Encyclopedia of Asian Politics (Elgar Encyclopedias in the Social Sciences series) 1800374003, 9781800374003

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Encyclopedia of Asian Politics

ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIAS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Elgar Encyclopedias in the Social Sciences serve as the definitive reference works to their fields. Each Encyclopedia is overseen by an editor internationally recognised as a leading name within the field, and contain a multitude of entries written by key scholars, providing an accessible and condensed overview of the key topics within a given subject area. Volumes in the series are commissioned across the breadth of the social sciences, and cover areas including, but not limited to, Political Science, Sociology, Human Geography, Development Studies, Social Policy, Public Management and Public Policy. Individual entries present a concise and logical overview of a given subject, together with a list of references for further study. Each Encyclopedia will serve as an invaluable resource for practitioners, academics, and students, and should form an essential part of any research journey. For a full list of Edward Elgar published titles, including the titles in this series, visit our website at www​.e​-elgar​.com.

Encyclopedia of Asian Politics Edited by

Alexander C. Tan Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Canterbury, New Zealand and University Chair Professor, Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Dennis F. Quilala Assistant Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines

ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIAS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Cheltenham, UK · Northampton, MA, USA

© Alexander C. Tan and Dennis F. Quilala 2023 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.   Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK   Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA       A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2023946643 This book is available electronically in the Political Science and Public Policy subject collection http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.4337​/9781800374010    

ISBN 978 1 80037 400 3 (cased) ISBN 978 1 80037 401 0 (eBook)

EEP BoX

For Jessie, Julian, Georgia, and Luke Chu-Tan AT For my mother and my mentors DQ To our students (past, present, and future)

Contents List of contributors Preface Acknowledgements

ix xi xiii

17 Identity politics Orson Tan

PART I  APPROACHES AND METHODS

99

18 Legislatures Juhn Chris P. Espia

103

1 Comparative methods Dawn Miller-McTaggart

2

19 Militaries Saya Kiba

109

2 Ethnography Josefina Socorro Flores Tondo and Eulalio R. Guieb III

6

20 Political behavior Dennis Lu Chung Weng

113

21 Political culture Charles K. S. Wu, Hsuan-Yu Lin and Yao-Yuan Yeh

118

22 Political economy Stephen Noakes

122

3 Experiments Jay C. Kao

13

4 Game theory Taehee Whang

21

5 Institutions and institutionalism Rosalie Arcala Hall

26

6 Q-methodology Orson Tan

33

7 Statistical analysis Guang Yang and Tsung-Han Tsai

37

24 Political ideologies Chien-Kang Chen

133

8 Survey research Chia-hung Tsai

45

25 Political parties Ching-Hsin Yu

137

26 Public policy Dawn Miller-McTaggart

142

27 Religion and politics Michael I. Magcamit

147

28 Social movements Mariana Cifuentes

155

29 Terrorism Juhn Chris P. Espia

158

23 Political economy of developmental states Tian He

PART II  THEMES/THEMATIC CHAPTERS

9 Civil society Janjira Sombatpoonsiri

52

10 Civil wars Juhn Chris P. Espia

58

11 Constitutions Neel Vanvari

62

12 Courts and judicial systems Rodelio C. Manacsa

69

13 Democratization Fang-Yu Chen

75

14 Electoral systems Ikhsan Darmawan

126

PART III  REGIONS

163

82

30 Northeast Asia Hsuan-Yu Lin, Charles K. S. Wu and Yao-Yuan Yeh

15 Executives Dawn Miller-McTaggart

87

31 South Asia Rajat Ganguly

168

16 Gender and politics Wan-Ying Yang

92

32 Southeast Asia Juhn Chris P. Espia

174

vii

viii  encyclopedia of asian politics PART IV  REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

33 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 179 Andrea Chloe Wong 34 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 182 Laura Southgate 35 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Neel Vanvari

187

PART V  C  OUNTRY CHAPTERS/ CASE STUDIES

36 Bhutan Neel Vanvari

194

37 Brunei Darussalam 201 Edna Nurafeeqah Abdul Ghani Luah

43 Laos Suthikarn Meechan

235

44 Malaysia Orson Tan

241

45 Myanmar Noel M. Morada

246

46 Pakistan Neel Vanvari

254

47 Philippines Andrea Chloe Wong

262

48 Republic of Korea (South Korea) Sun Young (Kelly) Park

267

49 Singapore Orson Tan

274 279

38 China Tian He

207

50 Sri Lanka Rajat Ganguly

39 Hong Kong Karl Ho

213

51 Taiwan 286 Alexander C. Tan and Jundeh Wu

40 India Neel Vanvari

218

41 Indonesia Amalia Sustikarini

225

42 Japan Takayoshi Uekami

230

52 Thailand Thanikun Chantra and Pradit Chinudomsub

290

53 Vietnam Mai-Huong Vo

293

Index

298

Contributors Editors

Communication of the College of Mass Communication at the University of the Philippines at Diliman.

Alexander C. Tan is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Canterbury and the University Chair Professor of Political Science at National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

Rosalie Arcala Hall is a Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines Visayas. Tian He is a Lecturer at Xi’an JiaotongLiverpool University, China.

Dennis F. Quilala  is an Assistant Professor of the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines Diliman.

Karl Ho is an Associate Professor of Instruction at the University of Texas at Dallas.

Authors

Jay C. Kao is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago, IL.

Thanikun Chantra is a Lecturer and Assistant Dean in the International Development Program at the School of Social Innovation, Mae Fah Luang University, Thailand.

Saya Kiba is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Foreign Studies Department of International Relations at Kobe City University of Foreign Studies, Japan.

Chien-Kang Chen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

Hsuan-Yu Lin is currently a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan, and an associate in research at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, MA.

Fang-Yu Chen is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Soochow University, Taiwan. Pradit Chinudomsub is a Lecturer in the International Development Program at the School of Social Innovation, Mae Fah Luang University, Thailand.

Edna Nurafeeqah Abdul Ghani Luah is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand.

Mariana Cifuentes is a Senior Advisor for Strategic Communication and Engagement for the British Council in Myanmar.

Michael I. Magcamit is a Lecturer in Global Politics at the University of Manchester, UK.

Ikhsan Darmawan is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Indonesia and a PhD graduate of the Political Science Department at Kent State University, OH.

Rodelio C. Manacsa is an Associate Professor of Politics at Sewanee-University of the South, TN.

Juhn Chris P. Espia is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines Visayas.

Suthikarn Meechan is an Assistant Professor at the College of Politics and Governance, Mahasarakham University, Thailand.

Rajat Ganguly is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies at Murdoch University, Australia, and is the Editor in Chief at the Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs.

Dawn Miller-McTaggart is a Research Fellow with the Sustainability, Citizenship and Civic Imagination Research Group (SCCI) at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand.

Eulalio R. Guieb III is an Associate Professor in the Department of Broadcast

Noel M. Morada is a Senior Fellow and Director (Regional Diplomacy) at the Asia ix

x  encyclopedia of asian politics Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, University of Queensland St. Lucia, Australia.

Mai-Huong Vo is a PhD Candidate in the Asia-Pacific Studies program at the National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

Stephen Noakes is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations and Director of the China Studies Centre at the University of Auckland, New Zealand.

Dennis Lu Chung Weng is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Sam Houston State University, TX.

Sun Young (Kelly) Park is a PhD Candidate in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at the National Chengchi University, Taiwan. Janjira Sombatpoonsiri is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, and an Associate at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies.

Taehee Whang is a Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Yonsei University, South Korea. Andrea Chloe Wong holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. She has previously worked as a Senior Foreign Affairs Research Specialist at the Foreign Service Institute, Philippines.

Laura Southgate is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, UK.

Charles K. S. Wu is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice at the University of South Alabama.

Amalia Sustikarini is a Research and Evaluations Associate at the Australia Council for the Arts in Sydney, Australia.

Jundeh Wu is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tunghai University, Taiwan.

Orson Tan is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs in Christchurch, New Zealand.

Guang Yang is a Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at Central China Normal University, China.

Josefina Socorro Flores Tondo is the Vice President for Research and Extension Services and Associate Professor of Anthropology at Camarines Norte State College, Philippines.

Wan-Ying Yang is a Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Social Sciences at the National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

Chia-hung Tsai is a Distinguished Research Fellow of the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University, Taiwan. Tsung-Han Tsai is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica, Taiwan. Takayoshi Uekami is a Professor in the Department of Law at Kokugakuin University, Japan. Neel Vanvari is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs in Christchurch, New Zealand.

Yao-Yuan Yeh is the Chair of the Department of International Studies and Modern Languages, Chair of the Department of Political Science, Director of the Master of Diplomacy and Strategic Affairs Program, Director of the Taiwan and East Asia Studies Program, and Professor of International Studies at the University of St Thomas, Houston, TX. Ching-Hsin Yu is the Director of the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

Preface offers a snapshot of the study of politics in Political science in Asia: An introduction to the Encyclopedia Asia. This approach has two main objectives:

(1) to provide a start-off point and (2) to continue engaging readers interested in the study of Asian politics. The Encyclopedia is best for those who are just about to engage with the politics of Asia. We were thinking of the students of politics and scholars who are interested to explore a new topic. Those who have been exposed to the politics of Asia may also be surprised at some of the ideas offered by our authors. All the contributors to the Encyclopedia were asked to provide the readers with an idea of where to start in their journey to the politics of Asia. If a student googles an Asian state and includes the word ‘politics’, it is possible that the search would include hundreds of books and journal articles. Our authors would tell you which of those are most important to start with. The Filipino term for the word “teach” is turo. Turo has a second meaning which is to point. It is easy to get lost in the academic vastness of Asia and we would like to think that the main contribution of the Encyclopedia is to provide our readers with an idea of where to start and therefore to point our readers in the right direction. Each contributor was asked to limit their work to an average of 3,000 words. This has been one of the challenging aspects of the project. Aside from the limits of publishing, it is also designed to engage the readers. Our contributors were also asked to give the readers an idea of what to do next. Instead of writing something new about the topics assigned to them, the contributors were invited to inform the reader of what can be explored for future research. The Encyclopedia is also pointing out where to go next. This is the exciting part. The readers may take the challenge and contribute to the study of Asian politics. Their work may even be included in other introductory books like the Encyclopedia. In order for us to meet our two objectives, our contributors were asked to provide the following in each chapter: the concept, the landscape, future research, references, and key resources. From the beginning, the contributor would give you an idea of what the chapter is about. If it is a political approach or a thematic chapter, the topic is defined by

There has been a constant growth in academic interest in Asia. Degrees, both graduate and undergraduate, and university-based institutions focusing on the region are more common. There are even more degrees and institutions that focus on various sub-regions or states. The multidisciplinary Association of Asian Studies prides itself on having more than 6,500 members. They offer annual and regional conferences in the United States, annual conferences in Asia, webinars, and other events. Like other Asian studies groups, they celebrate publications and other academic outputs on Asia. In business and economics, there have been claims that the 21st century is the Asian century. While anchored on China, it recognizes the vast economic potential of the whole region. There are also claims that the “Future is Asian.” The future of politics and international relations is going to be shaped differently by Asian states. The interest goes beyond the classrooms and conferences. It is not only academic. The cultural influence of Japan, South Korea, India, and China has been growing. Music, movies, food, and many more are shared outside their home countries with those within and outside the region. Outsiders want to know how things are done and how to do them the “Asian” way. The excellence of these has been recognized by the best of the “West.” The gaze on the region is important for outsiders who would want to understand “the East” but the agenda on what should be known is also co-determined by Easterners. The region is also establishing its own Asian centres. They create knowledge products that are being used by all scholars. The past observations by Western scholars of the region are now compared with the current interpretations of Eastern scholars. While there are some that go for a decolonized future of Asian scholarship, a fuller understanding of Asia may also come from the inclusion of the Western gaze. The Encyclopedia of Asian Politics recognizes the vastness, diversity, and dynamism of Asia. We know the challenges of including everything in just one volume and how difficult that task would be. The Encyclopedia xi

xii  encyclopedia of asian politics the contributor. Moreover, the authors were encouraged to provide alternative definitions or alternative discussions of the topic if there are any. The main idea is to provide readers with as much information on where to start with their own research journey. The contributor was also encouraged to provide a definition of the topic from an Asian perspective. Has there been an Asian effort to contribute to the topic at hand? This is a way of providing an Asian gaze to a topic. To go in-depth, the contributor then was asked to provide the academic landscape. This section would provide a summary of the research related to the concept or topic in the past ten years. It may be considered a review of related literature. Although older studies can be recognized, especially key publications, contributors were encouraged to deal with more contemporary debates. For some chapters, they would look into how the concepts were applied in Asia and for some topics, particularly the case studies, they delved into more current discussions. The section also aims to provide an idea of where the study of politics on a particular topic is and how they have contributed to the advancement of Asian politics. The following section provides us with the opportunity to engage our readers by suggesting the next steps that can be taken. The academic landscape aims to provide everyone with an idea of the gaps in the research. It indicates what future researchers need to do

in order to have a fuller and updated study of Asian politics. In the future research section, the readers are challenged to participate in the community of Asian scholars by encouraging them to fill in the gaps. The two other sections of each chapter include the references. The fourth section enumerates the references used by the contributors in writing the chapter. The fifth and last section is the contributor’s idea of the more important references that the reader should start with. These references include those that the reader should start with to know the topic and those that would help the reader know about its application in Asia. There are limitations to starting one’s journey to the politics of Asia with 3,000 words. Some debates and many other possible references may not be included. However, that is also the difficulty of including everything in just one volume. If one wishes to be comprehensive, then at best maybe only two topics can be included in this volume. Moreover, there are already books available on a more indepth discussion of Asian politics. We would not want to duplicate those efforts. If you are new to Asian politics, the Encyclopedia will help you navigate Asian politics. It tells you where we are currently in the study of Asian politics and where we could be headed next. Our readers are not intended to just read but also to join the journey. Dennis F. Quilala and Alexander C. Tan

Acknowledgements This Encyclopedia is an idea of the publisher, Edward Elgar, that began in 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic was just beginning to spread across the world. Taking a quick survey of the academic literature at the time, we felt that a reference work on Asian politics will be useful to those who want to begin the study of Asian politics or who are simply curious about the region. The political and economic development of Asia in the past 50 years has increased scholarly interest in the region. It is our sincere belief that Asia – in its vastness and diversity – can offer important insights into politics and contribute to the study of politics itself. This was our motivation to decide to take on this project. We extend our heartfelt gratitude to all the chapter authors who have graciously accepted our invitation to participate in this project. We are humbled by the overwhelmingly positive response we have received from our colleagues, which has made this

Encyclopedia possible. We acknowledge that contributing a chapter to an encyclopaedia poses certain challenges for authors, including the need to balance depth, breadth, and conciseness. Additionally, such contributions are often not recognized by current academic research output metrics, as they are typically voluntary and do not directly benefit the authors. Therefore, we hold our colleagues who have invested their time and effort in writing their chapters in high esteem and express our utmost appreciation for their invaluable contributions to the public value of this encyclopaedia. We would like to thank Neel for helping manage the complexity of the many moving parts of this project and for the final editorial work to get the manuscript ready for submission to the publisher. Finally, we thank Daniel Mather at Edward Elgar Publishing for proposing the idea of the Encyclopedia back in 2020 and for his continuing support and patience throughout the project.

xiii

PART I APPROACHES AND METHODS

1. Comparative methods

at the development of one state’s political system over time. Some common approaches that compare across time include longitudinal studies, historical case studies, and comparative institutional analyses. Researchers are not limited to either space or time; they may also compare across space and time. For example, we may be interested in the economic development of several states over a period of time. By comparing across both space and time, researchers can develop a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that affect political phenomena. Ultimately, the choice of whether you compare across space, time, or space and time is dependent upon the research question. The comparative method not only allows for the description of particular units of interest but enables researchers to test assertions and hypotheses. Through the construction and testing of hypotheses, researchers may build theories. Through the investigation of one or more cases, researchers are able to develop a theoretical understanding of political phenomena. In other words, it seeks to provide general explanations about how the world works by examining specific cases and their underlying dynamics. For example, comparative studies of democracy in different states can help scholars understand the factors that influence the development of democratic institutions and norms. Or studies of revolutionary uprisings can help scholars understand the factors that lead to successful revolutions and failed ones. There are many different ways to apply the comparative method. Studies that use the comparative method in political science can involve both quantitative and qualitative methods and can include cross-sectional and longitudinal studies and case studies. The choice of how the approach is applied is dependent upon the researcher’s expertise and most importantly, on what approach is appropriate for the research questions. The number of cases used in the application of the comparative method varies from one case to a small number of cases to a broad cross-sectional study which encompasses a large number of cases. The choice of the number of cases a researcher chooses is based on their research question. The number of cases varies according to the level of abstraction of the research project. If the research question is concerned with how a particular state’s government functions, they will conduct a case study. Whereas if a research question is

A. The concept Comparative methods are an analytical approach to the study of political phenomena. With this approach, researchers use similarities and differences to develop theories and hypotheses, infer causality, and generalize results. In the study of politics, this method is used to identify similarities and differences in political structures, processes, and outcomes, and the factors that explain these similarities and differences. Political systems, actors, or phenomena are compared across multiple cases or contexts. This may involve comparing the political systems of different states, the political behaviour of individuals or groups within a state, or the outcomes of different policies or interventions (Sartori 1994; Mair 1996; and Schmitter 2009). In the comparative method, comparison is “the fundamental tool of analysis” (Collier, 1993, p. 105). Concepts are defined and evaluated in relation to other units of the same type. Units are described accurately and precisely. Comparison allows for the description of variation across our unit of interest. Conversely, researchers can examine what is distinct about a unit such as a particular policy, institution, norm, or state. Researchers can also examine what the units may have in common. Using these similarities and differences, researchers can then classify the units into types as well as identify and describe trends. The comparative method allows for the simplification of reality thereby enabling researchers to look at a particular set of states, issues, or institutions. Researchers may choose to focus on similarities and differences across space, time, or both space and time. Comparing across space refers to the practice of examining and analysing political phenomena across different units such as states or regions. For example, a researcher may compare the provision of human rights across states in a particular year. Some common approaches that compare across space include case studies, cross-national statistical analyses, and comparative historical analyses. Comparing across time refers to the practice of analysing units over specified time periods. For example, a researcher may look 2

comparative methods  3 concerned with economic growth across the globe, the researcher would choose a large number of cases chosen from states across the world. The higher the level of abstraction the higher number of cases or units that may be used, while the fewer states or units used allow for a deeper exploration of specific contexts. In addition to choosing the number of cases, researchers may choose how they wish to compare the cases. In the Most Similar Systems Design (MSS), similar cases that differ on the dependent variable are compared. In MSS, similar cases produce different outcomes. This method helps to control for factors that are not the causal agent and isolate the independent variable that explains the presence or absence of the dependent variable. For example, if a researcher wanted to explain why some states successfully transition to democracies while others fail, they select two or more states that are very are very similar in their democratic history, colonial experience, and economic development but differ in the outcome of their transitions. Some of the states in the sample have successful democratic transitions while others have failed democratic transition. The similar characteristics serve as control variables allowing the researcher to identify the variable that contributed to the success or failure of the transition. In the Most Different Systems Design (MDS) approach, cases of different characteristics are chosen but the cases share a common problem or outcome. By comparing these cases, researchers can identify the factors that are most likely to be responsible for the outcome while controlling for other variables that may differ between the cases. If return to the example of democratic transitions, under this model the researcher chooses cases based on the similarity of the outcome or dependent variable: successful democratic transition. Under this model the researcher selects two or more states that are very different in terms of their political, economic, and cultural characteristics, but all successfully transitioned to democracy. By comparing these cases, the researcher may identify the factors that were most important in contributing to the successful transition to democracy. Both approaches, MSS and MDS, require careful case selection, rigorous data analysis, and a clear understanding of the theoretical concepts and variables being studied.

Another variation in the application of the comparative method is the unit of interest. The majority of studies focus on the state as the predominant unit. However, the comparative method can also be used to investigate institutions and processes within states. Some scholars may focus on comparing entire political systems across states such as presidential versus parliamentary systems. While others may focus on comparing specific institutions or actors within a state or across states such as the judiciary or political parties.

B. The landscape The comparative method has been a valuable approach for political scientists, allowing the study of similarities and differences among states, systems, and actors. In the last ten years, the approach has continued to be used extensively in political science research, particularly in the study of democratization, institutional design, political behaviour, and public policy. Scholars have used the comparative method to examine the processes of democratization in different regions and to explore the factors that facilitate or impede the transition to democracy. For example, researchers have compared the experiences of states such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya during the Arab Spring to analyse the factors that led to a successful or failed transition to democracy. The comparative method has also been used to examine the design of political institutions and their impact on governance and other political outcomes. Researchers have compared the effectiveness of different institutional structures to describe and explain their impact on political outcomes. Researchers have used this approach to study the behaviour of individuals and groups in different political systems, such as women’s participation in politics or the role of social media in mobilizing protest movements. Researchers have compared patterns of political behaviour in different states to identify similarities and differences in political culture. The approach has also been used to examine public policy in different states and compare policy outcomes in areas such as health care, education, and welfare. Researchers have analysed the impact of different policies and implementation strategies on outcomes such as access, quality, and equity. Recently, DAW N M I L L E R- M cTAG G A R T

4  encyclopedia of asian politics there has been a proliferation of studies exploring COVID-19 policies. The comparative method remains a valuable approach for political scientists to analyse policy phenomena in different contexts. It offers insights into the factors that influence policy outcomes and the effectiveness of different policy approaches. Studies using the comparative method have contributed significantly to advancing our understanding of Asian politics by providing a means to identify patterns, generalizations, and causal relationships across different states, contexts, and time periods in the region. Some of the topics studied using this method are democratization, political institutions, civil society, public policy, and regional integration. Scholars have used the comparative method to examine democratization in Asia and explore the factors that have facilitated or hindered democratic transitions in states such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar. Comparative studies have also been conducted to understand the different patterns of democratic development in the region (Panke et al 2020). The comparative method has been used to examine the design and performance of political institutions in Asia, including electoral systems, party systems, and executivelegislative relations. Comparative studies have helped to deepen our understanding of different forms of governance, electoral systems, and political parties in Asia. This has led to a more nuanced understanding of the similarities and differences between different political systems in the region. The role of non-state actors and their effect on civil society has been studied using the comparative method. These studies explore the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements in promoting democratic participation and social justice in different states. Comparative public policy studies employ the comparative method to analyse public policy in Asia. The body of research compares the policy outcomes and implementation strategies across states in areas such as health care, education, and environmental protection. Recently, this approach has been used to explore public health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in the Asia-Oceania region and the implications of the responses on democratic reversals. DAW N M I L L E R- M cTAG G A R T

Scholars have used the comparative method to analyse regional integration in Asia. Of particular interest is the role regional organizations, such as ASEAN, SAARC, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, play in the facilitation of cooperation among member states. Research in this area indicates that regional integration in Asia has evolved incrementally, rather than developing in waves as is the pattern in the Americas and Europe. The comparative method is a valuable approach for political scientists to understand politics in Asia. It provides insights into the factors that shape policy outcomes and the effectiveness of different policy approaches, democratization, political institutions, civil society, and regional integration.

C. Future research Most work on comparative Asian politics is qualitative and focuses on the state as the unit of analysis (Abbott & Fahey, 2014). While there are studies that use the comparative method to make comparisons across states in the region, there is still room for more systematic studies of politics in Asia. Considering that most comparative studies of Asian politics focus on a particular state, a wealth of detailed information can be used to develop new measures and models of political phenomena in the region. This expansion of the level of abstraction allows researchers to compare and contrast across units and gain new insights into existing theories and ultimately develop new theories. Dawn Miller-McTaggart

References Abbott, J. P., & Fahey, K. (2014). The State and Direction of Asian Comparative Politics: Who, What, Where, How? Journal of East Asian Studies, 14(1), 109–134. Collier, D. (1993). The Comparative Method. In A. W. Finifer (Ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline II. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association. Mair, P. (1996). Comparative Politics: An Overview. In R. E. Goodin & H. Klingemann (Eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science (pp. 309–335). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Panke, D., Stapel, S., & Starkmann, A. (2020). Regional Organizations in Asia.

comparative methods  5 In Comparing Regional Organizations: Global Dynamics and Regional Particularities (pp. 83–100). Cambridge: Bristol University Press. Sartori, G. (1994). Compare Why and How: Comparing, Miscomparing and the Comparative Method. In M. Dogan & A. Kazancigil (Eds.), Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, Substance (pp. 14– 34). London: Basil Blackwell. Schmitter, P. C. (2009). The Nature and Future of Comparative Politics. European Political Science Review, 1(1), 33–61.

Key references Resources on comparative methods The journal Comparative Political Studies is a good source of articles on methodology, theory, and research in the field of comparative politics.

Landman, T., & Carvalho, E. (2017). Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction. London: Routledge. Pennings, P., Hans, K., & Kleinnijenhuis, J. (2006). Doing Research in Political Science: An Introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics. London: Sage Publications. Resources on the comparative method in Asian politics Ahram, A. I., KÖllner, P., & Sil, R. (Eds.). (2018). Comparative Area Studies: Methodological Rationales and Cross-Regional Applications. New York: Oxford Academic. Hua, S. (Ed.). (2018–2023). Routledge Studies on Comparative Asian Politics. London: Routledge. Lim, T. C. (2022). Politics in East Asia: Explaining Change and Continuity. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

DAW N M I L L E R- M cTAG G A R T

2. Ethnography

societies make sense of their everyday lives. From Malinowski’s broad descriptive model (1922), ethnography’s postmodern turn beginning in the 1960s opened up a critical interrogation of its professional culture, which Marcus and Fischer (2001) described as a crisis of representation in the human sciences. From the descriptively observational, ethnography shifted toward the interpretive (Geertz, 1973a) that gave prominence to thick description or the multi-layered worlds of possibilities of meanings and to a poetics of its own (Clifford & Marcus, 1986) that frames knowledge as partial truths situated in a continuously “moving earth” (Clifford, 1986, p. 22). Ethnography embraced the norm of incompleteness (Marcus, 2009), and its intellectual trajectory moved to investigations of the fluctuating interior fields of emotions (Rosaldo, 1984) and the consciousness of the relational self (Cohen, 1992). Ethnographic writing covers a wide range of narrative conventions. The formalist descriptive representation as informed by classical ethnography is widely employed. Recent models employ discursive and narrative styles of reflexivity (Hastrup, 1992; Och & Capps, 1996), the autobiographical (Okely & Callaway, 1992; Prattis, 1997), the literary (Rapport, 1997), the cinematic and visual (Marcus, 1990), and other emerging and experimental modes of representation (Clifford, 1986; Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995; Garber, Walkowitz, & Franklin, 1996; Jackson, 1989).

A. The concept Ethnography is considered a fundamental methodological and analytic tool in the social sciences in general (Allard & Anderson, 2005). Key to understanding ethnography is that it is a first-hand field study of social processes of small units. What differentiates ethnography from other methodologies is its fieldwork-informed participant observation and the explorations arising from this. It employs the qualitative research inquiry design for the systematic study of a group or community’s observable values, behaviors, beliefs, language, and social practices through immersion and participant observation for extended periods. Ethnography was first adopted by anthropology, then gradually inter-phased with other disciplines, one of which is political science. The connection between anthropology and ethnography runs so deep that the latter’s principles and methodology have “become a basic premise for the anthropological epistemology” (Howell, 2018). It is one of anthropology’s major contributions to analytical approaches in understanding the deeply complex social relations of humans in differently situated contexts. Social-cultural anthropology leans on the qualitative-ethnographic research approach to provide an integrative viewpoint towards understanding human societies and cultures. Requiring close proximity to the subject, ethnography offers the views and experiences of people in their quotidian activities. The descriptive detail of day-to-day human activities and behaviors from in-situ participant observation has significantly contributed to a better understanding of the complexity of peoples and cultures. The ethnographic process, however, is not orderly and neat. Life is complex, and human beings and events are often unpredictable. Fieldwork immersion engages the researcher in life’s tensions, contradictions, chaos, and loose ends (Weeden, 2010). This seeming “disorder” leads most researchers with a penchant for academic logical philosophical orientations who venture into ethnography into areas that are unknown and uncharted. Ethnography has undergone epistemological shifts in understanding how human

B. The landscape Ethnography is a rarity in political science, mainly because it has a marginalized status in the discipline (Bayard de Bolo & Schatz, 2004), which may be attributed to political science’s preoccupation with universalizing tenors. In contrast, its mainstream use in anthropology may be credited to the discipline’s descriptive and interpretivist approaches to meaning-making that welcome, albeit with clearly defined limitations, particularizing tendencies (Aronoff & Kubik, 2013). Both approaches are valid and, when combined, are clearly advantageous, as applied by the majority of disciplines of the arts and the humanities. A universalizing theme, on the one hand, and the descriptive particularities, on the other, allow the interpretivists to describe and explicate meanings and the positivists to find or discover 6

ethnography  7 causality (Bayard de Bolo & Schatz, 2004). Ethnography simplifies the macro approaches to political issues through its focus on how these issues unfold in the quotidian lives of people at the micro level, which provides a better understanding of macro issues in terms of policies, power, conflict, violence, and governance to a broader audience of participants or citizens engaged in political processes. Moreover, political cultures are founded on micro societies, which form the core inquiry of anthropology. With the anthropological tool of ethnography, political science, thus, enlarges its understanding of human beings in small localities and thus validates its macrogeneral suppositions and propositions. Terms and references have recently arisen and steadily gained recognition in political science in the last two decades. Indicative of the increasing use of ethnography in the discipline are emerging terms, such as political ethnography (Hervouet, 2021; Joseph, Mahler, & Aureyo, 2007; Schatz, 2009; Schubert, 2017; Stepputhat & Larsen, 2015; Tilly, 2006; Waaranperä, 2022; Yadav, 2018), ethnographic work in political science (Weeden, 2010), ethnographic methods in political research (Bayard de Bolo & Schatz 2004), ethnography of politics (Luthkallio & Elliasoph, 2014), political culture and identity politics (Wiarda, 2014), and ethnographies of power (Loloum, Abram, & Ortar, 2021). Notably, Yadav (2018) pushes for ethnography as an option, while Biel and McKay (2012) consider it a useful tool in political critique. There are interfaces and common grounds between anthropology and political science, one of which is political anthropology. Godah (1999) approaches the investigation of political cultures and systems into three classifications: (1) political anthropology, which is the study of so-called “traditional” political systems in small societies, (2) the politics of anthropology, which covers the political reach or influences of anthropological studies, and (3) the anthropology of politics, which contextualizes the comparative study of local political cultures within regional or global arrangements. In many ways, ethnographic accounts relate people’s day-to-day life to the overarching structures of politics, power, ideology, decision-making processes, and governance discourses. In this sense, the line delineating anthropology and politics is somewhat blurred, such that one may ask where one ends and the other begins (Howell, 2018).

A research area under the political anthropology category covers explorations of local socio-cultural arrangements that serve as the impetus to historic geo-political arrangements of human societies, from the household and ethnic kinship to geographically local, national, regional, and global political arrangements, and how such processes inform state or territorial formations. Classic works of this ethnographic tradition include Keesing and Keesing’s Taming Philippine Hunters: A Study of Government and Cultural Change in Northern Luzon (1934), Leach’s Political Systems of Highland Burma (1954), Hefner’s The Political Economy of Mountain Java (1990), and several works of Geertz in Indonesia (1959, 1963, 1973b). Recent scholarship in political science employs aspects of political ethnography and incorporates the politics of ethnic groups in the reconfiguration of contemporary Asian societies. For example, Istania (2021) illustrates how Indonesian ethnic conflicts play into the formation of new territorial claims under the government’s decentralization strategy. Mughal (2020) discusses how the marginalization of the ethnic group Saraiki from the economic resources of Southern Punjab has triggered the struggle among them to create a new province that has huge implications in the political terrain of Pakistan. In short, recent political science scholarship has acknowledged the value and significance of the ethnographic lens through which to view a wide spectrum of political phenomena in highly varied contexts and scales of socio-cultural units, including global policy regimes (e.g., Stepputat & Larsen, 2015) and the semiotic dimensions of politics and the discursive construction of political concepts and practices (e.g., Aronoff & Kubik, 2013; Joseph, Mahler, & Auyero, 2007; Tilly, 2006). Interestingly, recent works in political science indicate some of the discipline’s scholars moving toward postmodern ethnography that explores the micro-phenomenological experiences of researchers on fieldwork and life within small “ethnos” of marginal communities. Among Asian political science scholars, Ritu Mathur’s works exemplify the discursive strand of ethnography to tease out the macrostructures of power on the issue of arms control and disarmament. Mathur (2018a) unpacks her bifurcation from security studies that provide only a critique of Orientalist discourses on warfare but falls short of

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8  encyclopedia of asian politics providing insights into the discursive articulations of race, technology, law, and culture. She shifts her analytical gaze into the subaltern to enlarge the analysis of their reflexive performativity of power towards their emancipation and the attainment of social justice. In another essay, Mathur (2018b) incorporates the everyday practices of weapons control into the intersection of what she terms “the dynamic of difference,” which is about the dichotomy of the West and the Rest, and “the dynamic of denial,” which focuses on the erasure of colonial violence. Through a postcolonial view of the disarmament issue, she introduces the concept of techno-racism to elucidate the circulating power of discourses on racial reductionism. Finally, an excellent example of a political science research that has explored affect or emotions is the work by Karimi Malh and Garshasbi (2020), whose ethnographic observation of how the emotional protest of Iranians on December 28, 2017, that turned violent has implicated the economic, social, political, and cultural conditions in Iran to have caused emotions to transform to anger, hatred, aversion, and alienation. In short, these global political ethnographies illustrate the clarity ethnography brings to the overarching themes in political science discourse. Significant contributions to this brand of ethnographic exploration from political science scholars elsewhere in the world are those coming from Biehl and McKay (2012), Boswell et al. (2018), Hervouet (2021), and Schubert (2017), to name a few. Important to cite as well are the scholarly contributions in Clark and Cavatorta (2018) by Swedler and Clark, Rivetti and Saeidi, Okruhlik, Challand, Parkinson, Bush, and Bouziane. One important component of the ethnographic study of political governance is legal anthropology, which underscores the shifting social relations of humans pertaining to legal institutional arrangements that find expression in continuously evolving local knowledge systems to highly codified state laws or in de facto legal pluralist systems. Foundational theoretical elaborations in legal anthropology are found in the works of Bohannan (1969), Gluckman (1969), Nader (1969), Pospisil (1971), and Moore (1978), to name a few. A classic ethnographic work in legal anthropology in Asia is Ifugao Law (1919) by Roy Franklin Barton, which described the Ifugao legal system in the Cordilleras of northern

Philippines. Scholarship that came out during the colonial period of most Asian states is too much to mention, done mostly by colonizers, and later, in the aftermath of these states’ independence, by local scholars. These studies have largely contributed to contemporary articulations of state governance, the sources and consequences of political authority, and the operation of political institutions. Issues in legal anthropology cover the changing nature of the state, including the politics of state expansion, local autonomy, self-governance, democratization processes, resistance movements, and peace studies; the manifold operations of the institutions of society, such as the individual, family, household, kin, and politico-geographic social units; customary law, property, and tenure rights, including dispute and conflict management and resolution that span family law and penal law; the legal position of civil society and marginalized groups, such as women, indigenous peoples, workers, peasants, which encompass human rights concerns; and many more issues and debates that inform the formal and nonformal governance of individuals, groups, and states. An interesting work in Asian political science scholarship that employs the classic observational mode of examining political cultures, which may fall under legal anthropology as well, is the study by Bolton (2018). He participated in the advocacy of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) to observe the negotiations in the crafting of the 2017 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The participant observation mode provided Bolton with a direct view of how formerly colonized states in the Pacific region, which were sites of several nuclear weapons tests in the past, were able to advocate for a strong treaty that placed positive obligations on states to assist victims of nuclear weapons use and testing and remediate contaminated environments. Moreover, through fieldwork employing a case-oriented qualitative approach, Kumar Panday and Feldman (2015) analyze the mainstreaming of gender in politics in Bangladesh, especially women’s participation in policy processes. Debrah and Asante (2019) have presented a nuanced elaboration of China-Ghana diplomatic relations, the tenacity of which has been put to the test in the case of competing interests in small-scale gold mining in Ghana between Ghanaian indigenes and Chinese

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ethnography  9 migrants. Drawing on personal observations and in-depth interviews, the authors showed that the dispute was of less value compared to the benefits that each country gains in their bilateral relations.

C. Future research The future of ethnography in political science studies is dependent on practitioners’ better understanding of the method and its advantages in various kinds of inquiries. Notably, it is important to recognize that enmeshed in the taxonomy of anthropological ethnographic analyses of the multifarious political cultures and systems in Asia is a wide range of concerns which can be summarized in five major categories, namely, (1) local arrangements informing the crafting of Asian polities, (2) the politics of the historical periodization of Asian histories, (3) the consequences of Western and European colonial projects that seep into contemporary politics of territoriality, the politics of ethnicities, globalization, development, human rights, terrorism, civil wars and territorial defense, and the geopolitics of contested natural resource spaces, (4) ethnographies of social interactions, social organizations, language, symbols, rituals, and material production and consumption that seep into political cultures, and (5) the relational self in critical self-reflexive ethnographies, especially newer expressions of individual, translocal, and transnational political identities emerging from the challenges offered by the intersection of feminism, ethnicities, genders, colors, virtualities, and other identity formations as embedded in the recontextualization of the local within local-global dynamics of a high variability of social, cultural, economic, and political systems and discursive practices. Research in these five categories may help political science scholarship to integrate macro-universal concepts with ethnography’s in-situ participant observation of micro-quotidian politics of peoples and thus present a more coherent understanding of politics among political practitioners. The chapter leaned on the classical works of anthropology to provide an outline of ethnography’s epistemological and methodological historical roots from anthropology and its increasing significance in modern political science studies in Asia. The authors carried out a search scanning and review of

major political science journals and scholarly publications from the past ten years that focus on Asia and the Asia-Pacific studies on politics, governance, power (in terms of military capabilities and influence), and policies. These include the Asian Journal of Political Science, Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, Comparative Political Studies, Chinese Political Science Review, Asian Social Work and Policy Review, International Studies, Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal, and China Strategy Review. Also consulted were conference proceedings and books from 1995 onwards. These helped in establishing the rarity of ethnographic studies and mentions of ethnography in political science discourse. Notably, recently published political science resources do not include ethnography, which supports its adjunct methodological status in political science; these resources are The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations (2020), Political Science in Research Practice (2019), and Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Political Science (2016). While ethnography is yet to have a significant mention in political studies of East Asia, South East Asia, and Oceania, a few attempts have been made in South Asia and the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. Josefina Socorro Flores Tondo and Eulalio R. Guieb III

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10  encyclopedia of asian politics Biehl, J., & McKay, R. (2012). Ethnography as political critique. Anthropological Quarterly, 85(4), 1209–1227. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1353​/anq​.2012​.0057 Bohannan, P. (1969). Ethnography and comparison in legal anthropology. In L. Nader (Ed.), Law in culture and society (pp. 401–418). Aldine Publishing Co. Bolton, M. (2018). The “-pacific” part of “Asia-pacific”: Oceanic diplomacy in the 2017 treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Asian Journal of Political Science, 26(3), 371–389. Boswell, J., Corbett, J., Dommett, K., Jennings, W., Flinders, M., Rhodes, R. A. W., & Wood, M. (2018). State of the field: What can political ethnography tell us about anti‐politics and democratic disaffection? European Journal of Political Research, 58(1), 56–71. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/1475​ -6765​.12270 Bouziane, M. (2018). The (ambiguous) fieldwork experiences of a German Moroccan in Jordan. In J. A. Clark & F. Cavatorta (Eds.), Political science research in the Middle East and North Africa: Methodological and ethical challenges (pp. 264–274). Oxford University Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/oso​/9780190882969​ .003​.0023 Bush, R. (2018). Researching the countryside: Farmers, farming, and social transformation in a time of economic liberalization. In J. A. Clark & F. Cavatorta (Eds.), Political science research in the Middle East and North Africa: Methodological and ethical challenges (pp. 94–106). Oxford University Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ oso​/9780190882969​.003​.0008 Challand, B. (2018). Research in and on the Palestinian occupied territories. In J. A. Clark & F. Cavatorta (Eds.), Political science research in the Middle East and North Africa: Methodological and ethical challenges (pp. 62–72). Oxford University Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ oso​/9780190882969​.003​.0005 Clifford, J. (1986). Introduction: Partial truths. In J. Clifford & G. E. Marcus (Eds.), Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography (pp. 1–26). University of California Press. Clifford, J., & Marcus, G. E. (Eds.). (1986). Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography. University of California Press.

Cohen, A. P. (1992). Self-conscious anthropology. In J. Okely & H. Callaway (Eds.), Anthropology and autobiography (pp. 221–239). Routledge. Debrah, E., & Asante, R. (2019). Sino-Ghana bilateral relations and Chinese migrants’ illegal gold mining in Ghana. Asian Journal of Political Science, 27(3), 286– 307. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/02185377​.2019​ .1669473 Emerson, R. M., Fretz, R. I., & Shaw, L. L. (1995). Writing ethnographic fieldnotes. The University of Chicago Press. Garber, M., Walkowitz, R. L., & Franklin, P. B. (Eds.). (1996). Field work: Sites in literary and cultural studies. Routledge. Geertz, C. (1959). The Javanese village. In G. W. Skinner (Ed.), Local, ethnic, and national loyalties in village Indonesia: A symposium (pp. 34–41). Cultural report series no. 8. Yale University Southeast Asia Program. Geertz, C. (1963). Peddlers and princes: Social change and economic modernization in two Indonesian towns. University of Chicago Press. Geertz, C. (1973b). The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states. In C. Geertz (Ed.), The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays by Clifford Geertz (pp. 255–310). Basic Book Publishers. Geertz, C. (1973a). Thick description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture. In C. Geertz (Ed.), The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays by Clifford Geertz (pp. 3–30). Basic Book Publishers. Gluckman, M. (1969). Concepts in the comparative study of tribal law. In L. Nader (Ed.), Law in culture and society (pp. 349– 374). Aldine Publishing Co. Goda, T. (1999). Political culture and ethnicity: An anthropological study of Southeast Asia. New Day Publishers. Hastrup, K. (1992). Writing ethnography: State of the art. In J. Okely & H. Callaway (Eds.), Anthropology and autobiography (pp. 115–131). Routledge. Hefner, R. W. (1990). The political economy of mountain Java: An interpretive history. University of California Press. Hervouet, R. (2021). A taste of oppression: A political ethnography of everyday life in Belarus. Berghahn Books. Hossain, A. A. (2015). Contested national identity and political crisis in Bangladesh:

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ethnography  11 Historical analysis of the dynamics of Bangladeshi society and politics. Asian Journal of Political Science, 23(3), 366–396. Istania, R. (2021). How do ethnic groups compete for a new province in a decentralized Indonesia. Asian Journal of Political Science, 29(3), 316–337. Jackson, M. (1989). On ethnographic truth, in Paths toward a clearing: Radical empiricism and ethnographic inquiry (pp. 170–187). Indiana University Press. Joseph, L., Mahler, M., & Auyero, J. (2007). New perspectives in political ethnography. Springer. Karimi Mahl, A., & Garshasbi, R. (2020). The sociology of emotions of the protest action of Iranians on 28 December 2017. Asian Journal of Political Science, 28(3), 334–355. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/02185377​ .2020​.1814362 Keesing, F. M., & Keesing, M. M. (1934). Taming Philippine headhunters: A study of government and of cultural change in northern Luzon. Stanford University Press. Kumar Panday, P., & Feldman, S. (2015). Mainstreaming gender in politics in Bangladesh: Role of NGOs. Asian Journal of Political Science, 23(3), 1–20. https://doi. org/10.1080/02185377.2015.1055772 Malinowski, B. (1922). Introduction: The subject, method and scope of this inquiry, in Argonauts of the Western Pacific (pp. 11–24). Fundacja Nowoczesna Polska, wolnelectury​.p​l. Leach, E. R. (1954). Political systems of highland Burma: A study of Kachin social structure. Beacon Press. Marcus, G, E. (1990). The modernist sensibility in recent ethnographic writing and the cinematic metaphor of montage. Visual Anthropology Review, 6(1), 2–12. Marcus, G. E. (2009). Introduction: Notes toward an ethnographic memoir of supervising graduate research through anthropology’s decades of transformation. In J. D. Faubion & G. E. Marcus (Eds.), Fieldwork is not what it used to be: Learning anthropology’s method in a time of transition (pp. 1–31). Cornell University Press. Marcus, G., & Fischer, M. M. J. (2001). A crisis of representation in the human sciences. In P. A. Erickson & L. D. Murphy (Eds.), Readings for a history of anthropological theory (pp. 631–641). Broadview Press.

Mathur, R. (2018a). Postcolonial perspectives on weapons control. Asian Journal of Political Science, 26(3), 293–296. Mathur, R. (2018b). Techno-racial dynamics of denial and difference in weapons control. Asian Journal of Political Science, 26(3), 297–313. Mughal, M.  A.  Z. (2020). Ethnicity, marginalization, and politics: Saraiki identity and the quest for a new southern Punjab province in Pakistan. Asian Journal of Political Science, 28(3), 294–311. Moore, S. F. (1978). Law as process: An anthropological approach. Routledge & Kegan Paul. Nader, L. (Ed.). (1969). Law in culture and society. Aldine Publishing Co. Ochs, E., & Capps, L. (1996). Narrating the self. Annual Review of Anthropology, 25(1), 19–43. https://doi​.org​/10​.1146​/annurev​ .anthro​.25​.1​.19 Okely, J., & Callaway, H. (1992). Anthropology and autobiography. Routledge. Okruhlik, G. (2018). Authoritarianism, gender, and sociopolitics in Saudi Arabia. In J. A. Clark & F. Cavatorta (Eds.), Political science research in the Middle East and North Africa: Methodological and ethical challenges (pp. 46–61). Oxford University Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ oso​/9780190882969​.003​.0004 Parkinson, S. E. (2018). Seeing beyond the spectacle: Research on and adjacent to violence. In J. A. Clark & F. Cavatorta (Eds.), Political science research in the Middle East and North Africa: Methodological and ethical challenges (pp. 73–82). Oxford University Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ oso​/9780190882969​.003​.0006 Prattis, J. I. (1997). Opening ourselves up to the voyage of anthropological practice. In Anthropology at the edge: Essays on culture, symbol, and consciousness (pp. 99–126). University Press of America. Pospisil, L. J. (1971). Anthropology of law: A comparative theory. Harper & Row. Rapport, N. (1997). Transcendent individual: Towards a literary and liberal anthropology. Routledge. Rivetti, P., & Saeidi, S. (2018). What is so special about field research in Iran? Doing fieldwork in religiously charged authoritarian settings. In J. A. Clark & F. Cavatorta (Eds.), Political science research in the Middle East and North Africa: Methodological and ethical challenges

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12  encyclopedia of asian politics (pp. 35–45). Oxford University Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/oso​/9780190882969​ .003​.0003 Rosaldo, M. (1984). Toward an anthropology of self and feeling. In R. A. Shweder & R. A. Levine (Eds.), Culture theory: Essays on mind, self, and emotion (pp. 137–157). Cambridge University Press. Schatz, E. (Ed.). (2009). Political ethnography: What immersion contributes to the study of power. The University of Chicago Press. Schwedler, L., & Clark, J. A. (2018). Encountering the Mukhabarat State. In J. A. Clark & F. Cavatorta (Eds.), Political science research in the Middle East and North Africa: Methodological and ethical challenges (pp. 23–34). Oxford University Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ oso​/9780190882969​.003​.0002 Shubert, J. (2017). Working the system: A political ethnography of the new Angola. Cornell University Press. Tilly, C. (2006). Afterword: Political ethnography as art and science. Qualitative Sociology, 29(3), 409–412. Waaranperä, U. K. (2022). People, place and property rights: A political ethnography of land in Molo, Kenya. Routledge. Weeden, L. (2010). Reflections on ethnographic work in political science. Annual Review of Political Science, 13(1), 255–272. https://doi​.org​/10​.1146​/annurev​ .polisci​.11​.052706​.123951 Yadav, S. P. (2018). Ethnography is an option: Learning to learn in/through practice. In J. A. Clark & F. Cavatorta (Eds.), Political science research in the Middle East and North Africa: Methodological and ethical challenges (pp. 165–174). Oxford University Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ oso​/9780190882969​.003​.0014

Key resources

a concept (Aronoff & Kubik, 2013; Clark & Cavatorta, 2018; Howell, 2018) and as a methodological approach in political science for researchers applying the use of ethnography as their research methodology (Keman & Woldendorp, 2016; Loloum, Abram, & Ortar, 2021; Luhtakallio & Eliasoph, 2014; Stepputat & Larsen, 2015; Wiarda, 2014) are the following: Aronoff, M. J., & Kubik, J. (2013). Anthropology & political science: A convergent approach. Berghahn. Clark, J. A., & Cavatorta, F. (2018). In J. A. Clark & F. Cavatorta (Eds.), Political science research in the Middle East and North Africa: Methodological and ethical challenges. Oxford University Press. Howell, S. (2018). Ethnography. In F. Stein, M. Candea, H. Diemberger, S. Lazar, J. Robbins, A. Sanchez, & R. Stasch (Eds.), Cambridge encyclopedia of anthropology, February 18, 2018. https://doi​.org​/10​.29164​ /18ethno Keman, H., & Woldendorp, J. (2016). Handbook of research methods and applications in political science. Edward Elgar Publishing. Loloum, T., Abram, S., & Ortar, N. (2021). Ethnographies of power: A political anthropology of energy. Berghahn Books. Luhtakallio, E., & Eliasoph, N. (2014). Ethnography of politics and political communication. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. Stepputat, F., & Larsen, F. (2015). Global political ethnography a methodological approach to studying global policy regimes. DIIS. Wiarda, H. J. (2014). Political culture, political science, and identity politics: An uneasy alliance. Routledge.

Recommended references and key resources for political science researchers interested to know more about ethnography as

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3. Experiments

identifying causal mechanisms, and evaluating policy and program effectiveness. In a recent review, Druckman and Green (2021) note that the field is entering a new era characterized by several developments. Firstly, there is a growing use of new experimental designs. Secondly, novel data sources such as non-student and elite subjects, measurement approaches, and statistical methods are being introduced. Thirdly, the use of experiments is expanding to more research topics. Finally, there is a focus on discussions about the generalizability and ethics of experiments. To assess the current state of experimental studies in the realm of Asian politics, I compile data on journal articles accepted between 2012 and 2022 in four prominent general interest journals (American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, and British Journal of Political Science) and two leading comparative politics journals (World Politics and Comparative Political Studies). All articles in the sample employ experimental methods and include Asian cases in their empirical analysis.1 In total, I find 45 articles that meet these criteria. The data collected are stored in Harvard Dataverse.2 Methodically, Asia scholars have incorporated various experimental approaches into their research. The data show that the most prevalent method employed is survey experiments, which are utilized in 75.6% of the articles examined. This is followed by field experiments, featured in 20% of the studies, and laboratory experiments, used in 11.1% of the articles.3 Notably, survey experiments utilizing conjoint analysis have seen a marked increase in use in recent years. Out of the 34 articles that incorporate survey experiments, seven employ a conjoint design. It is worth noting that all the studies leveraging conjoint analysis were accepted for publication since 2020. Additionally, Asia scholars have utilized list and endorsement experiments to indirectly elicit truthful answers to sensitive questions among politicians (Meng et  al., 2017) and ordinary citizens (Hicken et  al., 2022; Lyall et  al., 2013). Moreover, certain studies combine observational and experimental analysis, where experiments are employed to augment the main findings derived from observational data (Dunning & Nilekani, 2013; Mattingly, 2016; Mcmurry, 2022). One study uses a paired experiment in India to evaluate whether (and which of) the experimental findings in the United States are

A. The concept The increasing importance of causal inference in political science has led to a rise in experimental research. In this chapter, the term “experiment” refers to studies where units of observation, such as citizens, legislators, firms, and villages, are randomly assigned by researchers to different treatment conditions. The treatment is an intervention that the researcher intends to identify its causal impact on the outcome of interest. Random assignment means that each subject has a known probability determined by the researcher to be in a particular treatment condition. This helps establish the comparability between the treatment and control groups, making any differences in post-treatment outcomes between them likely to reflect the treatment effect. It is important to note that the definition of experiments used in this article excludes natural experiments and quasi-experiments. A natural experiment is a situation where there is a random assignment of treatment via a randomization device, but the researcher has no control over the assignment. On the other hand, a quasi-experiment is a study where the treatment is not randomly assigned, but the researcher makes a credible claim that the assignment of nonexperimental subjects to different treatment conditions is “as-if” random. Experimental studies can take many forms, including lab experiments, field experiments, and survey experiments. A lab experiment involves an intervention in a lab-like setting created and controlled by the researcher; a field experiment takes place in naturally occurring settings; and a survey experiment entails an intervention during an opinion survey. Since 2000, there has been an increase in the use of field experiments, as they simulate real-world occurrences and potentially have higher external validity (Druckman & Green, 2021). Political scientists have also increasingly used conjoint survey experiments to analyze multidimensional preferences of political objects such as political candidates and public policies.

B. The landscape Experimental political science is becoming increasingly important as a tool for measuring causal relationships, testing theories, 13

14  encyclopedia of asian politics generalizable to other contexts (Carnegie & Gaikwad, 2022). Geographically, 37.8% of the articles analyzed focus on countries in East Asia, with South Asia following closely at 31.1%, West Asia at 20%, and Southeast Asia at 11.1%. Figure 3.1 further breaks down the data by country, revealing that China is the most studied country in the sample. Together with India, the runner-up, they make up almost half of the studies. The articles on China mainly concentrate on citizens’ regime evaluations and satisfaction with the government and its policies. In addition, major political science journals also show interest in Japan, Turkey, Vietnam, Israel, and Afghanistan. Substantively, I identify at least four research areas to which Asia scholars utilizing experiments have recently made important contributions, including (1) identity politics, (2) authoritarian responsiveness, (3) political information, and (4) political behavior and public opinion. Identity politics Several articles analyzed focus on issues related to gender, ethnicity, and intergroup relations. Chaudhuri et al. (forthcoming) find that inexperienced female politicians are more honest in the behavioral game than their male counterparts, but this gender gap disappears among experienced politicians. Barnett et al. (2021) show that patriarchal norms constrain

the impact of earned income on women’s bargaining power and their job preferences. In the realm of ethnic politics, Mcmurry (2022) finds that government recognition of self-governance for indigenous communities may actually increase ethnic minorities’ identification with the nation. Dunning and Nilekani (2013) use a survey experiment to provide individual-level evidence of why ethnic quotas for the presidencies of village councils in India have weak distributive effects on marginalized castes and tribes. Chauchard (2016) also reports a subtler and more complex impact of ethnicity on voter preferences. Some scholars use innovative experimental designs to study intergroup relations in Asia. They establish that local contexts in which interethnic interaction occurs matter as to whether such interaction mitigates outgroup bias. Enos and Gidron (2016) show that residential environments – the proportion of outgroup members and residential segregation – affect how much diversity is associated with intergroup discriminatory behavior. Condra and Linardi (2019) find that casual interethnic contact decreases outgroup altruism because this involuntary contact exposes people to a continuum of descent-based attributes that increase in-group identity. Additionally, Enos and Gidron (2018) show that exclusionary preferences affect the extent to which Jewish citizens are willing to cooperate with Palestinian citizens of Israel. Bloom

Figure 3.1  Number of times studied in articles accepted by top political science journals between 2012 and 2022

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experiments  15 et  al. (2015) differentiate the impact of religious identity and religious belief on attitudes toward immigrants, especially those outgroup members in ethnicity and religion. In a more recent study, Siegel and Badaan (2020) find experimental evidence in Lebanon that messages priming common religious identity in a manner that emphasizes elite support makes citizens more supportive of social media posts advocating positive intergroup relations. Authoritarian responsiveness Some experimental studies in Asian politics explore whether, when, and why autocracies are responsive to citizens. A field experiment in Vietnam, for example, reveals that delegates who obtain randomly assigned information on the policy preferences of their constituents are more likely to use this information in parliamentary debates. Notably, the responsive delegates are more interested in securing a landslide reelection to signal their eligibility for future promotion, rather than winning the election itself (Malesky et  al., 2023). In another study, a list experiment is employed to assess local Chinese leaders’ receptivity to citizen feedback expressed through formal institutional channels and the Internet. Results show that officials are generally receptive to such feedback, but in areas where officials perceive antagonism between the state and citizens, receptivity to citizen suggestions from the Internet decreases (Meng et al., 2017). Other studies probe whether providing citizens with opportunities to express their policy concerns and preferences improves their regime evaluations and compliance. Truex (2017) randomly exposes Chinese respondents to the National People’s Congress’s new online participatory portals, finding that the treatment successfully enhances regime assessments only among less educated and politically excluded citizens. In a separate field experiment in Vietnam, Malesky and Taussig (2019) randomly give local firms the chance to comment on draft regulations. They find that treated firms have more positive views about the government’s regulatory authority and greater compliance with the target regulation on the factory floor than untreated firms. Political information A number of articles examined study the impact of political information. In one set of

experiments, researchers analyze the effectiveness of elite communication. Elçi (2022) tests the impact of different types of nostalgic messages on people’s populist attitudes. Huang (2018) shows that hard propaganda tends to backfire on individuals’ political support. Aytaç (2021) compares the effectiveness of two elite communication strategies – “shifting the blame” versus “changing the agenda” – in shoring up popular support. Huang (2017) and Wang and Huang (2021) study when government rebuttals of political rumors restore people’s political trust. Another set of experiments examines the effect of international knowledge and information on opinion formation. Huang (2015) finds that correcting socioeconomic misinformation about foreign countries can improve Chinese people’s evaluations of their government. Similarly, Huang and Yeh (2019) show that reading positive foreign media content about foreign countries improves the domestic evaluations of Chinese citizens because foreign media tend to provide more realistic information than the overly rosy information that commonly circulates in China. Dietrich et  al. (2018) discover that in Bangladesh, exposure to information about US foreign aid slightly improves perceptions of the US but does not sway opinions about foreign policy issues. In addition to exploring the impact of information, political scientists also seek approaches to combating misinformation. Badrinathan (2021) conducts a field experiment in India that randomly assigns participants to receive an hour-long, in-person media literacy training. On average, the training does not increase people’s ability to identify misinformation. If anything, treated participants who support the ruling party become less able to identify misinformation on proattitudinal stories, suggesting the presence of motivated reasoning. Political behavior and public opinion Last but not least, many articles in the sample focus on political behavior, attitudes, and opinion formation. First, some studies speak to the literature on IPE public opinions, intending to understand what drives people’s opinions about international economic exchange, such as trade with allies and adversaries (Carnegie & Gaikwad, 2022), support for free trade (Naoi & Kume, 2015), jay c. kao

16  encyclopedia of asian politics restrictions on FDI (Chilton et al., 2020), and sector-specific trade protection (Lü et  al., 2012). One article utilizing a field experiment explains why some foreign-invested firms in Vietnam are willing to improve labor standards (Malesky & Mosley, 2018). Several articles contain international relations components in their analysis. Incerti et al. (2021) use paired experiments in China and Japan to explore political parties as a pathway through which regime types affect international conflicts. Tago and Ikeda (2015) show that foreign public support for US military action varies depending on whether the action has UN Security Council approval. Kitagawa and Chu (2021) study the impact of political apologies on domestic and foreign public opinions. Gruffydd-Jones (2019) evaluates the reactions of Chinese citizens to external human rights pressure. Second, some articles focus on public opinions during wartime. Utilizing an endorsement experiment, Lyall et  al. (2013) show that civilian attitudes toward combatants are conditional on whether the combatants are ingroups or outgroups. In another field experiment, Lyall et al. (2020) find that the “hearts and minds” interventions do not influence civilian attitudes toward combatants, though they improve recipients’ livelihoods. Kao and Revkin (2023) report that people’s attitudes toward enemy collaborators in post-conflict societies are driven by the perceived volition behind the act of collaboration. Hanson (2021) uses a conjoint experiment to study factors that may differentially affect the joining decision of likely rebel recruits. Third, three articles in the sample contribute to the literature on Get-Out-the-Vote by focusing on non-US cases and, in two of the articles, marginalized voters. Cheema et  al. (2023) find that a non-partisan GOTV campaign has no impact on women’s turnout in Pakistan, but turnout significantly increases when male household members are canvassed to support women’s political participation. Gaikwad and Nellis (2021) randomize doorto-door drives to facilitate voter registration among internal migrants in India. They find that the intervention improves migrant registration rates. The rates are further boosted in randomly chosen areas where local politicians are informed about the drive. In a turnout field experiment in South Korea, Hur (2020) finds that an appeal to national obligation successfully increases people’s turnout, suggesting jay c. kao

that national identity could motivate people’s compliance with citizen duty. Fourth, some work looks at specific mechanisms that can shape people’s opinions and preferences. Davies (2023) examines the long-term impact of private education on people’s economic beliefs and political participation. Healy et al. (2017) utilize a priming experiment to test Tocqueville’s thesis that declining economic well-being and an increase in social-wide mobility may enhance people’s political discontent. Tsai et al. (2022) use a novel experiment for mediation analysis embedded in conjoint design to show that anti-corruption builds public support for the officials carrying it out by signaling the officials’ competence and moral commitment. Mattingly (2016) finds that Chinese villagers are more likely to have confidence in statements about property-taking from lineage leaders than from other villagers or village officials, indicating that informal institutions may empower local elites to capture rents. Williamson et al. (2023) use paired conjoint experiments in multiple countries, finding that preachers connected to political positions or movements are viewed as less religiously authoritative.

C. Future research This article has reviewed the recent cumulation of evidence from experiments that focus on Asian politics, highlighting the increasing use of experiments in high-quality research on the topic. The literature shows a growing trend in the use of non-traditional designs and non-traditional subject pools, consistent with Druckman and Green’s (2021) observations on the recent development of experimental work in social sciences. Additionally, the experimental studies reviewed in this article have contributed to the broader literature on identity politics, authoritarian politics, political information, and political behavior/ attitudes. In conclusion, two directions for future scholars intending to use experiments to understand (Asian) politics are discussed. First, with the growing concern about the generalizability of experimental studies, scholars can contribute to the disciplinewide discussion by conducting paired, multicountry experiments that involve Asian cases. When experimental evidence in most fields is primarily from the US and other Western

experiments  17 democracies, Asian countries provide researchers with a unique and potentially different context to evaluate the generalizability of their experimental results. So far, multicountry experiments are still rare.4 Likewise, Asia scholars using experiments should explicitly discuss external validity in the main text of their papers. Second, the latest advances in experimental methodology include new statistical tools for evaluating treatment effect heterogeneity and causal mechanisms. Although most literature reviewed here intends to evaluate subgroup differences in treatment effect and potential causal roles of mediators in their main text, few exploit these new methods for more rigorous analysis. It is also worth noting that Asian scholars are making the leading contribution to the development of these new statistical methods in experimental studies, particularly in conjoint analysis (e.g., Horiuchi et al., 2022), causal mediation analysis (Imai et al., 2010), and causal interaction in factorial experiments (Egami & Imai, 2019). Future Asia scholars should consider these methods when designing their experiments. Jay C. Kao

Notes 1.

I follow the United Nations Geoscheme to determine whether a country belongs to Asia. See https://unstats​ .un ​ .org ​ / unsd ​ / methodology​ / m49/ (last accessed December 2, 2022). 2. https://doi​.org​/10​.7910​/ DVN​/ XEMUM3. 3. The numbers do not round up to 100 because some articles utilize more than one experimental method. 4. Content analysis by Druckman and Green (2021) finds only 5% in the most recent decade.

References Aytaç, S. E. (2021). Effectiveness of Incumbent’s Strategic Communication During Economic Crisis Under Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence From Turkey. American Political Science Review, 115 (4), 1517–23. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0003055421000587. Badrinathan, S. (2021). Educative Interventions to Combat Misinformation: Evidence From a Field Experiment in India. American Political Science Review, 115 (4), 1325–41. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0003055421000459. Barnett, C., Jamal, A. A. and Monroe, S. L. (2021). Earned Income and Women’s

Segmented Empowerment: Experimental Evidence From Jordan. American Journal of Political Science, 65 (4), 954–70. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1111​/ajps​.12561. Bloom, P. B., Arikan, G. and Courtemanche, M. (2015). Religious Social Identity, Religious Belief, and Anti-Immigration Sentiment. American Political Science Review, 109 (2), 203–21. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1017​/S0003055415000143. Carnegie, A. and Gaikwad, N. (2022). Public Opinion on Geopolitics and Trade: Theory and Evidence. World Politics, 74 (2), 167–204. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0043887121000265. Chauchard, S. (2016). Unpacking Ethnic Preferences: Theory and Micro-Level Evidence From North India. Comparative Political Studies, 49 (2), 253–84. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1177​/0010414015609356. Chaudhuri, A., Iversen, V., Jensenius, F. R. and Pushkar Maitra, P. (2022). Time in Office and the Changing Gender Gap in Dishonesty: Evidence From Local Politics in India. American Journal of Political Science. 2022. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/ajps​ .12733. Cheema, A., Khan, S., Liaqat, A. and Mohmand, S. A. (2023). Canvassing the Gatekeepers: A Field Experiment to Increase Women Voters’ Turnout in Pakistan. American Political Science Review, 117 (1), 1–21. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1017​/S0003055422000375. Chilton, A. S., Milner, H. V. and Tingley, D. (2020). Reciprocity and Public Opposition to Foreign Direct Investment. British Journal of Political Science, 50 (1), 129–53. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1017​/S0007123417000552. Condra, L. N. and Linardi, S. (2019). Casual Contact and Ethnic Bias: Experimental Evidence From Afghanistan. Journal of Politics, 81 (3), 1028–42. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1086​/703380. Davies, E. (2023). The Lessons Private Schools Teach: Using a Field Experiment to Understand the Effects of Private Services on Political Behavior. Comparative Political Studies, 56 (6): 824–61. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1177​/00104140221115178. Dietrich, S., Mahmud, M. and Winters, M. S. (2018). Foreign Aid, Foreign Policy, and Domestic Government Legitimacy: Experimental Evidence From Bangladesh. Journal of Politics, 80 (1), 133–48. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1086​/694235. jay c. kao

18  encyclopedia of asian politics Druckman, J. N. and Green, D. P. (2021). A New Era of Experimental Political Science. In D. P. Green and J. N. Druckman (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Political Science (pp. 1–16). Cambridge University Press. Dunning, T. and Nilekani, J. (2013). Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils. American Political Science Review, 107 (1), 35–56. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1017​/S0003055412000573. Egami, N. and Imai, K. (2019). Causal Interaction in Factorial Experiments: Application to Conjoint Analysis. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 114 (526), 529–40. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​ /01621459​.2018​.1476246. Elçi, E. (2022). Politics of Nostalgia and Populism: Evidence From Turkey. British Journal of Political Science, 52 (2), 697–714. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0007123420000666. Enos, R. D. and Gidron, N. (2016). Intergroup Behavioral Strategies as Contextually Determined: Experimental Evidence From Israel. Journal of Politics, 78 (3), 851–67. https://doi​.org​/10​.1086​/685545. Enos, R. D. and Gidron, N. (2018). Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies: Experimental Evidence From Israel. American Political Science Review, 112 (4), 742–57. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0003055418000266. Gaikwad, N. and Nellis, G. (2021). Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants: Theory and Experimental Evidence from India. American Political Science Review, 115 (4), 1129–46. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1017​/S0003055421000435. Gruffydd-Jones, J. J. (2019). Citizens and Condemnation: Strategic Uses of International Human Rights Pressure in Authoritarian States. Comparative Political Studies, 52 (4), 579–612. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1177​/0010414018784066. Hanson, K. (2021) Good Times and Bad Apples: Rebel Recruitment in Crackdown and Truce. American Journal of Political Science, 65 (4), 807–25. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1111​/ajps​.12555. Healy, A., Kosec, K. and Mo, C. H. (2017). Economic Development, Mobility, and Political Discontent: An Experimental Test of Tocqueville’s Thesis in Pakistan. American Political Science Review, jay c. kao

111 (3), 605–21. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S000305541700017X. Hicken, A., Aspinall, E., Weiss, M. L. and Muhtadi, B. (2022). Buying Brokers: Electoral Handouts Beyond Clientelism in a Weak-Party State. World Politics, 74 (1), 77–120. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0043887121000216. Horiuchi, Y., Markovich, Z. and Yamamoto, T. (2022). Does Conjoint Analysis Mitigate Social Desirability Bias? Political Analysis, 30 (4), 535–49. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/pan​ .2021​.30. Huang, H. (2015). International Knowledge and Domestic Evaluations in a Changing Society: The Case of China. American Political Science Review, 109 (3), 613–34. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S000305541500026X. Huang, H. (2017). A War of (Mis) Information: The Political Effects of Rumors and Rumor Rebuttals in an Authoritarian Country. British Journal of Political Science, 47 (2), 283–311. Huang, H. (2018). The Pathology of Hard Propaganda. Journal of Politics, 80 (3), 1034–38. Huang, H. and Yeh, Y. (2019). Information From Abroad: Foreign Media, Selective Exposure and Political Support in China. British Journal of Political Science, 49 (2), 611–36. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0007123416000739. Hur, A. (2020). Citizen Duty and the Ethical Power of Communities: Mixed-Method Evidence From East Asia. British Journal of Political Science, 50 (3), 1047–65. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1017​/S0007123418000066. Imai, K., Keele, L. and Tingley, D. (2010). A General Approach to Causal Mediation Analysis. Psychological Methods, 15 (4), 309–34. https://doi​.org​/10​.1037​/a0020761. Incerti, T., Mattingly, D., Rosenbluth, F., Tanaka, S. and Yue, J. (2021). Hawkish Partisans: How Political Parties Shape Nationalist Conflicts in China and Japan. British Journal of Political Science, 51 (4), 1494–515. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0007123420000095. Kao, K. and Revkin, M. R. (2023). Retribution or Reconciliation? Post-Conflict Attitudes Toward Enemy Collaborators. American Journal of Political Science, 67 (2), 358– 73. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/ajps​.12673. Kitagawa, R. and Chu, J. A. (2021). The Impact of Political Apologies on Public Opinion.

experiments  19 World Politics, 73 (3), 441–81. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1017​/S0043887121000083. Lü, X., Scheve, K. and Slaughter, M. J. (2012). Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection. American Journal of Political Science, 56 (3), 638– 54. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​.1540​-5907​ .2012​.00589​.x. Lyall, J., Blair, G. and Imai, K. (2013). Explaining Support for Combatants During Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan. American Political Science Review, 107 (4), 679–705. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1017​/S0003055413000403. Lyall, J., Zhou, Y. and Imai, K. (2020). Can Economic Assistance Shape Combatant Support in Wartime? Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan. American Political Science Review, 114 (1), 126–43. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0003055419000698. Malesky, E. and Taussig, M. (2019). Participation, Government Legitimacy, and Regulatory Compliance in Emerging Economies: A Firm-Level Field Experiment in Vietnam. American Political Science Review, 113 (2), 530–51. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1017​/S0003055418000849. Malesky, E. J. and Mosley, L. (2018). Chains of Love? Global Production and the Firm-Level Diffusion of Labor Standards. American Journal of Political Science, 62 (3), 712–28. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/ajps​.12370. Malesky, E. J., Todd, J. D. and Tran, A. (2023). Can Elections Motivate Responsiveness in a Single-Party Regime? Experimental Evidence From Vietnam. American Political Science Review, 117 (2), 497–517. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0003055422000879. Mattingly, D. C. (2016). Elite Capture: How Decentralization and Informal Institutions Weaken Property Rights in China. World Politics, 68 (3), 383–412. Mcmurry, N. (2022). From Recognition to Integration: Indigenous Autonomy, State Authority, and National Identity in the Philippines. American Political Science Review, 116 (2), 547–63. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1017​/S0003055421001039. Meng, T., Pan, J. and Yang, P. (2017). Conditional Receptivity to Citizen Participation: Evidence From a Survey Experiment in China. Comparative Political Studies, 50 (4), 399–433. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1177​/0010414014556212.

Naoi, M. and Kume, I. (2015). Workers or Consumers? A Survey Experiment on the Duality of Citizens’ Interests in the Politics of Trade. Comparative Political Studies, 48 (10), 1293–317. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /0010414015574879. Siegel, A. A. and Badaan, V. (2020). #No2Sectarianism: Experimental Approaches to Reducing Sectarian Hate Speech Online. American Political Science Review, 114 (3), 837–55. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1017​/S0003055420000283. Tago, A. and Ikeda, M. (2015). An ‘A’ for Effort: Experimental Evidence on UN Security Council Engagement and Support for US Military Action in Japan. British Journal of Political Science, 45 (2), 391–410. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0007123413000343. Truex, R. (2017). Consultative Authoritarianism and Its Limits. Comparative Political Studies, 50 (3), 329–61. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1177​/0010414014534196. Tsai, L. L., Trinh, M. and Liu, S. (2022). What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-Level Evidence From China. Journal of Politics, 84 (1), 602–6. https://doi​.org​/10​.1086​/715252. Wang, C. and Huang, H. (2021). When ‘Fake News’ Becomes Real: The Consequences of False Government Denials in an Authoritarian Country. Comparative Political Studies, 54 (5), 753–78. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1177​/0010414020957672. Williamson, S., Yildirim, A. K., Grewal, S. and Kuenkler, M. (2023). Preaching Politics: How Politicization Undermines Religious Authority in the Middle East. British Journal of Political Science, 53 (2), 555–74. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S000712342200028X.

Key resources For readers who want to know more about experimental political science (in Asian politics): Broockman, D. E., Kalla, J. L. and Sekhon, S. K. (2017). The Design of Field Experiments With Survey Outcomes: A Framework for Selecting More Efficient, Robust, and Ethical Designs. Political Analysis, 25 (4), 435–64. Druckman, J. N. and Green, P. D. (Eds.). (2021). Advances in Experimental Political Science. Cambridge University Press. jay c. kao

20  encyclopedia of asian politics Gerber, A. S. and Green, D. P. (2012). Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation. W. W. Norton & Company. Glennerster, R. and Takavarasha, K. (2013). Running Randomized Evaluations: A Practical Guide. Running Randomized Evaluations. Princeton University Press.

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Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J. and Yamamoto, T. (2014). Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments. Political Analysis, 22 (1), 1–30. Mutz, D. C. (2011). Population-Based Survey Experiments. Princeton University Press.

4. Game theory

non-cooperative game’s key is to identify a self-enforcing decision and find a condition of the self-enforcing agreement. Game theorists should define clearly what the players want (i.e., interests), what constraints they have (i.e., institutions), and what options they have to interact (i.e., interactions) and use them to explain the choices of the players and outcomes that the choices collectively lead to.1 Following the positivist and rationalist research tradition, game theory provides a better analytical tool than other approaches for those:

A. The concept Game theory uses mathematical tools to analyze players’ strategic interactions, attempting to understand a player’s action as the best response to others’ actions. The players include voters, politicians, interest groups, parties, or states, all of which can be considered units of analysis. Voters want to elect a politician closest to their ideal points, politicians are office-seeking, interest groups want to affect government policy to accomplish their causes, political parties contend with advancing their ideals by forming governments, and states want to survive and prosper. The players are assumed to be rational instrumentally, i.e., the players make a rational choice whenever possible to attain their goals. As Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) imply, it is assumed that players know their own choices, have expectations regarding unknowns, and select their behaviors through careful consideration of best responses. These micro-level premises of instrumental rationality may seem too atomistic, but they can lead deductively to an outcome that is sometimes mutually beneficial and cooperative. Game theory is divided broadly into cooperative and non-cooperative games. While the two games are similar in that players seek to maximize their utilities by reaching their most preferred outcome, their basic assumption is different. On the one hand, cooperative game theory focuses on identifying a condition in which players can form a coalition to reach a binding agreement. An interesting question arises in this game on distributing the binding agreement’s collective payoff. On the other hand, non-cooperative game theory models a situation in which players cannot reach a binding agreement, as in the example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. A player decides whether or not to honor the agreement given the other players’ behavioral plans and given which choice would make him or her better off. For example, many non-democratic states signed and ratified human rights treaties knowing that the treaties would restrain their domestic political autonomy. Simultaneously, given that there is no effective monitoring and enforcement in the international treaty of human rights, we can say that it is a selfenforcing decision by the states. Here, the

1. Who are interested in understanding the strategic interdependence of players. 2. Who seek to provide general and causal explanations of a complex situation in politics. 3. Who want to study underlying concepts that are difficult to be measured directly from observational data. First, game theory can shed light on examining how players move strategically. When players choose strategically, they consider the likely responses of other players. The player will not be able to gain the objectives by acting naively. An implication is that strategic interdependence makes not all players achieve what they prefer the most. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is an excellent example that rational and strategic players end up defecting, resulting in an outcome that is collectively worse off. The security dilemma is a security application of the PD, in which both states that prefer the status quo to war end up in a “spiral of hostility.” Moreover, speeches of state leaders or official documents of political parties such as Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address in 2018 or Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China are often already a product of strategic consideration. Thus, it would be naive to accept and explain the content of them as prima facie valid. We can learn from game theory a set of strategic decisions of all players in terms of equilibrium, in which no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate. Suppose strategic interaction is an integral part of how politics works, which should be the case in Asian politics. In that case, game theory can provide a powerful analytical tool to understand why and under what circumstances some choices and outcomes occur in equilibrium. 21

22  encyclopedia of asian politics Second, game theory can contribute to establishing a causal mechanism that is deductively and logically driven from simple assumptions that players make a rational decision to gain their best possible objectives. In particular, the Nash equilibrium concept is used as a solution of the game in most cases to express a set of action plans in which no player can gain by changing his or her action.2 In equilibrium, we can generally explain the outcome of strategic interactions and how and why each player is led to such actions. Generalization is possible because proper nouns and time are dropped, thereby distinguishing the game elements, i.e., players, interests, interactions, and constraints, from specific events. Moreover, the way that equilibrium is found shows that game theory helps us understand how strategic interactions play out causally. We assume that the players’ interests are, in principle, independent of situational factors. In doing so, we can avoid ad-hoc explanations of outcomes, in which we select a cause after we observe an outcome. We also avoid a post hoc interpretation of an event, which often happens when there is too much emphasis on event-specific idiosyncrasy. Unless causes specific to the event occur repeatedly, the post hoc interpretation hinders us from predicting what will happen in the future. Given the analytical approach that is both general and causal, we can predict a set of equilibrium choices and outcomes and are better positioned to suggest rigorous and practical policy implications for policymakers. Third, game theory can enhance a refined understanding of concepts not observed directly from data. Examples of such concepts abound, such as credibility, deterrence, signaling, and reputation. Such concepts are not measured directly from actual world observation because they work through belief systems and counterfactuals in the game, which cannot be counted or observed. In particular, when players are uncertain regarding other players’ intentions and capabilities, studying strategic interactions is even more difficult. For a theoretical example, any player with private information can have an incentive to let the opponent player know that he or she is resolved in current matters. The informed player may want to signal such intention via public speeches, official documents, or more costly actions that a weak type of player cannot mimic. taehee whang

The concept of costly and costless signaling can help us understand how these messages are developed and interpreted. A signaling game’s equilibrium can uncover why and under what conditions credible communication works effectively between players. For an empirical example, let me get back to security dilemma that is often attributed as a theoretical mechanism for explaining a hostile relationship between North Korea and the United States over decades. However, the security dilemma concept assumes that both states prefer the status quo to any conflictual outcomes, which may not be the case. Depending on how we take what the two states want, we end up in a very different game. It is important to correctly define an objective function for any player in the game. The correct specification of state interests leads us to consider an alternative concept that is well developed in game theory: the concept of credible commitment (Fearon, 1995, 2017, Powell, 2006). It matters which theoretical mechanism we utilize to understand the states’ interaction because policy implications differ for the peaceful resolution of disputes depending on how we define the problem in the first place.

B. The landscape Game theory has long been applied to many fields, including biology, economics, business, and other social sciences, where strategic interdependence is crucial. In political science, copious literature also exists exploring international relations (Fearon, 1995; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Spaniel, 2019), comparative politics (Przeworski, 1991; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Svolik, 2012), and legislative and electoral politics (Riker, 1982; Cox, 1997; Cho, 2014) that uses game theory. Studying Asian politics will benefit immensely from the game theoretic approach, and it is immediately applicable to various issues and problems in Asian politics. Promising avenues of research include domestic politics (e.g., collective action, principal-agent contract, and bargaining and coalition formation) and international politics (e.g., cooperation and coordination, conflict resolution, and the provision of international public goods). All the examples incorporate a strategic problem into a well-defined model that presents a causal mechanism to conceptualize micro-level interactions.

game theory  23 However, game theoretic models are not widely used in Asian politics. It may be that politics in Asia fit better with historical or constructivist explanations without any coherent strategic interdependence. Studies of Asian politics have tended to focus on explanations based on cultural pervasiveness embedded across regions and countries but without coherent theoretical underpinnings. It would not be plausible to draw a general theoretical mechanism if Asian citizens and states behave so inconsistently that their behaviors cannot be explored systematically using rationality assumptions. If this is the case, all the explanations will be based on idiosyncratic characteristics that belong to a specific time and space. It cannot be denied that interesting research questions may require “soaking and poking” into peculiar details that are not easily deduced from game theoretic models. At the same time, we can conceptualize and analyze Asia’s domestic and international politics using games if citizens and states are influenced by each other’s actions in a mutually interdependent setting. Let me introduce an example of how game theory can help understand Asian politics. Scholars of international relations indicated that there had been few, if any, official interstate organizations that govern security and economic cooperation among Asian states. Many studies use game-theoretic ideas to discuss this issue. The absence of regional organizations in Asia, especially in security since the end of the Cold War, may induce an incorrect inference that there is something other than a rationalist perspective that explains Asian politics better. The Asian way to cooperate, if we have to call it that way, may appear unique, but this is not because Asians behave irrationally or inconsistently. As Mattli (1999) shows in the theory of regional integration using a simple game theoretic analysis, Asia failed to meet both demand and supply-side conditions to develop a formal international organization. Asian states are diverse in their political system (e.g., from personal dictatorship to full-fledged democracy), economic system, and development (e.g., developing socialist economy to developed market economy). It is difficult to find a coherent demand for institutionalizing interstate cooperation as we have witnessed in Europe. The supply-side condition is also not satisfied for Asian states to formally cooperate. There is no undisputed hegemonic leader in

Asia like Germany in Europe, who is willing to provide public goods in stable trade and investment regimes. Thus, Mattli’s game theoretic analysis offers an important mechanism to account for why it is in equilibrium not to have a formal and robust interstate institution in Asia. Asian states do have international security institutions but selected a looser and more flexible route to cooperate. One example is ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Kawasaki (2006) employs an Assurance Game to conceptualize the problem of collective action among Asia-Pacific member states. The result shows that ARF has successfully conducted “efficient information transmission” without imposing too many obligations on the members. It is an optimal form of multilateral cooperation that reflects member states’ interdependent decisions. Note that game theorists have long explored the optimal level of trade-off between breadth and depth in constructing international institutions (Oye, 1986; Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, 1998; Lake & McCubbins, 2006). A “broad” institution with a large membership implies that there is a limit that member states’ behaviors can be monitored and enforced. It is clear that Asian states chose the “weak and loose” ARF for security cooperation not because they lack rational decision-making but because there are 27 member states with heterogeneous preferences, which may restrain states’ capability to enforce costly agreements. Moreover, Asian states did create institutional arrangements in trade and security since the early period of the Ming dynasty based on Chinese hegemony in the region. Previous studies (Kang, 2010; Zhang & Buzan, 2012) regarded medieval Asia’s tributary system as a Confucian hierarchical culture embedded and shared by member states. On the other hand, scholars like Zhou (2011) and Suzuki (2017) make excellent arguments formally that a tributary system was established and managed successfully by the costs and benefits calculus of system membership of neighboring states of China. The state policies under the tributary system were not fixed and have undergone constant shifts and communications depending on state interests. This explanation of the Asian world order that goes back to the 14th century supports a general and causal proposition with a clear microfoundation where the tributary system was a self-enforcing agreement. Furthermore, taehee whang

24  encyclopedia of asian politics no less significantly, it contrasts with the conventional claim that the tributary system was possible because Asian states accepted and internalized Confucian norms and values that China imposed. Now, I turn to other recent studies in international relations and comparative politics in Asia that use a game theoretic approach. As noted earlier, few scholarly works of contemporary Asian politics have applied the game theory. In most studies, scholars use qualitative methods to draw theoretical stories and show their empirical implications. One noticeable exception is the book titled “Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia” which Suzuki and Okada edited in 2017. The edited volume is a collaborative effort to analyze international security and political economy in Asia using game theory. A couple of chapters deal with security issues from international and domestic angles. First, Tago (2017) uses stag-hunt and prisoner’s dilemma games to demonstrate under what conditions a state invokes the individual right of self-defense protected by the United Nations in Article 51. His theoretical findings, which consider both strategic relations between states in disputes and with the hegemonic power state, are applied to India–Pakistan territorial disputes. Second, Kurizaki (2017) uses a signaling game to examine the effect of Japan’s reinterpretation of the constitutional constraint on collective self-defense (CSD) on security. He finds that, unless Japan entirely removes the constitutional constraint, any partial manipulation of CSD will fail to work as a costly signaling device in equilibrium and, hence, reduce the US–Japan alliance’s deterrence capability. Scholars of comparative politics in Asia have also utilized game theoretic models. Hirose and Kurizaki (2019) study competitive authoritarianism, asking how North Korea might have survived for an extended period, while other states with similar authoritarian regimes apparently could not. They employ a two-level game that explores strategic interdependence between external (e.g., US armed intervention) and internal (e.g., civil conflicts) conflicts to investigate the likelihood of political survival of authoritarian regimes. Laver and Kato (2001) conceptualize a dynamic legislative party system similar to the Japanese case. They argue that such a party system is unstable since parties continually conduct fission and fusion. However, once a party taehee whang

passes a specific size threshold, it can persist, as in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Finally, Kim (2011) models the democratization process of South Korea in 1987 to explain seemingly irrational decisions, i.e., (1) the governing party candidate’s decision to allow for a direct presidential election and (2) the opposition party leaders’ coordination failure to unify presidential candidacy. The result was successful democratization but the opposition lost in the presidential election.

C. Future research In sum, game theory can advance understanding of Asian politics by providing rigorous causal mechanisms when strategic interdependence is at the heart of the research question. Such a research question requires a parsimonious conceptualization whereby players’ micro-level interactions and counterfactuals are comprehensively analyzed. The lack of game-theoretic works so far is not because Asian politics lacks such questions but because it has been dominated by qualitative approaches that use cultural and historical explanations focusing on individual cases. Future research on Asia would benefit by incorporating game theory as an approach. It will help in a more comprehensive understanding of the strategic decisions which actors make. Using game theory to examine how actors make strategic decisions both at the international and the domestic level will advance the study of political science in Asia. Taehee Whang

Notes 1. 2.

For examples in international relations, see Frieden et al. (2019). This Nash equilibrium exists for all games with a finite number of players and strategies, as implied by Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem.

References Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. Cho, S. (2014). Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation. American Political Science Review, 108, 281–296. Cox, G. W. (1997). Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. Cambridge University Press.

game theory  25 De Mesquita, B. B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M. and Morrow, J. D. (2005). The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press. Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M. and Barsoom, P. N. (1998). Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. International Organization, 52, 397–419. Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 49, 379. Fearon, J. D. (2017). The Big Problem With the North Koreans Isn’t That We Can’t Trust Them. It’s That They Can’t Trust Us. The Washington Post. Frieden, J. A., Lake, D. A. and Schultz, K. A. (2019). World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions. Norton. Hirose, K. and Kurizaki, S. (2019). The Logic of the Survival of North Korea. Asian Economic Policy Review, 14(2), 287–304. Kang, D. C. (2010). East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute. Columbia University Press. Kawasaki, T. (2006). Neither Skepticism Nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a Solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game. Pacific Review, 19(2), 219–237. Kim, H. (2011). Korean Democracy in Transition: A Rational Blueprint for Developing Societies. University Press of Kentucky. Kurizaki S. (2017). Signaling Game of Collective Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In M. Suzuki and A. Okada (Eds.), Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia. Springer. Lake, D. A. and McCubbins, M. D. (2006). The Logic of Delegation to International Organizations. In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (pp. 341– 368). Cambridge University Press. Laver, M. and Kato, J. (2001). Dynamic Approaches to Government Formation and the Generic Instability of Decisive Structures in Japan. Electoral Studies, 20(4), 509–527. Mattli, W. (1999). The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. Cambridge University Press.

Osborne, M. J. and Rubinstein, A. (1994). A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press. Oye, K. A. (1986). Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton University Press. Powell, R. (2006). War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization, 60, 169–203. Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge University Press. Riker, W. H. (1982). Liberalism Against Populism. WH Freeman. Spaniel, W. (2019). Bargaining Over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations. Cambridge University Press. Suzuki, M. and Okada, A. (Eds.). (2017). Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia. Springer. Svolik, M. W. (2012). The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press. Zhang, Y. and Buzan, B. (2012). The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice. Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(1), 3–36. Zhou, F. (2011). Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System. Chinese Journal of International Politics, 4(2), 147–178.

Key resources In Asia Morrow, J. D. (1994). Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton University Press. Kawasaki, T. (2006). Neither Skepticism Nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a Solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game. Pacific Review, 19(2), 219–237. Laver, M. and Kato, J. (2001). Dynamic Approaches to Government Formation and the Generic Instability of Decisive Structures in Japan. Electoral Studies, 20(4), 509–527. Suzuki, M. and Okada, A. (Eds.). (2017). Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia. Springer.

taehee whang

5. Institutions and institutionalism

set aside to spotlight the preferences of selfinterested and utility-maximizing individuals. Reactions to the microscopic focus of Rational Choice gave way to Rational Choice Institutionalists (RCI), which brought back institutions into the picture by arguing that they bracket individual preferences through inducements. Institutions for them are structural features of society, economy, or the state that give rise to patterned or predictable interactions among actors (Peters, 2019, p. 23; Jönsson & Talleberg, 2008, p. 110). In this reckoning, behavior is more important rather than the processes behind institutional effects. Institutions matter for RCI as they provide possibilities for cooperation. Institutions are defined as patterned relations that reduce transaction costs and provide information which then reduces uncertainties pushing actors to pursue more cooperative rather than conflicting behavior (Djelic, 2010, p. 25). In this perspective, institutions are like a web of interdependent relationships between states or a particular type of order, e.g., hierarchic, hegemonic, multipolar interdependency which affects state behavior in the international scene. For instance, underpinning a hegemonic order is the military power of the hegemon to enforce. Another variant is liberal institutionalism which puts value on the power of legitimacy in explaining cooperative behavior. In this lens, it is not hegemonic power per se that is key to international stability but the domestic norms of the hegemon that it carries over into global institutions it designs. This version embeds liberalism in international institutions by arguing that openness, inclusivity, and the binding nature of bilateral and multilateral institutions created by US hegemony reflect its democratic identity. Historical Institutionalism (HI) focuses on institutions as variables (as opposed to just context) that influence political outcomes (Thelen, 2003). HI emphasizes the historicity of institutions and the importance of historical legacies in constraining and restraining individual or organizational options and choices (Fioretos, 2011, p. 370). For HI, institutions have backstories of political competition hidden in their evolution. Because institutions fashion winners and losers, actors compete in creating and modifying institutions to their favor. Given this, institutional configuration and reconfiguration is a very political process.

A. The concept Institutions are central to the study of politics. They are commonly held rules, procedures, understanding, and practices that impinge on the actor’s behavior (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727; Jackson, 2017, p. 260). The definition has cognitive and material dimensions. The cognitive dimension focuses on how these rules and procedures reflect underlying ideas, beliefs, and norms, while the material dimension points to external structures that frame social interactions and power relations (Djelic, 2010, p. 33; Scott, 2004, p. 9). Institutions are normative frames or ideational templates with built-in meaning and imbue a sense of identity for a community or collective. They help actors make sense of or interpret the world. Structures could also be guidelines that exist in the broader environment and reflect underlying material conditions such as power or wealth inequities (Fioretos, 2011, p. 372). Institutions can be formal or informal, depending on whether their creation, communication, or enforcement go through sanctioned channels or not (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). The rules and procedures in state institutions or any kind of organization, e.g., business or interest groups, would be formal. The processes of designing institutions and how they are disseminated and appropriated are political because they confer built-in advantages or disadvantages to actor-players (Beeson, 2014). As such, institutions and how they are altered are subject to coordination or contestation (Jackson, 2017, p. 260) Early political science focused on formal institutions emanating from government structures (i.e., legislature, courts, bureaucracies) and how these differ in distinct constitutional setups (i.e., parliamentary, presidential, unitarian, federal). Politics was seen as resulting from these organizations and legal design (Peters, 2019, p. 15). Following the behavioral revolution in the 1940s, there was a shift away from these formal institutions to politics in practice at the individual level. Institutions faded into the background because they do not directly affect individual political behavior. Under Rational Choice theory which held sway in the discipline, institutions were 26

institutions and institutionalism  27 Institutions provide constraints and opportunities in that once they are established, they create lasting legacies. HI emphasizes the temporality and sequence in institutional evolution. Path-dependent mechanisms limit the range of realizable political outcomes. Once a choice has been made on an institutional design, commitments are locked in making it difficult to stray from the logic that was set in motion. Positive feedback and reinforcement of these rules create further straitjackets. Historical institutionalism assumes institutional change to be gradual and pushed by a critical historical juncture, which allows for these patterns to be reproduced. Baked-in inequality in institutional design is not subject to negotiation (Richardson, 2008, p. 7). Institutions tend towards stability; change occurs when a crisis happens but after which stasis sets in again (Thelen, 2003). Institutions change incrementally through layering (new rules are introduced alongside old ones), displacement (removal of old and replacement with new rules), drift (changed impact of current rules), and conversion (changed manner of using the rules) (Fioretos, 2011, p. 377; Djelic, 2010, p. 25). There is also New Institutionalism (NI) which focuses on minute processes of preference formation via institutions, highlighting complex ways such as bricolage (recombination of different institutional sets) and reinvention (revival and reinterpretation of institutions previously taken out) (Scott, 2014, p. 10; Djelic, 2010, p. 25). Constructivism (also called social constructivism) and Discursive Institutionalism are approaches that examine the processes by which institutions as ideas are constructed and popularized (Fioretos, 2011, p. 374). Discursive Institutionalism focuses on the communication, coordination, and consensus formation around an idea through deployed language or narratives. Constructivism looks at meaning-making and brings attention to the power of ideas and how these are communicated. Rather than simply categorizing rules and norms, social constructivism looks at how these ideas are transmitted, transposed or upheld. Underlying the articulation and acceptance of particular discourse or ideas are distinct power relations. In this manner, agency is brought back by treating the individual not as passive vessels of institutional logic. Inquiring as to who holds the norms and who upholds them also opens up discussion

on the dynamics of contestation. There are challengers, disruptors, and entrepreneurs out there motivated to change institutions. While there is agreement among political science approaches that institutions matter, they employ varying definitions of an institution on the basis of scope (what it covers) and its function as a variable. Unlike RCI and liberal institutionalism, which looks at institutions from a macro perspective, HI considers meso or intermediate-level institutions at the domestic level, e.g., party system and structure of economic organizations, as more relevant. Rational Choice treats institutions as a contextual variable that moderates individual preferences or choices. They make possible cooperative behavior because they provide inducements in the form of more information and reduced transaction costs. HI and other institutionalism variants view institutions as both independent and dependent variables (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 46). New Institutionalists, constructivists, and discursive institutionalists emphasize normative aspects, e.g., norms, values, and their appropriation (shorthand symbols used to convey meanings) behind the creation of and changes in institutions (as independent variables). These cognitive frames in turn explain different political outcomes. In international relations, they are called rules of the game which in themselves are products of deliberate efforts of state and transnational actors. In turn, states are socialized into accepting these norms, values, and perceptions. In comparative politics, state (domestic) institutions are embedded in wider social constructs. How state and non-state agents interact is guided and constrained by these accepted conventions. Economic policies are negotiated and renegotiated within this institutional setting (Schmidt, 2009, p. 516). Studies on Asian institutions within international relations differentiate between the structural and normative elements. The first type looks at the security order that structures relationships among countries in the region and those external to it. This security architecture is characterized as hierarchical between those greater and lesser powers, which affects the extent of agency Asian countries are able to exert. In this context, the rules of the game are centered on the US, which created them post–World War II and for which Asian countries have no choice but to balance, i.e., organize to match the great power, or bandwagon, rosalie arcala hall

28  encyclopedia of asian politics i.e., acquiesce for gain. The long peace in the region is attributed to the stability afforded by the US’s uncontested position. Beyond the binary of balancing and bandwagoning, Asian countries’ reaction to the US is also characterized in other ways such as “flexible engagement” (Acharya, 2004), soft balancing (important to the process of great power negotiations and bargains) (Goh, 2011), hedging (risk avoidance), or binding (enmeshing the US into webs of economic and security interdependencies that increase the cost of using force in the region). This perspective downplays the role of lesser powers in normbuilding but admits to their ability to affect the process in which greater powers engage in strategic bargaining. In this formulation, regional institutions like ASEAN play a role in managing regional security but not as much as external great powers like US and China. There is another branch of studies on Asian institutions that focus on the economic growth patterns of Japan, the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) of South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, and more recently China and India. In this type of study, the focus is on state institutions – bureaucracy, courts, legislature, and the extent to which they are autonomous from societal forces (Beeson, 2014, p. 8). The developmental state or sustained government interventions into the economy were more important factors behind these countries’ phenomenal growth, rather than the international capitalist order that provided stable financial conditions. Domestic institutions, such as Japan’s iron triangle between business, politicians, and powerful planning agencies; strong bureaucracies that guided long-term industrial planning in South Korea and Taiwan; and authoritarian governments that suppressed distributional pressures from labor were argued as key factors (Haggard, 2004, p. 56). Asian economic relations put value on micro-domestic-level institutions including legal systems, property rights, and publicly available information which are guaranteed by the state and therefore allow for the kind of credibility, commitment, and orderly contracting that business and other economic groups need to thrive (Haggard, 2004, pp. 58, 74). But the same institutional patterns that led to phenomenal growth also were the reason behind the Asian financial crisis in 1998. Institutional weakness in regulating the financial sector and private sector aggrandizement were seen as the culprits. rosalie arcala hall

State bureaucratic arrangements and how they are autonomous of or wedded to private sector interests produce distinct economic policies. Capitalism as practiced in Asia exhibits different patterns due in large part to the nature of bureaucratic institutions and the political arrangements that frame the state–business interface (Beeson, 2014). Governments have various ways of bringing in these private sector interests – state-led, state-coordinated, or state-free (hands-off). In turn, business groups have varying degrees of mobilizational competencies and political power within these institutional settings. Rather than the model of states regulating or leading (which applies to East Asian cases), Hutchcroft’s concept of patrimonial-administrative and patrimonial-oligarchic states in Southeast Asia point to the degrees to which private sector interest has held the state apparatus captive through rent-seeking and election strategies.

B. The landscape In the area of institutionalism in international relations, the rise of China introduces instability to the regional order as it seeks to supplant US-centered rules of the game. While hierarchy as a feature remains, scholars impute that Asian relations have been shaped by shared norms and rules around China’s superiority from select periods of the Ming and Qing dynasties (Kang, 2003/2004, p. 176). Underpinning this accommodation of China are the relative autonomy of the client tributepaying kingdom and the relative stability and peace during these periods. Norms such tianxia (all under heaven) and the Indian-Sanskrit notion of mandala are cited to capture these distinctively Asian mental maps of international relations (Johnston, 2012). Another perspective locates the center of the regional security order to ASEAN and ASEAN-centered structures which feature the leadership of countries within the region (rather than without). Following constructivism, structures are said to reflect the shared norms of ASEAN countries such as nonintervention, inclusivity, and non-use of force in settling disputes (Acharya, 2009). The socalled ASEAN Way has come to provide a sense of regional identity for member-states (He, 2014, p. 1871). Acharya (2004, p. 159) defines this normative handle as a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors within a

institutions and institutionalism  29 given identity.” Not only is the ASEAN Way embodied within these regional architectures, but external partners have also been socialized into the ASEAN Way as evident in their participation in dialogue platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Plus Three (Yong, 2013; He, 2014). In this formulation, ASEAN takes the driver’s seat and mitigates the security rivalry between the US and China. In turn, socialization of the ASEAN Way amongst members shapes their assessment of China and the US. Institutions are defined as a series of strategic interactions between the weaker ASEAN and the powerful US and China within this normative frame. There are various perspectives about ASEAN changing as an institution. For Acharya (2004, p. 159), ASEAN’s evolution as a bureaucratic structure was path dependent. From its genesis in the 1955 Bandung conference to the formation of the ARF and ASEAN Plus Three, the principle of noninterference has locked the organization to a conservative stance and away from the diminution of prized sovereignty. It could not therefore become a thick institution like the EU because of normative constraints at inception. Nabers (2003) states that institutionbuilding through norm formation occurred as a result of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. But adopting a social constructivist viewpoint, he argues that sustained social interactions by ASEAN diplomats through communicative processes within the organization created a new collective identity and interest that transcended the national interest alone (Yong, 2013, p. 293). The creation of the ARF and ASEAN Plus Three are proofs of the institutionalization of collective security as an idea. Using historical institutionalism as a lens, Komori (2009) pinpoints the Asian financial crisis as an external event which precipitated a critical juncture for institutional development at the regional level. The legitimacy of external institutions was subsequently questioned, leading to institutional “layering” in the case of ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asian Summit. Network activities and policy discussions on economic cooperation (not on security per se) in more global settings expanded the issue coverage and priorities of these regional formations. The importance of the socialization process, i.e., the adoption of ASEAN modalities of consensus-based decision-making in the Asian Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC) is seen as proof of institutionalization. There is merit in the functionality of ASEAN as an information clearinghouse; by providing a discussion of pressing issues on the sidelines, it facilitates information exchange (He, 2014, p. 1187). Nair (2009, p. 114), however, argues that as a regional institution, ASEAN could not elevate its functionality beyond confidence building to include the resolution of security conflicts because elite aspirations are not rooted. There is a gap between regional elites who imagine a shared community in ASEAN and nonelites who do not. He also questions whether elites themselves share a level of acceptance of the functional and normative aspects of ASEAN or the value imputed in bilateral relations with the US. For Yong (2013), ASEAN is but a regional arrangement, a loose coalition brought together by US power and therefore a marginal player in decisions of Asian states to balance or bandwagon in the face of ascendant China. Asian international relations scholarship is replete with attributions of shared norms, common perceptions, and cultural identity shaping individual state behavior. Constructivists like Acharya (2009) argue that ASEAN’s dialogue and consultations socialized members into the ASEAN Way, which enabled members to see each other as friends and therefore mitigate conflict between them despite outstanding territorial issues. Using historical institutionalism, Ba (2009) traces ASEAN’s identity formation to various consensus points in debates on how regionalism can be attained. In her reckoning, agreements on national self-determination and inclusivity informed ASEAN’s later stance not to rely on outside leadership for its own security concerns. For Ryu (2012), it is the localization of these largely elite norms, i.e., the adoption of regional identity anchors by Southeast Asian politicians, domestic interest groups, academics, and think tanks that matters. Other scholars downplay the impact of ASEAN norms, citing that they are more aspirational rhetoric rather than routinized, as exemplified by its failure to bring China to behave accordingly with respect to the South China Sea dispute (Johnston, 2012, p. 64; Beeson, 2017, p. 526). At the domestic level, interests in Asian economic trajectories have also directed attention to ideas of how economic growth is achieved. Economic policies are seen as outcomes of political contestation between rosalie arcala hall

30  encyclopedia of asian politics competing interests of big or small businesses, labor groups, and banks. Analyzing Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia’s response to globalization, Al-Fadhat (2020, p. 178) argues that transnational capitalists within these countries which have a vested interest in further financial liberalization were able to leverage their political weight to protect and further amass wealth. Using discursive institutionalism, Schmidt (2009) argues that the East Asian states provide frames that produce and reproduce the political stances of actors, as seen in the ideas of what constitutes public interests behind economic policies. How coalitions of actors supporting an idea deploy discourse to persuade further illustrates this tendency. For Beeson (2014, p. 19), institutions encapsulate certain ideas. For instance, neoliberal economic policies by Asian states suggest an underlying consensus between elites on the government and business sides favoring it. Following the 1998 Asian financial crisis, there has also been a recognition of the economic interdependencies of Asian economies that lend vulnerabilities as well as opportunities for growth. The overarching structure of globalization renders Asian states vulnerable, for which some kind of insurance is needed beyond help available from IMF. The Asian financial crisis pushed Asian countries to craft arrangements such as the Chang-Mai initiative for currency swaps and similar coordinated institutional linkages for investment, sans and sometimes amidst opposition from the US. The Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, and the Lancan-Mekong Cooperation are seen as balancing strategies by China in the region but largely seen as ineffectual as Asian countries themselves are divided over the risk China poses and for which the idea of China-centric regional hegemony has weak legitimacy (Po & Primiano, 2021; Acharya, 2014, p. 165). Nevertheless, recent scholarship acknowledges the importance of China to the economies of many Asian countries, for which China is a major if not the principal trading partner and investment source.

C. Future research Institution-focused inquiries within international security studies tended to bifurcate between those looking at cases in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, not inclusive of rosalie arcala hall

South Asia. Structuration on account of shared Confucian culture or state capacities tends to cluster Northeast Asian states together while those looking at Southeast Asia focus more on the institutionalizing effects of ASEAN. The definition of what comprises Asian institutions is challenging given the diversity in political regimes and cultural systems of countries in the region. The predominance of bilateral links between Asian states and great powers, e.g., the US and China, also tends to divide the region in terms of degrees of political and economic interdependencies with these two. There is no singular Asian institution as a locus of study but a plurality. That said, substantial gaps remain in studies that establish what is commonly shared by way of rules and patterns, perhaps drawing more from decolonization residuals. While the importance of a normative basis of state interactions has gained traction in scholarship surrounding Asian institutions dealing with security, there is a paucity of studies empirically establishing the rootedness of these regional institutional frames among political elites (as opposed to diplomatic elites who attend consultations and meetings). As foreign policy architects, political elites answer in one way or form to their domestic publics and operate on different logics. To impute that regional institutions have a bearing on state action is to put more weight on these meta-state norms over more proximate domestic rules that inform decisionmaking by politicians. State actions at the end of the day are decided by politicians, not by diplomats. States also have varying levels of receptiveness to public opinion, which could convey differing perceptions or attitudes toward foreign government intent. A disconnect or alignment, for instance, in elite and public perception of China and the US across Asia could reveal underlying mechanisms. Studies on institutionalism in the policy area of security have not benefited from the application of state institutional frames as sites of political struggle by competing groups or as emblematic of entrenched ideas by relevant security actors, akin to comparative political economy. Beyond diplomats, the military, business groups with vested interests in the military industry, and communities with local economies tethered to transnational security concerns, e.g., military bases, have so much to gain or lose that they would conceivably mobilize and use political

institutions and institutionalism  31 means to leverage their positions. How much agency these domestic actors exercise depends on institutional premises about their roles. Whether states choose to self-balance or rely on external powers intuitively would also have to reflect these configurations. Rosalie Arcala Hall

References Acharya, A. (2004). How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asia Regionalism. International Organization, 58, 239–275 Acharya, A. (2009). Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. Routledge. Acharya, A. (2014). Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China’s Rise and Asia’s Emerging Security Order. International Studies Quarterly, 58(1), 158–173. Al-Fadhat, F. (2020). The Internationalisation of Capital and the Transformation of Statehood in Southeast Asia. In T. Carroll, S. Hameiri and L. Jones (Eds.), The Political Economy of Southeast Asia: Politics and Uneven Development under Hyperglobalisation (pp. 177–198). Palgrave Macmillan. Ba, A. D. (2009). (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Regions, Regionalisms, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Stanford University Press. Beeson, M. (2014). Regional Institutions after the Crisis. Routledge. Beeson, M. (2017). Alternative Realities: Explaining Security in the Asia Pacific. Review of International Studies, 43(3), 516–533. Djelic, M. (2010). Institutional Perspectives? Working Towards Coherence or Irreconcilable Diversity? In G. Morgan, J. Campbell, C. Crouch, O. K. Pedersen and R. Whitley (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis (pp. 15–40). Oxford University Press. Fioretos, O. (2011). Historical Institutionalism in International Relations. International Organization, 65(2), 367–399. Goh, E. (2011). Institutions and the Great Power Bargain in East Asia: ASEAN’s Limited ‘Brokerage’ Role. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 11(3), 373–401.

Haggard, S. (2004). Institutions and Growth in East Asia. Studies in Comparative International Development, 38(4), 53–81. He, K. (2014). A Strategic Functional Theory of Institutions and Rethinking Asian Regionalism. Asian Survey, 54(6), 1184–1208. Helmke, G. and Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 725–740. Jackson, V. (2017). A Region Primed for Peace or War? Historical Institutionalism and Debates in East Asian Security. Journal of Global Security Studies, 2(3), 253–267. Johnston, A. I. (2012). What (If Any) Does East Asia Tells Us About International Relations Theory? Annual Review of Political Science, 15, 53–78. Jönsson, C. and Tallberg, J. (2008). Institutional Theory in International Relations. In J. Pierre, B. G. Peters and G. Stoker (Eds.), Debating Institutionalism (pp. 86–114). Manchester University Press. Kang, D. C. (2003/2004). Hierarchical Balancing and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations. International Security, 28(3), 165–180. Keohane, R. O. and Martin, L. L. (1995). The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security, 20(1), 39–51. Komori, Y. (2009). Asia’s Institutional Creation and Evolution. Asian Perspective, 33(3), 151–182. Nabers, D. (2003). The Social Construction of International Institutions: The Case of ASEAN + 3. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 3(1), 113–136. Nair, D. (2009). Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(3), 110–142. Peters, B. G. (2019). Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism. Edward Elgar Publishing. Po, S. and Primiano, C. B. (2021). Explaining China’s Lancang-Mekong Cooperation as an Institutional Balancing Strategy: Dragon Guarding the Water. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 75(3), 323–340. Richardson, J. L. (2008). The Ethics of Neoliberal Institutionalism. In C. ReusSmit and D. Snidal (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford University Press. rosalie arcala hall

32  encyclopedia of asian politics Ryu, Y. (2012). Region of Conflict, Region of Peace: Identity Distance Theory and Regional Conflict in Northeast and Southeast Asia [Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation]. Harvard University. Schmidt, V. A. (2009). Putting the Political Back into Political Economy by Bringing the State Back in Yet Again. World Politics, 61(3), 516–546. Scott, W. R. (2004). Institutional Theory: Contributing to a Theoretical Research Program. In K. G. Smith and M. A. Hitt (Eds.), Great Minds in Management: The Process of Theory Development. Oxford University Press. Scott, W. R. (2014). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests and Identities. Sage. Thelens, K. (2003). How Institutions Evolve Insights From Comparative Historical Analysis. In J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (Eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (pp. 208–240). Cambridge University Press. Yong, W. (2013). Consolidating the Security Foundation of Regional Economic Prosperity: Evolving Power Balances in East Asia and Alternate Conceptions for Building

rosalie arcala hall

Regional Institutions. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 77, 278–298.

Key resources Jönsson, C. and Tallberg, J. (2008). Institutional Theory in International Relations. In J. Pierre, B. G. Peters and G. Stoker (Eds.), Debating Institutionalism (pp. 86–114). Manchester University Press. Morgan, G., Campbell, J., Crouch, C., Pedersen, O. K. and Whitley, R. (2010). Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis. Oxford University Press. In Asia Peters, B. G. (2019). Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism. Edward Elgar Publishing. Acharya, A. (2004). How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asia Regionalism. International Organization, 58, 239–275. Beeson, M. (2014). Regional Institutions After the Crisis. Routledge. Jackson, V. (2017). A Region Primed for Peace or War? Historical Institutionalism and Debates in East Asian Security. Journal of Global Security Studies, 2(3), 253–267.

6. Q-methodology A.

probably be unfamiliar with this method of data collection (Bashatah, 2016). However, these weaknesses can be addressed by taking extra care in the design of the study itself.

The concept

How to conduct a Q-method study In order to begin a Q-method study, the researcher must first create the concourse for the study; the concourse refers to the pantheon of statements representing the variety of opinions that exist about the given topic. This is done by collecting statements from as many sources as possible, covering as many of the standpoints and sub-issues that exist within the topic as possible (Herrington & Coogan, 2011). These statements can be collected via interviews with experts or people involved in the topic, relevant literature, or even parsing through data troves like online forums. It is important that the researcher ensures that the concourse is as well-populated as possible; the broad coverage and the depth of coverage of the statements will impact the whole Q-method study. Having secured the concourse, the researcher can then begin to design the experiment by filtering the concourse into various categories and sub-categories; this is done to ensure that the statements in the concourse don’t favour one aspect over the other and allows for overlapping statements to be grouped together (Herrington & Coogan, 2011). This process of filtering also allows the researcher to select the statements to be used in the Q-sort, discarding the other statements; a good rule of thumb is that the concourse should be distilled down to a minimum of 40 statements to be used for the Q-sort. To check the validity of the Q-sort, it is recommended that the researcher present the concourse and the filtered-down selection of statements to experts on the topic for them to confirm that the selection accurately covers the viewpoints across the topic. Having done so, the researcher can then begin the process of collecting Q-sorts. For Q-method to work, a minimum sample size of 12 participants is required for the results of the Q-sort to be statistically significant, with most Q-method studies having sample sizes that range from 15 to 40 participants (Bashatah, 2016). As mentioned above, Q-method allows for a scientific study to be conducted without the need for a large sample size like an R-method study would need. In fact, with 40 participants, the data from the Q-sorts start to get saturated. The participants for a Q-method study are not necessarily

Q-methodology or Q-technique was first pioneered by the psychologist/physicist William Stephenson in a letter to Nature in 1935 before being subsequently elaborated upon in more detail in later works including The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and Its Methodology, which was published in 1953 (Brown, 1993). Q-methodology is fundamentally a way to systematically study subjectivity; Stephenson envisioned it as a scientific framework to be applied to the elusiveness of subjectivity (Brown, 1993; Herrington & Coogan, 2011). It allows an individual to express his or her subjective opinion in a way that can be held constant for inspection and comparison; the individual’s pattern of responses is taken as a whole, making people the variable and not the test, thereby bringing in the scientific objectivity of quantitative study to the qualitative field, addressing the criticisms regarding reliability and validity of qualitative data (Brown, 1993, 1996; Herrington & Coogan, 2011; Van Exel & De Graaf, 2005). Q-methodology is carried out via the Q-sort technique, where participants of the study (P-set) are asked to rank a set of statements (Q-set) from agree to disagree; the resultant data collected reveal their subjective viewpoints and are thereafter subjected to factor analysis, with factors representing clusters of subjectivity that are operant (Brown, 1996; Van Exel & De Graaf, 2005). The Q-technique’s uniqueness lies in its ability to combine qualitative and quantitative aspects and its strength in exploring and explaining patterns in subjective opinions. Unlike a conventional R-method data collection where R describes a population of people, Q describes a population of opinions without needing the large number of subjects that R does. This ensures that all voices are highlighted with none being left out. While the Q-technique is a strong tool used to quantify subjectivity, it does not come without its criticisms. The biggest criticism of Q is that, when compared to more conventional R-methodology, it displays validity and reliability issues (Watts & Stenner, 2005). Also, the relatively more complex method of response would necessitate clear and concise instructions to participants who will most 33

34  encyclopedia of asian politics randomly selected; they are purposively sampled as determined by the question of interest to represent the breadth of opinion around the topic (White, 2021). In most cases, researchers would identify the specific population they are studying (e.g., nurses working in Country X’s public healthcare system) before randomly selecting participants from this pool. In carrying out the data collection with a participant, the researcher should refrain from giving too many instructions to the participant; this is especially when it comes to interpreting the statements. To do the Q-sort, a participant is first handed the statements as a deck of cards and asked to sort the statements into three separate piles; a “Disagree” pile, an “Agree” pile, and a “Neutral” pile. After Step 1 is concluded, Step 2 involves asking the participant to review the three piles of cards and make any changes to the piles if they wish to reconsider any statement card. If there are no changes to be made, the participant can then move on to Step 3, which involves placing the cards onto a symmetrical Q-sort grid, like the sample shown in Figure 6.1. In this step, the placing of the cards on the grid reflects a value judgement made by the participant as they are asked to rank the degree to which they either agree or disagree with the statements they sorted in Steps 1 and 2. The example given in Figure 6.1 shows a grid between –5 and +5, with –5 being most disagreed and +5 most agreed, and made for a Q-sort of 41 statements. It is up to the researcher to decide how wide or tall the grid becomes, as some studies have gone as far as –7/+7 or as narrow as –4/+4. In Step 3, it is important that the instruction given to the participant be as

Figure 6.1   Symmetrical Q-sort grid

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concise as possible; a good example of a succinct instruction is as follows: Take the cards from the “AGREE”-pile and arrange them on the right side of the grid. Next, take the cards from the “DISAGREE”-pile and arrange them on the left side of the grid. Follow this procedure for all cards in the “AGREE”and “DISAGREE”-piles. Finally, take the “NEUTRAL”-cards and arrange them in the remaining open boxes of the score sheet. Please note that all boxes on the grid must be filled up; if you have too many cards from any of the piles they can go to the next nearest box. This is done to ensure that the participant is not led to arrange the cards in any specific manner. For Step 4, the participant is asked to look at the filled-up grid and consider if any changes are to be made. If there are none, the researcher may move on to Step 5. In Step 5, the researcher invites the participant to explain why he or she arranged the cards on the grid the way he or she did; specific attention is paid to the cards placed at the furthest ends of the grid. This step allows for an additional opportunity for data gathering and invites participants to share with the researcher their understanding of the statements and why they hold the opinions they do. It is an important step in creating a baseline to compare Q-sort responses as whole standalone variables and in explaining the variances. Once all the participants have completed their Q-sort, the

q-methodology  35 researcher can begin the analysis by using the various available programmes like PQMethod or KADE. The programmes conduct the analysis of the Q-sort data by first generating a correlation matrix of the Q-sorts. This gives a general sense of how closely the opinions of the participants align with each other. The programme then gives the researcher a choice of what method of factor analysis to use. When Stephenson first pioneered Q-method, he used Centroid Factor Analysis to analyse the data, but statistical methods have progressed since then and the researcher has the option to use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) instead. Regardless of the choice of factor analysis method, factor analysis allows the programme to sort through all the various Q-sorts and the multiple ways the statements have been sorted and extracts a smaller set of factor loadings. These factors are essentially variables that represent clusters of similar Q-sorts. The researcher then has to decide on which factor loadings to keep, in order to explain as much of the variance as possible with the smallest number of factors (Damio, 2018). The decision can be made by looking at the eigenvalue of each factor; a general rule is that a factor with an eV of more than 1 is significant and should be kept. At this stage of the analysis, the data is still not easily interpretable, even after being extracted into factors. Having selected the factors to be kept, the researcher can proceed with the factor rotation process, which rotates the original factors about their origin to yield a simple structure and factors that are more easily interpretable (AkhtarDanesh, 2017). Once the factors have been rotated, the programme loads the Q-sorts onto the factors, allowing the researcher to once again select factors that may not be representative of the discourse. The final selection of factors can then be extracted, and the output is presented in the form of composite Q-sort grids for each factor. This gives the researcher a sense of the major views that the population holds with regard to the topic. Further data points that the researcher can use are distinguishing statements of the respective factors. These are statements that when loaded onto the factor are flagged as significant for that factor (P < 0.05). The statements can help the researcher identify what sub-categories are especially vital for that specific viewpoint.

As can be seen, the conduct of a Q-method experiment requires a good level of preparation and considered design. It is important that the researcher has a clear and concise objective in mind when designing the experiment. There are also a variety of statistical techniques at the factor analysis and factor rotation stage for the researcher to choose from; whilst this may seem daunting at first to a first-time user of the method, the options allow for greater accuracy in trying to extract the representative viewpoints of a given population.

B. The landscape Q-methodology has seen increasing use in the study of politics, especially since Brown wrote his book titled Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q-Methodology in Political Science in 1980. Most of the applications of Q-methodology in the field of political science have focused on policymaking, decisionmaking, or public opinion on policy issues. Some of the latest contributions to this field include studies like MacKillop and Downe (2022), which focused on the perception of policymakers towards what constitutes suitable evidence for policy decisions, or Minkman (2022) on the issue of policy translation and mobility for states. Over the years, there have also been studies done using Q-methodology to gauge public perception towards climate change policy and the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. As can be seen, the use of the Q-method in the space of political science keys into the strength of the methodology to measure subjectivity, allowing researchers to delve deeper into the process of policymaking and decision-making. In the case of Asia, there has been little research in political science done using Q-methodology. Research into this seems to suggest that scholars in South Korea tend to make the most use of the method compared to their other Asian counterparts, but the focus of their research is largely on marketing or the economy rather than on politics or influencing policymaking.

C. Future research As can be seen from the landscape of Q-method research in political science, current usage of the method seems to congregate around the public policy sphere. This presents a gap as other aspects of political orson tan

36  encyclopedia of asian politics science could benefit from the application of Q-methodology to produce some innovative research. Examples of areas that could use the method include electoral politics – especially voter behaviour, political theory, and identity politics. There remains a wealth of data to be extracted from these populations to derive new insights into what influences our interaction with politics. Additionally, the relative lack of research in Asian politics done using Q-methodology presents a significant gap to be filled by researchers with an interest in Asia. Voting behaviour and voter attitudes towards democracy vary across countries in Asia, given the wide variety of political systems in place, and researchers could be well-served in using Q-methodology to drive new research into this aspect. Another topic of interest in Asian politics could be race and identity, which given its subjective nature, could fit well with Q-method for research. Orson Tan

References Akhtar-Danesh, N. (2017). A comparison between major factor extraction and factor rotation techniques in Q-methodology. Open Journal of Applied Sciences, 7(4), 10, Article 75813. https://doi​.org​/10​.4236​/ ojapps​.2017​.74013. Bashatah, L. S. (2016). Q-methodology: What and how. Journal of Research & Method in Education, 6(5), 37–43. Brown, S. R. (1993). A primer on Q methodology. Operant Subjectivity, 16(3/4), 91–138. Brown, S. R. (1996). Q methodology and qualitative research. Qualitative Health Research, 6(4), 561–567.

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Damio, S. M. (2018). The analytic process of Q methodology. Asian Journal of University Education (AJUE), 14(1), 59–75. Herrington, N., & Coogan, J. (2011). Q methodology: An overview. Research in Teacher Education, 1(2), 24–28. MacKillop, E., & Downe, J. (2022). What counts as evidence for policy? An analysis of policy actors’ perceptions. Public Administration Review. Minkman, E. (2022). Resolving impasses in policy translation: Shall we adjust the idea or the process? Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 41(2), 333. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1177​/23996544221125070. Van Exel, J., & De Graaf, G. (2005). Q Methodology: A Sneak Preview. Watts, S., & Stenner, P. (2005). Doing Q methodology: Theory, method and interpretation. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2(1), 67–91. White, B. (2021). Methods Vignettes: Q Method (Q Methodology). Steps Centre. Retrieved November 2, from https://steps​ -centre​.org​/pathways​-methods​-vignettes​/ methods​-vignettes​- q​-method/#:~​:text​= Q​ %20method​%20is​%20most​%20often​,by​ %20the​%20question​%20of​%20interest.

Key resources Brown, S. R. (1980). Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Van Exel, J., & De Graaf, G. (2005). Q Methodology: A Sneak Preview. Watts, S., & Stenner, P. (2012). Doing Q Methodological Research: Theory, Method and Interpretation. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd.

7. Statistical analysis

individuals, which consist of a large of characteristics of individuals. Data across individuals can be divided into four categories: (1) data collected in a country (or a subnational jurisdiction) over a particular period, (2) data collected in a country over multiple periods, (3) data collected in multiple countries over a period, and (4) data collected in multiple countries over discrete periods. The first category can be used to find causes affecting the variations between individuals, whereas the other three categories can assist scholars to determine whether the crucial factors in the variations are consistent across different geographic regions or over time. The second type, multiple observations on an individual, measures the same person over multiple periods and can be employed to explain the variations with individuals over time. The third type is called panel or longitudinal data (i.e., repeated measurements conducted for the same persons over time), and these data can be utilized to examine the variations between and within individuals.5 Overall, when analyzing individual-level data, scholars pay more attention to the variations between individuals rather than within them owing to the limited number of measurements over time periods. Aggregate-level data can also be classified into three types. The first type is crosssectional data and the unit of the analysis is often the country or subnational jurisdiction, such as the state, province, and electoral district.6 This type of data is usually used to explain the variations between countries. The second type is time-series data (i.e., the data from a country over discrete periods); these data are used to understand the variations within countries over time. The third type is time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data; that is, data from several countries over multiple periods.7 These data can be employed to analyze variations between and within countries; thus, for these data, scholars can select from a wide range of statistical methods that are most appropriate to their research purposes.8 For data across individuals in one country over a period and cross-sectional data, it is reasonable to assume that observations are independent. However, this assumption does not hold for other types of data (Wooldridge, 2016, p. 403). Therefore, scholars must account for the correlations among the lowerlevel observations as well as the variations between higher-level units when analyzing

A. The concept We have found a proliferation of statistical analysis in Asian politics studies in the last decade.1 Scholars exploring Asian politics have become more interested in comparative research making comparisons across countries or between individuals from different countries. In other words, they have attempted to understand why the outcomes of interest vary across subjects. Methodologically, statistical analysis can be used to explain the variations between subjects, in particular when dealing with many cases. Consequently, statistical analysis has been used more frequently in recent research on Asian politics. We have observed that not only in journals of Asian politics but also in top journals of political science, a certain proportion of recently published articles on Asian politics employ statistical analysis to address research questions (RQs) of interest.2 In this chapter, we provide a framework to understand the statistical methods employed in Asian politics studies in particular and in political science in general. This framework differentiates the types of data based on the research issues that scholars focus on and the source of the variations. Concerning the research issues, the RQs can be sorted into two categories: individual- and aggregatelevel issues. Regarding the source of variations, there are mainly three types: between variations, within variations, and between and within variations.3 The first type refers to variations across cross-sectional units (e.g., individuals or countries); that is, compared with other units, whether the outcomes of scholars’ interest are more likely to emerge in the units with the specific characteristics. The second type indicates variations within units over time; that is, whether the outcomes tend to occur with the change in specific characteristics of the units. The third type is a combination of the previous two types, in which variations across cross-sectional units over time are observed. Table 7.1 summarizes the six combinations of the two-category RQs and three-category variations and the types of data that correspond to each combination.4 The individual-level data can be sorted into three types based on the variations to be explained. The first type is data across 37

38  encyclopedia of asian politics Table 7.1  Research questions, variations to be explained, and types of data RQs

Individual-level issues

Aggregate-level issues

Between variations

Data across individuals

Cross-sectional data

Within variations

Multiple observations on an individual

Time-series data

Between and within variations

Panel data

Time-series cross-sectional data

Variations

Source:   By authors.

multilevel data. Two strategies can be used to address these data features: the no-pooling approach and the pooling approach. The pooling approach can be divided into three modeling techniques: completely pooled models, fixed effects (FE) models, and random effects (RE) models. The four models differ significantly in the assumptions about both the intercepts and the coefficients of independent variables (IVs) when modeling the relationship between IVs and dependent variables (DVs).9

B. The landscape In this section, we review the statistical analysis methods used in the recent studies on East Asian politics according to the classification shown in Table 7.1. Because of scholars’ considerable interest in between variations or between and within variations, we focus on statistical modeling strategies for the four types of data: data across individuals, panel data, cross-sectional data, and TSCS data. Individual-level issues and data Due to their perceived importance as well as the relatively easy availability of data, issues related to individuals have received significant attention in research on East Asian politics. These studies often focus on some crucial political actors, such as the masses and political elites (e.g., candidates and leaders), and examine the effects of the characteristics of these political actors on their attitudes or behaviors. Scholars employ data across individuals and panel data to address their questions of interest. Between variations

The four categories of data across individuals can be used to investigate variations between individuals, but two fundamental differences exist in their analysis between the first and the guang yang and tsung-han tsai

other three categories. One is the questions intended to be answered; that is, in addition to the effects of the IV on the DV, scholars aim to identify whether the effects vary across geographic regions or over time when analyzing the other three categories of data. The other difference is the data structure: the second, third, and fourth categories have hierarchical or multilevel features. For these reasons, scholars have to take the hierarchical structure into account when analyzing the latter three categories. To explain the variations among political actors in terms of attitudes or behaviors, scholars employ linear or nonlinear models to analyze data collected in a country (or a subnational jurisdiction) over a particular period. For example, such data are used to understand Chinese citizens’ attitudes. Huang (2015) explains the variations in the evaluation of domestic situations of Chinese college students by analyzing data from a traditional survey and an online survey. Pan and Xu (2018) study ideology in China using data from an online survey conducted between 2012 and 2014. Such data are also widely employed in recent research in Taiwan, such as in research by Chen and Yen (2017), who investigate the factors for the differences in voters’ evaluation of the Sunflower Movement, and in research by Tsai, Wang, and Weng (2019), who examine the variations in voters’ independence-unification view. Similarly, by analyzing data from telephone interviews in 2018, Hsiao and Yu (2020) explain why Taiwanese citizens have lost faith in democratic systems from the standpoint of political polarization. Additionally, researchers such as Chang (2019) and Lim (2020), conduct analyses of survey data to examine why attitudes toward immigration vary across South Korean cities and policy stakeholders. In addition to individual attitudes, another extensively discussed research topic

statistical analysis  39 is individual behavior. For example, Tsai and Lin (2017) adopt survey data from the 2012 Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) project to explore respondents’ guessing behavior when answering multiplechoice questions. With regard to individual political participation, Chen (2017) explains whether a state worker performs actively in a collective petitioning or protest event in China by using a binary logit model to analyze data from a survey of a random sample of 589 former employees. Tsai (2019) analyzes the 2016 Taiwan Social Change Survey data to understand why some Taiwanese citizens attended contentious activities while others did not. When the data structure is hierarchical, the specification of variations is important. Specifically, the variations between both lower- and higher-level units can lead to variations in the outcomes of interest. For this reason, the differences between geographic regions or periods in which individuals are nested should be considered, not solely those between individuals. As summarized in Table 7.2, in the existing literature, at least four approaches can be used to conduct analyses of such data: no-pooled models, completely pooled models, FE models, and RE models. In no-pooled models, data from several sources are treated as completely different (i.e., the variations between geographic regions or periods are assumed to be the maximum) and thus are analyzed separately. Both the estimated intercepts and the coefficients of IVs are assumed to vary across higher-level units in such model specification. In previous East Asian politics research, this approach has been applied to compare the patterns of voting behavior in different countries or

periods. For example, to explore whether differences across age groups and generations affect Taiwan’s voter turnout, Achen and Wang (2019) employ a model to analyze the survey data collected after the 2004 and 2016 Taiwan presidential elections and then compare the regression results across the two groups. Similarly, by using this approach to analyze data from Hong Kong and Taiwan, Wong et al. (2019) test their argument that the flood of immigrants affects the size of the age gap in voting behavior. The completely pooled approach pools data from different sources to fit a single model, in which the variations between geographic regions or periods are ignored. This technique is more likely to determine generalized causal patterns. For instance, Chung (2017) uses completely pooled models rather than country-specific models to analyze survey data from five countries in East and Southeast Asia collected by the Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends Project to determine the factors influencing the attitudes of citizens toward China in general. Lee and Hwang (2015) pool 156 months of presidential approval ratings and conduct a series of OLS regression analyses to examine why South Korean presidential popularity varies significantly between 1993 and 2008. FE models, which are also known as least squares dummy variable (LSDV) models or within-group models, treat group-specific variables as fixed constants and incorporate a dummy variable for each higher-level unit into the model specification to control the unobservable factors that influence the DVs. In other words, the effect of the same IV on the DV (i.e., the coefficient of IV) is assumed to be the same across different geographic regions or over time. However, the intercepts,

Table 7.2  Four approaches to modeling multilevel data Variations between higher-level units

Intercepts

Coefficients of IVs

No-pooled models

Assumed to be the maximum

Different

Different

Completely pooled models

Ignored

The same

The same

FE models

Assumed to be maximum

Different

The same

RE models

A parameter to be estimated

Different/the same

Different/the same

Variations/ parameters Models

Notes:   “The same” (different) means that intercepts/coefficient are (not) constant across higher-level units. Source:   By authors.

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40  encyclopedia of asian politics which capture the variations between higherlevel units, vary from one region (period) to another. For instance, in the most recent study on Japanese politics, to investigate the causes of variations in the support that candidates received from voters, Catalinac, Bueno de Mesquita, and Smith (2020) use data on more than 3,000 Japanese municipalities from 1980 to 2000 and fit FE models with both district-year and municipality FEs to control for the district-level features in a specific election and features of a municipality, respectively. In an earlier study on Japanese elections, Catalinac (2018) also employs such an analytical approach to address the hierarchical structure of data. Compared with no-pooled models, completely pooled models, and FE models, the assumption is relaxed in RE models, which are also called multilevel models or mixed effects models; that is, both intercepts and coefficients of IVs can be different or the same. The variations between both lower- and higher-level observations are set as parameters to be estimated in the model specification.10 For example, Zhong and Hwang (2020) collect survey data from 34 large Chinese cities and employ a multilevel model with city-variant intercepts, in which not only residents’ characteristics such as democratic values, age, and education but also the features concerning the city such as economic development are included to explain the variations in Chinese residents’ nationalist feelings. Between and within variations

All of the four modeling techniques reviewed in the earlier text can also be applied to panel data to explain variations of outcomes between and within individuals. Compared with the other three models, FE models, as the “default” for panel data (Bell & Jones 2015, p. 133), are the most frequently used by scholars in the discipline of political science. Recently, the behavior of Chinese political elites has become a growing topic of interest, and scholars frequently use FE models to examine these data. For instance, Jiang (2018) and Shih and Lee (2020) utilize FE models to discuss patron–client relations and their effects in China. From the perspective of city leaders’ patronage networks, Jiang (2018) investigates how economic performance varies across Chinese local governments. To test this hypothesis, city-level panel data are analyzed using FE models with city and guang yang and tsung-han tsai

province-year effects. Shih and Lee (2020) also employ FE models to examine whether high-level patronage and withdrawal thereof affect the promotion and exit of alternate members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. All these FEs can control unobserved heterogeneity across cross-sectional or time-series observations. Additionally, some scholars consider the variations between and within citizens’ attitudes. For example, Huang (2018) tests whether partisan bias existed in Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election. Based on a panel study, he utilizes a two-way FE model to estimate Taiwanese citizens’ retrospective and prospective economic perceptions. Aggregate-level issues and data In political science, to address the issues concerning aggregate-level entities, scholars use cross-sectional and TSCS data to explain between variations and between and within variations, respectively. Between variations

To explain variations between aggregate-level units, researchers tend to employ cross-sectional data. Although such a type of analysis is not as common as individual-level crosssectional analysis, the principles of choosing statistical methods are similar to those for data across individuals. For instance, Xi (2017) explores why the frequency of government inspections varies across Chinese villages by using a negative binomial model to analyze data from 961 villages. To explain the variations in the voting outcomes of Korea’s 2017 presidential election between regions, Lee and Repkine (2020) apply spatial econometrics to analyze data comprising the features of 229 Korean regions. Between and within variations

Compared with panel data, TSCS data are more appropriate to explain variations between and within aggregate-level units, especially within variations. The reasons are twofold. First, it is easier to measure the same aggregate-level units at more time points and at regular intervals; thus, the number of time-series observations is larger than that of panel data (Hill, Griggiths, & Lim, 2018, p. 9). Second, TSCS data have overall time patterns (Gelman & Hill, 2007, pp. 243–4). Considering the statistical properties of estimation (e.g., unbiasedness and efficiency),

statistical analysis  41 with more time-series observations, the data is more appropriate for examining variations over time. Therefore, most scholars account for both between and within variations in TSCS analyses. Scholars tend to include the variations over time in the model specification of both FE and RE models. In other words, compared with analyzing panel data, scholars are more likely to add year dummies to FE models or add time-varying coefficients of IVs to RE models when analyzing TSCS data. For instance, Hong (2018) investigates why the Chinese government’s provision of public services varies across cities. He employs FE models with both city and year FEs to analyze the data across 288 Chinese prefectural cities between 1992 and 2010. To explain variations in the efficiency of public health services across provinces, Wu, Wang, and Zhang (2015) focus on China’s new healthcare reform from 2009 and utilize a Tobit RE panel model to analyze data, including variations of the efficiency that result from the province-year level as well as the provincial level.

C. Future research Over the past decade, there has been a proliferation of East Asian politics research collecting data through approaches such as big data and experiments, especially in the past five years. The reasons for this phenomenon appear to be twofold. First, observational data (e.g., survey data) have received many criticisms due to their shortcomings, such as unobservable factors and endogeneity (Rosenbaum 2005). Second, statistical analysis methods need to be developed as political theories have been refined. The evolution of methodology provides scholars with more opportunities to obtain new data and utilize statistical methods to assist them in explaining the political phenomena of interest. As a result, except for traditional approaches, more scholars adopt these approaches to collect data, namely big data (Chan & Fu, 2017; Wijaya, Billah, & Ahn, 2018) and experiments (Anderson et al., 2019; Bush et al., 2016; Cho & Kruszewska, 2018; Fukumoto & Miwa, 2018), especially survey experiments. However, these approaches are more regularly used to study individual- rather than aggregate-level issues for two main reasons. First, unlike other regions of the world, Asian

countries differ too much from one another for easy comparison. Second, if making a subregional comparison, the number of cases is small and thus inappropriate for the research themes. In conclusion, we believe that the approaches mentioned here will be extended to explore RQs concerning aggregate-level entities with the development of methodology. Altogether, we provide a systematic framework to understand the relationship between the RQs of interest and variations to be explained, as well as the types of data. This framework assists researchers to utilize appropriate statistical modeling strategies. Guang Yang and Tsung-Han Tsai

Notes 1.

Based on the research purposes, there are two ways of analyzing data: description and inference. We refer readers to good general introductions to data analyses by Agresti (2018, pp. 15–8). Statistical methods reviewed in this chapter refer to the methods for inferential statistical analyses. 2. To make the discussion more focused, we mainly review studies on East Asia, which can reflect the features and trends of contemporary Asian political studies to some extent. 3. “Between variations” and “within variations” used in this chapter are similar to “between effects” and “within effects” discussed in Bell and Jones (2015). 4. The types of data are discussed in numerous econometrics textbooks, see Gujarati and Porter (2008, pp. 22–5); Hill, Griggiths, and Lim (2018, pp. 7–9); and Wooldridge (2010, pp. 4–7, 2016, pp. 5–10) for details. 5. For systematic discussions on the analysis of panel data, see Baltagi (2013); Hsiao (2014). 6. For convenience, we use “countries” to refer to “countries or subnational jurisdictions” hereafter. 7. The use of TSCS data has become increasingly popular in political science in recent decades. For detailed introductions to TSCS analysis, see Beck (2008); Beck and Katz (2011); articles in the special issue of Political Analysis 15(2). 8. In general, panel data refer to a few repeated observations on many individual-level sampled units, whereas TSCS data refer to repeated observations on several aggregate-level non-sampled units (Beck & Katz, 1996, p. 1; Fairbrother, 2014, p. 122). In other words, the number of individuallevel units of panel data is normally large relative to this of time periods (Beck, 2008, p. 475; Hill, Griggiths, & Lim, 2018, p. 9). 9. We refer readers to see Gelman and Hill (2007, sec. 12.2–12.3) for a detailed comparison among no-pooled, FE models (i.e., “complete pooling” in Gelman and Hill’s term) and RE models (i.e., “partial pooling” in their term). 10. Compared with FE models, RE models have at least two advantages. First, they can provide all that FE models promise, in particular, is useful to separate between and within effects (Bell &

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42  encyclopedia of asian politics Jones, 2015). Second, they perform better than FE models when the variations between the aggregatelevel units are slight and/or there are a small number of observations within an aggregate-level unit (Gelman & Hill, 2007, pp. 256–8).

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44  encyclopedia of asian politics Xi, J. (2017). Chinese government village inspections: Where does the king show up? Asian Survey, 57(3), 450–474. Zhong, Y., & Hwang, W. (2020). Why do Chinese democrats tend to be more nationalistic? Explaining popular nationalism in urban China. The Journal of Contemporary China, 29(121), 61–74.

Key resources Given that FE and RE models have been extensively used in the existing studies on East Asian politics, we refer readers to detailed discussions on FE models by Allison (2009); Brüderl and Ludwig (2015); and Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran (2022), and to discussions on RE models by Gelman and Hill (2007); Hox, Moerbeek, and Schoot (2017); Raudenbush and Bryk (2002); and Snijders and Bosker (2012). Additionally, the

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distinction between FE and RE models has been discussed by many researchers, including Beck and Katz (1995); Bell, Fairbrother, and Jones (2019); Bell and Jones (2015); Clark and Linzer (2015); and McNeigh and Kelley (2019), and articles in the special issue of Political Analysis 15(2). In addition to specific models, we refer readers to recent research on other Asian countries for gaining a comprehensive understanding of statistical analysis in Asian politics research. Because this chapter’s discussion concentrates on East Asian politics, we suggest that readers should know more about statistical methods in studies on other Asian countries that have been published in the top journals of political science (e.g., American Political Science Review and Comparative Political Studies), especially research on India.

8. Survey research

to check the robustness of their findings. Differing sample size not only reflects the diversity of interest of research but also the scale and scope of the entire enterprise. There are many creative ways to answer important research questions through survey data. Quality of research is based on the soundness of research design, and theory is the foundation of everything. Scholars introduce many new theories to survey research in Asia. The “Big Five” approach has been applied to research on political behavior since the 1990s (Mondak, 2010). Wang and Weng (2018) examined the influence of political personality on Korean national pride. They also analyzed the relationship between personality traits and voter turnout in Korea (Wang, Weng, & Cha, 2017), and Taiwanese people’s attitude toward the independence– unification issue (Tsai, Wang, & Weng, 2019). They revealed the direct and indirect impact of personality traits on attitudes and behavior. While it is still not clear why some of the five personality traits influence attitudes or behaviour but some do not, the personality research seemingly echoes polarization studies that emphasize personality differences (Hetherington & Weiler, 2018). Party cues theory can trace back to Popkin (1994). Before then, the complicated relationship between exposure to campaign information, sophistication, and persuasion had come to Converse’s (1962) attention. Zaller (1989, 1992) explained why voters with political awareness tend to show a high level of party loyalty especially when campaign intensity rises. There have been numerous studies in the non-US context, such as Merolla et al. (2008), Brader et al. (2013), Kobayashi and Yokohama (2018), and Yokohama and Kobayashi (2019). One of the preconditions of party cues affecting attitudes is strong partisanship built on ideological cleavages. Kobayashi and Yokohama found the limited effects of party cues and press cues in Japan, where the party system is fluid and partisanship is weak. Yokohama and Kobayashi’s survey experiment showed that while prime minister cues cannot form the policy preferences of the supporters of incumbent parties, they reduce the supporters of opposition parties’ approval of a policy. In other words, political leaders may have an asymmetrical influence on the incumbent and opposition party supporters. Given that the team of Kobayashi and Yokohama found mixed results about party cues in Japan, there are

A. The concept Survey methodology is a practice that collects observational data through telephone, mail, Internet, and face-to-face interviewing. Unlike experiments, survey data collection is aimed to make inferences about populations. Therefore, it uses representative samples drawn from certain frames, such as lists of people, telephone numbers, and mailing addresses of interest. Survey research is also different from big data analysis, which employs algorithms to classify units of analysis, such as text, images, or other information. Researchers use scales based on theories and concepts to measure people’s preferences and predispositions, predicting their behavior or intention. Many scholars have used survey research to grapple with understanding public opinions. Due to the proliferation of public opinions in Asia, the survey topics range from social well-being, populism, polarization, misinformation, social issue, mental health, and national security to climate change, among many others. The diversity of survey research reflects not only the evolution of Asian states and society but also the fast growth of scholarship in this field. Some topics are timely and still undergoing. For example, Wang (2020) studied the degree to which fake news influenced vote choices in the 2018 Taiwan local elections. Go and Lee (2020) examined the effect of fake news in mobilizing voters. Yang and Tsai (2020) investigated the relationship between privacy concerns and support for government measures during the COVID-19 pandemic in Taiwan. Some topics are everlasting. For example, Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi (2019) assess Indonesian voters and argue that they are “critical democrats.” Most survey research in Asia uses national representative sampling to make inferences, but there are studies using small N or nonprobability samples. For example, Rabacal, Oducado, and Tamdang (2020) recruited hundreds of teachers enrolled in master’s and doctoral programs as participants in their survey to assess the impact of COVID-19 on their psychological well-being. To evaluate the effect of Internet usage in a broad context, You and Wang (2020) examined the World Value Survey data and used entropy balancing 45

46  encyclopedia of asian politics many research questions to answer. If party cues do not provide an effective heuristic, what else?

B. The landscape There are three challenges for contemporary survey research in Asia: mixed-mode methods, data sharing, and surveys in China. Mixed-mode Mixed-mode surveys  combine more than one way of collecting data for a single project (Lavrakas, 2008).  To address problems associated with low response rates, researchers often employ mixed-mode survey designs. For example, researchers combine telephone surveys and online surveys to address the problem of under-coverage of old people that may not have access to the Internet. To reduce cost and enhance efficiency, some IVRs (Interactive Voice Surveys) use telephone surveys to recruit people (De Leeuw, 2005b) It is found that self-administered interviews may lessen the problem of social desirability (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). The rate of responses to sensitive questions with self-administration is higher than with interviewer administration. In other words, individual response varies with survey modes. Combining self-administered and interviewer-administered surveys likely creates such mode effects. According to Pew Research Center’s report, mode effects are likely to occur in questions regarding the evaluation of social life and political figures. More importantly, differences in income and education may be related to the mode effect. For example, low-income people may be more sensitive to financial difficulty questions, especially in the telephone survey (Keeter, 2015). Examining Internet and in-person surveys used in the 2005 survey administered by British Election Study, however, Sanders et  al. (2007) showed small mode effects except for the evaluation of political leaders. Through reliable interviews and weighting, they argued that key parameters in voting and partisanship models are similar through different survey modes. Although Sanders et  al. suggested that their findings may not apply to other countries, the issue of the mode effect draws the attention of Asian survey researchers. In Asia, mixed-mode surveying has become popular and so is the discussion of chia-hung tsai

the mode effect. Hayashi (2007) discussed the advantages of contacting a respondent via more than one mode while addressing the mode effect. Han (2014) reported that mixedmode and online surveys are fast becoming mainstream in Korea. Using Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) data, Yu and Tu (2017) used propensity scores derived from webographic questions to adjust the web survey samples biased toward highly educated and young people. Using national sample surveys conducted in 2002, 2011, and 2015, Miao’s paper (2019) finds that while the Internet has become an important communication channel in China, the use of the Internet for political information and political participation is still overestimated. Those studies indicate that there is demand for more mixedmode surveys and more efforts to address the problem of mode effects. For example, how can we weight samples from online and inperson data collection to eliminate, if any, the mode effect? If panel data is from more than one way of data collection, how can we detect and reduce the mode effect? Data sharing Data is the ultimate product of survey research. Without data, at least for survey research, it is impossible to test theories and verify the results. Survey data is so valuable that some research teams reserve the right to use the data for their members. To ensure replication, there have been well-established institutions for survey data in the US and Europe. For example, it is easy to share, search, and download data via the Interuniversity Consortium for Political Research (ICPSR) with the University of Michigan. It has been archiving global survey data since the 1960s. Anyone can register for the ICPSR and download all of the data right away. The Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD) also stores cross-national data and provides easy access to researchers. With those data archives, survey research has made enormous progress. One of the advantages and promises of quantitative research is replication. Sharing survey data for replication is essential to this field. Without replication, it is impossible to confirm the empirical evidence that is the foundation of theory. One of the challenges of data sharing for Asian survey research is the language barrier; it is hard to share data without a common language. Although many scholars publish

survey research  47 their survey research in English, there are only a few recognized datasets open to the international community. One of the promising efforts that get around this problem is the Network for Asian Social Science Data Archives (NASSDA). This organization has four institution members: the Chinese National Survey Data Archives (CNSDA), the Korea Social Science Data Archive (KOSSDA), the Social Science Japan Data Archive (SSJDA), and the Survey Research Data Archive (Taiwan). Except for CNSDA, there are English webpages on the other three websites. Through NASSDA, however, users can only access data in individual institutions. It may still take time for more countries to join this network, sharing data in a unified format. It also requires more effort to set up an integrated and respectful archive like ICPSR. Fortunately, there are some recognized cross-national survey data in which many Asian countries participate. These surveys have core questions that allow researchers to compare country by country. They also include country-specific questions so researchers can study a single country, exploring the temporal relationship between the dependent and independent variables. More importantly, their procedure of fieldwork and dataset are mostly standardized. For example, the World Value Survey (WVS) has conducted comparative surveys since 1981. It just completed the 2017–2020 fieldwork that covers 79 countries. This project focuses on the transition of people’s values and beliefs, which may explain changes in party systems. Many Asian countries support this project, including China, Thailand, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Japan, and so on. The Asia Barometer Survey (ABS) based in Taipei is another prominent channel to understand the political culture of up to 18 Asian countries. It has already conducted four waves of surveys in these countries, including China, Mongolia, and Vietnam. Finally, some Asian countries joined the Comparative Study of Election Systems (CSES). Unlike WVS and ABS, CSES sets up a theme and designs questions (modules) based on the theme. Thus far, there are five modules, each of which reflects the most pressing question facing the countries, such as wealth distribution, populism, and accountability. ICPSR stores WVS, ABS, and CSES data, so there are multiple accesses to these cross-national data.

China There have been many outstanding survey teams and data archives like CNSDA in China. Like many other Asian countries, China is one of the surveyed countries in WVS and ABS, but not CSES. Scholars have managed to collect local or national representative survey data to answer important questions, such as rural protests (O’Brien & Li, 2006), participation of villagers (He, 2006), life satisfaction (Han, 2013), and migrant workers (Tang & Yang, 2008). Considering the size of the population and the diversity of this country, the quantity of survey data that leads to more in-depth research still falls short of expectations. Nevertheless, what is truly challenging is the reliability of data collection. In his seminal work on public opinion in China, Tang (2005, p. 51) argued that “political sensitivity remains a major barrier on survey research in China.” Sensitivity means three things. First of all, some questions that directly challenge the government may be censored (Tang, 2005, p. 51) Second, it means local authorities have a lack of incentive to cooperate with researchers (Manion, 1994). Third, it refers to respondents’ political caution or political wariness; people may not be outspoken about political questions. Shi (2001) measured political caution as a checkpoint of data reliability in Taiwan and China with the following question. “If you criticized the party and state leaders in conversations where you live or work, would you be concerned that someone would report you to the authorities?” Shi found that political caution is more prevalent in the PRC than in Taiwan but the correlation between political caution and political trust is weak. Although Shi argued that it is evidence of the validity of political trust, it is hard to ignore his report that more than 40 percent of respondents in the PRC expressed their political fear. Moreover, Munro (2017) raised the issue of refusal bias in China. After correcting unit non-response bias by response propensity, he found lower estimates of trust in the central and local government.

C. Future research The foremost task of students of public opinion is building a theoretical framework that can travel to more than one country. As Shi (2001) pointed out, structuralism, institutionalism, and culturalism are utilized to explain attitudes and beliefs, such as political trust. chia-hung tsai

48  encyclopedia of asian politics Structure refers to demographic background, which may dictate beliefs and values through socialization. The institutional argument holds that people may adopt certain attitudes if they have the incentive to do so. For example, people that are better off may be satisfied with democracy. Culture is the source of values, which decide how things ought to be. Culture is also a set of convictions shared by many people, such as trust, tolerance, and individualism. Many Asian survey researchers apply culturalism to important questions. For example, Park and Uslander (2019) studied how people perceive democracy, inequality, and participation among other topics in 14 Asian countries. Political culture is especially relevant to the study of Chinese public opinion because China has undergone the transition from pre-modern to modernization in the last century (Moody, 1994). Culturalism emphasizes the importance of different contexts, which supports cross-national studies but may not be able to develop a unified theory. The paradigm of rational choice theory needs to be revived. For example, family politics is an important subject in Asia. Politicians transfer their political power to their offspring. To study family politics from the public opinion perspective, it is necessary to explain who favors political families and who does not. One of the key variables is how citizens evaluate political patronage from political families. Even though citizens may be aware that it is not democratic to choose a political dynasty instead of someone else who might be also qualified for the same position, they may still do so as long as they are taken care of by notable politicians. We may find a similarity between constituent services in Western countries and political patronage in Asia, thereby building a theory that applies to different cultures. In addition to theory building, it is important to consider interdisciplinary research for public opinion. On the one hand, psychology and communication theories may help sort out the sources of political attitudes. Where do people get their perceptions about the government? Why do some people worry more about immigrants than other people? On the other hand, we should explore the micro-foundation of some overarching classical theories that are central to the discipline. For example, why do people have better perceptions about country A rather than B? Answering this question may contribute to our knowledge of international chia-hung tsai

relations. We can also learn about the principles of strategic behavior through survey research. Why are some people more willing to cooperate with other people? Do they have some predisposition for cooperation? To summarize, survey research is an influential and prominent method in Asia. However, there are at least three challenges to overcome. First of all, it is necessary to establish a data archive and encourage data sharing. Mixed-mode research is also highly demanded to solve the problem of sampling composition. In doing so, we may raise the quality of survey research to a higher level. Furthermore, it is necessary to find a way to revisit survey research in China. If the political atmosphere is freer, perhaps it is easier to “unbox” Chinese public opinion. At the same time, we should revive our research methods and extend them to other disciplines. More interdisciplinary collaboration is likely to stimulate existing research topics and methods. Chia-hung Tsai

References Brader, T. A., Tucker, J. A., and Duell, D. (2013). Which Parties Can Lead Opinion? Experimental Evidence on Partisan Cue Taking in Multiparty Democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 46(11), 1485–1517. De Leeuw, E. D. (2005a). Mixed-Mode Surveys and the Internet. https://www​ .researchgate​.net ​/publication ​/50206485​_ Mixed​-Mode​_ Surveys​_and​_the​_Internet. De Leeuw, E. D. (2005b). To Mix or Not to Mix Data Collection Modes in Surveys. Journal of Official Statistics-Stockholm, 21(2), 233–255. Go, S., and Lee, M. (2020). Analysis of Fake News in the 2017 Korean Presidential Election. Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research, 8(2), 105–125. https://doi​.org​/10​ .15206​/ajpor​.2020​.8​.2​.105. Han, C. (2013). Satisfaction With the Standard of Living in Reform Era China. The China Quarterly February, 1–22. Han, S. (2014). Prospects and Problems of the Recent Developments in Social Survey in Korea: Mixed-Mode Surveys and Volunteer Web Panels. Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research, 1(2), 147–150. Hayashi, T. (2007). The Possibility of Mixed‐Mode Surveys in Sociological

survey research  49 Studies. International Journal of Japanese Sociology, 16, 51–63. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1111​/j​.1475​-6781​.2007​.00099​.x. He, B. (2006). A Survey Study of Voting Behavior and Political Participation in Zhejiang. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 7(3), 225–250. Hetherington, M., and Weiler, J. (2018). Prius or Pickup?: How the Answers to Four Simple Questions Explain America’s Great Divide. Houghton Mifflin. Keeter, S. (2015). From Telephone to the Web: The Challenge of Mode of Interview Effects in Public Opinion Polls. https:// www​ . pewresearch ​ . org ​ / methods ​ / 2015​ /05​ /13​ / from​ - telephone​ - to​ - the​ -web​ - the​ -challenge​-of​-mode​-of​-interview​-effects​-in​ -public​-opinion​-polls/. Kobayashi, T., and Yokohama, T. (2018). Missing Effect of Party Cues in Japan: Evidence From a Survey Experiment. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 19(1), 61–79. Lavrakas, P. (2008). Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods. Sage. Manion, M. (1994). Survey Research in the Study of Contemporary China: Learning From Local Samples. The China Quarterly, 139, 741–765. Merolla, J. L., Stephenson, L. B., and Zechmeister, E. J. (2008), Can Canadians Take a Hint? The (In) Effectiveness of Party Labels as Information Shortcuts in Canada. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 673–696. Miao, H. (2019). Media Use and Political Participation in China: Taking Three National Large-N Surveys as Examples. Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research, 7(1), 1–22. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .15206​/ajpor​.2019​.7​.1​.1. Mondak, J. (2010). Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior. Cambridge University Press. Moody, P. R. (1994). Trends in the Study of Chinese Political Culture. The China Quarterly, 139, 731–740. Mujani, S., Liddle, R. W., and Ambardi, K. (2019). Voting Behavior in Indonesia Since Democratization: Critical Democrats. Cambridge University Press. Munro, N. (2017). Does Refusal Bias Influence the Measurement of Chinese Political Trust? Journal of Contemporary China, 27(111), 457–471.

O’Brien, K., and Li, L. (2006). Rightful Resistance in Rural China. Cambridge University Press. Park, C., and Uslaner, E. M. (Eds.). (2019). Inequality and Democratic Politics in East Asia. Routledge. Popkin, S. L. (1994). The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns. University of Chicago Press. Rabacal, J. S., Oducado, R. M. F., and Tamdang, K. A. (2020). COVID-19 Impact on the Quality of Life of Teachers: A CrossSectional Study. Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research, 8(4), 478–492. Sanders, D., Harold, C., Stewart, M. C., and Whiteley, P. (2007). Does Mode Matter For Modeling Political Choice? Evidence From the 2005 British Election Study. Political Analysis, 15(3), 257–285. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1093​/pan​/mpl010. Shi, T. (2001). Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. Comparative Politics, 33(4), 401–419. Tang, W. (2005). Public Opinion and Political Change in China. Stanford University Press. Tang, W., and Yang, Q. (2008). The Chinese Urban Caste System in Transition. The China Quarterly, 196, 759–779. Tourangeau, R., Rips, L. J., and Kenneth Rasinski, K. (2000). The Psychology of Survey Response. Cambridge University Press. Tsai, C., Wang, C., and Weng, D. (2019). Personality Traits and Individual Attitude Toward the Independence-Unification Issue in Taiwan. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 54(3), 430–451. Wang, C., and Weng, D. L. (2018). Personality Traits and Individual Feeling of National Pride in South Korea. Asian Journal of Political Science, 26(2), 257–275. Wang, C., Weng, D. L., and Cha, H. (2017). Personality Traits and Voter Turnout in South Korea: The Mediation Argument. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 18(3), 426–445. Wang, T. (2020). Does Fake News Matter to Election Outcomes? The Case Study of Taiwan’s 2018 Local Elections. Asian Journal of Public Opinion Research, 8(2), 67–104. https://doi​.org​/10​.15206​/ajpor​.2020​ .8​.2​.67. Yokoyama, T., and Kobayashi, T. (2019). Pitting Prime Minister Cues With Party chia-hung tsai

50  encyclopedia of asian politics Cues in a Multiparty System: A Survey Experiment in Japan. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 20(2), 93–106. You, Y., and Wang, Z. (2020). The Internet, Political Trust, and Regime Types: A Cross-National and Multilevel Analysis. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 21(2), 68–89. Yu, E., and Tu, C. (2017). Exploring the Use of Telephone Surveys and Propensity Score Adjustments to Correct Web Survey Biases. Journal of Political Science, 73, 81–125. Zaller, J. (1989). Bringing Converse Back In: Modeling Information Flow in Political Campaigns. Political Analysis, 1, 181–234. Zaller, J. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press.

Key resources Keeter, S. (2015). From Telephone to the Web: The Challenge of Mode of Interview Effects in Public Opinion Polls. https:// www​ . pewresearch ​ . org ​ / methods ​ / 2015​ /05​ /13​ / from​ - telephone​ - to​ - the​ -web​ - the​ -challenge​-of​-mode​-of​-interview​-effects​-in​ -public​-opinion​-polls/.

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Lavrakas, P. (2008). Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods. Sage. Tourangeau, R., Rips, L. J., and Kenneth Rasinski, K. (2000). The Psychology of Survey Response. Cambridge University Press. In Asia Han, S. (2014). Prospects and Problems of the Recent Developments in Social Survey in Korea: Mixed-Mode Surveys and Volunteer Web Panels. Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research, 1(2), 147–150. Kobayashi, T., and Yokohama, T. (2018). Missing Effect of Party Cues in Japan: Evidence From a Survey Experiment. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 19(1), 61–79. Tang, W. (2005). Public Opinion and Political Change in China. Stanford University Press. Yang, W., and Tsai, C. (2020). Democratic Values, Collective Security, and Privacy: Taiwan People’s Response to COVID-19. Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research, 8(3), 222–245.

PART II THEMES/THEMATIC CHAPTERS

9. Civil society

working class should lead civil society to reclaim the state. Antonio Gramsci goes further in saying that civil society is a sphere of discursive contestation in which the working class can counter capitalism’s cultural dominance (Baker, 2002, p. 5; Ehrenberg, 1999, pp. 205–11). Similarly, Robert Cox (1999) regards civil society as a ‘surrogate for revolution’ that would challenge the neoliberal economic orthodoxy, empowering citizens to regain control of public life. In other words, left/socialist philosophers conceived civil society in terms of agency countering forms of oppression that the state embodies. Based on these reflections, civil society definitions coincide with state structures, economic infrastructures, and cultural landscapes that were shaped by Europe’s modernization. By drawing on early works shedding light on specific traits of civil society in Asia (e.g., Callahan, 1998; Chan, 1997; Gellner, 1994), Muthiah Alagappa (2004) and Lee Hock Guan (2004) observed the convergence and divergence in experiences of civil society in Asia and Europe, arguing that instead of fixing our gaze on what defines civil society, we should pay more attention to civil society as a site of conflict and power contestation. Civil society accordingly may or may not necessarily be independent from the state. Nor should it be inherently liberal, democratic, and secular. Rather, civil society groups are heterogeneous; those with opposing agendas may compete for discursive and political influence in the same arena. Civil society is dynamic, reflecting a broader power struggle in society. The following section elaborates on conventional and emerging approaches to civil society and connects them with civil society experiences in Asia.

A. The concept Civil society is generally defined as both a site and an entity that exists between the state on the one hand and the realm of family and individuals on the other. Actors within civil society are believed to rely on nonviolent actions in pursuing their collective agenda, remain autonomous from the state, and operate not for profit. Until recently, the growing interest in studying civil society is due to its assumed positive association with the emergence and sustainability of democracy. Autonomous civil society serves to consolidate ‘diagonal accountability’ (Lührmann, Marquardt, & Mechkova, 2020) by keeping the executive in check while contributing to the vibrancy of independent media and grassroots associations. The latter in return deepen representative democracy by introducing participatory democracy (Cohen & Arato, 1992; Kean, 1988; Woldring, 1998). This mainstream conception of civil society is largely shaped by specific schools of thought and historical developments in Europe. Originating in Greek antiquity, notions of civil society were developed in light of Europe’s eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury modernization. Pioneering thinkers represented two main philosophical traditions, which are liberalism and left/socialism, that distrust the state for different reasons. Liberal intellectuals such as Adam Ferguson of the Scottish Enlightenment conceived an early definition of civil society to defend civic and communal culture in the face of the market economy and state interference in it (Ferguson, 1995). One hundred years later, Alexis de Tocqueville, a seminal French philosopher, suggested that civil society associations should service delivery functions on behalf of the state while restraining the latter’s power and abuse. The state’s role should accordingly be limited to ensuring socio-economic conditions that encourage thriving civil society (Tocqueville, 1994). Following the Tocquevillean tradition is the seminal work by Robert Putnam (1993) who contends that civic participation in associations produces social capital vital to healthy democracy. In contrast, left/socialist intellectuals such as Karl Marx distrust the state that is captured by the capitalists, suggesting that the

B. The landscape Over the past three decades, the existence and vibrancy of civil society has been causally connected with a democratic-liberal order, but this outlook has been increasingly challenged and made nuanced by three groups of literature: civil society under autocratic regimes, civil society as a vehicle for autocratization, and violent and conservative traits of civil society. First, let us explore a conventional outlook that correlates civil society with the emergence and sustainability of a democratic-liberal order. The advent of the third-wave democratization in the late 1970s to 1990s saw civil society organizations at 52

civil society  53 the forefront of the opposition coalition that precipitated a series of autocratic breakdowns in Latin America, Asia, and Central Europe (Alagappa, 2004; Boose, 2012; della Porta, 2014; Welsh, 1994).1 In consolidating liberal democracy post-transition, civil society is also encouraged to actively participate in elections and voluntary activities that shape policy directions, hold elite power accountable, and build mutual trust among citizens conducive to overcoming collective action problems and strengthening democratic institutions (Almond & Verba, 1963; Diamond, 1999, 174–92; Putnam, 1993). Based on this optimistic view of civil society’s democratic and liberal characteristics, contemporary studies also suggest that threats against civil society in young democracies potentially signal democratic reversal. The majority of quantitative datasets that evaluate and rank democracies typically include the guarantee of civic freedom of association, assembly, and expression as a democratic milestone (e.g., V-Dem and Freedom House). Similarly, burgeoning literature on ‘thirdwave’ autocratization – that is the process whereby third-wave democracies gradually lose central democratic traits (e.g., Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; see also Bermeo, 2016; Levitsky & Way, 2010) – and closing or shrinking civic space identifies various forms of autocratic threats against civil society as an indicator of eroding qualities of democracy or even recurring autocracy. For instance, autocratic regimes have sought to strangle and de-politicize civil society through a myriad of legal tools that hinder the registration of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), drain external funding of civic groups, and criminalize their activities (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014; Poppe & Wolff, 2017; Richter, 2018). Against this backdrop, analysts have increasingly questioned the sole focus on ‘good,’ liberal and democratic, civil society that counteracts the state. First, scholars in autocratic regime studies argue that CSOs do exist in autocracies, but their autonomy from regimes and the state can be limited. While suppressing claim-making CSOs whose pro-democracy and rights-based advocacies potentially undermine the status quo, autocratic regimes tend to co-opt CSOs without contentious agendas by supplying them with resources and alliances and retaining nepotic relationships with CSO members (Aarts

& Cavatorta, 2013; Giersdorf & Croissant, 2011; Lewis, 2013; Wischermann et al., 2018; Yabanci, 2019). Coopted CSOs return the favor by helping regimes deliver social services in places where regimes lack the capacity, thus reducing regimes’ socio-economic burden and simultaneously increasing output legitimacy (Hsu, 2010; Lorch, 2006). Most importantly, as Lorch and Bunk (2017) note, co-opted CSOs serve as a crucial source of legitimacy for autocratic regimes in the face of political contestation. CSOs are a façade of democracy, while their compliance with regulations confirms the autocratic order. Their limited participation in policy-making processes is also useful as a feedback mechanism (Petrone, 2011). CSOs’ cordial relationships with regimes in many Asian countries, including China, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, are well-documented, serving as an empirical basis for analyzing the role of civil society in autocratic regimes. Particularly the cases of China, Vietnam, and Thailand are telling in that CSOs’ support for regimes can be ideological. In China, some CSOs believe that they should endorse, rather than oppose, the state that is supposed to retain stability and order (Hsu, 2010). Similarly, in the Communist Party–ruled Vietnam, many community-based organizations (CBOs) that focus on local development see themselves as partners of the state, thereby collaborating with state agencies to improve state services (Thayer, 2009). In military-palacedominated Thailand, parts of civil society embrace the idea of royal patronage and discourses on nationalist economic development (Pitidol, 2016). In a similar vein, the positive impact of CSOs on democratic development has been increasingly questioned in the face of recent democratic reversal and autocratization. In the wake of the 1990s democratic optimism, Berman (1997) already warned against a linear association between civil society and democracy by referring to the example of grassroots supporters of Germany’s Nazi regime. Contemporary studies that further this analysis point to two roles CSOs play in sustaining autocrats and undermining democracy. First, drawn from cases in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, scholars explore dynamics of CSOs’ mass mobilization that signals support (Aarts & Cavatorta, 2013; Lorch, 2017) and at times paves the janjira sombatpoonsiri

54  encyclopedia of asian politics way for unconstitutional overthrow of democratically elected governments (Arugay, 2014; Encarnación, 2002). Against the conventional wisdom that middle class–led civil society is inherently a positive force for democracy, this group of literature moreover demonstrates that the middle class that is sandwiched between the elite minority and the workingclass majority can rally behind autocratic figures and policies favorable to its interest (e.g., Kurtlandzick, 2014). Second, particularly in Asia, this trend exacerbates as CSOs loyal to regimes may condone and even initiate repression against oppositional segments of civil society, thus contributing to eroding democratic, pluralistic civic space. In Thailand, for instance, royalist CSOs work in tandem with the regime to crack down on anti-establishment groups. These CSOs monitor social media posts considered to offend the monarchy and report the offence to the authorities. If the latter fails to charge offenders, these CSOs take matters into their own hands by harassing anti-establishment dissidents (Sombatpoonsiri, 2020). As with Thailand, ‘cyber troops’ in China and Vietnam are not only sanctioned by the state, but also organic in that regime loyalists volunteer to surveil and harass online critics (An Luoung, 2021; Scheider, 2018). The third group of literature challenging the liberal-democratic approach to civil society regards its otherwise ‘uncivil’ characteristics, specifically drawing on vigilante, extremist groups and self-organized militias. While the mainstream literature tends to exclude violent civil society from the discussion, researchers on uncivil society argue that this dark side of civil society is its constitutive part (Bob, 2011). In the bastions of thirdwave democracy such as Central Europe and Latin America, rightwing, religious extremist, and nationalist CSOs have mobilized to undermine democratic institutions (Kopecky & Mudde, 2003). A similar phenomenon is observed in both increasingly consolidated autocracies such as Turkey (Dönmez, 2008) and backsliding democracies such as Western Europe and the US (Roth, 2018). A similar trend exists in Asia, with one specific direction worth elaborating. Extremist groups have emerged against the backdrop of nationalist narratives in which ethnic and religious chauvinism is central to the state’s or government’s ideology. Predominantly Theravada Buddhist countries such as Sri janjira sombatpoonsiri

Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand are prime examples as the proximity between the state and the religion provides fertile ground for the proliferation of religious extremist groups (e.g., Ivarsson, 2019; Sombatpoonsiri, 2021; Walton & Hayward, 2014). In addition, the once secular states such as Indonesia and India are threatened by the rise of Islamist and Hindu-nationalist movements respectively, with India currently governed by the key promoter of Hindu nationalism, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Sahoo, 2020), and Indonesia’s pluralism challenged by Islamist civil society movements (Hadiz, 2018; see also Beittinger-Lee, 2009).

C. Future research One of the nascent research terrains regarding civil society in Asia tackles the subject of digital technology. First, in the increasingly autocratized Asia (with the exceptions of three consolidated democracies: South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia), governments have effectively utilized digital technology to clamp down on oppositional civil society (Sinpeng, 2019; Yanjue, 2014). Second, contrasting this perspective, many scholars view digital space as a contested arena in which CSOs’ digital savviness has fostered mass mobilization against regimes (Han, 2018). Lastly, as with the abovementioned debate regarding the ‘dark side’ of civil society, digital media shapes the proliferation of uncivil society groups that seek to undermine democracy, while echo chambers resulting from social media’s algorithms deepen political divide that harms healthy democratic dialogues (e.g., Lim, 2017). Studies on multifaceted civil society in Asia have profoundly configured debates regarding civil society at large by broadening the focus on ‘good’ civil society. Civil society represents diverse functions, ideologies and patterns of state–society relations. It is not always a progressive space; its agents do not always promote civility; and its relationship with the state can be intertwined. In the wake of digital technology, understanding civil society requires an even more sophisticated conceptual instrument that unpacks layers of civil society as a social phenomenon and the effects of digital technology on changing trajectories of civic groups. One way forward is to strike a balance between unreserved optimism and radical pessimism

civil society  55 regarding civil society’s role in transforming our society. This implies that future research may need to shed light on how the interaction of competing civic groups embodies deeper power struggle and discursive contestations in the region, and how that unveils a crisis of governance. Particularly relevant are studies that highlight the long-term impact of COVID-19 on the changing role of civil society and altering patterns of state–society relations. Janjira Sombatpoonsiri

Note 1.

Based on Samuel Huntington’s conception (1991), the first wave of democratization took place in the mid-1900s and the second wave occurred post-WWII.

References Aarts, P., and Francesco Cavatorta, F. (Eds.). (2013). Civil Society in Syria and Iran: Activism in Authoritarian Contexts. Lynne Rienner. Alagappa, M. (Ed.). (2004). Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space. Stanford University Press. Almond, G. A., and Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton University Press. An, L., and Nguyen, D. (2021). How the Vietnamese State Uses Cyber Troops to Shape Online Discourse. ISEAS Perspective. https://www​.iseas​.edu​.sg​/ articles​- commentaries ​/ iseas​-perspective​ /2021​-22​-how​-the ​-vietnamese ​-state ​-uses​ -cyber​-troops​-to ​-shape ​- online ​- discourse​ -by​-dien​-nguyen​-an​-luong/. Arugay, A. (2014). Democracy’s Saviors and Spoilers: A Study of the Causal Conditions and Mechanisms Behind Civil Society Coups After the Third Wave of Democratization [Unpublished Doctoral Thesis]. Georgia State University. Baker, G. (2002). Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices. Routledge. Beittinger-Lee, V. (2009). (Un)Civil Society and Political Change in Indonesia: A Contested Arena. Routledge. Berman, S. (1997). Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic. World Politics, 49(3), 401–29.

Bermeo, N. (2016). On Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5–19. Bob, C. (2011). Civil and Uncivil Society. In M. Edwards (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society (pp. 209–19). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boose, J. W. (2012). Democratization and Civil Society: Libya, Tunisia, and the Arab Spring. International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, 2(4), 310–15. Callahan, W. (1998). Comparing the Discourse of Popular Politics in Korea and China: From Civil Society to Social Movements. Korea Journal, 38(1), 277–322. Carothers, T., and Brechenmacher. S. (2014). Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire. https://carnegieendowment​ .org​ / 2014​ / 02​ /20​/closing​-space​- democracy​-and​-human​ -rights​-support​-under​-fire​-pub​-54503. Chan, A. (1997). In Search of Civil Society in China. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 27(2), 242–51. Cohen, J. L., and Andrew, A. (1992). Civil Society and Political Theory. MIT Press. Cox, R. W. (1999). Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternate World Order. Review of International Studies, 25(1), 3–29. della Porta, D. (2014). Mobilizing for Democracy: Comparing 1989 and 2011. Oxford University Press. Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press. Dönmez, R. O. (2008). Vigilantism in Turkey: Totalitarian Movements and Uncivil Society in a Post-9/11 Democracy. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 9(4), 551–73. Ehrenberg, J. (1999). Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea. New York University Press. Encarnación, O. G. (2002). Venezuela’s ‘Civil Society Coup’. World Policy Journal, 19(2), 38–48. Ferguson, A. (1995). An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Cambridge University Press. Gellner, E. (1994). Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals. Penguin Press. Giersdorf, S., and Croissant, A. (2011). Civil Society and Competitive Authoritarianism in Malaysia. Journal of Civil Society, 7(1), 1–21. janjira sombatpoonsiri

56  encyclopedia of asian politics Guan, L. H. (Ed.). (2004). Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Hadiz, V. R. (2018). Imagine All the People? Mobilising Islamic Populism for RightWing Politics in Indonesia. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48(4), 566–83. Han, R. (2018). Contesting Cyberspace in China: Online Expression and Authoritarian Resilience. Columbia University Press. Hsu, C. (2010). Beyond Civil Society: An Organizational Perspective on StateNGO Relations in the People’s Republic of China. Journal of Civil Society, 6(3), 259–77. Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press. Ivarsson, C. H. (2019). Lion’s Blood: Social Media, Everyday Nationalism and AntiMuslim Mobilisation Among SinhalaBuddhist Youth. Contemporary South Asia, 27(2), 145–59. Keane, J. (1998). Civil Society, Old Images, New Visions. Polity Press. Kopecky, P., and Mudde, C. (2003). Uncivil Society: Contentious Politics in PostCommunist Europe. Routledge. Kurtlandzick, J. (2014). Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the Worldwide Decline of Representative Government. Yale University Press. Levitsky, S., and Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press. Lewis, D. (2013). Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooptation, Contestation and Discourse. Journal of Civil Society, 9(3), 325–40. Lim, M. (2017). Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia. Critical Asian Studies, 49(3), 411–27. Lorch, J. (2006). Civil Society Under Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Myanmar. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2, 3–37. Lorch, J. (2017). Civil Society Support for Military Coups: Bangladesh and the Philippines. Journal of Civil Society, 13(2), 184–201. Lorch, J., and Bettina Bunk, B. (2017). Using Civil Society as an Authoritarian Legitimation Strategy: Algeria and janjira sombatpoonsiri

Mozambique in Comparative Perspective. Democratization, 24(6), 987–1005. Lührman, A., and Lindberg, S. (2019). A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New About It? Democratization, 26(7), 1095–113. Lührmann, A., Marguardt, K. L., and Mechkova, V. (2020). Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Accountability. American Political Science Review, 114(3), 811–20. Petrone, L. (2011). Institutionalizing Pluralism in Russia: A New Authoritarianism? Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 27(2), 166–94. Pitidol, T. (2016). Redefining Democratic Discourse in Thailand’s Civil Society. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3), 520–37. Poppe, A. E., and Wolff, J. (2017). The Contested Spaces of Civil Society in a Plural World: Norm Contestation in the Debate about Restrictions on International Civil Society Support. Contemporary Politics, 23(4), 469–88. Putnam, R. (1993). The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life. American Prospect, 13, 35–42. Richter, T. (2018). Reduced Scope for Action Worldwide for Civil Society. GIGA Focus Global Number 5. https://www​.giga​ -hamburg​.de​/en​/publication​/reduced​-scope​ -for​-action​-worldwide​-for​-civil​-society. Roth, S. (2018). Introduction: Contemporary Counter-Movements in the Age of Brexit and Trump. Sociological Research Online. DOI: 10.1177/1360780418768828. Sahoo, S. (2020, March 10). The Shrinking Democratic Space in India: Uncivil Society and an Illiberal State. Melbourne Asia Review. DOI: 10.37839/ MAR2652-550X1.11. Schneider, F. (2018). China’s Digital Nationalism. Oxford University Press. Sinpeng, A. (2019). Digital Media, Political Authoritarianism, and Internet Controls in Southeast Asia. Media Culture & Society, 42(1), 25–39. Sombatpoonsiri, J. (2020). Authoritarian Civil Society: How Anti-Democracy Activism Shapes Thailand’s Autocracy. Journal of Civil Society, 16(4), 333–50. Sombatpoonsiri, J. (2021). Buddhist Majoritarian Nationalism in Thailand:

civil society  57 Contestation, Narratives, and Activism. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 8(1), 190–92. Thayer, C. A. (2009). Vietnam and the Challenge of Political Society. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(1), 1–27. Tocqueville, A. 1994. Democracy in America: With an Introduction by Alan Ryan. Knopf. Walton, M., and Hayward, S. (2014). Contesting Buddhist Narratives: Democratization, Nationalism and Communal Violence in Myanmar. East-West Center. Welsh, A. H. (1994). Political Transition Process in Central and Eastern Europe. Comparative Politics, 24(4), 379–94. Wischermann, J., Bettina Bunk, B., Patrick Köllner, P., and Jasmin Lorch, J. (2018). Do Associations Support Authoritarian Rule? Evidence From Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam. Journal of Civil Society, 14(2), 95–115. Woldring, H. E. S. (1998). State and Civil Society in the Political Philosophy of Alexis de Tocqueville. Voluntas, 9(4), 363–73. Yabanci, B. (2019). Turkey’s Tamed Civil Society: Containment and Appropriation Under a Competitive Authoritarian Regime. Journal of Civil Society, 15(4), 258–306. Yangjue, L. (2014). Competitive Political Regime and Internet Control: Case Studies

of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Key resources Kopecky, P., and Mudde, C. (2003). Uncivil Society: Contentious Politics in Postcommunist Europe. Routledge. Poppe, A. E., and Wolff, J. (2017). The Contested Spaces of Civil Society in a Plural World: Norm Contestation in the Debate About Restrictions on International Civil Society Support. Contemporary Politics, 23(4), 469–88. Woldring, H. E. S. (1998). State and Civil Society in the Political Philosophy of Alexis de Tocqueville. Voluntas, 9(4), 363–73. In Asia Han, R. (2018). Contesting Cyberspace in China: Online Expression and Authoritarian Resilience. Columbia University Press. Lorch, J. (2006). Civil Society Under Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Myanmar. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2, 3–37. Sinpeng, A. (2019). Digital Media, Political Authoritarianism, and Internet Controls in Southeast Asia. Media Culture & Society, 42(1), 25–39.

janjira sombatpoonsiri

10. Civil wars

about 16 years on average (Dowding, 2011). Overall, from 1946 to 2020, there have been 3,728 recorded civil conflicts, 778 of which involved foreign state intervention. This greatly outnumbers conflicts between states (287) and colonial or imperial conflicts (234) (Pettersson et al., 2021; Gleditsch et al., 2002). The usage of the term civil war is in and of itself a subject of semantic contestation. Part of this is that using the term confers or denies legitimacy and/or equality between parties. Insurgents and challengers use it to claim legitimacy while incumbents use a whole variety of terms to delegitimize their opponents, such as bandits, criminals, and terrorists. After the conflict, the defeated use it to gain inclusion and political redemption while the winners use it to exclude the defeated. This shaped research on the topic, as the usage of the term until fairly recently depended on the outcome of the conflict (see, for instance, Price, 2001). Asia is one of the most civil war–prone parts of the world. Since 1945, Asian states not experiencing at least one civil war or insurgency are the exceptions, rather than the rule (Lockyer, 2018). Asia is characterized by ethnic and religious heterogeneity, different political and economic development levels, and natural resource disparities. In many parts of the region, such as Southeast Asia and South Asia, civil wars have been characterized by long and stalemated guerrilla conflicts. These protracted conflicts rarely benefitted from third-party security guarantees and peacekeeping operations after negotiated settlements and are prone to recurrence (Derouen et al., 2009). Conflicts in Asia have largely been around the issues of territory, ethnicity, religion, and ideology, as well as class, social mobility, and redistribution (Wallensteen et al., 2009; Sundar & Sundar, 2014). In Asia, civil wars have shown a splitting between and among insurgent groups, showing that both incumbents and insurgent groups within the same war are rarely unified actors. Conflicts tend to be low intensity (and therefore not always meeting the 1,000-casualty threshold) and are a mix of dyadic (government versus rebel) and nondyadic conflicts whose actors are oftentimes asymmetrical. The majority of conflicts also tend to be “sons-of-the-soil” events, where rebel groups are small and are typically outgunned. These types of conflicts are ruralbased and involve peripheral ethnic groups fighting for autonomy or secession (Möller et al., 2007).

A. The concept Civil wars are defined as armed conflicts between different groups within a nation-state for control of the state apparatus. These also include conflicts incited by groups wanting to secede from the nation-state. This definition suggests that armed combat occurs within the boundaries of a sovereign entity and that the armed parties are subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities. Armed combat implies a degree of organization and violence from both sides that serve political and other goals (Kalyvas et al., 2006). Many academics argue that what distinguishes a civil war from other internal conflicts is that civil wars require at least 1,000 casualties (Newman, 2014). Civil wars have been fought for many different reasons, from ascription (mostly ethnicity and religion) to plain powergrabbing and control over resources, with parties either seeking to capture the state or divide it. While there are variations in terms of the goals, type of actors, and resources in a civil conflict, civil wars mean the end of the monopoly of violence of the state in the face of armed internal challenge, producing a situation of divided or dual sovereignty (Tilly, 1978), which then produces a de facto territorial division. Among historians, the usage of the term “civil war” pertains to conflicts involving sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities, such as empires, city-states, and kin-based groupings, and increasingly referred to conflicts for and against state authority after 1648. Since the late Roman Empire, civil wars have been the dominant form of armed conflict. In the 19th century, civil wars almost always saw major European powers trying to quell civil conflict by backing a side in one of the many European civil wars. While European civil wars tended to be bloody yet short-lived, those in Latin America during this period tended to last longer, but with fewer deaths. The number of civil wars increased dramatically in the 20th century, with the increase in the number of nation-states as a result of the demise of colonial empires in Africa and Asia, as well as the Cold War. In the 21st century, while the number of civil wars dropped to around 30 per year (from more than 40 in the late 1990s), they tended to be longer, lasting 58

civil wars  59

B. The landscape Despite civil wars being the more dominant type of armed conflict after World War II, research on the topic began to gain more traction only in the 2000s. The main catalyst for both academic and policy work on the subject is the World Bank’s “Economics of Political and Criminal Violence” project. Civil wars were conceptualized as a development problem and economic models were used to explain the occurrence, duration, and effects of civil war. The “Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset”, the project’s main contribution, was particularly influential in shaping subsequent research. The model argues that it is not political and social grievance per se that leads to civil war but rather at a given level of grievance, the opportunity to organize and finance a rebellion determines the onset of civil war (Collier & Sambanis, 2005). Since then, civil wars have been studied extensively, with databases such as the Correlates of War (COW) project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) providing data for the study of civil wars and other forms of organized violence. In the past ten years, a lot of research has focused on Africa and Asia that examines factors that affect civil war onset, duration, post-conflict settlement, and recurrence. First, some studies examine the role of socioeconomic factors, such as levels of education, per capita income, economic growth, ethnicity, and religion in shaping conflict onset and rebel recruitment (Dowding, 2011). Second, some studies examine the role of institutions and institutional arrangements in the prevention of conflict and how states can diminish the risk of civil conflict by establishing and maintaining high-quality institutions that shape the relationship between government and citizens (see Kurtenbach & Mehler, 2013; Taydas et  al., 2010). An important part of these studies is governance arrangements during civil wars that look at the role of actors beyond government forces and rebels, such as militias, the local police, and international actors (see Kasfir et al., 2017). In particular, studies have explored the role of the international community in conflict regulation and how diplomatic, economic, and military interventions impact conflict resolution (see Wolff & Dursun-Özkanca, 2012). Third, some studies look at how political violence is framed, where civil wars are examined in

terms of how collective action frames mobilize people for various forms of contentious behavior, including organized violence (see Granzow et  al., 2015). Fourth, some studies examine post-conflict scenarios regarding the socio-economic aspects of peace, peacebuilding programs, and how former rebels are integrated into party politics in post-conflict elections (see Distler et  al., 2018; Sindre & Söderström, 2016). Because of the proliferation of civil wars in Asia, there have been many attempts to examine post-conflict settlements. Some of these studies utilize large-N programs to examine the dynamics and multi-process phase civil war settlements (see Pearson et  al., 2011) as well as specific cases studies of an area where post-conflict settlements have seen some success, such as Aceh and East Timor (Sindre, 2016). Asia’s conflicts have also seen extensive foreign power intervention, resulting in longer, deadlier civil wars. Foreign intervention and their impacts have been an important focus area for research, with attention to old great powers as well as emerging regional powers and the impacts of their attempts to manage conflicts in their immediate neighborhoods (see Destradi, 2012). Asia is also vulnerable to climate change impacts and there have been studies exploring the connection between climate variability and civil war in Asia (see Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014). Despite some successes in Asia’s post–civil war settlements, there is considerable debate on the recurrence of post-conflict violence and the factors that account for their variation within and among states (Barron, 2019). While religion, ethnicity, and ideology play important roles in civil wars in Asia, the specific role that these factors play in different contexts is still a subject of considerable disagreement (see Finnbogason & Svensson,2018).

C. Future research While the question of why civil wars occur has received much attention, little is known as to what drives the choice to pursue violent rebellion, non-violence, or conventional politics in cases where the grievances are similar. The role of democratic institutions also remains heavily debated in the literature. Research needs to be done on variations between established versus new democracies, the impacts of regime transition and political instability, the role of escalation dynamics juhn chris p. espia

60  encyclopedia of asian politics (such as social protest and low-level violence in the sequence of protest events), and the role of government repression in starting civil wars. The role of domestic “third actors”, such as militias that are active in the majority of civil wars, remains under-researched and under-theorized (Jentzsch, 2022), especially in Asia. Despite Asia’s experience of civil war almost at a similar scale to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), there have been few systematic investigations into the determinants of civil war in post-colonial Asia (see Krause & Suzuki, 2005), as many studies are country case studies or of small sections of the region. This opens up opportunities for the systematic study of civil war onset, duration, dynamics, and post-conflict settlement with the end view of creating an understanding based on the region and its states’ specificities. Juhn Chris P. Espia

of Peace Research, 39(5), 615–637. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1177​/0022343302039005007 Granzow, T., Hasenclever, A., & Sändig, J. (2015). Introduction: Framing political violence - A micro-approach to civil war studies. Civil Wars, 17(2), 113–119. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1080​/13698249​.2015​.1070448 Jentzsch, C. (2022). Violent resistance: Militia formation and civil war in Mozambique. Cambridge University Press. Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). The logic of violence in civil war. Cambridge University Press. Kasfir, N., Frerks, G., & Terpstra, N. (2017). Introduction: Armed groups and multilayered governance. Civil Wars, 19(3), 257–278. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/13698249​ .2017​.1419611 Krause, V., & Suzuki, S. (2005). Causes of civil war in Asia and sub-saharan Africa: A comparison. Social Science Quarterly, 86(1), 160–177. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​ .0038​- 4941​.2005​.00296.x Kurtenbach, S., & Mehler, A. (2013). References Introduction: Institutions for sustainable Barron, P. (2019). When violence works: peace? determinants and effects of Postconflict violence and peace in institutional choices in divided societies. Indonesia. Cornell University Press. Civil Wars, 15(sup1), 1–6. https://doi​.org​/10​ Collier, P., & Sambanis, N. (2005) .1080​/13698249​.2013​.850872 Understanding civil war: Evidence and Lockyer, A. (2018). Civil war and insurgency analysis, Volumes 1 and 2. World Bank. in Asia. Journal of Policing, Intelligence Derouen, K., Bercovitch, J., & Wei, J. (2009). and Counter Terrorism, 13(2), 142–154. Duration of peace and recurring civil wars https://doi​ . org​ / 10​ .1080​ / 18335330​ . 2018​ in southeast Asia and the pacific. Civil .1478115 Wars, 11(2), 103–120. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ Möller, F., DeRouen Jr, K., Bercovitch, J., & .1080​/13698240802631046 Wallensteen, P. (2007). The limits of peace: Destradi, S. (2012). India and Sri Lanka’s Third parties in civil wars in southeast civil war: The failure of regional conflict Asia, 1993–2004. Negotiation Journal, management in south Asia. Asian Survey, 23(4), 373–391. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​ 52(3), 595–616. https://doi​.org​/10​.1525​/as​ .1571​-9979​.2007​.00151.x .2012​.52​.3​.595 Newman, E. (2014). Understanding civil Distler, W., Stavrevska, E. B., & Vogel, B. wars: Continuity and change in intrastate (2018). Economies of peace: Economy conflict. Routledge. formation processes and outcomes in Pearson, F. S. (2011). Steps toward peace conflict-affected societies. Civil Wars, in civil wars in the Asia-pacific region: 20(2), 139–150. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​ A disaggregate approach to civil war /13698249​.2018​.1500164 settlements. International Negotiation Dowding, K. (2011). Encyclopedia of power. (Hague, Netherlands), 16(1), 39–68. https:// SAGE Publications. doi​.org​/10​.1163​/157180611X553863 Finnbogason, D., & Svensson, I. (2018). Pettersson, T., Davies, S., Deniz, A., Engström, The missing jihad. Why have there been G., Hawach, N., Högbladh, S., & Öberg, M. no jihadist civil wars in southeast Asia? S. M. (2021). Organized violence 1989– Pacific Review, 31(1), 96–115. https://doi​ 2020, with a special emphasis on Syria. .org​/10​.1080​/09512748​.2017​.1325391 Journal of Peace Research, 58(4), 809–825. Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/00223433211026126 Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed Price, J. J. (2001). Thucydides and internal conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset. Journal war. Cambridge University Press. juhn chris p. espia

civil wars  61 Sindre, G. M. (2016). Internal party democracy in former rebel parties. Party Politics, 22(4), 501–511. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1177​/1354068814550436 Sindre, G. M., & Söderström, J. (2016). Understanding armed groups and party politics. Civil Wars, 18(2), 109–117. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1080​/13698249​.2016​.1205559 Sundar, A., & Sundar, N. (2014). Civil wars in south Asia: State, sovereignty, development. SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd. https://doi​.org​/10​.4135​/978935150 8052 Taydas, Z., Peksen, D., & James, P. (2010). Why do civil wars occur? Understanding the importance of institutional quality. Civil Wars, 12(3), 195–217. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1080​/13698249​.2010​.509544 Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. McGraw-Hill. Wallensteen, P., DeRouen, K., Bercovitch, J., & Möller, F. (2009). Democracy and mediation in territorial civil wars in southeast Asia and the south pacific. Asia Europe Journal, 7(2), 241. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1007​/s10308​-009​-0229-z Wischnath, G., & Buhaug, H. (2014). On climate variability and civil war in Asia. Climatic Change, 122(4), 709–721. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1007​/s10584​-013​-1004-0 Wolff, S., & Dursun-Özkanca, O. (2012). Regional and international conflict

regulation: Diplomatic, economic and military interventions. Civil Wars, 14(3), 297–323. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/13698249​ .2012​.706948

Key resources Key references on the concept Kalyvas, S. (2006). The logic of violence in civil war. Cambridge University Press. Newman, E. (2014). Understanding civil wars: Continuity and change in intrastate conflict. Routledge. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). (2022). Uppsala conflict database.​https:/​/ www​.pcr​.uu​.se​/research ​/ucdp​/ucdp​​-data/ In Asia Krause, V., & Suzuki, S. (2005). Causes of civil war in Asia and sub-saharan Africa: A comparison. Social Science Quarterly, 86(1), 160–177. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​ .0038​- 4941​.2005​.00296.x Lockyer, A. (2018). Civil war and insurgency in Asia. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 13(2), 142–154. https://doi​ . org​ / 10​ .1080​ / 18335330​ . 2018​ .1478115 Sundar, A., & Sundar, N. (2014). Civil wars in south Asia: State, sovereignty, development. SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd. https://doi​.org​/10​.4135​/9789351508052

juhn chris p. espia

11. Constitutions

(1963) notes, democracy came after constitutions. Autocracies such as the Soviet Union and China also have constitutions. However, there is a key distinction between constitutions in autocracies and democracies. The concept of constitutional government or constitutionalism, usually associated with democracies, is often described as ‘limited government’ or a system wherein the fundamental function of the constitution is to restrain the government from violating the rights of its citizens (Mahler, 2013; Colomer, 2006; Lerner, 2011; Paine, 2008). Therefore, even though the Soviet Union may have had a constitution, it would still not be classified as a constitutional government as there was no ‘effective’ limitation on the government’s power (Mahler, 2013). Constitutions can be either written or unwritten. A written constitution is one single document which spells out the rules of the game and most political systems tend to have a written constitution. An unwritten constitution is a collection of numerous different documents that are not codified into a single document. For example, the UK and New Zealand may be characterised as having an unwritten constitution as they lack a single document which sets out the basic framework for the legal and political system in these countries (Rishworth, 2016; McBain, 2022). However, some scholars prefer the term ‘uncodified’ constitution instead of an unwritten constitution (Garnett & Lynch, 2012). For instance, the British constitution is a set of documents which have been written but not codified and formalised into a single document (Garnett & Lynch, 2012). Constitutions also differ based on how difficult or easy it is to amend or modify the rules of the game. In some cases, constitutional rules and constitutional provisions require a higher bar, such as a two-thirds majority in the legislature, than just a simple majority used for ordinary legislation. This is sometimes referred to as ‘entrenchment’, a rigid process which makes it more difficult to amend these constitutional rules (Levinson, 1995). Flexible constitutions, on the other hand, are amended easily and sometimes require only a simple majority in order to be amended. Lijphart (1999), in his typology of political systems, associates rigid constitutions as being a feature of the consensus model of democracy and flexible constitutions as being a feature of the Westminster or majoritarian model of democracy.

A. The concept Constitutions are often referred to as ‘the rules of the game’ or ‘power maps’ in political science (Duchacek, 1973; Lerner, 2011). Samuels (2013, p. 66) defines a constitution as ‘a set of key laws and principles that structure the extent and distribution of government authority and individual rights, by setting up the rules of the political game’. A constitution is the basic framework of a political system. It tells us how power is distributed within a system, the limitations on the power of the state within a system, and the fundamental rights that are given to the citizens of the state (Mahler, 2013). Constitutions also outline the process through which laws can be enacted and amended by laying out the ‘legal framework of political order’ (Lerner, 2011). In political science, the study of constitutions has evolved since Aristotle first defined constitutions as a way of ‘organising’ the city’s inhabitants. Kelsen (1961) draws a distinction between formal constitutions, such as those that were written and enacted through an act of parliament, and material constitutions, which were informal norms such as conventions that formed the basis on which political power and political order is organised. Constitutions in earlier times were material constitutions which merely ‘reflected’ the existing legal and political practices (Lerner, 2011). The drafting of the US Constitution is regarded as a pivotal moment after which the focus shifted to modern formal constitutions (Lerner, 2011). Going beyond merely spelling out the existing legal and political practices, formal constitutions were a ‘conscious formulation by people of its fundamental law’ (McIlwain, 2005, p. 3). Colomer (2006) notes that this evolution in the study and practice of constitution-making took place in line with the expansion of universal suffrage and an increase in democratisation. During the 19th and 20th centuries, a formal constitution became the norm in politics to the extent that the introduction of a regime or a change of the regime is ‘inconceivable’ without the drafting of a constitution (Lerner, 2011). It is vital to note that constitutions are not just found in democratic systems, but they are increasingly prevalent in non-democratic regimes as well (Colomer, 2006). As Strong 62

constitutions  63 As stated earlier, a constitution will lay out the rules of the game of a political system. However, not all aspects of a political system are always specified in the constitution. For instance, the US Constitution does not mention political parties, the office of the Prime Minister is not mentioned in Canada’s Constitution, and the British Constitution does not explicitly specify how the Prime Minister should discharge his duties (Mahler, 2013; Jackson & Jackson, 2001; Garnett & Lynch, 2012). Yet, the functioning of these political systems is inconceivable without the presence of political parties or a Prime Minister. It is vital to note that different constitutional rules will produce different effects. These rules determine the distribution of benefits in a political system; they condition the behaviour of political actors and, crucially, the resulting consequences also differ across political systems. For example, Finer (1979, p. 15) notes that ‘constitutions are codes of rules which aspire to regulate the allocation of functions, powers, and duties among the various agencies and officers of the government, and define the relationship between these and the public’. Depending on the constitutional rules that have been chosen, the allocation of power among government organs will be different across political systems. Certain rules may result in the creation of a Westminster-style parliamentary regime wherein parliament is supreme, there is no separation of powers, and the executive is drawn from the legislature (Lijphart, 1992, 1999; Cheibub & Limongi, 2002). Alternatively, constitution rules may specify the creation of a presidential system wherein the president is elected separately from the legislature. This system operates on the principle of separation of powers in order to ensure ‘checks and balances’, thereby dispersing power between the various branches of government (Neustadt, 1991; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Przeworski et al., 2000). Other regimes, such as a semi-presidential system which has both a president and a prime minister exercising executive power, may also emerge based on the rules of the game specified in the constitution (Cheibub & Chernykh, 2009). A constitution will determine whether a political system is federal or unitary. A constitution will also specify which government body has the ‘final word’ on policymaking (Lijphart, 1999). Constitutions will determine whether a political system functions on the basis of

parliamentary sovereignty or judicial review (Lijphart, 1999). Whereas the former allows parliament to have the final say about the constitutionality of the legislation that it enacts, under judicial review, a supreme court or a constitutional court is the institution responsible for determining the constitutionality of legislation (Lijphart, 1999). In such systems, a court can strike off legislation enacted by parliament if it deems such legislation to be in violation of the constitution. Finer’s (1979, p. 15) definition of constitutions discussed above also states that the constitution defines the relationship between the government and the people. In democracies, elections are mediums through which interaction between the government and the public takes place (Colomer, 2006). Depending on the constitutional arrangement which has been chosen, different electoral rules may be enforced, and the effect of these rules also varies. Some systems may have a singlemember plurality or a ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system. Some systems may have a proportional election system where the percentage of votes received by parties closely matches the percentage of seats allocated to these parties in the legislature. Some systems may also have a mixed electoral system, combining elements of both the majoritarian and proportional systems. The type of electoral system will determine the nature of the party system, which in turn will affect the relationship between the executive and the legislature examined previously (Rae, 1967; Pedersen, 1997; Duverger, 1954, 1964; Colomer, 2006; Chiebub & Limongi, 2002). For instance, plurality or majoritarian electoral rules tend to create two-party systems whereas proportional rules often result in multiparty systems. Different regimes will produce different outcomes, such as concentration of power or dispersion of power (Lijphart, 1999). Parliamentary systems with plurality electoral rules, where one party is able to control the legislature and form the government, are examples of regimes which concentrate power in the hands of a few actors. Presidential systems with checks and balances and separation of powers, or parliamentary systems wherein proportional electoral rules are in place and multiple parties have to form coalition governments, are examples of systems where power is dispersed among several political actors. Colomer (2006, p. 226) introduces a typology of constitutional regimes to account for the neel vanvari

64  encyclopedia of asian politics various types of electoral rules and government structures as well as how these regimes concentrate or disperse political power: electoral (1) Parliamentary-proportional rules. (2) US-style presidential checks and balances. (3) Semi-presidential. (4) Presidentialist systems found in Latin America. (5) Parliamentary-majority electoral rules. The power structure put in place by a constitution has several implications and ‘different constitutional formulas have different consequences on politics, policies and the polity’ (Colomer, 2006, p. 226). Constitutions affect the stability, efficacy, and legitimacy of the political system. For instance, a parliamentary system that has proportional electoral rules will result in a governance structure that has multiple parties in government. Consequently, parties will have to agree on policies through negotiation and compromise. This system may disperse power among multiple different actors, thereby enhancing equitability and representation of a broader range of interests in policymaking. However, scholars have found that coalition cabinets and multiparty governments tend to be unstable as they are more susceptible to coalition splits and disagreements between the parties in government, thereby resulting in a shorter lifespan of the cabinet and the government (Roberston, 1983; Midlarsky, 1984; Shomer, Rasch, & Akirav, 2021; Fisher, Dowding, & Dumont, 2012). On the other hand, parliamentary systems with majoritarian electoral rules that result in one-party governments may lack the same level of equity and representation at the policy level compared to multiparty cabinets, but they are associated with being relatively more stable and enduring (Laver & Schofield, 1998; Muller & Strom, 2003; Cheibub & Limongi, 2002). There is a trade-off here between efficiency and equity. A single-party cabinet in a parliamentary system under plurality rules may be more efficient as decision-making is more streamlined due to a single party being involved in decision-making. A multiparty cabinet in a parliamentary system under proportional rules, on the other hand, will score higher in terms of equity as more voices from different parties are present at the cabinet neel vanvari

table. But, as discussed above, these cabinets have shorter lifespans and may not be as effective as single-party cabinets. Similarly, a US-style presidential system may disperse power between the different branches of government through separation of powers. The inbuilt checks and balances in this system also aim to ensure that, unlike parliamentary systems, no one branch of government can dominate the others. These checks and balances were designed with the aim of finding a balance between limited government and effective government which is also called ‘Madison’s Dilemma’ (Samuels, 2013). However, as elections for the president and the legislature are separate in these systems, the president’s party may not always be in control of the legislature, resulting in a ‘divided’ government (Cheibub & Limongi, 2002). Divided governments may result in policy gridlock and adversely affect policymaking. Constitutions therefore determine the number of ‘veto-players’ in a political system (Colomer, 2006; Tsebelis, 2002). Different regimes will have a different number of vetoplayers with different consequences for policymaking. Some systems will place emphasis on efficiency by reducing the number of vetoplayers whereas other systems may focus on equity by increasing the number of veto-players to disperse power and bring in a broader range of interests into the policymaking process. In political science, ‘comparative constitutional engineering’ emerged as an area of study in the early 1990s after Horowitz used the term to describe the creation of institutions in South Africa (Horowitz, 1991; Qvortrup, 2018). Scholars in this area of comparative constitutional engineering examine how constitutions and institutions shape all aspects of political behaviour and policymaking across different political systems (Horowitz, 1991; Qvortrup, 2018; Lijphart, 1999; Sartori, 1997). Since the late 1990s, scholars have also been interested in how constitutions and the institutions they create affect the process of democratic consolidation in those countries which transitioned to democracy during the third wave of democratisation (Easter, 1997; Frye, 1997; Bunce, 2003; Huber & Powell, 1994). Numerous studies also examine whether certain constitutional designs result in low levels of political violence and how constitutionmaking occurs in intensely polarised societies wherein no prior consensus about the

constitutions  65 rules of the game exists among key groups (Fortin, 2008; Rubin, 2004; Qvortrup, 2018; Piazza, 2007; Lerner, 2011; Li, 2005). Constitutions in Asia are incredibly diverse. Countries in Asia function under parliamentary (ex-India and Japan), presidential (ex-Indonesia and the Philippines), and semipresidential systems (ex-Taiwan). Similarly, a diverse range of electoral rules are also found in countries across Asia. In addition, Asia has several non-democratic regimes such as absolute monarchies (Brunei Darussalam) and autocratic one-party states (China) which also have constitutions.

B. The landscape Given the sheer diversity of constitutions in Asia, the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) is a useful dataset on constitutions. The CCP includes timelines for constitutions across Asia, including when they were changed or amended. The CCP dataset also has a detailed ranking system for constitutions which scores constitutions on various parameters such as executive power, legislative power, and the number of rights in a constitution. In recent years, several comparative studies on Asian constitutional regimes and constitutionalism have emerged. Although some studies examine aspects of constitutions across different regions of Asia (Williams, 2014), studies usually tend to compare constitutions within the same subregions of Asia, such as Southeast Asia and South Asia (Hill & Menzel, 2008, 2009; Neo & Bui, 2019 Tushnet & Khosla, 2015; Khilnani, Raghavan, & Thiruvengadam, 2013). Earlier works on Asian constitutionalism did not adequately focus on South Asia. Recent studies have rectified this and there a numerous studies now on comparative constitutionalism in South Asia. Tushnet and Khosla (2015) argue that ‘unstable constitutionalism’ exists in South Asia. They examine the legal and political factors influencing this unstable constitutionalism in South Asia (Tushnet & Khosla, 2015). Khilnani, Raghavan, and Thiruvengadam’s (2013) study examines several aspects of constitutionalism in South Asia such as the role of the judiciaries, personal laws, the flexibility or rigidity of constitutions, as well as similarities in the constitutions, political structures, and legal systems of countries in the region.

Studies also focus on factors which influence constitution-making and constitutionalism in Asia. Go (2019) examines the impact of colonialism on constitutions across Asia. After the Second World War and the retreat of colonialism, several newly independent states emerged in Asia. Go (2019, p. 109) argues that these postcolonial constitutions in Asia reproduced or imitated the governance structures of their colonial masters and there existed an ‘intraimperial isomorpherism between the constitutions of the postcolonial state and former colonial powers’. Scholars have also studied the impact of religion on constitutions in Asia. For instance, Whitecross (2012), in his examination of the newly adopted 2008 constitution of Bhutan, notes the extensive influence of Buddhism and Buddhist teachings on the constitution. Similarly, scholars have also examined how cultural factors have influenced constitutions in Asia. For example, some scholars examine the effect of Confucian values on citizens’ views, social attitudes, and elite perceptions of democracy and how these subsequently influence constitutions and constitution-making in East Asia (Shi & Lu, 2010; Kim, 2016). Another strand of research looks at the concept of constitutional durability and why certain countries are able to have constitutional regimes which last longer than others. These studies examine why some countries change their constitutions more frequently than others. As an example, Pakistan and Thailand are two countries in Asia which have frequently changed their constitutions (Dressel, 2009; Ahmed, 2017). Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2009), in their study on the ‘endurance’ of national constitutions across various political systems, compare the factors which enabled India’s constitution to be more longlasting and stable than that of neighbouring Pakistan. Some studies have also studied constitutions in Asia by applying existing typologies of constitutional regimes to Asian countries. For instance, Croissant and Schächter ( 2010) use Lijphart’s (1999) typology of majoritarian and consensus models of democracy to examine whether countries in Asia conform to this typology. They find that the eight Asian countries examined in their study do not conform to Lijphart’s majoritarian-consensus model typology. Partly as a consequence of colonialism, countries in Asia have diverse populations and studies have also examined neel vanvari

66  encyclopedia of asian politics how constitutions deal with representation in Asia. Croissant (2014) examines whether constitutional democracies in Southeast Asia are more representative than authoritarian regimes and finds that countries transitioning to democracy have not always had an inclusive constitution drafting process. Neo and Bui’s (2019) study examines how constitutions in Southeast Asia have developed mechanisms beyond just institutional factors to accommodate these various aspects of ethnic, religious, and ideational pluralisms prevalent in the region.

C. Future research Constitutions across Asia are diverse and the study of constitutions has also covered an array of topics by adopting various approaches. In terms of future research, academic research on constitutions would benefit from more pan-Asian studies which go beyond comparing constitutions of countries in their own sub-regions. Another area of future research would be examining how democratic recession affects constitutions and constitutionmaking across Asia. Like the rest of the world, in the past decade, there has been a noticeable trend towards democratic backsliding in Asia. Autocracies are increasingly becoming more attractive to some than democracies because they seem to be performing better in terms of managing economic, political, and social challenges. Studying the implication of democratic backsliding on constitutions and constitutional government in Asia is vital as aspects of democratic backsliding impinge on the ability of constitutions to perform several functions. Neel Vanvari

References Ahmed, I. (2017). ‘Strategic constitutions’: Constitutional change and politics in Pakistan. South Asia, 40(3), 481–499. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/ 00856401​. 2017​ .1332712 Bunce, V. (2003). Rethinking recent democratization: Lessons from the postcommunist experience. World Politics, 55, 167–192. Cheibub, J. A., & Chernykh, S. (2009). Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance? Constitutional Political Economy, 20, 202–229. neel vanvari

Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2002). Democratic institutions and regime survival: Parliamentary and presidential democracies reconsidered. Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 151–179. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1146​/annurev​.polisci​.5​.102301​ .084508 Colomer, J. M. (2006). Comparative constitutions. In R. A. W. Rhodes, S. Binder, & B. Rockman (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (pp. 218–238). Oxford University Press. Croissant, A. (2014). Ways of constitutionmaking in Southeast Asia: Actors, interests, dynamics. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 23–50. Croissant, A., & Schächter, T. (2010). Institutional patterns in the new democracies of Asia: Forms, origins and consequences. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 11(2), 173–197. Dressel, B. (2009). Thailand’s elusive quest for a workable constitution, 1997–2007. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(2), 296– 325. https://doi​.org​/10​.1355​/cs31​-2e Duchacek, I. D. (1973). Power Maps: Comparative Politics of Constitutions. ABC-Clio. Duverger, M. (1954). Political Parties. Wiley. Duverger, M. (1964). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (B. North & R. North, Trans). Methuen & Co. Ltd. Easter, G. M. (1997). Preference for presidentialism: Post-communist regime change in Russia and the NIS. World Politics, 49, 184–211. Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T., & Melton, J. (2009). The Endurance of National Constitutions. Cambridge University Press. Finer, S. E. (Ed.). (1979). Five Constitutions. Harvester Press. Fischer, J., Dowding, K., & Dumont, P. (2012). The duration and durability of cabinet ministers. International Political Science Review, 33(5), 505–519. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1177​/0192512112462971 Fortin, J. (2008). Patterns of democracy?: Counterevidence from nineteen postcommunist countries. Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 2(2), 198–220. https://doi​.org​/10​.1007​/s12286​ -008​-0014-1 Frye, T. (1997). A politics of institutional choice: Post-communist presidencies. Comparative Political Studies, 30, 523–552.

constitutions  67 Garnett, M., & Lynch, P. (2012). Exploring British Politics. Pearson. Go, J. (2019). Modeling states and sovereignty: Postcolonial constitutions in Asia and Africa. In C. J. Lee & V. Prashad (Eds.), Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Movement and Its Political Afterlives (pp. 107–142). Ohio University Press. Hill, C., & Menzel, J. (2008). Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Hill, C., & Menzel, J. (2009). Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia: Cross-Cutting Issues. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Horowitz, D. (1991). A Democratic South Africa: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society. University of California Press. Huber, J. D., & Powell, G. B. (1994). Congruence between citizens and policymakers in two visions of liberal democracy. World Politics, 46(3), 291–326. https://doi​.org​/10​.2307​/2950684 Jackson, J., & Jackson, D. (2001). Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions, Behavior and Public Policy. Prentice Hall Canada. Kelsen, H. (1961). General Theory of Law and State. Russell and Russell. Khilnani, S., Raghavan, V., & Thiruvengadam, A. K. (Eds.). (2013). Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia. Oxford University Press. Kim, S. (2016). Public Reason Confucianism: Democratic Perfectionism and Constitutionalism in East Asia. Cambridge University Press. Laver, M., & Schofield, N. (1998). Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. University of Michigan Press. Lerner, H. (2011). Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies. Cambridge University Press. Levinson, S. (Ed.). (1995). Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment. Princeton University Press. Li, Q. (2005). Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents? The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(2), 278–297. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /0022002704272830 Lijphart, A. (1992). Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government. Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press. Mahler, G. S. (2013). Principles of Comparative Politics. Pearson. McBain, G. (2022). Modernising the UK constitution - Draft legislation. Journal of Politics and Law (Toronto), 15(4), 110. https://doi​.org​/10​.5539​/jpl​.v15n4p110 McIlwain, C. H. (2005). Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. Midlarsky, M. I. (1984). Political stability of two-party and multiparty systems: Probabilistic bases for the comparison of party systems. The American Political Science Review, 78(4), 929–951. https://doi​ .org​/10​.2307​/1955799 Müller, W. C., & Strom, K. (Eds.). (2003). Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford University Press. Neo, J. L., & Bui, N. S. (Eds.). (2019). Pluralist Constitutions in Southeast Asia. Bloomsbury Publishing. Neustadt, R. E. (1991). Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership From Roosevelt to Reagan. Simon and Schuster. Paine, T. (2008). Rights of Man, Common Sense, and Other Political Writings. Oxford University Press. Pedersen, M. N. (1997). The dynamics of European party systems: Changing patterns of electoral volatility. European Journal of Political Research, 31(1–2), 83–97. Piazza, J. A. (2007). Draining the swamp: Democracy promotion, state failure, and terrorism in 19 middle eastern countries. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30(6), 521–539. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​ /10576100701329576 Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (No. 3). Cambridge University Press. Qvortrup, M. (2018). The logic of constitutional engineering: Institutional design and counterterrorism from Aristotle to Arend Lijphart. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 41(2), 96–108. Rae, D. W. (1967). The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. Yale University Press. Rishworth, P. (2016). Writing things unwritten: Common law in New Zealand’s neel vanvari

68  encyclopedia of asian politics constitution. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 14(1), 137–155. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1093​/icon​/mow005 Robertson, J. D. (1983). The political economy and the durability of European coalition cabinets: New variations on a game-theoretic perspective. The Journal of Politics, 45(4), 932–957. https://doi​.org​/10​ .2307​/2130419 Rubin, B. R. (2004). Crafting a constitution for Afghanistan. Journal of Democracy, 15(3), 5–19. Samuels, D. J. (2013). Comparative Politics. Pearson. Sartori, G. (1997). Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. New York University Press. Shi, T., & Lu, J. (2010). The meanings of democracy: The shadow of confucianism. Journal of Democracy, 21(4), 123–130. Shomer, Y., Rasch, B. E., & Akirav, O. (2021). Termination of parliamentary governments: Revised definitions and implications. West European Politics, 45(3), 550–575. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1080​/01402382​.2021​.1997498 Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. M. (1992). Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge University Press. Strong, C. F. (1963). A History of Modern Political Constitutions. Capricorn. Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players. Princeton University Press. Tushnet, M., & Khosla, M. (Eds.). (2015). Unstable Constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia. Cambridge University Press.

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Whitecross, R. W. (2012). Separating religion and politics? Buddhism and Bhutanese constitution. In S. Khilnani, V. Raghavan, & A. K. Thiruvengadam (Eds.), Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia (pp. 116– 144). Oxford University Press. Williams, S. H. (Ed.). (2014). Social Difference and Constitutionalism in PanAsia. Cambridge University Press.

Key resources Comparative Constitutions Project Dataset. https://com​para​tive​cons​titu​tion​sproject​.org​ /ccp​-rankings/​#indices Levinson, S. (Ed.). (1995). Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment. Princeton University Press. Sartori, G. (1997). Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. New York University Press. In Asia Croissant, A., & Schächter, T. (2010). Institutional patterns in the new democracies of Asia: Forms, origins and consequences. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 11(2), 173–197. Khilnani, S., Raghavan, V., & Thiruvengadam, A. K. (Eds.). (2013). Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia. Oxford University Press. Neo, J. L., & Bui, N. S. (Eds.). (2019). Pluralist Constitutions in Southeast Asia. Bloomsbury Publishing.

12. Courts and judicial systems

and judicial institutions (Volcansek, 2019). Most of the judicial systems were structured around the three major legal traditions in the world: common law, civil law, and religious law. Glendon, Gordon, and Carozza (1999, p. 262) aver that “the fabric of common law is its precedent, and the vast number of volumes of ‘unwritten’ law is the foremost distinguishing feature of the common law tradition.” The principle of precedent holds that current situations that are similar in facts to previous cases should be decided similarly (Yap, 2015). However, since these precedents were judge-made, courts usually have much discretion in interpreting them. Most AngloAmerican nations are wedded to the common law tradition. The civil law tradition provides lesser autonomy to the judge as laws enacted by legislators, and authorities are considered the most important law sources. The civil law system tends to constrain judicial discretion as courts are expected to follow the specifically codified laws by legislatures and administrative agencies. Meanwhile, religious legal traditions usually have some sacred text that guides and determines judicial decision-making, like Sharia Law, primarily based on the Quran, the Jewish Halakhah, and Christian Canon Law (Ishiyama, 2012). For the study of court systems in Asia, it is also important to understand socialist legal systems whose judicial institutions have been hewn and operated along Marxist and Leninist lines (Nicholson, 2015). Thus, critical documents of the Communist Party and their directives and policies “serve as key tools for the judges” (Yeh & Chang, 2015, p. 47).

A. The concept In a given polity, the judiciary has the crucial task of rendering authoritative verdicts on disputes and social questions (Volcansek, 2019; Jhaveri, 2022). Disputes in a collective inevitably arise due to conflicting claims over material and ideal resources. When human actions are governed by the rule of law rather than the rule of person or power, actions are bounded, and disagreements are managed. The courts allow the flourishing of liberty by providing mechanisms for governance and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Dressel, 2014). Unfortunately, “few academic works have provided systematic and contextual analyses of Asian courts and their changing functions” (Yeh & Chang, 2015, p. 3). Shapiro (1981) contended that the judicial system could be best understood as part of the progression of the human system of triadic conflict resolution, from good offices to mediation to adjudication. Compared to the other dispute settlement instruments, adjudication is characterized by the resolution of disputes through “a permanent judicial body, with fixed rules of procedure and the power to issue binding judgments” (Hernandez, 2019, p. 308). The judges in a court can impose their judgments on the disputants whether they agree with them or not. Courts fulfill other functions in society besides the settlement of disputes (Shetstreet, 2017; Yap, 2017). Judiciaries are also instruments of social control. Together with domestic policing institutions, judges help ensure that those who violate the law are made accountable and, if warranted, punished. They are also involved in secondary social control. “Teaching, admonishing, rehabilitating is equally important. The thief who is caught and dragged before a court is not merely controlled; he is taught a lesson” (Friedman, 1975, p. 18). Finally, courts participate in law-making as well. They help construct the rules and processes that govern our lives by interpreting vague legal provisions or invalidating legislation through the power of judicial review (Chen, 2014; Ginsburg, 2008; Jhaveri, 2022). Even though courts worldwide share similar functions, there are considerable differences in legal traditions that shape administrative

B. The landscape Judiciaries in Asia have become central players in political processes in both national and international contexts (Harding & Bui, 2016). Vigorous actuations by the high courts of India and the Philippines were long considered outliers, but that is no longer the case. Ginsburg (2012, p. 720) noted that there were two driving forces in the polities of states in the past generation: democratization and judicialization. Hirschl (2006, p. 721) defined judicialization as the “ever-accelerating reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, and political controversies.” Much of the writings for the past ten years have been attempts to trace the extent, scope, and impact of this 69

70  encyclopedia of asian politics “global expansion of judicial power” (Tate & Vallinder, 1995). The dominant work in this research field remains on the dynamics of judicial politics in established or dynamic democracies (Yap, 2017; Lin & Ginsburg, 2021). These are entities where democratic governance has more robust roots, with political parties that effectively compete for power and where authority transfers are routine, factors crucial to promoting judicial independence and empowerment (Tate, 1995). For example, published research on India demonstrated that institutional protections like the security of tenure and fiscal autonomy, as well as public support, can allow judiciaries to effectively constrain governmental behavior (Krishnan, 2015; Abeyratne, 2017). The Indian Supreme Court acted spiritedly on spaces when political actors would not, including on issues of corruption and felonious behavior in the electoral process. Yap (2018, p. 33) contended that “the Supreme Court of India has taken upon itself the responsibility of compelling action when the political actors are in serious and chronic default.” The possibilities opened up by the dilution of the power of other actors to sanction judges allowed courts to emerge as powerful, independent actors in South Korea (Kim, 2015; Kim Seong Hak, 2015), Taiwan (Chang, 2015; Dalla Pelegrina, Garoupa, & Lin, 2012), and Mongolia (Amersanaa, 2015). Meanwhile, interest groups in Asia have also seen the potential of the judiciary for realizing its objectives and rights protection in what was detailed before by Epp (1998) in his comparative work on the “rights revolution.” The effects of the interaction of public support, interest action, and political space on judicial empowerment were seen in the Philippines (Escresa & Garoupa, 2013; Pangalangan, 2015) and Sri Lanka (Ratnapala, 2017). Finally, it is important to point out that ideational variables can still influence judiciaries despite the spaces and opportunities provided by the political system. For example, the research work on Japan (Kawagishi, 2015; Matsui, 2017) continues to portray its High Court taking restraintist and conservative positions about other political players. The published research on the dominant party and fragile democracies illuminates how the diminution of institutional restrictions can affect judicial behavior. Bereft of the institutional protections enjoyed by their counterparts in dynamic democracies, courts rodelio c. manacsa

and judges need to pay due attention to the preferences of other political players. This was demonstrated in research on single-party democracies like Singapore (Chua & Haynie, 2016; Rajah, 2012; Tan, 2015) and Malaysia (Choong, 2015; Lee & Foo, 2017). Within these policies, judges learn to work on those that lie outside the ambit of the core interests of political power-holders. This is due to the potency of the possible retaliation, which may involve the closure of the courts, the return of the military, or the emaciation of the emerging democratic space. The difficulties and possibilities available to judicial personnel in these contexts were demonstrated in Thailand (Pimentel, 2016; Pruksacholavit & Garoupa, 2016; Satayanurug & Nakornin, 2015), Pakistan (Yap, 2017), Indonesia (Hosen, 2017; Juwana, 2015), and Bangladesh (Hogue 2015; Islam, 2017). The literature on judiciaries in authoritarian polities, whether socialist systems like China (Chen & Li, 2021), monarchies like Brunei (Black, 2017), or military governments like Myanmar (Epling, 2016), provide analyses of the judicial roles in contexts characterized by domination. Judges under authoritarian regimes operate in an insecure environment: judges’ jobs are insecure, the state can ignore them, and threats to their safety are legitimate concerns. The published research on Communist China (Fu, 2016; Gu, 2015) and Vietnam (Nicholson, 2015) demonstrates how powerholders wielded the courts to maintain social control, marginalize opponents, and legitimize the regime. However, studies indicate that openings have emerged in those dire settings that provided opportunities for some judicial discretion (Moustafa, 2014). For example, globalization brought to the fore the need to provide some insulation to the judiciary to secure global investment and trade (Li, 2018). This allowed the courts to become “a forum established for strategic reasons with the potential to facilitate activities that undermine the regime” (Ginsburg, 2012, p. 723; Feng, 2017; Lo, 2015; Wang, 2014). Besides these single-case studies, comparative assessments of judicial politics have also been done, with most works on apex courts like Constitutional Courts (Chen & Hardin, 2018; Dressel, 2012, Harding & Nicholson, 2011; Lee & Pittard, 2017; Tew, 2020; Yeh & Chang, 2015). Comparison can increase our ability to generalize, so the proposals of Driscoll (2021) and Gill and Zorn (2021)

courts and judicial systems  71 to help overcome obstacles to comparative research have the potential to help comparativists enrich the current landscape. Several data collection projects have been released to facilitate the cross-national examination of the judicial process. The first one is the High Courts Database (HCJD). The dataset mainly contained countries with a common law tradition, including India and the Philippines. It includes data on the litigants’ characteristics, the issue’s nature, and the case’s disposition, among others (Haynie et al., 2007). Another valuable data source for comparative work is the Variety of Democracies (VDM) project which employs expert surveys to investigate various institutions, including the courts (Coppedge et  al., 2019). Finally, for scholars interested in the de jure comparative examination of constitutions in the world, the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) has data on the fundamental laws of several states (Elkins, Ginsburg, & Melton, 2014).

C. Future research The objective of the final section is to map the areas where our substantive knowledge of courts and judiciaries needs more robust data collection or systemic investigation. The first gap in the literature is theory construction and empirical analyses of judiciaries at levels lower than the full court, like individual justices or the coalitions they make. By moving the study to lower levels of analysis, like the level of the individual judge, additional leverage is gained in tracking the effects of a host of significant factors (Barry, 2020; Dalla Pelegrina & Garoupa, 2014; Dressel, Sanchez-Uribarri, & Stroh, 2017; Rachlinski & Wistrich, 2017). A second area that would benefit from scholars of courts and judiciaries is the development and incorporation of improved measures of legal variables in empirical studies. Attitudinalists contend that the legal justification is a public edifice concocted by a judge to support a conclusion on fact patterns reached on other grounds like ideology (Kornhauser, 2021, pp. 31–2). Thus, understanding judicial decision-making demands suitable measures of legal variables to measure their impact (Lax, 2011; Pang et al., 2012). Finally, much of the focus of analytical work on the region is on what Kornhauser (2021, p. 18) referred to as apex courts, “a court of last resort that typically sits atop a judicial

hierarchy.” The heightened interest in these legal institutions is understandable, given their potential role in the policy process and the generation of outcomes that can have political and constitutional significance. However, an intentional and systematic pivot to the decision-making and processes in the lower courts (e.g., courts of first instance, appeals courts) will allow us to understand inter-court dynamics and their concomitant issues and concerns. These courts also tend to be the ones that are accessed by the general citizenry, and understanding their processes and actions is vital to the delivery of justice and the consolidation of the rule of law in any given polity. Rodelio C. Manacsa

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72  encyclopedia of asian politics Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M. S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., & Lührmann, A. (2019). The V-Dem Dataset. https://www​.v​-dem​.net​/ data​/the​-v​-dem​-dataset/. Dalla Pellegrina, L., Escresa, L., & Garoupa, N. (2014). Measuring Judicial Ideal Points in New Democracies: The Case of the Philippines. Asian Journal of Law and Society, 1, 125–164. Dalla Pellegrina, L., Garoupa, N., & Lin, S. (2012). Judicial Ideal Points in New Democracies: The Case of Taiwan. National Taiwan University Law Review, 7, 123–166. Dressel, B. (Ed.). (2012). The Judicialization of Politics in Asia. Routledge. Dressel, B. (2014). Governance, Courts, and Politics in Asia. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 44, 259–278. Dressel, B., Sanchez-Uribarri, R., & Alexander Stroh, A. (2017). The Informal Dimension of Judicial Politics: A Relational Perspective. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 13, 413–430. Driscoll, A. (2021). Chapter 14: Comparative Studies of Judicial Behavior. In N. Garoupa, R. Gill, & L. Tiede (Eds.), The High Courts in Global Perspective. University of Virginia Press. Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T., & Melton, J. (2014). The Comparative Constitutions Project. https://com ​ p ara ​ t ive ​ c ons​ t itu​ t ion ​ s project​ .org/. Epling, J. (2016). How Far Have We Come And Where Do We Go From Here? A Culturally Sensitive Strategy for Judicial Independence in Myanmar. Duke Journal of Comparative Law, 27, 107–140. Epp, Charles. (1998). The Rights Revolution: Rights, Lawyers, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective. University of Chicago Press. Escresa, L., & Garoupa, N. (2013). Testing the Logic of Strategic Defection: The Case of the Philippine Supreme Court—An Empirical Analysis (1986–2010). Asian Journal of Political Science, 21, 189–212. Feng, L. (2017). The Future of Judicial Independence in China. In H. Lee & M. Pittard (Eds.), Asia-Pacific Judiciaries. Cambridge University Press. Friedman, L. (1975). The Legal System. Russell Sage Foundation. rodelio c. manacsa

Fu, H. (2016). Building Judicial Integrity in China. Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 39, 167–182. Gill, R., & Zorn, C. (2021). Overcoming the Barriers to Comparative Judicial Behavior Research. In N. Garoupa, R. Gill, & L. Tiede (Eds.), The High Courts in Global Perspective. University of Virginia Press. Ginsburg, T. (2008). Constitutional Courts in East Asia: Understanding Variation. Journal of Comparative Law, 80, 80–99. Ginsburg, T. (2012). Courts and New Democracies: Recent Works. Law and Social Inquiry, 37, 720–742. Glendon, M. A., Gordon, M., & Carozza, P. (1999). Comparative Legal Traditions. West Group. Gu, W. (2015). Courts in China: Judiciary in the Economic and Societal Transitions. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Harding, A., & Bui, N. S. (2016). Recent Work in Asian Constitutional Studies: A Review Essay. Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 11, 163–183. Harding, A., & Nicholson, P. (Eds.). (2011). New Courts in Asia. Routledge. Haynie, S. L., Sheehan, R. S., Songer, D. R., & Tate, C. N. (2007). High Courts Judicial Database. Judicial Research Initiative, University of South Carolina. http://www​ .songerproject​.org​/national​-high​-courts​.html. Hernandez, G. (2019). International Law. Oxford University Press. Hirschl, R. (2006). The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide. Fordham Law Review, 75, 721–754. Hoque, R. (2015). Courts and the Adjudication System in Bangladesh: Quest for viable reforms. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Hosen, N. (2017). Indonesian Courts: From Non-Independence to Independence Without Accountability. In H. Lee & M. Pittard (Eds.), Asia-Pacific Judiciaries. Cambridge University Press. Ishiyama, J. (2012). Comparative Politics. John Wiley and Sons. Islam, M. R. (2017). The Judiciary in Bangladesh. In H. Lee & M. Pittard (Eds.), Asia-Pacific Judiciaries. Cambridge University Press.

courts and judicial systems  73 Jhaveri, S. (2022). Judicial Review of Administrative Action Across the Common Law World. Cambridge University Press. Juwana, H. (2015). Courts in Indonesia: A Mix of Western and Local Character. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Kawagishi, N. (2015). Towards a More Responsive Judiciary: Courts and Judicial Power in Japan. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Kim, J. (2015). Courts in the Republic of Korea: Featuring a Built-In Authoritarian Legacy of Centralization and Bureaucratization. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Kim Seong-Hak, M. (2015). Travails of Judges: Courts and Constitutional Authoritarianism in South Korea. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 63, 601–654. Kornhauser, L. (2021). Understanding Adjudication. In N. Garoupa, R. Hill, & L. Tiede (Eds.), The High Courts in Global Perspective. University of Virginia Press. Krishnan, J. (2015). Legitimacy of Courts and the Dilemma of Their Proliferation: The Significance of Judicial Power in India. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Lax, J. (2011). The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine. Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 131–157. Lee, H., & Foo, R. (2017). Malaysian Judiciary: A Sisyphean Quest for Redemption. In H. Lee & M. Pittard (Eds.), Asia-Pacific Judiciaries. Cambridge University Press. Lee, H., & Pittard, M. (Eds.). (2017). AsiaPacific Judiciaries. Cambridge University Press. Li, Z. (2018). Innovation Through Interpretation: How Judges Make Policy in China. Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 26, 327–380. Lin, C., & Ginsburg, T. (2021). Judicial Behavior Research in East Asia. In N. Garoupa, R. Gill, & L. Tiede (Eds.), The High Courts in Global Perspective. University of Virginia Press. Lo, P. (2015). Hong Kong: Common Law Courts in China. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Matsui, S. (2017). Independence of the Judiciary and Securing Public Trust in

Japan. In H. Lee & M. Pittard (Eds.), AsiaPacific Judiciaries. Cambridge University Press. Moustafa, T. (2014). Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 10, 281–299. Nicholson, P. (2015). Renovating Courts: The Role of Courts in Contemporary Vietnam. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Pang, X., Friedman, B., Martin, A., & Quinn, K. (2012). Endogenous Jurisprudential Regimes. Political Analysis, 20, 417–436. Pangalangan, R. (2015). The Philippines’ Post-Marcos Judiciary: The Institutional Turn in a Populist Democracy. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Pimentel, D. (2016). Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability in a Transitional State: The Case of Thailand. UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, 33, 155–186. Pruksacholavit, P., & Garoupa, N. (2016). Patterns of Judicial Behaviour in the Thai Constitutional Court, 2008–2014: An Empirical Approach. Asia Pacific Law Review, 24, 16–35. Rachlinski, J. J., & Wistrich, A. J. (2017). Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 13, 203–229. Rajah, J. (2012). Authoritarian Rule of Law: Legislation, Discourse, and Legitimacy in Singapore. Cambridge University Press. Ratnapala, S. (2017). Decline and Fall of Sri-Lanka’s Judiciary and Prospects for Resurrection. In H. Lee & M. Pittard (Eds.), Asia-Pacific Judiciaries. Cambridge University Press. Satayanurug, P., & Nakornin, N. (2015). Courts in Thailand: Progressive Development as the Country’s Pillar of Justice. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Shapiro, M. (1981). Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. University of Chicago Press. Shetstreet, S. (2017). Comparative Analysis of the Theories and Realities With Lessons for the Asia-Pacific. In H. Lee & M. Pittard (Eds.), Asia-Pacific Judiciaries. Cambridge University Press. rodelio c. manacsa

74  encyclopedia of asian politics Tan, K. (2015). As Efficient as the Best Businesses: Singapore’s Judicial System. In J. Yeh & W. Chang (Eds.), Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press. Tate, C. N. (1995). Why the Expansion of Judicial Power. In C. N. Tate & T. Vallinder (Eds.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. New York University Press. Tate, C. N., & Vallinder, T. (1995). The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. New York University Press. Tew, Y. (2020). Constitutional Statecraft in Asian Courts. Oxford University Press. Volcansek, M. (2019). Comparative Judicial Politics. Rowman and Littlefield. Wang, Y. (2014). Tying the Autocrat’s Hands: The Rise of the Rule of Law in China. Cambridge University Press. Yap, P. (2015). Constitutional Dialogue in Common Law Asia. Oxford University Press. Yap, P. (2017). Courts and Democracies in Asia. Cambridge University Press. Yap, P. (2018). Courts as Democracy Builders in Asia. Yonsei Law Journal, 9, 23–40. Yeh, J., & Chang, W. (Eds.). (2015). Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press.

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Key resources Key resources on the concept Barry, B. (2020). How Judges Judge: Empirical Insights into Judicial DecisionMaking. Routledge. Shapiro, M. (1981). Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. University of Chicago Press. Tate, C. N., & Vallinder, T. (1995). The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. New York University Press. Volcansek, M. (2019). Comparative Judicial Politics. Rowman and Littlefield. In Asia Chen, A., & Andrew Hardin, A. (Eds.). (2018). Constitutional Courts in Asia: A Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press. Lee, H., & Pittard, M. (Eds.). (2017). AsiaPacific Judiciaries. Cambridge University Press. Tew, Y. (2020). Constitutional Statecraft in Asian Courts. Oxford University Press. Yeh, J., & Chang, W. (Eds.). (2015). Asian Courts in Context. Cambridge University Press.

13. Democratization

in 1987, either initiating a new constitution or lifting martial law. In Mongolia, the 1990 “Democratic Revolution” peacefully led to a multi-party system. Thailand resumed a civilian government in 1992, and Cambodia established a democratic regime, while short-lived, in 1993 under UN intervention. In Indonesia, the Suharto regime fell down in 1998, and the newly independent East Timor became a new member of democracies. Along with the long-standing democracies of Japan and India, these transitions changed the political landscape of Asia, a region once dominated by authoritarian rules. If we use the minimum threshold, the number of democracies surges from three in 1980 to 11 in 2017. Although democratic transitions took place in many countries in this region, the quality of democratic development shows a substantial divergence (Croissant et al., 2013). In particular, many Asian democracies remain “defective” (Croissant, 2022), having trouble managing legitimacy crises or establishing rule of law. Some countries suffer from frequent military coups, such as Thailand, while others struggle to establish institutions that protect freedom of speech or other human rights. For example, Malaysia and Singapore have competitive elections but both have limited progress on political liberalization. The Philippines has had periodic democratic setbacks while many indicators evaluate that it is decaying in democratic performance in recent years, especially under the Duterte administration. Cambodia’s democracy was just shortlived. Several dictatorships remain stable, such as China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. It seems like liberal democracy only thrives in a specific area in Asia, especially in Northeast Asia. Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea seem to have relatively better performance on democratic consolidation. A long-term debate continues on what is the substantive element of democracy. There is significant scholarship, especially based on the East Asian authoritarian contexts, devoted to the discussion of the “Asian Model” of democracy which emphasizes the Asian value system and differences from the “West” (e.g., Neher, 1994; for a review, see Hood, 1998). At the root of this theory is the Confucianism value system that focuses on the welfare of the family, community, and state instead of individuals. In this model, economic development is of paramount importance for all regimes and comes before democratization. The leaders, using a top-down approach and

A. The concept Democratization is generally defined as the political transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic regime when democratic institutions such as elections and multiparty systems have been established. In the foundational book Polyarchy, Dahl (1971) defines democracy as a regime that has continuing responsiveness to the demands of the people and in which citizens are able to equally participate in the political process. Two fundamental institutional arrangements include (1) open and fair public competition for political power and (2) equal participation, or inclusiveness, in the political processes. That is, ideally, a polyarchy is equivalent to the term liberal democracy, with not only free and fair elections but also the protection of human liberties, rule of law by the government, and separation of powers. In the empirical studies, many researchers operationalize democracy by the minimalprocedural definition laid out by Schumpeter (1943), that a democratic regime must satisfy these conditions: in a country, citizens must have the right to elect the chief executive and the legislature, either directly or indirectly, under the competition of more than one party. Also, there must exist at least one power transition due to an open and fair election (Przeworski et  al., 2000; Diamond, 1992). The procedural definition of democracy becomes a common threshold to identify a specific time that a democratic transition occurs. However, the minimum definition may not guarantee that a country possesses institutions that lead to liberal democracy. Therefore, there are also indicators of the quality of democracy, such as the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem), Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index, Polity IV, and the Democracy-Dictatorship Index (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010). Asian countries witnessed a major wave of transitions from autocracy to democracy in the late 1980s. The so-called third wave of democratization began first in the Philippines, as the popular uprising against President Marcos in 1986 led to a regime transition. Then, the long-term militarybacked single-party dictatorships in South Korea and Taiwan both began liberalization 75

76  encyclopedia of asian politics led by a strong party machine, should utilize power to pave economic developments for citizens, while it is not necessary to build up institutions for the governed. Huntington (1996) further argues that societies influenced by the Confucian culture are incompatible with democracy as the traditions prioritize the group over the individual, responsibility over human rights, and authority over liberty. Empirical evidence seems to confirm part of the theory. For example, Reilly (2007) finds that more and more Asia-Pacific countries have developed similar strategies of institutional design that lead to limits on challengers entering the party system and constraints on the enfranchisement of minorities. That is, many newly democratized countries at best can only become illiberal democracies (Zakaria, 1997) or electoral democracies (Diamond, 2008). Some scholars also use the term hybrid regimes (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Some proponents of the Asian-style democracy, or soft authoritarianism, even argue that the Asian model is an improvement on liberal democracy because the leader is able to maintain a high level of economic development. Political strongmen in Asia often advocate for such a model. In particular, Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, and many long-ruling leaders in Asia maintain that individual rights should give way to the state so that leaders can pursue social harmony and socio-economic prosperity for the whole community. Some illustrate the “Asian Exceptionalism” against liberal democracy (Pei, 1994). At the individual level, the evidence shows mixed results. Shin (2011) illustrates how the Confucian legacy influences democratic demand. Although Confucian political values result in support for a non-liberal style of government that prioritizes the economic welfare of the whole community over individual freedom, its core belief encourages tolerance and interpersonal trust, which consists of fundamental elements of civic culture in democracies. Chu et  al. (2008) find that East Asian citizens indeed have nostalgia for the softauthoritarian regimes of the past due to the memories of the fast-growth era. However, they also find that citizens throughout the region value individual freedom and support the legitimacy of the democratic government. The following survey data confirm that the paths of the modernization theories that lead fang-yu chen

to human empowerment also apply to Asian people and there is little difference compared with the West (Weltzel, 2012). Furthermore, the progress of democratic performances in successfully democratized countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan directly challenges the Asian exceptionalism argument. Yet liberal democracies face a variety of challenges amid a decadelong global recession (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2022). In particular, researchers now turn to the studies of authoritarian diffusion that might undermine the progress of democratic transition and consolidation (Beckley & Brands, 2023). The latest scholarship also focuses on how autocracies strengthen their rules with new technologies and spread authoritarian values (Hoffman, 2022). In the international political arena, a rising China is actively promoting the new model of “democracy,” especially via international organizations. For example, China has successfully changed the definition of human rights in the United Nations so that economic development becomes a core element of human rights, which may override the protection of civil liberty. As the alliance of authoritarian regimes is rewriting the norms for democracy, the debate on Asian-style democracy goes far beyond the region as it becomes part of the ideological competition between the West and the rising China.

B. The landscape On the causes of democratization, abundant literature has been accumulated. In general, one might categorize two major schools of literature. The first one explains the factors that lead to regime transitions. The main findings identify economic development, social structure, international environment, and elite interactions as key factors. Meanwhile, the second one analyzes how a democracy can achieve consolidation. The literature emphasizes three factors – nurturing mass norms and beliefs, establishing political institutions and organizations, and approving higherquality democratic governance (Cheng & Chu, 2018). In this section, we mainly focus on the causes of democratization because it seems like there is consensus on the foundations of democratic consolidation as long as we set liberal democracy as the ultimate goal. Theories of democratization were first articulated by the modernization theory

democratization  77 which stated that economic development is the precondition of transition. It was then challenged by a variety of modes of transition. Major studies of determinants of democratic transition have gradually shifted the focus to class conflict and economic inequality. At the same time, studies find that international factors also play a significant role. The latest research for Asian democratization focuses on a top-down approach, illustrating how the rulers and elites concede democracy. In general, due to the great divergence of political developments in Asia, each theory may find both positive and negative cases in the region. The earliest scholarship on democratization, and perhaps the most influential one, is the modernization theory pioneered by Lipset (1959). He finds that economic development and democracy are significantly correlated. Individuals in a modernized state driven by technological innovations, industrialization, and urbanization have higher levels of wealth accumulation and education and thus are more likely to be empowered and participate in politics. In particular, the rising middle class, compared with poorer citizens in some less-modernized states, have more bargaining power over the elites and they are expected to push for reforms for more political rights. Since Lipset’s seminal work, numerous studies have confirmed the positive relationship between wealth and democracy. Some scholars add essential factors to the theory. For example, Rueschemeyer et  al. (1992) argue that industrialization fosters democracy by strengthening the organized working class and weakening the land-owning class. Diamond (1992) argues that the leading factor of democracy is not mere economic development, but rather socioeconomic development. That is, economic development is not the sole factor but it does create an environment conducive to democracy. Many East and Southeast Asian countries seem to follow similar paths of economic development, although they might differ on political-ideological processes (Laothamatas, 1997). Geddes (1999) provides a general evaluation of the evolving literature on democratization. She concludes that there was a strong consensus that economic development is associated with democratic consolidation, while economic downturn leads to regime transition of all kinds. Przeworski et al. (2000) specifically point out the threshold that no democracy has ever experienced breakdown when

the country reaches above a per capita GDP of $6,055, calculated by Argentina’s level in 1975. Despite the strong correlation between democracy and development, the causal relationship between the two remains uncertain. In the real world, as mentioned above, Asian countries provide mixed results for the theories. For example, Taiwan and South Korea are typical cases of modernization theory that the rising middle class pushes for political reforms and the elites concede to the mass pressure. However, some countries successfully have maintained a high level of economic development without democratization for a long time. For example, Singapore has become an anomaly in modernization theory. China, after long-term rapid development, is expected to democratize, but the ruling of the Communist Party seems to go in the opposite direction, especially under the rule of Xi Jinping. On the other hand, since the 1990s, there have been several low-income but successful democratic “survivors,” including Mongolia and other cases such as El Salvador, Ghana, and the Dominican Republic. In general, modernization theory cannot explain these cases. Theoretically, the anomalies might come from various modes of transition. Munck and Leff (1997) laid out a framework to analyze different types of democratic transition. They identify three kinds of agents of change, including elites, mass public, and both, and three strategies, including confrontation, cooperation, and both. From the interaction between the agents, we identify modes of transition including reform from below or above, through transaction, through rupture, and through revolution from the people. Others also find that it is the unequal distribution of power that affects a regime’s transition to democracy (McFaul, 2002). Houle (2009) points out that democracy from above and from the bottom undergo very different paths, as the elites and the mass public have contradictory interests. Therefore, the claim that economic development results in democratic transition is highly contested. Two main schools try to provide alternatives to the modernization theory. First, the focus has been shifting from the level of wealth to the distribution of wealth, combined with class conflicts. This line of literature illustrates that when income is not equally distributed, the poor have more incentives to fang-yu chen

78  encyclopedia of asian politics demand democracy because they could gain more from redistribution after they obtain the right to reset the tax rate (Boix, 2003). Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that the relationship between inequality and democratization follows an inverted U-shaped curve. Democracy is most likely to emerge when there is a middle level of inequality. When the level of inequality is low, the poor don’t have incentives to democratize since there is not much benefit they can gain from redistribution, while at a high level of inequality, the rich have strong incentives to repress democratization because they will lose a lot under redistribution carried out by democracies. However, Haggard and Kaufman (2012) point out that distributive conflict is not a necessary condition for regime transitions, as democratization could occur in countries with different levels of income inequality. Empirically, Asian cases seem to provide limited evidence for the inequality-centered determinant of democratization. The second school of alternative to modernization theory illustrates the importance of international factors. Many Asian countries began the process of liberalization during a similar period in the mid-1980s, as Huntington (1991) illustrates the snowball effect of democratization that a regional wave of democratic transition is influential across the border. While Huntington points out that people in former autocracies learn from neighboring countries, Levitzki and Way (2010)’s seminal work Competitive Authoritarianism elucidates how linkage to the West, especially the United States and the European Union, transforms the hybrid regimes into democracy. A competitive authoritarian regime is one that has limited multi-party elections, but the democratic institutions and civil liberties are systematically violated in favor of the incumbent. That is, for example, the elections exist but are not fair, so the ruling party almost always wins. Taiwan, Malaysia, and Cambodia were typical cases at the beginning of the 1990s but evolved to diverging trajectories. Levitzki and Way examine all 35 of such cases from 1990 to 2008 and conclude that advanced democracies contribute to newcomers’ transition via the influence of direct interaction of economic, political, and social ties and cross-border flows of capital, goods, people, and information. To maintain the linkage to the advanced economies and respond to the demand of the West, dictators fang-yu chen

must build up democratic institutions to avoid international isolation. This path explains Taiwan’s successful democratization, and it also applies to South Korea. On the contrary, those without linkage to the West are more likely to develop into stable dictatorships such as in Malaysia and Cambodia. For countries that do not even have competitive elections, the hopes for shaking the legitimacy of dictatorship are even less. Boix (2011) theorizes the international factor in a structural approach. He points out that when the international system was dominated by a liberal hegemon, mainly the United States, in the post–Cold War period, it changed the power balance between proauthoritarian and pro-democratic factions in autocracies by relocating resources and strategies. The international system helps democrats in dictatorships by reducing the “drag” on the structural factors from geostrategic and ideological rivalries. The latest research about Asian democratization focuses on the top-down approach, but the causal mechanisms are different from the previous studies. In particular, Slater and Wong (2022) bridge the gap between economic development and democratization by exploring the role of the ruling elites. They argue that the authoritarian ruling parties are willing to concede democratization when they are in a position of either exceptional strength or extreme weakness. The “conceding-to-thrive” scenario occurs when the elites hold that they possess substantial strengths and resource advantages so that the existing authoritarian party can dominate even after the transition. It is also possible that the elites sense that they have already passed the peak of domination, suffering from ominous setbacks such as a defeat in local elections, and therefore pursue a new strategy for regaining legitimacy. That is, many countries democratize by the conservative elites because they want to hold power and believe they can do so after democratization. It is not because of the belief in liberal values or foreign pressure. These elites are hardly viewed as democrats, but some of them do play an essential role in democratizing dictatorships, especially in the cases of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.

C. Future research In general, studies on determinants of democratization start with economic development

democratization  79 and the dynamics of the socio-economic structure. The paradigm is gradually shifting to class conflicts, mainly driven by economic inequality, or the interactions between different agents, especially the elites and the masses. International factors might change the power balance between domestic actors, especially giving pressure on the rulers. The latest research illustrates a “conceding-tothrive” scenario that the authoritarian elites are willing to democratize because it is the best strategy to stay in power. Asian countries, with highly diverse geographic and geopolitical characters, may provide both positive and negative cases for each theory at the same time. The region also poses several puzzles for the studies (Cheng & Chu, 2018, pp. 2–3). First, this region has one of the worst ratios of functioning democracies. Counting for East Asia, five out of 18 countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, and Indonesia) are far less than the world’s regional average of six out of ten. Other countries have undergone several democratic setbacks or remain in autocracy. Second, although the number of democracies is less than the world regional average, the democratic breakdowns are relatively mild compared with other regions. Military coups occur in Thailand and the Philippines, but the frequency is much less than in other regions. Third, some cases remain the greatest challenge to the modernization theory. In particular, China maintains rapid economic growth but the authoritarian rule is highly resilient. Fourth, at the individual level, there is still a strong preference for alternatives to liberal democracy. Even in the most successful cases of democratization, Taiwan and South Korea, authoritarian nostalgia remains popular. Besides the theoretical debate, there is also abundant discussion on the policy side. For example, policymakers are figuring out how to achieve civil control in military regimes such as in Thailand and Myanmar. How to improve the quality of democracy in “partly free” countries such as India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines? How to prevent the global trend of democratic backsliding in liberal democracies? These discussions are across various disciplines and fields. Last but not least, the most salient issue in the contemporary world lies in authoritarian diffusion. Before China’s Xi Jinping came to power, most scholars seem to view this as a mild problem (Ambrosio, 2010, 2012).

However, more and more democracies find that China has extended its influence into democratic institutions (National Endowment for Democracy, 2017). Country-specific studies reveal how authoritarianism might decay democratic institutions (e.g., Fong, Wu, & Nathan, 2021). A decade ago, many strategists predicted that as the likelihood of China’s prospect of liberalization remained faint, the region was going to be further divided by the continental and maritime spheres of influence (e.g., Friedberg, 2010). While the US–China competition becomes more intense, the world has been gradually clustered into two main camps; some depict it as a democracy-versusautocracy duel (Brands, 2018; Rak, 2022). Therefore, the studies on democratization, along with the existing unresolved puzzles, will be more challenging yet more directly linked to world politics. Fang-Yu Chen

References Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. Ambrosio, T. (2010). Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research: Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion. International Studies Perspectives, 11(4), 375–392. Ambrosio, T. (2012). The Rise of the ‘China Model’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’: Evidence of Authoritarian Diffusion? Contemporary Politics, 18(4), 381–399. Beckley, M., and Brands, H. (2023). China’s Threat to Global Democracy. Journal of Democracy, 34(1), 65–79. Boix, C. (2003). Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge University Press. Boix, C. (2011). Democracy, Development, and the International System. American Political Science Review, 105(4), 809–828. Brands, H. (2018). Democracy vs Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes Great-Power Conflict. Survival, 60(5), 61–114. Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., and Vreeland, J. A. (2010). Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited. Public Choice, 143(1–2), 67–101. Cheng, T., and Chu, Y. (2018). Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia. Routledge. fang-yu chen

80  encyclopedia of asian politics Chu, Y., Diamond, L., Nathan, A. J., and Shin, D. C. (Eds.). (2008). How East Asians View Democracy. Columbia University Press. Croissant, A. (2013). Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia. Palgrave Macmillan. Croissant, A. (2022). Democracy and Dictatorship in Southeast Asia— Retrospective and Prospective. In Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia (pp. 491–507). Springer Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press. Diamond, L. (1992). Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered. The American Behavioral Scientist 35(4), 450–499. Diamond, L. (2008). The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State. Foreign Affairs, 87(2), 36–48. Fong, B. C. H., Wu, J., and Nathan, A. J. (Eds.). (2021). China’s Influence and the CentrePeriphery Tug of War in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Indo-Pacific. Routledge,. Friedberg, A. L. (2010). The Geopolitics of Strategic Asia, 2000–2020. In A. J. Tellis, A. Marble and T. Tanner (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2010–11 Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued Purpose. The National Bureau of Asian Research. Geddes, B. (1999). What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years? Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), 115–144. Haggard, S., and Kaufman, R. R. (2012). Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule. American Political Science Review, 106(3), 495–516. Hoffman, S. (2022). China’s Tech-Enhanced Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 33(2), 76–89. Hood, S. J. (1998). The Myth of Asian-Style Democracy. Asian Survey, 38(9), 853–866. Houle, C. (2009). Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization. World Politics, 61(4), 589–622. Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington, S. P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster. Laothamatas, A. (Ed.). (1997). Democratization in Southeast and East Asia. ISEAS Publishing. fang-yu chen

Levitsky, S. and L. Way. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press. Lipset, S. Martin. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. McFaul, M. (2002). The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World. World Politics, 54(2), 212–244. Munck, G. L., and Carol Skalnik Leff, C. S. (1997). Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Comparative Politics, 29(3), 343–362. National Endowment for Democracy. (2017). Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence. Neher, C. D. (1994). Asian Style Democracy. Asian Survey, 34(11), 949–961. Pei, M. (1994). The Puzzle of East Asian Exceptionalism. Journal of Democracy, 5(4), 90–103. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge University Press. Rak, J. (2022). The Global Authoritarian Turn, Democratic Vulnerability, and Geodigital Competition. Geopolitics, 27(2), 680–686. Reilly, B. (2007). Democratization and Electoral Reform in the Asia-Pacific Region: Is There an ‘Asian Model’ of Democracy? Comparative Political Studies, 40(11), 1350–1371. Repucci, S., and Slipowitz, A. (2022). Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule. Freedom House. Rueschemeyer, D., Huber, E., and Stephens, J. D. (1992). Capitalist Development and Democracy. University of Chicago Press. Schumpeter, J. A. (1943). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. Shin, D. C. (2011). Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia. Cambridge University Press. Slater, D., and Wong, J. (2022). From Development to Democracy: The Transformations of Modern Asia. Princeton University Press.

democratization  81 Welzel, C. (2012). The Myth of Asian Exceptionalism: Response to Bomhoff and Gu. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 43(7), 1039–1054. Zakaria, F. (1997). The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 22–43.

Key resources Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy

and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge University Press. In Asia Cheng, T., and Chu, Y. (2018). Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia. Routledge Shin, D. C. (2011). Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia. Cambridge University Press. Slater, D., and Wong, J. (2022). From Development to Democracy: The Transformations of Modern Asia. Princeton University Press.

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14. Electoral systems

disputes are to be resolved, campaign financing, and other legal matters that are not specifically about the votes to seat conversion process. (Herron, Pekkanen, & Shugart, 2018)

A. The concept

Blais (1988) seems not to disagree with Herron et  al., pointing out that electoral systems are related to, and are part of, electoral laws. He adds that electoral laws “correspond to the whole set of rules pertaining to the conduct of elections, including suffrage and registration requirements, districting procedures, and campaign financing.” Employing a different term, electoral regulations, Gallagher and Mitchell (2005) agree with Blais and Herron et al. that the electoral system is narrower than electoral regulations. For them, electoral regulations are the broader set of rules related to elections, including the ease of access to the ballot, voters’ rights, whether the election administration is fair, and vote counting transparency (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005). Electoral systems could be classified broadly as follows: plurality (or majoritarian) versus the proportional electoral system. This simple classification has been criticized because it is too simplistic and misleading (Lijphart & Grofman, 1984). Lijphart and Grofman (1984) argue that plurality and proportional terms should be treated as a general category of the electoral systems. For example, the two-round system (TRS) (as applied in France) and alternative vote (AV) (as employed by Australia) are parts of the category of plurality electoral systems along with first past the post (FPTP).1 Likewise, proportional electoral systems consist of listproportional (as used in Finland) and single transferable vote (STV) (as adopted by Ireland).2 In terms of the contribution of Asian scholars to the study of the electoral system, Hicken and Kasuya (2003) provide a succinct descriptive analysis of constitutional structures and electoral systems of 17 Asia Pacific countries from 1945 to 2000. They posit that the regions of East, South, and Southeast Asia consist of three families of electoral systems: single-seat plurality, proportional, and mixedmember electoral systems (Hicken & Kasuya, 2003). While Hicken and Kasuya (2003) convey a broad analysis, Croissant and Martin (2006) have provided a more specific explanation. They note that electoral systems reforms in Southeast Asia are one of the results of the democratization in this region.

There is little contention among scholars in defining the concept of the electoral system. Blais (1988), for instance, defines it as “[the] rules which govern the process by which preferences are articulated as votes and by which these votes are translated into the election of decision-makers.” Similarly, Gallagher and Mitchell (2005) in The Politics of Electoral Systems delineate the electoral system as “the set of rules that structure how votes are cast at elections for a representative assembly and how these votes are then converted into seats in that assembly.” Additionally, Herron, Pekkanen, and Shugart (2018) understand electoral systems as “the set of rules for taking votes in any given election and determining the seats in the representative assembly or other elected institution, including a presidency where one is elected.” Among these definitions, the one offered by Herron, Pekkanen, and Shugart (2018) is the most specific in that it refers to specific institutions, namely a representative assembly and a presidency. Meanwhile, Gallagher and Mitchell (2005) prefer to include specifically only the legislative body. Likewise, Blais’s scope of definition (1988) which includes the “decision-makers” could be interpreted as involving the election of the president, parallel to the classification of independent countries’ electoral systems created by Soudriette and Ellis (Diamond & Plattner, 2006). Unlike the definitions of the electoral system, the scholars above show almost no contrasting perspectives on the equivalent of the electoral system to other concepts that have close meaning to it. According to Herron, Pekkanen, and Shugart (2018), the electoral system as a concept is more immense than electoral rules, yet a country’s electoral system is narrower than its electoral laws. In their view, electoral rules include “specific provisions defining the allocation of seats (e.g. proportional formulas) or minimum vote percentages required to earn seats (i.e. legal threshold).” In the meantime, electoral laws comprise: provisions on who is eligible to vote, the criteria for candidacy, whether voting is mandatory, the days(s) on which voting is held, how

82

electoral systems  83 Further, no specific study covers the Southeast Asian way in contributing to the understanding of electoral systems. However, the study by Reilly (2015) points out that recently Southeast Asian countries have shown a tendency to switch their electoral systems to be more “majoritarian.” This is called the “Asian model” (Reilly, 2015; Weiss, 2014).

B. The landscape3 Over the last ten years, various journals have published a total of 297 articles on the electoral system. The trend has increased in recent years. For instance, in 2021, there were 38 published journal articles (see Figure 14.1 for details).4 The most recent research on the electoral system from 2012 to 2022 has been dominated by the inclusion of European countries as case studies (148 articles).5 Meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries have been employed limitedly by the existing literature – only 12 articles have been published and five countries included.6 The countries are Myanmar (three articles), Thailand (three articles), Indonesia (three articles), Malaysia (two articles), and Singapore (one article). Moreover, when we study each of the articles, it is found that not all articles center their analysis on the electoral system in Southeast Asia. Almost all the articles touch on electoral systems only as part of a broader analysis (Aspinall, 2014; Dukalskis & Raymond, 2018; Kongkirati, 2014; Lidauer, 2022; Sawasdee, 2020; Selway, 2022; Ufen, 2020;

Wong, 2018). For example, the discussion on the open list system in Indonesia in the article by Aspinall (2014) features, as part of the analysis, the party system, parliament, and patronage in Indonesia. Also, in the case of Myanmar, the choice of the electoral system is seen as a driving factor for the failure of the military to “perpetuate its power in the electoral sphere” (Dukalskis & Raymond, 2018). The only articles that focus on analyzing the electoral system in Southeast Asia are those by Tan (2013), Marston (2013), Fossati (2019), and Tan and Preece (2020). The most recent research on electoral systems in Southeast Asia focuses on their effects on political institutions or partisanship and identities. The article by Tan and Preece (2020) examines how Myanmar’s electoral system influences the small ethnic party’s electability and the stability of the party system. They find that the success of an ethnic party depends on (1) the number of parties competing in a constituency; (2) the spatial distribution or concentration of supporters for the ethnic parties; (3) the ratio of population to seats-apportionment (electoral quotient); and (4) the psychological effects of the institutional context on voters and parties. (Tan & Preece, 2020)

Previously, in 2019, Fossati published his article on the connection between electoral systems and the strength of partisan identities. He argued that “deep-seated partisan

Source:   Collected by author.

Figure 14.1  Publications on the electoral system, 2012–2022

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84  encyclopedia of asian politics affiliations weakened substantially with the introduction of an open-list proportional system in Indonesia” (Fossati, 2019). Further, Fossati (2019) conveyed that “partisan alignment has been more pronounced where personal voting is more prevalent.” Meanwhile, there are at least two topics on the study of electoral systems in the current debates in Southeast Asia. The first is the conversion of electoral systems among countries in Southeast Asia. While Reilly in Case (2015) and Weiss (2014) argue that nowadays there is an “Asian model” trend where countries in Southeast Asia make their electoral systems more majoritarian, Croissant and Lorenz (2018) disagree with them because in the former’s opinion, “the electoral systems for lower house elections in the region follow no clear trend.” Nevertheless, Croissant and Lorenz (2018) contend that there is a pattern of favorability of the largest party in the electoral systems of authoritarian regimes. Despite being debated among scholars, if this tendency is true, it means it is driven by several factors, such as the willingness of incumbents to curtail political fragmentation and competition, the development of more “cohesive and policy focused-political parties,” and party systems reform among countries in Southeast Asia (Reilly, 2015). Moreover, according to Weiss (2014), these changes are related to “[the] combination of reducing corruption, as by strengthening political parties and reducing the imperative of cultivating a ‘personal vote’; increasing accountability and representativeness, and facilitating more efficient, stable policy-making processes.” Likewise, she adds that since the structural changes in the electoral system amendments are more readily and measurably done than behaviors, more attention to the structures is needed (Weiss, 2014). The second topic of debate is the effects of electoral systems on institutional arrangements. Tan (2013) analyzes the way the hegemonic party in Singapore manipulated its electoral system to establish its majority in the legislative. She shows that the changes in the rules of the game (or electoral manipulation) in the electoral system have favored the dominance of the legislative incumbent although their shares of the vote declined in the late 1980s (Tan, 2013). Whereas Tan criticizes the efforts of the ruling party in Singapore to maintain its existence, Marston (2013) is more interested in analyzing Myanmar’s electoral ikhsan darmawan

system and its impact on political stability, parliamentary majority, and proportional representation. He argues that a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system is an ideal alternative system for Myanmar to produce “the most stable and representative results for all parties concerned.”

C. Future research Given the existing literature on electoral systems as explained above, there is still a gap to fill in the study of the electoral system. The study on electoral systems could be expanded into regions outside Europe and other developed countries by examining the topics and problems researched in these places. Several possible topics and problems are why does the public in a country support an electoral system change or electoral reform? What is the effect of an electoral system on the quality of politicians? What are the effects of an electoral system on descriptive and substantive representation? What are the effects of an electoral system on party unity or polarization? In terms of the employment of the cases, it could be a single case study, a two-country comparison, a region analysis, or a large-N comparative study. Additionally, further research could be advanced in the study of an electoral system in Southeast Asia. Following the existing trends in the study of electoral systems in Europe and other developed countries, a few topics could be considered as a focus for future research. The first is the study of the impact of electoral systems on voter turnouts in Southeast Asian countries; the second is the study of the impact of an electoral system on political representations; and the third is the study of the impact of an electoral system on the party system, party unity, and party polarization. These topics have not been well explored in this region. Furthermore, since studies on the electoral system in Southeast Asia are dominated by the qualitative approach, further research could be advanced by employing more diverse methods and approaches. The studies on the electoral system in Southeast Asia have been dominated by the employment of a qualitative approach. This way the use of quantitative and critical approaches could be an alternative for future research. Ikhsan Darmawan

electoral systems  85

Notes

Case, W. (2015). Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Democratization. Routledge. Croissant, A., and Lorenz, P. (2018). Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia: An Introduction to Governments and Political Regimes. Springer. Croissant, A., and Martin, B. (2006). Between Consolidation and Crisis: Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast Asia. LIT. Diamond, L., and Plattner, M. (2006). 2. Electoral Systems and Democracy. The John Hopkins University Press. Dukalskis, A., and Raymond, C. D. (2018). Failure of authoritarian learning: Explaining Burma/Myanmar’s electoral system. Democratization, 25(3), 545–563. https://doi​. org​/ 10​.1080​/ 13510347​. 2017​ .1391794 Fossati, D. (2019). Electoral reform and partisan dealignment in Indonesia. 3. International Political Science Review, 41(3), 349–364. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /0192512119826389 Gallagher, M., and Mitchell, P. (2005). The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press. Herron, E. S., Pekkanen, R. J., and Shugart, M. S. (2018). The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press. 4. Hicken, A., and Kasuya, Y. (2003). A guide to the constitutional structures and electoral systems of east, south and southeast Asia. 5. Electoral Studies, 22(1), 121–151. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1016​/S0261​-3794(01)00053-1 Kongkirati, P. (2014). The rise and fall of electoral violence in Thailand: Changing 6. rules, structures and power landscapes, 1997–2011. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 36(3), 386–416. https://doi​.org​/10​.1355​/ References cs36​-3c Aspinall, E. (2014). Indonesia’s 2014 elections: Lidauer, M. (2022). Boundary making in Myanmar’s electoral process: Where Parliament and patronage. Journal of elections do not take place. Modern Asian Democracy, 25(4), 96–110. https://doi​.org​ Studies, 56(2), 533–566. https://doi​.org​/10​ /10​.1353​/jod​.2014​.0070 .1017​/S0026749X20000335 Blais, A. (1988). The classification of electoral systems. European Journal of Political Lijphart, A., and Grofman, B. (1984). Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Research, 16(1), 99–110. https://doi​.org​/10​ Alternatives. Praeger. .1111​/j​.1475​-6765​.1988​.tb00143​.x Blais, A. (1991). The debate over electoral Marston, H. (2013). Myanmar’s electoral system: Reviewing the 2010 and systems. International Political Science 2012 elections and looking ahead to the Review, 12(3), 239–260. https://doi​.org​/10​ 2015 general elections. Asian Journal of .1177​/019251219101200304 1.

Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis (2008) categorize electoral systems in the world based on their families as follows: (1) plurality/majority family (first past the post, two-round system, alternative vote, block vote, and party block vote); (2) mixed family (parallel and mixed-member proportional); (3) proportional representation family (list-proportional and single transferable vote); and (4) other family (single non-transferable vote, limited vote, and Borda count). As of 2008, the most used electoral system in the world was list-proportional with 70 countries, then followed by first past the post with 47 countries. To have a complete understanding of the electoral system in a country, most scholars also explain the dimensions of the electoral system in addition to categorizing a country’s electoral system with a broad category. A comprehensive explanation of the dimensions of electoral systems is provided by Gallagher and Mitchell (2005) as follows: district magnitude, the ballot structure, the extent of voter choice for individual candidates, levels of seat allocation, thresholds, and malapportionment. See also Blais (1991) for a deeper debate on the dimensions of electoral systems. In writing the first part of this section, I used a semi-systematic review method (Snyder, 2019) for the literature review. I also used Google Scholar, while employing “electoral system” as the keyword. I focused on the first ten pages of the results for every year’s publications from 2012 to 2022. I collected the literature from March 31 to April 2. I included only English-written journal articles from the Scopus-indexed journals. I primarily concentrated on the titles and abstracts that had the term “electoral system(s).” Because of the limited space, the analysis focuses on evaluating the number of publications. Although the data show that in 2022 the number of publications decreases to 32 articles, the data were collected until April 2022, not December 2022. It is still possible that the number will increase. This calculation refers to the categories of a single case study and the comparison of two European countries or more. The worldwide comparison studies are excluded from this calculation. This conclusion is derived from the gathered data by the author where they do not include the other types of publications, such as books and reports.

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86  encyclopedia of asian politics Political Science, 21(3), 268–284. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1080​/02185377​.2013​.864515 Reilly, B. (2015). Electoral systems. In W. Case (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Democratization. Routledge. Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., and Ellis, A. (2008). Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. International IDEA. Sawasdee, S. N. (2020). Electoral integrity and the repercussions of institutional manipulations: The 2019 general election in Thailand. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 5(1), 52–68. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /2057891119892321 Selway, J. S. (2022). Thailand in 2021: Demonstrations and discord in the depths of a pandemic. Asian Survey, 62(1), 105– 117. https://doi​.org​/10​.1525​/as​.2022​.62​.1​.10 Snyder, H. (2019). Literature review as a research methodology: An overview and guidelines. Journal of Business Research, 104, 333–339. https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​/j​ .jbusres​.2019​.07​.039 Tan, N. (2013). Manipulating electoral laws in Singapore. Electoral Studies, 32(4), 632– 643. https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​/j​.electstud​.2013​ .07​.014 Tan, N., and Preece, C. (2020). Electoral system, ethnic parties, and party system stability in Myanmar. The European Journal of Development Research, 32, 431–456. Ufen, A. (2020). Opposition in transition: Pre-electoral coalitions and the 2018 electoral breakthrough in Malaysia. Democratization, 27(2), 167–184. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1080​/13510347​.2019​.1666266 Weiss, M. L. (2014). Electoral Patterns in Southeast Asia: The Limits to Engineering.

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ISEAS Working Paper #3 2014. Accessed October 11, 2021. https://www​.iseas​.edu​.sg​ /images​/pdf ​/iseas ​_working ​_ papers ​_ 2014​ _3​.pdf Wong, C. (2018). Constituency delimitation and electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia. Round Table (London), 107(1), 67–80. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1080​ / 00358533​ . 2018​ .1424075

Key resources Key references to know more about electoral systems: Blais, A. (1988). The classification of electoral systems. European Journal of Political Research, 16(1), 99–110. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1111​/j​.1475​-6765​.1988​.tb00143​.x Gallagher, M., and Mitchell, P. (2005). The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press. Herron, E. S., Pekkanen, R. J., and Shugart, M. S. (2018). The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press. In Asia Croissant, A., and Lorenz, P. (2018). Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia: An Introduction to Governments and Political Regimes. Springer. Hicken, A., and Kasuya, Y. (2003). A guide to the constitutional structures and electoral systems of east, south and southeast Asia. Electoral Studies, 22(1), 121–151. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1016​/S0261​-3794(01)00053-1 Reilly, B. (2015). Electoral systems. In W. Case (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Democratization. Routledge.

15. Executives

impacts on the political landscape. Lastly, the external dimension of power encompasses the political, economic, and diplomatic context in which the executive functions. This dimension highlights the impact of global events, regional alliances, and international relationships. These three dimensions, when considered together, constitute a comprehensive understanding of executive power. While many may associate executive authorities with democratic political systems, it is important to recognize that executives maintain a substantial role in authoritarian regimes as well. In such contexts, the executive branch is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of policies, often with limited to no oversight from other governmental institutions due to an inherent lack of democratic accountability. These undemocratic systems lead to a consolidation of power, as authority is heavily concentrated within a single individual or a dominant party rule. Often embodied by a dictator, monarch, or military authority, these executives wield the reins of control without constraints, making consequential decisions independently of other governmental bodies or public opinion. In authoritarian systems, the executive figure emerges as a paramount force, dictating the nation’s trajectory and compelling its adherence to their will by utilizing their extensive control over pivotal institutions – the military, police, and media. Profound authority is granted to authoritarian executives through the capacity to issue decrees and impose laws without recourse to legislative validation, further consolidating their dominance over the social and political establishments. Consequently, the executive figure in authoritarian regimes becomes an instrumental figure who dictates the trajectory of a state’s political climate, often with substantial repercussions on the welfare of the citizenry. Due to the impact executives have on citizens, the state, and the international arena, there is a large body of literature on political executives. Scholars of comparative politics extensively examine and contrast the distinctive types of executive structures prevalent in different systems, such as presidential and parliamentary setups, to ascertain how these variations impact the workings and efficiency of the executive body. Additionally, experts in the field of international relations delve into the study of executives to evaluate the significance of their decisions in shaping foreign policy and international relations.

A. The concept The executive is the governmental body whose primary role is the implementation of the law. The role and powers of executives can vary depending on the specific political system and constitutional structure of a state. Some systems may have strong executives with significant powers, while others may have weaker executives with limited powers. In democratic systems, the head of state holds a multifaceted role, encompassing various essential functions that contribute to the functioning of the government. As the ceremonial figurehead, the executive serves as the face of the nation, representing its interests and values, and engaging with the populace by presenting awards and delivering speeches. Simultaneously, as the head of government, they are responsible for steering the policy process, managing the state’s affairs, and working relentlessly to implement laws that reflect public will. Beyond these highlevel tasks, the head of state also assumes the responsibility of bureaucratic leadership, ensuring that various administrative tasks and responsibilities are executed. In addition to the daily function of the state, in times of crisis, the executive serves as chief decisionmaker and crisis manager to guide the state through the crisis. Overall, the diverse roles played by the head of state in a democracy are created to enable effective governance and contribute to the stability and progress of the state. The concept of executive power can be classified into three dimensions: formal, informal, and external. Firstly, the formal dimension of power refers to the codified responsibilities bestowed upon the executive by constitutional provisions, legal frameworks, executive orders, and other agreements. This demarcates the official powers and prerogatives of the executive branch, providing a basis for governance and decision-making. Secondly, the informal dimension of power highlights the influential role that personality, political acumen, and experience play in shaping the executive’s power dynamics. This dimension is derived from the executive’s capacity to influence politics and civil discourse through rhetoric, symbolic representation, and personal charisma, which can have significant 87

88  encyclopedia of asian politics Research conducted on executives varies depending on the specific theories and perspectives they adopt. For example, political scientists researching executives might aim to understand their constitutional powers and responsibilities, while those investigating from a behavioural perspective would look at their decision-making processes. Some of these theories even suggest contrasting views on the same issue – while the separation of powers theory promotes a strong and independent executive, democratic accountability theory stands in favour of a weak executive with an emphasis placed on accountability. Ultimately, this diversity in approaches allows for investigations into the role of executives, furthering our understanding of their effect on governments.

B. The landscape Executive power has been a topic of longstanding interest in political research. Recent studies have delved into the evolution of political executives’ authority over time and their ability to exercise unilateral powers, noting a trend towards a resurgence of executive power (Andeweg et al., 2020). The augmented influence of political executives is significant in the policy-making process as they are vital in setting the political agenda. Within the last decade, democracies worldwide have experienced the rise of populist parties, which may have implications for the exercise of executive power. The rise of populist leaders in the United States and Latin America is a concerning trend that poses a significant threat to democratic institutions in these regions (Lieberman et al., 2019, Pérez-Liñán, Schmidt, & Vairo, 2019). This trend and its potential deleterious impact on democracy call for more research on political executives and the impact of their use of power. Historical events, as well as current crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have highlighted how presidential power may be used in times of crisis. Current research suggests that in times of crisis, the public does not prefer executive policy-making over legislative measures. Presidents do not pay a public penalty for acting unilaterally. The public is more concerned with the effectiveness of the policy rather than its source (Lowande & Rogowski, 2021a). Within the realm of presidential power, there exists a prominent area of research DAW N M I L L E R- M cTAG G A R T

that delves into the ways in which presidents wield unilateral power. This body of literature draws on the premise that presidents possess constitutional authority that allows them to take independent action aimed at shaping national policy. Researchers studying unilateral power examine two main factors: firstly, how the checks and balances present in a political system can impact the extent of a president’s unilateral powers; and secondly, the ways in which the accountability of this power is shaped by the relationship between the president and the voters (Lowande & Rogowski, 2021b). Given these factors, understanding the dynamics of presidential unilateral action provides a critical lens to examine the exercise of presidential power. In addition to studies on particular states and their political executives, there has been a renewed interest in comparative analysis of executive power, with scholars exploring the factors that shape the balance of power between the executive, legislature, and judiciary in different political systems. Such research has revealed how institutional arrangements such as legislative oversight and judicial checks on presidential authority influence the president’s power base, as well as evaluating how these arrangements can either heighten or restrict accountability and policy-making initiatives. Such comparative analysis has allowed us to better understand the link between a president’s exercise of power and the institutional context from which those decisions are made. The research on presidentialism and parliamentary systems has shed light on the fundamental differences between these two types of governments. There is an evident distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems of government, particularly when it comes to executive-legislative relations and the duration of a president’s or prime minister’s power. Notably, presidents remain in office until the end of their term regardless of any changes within the legislative body, while prime ministers can lose power before their term is complete. This research has highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of these systems and the importance of institutional design in shaping executive performance. There has been a continued focus on the relationship between the executive and the legislature. A main focus of these research efforts has been to explore how factors such as party politics, institutional design, and

executives  89 public opinion affect the relationship between the president and the legislature. Moreover, this research engages with the role that power plays in a president’s ability to provide effective leadership and manage any internal conflict or competition that may arise. These studies have highlighted how cooperative activities between the two branches can yield successful policy outcomes and facilitate productive decision-making processes. In addition to the impact of state institutions on political executives, external institutions and factors play an important role in the exercise of political power such as institutional organizations and globalization. These external factors may expand or dampen executive power. International organizations represent one way in which executives can amplify or further their own political agendas due to privileged access granted to political executives. As such, executive-legislative balance may be altered by these international organizations as presidents are afforded more access than legislators. On the other hand, globalization has limited the use of executive power. As events such as economic changes, political decisions, environmental disruptions, and cultural movements are no longer limited to national domains, these international influences require agenda-setting at all levels of government with little allowance for unilateral decisions from political executives. For instance, due to the rise of transnational corporations and global trade networks such as NAFTA and WTO, domestic politics can be overruled by external actors hindering the power of political executives. Overall, the study of executives in comparative politics has become increasingly sophisticated over the past decade, with scholars exploring a wide range of institutional and behavioural factors that shape executive use of power and the effect on policy-making. This research has important implications for our understanding of political executives and how they are affected by internal and external factors. The study of political executives in Asia offers an interesting insight into states and regional systems. The research also serves to highlight the distinctiveness of political systems involving executives in Asia and how understanding these nuances is critical to our understanding of political executive behaviour and theories.

Leadership styles of political executives in Asia have drawn more interest from researchers, as their approach to policy-making has a direct effect on the region’s political stability. A number of studies have looked at the differences between authoritarian and democratic leadership styles, as well as the variations in these styles across different Asian states. On the whole, while many leaders showed similar traits and provided efficient governance, variations can still be gleaned between each executive’s model of leading. In short, examining leadership styles has unprecedented potential when it comes to understanding which policies would best support the diverse needs of Asian populations. Studies of institutional design in Asia have provided useful insight into the effects of structural elements such as constitutions, electoral processes, and institutional arrangements on the power and decision-making capacity of executive power holders. This includes an examination of dual executive systems, such as the one in Taiwan, which enable effective and flexible governance (Shen, 2018). These studies not only help to better understand institutional design across the continent but also offer insights into the general understanding of the impact of constitutional engineering. As in the wider comparative politics literature, there has been considerable academic work on the executive–legislative relationship in Asian states and how that relationship influences policy outcomes and political stability. To better understand the interaction between these actors, studies have focused on topics such as the balance of power distribution, the effects of party systems, and the roles of veto players. In South Korea, researchers have observed a shift from policies being primarily created by executive entities to a multi-institutional process marked by increased competitiveness and interplay between both the president and legislature (Kim, 2017). While in Japan, the Abe administration saw a shift towards executive power (George Mulgan, 2018). These observations highlight the dynamic and evolving relationship between institutions. Political research on economic performance in Asia has exploded in recent years, as the region has experienced unprecedented economic growth. Studies have examined the role of political executives in economic policymaking, the impact of economic performance DAW N M I L L E R- M cTAG G A R T

90  encyclopedia of asian politics on executive popularity and stability, and the challenges and opportunities facing political executives in managing economic growth. Political executives shape Asia’s economy and are shaped by the economy in turn. In the literature on Asian political executives, there are many debates. The traditional presidential model is seen by some experts as falling short of understanding true power dynamics within the region, leading to discussion around alternative power structures. Critics of the common president-centric view suggest that it is often a narrowly focused approach resulting in limited research into those with access to greater resources and decision-making roles. As such, they emphasize the need for a more expansive outlook on political executives in order to better represent their actual positions of power. Understanding how those holding a variety of positions exercise authority will be key to forming diverse representations and gaining insights into Asian political executives. Overall, these debates reflect ongoing discussions and disagreements in the field of political science, highlighting the complex and evolving role of political executives in Asia’s political and economic development.

C. Future research The study of political executives, such as presidents, prime ministers, and governors, has been an active area of research in political science. However, there are still gaps in our understanding of these leaders. Two areas which require more attention are authoritarian executives and collegial executives. While some comparative research has been conducted on authoritarian political executives, more research is necessary to better understand political institutions and how they influence the behaviour of authoritarian leaders such as dictators, monarchs, and military leaders. Limited data and a lack of transparency make this area of research challenging. However, it remains important to study how these leaders use their power and repression to maintain power and control. By expanding comparative research on different authoritarian regimes, we can gain a deeper insight into the behaviour of authoritarian political executives and the institutions that shape their decision-making. These comparative studies would not only enhance our understanding of authoritarian regimes but also contribute DAW N M I L L E R- M cTAG G A R T

to the development of effective strategies for democratic reform. The relationship between institutional arrangements and the level of democracy is a topic of great interest for political scientists. In this regard, the emergence of collegial executives, as opposed to the typical presidential or parliamentary models, is a topic of interest for scholars. Collegial executives consist of multiple executive governments that work collaboratively to control the abuse of power by individual executives. This institutional structure is designed to combat what is known as the cult of executives, where a single individual wields an excessive amount of power, leading to a decline in democracy (Altman, 2020). The adoption of collegial executives poses new questions about the nature of democracy and its relationship to institutional arrangements. In addition to the areas of interest previously mentioned, there is still much to learn about political executives and their roles in governance. Future research in executives will advance our understanding of political leadership, decision-making, and leaders’ interactions with internal and external political actors. Political executives in Asian states have been studied extensively over the decades, yet there still remain several gaps in the research that require attention. One of the most significant gaps is the lack of comparative studies between Asian states and other regions of the world. While scholars have conducted many studies on political executives in North America and Europe, there is a paucity of research that offers comparative insights into Asian political executives. There is a need for more research on regional variations in executive power and decision-making. For example, there may be significant differences between Southeast Asian and East Asian political systems, or between small island states and large continental powers. This can help to identify similarities and differences in executive power and decision-making and highlight the factors that shape executive behaviour in different contexts. Additionally, there is a need for more research on the role of political executives in democratic and authoritarian states in Asia. Although some analyses have explored the differences between these two forms of government, there is a dearth of studies specifically focused on political executives

executives  91 in authoritarian regimes. Addressing these gaps in the study of political executives will provide a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the role of executives in shaping political and economic outcomes in Asia. Improving the study of political executives in Asia requires a commitment to interdisciplinary and multi-method research. To capture the complex and dynamic nature of executive decision-making, more comparative and longitudinal research is needed. Combining quantitative and qualitative research methods and utilizing a variety of data sources is essential to examine executive behaviour and decision-making in different contexts (Lijphart, 2012). Methodological improvements in the study of Asian political executives will enhance our understanding of how executive power and politics operate in this region. Ultimately, these methodological improvements will help to ensure that our research is both rigorous and relevant to the complex political realities of Asia. Dawn Miller-McTaggart

References Altman, D. (2020). Checking executive personalism: Collegial governments and the level of democracy. Swiss Political Science Review, 26(3), 316–338. Andeweg, R. B., Elgie, R., Helms, L., Kaarbo, J., and Muller-Rommel, F. (2020). The political executive returns: Re-empowerment and rediscovery. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives. Oxford University Press. George Mulgan, A. (Ed.). (2018). The Abe Administration and the Rise of the Prime Ministerial Executive. Routledge. Kim, D. (2017). Executive-legislative competition in agenda setting: An analysis of longitudinal changes in South Korea. Asian Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 383–400. Lieberman, R. C., Mettler, S., Pepinsky, T. B., Roberts, K. M., and Valelly, R. (2019).

The trump presidency and American democracy: A historical and comparative analysis. Perspectives on Politics, 17(2), 470–479. Lijphhart, A. (2012). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press. Lowande, K., and Rogowski, J. C. (2021a). Executive power in crisis. American Political Science Review, 115(4), 1406–1423. Lowande, K., and Rogowski, J. C. (2021b). Presidential unilateral power. Annual Review of Political Science, 24(1), 21–43. Pérez-Liñán, A., Schmidt, N., and Vairo, D. (2019). Presidential hegemony and democratic backsliding in Latin America, 1925–2016.  Democratization,  26(4), 606–625. Shen, Y. (2018). Institutional resilience of Taiwan’s semi-presidential system: The integration of the president and premier under party politics. Asian Journal of Political Science, 26(1), 53–64.

Key resources on executives Andeweg, R. B., Elgie, R., Helms, L., Kaarbo, J., and Müller-Rommel, F. (Eds.). (2020). The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives. Oxford University Press. Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z., and Ginsburg, T. (2014). Beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism.  British Journal of Political Science, 44(3), 515–544. Ludger H. (Ed.). (2012). Comparative Political Leadership. Palgrave Macmillan. In Asia Asian Journal of Political Science. Taylor & Francis. Bünte, M., and Thompson, M. R. (Eds.). (2022). Presidentialism and Democracy in East and Southeast Asia. Taylor & Francis. McCarthy, S., and Thompson, M. R. (Eds.). (2020). Governance and Democracy in the Asia-Pacific: Political and Civil Society. Routledge.

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16. Gender and politics

against colonial powers and democratic struggles for national independence. The histories of colonialism, capitalism, religion, ethnicity, and gender are closely interconnected and have thereby transformed our very conceptual maps of gender politics. However, attempts to locate these diverse struggles, which are often internally conflictual histories of varieties of third-world feminism under a single rubric, seem elusive (Mohanty, 2003). Working against the domination of imperialism, postcolonialist theory pays special attention to issues of nation-state, class, racial, ethnic, sexual, and gender differences. In addressing the simultaneity of multiple oppressions, the idea of intersectionality that originated from black feminists (Crenshaw, 1989) could serve as a useful analytical tool. Given these complications, the ideas of post-colonialism and intersectionality have been of great importance in understanding the interplay between gender and politics in Asia. Secondly, the multifaceted diversity within Asian countries has made the generalization of gender politics in Asia as an entity almost impossible. The majority of the studies in Asian gender politics are individual country studies or edited books covering case studies with different foci. The internal differences within Asian countries to some extent surpass the external differences between them and other continents. Even the often-criticized notion of third-worldism cannot fully cover the spectrum of gender and politics in Asia. The differences extend across political, economic, and socio-cultural lines. Politically, there have been democratic, transitional, and non-democratic countries in Asia. Economically, Asia has advanced economies in East Asia, the poorest economies in South Asia, and oil-rich countries in West Asia (the Middle East). Along with different levels of economic development, socio-modernization has also developed at a different pace among Asian countries. Culturally, Asia has the largest Muslim population in the world, followed by Hinduism. Meanwhile, many East Asian countries have traditionally inherited a Confucian legacy. These differences have great implications for understanding gender and politics in Asia.

A. The concept Politics is highly gendered, and gender itself is political. Conventional understandings of politics have been centered around the activities of governing and formal institutions. Such an understanding is based on a public/ private dichotomy paralleled by the male/ female divide. The feminists’ claim that “the personal is political” has fundamentally deconstructed this public/private dichotomy. Feminists have brought many challenges to the definitions, methods, and terrains of politics either as a discipline or as a political process (Celis et al., 2013). This review uses the term “gender politics” in a general way to refer to the efforts to view politics through the lens of gender. Before proceeding with this survey, the uniqueness of this subject in an Asian context should be carefully noted. Most of the interplay between gender and politics has been within the Western purview. The so-called liberal, radical, or even postmodern feminist scholarship is closely associated with the advocates of the three waves of feminist activists and movements in the US and Europe. Nevertheless, simply viewing feminism as a Western invention could also be problematic (Celis et  al., 2013). As Jayawardena (1986, pp. 2–3) argued, feminism in Asia was not imposed on the third world by the West but has rather been “hidden from history”. Advocacy for women’s rights and education occurred in 18th-century China, women struggled for social emancipation in early 19th-century India, and feminists’ struggles emanated in the early 20th century in many countries of Asia. How has feminist scholarship in Asia affected political studies and practices in their specific circumstances? To date, there has been no systematic study that has synthesized the interplay of gender and politics in Asia as a whole. The lack of such an endeavor could be attributed to two main factors. First of all, feminist activists and scholars have a more complicated relationship with politics in Asia compared to that in the West. The feminist movements in Asia have often been intertwined with other political and socioeconomic struggles. The struggle for women’s emancipation in many third-world countries cannot be separated from the fight

B. The landscape Given the complexity and diversity of gender politics in Asia, what we can present here about the relevant studies on the subject is 92

gender and politics  93 limited and inevitably involves some oversimplifications. In order to cast a wider net, this overview takes on the studies on gender politics in the Asian context based on a bottomup approach, that is, by grouping the main themes that have emerged in Asian gender politics in the extant literature, particularly within the time frame of the past ten years. One of the major themes of Asian gender politics is the relatively low presence of women in politics. This line of the literature occupies the main terrain of gender politics in Asia, as an attempt to reveal and criticize the existing gender inequality in politics. It has been a persistent pattern that Asian countries have one of the worst records for women’s parliamentary representation, only better than the Middle East and North Africa and the Pacific (Global and Regional Averages of Women in National Parliaments, 2020). The common explanations for women’s low presence in politics have been related to socioeconomic structure (modernization), cultural gender norms, and political institutions (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Paxton, Kunovich, & Hughes, 2007; Iwanaga, 2008). Nevertheless, the applications of these theories to different countries in Asia have been varied and to some extent have challenged the existing explanations found in the US and Europe. The first approach argues that economic development brought about social modernization, thereby enhancing women’s education and labor force participation, with more women entering politics as a result. However, comparative studies have shown that the presence of females as national leaders tends to be associated with lower levels of parity of women to men in the socioeconomic sphere (Jalalzai, 2008; Jalalzai & Krook, 2010). Asia clearly demonstrates this paradoxical relationship between social modernization and female political engagement. Many poorer countries have higher percentages of women’s representation than more affluent countries in Asia (Iwanaga, 2008). Japan as a highly advanced industrialized society is probably ranked the worst in the developed world in terms of the level of women’s representation (Eto, 2010). South Asia has been the fastest-growing region in the world, but serious and persistent gender inequality has deterred women from gaining power (Nazneen, Hossain, & Chopra, 2019). Ross (2008, 2009) has found that oilrich countries that have reduced women’s

labor participation have entrenched the patriarchal power and hampered women’s political representation in the Middle East. Asia seems to provide a strong rebuttal to the modernization thesis. The second approach regards the culture factor as the major barrier to women’s representation in Asia. Inglehart and Norris (2003) revised modernization theory, arguing that increasing women’s political participation through socioeconomic growth is filtered by religious heritage, of which Islam is considered to be most likely to impede women’s political participation because of the relatively low gender equality norms. In a similar vein, in debating Ross’s thesis of oil wealth hurting gender equality, some have argued that a strong kin-based network (Charrad, 2009) or the Islamic patriarchal culture (Norris, 2009; Groh & Rothschild, 2012) are the real barriers to women’s political participation. However, the relationship between a dominant religion and gender attitudes has been found to be indeterminate (Seguino, 2011; Schnabel, 2016; Prihatini, 2020). In Turkey and Iran, Islamist parties have been recruiting more women to parliament than secular parties (Tajali, 2015, 2017). In East Asian countries, Confucianism still wields enormous power in shaping the public lives of women and men. In contradictory examples such as Japan where voters need not necessarily discriminate against female politicians (Kage, Rosenbluth, & Tanaka, 2019), female politicians are still expected to conform to gender-role expectations (Ono & Yamada, 2020). Even in countries that have inherited a similar Confucian cultural heritage, such as Taiwan and mainland China, different trajectories in terms of socioeconomic and political transformations have led to different genderrole attitudes (Yang, 2016). Culture provides a partial and complicated picture of the presence of women in politics in Asia. Still, the third explanation of women’s presence in politics is related to the political institutions, with a particular focus on the electoral rules and gender quotas. Scholars have voiced criticism that the existing studies on electoral rules and gender quotas have been largely Eurocentric. Even though Asia might have the lowest average of women’s representation, some of the world’s highest levels of female representation have appeared in Asia, with Timor-Leste and Taiwan, for example, having around 40 percent female wan-ying yang

94  encyclopedia of asian politics legislators. Some have attributed the increasing percentages of female representatives to gender quotas, which could be classified into three types, with the first type being the reserved seats, including studies on Taiwan (Huang, 2015), Bangladesh (Ahmed & Hasan, 2018), Pakistan (Chowdhury, 2018), Jordanian municipal councils (Bush & Gao, 2017), and Nepal (Lotter, 2018). The second type refers to the legal candidate quotas, such as studies on Timor-Leste (Cummins, 2011), Indonesia (Hillman, 2018), and South Korea (Lee & Shin, 2016). The third type, which focuses on party quotas, includes Singapore (Tan, 2016). Relatively few studies, however, have compared the regional variations in gender quotas in Southeast Asian countries (Azizah, 2015; Ahmed, 2018). Even though many agree with the positive effect of gender quotas, their impacts are greatly affected by the enforcement mechanism and socio-political contexts (Tan, 2016; Joshi & Kingma, 2013), their interaction with electoral reforms like open-list PR in Indonesia (Hillman, 2018; Prihatini, 2020), party institutionalization in South Korea (Lee & Shin, 2016), or international norms and democratization (Bush, 2011; Azizah, 2015). Another significant theme of Asian gender politics, contrary to its women’s low presence in parliament, is that Asia had the first female head of government in the world (Sri Lanka in 1960), and since then many female political leaders have risen to power in Asia. Interestingly, many Asian women rose to the leadership position mainly from political families, across different cultural or religious traditions: in predominantly Buddhist countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand, in South Korea, in the Christian Philippines, and in the predominately Islamic countries like Indonesia (Thompson, 2020). Almost all female prime ministers or presidents in Asia, with a few exceptions, have family connections, either as daughters, wives, or sisters of male politicians. This pattern is not limited to Asia but has been particularly prevalent in Asia and has resulted in a wide range of literature on female dynastic politics (Basu, 2016; Jalalzai, 2010; Chandra, 2016; Trajano & Kenawas, 2013; Jalalzai & Krook, 2010; Derichs & Thompson, 2013; Choi, 2019). Criticisms have arisen on the basis that female dynastic leaders might entrench the family-based patrimonial polity as in the case of Thailand (Nishizaki, 2018), or whether wan-ying yang

they might increase women’s status and rights (Alexander & Jalalzai, 2020; Lee & Jalalzai, 2017). Nevertheless, dynastic politics have the function of serving as the charismatic legitimacy in the context of weak institutions (Thompson, 2020; Jalalzai & Krook, 2010) and provide a historically distinctive and exceptional pathway for Asian women lacking other socioeconomic resources to enter politics (Richter, 1990–1991, p. 539). Given that Asian countries have different socio-political developments, in newly independent or democratized countries, women’s involvement in various political movements or engagement in the transformation of the power relationship has also attracted much attention. In 2019, Contemporary South Asia featured a special issue on contentious women’s empowerment in South Asia, documenting the struggles, strategies, and obstacles that women faced in gaining power (Nazneen, Hossain, & Chopra, 2019). On the contesting relationship between feminism and nationalism, following the most representative study conducted by Jayawardena (1986) in the third world (covering 12 countries), very little systematic work has been done in the past ten years. A more recent attempt has been a series of studies that appeared in the Nationalities Papers in 2016, which explored how gender norms were appropriated for nationalistic construction and how the gender relationship has been transformed and constrained after independence in post-Soviet Central Asia (Cleuziou & Direnberger, 2016; Hoare, 2016; Kudaibergenova, 2016; Ismailbekoya, 2016; Roche, 2016; Suyarkulova, 2016). Some other individual case studies have also depicted the fluid yet contesting relationship between feminism and nationalism, such as Vijayan’s (2020) analysis of the masculine hegemony in the formation of Hindu nationalism in India, Yang’s (2019) inquiry into the less nationalistic inclination of women in Taiwan, and Edwards’ (2016) explanation of how Chinese nationalism has long been a problem for women in mainland China. Finally, Asia is not a homogeneous entity, with the exceptional commonality probably being the fact that many of its countries have shared a colonial past which has affected their contemporary process of globalization, migration, and capitalism (Loomba & Lukose, 2012). Hussein’s (2018) edited volume defies the generalized label of third-world women constructed by the colonialists and

gender and politics  95 reconceptualizes the “new women” as those who challenge and negotiate the boundaries of identity around modernity and tradition, culture and religion, and local and global, as well as the discourse about class and gender in South Asia. The new woman is recast as a complex, intersectional and heterogeneous subject. In a world of increasing global migration and integration, Yeoh (2016) also noted that gender politics has been transformed by the uneven economic growth and global capital movements in Southeast Asia. Concurring with Ong’s (2006, 2010) concerns with the transnational labor and capital movements of neoliberal economies in the extra-sovereign Asia-Pacific Rim, Zhang (2014) showed that gender and class inequalities are used intersectionally by the Chinese state to enhance China’s transition from socialism to neoliberalism and its integration into the global economy. A growing concern revolves around how neoliberal globalization has self-reinforced and reproduced itself through the intersection of race, gender, and class inequality under different circumstances in Asia.

C. Future research The above literature survey on Asian gender politics over the past ten years can never be regarded as exhaustive. Many individual studies of interest have been left out as the author has found it hard to group them into a specific line of discussion. The emergence of categorization implies that some collective intellectual efforts have inadvertently formed an area of scholarship on Asian gender politics in this vast and diverse terrain. I shall briefly summarize the contributions and limitations of existing studies on this subject to suggest possible directions for future research. First, Asia’s diverse experiences have not only added to our understanding of gender politics but have also recast the existing theoretical explanations with vast amounts of counterexamples. The current modernization theory and its cultural explanation have been argued to provide at best a partial or at worst a biased understanding of the relationship between gender and politics in Asia. Institutional engineering such as that related to electoral reforms and gender quotas provides some solutions to the low representation of women, but their adoption and implementation are conditioned by different socio-political contexts. Just as Prihatini (2019) rightly

suggested, with comparisons across 47 Asian countries, women’s political representation in Asia cannot account for any of the social, economic, cultural, or institutional factors alone, but is rather a result of multiple configurations of conditions. Added to such complications, the lack of women’s equal political representation coexists with the fact that Asian women have risen to executive power at the earliest stages in the world and have occupied many of the leadership posts in Asia. Asian gender politics thus displays a more complicated dynamic between gender and politics. Understanding Asian gender politics can therefore no longer depend on the references to the Eurocentric perspective. Various anomalies call for, if not the replacement, at least the revision of the given theoretical paradigm. Second, the historical and political context matters. Situated knowledge grounded in disparate places and people is better than the imposition of a grand theory (unifying vision) in studying Asian gender politics. Given the various and fluid gender power relationships in such a rapidly changing continent, it is more likely to present multiple perspectives with grounded studies. Even the subculture has not formed a homogeneous collectivity. With a critical reflection on the booming scholarship on gender in the Middle East since 2000, Charrad (2011) argued that there are two core subjects in these endeavors. The first core subject is influenced by Said’s critique of Orientalism, which aims at dismantling the stereotype of passive Muslim women under the essentialist and binary assumptions of a Western colonialist projection. The second core subject emphasizes the diversity within Islam, revealing how the cultural effect works differently in different contexts within Islam. Charrad (2011) contested that it is more useful to think of Islam as an “umbrella identity,” with considerable variations. Similar reflections can be applied to other subcultures or studies in Asian gender politics. Confucianism as an amorphous and ahistorical concept connotes different meanings to different people (Ko, Haboush, & Piggott, 2003, p. 3). More contextualized studies are required to examine the internal heterogeneities of Asian societies with different historical and political developments. Finally, in unraveling the limits of current Eurocentric feminist studies, Asian gender studies should attend to intersectionality and contribute more to this approach. Many Asian wan-ying yang

96  encyclopedia of asian politics women have suffered what Mohanty (2003) refers to as double colonization, first as a colonized subject and second as being a woman within a patriarchal system. Therefore, studying gender politics in Asia might involve a double-resistance process: acknowledging the fact that there is neither a universal notion of colonialism differentiating the West from the East on the one hand, nor a universal form of patriarchy dividing men and women on the other. Researchers have to continue to interrogate the Eurocentric imagination in configuring the “third-world” women as a monolithic entity that ignores the differences. Future studies in Asian gender politics can develop historically and culturally specific analyses in understanding the fundamental complexities and conflicts that characterize the lives of women of different classes, religions, cultures, races, and castes in different countries. Wan-Ying Yang

References Ahmed, N. (2018). Women in Governing Institutions in South Asia. Springer International Publishing. Ahmed, N., and Hasan, S. (2018). Alangkar or Ahangkar? Reserved-Seat Women Members in the Bangladesh Parliament. In N. Ahmed (Eds.), Women in Governing Institutions in South Asia (pp. 17–39). Springer. Alexander, A. C., and Jalalzai, F. (2020). Symbolic Empowerment and Female Heads of States and Government: A Global, Multilevel Analysis. Politics, Groups, and Identities, 8(1), 24–43. Azizah, N. (2015). The Paradoxical Impact of Globalisation on Women’s Political Representation: A Review of Situations in Southeast Asia. Journal of Government and Politics, 6(1), 31–49. Basu, A. (2016). Women, Dynasties, and Democracy in India. In K. Chandra (Eds.), Democratic Dynasties (pp. 136–72). Cambridge University Press. Bush, S. S. (2011). International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures. International Organization, 65(1), 103–37. Bush, S. S., and Gao, E. (2017). Small Tribes, Big Gains: The Strategic Uses of Gender Quotas in the Middle East. Comparative Politics, 49(2), 149–67. wan-ying yang

Celis, K., Kantola, J., Waylen, G., and Weldon, S. L. (2013). Introduction: Gender and Politics: A Gendered World, a Gendered Discipline. In G. Waylen, K. Celis, J. Kantola and S. L. Weldon (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics (pp. 1–26). Oxford University Press. Chandra, K. (2016). Democratic Dynasties: State, Party and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics. In K. Chandra (Ed.), Democratic Dynasties: State, Party and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics (pp. 12–55). Cambridge University Press. Charrad, M. M. (2009). Kinship, Islam, or Oil: Culprits of Gender Inequality? Politics & Gender, 5(04), 546–53. Charrad, M. M. (2011). Gender in the Middle East: Islam, State, Agency. Annual Review of Sociology, 37(1), 417–37. Choi, N. (2019). Women’s Political Pathways in Southeast Asia. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 21(2), 224–48. Chowdhury, N. J. (2018). Who Speaks for Women in Parliament? Patriarchy and Women MNAs in Pakistan. In N. Ahmed (Ed.), Women in Governing Institutions in South Asia (pp. 97–116). Springer. Cleuziou, J., and Direnberger, L. (2016). Gender and Nation in Post-Soviet Central Asia: From National Narratives to Women’s Practices. Nationalities Papers, 44(2), 195–206. Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. The University of Chicago Legal Forum, 140, 139–67. Cummins, D. (2011). The Problem of Gender Quotas: Women’s Representatives on Timor-Leste’s Suku Councils. Development in Practice, 21(1), 85–95. Derichs, C., and Mark R. Thompson, M. R. (2013). Introduction. In C. Derichs and M. R. Thompson (Eds.), Dynasties and Female Political Leaders in Asia: Gender, Power and Pedigree (pp. 11–26). LIT Verlag. Edwards, L. (2016). International Women’s Day in China: Feminism Meets Militarised Nationalism and Competing Political Party Programs. Asian Studies Review, 40(1), 89–105. Eto, M. (2010). Women and Representation in Japan: The Cause of Political Inequality. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 12(2), 177–201.

gender and politics  97 Groh, M., and Rothschild, C. (2012). Oil, Islam, Women, and Geography: A Comment on Ross (2008). Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 7(1), 69–87. Hillman, B. (2018). The Limits of Gender Quotas: Women’s Parliamentary Representation in Indonesia. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48(2), 322–38. Hoare, J. P. (2016). Doing Gender Activism in a Donor-Organized Framework: Constraints and Opportunities in Kyrgyzstan. Nationalities Papers, 44(2), 281–98. Huang, C. (2015). Gender Quotas in Taiwan: The Impact of Global Diffusion. Politics & Gender, 11(01), 207–17. Hussein, N. (2018). Rethinking New Womanhood: Practices of Gender, Class, Culture and Religion in South Asia. Springer International Publishing. Inglehart, R., and Norris, P. (2003). Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge University Press. Ismailbekova, A. (2016). Constructing the Authority of Women through Custom: Bulak Village, Kyrgyzstan. Nationalities Papers, 44(2), 266–80. Iwanaga, K. (2008). Women’s Political Participation and Representation in Asia: Obstacles and Challenges. NIAS Press. Jalalzai, F. (2008). Women Rule: Shattering the Executive Glass Ceiling. Politics & Gender, 4(2), 205–31. Jalalzai, F. (2010). Madam President: Gender, Power, and the Comparative Presidency. Journal of Women, Politics, and Policy, 31 (2), 132–65. Jalalzai, F., and Krook, M.L. (2010). Beyond Hillary and Benazir: Women’s Political Leadership Worldwide. International Political Science Review, 31(1), 5–21. Jayawardena, K. (1986). Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World. Zed Books. Joshi, D. K., and Kingma, K. (2013). The Uneven Representation of Women in Asian Parliaments: Explaining Variation across the Region. African and Asian Studies, 12(4), 352–72. Kage, R., Rosenbluth, F. M., and Seiki Tanaka, S. (2019). What Explains Low Female Political Representation? Evidence from Survey Experiments in Japan. Politics & Gender, 15(02), 285–309. Ko, D., Haboush, J. K., and Piggott, J. R. (2003). Women and Confucian Cultures

in Premodern China, Korea, and Japan. University of California Press. Kudaibergenova, D. T. (2016). Between the State and the Artist: Representations of Femininity and Masculinity in the Formation of Ideas of the Nation in Central Asia. Nationalities Papers, 44(2), 225–46. Lee, H., and Shin, K. (2016). Gender Quotas and Candidate Selection Processes in South Korean Political Parties. Pacific Affairs, 89(2), 345–68. Lee, Y., and Jalalzai, F. (2017). President Park Geun-Hye of South Korea: A Woman President without Women? Politics & Gender, 13(04), 597–617. Loomba, A., and Lukose, R. A. (2012). South Asian Feminisms. Duke University Press. Lotter, S. (2018). Gender Gap, Gender Trap: Negotiations of Intersectionality and Patriarchy amongst Women Elites in Nepal. International Quarterly for Asian Studies, 48, 97–115. Mohanty, C. T. (2003).  Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity. Duke University Press. Nazneen, S., Hossain, N., and Chopra, D. (2019). Introduction: Contentious Women’s Empowerment in South Asia. Contemporary South Asia, 27(4), 457–70. Nishizaki, Y. (2018). New Wine in an Old Bottle: Female Politicians, Family Rule, and Democratization in Thailand. The Journal of Asian Studies, 77(2), 375–403. Norris, P. (2009). Why Do Arab States Lag the World in Gender Equality? SSRN Electronic Journal. http://www​.ssrn​.com​/ abstract​=1474820 Ong, A. (2006). Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Duke University Press. Ong, A. (2010). Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia. SUNY Press. Ono, Y., and Yamada, M. (2020). Do Voters Prefer Gender Stereotypic Candidates? Evidence from a Conjoint Survey Experiment in Japan. Political Science Research and Methods, 8(3), 477–92. Paxton, P., Kunovich, S., and Hughes, M. M. (2007). Gender in Politics. Annual Review of Sociology, 33(1), 263–84. Prihatini, E. S. (2019). Women’s Representation in Asian Parliaments: A QCA Approach. Contemporary Politics, 25(2), 213–35. wan-ying yang

98  encyclopedia of asian politics Prihatini, E. S. (2020). Islam, Parties, and Women’s Political Nomination in Indonesia. Politics & Gender, 16, 637–59. Richter, L. K. (1990). Exploring Theories of Female Leadership in South and Southeast Asia. Pacific Affairs, 63(4), 524–40. Roche, S. (2016). A Sound Family for a Healthy Nation: Motherhood in Tajik National Politics and Society. Nationalities Papers, 44(2), 207–24. Ross, M. L. (2008). Oil, Islam, and Women. American Political Science Review, 102(1), 107–23. Ross, M. L. (2009). Does Oil Wealth Hurt Women? A Reply to Caraway, Charrad, Kang, and Norris. Politics & Gender, 5(4), 575–82. Schnabel, L. (2016). The Gender Pray Gap: Wage Labor and the Religiosity of HighEarning Women and Men. Gender & Society, 30(4), 643–69. Seguino, S. (2011). Help or Hindrance? Religion’s Impact on Gender Inequality in Attitudes and Outcomes. World Development, 39(8), 1308–21. Suyarkulova, M. (2016). Fashioning the Nation: Gender and Politics of Dress in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan. Nationalities Papers, 44(2), 247–65. Tajali, M. (2015). Islamic Women’s Groups and the Quest for Political Representation in Turkey and Iran. The Middle East Journal, 69(4), 563–81. Tajali, M. (2017). Protesting Gender Discrimination from within: Women’s Political Representation on Behalf of Islamic Parties. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 44(2), 176–93. Tan, N. (2016). Gender Reforms, Electoral Quotas, and Women’s Political Representation in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. Pacific Affairs, 89(2), 309–23. Thompson, M. R. (2020). The Rise and Downfall of Dynastic Female Leaders in Asia. In C. Chao and L. Ha (Eds.), Asian Women Leadership (pp. 49–63). Routledge.

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Trajano,  J. Desar, I., and Kenawas, Y. C. (2013). Indonesia and the Philippines: Political Dynasties in Democratic States. RSIS Commentaries 18. Vijayan, P. K. (2020). Gender and Hindu Nationalism: Understanding Masculine Hegemony. Routledge. Yang, W. (2016). Differences in Gender-Role Attitudes between China and Taiwan. Asian Women, 32(4), 73. Yang, W. (2019). Why Are Women Less Likely to Be Nationalistic in Taiwan? Asian Women, 35(2), 25–51. Yeoh, B. (2016). Migration and Gender Politics in Southeast Asia. Migration, Mobility, & Displacement, 2(1), 74–88. Zhang, C. Y. (2014). Untangleing the Intersectional Biopolitical Globalization: Asian, Asian, and the Asian-Pacific Rim. Feminist Formations, 26(3), 167–96.

Key resources Inglehart, R., and Norris, P. (2003). Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge University Press. Jalalzai, F., and Krook, M. L. (2010). Beyond Hillary and Benazir: Women’s Political Leadership Worldwide. International Political Science Review, 31(1), 5–21. Waylen, G., Celis, K., Kantola, J., and Weldon, S. L. (Eds.). (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics. Oxford University Press. In Asia Ahmed, N. (2018). Women in Governing Institutions in South Asia. Springer International Publishing. Choi, N. (2019). Women’s Political Pathways in Southeast Asia. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 21(2), 224–48. Ko, D., Haboush, J. K., and Piggott, J. R. (2003). Women and Confucian Cultures in Premodern China, Korea, and Japan. University of California Press.

17. Identity politics

under this umbrella – to defining what exactly is identity politics. To these scholars, the debate over identity and how to define identity politics alludes to a disjunction between theory and practice – a misunderstanding of the context in which the concept operates (Hekman, 1999). Bernstein (2005) summarises the alternative perspectives on how to define the concept into three separate broad approaches that have captured the complexity of the field: the neo-Marxist approach, the new social movement approach, and the postmodernist or poststructuralist approach.

A. The concept As a term, identity politics is one of the most misused political terms in contemporary media; often it can be found alluding to the struggle between progressive and conservative ends of a political spectrum, yet that usage connotes a certain “badness” to identity politics which is untrue. Like any field of politics, it has both its good and bad qualities, and the field of identity politics is one that is diverse, encompassing a multitude of interests and struggles that range from civil rights, women’s (and now feminist), and LGBTQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer) movements to separatist movements and ethnic or nationalist conflicts in places like French Quebec and post-colonial Africa and Asia (Pilgrim, 2022). The most succinct definition of the concept comes from Hill and Wilson (2003) who suggest that we should consider identity politics as the means by which culture and identity – be they traditional, modern, or radical, local, regional, or global, and involving religion, gender, class, or ethnicity – are articulated, constructed, invented, and commodified so as to achieve a political end. They argue that identity politics should be seen as both the discourse and the action within public arenas of political and civil society, where both culture and identity cannot be understood without seeing it in the context of the wider theorising around institutions and actors in society. This definition would thus contrast with what Hill and Wilson (2003) term the politics of identity, which focuses more on the issues of personal and group power. In their differentiation of the two terms, Hill and Wilson (2003) draw a line between concepts by using the domain that the interaction occurs in, with the politics of identity taking place in any social setting but tending towards the domains of the private, subaltern, or subversive, while identity politics involves the domain of institutions that carry with it the application of economic and political power. In essence, they define identity politics as describing any political mobilisation related to culture and identity. However, this generalised view is not accepted by all in the field, and there have been alternative approaches – some of which have sought to include the politics of identity

The three alternative approaches Neo-Marxist approach

The neo-Marxist approach derives its name from the theoretical assumptions borrowed from Marxist/neo-Marxist theory. Scholars in this approach believe that class inequality is the only “real” source of exploitation and oppression, and contestation of power is only brought about by activists who challenge the class structure (Bernstein, 2005). To this group of scholars, identity politics is a practice that lacks the ability to effectively challenge the key dynamics of the power relationship, cannot affect real change, and thus should be understood in symbolic, cultural, or psychological terms. In fact, the neo-Marxist approach tends to define identity politics as a distinct political practice from class politics, relating identity politics to more cultural politics. These scholars, like Kauffman (2001), see identity politics as cultural because identity is unrelated to institutional structures and the political economy (similar to Hill & Wilson, 2003), and also because they believe identity groups are only advocating for recognition of their cultural differences. New social movement approach

The new social movement (NSM) approach attempts to move beyond the restrictiveness of Marxist theory in trying to understand the underpinnings of social movements like those that arose in the 1960s and 1970s (Bernstein, 2005). Unlike the neo-Marxist approach, NSM does not simply sideline identity politics as being merely cultural or symbolic. It views identity politics as part of a new group of collective action that has arisen due to the macrostructural changes that modernisation has brought to a post-industrial society (Bernstein, 2005). Such a definition allows those who subscribe to NSM to distinguish identity 99

100  encyclopedia of asian politics politics (and other contemporary movements arranged on ideology or values) from classbased collective action without devaluing the impact that these movements have. In this context, identity politics is seen as part of the effort to expand freedom as it challenges the dominant normative and cultural codes and transforms civil society, giving the concept a broader purpose. However, much like the neoMarxist approach, the NSM approach continues to separate identity politics, and culture, from the political economy. Postmodernist/poststructuralist approach

The last approach to defining identity politics can be classified as a postmodernist or poststructuralist approach. The main difference between this approach and the neo-Marxist and NSM approaches lies in its conceptualisation of power. The postmodernist approach views power not in terms of economic inequality but rather differences in status identity; it sees the existence of status categories as a form of oppression and regulation and thus, any form of activism in the name of status groups will only serve to highlight the existence of the status group and harden the oppression of it. Under this conceptualisation, identity politics is defined as a narrow and state-centred political activism that fails to adequately address its cultural base. This approach to defining identity politics has its roots in the emergence of queer politics in the 1980s and what was perceived as a new politics that transcended group categories and brought different marginalised groups together. The emergence of queer politics was contrasted with previous advocation for the lesbian/gay subject and saw scholars identify the previous methods as entrenching a hierarchical ordering on the homosexual subject versus the heterosexual. Thus, identity politics was seen as failing to achieve any significant improvement for the lesbian/gay community and came to be defined as a narrow concept that fails to properly challenge both the real relations of power and also the social construction of status and identities.

B. The landscape As evidenced by the multiple approaches to defining the concept, studies involving identity politics have been conducted since the emergence of post–World War II social movements (Bernstein, 2005; Fukuyama, 2018). orson tan

Such studies have covered the gamut of political struggles as mentioned at the start, but the rise of social justice movements and other protests in the past ten years have once again focused the spotlight on the field and brought a new trove of research. Of these movements, the Black Lives Matter and the #MeToo movements that originated in the United States have led to renewed interest in the intersection of identity politics with the social categorisations of race and gender. Research, including those by Grosfoguel (2012), Klandermans (2014), and Hall (2020) to name a few, have focused on how the Black Lives Matter movement that focused on institutionalised racism and police brutality has redefined the politicisation of race and race treatment and contributed to a new understanding of identity politics. Likewise, on the issue of women’s rights and the #MeToo movement, scholars like Fileborn and Loney-Howes (2019) and Moghadam (2019) have published new research on how there has been institutionalised oppression against women in the form of harassment and abuse by men in power, and such oppression has led to a de facto failure to accord the identity of women the full equality of treatment that many expect. To these scholars, identity politics have become a conduit for political mobilisation against institutional structures, be they racial hierarchy as a result of the historical struggle of the African-Americans or the historical struggle of persons of colour against the legacy of colonialism, or gendered oppression where men, especially white men, are privileged above the rest. Beyond the United States, other events have also prompted scholars to produce new research in the field of identity politics. For example, the Euro crisis and the Schengen crisis in Europe have prompted scholars like Börzel and Risse (2018) to delve into how globalisation, European integration, and refugee migration have driven the rise of populist identity politics in Europe, which contributed directly to the two crises that have been referred to as the European Union’s most severe. In more general theoretical study, works like Fukuyama’s (2018) have tracked what he terms the politics of resentment and its link to identity politics. To him, the issue of identity has never been more important than in today’s contemporary society, and the rise of these new movements linked to identity politics can be traced to a lack of recognition accorded to an individual’s identity, thus

identity politics  101 generating resentment of the individuals that form certain status categories or identities (Fukuyama, 2018). This politics of resentment has essentially personalised identity politics and explains why the field is garnering so much attention recently. Scholars in Asia have also contributed greatly to the body of research on identity politics. Just like the rest of the world, there have been events in Asia that have marked the rising influence of identity politics, whether it is women’s rights in South Asia or rising nationalism in South, East, and Southeast Asia. Jeffery and Basu (2012), Chhachhi (2019), and Moghadam (2019) have both written on the issues of gender and the treatment of women in South Asia and how that has given rise to a form of identity politics in that region as women mobilise against perceived institutional oppression, especially in light of the #MeToo movement. The developments in Hong Kong, with what was styled as democracy riots by the protesters, many of whom were youth, have also led to renewed interest in the issue of nationalism and identity politics; Ip (2019) and Wong et al. (2021) have written about the role of identity politics in the polarisation of Hong Kong’s politics. These studies fit into the larger ongoing narrative about Chineseness, ethnonationalism, and politics, which have also been considered part of the field of identity politics. Works by Chun (2017) and Ang (2022) have positioned the rise of China and its new aggressiveness on defining Chinese identity within the confines of identity politics as they study the clashes with other Sino-majority societies with their own strong perception of what Chineseness entails. Ethnic identity plays a large role in Asia, given the diversity of cultures that populate the region and the presence of many nations that are multicultural in demography. Likewise does religion and religious identity, given that the region is home to many religious groups. Thus, the role of identity politics in navigating ethnic identity and religious identity has been covered by scholars and is part of the work done by researchers like Baird (2016), Ngeow et al. (2017), and Fossati (2019).

C. Future research The field of identity politics in Asia continues to be one that is all-encompassing and diverse. There exist gaps in current research that scholars in the field can take advantage of

to contribute to the existing body of research. The subject of Chinese ethnonationalism and contestation of ethnic identity is a field that provides multiple opportunities for scholars, given the prevalence of the Chinese diaspora across Southeast Asia and their reaction to China’s assertiveness in defining Chineseness. There is room for researchers to delve deeper into the conflict between national identity and ethnic identity as a form of politics. The rising religious conservatism across the region, especially within the Islamic religious sphere, provides another avenue for researchers to study how conceptualisations of religious identity have political implications, especially in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia that seem to be witnessing democratic backsliding that is partially driven by this surging religiosity. Likewise, the impact of rising nationalism in countries like India and China will have a large impact on the politics of the region and could be an angle that scholars can pursue in tying identity politics to international relations and regional stability. Orson Tan

References Ang, S. (2022). Contesting Chineseness: Nationality, Class, Gender and New Chinese Migrants. Amsterdam University Press. Baird, I. G. (2016). Indigeneity in Asia: An emerging but contested concept. Asian Ethnicity, 17(4), 501–505. Bernstein, M. (2005). Identity politics. Annual Review of Sociology, 47–74. Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2018). From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(1), 83–108. Chhachhi, A. (2019). Identity politics, secularism and women: A South Asian perspective. In Forging Identities (pp. 74– 95). Routledge. Chun, A. (2017). Forget Chineseness: On the Geopolitics of Cultural Identification. State University of New York Press. Fileborn, B., & Loney-Howes, R. (2019). # MeToo and the Politics of Social Change. Springer. Fossati, D. (2019). The resurgence of ideology in Indonesia: Political Islam, Aliran and political behaviour. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 38(2), 119–148. orson tan

102  encyclopedia of asian politics Fukuyama, F. (2018). Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Grosfoguel, R. (2012). The dilemmas of ethnic studies in the United States: Between liberal multiculturalism, identity politics, disciplinary colonization, and decolonial epistemologies. Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, 10(1), 9. Hall, S. (2020). Old and new identities, old and new ethnicities. In Theories of Race and Racism (pp. 199–208). Routledge. Hekman, S. (1999). Identity crises: Identity, identity politics, and beyond. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2(1), 3–26. Hill, J., & Wilson, T. (2003). Identity politics and the politics of identities. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 10(1), 1–8. Ip, I.-c. (2019). Hong Kong’s New Identity Politics: Longing for the Local in the Shadow of China. Routledge. Jeffery, P., & Basu, A. (2012). Appropriating Gender: Women’s Activism and Politicized Religion in South Asia. Routledge. Kauffman, L. (2001). The anti-politics of identity. Identity Politics in the Women’s Movement, 20(1), 23–34. Klandermans, P. G. (2014). Identity politics and politicized identities: Identity processes and the dynamics of protest. Political Psychology, 35(1), 1–22. Moghadam, V. M. (2019). Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and

orson tan

Feminisms in International Perspective. Routledge. Ngeow, C. B., Ling, T. S., & Fan, P. S. (2017). Pursuing Chinese studies amidst identity politics in Malaysia. In Producing China in Southeast Asia (pp. 17–38). Springer. Pilgrim, D. (2022). Identity Politics: Where Did It All Go Wrong. Phoenix Publishing House. Wong, M. Y., Kwong, Y.-h., & Chan, E. K. (2021). Political consumerism in Hong Kong: China’s economic intervention, identity politics, or political participation? China Perspectives 3, 61–71.

Key resources Bernstein, M. (2005). Identity politics. Annual Review of Sociology 31, 47–74. Fukuyama, F. (2018). Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Pilgrim, D. (2022). Identity Politics: Where Did It All Go Wrong. Phoenix Publishing House. In Asia Baird, I. G. (2016). Indigeneity in Asia: An emerging but contested concept. Asian Ethnicity, 17(4), 501–505. Chun, A. (2017). Forget Chineseness: On the Geopolitics of Cultural Identification. State University of New York Press. Moghadam, V. M. (2019). Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective. Routledge.

18. Legislatures

serve both as a means to legitimize regimes and produce policies. They are “the single most important representative institution in a democratic system” (Hahn, 1996, p. 4) which provides an avenue for people to exercise sovA. The concept ereignty. When coupled with party and party In the broadest sense, legislatures are bodies system institutionalization, social demands created to formulate and approve measures are tempered and incorporated into effecthat will form the law of the land (Norton, tive governance policy through legislation 2013). While this definition focuses on law- (Hicken & Kuhonta, 2015). making as the main purpose of legislatures, Strong legislatures serve important overthey also serve as important bodies for rep- sight and accountability functions in demoresentation, public deliberation, legitimation, cratic and democratizing regimes. First, they recruitment, socialization, and ensuring trans- serve as the primary means of promoting parency and accountability (Baldwin, 2013; horizontal accountability by providing a Martin, Saalfeld, & Strøm, 2014). There have powerful check to the authoritarian tendenbeen many local names given to legislatures, cies of executives (O’Donnell, 1999). They such as “Assembly”, “Diet”, “Congress”, and also serve as a source of vertical account“Parliament”. Although the term “parliament” ability through political parties. Strong legis oftentimes used interchangeably with “leg- islatures produce more developed political islature”, it has a distinctive history and has parties whose members develop platforms its own set of peculiar functions. Legislatures and engage their constituencies as a means of in parliamentary systems perform an elective maintaining power. Weaker legislatures, on function, that is, “the making, breaking, and the other hand, do not encourage institutionmaintenance of governments” which does building and this type of power competition not exist in presidential systems. In parlia- (Fish, 2006). Interestingly, in developed mentary systems, the majority in parliament democracies, legislatures are the least popucontrols the legislative process and sets its lar institutions, despite strong support for agenda for legislation (Martin, Saalfeld, & other institutions of the democratic regime Strøm, 2014, p. 1). In presidential systems, in (Loewenberg, 2007). In developing democcontrast, agenda-setting does not rest solely racies, public attitudes toward legislatures with the executive and hence, the executive provide a gauge for citizen support towards needs congressional support to pass its prior- new democracies (Sanborn, 2019). ity legislation (Cox & Morgenstern, 2001). On Legislatures in Asia are diverse. When the other hand, a high degree of variation in compared to Latin America (where legthis relationship is found among semi-presi- islatures are patterned after the congresdential systems, depending on the strength of sional model), the Pacific region (where the the legislature vis-à-vis the executive (Fish & Westminster model is generally followed), Kroenig, 2009). and Western Europe (where the continental Aside from national legislatures, there model predominates), Asia’s legislatures are are thousands at the subnational level, and patterned after all of the three extant models one transnational assembly (the European (Ahmed, 2012). Despite this, legislatures in Parliament) (Loewenberg, 2011). Some are Asia have been relatively neglected in earlier unicameral (single-chamber) legislatures, academic inquiries dominated by literature such as in both Denmark (the Folketing) and focusing on the US Congress, Latin American New Zealand (the House of Representatives); legislatures, and European parliaments. Most others are bicameral (two-chamber) leg- of the studies in Asia tended to be countryislatures, such as in the United Kingdom specific, with very few works that provide (the House of Commons and the House of a comparative analysis (Norton & Ahmed, Lords), France (the National Assembly and 1998; Ahmed, 2012). Part of the reason for the Senate), Russia (the State Duma and the this is the limited access to authoritarian Council of the Federation), and the United regimes that dominated the region in the Cold States (the House of Representatives and War era as well as government censorship the Senate) (Baldwin, 2013, p. 1). From their (Sanborn, 2019). The lack of past scholarly medieval origins, the ubiquity of legislatures interest in Asian legislatures also had a lot to is borne out of the fact that they are paramount do with the view that they are no more than institutions in modern democracies as they “rubber stamps” (Rüland et al., 2005). 103

104  encyclopedia of asian politics Literature on legislatures in the region has framed legislatures as relatively weak in comparison to the executive, particularly in the case of East and Southeast Asia, where societal preferences for powerful executives still shape institutional design, rules, and legislative dynamics (Case, 2009; Aspinall, 2014). Legislatures in Asia are oftentimes viewed as instruments of and not products of democratization, where democratic practices and the existence of opposition political parties allowed the debate to occur (Solinger, 2001). Scholars studying the region also tend to view Asian legislatures as “repurposed” organizations from previous authoritarian regimes. Thus, their function for their constituencies is not so much as institutions to check executive power, but rather as sources of constituency services and representation (Treux, 2014). Because most countries in the region have adopted a single-member district plurality system (SMDP), it has become imperative for legislators to maintain close contact with their constituencies (Ahmed, 2012; Norton, 2002). Because legislatures oftentimes serve as the primary link between citizen views and executive action, legislatures have taken on prominent roles as targets of notable mass democratic movements in Asia (e.g. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea) (Sanborn, 2019). In some areas, legislatures slowly becoming institutions of accountability marks a shift in the understanding of the role of legislatures as institutions for democratic governance in Asia, where many third-wave democracies were deemed to be elite-led and thus still have a long way to go in terms of consolidating democratic gains (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Some scholars examine the role of “Asian values” in the development of legislatures and citizen support for them. These studies examine the role of values such as deference to authority and the prioritization of societal harmony and how it contrasts with the accountability function of legislatures (see for instance Chang, Chu, & Huang, 2011; Chu & Huang, 2010).

B. The landscape Legislative studies have become a major field of study in political science in the past 50 years. Many national and international political science associations have established sections on legislative studies. Several academic journals juhn chris p. espia

have also specialized in legislative studies (Martin, Saalfeld, & Strøm, 2014). Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI), which attempts to measure the powers of legislative assemblies across 158 countries using expert surveys, is the most important effort to date to measure legislative power from a cross-national perspective. A number of researches were built on the theoretical and methodological issues arising from the PPI (see Chernykh, Doyle, & Power, 2017). Another major effort to collect cross-national data on legislative abilities is the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) which documented codified rules regarding formal institutions across different countries between 1960 and 2012 (Wig, Hegre, & Regan, 2015). The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project was built on PPI and the IAEP’s findings but was expanded to include more detailed information on the legislature as well as the elections, parties, the executive, the judiciary, and civil society (Coppedge et al., 2018). In the past ten years, considerable research has been done in several thematic areas of legislative studies. The first is in the area of institutional design and how it shapes legislative processes and outputs (see for instance Arnold, Doyle, & Wiesehomeier, 2017), agenda-setting, legislative institutions, and policy outcomes (see Aleman & Tsebelis, 2016). Second, are the studies that deal with the oversight functions of legislatures (see Fish, Michel, & Lindberg, 2015; Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2012). Third are the sets of studies that deal with legislative dynamics and activities such as debates, Parliamentary Questions (PQs), legislative roll-call, and legislative recruitment and professionalization, and the role that these activities play in democracy and representation (Back, Debus, & Fernandes, 2021; Ainsley et  al., 2020). Fourth, considerable work has also been done in the areas of cross-national research on diversity and representation in national legislatures in terms of gender, racial, ethnic, and religious representation (O’Brien & Piscopo, 2017). Fifth, recent studies have also dealt with legislatures in nascent democracies and small polities (Kinyondo & Pelizzo, 2013). Lastly, the role of legislatures in non-democratic regimes has been examined extensively by scholars. This is especially relevant given that legislatures have been present in 80% of dictatorships with a non-elective executive since the 19th century (Prezoworski et  al.,

legislatures  105 2013) and the general global trend of increasing executive strength at the expense of national legislatures (Khmelko, Penhurstrst, & Mezey, 2020). There have not been many attempts to systematically compare legislatures in Asia since Norton and Ahmed’s 1998 study. Recent comparative examples include that of Rüland et  al. (2005) on Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and India, Case’s (2011) comparison of the role of the legislature in fostering horizontal accountability in the executive in Southeast Asia (Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Singapore), how legislative institutional design affects party competition in Southeast Asia (Rüland, 2013), how presidents in new democracies choose their cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals and control legislatures in East Asia (Lee, 2018), popular support for legislatures in Asia (Sanborn, 2019), and the comparative study of parliaments in South Asia (Ahmed, 2020). On the other hand, the majority of the current research on legislatures in Asia has dealt with several puzzles and debates utilizing country case studies. First is the set of studies that deal with the representativeness of legislatures in terms of membership and composition. The majority of these studies examine the debates on women’s representation, including the issue of whether their presence increases the likelihood of them acting on behalf of women electorates (Joshi & Kingma, 2013; Tan, 2016). Class representation is also a key research topic, particularly in the region’s developing democracies, where clientelist politics and wealth inequalities make it difficult for lower-class citizens to run for office (Warburton et al., 2021). This subsequently shapes incumbency and legislative turnover rates (Lee, 2020). Ethnic representation is also an important part of this scholarly conversation, where issues of legislatures are pivotal in tackling ethnic and religious conflicts, in particular how legislative functions of representation, law-making, and legislative and judicial oversight contribute to peace processes (Win & Kean, 2017; Egreteau, 2019. Another important facet of this research is legislature–citizenship relations, in particular, how the dialogue between citizens and legislatures occurs and the mechanisms of contact that are available (Ahmed, 2012). Second are the studies that deal with legislative organization and procedures, including

delegation, the role of legislative committees, and partisanship. The issues examined include the dynamics of bill co-sponsorship (e.g. in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan), the intensity of the government-opposition divide (e.g. in the Japanese Diet), and the phenomenon of legislative professionalism (e.g. in South Korea) (Curini, Hino, & Osaka, 2018). Third, in the region’s developing countries, there has also been a proliferation of studies that deal with the role of patronage politics, clientelism, and dynastic politics in shaping policymaking outcomes (Aspinall, 2014; Panao, 2016). Lastly, there is also a proliferation of studies that deal with the role of legislatures in non-democratic regimes in the region. While there are a number that still look at the role of “Asian values”, the role of legislatures as institutions for co-optation, information collection, and as “rubber-stamps” of regime policymaking, more recent research has highlighted the role of legislatures as arenas of contestation and debate, albeit limited in the manner and type of contestable issues. The majority of these research projects examine the cases of China’s National People’s Congress and Vietnam’s National Assembly (see Lü, Liu, & Li, 2020; Truex, 2016; Schuler, 2020).

C. Future research There has been considerably less research done on legislatures in Asia, along with Africa and Latin America, than in any other region in the world (Andeweg, 2014). As mentioned above, there is still a dearth of studies that systematically compare legislatures in the region. This is a potentially fertile ground for future research, as legislatures have proven to be suitable subjects for many methodological lenses in political science as well as in other disciplines (see Loewenberg, 2011; Martin, Saalfeld, & Strøm, 2014). There are also a number of research gaps in several thematic areas where the region can contribute theoretically and empirically. For instance, among Asian democracies, despite the variation in regime forms, the bulk of the work that examines executive–legislative relations and how they shape policymaking outcomes was done in presidential (Indonesia, Philippines, and South Korea) and semi-presidential (Taiwan) systems (Cheibub & Limongi, 2014). In addition, the relationship between legislatures and juhn chris p. espia

106  encyclopedia of asian politics citizens is one of the least studied areas in legislative studies, yet this is a crucial dimension in understanding legislatures and the role they play in our political systems. With rapid developments occurring in the region, it provides an interesting test for the assumptions drawn from the West on the relationship between citizens and legislatures. In addition, the study of subnational legislatures in Asia is still thin, despite the growth in their number in Europe, Latin America, and North America and despite the fact that many parts of the region have undertaken different forms of decentralization. Lastly, given the prominence of legislatures around the world and their central place in the dynamics of non-democratic rule, it is surprising that few have concentrated on how legislatures are empowered or disempowered (Wilson & Woldense, 2019. This is particularly useful for comparative analysis, given the number of non-democratic regimes in Asia, the changes in their role from being mere “rubber stamps”, and the variations in the types of power that legislatures have in non-democratic settings. Juhn Chris P. Espia

References Ahmed, N. (2012). Parliament and Citizens in Asia: The Bangladesh Case. Journal of Legislative Studies, 18 (3–4), 463–478. Ahmed, N. (2020). Parliaments in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. 1st edition. Routledge. Ainsley, C., Carrubba, C.J., Crisp, B.F., Demirkaya, B., Gabel, M.J., and Hadzic, D. (2020). Roll-Call Vote Selection: Implications for the Study of Legislative Politics. American Political Science Review, 114 (3), 691–706. Aleman, E., and Tsebelis, G. (Eds.). (2016). Legislative Institutions and Law-making in Latin America. Oxford University Press. Andeweg, R.B. (2014). Roles in Legislatures. In T. Saalfeld, K.W. Strøm, and S. Martin (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies. Oxford University Press. Arnold, C., Doyle, D., and Wiesehomeier, N. (2017). Presidents, Policy Compromise, and Legislative Success. The Journal of Politics, 79 (2), 380–395. Aspinall, E. (2014). Parliament and Patronage. Journal of Democracy, 25 (4), 96–110. juhn chris p. espia

Back, H., Debus, M., and Fernandes, J.M. (Eds.). (2021). The Politics of Legislative Debates. Oxford University Press. Baldwin, N. (Ed.). (2013). Legislatures of Small States: A Comparative Study. Routledge. Case, W. (2009). Low-Quality Democracy and Varied Authoritarianism: Elites and Regimes in Southeast Asia Today. Pacific Review, 22 (3), 255–269. Case, W. (2011). Executive Accountability in Southeast Asia: The Role of Legislatures in New Democracies and Under Electoral Authoritarianism. Policy Studies, No. 57. East-West Center. Chang, Y, Chu, Y., and Huang, M. (2011). Procedural Quality Only? Taiwanese Democracy Reconsidered. International Political Science Review, 32 (5), 598–619. Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F. (2014). The Structure of Legislative-Executive Relations: Asia in Comparative Perspective. In R. Dixon, and T. Ginsburg (Eds.), Comparative Constitutional Law in Asia (pp. 123–162). Edward Elgar Publishing. Chernykh, S., Doyle, D., and Power, T.J. (2017). Measuring Legislative Power: An Expert Reweighting of the Fish‐Kroenig Parliamentary Powers Index. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 42 (2), 295–320. Chu, Y., and Huang, M. (2010). Solving an Asian Puzzle. Journal of Democracy, 21 (4), 114–122. Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C.H., Lindberg, S.I., Skaaning, S., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Cornell, A., Fish, M.S., Gjerløw, H., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., et  al. (2018). V-Dem Codebook v8. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Cox, G.W., and Morgenstern, S. (2001). Latin America’s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents. Comparative Politics, 33 (2), 171–189. Curini, L., Hino, A., and Osaka, A. (2018). The Intensity of Government–Opposition Divide as Measured through Legislative Speeches and What We Can Learn from it: Analyses of Japanese Parliamentary Debates, 1953–2013. Government and Opposition, 55 (2), 184–201. Egreteau, R. (2019). Towards Legislative Institutionalisation? Emerging Patterns of Routinisation in Myanmar’s Parliament. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 38 (3), 265–285.

legislatures  107 Fish, M.S. (2006). Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies. Journal of Democracy, 17 (1), 5–20. Fish, M.S., and Kroenig, M. (2009).  The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey. Cambridge University Press. Fish, S.M., Michel, K.M., and. Lindberg, S.I. (2015). Legislative Powers and Executive Corruption. V-Dem Working Paper 2015:7. http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.2139​/ssrn​.2622570 Hahn, J.W. (1996). Democratization in Russia. The Development of Legislative Institutions. Sharpe. Hicken, A., and Kuhonta, E.M. (Eds.). (2015). Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocracies, and the Shadows of the Past. Cambridge University Press. Joshi, D.K., and Kingma, K. (2013). The Uneven Representation of Women in Asian Parliaments: Explaining Variation Across the Region. African and Asian Studies, 12 (4), 352–372. Khmelko, I., Stapenhurst, R., and Mezey, M.L. (Eds). (2020). Legislative Decline in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective. Routledge. Kinyondo, A., and Pelizzo, R. (2013). Strengthening Legislatures: Some Lessons from the Pacific Region: Strengthening Legislatures. Politics & Policy, 41 (3), 420–446. Lee, A. (2020). Incumbency, Parties, and Legislatures: Theory and Evidence from India. Comparative Politics, 52 (2), 311–331. Lee, D.S. (2018). Executive Capacity to Control Legislatures and Presidential Choice of Cabinet Ministers in East Asian Democracies. Governance, 31 (4), 777–795. Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A.C. (1996). Toward Consolidated Democracies. Journal of Democracy, 7 (2), 14–33. Loewenberg, G. (2007). Paradoxes of Legislatures. Daedalus, 136 (3), 56–66. Loewenberg, G. (2011). On Legislatures: The Puzzle of Representation. Paradigm Publishers. Lü, X., Liu, M., and Li, F. (2020). Policy Coalition Building in an Authoritarian Legislature: Evidence from China’s National Assemblies (1983–2007). Comparative Political Studies, 53 (9), 1380–1416. Martin, S., Saalfeld, T., and Strøm, K. (Eds.). (2014). The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies. Oxford University Press.

Norton, P. (2002). Parliaments and Citizens in Western Europe. Taylor & Francis Group. Norton, P. (2013). Parliament in British Politics. Palgrave Macmillan. Norton, P., and Ahmed, N. (1998). Legislatures in Asia: Exploring Diversity. Journal of Legislative Studies, 4 (4), 1–12. O’Brien, D.Z., and Piscopo, J.M. (2017). Electing Women to National Legislatures. In A. Alexander, C. Bolzendahl and F. Jalalzai (Eds.), Measuring Women’s Political Empowerment Across the Globe (pp. 139–163). Springer International Publishing. O’Donnell, G.A. (1999).  Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization. University of Notre Dame Press. Panao, R.A.L. (2016). Tried and Tested? Dynastic Persistence and Legislative Productivity at the Philippine House of Representatives: Persistence and Productivity at Philippine House of Representatives. Asian Politics & Policy, 8 (3), 394–417. Pelizzo, R., and Stapenhurst, F. (2012). Parliamentary Oversight Tools: A Comparative Analysis. Routledge. Przeworski, A., Newman, L., Park, S.K., Queralt, D., Rivero, G., and Sin, K. (2013). Political Institutions and Political Events (PIPE) Data Set. Department of Politics, New York University. Rüland, J., Jurgenmeyer, C., Nelson, M.H., and Ziegenhain, P. (2005). Parliaments and Political Change in Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Sanborn, H. (2019). Popular Support for Legislatures in Asia. Journal of Legislative Studies, 25 (2), 188–209. Schuler, P. (2020). Position Taking or Position Ducking? A Theory of Public Debate in Single-Party Legislatures. Comparative Political Studies, 53 (9), 1493–1524. Solinger, D.J. (2001). Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico. Journal of Democracy, 12 (1), 30–42. Tan, N. (2016). Gender Reforms, Electoral Quotas, and Women’s Political Representation in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. Pacific Affairs, 89 (2), 309–323. Truex, R. (2014). Consultative Authoritarianism and Its Limits. Comparative Political Studies, 50(3), 329–361. juhn chris p. espia

108  encyclopedia of asian politics Truex, R. (2016). Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Information in China. Cambridge University Press. Warburton, E., Muhtadi, B., Aspinall, E., and Fossati, D. (2021). When does Class Matter? Unequal Representation in Indonesian Legislatures. Third World Quarterly, 42 (6), 1252–1275. Wig, T., Hegre, H., and Regan, P.M. (2015). Updated Data on Institutions and Elections 1960–2012: Presenting the IAEP Dataset Version 2.0. Research & Politics, 2 (2), 205316801557912. Wilson, M.C., and Woldense, J. (2019). Contested Or Established? A Comparison of Legislative Powers Across Regimes. Democratization, 26 (4), 585–605.

Key resources Key references on the concept: Khmelko, I., Stapenhurst, R., and Mezey, M.L. (Eds.). (2020). Legislative Decline in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective. Routledge. Loewenberg, G. (2011). On Legislatures: The Puzzle of Representation. Paradigm Publishers. Martin, S., Saalfeld, T., and Strøm, K. (Eds.). (2014). The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies. Oxford University Press.

juhn chris p. espia

In Asia Ahmed, N. (2020). Parliaments in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Routledge. Case, W. (2011). Executive Accountability in Southeast Asia: The Role of Legislatures in New Democracies and Under Electoral Authoritarianism. Policy Studies, No. 57. East-West Center. Rüland, J., Jurgenmeyer, C., Nelson, M.H., and Ziegenhain, P. (2005). Parliaments and Political Change in Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Rüland, J. (2013). Participation without Democratization: the ASEAN Interparliamentary Assembly (AIPA and ASEAN’s Regional Corporatism. In O. Costa, C. Dri, and S. Stavridis (Eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (pp. 166–186). Palgrave Macmillan. Win, C. and Kean, T. (2017). Communal Conflict in Myanmar: The Legislature’s Response, 2012-2015. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47 (3), 413–439.

19. Militaries A. The concept According to The Military Balance, an annual research paper of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), defence spending in Asian countries, including some leastdeveloped countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar, is relatively high. However, the armed forces in Asia have been involved in inward-looking missions rather than missions to defend the territory against foreign aggression, given that there has been no state-to-state war in the region since the Cambodian–Vietnamese War (1975–1989). Scholars in Asian Studies have emphasized that, due to relatively weak state capacity and the ability of social entities to mobilize militias and vigilantes within local communities to maintain control over specific areas, nonstate armed actors are embedded in the local order in many developing countries. They are often called rebels but traditionally played certain roles exerting violence and maintaining endemic control of power in local communities. Migdal’s series of works (1988, 1994, and 2001) and Sidel (2013)’s concept of “bossism” behaviour demonstrate how progovernment militia and vigilantes, as well as other rebel groups, have been mobilized as vote collectors and interest brokers by different kinds of strongmen, party organizations, and ethnic groups. Other studies provide clear examples of how leaders of rebel groups govern a particular territorial area – not by providing election-related jobs, but rather by ensuring local order in the community and behaving like a de facto representative of the population. Therefore, the militaries have allocated a huge amount of their resources to prepare for counter-insurgency operations against the armed conflicts and violence caused by communist guerrillas, local militias, ethnic armed groups, terrorist groups, and so on. Since the era of the Cold War, the military was often mobilized for civil-military operations (CMO) such as rural development, disaster relief and rehabilitation, and health and education service for the populations in remote communities in order to gain the hearts and minds of the disadvantaged people. That allowed soldiers to cultivate strong self-conception believing

that they are “guardians,” “moderators,” or even “rulers” of the state (Nordlinger, 1977). At the same time, the state still relies on non-state actors for security provision and confrontation with remaining rebels, mobilizing paramilitaries, militias, and vigilantes in expectations that their military-like strength and capacity will win the hearts and minds of the local population, guerrillas, and rebel followers. Frontline operations are subcontracted by the state’s armed forces to auxiliary security forces like paramilitaries and progovernment militia. This is the unique feature of the presence of security governance in Asia’s new democracies: the state’s attempts, although risky, to eradicate the rebels, relying on irregular forces. The Military Balance also indicates the number of paramilitaries in Asian countries. While paramilitaries are contracted and allegiant to the state, the contractual relationship can be denied by the state when such forces are accused of abuse (such as illegal acts, human rights violations, corruption, disobedience, and other forms of wrongdoing). Such auxiliary security forces are often ill-trained and transactional rather than professional and disciplined. On the ground, they assist the regular forces in imposing order and represent the lowest-level agents in a pyramidal security structure.

B. The landscape Civilian control of the military In most liberal democracies, the military support their civilian governments in responding to internal and external threats, assisting the police and other agencies in securing peace and order. However, many countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia continue to lack “objective civilian control,” with the military often attempting to subordinate civilian political leaders and intervene in important decisions on foreign and defence policies. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State (1957) set a starting point for discussions of civil–military relations. He draws two patterns of civilian control. Subjective control requires the armed forces to minimize their political power. Military affairs are governed according to what furthers the power interests of the dominant civilian group within society, unchecked by the experts of the military perspectives. On the other hand, objective control values the role of a politically neutral and autonomous professional military which

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110  encyclopedia of asian politics gives its obedience to whatever leader obtains legitimate political power within the state. Stepan (1988) classifies the elements of the armed forces into two: the “Military as Government” and the “Military as Institution.” When the members of the armed forces share interest and self-conception of professionalism, they keep their distance from politics and focus on their mandates for national security. What leads the military as government? Not all authoritarian regimes undermine civilian control. Janowitz, in his work titled The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (1964) indicates five patterns of civil–military relations in post-colonial countries. First is “authoritarian-personal control,” where the primitive oligarchical elites eliminate the military’s intervention from any decision-making. Second is the “authoritarian-mass party,” where the oligarchical elites and local strongmen, with mobilizing nonstate armed actors, exercise violence simply to secure positions of power and govern a particular territorial area – not by providing election-related jobs, but rather by ensuring local order in the community and behaving like a de facto representative of the population. The third is the “democratic competitive and semi-competitive system” where the military respects both political elites and civilian agencies. Post-colonial India and Malaya experienced this path, given the established bureaucracy in the colonial era. Fourth is the “civil-military coalition,” where the military is engaged in a moderator of the powersharing game as one of the political blocs of the country. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Pakistan under authoritarian rules are categorized here. The fifth is “military oligarchy,” such as post-coup Thailand and Myanmar. Stepan (1988) also points out the military’s “new professionalism,” a strong selfconception as guardian of the nation, as a key incentive for political intervention. This well explains the behavior of the Asian military in the Cold War regimes. In countries without insurgency, such as Singapore and Malaysia, with the successful neutralization of the communists in the 1970s, militaries have grown as institutions with old professionalism. On the other hand, in countries with non-state armed groups, the state more dependent on the armed forces to work as a frontline service provider to gain physical and psychological saya kiba

support from the civilian population. The military developed new professionalism and motivation to guide the civilian governments. The Myanmar military has regarded state unification and administrative reform as its primary missions. The Thai military, with its name of Royal Thai Armed Forces, has been a guardian of the monarchy, moderating the royal projects for national development for decades. Croissant’s series of works shows various frameworks to understand the status quo of civil–military relations in post-colonial Asia. His work Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia (Croissant et al., 2013) shows how civilians in newly democratized countries can ensure their control over the military, examining the cases in Northeast Asia (South Korea, Taiwan), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand), and South Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan). Democratic transition and security sector reform/governance (SSR/G) Many Asian countries adopted security sector reform and governance (SSR/G), supported by the state and non-state donors in Western democracies. SSR/G aims to enhance the effectiveness of security, justice, and oversight institutions and to bring the state as well as non-state security sectors (e.g., military, police, and private security companies) under democratic governance as a state-building end goal (OECD DAC, 2007). However, particularly in Southeast Asia, security sector–related reforms in those countries have quickly become enmeshed in national power politics, and their scope, as well as their success, has relied on interpersonal loyalties and patronage networks between the respective political leadership and the armed forces. As a result, civilian control over the military remains insufficient in all four countries. In post-democratization countries in Asia, the degree of civilian control highly depends on the “strategic actions of political actors and how they relate to the structural, ideological, and institutional environment in which civilian and military elites interact.” Heiduk (2014) concludes that the SSR process in Southeast Asia is pathdependent and local ownership-oriented, valuing traditional and personal networks of the local elites and state security sector. The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) has promoted the concept

militaries  111 of security sector governance (SSG) worldwide, as an alternative to SSR. Under its former name Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the organization began SSR promotion in the 2000s to enhance democratic control of armed forces in new democracies, providing advice and training to the military and police, training members of parliament, and hosting expert meetings around the world. However, as Heiduk (2014) points out, as the root cause of insufficiency of civilian control lies in the resilience of interpersonal loyalties and patronage networks, it does not make much sense to demand reform of only the security institutions. Recognizing this, it presents the alternative concept of SSG, which may be applied not only to vulnerable and post-conflict countries that require international intervention but also to emerging democracies and countries where democracy is already established. DCAF defines SSG as “the process by which accountable security institutions supply security as a public good via established transparent policies and practices” (DCAF, 2020).

C. Future research Mandates of the military are reviewed and reshaped almost all over the world in response to the emergence of non-traditional threats and diversification of threats in the past decade. Large-scale disasters in the region are changing the landscape. Asian militaries are getting more oriented towards diverse international cooperation activities through the framework of the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 accelerated cooperation and coordination among civilian government agencies, international organizations, and regional organizations for crossborder disaster relief activities. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), a British research organization that digitizes world conflicts, world conflicts are becoming more complex and diverse than the structure in which the state and rebels confront each other as before. Conflicts beyond the national framework alone, such as armed conflicts between non-state actors and local riots, and terrorism keep increasing. Since 2010, the militaries in Southeast Asia also face the immediate need to respond

to the external threat in the South China Sea. Change in threat perception and mandates of the armed forces may gradually restructure their relationship with civilian governments. However, for the time being, the Asian militaries will continue their activities beyond the framework of Huntington’s ideal type of “professionalism.” Democratic governance and accountability of the security sector remain the central issues for the militaries in Asia, particularly when they enhance regional and international cooperation to prepare for the new threat. The governments and defence industry personnel in Western democracies, including Japan, take a strong interest in transferring defence equipment to South Asia and Southeast Asia. However, equipment procurement in recipient countries is often fraught with many problems in terms of transparency. Saya Kiba

References Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., Lorenz, P., and Chambers, P. W. (2013) Civilian Control and Democracy in Asia. Palgrave. Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF). (2020). About Security Sector Reform. https://www​.dcaf​.ch​/about​-ssgr Heiduk, F. (Ed.). (2014). Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia: From Policy to Practice. Palgrave. Huntington, S. (1957). The Soldier and the State. Harvard University Press. Nordlinger, E. A. (1977). Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. Prentice-Hall. International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2021). The Military Balance 2021. Janowitz, M. (1964). The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis. University of Chicago Press. Migdal, J. (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton University Press. Migdal, J. (1994). The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles for Domination. In J. Migdal, A. Kohli, and V. Shue (Eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (pp. 7–34). Cambridge University Press. Migdal, J. (2001). State in Society: Studying How States and Societies: Transform saya kiba

112  encyclopedia of asian politics and Constitute One Another. Cambridge University Press. Organisation for Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD). (2007). OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. Sidel, J. (2013). Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of Local Strongmen. In J. Harriss, K. Stokke and O. Tönquist (Eds.), Politicising Democracy: The New Local Politics of Democratisation (pp. 51–74). Palgrave Macmillan. Stepan, A. C. (1988). Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton University Press. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). https://www​ .acleddata​ .com/

Key resources Diamond, L., and Plattner, M. (Eds.). (1996). Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. Johns Hopkins University Press.

saya kiba

Huntington, S. (1960). Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. The Free Press. Janowitz, M. (1964). The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis. University of Chicago Press. In Asia Chambers, P., and Waitoolkiat, N. (2017). Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia. Nordic Inst of Asian Studies (NIAS). Chambers, P. W., and Aurel Croissant, A. (Eds.). (2010). Democracy under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South and Southeast Asia. Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Chulalongkorn University. Mietzner, M. (2013). The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia. Routledge. Yasutomi, A., Hall, R. A., and Kiba, S. (2021). Pathways for the Irregular Forces in Southeast Asia: Mitigating Violence with Nonstate Actors. Routledge.

20. Political behavior

in addressing the concern by collecting new data on the general public attitudes in various countries. How do Asian people engage in politics? Do they engage in politics the same way as A. The concept citizens in advanced Western democracies? Political behavior refers to any form of Over the past several decades, alternative involvement in the political process or any explanations of various types of political activity that has political consequences con- behavior have been investigated in significant cerning government and public policy. The studies conducted in Western democracies. general definition includes legitimate forms of Unlike the factors that could drive political political participation (such as participating in behavior in the West, the effect of “Asian campaigns and elections, working with inter- values” on political behavior started gaining est groups, or organizing social movements) traction in the academic discourse during the and unlawful political activities (including wave of Asian democratization of the 1990s violent protest, terrorism, and revolutions). In (Subramaniam, 2000; Park & Shin, 2006). the internet era, posting political comments, Studies on how Asian values influence joining online petitions, or sharing informa- political behavior have made at least four argution via various social media platforms is ments suggesting that Asian political behavnow also considered a new form of political ior should be studied with caution. The first behavior. view is on the different notions of individual While formal participation aims at con- political rights between Asian countries and taining social conflict within the extant politi- Western democracies. The argument is that cal system so that the political order remains individual rights do not apply to or are less stable, dissent which cannot be received as suitable for Asian cultures, where the fundaexpected via existing political structures mental foundation of a society is not the indiwould potentially not only pursue policy vidual but the family. Also, in Asian cultures, changes but also challenge the political order individuals exist in relationship to their famiitself. The study of political behavior also lies and the larger community, where duty and embraces the analysis of political ideologies, responsibility to others are valued as highly, if values, and attitudes as the basis of partici- not more highly, than individual freedom and pation and non-participation in the political rights. The second argument does not necessphere. sarily question the notion of individual rights. Conventional wisdom believes that all However, it suggests that Asian countries human behavior is rational. Yet, this argu- need more time to adopt individualism, given ment has stimulated debates about whether that many are still developing countries, arguthe individual’s rational decision is driven ing that the right to economic development is by relatively stable internal factors or by just as important, if not more important, than the dynamic external political changes per- the other, more traditional notions of politiceived by the individuals. The studies on the cal rights, including the rights to partake in effects of internal factors on political behav- political activities. The third group questions ior embrace the consideration of personal the ontological existence of the “Asian Value” socio-demographic characteristics and an and suggests that there should not be such a individual’s attitude toward political informa- presumption regarding Asian political behavtion perceived in the political process. On the ior. Furthermore, they argue that Asia is not contrary, the studies on external factors that a tiny homogeneous geographical entity, nor may influence political behavior concern the can a single set of values could possibly reprepolitical situation in which the individual is sent the entire region, let alone define political surrounded. The primary debate on how to behavior in Asia as a whole. Finally, the fourth interpret political behavior is, therefore, about argument claims that the idea of Asian Values examining whether internal or external fac- was promoted for political and ideological tors are more critical determinants that could purposes to legitimize rulers’ authority in influence an individual’s rationality to trig- Asia. Thus, the so-called Asian Values should ger political behavior. The continuation of be viewed as merely a pretext for maintaining these debates over the years implies that the the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. explanation of political behavior is still unsatTogether, these studies raise the ongoing isfactory. Still, some progress has been made discussion on whether political behavior in 113

114  encyclopedia of asian politics Asia differs from the West. Given that most of this debate so far has been driven by theoretical speculation, the latest development of Asian political behavior studies tends to focus on empirical investigation through collecting data in Asia. Starting in the late 1990s, more and more empirical studies were conducted to examine the effect of various internal and external factors on political behavior in Asia.

B. The landscape Internal factors Two major theoretical perspectives demonstrated in the West were helpful in understanding Asian political behavior. The “elite competition” and “participatory citizenship” theories have guided much of the research on voter turnout and other forms of political behavior in mature democracies (Dalton, 2002). The elite competition theory is associated with the “responsible government” school of thought (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963), and its core ideas are that modern governments should be, or are necessarily, dominated by political elites. Citizen participation in such political systems is episodic and circumscribed. According to the elite competition theory, limited citizen involvement is an adequate and appropriate method for ensuring that a democratic regime will have a stable and effective government responsive to public needs and demands. In contrast to the elite competition theory, the participatory citizenship theory contends that a defining characteristic of democracy should be “untidy” governance attendant upon widespread public involvement in governmental processes. “Healthy” democracy requires extensive – not minimal – political engagement (e.g., Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970; Macpherson, 1977; Clarke et al., 2004). Participatory democracy theorists argue that extensive citizen involvement in various political activities enhances government effectiveness, openness, and responsiveness while bolstering citizens’ political interest, knowledge, efficacy, and trust (e.g., Pateman, 1970; Macpherson, 1977). Widespread political engagement is integral to a “virtuous circle” of responsive governance and informed citizenship (Norris, 2000). The two democratic theories delineate a sharp contrast regarding the desirable and possible scope of an individual’s political behavior. Despite these substantial differences dennis lu chung weng

between the two theories, there are still significant areas of agreement. Perhaps most fundamentally, both theories conceptualize “political behavior as a voluntary activity done by an individual acting alone or with others”(Clarke et  al., 2004, p. 219). Such behavior involves citizens’ activities aimed at influencing government action by expressing attitudes, beliefs, and opinions about the ends and means of public policy. Starting in the 1970s, scholars initiated systematic investigations of citizen involvement in a diverse range of non-electoral political activities. A frequent demarcation point for these inquiries is the distinction between types (or “modes”) of political behavior that are “conventional” or “unconventional” (Verba & Nie, 1972; Inglehart, 1983; Dalton, 2002; Clarke et  al., 2004, 2009). In addition to election-centered activities such as voting and campaign work, conventional activities encompass various community involvement in inter-election periods. As Verba and Nie (1972) state, community involvement includes citizens trying to solve local problems by contacting public officials and working with friends and neighbors in policy advocacy and problem-solving roles. These activities can be seen as “elite supportive” because they are peaceful and implicitly recognize the legitimacy of existing governmental structures and processes. In contrast, “unconventional” participation may range from “mild” forms, such as signing a petition or joining a boycott of goods and services, to “strong” ones, such as marches and demonstrations or protests that involve violence against people and property. Prior empirical research on public political participation has delineated the nature and incidence of various activities in mature democracies. A key finding is that political behavior is multidimensional. While various types of political behavior have been identified by existing Western literature, it is essential to consider what factors are involved in the mechanism by which people perform political action in Asia. First, socioeconomic status brings about variation among individuals in political behavior because such status shapes cost–benefit structures for learning about and engaging in politics (Verba et  al., 1995). As people gain more knowledge and skills to understand public matters, they are more likely to perform political action to address shared concerns. Perception of various political issues is another internal factor

political behavior  115 to be considered because of its role in differential attitudes toward politics and its direct influence on political behavior (Delli Carpini, 2004; Xenos & Moy, 2007). This perspective emphasizes the importance of various internal factors as potential mediators of actual political behavior (Hsieh & Newman, 2001; Ho et al., 2013). External factors Previous studies suggested that external factors such as political institutions and context affect how people participate in politics. Scholars argue that political regimes in general and governments in Asia need to be identified not in terms of institutional attributes but the spaces of political activities with Asian cultural elements involved, through which specific conflicts are managed, ameliorated, and contained (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2006). While their former colonial powers influence the development of Asian democratization, Asian culture is embedded and influential in each Asian country. Undoubtedly, Western political ideology has been brought to Asian countries as the social democratic view of liberal capitalism dominated how to govern throughout the wave of democratization in Asia. Given the different speeds of development progress, these young Asian democracies may not be able to adopt all of the social democratic views at once, but the advancement of democratic government became intertwined with the broader class project. Specifically, democratization in Asia went hand in hand with capitalist industrialization and its associated social conflicts. These conflicts have found a material expression in political spaces within the state: through structures and organizations of representation that required creating new forms of political organizations and collective mobilization. The most important such development was the formation of a mass political party. However, the idea of representation as a form of politics that acknowledges and institutionalizes conflict is arguably under attack because of the advance of the global neoliberal revolution. What differentiates Asian nations from the Western world is that the effects of neoliberal development are much more profound in the region where patterns of industrialization and production structures have fragmented the working class in a way that constrains the mobilization and capacity for collective action (Chen & Li, 2012).

In Asia, neoliberalism has led to an extensive program of market reform and disciplines that have undermined the roles of class as a basis for collective action and identity. Late industrialization further reinforced this marginalization of representative institutions and reinforced vertical rather than horizontal relationships between state and civil society. Hence, the combination of neoliberalism and late industrialization has led to the promotion of structures of capitalism characterized by the interdependence and inter-penetration of public and private power. In turn, this inter-penetration of public and private power implies that the boundary between public and private is much more indistinct than is assumed in forms of Western-style representative politics. The external political condition, directly and indirectly, influences how individuals behave as the perception of politics varies accordingly. Unlike Western democracies, in many Asian countries, the Cold War has reinforced the capacity of authoritarian regimes to obstruct or contain independent labor movements and other potential structures through which social democratic politics can be prosecuted. This history of repression has resulted in the marginalization of these social forces, weakening those forces that might have sustained such an imaginative constitution of class. They hypothesize that a major restructuring of the state is underway in many Asian countries during their democratization process. A distinguishing mark of these political spaces is that they seek to encourage democratic political behavior and are prone to use the language of empowerment, but at the same time, this is paralleled by the continuation of maintaining hierarchical representative institutions and organizations such as political parties or labor unions. Hence, paradoxically, while many of these institutional forms seek to promote political behavior, they stand in contradiction to the development of representative institutions seen as the instruments for political participation. There is obviously a great degree of variation in the nature and form of these new political spaces, but nonetheless, they constitute an important shift away from formalized representative structures to more informal associations as centers of decision-making. This includes shifts to civil society organizations rather than political parties; governance through mechanisms such as transparency dennis lu chung weng

116  encyclopedia of asian politics rather than formal political contestation; direct “populist” appeals rather than deliberation in legislative assemblies; and “local” rather than national-level representation. The rationale that makes individuals want to participate in politics is to let people perceive the political environment as welcoming new thoughts. So, studying external factors that are associated with individuals’ rationale behind their political behavior could help address the concerns: who gets heard? What forms of behavior are allowed? What forms of behavior are excluded?

C. Future research While political behavior has been studied empirically in Western democracies for several decades and the importance of Asia is inevitable, only few have attempted to disclose this underdeveloped topic in Asian countries. Among other reasons, lacking reliable data may be the most obvious obstacle in the past, but it is not the only one. To date, existing studies of mass political behavior in the new Asian democracies have emphasized the determinants of voting in periodic national elections. The paucity of theoretically driven survey data collections focused on the determinants of different types of citizen political participation limits scholars’ ability to use existing data sources to test competing models’ explanatory power. In the context of East and Southeast Asian countries, existing research has focused heavily, albeit not exclusively, on electoral behavior (see, e.g., Dalton, Chu, & Shin, 2008). For most Asian countries, the only noteworthy ongoing project that could provide valuable data is the specific component of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). The ABS project was first launched in mid-2000. Since then, the ABS has been increasingly recognized as the region’s first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regimes, democracy, governance, and economic reform. In the present context, it is essential to note that existing ABS surveys do not contain a number of the variables needed to test all the competing theoretical models of various forms of political behavior demonstrated in mature democracies. Although the ABS surveys do not have all the needed variables, similar indicators that are compatible with existing models are still dennis lu chung weng

worth testing. Future studies on Asian political behavior may try to test variables that are convertible to previous studies to delineate Asian political behavior. Accordingly, future research should be able to answer a simple question: what is the nature, structure, and extent of citizen political behavior in Asia? Currently, more research on Asian political behavior is being conducted by scholars through both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Some conventional qualitative approaches include Asian political participation history review, case studies, in-depth interviews, and individual political engagement exploration. Meanwhile, the standard quantitative methods examine internal and external factors associated with political behavior in Asia by collecting more empirical data from all Asian countries. The methodological pluralism, advancement, and data accessibility in the future will enable researchers to extend their understanding of Asia and Asian people. In summary, studies on political behavior in Asia offer a different perspective to the longneeded understanding of Asian countries. Dennis Lu Chung Weng

References Almond, G., and Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Sage. Barber, B.R.  (1984).  Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. University of California Press. Carpini, M.X.D. (2004). Mediating democratic engagement: The impact of communications on citizens’ involvement in political and civic life. In Handbook of Political Communication Research (pp. 413–452). Routledge. Chen, Y.L., and Li, W.D. (2012). Neoliberalism, the developmental state, and housing policy in Taiwan. In Locating Neoliberalism in East Asia: Neoliberalizing Spaces in Developmental States (pp. 196– 224) Wiley-Blackwell. Clarke, H., David Sanders, D., Marianne Stewart, M., and Paul Whiteley, P. (2004). Political Choice in Britain. Oxford University Press. Clarke, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M., and Whiteley, P. (2009). Performance Politics and the British Voter. Cambridge University Press.

political behavior  117 Dalton, R.J. (2002).  Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. CQ Press. Hsieh, F., and Newman, D. (2001). How Asia Votes. Seven Bridges Press. Ho, K., Clarke, H.D., Chen, L.K., and Weng, D.L.C. (2013). Valence politics and electoral choice in a new democracy: The case of Taiwan.  Electoral Studies,  32(3), 476–481. Macpherson, C.B. (1977). The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford University Press. Park, C.M., and Shin, D.C. (2006). Do Asian values deter popular support for democracy in South Korea?  Asian Survey,  46(3), 341–361. Pateman C. (1970). Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge University Press. Rodan, G., and Jayasuriya, K. (2006). Conflict and the New Political Participation in Southeast Asia. Working Paper Series, Asia Research Centre. Subramaniam, S. (2000). The Asian values debate: Implications for the spread of liberal democracy.  Asian Affairs: An American Review, 27(1), 19–35. Verba, S. (1995). The citizen as respondent: Sample surveys and American democracy. American Political Science Review, 90, 1–7. Verba, S., Nie, N.H., and Jae-On Kim, J. (1972). Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison. Cambridge University Press.

Xenos, M., and Moy, P. (2007). Direct and differential effects of the internet on political and civic engagement. Journal of Communication, 57(4), 704–718.

Key resources Clarke, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M., and Whiteley, P. (2004). Political Choice in Britain. Oxford University Press. Dalton, R.J. (2002).  Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. CQ Press. Inglehart, R. (1983). Changing paradigms in comparative political behavior. Political Science: The State of the Discipline, 429–469. Norris, P. (2000). A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Norris, P. (2004).  Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge University Press. In Asia Achen, C.H., and T.Y. Wang (Eds.). (2017). The Taiwan Voter. University of Michigan Press. Dalton, R.J., Shin, D.C., and Chu, Y.H. (Eds.). (2008). Party Politics in East Asia: Citizens, Elections, and Democratic Development. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Welzel, C. (2011). The Asian values thesis revisited: Evidence from the world values surveys. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 12(1), 1–31.

dennis lu chung weng

21. Political culture

to Confucianism, other regions of Asia are influenced by religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism in Indochina and India, further challenging the one-size-fits-all thesis of modernization. A. The concept In the ongoing debate about democratiThe study of political culture focuses on how zation, a key question is why China has not citizens’ beliefs, feelings, and values influence yet transitioned to a democratic regime. The their political attitudes and behaviors. Some initial optimism that China would eventucommon research topics in political culture ally become a democracy has dissipated with include citizens’ trust in political institu- President Xi consolidating indefinite rule in tions, support for democratization, tendencies the People’s Republic of China. Consequently, for political participation, and belief in the the scholarly debate has shifted to examining effectiveness of the rule of law. In this chap- the factors that prevent such a transition. One ter, we explore some critical questions and refutation of the modernization thesis is that debates surrounding political culture in Asia. the Chinese middle class does not actually We begin by discussing the debate between desire democratization. Chen and Lu’s (2011) modernization theorists and their skeptics survey of three major cities found that the regarding the theory’s adaptability to Asia. To middle class was unsupportive of disruptive illustrate the theory’s limited reach in Asia, protests or political organizations that could we examine the roadblocks and explanations threaten social harmony. They also had little for the lack of democratization in China and interest in extra-systemic political reform or other Southeast Asian states. We then inves- interfering with government decision-maktigate the extent to which Confucianism, ing. As beneficiaries of the regime, they were Buddhism, and Hinduism influence political unlikely to challenge the status quo. Public culture among the citizenry in Asia. opinion polls have similarly shown strong Although the study of political culture middle-class support for the party (Chen & has made significant progress in the West, an Dickson, 2010; Dickson, 2016). As a result, ongoing debate regarding political culture in the modernization thesis is not universal but the Asian context concerns the democratiza- rather contingent on specific socioeconomic tion process. The dominant school of thought, and political factors (Bertrand, 1998; Jones, modernization theory, argues that the rapid 1998; Inglehart, 2003). economic growth of Asian economies in In addition to the above factors, there is a the 1980s would ultimately transform Asian growing body of literature on why China has societies into democracies (Neher & Marlay, not democratized. Stockmann and Gallagher 1995; Diamond, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita & (2011) suggest that the media environment in Downs, 2005). The story is straightforward: China helps bolster the regime’s legitimacy by as Asian economies grew, a middle class creating an image that the party is concerned would emerge demanding political and civil about labor rights while ignoring issues rights, ultimately pressuring authoritarian with implementation. Others have examined governments to democratize. Proponents of how China’s “50 cent army” combats verbal modernization theory cite Taiwan and South attacks on the regime from within and outside Korea as successful examples, supporting the the country (e.g., Han, 2015). Some scholvalidity of their claims. ars point to power-sharing mechanisms and Skeptics of the modernization thesis con- norms among top elites in China that facilitate tend that Asia will not necessarily follow leadership transitions and suppress dissent the same developmental trajectories due to among political elites (Nathan, 2003; Yang, its unique political cultures. For instance, 2004; Shambaugh, 2008). However, recent Confucianism heavily influences a sig- research and the failed succession from Xi to nificant portion of Asia. Confucius and his the next leader in China have raised doubts teachings became the dominant guidelines about the durability of this thesis (Fewsmith for Chinese dynasties, and to this day, they & Nathan, 2019). impact many societies in Asia. The core valThe slow pace of democratization in ues of Confucianism emphasize respect for many Southeast Asian states is less surprisseniority, deference to authority, and disdain ing than in China. Scholars have identified for individualism, all of which could hin- various factors that impede democratizader the democratization process. In addition tion. Stuart-Fox (2006) highlights corruption 118

political culture  119 as a long-standing issue in Laos, with high public acceptance of such behavior making it unlikely to be resolved soon. Another impediment to democratization in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos concerns elites’ attitudes toward democracy. Unlike Taiwan, where the Chiang family eventually ended their authoritarian rule by relaxing restrictions on political dissent, elites in these three countries believe in paternalism. As a result, the limits of the elite’s power are primarily self-imposed rather than being imposed by the public in a fully democratic system (Gainsborough, 2012).

B. The landscape Examining whether citizens in Asia have different political attitudes and behaviors based on their cultures, the debate largely remains unsettled. Some suggest that values unique to Confucianism do not result in observable differences (Dalton & Ong, 2005), while others support such differences (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Kim, 1994). It is fair to say that recent empirical evidence seems to support the latter view. For starters, several studies have found that Confucianism does influence citizens’ understanding of democracy. Shi and Lu (2010) showed how the Confucian concept of Minben (citizens as the basis of the state) affects citizens’ understanding of democracy in China. In a survey, at least 14% of citizens clearly expressed the concept of Minben when answering an open-ended survey probing their understanding of democracy, including that an ordinary citizen would naturally succumb to the capable state composed of elites of extraordinary talents, and the state would, in return, look after them. In another example, Nguyen and Ho (2019) illustrated how key concepts of Confucianism influenced the elites of numerous dynasties in Vietnam. For social attitudes, compared to non-Confucian societies, Confucian ones were less likely to accept homosexuality due to fears of endangering the family structure and lineage (Adamczyk & Cheng, 2015). In another study, Grosse (2015) found that Confucianism led to less gender-equal attitudes in Asia. Compared to other religions, Buddhism and Hinduism also shape citizens’ viewpoints in Asia in meaningful ways. Buddhists are known for being subservient to the state, but it is unclear whether the religion’s conservative values make their way to influence believers’ viewpoints of public policy. For

instance, Buddhists overall are quite lenient toward sexual issues such as premarital sex (Detenber et  al., 2007; Adamczyk & Hayes, 2012), even though their stance on homosexuality could be less clear (Cabezon, 1993). In contrast, religion-based disapproval and environmental causal attributions were the best predictors of Indian respondents’ attitudes. In contrast, gender binary belief played only a minor role, and political conservatism and personal contact had no role at all (Elischberger et  al., 2018). In another cross-national research, Bloom and Arikan (2012) rejected claims that citizens living in Buddhist countries were less supportive of democratic values such as self-expression. The findings that are most robust fall in the area of gender equality, in which researchers consistently find women were disadvantaged in the education system in Buddhist countries compared to those in Christian ones (Cooray & Potrafke, 2011; Norton & Tomal, 2009).

C. Future research Going forward, it is clear that there is still much work to be done in researching political culture. The literature on authoritarian resistance is likely to continue expanding, especially as China’s influence grows and its governing philosophy and structure become more emulated by developing countries (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019). This trend, combined with the growing dissatisfaction with democracy among citizens and other forms of democratic backsliding (e.g., Haggard & Kaufman, 2021), is likely to revive the appeal of authoritarianism worldwide. This new phenomenon poses new challenges for modernists who believe in an irreversible trend of democratization worldwide (Diamond, 2002). For democracies, understanding the causes behind these trends is not just a matter of scholarly inquiry but of survival. For research on political culture in Asia, the literature suggests several promising directions. First, while research on Confucianism and various religions in Asia has focused more on domestic issues such as gender equality and education, less attention has been paid to their impact on citizens’ preferences for foreign policy. Given numerous flashpoints in Asia (e.g., cross-Strait relations, India and Pakistan), understanding whether citizens influenced by these cultures will be more or less tolerant of violence could

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120  encyclopedia of asian politics help foster peace. Second, most work on political culture in Asia has only considered one cultural variable at a time. However, in many Asian societies, multiple cultural forces could be at play simultaneously. For instance, citizens in Taiwan are heavily influenced by Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. Investigating how these diverging cultural factors interact with each other and what the pathways or hierarchical structures are for them to influence the citizenry can help advance our understanding of the neglected nuances of varying cultural forces in Asian societies. Finally, these questions have implications beyond academic inquiry as they can inform policymakers and help democracies understand the causes behind trends that pose a challenge to their survival. Charles K. S. Wu, Hsuan-Yu Lin and Yao-Yuan Yeh

References Adamczyk, A., & Cheng, Y.  A.  (2015). Explaining attitudes about homosexuality in Confucian and non-Confucian nations: Is there a ‘cultural’ influence?  Social Science Research, 51, 276–289. Adamczyk, A., & Hayes, B. E. (2012). Religion and sexual behaviors: Understanding the influence of Islamic cultures and religious affiliation for explaining sex outside of marriage.  American Sociological Review, 77(5), 723–746. Ben-Nun Bloom, P., & Arikan, G. (2012). A two-edged sword: The differential effect of religious belief and religious social context on attitudes towards democracy.  Political Behavior, 34(2), 249–276. Bertrand, J. (1998). Growth and democracy in Southeast Asia. Comparative Politics, 30 (3), 355–375. Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Downs, G. W. (2005). Development and democracy. Foreign Affairs, 84(5), 77–86. Cabezon, J. I. (1993). Homosexuality and Buddhism. In A. Swindler (Ed.), Homosexuality and World Religions (pp. 47–80). Trinity. Chen, J., & Dickson, B. (2010) Allies of the State: China’s Private Entrepreneurs and Democratic Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chen, J., & Lu, C. (2011). Democratization and the middle class in China: The middle class’s

attitudes toward democracy.  Political Research Quarterly, 64(3), 705–719. Cooray, A., & Potrafke, N. (2011). Gender inequality in education: Political institutions or culture and religion? European Journal of Political Economy, 27(2), 268–280. Dalton, R. J., & Ong, N. N. T. (2005). Authority orientations and democratic attitudes: A test of the Asian values’ hypothesis. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 6(2), 211–231. Detenber, B. H., Cenite, M., Ku, M. K. Y., Ong, C. P. L., Tong, H. Y., & Yeow, M. L. H. (2007). Singaporeans’ attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and their tolerance of media portrayals of homosexuality. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 19, 367–379. Diamond, L. (2002). Can the Whole World become Democratic? Democracy, Development, and International Polities. Irvine, CA: Center for the Study of Democracy. Dickson, B. (2016). The Dictator’s Dilemma. The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for Survival. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Elischberger, H. B., Glazier, J. J., Hill, E. D., & VerduzcoBaker, L. (2018). Attitudes toward and beliefs about transgender youth: A cross-cultural comparison between the United States and India. Sex Roles, 78(1–2), 142–160. Englehart, N. A. (2003). Democracy and the Thai middle class. Asian Survey, 43(2), 253–279. Fewsmith, J., & Nathan, A. (2019). Authoritarian resilience revisited: Joseph Fewsmith with response from Andrew Nathan. Journal of Contemporary China, 28(116), 174–175. Gainsborough, M. (2012). Elites vs reform in Laos, Cambodia, and vietnam. Journal of Democracy, 23(2), 34–46. Grosse, I. (2015). Gender values in Vietnam-between confucianism, communism, and modernization. Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 3(2). Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. (2021). The anatomy of democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 32(4), 27–41. Han, R. (2015). Manufacturing consent in cyberspace: China’s “fifty-cent army”. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 44(2), 105–134.

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political culture  121 Hofstede, G., & Bond, M. H. (1988). The Confucius connection: From cultural roots to economic growth. Organizational Dynamics, 16(1), 5–21. Jones, D. M. (1998). Democratization, civil society, and illiberal middle-class culture in Pacific Asia. Comparative Politics, 30, 147–169. Kim, D.-J. (1994). Is culture destiny? The myth of Asia’s anti-democratic values. Foreign Affairs, 73, 1. Nathan, A. (2003) China’s changing of the guard. Authoritarian resilience. Journal of Democracy, 14(1), 6–17. Neher, C. D., & Marlay, R. (1995). Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia. Westview Press. Nguyen, T. D., & Ho, M. T. (2019). People as the roots (of the state): Democratic elements in the politics of traditional Vietnamese Confucianism. Journal of Nationalism, Memory, and Language Politics, 13(1), 90–110. Norton, S. W., & Tomal, A. (2009). Religion and female educational attainment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41, 961–986. Polyakova, A., & Meserole, C. (2019). Exporting digital authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese models. In Policy Brief, Democracy and Disorder Series (pp. 1–22). Brookings. Shambaugh, D. (2008). The Chinese Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. University of California Press.

Shi, T., & Lu, J. (2010). The meanings of democracy: The shadow of Confucianism.  Journal of Democracy, 21(4), 123–130. Stockmann, D., & Gallagher, M. E. (2011). Remote control: How the media sustain authoritarian rule in China.  Comparative Political Studies, 44(4), 436–467. Stuart-Fox, M. (2006). The political culture of corruption in the Lao PDR. Asian Studies Review, 30, 59–75. Yang, D. (2004). Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Key resources The  Asian Barometer Survey, which contains 18 Asian states and territories, is another key source for studying political culture in Asia. https://www​ .asianbarometer​.org/ The World Value Survey is one of the most trusted datasets for studying political culture. https://www​.worldvaluessurvey​.org​ /wvs​.jsp To understand the compatibilities between political values in China and the West, read this review article by Daniel A. Bell. https://www​ . annualreviews​ .org​ /doi​ /10​ .1146​/annurev​-polisci​-051215​-031821

charles k. s. wu, hsuan-yu lin and yao-yuan yeh

22. Political economy A. The concept Political economy is the study of the interaction between political and economic systems, encompassing a broad spectrum of topics such as trade and finance, wealth and poverty, authoritarianism and democracy, markets and bureaucracies, and government and private enterprise. Approaches to political economy vary widely among Asian countries and among constituent regions within Asia, as it is home to some 48 sovereign countries and nearly 60 per cent of all people (as of 2022) (Doner, 1991). They have also shifted considerably over time. Thus, it is difficult to settle upon a singular understanding of “Asian political economy”. However, most of the focus has traditionally been on the role of the state in promoting economic development. Indeed, competing visions of the state are probably the most central issue animating the field of political economy in Asia over the last several decades. As illustrated below, we can also identify some of the factors that shape the understanding of political economy in Asia, and which may continue to do so. These include institutional and ideological legacies, global geopolitical trends, economic crises, and even humanitarian emergencies such as COVID-19 and its resulting impact on international commerce.

B. The landscape For much of the 20th century, views of political economy in Asian countries were determined in large part by ideas and trends beyond Asia itself. During the Cold War, which lasted from approximately 1945 to 1990, Asian countries were sorted into two camps, each defined by its approach to political economy and a competing vision of the state’s role. Some followed the market-oriented capitalist model practised in many of the most economically advanced countries, particularly the United States. Guided by a philosophy of economic liberalism, Asian states in this camp took the view that it is preferable for the state to have minimal or no role in markets, which were deemed to have self-regulating characteristics. The path to national prosperity lay primarily in leaving markets alone, and in

allowing the boom-and-bust cycles of capitalism to play out on their own. Examples include the Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan, all of which were aligned strategically with the United States and its allies in “the West”, and thus espoused free market economics. Many other Asian states experienced strong influence from the Soviet Union – the United States’ rival during the Cold War. Those aligned with the Soviet Union adopted an economic model diametrically opposed to the one found in US-aligned capitalist countries. Instead of allowing markets to form and operate free from state involvement, economies in this “communist” camp were centrally planned by their governments. This meant that businesses were owned and operated by states rather than private individuals or companies. States thus ran monopolies, setting production targets and providing for citizens, who performed government-required labour, instead of allowing businesses to produce as much as they wished and to charge whatever consumers were willing to pay with a wage they had earned. Food, housing, healthcare, and other things were largely rationed, and in many such places, private property was an anathema. The varieties of capitalism that emerged across Asia are well-documented (Hundt & Uttam, 2017). Likewise, different forms of communism were present across Asia during the Cold War too. For example, in the early years of Mao Zedong’s leadership, China underdeveloped a “peasant-based” form of communism. Having had much of its infrastructure destroyed in the 1930s and 1940s under Japanese occupation, the fledgling People’s Republic initially lacked the resources to sustain the kind of industrial collectivization found in the Soviet Union. During the rule of Kim Il Sung, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) modelled its version of communism on the “Juche idea”, which emphasized self-reliance and national sovereignty, thus carving out an exclusive role for the state in providing for the North Korean people. Under the Khmer Rouge, which ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, the state undertook rapid collectivization and radical social engineering projects that cost the lives of about two million people – approximately one quarter of Cambodia’s population at the time. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s spelt the end of bipolar alignments. Communism,

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political economy  123 at least as traditionally practised in Asia and elsewhere, fell into disrepute, leaving capitalism as the victor and, seemingly, the only credible approach to political economy left standing. Sometimes referred to as “neoliberalism”, the focus shifted toward market logic as a means to understand the freer flow of people, ideas, money, and goods in an increasingly globalized, interdependent, and borderless world. Asian countries, however, became living laboratories in which conventional approaches to political economy were being put to the test, and new perspectives developed. One of the most important ways in which this was done was to challenge the common notion that free market capitalism and democracy reinforce and serve one another, a premise known as “modernization theory”. A staple of US foreign policy throughout the Cold War, modernization theory centred on the hypothesis that for a state to develop economically and politically, the proper institutions (i.e., free markets, electoral democracy) needed to be in place. For adherents of this view, free markets led to free people and vice versa. Thus, the triumph of capitalism over communism was expected to produce a spike in the number of democracies in Asia and elsewhere. Yet many Asian countries bucked this trend and became responsible for the emergence of a perspective known as “neo-authoritarianism” – the pairing of free market economics with non-democratic politics (Perry, 1993). Particularly prevalent in East Asia, the term was used during the 1980s to describe South Korea, and Taiwan well into the 1990s. Both were US-friendly and subscribed to market economics, but Korea resisted democratization until the election of Roh Tae-woo in 1987, and Taiwan held its first direct presidential contest in 1996. However, Singapore has long been the neo-authoritarian exemplar par excellence. Boasting some of the highest living standards in Asia, Singapore has thrived under capitalism. In 2022, it ranked 12th overall on the United Nations Human Development Index, ahead of such affluent countries as New Zealand (13th), Canada (15th), the United Kingdom (18th), and the United States (21st). Yet this feat has been accomplished while eschewing democratic politics. While Singapore does hold democratic elections at regular intervals, these are an example of

what scholars call “competitive authoritarianism” since there is no (or very little) possibility that the incumbent party will lose (Levitsky & Way, 2010). The People’s Action Party has won every electoral contest and ruled Singapore continuously since 1959. Between 1965 and 1990, it won every seat in every election, meaning that the government operated free from any formal opposition. Civil liberties, including those of speech and assembly, are also restricted. According to former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who was in office from 1959 to 1990, these “benign” aspects of Singapore’s model were essential to its economic success. For Lee and other subsequent Singaporean leaders, authoritarian institutions are more conducive to prosperity. Hence, this alternate view of the relationship between political and economic systems is known as the “Lee Hypothesis”. No topic in the field of political economy has received as much attention as the rise of China, which since the late 1970s has also exemplified neo-authoritarianism (Ortmann & Thompson, 2018). However, this case differs from Singapore in that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), after 30 years of radical economic policies under Mao Zedong, had failed to produce much improvement in people’s livelihoods. Indeed, the country paid a high price for these policies in material terms (with an estimated 30 million starved, the Great Leap Famine of 1960 still rates as the largest humanitarian disaster in world history). Following Mao’s death, the new CCP leader Deng Xiaoping embarked on a new policy he termed “market socialism”. Instead of viewing capitalism and communism as the antitheses of one another, Deng claimed that markets could be of use in generating the kind of prosperity that would serve the communist government’s ideals. As he put it, “doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice”. Deng’s reform program began with a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Pearl River Delta in the early 1980s. It was an experiment in which foreign investment would be encouraged in order to help form rudimentary markets. The initial success of the Pearl River SEZ paved the way for more, including the Shanghai Pudong SEZ in 1994. Nearly three decades later, the glittering Pudong Skyline is the crown jewel of China’s economic transformation, which under Deng Xiaoping’s successors, has seen hundreds of millions lifted from poverty. China is no stephen noakes

124  encyclopedia of asian politics longer among the world’s poorest nations, as it once was. As of 2022, it is classified as a “middle-income country” by the IMF and World Bank. The rapid economic progress of many East Asian economies during the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to a new theory to explain the phenomenon – developmentalism. In his pioneering study on the topic, Chalmers Johnson depicted Japan as a “developmental state”, differentiating its style of economic governance as distinct from “Western” models (Johnson, 1995). A developmental state is one in which the government, motivated by a desire for economic advancement, intervenes in industrial affairs (Woo-Cummings, 1999). It is a variety of capitalism in which the state itself plays a central role in engineering competitiveness and productivity, often by means of an elite bureaucracy or specifically designated agency, staffed by experts, and enabled by a political system capable of overseeing the formation and execution of industrial policy (Öniş, 1991). Since it was coined, the concept of the developmental state has retained its relevance as a way of understanding Asian political economy. However, it has not been without its detractors. After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, critics argued that the interventionist role of the state was in decline and that it no longer aptly captured the behaviour of Asian governments, whose interventionism was more limited by liberalization measures. Three decades on, it appears that developmentalism has evolved rather than died out, with national models adapting to emergent contextual factors (Thurbon, 2014; Hamilton-Hart & Yeung, 2021). There is strong evidence that China has adopted many elements of developmentalism in its economic success since the 1990s and that the state, its motivations, actors, and policy choices continue to be a driving force behind its ongoing economic rise (Helleiner, 2022; Beeson, 2009). Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and others in East Asia have retained but tweaked elements of their developmental models, often in response to shifting imperatives. One good example of this is the turn toward “eco-developmentalism” or “green developmentalism” of recent years, in which East Asian governments have oriented economic policy-making toward enhanced production of energy alternatives (Esarey et al., 2020; Dent, 2017). stephen noakes

C. Future research Two key issues are likely to be fixtures of scholarship on Asian political economy for the foreseeable future. The first of these is the ongoing economic and geopolitical rise of China and its implications, which are many. One key aspect of that rise is the redrafting of international alliances in a manner reminiscent of Cold War era bipolarity. With China now serving as a counterpoint to American interests around the world, other states may have renewed incentives to examine their own priorities and align themselves with one or the other, effectively dividing the world into pro-China and pro-US economic and strategic blocs. For China, the main tool by which this rise has been facilitated over the last decades is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Previously referred to as One Belt, One Road (yi dai, yi lu), the BRI is the flagship foreign policy of paramount leader Xi Jinping and seeks to accelerate global commerce and people-to-people connections primarily through a wide range of large infrastructure projects, with transport construction having been most prominent thus far (Jiang, 2021). Given its growing global prominence and rivalry with the US, we might expect to see China becoming increasingly assertive, making its presence felt in multilateral institutions and international debates. Alternatively, it may create new multilateral agencies under its own auspices which operate parallel to yet separately from other long-established ones. There are numerous examples of these kinds of China-brokered entities in existence, which affect a great many Asia-Pacific countries. These include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), though scholarly research on these and other institutions remains in its infancy. A second but related set of challenges resulting from China’s rise is the possible overlap of economic and security issues in Asia and elsewhere. Bipolar competition among superpowers could encourage states to “bandwagon” with one or the other, that is, to choose sides. Dependent to some degree on either the US or China, smaller states may find their incentives for broader cooperation are more limited. In turn, this may impede efforts at forging comprehensive free trade deals or multilateral bargaining efforts among Asian countries more broadly, as

political economy  125 opposed to letting other “regional” perspectives guide decision-making (Peng, 2002). Worse, the “two camps” nature of a bipolar environment can cause even seemingly small economic decisions to acquire a strategic dimension, increasing the risk of conflict and making cooperation more difficult (Ravenhill, 2013). Of course, these circumstances are not a foregone conclusion, but one prominent line of inquiry in current thinking about Asian political economy. The behaviour of nonsuperpowers described here is primarily hypothetical, and many factors may intercede to change matters in one way or another. Possibilities are almost limitless. Is China’s economic climb sustainable? What if it were to taper off or stop entirely? What are the limits and consequences of its current economic strategies, and how might unforeseen or incalculable events influence outcomes? Now in its fourth year, the COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc on economies across Asia. How will Asian states respond or future-proof themselves against other disruptions? China was recently forced to abandon its “zero COVID” policy, which had enormously disruptive effects on the national, regional, and global economies, amid popular backlash. What will the longer-term effects be on its own political stability or its international strategy? These and many other issues are fodder for ongoing research. Stephen Noakes

References Beeson, M. (2009). Developmental States in East Asia: A Comparison of the Japanese and Chinese Experiences. Asian Perspectives, 33(2), 5–39. Dent, C. M. (2017). East Asia’s New Developmentalism: State Capacity, Climate Change and Low-Carbon Development. Third World Quarterly, 39(6), 1191–1210. Doner, R. F. (1991). Approaches to the Politics of Economic Growth in Southeast Asia. The Journal of Asian Studies, 50(4), 818–849.

Esarey, A., Haddad, M. A., Lewis, J. I., and Harrell, S. (Eds). (2020). Greening East Asia: The Rise of the Eco-Developmental State. University of Washington Press. Hamilton-Hart, N., and Yeung, H. W. (2021). Institutions Under Pressure: East Asian States, Global Markets and National Firms. Review of International Political Economy, 28, 11–35. Helleiner, E. (2022). Neglected Chinese Origins of East Asian Developmentalism. New Political Economy, 27, 916–928. Hundt, D., and Uttam, J. (2017). Varieties of Capitalism in Asia; Beyond the Developmental State. Palgrave. Jiang, Y. (2021). Demystifying the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Domestic and Non-Strategic Policy? Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 6(4), 468–481. Johnson, C. A. (1995). Japan, Who Governs?: The Rise of the Developmental State. WW Norton & Company. Öniş, Z. (1991). Review Article: The Logic of the Developmental State.  Comparative Politics, 24(1), 109–126. Ortmann, S., and Thompson, M. R. (2018). Introduction: The “Singapore Model” and China’s Neo-Authoritarian Dream. The China Quarterly, 236, 930–945. Peng, D. (2002). Invisible Linkages: A Regional Perspective of East Asian Political Economy. International Studies Quarterly, 46(3), 423–447. Perry, E. J. (1993). China in 1992: An Experiment in Neoauthoritarianism. Asian Survey, 33(1), 12–21. Ravenhill, J. (2013). Economics and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region. The Pacific Review, 26(1), 1–15. Thurbon, E. (2014). The Resurgence of the Developmental State: A Conceptual Defence. Critique Internationale, 63(2), 65. Way, L. A., and Levitsky, S. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press. Woo-Cummings, M. (Ed.). (1999).  The Developmental State. Cornell University Press.

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23. Political economy of developmental states

Godthorpe, 1984; Milner, 1988; Rogowski, 1989; Katzenstein, 1985).

A. The concept Political economy refers to the intersection of the political and the economic. Clark (1998) examines change and continuity in the meaning of the term. The classical contributors to economics routinely used the term, including David Ricardo and Adam Smith. Classical economists treated political economy as a science to increase the wealth of nations and could not conceive of the economic and political worlds as separate. Political economy has established itself as a key concept in political science. For political scientists, political economy means the interaction of politics and economics, which can be studied using a wide range of methodologies. International processes like commerce, money and finance movement, or human migration are typically the focus of international political economy (IPE). The study of IPE emerged in the 1970s. The early focus of IPE was dominated by American academics associated with the famous academic journal International Organization, particularly Stephen Krasner (1978), Peter Katzenstein, and Robert Keohane, who were subsequently joined by Benjamin Cohen and Robert Gilpin (1975). “International Politics and International Economics: A Case of Mutual Neglect” was a ground-breaking paper written by Strange in 1970 that provided the conceptual case for the area of IPE (Strange, 1970). Comparative political economy (CPE) sets itself apart from international political economy (IPE), focusing on domestic economic and political institutions. It primarily focuses on the domestic scene rather than studying global economic processes separately from them. A number of significant and ground-breaking contributions to CPE were made in the 1980s. By examining the domestic influences on foreign economic policy or, conversely, the impacts of global free trade and economic liberalisation on domestic politics, including the distribution of power among interest groups or producer alliances, academics started to look into the exchange and interaction in the domestic–international nexus (Gourevitch, 1986;

The political economy of the state in East Asia Conceptualising and analysing the relationship between the state and the market is political economy’s most important contribution to social science. Many scholars within comparative politics and comparative political economy have argued for the need to “bring the state back in” (e.g., Evans et  al., 1985). Though studies of the political economy of the state remain a very Western and Euro-centric field of study to this day, the remarkable rise of Japan and the East Asian newly industrialising countries (NICs) has been a major area of investigation since the mid-1980s. The developmental state literature – pioneered by Chalmers Johnson (1982) – historically focused on Northeast Asia. The growth trajectories out of which the concept emerged were characterised by rapid industrialisation led by the state through financial centralisation and widespread state involvement in capital allocation. It analysed the rise of the Japanese developmental state by emphasising the key position of the Ministry of Trade and International Industry in formulating industrial policy and spearheading economic development. The developmental state model was closely followed by other East Asian NICs, notably South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and, later and somewhat less successfully, several Southeast Asian countries. Major studies on East Asian states include Wade (1990), Amsden (1989), Evans (1995), Weiss (1995), and Woo-Cummings (1999). The late 1990s was a turning point for the study of Asian developmental states. Not only did the 1997 Asian financial crisis abruptly end the economic miracle of the region, but it also cast serious doubts on the state-led developmental model that most of the region had pursued and, alongside it, those theoretical explanations. Although the region recovered quickly at the end of the 1990s, it seemed that “the most severe and lasting casualty of the 1997 crisis was the East Asian developmental state model itself” (Wong, 2004, p. 345). What emerged in the 2000s was a mix of studies on the transformation of the developmental state. On the one hand, scholars found the developmental state “disappeared” (Minns, 2001; Heo & Tan, 2003; Clark & Jung, 2002; Tan, 2001). It is argued that

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political economy of developmental states  127 developmental states have lost their defining characteristics as the state significantly lost its control over capital due to the loss of policy space or the imposition of liberalisation policies in East Asian economies after the Asian financial crisis (Minns, 2001; Jayasuriya, 2005; Kim, 2005; Lee & Han, 2006). On the other hand, studies also showed the continuation of state activism in several cases. For example, Singapore is believed to be a resilient developmental state (Pereira, 2008), while changes did not occur in Taiwan prior to the 2000 regime turnover (Tan, 2001; Clark & Jung, 2002; Clark & Tan, 2012). Broadly speaking, it is believed that three factors have produced pressure on the Asian developmental state model: the process of democratisation (Heo & Tan, 2003), the transition to an innovation-driven economy (Wong, 2011), and the process of globalisation (Wong, 2004).

B. The landscape The political economy of East Asian states Although the tendency for the state to decline is still being investigated by scholars (e.g., He, 2020), many scholars of Asian developmental states conclude that the state’s transformative capacity has been expanding, not shrinking, by identifying clear imprints of the developmental legacy in policies and the challenges that are faced by post-developmental states (Thurbon, 2016; Pirie, 2016). The relationship between finance, development, and the state has been a long-standing focus of the political economy of East Asian states. Rethel and Thurbon (2020) re-examine how East Asian states continue to intervene in their financial markets and whether their interventions can still meaningfully be characterised as “developmental” in nature. An analysis of the state’s activism in the financial system shows mixed outcomes. Making use of interview data and policy document analysis, Klingler-Vldra and Pacheco Pardo (2020) argue that creative economy efforts represent the continuity of entrepreneurial finance support, especially since the Asian financial crisis. In contrast, Thurbon (2020)’s analysis reveals that the evolutionary trajectory of Taiwan’s developmental state has not been linear; since the early 2000s, the state’s commitment to and capacities for financial activism have waxed and waned. It is widely believed that financial liberalisation has noticeably

reduced the role of the state in effectively influencing the economy in post-developmental states. However, Lee and Grimes (2022) find that the limitations on state capacity that followed liberalisation in the late 1990s are substantially eased in the face of national emergencies, revealing the continued impact of the developmental legacy. East Asia is known for its rapid economic growth and dramatic scenes of environmental degradation. Yet, an emerging theme is the rise of East Asian eco-developmental states. Esarey, Haddad, Lewis, and Harrell (2020) note that the region has displayed remarkable environmental improvement, signalling a broader shift in the nature of East Asian developmental states. This radical shift of the narrative of the East Asian states was observed by others. Kim (2019) shows that policymakers in Korea and Taiwan view smart microgrids strategically as a new developmental infrastructure, which will help position domestic firms onto a new competitive footing. Kim (2021) argues that the intensification of competitive pressures in the global renewables sector created the conditions for these states to muster a developmental response via the expansion of domestic markets for renewables. Dent (2018) explores the extent to which the clean energy trade is currently governed, contending that the most fundamental challenge for the future governance of the clean energy trade concerns how to reconcile ramped-up interventionist climate action with an essentially liberal trade order. Another set of studies situates the new model of state developmentalism in the context of the global production network. Based on recent developments in such East Asian economies as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, Yeung (2014) examines how, since the 1990s, the relationship between the developmental state and national firms, well integrated into global chains and networks spanning different territories and regions, has evolved. Concurring with Yeung (2014), Yinwah Chu (2021) argues that the developmental states of South Korea and Taiwan have persisted, to various extents, despite deepening global integration, the maturation of national enterprises, and democratisation. HamiltonHart and Yeung’s (2021) study, which focuses on the role of markets and firms in bringing about different types of institutional change, as well as the reconfiguration of state roles to meet new challenges, shows that some of tian he

128  encyclopedia of asian politics these changes have been adaptive while others appear to erode institutional capacity. Several studies also examined the origins of state activisms in East Asia. Carney (2015) argues one-party regimes have both the motivation and a greater institutional capacity for addressing these threats in comparison to other regimes. Their tests, conducted on 607 firms in 1996 and 856 firms in 2008 across seven East Asian economies and supplemented with case studies of Malaysia and South Korea, suggest that financial globalisation is contributing to the rise of the state as a counter-reaction. Helleiner (2022) demonstrates that locally originated Chinese developmentalist ideology diffused beyond China’s borders in ways that influenced the emergence of “developmental mindsets” elsewhere in the East Asia region in the nineteenth century, including in Meiji Japan. The political economy of the Chinese state Illustrating the application of the developmental state concept outside the Asian tigers, contemporary CPE scholars have sought to use it to analyse the transformation of China’s state/ market relations and its rise as a global power (Breslin 1996; Knight 2014). However, scholars have argued that China has developed a different pattern of state/market relations, given its sizable state-owned sector (Zheng & Huang, 2018). Examining Chinese capitalism is a major theme of Asian political economy. Studies suggest that China’s experimentalist reform path has created its own distinctive economic system (Zheng & Huang, 2018; Weber, 2021). An increasing number of studies set out to describe the specific nature of China’s capitalism (e.g., Huang, 2008; Nölke et al., 2020). Some scholars describe China as neoliberal, but this does not reveal much about the more specific nature of China’s system (Weber, 2019). Others, pointing to the important role of the state, suggest China’s system is state capitalist (Naughton & Tsai, 2015; Pearson et al., 2020; Petry 2020). Terms such as “state capitalism” was often used to describe China’s developmental model (Alami & Dixon, 2020). There is a disagreement on the coherent nature of the Chinese state and its relationship with the private sector. Indicating the development orientation of the state, some studies have highlighted the state-centric developmental model in China. Gruin and Knaack (2020) find that the Chinese party-state is tian he

taking an active role in the financial institutional change necessary for the transformation of China’s growth model and developing novel forms of governance to ensure that this institutional change unfolds in accordance with its core political objectives. Jones and Bloomfield (2020)’s findings suggest that PPPs in China do not reflect a break from earlier, state-centric modes of governance; rather, Chinese PPPs are being used as a tool to strengthen the state, which challenged the Western-centric nature of prevailing wisdom in political economy scholarship. Seeking to widen the application of the concept of developmental states, Gore (2014) addresses the developmentally relevant aspects of labour management in China. He argues that the Chinese state’s approach to industrial relations is integrated with the national development strategy. In contrast, several studies questioned the existence of the coherent and powerful Chinese state and its dominant position in governing the market. For example, Jones and Zou (2017) show the Chinese state’s fragmentation. They argue that this fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation since the late 1970s has substantially increased SOE autonomy and weakened but also transformed the executive’s control, reconfiguring it towards a regulatory mode of governance. Challenging the recent scholarly analyses of China’s state capitalism which tends to point to the Party as dominating over market forces, To (2023) argues that the actual patterns of collaboration and confrontation between the Party and private tech capital are multifarious and often contested. An interesting study of Chinese state capitalism is offered by Zhang and Lan (2023) who show that the Chinese state, reacting to foreign economic and geopolitical pressures, attempted to graft a centralised innovation system onto preexisting decentralised governance structures, concentrating resources to promote selected strategic industries. However, according to them, the Chinese state is not monolithic, unchanging, and culturally essentialist. Rather, it is actively engaged in global debates and in contested experiments in response to the external environment. Economic statecraft as a new form of state activism Defined simply, economic statecraft is the use of economic resources by political leaders to exert influence in pursuit of foreign

political economy of developmental states  129 policy objectives. Economic statecraft seeks to either increase political affinity, where the target state identifies with the sending state’s interests and preferences, and/or to achieve policy accommodation, whereby the target state adopts measures desired by the sending state. “Economic statecraft” emerged as a concept from theories of structural power, with Baldwin (1985) arguing that states use economic tools as a means to further their security objectives. Industrial policy, trade instruments, regulation, foreign aid, and sanctions each represent important tools to maintain the cutting edge of military technology for superpowers including the United States, China, and Russia as well as middle powers manoeuvring between competing interests (Bräutigam & Tang, 2012; Zhang & Keith, 2017). An increasing number of recent studies have focused on the use of economic statecraft by East Asian states. By examining the case of the Sino–North Korean border economy, Lee and Gray (2017) contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the shortcomings of financial sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. Liu (2022) analyses the role of China’s private fintech business in Singapore’s emerging digital banking and payment sector by proposing a research framework that synthesises platform political economy, financial statecraft, and recentralisation. This research demonstrates that Alibaba, Ant Group, and Tencent can be seen as a form of CCP financial statecraft to help achieve its foreign policy goals because they are established “fintech platforms”. Chey (2019) analyses how a state’s reactive currency statecraft – its strategic reaction to an international currency issued by a foreign state – is shaped, by devoting special attention to its broad foreign policy stance towards the state issuing that international currency, with a main empirical focus on the Japanese case with regard to the Chinese renminbi. Armijo and Katada (2015) seek to understand and theorise the financial statecraft of emerging economies, moving beyond the traditional understanding that closely identifies the concept with financial sanctions imposed by a strong state on a weaker state. Scholars have also argued that the concept of economic statecraft could advance our understanding of East Asian states’ activism in the new era. By refocusing the concept of geo-economic statecraft to encompass domestically deployed initiatives at the techno

frontier, Thurbon and Weiss (2020) intend to breach the impasse in the developmental/ post-developmental state debate and open up a new research agenda. The study of Weiss and Thurbon (2020) refurbishes the idea of statecraft as it plays out in two very different national agendas, and as it is shaped by contrasting state–society relations. By paying attention to the differential international drivers and state ambitions, their analysis delivers a new and improved understanding of the character, purpose, and capacities of the state in each national setting and, by implication, of their commitment and ability to confront specific challenges.

C. Future research In contrast with the declinist view on the developmental state, the study of state activism in cultivating competitive strategic industries will continue to dominate the study of Asian political economy. Unlike the old Asian developmentalism, which was driven by the imperative for development coupled with economic nationalism, it could be argued that East Asian developmentalism in the new era of great power competition, to a large extent, is driven by national security. Future researchers could use the three forms of Asian state activism highlighted above (i.e., the East Asian developmental state; the capitalist-authoritarian Chinese state; and Asian states’ economic statecraft) to construct this “security-driven” developmentalism. The concept of economic statecraft will be particularly useful in advancing the analysis of East Asian states’ activism in the new era. The US–China rivalry is normalising the use of economics as a matter of national security. The “states versus markets” debate has “now firmly entered the realm of international relations, and ‘states’ appear to be winning” (Lim 2019). Specialists of Asian political economy should investigate how geopolitical tensions and great rivalry give rise to a new wave of state activism in strategic sectors. Past research on economic statecraft has focused mainly on economic policy or strategy towards foreign countries. Following Weiss and Thurbon (2021), future scholars could examine how Asian states’ geo-technological policies – aimed at enhancing domestic economic competitiveness and technological capability – are driven by external geo-economic pressure. tian he

130  encyclopedia of asian politics When investigating the new form of Asian developmentalism, future scholars should pay attention to the state’s relationship with the private sector in strategic industries. The Asian states, particularly the Chinese state, should not be considered monolithic. For example, reports have shown that China’s development of AI as a general-purpose technology entails a civilian-led process. An analysis of state–business relations in technological sectors will have major implications for understanding Chinese capitalism in the era of US–China strategic rivalry. In the case of the semiconductor industry, it would be particularly interesting to find out how transnational corporations respond to new policy initiatives formulated by the security-motivated states and whether or not states’ and firms’ interests align in a period of great power conflict. Tian He

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political economy of developmental states  131 Helleiner, E. (2022). Neglected Chinese origins of east Asian developmentalism. New Political Economy, 27(6), 916–928. Heo, U., and Tan, A.C. (2003). Political choices and economic outcomes: A perspective on the differential impact of the financial crisis on South Korea and Taiwan. Comparative Political Studies, 36(6), 679–698. Huang, Y. (2008). Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics. Cambridge University Press. Jayasuriya, K. (2005). Beyond institutional fetishism: From the developmental to the regulatory state. New Political Economy, 10(3), 381–387. Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975. Stanford University Press. Jones, L., and Zou, Y. (2017). Rethinking the role of state-owned enterprises in China’s rise. New Political Economy, 22(6), 743–760. Jones, L., and Bloomfield, M.J. (2020). PPPs in China: Does the growth in Chinese PPPs signal a liberalising economy? New Political Economy, 25(5), 829–847. Katzenstein, P. (1985). Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Cornell University Press. Kim, S. (2019). Hybridized industrial ecosystems and the makings of a new developmental infrastructure in East Asia’s green energy sector. Review of International Political Economy, 26(1), 158–182. Kim, S. (2021). National competitive advantage and energy transitions in Korea and Taiwan. New Political Economy, 26(3), 359–375. Kim, Y.T. (2005). DJnomics and the transformation of the developmental state. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 35(4), 471–484. Klingler-Vidra R., and Pardo, R.P. (2020). Legitimate social purpose and South Korea’s support for entrepreneurial finance since the Asian financial crisis. New Political Economy, 25(3), 337–353. Knight, J.B. (2014). China as a developmental state. The World Economy, 37, 1335–1347. Krasner, S. (1978). Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton University Press. Lee, J., and Gray, K. (2017). Cause for optimism? Financial sanctions and the rise

of the Sino-North Korean border economy. Review of International Political Economy, 24(3), 424–453. Lee, S., and Han, T. (2006). The demise of “Korea Inc.”: Paradigm shift in Korea’s developmental state. Journal of Contemporary Asia. Lee, Y., and Grimes, W.W. (2022). Manifesting the embedded developmental state: The role of South Korea’s National Pension Service in managing financial crisis. Review of International Political Economy. Lim, D. (2019). Economic statecraft and the revenge of the state. East Asia Forum Quarterly (EAFQ). Liu, C. (2022). Conceptualising private fintech platforms as financial statecraft and recentralisation in China. New Political Economy. Milner, H.V. (1988). Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton University Press. Minns, J. (2001). Of miracles and models: The rise and decline of the developmental state in South Korea. Third World Quarterly, 22(6), 1025–1043. Naughton, B., and Tsai, K.S. (2015). State Capitalism, Institutional Adaptation, and the Chinese Miracle. Cambridge University Press. Nölke, A., et  al. (2020). State-Permeated Capitalism in Large Emerging Economies. Routledge. Pearson, M., et  al. (2020). Party-State Capitalism in China. Harvard Business School working paper No.21-065. Pereira, A. (2008). Whither the developmental state? Explaining Singapore’s continued developmentalism. Third World Quarterly, 29(6), 1189–1203. Petry, J. (2020). Same same, but different: Varieties of capital markets, Chinese state capitalism and the global financial order. Competition & Change, 25(5), 605–630. Pirie, I. (2016). South Korea after the developmental state. In Y. Chu (Ed.), The Asian Developmental State: Reexamination and New Departures (pp. 139–158). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Rethel, L., and Thurbon, E. (2020). Introduction: Finance, development and the state in East Asia. New Political Economy, 25(3), 315–319. Rogowski, R. (1989). Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic tian he

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Wong, J. (2004). The adaptive developmental state in East Asia. Journal of East Asian Studies, 4(2004), 345–362. Wong, J. (2011). Betting on Biotech: Innovation and Limits of Asia’s Developmental State. Cornell University Press. Woo-Cumings, M. (1999). The Developmental State. Cornell University Press. Yeung, H.W. (2014). Governing the market in a globalizing era: Developmental states, global production networks and inter-firm dynamics in East Asia. Review of International Political Economy, 21(1), 70–101. Zhang, L., and Lan, T. (2023). The new whole state system: Reinventing the Chinese state to promote innovation. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 55(1), 201–221. Zhang, X., and Keith, J. (2017). From wealth to power: China’s new economic statecraft. The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), 185–203. Zheng, Y., and Huang, Y. (2018). Market in State: The Political Economy of Domination in China. Cambridge University Press.

Key resources Key references on political economy Clark, B. (1998). Political Economy: A Comparative Approach, Praeger. Clift, B. (2021). Comparative Political Economy: States, Markets and Global Capitalism, 2nd edition. Bloomsbury Publishing. Menz, G. (2018). Comparative Political Economy: Contours of a Subfield. Oxford University Press. In Asia Chu, Y. (2015). The Asian Developmental State: Reexaminations and New Departures. Palgrave Macmillan. Haggard, S. (2018). Developmental States. Cambridge University Press. Wan M. (2020). The Political Economy of East Asia: Wealth and Power. Second edition. Edward Elgar Publishing.

24. Political ideologies

1977, pp. 425–8). Even so, Bentham adhered to Locke’s idea of representative democracy and supplied it with a utilitarian principle by arguing that the strength of democracy, compared with other polities, lies in its contribuA. The concept tion to the identification of interests between At present, the ideology of liberal democracy people and their rulers (Bentham, 1989). has staked a universal claim and is regarded Given that liberal democracy is an ideolby many as a general standard by which the ogy rooted in Western culture, one that has legitimacy of regimes should be measured developed only after a long evolution within and justified. It bears repeating, however, Western civilisation over the course of two that liberal democracy and the political val- centuries, its universal legitimacy has someues that it entails, including the natural rights times become controversial in non-Western of humankind, free elections, representative societies. As a case in point, Lee Kuan Yew, government, and the equality of the politi- the former prime minister of Singapore, procal and social status of individuals, origi- posed ‘Asian values’ in the 1970s and reasnated in Europe during the Enlightenment. serted his claim in the 1980s and 1990s. The Montesquieu, for example, in his discussion significance of the concept of ‘Asian values’ of the principles of democracy in The Spirits lies in its pursuit of an alternative basis for of the Laws, argues that ‘love of democracy is explaining and justifying Asian political love of equality’ (Montesquieu, 1989, p. 43). institutions based on the culture and tradition By the same token, when democracy devi- of Confucianism. In an interview with Fareed ates from the spirit of moderation and pursues Zakaria in 1994, then the managing editor of ‘extreme equality’ – that is, when people find Foreign Affairs, Lee commented on US socithe power that they entrust to public func- ety by saying, ‘Westerners have abandoned tionaries to be intolerable and seek to judge, an ethical basis for society, believing that all deliberate, and execute every decision by problems are solved by a good government, themselves – Montesquieu would call it the which we in the East never believed possible’ corruption of democracy (1989, p. 112). (Zakaria & Lee, 1994, p. 112). In Lee’s obserMoreover, in Two Treatises of Government, vation, the essential roles of family and clan John Locke views humankind as being free in Chinese history are the people’s survival and equal by nature and as having chosen rafts and a feature of Asian societies distinct to establish civil government by social con- from that of Westerners. In Lee’s words, ‘We tract only because government functions as are fortunate we had this cultural backdrop, an impartial arbiter by which injuries and the belief in thrift, hard work, filial piety and controversies in social life can be redressed loyalty in the extended family, and, most of and determined (Locke and Laslett, 1988, p. all, the respect for scholarship and learning’ 325). Unlike feudal government and absolute (Zakaria & Lee, 1994, p. 114). Maintaining monarchy, Locke’s idea of civil government is that Western societies manifest individuality founded on people’s consent, which suggests and self-interest whereas Asian ones cherish at least two conclusions. First, people’s vol- communal relationships and give importance untary consent is the only legitimate source to one’s duty to preserve the general welfare, of the government’s authority. Second, when he remarks, ‘In the ultimate crisis … it is the trustee – that is, the government – betrays your human relationships that will see you people’s trust and sacrifices their interests by through. . . . The family and the way human way of despotic rule, then the trustor – that relationships are structured, do increase the is, the people – may rightfully withdraw their survival chances of its members’ (Zakaria & consent and resist the government (Locke Lee, 1994, p. 115). and Laslett, 1988, pp. 406–28). However, Although ‘Asian values’ were unsurprisJeremy Bentham, another important political ingly controversial among Western commenthinker during the Enlightenment, challenged tators, they were also found to be unsatisfying Locke’s theory of consent by transferring the among Asian and Singaporean critics. Some justification of political authority from peo- criticised Lee for using ‘Asian values’ to conple’s consent to social utility. In that view, the solidate the authoritarian rule that he had authority of rulers to govern is not based on imposed on Singapore (Englehart, 2000). people’s voluntary consent but on the author- Others were sceptical about the reality of ity’s service to people’s happiness (Bentham, ‘Asian values’ and pointed out the complexity 133

134  encyclopedia of asian politics and heterogeneity of various Asian countries and their cultures. For example, as early as 1977, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, one of the founding leaders of Singapore’s People’s Action Party, doubted the authenticity of ‘Asian values’ and remarked, ‘If it has any meaning at all it is merely a convenient way of describing the heterogeneous, conflicting and complex network of beliefs, prejudices, and values developed in the countries which for geographical purposes have been grouped as being in Asia’ (quoted in Hill, 2000: 183).

B. The landscape The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 undermined the effectiveness of ‘Asian values’ in attributing Asia’s unprecedented economic growth to Confucian ethos such as filial piety, diligence, obedience to authority, submission to the community, and emphasis on personal virtue (Mahbubani, 2009; Thompson, 2001, p. 154). Ever since then, the relationship between Confucianism and democracy has been a question of debate among scholars. Samuel Huntington, in comparing the democratisation of South Korea and Taiwan with that of Europe and Latin America, argues that the Confucian cultural traditions of South Korea and Taiwan have delayed their democratisation because the Confucian emphases on hierarchy, authority, community, and loyalty have impeded social group’s demands for political reform from the government. Huntington observes that the central values of Confucian societies are respect for hierarchy and the avoidance of discourse about rights against the state. Beyond that, Huntington, in referring to Yu-sheng Lin’s view, remarks that ‘Confucianism merged society and the state and provided no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions to balance the state at the national level’ (1991, p. 301). On that count, Huntington perceives the incompatibility of democracy and Confucianism and claims that ‘in practice Confucian or Confucianinfluenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy’ (1991, p. 301). Huntington’s view has been corroborated by Moody’s discussion of the Western discourse on human rights. The classical theory of human rights considers anatomised individuals as the starting point for exploring the origin of society and politics. In that light, society and politics are the results of pursuing mutual advantage expressed by the terms chien-kang chen

of a social contract. In Moody’s account, by contrast, Confucianism focuses on the person, not the individual, namely ‘the human being enmeshed in a set of relations with other human beings’ (Moody, 1996, p. 179). Moreover, the Western discourse of human rights focuses on what people may legitimately claim from society – that is, what others owe to them. Confucianism, however, is primarily an ethical discourse revolving around personal responsibility, which stresses what people owe to others, not vice versa. Likewise, Weatherly argues that the modern Chinese conception of rights has resulted from importing the ideology from the West, not from any organic growth from Confucianism. In his words, ‘It is apparent that, in many respects, Confucianism was inhospitable to the concepts of rights’ (Weatherly, 1999, p. 7). By contrast, other scholars have questioned the incompatibility of Confucianism and liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama, a student of Huntington, has questioned his teacher’s argument and the idea of ‘Asian values’ and revealed two fundamental defects of the idea. On the one hand, he recalls the fact that Asia is an area of diverse cultures, languages, and value systems, and Confucianism, which was taken by Lee Kuan Yew as the bedrock of ‘Asian values’, does not seem to shape the social norms and behaviours among the Malay populations of Malaysia or Indonesia (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 151). On the other, he questions the causal connection between ‘Asian values’ and Asia’s explosive economic growth. The reason lies in that ‘Asian values’ and other cultural explanations of development have neglected the functions of institutions, including stable governments and property systems, as well as economic policies that have made such economic miracles possible (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 152). As one of the most prominent critics of Lee’s argument of ‘Asian values’ and Huntington’s thesis, Fukuyama delineates the compatibility of Confucianism and liberal democracy in three ways. First, influenced by the traditional imperial system of examination, many of today’s Confucian societies have adopted examination systems as the chief gateways to higher education and bureaucratic positions. According to Fukuyama, such systems create upward mobility and redistribute income, both of which align with the egalitarian elements of liberal democracy. Second, the Confucian emphasis on education has raised

political ideologies  135 people’s literacy, which has subsequently enabled them to participate in political debates and cultivate their interests in public affairs. Third, as an ethical system, Confucianism is more tolerant than Islam or Christianity, as proven by Confucianism’s historical coexistence with Buddhism and Christianity (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 25).

C. Future research In 2002, Michael Barr commented that although the use of ‘Asian values’ as a defence of authoritarianism has ended, ‘The impulse that underpinned the “Asian values” reaction remains’ and is waiting to be summoned to serve when Asian leaders next ‘feel a surge of stridency’ in dealing with Western liberal democracy (Barr, 2002, p. 177). In recent years, the study of liberal democracy and critiques of it have been situated in a more comprehensive context of imperialism. For example, Jennifer Pitts’ A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France, published in 2005, has greatly impacted scholars’ reassessment of liberal democracy as an ideology and directed attention to the historical phenomenon of the combination of liberalism and imperialism in Europe in the 19th century. In Pitts’s view, the development of liberalism in England and France underwent a significant transformation from the 18th to the 19th centuries. The great liberal thinkers of the 18th century, including Bentham, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke, embraced liberalism while rejecting the imperial expansion and colonial policies of England and France. The political contexts shifted dramatically in the 19th century, however, and, as Pitts observes, liberal thinkers started to endorse imperialism and regard colonialism either as a project of enlightening foreigners that was compatible with liberal democracy or as a necessary evil to preserve their domestic liberal regimes. The imperial turn in contemporary scholarship corresponds with the new international order in which the antagonists of American and Western European liberal democracy are the imperialist expansion and aggression of China and Russia. Even so, in the recent rise in comparative political philosophy, instead of exploring the historical origins and normative justifications of liberal democracy, more Asian scholars today devote themselves to the comparative study of Western and Eastern

political thought. They do so presumably because they find the universalism implied in liberal democracy questionable, and, with the construction of their cultural subjectivity and national identity, they are more curious about the cultural origins of their own societies. Chien-Kang Chen

References Barr, M. D.  (2002). Cultural Politics and Asian Values: The Tepid War. Routledge. Bentham, J. (1977, 2008).  A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government. Clarendon Press. Bentham, J., and Schofield, P. (1989).  First Principles Preparatory to Constitutional Code. Clarendon Press. Englehart, N. A. (2000). Rights and culture in the Asian values argument: The rise and fall of Confucian ethics in Singapore. Human Rights Quarterly 22(2), 548–568. Fukuyama, F. (1995). Confucianism and democracy.  Journal of Democracy  6(2), 20–33. Fukuyama, F. (2001). Asian values in the wake of the Asian crisis. In F. Iqbal and J. You (Eds.), Democracy, Market Economics, and Development: An Asian Perspective. World Bank. Hill, M. (2000). ‘Asian values’ as reverse orientalism: Singapore.  Asia Pacific Viewpoint 41(2), 177–190. Huntington, S. P. (1991).  The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press. Lee, K. Y., and Zakaria, F. (1994). Culture is destiny: A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. Foreign Affairs 73(2), 109–126. Locke, J., and Laslett, P. (1988). Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge University Press. Mahbubani, K. (2009).  Can Asians Think? Marshall Cavendish International Asia. Montesquieu. (1989). The Spirit of the Laws. Translated and Ed. by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, Harold Samuel Stone. Cambridge University Press. Moody Jr, P. R. (1996) Asian values. Journal of International Affairs 50(1), 166–192. Pitts, J. (2005). A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France. Princeton University Press. Thompson, M. R. (2001) Whatever happened to ‘Asian values’?  Journal of Democracy 12(4), 154–165. chien-kang chen

136  encyclopedia of asian politics Weatherly, R. (1999).  The Discourse of Human Rights in China: Historical and Ideological Perspectives. Macmillan Press.

Key resources Bell, Daniel, and Chaibong Hahm, (Eds.) (2003). Confucianism for the Modern World. Cambridge University Press. Bell, Duncan, (Ed.) (2019). Empire, Race and Global Justice. Cambridge University Press. Jenco, Leigh. (2013). Revisiting Asian values. Journal of the History of Ideas  74(2), 237–258.

chien-kang chen

Shin, Doh Chull.  (2012). Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia. Cambridge University Press. Song, Young-Bae. (2002). Crisis of cultural identity in East Asia: On the meaning of confucian ethics in the age of globalisation. Asian Philosophy 12(2), 109–125. Yu, Ying-shih. (2016). Confucianism and China’s encounter with the west in historical perspective. In Chinese History and Culture (pp. 351–367). Columbia University Press.

25. Political parties A. The concept Political parties play a crucial role in the function of modern democracies (Schattschneider, 1942). It is also true that political parties are indispensable in the operation of non-democratic regimes. The study of political parties and party systems has been a dominant field in political science literature. Nevertheless, scholars have different connotations of what a political party is. Classic theorist E. Burke (1790) envisioned a political party as a group that adheres to normative or moral principles to improve public well-being. Similarly, Duverger (1951) defined political parties as groups of people who share a common ideology or program to gain political power. Both theorists emphasize the importance of a common principle or ideology as the core rationale for the existence of a political party. A political party’s efforts of pursuing political power are to implement a set of programs for the general public. In Europe, political parties often embrace distinctive ideologies and differ from each other. However, the definition of a political party takes a different shape across the Atlantic Ocean to the US. For example, Schattschneider (1942) and Key (1942) suggested that a political party is composed of a group of people intending to control the government through competitive elections. Both scholars have highlighted the importance of the democratic process where party competition takes place in modern democracies. Programs or ideologies are relatively of less concern as Epstein (1975) called the political party in America a “label” under which a group of people collaborated in the campaign for political positions. Political parties with ideologies and mass support in Europe function differently from their American counterparts. As such, the pursuit of general concepts and theories of political parties becomes inevitable. For instance, in the widely cited article “Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory,” Janda thoroughly discussed how political parties were studied and what can be expected in the future. The ten core concepts in the study of political parties are still fundamental today: institutionalization, issue orientation, social support, organizational complexity, centralization of power, autonomy, coherence,

involvement, strategy and tactics, and governmental status. Students of political parties have thus benefitted from these concepts. The Handbook of Party Politics (2006), edited by Katz and Crotty, is an excellent example of a work that presents broad concept implications and comparative case studies of political parties. However, Janda cautioned readers against “missing the forest for the trees” as his concepts were mainly drawn from the American context. Likewise, in Katz and Crotty’s handbook, scholars also referred to the issue of American exceptionalism and the need for additional discussions in the third-wave democratizing countries. In Asia, party politics has evolved in a multi-faced fashion due to the region’s diversified regime types and cultural complexities, making theoretical generalization difficult. Janda’s definitions and concepts of a political party serve as gauges for the study of party politics in Asia, but the same concept may carry different implications in a given county. As Sachsenröder (1998, p. 2) suggested, “The ‘ideological’ or programme-related standpoints of most of the important or prominent political parties in the region appear unclear. Clear-cut conservative, socialist, social-democratic, green or liberal parties as in the European Context are difficult to find in Asia.” The complicated political history and realities in the Asian region have presented a daunting challenge for scholars of political parties. As political parties travel to Asia after the Second World War, they performed in a distinctly Asian style that does not exactly resemble either European and American political parties.

B. The landscape Despite the challenges of generalization of party study in Asia, Janda’s discussion of party study is still a reasonable starting point for describing the characteristics of Asian political parties with some readjustments to the concepts. Notably, the varying pace of political development has introduced different shapes of party politics in the individual countries in the region. The definition and function of a political party, in a simplified way, should vary in the communist regimes of China and North Korea, the democratic regimes of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, and rapidly developing states in the IndoChina peninsula.

137

138  encyclopedia of asian politics Totalitarian communist party politics North Korea and China continue to maintain a strict party-state regime type. Both the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are in reality the sole legitimate governing parties. Other parties do not play a meaningful role. The operation of political parties in the two countries, to some extent, reflects the oneparty system suggested by Sartori (1976, p. 227). The party’s hegemonic official ideologies and its totalitarian/authoritarian rules have completely controlled the state and society. There are minor parties other than the CCP in China, such as China Democracy Party, the China Democratic League, and the China Association for Promoting Democracy. Unfortunately, these minor parties do not perform any real function of a political party in China. Worse, they are treated as social supporting groups for the regime under the CCP’s close control. Likewise, the society of North Korea has been considerably penetrated by the WPK. Other minor parties such as Korean Social Democratic Party and Chondoist Chongu Party do not present a meaningful presence in North Korea’s political landscape (Smith, 2019; Greitens & Silberstein, 2022). A similar case is also found in Laos where the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) is the sole legitimate political party in the country. The LPRP has controlled all sectors of society and other minor political parties are negligible (Forbes & Cutler, 2006; Simon & Barney, 2018). Other than the control of states and societies, the ruling parties also pursue national development but come up with different achievements. The exceptionally rapid rise of China in recent decades has suggested the CPP’s success in pushing for a developmental party-state in China. The rapid socio-economic developments in China have to some extent legitimatized the CCP’s ruling status. Developmentalist and authoritarian party politics The landscape of political parties in the Indo-China peninsula has shown diverse and rapidly changing faces in recent decades (Sachsenröder, 2014). One notable feature of the development of political parties in these counties is strongly intertwined with the process of nation-building, economic development, democratic transition, and the threats of military intervention. Some countries in this region are multi-ethnic, some are ching-hsin yu

multi-religious, and some are suffering continuous struggles between popularly elected civilian leaders and military strongmen. Summarizing the commonalities of political parties is by no means an easy task. Firstly, it can be found that, though there are opposition parties, the ruling parties in these countries tend to be more assertive-oriented, if not repressive-oriented. Meanwhile, these ruling parties have concentrated national resources for a clear developmentalist mentality. One manifest example would be the ruling Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle of Indonesia (PDI-P) under the Pancasila doctrine.1 The PDI-P has managed to reach a balance of economic development and unity in the Indonesian nation (Hefner, 2018). This developmentalist mentality is also clear in Vietnam where the authoritarian Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) adopts a grand opening strategy for the nation’s economic growth. The CPV’s strategy has proven to be effective given Vietnam’s importance of the global division of labor in recent years. Given the importance of this developmentalist mentality, party leaders are less concerned with the costs the and goals of democratic transitions. Secondly, the organization and power distribution of political parties have also exhibited striking differences across nations. The first would be a prevalent role played by the military (May & Selochan, 2004). Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia are typical cases where the military has deeply influenced the function of government. Either through longterm ruling, such as the communist Cambodia People’s Party (CCP) or through a military coup d’état in Myanmar (in 2021), or through the military intervention of the previous popularly elected government in Thailand. Similar but less severe developments can also be found in Pakistan. The struggles between civilian political leaders and military strongmen in Myanmar and Thailand are noticeable. Though both countries moved toward democracy, democratic parties were unable to counteract the veto power of the military. Despite this, the anti-military parties, such as Pheu Thai and the Future Forward Party in Thailand as well as the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Myanmmar are still strong in elections. Thirdly, the organization and operation of a political party have been under the shadows of patronage and populist charisma. The

political parties  139 patron–client network in which Asian party leader provides material benefits in exchange for political support is not new (Scott, 1972; Tadem & Tadem, 2016; Kenny, 2017). Party leaders, especially from the ruling party, would use governmental positions or financial benefits to secure the recipient’s loyalty. Members outside the patron–client network would find it difficult to gain the fair resources needed to compete against the ruling party. In the Philippines, the patronage practice is deeply embedded into the political process which affects the development of democracy (Hutchcroft, 2020). India’s party system is no less influenced by the patron–client network than the Philippines (Hellmann, 2011, p. 100; Naseemullah, 2021). The presence of a patron–client network also accompanies a populist or charismatic leader. Supporters tend to maintain a closer connection to the party leader than the party itself. The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India has portrayed the strong individual character of its leader Narendra Modi (McDonnell & Cabrera, 2018). Similarly, the rise of Joko Widodo in Indonesia has carried a strong personal charisma beyond institutional regulations (Kimura, 2017; Rukmana, Aman, & Sugito, 2020). Competitive party politics In Asian liberal democracies, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand, the functioning of party politics has, for the most part, resembled its Western counterpart. Peaceful party alternation and fair electoral competition have been common practices. However, there are still significant differences. Australia and New Zealand share a similar pattern of party politics to European countries. Major political parties have perennial social bases, and open and fair electoral competition determines who takes power. The left–right ideology also matters in projecting the political party’s issue stand, and party alternation of political power has been a rule and not an exception (Vowles & Aimer, 2015; Fenna & Manwaring, 2021). In contrast, party politics in the three East Asian countries have demonstrated unique characteristics. Japan has experienced a long history of democracy since the Second World War. Despite the long-ruled Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) losing power again in 2009, it regained its ruling status in 2012. In essence, Japan

continues to be an LDP-predominant party system in which oppositions do not pose substantial threats. Additionally, the importance of factional politics within Japanese political parties deserves further exploration (Johnson, 1994; Reed, 1995). To date, intraparty factional politics has received more attention from scholars than inter-party competition (Takeuchi & Lind, 2018; Maeda & Williams, 2021). Democracy in South Korea and Taiwan did not come until the 1980s. A combination of military strongmen and a hegemonic party system had prevailed before democratization. The transition to democracy led to a proliferation of political parties in both countries. While there are similarities between the two countries’ post-transition party systems, such as the existence of two major political parties, intense competition in elections, and ideological differences among major political parties (Hermanns, 2009), the shape of party politics differs between the two countries. In South Korea, party competition is shaped by deep-rooted regionalism, which also reflects a conservative–liberal divide (Kang, 2011; Lee, 2017). Moreover, individual political leaders exert a significant influence on party organization, and viable candidates often revise their party’s name in presidential campaigns, resulting in nominally short-lived political parties (Hellmann, 2014). For Taiwan, party organization matters more than individuals. More importantly, it is the China issue, or identity issue, that is the primary factor that distinguishes the two major political parties (Achen & Wang, 2017; Tan, 2021).

C. Future research Studying Asian political parties presents a considerable challenge due to the region’s diverse political regimes and unique characteristics. While Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are often categorized as Western democracies and have been subject to extensive comparative studies on political parties, party politics in communist China, North Korea, and to a lesser extent Cambodia are characterized by a strong party-state influence in which the ruling communist party controls all resources and defines the rules of the political game. Party politics in the two young East Asian democracies f South Korea and Taiwan have shared considerable similarities and differences, with regionalism ching-hsin yu

140  encyclopedia of asian politics in South Korea and identity issues in Taiwan shaping party competition respectively. Countries in the Indo-China peninsula are focused on achieving economic modernization while contending with the threats of military intervention. Still, patronage politics and personal charisma remain prevalent across national boundaries (Sachsenröder, 2014; 2018). The overall performance of democracy in these countries is not satisfactory, with a weak party system serving as a significant contributing factor, if not the most important one. The study of Asian party politics demands a patient and thorough examination of each individual country’s history, society, culture, religion, political institutions, and external relations (Katz & Crotty, 2006; Croissant & Hellmann, 2020). Additionally, cross-national comparative studies are necessary to identify regional factors. However, the quantity of studies on North Korea and Cambodia is relatively scarce compared to China. Likewise, party politics in the Indo-China peninsula tend to be more complicated than expected given its rapidly changing dynamics. While a comprehensive theory of Asian party politics may not be attainable, Asian perspectives on party politics are a more plausible goal. Ching-Hsin Yu

Note 1.

Pancasila refers to the nation’s official ideology of Indonesia emphasizing the respect for religion, humanity, unity, guided democracy, and socialism.

References Achen, C., and Wang, T.Y. (Eds.). (2017). The Taiwan Voter. University of Michigan Press. Burke, E. (1790). Reflections on the Revolution in France. J. Dodsley. Croissant, A., and Hellmann, O. (2020). Stateness and Democracy in East Asia. Cambridge University Press. Duverger, M. (1951). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. Methuen & Co. Ltd. Epstein, D.L. (1975). Political Parties. In F.I. Greenstein, and N.W. Polsby (Eds.), The Handbook of Political Science (pp. 29– 231). Addison-Wesley. Fenna, A., and Rob Manwaring, R. (2021). Political Parties and the Australian Party System. In A. Fenna, and R. Manwaring ching-hsin yu

(Eds.), Australian Government and Politics (pp. 112–130). Pearson. Forbes, D., and Cutler, C. (2006). Laos in 2005: 30 Years of the People’s Democratic Republic. Asian Survey, 46(1), 175–179. Greitens, S.C., and Silberstein, B.K. (2022). Toward Market Leninism in North Korea: Assessing Kim Jong Un’s First Decade. Asian Survey, 62(2), 211–239. Hellmann, O. (2011). Political Parties and Electoral Strategy: The Development of Party Organization in East Asia. Palgrave Macmillan Hellmann, O. (2014). Party System Institutionalization Without Parties: Evidence from Korea. Journal of East Asian Studies, 14, 53–84. Hefner, R.W. (2018). The Religious Field: Plural Legacies and Contemporary. In R.W. Hefner (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia (pp. 211–226). Routledge. Hermanns, H. (2009). Political Parties in South Korea and Taiwan after Twenty Years of Democratization. Pacific Focus, XXIV(2), 205–224. Hutchcroft, P. (2020). Strong Patronage, Weak Parties: The Case for Electoral System Redesign in the Philippines. Anvil Publishing Inc. Johnson, C. (1994). Factional Politics in Postwar Japan. University of California Press. Kang, W. (2011). Formation of Political Cleavage in South Korea: Application of the Lipset-Rokkan Model. Korea and International Politics, 74, 99–129. Katz, R.S. and Crotty, W. (2006). Handbook of Party Politics. Sage Publications. Key, V.O. (1942). Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. Kenny, P.D. (2017). Populism and Patronage: Why Populists Win Elections in India, Asia, and Beyond. Oxford University Press. Kimura, E. (2017). Populist Politics in Indonesia. Asia Pacific Bulletin, 407. https://scholarspace​ . manoa​ . hawaii​ .edu​ / server​/api ​/core​/ bitstreams​/04eb67e0 ​-147b​ -4565​-b536​-12142a4d5f0f​/content. Lee, H., and Repkine, A. (2017). Changes in and Continuity of Regionalism in South Korea: A Spatial Analysis of the 2017 Presidential Election. Asian Survey, 60(3), 417–440. Maeda, K., and Williams, D. (2021). The Transformation of Japanese Party Politics:

political parties  141 From Single-Party Rule to Permanent Coalition Government. The Pacific Review, 34(1), 33–49. May, R.J., and Selochan, V. (2004). The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific. ANU Press. McDonnell, D., and Cabrera, L. (2018). The Right-Wing Populism of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (and Why Comparativists Should Care). Democratization, 26(3), 484–501. Naseemullah, A. (2021). Patronage vs. Ideology in Indian Politics. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 59(2), 193–214. Reed, S.R. (1995). The Formation of Factionalism in the LDP. Party Politics, 1(1), 71–92. Rukmana, L., and Sugito, N. (2020). Strategy of Prabowo Populism in 2019 General Elections. Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, 398, 20–23. Sachsenröder, W. (1998). Party Politics and Democratic Development in East and Southeast Asia – A Comparative View. In W. Sachsenröder and U.E. Frings (Eds.), Political Party Systems and Democratic Development in East and Southeast Asia, Volume I: Southeast Asia. Ashgate Publishing. Sachsenröder, W. (Ed.). (2014). Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Organization-MoneyInfluence. Createspace. Sachsenröder, W. (2018). Power Broking in the Shade: Finances and Money Politics in Southeast Asia. World Scientific Publishing. Schattschneider, E.E. (1942). Party Government. Farrar & Rinehart. Scott, J.C. (1972). Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia. The American Political Science Review, 66(1), 91–113. Simon, C., and Barney, K. (2018). Conceptualising Party-State Governance

and Rule in Laos. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48(5), 693–716. Smith, H. (Ed.). (2019). North Korea Under Kim Jong-un: Power, Politics, and Prospects for Change. Routledge. Tadem, T.S.E., and Tadem, E.C. (2016). Political Dynasties in the Philippines: Persistent Patterns, Perennial Problems. South East Asia Research, 24(3), 328–340. Takeuchi, H., and Lind, J. (2018). Intra-party Politics and Coalition Formation in Japan. Party Politics, 24(4), 394–406. Tan, A. (2021). Taiwan: Party Systems of a Young Consolidated Democracy. Paper prepared for the International Conference on Political Parties and the Crisis of Democracy, 6–9 October, 2021, Madrid, Spain. Vowles, J., and Aimer, P. (2015). Party Politics in New Zealand. Auckland University Press.

Key resources Duverger, M. (1951). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. Methuen & Co. Ltd. Katz, R.S. and Crotty, W. (2006). Handbook of Party Politics. Sage Publications. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge University Press. In Asia Hellmann, O. (2011). Political Parties and Electoral Strategy: The Development of Party Organization in East Asia. Palgrave Macmillan. Kenny, P. D. (2017). Populism and Patronage: Why Populists Win Elections in India, Asia, and Beyond. Oxford University Press. Sachsenröder, W. (Ed.). (2014). Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Organization-MoneyInfluence. Createspace.

ching-hsin yu

26. Public policy

“Decision makers, working within or close to the machinery of government and other political institutions, produce [...] that are intended to have an impact outside the political system” (Mintrom & Williams, 2018, p. 4). The incluA. The concept sion of these actors provides a comprehensive Public policy is the set of actions and deci- framework to examine public policy. sions made by a government or other authoriPublic policy is typically developed tative bodies to address a particular problem through a complex process of policymakor issue. These actions and decisions can ing that involves multiple actors, institutions, include various activities, such as creating and stages. To study this complex process laws and regulations, allocating resources, researchers have abstracted policy-making setting goals and priorities, and implement- into a multistage process. This parsimoniing programs and services. Public policy is a ous policy cycle model was first introduced multi-faceted concept. Definitions of public by Harold Lasswell in 1956. The policy cycle policy vary depending on the focus of actors, model divides policy-making into five stages: parts of the process, as well as outcomes. agenda setting, policy formulation, policy A group of definitions of public policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy focus on the actions of the government to evaluation. address specific issues within a state. These Later researchers, such as Brewer and actions may include laws, regulations, pro- deLeon (1983), expanded the policy cycle grams, and spending decisions that are to better capture the way policies are made. implemented to achieve specific goals or The weakness of the original model is that objectives. Among the most parsimonious it portrayed the process as linear that starts of these definitions is offered by Harold with agenda setting and ending with policy Lasswell. He defines public policy as the dis- evaluation. Researchers changed Lasswell’s tribution of outcomes and resources, “Who linear model to a continuous and evolutionary gets what when and how” (1936). one. In this model, the policy-making cycle Since Lasswell’s definition, the concept moves from one stage to another but also may of public policy has undergone significant move back to a previous step. At the end of the evolution, with scholars like Dye broaden- evaluation phase, the policy-making process ing its scope to include not only government may be repeated again in part or full dependaction but also inaction. According to Dye, ing on the success of the particular intervenpublic policy is “[a]nything a government tion. Critics of the policy cycle model have chooses to do or not do” (1972, p. 2). Public argued that it is too simplistic to capture the policy also determines who does not receive dynamic process of policy-making. However, resources. Cairney further extends the defi- the cycle is useful in that it is easily applied nition by encompassing signals of intent and to all political systems. Additionally, it allows evaluating the entire gamut of government researchers to identify and focus on a particuconduct – from initial expressions of pur- lar part of the policy-making process. Some pose to the ultimate outcomes. Public pol- scholars may be interested in the impact of icy is “the sum total of government action, agenda setting while others are interested from signals of intent to the final outcome” in how policies are implemented. Another (Cairney, 2019, p. 2). By adopting this broad- strength of this model is the emphasis on ened perspective, public policy emerges as a fluidity. Issues may move back to a previous complex, multifaceted concept. stage in the cycle. In addition to government action, pubStudies of public policy can be divided lic policy can also refer to the process by into four areas of research: substantive area which these actions are developed, debated, research, evaluation and impact studies, poland implemented. Some definitions of pub- icy process, and policy design (Sabatier 1991). lic policy include the actors and institutions Substantive area research in public policy involved in this process. Anderson defines examines the politics of specific policy areas, public policy as a “purposive course of action such as foreign policy, the environment, susfollowed by an actor or a set of actors in tainability, and healthcare. Evaluation or dealing with a problem” (1984, p. 3). Other impact studies examine how policies address definitions of public policy seek to include particular issues and the effects of those poliactors other than governments in the process. cies. Research on the policy process explores 142

public policy  143 how a policy reaches the government agenda, the implementation of the policy, and evaluating the effectiveness of the policy. Lastly, policy design examines policy instruments and strategies as well as the negative externalities these instruments and strategies may introduce.

B. The landscape The body of work on public policy is as diverse and vast as the definitions of public policy. As the study of public policy has evolved over the past decade, it has become more interdisciplinary, drawing on perspectives from economics, sociology, psychology, and other disciplines to provide insights into public policy. Researchers have used this approach to study the role of institutions, such as government bureaucracies and regulatory bodies, in shaping public policy outcomes. One crucial area of inquiry revolves around the role that political executives play in shaping policy directions, acknowledging the significance of leadership in driving transformative agendas. Concurrently, a growing body of research emphasizes the study of actors involved in social movements, interest groups, and other modes of political engagement to understand how they shape public policy. Evaluating public opinion and societal attitudes towards these policies has remained an indispensable aspect of such investigations. Scholars have also turned their attention to pressing concerns related to inequality – particularly income and wealth disparities – and the subsequent ramifications for policymaking. Furthermore, to account for the interconnected nature of the modern world, researchers have expanded their focus to encompass the effects of globalization and international institutions on public policy decisions, transcending the confines of individual states. The emergence of evolving technologies, particularly social media, has significantly shaped public policy processes and outcomes, garnering the interest of researchers in the field. As well as studying the impact of new technologies and approaches on public policy, the digital age has facilitated novel approaches to analyzing and discerning the potential consequences of public policy interventions, including the growing utilization of big data. This data-intensive methodology enables researchers to discern trends, establish patterns and unravel relationships that

can substantially inform and impact policy decisions. Moving beyond public policy in one state, comparative public policy is a growing area of public policy research. In comparative public policy, researchers explore the similarities and differences in the institutional context in which policymaking takes place. The use of comparative public policy increases the level of abstraction that allows for developing theories and frameworks to better understand public policy. The Comparative Agendas Project builds on Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones’ Policy Agenda Project to explore policy stability and instability in states across the world (Baumgartner & Jones 2009; Dowding et al. 2016). Recent trends in the study of public policy in Asia include increased use of comparative analysis, studies on decentralization and governance, policy diffusion, environmental policy, digital transformation, health policy, the impact of executives on policy-making, and international impacts on public policy. As evidenced by the recent trends, the study of public policy in Asia is a diverse and complex field; within this field, there are several ongoing debates that have emerged over the years. The debates may be categorized into three broad themes: institutions and state responsibilities, economic, and external forces. The first set of debates focuses on state institutions, norms, and responsibilities. There is a debate about the relationship between institutional structure and policymaking in Asia, with competing claims regarding whether liberal institutions lead to better policy outcomes. Furthermore, an equally contentious issue revolves around the role of the state in delivering essential social welfare services like healthcare and education. These vital services demand a critical evaluation of the government’s responsibilities in ensuring an efficient and fair distribution to its citizens. An additional topic of significance is the impact of corruption on policymaking in Asia, as it raises questions about transparency, accountability, and the overall efficacy of policies implemented. In essence, these compelling debates shed light on the complex relationship between state institutions, norms, and responsibilities in the Asian context, calling for a thorough exploration and synthesis of ideas to inform and enhance policymaking in the region. DAW N M I L L E R- M cTAG G A R T

144  encyclopedia of asian politics The second theme in the public policy debate concerns economic issues. At the core of this contention lie two pivotal debates: comprehending the optimal interplay between state intervention and market mechanisms, as well as striking a judicious balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability. Consequently, this complex interplay of variables presents fertile ground for academic exploration and analysis, fostering innovative policy solutions that cater to the unique socio-political and economic fabric of Asian states, while keeping the broader human and ecological welfare as a unifying focal point. Lastly, the significance of external forces in shaping policymaking and the autonomy of states has consistently remained a subject of rigorous analysis and debate. A critical facet of this discourse centers around the impact that regional integration exerts on state sovereignty and policy-making efficiency. A group of scholars has advocated the position that regional integration fosters more efficacious policy outcomes, as it enables states to engage in collaborative processes and harmonize their efforts. Conversely, there are those who contend that such integration may, in fact, jeopardize the self-determination and sovereignty of individual states, as they may be compelled to conform to policies that do not cater to their unique interests. Similarly, scholarly discord persists on the matter of globalization and international institutions’ bearing on the policy-making autonomy of states in the Asian context. The extent to which these forces circumscribe the independent policy formulation capacities of Asian states remains a divergent and fiercely debated topic within the academic realm. The continuous exchange of ideas and debates surrounding critical public policy concerns can significantly improve our understanding of how these policies are shaped and implemented within the Asian context. By delving into the intricacies of policy-making processes, socio-political factors, and economic implications, scholars and practitioners can glean valuable insights that can further enrich and refine existing theories and frameworks in the field. Additionally, as we deepen our understanding of the nuances and complexities of Asian public policy, we also create opportunities for the adaptation and application of these insights to other states and regions. Such collaboration fosters a DAW N M I L L E R- M cTAG G A R T

more comprehensive and informed approach to addressing global policy challenges, while simultaneously advancing the discourse on public policy in the international academic community.

C. Future research A fruitful area of research in public policy includes bridging the gap between academic study and real-world practice. By evaluating the impact of existing and proposed policies, researchers can provide practitioners with evidence-based insights to strengthen programs and inform decisions. Likewise, a close study of policy implementation can reveal new research questions and hypotheses for academics to investigate. Combining theoretical and applied approaches promises to accelerate progress on pressing issues and help governments make the most of limited resources. Move beyond familiar cases to include lesser-studied states. Use big data to leverage where state-related factors may not have as much impact due to abstraction. Third, adopt compound or embedded research designs. According to this strategy, there are four levels of comparison in policy analysis: national, sectoral, international, and longitudinal. In this approach, researchers choose cases on at least two of the four levels to enhance variation (Engeli et al., 2018). Advancing our understanding of how public policy is developed and implemented requires further research in several areas. Artificial intelligence can have a massive influence over the policy-making process and therefore an academic study of these technologies and their role in public policy needs to be conducted. Additionally, there is a need for research into how policy experimentation can help inform and enhance evidencebased implementation in different contexts. Comparative policy analysis provides crucial insight into how policies work under different conditions, while insights from behavioral economics can also be used to further inform policy-making within academic circles. Crucially, academic rigor is needed when examining how citizen participation plays into the formulation of policy choices, and how policies are implemented effectively. Ultimately, an academic exploration of these topics is important to scholarship and development in the public policy sphere.

public policy  145 The dominant theories and work on public policy are based on research in the United States and applied to other Western democracies such as Canada, Australia, West European states such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, and other states or regions within the European Union. There is not as much work on states in other parts of the world with differing levels of development. Due to the lack of global application, we cannot evaluate whether the predominant public policy theories are globally applicable or whether there are important differences across states and systems that may be incorporated in the building of theories. Although there is a growing emphasis on comparative work, the bulk of public policy research in Asia focuses on individual states. This body of research provides valuable insight and information on which to study factors that shape policy outcomes across the region. Comparative work on public policy in Asia can help us to better understand the factors that shape policy outcomes across different states in Asia. This can help to identify the factors that influence policy-making in different contexts and promote cross-national learning. Additionally, such studies will strengthen and develop public policy theories and frameworks. Public policy research in the Asian region has been primarily centered on national-level governance, often neglecting the crucial role that local governments and subnational authorities play in formulating and executing policies. This is an area deserving further attention, as the success of policy initiatives is often contingent on effective coordination between various layers of governance. Moreover, there is a significant gap in the understanding of factors that contribute to the actual implementation of policies and the extent to which they achieve their intended outcomes. Beyond the mechanics of policymaking, there is a pressing need to investigate the impact of these policies on marginalized communities, such as women, ethnic minorities, and economically disadvantaged populations. This requires delving deeper into the policy-making processes, identifying barriers to the meaningful inclusion of these groups, and developing targeted strategies for their empowerment. Ultimately, a more inclusive and nuanced understanding of public policy in Asia is essential for the promotion of social

and economic equity and effective governance across the region. Much of the research on public policy in Asia has focused on the role of the state in policy-making, with relatively little attention paid to non-state actors. However, nonstate groups are increasingly influential in shaping policy outcomes across the region. These groups, ranging from business lobbies to civil society organizations, employ a variety of tactics to influence policy debates and decisions. By overlooking the role of nonstate actors, studies of public policy in Asia risk missing key dynamics that are central to policy change and continuity. A more comprehensive understanding of policy processes in Asia requires analyses that incorporate the roles and impacts of both state and non-state actors. Policy-making processes in Asia’s diverse range of states are complex phenomena shaped by countless political, social, and historical forces. However, our theoretical frameworks for understanding policymaking in the Asian context are underdeveloped. More research is needed to build and test theories that account for the unique contexts of Asian states. For example, frameworks that incorporate the roles of cultural values, informal institutions, and nondemocratic political systems would help advance our academic understanding of policy-making dynamics in Asia. By developing and refining theoretical models that are tailored to the Asian experience, researchers can generate insights that are more relevant and useful for policymakers and citizens across this important but often over-generalized region. The advancement of the study of the public policy process in Asia would benefit from a multifaceted approach that takes into account the unique non-Western context of the region. One crucial aspect to explore is the focus on policy implementation. This would involve investigating the various factors that influence the success or failure of policy implementation in diverse Asian settings, thereby bridging the gap between policy formulation and its execution on the ground. By delving deeper into this aspect, researchers can contribute to more robust, evidence-based policy-making that is tailored to the specific contexts and challenges faced in Asia. Additionally, fostering greater collaboration and knowledge sharing among scholars and policymakers across DAW N M I L L E R- M cTAG G A R T

146  encyclopedia of asian politics the continent can significantly facilitate the translation of research into tangible, beneficial outcomes for Asian societies. Through such collaborative efforts, public policy studies can be elevated to new heights. This will eventually lead to effective and inclusive policies that fully consider the unique cultural, economic, and political nuances of the Asian context. Dawn Miller-McTaggart

References Anderson, J. E. (1984). Public Policy-Making: Basic Concepts in Political Science. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Baumgartner, F. R., and Jones, B. D. (2009). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. University of Chicago Press. Brewer, G. D., and deLeon, P. (1983). The Foundations of Policy Analysis. Dorsey Press. Cairney, P. (2019). Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues. Bloomsbury. Dowding, K., Hindmoor, A., and Martin, A. (2016). The Comparative Policy Agendas Project: Theory, Measurement and Findings. Journal of Public Policy, 36(1), 3–25. Dye, T. R. (1972). Understanding Public Policy. Prentice-Hall. Engeli, I., Allison, C. R., and Montpetit, E. (2018). Beyond the Usual Suspects: New Research Themes in Comparative Public Policy. Journal of Comparative Policy

DAW N M I L L E R- M cTAG G A R T

Analysis: Research and Practice, 20(1), 114–132. Lasswell, H. (1936). Politics: Who Gets What, When and How. McGraw Hill. Mintrom, M., and Williams, C. (2018). Public Policy Debate and the Rise of Policy Analysis. In E. Araral, Jr., S. Frizen, M. Ramesh, and X. Wu (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Public Policy (pp. 3–16). Routledge. Sabatier, P. A. (1991). Political Science and Public Policy. PS: Political Science & Politics, 24(2), 144–147.

Key resources Resources on public policy Cairney, P. (2019). Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues. Bloomsbury. Dodds, A. (2018). Comparative Public Policy. Bloomsbury. Lodge, M., Balla, S. J., and Page, E. C. (Eds.). (2015). The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Administration. Oxford University Press. In Asia Jamil, I., Aminuzzaman, M., Tawfique, S. K., and Haque, M. (Eds.). (2015). Governance in South, Southeast, and East Asia: Trends, Issues and Challenges. London: Springer. Mok, K. A., and Holliday, I. (Eds.) Journal of Asian Public Policy. Taylor & Francis. Policy Studies Organization. Asian Politics & Policy Journal. Wiley.

27. Religion and politics

World Values Survey reveal that, on average, the level of national pride that the people in West, South, and Southwest Asia feel toward their own nations is at 77 per cent; whereas in Southeast and Central Asia, the level A. The concept of national pride averages between 67 and The growing religious fundamentalism, eth- 68 per cent. Yet, despite their ubiquity and nic factionalism, and nationalist impulses dominance, scholars and experts from varibeing witnessed today are exposing the lim- ous intellectual disciplines continue to debate its of scholarly works built around the mod- about how to accurately define and describe ernization and secularization thesis and the the nature and essence of these two concepts. inexactness of their findings. The end of the On the one hand, religion is deemed by Cold War and the collapse of Soviet-inspired many to be elemental and causal rather socialist endeavours coincided with the global than just being epiphenomenal or derivarejuvenation of individual and collective inter- tive. Chris Seiple, Dennis Hoover, and est in religion and nationalism, allowing these Pauletta Otis (2012, p. 2) offered a definiphenomena to reclaim their prime status in tion of religion that is relatively detached both the private and public realms. The rude from the philosophical hyper-individualism awakening brought about by the unforeseen of Western Enlightenment, that is, “a belief events of 11 September 2001 further forced us in something greater than oneself […] which to confront their lingering power and influence is often made manifest in rituals and instituin modern national and international politics. tions.” Meanwhile, James Wellman and Clark At the structural level, religion and national- Lombardi (2012, p. 9) proposed to define reliism have profoundly guided and shaped both gion based on what they believed is the “genthe constitutive and regulative norms and pro- eral agreement on the types of thing” that cedures observed by states and societies since people refer to when they talk about religion: the emergence of the contemporary inter- a socially enacted desire for the ultimate, national system (see, Juergensmeyer, 1993; embodied in practices that have ultimate sigPetito & Hatzopoulos, 2003; Thomas, 2005; nificance, with the understanding that these Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011; and Gorski & practices include both rituals directed to gods Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2013). At the individual or spirits and also obedience to moral laws level, the countless people from the past who with ultimate consequences. Such definitions sacrificed their lives in defense of their gods are comprehensive and inclusive enough to and tribes, and their billions of descendants satisfy religion’s most vital characteristics who are now fiercely guarding their faiths and as enumerated by William Alston (1972), flags, underscore the transcendental devotion namely: believing in supernatural beings and allegiance that religion and nationalism and offering prayers to them; accepting traninspire. This is particularly true and relevant scendental realities such as heaven and hell in various regions of Asia. or Jannah and Jahannam; distinguishing According to the 2018 Pew Research between holiness and unholiness or between Centre Survey, for example, religion remains sacred rituals and sacrilegious acts; adopting very important to most people in the Middle an overarching “philosophy” for explaining East (West and Southwest Asia), South Asia, the world and humans’ relation to it; observand Southeast Asia. The share of those who ing a code of conduct that corresponds with believe religion is central to their daily lives is that view; and communing with a temporal highest in predominantly Muslim countries in “church” bound by obedience to these beliefs South Asia such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and practices (see also, Toft, 2007, p. 99; Toft, and Pakistan where more than 90 per cent Philpott, & Shah, 2011, p. 21). These various agree that religion is essential. Moreover, roles of religion in human life, as Otis (2004, in all countries surveyed in Southeast Asia p. 17) argued, underscore its salience in pro(except Singapore and Vietnam), between viding people with “meaningful worldviews” 96 and 99 per cent of the population agree that and sets of behavioural rules and standards religion is crucial to their lives; whereas in intended to mold individual goals and actions West and Southwest Asia at least 70 per cent in accordance with those meaningful worldof the people confirm that religion is pivotal views. Drawing on these conceptualizations to them (except in Lebanon and Israel) (Pew, of religion, Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, 2018). Meanwhile, data from the 2017–2020 and Timothy Shah (2011, p. 21) succinctly 147

148  encyclopedia of asian politics described religion as encompassing “a combination of beliefs, behaviour, and belonging in a community.” On the other hand, nationalism, as many agree, presents both benefits and risks and, as such, cannot be fully explained by a single model or theory. While it certainly contributes to personal and societal self-definition by serving as a “ doctrine of freedom and sovereignty, or an agent in movements for freedom and emancipation” (Merdjanova, 2000, p. 234; see also, Gorski & TürkmenDervişoğlu, 2013), it also plays a role in the promotion of “intolerance, arrogance, hostility and oppression of other nations, and thus constructs new ‘us’–‘them’ boundaries” (Merdjanova, 2000, p. 235). Florian Bieber (2018, p. 2) delivered a reasonably eclectic definition of nationalism as malleable and narrow ideology which values membership in a nation greater than other groups (i.e. based on gender, parties, or socioeconomic group), seeks distinction from other nations, and strives to preserve the nation and give preference to political representation by the nation for the nation.

Although modern, this nation, as Anthony Smith (1988, p. 10) postulated, is significantly anchored on the much longer time spans of pre-modern ethnies, and the survival of ethnic ties and ethnic mosaics from these periods into the modern world. Contrary to the modernist/constructivist interpretations of nations proposed by the likes of Ernest Gellner (1983) and Benedict Anderson (1983), primordialist scholars like Smith (1988, 1998) emphasized the older, pre-existing ethnies on which these entities are established. For the latter, the fact that nations require pre-modern ethno-symbolic elements such as shared culture, identity, and history suggests that they are neither purely modern nor merely imagined communities (Smith, 1988, 1998; see also, Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2013; Liow, 2016). Despite this glaring divide, nationalism, as Barbara-Ann Rieffer (2003) noted, addresses the very basic human need of having a secure and established identity that allows us to identify and connect with someone or something. Although nationalism might be conducive to the modernization and secularization of political life, it can also function as a substitute for the mythologization of the past in ways that erect boundaries along distinctive ethnic and michael i. magcamit

religious cleavages (see, Smith, 1996, 1998; Merdjanova, 2000; Brubraker, 2012).

B. The landscape Regardless of their exact meanings and uses, to their foremost critics, nothing can ever rectify the inherent propensity of religion and nationalism to demarcate humanity and territory. Those who insist on keeping them out of politics and policymaking tables insist that their presence and proliferation ultimately create a violent cycle of “othering and strangeness; of fear and paranoia; misunderstanding and conflict” (Magcamit, 2022, p. 157). The continuation and further entrenchment of these religious and nationalist divisions are expected to sustain the old faultlines of conflicts and create new ones, especially when people believe that these ideas are the basis of their “bios,” or what Giorgio Shani (2014, p. 2) describes as “a life with dignity, endowed with meaning, in contrast with the bare life.” Thus, critics maintain that for as long as people and territories are segregated on the basis of their religious and national affiliations and identities, durable peace and stability will be difficult to achieve as some empirical research seem to suggest (e.g., Fox, 2004; Hassner, 2009; Hutchison, 2017; Toft, 2010) . To them, these phenomena are merely transitional stages/qualities within the social evolution continuum and, therefore, are expected to wither and be superseded by more modern and secular ideals such as Durkheim’s “post-patriotic human rights” or Marx’s and Engel’s “proletarian internationalism” (see Wimmer & Schiller, 2002, p. 303). Such views and expectations result from some established myths identified by Gorski and Türkmen-Dervişoğlu (2012). One of them is the myth of inherently violent religion which contrasts religion with secularism by framing the former as a natural cause of violence and the latter as a crucial precondition of peace (Gorski & TürkmenDervişoğlu, 2012). The liberal conviction that the 1648 Peace of Westphalia had not only ended the European wars of religion but also opened the “majestic portal which [led] from the old into the new world” (Gross, 1948, p. 28) created false dichotomies/choices with regard to the ideal nature and arrangement of modern states and societies: first, that people could only choose to live in either the eternal hell created by religious wars or the perpetual

religion and politics  149 peace provided by political liberalism; and second, that people must radically privatize their faith and keep it in a drawer or suffer the irresolvable dilemma of religious pluralism (Fox, 2001; Cavanaugh, 2009; Casanova, 2011). Such simplistic assumptions underscore a built-in bias in favour of a liberal domestic and international order and a problematic reading of Western historical development (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2012; see also, Wimmer & Schiller, 2002; Cavanaugh, 2009). What most early political liberals failed, if not refused, to recognize was these “religious” wars did not simply originate from irreconcilable theological disagreements between the congregations of competing churches. Instead, the religious tensions between the Roman Catholics and the Protestants intersected with the already mounting politico-economic and socio-cultural crises emanating from severe power struggles within and between the monarchies and the churches, down to the parliaments and the streets (see Philpott, 2003). The ignition of these high-pressure conditions enabled religious Reformation movements to transcend class divisions and regional territories, thereby generating much “larger and fiercer forms of resistance” that traditional “patrimonial politics or divide-and-rule tactics” could not simply contain (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2012, p. 137). Thus, if one was to claim that the wars on religion were inherently religious by nature, one must also acknowledge the significant role that profound religious administration reforms had played (alongside a confluence of nonreligious forces) in triggering and intensifying these violent events. In addition, there is also the problem of what appears to be a deliberate miscalculation and misattribution of the moral atrocities and depravity in modern times by the most zealous crusaders of political liberalism. This was in large part due to the liberal perception that whereas religion was inherently absolutist and isolating, secularism was fundamentally relativist and inclusive (see Petito & Hatzopoulos, 2003; Fox & Sandler, 2004; Toft et  al., 2011). Accordingly, “religious wars” were perceived to be different and separate from “secular wars”: the former being driven by some non-negotiable and irrational causes, and the latter having more rational causes that could be resolved through negotiations and compromise (see Philpott, 2002; Fox,

2004, 2018; Haynes, 2007, 2016; Toft, 2007). In reality, however, the most horrific crimes ever committed against humanity in the contemporary era, particularly during the periods of the three world wars, were fuelled not by pre-modern theological religions per se, but by the totalitarian ideals and terroristic methods of modern, non-religious ideologies – Jacobinism, fascism, Nazism, and communism (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2012, 2013). Their impacts revealed that violence and fanaticism were not exclusive features of religion but were also shared by secularism. Secularism could not be the only source of security and stability, as religion could, and indeed, has been providing these necessities to its own followers for millennia. Yet, despite these realizations, the adherents of secular liberalism continued lobbying for the exile of religion as if it was the single biggest source of political malady and human suffering. Sweeping secularizing operations had been carried out in attempts to extract religion from politics while ignoring the severe backlash from fundamentalist movements that were taking place not only in the non-Western world but also in many liberal democracies in the West (Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011; Wellman & Lombardi, 2012; Haynes, 2016). The other myth, which is the myth of inherently modern nationalism, juxtaposes “primordial” religion with “constructivist” nationalism by portraying the former as primitive and regressive and the latter as secular and progressive (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2012). Proponents of constructivist/modernist nationalism all shared the view that the nation is defined and legitimized by the recognition of some factitious ideological bonds among the people rather than by some pre-existing religious characteristics, and the belief that modern nationalism is replacing and filling up the moral and cultural vacuum created by religion’s demise (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). Statues of warriors and heroes replaced those of the martyrs and the saints; whereas “objective” histories of national struggles and destiny superseded the “subjective” myths of creation and salvation. Notwithstanding their anti-essentialist stance with regard to nation and nationalism; however, these constructivist sentiments and narratives were littered with primordialist elements of religion. In fact, the common denominator shared by these secular theories of modern nationalism is their core religious foundation, which means that michael i. magcamit

150  encyclopedia of asian politics religion is not a mere precursor to nationalism but an integral and constitutive part of it (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2012, 2013; Seiple, Hoover, & Otis, 2012). Yet, to effectively endorse itself as the best provider of peace and stability, political liberalism must prohibit religion from having a voice, let alone a seat, in policymaking chambers. Promoting secular nationalism as a vehicle for cultivating the strong civic mindset and social harmony that are necessary for building and sustaining a political community means that people’s religious beliefs and devotions must be quelled or at least permanently kept in private (see Cochran, 1990). Hence, although religion has been persistently portrayed as being undesirable and backward, modern nationalism has been constantly trumpeted as the only desirable and enlightened path towards national state and society building. This underlines the view that a liberal state cannot be a religious state but a secular one, embedded within and reinforced through a “good” form of nationalism, that is, modern nationalism (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2012, 2013). Such a perspective continues to be manifested in international relations which has its origin in the rejection of religion, more specifically, “the belief that era in which religion caused war was over” (Fox, 2001, pp. 55–6). This desire to depart from its influence was captured by Voltaire’s argument that the Age of Enlightenment would bring an end to superstition and the religious authoritarian order (Marty & Appleby, cited in Fox, 2001, p. 54). Accordingly, efforts to find more “rational” as opposed to supernatural explanations for human behaviour in the age of scientific revolution were pursued at the expense of religion. Thomas Jefferson, for example, went as far as revising the New Testament by removing any references to the supernatural (e.g. heaven, resurrection, cross, and hell) and keeping only those passages which he believed reflected enlightened ethical wisdom (see Bryan, 1987). Such visions/agendas have resonated well into the future as some of the most renowned political scientists pushed forward the idea that modernization would reduce, if not completely abolish, the political currency of primordial phenomena such as religion (Fox, 2001; see also, Apter, 1965; Smith, 1970). The problem of course is stripping nationalism of its religious genes given their inextricably entwined histories, michael i. magcamit

which makes political liberals also suspicious and quite nervous (admittedly or not) about the former. In many modern national states and societies, for example, the confessional notions of “holy lands” and “chosen peoples” continue to forge and underpin the sense of national identity and, thus, remain essential to their cohesion and persistence (Hassner, 2003, 2006; Smith, 2003). This suggests that secular nationalism feeds off from many of the pre-existing confessional reservoirs of identity, which would explain why nationalist movements habitually adopt religious undertones until they coincide with the underlying religious boundaries. Moreover, the expected secularizing effects of modern nationalism by political liberals have failed to significantly materialize. Even in the 21st century, scholars and experts continue to argue over the influence of religion on modern societies on two fronts: (1) whether secularization means people are becoming less religious or only pertains to the decline in the influence of religion on sociopolitical institutions; and (2) whether either of these processes is, in fact, taking place (see, Juergensmeyer, 1993; Thomas, 2000, 2005; Fox, 2001). From these debates, counter-analysis and arguments revealing that modernization has actually resulted in the resurgence of religion have emerged. Jonathan Fox (2001, 2004, 2018) synthesized these findings into three categories. First, as far as the so-called Third World is concerned, attempts at modernization have been unsuccessful in weakening the values and traditions of local tribal communities, creating a backlash of repressed grievances and resentments by religious/nationalist movements. The failed promise of modernization resulted in alienation, confusion, and displacement of many local people, which made them attracted to religious/nationalist actors who swore to protect their identity and homeland (Fox, 2001; see also, Sahliyeh, 1990; Haynes, 1999; Juergensmeyer, 1993, 1996; Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011; Seiple, Hoover, & Otis, 2012). Second, instead of diminishing the operational fields of religious/nationalist movements and governments, the process of modernization had the paradoxical effect of expanding their respective domains, resulting in a collision between these two forces. Modernity has not only given religious/nationalist agents access to political processes but also facilitated both the

religion and politics  151 nationalization and globalization of their struggles and causes (Fox, 2001, 2004; see also, Johnston & Sampson, 1994; Eisenstadt, 2000). And third, the freedom of religion that has become a central ethos of modern societies has been linked to an increase in the level of individual religiosity. With the breakdown of religious monopolies in much of the modern world, people of faith have started applying cost–benefit analysis in choosing their own religion, while at the same time, religious “entrepreneurs” bolstered their efforts in making their religion more attractive and marketable to prospective “buyers,” thereby increasing their level of religiosity (Fox, 2001, 2018). Given the “genetic” link between religion and nationalism, these distinctions between the “rationally” secular and “irrationally” religious forms of nationalism are mainly in terms of scale rather than of kind (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2012, 2013).

C. Future research Against this backdrop, there are at least three general research themes that scholars of religion and nationalism in Asia can further examine and analyse. The first theme is the significance of these phenomena in the survival and endurance of nations and states in the region. The overarching assertion that nations and states fail mainly due to their “extractive” as opposed to “inclusive” economic and political institutions invites important questions regarding the role of religion and nationalism in the creation and legitimation of these non-inclusive institutions (see Fukuyama, 1989, 1992; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). What most modernist and secularist analysts neglect to explain are the most fundamental bases and origins of the factors that lead to the formation of institutions (both inclusive and extractive), and the processes through which these institutions (along with their constitutive elements) become normalized over time. The problem lies with the outright rejection of religion and nationalism as explanatory factors, presuming that these phenomena have very little to do with the nature and type of institutions that develop within nations and states and how they are utilized. The more recent works of scholars such as Kikue Hamayotsu (2002), Julius Bautista and Francis Lim (2009), Michael Barr (2010), Ali Riaz (2010), Anthony Reid (2010), Ishtiaq Ahmed (2011), David DuBois (2011), Adeeb Khalid (2014),

Donald Smith (2015), and Shani and Takashi Kibe (2019), all provide fresh insights into the nature of the role of these phenomena in contemporary nation- and state-building across Asian regions, which can be further interrogated and examined. The second theme is the processes and mechanisms via which religion and nationalism contribute to the eruption and protraction of internal (between ethnic/religious groups) and intrastate (between states and specific ethnic/religious groups) conflicts across Asia. Most studies on such conflicts, especially the more violent ones, have focused on identifying their primary causes. Although undoubtedly necessary and helpful, however, determining the exact reasons behind these clashes cannot fully explain how these causes transform into conflicts, particularly those that protract over time. Hence, instead of answering why such events occur, scholars and experts can examine the role of religion and nationalism in these conflicts by uncovering and explaining the stages and dynamics through which the identified causes (e.g. material/rationalist, nonmaterial/non-rationalist, or elite/ instrumentalist) crystallize into full-blown conflicts. Some of the key literature on this subject include the works of Stanley Tambiah (1997), Peter Searle (2002), Imtiaz Ahmad and Helmut Reifeld (2004), John Hinnells and Richard King (2007), Isak Svensson and Emily Harding (2011), William Gould (2011), Nicholas Gier (2014), and Joseph Liow (2016). Although these studies offer useful explanations about the role of religion and nationalism in conflicts, their contrasting outcomes highlight the need for more comprehensive, yet still nuanced and systematic, analyses of these relationships. Last, the third theme is the function of religion and nationalism in framing certain ethnic and religious groups within the pluralistic polities in Asia as security threats. Scholars and experts can further investigate how the imagined insecurities of different ethnic/religious groups (both individual and collective) are transformed into tangible security threats. More specifically, the effects of emotions, symbolic predispositions, and perceptions on the “othering” of the outgroups, which are cultivated, socialized, and legitimized through religion and nationalism, need to be systematically examined. Far from being obsolete, these elements remain fundamental to reimagining and renegotiating michael i. magcamit

152  encyclopedia of asian politics the “state of being” of all target ethnic/religious groups and their respective positions in pluralistic imagined communities throughout the Asian region. The works of scholars like Kelly Pemberton and Michael Nijhawan (2009), Diana Dimitrova (2014), Stuart Kaufman (2011), Rama Charan Tripathi and Purnima Singh (2016), Rachel Ting and Louise Sundararajan (2017), Yulia Egorova (2018), and Michael Magcamit (2020, 2022) all present eclectic arguments, concepts, and frameworks in relation to these interlinkages which can be applied to and tested further using other notable cases in Asia. Michael I. Magcamit

References Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown Books. Ahmed, I. (2011). The Politics of Religion in South and Southeast Asia. Routledge. Ahmad, I., and Reifeld, H. (2004). Lived Islam in South Asia: Adaptation, Accommodation, and Conflict. Social Science Press. Alston, W. (1972). Religion. In E. Paul (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (pp. 140– 145). Macmillan. Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso Books. Apter, D. (1965). The Politics of Modernization. University of Chicago Press. Barr, M. (2010). Religious Nationalism and Nation-Building in Asia: An Introduction. Australian Journal of International Affairs 64(3), 255–261. Bautista, J., and Lim, F. K. G. (Eds.). (2009). Christianity and the State in Asia: Complicity and Conflict. Routledge. Bieber, F. (2018). Is Nationalism on the Rise? Assessing Global Trends. Ethnopolitics 17(5), 519–540. Brubaker, R. (2012). Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches. Nations and Nationalism 18(1), 2–20. Bryan, S. (1987). Reauthorizing the Text: Jefferson’s Scissor Edit of the Gospels. Early American Literature 22(1), 19–42. Casanova, J. (2011). Public Religions in the Modern World. University of Chicago Press. Cavanaugh, W. (2009). The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots michael i. magcamit

of Modern Conflict. Oxford University Press. Cochran, C. (1990). Religion in Public and Private Life. Routledge. Dimitrova, D. (Ed.). (2014). The Other in South Asian Religion, Literature and Film: Perspectives on Otherism and Otherness. Routledge. DuBois, T. (2011). Religion and the Making of Modern East Asia. Cambridge University Press. Egorova, Y. (2018). Jews and Muslims in South Asia: Reflections on Difference, Religion, and Race. Oxford University Press. Eisenstadt, S. (2000). The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of Multiple Modernities. Millennium 29(3), 591–611. Fox, J. (2001). Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations. International Studies Review 3(3), 53–73. Fox, J. (2004). The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945– 2001.  Journal of Peace Research  41(6), 715–731. Fox, J. (2004). Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 Through the New Millennium. Lexington Books. Fox, J. (2018). An Introduction to Religion and Politics: Theory and Practice. Routledge. Fox, J., and Sandler, S. (Eds.). (2004). Bringing Religion into International Relations. Springer. Fukuyama, F. (1989). The End of History? The National Interest 16(0), 3–18. Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Cornell University Press. Gier, N. (2014). The Origins of Religious Violence: An Asian Perspective. Lexington Books. Gorski, P., and Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, G. (2012). Religion, Nationalism, and International Security: Creation Myths and Social Mechanisms. In R. Seiple and D. Hoover (Eds.), Religion and Security: The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Security (pp. 136–147). Routledge. Gorski, P. S., and Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, G. (2013). Religion, Nationalism, and Violence: An Integrated Approach. Annual Review of Sociology 39(1), 193–210. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1146​/annurev​-soc​-071312​-145641.

religion and politics  153 Gould, W. (2011). Religion and Conflict in Modern South Asia. Cambridge University Press. Gross, L. (1948). The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948. American Journal of International Law 42(1), 20–41. Hamayotsu, K. (2002). Islam and Nation Building in Southeast Asia: Malaysia and Indonesia in Comparative Perspective. Pacific Affairs 75(3), 353–375. Hassner, R. (2003). To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts Over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility. Security Studies 12(4), 1–33. Hassner, R. (2006). The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Disputes.  International Security 31(3), 107–138. Hassner, R. (2009). War on Sacred Grounds. Cornell University Press. Haynes, J. (Ed.). (1999). Religion, Globalization and Political Culture in the Third World. Macmillan Press. Haynes, J. (2007). Introduction to International Relations and Religion. Pearson Education. Haynes, J. (2016). Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power. Routledge. Hinnells, J., and King, R. (Eds.). (2007). Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice. Routledge. Hutchinson, J. (2017). Nationalism and War. Oxford University Press. Johnston, D., and Sampson, C. (Eds.). (1994). Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft. Oxford University Press. Juergensmeyer, M. (1993). The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. University of California Press. Juergensmeyer, M. (1996). The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism. Journal of International Affairs 50(1), 1–20. Kaufman, S. (2011). Symbols, Frames, and Violence: Studying Ethnic War in the Philippines. International Studies Quarterly 55(4), 937–958. Khalid, A. (2014). Islam After Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia. University of California Press. Liow, J. (2016). Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. Magcamit, M. (2020). Imagined Insecurities in Imagined Communities: Manufacturing the Ethnoreligious Others as Security

Threats. International Studies Quarterly 64(3), 684–698. Magcamit, M. (2022). Ethnoreligous Otherings and Passionate Conflicts. Oxford University Press. Merdjanova, I. (2000). In Search of Identity: Nationalism and Religion in Eastern Europe. Religion, State & Society 28(3), 233–262. Otis, P. (2004). Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century. In R. Seiple and D. Hoover (Eds.), Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations (pp. 11–24). Rowman and Littlefield. Pemberton, K., and Nijhawan, M. (Eds.). (2009). Shared Idioms, Sacred Symbols, and the Articulation of Identities in South Asia. Routledge. Petito, F., and Hatzopoulos, P. (2003). Religion in International Relations: The Return From Exile. Palgrave Macmillan. Pew Research Center. (2018, June 13). How Religious Commitment Varies by Country Among People of All Ages. Pew Research [Report]. https://www​.pewforum​.org​/2018​ /06​/13​/ how​-religious​- commitment​-varies​ -by​-country​-among​-people​-of​-all​-ages/. Philpott, D. (2002). The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations. World Politics 55(1), 66–95. Philpott, D. (2003). Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State. Michigan Journal of International Law 25(4), 981–998. Reid, A. (2010). Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. Riaz, A. (Ed.). (2010). Religion and Politics in South Asia. Routledge. Rieffer, B. (2003). Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship. Ethnicities  3(2), 215–242. Sahliyeh, E. (Ed.). (1990). Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World. SUNY Press. Searle, P. (2002). Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Rise or Decline? Recent Developments in Southeast Asia. Contemporary Southeast Asia 24(1), 1–11. Seiple, C., Hoover, D., and Otis, P. (Eds.). (2012). The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Security. Routledge. Shani, G. (2014). Religion, Identity and Human Security. Routledge. michael i. magcamit

154  encyclopedia of asian politics Shani, G., and Kibe, T. (Eds.). (2019). Religion and Nationalism in Asia. Routledge. Smith, A. (1988). The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Blackwell. Smith, A. (1996). Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism. International Affairs 72(3), 445–458. Smith, A. (1998). Nationalism and Modernism. Routledge. Smith, A. (2003). Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity. Oxford University Press. Smith, D. (1970). Religion and Political Development. Little, Brown & Co. Smith, D. (2015). South Asian Politics and Religion. Princeton University Press. Svensson, I., and Harding, E. (2011). How Holy Wars End: Exploring the Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions in Asia. Terrorism and Political Violence 23(2), 133–149. Tambiah, S. (1997). Levelling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia. University of California Press. Thomas, S. (2000). Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Society. Millenniums 29(3), 815–841. Thomas, S. (2005). The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century. Springer. Ting, R., and Sundararajan, L. (2017). Culture, Cognition, and Emotion in China’s Religious Ethnic Minorities: Voices of Suffering Among the Yi. Palgrave Macmillan. Toft, M. (2007). Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War. International Security 31(4), 97–131.

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Toft, M. (2010).  The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory. Princeton University Press. Toft, M. D., Philpott, D., and Shah, T. S. (2011). God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics. WW Norton & Company. Tripathi, R. C., and Singh, P. (Eds.). (2016). Perspectives on Violence and Othering in India. Springer. Wellman, J., Jr., and Lombardi, C. (Eds.). (2012). Religion and Human Security: A Global Perspective. Oxford University Press. Wimmer, A., and Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation–State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences. Global Networks 2(4), 301–334. World Values Survey. (2020, November 4). World Values Survey Wave 7: 2017–2020. World Values [Online Data Analysis]. ht t p://w w w​ .worldva luessu r vey​ . org ​ / WVSOnline​.jsp.

Key resources Petito, F., and Hatzopoulos, P. (2003). Religion in International Relations: The Return From Exile. Palgrave Macmillan. Shani, G. (2014). Religion, Identity and Human Security. Routledge. Wellman, J., Jr., and Lombardi, C. (Eds.). (2012). Religion and Human Security: A Global Perspective. Oxford University Press. In Asia Ahmed, I. (2011). The Politics of Religion in South and Southeast Asia. Routledge. Liow, J. (2016). Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. Shani, G., and Kibe, T. (Eds.). (2019). Religion and Nationalism in Asia. Routledge.

28. Social movements A. The concept Social movements can be defined as a loosely organized but sustained effort by a large group of people to achieve a goal (Scott & Marshall, 2009). Social movements are thought to begin as a condition of unrest, driven by dissatisfaction with the current form of life, as well as wishes for a new scheme or system of living (Blummer, 1971, p. 99). People that participate in social movements share a common outlook on society and are willing to have a long-term, although loose, involvement in the cause that unites them (Killian, Turner, & Smelser, 2020). The study of social movements is a relatively new academic endeavor (Aslanidis, 2012).1 In the 1960s, academics started to explain social movements as part of collective action theories, indicating the purposeful nature of this form of collective behavior. In the 1970s, sociologists created a typology of social movements, examining their scope, type of change, method of work, range, and time frame. In the 1980s and 1990s, Western political scientists developed theories highlighting the relationship between popular movements and the formation of political systems, such as the transition to democracy and the formation of new political parties (Pugh, 2008). Examples of social movements are the following: ●

●

Between 1945 and 1957, the post–World War II period led to significant social movements in the Southeast Asian British colonies, such as Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore.2 Anderson (1998) argues that these social movements culminated in the independence of the British colonies, as the post-war period brought together working-class movements with the emerging nationalist movement leading to the independence process. The independence movements prompted a quick and innovative response regarding empirical and theoretical analysis of social movements, lending to the proliferation of a range of social movement theories (Ford, 2013). The United States civil rights movement was a non-violent social and political movement and campaign from

●

1954 to 1968, after the end of Jim Crow policies (Arsenault, 2006). The civil rights movement aimed to abolish legalized institutional racial segregation, discrimination, and disenfranchisement of African Americans (Tyson, 1998). The climate movement is a more recent global social movement focused on pressuring governments and industry to address the causes and impacts of climate change (Hadden, 2015, p. 2).

B. The landscape After the internet revolution of the 1990s, social movements have benefitted from the use of digital technologies and the internet, such as social media, listservs, blogs, and e-petitions, among others to mobilize people globally (Buettner & Buettner, 2016). Castells (2004) coined the term “Networked Social Movements” to distinguish modern movements from earlier periods. He argues that many social movements have adopted the use of the internet as part of their campaigns for change for three reasons. First, these movements are mobilized around cultural values. Second, they are ad hoc movements and seek to change public opinion and not state power. Third, movements have become globalized. Part of Castells’ argument regarding a networked society is that it consists of networked individualism, which means networks built around an individual’s interests, values, affinities, and projects. The internet became the perfect tool for the expansion of social movements. Since the 1990s, the use of new technologies is a common theme among successful movements (Obar, Zube, & Lampe, 2012, p. 1). Research conducted by Obar et al. (2012) showed how advocacy organizations linked to social movements used social media to facilitate civic engagement and collective action across the world. An example of a recent social movement that is referred to by its hashtag is The Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement that began in Zuccotti Park, located in New York City’s Wall Street financial district in September 2011. The movement created a hashtag (#OccupyWallStreet) to help participants organize their involvement in the protest movement. The hashtag allowed the OWS movement to expand throughout the world. It now continues as a global movement against economic inequality and the influence of money in politics (Kavada, 2015, p. 872).

155

156  encyclopedia of asian politics Similarly, #MeToo became a digital social movement against sexual abuse, sexual harassment, and rape culture, in which people publicize their experiences of sexual abuse or sexual harassment. The phrase “Me Too” was initially used in this context on social media in 2006, on MySpace, by sexual assault survivor and activist Tarana Burke (Strause, 2018). The Myanmar Spring Revolution, starting on 2 February 2021, led to the mobilization of healthcare workers and civil servants across the country in the form of a national civil disobedience movement in opposition to the coup d’état that took place on 1 February of the same year. Through a Facebook campaign group dubbed the “Civil Disobedience Movement” (The Myanmar Times, 2021), participants were able to mobilize 230,000 followers in a couple of days. This campaign was expanded to adopt wider anti-coup demonstrations that lobbied the million civil servants in the country to follow a “no recognition, no participation” stance toward the military-led government. Although weakened by military-led mass human rights violations, in 2023, this social movement continues to resist the military dictatorship. The Myanmar example falls within the examples provided by Anugrah (2014) where citizens form a social movement to defend democratization against the pressure of authoritarianism in Southeast Asia.3

C. Future research This brief piece provides an example of the exciting field of research that social movements provide to the academic world. Future research on social movements requires an interdisciplinary approach that is broad in scope, including solid empirical research that allows for an overview of the dynamics of social movements, as well as suggestions on how to move forward theoretical understanding of the juxtaposition of technology and social movements. Mariana Cifuentes

Notes 1. Jerkins (1983) explains that before the 1960s, three theories – mass society theory, collective behavior, and relative deprivation – were used to explain social mobilization by focusing on psychological and affective factors, where some sort of rare increase in individual grievances led to social strain and transitory instances of irrational behavior at a mass level (Jenkins, 1983).

mariana cifuentes

2.

3.

These social movements brought together actors across class boundaries – including women, students, ethnic minorities, migrants, or peasants – in countries such as Burma/Myanmar, French Indochina, Indonesia (with the third largest Communist Party outside of the Soviet Union and China), and Cambodia (Anderson, 1998, pp. 7–8). Anugrah (2014) also quotes the work of Michele Ford (2013) and her overview of the major theoretical approaches to studying social activism (social movement, civil society, and democratization) and their relevance in the Southeast Asian context. More specifically, Ford’s body of work in Southeast Asia points out theoretical approaches commonly used in studying social activism and civil society across the region, such as resource mobilization theory, new social movement theory and theories on civil society mobilization in the context of democratization.

References Anderson, B. (1998). The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World. Verson. Anugrah, I. (2014). Social Movements in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 33(2), 125–137. Arsenault, R. (2006). Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice. Oxford University Press. Aslanidis, P. (2012). Occupy Populism: Social Movements of the Great Recession in Comparative Perspective [Unpublished Doctoral Thesis]. University of Macedonia. Blummer, H. (1971). Collective Behavior. In Principles of Sociology (pp. 65–122). Barnes and Noble, Inc. Buettner, R., and Buettner, K. (2016). A Systematic Literature Review of Twitter Research From a Socio-Political Revolution Perspective. 49th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Science. Kauai, Hawaii: IEEE. Castells, M. (2004). The Network Society: A Cross-cultural Perspective. Edward Elgar Pub. https://doi​.org​/10​.4337​/9781845421663. Ford, M. (2013). Social Activism in Southeast Asia. Routledge. Hadden, J. (2015). Networks in Contention: The Divisive Politics of Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. Jenkins, C. (1983). Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 9, 527–553. Kavada, A. (2015). Creating the Collective: Social Media, the Occupy Movement and Its Constitution as a Collective Actor.

social movements  157 Information, Communication & Society, 18, 872–886. Killian, L., Turner, R., and Smelser, N. (2020, November 19). Retrieved August 2, 2022, from https://www​.britannica​.com​/topic​/ social​-movement. Obar, J., Zube, P., and Lampe, C. (2012). Advocacy 2.0: An Analysis of How Advocacy Groups in the United States Perceive and Use Social Media as Tools for Facilitating Civic Engagement and Collective Action. Journal of Information Policy, 2, 1–25. Pugh, J. (2008). Vectors of Contestation: Social Movements and Party Systems in Ecuador and Colombia. Latin American Essays, XXI, 46–65. Scott, J., and Marshall, G. (2009). Social Movements. In A Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford University Press. Strause, J. (2018, October 12). Tarana Burke Responds to Asia Argento Report: There Is No Model Survivor. The Hollywood Reporter. The Myanmar Times. (2021, February 2). Nay Pyi Taw, Mandalay Healthcare Staff to Join “Civil Disobedience Campaign”. The Myanmar Times.

Tyson, T., and Williams, R. F. (1998). ‘Black Power,’ and the Roots of the African American Freedom Struggle. Journal of American History, 85, 540–570.

Key resources Della Porta, D., and Diani, M. (1999). Social Movements. In The SAGE Handbook of Political Science. Sage. Tilly, C. (2004). Social Movements, 1768– 2004. Paradigm Publishers. Touraine, A. (1985). An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements. Social Research, 749–787. In Asia Aspinall, E., and Weiss, M. (2012). The Limits of Civil Society: Social Movements and Political Parties in Southeast Asia. In Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics. Routledge. Ford, M. (2013). Social Activism in Southeast Asia. Routledge. Liu, Y. (2015). Tweeting, Re-Tweeting, and Commenting: Microblogging and Social Movements in China. Asian Journal of Communication, 25(6), 567–583.

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29. Terrorism

also suffers from “stretching” and “traveling” problems. Writers’ views are influenced by their physical and social distance from the phenomenon. This has in turn produced terms such as “narco-terrorism” and “cyberA. The concept terrorism” which rarely involve violence or Terrorism is a form of political violence the threat of it (Weinberg et al., 2004). whose very definition is contested. The Despite the lack of a commonly accepted field of terrorism studies is characterized definition, there are core areas of agreement on by endless definitional debates. Schmid and the key characteristics of terrorism. Terrorism Jongman (1988), for instance, compiled more is viewed as the use of violence or the threat of than 100 definitions of terrorism in the litera- violence against targets (the victims) to induce ture that only included those that had been behavior or influence the main targets (the written up to the late 1980s. While this debate audience). As a form of political violence, the has many facets and has been going on since execution of terrorism depends on the elements the 1970s, Weinberg et  al. (2004) summa- of concealment, surprise, stealth, conspiracy, rize three major elements of the definitional and deception. The act itself communicates a debate on terrorism. First are the political future threat to people who identify with the connotations of using the term. On the one victims of the violence. The choice of the act, hand, states faced with the threat of their the timing, and the type of victims are meant monopoly of violence use the label “terrorist” to shock, frighten, and outrage. What makes to describe challengers. On the other hand, it effective is the psychological impact of the groups and states that support these groups violence, making it attractive for those not reject the term and prefer to call their actions in power (Crenshaw, 2011). Oftentimes it is “revolutionary warfare”, “national liberation”, viewed as a “weapon of the weak”, as many of or “holy war”. These disagreements are aptly its perpetrators do not have strong social supsummarized in the phrase “one man’s ter- port and have scarce resources. The majority rorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. The of the victims are civilians, as they increase political debate also extends to which types the impact of the violence on target audiences of actors can use terrorism as a political tool. (Lutz & Lutz, 2010). The tactics used in terrorWhile terrorists are oftentimes portrayed ism have the end goal of causing hurt to terrorby both academics and the media as challeng- ize an audience and these tend to be clandestine ers of the state, the roots of the term “terror- in the planning and execution because terrorist ism” go back to an episode of state repression groups suffer a basic constraint, which is the during the Reign of Terror in the French lack of territory, and are oftentimes too weak Revolution. Despite terrorism by non-state to mount a guerrilla insurgency from a territoactors being at the forefront of media attention, rial base. Groups have the propensity to mount some researchers argue that state terrorism is spectacular acts of violence because if it is more prevalent, more deadly, and more diffi- seen as effective, then it may expand its base cult to prevent. They point out that the state is of support and/or obtain concessions from the central to terrorism both as a perpetrator and state. But since the French Revolution, the as a target, even if most academic research term has taken a more pejorative turn, with has focused on non-state perpetrators (see, the word being used with a negative connotafor instance, McConaghy, 2017). However, tion and applied to one’s enemies (Hoffman, major databases, such as the Global Terrorism 2006). Database, define terrorism as acts of non-state In Asia, the threat and implications of teractors (START, 2022). Supporters of this rorism are persistent and enduring but also view argue that while state terrorism exists, show variations across different parts of the it is a different kind of terrorism from that of region (Tan, 2018). In Southeast Asia, ternon-state actors, differing for instance in the rorism is closely linked with transition, ecokinds of tactics that they use, such as bomb- nomic growth, and instability. In South Asia, ings. Second, as a concept, terrorism suffers the specter of it looms large while in Central from “border” and “membership” problems. Asia, the role of Russia and former Soviet There is considerable debate on where terror- states is paramount. East Asia, on the other ism stops and where other forms of political hand, has shown a lack of sustained terrorism violence, such as insurgencies and guerrilla against the state. The role of religious extremwarfare, start. Third, terrorism as a concept ism in Asia, particularly Islam, is important. 158

terrorism  159 Terrorism in the region is also intertwined with other forms of political violence, such as civil wars and insurgencies. The September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States and the subsequent War on Terror have also shaped security narratives in the region (Mustapha, 2019). South Asia, particularly Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India, is a hotbed for various forms of extremism that involve indiscriminate violence with strong religious overtones. With the weakening of Al Qaeda, the Islamic State was instrumental in bringing terrorism as an important security threat again in areas such as South and Southeast Asia (D’Souza, 2017). Asia also provides a good example for examining different kinds of linkages between terrorism, organized crime, and the state. In Central Asia for instance, numerous examples can be found of ties between nonstate violent actors, including terrorist groups and criminal gangs (Lewis, 2014).

B. The landscape From its origins 40 years ago as an obscure subject in the social sciences, the study of terrorism has become a full-fledged field (Crenshaw, 2014). While it has been researched since the 1970s, research on terrorism gained more prominence after 9/11. Currently, 160 databases and datasets cover terrorism, although they also cover broader forms of political violence (Bowie, 2021). Keeping up with the literature on terrorism is a challenge, given the explosion of publications on the topic. In one listing, Schmid et al. (2021) note that Amazon​.c​om alone has over 40,000 books on terrorism while the research community website Academia​.e​du provides access to over 270,000 papers on terrorism. There are several strands of current research in terrorism studies. The first strand is those that examine terrorism as a strategy and includes vigorous debates on the causes of terrorism. These include an examination of the role of state capacity, in this case, military capacity and administrative power, in explaining the rise in terrorism in developing states (see Hendrix & Young, 2014) as well as the question of how types of political systems shape terrorist activity. Lutz and Lutz (2010) for instance examine the question of whether democratic political systems provide greater opportunities for terrorist groups and create an environment where terrorist networks can operate easily. There are also studies about how

effective terrorism is, although there is considerable variation in terms of case selection and standards for the measure of effectiveness (Krause, 2013). Second are the studies that look at state responses to terrorism, including national counter-terrorism policies, measures used by police and military forces, and how these measures meet the goal of reducing terrorism. There has been a lot of attention in terms of how indicator-based approaches to terrorism have the potential to create systematic discrimination through pre-emptive surveillance regimes, even if the intentions were non-discriminatory (Monaghan & Molnar, 2016). Third are the sets of studies that look at how terrorism ends, including whether the end of terrorism is due to government counterterrorism efforts or that terrorism rises and falls in waves (Rapoport, 2016). Lastly are the type of studies that examine terrorism within broader theoretical frameworks, such as organizational theory or social movement theory (see Shapiro, 2013). Of late, there has been a lot of attention to transnational jihadism as a particular type of conflict, as a distinct form of organization, and as an ideology with specific content (see Sheikh & Krause, 2022). The influence and links of terrorist groups in one part of Asia to groups from other parts of the region are important for research in Asia. Scholars look at the re-emergence of terrorism in Asia as a by-product of the rise of the Islamic State. There are several studies on the links between groups in Southeast Asia such as Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayaf Group and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Smith, 2015). The return of terrorism as a major security threat is also seen as compounding the existing security challenges in Asia, such as rebellion and ethnic-nationalist insurgencies. Because terrorism is oftentimes intertwined with insurgencies, attention has also been paid to how states conduct counterterrorist and counter-insurgency operations (see Schreer & Tan, 2019; Tan, 2018). While the literature on political violence oftentimes explores civil wars and terrorism separately, there are studies in Asia that look at them as one continuum of intrastate conflict. Ghatak (2018), for instance, looks at how guerrilla warfare is undertaken by rebel groups that have greater support bases in weak states while terrorism is a choice undertaken mostly in places where social support is weak and the state is relatively strong. juhn chris p. espia

160  encyclopedia of asian politics A major source of debate is why individuals choose to join and support extremist groups in Asia, despite the generally negative picture of them in the mainstream public consciousness. Some studies examine the role of social bonds, kinship ties, teacher–student ties, and online relationships that are strong predictors for joining and support among Muslim and non-Muslim countries (see Hwang, 2018). Education has also been seen as promoting domestic terrorism in Asia, with empirical evidence from terrorist attacks since the 1970s showing terrorist attacks involving well-educated individuals while enrolment rates show a positive correlation with the rise in domestic terrorism (Hou, 2022). The role of social media platforms in creating an online environment that has allowed groups to transcend geographic and political boundaries and traditional mechanisms of state authority has also been examined. Research has focused on how groups have used social media for financing and planning terrorist operations, distributing propaganda, attracting recruits to their cause, providing training, and networking with other terrorist organizations (see Droogan et al., 2018).

C. Future research There has been an ongoing criticism that much of the research on terrorism is focused on jihadism and is too strongly tied to government-driven counter-terrorism research agendas. While these topics are interesting in themselves, this has also led to the neglect of other areas and topics, such as right-wing and left-wing extremism, and state terrorism (Schuurman, 2019). In Asia, despite the persistence of terrorism associated with Islamic extremist groups, scant attention has been paid to the role of left-wing extremism and state terrorism. There is also a need to systematically examine the changing character of conflict and political violence within states (see D’Souza, 2017) given how intertwined terrorism is with other forms of political violence in Asia. There has been a strong call as well for terrorism studies to draw from a more bottom-up approach in generating topics for research, as opposed to those largely driven by national governments and foreign government interests. Additionally, the literature on the education–terrorism nexus in Asia remains scarce, as well as gender’s place in juhn chris p. espia

terrorism. The latter point is quite significant, as the enduring image of a terrorist is male, despite women’s significant roles in terrorism movements (see Banks, 2019). Radicalization is an ongoing and persistent threat in many parts of Asia, especially with the increasing online access in the region. However, online and offline radicalization dynamics remain a key research gap. This needs to be addressed by primary empirical research as well as research that integrates both social theories and advanced computational methods (see Smith et al., 2022). Juhn Chris P. Espia

References Banks, C. (2019). Introduction: Women, gender, and terrorism: Gendering terrorism. Women & Criminal Justice, 29(4–5), 181–187. Bowie, N. G. (2021). 40  terrorism databases and data sets: A new inventory. Perspectives on Terrorism (Lowell), 15(2), 147–161. Crenshaw, M. (2014). Terrorism research: The record. International Interactions, 40(4), 556–567. Droogan, J., Waldek, L., & Blackhall, R. (2018). Innovation and terror: An analysis of the use of social media by terrorrelated groups in the Asia pacific. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 13(2), 170–184. D’Souza, S. M. (2017). Countering insurgencies, terrorism and violent extremism in south Asia. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 28(1), 1–11. Ghatak, S. (2018). The role of political exclusion and state capacity in civil conflict in South Asia. Terrorism and Political Violence, 30(1), 74–96. Hendrix, C. S., & Young, J. K. (2014). State capacity and terrorism: A two-dimensional approach. Security Studies, 23(2), 329–363. Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. Columbia University Press. Hou, D. (2022). The impact of education on domestic terrorism in Asia: A control function approach. Defence and Peace Economics, 33(7), 857–875. Hwang, J. C. (2018). Pathways into terrorism: Understanding entry into and support for terrorism in Asia. Terrorism and Political Violence, 30(6), 883–889. Krause, P. (2013). The political effectiveness of non-state violence: A two-level

terrorism  161 framework to transform a deceptive debate. Security Studies, 22(2), 259–294. Lewis, D. (2014). Crime, terror and the state in Central Asia. Global Crime, 15(3–4), 337–356. Lutz, J. M., & Lutz, B. J. (2010). Democracy and terrorism. Perspectives on Terrorism, 4(1), 63–74. McConaghy, K. (2017). Terrorism and the state: Intra-state dynamics and the response to non-state political violence. Palgrave Macmillan UK. Monaghan, J., & Molnar, A. (2016). Radicalisation theories, policing practices, and “the future of terrorism?” Critical Studies on Terrorism, 9(3), 393–413. Mustapha, J. (2019). Writing Southeast Asian security: Regional security and the war on terror after 9/11. Routledge. Rapoport, D. (2016). It is waves, not strains. Terrorism and Political Violence, 28(2), 217–224. Schmid, A. P., Forest, J. J. F., & Lowe, T. (2021). Terrorism studies: A glimpse at the current state of research (2020/2021). Perspectives on Terrorism (Lowell), 15(3), 142–152. Schmid, A. P., & Jongman, A. (1988). Political terrorism. Transaction Publishers. Schreer, B., & Tan, A. T. (Eds.). (2019). Terrorism and insurgency in Asia: A contemporary examination of terrorist and separatist movements. Routledge. Schuurman, B. (2019). Topics in terrorism research: Reviewing trends and gaps, 2007–2016. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 12(3), 463–480. Shapiro, J. N. (2013). The terrorist’s dilemma: Managing violent covert organizations. Princeton University Press. Sheikh, M. K., & Krause, D. (2022). Transnational jihadism: Conflict to be resolved, a movement to implode or an ideology to be countered? Perspectives on Terrorism (Lowell), 16(1), 2–11. Smith, C., Resnyansky, L., & Taylor, C. (2022). Radicalization in the Asia-pacific

region: Themes and concepts. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2022.2034232. Smith, S. (2015). Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The case of the Abu Sayyaf group and Jemaah Islamiyah. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism). (2022). Global terrorism database 1970– 2020 [Overview of the GTD]. https://www​ .start​.umd​.edu​/gtd. Tan, A. T. H. (2018). Evaluating counterterrorism strategies in Asia. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 13(2), 155–169. Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & HirschHoefler, S. (2004). The challenges of conceptualizing terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(4), 777–794.

Key resources Key references on the concept Crenshaw, M. (2011). Explaining terrorism: Causes, processes, and consequences. New York: Routledge. Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism). (2022). Global terrorism database 1970– 2020. https://www​.start​.umd​.edu​/gtd. In Asia Gunaratna, R., & Kam, S. (Eds.). (2016). Handbook of terrorism in the Asia-Pacific. London: Imperial College Press. Schreer, B., & Tan, A. T. H. (Eds.). (2019). Terrorism and insurgency in Asia: A contemporary examination of terrorist and separatist movements. New York: Routledge. Smith, P. (Ed.). (2015). Terrorism and violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational challenges to states and regional stability. Abingdon: Routledge.

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PART III REGIONS

30. Northeast Asia A. The concept Northeast Asia is a dynamic and diverse region encompassing some of the world’s most prosperous economies, ancient cultures, and cutting-edge technologies. The region is home to five nations, each with its unique identity, politics, and economy: China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan. Although these countries share some historical and cultural ties, they have evolved differently over time and exhibit contrasting economic and political systems. China, the world’s most populous country, is a socialist republic governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP hereafter). In contrast, Japan is a constitutional democratic monarchy with a parliamentary system of government, and South Korea is a democratic republic. North Korea, on the other hand, is a communist state with a highly centralized economy controlled by the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). Taiwan is a democratic country that faces political challenges related to its relationship with China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory. Each of these countries has its economic strengths and challenges. China has emerged as a global superpower with the secondlargest economy in the world, valued at over $14.14 trillion. Japan is the world’s third-largest economy and is known for its advanced technology, particularly in the fields of electronics and robotics, as well as its automobile industry. South Korea, the “Miracle on the Han River,” has experienced significant economic growth in recent decades, known for its high-tech industries such as semiconductors and telecommunications. In contrast, North Korea faces substantial economic challenges, including widespread poverty, food shortages, and limited resource access. Taiwan, with a population of around 24 million people, is an industrialized economy valued at over $634 billion in GDP, with a strong focus on technology and exports. Taiwan is known for its high-tech industry, particularly semiconductors, and is a major player in the global supply chain. While Taiwan has achieved significant economic prosperity, it grapples with political obstacles arising from its relationship with China. China asserts sovereignty over Taiwan and considers it an integral part of its territory.

Despite being characterized by distinctive features among its constituent countries, Northeast Asia remains a vital and interdependent region within the global community. This region’s economic growth and technological progress continue to shape global markets, while its cultural and historical legacy furnishes a rich context for regional and international diplomacy. Therefore, a thorough comprehension of Northeast Asia is indispensable for anyone concerned with global affairs. Consequently, this chapter aims to present three significant themes that are integral to research on Northeast Asian countries: (1) democratization and democratic consolidation, (2) Chinese politics, and (3) public opinion.

B. The landscape South Korea South Korea’s successful democratization is often cited as a model for other countries in Asia and beyond. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the country was ruled by a series of military dictatorships that suppressed political opposition and civil society. However, starting in the late 1980s, South Korea underwent a process of democratization, leading to the establishment of multi-party democracy in the early 1990s. The successful democratization of South Korea can be attributed to several factors, as identified by scholars. These factors include economic development, civil society mobilization, and international support. In particular, civil society organizations and social movements played a crucial role in facilitating South Korea’s democratization. While traditional literature on civil society and democratization often assumes a tension between civic organizations and the nation, Howe (2022) challenges this argument and posits that civic organizations are productive partners of the state in South Korea, working toward a common goal of democratic consolidation. Furthermore, overseas support played a significant role in driving South Korea’s democratization. Research has shown that transnational information exchange networks in Japan and the US collaborating with Korean Christians were critical in organizing and mobilizing social movements for democratization in South Korea (Lee, 2014). These factors demonstrate the complexity of the democratization process and highlight

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164  encyclopedia of asian politics the importance of diverse actors and influences in driving democratic change. The success of South Korea’s democratization underscores the role of civil society and external support in promoting democratic consolidation and the potential for partnerships between civil society organizations and the state in promoting democratic values and institutions. Taiwan Taiwan’s democratization stands out as a success story in the Asian region. For several decades, Taiwan was under the authoritarian rule of the Kuomintang (KMT) party, which monopolized political power. However, starting in the 1980s, Taiwan embarked on a gradual democratization process, ultimately culminating in establishing a multi-party democracy in the early 1990s (Chu & Lin, 2001). Tien and Chu (1996) underscore the pivotal role played by the 1992 Legislative Yuan election in Taiwan’s democratization process. The democratization of Taiwan can be attributed to several factors, including the impact of the country’s economic development, which facilitated the emergence of a robust middle class that demanded greater political freedom (Schafferer, 2020). The influence of China, with its communist and authoritarian regime, also played a role, as Taiwanese political elites and citizens became more supportive of democracy in the face of China’s shadow (Niou, 2008). Research examining the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy, based on survey data from 1996 to 2012, shows that Taiwanese citizens generally hold a positive view of the Taiwanese regime. Party affiliations among the public have gradually increased, while levels of polarization within the party system have remained consistently low (McAllister, 2016). Taiwan’s successful democratization process has important implications for other countries in the region. It underscores the role of economic development in nurturing democratic values and the importance of external factors, such as the influence of a nearby authoritarian state, in motivating the consolidation of democratic regimes. These insights may prove useful for policymakers seeking to promote democracy in other parts of Asia and beyond. Furthermore, Taiwan’s democratic consolidation demonstrates the resilience of democratic institutions and the ability of democratic transitions to be successful, even in the face of challenging circumstances.

Chinese politics Communist system in China

The Chinese Communist system is a socialist state with a one-party system. Despite the existence of multiple political parties in China, “the only one that matters is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)” (Saich, 2011). The CCP has ruled the country since 1949 when it established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the Chinese civil war. In principle, the apex of the Chinese political hierarchy is occupied by the National Party Congress, which assumes the role of the Congress in its absence. Nevertheless, actual power is vested in the Political Bureau, also known as the Politburo, its Standing Committee, and the Secretariat within the CCP (Saich, 2011). This concentration of power reflects the centralized nature of Chinese politics, which is characterized by a small group of top leaders wielding significant decision-making authority. Personal power and relationships with influential individuals remain critical factors in the CCP system. Although some experts have suggested that political reforms might lead to greater institutionalization (Guthrie, 2001), others maintain that guanxi, or personal networks, continue to play a significant role. This view is supported by the work of scholars such as Nathan and Tsai (1995) and Nathan (1973). Personal networks nurture patron–client ties, a social relationship between two individuals or groups where the patron provides the client benefits, resources, or protection in exchange for loyalty, support, or other forms of reciprocal actions. Patron–client ties then contribute to the formation of factions within the CCP. Due to a factions-friendly political environment in China, informal politics prevail (Dittmer, 1995; Dittmer & Yu, 2010). Economic reform and development

China’s economic reform and development are one of the most remarkable stories of the 20th and 21st centuries. China has transformed from a poor, agrarian economy to a global economic superpower in the past four decades. This transformation has been driven by a series of economic reforms initiated by the Chinese government in the late 1970s. These reforms were aimed at modernizing China’s economy, increasing productivity, and improving living standards for the Chinese people.

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northeast asia  165 One of the key features of China’s economic reform was the introduction of market-oriented policies that encouraged private enterprise and foreign investment in 1978. The Chinese government also allowed stateowned enterprises to operate more independently and introduced measures to liberalize trade and open up the country’s economy to the world. Two scholarly debates emerged over China’s economic transformation and development. First, scholars debated whether China’s gradualist strategy for change was preferable to the shock therapy attempted in Russia. The second debate was on whether a Chinese model of development exists – or the “Beijing Consensus,” a notion first described by Joshua Cooper Ramo (Moak, 2017). China’s gradual and measured approach to reform has garnered praise from numerous observers, especially compared to the reforms carried out in Russia. As a result, many experts view it as a sensible and effective strategy for navigating the challenges of transitioning to a market-oriented economy (Rawski, 1999; Naughton, 2007). Some, however, argue that the kick-start for the reforms was hardly gradual – the collective structures in the countryside were almost completely dismantled, and the focus was on household-based farming (Saich, 2011). Some scholars argue that China’s economic development model is not necessarily better than the Russian model because they found that China’s success has come in areas where economic reforms have been most radical (Sachs et al., 1994). So, given its particularity, China’s model is not necessarily a model for other transitional economies. The power rivalry between China and the US

Realism, a predominant paradigm in international relations, emphasizes the significance of power in shaping the actions of nations. Realists argue that the United States and China are engaged in a vivid competition for global influence and dominance, with each nation striving to maximize its military and economic capabilities while safeguarding its national interests. From this perspective, competition between the United States and China is inevitable and may result in conflict if their interests collide. John Mearsheimer (2014) contends that China’s rise will inevitably challenge America’s global leadership. Therefore, the United States must work

towards restricting China’s ascension and enhancing its own power. The present-day policy of the United States towards China, including its technology war, reflects this strategic approach. The crux of the technology war is a rivalry between the two superpowers vying for supremacy in the worldwide technological arena and fortifying their standing as leaders in critical domains such as advanced chips, 5G, and AI. As per Sun’s analysis in 2019, the United States’ endeavors in the technology war against China comprise of trade sanctions, investment regulation, export control, and limitations on exchanging technological expertise. Such measures are poised to further damage the security relationship between China and the United States and their science and technology collaboration and destabilize the regional situation and global science and technology governance (Sun, 2019). Overall, the tech war between the US and China is a complex and rapidly evolving issue with significant implications for the global technology landscape and these two superpowers’ power competition. As the two superpowers continue to compete for dominance in key areas such as advanced chips, 5G, and AI, it remains to be seen which side will emerge victorious. Public opinion research in Northeast Asia Public opinion is an increasingly popular topic in political science. Scholars have extensively explored factors impacting public opinion about public policy. Public opinion about foreign policy, for example, alliance commitments (Michael Tomz, Weeks, & Yarhi-Milo, 2020), a country’s human rights record (Michael Tomz & Weeks, 2020), and peer opinions (Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017), can impact people’s support for foreign intervention. While much public opinion research is based on Western samples, such as US, UK, and Canadian samples, scholars have started investigating public opinion in Northeast Asia to develop new theories or test the generalizability of existing theories. Public opinion research in the context of voting and election in the case of South Korea finds that political corruption has a different impact on different types of voters and their voting behavior. According to Choi (2019), the perception of political corruption is generally negatively associated with voter turnout (the nonvoting argument). People

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166  encyclopedia of asian politics with higher education may tend to vote for the opposite party as a way to punish the candidate involved in a political corruption scandal. Wang’s research on Taiwanese voters reveals the polarization dynamics among them. According to his findings, before 2008, the growing polarization among partisans was caused by the shift of pan-green voters towards independence. From 2008 to 2014, the reduction in polarization was due to moderate voters identifying themselves as panblue supporters. However, since 2014, many nonpartisans have departed from the panblue faction. The increased participation of highly extreme pan-blue voters has led to a resurgence of polarization among partisans (Wang, 2019). Due to their improved economic opportunities, studies of immigrants are an important topic in numerous Northeast Asian societies as they draw in workers or migrants from less-developed regions. Regarding research on South Koreans’ political attitudes toward migrants, a study finds that South Koreans’ anti-immigration attitudes can be reduced by increasing their ethnocultural views of Korean identity (Chang, 2019). South Koreans’ attitudes toward North Korea are another popular research topic in public opinion research in South Korea. Research finds that South Koreans with high ethnic factors are less likely to support national reunification, while those with higher civic factors are more likely to support this policy (Suh, 2017). Taiwanese political attitudes are also a popular topic in Taiwanese studies. One study based on Taiwan’s sample finds that violence can change one’s political attitudes. Specifically, Taiwanese people with direct or indirect political violence experiences tend not to support unification with mainland China and are less likely to support the Kuomintang Party (Chiou & Hong, 2021).

C. Future research This chapter introduces critical research and many topics in the studies of comparative politics in East Asia. Nevertheless, there are a few noteworthy points for future research. Although many scholars have been investigating the democratization and democratic consolidation of South Korea and Taiwan, there has been relatively little focus on a developing trend – democracy backsliding. Additionally,

research is scarce on how Chinese President Xi Jinping’s individual attributes influence Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, to improve our understanding of democratic backsliding in Northeast Asia and the shifting landscape of Chinese elite politics, it is essential to incorporate the latest information and data. We can more accurately capture and analyze these complex phenomena by utilizing modern computational techniques. These advanced methods can help us identify patterns and trends that may not be apparent through traditional research methods. Furthermore, the use of cutting-edge technologies enables us to gather and process vast amounts of information efficiently, providing us with a more comprehensive view of the political landscape in the region. Hsuan-Yu Lin, Charles K. S. Wu and Yao-Yuan Yeh

References Chang, H. I. (2019). Public Attitudes Toward Immigration Policies in South Korea. Asian Journal of Political Science, 27 (2), 190–210. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/02185377​ .2019​.1594322. Chiou, F., and Hong, J. Y. (2021). The LongTerm Effects of State Repression on Political Behavior and Attitudes: Evidence From Taiwan. Journal of East Asian Studies, 21 (3), 427–448. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1017​/jea​.2021​.24. Choi, E. (2019). Perceptions of Political Corruption and Voting Behavior in South Korea. International Studies Review, 20 (2), 1–27. https://doi​.org​/10​.1163​/2667078X​ -02002001. Chu, Y., and Lin, J. (2001). Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity. The China Quarterly (London), 165, 102–129. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0009443901000067. Dittmer, L. (1995). Chinese Informal Politics. The China Journal (Canberra, A.C.T.), 34, 1–34. https://doi​.org​/10​.2307​/2950131. Dittmer, L., and Yu, G. T. (2010). China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic. Guthrie, D. (2001). Dragon in a Three-Piece Suit: The Emergence of Capitalism in China. Princeton University Press.

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northeast asia  167 Howe, B. (2022). Civil Society and Democratization in South Korea. Springer International Publishing. Kertzer, J. D., and Zeitzoff, T. (2017). A Bottom-Up Theory of Public Opinion About Foreign Policy. American Journal of Political Science, 61 (3), 543–558. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1111​/ajps​.12314. Lee, M. (2014). South Korea’s Democratization Movement of the 1970s and 80s and Communicative Interaction in Transnational Ecumenical Networks. International Journal of Korean History, 19 (2), 241–270. https://doi​.org​/10​.22372​/ ijkh​.2014​.19​.2​.241. McAllister, I. (2016). Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan in Comparative Perspective. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 1 (1), 44–61. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1177​/2057891115620683. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company. Moak, K. (2017). The Washington Consensus Versus the Beijing Consensus. Springer International Publishing. Nathan, A. J. (1973). A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics. The China Quarterly (London), 53, 34–66. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1017​/S0305741000500022. Nathan, A. J., and Tsai, K. S. (1995). Factionalism: A New Institutionalist Restatement. The China Journal (Canberra, A.C.T.), 34, 157–192. https://doi​ .org​/10​.2307​/2950136. Naughton, B. (2007). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. The MIT Press. Niou, E. (2008). The China Factor in Taiwan’s Domestic Politics. Routledge, pp. 185–200. Rawski, T. G. (1999). Reforming China’s Economy: What Have We Learned? The China Journal (Canberra, A.C.T.), 41, 139–156. https://doi​.org​/10​.2307​/2667590. Sachs, J., Woo, W. T., Fischer, S., and Hughes, G. (1994). Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union. Economic Policy, 18, 101–146. https://doi​ .org​/10​.2307​/1344459. Saich, T. (2011). Governance and Politics of China. Palgrave Macmillan. Schafferer, C. (2020). Taiwan’s Defensive Democratization. Asian Affairs, an

American Review (New York), 47 (1), 41– 69. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/00927678​.2020​ .1730041. Suh, J. (2017). How National Identity Shapes South Koreans’ Attitudes Toward North Korea and Its Defectors. The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Civic and Political Studies, 12 (1), 13–42. https://doi​ .org​/10​.18848​/2327​- 0071​/CGP​/v12i01​/13​ -42. Sun, H. (2019). U.S.-China Tech War: Impacts and Prospects. China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, 5 (2), 197–212. https://doi​.org​/10​.1142​/ S237774001950012X. Tien, H. M., and Chu Y. (1996). Building Democracy in Taiwan. The China Quarterly (London), 148, 1141–1170. https://doi​ .org​ /10​.1017​/S030574100005058X. Tomz, M., and Weeks, J. (2020). Human Rights and Public Support for War. The Journal of Politics, 82 (1), 182–194. Tomz, M., Weeks, J. L. P., and Yarhi-Milo, K. (2020). Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies. International Organization, 74 (1), 119–143. Wang, A. H. (2019). The Myth of Polarization Among Taiwanese Voters: The Missing Middle. Journal of East Asian Studies, 19 (3), 275–287. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ jea​.2019​.25; https://www​.cambridge​.org​/ core​/article​/myth​- of​-polarization​-among​ -taiwanese​-voters​-the​-missing​-middle​/2AF​ 5A8B​5D53​3E35​1283​B44C​81684DCC0.

Key resources The Taiwanese government provides data on public attitudes towards public policy, which can be found at: https://www​.mac​.gov​ .tw​ / News​ . aspx​? n ​ =34D9690F2F8BCE53​ &sms​=B5449820D7077391. For policy analyses on Northeast Asia, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) website is a valuable resource:  https://www​ .csis​ .org​ / regions​ / asia. To gain insight into the United States’ stance on affairs in Northeast Asia, you can refer to the following website: https://www​.state​ .gov​/ key​-topics​-bureau​- of​- east​-asian​-and​ -pacific​-affairs/.

hsuan-yu lin, charles k. s. wu and yao-yuan yeh

31. South Asia A. The concept South Asia is an immensely diverse landscape. The region comprises eight states – Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. These states vary immensely in size, population, and power. However, all these states, except for Afghanistan, currently have democratically elected governments, although there is a history of authoritarian rule in South Asia (e.g., Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh). The region has a combined population of around 1.7 billion people, nearly a quarter of the global population. All the major religions of the world (Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Jainism, Sikhism, Judaism, etc.) are found in South Asia. The region is ethnically diverse, and several hundred languages and dialects are spoken across the eight states. India is the largest and most dominant state in South Asia. It has the fourth largest economy in the world and ranks third amongst military powers in terms of annual defence spending. It has a population of 1.2 billion people, roughly 70% of whom are below the age of 30. Pakistan is the second most powerful state, with a large military. But it is a country where Islamist forces have gained ground, social development is very low, and the economy is under severe stress. Afghanistan has known nothing but conflict and war since the early 1970s. From October 2001, the country was under US occupation. The US-imposed Afghan government was very weak and over 70% of the country was under the control of the Taliban insurgent forces. That occupation came to an end in August 2021 after the messy and hasty withdrawal of the US military from Afghanistan, which handed the country back to the Taliban. The Taliban has wasted no time in imposing a harsh and puritanical Islamist rule. Nepal and Bhutan, the two Himalayan mountain states, are small states that depend to a large extent on economic and military support from India. Nepal faced a ten-yearlong Maoist insurgency in the 1990s and then had a severe earthquake several years ago. Bhutan saw ethnic troubles between the local Drukpas and migrant Nepalis in the 1980s. In the new millennium, it underwent a political transition from an absolute monarchy to

a democratic polity. Both states are heavily dependent on India for economic assistance and military security. Bangladesh witnessed military rule in the past but is now an established democracy. But the relations between its two main political parties (Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party) are vitriolic, which makes national politics volatile and governance difficult. In recent years, Bangladesh has witnessed a steady rise in Islamist radicalization and terrorist attacks. Sri Lanka was once known as a paradise in the Indian Ocean. But that changed with the onset of the Tamil insurgency in the 1970s. The insurgency lasted for over 30 years and was extremely brutal in nature. It ended in May 2009 with the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). In recent years, Sri Lanka has witnessed Islamist terror attacks (Easter bombings in 2019). In November 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa became the new president. He chose his elder brother and former president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, as his new prime minister. The Rajapaksas were known hardliners and ultra-nationalists. Their harsh policies, proximity to China, and economic mismanagement, coupled with the global turmoil unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic, eventually led to a serious economic meltdown in Sri Lanka. Faced with popular anger and protests, the Rajapaksa regime collapsed, and President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country. In the neighbouring Maldives, politics has been turbulent with the steady growth in pro-Islamist forces. But the re-election of President Solih later this year may signal a return to moderate ways.

B. The landscape Islamist threat in South Asia South Asia’s four Muslim-majority states (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives) have all witnessed growing Islamist radicalization and terrorist violence. In Afghanistan, the Taliban is the main source of trouble, although the Islamic State (ISIS) is known to be gaining ground. In Pakistan, some of the world’s most dreaded terrorist groups are located (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or Pakistani Taliban; Jaish-e-Mohammad; Lashkar-e-Toiba; Hizbul Mujahideen; the Haqqani Network, etc.). These groups are used by the Pakistani military and its intelligence service (the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI) as weapons against

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south asia  169 neighbouring enemy states like Afghanistan and India. In Bangladesh, the oldest jihadi group in operation is the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JeIB). The JeIB and its student wing, the Islamic Chhatra Shibir (ICS), desire to convert Bangladesh into an Islamic emirate akin to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. These groups are joined by other jihadi groups, the most prominent of which are the Harkat-ulJihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) and the Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). The Maldives has witnessed a growing radicalization of Muslim youths, encouraged to a large extent by former president Maumoon Abdul Gayoom and hardline Islamic preachers patronized by the Gayoom regime. A large contingent of radicalized fighters (around 200) went to Syria-Iraq to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and help sustain the caliphate war. With the hasty US military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Biden Administration basically handed back the country to the Afghan Taliban (Crocker, 2019). Within days, the US-supported government of President Ashraf Ghani collapsed and President Ghani along with his key advisers fled the country. The Taliban did not waste time in reimposing a harsh Islamist rule in the country, which has been particularly hard for Afghan women. Complicating matters further has been the steady growth of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) forces in Afghanistan. The ISKP’s rise in Afghanistan has been the result of two main developments: the defection of extreme hardline factions/ leaders from the Taliban to the ISKP and the return of battle-hardened jihadis from SyriaIraq as the IS caliphate crumbled. The ISKP has further muddied the political landscape and security situation in Afghanistan. In recent times, the ISKP forces have carried out terror attacks against the civilian population, government officials, and even the Taliban (Burke, 2019). Islamist jihadi terrorism’s main incubator is in neighbouring Pakistan. Over the past five decades, Pakistan’s powerful military establishment and its intelligence agencies have created, nurtured, and consolidated an Islamist jihadi terror factory within the country (Rashid, 2008). The growth of Islamist forces in Pakistan serves two main purposes for the Pakistani military. One, it acts as a counterweight to the mainstream political

parties and creates a loyal support base for the military rulers. Secondly, non-state jihadi forces can be used as an ‘unofficial arm’ of the military to pursue its strategic objectives in neighbouring states such as Afghanistan and India (Fair, 2014; Paul, 2014). In spite of massive international pressure, therefore, the Pakistani military has not seriously cracked down upon jihadi groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Jaishe-Mohammad (JeM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Haqqani Network (HN), and a plethora of similar groups that operate freely inside Pakistan. But things could be slowly changing. Serious fissures have now emerged between the Afghan Taliban government in Kabul and the Pakistani state. The fight seems to be over two issues mainly: one, the Afghan Taliban’s support of the TTP or Pakistani Taliban in its efforts to introduce harsh Islamist rule in the Pakistani provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan; and two, the fencing of the Durand Line, the Afghanistan–Pakistan border created by the British Indian administration which no Afghan government has ever accepted as a legitimate border. South Asia’s smaller states with either a Muslim majority (such as Bangladesh and the Maldives) or a Muslim minority (such as Sri Lanka) have also witnessed a phenomenal growth in Islamist jihadi ideology, especially among disaffected youth, many of whom are now openly identifying with the Islamic State and al Qaeda. In Bangladesh, a country of around 168 million people of which almost 90% are predominantly Sunni Muslim, the oldest jihadi group in operation is the Jamaate-Islami Bangladesh (JeIB). The JeIB and its student wing, the Islamic Chhatra Shibir (ICS), mainly draw their members from Deobandi seminaries that have mushroomed across the country. Modelling themselves along the lines of a Salafi jihadi organization such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the JeIB and the ICS desires to convert Bangladesh into an Islamic emirate akin to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. These groups are joined by other jihadi groups, the most prominent of which are the Harkat-ulJihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) and the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), in spreading jihadi ideology and carrying out terror attacks using mainly bombs and knives. In recent years, these groups have carried out attacks against secular bloggers, journalists, rajat ganguly

170  encyclopedia of asian politics minorities, politicians, security personnel, and prominent social and political activists. Several members of the JeIB have been given death sentences by the Bangladesh courts for war crimes committed during the war of independence in 1971. The two island nations of the Maldives and Sri Lanka have also not been devoid of jihadi violence in recent times. The Maldives has witnessed growing radicalization of Muslim youths, encouraged to a large extent by former president Maumoon Abdul Gayoom and hardline Islamic preachers patronized by the Gayoom regime. A large contingent of radicalized fighters (around 200) went to Syria-Iraq to join the ISIL and help sustain the caliphate (Roy, 2019). The radicalization of Sri Lanka’s small Muslim or Moor minority (located mainly in the Eastern Province) has also been taking place over several years. At the height of the Tamil–Sinhalese civil war, clashes between the Tamil Tigers and Muslims used to be a regular occurrence. To protect their community from Tiger violence, Muslim youths had sought guidance and support from jihadi groups like al Qaeda and had even organized themselves into Osama hit squads (Klem, 2011). Once the civil war ended with the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 2009, things calmed down for a while. But the rise of the ISIL and the creation of the caliphate in Syria led to another cycle of radicalization, especially among members of small obscure groups. On 21 April 2019, one such group, the National Thowheed Jamaath (NTJ), carried out eight suicide bomb blasts that killed more than 200 people at several targets including two luxury hotels and three churches holding Easter services (BBC, 2019). The main suspect, Zaharan Hashim, was a local Muslim preacher in his hometown Kattankudy in eastern Sri Lanka who was known for his radical views, calls for jihad, and support for the caliphate (Beech, 2019). One of his associates, Abdul Lathief Jameel Mohamed, was reportedly radicalized in Australia where he lived from 2009 to 2013 and completed a postgraduate degree (SBS News, 2019). The suicide attacks, allegedly carried out to avenge the Christchurch mosque attack in New Zealand by a white supremacist, predictably created tensions in communal relations between Christians and Muslims in Sri Lanka. rajat ganguly

South Asia’s strategic environment Relations between India and Pakistan greatly dominate the strategic environment of South Asia. In recent times though, particularly since the 2017 Doklam skirmishes and then the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes, the India–Pakistan strategic angle has been overshadowed by the India–China strategic relationship. The China–Pakistan strategic partnership is also an important aspect of the strategic environment in South Asia. The India–Pakistan relationship is marked by deep animosity, which is unlikely to change soon. Several factors are responsible for this outcome: the nature of the Indian freedom struggle; the trauma of partition; the dispute over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir; several wars and near misses; the dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of the state of Bangladesh with India’s support; Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India since the 1980s; dispute over the sharing of river waters; differences over Afghanistan; and Pakistan’s strategic ties with China. But the relationship has become more complicated and dangerous since the late 1990s after both India and Pakistan became officially nuclear weapon states. India’s relations with China are also difficult, complex, and at times hostile. The main reason for hostility is the India–China border dispute, which has simmered for over 50 years now and shows no signs of resolution. The border dispute resulted in a brief war in 1962, which the Indian side lost. The Chinese attack (which Indian leaders consider as treacherous) is deeply embedded in the psyche of India’s political and military elites. It has been a key reason for India’s military modernization and decision to go nuclear. Pakistan’s growing strategic ties with China further added to the animosity in India’s relations with China. Today, India’s military planners talk about the need to be ready to fight a two-front land war with Pakistan and China. India’s strategic thinking and planning as well as its military procurement policies are significantly influenced by this idea of a two-front war with Pakistan and China. Several other irritants are present in India–China relations, such as the status of Tibet and the presence of the Dalai Lama in India, and the growing presence of the PLA Navy (PLAN) in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China’s offer to invest vast sums of money in Pakistan (China Pakistan Economic Corridor), Sri Lanka

south asia  171 (long-term lease and upgradation of ports), and Bangladesh (long-term lease and upgradation of the Chittagong port plus the possible opening of a trade route from Chittagong to southern China) are looked at with suspicion by New Delhi. Pakistan–China strategic relations are based on the realist dictum ‘my enemy’s enemy ought to be my friend’. China has used Pakistan to keep India under strategic pressure, mainly so that India cannot rise quickly and challenge China in Asia. China has also benefited from Pakistan’s occupation of a part of Jammu and Kashmir (it is through this region that the CPEC is expected to pass and link the Pakistani port of Gwadar with Kashgar in western China). Moreover, Pakistan is a major buyer of Chinese military equipment including the J-17 strike fighters. Pakistan’s military has benefitted enormously from China. Pakistan’s nuclear capability (reactors, fuels, missiles) is mainly because of China. In recent years, Pakistan has bought Chinese-made military equipment. China has diplomatically saved Pakistan from terrorism charges in international forums. China has also pumped billions of dollars into Pakistan, which has kept Pakistan economically afloat but also increased Pakistan’s debt burden. Pakistan’s relations with its western neighbour, Afghanistan, have been troubled except for a brief period when Afghanistan was under the control of the Taliban (a largely Pashtun group created and funded by the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI) from 1996 to 2001. The ISI’s covert involvement in Afghan politics started in the early 1970s when King Zahir Shah was deposed by Mohammad Doud. Within a few years, Doud was murdered and the country was taken over by communists. The Soviet Union militarily intervened in December 1979, after the Afghan communists got bogged down by factional infighting. During the Soviet occupation, Pakistan became a frontline strategic ally of the United States and managed the Afghan resistance (the mujahideen). The ISI developed deep ties with the Afghan resistance and handled vast quantities of money and military equipment. After the Soviets pulled out in 1989, Afghanistan was engulfed in civil war. On one side were the Pashtuns who were backed by Pakistan. On the other side were non-Pashtun groups (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras) backed by India and Iran. The ISI created the Afghan Taliban

and helped it to power in 1996. The US invasion of October 2001 removed the Afghan Taliban from power. Most of the Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders were provided safe sanctuary in Pakistan. Pakistan’s relations with the Afghan government after 2001 have been hostile. The main issue has been Pakistani support to the Afghan Taliban, which allowed the group to bounce back and become a potent force in Afghanistan. Another serious issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan is their border, the Durand Line, which no Afghan government has ever accepted as the official border. Pakistan therefore would desperately want a return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. The troubled Himalayas In April 1990, a popular Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) succeeded in reintroducing multi-party democracy in Nepal after almost 30 years of absolute rule by the monarchy. In November 1990 a new Constitution was introduced in Nepal and in May 1991 the country held its first democratic election in 32 years. The Nepali Congress Party (NCP) won the election and formed a new government under Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala. The Prime Minister was an outspoken critic of the communists. So, it was not surprising that the main opposition party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist – UML), along with other communist parties, adopted an uncooperative attitude towards the Koirala Government. The Government was further hampered by a stagnant economy, which soon increased public frustration at the poor performance of the NCP in power and led to an outbreak of serious factional infighting. The Koirala Government eventually collapsed in June 1994. Fresh elections resulted in a ‘hung’ parliament. The King invited Man Mohan Adhikari, the leader of the single largest party, the UML, to form a minority government. The minority Adhikari Government lasted for nine months. In September 1995, the King appointed Sher Bahadur Deuba as the new Prime Minister at the head of a coalition government comprising the NCP, the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), and the Nepali Sadbhavana Party (NSP). The Deuba government lasted until March 1997. It spent most of its time and energy on fending off concerted efforts by the opposition UML to bring down the coalition; in the process, the rajat ganguly

172  encyclopedia of asian politics basic needs of the people were ignored and living standards remained dismal. During the struggle for the restoration of democracy in Nepal, four left-wing parties joined forces to form the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre) and demanded that a new constituent assembly be established to draft a new popular constitution. By the time the 1994 parliamentary elections took place, the Unity Centre had suffered a major split. One faction, led by Nirmal Lama, was officially recognized in Parliament and by the Election Commission. The other faction, led by Baburam Bhattarai, was denied recognition and decided to change its name to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). The Bhattarai faction announced that henceforth it would resort to armed struggle in the form of a ‘people’s war’ (as developed by the Chinese leader Mao Zedong) in order to capture power and usher in a genuine democratic revolution. On 4 February 1996 Bhattarai presented the Deuba Government with a list containing 40 specific demands, including the abrogation of the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty and the new Mahakali Treaty with India; the divestment of the monarchy of all powers and privileges; the drafting of a new constitution by a popularly elected constituent assembly; the introduction of work permits for foreign nationals working in Nepal; the nationalization of the property and assets of capitalists; the declaration of Nepal as a secular nation; a halt to all foreign aid; and the initiation of a large number of social reforms and development projects, such as the building of roads and the provision of electricity and drinking water to rural areas. Bhattarai warned that if the government failed to act on these demands by 17 February 1996, the CPN (Maoist) would launch an armed struggle against the Nepali State. The Maoist armed struggle lasted for ten years and took a huge toll on the country. In 2006 a popular uprising against the king led to a victory for the Maoists. A multi-party Interim Government (IG) headed by G. P. Koirala of the NCP assumed power in May 2006. The IG accepted the Maoists’ demand that the monarchy be abolished and a popularly elected Constituent Assembly be formed to draft a new constitution. In early 2007 the Maoists agreed to join the interim government, proclaiming that their rebellion was over. A new republican constitution was promulgated in Nepal in 2015. There were also signs rajat ganguly

that China’s influence is beginning to grow in Nepal. Under China’s influence, particularly at the behest of the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) was born in May 2018 by unifying the different communist factions. Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), the former Maoist leader, became chair of this new party. China’s objective was to make the NCP the vanguard of Nepal’s future development and social reforms. But soon signs of strain emerged within the NCP between a faction led by Dahal and other leaders like Madhav Kumar Nepal and another faction led by Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli. The power struggle has made stable government formation and continuity difficult. The communists have also tried to play India against China to gain certain political advantages. Prime Minister Oli riled India by repeatedly raking up border issues between the two states. Other communist leaders keep talking about leaning towards Beijing to seek greater concessions from New Delhi. Like Nepal, the tiny Himalayan state of Bhutan was an absolute monarchy until 1998. The kingdom had experienced serious ethnic clashes in the 1980s between the native Drukpas and the migrant Nepali workers. Once the ethnic issues were resolved, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck decided to cede power to an elected National Assembly and gave up the role as head of government; the governing cabinet was now to be chosen by the National Assembly with the monarchy in an institutional role. In December 2006, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck abdicated the throne in favour of his son, Crown Prince Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck. In March 2008, the first democratic elections were held in Bhutan. While Bhutan’s transition to democracy was welcome news, dark clouds began to gather on the horizon in terms of belligerent Chinese territorial claims in the Doklam area, a triangular piece of territory where China, Bhutan, and India meet. In 2017, India was forced to rush troops to the area to prevent the People’s Liberation Army from building a road in an area which is claimed by Bhutan. The resultant clash in which a few soldiers on both sides received injuries flared tensions between India and China. The Doklam incident was followed in 2020 by clashes between the Indian Army and the PLA in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, in which 20 Indian soldiers

south asia  173 died and more than 40 soldiers of the PLA were reported to have died. The shadow of India and China continues to fall on Bhutan.

C. Future research South Asia faces several challenges as a region. Countries in the region have to work together to address some of these issues as the region as a whole is being impacted by them. For instance, climate change has wreaked havoc across the region with several recent natural disasters such as floods in Pakistan and rising sea levels affecting the Maldives. One area of future research is examining how countries in the region cooperate and resolve this collective action problem to find a solution to climate change issues. A related issue is the lack of regional economic integration in South Asia. With the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) now largely defunct, regional economic cooperation in the region has come to a standstill. It will be interesting to study how the region progresses in the future and whether it is able to find suitable forums for cooperation. Rajat Ganguly

References BBC News. (2019, April 21). Sri Lanka Attacks: More Than 200 Killed as Churches and Hotels Targeted. https://www​.bbc​.com​/ news​/world​-asia​- 48001720. Beech, H. (2019, April 25). Sri Lankan Accused of Leading Attacks Preached Slaughter. Many Dismissed Him. The New York Times. https://www​.nytimes​.com​ /2019​/04​/25​/world ​/asia ​/sri​-lanka​-attacks​ -mastermind​.html​?action​= click​&module​ =Top​%20Stories​&pgtype​=Homepage. Burke, J. (2019, August 19). With Kabul Wedding Attack, ISIS Aims to Erode Taliban Supremacy. The Guardian. https:// www​.theguardian​.com​/world​/2019​/aug​/19​

/with​-kabul​-wedding​-attack​-isis​-aims​-to​ -erode​-taliban​-supremacy. Crocker, R. (2019, January 29). I was Ambassador to Afghanistan: This Deal Is a Surrender. The Washington Post. https:// www​.washingtonpost​.com​/opinions​/i​-was​ -ambassador​-to​-afghanistan​-this​- deal​-is​ -a​-surrender​/2019​/01​/29​/8700ed68​-2409​ -11e9​-ad53​-824486280311​_story​.html. Fair, C. C. (2014). Fighting to the End: The Pakistani Army’s Way of War. Oxford University Press. Klem, B. (2011). Islam, Politics and Violence in Eastern Sri Lanka. The Journal of Asian Studies, 70 (3), 730–753. Paul, T. V. (2014). The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World. Oxford University Press. Rashid, A. (2008). Descent into Chaos: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Threat to Global Security. Penguin Books. Roy, S. (2019, March 4). The Maldives: The New Kid on the Islamist Block. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com​/2019​/03​ /the​-maldives​-the​-new​-kid​-on​-the​-islamist​ -block/. SBS News. (2019, April 27). A Completely Changed Person: Sri Lanka Bomber Radicalized in Australia, Friend Says. https://www​.sbs​.com​.au​/news​/a​-completely​ - cha nge d ​ - p er son ​ - sr i ​ - la n k a ​ - b omb er​ -radicalised​-in​-australia​-friend​-says​?cid​ =newsapp​:socialshare​:other.

Key resources Brass, P. R. (Ed.). (2010). Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Routledge. Contemporary South Asia. Routledge (Journal). South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies. Taylor and Francis Group (Journal).

rajat ganguly

32. Southeast Asia

inadvertently as the arena of great power rivalry and competition, becoming a site of one of the two “hot” wars in Asia during the Cold War, while communist insurgencies were present in about every Southeast Asian A. The concept state (Liow, 2023). The three decades post– The use of the term “Southeast Asia” began Cold War saw several remarkable changes in with the creation of the Allied South-East Southeast Asia. While it has long been conAsia Command in 1943. It was a politi- sidered an arena for superpower rivalry and cal term used in response to the fact that remains an important battleground for US– British Burma, Malaya, Singapore, and the China rivalry (Shambaugh, 2018), Southeast American Philippines were occupied by the Asia has increasingly found itself at the foreJapanese Imperial Army. The term subse- front of regional integration initiatives involvquently gained currency among academ- ing states in the region and other external ics from these Anglo-Saxon imperial states powers such as India, Japan, and Australia. (Anderson, 1998). This was further reinSoutheast Asia today has a combined popuforced by the creation of Southeast Asian lation of close to 675 million and is comprised studies programs in the United States (nota- of governments of varying kinds: parliamenbly at Yale and Cornell) in the 1940s and the tary and presidential systems, constitutional 1950s. In the decades that followed, the First monarchies, socialist and communist states, and Second Indochina Wars, the articulation military rule, and a ruling monarchy. While of the “domino theory” by successive US there has been resistance to democratizaadministrations, and the subsequent process tion in the region (in the name of economic of decolonization meant that the term would development and social order), economic find supporters in academia and among pol- challenges (the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis), icy elites. The acceptance and development of the drastic increase of access to the internet the regional concept by the region’s govern- and social media, the emergence of a more ing elites, oftentimes seen in the formation of politically engaged youth, and the excesses the Association of Southeast Asian Nations of authoritarianism led to mass movements (ASEAN) in 1967, further cemented the usage which toppled down dictatorships. However, of the term (Acharya, 2013). barely two decades after, many of the achieveCurrently, Southeast Asia is comprised ments of these movements in the Philippines, of 11 countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Timor- Thailand, Myanmar, and Malaysia have Leste, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar been effectively rolled back (Liow, 2023). In (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, contrast to counterparts in Northeast Asia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Ten of these are full Southeast Asian developmental states genmembers of ASEAN while leaders from the erally lagged (except for Singapore) despite bloc agreed “in principle” to admit Timor- enjoying post-war comparative advantages of Leste in 2022, paving the way for the island natural resources and a large pool of discination’s full membership, more than a dec- plined labor. Some scholars attribute this to ade after it requested admittance. Among the lack of an independent bureaucracy due to regional organizations, ASEAN is unique as crony capitalism and patrimonialism, where it does not count among its members a Great a small group of elites gained an overwhelmPower or a nuclear power. It is also not a com- ing advantage (Carroll, 2020) and have found munity of democracies (hence, no “domestic innovative ways to deal with political conflict constraint” on war-making) and has been (Rodan, 2018). prone to domestic political violence and strife Because of the roots of the term “Southeast from ethnic, religious, and political divisions. Asia”, there has been some debate about its Despite this, states in the region have gener- meaningfulness. On the one hand, earlier ally avoided protracted and devastating con- work by historians of the region, such as D. flict (Acharya, 2021). G. E. Hall (1960), point out that the use of Geography has provided Southeast Asia the term is “solely dictated by convenience”. with numerous advantages, foremost of which Since then, however, there has been a strong is its cultural diversity as a consequence of push from “Southeasianists” and indigenous being at the crossroads of Indian and Sinic scholars for greater acceptance of the term. cultures. However, this same geographic The key difficulty in defining Southeast location also meant that the region finds itself Asia as a region is the tendency to run into 174

southeast asia  175 oversimplifications, given the geographic, ethnic, and political diversity of the region. It is this diversity that has hindered scholars, particularly Western social scientists, from studying the region as a whole, with social scientists instead becoming “country specialists”. There has been a tendency among political scientists and historians alike to focus on constituent parts of Southeast Asia, rather than the region as a whole. This has been overcome by earlier work of some scholars, such as Reid (1990) and Tarling (1998, 2006), which paved the way for the recent scholarship, which has increasingly devoted attention to the study of the region as a whole. This marks a shift away from the pre–World War II studies of the region, which view it from imperial and orientalist perspectives. The key source of geographic diversity is the division of the region into mainland and maritime segments. While mainland Southeast Asia is characterized by mountain ranges enclosing major valleys, maritime Southeast Asia is comprised of river valleys and smaller alluvial lowlands. In the former, this led to the creation of major polities that fostered imperial states (take for instance the first major classical state in Southeast Asia, Funan, which exerted control over much of the Malay Peninsula) while in maritime Southeast Asia, small states became larger empires by controlling sea routes (for instance the port city state of Srivijaya). Other sources of diversity include religious (Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism, and much later on, Christianity), ethnic, and linguistic diversity. The key approach used by scholars to study this diversity is “unity in diversity”, arguing that this diversity supports the claim of the distinctiveness of the region (Acharya, 2013, 2014). While some scholars tend to look at the region in terms of geographic location and ethno-social lines, the view that regions such as Southeast Asia are geopolitical entities that can be measured using empirical indicators has been challenged by the view that regions are socially constructed entities (Acharya, 2013). Reid (1990) for instance, looks at the importance of pre-colonial commercial linkages in the regional construction of Southeast Asia while some scholars look at how nationstates perceive and look at these bonds in terms of “imagined communities”, making the term “Southeast Asia” no longer a term of convenience (Acharya, 2013).

B. The landscape The politics of Southeast Asia have been understood and interpreted through three main scholarly traditions: American political science, political economy in the British and European traditions, and rational political economy and New Institutional Economics. These schools of thought have differing understandings of politics, economics, and society but have also resulted in several subsidiary approaches. Some approaches, such as rational choice political studies and quantitative methodology, have clashed with area studies, particularly in the US (Robison, 2014). Despite being generally neglected in American political science, the study of politics in Southeast Asia has taken a “middle path” between European and US academic traditions (Teehankee, 2014). Southeast Asia does not generate the same attention in comparative politics when compared to Latin America and Europe (Kuhonta, Slater, & Vu, 2008). An estimate by Munck and Snyder (2007) points out that only 6.9% of articles published in the top three comparative politics journals have focused on the region. In the past three decades, there has been a proliferation of the work of both area studies specialists and disciplinal scholars. One particularly useful endeavor to integrate theories and concepts in comparative politics and Southeast Asian studies is the 2008 volume by Kuhonta, Slater, and Vu which argues that the study of Southeast Asian politics has contributed significantly to three main areas of knowledge accumulation: causal arguments, conceptual improvements, and interpretivist analysis. In addition, there have been academic outlets dedicated to the study of the region. For instance, Southeast Asian Affairs, the annual publication of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, was launched in 1974 as an annual review of the politics, economies, and international relations of Southeast Asia and its individual states. It has been an important source for scholars and think tanks interested in contemporary Southeast Asia (Singh & Cook, 2018). Until fairly recently, studies of Southeast Asia have focused on individual states or a handful of states, but very few have focused on the region as a whole. Much of the comparative work in the last ten years has focused on themes that deal with democracy, juhn chris p. espia

176  encyclopedia of asian politics authoritarianism, nationalism, and political participation. For instance, studies have examined how elites have managed conflict by providing avenues for political participation as well as the role of civil society across different regimes in the region and the power struggles over the relationship between civil society and the state (see for instance, Rodan, 2018, 2022). Because the region’s nascent democracies are faced with ethnic and nationalist challenges, questions of how democracy interacts with nationalism in Southeast Asia are deemed important. While democratization significantly reduces violent insurgency over time, it also introduces subtle yet harmful effects that fail to resolve conflict and helps maintain nationalist grievances (see Bertrand, 2021). Studies have also explored how the region’s authoritarian regimes have evolved. Vast differences exist between different authoritarian regimes but across these regimes, there has been a discernible shift towards sophisticated authoritarianism over time (see for instance Morgenbesser, 2020). Because of the exponential increase in terms of internet access in the region, the role of social media both as a tool for disinformation by authoritarian regimes and as a tool for claims-making by grassroots activists against these regimes has been explored (see Sinpeng & Tapsell, 2021). Populism in Southeast Asia has become an important area of research as well. Populists have thrived where ties between voters and either bureaucratic or clientelistic parties have decayed or simply do not exist, allowing populists to win and maintain political power (see Kenny, 2019).

C. Future research Studies of Southeast Asia in general have grown exponentially, with the increase in the diversity of authors coming from different intellectual traditions. There is also a growing “indigenization” of scholarship in the region, with scholars trained within and outside the region starting to take leading roles in research endeavors. However, discipline-based specialists and traditional area studies scholars do not communicate well with each other, despite efforts to bridge the gap (Acharya, 2014). Scholars studying the region through different lenses have oftentimes operated in what Robison (2014) called juhn chris p. espia

“parallel universes”. There is a need for further dialogue and research to bridge this gap. Juhn Chris P. Espia

References Acharya, A. (2013). The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region. Cornell University Press. Acharya, A. (2014). Remaking Southeast Asian Studies: Doubt, Desire and the Promise of Comparisons. Pacific Affairs, 87(3), 463–183. Acharya, A. (2021). ASEAN and Regional Order: Revisiting Security Community in Southeast Asia. Routledge. Anderson, B. (1998). The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World. Verso. Bertrand, J. (2021). Democracy and Nationalism in Southeast Asia: From Secessionist Mobilization to Conflict Resolution. Cambridge University Press. Caroll, T., Hameiri, S., and Jones, L. (Eds.). (2020). The Political Economy of Southeast Asia: Politics and Uneven Development Under Hyperglobalisation. Palgrave Macmillan. Hall, D. G. E. (1960). Looking at Southeast Asian History. Journal of Asian Studies, 3(1), 243–253. Kenny, P. (2019). Populism in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. Kuhonta, E. M., Slater, D., and Vu, T. (2008). Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis. Stanford University Press. Liow, J. C. (2023). Dictionary of Modern Politics of Southeast Asia. Routledge. Morgenbesser, L. (2020). The Rise of Sophisticated Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. Munck, G. L., and Snyder, R. (2007). Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics: An Analysis of Leading Journals. Comparative Political Studies, 40(1), 5–31. Reid, A. (1990). An ‘Age of Commerce’ in Southeast Asian History. Modern Asian Studies, 24(1), 1–30. Robison, R. (2014). Interpreting the Politics of Southeast Asia: Debates in Parallel Universes. In R. Robinson (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics (pp. 5–22). Routledge. Rodan, G. (2018). Participation Without Democracy: Containing Conflict in Southeast Asia. Cornell University Press.

southeast asia  177 Rodan, G. (2022). Civil Society in Southeast Asia: Power Struggles and Political Regimes. Cambridge University Press. Shambaugh, D. (2018). U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia. International Security, 42(4), 85–127. Singh, D., and Cook, M. (2018). Turning Points and Transitions: Selections From Southeast Asian Affairs 1974–2018. ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Sinpeng, A., and Tapsell, R. (2021). From Grassroots Activism to Disinformation: Social media in Southeast Asia. ISEASYusof Ishak Institute. Tarling, N. (1998). Nations and States in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. Tarling, N. (2006). Regionalism in Southeast Asia: To Foster the Political Will. Routledge. Teehankee, J. (2014). The Study of Politics in Southeast Asia: The Philippines in Southeast Asian Political Studies. Philippine Political Science Journal, 35(1), 1–18.

Key resources Acharya, A. (2021). ASEAN and Regional Order: Revisiting Security Community in Southeast Asia. Routledge. Acharya, A. (2013). The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region. Cornell University Press. Caroll, T., Hameiri, S., and Jones, L. (Eds.). (2020). The Political Economy of Southeast Asia: Politics and Uneven Development Under Hyperglobalisation. Palgrave Macmillan. Hicken, A. (Ed.). (2010). The Politics of Modern Southeast Asia. Routledge. Kuhonta, E. M., Slater, D., and Tuong Vu, T. (2008). Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis. Stanford University Press. Robison, R. (Ed.). (2014). Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics. Routledge.

juhn chris p. espia

PART IV REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

33. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation A. The concept The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989 in Australia as an informal forum for member economies to discuss free trade and economic cooperation along the Pacific Rim. Aside from Australia, the founding members were Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. China, Hong Kong, and Chinese Taipei joined in 1991, followed by Mexico and Papua New Guinea in 1993. Chile became a member in 1994, while Peru, Russia, and Vietnam participated in 1998, bringing in a total of 21 APEC members. As per its website, APEC’s agenda is to promote its three pillars that focus on: trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation (ECOTECH).1 To achieve its objectives, APEC follows a consensus-based approach to decisionmaking that seeks to accommodate its members. According to McKay (2002, p. 50), it is based on the structure and methods of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), dubbed as the “ASEAN Way,” which proponents particularly from developing countries consider a fair way to manage a diverse membership especially in relation to developed economies. Most of the developing countries have since insisted that APEC remains a loose, consultative body to encourage cooperative projects. It was thus a great accomplishment to get all the members to approve the dates of 2010 for developed economies to reach the goal of complete liberalization, and 2020 for the developing countries to do so. For Langdon and Job (1997, p. 8), this allows the latter members “to open up their economies at their own pace and not be bound to firm deadlines”. The name APEC itself reflects efforts to accommodate economic diversity and acknowledge conflicting interests among its members. To keep the group as a “loose consultative body,” it was simply called “Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation,” with no final word like “council,” or “organization.” As the

former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans puts it, APEC is essentially “four adjectives in search of a noun.”2 But through the years, APEC has slowly and inevitably become a “forum” rather than an “organization.” It was neither a negotiating body that makes legally binding treaties and agreements nor a well-organized structure with a large administrative staff, though it has a secretariat located in Singapore.

B. The landscape Given its format and procedures, APEC has encountered several challenges that slowed down the realization of its goal of promoting free trade and investments in the region. According to Feinberg and Zhao (2001), these obstacles include 1. Absence of priorities because APEC’s efforts in trade reforms have been diffused in various areas; 2. Shortfalls in member commitments in their response to APEC initiatives, as some members may have not gone further than pledging commitments; 3. Weak evaluation procedure that lacks outside scrutiny of each member’s progress in implementing reform; 4. Lack of enforcement since APEC has no mechanism to enforce group decisions; 5. Excessive diffusion of limited resources with many projects spread across too many different areas that tend to overlap; 6. Lack of coordination of defined APEC objectives with projects that are not linked effectively with wider APEC priorities; and 7. Proliferation of forums such as APEC working groups and networks that have multiplied over time, creating some confusion and inefficiency. Despite these challenges, APEC continues to promote more trade interactions between nations resulting in increased economic interdependence due to its “openness.” It essentially represents a kind of regionalism in the Asia Pacific that seeks to accommodate all regional parties making it generally more “open,” in contrast to the closed regionalism of groupings such as the European Community, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, APEC

179

180  encyclopedia of asian politics does not seek to create special economic privileges for members; outsiders can participate on a nonreciprocal basis (Langdon & Job, 1997, p. 11). The increased interaction among states in the Asia Pacific through APEC has led to the opening of trade and investment relations among virtually all former adversaries in the region. This development inadvertently leads to a dilemma that Scalapino (1995) describes as “economic dynamism and political fragility,” found especially in Northeast Asia. And with economic dynamism in the region comes a renewed political self-confidence that tends to magnify hostility between great powers such as the United States and China and heighten tensions among states over conflicting territorial claims, particularly in the South China Sea. Thus, APEC can neither isolate itself from the political consequences nor escape the possibility of having regional security implications of its economic regionalism. Yet most APEC members resist the idea of APEC progressing into a multilateral security organization such as those found in Europe, despite increasing political and security tensions in the region. This is partly because alternative institutions began to at least discuss security problems. Thus, in 1994 the United States as well as most other countries in Asia Pacific joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), held at the same times as the annual meetings of the foreign ministers of ASEAN. The ARF provides consultative opportunities on non-binding multilateral security issues among representatives of member states. Moreover, most APEC members oppose efforts toward institutionalization in the security domain (particularly in Northeast Asia) as they tend to guard their freedom of maneuver by insisting on bilateral negotiations and settlements when it comes to security-related issues. This is in contrast to the economic side, where countries seek to join and commit to collective agreements. Ahn (1996) provides an extensive discussion of such distinction that exists in the region, particularly between the character of regionalism found in the economic sphere and regionalism found in the political/security sphere. Because members tend to focus more on economic regionalism, APEC is therefore not destined to become a regional security institution. Yet over the years, APEC has assumed political significance because of its distinct multilateral arrangements. Aside from its andrea chloe wong

openness, APEC is known for its inclusiveness. Essentially, it is the only regional body that has established an acceptable arrangement for the economic parties of “greater China” to be included in APEC, namely mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. APEC has succeeded in keeping all parties engaged and its process has succeeded in avoiding political deadlock over sovereignty issues, which have threatened to paralyze other international or regional forums. Moreover, APEC has since held a political and security purpose in the region, whether willfully or inadvertently. In no other forum do most leaders in the Asia Pacific come together, making APEC the best platform to discuss sensitive issues. It is at these summit gatherings and bilateral meetings that trade issues with political implications are discussed (mostly privately) such as the United States’ human rights considerations in its economic relations with China or Myanmar. This dispels accusations of critics portraying APEC as a mere talk shop, even sarcastically suggesting that its acronym stands for “a perfect excuse for coffee” (McKay, 2002, p. 44). In fact, the gathering of leaders to discuss political-security concerns through private consultations and informal negotiation already reflects an aura of “success” for APEC despite the absence of achieving definitive results or political breakthroughs. Thus, the most valuable contribution of APEC may turn out to be the process itself as it involves both Asian and Western governments conducting regular, consensus-driven meetings and finding common ground. From this perspective, APEC’s political and security prospect in the long term is to function as a regional confidence-building mechanism. As a regional forum, it is expected to encourage stability in the region by promoting common interests and mutual understanding among its members, as discussed in Pauline Kerr’s (1994) article on “The Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific.” It is also worth reviewing Richard Higgott’s (1994) research on the “Ideas, Identity, and Policy Coordination in the Asia Pacific” to understand APEC’s operational modes. According to him, “its informal negotiations, less institutionalization, and engagement with nongovernmental players are viewed as more acceptable, more effective, and more conducive to success in Asian environments (Higgott, 1994, p.370).” Such a dynamic

asia pacific economic cooperation  181 is considered a better “fit” for the region, based on Desmond Ball’s (1993) study on the “Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region,” which is a good reference to understand the contrast between the more flexible cooperation initiatives in Asia vis-à-vis the more routine, legalistic, and institutionalized processes that are evident in multilateral organizations in Europe or North America. Despite its primary economic objectives, APEC cannot continue to define its goals and measure of success in terms of trade and economics alone. Insisting on a clear separation of economic vis-à-vis political-security matters at the highest policy level is deemed artificial since APEC members are intricately bound in interrelationships. Thus, APEC as an organization can be influential as a platform to manage relations within the region. In his assessment, Hellman (1995) advises that “while it is not up to APEC per se, it is incumbent on its members to pay greater attention to political conflicts and security issues,” which are necessary for promoting economic interdependence and achieving economic development in the Asia Pacific.

C. Future research In recent years, the strategic competition between the US and China has intensified. Many countries and states in the Indo-Pacific region are adjusting their own foreign policies in order to incorporate this sharpening of the US–China rivalry. Given that both the US and China are members of APEC, studying whether and how the intensification of US–China strategic competition affects the workings of APEC will be a crucial area of future research. Since the Trump administration, US trade and economic policy has become more inwardlooking with a distinct shade of protectionism as represented by the “America First” policy. The US has also withdrawn from regional trade agreements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Some observers have argued that US trade policy has not changed significantly under President Biden. Examining how APEC is affected by this trend of economic nationalism prevailing in the US and whether the organization is weakened as a result of this is another area of future research. Andrea Chloe Wong

Notes 1. “Three Pillars of APEC’s Agenda,” Scope of Work, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. 2. Quoted in Alan Freeman, “Leaders Aim for Free Trade at APEC Forum,” Globe and Mail, 12 November 1994, B4.

References Ahn, B. (1996). Regionalism in the AsiaPacific: Asian or Pacific Community. Korea Focus, 4 (4), 5–23. Ball, D. (1993). Strategic Culture in the AsiaPacific Region. Security Studies, 3 (1), 44–74. Feinberg, R., and Zhao, Y. (2001). Assessing APEC’s Progress: Trade, Ecotech and Institutions. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Publishing. Hellman, D. (1995). APEC and the Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific: New Myths and Old Realities. In APEC at the Crossroads. National Bureau of Asian Research. Higgott, R. (1994). Ideas, Identity, and Policy Coordination in the Asia Pacific. Pacific Review, 7 (4), 367–379. Kerr, P. (1994). The Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific. Pacific Review, 7 (4), 397–409. Langdon, F., and Job, B. (1997). APEC Beyond Economics: The Politics of APEC. Working Paper 243, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, pp. 1–22. McKay, J. (2002). APEC: Successes, Weaknesses, and Future Prospects. Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 42–53. Scalapino, R. (1995). Economic Dynamism and Political Fragility in Northeast Asia Prospects for the 21st Century. In Northeast Asia in an Age of Upheaval. National Bureau of Asian Research. Analysis, 6 (2), August.

Key resources APEC Secretariat. https://www​.apec​.org/. Feinberg, R., and Ye Zhao, Y. (2001). Assessing APEC’s Progress: Trade, Ecotech and Institutions. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Publishing. McKay, J. (2002). APEC: Successes, Weaknesses, and Future Prospects. Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 42–53.

andrea chloe wong

34. Association of Southeast Asian Nations

peace treaty designed to guide intra-ASEAN state relations and ASEAN relations with external actors. Its fundamental principles include mutual respect for state sovereignty, the right of states to lead an existence free from external interference, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the renunciaA. The concept tion of the threat or use of force (ASEAN, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 1976). Hoping to establish a legal and insti(ASEAN) is a regional organisation estab- tutional framework for the Association, lished in 1967. It was founded by the lead- member states ratified the ASEAN Charter ers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, in 2008. This established a new legal frameSingapore, and Thailand with the purpose work and legal personality for ASEAN, desof accelerating regional growth and devel- ignated new ASEAN bodies, and defined the opment, promoting regional peace and sta- roles of important ASEAN actors such as the bility, and promoting collaboration across Foreign Ministers and the Secretary-General member states (ASEAN, 1967). At the time (ASEAN, 2008). ASEAN took a step towards of its establishment, the international system even greater regional integration in 2012. was gripped by Cold War between the United The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali States (US) and the Soviet Union. The rivalry Concord II) called for the establishment of an between these Great Powers had extended into ASEAN community comprising three pillars Southeast Asia, where a proxy conflict was of political and security cooperation, ecowaged in Vietnam between the Soviet-backed nomic cooperation, and socio-cultural coopNorth Vietnamese and the US-backed South eration. The Declaration highlighted several Vietnamese. The Vietnam War was the most areas for cooperation within these pillars, recent crisis in a history of external interven- including maritime cooperation and respondtion in Southeast Asia beginning with coloni- ing to transnational threats, development of a alism in the 16th century. With the exception single market by 2020, cooperation in science of Thailand, all Southeast Asian states were and technology development, prevention and subjected to European colonial rule. By 1967, control of infectious diseases, and fostering a most of the region’s states were newly inde- regional identity (ASEAN, 2012). pendent. This bred insecurity, as new nations Greater regional integration has inspired struggled to gain political control and to ward ASEAN to take on a leading role in regional off domestic challenges from insurgencies and dialogue forums. The ASEAN Regional separatist groups. The formation of ASEAN Forum (ARF), established in 1993, is a mulcan be viewed as a response to this history of tilateral security forum that currently cominternal instability and external interference prises 27 member states. Members states in Southeast Asia. Through ASEAN, regional include all ASEAN states plus ASEAN states hoped to prevent communist insurgen- dialogue partners including the US, China, cies, reduce the military influence of external Russia, the European Union (EU), Japan, powers in Southeast Asia, limit intra-ASEAN and India. The purpose of the ARF is to competition, and promote regional coopera- provide a forum for confidence-building tion (Narine, 2002, p. 13). and constructive dialogue and consultation As the Cold War dissipated, ASEAN mem- on political and security issues impacting ber states rejuvenated the Association. This the Indo-Pacific. As an ASEAN-led forum, began with a period of expansion. A further the ARF adopts ASEAN’s distinct style of five Southeast Asian member states joined diplomacy known as the ‘ASEAN Way’. The the Association: Brunei (1984), Vietnam ASEAN Way can be understood as ‘a set of (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997), and norms and principles that regulate relations Cambodia (1999). This cultivated a culturally, among member states’ (Caballero-Anthony, economically, and socio-politically diverse 2022, p. 5). These include consensus-buildorganisation. Member states also advanced ing, informality, dialogue and consultation, the Association’s founding principles beyond and a peaceful settlement of disputes. By the limited scope of the 1967 Bangkok adopting this method of interaction within Declaration. This began in 1976 with the the ARF, ASEAN states hoped to develop a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), a constructive dialogue process that will help 182

association of southeast asian nations  183 build trust between ARF members. ASEANled forums have flourished in the post–Cold War period including the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) cooperation forum for ASEAN states, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, the East Asia Summit (EAS) dialogue forum on areas of strategic, political, and security issues across 18 members, and an ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) for regional defence cooperation. The TAC has also received international recognition as a vehicle for multilateral cooperation, with 51 countries now party to the treaty. ASEAN’s centrality in the regional architecture has solidified its position as a major international actor. The Association has also benefitted from a sustained period of economic growth and regional development. ASEAN had a combined population of 661.8 million in 2020, making it the third-largest population after China and India (ASEAN, 2021, p. 3). It also had a combined GDP of US$3.0 trillion, making it the fifth-largest economy in the world (ASEAN, 2021, p. 33). Since 2000, ASEAN’s economy has grown at an average annual rate of 5.0% (ASEAN, 2021, p. 36). This has made it a popular recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which increased by 42% in 2021 to $174 billion (ASEAN, 2022, p. xv). Despite consolidating its position as a regional power, the organisation is not without its challenges. These include uneven economic and social development, corruption and rising authoritarianism, environmental degradation, territorial conflicts and maritime disputes, and transnational organised crime. ASEAN has also struggled to effectively respond to crises occurring within member states. ASEAN was criticised for its muted response to the 2021 Myanmar political coup and subsequent violence against civilians. This was due in part to the organisation’s adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, which has threatened to undermine ASEAN’s leadership role in the Indo-Pacific.

B. The landscape Recent scholarly works on ASEAN are divided over the impact the organisation has on regional security and stability. Stubbs (2019) characterises these opposing camps as ASEAN sceptics and ASEAN proponents. Sceptics and proponents clash over

ASEAN’s effectiveness, legitimacy, and efficiency (Stubbs, 2019, p. 924). From the sceptic perspective, ASEAN is characterised by ‘organizational ambiguity’ with a diplomatic style that has allowed more powerful actors from outside the region to manipulate the Association (Jones & Smith, 2007, p. 149). ASEAN is accused of having weak integration and institutional development (Narine, 2016) and of lacking the ability to act collectively to respond to regional threats including the rise of China (Beeson, 2016). ASEAN’s proponents claim that the Association has been instrumental in promoting peace in Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. ASEAN has shaped regional security practices through ideas of national resilience and comprehensive security (Caballero-Anthony & Emmers, 2022, p. 3), by developing a nascent security community in Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2021), and by extending ASEAN institutionalisation across East Asia and the Asia Pacific (Ba, 2016). The debate between the two camps has become increasingly polarised and entrenched. Beeson (2019, p. 2) referred to ASEAN proponents as ‘overcome by wishful thinking and a mysterious disposition to think well of an organisation that has done little to merit such admiration’. Differences in theoretical approach underpin these contrasting perspectives. Those that subscribe to a neorealist view of international relations perceive international institutions as vehicles for Great Power politics, not as arbiters of peace (Mearsheimer, 1994). Small powers have fewer capabilities to impact the international system. This minimises the impact that regional states can have on international affairs. Some critics of ASEAN subscribe to this realist perception of the system. Kliem (2021, p. 372) highlights a ‘vicious cycle of national self-help responses paralysing regional cooperation’ in ASEAN caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. He describes this as a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy of realism’ (Kliem, 2021, p. 372). Narine (2009, p. 370) adopts a theory of subaltern realism when analysing ASEAN, where concerns with nation-building undermine internal unity and identity, limiting ASEAN’s ability as a regional actor. Southgate (2019) also writes from a realist perspective, arguing that ASEAN’s ability to uphold regional sovereignty is highly dependent on the role of external actors. This can be contrasted with constructivist theorising, a school of thought laura southgate

184  encyclopedia of asian politics that several of ASEAN’s proponents subscribe to. Constructivists take a more positive view of ASEAN’s ability to uphold regional order. Constructivist scholars believe in the transformative power of ASEAN’s norms that can regulate intra-ASEAN relations and socialise external actors to engender peace (Acharya, 2021). Glas (2016) argues that regional relations are circumscribed by habits of cooperation, such as consensus-seeking or informal decision-making, that imbue social interaction and act as a source of stability. From a constructivist perspective, ASEAN’s identity has positively reshaped its interactions with external powers such as the European Union (Xuechen, 2018). Whilst the ASEAN sceptic vs. proponent dichotomy is a useful starting point from which to analyse ASEAN, its scholarship is often more nuanced. Scholars from both sides of the divide highlight ASEAN’s strengths as well as its weaknesses. They also adopt a variety of differing theoretical perspectives that transcend the realist– constructivist divide. Yates (2017, p. 444) adopts an English School-inspired framework to examine ASEAN’s social role as ‘primary manager’ and ‘regional conductor’ of Southeast Asian order resulting from reciprocal role bargains with great powers. Another branch of literature utilises a critical theoretical perspective to examine the contestation between ASEAN’s powerful social forces and how this can determine the scope of political conflict and intervention (Jones, 2012). Gerard (2015) adopts a similar approach, using political economy analysis to examine ASEAN civil society engagement and participatory policy-making, which create sites for contestation rather than democratic change. Contemporary debates in the ASEAN literature prioritise different levels of analysis and emerging themes. Davies (2013) uses rational choice theory to explain the action–identity gap characterising ASEAN’s engagement with human rights. According to this view, ‘ASEAN member states have used human rights norms for their own political ends and did not intend their integration into the regional framework’ (Davies, 2013, p. 209). Simpson (2018) examines the environmental issues facing Southeast Asia. Using political economy analysis, Simpson (2018) highlights the economic activities of elites that marginalise civil society actors and undermine laura southgate

the protection of environmental values and limits. Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia is a factor that underpins a number of these scholarly debates. To Arugay and Sinpeng (2018), elites have maintained barriers to grassroots civil society that limit democratic regime consolidation across Southeast Asia.

C. Future research Discussion of emerging contemporary issues and the application of multiple theoretical perspectives has increased the scope of the ASEAN debate. The examination of ASEAN’s response to non-traditional security challenges such as environmental issues and the impact of COVID-19 has added depth to the analysis. Recent scholarly works also divert attention away from the systemic level of analysis to examine the role that the state, domestic groups, and individuals have in regional order. These varying approaches have helped diversify the ASEAN literature. There is more to do to advance the ASEAN debate, however. As a starting point, the literature would benefit from greater areas of synergy between the sceptics and opponents. Finding areas of common ground or applying contrasting perspectives to key debates in the literature would help prevent the entrenchment of ideas and present new ways of thinking about old topics. Similarly, applying new theoretical frameworks to the study of ASEAN can help to bridge the gap between traditional perspectives or to transcend existing theories altogether. There is also a temptation in the literature to categorise ASEAN as either a homogeneous entity with the ability to act in a unitary way, or as a collection of diverse states with only weak institutional linkages and commitments. Greater focus on the Association’s internal dynamics, including the interrelationship between the states that constitute ASEAN, would provide a greater understanding of the way in which the Association acts and how it might respond to events in the future. Laura Southgate

References Acharya, A. (2021). ASEAN and Regional Order: Revisiting Security Community in Southeast Asia. London: Routledge.

association of southeast asian nations  185 Arugay, A., & Sinpeng, A. (2018). Varieties of Authoritarianism and the Limits of Democracy in Southeast Asia. In Ba, A., and Beeson, M. (Eds.), Contemporary Southeast Asia: The Politics of Change, Contestation, and Adaptation. Basingstoke: Palgrave. ASEAN. (1967). The ASEAN Declaration. Bangkok, 8 August 1967. https:// agreement​ . asean​ . org​ / media​ /download​ /20140117154159​.pdf (accessed 6 October 2021). ASEAN. (1976). Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. https:// asean​-aipr​.org ​/wp ​- content ​/uploads ​/2018​ /07​/ Treaty​- of​-Amity​-and​- Cooperation​-in​ -Southeast​-Asia​-1976​-TAC​.pdf (accessed 6 October 2021). ASEAN. (2008). The ASEAN Charter. https:// asean​ .org​ / wp​ - content​ / uploads​ / images​ / archive​/publications​/ASEAN​- Charter​.pdf (accessed 7 October 2021). ASEAN. (2012). Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II). 11 May 2012. https://asean​ . org​ / speechandstatement​ /declaration​ - of​ - asean​ - concord​ - ii​ - bali​ -concord​-ii/ (accessed 7 October 2021). ASEAN. (2021). ASEAN Key Figures. https:// www​.aseanstats​.org​/wp​- content​/uploads​ /2021​/12​/ASEAN​-KEY​-FIGURES​-2021​ -FINAL​-1​.pdf (accessed 7 October 2021). ASEAN. (2022). ASEAN Investment Report 2022. https://asean​.org​/wp​-content​/uploads​ /2022 ​/09​/AIR2022 ​-Web ​- Online ​-Version​ -310822​.pdf (accessed 7 October 2021). Ba, A. (2016). Institutionalization of Southeast Asia: ASEAN and ASEAN Centrality. In Ba, A., Kuik, C., and Sudo, S. (Eds.), Mapping and Reconfiguring Regional Cooperation. London: Routledge. Beeson, M. (2016). Can ASEAN Cope with China? Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35(1): 5–28. Beeson, M. (2019). The Great ASEAN Rorschach Test. The Pacific Review 33(3): 574–581. Caballero-Anthony, M. (2022). The ASEAN Way and the Changing Security Environment: Navigating Challenges to Informality and Centrality. International Politics. https://doi​.org​/10​.1057​/s41311​-022​ -00400​-0. Caballero-Anthony, M., and Emmers, R. (2022). Keeping the Peace in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Quest for Positive

Peace. The Pacific Review. https://doi​.org/​ 10​.1080​/09512748​.2022​.2075440. Davies, M. (2013). ASEAN and Human Rights Norms: Constructivism, Rational Choice, and the Action-Identity Gap. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 13(2): 207–231. Gerard, K. (2015). Explaining ASEAN’s Engagement of Civil Society in Policy-Making: Smoke and Mirrors. Globalizations 12(3): 365–382. Glas, A. (2016). Habits of Peace: LongTerm Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia. European Journal of International Relations 23(4): 833–856. Jones, D. M., and Smith, M. L. R. (2007). Making Process, Not Progress ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order. International Security 32(1): 148–184. Jones, L. (2012) ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kliem, F. (2021). ASEAN and the EU Amidst COVID-19: Overcoming the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Realism. Asia Europe Journal 19(3): 371–389. Mearsheimer, J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19(3): 5–49. Narine, S. (2002). Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Narine, S. (2009). ASEAN in the Twenty-First Century: A Sceptical Review. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22(3): 369–386. Narine, S. (2016). ASEAN and the Response to Regional Crisis: The Limits of Integration. In Saurugger, S., and Terpan, F. (Eds.), Crisis and Institutional Change in Regional Integration. London: Routledge. Simpson, A. (2018). The Environment in Southeast Asia: Injustice, Conflict and Activism. In Ba, A., and Beeson, M. (Eds.), Contemporary Southeast Asia: The Politics of Change, Contestation and Adaptation. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Southgate, L. (2019). ASEAN Resistance to Sovereignty Violation: Interests, Balancing and the Role of the Vanguard State. Bristol: Bristol University Press. Stubbs, R. (2019). ASEAN Sceptics Versus ASEAN Proponents: Evaluating Regional laura southgate

186  encyclopedia of asian politics Institutions. The Pacific Review 32(6): 923–950. Xuechen, I. (2018). The Role of ASEAN’s Identities in Reshaping the ASEAN–EU Relationship. Contemporary Southeast Asia 40(2): 222–246. Yates, R. (2017). ASEAN as the ‘Regional Conductor’: Understanding ASEAN’s Role in Asia-Pacific Order. The Pacific Review 30(4): 443–461.

laura southgate

Key resources Acharya, A. (2021). ASEAN and Regional Order: Revisiting Security Community in Southeast Asia. Routledge. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Website. https://asean​.org/. Weatherbee, D. (2015). Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, 3rd ed. Rowman & Littlefield.

35. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

such as the Foreign Secretaries of South Asian states, the framework and scope for SAARC were negotiated (Chaturvedi, Sharma, & Kumar, 2006). An Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) was devised and a Charter for the organisation was drafted (Chaturvedi, Sharma, & Kumar, 2006). In 1985, SAARC was formally established A. The concept after the Heads of State of the seven founding Founded in 1985, the South Asian Association members adopted the Charter (Chaturvedi, for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is a Sharma, & Kumar, 2006). In order to address regional organisation in South Asia. Its found- the concerns expressed by India and the other ing members include the South Asian states founding members, all bilateral and contenof Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, tious issues were excluded from SAARC and Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The Charter a Secretariat for the organisation was only of the organisation aims to foster “mutual established in Kathmandu two years later understanding, good neighbourly relations in 1987 (Gonsalves, 2016). At the time of and meaningful cooperation among the SAARC’s establishment, five areas of mutual Member States” in order to achieve “peace, cooperation were identified, some of which freedom, social justice and economic pros- included agriculture, rural development, and perity” (SAARC Secretariat, 2022). telecommunications (SAARC Secretariat, After the Second World War, regionalism 2022). Other areas of cooperation such as acquired a new impetus in international poli- arts and sports were added in later years as tics (Katzenstein, 2005; Fawcett & Hurrell, the organisation continued to evolve, and 1995). Several European states engaged in the IPA now identifies 11 areas of cooperaregional integration by first forming the tion (Chaturvedi, Sharma, & Kumar, 2006; European Coal and Steel Community in Murthy, 1998). The SAARC Charter mentions 1951 which then gradually evolved into the that the principles of “sovereign equality, terEuropean Economic Community (Taylor, ritorial integrity, national independence, 2008). This was followed by the forma- non-use of force and non-interference in the tion of the Association of Southeast Asian internal affairs of other States and peaceful Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 to encourage settlement of all disputes” are integral for regional cooperation in Asia (Narine, 2008). the functioning of the organisation (SAARC According to Chakma, SAARC “grew out Secretariat, 2022). Through collaboration in of this broader trend for regionalism at the areas mentioned in the IPA, SAARC aims global level” (2020, p. 5). In 1980, Bangladesh to foster regional integration and sociotook the initiative and made a formal proposal economic development (Mukherjee, 2014, for the creation of a forum for regional eco- p. 375). According to Gonsalves and Jetly nomic cooperation in South Asia (Chaturvedi, (1999), SAARC had two distinct goals which Sharma, & Kumar, 2006). Initially, India was are also interconnected. In the short term, opposed to the proposal as India feared that SAARC’s goal was non-political as it aimed other South Asian neighbours may “gang to achieve mutual socio-economic developup” against India in a regional multilateral ment for all member states through economic forum (Gonsalves, 2016, p. 3). Pakistan was cooperation (Gonsalves & Jetly, 1999). In also apprehensive about a proposal involv- the long term, its goal was more political in ing closer relations with India on account of nature as it hoped that economic cooperation the contentious relations between India and would gradually lead to a stable, prosperous Pakistan as well as the gains that Pakistan and peaceful regional order in South Asia had made due to the patronage of great pow- (Gonsalves & Jetly, 1999). ers, particularly the US, during the Cold War Chakma notes that SAARC’s evolution (Gonsalves, 2016, p. 3). Other smaller South as an organisation took place in two distinct Asian states had their reservations as well as phases. During the first phase of SAARC’s they feared that such a proposal would result evolution, which began in 1980 and lasted in India further entrenching its dominant until the early 1990s, the organisation position in the region (Nuruzzaman, 1999). adopted a “neo-functional” approach with From 1980 to 1985, over multiple rounds of the expectation that “cooperation in funcdiscussions involving high-ranking officials tional areas would ‘spillover’ in other areas 187

188  encyclopedia of asian politics of cooperation, leading to regional integration in South Asia” (2020, p. 80). There were two reasons for the adoption of this neo-functional approach. Firstly, SAARC was borrowing the concept of neo-functionalism after observing how it influenced regional integration in Europe after the Second World War (Chakma, 2020). Secondly, by following a neo-functional approach, SAARC was attempting to address the reservations voiced by member states which were discussed earlier, and it was hoped that by focusing on functional issues which were not controversial, SAARC would be able to gain a strong foundation and find more avenues for cooperation, and this would also serve the purpose of building confidence about the organisation’s effectiveness among member states (Chakma, 2020). All of SAARC’s activities in this phase were guided by this neo-functional approach (Chakma, 2020). During this phase, SAARC focused on functional and non-controversial issues such as food security, enhancing satellite communications and cooperation in the agricultural sector (Chaturvedi, Sharma, & Kumar, 2006). In the early 1990s, SAARC began to change its approach and move beyond neo-functionalism. In this second phase, the organisation began to focus on core economic issues such as trade and finance (Chakma, 2020). In 1991, at the sixth SAARC Summit in Colombo, inter-governmental groups were set up to examine measures for trade liberalisation with the aim of establishing preferential trading agreements between the member states (Dutt & Bansal, 2012). This led to the signing of the SAARC Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) in 1993 and the agreement came into effect in 1995 (Hossain, 2018). SAPTA recognised the specific needs of the lesser developed member states: Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Nepal. While emphasising and ensuring the mutual advantages and benefits to all member states, SAPTA was also able to include significant preferential measures for the lesser developed member states (Dutt & Bansal, 2012; Chakma, 2020). At the ninth SAARC Summit in Male in 1997, the signing of SAPTA was then followed by a decision to create a free trade area in South Asia. A Committee of Experts was set up to draft the framework for the creation of a free trade area in the late 1990s (Oni, 2022). Although negotiations began in 1999, the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was not signed until 2004 at the twelfth SAARC summit in neel vanvari

Islamabad (Oni, 2022). SAFTA’s aim is to achieve greater levels of trade and economic cooperation between member states by focusing on a further reduction of trade barriers such as lists of sensitive products, para-tariffs, and non-tariff barriers (Chakma, 2020; Oni, 2022). Apart from trade agreements, in this phase, SAARC also focused on areas such as setting up the SAARC Development Fund, tackling climate change, and addressing poverty alleviation in South Asia (Chakma, 2020). SAARC’s membership also grew when Afghanistan joined SAARC as a new member at the fourteenth SAARC Summit held in New Delhi in 2007 (Embassy of India in Kabul, 2007). In addition, other states and supranational organisations such as China, the US, and the EU were granted observer status by SAARC (SAARC Secretariat, 2020a). In terms of its organisational structure, SAARC consists of the following bodies: the Summit, the Council of Ministers, the Standing Committee, and the Technical Committees (SAARC Secretariat, 2020b). The Summit is the apex body consisting of the heads of state/government of member states who are required to meet annually according to the Charter (SAARC Secretariat, 2022). The Council of Ministers is made up of the foreign ministers of all member states. According to Article V of the Charter, some of the Council’s responsibilities include the formulation and review of policies along with identifying new areas of cooperation, but the Summit is the ultimate decision-making body (SAARC Secretariat, 2022). The Standing Committee is made up of Foreign Secretaries of member states who report to the Council of Ministers (SAARC Secretariat, 2022). The Technical Committees focus on areas of cooperation mentioned in the IPA (SAARC Secretariat, 2022). Apart from these organisational bodies, SAARC has also created some specialised bodies since its formation, such as the South Asian University in New Delhi and the SAARC Arbitration Council (SAARC Secretariat, 2020c). Over the years, SAARC has signed seven conventions. Two of these conventions, the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and the SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances were signed in the first phase of the organisation’s development (SAARC Secretariat, 2020d). Some of the other conventions signed

south asian association for regional cooperation  189 in the second phase relate to issues such as environmental cooperation, prevention of human trafficking, and mutual assistance on crime (SAARC Secretariat, 2020d). SAARC has also signed several agreements over the years covering a wide range of issues such as quick response to natural disasters, avoidance of double taxation, enhancing trade in services, and establishing the SAARC Food Bank (SAARC Secretariat, 2020d). Since 1989, SAARC has created several regional centres to cover specific areas of cooperation such as the SAARC Agricultural Centre in Dhaka and the SAARC Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS Centre in Kathmandu (SAARC Secretariat, 2020e).

B. The landscape Recent research on SAARC has focused on its effectiveness and whether the organisation has been able to achieve its stated goals. Chakma (2020) argues that SAARC has been instrumental in enhancing regional cooperation in certain areas. SAARC has had some achievements in the fields of agriculture through the work of the SAARC Agricultural Centre, disease control, poverty alleviation, satellite communications, and disaster management (Chakma, 2020; The Economist, 2013). The signing of two conventions, the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and the SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, was a significant milestone for the organisation (Chakma, 2020; Mukherjee, 2014; Gonsalves & Jetly, 1999). The convention on terrorism in particular enabled SAARC to address a problem which was impacting all of South Asia and enabled SAARC to make a significant contribution to regional security (Chakma, 2020; Mukherjee, 2014). As a platform for diplomacy, SAARC gave the leaders of its member states, particularly India and Pakistan, the opportunity to engage informal discussions on the sidelines of summits and meetings, especially at a time when bilateral relations between India and Pakistan were frosty (Naazer, 2018). However, the failures of the organisation are more visible than its achievements, especially when compared to other regional organisations such as ASEAN (Chakma, 2020; Mukherjee, 2014; Shishir & Sakib, 2022; Gonsalves, 2016). As an organisation, SAARC has continued to expand its remit and

include more issues and areas of cooperation within its purview over the years. The list of issues that SAARC attempts to resolve is certainly impressive. However, Dash (1996) argues that most of SAARC’s achievements are “on paper”. SAARC’s failures are more “glaring” than its achievements (Chakma, 2020). Despite having made noteworthy achievements through agreements and conventions in areas such as terrorism and free trade, member states have either refused to fully implement the measures signed off by SAARC or the benefits of SAARC’s policies have been “rather limited” (Saez, 2011, p. 42). For instance, despite signing the SAPTA and SAFTA, intra-regional trade among SAARC countries still remains low (Hossain, 2018; Oni, 2022). Oni (2022) notes that SAFTA has been less successful than other regional trade agreements when it comes to increasing intraregional trade. According to Oni, the percentages of intra-regional imports and exports among member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have risen from 17% to 24% and from 21% to 27%, respectively, between 1992 and 2017. The corresponding intraregional exports and import shares in the case of SAFTA remained at 3% and 6–7% since SAFTA came into force. (2022, p. 4)

Since the implementation of SAFTA, the larger SAARC members, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, are less reliant on each other for trade and engage more extensively with other trading partners beyond SAARC (Sawhney, 2010). Some of SAFTA’s failures are due to economic factors such as the presence of “sensitive lists” of products, the persistence of protectionist practices by member states, and an increase in para-tariffs such as regulatory duties (World Bank, 2018). Beyond these economic factors, scholars argue that SAARC’s failure to fully realise its potential and implement all of its measures, as well as the failure of regionalism more generally in South Asia, is due to political and geostrategic factors. Adopting a security studies approach, Mukherjee (2014) argues that the presence of several conflicts, both within and between member states, has hindered the progress of SAARC and by extension, of regionalism in South Asia. The Kashmir conflict has strained relations between India and Pakistan since 1947. Similarly, relations neel vanvari

190  encyclopedia of asian politics between Bangladesh and Pakistan as well as between India and Nepal have been tense in the past. South Asia has also been plagued with domestic conflicts in India such as Maoist insurgency, a civil war in Sri Lanka, and nationalist movements in Pakistan’s provinces. Scholars argue that the regional rivalry between India and Pakistan has hindered the project of regional integration in South Asia and adversely impacted SAARC’s progress (Chakma, 2020; Mukherjee, 2014; Dash, 1996; Gonsalves, 2016; Saez, 2011). Relations between India and Pakistan have been strained and antagonistic, fermenting political distrust over time and resulting in the obfuscation of regionalism in the long term (Dutta, 2011; Mukherjee, 2014). The political complexity and asymmetry between member states have been identified as another cause of SAARC’s failure (Reed, 1997; Pattanaik, 2004; Chakma, 2020; Saez, 2011). South Asia is an Indo-centric region due to the power asymmetry between India and the rest of South Asia (Kodikara, 1993, p. 8; Chakma, 2009). India is the dominant player in the region due to its larger geographical size, booming economy, political stability, and advanced military prowess compared to all other countries in the region (Chakma, 2020). Given this power asymmetry, India’s dominance is seen by other South Asian states as a threat to their political independence and survival (Schaffer & Schaffer, 1998). India’s perception of its South Asian neighbourhood as being its sphere of influence as well as India’s heavy-handed and intransigent behaviour towards its South Asian neighbours in the past has added a further layer of complexity to this power asymmetry (Schaffer & Schaffer, 1998). As a result, South Asian states have been reluctant to engage in closer regional integration or commit fully to SAARC’s agenda (Chakma, 2020). Saez (2011) notes that the complex regional security dilemma makes certain kinds of regional cooperation impossible to achieve in South Asia. Due to the power asymmetry and the security complexities discussed above, SAARC member states “viewed the operation of SAARC through a prism of security rather than through a lens of genuine economic cooperation” (Chakma, 2020, p. 150). This was due to an inherent “contradiction” between the objectives which SAARC was trying to achieve and the modus operandi of its member states (Chakma, 2020). SAARC was neel vanvari

primarily set up to enhance regional integration through economic cooperation (Chakma, 2020). Instead of considering economic benefits as the rationale in their decision-making, SAARC member states were making decisions on “politico-strategic calculations” and security considerations (Chakma, 2020, p. 3). Chakma (2020) also highlights other “structural” factors which contributed to SAARC’s failure, such as the weakness of the SAARC Secretariat and issues concerning funding for the organisation. A recent report evaluating SAARC’s performance notes, “SAARC today faces multiple challenges: It is arguably spread too thin, it faces problems of delivery, it is prone to obstructionism by individual member states, and it lacks a brand identity” (Centre for Social and Economic Progress, 2016). As a result of SAARC’s stagnation and ineffectiveness, an area of research that scholars have been focusing on is the emergence of alternative forums for regionalism in South Asia. Due to SAARC’s stagnation and the hostile relations between India and Pakistan, India has increased its engagement with the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) (Subramanyam Raju & Basu Ray Chaudhury, 2023; Kumar, 2020; Shishir & Sakib, 2022). Unlike SAARC, Pakistan is not a member of BIMSTEC. In addition, BIMSTEC aligns more with India’s developmental priorities, such as encouraging growth and investment in the country’s northeastern region (Basu Ray Chaudhury & Ghosh, 2022). Similarly, the Bangladesh Bhutan India and Nepal (BBIN) Initiative is a subregional grouping which has gained traction in recent years (Poudel, 2022; Chakma, 2020).

C. Future research In terms of further research, one area which warrants further examination is the impact of the rivalry between India and China on regionalism in South Asia. Some scholars have suggested that making China a new member of SAARC would revive the organisation (Bishwakarma & Hu, 2022). South Asian states like Pakistan and Nepal have substantive economic and political relations with China. Given the increasingly contentious relations between India and China at present, it would be interesting to study whether India would allow China to join SAARC and how

south asian association for regional cooperation  191 India prevents other member states from integrating China into the regional architecture of South Asia. In addition, examining how and under what conditions SAARC may be revived, if at all, after years of stagnation also requires careful analysis. No SAARC Summit has been held since 2016 and the organisation has been “limping” ever since (Chakma, 2020). Although Chakma (2020) has outlined some conditions under which SAARC may be revived, a more detailed study about whether and how member states would renew their commitment to SAARC will further advance our understanding of the future of regionalism in South Asia. Neel Vanvari

Embassy of India in Kabul. (2007, May 5). Afghanistan Formally Joins SAARC. https://eoi​.gov​.in​/ kabul/​?pdf0162​?000. Fawcett, L. L. E., and Hurrell, A. (Eds.). (1995). Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford University Press. Gonsalves, E. (2016). Reviving regional cooperation in South Asia. In R. Kumar and O. Goyal (Eds.), Thirsty Years of SAARC: Society, Culture and Development (pp. 1–12). SAGE Publications India. Gonslaves, E., and Jetly, N. (Eds.). (1999). The Dynamics of South Asia: Regional Cooperation and the SAARC. SAGE. Hossain, S. (2018). SAFTA and AFTA: A comparative welfare analysis of two regional trade agreements. Journal of References Economic Structures, 7(1), 1–27. https://doi​ Basu Ray Chaudhury, A., and Ghosh, A. K. .org​/10​.1186​/s40008​-018​-0124-0. (2022, September 27). Situating India’s Katzenstein, P. J. (2005). A World of Northeast in the Bay of Bengal Regional Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Architecture. ORF Observer Research Imperium. Cornell University Press. Foundation. https://www​.orfonline​.org​ Kodikara, S. U. (Ed.). (1993). External /wp​ - content​ / uploads​ / 2022​ / 09​ / GP​ - ORF​ Compulsions of South Asian Politics. Sage _Situating​-Indias​-Northeast​.pdf. Publications. Bishwakarma, J. K., and Hu, Z. (2022). Kumar, S. (2020). Reinvigoration of Problems and prospects for the south BIMSTEC and India’s economic, strategic Asian association for regional cooperation and security concerns. Millennial Asia, (SAARC). Politics & Policy (Statesboro, 11(2), 187–210. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ GA), 50(1), 154–179. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​ /0976399620925441. /polp​.12443. Mukherjee, K. (2014). The South Asian Centre for Social and Economic Progress. association for regional cooperation: (2016, November 17). What Next for SAARC? Problems and prospects. Progress in https://csep​.org​/event​/what​-next​-for​-saarc/. Development Studies, 14(4), 373–381. Chakma, B. (2009). South Asia’s realist https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/1464993414521524. fascination and the alternatives. Murthy, P. (1998). SAARC completes Contemporary Security Policy, 30(3), thirteen years. Strategic Analysis, 22(9), 395–420. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​ 1449–1452. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​ /13523260903326404. /09700169808458894. Chakma, B. (2020). South Asian Regionalism: Naazer, M. A. (2018). SAARC summit The Limits of Cooperation. Polity Press. diplomacy and its impact on Indo-Pakistan Chaturvedi, S., Sharma, K., and Kumar, S. K. relations (1985–2014). FWU Journal of (Eds.). (2006). SAARC: The Summits. Social Sciences, 12(1), 67–75. Pragun Publications. Narine, S. (2008). Forty years of ASEAN: Dash, K. C. (1996). The political economy of A historical review. Pacific Review, 21(4), regional cooperation in south Asia. Pacific 411–429. Affairs, 69(2), 185–209. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ Nuruzzaman, M. (1999). SAARC and .2307​/2760724. subregional co‐operation: Domestic Dutt, S., and Bansal, A. (Eds.). (2012). South politics and foreign policies in South Asian Security: Twenty-First Century Asia. Contemporary South Asia, 8(3), Discourses. Routledge. 311–322. Dutta, S. (2011). China in SAARC? To what Oni, S. S. (2022). Trade Flows Between SAFTA effect? Strategic Analysis, 35(3), 493–501. Member Countries: An Empirical Analysis https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/ 09700161​. 2011​ [Unpublished Master’s Dissertation]. .559993. University of Lethbridge. neel vanvari

192  encyclopedia of asian politics Pattanaik, S. S. (2004). Indo-Pak relations and the SAARC summits. Strategic Analysis, 28(3), 427–439. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​ /09700160408450146. Poudel, S. S. (2022, September 27). SAARC is dead. Long live subregional cooperation. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com​ /2022​ / 09​ /saarc​ - is​ - dead​ - long​ - live​ - sub​ -regional​-co​-operation/. Reed, A. M. (1997). Regionalization in south Asia: Theory and praxis. Pacific Affairs, 70(2), 235–251. https://doi​.org​/10​.2307​ /2760774. Saez, L. (2011). The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): An Emerging Collaboration Architecture. Routledge. Sawhney, U. (2010). Growth and structural change in SAARC economies. International Journal of Economics and Finance (Izmir, Turkey), 2(2), 95–103. Schaffer, H., and Schaffer, T. (1998). Better neighbors?: India and South Asian regional politics. SAIS Review, 18(1), 109–109. Shishir, M. F. J., and Sakib, N. H. (2022). How interests and ideas of a dominant actor make a big difference: Analyzing India’s role in SAARC and BIMSTEC. Chinese Political Science Review, 1–23. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1007​/s41111​-022​-00230​-8. South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat. (2020a, July 16). External Relations. https://www​ .saarc ​ - sec ​ . org ​ / index ​ . php ​ /about​ - saarc ​ / external​ -relations#:~​:text​ =There​ %20are​ %20currently​%20nine​%20Observers​,the​ %20United​%20States​%20of​%20America. South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat. (2020b, July 12). SAARC Summits. https://www​ .saarc​-sec​.org​/index​.php​/about​-saarc​/saarc​ -structure​/saarc​-summits. South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat (2020c, July 16). SAARC Specialized Bodies. https://www​.saarc​-sec​.org​/index​.php​/saarc​ -specialized​-bodies.

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South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat. (2020d, July 27). Agreements and Conventions. https://www​ . saarc​ - sec​ . org​ / index​ . php​ / resources ​/agreements​- conventions​? limit​ =20​&limitstart​=20. South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat. (2020e, July 16). SAARC Regional Centres. https:// www​ . saarc​ - sec​ .org​ / index​ .php​ / regional​ -centres. South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat (2022). SAARC Charter. Accessed December 10, 2022. https://www​.saarc​-sec​.org​/index​.php​ /about​-saarc​/saarc​-charter. Subramanyam Raju, A., and Basu Ray Chaudhury, A. (2023). BIMSTEC: Mapping Sub-Regionalism in Asia. Routledge. Taylor, P. G. (2008). The End of European Integration: Anti-Europeanism Examined. Routledge. The Economist. (2013, October 2). SAARC Comes Out With Poverty Profile. https:// economictimes​ . indiatimes​ . com​ / news​ / economy​/indicators​/saarc​-comes​-out​-with​ -poverty​ - profile​ /articleshow​ / 23418035​ .cms​?utm​_ source​= contentofinterest​&utm​ _medium​=text​&utm​_campaign​=cppst. World Bank. (2018). A Glass Half Full: The Promise of Regional Trade in South Asia. https://thedocs​.worldbank​.org​/en​/ doc​ / 362241549390789705​ - 0310022019​ /original​ / Cou​ n try​ O neP​ a ger​ s AGl​ a ssH​ alfFull​.pdf.

Key resources Chakma, B. (2020). South Asian Regionalism: The Limits of Cooperation. Polity Press. SAARC Secretariat. https://www​.saarc​-sec​ .org​/index​.php​/about​-saarc​/saarc​-charter. Saez, L. (2011). The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): An Emerging Collaboration Architecture. Routledge.

PART V COUNTRY CHAPTERS/CASE STUDIES

36. Bhutan

and the Office of Legal Affairs were created. Accountability agencies such as the Royal Audit Authority and the Anti-Corruption Commission were established. The power to appoint ministers was handed over by the A. The concept king to the National Assembly and the news Bhutan is a landlocked South Asian coun- media environment was made autonomous try located in the eastern Himalayas. With and independent. a geographical land size of 38,394 km2, As Bhutan lacked a formal codified constiit is the second smallest country in South tution, the king issued directives in 2001 for Asia (WorldData​.inf​o, 2022).1 Reflecting the drafting of a formal constitution with the its smaller geographical land size, Bhutan’s aim of institutionalising democratic governpopulation is 770,276 (National Statistics ment (Dorji, 2022). A Constitution Drafting Bureau, 2023). Bhutan’s history can be traced Committee was set up comprising members back to the 1600s, when Zhabdrung Ngawang of both the religious and civilian branches Namgyel, a Buddhist figure from Tibet, uni- from the federal as well as the district level fied Bhutan and created a framework for (Dzongkhags). The committee reviewed centralised governance (Phuntsho, 2013; existing royal decrees, Buddhist texts and Dorji, 2022; Tobgye, 2016). After centuries scriptures as well as foreign constitutions of infighting among regional leaders, Ugyen (Dorji, 2022). The Constitution was formally Wangchuck was installed as the first heredi- adopted in 2008 through an Act of Parliament tary monarch of Bhutan in 1907 (Phuntsho, and in doing so, completed the transformation 2013). Ugyen Wangchuck’s successful media- of Bhutan’s monarchy from being an absolute tion of a dispute between Tibet and the British to a constitutional monarchy, as envisioned along with his policy of strengthening rela- by the fourth king (Dorji, 2022). Although tions with the British through various treaties the Constitution retains the king as the head and trade were key factors resulting in Bhutan of state, executive, legislative, judicial, and never being colonised by the British who were administrative power which was formerly the colonial rulers of India (Jamtsho, 2016; held by the king has been transferred to the Dorji, 2022). three branches of government (Dorji, 2022; Since its unification under a single ruler in Phuntsho, 2013). The executive (Lhengye the 1600s, Bhutan’s political system has been Zhungtshog) is headed by the Prime Minister characterised by the presence of a dual system and supported by the Cabinet. The independof governance (van Norren, 2023). This was ence of the judiciary was safeguarded in the a system wherein “religious and civil govern- Constitution and a Supreme Court was estabance united under the religious leadership of lished which replaced the king as the highthe Abbot and later the hereditary King” (van est appellate body in the new Constitution Norren, 2023, p. 5). Once the Wangchuck (Turner & Tshering, 2014). Reforms to the dynasty took over as hereditary and abso- legislature have also been introduced after lute monarchs in 1907, this dual system of the Constitution came into effect. The legislagovernance was carried on. However, from ture is bicameral, with the upper house being 1953 onwards, the third king began steer- the National Council and the lower house ing the country towards modernisation and being the National Assembly. The electorate democratisation. The third king instituted a directly elects members for both houses. process of decentralisation and various instiThe National Council “has legislative tutions and agencies were established. The functions and acts as a house of review” Council of Ministers, the Royal Advisory (Turner & Tshering, 2014, p. 416). Each of the Council, the High Court, and the National 20 districts (Dzongkhags) elects one member Assembly were created during the reign of and the king can appoint five additional memthe third king (Phuntsho, 2013; Dorji, 2022). bers to the National Council. Members of the This process of democratisation and mod- National Council cannot be affiliated with ernisation continued under the reign of the any political party. The National Assembly fourth king from 1972 to 2006. Governance has 47 members who are members of politibodies at the district level (Dzongkhags) and cal parties and the leader of the largest party the village level (Gewog) were introduced and is appointed Prime Minister. There are no local elections were characterised by univer- coalitions in parliament as only two political sal suffrage. Subdistrict courts (Dungkhag) parties, the government and the opposition, 194

bhutan  195 can be represented in parliament (Turner & Tshering, 2014). This is because National Assembly elections in Bhutan are a two-stage process if there are more than two parties in the electoral fray (Kantha, 2014). In the first stage, a primary election is held with all the registered parties on the ballot. The two parties which win the most votes during the primary election then go to contest the general election (Kantha, 2014). There are other eligibility requirements which members of parliament need to fulfil such as holding a university degree and not being a civil servant (Turner & Tshering, 2014). Following the adoption of the new Constitution in 2008, Bhutan held its first national elections. In preparation for the election, the Electoral Commission of Bhutan (ECB) held mock elections to inform the public about the process and ECB officials personally visited all parts of the country to educate the public about the newly instituted electoral process (Majumder, 2007). After the election, the ECB was lauded for its efforts and for running a successful election, especially given the organisational challenges posed by a population that is spread out across rugged terrain that is challenging to get to (Turner & Tshering, 2014). The European Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) stated that the 2008 elections “generally met international standards for general elections” (2008, p. 1). There are two other aspects of Bhutan’s Constitution which need to be examined. The first is the role played by Buddhism in Bhutan’s governance and socio-economic spheres. According to Whitecross (2007, p. 709), “Bhutan has traditionally viewed itself as a Buddhist country, indeed as a beyul or ‘hidden land’ preserving the buddhadharma [teachings of the Buddha]”. The influence of Buddhism on Bhutan’s politics and governance stretches back to the time of Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyel in the 1600s. The dual system of governance discussed earlier finds its origins in Buddhism and was traditionally practised in Tibet. As Whitecross (2007, p. 707) argues, “Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal, who unified Bhutan, implemented his personal vision of Bhutan as a religious state, with secular and temporal rule combined much more intimately than in the government of the Dalai Lamas”. The influence of Buddhism in governance continued under the Wangchuck dynasty, who were themselves

descendants of a prominent fifteenth-century Buddhist saint (Whitecross, 2007, p. 707). The king is expected to rule and exercise his powers in accordance with Buddhist values and principles (Dharma) such as justice and morality and Buddhist kinship (Kinga, 2009). The king’s legal authority is derived from the four noble truths of Buddhism and the code of ethics of the ten precepts which encapsulate these noble truths (Kinga, 2009; Whitecross, 2009; Tobgye, 2016). Buddhism continues to influence Bhutan’s governance and political structure even after the adoption of a formal Constitution in 2008. Article 3.1 of the Constitution states that “Buddhism is the soul of the country”, even though Buddhism was not made the official religion of the country and the state is secular (Whitecross, 2007; Turner & Tshering, 2014; National Assembly of Bhutan, 2022, p. 9). All of the teachings and virtues of Buddhism are mentioned and included in the Constitution (Whitecross, 2009; Kinga, 2009; Tobgye, 2016). Although the king is regarded as the protector of all religions in Bhutan, the Constitution requires the king to be Buddhist (Dorji, 2022, p. 426). There are other ways in which the Constitution protects Buddhism, such as by permitting the state to provide subsidies to Buddhist organisations (van Norren, 2023; Dorji, 2022, p. 426). Reflecting its position as the last remaining independent Buddhist kingdom, 75.3% of the population of Bhutan is Buddhist (Whitecross, 2007; WorldData​ .inf​ o, 2022). Whitecross (2007, p. 708) notes that Buddhism “is not comprised of a unified set of values, and often displays variations by locality; each area therefore has its local version of ‘Buddhism’”. In Bhutan, people tend to follow the Mahayana and Vajrayana versions of Buddhism (van Norren, 2023). The second factor which needs to be examined in relation to the Constitution and Bhutan’s economy more generally is the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH). GNH was first introduced by the fourth king in 1986 when he decreed that the progress and success of each five-year plan would be measured by whether the Bhutanese people were happy and leading comfortable lives (Nishimizu, 2008). The concept of GNH and the emphasis on happiness are also linked in Buddhism. In line with the role of the king (Dharmaraja) and its link to Buddhist values and teachings (Dharma), the dual system neel vanvari

196  encyclopedia of asian politics of governance “recognized happiness as the ultimate end of all sentient beings, and accordingly also the purpose of law and government” (Dorji, 2022, p. 441). The desired goal of the king’s rule and implementation of laws is to “is to bring benefit and happiness to all beings of the country” (Dorji, 2022, p. 441). Consequently, happiness can be promoted by the government through the formulation and implementation of laws based on Buddhist values and teachings (Dharma) (Aries, 2009). The promotion of welfare and happiness is the primary responsibility of the king and the basis for the government’s existence (Ardussi, 2004; Dorji, 2022). When the concept of GNH was first introduced by the fourth king, it was based on four pillars – good governance, conservation of the environment, cultural preservation, and sustainable socio-economic development (Ura et  al., 2012). GNH policy is based on finding the “middle path” and the right balance between material wealth and spiritual happiness, while ensuring that all features of Bhutanese society including the environment, cultural beliefs, and unique traditions are preserved along with seeking economic prosperity and ensuring sound democratic governance and security (Dorji, 2022; van Norren, 2023). Since it was introduced in 1986, the policy of GNH has been implemented through the GNH index which has expanded the four pillars into nine measurable domains, 33 indicators and over 100 variables (Ura et  al., 2012; Long, 2019; Dorji, 2022). Over the years, the GNH index has emerged as an alternative to pure economic measures such as Gross National Product (GNP) as it measures levels of happiness by striking a balance and merging developmental, environmental, socioeconomic, and spiritual indicators (van Norren, 2023; Long, 2019). GNH and the four pillars that it is based on along with the emphasis on happiness are all mentioned in the Constitution. Articles 9.2 and 20.1 of the Constitution have incorporated the values and pillars on which GNH is based as constitutional values and principles (National Assembly of Bhutan, 2022). The state not only has “a clear duty” in implementing GNH, but GNH and its four pillars are elements around which the entire Constitution has been built (van Norren, 2023; Tobgye, 2016). Since the introduction of GNH in the 1980s, annual real GDP growth has averaged 7.5% (World Bank, 2022). Levels of poverty neel vanvari

have dropped from 27% in 2007 to 9% in 2017, based on a threshold of $3.65 a day (World Bank, 2022). In 2021, Bhutan had a GDP per capita of $3,358 (National Statistics Bureau, 2023). Hydropower, specifically the sale of surplus hydroelectricity to India, and tourism are the main drivers of the economy (Akita & Lethro, 2022). India and Bhutan have a long history of cooperation in hydroelectricity, with India financing hydroelectric projects in Bhutan and Bhutan exporting most of the energy generated from these hydroelectric projects to India (Akita & Lethro, 2022; Tortajada & Saklani, 2018). While the agricultural sector only accounts for 17% of total GDP, it accounts for 54% of total employment (Akita & Lethro, 2022). Agriculture continues to remain a significant source of employment in rural areas. The declining growth rate in agriculture from 5% in the 1980s to 1.53% between 2005 and 2010 has had adverse effects on the rural economy (Kantha, 2013). Despite its success in eliminating poverty and having the second lowest incidence of poverty in South Asia, rural poverty continues to be a significant challenge, partly due to low labour productivity in agriculture and declining levels of agricultural growth (Akita & Lethro, 2022). Like the rest of Asia, Bhutan was impacted by the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Revenues from tourism fell sharply as Bhutan closed its borders in early 2020 (Whitecross, 2021). Economic relief measures implemented by the government during the pandemic have increased fiscal deficits (World Bank, 2022). Supply chain disruptions, labour shortages, and high commodity prices have put a strain on the balance of payments and delayed the completion of several hydroelectric projects (World Bank, 2022). The poverty rate rose to 9.4% in 2021 from 8.4% in 2020 (World Bank, 2022). However, after a successful vaccine rollout and the easing of restrictions in 2021, Bhutan’s GDP grew by 4.01% in 2021 (National Statistics Bureau, 2023).

B. The landscape One area which recent research on Bhutan focuses on is the state of Bhutan’s democracy. Whitecross (2012) notes that Bhutan is a “nascent democracy”, as Bhutan held its first national election in 2008. Turner and Tshering (2014) examine Bhutan’s democracy after the

bhutan  197 country’s second general election in 2013. They use several criteria to analyse the robustness of Bhutan’s evolving democracy such as freedom of expression, elections, and the rule of law. In 2013, more parties and candidates were on the ballot than in the 2008 election (Turner & Tshering, 2014). In the 2008 National Assembly election, the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) party won 45 seats and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won just two seats (Kantha, 2013). In the 2013 National Assembly election, the PDP won 32 seats and there was a peaceful transfer of power to the PDP from the DPT (Kantha, 2013). Scholars argue that this was a crucial test for Bhutan’s burgeoning democracy (Turner & Tshering, 2014; Muni, 2014; Kantha, 2013). Muni (2014) notes that this transition of power from the incumbent to the opposition fulfils Huntingdon’s criterion of a “two turnover test” of democratic consolidation (Muni, 2014, p. 159; Huntingdon, 1991). In the 2018 election, the Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT) party won 30 seats in the National Assembly and the DPT won 17 seats (Nayak, Singh, & Behuria, 2018). The incumbent PDP failed to qualify from the first stage of the primary election to the general election (Nayak, Singh, & Behuria, 2018). In the three elections that Bhutan has had since its transition to democracy in 2008, three different parties have formed the government and new parties have been able to gain seats in parliament. Nayak, Singh, and Behuria (2018) note that this indicates a further “maturing” of Bhutan’s democracy. Beyond elections, Turner and Tshering (2014) note that the presence of other elements of democracy such as the rule of law and freedom of expression are further signs of democratic consolidation in Bhutan. For instance, they note that institutions continue to fulfil their role of being checks and balances as stated in the Constitution (Turner & Tshering, 2014). The judiciary has acted as a check and balance against the executive when the executive was found to be in breach of the law (Turner & Tshering, 2014). Similarly, the upper house of the legislature, the National Council, has acted as a check and balance against the executive, who, through its control of the lower house (the National Assembly), was attempting to pass a bill without proper consultation (Turner & Tshering, 2014). Another area of research has been the role of the king. Dorji (2022) argues that the

monarchy continues to remain a key feature of Bhutan’s Constitution. The emphasis on stability prevalent in Bhutanese society, the reluctance to accept democracy as a system of governance due to its perception of being an untested and unfamiliar system, as well as the public’s desire to see the monarchy play a key role in public life resulted in the king being kept as head of state in the 2008 Constitution (Muni, 2014; van Norren, 2023; Turner & Tshering, 2014). As the initiator of reform and the institution which pushed the country towards democratisation, the monarchy is seen as “braiding” traditional values with modern democratic values (Dorji, 2022, p. 18). Along with being head of state, the king still has other powers as outlined in the Constitution, such as being a member of the legislature and being able to initiate “abstract” judicial review (Dorji, 2022). Due to the vital role still played by the king in relation to Bhutan’s democracy, Muni calls Bhutan’s regime a “top-down democracy” (2014, p. 158). Gallenkamp (2010) refers to the king’s role as being more in line with the role of a president and calls Bhutan’s governance structure a “semi-presidential” monarchy. Adhikari (2022) questions whether Bhutan can be classified as an “imposed or dictated” democracy, noting that the king continues to remain significantly popular on account of the moral authority and the traditional reverence given to the monarch in Bhutanese society. Democracy and elected politicians, on the other hand, continue to remain unpopular, as represented by the opposition towards democratisation in the late 2000s and the lack of citizen participation through low turnouts in democratic elections (Adhikari, 2022; Muni, 2014; Mathou, 2018). Sebastian argues that the position of the king is “unchallengeable” given that the process of democratisation itself began at the instigation of the throne (2015, p. 221). However, despite the powers that the king holds, he has stayed out of party politics and there are other checks and balances in the Constitution ensuring that the principle of constitutional monarchy remains intact (Dorji, 2022; van Norren, 2023). For instance, the king must abdicate once he reaches the age of 65 and the king can also be forced to abdicate through an Act of Parliament and a referendum (Dorji, 2022; van Norren, 2023). Moreover, scholars have argued that the king still plays a vital role by providing welfare neel vanvari

198  encyclopedia of asian politics for the people as well as personally travelling across the country to raise awareness on issues such as the COVID-19 vaccine, convincing people to be more open to the idea of democratisation and settling land disputes in rural areas (Whitecross, 2021; Dorji, 2022; Muni, 2014; van Norren, 2023). Given the dual system of governance as well as the emphasis on Buddhism in the Constitution, Whitecross (2007) examines whether there is separation of religion and politics in Bhutan. Despite the majority of the population being Buddhist and the role that Buddhism has played in influencing GNH as well as its importance in the Constitution, Buddhism was not made the official religion of Bhutan (Whitecross, 2007). Similarly, other measures were introduced to ensure that there was some degree of separation between religion and politics. For instance, the religious branch of the dual system of governance was removed from the legislature as part of the new Constitution (van Norren, 2023). According to van Norren (2023), it would be wrong to categorise Bhutan as a theocracy simply based on the role that Buddhism plays in its governance structure. The Constitution aims to strike a balance between secularism and the need to “preserve culture and identity; a culture in which Buddhist values (including religion) have a strong influence” (van Norren, 2023, p. 16). Despite the strides that democracy has made in Bhutan, scholars have also pointed out some of the problems which are still prevalent in Bhutan. The most pertinent of these is the issue of the treatment of minorities in Bhutan. Despite the emphasis on GNH and happiness, the treatment of minority groups such as the Nepali-Bhutanese Lhotshampas or the Sharchops is still an issue of concern (Banki, 2014). These ethnolinguistic tensions, which led to the deportation of minority Nepali-Bhutanese who are mostly Hindu and speak Nepali in the 1990s, have not been adequately addressed even in the post-democratisation era (Mørch, 2016; Muni, 2014). The Constitution reserves certain freedoms only for Bhutanese citizens and implicitly discriminates against the minority Lhotshampas (van Norren, 2023). GNH has also been criticised for being a medium to “smoothen up” Bhutan’s image (van Norren, 2023, p.14; Munro, 2016). GNH has not provided solutions to socioeconomic problems such as increasing the participation of women in public office, high neel vanvari

levels of youth unemployment, and widening urban–rural divide due to high costs of infrastructure development in rural areas resulting in a lack of development (Mocko & Penjore, 2016; Mathou, 2017; Munro, 2016).

C. Future research Although scholars like Dorji (2022) have already begun to analyse the role of political parties in Bhutan’s democracy, a detailed analysis and knowledge of Bhutan’s political parties is still lacking. Given that local elections and National Council elections take place on a non-partisan basis, parties can only compete for the National Assembly once every five years. Moreover, given Bhutan’s unique system of only having two parties in Parliament, minor parties have few avenues to interact with the electorate. Dorji (2022) has already questioned how parties survive between elections. A more detailed study about how parties organise, institutionalise, and function in Bhutan would fill a vital research gap. A second area of research on Bhutan would be the voting patterns of the electorate, especially those of younger voters. As discussed earlier, youth unemployment continues to remain a serious problem in Bhutan. This is accompanied by a weakening of traditional values such as spirituality and the role of religion (van Norren, 2023). In light of this, it would be interesting to study how the youth in Bhutan vote and whether they only consider economic variables or whether their voting patterns are influenced by other factors as well, such as the liberalisation of the political space and the public sphere. Lastly, Bhutan’s geo-strategic location places it between two rising powers, India and China (Mathou, 2017). Bhutan has extensive economic and diplomatic relations with India, but it also has an unresolved border dispute with China (Mocko & Penjore, 2016). This is further complicated by China making fresh territorial claims on areas located inside Bhutan (Whitecross, 2021). As the rivalry between India and China continues to intensify and the Himalayan border between India and China continues to become more militarised, Bhutan will have to walk a careful diplomatic tightrope between India and China (Whitecross, 2020). On the one hand, Bhutan has to maintain its long-standing relations with India, and on the other hand, China is a

bhutan  199 diplomatic and economic powerhouse which Bhutan cannot ignore (Mitra & Thaliyakkatil, 2018). Studying how Bhutan responds to the contentious geo-political environment as a small state will further enrich the academic literature on Bhutan. Neel Vanvari

Note 1.

The Maldives is the smallest country in South Asia with a geographical land size of 298 km 2.

References Adhikari, P. (2022, December 24). Bhutan dictated democracy? Southern Social Movements Newswire. https://www​.cetri​ .be​/ Bhutan​-Dictated​-democracy​?lang​=fr. Akita, T., & Lethro, D. (2022). Pro-poorness of rural economic growth and the roles of education in Bhutan, 2007–2017. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 1–27. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1080​/13547860​.2022​.2054132. Ardussi, J. (2004). Formation of the state of Bhutan (‘Brug gzhung’) in the 17th century and its Tibetan antecedents. Journal of Bhutan Studies, 11, 10–32. Aries, M. (2009). Sources for the History of Bhutan. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Banki, S. (2014). Bhutan: What future for minorities in the emerging democracy? East Asia Forum Quarterly (Online), 6(1), 22–23. Dorji, N. (2022). The progressive monarchy of Bhutan: A not-so-absolute monarchy to a democratic constitutional monarchy. Asian Journal of Law and Society, 9(3), 440–459. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/als​.2022​.34. European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM). (2008, March 24). Bhutan Final Report National Assembly Election. https://www​.eods​.eu​/library​/eu_​ _eom​_bhutan​_2008​_final​_report​.pdf. Gallenkamp, M. (2010). Democracy in Bhutan: An Analysis of Constitutional Change in a Buddhist Monarchy. IPCS Research Papers. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Accessed January 3, 2023. http://www​.ipcs​.org​/research​-paper​/south​ -asia​/democracy​-in​-bhutan​-an​-analysis​-of​ -constitutional​-change​-in​-a​-24​.html. Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press.

Jamtsho, T. (2016). Summary of Their Majesties’ Deeds. Centre for Bhutan Studies. Kantha, P. K. (2013). Nepal and Bhutan in 2012: Uncertain democratic consolidation. Asian Survey, 53(1), 84–92. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1525​/as​.2013​.53​.1​.84. Kantha, P. K. (2014). Nepal and Bhutan in 2013: A year of elections. Asian Survey, 54(1), 206–213. https://doi​.org​/10​.1525​/as​ .2014​.54​.1​.206. Kinga, S. (2009). Polity, Kingship and Democracy: A Biography of the Bhutanese State. Ministry of Education of Bhutan. Long, W. (2019). Tantric State: A Buddhist Approach to Democracy and Development in Bhutan. Oxford University Press. Majumder, S. (2007, April 21). Bhutan holds fake national poll. BBC. http://news​.bbc​.co​ .uk​/2​/ hi​/south​_asia​/6578421​.stm. Mathou, T. (2017). Bhutan in 2016: A new era is born. Asian Survey, 57(1), 56–59. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1525​/AS​.2017​.57​.1​.56. Mathou, T. (2018). Bhutan in 2017: Preparing a new cycle. Asian Survey, 58(1), 138–141. https://doi​.org​/10​.1525​/AS​.2018​.58​.1​.138. Mitra, S. K., & Thaliyakkattil, S. (2018). Bhutan and Sino–Indian rivalry. Asian Survey, 58(2), 240–260. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1525​/as​.2018​.58​.2​.240. Mocko, A., & Penjore, D. (2016). Nepal and Bhutan in 2015: Shifting ground. Asian .org​ /10​ Survey, 56(1), 210–215. https://doi​ .1525​/AS​.2016​.56​.1​.210. Mørch, M. (2016, September 21). Bhutan’s dark secret: The Lhotshampa expulsion. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​ .com ​ / 2016 ​ / 09 ​ / bhutans ​ - dark​ - secret​ - the​ -lhotshampa​-expulsion/. Muni, S. D. (2014). Bhutan’s deferential democracy. Journal of Democracy, 25(2), 158–163. https://doi​.org​/10​.1353​/jod​.2014​ .0027. Munro, L. T. (2016). Where did Bhutan’s gross national happiness come from? The origins of an invented tradition. Journal of Asian Affairs, 47, 71–92. National Assembly of Bhutan. (2022). The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan. Accessed December 12, 2022. https:// www​.nab​.gov​.bt ​/assets​/templates​/images​/ constitution​-of​-bhutan​-2008​.pdf. National Statistics Bureau of Bhutan. (2023). Home. Accessed January 3, 2023. https:// www​.nsb​.gov​.bt/. neel vanvari

200  encyclopedia of asian politics Nayak, N. R., Singh, R., & Behuria, A. K. (2018). Bhutan national assembly elections 2018: A mandate for change? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Accessed November 12, 2018. https://www​ . idsa​ . in​ / issuebrief​ / bhutan​ -elections​-2018​_ nnayak​-rsingh​-akbehuria​ -121118. Nishimizu, M. (2008). Portrait of a Leader: Through the Looking-Glass of His Majesty’s Decrees. Centre for Bhutan Studies. Phuntsho, K. (2013). The History of Bhutan. Penguin Random House India. Sebastian, S. (2015). Parliamentary Democracy in Bhutan, a Journey From Tradition to Modernity. Adroit Publishers. Tobgye, S. (2016). The Constitution of Bhutan—Principles and Philosophies. The Royal Court of Justice of Bhutan. Tortajada, C., & Saklani, U. (2018). Hydropower-based collaboration in south Asia: The case of India and Bhutan. Energy Policy, 117, 316–325. https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​ /j​.enpol​.2018​.02​.046. Turner, M., & Tshering, J. (2014). Is democracy being consolidated in Bhutan? Asian Politics & Policy, 6(3), 413–431. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/aspp​.12127. Ura, K., Alkire, S., & Zangmo, T. (2012). A Short Guide to Gross National Happiness Index. Centre for Bhutan Studies. van Norren, D. E. (2023). Gross national happiness in Bhutan: Is Buddhist constitutionalism legitimate in the age of secularism? A post-colonial view. Religions (Basel, Switzerland), 14(1), 1–20. https:// doi​.org​/10​.3390​/rel14010072. Whitecross, R. W. (2007). Separation of religion and law?: Buddhism, secularism and the constitution of Bhutan. Buffalo Law Review, 55(2), 707–711.

neel vanvari

Whitecross, R. W. (2009). Keeping the stream of justice clear and pure: The Buddhicization of Bhutanese law. In A. Griffiths, F. von Benda-Beckmann, & K. von Benda-Beckmann (Eds.), The Power of Law in a Transnational World: Anthropological Enquiries (pp. 195–215). Berghahn Books. Whitecross, R. W. (2012). Separating religion and politics? Buddhism and Bhutanese constitution. In S. Khilnani, V. Raghavan, & A. K. Thiruvengadam (Eds.), Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia (pp. 116– 44). Oxford University Press. Whitecross, R. W. (2020). Bhutan in 2019. Asian Survey, 60(1), 204–206. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1525​/as​.2020​.60​.1​.204. Whitecross, R. W. (2021). Bhutan in 2020. Asian Survey, 61(1), 207–210. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1525​/as​.2021​.61​.1​.207. World Bank. (2022, October 9). The World Bank in Bhutan. https://www​.worldbank​ .org​/en​/country​/ bhutan​/overview​#1. WorldData​.info​. (2022). Bhutan. Accessed December 12, 2022. https://www​.worlddata​ .info​/asia​/ bhutan​/index​.php.

Key resources Long, W. (2019). Tantric State: A Buddhist Approach to Democracy and Development in Bhutan. Oxford University Press. Phuntsho, K. (2013). The History of Bhutan. Penguin Random House India. Whitecross, R. W. (2012). Separating religion and politics? Buddhism and Bhutanese constitution. In S. Khilnani, V. Raghavan, & A. K. Thiruvengadam (Eds.), Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia (pp. 116– 44). Oxford University Press.

37. Brunei Darussalam

With the discovery of the Seria oil field in 1929 in the Belait District of Brunei Darussalam, the economy of the country developed and stabilised (Odekon, 2006). Brunei Shell Petroleum (BSP) was formed A. The concept where it is a joint venture between the Brunei Darussalam is a country reigned by a Government of Brunei Darussalam and Royal hereditary Malay Muslim monarchy since the Dutch Shell. The joint venture is responsible 15th century. Darussalam means the ‘Abode for extracting and processing oil and natural of Peace’ (Haggett, 2002), therefore known in gas. The discovery resulted in another joint full as Brunei, the Abode of Peace. Located on venture, with Mitsubishi Corporation, in liqthe northwest coast of the island of Borneo in uefied natural gas. Brunei Liquefied Natural Southeast Asia overlooking the South China Gas (BLNG) was formed in 1969 and was Sea, the country of 5,769 square kilometres is the world’s most extensive liquefied natural separated into two parts by the East Malaysian gas facility in 1973 (Brunei LNG, 2022). As state of Sarawak. Brunei would likely have 90% of Brunei’s export earnings come from been incorporated into Sarawak if the British oil and gas, the country’s economy is highly had not established a residence there in the reliant on the extraction of natural resources earlier years of their administration in 1906 (Koh, 2011). Oil and gas became the pri(Talib, 2002). The research by Odekon (2006) mary trade and export activity of Brunei elaborated that Brunei Darussalam became a Darussalam, which accounted for 43.6% of British protectorate in 1888 and was the only the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2017 protectorate of the British Empire that resisted (OECD, 2018), and the country was subsejoining the planned Federation of Malaysia in quently recognised as a developed nation by 1963. Wright (1988) stated that under the pro- the Organization for Economic Cooperation tectorate, Brunei Darussalam was known as and Development. the British Protectorate State of Brunei. Due In the monarchical government of Brunei to the historical influence, although the offi- Darussalam, all executive authority is derived cial language in Brunei Darussalam is Malay, from the Constitution. The hierarchical ruler, English is widely used and spoken. Basic edu- the 29th Sultan, His Majesty Sultan Haji cation is taught in the English language, and Hassanal Bolkiah Mui’izzaddin Waddaulah students who complete their education will Ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Haji Omar ‘Ali achieve a formal certification known as the Saifuddien Sa’adul Khairi Waddien, also Brunei Cambridge General Certification of known as the Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei Education (MOE, 2018). Darussalam, the Supreme Executive The nation is made up of four districts. Authority, has absolute authority in the govBandar Seri Begawan is the capital and ernment structure. The Cabinet and their is situated in the Brunei-Muara district, respective offices hold the Executive authorthe centre for government and commer- ity. In 1959, Brunei Darussalam’s first cial activities. Other districts are Tutong, Constitution provided for a mostly appoinBelait, and Temburong. Belait district was tive Legislative Council (Odekon, 2006). The the primary location for oil and gas activi- AGC elaborated that the legislation’s goal was ties until 2019 when a foreign direct invest- to carry out obligations to the international ment company, Hengyi Industries (2022), community to advance the nation’s socioecoestablished a refinery and integrated petro- nomic growth. chemical project on Pulau Muara Besar1 in The Sultan and the Legislative Council the capital. Temburong district is where it determine and define how the functions of is separated from the rest of the country by the country’s legal system will be enforced Sarawak. and interpreted (AGC, 2015). The Sultan is According to the Department of Economic the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Planning and Statistics in Brunei Darussalam Minister of Finance and Economy, and (2021) during the Population and Housing Minister of Foreign Affairs (Prime Minister’s Census, 440,715 people made up the coun- Office, 2022). There are no general elections, try’s total population. Of these, 297,016 peo- organised opposition, or independent civil ple are of the Malay race; while 42,132 are society. Müller (2017) elaborated that Brunei Chinese, the majority of these are stateless, Darussalam is the only ASEAN country with and 101,567 are of other races. such governance. The only political party 201

202  encyclopedia of asian politics permitted in Brunei Darussalam, the National Development Party, operates on absolute loyalty to the monarchy (Freedom House, 2022).

B. The landscape Recent academic research on Brunei has focused on how the country has addressed demographic, economic, and political issues. The Brunei Nationality Act of 1961 (AGC, 2002) regulates the population of Brunei Darussalam. Regardless of if a person or family was born or has lived for many generations in Brunei Darussalam, both permanent residents and non-citizens must meet a specific set of requirements of the Brunei Nationality Act. Without it, they are unable to access the rights and advantages of Bruneian citizens and have to live with stateless status in the country. The status would also mean it is difficult to obtain travel documents and visas to travel out of the country. Sinaga (2022) states that although ASEAN2 (Association of the Southeast Asian Nations) has pledged to uphold democracy and human rights, it is unable to enforce these values among its members or guarantee access to citizenship and protection for people who are on stateless status. In 1984, Brunei Darussalam acceded to ASEAN. According to Allaert (1995), given the fundamental differences in the economic, cultural, and political systems among its members, ASEAN is not an integrating organisation. Instead, it is a forum for intergovernmental dialogue and collaboration that aims to accommodate and harmonise individual policies on shared topics. As a result of a mandate between Brunei Darussalam and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR, 2013), the efforts3 of the country to forge a more substantial presence and sociopolitical relationship among the community of international organisations are ongoing. The nation of less than half a million people is taking obligatory steps, albeit at its own pace, to participate and share information at ASEAN bodies and UNHCR workshops to improve human rights in the country. Brunei’s economic prosperity is dependent on oil and gas exports. Although the slump in oil prices in 2014 caused growing deficits in the country’s budget (Müller, 2017), the steep decline did not warrant an incurrence of personal income tax implementation (Cooke, 2012). As a result, Bruneians enjoy a standard edna nurafeeqah abdul ghani luah

of living with heavily subsidised medical care, free education, and a tax-free lifestyle. It was also an effort to comply according to the Maqasid of the Syariah,4 which will later be elaborated in this chapter. According to Ackerman (2022), OPEC5 acknowledged that the biggest impediments which would threaten the economy of the oil- and gasproducing countries are political stability and security. In times of economic disruption and political instability resulting from COVID-19 and the Russia–Ukraine war,6 ‘inflationary pressure is expected to persist’ (IMF, 2022). Due to their long-standing friendship, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam established the Currency Interchangeability Agreement.7 The Agreement was established in 1967 to encourage financial collaboration between the two countries. In establishments such as banks and retail stores, each of the respective countries accepts currency issued by the other at par and without charging a conversion fee into their own currency. Therefore, both currencies enjoy flat usage in both countries. The influence of religion on politics and governance in Brunei has been studied extensively in recent years. The majority of the legal systems in Malay countries implement the English common law system. According to Chuchu and Saxena (2009), this is because European nations, primarily the empires of the British and Dutch, have colonised those nations for a very long time. Since gaining its independence in 1984, Brunei Darussalam has been operating under a dual legal system based on parallel systems of English common law and Syariah Islamic Law. The duality allows the two legal systems to effectively run in two separate court systems, namely the civil court and the Syariah court. In the progression of the Syariah Law, the country’s political landscape today incorporates the elaboration of the Maqasid of the Syariah. The Maqasid of the Syariah in the country’s scale of Islamic Governance was already well underway when Brunei Darussalam attained complete independence in 1984 (Yunos, 2017). The Sultan declared during the National Day ceremony in 2018 that the Maqasid of Syariah’s enforcement is both a must and a catalyst for the country’s progress (Tarip, 2021). The Maqasid of the Syariah translates to ‘the principles of Islamic Law’ (Yunos, 2017). Aziz (2015) explains that the Maqasid of the Syariah is the application of

brunei darussalam  203 ideas, procedures, standards, and principles from the holy Qur’an built within its specific socio-political context, enabling organisations to safeguard and advance the goals of Islamic governance effectively. The operational framework of the Islamic governance envisioned by the Maqasid of the Syariah is completed when modelled on the level of the individual, the community, and collectively by the state and governing body. Abdulaziz (2010) highlights that the highest aspirations of Islamic law in accordance with Imam al-Ghazali could be divided into two categories: the spiritual or religious aspirations that are related to the afterlife and worldly aspirations pertaining to concerns and challenges of this world. Therefore, the Maqasid of the Syariah was created for the benefit and welfare of humanity. Imam al-Ghazali was one of the most eminent and prominent intellectuals, theologians, jurists, and mystics in Sunni Islam (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2020). In the present moment, the Government of Brunei Darussalam confidently carries out and fulfils the Maqasid of the Syariah with certainty (Yunos, 2017), although with some resistance from foreign governments and international organisations during the early stages of the Syariah Law implementation. The contemporary societal activities already oriented to achieving the Maqasid of the Syariah in Brunei Darussalam were governed to build a society supportive of the worship of Allah. Instances of these activities are 1) Preservation and promotion of faith – Brunei Darussalam delivered the introduction of the Syariah Law, the Syariah Penal Code Order 2013. According to Black (2019), under the Syariah Penal Code Order, Brunei Darussalam allowed theft to be punishable by amputation while sodomy, adultery, and rape are punishable by whipping, imprisonment, or the death penalty by stoning. The punishment lined out by the order sparked an uproar in the international community, such as Amnesty International (2019) which pointed out that Brunei has turned down recommendations in the UN human rights evaluation, including the treaty of Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading treatment or Punishment (CAT). The economic, social, political, cultural,

and civic rights that support a life free from want and terror are all guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 2015). However, the death penalty was an existing English common law capital punishment in Brunei Darussalam. The entirety of the Syariah Penal Code Order 2013, protecting the rights of women and minors, was not taken into account by those who opposed one component of the order. On the other hand, the rights of women and minors8 under the Brunei Nationality Act could be improved upon. The Asia Media Centre (2019) reported that the former New Zealand Prime Minister and UN Development Programme Administrator Helen Clark called such a move ‘barbaric’ as New Zealand strongly supports the rainbow community and, as a nation, is against the death penalty. However, the order was followed through in the exercise of the power of the Constitution of Brunei Darussalam; as a sovereign Islamic and fully independent country, the country enforces its own rule of law (AGC, 2013). 2) Preservation and promotion of life – According to Sulaiman (2003), due to significant welfare services and programmes established in the 1950s by the monarchy and supported by the riches generated from oil and gas, Bruneians enjoy a high standard of living. Healthcare was provided to citizens at no cost prior to 1998 and later at the fee of one Brunei dollar for citizens as a registration fee (MOH, 1998). 3) Preservation and promotion of intellect – United Nations Human Rights (2016) reported in their press release that compulsory education in Brunei Darussalam is provided free for citizens, then later permanent residents, in governmentowned schools. It was also reported that the literacy rate of young people was almost 100% with the preparation of inclusive schools equipped to facilitate learning for children with special needs and different abilities. 4) Preservation and promotion of progeny – The overall rating for Brunei Darussalam in the aspect of women, business, and the law was lower than the regional average for East Asia and the Pacific, according to the World Bank Group (2021). It edna nurafeeqah abdul ghani luah

204  encyclopedia of asian politics was noted that there is a lack of policies and regulations concerning the welfare and women after having children, as well as the nationalities of their children, when not in accordance with the Brunei Nationality Act. However, women receive the same pension benefits as men in the country. 5) Preservation and promotion of wealth – Despite limitations in policies and framework, Brunei Darussalam continuously laboured to ensure that jobs and trade were functioning to sustain the country’s economy (OECD, 2018), allowing Bruneians to enjoy a lifestyle free from personal income tax. Additionally, to assist retirees in their golden age of above 60 years old, the government disbursed a monthly old-age pension at the order of the Sultan (Sulaiman, 2003). Pension fund entitlements are disbursed to all eligible retirees (citizens and permanent residents), regardless of whether they have previously held a job.

Islamic Governance framework. It is also useful to explore how international organisations will assist to facilitate the changes through the challenges, unique to each country, such as MIB and Islamic governance in Brunei Darussalam. Conway (2006) noted that trends have a predictable cycle and will draw attention to emerging issues. To diversify the economy from the reliance on oil and gas, how will Brunei Darussalam introduce policies in order to grow foreign direct investment and industry portfolio for the country? The country’s effort to work on policies to support small and medium enterprises may need to hasten so the economy, not limited to the country’s oil and gas industry, can broaden. Hence research in this area is also warranted, in order to examine whether Brunei is successful in navigating the challenge of economic transformation and its consequences. Edna Nurafeeqah Abdul Ghani Luah

C. Future research

1.

Brunei Darussalam’s National Philosophy upholds the tenets of the Malay Islamic Monarchy, also known as Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), which directs the practice of Islam and preserves Brunei Darussalam’s Malay heritage. The concept of MIB is the government’s effort in response to building public piety and increasing demands for an Islamisation of society. But like all other aspects of life in the rapidly changing and modernising of Brunei Darussalam, future stability depends on the success of the sociopolitical and economic reform processes currently underway, which are fast evolving and becoming more contemporary (Schottmann, 2012). On the one hand, Brunei Darussalam’s official policy is to ‘encourage economic growth while preserving cultural and religious values’ (Commonwealth Governance, 2022). On the other hand, the obligatory participation in international organisations such as ASEAN and the UN shaped the political landscape for Brunei Darussalam. If contemporary Asian politics seeks for solutions to ease the political challenges and changes faced by the countries of Asia, then further study will need to understand and further explore how Brunei Darussalam can navigate incorporating the edna nurafeeqah abdul ghani luah

Notes Pulau Muara Besar is an island off Brunei Bay that has restricted access. The foreign direct investment comprised a joint venture between the government of Brunei Darussalam and China’s petrochemical industry giant, Zhejiang Hengyi Group. 2. ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See https://asean​.org. 3. UNHCR compiled that Brunei Darussalam endeavours the following: a. Integration and naturalisation of stateless people b. Birth registration c. Nationality law and the prevention and reduction of statelessness d. Developing areas of cooperation with UNCHR However e. A national refugee law has yet to be put in place. 4. Refer to Maqasid of the Syariah in Brunei Darussalam. 5. OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. See https://www​.opec​.org​/opec​_web​/en/. 6. Graph showing volatility index (VIX) of COVID19 crisis and Ukraine war. See https://www​.mckinsey​. com ​ /capabilities ​ /strategy​ - and ​ - corporate​ -finance​/our​-insights​/war​-in​-ukraine​-twelve​- disruptions​-changing​-the​-world. 7. Money Authority Singapore (MAS) (2017). The Currency Interchangeability Agreement. Macroeconomic Review. Economic Policy Group 16(1). See https://www​.mas​.gov​.sg/-​/media​/mas​/ macroeconomic​-review​-2017​/mrapr17​.pdf. 8. ‘Brunei Darussalam’s Gender Discriminatory Laws and Policies That Prevent Women from Conferring Nationality on Their Children and Spouses’ – Statelessness Network Asia Pacific, Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights, The

brunei darussalam  205 Understanding the Law: Role and Responsibilities of the Government. Retrieved 23 November 2022, from https://www​.agc​.gov​.bn​/AGC​%20Images​ /Understanding​%20the​%20Law​%202019​ / 01.​%2 0 T H E ​%2 0 G OV E R N M E N T​ %20AND​%20ITS​%20POLICY​.pdf. References Black, E. A. (2019). Casting the First Stone: Abdulaziz, A. (January 2015). Governance in The Significance of Brunei Darussalam’s a Contemporary Islamic Negara. Journal Syariah Penal Code Order for LGBT of Islamic Governance, 21, 1. Bruneians. Australian Journal of Asian Abdulaziz, A. (December 2010). Al-Dhar’i Law, 20(1), 247–263. and Maqasid Al-Shari’ahh: A Case Study of Islamic Insurance. Intellectual Discourse, Brunei LNG. (2022). History and Background. https://www​.bruneilng​.com ​/profile​/ history​ 18(2), 261–281. -and​-background/. Ackerman, W. C. (July 2022). OPEC and Maximum Production: What is Chuchu, F., and Saxena, M. (2009). SocioCultural Hierarchy in the Palace Language Sustainable? Middle East Institute. of Brunei Darussalam. https://fass​.ubd​.edu​ Retrieved 27 November 2022, from https:// .bn​/SEA​/vol9​/SEA​-v9​-fatimah​-saxena​.pdf. www​ . mei​ . edu​ / publications​ / opec​ - and​ Commonwealth Governance. (2022). -maximum​-production​-what​-sustainable. Government Politics of Brunei Allaert, A. M. (1995). Negara Brunei Darussalam. Retrieved 13 December Darussalam: A Country Study on the 2022, from https://www​.com​monw​ealt​ Wealthiest State in South East Asia. CAS hgov​ e rnance​ .org​ /countries​ /asia​ / brunei​ Discussion Paper. _darussalam​/government​-politics/. Amnesty International. (April 2019). Press Conway, M., and Futures, T. (2006). An Release: Brunei Must Immediately Overview of Foresight Methodologies. An​_ Halt Plans to Introduce Stonings and Ov​​ervie​​w​_of_​​Fores​​ight_​​Metho​​dolog​​​ies​.p​​df. Other Viscious Punishmnets. Retrieved 10 August 2023, from https://www​.amnesty​ Cooke, K. (2012). Brunei Darussalam: Diversifying is hard to do. Global: .org​/en ​/ latest ​/press​-release​/2019​/04​/ brunei​ The International Briefing. Retrieved -darussalam​-must​-immediately​-halt​-plans​ 27 November 2022, from https://www​ -to ​-introduce ​-stonings​-and​- other​-vicious​ .global​-briefing​.org​/2012​/07​/diversifying​-is​ -punishments/. -hard​-to​-do/. Asia Media Centre. (2019). Asia in the news: Brunei brings in ‘barbaric’ anti-gay stoning Department of Economic Planning and Statistics (DEPS). (2021). Ministry of laws. Retrieved 12 December 2022, from Finance and Economy: Population 2021. https://www​.asiamediacentre​.org​.nz​/news​/ Retrieved 24 November 2022, from https:// asia​-in​-the​-news​-brunei​-brings​-in​-barbaric​ deps​ . mofe​ .gov​ .bn​ /SitePages​ / Population​ -stoning​-law/. .aspx. Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC). (2002). Constitution of Brunei Darussalam. Brunei Freedom House. (2022). Freedom in the World 2022: Brunei. Retrieved 15 December Nationality Act (Amendment) Order, 2002. 2022, from https://freedomhouse​.org​/ Brunei Darussalam Government Gazette. country​/ brunei​/freedom​-world​/2022. Retrieved 1 December 2022, from https:// www​.agc​.gov​.bn​/AGC​%20Images​/ LAWS​/ Haggett, P. (2002). Encyclopedia of World Geography (21). Marshall Cavendish. Gazette​_PDF​/2002​/ EN​/s055​.pdf. Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC). (2013). Hengyi Industries Sdn Bhd. (2022). About Us: We are Hengyi. Retrieved 26 November Constitution of Brunei Darussalam: Order 2022, from https://www​.hengyi​-industries​ Made Under Article 83(3). Retrieved 24 November 2022, from https://www​ .com ​/about​-us/. .agc​.gov​.bn ​/aGc​%20images​/ Laws​/Gazette​ International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2022). Brunei Darussalam: 2022 Article IV _pdf ​/ 2013​/en ​/syariah​%20penal​%20code​ Consultation-Press Release. Retrieved %20order2013​.pdf. 27 November 2022, from https://www​ Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC). .elibrary​.imf​.org​/view​/journals​/002​/2022​ (2015). The Government and Its Policy. /302​/article​-A001​-en​.xml. Brunei Project and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion. May 2019. Joint submission to the Human Rights Council at the 33rd session of the Universal Periodic Review: Brunei Darussalam. See https:// equ​alna​tion​alit​yrights​.org​/images​/zdocs​/GCENR-​ -UPR​-Submission​-Brunei​-Darussalam​.pdf.

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206  encyclopedia of asian politics Koh, W. C. (2011). A Macroeconomic Model of Brunei Darussalam. CSPS Strategy and Policy Journal, 2, 70. Ministry of Education (MOE). (2018). Brunei Darussalam Secondary Education. Retrieved 2 December 2022, from https:// www​ . moe​ .gov​ .bn​ / SitePages​ / Secondary​ %20Education​.aspx. Ministry of Health (MOH). (1998). Scheme of Charges for the Ministry of Health. Retrieved 2 December 2022, from https://www​ . moh​ . gov​ . bn ​ / Sit​ e Col​ l ect​ ionD ​ o cuments ​ / Medical​ %20Charges ​ / chargesformoh​.pdf. Müller, D. (2017). Brunei Darussalam in 2016: The Sultan is Not Amused. Asian Survey, 57(1), 199–205. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1525​/as​.2017​.57​.1​.199. Odekon, M. (2006). Encyclopedia of World Poverty. Sage Publications, Inc. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2018). Structural Policy Country Notes: The Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2019: Towards Smart Urban Transportation. Retrieved 11 December 2022, from https://www​.oecd​.org​/dev​/asia​ -pacific​/saeo​-2019​-Brunei​_Darussalam​.pdf. Prime Minister’s Office, Brunei Darussalam. (2022). Prime Minister. Retrieved 6 December 2022, from https://www​.pmo​ .gov​ . bn​ / SitePages​ / minister​ - and​ - senior​ -officials​/ Prime​-Minister​.aspx. Schottmann, S. (Ed.). (2012). Vols. 1–4. SAGE Publications, Inc. https://dx​.doi​.org​ /10​.4135​/9781452218458. Sinaga, L. C. (2022). The Problem of Statelessness of the Ethnic Chinese in Brunei Darussalam. Marginalisation and Human Rights in South East Asia. Taylor & Francis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2020). Al-Ghazali. Retrieved 22 November 2022, from https://plato​.stanford​.edu​/entries​/al​ -ghazali/. Sulaiman, H. (2003). Negara Brunei Darussalam: Socioeconomic Concerns Amid Stability and Plenty. Southeast Asian Affairs, 69–79. Talib, N. (2002). A Resilient Monarchy: The Sultanate of Brunei and Regime Legitimacy in an Era of Democratic Nation-States. New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 4(2), 134–147.

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Tarip, I. (2021). Developing the Head, Heart and Hand Holistically Towards Achieving the Maqālop of the Sharī’ah: An Undergraduate Perspective. Journal of Islamic Governance. United Nations (UN). (2015). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved 5 December 2022, from https://www​ .un​ .org​ /en​ / udhrbook​ / pdf​ / udhr​ _ booklet​ _ en​ _web​.pdf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2013). Submission by the UNHCR for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report – Universal Periodic Review: Brunei Darussalam. UNHCR​ _UPR19​_BRN​_E​_Main​​.pdf. United Nations Human Rights. (2016). Committee on the Rights of the Child Considers the Report of Brunei Darussalam: Brunei Reviewed. Retrieved 21 November 2022, from https://www​ .ohchr​ . org ​ /en ​ / press ​ - releases ​ / 2016 ​ / 01 ​ / committee ​-rights​- child​- considers​-report​ -brunei​-darussalam. World Bank Group. (2021). Women, Business and the Law 2021: Brunei Darussalam. Retrieved 11 December 2022, from https://wbl​.worldbank​.org​/content​/dam​/ documents​ / wbl​ / 2021​ /snapshots​ / Brunei​ -darussalam​.pdf. Wright, L. R. (1988). The Origins of British Borneo. Hong Kong University Press. Yunos, R. (June 2017). The Evolution of Islamic Governance: With Special Reference to Brunei Darussalam. The Journal of Islamic Governance, 3(1), 1–19.

Key resources Sinaga, L. C. (2022). The Problem of Statelessness of the Ethnic Chinese in Brunei Darussalam: Marginalisation and Human Rights in South East Asia. Taylor & Francis. Sulaiman, H. (2003). Negara Brunei Darussalam: Socioeconomic Concerns Amid Stability and Plenty. Southeast Asian Affairs, 2003, 69–79. Talib, N. (2002). A Resilient Monarchy: The Sultanate of Brunei and Regime Legitimacy in an Era of Democratic Nation-States. New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 4(2), 134–147.

38. China A. The concept This chapter examines the contemporary politics of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1989. The focus will be on the regime durability and adaptability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which has been in power since 1949. The CCP is the largest and one of the most powerful political organisations in the world today and has led the nation’s major socioeconomic transformation over the past four decades. China’s economic transformation in the post-Mao period China’s economic transformation and emergence as a world power began when the late Deng Xiaoping launched the reform and open-door policy in 1978. These policy ideas had their roots in the Mao period prior to reform. Following the founding of the PRC in 1949, Mao Zedong launched one of the biggest experiments in human history to fundamentally alter Chinese politics, the economy, and society. The Maoist development model, however, was unsustainable due to the tremendous human costs. By the late 1970s, there were clear indications of a systemic breakdown, making structural reform necessary. After regaining power following his purge from leadership in earlier decades, Deng promptly started China’s first phase of reform in the 1980s. The contract system and decentralisation were part of this initial phase. This stage of economic development was frequently referred to as “reform without losers”, which referred to an inclusive growth approach that aimed to enhance welfare conditions for people from all socioeconomic backgrounds (Zheng, 2013, p. 43). In the 1990s and up until China’s admission into the World Trade Organization in December 2001, the government pushed for more drastic reform. The fundamental institutional framework of the contemporary Chinese economy has been shaped by this reform era, which included a number of re-centralisation and institutionalisation projects. The third phase of reform began in late 2002 and early 2003. The distorted structure of the Chinese economy and the socioeconomic issues brought on by the previous decade’s unheard-of economic boom was the focus of the reform agenda.

China’s economic transformation is one of the most significant developments in contemporary world history. The country has transformed from a planned economy to a vibrant market economy within barely three decades. In each of the aforementioned three growth periods, the economy achieved an average growth rate of at least 9%. This remarkable transformation is sometimes referred to as the “Chinese economic miracle”. Economic reform in China and the ensuing economic transformation have resulted in significant societal transformations. The fast growth of the private and non-state sectors is one significant trend. The emergence of the middle class has been made possible by the growth of the market economy and the expansion of the private sector. However, China is still far from having a middle-class society similar to that in the industrialised West (Chen & Goodman, 2013). Socioeconomic and political consequences of China’s reform China’s market-oriented reform has accelerated economic growth and transformed society. Many Chinese have profited from economic prosperity, while others have experienced social injustice. What is known as “mass incidents” or social unrest in China has steadily increased since the early 1990s. Social grievance has been closely related to widening income inequality, regional disparities, and urban–rural divide throughout the reform era. The increasingly sophisticated society also resulted in growing political distrust among the Chinese public towards the government. A major driver of public distrust was the issue of widespread corruption among party cadres during the economic reform process. While the middle classes were supportive of government policies and were politically conservative (Nathan, 2016), they did engage in social protests to assert their preferences for issues related to environmental protection and other societal issues. While drastic economic and social changes have occurred in the post-Mao era, China’s political structure remains intact. However, ideological and bureaucratic reforms were implemented to adapt the party to the rapidly evolving society and new world order. In 2001, the CCP proposed the theory of “Three Represents”, indicating an important shift in party ideology, party composition, and party orientation (Shambaugh, 2008, p. 112). The

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208  encyclopedia of asian politics new ideology signified the party’s intention to break away from the old Marxist tradition by recruiting private entrepreneurs and professionals into the party. The CCP’s ideological shift was reinforced by the concept of the “scientific theory of development” and more recent policy agendas such as the “Chinese Dream”. Institutional reforms were also carried out to build a more efficient bureaucratic system. Particularly, the CCP strengthened the cadre-selection system to ensure that professionally competent people were recruited and promoted and remained loyal to the party’s ideologies and policies (Brodsgaard, 2001 pp. 1–2).

B. The landscape The CCP has continued to exert influence over the rapidly changing Chinese society despite other communist governments’ falls from power in the 1990s. The literature review of selected studies below is motivated by one question: how did the party-state hold on to power despite rapid structural reform and socioeconomic transformation in China? Earlier studies on the CCP’s adaptability and regime resilience To explain the durability of the CCP regime, scholars have turned to an overarching theme of Chinese politics – the concept of “authoritarian resilience”– to make sense of the party’s incredible adaptability. Nathan (2003) credits the CCP’s capacity to institutionalise and reconsolidate itself for its surprisingly resilient response to the Tiananmen crisis of 1989. He mentioned the party’s rising functional specialisation, meritocratic promotion patterns, and the development of institutions with participatory input as factors that strengthened the party’s legitimacy. Collectively, these elements, according to Nathan, had created a particularly Chinese type of “authoritarian resilience” that could successfully handle both internal and external shocks. Shambaugh (2008) points out that partystate “resilience” was the product of the CCP’s efforts to completely overhaul its governing capacity in the wake of the 1989 political crisis when popular protests almost crippled the regime. In other words, this wave of institutionalisation occurred in China not in spite of the Tiananmen Square protests and the fall tian he

of Leninist party-states elsewhere, but rather because of them. Dickson (2003) shows that the most successful institutional reform was the party’s decision to allow private entrepreneurs to join the party. This reform allowed the party to build a strong link with the “red capitalists” and ensure that new social forces also had a stake in ensuring the regime’s survival. Naughton and Yang (2004, p. 9) point out that “China has retained a core element of central control: the nomenklatura system of personnel management” and argue that “this nomenklatura personnel system is the most important institution reinforcing national unity”. Scholars have also attributed the durability of the CCP regime to informal social institutions created in the reform era. For example, Tsai (2006) defines the numerous coping mechanisms used by local business actors to avoid constraints or take advantage of opportunities as “adaptive informal institutions” in the political structure of the country. Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry (2011) highlight an adaptable “guerrilla policy style” capable of producing new discoveries and original solutions to problems already in existence, which led to adaptable behaviours that were bound to the CCP’s openly Leninist organisational structure. Recent focus on elite promotion mechanism Understanding the resilience of the CCP was an important topic in the 2000s; in recent years, a major focus of the studies on the party-state’s authoritarian resilience is the CCP’s promotion of party elites. The overarching task for these scholars is to explain how the party can promote economic growth and concurrently ensure its political survival. In the late 1990s and 2000s, scholars observed the association between local economic performance and local government leaders’ likelihood of promotion (Bo, 2002; Li & Zhou, 2005). As Li and Zhou (2005, p. 1) point out, “the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination decreases with their economic performance”. Recent attempts have been made to examine this hypothesis. Identifying patronage ties based on past promotions, Jiang (2018) shows that city leaders with informal ties to the incumbent provincial leaders deliver significantly faster economic growth than those

china  209 without. More recent studies also show a weak correlation between performance and promotion. Using a new biographical database of Central Committee members, Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012) find no evidence that strong growth performance was rewarded with higher party ranks at any of the postreform party congresses. Similarly, Pang, Keng and Zhang (2023) argue that promotion competition has no significant impact on local leaders’ performance. In other words, regardless of whether better-performing leaders are being promoted or not, the competition among Chinese leaders is not the primary factor driving better performance. Landry, Lu, and Duan (2018) show that economic performance plays a greater role in promotion at lower administrative levels of government than at higher ones. This dualist strategy allows the CCP to achieve economic performance while minimising the advancement of potentially disloyal challengers. Studies have also identified other patterns of cadre promotion mechanisms that contribute to the resilience of the CCP party-state. Pang, Keng, and Zhong (2018) show that officials who have held a series of key positions briefly are more likely to rise higher in their careers than other officials, a pattern they refer to as “sprinting with small steps”. Linking elite promotion and social policy, Zou (2015)’s work sheds light on the structure of political incentives in China and why local political leaders improve public welfare. Tsai and Kou (2015) note that the CCP recruits reserve cadres through careful selection and training to build a legion of youthful political elites with exceptional administrative ability and correct political thinking, thereby manifesting the very nature of a resilient authoritarian regime. Studies on the CCP’s political control mechanism Another major theme for studying post-1989 Chinese politics is the party-state’s attempt to retain its authoritarian control vis-à-vis the evolving society. Several studies have focused on the strategies and methods to deal with emerging social discontent and demand during the reform period. Liao and Tsai (2019) explore the strategies used by the CCP for managing citizens’ irregular petitions to maintain social stability and guarantee its regime survival. At the local level, Ong (2018) examines social control and state repression

in China by underlining the local governments’ pervasive use of thugs and gangsters to meet their objectives. Jiang (2021) points out that the regime has systematically institutionalised mass reporting to cultivate an atmosphere of fear in society and fuel distrust among citizens, which may turn citizens into an apparatus facilitating authoritarian control and turn society into a suppressive Panopticon. Scholars also argue that the manipulation of information is a major component of the party-state’s control mechanism in China. The CCP’s information control, particularly over the media (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011) and the internet (Tang & Huhe, 2014), is believed to be crucial for its authoritarian rule over the changing society. The CCP’s propaganda process is regarded as the lifeblood of the party-state in post-1989 China (Brady, 2008). A recent study by Fang (2022) explores how the Chinese party-state uses foreign experts in its propaganda to provide extra legitimacy to Chinese government policies. Some studies emphasised the “resilience” of the party-state by examining the party’s strategic control of specific areas. For example, the CCP’s control over higher education has been argued as an important control mechanism for authoritarian stability and resilience in post-Mao China (Yan, 2014; Perry, 2015). The state and society in the era of new technologies A recent trend in Chinese politics is to examine the relationship between technologyempowered social actors (particularly in cyberspace) and the monolithic party-state. In the 2000s, Zheng (2007) suggested that the internet had sparked new dynamics in China’s socio-political transformations and that state power and social forces were evolving in a public sphere mediated by the internet. However, recent studies have noted that the Chinese online sphere is not threatening the CCP’s regime stability. Yang and Wu (2022) argue that while political dissent persists, the potential to connect various social grievances has declined as the state tightened its control over the internet and digital spaces. Several studies also show growing regime support for the party-state in China’s cyberspace. Exploring how Chinese internet users acquire and consolidate their identity, Han (2015, 2021) reveals how the competitive tian he

210  encyclopedia of asian politics dynamics of online discourse may work to the authoritarian regime’s advantage. Particularly, there has been strong popular nationalism and regime support in China’s cyber sphere in recent years (Han, 2021). Zhang (2022) shows that while China’s online sphere was once dominated by liberal voices, expressions of doubt about liberal democracy have become more pronounced since 2013. Scholars have examined how technologies are increasingly equipping the CCP to improve governance and impose political control. Schlager and Wang (2017) explore how e-monitoring has become an important part of a strategy to lead China towards a higher quality of government. Big data has become a way for the regime to enhance its capability to govern in an increasingly sophisticated society (Xia, Yan, & Yang, 2022). The COVID-19 pandemic provides a case study for understanding how the regime facilitated a public governance mechanism in public health emergency management (Gao & Yu, 2020; Huang et al., 2020). In terms of the regime’s enhanced ability to impose control, one major work by Huang and Tsai (2022) shows how the CCP regime acquired the most advanced technologies for ensuring domestic security as a result of the establishment of a surveillance state led by globally competitive security companies.

C. Future research Studying the party-state regime’s durability is an important research agenda for political scientists working on China. “Authoritarian resilience” and authoritarian control will remain two major thematic perspectives for future scholars to pursue this research agenda. There are several areas to which future scholars could pay attention. First, future scholars could further examine the adaptive nature of the CCP party-state. As recent events seem to suggest Chinese politics is moving towards a personalistic rule, there has been limited attention to the internal institutionalisation of the party-state. A recent article by Yuen Yuen Ang (2022) argues that the current CCP leadership has not abandoned the party’s famously adaptive methods of governance. As the regime tightened its political control, what are the bureaucratic reforms in recent years, and how do they contribute to the regime’s stability and durability? Balancing political control and authoritarian tian he

resilience would allow future researchers to produce a nuanced understanding of contemporary Chinese politics. In this respect, the study of elite politics will remain central to contemporary Chinese politics in the foreseeable future. Future scholars should continue to study the institutionalisation of the CCP’s elite management mechanism. A study has shown clear institutionalised logic behind civil-military leadership formation in China (You, 2020). Is economic performance still the primary determinant of elite promotion mechanisms in the new era? Wang and Zeng (2016) have argued that the party’s corruption fighting and power centralisation represent part of a state or party-building project to enhance the party-state’s capacity to pursue governance objectives. Future research could examine to what extent the greater demand for the formulation of social policies has led to new patterns of cadre promotion mechanisms that contribute to the resilience of the CCP party-state. Second, future scholars could explore the effect of emerging technologies on the durability of the party-state. Huang and Tsai (2022) have set up a new research area for future scholars to examine the political economy of China’s technology-enabled domestic security. In addition to surveillance technology, it would be interesting to find out how the Chinese business–state alliance has utilised other new emerging technologies (e.g., artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and big data) to build a developmental techno-authoritarianism. Future scholars could also deepen the understanding of authoritarian resilience by examining the regime’s push for using technologies to enhance its governance capacity. There have been an increasing number of studies on the regime’s adoption of technologies to improve its governance performance. How this process might have consequences on regime durability would be an interesting topic to explore. Tian He

References Ang, Y. Y. (2022). How Resilient Is the CCP? Journal of Democracy, 33(3), 77–91. Bo, Z. (2002). Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility Since 1949. M.E. Sharpe.

china  211 Brady A. (2008). Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Brodsgaard, K. E. (2001, July 11). China’s Cadres: Professional Revolutionaries or State Bureaucrats? Singapore: East Asian Institute Background Brief, No. 94. Chen, M., and Goodman, D. S. G. (Eds.). (2013). Middle-Class China: Identity and Behaviour. Edward Elgar. Dickson, B. J. (2003). Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change. Cambridge University Press. Fang, K. (2022). Praise From the International Community: How China Uses Foreign Experts to Legitimize Authoritarian Rule. The China Journal, 87, 72–91. Gao, X., and Yu, J. (2020). Public Governance Mechanism in the Prevention and Control of the COVID-19: Information, DecisionMaking and Execution. Journal of Chinese Governance, 5(2), 178–197. Han, R. (2015). Defending the Authoritarian Regime Online: China’s “Voluntary FiftyCent Army.” The China Quarterly, 224, 1006–1025. Han, R. (2021). Cyber Nationalism and Regime Support under Xi Jinping: The Effects of the 2018 Constitutional Revision. Journal of Contemporary China, 30(131), 717–733. Heilmann, S., and Perry, E. J. (2011). Embracing Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in China. In E. J. Perry and S. Heilmann (Eds.), Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (pp. 1–29). Harvard University Asia Center. Huang, H., Zongchao, P., Hongtao, W., and Qihui, X. (2020). A Big Data Analysis on the Five Dimensions of Emergency Management Information in the Early Stage of COVID-19 in China. Journal of Chinese Governance, 5(2), 213–233. Huang, J., and Tsai, K. S. (2022). Securing Authoritarian Capitalism in the Digital Age: The Political Economy of Surveillance in China. The China Journal, 88, 2. Jiang, J. (2018). Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China. American Journal of Political Science, 62(4), 982–999.

Jiang, J. (2021). The Eyes and Ears of the Authoritarian Regime: Mass Reporting in China. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 51(5), 828–847. Landry, P. F., Lü, X., and Duan, H. (2018). Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder. Comparative Political Studies, 51(8), 1074–1105. Li, H., and Zhou, L. (2005). Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9–10), 1743–1762. Liao, X., and Tsai, W. (2019). Managing Irregular Petitions in China: Two Types of Social Control Strategy Within the Authoritarian Regime. Journal of East Asian Studies, 19(1), 1–18. Nathan, A. J. (2003). China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience. Journal of Democracy, 14(1), 6–17. Nathan, A. J. (2016). The Puzzle of the Chinese Middle Class. Journal of Democracy, 27(2), 5–19. Naughton, B. J., and Yang, D. L. (Eds.). (2004). Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era. Cambridge University Press. Ong, L. H. (2018). Thugs and Outsourcing of State Repression in China. The China Journal, 80, 94–110. Pang, B., Keng, S., and Zhang, S. (2023). Does Performance Competition Impact China’s Leadership Behaviour? Re-Examining the Promotion Tournament Hypothesis. The China Quarterly, 1–18. Pang, B., Shu, K., and Zhong, Z. (2018). Sprinting With Small Steps: China’s Cadre Management and Authoritarian Resilience. China Journal, 80, 68–93. Perry, E. J. (2015). Higher Education and Authoritarian Resilience: The Case of China, Past and Present. HarvardYenching Institute Working Paper Series. Schlager, J., and Wang, Q. (2017). E-Monitoring of Public Servants in China: Higher Quality of Government? Journal of Chinese Governance, 2(1), 1–19. Shambaugh, D. (2008). China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. Shih, V., Christopher, A., and Mingxing, L. (2012). Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China. American Political Science Review, 106(1), 166–187. tian he

212  encyclopedia of asian politics Stockmann, D., and Gallagher, M. E. (2011). Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China. Comparative Political Studies, 44(4), 436–467. Tang, M., and Huhe, N. (2014). Alternative Framing: The Effect of the Internet on Political Support in Authoritarian China. International Political Science Review, 35(5), 559–576. Tsai, K. S. (2006). Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China. World Politics, 59(1), 116–141. Tsai, W., and Kou, C. (2015). The Party’s Disciples: CCP Reserve Cadres and the Perpetuation of a Resilient Authoritarian Regime. China Quarterly, 221, 1–20. Wang, Z., and Zeng, J. (2016). Xi Jinping: The Game Changer of Chinese Elite Politics? Contemporary Politics, 22(4), 469–486. Xia, Z., Xingyu, Y., and Xiaoyong, Y. (2022). Research on Big Data-Driven Public Services in China: A Visualized Bibliometric Analysis. Journal of Chinese Governance, 7(4), 531–558. Yan, X. (2014). Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control Over University Students in Post-Deng China. The China Quarterly, 218, 493–513. Yang, S., and Wu, F. (2022). From Online Mass Incidents to Defiant Enclaves: Political Dissent on China’s Internet. The China Journal, 87, 20–39.

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You, J. (2020). How Xi Jinping Dominates Elite Party Politics: A Case Study of CivilMilitary Leadership Formation. The China Journal, 84, 1–28. Zhang, Y. (2022). Passive Political Legitimacy: How the Chinese Online Sphere Went From Challenging to Supporting the State Within the Past Decade. The China Journal, 88, 29–54. Zheng, Y. (2007). Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China. Stanford University Press. Zheng, Y. (2013). Contemporary China a History Since 1978. John Wiley & Sons Inc. Zuo, C. (Vera). (2015). Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China. The China Quarterly, 224, 955–984.

Key resources Goodman, D. S. G. (2016). Handbook of the Politics of China. Edward Elgar. South China Morning Post – An EnglishLanguage Newspaper Published in Hong Kong and Owned by Alibaba Group. https://www​.scmp​.com/. The China Project – A New York-Based China-Focused Information, News and Business Service Provider. https:// thechinaproject​.com/.

39. Hong Kong A. The concept Not many societies in the world feature such a unique combination of freedom and authoritarian sovereignty as Hong Kong. Its “hybrid” regime is characterized by civil liberties, an independent judiciary, and a local government with generally high autonomy but under the sovereignty of a communist regime (Cheng, 2016; Bush, 2016). The former British colony has been rated as one of the freest economies by many freedom indices and was ranked as the world’s second in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.1 With a population of approximately 7.5 million people, Hong Kong is one of the most affluent cities in the world as China’s major financial center and gateway to the world. The capitalist, free-market economy next to the world’s biggest market and population is the most significant factor explaining the city’s success. Since the 1997 turnover to Chinese sovereignty, the Special Administration Region (SAR) under the “one country, two systems” framework has remained vibrant in its economy and become home to the regional headquarters of many multinational corporations. Recent political developments, however, brought sweeping changes to Hong Kong’s political landscape and civil society. Millions of protesters marched in 2019 in opposition to a proposed bill of extradition to China. With the introduction of the National Security Law (NSL), tens of thousands of journalists, political party leaders, human rights workers, and lawyers have been arrested under charges of violations of the NSL in categories of offenses including “secession, subversion, terrorist activities, collusion”. One most notable example is the arrest of newspaper Apple Daily’s Jimmy Lai and the shutdown of his news organization. A majority of the arrested, including Lai and his chief editors and reporters, have been denied bail and in jail for years, still pending the first trial legal procedures. The UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights noted in a 2023 report that the new NSL enacted in 2020 “has de facto abolished” the city’s judicial independence.2

Political landscape: generally free but definitely not democratic Why is there such a sharp turn and abrupt deterioration in merely a couple of years? Hong Kong’s political problems can be dated back to the 1980s when its roadmap for political development was designed. When Britain and China negotiated to return the colonial city to be under the latter’s sovereignty, the two nations agreed on a few terms. The original promises outlined in the 1984 SinoBritish agreement include a “one country, two systems” framework keeping the capitalist system for 50 years, a highly autonomous government, and ultimately, a full democracy. The agreement and the mini-constitution called the Basic Law, nevertheless, left incomplete works for full institutional reform. The ambiguity in the implementation timeline and scale of “full democracy” became the root of all the problems when tensions began to mount between the population and Beijing as early as 2003. Tensions between the population and the governments in Hong Kong and Beijing mount from the deficit of mandate without a fully representative system, as local political scientist Ma Ngok terms the “deep legitimacy and governance crisis” (2007). The growing discontent from civil society leads more and more often to confrontations in the form of protests. Ma attributes the problem to the ambiguity in the agreement between China and Great Britain, which promised “high autonomy” with universal suffrage to be implemented. The future tense and uncertain language on democracy in the Basic Law are the source of increasing “relative deprivation”. As a result, Hong Kong becomes a society with citizens given civil liberties but short of the right to elect their own government. It is inevitable such an arrangement would lead to problems of legitimacy and weakened state capacity (Scott, 2008). According to the Basic Law, Hong Kong should select its own political leaders by universal suffrage, i.e. full democratic elections. In Article 45 and Annex I of the mini-constitution, which stipulate the selection method of the Chief Examine, the promise is spelled out: “The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures”.3

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214  encyclopedia of asian politics The original timeline for the democratization was a ten-year plan after 1997. In other words, universal suffrage should have been considered in 2007 to first elect the Chief Executive, then the legislative body (Legislative Council) the next year. However, subsequent interpretations of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress only fueled further skepticism in the general public and eventually drove protesters to the street, in many cases calling for dropping unpopular bills but more generally demanding the promised democratic reform. Hong Kong has a growing civil society that has been active in advocating civil liberties and local identity. For decades since the handover, pro-democracy parties have enjoyed higher popularity than pro-Beijing groups and parties. The Democratic Party and its allies in the same pro-democracy camp generally received about 60% of popular votes while the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) and other proBeijing parties or labor unions netted about 40%. In the mid-2010s, new “localist” groups and parties composed of the younger generation of activists were formed. To name a few, the Hong Kong Indigenous (represented by Edward Leung) and Demosisto (represented by Joshua Wong) were generally more radical in promoting local interests and more appealing to young voters. These pro-democracy parties, however, became either defunct or inactive almost as soon as the NSL came on stage in 2020. Most of these groups and parties are either dissolved or dormant with little or no participation in elections and other conventional or unconventional political activities. Another reason is many of the opposition party leaders are still arrested and jailed without bail. Even after the lifting of the stringent COVID policies in early 2023, voices from any opposition groups are literally muted. Chinese government’s repeated interpretations of the Basic Law have become increasingly expansive, with Beijing seeking to exert greater control over Hong Kong’s legal system and limit the scope of its autonomy (Zhu, 2023) Major political events in the last ten years 1. 2014 Umbrella movement: The studentsupported movement saw thousands of protesters occupy major roads in karl ho

Hong Kong for 79 days, in opposition to Beijing’s ruling of setting prohibitive nomination constraints to the election of the Chief Executive. The movement sparked a broader debate about Hong Kong’s political future and highlighted the tensions between Beijing and the local population over democratic reform. 2. 2016 Mong Kok unrest: The nicknamed “Fishball Revolution” protests were triggered by the government’s crackdown on unlicensed food hawkers selling fishballs (a popular street food in Hong Kong) during the Chinese New Year holiday. The clashes between the localist protesters and the police led to the arrest of Edward Leung on charges of riots. 3. 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB) movement: The protests of 2019 were sparked by a proposed law that would have allowed extradition to mainland China, driving up to millions of protesters to march on major routes of the city. The protests, which lasted for several months, were marked by violent clashes between protesters and police and underscored the deepening divisions within Hong Kong’s society over issues of democracy and autonomy. 4. 2020 introduction of National Security Law: The introduction of the National Security Law in 2020 was a major turning point in Hong Kong’s political landscape, granting Beijing sweeping powers to crack down on dissent and opposition to its rule. The law has led to a significant erosion of Hong Kong’s civil liberties and autonomy and has been met with widespread condemnation from the international community.

B. The landscape Scholarship on Hong Kong politics has been remarkably growing in several directions, developing major works in a range of themes including civil society, electoral politics, social movements, and the role of the media in shaping public opinion. Big picture For comprehensive overviews, Lui et  al. (2018); Cheng, (2014), and a few others provide edited volumes covering a wide range of topics in contemporary Hong Kong politics, including democratization, civil society,

hong kong  215 electoral politics, and the relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China. They bring together contributions from leading scholars in the field and provide valuable resources for researchers and policymakers alike. Governance and civil society Ma’s agenda-setting book (2007) lays out themes and subthemes for studying Hong Kong politics in political society and civil society and is to date the most cited work on the SAR’s political development. More studies follow and investigate the roles of the state, political society, and civil society in shaping the city’s political landscape (Fong, 2013; Bush, 2016). This line of research provides an excellent foundation for understanding the background and root causes of the conflicts and social movements arising from institutional issues dating back to the fundamental design of the political system. Social movements Street politics and protests constitute another major line of research studying mobilization and political activism starting even before the 1997 handover (Cheng, 2016). Protests have been major venues for civil society groups to voice concerns and challenge the government barely representing the views of the population due to the lack of institutions fully and democratically elected by the population (Ma 2009). Recently, more empirical studies arise from analyzing the causes and impacts of movements and protests in 2014 and 2019, particularly the consequences and cultural impacts (Lam, 2015; Kaeding, 2017; Shum, 2021, 2023, Fu 2023). Electoral studies A series of data-driven studies have been developed in exploring the challenges and opportunities in the Hong Kong elections still under China’s authoritarian influence (Wong, 2015, 2019; Chan & Ng, 2022; Shum, 2021), including the role of protest, authoritarian influence, patronage, and the media in shaping the outcome of elections. These works also examine the challenges of electoral reform after the 2019 protests and the introduction of the NSL in shaping the voting behaviors and party system. Media and politics Another group of studies comes from political communication and journalism analyzing

media and social media impacts on political attitudes and beliefs, social movements, political participation, and other collective actions (Lee & Chan, 2018; Lee, 2020). Collecting data through systematic surveys, experimental designs, and web and social media scraping, scholars tap extensively into voices on social media and general public opinion in investigating the connections between political discontent, mobilization, and formation of local identity. New linguistics methods were also introduced in studying media, social movements, and politics (Liu & Wang, 2022). Overall, the recent scholarly works on Hong Kong politics have provided valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities facing the SAR’s political system. These works have highlighted the unique features of Hong Kong’s hybrid regime, the impact of Beijing’s increasing influence on the city’s political landscape, and the potential for civil society groups and activists to promote greater democracy and autonomy in the SAR. As Hong Kong continues to navigate these challenges, it will be critical for researchers, policymakers, and civil society to work together to promote a more democratic, transparent, and inclusive political system for the SAR.

C. Future research The most recent developments in the last few years invite new research efforts in the following emerging themes. COVID and stringent policy on political development The global pandemic shut down Hong Kong in many areas including political participation and civil society. Protests were literally banned in the name of strict quarantine policies, and political participation and activism also almost fall to ground zero. New research is warranted to examine the actual impact on political attitudes and the population’s support for parties and the government in general. Migration and demographic change Hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong citizens emigrated to other countries such as Britain, Canada, Australia, and others in apprehending the new politics characterized by the NSL arrests and shutdown of major media such as Apple Daily. How these migrant Hongkongers settle in other countries or if they will be karl ho

216  encyclopedia of asian politics returning would be important topics in studying the future of Hong Kong developments. Civil society and social movements While there has been considerable research on civil society and social movements in Hong Kong in the last decade, the disappearance of protests and general political activism poses another important topic for researchers in gauging whether there could be democratic developments under the draconian NSL rule. Basic law and judicial system New studies examining the impact of the NSL plugging into Hong Kong’s common law system describe the current Hong Kong legal system as a “glass cracked by the wedge” of the NSL (Zhu, 2023). How much this system can hold up and develop warrants new judicial studies. It is the pillar supporting Hong Kong’s role as the global financial center and the key hub of trade between China and the world. Important questions of whether international investors would still trust Hong Kong’s courts, stock market, and legal protection must be addressed to understand the city’s future development. Regional integration Crackdowns in 2019 and the NSL represent new levels of China’s intervention in Hong Kong’s political institutions and systems. Will Hong Kong become another Chinese city like Shenzhen and Shanghai? Hong Kong’s post-COVID and post-NSL new roles will be key important topics for studying the political economy of the city and the neighboring “Greater Bay Area” covering Macau and Guangdong province. Media ecosystem New media platforms and outlets take new roles in the information society of Hong Kong, in particular compared with traditional press and electronic media. The closing of the leading newspaper Apple Daily and the arrests of its founder Jimmy Lai and other journalists had a ripple effect on other media organizations. How much the city, once well renowned for its free press and media competition, has been affected requires more research among scholars in political science and mass communication. In conclusion, the study of Hong Kong politics is a dynamic and rapidly evolving karl ho

field, with many gaps and opportunities for future research. The most recent political events open new avenues of studying and understanding Hong Kong’s unique political roles and its changes mixing democratic developments and authoritarian rules. Accelerated growth of new research about Hong Kong contributes to the literature of multiple disciplines in both size and diversity. It presents a very special case to help further understanding of political development, democratization, and civil society in a hybrid regime. Karl Ho

Notes 1.

According to the Heritage Foundation, Hong Kong is only second to Singapore. The Foundation has, however, dropped Hong Kong from its list since 2020. 2. Original report (available at https://tbinternet​.ohchr​.org/​_ layouts​/15​/ treatybodyexternal​/ Download​.aspx​?symbolno ​= E​%2FC​.12​%2FCHN​ %2FCO​%2F3​&Lang​= en) section 100 reads: Noting the information provided during the dialogue with the State party, the Committee is concerned about reports that the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2020) has de facto abolished the independence of the judiciary of Hong Kong SAR, China. 3.

The full text of the 2004 Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China actually indicates Beijing’s reluctance to allow a full-fledged democracy with one-man-one-vote elections for all citizens in Hong Kong. The verbiage regarding the selection methods that “may be amended or remain unamended in 2007” demonstrates the central government’s intention to postpone such decision to at least another ten years (www​.cmab​.gov​.hk​/ doc​/en ​/documents​/policy​_ responsibilities​/ Racial​ _Discrimination​/AnnexI​-Eng​.pdf).

References Bush, R. C. (2016). Hong Kong in the Shadow of China: Living With the Leviathan. Brookings Institution Press. Chan, K. M., and Ng, K. L. (2022). Elections With Candidate Filtering and Two Mechanisms of Demobilization Effect: The Prologue to Hong Kong’s Authoritarian Turn. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 1–20.

hong kong  217 Cheng, E. W. (2016). Street Politics in a Hybrid Regime: The Diffusion of Political Activism in Post-Colonial Hong Kong. The China Quarterly, 226, 383–406. Cheng, J. Y. (Ed.). (2014). New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong. City University of HK Press. Fong, B. C. H. (2013). State-Society Conflicts Under Hong Kong’s Hybrid Regime: Governing Coalition Building and Civil Society Challenges. Asian Survey, 53(5), 854–882. Fu, K. (2023). Digital Mobilization Via Attention Building: The Logic of CrossBoundary Actions in the 2019 Hong Kong Social Movement. The Information Society, 39, 158–170. Kaeding, M. P. (2017). The Rise of “Localism” in Hong Kong. Journal of Democracy, 28(1), 157–171. Lam, W. (2015). Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong: The Paradox of Activism and Depoliticization. Routledge. Lee, F. L. F. (2020). Solidarity in the AntiExtradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong. Critical Asian Studies, 52(1), 18–32. Lee, F. L. F., and Chan, J. M. (2018). Media and Protest Logics in the Digital Era: The Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. Oxford University Press. Liu, M., and Wang, G. (2022). An Introduction to the Special Issue on ‘Language, Politics and Media: The Hong Kong Protests. Journal of Language & Politics, 21(1), 1–16. Lui, T., Chiu, S. W., and Yep, R. (2018). Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong. Routledge. Ma, N. (2007). Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society. Hong Kong University Press. Ma, N. (2009). Social Movements and StateSociety Relationship in Hong Kong. In

Social Movements in China and Hong Kong: The Expansion of Protest Space (pp. 45–63). Amsterdam University Press. Scott, I. (2008). Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society by Ngok Ma. The China Journal, 59, 189–191. Shum, M. (2021). When Voting Turnout Becomes Contentious Repertoire: How Anti-ELAB Protest Overtook the District Council Election in Hong Kong 2019. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 22(4), 248–267. Shum, M. (2023). Transnational Activism During Movement Abeyance: Examining the International Frontline of Hong Kong’s 2019 Anti-Extradition Bill Movement. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 58(1), 143–166. Wong, S. H. (2015). Electoral Politics in Post1997 Hong Kong: Protest, Patronage, and the Media. Springer. Wong, S. H. (2019). Gerrymandering in Electoral Autocracies: Evidence From Hong Kong. British Journal of Political Science, 49(2), 579–610. Zhu, H. (2023). A Chinese Law Wedge into the Hong Kong Common Law System: A Legal Appraisal of the Hong Kong National Security Law. Northwestern Journal of Human Rights, 21(1), 43.

Key resources Bush, R. C. (2016). Hong Kong in the Shadow of China: Living With the Leviathan. Brookings Institution Press. Lui, T., Chiu, S. W., and Yep, R. (2018). Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong. Routledge. Wong, S. H. (2015). Electoral Politics in Post1997 Hong Kong: Protest, Patronage, and the Media. Springer.

karl ho

40. India A. The concept With a geographical land size of 3,287,259 km² and an extensive coastline of 7,000 km, India is the largest country in South Asia (WorldData​ .inf​ o, 2022). Often regarded as the world’s largest democracy, India has an estimated population of more than 1.4 billion people and the country’s population is predicted to surpass China’s population in the future1 (Silver, Huang, & Clancy, 2023; Rajesh & Jain, 2023). Although India has a rich and diverse history, the history of the presentday Republic of India can be traced back to 1947. After a lengthy independence struggle, India gained its independence from Britain, the colonial power which had directly and indirectly ruled India since the mid-1700s.2 Following the partition of the Indian subcontinent, the new nation-states of India and Pakistan came into existence in August 1947. India’s post-independence government, led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, focused on addressing numerous internal and external problems which India was facing as a fledgling nation-state. Nehru’s “grand strategy” incorporated important elements such as the establishment of a constitutional democracy, federalism, recognition of all religions, the state’s involvement in a mixed economy, and the adoption of a policy of non-alignment in order to address India’s domestic and international challenges (Hall, 2022; Nayar & Paul, 2003; Subramanyam, 2012). Like other former European colonies, India has a diverse and heterogeneous population comprising different religions, ethnicities, and castes. According to the 2011 Census, 79.8% (960 million people) of the population is Hindu. Muslims account for 14.2% (170 million people) of the population, and 2.3% (270 million) of the population identify as Christians (Government of India, 2015). Other religions, such as Sikhism, Buddhism, and Jainism are also practised widely across India. A 2021 report stated that since independence, India’s religious composition has only witnessed “modest changes” and Hinduism continues to remain the largest religion in the country while the share of Muslims has gradually grown in India (Kramer, 2021). Communal tensions between

various religious groups have often led to periods of communal violence in India. India’s caste composition is also diverse across the country. Castes are hereditary social classes or a “fourfold ritual hierarchy” (Murali, 2017, p. 39). The four main macro groupings or varnas are the Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras (Murali). Apart from these four broad categories of the caste system, the Dalits, or Scheduled Castes (SCs), are a group against whom untouchability was practised in the traditional caste structure (Murali, 2017). Within these macro caste clusters lie several horizontal or segmental categories known as jatis. There are over 5,000 different jatis and moreover, every state in India has a different configuration of these jatis and caste structures (Chhibber, 2010; Sridharan, 2018). India is a federal parliamentary republic which has a president as the head of state and a prime minister as the head of government. The president is indirectly elected by an electoral college comprising members of both the houses of the federal parliament, members of state legislatures, and elected representatives of those parts of the country which are administered by the federal government (Union Territories) and have a legislative chamber (for example, New Delhi and Puducherry). At the federal level, the executive is headed by the prime minister and supported by the Union Council of Ministers. India has a bicameral legislature with the upper house (Rajya Sabha) comprising 245 members. Unlike other federal countries where the upper house tends to have equal representation from all federal units, the Rajya Sabha does grant more members to states which have a greater proportion of the population. However, members of the Rajya Sabha are directly elected by the legislatures of individual state assemblies. The lower house (Lok Sabha) currently has 543 members who are popularly elected through single-member plurality (first-pastthe-post) electoral rules for a term of five years. The largest party or coalition in the legislature goes on to form the government if the largest party can command the majority on the floor of the house. The executive is accountable to the legislature and a government can be removed from office through a vote of no confidence in the Lok Sabha. The two chambers are not co-equal as the Rajya Sabha has limited powers in relation to money bills and finance bills which can only be initiated in the

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india  219 lower house. The judicial branch in India is headed by the Supreme Court and individual states have their own high courts. The constitution of India does grant the judiciary the powers of judicial review and the judiciary can strike off laws if they are found to be in violation of certain constitutional provisions such as civil liberties of citizens. At the state level, every state has its own state assembly (Vidhan Sabha) which can be unicameral or bicameral, and elections for these state assemblies also take place through the first-past-the-post electoral system. Every state has a chief minister who is the head of government at the state level and is supported by a State Council of Ministers. India’s economy has transformed significantly since independence in 1947. Termed as the “Hindu rate of growth” by economist Raj Krishna to signify a slow-growing economy, India’s economy has now become the fifth largest economy in the world (Ahluwalia, 1995; Bhasin, 2022). After independence, India followed a model of state-led industrialisation along with a strong emphasis on central planning (Bhagwati & Desai, 1970; Chibber, 2003). Industry was heavily regulated through a system of industrial licenses and permits, which were controlled and handed out by the state (Balasubramanyam, 1984; Tomlinson, 2013). Over time, economic inefficiencies and a deceleration in industrial activity began to plague India’s economy. Internal liberalisation of the economy took place in the 1980s and after India faced a balance of payments crisis in the early 1990s, liberalisation reforms were fully implemented, opening up India’s economy (Ganguly & Mukherjee, 2011; Tomlinson, 2013). Since the 1990s, India’s economy has grown consistently, primarily driven by an increase in output by the service sector.

B. The landscape Academic research on India has focused on several key areas in recent years. One group of studies has studied the role of political parties and India’s party system. India’s party system has transformed since independence. From 1947 to 1977, India had a dominant party system wherein the Congress Party was in power at the federal level and in every state due to several factors, such as its ‘catch-all’ nature, its umbrella organisation, and its image of being the party that brought independence

to India (Kothari, 1964; Lijphart, 1996). Between 1977 and 1990, the Congress was out of power at the federal level for only two years but opposition to the Congress continued to ferment at the state level. From the 1990s onwards, India’s party system underwent another transformation wherein regional parties or state-level parties started making an impact at the federal level, resulting in a multiparty system and coalition governments (Chiriyankandath, 1997; Sridharan, 2002; Kailash, 2014; Ziegfeld, 2012). The Congress also had a pan-Indian party as an opponent as the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) started to mobilise voters across India. After a series of coalition governments where the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) were both in power, in 2014 the BJP became the first party to win an overall majority on its own in the federal elections for the first time since the 1980s (Tillin, 2015). The BJP repeated this at the 2019 election, leading some scholars to examine whether India was entering a second phase of a dominant party system, given the BJP’s electoral performance (Chhibber & Verma, 2019; Chhibber & Ostermann, 2014). Scholars have examined the causes and consequences of the transformations of the party system. For instance, one set of studies focuses on the link between political parties and social cleavages such as caste to explain the rise of regional parties (Wilkinson, 2003; Chhibber, 2010; Sridharan, 2002; Ziegfeld, 2012). As noted earlier, jatis and castes are different and diverse across Indian states, making them geographically contained and state specific. Since the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report,3 caste as a cleavage, which was always politicised in India, became institutionalised resulting in a proliferation of regional state-level parties, some of whom were mobilising voters specifically along these caste cleavages (Wilkinson, 2003; Chhibber, 2010; Sridharan, 2002; Ziegfeld, 2012). Given the geographically constrained nature of these caste cleavages, different regional parties began mobilising different groups resulting in a proliferation of regional parties and coalition governments at the federal level. Scholars have also studied the link between the electoral system and the party system in India. India’s party system transformations have taken place in an environment where neel vanvari

220  encyclopedia of asian politics its first-past-the-post electoral system has remained unchanged. Hence, India has been a unique case study as India’s party system does not always conform to the principle of Duverger’s law.4 While some scholars argue that at the state level and at the district level, parties in India tend to converge and conform to Duverger’s Law, others argue that in certain states there is a clear divergence and a move away from Duverger’s proposed twoparty system under single-member plurality electoral rules (Sridharan, 2002; Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Chhibber & Murali, 2006; Yadav & Palshikar, 2003; Chhibber & Nooruddin, 2004; Mayer, 2013). Furthermore, it is argued that given the diversity, heterogeneity, and inter-regional differences between Indian states, it is difficult to make generalisations about parties conforming to Duverger’s Law, even at the district level (Diwakar, 2007). Recent studies have also examined the consequences of India’s changing party system such as electoral volatility and its impact on economic performance (Heath, 2005; Heath & Ziegfeld, 2018; Nooruddin, 2011; Nooruddin & Simmons, 2015). Another group of studies has focused on how the reforms of the 1990s have transformed India’s political economy. The reforms of the 1990s not only liberalised the economy but also dismantled the central control of the state in aspects of the economy. Licenses and permits were no longer required to set up industries and the private sector began to play a bigger role. Scholars have examined how these reforms have altered India’s political economy from the pre-reform phase (Ruparelia et. al, 2011). For instance, one theme which scholars have focused on is the link between business and politics in India. After the reforms, there has been a “pro-business tilt” in state–business relations and although this move towards a pro-business direction began in the 1980s, it has intensified since the economic reforms of the 1990s (Jaffrelot et al., 2019). The power of business has increased in both direct and indirect ways such as business groups “moving” inside the “porous” institutions of the Indian state or the threat of business groups withholding investment on account of these groups playing a larger role in the economy, thereby adversely affecting political fortunes (Sinha, 2019; Murali, 2019; Kohli, 2012; Jaffrelot et  al., 2019). Another theme that scholars have focused on is that in this postreform phase, India’s growth has not been neel vanvari

inclusive. Despite high rates of growth since these economic reforms, income inequality and wealth disparity have become more acute and the impact on economic development has been less uniform (Drèze & Sen, 2013; Kohli, 2012; Jaffrelot, 2019; Sud, 2022). The transformation in India’s party system and in its political economy has in turn affected how federalism has functioned in India. Both the party system and the changing political economy have altered state–centre relations. After the economic reforms, the locus of power moved solely from being at the federal level to being shared with the state level (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Hicken, 2009). The reforms ushered in a phase where the federal government did not decide which parts of the country investment was destined for. Individual states could look for investors and investment on their own without being constrained by the federal government. This fiscal and vertical decentralisation made the state governments the level at which resources could be allocated and won, in addition to the federal level (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004). As a result, the party system became more decentralised and more regionalised as parties began to compete more vigorously for these state-level resources (Hicken, 2009). Regional parties who became part of the governing coalition at the federal level could also demand additional resources for their particular state as a price for being in coalition with and constrain the central government (Patil, 2001; Kailash, 2011; Sadanand, 2012). This, coupled with the ability of states to seek investment on their own, did in some cases widen the gap between the well-off industrialised states and those states who were still in earlier stages of development, thereby making regional disparity more uneven (Ahluwalia, 2000; Corbridge, 2011; Tillin, 2019). Scholars have also examined India’s foreign policy. In recent years, the country’s foreign policy has transformed and moved away from the policy of non-alignment which India followed during the Cold War. India today engages with a wide range of partners such as the Southeast Asian states through its Act East Policy and its South Asian neighbours through its Neighbourhood First policy (Pardesi, 2015; Palit, 2016; Aryal, 2021). It has extensive economic and defence-military relations with other key actors in the IndoPacific such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the US. However, despite convergence

india  221 between India and the US due to a rising China, India is not a formal US ally. While India has enhanced its strategic partnerships in recent years to balance a more assertive China on its doorsteps, it has followed a policy of “strategic autonomy” and preferred to have informal arrangements with its strategic partners as opposed to formal alliances (Pardesi, 2019; Mukherjee, 2022). However, scholars have argued that strategic autonomy has similarities with non-alignment and is a “realist mutation” of non-alignment (Ganguly & Pardesi, 2009). India sees itself as being a leading power in the global order and it has shown a preference for multipolarity and multi-alignment in order to achieve this goal of being one of the poles in a multipolar world (Hall, 2016; Pardesi, 2015, 2019).

C. Future research One area of future research is to examine the changing nature of India’s party system and its democracy more generally. With federal elections scheduled for 2024, it will be interesting to study whether the BJP is able to hold on to its dominant position and whether the Congress continues to lose support. In the absence of a viable Congress Party, is there any scenario wherein an alternative party emerges as a pan-Indian challenger to the BJP? Will regional parties decide to form a pan-Indian alliance to oust the BJP, such as the Janata Dal alliance in 1977? Another area of research is the changing nature of federalism in India. With the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) by the federal government, analysing how this recent development in fiscal federalism affects centre– state relations in the long term is another key area of future research. A third emerging area of research is the state of India’s democracy. In recent years, some studies have noted the presence of democratic recession and democratic backsliding in India. However, some scholars argue that Indian democracy continues to be robust and given the sheer scale of diversity across the country, so far India appears to have done well in maintaining the stability of its democracy. These scholars point to the fact that democracy in India is more consolidated than its other South Asian neighbours. Examining how democracy in India continues to remain robust will further advance academic research on India. Lastly, studying how India continues to achieve its

stated goal of becoming a leading power by addressing problems such as military modernisation and the ongoing border conflict with China and ensuring that it continues to grow its economy in order to support its global ambitions is another key area of research for the future. Neel Vanvari

Notes 1.

India has not conducted a census since 2011 and hence estimated figures have been highlighted. 2. British colonial rule in India was first through the East India Company. In 1858, the powers of the East India Company were transferred to the Crown and the British government assumed direct control of the government of India. 3. The Mandal Commission report set out recommendations to put in place constitutional provisions such as quotas or reservations in educational institutions and government jobs to enable the empowerment of socially “backward” sections of Indian society (see Suri, 1994). 4. Duverger’s law simply states that “the simplemajority single-ballot system favours the two-party system”. Due to the mechanical and psychological effect of voting as well the theory of the wasted vote, Duverger argues that over time, third parties in a first-past-the-post system die out and first-pastthe-post systems tend to result in a two-party system (see Duverger, 1954).

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india  223 Kothari, R. (1964). The congress ‘system’ in India. Asian Survey, 4(12), 1161–1173. https://doi​. org ​/ 10​.1525​/ as​.1964​. 4​.12​ .01p00302. Kramer, S. (2021, September 21). Religious Composition of India. Pew Research Center. https://www​.pewresearch​.org​/ religion​ / 2021​ / 09​ / 21​ / population​ -growth​ -and​-religious​-composition/. Lijphart, A. (1996). The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation. The American Political Science Review, 90(2), 258–268. https://doi​.org​/10​.2307​ /2082883. Mayer, P. (2013). Gross violations of Duverger’s law in India. Studies in Indian Politics, 1(2), 179–201. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1177​/2321023013509150. Mukherjee, R. (2022). Leveraging uncertainty: India’s response to the US-China competition. In A. J. Tellis, A. Szalwinski, and M. Wills (Eds.), Navigating Tumultuous Times in the IndoPacific (pp. 127–161). The National Bureau of Asian Research. Murali, K. (2017). Caste, Class, and Capital: The Social and Political Origins of Economic Policy in India. Cambridge University Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​ /9781316659007. Murali, K. (2019). Economic liberalization and the structural power of business. In C. Jaffrelot, A. Kohli, and K. Murali (Eds.), Business and Politics in India. Oxford University Press. Nayar, B. R., and Paul, T. V. (2003). India in the World Order: Searching for MajorPower Status. Cambridge University Press. Nooruddin, I. (2011). Coalition Politics and Economic Development: Credibility and the Strength of Weak Governments. Cambridge University Press. Nooruddin, I., and Simmons, J. W. (2015). Do voters count? Institutions, voter turnout, and public goods provision in India. Electoral Studies, 37, 1–14. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1016​/j​.electstud​.2014​.10​.006. Palit, A. (2016). India’s act east policy and implications for Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian Affairs, 2016, 81–91. Pardesi, M. S. (2015). Is India a great power? Understanding great power status in contemporary international relations. Asian Security, 11(1), 1–30. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1080​/14799855​.2015​.1005737.

Pardesi, M. S. (2019). Modi, from “Look East” to “Act East”: Semantic or substantive change? International Studies Perspectives, 20(1), 29–33. https://doi​ .org​ /10​.1093​/isp​/eky008. Patil, S. H. (2001). India’s experiment with coalition government at the federal level. Indian Journal of Political Science, 62(4), 586–593. Rajesh, Y. P., and Jain, R. (2023, February 15). India, soon world’s most populous nation, doesn’t know how many people it has. Reuters. https://www​.reuters​.com​/world​ /india​/india​-soon​-worlds​-most​-populous​ -nation​- doesnt​-know​-how​-many​-people​-it​ -has​-2023​-02​-15/. Sadanandan, A. (2012). Bridling central tyranny in India: How regional parties restrain the federal government. Asian Survey, 52(2), 247–269. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1525​/as​.2012​.52​.2​.247. Silver, L., Huang, C., and Clancy, L. (2023, February 9). Key facts as India surpasses China as the world’s most populous country. Pew Research Center. https:// www​.pewresearch​.org ​/fact​-tank ​/2023​/02​ /09​/ key​-facts​-as​-india​-surpasses​- china​-as​ -the​-worlds​-most​-populous​-country/. Sinha, A. (2019). India’s porous state: Blurred boundaries and the evolving business-state relationship. In C. Jaffrelot, A. Kohli, and K. Murali (Eds.), Business and Politics in India. Oxford University Press. Sridharan, E. (2002). The fragmentation of the Indian party system, 1952–1999: Seven competing explanations. In Z. Hassan (Ed.), Parties and Party Politics in India (pp. 475–503). Oxford University Press. Sridharan, E. (2018). Coalition congruence in India’s federal system. In A. Albala and J. M. Reniu (Eds.), Coalition Politics and Federalism (pp. 77–113). Springer. Subrahmanyam, K. (2012). Grand strategy for the first half of the 21st Century. In K. Venkatshamy, and P. George (Eds.), Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond (pp. 13–27). Pentagon. Sud, N. (2022). The actual Gujarat model: Authoritarianism, capitalism, Hindu nationalism and populism in the time of Modi. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 52(1), 102–126. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​ /00472336​.2020​.1846205. Suri, K. C. (1994). Caste reservations in India: Policy and politics. Indian Journal of Political Science, LV(1), 37–54. neel vanvari

224  encyclopedia of asian politics Tillin, L. (2015). Indian elections 2014: Explaining the landslide. Contemporary South Asia, 23(2), 117–122. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1080​/09584935​.2015​.1030354. Tillin, L. (2019). Indian Federalism. Oxford University Press. Tomlinson, B. R. (2013). The Economy of Modern India: From 1860 to the TwentyFirst Century. Cambridge University Press. WorldData​ .in​ fo (2022). India. Accessed December 12, 2022. https://www​.worlddata​ .info​/asia​/ india​/ index​.php#:~​:text​= India​ %20is​%20located​%20in​%20South​,times​ %20the​%20size​%20of​%20Texas. Wilkinson, S. I. (2003). Social cleavages and electoral competition in India. India Review (London, England), 2(4), 31–42. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1080​/147​3648​0412​331307152. Yadav, Y., and Palshikar, S. (2003). From hegemony to convergence: Party system and electoral politics in the Indian states,

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Key resources Ganguly, S., and Pardesi, M. S. (2009). Explaining sixty years of India’s foreign policy. India Review (London, England), 8(1), 4–19. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​ /14736480802665162. Nooruddin, I. (2011). Coalition Politics and Economic Development: Credibility and the Strength of Weak Governments. Cambridge University Press. Ruparelia, S., Reddy, S., Harriss, J., and Corbridge, S. (Eds.). (2011). Understanding India’s New Political Economy: A Great Transformation? Routledge.

41. Indonesia A. The concept Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy with the world’s largest Muslim population, provides us with an interesting trajectory of democratisation. Indonesia did not have any democratic experience before proclaiming its independence in 1945. According to Liddle (1992), Indonesia has experienced several types of political systems: representative democracy (1945–1957), authoritarianism under Sukarno’s guided democracy (1957–1966), and authoritarianism under Suharto’s New Order (1967–1998). Feith (1982) describes Suharto’s New Order era as a “repressive-developmentalist”. This regime was based on the coalition between army leaders, businesspeople, and intellectuals, with the army as the backbone, to support Suharto’s priority of stabilising the economy and weakening other political challengers. May 1998 marked the downfall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime and the beginning of reformasi or democratisation. Since then, Indonesia has achieved significant indicators of a robust democracy by holding regular fair and free elections, establishing pluralism in politics, and supporting a vibrant civil society and free press. Another important milestone is the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK) as a response to rampant but untouchable corruption cases, collusion, and nepotism practices under Suharto’s administration. Diamond (2009) dubbed Indonesia as a stable, vigorous, and legitimate democracy with support for liberal democratic values from its citizens. Sukma (2009 argued that Indonesia’s politics was characterised by resilient democracy. While this progress came with some shortcomings, such as law enforcement, there was an analytical consensus that Indonesia’s democracy was stable and relatively liberal, with no serious existential threats (Warburton & Aspinall, 2018).

B. The landscape Over the past two decades, the democratic decline has been a global concern in politics. The number of both electoral and liberal democracies began to decline after 2006, and

the average level of freedom in the world has also deteriorated slightly (Diamond, 2015). In 2004, Indonesia just experienced a vibrant democratic consolidation before this declining global trend in 2006 (Setiawan, 2022). However, it gradually shows signs of regression. The rating from several international institutions and the national index published by the Central Statistical Agency demonstrates this setback. The Freedom House’s democracy index has recorded the constant fall of Indonesia’s democratic performance over the last four years, with a score of 62/100 in 2019, 61/100 in 2020, and a stagnation in 2021 and 2022 with 59/100 (Freedom House, 2022). We could see a similar trend from the EIU, albeit with fluctuation. In 2018, Indonesia’s democracy score was 6.39, slightly increasing to 6.48 in 2019 before finally dropping again in 2020 to 6.3, placing Indonesia as a flawed democratic country. In 2021, it rebounded to 6.71. The Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) published by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) shows declining political rights scores and democratic institutions. The political rights score had increased in 2019 to 70.71 from 65.79 in the previous year but decreased to 67.85 in 2020. The score of democratic institutions had increased in 2019, the prior year, but fell to 75.66 in 2020 (BPS, 2020). The declining trend occurred during Joko Widodo’s two terms of presidency (2014– 2019 and 2019–2024). Before elaborating on the backsliding, it is important to describe the process of democratic consolidation and stagnation during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency that has given way to the recession under his successor, Joko Widodo. Democratic consolidation and stagnation Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected in 2004 through the first direct and democratic election in Indonesian history. The early years of Yudhoyono’s presidency brought ample progress: economic stability, peaceful resolution of separatist conflict in Aceh, and robust civil society participation in politics. Indonesia was also hailed as a model of democracy in a Muslim-majority country after a series of tumultuous democratic transitions in Middle East countries. Freedom House confirmed this impressive achievement by ranking Indonesia as Southeast Asia’s most free and democratic country between 2006 and 2013.

225

226  encyclopedia of asian politics As the country entered the second term of Yudhoyono’s presidency in 2009, some signs of democratic stagnation led to early regression. Yudhoyono is a consensus maker who preferred to establish a grand coalition that included his supporters and some of his competitors when he took power after the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections (Anugrah, 2020). One indicator of the early democratic regression during Yudhoyono’s administration was the formation of a grand coalition of elites. While it was beneficial in keeping democratic stability, Yudhoyono’s moderate political stance also meant that “Indonesia missed the opportunity to implement much-needed structural reforms to deepen democracy and move the economy forward from a commodity boom-driven, oligarchs-benefitting economy” (Anugrah, 2020, p. 4). Mietzner (2015) explained the democratic stagnation-regression under Yudhoyono through three significant causes: his failure to offer a substantive structural answer to the problem of political corruption, the absence of further electoral reform, and Yudhoyono’s failure to introduce military reform measures. Democratic decline Despite his emergence from a divisive election with identity politics, the election of Joko Widodo or Jokowi in 2014 was initially welcomed with optimism due to the large-scale support from volunteers and civil society activists to his victory. However, the process of democratic stagnation and early signs of regression during the second term of Yudhoyono’s presidency have been sustained and even amplified after Jokowi assumed his presidency. According to Power (2018), Jokowi’s approaches to the presidency have primarily focused on his preoccupation with domestic economic development, lack of interest in reformist politics, and reactive decision-making. Jokowi’s focus on economic development has made him prone to coercive measures backed by the security apparatus to safeguard favourable conditions for investment. They include crushing the Islamic extremist groups and repressing protesters and opposition groups, refusing to defend KPK and expanding the role of the military in politics and governance (Slater, 2023). Bland (2019) argues that the challenges posed by Indonesia’s democracy are derived from the “original sin” of the reformasi. Indonesia had avoided political violence and amalia sustikarini

uncertainty by undergoing a gradual change from within rather than a revolution. Hence, a peaceful transition must leave Suharto-era figures and institutions with a seat at the table of power. Similarly, Warburton and Aspinall point out the nature of Indonesia’s transition and the incorporation of anti-democratic elites into the governing structures of its democracy as the origins of democratic weakness in Indonesia. Jati (2021) explains the causes of this backsliding in three detailed categories: the increasing role of the military in the civilian sphere, ideology divisions, and dynasticism. Meanwhile, Amalia (2021) divides the setback into three factors: the corruption of political officials and efforts to weaken the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK), identity politics by political elites, and the overreaction of state officials in responding to freedom of expression. The next section will explain Indonesia’s democratic decline trend from the perspective of polarisation and civil liberty. These two aspects are taken from the Freedom House country ranking measurement: political rights and civil liberty. We use polarisation to depict the flaw in the electoral process as a part of political rights. Political polarisation One of the most striking characteristics of Indonesia’s democracy in the past ten years is the divisive elections. It occurs both in presidential and gubernatorial elections. Carothers and O’Donohue (2019) highlight the damaging impact of severe polarisation on all essential institutions of democracy, such as the judiciary, legislature, and executive powers. More fundamentally and related to the election process, polarisation ruins crucial norms of tolerance and moderation in a democracy, like conceding peacefully after an electoral defeat. In the 2014 presidential election, Indonesians were choosing two candidates with seemingly opposing ideologies and values: Prabowo Subianto, a former military general with an authoritarian populist style supported by Islamist allies, and Jokowi, a former businessman turned politician who emphasised communal pluralism. The match between the same candidates was repeated in the 2019 election. While Jokowi’s choice of Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate was intended to win more votes from Muslim

indonesia  227 groups and portray him as a more “Islamic” candidate, the primary ideological cleavage in this election remained the pluralist versus Islamist cleavage. The polarisation that started in the 2014 presidential election was replicated during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election but with even stronger identity politics. A clear boundary between Anies Baswedan as Muslim and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) as Chinese-Christian, a double minority in Indonesia, widened this polarisation. The mobilisation of grievance and identity politics during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election created deep-seated polarisation in Indonesia. Warburton (2020), Setijadi (2017), and Afrimadona (2021) agree that the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election used explicit sectarian campaigns and hence, heightened the polarisation. Tomsa and Setiawan (2020) describe this polarisation as the most profound cleavage between Islamists and pluralists since 1950. Another aspect brought by this polarisation is the attitude of election losers towards the election result (Carothers, Press, 2022) During the two presidential elections in 2014 and 2019, Prabowo Subianto refused to peacefully concede the election defeat, blaming the loss on electoral fraud. We could see a similar attitude in the US and, recently, in Brazil. Trump’s rejection of the 2020 election result is the turning point that has added the US to the list of backsliding democracies for the first time by IDEA (The Guardian, 2021) Civil liberty The illiberal drift on civil liberty in Indonesia began under the second term of President Yudhoyono and contributed to the lowering score of Indonesia’s freedom from “free” to “partly free” in 2013. It is indicated by, among other things, the promulgation of various laws on defamation, treason, and blasphemy and weakening protection for religious minorities and LGBTQI communities. In December 2021, the parliament unanimously passed a new criminal code (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana/KUHP) with some provisions that violate international human rights and standards (Human Rights Watch, 2020). This law contains several vague and oppressive provisions, including criminalising consensual sex outside of marriage and a ban on insulting the president state’s symbols: the president, the

vice president, state institutions, Indonesia’s national ideology known as Pancasila, and the national flag. This law could invade privacy and threaten political opposition with jail. In other words, this law “gives the state new tools to punish a wide range of ideological, moral and political offences” (Jaffrey & Waburton, 2022). Before this new controversial law was passed, the Indonesian public had seen heightened coercive measures, repression of civil society actors, and broader freedom of speech outlets. In the aftermath of mass protests of the 2019 presidential election result, the government responded to the public outcry with tough measures that included mobilisation of security forces, arrest of protesters, and blocking of video and image sharing on social media and messaging platforms such as WhatsApp (Setiawan, 2020). In 2020, a similar policy was applied to crack down on massive demonstrations towards the new Omnibus Law. The law undermines environmental and labour protection for robust investment. The study by pollster Indikator Politik Indonesia demonstrated the public’s concern over the government’s authoritarian stance in responding to critics. The majority of respondents (69.6 per cent) expressed their increasing fear of publicly voicing their opinions on current issues. In addition, 73.8 per cent of respondents found it more difficult to hold public rallies and demonstrations, and 57.7 per cent of respondents believed the excessive use of authority represses political dissent (The Jakarta Post, 2020). These cases portray the increasing restriction on civil liberty under Jokowi’s presidency, as identified by McGregor and Setiawan (2019) as a characteristic of Jokowi’s administration that only takes a limited interest in civil and political rights.

C. Future research It is worth considering Bland’s (2019) statement about analysing democratisation in Indonesia. The nature of Indonesia as a vast, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious nation makes the process not a linear one that follows a simple measure of progress versus regression. Slater (2023) emphasises the importance of examining Indonesia as a survival case of flawed democracy amid troubled democratic times. amalia sustikarini

228  encyclopedia of asian politics Gammon (2023) believes that in the coming years, particularly in the aftermath of the 2024 presidential election and post-Jokowi era, Indonesia will remain a democracy, albeit a weaker and more illiberal one. This ruling government will continue its emphasis on electoral democracy with free, fair, and robust elections but is less concerned about civil liberties, human rights issues, and the rule of law. Future research could be focused on the relationship between Islamist groups and nationalist-pluralists in parliament and executive power and its impact on Indonesian democracy. Jaffrey and Warburton (2022) investigate the compromise between the religious conservative and nationalist groups in parliament to pass the new controversial criminal code. In addition to preserving existing criminalisation for disseminating communist/Marxist-Leninist thought, this law also bans the expression of ideas contradictory to Pancasila, a provision that strongly amplified the nationalist stance under the Indonesia Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan/PDI-P). At the same time, the new law is a major success for Islamist groups by banning and criminalising all sexual relations outside of marriage. While the division between pluralistnationalist and Islamist has long been entrenched in Indonesian politics and perceived as the driver of political polarisation, the two could pragmatically compromise to win the bigger gain. This compromise and cooperation will have two possibilities: the improvement of Indonesia’s democratic performance or, on the contrary, turning Indonesia into a more illiberal democracy with the cost of civil liberty and freedom. Amalia Sustikarini

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BPS. (2020). Indonesia Democratic Index Based on Democratic Aspect and Province. https://www​.bps​.go​.id ​/indicator​/34​/599​/1​/ indeks​- demokrasi​-indonesia​-idi​-menurut​ -aspek​-dan​-provinsi​.html Bland, B. (2019). Politics in Indonesia: Resilient Elections, Defective Democracy. Lowy Institute. Carothers, T., and O’Donohue, A. (2019). How to Understand the Global Spread of Political Polarization. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carothers, T., and Press, B. (2022). Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding: How to Understand the Global Spread of Political Polarization. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Diamond, L. (2009). Indonesia’s Place in Global Democracy. In E. Aspinall and M. Mietzner (Eds.), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society. ISEAS. Diamond, L. (2015). Facing Up to the Democratic Recession. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 141–155. Feith, H. (1982). Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia. Alternatives, 7(4), 491–506. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /030437548200700406. Gammon, L. (2023, January 1). The Need to Deal With Indonesia As It Is. East Asia Forum. Human Rights Watch (2020). Indonesia: Backsliding on Rights Abusive Laws Proposed, Minorities Face Persistent Harassment. https://www​.hrw​.org​/news​ /2020​/01​/14​/indonesia​-backsliding​-rights Freedom House (2022). Freedom in the World 2022: Indonesia. https://freedomhouse​.org​/ country​/indonesia​/freedom​-world​/2022 Jaffrey, S., and Waburton, E. (2022). Indonesia’s New Criminal Code Turns Representatives into Rulers. New Mandala. Jati, W. R. (2021). The Situation of Declining Indonesian Democracy in 2021. THC Insight. The Habibie Center. Liddle, W. (1992). Indonesia’s Democratic Past and Future. Comparative Politics, 24(4), 443–462. Mc Gregor, K. and Setiawan, K. (2019). Shifting from International to “Indonesian” Justice Measures: Two Decades of Addressing Past Human Rights Violations. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 49(5), 837–861.

indonesia  229 Mietzner, M. (2015). Indonesia: Democratic Consolidation and Stagnation Under Yudhoyono, 2004–2014. In W. Case (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Democratization (pp. 370–383). Routledge. Power, T. P. (2018). Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 54(3), 307–338. Setiawan, K. (2020). A State of Surveillance? Freedom of Expression Under the Jokowi Presidency. In T. Power and E. Warburton (Eds.), Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression? (pp. 254–274). ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. Setiawan, K. M. P., and Dirk, T. (2022). Politics in Contemporary Indonesia Institutional Change, Policy Challenges and Democratic Decline. Routledge Setijadi, C. (2017). Ahok’s Downfall and the Rise of Islamist Populism in Indonesia. ISEAS Perspective. Slater, D. (2023). What Indonesian Democracy Can Teach the World. Journal of Democracy, 34(1), 95–109. Sukma, R. (2009). Indonesian Politics in 2009: Defective Elections, Resilient Democracy. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 45(3), 317–336. https://www​ .tandfonline​ .com​/doi​/abs​/10​.1080​/00074910903301647. The Guardian. (2021, November 22). US Added to List of ‘Backsliding’ Democracies for First Time.

The Jakarta Post. (2020, November 26). Growing Fear of Speaking Out: Survey Finds Indonesia’s Civil Liberties Under Threat. Warburton, E., and Aspinall, E. (2018). Indonesian Democracy: From Stagnation to Regression? Coral Bell School of Asia and Pacific Affairs, Australia National University. Waburton, E. (2020). Deepening Polarization and Democratic Decline in Indonesia. In T. Carother and A. O’Donahue (Eds.), Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Key resources East Asia Forum: a platform for analysis and research on politics, economics, business, law, security, international relations, and society relevant to public policy, centred on the Asia Pacific region. It consists of an online publication and a quarterly magazine, East Asia Forum Quarterly: www​.eastasiaforum​.org​/about/. New Mandala: online platform for analysis and new perspectives on Southeast Asia. It is hosted by the Australian National University’s (ANU) Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs in the College of Asia and the Pacific: www​.newmandala​.org/. The Jakarta Post: www​.thejakartapost​.com/.

amalia sustikarini

42. Japan A. The concept In this chapter, we summarize the background information on Japanese politics, especially since the 1990s, and then present the concept of majoritarian democracy with limits to examine the development after the electoral and administrative reforms. Socioeconomic and historical backgrounds The ideological tension between the left and the right set the tone for post-war Japanese politics; however, Japanese politics took a real turn after the end of the Cold War. Not surprisingly, the socialist and communist camps were hit hard by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Besides that, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a dominant party since its establishment in 1955, lost its credibility as the sole defender of capitalism and the market economy. In short, the post-war settlement was shaken badly, which led to a systemic crisis in political parties. At the outbreak of the Gulf War, Japan had to reconsider its self-image as a pacifist nation and tried to recast itself to a more “normal” state that could deploy both military and non-military operations abroad. Some ambitious politicians insisted that Japan should take a more active role and pursued strong political leadership to achieve that end. While accelerating its settlement into the new international environment, Japan had to cope with the difficulties caused by economic decline and population ageing from the 1990s onwards. After the burst of the asset price bubble, the Japanese economy was plagued by low growth and ever-lasting deflation. Furthermore, society was greying at the fastest pace in the world. To tackle these problems, Japan was determined to bolster the positions of its political leaders to make them more accountable to the public. Combined with the collapse of old left and right ideologies, the need for strong leadership brought Japan into an era of political reform. In essence, the main agenda was the introduction of the British Westminster model to Japanese politics where the LDP, factionalized and money-ridden, occupied the government without interruption.

Political reforms in Japan since 1994 In 1994, Japan changed its electoral formula for the lower house (the House of Representatives, the HR) to a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, which was comprised of two tiers: 300 single-member districts (SMD) and 200 proportional representation (PR) seats. The old familiar single non-transferable vote (SNTV) was finally abandoned. Under the new system, the once fragmented opposition parties were expected to unite and overturn the LDP’s dominance. In addition to making the Japanese party system more competitive, the MMM was expected to strip down the influence of factions and centralize the authority inside of the LDP. In this sense, it can be said that the main purpose of the reform was to transform the Japanese political system into a more competitive, effective, and transparent one. After the passage of the 1994 bill, a series of administrative reforms followed. To concentrate the power in the hands of the prime minister, the 1999 Cabinet Act clearly stipulated that the PM has the initiative at Cabinet meetings. The Cabinet Office was also created in 2001 to support the Cabinet Secretariat. Consequently, the number of personnel who work for the Cabinet Secretariat has more than tripled since then. Although the political reforms since the 1990s changed the traditional way of politics, the opposition parties remain fragmented. By nature, a single-member constituency facilitates coordination between parties to run a single candidate. Due to this feature, Japanese oppositions merged into the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2003. The DPJ won the general election in 2009, but they fell victim to internal conflicts and finally broke up. In contrast, the LDP tightened its discipline and was able to successfully remain in power. Majoritarian democracy with limits According to the classic study by Lijphart (2012), majoritarian democracy, as opposed to consensus democracy, is mainly characterized by features like the concentration of executive power in a single-party majority, executive dominance over the legislature, a two-party system, first-past-the-post electoral rules, a unitary state structure, and a unicameral legislature. Japanese electoral and administrative reforms did not address either of the last two of these features – that is, its state structure and bicameral legislature

230

japan  231 – when the majoritarian system was adopted. In the former case, even more decentralization reforms have been implemented since the 2000s. Furthermore, the PR component allows smaller parties to survive. In this sense, the reforms were supposed to establish a majoritarian democracy, but only in a limited manner as we will see below.

B. The landscape In the section below, we will review the studies on the recent development of Japanese politics, focusing on party and executive politics in particular. The move toward majoritarian democracy in Japan According to Takenaka (2006), the Japanese witnessed a dramatic shift of power to PM Koizumi Junichirō in the early 2000s. PM Koizumi took office in 2001 and exploited the opportunities brought about by the political reforms undertaken since 1994. As the LDP leader, Koizumi fully took advantage of his power to nominate candidates running for the SMDs and ousted internal dissidents. Subsequently, his party won the 2005 general election by a landslide. Furthermore, he centralized the decision-making process whereby the Cabinet Secretariat played a more decisive role. Takenaka regards the Koizumi premiership as the beginning of a new era and called it “the 2001 regime”. Machidori (2006) predicted the appearance of “a strong premier” as Takenaka did. It is presumable that the leadership demonstrated by Koizumi came from his personal qualities. If that was the case, then the powerful premiership should have ended when Koizumi left office. Machidori insisted, however, that Koizumi was not a distinct, individual phenomenon but part of a secular trend rooted in institutional changes since the 1990s (cf. Machidori, 2012). The effects of electoral and administrative reforms were again credited. Along with the studies done by Takenaka and Machidori, Uchiyama (2010) also admitted that Koizumi exerted a stronger leadership compared to his predecessors, but according to Uchiyama, his involvement with actual policy-making varied according to domain. That is, Koizumi paid greater attention to policies concerning domestic economy and society, but he paid lesser attention to foreign relations. While he successfully led policies

and changed them as he liked in the former domain, his scant attention and whims sometimes made policies ineffective in the latter realm. This trend was boosted by leadership selection practices, which aimed to choose a popular leader based on an intraparty plebiscite (Uekami, 2008). To attract voters in an increasingly volatile electoral market, it matters who the leader is. As broadcast media spotlighted Japanese prime ministers during the election campaign, they became “presidentialized” (Krauss & Nyblade, 2005). This term, originally coined by Poguntke and Webb (2005), refers to the certain elevation not only of the position of PM, but also of LDP leadership in the Japanese context. Krauss and Pekkanen (2011) take a slightly different approach and explore the reason why some organizations inside of the LDP were changed much more than others. Based on historical institutionalism, they apply concepts such as institutional complementarity. By introducing the MMM, they argue that the factions were hit the hardest, followed by the party’s decision-making body (Policy Affairs Research Council, PARC), and personal campaign organizations (Koenkai). As mentioned above, the party was required to select a popular leader after the electoral reforms (Krauss & Nyblade, 2005). Giving voting rights to ordinary party members certainly deprived the factions of their power. The PARC was also affected as factionalism declined because factionalism was complementary to the PARC. These processes, working together, contributed to bolstering the leadership position overall, but they left some room for the Koenkai to cultivate personal votes. Turning to the voters, party labels have played a greater role in Japanese people’s minds in the lower house elections, especially since the mid-2000s (Reed, Scheiner, & Thies, 2012; Catalinac, 2016). Because the old SNTV was known for its intrinsic features that enhanced personal voting (cf. Carey & Shugart, 1995), it is no wonder that the electorate took different cues after the electoral system reforms (Nakakita, 2014). The trends toward strong leadership continued under the second government headed by PM Abe Shinzō (Takenaka, 2021). At the same time, it is not always appropriate to describe the Japanese prime minister as a strong leader after Koizumi. For example, takayoshi uekami

232  encyclopedia of asian politics during the first government led by Abe, who succeeded Koizumi, misconduct by his cabinet ministers decreased his approval rating, which eventually led to the LDP losing majority status in the 2007 upper house election (the House of Councillors, HC). Consequently, Abe was forced to resign for health reasons. After Abe, Fukuda Yasuo, and then Asō Tarō, inherited the rule of the LDP. As they were crippled by the failure to secure more than half the seats of the upper house, these administrations were both short-lived, and the LDP-led government was defeated by a DPJ-led coalition in the 2009 general election. But the DPJ government also failed to sustain its popularity and lost the 2010 upper house election and the 2012 general election consecutively. In this sense, electoral and administrative reforms are not sufficient conditions for lasting political leadership. Some newer research has tried to clarify the mechanisms and conditions under which the power of leadership can be fully exercised. Takayasu (2014) explains why some PMs succeed in establishing robust leadership while others do not. According to Takayasu, PMs were able to exercise strong leadership when MPs could not overcome a collective action problem and effectively control their agent, namely the PM. The pacifism among the five largest factions inside of the LDP led to weaker PMs during the 1980s, while the factional decline after the 1994 reforms strengthened the LDP leadership dramatically. Hamamoto (2018) also argues that it all depends on whether their parties succeed in gaining enough support from voters. The party leadership will remain steadfast and suppress potential defection from the party line when the party and its leadership can skilfully manage its popularity. In other words, it is essential that politicians take advantage of the opportunities brought about by institutional changes. With Japanese elections becoming more competitive amid the rise of the DPJ, the internal party structure was centralized to cope with the external uncertainties according to Uekami and Tsutsumi (2019). This heightened electoral competitiveness transformed the once dominant but internally divided LDP into a more consolidated party, and conversely, intraparty centralization tends to decline with relaxed interparty competitiveness. takayoshi uekami

Meanwhile, non-LDP parties have repeatedly failed to establish an alternative to the governing party. Under the SMD, political parties are forced to merge their candidates in general. But Japanese opposition parties could not deliver a single candidate except in the cases of the DPJ and its successor party, which finally broke up in 2017. The DPJ was founded just before the 2003 general election and grew to become the second-largest next to the LDP. As previously mentioned, it won the 2009 general election and formed a government, but it lost the 2012 general election and ended up with internal conflicts afterwards. Why was this the case? A more direct answer to the question lies with the Japanese MMM system. Since the electoral system for the lower house election has a sizable PR component, it not only allows sincere voting for the PR candidates but also invites a so-called contamination effect, which spills over to the SMD competitions (Ferrara, Herron, & Nishikawa, 2005). Consequently, the mixed electoral system does not guarantee a two-party system as is expected in the United Kingdom. The other possible answer lies in the very process of the DPJ’s formation. There is much research that tries to explain the development of the DPJ and its final demise (cf. Kushida & Lipscy, 2013; Maeda & Tsutsumi, 2015; Yamamoto, 2021). Besides presenting itself as free of corruption, the party appealed to voters with universalistic socioeconomic policies in addition to maintaining an international view that emphasized the Japan–US alliance. In sum, it is fair to say that it gained the position as a viable alternative to the LDP. But, as Uekami and Tsutsumi (2011) point out, the DPJ was only shallowly rooted in Japanese society. It was established from the top-down efforts of MPs who were struggling to survive in the single-seat constituency races. By extrapolating beyond the scope of Uekami and Tsutsumi, it can be said that the DPJ failed to mobilize support from voters on behalf of the party; that is one reason why the party could not sustain itself in the longer run.

C. Future research In this final section, we will discuss the direction of future research on political reforms with an emphasis on institutional constraints other than the electoral formula of the lower house.

japan  233 Other factors hampering majoritarian democracy in Japan According to Takenaka (2010), the presence of the upper house (the House of Councillors, the HC) came to affect the power of Japanese premiers. Since the Constitution of Japan stipulates that the upper house has the authority to enact bills almost identical to the lower house, securing a majority of seats in the HC has been critical to ruling governments. During the era of LDP hegemony, which lasted until 1993, the party dominated both the HR and the HC. But the LDP-led coalitions have lost some HC elections since the late 1990s, which has resulted in a Japanese style of divided government. After Koizumi, the Abe government lost the upper house election in 2007. Subsequently, Abe stepped down from the office. His successors only proved that a government without a majority of HC seats ends up in a deadlock. In this sense, Japan’s bicameral system does not fit well with majoritarian democracy. Besides the other chamber of the National Diet, local assemblies also pose problems to the development of majoritarian democracy in Japan. Firstly, the electoral system currently used for the local assemblies remains the single non-transferable vote system (SNTV). The SNTV, which was previously used for lower house elections, was abandoned with the 1994 reforms on the grounds that it promoted personal voting and factionalism inside of the LDP. As a political party usually consists of multiple entities, including members of local assemblies, inconsistent electoral systems at multiple levels provide politicians with contradictory incentives: the introduction of MMM to the lower house does not always guarantee behavioural changes in local assembly members, which further hinders the development of majoritarian democracy (Uekami, 2013; Tatebayashi, 2017). Secondly, the SNTV system allows candidates to appeal to voters on a non-partisan basis in the local assembly elections. It did not help the DPJ to rally support from local politicians and made it harder for the party to build its party-on-the-ground from scratch. Contrary to the LDP, which has focused enormous efforts on organizing its local base since the early post-war period, the DPJ found itself squarely in a disadvantaged position. Furthermore, as the decentralization reforms during the 2000s relaxed the central

government’s grip on local politics, it also fuelled the assertiveness of local politicians not to be engaged in the joint venture of establishing a new national party (Sunahara, 2017). As Batto et al. (2016) argue, the Japanese MMM system should be understood as something embedded in the constitutional context. Due to its bicameral legislature coupled with the increased autonomy of local governments, Japan’s would-be Westminster system has often failed to exert a centripetal force. Takayoshi Uekami

References Batto, N. F., Huang, C., Tan, A. C., and Cox, G. W. (2016). Mixed-member electoral systems in constitutional context: Taiwan, Japan, and beyond. University of Michigan Press. Carey, J. M., and Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies, 14, 417–439. Catalinac, A. (2016). Electoral reform and national security in Japan: From pork to foreign policy. Cambridge University Press. Ferrara, F., Herron, E. S., and Nishikawa, M. (2005). Mixed electoral systems: Contamination and its consequences. Palgrave Macmillan. Hamamoto, S. (2018). Institutional analysis of party politics in Japan. Yūhikaku Publishing (In Japanese). Krauss, E. S., and Nyblade, B. (2005). ‘Presidentialization’ in Japan? The prime minister, media and elections in Japan. British Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 357–368. Krauss, E. S., and Pekkanen, R. J. (2011). The rise and fall of Japan’s LDP: Political party organizations as historical institutions. Cornell University Press. Kushida, K. E., and Lipscy, P. Y. (Eds.). (2013). Japan under the DPJ: The politics of transformation and governance. The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Lijphart, A. (2012). Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries, 2nd edition. Yale University Press. Machidori, S. (2006). The ‘strong premiership’ will become common: Although the selection of leadership and the presence of the upper house pose some difficulties. Chū ō Kōron, 174–184 (In Japanese). takayoshi uekami

234  encyclopedia of asian politics Machidori, S. (2012). The Japanese premiership: An institutional analysis of the power relations. Chikura Syobō (In Japanese). Maeda, Y., and Tsutsumi, H. (Eds.). (2015). Party government and party governance: The case of the democratic party of Japan. Chikura Shobō (In Japanese). Nakakita, K. (2014). The transformation of LDP politics. NHK Publishing, Inc. (In Japanese). Poguntke, T., and Webb, P. (Eds.). (2005). The presidentialization of politics: A comparative study of modern democracies. Oxford University Press. Reed, S. R., Scheiner, E., and Thies, M. F. (2012). The end of LDP dominance and the rise of party-oriented politics in Japan. The Journal of Japanese Studies, 38(2), 353–376. Sunahara, Y. (2017). Party system institutionalization in Japan: Between fragmentation and integration. Chikura Syobō (In Japanese). Takayasu, K. (2014). Prime ministerial power and the party organisation in transformation: The case of the liberal democratic party. Japanese Journal of Electoral Studies, 30(2), 35–48. Takenaka, H. (2006). Prime minister rule: The changing face of Japanese politics. Chū ō Kōron Shinsha (In Japanese). Takenaka, H. (2010). What is the house of councillors all about? 1947–2010. Chū ō Kōron Shinsha. Takenaka, H. (2021). Expansion of the Japanese Prime Minister’s power and transformation of Japanese politics. In T. Hoshi and P. Y. Lipscy (Eds.), The political economy of the Abe government and Abenomics reforms (pp. 43–67). Cambridge University Press. Tatebayashi, M. (2017). Comparative institutional analysis of multi-level party politics in Japan. Chikura Syobō (In Japanese).

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Uchiyama, Y. (2010). Koizumi and Japanese politics: Reform strategies and leadership style. Routledge. Uekami, T. (2008). The democratization of party leadership selection in Japan. The Annuals of Japanese Political Science Association, 59(1), 220–240. Uekami, T. (2013). Party politics and Japan’s inconsistent electoral systems: National elections, local elections, and party leadership selection. University of Tokyo Press. Uekami, T., and Tsutsumi, H. (Eds.). (2011). Organization and policies of the Democratic Party of Japan: From its formation to the acquisition of power. Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha (In Japanese). Uekami, T., and Tsutsumi, H. (2019). Inverse relationship between party Institutionalisation and party system competitiveness: The transformation of postwar Japanese party politics. In R. Harmel and L. G. Svåsand (Eds.), Institutionalisation of political parties: Comparative cases (pp. 111–131). Rowman & Littlefield International. Yamamoto, K. (2021). Political realignment: What can we learn from 30 years of alignment and realignment? Chū ō Kōron Shinsha (In Japanese).

Key resources Center for Social Research and Data Archives, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo – The most comprehensive social data archive in Japan, covering topics such as the economy, education, social security, and politics. https://csrda​.iss​.u​-tokyo​.ac​.jp​/english/. nippon​.c​om – A multilingual Japanese news website run by the Nippon Communications Foundation, a private foundation. www​ .nippon​.com​/en/. The Japan Times – The most famous Englishlanguage newspaper in Japan. www​ .japantimes​.co​.jp/.

43. Laos A. The concept The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) is considered one of Asia’s poorest, most mountainous and landlocked countries. The country possesses some of Asia’s richest natural resources and is positioned in the centre of continental Southeast Asia, bordered by Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, and China. Given its geographical position, it not only acted as a buffer and procurator during the Cold War (1947–1991), but also has a tremendous amount of potential to serve as a source of economic opportunity in the new world order (Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006). Since Laos is governed by an undemocratic regime confined to a single party, it is vital to concentrate on the roles and political orientation imposed by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) as the country’s dominant party. The ruling party has an impact on domestic as well as international affairs. However, the LPRP’s history and evolution reveal Laos’s political evolution and transformation. Understanding the LPRP’s nature enables us to anticipate the future and the direction that the country will follow in addition to understanding the values that the country upholds. The LPRP is the only party in the Republic that controls the Lao PDR, and its new government was established on 3 December 1975. The LPRP operates for political ends and has almost total control across all facets of life in Laos, according to Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the ideas of Kaysone Phomvihane, the first head of the LPRP who was influenced by Ho Chi Minh. It is a one-party state just like the other four communist countries that are still in existence: China, Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea. Even though these five communist nations are quite distinct from one another, still they share certain characteristics, such as low levels of conflict, but also inequality, low freedom, and political centralisation under a single ruling party (Freedom House, 2022). The LPRP was established in 1955 and has its roots in the Laotian and Vietnamese revolutionary campaigns for independence at the time. The founding members are former members of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) who led the revolt against the royal government of

Laos and accompanied the North Vietnamese military in its battle against the United States as well as formed a communist alliance with the former Soviet Union. Following the Laotian Civil War and the 30-year National Democratic Revolution, the LPRP gained power and called a National Congress of People’s Representatives with representatives from the party and minority ethnic groups. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic was established on 2 December 1975, following the dissolution of the Kingdom of Laos by congress (Brown & Zasloff, 1976; Stuart-Fox, 1997; Evans, 2002). The LPRP’s primary objectives were to establish and retain its leadership position, uphold and defend socialism, advance societal modernisation, and accelerate industrialisation, all while tightly regulating all political aspects and severely restricting civil rights. The aim of upholding national independence and unity continues to be paramount to nation-building. Additionally, it is important for fostering relationships between the party establishment and the general public, which includes all of the nation’s ethnic groups. It may be argued that the LPRP is now a ruling party attempting to maintain the status quo and extend its power, rather than a revolutionary party working to create a communist utopia (Creak & Barney, 2018; Croissant, 2022). The LPRP is evolving from a salvation army to a state organisation that adheres to the Lao Constitution’s tenet that the “Party is the guiding nucleus, the state provides the protection” and consolidates power over the military and economy. The party has a monopoly on state authority, just as in other communist countries, and it upholds a unitary state with the support of China and Vietnam – Laos’s two communist neighbours. In terms of the LPRP’s position and management, the party in power must always be in charge of the government and all other state institutions. A government representative who upholds party policies can speak for both the party and the government (Meechan, 2022, p. 36). The General Secretary of the LPRP, who is elected by the Party’s Central Committee, is the highest-ranking member of the party and is also the President of Laos as the ultimate leader of the Lao PDR. Furthermore, the General Secretary is eventually appointed to additional significant positions, including chairman of the Defence and Public Security Commission and the commander-in-chief of the Lao People’s Armed Forces.

235

236  encyclopedia of asian politics The function of the LPRP extends into every single Laos political hierarchical system. However, the LPRP does not function in a vacuum; rather, it uses other institutions with particular mandates to influence policy at all levels, from the national to the local. For example, the Lao People’s Armed Forces are responsible for protecting the country. The Constitution mandates the existence of mass groups, which are part of Laos’s political system. They consist of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Youth Union (LPRYU), the Party’s youth wing, the Lao Front for National Development (LFND), the Lao Women’s Union (LWU), and the Lao Trade Unions, which are strictly governed by the LPRP (Stuart-Fox, 2005, 2006). Additionally, each ministry and bureaucratic function has a department or unit that belongs to the ruling party. This is comparable to a cell unit in the structure of the Communist Party, to increase its influence over the governing geographical area and foster unity. The LPRP also takes into account and has an impact on the promotion and transfer of provincial governors and the head of a significant district. Particularly, a minister’s post is equal to that of a provincial governor because it is one that the party directly considers and serves as the position for the LPRP secretary in the province. In general, a provincial governor has more political clout than a minister, particularly in border and high-potential economic provinces like Savannakhet Province and the capital city of Vientiane. Even as a result of the promulgation of the revised constitution and the revised law on local administration in 2015, the provinces will be able to become more decentralised whilst the party remains the unit of state centralisation. In terms of the socioeconomic system, after the insurrection peaked in 1975, the LPRP in Laos was overturned, the stateparty control over society was increased, and efforts were made to establish a planned economy based on the Marxism-Leninism of the Soviet model. To privatise state-owned firms and legalise private property in line with democratic centralism, the LPRP implemented economic reforms in the 1980s that were influenced by China and Vietnam’s market reforms (see Hiebert, 1980). By pragmatically implementing the “New Economic Mechanism (NEM)” approach towards a more market-oriented economic system and welcoming foreign investments, the Lao suthikarn meechan

PDR, which has transitioned to socialist capitalism (Radetzki, 1994), continues to depend on international aid to support its domestic growth regardless of the regime’s borders. Although the new policy aims to experiment with economic reform, battle poverty, and overcome the obstacle of being a landlocked country, the ruling party still holds political sway, which hinders efficient governance (Yamada, 2018). The National Congress of the LPRP, which meets every five years following the general election, has one of its main agendas the implementation of the five-year National SocioEconomic Development Plan (NSEDP), along with the election of the central committee of the party, approval of economic policies, and maintenance of the political stability and security of the country. The Party Congress is also concerned with preserving social order and political stability. In terms of military controls, the consolidation of the peace defence force to achieve peace in its entirety is considered. However, maintaining political stability and bolstering party leadership are the key goals of the summit. Besides, the LPRP also maintains a resounding majority of members in the National Assembly, making any opposition to its policies practically impossible due to political and legal constraints as well as the LPRP’s considerable influence. Table 43.1 shows the high turnout in elections for National Assembly members from 2002 to 2021. During the previous two decades, the election results could therefore ensure legitimacy for the members of the National Assembly who represented the people in their role as an important mechanism of the state. While more than 90 per cent of eligible voters participate in elections and it Table 43.1  Voter turnout for members of the Laos National Assembly elections from 2002 to 2021 Election year

Voter turnout levels in per cent

2002

99.9

2006

99.8

2011

99.7

2016

97.9

2021

92.8

Source:   Election Guide 2021; Meechan 2022, p. 158.

laos  237 can be higher than in many democratic countries, Lao PDR has continuously received global freedom status as “not free” and also received a lower score of political rights (2/40) and civil liberties (11/60) (Freedom House, 2022). What are the causes of this political consciousness, or may it be the outcome of a governmental mechanism? It can be questioned or explored further. Despite Lao PDR’s democratic status, civil liberties, and political rights will be comparable to Myanmar before the coup in February 2021. Given that Myanmar still permits opposition parties and that there are several instances of activists being forcibly disappeared in Laos, however, Laos political scholars like Grant Evans (2002) believe that Myanmar is preferable to the Lao PDR. In this regard, it is argued that the political and social context of the Lao PDR distinguishes itself from Myanmar and other countries in Southeast Asia in terms of the importance of national unity which limits political activity but openly favours economic support. Likewise, Phill Wilcox (2021) points out that even though Laos transfers to the postsocialism era, it is unhelpful since socialism remains part of everyday discourse and an ideology of the country. In addition, the LPRP’s mechanism for selecting and promoting party members, particularly for positions on the central committee and Politburo, is viewed as a check on stable generational transfer among elite families rather than the performance of the state’s elected representatives.

B. The landscape Under an undemocratic government governed by a one-party parliamentary socialist republic, Lao PDR has undergone rapid transformations due to socioeconomic and global political challenges for over a decade. Extensive research on Lao PDR’s politics focuses mostly on economic issues and the results of LPRP monopoly politics. It depicts a triangle of patronage and cooperation between the party, the economy, and foreign diplomacy. In terms of economic development issues, the expansion of the market in agriculture and industry and the expansion of infrastructure are accompanied by land and environmental concerns. Laos’s position on the international stage and its participation in international cooperation that extends well beyond ASEAN

and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) by joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in February 2012 has attracted attention (Vilavong, 2014). Still, the vast majority of studies conducted on Laos in the late 2010s criticised China’s growing influence in the country (Ku, 2016; High, 2021; Creak, 2021; Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 2022). They have favourable effects on financial aid and investment promotion but adverse effects on economic dominance (Sims, 2020). However, additional challenges that have been presented in recent years can also be handled through the military from a political economy perspective. As noted by Lipp and Chambers (2017), since the 1980s, as a result of a reduction in foreign aid, the Lao People’s Army (LPA) has contributed to military enterprises engaged in business endeavours that monopolise privatisation, particularly in infrastructure as well as agricultural and forestry development companies. The LPRP used the khaki capital of Laos as a means of consolidating its expanding political and economic power by functioning as a tense interaction between three parties: the military, corporations, and party politicians. Furthermore, the monopoly politics of Laos appear to both combat and overcome corruption culture in the context of an impoverished developing nation and patronage rules. According to Martin Stuart-Fox (2006), the National Assembly passed the Anti-Corruption Act in 2005 to keep an eye on corrupt activities and promote transparency. These reassuring efforts are designed to increase domestic and international sectors’ trust in the government, the LPRP’s leadership, and the party’s legitimacy, as a result of their impact on the confidence of international investors and funders. Nonetheless, Laos’s political landscape may indeed be examined in terms of the transition within the ruling party, competition and compromise between influential elite families of former leaders and young party members and officials with progressive ideas (Creak, 2021; Stuart-Fox, 2021; Rehbein, 2022).

C. Future research In line with the dominant power of the LPRP, the country under one-party control evolves an argument on the legitimacy of the monopoly government, and the party itself is extended to the issue of the non-democratic suthikarn meechan

238  encyclopedia of asian politics regime and its adaptation of the LPRP. It is undeniable that the government in the Lao PDR does not actively promote democracy and freedom, especially when it comes to implementing measures to prevent unrest or social instability. Likewise, numerous prodemocracy activists and demonstrators have simply disappeared and political activity is prohibited due to the government’s strict surveillance and control. However, there is a trend of movement, which is a positive sign for political change in terms of state power negotiation – for instance, in the case of movements or expressions of discontent and concern regarding the widespread environmental impact of the people supported by international NGOs toward development projects. The most significant example is the construction of the Xayaburi Dam project hydropower development, which has delayed the project’s construction and prompted the government to clarify and provide the public with additional information. These cases are an encouraging sign for the incubation and growth of the public sector, which may expand in the future, despite the Lao PDR government’s concerns about the domino effect of democratic uprisings in Thailand and Myanmar (Siow,2021). Even though the government has severely controlled and punished its critics, these domino effects may lead to unrest in their countries as a result of demands for democratic reform. It also demonstrates social media activity, such as the creation of the hashtags “#IfLaosIsDemocratic” and “#IfLaosPoliticsIsGood” by the younger generation. These movements make an effort to raise awareness of the problems facing the nation, which range from the restriction of free speech and income inequality to the depletion of natural resources and anti-Chinese sentiment in Lao PDR. These challenges illustrate the legitimacy of the LPRP’s leadership duties in addition to criticising political issues. Fundamental questions about how the LPRP can campaign and negotiate its policies with various domestic and international sectors, as well as how the LPRP can reinvent itself to serve a younger generation that absorbs and learns from a wide range of experiences, were also raised as a result of these discussions. The five-year cycle of the party congress and its decision-making on the Lao PDR’s future move are highlighted by these problems.

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The efficacy of the government’s economic development is the second major issue. The Lao PDR has achieved the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which set a deadline of 2020 for eradicating extreme poverty and later extended to 2030. Lifting 500,000 people out of poverty is not only a result of government support but also of the LPRP’s success in raising the standard of living for its people when it was in power. Similar to underdeveloped Asian nations such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Laos’s government and local authorities can effectively respond to the COVID-19 outbreak with foreign vaccine aid and the cooperation of the international community that also promotes the fundamental values of the LPRP-ruled political culture, but the country’s economy has collapsed due to the pandemic (High, 2021; Rehbein, 2022). Specifically, China’s debt trap diplomacy with the greatest external debt is all involved in massive growth in infrastructure and other sectors of the national economy. Laos does play a significant role in the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC), a corridor that was created and included in a global strategy for infrastructure development, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and significant investments for large-scale infrastructure projects like the China–Laos high-speed train project can benefit and promote the growth of economic development. However, these financial benefits might not be enough to deliver the necessary financial returns (Jiang,2022). Laos PDR, like many other countries, is encumbered by a large debt to China, which has an impact on Lao sovereignty in terms of economic independence. The LPRP’s capacity to maintain power and assist Laos’s economic development in the face of global challenges also casts doubt on the sustainability of a government presided over by a single party. Similarly, this won’t result in any meaningful changes for Laos as long as cries for greater democracy seem unachievable if the Politburo’s dynasty survives, multiparty elections are not set up, and the nation remains a member of the socialist bloc. In conclusion, even though the ruling party and elites are capable of maintaining the regime’s stability, the future of one-party rule is uncertain due to the obstacles posed by accessing modernisation and being a part of

laos  239 the international community, upon which the Lao PDR is reliant on loans and foreign aid. The direction of the future will necessitate the adaptation and implementation of policies on multiple levels for the “VISION 2030” and the Ten-Year Socioeconomic Development Strategy 2016–2025 to develop Lao PDR into an upper middle-income nation (Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2022). Even though there are more questions regarding economic sovereignty, still the LPRP holds the key to the nation’s success. Suthikarn Meechan

easta​​siafo​​r um​.o​​rg​/20​​16​/02​​/26​/c​​hinas​​-expa​​ nding​​-infl​​ue​nce​​-in​-l​​aos/.​ Lipp, H., & Chambers, P. (2017). Earning Their Keep: The Political Economy of the Military in Laos. In P. Chambers & N. Waitoolkiat (Eds.), Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia (pp. 218–270). Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Meechan, S. (2022). Local Government System in Lao PDR (in Thai). King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Ministry of Planning and Investment. (2022, April 2). Vision 2030 and 10 Year Socioeconomic Development Strategy References 2016–2025. https://rtm​.org​.la​/nsedp​ Bertelsmann-Stiftung. (2022). Laos Country /documents​ / vision2030 ​ - a nd​ -10 ​ - yea r​ Report 2022. https://bti​-project​.org​/en​/ -socioeconomic​- dev​-strategy​-2016 ​_ 2025​ reports​/country​-report​/ LAO (5 August -lao/. 2022). Pholsena, V., & Banomyong, R. (2006). Laos: Brown, M., & Zasloff, J. J. (1976). New Stages From Buffer State to Crossroads? Mekong of Revolution in Laos. Current History, Press. 71(422), 218–229. Radetzki, M. (1994). From Communism to Creak, S. (2021, December 20). Hints at Capitalism in Laos: The Legal Dimension. Political Change in Laos. https://www​ Asian Survey, 34(9), 799–806. .eastasiaforum ​ .org ​ / 2021/01/27​/ hint ​ s -at-​ Rehbein, B. (2022). Laos in 2021: One More polit​ical-​chang​e-in-​laos/​. Return to the Subsistence Ethic? Asian Creak, S., & Barney, K. (2018). Survey, 62(1), 145–152. Conceptualising Party-State Governance Sims, K. (2020). Laos Set Its Own Debt Trap. and Rule in Laos. Journal of Contemporary Accessed December 15, 2021. https://www. Asia, 48(5), 693–716. eastasiaforum​​.org/​​2020/​​10​/31​​/ laos​​-set-​​its​ Croissant, A. (2022). Laos: The -o​​wn​-de​​​bt​-tr​​ap/. Transformation of Periphery Socialism. In Siow, M. (2021, December 15). Laos Leaders Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia. Fear ‘Domino Effect’ of Thailand’s ProSpringer. Democracy Movement Amid Election. ElectionGuide. (2021, December 15). Election h t t p s: // w w w​. s c m p​. c o m ​/ we e k a s i a ​/ for Laotian National Assembly. ​https:/​/ politics​/article​/3122480​/ laos​-leaders​-fear​ www​.electionguide​.org​/elections​/id​/​3623/. -domino​- effect​-thailands​-pro​- democracy​ Evans, G. (2002). A Short History of Laos: -movement. The Land in Between. Silkworm Books. Stuart-Fox, M. (1997). A History of Laos. Freedom House. (2022). Laos. Accessed Cambridge University Press. July 20, 2022. https://freedomhouse​ .org​ / Stuart-Fox, M. (2005). Politics and Reform in country/ laos/freedom-world/2022. the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Asia Hiebert, M. (1980). Socialist Transformation Research Centre, Working Paper No. 126. in Laos. Current History, 79(461), 175–195. Stuart-Fox, M. (2006). The Political Culture High, H. (2021). Laos in 2020: Reaping a of Corruption in the Lao PDR. Asian Harvest of Unity and Debt. Asian Survey, Studies Review, 30(1), 59–75. 61(1), 144–148. Stuart-Fox, M. (2021). Elite Family Ties Still Jiang, J. (2022, July 10). Laos Faces Debt Bind the Lao Peoples’ Revolutionary Party. Crisis After Borrowing Billions From East Asia Forum. China. https://www​.voanews​.com​/a​/laos​ Vilavong, B. (2014). After Joining the WTO, -faces​-debt​-crisis​-after​-borrowing​-billions​ What’s Next for Laos? Accessed December -from​-china-​/6641633​.html. 21, 2021. https://www.easta​​siafo​​r um​.o​​rg​ Ku, S. (2016). China’s Expanding Influence in /20​​14​/08​​/09​/a​​f ter-​​joini​​ng​-th​​e ​-wto​​-what​​s​​ Laos. Accessed April 2, 2022. https://www. -nex​​t​-for​​-laos​/. suthikarn meechan

240  encyclopedia of asian politics Yamada, N. (2018). Legitimation of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party: Socialism, Chintanakan Mai (New Thinking) and Reform. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48(5), 717–738.

Key resources Goldston, D. (editor) (2019). Essays on Laos and Beyond in Honour of Martin StuartFox. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

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Lintner, B. (2019). Communism and Capital: Marxists Literature in Southeast Asia. In A. Chakraborty, A. Chakrabarti, B. Dasgupta & S. Sen (Eds.), ‘Capital’ in the East. Singapore: Springer. Wilcox, P. (2021). Heritage and the Making of Political Legitimacy in Laos: The Past and Present of the Lao Nation. Bristol University Press.

44. Malaysia

up 57.8% of the population (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2022). This is followed by the Chinese who at 6.9 million make up 22.7% of the population, and the Indians form the smallest ethnic demographic with A. The concept two million people (6.6% of the population) Malaysia is a Southeast Asian country with (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2022). territory both in mainland Southeast Asia In fact, the Indians as an ethnic group are (also known as Peninsula Southeast Asia) and even smaller than those classified as “Other in maritime Southeast Asia. It has a total geo- Bumiputera” (Bumiputera, which translates graphical land size of 330,345 km2, making it literally to “sons of the soil”, is the official the 19th largest country in Asia, and the 68th Malay term used to describe the Malays, the largest in the world (WorldData​.in​fo). Being Orang Asli of Peninsula Malaysia, and other divided into two regions by the South China indigenous peoples of East Malaysia). The Sea, West Malaysia has a geographical size multicultural makeup of Malaysian society of roughly 131,732 km2, while East Malaysia, has led to flare-ups in racial tensions between which is located on the island of Borneo in the various ethnic groups throughout the hismaritime Southeast Asia, is 198,447 km2 tory of the country; this was especially so in (WorldData​ .in​ fo). Given its unique geog- the 1960s as a series of deadly racial riots raphy, Malaysia shares a land border with led separately to the expulsion of Singapore Thailand on the peninsula and Indonesia from the Federation and then, later on, the and Brunei on the island of Borneo. It is also implementation of the New Economic Policy linked to Singapore via two causeway bridges (Faaland et al., 1990). across the Straits of Johor. The history of the Malaysia’s economy is rated as one of country traces back to the Malay kingdoms on the most open economies in the world, with the peninsula – like the Malaccan Sultanate the World Bank (2022) recording the counwhich at one point in time was the dominant try’s trade-to-GDP ratio at over 130% since power in the region – that were colonised 2010 and 40% of jobs in Malaysia having by the British as part of the British Straits links to export activity. This openness to Settlements (Andaya & Andaya, 2017). The trade has resulted in the Malaysian economy unique geography of the country can also be having an upward growth trajectory since attributed to the lasting legacy of British colo- the Asian Financial Crisis and the counnialism as the Federation of Malaya merged try is projected to transition from an upperwith the British Crown colonies of Singapore, middle-income economy to a high-income North Borneo (present-day Sabah), and economy by 2024 (World Bank, 2022). This Sarawak to form Malaysia. strong economic performance since 1997 has Given its large geographical size, Malaysia seen the country grow into one of the larghas a likewise large population demographic. est economies in the region, with a GDP of The latest figures from the Malaysian gov- US$ 434.06 billion and a GDP per capita of ernment’s Department of Statistics (2022) US$13 110 (IMF, 2022). The economic indiplace its population numbers at 32.9 million, cators place Malaysia as the third largest a growth of 0.9% since 2021, and a further economy in Southeast Asia, behind Indonesia inspection of its population numbers shows and Thailand, and its per capita GDP makes that it is made up of 30.3 million citizens and it the third most prosperous country in the 2.6 million foreigners. The population num- region behind Singapore and Brunei (IMF, bers make Malaysia the 6th largest in the 2022). Much of this economic success can be region; its population density is also ranked traced to structural reforms beginning in the 6th in the region at approximately 99 persons 1970s as part of the New Economic Policy per km2 (Department of Statistics Malaysia, that led to a shift of focus from agricultural2022). Like many other ex-European colo- dependent trade to export-orientated indusnies in the Southeast Asian region, Malaysia’s trialisation and with that an open economic population is made up of diverse ethnic environment to investments (Koen et  al., groups as the period of European colonisation 2017). Further structural reforms after the saw large-scale migration of immigrants from Asian Financial Crisis helped to reinforce the places like India and China into the region. financial sector and reduced the risks generIn Malaysia, the largest ethnic group are the ated by external financial markets, thereby Malays who number 17.5 million and make making the domestic market more resilient 241

242  encyclopedia of asian politics (Koen et al., 2017). Furthermore, government policy was introduced to nurture a businessfriendly environment, with the country being ranked within the top 20 in the world for ease of doing business (Koen et al., 2017). It is for these reasons that Malaysia’s economy managed to recover rapidly from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and has been tipped to be the fifth Asian Tiger Economy since the 1990s (Koen et  al., 2017; Perryer, 2019). However, despite these stellar numbers, the Malaysian economy has suffered from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic; the World Bank’s data records that 5.6% of households in the country live in absolute poverty, well below the official poverty line, and growth in the absolute gap between income levels has meant that income inequality levels still remain higher compared to other countries in the region (World Bank, 2022). Malaysia’s political system carries some holdover from its British colonial history, it practices a Westminster parliamentary system with a constitutional monarchy while also having aspects of a federation (Mokhtar, 2014). The country itself is made up of 13 states and three federal territories; the states are Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Penang, Perak, Perlis, Sabah, Sarawak, Selangor, and Terengganu, while Kuala Lumpur, Labuan, and Putrajaya are the federal territories. Governance in Malaysia is thus divided between the federal government and state governments, with the federal government also responsible for the three federal territories. Of the 13 states, nine of them have constitutional monarchs. The nine states – Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor, and Terengganu – are collectively known as the Malay states and are based on the historical Malay kingdoms that ruled over Peninsula Malaysia (Hassan, 2022). These states either have Sultans, or Yamtuan Besar (Negeri Sembilan), or Raja (Perlis) as their titular head of state while an elected Chief Minister (Menteri Besar) serves as the head of the state government. These nine rulers also form the Conference of Rulers from which the constitutional monarch who serves as the federal head of state (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) is elected via rotation on a five-year term (Hassan, 2022). The 13 states all practice the Westminster parliamentary system and each has a unicameral parliamentary assembly, where members of parliament orson tan

are elected during the state elections. The majority party in the state assembly forms the state government. At the federal level, Malaysia is classified as a representative democracy as it uses the Westminster parliamentary system and nominally has three separate branches of government; the Legislature that comprises Parliament and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the Executive that is led by the Prime Minister, and the Judiciary with the Federal Court serving as the highest court of the land. The Legislature makes the laws, the Executive administers the law and the Judiciary interprets the law through the Courts. The Federal Constitution of Malaysia is a written constitution that came into force in 1957 and serves as the supreme law of the land (Mokhtar, 2014). Malaysia’s legislature is a bicameral parliament which consists of the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) and the Dewan Negara (Senate). The senators that make up the Dewan Negara sit for three-year terms and are either elected by state legislatures (each state is allowed to elect two senators) or are nominated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under the advice of the Prime Minister. The Dewan Rakyat consists of members of Parliament who are elected via a federal election, and the government of the day is formed by the political party or party coalition that has a simple majority (112 seats) in the 222-seat house. Based on the constitution, the lower house can sit for a maximum of five years before it must be dissolved and elections held to convene a new one. The prime minister, who holds the executive power in the country as the head of government, must be a member of the lower house of parliament and must also prove to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong that he or she commands a majority in the lower house; this clause has put the spotlight on the role of the ceremonial ruler in the recent political upheaval in Malaysia. Interestingly, although the Judiciary was established as constitutionally independent, it was made subject to Parliament following constitutional amendments after the 1988 constitutional crisis (Harding, 1990). These amendments essentially placed judicial power in the hands of parliament and parliament in turn vests that power to the courts. Elections in Malaysia are carried out using a first-past-the-post electoral system, with individual states having the option to hold their state elections in conjunction with

malaysia  243 the federal parliamentary elections (General Election); this is usually the case for all states except for Malacca, Sabah, and Sarawak. Both the federal and state elections are contested using single-member constituencies, which means there is only one single representative for each electoral district. Federal constituencies are made up of two to six state constituencies. The electoral boundaries and number of constituencies are reviewed and drawn by the Electoral Commission, a body that comprises a Chairman, a Deputy Chairman, and three members, one of whom must be from Sabah or Sarawak. The Commission is appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, under the advice of the Prime Minister. From the country’s independence to 2018, Malaysia’s general elections were dominated by the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition and its predecessor, the Alliance Party. Originally made up of the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), the BN was established in 1977 with the expansion of the Alliance Party to include parties from Sabah and Sarawak, with a total of nine parties forming the initial BN coalition. The makeup of the dominant coalition, with parties that are organised along ethnic lines, is symptomatic of the state of Malaysian electoral politics where ethnic politics has had a stranglehold over the system (Welsh, 2020). As mentioned, the multicultural demography of Malaysia has contributed to heightened racial tension between the ethnic groups; this racial tension has not been aided by the Federal Constitution recognising and enshrining the special role of the Malays as Bumiputera, granting them special privileges or the recognition of Islam as the state religion, with the conflation of Islam and the Malay identity. Thus, Malaysian political parties were also formed along racial lines to look out for the interest of their respective ethnic groups. Despite being members of the BN, MCA and MIC have not had representation in Parliament and state legislature that was commensurate to their positions in the coalition. It has largely been the role of UMNO to form the majority of the executive government, and they managed to hold on to power till 2018 by playing off the fears of the Malay majority of losing their status and privileges to the other races. In fact, the 1969 race riots that led to the NEP came about directly

due to UMNO having its majority in parliament cut down by gains by the multicultural Democratic Action Party and Gerakan Party in the 1969 elections.

B. The landscape Research into Malaysian politics has been focused on the outsized role that ethnic politics has played in the country. This was especially so after 2008 when the opposition parties in the country made inroads by limiting the BN coalition to a simple majority in Parliament, instead of the expected two-thirds, and also wresting control over five of the 13 state legislatures. It heralded the first setback suffered by UMNO since the 1969 election, and many observers were keen to see if the results would foreshadow a positive change in Malaysian politics (Mohamad, 2008). Yet, the resultant years have seen racial politics and the issue of Malay sovereignty even more ingrained in the political scene, as shown by the works of Segawa (2013) and Welsh (2020). Their studies have shown how the Malay political elite from UMNO have increasingly turned up the rhetoric on Malay entitlement and, increasingly, Islamist values to mobilise their voters and maintain their grip on power, which in turn has led to Malaysia seeing increasing polarisation in their divisions. Under UMNO, the constant fallback on ethnic politics to protect their position has led to politics in Malaysia turning into zero-sum games. Alongside research into the dominance of ethnic politics in the country, there has also been further research into the rise of political Islam or Islamisation in the country. Liow (2004), Hassan (2007), and Abbott and Gregorios-Pippas (2010) have all tried to explain how the Malaysian political elite, led by the Malay parties, has slowly embraced the rising religiosity of its largest ethnic group and turned it into a political flashpoint. The Islamisation of the country’s politics, with exPrime Minister Mahathir going so far as to proclaim that Malaysia is an Islamic state, has far-reaching consequences for the social fabric of its multi-ethnic society which already has a history of ethnic violence; it has played a key role in increasing the political polarisation in the country, but the political elite cannot, and seem to not want to, step back on the rhetoric as their Malay-Muslim constituents become increasingly agitated. It also has an impact on the country’s foreign policy, as rising Islamic orson tan

244  encyclopedia of asian politics religiosity in the region has opened an opportunity for Malaysia to position itself as one of the leaders of the Islamic world.

C. Further research While scholars like Welsh (2020) have already begun to analyse the events of 2020 that led to the collapse of the Pakatan Harapan government that had achieved a stunning victory over UMNO in 2018, there still remains an avenue for scholars to delve deeper into how Malay ethnonationalism, corruption, and an entrenched Malay political elite have contributed to growing political instability within the country. It would be an interesting study to evaluate the way the Malay political elite, many of whom are either part of or used to be part of UMNO, continue to shape the discourse in the country, and how they seem to be impervious to any consequences for their political bickering. It would also be interesting to study the results of the recent 2022 General Election which not only saw UMNO record its worst electoral performance ever by winning only 26 seats but saw the stunning rise of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), an Islamist party, which won the highest number of seats in Parliament as part of the “Green Wave”. It remains to be seen as to why the Malay vote shifted so drastically in this election, whether the rise of PAS is a signal of even more increasing Islamisation, and how the newly formed unity government which excludes PAS affects the political behaviour of the different ethnic groups. Orson Tan

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Faaland, J., Parkinson, J. R., & Saniman, R. B. (1990). Growth and Ethnic Inequality: Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP). Chr. Michelsen Institute. Harding, A. J. (1990). The 1988 Constitutional Crisis in Malaysia. International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 39(1), 57–81. Hassan, H. (2022, 24 November). 5 Things to Know About Malaysia’s Conference of Rulers. The Straits Times. https://www​ .straitstimes​.com​/asia​/se​-asia​/5​-things​-to​ -know​ - about​ - malaysia​ - s​ - conference​ - of​ -rulers. Hassan, M. H. B. (2007). Explaining Islam’s Special Position and the Politic of Islam in Malaysia. The Muslim World, 97(2), 287. IMF. (2022). IMF DataMapper - Malaysia. International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 24 November 2022 from https://www​.imf​ .org​/external​/datamapper​/profile​/ MYS. Koen, V., Asada, H., Nixon, S., Rahuman, M. R. H., & Mohd Arif, A. Z. (2017). Malaysia’s Economic Success Story and Challenges. https://​doi​.org​/10​.1787​/cf7fddf2​-en. Liow, J. C. (2004). Political Islam in Malaysia: Problematising Discourse and Practice in the UMNO–PAS ‘Islamisation Race’. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 42(2), 184–205. Mohamad, M. (2008). Malaysia—Democracy and the End of Ethnic Politics? Australian Journal of International Affairs, 62(4), 441–459. Mokhtar, K. A. (2014). Confusion, Coercion and Compromise in Malaysian Federalism. In A. J. Harding & J. Chin (Eds.), 50 Years of Malaysia: Federalism Revisited (pp. 220– 265). Marshall Cavendish International. Perryer, S. (2019). Malaysia’s Journey to Become the Next Asian Superpower. World Finance. Retrieved 24 November 2022 from https://www​.worldfinance​.com​/ markets​/malaysias​-journey​-to​-become​-the​ -next​-asian​-superpower. Segawa, N. (2013). Ethnic Politics in Malaysia: Prospects for National Integration. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 19(2), 210–232. Welsh, B. (2020). Malaysia’s Political Polarization: Race, Religion, and Reform. In T. Carothers & A. O’Donohue (Eds.), Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Dangers (pp. 41–52). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

malaysia  245 World Bank. (2022). Overview: Development Melayu Islam. In Religion and Identity News, Research, Data. World Bank. Politics: Global Trends and Local Realities Retrieved 24 November 2022 from https:// (pp. 75–95). www​.worldbank​.org​/en​/country​/malaysia​/ Tayeb, A. (2021). Malaysia in 2020: Fragile overview. Coalitional Politics and Democratic WorldData​ .inf​ o. Malaysia: Country Data Regression. Asian Survey, 61(1), 99–105. and Statistics. WorldData​.info​. Retrieved Welsh, B. (2020). Malaysia’s Political 24 November 2022 from https://www​ Polarization: Race, Religion, and Reform. .worlddata​.info​/asia​/malaysia​/index​.php. In T. Carothers & A. O’Donohue (Eds.), Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Key resources Dangers (pp. 41–52). Carnegie Endowment Chin, J. (2021). Malaysia: Identity Politics, for International Peace. the Rise of Political Islam and Ketuanan

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45. Myanmar A. The concept Myanmar (also known as Burma) is a multiethnic society that was under military rule from 1962 to 2010. This was followed by a decade of precarious “democratic transition” that began under a quasi-civilian government (2011–2015) after the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) won the general elections in November 2010 and was succeeded by a civilian government (2016–2021) under the National League for Democracy (NLD) after its landslide victory in 2015 and again in 2020. The country is back under military rule as the NLD was prevented from starting a new five-year term after Army Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing staged a coup on 1 February 2021 and declared a national emergency. He justified the military putsch against the civilian government by claiming widespread election fraud, the results of which were subsequently nullified by the junta. Immediately, NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other high-ranking NLD members of parliament were arrested and detained. Students, journalists, doctors, children, and other civilians who joined the widespread anti-coup protests were also arrested, detained, tortured, or killed in the months ahead. The latest military takeover in Myanmar against a popularly elected civilian government shows the failed experiment in the country’s democratic transition designed by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) under the framework of the 2008 Constitution. The charter, which was supposed to usher in a period of “disciplined democracy” in the country, allowed for regular elections to take place every five years following the first democratic elections in 2010. However, the constitution also included provisions that ensured the continuation of the military’s dominance and control of politics and economy. The Tatmadaw’s unwillingness to share power with a democratically elected civilian government has caused much tension in civilmilitary relations during the first term of the NLD. Following its landslide victory in 2015, the NLD pursued constitutional amendments aimed at clipping the powers of the Tatmadaw. However, this effort failed as the military strongly opposed the proposed amendments put forward by the NLD in parliament.

Myanmar is a poor country that has been torn by internal armed conflicts between ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and the Tatmadaw since the country’s independence from British rule in 1948. There are at least 21 ethnic armed groups fighting for autonomy or independence against the central government, some of whom have effective control of resource-rich territories along the common border with Thailand, China, Bangladesh, and India. Although the military negotiated national ceasefire agreements with a number of these EAOs, this did not prevent the eruption of violence in certain states like Shan, Chin, Karen, Mon, and Kachin as government forces continue to conduct counterinsurgency operations in these areas in an effort gain control of ethnic minority territories. Non-signatories to the ceasefire agreement like the Arakan Army (AA) and other Northern Brotherhood Alliance EAOs that have been engaging with Tatmadaw forces in fierce battles in Rakhine and neighbouring states since 2018. This has resulted in hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and refugees fleeing into neighbouring Thailand and Bangladesh.

B. The landscape Political developments Under the 2008 charter, the military maintains control of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), which is the most powerful executive body in the cabinet, with six military representatives vis-à-vis five civilians. The heads of the national defence, border security, and home affairs portfolios are also appointed by the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw also has veto powers in national, state, and regional parliaments given that 25 per cent of seats are reserved for unelected representatives of the armed forces. Effectively, the military can veto any attempt to amend the constitution as the charter requires more than 75 per cent of votes for such proposals to pass. Finally, under the constitution, the armed forces chief has sweeping powers to declare a national emergency. The military is practically above the law as it is not under civilian control. Specifically, it lacks transparency in its budget and expenditures, operates independently of the government, and has not been effectively held accountable for human rights violations in the country. As well, it is engaged in business

246

myanmar  247 and trade transactions in Myanmar through several conglomerates and economic holdings in finance, natural resource exploitation, telecommunications, manufacturing, and service industries. The Tatmadaw is estimated to have about a 300,000-strong standing army composed of regular troops, militias, border guards, and para-military forces. After the 2010 general elections, the quasicivilian government of President Thein Sein of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) – composed mainly of retired military officials – ushered in a period of economic reform and the opening of democratic space in Myanmar. It encouraged many Burmese exiles to come home, granted licenses to foreign and local media companies to operate in the country, and released all political prisoners including National Democratic League (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi, which allowed her party to run and win some seats in parliament in the 2012 byelections. Under the USDP, Myanmar projected itself as seriously in pursuit of political and economic reform at home and eager to attract foreign investments that would propel the country to a level of economic and social development at par with the rest of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The international community was encouraged by positive steps taken by President Thein Sein in opening the country, which resulted in ending its pariah status after Western countries lifted trade sanctions and normalised relations with Nay Pyi Taw. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Barack Obama visited Myanmar in 2011 and 2014, respectively, while President Thein Sein and then opposition leader Suu Kyi visited the US separately in 2012. The Rohingya crisis However, the euphoria about Myanmar’s democratic transition did not last long enough as the country’s ethnic conflicts began to surface and undermined the initial positive gains under the USDP government. Specifically, the eruption of communal violence in Rakhine State in 2012 between the Muslim Rohingya people and Arakanese Buddhists demonstrated to the world the dangers of the new democratic space in Myanmar, which was being abused by some Buddhist nationalists in the country. For several decades, the Rohingya community has been persecuted after they were stripped of their rights to

citizenship in 1982. Although they were allowed to vote in the 2010 general elections using only their national ID cards and had a representative in the union parliament, the Rohingya community were generally considered by the majority Bamar population as illegal “Bengali” migrants. The communal violence in Rakhine in 2012, which forced tens of thousands of Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh or be confined to internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, was triggered by false rumours spread by Buddhist nationalists led by the notorious monk Wirathu. The group started its campaign against the Rohingya and other Muslim communities in Myanmar through their 969 movement, which considered them as a threat to the “purity” of the Burmese race and religion in Myanmar. The movement later evolved into the MaBaTha (Patriotic Association of Myanmar or Protection of Race and Religion) and began engaging in violent attacks against other Muslim and Christian communities in other parts of Myanmar throughout 2013 and 2014 by burning houses, places of worship, and business establishments owned by these communities. The USDP government and the Tatmadaw apparently tolerated the violent actions of the MaBaTha as they failed to stop the violence and prosecute Wirathu and his followers. In fact, in 2014, parliament passed four laws on the protection of race and religion, which was proposed by the MaBaTha. These laws include a ban on polygamy and religious conversion, a Buddhist women’s special marriage law, and a law on population control. All these were apparently aimed at controlling the growth of the Rohingya and other Muslim community populations in the country. The NLD won by landslide over the USDP in the 2015 elections and took over the government in March 2016. The euphoria over the NLD’s victory in Myanmar also did not last long as Suu Kyi and her government were overshadowed by the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacks in October 2016 and August 2017. Her attempts to address international concerns over the persecution of the Rohingya were constrained at home by the strong influence of the MaBaTha and the tension between the civilian government and the Tatmadaw on several issues such as amending the 2008 constitution to limit the powers of the military and addressing the root causes noel m. morada

248  encyclopedia of asian politics of the crisis in Rakhine. These hurdles effectively thwarted any attempts by Suu Kyi to significantly alter Myanmar’s policy towards the Rohingya people and other Muslim communities after the NLD took over in 2016. Although Suu Kyi created the Rakhine Advisory Commission headed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2016 to examine the root causes of the communal conflict and propose a set of recommendations to address them, the Tatmadaw and its supporters (including the MaBaTha) were not comfortable with the idea of creating this panel and, more importantly, its recommendations. Among other things, the commission recommended the restoration of the citizenship rights of the Rohingya people, accountability for human rights violations committed against them, and the protection of their fundamental freedoms including access to basic services and a dignified source of livelihood. A day before the submission of the commission’s report to Suu Kyi in August 2017, the ARSA militants attacked and killed several border guard policemen and other civilians in Rakhine. The Tatmadaw responded to the attacks by conducting so-called “clearing operations” against the ARSA militants, which forced over 700,000 Rohingya people to flee to Bangladesh and resulted in more than 6,000 people killed. There were reports of the Tatmadaw forces burning villages, sexually assaulting women, and extra-judicial killings of Rohingya people suspected of being sympathisers of the ARSA militants. The militants were also reported to have killed civilians, including some Hindu and indigenous Arakanese civilians during their attacks. International outrage over the plight of the Rohingya and the failure of the NLD government to stop the atrocities being committed by the Tatmadaw in Rakhine prompted Suu Kyi to create the Independent Commission of Enquiry (ICOE) composed of foreign and local experts to investigate the human rights violations following the military’s clearing operations against the ARSA militants. This came after her government refused to cooperate with international efforts in investigating the atrocities committed by Myanmar forces. Specifically, Suu Kyi denied issuing visas to the members of the International and Impartial Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFMM), which was created by the UN Human Rights Council and mandated to noel m. morada

conduct a thorough investigation of the persecution of the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in the country. The NLD government also asserted that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has no jurisdiction over Myanmar following a case filed by Bangladesh – a party to the Rome Treaty – against its neighbour concerning atrocities by the Tatmadaw that forced the displacement of the Rohingyas who sought refuge in Cox’s Bazaar since 2012. In December 2019, Suu Kyi also defended the Tatmadaw before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after a case filed against Myanmar by The Gambia on behalf of the members of the Islamic Organisation for Cooperation (IOC) for violation of the 1948 international convention against genocide. Specifically, she denied that the Myanmar military committed genocide against the Rohingya with the intention of eliminating the community from Rakhine. Accordingly, she acknowledged that war crimes may have been committed by security forces against the Rohingya and other affected communities during clearing operations in 2017, which was among the findings of the ICOE in the executive summary of its report that was subsequently released to the public in January 2020. Ethnic armed groups Since its independence in 1948, Myanmar has been struggling to build a unified nation-state amidst continuing armed rebellion against the predominantly Bamar majority state, which has been effectively controlled and dominated by the Tatmadaw over the last six decades. Under the USDP, President Thein Sein pursued peace talks with various EAOs aimed at persuading them to sign ceasefire agreements and convert their troops into border guards. However, only eight EAOs signed NCAs with the Tatmadaw and USDP even as the longest ceasefire agreement with the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) broke down in 2012. Other ethnic armed groups refused to sign a ceasefire agreement as they were not willing to convert their forces into border guards and give up territories under their effective control and administration. After the NLD took over in 2016, Suu Kyi pursued peace talks with EAOs within the framework of the Panglong Dialogue II, which was anchored on the commitment made by her father, General Aung San, under the 1949 Panglong agreement that would

myanmar  249 grant autonomy to ethnic communities in the country under a federal system. However, peace negotiations with EAOs failed to make any substantial progress given the strong opposition of the Tatmadaw to the Panglong Dialogue framework, which the military viewed as contrary to the 2008 Constitution’s commitment to a unitary state. Indeed, the military was opposed to the demands made by several EAOs for more autonomy during various peace conferences organised by the NLD since 2017. In fact, the Tatmadaw conducted several attacks against some EAOs to force them to sign NCAs even as the central government was pursuing peace negotiations with them. Indeed, apart from atrocities committed against the Rohingya in Rakhine, the Tatmadaw also committed such crimes in Chin, Kachin, and Shan states that resulted in civilians being killed in the crossfire or maimed by landmines, as well as tens of thousands of being displaced from their villages, children and women being raped by security forces, and homes, schools, and houses of worship being looted and burned. In Rakhine and its neighbouring states, fierce fighting escalated in late 2018 following sustained attacks by the AA forces and members of the Northern Alliance against the Tatmadaw troops well into the third quarter of 2020. This resulted in more refugees fleeing to Bangladesh and increasing the number of internally displaced persons in these areas. In the aftermath of the February 2021 coup, EAOs responded differently to the political crisis in Myanmar given their diverse interests and motivations. The largest ethnic armed group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) estimated to have about 30,000 troops, has neither condemned the coup nor attacked Tatmadaw forces. It has adopted a wait-andsee attitude about the coup, along with the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N). For their part, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) condemned the coup and staged attacks on the Tatmadaw. Both ethnic armed groups have suffered the brunt of assaults by the Myanmar military over the last two decades and their attacks against the security forces were primarily aimed at recovering lost territories. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) or the Kokang group also had an interest in recovering territories but has not openly engaged in

attacks against Tatmadaw troops. However, it was involved in some skirmishes in Shan State along with its Northern Brotherhood Alliance partner, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), which killed some security forces in May 2021 (Ong, 2021). A ceasefire agreement with another member of the Northern Brotherhood Alliance – the Arakan Army – and the Tatmadaw was in force even after the coup and beyond its expiration in March 2021. The AA did not immediately condemn the coup but expressed concerns about the human rights of protesting civilians. However, the Mon Unity Party and the Arakan National Party (ANP) at first cooperated with the junta after the coup; however, the former faced several party resignations as a consequence. Although the ANP for its part initially saw the coup as an opportunity to get the representation that it was denied in the November 2020 elections, its position now remains uncertain even as the fighting between AA and the Tatmadaw resumed in early November 2021 (Ong, 2021). Although six of the EAOs – AA, KIA, KNLA, SSA-N, UWSA, and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) – have some reasonable capability to engage with the Tatmadaw forces, they are unlikely to seize and hold territory against the military’s aerial and ground attacks (Ong, 2021). Meanwhile, ten signatories to the 2015 NCA, which were mostly from the southern part of Myanmar, quickly withdrew from the peace negotiations and declared their support to the civil disobedience movement following the coup (Ong, 2021). Other EAOs have worked with ethnic militias to defend civilians in their territories from incursions by SAC troops even as some have fought with the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) in attacking Tatmadaw soldiers in Kayah State and in Mindat (Ong, 2021). Some EAOs have provided protection for thousands of activists and civilians who fled the major urban centres as the junta escalated its violent crackdown against anti-coup protesters. Several members of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hlutaw (CRPH) have reportedly fled to Karen National Union (KNU)-controlled territories to avoid detention even as some activists and civilians relocated to EAO-controlled areas in Kayin, Mon, and Shan States. Some people who fled to these areas have reportedly joined EAOs or are receiving military training to form civilian defence forces (CDF) or people’s defence noel m. morada

250  encyclopedia of asian politics forces (PDFs). An unknown number of Bamar civilians have taken part in the training as part of forming urban resistance forces similar to the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSD) that was created after the 8888 Uprising (Martin, 2021). The National Unity Government The National Unity Government (NUG) was formed in April 2021 by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hlutaw (CRPH) as an interim government challenging the legitimacy of the military-installed SAC after the coup. It is composed of elected representatives from the NLD and ethnic minorities that include Karen, Shan, Chin, and Kachin representatives. Two of the top NUG leadership were filled by Duwa Lashi La, an ethnic Kachin, and Man Khin Waing, an ethnic Karen, who were chosen as vice president (and acting president) and prime minister, respectively. The NUG currently operates based on an interim Federal Democracy Charter (FDC) adopted in March 2021 by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which the CRPH said effectively declared the abolition of the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar that was drafted by the Tatmadaw (BNI, 2021). The FDC was received with muted and reserved approval by the members of the CDM and some EAOs partly because it failed to address some of the key issues for ethnic minorities and the ethnic armed groups. The formation of the NUG was also met with scepticism as well as criticisms as it reflects the continuation of Bamar majority control and lack of inclusion of representatives from other ethnic minorities, including the Rohingya community (Martin, 2021). Concerning the Rohingya, the NUG issued a policy statement in June, which directly spelt out its position on the persecuted community and related issues in Rakhine. Among other things, the NUG: 1) recognised the violence and gross human rights violations inflicted on the Rohingyas in Rakhine over decades that resulted in massive displacements; 2) underscored the sympathy of the entire people of Burma over the plight of the Rohingya even as all are now experiencing atrocities by the military; 3) expressed its intent to continue seeking justice and accountability for atrocities noel m. morada

committed by the military against the Rohingya and other minorities, including the grant of jurisdiction over these crimes by the International Criminal Court; 4) recognised the crucial role of the recommendations made by the Rakhine Advisory Commission in addressing the root causes of conflict in Rakhine; 5) underscored the importance of abolishing the 1982 Citizenship Law and for a new citizenship law to be enacted that recognises birth in Myanmar or birth anywhere as a child of Myanmar citizens as a basis for citizenship; and 6) committed to reaffirming agreements with neighbours on the safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation of the Rohingya people who were forced to flee Rakhine (National Unity Government, 2021a). The policy statement also invited Rohingyas “to join hands” with the NUG and others “to participate in the Spring Revolution against the military dictatorship in all possible ways” (National Unity Government, 2021a). People’s Defence Forces In May, the NUG announced the creation of People’s Defence Forces (PDF), which are ad hoc self-defence groups in urban and rural areas. There are reportedly at least ten urban guerrilla outfits operating in main cities. Since the coup, over 300 bombings attacks conducted at night have taken place throughout the country targeting ward and township government offices, schools, universities, and gas stations (Frontier Myanmar, 2021). Some military and police defectors have reportedly joined the civilian armed squads that have attacked soldiers and military installations in the country (PassBlue, 2021). A spokesperson of the pro-military USDP claimed that over 70 party members have been killed on suspicion of being state informers, forcing many party MPs and their families to keep a low profile (Myanmar Now, 2021a). Some 30 local administrators in Yangon were killed between March and early June according to media reports even as the junta acknowledged that they cannot properly protect its officials (Myanmar Now, 2021b). The NUG claimed that a total of 1,710 junta soldiers were killed and over 630 wounded during 1,171 encounters and assassinations

myanmar  251 conducted by ethnic armed groups and PDF against the security forces over three months until the end of August 2021 (The Irrawady, 2021a). More than 431 civilians were killed and 184 were wounded by junta soldiers during these incidents (The Irrawady, 2021a). Increasingly intense violence between the Tatmadaw and PDF was reported across Myanmar following the NUG’s declaration on 7 September for a “people’s defensive war” against the junta. Since then, the Tatmadaw has not only increased its inspections and arrests but also intensified raids and violent assaults by burning down and bombarding villages across Myanmar, particularly in Kayah state and Magwe and Sagaing regions (The Irrawady, 2021a). Some 100 Tatmadaw forces were killed in one day in October across the country after 37 attacks against junta targets were carried out by the PDF (The Irrawady, 2021b). The NUG also reported that the PDF destroyed 80 telecom towers across the country, which were owned in a joint venture between the military and Vietnam’s defence ministry (The Irrawady, 2021c). There is also growing concern over possible war crimes being committed by PDF groups against unarmed civilians. This prompted the NUG’s Ministry of Human Rights to issue a plea to armed groups resisting the junta to avoid harming civilians including children and for them to exercise due caution not to violate international human rights laws (National Unity Government, 2021b). Subsequently, the NUG announced that it has formed a command structure to coordinate civilian defence forces and allied EAOs in their operations against the junta forces. The Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) includes leaders from the NUG and EAOs who will engage with the PDFs across the country. As some PDFs have not been under the NUG command, the creation of a single command structure will enable the interim government to encourage these PDFs to follow the code of conduct under its Ministry of Defence, manage resources, and coordinate training (The Irrawady, 2021d). Myanmar in ASEAN Myanmar was admitted as a member of the ASEAN in 1997 notwithstanding regional concerns about the human rights situation in the country under the junta. It was part of the regional organisation’s strategic move in post–Cold War Southeast Asia to expand its

footprint and influence amidst the perceived instability brought by the US withdrawal from the region and the rise of China as an economic and military power. However, Myanmar’s admission into ASEAN brought reputational risks to the organisation as the Tatmadaw failed to fulfil its obligations, especially in adhering to the relevant principles of the ASEAN Charter concerning the protection of human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms. Specifically, ASEAN called out the junta’s human rights violations by the Tatmadaw in 2003 against Aung San Suu Kyi and her followers; its violent crackdown in 2007 against Buddhist-led protesters; its initial reluctance to allow international humanitarian assistance following the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis in 2008; its failure to contain the spread of communal violence that erupted in Rakhine in 2012 and spilt over in other parts of Myanmar against Muslim, Hindu, and Christian communities in 2013 and 2014; and failure to hold accountable the perpetrators of atrocities committed against the Rohingya population following the security forces’ clearing operations in 2016 and 2017. In all these incidents, ASEAN members were very patient and accommodating towards Myanmar even as the organisation tried to strike a balance between its traditional principles of non-interference and consensus decision-making, on the one hand, and its legitimate concerns over human rights violations and prevailing humanitarian crisis created by the Tatmadaw’s impunity. Things took a turn in 2017 when international outrage over the plight of the Rohingya people started to cause significant reputational damage to ASEAN as it failed to respond effectively to the crisis. Myanmar remained defiant and uncooperative in supporting international calls for pursuing accountability for atrocity crimes committed by the Tatmadaw. For the first time in 2018, following its Leaders’ Summit in Singapore, ASEAN issued a Chairman’s statement that called on the Myanmar government to ensure an independent and impartial investigation into the human rights violations in Rakhine and hold the perpetrators accountable. As well, it also called for the voluntary, safe, and dignified repatriation of refugees who were displaced by the crisis since 2017. These were reiterated in the succeeding Chairman’s statements in 2019 and 2020, which effectively demonstrated that ASEAN is no longer noel m. morada

252  encyclopedia of asian politics tolerating an erring member’s behaviour and using its non-interference principle as cover to avoid openly calling out Myanmar. Following the coup of February 2021, ASEAN expressed deep concern over the violent crackdown against anti-coup protesters in Myanmar by security forces. It called on the junta to adhere to ASEAN Charter principles such as respect for fundamental freedoms, protection of human rights, and respect for the will of the people. Subsequently, the organisation took a hard-line stance against the SAC in Myanmar after the latter failed to comply with the five-point consensus agreed to between Min Aung Hlaing and ASEAN leaders during their meeting in Jakarta in April 2021. Specifically, the organisation refused to invite the junta chief to the ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in October as it failed to allow its special envoy to visit the country. In response, Myanmar did not send a delegation to the Summit and criticised ASEAN for violating its non-interference principle by not extending an invitation to the coup leader. More than nine months since the military takeover, the killings, torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention of anti-coup protesters continued in the country. Assaults against civilians using air strikes and other lethal weapons took place in ethnic community areas and were continually conducted in defiance of ASEAN’s and the UN’s calls for an end to the violence by security forces. Overall, it remains to be seen how far ASEAN would exert more pressure on the junta in Myanmar. For sure, there are available options to consider, including suspension of its membership in the regional organisation if the Tatmadaw remains defiant and unwilling to stop the violence against anticoup protesters. It is evident that the crisis in Myanmar is causing significant reputational damage to ASEAN’s credibility. At the same time, however, the organisation must remain steadfast in ensuring that the will of the people of Myanmar ultimately prevails – that is, restoring the country back to its democratisation path and denying legitimacy to the junta.

C. Future research Myanmar has had an uncertain political trajectory in recent years following the military coup. Going forward, examining the consequences and implications of the coup in greater detail will be vital. With the recent noel m. morada

announcement of the dissolution of political parties by the junta, including the NLD, the restoration of democracy looks even more unlikely. How does the coup affect Myanmar’s already stagnant economy? What are the implications of continued military rule on the several ethnic conflicts going on in Myanmar? How do Myanmar and the ruling junta manage relations with its powerful neighbours, particularly India and China? Will Myanmar’s relationship with ASEAN be affected in the future if ASEAN’s credibility is further damaged? Are there any circumstances under which democracy may be restored in Myanmar? These questions can be a starting point for future research which will be important in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the political development in Myanmar over the last decade. Noel M. Morada

References BNI. (2021, April 2). The Shadow CRPH Government Declares 2008 Constitution Abolished and Pledges a Charter for Federal Democracy. https://www​.bnionline​ .net​ /en​ / news​ /shadow​ - crph​ - government​ -declares​-2008​-constitution​-abolished​-and​ -pledges​-charter​-federal. Frontier Myanmar. (2021, June 9). ‘Our Revolution is Starting’: Urban Guerrillas Prepare to Step Up Killings, Bombings. https://www​.frontiermyanmar​.net​/en​/our​ -revolution​ -is​ - starting​ - urban​ -guerrillas​ -prepare​-to​-step​-up​-killings​-bombings/. Martin, M. F. (2021). The Importance of Ethnic Minorities in Myanmar’s Future. Stimson Asia Policy Paper. https://www​ .stimson​.org​/wp​- content​/uploads​/2021​/06​ /The​-Importance​- of​-Ethnic​-Minorities​-to​ -Myanmar​-1​.pdf. Myanmar Now. (2021a, June 11). Former USDP MP Assassinated, as Wave of Killings Continues. https://myanmar​ -now​ .org​/en​/news​/former​-usdp​-mp​-assassinated​ -as​-wave​-of​-killings​-continues/. Myanmar Now. (2021b, June 14). Military Gives Cash to Families of Assassinated Yangon Administrators. https://myanmar​ -now​ . org​ /en​ / news​ / military​ - gives​ - cash​ -to​ - fam ilies​ - of​ - assassinated​ - yangon​ -administrators/. National Unity Government. (2021a, June 3). Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State.  https://gov​.nugmyanmar​.org​/2021​

myanmar  253 /06​/03​/policy​-position​-on​-the​-rohingya​-in​ -rakhine​-state/. National Unity Government. (2021b, September 26). Plea to Armed Groups to Avoid Harming Civilians Including Children.   https://www​ . facebook ​ . com ​ / photo/​? fbid​=10160331306560864​&set​= a​ .10151064565150864. Ong, A. (2021). Ethnic Armed Organisations in the Post-Coup Myanmar: New Conversations Needed. ISEAS Yusok Ishak Institute Brief (No. 79). https://www​.iseas​ .edu​ . sg​ / wp​ - content​ / uploads​ / 2021​ / 05​ / ISEAS​_Perspective​_2021​_79​.pdf. PassBlue. (2021, June 13). Attacks on Burmese Military Intensify Nationwide, Signaling a Possible Revolt. https://www​.passblue​.com​ /2021​/06​/13​/attacks​- on​-burmese​-military​ -intensify​-nationwide​-signaling​-a​-possible​ -revolt/. The Irrawady. (2021a, October 4). Some 100 Junta Troops Killed in a Day in Clashes Across Myanmar. https://www​ .irrawaddy​.com ​ / news ​ / burma ​ /some ​ -100​ -junta​ -troops​ -killed​ -in​ -a​ - day​ -in​ - clashes​ -across​-myanmar​.html. The Irrawady. (2021b, September 13). Over 80 Myanmar Military-Owned Telecom

Towers Destroyed Nationwide. https:// www​.irrawaddy​.com ​/news​/ burma ​/over​-80​ -myanmar​-military​-owned​-telecom​-towers​ -destroyed​-nationwide​.html. The Irrawady. (2021c, October 29). Myanmar Civilian Government Forms Military C o m m a n d   St r u c t u r e.   ht t p s: // w w w​ .irrawaddy​. com ​ / news ​ / burma ​ / myanmar​ -civilian ​ - government​ - forms ​ - military​ -command​-structure​.html?_​_cf​_chl​_ jschl​_ tk__​=pmd​_lxd​32wF​uUyl​DLNc​7MbT​k12Z​ Ou7Z​Af7E​m BEO​ZzXFYvTY​-1635924303​ -0​-gqN​tZGz​NAmW​jcnBszQgl.

Key resources Callahan, M. P. (2003). Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Cornell University Press. Htut, Y. (2019). Myanmar’s Political Transition and Lost Opportunities (2010– 2016). ISEAS Publishing. Morada, N. M. (2021). ASEAN and the Rakhine Crisis: Balancing NonInterference, Accountability, and Strategic Interests in Responding to Atrocities in Myanmar. Global Responsibility to Protect, 13(2–3), 131–157.

noel m. morada

46. Pakistan

Pakistan’s second military ruler, General Yahya Khan, came to power in 1969 and the country’s first election took place a year later in 1970. Following the 1970 election, the Awami League party won overwhelmA. The concept ingly in East Pakistan, giving it enough Pakistan is a country in South Asia. It has a seats to govern the whole of Pakistan. The geographical land size of 796,100 km² and a Awami League also supported the cause population of 231,402,1171 (WorldData​.inf​o, of Bengali nationalism and demanded 2022; World Bank, 2022a). Pakistan’s history more autonomy and a confederal system can be traced back to 1947 when the coun- as a response to political and economic try came into existence following the parti- domination by West Pakistan since indetion of the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan was pendence. The political leaders of West created after the All India Muslim League, Pakistan rejected this demand and followa political party in pre-independence India, ing a civil war in which India intervened, demanded a separate homeland for Muslims East Pakistan split from West Pakistan to in the Indian subcontinent (Cohen, 2004; become the newly independent country of Talbot & Singh, 2009). The Muslim League’s Bangladesh in 1971. Pakistan’s transition rationale for a separate Muslim state was to to civilian rule began in this period and a protect the distinct identity of Muslims, who third constitution came into force in 1973. constituted a separate ‘nation’, from being This new constitution moved Pakistan from threatened and dominated by the ‘Hindu a presidential to a parliamentary regime majority’ of India (Cohen, 2004, p. 93). The and also declared Islam as the ‘state reliIndian subcontinent was partitioned along gion’ of Pakistan (Ahmed, 2017). religious lines and Pakistan was formed out Despite the democratic nature of the of the Muslim-majority provinces of pre- 1973 constitution, the civilian government of independence India. However, at the time of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was increasingly authoripartition in 1947, Pakistan consisted of two tarian and was eventually ousted in another parts: West Pakistan and East Pakistan. These military coup in 1977. General Zia ul Haq two parts of the country were separated by became Pakistan’s third military leader and over 1,000 miles of Indian territory. In 1971, his military regime was more autocratic than Pakistan spilt up following a civil war in East the ones before. Under General Zia, politiPakistan which became the newly independ- cal opponents were imprisoned and the proent country of Bangladesh. cess of ‘Islamisation’ intensified. Although Pakistan’s post-independence politics this process of ‘Islamisation’ through which have been tumultuous with frequent mili- Islamists were co-opted began under Yahya tary coups and an unstable democratic tra- Khan, it reached its peak under General Zia jectory. Since independence, not a single (Talbot, 1998; Mukherjee, 2010a). Policies Prime Minister has been able to complete such as the setting up of religious schools, their full five-year term in office. Although the establishment of religious Sharia courts, Pakistan gained its independence in 1947, and efforts to support the Afghan mujahideen it took the country’s Constituent Assembly against Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan were a further nine years to finalise the coun- implemented under General Zia’s rule. The try’s constitution in 1956. This was due to 1973 Constitution was amended and the powinternal divisions among political parties, ers of the President were strengthened again, interference from senior bureaucrats, and with the President now able to dismiss govthe disqualification of the first Constituent ernments and dissolve the legislature. Assembly along with the election of a new Pakistan’s second transition to democracy one (Jaffrelot, 2015). The 1956 constitution began in 1988 following General Zia’s death. was suspended two years later in 1958 and However, this transition to democracy and the country’s first military coup took place, civilian rule was rocky and unstable. Political making General Ayub Khan Pakistan’s power alternated between the Pakistan military dictator. A second constitution was People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim introduced in 1962 and it was more repres- League-Nawaz (PMLN) party. Between sive than the first constitution with the aim of 1988 and 1999, successive PPP and PMLN limiting political opposition to the military’s governments did not complete their terms of rule (Jaffrelot, 2015). office as were dismissed by the president, in 254

pakistan  255 conjunction with the military. Pakistan eventually transitioned back to a parliamentary system when the powers of the president to dissolve the legislature and dismiss the prime minister were revoked in 1997 (Jaffrelot, 2015; Ahmed, 2017). Although the military was not in power, it continued to remain an influential actor in politics and was in charge of key policy areas such as relations with India, defence, and the country’s nuclear programme. Despite the restoration of democracy in this period between 1988 and 1999, the commitment of civilian leaders to democracy has been questioned due to their tendency to ignore aspects of constitutional democracy such as judicial independence and freedom of the press. In 1999, Pakistan’s third military coup took place when General Pervez Musharraf ousted the PMLN government of Nawaz Sharif. The constitution was ‘placed in abeyance’, the presidency was again strengthened, and the parliament along with the judiciary and competitive political parties were weakened as Musharraf centralised power by making himself the president. Pakistan restored its status as a key US ally by supporting President Bush’s War on Terror (Ahmed, 2017). Musharraf was ousted in 2007 following widespread street protests from the judiciary and civil society actors. Following elections, democracy was restored in 2008 and a parliamentary system was once again restored in 2010 when the powers of the president to dissolve parliament were removed. Other democratic measures mentioned in the 1973 constitution such as enhanced federalism and the independence of the judiciary were also enacted. In 2013, the transition of power from one civilian government, which had completed its full five-year term in office, to another civilian government took place for the first time in Pakistan’s political history. Another transition of power took place after the 2018 election when the outgoing PMLN government handed over the reins of government to the incoming Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government. In the course of its political history, Pakistan has consistently oscillated between presidential and parliamentary regimes. The 1973 constitution has frequently been amended to enhance or erode the power of the president. As the above discussion demonstrates, the military rules of Pakistan have shown a preference to ‘presidentialise’ the constitution. Civilian leaders, on the other

hand, have consistently invoked amendments to weaken the president’s powers, specifically those provisions which empower the president to nominate a prime minister, dissolve parliament, and remove the government from power. Civilian leaders have restored the parliamentary nature of the constitution on several occasions as illustrated above. Pakistan’s political system today is a federal parliamentary republic where the president is the head of state and the prime minister is the head of government. The president is elected through an electoral college comprising members of the Senate, the National Assembly, and the provincial assemblies. The executive branch is headed by the Prime Minister and the cabinet. The judicial branch is headed by the Supreme Court, and religious or Sharia courts also exist concurrently in Pakistan. At the federal level, the legislative branch is made up of a bicameral legislature with the Senate serving as the upper house and the National Assembly serving as the lower house. Members of the Senate are elected by members of the provincial assemblies for a period of six years. All the provinces have equal representation in the Senate. Most members of the National Assembly are directly elected through a first-past-the-post electoral system under universal suffrage for a period of five years. Of the total 342 seats in the National Assembly, 272 are directly elected and 70 seats, which are reserved for women and religious minorities, are allocated based on proportional representation to those parties which have won more than 5% of the vote. The four provinces of Pakistan (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Baluchistan) have their own provisional assemblies. In addition, two areas in the parts of Kashmir which are controlled and administered by Pakistan and whose sovereignty is disputed by India and Pakistan also have their own regional bodies. After the passage of the 18th Amendment in 2010, the powers of the provincial assemblies, as well as the degree of autonomy given to these provincial and administrative bodies in the disputed areas, were enhanced (Adeney, 2012). The military also continues to remain an influential actor in the politics of the country. Key areas of policy such as relations with India, control of Pakistan’s premier intelligence organisation, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme continue to neel vanvari

256  encyclopedia of asian politics remain in the hands of the military (Jaffrelot, 2015). Religion continues to be an important element affecting the politics of Pakistan. Pakistan is an ‘Islamic Republic’ and the constitution makes Islam the state religion of Pakistan (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2012). According to the 2017 census, Muslims make up 96% of Pakistan’s population (US Department of State, 2022). In addition, the constitution mandates that the president and the prime minister also have to be Muslims. Despite functioning under civilian rule since 2008, Pakistan is still regarded as a ‘hybrid regime’ (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023). Apart from political uncertainty, conflict and violence have also been prevalent in Pakistan since independence in 1947. The Kashmir issue has been the focal point of the relationship between India and Pakistan since 1947 (Mukherjee, 2016; Shukla, 2020). Both countries claim sovereignty over the disputed area and have fought three wars over the years.2 Another cause of violence in Pakistan has been actions by Islamic extremists against the Pakistani state. For several years, extremist organisations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have operated in Pakistan. There has been a noticeable increase in violence by these extremist organisations including attacks on airports and schools which has further destabilised Pakistan. Like many former colonies, Pakistan inherited a heterogeneous population comprising various ethnic groups. Some of these major groups are the Punjabis, the Sindhis, the Baloch, the Pashtuns, and the Mohajirs.3 There are also linguistic differences between these different ethnic groups as unlike the other ethnic groups, the Mohajirs were predominantly Urdu speakers. Ethno-linguistic tensions between these various ethnic groups have often led to conflict and violence in Pakistan. Scholars have argued that these ethno-linguistic tensions exist due to the domination of certain ethnic groups in areas of public life, such as the Mohajirs in the bureaucracy in the period immediately after independence and, more recently, the Punjabis who have dominated aspects of public life in Pakistan (Adeney, 2007; Siddiqi, 2012; Faiz, 2022; Khan, 2014). Ethno-linguistic tensions have further been exacerbated by a complex relationship between the federal government and the provinces. Although Pakistan’s constitution established a federal framework, in practice Pakistan operated as a unitary state neel vanvari

(Jalal, 1995). Civilian and military governments have consistently centralised power at the federal level creating a rift between the centre and the ethnic groups in various provinces, further fuelling ethno-linguistic tensions (Waseem, 2010; Adeney & Boni, 2022; Adeney, 2007). Pakistan’s economy is classified as a lowermiddle-income economy and the country has experienced frequent periods of growth and stagnation (McCartney, 2011; World Bank, 2023). In 2021, Pakistan’s GDP was US$348 billion and its GDP per capita was US$1505 (World Bank, 2022b). The service sector makes up nearly 60% of Pakistan’s GDP, with manufacturing and agriculture comprising the other 40% (Government of Pakistan, 2022). Trade does not play a major role in Pakistan’s economy and the trade-to-GDP ratio is 30%, one of the lowest in the world (Dawn, 2022). Pakistan still faces significant challenges in terms of addressing levels of poverty, and the country’s human development scores are amongst the lowest in South Asia as well as globally. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2023) ranks Pakistan 161st out of 191 countries in its human development reports. Since 1997, the country has faced serious macroeconomic challenges and frequently relied on international aid from donors such as Saudi Arabia and other international organisations. Pakistan has sought financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at least five times since 1997 (Shahid, 2023). Due to factors such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, and supply-chain disruptions, these macroeconomic problems have become more acute in recent years. As a result, since 2022, Pakistan’s economy has suffered from high levels of inflation of over 30% (Shahzad, 2023).

B. The landscape Academic research on Pakistan has focused on several key themes. One area of research has been the study of Pakistan’s rocky democratic trajectory. Scholars have examined factors resulting in the lack of democratic consolidation in Pakistan (Shah, 2003; Ahmed & Ahmed, 2014; Mohmand, 2019; Waheed & Abbasi, 2013). Studies have also focused on examining Pakistan’s democracy from a comparative perspective by comparing why democracy has endured in neighbouring

pakistan  257 India while being eroded in Pakistan (Jalal, 1995; Mukherjee, 2010b; Oldenburg, 2010; Tudor, 2013; Hassan, 2023). Scholars have identified several factors which have contributed to the unstable democratic trajectory in Pakistan, such as the continuing dominance of the feudal elite, the role of religion, and differing legacies of colonialism resulting in India inheriting the institutional structures of British colonial rule and Pakistan having to set up these structures from scratch (Jalal, 1995; Mukherjee, 2010b; Waheed & Abbasi, 2013; Rizvi, 2000). The role of political parties in Pakistan’s democracy has also been analysed (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020; Farrukh & Masroor, 2021; Siddiqui, 2020; Hasnain, 2008; Siddiqui, 2023; Kausar & Hafeez, 2023; Ali & Mufi, 2022). This rich literature has examined several aspects of political parties in Pakistan, such as how these parties function in a hybrid regime where the military still plays a dominant role, intra-party competition, party patronage, and the use of political violence by these political parties. Although earlier studies on Pakistan’s political parties predominantly focused on parties such as the Muslim League (Nasr 1994; Rizvi, 2000), more recent studies have focused not just on the major parties such as the PPP and the PMLN but also on regional parties such as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) party and the religious parties representing various denominations (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020; Nazar, 2016; Khan, 2010). Research has also focused on the role of religion in Pakistan. Pakistan was founded in the name of Islam (Nasr, 1994). The constitution also makes special provisions for Islam by stating that ‘All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and sunnah and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions’ (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2012). Article I of the constitution states that Pakistan is an ‘Islamic Republic’ and Article II makes Islam the state religion of Pakistan (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2012). The role of religion and its influence on politics are further illustrated by the fact that all three constitutions of Pakistan were modelled in accordance with Islamic political principles, influenced by the Koran and the sunnah (Joshi, 2003). Scholars have extensively studied this link between religion and politics in Pakistan. Studies have examined

how politics has been affected by religious organisations as well as the various subsects of Islam practised in Pakistan such as Barelvi, Deobandi, and Sufi subsects (Behuria, 2008; Mukherjee, 2010a; Haqqani, 2013; Tanchum, 2013; Hussain, 2018). Scholars have argued that political leaders in Pakistan, both civilian and military, have often used Islam as a political tool to give legitimacy to their regimes (Haqqani, 2013; Mukherjee, 2010a). As noted earlier, this process of turning to religion and the ‘Islamisation’ of society peaked under General Zia. However, even secular leaders such as former PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or military dictators averse to religion such as General Pervez Musharraf have either turned to Islam or softened their stance on religion when their regimes have been challenged (Mukherjee, 2010a). Scholars have also studied the role of Islamism in Pakistan’s politics. Mukherjee defines Islamism as ‘extreme form of politicized version of Islam that argues that Islam is in a state of constant conflict with the West, non-Muslims, and other Muslims who are not seen to be sufficiently pious by revivalist thinkers and Islamist ideologues’ (2010a, p. 330). Along with studying Islamist organisations such as the Jamat-I-Islami, this strand of research has focused on rising Islamic extremism and sectarian violence resulting from this revivalist Islamism (Nasr, 1994; Jaffrelot, 2002; Mukherjee, 2010a). Several factors have been identified to explain the prevalence of Islamism and Islamic militancy in Pakistan such as the link between the Pakistan military and the militants, the Islamisation of society under General Zia, the use of militancy as a tool for asymmetric warfare against the Pakistani state’s adversaries, and external factors such as the role of the US in fostering these extremist groups along with the Zia regime during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Abbas, 2005; Hussain, 2008; Reidel, 2012; Tankel, 2013; Shah, 2014; Kapur, 2016). Given the central role that the military has played in Pakistan’s politics post-independence, academic literature has examined Pakistan’s military, its objectives, its motives, and the consequences of its centrality in the country’s polity (Haqqani, 2005; Siddiqa, 2017; Nawaz, 2008; Shah, 2014; Fair, 2014; Paul, 2014; Jaffrelot, 2015). Several studies have argued that the military was able to occupy its place as the apex decision-making neel vanvari

258  encyclopedia of asian politics body in Pakistan’s political and strategic realm due to a combination of factors such as the sense of vulnerability due to the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan’s rivalry with India, and the failure of civilian politicians to foster a political culture conducive to democracy (Mukherjee, 2010b, 2016; Fair, 2014; Shah, 2014). Subsequently, Pakistan’s military was able to justify its position in the decisionmaking process by claiming to be the only institution which could resolve complex issues and address this vulnerability plaguing Pakistan since independence (Jaffrelot, 2015; Mukherjee, 2010b, Fair, 2014; Paul, 2014). Scholars have also studied the military’s organisation, the vast resources at its disposal, and the military’s own economic interests (Siddiqa, 2007; Nawaz, 2008; Paul, 2014). Pakistan’s military has further enhanced its dominant position by retaining control of important foreign policy and strategic goals such as relations with India, the country’s nuclear programme, and control over Pakistan’s primary intelligence organisation, the ISI. The military’s aims and objectives, such as frustrating India through its activities in Kashmir and its ‘revisionist goal’ of changing Pakistan’s borders, have also been examined (Fair, 2014; Shah, 2014). The literature also highlights how the military has achieved these goals by supporting non-state actors and Islamic militants in both Kashmir as well as neighbouring Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2005; Fair, 2014; Paul, 2014). Since the Kashmir issue and ‘balancing India’ are of crucial importance to the military, it has used these militant groups to achieve these aims and maintained close connections with a host of militant organisations (Haqqani, 2005; Fair, 2014; Paul, 2014).

political opposition. In the lead-up to the noconfidence vote, Prime Minister Imran Khan suspended parliament in order to prevent the no-confidence motion from taking place but this decision was reversed by the judiciary. After the no-confidence motion, a PMLNled coalition government took the reins of government. Since his ouster, PTI leader and former PM Imran Khan has been engaged in public mobilisation through large-scale rallies. Through all of this, the economic crisis affecting Pakistan continues to deepen and acts of violence by Islamist extremists continue to intensify. These developments raise several key questions which can serve as a starting point for future research. How will the outcome of the upcoming federal elections in 2023 affect the political situation in Pakistan? Will Imran Khan and PTI be able to return to government and receive the backing of the military? If political uncertainty continues, will the military decide to intervene in politics again as it has done in the past? How is Pakistan’s political economy going to be affected by the ongoing economic crisis? How does Pakistan manage its relations with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and address the problem of rising sectarian violence in the country? Neel Vanvari

C. Future research

Abbas, H. (2005). Pakistan’s drift into extremism: Allah, the army, and America’s war on terror. M. E. Sharpe. https://doi​.org​ /10​.4324​/9781315701912 Adeney, K. (2007).  Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan (1st ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. Adeney, K. (2012). A step towards inclusive federalism in Pakistan? The politics of the 18th amendment. Publius, 42(4), 539–565. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/publius​/pjr055 Adeney, K., & Boni, F. (2022). Federalism and regime change: De/centralization in Pakistan – 1956–2020. Regional & Federal

The last few years have been tumultuous for Pakistan. In 2022, the PTI government which was elected in 2018 was voted out of office through a vote of no confidence in parliament. The PTI government, largely elected after securing the backing and the support of the military, was unable to address the serious economic problems facing Pakistan. Opposition political parties, which came together to form a democratic alliance, also mobilised extensively against the PTI, accusing it of using authoritarian tactics to stifle neel vanvari

Notes 1. 2. 3.

This figure is the estimated population of Pakistan in 2021 according to the World Bank. This does not include India’s intervention in East Pakistan during the 1971 civil war. Mohajirs are Muslims who migrated to Pakistan from Muslim minority parts of northern India after partition in 1947.

References

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Key resources Cohen, S. P. (2004). The idea of Pakistan. The Brookings Institution. Fair, C. C. (2014).  Fighting to the end: The Pakistan army’s way of war. Oxford University Press. Mufti, M., Shafqat, S., & Siddiqui, N. (Eds.). (2020). Pakistan’s political parties: Surviving between dictatorship and democracy. Georgetown University Press.

neel vanvari

47. Philippines A. The concept The Philippines, an archipelago consisting of over 7,000 islands, is a country in Southeast Asia. Recently, the Philippines has witnessed democratic decay in its political trajectory. In 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was elected the 16th president of the Philippines based on a tough law-and-order policy combined with his war against crime. In 2022, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the son of a former dictator and kleptocrat, became the 17th president based on an orchestrated campaign that whitewashed his family’s dark legacy in the nation’s history. Both leaders are known to have authoritarian tendencies. During his term, Duterte waged his controversial war on drugs that included human rights violations and extrajudicial killings. He also jailed opposition leaders (incarcerated former Senator Leila de Lima for investigating his human rights abuses); harassed independent media outlets (shut down ABS CBN, the country’s largest media company); and challenged the autonomy of the judicial branch that serves as a check and balance on executive power (pushed for the impeachment of former Supreme Court Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, a known critic of Duterte). Though the recently elected Marcos Jr. has yet to overtly manifest any dictatorial act, his father’s notoriety for graft and corruption and human rights abuses presupposes that, at the very least, his administration will not give precedence to individual freedom and human rights guaranteed by the Philippine constitution. The election of both leaders underscores the Philippines’ gradual yet alarming slide towards illiberal democracy. According to Zakaria (1997), illiberal democracies are “democratically elected regime, often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, [but] are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms”. Particularly during Duterte’s reign, the Philippines reflects some features of illiberal democracy, despite a facade of normal democratic political life. While it holds regular elections and has a democratic constitution, Duterte has suppressed dissent from opposition parties and independent civil

society. The following description of illiberal democracy put forward by Carothers (2002, pp. 9–10) sums up the state of Philippine politics: poor representation of citizens interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by the state. Political leaderships, therefore, have influential roles in the democratic trajectory of the Philippines. From the liberal political order focused on good governance under Benigno Aquino III’s administration (2010–2016), the Philippines took an illiberal turn with Duterte’s authoritarian leadership, which has since been sustained with the election of Marcos Jr. as president. This brings about an important question on the state of Philippine politics: How is it possible that a country with a relatively long experience with democracy elects and supports these leaders who undermine the nation’s democratic identity? The support for authoritarian leaders like Duterte is founded on the failures of previous administrations that came after the 1986 People Power Revolution. Bello (2017) points to the election of Duterte as a manifestation of a nation holding its leaders to account following the disappointments after the 1986 People Power Revolution that led to the ouster of Marcos and instituted liberal democratic institutions. Successive presidents have failed to bring about economic progress to the country, which has been widely perceived as a failure of liberal democracy (Manasca & Tan, 2012). Interestingly, the election to the presidency of the dictator’s son and namesake is largely deemed as the nation’s repudiation of democracy’s failures. Referring to the Philippines, Kreuzer (2020, p. 6) explains: “liberal democracy…lost much of its appeal due to its inability to bring about improvement with respect to the ‘more basic’ human needs of security, welfare and the reduction of poverty and inequality”. The disjunction between the expectations of liberal democracy and the realities in Philippine politics has prompted the Filipino electorate to be open to other political options. According to Alston (2017, p. 4):

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citizens who once accepted democracy as the only legitimate form of government (become) more open to authoritarian alternatives. Simply, the importance of liberal order has

philippines  263 been depreciated, the possibility of authoritarian rule has been floated, and anti-liberal ideas have been offered.

Throughout his regime, Duterte particularly challenged the liberal order and its values by promoting methods he deems necessary to promote the interests of the broader society. He did so by violating human rights and the checks and balances that liberal democracy espouses.

B. The landscape Such discontent has since prompted the nation to be open to trade-offs, in a patron–client system that links political elites and the majority of the electorate. In his basic conception, Kreuzer (2020, p. 9) differentiates patronage as the top-down perspective, whereas clientelism focuses on the bottom-up perspective of relations between patrons and clients. According to Teehankee (2017), this system of asymmetric relationships involves elite patrons furnishing much-needed resources to clients in exchange for their votes, loyalty, and support. In the case of the Philippines, patronage and clientelism are considered a common, dominant, legitimate form of sociopolitical order, “provided both sides fulfill their respective role expectations” (Kreuzer, 2020, p. 10). During elections, the Philippines is considered a typical example of what Berenschot and Aspinall (2020, p. 1) describe as patronage democracy “where parties and candidates primarily rely on the distribution of material benefits, or patronage, when mobilizing voters”. It transforms public into private goods, as benefits are not distributed impersonally but are “perceived to be contingent on the support [the client] gives to the politician” (Berenschot & Aspinall, 2020, p. 4). Such a patron–client political system provides fertile ground for a “patron-strongman” who provides for his “client-constituents”. The leadership of a patron-strongman expects “unconditional loyalty from his followers in return for a pledge of abiding support for all their needs” (David, 2015). The patronstrongman generates legitimacy by instituting a decisive government for the people that provides for their core human needs: security, order, and livelihood. In exchange, clientconstituents offer unprecedented loyalty and support (almost blindly) to the patron who

delivers. Such a system highlights a personalistic style of leadership that trumps the authority of political institutions. During Duterte’s reign, patronage and clientelism in the country were very much evident. His campaign promises such as the bloody war on drugs, vast infrastructure projects, increase in salaries of police and military officers, and free tuition in state colleges, among others, were implemented immediately, signaling a determined and purposeful administration. Duterte’s iron-fisted style of leadership was rewarded with a record high of +81 net public satisfaction rating until his last month in office (June 2022), based on the Social Weather Station (SWS) survey. The supposedly liberal middle class did not fear the possible loss of its liberties and even supported Duterte as he led the Philippines towards an illiberal decline. Meanwhile, the poor stood by his administration despite the murder of thousands of their own in his brutal war on drugs. Patron–client interactions in the country’s political system have also manifested during Marcos Jr.’s campaign. His landslide victory of 31.6 million votes in the May 2022 election (Cervantes, 2022) demonstrates the Filipinos’ craving for authoritarian nostalgia, propagated by coordinated propaganda of historical whitewashing. Marcos Jr. has exploited this nostalgia by giving hope to the Filipino masses of a return to the golden era of his father’s reign: a time when the economy was thriving and infrastructure was developed under a peaceful and orderly society. Most Filipino voters have swept aside human rights abuses and the ill-gotten wealth of his father (which has yet to be fully recovered by the state) in anticipation of a better life under Marcos Jr.’s reign. In this political paradigm, “dictators are nostalgically remembered as strong leaders, historical facts are purposely manipulated, and the past is perceived to be glorious” (Kuhonta, 2022). Though patronage and clientelism may explain Duterte and Marcos Jr.’s rise to power, both concepts do not adequately explain their enduring popularity. Particularly with Duterte, the extent and continuity of broadbased support for him, including his controversial war on drugs, is remarkable despite the use of physical violence. McCoy (2017, p. 519) highlights the central role of “performative violence”: the use of raw violence in effecting order and, through that, projecting personal andrea chloe wong

264  encyclopedia of asian politics power and authority as a magnet that continues to attract broad-based support for Duterte. His performative violence also finds historical resonance with that of the Philippines’ former dictator Marcos, whose son derives his wide popularity from the elder’s strongman persona. In Duterte’s case, the continued public tolerance for his coercion-based leadership has made him, in the words of Kusaka (2017, p. 49), a “patriarchal boss” who brings together “compassion and violence” and “maintains justice outside of the law”. According to Itao (2018, p. 143), “This collective approval signifies that most Filipinos do not see Duterte’s exercise of political power as a threat to their freedom or to democracy at large, but rather as a source and sign of social security. In short, it is the people who have spoken: Duterte is the kind of leader that they want”. Such a phenomenon can be further explained in Marco Garrido’s (2017) research entitled: “Why the Poor Support Populism: The Politics of Sincerity in Metro Manila”. By analyzing former Philippine president Joseph Estrada1 (another populist leader) as a case study, Garrido argues that such leaders are perceived to be sincere, or someone who cares about the people beyond elections. Situating his analysis within the “populism” paradigm, Garrido’s observations on Estrada can be similarly applied to Duterte and Marcos Jr. towards understanding the “irrational” bonding logic and the emotional quality of patronage. The populist leader as patron must continue with such sincerity as “part of a coherent performance” to maintain the asymmetrical clientelist bond since the public, in the context of clientelism, expects to be treated with “consideration and respect” (Garrido, 2017, p. 657). Scholars and researchers can also consult with Cleve Arguelles’ (2019) work entitled: “‘We Are Rodrigo Duterte’: Dimensions of the Philippine Populist Publics’ Vote”. He adds to Garrido’s “sincerity” discussion on leadership by highlighting “authenticity” as part of the populist leader’s persona. According to Arguelles (2019, p. 428), the authenticity of the leader, once durably constructed and promoted, is resistant to external threats as new information is “interpreted according to established understandings, and contradictory information may be discarded or discounted”. To a certain extent, this may andrea chloe wong

explain the approval and admiration of the majority of Filipinos towards Duterte despite his coercive and violent tendencies, as well as Marcos Jr., despite his family’s historical baggage and his lackluster record as a politician. Yet further research can be made to determine how a populist leader can promote sincerity and authenticity to the public, how these translate to unconditional loyalty among followers, and how both characteristics can be publicly sustained as important sources of legitimacy to the leadership. Aside from exploring the continued popularity of the “patron-strongmen”, it is also worth analyzing the loyal followers of their varied “client-constituents”. After all, patron– client relationships are a two-way street, particularly in terms of political representation. According to Saward (2006, pp. 301–2): “the represented play a role in choosing representatives and representatives ‘choose’ their constituents in the sense of portraying them or in framing them in particular, contestable ways”. To understand Duterte and, to a certain extent, Marcos Jr.’s supporters, particularly among the lower class, Nicole Curato’s (2016) scholarly work titled “Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte’s Rise to Power” is worth reading. She puts into context how the poor are generally viewed in relation to their support for both leaders. One may think that they are “blind followers whose moralities have been compromised. They are “pejoratively called as ‘Dutertards’ (referring to those following Duterte as retards) or Marcos loyalists who pin their hopes on a messianic leader” (Curato, 2016, p. 3). After interviewing poor communities for her research, Curato avoids dismissing the “populists’ constituencies as fanatics who fall prey to a manipulative politician”. Instead, she argues that public support for leaders “hinges on citizens’ moral assessments, which decide whether to bestow or withhold support to politicians that have granted them recognition and esteem” (Curato, 2016, pp. 6–7). Another insight worth studying regarding the poor’s support for authoritarian leaders is Frederic Schaeffer’s (2002) “Disciplinary Reactions: Alienation and the Reform of Vote Buying in the Philippines”. Based on his ethnographic work among slum communities, Schaeffer claims that the poor are often disparaged for their short-sightedness and poor

philippines  265 political discernment: “They elect ‘immoral’ leaders such as Joseph Estrada. They sell their votes during elections. They deliver warm bodies in political gatherings in exchange for 500 pesos (10 USD)”. Yet for low-income groups, they view Duterte, Marcos Jr., and even Estrada as kind and considerate leaders who treat them with dignity (never mind the brutality of Duterte, the historical baggage of Marcos Jr., and the corruption of Estrada). Schaeffer (2002, p. 20) refers to this as a “class politics of dignity” that pertains to the treatment of the poor – the kind that shuns the callousness typical of politicians who only remember their constituencies during elections. In effect, the poor value politicians who accorded them with respect, who they can identify with, and who can sympathetically make claims on their behalf. In return, the poor offer loyalty to those who continuously pay attention to their needs and provide them assistance to ease their suffering. Aside from the low-income groups, understanding the middle class as client-constituents is necessary to decipher the nation’s growing appeal towards leaders with authoritarian tendencies. The changing views of the educated elite on state leadership are intriguing, especially with their support for Duterte as he fulfilled his promise of peace and order despite the use of physical violence and coercion. They also tolerated and even approved of his authoritarian practices that were in obvious conflict with liberal democracy. This inadvertently reduces the middle classes’ credibility as normative advocates of the liberal democratic order (focusing on the rule of law and human rights) as background for good governance that they expect the state leadership to uphold. As democracy loses its appeal among the educated, the middle class has since shared with the poor veneration and approval for Duterte and even Marcos Jr. (albeit to a lesser degree). To understand the middle class, another scholarly work by Marco Garrido (2020) entitled “A Conjunctural Account of Upper- and Middle-Class Support for Rodrigo Duterte” serves as a good reference. He argues that the group’s rejection of the previous administration’s reforms and their desire for order and discipline has crystallized over time during the trajectory of democracy in the Philippines. His research explains the upper and middle classes’ predisposition to “strong leaders” and their election of Duterte in 2016.

C. Future research The Philippines’ long-standing patronage and clientelist political system have paved the way for Duterte and Marcos Jr.’s rise to power. As patrons, Duterte and Marcos Jr. manifest the fulfillment of the nation’s basic needs. As clients, the poor and the middle class give back by demonstrating approval and support. The Philippines is an interesting case for analysis as it confronts growing perceptions of its illiberal tendencies and democratic decline following the successive elections of both leaders of authoritarian tendencies. By looking at the Philippines, scholars and political observers can relate it to other countries, particularly developing nations with weak democratic institutions, that are increasingly fascinated with authoritarianism. Looking at the recent political trend on authoritarian leaders and illiberal democracies around the world, further research on the Philippines can provide insights for other countries and can enrich the field of political science and contemporary politics. Andrea Chloe Wong

Note 1. Estrada served as president in 1998 but was ousted by the middle class, church, and civil society groups in 2001 due to corruption cases filed against him.

References Alston, P. (2017). The Populist Challenge to Human Rights. Journal of Human Rights Practice, 9(1), 1–15. Arguelles, C. (2019). “We are Rodrigo Duterte”: Dimensions of the Philippine Populist Publics Vote. Asian Politics and Polity, 11(3), 419–437. Bello, W. (2017, January 6). Rodrigo Duterte: A Fascist Original. Foreign Policy in Focus. https://fpif​.org​/rodrigo​-duterte​ -fascist​-original/. Berenschot, W., and Aspinall, E. (2020). How Clientelism Varies: Comparing Patronage Democracies. Democratization, 27(1), 1–19. Carothers, T. (2002). The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 5–21. Cervantes, Filane (2022). “Marcos, Duterte Proclaimed Winners in PH’s Fastest Vote Count,” Philippine News Agency, May 25, https://www​.pna​.gov​.ph​/articles​/1175224. andrea chloe wong

266  encyclopedia of asian politics Curato, N. (2016). Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte’s Rise to Power. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 35(3). David, R. (2015, December 03). Four Models of Political Leadership. Inquirer.Net. https://opinion​ . inquirer​ . net​ / 90847​ / four​ -models​-of​-political​-leadership. Garrido, M. (2017). Why the Poor Support Populism: The Politics of Sincerity in Metro Manila. American Journal of Sociology, 123(3), 647–685. Garrido, M. (2020). A Conjunctural Account of Upper and Middle Class’ Support for Rodrigo Duterte. International Sociology, 35(6), 651–673. Itao, A. (2018). The Political Vision of Contemporary Filipinos: A Ricoeurian Reading of Duterte’s Popular Presidency. Social Ethics Society Journal of Applied Philosophy, 121–160. Kreuzer, P. (2020). A Patron-Strongman Who Delivers: Explaining Enduring Public Support For President Duterte in the Philippines. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) Report, 1–44. Kuhonta, E. (2022, May 10). Why Did Filipinos Vote Overwhelmingly for Ferdinand Marcos Jr.? Open Canada. https://opencanada​.org​/ why​-did​-filipinos​-vote​-overwhelmingly​-for​ -ferdinand​-marcos​-jr/. Kusaka, W. (2017). Bandit Grabbed the State: Duterte’s Moral Politics. Philippine Sociological Review, 65, 49–75. Manacsa, R.C. and Tan, A.C. (2012). “Strong r e p ubl ic”  Sid e t r a cke d:  Ol iga r ch ic Dynamics, Democratization, and Economic Development in the Philippines. Korea Observer, 43(1), 47–88. McCoy, A. (2017). Philippine Populism: Local Violence and Global Context in the Rise of a Filipino Strongman. Surveillance & Society, 15(3/4), 514–522.

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Saward, M. (2006). The Representative Claim. Contemporary Political Theory, 5(3), 297–318. Schaffer, F. (2002). Disciplinary Reactions: Alienation and the Reform of Vote Buying in the Philippines. Paper prepared for a Conference on Trading Political Rights: The Comparative Politics of Vote Buying, Cambridge. http://www​.gsdrc​.org​/docs​/ open​/po15​.pdf. Social Weather Station. (2022, September 23). Second Quarter 2022 Social Weather Survey: Pres. Rodrigo Duterte’s final net satisfaction rating at +81. https:// www​.sws​.org​.ph​/swsmain​/artcldisppage/​ ?artcsyscode​=ART​-20220923101814. Teehankee, J. (2017). Clientelism and Party Politics in the Philippines. In D. Tomsa and A. Ufen (Eds.), Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (pp. 186–214). Routledge. Zakaria, F. (1997). The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 22–43.

Key resources Arguelles, C. (2019). “We are Rodrigo Duterte”: Dimensions of the Philippine Populist Publics Vote. Asian Politics and Polity, 11(3), 419–437. Manacsa, R.C. and Tan, A.C. (2005). Manufacturing Parties: Re-examining the Transient Nature of Philippine Political Parties. Party Politics, 11(6), 748–765. McCoy, A. (2017). Philippine Populism: Local Violence and Global Context in the Rise of a Filipino Strongman. Surveillance & Society, 15(3/4), 514–522. Teehankee, J. (2017). Clientelism and Party Politics in the Philippines. In D. Tomsa and A. Ufen (Eds.), Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (pp. 186–214). Routledge.

48. Republic of Korea (South Korea) A. The concept The Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) is located in Northeast Asia and covers the southern part of the Korean peninsula, divided through the demilitarized zone (DMZ). South Korea shares a maritime border with the People’s Republic of China and Japan. The total size of the Korean peninsula is equivalent to the size of the United Kingdom. South Korea occupies 45% of the peninsula’s land area. Nearly 70% of South Korea’s land consists of mountainous ranges. South Korea’s capital is Seoul, located near the Han River in the northwest area of the country. South Korea is composed of six metropolitan cities and nine provinces. South Korea’s main islands include Jeju Island, Ulleng Island, and Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo Islands), a series of rocky isles under territorial dispute with Japan. South Korea’s population was reported to be 51.74 million in 2021, with 49.95% of the population female and 50.05% of the population male.1 Since the 1970s, South Korea’s population growth has declined and experienced a low total fertility rate. In 2018, South Korea’s total fertility rate dropped below 1.0.2 South Korea’s population trend forecasts a continued rise in the aging population, a minor decline in the youth population, and a low fertility rate. South Korea has no official national religion and is a multi-religious society. Traditional beliefs include Shamanism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, which greatly influenced the country’s earlier cultural development and social values. Other religions include Christianity, Catholicism, and Islam. In 2020, 20% of the population identified themselves as Protestant, 15% as Buddhist, 8% as Catholic, and 45% reported being without religious affiliations.3 Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, Korea experienced nearly 30 years of “president-centered military dictatorship ruling”,4 which ignited the miraculous post-war economic recovery while suppressing democratic practice and rights. Vast economic growth, increase in the average income, and higher education levels of its

citizens contributed to the development of the middle class, of whom many participated in the grassroots movement for democratization. The historical actions calling for democracy led to the amendment of the Constitution nine times. The latest revision made was in 1987, which mandates the presidential election through a popular vote and limits it to a single five-year term. The nine constitutional amendments represent milestones in Korea’s path of building a consolidated democracy. South Korea is a liberal democratic country with structured institutions of governance composed of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The presidential executive is a powerful position limited to a single fiveyear term and appoints the prime minister and the state council with the consent of the National Assembly. The legislative branch consists of the Korean National Assembly, which has 300 members elected every four years. The political parties in Korea consist of two major parties – the Democratic Party, a center-left party, and the People’s Party, a conservative party – and two smaller parties, often composed of one conservative party and one progressive party. The democratic party supports progressive economic policy, human rights, and proactive relations with North Korea, while the People’s Party advocates a market-based economy, conservative policies toward North Korea, and fiscal responsibility. Former Presidents of the Democratic Party include Kim Dae-Jung, Roh Moo-Hyun, and Moon Jae-In. Former presidents of the People’s Party include Lee MyungBak, Park Geun-Hye, and the current President, Yoon Seok-Yeol, who was elected in March 2022. The judicial branch of Korea consists of Supreme, constitutional, and lower courts. While democracy was first introduced to South Korea in 1948, the path toward a consolidated democracy began in 1987 following the fall of the authoritarian rule of the two presidents. Park Chung-Hee and Chun Do-Hwan utilized coercive military power to promote economic development while limiting citizens’ political freedom and rights. Historical protests led by students and civilians, such as the April 19th Revolution of 1960, the Kwangju Uprising in 1980, and the June Democratic Struggle of 1987, have served as critical junctures in establishing Korea’s democratic values and political culture.

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268  encyclopedia of asian politics The 1987 amendment transitioned Korea into a democratic republic and transferred power to the opposition party. From 1987 to the next three presidents,5 South Korea experienced “democratic paternalism” (Wright, 2022), where reformations entrenched democratic values and social norms. Economic and social development became the basis for democratization, while industrialization and the emergence of the middle class created a core constituency for democracy.6 South Korea’s democracy since 2002 represents “participatory democracy” (Wright, 2022), with increased use of modern technology as a method of public political engagement, growing public resentment against the elites, and widened demographic gap between old and youth voters (Draudt, 2019). The older generation, who have experienced economic growth and the democratic transition of Korea, have political cleavages based on region and political ideologies. In contrast, the younger generations raised in a different historical context have newly emerged political divisions based on gender, social class, and generation. South Korea’s efforts to practice and apply liberal democracy are ongoing. Several indicators highlight Korea’s modern democratic activism and practices. First is the gradually increasing number of female leaders in the National Assembly. With 50% gender quota seats secured, female leaders serve in over 19% of seats in the National Assembly. While the ratio of female representation in politics is low compared to the EU and other political institutions, there is a steady increase in Korean female participation in politics.7 Second, the peaceful Candlelight demonstrations of 2016–2017 supporting the impeachment of former President Park GeunHye demonstrated a peaceful political movement and participation from the public. In 2020, South Korea was the first to hold a national election amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The election of April 2020 had the highest voter turnout of 66.2% since 1992 despite experiencing the first wave of COVID-19 cases. South Korea, as a consolidated democracy, is on a continued evolving path. While challenges of transparency, trust, and political accountability lie ahead, citizen activism and democratic engagement will evolve, adapting to the changing social, technological, and economic conditions. sun young (kelly) park

South Korea’s presidential legacy depicts a tarnished end to the democratic leadership. More than half of the Korean Presidents or their family members have been convicted of political scandals and faced imprisonment. In 2017, former President Park Geun-Hye was convicted of abuse of power, coercion, and leaking confidential presidential information to a personal friend and executives of the Samsung company. While corruption in politics is not uncommon, South Korea’s frequency of presidential imprisonment involving bribery with Chaebols and abuse of power remains a challenge to practicing democratic order. The influence of Chaebols in Korea’s politics is just as critical as their role as the main drivers of the Korean economy. Chaebol (Chae-wealth; Bol-Clique) are also known as the family-owned business conglomerates in South Korea and innovators of South Korea’s economy. As part of former President Park Chung-Hee’s export-oriented economic policy and rapid industrialization in the 1970s, the government prioritized heavy and chemical sectors and insulated domestic industries from external competition. The government provided a significant capital inflow for Chaebols, enabling them to take advantage of the economies of scale, invest in R&D, and improve technology and labor capacity. Since then, Chaebols have continued to assert influence in Korea’s politics and enjoy a close-knit relationship with the government. As one Korean scholar describes, “The large conglomerates and Korean economy cannot be separated from politics and the culture and history”8 (1Albert, 2018). Chaebols during Korea’s industrialization period received credit for building the Korean economy, whereas today are criticized for exacerbating social inequality problems. From 1963 to 1996, South Korea’s economic growth rate reached over 8.7% per year (Kwon, 2005). In 1979, the Korean government adopted the Comprehensive Policy Measure of Economic Stabilization, which focused on expanding exportation and developing investments in heavy industries producing steel, iron, and chemical, also known as the heavy and chemical industry (HCI). With the robust development of Chaebols and rapid industrialization, South Korea expanded domestic production of electronics, IT, semiconductors, and automobiles in the mid-1980s.

republic of korea (south korea)  269 However, political and social upheavals existed behind the rapid economic growth. Growing dependence on foreign capital generated the accumulation of foreign debt. In the 1980s, the government prioritized economic policies to minimize the side effects of the rapid growth experience from 1960 to the 1970s and stabilize prices from high inflation. Gradually, Korea’s economy transitioned to a market-led structure and began social welfare programs such as national medical care, national pension system, and minimum wage policy. In the 1990s, South Korea experienced an increase in the working population size, contributing to the nation’s rise in GDP. Former President Kim Young-Sam adopted the globalization economic strategy to make Korea a first-class country in the 21st century (Moon & Rhyu, 2010). With technological advancements and human capital, Korea expanded its exportation to advanced economies such as the US and Japan. The opening of financial markets increased the inflow of foreign direct investment to Korea, providing Chaebols with access to foreign technology and investment. However, the weak institutions and lack of regulation left Korea vulnerable to the economic crises ahead. The 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis was catastrophic for Korea’s economy. Korea’s foreign debt had increased from $43.9 billion to $160.7 billion in 1996. The Chaebols also faced a heavy fall, with more than 15 top Chaebols claiming bankruptcy. The government filed for national economic bankruptcy and asked IMF for a bail-out plan. The 1998 IMF bail-out of $57 billion came with a new reformation of the Korean economy. The implementation of policies and institutions reduced government subsidies, weakened ties with Chaebols, and set new transparency measures. However, the consequences of the financial crisis were too significant, leaving Korea with worsened income inequality, increased foreign debt, a higher unemployment rate, and stagnation of capital. The myth of the Korean economic miracle was shattered (Moon, 2000). The 2008 global financial crisis was another critical juncture that reshaped Korea’s economy. In 2008, South Korea’s GDP growth rate fell from 6.2% in 2007 to 2.2% in 2008, which was the first negative growth since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. The hastily opening and monitoring of

the domestic capital market with a dearth of efficient policy response led to a detrimental fall in the Korean economy. In the past decade, Korea’s economy has faced challenges of decreased growth rate, unemployment, income gap, inequality, global supply chain, and growing public discontentment toward the Chaebols. President Yoon Seok-Yeol’s economic policies aim to provide a balanced distribution of wealth, transparency of conglomerates, and an innovation-based economy.

B. The landscape South Korea’s frequently visited political issues Several signature issues can be identified by observing Korea’s political identification and discourse. These topics are frequently discussed in political campaigns and reflect Korea’s social problems and political cleavages. The first issue is South Korea’s commitment to the ROK–US alliance and the dilemma of the rising influence of China in the region. As the strategic competition between the two superpowers escalates, South Korea faces more complex challenges in balancing its security and economic interests. External factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the tension between Taiwan and China, and the rising importance of technology linking economy and security are affecting Korea’s domestic discourse. The second issue deals with various political interpretations and acknowledgments of historical events such as the Kwangju Uprising in 1980, the sinking of Sewol Ferry in 2014, and past scandals of political leaders. The third frequently debated issue focuses on strategies for elevating South Korea’s autonomy in the international community through economic, cultural, or geopolitical leadership. During the COVID-19 pandemic, South Korea demonstrated success in the containment of the spread of the virus with efficient tracking and monitoring system. The government established initiatives to export the “K-Quarantine strategy” and elevate Korea’s influence in global health governance. Another ongoing topic is the territorial and historical dispute with Japan over the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo Island) and the sacrifice of Korean comfort women during World War II. sun young (kelly) park

270  encyclopedia of asian politics The last prominent issue is South Korea’s relations with North Korea and building practical solutions to handle current and future challenges in the Korean Peninsula. Contemporary economic development of South Korea South Korea is one of the four Asian tigers and a successful economic study case recognized by the World Bank. Korea’s miraculous economic recovery following the war and the policies behind it have been researched widely. South Korea is a leading country in innovation and technology, driving an economy size of 1.8 trillion GDP.9 In 2020, South Korea ranked tenth largest economy in the global GDP rankings despite the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic,10 fifth in total exports, and ninth in total imports. South Korea is also a critical player in the global supply chain. South Korea is a global exporter of integrated circuits, automobiles, cargo, passenger ships, and refined petroleum. The country established 18 free trade agreements.11 Korea’s total value of exports in 2020 was $512,710 million, and import was $476,498 million. Korea’s top export and import partners are China, the US, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Japan. South Korea has been a member of the WTO since 1995 and joined the OECD in 1996 as the second Asian nation after Japan. South Korea is also a founding member of the APEC. Many scholars list factors such as advancement in human capital, financial liberalization, export expansion, and physical capital accumulation as critical drivers of South Korea’s economic growth (Feeny et al., 2012). Recent studies also highlight the importance of Korea’s capacity to quickly adapt to evolving technology and explore new opportunities (6Kwack & Lee, 2006), while some research criticizes the negative externalities of the rapid growth causing environmental degradation, inequality of income distribution, and reduced welfare (Feeny et al., 2012). Rise of IT industry, Hallyu Wave, and COVID-19 pandemic Since the late 1980s, South Korea has invested in IT technology, semiconductors, and innovation, allowing it to emerge as a top global technology leader. South Korea’s Samsung Electronics, in line with Taiwan’s TSMC sun young (kelly) park

and the US’s Intel, are leading chip suppliers operating the global supply chain of IT, telecommunications, automobiles, sensors, and memory chips. Samsung Electronics makes an annual revenue of $200 billion, which is a critical contribution to Korea’s economy. In 2020, the semiconductor industry accounted for nearly 19%12 of Korea’s total exportation. Given the rising role of intelligence technology in the economy and security, Korea’s outlook for the semiconductor and innovation technology sector is hopeful. The Hallyu Wave is another rising economic factor in Korea’s economy. Hallyu refers to sharing Korean popular cultures such as K-pop, K-drama, movies, Netflix series, food, and beauty product. BTS, the movie Minari, and the Netflix series Squid Game are a few cases depicting the positive contribution of the exportation of Hallyu in South Korea’s economy and the spread of Korean culture beyond Asia. In 2021, the exportation of Hallyu marked $11.69 billion, with the export of cultural products estimated at $7 billion ($5 billion generated from online games and $639 million from music).13 Within ten years, the export of Korean cultural products has increased 4.1 times. The share of exports related to Hallyu consists of nearly 12% of the total service exports of Korea. During the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, South Korea demonstrated the capacity to export 2.5 trillion won of biopharmaceutical products and technology to more than 170 countries.14 According to Korea’s Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, 221 domestically made COVID-19 diagnostic kits (RT-PCR) were exported, equivalent to testing 4.9 million people. India (15.6%), Germany (13.2%), the Netherlands (9.6%), Italy (7.8%), and the US (5.2%) make up half of the total export destinations.15 In 2021, South Korea was one of the few countries authorized for domestic production of foreign COVID-19 vaccines, including AZ, Novavax, Sputnik V, and Moderna. While South Korea did not export domestically produced vaccines, 3.29% of the global COVID-19 vaccines were traded by South Korea. South Korea’s balancing between the US– China strategic competition The rising strategic competition between the US and China has placed South Korea in a challenging position for many years. South Korea’s tightrope walking between the two

republic of korea (south korea)  271 superpowers depicts the nation’s long-term dilemma of maintaining the ROK–US alliance for security reasons and expanding the strategic partnership with China for economic opportunities. The ROK–US alliance established since the Korean War is critical for Korea’s regional security position and for coping with North Korea’s conventional and nuclear threat (Moon & Rhyu 2010). The alliance between the two countries helped South Korea with economic development and military deployment. Following Japan and Germany, South Korea has the third largest US military presence outside the US territory. South Korea has about 28,500 US troops spread out in six military camps. Like many countries in the region, South Korea benefitted from the international economic liberal order established by the US and its allies. However, in times of economic crisis, such as the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Global Economic Crisis in 2008, the South Korean government took policy steps attempting to gear away from the US-led system. However, due to the complex relations with North Korea and the circumstances of the global finance and international economic system, Korea maintained a strong security alliance with the US while fostering economic partnerships with China. The US– ROK Indo-Pacific Cooperation is a recent initiative demonstrating the continued alliance between the two nations. Since restoring diplomatic ties between Korea and China in 1992, the two nations have become vital trade partners and neighbors. China has been Korea’s top trade partner since 2003, surpassing trade volumes with the US. In 2021, Korea’s exports to China were reported as US $162.9 billion with 39.7%16 of semiconductor and memory chips exports. In the early 2000s, Korea’s raw wood material and leather and shoe-making industries were the main exporters to China, whereas, in 2021, the precision instruments industry, fine chemistry and semiconductor sectors dominated Korea’s export market to China. China is also a critical stakeholder in North Korean relations and bringing stability to the Korean Peninsula. In 2016, South Korea, with joint efforts of the US, launched the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THADD) deployment to intercept the incoming missiles from North Korea. In reaction, China

imposed dramatic trade sanctions against South Korea and immediately disconnected cultural and economic trade activities. The trade retaliation between Korea and China expanded to domestic political disputes on the future of the ROK–US alliance and Korea’s national security. The continued decoupling of the US and China, strategic technological competition, and the US’s assertive push to bring Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor technology to the US make Korea’s tightrope walking even more challenging. In addition, the global pandemic outbreak, the slowing of the global supply chain, and the growing importance of technology, data, and information in the security and economic realm are adding obstacles for middle-power countries like South Korea. President Yoon Seok-Yeol’s foreign policy aims to strike a balance in Korea’s diplomacy by acknowledging the ROK–US alliance as a critical defense policy and emphasizing shared values with other liberal democracies and, in addition, expanding the economic opportunities with other trade partners while being mindful of China’s technological capability and resources to catch up.

C. Future research and knowledge in Korea’s political economy In the areas of political economy, many extensive studies have looked at Korea’s economic achievement from 1960 to the 1980s from historical, economic, and political theory-based perspectives. In particular, many studies analyze Korea’s political structure and economic policies that have led to successful economic development. While these studies provide an extensive understanding of the importance of institutions in economic growth, they tend to dismiss the critical role of other non-economic factors. Thus it would be interesting to conduct research that illustrates Korea’s economic development from health, social welfare, education, and other social indicator perspectives. In future studies, it would be interesting to conceptualize the next steps for Korea’s democracy. External and internal factors such as the global pandemic, the aging population, dependence on digitalized society and metaverse, environmental degradation, and deepening of inequality are sun young (kelly) park

272  encyclopedia of asian politics critical contemporary factors that will shape the future practice and norms of Korea’s democracy. Sun Young (Kelly) Park

Notes 1. According to the South Korea demographics 2021 report by StatisticsTimes.Com. 2. Stangarone 2022, The Diplomat article on South Korea’s demographic trends. 3. Report on the Religions of Korea from Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4. Terminology used to describe the authoritarian ruling of former President Park Chung-Hee and Chun Do-Hwan (Moon, 2020). 5. Roh Tae-Woo (1988–93), Kim Young-Sam (1993– 98), and Kim Dae-Jung (1998–2003). 6. Kim Yong-Ho, Professor of Inha University’s quote from an interview on characteristics of Korean democracy, by the National Museum of Korean Contemporary History. 7. According to the World Bank data on South Korea’s female representation in political leadership. 8. Rhyu Sang-young, Yonsei University Professor’s quote in the Council of Foreign Relations report on South Korea’s Chaebol Challenge. 9. According to the World Bank Data of 2021 GDP Report. 10. According to the Korea Herald Journal article. 11. Korea has 18 free trade agreements with New Zealand, Canada, Central America, Colombia, Peru, Australia, Singapore, Vietnam, India, RCEP, China, ASEAN, Turkiye, the EU, the UK, the US, and the EFTA. 12. According to the 2021 report by the Korea Semiconductor Industry Association. 13. Jung, K.H. (2021) report on the ripple effect of Hallyu by the Korea Foundation for International Cultural Exchange. 14. According to Mae Il Economy News on South Korea’s exportation of Covid-19 kits. 15. According to the 2020 Ministry of Food and Drug Safety report on COVID-19 Korea update. 16. According to the Yonhap News article in 2022.

References Albert, E. (2018, May 3). South Korea’s Chaebol Challenge. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www​.cfr​.org​ / backgrounder​ / south​ - koreas​ - chaebol​ -challenge Coronavirus Disease 19(COVID-19). (n.d.). https://ncov​.kdca​.go​.kr​/en/ Feeny, S., Mitchell, H., Tran, C., & Clarke, M. (2012). The determinants of economic growth versus genuine progress in South Korea. Social Indicators Research, 113(3), 1055–1074. https://doi​.org​/10​.1007​/s11205​ -012​-0127-4 Jung, K. H. (2021). 2021 한류 파급효과 연구 . Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange. https://kofice​.or​.kr​/ sun young (kelly) park

b20industry​ / b20​ _ industry​ _ 00​ _view​ . asp​ ?seq​=1251 Jwa, S.-H. (2017). The Rise and Fall of Korea’s Economic Development. Springer International Publishing. Kwack, S. Y., & Lee, Y. S. (2006). Analyzing the Korea’s growth experience: The application of R&D and human capital based growth models with demography. Journal of Asian Economics, 17(5), 818– 831. https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​/j​.asieco​.2006​ .08​.002 Moon, C.-I., & Rhyu, S.-Y. (2010). Rethinking alliance and the economy: American hegemony, path dependence, and the South Korean political economy. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 10(3), 441– 464. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/irap​/lcq013 Kim, Y. H. National Museum of Korean Contemporary History [Interview on Democracy in South Korea]. https://www​ .much​.go​. kr​/en​/contents​.do​? fid​= 03​& cid​ =03_9 Nilsson-Wright, J., Dr. (2022). Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. https://www​ .chathamhouse​ .org ​ / 2022 ​ / 07​ /contested ​ - politics ​ - south​ -korea​/1​-introduction Religion in the Republic of Korea. Citizen Journalists Embassy of the Republic of Korea to Norway. https://overseas​.mofa​.go​ .kr​/no​-en​/ brd​/m​_21237​/view​.do​?seq​=88 Semiconductor Industry Driving Korea’s Economic Growth View Details. (2021). Invest KOREA(ENG). https://www​ .investkorea​.org​/ik​- en​/ bbs​/i​-308​/detail​.do​ ?ntt​_sn​= 490760 South Korea (KOR) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners. OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity. https://oec​.world​/en​ /profile​/country​/ kor South Korea as a Liberal Democracy: Darcie Draudt. (2019, November 8). [Interview]. In Korea Economic Institute of America. https://keia​.org ​/podcasts​/south​-korea​-as​-a​ -liberal​-democracy​-darcie​-draudt/ South Korea Demographics 2021. (n.d.). StatisticsTimes.Com. https://statisticstimes​ .com​/demographics​/country​/south​-korea​ -demographics​.php Stangarone, T. (2022, August 9). South Korea’s demographic trends continue to decline. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​ .com ​/2022​/08​/south​-koreas​- demographic​ -trends​-continue​-to​-decline/

republic of korea (south korea)  273 Yonhap News.곽영섭. (2022, August 23). S. Korea’s Exports to China Rise over 160 Times in 30 Years. https://en​.yna​.co​.kr​/ view​/AEN​2022​0823​000800320 Yul Kwon, O. (2005). A cultural analysis of South Korea’s economic prospects. Global Economic Review, 34(2), 213–231. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1080​/12265080500117541 Mae Il Economy News. (2020, December 4). Korea made Covid-19 kits export reaching a high rate of 2.5 trillion won to 170 countries. https://www​.mk​.co​.kr​/news​/ economy​/view​/2020​/12​/1249359/ Moon, C.-I. (2000) ‘In the shadow of broken cheers: The dynamics of globalization in South Korea’, In Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey

A. Hart (Eds.), Responding to Globalization, NewYork: Routledge, 65–94.

Key resources Moon, C.-I., & Rhyu, S.-Y. (2010). Rethinking alliance and the economy: American hegemony, path dependence, and the South Korean political economy. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 10(3), 441– 464. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/irap​/lcq013 Seoul National University Asia Center. https:// snuac​.snu​.ac​.kr​/eng​/index​.php​/category​/ publications/   The Korea Times. https://www​.koreatimes​.co​ .kr​/www2​/index​.asp

sun young (kelly) park

49. Singapore

country’s population is made up of foreign labour, with 4.07 million residents, of which 519,500 are permanent residents while 3.55 million are Singapore citizens (SingStat, 2022a). The dependency on foreign labour is A. The concept further highlighted by the SingStat (2022a) Singapore is a tiny island nation found at the data concerning annual population growth, bottom of peninsular Southeast Asia. It is with the percentage growth of the non-resilocated one degree north of the equator and dent population constantly outstripping that of has a geographical size of 728.3 km2, mak- the resident population, not accounting for the ing it the third smallest country in Asia and two COVID years where there was a decline the 52nd smallest in the world (Data​ .gov​ .​ in the population. Additionally, like many sg, 2021; WorldData​.in​fo). Being an island other Southeast Asian countries, Singapore’s nation, Singapore’s landmass is made up of population is made up of diverse, multiracial, one main island (also called Pulau Ujong) and multicultural groups. The largest ethand 62 other tiny islands (WorldData​.in​fo). nic group in Singapore are the Chinese who It is also one of the lowest-lying countries in account for 74.12% of the resident population, the world, with an average elevation of only making Singapore the only Chinese-majority 15 m, making rising sea levels a great concern nation outside of the greater China region for the country (Lee, 2019; WorldData​.in​fo). (Han, 2018; SingStat, 2022b). The second In fact, Singapore’s small size is referenced largest ethnic group are the Malays who make to by the popular nickname for the state: the up 13.6% of the population, while the Indians little red dot. The term itself has its roots form 9%. The Singapore government follows from a comment made in 1998 by the then- a strict racial categorisation model called the President of Indonesia, B. J. Habibie, who CMIO (Chinese Malay Indian Others), where called Singapore “a red dot” in reference to those that do not fall under the three main its depiction on the world map (Straits Times, racial groups are classified as Others. These 2019). Other nicknames used by Singapore “Others” account for 3.28% of the resident include the Lion City, which is a reference population. to the historical discovery of the island by a This population-dense island nation is also Malay prince that was recorded in the Malay home to one of the world’s most advanced Annals, and the Garden City, a moniker economies, with Singapore ranked as one of coined by the first Prime Minister Lee Kuan the richest nations in the world. The World Yew. Its location at the southern end of the Bank’s 2021 report puts Singapore’s gross Straits of Malacca meant that Singapore’s domestic product (GDP) at US$ 397 billion existence was intrinsically tied to trade. Even with a GDP per capita of US$ 72,794; the before colonisation by the British in 1819 with GDP per capita figures place Singapore as the arrival of Sir Stamford Raffles and the the sixth most prosperous nation in the world, East India Company, Singapore had played a ahead of other developed economies like role as a regional entrepot. However, it is with the United States and Japan (World Bank, colonisation and the development that being 2021). The success of Singapore’s economic the main British trading port in the region development has led to it being coined the brought to it that started the story of modern- Singapore economic miracle, as scholars and day Singapore. officials over the years have tried to study and Despite its small geographical size, replicate the policies that allowed an island Singapore has one of the highest population with distinct limitations in natural resources densities in the world. As of June 2022, the to grow from a third-world economy to one of island is home to a population of 5.64 mil- the world’s key financial centres in just under lion people, giving the country a population 50 years (Hussain, 2015). Part of the reason density of 7,688 per km2 (SingStat, 2022a). for Singapore’s vibrant and prosperous econThat population density ranks Singapore omy can be traced to the stellar reputation as the third most densely populated city in that Singapore has for investments and ease the world, behind only the Macao Special of doing business. The Heritage Foundation’s Administrative Region (SAR) and Monaco Index of Economic Freedom (2022) has (WorldData​ .in​ fo). Given that Singapore is Singapore ranked first amongst all countries, a small state, its population numbers are scoring highly for all four categories: rule bolstered by foreign workers; 27.8% of the 274

singapore  275 of law, government size, market access, and regulatory efficiency. Singapore’s economic prosperity is built off a solid foundation as the government has pursued economic liberalisation through business-friendly policies while ensuring transparency, corruption-free business practices, and a world-class education system that supplies highly skilled workers, and over the years, this has encouraged foreign investment in the country and allowed the Singapore economy to rapidly shift from low-skill manufacturing to the current drivers of financial services and highly skilled manufacturing. In fact, Singapore is one of the few developed economies that has manufacturing, albeit highly advanced manufacturing like semiconductors and petrochemicals, as a key component of their GDP. The island nation has also capitalised on its geographical location to position itself as a regional trade and financial hub, with its ports ranking as one of the busiest ports in the world and its banking and financial services playing a huge role in the regional economy, thereby securing its position as one of the dominant economies in the region despite its tiny size. Singapore’s political system is built upon its roots as an ex-British colony. It is a unitary parliamentary democracy that is modelled after the Westminster parliamentary system. There are three separate branches of government: the Legislature comprises parliament and the president, the Executive is led by the prime minister, and the Judiciary has the Supreme Court serving as the highest court of the land. The Legislature makes the laws, the Executive administers the law, and the Judiciary interprets the law through the courts. Being a republic, power is vested in parliament via the people, and the president serves as the head of state while the prime minister leads the government. The president is elected directly by the people during a presidential election, and it is the role of the president of the day to appoint the prime minister and his cabinet to lead, and they in turn are held responsible to parliament. However, while the government is modelled after the Westminster system, Singapore is unicameral. This means that the Parliament of Singapore only has one House, with Members of Parliament (MPs) being elected by the people during a general election. The leader of the political party with the largest number of MPs will be invited by the president to form the government. Furthermore, the three branches

of government are guided by the Constitution of Singapore, a written constitution which serves as the supreme law of the land. A unique feature of the Parliament of Singapore is the presence of non-elected MPs as part of the House of Parliament. The Constitution was first amended in 1984 to introduce the Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) scheme, the express aim of this scheme was to ensure that there would always be a minimum opposition voice in parliament (Lim, 2016b). According to the scheme, the losing opposition candidates with the highest percentage of votes secured during a general election, subject to a minimum of 15% of votes cast, can be offered seats in parliament if the number of elected opposition candidates falls short of the minimum number; as of 2016, that number is 12. NCMPs are subjected to the same qualifying criteria as MPs and are accorded all the rights, privileges, and duties of elected MPs with the exception that they are not entitled to vote on motions relating to a bill to amend the constitution; a supply, supplementary supply or final supply bill; a money bill; a vote of no confidence in the government; and removing the president from office (Lim, 2016b). This was followed in 1990 with the introduction of the Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme. Each parliament can appoint up to nine NMPs on 2.5-year terms from a list of candidates nominated by the public; the purpose of the scheme was to provide parliament with alternative nonpartisan views (Lim, 2016a). NMPs share the same rights as NCMPs. Singapore’s electoral system is a form of the one man one vote, plurality voting system. Following the Westminster tradition of first-past-the-post voting, the party with the largest number of votes in a constituency will be declared the winner. However, unlike the Westminster system, Singapore’s electoral map is made up of a mix of single-member constituencies (in Singapore they are called SMCs) and multi-member constituencies. These multi-member constituencies in Singapore are known as Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs) and involve teams of either four or five politicians representing their respective parties to run against each other. An additional requirement is that each team must include at least one candidate who belongs to a minority racial community, defined as the Malay, Indian, orson tan

276  encyclopedia of asian politics or other minority communities (National Library Board, 2013). The GRC system was introduced to ensure minority representation in parliament which would thereby ensure that parliament would always be multiracial in composition and representation; it was first implemented in the 1988 elections (National Library Board, 2013). The division of constituencies (electoral divisions) is decided based on demographic data and is usually reviewed by the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee prior to a general election; as of 2020, there are a total of 31 constituencies, made up of 14 SMCs and 17 GRCs (Elections Department Singapore, 2020). Singapore’s political scene has been dominated by one political party. Since 1959 when Singapore was first granted self-government by the British, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has consistently won every single election that has been held. It is precisely because of the PAP’s stranglehold on politics that the NCMP scheme was introduced in 1984, and the results of the 1988 election where the PAP won all but one seat seemed to prove the necessity of the scheme (Lim, 2016b). Initially formed by Lee Kuan Yew, who became Singapore’s founding prime minister, the PAP is currently led by Lee Hsien Loong, Lee’s eldest son, and commands a supermajority in parliament, with the party occupying 83 out of the available 93 seats. Despite having a Leninist party organisation, which harkens back to the party’s labour left roots, the PAP styles itself as a conservative centre-right party. The main opposition to the PAP is the Worker’s Party (WP), which is a centre-left party currently led by Pritam Singh, Singapore’s first Leader of the Opposition, and together with the PAP are the two oldest political parties in the country. The WP has slowly been making inroads in parliament and is now the largest opposition party, holding nine seats. Other opposition parties that have had parliamentary presence include the Progress Singapore Party, which holds two seats in parliament via the NCMP scheme, the Singapore Democratic Party, led by outspoken opposition politician Chee Soon Juan, the Singapore People’s Party, the Democratic Progressive Party, and the Singapore Democratic Alliance.

B. The landscape The PAP’s stranglehold on Singapore politics has turned the country into what essentially orson tan

equates to a one-party state. The GRC system has also led to opposition voices in Singapore throwing accusations of gerrymandering at the incumbent government, while the perceived control that the PAP government exerts over society and its effect on constraining the growth of effective opposition while limiting perceived freedoms has led to most democracy indexes ranking the country as a semi-democracy or partly free (Freedom House, 2022). Scholarly research on the topic of Singapore politics has thus been largely focused on the uniqueness of its political situation. As Yeo (2010) writes, Singapore’s political situation has challenged existing literature on the impact of economic development and a rising middle class on the democratisation of society. Despite the rapid economic growth and a large and wealthy middle class, the PAP has consistently captured a supermajority in elections, maintaining its semi-democratic hold over the country. Scholars of electoral politics have attempted to explain this phenomenon by studying the electoral behaviour of the Singaporean voter, with Oliver and Ostwald (2018) and Tan (2012) having written about how the focus on valence politics and pragmatic ideology has contributed to the PAP’s dominance. Furthermore, scholars have also been keen to study the political economy of Singapore’s economic miracle. The ability of the PAP to have overseen the dramatic rise of Singapore as an economic power has led scholars like Siddiqui (2010) and Rodan (2016) to publish material discussing the role of a strong, authoritative government in providing the necessary conditions for rapid economic growth. Additionally, a new area of interest that has arisen in the past decade has been a focus on the social fabric of Singapore society and the political impact of the changes, mainly immigration and new cultural cleavages, in that social dimension. Some works worth reading on this topic include Chong (2020) and Liu (2014).

C. Future research The better-than-expected performance of the Worker’s Party (WP) in the 2020 election creates a new area of research for scholars looking to study electoral behaviour in Singapore. The WP’s victory in two GRCs and one SMC seems to suggest that existing theory about the role of pragmatism and valence issues

singapore  277 in securing the dominance of the PAP may be challenged by a new group of voters who value diversity of voices in parliament and are also driven by beliefs in different issues. Such development of political voice and opposition in Singapore may give rise to different electoral outcomes, which in turn signals a development of a vastly different political landscape for the country, and would be an interesting topic to research. Given the lack of experience the electorate has had with having a sizeable opposition in parliament, this poses the question of whether this new experience of having a viable opposition in parliament will be the one which the population embraces or whether they will backslide towards the comfort of the PAP-single party majority system. Furthermore, it would be equally interesting to study the impact of US–China superpower rivalry in the region on Singapore’s foreign policy. Traditionally, Singapore has been keen to maintain a good balance in its relationships with major powers, a foreign policy stance with its root in the Cold War, but with China’s rising assertiveness in the region, it remains to be seen if Singapore can maintain its policy of hedging without having negative repercussions from one or both major powers. It also remains to be seen, and could be an additional area of research, whether Singapore’s foreign policy choices have any impact on its domestic politics, as any credible opposition would have to be able to provide a sound policy in dealing with the two major powers becoming more involved in the region. Orson Tan

November 22 from https://freedomhouse​ .org​/country​/singapore Han, K. (2018). The many ways to be Chinese Singaporean. The Interpreter. https://www​ .lowyinstitute​ .org ​ / the ​ -interpreter​ / many​ -ways​-to​-be​-chinese​-singaporean Heritage Foundation. (2022). Singapore Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption. Heritage Foundation. Retrieved November 21 from https://www​.heritage​.org​/index​/ country​/singapore Hussain, Z. (2015, March 24). How Lee Kuan Yew engineered Singapore’s economic miracle. BBC. https://www​.bbc​.com​/news​ /business​-32028693 Lee, H. L. (2019). National Day Rally 2019. https://www​ . pmo​ . gov​ . sg​ / Newsroom ​ / National​-Day​-Rally​-2019 Lim, P. L. (2016a). Nominated Member of Parliament Scheme. National Library Board. Retrieved November 22 from https://eresources​ . nlb​ .gov​. sg ​ / infopedia ​ / articles​/SIP​_1016​_2010​-12​-24​.html Lim, P. L. (2016b). Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) Scheme. National Library Board. Retrieved November 22 from https://eresources​ .nlb​ .gov​.sg​/infopedia​/articles​/SIP​_1743​_ 2010​ -12​-24​.html Liu, H. (2014). Beyond co-ethnicity: The politics of differentiating and integrating new immigrants in Singapore. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 37(7), 1225–1238. National Library Board. (2013). Group Representation Constituencies. National Library Board. Retrieved November 22 from https://eresources​.nlb​.gov​.sg​/ References infopedia​/articles​/SIP​_ 2013​-10​-25​_182746​ Chong, T. (2020). Navigating Differences: .html Integration in Singapore. ISEAS - Yusof Oliver, S., & Ostwald, K. (2018). Explaining Ishak Institute. http://ebookcentral​ elections in Singapore: Dominant party .proquest​.com ​/ lib​/canterbury​/detail​.action​ resilience and valence politics. Journal of ?docID​= 6259465 East Asian Studies, 18(2), 129–156. Data​.gov​.sg​. (2021). Total Land Area Rodan, G. (2016). The Political Economy of of Singapore. Data​.gov​.​sg. Retrieved Singapore’s Industrialization: National November 20 from https://data​.gov​.sg​/ State and International Capital. Springer. dataset​/total​-land​-area​-of​-singapore Siddiqui, K. (2010). The political economy Elections Department Singapore. (2020). of development in Singapore. Research in Electoral Divisions. Elections Department Applied Economics, 2(2), E4. Singapore. Retrieved November 22 from SingStat. (2022a). Population Trends, 2022. https://www​ . eld​ .gov​ . sg​ /elections​ _ map​ Singapore: Ministry of Trade & Industry. _electoral​.html SingStat. (2022b). Singapore Residents by Age Freedom House. (2022). Singapore: Country Group, Ethnic Group and Sex, End June. Profile. Freedom House. Retrieved Ministry of Trade & Industry. Retrieved orson tan

278  encyclopedia of asian politics November 20 from https://tablebuilder​ November 20, 2022 from https://www​ .singstat​.gov​.sg​/table​/ TS​/ M810011 .worlddata​.info​/asia​/singapore​/index​.php Straits Times. (2019, September 12). Former Yeo, L. H. (2010). Democracy and governance Indonesian President Habibie, who in Singapore: The sustainability of described Singapore as a ‘little red dot’, Singapore’s political system. In B. Bridges dies aged 83. The Straits Times. https:// & L. S. Ho (Eds.), Public Governance in www​.straitstimes​.com​/asia​/se​-asia​/former​ Asia and the Limits of Electoral Democracy (pp. 172–190). Edward Elgar Publishing. -indonesia​-president​-habibie​-dies Tan, K. P. (2012). The ideology of pragmatism: Neo-liberal globalisation and political Key resources authoritarianism in Singapore. Journal of Barr, M. D. (2018). Singapore: A Modern Contemporary Asia, 42(1), 67–92. History. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. World Bank. (2021). World Development Singh, B. (2022). Understanding Singapore Indicators. World Bank. Retrieved November 21 from https://databank​ Politics (2nd ed.). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. .worldbank​.org​/indicator​/ NY​.GNP​.PCAP​ Yeo, L. H. (2010). Democracy and governance .CD​/1ff4a498​/ Popular​-Indicators in Singapore: The sustainability of WorldData​.info​. Comparison of the Global Singapore’s political system. In B. Bridges Population Density. WorldData​.info​. & L. S. Ho (Eds.), Public Governance Retrieved November 20, 2022 from https:// in Asia and the Limits of Electoral www​.worlddata​.info​/population​-density​.php Democracy, 172–90. UK: Edward Elgar WorldData​.info​. Singapore: Country Data Publishing. and Statistics. WorldData​.info​. Retrieved

orson tan

50. Sri Lanka A. The concept Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) is a small tear drop-shaped island located off the southern coast of India. Sri Lanka has a total population of around 20 million, of which roughly 74% are Sinhalese, 18% are Tamils, 7% are Moors, and the rest are Burghers, Malays, and Veddhas.1 The Sinhalese are mostly Buddhists and are concentrated in the southern, western, and central parts of the island. The roots of their civilization are largely Indian although over the years they have been influenced by other cultures including the Portuguese, the English, and to a lesser extent, the Dutch, the Burmese, and the Thais. Sri Lanka’s Tamil population is largely Hindu and mostly inhabits the drier northern and eastern parts of the country. Sri Lanka also has a separate “Indian Tamil” community; these are descendants of indentured plantation workers that had been brought to the island by British tea planters during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The relationship between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils has always been a key question affecting Sri Lankan politics. During British colonial rule, this relationship was well-managed by the state. The minority Tamils benefitted from their embrace of English education, which was introduced in Sri Lanka by the British government, and thus became prosperous and over-represented relative to their numerical size in the bureaucracy and professional services. Things took a turn for the worst after independence in 1948. Despite strong Tamil protest, the Soulbury Commission, which was set up in 1944 to transfer political power, agreed to hand over the controls of the state to the majority Sinhalese. Acting promptly, the post-independent Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government, pandering to SinhaleseBuddhist nationalism, passed a series of laws that blatantly discriminated in favor of the majority Sinhalese at the expense of the minority Tamils (Senewiranthe, 1986). The most infamous of these new laws were the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948, the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949, and the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act of 1949. These laws laid down strict requirements and documentation for citizenship, which very few Indian Tamils

could meet, and as a result, around 975,000 Indian Tamils became stateless. Thereafter, the Sri Lankan government passed the Official Language Act of 1956, which made Sinhalese the sole official language of Sri Lanka. This adversely affected the Tamils, particularly in the fields of education, government services, and the professions. Faced with mounting Tamil anger and protests, the Sri Lankan government passed the Tamil Language Act of 1958 to provide for the “reasonable use” of the Tamil language in education, administration, and public service examinations in the northern and eastern provinces. But the effect of this law was minimal since the government introduced the policy of “standardization” under which for admission purposes in higher educational institutions the marks obtained by Tamil students were weighted downward against marks obtained by Sinhalese students. The Sri Lankan government also began to encourage the settlement of Sinhalese peasants in historically Tamil-dominated areas of the eastern and northern provinces. At the societal level, the persecution of minorities, particularly Tamils, started often with tacit governmental encouragement. The drift towards Tamil insurgency Faced with grim prospects and a discriminatory majoritarian government, Sri Lankan Tamils demanded autonomy and resorted to agitation, strikes, and civil disobedience to “protect their community from domination and possible assimilation by the large Sinhalese majority” (Kearney, 1985). The Sri Lankan government was, however, in no mood to relent. In 1972, Sri Lanka adopted a new Constitution that did not contain any provisions for power sharing with the Tamils, reiterated the pre-eminent status of Sinhalese as the sole official language, and bestowed a special status on Buddhism. In the mid-1970s, perhaps encouraged by the successful secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, newly formed Tamil insurgent groups began to demand outright secession and separate statehood (Senewiranthe, 1987; Kearney, 1985). The most potent of the Tamil insurgent groups was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or Tamil Tigers led by Velupillai Prabhakaran. The LTTE chose the tiger as its symbol, reflecting “not only the ferocity of that animal but a deliberate contrast with the lion (singha), which traditionally has been a symbol of the Sinhalese

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280  encyclopedia of asian politics people and is depicted in the Sri Lankan flag” (Library of Congress, Department of the Army, 1990). Other Tamil insurgent groups that were formed included the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA), and the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS). In the initial years of the Tamil insurgency, attacks were mostly in the form of political assassinations and armed robberies. But after the anti-Tamil riots that swept Colombo and other towns in July 1983 (see Manor, 1983), the LTTE and the other Tamil groups intensified their attacks on the government forces, which brought harsh retaliation against the Tamil population, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula (Sivathamby, 1987). International involvement and the onset of dirty war India’s involvement in the ethnic insurgency in Sri Lanka started in the early 1980s, mainly to placate Tamil sentiments at home and to obtain from the Sri Lankan government certain security-related concessions. Tamils residing in the state of Tamil Nadu were naturally concerned by the plight of their ethnic kin in Sri Lanka during the anti-Tamil riots and urged the Indian government to get involved. New Delhi was also concerned by reports that to tackle the insurgency the Sri Lankan government had reached out to Pakistan, China, South Africa, Israel, Singapore, and Malaysia for weapons and military training (Kadian, 1990; Ostrovsky & Hoy, 1990; Sereviratne, 1986). India’s covert agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), imparted military training and supplied weapons to the LTTE and other Sri Lankan Tamil insurgent groups. The training camps were established in the Ramanathapuram district in southern Tamil Nadu (Kadian, 1990). Political parties in Tamil Nadu further provided the Tamil insurgent groups with financial support and media exposure. In early 1987, intense fighting broke out in Sri Lanka after the government authorized the Sri Lankan military to launch a major operation in the Jaffna peninsula, an LTTE stronghold. The bombing of Jaffna was started in earnest and a food and fuel embargo was imposed in the region, leading rajat ganguly

to severe hardship among the civilian population of the peninsula. Faced with intense criticism from the Tamil Nadu government, the Indian government announced its intention to send relief supplies to the people of the beleaguered and embattled Jaffna peninsula. When the Indian flotilla was intercepted and turned back by the Sri Lankan navy, 25 tons of food and relief supplies were paradropped in Jaffna by Indian Air Force jets. A rattled Sri Lankan government tried desperately to placate the Indian government, leading to intense diplomatic negotiations and the signing of the Indo–Sri Lankan Accord on July 29, 1987. The key provisions of the Indo–Sri Lankan Accord were as follows. First, the Accord recognized the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, thereby ruling out the Tamils’ demand for a separate state (Ralph & Samarsinghe, 1988). Second, the Accord also recognized Sri Lanka as a “multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society” comprised of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors), Malays, and Burghers. Third, while the Accord recognized that the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka constituted “areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples,” it also recognized the territorial rights of other groups who have at all times lived in this territory. Fourth, the Accord provided for the temporary merger of the northern and eastern provinces as a single administrative unit after the holding of elections to the provincial councils by December 1987; the permanency of this merger was to be determined by a referendum to be held no later than December 1988. Fifth, the Accord provided for the cessation of hostilities, the surrender of arms by the Tamil militant groups, and the return of the Sri Lankan Army to the barracks. It also provided for a general amnesty to all political detainees and the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other emergency laws. Finally, India agreed to provide military assistance as and when requested by Colombo to implement the provisions of the Accord (Rupesinghe, 1988). Orders were given on July 30, 1987, for an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to move into Sri Lanka to help implement the Accord. Initially, the IPKF comprised around 8,000 troops. Because no fighting was anticipated, the maxim of concentration of force was ignored and heavy weaponry was left behind in India. Within a few days of its induction,

sri lanka  281 however, the IPKF got bogged down and suffered setbacks. One key setback was the LTTE’s refusal to surrender arms. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi therefore had no option but to order the IPKF to go after the LTTE. For the next two years, the IPKF was engaged in a fierce war with the LTTE that it was unprepared for. Eventually, a ceasefire between the IPKF and the LTTE was arranged and the IPKF finally left Sri Lanka in March 1990 (Matthews, 1989). The IPKF’s withdrawal set the stage for the onset of a “dirty war” in Sri Lanka that lasted a decade. The main catalyst of the dirty war was the Sri Lankan government’s decision to annul the merger of the northern and eastern provinces (a key provision of the Indo–Sri Lankan Accord), which led to renewed fighting in the north. Violence also broke out between the Tamils and Muslims in the eastern province (de Silva, 1990). In the south, violence broke out in the form of the ultra-Marxist JVP insurrection. The Sri Lankan government responded by organizing pro-government death squads that killed thousands of youths, students, and supporters of the JVP, including its leader Rohana Wijeweera and his key associates. On the Sri Lankan government side, President Premadasa was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber in 1993. Premadasa’s successor, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, tried to work out a ceasefire with the LTTE but failed. This set the stage for a major military offensive (Operation Riviresa) in the north against the LTTE in 1995. In 1997, another military offensive (Operation Jayasikuru) was launched to establish a secure land corridor between Jaffna and the rest of Sri Lanka, clear the northern jungles of the Wanni district, and gain full control of the upper sectors of the eastern province. The LTTE fought back to inflict heavy casualties on the armed forces (Chalk, 2003). It also launched a series of suicide attacks on Sinhalese-Buddhist shrines, such as the bomb attack on a Buddhist temple in Kandy in January 1998. Furthermore, the LTTE carried out the assassinations of pro-government Tamil leaders such as Neelan Thiruchelvam (a Member of Parliament and leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front) in July 1999 and N. Manickathasan (Vice President of the Peoples’ Liberation Organization of Tamil

Eelam) in September 1999 (The Hindu, 1999; Balachandran, 1999). Futile peace efforts Early in the new millennium, Norway took the initiative to facilitate peace negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The key player in this facilitation process was Erik Solheim, special adviser to Norway’s foreign minister and previously the leader of the Norwegian Socialist Left Party. After a lot of persuasion by Solheim, a ceasefire was worked out and a round of discussions was held in Thailand in September 2002. At the end of the three-day discussions, the chief LTTE negotiator and political strategist, Anton Balasingham, clarified that the Tigers were ready to accept autonomy and self-governance in northeastern Sri Lanka, the details of which could be worked out if both parties first agreed to a federal political system for the whole country. The head of the government delegation, Gamini Lakshman Peiris, also stressed that the LTTE’s political aspirations could be fulfilled “within one country” (Sambandan, 2020a). Another round of discussions was held in Oslo, Norway, in December 2002. At this meeting, both sides agreed to develop a federal political system that would give the Tamils “internal self-determination” in the Tamil-dominated areas of the northeast. Norway’s Special Envoy termed this agreement as a “major step” but warned that a “long and bumpy” road was ahead before a final solution could be agreed upon (Sambandan, 2002b). G. L. Peiris, head of the Sri Lankan government delegation, also cautioned that the Oslo decision to explore a federal model was just the outer perimeter of a complex conflict resolution process and that more contentious issues such as “division of power” and “human rights” would be taken up for discussion later (Sambandan, 2002c). By early 2003, the peace process came under strain due to several developments. First, both sides continued to build up their military strength and war preparedness, which indicated that they did not place much faith in negotiations. Secondly, President Kumaratunga developed deep apprehensions regarding the nature of the concessions being made to the LTTE by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and his government and felt that the Tigers were taking advantage of the ceasefire and peace talks to set up a de facto rajat ganguly

282  encyclopedia of asian politics independent Tamil state in the northeastern parts of Sri Lanka (Baruah, 2003). Her concerns were shared by her Sri Lanka Freedom Party colleagues, allies such as the JVP, and the Sinhalese-Buddhist clergy. Finally, Sri Lanka’s key international donors expressed reservations about the LTTE’s behavior and stressed that any final solution must uphold principles of democracy, pluralism, and human rights (Times of India, 2003). In April 2003, LTTE leader Prabhakaran abruptly withdrew from the peace talks (Sambandan, 2003). In March 2004, reports of a split between the LTTE’s main northern unit, led by Prabhakaran and based in Kilinochchi, and its eastern unit, led by Muralitharan alias Colonel Karuna and based in the eastern Batticaloa-Amparai district, began to circulate. It was rumored that Colonel Karuna was upset by Prabhakaran’s decision to withdraw from the peace talks. Prabhakaran, however, was in no mood to compromise. He expelled Colonel Karuna from the organization and ordered his troops to crush the budding revolt by force. In December 2004, Sri Lanka suffered a major tragedy when a giant tsunami, which also devastated northern Indonesia, southern Thailand, and parts of southeastern India, hit the northern and eastern parts of the island causing massive destruction and loss of lives. As international humanitarian aid poured in, a tussle developed between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE over aid allocation and distribution. The LTTE accused the government of meting out step-motherly treatment to the Tamil-speaking areas of the northeast; the Sri Lankan government, however, refused to form a Joint LTTE-Government Mechanism (as suggested by the LTTE and facilitator Norway) for re-construction work as long as LTTE paramilitaries continued to operate in the north-east (Balachandran, 2005a). The bad blood that developed between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government over the posttsunami aid distribution and reconstruction work eventually took its toll on the Norwayfacilitated peace process. The first sign of major trouble came in August 2005 when the Sri Lankan foreign minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, was assassinated by an unidentified sniper (Indian Express, 2005). Although the LTTE denied any role in the Kadirgamar assassination, Sinhalese-Buddhist opinion put enormous pressure on the government to formally rajat ganguly

terminate the peace process. In this tense climate, Sri Lanka held a fresh presidential election, which was won by the hard-line Mahinda Rajapakse. In his election manifesto, Rajapakse made it clear that he supported a unitary rather than a federal political system in Sri Lanka (Balachandran, 2005b). Rajapakse had also been a strong critic of the Norway-facilitated peace process and advocated a “military solution” to Sri Lanka’s decades-old ethnic conflict (BBC News, 2005). The stage was thus set for a final military showdown.

B. The landscape LTTE’s defeat and the end of the Tamil insurgency By December 2005, the peace process was dead, and Sri Lanka was back to civil war. The approach of the Sri Lankan government during this final phase of the war was markedly different from previous confrontations with the LTTE. For one, the Rajapakse government gave the Sri Lankan military almost unlimited powers to carry out military operations against the Tigers irrespective of collateral damage to Tamil civilians. The government also allowed the military to utilize fighter aircraft acquired from China to bomb LTTE positions from the sky. The government further authorized the military to utilize the services of former-LTTE militants such as Colonel Karuna in the fight against the Tigers; many of these former-LTTE militants provided invaluable intelligence on the Tigers’ secret locations and military preparedness to the Sri Lankan army (Ganguly, 2018; Wax, 2009). The war eventually ended in May 2009 after Sri Lankan forces captured the Jaffna Peninsula and trapped the LTTE into a small territorial enclave. Eventually, the top leaders of the LTTE, including supremo Prabhakaran, were caught and killed, and many LTTE cadres and Tamil civilians were captured and sent to detention centers. One of the most brutal ethnic civil wars thus came to an end. Post-civil war scenario In the post-civil war period, several issues have emerged in Sri Lanka that have tested the political, economic, and social stability on the island. The most important issue that emerged to create a major controversy in the immediate post-civil war years was the charge

sri lanka  283 of war crimes purportedly committed by the Sri Lankan military forces against Tamil civilians who were being used as a “human shield” by the Tamil Tigers toward the final days of the war. A Channel 4 documentary on the civil war accused the Sri Lankan military of deliberately firing upon Tamil civilians and putting thousands of innocent lives at risk; the documentary also accused the forces of wilfully murdering LTTE cadres who had surrendered or wanted to surrender as the soldiers closed in on the LTTE hideouts (Channel 4, 2011). A second major issue was regarding the treatment of Tamil civilians who were held in detention camps. The Sri Lankan government argued that many of these civilians were former members or cadres of the LTTE and hence it was important to screen the population to identify and arrest these former LTTE fighters. Donors, aid agencies, NGOs, and foreign governments, however, accused the government of violating the human rights of these detainees and not showing any serious intention to engage with the Tamil community to address their grievances and move the Tamil–Sinhalese conflict towards a permanent and meaningful resolution. Foreign observers also accused the Rajapakse government of blatantly pandering to SinhaleseBuddhist nationalists and hardliners and subjugating the Tamils to the status of second-class citizens (Times Now, 2021). Sri Lanka also had to deal with growing Buddhist–Muslim tensions. As it happened in many states, Sri Lanka’s small Muslim or Moor community witnessed growing religious radicalization, particularly amongst Muslim youths. When the Caliphate war in Syria-Iraq broke out in 2014, many of these radicalized Muslim youths from Sri Lanka went to join the war on the side of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The problem of Islamist radicalization took a sinister turn during the Easter celebrations in 2019 when a previously obscure radical organization carried out a synchronized suicide bombing attack on several targets including a luxury hotel and a church, leading to the deaths of over 300 people. The government of Gotabaya Rajapakse adopted draconian measures to deal with Islamist radicalization, which further escalated tensions between Sri Lankan Muslims and Sinhalese-Buddhist hard-liners (The New York Times, 2020).

Finally, Sri Lanka was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic. The global turmoil that the pandemic created and the lockdowns that it necessitated had a devastating toll on the Sri Lankan economy, particularly the tourism sector which is the lifeblood of the economy. Sri Lanka’s economic woes were further exacerbated by the Rajapakse government’s ill-advised policy of borrowing heavily from China, particularly for infrastructural projects that turned out to be unprofitable. Once caught in China’s “debt trap,” the government had little room to maneuver. Consequently, Sri Lanka suffered a devastating economic crisis in 2022 when food, fuel, medicines, and other essentials became scarce. The mounting public anger led to street protests and attacks against the government. Eventually, President Gotabaya Rajapakse was forced to resign and leave the country (The Times of India, 2022).

C. Future research Sri Lanka faces serious political and economic challenges in the future. The current economic crisis continues to wreak havoc, rendering the state unable to fulfill its most basic functions. Several areas of future research have emerged which will help to guide the advancement of academic study on Sri Lanka. How will the current economic crisis affect Sri Lanka’s political economy in the future? Will there be a reconfiguration of interest groups due to a reconfiguration of the economy? How will institutions respond and recover from this crisis? How is the country’s party system going to be affected by the departure of the Rajapakse dynasty? How does Sri Lanka handle its relations with China, given the economic intricacies of this relationship? How do India and Sri Lanka interact going further and how will this affect the regional order in South Asia more broadly? Rajat Ganguly

Note 1.

The Moors are descendants of the ancient Arab traders that used to visit Sri Lanka before the advent of the Europeans. They practice Islam, speak mostly Tamil, and are concentrated in the major trading centers like Colombo and in the east of the island. The Moors living in the trading centers are usually wealthy and literate while those living in the east are economically backward with a low literacy level. The Burghers are of mixed European and Sri Lankan descent. They are mostly Christians and speak English. They are mainly concentrated in Colombo and are economically

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284  encyclopedia of asian politics prosperous. The Malays are descended from the Malay traders and guards brought to the island during the colonial periods. Finally, the Veddhas are the descendants of the aboriginal tribes of ancient Sri Lanka, whose numbers have been greatly reduced over the years as many of them have been absorbed in the Sinhalese race. The remaining Veddhas continue to rely on hunting for their food and live under extreme primitive conditions in the forests of eastern Sri Lanka. See Department of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka (1998).

References BBC News. (2005, November 21). Hawk Named as Sri Lanka Premier. Balachanddran, P.K. (1999, September 03). Suicide Bomber Kills Pro-Government Tamil Leader. The Hindustan Times. Balachandran, P.K. (2005a, April 18). Lankan Government, LTTE Take their Fight to Global Arena. Hindustan Times. Balachandran, P.K. (2005b, October 18). Rajapakse for Unitary Constitution. Hindustan Times. Baruah, A. (2003, April 12). LTTE Has Set Up De-facto State. The Hindu. Chalk, P. (2003). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Insurgency in Sri Lanka. In R. Ganguly and I. Macduff (Eds.), Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions (pp. 128–165). Sage Publications. Channel 4 (2011). Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields (Documentary).   https://www​. channel4​ .com​/programmes​/sri​-lankas​-killing​-fields. de Silva, M. (1990). Communal Bloodbath. Far Eastern Economic Review, 30. Department of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka. (1998). Statistical Pocketbook of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka – 1998. Ganguly, S. (2018). Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War. Daedalus, 147(1), 78–89. Indian Express. (2005, August 13). Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Shot Dead, Rebels Blamed. Kadian, R. (1990). India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco: Peace Keepers at War. Vision Books. Kearney, R.N. (1985). Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka. Asian Survey, 25(9), 898–917. Library of Congress, Department of the Army. (1990). Sri Lanka: A Country Study. Area Handbook Series. Government Printing Office. Manor, J. (1983). Sri Lanka: Explaining the Disaster. The World Today, 39(11), 450–459. rajat ganguly

Matthews, B. (1989). Sri Lanka in 1988: Seeds of the Accord. Asian Survey, 29(2), 229–235. Ostrovsky, V., and Hoy, C. (1990). By Way of Deception. St. Martin’s Press Ralph, R.P., and Samarasinghe, S.D.A. (1988). Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: The IndoLanka Peace Accord. Asian Survey, 28(6), 676–690. Rupesinghe, K. (1988). Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF). Journal of Peace Research, 25(4), 337–350. Sambandan, V.S. (2002a, September 19). Separation only if Autonomy is Denied: LTTE. The Hindu. Sambandan, V.S. (2002b, December 06). Colombo, LTTE Agree on Federal Structure. The Hindu. Sambandan, V.S. (2002C, December 10). Peace Negotiators Face Uphill Task. The Hindu. Sambandan, V.S. (2003, May 05). Efforts to Defuse Stalemate in Sri Lanka. The Hindu. Senewiratne, B. (1987). The Problem of Sri Lanka. In K. Bahabur (Ed.), South Asia in Transition: Conflicts and Tensions. Patriot Publishers. Seneviratne, P. (1986). The Mossad Factor in Government Repression. In K. Bahadur (Ed.), South Asia in Transition (pp. 288– 294). Patriot Publishers. Sivathamby, K. (1987). The Sri Lankan Tamil Question: Socio-Economic and Ideological Issues. Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 18(4), 628–634. The Hindu. (1999, July 30). TULF Leader Assassinated. The New York Times. (2020, July 2). Two Wealthy Sri Lankan Brothers became Suicide Bombers. But Why? https://www​ .nytimes​ .com ​ / 2020 ​ / 07​ / 02 ​ / magazine ​ /sri​ -lanka​ - brothers​ - bombing​ . html​ ? action​ =click. The Times of India. (2003, April 10). Lanka, Tamil Rebels Must Show Results at Peace Talks. The Times of India. (2022, July 13). Sri Lankan President Flees the Country Amid Economic Crisis. https://timesofindia​ .indiatimes​ . com ​ / world​ / south​ - asia ​ / sri​ -lankan​-president​-flees​-the​- country​-amid​ -economic​- crisis​/articleshow​/ 92837724​ .cms

sri lanka  285 Times Now. (2021, March 21). UNHRC Adopts Resolution against Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Record, India Abstains. h t t p s : // w w w ​ . t i m e s n o w n e w s ​ . c o m ​ / i nt e r n a t io n a l ​/a r t icle ​/ u n h r c ​- a d o p t s​ -resolution ​ - against​ - sri ​ - lanka ​ - s ​ - human​ -rights ​ - record ​ - india ​ - abstains ​ - read ​ -full​ -statement ​/736188 Wax, E. (2009, February 11). ‘Without Me, They Couldn’t Win the War’ – Former Tamil Tiger Commander Says He Helped Weaken Rebellion. The Washington Post.

Key resources Chalk, P. (2001). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Insurgency in Sri Lanka. In R. Ganguly and I. Macduff (Eds.), Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions (pp. 128–165). Sage Publications. Ganguly, S. (2018). Ending the Sri Lankan civil war. Daedalus, 147(1), 78–89. Stone, J. G. (2014). Shifting Tides in South Asia: Sri Lanka’s Postwar Descent. Journal of Democracy, 25(2), 146–157.

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51. Taiwan A. The concept Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), is an island situated off the southeast coast of China, separated from the mainland by the Taiwan Strait. Prior to 1986, Taiwan was governed as a one-party authoritarian state by the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party), which had dominated the island’s politics since 1949. Due to Taiwan’s ongoing civil war with mainland China, the National Assembly enacted a constitutional amendment that served as the basis for martial law, which was in effect from 1949 until its repeal in 1987. During martial law, the KMT maintained its authoritarian rule over Taiwan, allowing only approved parties to exist under its guidance. Opposition to the KMT’s rule and regime was not legally allowed to exist as organized political parties during this period, although an informal loose coalition of regime opponents did exist (Chao & Myers, 1998; Rigger, 1999). The authoritarian rule of Taiwan’s KMT had a significant impact on the development of the country’s party system. After losing the Chinese civil war, the KMT established a government-in-exile in Taiwan and brought their structure, people, and party to the island. This resulted in a divide between mainlanders, who were part of the exiled group and held positions in government, military, and political parties, and islanders, who were largely excluded from national politics. This imposition of the KMT system created an “us versus them” environment, where mainlanders became the core of Taiwanese society while islanders remained marginalized on the periphery (Yu, 2005; Tan, 2021; Chao & Myers, 1998; Hsieh, 1999). The KMT faced challenges integrating Taiwan into the Republic of China after World War II. Taiwan had been ceded to Japan in 1895 and was under Japanese colonial rule until 1945, during which Japan developed its agriculture, infrastructure, and education system. After Japan’s defeat in World War II, Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China. However, with the KMT’s defeat in the Chinese civil war, Taiwan became a separate entity again as the KMT established an exile government on the island (Chao & Myers, 1998).

Islanders in Taiwan have complex and ambiguous political and national identities due to their history of experiencing Japanese colonial rule followed by the authoritarian control of the KMT. While the KMT regime and mainlanders tend to identify with panChinese identity, islanders often identify primarily with Taiwan. This has resulted in a national identity divide, with some supporting unification with China while others advocate for Taiwan’s independence. This national identity cleavage has further reinforced the mainlander–islander divide, which originated in 1949. These divisions continue to play prominent roles in Taiwan’s politics to this day (Rigger, 1999; Wang & Chang, 2005). The emergence of the DPP and its competition with the KMT has solidified the two reinforcing cleavages – mainlander versus islander and unification versus independence – in Taiwan. In present-day Taiwan, these cleavages continue to shape the alignment of political parties. However, in recent years, the mainlander–islander divide has become less pronounced as the mainlander generation passes on and their offspring are born in Taiwan (Wang & Chang, 2005). Instead, the unification versus independence cleavage has taken on a more prominent role in contemporary Taiwanese politics. Political parties that advocate for unification with China and have a pan-Chinese identity are grouped in what is known as the pan-Blue coalition, led by the KMT. On the other hand, parties that have a stronger Taiwanese identity and support Taiwanese independence are grouped in the pan-Green coalition led by the DPP. The terms “pan-Blue” and “pan-Green” are derived from the respective colors of the KMT and DPP party banners. As mentioned, Taiwan’s party system is characterized by the unification–independence and mainlander–islander cleavages, with the left–right cleavage playing a less prominent role in Taiwanese politics. Unlike the social democracies of Western Europe, progressivism in Taiwan does not typically extend to robust labor rights, immigrant rights, and extensive social welfare systems. The unification–independence cleavage remains the most pressing existential issue for Taiwan, and political parties often emphasize their stance on this issue in their positioning (Yu, 2005; Tan, 2021). Under the authoritarian rule of the KMT, Taiwan experienced remarkable economic

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taiwan  287 development during this period, which came to be known as the “Taiwan Miracle.” The KMT’s pro-growth policies, including exportoriented industrialization, investment in education and infrastructure, and emphasis on stability and pragmatic economic planning, played a crucial role in transforming Taiwan into a globally competitive economy which today is ranked amongst the top 20 trading nations in the world. In 1987, under the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo, the KMT initiated liberalization by lifting martial law and allowing for the legal formation of opposition political parties. Subsequently, under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan further progressed on the path to democratic transition. In 1996, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election, and in 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won the presidency, marking the first peaceful transfer of power. In 2008, the KMT returned to power with Ma Ying-jeou’s victory, but in 2016, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP became the first female president of Taiwan and was re-elected in 2020. While executive power has peacefully turned over three times since 1996, it is only since 2016 that the DPP won control of the legislative majority. Taiwan is considered one of the most vibrant democracies in Asia. In 2023, Taiwan ranked 17th in the world and second in Asia in the Freedom House ranking. As for electoral integrity, Taiwan ranks ninth in the globe and first in Asia, according to the Electoral Integrity Project’s 2019–2021 global report (Garnett, James, & MacGregor, 2022).

B. The landscape Studies of Taiwan’s politics reflect the major developments in Taiwan’s contemporary history. The rapid economic development that created the so-called “Taiwan miracle” saw a cottage industry of political economy research. In the late 1980s, with political democratization and eventual democratization, there were huge amounts of studies on democratization and electoral studies. And as Taiwan’s international status has been challenging, especially since Taiwan’s removal from the United Nations in 1971, Taiwan’s international relations studies have been focused on cross-Strait relations, US–China– Taiwan triangular relations, as well as studies on regional economic integration. Let us

turn to briefly discuss these three groups of research. In the field of political economy, scholars have conducted research on various aspects of Taiwan’s rapid economic development, including the government’s economic policies, the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the study of Taiwan’s developmental state. For example, researchers have examined Taiwan’s industrial policies and strategies (Chan & Clark, 1992; Clark and Tan, 2012; Haggard, 1990; Fields, 1995; Wu, 2007), such as the development of high-tech industries (Chu, 1989; Cheng, 2001), the promotion of renewable energy (Kim, 2023), and the pursuit of regional economic integration (Magcamit & Tan, 2015). In the field of Taiwan’s democratic development and electoral studies, scholars have conducted extensive research on the process of democratization in Taiwan, examining the factors that contributed to the transition from authoritarian rule to a democratic system. Researchers have explored various aspects of Taiwan’s democratic development, including the role of civil society and social movements, political parties, legislative development, and constitutional structures (Batto, 2005; Batto & Beaulieu, 2020; Clark and Tan, 2012; Fell, 2018; Liao & Chien, 2005; Tien & Chu, 1996; Wu, 2000; Yang, 2018; Yu, 2005). Electoral studies in Taiwan also form a key area of research, especially with the introduction of large survey research such as the Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) and Asia Barometer (AB). With the benefit of these, survey data scholars have examined topics such as voting behavior (Yu, 2005), party competition (Yu, 2005; Fell, 2018; Tan, 2021), and identity politics (Cheng, 2001; Wang & Cheng, 2005). Researchers analyze the impact of electoral systems, including Taiwan’s mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system, on party politics, representation, and governance (Batto et al., 2016). The study of international relations in Taiwan evolves with the challenge that Taiwan faces regarding its international status. Scholars conduct extensive research on Taiwan’s relationships with major powers, such as China, the United States, and Japan, which have significant implications for Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, and security interests. Research on cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China is a prominent alexander c. tan and jundeh wu

288  encyclopedia of asian politics area of study (Wu, 2000, 2005a). Scholars analyze the dynamics of this complex relationship, including issues such as diplomatic recognition, economic ties, security concerns, and political interactions. They examine the impact of China’s policies towards Taiwan, such as its efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and restrict its international presence, and Taiwan’s strategies for maintaining its autonomy and security in the face of China’s pressure (Tan, Chan, & Jillson, 2001). Furthermore, researchers explore Taiwan’s engagement with other countries and regions, including its economic relations, trade policies, and participation in regional organizations and global forums. They analyze Taiwan’s efforts to expand its international presence through diplomatic channels, economic partnerships, and multilateral cooperation initiatives (Lee & Sun, 2019). Topics such as Taiwan’s participation in regional organizations like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) provide insights into Taiwan’s international relations strategies and challenges (Lu, 2022). Additionally, scholars investigate Taiwan’s security concerns, including its relations with the United States and Japan, and its efforts to navigate its strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region (Wu, 1996, 2005). They examine issues such as military cooperation, arms sales, and regional security dynamics, shedding light on Taiwan’s efforts to ensure its security and protect its interests in the face of geopolitical challenges (Kastner, 2015).

C. Future research Taiwan’s democratization since the late 1980s has developed a very robust political science research community of scholars based in Taiwan and overseas. Today, Taiwan studies have become a field of academic inquiry that is separate from China studies with research topics that cover the range of political science inquiry similar to those of the advanced industrial democracies. New research directions in the study of Taiwan politics will be influenced and stimulated by the deepening and maturation of Taiwan’s democracy, its contentious relationship with China, and its unresolved international status. In terms of democratic politics, some possible future topics of research in Taiwan’s politics can explore the changes to the developmental state, partisan polarization, alexander c. tan and jundeh wu

continuing evolution of identity politics, the dealignment and realignment of partisanship, the non-development of social democracy, as well as the politics of migration and labor rights to name a few. In terms of international relations, Taiwan’s challenging international situation will see the continuance of studies that explore the cross-Strait relationship, the US–China– Taiwan triangular relationship, and Taiwan’s efforts to connect with international governmental organizations. Recent tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the US’s strategic competition with China will also see more interest in the military and security aspects of international relations. Alexander C. Tan and Jundeh Wu

References Batto, N. F. (2005). Electoral strategy, committee membership, and rent seeking in the Taiwanese legislature, 1992– 2001. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 30(1), 43–62. Batto, N. F., & Beaulieu, E. (2020). Partisan conflict and citizens’ democratic attitudes: How partisanship shapes reactions to legislative brawls.  The Journal of Politics, 82(1), 315–328. Batto, N. F., Huang, C., Tan, T. C., & Cox, G. W. (2016). Mixed-member electoral systems in constitutional context. University of Michigan Press. Chan, S., & Clark, C. (1992).  Flexibility, foresight and Fortuna in Taiwan’s development. Routledge. Chao, L., & Myers, R. H. (1998).  The first Chinese democracy: Political life in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Johns Hopkins University Press. Cheng, T. J. (2001). Transforming Taiwan’s economic structure in the 20th century. China Quarterly, 165, 19–36. Chu, Y. (1989). State structure and economic adjustment of the East Asian newly industrializing countries.  International Organization, 43(4), 647–672. Fell, D. (2018). Government and politics in Taiwan. Routledge. Fields, K. (1995). Enterprise and the state in Korea and Taiwan. Cornell University Press. Garnett, H. A., James, T. S., & MacGregor, M. (2022). Year in elections global

taiwan  289 report: 2019–2021. The Electoral Integrity Project. Haggard, S. (1990). Pathways from the periphery. Cornell University Press. Hsieh, J. F-S. (1999). Manipulating the electoral system under SNTV: The case of the Republic of China on Taiwan. In B. Grofman, S. Lee, E. Winckler, and B. Woodall (Eds.), Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single NonTransferable Vote. University of Michigan Press. Kastner, S. L. (2015). Is the Taiwan strait still a flash point? Rethinking the prospects for armed conflict between China and Taiwan.  International Security,  40(3), 54–92. Kim, S-Y. (2023). East Asia’s green economic recovery: A path out of the coronacession. In S. Noakes & A. C. Tan (Eds.), AsiaPacific Small States: Political Economies of Resilience. Lynne Rienner Publishing. Lee, R. C., & Sun, G. (2019). Economic relationship between Taiwan and ASEAN, and the implications of the new Southbound Policy.  Defense Strategy and Assessment Journal, 9, 65–89. Liao, D. C., & Chien, H. (2005). Why no cohabitation in Taiwan? An analysis of Taiwan’s Constitution and its application. China Perspectives, 2005(58). Lu, Y. C. (2022). Taiwan in APEC: A partner indeed. East Asian Policy, 14(02), 56–74. Magcamit, M. I., & Tan, A. C. (2015). Crouching tiger, lurking dragon: Understanding Taiwan’s sovereignty and trade linkages in the twenty-first century.  International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 15(1), 81–112. Rigger, S. (1999). Politics in Taiwan: Voting for democracy. Routledge. Tan, A.C. (2021). An etiology of party system development and voter alignments in democratic Taiwan: Stability before the storm. In C. Clark, K. Ho, & A. C. Tan (Eds.),  Taiwan: Environmental, political and Social Issues. Nova Science Publishers. Tan, A. C., Chan, S., & Jillson, C. (Eds.). (2001).  Taiwan’s national security:

Dilemmas and opportunities. Ashgate Publishing Limited. Tien, H., & Chu, Y. (1996). Building democracy in Taiwan.  The China Quarterly, 148, 1141–1170. Wang, T. Y., & Chang, G. A. (2005). Ethnicity and politics in Taiwan: An analysis of mainlanders’ identity and policy preferences. Issues & Studies, 41(4), 35–66. Wu, Y. S. (1996). Exploring dual triangles: The development of Taipei-Washington-Beijing relations. Issues & Studies, 32(10), 26–52. Wu, Y. S. (2000a). Theorizing on relations across the Taiwan Strait: Nine contending approaches.  Journal of Contemporary China, 9(25), 407–428. Wu, Y. S. (2000b). The ROC’s semipresidentialism at work: Unstable compromise, not cohabitation.  Issues & Studies, 36(5), 1–40. Wu, Y. S. (2005a). Taiwan’s domestic politics and cross-strait relations.  The China Journal, 53, 35–60. Wu, Y. S. (2005b). From romantic triangle to marriage? Washington-Beijing-Taipei relations in historical comparison. Issues & Studies, 41(1), 113–159. Wu, Y. S. (2007). Taiwan’s developmental state: After the economic and political turmoil. Asian Survey, 47(6), 977–1001. Yang, W-Y. (2018). Beyond number: Women’s representation in Taiwan’s post-reform legislative elections. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 14(2), 51–72. Yu, C. (2005). The evolution of party system in Taiwan, 1995–2004. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 40(1/2), 105–129.

Key resources International Journal of Taiwan Studies; Issues and Studies; Taiwanese Political Science Review. Clark, C., & Tan, A. C. (2012). Taiwan’s political economy. Lynne Rienner Publishing. Fell, D. (2018). Government and politics in Taiwan, 2nd Edition. Routledge. Rigger, S. (1999). Politics in Taiwan: Voting for democracy. Routledge.

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52. Thailand A. The concept Understanding contemporary Thai politics can be traced back to 20 years ago when the first election under the new constitution was held in 2001. The Democrat Party lost to the new shining political party, the Thai Rak Thai (TRT). Thaksin Shinawatra, the leader of the TRT party, took power of the government and became the 23rd prime minister of Thailand. After the Thai Rak Thai Party won the 2001 election and Thaksin became a leader of the Thai government, he wanted to expand his power in parliament, so he convinced other smaller parties, including the New Aspiration Party, to merge with the Thai Rak Thai party. This put his government in a strong position and he could control a majority in the council and independent organizations, which made it impossible to counterbalance and monitor the functioning of the government. Despite being known as a “parliamentary dictatorship,” Thaksin won the support of a large number of non-urban residents through his populist policies. During the Thaksin government, many campaign policies, such as a four-year debt moratorium for farmers, the thirty-baht healthcare scheme, and Ban uea athon (low-cost housing) project were implemented as promised. Although many journalists and scholars criticized his populist policies, Thaksin and his party were admired by many voters, especially rural voters, in Thailand. Therefore, when the next election came in February 2005, Thaksin undoubtedly was on top of the Thai political landscape once again. The election results of the 2005 general election brought about an even larger landslide victory for Thaksin as his party won 377 of 500 seats in the parliament nationwide. However, due to his policeman and millionaire background and having utmost power in the parliament, Thaksin himself was considered decisive and obstinate. He showed reluctance to accept any criticism about him and his policies, both in public and in parliamentary debate. His policies thus reflected his dispositions, as the liberty of monitoring agencies and the media, including television, radio, and printed and online media, were weakened during his time (Ockey, 2007, p. 134). Moreover, the voices or opinions of

MPs, journalists, and academics, even reputably international organizations, such as the UN, were ignored. Due to his popularity, despite criticisms about his misdoings, there was a perception among some Thai people that “Corruption is okay and can be acceptable as long as a politician does or gives you something” or “Democracy equals election, no matter if it is cheated or not. It is okay if the government receives (personal) benefit. As long as the government can give something to its citizens.”

B. The landscape The allegations of corruption, the inability to deal with the insurgency in the south, the weakening of democracy and royal authority, and the divisions within the military led to the decision of the military leaders to remove Thaksin from power (Ockey, 2007, p. 138). The coup, led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, successfully seized power from the Thaksin government on 19 September 2006 and marked the end of the 1997 People’s Constitution. After Prime Minister Thaksin was overthrown by the 2006 coup d’état, Thailand was governed by the military government first led by General Sondhi Boonyaratglin, and then the junta-appointed Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanond. Even though the coup satisfied most people, in particular the antiThaksin demonstrators, as it ended the period of political unrest, the coup illustrated a setback for democracy in Thailand and brought back the country to a military regime for the first time in 15 years (Ockey, 2007, p. 133). Later, the Yingluck government from Phuea Thai Party (Party for Thailand) emerged victorious and formed a government but was unable to stay until the end of its term due to attempts to enact the Amnesty Bill. There was a gathering of people who opposed an amnesty bill initiated by the government and an earlier attempt to change the constitution to allow the election of senators. The protesters believed that these actions aimed to erase Thaksin’s (former Prime Minister in exile and brother of Yingluck) culpability and to put senators under government control. Crowds grew from hundreds to hundreds of thousands, perhaps over a million, as the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) grew stronger. Soon their demands expanded to include the removal of Yingluck’s government. On the other side, the United Front for Democracy

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thailand  291 against Dictatorship (UDD), or Red Shirts, showed their support for Yingluck’s government by gathering in Bangkok and vowed to protect the elected government. The Yingluck government was overthrown on 22 May 2014 by a military coup led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) Commander. Although this coup was not unexpected and no one had ever ruled out its possibility, it did create some surprises for a lot of people, especially disputants. Before the coup, the protesters, though they had not directly asked for a coup, had tried thoroughly to encourage the military to stop supporting Yingluck Shinawatra’s government. The military seemed, at first, to be very quiet and did not want to get directly involved. After seizing power, General Prayuth, then, established the National Peace and Order Maintaining Council (NPOMC). The name was later changed to National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) to rule the country under the military-led government. The cycle of democracy and military rule once again appeared in Thai politics. General Prayuth Chan-ocha’s government had an ideological perception that people’s opposition to the government was simply a misunderstanding or a misguided attitude. It was therefore necessary to invite those misguided citizens into the process of attitude adjustment. In addition, another urgent task of the government was to arrange for the drafting of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017). During the term of Prayuth’s government, there were social movements and protests through online platforms and in Bangkok and other provinces, especially from the young generations. This youth political rally, in 2020, requested the government three stances and demands: the resignation of Prime Minister Prayuth, the amendment of the 2017 Constitution, and a reform of the monarchy. In addition to these aforementioned claims, there was also dissatisfaction among the younger generation over the court’s decision to dissolve the New Future Party, a political party into which young people pour a lot of votes. Many Thai youths perceive the New Future Party as their new hope for a better future of Thai democracy and as a guardian of freedom. Unlike Thai youths, some people in the older generation believe young Thai people misinterpret the meaning of freedom,

rights, and democracy. The different values of democracy highlight the conflicts between generations in Thai society nowadays. The political battlefield has moved to the online community and social media, and the youthled protests have been heating up Thai politics. In the later stages, the coronavirus pandemic, also known as COVID-19, was a major challenge and caused the government to announce a state of emergency decree. In essence, five or more people are prohibited from gathering. The issuance of this decree has had the indirect effect of declining the assembly of young people who were calling for democracy. They have high expectations for the development of democracy in Thai society. Overall, it is a good indication of political participation among Thais who seek to develop democracy. However, there is controversy over the different understandings of democratic processes of each group with different generations. It is unclear and arguable how Thai people understand the principles of democracy or the democratic system. Although democracy is not a new thing for the Thai people, the ongoing conflict may be a critical sign for Thai society to review and go back to the basics of what democracy really is. The understanding of the concept of democracy should be a main concern before the word “democracy” becomes disillusioned and a tool for intervention or destroying people with different opinions.

C. Future research Scholars interested in studying Thailand in the future have several avenues for future research. One area of future research would be to examine the consequences of the general election in 2023. Since this election is taking place after months of protests against the monarchy and the military, it would be interesting to examine whether these protests have had an effect on how the electorate cast their votes. It would also be interesting to study whether the position of the military is consolidated or damaged after the election. Another area of future research would be to study Thailand’s relations with the US and China. Thailand has historically had close relations with the US but recently, China has emerged as Thailand’s largest trading partner.

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292  encyclopedia of asian politics Hence it would be interesting to study how Thailand responds to the intensifying competition between the US and China. Thanikun Chantra and Pradit Chinudomsub

Reference Ockey, J. (2007). Thailand in 2006: Retreat to Military Rule. Asian Survey, 47(1), 133–140.

Key resources Ferrara, F. (2015). The Political Development of Modern Thailand. Cambridge University Press. Ockey, J. S. (2004).  Making Democracy: Leadership, Class, Gender, and Political Participation in Thailand. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Unger, D. H. & Mahakanjana, C. (2016). Thai Politics: Between Democracy and Its Discontents. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

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53. Vietnam A. The concept In 1975, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam became Vietnam’s official name following the reunification of South (the Republic of Vietnam, 1955–75) and North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945–75). The country, whose ideology is closely aligned with Marxist-Leninist doctrines and Ho Chi Minh’s thoughts, is one of the few communist states in the world to have survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. Demographically, Vietnam has one of the world’s densest populations, with 99.5 million people (as of 2022), half of which are relatively young and increasingly well-educated. The country has witnessed a rapid urbanization process with 37.3% of the population living in urban areas in 2022, an increase of 17.3% from 1990.1 Politically, the quartet of power, the so-called Four Pillars, currently shapes Vietnam’s political and economic directions. They are the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) General Secretary, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Chairman of the National Assembly. This structure helps maintain the balance of power between the ruling party, the executive, and the legislature, rather than consolidating power in one person (Kassim, 2021). Vietnam’s political structure is composed of multiple historical layers, as described by the concept of “layer state” proposed by Tonneson (2000), which includes Confucian, colonial, Viet Minh, South Vietnam, centralized planning, and market-oriented layers. As Vietnam is constantly adding new layers and navigating an uncertain environment, an indepth understanding of these layers and their interactions is crucial for any studies of the country. Therefore, taking this complexity into account will be greatly beneficial in the understanding of Vietnam’s political and economic landscape. While the political structure largely remains untouched, the country’s adoption of Reform (Doi Moi) in 1986 has brought remarkable strides in its socioeconomic development. Consistent structural reforms and international integration resulted in the so-called “Vietnam economic miracle.” Not only has it risen to the ranks of middle-income

countries in 2010, but Vietnam has also exemplarily lifted millions of Vietnamese out of poverty (The World Bank, 2022). Per capita GDP, a scant $96.7 in 1990, has reached $3,756 in 2021.2 More recently, Vietnam has benefited from shifting manufacturing out of China amid deteriorating US–China relations and the COVID19 pandemic. Despite potential obstacles like the end of the baby boom era, declining globalization, dominating low-value-added sectors, and an autocratic government clinging to power, Vietnam is continuing “a miracle from a bygone era, exporting its way to prosperity” (Sharma, 2020).

B. The landscape Recent scholarly research on Vietnam has focused on the economic transformations underway in Vietnam. Transitions from state socialism in Vietnam occurred in response to economic shocks rather than domestic mobilizations of opposition forces capable of capturing state power. Despite the abandonment of central planning and the rise of a significant private sector, the Vietnamese government has maintained significant state control over the economy (Hughes, 2020). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam continue to play “the leading role in the socialist-oriented market economy” and “the main force in international economic integration,” while the country’s macroeconomy is also oriented and regulated by the state (Vu-Thanh, 2017). The government merged SOEs in key sectors into state economic groups (SEGs) in sector-organized conglomerates, initially in textiles, telecommunications, shipbuilding, minerals, and finance. State control also enabled the VCP to form a state-party-business alliance through the distribution of benefits. Being identified as a “fertile ground” for rent-seeking (Vuving, 2013), Vietnam, however, is able to achieve growth with an ongoing industrial restructuring towards higher competitiveness by adopting a “superposition” of socialism, state capitalism, and crony capitalism in different industries. Despite the lack of a universal rule of law, contract, and property protection, the interplay between markets, politics, and institutions in Vietnam allows growth and development to happen, even from a crony capitalist (Ngo & Tarko, 2018). Nevertheless, SOEs are failing the economy and there is a need to push further for

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294  encyclopedia of asian politics privatization. In 2022, the average asset of an SOE is ten times that of a foreign-invested firm and 109 times that of a domestic private enterprise. However, the contribution of SOEs to Vietnam’s GDP is a humble 29% (Lan Anh, 2022). Baccini et al. (2019) estimated that the aggregate productivity gains from trade in the five years following Vietnam’s WTO accession would have been 66% higher and the overall productivity gains would have been 140% in a counterfactual economy without SOEs. The impact of trade liberalization has been limited by SOE advantages in land usage, government equity and debt financing, and subsidies. For the new generation of FTAs3 to successfully aid Vietnam in growing its economy, improving labour standards, and improving industrial relations systems, it is crucial to create a favourable business environment which depends less on state control and more on state facilitation. Another recent area of research on Vietnam concerns its role on the global stage and in particular, Vietnam’s relations with the great powers. Not only has it joined various international and multilateral trade deals, but Vietnam has also intensively developed its diplomatic relations. Efforts to raise Vietnam’s profile in regional and global affairs continued, with hosting the meeting between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as a highlight. The country not only became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the year 2020–2021 but also strengthened its role in international security, notably in maritime territorial conflicts with China through its efforts to strengthen Cambodian and Laotian engagement in reaction to China’s growing influence in continental Southeast Asia (Emmers & Le Thu, 2021). In increasingly tense international relations, with China–US relations being central, Vietnam has adopted the “Four Nos” policy4 as its guiding principle. The four nos are: Vietnam will (i) not join any military alliance; (ii) not side with one country to counter another one; (iii) not allow a foreign country to set military bases or use Vietnam’s territory to counter a third country; (iv) not use force or threaten to use force in international relations. The country consistently prefers this principle as “a policy of peace,”5 which supports Hanoi’s promotion of the emerging “bamboo diplomacy.” The term was mai-huong vo

adopted by Thailand in 1995 to describe its foreign policy: “always solidly rooted but flexible enough to bend whichever way the wind blows in order to survive.”6 Also with this spirit in mind, the VCP chief, Nguyen Phu Trong, highlighted the country’s commitment to developing modern diplomacy with “Vietnamese bamboo” characteristics: flexibility and pragmatism in balancing competing geopolitical interests. Sino-Vietnamese relations are often described as a “coercive brotherhood” or “asymmetric relation” given that China is Vietnam’s “giant” neighbour sharing a complex history. Their history dated back to the relationship “between part and the whole” during 1,000 years of Chinese rule in Vietnam, and the following tributary exchange, in which China accustomed itself as a middle kingdom among other inferior kingdoms (including Vietnam). The early 19th century of Western imperialism in Asia witnessed a disruption in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship until the brotherly party-to-party connection was established between the two Communist parties. However, this brotherly relationship did not last long due to the Sino-Soviet split “because China’s rhetoric of anti-(Soviet) hegemonism clashed with Vietnam’s rhetoric of socialist internationalism” (Womack, 2006). After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the relationship between Vietnam and China was normalized. Since then, both sides’ state apparatuses and communist parties shifted their mindsets from hostility to rapprochement and collaboration. Both the CCP and the VCP see the West’s essential ideals, like democratic elections and free speech, as a challenge. Thus, both parties have increased interactions and sought useful measures to protect both their socialist systems and the governing power of their respective communist parties, marked by the 2022 visit of the VCP Central Committee General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong as a response to the invitation of the CCP Central Committee General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Moreover, the entire Vietnamese production chain is vulnerable to the volatility of Chinese intermediate and capital goods, given that China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner since 2004. The close economic and ideological connections keep the two countries striving for present and future stability.

vietnam  295 However, hostility and distrust from the confrontation between the two countries during the Cold War and Sino-Vietnam wars remain high and have been amplified as China became more assertive in the South China Sea disputes. The complexity of Vietnam’s perception of China is the interplay between its acknowledgement of Chinese power and capability to cause destruction and the preservation of Vietnamese independent identity. Therefore, Vietnam’s foreign policy toward China is primarily motivated by an internal political struggle “duality” of deference and resistance (Path, 2018). The anxiety of China prompted Vietnam to take an active role in promoting the perception that China can be a common threat to ASEAN security. Furthermore, the country has been pushing for more normalization in its relations with the US despite the lack of a formal balancing alliance between the two countries. Steering away from an official US–Vietnam alliance, however, does not imply that Vietnam supports a China-dominated hierarchical order, but rather that Vietnamese nationalism opposes both nations. The VCP still fears an American-instigated “peaceful revolution” against its national ideology and believes that by leveraging competition among the great powers, Vietnam can maximize its national interests. US–Vietnam relations were normalized in 1995 after the US lifted its 30-year trade embargo on Vietnam following the end of the Vietnam War. Since then, Vietnam has shown a strong willingness to enhance economic connections while carefully selecting collaboration in the security domain. US trade statistics show that total merchandise trade between the United States and Vietnam has grown from $1.5 billion in 2001 to $112.8 billion in 2021, making Vietnam the sixth-largest source of US imports. Furthermore, the US merchandise trade deficit with Vietnam has increased from $592 million in 2001 to more than $90 billion in 2021, making it the third-highest US bilateral trade imbalance, just after China and Mexico. Former US President Barack Obama advocated for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) involving Vietnam, who was seen as one of the greatest gainers of this FTA; however, all of this came to a halt in 2017, when former US President Trump terminated the agreement, alleging it would harm US businesses and employment. However, under the

Biden administration, the US resolved a dispute over Vietnam’s currency during Donald Trump’s presidency and also launched the new vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) with Vietnam being one of the leading regional partners. With the implementation of the FOIP strategy, Vietnam and the United States are increasingly aligned on a number of strategic concerns. Nevertheless, the existing significant political differences between the two countries and the China factor added uncertainties to the declaration of a strategic partnership for now. It will take time for the two countries to build credibility and strengthen their existing partnership, just as it took decades for Vietnam and the US to turn their relationship from foes to friends. Vietnam also keeps a good relationship with Russia for arms imports as well as oil and gas operations in the South China Sea. Despite Western pressures, Vietnam was one of a handful of nations that opposed international efforts to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine (Pham & Nguyen, 2022).7 The nature of this relationship with Russia prompted concerns regarding Vietnam’s collaboration with partners who implement antiRussia sanctions, particularly the US. Lastly, recent studies have also examined the state of Vietnam’s democracy. The Vietnamese government frequently portrays the country’s political system as democratic, a system “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” However, Vietnam has stoutly resisted any democratization of politics while liberalizing its markets and easing its ideological strictures. As Kerkvlietz (2014) argues, “Even in scholarly literature, the two words ‘democracy’ and ‘Vietnam’ are rarely paired.” Censorship is widespread and imposed on all forms of media for political reasons, such as suppressing political dissent and restricting events that are unfavourable to the party, including democracy advocates. However, Kerkvliet (2014) suggested that there are no clear divisions among the elite, the middle class, or industrial workers that would indicate the potential for significant political change toward a procedural democracy in the near future. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the VCP has been diminished by a number of factors. First, the market economy’s ability to improve living standards has created a gap between the regime’s socialist ideology and mai-huong vo

296  encyclopedia of asian politics reality. Ruling elites no longer believe in the ideology but still publicly pledge allegiance to it. The government’s control of resources and abuse of power has contributed to high levels of corruption and widespread grievances. Furthermore, the Communist Party’s ability to keep secrets has diminished as rival factions use the internet to expose their enemies (Truong & Vu, 2023). The regime is in a challenging position as it must balance the need for economic development with increasing threats to its survival, particularly in scenarios when it has failed to address public needs and social unrest.

C. Future research Going forward, the decreasing legitimacy of the VCP and its impact on the Vietnamese state will need careful consideration. Similarly, whether the VCP will be successful in bringing about the required economic development and its consequences will also need to be examined in the future. Lastly, the impact of increasingly adversarial US–China rivalry on Vietnam’s foreign policy will have to be considered. Vietnam has contentious relations with both the superpowers in the region and hence how Vietnam incorporates the changing geopolitical climate in the IndoPacific into its decision-making calculus will need to be studied in the future. Mai-Huong Vo

Notes 1. According to data from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. 2. The World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files. 3. As of 2022, Vietnam is a member of several newgeneration FTAs, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the EU-Vietnam FTA (EVFTA), the UK-Vietnam FTA (UKVFTA), and most recently the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 4. The policy is stated in the “Vietnam 2019 National Defence White Paper.” 5. This is clearly stated in the National Defence Journal in June 2022. Access from http://tapchiqptd​.vn ​/en ​/theory​-and​-practice​/four​-nos​-a​-policy​-of​-peace​/18841​.html. 6. “Thailand’s Bamboo Diplomacy Blows in the Wind,” Asia Sentinel, October 13, 2010. 7. Hanoi abstained on two United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion and demanding civilian protection and humanitarian access in Ukraine, and voted against a motion suspending Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.

mai-huong vo

References Baccini, L., Impullitti, G., & Malesky, E. J. (2019). Globalization and state capitalism: Assessing Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. Journal of International Economics, 119, 75–92. Emmers, R., & Le Thu, H. (2021). Vietnam and the search for security leadership in ASEAN. Asian Security, 17(1), 64–78. Hughes, C. (2020). Transitions from State “Socialism” in Southeast Asia. In The Political Economy of Southeast Asia (pp. 111–132). Springer. Kassim, Y. R. (2021). Vietnam’s new leadership: Back to the four pillars. RSIS Commentaries, No. 056 – 3 April 2021. Kerkvliet, B. J. T. (2014). Democracy and Vietnam. In Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Democratization (pp. 438–453). Routledge. Lan Anh. (2022). Vietnam’s labor productivity and the role of SOEs. VietNamNet. https://vietnamnet​.vn​/en​/vietnam​-s​-labor​ -productivity​-and​-the​-role​-of​-soes​-2017379​ .html Ngo, C., & Tarko, V. (2018). Economic development in a rent-seeking society: Socialism, state capitalism and crony capitalism in Vietnam. Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement, 39(4), 481–499. Path, K. (2018). The duality of Vietnam’s deference and resistance to China. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 29(3), 499–521. Pham, M. N., & Nguyen, H. K. (2022). It takes two to Tango: Vietnam-US relations in the new context. ISEAS Perspective (2022/55). Sharma, R. (2020). Is Vietnam the next ‘Asian Miracle’? The New York Times. The World Bank. (2022). From the Last Mile to the Next Mile–2022 Vietnam Poverty & Equity Assessment. World Bank. Tonneson, S. (2000). The layered state of Vietnam. In Brødsgaard, K. E., & Young, S. (Eds.), State Capacity in East Asia: Japan, Taiwan, China, and Vietnam (pp. 236–268). OUP Oxford. Truong, N., & Vu, T. (2023). Introduction: The peg of Vietnam’s economic and political development. In Truong, N., & Tuong, V. (Eds.), The Dragon’s Underbelly: Dynamics and Dilemmas in Vietnam’s Economy and Politics. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

vietnam  297 Vu-Thanh, T. A. (2017). Does WTO accession help domestic reform? The political economy of SOE reform backsliding in Vietnam. World Trade Review, 16(1), 85–109. https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S1474745616000409 Vuving, A. L. (2013). Vietnam in 2012: A rent-seeking state on the verge of a crisis. Southeast Asian Affairs, 2013(1), 323–347. Womack, B. (2006). China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. Cambridge University Press.

Key resources London, Jonathan D. (Ed.). (2022). Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Vietnam. Taylor & Francis: This handbook is a comprehensive resource exploring Vietnam’s economic development, political

landscape, cultural identity, international relations, and social changes over the past three decades. Vietnam Studies Programme from ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute: The Vietnam Study Group focuses on important issues related to Vietnam’s internal situation, including political economy, internal political dynamics and leadership, mass organizations, social change, and sociocultural issues. The group also examines Vietnam’s relationships with major powers and its role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). VnExpress International at https://e​.vnexpress​ .net: The English edition of VnExpress, Vietnam’s most-read news website. Provides daily news, analyses, and reviews on the politics, society, and economy of the country.

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Index Abbott, J. P. 243 Abdulaziz, A. 202, 203 Abe Shinzō 231, 232 ABS see Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) Abu Sayaf Group 159 Acemoglu, D. 78 Acharya, A. 28, 29 Achen, C. H. 39 Ackerman, W. C. 202 Act East Policy 220 “adaptive informal institutions” 208 Adhikari, Man Mohan 171 Adhikari, P. 197 Afrimadona 227 agenda-setting book 215 Age of Enlightenment 150 aggregate-level data 37 aggregate-level issues 40 between variations 40 between and within variations 40–41 Agresti, A. 41n1 Ahn, B. 180 Alagappa, M. 52 Al-Fadhat, F. 30 al-Ghazali, Imam 203 Allaert, A. M. 202 All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSD) 250 All India Muslim League 254 Al Qaeda 159, 171 Alston, P. 262–3 Alston, William 147 alternative vote (AV) 82 Amalia, L. S. 226 Ambardi, K. 45 Amnesty Bill 290 Amnesty International 203 Anderson, B. 155 Anderson, Benedict 148 Ang, S. 101 Ang, Yuen Yuen 210 Anies Baswedan 227 Annan, Kofi 248 anthropology 6 and political science 7 anti-Chinese sentiment 238 Anti-Corruption Act 237 Anti-Corruption Commission 194 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (AntiELAB) movement (2019) 214 anti-military parties 138 Anugrah, I. 156, 156n3 APEC see Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

Apple Daily 213, 215, 216 April 19th Revolution (1960) 267 Aquino III, Benigno 262 Arakan Army (AA) forces 246, 249 Arakan National Party (ANP) 249 Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) 247, 248 Arguelles, Cleve 264 Arikan, G. 119 armed forces 109, 110 Armijo, L.E. 129 Arugay, A. 184 Asante, R. 8 ASEAN see Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ASEAN Charter 251, 252 ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) 183 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 29, 183 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 23, 29, 180, 182, 183 ASEAN Way 28, 29, 179, 182 Asia armed forces in 109 comparative politics in 24 conflicts in 58 democratization in 115 domestic terrorism in 160 economic performance in 89–90 education–terrorism nexus in 160 gender politics in 92, 96 identity politics in 101 institutional design in 89 intergroup relations in 14 judiciaries in 69 legislatures in 103, 104 party politics in 137 political culture in 119 political executives in 89, 91 post-democratization countries in 110 regional integration in 4 Asia Barometer (AB) 287 Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) 47, 116 “Asian Exceptionalism” 76 Asian financial crisis 30, 127, 134, 241, 269, 270 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 30, 124 Asian liberal democracies 139 “Asian model” 83, 84 Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 29 Asian political institutions 133 Asian political science scholarship 8 Asian politics 4

298

index  299 experimental studies in 15 experimental studies in realm of 13 game theoretic models in 23 lack of research in 36 proliferation of statistical analysis in 37 Asian-style democracy 76 “Asian values” 104, 105, 113, 133–5 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 179, 288 concept 179 future of 181 landscape 179–81 Asō Tarō 232 Aspinall, E. 83, 226, 263 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 4, 174, 179, 247 concept 182–3 future of 184 landscape 183–4 Myanmar in 251–2 Assurance Game 23 “authoritarian-mass party” 110 authoritarian party politics 138–9 “authoritarian-personal control” 110 authoritarian responsiveness 15 authoritarian systems 87 autocracies 62, 66 Awami League 254 Aytaç, S. E. 15 Ba, A. D. 29 Badaan, V. 15 Badrinathan, S. 15 Baird, I. G. 101 baked-in inequality 27 Baldwin, D. A. 129 Ball, Desmond 181 bamboo diplomacy 294 Bandung conference 29 Bangkok Declaration 182 Bangladesh 169 Bangladesh Bhutan India and Nepal (BBIN) Initiative 190 Barnett, C. 14 Barr, Michael 135 Barton, Roy Franklin 8 Basic Law 213, 214, 216, 216n3 Basu, A. 101 Batto, N. F. 233 Baumgartner, Frank 143 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) 190 Beeson, M. 30 Behuria, A. K. 197 “Beijing Consensus” 165 Bell, A. 41n3

Bello, W. 262 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 30, 124, 238 Ben-Nun Bloom, P. 119 Bentham, Jeremy 133, 135 Berenschot, W. 263 Berman, S. 53 Bernstein, M. 99 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 54, 139, 219, 221 Bhattarai, Baburam 172 Bhutan 168 concept 194–6 future of 198–9 landscape 196–8 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 254, 257 Biden (President) 181 Bieber, Florian 148 Biehl, J. 7, 8 “Big Five” approach 45 BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 219 Black, E. A. 203 Black Lives Matter 100 Blais, A. 82 Bland, B. 226, 227 Bloom, P. B. 14–15 Bloomfield, M.J. 128 Bohannan, P. 8 Boix, C. 78 Bolton, M. 8 Börzel, T. A. 100 “bossism” behaviour 109 Boswell, J. 8 Bouziane, M. 8 Brewer, G. D. 142 British colonial rule, in India 221n2 British Constitution 62, 63 British Westminster model 230 broad descriptive model 6 Brown, S. R. 35 Brunei Darussalam concept 201–2 landscape 202–3 research gap 203 Brunei Liquefied Natural Gas (BLNG) 201 Brunei Nationality Act 202–4 Brunei Shell Petroleum (BSP) 201 Buddhism 119, 195, 198, 279 Buddhist–Muslim tensions 283 Bueno de Mesquita, B. 40 Bui, N. S. 66 Burghers 279, 280, 283n1 Burke, E. 135, 137 Bush (President) 255 Bush, R. 8 Cabinet Act (1999) 230 Cairney, P. 142

300  encyclopedia of asian politics Cambodia, democracy 75 Cambodia People’s Party (CCP) 138 campaign policies, of Thaksin 290 capitalism 28, 52, 122–4, 230 Carney, R. W. 128 Carothers, T. 226, 262 Carozza, P. 69 Case, W. 105 case-oriented qualitative approach 8 Castells, M. 155 castes 218, 219 Catalinac, A. 40 Cavatorta, F. 8 CCP see Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) censorship 295 Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) 251 Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 40 Central Statistics Agency (BPS) 225 Centroid Factor Analysis 35 Ceylon Citizenship Act (1948) 279 Chaebols 268, 269 Chakma, B. 187, 189–91 Challand, B. 8 Chambers, P. 237 Chang, H. I. 38 Chang-Mai initiative 30 Charrad, M. M. 95 Chauchard, S. 14 Chaudhuri, A. 14 Cheema, A. 16 Chee Soon Juan 276 Chen, F. 38 Chen, X. 39 Cheng, J. Y. 214 Chen Shui-bian 287 Chey, H. 129 Chhachhi, A. 101 Chiang Ching-kuo 287 China concept 207 economic transformation in post-Mao period 207 socioeconomic and political consequences of reform 207–8 “50 cent army” 118 future of 210 gradual and measured approach 165 labour management in 128 landscape 208 focus on elite promotion mechanism 208–9 state and society in new technologies era 209–10 studies on CCP’s adaptability and regime resilience 208 studies on CCP’s political control mechanism 209

power rivalry between US and 164–5 rapid economic growth 79 security relationship between United States and 165 survey research 47 transition from socialism to neoliberalism 95 China Association for Promoting Democracy 138 China Democracy Party 138 China Democratic League 138 China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC) 238 China–Pakistan strategic partnership 170, 171 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 123, 138, 163, 164 adaptability and regime resilience 208 studies on political control mechanism 209 “Chinese economic miracle” 207 Chinese National Survey Data Archives (CNSDA) 47 Chinese politics Chinese Communist system 164 economic reform and development 164–5 Chinese state, political economy of 128 Choi, E. 165 Chondoist Chongu Party 138 Chong, T. 276 Chu, J. A. 16 Chu, Y. 76, 127, 164 Chuchu, F. 202 Chun, A. 101 Chun Do-Hwan 267, 271n4 Chung, A. 39 Citizenship Law (1982) 250 Civil Disobedience Movement 156 civilian control of militaries 109–10 civilian defence forces (CDF) 249 civil law tradition 69 civil liberty 123 Indonesia 227 civil-military coalition 110 civil-military operations (CMO) 109 civil–military relations 110 civil society 176 concept 52 future of 54–5 Hong Kong governance and 215 and social movements 216 landscape 52–4 civil wars concept 58 future of 59–60 landscape 59 claim-making CSOs 53 Clark, B. 126 Clark, Helen 203 Clark, J. A. 8 climate movement 155 Clinton, Hillary 247

index  301 CMIO (Chinese Malay Indian Others) 274 coercion-based leadership 264 coercive brotherhood 294 Cohen, Benjamin 126 Cold War 58, 103, 109, 110, 115, 122, 123, 147, 174, 182, 220, 230, 235, 295 collective behavior 156n1 collective self-defense (CSD) 24 collegial executives 90 “Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset” 59 Colomer, J. M. 62, 63 Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hlutaw (CRPH) 249, 250 communal tensions 218 communism 122–3 Communist Party 69 Communist Party of Nepal 172 Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) 138 community-based organizations (CBOs) 53 Comparative Agendas Project 143 ‘comparative constitutional engineering’ 64 Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) 65, 71 comparative methods concepts 2–3 future of 4 landscape 3–4 comparative policy analysis 144 comparative political economy (CPE) 126 “Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory” (Janda) 137 comparative public policy studies 4 Comparative Study of Election Systems (CSES) 47 comparison 2 Competitive Authoritarianism (Levitzki and Way) 78 “competitive authoritarianism” 123 competitive authoritarian regime 78 competitive party politics 139 completely pooled models 38, 40 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 181 “conceding-to-thrive” scenario 78 concentrate/disperse political power 64 Condra, L. N. 14 Confucian culture 76 Confucianism 93, 118, 133, 135 relationship between democracy and 134 value system 75 Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 219 Congress Party 219, 221 “A Conjunctural Account of Upper- and MiddleClass Support for Rodrigo Duterte” (Garrido) 265 consensus-based approach 179 constitutionalism, in South Asia 65 Constitution Drafting Committee 194

Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017) 291 constitutions concept 62–5 future of 66 landscape 65–6 constructivism 27 constructivist/modernist nationalism 149 contamination effect 232 contemporary economic development, Korea 270 Contemporary South Asia 94 conventional wisdom 113 Converse (1962) 45 Conway, M. 204 cooperative games 21 co-opted CSOs 53 coronavirus pandemic see COVID-19 Correlates of War (COW) project 59 corruption 290 Corruption Eradication Commission 225, 226 courts and judicial systems concept 69 future of 71 landscape 69–71 COVID-19 pandemic 88, 125, 168, 210, 291, 293 in Asia-Oceania region 4 impact in Bhutan 196 in Korea 270 long-term impact of 55 in Sri Lanka 283 and stringent policy on political development 215 in Taiwan, government measures during 45 Cox, Robert 52 Croissant, A. 65, 66, 82, 84 Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia 110 crony capitalism 293 cross-sectional data 37, 40 cross-Strait relations 287, 288 Crotty, W. 137 CSOs 53–4 culturalism 47, 48 cultural politics 99 culture 48 Curato, Nicole 264 Currency Interchangeability Agreement 202 Dahal, Pushpa Kamal 172 Dahl, R. A. 75 data aggregate-level issues and 40–41 individual-level issues and 38–40 research questions, variations and types of 38 types of 41n4 data-intensive methodology 143 data sharing, survey research 46–7 Davies, E. 16 Davies, M. 184

302  encyclopedia of asian politics Debrah, E. 8 decision-making processes 88, 89 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II 182 “deep legitimacy and governance crisis” 213 deLeon, P. 142 demilitarized zone (DMZ) 267 democracy 78 comparative studies of 2 development of 139 free market capitalism and 123 language in Basic Law 213 principles of 133 procedural definition of 75 quality of 75 relationship between Confucianism and 134 strength of 133 Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) 214 “democratic competitive and semi-competitive system” 110 democratic consolidation and stagnation, Indonesia 225–6 democratic decline, Indonesia 226 democratic development, Taiwan 287 democratic institutions 59 democratic-liberal order 52 Democratic Party, Hong Kong 214 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 230, 232, 233 “democratic paternalism” 268 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 287 emergence of 286 “Democratic Revolution” 75 democratic systems 87 democratic transition 110–11 democratization 4, 62, 69, 118, 119, 194, 214 in Asia 115 concept 75–6 future of 78–9 inequality-centered determinant of 78 landscape 76–8 of South Korea 134, 163 of Taiwan 134, 164 theories of 76–7 Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia (Croissant) 110 Deng Xiaoping 123, 207 Dent, C. M. 127 de Tocqueville, Alexis 52 Deuba, Sher Bahadur 171, 172 developmentalism 124 developmentalist 138–9 “developmental mindsets” 128 developmental state 124, 128 literature 126 Dewan Rakyat 242 diagonal accountability 52

Diamond, L. 77, 225 Dickson, B. J. 208 Dietrich, S. 15 dirty war 280–81 “Disciplinary Reactions: Alienation and the Reform of Vote Buying in the Philippines” (Schaeffer) 264 “disciplined democracy” 246 discursive institutionalism 27, 30 Doi Moi 293 Doklam incident 172 domestic institutions 28 domestic politics 89 domestic terrorism, in Asia 160 “domino theory” 174 Dorji, N. 197, 198 double-resistance process 96 Doud, Mohammad 171 Downe, J. 35 Driscoll, A. 70 Druckman, J. N. 13, 16 Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT) party 197 Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) party 197 Duan, H. 209 Dunning, T. 14 Duterte, Rodrigo 262–5 Duverger, M. 137 Duverger’s law 220, 221n4 Duwa Lashi La 250 Dye, T. R. 142 dynastic politics 94 East Asia political economy of state in 126–7 state activisms in 128 East Asia Summit (EAS) 29, 183 East India Company 274 eco-developmentalism 124 economic and technical cooperation (ECOTECH) 179 economic governance 124 economic performance, in Asia 89–90 economic policies 29–30 economic reform, in China 207 “Economics of Political and Criminal Violence” project 59 economic statecraft 128–9 Edwards, L. 94 Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) 280 Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) 280 Elçi, E. 15 election-centered activities 114 Electoral Commission 243 Electoral Commission of Bhutan (ECB) 195 electoral laws 82

index  303 electoral regulations 82 electoral rules 82 electoral studies 215 in Taiwan 287 electoral systems 85n2 concept 82–3 future of 84 landscape 83–4 elite competition theory 114 elite promotion mechanism 208–9 “elite supportive” 114 Elkins, Z. 65 Ellis, A. 85n1 endorsement experiment 16 Enlightenment 133 Enos, R. D. 14 Epp, Charles 70 Epstein, D. L. 137 Esarey, A. 127 Estrada, Joseph 265, 265n1 ethnic armed groups 248–50 ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) 246, 248–50 ethnic groups 58, 256 politics of 7 ethnic identity 101 ethnic politics, realm of 14 ethnic representation 105 ethnographic writing 6 ethnography concept 6 future of 9 landscape 6–9 ethno-linguistic tensions 256 Euro crisis 100 Europe, political parties in 137 European civil wars 58 European Coal and Steel Community 187 European Community 179 European Economic Community 187 European Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) 195 European Union 145, 184 Evans, Gareth 179 Evans, Grant 237 executive–legislative relationship 89 executive power 87, 88 executives concept 87–8 future of 90–91 landscape 88–90 experimental political science 13 experimental studies 13 in Asian politics 15 experiments concept 13 future of 16–17 landscape 13–14

authoritarian responsiveness 15 identity politics 14–15 political behavior and public opinion 15–16 political information 15 external dimension of power 87 external factors, political behavior 115–16 extremist groups 54 faith, preservation and promotion of 203 Fang, K. 209 Federal Constitution of Malaysia 242 Federal Democracy Charter (FDC) 250 Federation of Malaya 241 Feinberg, R. 179 Feith, H. 225 Feldman, S. 8 feminism, relationship between nationalism and 94 Ferguson, Adam 52 field experiment 16 in South Korea 16 in Vietnam 15 fieldwork immersion 6 Fileborn, B. 100 financial liberalisation 127 Finer, S. E. 63 “fintech platforms” 129 first past the post (FPTP) 63, 82 Fischer, M. M. J. 6 Fish, M. S. 104 fixed effects (FE) models 38–41, 41n10, 42n10 flexible constitutions 62 Ford, Michele 156n3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 183 formal dimension of power 87 formal institutions 26 Fossati, D. 83, 84, 101 “Four Nos” policy 294 Four Pillars (Vietnam politics) 293 Fox, Jonathan 150 Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 295 Freedom House, democracy index 225 free market capitalism 123 French Revolution 158 FTA 295, 296n3 Fukuda Yasuo 232 Fukuyama, F. 100, 134 Future Forward Party 138 Gaikwad, N. 16 Gallagher, M. 85n2 The Politics of Electoral Systems 82 Gallagher, M. E. 118 Gallenkamp, M. 197 “Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia” 24 game theoretic models 23 game theorists 21

304  encyclopedia of asian politics game theory concept 21–2 future of 24 landscape 22–4 Gammon, L. 228 Gandhi, Rajiv 281 Garrido, Marco 264 “A Conjunctural Account of Upper- and Middle-Class Support for Rodrigo Duterte” 265 Garshasbi, R. 8 Gayoom, Maumoon Abdul 170 Geddes, B. 77 Gellner, Ernest 148 gender concept 92 future of 95–6 landscape 92–5 gender binary belief 119 gender equality 119 gender gap 14 gender politics in Asia 92, 96 in Asian states 93 theme of 94 generalization 22, 137 Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) 110, 111 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 111 Gerard, K. 184 Get-Out-the-Vote 16 Ghani, Ashraf 169 Ghatak, S. 159 Gidron, N. 14 Gill, R. 70 Gilpin, Robert 126 Ginsburg, T. 65, 69 Glas, A. 184 Glendon, M. A. 69 global financial crisis (2008) 242, 269, 270 globalization 89 global political ethnographies 8 Global Terrorism Database 158 Gluckman, M. 8 Go, J. 65 Go, S. 45 Goda, T. 7 Gonslaves, E. 187 Goods and Services Tax (GST) 221 Gordon, M. 69 Gore, L.L.P. 128 Gramsci, Antonio 52 Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 237 Great Leap Famine 123 Green, D. P. 13, 16 green developmentalism 124

Green Wave 244 Gregorios-Pippas, S. 243 Grimes, W.W. 127 Grofman, B. 82 Grosfoguel, R. 100 Gross National Happiness (GNH) 195–6, 198 Gross National Product (GNP) 196 Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs) 275, 276 Gruin, J. 128 Guan, L. H. 52 Gulf War 230 Habibie, B. J. 274 Haddad, M.A. 127 Haggard, S. 78 Hall, D. G. E. 174 Hall, S. 100 Hallyu Wave 270 Hamamoto, S. 232 Hamilton-Hart, N. 127 Han, R. 209 Han, S. 46 The Handbook of Party Politics (Katz and Crotty) 137 Hanson, K. 16 Haqqani Network (HN) 169 Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) 169 Harrell, S. 127 Harvard Dataverse 13 Hashim, Zaharan 170 Hassan, M. H. B. 243 Hayashi, T. 46 HCJD see High Courts Database (HCJD) Healy, A. 16 heavy and chemical industry (HCI) 268 Hefner, R. W. 7 Heiduk, F. 110, 111 Heilmann, Sebastian 208 Helleiner, E. 128 Hellman, D. 181 Hengyi Industries 201 Heritage Foundation 216n1 Index of Economic Freedom 213, 274 Herron, E. S. 82 Hervouet, R. 8 Hicken, A. 82 Higgott, Richard 180 High Courts Database (HCJD) 71 Hill, J. 99 Himalayas 171–3 Hinduism 119 Hirose, K. 24 Hirschl, R. 69 historical institutionalism (HI) 26 Ho, M.T. 119

index  305 Ho Chi Minh 235, 293 Hong, J. Y. 41 Hong Kong 213 Basic Law and judicial system 216 civil society and social movements 216 concept 213 political events 214 political landscape 213–14 COVID and stringent policy on political development 215 growing civil society 214 landscape 214 big picture 214–15 electoral studies 215 governance and civil society 215 media and politics 215 social movements 215 media ecosystem 216 migration and demographic change 215–16 regional integration 216 scholarship on politics 214 Hoover, Dennis 147 horizontal accountability 103 Houle, C. 77 Howe, B. 163 Hsiao, Y. 38 Huang, C. 40 Huang, H. 15, 38 Huang, J. 210 Huntington, S. P. 55n1, 76, 78, 134 The Soldier and the State 109 Hur, A. 16 Hussein, N. 94 Hwang, W. 39, 40 ‘hybrid regime’ 256 hydropower 196, 238 identity politics 14–15 concept 99 neo-Marxist approach 99 new social movement approach 99–100 postmodernist/poststructuralist approach 100 future of 101 landscape 100–101 #IfLaosIsDemocratic 238 #IfLaosPoliticsIsGood 238 Ifugao Law (Barton) 8 IISS see International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Ikeda, M. 16 illiberal democracies 228, 262 “imagined communities” 175 Incerti, T. 16 Independent Commission of Enquiry (ICOE) 248 India 168 British colonial rule in 221n2 concept 218–19

foreign policy 220 future of 221 ‘Hindu majority’ of 254 judicial branch in 219 landscape 219–21 Lok Sabha 218 population of 218 Rajya Sabha 218 relations between Pakistan and 170 relations with China 170 India–China border dispute 170 Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act (1949) 279 Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) 280–81 India–Pakistan territorial disputes 24 Indikator Politik Indonesia 227 individual-level data 37 individual-level issues 38 between variations 38–40 between and within variations 40 Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) 235 Indonesia concept 225 future of 227–8 landscape 225 civil liberty 227 democratic consolidation and stagnation 225–6 democratic decline 226 political polarisation 226–7 Indonesia Democratic Party 228 Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) 225 Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle of Indonesia (PDI-P) 138 Indo–Sri Lankan Accord 280 industrialization 268 informal dimension of power 87 Inglehart, R. 93 in-group identity 14 institutionalism concept 26–8 future of 30–31 landscape 28–30 institutional reforms 208 institution-focused inquiries 30 institutions concept 26–8 future of 30–31 landscape 28–30 in South Africa 64 Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) 104 Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) 187 intellect, preservation and promotion of 203 intergroup discriminatory behavior 14 Interim Government (IG) 172 internal factors, political behavior 114–15 internally displaced persons (IDP) camps 247

306  encyclopedia of asian politics International and Impartial Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFMM) 248 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) 8 international conflicts 16 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 248 International Criminal Court (ICC) 248 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 109 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 256 International Organization 126 international political economy (IPE) 126 international relations, in Taiwan 287, 288 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency 255 Interuniversity Consortium for Political Research (ICPSR) 46, 47 interviewer-administered surveys 46 Ip, I.-c. 101 Islam 95, 257, 283n1 Islamic Chhatra Shibir (ICS) 169 Islamic Law 202 Islamic Organisation for Cooperation (IOC) 248 Islamic Republic 256, 257 Islamic State (ISIS) 168 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 159 Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) 169 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 169, 170, 283 Islamisation 254, 257 Islamist threat, in South Asia 168–70 Istania, R. 7 Itao, A. 264 IT industry, rise of 270 Jaffna bombing 280 Jaffrey, S. 228 Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JeIB) 169, 170 Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) 169 Janda, K. 137 Janowitz, M. 110 Japan advanced industrialized society 93 future of 232 factors hampering majoritarian democracy 233 landscape 231 majoritarian democracy 231–2 majoritarian democracy with limits 230–31 socioeconomic and historical backgrounds 230 Japanese Imperial Army 174 Jati, W. R. 226 jatis 218 Jayawardena, K. 92, 94 Jefferson, Thomas 150 Jeffery, P. 101 Jemaah Islamiyah 159 Jenkins, C. 156n1

Jetly, N. 187 Jiang, J. 40, 208, 209 jihadi groups 169 Job, B. 179 Johnson, Chalmers 124, 126 Joko Widodo 139, 226 Jones, Bryan 143 Jones, K. 41n3 Jones, L. 128 Jongman, A. 158 judicialization 69 judicial politics, dynamics of 70 judicial system, Hong Kong 216 judiciaries, literature on 70 June Democratic Struggle (1987) 267 Jung, K.H. 271n13 Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 249 Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) 248 KADE 35 Kadirgamar, Lakshman 282 Kao, K. 16 Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) 249 Karimi Mahl, A. 8 Karuna (Colonel) 282 Kashmir conflict 189–90 Kasuya, Y. 82 Katada, S.E. 129 Kato, J. 24 Katz, R. S. 137 Katzenstein, Peter 126 Kauffman, L. 99 Kaufman, R.R. 78 Kawasaki, T. 23 Kaysone Phomvihane 235 Keesing, F. M. 7 Keesing, M. M. 7 Kelsen, H. 62 Keng, S. 209 Keohane, Robert 126 Kerkvliet, B. J. T. 295 Kerr, Pauline 180 Key, V. O. 137 Khan, Ayub 254 Khan, Imran 258 Khan, Yahya 254 Khmer Rouge 122 Khosla, M. 65 Kim, H. 24 Kim, S. 127 Kim Dae-Jung 271n5 Kim Il Sung 122 Kim Jong Un 294 Kim Yong-Ho 271n6 Kim Young-Sam 269, 271n5 Kitagawa, R. 16 Klandermans, P. G. 100

index  307 Klingler-Vldra, Robyn 127 Knaack, P. 128 Koirala, Girija Prasad 171, 172 Koizumi Junichirō 231–3 Kokang group 249 Komori, Y. 29 Korean National Assembly 267 Korean Social Democratic Party 138 Korea Social Science Data Archive (KOSSDA) 47 Kornhauser, L. 71 Kou, C. 209 “K-Quarantine strategy” 269 Krasner, Stephen 126 Krauss, E. S. 231 Kreuzer, P. 262, 263 Krishna, Raj 219 Kroenig, M. 104 Kuhonta, E. M. 175 Kumar Panday, P. 8 Kuomintang (KMT) 164, 286 Kurizaki, S. 24 Kusaka, W. 264 Kwangju Uprising (1980) 267, 269 Lai, Jimmy 213 Lama, Nirmal 172 Lan, T. 128 Lancan-Mekong Cooperation 30 Landry, P. F. 209 landscape Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 179–81 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 183–4 Bhutan 196–8 Brunei Darussalam 202–3 China 208 focus on elite promotion mechanism 208–9 state and society in new technologies era 209–10 studies on CCP’s adaptability and regime resilience 208 studies on CCP’s political control mechanism 209 civil society 52–4 civil wars 59 comparative methods 3–4 constitutions 65–6 courts and judicial systems 69–71 democratization 76–8 electoral systems 83–4 ethnography 6–9 executives 88–90 experiments 13–14 authoritarian responsiveness 15 identity politics 14–15 political behavior and public opinion 15–16 political information 15 game theory 22–4

gender and politics 92–5 Hong Kong 214 big picture 214–15 electoral studies 215 governance and civil society 215 media and politics 215 social movements 215 identity politics 100–101 India 219–21 Indonesia 225 civil liberty 227 democratic consolidation and stagnation 225–6 democratic decline 226 political polarisation 226–7 institutions and institutionalism 28–30 Japan 231 majoritarian democracy 231–2 Laos 237 legislatures 104–5 Malaysia 243–4 militaries civilian control 109–10 democratic transition and SSR/G 110–11 Myanmar in ASEAN 251–2 ethnic armed groups 248–50 National Unity Government 250 People’s Defence Forces 250–51 political developments 246–7 Rohingya crisis 247–8 Northeast Asia Chinese politics 164–5 public opinion research in 165–6 South Korea 163–4 Taiwan 164 Pakistan 256–8 Philippines 263–5 political behavior external factors 115–16 internal factors 114–15 political culture 119 political economy 122–4 of developmental states 127–9 political ideologies 134–5 political parties 137 competitive party politics 139 developmentalist and authoritarian party politics 138–9 totalitarian communist party politics 138 public policy 143–4 Q-methodology 35 religion 148–51 Republic of Korea (South Korea) balancing between US–China strategic competition 270–71 contemporary economic development 270

308  encyclopedia of asian politics frequently visited political issues 269–70 rise of IT industry, Hallyu Wave, and COVID-19 pandemic 270 Singapore 276 social movements 155–6 South Asia Islamist threat 168–70 strategic environment 170–71 troubled Himalayas 171–3 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 189–90 Southeast Asia 175–6 statistical analysis aggregate-level issues and data 40–41 individual-level issues and data 38–40 survey research 46 China 47 data sharing 46–7 mixed-mode 46 Taiwan 287–8 terrorism 159–60 Thailand 290–91 Vietnam 293–6 Langdon, F. 179 Lao Front for National Development (LFND) 236 Lao People’s Army (LPA) 237 Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) concept 235–7 future of 237–9 landscape 237 Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) 138, 235–8 Lao People’s Revolutionary Youth Union (LPRYU) 236 Laotian Civil War 235 Lao Trade Unions 236 Lao Women’s Union (LWU) 236 Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) 169 Lasswell, Harold 142 Latin America, populist leaders in 88 Laver, M. 24 “layer state” concept 293 LDP see Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Leach, E. R. 7 least squares dummy variable (LSDV) models 39 Lebanon, experimental evidence in 15 Lee, H. 40 Lee, J. 39, 40 Lee, M. 45 Lee, Y. 127 Lee Hsien Loong 276 “Lee Hypothesis” 123 Lee Kuan Yew 76, 123, 133, 134, 274, 276 Lee Myung-Bak 267 Lee Teng-hui 287 Leff, C. S. 77 left-wing extremism 160

legal anthropology 8 legislature–citizenship relations 105 legislatures concept 103–4 future of 105–6 landscape 104–5 literature on 104 Levitsky, S. 78 Lewis, J.I. 127 Li, H. 208 Liao, X. 209 liberal capitalism 115 liberal democracy 135 egalitarian elements of 134 ideology of 133 liberal-democratic approach 54 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 139, 230 Liberal Democratic Party of Japan 24 liberal institutionalism 26, 27 liberalization 78, 127 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 168, 170, 279–81 cadres of 283 defeat of 282 Liddle, R. W. 45 Liddle, W. 225 life, preservation and promotion of 203 Lijphart, A. 62, 65, 82, 230 Lim, D. 38 Lin, C. 39 Linardi, S. 14 Liow, J. C. 243 Lipp, H. 237 Lipset, S. M. 77 Liu, C. 129 Liu, H. 276 Locke, John 133 Lombardi, Clark 147 Loney-Howes, R. 100 Lorenz, P. 84 lower house (Lok Sabha) 218 low-income groups 265 Lü, X. 209 Lu, J. 119 Lui, T. 214 Lutz, B. J. 159 Lutz, J. M. 159 Lyall, J. 16 MaBaTha 247 Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR) 274 Machidori, S. 231 MacKillop, E. 35 Madison’s Dilemma 64 Mahathir Mohamad 76, 243 mainlander–islander divide 286 majoritarian-consensus model typology 65

index  309 majoritarian democracy 231–2 factors hampering 233 with limits 230–31 Malays 279, 280, 284n1 Malaysia concept 241–3 elections in 242–3 future of 244 landscape 243–4 political system carries 242 Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 243 Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) 243 Maldives 170 Malesky, E. 15 Malinowski, B. 6 Mandal Commission report 219, 221n3 Ma Ngok 213, 215 Manickathasan, N. 281 Man Khin Waing 250 Mao Zedong 122, 207 Maqasid of the Syariah 202, 203 Marcos, Ferdinand, Jr. “Bongbong” 262–5 Marcus, G. 6 market-oriented economy 165 market-oriented reform, in China 207 Marston, H. 83, 84 Martin, B. 82 Ma’ruf Amin 226 Marx, Karl 52 Marxist-Leninist doctrines 293 Marxist-Leninist philosophy 235 mass society theory 156n1 Mathur, Ritu 7, 8 Mattingly, D. C. 16 Mattli, W. 23 Ma Ying-jeou 287 McCoy, A. 263 Mc Gregor, K. 227 McKay, J. 179 McKay, R. 7, 8 Mcmurry, N. 14 MDS approach see Most Different Systems Design (MDS) approach Mearsheimer, John 165 media, Hong Kong ecosystem of 216 and politics 215 Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) 204 Melton, J. 65 #MeToo movement 100, 156 Miao, H. 46 micro-domestic-level institutions 28 Mietzner, M. 226 Migdal, J. 109 militaries concept 109 future of 111

landscape civilian control 109–10 democratic transition and SSR/G 110–11 “Military as Government” 110 “Military as Institution” 110 The Military Balance 109 The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Janowitz) 110 military oligarchy 110 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 238 Min Aung Hlaing 246 Minkman, E. 35 Mitchell, P. 85n2 Mitsubishi Corporation 201 mixed electoral system 232 mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system 230, 232, 233 mixed-member proportional (MMP) system 84, 287 mixed-mode survey research 46 modernisation 194 modernity 150–51 modernization theory 76–9, 93, 95, 118, 123 modernization thesis 118 modern nationalism 150 Moghadam, V. M. 100, 101 Mohajirs 256, 258n3 Mohamed, Abdul Lathief Jameel 170 Mohanty, C. T. 96 Monaco 274 Money Authority Singapore (MAS) 204n7 Mong Kok unrest (2016) 214 Mon Unity Party 249 Moody P. R. Jr. 134 Moore, S. F. 8 Moors 279, 280, 283n1 Most Different Systems Design (MDS) approach 3 Most Similar Systems Design (MSS) 3 Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) 171 MSS see Most Similar Systems Design (MSS) Mughal, M.A.Z. 7 Mujani, S. 45 Mukherjee, K. 189 Müller, D. 201 multi-country experiments 17 multilevel models/mixed effects models 40 multiparty cabinets 64 multi-party democracy 171 Munck, G. L. 77 Muni, S. D. 197 Munro, N. 47 Musharraf, Pervez 255, 257 Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) 257 Myanmar

310  encyclopedia of asian politics concept 246 future of 252 landscape in ASEAN 251–2 ethnic armed groups 248–50 National Unity Government 250 People’s Defence Forces 250–51 political developments 246–7 Rohingya crisis 247–8 Myanmar military 110 Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) 249 Myanmar Spring Revolution 156 Nabers, D. 29 Nader, L. 8 NAFTA 89 Nair, D. 29 Nash equilibrium concept 22 Nathan, A. J. 164, 208 National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) 291 National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) 246 National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) 249 National Democratic Revolution 235 nationalism 148, 150 and identity politics 101 relationship between feminism and 94 National League for Democracy (NLD) 138, 246–8 National Peace and Order Maintaining Council (NPOMC) 291 National People’s Congress 214 National Security Law (NSL) 213–14 National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) 236 National Thowheed Jamaath (NTJ) 170 National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) 250 National Unity Government (NUG) 250, 251 Naughton, B. J. 208 Nawaz Sharif 255 Nayak, N. R. 197 Nay Pyi Taw 247 Nehru, Jawaharlal 218 Nellis, G. 16 Neo, J. L. 66 neo-authoritarianism 123 neo-functional approach 187–8 neoliberal economic policies 30 neoliberal globalization 95 neoliberalism 115, 123 neo-Marxist approach 99 Nepal 168 multi-party democracy in 171 restoration of democracy in 172

Nepal, Madhav Kumar 172 Nepal Communist Party (NCP) 172 Nepali Congress Party (NCP) 171 New Aspiration Party 290 New Economic Mechanism (NEM) approach 236 New Institutionalism (NI) 27 Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) 28 “new professionalism” 110 new social movement (NSM) approach 99–100 Ngawang Namgyel, Zhabdrung 194, 195 Ngeow, C. B. 101 Nguyen, T.D. 119 Nguyen Phu Trong 294 Nie, N.H. 114 Nilekani, J. 14 Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme 275 Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) scheme 275 non-cooperative games 21 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 4, 53 non-LDP parties 232 non-religious ideologies 149 non-state actors, role of 4 non-superpowers, behaviour of 125 no-pooled models 39, 40 Norris, P. 93 North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 179 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 179 Northeast Asia concept 163 future of 166 landscape Chinese politics 164–5 public opinion research in 165–6 South Korea 163–4 Taiwan 164 Northern Brotherhood Alliance 249 North Korea 163 relationship between United States and 22 Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD) 46 novel data sources 13 Obama, Barack 247 observational data 41, 45 Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement 155 Odekon, M. 201 O’Donohue, A. 226 Oducado, R. M. F. 45 Okruhlik, G. 8 Oli, Khadga Prasad Sharma 172 Oliver, S. 276 Omnibus Law 227 One Belt, One Road 124 Ong, A. 95 Ong, L. H. 209 Oni, S. S. 189

index  311 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 201 orientalist discourses, on warfare 7–8 Osborne, M. J. 21 Ostwald, K. 276 “Other Bumiputera” 241 Otis, Pauletta 147 Pakistan 168 concept 254–6 economy of 256 future of 58 impact on women’s turnout in 16 landscape 256–8 political terrain of 7 relations between India and 170 relations with Afghanistan 171 role of political parties 257 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN) party 254, 257 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 254, 257 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 255 Pan, J. 38 pan-Blue 286 Pancasila doctrine 138, 140n1 pan-Chinese identity 286 panel data 41n8 Pang, B. 209 Panglong agreement (1949) 248–9 pan-Green 286 Pardo, R.P. 127 Park, C. 48 Park Chung-Hee 267, 268, 271n4 Park Geun-Hye 267, 268 Parkinson, S. E. 8 Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act (1949) 279 Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI) 104 parliamentary systems 88 participatory citizenship theory 114 “participatory democracy” 268 participatory democracy theorists 114 Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) 244 path-dependent mechanisms 27 patrimonial-administrative states 28 patrimonial-oligarchic states 28, 29 patron–client network 139 patron–client political system 263 PCA see Principal Component Analysis (PCA) peace efforts, Sri Lanka 281–2 “peaceful revolution” 295 Peiris, Gamini Lakshman 281 Pekkanen, R. J. 82, 231 People Power Revolution 262 People’s Action Party (PAP) 123, 276, 277 people’s defence forces (PDFs) 249–51 People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 197

People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) 290 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 172, 173 People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) 280 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 164 Perry, Elizabeth 208 personal networks 164 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends Project 39 Pheu Thai 138 Philippines concept 262–3 future of 265 landscape 263–5 patronage practice in 139 Philpott, Daniel 147 Pitts, Jennifer 135 Poguntke, T. 231 Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) 231 Policy Agenda Project 143 policy-making cycle 142 policy-making processes 142, 144, 145 “a policy of peace” principle 294 Politburo 164 political anthropology 7 political behavior 15–16 concept 113–14 future of 116 landscape external factors 115–16 internal factors 114–15 political corruption 165–6 political culture 118 in Asia 119 concept 118–19 future of 119–20 landscape 119 political developments, Myanmar 246–7 political economy 122 of Chinese state 128 concept 122 of developmental states in East Asia 126–7 future of 129–30 landscape 127–9 future of 124–5 landscape 122–4 Taiwan 287 The Political Economy of Mountain Java (Hefner) 7 political events, Hong Kong 214 political executives in Asia 89, 91 in Asian states 90 leadership styles of 89 political ideologies concept 133–4

312  encyclopedia of asian politics future of 135 landscape 134–5 political information 15 political landscape, Hong Kong 213–14 political leaderships 262 political liberalization 75 political parties concept 137 future of 139–40 landscape 137 competitive party politics 139 developmentalist and authoritarian party politics 138–9 totalitarian communist party politics 138 political polarisation, Indonesia 226–7 political science 40 ‘comparative constitutional engineering’ 64 ethnography in 9 experimental 13 on formal institutions 26 scholarship in 7 study of constitutions 62 political science approaches 27 political scientists 13 Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q-Methodology in Political Science (Brown) 35 political system 63 Political Systems of Highland Burma (Leach) 7 politics concept 92 of ethnic groups 7 future of 95–6 landscape 92–5 media and 215 religion and 147–52 The Politics of Electoral Systems (Gallagher and Mitchell) 82 Polyarchy (Dahl) 75 Popkin, S. L. 45 populism 176 Pospisil, L. J. 8 post–civil war scenario 282–3 post–Cold War period 78 post-Mao period, economic transformation in 207 postmodernist/poststructuralist approach 100 Power, T. P. 226 PPI see Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI) PQMethod 35 Prabhakaran, Velupillai 279, 282 Prabowo Subianto 226 Prayuth Chan-ocha 291 Preece, C. 83 Premadasa (President) 281 “president-centered military dictatorship ruling” 267 presidentialism 88

presidential power 88 presidential systems 63, 64, 103 Prihatini, E. S. 95 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 35 Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) 21 “pro-business tilt” 220 pro-democracy parties 214 progeny, preservation and promotion of 203–4 Progress Singapore Party 276 Przeworski, A. 77 public opinion 15–16 public opinion research, in Northeast Asia 165–6 public policy concept 142–3 future of 144–6 landscape 143–4 public political participation 114 Pulau Muara Besar 204n1 Putnam, Robert 52 Q-methodology concept 33–5 future of 35–6 landscape 35 Q-method study 33–5 Q-sort technique 33–5 qualitative research inquiry design 6 Qur’an 203 Rabacal, J. S. 45 radicalization 160 Raffles, Sir Stamford 274 Rajapakse, Gotabaya 168, 283 Rajapakse, Mahinda 282 Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby 134 Rakhine Advisory Commission 248, 250 random effects (RE) models 38, 41, 41n10 Rational Choice Institutionalists (RCI) 26, 27 Rational Choice theory 26, 27 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 124 regional integration in Asia 4 Hong Kong 216 regionalism 187 regional organizations 4 Reid, A. 175 Reilly, B. 76, 83, 84, 85n1 relative deprivation 156n1 religion concept 147–8 future of 151–2 landscape 148–51 Repkine, A. 40 Republic of China (ROC) see Taiwan Republic of Korea (ROK) concept 267–9

index  313 export and import partners 270 landscape balancing between US–China strategic competition 270–71 contemporary economic development 270 frequently visited political issues 269–70 rise of IT industry, Hallyu Wave, and COVID-19 pandemic 270 political economy 271–2 research, quality of 45 Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) 280 researchers 2, 3 research questions (RQs) of interest 37 Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) 249 Rethel, L. 127 Revkin, M. R. 16 Reynolds, A. 85n1 Rhyu Sang-young 271n8 Ricardo, David 126 Rieffer, Barbara-Ann 148 Risse, T. 100 Rivetti, P. 8 R-method study 33 Robinson, J.A. 78 Robison, R. 176 Rodan, G. 276 Rohingya crisis 247–8 Roh Tae-Woo 271n5 ROK–US alliance 269, 270 Ross, M. L. 93 Royal Audit Authority 194 Royal Thai Armed Forces 110 “rubber stamps” 103, 105, 106 Rubinstein, A. 21 Rueschemeyer, D. 77 Rüland, J. 105 Russia–Ukraine war 202 Ryu, Y. 29 SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 188, 189 SAARC Development Fund 188 SAARC Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) 188 SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism 188, 189 Saeidi, S. 8 Saez, L. 190 Said’s critique of Orientalism 95 Samuels, D. J. 62 Sanders, D. 46 Sartori, G. 138 Saward, M. 264 Saxena, M. 202 Scalapino, R. 180 Schächter, T. 65 Schaeffer, Frederic 265

“Disciplinary Reactions: Alienation and the Reform of Vote Buying in the Philippines” 264 Schattschneider, E. E. 137 Schengen crisis in Europe 100 Schlager, J. 210 Schmid, A. P. 158, 159 Schmidt, V. A. 30 Schumpeter, J. A. 75 Schwedler, L. 8 Sebastian, S. 197 Second World War 65, 187, 188, 286 secularism 149 secular nationalism 150 “The Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific” (Kerr) 180 security dilemma 21 security sector governance (SSG) 111 security sector reform/governance (SSR/G) 110–11 Segawa, N. 243 Seiple, Chris 147 self-administered surveys 46 semi-presidential system 63 September 11, 2001 attacks 159 Sereno, Maria Lourdes 262 Setiawan, K. 227 Setijadi, C. 227 Sewol Ferry 269 Shah, Timothy 147 Shambaugh, D. 208 Shanghai Cooperation Organization 4 Shani, Giorgio 148 Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) 249 Shapiro, M. 69 Sharia Law 69 Shi, T. 47, 119 “shifting the blame” versus “changing the agenda” 15 Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu (2012) 209 Shih, V. 40 Shin, D. C. 76 Shu, K. 209 Shubert, J. 8 Shugart, M.S. 82 Siddiqui, K. 276 Sidel, J. 109 Siegel, A. A. 15 Singapore 133–4 and Brunei Darussalam 202 concept 274–6 future of 276–7 gross domestic product 274 landscape 276 People’s Action Party 134 political scene 276 political system 275

314  encyclopedia of asian politics Singh, Pritam 276 Singh, R. 197 single-member constituencies (SMCs) 275 single-member district plurality system (SMDP) 104 single-member plurality 63 single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) 230, 233 single-party cabinets 64 single transferable vote (STV) 82 Sinhalese 279, 280, 284n1 Sinhalese-Buddhist shrines attacks 281 Sino-British agreement (1984) 213 Sino–North Korean border economy 129 Sino-Vietnamese relations 294 Sino-Vietnam wars 295 Sinpeng, A. 184 Slater, D. 78, 175, 227 SMDP see single-member district plurality system (SMDP) Smith, A. 40, 126, 135 Smith, Anthony 148 SNTV see single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) social-cultural anthropology 6 social grievance 207 social movements 4, 215 civil society and 216 concept 155 future of 156 Hong Kong 216 landscape 155–6 Social Science Japan Data Archive (SSJDA) 47 Social Weather Station (SWS) survey 263 socio-modernization 92 socio-political developments 94 The Soldier and the State (Huntington) 109 Solheim, Erik 281 Sonthi Boonyaratglin 290 Soudriette and Ellis 82 Soulbury Commission 279 South Africa, institutions in 64 South Asia concept 168 constitutionalism in 65 future of 173 landscape Islamist threat 168–70 strategic environment 170–71 troubled Himalayas 171–3 South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) 188, 189 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 4, 173 concept 187–9 future of 190–91 landscape 189–90 Southeast Asia concept 174–5

future of 176 landscape 175–6 terrorism in 158 Southeast Asian Affairs 175 Southgate, L. 183 South Korea 163–4 see Republic of Korea (ROK) democratization of 134, 163 field experiment in 16 party competition in 139 public opinion research in 166 Soviet Union 122, 182, 230 Special Administration Region (SAR) 213 Special Economic Zone (SEZ) 123 “spiral of hostility” 21 The Spirits of the Laws 133 Sri Lanka 168, 170 concept 279 drift towards Tamil insurgency 279–80 futile peace efforts 281–2 international involvement and onset of dirty war 280–81 future of 283 landscape LTTE’s defeat and end of Tamil insurgency 282 post–civil war scenario 282–3 standardization 279 state assembly (Vidhan Sabha) 219 state capitalism 293 state economic groups (SEGs) 293 state institutions, rules and procedures in 26 state-led industrialisation 219 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 287, 293, 294 state–society relations 54, 55, 129 state terrorism 160 statistical analysis concept 37–8 future of 41 landscape aggregate-level issues and data 40–41 individual-level issues and data 38–40 Stepan, A. C. 110 Stockmann, D. 118 “Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region” (Ball) 181 Strong, C. F. 62 Stuart-Fox, M. 118, 237 Stubbs, R. 183 The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and Its Methodology 33 subjective control 109 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 60 substantive area research, in public policy 142 Suharto downfall of authoritarian regime 225 New Order era 225 Sukarno, guided democracy and authoritarianism 225

index  315 Sukma, R. 225 Sulaiman, H. 203 Sun, H. 165 Sunflower Movement 38 Sunni Muslim 169 “superposition” of socialism 293 Surayud Chulanond 290 survey experiments 13, 14 survey research concept 45–6 future of 47–8 landscape 46 China 47 data sharing 46–7 mixed-mode 46 Survey Research Data Archive (Taiwan) 47 Suu Kyi, Aung San 246–8, 251 Suzuki, M. 23 Syariah Islamic Law 202, 203 Syariah Penal Code Order 2013 203 Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) 249 TAC see Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) Tago, A. 16, 24 Taiwan 163, 164 concept 286–7 democratisation of 134 future of 288 landscape 287–8 party organization matters 139 Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) 287 Taiwan Miracle 287 Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) project 39, 46 Taiwan Social Change Survey data (2016) 39 Takayasu, K. 232 Takenaka, H. 231, 233 Taliban 171 Tamdang, K. A. 45 Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA) 280 Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) 280 Tamil insurgency drift towards 279–80 end of 282 Tamil Language Act (1958) 279 Tamil Tigers see Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Taming Philippine Hunters: A Study of Government and Cultural Change in Northern Luzon (Keesing and Keesing) 7 Tan, K. P. 276 Tan, N. 83, 84 Tang, W. 47 Tarling, N. 175 Tatmadaw 246–9, 251, 252 Taussig, M. 15

techno-racism 8 Teehankee, J. 263 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 169, 256 Ten-Year Socioeconomic Development Strategy 2016–2025, 239 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THADD) 270 terrorism concept 158–9 future of 160 landscape 159–60 in Southeast Asia 158 Thailand concept 290 future of 291–2 landscape 290–91 royalist CSOs in 54 Thai military 110 Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party 290 Thaksin Shinawatra 290 Thein Sein 247, 248 ‘third-wave’ autocratization 53 third-wave democracy 54 third wave of democratization 75 Third World 150 Thiruchelvam, Neelan 281 “Three Represents” theory 207 Thurbon, E. 127, 129 Tien, H. M. 164 time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data 37, 38, 40, 41, 41n7 time-series data 37 To, Y. 128 Tocqueville’s thesis 16 Toft, Monica 147 Tomsa and Setiawan (2020) 227 Tonneson, S. 293 top-down approach 75–8 top-down democracy 197 totalitarian communist party politics 138 trade-to-GDP ratio 241 traditional political systems 7 traditional presidential model 90 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 295 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017) 8 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 182, 183 Truex, R. 15 Trump, Donald 294, 295 Tsai, C. 38, 39, 45 Tsai, K. S. 164, 208, 210 Tsai, L. L. 16 Tsai, T. 39 Tsai, W. 209 Tsai Ing-wen 287 TSCS data see time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data

316  encyclopedia of asian politics Tshering, J. 196, 197 Tsutsumi, H. 232 Tu, C. 46 Turner, M. 196, 197 A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Pitts) 135 Tushnet, M. 65 two-round system (TRS) 82 Two Treatises of Government (Locke) 133 UCDP see Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Uchiyama, Y. 231 Uekami, T. 232 “umbrella identity” 95 Umbrella movement (2014) 214 UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 213 unification–independence cleavage 286 Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 246, 247 United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) 290–91 United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) 243, 244 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 256 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) 202, 204n3 United Nations Human Rights 203 United States populist leaders in 88 power rivalry between China and 164–5 relationship between North Korea and 22 security relationship between China and 165 September 11, 2001 attacks 159 United States civil rights movement 155 United Wa State Army (UWSA) 249 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 203 ‘unstable constitutionalism’ 65 upper house (Rajya Sabha) 218 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 59 US–China rivalry 129, 130, 181 US–China strategic competition 270–71 US–China–Taiwan triangular relations 287 US Constitution 62, 63 US–Japan alliance 24 Uslaner, E. M. 48 US–ROK Indo-Pacific Cooperation 270 US trade statistics 295 US–Vietnam relations 295 van Norren, D. E. 198 Variety of Democracies (VDM) project 71, 104 Veddhas 279, 284n1 Verba, S. 114 Vietnam concept 293 field experiment in 15

future of 296 landscape 293–6 Vietnam economic miracle 293 “Vietnamese bamboo” characteristics 294 Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) 293, 294 legitimacy of 295, 296 Vietnam War 182 Vijayan, P.K. 94 “VISION 2030” 239 Vu, T. 175 Waburton, E. 227, 228 Wang, C. 15, 38, 41, 45 Wang, Q. 210 Wang, T. Y. 39, 45 Wang, Z. 45, 210 Wangchuck, Ugyen 194, 195 Warburton, E. 226 War on Terror 159 Way, L. 78 wealth, preservation and promotion of 204 Webb, P. 231 Weinberg, L. 158 Weiss, L. 129 Weiss, M. L. 84 Wellman, James 147 Welsh, B. 243, 244 Weng, D. L. 38, 45 Western democracies 115 Westminster-style parliamentary regime 63 Whitecross, R. W. 65, 195, 196, 198 Wickremesinghe, Ranil 281 Wilcox, Phill 237 Williamson, S. 16 Wilson, T. 99 Wong, J. 78 Wong, M. Y. 101 Wong, S. H. 39 Worker’s Party (WP) 276 Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) 138, 163 World Bank, “Economics of Political and Criminal Violence” project 59 World Trade Organization (WTO) 207, 237 World Value Survey (WVS) 45, 47 Wright, L. R. 201 WTO 89 Wu, F. 209 Wu, S. 41 Xayaburi Dam project 238 Xi, J. 40 Xi Jinping 77, 79, 118, 166, 294 Xu, Y. 38 Yadav, S. P. 7 Yang, D. L. 208

index  317 Yang, S. 209 Yang, W. 45, 94 Yang di-Pertuan Agong 201, 242, 243 Yap, P. 70 Yates, R. 184 Yeh, Y. 15 Yen, W. 38 Yeo, L. H. 276 Yeoh, B. 95 Yeung, H.W. 127 Yingluck Shinawatra 290, 291 Yong, W. 29 Yoon Seok-Yeol 269, 270 You, Y. 45 Yu, E. C. 38, 46 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang 225, 226 Yu-sheng Lin 134 Zahir Shah, King 171 Zakaria, F. 133, 262

Zaller, J. 45 Zeng, J. 210 “zero COVID” policy 125 Zhang, C. Y. 95 Zhang, G. 41 Zhang, L. 128 Zhang, S. 209 Zhang, Y. 210 Zhao, Y. 179 Zheng, Y. 209 Zhong, Y. 40 Zhong, Z. 209 Zhou, F. 23 Zhou, L. 208 Zia ul Haq (General) 254 Zorn, C. 70 Zou, Y. 128 Zuo, C. 209