krisenmanagement des Netzbetreibers S. 1002. Berlin, Stand: 11/2011. VDMA (2020) Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau VDMA e. V.: Industrial Drone Solutions. Drohnen im Zeitalter von Corona. 17.04.2020. ids.vdma.org/viewer/-/ v2article/render/48199568. Aufruf am 18.05.2021. Velten (2020) Velten, Carlo: Digitale Resilienz statt digitale Disruption. Cloudflight, 06.04.2020. de.cloudflight.io/presse/digitale-resilienz-statt-digitale-disruption-38235/. Aufruf am 12.05.2021. Venzke-Caprarese (2020) Venzke-Caprarese, Sven: Zur Praxistauglichkeit des Datenschutzes in der digitalen Kommunikation. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 12, 2020, S. 796 ff. Voßschmidt/Karsten (2019) Voßschmidt, Stefan/Karsten, Andreas H.: Resilienz und Kritische Infrastrukturen. Aufrechterhaltung von Versorgungsstrukturen im Krisenfall. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2019.

108

Bibliography

Willkomm/Jäger et al. (2018) Willkomm, Marlene/Jäger, Stefan/Aravena Pelizari, Patrick/Müller, Inken/Meiers, Thomas/Runde, Detlef/Gärtner, Dietmar/Wimmer, Max: Smart Data Katastrophenmanagement – Möglichkeiten einer Informationsplattform für die Einsatzleitung am Beispiel Hochwasser. In: Pinnekamp, Johannes (Hrsg.): 51. Essener Tagung für Wasserwirtschaft „Wasserwirtschaft im Umbruch“: 14. bis 16. März 2018 in der Messe Essen Ost, 22/1–22/15. Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Siedlungswasserwirtschaft an der RWTH Aachen e. V., Aachen 2018. World Economic Forum (2021) World Economic Forum. The Global Risks. Report 2021. 16th Edition. Insight Report. Cologny/Geneva 2021. www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ The_Global_Risks_Report_2021.pdf. Zettl/Nell (2019) Zettl, Veronika/Nell, Rebecca: Pflege- und Hilfsbedürftige in Schadenslagen. Durch Vernetzung relevanter Akteur*innen und durch systematische Kooperation die ambulante Versorgung sicherstellen. In: Krüger, Marco/Max, Matthias (Hrsg.): Resilienz im Katastrophenfall. Konzepte zur Stärkung von Pflege- und Hilfsbedürftigen im Bevölkerungsschutz, S. 227 ff. transcript, Bielefeld 2019.