Enactment, Politics, and Truth: Pauline Themes in Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger 9781501341014, 9781501341045, 9781501341038

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ENACTMENT, POLITICS, AND TRUTH

ENACTMENT, POLITICS, AND TRUTH

Pauline Themes in Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger

Antonio Cimino

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Inc 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in the United States of America 2018 Paperback edition published 2020 Copyright © Antonio Cimino, 2018 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Inc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Cimino, Antonio, 1979- author. Title: Enactment, politics, and truth : Pauline themes in Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger / Antonio Cimino. Description: New York, NY : Bloomsbury Academic, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018027327 (print) | LCCN 2018036170 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501341021 (ePub) | ISBN 9781501341038 (ePDF) | ISBN 9781501341014 (hardback : alk. paper) | Subjects: LCSH: Bible. Epistles of Paul--Theology. | Religion--Philosophy. | Agamben, Giorgio, 1942- | Badiou, Alain. | Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. Classification: LCC BS2651 (ebook) | LCC BS2651 .C49 2018 (print) | DDC 227/.06--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018027327 ISBN: HB: 978-1-5013-4101-4 PB: 978-1-5013-6169-2 ePDF: 978-1-5013-4103-8 eBook: 978-1-5013-4102-1 Typeset by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters

CONTENTS Acknowledgments

vi

Introduction

1

Chapter 1 PROCLAMATION, PERFORMATIVITY, AND DECLARATION

5

Chapter 2 PAULINE PISTIS AS A RADICAL ATTITUDE

51

Chapter 3 ARTICULATING THE POLITICAL

91

Chapter 4 PISTIS BETWEEN TRUTH AND UNTRUTH

129

Bibliography Name Index Subject Index

164 173 176

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book results from my three-year postdoctoral research project The Truth of Conviction: Attestation, Testimony, and Declaration, financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). It is part of a larger project, Overcoming the Faith–Reason Opposition: Pauline Pistis in Contemporary Philosophy (project no. 360–25–120), carried out at Radboud University Nijmegen and at the University of Groningen. I thank the members of the research group (Ezra Delahaye, Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Geurt Henk van Kooten, Suzan Sierksma-Agteres, and Ben Vedder) for the excellent cooperation and the very fruitful and inspiring discussions, which have been of great importance for my work on Saint Paul and contemporary European philosophy. I would also like to thank Andrew Smith for checking and improving the English in the manuscript. Parts of this book have been presented at national and international research meetings and conferences in Nijmegen, Groningen, Ravenstein, Copenhagen, Wuppertal, Roma, Patras, Madrid, Stockholm, Barcelona, and Freiburg im Breisgau. I wish to thank all those who gave me feedback and thereby allowed me to develop and improve my research. Parts of this book have already been published in the form of journal articles and book chapters: “Attestation and Facticity: On Heidegger’s Conception of Attestation in ‘Being and Time,’” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 44, no. 2 (2013): 181–97, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2013.11006798; “Messianic Experience of Language and Performativity of Faith: Agamben’s Interpretation of Pauline Faith,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 61, no. 1 (2014): 127‒40; “Pistis en ēthos in Heideggers interpretatie van Paulus en Aristoteles,” trans. Ben Vedder, Tijdschrift voor Theologie 54, no. 3 (2014): 239‒50 (this book includes a revised English version of the article, which originally appeared in Dutch); “Seeing the Truth and Living in the Truth: Optical Paradigms of Truth and Pauline Countermodels,” in Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Sight, ed. Antonio Cimino and Pavlos Kontos (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 208–23; “Paul as a Challenge for Contemporary Philosophers: Nietzsche, Heidegger and Agamben,” in Rethinking Faith: Heidegger between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, ed. Antonio Cimino and Gert-Jan van der Heiden (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 179–201. I thank the publishing houses and editors for granting me the permission to reprint these previous publications, which have been revised and updated for the present book.

Acknowledgments

vii

Chapter 3 contains research results that I have presented in a different form and more extensively in a paper in Italian, “Fatticità politica: Per un superamento del paradigma filosofico di Heidegger,” in Constellations herméneutiques: Interprétation et liberté, ed. Riccardo Dottori, István M. Fehér, and Csaba Olay (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014), 37–50. The book is dedicated to my mother, Franca, with my deepest gratitude and love. Antonio Cimino Arnhem, October 2017

I N T R O DU C T IO N

Pauline pistis is a pivotal subject in contemporary European thought. It is evident that a considerable number of prominent twentieth- and twenty-first-century thinkers paid much attention to this theme. They developed original, diverse, and innovative readings of the Pauline letters in direct conjunction with their own approaches to specific philosophical questions. The present book is devoted to the interpretations of Pauline pistis that have been worked out by Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, and Martin Heidegger. There are three principal and complementary reasons that led me to concentrate on these thinkers, although a different focus would no doubt be justifiable. First, the readings of Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger are characterized by substantial thematic overlaps, which can be traced back to a specific key subject, that is, the articulation of pistis. Although each approaches the issue from a different angle, they all interpret Pauline pistis by concentrating on the way it is enacted, articulated, and expressed in Paul’s concrete situation. Thus, focusing on these three thinkers will provide me with a very clearly delimited and coherent thematic focal point. Second, the interpretive frameworks that define their respective approaches to Paul are truly diverse in terms of their theoretical presuppositions and philosophical motives. Thus, although the articulation of pistis constitutes the shared thematic core of their analyses of the Pauline letters, Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger deal with them in multifarious ways. This fact has induced me to shed light on the intriguing tensions between their common complex of themes and the different ways such themes are interpreted. In this connection, my main concern is to clarify why Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger address Pauline pistis and what kind of philosophical motives underlie their own readings. Third, it is worthwhile underlining that, notwithstanding their very diverse approaches and interpretive lines, Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger come to very similar conclusions—even though they each claim to present innovative commentaries on the Pauline letters. Concerning this matter, I intend to illustrate the manifold aspects of these convergences by paying special attention to how they appropriate Pauline pistis within the framework of their respective critiques of traditional metaphysics. In this regard, Paul in fact turns out to be a

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Enactment, Politics, and Truth

central interlocutor in their respective attempts to reject the specific conceptual and foundational patterns inherent in the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics. This crucial point becomes apparent already in Chapter 1 (“Proclamation, Performativity, and Declaration”), which explores the different models Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger bring into play in their respective readings of the Pauline articulation of pistis. Upon closer inspection, these readings can be considered refutations of Nietzsche’s claims against Paul and show the extent to which and why the Pauline letters are in fact seminal sources of inspiration for philosophical thought. For his part, Heidegger understands the Pauline articulation of pistis in terms of proclamation. His lectures on Paul display a groundbreaking interpretation of Pauline proclamation by highlighting some philosophically very fruitful motifs, especially the pre-theoretical self-articulation inherent in factical life experience and the considerable number of insights Paul can offer with regard to the original hermeneutical character of human existence. In this context, Heidegger lays much emphasis on the enactment-character of Pauline proclamation. Agamben’s approach to the Pauline letters is not much different insofar as he develops a reading that is meant to retrieve the original performativity underlying Paul’s pistis, especially with regard to its linguistic self-articulation. What Heidegger calls “enactment” (Vollzug) reappears in Agamben in the shape of the performativum fidei,1 which is directly linked to the messianic tone Agamben sees in Paul’s pistis and is characterized by a clear political potential. However, the political implications of the Pauline articulation of pistis become more apparent in Badiou, who understands that articulation in the form of an evental declaration. Thus, the enactment of Pauline pistis coincides with the emergence of the subject that declares the event and is faithful to it. According to Badiou, this declarative articulation of pistis has a revolutionary potential insofar as it allows for a different understanding of universality, which can help us to reject traditional metaphysical frameworks and conceive of new ways of overcoming ethnic, ideological, and political differences and particularisms. Chapter 2 (“Pauline Pistis as a Radical Attitude”) elaborates on the three models analyzed in Chapter 1 and intends to show that proclamation, the performativum fidei, and declaration are embedded in a certain attitude or way of life. The phrase that names such an attitude is the famous expression hōs mē (1 Cor. 7:29), which plays a decisive role, particularly in Heidegger’s and Agamben’s commentaries on Paul. Chapter 2 goes beyond the more descriptive vein that characterizes Chapter 1 and attempts to single out some implicit assumptions, consequences, and interpretive perspectives that shape the 1. Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 58; Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 134.

Introduction

3

readings given by the three thinkers. This is especially the case with Heidegger. In fact, Paul was one of the models for his conception of authenticity. I will make the Pauline influence explicit by analyzing the fundamental theme of attestation in Heidegger’s analytic of existence and its background, which will be traced back to his lectures on the phenomenology of religion. My attempt to locate Heidegger’s reading of Paul in a broader context led me to consider interesting connections between his account of Pauline pistis and the interpretation of Aristotle’s rhetoric he gives in his 1924 Marburg course. The extensive analysis of Heideggerian sources in Chapter 2 is also due to the fact that they had a substantial influence on Agamben, despite the Italian philosopher’s claims to originality. Agamben’s approach to the hōs mē, in particular, gives quite clear indications of his indebtedness to Heidegger. Aside from this direct link, I will also explain to what extent and in what sense both Heidegger’s interpretation and that of Agamben establish a substantive link between Pauline pistis and the notions of attestation or testimony. Remarkably enough, this link also extends to Badiou’s account of the Pauline evental declaration, which cannot be understood as a mere isolated speech act but must be thought of as an articulation of pistis located in a specific form of attestation and an enduring attitude. Chapter 3 (“Articulating the Political”) constitutes an attempt to develop a substantive critique of what I will call “political Paulinism.” Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate that the notions of proclamation, performativity, and declaration, which are used by Heidegger, Agamben, and Badiou to name the Pauline articulation of pistis, all share an emphasis on processuality and are played off against models based on the metaphysics of presence and objectification. Chapter 3 shows the consequences of this approach, especially as concerns its political implications. The label “political Paulinism” is meant to stress that the emphasis laid by Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger on diverse forms of processuality cannot do justice to the essential nature of the political. This is quite evident in Heidegger, who, both in his commentary on Paul and in his systematic project concerning an ontological analysis of human existence, is unable to capture the political dimension of subjectivity and, as a consequence, presents a politically disembodied facticity, in which institutions, normative orders, power structures, and so forth are not taken into account. Thus, Heidegger’s approach is characterized by an extreme form of political Paulinism, to the effect that it does not allow political orders to become visible. Agamben and Badiou present different, albeit converging, forms of political Paulinism. In fact, messianism and the evental-declarative emergence of subjectivity are linked to a radical critique of institutions and power structures insofar as these are objectified in political orders. According to the analysis developed in Chapter 3, Agamben’s and Badiou’s forms of political Paulinism turn out to be new versions of utopian thought that can neither account for the real nature of the political nor offer plausible solutions to the problems they claim to tackle. The critical analysis developed in this chapter allows me to outline a conceptual

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model according to which the political has to be understood on the basis of three components, that is, interest, conflict, and power. Chapter 4 (“Pistis between Truth and Untruth”) further develops my critique of Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger by taking into account the question of truth. The three philosophers elaborate Pauline accounts of truth by attempting to reject optical paradigms rooted in the Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics of sight. Thus, they construct Pauline countermodels of truth that are meant to constitute radical alternatives to the Platonic and Aristotelian perspectives. This is a further confirmation of the substantial convergence of the three interpretive models. The question arises, however, whether they do justice to the history of metaphysics. In Chapter 4, I argue that Plato can offer an account of pistis that is not susceptible to Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s critiques of traditional metaphysics as onto-theology. In this vein, I emphasize the multifaceted character of pistis in Plato and show that he is able to capture the decisive role pistis plays both in everyday life and in scientific or philosophical knowledge. In this context, my main interpretive hypothesis is that Plato presents an account of rationality that by no means excludes pistis. In accordance with the Platonic account, pistis shapes our everyday attitudes in various ways and also determines scientific knowledge, to the effect that in both cases we have to rely on presuppositions we cannot provide any secure grounds for. Therefore, I argue that we cannot depict Plato as a proponent of onto-theological claims to absolute foundation.

Chapter 1 P R O C L A M AT IO N , P E R F O R M AT I V I T Y, A N D   D E C L A R AT IO N

1 Paul as a Challenge for Contemporary Philosophers The multifarious nature of Pauline pistis becomes apparent when one considers the truly diverse ways in which Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger understand its specific articulation. The main forms of this articulation are conceptualized in terms of proclamation (Heidegger), performativity (Agamben), and declaration (Badiou). This first chapter is devoted to the analysis of these readings, with a view to showing the extent to which Heidegger’s, Badiou’s, and Agamben’s elaborations on Pauline pistis are meant to develop substantial alternatives to traditional epistemological and metaphysical frameworks. In the first part of this chapter, I concentrate my attention on Heidegger’s reading of Paul. In his early Freiburg lecture course Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,1 Heidegger uses the notion of proclamation in order to phenomenologically address the pre-theoretical articulation of Paul’s factical situation. According to Heidegger, that articulation allows us to go beyond the specific features of ontotheological or Cartesian models. In the second part, I will focus on Agamben’s interpretation of the Pauline performative. Agamben argues that Paul’s linguistic articulation of pistis is characterized by a fundamental performativity, which he contrasts with the constative or descriptive nature of the linguistic articulation of traditional ontology. As Agamben shows, Paul is in a position to pave the way for a new experience of language. Such an experience is supposed to enable a new understanding of human life and ethico-political relations. Finally, I will focus on Badiou’s conception of Paul’s evental declaration.2 Within the framework of his conception of event, Badiou uses the Pauline letters in order to conceptualize the notion of universal singularity. In this connection, Badiou’s pivotal thesis is that Paul’s evental-declarative articulation of pistis has to be understood as a substantial alternative to the abstract universality that defines traditional metaphysics. 1. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 1‒111. 2. Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

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The following analysis of the readings put forward by Heidegger, Agamben, and Badiou will document how and why Paul turns out to be a central source of inspiration for them. An appropriate assessment of the pivotal role Paul plays in the context of contemporary philosophy should also take into consideration the deep ambiguity that characterizes the philosophical reception of Pauline themes.3 As a matter of fact, Paul represents a challenge to the very self-understanding of a number of contemporary thinkers. In what follows, I intend to show the extent to which Paul is an important interlocutor for Heidegger, Agamben, and Badiou, especially with regard to basic questions about the nature of philosophical thought. In doing so, I will develop an interpretive hypothesis that, in my opinion, does justice to the complex and ambiguous reception of Paul in contemporary continental philosophy. According to this hypothesis, Heidegger’s, Agamben’s, and Badiou’s readings of the Pauline letters comprise a substantial refutation of Nietzsche’s anti-Pauline commitment.

3. Over the past few years, much research has been devoted to the reception of Paul in contemporary philosophy. See, for example, Carlo Scilironi, ed., San Paolo e la filosofia del Novecento (Padova: Cleup, 2004); John D. Caputo and Linda M. Alcoff, eds., St. Paul among the Philosophers (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009); Alisdair John Milbank, Slavoj Žižek, Chreston Davis, and Catherine Pickstock, Paul’s New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2010); Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries, eds., Paul and the Philosophers (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013); Peter Frick, ed., Paul in the Grip of the Philosophers: The Apostle and Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress Publisher, 2013); Christian Strecker and Joachim Valentin, eds., Paulus unter den Philosophen (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2013); Ward Blanton, A Materialism for the Masses: Saint Paul and the Philosophy of Undying Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Claudio Tarditi, “Seeing the Invisible: Jean-Luc Marion’s Path from Husserl to Saint Paul,” in Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Sight, ed. Antonio Cimino and Pavlos Kontos (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 142‒62; Gert-Jan van der Heiden, ed., “Paul in Philosophy Today,” special issue, International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 77, no. 3 (2016); Gert-Jan van der Heiden, George van Kooten, and Antonio Cimino, eds., Saint Paul and Philosophy: The Consonance of Ancient and Modern Thought (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017). Paul Ricoeur offers a very useful overview on recent philosophical readings of Paul: Paul Ricoeur, “Paul apôtre: Proclamation et argumentation; Lectures récentes,” Esprit: Revue internationale, no. 292 (February 2003): 85–111 (translated by David Pellauer as “Paul the Apostle: Proclamation and Argumentation,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries [New York: Fordham University Press, 2013], 256–78). This overview is particularly fruitful for the discussion developed in this book because Ricoeur lays special emphasis precisely on the question of the articulation of pistis. For an updated overview on Paul and the philosophers, see also Ward Blanton, “Paul and the Philosophers: Return to a New Archive,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 1–38.

Proclamation, Performativity, and Declaration

7

According to Nietzsche’s polemical considerations in The Anti-Christ, Paul should be considered as the real founder of Christianity as an institutionalized religion and is therefore one of the most radical opponents of the authentic philosophical spirit that Nietzsche wants to initiate. On the other hand, according to Heidegger, Agamben, and Badiou, one can defend the very opposite reading and argue that Paul is a revolutionary figure who can provide relevant starting points for a radically new conception of philosophy itself. This revolutionary potential of Paul, as it unfolds in the interpretation of Heidegger, Agamben, and Badiou, can ultimately be said to be very representative of the reception of Paul in contemporary thought, which could also be understood as the attempt to answer the questions of whether and to what extent Paul can be regarded as a philosopher or as an anti-philosopher.4 I will explain how Heidegger, Agamben, and Badiou formulate and answer these questions, paying particular attention to the position these thinkers assign to Paul within the framework of the Western philosophical and religious tradition.5 The philosophical potential of Paul emerges in Heidegger’s thought in a very clear way. Heidegger’s interest in the Pauline letters might be explained with reference to various factors (the historical context, biographical motives, his interaction with other philosophers or theologians, etc.), but if one wants to elucidate the authentic philosophical commitment underlying his reading and to do so against the background of Nietzsche’s anti-Pauline attitude, then it makes sense to consider the radical anti-Platonism of his early Freiburg lectures. According to the interpretive framework Heidegger uses in these lectures, the predominant tendency in the Western philosophical tradition is the 4. As regards the anti-philosophical aspect of Paul, see Geurt Henk van Kooten, “Paulus als anti-filosoof en messiaans nihilist? Kanttekeningen vanuit antiekwijsgerig perspectief bij Badious, Taubes’ en Agambens interpretatie van Paulus,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 54, no. 3 (2014): 277–94. 5. In order to appreciate the real importance of the Pauline challenge that comes into consideration here, one should also stress the fact that such an ambiguity does not only belong to the readings of Paul in contemporary philosophy, but also defines an essential part of the philosophical reception of the Pauline letters in general. In this connection, it makes sense to mention Spinoza’s position in his Theological-Political Treatise, where an entire chapter (11) is devoted to the question concerning the nature of apostolic announcement. According to Spinoza, the apostolic function can be considered from two different perspectives. In some respects, it can in fact be traced back to prophecy, inasmuch as apostleship presupposes imagination (imaginatio) as its own cognitive faculty. Nevertheless, apostles also make use of argumentation, most notably in their letters, in order to convince, to debate, to formulate opinions, and also to explain the foundations of religion. If we follow Spinoza’s approach here, we can see in Paul a strong philosophical attitude. See especially Baruch Spinoza, Complete Works, ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), 503.

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theoretical attitude, that is, a distanced and objectifying comportment toward the pre-scientific life-world. The project of a phenomenological hermeneutics of factical life is meant to provide a nontheoretical interpretation of human existence and, in the final analysis, a “destruction” of Platonism,6 which accords primacy to such a theoretical attitude. Within this framework, Heidegger’s interpretation of Paul should be considered not merely as an application of his own revised phenomenological method, but above all as an attempt to find inspiring starting points for a new form of phenomenological thinking. Thus, in Heidegger’s approach to Paul we see a radical reversal of Nietzsche’s perspective. For Nietzsche, Paul belongs to the Platonic-Christian theological-philosophical tradition he wants to overcome, whereas for Heidegger a phenomenological interpretation of Paul stands in contrast to the traditional Platonic tendency. The opposition between Paul and Platonism emerges in particular with reference to the problem of temporality and historicity. According to Heidegger, the Platonic tendency is not able to do justice to the factical character of human existence— namely, either to its primordial temporality or to its self-experience independent of theoretical commitments—because Platonic philosophers consider facticity as a secondary dimension in comparison to atemporal being. In contrast to this, Paul can be said to provide a genuine account of facticity as such—even if it is not explicitly philosophical—once it is viewed from a phenomenological perspective. In Agamben’s reading of the letter to the Romans, the ambiguity that determines the reception of Paul becomes apparent in an emphatic way insofar as Agamben stresses both Paul’s philosophical potential and his radical opposition to some traditional philosophical frameworks. I will focus on two aspects of his approach. On the one hand, Agamben formulates an extremely interesting hypothesis, according to which there are essential starting points for Hegel’s conception of dialectic to be found in Paul, most notably for the notion of sublation (Aufhebung). On the other hand, because of his messianism, Paul enacts a new experience of language, which does not accord with traditional logic and represents a substantial alternative to both the denotative character of language and allegedly obvious differentiations (e.g., the separation between essence and existence or the distinction between subject and predicates). In the end, Nietzsche’s ideological and tyrannical Paul disappears completely in Agamben’s reading, which, in line with Heidegger’s, presents Paul as a deeply antidogmatic personality, who, on the basis of his profound messianism, acts against institutionalizations of religion, the abstract codification of norms, and the reification of language. Within this framework, the Pauline performative experience of language plays a truly important role. In Badiou’s book on Paul, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, the revolutionary role of the Pauline letters comes to the fore to its full extent, insofar as Paul is said to serve as a basis for a new conception of the political. In 6. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, rev. Dennis Schmidt (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2010), 19‒25.

Proclamation, Performativity, and Declaration

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fact, for Badiou, Paul provides not only novel conceptual patterns that allow us to reject traditional metaphysics. The evental-declarative articulation of pistis also turns out to be a new way of rethinking political action and of outlining a new form of universality, which Badiou recapitulates in terms of “universal singularity.”7 Thus, according to Badiou, the universalism that defines Paul’s apostleship can and should be appropriated in our era of globalization because it may constitute the genuine solution to the problem of overcoming ideological, cultural, ethnic, legal, and identitarian particularisms. Far from being mere outdated documents belonging to the Western religious tradition, the Pauline letters can be understood as a groundbreaking model with which to face contemporary societal and political challenges.

2 Nietzsche’s Anti-Pauline Paradigm Nietzsche’s anti-Pauline manifesto, The Anti-Christ, outlines a very negative and one-sided account of Paul.8 Indeed, the real target of Nietzsche’s violent attack is not Christianity as such, but the institutionalized Christian ideology allegedly founded by Paul, who is considered to be one of the most radical opponents of the authentic philosophical spirit that Nietzsche wants to establish against the Platonic-Christian tradition.9 Actually, the genuine intention of Nietzsche’s anti-Christian commitment is clearly revealed in his very different evaluations of Jesus and Paul. In his explanation of the history of Christianity, Nietzsche lays special emphasis on the sharp opposition between Jesus and Paul, that 7. Badiou, Saint Paul, 22. As regards the question of universality in Badiou’s reading of Paul, see Ezra Delahaye, “Geen Joden of Grieken meer: Badiou en Agamben over universaliteit en particulariteit bij Paulus,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 54, no. 3 (2014): 251–63. 8. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 166. For discussions of the relationship between Nietzsche and Christianity, see especially the following studies: Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche und das Christentum (München: Piper, 1963); Bernhard Welte, Nietzsches Atheismus und das Christentum (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964); Paul Valadier, Nietzsche et la critique du christianisme (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1974); Eugen Biser, Gottsucher oder Antichrist? Nietzsches provokative Kritik des Christentums (Salzburg: Mueller, 1982); Alistair Kee, Nietzsche against the Crucified (London: SMC Press, 1999); Hans Hübner, Nietzsche und das Neue Testament (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000); Eugen Biser, Nietzsche: Zerstörer oder Erneuerer des Christentums? (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2008). As regards Nietzsche’s interpretation of Paul, see also Daniel Havemann, Der “Apostel der Rache”: Nietzsches Paulusdeutung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2002); Abed Azzam, Nietzsche versus Paul (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 9. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, 131.

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is, between the authentic essence of the primordial Christian religion on the one hand, which he alleges had already disappeared after Jesus’ death,10 and Christianity as a purely ideological construction, on the other hand. According to Nietzsche, Jesus is the only real Christian and represents the concrete embodiment of authentic Christianity,11 which does not refer to any faith or dogmatic system, but only to a concrete way of life.12 As a matter of fact, Nietzsche entirely disregards and degrades faith and dogma, considering them as mere cognitive or ideological epiphenomena that do not allow one to see the real nature of the Christian religion.13 Against this background, Nietzsche attributes to Paul the falsification of the history of Christianity and, above all, the pure invention of the theological-metaphysical paradigm of Christianity, especially with regard to the immortality of soul, which is, according to Nietzsche, an ideological conception Paul shares with Platonism.14 In doing so, Nietzsche claims to discover the real intentions of Paul, which, according to him, are political because the genuine goal of Paul was to get power by establishing a clerical elite and controlling the masses. In the end, Paul made use of the Christian religion as an instrumentum regni.15 According to Nietzsche’s virulent criticisms, this Pauline-Christian ideological construction had a fatal impact on the conception of life developed and experienced in the European tradition because it prevented the experience of life in its genuine nature and deprived it of its intrinsic, instinctual power, passing off afterlife as the real meaning of life.16 In the final analysis, Nietzsche thinks Paul to be a typical proponent of the Platonic-Christian ideology, which he wants to fight in order to establish not only an alternative philosophical paradigm, but also a new humankind.

3 Heidegger and His Reversal of Nietzsche’s Position: Paul as an Anti-Platonist and as a Starting Point for a New Conception of Philosophy Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of Paul can be addressed from very different perspectives.17 In this context, I deliberately avoid any historical 10. Ibid., 163‒64. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., 157‒58. 13. Ibid., 178‒87. 14. See especially Nietzsche’s famous definition of Christianity as Platonism for the people. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil/On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 2. 15. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, 166‒67. 16. Ibid., 167‒69. 17. With regard to Heidegger’s reading of Paul in his early Freiburg lectures, I would like to at least mention the following analyses: Jaromir Brejdak, Philosophia crucis:

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or biographical approaches because I intend to focus on the purely philosophical commitment underlying Heidegger’s analysis of the Pauline letters in his early Freiburg lecture courses. Accordingly, I make use of the opposition between Platonism and anti-Platonism, considering this as a privileged framework for explaining the real impact of Paul on Heidegger’s thought. First of all, however, it makes sense to clarify Heidegger’s conception of Platonism in his lecture course Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion. This is especially pertinent because his notion of Platonism does not refer to Plato as such,18 but only to modern and contemporary thinkers, who can be classified as Platonists for many reasons.19 As a matter of fact, Heidegger’s notion of Platonism in his early Freiburg lecture courses is extremely vague. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify at least four basic elements that, according to Heidegger, define the Platonic framework. First, Platonism should be understood as a theoretical attitude,20 that is, as a

Heideggers Beschäftigung mit dem Apostel Paulus (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1996); Otto Pöggeler, “Martin Heidegger und die Religionsphänomenologie,” Edith-Stein-Jahrbuch 2 (1996): 15–30; Luca Savarino, Heidegger e il cristianesimo (1916–1927) (Napoli: Liguori, 2001); Ben Vedder, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion: From God to the Gods (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007), 51–59; Aniceto Molinaro, ed., Heidegger e San Paolo: Interpretazione fenomenologica dell’Epistolario paolino (Roma: Urbaniana University Press, 2008); Ben Vedder, “Heidegger’s Explication of Religious Phenomena in the Letters of Saint Paul,” Bijdragen: International Journal in Philosophy and Theology 70, no. 2 (2009): 152–67; Sylvain Camilleri, “Heidegger, lecteur et intèrprete de Saint Paul,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 58, no. 1 (2011): 145–62. See also the volume edited by Sean J. McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski, A Companion to Heidegger’s “Phenomenology of Religious Life” (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010). A very interesting philosophical analysis of Heidegger’s reading of Paul is also given in Simon Critchley, “You Are Not Own: On the Nature of Faith,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 224–55. 18. Since scholarly research on Heidegger and Plato is very extensive, I mention only the following contributions: Denis Seron, Le problème de la métaphysique: Recherches sur l’interprétation heideggerienne de Platon et d’Aristote (Bruxelles: Ousia, 2001); Robert Petkovšek, Le statut existential du platonisme: Platon dans l’analytique existentiale de Heidegger (Bern: Lang, 2004); Antonio Cimino, Ontologia, storia, temporalità: Heidegger, Platone e l’essenza della filosofia (Pisa: ETS, 2005); Catalin Partenie and Tom Rockmore, eds., Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2005); Rosalia Peluso, Logica dell’altro: Heidegger e Platone (Napoli: Giannini, 2008); Marc Ralkowski, Heidegger’s Platonism (London: Continuum, 2009). 19. Regarding Heidegger and modern Platonism(s), see especially: Markus J. Brach, Heidegger—Platon: Vom Neukantianismus zur existentiellen Interpretation des “Sophistes” (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1996); Alan Kim, Plato in Germany: Kant – Natorp – Heidegger (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2010). 20. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 27.

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distanced and objectifying comportment toward the pre-scientific life-world. In fact, in modern Platonism, which includes Husserl, the neo-Kantians, and the various philosophers of values,21 the reception of the original theoretical commitment of Greek thought entails an essential tendency to view philosophy as science.22 Second, Platonism is a metaphysical paradigm that establishes a basic dualism between the ideal (i.e., atemporal or extra-temporal) and the empirical (i.e., temporal and historical).23 Third, Platonism neglects not only the specific ontological status of human existence, but also temporality and historicity as basic features of human facticity.24 Fourth, Platonism is not able to give a proper philosophical account of facticity, since facticity is neglected or considered as a secondary dimension in contrast to the ideal.25 Manifestly, in modern Platonists the four characteristics mentioned above become apparent in very different ways and combinations. In the final analysis, however, these various Platonic approaches lead to the same result, that is, Platonistically oriented philosophies do not have adequate access to factical life as such, which represents the principal issue and theme of philosophical inquiry for Heidegger. Such a Platonism can be considered the most important opponent for Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity so that his philosophy is characterized by a fundamental anti-Platonic tendency. In this regard, one notices clear resemblances between Heidegger’s early philosophical program and Nietzsche’s intentions. In fact, they both adopt a strong anti-Platonic attitude, criticizing in particular the metaphysical positing of ideal values, norms, or entities, and also stressing the need for a philosophical perspective that would understand life starting from life as such—without the allegedly Socratic-Platonic idea of a scientific philosophy.26 Even if Heidegger and Nietzsche share an anti-Platonic and anti-metaphysical attitude, the consequences of this for their respective readings of Paul could not be more different. As has been said, Nietzsche considers Paul a paradigmatic proponent of the metaphysico-theological tradition he wants to overcome. For him, Paul is a significant manifestation of the Christian-Platonic ideology that 21. Ibid., 33. 22. Ibid., 12. 23. Ibid., 27. 24. In this case, Heidegger refers to Rickert’s neo-Kantian Platonism. See Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 34. 25. Ibid., 27. 26. As concerns Heidegger and Nietzsche see at least the following contributions: Antonello Giugliano, Nietzsche, Rickert, Heidegger (ed altre allegorie filosofiche) (Napoli: Liguori, 1999); Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Heidegger und Nietzsche (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000); Alfred Denker, Marion Heinz, John Sallis, Ben Vedder, and Holger Zaborowski, eds., Heidegger und Nietzsche (Freiburg: Alber, 2005); Rita Casale, Heideggers Nietzsche: Geschichte einer Obsession (Bielefeld: transcript, 2010); Babette E. Babich, Alfred Denker, and Holger Zaborowski, eds., Heidegger and Nietzsche (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012).

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prevents a genuine experience and philosophical account of life as such. For Heidegger, in stark contrast, Paul paves the way for a real overcoming of the Platonic features of philosophical thought. In Heidegger’s anti-Platonism, one can also see the deep ambiguity that defines his project of a hermeneutics of facticity. On the one hand, this project is anti-philosophical insofar as Heidegger intends to dismiss the philosophical tradition, which is considered to involve the interplay between the four Platonic elements mentioned above, especially in the case of contemporary philosophy. On the other hand, his hermeneutics of facticity does not intend to dismiss philosophy as such, because Heidegger’s aim is to emancipate philosophical thought from the Platonic commitment that becomes evident in the idea of a scientific philosophy. In doing so, he claims to do justice to the real nature of philosophical thought. In the end, Heidegger’s project of a hermeneutical phenomenology of factical life is indeed both anti-philosophical and philosophical. Within this framework of an essential ambiguity between philosophy and anti-philosophy, one should also understand the reasons why Paul becomes a relevant starting point for Heidegger’s hermeneutics of factical life. In fact, Heidegger’s philosophical and anti-philosophical perspective is also a specific feature of his approach to Paul. This means one cannot understand Heidegger’s approach to Paul without considering this basic ambiguity of his early phenomenological hermeneutics. On the one hand, Heidegger sees in Paul an essentially anti-philosophical attitude because Paul’s religious experience is articulated differently from Greek philosophy. Given these premises, Heidegger is not interested in possible or documented connections between Paul and ancient philosophy,27 because he basically focuses on the anti-philosophical potential of Paul. On the other hand, however, Heidegger’s use of Paul does not have any theological or religious intentions because his concern is and remains philosophical, even if not in the traditional (i.e., Platonic) sense of philosophy.28 3.1 Heidegger’s Pauline Commitment: Against Greek Philosophy as “the Wisdom of the World” The Pauline character of Heidegger’s early philosophy can be revealed if one considers how suitable Paul’s famous remark about “the wisdom of the world” 27. As regards the relationship between Paul and ancient thought, see the following useful contributions: Hans Conzelmann, “The Address of Paul on the Areopagus,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 41–51; Peter A. Holloway, “Paul as a Hellenistic Philosopher,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 52–68; Emma Wasserman, “Paul among the Ancient Philosophers: The Case of Romans 7,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 69–83. 28. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 47.

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(hē sophia tou kosmou, 1 Cor. 1:20) would be as a motto for Heidegger’s program of a hermeneutics of factical life. While it is of course evident that the substance of Heidegger’s argumentation against Greek philosophy cannot be reduced to Paul’s remark, one should nevertheless place a special emphasis on the convergence between Heidegger’s Pauline motifs and his phenomenological destruction of the Greek sophia. In the following analysis, I explain why Heidegger’s early philosophy can be read as an alternative to the Greek sophia and how his Pauline inspiration—not Paul as such—is consistent with his own opposition to it.29 Heidegger’s philosophical program implies a “destruction” of the Greek primacy of sophia because he considers sophia as the theoretical attitude rooted in a mundane (i.e., inauthentic) self-understanding of human life. In connection with this, one should mention the paradigmatic interpretation of sophia in the Marburg lecture course on Plato’s Sophist.30 According to Heidegger’s account, sophia expresses the typical Greek self-understanding of human existence and also of philosophical inquiry. He is convinced that the Platonic-Aristotelian idea of philosophy as a theoretical attitude is essentially different from the modern idea of theoretical experience because the former is not shaped by the modern (i.e., Galilean-Newtonian) paradigm of science. Nevertheless, for him sophia does not imply any proper, or authentic, self-understanding of human being or of philosophy, because it basically remains world-oriented. In fact, sophia is essentially connected with the tendency to assimilate itself to eternal beings. From this viewpoint, Heidegger’s philosophy—both his hermeneutics of facticity and his existential ontology—has an essentially Pauline character since it contests the primacy of sophia as a mundane self-understanding, but also because his alternative to sophia is shaped in Pauline terms. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is important to stress that Heidegger’s commitment to the Pauline rejection of the mundane Greek sophia does not entail the elimination of philosophy as such, since, on the contrary, Heidegger intends to make use of the anti-philosopher or anti-Platonist Paul against what he considers an inauthentic enactment of philosophical existence. Otherwise put, the anti-philosopher Paul can pave the way for a truly philosophical enactment of philosophy inasmuch as Paul’s articulation of factical life enables one to understand facticity starting from facticity as such—that is, apart from theoretical or sophia-related preconceptions. In this sense, Paul plays a very seminal role for Heidegger’s phenomenological enactment of philosophy because his religious articulation of facticity has a strong philosophical impact, being an essential alternative to traditional 29. Christian Sommer, Heidegger, Aristote, Luther: Les sources aristotéliciennes et néotestamentaires d’“Être et Temps” (Paris: PUF, 2005) offers a detailed presentation of the interplay between Christian anthropology and Greek sources in Heidegger. 30. Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 122.

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Platonic-Aristotelian theoretical comportments. In the final analysis, Heidegger makes use of the anti-philosophical potential of Paul’s articulation of facticity in order to establish philosophically deeper foundations for his hermeneutics of human life. The framework sketched above can be clarified in a more concrete way by emphasizing Heidegger’s opposition of his Pauline account of authentic life to the inauthentic, world-oriented Greek existence. According to Heidegger, sophia is an unconcerned contemplative attitude characterized by inauthentic tendencies. Generally speaking, Heidegger maintains that human existence does not take seriously the primordial characteristics of its own facticity, which refer to the essential finitude and insecurity of human life as such. This tendency toward self-assurance articulates itself philosophically in the positing of ideal dimensions or levels of reality. The paradigmatic example is Plato’s world of ideas, which later reemerges in Husserl’s idealism. In order to avoid this tendency, Heidegger is convinced that the hermeneutics of facticity should pay attention to Paul’s and Augustine’s emphases on the fundamental insecurity of factical life.31 Paul’s experience of facticity represents an important alternative to traditional metaphysical frameworks precisely because it attests to the primacy of temporality, historicity, and insecurity that defines human existence. In this regard, the radically anti-Platonic character of Paul is extremely clear since Heidegger starts from the Pauline experience of temporality in order to reverse the Platonic metaphysical paradigm. In fact, according to Heidegger, Paul neither attempts to escape life as such nor establishes the ideological primacy of the afterlife, but, on the contrary, paves the way for a genuine understanding of human existence in its radical facticity and finitude. For Heidegger, temporality and historicity in Paul are not understood in opposition to eternal entities, as is the case with Greek philosophy, but are instead understood and experienced as such, that is, in their primordial character. It is possible to summarize this point by saying that, within the framework of Heidegger’s reading of Paul, the Pauline account of temporality, historicity, and insecurity is radically opposed to the Greek ideal of sophia. It makes sense to refer again to Heidegger’s lecture course on Plato’s Sophist, where he formulates the thesis according to which Greek philosophy is characterized by the tendency to subordinate the temporality specific to human existence to the eternity of the world, where the highest ideal is the uninterrupted enactment of theōrein. In referring to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Heidegger stresses that Greek philosophers view theōrein as a way of sharing the eternity of the world and becoming immortal (athanatizein), to the extent to which this may be possible for human existence.32 The Greek 31. On Heidegger and Augustine, see Craig J. N. de Paulo, ed., The Influence of Augustine on Heidegger: The Emergence of an Augustinian Phenomenology (Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 2006). 32. Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 122.

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ideal of sophia as theōrein and athanatizein is the exact opposite of Heidegger’s experience of “being-toward-death” (Sein zum Tode), which in turn draws its primordial inspiration from the Pauline hōs mē and also from the experience of the parousia.33 One could also say that Heidegger makes use of the Pauline experience of the parousia, which is future-oriented and essentially linked to the experience of human finitude, in order to overcome Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of presence, which, by contrast, are rooted in a mundane self-understanding and do not take human mortality seriously. Heidegger ultimately formulates his own philosophical program in opposition to the Greek “wisdom of the world,” where this is understood not only in the sense of the genitivus objectivus—that is, “the wisdom of the world” as the wisdom that gives priority to worldly entities and does not consider the proper ontological status of human existence—but also in the sense of the genitivus subjectivus, so that the two senses cannot be separated at all. In this regard, the following quotation from Heidegger’s On the Essence of Ground clearly shows that, for Heidegger, the opposition between Greek philosophy and the Pauline religious experience does not refer simply to different conceptions of the world, but to two different attitudes or ways of experiencing the world, which is to say, to two different ways of life. The crucial passage reads as follows: It is no accident, however, that in connection with the new ontic understanding of existence that irrupted in Christianity the relation between κόσμος and human Dasein, and thereby the concept of world in general, became sharper and clearer. The relation is experienced in such an originary manner […] that κόσμος now comes to be used directly as a term for a particular fundamental kind of human existence. Κόσμος οὖτος in Saint Paul (cf. I Corinthians and Galatians) means not only and not primarily the state of the “cosmic,” but the state and situation of the human being, the kind of stance he takes toward the cosmos, his esteem for things. Κόσμος means being human in the manner of a way of thinking that has turned away from God (ἡ σοϕία τοῦ κόσμου). Κόσμος οὖτος refers to human Dasein in a particular “historical” existence, distinguished from another one that has already dawned (αἰὼν ὁ μέλλων).34

The Pauline anti-Platonism of Heidegger’s early philosophy does not only concern the general framework of his “destruction” of Greek ontology, it also affects some specific elements of his hermeneutics of facticity, as I show in what follows.

33. See Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 48. 34. Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 112. On the Pauline account of the cosmos, see also Stanislas Breton, A Radical Philosophy of Saint Paul, trans. Joseph N. Ballan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 96–125.

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3.2 Pauline Anthropology and the Aristotelian Self-Understanding of Philosophy as Starting Points for Heidegger’s Conception of Authentic Life With regard to the relationship between authentic and inauthentic life, Heidegger’s attitude toward ancient philosophy is deeply ambiguous insofar as his approach to Plato and Aristotle cannot be reduced to a mere rejection of the philosophical life enacted in classical antiquity. In fact, although Paul represents a central interlocutor for the Heideggerian conception of authenticity, one should nevertheless stress that Plato and Aristotle serve as models for discovering the possibility of a proper self-understanding of human life. It makes sense to clarify this point because it is of central importance for understanding the multifaceted connection between early Christianity and ancient philosophy in Heidegger’s thought. Even if Heidegger rejects the self-understanding of philosophy as sophia, he nevertheless explicitly considers the Aristotelian phronēsis to be an enactment of authentic life. This crucial tension between sophia and phronēsis clearly emerges again in his lecture course on Plato’s Sophist, where Heidegger focuses on Aristotle’s account of sophia and phronēsis, trying to show that, according to the conception developed in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle grants primacy to sophia. Heidegger’s main point is that Aristotle analyzes the relationship between sophia and phronēsis from an ontological viewpoint, which focuses on the meaning of sophia and phronēsis for the being of human existence. In this context, Heidegger refers to the teleological framework of Aristotelian philosophy. Thus, compared to sophia, phronēsis is ontologically different and subordinate insomuch as it is dependent on human action. Contrary to this, sophia, which is enacted as theōrein, has no external goals. Nor does it depend on external factors: “Θεωρεῖν is a mode of Being in which man attains his highest mode of Being, his proper spiritual health.”35 In the final analysis, the ontological primacy of presence and eternal beings cannot be separated from the priority of sophia over phronēsis.36 Heidegger’s interpretation of sophia in terms of an inauthentic mode of existence can be understood against the background of the tension between early Christianity and ancient wisdom, especially because Heidegger sees a basic feature of inauthenticity in the Greek sophia, that is, curiosity. In fact, the primacy of sight, which becomes apparent in the contemplative, or theoretical, nature of traditional philosophy,37 should be traced back to the ontological structure of human existence.38 In contrast, the Christian religious tradition provides a new critical insight into the primacy attributed to theōrein. In this regard, Augustine’s analysis of concupiscentia 35. Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 117. 36. Ibid., 117‒18. 37. See William McNeill, The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999). 38. Heidegger, Being and Time, 164‒67.

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oculorum is of central importance for Heidegger and is embedded in Being and Time.39 In spite of the priority attributed to sophia, Heidegger argues that Aristotle is nevertheless able to discover an authentic possibility of human being, that is, phronēsis, which is interpreted as a form of conscience (Gewissen).40 It is possible to achieve a clearer articulation of the ambiguity characterizing Heidegger’s attitude toward Aristotle’s anthropology if one takes into consideration the temporal dimension of the basic division between sophia and phronēsis. Heidegger criticizes Aristotle’s emphasis on sophia and refers to the alleged primacy of the Greek ontology of presence, but, on the other hand, he discovers in Aristotle not only the possibility of authentic life as phronēsis, but also the specific temporal structure of the related experience. The temporality of phronēsis could be considered as Pauline inasmuch as it is kairological. This crucial intersection of Pauline temporal experience with Aristotelian anthropology is well documented in those passages where Heidegger refers to the two fundamental starting points for the kairological conception of temporality. In this context, Heidegger analyzes the experiential structure of Christian hope from a phenomenological viewpoint by concentrating his attention on the intentional relation that defines the Pauline experience of the parousia. As Heidegger stresses, the Pauline way of experiencing the parousia cannot be reduced to any forms of expectation. Accordingly, when Paul uses the expression “[t]ime and moment” (1 Thess. 5:1),41 he does not refer to a concrete “when” that may be objectified and defined clearly and objectively. The time factical life objectifies and articulates numerically is not capable of capturing the genuine experiential meaning of the temporality specific to Christian facticity. Paul does not define any specific dates for the parousia not because he is unable to give any indication. The actual reason is that Paul is not interested at all in any attempt to schedule the parousia according to commonsensical, objective, or calculable temporal features. According to Heidegger, the nature of that question may not be reduced to any “when.” Thus, Paul does not face an alternative between precise knowledge and ignorance of when the parousia will occur. What he requires the Thessalonians to do is not to know the exact time of the parousia but to refer to the self-knowledge embedded in their own factical life.42 For Heidegger, Paul’s fundamental contribution to a philosophical understanding of temporality consists in the emphasis on a primordial experience of temporality—“primordial” in the sense of an experience free from Platonic and scientific misconceptions. Platonic conceptions regard temporality as a secondary dimension, and scientific approaches consider temporality first and foremost on the basis of linear time. In contrast to these, 39. Ibid., 164‒67. See also Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 165‒69. 40. Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 39. 41. For what follows, see especially Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 71‒72. 42. Ibid.

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Paul enables Heidegger to see a temporality rooted in factical life as such and related to the concrete situation of the “I am,” wherein the positing of ideal dimensions or objectifying experiences of temporality plays no role whatsoever. Although Heidegger’s reiterated remarks on the primacy of presence in ancient philosophy do not seem to leave open other interpretive approaches, closer consideration reveals that one should also emphasize Aristotle’s contribution to a phenomenology of authentic temporality or, more precisely, Heidegger’s Pauline reading of Aristotle’s kairological conception of the authentic temporality specific to phronēsis: The instant is a primal phenomenon of original temporality, whereas the now is merely a phenomenon of derivative time. Aristotle already saw the phenomenon of the instant, the kairos, and he defined it in the sixth book of his Nicomachean Ethics; but, again, he did it in such a way that he failed to bring the specific time character of the kairos into connection with what he otherwise knows as time (nun).43

This passage makes clear the extent to which Heidegger identifies an essential inconsistency in Aristotle’s philosophy of temporality since a clear distinction is made between the kairological account and the chronological one such that the former refers to the primordial temporality of human existence and the latter to the derivative experience of the now. According to Heidegger, in the end Aristotle is not able to clarify the connection between these two experiences of temporality. 3.3 Pauline Features of Heidegger’s Hermeneutics of Facticity Heidegger’s Pauline reversal of Platonism in his early Freiburg period also offers more concrete starting points for outlining a hermeneutics of facticity. I want to place special emphasis on three basic themes of Heidegger’s interpretation of Paul: the Pauline model of pre-theoretical self-knowledge, the hermeneutical features of the Pauline announcement, and the Pauline inspiration for formally indicative conceptuality. The first Pauline element is the possibility of a pre-theoretical self-knowledge rooted in the primordial facticity of human existence. In Paul Heidegger sees a clear example of a self-articulation of human existence that does not make use of traditional philosophical categories and does not rely on the theoretical commitment common to Greek philosophical thought. Facticity as such already has a primordial self-understanding, which is situation-related and addresses the individual as such. In explaining the connection between “you know” and “having-become,”44 Heidegger discovers in Paul this fundamental 43. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 288. 44. See 1 Thess. 2:1–12.

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phenomenon of a pre-theoretical self-experience defining human facticity. Heidegger explains this crucial point by stressing the relationship between Christian facticity and the specific self-knowledge inherent to it. According to Heidegger’s reading, the self-knowledge that defines Christian facticity has to be understood in the light of the concrete situation in which Christian life experience is enacted and lived. This kind of knowledge is not of a merely cognitive nature but concerns what Heidegger, in the wake of Paul, describes in terms of “having-become” (Gewordensein), that is, the radical transformation Christian factical life experience undergoes within the context of the experience of the parousia. Thus, Christian facticity should not be seen to be independent of that primordial self-knowledge. On the other hand, this kind of knowledge is essentially embedded in Christian factical life, so that it cannot be formalized and made abstract.45 This point is of absolute importance within the framework of Heidegger’s hermeneutical philosophy because the entire project of his hermeneutics of facticity, and that of his existential ontology too, cannot be understood without the basic assumption that human existence is characterized by a primordial self-understanding that belongs to its being as such and is independent of purely scientific or philosophical commitments. Otherwise put, Heidegger finds in Paul a relevant confirmation of the essentially hermeneutical character of human life. This peculiar approach is readily apparent if one pays attention to the fact that Heidegger interprets Christian facticity in terms of an enactment-based self-experience. In this connection, even though Heidegger focuses on the specific features of Christian facticity, he nevertheless clarifies the structures of facticity as such because enactment-sense constitutes the basic phenomenal character that he always emphasizes in his phenomenological analyses of factical life: The conversion to Christian life experience concerns the enactment. In order to raise the relational sense of factical life experience, one must be careful that it becomes more “difficult,” that it is enacted ἐν θλίψεσιν. The phenomena of enactment must be entwined with the sense of facticity. Paul makes of enactment a theme. It reads: ὡς μή, not οὐ. This μή indicates the tendency toward that which has the character of enactment. μή refers back to the enactment itself.46

Heidegger’s analyses cannot be understood in terms of a psychological account of Paul’s self-experience, since his phenomenological approach consistently implies a suspension of such explicative schemas. Furthermore, he avoids fictitious oppositions such as practical versus theoretical, which are

45. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 65‒66. 46. Ibid., 86.

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inadequate if one wants to grasp the actual meaning of the enactment-based self-knowledge belonging to Christian facticity.47 Starting from the enactment-based meaning of the primordial self-understanding rooted in the Christian facticity, Heidegger is in a position to give a phenomenological account of two basic terms of the Pauline anthropology, that is, “flesh” (sarx) and “spirit” (pneuma).48 In this regard, the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s interpretation is shown by the fact that he avoids any Platonizing reading of these two concepts (i.e., flesh and spirit as substantial parts of human being) and instead interprets them as notions referring to the phenomenal dynamics of facticity. To put it differently, for Heidegger flesh and spirit represent basic tendencies of factical life that are, more or less directly, related to inauthentic life and authentic existence respectively.49 We can go one step further and underline the phenomenon of announcement, which is central in Heidegger’s reading of Paul, as another fundamental starting point for Heidegger’s analysis of the hermeneutical character of human life. In this case, it makes sense to render explicit some central conceptual connections that are not initially self-evident. As a matter of fact, the hermeneutical features of Paul’s apostolic announcement become apparent if we take into consideration both Heidegger’s emphasis on the original meaning of hermeneutics and the phenomenon of attestation analyzed in his existential ontology.50 3.4 The Hermeneutical Features of Pauline Proclamation Even if Heidegger shaped the hermeneutical character of his thought in very different ways according to his various conceptions of philosophy, he always describes hermeneutics in terms of announcement or making known (Kundgabe).51 This characteristic relation of hermeneutics to announcement concerns not only the specific task of philosophy, but also a central phenomenon of Heidegger’s existential analytic, that is, “attestation” (Bezeugung). In fact, Heidegger characterizes attestation not as a mere epistemic phenomenon, but rather as a kind of making known, or giving-to-understand, which

47. Ibid., 87‒88. 48. A detailed analysis of Pauline anthropology is given in George H. van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). This study is particularly informative with reference to the problems discussed in the present chapter because it locates Paul’s anthropology in its own historical context. 49. See Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 88. 50. Concerning the question of attestation in Heidegger and its Pauline background, see also Chapter 2, Sections 2‒3. 51. See, for example, Heidegger, Being and Time, 35.

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human existence bears in itself and which can be traced back to “conscience” (Gewissen). It seems worthwhile to draw together some paradigmatic passages where the hermeneutical features of attestation as the call of conscience are well documented. The key idea here is that the specific enactment of attestation can be characterized as a “giving-to-understand” (das Zu-verstehen-geben).52 According to Heidegger, the meaning of attestation is that it discloses the authentic possibility of the self.53 This function becomes especially apparent in the case of conscience, which indeed gives us something to understand; that is, it discloses something.54 This crucial aspect, which is directly related to Heidegger’s account of truth as disclosure, defines his analysis of conscience and attestation.55 Accordingly, Heidegger says: “That which, by calling in this way, gives us to understand, is conscience […]. If the everyday interpretation knows about a ‘voice’ of conscience, it is thinking not so much about an utterance, which can factically never be found, but ‘voice’ is understood as giving-to-understand.”56 The basic hermeneutical feature of both philosophical discourse and attestation concerns the fact that hermeneutical givenness is essentially different from theoretical or scientific givenness. Both in the case of the hermeneutical enactment of philosophical thinking and in the case of the hermeneutically shaped giving-to-understand that defines attestation as the call of conscience, the related givenness is neither the result nor the starting point of a scientific reasoning or proof. Both cases are forms of enactment pertaining to the primordial (self-)understanding of human existence. In both cases, in fact, Dasein gives itself something to understand. One could also say that Dasein announces something to itself. The announcement-related hermeneutical features of the Pauline discourse become apparent if one focuses not only on etymological or conceptual connections—in this regard, one could mention, for example, some clear resemblances in German: Kundgabe, Verkündigung, Bekundung—but above all on the concrete phenomenon analyzed in Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology of Pauline proclamation. In fact, Heidegger develops a phenomenological account of Paul’s proclamation and takes into consideration its content-sense, relational sense, and enactment-sense.57 He thus shows the extent to which Paul’s proclamation is irreducible to any traditional philosophical or scientific discourse and should be considered in reference to its concrete factical situation,58 as is the case with Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity. 52. Ibid., 261. 53. Ibid., 257. 54. Ibid., 259. 55. Ibid., 260. 56. Ibid., 261. 57. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 97–104. 58. Ibid., 63–67.

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A clear indication of the way Heidegger develops his own phenomenological explication of Pauline proclamation can be found in the following crucial passage contained in the notes and sketches on the lecture course devoted to the introduction to the phenomenology of religion: How of the proclamation: enactmental complex in his life, how the proclamation is positioned in his life, and how it perpetually occupies him (the “hurry”) 2:2; proclamation in broad, great struggle of effort. “The warning [Vermahnung]” may not be separated, no practical, usual appendage, rather corresponds to the fundamental sense of Christian existence of perpetual and radical concern (μᾶλλον).59

Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to Pauline proclamation becomes already apparent in the way he wants to shed light on the intentional structure of that experience. This is because Heidegger is not interested in the concrete content of the proclamation independently of the situation in which it is enacted. The basic perspective of his analyses focuses precisely on the way proclamation is enacted within Paul’s factical situation. According to Heidegger’s own terminology, the central subject-matter is the “enactmental complex” (Vollzugszusammenhang) that defines the experience underlying Pauline apostleship. The central importance of the enactment-sense should be understood both in methodological terms and from a thematic perspective. Not only does Heidegger try to capture the meaning of Pauline proclamation phenomenologically by focusing on the way it is enacted. In principle, all experiences can be analyzed in terms of the threefold intentional articulation concerning content, enactment, and relation. The fact that Heidegger focuses on the enactment of Pauline proclamation is not the decisive factor. The enactment-sense of Pauline proclamation also has a groundbreaking thematic meaning because it is particularly emphasized in Christian facticity.60 It is precisely this emphasis on the enactment-sense that characterizes the factical situation in which the Pauline proclamation is rooted. And, as has been seen, it is this emphasis that inspires Heidegger in his critique of Greek metaphysics. The Pauline “enactmental complex” is the resource Heidegger uses in order to undermine the primacy of presence that he ascribes to traditional ontology. It is worthwhile mentioning at least three basic features of the Pauline “enactmental complex.” They can be easily integrated into a coherent picture that includes the themes addressed in the preceding sections.

59. Ibid., 98. 60. See Heidegger’s pregnant phrasing of the essential link between proclamation and enactment in the following quote: “The phenomenon of proclamation—center of motivation of the enactment.” Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 101. See also ibid., 97‒98.

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The first basic feature of the enactment specific to Pauline proclamation is temporality. The emphasis on enactment can be understood in terms of an intensified temporality that gives a new tone to the entire situation Paul is experiencing.61 In his own Christian facticity, Paul experiences and lives temporality in a new way that one cannot detect in ancient ontology. He lives temporality as such, without tracing it back to a sequences of instants (Aristotle) or seeing it as a lower dimension in comparison with the realm of the eternal (Plato and the diverse expressions of Platonism). It is such an experience of temporality that paves the way for a new account of the historicity inherent in facticity. The second basic aspect is the experience of precariousness and urgency that comes to the fore in Pauline proclamation.62 Heidegger underlines that Pauline proclamation does not offer any certainties—in contradistinction to the various forms of Platonism that pretend to offer stable moral and epistemic foundations. The way Paul enacts and articulates his apostleship is deeply determined by the “uncertainty” and the “concern” that characterize his Christian factical situation lived in view of the parousia.63 The third basic characteristic of Pauline proclamation is its constitutive situatedness in a worldly context. Paul’s experience of temporality and precariousness cannot be reduced to his own private way of living the Christian apostleship and the parousia. The proclamation cannot be conceived of and articulated apart from its addressees.64 3.5 The Pauline Inspiration for Formally Indicative Conceptuality The philosophical potential of the Pauline factical experience also becomes apparent in Heidegger’s elaboration of the methodical strategy he calls “formal indication.”65 In this case, one can say that Paul serves as a model both thematically and methodologically. Thematically, the philosophical relevance of Paul for the elaboration of formally indicative concepts consists in the fact that the Pauline experience reveals the primacy of the enactment-sense.66 It 61. Ibid., 57, 98. 62. See, for example, ibid., 72, 98. 63. Ibid., 98. 64. This decisive aspect of Paul’s apostleship is emphasized by Agamben and Badiou as well. See also Chapter 1, Sections 4‒5. Heidegger conceptualizes this structural openness of proclamation by using his own phenomenological conception of the world. See Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 98. 65. Concerning this aspect of Heidegger’s methodology, see Antonio Cimino, “Begriff und Vollzug: Performativität und Indexikalität als Grundbestimmungen der formal anzeigenden Begriffsbildung bei Heidegger,” Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik 10 (2011): 215–39. 66. This point is explained in detail in the very clear analysis developed in Benjamin D. Crowe, Heidegger’s Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006).

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is precisely the enactment-sense that constitutes the basic phenomenal theme formally indicative concepts have to articulate and to express. Under these premises, Paul’s factical experience, insofar as it is enactment-based, turns out to be a concrete and privileged research field for Heidegger, such that philosophy should face a basic question: How should Christian factical life be approached in order to articulate philosophical concepts that do justice to the specific ontological structures of religious life? This issue should be contextualized in the general methodological problem Heidegger elaborates in his early hermeneutics of factical life with regard to the adequate categories that enable the articulation of human existence in philosophical terms. Assuming, as Heidegger does, that the Pauline factical life experience markedly expresses some primordial features of human life, especially as concerns enactment-related characters, then a phenomenological analysis of the Pauline experience could be an appropriate starting point for elaborating the general question concerning the philosophical categories of human existence. In other words, the Pauline experience represents a thematic challenge for phenomenological inquiry since it finds itself confronted with a self-articulation of human existence that cannot be approached on the basis of traditional categories. The unfolding of Heidegger’s phenomenological explications of the Pauline letters concretely shows to what extent his analysis anticipates, in many respects, his general ontology of human life, especially as regards the intentional features that define the experience of temporality and authentic life. If we consider Heidegger’s ontological analysis of human existence in Being and Time to be a formal explication focused on general structures, then his phenomenological interpretation of the Pauline letters is a decisive step toward such a formalization. In fact, on the one hand, in the course of his interpretation, Heidegger is interested in the concrete dynamics of the Pauline experience of factical life. On the other hand, however, his interpretation is not carried out as a mere report referring to texts, but is rather the attempt to highlight the Pauline experience phenomenologically, on the basis of the essential conceptual framework he introduces in his early hermeneutics— that is, the threefold articulation of intentionality in terms of content-sense, relational sense, and enactment-sense.67 This basically means that the results of his phenomenological reading reach an essential level of formality. From a methodological viewpoint, the central role of Pauline enactment concerns the possibility of formal experience. The formality of the Pauline experience does not mean a separation from factical contents (as would be the case, e.g., with a pure ontology in the Husserlian sense) or a formality in the sense of the Heideggerian formal indication, since Paul’s factical experience 67. I have elaborated on this phenomenologically central framework in Antonio Cimino, Phänomenologie und Vollzug: Heideggers performative Philosophie des faktischen Lebens (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2013), 119–20.

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is not a philosophical one. Rather, the peculiar formality of Paul’s experience refers to the fact that, on the basis of the hōs mē, it is an experience that is not absorbed in worldly contents. In this regard, the Pauline experience of factical life is not only thematically fruitful, but can be considered a model for philosophy itself, at least according to Heidegger’s conception of philosophy in his early Freiburg period. It is in fact quite clear that Heidegger conceives of philosophy in terms of authentic life—that is, a life that is not absorbed in the contents of the world, with the central phenomenal feature being the enactment-sense. Accordingly, the Pauline experience of factical life can serve as a model that clarifies the possibility of philosophy as an authentic way of life. If in this connection ancient philosophy should be considered an inauthentic enactment of human life, then, conversely, Christian factical life can provide essential impulses for a new enactment of philosophy, which enables one to articulate formally indicative concepts. Formally indicative conceptuality is possible only on the basis of an experience that emancipates us from an ontology of substance and from a worldly self-understanding of human life. Thus, in the final analysis, Paul’s experience of factical life provides one with a paradigm of performativity that is of importance for the self-understanding of philosophy as such.

4 Pauline Emancipation in Agamben: A Radical Refutation of Nietzsche’s Reading Among the contemporary philosophical interpretations of Paul, Giorgio Agamben’s commentary on the letter to the Romans deserves special attention for at least three reasons. First, it reveals a strong internal coherence, since Agamben manages to show to what extent the most important aspects of Pauline pistis can be consistently traced back to its distinctive messianic character.68 Second, in approaching the Pauline letters, Agamben combines many methodical strategies in a very original and fruitful way. In fact, his philological accuracy provides reliable and substantial starting points for philosophical considerations that also refer to basic problems of theology, the history of law, political science, the history of literature, and linguistics. Third, despite his interdisciplinary approach, Agamben’s original reading of the Pauline letters does not lose sight of central philosophical issues. This is because, for Agamben, Paul is not merely one theme among others, but an important figure who represents a fundamental challenge to philosophy as such. Because of this reading of Paul, Agamben is able to shed new light upon many classical philosophical problems and concepts (e.g., dialectic, performativity,

68. As regards messianism in Agamben, see Catherine Mills, The Philosophy of Agamben (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), 107‒31.

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potentiality), and outline original paths of research for current and future philosophical work. A complete reversal of Nietzsche’s position can also be found in Agamben’s commentary on the letter to the Romans. In Agamben’s work the ambiguity that determines the philosophical reception of Paul becomes apparent in an emphatic way. In this connection, it makes sense to focus on two main points: Paul’s overcoming of traditional logic and the allegedly Pauline origin of Hegel’s dialectic. I do not intend to provide a general account of these two points. My intention is rather to explain to what extent Nietzsche’s conservative, tyrannical, and dogmatic Paul radically contrasts with Agamben’s Paul, who emerges as a hero of both philosophical and political emancipation. The messianic enactment of language that emerges in Paul’s religious life represents a substantial alternative to Plato’s and Aristotle’s ontologies because Paul enacts a new experience of language that cannot be reduced to the denotative character of linguistic articulation or to allegedly obvious distinctions such as essence versus existence or subject versus predicates. On the basis of Agamben’s reading, one cannot consider Paul as a founder of an institutionalized religion precisely because his conception and enactment of language does not allow any formation of dogmas. The denotative function of language acts as the basic presupposition for the codification of laws and norms and, in particular, for the separation between statements of general normative principles—and also dogmas—and the comportment of individuals.69 According to Agamben, Paul’s messianism is essentially antidogmatic and anti-institutional because it deactivates the denotative function and does not fit with the traditional distinction between general and individual. On the contrary, in dogmatized and institutionalized religions there is a basic asymmetry between norms and individual experience, whereby statements of general principles become preponderant and self-sufficient, that is, separate from individual enactment. Paul’s deactivation of law runs in the exact opposite direction because it is committed to a strong unity between individual religious experience and the statement of principles, between utterance and concrete comportment. 4.1 The Hegelian Reception of Paul’s Performative and Antidogmatic Deactivation In his commentary on Paul’s letter to the Romans, Giorgio Agamben formulates a suggestive hypothesis about the relationship between the Pauline deactivation (katargein), which denotes Paul’s new experience of law, and Hegel’s conception of dialectic, especially regarding the notion of sublation (Aufhebung). According to Agamben, the much-debated theme of the link between pistis and law in Paul 69. As regards the relationship between politics and language in Agamben, see especially Giorgio Agamben, The Sacrament of Language: An Archeology of the Oath, trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

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cannot reduce these terms to mutually exclusive alternatives. Instead, one should focus on the specific meaning intended by Paul’s use of the word katargein. The messianic deactivation does not in fact mean a pure destruction or abolition, but a deactivation that in turn implies a preservation and also a completion or perfection.70 Here Agamben identifies a strong connection with Hegel’s notion of sublation, which he bases on a philological hypothesis, according to which Hegel’s reception of the Pauline deactivation can be traced back to Luther’s frequent translation of katargein as aufheben. According to Agamben, Luther is aware of the particular double meaning that characterizes the German verb, that is, an overcoming and at the same time a preservation that culminates in a more complete, or perfect, condition.71 In formulating this proposal, Agamben argues that the idea of messianic deactivation is the source of inspiration for Hegel’s account of dialectic since, on the basis of the messianic deactivation, the law is simultaneously deactivated and fulfilled.72 In order to understand the reason why Agamben is connecting law and pistis within the messianic dynamics of the Pauline deactivation, one should also consider an important presupposition underlying his interpretive approach—a presupposition that, upon closer consideration, enables him to connect the Pauline deactivation with Hegelian dialectic. Law and faith belong to a primordial sphere that encompasses both of them and can be characterized as law in the broad sense. Law is opposed to pistis insofar as nomos is understood in the narrow sense of the normative, or prescriptive, nomos. As Agamben stresses, however, there is also a different form of nomos, which is not normative, but promissive.73 In the final analysis, Agamben can only argue for the dialectical character of the deactivation because he assumes that the Pauline deactivation unfolds within the sphere of the nomos in the broad sense. Apart from the philological and historical plausibility of Agamben’s hypothesis, it also makes sense to focus on a further conceptual implication he draws in reference to the Hegelian reception of the Pauline deactivation, especially considering the problem of time. Here Agamben emphasizes not only a connection between Hegel and Paul, but also a crucial difference.74 Agamben sees a substantial ambiguity in Hegel’s reception of Paul’s messianic conceptual framework. On the one hand, he underlines the messianic feature of the problem concerning the end of history with reference to the Pauline notion of fulfillment (plērōma). On the other hand, however, Agamben notices that Hegel does not make a clear distinction between messianism and eschatology, since fulfillment is not seen within the framework of a qualitative transformation of time—that is, as the messianic transformation, which primarily affects the 70. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 99. 71. Ibid., 100. 72. Ibid., 99. 73. Ibid., 95. 74. See ibid., 100‒1.

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present—but essentially from the perspective of the end of history and time, that is, as concerns the final stage of the Hegelian dialectical process. In the end, despite the allegedly Pauline resonances, Hegel is not in a position to assimilate Paul to the dogmatic aspects of his dialectical conception. 4.2 The Messianic Experience of Language and Performativity: Agamben’s Interpretation of Pauline Faith At this juncture, it makes sense to elaborate on the notion of performativity and to demonstrate the fruitful and original character of Agamben’s reading of Paul, focusing especially on two themes, that is, messianism and performativity. Even if Agamben explicitly uses performativity only in the last part of his commentary, upon closer consideration one can provide evidence of the fundamental thematic and methodic role performativity and related conceptual frameworks play, more or less implicitly, throughout his interpretation. For this reason I will explain why Agamben’s interpretation places special emphasis on Paul’s messianic experience of language and also what role the performative character of pistis plays within this experience.75 In order to specify the methodological strategy of my approach to Agamben’s interpretation of Pauline messianism, it makes sense to clarify very briefly the way in which I will use the notion of performativity. My account of performativity exceeds Agamben’s conception of the performative, even if in principle the former includes the latter. In fact, in a certain way I intend to radicalize Agamben’s approach by showing that he manages to highlight very well many of the dimensions of performativity that define Paul’s messianism, even if he explicitly speaks of performativity above all in reference to what he calls “the performativum fidei.”76 Since the concept of performativity is used by many authors in very different ways,77 I intend 75. In the present context, I focus on the relationship between pistis, messianism, and language, but I do not devote special attention to Agamben’s interpretation of the Pauline experience of time (see especially Agamben, The Time That Remains, 59‒87), because this theme would require extended specifications, which exceed the immediate scope of the present analysis. So I confine myself to Agamben’s account of Pauline messianism, starting from the primordial discourse dynamics involved in the messianic form of life, that is, the vocation or calling (klēsis), and analyzing the performative character of pistis emerging in Paul’s experience of “the word of faith” (to rhēma tēs pisteōs, Rom. 10:8). Concerning Agamben’s interpretation of Paul’s messianic experience, see the contribution provided by Job De Meyere, “The Care for the Present: Giorgio Agamben’s Actualisation of the Pauline Messianic Experience,” Bijdragen: International Journal in Philosophy and Theology 70, no. 2 (2009): 168–84. 76. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 131‒37. 77. For a general introduction, see James Loxley, Performativity (London: Routledge, 2007).

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to start from a minimal definition of performativity, which will be specified in the course of my subsequent analyses. In the first instance, then, one could define performativity as the primacy of enactment as such.78 In my elaboration of the aforementioned themes, I will especially focus on three points. My initial concern will be to give a general presentation of Agamben’s conception of Pauline messianism. In this regard, I will take into account his interpretation of three seminal Pauline terms, that is, klēsis, hōs mē, and chrēsis, which, according to Agamben’s reading, express the basic characteristics of Paul’s messianic attitude. Second, I will concentrate on the relationship between pistis and nomos, which cannot be reduced to a mere opposition and in which a new experience of language emerges. Agamben interprets this relationship on the basis of the dialectic between operativity, an aspect of performativity, and deactivation. Finally, I will explain the reasons why Agamben uses the notion of performativity in order to specify the linguistic features of Pauline pistis. In fact, the concept of the performativum fidei enables Agamben to put the problem of pistis into a more general context, which concerns other  domains of human culture, particularly law and institutionalized power. 4.3 Agamben’s Reading of Pauline Messianism: Klēsis as a Messianic Transformation In the course of his interpretation, Agamben gives priority to the notion of klēsis,79 being convinced that it and its related terms express Paul’s messianic form of life in a very significant way.80 According to Agamben, the basic

78. The methodological meaning of such a minimal definition should be understood in the same sense in which Heidegger speaks of “formally indicative concepts” and Wittgenstein of “family resemblances.” See Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), 291‒300; Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 27. Conceived in general terms, the genuine function of philosophical concepts does not consist in a definitive and hypostatized determination, but in a pre-delineation that remains flexible and also open to self-correction. Already Aristotle saw very clearly, more so than Plato, this function of philosophical conceptuality. See especially Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), 1.3.1094b20, where he underlines that philosophical discourse operates according to the nature of the intended topic. 79. See especially Agamben, The Time That Remains, 19‒43. 80. Agamben specifically refers to 1 Cor. 7:17–22 and Rom. 1:1, stressing Paul’s consistent use of terms and clauses related to kaleō.

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meaning of klēsis can be summarized by underlining the fact that vocation is “the particular transformation that every juridical status and worldly condition undergoes because of, and only because of, its relation to the messianic event. It is therefore not a matter of eschatological indifference, but of change, almost an internal shifting of each and every single worldly condition by virtue of being ‘called.’”81 In his account of Paul’s vocation as an “internal shifting” of factical worldly conditions, Agamben strongly emphasizes the transformative character defining the dynamics of messianic klēsis. The first peculiar point of this reading is the radical formality of messianic klēsis, that is, the fact that klēsis does not have any determined content and does not contain any particular prescription.82 In fact, the messianic vocation does not represent an alternative to the factical conditions in which individuals stand. Rather, the primordial emptiness of messianic klēsis is characterized by a productive negation, which should be understood as a revocation.83 Vocation as revocation does not consist in a mere elimination or abrogation of the factical worldly conditions, but in an essential transformation of them. This transformation is at the same time a preservation and an overcoming.84 It is a preservation because individuals remain in the same factical conditions in which they have already been. Indeed, the change and the overcoming affect the way in which individuals experience their worldly situations, since they live their factical conditions on the basis of the hōs mē.85 Since the messianic transformation does not have any content, it is able to pervade each factical condition and to give a new feature or form to it. If the hōs mē represents the negative aspect of klēsis as the messianic attitude toward the factical conditions, the positive one is the chrēsis, that is, the “use” of them. According to Agamben’s clarification,86 one should focus on the juridical sense of chrēsis and therefore emphasize the fact that, in the messianic form of life, worldly conditions do not represent essential features. Messianic life only uses the worldly facticity in which it finds itself, making no claim to full possession. For messianic life, the world remains the same, only the way in which it is experienced and lived is radically different. One could also formulate this point

81. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 22. 82. Ibid., 23. 83. Ibid. 84. See Arne De Boever, “Politics and Poetics of Divine Violence: On a Figure in Giorgio Agamben and Walter Banjamin,” in The Work of Giorgio Agamben: Law, Literature, Life, ed. Justin Clemens, Nicholas Heron, and Alex Murray (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 82‒96, here 93‒94. I will specify this point in the section dedicated to the relationship between pistis and nomos: see Chapter 1, Section 4.4. 85. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 22‒23. 86. Ibid., 26.

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by saying that the world does not change at all. Rather, our world-experience receives a new tone or rhythm.87 The special emphasis placed by Agamben on the transformation that defines messianic experience is consistent with his interpretation of messianic time. Messianic time is not separate from worldly or chronological time, but it does represent a radical transformation of it in the form of a contraction.88 One could also say that while messianic time is chronological, it is experienced in a very different way. This qualitative transformation of experienced or lived time presupposes a historical event, that is, Jesus’ resurrection. Nevertheless, it cannot be reduced to a chronological order in the normal sense. The second messianic event, the parousia, cannot be considered as a predictable occurrence either. Messianic time, deeply different from the prophetic experience of time and also from the apocalyptic or eschatological one,89 escapes every chronological objectification and relies on a contracted present, in which the apostolic announcement takes place in and through the above-mentioned messianic transformation. 4.4 The Relationship between Pistis and Nomos: Agamben’s Discovery of the Performative Dimension of Paul’s Messianism Agamben’s conception of the Pauline messianic attitude represents an interpretive approach that also enables one to give a very consistent answer to a fundamental problem that every exegesis of the Pauline letters faces, that is, how the relationship between pistis and nomos should be understood. The central point emerging from Agamben’s interpretation can be explained by making use of the notion of performativity, which will here be taken in the first instance in the sense of the above-mentioned minimal definition. In fact, even if tacitly, the performative character of Pauline messianism already emerges in Agamben’s account of the vocation. The emphasis placed by Agamben on the formal character of messianic klēsis implicitly refers to two aspects of performativity. First, the genuine messianic attitude does not produce new contents, since its real substance consists in the new manner in which factical conditions are experienced. To put it differently, according to Agamben, in the 87. Agamben’s interpretation is very close to Heidegger’s reading of the hōs mē. See Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 72‒73, 86. Here one could also see further significant overlaps with other philosophical or theological authors. To mention just one example, one could point to Wittgenstein’s conception of the ethical attitude that he articulates at the end of the Tractatus. In fact, this attitude does not affect the worldly contents, but only the manner in which one sees the world. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, trans. David F. Pears and Brian F. McGuinness (London: Routledge, 2001), § 6.54. 88. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 64. 89. Ibid., 59‒64.

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Pauline messianic life the fundamental point is not which factical conditions are experienced, but only how they are enacted. Second, in Agamben’s reading, the performative disempowerment of worldly contents is linked to his general interpretive framework, which indeed makes use of the messianic performativity that has just been mentioned. It must be remembered, of course, that this messianic performativity emphasizes the primacy of enactment as such over worldly contents, in contrast to dogmatic forms of religion.90 The central role performativity plays in Agamben’s account of Pauline messianism is confirmed and becomes increasingly apparent in his reading of further basic Pauline terms, especially in reference to apostolic announcement.91 In fact, Agamben stresses that the Pauline apostolic announcement as such has an operative character, since a clear distinction between the act of announcing and the content of the announcement is not feasible. So, according to Agamben, in Paul euangelion never means any written stock of dogmatic contents separate from the concrete enactment of the announcement. This primordial indistinction between the act of announcing and the contents announced represents the crucial starting point that enables Agamben to single out the manifold performativity of Pauline pistis and of the related messianic experience of language.92 Agamben emphasizes this point when he says: “What has just been announced is the same faith that realizes the power of the announcement. Faith is the announcement’s being in act, its energeia.”93 Indeed, Agamben substantiates his emphasis on the performative nature of Paul’s pistis by focusing on the essential relationship established in the Pauline letters between faith and energeia and by referring to many text passages where this connection manifestly emerges.94 This operative or performative nature of Pauline pistis and of the related announcement is also highlighted by Agamben on the basis of the term plērophoria.95 Agamben reads it within the framework of the fundamental contraposition between an empty discourse, which may be repeated, believed, or verified, and the genuine apostolic announcement, which 90. Ibid., 1‒2. 91. Ibid., 88‒93. 92. Ibid., 90. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid. In this regard, further text passages from the Pauline letters can be taken into account in order to confirm and substantiate this interpretive approach: see, for example, 1 Thess. 1:3, 1 Thess. 2:13, and Phlm. 6. Agamben also mentions the Aristotelian conception of energeia within the framework of his analysis of the performativity that defines the Pauline word of faith. See Agamben, The Time That Remains, 136. For Agamben’s reading of Aristotle’s distinction between potentiality and actuality, see also Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 177‒84. 95. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 91. In his clarification of plērophoria, Agamben especially refers to 1 Thess. 1:5.

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relies on very specific conditions that are linked to performativity. What these conditions could be will now be discussed. Agamben focuses on the situation-related nature of the Pauline announcement and faith. In fact, Paul’s announcement is not a mere discourse expressing certain information, but originates in a concrete situation. This link to the concrete individual situation of the announcement is an essential feature, not a contingent or accidental one. Under these circumstances, the announcement and the related pistis address concrete individuals and originate in Paul’s factical situation.96 Otherwise put, announcement and pistis are based on the first- and second-person perspective. According to Agamben, the roots of the plērophoria that defines Paul’s announcement can be located precisely in the pistis of Paul and also that of his listeners or addressees, so that, in a given situation, the logos announced is always enacted and comes to fulfillment in and through pistis. Against this background, one can appreciate the consistency of Agamben’s reading, paying attention especially to the extent to which the emphasis on the performative, or operative, character of pistis enables one to consider the relationship between pistis and nomos from a new viewpoint, which is expressed with the verb katargein. In fact, the relationship between pistis and nomos cannot be reduced to a mere opposition, in which pistis would simply abolish or eliminate nomos. One could summarize Agamben’s point by saying that the performativity or operativity of pistis deactivates, or renders inoperative, the nomos.97 It makes sense to emphasize that the intriguing ambiguity of the relationship between pistis and nomos also plays a central role in Agamben’s account of the original meaning of pistis, which, according to his reconstruction, should be contextualized in a primordial sphere, which he, following other scholars, calls “prelaw.”98 On the basis of his archaeological approach to the notion of pistis, Agamben tries to show to what extent pistis is strongly connected with oath, and to what extent both belong to the sphere of prelaw, in which it is not possible to distinguish magic, religion, and law. Under these presuppositions, Agamben argues that Paul’s discussion of the relationship between pistis and nomos cannot be considered as a strict contraposition of two heterogeneous dimensions, precisely because they are both rooted in the sphere of prelaw. Otherwise put, the Pauline dialectic between pistis and nomos should be understood within 96. Ibid., 91. 97. Ibid. For a useful contextualization of this theme in Agamben’s work, see Bruno Gullì, “The Ontology and Politics of Exception: Reflections on the Work of Giorgio Agamben,” in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life, ed. Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 219‒42. 98. As regards the notion of prelaw, see Agamben, The Time That Remains, 113‒15. A more extended and critical analysis of this notion is to be found in Agamben, The Sacrament of Language, 15‒17, 22‒29.

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the framework of this unique primordial dimension.99 Agamben consistently places a special emphasis on the subsequent, more specific juridical features of pistis in ancient civilizations.100 Agamben’s archaeological remarks concerning the primordial meaning of pistis are not only of a historical and philological nature, insofar as they also represent a relevant basis for a more philosophical commitment. In fact, on closer consideration, emphasizing the (pre-)juridical features of pistis and its intriguing relation with law and also prelaw implies a concrete substantiation of the thesis about the performative character of pistis. If law and the juridical are eminent dimensions in which the performativity of human language clearly emerges, the performativity of faith is not an accidental or superficial feature, since it is rooted in the primordial performativity that characterizes human experience and language and defines the sphere of prelaw, even if faith will become characterized by a specific form of performativity. 4.5 Paul’s Performative Experience of “the Word of Faith” All the points analyzed above concerning the performative nature of Paul’s faith and announcement are consistently synthesized in Agamben’s account of “the word of faith.”101 In this regard, Agamben very convincingly shows how and to what extent Paul’s experience of faith is, in the final analysis, an originary linguistic experience rooted in a primordial performativity, that is, in the performativum fidei, as Agamben calls it. The starting point of this challenging and original reading is the verb homologein in Rom. 10:9, which, for Agamben, pointedly expresses the seminal correspondence, within “the word of faith,” between “mouth” and “heart.”102 In this case, the denotative correspondence between words and facts does not play any role at all, since the nature of the correspondence belonging to “the word of faith” indeed indicates a performative self-reference. This crucial point is articulated nicely by Agamben with reference to the relation between “mouth” and “heart.”103 In his elaboration, Agamben makes use of a very particular point of Austin’s account of performativity, that is, the fact that, in order to be really felicitous in its realization, the performative utterance should be linked to certain situation-related conditions, which are not linguistic and also concern, among other things, the personal qualities and functions of the individual 99. Within this framework, messianism as such cannot be considered as a purely religious phenomenon, but should be understood in reference to the historical dialectic between law and religion. See especially Agamben, The Time That Remains, 118‒20. 100. Ibid., 114‒19. 101. In his interpretation of this term, Agamben especially refers to Rom. 10:6–10. See Agamben, The Time That Remains, 129‒37. 102. Ibid., 130. 103. Ibid., 131.

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who articulates the performative utterance. Here, not only is the content of the utterance as such relevant, but (first and foremost) knowing who is pronouncing the utterance and under which circumstances is likewise important. For Agamben, the performative power of Paul’s “word of faith” exemplifies this situation-relatedness by addressing the first- and second-person perspective of the individuals involved, that is, Paul and the addressed ekklēsia. But in Agamben’s reading of “the word of faith” one can notice a further performative aspect, which is linked to the three basic notions of Pauline messianism, that is, klēsis, hōs mē, and chrēsis. In fact, the performative nature of “the word of faith” indicates an originary experience of language as well, that is, the messianic one, in which codified norms and institutionalizations are suspended due to the transformation that defines Pauline messianism and culminates precisely in this performativum fidei. Under these circumstances, according to Agamben’s account, the performativity of the messianic experience of language refers not only to the basic consistency between the articulation of discourse and personal qualities, but also to the deactivation of the denotative or constative character of language. Otherwise put, the messianic experience of language indicates an inner transformation of language, by which the normal denotative relation becomes inoperative. In fact, in the case of the denotative relation, language corresponds to things, so that the dictum and its external reference to the world play the central role. Therefore, in Agamben’s general elaboration, and not only in reference to Paul’s messianic experience, performativity essentially consists in deactivating the referential feature of language and in transforming it into a self-reference. Thus, the self-referentiality that characterizes the performative structurally implies a “suspension” of the denotative nature of language.104 In this context, Agamben notes that the performative verb needs a dictum. Otherwise, its efficacy would be merely empty. Accordingly, the performative does not involve an elimination of the respective dictum but implies a substantial qualitative transformation of it insofar as the “constative quality” of the dictum is, so to speak, put in brackets.105 The essential distinction between “the word of faith” and the denotative character of sentences concerning deeds is emphasized by Agamben by also taking into account what he calls the “nominal sentence.”106 The belief in Jesus Messiah does not consist in a pure epistemic act of believing something about Jesus.107 In fact, neither apophantic features of language nor the related traditional ontological framework play any role in the linguistic self-articulation of pistis. Consequently, the substance of pistis does not refer to an expression of epistemic contents articulated in predicative assertions, which in turn are based 104. Ibid., 132‒33. 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid., 127‒29. 107. See also ibid., 137.

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on the use of the verb “be.” So, according to Agamben, in Paul only the nominal sentence “Jesus Messiah” is relevant, while the predicative sentence “Jesus is the Messiah” is not. In Paul’s experience of language and in his word of faith “the Messiah” is not a predicate that can be attributed to the substance “Jesus,” but an inseparable feature of Jesus as such, disregarding philosophical distinctions between essence and existence or predicates and subject. This peculiar experience of language belonging to “the word of faith” and connected to the plērophoria is consistently linked to the aforementioned nominal sentence. Since there is here no distinction between substances and qualities, between existence and essence, the experience of the nominal sentence is based on an absolute positing, that is, not on a relative positing, which takes place in and through the connection between a substance and its predicates, or between essence and existence. In the final analysis, the absolute positing belonging to the nominal sentence of “the word of faith” cannot mean a belief in the fact that Jesus is the Messiah, but only in Jesus Messiah, where the relationship to Jesus is characterized by a full adhesion.108 The qualitative transformation of language belonging to messianism is, for Agamben, the fundamental aspect that should be taken to characterize the nature of the performative. Here one can notice some basic analogies between messianism and performativity. Messianism does not introduce new contents into the world, but it does effect a radical transformation in the way in which one experiences one’s own factical situation. In a very similar way, the performative does not introduce new dicta but operates an internal transformation of language and its dicta due to a fundamental transition from an external reference to an operative self-reference. In both cases, the described transformation is based on a peculiar dialectic between operativity and deactivation. The operativity of messianic experience consists in the deactivation, or revocation, of the factical worldly situations that are experienced on the basis of the hōs mē. The operativity of pistis consists in deactivating the nomos on the basis of the katargein. The performativity of language refers to the deactivation of the pure denotative relation on the basis of an operative self-reference. In all cases, according to Agamben’s reading, deactivation does not at all mean a pure elimination, but rather a transformation of the worldly situation, of the law, and of language, respectively. This very important point could also be reformulated by saying that the qualitative transformation that affects the world, law, and language disempowers one-sided, codified, and rigidified experiences of them. If we want to draw consequences from Agamben’s approach, we could also say that the revolutionary character of Pauline messianism especially concerns its revocation of world, law, and language, inasmuch as it enables us to free ourselves from the pre-existing, codified, and normal givens. 108. This full adhesion expressed in the plērophoria and articulated in the absolute character of the nominal sentence indicates, for Agamben, the concrete meaning of Gal. 2:20. See also Agamben, The Time That Remains, 91, 129.

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Summarizing the main points concerning the role performativity plays in Agamben’s reading of Pauline faith, one could also stress two interconnected aspects, that is, performativity as consistency between the articulation of discourse and personal qualities, between mouth and heart, and performativity as a self-referential character of language, which includes the suspension of its denotative features.109 In the final analysis, the Pauline homologein expresses exactly these two aspects of the messianic performativity belonging to “the word of faith.” However, in introducing the notion of performativity into his interpretation of Pauline faith, Agamben does not confine himself to a mere application of this concept on the basis of a pre-established formulation. On the contrary, with his introduction and use of performativity he tries to develop a deeper account of it and to put it into a larger philosophical context, one which refers especially to performativity as a primordial character of human experience and culture. It makes sense to focus on the main aspects of his approach to this theme, especially on the intriguing relationship between the juridical sphere and religious experience. According to Agamben, performativity is not merely a feature of a certain type of utterance. Performativity refers to a primordial power of human language, which emerges especially in the sphere of law. In this case, the specific function of language is not to express facts or to refer to facts, but to produce them.110 In the course of these considerations, Agamben argues that the denotative relation between language and the world is a derivative one, inasmuch as it follows from the disruption of the aforementioned primordial performativity.111 Within the framework of this tension between the denotative and the performative, Agamben tries to reread the Pauline relationship between pistis and nomos, connecting them with two different experiences of language. Against this background, Agamben argues that in Paul pistis and nomos essentially refer to two opposing tendencies.112 It makes sense to reformulate in a more pointed 109. Ibid., 134. 110. Ibid., 133. 111. In this regard, the conceptual framework of Agamben’s considerations is very close to Heidegger’s approach to the question of truth and language within the context of the history of metaphysics. In fact, for Heidegger as well, the denotative function of language and the related conception of truth as correspondence follow from a derivative experience. According to Heidegger, the primordial nature of language and truth exhibits what one can consider a performative character, which is essentially linked to the dynamics of being as event (Ereignis). The derivative, metaphysical conception of language and truth (the denotative function of language, truth as correspondence) is unilateral and inauthentic, following from a disruption of the original sphere of the relationship between human existence and being as event. See, for instance, Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1982), 1‒54. 112. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 134‒35.

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and perspicuous way the very important consequences Agamben draws from his account of the Pauline opposition between pistis and nomos and also from the primordial performativity belonging to human language. Agamben’s conception of performativity seems to imply essentially two interwoven perspectives. According to the first perspective, which is basically historical, the primordial performative sphere of human language undergoes essential separations, for instance, between denotative and performative (in the narrow sense), between religion and law, or between language and things. Considered as a whole, this process is essentially one of degeneration. The second perspective is dialectical and alludes to the two aforementioned experiences of word or language. On the one hand, the word of the nomos implies a rigid codification of norms and dogmatic contents, so that the primordial performative power of language is markedly reduced. In this case, one could also speak of an objectification and dogmatization, whereas one can notice what Agamben calls the “juridicizing of all human relations in their entirety,”113 in reference to the phenomenon of the institutionalization of human life. On the other hand, the performativum fidei and the messianic point to an experience of language that essentially exceeds the scope of any objectification, dogmatization, or institutionalization, whereas “the word of faith” is not of denotative nature and cannot be reduced to the juridical performative. To put it differently, “the word of faith” is neither the denotative utterance concerning deeds in the world nor the juridical performative, which “posits itself as fact.”114 Here Agamben sees a pure potentiality of saying, which “also exceeds the act of saying itself, the performative power of language,”115 and turns out to be a radical freedom from mere states of facts and also from states of law.

5 Pauline Logic: The Theory of Discourses and Declaration in Badiou’s Reading of Paul In interpreting the Pauline letters, Agamben and Badiou outline and approach very similar philosophical questions but arrive at, to some extent, widely divergent conclusions.116 In what follows, I will focus my attention on how Badiou shows the basic principles of a Pauline logic in his book Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, with special emphasis on what he calls a “theory of 113. Ibid., 135. 114. Ibid., 136. 115. Ibid., 137. 116. With regard to Agamben’s and Badiou’s interpretations of Paul, see Eleanor Kaufman, “The Saturday of Messianic Time: Agamben and Badiou on the Apostle Paul,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 297–309.

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discourses.”117 Upon closer consideration, the Badiouian theory of discourses is crucial for the pursuit of three concurrent goals: to provide a general assessment of the philosophical and also anti-philosophical significance of Paul in Badiou’s reading; to clarify how Badiou elaborates the Pauline differentiation between three basic forms of discourse (i.e., Greek discourse, Jewish discourse, Christian discourse); to single out and emphasize some important divergences between Agamben and Badiou, especially concerning the hermeneutical frameworks they bring into play in their interpretations. In my analysis, I will primarily address the first two points, whereas the last one will stay in the background. In approaching these topics, I do not intend to offer an immanent presentation of Badiou’s Pauline commitment. Rather, I want to bring out its philosophical meaning and see the most characteristic aspects of Badiou’s reading in terms of a general theory concerning the constitution of subjectivity.118 In fact, in the final analysis, Badiou’s primary interest in Paul is neither historical-exegetical nor theological-religious,119 but strictly philosophical, since he assumes that Paul is an exemplary case for the clarification of the general features that define the emergence of subjectivity as such. 5.1 The Distinction between Prophecy and Apostleship in Badiou and Agamben Agamben and Badiou approach the same problem concerning the distinction between prophecy and apostleship; however, they make use of very different perspectives, which reflect their essential divergences. For his part, Agamben primarily refers to the temporal features of prophecy and apostleship. According to Agamben, one has to differentiate between prophecy, apostleship, and eschatology, since they are essentially constituted by very different experiences of time. In fact, in the case of prophecy, the future has priority over both the present and the past, because the prophet predicts what has not yet happened, whereas eschatology concerns the very last day, that is, the end of time.120

117. Badiou, Saint Paul, 40‒54. Concerning Badiou’s reading of Paul, see the contribution by Marc de Kesel, “The Time of Truth: Reflections on Alain Badiou’s Reading of Saint Paul,” Bijdragen: International Journal in Philosophy and Theology 70, no. 2 (2009): 207–35. See also L. L. Welborn, “The Culture of Crucifixion and the Resurrection of the Dispossessed: The Interpellation of the Subject in the Roman Empire and Paul’s Gospel as ‘Truth Event,’” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 127–40. 118. Badiou, Saint Paul, 4. Regarding the question of subjectivity in philosophical readings of Paul, see Stanley Stowers, “Paul as a Hero of Subjectivity,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 159–74. 119. Badiou, Saint Paul, 1‒2. 120. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 62.

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For  Pauline apostleship, the experience of time is principally shaped by the present, which is experienced as a contracted time.121 In differentiating prophecy, philosophy, and apostleship, Badiou takes into account their respective logical structures, considering them as essentially different discourse-related paradigms: Greek discourse, Jewish discourse, and Christian discourse.122 In Badiou’s account of these fundamental differences, time does not play any role at all. However, in this connection, the characterizations “Jewish,” “Greek,” and “Christian” do not have any historical or ethnic connotations because they refer to “subjective dispositions” and “regimes of discourse.”123 According to Badiou, the institution of Christian discourse takes place through an essential differentiation from Greek discourse and Jewish discourse,124 since they respectively reveal very dissimilar features in reference to the question of universality. For Badiou, Jewish discourse is embodied in the figure of the prophet and rooted in Jewish ritualism. Such a prophetic articulation turns out to be a discourse of the sign. This type of discourse relies on exception, since its essential elements (sign, miracle, election) exceed the cosmic totality and go beyond the established order of the cosmos.125 On the other hand, Greek discourse, embodied in the figure of the wise man, is differently shaped, since it relies on Greek wisdom, which is a cosmic discourse, or a discourse of the cosmic order, where this is understood in terms of totality. Badiou sees a strong complementarity between Jewish discourse and Greek discourse since both structurally refer to the figure of mastery.126 Assuming the intrinsic complementarity between Jewish discourse and Greek discourse, Badiou questions the universal character of both discourses, since “each supposes the persistence of the other,”127 so that they cannot claim to be genuinely universal. Moreover, both discourses are characterized by pre-established orders. In fact, philosophy, or wisdom, “consists in appropriating the fixed order of the world, in the matching of the logos to being.”128 One can easily see that such an appropriation cannot be entirely free and subjective, since, on the contrary, it merely consists in a conceptual or logic recognition of the natural order pre-given in the cosmos. Within the framework of Greek wisdom, according to Badiou’s reading, there is no place for universal singularity in the proper 121. Ibid. 122. These three types of discourse become connected with respectively different types of articulation, that is, Jewish discourse with a demand for miracles, Greek discourse with questioning, and Christian discourse with declaration. See Badiou, Saint Paul, 58. 123. Ibid., 41. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid., 41‒42. 126. Ibid., 42. 127. Ibid. 128. Ibid., 41.

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sense, because singularity would be always and everywhere situated in an order it cannot modify, challenge, or reverse. To put it another way, natural or cosmic universality is not open to subjective or evental foundation, and philosophical discourse cannot be declarative in Badiou’s sense, given that it is only the recognition or discovery of a pre-given universal order.129 As concerns Jewish discourse, it relies on the “mastery of a literal tradition and the deciphering of signs,”130 which presupposes a further pre-established order, given in Jewish ritualism and prophecy. There is no room for universal (i.e., evental-declarative) singularity, not only because a traditional (ritualistic and prophetic) order has priority, but also, as has been said, because Jewish discourse implies an essential reference to the cosmic order articulated by Greek mastery.131 In this connection, Badiou sees a decisive consequence. On the basis of his differentiation between the three forms of discourse, Badiou tries to highlight the specific features of Christian discourse by stressing the substantial novelty introduced by Paul. Thus, the Pauline discourse originates as a discourse of radical “rupture” that is “absolutely new” insofar as the Christian discourse is equidistant from Jewish prophetic mastery and from Greek philosophical mastery.132 For Badiou, “Paul will be neither a prophet nor a philosopher,”133 because apostleship does not consist in wisdom or legitimation on the basis of the cosmos,134 nor does it rely on the mastery of signs. Badiou also clarifies the specific epistemic features of Pauline discourse, arguing that an apostle cannot be considered “a material witness.”135 Pauline discourse is foreign to the standard criteria of scientific discourse, since it is not empirical, historical, falsifiable, or demonstrable.136 In fact, apart from the specific content of the Pauline announcement, which, as we will see, is not relevant for Badiou’s reading, it is the formal features of the resurrection as pure event that are of central importance in this connection. The resurrection cannot be traced back to a particular historical event but should, in terms of Badiou’s account, rather be understood as the opening of an epoch or a “rupture.”137 In this regard, one can argue for a similarity between event and the phenomenon of paradigm shifts investigated in the philosophy of 129. The sharp conflict between Paul’s evental-declarative discourse and Greek discourse is concretely displayed in his Areopagus speech, where the evental-declarative conviction confronts ancient wisdom. See Badiou, Saint Paul, 27‒29. 130. Ibid., 42. 131. The evental-declarative articulation of Christian discourse is foreign to the logic of mastery. See Badiou, Saint Paul, 59. 132. Ibid., 43. 133. Ibid., 44. 134. Ibid., 28. 135. Ibid., 44. 136. Ibid., 44‒45, 61. 137. Ibid., 43.

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science. For its part, philosophical discourse is not in a position to declare the Christian event, so that a radically new discourse is needed in order to articulate it. However, this articulation cannot consist in a mere description or historical report, but rather in a substantial break, which implies a radical reversal of established languages. Ultimately, Pauline declaration is not an invention of a new philosophical discourse, but an overcoming of philosophical discourse as such, especially of the onto-theological framework that defines traditional discourses concerning God.138 5.2 Pauline Evental Declaration and a New Articulation of Subjectivity One can consider Badiou’s account of Pauline evental declaration in the light of conceptual frameworks belonging to other philosophical authors. This is not only a potentially productive perspective, but also a necessary one if we bear in mind that Badiou’s concept of declaration might be easily misunderstood by being associated with seemingly similar philosophical notions or prephilosophical meanings. In order to single out the actual meaning of this basic notion from Badiou’s reading of Paul, I will concentrate on four relevant points: (i) the nonapophantic nature of declaration; (ii) the formal character of declaration, that is, the fact that declaration as such does not need any concrete or positive cognitive content; (iii) declaration as emancipation; and (iv) declaration as subjective discourse. If one considers these four points as a whole, it is possible to argue that, according to Badiou’s conception, Pauline evental declaration is radically new in comparison with traditional types of discourse. In fact, the event of the resurrection is not a theme of philosophical, empirical, or historical knowledge and cannot be grasped and articulated by means of Greek discourse, simply because philosophy has no access to it. Therefore, what is necessitated is not a new philosophical discourse, but a new discourse as such, which implies a break with philosophy.139 138. Ibid., 47. At this point, one can notice a convergence between Badiou and Agamben, as concerns the anti-philosophical character of Pauline discourse, even if they make a distinction between philosophical discourse and apostolic discourse on the basis of different presuppositions, as has been explained. In this connection, it makes sense to stress two crucial points. First, both of them emphasize the fact that old (Platonic-Aristotelian) ontological categories are not applicable in the case of Pauline discourse, given that in Paul there is no place for an ontology of substance and in general for onto-theological discourse (regarding Agamben, see especially The Time That Remains, 126–29). Second, they both stress the subjective character of Pauline discourse, that is, the fact that such a discourse originates in a concretely situation-related context and addresses specific interlocutors (regarding Agamben, see especially The Time That Remains, 128‒37). Accordingly, the first-person perspective and the second-person perspective are the defining traits of Pauline discourse. 139. Badiou, Saint Paul, 46.

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5.2.1 The Nonapophantic Nature of Declaration At first sight, the notion of declaration might be understood in apophantic terms, that is, as a statement or constative formulation that articulates and expresses states of affairs on the basis of predicative clauses. This account of declaration is not in line with Badiou’s notion. In fact, Badiou describes the truth procedure specific to Paul by emphasizing the connection between event, truth, and the declaration of such an event. According to Badiou, a truth procedure consists in declaring the event and also in faithfulness in relation to this declaration.140 The fact that truth is essentially linked to an event declared by a subject implies the original singularity of such a truth. Conceived in such a way, truth cannot be traced back to a structural, axiomatic, or legal framework, precisely because of the singular, subjective, and evental characteristics that define evental declaration.141 Given this singularity, truth can at the same time constitute an authentic universality that escapes any pre-established historical or communitarian order.142 This evental declaration belonging to the Pauline truth procedure cannot be understood in apophantic terms, because such a declaration does not simply notice or articulate states of affairs. Put another way, it is not an objective declaration which articulates pre-given deeds in the world. This declaration— and its truth—are “entirely subjective,”143 since it “testifies to a conviction relative to the event.”144 It is precisely in this context that Badiou introduces his interpretation of Pauline pistis, which, according to him, should be translated not as “faith,” but as a “conviction” or “fidelity.” Conviction, or fidelity, is an essential element of the evental-declarative dynamics, since it names “the subject at the point of declaration,” or, to put it another way, the subject in its founding emergence.145 In order to avoid misunderstandings, it makes sense to stress that the subjective character of faith as conviction does not mean a merely individual, private, and self-referential belief. On the contrary, Badiou explicitly ascribes a public character to the evental-declarative articulation of faith as conviction. Its public character is in turn consistent with the militant feature of truth.146 In other words, “the public declaration of the event” and “the public confession of faith” are required.147 5.2.2 The Formal Character of Declaration Declaration as such does not have any concrete or positive content. Badiou explicitly stresses the fact that he is not interested in the specific content of the Pauline announcement, that is, in 140. Ibid., 14. 141. Ibid. 142. Ibid. 143. Ibid. 144. Ibid. 145. Ibid., 15. See also ibid., 17. 146. Ibid., 88. 147. Ibid.

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the statement that constitutes what in Badiou’s opinion should be characterized as “a fable,” “a fabulous element,” or an “element of fabulation,” and should be summarized as follows: Jesus is resurrected.148 Badiou is firmly convinced that one can separate such a fabulous core of Paul’s announcement from his substantial contribution to a theory of the subject.149 It is worthwhile noting that the undermining of the content of the Pauline announcement is a trait shared by Heidegger, Agamben, and Badiou. In fact, they all contend that the pivotal element specific to Paul’s articulation of pistis concerns not what is announced but how that articulation takes place. Heidegger lays emphasis on the enactment-sense of Pauline proclamation, Agamben refers to the performativity that characterizes the Pauline experience of language, and Badiou foregrounds the evental dynamics of Pauline declaration by pointing out its peculiar formal conditions. 5.2.3 Declaration as Emancipation The evental, singular, and subjective character of declaration also implies a basic emancipatory tendency, in which the revolutionary potential of Paul comes to the fore, in that truth allows for a subversion of the pre-established or old orders of discourse. One can notice here some convergences between Badiou and Agamben, insofar as they both emphasize the emancipatory character of Pauline discourse, even if they start from different premises. Badiou sees Paul’s emancipatory power in the universal singularity of the evental-declarative truth procedure, whereas Agamben focuses on Pauline messianism.150 Considering the epistemic qualities of Pauline apostleship, one can emphasize its specific features in relation to philosophy and also to prophecy. As has been said, philosophy relies on a logos that recognizes and articulates the cosmic order, whereas prophecy is legitimated on the basis of tradition and exception, being the mastery of signs. What is apostleship? Why is Paul an apostle? Badiou strongly stresses that fact that “[i]n order to be an apostle, it is not necessary to have been a companion of Christ, a witness to the event. […]. An apostle is neither a material witness, nor a memory.”151 Accordingly, the evental-declarative truth procedure does not rely on proofs or visibility, and it escapes any empirical or conceptual knowledge.152 Here one can see the crucial point of Badiou’s account of the evental-declarative truth procedure—namely, the fact that the Pauline apostolic truth procedure does not rely on empirical or historical foundations, 148. Ibid., 4. Badiou’s emphasis on the resurrection is not an abrupt oversimplification; rather, it relies on a clear consideration of the profound differences between the Gospels and the Pauline letters. Badiou clarifies the reason why the actual meaning of Paul’s evental declaration refers to Jesus’ resurrection. See Badiou, Saint Paul, 33. 149. Badiou, Saint Paul, 6. 150. Ibid., 14‒15. 151. Ibid., 44. 152. Ibid., 45. See also ibid., 5 and Chapter 4, Section 2.2.2.

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it does not claim to provide proofs or counterproofs, regardless of whether they are falsifiable, verifiable, empirical, or historical. The declaration of the event does not mean a historical report based on empirically or historically verifiable facts. If declaration were merely such a report, Paul would not be entitled to make such a declaration, since he is not a material or historical witness to the resurrection event.153 Because of the evental declaration, the subject emancipates itself from old discourses. In fact, philosophy and prophecy can only provide a cosmic or ritualistic-prophetic universality, which, on closer consideration, is not the authentic universality Paul is able to articulate by means of the evental declaration performed in his truth procedure. Cosmic law, articulated in Greek philosophy, and ritualistic-prophetic law, which finds expression in Jewish prophecy, must be abandoned. In the final analysis, the Pauline evental-declarative truth procedure turns out to be “a-cosmic and illegal.”154 The emancipatory power of Paul’s evental-declarative articulation of the subject becomes apparent in several contexts. A few significant examples can be mentioned. In contrast to Greek discourse, which establishes an order of places within the cosmic totality,155 the Christ-event and the related discourse imply “the vanity of places.”156 The same applies to ethnic or cultural differences, especially the Jewish-Greek divide, which is removed and overcome through the real universality of Christian discourse.157 The universality that defines the Pauline evental-declarative discourse is very different from the universality pertaining to Greek discourse. In fact, the Pauline experience of universality is essentially “ex-centered,” assuming that “all true universality is devoid of a center.”158 This is consistent with what I would call “destructured universality,” that is, a universality that escapes abstract homogeneity, being shaped by the evental singularity. The emancipatory trait that characterizes evental-declarative subjectivity is reinforced by the radical discontinuity of its truth procedure.159 The essential discontinuity of the evental-declarative discourse becomes apparent and is embodied in Christ as event, where Badiou argues that Christ cannot act as a mediation but should be understood as “pure event”: “he [Christ, A.C.] is what interrupts the previous regime of discourses. Christ is, in himself and for himself, what happens to us.”160 The question of emancipation as freedom from pre-given social, historical, legal, communitarian, or identitarian orders is of decisive importance for 153. Ibid., 45. 154. Ibid., 42. 155. Ibid., 56. 156. Ibid. 157. Ibid., 57. 158. Ibid., 19. 159. Ibid., 21–22. 160. Ibid., 48.

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assessing the basic divergences between Badiou and Agamben. They both stress Paul’s emancipatory force, albeit in very different ways. It makes sense to mention the basic elements of this contrast. As has already been shown, in Badiou the possibility of breaking with pre-given orders should be traced back to the universal singularity of Pauline evental declaration. Here, a subject emerges that does not exist prior to the evental declaration and cannot be understood in terms of traditional categories such as substance, soul, and res cogitans. The Pauline universal singularity disrupts and questions such pre-given orders. For his part, Agamben sees Paul’s emancipatory power in his messianism, in that the messianic experience of time is the condition of possibility for the deactivation of factical situations.161 The difference also becomes apparent in the case of law. According to Badiou, Paul is able to overcome the abstract universality of law on the basis of a new, more radical universality, that is, the universal singularity opened up by the evental-declarative truth procedure.162 The rejection of law and works is consistent with Paul’s emphasis on the universality, subjectivity, and singularity of the evental-declarative articulation of conviction: “considered in its particularity, that of the works it prescribes, the law blocks the subjectivation of grace’s universal address as pure conviction, or faith.”163 The universal singularity of the subject that declares the event is in sharp contrast with the particularity of law and of its inauthentic universality.164 Instead of giving priority to the question of universality,165 Agamben concentrates his attention on the deactivation of law through pistis. Pistis does not abolish or eliminate laws, but it does render law inoperative. In this context, the question of universality does not play a primary role. 5.2.4 Declaration as Subjective Discourse As has already been seen, the Pauline truth procedure cannot be traced back to any structural, axiomatic, or legal order, given the fact that it is evental and singular. For the same reason, it cannot be reduced to communitarian or historical facticities. This point is of extreme importance for understanding Badiou’s theory of subjectivity. In fact, the subject escapes any pre-given orders and does not exist before the event it declares.166 According to Badiou, the subject emerges where an event is declared, insofar as the emergence of the subject essentially consists in the declaration of the event. From this viewpoint, such a declarative constitution of subjectivity disrupts pre-given facticities and orders as it is the articulation of a new subjectivity. Thus, the articulation of pistis is indeed the articulation of the 161. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 18‒43. 162. Badiou, Saint Paul, 57. 163. Ibid., 75. 164. Ibid., 77. 165. See Agamben, The Time That Remains, 51‒58. 166. Badiou, Saint Paul, 14.

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subject. The situation-related character of Paul’s discourse is consistent with its universal singularity and paves the way for a radically new experience of truth. In fact, truth does not in this case refer to an alleged objectivity or neutrality, but to the evental-declarative subjectivity that breaks with traditional conceptual frameworks and gives priority to an unconditioned singularity. That the anti-philosophical character of the Pauline discourse cannot be separated from its subjective nature is confirmed by the style of his letters. As Badiou rightly emphasizes,167 Paul’s texts are concrete situation-related “interventions” and “militant documents.”168 They are not systematic treatises, books, or a dogmatic and canonized corpus.

6 Hegelian Dialectic and Pauline Logic By way of a conclusion, I would like to mention that the similarities and differences between the three approaches to the Pauline articulation of pistis can also be clarified by pointing out their common Hegelian background, which can hardly be overestimated. Hegel turns out to be a crucial interlocutor for Agamben, Heidegger, and Badiou when they aim at illuminating the essential features of Pauline logic. In this connection, their shared concern is to spell out the non-Hegelian traits of Pauline pistis with regard to different aspects. We have already discussed the extent to which Agamben emphasizes the link and the difference between the Pauline notion of deactivation and the Hegelian concept of sublation.169 At this juncture, it is also worth mentioning how both Badiou and Heidegger distance themselves from a Hegelian reading of Paul’s articulation of pistis. Badiou’s anti-Hegelian stance becomes apparent in chapter 6 of his book on Paul, where he gives a clear answer to the question of whether Paul’s conception of the event is dialectical. One can easily notice the convergence between Badiou and Agamben when they both put great emphasis on the Christian theological background of Hegel’s philosophy.170 Badiou, too, wants to avoid any incorporation of the event into the dialectic of the Absolute, because such incorporation would amount to the dissolution of the event. Grace, which 167. Ibid., 31‒32. 168. Ibid., 31. See also the way Stanislas Breton describes the situation-related feature of Paul’s letters: Stanislas Breton, A Radical Philosophy of Paul, 53. Concerning Breton’s approach to Paul, see Jeffrey Bloechl, “The Philosopher on the Road to Damascus: On Breton’s St. Paul,” Philosophy and Theology 16, no. 2 (2004): 269–81. It is also worth mentioning another book by Stanislas Breton, The Word and the Cross, trans. Jacquelyn Porter (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), which discusses the relation between faith and philosophy by drawing its inspiration from Paul. 169. See Chapter 1, Section 4.1. 170. Badiou, Saint Paul, 65.

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Badiou understands in terms of the contingency of the event, would be deprived of the radical rupture that is typical of the Christ-event. We can therefore conclude that Badiou’s conception of Pauline subjectivity is quite different from Hegel’s absolute subjectivity, although they both conceptualize subjectivity in the light of its inherent processuality. Hegelian subjectivity is auto-foundational and displays the necessary and compelling process of dialectical logic, which ultimately results in the rational reconciliation of the Absolute. This is not the case with the evental-declarative processuality of the Christ-event, which is defined by an irreducible contingency.171 A similar anti-Hegelian stance can also be ascertained in Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures, although it must be noted that the explicit references to Hegel are scarce. It is therefore the global anti-Hegelian trait of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity that must be taken into account when we aim at explaining how Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pauline letters is instrumental in outlining a new account of philosophy and logic. However, at the same time, we should not forget that Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures echo a number of Hegelian themes and terms. In this regard, one can mention many topics of more or less explicitly Hegelian provenance—for example, historicity, the self, alienation, critique, negativity.172 Heidegger’s understanding and use of dialectic is highly symptomatic of such ambivalence.173 On the one hand, Heidegger reappropriates the Hegelian sense of negation within the framework of his new phenomenological method: factical life gives itself in a particular deformation. This formation into an object-thing must be undone. Therefore, one perpetually says “not” with phenomenological descriptions.—That is the basic sense of the Hegelian method of dialectic (thesis, antithesis, synthesis).—Negation achieves thereby a creative force, which is the driving force of the concepts of expression in opposition to the concepts of order.174

This phenomenological and hermeneutical reappropriation of Hegel’s concept of negation leads Heidegger to what he calls “diahermeneutics”: “The dialectic in philosophy, as a form of expression, is not dialectic in the sense of the synthetic confrontation of concepts. Rather, philosophical dialectic is ‘diahermeneutics.’”175 On the other hand, Heidegger rejects a Hegelian account

171. Ibid., 65‒66. 172. See also Jean Grondin, Sources of Hermeneutics (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995), 47‒60. 173. See also Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Winter Semester 1919/1920, trans. Scott M. Campbell (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 9. 174. Ibid., 181. 175. Ibid., 198.

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of dialectic,176 so that his hermeneutics of facticity does not result in any reconciliation. Factical life and philosophy are inherently characterized by the unresolved dialectic of authenticity and inauthenticity.177 In other words, Heidegger puts emphasis on the finitude that characterizes both facticity and philosophy. His interpretations of early Christianity—most notably, Paul and Augustine—are crucial components of this anti-Hegelian philosophical program, which also includes Luther and Kierkegaard.178 It therefore comes as no surprise that the method of formal indication, which also results from Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pauline letters,179 does not adhere to Hegelian dialectic, because formally indicative, or phenomenological, conceptuality has no claim to ultimate understanding. That is why Heidegger asserts that religious experience is not incorporated into the philosophical Absolute: “The formal indication renounces the last understanding that can only be given in genuine religious experience; it intends only to open an access to the New Testament.”180

176. See, for example, Martin Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. John van Buren (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 33‒37 and Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), 110‒12. 177. See, for example, Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 98‒135. 178. See, for example, Heidegger, Ontology, 83, 86. However, Heidegger also emphasizes the link between Hegel and Kierkegaard: see ibid., 33. 179. See Chapter 1, Section 3.5. 180. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 47.

Chapter 2 PAU L I N E PI ST I S A S A R A D IC A L AT T I T U D E

1 Enacting Pauline Pistis In the previous chapter, I have outlined the different ways in which Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger understand the articulation specific to Pauline pistis. My primary concern was to show the extent to which they introduce the notions of proclamation (Heidegger), performativity (Agamben), and evental declaration (Badiou) with a view to singling out, from different angles, the characteristic processuality that defines that articulation. The question is not only of an interpretative nature. In fact, the three thinkers appropriate Pauline pistis with the intention of calling traditional metaphysical models into question. The present chapter aims to elaborate on Heidegger’s, Agamben’s, and Badiou’s interpretations of Pauline pistis by demonstrating how they associate its articulation with what I call “a radical attitude.”1 I bring this concept into play because I want to emphasize two relevant traits of such readings. First, for the three thinkers the articulation of pistis cannot be reduced to a mere cognitive or linguistic phenomenon but is structurally embedded in a way, or form, of life, that is, an attitude that determines how one experiences the world, the self, and others. Second, Pauline pistis as an attitude is radical insofar as it represents a new way of experiencing all possible situations in which individuals stand. In other words, the radical attitude in question consists in a deep qualitative change, which influences the individual’s life as a whole. In what follows, I will further elaborate on a number of themes I have already addressed in Chapter 1, by giving priority especially to the hōs mē. It can be considered the typical phrase that recapitulates the substance of Pauline pistis as a radical attitude. It is indeed the key theme Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger address in their 1. With regard to the reading of Pauline pistis in terms of attitude, see Suzan Sierksma-Agteres, “‘Oefen je dag en nacht daarin!’: Pistis als levenshouding in Paulus en de hellenistische wijsbegeerte,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 54, no. 3 (2014): 220–38; Gert-Jan van der Heiden, “Gebeurtenis en geloof: Levenshouding in de hedendaagse wijsgerige Pauluslectuur,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 54, no. 3 (2014): 264–76.

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respective attempts to specify the radicality of Paul’s experience of pistis. The following analysis has four parts. First, I will draw attention to some Pauline resonances in Heidegger’s conception of authentic existence. Since research has already been done on this subject,2 I will adopt a different perspective, which focuses on the conceptual constellation related to attestation. Developing some very thought-provoking remarks made by Derrida with regard to faith in Heidegger, I will show that Heidegger’s notion of attestation, as well as cognate concepts concerning authentic existence, can be linked to his appropriation of Pauline pistis. Second, I will take into consideration the intriguing interaction between Heidegger’s reading of Paul and his phenomenological interpretations of Aristotelian texts. There are two main reasons behind my decision to shed light on this relation. First of all, in the lectures published as Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy,3 Heidegger provides a careful analysis of pistis in Aristotle. This circumstance has led me to the question of whether there are connections between that analysis and his account of Pauline pistis, regardless of whether Heidegger himself is aware of them. Secondly, remarkably enough, in both interpretations pistis is traced back to an attitude. In fact, this applies not only to Paul but even more explicitly to Aristotle, in whose texts Heidegger highlights the link between pistis and ēthos. Third, I will again discuss Agamben’s account of the Pauline hōs mē,4 which has already been treated in Chapter 1 in the context of his take on the vocation defining the Pauline performative experience of pistis. In the present chapter, I will discuss two further points. First, I will argue that Agamben’s reading of the hōs mē has been heavily influenced by Heidegger’s approach to the same issue, despite the fact that Agamben does not admit to this indebtedness. Second, I will attempt to show how Agamben’s articulation of Pauline pistis as an attitude can be read fruitfully in terms of attestation or testimony—which will further contribute to shedding light on the relationship between his interpretation and Heidegger’s. In the fourth part of the chapter, I will deal with Badiou’s notion of evental declaration and will argue that it cannot be understood merely in terms of a single act. Instead, the evental emergence of the subject is concurrent with the unfolding of an enduring attitude. I will analyze some specific facets of such an attitude, which become particularly evident in Badiou’s account, and provide a 2. See especially Brejdak, Philosophia crucis. 3. Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009). 4. For an insightful analysis of this crucial aspect of Pauline pistis, especially in the light of meontology, see Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Ontology after Ontotheology: Plurality, Event, and Contingency in Contemporary Philosophy (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2014), 172‒73. Concerning Paul and meontology, see also Simon Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology (London: Verso, 2012), 177–83.

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concise overview of them. Furthermore, I will show that Badiou’s reading also allows for an account of pistis in terms of attestation or testimony, so that we will be in a position to see all three thinkers’ interpretations within a coherent horizon.

2 Pauline Resonances in Heidegger’s Conception of Authentic Existence 2.1 Faith and Attestation In “Faith and Knowledge,” Jacques Derrida emphasizes the central role of attestation in Being and Time and considers it a “decisive and largely underestimated motif.”5 He attributes the same importance to the other related concepts, especially conscience, guilt, and resoluteness. According to Derrida, in each of these concepts one can recognize “the immense question of the ontological repetition […] of a so markedly Christian tradition.”6 By formulating these remarks, Derrida intends to allude above all to a crucial starting point determining Heidegger’s existential analytic, a starting point he pointedly expresses as follows: “Like the experience of authentic attestation (Bezeugung) and like everything that depends upon it, the point of departure of Sein und Zeit resides in a situation that cannot be radically alien to what is called faith.”7 At first glance, this remark is quite surprising because Heidegger repeatedly affirms both the “a-theistic” character of his thought and the basic difference between a philosophical and a religious, or theological, self-understanding of human life.8 Nevertheless, Derrida does not in this context refer to religion or theology in the narrow sense of the word, and he is obviously aware that Heidegger differentiates between faith and philosophical discourse. Rather, his remark points out the pre-philosophical, intersubjective dimension of experience and language, which, in the existential analytic, is characterized as the bare fact of the pre-ontological understanding of being. I would like to refer to this preliminary dimension, which, according to Derrida’s reformulation, is prior to all philosophical questioning, as pre-philosophical facticity.9 If one 5. Jacques Derrida, Acts of Religion, ed. and with an introduction by Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 2002), 96. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. See, for example, Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik, ed. Günther Neumann (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2005), 363. 9. In Heidegger’s early writings (1919–1927) one can basically differentiate between two meanings of “facticity” (Faktizität), although these are strongly interconnected. In Being and Time “facticity” is in principle a synonym of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) and means the specific factuality of human existence (see, for example, Heidegger, Being

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keeps in mind that Derrida considers such a pre-philosophical facticity to be a dimension of acquiescence, one can immediately grasp his reason for connecting faith and pre-philosophical facticity in Heidegger.10 In what follows, I intend to develop, specify, and, where necessary, correct Derrida’s claim by focusing my attention on the role attestation plays in Heidegger’s existential analytic.11 According to my main interpretive hypothesis, attestation represents a defining component for the entire methodological and thematic framework of Being and Time, even if Heidegger does not devote particular attention to attestation and uses the notion without explicit and extended specifications. In fact, upon closer consideration, attestation can be seen to be a crucial element for the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s analytic of human existence. In the course of my analysis, I will concentrate my attention on the following points. First of all, I intend to clarify why attestation is extremely important for the phenomenological framework of the existential analytic and to identify the position which it occupies within the development of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. I will subsequently highlight the most important features that, in my opinion, characterize Heidegger’s treatment and use of attestation in Being and Time. In this regard, my primary concern is to emphasize three closely related points: (i) Heidegger’s ontologization of attestation, namely, the fact that attestation is not a mere cognitive phenomenon or simply a contingent and Time, 56). According to Heidegger, human life is “thrown” in the world, inasmuch as it is not capable of self-foundation and of deciding about its coming into the world. In other words, it cannot help being confronted with the bare fact of its existence. The second meaning, which is to be found especially in his early Freiburg writings (1919– 1923), refers to human existence in general (see, for example, Heidegger, Ontology, 5; “Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation,” in Martin Heidegger, Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to “Being and Time” and Beyond, ed. John van Buren [Albany, NY: SUNY, 2002], 123–24). In his hermeneutics of facticity, Heidegger makes use of the second meaning because he wants to emphasize that philosophy should address human life as a primordial fact that is distinct from scientific and theoretical conceptualizations. My formulation “pre-philosophical facticity” basically refers to the second meaning and intends to underline that human existence as such and its peculiar pre-understanding of being are a primordial fact, which is independent of philosophy. In principle, the addition of “pre-philosophical” is redundant, since facticity as such is prior to philosophy or science, that is to say, to every methodical thematization or reflection. However, I prefer to add “pre-philosophical” in order to underline, in the context of the present study, the irreducible primordiality of the facticity belonging to human existence. 10. See especially Derrida, Acts of Religion, 96. 11. On attestation in Heidegger see Gert-Jan van der Heiden, “Announcement, Attestation, and Equivocity: Ricoeur’s Hermeneutic Ontology between Heidegger and Derrida,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85, no. 3 (2011): 415‒32.

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form of comportment, but is deeply rooted in the being of human existence as such, (ii) the performative character of attestation according to Heidegger’s conception, and (iii) attestation as a radical alternative to Cartesian-Husserlian foundationalism. Starting from these specifications, it will become apparent that, in Being and Time, attestation has a double dimension, since it is placed between ontological analysis and ontic experience, between philosophy and the pre-philosophical enactment of human existence. Finally, attestation will be further clarified by taking into account the points at which it overlaps with the phenomena of religious experience. In this regard, I will draw attention to some implicit connections between Heidegger’s conception of attestation as the experience of authenticity and his interpretation of the Pauline letters. 2.2 The Phenomenological Relevance of Attestation in Being and Time Despite its apparently marginal role in comparison with other well-known concepts of the existential analytic, the crucial function of attestation comes to light if one pays attention to its specific position in the development of Heidegger’s ontological analysis of human existence. In order to contextualize Heidegger’s use of attestation, one has to explain why it is a phenomenologically necessary step within his existential analytic. In this regard, it makes sense to summarize some relevant methodological and conceptual specifications that play a central role for Heidegger’s existential analytic. 2.2.1 Methodological and Conceptual Specifications At the very beginning of Being and Time,12 Heidegger introduces a crucial distinction by differentiating between three basic levels or perspectives. (i) The ontic level refers to an experience of beings that excludes any more or less explicit consideration of their being or ontological features. That could be my everyday self-experience, the experience of things belonging to me, or my intersubjective experience in reference to other human beings. Generally speaking, the ontic dimension, or level, encompasses not only immediate and natural experience, but also the majority of intellectual and reflective experiences, such as a literary description or a scientific investigation in the field of physics or biology. (ii) On the other hand, the ontological level concerns the more or less explicit experience of the ontological structures of beings. The specification “more or less explicit” is very important for singling out the authentic nature of philosophy according to Heidegger’s conceptualization of it. In fact, philosophy is in principle the thematically explicit and methodically enacted experience of ontological structures or features, that is to say, philosophy is ontological investigation. In this case, one refers to ontological experience in the narrow sense of the word. If the ontological experience is not thematically explicit and methodically enacted, then it can be more precisely characterized as (iii) a pre-ontological 12. Heidegger, Being and Time, 8–13.

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understanding. This means that ontological structures, or features, are experienced tacitly and independently of an explicit reenactment. Such (pre-) understanding of being is the essential feature of human being: “Understanding of being is itself a determination of being of Dasein […]. The ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological.”13 If the distinction between ontological and ontic is made with reference to human existence, then it coincides with the difference between existential and existentiell. The aim of Heidegger’s existential thematization of human existence is strictly ontological, that is, in view of the general question of being as such. The analysis of the meaning of human existence is relevant only insofar as human being is the sole entity that has a (pre-)understanding of being. In phenomenological terms, the philosophical articulation and thematization of the question of being demands that being is adequately given. But how and where is being given? According to Heidegger, it is given in the (pre-) ontological understanding that defines human existence as such.14 Therefore, the consequent development of the general ontological question, which concerns being as being, requires the philosophical articulation and thematization of the (pre-)understanding of being and of its conditions of possibility. This means that the general ontological investigation has to be developed in conjunction with the ontology of human existence, on the basis of the well-known hermeneutical reciprocity between the givenness of being as such and the givenness of the being of human existence.15 But in order to reach an adequate understanding of the givenness of the being of human existence, the phenomenologist has to reach, first of all, an adequate understanding of the ontic or existentiell givenness of human existence. This fundamental principle of Heidegger’s phenomenological method is clearly formulated in the following passage of Being and Time: “Because phenomenon in the phenomenological understanding is always just what constitutes being, and furthermore because being is always the being of beings, we must first of all bring beings themselves forward in the right way if we are to have any prospect of exposing being.”16 I designate this formulation as the principle of ontic foundation. The differentiation between the ontic and the ontological is concurrent with a differentiation between two basic meanings of “phenomenon.”17 The general and formal characterization, according to which a phenomenon is “what shows itself, the self-showing, the manifest,”18 can refer to anything in

13. Ibid., 11. 14. Ibid., 8‒10. 15. In the present context I use the concept of givenness in a very formal sense, without any Husserlian connotations. 16. Heidegger, Being and Time, 35. 17. Ibid., 26‒37. 18. Ibid., 27.

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the world. Everything we experience in the worldly context and on the basis of our pre-philosophical attitude, including ourselves, is a phenomenon in this very broad sense. But “phenomenon” in this ontic sense is not the authentic phenomenological meaning, since “phenomenon” in the strict phenomenological sense refers only to ontological structures, or features, such as “historicity” and “temporality.” Even if ontological structures are the only authentic phenomena for phenomenology according to Heidegger’s definition, the ontic sense of “phenomenon” remains in any case relevant for phenomenology because the explication of ontological structures has to start from the related ontic phenomena. Therefore, if the phenomenologist articulates and thematizes an inadequate ontic or existentiell givenness of human existence, it is inevitably damaging for the ontological results of the whole existential analytic. Thus, the entire methodological and thematic framework of the ontological inquiry basically relies on three interrelated levels of givenness: the ontic givenness of human existence, the ontological givenness of human existence, and the (ontological) givenness of being as such. The final target of Heidegger’s analyses of both everyday human life and authentic existence can be understood only if one takes into account the fundamental differentiation of these three levels. Heidegger’s main concern is not to provide an existentialistic conception of the world or to formulate an ethical, ideological, or cultural program, since the treatment of the dialectic between authenticity and inauthenticity is purely phenomenological. Consequently, “authentic” (eigentlich) and “inauthentic” (uneigentlich) have a primarily phenomenological sense, which is to say, according to my reformulation, “authentic” means “adequately given,” whereas “inauthentic” means “inadequately given.” Since the phenomenologist is not an unconcerned observer of existential phenomena, but someone who formalizes the results of a first-person experience, the ontological and ontic givenness of human existence is, on closer consideration, a self-givenness or self-experience. Under these circumstances, the entire development of the existential analytic can be considered as the proper unfolding of a self-experience carried out from the first-person point of view—starting from the inadequate, or inauthentic, self-givenness of human existence and reaching an adequate, or authentic, mode of self-experience. One should emphasize that the phenomenologist does not confine his or her own work to an autobiographical description of particular events or givens, but has to formalize the ontic givens in order to articulate the general ontological structures of human existence.19 This peculiar character of the phenomenological analysis is performative, insofar as it is characterized by 19. This tension between ontological, or phenomenological, generality and ontic individuality represents the very challenge of Heidegger’s hermeneutic-phenomenological method. For a more precise and detailed interpretation of this important point, see Cimino, “Begriff und Vollzug.”

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an enactment from the first-person point of view.20 Generally speaking, then, in the framework of fundamental ontology, philosophical investigation is not and cannot be a distanced, unconcerned description, registration, or finding of data, but must be a methodical (re)enactment of existential phenomena, starting from the concrete ontic self-experience of the phenomenologist. 2.2.2 Attestation as a Turning Point in Heidegger’s Existential Analytic Having analyzed the general structures and phenomena concerning the world,21 intersubjectivity,22 being-in as such,23 and care as the being of human existence in the first division of Being and Time,24 Heidegger is searching, in the second division, for the whole and authentic givenness of human existence, because it is only on this basis that one is able to articulate and specify, in a phenomenologically proper way, the meaning of the being of human existence and its related (pre-)understanding of being. Now, in the first chapter of the second division, Heidegger focuses on being-toward-death as the self-experience that enables the attainment of the authentic self-givenness of human existence. Nevertheless, from Heidegger’s phenomenological viewpoint, the analysis that has been carried out so far is not enough. This is because the anticipation of death remains only an ontological possibility, so that the existential analytic urgently demands adherence to the principle of ontic foundation. Heidegger underlines this point, being well aware of the fact that the problem concerning ontic foundation is a decisive component of his fundamental ontology: The existential project in which anticipation has been delimited, has made visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell, authentic being-towarddeath. But with this, the possibility then appears of an authentic potentialityfor-being whole—but only as an ontological possibility. […] And yet this existentially “possible” being-toward-death remains, after all, existentielly a fantastical demand. The ontological possibility of an authentic potentialityfor-being-a-whole of Dasein means nothing as long as the corresponding ontic potentiality-of-being has not been shown in terms of Dasein itself.

20. Assuming that phenomenology can be characterized, in very general terms, as a philosophical investigation of lived experiences carried out from the first-person point of view, this would mean that, if we follow Heidegger’s criticism of Husserlian phenomenology, we can differentiate between a performative phenomenology, that is, an enactment-based phenomenology, and an observation- or reflection-based phenomenology. See Cimino, “Begriff und Vollzug.” 21. Heidegger, Being and Time, 53–110. 22. Ibid., 112–26. 23. Ibid., 126–73. 24. Ibid., 130–61.

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Does Dasein ever project itself factically into such a being-toward-death? Does it demand, even only on the basis of its ownmost being, an authentic potentiality of being which is determined by anticipation?25

Here one can easily see the tension between ontological, or philosophical, discourse and ontic, pre-philosophical givens. The existential project— that is, the philosophical articulation of phenomena pertaining to human existence—might have an inner coherence and phenomenal plausibility. In this case, the existential project of the anticipation of death as an authentic being-toward-death shows its own coherence and plausibility in relation to the other existential structures and phenomena that Heidegger has made explicit in the previous sections of Being and Time. But it remains a philosophical project and a theoretical possibility, if not a pure construction. In this regard, the phenomenologist is confronted with two strongly correlated questions. Does the anticipation of death remain only a pure ontological possibility? One could then ask whether the anticipation of death is the sole self-experience enabling the attainment of the whole and authentic self-givenness of human existence. Even if Heidegger is able to show the ontic foundation of his existential project concerning the anticipation of death, the second question arises: Is the ontic basis of the anticipation of death characterized by an inner cogency or necessity? Otherwise put, is there an ontic, or existentiell (i.e., prephilosophical), demand for the “authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole”? In the final analysis, Heidegger’s concern is to show the ontic, or existentiell, possibility and necessity of such an authentic potentiality. The intrinsically phenomenological challenge represented by these two questions becomes apparent if one takes into account the principle according to which phenomenological investigation means “to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself.”26 If the existential project concerning the anticipation of death merely remains an ontological possibility, and consequently there is no ontic, or pre-philosophical, substantiation rooted in human existence itself, then such a project can be considered a construction rather than a phenomenological analysis starting from the things themselves. The required ontic or existentiell substantiation is indeed the starting point for showing not only that the existential project of being-toward-death has pre-philosophical roots and is existentielly possible, but also why this authentic self-givenness is existentielly necessary, that is, why it represents a primordial pre-philosophical demand of human existence. It is precisely in this context that Heidegger introduces a conceptual framework that can be traced back to attestation: “Before answering these questions, we must investigate to what extent at all and in what way Dasein bears witness [Zeugnis gibt] to a possible authenticity of its existence from 25. Ibid., 255. 26. Ibid., 32.

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its ownmost potentiality-of-being, in such a way that it not only makes this known as existentielly possible, but demands it of itself.”27 If one sought to explain the reason why Heidegger introduces attestation, one could say that the conceptual framework of attestation is very useful for emphasizing the extra-philosophical character of a dimension in which traditional logical tools and procedures (i.e., deduction, induction, etc.) are not able to operate.28 In other words, the dimension of attestation alludes to a factical domain that is independent of philosophy. In fact, if we recollect the earlier cited remarks from Derrida and attempt to elucidate them in the light of our subsequent considerations, we realize the extent to which, as regards the phenomenon of attestation, the phenomenologist is confronted with a dimension of factical primordiality. To formulate it differently, the phenomenological self-unfolding of thought has to finally overcome itself and reach the things themselves, from which it can obtain the ultimate substantiation of its own results. In Derrida’s terms, the pre-philosophical facticity in which “Dasein bears witness [Zeugnis gibt] to a possible authenticity of its existence from its ownmost potentialityof-being” is the dimension of acquiescence in which philosophy itself has its roots. Attestation is neither a pure cognitive fact nor a merely preliminary step toward an authentic foundation of the phenomenological self-interpretation of human existence. Human existence itself has to attest, that is, to bear witness to authentic wholeness phenomenologically conceived. One could also say that attestation should in principle serve as the ultimate confirmation of the phenomenological results of Heidegger’s analyses: The question hovering over us of an authentic wholeness of Dasein and its existential constitution can be placed on a viable, phenomenal basis only if that question can hold fast to a possible authenticity of its being attested [bezeugte] by Dasein itself. If we succeed in discovering phenomenologically such an attestation [Bezeugung] and what is attested to in it, the problem arises again of whether the anticipation of death projected up to now only in its ontological possibility has an essential connection with that authentic potentiality-of-being attested to.29

It is no exaggeration to say that exactly this required attestation is the turning point for Heidegger’s existential analytic, inasmuch as it is the defining component for both the ontic self-givenness and the ontological self-givenness of human existence. We should now specify the character of this notion of attestation by focusing on three aspects: the ontologization of attestation, the performative character of attestation, and attestation as a radical alternative to Cartesian-Husserlian foundationalism. 27. Ibid., 255. See also Chapter 1, Section 3.4. 28. See, for example, ibid., 259. 29. Ibid., 255.

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2.3 The Basic Features of Attestation In the following analysis of Heidegger’s account of attestation, I will develop a certain interpretive strategy. The phenomenon of attestation is most frequently read in the context of a general analysis of conscience. Contrary to this, I will focus my attention on attestation itself and will take into account conscience and related phenomena only insofar as they are relevant to gaining an insight into attestation as such.30 2.3.1 Heidegger’s Ontologization of Attestation Heidegger’s introduction of attestation at the end of § 53 in Being and Time and his preliminary characterization of it could in some respects be misleading and difficult to understand. This is because, at first glance, attestation seems to be merely an empirical fact or a certain comportment of human being. In the first case, one might think that attestation is basically an observable feature of human being that the phenomenologist could identify in order to confirm his analysis. But, when one says that attestation has to be an ontic or existentiell basis for the phenomenological project of authenticity, “ontic” and “existentiell” do not in any way mean “empirical” or “empirically identifiable,” since, in this context, the qualifications “ontic” and “existentiell” refer to an intrinsic characteristic of human existence—prior to and apart from every philosophical conceptualization. Thus, according to Heidegger, attestation is not a certain temporally and spatially identifiable comportment either, which may or may not occur depending on the external circumstances, but an essential feature of human being as such. In this regard, citing the following key passages serves the goal of documenting Heidegger’s ontologization of attestation. They clearly confirm that, according to his own account, attestation has roots in the being of human existence. I think it is very useful to consider these passages together in order to have a coherent picture of the actual meaning Heidegger ascribes to attestation: We are looking for an authentic potentiality-of-being of Dasein that is attested by Dasein itself in its existentiell possibility. First of all, this attestation must let itself be discovered. If it is to “give Dasein to understand” itself in its possible authentic existence, it will have its roots in the being of Dasein. The phenomenal demonstration of such an attestation thus contains evidence of its origin in the constitution of being of Dasein.31 Up to now we have tried solely to trace conscience as a phenomenon of Dasein back to the ontological constitution of this being. This served to 30. As regards the presence of conscience in Heidegger, I recommend the following contributions: István M. Fehér, “Eigentlichkeit, Gewissen und Schuld in Heideggers Sein und Zeit,” Man and World 23 (1990): 35‒62; Jean Greisch, Ontologie et temporalité: Esquisse d’une interprétation intégrale de “Sein und Zeit” (Paris: PUF, 1994), 284‒304. 31. Heidegger, Being and Time, 257.

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In the course of Heidegger’s analysis, it becomes more and more apparent that attestation is a peculiar manifestation of Dasein’s being-in. Attestation is characterized by specific modes of understanding, discourse, and attunement, and cannot be conceptualized on the basis of scientific or empirical categories. By taking into account these general clarifications, one is able to articulate more precisely the phenomenon of attestation and specify its phenomenal structure, that is, what attests as such (i.e., conscience), what is attested by it (i.e., Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-of-being), and the process of attestation as such (i.e., the call of conscience). All these phenomenal components are to be traced back to an inner dynamics of human being—a dynamics whose protagonist is conscience (Gewissen), insofar as it is “an attestation in Dasein of its ownmost potentiality-of-being.” In this context, the ontologization of attestation as a proper manifestation of conscience finds its clear formulation in the fact that the condition of possibility for the call of conscience is care as the being of human existence.35 The most important conclusion we can draw from Heidegger’s phenomenology of attestation as conscience is that attestation is a dynamics not initiated through a theoretical attitude and method (e.g., reflection or transcendental epoché) or on the basis of an explicit deliberation, but that it is ontologically rooted in the bare existence of human being. In this regard, we find a substantial confirmation of Derrida’s suggestion according to which philosophy relies on a non- or pre-philosophical basis, that is, the facticity of human existence. The intricate relationship between attestation, philosophy, and the call of conscience can be clarified by paying attention to the performative character of attestation. 2.3.2 The Performative Character of Attestation I have already mentioned the general relevance of performativity for the enactment of the existential analytic. In the present section, I intend to give a more precise and specific account of 32. Ibid., 268. 33. Ibid., 276. 34. Ibid., 282–83. 35. Ibid., 267.

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performativity with reference to attestation. In attestation performativity becomes apparent in a peculiar way. In this respect, I propose to differentiate, first of all, two specific modes in which performativity emerges in Heidegger’s phenomenology of attestation. The first mode can be characterized as a methodical one and concerns the relationship between the phenomenologist and the phenomenon of attestation. The second mode refers to the peculiar discursive dynamics defining the process of attestation as the call of conscience in human existence. From a methodological viewpoint, we should emphasize the fact that the phenomenological analysis of attestation cannot be reduced to a mere observation, report, or introspection of existential phenomena. The phenomenologist does not confine himself or herself to reporting and formalizing an empirical or psychic phenomenon. His philosophical articulation of general ontological structures takes place on the basis of the first-person perspective. Hence one can conclude that the phenomenologist himself or herself experiences attestation as a call of conscience from the first-person point of view. On the other hand, one should stress that this experience from the first-person point of view is not only an empathic reenactment that is essential for analyzing existential phenomena, in accordance with the principle of ontic foundation. The experience of attestation is in fact a presupposition for philosophy as such. This indicates that one has many reasons to argue that the enactment of philosophy relies on authentic existence. The crucial question in this context is whether the call of conscience is a necessary condition for the enactment of philosophy, that is, phenomenology. That it is not a sufficient condition is shown by the fact that a non-philosopher can enact an authentic existence without making the further step to a philosophical articulation of authentic self-experience. On the contrary, philosophy, as an ontic or existentiell possibility of existence,36 must have its roots in authentic existence. Since authentic existence presupposes attestation as the call of conscience, we can conclude that attestation should be considered as the ultimate root of philosophy. This is a further confirmation of Derrida’s suggestion, according to which philosophy can be traced back to a nonphilosophical or pre-philosophical dimension, that is, to the primordial facticity of human existence. In the final analysis, the phenomenology of attestation as the call of conscience should be considered in the double meaning of the word, that is, as both a genitivus subjectivus and a genivitus objectivus, insofar as attestation is not only an important existential phenomenon, but also the condition of possibility for the enactment of philosophy (phenomenology) as such. Without attestation there is no authenticity, and without authenticity philosophizing does not take place. The second aspect regarding the performative character of attestation concerns the discursive dynamics of the call of conscience,37 insofar as 36. Ibid., 12. 37. This second aspect of performativity concerning attestation has been emphasized by Jean Greisch. See Greisch, Ontologie et temporalité, 287.

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Heidegger explicitly rejects any constative or narrative reduction of this phenomenon: But how are we to define what is talked about in this discourse? What does conscience call to the one summoned? Strictly speaking—nothing. The call does not say anything, does not give any information about events of the world, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it strive to open a “conversation with itself ” in the self which has been summoned. “Nothing” is called to the self which is summoned, but it is summoned to itself, that is, to its ownmost potentiality-of-being.38

The fact that the discursive articulation of attestation and of the call of conscience does not have any content can be interpreted in the light of the threefold intentional phenomenality emphasized by Heidegger in his early Freiburg lecture courses: content-sense (Gehaltssinn), relational sense (Bezugssinn), and enactment-sense (Vollzugssinn). Against the background of this conceptual framework, we can say that the decisive phenomenal aspect of attestation is enactment as such, since in this case the content is substantially irrelevant and absent. An indirect confirmation of this reading can be found if one considers the connection between attestation and authenticity. In fact, one can easily show that, according to Heidegger’s phenomenology of experience, the inauthentic modes of experience are, so to speak, content-based, whereas the authentic ones are enactment-based.39 The relevance of the enactment-sense is a convenient basis for the emphasis put on the performative character of the articulation of attestation. But the contrast outlined by Heidegger between attestation, on the one hand, and “information about events in the world” or having something “to tell,” on the other, clearly shows that attestation has an explicitly performative character. Attestation does not inform us about anything and does not tell us anything, but it does perform, or enact, the process of the call of conscience. Attestation as the call of conscience is exactly the performing, or enacting, inherent in the call of conscience. This primacy of the enacting character belonging to the call of conscience can be well documented if one bears in mind the fundamental process defining the call itself: “Wanting to have a conscience is rather the most primordial existentiell presupposition for the possibility of factically becoming guilty. Understanding the call, Dasein lets its ownmost self take action in itself in terms of its chosen potentiality-of-being.”40 Here one can easily see that attestation, conceived as both the understanding and the understood self-articulation of the call of conscience, cannot be reduced to a transmission of information, but should rather be thought in terms of the 38. Heidegger, Being and Time, 263. 39. See again Cimino, “Begriff und Vollzug.” 40. Heidegger, Being and Time, 276.

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transformation of the ownmost self and of the philosophical self as well. In the final analysis, the specific performativity of attestation and its importance for the enactment of philosophy also imply a new alternative to traditional models of foundation. 2.3.3 Attestation as an Alternative to the Cartesian-Husserlian Foundationalism of the ego cogitans From a systematic viewpoint, the importance of attestation can be further stressed if one outlines a basic contrast between attestation as an existentiell ground for the phenomenological discourse, on the one hand, and the Cartesian-Husserlian foundationalistic framework, on the other. To single out this aspect of attestation, one has to focus primarily on the demanding character of attestation. In fact, attestation as the call of conscience has a specific cogency that cannot be reduced to purely epistemic apodicticity. Rather, attestation reveals itself to be a demand rooted in the being of human existence. This interpretive line can be further developed if one takes into account the certainty and the truth related to attestation. In fact, in the case of attestation, there is no place for a merely logical or epistemic necessity; rather, it concerns an existentiell necessity of human existence in its ownmost potentiality-of-being. Considered as a whole and from a formal viewpoint, Heidegger’s attempt to find the ultimate ground for his existential-phenomenological ontology of human being could be regarded as similar to Cartesian or Husserlian foundationalism, since in both cases the main point is to overcome everyday givenness. However, as regards Heidegger, the end goal is not the cogito ergo sum or transcendental consciousness in general, but the peculiar cogency of attestation rooted in pre-philosophical facticity. In other words, according to Heidegger’s conception, the ground of philosophical discourse should be found not in consciousness (Bewusstsein) or in the ego cogitans, but rather in conscience (Gewissen). This ground is not a fundamentum inconcussum, because, on the contrary, it is characterized by the radical nullity of the existentiell facticity and thrownness revealed in and through attestation.41 In the case of Husserl’s phenomenological approach to consciousness, methodical operations are needed, which in principle are able to reveal the intended ultimate ground of philosophical discourse: reflection, transcendental epoché, and eidetic reduction. These operations are basically thought operations that the phenomenologist performs in order to overcome everyday experience and to reach the genuine domain of philosophical thinking. In the case of Heidegger’s phenomenology, they are not methodical or purely philosophical operations in this sense. In fact, the phenomenologist succeeds in overcoming the everyday, inauthentic experience not through thought acts, but on the basis of attestation as the call of conscience, which also represents the real turning point for the transition from inauthentic self-experience to 41. Ibid., 272.

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authenticity.42 As has been said, even if attestation is not a sufficient condition for the enactment of philosophy, it remains in any case a necessary precondition in order to reach an adequate phenomenal basis, since it represents the ontically authentic self-experience. Such an authentic self-experience does involve a radical transformation of all components of being-in, that is, understanding, attunement, and discourse.43

3 Heidegger’s Account of Attestation against the Background of His Interpretation of Early Christianity At this juncture, I am going to follow and develop a further suggestion of Derrida’s, that is, the thesis according to which in attestation and its related concepts one can see “the immense question of the ontological repetition […] of a so markedly Christian tradition.”44 To substantiate this reading, I do not intend to document, from a historical point of view, a more or less explicit influence of the Christian tradition on Heidegger’s conception of attestation and conscience.45 Rather, my concern is to pursue a more circumscribed goal and to exhibit some interesting points of convergence between Heidegger’s account of attestation as the call of conscience and some aspects emphasized by Heidegger in his lecture course on Paul. Even if Heidegger explicitly differentiates his treatment of attestation and guilt from religious and theological perspectives,46 on closer consideration some overlaps are identifiable. First of all, it makes sense to pay attention to the specific knowledge that, according to Heidegger, is involved in Paul’s religious experience. As has been seen, attestation as the call of conscience is not an irrational experience, but has its own peculiar enactment corresponding to specific modes of understanding, attunement, and discourse. Conceived in these terms, attestation represents the pre-theoretical factical dimension in which the philosophizing existence 42. This turning point can be described as a radical interruption or breach. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 261. 43. See, for example, the following characterization, in which understanding, attunement, and discourse are mentioned: “The call attuned by anxiety first makes possible for Dasein its project upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 266–67. 44. Derrida, Acts of Religion, 96. 45. In this regard see, for an overview, the following contributions: Eilert Herms, “Handeln aus Gewißheit: Zu Martin Heideggers Phänomenologie des Gewissens,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 41, no. 2 (1999): 132‒57; Claudia Welz, “Das Gewissen als Instanz der Selbsterschließung: Luther, Kierkegaard und Heidegger,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 53, no. 3 (2011): 265‒84. 46. See, for example, Heidegger, Being and Time, 258–59.

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is rooted, even if philosophy as such may not be reduced to the existentiell self-experience disclosed through attestation. Now, if one takes into account Heidegger’s reading of early Christianity, one can easily see that the German philosopher also recognizes in Paul’s self-articulation of factical experience a specific knowledge and self-experience, which cannot be brought back to any traditional epistemological framework. According to Heidegger, in the Pauline enactment of the factical situation what becomes apparent is not a blind, irrational experience, but on the contrary, in the terms of the existential analytic, a peculiar self-articulation of understanding, discourse, and attunement—a self-articulation which should not be considered as a mere counterpart or opponent of theoretical or scientific rationality, since it has its own genuine enactment-sense. Regarding this crucial point, we can refer again to the passage in Heidegger’s lecture course on the phenomenology of religion where he gives a phenomenological analysis of the Pauline experience of the parousia by singling out the meaning of the knowledge that Paul attributes to the genuine facticity of the Thessalonians.47 Heidegger stresses that Paul is not interested in determining the exact time frame of the parousia. The question does not concern when precisely Jesus will come again. This kind of knowledge does not affect the actual significance of Christian facticity. According to Heidegger, Christian factical life is characterized by a specific knowledge, which does not concern states of affairs, but facticity itself and the way it has been transformed by the conversion to a Christian life. This self-reflexivity inherent in Christian factical life does not provide any security, because, quite the contrary, it takes the essential uncertainty of factical life experience seriously,48 and this is analogous to the precariousness and fragility that is disclosed in the existential analytic of Dasein on the basis of the authentic life articulated in the call of conscience. In fact, the call of conscience is an attestation of authentic self-experience and does not concern information or a merely epistemic necessity. What it does do is to disclose the primordial nullity of human existence, just as—according to Heidegger’s reading—the self-experience expressed in the Pauline letters primarily articulates an enactment-sense or a “how” (not a content-sense or a “what”). This “how” is characterized by a specific cogency and authentic self-knowledge, yet a secure ground is alien to it. This fundamental overlap between attestation as authentic self-knowledge and Paul’s factical life experience is confirmed if one pays attention to the phenomenon of the hōs mē, which is emphasized by Heidegger in his lecture course on Paul, and to the central role the enactment-sense plays in this context.49 According to Heidegger’s interpretation, the hōs mē indicates the peculiar phenomenality of Christian factical experience with reference to the surrounding world. The peculiarity of Christian factical experience does not affect its content-sense or its relational sense, but rather its enactment-sense. 47. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 72. 48. Ibid., 73. 49. Ibid., 85–86.

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From a phenomenological viewpoint, the relational sense and the content of Christian facticity remain unaffected, insofar as the factical conditions in which individuals stand remain the same. What is changed is the way those factical conditions are experienced and lived.50 This means that the world of the Christian is and remains the same world, whereas the real change occurs in the complex of enactment of the Christian life. In other words, it concerns how the Christian enacts his or her factical life experience. Thus, the authenticity of the Christian life does not introduce new worldly contents or new relations to the surrounding world, but resides in a new experience of temporality and historicity. One can say, then, that the genuine meaning of the Christian life consists in a new modality in which the same contents are experienced: One is tempted to translate the ὡς μή by “as if,” but that will not work. “As if ” expresses an objective connection, and suggests the view that the Christian should eliminate these relations to the surrounding world. This ὡς means, positively, a new sense that is added. The μή concerns the complex of enactment of the Christian life. All of these relations experience a retardation in the respective enactment, so that they arise out of the origin of primordial Christian life experience. Christian life is not straightforward, but is rather broken up: all surrounding-world relations must pass through the complex of enactment of having-become, so that this complex is then co-present, but the relations themselves, and that to which they refer, are in no way touched.51

In the case of attestation as authentic self-experience and the call of conscience, it is evident that the same emphasis is put on the enactment-sense of experience. As has already been stressed, the call of conscience is characterized by performativity at a high and multifaceted level. Attestation does not introduce new contents, and it does not change the world as such; instead, it provides us with a new modality of experience: The eminent, authentic disclosedness attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—the reticent projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost being-guilty which is ready for anxiety—we call resoluteness [Entschlossenheit]. […] But authentic disclosedness then modifies equiprimordially the discoveredness of “world” grounded in it and the disclosedness of being-with with others. The “world” at hand does not become different as far as “content,” the circle of the others is not exchanged for a new one, and yet the being toward things at hand which understands and takes care of things, and the concerned being-with with others is now defined in terms of their ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self.52

50. Ibid., 85. 51. Ibid., 86. 52. Heidegger, Being and Time, 284–85.

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This passage from Being and Time, in which Heidegger focuses on resoluteness as the authenticity attested in the call of conscience, very clearly documents the extent to which his interpretation of Paul’s factical life experience represents a de facto starting point for outlining the basic characteristics of attestation and authentic experience in general. It does so in spite of his claim that his phenomenology of attestation as the call of conscience is in principle different from theological and religious approaches. In this regard, Derrida’s interpretive suggestions have been very much confirmed. Derrida’s remarks about Heidegger’s account of attestation draw attention to a very significant point in the ontological analytic, even if they only focus on the ambiguous religious character of this phenomenon. On the one hand, my analysis above has shown that Derrida is substantially right in stressing that Heidegger’s enactment of philosophical thinking cannot be traced back to purely philosophical foundations. The specific, radical experience of attestation and those phenomena related to it exceeds the scope of philosophy and paves the way to a dimension “that cannot be radically alien to what is called faith.”53 This is the dimension of a pre-philosophical facticity, which essentially remains inaccessible to a number of traditional conceptual and methodological frameworks, including, as we have seen, the Cartesian-Husserlian foundationalistic approach. On the other hand, Derrida’s remarks need substantial development and clarification, since the importance of attestation does not merely concern the ambiguity between philosophical and religious experience. In the course of my analysis I have shown to what extent attestation affects, more or less directly, the methodological core of phenomenological ontology. This is because attestation is the ultimate basis for a substantial validation of Heidegger’s analyses, especially as it concerns the phenomenological role that authenticity plays within the entire framework of Being and Time. In this vein, one should also emphasize a further and deeper ambiguity, since attestation constitutes the crucial point of intersection between ontology and ontic experience, between philosophy and pre-philosophical facticity, between philosophical conceptuality and concrete existence. On closer consideration, in Heidegger’s ontology of human life, attestation is not merely one phenomenon among others. Rather, it is the fundamental turning point to which phenomenological thinking should stay true if the provided ontological analysis of human existence is not merely to subsist as a pure philosophical construction, but is instead to be a radical philosophical self-understanding deeply rooted in the being of human existence. Without a performative experience of attestation, Heidegger’s analyses of authenticity would remain a philosophical thought experiment. In the end, when Heidegger argues that the hermeneutics of human being, “as an analysis of existence […], has fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it arises and to which it returns,”54 one can say that it is attestation which represents exactly that “point.” 53. Derrida, Acts of Religion, 96. 54. Heidegger, Being and Time, 36.

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4 Pistis and Ēthos in Heidegger’s Reading of Paul and Aristotle In ancient Greek the term pistis and cognate words designate a diverse range of things, attitudes, and actions that modern languages usually label with very different words.55 At first glance, one could argue that, as in many other similar cases, the equivocal nature of the word is merely due to the fact that the ancient Greek language is not able to differentiate things, attitudes, and actions that modern languages manage to keep separate. As a matter of fact, ancient Greek involves semantic domains that are incommensurable with those of modern languages, so that we cannot but acknowledge the incommensurability. One can, however, take a second approach and say that modern languages separate things, attitudes, and actions that, upon closer inspection, might be closely linked to each other. In line with this second approach, the ambiguity of the word pistis can be seen as a fruitful one, to the extent that an analysis of the way pistis and pisteuein are used in ancient Greek can help us to identify and understand connections that would not be seen if our considerations were exclusively focused on modern language usages.56 At any rate, this approach should not confine itself to linguistic facts, because it has to highlight certain aspects of the rich and diverse conceptual relations that, in turn, might concern the things themselves. In the end, an appropriate understanding of such a complexity could enable one to avoid oversimplifications that are often rooted, for instance, in merely ideological motives or biases. In this regard, a paradigmatic example is the opposition between faith and reason. In many cases, this opposition has been and is often still understood in terms of a strict mutual exclusion, for instance, in accordance with the more or less explicit assumption that faith should be understood as religious belief, which in turn

55. The word pistis can mean not only “faith” in the narrow sense but also “trust,” “conviction,” “persuasion,” “belief,” “confidence,” “assurance,” “trustworthiness,” or “credibility,” “credit,” “guarantee” “argument,” “proof,” etc. Accordingly, the verb pisteuein means not only “to have faith” but also “to trust,” “to put faith in,” “to believe,” “to entrust,” etc. Thus, pistis and related words are in no way confined to the domain of religion. For more details and a complete overview, see the standard lexicon for ancient Greek A Greek-English Lexicon, comp. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, revised and augmented (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 1408. For a general overview of the meaning of faith in the history of religions and theology, see Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft, ed. Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, Bernd Janowsky, and Eberhard Jüngel (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998–2007), 3:940–85. 56. This is a good example of how a comparative analysis of concepts and terms can have a concrete hermeneutical function, insofar as, in conversation with foreign or ancient languages, we can put in brackets or relativize our customary linguistic usages and conceptual frameworks.

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is supposed to be characterized by some form of irredeemable irrationality.57 The word “reason,” for its part, evokes an association with things such as mathematical proof, emotionless scientific reasoning, and concrete evidence. However, if we replace “faith”—and the related associations sedimented in the modern or ideological usage of this term—with the word pistis and give due regard to the complexity of the latter, then we can see the relation between pistis and reason in a very different light, so that clearer differentiations are needed and the aforementioned opposition turns out to be a highly problematic construction. The question can then be raised whether, on what basis, and to what extent pistis and reason ultimately imply or exclude each other.58 With due regard to this complexity characterizing the relation between pistis and reason, in what follows I will focus on the interplay between Heidegger’s interpretation of Pauline pistis and his reading of pistis in Aristotle. My purpose is to show how Heidegger does justice to the complex nature of pistis, both in the domain of religious life and in the realm of rhetoric. 4.1 Heidegger’s Interpretations of Paul and Aristotle: A General Framework In the early 1920s, Martin Heidegger delivered a considerable number of lectures on some of the major sources of our philosophical and theologicalreligious tradition, with a special emphasis on Aristotle and early Christianity (Paul and Augustine). In doing so, he was oriented toward what he calls a “phenomenological destruction” of Western thought.59 According to Heidegger’s intention, phenomenological destruction is meant to provide a new and fresh access to the primary concepts and hermeneutical frameworks that have shaped the philosophical and theological self-interpretations of human existence in the Western intellectual tradition. However, Heidegger’s phenomenological destruction is not guided by a merely historical commitment, since such an

57. An example is Lucretius’ position against religious belief in his philosophical poem On the Nature of Things. See Lucretius, De rerum natura, with an English translation by W. H. D. Rouse, revised by Martin Ferguson Smith (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 1.62–135. 58. In this connection, I would like to mention Augustine’s On the Profit of Believing (De utilitate credendi), which outlines, in a very inspiring way, some of the multifaceted connections between the domains of faith and reason that are alleged to be separated, if not opposed. In this writing Augustine convincingly shows to what extent faith (fides) or believing (credere) plays an epistemically, pedagogically, and socially fundamental role, which largely exceeds the scope of religion in the narrow sense. See especially Augustine, “On the Profit of Believing,” trans. C. L. Cornish, in Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, ed. Whitney J. Oates (New York: Random House, 1948), 1:399‒427, here 414‒21. 59. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 19‒25. See also Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle,” 123–24.

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approach is an essential component of his philosophical project concerning “the phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity.”60 This philosophical analysis is supposed to elaborate basic categories of human existence, which also means to assess whether, and to what extent, traditional philosophy and theology have been capable of articulating original features of facticity. Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle and Paul are paradigmatic examples of this way of proceeding.61 In the course of his reading of Aristotelian and Pauline texts, Heidegger does not confine himself to an interpretation in the light of his own philosophical interests, but wants, rather, to use Aristotle and Paul as sources of inspiration for his hermeneutics of factical life. Otherwise put, his phenomenological reading of these two authors is expected to have a substantial impact on the enactment of his phenomenological hermeneutics itself. Within the framework of this phenomenological destruction of Aristotle and Paul, Heidegger focuses on the phenomenon of pistis and provides an interpretation that is interesting and inspiring in several respects. In what follows I will place special emphasis on two points. First, as has been said above, one can easily see that Heidegger’s analysis of pistis is capable of detecting the intrinsic complexity of this phenomenon and does not confine it to a religious dimension in the narrow sense. Second, Heidegger reads the Aristotelian notion of pistis and the Pauline one in the light of very similar interpretive frameworks. Though there is no self-evident and direct connection between the two readings, one can argue that in both cases Heidegger ultimately traces pistis back to a comportment, attitude, or posture, that is, to what ancient Greek would name ēthos. 4.2 Paul and Pistis as a Fundamental Attitude As was seen in the previous chapter, in his phenomenological analysis of the Pauline letters, Heidegger does not understand pistis with reference to certain dogmas or a particular stock of beliefs, but only in terms of a fundamental attitude or, to put it another way, in terms of a “how.”62 This approach is very

60. Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle,” 121. Concerning the term “facticity,” see Chapter 2, Section 2.1. In the present context, I make use of “facticity” and related terms (e.g., “factical” and “factical life”) in the broad sense (i.e., facticity as human life in general), not only because I mainly refer to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle and Paul before Being and Time, but especially because I intend to show how he situates the phenomenon of pistis in a domain that antecedes scientific or theoretical conceptualizations and concerns human life as such. 61. I will refer especially to Heidegger’s lecture course on Paul and to his Marburg lecture course Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. 62. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 108.

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consistent with Heidegger’s general intention of interpreting the Pauline letters with due regard to the way Paul’s religious experience is enacted or performed.63 The emphasis Heidegger lays on what he calls “enactment-sense” serves as a basis for revealing the specific characteristics of the Christian factical life,64 characteristics Heidegger traces back to a very specific experience of temporality and facticity.65 It is no coincidence that this basic feature of his approach to Pauline pistis is clearly formulated from the very beginning, where he refers to Phlm. 3:13 and interprets the relation between pistis and law as a relation between two different attitudes.66 In the final analysis, Heidegger’s entire reading of the Pauline letters to the Galatians and to the Thessalonians evolves from a careful analysis of the basic facets which characterize Paul’s pistis as a fundamental attitude. As was explained in Chapter 1, three of these facets are indeed very significant for grasping the concrete meaning of Heidegger’s reading of the way the Pauline experience of pistis is performed: proclamation, the specific knowledge belonging to Christian facticity, and the hōs mē. They should be seen as complementary aspects of the global phenomenon of the attitude characterizing Pauline pistis. In order to avoid misunderstandings, some clarifications are needed, especially as regards the way Heidegger approaches Pauline pistis as an attitude. In fact, Heidegger excludes any psychological or epistemological frameworks, since according to him pistis as a fundamental attitude should be considered with due regard to the “situation” in which it is enacted and also to its specific articulation or discourse.67 We have already seen that Heidegger calls this articulation “proclamation” and considers the Pauline letters not merely as historico-theological or literary documents, but rather as the result of such an intrinsic articulation enacted on the basis of pistis.68 According to Heidegger, Pauline pistis cannot be brought into line with any system of codified dogmas and cannot be assessed on the basis of the opposition between an allegedly irrational religious experience and scientific, logical, or philosophical rationality. First, the prominent role of the enactment-sense prevents one from reducing pistis to a stock of cognitive or dogmatic contents. Second, pistis has its own rationality or articulation, which is inherent in its enactment in the form of a fundamental attitude. We could characterize this articulation in terms of hermeneutical rationality, since its function consists in articulating pistis and making it understandable independently of theoretical or scientific conceptualizations. This hermeneutical rationality is an essential component of

63. Ibid., 86‒89. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid., 55. 66. Ibid., 51. 67. Ibid., 63‒74. 68. Ibid., 56.

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the facticity which defines Christian life experience.69 Pauline pistis as an attitude is characterized not only by its own specific articulation and expression, but also by a distinctive knowledge, which, according to Heidegger,70 has nothing to do with theoretical or scientific insights. In fact, such knowledge concerns the individual as such, is co-experienced in the factical situation, and constitutes the original self-awareness of the radical transformation evoked in Christian life. Under these premises, from Heidegger’s viewpoint Paul’s attitude cannot be designated as a merely practical commitment, since it originally imports such a form of self-knowledge rooted in Christian factical life experience. According to Heidegger’s reading, a further element which defines Pauline pistis as an attitude is the enactment of the hōs mē.71 In view of our analysis, this phenomenon is of central importance for two reasons. First, the hōs mē confirms the emphasis Heidegger puts on the way faith is lived and performed in Paul, since from the perspective of the hōs mē the specific contents of the given circumstances under which faith is lived are not relevant. The basic meaning of Pauline pistis does not concern these given circumstances as such, but rather the way they are viewed or experienced. Second, the attitude defined by the hōs mē cannot be understood as a mere thought experiment or as a single act performed from time to time, but must be seen as a new posture that influences all particular actions by giving a new tone to our experience of the world and of the self.72 If one wants to translate this posture of the hōs mē into Aristotelian terms, one has substantial reasons to state that it is an ēthos in a way comparable to Aristotle’s conception, according to which ēthos is not a single and isolated act or comportment, but an enduring attitude.73 For Aristotle, this attitude is not a mere result of natural dispositions, but one that can only be stabilized through continual repetition and action. Thus, one becomes brave only by repeatedly acting in a brave way, so that one acquires this character.74 Aside from Aristotle’s analysis in the Nicomachean Ethics, we can also consider his elaborations in the Rhetoric, which indeed represents a fundamental reference point for Heidegger’s analysis of the connection between pistis and ēthos. 69. Ibid., 79–80, where Heidegger stresses the extent to which Paul does not have any theoretical or dogmatic intentions. Accordingly, the articulation of Pauline pistis is enacted in the concrete factical situation, which does not involve any theoretical proofs. Thus, Heidegger argues that we cannot speak of dogma with reference to Paul, if by “dogma” we understand a doctrinal content that can subsist independently of the enactment underlying Christian religiosity. According to Heidegger, we cannot subordinate Christian facticity to any doctrinal system, because, on the contrary, dogma itself must be seen to have its origin in the situation-related enactment of Christian religiosity. 70. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 66, 87–88. 71. Ibid., 85–86. As for the hōs mē in Paul, see 1 Cor. 7:29–31. 72. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 86. 73. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2.1.1103a34‒b25. 74. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2.1.1103a14‒34.

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4.3 Pistis as Ēthos in Aristotle In the course of his reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Heidegger develops an interpretation of pistis which complements his phenomenological analysis of Pauline faith. In order to summarize the main point, one could say that, as concerns Paul, Heidegger reads pistis as ēthos, whereas in the case of the Aristotelian rhetoric he considers ēthos as pistis.75 The conceptual and interpretive interplay between Pauline pistis and Aristotelian pistis in Heidegger’s readings can be articulated with reference to three main points. First, the shared conceptual framework of the two readings becomes apparent because in both cases Heidegger sees a direct connection between pistis and ēthos, assuming that pistis essentially concerns an attitude, comportment, or posture (Haltung), not simply a certain stock of cognitive contents (convictions, beliefs, etc.): “First of all, we will consider ἦθος the ‘comportment [in German: Haltung, A.C.]’ of the speaker: in what manner the speaker offers himself to his hearers in discourse, how this offering of himself contributes to the cultivation of the πιθανόν, how this ἦθος acquires the possibility of co-speaking, of comattering.”76 Second, one can already notice that Heidegger concentrates his attention on two specific meanings of pistis, that is, trust or credibility (Vertrauen) and attestation or testimony (Zeugnis), whereas in the case of Paul he places special, but not exclusive, emphasis on pistis as belief or faith (Glaube). According to Heidegger’s reading, there is a direct relation between these two facets of pistis, insofar as trust presupposes a capability for attestation. If I am in a position to attest to a certain thing, one can trust me with regard to this thing. On the other hand, if I am not capable of attesting to something, people will not trust me in this regard: “How is it with speaking that we as hearers take the speaker to be himself what bears witness [in German: Zeugnis ablegt, A.C.] to the matter that he represents? What is it about speaking that the speaker speaks for the matter with his person, leaving aside what he says, the concrete arguments that he has brought to bear on something.”77 Third, in accordance with Aristotle, Heidegger highlights the three conditions of possibility of ēthos as pistis (trust or credibility, attestation or testimony), that is, “looking around” (phronēsis), “seriousness” (aretē), and “good attitude” or “good will” (eunoia).78 It is important to underscore that all three conditions exceed the scope of pure logical-formal requirements, since they concern the first-person perspective and the related comportment (i.e., attitude, posture). 75. Pistis in Aristotle is not confined to ēthos, since it includes pathos. See Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, 113‒16. With regard to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotelian pistis, see ibid., 109‒16. 76. Ibid., 111. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid.

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The first condition concerns knowledge, or rather, the proper relation to the thing itself. If the speaker is not acquainted with the issue, he loses credibility, so that the audience does not trust him. Thus, the capability of arguing in terms of formal logic is not relevant here, since an intimate familiarity with the content or issue itself is indeed required: “The view that he conveys is not oriented toward what the matter genuinely is, it is missing the ὀρϑότης. As soon as the hearer notices the flaw, the speaker loses πίστις; he no longer is in consideration as to the matter for which he speaks.”79 The second condition refers to “virtue,” reformulated by Heidegger in terms of “seriousness” (Ernst). Though I am properly acquainted with something, so that I know what I am talking about, nevertheless this is not enough in order to deserve pistis. I have to make proper use of my knowledge in order to convince people and adopt a proper attitude or posture.80 Finally, the third condition concerns what one could reformulate in terms of full commitment. Acquaintance and its proper use are not enough, since the speaker should also be committed to the interest of the audience. Otherwise put, he or she should feel obliged to speak in the best interest of the audience.81 If all the above requirements are fulfilled, then the speaker is an actual embodiment of pistis and is experienced as such.82 It is interesting to note that Paul’s pistis also fulfills all the above requirements of Aristotelian pistis, as they are reformulated by Heidegger in his reading. First, Paul is indeed acquainted with what he is talking about, speaking from his own life experience and from the first-person perspective. Second, he takes his audience seriously and is, for his part, taken seriously. Third, he is fully committed to his audience’s interest. In the final analysis, Paul’s pistis is a real example or embodiment of the general requirements that define Aristotelian pistis. Therefore, Pauline pistis is not confined to pistis in the narrow sense of faith as religious belief, since it includes the other two aspects exposed during the analysis of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotelian pistis, that is, pistis as trust or credibility and pistis as attestation or testimony. In fact, Pauline proclamation as the articulation and authentic communication of faith cannot be properly enacted without trust or credibility. But such proclamation involves an attestation or testimony as well, insofar as Paul bears witness to pistis as faith with his own life, which is indeed a concrete attestation of his own apostolic announcement. Heidegger’s reading of the Pauline and Aristotelian forms of pistis in terms of ēthos is fruitful not only for its capacity to expose interesting conceptual connections between very different theological and philosophical sources. It also serves as an inspiration for the philosophical articulation of some

79. Ibid., 112. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid., 112–13.

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phenomena that we experience in certain situations of everyday life. In this regard, I would like to briefly mention a further development and establish a connection between pistis as ēthos and what philosophers of language call “performativity,” a phenomenon I have already addressed in Chapter 1 with particular reference to Agamben’s appropriation of the Pauline experience of “the word of faith.” According to the initial formulation given by John L. Austin,83 performative utterances are not supposed to describe events or states of affairs, as is the case with constative ones. Rather, articulating performative utterances involves doing something. If, for instance, I say “I promise …,” then I am not describing a certain state of affairs; rather, I am doing something, that is, I am promising. Austin tentatively describes several conditions or requisites which performative utterances are supposed to fulfill in order to be felicitous,84 given that mere linguistic articulation as such is not sufficient. In a considerable number of situations, the linguistic articulation of performative utterances requires conditions that concern the inner disposition or personal qualities of the speaker.85 In fact, if I promise something and have, from the outset, no intention of keeping my promise, then the related performative utterance will not be felicitous. It will be a mere linguistic articulation that is lacking actual significance. Assuming that performativity in a broad sense names such a surplus of meaning, which does not concern linguistic articulation as such, but relates to personal qualities or attitudes of the speaker, one can easily argue that, in the end, this performativity should be traced back to pistis as ēthos. Now, Agamben’s reading of the Pauline experience of “the word of faith” can be understood precisely on the basis of the conceptual clarifications that I have developed in the light of the interplay between Heidegger’s interpretation of Pauline pistis and his phenomenological reading of Aristotelian pistis. In fact, the consistency between the articulation of discourse and the personal qualities of the speaker is rooted in pistis as an ēthos, which is determined by both attestation (or testimony) and trust (or credibility).86 Against the background of the above analyses, we are in a position to see the extent to which pistis largely exceeds the scope of religion in the narrow sense and affects our understanding of language, social cohesion, and the truly ethical commitment underlying human communication. A proper understanding of the complexity that defines pistis allows one to substantially relativize some allegedly ultimate oppositions, especially the contrast between faith and reason, and to argue that pistis turns out to be an essential component of human rationality, especially insofar as this is embedded in social, ethical, and political interaction.

83. John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 4‒11. 84. Ibid., 12‒24. 85. Ibid., 15‒24. 86. See Chapter 1, Sections 4.4‒4.5.

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5 The Pauline Hōs Mē and Heidegger’s Conception of Authentic Existence In the preceding sections of the present chapter, I have tried to highlight the extent to which the Pauline hōs mē is a central source of inspiration for Heidegger’s elaboration of authentic existence. A number of structural similarities have come to the fore. As a follow-up, I will recapitulate these by paying special attention to three basic overlaps. First, the Pauline hōs mē and the Heideggerian authentic existence are both enactment-based; that is, they do not concern any specific contents, visions of life, or concrete situations. The basic meaning of both attitudes lies in the way in which factical situations are lived and experienced. For both attitudes give a different sense to the experience of the world. The concrete content of worldly meaningfulness may remain one and the same. What radically changes is how we enact that experience.87 Second, they have an analogous temporal structure. Paul’s impact on Heidegger’s phenomenological articulation of primordial temporality cannot be neglected. It is Paul who helps Heidegger find a concrete alternative to the experience of temporality lived and conceptually articulated in ancient Greek thought, especially in that of Aristotle.88 Regarding Pauline temporality and its impact on Heidegger’s account, however, one should avoid hasty oversimplifications. The one-sided focus on the relevance of the future does not do justice to the richness and complexity of that phenomenon, which is evident in both the lecture course on Paul and the existential analytic. It is the configuration of temporality as a whole—not only its future-orientedness—that is at stake in both cases.89 Third, both attitudes rely on the experience of the precariousness and finitude that characterize human life. The Heideggerian authentic existence is structurally linked to anxiety as well as to the awareness of the fact that any absolute foundations are missing.90 Analogously, the Pauline experience of precariousness is phrased by Heidegger in the following way: “The conversion to Christian life experience concerns the enactment. In order to raise the relational sense of factical life experience, one must be careful that it becomes more ‘difficult,’ that it is enacted ἐν θλίψεσιν. The phenomena of enactment must be entwined with the sense of facticity.”91 The way the hōs mē determines the Pauline experience of the world—and the extent to which it is indeed the truly fundamental source of inspiration for Heidegger’s account of authentic existence in his ontology of Dasein— becomes even more apparent if we consider Heidegger’s understanding of the Pauline passage concerning “the form of this world” (1 Cor. 7:31).92 The passage 87. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 86. 88. See Chapter 1, Sections 3.1‒3.2. 89. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 85. 90. Heidegger, Being and Time, 182‒84. 91. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 86. 92. In what follows, I will concentrate my attention on Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 85‒86.

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immediately follows the sections concerning the hōs mē and the contracted time.93 We have already paid attention to the fact that the Pauline experience of worldly meaningfulness is affected by that experience of temporality and filtered by the hōs mē.94 Heidegger understands the Pauline passage concerning “the form of this world” phenomenologically, in that he interprets the notion of schēma in relation to another important passage from the letter to the Romans: “σχῆμα is not meant so very objectively, rather as ordered toward a self-comportment. Rom. 12:2 shows how σχῆμα [form] should be understood: καὶ μὴ συσχηματίζεσϑε τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ [and do not be conformed to this world]. Here one can gather the enactment-character of σχῆμα.”95 According to Heidegger, schēma does not denote the objective shape of the world in itself. Thus, when Paul says that “the form of the world passes away,”96 he does not mean that the world is collapsing but wants to convey a new idea of life, that is, a new attitude. In other words, the schēma is the form of the world as it is lived or experienced. Living or experiencing the world in accordance with the hōs mē based on the contracted time means that the Christians do not shape their own life according to the schēma of this world. If we translate this attitude in Heideggerian terms, we could say that the Pauline notion of schēma corresponds to the Heideggerian concept of worldly “meaningfulness” (Bedeutsamkeit).97 In fact, in Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein the concept of meaningfulness indicates the structure, or configuration, of the world as it is experienced or lived in terms of Dasein’s “thrown being-in-the-world.”98 From this viewpoint, the analogy between the Pauline experience of the world and Heidegger’s account of authenticity is pretty clear. First, inauthentic existence means being involved and absorbed in worldly meaningfulness; that is, this circumstance is one in which Dasein conforms itself to that meaningfulness. Second, authentic existence—that is, the experience of the world as it manifests itself in anxiety—implies that it is not the form or the meaningfulness of the world that determines existence. The world in itself does not disappear. What changes, in fact, is how we experience it. In Heidegger, authentic existence does not entail any flight from the world,99 but a new way of experiencing it, that is, a new comportment or attitude, as is precisely the case with the Pauline way of life. Introducing the notion of ēthos in this context does not imply any commonsensical understanding of ethical connotations such as prescriptions, precepts, and duties. Nor does it involve taking any stance against the world. Concerning this possible misunderstanding, Heidegger’s statements are 93. See 1 Cor. 7:29–30. 94. See Chapter 1, Section 3.3. 95. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 85‒86. 96. Ibid., 85. 97. Heidegger, Being and Time, 85‒87. 98. Ibid., 161. 99. Ibid., 244‒55.

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unequivocal. Accordingly, he takes a clear position against Nietzsche’s dismissal of Paul.100 This clarification further attests to the truly phenomenological viewpoint that guides Heidegger’s approach to Paul. According to Heidegger, reading the Pauline letters in terms of religious or ethical contents would not do justice to their philosophical potential, which can unfold once we use Paul with a view to working out some basic structures of facticity. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche fails to understand Paul precisely because his vehement attack relies on the assumption that Paul’s apostleship can be reduced to a merely ethical or crypto-political stance.

6 Agamben’s Account of the Pauline Hōs Mē: Critical Considerations and Developments Agamben’s commentary on Paul’s messianic experience contains an interesting digression on Heidegger’s interpretation from the early 1920s, particularly as it concerns the notions of the hōs mē, vocation, and use.101 It is worth analyzing Agamben’s considerations on the Heideggerian reading because such an analysis allows us to recognize similarities but also ambiguities in the two approaches. Agamben very clearly and aptly sees the gist of Heidegger’s understanding of the Pauline factical life experience: “According to Heidegger, what is essential in Paul is not dogma or theory, but factical experience, the way worldly relations are lived (Vollzug, the carrying out, the way of living). For Paul, this way of living is determined through the hōs mē.”102 Agamben documents Heidegger’s approach with particular reference to those passages where Heidegger explains the meaning of the hōs mē.103 Agamben’s digression, however, leads me to formulate some critical considerations concerning at least three points. First, as a general critical consideration, although Agamben clearly recognizes the enactment of Pauline experience as the pivotal element of Heidegger’s explication, he does not relate it to his own performativity-centered reading. I am convinced that Agamben misses the opportunity to engage in a philosophically fruitful conversation with Heidegger here, especially considering that they both make use of notions (i.e., enactment and the performativum fidei) that are very similar, if not identical. Second, I am very sympathetic to Agamben’s attempt to see a strong (“more than just a simple anticipation”104) link between Heidegger’s interpretation of 100. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 86. See also Chapter 1, Section 3. 101. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 33‒34. 102. Ibid., 33. 103. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 84‒86. 104. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 34.

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Paul and the account of existence provided in Being and Time. I agree with this connection, as my previous considerations show. Nonetheless, I disagree substantively over the extent to which and how we have to understand that link. Agamben contends that “[i]t is through his reading of the Pauline hōs mē that Heidegger seems to first develop his idea of appropriation of the improper as the determining trait of human existence.”105 In this context, Agamben seems to understand Heidegger’s lectures on Paul too retrospectively, inasmuch as he reads Being and Time’s conceptuality back into those lectures. This is most evident in the case of the conceptual constellation related to “the dialectic of the proper (Eigentlichkeit) and the improper (Uneigentlichkeit).”106 I too think that an anticipation of the conceptual framework concerning the dialectic of authenticity and inauthenticity can be seen in the Heideggerian lecture course on Paul. Nevertheless, I disagree with Agamben when he argues that in the Pauline course Heidegger understands that dialectic already in terms of the proper and the improper. As a matter of fact, the conceptuality relating to the proper and the improper is fragmented and not yet systematized in that text, at least in the form in which it has been published. It is this overemphasis on the dialectic between the proper and the improper that allows Agamben to formulate the following critical remark on Heidegger’s reading: “Nonetheless, for Paul, what is at stake is not appropriation, but use, and the messianic subject is not only not defined by property, but he is also unable to seize hold of himself as a whole, whether in the form of an authentic decision or in Being-toward-death.”107 Upon closer inspection, nowhere in his lecture course does Heidegger define Paul’s radical attitude in terms of the dialectic between the proper and the improper. Nor does he elaborate on death or authentic decision. I am fully convinced that one should read and understand Heidegger’s Pauline course in its own right, despite the fact that anticipations of themes present in Being and Time are clear enough. If we read Heidegger’s Pauline course in this way, we can come to the conclusion that Agamben is much more indebted to Heidegger than he is willing to concede. This leads me to the third critical remark. In Heidegger we already find a number of themes and interpretive lines that are of decisive importance for Agamben’s approach as well, even though they are still undeveloped. Heidegger’s comments on the first letter to the Corinthians might have been the hidden source of inspiration for Agamben’s book. Aside from the relevance of the general framework regarding enactment and performativity, one can easily notice the extent to which Heidegger and Agamben share a substantive concern with themes such as the hōs mē, temporality, and the linguistic articulation specific to Pauline pistis. And it is Heidegger that draws attention not only to the groundbreaking meaning of 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid.

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the “compressed temporality,”108 but also to the notions of vocation and use,109 which are at the core of Agamben’s commentary. One can elaborate on further convergences between Heidegger and Agamben by bringing the theme of attestation, or testimony, into play. In what follows, I will go beyond explicit and manifest similarities and attempt to develop a brief systematic analysis that is meant to show a common implicit conceptual constellation. Remarkably, such a constellation concerning attestation coherently captures a considerable number of aspects I have already discussed in the preceding considerations. Let us try to rethink Agamben’s understanding of Pauline pistis by using the notion of radical attitude, in accordance with the main interpretive hypothesis guiding my approach in the present chapter. As has already been shown, the radicality of Pauline pistis consists in the fact that the hōs mē involves a complete reconfiguration of the attitude toward the world, the self, and others. In the Agambenian reading, the experience of the hōs mē is not instantaneous, but structures Christian life enduringly. In Aristotelian terms, it is an ēthos. The articulation of such an ēthos is eminently related to the accentuated performativity of “the word of faith,” which is a substantial facet of the energeia specific to Pauline pistis.110 Pauline pistis is a radical attitude that is and should be repeatedly enacted, that is, become operative concretely. Let us ask ourselves how this inherent operativity of the ēthos of pistis becomes manifest. I argue that this happens, according to the “principle of messianic inversion,”111 in the form of an attestation that is embodied in the Pauline notion of “weakness.”112 What kind of attestation is involved in the Pauline pistis that becomes operative in its own peculiar weakness? The fundamental aspect of such attestation can be distinguished with particular reference to the way Pauline pistis concerns the first-person perspective and is structurally situation-related. As we already saw with regard to the performativity of “the word of faith,”113 Pauline discourse always enacts itself in reference to a certain situation. It never articulates itself in terms of a universality detached from the concrete enactment within a factical context. Concerning this aspect, Agamben is in fact very close to Heidegger’s emphasis on the situation of proclamation.114 Pauline apostleship is intrinsically attestation in that it involves living (i.e., a way of life, an ēthos) in the announcement itself. Paul and the Christians are supposed to attest to the announcement by means of their own way of life. The meaning of this attestation is indeed recapitulated in what Agamben calls 108. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 85. 109. Ibid., 84, 87. 110. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 90. See Chapter 1, Section 4.5. 111. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 97. 112. Ibid. 113. See also Chapter 1, Section 4.5. 114. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 97.

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“[t]he reciprocal interlacing of announcement, faith, and plērophoria.”115 This specification allows us to understand the extent to which the Pauline word of faith cannot be understood as a mere speech act, that is, as a mere linguistic operativity or performativity. For the articulation of pistis and the concrete enactment of a way of life (i.e., ēthos or attitude) that attests to the announcement is one and the same phenomenon. First, the Pauline way of life enacts itself by means of the performative articulation of pistis, which comes to the fore in the announcement. A mere posture does not in itself do justice to the intrinsic operativity of pistis. Indeed, the Pauline letters are the concrete documents in which such an articulation emerges within the factical situation in which Paul and the Christian communities live. Second, the Pauline letters are not theoretical writings. Nor do they aim to convey mere doctrines detached from everyday lived experience. They answer—and attest to—specific challenges experienced by Paul himself and the Christian communities he addresses. Thus, the Pauline letters are always already embedded in factical experiences. It is possible to elaborate on Agamben’s understanding of the messianic attitude in terms of a radical ēthos and attestation by considering his way of reading the passage from the first letter to the Corinthians where Paul speaks of the schēma of this world. This will allow me to ascertain further similarities with regard to Heidegger’s interpretation, which I have analyzed in the previous sections. Agamben’s rephrasing of that passage reads as follows: The Pauline passage on the hōs mē may thus conclude with the phrase “paragei gar to schēma tou kosmou toutou [for passing away is the figure, the way of being of this world]” (I Cor. 7:31). In pushing each thing toward itself through the as not, the messianic does not simply cancel out this figure, but it makes it pass, it prepares its end. This is not another figure or another world: it is the passing of the figure of this world.116

Analogously to Heidegger, Agamben underlines that the content of the world itself does not change when it is experienced through the hōs mē. The messianic attitude does not imply any change in the factical shape in which the world presents itself. In other words, the messianic does not aim to introduce a different world. From this viewpoint, the Pauline messianic ēthos cannot be depicted as a revolutionary attitude, because it does not want to change the world as it stands by introducing new contents, that is, new factical conditions. What changes is the way the world, that is, the factical condition or the status quo is experienced. Agamben stresses this point very clearly when he says: “The messianic tension thus does not tend toward an elsewhere, nor does it exhaust itself in the indifference between one thing and its opposite.”117 This specification 115. Ibid., 91. 116. Ibid., 24‒25. 117. Ibid., 24.

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contains two important statements. First, according to Agamben, the messianic attitude does not envisage a new world (“an elsewhere”) that is supposed to replace the present world or the present schēma of the world. In this sense, the messianic attitude does not seem to involve any utopian commitment. The messianic attitude keeps being enacted and lived precisely in the present world. It does not contain any prefiguration of a different world. Second, the attitude based on the hōs mē does not replace a certain factical condition with its opposite. Such a reading of the Pauline hōs mē would not do justice to its radicality, because it would reduce the hōs mē to a mere negation of the present factical condition. This is not the case, as Agamben rightly explains. Nor does the messianic attitude imply any form of indifference toward the factical shape of the world. The messianic attitude is not indifferent to factical condition x and its opposite, that is, factical condition non-x. The crucial and very subtle specification provided by Agamben reads as follows: The apostle does not say: “weeping as rejoicing” nor “weeping as [meaning =] not weeping,” but “weeping as not weeping.” According to the principle of messianic klēsis, one determinate factical condition is set in relation to itself—the weeping is pushed toward the weeping, the rejoicing toward the rejoicing. In this manner, it revokes the factical condition and undermines it without altering its form.118

If we interpret the messianic attitude in terms of indifference, factical condition x and factical condition non-x are equivalent. Accordingly, the hōs mē would be read incorrectly, because the hōs and the mē would be kept separate. Following the example examined by Agamben, we would understand the Pauline phrase hoi klaiontes hōs mē klaiontes (“weeping as not weeping,” 1 Cor. 7:30) as follows: klaiontes = (i.e., hōs) mē klaiontes. Agamben very aptly stresses that the hōs mē composes one single phrase, so that we should understand it in the following way: klaiontes hōs mē (i.e., as not) klaiontes. This means the factical condition of weeping is not set in relation to the factical condition of not weeping. Paul’s concern is not to remove or replace the factical condition of weeping, but to live and experience it in a different way, that is, in the light of the messianic and within the horizon of “the time that remains.” In the case of “eschatological indifference,”119 the factical conditions of weeping and not weeping would be equivalent to the effect that one may interchange them. However, according to Agamben’s interpretation, this would be a deep misunderstanding of Paul’s messianic attitude. At this juncture, it is worth returning to a truly crucial passage from Agamben’s commentary,120 where the actual meaning of the Pauline hōs mē 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid., 22. 120. Ibid., 22‒23.

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becomes clear in the light of the specifications just provided. By developing Agamben’s considerations, one may say that the messianic attitude, which recapitulates the manifold facets (i.e., hōs mē, klēsis, and chrēsis) singled out in the previous analyses, does not attest to new contents, utopian visions, or revolutionary programs in the commonsensical understanding. At first sight, it does not attest to anything. But precisely for this reason it constitutes a more profound and radical attestation, which consists in “an internal shifting of each and every single worldly condition by virtue of being ‘called.’”121 The messianic attitude attests to the concrete factical and worldly condition in which it stands. But it does not attest to the mere acceptance of that condition. Instead, it attests to the “internal shifting,” which might not be visible from outside, but introduces a new way of experiencing the world, that is, experiencing the world as the world that is passing away. The convergences between Agamben’s understanding of the messianic attitude and Heidegger’s are quite clear now. If one takes into consideration both Heidegger’s interpretation of Paul and his analysis of attestation and authentic existence in Being and Time, one can easily notice that Heidegger too lays emphasis on the fact that those experiences do not concern any concrete contents, but involve a new way of experiencing or enacting what constitutes the factical condition in which Paul or authentic Dasein stands. This fundamental aspect, which, as we will see, appears to some extent in Badiou’s approach as well, also comes up in the notion of use (chrēsis), which Agamben introduces to more concretely determine the way the messianic attitude is enacted. Agamben stresses that the messianic does not provide any new identities by removing the old ones,122 insomuch as the messianic vocation “is a generic potentiality [potenza] that can be used without ever being owned. To be messianic, to live in the Messiah, signifies the expropriation of each and every juridical-factical property […] under the form of the as not.”123 The messianic attitude cannot be exhausted by the possession of factical conditions, identities, or properties. Otherwise, it would pass away in exactly the same way as the world and its old configuration do. Instead, it is a way of using the worldly facticities by experiencing them as transitory conditions.

7 Badiou’s Paul: Evental Declaration and Attestation I have tried to show the extent to which both Heidegger’s understanding of Paul’s fundamental posture and Agamben’s account of the messianic vocation can be seen to converge because both allow for a reading of the Pauline experience in terms of attestation or testimony. According to Heidegger and 121. Ibid., 22. 122. Ibid., 26‒27. 123. Ibid., 26.

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Agamben, Paul embodies a radical attitude. The radicality of this stance lies in the fact that the Pauline attitude does not imply the introduction of new contents, factical conditions, or novel identities. Its actual meaning concerns, instead, the new way that the world, the self, and others are experienced and disclosed. The same holds true for the Badiouian Paul. In this last section of this chapter, I will elaborate on Badiou’s position with the intention of showing how, according to his interpretive framework, the Pauline articulation of pistis as evental declaration goes hand in hand with a radical posture, which in turn can again be understood as a form of attestation or testimony. The first point we have to elucidate is how the evental-declarative articulation of pistis cannot be understood merely in terms of a single act. At first sight, in accordance with a commonsensical account of declaration, one might be inclined to see declaration as an act that happens at a certain place at a certain time. One can easily imagine a number of examples illustrative of this understanding: “Here and now, I declare that thing x is y,” “State x declares war on state y,” “We hereby declare that student x passed exam y,” and so on. However, in a number of respects, the everyday usage of the word “declaration” already contradicts such a one-sided account. It is true that the act of declaring happens at a certain place at a certain time, but it contains a binding force that in fact goes beyond the contingent situation in which it takes place. A concrete example of such a binding force specific to declaration can be found especially in the domains of political and juridical discourses. Declaring the independence of a state is a single act, but such a declaration, if and when enacted and performed, opens up a new situation, or horizon,124 that forces us to see persons, relations, and things in a different way. It establishes (i.e., founds or articulates) a new order. Performative, or transformative, power is inherent in declaration as such. I think we have good reasons to understand the Badiouian Paul’s evental declaration precisely in the same sense that declarations are utilized in political and juridical discourses. Paul’s evental declaration is characterized by the foundation (i.e., articulation and establishment) of a new order that disrupts and subverts the old ones.125 Accordingly, such a new order, or foundation, is supposed to be innovative and enduring to the effect that it is not exhausted in the mere act of declaring. We could also say that declaration as the act of declaring happens at a certain place at a certain time, but what is declared, that is, the new order, is characterized by bindingness in its own right.

124. See, for example, Badiou, Saint Paul, 45, where he depicts the innovative force of Paul’s articulation of pistis by stressing that, for Paul, Jesus’ resurrection cannot be reduced to a falsifiable or demonstrable fact. According to Badiou, the evental (nonfactual) nature of Jesus concerns precisely the way it opens a new epoch by transforming the range of the possible and impossible. See also Badiou, Saint Paul, 43, where he speaks of “rupture.” 125. See Chapter 1, Section 5.2.3.

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It is precisely in the new horizon opened up by the evental declaration that the new Pauline attitude is lived and enacted. In Badiou’s reading, we find further elements that lead us to understand the Pauline evental declaration in terms of an enduring, or stable, attitude, not as a single act performed conditionally. One of those aspects is the public nature of declaration.126 According to Badiou, Pauline pistis is essentially “declared conviction.”127 The use of “declared” in this phrase is not a redundant specification. It is necessary if we want to make a clear differentiation between “mere private conviction,” which is defined by “unutterable utterances” and thus does not entail any need for articulation, and “the public declaration of the event.”128 Let us develop Badiou’s characterization of Pauline pistis in terms of public declaration. What does such a public character entail with reference to the binding force of evental declaration that was just pointed out? The fact that pistis declares itself publicly implies that it must commit itself. The declaration articulates the principles and the order on the basis of which its own credibility and its own trustworthiness can be assessed. In this context, the crucial point is that by publicly declaring itself, pistis is committed to its own attestation. This also means that in declaring itself pistis is exposed to the potential loss of credibility and trustworthiness, which can be avoided only by its own attestation and self-testimony. One can easily see such situations in everyday life as well. If I do not declare my intention of doing something, I do not commit myself to anything, so that my credibility and trustworthiness will never be affected. Or rather, it does not even make sense to ask whether I am credible and trustworthy if I do not declare somehow or other my intention of doing something. The alternative between credibility and trustworthiness, on the one hand, and untrustworthiness, on the other hand, makes sense only if and when I commit myself to something by publicly declaring it. Private conviction itself does not suffice, as Badiou very convincingly states.129 I have addressed the same problem in my discussion of Agamben’s conception of the performativum fidei, specifically with regard to the decisive notion of homologia. Roughly speaking, we can say that Agamben and Badiou approach the issue from convergent points of view. Agamben, too, highlights the performative efficacy of Pauline pistis by laying emphasis on the fact that the articulation of pistis can take place only “in the harmony between mouth and heart.”130 Both contend that the profession or utterance of “the word of faith” is the necessary condition of possibility for the efficacy specific to pistis. We should also bear in mind what 126. Badiou, Saint Paul, 87‒88. See also Chapter 1, Section 5.2.1. 127. Badiou, Saint Paul, 87. 128. Ibid. 129. Ibid., 88. 130. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 131. In addressing this crucial point, both Agamben and Badiou refer to the same passage. More precisely, Agamben takes Rom. 10:6–10 as his main source, whereas Badiou quotes and comments on Rom. 10:9–10.

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Agamben says about this fundamental aspect of Pauline pistis in a passage that was already analyzed in Chapter 1.131 What Badiou characterizes in terms of the “material evidence” of pistis,132 that is, public articulation and utterance, is not a merely concomitant component of pistis, but an essential and necessary feature of it. If we ask ourselves about the concrete shape in which that articulation is performed, we can easily find an answer. The “material evidence” Badiou is talking about is precisely the collection of the Pauline letters. By publicly articulating itself, pistis is enacted in terms of attestation. The clarifications just given allow us to understand the reason why Badiou defines the evental-declarative truth as follows: “Truth is entirely subjective (it is of the order of a declaration that testifies to a conviction relative to the event).”133 This means evental declaration, insomuch as it is inherently public, is an attestation of pistis, in the sense of both a genitivus objectivus and a genitivus subjectivus. According to Badiou’s definition, pistis “names the subject” precisely “at the point of declaration.”134 In other words, there is no pistis detached from its own being declared. In explaining the processual nature of Pauline truth,135 Badiou mentions not only pistis—understood in terms of conviction, not as faith—but also two more ingredients of the Pauline attitude, that is, agapē and elpis, which he translates as “love” and “certainty” respectively. This is a further evidence of the fact that the Pauline evental-declarative articulation of pistis has to be understood not as a single act, but with reference to an attitude. Let us examine how Badiou develops his analysis of those further facets of the Pauline attitude. According to him, the concept of love “names the subject at the point of his conviction’s militant address.”136 It is no coincidence that Badiou specifies and underscores the public nature of pistis precisely in the chapter he devotes to “love as universal power.”137 Love is indeed the other side of the public articulation of pistis, insofar as it is the “nonliteral law” that is defined by a universal address.138 While being articulated publicly, Pauline pistis involves love as the force underlying the 131. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 131. See Chapter 1, Sections 4.4‒4.5. 132. Badiou, Saint Paul, 88. 133. Ibid., 14. The original phrasing in French is even clearer: “l’ordre d’une déclaration qui atteste une conviction quant à l’événement.” Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), 15. 134. Badiou, Saint Paul, 15. 135. Ibid. 136. Ibid. 137. Ibid., 86‒89. 138. It is important to notice a point that may support my understanding of Badiou’s account of Pauline pistis as an attitude. Badiou attributes to love as nonliteral law the capability of giving “consistency” to the faithful subject. See Badiou, Saint Paul, 87. I understand that “consistency” precisely with reference to the enduring character of Paul’s attitude.

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universal address that defines it. The public nature of the evental declaration of pistis cannot be without love precisely because it is addressed universally.139 If Pauline pistis is not a private, self-referential, and “unspeakable” belief that concerns the subject as individual,140 but is publicly declared and shared, then it has to be enacted in terms of love.141 Love is an inherent component of the processuality that structures the evental-declarative articulation of Pauline pistis.142 Besides pistis (i.e., conviction) and love, Badiou adds a third aspect of the Pauline attitude, that is, elpis. The way he translates it (i.e., as “certainty”) can help me to elaborate on the interpretive approach I am using in this section. In the present context, the key point is that he rejects any attempt to relate elpis to future. Thus, elpis does not designate any expectation or projection of a condition or state to come. Badiou locates the temporal dimension specific to elpis in the present.143 It is appropriate to read such characterizations in the light of what he says in Chapter 1 of his book on Paul,144 where he connects Pauline elpis to the completion of the truth procedure. The assumption that the truth procedure has been “completed [achevé]” gives to the subject a peculiar force that one might view as certainty.145 I understand this elucidation that Badiou provides in the sense that the actualization of the evental-declarative truth procedure should be seen in its own immanence. In phenomenological terms, one might speak of a fulfillment that characterizes the emergence of the subject in conjunction with the truth procedure. As we already know, Heidegger and Agamben speak of enactment (Vollzug) and the performativum fidei respectively. It comes as no surprise that Badiou explains the actual meaning of the Pauline elpis by introducing concepts such as “continuation,” “tenacity,” “obstinacy,” “endurance,” “perseverance,” and “patience.”146 This is a very coherent conceptual constellation that is highly symptomatic of the fact that the attitude inaugurated by and embodied in the evental declaration of the truth procedure does not allow for any postponement and has to face the painful challenges the new pistis entails.147 This kind of elpis, as delineated by Badiou, is the quintessence of the attesting or testifying that is inherent in the Pauline attitude. For Paul attests to his own apostleship (i.e., the evental declaration and the public proclamation of pistis) precisely by means of that “enduring fidelity” that faces the ordeal, that is, by being a martyr. Let us recall 139. Badiou, Saint Paul, 90. 140. Ibid. 141. See also “Theorem 6.” Badiou, Saint Paul, 90. 142. Ibid., 91. 143. Ibid., 97. 144. Ibid., 15. 145. Ibid. 146. For all these terms, see Badiou, Saint Paul, 93. 147. Ibid., 95.

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that in ancient Greek the word martys means “witness,” that is, the one who attests, or testifies, to his or her own pistis. It is true that Paul cannot be said to bear material (i.e., empirical or historical) witness to the event. Nor can his declaration of the event be understood in terms of a report about a historical occurrence.148 If we follow Badiou’s reading, his attestation is, however, more radical and risky precisely because the pistis Paul wants to attest to with his apostleship lacks any objective certainties or givens.149

148. See also Chapter 4, Section 2.2.2. 149. Badiou explicitly emphasizes this point. See Badiou, Saint Paul, 44.

Chapter 3 A RT IC U L AT I N G T H E P O L I T IC A L

1 Rethinking the Political: Toward a Critique of Political Paulinism The preceding analysis of Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s readings of Paul allowed us to highlight both their differences and their shared interpretive frameworks, with particular reference to how they explain and appropriate the articulation of Pauline pistis. Let us summarize the main aspects of those readings. According to Heidegger, the core of Paul’s articulation of pistis consists in the complex of enactment that determines Pauline proclamation and is linked to the factical experience of the temporality specific to early Christianity. Badiou, in turn, locates that articulation in the declaration of pistis, to the effect that the Pauline truth procedure (i.e., declaring the event and being faithful to that declaration) is concurrent with the emergence of the Christian subject. For his part, Agamben introduces the notion of the performative surplus of meaning by underlining that “the word of faith” in Paul largely exceeds referential language and truth as correspondence. Thus, notwithstanding the very diverse range of theoretical concerns and questions that define these authors’ approaches to Paul, it is easy to discern the extent to which they converge in emphasizing that Paul’s experience of pistis is primarily characterized by a specific form of processuality, which they respectively depict in terms of enactment-sense (Heidegger), evental declaration (Badiou), and performativity (Agamben). In accordance with my interpretive approach, their interest in appropriating those facets of Pauline processuality aims to reject conceptual patterns underlying traditional metaphysics and ontology, with the intention of discovering and outlining new forms of philosophical discourse. Thus, Paul does not merely serve as one theme among others, but as a groundbreaking reference point for the redefinition of philosophical rationality itself. Accordingly, Heidegger views Paul not only as a truly alternative source that can help him overcome the Platonic metaphysical paradigm and develop a more original account of temporality, but also as a pivotal interlocutor for the project of establishing a new paradigm, that is, the hermeneutical and pre-theoretical self-articulation inherent in factical life itself. In a very similar

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vein, Badiou holds that the Pauline evental foundation of subjectivity turns out to be a substantial alternative to philosophical models such as onto-theology. He emphasizes the radical contingency that determines human life and remains ungraspable for traditional philosophy. Agamben reads Paul in an analogous way. He convincingly articulates the specific Pauline experience of finitude and “weakness,”1 with the result that his Paul is a subverter of traditional metaphysical and political discourses. The purpose of this chapter is to continue to develop the convergences and differences of these readings of Paul, with a particular focus on how Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger interpret the other pole of Pauline processuality, that is, nomos. With this in mind, in what follows I will examine the extent to which their readings of the Pauline account of nomos rely on shared or similar approaches. At the same time, such an explication will enable me to explore challenging questions that underlie Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s considerations concerning the dialectic between pistis and nomos. With regard to this dialectic, a main issue will come to the fore—the emergence and establishment of political orders. As is revealed especially in Badiou’s and Agamben’s commentaries on the Pauline letters, the relation between pistis and nomos can in no way be separated from the question of the political in Paul. More precisely, an analysis of the problems concerning the dialectic between pistis and nomos will have to address questions related to the establishing, overcoming, and subverting of political orders or orders of power. In this context, I intend to critically assess Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s treatment of those questions by showing to what extent they share a perspective that I will call “political Paulinism.”2 Regarding this, I will highlight substantial shortcomings in both their appropriation of the Pauline letters and the philosophical projects resulting therefrom. This critical reassessment will be conducted on the basis of a conceptual framework that will allow me to explain why the assumptions and the consequences defining Badiou’s and Agamben’s Pauline political programs do not always seem convincing. By introducing the notion of “political Paulinism,” I refer to the fact that Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s analyses of the political in Paul can be traced back to the Pauline primacy of the spirit (or pistis) over the letter

1. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 97. 2. I use this notion in a different way than Jean-Claude Monod does in his article “Destins du paulinisme politique: K. Barth, C. Schmitt, J. Taubes,” Esprit: Revue International, no. 292 (February 2003): 113–24. For an account of the political significance of contemporary philosophical interpretations of Paul (with particular reference to Taubes, Badiou, and Agamben), see Elizabeth A. Castelli, “The Philosophers’ Paul in the Frame of the Global: Some Reflections,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 143–58.

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(or  nomos).3 More precisely, they translate and transplant the primacy of the spirit over the letter into the domain of the political, which leads them to approach political orders in a negative and undermining way, given that these orders are grounded in the letter. To say that political orders are grounded in the letter is to say that they have been objectified or fixed in laws, institutions, values, power structures, social roles as well as hierarchies, traditions, dogmas, and legal principles.4 In what follows, I will analyze the different forms in which political Paulinism has been developed by Heidegger, Badiou, and Agamben, and clarify how it leads them to neglect either the political in general (Heidegger) or a number of its essential elements (Badiou and Agamben). Heidegger articulates the most extreme version of what I call political Paulinism, to the effect that political orders—that is, institutions, values, established power structures, social roles as well as hierarchies, traditions, legal principles, and in general any kind of normativity—disappear in his reading of Paul because of the primacy he accords to enactment-sense, which is his way of appropriating the Pauline notion of spirit. His phenomenological interpretation of Paul misses the political implications of the Pauline announcement. This is quite surprising given that other major authors—such as Nietzsche, Taubes, Badiou, and Agamben—claim to see a specific political dimension in the Pauline letters, albeit from different viewpoints and for very diverse reasons.5 A clear indication of this missing aspect can, among other things, be seen precisely in the fact that Heidegger does not pay much attention to the problem 3. The term “political Paulinism” does not imply that the ways in which Heidegger, Badiou, and Agamben understand (or misunderstand) the political on the basis of the Pauline letters have to be traced back to Paul himself. In this chapter, it is rather a question of how the Pauline framework concerning the letter and the spirit is read and reformulated by them in political terms. Moreover, I would like to stress that I do not aim to discuss the question of the political in other works by Heidegger, Badiou, and Agamben, which would require a much more extensive investigation. I will rather concentrate on their writings on Paul and leave open the more general question of the extent to which and the way their interpretations of the Pauline letters are linked to their own conceptions of the political. 4. Upon closer inspection, political orders always imply forms of objectification or ways in which they are articulated and fixed or established. For their part, however, objectification and fixing do not contain eo ipso any political meaning. One might think, for example, of art as objectification or fixing, but the shaping specific to artistic creation does not necessarily have a political significance. The fixing or objectification underlying political orders emerges within the domain of the political insomuch as this is defined by interest, power, and conflict, as shall be elucidated in what follows. 5. Jacob Taubes notoriously constitutes the main reference point with regard to the question of political theology in Paul. See especially Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, ed. Aleida Assman and Jan Assmann in conjunction with Horst Folkers, WolfDaniel Hartwich, and Christoph Schulte, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford, CA: Stanford

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of the nomos in the Pauline sense, even though he devotes an extensive, but very critical, analysis to the problem of normative orders, especially in their metaphysical configuration. The premises and consequences of Heidegger’s apolitical reading of Paul cannot be understood without taking into account the more general apolitical tone of his hermeneutics of facticity. It is quite difficult, however, to give a final answer to the question of whether the apolitical character of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity implies, as a consequence, the apolitical tone of his interpretation of the Pauline letters or if it is not, rather, the other way around. Yet, this question is relevant in the end only to a limited extent, given that the hermeneutics of facticity and phenomenological interpretations of Paul in Heidegger are mutually dependent. This being said, I will focus on the way political Paulinism is developed and shaped in Heidegger’s course on the introduction to the phenomenology of religion. In that context, I will show that Heidegger’s political Paulinism determines precisely the apolitical fashion of his early philosophy and consists in undermining or neglecting the role of politics. For their part, Agamben and especially Badiou offer, more or less explicitly, a politically relevant rereading of the Pauline letters. From this perspective, it might seem that they make up for the gap in Heidegger’s approach to Paul. Yet, political Paulinism can still be seen to influence their interpretive frameworks in different ways. While in Heidegger political Paulinism is developed in the extreme form of an apolitical phenomenological approach to facticity, Badiou and Agamben engage with political phenomena within the framework of a more or less residual political Paulinism, with the effect that they understand such phenomena by means of conceptual resources that still rely on the primacy of the spirit over the letter. As a result, they continuously miss genuine aspects of the political in their analyses. The residual political Paulinism in Agamben University Press, 2004). In this chapter, which focuses on Heidegger, Badiou, and Agamben, I cannot analyze Taubes’ approach to Paul extensively. I will bring him into play, however, with reference to specific points I will address in the course of the present analysis. Concerning the critical literature on Taubes, Paul, and political theology, I would like to mention especially the following contributions: Marin Terpstra, “Jacob Taubes’ Conversation with Carl Schmitt on Paul,” Bijdragen: International Journal in Philosophy and Theology 70, no. 2 (2009): 185–206; Monod, “Destins du paulinisme politique”; Kenneth Reinhard, “Paul and the Political Theology of the Neighbor,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 449–65; Hent de Vries, “Inverse versus Dialectical Theology: The Two Faces of Negativity and the Miracle of Faith,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 466–511. Regarding the theological-political in Paul, with particular reference to Carl Schmitt, see also Marc de Wilde, “Politics between Times: Theologico-Political Interpretations of the Restraining Force (katechon) in Paul’s Second Letter to the Thessalonians,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 105–26.

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is phrased in terms of performativity, whereas in Badiou it is elaborated as the evental emergence of the subject. Both approaches result from the tendency to undermine political orders or rather the objectified and fixed shapes in which political orders emerge and become apparent. I will argue that Agamben’s messianic performativity and Badiou’s evental subjectivity do not supply us with appropriate conceptual frameworks—neither for understanding the political in its complex manifestations nor for proposing solutions to the political challenges that affect contemporary society. In showing that both the presuppositions and the consequences of Heidegger’s, Badiou’s, and Agamben’s political Paulinism are due to their overemphasis on the Pauline processuality (i.e., on the primacy of the spirit), I intend to pave the way for a reevaluation of the letter, that is, a positive reappraisal of objectified and fixed political orders. Such a reevaluation leads me to reject the utopian political programs outlined by Badiou and Agamben in their commentaries on Paul. The critical appraisal presented in this chapter is meant to go beyond an immanent analysis of Heidegger’s, Badiou’s, and Agamben’s elaborations on Pauline pistis. Given this intention, I would like to briefly clarify the definition of the political that I put into play in what follows. It will serve as a reference point for my examination of the three readings, in that it will allow me to critically assess Heidegger’s, Badiou’s, and Agamben’s positions from an external viewpoint. Thus, I will be able to show more clearly both why Heidegger does not manage to see the specific political meaning of Paul and why Badiou’s and Agamben’s commentaries do not succeed in outlining an appropriate analysis of the political in Paul. According to my definition, the political is determined by three main components: interest, power, and conflict.6 One cannot think the political without a more or less explicit consideration of these three interrelated components. Put another way, thinking the political means thinking interest, power, and conflict as well as the relation between them. With this postulate in 6. This definition integrates some seminal insights of Baruch Spinoza and Carl Schmitt, as they have been formulated in the Theological-Political Treatise and The Concept of the Political respectively. In the present context, I cannot provide an exhaustive justification of this definition, because this would require a separate investigation. Therefore, I confine myself to making explicit the assumptions and presuppositions that underlie my treatment of the political in Heidegger’s, Badiou’s, and Agamben’s commentaries on Paul. This being said, I would like to very briefly mention how and to what extent I have appropriated these Spinozian and Schmittian ideas. For his part, Spinoza gives a very convincing analysis of interest as the ultimate ground of human society. In this regard, see especially Spinoza, Complete Works, 526‒35. Moreover, Spinoza offers very fruitful elaborations on the notion of conatus: see especially ibid., 283. In my opinion, this notion is still a valuable conceptual resource because it can provide political philosophy not only with anthropological foundations but also with an ontology of power. See Matthew J. Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy and the Good Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 220‒35. Upon closer inspection,

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mind, one can characterize the political as the domain determined by interest, power, and conflict. Accordingly, x can be defined as “political” if and only if it entails, at the very least, these three components. This definition enables us to remove certain ambiguities that affect both the language of everyday life and the philosophical usage of the terms “political” (adjective) and “politics.” Hence, we are in a position to make an important distinction between the political, as it has just been defined, and (party) politics, or politics in the narrow sense, that is, the field wherein the action of political parties, systems, and movements takes place. Such a distinction is needed because it enables us to specify why and how we attribute political significance to actions, expressions, and domains that are not directly linked to (party) politics. A brief example may help to clarify this differentiation. When we speak of the political relevance of religion, art, philosophy, and science, we do not necessarily mean that they are involved per se in party politics by being used, for instance, as instruments of propaganda. On the contrary, they can have a very specific and much stronger political relevance when they are not involved in any party political disputes and can thus affirm their own original political configuration. As a matter of fact, if one realizes that religion, art, philosophy, and science embody specific interests, which they seek to affirm by enacting themselves as forms of powers, one can see their own political scope, which is what can lead them to conflict with party politics or politics in the very narrow sense. At this juncture, it makes sense to provide a brief, provisional definition of the three components of the political that have been introduced above. First, interest can be defined as what concerns individuals and groups. Concerns, or interests, are very different and multifarious in terms of their nature, given that they include primary needs, such as survival, food and safety, economic interests, spiritual interests, cultural interests, and personal ambitions. If we consider again the examples mentioned above, we can contend that religion, art, philosophy, and science embody spiritual concerns that demand expression and affirmation. Let us focus on philosophy, which can serve as a highly Spinoza’s notions of interest and power can help us to fill in some gaps that are evident in Schmitt’s definition of the political. As a matter of fact, Schmitt is right when he defines the political in terms of conflict. See especially Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. and with an introduction by George Schwab, with a foreword by Tracy B. Strong and notes by Leo Strauss (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007). He does not clarify, however, the anthropological and ontological foundations that underlie conflict in general and determine its multifarious shapes. Those foundations are to be found precisely in interest and power. Thus, in line with the approach I develop in my definition of the political, one cannot think the political without considering conflict, but conflict should be philosophically conceptualized by taking into account interest and power as the ultimate foundations of its unfolding. If one tries to define the political by attributing exclusive primacy to conflict, one would not make any substantial progress, because the roots of conflict would still remain unclear.

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illustrative case, by recalling what Kant says about the ultimate meaning belonging to philosophical research.7 Philosophy is confronted with the most fundamental interests, or concerns, that define human nature and result in the questions about what I can know, what I should do, and what I may hope. In addressing those questions, philosophy is supposed to be committed to its own primary concern, that is, to truth.8 The articulation and affirmation of truth can lead philosophy into conflict with politics precisely because politics is not per se committed to truth. Accordingly, philosophy and politics embody truly different interests, which are often so divergent that they can come into conflict with each other. The nature of that conflict is indeed political, although it does not take place within the domain of politics in the narrow sense of party politics. Put another way, the political function of philosophical thought does not imply that philosophy is or should be involved in party politics. Quite the opposite, the specific political function of philosophy can and should unfold especially when philosophy does not involve itself in any disputes within party politics. If it does, it falls victim to politics’ own interests and concerns by becoming, for instance, a political ideology or an instrument of propaganda, that is, a more or less consistent set of beliefs, values, convictions, and so on that are articulated and expressed with a view to legitimating certain political orders or power structures, gaining consensus, identifying supporters, and excluding opponents. In sum, philosophy belongs to the political and cannot remain politically (in the substantive sense of the political) neutral as long as it embodies specific concerns, among which first and foremost is the commitment to truth. But philosophy cannot be involved in politics (in the sense of party politics) without exposing itself to the risk of becoming subject to alien interests.9 The same applies to religion, science, and art, to the effect that they have their own concerns and interests (i.e., their own 7. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2:677. 8. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 2.1.993a30. 9. The distinction between the political function of philosophy and its involvement in politics in the narrow sense (which we would call today party politics) has been quite clearly articulated by Kant when he states that “[i]t is not to be expected that kings will philosophise or that philosophers will become kings; nor is it to be desired, however, since the possession of power inevitably corrupts the free judgment of reason. Kings or sovereign peoples (i.e. those governing themselves by egalitarian laws) should not, however, force the class of philosophers to disappear or to remain silent, but should allow them to speak publicly. This is essential to both in order that light may be thrown on their affairs. And since the class of philosophers is by nature incapable of forming seditious factions or clubs, they cannot incur suspicion of disseminating propaganda.” Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Kant’s Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 93‒130, here 115.

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spiritual and expressive needs) that demand to be articulated and shared, which often leads them to come into conflict with party politics. For its part, conflict, the second component of the political, can be defined as the irreconcilability of interests. Conflict is rooted in interest, given that interests are not organized and ordered for the sake of reconcilability. To the contrary, interests are first and foremost disorganized and lacking in direction, with the result that conflicts arise. One can differentiate two basic forms of irreconcilability. Irreconcilability can occur within the same domain, which is the case, for example, with diverging economic interests. Thus, two or more economic interests cannot coexist if they are mutually exclusive, so that their incompatibility leads them into conflict. According to my postulate, such conflict is not merely economic but can be characterized as political (in the sense of the political), or as a certain type of political conflict, although it does not take place within the domain of party politics. The second form of irreconcilability occurs with regard to different kinds of interest. This happens, for example, when certain economic interests come into conflict with certain ethical or spiritual interests. But a more illustrative example can be given if one considers conflicts between economic interests and political interests (in the very narrow sense of party politics) or between ethical concerns and political interests (again, in the very narrow sense of party politics). Such cases show the extent to which the differentiation between the political and (party) politics is not only a fruitful one, but also one that is much needed. For if such a distinction is not taken as a basis for analysis, one can hardly understand and conceptualize conflicts that involve party politics and, at the same time, exceed its domain. Let us focus on a further example, which is even more illustrative and relevant for the topics addressed in this chapter—that is, conflicts between religion and (party) politics. How should one characterize this kind of conflict between powers belonging to two heterogeneous domains? On the one hand, it is a matter of course that it is not a religious conflict, given that the interests of party politics do not, per se, pertain to religion. A religious conflict can only arise within the domain of religion or religious action, beliefs, convictions, dogmas, and so on. On the other hand, such a conflict does not belong to (party) politics either, given that a certain religion might come into conflict with (party) politics if religious motivations and political interests appear irreconcilable. In the end, this paradigmatic case requires a conceptualization that goes beyond the distinction between religious conflict and political conflict (in the narrow sense of politics). There thus arises a need for a more encompassing horizon, which is to be found precisely in the political. Finally, the third component of the political, that is, power, can be defined as the capability of (re)affirming interests within the context of irreconcilability. Power as such does not have to be displayed and actualized at any time. When we say a certain person has the power to do something or that he or she is powerful, we do not mean that he or she is using his or her power. We mean that he or she is capable of doing something, provided that he or she wants to

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do it for the sake of the interests he or she is standing for. Hence, power has to be understood in terms of capability. The specific capability embodied in power concerns interests and the conflicts resulting therefrom. Interests imply conflicts, and power is the capability of (re)affirming interests within a certain conflict. The specification “(re)affirming” is needed to the extent that one has to make a distinction between established power and power that is not yet established.10 In the case of established power, power has to reaffirm interests that have already been affirmed, managed, and ordered in a certain fashion, whereas emerging powers are those still trying to affirm their own interests. Power as the capability of (re)affirming interests within a certain conflict is multifaceted and diverse. According to my definition, if we say that person A has more power than person B, we mean that person A is capable of (re)affirming his or her interests (or the interests he or she stands for) despite the possible or actual opposition of person B. Moreover, as regards the quality of power, in accordance with the multifarious nature of interests and conflicts, power becomes apparent in its own multifaceted shape—that is, as economic power, religious power, cultural power, or political power in the narrow sense, and so on. Accordingly, one can characterize a certain power as, for instance, economic power when it entails the capability of (re)affirming economic interests. In accordance with these brief characterizations of interest, conflict, and power, one can specify the aforementioned provisional definition of the political by arguing that the political is the interplay of different powers that (re)affirm conflicting interests. By taking into consideration such an interplay, one is in principle in a position to explain the emergence, establishment, and dynamics of political orders and actions, insomuch as they are precisely forms and configurations in which that interplay takes place by showing and articulating itself. Put another way, the political as the interplay of different powers that (re)affirm conflicting interests manifests itself in orders such as institutions, values, power structures, social roles as well as in hierarchies, traditions, dogmas, normative claims, and legal or juridical principles. Accordingly, the conflict inherent in the political is not an abstract interaction between forces but takes place within already established political orders and can result—and in most cases does result—in more or less new political orders. Thus, in line with my postulate, nomos itself has to be seen as an order emerging within that interplay, to the effect that juridical or legal orders cannot be considered independently of the political in the sense just sketched. Therefore, juridical or legal orders have to be seen as specific forms of political orders, provided that political orders do not include only political institutions and entities in the narrow sense of party politics. In this connection the conceptual framework of 10. The distinction between established power and power not yet established is very significant for discussing Badiou’s and Agamben’s reading of Paul. As we will see, they both agree that Paul is a source of inspiration for actions aimed at subverting established political orders.

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the political proves all the more fruitful because the notion of nomos in Paul entails a number of phenomena, such as tradition and rituals, that go beyond legal or juridical phenomena in the narrow sense which the notion of law has acquired in modern and contemporary societies. In what follows, we have to specify in what sense Heidegger, Badiou, and Agamben take the Pauline notion of nomos, how they conceive of the relation between pistis and nomos, and whether they are in a position to identify and highlight the politically significant facets of that seminal relationship.

2 Heidegger and Apolitical Facticity 2.1 Nomos, Tradition, and Christian Factical Life When we compare Heidegger’s reading of Paul to other interpretations, a substantial difference becomes readily apparent, which needs to be explained: Heidegger seems to neglect the political meaning of the Pauline letters. This is quite surprising because this aspect of them plays a truly pivotal role in a number of the other philosophical commentaries and readings that were already mentioned, including those of Badiou and Agamben. At this juncture, an important specification is appropriate, which will help to clarify why Heidegger ultimately gives what I would call an apolitical reading of the Pauline letters. According to my interpretive hypothesis, Heidegger does not grasp the specific characteristics of the political as a field defined by interest, conflict, and power. Therefore, although he devotes much attention to the factical situation and the concrete environment in which Paul’s apostolic announcement is enacted and addresses Christian communities, a lack of any clear distinction between the communal, or the social, and the political remains in his interpretation. Pauline intersubjectivity, at least as it becomes apparent in Heidegger’s commentary, is not political. In line with the postulate I have articulated above—the political has to be located in the interplay of different powers that (re)affirm conflicting interests—the communal (or social) does not necessarily coincide with the political. Considered in themselves, social or community-related phenomena are not necessarily viewed with regard to interest, conflict, and power. On the contrary, political phenomena do, in themselves, pertain to the threefold nature of the political. One can analyze the very same situation or phenomenon either, for example, from the viewpoint of the social sciences or from the perspective of the political. If one intends to analyze a given phenomenon or a certain situation from the viewpoint of the political, then the primary concern will be to analyze how power relations (i.e., conflicts and interests) are configured and structured in that phenomenon or situation. This is the approach specific to a philosophical analysis focusing on the political as such. Therefore, analyzing (social) interaction within a particular community or providing a conceptual framework that explains

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features of intersubjectivity does not yet mean articulating the specifically political aspects of it. If we consider Heidegger’s reading of Paul and, in general, his early phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity, we can conclude that the political, as it has been defined above, does not become apparent at all.11 In both cases, power and power relations, insomuch as they are determined in terms of conflicting interests, are not thematized.12 One could express this fact by saying that in Heidegger facticity, including Paul’s, remains in essence

11. I have developed this critique in a more systematic and extensive way in Antonio Cimino, “Fatticità politica: Per un superamento del paradigma filosofico di Heidegger,” in Constellations herméneutiques: Interprétation et liberté, ed. Riccardo Dottori, István M. Fehér, and Csaba Olay (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014), 37–50. 12. The same applies to Heidegger’s ontology of human existence, as it has been articulated in Being and Time. In his ontology of Dasein, Heidegger is not able to think the political and the political facets of human existence precisely because he neglects the main constituents of political phenomena, that is, interest, conflict, and power, which do not occur in his ontology. As is the case with facticity in his early Freiburg lectures, Dasein remains apolitical insomuch as Heidegger does not consider the specific ontological structures that underlie the political and political phenomena and does not offer any ontological explication of the three components pertaining to the political. The fact that Heidegger gives an ontological analysis of intersubjectivity in terms of being-with (Mitsein) and takes into account related phenomena—such as the public sphere (Öffentlichkeit), shared historicity, solicitude (Fürsorge)—does not imply that he offers a thematization of the political. For intersubjectivity, as such, is not political unless it is understood in terms of an investigation of the three aforementioned components. Thus, ontological findings about being-with and cognate ontological structures are not informative about how one has to investigate the dimension of the political within the Heideggerian ontology of Dasein. To further substantiate this objection leveled against Heidegger, I underscore the fact that his ontology of human existence does not explore a number of phenomena that are of decisive importance for a proper analysis of the political. In this connection, one can mention social, cultural, and political institutions, bureaucracy, government, violence, the military, law, and economic systems. In other words, precisely those political orders are missing in which the interplay of the political takes place and objectifies itself. Therefore, on the one hand, one might agree with Heidegger that Husserl’s phenomenology remains very abstract due to its (Cartesian) epistemological orientation, which results in thinking human subjectivity as consciousness. On the other hand, however, a similar objection can be raised against Heidegger himself because his conception of human subjectivity is still abstract, given the fact that it turns out to be in principle apolitical. Accordingly, the transition from transcendental consciousness to factical life is not the final answer, given that facticity itself has to be analyzed in the light of the political features inherent to it. See Cimino, “Fatticità politica,” 52.

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apolitical or politically disembodied. Two circumstances give evidence of this missing thematization. First, Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity and the related interpretation of Paul do not take into account any orders of powers, or political orders, as these are objectified and fixed in institutions, values, established power structures, social roles, hierarchies, traditions, and legal principles. Second, Heidegger does not pay much attention to the question of nomos in Paul, which is in line with his repeated critique and undermining of the notion of normativity or value. Thus, although the notion of normativity, or value, is relevant to Heidegger’s early philosophy, he addresses it only from an ontological, or metaphysical, viewpoint. For he traces the neo-Kantian or Husserlian notion of normativity back to Platonism, which is understood by him, in turn, as the predominant metaphysical paradigm that has to be rejected.13 Yet, a focus on the specifically political facets of normativity as well as on political orders in general is missing in Heidegger. A clear indication of the failings of this approach can be seen in the way Heidegger analyzes the Pauline notion of nomos. In fact, one can readily ascertain his tendency to undermine the way nomos is politically objectified and fixed in orders. Analogously to his approach to other Pauline notions, Heidegger outlines a phenomenological reading of nomos by locating it in Christian factical life. The question of nomos is addressed with regard to the intentionality (content, relation, enactment) that shapes the Christian comportment toward law. In fact, for him, this question does not concern theoretical or theological contents but Christian factical life. Thus, Heidegger considers the conflict between pistis and nomos as a struggle deeply embedded in Paul’s factical situation.14 The document of this struggle is the letter to the Galatians, which, as Heidegger emphasizes, attests to an urgent and challenging issue—the foundation and constitution of Christianity as a new form of religion. This issue leads directly to the question of how Paul copes with the Jewish tradition and the pre-given religious and normative orders. According to Heidegger’s remarks on the letter to the Galatians, Paul understands the constitution of Christianity in terms of “an original experience” that cannot be traced back to any tradition or preceding forms of religion.15 Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of Paul’s posture toward law and the Jewish tradition becomes, in the end, a narrative that presents Paul as a heroic figure locked in a confrontation with tradition. Heidegger depicts Paul as being in a struggle in which he makes every effort to affirm the new experience of life embedded in Christian facticity.16 The way

13. See also Martin Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2002), 103‒71. 14. See Heidegger, Phenomenology of Religious Life, 48. 15. Ibid., 49. 16. Ibid., 50.

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in which Heidegger describes Paul’s heroic fight against pre-given traditional orders is, in essence, in accordance with his conception of destruction.17 Within the framework of a specific hermeneutical and historical situation, the task of phenomenological destruction is performed as an attempt to dismantle philosophical assumptions, to fluidify a rigidified tradition, and to reassess sedimented interpretations. On the one hand, hermeneutical and historical embeddedness is a factical point of departure for phenomenology, so that in the first instance tradition is indeed unavoidable. On the other hand, however, phenomenology is supposed to deal critically with its own tradition, both by disclosing those primordial experiences that underlie pre-given concepts, theories, and so on, and by performing a more true-to-fact philosophical experience of the issues at stake. Paul’s “fundamental posture” is very similar to this.18 He cannot help using the means of rabbinical teaching, but he is in search of a new religious experience and has the intention of breaking with the Jewish tradition.19 The emphasis Heidegger lays on the novelty of Paul’s religious experience is very consistent with the two main aspects he identifies in his analysis of the question of law. The first aspect concerns the way in which he interprets nomos as a phenomenon in the strict phenomenological sense, that is, as an attitude or a tendency of factical life.20 Heidegger deemphasizes the way nomos and normative orders show themselves when they are objectified and established in political orders. According to Heidegger, the question of nomos in Paul has to be seen mainly in view of how (i.e., relation and enactment) he experiences nomos and comports himself toward it. Thus, the primacy of the spirit (i.e., the primacy of the enactment-sense, in Heideggerian terms) leads Heidegger to neglect the content-related side of nomos—not only the Jewish law, but also the Christian law, that is, the political and normative orders that the Christian religion introduces by contesting the Jewish tradition. It is precisely in this context that one can make more explicit use of the conceptual framework concerning the political so as to very clearly indicate the shortcomings that define Heidegger’s reading. According to my postulation, the conflict between the Christian religion, or Paul, and the Jewish tradition can be seen as a truly political conflict—that is, not merely in terms of party politics or as a purely religious issue. One can attribute a political scope to that conflict not only on the basis of my postulations, but also considering the fact that religion within the Jewish tradition encompasses all the major domains of life. Thus, the

17. This is not an isolated case of self-projection, given that Heidegger presents Aristotle’s critique of Parmenides and Plato in a similar fashion. See, for example, Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, 192‒95. 18. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 50. 19. Ibid., 48–49. 20. Ibid., 51.

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conflict can be seen as a clash between an established power (i.e., the Jewish tradition) and an emerging power (i.e., the Christian religion) seeking to affirm its own interests.21 Because of his failure to see the political scope of the contrast between the established power and the emerging one, Heidegger reduces Paul’s struggle to the enactment of a new religious experience. The concrete political content of Pauline apostleship and of that conflict disappears in Heidegger’s reading. The primacy of the spirit or enactment also becomes apparent in the second aspect I would like to mention, which concerns the emergence of dogmas. According to Heidegger, dogmas cannot be reduced to factors extrinsic to religious experience itself because the question of dogma primarily concerns the articulation specific to religious experience. Such an articulation can be understood neither in terms of theoretical, or logical, explication nor as a theological system. Instead, one can conceive of it as an original “making comprehensible” that belongs to the consciousness of pistis.22 In Heidegger’s view, Christian facticity as such includes an original self-knowledge and self-articulation that precedes theological discourse and theoretical proofs, notwithstanding that the enactment of such a self-knowledge, embedded in the situation of Christian factical life experience, establishes the basis for the genesis of dogma itself. Heidegger’s statements on this crucial point are quite clear. According to him, the question of dogma is posed in the wrong way if dogma is understood as doctrinal content that may subsist independently of the enactment that defines the situation of Christian facticity.23 Heidegger contends that a proper (phenomenological) understanding of dogma has to locate it in the enactment proper to Christian factical life. This also applies to the letter to the Romans, which cannot be seen as a mere doctrinal or theological disquisition but has to be understood on the basis of the factical situation in which Paul writes it.24 This approach very appropriately mirrors the primacy that Heidegger ascribes to the enactment-sense, not only with regard to Christian factical life experience but also concerning facticity in general. The priority pertaining to enactment has a double function. First, the enactment has an explicative function, given that understanding a phenomenon primarily requires understanding its own enactment-sense. Second, enactment-sense has a primacy over relational sense and content-sense, to the effect that, according 21. See the incisive way in which Taubes describes the truly dramatic character of that conflict: “For Paul, the task at hand is the establishment and legitimation of a new people of God. This doesn’t seem very dramatic to you, after two thousand years of Christianity. But it is the most dramatic process imaginable in a Jewish soul.” Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, 28. 22. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 51. 23. See also Chapter 2, Sections 3‒5. 24. See Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 79‒80.

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to Heidegger, the more enactment-based an experience is, the more original it is.25 Accordingly, detached concepts, sets of cognitive contents, and so on are merely derivative sediments that result from a decrement of the enactment of facticity. It is important to specify, as Heidegger underscores,26 that the knowledge that structures Christian facticity escapes the alternative between theoretical knowledge and practical, or applied, knowledge. This is due to the fact that enactment cannot be considered as the application of a knowledge that exists per se: “The complexes of enactment themselves, according to their own sense, are a ‘knowledge.’”27 Such an enactment-based reading of dogma, however, again misses the very political scope of dogma, which, in accordance with the conceptual framework I have postulated, becomes evident as soon as one sees it as a principle laid down to manage conflicts resulting from diverging concerns and interests, which are not of merely theological importance. To place the question of dogma within an exclusively experiential horizon, as Heidegger has it, is to fail to do justice to all the dimensions that are involved in the emergence of dogma, which are also of a political nature. At this juncture, it makes sense to highlight the way Heidegger connects the Pauline notion of spirit to his own phenomenological concept of enactment. As for the knowledge belonging to Christian facticity as enactment, it is remarkable how Heidegger establishes a truly challenging connection between this kind of knowledge and the Pauline notion of spirit (pneuma): “The πνεῦμα in Paul is the basis of enactment from which knowledge itself arises.”28 Heidegger rejects the interpretation of pneuma in terms of spiritual substance (i.e., an ontological component belonging of human nature) and maintains an understanding of it as a tendency, or attitude, of life, which he characterizes in a way that is roughly reminiscent of his own notion of authenticity: “ἄνϑρωπος πνευματικός is one who has appropriated a certain peculiar property of life. That means the πάντα ἀνακρίνειν. In sharp opposition to this is the theoretical cognition, the πάντα γνωρίζειν in the hermetic writings.”29 Considering Heidegger’s interpretive approach as a whole,30 we are in a position to gather in a coherent manner the conceptual constellation that emerges from his reading of the Pauline notion of spirit. In fact, I have already underlined that he establishes a connection not only between the enactment and the knowledge belonging to Christian facticity, but also—and this is very relevant to our current considerations—between spirit and enactment. Remarkably 25. See Martin Heidegger, Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation, trans. Tracy Colony (London: Continuum, 2010), 57. 26. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 87‒88. 27. Ibid., 88. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., 87‒88.

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enough, within the framework of the opposition between enactment-based, spiritual knowledge and theoretical knowledge, he mentions the passage from the second letter to the Corinthians where Paul lays emphasis on the contrast between the spirit and the letter.31 This leads us to reconstruct the following interconnections between Heidegger’s notions and the Pauline ones—on the one hand, spirit, enactment, and authenticity, and, on the other hand, letter, objectified worldly contents, and inauthenticity. Here, the connection “spirit, enactment, authenticity” serves, in the end, as the most important component of Heidegger’s Paulinism that is deployed against the stocks of dogmas, objectified contents, alienating absorption into the worldly meaningfulness, content-based intentional dynamics, and related decrement of enactment, which are all manifestations of an experience based on the primacy of the letter. In line with this reconstruction that I am proposing, the Pauline principle according to which “the written law condemns to death, but the Spirit gives life” (2 Cor. 3:6)32 can be translated into the framework of Heidegger’s early hermeneutics of facticity without any constraints, to the effect that the enactment (i.e., the spirit, in Paul’s terms) is the vivifying force underlying authentic life, while the objectifying, or content-oriented, attitude implies an alienating (self-)objectification of facticity. It will become apparent that Heidegger’s analysis of the hōs mē goes in precisely the same direction. As a matter of fact, the Christian attitude adopted according to the hōs mē implies what I would call an “intentional shifting.” Such a shifting consists in reorienting the threefold dynamics of content, relation, and enactment in such a way that the relevance of contents becomes significantly less important, whereas enactment as such is intensified and accentuated. An existence that does not perform the hōs mē is absorbed into worldly contents and searches for security within the context of worldly meaningfulness. Such a world-oriented existence is incapable of experiencing the parousia because it tries to view it in terms of objectified temporality. The inauthentic enactment of factical life involves a specific comportment, or posture, that tries to reach “peace and security” in what the worldly content offers.33 Needless to say, such an attitude constantly tries to remove or hide the insecurity and uncertainty inherent in factical life. An analogous content- and world-oriented experience underlies what Heidegger denotes as contemporary Platonism, that is, a philosophical tendency that tries to overcome its own insecurity toward factical historicity by the positing of norms and values that are to be located in a realm of ideas. One can see here a further confirmation of Heidegger’s Paulinism in the extent 31. See 2 Cor. 3:3. 32. Trans. The Oxford Study Bible: Revised English Bible with Apocrypha, ed. M. Jack Suggs, Katharine Doob Sakenfeld, and James R. Mueller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 33. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 72.

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to which he radically contests any positing of orders and values, with a view to confirming the primacy attributed to the enactment or spirit. 2.2 Values and Historicity Heidegger’s overemphasis on enactment-sense is of decisive importance not merely for his interpretive approach to Paul, but also for specific philosophical reasons. This is because he plays off enactment-sense not only against established tradition, but also against the emergence of normative orders in general. More precisely, the phenomenology of enactment is his own proposed alternative to the formation of norms and values in the Platonic sense. This becomes apparent when one takes into account the introductory part of his course on Paul.34 Here, he gives an overview of contemporary German philosophical positions concerning history and differentiates three ways in which life deals with historicity.35 The first option is called by Heidegger the “Platonic way,”36 whose typical formulation implies the devaluation of historical-empirical reality as well as the positing of a domain of ideas, which are understood “as substances, as values, as norms or principles of reason.”37 According to Heidegger’s very short and oversimplifying presentation, the Platonic position is essentially grounded in theoretical motivations, that is, in the intention of providing knowledge with secure foundations against any relativistic or skeptical positions, which, conversely, try to overemphasize the instability specific to historical-empirical reality. For its part, the second option consists in radicalizing history, so that this is not seen in opposition to an extra-temporal domain but is absolutized to the effect that everything is viewed in the light of an encompassing historical process, which defines being as such.38 Finally, the third option tries to combine the first two by arguing that values are given in history, although in a relative form.39 Despite the fact that Heidegger’s presentation of these three options is very short, oversimplifying, and, to some degree, quite inaccurate, his main philosophical intention is one that is both clear and challenging. He wants to show the extent to which German philosophy at that time was in search of philosophical strategies to secure itself against history, or against its own insecurity concerning history, relativism, and skepticism, with the Platonic position serving as its overarching horizon. In fact, Heidegger contends that the three options are all characterized by Platonism, albeit in different ways. Thus, the first option is the typical Platonic 34. Ibid., 3‒37. 35. Ibid., 26‒35. See also Chapter 1, Section 3. 36. Ibid., 27. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid., 30. 39. Ibid.

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position, which relies on the opposition between historical-factical reality and the ideal domain. The second option is still influenced by Platonism in that it is developed in opposition to it. The third option posits residual absolute values, although these manifest themselves in a relative form.40 Heidegger does not confine himself to summarizing and criticizing these positions. He also provides a phenomenological genealogy of Platonism as a philosophical positing of ideas as norms and values by tracing the genesis of ideas back to a peculiar tendency of factical life, that is, “the falling tendency.”41 According to his description, such a tendency brings the meaningful relations of the world to an increasing stabilization and objectification, with the result that the connectedness of objects, object-domains, and orders of things emerges. Science and traditional philosophy are then nothing but an explicit, methodical, and more radical effort to develop and consolidate this process of objectification. In this context, Heidegger mentions Plato’s world of ideas as a paradigmatic example of object-domains that are formed in accordance with this phenomenon rooted in factical life itself.42 If we consider the threefold articulation of intentionality—content, relation, and enactment—we can schematically conclude that the objectification resulting from “the falling tendency” of factical life constitutes an attitude that is primarily content- and relation-centered, whereby enactment as such is significantly reduced. As it is performed in science and philosophy, objectification is indeed the systematic removal of enactment-based features of factical experience. Considered as a whole, and despite the fragmentary shape of its published form, in the end Heidegger’s lecture course on Paul clearly outlines a clash of titans whose protagonists are Plato and Paul or Platonism and Paulinism. On one side, Platonism is the paradigm of objectification as well as that of positing ideas and normative orders, while on the opposite side Paulinism consists in asserting the primacy of enactment as the fundamental dimension of history and factical life. If one bears in mind Heidegger’s early hermeneutics of facticity and his ensuing project as presented in Being and Time, then one can conclude that his main intention is to assert the primacy of this conception of Paulinism against the Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics of presence. As a matter of fact, his later critique of the ontology of substance is nothing but the consistent development of his own Pauline emphasis on the pivotal role of enactment, which also defines his general attempt to conceptualize temporality by going beyond the allegedly narrow account of time that serves as an implicit horizon for ancient thought. In sum, I am convinced that Heidegger’s Paulinism can be taken as the core of his main positions in the 1920s, in that it is in fact the center around which both his outline of existential ontology and his construction of the history of metaphysics gather. 40. Ibid., 32. 41. Ibid., 12. 42. Ibid.

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Although the contrast between Paulinism and Platonism in the early Heidegger unfolds mainly in ontological terms, his Paulinism has political consequences precisely because it is highly symptomatic of the apolitical tone that characterizes both his phenomenological reading of Paul and his hermeneutics of facticity in general. That apolitical feature not only means that Heidegger does not pay significant attention to the political issues at stake in the Pauline letters, it also means that the general theoretical framework of his hermeneutics of facticity prevents him from seeing the political as such. Nor does he seem to recognize that the political—understood as the field defined by interest, conflict, and power—unfolds in and through orders of power that objectify and fix themselves. In the end, both his reading of Paul and the facticity he analyzes in his early hermeneutics turn out to be politically disembodied. In other words, Heidegger’s political Paulinism is so radical that the political as such vanishes in his early philosophy. As shall be seen, truly analogous tendencies can be identified in Badiou as well as in Agamben, despite the fact that their versions of political Paulinism are quite far from Heidegger’s.

3 Nomos and the Evental Emergence of the Subject 3.1 Nomos and Objectification Despite the fact that Badiou offers a very different reading of Paul compared to that of Heidegger, in his interpretation conceptual frameworks can be detected that allow us to classify the Badiouian approach in terms of political Paulinism, according to the meaning I have given to this phrase. In fact, in a very similar fashion, Badiou views nomos and normative orders mainly in the light of their objectifying force, which he counterposes to the evental dynamics of subjectivation.43 Badiou rethinks the Pauline opposition between pistis and nomos in terms of the contrast between universality and particularity. At first sight, this consideration seems confusing because one is inclined to see nomos as a set of universal norms, while ascribing pistis to individual attitudes or beliefs. Upon closer examination, however, Badiou’s reading turns out to be more plausible and consistent on the condition that one considers pistis and nomos with regard to their respective dynamics, that is, how they emerge and are experienced. The dynamics that underlies nomos (i.e., the acknowledgment as well as the practice of the law) can be designated as particularization. According to Badiou, despite the general or universal formulations that characterize the law, the claim to universality is fallacious and fictitious because it is valid only for “those who acknowledge and practice the injunctions it specifies.”44 In addition, 43. Badiou, Saint Paul, 75. Concerning the Christ-event, see also Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2006), 212–22. 44. Badiou, Saint Paul, 76.

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this particularization affects not only the acknowledgment of nomos but also its emergence, given that nomos is structurally embedded in particular ethnic, political, religious, communitarian, and identitarian facticities. Finally, that particularization becomes apparent with respect to the “statist” way in which nomos operates.45 In other words, particularization is an essential feature of the government and implementation of law, which is conducted as a distribution.46 Let us try to briefly reformulate Badiou’s considerations on nomos in order to make it clearer that the three aspects of nomos mentioned above imply objectification. First, the acknowledgment and practice of nomos leads to sharply defined constellations, first and foremost the separation between those who acknowledge and practice nomos and those who do not. In this case, objectification takes place in terms of a particularization that defines and fixes those constellations. Second, nomos is structurally linked to objectification because it relies on established and fixed orders, regardless of what form (i.e., ethnic, religious, political, etc.) they take. Third, the distribution that is involved in the implementation of nomos has an objectifying force insomuch as it is conducted as a fixing.47 From Badiou’s point of view, the evental dynamics underlying the emergence of subjectivity is meant to abolish precisely those objectified cultural, ethnic, and political orders, by affirming a new form of universality that is based on singularity. For Badiou, the truth procedure specific to the Pauline evental declaration and fidelity in fact serves as a radical break with pre-constituted orders because its peculiar singularity escapes any structural, axiomatic, and legal reduction. As a result, “there cannot be a law of truth.”48 As Badiou writes, “truth being inscribed on the basis of a declaration that is in essence subjective, no preconstituted subset can support it; nothing communitarian or historically established can lend its substance to the process of truth.”49 Badiou expresses this pivotal aspect of evental truth by underscoring its peculiar “diagonal” character,50 that is, the fact that it cannot be inscribed within any communitarian, legal, historical, cultural or ethnic subset.51 This diagonal feature of truth characterizes both its emergence and its ensuing impact on the life of those who adhere to it. On the one hand, Pauline truth cannot be established on the basis of pre-constituted orders; on the other hand—and this is the central point of Badiou’s approach— it does not produce any orders: “it neither claims authority from, nor (this is obviously the most delicate point) constitutes any identity.”52 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid., 78. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid., 14. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., 57. 52. Ibid., 14.

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It is precisely for this reason that such truth lays the ground for a real universality and has an illegal nature, insofar as it is directed against the three main legal orders that were shaping the Mediterranean cultural landscape at that time. Pauline truth procedure implies a “radical critique of Jewish law” because it does not presuppose any ethnic limitations.53 At the same time, Pauline truth is directed against Greek nomos because it does not allow for any subordination to the cosmic order.54 The specific feature of the Greek normative order is the experience of the world understood as a cosmic totality that is characterized by intrinsic natural laws. The cosmic universality, which is reflected and articulated in the philosophical logos, cannot capture or subordinate the radical rupture that defines Pauline illegality.55 Thus, Pauline truth overcomes the opposition between Jewish prophetic discourse and Greek philosophical logos,56 between exception and totality.57 In the same fashion, the imperial universality of the Roman Empire does not have any effect, since Pauline truth is “subtracted from the organization of subsets prescribed” by the Roman state.58 It is quite evident that Pauline truth acts as a de-objectification with regard to the three orders that are fixed and established in the Jewish, Greek, and Roman worldviews: “that ‘ethnic’ or cultural difference, of which the opposition between Greek and Jew is in his time, and in the empire as a whole, the prototype, is no longer significant with regard to the real, or to the new object that sets out a new discourse. No real distinguishes the first two discourses any longer, and their distinction collapses into rhetoric.”59 Badiou’s emphasis on the de-objectifying and destabilizing (i.e., revolutionary) force of Pauline truth is more concrete and specific than Heidegger’s account of Pauline factical experience because Badiou views it in the light of the Jewish-Greek-Roman constellation, while Heidegger focuses only on the 53. Ibid., 15. 54. Ibid., 28. 55. See also ibid., 42, where he strongly stresses that the event as such cannot be reduced to any cosmic or legal orders, to the effect that no integration into a global system is possible. Accordingly, the event does not produce any legal orders, regardless of whether they might be philosophical or prophetic. See also Chapter 1, Section 5.1. 56. Badiou, Saint Paul, 40‒54. See also Chapter 1, Section 5.1. 57. Badiou, Saint Paul, 42‒54. 58. Ibid., 15. The conflict between Paul and the Roman Empire has been emphasized by Taubes. See Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, 16. 59. Badiou, Saint Paul, 57. See also ibid., 58, where Badiou pointedly emphasizes the fact that authentic universalism can unfold only if and when “established differences” are dismantled and a subject emerges. The de-objectification underlying the eventaldeclarative dynamics can indeed be described in terms of the vanishing of differences and established orders.

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anti-metaphysical implications of Pauline facticity and is interested in playing Paul off against Platonism understood as a theoretical order relying on an objectifying attitude. Nevertheless, they come to a very similar conclusion. Just like Heidegger, Badiou lays stress on the processual nature of Pauline truth and sees the content of Pauline evental declaration as a secondary component in relation to its specific evental dynamics. They are both interested in using Paul as a model for a new experience that turns out to be philosophically path-breaking because it allows for an overcoming of objectifications. Remarkably enough, however, Badiou’s interpretive model can explain not only the general features of Pauline de-objectifying experience but also some significant aspects of Paul’s attitude toward his own historical environment, that is, toward normative orders located in his historical environment. In Heidegger this aspect is hardly present. Thus, according to Badiou, Paul’s de-objectifying and universalizing experience explains his opposition to the incipient institutionalization of Christianity, given that his evental-declarative articulation of pistis is resistant to being codified and shaped in terms of an official religion. Regarding this crucial point, Badiou refers to the Damascus experience and stresses what Paul does not do after that decisive event. As Badiou strongly stresses, after the Damascus experience Paul does not look for any legitimation or recognition from the authorities in Jerusalem, that is, the apostles who had first-hand experience of Jesus’ life and teachings.60 Paul, Badiou claims, is not interested in any confirmation. By rephrasing Badiou’s remarks, we can say that Paul is not interested in being accepted into the institutional apostleship because his own apostleship does not rely, and does not want to rely, on the same legitimation that characterized the institutional apostles. This is the groundbreaking conviction that sets a clear differentiation between the old apostolic order and the new apostleship, which does not need historical or empirical foundations.61 3.2 Pauline Ex-Centeredness The de-objectifying and de-institutionalizing tendency of Pauline pistis is consistent with a further aspect that Badiou rightly emphasizes, that is, the “ex-centered” or “de-centered” character of Paul’s action.62 This ex-centeredness qualifies Pauline universalism insofar as it allows one to differentiate it both from cosmic totality and from imperial universalism. The centeredness, or centricity, of these two forms of universality relies on one center. In the case of the cosmic totality experienced and articulated by the Greek philosophical logos, this center is the onto-theological ground, whereas the Roman Empire famously understood Rome itself to be the world’s political, cultural, and 60. Badiou, Saint Paul, 18‒19. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid., 19, 34.

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economic center.63 Universality in both of these cases is essentially centripetal, whereas Pauline universalism is “ex-centered.”64 At this juncture, a further aspect of the de-objectifying and ex-centered experience in Paul can be highlighted in order to specify why it comes into conflict with the onto-theological discourse of traditional metaphysics. Badiou is fully aware of the convergence of his interpretation with that of Heidegger,65 and he speaks of “the ontological subversion to which Paul’s antiphilosophy invites the declarant or militant.”66 Pauline evental-declarative pistis entails a rejection of onto-theology because it does not legitimate the God of wisdom or the God of power. Accordingly, Pauline discourse cannot be translated into the traditional philosophical language, given that this is shaped in an onto-theological fashion. As a result, Pauline pistis implies a subversion of “established languages,”67 such that it requires a new logic and expressive power.68 This vanishing of traditional philosophical or theological languages is fully in accord with the anti-philosophical character of Paul, which Badiou vehemently affirms against Nietzsche’s attempt to picture Paul as a dogmatic figure.69 The contrast between Paul and onto-theology becomes even more apparent when we examine Badiou’s reading of the new conception of the One that emerges from the Pauline evental-declarative experience.70 It is worth reconstructing that reading, which will turn out to be particularly fruitful due to its philosophically and theologically provocative character. In order to do so, I will locate it in a coherent conceptual framework that includes not only the question of nomos but also the problems concerning what Heidegger calls “the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics.”71 What is so remarkably challenging about Badiou’s reading is that it reveals the disruptive forces of the Pauline evental-declarative articulation of pistis at precisely the juncture where such an articulation seems condemned to be re-incorporated into traditional metaphysical and political discourses—which would result in it losing its 63. See Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, 15–16. 64. As for universalism in Paul, see Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul and Universalism,” in Paul and the Philosophers, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 87–104. 65. Badiou, Saint Paul, 47, where Badiou ascribes to Paul “an anticipatory critique” of the foundational framework characterized by Heidegger in terms of onto-theology, which defines God as the supreme being. 66. Badiou, Saint Paul, 47. 67. Ibid., 46. 68. Ibid., 47. 69. See also Chapter 1, Section 5. 70. Badiou, Saint Paul, 46‒54. 71. Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-theological Constitution of Metaphysics,” in Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 42–75.

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revolutionary potential. In this connection, the crucial problem is what Badiou calls “the formidable question of the One.”72 How does Paul relate to the monotheistic element specific to Christianity? What is that One that comes into consideration in this context? It seems to me that precisely this question represents the touchstone that allows us to appreciate the extent to which Badiou’s reading is in the end a plausible one, in philosophical and exegetical terms. Let us try to explicate some of the basic reasons why the monotheistic character of Paul’s articulation of pistis might be seen as a disproof of his allegedly revolutionary power, as this is presented by Badiou. At first sight, the One which comes into question when we address the monotheism specific to Paul’s pistis as well as to Christianity in general might be regarded as a very symptomatic articulation of metaphysical structures and claims to power that are inherent in Christian theology. In theological-political terms, monotheism might be understood as the religious translation of monarchical or imperial power, which refers to one center of power or hegemony. In metaphysical terms, according to Heidegger’s pivotal thesis, the peculiar trait of the interplay between ontology and theology, as this has been shaped in the Western tradition, is the fact that beings are finally traced back and reduced to one fundament. Concrete examples of this truly momentous framework are numerous, with Plato’s idea of the Good and Aristotle’s unmoved mover being the paradigmatic instances, which have been variously adjusted and reformulated in the ensuing philosophical and theological traditions. Against this background, the question can be asked whether Paul’s One can be thought, unwittingly or explicitly, to fall under monotheistic patterns of this sort, to the effect that his universalism would involve similar imperial claims to power or onto-theological pretensions relating to one fundament. Badiou offers a reading of Paul’s monotheism that rejects such suspicions. In fact, he argues that the One which defines Pauline pistis concerns “a structure of address” in the extent to which it expresses not a supreme entity, to which the entire reality is supposed to be traced back, but the evental universality of Paul’s articulation of pistis.73 Upon closer inspection, therefore, the Pauline evental One is played off against the theological-political or onto-theological One. Let us have a closer look at the consequences Badiou draws from the evental conception of the One. The evental One is set against the legal One, that is, the One that characterizes the domain of nomos. Badiou describes the legal One as “fallacious” because its universality turns out to be merely fictitious.74 The legal One is in fact of importance only for those who accept it and follow its prescriptions. But such an acknowledgment is in itself always characterized by particularity. Thus, the legal One is not addressed to all and intrinsically lacks a genuine universality. The particularity that characterizes nomos is pictured by Badiou in terms of 72. Badiou, Saint Paul, 76. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid.

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a “statist” operation.75 Despite the fact that Badiou does not in this context mention the Roman Empire explicitly, the reference to it is quite clear. At first sight, the Roman Empire as a legal order can claim to be universal because it affects the whole of humanity living under the yoke of the Romans. Upon closer inspection, however, Roman legality unfolds in a statist way, in that it “enumerates, names, and controls the parts of a situation.”76 Contrary to this, the evental One is not based on any legal order. The fundament provided by the evental One is linked not to nomos, but, as Badiou explains, to grace. Grace is not generated by nomos, but is intrinsically evental, which means that one cannot explain the foundation of the subject in terms of juridical or legal reasons. The evental One does not allow for any metaphysical (i.e., onto-theological) foundation either. The fact that it is characterized by grace and gratuitousness means that its essential feature is “a radical contingency.”77 In this context, therefore, it is simply inappropriate to search for ultimate causes.78 The irreconcilability between the evental One, which is gratuitous and truly universal, and any theological-political or onto-theological foundations can also be articulated with regard to the concept of order, be it legal or metaphysical. All legal and metaphysical foundations prescribe and impose limits by assigning to everything a position within an established or fixed order.79 This logic is inoperative in the case of the evental emergence of the subject precisely because the aforementioned radical contingency prevents one from establishing and fixing imposed relations within a certain juridical, political, or ontological framework.80 The juridical, theological-political, and onto-theological concept of order is contrasted by Badiou to the Pauline notion of excess. Evental singularity cannot be circumscribed and put into an order because it structurally exceeds any fixation or binding foundation. Thus, evental singularity cannot be conceived in terms of particularity, that is, as a part of a whole, but “as in excess of itself.”81 In the end, universality, singularity, and excess are closely linked to each other, with each one of them consistently involving both of the other elements. Elucidating the evental One and the notion of order allows us to further clarify how nomos acts by means of its own objectifying operations and the extent to which the evental-declarative emergence of the subject is a radically de-objectifying dynamics. As has been seen, nomos objectifies by particularizing, setting limits, and putting everything within the established legal order. It does not allow for any excess or exception. Within the framework of nomos, there is 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid., 77. 78. Ibid. 79. See also ibid., 78, where the two doctrines of multiplicity are differentiated, in accordance with grace and law respectively. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid.

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in principle no room for singularity. The fact that the emergence of the subject does not take place under the yoke of nomos entails a further decisive situation, that is, the fact that the subject cannot identify itself in terms of “works,” “results,” or “prescribed forms.”82 Badiou’s specification here is crucially important to understand. The subject should not be viewed as the outcome of the evental dynamics. Instead of understanding it in terms of a result, it should be seen that “the subject is subjectivation.”83 Put another way, Badiou means that the subject coincides precisely with the evental process of the constitution of subjectivity. Accordingly, we cannot think of the subject as a fixed substance that relies on itself alone. This coincidence is what Badiou understands as the actual meaning of Pauline pistis, which also entails the necessity of a constant reenactment of the truth procedure.84 If we compare Badiou’s political Paulinism to Heidegger’s, substantial differences come to the fore. As has already been seen, Heidegger’s political Paulinism has to be understood as the radical disappearance of the political, with the effect that the basic structures of the political (interest, conflict, power) are absent in both his reading of Paul and his concurrent elaboration of the hermeneutics of factical life. Therefore, Heidegger’s Paul turns out to be substantially apolitical and cannot give us any guidance with regard to contemporary political issues. Badiou’s political Paulinism unfolds very differently, because it is precisely the ex-centeredness characteristic of Paul that can pave the way for a new political action. Badiou is in a position to recognize the political scope of Paul’s apostleship to such an extent that Paul becomes a potential source of inspiration for contemporary political action. His Paul cannot be categorized as an apostle, a saint, or a religious personality of any type.85 Badiou’s Paul is thoroughly political; he is a “militant figure.”86 Accordingly, Badiou views the Pauline letters as “militant documents.”87 The distance from Heidegger’s phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretive approach, which brackets the political impact of Paul, is evident. Moreover, Badiou strongly stresses the public character of the Pauline declaration of the event, and notes that Pauline pistis is not a merely private conviction. The public, militant, or political aspect is essential to Paul’s evental-declarative articulation of faith.88 82. Ibid., 81. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid., 1. 86. Ibid., 2. 87. Ibid., 31. 88. Ibid., 88. Here one can also notice an important difference between Badiou and Agamben. While Badiou foregrounds the public character of evental declaration and gives priority to “the lips,” Agamben, on the contrary, sees the primacy of “the heart” as the core of the Pauline articulation of pistis. See also Chapter 1, Section 4.5.

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It is now possible to critically assess Badiou’s political and militant Paul by considering his approach against the background of the conceptual framework I have outlined above. First and foremost, the question arises as to whether Badiou’s political Paulinism—especially the radical critique he leveled against nomos and other related objectifying forces—is able to capture the actual nature of the political. In sketching my conception of the political, I have stressed that the conflict between powers that tend to (re)affirm diverging interests takes place in and through orders such as institutions, values, power structures, social roles, hierarchies, traditions, dogmas, normative claims, and legal or juridical principles. Indeed, those orders constitute the dimension in which the political unfolds. Thus, the dynamics of power have to be understood and viewed as the dynamics of those orders. One has to concede that Badiou recognizes all three components of the political. This is pretty clear, despite the fact that his own terminology, or his reformulation of Pauline terminology, can be misleading. One can in fact identify the interests, conflict, and power specific to Paul’s political intervention in his reading. According to Badiou, what concerns Paul most is salvation and the universally singular truth of pistis.89 Thus, Paul is committed to a truth that “is never anything but ‘faith working through love.’”90 The Badiouian Paul is depicted as a militant fully devoted to a faith that leads him into conflict with established powers and political orders (i.e., the Jewish tradition, Greek legality, the Roman Empire). Badiou misses no opportunity to emphasize Paul’s struggle against these orders.91 It seems to me indisputable that Badiou’s account rightly emphasizes the conflicting interests that define Paul’s political situation. Nevertheless, what I find lacking in his construction of Pauline pistis—and this is also symptomatic of his political Paulinism more generally—is a plausible definition of the Pauline power that is supposed to affirm that pistis. I would like to formulate my objections to this in terms of two questions. First, does love as universal power enable the proper mastery of the genuinely political conflicts in which Paul is involved?92 Second, Badiou links love to the Pauline evental-declarative truth procedure as well as to a new law, yet it must be asked whether this “transliteral” or “nonliteral” law provides a plausible answer to the question about the kind of political orders to which Pauline pistis leads.93 A number of considerations lead me to give a negative answer to both questions. As it is portrayed by Badiou, Pauline love cannot as such facilitate the proper mastery of political conflicts. It may serve as a component of an ideological basis underlying or justifying certain political acts, but, taken by itself, such a

89. Ibid., 92. 90. Ibid. 91. See, for example, ibid., 16‒21, 93. 92. Ibid., 86‒89. 93. Ibid., 87.

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love cannot be the final answer to the challenges political action is confronted with. Moreover, since it is characterized by a universal singularity that relies on the evental-declarative truth procedure, the Pauline account of love that is presented by Badiou turns out to be politically disembodied, to the effect that it is in essence resistant to any concrete situatedness as well as to any embodiment in political orders. In other words, it remains quite abstract. It is precisely this political disembodiment that constitutes the main characteristic of Badiou’s political Paulinism, which comes into sharp relief when one considers how he describes the relationship between love and nomos. The crucial passage, which recapitulates the substance of Badiou’s political Paulinism, is contained in chapter 8 of his book on Paul.94 The illegality that Badiou thinks characteristic of Paul is not to be confused with mere lawlessness. Instead, it should be seen as the appearance of a very different kind of law, which Badiou calls a “nonliteral law” or “a law of the spirit,”95 and which can indeed be recognized in love. It is precisely the nonliteral nature of this law that is consistent with the universal singularity that characterizes the Pauline evental-declarative truth procedure, with the result that Badiou identifies that nonliteral law with both love and the universal singularity of the Pauline truth procedure.96 The Pauline truth procedure may not be articulated in the letter without losing its own peculiar universal singularity. If one were to try to translate that truth procedure into the letter, the truth procedure would then lose its spiritual character and become particular, that is, not universally singular. Badiou’s understanding of love as spiritual law does not sound convincing. He avoids the question of whether there can really be a nonliteral law. A nonliteral, or spiritual, law seems to be a contradiction in terms, given that the law and its universality require being inscribed, or translated, into the letter. Law is by definition fixed law in exactly the same way that political orders are in principle fixed and objectified orders. It is quite surprising that it is precisely within the framework of his analysis of the nonliteral character of the law that Badiou chooses to stress the public character that defines evental declaration.97 The emphasis on the public character of evental declaration seems to contradict its allegedly nonliteral nature because publicizing the evental declaration of pistis needs precisely the word, the letter, that is, a fixing articulation and objectification.98 As a matter of fact, Badiou does not clarify in what way the spiritual character of the nonliteral law may and should be consistent with its public nature. Indeed, remarkably enough, he gives the impression that he is trying to find a way of reconciling the new law and the old one by translating

94. Ibid., 86‒87. 95. Ibid., 87. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid., 88. 98. Ibid.

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the commandments into a single norm.99 Replacing the old commandments with the singularity of the new law does not imply that the letter vanishes, especially considering that, as Badiou himself admits, the new law has, in any case, to be publicized. One may concede that the letter itself is not sufficient for the articulation of the evental declaration, because love and fidelity are necessary prerequisites.100 Nevertheless, Badiou maintains that private faith, or conviction, is not in itself sufficient without first being publicized—which in my opinion amounts to saying that it needs to be objectified and fixed in a new normative order that replaces the old one. In sum, I do not think Badiou succeeds in clearly explaining the extent to which evental declaration and its related components can escape all forms of objectification. Nor does he clarify how the evental subject has the capacity to break with the old political orders without introducing new objectified orders.

4 Pauline Subversion101 4.1 Agamben’s Hermeneutics Paul’s revolutionary move against established orders is evident in Agamben’s commentary, which is itself intended as a subversive interpretation. This becomes apparent when he explains that his intention is to restore the fundamental messianic meaning underlying the Pauline letters.102 As a matter of fact, Agamben’s approach is the complete reversal of the Gadamerian conception of “the history of effect” (Wirkungsgeschichte),103 because it relies on the assumption that “two thousand years of translation and commentary coinciding with the history of the Christian church have literally cancelled out the messianic, and the word Messiah itself, from Paul’s text.”104 Thus, contrary to

99. Ibid., 89. 100. Ibid., 91. 101. This section develops some ideas I have outlined in two contributions: Antonio Cimino, “Agamben’s Political Messianism in ‘The Time That Remains,’” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 77, no. 3 (2016): 102–18; Antonio Cimino, “Europe and Paul of Tarsus: Giorgio Agamben on the Overcoming of Europe’s Crisis,” in Saint Paul and Philosophy: The Consonance of Ancient and Modern Thought, ed. Gert-Jan van der Heiden, George van Kooten, and Antonio Cimino (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 297–308. 102. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 1. 103. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd edn. (London: Continuum), 299‒306. 104. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 1.

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Gadamer’s thesis, according to which tradition and authority do not in themselves entail a distorting transmission of texts and sources,105 Agamben identifies deep “anti-messianic tendencies” in both the history of the Christian church and the Jewish tradition.106 While he does not ascribe any deliberate character to these tendencies, he does argue that they are nevertheless responsible for having concealed the actual meaning of Paul’s messianism. It is very important to note that Agamben’s remarks on the Church and the Synagogue do not merely serve as introductory exegetical considerations, because they are directly linked to central philosophical questions that he addresses in his commentary itself.107 The alleged anti-messianism operating in the Church and in the Synagogue is indeed not only the main exegetical target, but also, in the end, the pivotal philosophical problem that Agamben wants to address by rereading Paul and rediscovering his messianic potential with a view to a new conception of the political and of the ethical. This problem is recapitulated in the “paradoxical” and “discomforting” idea of “a messianic institution” or “a messianic community that wants to present itself as an institution.”108 The first objection I want to raise against Agamben’s messianic approach to Paul concerns precisely the presuppositions on which his hermeneutics is based. According to Agamben, a messianic institution is a patent contradiction, given that the formation of institutions—in terms of authorities, norms, orders, and so on—is precisely what impoverishes and finally extinguishes the messianic. Agamben’s answer to the question he formulated at the very beginning of his commentary is to be found in the chapter entitled “The Sixth Day,” in which he plays off the Pauline performative against institutionalized orders. When concluding his analysis of the Pauline homologia, Agamben concentrates on the “experience of a pure event of the word that exceeds every signification and is, nevertheless, animated by two opposing tensions.”109 The two opposing tensions that characterize the pure event of the word are related by Agamben to what Paul calls nomos and pistis respectively. They both go beyond the denotative function of language, albeit in very different ways. In the case of nomos, the excess of signification that becomes apparent in the experience of the pure

105. See also Gadamer, Truth and Method, 278‒85. Agamben’s hermeneutical assumption is closer to Heidegger’s idea of a destruction of the history of metaphysics, given that for both philosophers the emergence and development of tradition unfolds as the distortion of its original meanings. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 19‒25. 106. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 1. 107. Ibid. 108. Ibid. Agamben’s critique of constituted power in Homo Sacer should be seen in the light of his political Paulinism. See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 39–48. 109. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 134.

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event of the word is articulated “in precepts and in semantic contents.”110 Such an articulation allows for the establishment of contract and obligation and characterizes codification.111 The second tension that defines the experience of the pure event of the word is specific to pistis, which does not encapsulate, or codify, the excess of signification, but, on the contrary, holds it open “beyond any determinate signification.”112 Pistis allows for freedom, while nomos names the being subject to codifications, norms, and articles. 4.2 Event and Word The most interesting aspect of Agamben’s reading of the tension between pistis and nomos in terms of the two opposing experiences of the event of the word described above consists in the fact that Agamben uses this conceptual framework with a view to describing more general anthropological phenomena.113 As a matter of fact, the dialectic between pistis and nomos is a basic, structural element of facticity that becomes apparent in human communities and, more generally, in human society as such.114 It makes sense, then, that Agamben uses this conceptual framework not only with regard to specific historical phenomena—for example, in reference to the history of the Church—but also and especially with respect to human relations in general.115 The way Agamben describes the dialectic between pistis and nomos is in fact very fertile for explaining the emergence as well as the historical dynamics of institutions, especially in the field of religion. The case of Paul is informative in this context. Paul himself had a first-person encounter with the substantive problems that arose when his own exceptional religious experience had to be transplanted into an organizational configuration. In order to fulfil these tasks, pistis as such—that is, the messianic core of his religious experience and way of life—is no longer enough. In sharing his pistis with and transplanting it into a community, Paul confronts the necessity of nomos; that is, he recognizes the need for prescriptions, organizational structures, the codification of dogmas, authoritative interpretations of the Christian announcement, and power relations. It is precisely in this context that the dialectic between pistis and nomos reemerges as an unavoidable tension. In the end, Paul’s attempt to overcome the Jewish nomos is confronted again with a new form of nomos.

110. Ibid. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid., 135. 113. It is worth noting that Agamben’s use of Paul is in fact similar to Heidegger’s approach. They both use the Pauline letters in order to extrapolate general structures related to facticity. See Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 55. 114. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 135. 115. Ibid.

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4.3 Community and Institutions The distinction Agamben seems to suggest at the very beginning of his commentary between messianic community and messianic institution (or “a messianic community that wants to present itself as an institution”116) does not hold.117 Assuming that “messianic community” is understood by Agamben as a community that is based on pistis or klēsis and does not rely on the force of nomos, we have to conclude that the idea of a messianic community is an abstraction, because there can be no community without more or less explicit prescriptions, organizational structures, traditions, authorities, and power relations, that is, without nomos. The transition from Pauline pistis to the institutional Church cannot be described in terms of a transition that moves through a messianic community that is supposed to be free of nomos. As a matter of fact, a messianic community is eo ipso a messianic institution, which is for Agamben a paradox or a contradiction. The tension between pistis and nomos is already present from the beginning, when Paul sets out to share his religious experience, to announce the Gospel, and to organize Christian communities. Nevertheless, Agamben seems to consider the idea of a messianic community still possible. Let us now reconsider Agamben’s way of thinking the Pauline messianic community in conjunction with his reading of the notion of klēsis.118 As it is presented by Agamben, the messianic community as ekklēsia, that is, as an assembly of all messianic vocations, basically entails the disempowerment of nomos, inasmuch as the messianic vocation is indeed “the revocation of every vocation.”119 This messianic revocation also affects both explicit and implicit normative orders on account of its specific performative power, which in the end coincides with its capacity to render nomos inoperative. It is precisely this aspect that comes to the fore when Agamben relates the notion of vocation as revocation to the other phenomenon specific to the Pauline way of life, that is, the hōs mē. For the messianic attitude, based on the Pauline klēsis and the hōs mē, implies a deactivation of all juridical-factical conditions, that is, a katargēsis.120 If we push Agamben’s conception of messianic community to its extreme consequences, we are confronted with a number of problems. Following Agamben, a messianic community entails the deactivation of established normative and political orders, with the result that they are experienced 116. Ibid., 1. 117. On Paul’s notion of community see also Breton, A Radical Philosophy of Saint Paul, 126–41. Breton provides subtle insights into the differences between “communion,” “community,” “particular Churches,” and “universal Church.” 118. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 22‒23. 119. Ibid., 23. 120. Ibid., 28.

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through the filter of the hōs mē. Individuals are members of the messianic community insofar as they enact such a deactivation based on the messianic vocation and the hōs mē. The revocation of all juridical-factical conditions, however, does not introduce any new content, any new juridical-factical condition. Messianic community seems to be established by negation, that is, by the messianic revocation, so that one cannot give a proper positive definition of it. Where is messianic community situated? Given that it is based on the multifarious forms of deactivation mentioned above, the messianic community is, according to Agamben, situated in “a zone that is neither factual nor juridical, but is subtracted from the law and remains as a place of pure praxis.”121 The question is whether a community can emerge in such a way that the only or main presupposition for becoming and being a member of it is sharing the messianic revocation and the hōs mē. Although it is possible to assume that such a community has existed and may exist again, we would still be forced to wonder to what extent and for how long it could endure without any power relations, traditions, norms, values, and authorities. The messianic deactivation of Jewish and Roman law can unite individuals through a shared antagonism, but the actual emergence and continuity of a community requires positive contents in terms of norms, power structures, traditions, and so on that messianic revocation as such cannot provide if one remains strictly within the ambit of Agamben’s notion of messianism. Paul was urgently confronted with this problem, as his letters themselves show very concretely. They are meant to provide, among other things, guidance and prescriptions related to concrete community life, to solve questions that community members pose with regard to how they are supposed to act in the everyday life. The deactivation of the Jewish and Roman legal orders should entail—and does in fact entail—their replacement by new normative orders, that is, by a new nomos. Deactivation as such is not and cannot be the final answer if the aim is establishing a community. To put it another way, community cannot be thought independently of institutionalization, and messianic community is and should be considered as a messianic institution. In presenting the idea of a messianic community in contradistinction to both the Church and the Synagogue, Agamben is proposing a very abstract and unrealistic idea of community. In principle, the individual enactment of messianic revocation and the hōs mē might not constitute a problem. Yet a jointly enacted deactivation of nomos, which is supposed to serve as foundational principle of the ekklēsia as messianic community, seems to be in essence a utopia. The weaknesses of Agamben’s idea of messianic community become even more apparent when one introduces the constituents of the political that have been mentioned in the context of the critique of Heidegger’s apolitical facticity, that is, interest, conflict, and power. If my assumption that the political cannot be thought without considering these three components is plausible, then a 121. Ibid.

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further objection against the Agambenian messianic community is that it does not leave any room for a proper understanding of the specifically political dynamics that are supposed to take place within any human community, including the messianic one. The intrinsically conflictual nature of community entails the problem of shaping, in one way or another, power relations and thereby establishing or even imposing normative orders. The “pure praxis” that emerges in a “zone that is neither factual nor juridical, but is subtracted from the law” is not an answer at all.122 As a matter of fact, if one understands praxis independently of the dynamic interplay of power, interest, and conflict, then such a praxis cannot found any community—not even a messianic one. The dialectic between pistis and nomos, which Agamben considers essential for the history of Church and, more generally, for human society, is by no means ultimate, given that the conflict resulting from power and interests is more substantive and primary. Moreover, if my objections prove plausible and convincing, the dialectic in question is in the end asymmetrical due to the fact that nomos plays a more essential role in founding and shaping communities, whereas pistis as such cannot provide any political foundations without structurally involving orders of power. I would thus like to reverse Agamben’s formulation and argue that pistis needs nomos if it is to found and maintain a community. A community requires precisely the experience of language that Agamben ascribes to nomos, that is, an attempt “to encapsulate the excess [i.e., of signification, A.C.] by articulating it in precepts and in semantic contents” and “the expression of his [i.e., the subject’s, A.C.] subjection to a codified system of norms and articles of faith.”123 Agamben’s messianic community remains apolitical and therefore turns out not to be a community at all—because it is thought apart from both the dynamic interplay of interest, power, and conflict, and normative and political orders. In principle, we again find the same problem that is present in Heidegger’s reading of Paul and in the related hermeneutics of factical life, which prove incapable of thinking the political because they do not consider the power, interest, and conflict that are constituent elements of life as such. The emphasis Agamben lays on the messianic deactivation of nomos can be specified by examining his use of Carl Schmitt’s notion of the state of exception,124 to which he refers precisely in order to explain how to think the condition of nomos when it is affected by messianic katargēsis. Following Schmitt, Agamben concentrates his attention on three main aspects of nomos in the state of exception, that is, the “absolute indeterminacy between inside and outside,”125

122. Ibid. 123. Ibid., 134, 135. 124. Ibid., 104‒12. See also Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 125. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 105.

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the “unobservability,”126 and the “unformulability” of nomos,127 with the intention of showing the extent to which the Pauline katargēsis entails very similar features. The Pauline deactivation of nomos involves the indiscernibility of inclusion and exclusion, to the effect that the messianic does not allow us to make a distinction between Jews and non-Jews, that is, between those who are supposed to act according to nomos and those who do not fall within its ambit. Given that nomos becomes inoperative, one cannot make use of it as a demarcation. In addition, the inoperativity of nomos leads to its unobservability, so that one cannot make any distinction between acting according to nomos and acting against nomos. Finally, given the messianic deactivation, nomos cannot be formulated, with the result that we do not have any clear prescriptions in terms of what we have to do and what is prohibited. Against the background of his Schmittian reformulation of Paul’s messianic deactivation of nomos, Agamben tries to develop a new reading of the very ambiguous and mysterious notion of anomia, that is, lawlessness. In the present context I am not interested in testing the exegetical correctness of his interpretation. What is most important is to note how Agamben thinks of the relation between anomia and power.128 Agamben conceives of the messianic in terms of anomia, by which he means a lawlessness that stands in contrast to any constituted power and authority, especially the paradigmatic instance of the Roman Empire. In other words, in Agamben’s reading the lawlessness that characterizes the messianic is equivalent to powerlessness. It is no coincidence that it is precisely in the context of his interpretation of the Pauline messianic katargēsis that Agamben sees a consistent link between the deactivation of nomos and the weakness, or powerlessness, that defines the messianic dynamis. The messianic dynamis, which is radically weak, unfolds as the deactivation of nomos by rendering it “inoperative, no-longer-at-work,”129 which is also the case with regard to all forms of authority and power. Agamben emphasizes that this deactivation of nomos, authority, and power does not take the shape of a destruction. The Pauline katargēsis is not a mere attempt to destroy nomos and constituted power, but their fulfilment in terms of suspension and inoperativity.130 Developing Agamben’s argument, we can say that there are two main reasons why that suspension is in principle far more radical than any attempt to destroy constituted power and nomos. First, the attempt to destroy nomos would be basically parasitical with regard to nomos itself, since it would be enacted precisely against nomos and thereby would be dependent on it. It

126. Ibid., 107. 127. Ibid. 128. Ibid., 111. 129. Ibid., 97. 130. Ibid., 98.

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would be a mere antithesis, not an actual overcoming of it. Second, as a result of its antithetical character, such an attempt might entail replacing the nomos in question with another one. What is more radical, however, is that the Pauline deactivation avoids all conflict with power and nomos by overcoming the dialectic that is embedded in the horizon of nomos itself. This is fully in line with the Pauline attitude of the hōs mē, which does not aim at the destruction of the constituted orders of the world but experiences them in the light of the messianic revocation.131 In this context, the question arises as to whether the messianic experience outlined by Agamben allows for the foundation of a new political order. Aside from the objections I have raised against the possibility of a messianic community as such, I would now like to briefly focus on Agamben’s attempt to test the connection between the Pauline klēsis and some cognate concepts belonging to the Marxian and Marxist traditions. This will allow me to highlight the political potential of Pauline messianism and the way Agamben views that potential against the background of modern and contemporary political thought. In linking the Pauline klēsis to the Marxian notion of class, Agamben explores a number of very interesting conceptual constellations. First of all, he underscores the appropriateness of Benjamin’s thesis, according to which “the Marxian concept of a ‘classless society’ is a secularization of the idea of messianic time.”132 In the light of his own construction of Pauline messianism, Agamben envisages a clear connection between the Marxian notion of class, which means “the dissolution of all ranks and the emergence of a split between the individual and his own social condition,”133 and messianic klēsis, which implies the experience of all juridical and social conditions through the filter of the hōs mē. Accordingly, Agamben sees an evident analogy between the Pauline messianic community, the ekklēsia, and the Marxian proletariat, to the effect that Marx is supposed to have developed a secularization of the messianic. When Agamben asks whether one may speak of a Pauline “society without klēseis” by analogy with the Marxian “classless society,” he does not give a final answer and confines himself to exploring different interpretative options. In this context, however, he points out two interrelated issues that, in my opinion, are pretty symptomatic of his difficulties in dealing with the status of the messianic community. First, Agamben rejects promptly and without hesitation the Church’s interpretation of authority based on Rom. 13:1.134 As a matter of fact, he does not provide any concrete textual evidence that would warrant his rejection of that interpretation. Nor does he propose a convincing reading of Rom. 13:1 with regard to Paul himself. Second, he is clearly aware of

131. Ibid., 28. 132. Ibid., 30. 133. Ibid., 30‒31. 134. Ibid., 33.

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the problem concerning the relation between the messianic community and the Church.135 Agamben admits that the ekklēsia organizes itself and the question of self-organization is indeed related to the problem of dogma—in my terms, the problem of political orders. Agamben clearly sees this basic connection but does not provide concrete reasons for the distinction he draws between the messianic community and the organization distinct from the community itself, that is, the institution. He does not clarify the extent to which a community, including the messianic one, can be conceived as existing apart from any organizational (i.e., political and normative) configuration. In addition, he does not explain why the intrinsic tendency toward self-organization or institutionalization (i.e., political orders) should be regarded in terms of an alienation and not as a natural, structural, and necessary feature of any community.

135. Ibid.

Chapter 4 PI ST I S B E T W E E N T RU T H A N D U N T RU T H

1 Rethinking the Truth of Pistis This last chapter is devoted to a follow-up analysis of the readings of Paul provided by Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger, with a view to considering them in the light of the question of truth. A number of themes that have already been explored in the three preceding chapters will be reconsidered from new angles. The first part of the chapter provides an analysis of the Pauline models of truth deployed by Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger, which, though they take different forms, are all intended to overcome traditional conceptions. I will argue that the three Pauline models can be seen within a coherent horizon once one explicates their common rejection of the optical paradigms of truth that define those traditional accounts. Such optical paradigms can be traced back to what can be designated as “the metaphysics of sight.”1 The second part of the chapter further elaborates the question of the truth specific to pistis, with the intention of critically challenging the anti-metaphysical traits that characterize the Pauline inspiration of the three philosophers. The main question that guides the second part is whether and to what extent the Pauline dismissal of metaphysics as onto-theology that is found in Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger is plausible. I will contend that their attempts, although influential and fascinating, do not do justice to our metaphysical tradition, especially to Platonic thought, which can be inspiring precisely with reference to the question of the truth of pistis. Accordingly, I will reread the Platonic notion of pistis, show its fruitful complexity, and argue that it might help us to rethink the position of pistis in relation to truth and untruth.

1. See Antonio Cimino and Pavlos Kontos, eds., Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Sight (Leiden: Brill, 2015). On the relation between Paul and Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics, see also Eric Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, ed. Michael Franz, vol. 4 of Order and History (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 303–39.

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2 Seeing the Truth and Living in the Truth: Optical Paradigms of Truth and Pauline Countermodels 2.1 Ancient Thought and Optical Paradigms of Truth The metaphysics of sight finds one of its most conspicuous expressions in optical paradigms of truth. According to these paradigms, whose basic conceptual frameworks will be specified in the following sections of this chapter, truth is experienced by means of theoretical attitudes or comportments—that is, intuition and observation.2 Thus, the experience of truth turns out to be a primarily visual experience, which is characterized by a transitive relation between an observer and what is visually given, so that experiencing truth primarily means seeing truth. Many studies already document to what extent ancient Greek philosophy, most notably Plato and Aristotle, provided the first philosophical articulation of the metaphysics of sight.3 In this chapter, I will focus on how Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger criticize the metaphysics of sight by using Paul. In fact, their objections leveled against the alleged primacy of vision in ancient thought have been elaborated in conjunction with a substantial critique of optical paradigms of truth. I will analyze this critique with a view to showing a truly remarkable aspect that Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger have in common: In dealing with the metaphysics of sight and with related optical paradigms of truth, Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger draw inspiration from the Pauline letters—which results in Paul serving as a countermodel to theoretical, Platonic-Aristotelian conceptions of truth. As a very rough first approximation, the theoretical nature of Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of truth can be elucidated by considering the notions of “theory” or the “theoretical” in the strictly etymological sense.4 This is clearly symptomatic of the manner in which ancient philosophy consistently understands and actualizes itself as the metaphysics of sight. In this respect, one can easily provide substantial evidence by taking into account a considerable number of passages by several ancient philosophers. What is seen, contemplated, or observed concerns, above all, the eternal beings or

2. In what follows, I will use “theoretical,” “contemplative,” and “optical” as synonyms. 3. For an especially informative analysis, see Jussi Backman, “Towards a Genealogy of the Metaphysics of Sight: Seeing, Hearing, and Thinking in Heraclitus and Parmenides,” in Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Sight, ed. Antonio Cimino and Pavlos Kontos (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 11‒34. 4. See Hannelore Rausch, Theoria: Von ihrer sakralen zur philosophischen Bedeutung (Munich: Fink, 1982). See also Gert König and Helmut Pulte, “Theoria,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998), 10: 1128–54.

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phenomena belonging to the cosmic reality (planets, stars, etc.).5 In this vein, according to the Aristotelian definition, philosophy is theōrein, insomuch as its aim primarily consists in contemplating the first principles and causes of reality.6 Accordingly, the experience of truth is also characterized in terms of such a theōrein.7 The optical paradigms acquire a more specific philosophical connotation— truly decisive for the entire tradition, including phenomenology and other contemporary philosophical methods—when they exceed the realm of sight in the narrow sense. As a result, what is seen or observed is not primarily what the corporeal eyes see, but what one can see through noetic, or intellectual, cognitive acts.8 Plato in particular—and the entire Platonic tradition— underscores the fact that the authentic philosopher is the one who is able to go beyond what the eyes can see and contemplate eidetic givens (forms, ideas, etc.). In many cases, ancient and medieval thinkers do not confine themselves to emphasizing the essential difference between, on the one hand, visual experience actualized by the eyes and, on the other, noetic-eidetic vision, since, as is often the case, such a difference is regarded as an irreconcilable contrast. According to them, the eyes facilitate a type of seeing that gets caught up in a dispersed and incoherent manifoldness, whereas noetic, or intellectual, sight enables one to grasp a coherent and unified givenness, the eidetic one.9 The optical framework just described needs further specifications as to the various levels of truth. In fact, on the one hand, intuitive truth should be regarded as a monothetic act of seeing an eidetic given or of perceiving a sensorial given.On the other hand, propositional truth has to be traced back to a synthetic-diairetic activity and refers to a correspondence between

5. The contemplation of the cosmos can be considered the seminal experience that defines the emergence of philosophy as theōrein. Our entire philosophical tradition provides extensive evidence of the self-understanding of philosophy as theōrein, from the Presocratics (see, e.g., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz [Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1954], 2:13), through Plato (see, e.g., Phaedo, ed. John Burnet [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901], 99d6), to Aristotle (see, e.g., Metaphysics, 1.5.986b24), Spinoza (see Complete Works, 363‒82), and even Wittgenstein (see Tractatus logico-philosophicus, § 6.45). 6. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10.6.1177a12‒9.1181b23. 7. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 2.1.993a30. See also Plato, Phaedrus, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 247d4. 8. See, for example, Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 529a9–c3. 9. See Plato, Phaedrus, 249b6–c1; Theaetetus, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900), 148d, 181c. This contrast has an ethical connotation as well, already in Plato, but especially in the Platonic-Christian tradition.

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linguistic articulation and states of affairs.10 On its own, the truth-relation between linguistic articulation (or propositional content) and states of affairs is experienced primarily on the basis of an observing (i.e., theoretical or contemplative) attitude, which in principle enables one to see whether there is a correspondence.11 The above-outlined theoretical paradigms of truth have been questioned by Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger, with Paul acting simultaneously as their main source of inspiration and as a countermodel against the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. Such a circumstance is particularly challenging and fascinating because this philosophical use of Paul against ancient thought is in no way self-evident. As has already been seen,12 the reception of Paul in contemporary philosophy is deeply paradoxical. This holds true specifically as concerns Paul’s contributions to the question of truth. According to Nietzsche, Paul should be regarded as an archetypical falsifier and liar, who, in line with the Platonic theological-philosophical tradition, manipulates reality and disseminates false doctrines, dogmas, and invented truths in order to deprive life of its intrinsic value and to reach a privileged position of power.13 On the contrary, Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s philosophical readings of Paul reverse Nietzsche’s violent statements by undermining the two basic assumptions that underlie his polemical interpretation developed in The Antichrist—that is, the alleged Platonic tendencies of Paul and the Pauline commitment against philosophical truth. In fact, although they read the Pauline letters on the basis of very diverse assumptions and questions, in the end Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger come to the same conclusion: Paul can serve as a source of inspiration in order to articulate a new account of truth that cannot be reduced to traditional optical paradigms. 2.2 Pauline Conceptions of Truth in Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger, in line with those interpretive patterns that they respectively introduce in addressing ancient thought and Paul, read the 10. See Plato, Sophist, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900), 262a1‒263c13. and Aristotle, De interpretatione, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 4.17a2‒6.17a37. See also Martin Heidegger, Logic: The Question of Truth, trans. Thomas Sheehan (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), §§ 11‒13. 11. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 206‒10. Even if the primacy of the optical paradigms in Plato and Aristotle is well documented, one has to avoid oversimplifications, since in both cases we can find substantial starting points for different conceptions of truth. One could, for instance, mention the case of practical truth: see especially Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6.2.1139a26–27. In this regard, one could also mention the concept of truth that, according to Plato and Aristotle, defines philosophical life: see, for example, Aristotle, Metaphysics, 4.2.1004b15‒26. 12. See Chapter 1, Section 1. 13. See Chapter 1, Section 2.

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above-outlined optical paradigms of truth in different ways. In connection with this, I am not interested in examining the historical-philological accuracy of their readings of Greek philosophy—not only because this would require a different approach and another thematic focus, but especially because I intend to concentrate my attention on the conceptual frameworks that define their attempts to play Paul off against Greek philosophy. When one considers Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s readings of Paul, it can be hard to imagine more divergent interpretations, as has already been seen in the previous chapters. Heidegger starts from the Pauline experience of factical life in order to elaborate his own phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity. Here Paul acts as a discussion partner, and the specific question to be addressed is that of the time and historicity belonging to human existence. Badiou’s interest in Paul, on the other hand, should be traced back to political issues concerning the question of universalism.14 According to Badiou, in opposition to the abstract universality of globalization and capitalism, Paul can provide us with a new framework that enables us to conceive of a universal singularity rooted in the event declared by a subject and linked to a truth procedure. Finally, Agamben sets out to restore the primordial meaning of messianism by rediscovering in Paul the authentic essence of the messianic, with special emphasis on the relation between faith and language. Despite these heterogeneous approaches, a shared Pauline horizon can be revealed, which shapes precisely the way Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger readdress the question of truth. In the following analysis, I will show that these thinkers elaborate conceptions of truth that start, more or less explicitly, from Paul, inasmuch as they understand the experience of truth as an intransitive (i.e., performative or evental) relation. In the end, for all three thinkers, experiencing the truth will amount to living the truth, or rather, living in the truth. 2.2.1 Heidegger: Paul and the Existential-Phenomenological Paradigm of Truth Heidegger’s critique of the theoretical paradigms of truth should be examined in the light of his general analysis of “objective presence” (Vorhandenheit).15 According to his thesis, objective presence is a mode of being that corresponds to a specific attitude of human existence, that is, the scientific or theoretical one, whose characteristic features can be summarized as follows. First, a theoretical attitude is an observing comportment toward beings.16 Second, it is a distanced comportment, to the effect that it is unconcerned about the personal or existential meaning of beings.17 Third, it 14. Badiou, Saint Paul, 1–15. 15. See, for example, Heidegger, Being and Time, 41‒44. 16. Ibid., 59‒62. 17. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 7–13. In the present context, I use “existential” in a broad sense, regardless of Heidegger’s differentiation between “existential” and “existentiell.”

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articulates itself through scientific or constative utterances that report states of affairs.18 Heidegger argues that objective presence and the related theoretical (or observing) attitude primarily shaped philosophy in ancient Greece in terms of a contemplative comportment that objectifies beings and relations between them. Accordingly, the primacy of theōrein in Plato and Aristotle corresponds to the ontological priority of objective presence—a priority that is reflected in both the preeminence of substance (ousia) and the conception of truth as correspondence. In modern and contemporary philosophical thought, such a theoretical paradigm related to the priority of objective presence reemerges in the form of the primacy of intuition, which, according to Heidegger’s destruction of the history of ontology, influences the most important thinkers.19 As a matter of fact, already in the lectures held after the First World War,20 Heidegger vigorously criticizes Husserl for his theoretical conception of phenomenological intuition and enacts, or achieves, the phenomenological attitude in terms of a hermeneutical intuition, which is executed through an immanent reenactment of factical life.21 Within the framework of his hermeneutical and performative conception of phenomenology, Heidegger takes Paul as one of his main sources of inspiration. First, Heidegger views Paul’s articulation of factical life as an alternative to the theoretical paradigm initiated by Greek thought, inasmuch as Paul lets the truly primordial features of factical life emerge, especially its own historical-temporal finitude and enactment-sense.22

18. Heidegger, Being and Time, 149‒55. 19. Heidegger’s critique of intuition unfolds throughout his entire work, from the very beginning up to the late development of his thought. See, for example, Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2007), 78‒83. 20. Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 98–99. 21. For a more detailed account of this central aspect of Heidegger’s early hermeneutics of facticity, see Cimino, “Begriff und Vollzug.” Heidegger’s elaboration of an existential paradigm of truth, inspired by Paul, includes a radical critique of the primacy of intuition and in general of the optical paradigm. Such a critique is a consistent development of his conception of hermeneutical intuition, which he develops in his early hermeneutics of factical life. Within the ontological analysis of human existence, Heidegger’s overcoming of intuition takes place in the form of a reduction, inasmuch as he shows to what extent intuition and the related ontological basis of objective presence are derivative and should be traced back to a more fundamental dimension rooted in “understanding” (Verstehen). In the end, according to Heidegger’s reduction, intuition is nothing but a derivative form of the primordial hermeneuticity that characterizes human life as such. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 143. 22. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 67–74. See Chapter 1, Sections 3.1‒3.4.

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Second, the Pauline letters provide Heidegger with a considerable number of suggestions with regard to a philosophical elaboration of authentic life.23 Most remarkably, Paul supplies a new paradigm of temporality that is an alternative to the ontology of substance and presence typical of Greek thought, although Plato and Aristotle provide many relevant insights concerning existential truth.24 It is precisely the Pauline paradigm of temporality that allows Heidegger to overcome the ontology of presence that serves as the main basis for the primacy of theōrein, the correspondence theory of truth, and the alleged predominance of intuition.25 The Pauline roots of Heidegger’s conception of truth in terms of authenticity can be concretely documented by reference to Heidegger’s reading of the first letter to the Thessalonians.26 Within this framework, he works out the opposition between authenticity and inauthenticity starting from the Pauline contrast between two different ways of experiencing the parousia. On the one hand, the inauthentic experience of the parousia, in searching for precise givens, finds its expression in the attempt to objectify the specific temporality of factical life. On the other hand, authentic life allows for a genuine experience of the finitude that characterizes human existence, without any consideration of objectifiable givens.27 Heidegger interprets the Pauline expression eirēnē kai asphaleia (“peace and security”28) as an indication of the attitude that characterizes those who are not in a position to live and experience temporality in an authentic way, given that they search for security in meaningful worldly content and things. This reading clearly prefigures what in Being and Time Heidegger articulates in terms of inauthentic existence, which is indeed absorbed in the meaningfulness of the world.29 Analogously to inauthenticity, such an attitude articulated by Paul as eirēnē kai asphaleia goes hand in hand with a lack of self-knowledge.30 One can easily notice that in his reading of 1 Thess. 5:3–4 Heidegger places particular emphasis on the Pauline metaphorical opposition between darkness and luminosity, which is related to the two ways of experiencing facticity and temporality. This is a crucial issue for our approach to the metaphysics of sight. The metaphorical constellations related to light play a truly decisive role in

23. See the very insightful analyses given in Crowe, Heidegger’s Religious Origins. 24. In this regard, one can mention, for example, the fact that in his Marburg lectures on Plato’s Sophist Heidegger interprets the Aristotelian concept of practical intelligence (phronēsis) in terms of conscience (Gewissen). See Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 39. 25. See Chapter 1, Sections 3.1‒3.2 and Chapter 2, Sections 2‒3. 26. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 61–74. 27. Ibid., 72. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., 7–13. 30. Ibid., 72.

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Plato’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics and for the entire ensuing tradition.31 In the end, those constellations are an intrinsic component of the metaphysics of sight, with the metaphysics of light being its necessary correlate. The metaphysics of sight and the metaphysics of light, together with their various illustrations, define the core of traditional metaphysics and its self-understanding. Against such a background of the metaphysical use of metaphorical constellations of light, the Pauline opposition between darkness and luminosity represents an alternative articulation of that constellation, given that it does not concern any metaphysical commitments, but only two ways of life.32 The Pauline opposition between light and darkness, or at least Heidegger’s reading of it, turns out to constitute a complete reversal of the metaphysical understanding of such an opposition.33 According to this understanding, as Plato’s allegories show, light is the specific element in which true knowledge of the foundations of reality unfolds, whereas darkness characterizes the lowest of cognitive and ontological levels.34 Another paradigmatic example of metaphysical metaphors of light is Aristotle’s conception of the active intellect, which is fully in line with the Platonic allegories and reaffirms the luminosity of both true knowledge and the foundations of reality.35 In this sense, luminosity is ascribed to epistemic and ontological fundamenta inconcussa, whereas empirical, instable, and contingent reality is ascribed to darkness. This framework is completely reversed in Heidegger’s appropriation of Paul, where the “children of light” (1 Thess. 5:5) are not those who search for secure foundations, objective givens, and safe conditions. On the contrary, they are those who experience fragility,

31. See Werner Beierwaltes, Denken des Einen: Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1985), 139. See also Werner Beierwaltes, “Plotins Metaphysik des Lichtes,” in Die Philosophie des Neuplatonismus, ed. Clemens Zintzen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), 1977, 75‒117. 32. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 72–73. 33. This reversal goes largely beyond Heidegger’s reading of Paul. Heidegger’s destruction of traditional metaphysics can be viewed, among other things, as an attempt to question the structural configuration of onto-theology in terms of the metaphysics of light. The clearest indication of this approach is Heidegger’s concept of Lichtung (“clearing”). See especially Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, 83ff. Heidegger’s “clearing” can be read as a reformulation and reversal of the metaphysics of light, inasmuch as this notion dismisses the metaphysical tenet of full luminosity and affirms instead the mutual belonging of light and darkness, concealment and unconcealment. In the end, Heidegger’s concept of truth as unconcealedness (Unverborgenheit) is to be understood precisely as a critique of the metaphysical claim to fully displayed luminosity. 34. See, for example, Plato, Republic, 508a–509b. 35. See especially Aristotle, De Anima, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 3.5.430a10–25.

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contingency, and the finitude of human existence, and give up all claims to certainty. In line with his reading of Paul, Heidegger elaborates his conception of authentic existence in terms of existential truth. Existential truth is linked to a self-concern and a self-appropriation that is not due to external factors and is indeed an intransitive process. In fact, such a self-concern does not imply any introduction of new cognitive or epistemic contents, but only refers to how one experiences the world and the self. If one wants to formulate this phenomenon according to the early Heidegger’s terminology, one has good reason to say that the self-appropriation actualized in authentic existence as existential truth concerns the enactment-sense, not the content-sense. On the contrary, the theoretical, observing, or contemplative attitude related to the optical paradigms structurally implies a distance. Contemplating something always implies a proper distance, in the strict sense, as is the case with the observation of celestial phenomena. If one introduces the optical paradigm in order to explain self-knowledge in terms of self-contemplation, a distanced comportment toward the self emerges. A concrete example of this distanced self-observing can be seen in Husserl’s reflective approach, which Heidegger deems unsuitable for a properly philosophical self-understanding of human existence. The existential paradigm of truth overcomes such a self-alienation. Existentiality and thrownness, which define human life in its most genuine possibility, cannot be grasped or experienced through intuition, but only through performing authentic existence. Here we have a complete reversal of the hierarchy that defines the traditional epistemic paradigm. According to the latter, the intuition of essences or principles implies an overcoming or bracketing of factical individual givens, with the result that eidetic givens are grasped in their pure and noncontingent givenness. Instead, Heidegger argues that this intuitive grasp is only a derivative one, whereas the enactment of authentic life turns out to be a more fundamental and original (self-)knowledge. In the end, being-toward-death does not consist in any intuition of death, and the certainty related to being-toward-death cannot be traced back to a merely epistemic one.36 Existential truth is equivalent to authenticity, which in turns enables one to see the one-sided character of a theoretical attitude and an objective presence. In the case of existential truth, the primacy of the optical paradigm that shapes the traditional notion of truth is finally overcome, since existential truth cannot be seen, it is not a visible feature of concrete or ideal entities (or states of affairs) nor any correspondence relation between entities (or states of affairs) on the one side and psychic and/or semantic processes on the other side. Existential truth can only be enacted or experienced from a first-person perspective and turns out to be an intransitive experience. In sum, one cannot see it but can only live in it. 36. Heidegger, Being and Time, 247.

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The irreconcilability of authentic existence and the optical paradigm is substantiated by Heidegger in line with his interpretation of ancient philosophy in terms of a worldly oriented attitude. Within the framework of an ontological analysis of human existence, the central role of theōrein and the related primacy of objective presence in ancient philosophy have to be traced back to inauthentic tendencies of human life, inasmuch as this interprets itself as taking worldly entities as a foundation.37 Upon closer inspection, the primacy of vision and theōrein that emerges in ancient philosophy is, according to Heidegger, nothing but a radicalization of the curiosity that shapes the inauthentic attitude of human life. Put another way, there are ontological reasons that explain why sight or vision plays an eminent role in ancient thought. Since the existential paradigm of truth means an overcoming of curiosity as one of the peculiar phenomena of inauthenticity, such a paradigm is supposed to allow one to overcome the predominant role of vision in experiencing truth. 2.2.2 Badiou: Paul and the Evental-Declarative Paradigm of Truth The Pauline overcoming of the traditional optical paradigm of truth becomes particularly apparent in Badiou, since he emphasizes the intransitive character of evental-declarative truth. With a view to clarifying this peculiar intransitivity, it makes sense to readdress Badiou’s conception of truth in the light of his own account of the relationship between event, subject, truth procedure, and declaration, with a special focus on the dynamics that shape such an intransitivity. One should, first of all, consider Badiou’s definition of the Pauline truth procedure. As we know, according to Badiou, this procedure consists in a process that can be described as follows: declaring the event and “being faithful to this declaration.”38 In this context, the notion of pistis (faith, conviction) has a very specific meaning, since it refers to “the subject at the point of declaration.”39 On the basis of the clarifications I have provided in Chapter 2, it is clear to what extent Badiou’s reading is able to capture the gist of the relationship between pistis, love, and hope, to the effect that pistis, together with its own evental-declarative articulation, emerges as a radical attitude. Now, if we elaborate on Badiou’s definition of the Pauline truth procedure, we can identify further truly interesting, yet implicit, resonances that may help us to locate the Badiouian understanding of truth within a broader horizon. In accordance with that definition, pistis does not entail a passive attitude. Especially in the commonsensical understanding of religious faith or belief, one has a tendency to conceive of faith as acceptance. This happens, for instance, when one views religious experience in terms of the experience of a revelation. The same holds true when religiosity is understood as the

37. Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 122. 38. Badiou, Saint Paul, 14. See also Chapter 1, Section 5. 39. Ibid., 15.

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acceptance of dogmas that are not posited, or stated, by oneself. These facets of passivity, which seem intrinsically characteristic of the religious attitude, do not play any role in Badiou’s understanding of pistis. On the contrary, declaring the event and being faithful to this evental declaration involve, more or less explicitly, an activity or a creative force, which is able to open a new horizon of possibilities, as has become clear in the previous analyses. Remarkably enough, the fact that the Badiouian understanding of Pauline pistis rejects those forms of passivity also has consequences for the way in which the relation between pistis and philosophical contemplation should be understood. For philosophical theōrein also implies passivity. When Plato and Aristotle—and in essence the entire metaphysical tradition based on the primacy of vision— describe philosophical experience in terms of contemplation, the underlying assumption is that such experience may not alter its own correlate, that is, ideas and eidetic givens (Plato) or the first principles of the whole cosmos (Aristotle), which are indeed eternal. This fundamental difference—that is, between Pauline pistis, as it is delineated by Badiou, on the one side, and traditional philosophical contemplation and religious acceptance of dogmas or revelation on the other side—can be made more explicit if one considers the peculiar truth procedure of Pauline pistis against the background of traditional theories of truth. The Pauline truth procedure cannot be traced back to the correspondence theory for two reasons that are related to each other and that deeply undermine the presuppositions of correspondence. First, the declaration of the event does not consist in a constative description or report of it. Description or report always implies a form of passivity, in the sense that I utter a true statement merely by recognizing or recording a certain state of affairs. This does not happen in the case of Badiou’s Pauline pistis. In ontological terms, there is no relation between a Cartesian res cogitans and things. As Badiou points out, the Christian subject emerges precisely in conjunction with the above-described truth procedure, given that there is no subject independently of the truth process and the event.40 Second, a constative description is not possible in the case of evental declaration, because there is no empirical or historical givenness to the event. Put another way, the declaration of the event does not consist in a report related to the event as a describable historical or empirical fact. There is no historical, empirical, physical “proof ” of the event.41 Pauline truth is also profoundly different from what one might term an ontological or a Platonic conception of truth. According to the Platonic conception, truth is an objective feature that concerns things themselves and does not depend on subject-related circumstances. Platonic ideas are indeed the paradigmatic example of this notion, given that psychic, or subjective, activity

40. Ibid., 14. 41. Ibid., 49.

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does not affect their truth status. In principle, the philosophical contemplation of ideas is a typical transitive experience of truth. Truth is seen—not in terms of an empirical, or sensorial, given, but as a noetic, or eidetic, one. In the case of Badiou’s account of the Pauline truth procedure, there is no truth independent of the truth procedure of the evental declaration, with truth being intrinsically evental, that is, it is intrinsically connected to the event and also to the declaration of it. Such a truth is thoroughly subjective.42 The peculiar status of Pauline truth can be specified by considering the opposition between universal and particular or individual and emphasizing that the traditional role this opposition plays in determining truth is substantially dismantled in Badiou’s reading of Paul. The paradigmatic examples of universal truths are once again the Platonic ones. Logical, eidetic, mathematical truths, and so on are universal truths, not affected by empirical or historical situations. On the other hand, examples of particular or individual truths are indeed the historical ones. A report on the fact that event x happened in place y on day z is true if, and only if, it truly describes that fact. The Pauline truth procedure escapes this opposition, since it is based on a “universal singularity.”43 The evental nature of Pauline truth implies its own singularity. According to Badiou, the Pauline truth procedure is no mere repetition and there are no preestablished orders, procedures, or identities that structure truth.44 However, precisely because truth is singular, truth will be universal, insomuch as Pauline truth allows for the overcoming of pre-defined historical, cultural, ethnic, or political orders. Because of its singularity, truth breaks with those orders and identities, with the result that it paves the way for a genuine and new form of universality.45 Badiou’s overcoming of the optical paradigm also emerges in his theory of discourses,46 where he analyzes the structural subjective dispositions that are related to Jewish, Greek, and Christian discourses. Particular attention should be paid to the way he describes the essential features of Greek discourse, that is, ancient philosophy. Such a description is in fact in line with the emphasis I put on the relationship between philosophical attitude and optical paradigms of truth, on the one hand, and the passivity implied in contemplation, on the other.47 Upon closer inspection, the description provided by Badiou properly summarizes the structure of the theoretical attitude performed by

42. Ibid., 14. 43. Ibid. 44. Concerning the contrast between the evental universal singularity of Pauline truth and repetition, see Badiou, Saint Paul, 11, 14, 79, 81. 45. Ibid., 22. See Chapter 1, Section 5. 46. See also Chapter 1, Section 5.1. 47. Badiou, Saint Paul, 41.

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Greek philosophers in their dealing with cosmic reality.48 More precisely, “the matching of the logos to being” or “appropriating the fixed order of the world” constitutes the essence of the theōrein performed and articulated by ancient philosophers.49 At this juncture, the contrast between the intransitivity of the evental-declarative process and the transitivity of the Greek discourse becomes more apparent. While the evental-declarative emergence of subjectivity does not occur alongside any counterparts or correlates, but is driven by a creative force that introduces a new horizon of possibilities, Greek discourse enacts itself precisely in dealing with the cosmic totality. In contrast to this, the universal singularity that is related to the intransitive evental-declarative process goes beyond both Jewish and Greek discourse.50 The Pauline discourse does not take place in the form of a theoretical recognition of the order that structures the cosmic totality; rather, its universal singularity allows for a break with such orders. In turning out to be an alternative to both Jewish prophecy and Greek philosophy, Pauline apostleship radically questions traditional criteria of truth and undermines the relevance of any sight-based experiences.51 As has already been seen, Pauline apostleship does not consist in the acceptance, or passive recognition, of the given event of Jesus’ resurrection. Nor did Paul have a first-hand experience—be it visual or acoustical—of Jesus’ life and teachings. Those requirements, which would be of decisive importance for the traditional account of the experience of truth, do not play any role for Pauline truth. One could also understand this creative force of the Pauline evental truth procedure in terms of performativity, which allows us to readdress the proximity between Badiou’s Paul and Agamben’s. 2.2.3 Agamben: Paul and the Performative Model of Truth If Heidegger and Badiou provide, respectively, an existential model of truth and an evental-declarative one, Paul leads Agamben to what one could call performative, or enactive, truth, according to which truth is to be understood in terms of performative veridiction.52 Analogously to the Pauline inspirations that I analyzed in the case

48. In the present context, my use of “theoretical” is more in line with the traditional meaning and does differ from the specific sense Badiou gives to this notion precisely within the framework of his Pauline book. Concerning the Badiouian usage of “theoretical,” see Badiou, Saint Paul, 108. 49. Badiou, Saint Paul, 41. 50. Ibid., 42. 51. Ibid., 45. See also Badiou, Saint Paul, 44, where the undermining of visibility is reaffirmed. One can note Badiou’s rejection of the conception of a witness as one who had first-hand experience of a given event. In Chapter 2, I tried to show how Badiou’s reading allows for a different account of attestation or testimony, which is more radical precisely because it does not refer to any “material” givenness. 52. See also Chapter 1, Sections 4.4‒4.5.

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of Heidegger and Badiou, Agamben considers truth not in theoretical terms, but as an inner dynamics of the Pauline articulation of faith. The proximity of the three readings of Pauline truth does not consist only in the fact that all three thinkers reject optical, or theoretical, paradigms of truth. The basic convergences we have already noticed in their conceptions of the Pauline articulation of pistis reappear in the ways in which they understand Paul’s experience of truth. The Pauline articulation of faith is neither propositional, in the sense of constative truth related to states of affairs in the world, nor intuitive, in the sense of a monothetic grasp of eidetic or sensorial givens. The optical, or visual, experience implied in the constative truth concerning worldly states of affairs becomes apparent if we consider the way the truth or falsehood of a certain statement is ascertained. In accordance with what Wittgenstein says in his Tractatus, which is fairly representative of the traditional correspondence theory of truth, if we assume that truth and falsehood consist respectively in the correspondence and noncorrespondence with reality,53 then we have to compare a statement with reality if we want to know whether it is true or false.54 It is worth asking how this comparison takes place. It would seem to involve us comparing the related state of affairs with what the statement says. This means we have to see whether the meaning of that statement corresponds to what is given in the world. It hardly matters whether such a seeing is an actual visual grasp of the given state of affairs or is only a metaphor meant to articulate the substance of the observing, or theoretical, attitude. The comparison and the recognition of truth and falsehood are symptomatic of the peculiar passivity inherent in contemplation. We have to experience a given state of affairs and compare it to what is meant by the statement. The same holds true for the grasp of simple givens or entities that cannot be articulated in a complex way. As is well-known, Aristotle describes such experience in terms of touching.55 The Pauline truth related to pistis, as it is depicted by Agamben, cannot be captured by the models just mentioned. It does not articulate any states of affairs that Paul is supposed to have experienced and reported. Nor does it take place in the form of a corporeal experience such as touching.56 Instead,

53. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, § 2.222. 54. Ibid., § 2.223. 55. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 9.10.1051b24. 56. In this context, it is interesting to recall the case of Thomas the apostle, as is reported in Jn 20:20–31. Although Thomas was one of the Twelve Apostles, his first-hand experience of Jesus’ life and teaching did not help to convince him. In fact, the decisive moment came when the other apostles informed him that they had seen Jesus, but he could not believe them. What he required was a visual as well as a tactile experience: He wants to see and touch; otherwise, he is not willing to believe. Since his pistis relies on vision and touching, one cannot characterize it as pistis proper, as Jesus himself

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the performative truth specific to the Pauline articulation of pistis has to be understood as a homologia between utterances and inner disposition.57 The experience of “the word of faith” is not directed toward any counterpart or correlate, given that it is a process characterized by what Agamben calls the “self-referential quality of the word of faith.”58 In this connection, Agamben emphasizes the contrast between performativity and propositional truth on the basis of the two ways of understanding homologia. On the one hand, one can understand homologia in the traditional sense that was established by Aristotle in the De interpretatione,59 that is, as correspondence between mental states, words, and states of affairs. The discourse that articulates states of affairs (logos apophantikos) is enacted in such a way that it attributes (or does not attribute) quality x to subject y. Such a discourse fixes a relation between certain qualities and a certain subject in order to utter a statement. Truth can be ascribed to that statement if and only if a correspondence between the statement and the given state of affairs holds. The relation in which the state of affairs consists and the relation in which the statement consists are supposed to correspond with each other. Accordingly, this relation between those two relations is truth as correspondence. On the other hand, according to Agamben, one can understand homologia as consistency between words and attitude. Here, what is at stake is still a relation. Yet, this relation is internal to the articulation of pistis itself.60 Put another way, the Pauline homologia does not mean propositional truth, but performative truth, understood as veridiction or truth-telling.61 The performative experience of “the word of faith” does not match any of the logical or ontological frameworks of traditional metaphysics. First, such an experience is not a visual one, but is related to hearing. Accordingly, this is an experience of truth in which sight does not play any role whatsoever.62 Second, the performative nature of the experience concerning “the word of faith” radically escapes traditional ontology, since “[f]or Paul, this is faith; it is an experience of being beyond existence and

emphasized in the same passage from John: “Jesus said to him, ‘Because you have seen me you have found faith. Happy are they who find faith without seeing me.’” (Jn 20:29, trans. The Oxford Study Bible). If pistis requires seeing or touching that which is to be believed, then it no longer makes sense to speak of pistis. Here, we can see the divergent experiences of Paul and Thomas, which are very indicative of two different forms of pistis. For an inspiring account of Thomas, see Glenn W. Most, Doubting Thomas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). 57. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 131. 58. Ibid. 59. Aristotle, De interpretatione, 1.16a1–18, 4.16b26–17a6. 60. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 130–34. 61. Ibid., 134. 62. See ibid., 129.

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essence, as much beyond subject as beyond predicate.”63 Third, the performative experience articulates itself not by means of predication or apophantic logic, but through the nominal sentence. In other words, performative, or enactive, experience does not relate to a believing that Jesus is the Messiah, since it only concerns a believing in Jesus Messiah.64 Let us develop Agamben’s approach a little further. On the one hand, believing and asserting that Jesus is the Messiah is a clear case of logos apophantikos, where one fixes and articulates a relationship between a subject, or substance (i.e., Jesus), and a certain quality or predicate. Here, Aristotelian logic and ontology apply. The formulation of that statement might lead one to ask whether the statement or belief (“Jesus is the Messiah”) is true or false. Thus, what is at stake here is the correspondence between an articulation and a state of affairs. This approach paves the way for discourses concerning Jesus as the subject-matter of philosophical-theological doctrines. On the other hand, believing in Jesus Messiah evinces a powerful simplicity; that is, it implies the absoluteness of pistis, which does not allow for philosophical, theological, historical, or scientific speculations about the ontological status of Jesus: “Paul does not believe that Jesus possesses the quality of being the Messiah; he believes in ‘Jesus Messiah’ and that is all.”65 One can stress a substantial convergence between Agamben’s reading of the Pauline homologia and Badiou’s concept of pistis. Both of them characterize Pauline truth as an inner consistency that cannot be reduced to any traditional theories of truth. In fact, the consistency belonging to the homologia is, in the end, a coherency between words and deeds (Agamben), whereas the consistency of the Pauline truth procedure consists in being faithful to the evental declaration (Badiou). In both cases the intransitive character of truth comes to light: Truth does not consist in any relation—between words and states of affairs, between words and mental states, or between visual experience and its alleged correlates— but rather refers only to a performative or evental process. A very similar framework can be seen in Heidegger’s account of the truth of existence, which he modeled on the basis of Pauline factical life experience. The truth of authentic existence is indeed a form of inner consistency, or coherence, that shapes factical life and leads it to an enactive, or performative, concentration of subjectivity.66

3 Contaminated Truth In the previous analyses, I have explored the very different ways in which Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger appropriated the multifarious notion of 63. Ibid., 128. 64. Ibid., 126–28. 65. Ibid., 128. 66. See also what Heidegger says about Christianity and the concentration of self: Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Winter Semester 1919/1920, 47‒48.

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Pauline pistis. I have clarified not only significant differences between those readings but also the extent to which they share converging theoretical and interpretive frameworks, despite the fact that the three philosophers approach the Pauline letters on the basis of disparate interests. Taken as a whole, the preceding analysis has shown that the three thinkers make use of the Pauline letters to rethink the foundations and limitations of rationality, including the rationality of philosophical discourse itself. Thus, they critically reject paradigms of indubitable knowledge and onto-theological models in line with their respective critiques of traditional metaphysics. In the first part of this chapter, I have concentrated on the conceptualizations of truth implied by Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s interpretations of Paul and, to do so, have documented how the Pauline letters serve as a reference point for the articulation of notions that cannot be traced back to traditional metaphysical accounts of truth. In what follows, I intend to readdress the question of the truth specific to pistis from a different viewpoint, which will allow me to challenge the accounts of pistis provided by Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger and the respective readings of the history of metaphysics that underlie their interpretations of Paul. The interpretations provided by the three philosophers leave a number of crucial questions open, especially concerning the implications of pistis for untruth. Here questions arise as to what kind of truth defines the different facets of pistis (i.e., conviction, trust, belief) and to what extent that truth is or might be contaminated by untruth in the form of perjury or lies, for example. The key theme of my critical comments will be the question of the contaminated truth inherent in pistis. When one reconsiders each of the three authors’ Pauline models of truth, the question of untruth seems to pose itself quite urgently, which is no doubt due to the lack of a sharp boundary between truth and untruth in these models. As a matter of fact, if the possibility of a fundamentum inconcussum and indubitable knowledge (or truth) is lost, then questions seem to arise concerning what can be identified as “true” in contradistinction to “untrue” and, most importantly, the extent to which the relation between truth and untruth can be conceived of as a binary alternative. If we now very briefly summarize some of the main results of the previous analyses, it will become clear that the Pauline models of truth constructed by Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger do not, prima facie, allow one to deal with the question of untruth. In the wake of his phenomenological appropriation of Paul, Heidegger conceives of the existential model of truth, according to which the basic equivalence between truth and authenticity, on the one side, and untruth and inauthenticity, on the other side, is established. Within this framework, what matters is how existence is enacted, that is, whether it is done so authentically or inauthentically. Self-understanding, the understanding of others and worldly things, and the understanding of the world itself are enacted accordingly. But it is still unclear how we can decide whether an enactment is authentic (true)

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or inauthentic (untrue) and whether there is a clear cutoff point between these two alternatives. The fact that, in both his ontological analysis of human existence and his thinking of being as event (Ereignis), Heidegger repeatedly underscores, albeit from different angles, the intrinsic relationship of truth and untruth does not offer any answer to that question. Quite the opposite, this fact makes the question more urgent. If we accept that truth and untruth are intrinsically related to each other, then we still have to ask ourselves whether and how we can define a clear boundary between them. According to Badiou’s definition, the truth specific to pistis is the procedure of declaring the event and being faithful to that declaration. But if “conviction” designates the subject precisely “at the point of declaration” or “at the point of his conviction’s militant address,”67 it is rather a question of whether there may be still room left for the possibility of untruth or falsehood within such a conceptual framework. How could we check whether a declaration is true or false? May we conclude that conviction as such is true or that all declarations are true? If so, are they true to the same extent? In the Badiouian reading of the Pauline letters, truth seems to be the feature of a procedure that is indeed immanent, to the effect that declaring the event and being faithful to it are not affected by reality or cannot be scrutinized by taking into account deeds and states of affairs. In other words, the Badiouian truth inspired by Paul might be seen as a form of self-referential and self-sufficient coherence, which does not leave room for the possibility of falsehood. The same applies to Agamben’s notion of performative truth, which is specific to the Pauline performativum fidei. That form of performative deactivates the denotative function of propositional language, so that truth seems to amount to nothing more than performing “the word of faith”: “There is no such thing as a content of faith, and to profess the word of faith does not mean formulating true propositions on God and the world.”68 The notion of truth seems to vanish, to the extent that the question concerning the truth of the content is not relevant anymore. In line with the Pauline notions of truth developed by Heidegger and Badiou, Agamben’s concept results in giving prominence to the act, or the how, rather than to the content of faith. Thus, Agamben seems to leave no room for the decision about the truth or untruth of the contents articulated or professed by means of pistis. It is not surprising that the above questions and difficulties arise, if one bears in mind that the question of the truth of pistis challenges not only philosophical rationality (or discourse) per se but also, first and foremost, daily life. This applies to the main facets of pistis—conviction, trust, and belief. How can we assess their truth on the basis of the interpretations provided by Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger? Do they have a truth content? Is it possible to make a distinction between truth and untruth within this domain? While one can 67. Badiou, Saint Paul, 15. 68. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 136.

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intuitively argue that conviction, trust, and belief involve some truth claim, it is still quite unclear how to define and handle it by making use of Heideggerian, Badiouian, and Agambenian theoretical and interpretive frameworks. In principle, scientific truths, both in the sense of logical truths and in terms of propositional truths related to states of affairs to be confirmed or falsified empirically, do not seem to play any significant role here. Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s commentaries on the Pauline letters already pointed out that the truth of Pauline pistis cannot be traced back to any forms of scientific truth, be they empirical or logical, a posteriori or a priori. A closer look at other forms of rationality, especially those embedded in the (self-)articulation of everyday life, might lead us to realize the extent to which the truth of conviction, trust, and belief is not and cannot be integrated into the domain of scientific truth— which does not exclude, however, that scientific truth requires, on its own, forms of conviction, trust, or belief. But how should we understand the truth and untruth specific to conviction, trust, and belief? Moreover, one can ask whether Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s anti-metaphysical appropriation of Pauline pistis do justice to traditional metaphysics and to what extent we can agree with the three philosophers when they attempt to construct a more or less definite opposition between Pauline pistis and Platonic-Aristotelian onto-theology. With the intention of elaborating on these questions, I will, in what remains of this chapter, develop an interpretive and conceptual analysis that is intended to challenge Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s notions of pistis in two respects. First, I intend to show that their critical analyses of metaphysical rationality do not do justice to the complex and multifarious conceptions of pistis that are to be found in our philosophical tradition. In Chapter 2, I have already shown to what extent Aristotle can serve as a reference point for highlighting those features specific to pistis that cannot be reduced to scientific rationality in the strict sense. In this chapter, I will focus on Plato and outline an interpretive analysis of the truth specific to pistis as well as of the relationship between pistis and rationality by addressing some truly intriguing passages from his dialogues. Second, my analysis aims to show that Plato can be seen to provide important contributions to the question of the contaminated truth that defines pistis. In this regard, my reading of Plato is meant to outline not only interpretive perspectives but a follow-up conceptual framework, by mapping in a systematic way the different facets that come to the fore in the question of the truth of pistis. In this context, it will become apparent that a number of insights offered by Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s readings of Pauline pistis are in accord with these elaborations of Plato. The possibility of integrating the Pauline articulation of pistis and the Platonic account of rationality will lead us to see Platonic thought from a different perspective, which calls the Heideggerian interpretive framework concerning onto-theology into question. The Plato whom we will encounter in the following considerations turns out to be a thinker that is fully aware of the

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multifarious and intricate nature of pistis. On the one hand, Plato locates pistis at a lower level within the framework of his epistemology and ontology by clearly differentiating between pistis and science. On the other hand, however, Plato seems to ascribe a specific and indispensable function to pistis, to the effect that it plays an important role in domains that science cannot capture or deal with. This should come as no surprise considering that the question of the truth and untruth of pistis is indeed a truly decisive challenge to Plato. As Heidegger himself knows very well,69 the emergence of Plato’s philosophy cannot be understood without considering his crucial engagement with sophistry. Upon closer consideration, the battleground of that dispute is in fact the domain of pistis, that is, the domain of beliefs, trust, convictions, and so on that the sophists try to manipulate and the genuine philosopher attempts to cope with. It would be a hasty oversimplification to assume that Plato intends to reject or neglect pistis in order to leave room for the desideratum of absolute knowledge. In what follows, I will argue that this is not the case at all. In Plato, one finds forms of rationality that require pistis as their own unavoidable and inherent component. The opposition between pistis (understood in terms of faith, attestation, conviction, and belief) and reason, as it has emerged in modernity, is not able to capture what is at stake in Plato’s account of rationality.70 But Plato’s main merit consists in the fact that he very clearly sees not only that pistis is an essential ingredient of human rationality, but also that the truth specific to pistis is a contaminated truth. According to Plato, pistis is characterized by its own truth, which is never absolute. Compared to science in the Platonic sense, pistis has a lower level of truth, which corresponds to its own ontological domain. Accordingly, certainty does not belong to pistis. It is evident that the Platonic account and the Badiouian one are irreconcilable. Let us recall what Badiou says about the threefold nature of the evental truth procedure.71 He reads hope precisely in terms of certainty, and his way of depicting the Pauline truth procedure insists on the ascription of an absolute character. It goes without saying that this Badiouian absoluteness cannot be understood in terms of the absolute foundation proper to onto-theology, but must instead be understood in terms of the immanence of the Pauline truth procedure. The same applies to Agamben’s account. In this context, we can recall what he states about nominal sentences and the absolute character of love and belief.72 Agamben argues against the traditional ontology

69. See especially Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist. 70. The same applies to the relation between faith and reason in the Christian tradition. I have already mentioned the case of Augustine, who addresses the question in his De utilitate credendi by showing not only the rationality of belief and faith but also the pistis-based aspects of rationality. See Chapter 2, Section 4.1. 71. See Chapter 4, Section 2.2.2. 72. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 128–29. See Chapter 1, Section 4.5.

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and logic based on distinctions between existence and essence, subject and predicate. When Agamben states that Pauline faith is “an experience of being beyond existence and essence, as much beyond subject as beyond predicate,”73 it is not difficult to see in such experience a claim to absoluteness. To a certain extent the same applies to Heidegger’s account of truth, including his conception of the disclosing function of attestation.74 In fact, if truth constitutes the openness of existence or being as such, then falsehood and untruth are always subordinated components of a more comprehensive and overarching truth, which turns out to be absolute. In each of the three philosophers, truth seems to lack specificity and is not really confronted with what cannot be traced back to truth. The contamination of the truth specific to pistis does not emerge in Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger. Remarkably enough, one could in fact reverse their diverse critiques against onto-theological foundational models—most notably the Platonic and Aristotelian variations of them—and contend that they end up in similar claims to absoluteness. One could thus maintain that it is precisely Plato’s thought that can be understood as a genuinely restless struggle over the structural ambiguity that defines the domain of pistis. In Plato, the picture of pistis—and of rationality, which cannot easily dismiss the necessary function of pistis—is less metaphysical or onto-theological than Heidegger, Agamben, and Badiou might think. As has been said, the inextricable relation between truth and untruth is assigned to pistis as such. If we follow Plato, however, that relation is not static. Beliefs and opinions can (and should) be scrutinized, examined, and, if necessary, corrected. Under certain conditions, beliefs and opinions may become true, although they can never reach the truth status proper to science and knowledge in the strict sense. In this context, dialectic is the privileged instrument that allows for a critical examination of pistis, that is, opinions, convictions, and beliefs. This leads me to a further aspect related to the contaminated truth of pistis in Plato: the necessity of dialectic as a scrutinizing instrument that can examine and correct pistis. Faced with the contaminated truth of pistis (i.e., faced with the falsehood embodied in sophistry as well as with opinions, beliefs, and convictions that nourish everyday life), Plato does not attempt to escape the domain of pistis altogether. Rather, he reintegrates pistis into his own account of dialectical rationality, to the extent that he considers pistis not only to be the factical point of departure for philosophical logos itself but also to be a structural component in all forms of thinking, including scientific rationality, which in fact, as we will see, necessarily relies on hypotheseis. In this sense, Platonic dialectic does not aim to dismiss pistis but to appropriate it. In line with Socrates’ example, Plato’s dialectical commitment is not a mere intellectual endeavor but a genuine way of life. One could say that it is characterized by an attestation, or testimony, in the 73. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 128. 74. See Chapter 1, Section 2.

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first-person perspective. Heidegger nicely catches and articulates a truly crucial point when he conceives of the conflict between sophistry and philosophy as a fight that affects the existence of the philosopher. This is in full accordance with what Socrates and Plato state about the nature of philosophical thinking, which has to be understood, according to them, not as a technique or a stock of knowledge, but first and foremost as a radical attitude attested by the concrete enactment of philosophical life. The main thrust of this view would also be accepted by Aristotle, who sees the distinctive mark of philosophy precisely in a way of life, that is, the life committed to truth.75

4 Platonic Pistis Reinterpreted

4.1 Platonic Pistis as Risky Reliance The outcome of the analysis pursued in this chapter will urge us to question some of the interpretive patterns we have inherited from the twentieth-century critique of metaphysics and to rediscover the richness and complexity of our philosophical tradition. Thus, Plato turns out to be a very valuable philosophical interlocutor who, despite Heideggerian oversimplifications, can still offer precious conceptual resources for the development of phenomenological analyses of our life-world experience. The outline of Platonic pistis I sketch in this chapter presents a Plato who differs substantially both from Heidegger’s general account of Plato and Platonism in his early lectures on the phenomenology of religion and from the interpretive pattern Heidegger constructs with regard to Platonism and the history of metaphysics in his later works. Despite Heidegger’s claims, Plato’s discussions of the phenomenon of pistis show the extent to which he does not try to escape the essential insecurity inherent in factical life.76 Nor does Plato’s search for an absolute foundation mean that he neglects or rejects the possibility of an uncertain knowledge that structurally defines a number of domains of our life, including scientific knowledge. The same applies to Badiou’s and Agamben’s contentions concerning metaphysical rationality. They both argue that Pauline pistis constitutes an alternative to onto-theological rationality in that it de-emphasizes the claim to an absolute knowledge (or truth) or highlights the weakness that shapes human life. Badiou depicts Pauline apostleship as an experience or a way of life that gives up those claims.77 The apostle turns out to be an anti-philosopher precisely because he gives up the Platonic claim to the knowledge of eternal truth,

75. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 4.2.1004b24–25. 76. See Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 26‒37. 77. Badiou, Saint Paul, 45.

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becoming instead proud of his own ignorance. A very similar perspective is found in Agamben, who speaks of “messianic inversion.”78 The Greek opposition between dynamis and energeia, which has been investigated, conceptualized, and presented in a systematic way by Aristotle, undergoes an inversion in Paul in that “potentiality passes over into actuality and meets up with its telos, not in the form of force or ergon, but in the form of astheneia, weakness.”79 Thus, Pauline pistis does not look for ways of overcoming, neglecting, or rejecting that weakness. At this juncture, the question arises whether the ways in which Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger present the opposition between Pauline pistis and metaphysical (Platonic) rationality are plausible and accurate. Does Plato leave no room for forms of rationality that cannot be traced back to the claim to an absolute foundation, truth, or knowledge? Does Plato offer no insights into forms of pistis that are inherent in metaphysical rationality? In what follows, I will question the opposition presented by the three philosophers and outline a reading that helps us see Platonic rationality from a different viewpoint, which can reconcile that rationality with pistis to some extent. The conceptual map resulting from my rereading of Platonic passages will allow me to shed light on unexplored intersections between Platonic pistis on the one side and Agamben’s, Badiou’s, and Heidegger’s Pauline notions of pistis on the other side. Before developing my interpretive and conceptual analysis of the notion of pistis in Plato, I would like to very briefly introduce some methodological considerations. Approaching Platonic dialogues on the basis of particular philosophical intentions—in this case a targeted analysis of the notion of pistis—always entails the risk of decontextualizing text passages in the desire to present seemingly consistent terminological elucidations. It goes without saying that in Plato we do not find any systematic or exhaustive treatment of pistis. But this does not prevent us from highlighting a number of diverse conceptual connotations and associations that can reveal quite clear intersections. Indeed, the notion of pistis in Plato can be seen as a clear example of what Wittgenstein would call “family resemblances.”80 Despite the fact that the Platonic dialogues offer diverse accounts of pistis, I will argue that one can extrapolate a shared underlying conceptual core, which I will define in terms of “risky reliance.” Regardless of whether Platonic dialogues address pistis from an epistemological, ethical, or political viewpoint, Platonic accounts of pistis always entail a number of specific connotations that can be gathered in a conceptually coherent way. I would like to give a brief preliminary overview of these intersections, which I will then illustrate in detail in my analysis of the relevant Platonic passages. Pistis as such is risky in that it structurally implies uncertainty. This essential component of Platonic pistis becomes apparent especially in the context of the 78. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 97. 79. Ibid. 80. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations, 27.

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analogy of the divided line. This is because the ontological counterpart of pistis is the changeable world, which does not allow for secure foundations. Compared to the domains of shadows and reflections, however, the material world offers the possibility of something more solid and reliable. How do we have to understand this reliability? Despite the fact that reliance of this sort is structurally risky and does not provide any secure and absolute grounds, it is an essential constituent of our everyday experience and should be seen in its own specific function. In our everyday life, we are not looking for secure ontological and epistemological foundations, because the question concerning those foundations emerges and makes sense only if and when we move from the horizon of everyday life to the philosophical or scientific attitude. In our everyday life, we are involved in the world in such a way that in principle it does not become problematic or questionable. There might be, and indeed there are, a number of situations in which our familiarity with the world can be perturbed in our everyday life. This disruption does not result, however, from theoretical (i.e., epistemological or ontological) motivations. In principle, we live our everyday lives by being committed to the world and relying on it, although we are not in a position to provide reasons for this reliance or to justify it from a philosophical or scientific viewpoint. The Platonic differentiation between science (or knowledge) and pistis (or opinion) is indeed a clear conceptualization of this demarcation. The Platonic term pistis very aptly signifies this primal experience, which deeply affects our lives from childhood onwards. As a matter of fact, our reliance on the world may be shaped in multifarious ways and in different degrees, but the fact that we rely on the world is the primal condition for our lives. Thus, reliance of this sort is risky in two respects. First, for our part, we do not have any theoretically (philosophically or scientifically) accountable reasons for it. We rely on the world without having grounds for it, so that our reliance on the world is subjectively risky. Second, the world itself—understood in terms of both the natural world (nature) and our socio-historical environment—is unstable and changeable, so that such reliance is also objectively risky. Precisely this twofold risky character of pistis becomes very apparent in Plato’s analyses, as my reading will show. Given the intrinsically risky feature of pistis, the question arises whether we are supposed to immediately dismiss it as a lower, faulty epistemic state that prevents us from experiencing truth. And one can also ask whether Plato (or Plato’s Socrates) himself dismissed it for that reason. It is quite clear that these questions are of crucial importance for understanding both Plato’s thought and Platonism in general because they are directly linked to the problem of participation as well as the question of dualism. My analysis does not enter that debate. Nonetheless, the intended rereading of the Platonic notion of pistis will allow me to reconsider and question some overly schematic simplifications, especially insofar as these concern the relationship between pistis and knowledge (science, truth). In this context, the main question I would like to pose is whether we should understand the relation between pistis and knowledge as

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a sharp distinction. If we follow an oversimplified account of Plato’s thought, we will reach the conclusion that pistis and knowledge are sharply divided in accordance with the separation between the material and the intelligible world. My analysis will show the extent to which this oversimplification loses sight of the intriguing and fascinating relation that Plato identifies between pistis and knowledge. I would like to mention at least two main points that lead us beyond that simplistic notion of Platonic dualism. First, the possibility of attaining knowledge proper relies on a cognitive process that necessarily starts with what modern epistemology would call “empirical data” or “empirical knowledge”—what Plato in fact calls pistis or opinion (doxa). The way Plato describes the education specific to the philosopher is very clear in this regard. Attaining knowledge requires time and effort, and we cannot bypass the level of pistis but have to go through it. Second, Plato’s dialogues do not exclude the possibility of attributing a certain truth to pistis and opinion. Although true pistis and true opinion do not reach the same level of truth as knowledge and science proper, they in fact entail a degree of certainty. One can speak of a contaminated truth specific to pistis, which matches the instability and changeability that affects the material world. The material world and the related epistemic state of pistis are not characterized by the stability and eternity that defines the ideal world and knowledge, but they do have their own legitimacy and consistency. 4.2 Rereading Platonic Pistis 4.2.1 The Platonic Notion of Pistis in the Analogy of the Divided Line A brief look at the history of the philosophical concept of pistis can show the extent to which its truth status has been very challenging and intriguing for thinkers since the very beginning. It was in fact Parmenides who established a direct link between truth and pistis (or persuasion) by emphasizing the distinction between “the unshaken heart of persuasive Truth [in Greek: Alētheiēs eupeitheos atremes ētor, A.C.]” and “the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliance [in Greek: pistis alēthēs, A.C.].”81 It is precisely this connection that Plato questions in his epistemology by ascribing truth and pistis to two 81. Daniel W. Graham, ed. and trans., The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1:213. The link between persuasion or conviction (peithō) and truth is reaffirmed in a further key fragment: “Come now and I shall tell, and do you receive through hearing the tale, which are the only ways of inquiry for thinking: the one: that it is and that it is not possible not to be, is the path of Persuasion (for she attends on Truth) [in Greek: Peithous esti keleuthos, Alētheiēi gar opēdei, A.C.]; the other: that it is not and that it is right it should not be, this I declare to you is an utterly inscrutable track, for neither could you know what is not (for it cannot be accomplished), nor could you declare it [or: point it out]” (ibid.). It is important to keep in mind that further occurrences of the

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very different domains.82 While in Parmenides persuasion (peithō) and pistis are both related to truth, it is remarkable that in Plato’s Gorgias we find an interesting conceptual differentiation of two forms of persuasion (conviction, persuasiveness): the “persuasion that produces belief [in Greek: pistin, A.C.] without knowledge [in Greek: aneu tou eidenai, A.C.]” and the persuasion that produces science (epistēmē).83 The differentiation can be rephrased by saying that the persuasion connected to mere pistis does not rely on the knowledge of causes and grounds, whereas the persuasion that produces science is structurally linked to that knowledge. The distinction is a quite clear indication of the fact that the connection between truth and pistis, which is still acceptable for Parmenides, is not at all self-evident for Plato. Such a distinction between pistis, on the one side, and science (or knowledge), on the other, does in fact move in the direction that is developed in the Republic, more precisely in the analogy of the divided line,84 where Plato clarifies the cognitive function of pistis by differentiating four ontological and epistemic domains. Plato posits pistis as one of the four epistemic states or processes alongside intuitive, or noetic, knowledge (noēsis),85 discursive thought (dianoia), and link between pistis and truth can be found in other Parmenidean fragments. One finds a second occurrence of “true faith [in Greek: pistis alēthēs, A.C.]” (ibid., 217) and also the phrase “faithful account and thought about truth [in Greek: piston logon ēde noēma amphis alētheiēs, A.C.]” (ibid., 219). Without wishing to enter the exegetical debate on the Parmenidean epistemology, I tend to agree with the position of A. Finkelberg, who claims that “we need not conjecture about the relation of pistis to ‘persuasion’: the opposition eupeithēs alētheia: the lack of pistis alēthēs […] makes it certain that in Parmenides these terms are used as synonyms, and hence pistis is but another name of the apodeictic predication. Now pistis is characteristic of both specific conclusions arrived at in the course of deducing the attributes of Being […] and the doctrine of Being as a whole […]. We should therefore conclude that the apodeictic predication is regarded by Parmenides as the universal criterion of truth.” Aryeh Finkelberg, “Parmenides’ Foundation of the Way of Truth,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6 (1988): 39‒67, here 66. 82. As for Plato’s conception of pistis, see the very informative and solid article by Johannes M. van Ophuijsen, “Making Room for Faith: Is Plato?,” in The Winged Chariot: Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk, ed. Maria Kardaun and Joke Spruyt (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 119‒34. This contribution tries to show the extent to which Plato’s notions of pistis might be open to religious readings. 83. Plato, Gorgias, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), 454e3‒4. 84. See Plato, Republic, 509d1‒511e5. With regard to this analogy, see Wolfgang Wieland, Platon und die Formen des Wissens (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 201‒23. 85. Intuitive or noetic knowledge (noēsis) in the narrow sense, as distinct from discursive thought (see Plato, Republic, 511e1), is also called “science” (epistēmē). Noetic knowledge in the broad sense includes both noetic knowledge in the narrow sense and discursive thought. See Plato, Republic, 534 a4–5.

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imagination (eikasia).86 Pistis and imagination both belong to the domain of opinion (doxa), whose object (doxaston) is to be seen in the changeable (genesis).87 While imagination deals with images, which include shadows and reflections, pistis refers to things such as animals, plants, and artifacts, that is, concrete objects.88 Accordingly, in comparison to imagination, pistis constitutes a higher epistemic state, but it remains a form of opinion and is excluded from the domain of science or knowledge. If we focus on the difference between pistis and imagination and try to develop Plato’s considerations, it is possible to elaborate on that difference with particular reference to the stability that defines their respective objects or correlates. Thus, the objects of pistis are more stable and consistent. We could also say that the objects of pistis are more reliable—an ancient Greek would say: more pista—if they are compared to the truly fleeting and unstable nature of shadows and reflections. Despite the roughly dualistic ontology and epistemology underlying the Platonic analogy, there is room for a more nuanced account of what we experience within the material world, which cannot be reduced to mere illusions. Concrete objects such as artifacts, plants, and animals—including human beings—are admittedly perishable and subject to change, but this does not prevent us from relying on them with respect to our needs as well as within our everyday life. The Platonic conceptualization presented in the analogy of the divided line implies that pistis does not allow for an experience of truth proper. From this viewpoint, Plato’s account of pistis seems to be a complete reversal of the Parmenidean viewpoint, to the effect that Plato not only separates pistis from (the knowledge of) truth but includes pistis in the domain of opinion. However, it is possible to complicate this schematization by paying attention to further connotations that are implied by Plato’s own account of pistis, which concerns precisely the link between pistis and truth. There then arises the question of whether Plato excludes pistis from every form or degree of truth. In fact, the analogy of the divided line might be read in a more nuanced way, by underscoring that the different epistemic and ontological levels are related to different degrees or levels of truth. The final lines of book 6 seem to go precisely in this direction: Your exposition is most adequate. Thus there are four such conditions in the soul, corresponding to the four subsections of our line: Understanding 86. See Plato, Republic, 511d6‒e4, 534a1. In Plato, we find further uses of the term pistis that are related to ordinary language usage and do not seem to contain any specific philosophical or technical implications. They allow us to see, however, the rich connotations of the term and cognate notions. I would like to briefly mention a few examples: Plato, Phaedrus, 256d1; Laws, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 701c1; Critias, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 119d6. 87. Plato, Republic, 534a1‒8. 88. Plato, Republic, 510a1‒7.

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for the highest, thought for the second, belief for the third, and imaging for the last. Arrange them in a ratio, and consider that each shares in clarity [in Greek: saphēneias … metechein, A.C.] to the degree that the subsection it is set over shares in truth [in Greek: alētheias … metechein, A.C.].89

In this context, truth is not a feature belonging to the four epistemic states or processes but a characteristic of their objects themselves. In other words, truth is not an epistemic quality, but an ontological one. Accordingly, the different levels of reality have different degrees of truth, which in turn correspond to different levels of clearness that characterize the related epistemic states. Thus, pistis has its own clearness, which is related to the truth specific to its own objects. 4.2.2 The Truth of Pistis Other passages from the Platonic dialogues seem to go in a different direction by presenting a sharper dichotomy between pistis and science (knowledge, truth). A crucial source in this regard is the Timaeus, where the relation between truth and pistis is depicted as follows: the accounts we give of things have the same character as the subjects they set forth. So accounts of what is stable and fixed and transparent to understanding are themselves stable and unshifting. We must do our very best to make these accounts as irrefutable and invincible as any account may be. On the other hand, accounts we give of that which has been formed to be like that reality, since they are accounts of what is a likeness, are themselves likely, and stand in proportion to the previous accounts, i.e., what being is to becoming, truth is to convincingness [in Greek: hotiper pros genesin ousia, 89. Plato, Republic, 511d6‒e4 (English translation: Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997], hereafter cited as: trans. Cooper). It is worth stressing that, according to the Platonic analogy of the line, the domain that encompasses the objects of pistis and imagination is characterized as doxaston, “opinable” (Republic, 534a6), with doxa including both pistis and imagination. Now, most importantly, the domain of the doxaston is understood in terms of the horōmenon (Republic, 509d9) or horaton (Republic, 509d4), that is, “the visible.” Thus, according to the Platonic epistemology, pistis is structurally linked to (sensible) vision or sight. The counterparts of doxa, doxaston, and horōmenon (or horaton) are noēsis (noetic vision in the broad sense: see Republic, 534a4), gnōston (Republic, 478b2), and noēton (Republic, 510b2). As has already been seen earlier in this chapter, the link between pistis and vision is not self-evident in Paul and is radically put into question in the Pauline models of truth developed by Agamben, Badiou, and Heidegger. It also makes sense to note how far the Platonic usage of pistis is from our current understanding of faith. As a consequence of the religious connotation of faith or belief, one often associates it with what cannot be seen or proven. Accordingly, it is not at all intuitive why Plato brings pistis and sight together if we follow our usage.

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touto pros pistin alētheia, A.C.]. Don’t be surprised then, Socrates, if it turns out repeatedly that we won’t be able to produce accounts on a great many subjects—on gods or the coming to be of the universe—that are completely and perfectly consistent and accurate.90

According to this account, pistis is sharply separated from truth proper, with the latter being related to the ontological domain that is described as “lasting,” “permanent,” “intelligible,” whereas pistis refers to becoming—that is, the changeable (genesis), which is marked by the absence of those other attributes. We need not conclude that the passages from the Republic mentioned above and the text just quoted contradict each other. For one can construct a coherent notion of Platonic pistis by formulating two main follow-up theses. First, pistis cannot serve as the basis for science or knowledge proper, because it is the epistemic state or process in which one accesses the changeable, whereas science is characterized by stability, firm foundations, and inalterability, in accordance with its own object. Second, pistis does not produce truth in the proper sense, given that truth is linked to being (ousia). One may, however, attribute truth to pistis, but only in the secondary, or derivative, sense of having a lower degree of truth, which is appropriate to the instability specific to its own objects (animals, plants, and artifacts). As an epistemic state or process, pistis structurally implies uncertainty or a lower degree of certainty.91 In other passages from the Platonic dialogues a number of further specifications are added to the term pistis, which help in explaining the degree to which pistis is affected by uncertainty. This is a crucial point for the interpretive and theoretical thesis I am developing in the present context. If we avoid overly schematic simplifications such as the opposition between knowledge and pistis, we are in a position to shed light both on the relation between truth and pistis and on the nature of pistis as such. As a result, we can ascribe truth to pistis but also see the complexity of pistis itself, which allows for different degrees of truth and certainty. This interpretive line can be supported by taking into account 90. Plato, Timaeus, 29b3‒c7, trans. Cooper. 91. A similar structural epistemic uncertainty can to some extent also be seen in what Plato calls dia pistin graphēs, “relying on writing” (Plato, Phaedrus, 275a3). In the Phaedrus, in fact, we read that “it will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice using their memory because they will put their trust in writing, which is external and depends on signs that belong to others [in Greek: dia pistin graphēs exōthen yp’ allotriōn typōn, A.C.], instead of trying to remember from the inside, completely on their own” (Phaedrus, 275a2–5, trans. Cooper). In this passage, the use of the term pistis is not technical and has little to do with the specific meaning established in the analogy of the divided line. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in this context the term is used to name an attitude that is far from the proper experience of truth. Thus, having pistis in written letters, relying on them will most likely prevent one from knowing truth.

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further passages from Plato. In fact, the Timaeus mentions the possibility that “firm and true opinions and convictions come about [in Greek: doxai kai pisteis gignontai bebaioi kai alētheis, A.C.].”92 But such stability and truth is relative and does not allow opinions and beliefs to become science in the proper sense, because their own objects lack absolute stability.93 Thus, opinions and beliefs can become firm and true in that relative sense by being checked and tested, but this test does not allow for the stability, truth, and certainty specific to scientific knowledge.94

92. Plato, Timaeus, 37b8, trans. Cooper. See also Plato, Republic, 505e2‒3 (pistei … monimōi, “firm belief ” or “firm conviction”). 93. As for the certainty specific to knowledge in Plato, Francisco J. Gonzalez convincingly argues that “[k]nowledge of course involves its own type of bebaiotēs, but this stability is explained in terms of its objects, rather than in terms of the certainty of a proposition.” Francisco J. Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 365. If we explain the stability of epistemic states (or processes) in terms of their own objects, we are also in a position to conceptualize the difference between pistis and imagination by saying that the objects of pistis are indeed more stable and reliable, whereas imagination does not leave room for any epistemic or cognitive reliability due to the fact that its own correlates are mere shadows, reflections, and images. Thus, imagination does not offer any certainty, whereas pistis provides some reliance—although a risky one. 94. See again Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue, 365, which very appropriately refers to Plato, Phaedo, 85d3, 90c9. In this context, I cannot address the numerous exegetical questions concerning “correct opinion” (orthē doxa), especially as concerns the following passage from the Meno: “What am I thinking of when I say this? True opinions [in Greek: tas doxas tas alētheis, A.C.]. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why [in Greek: aitias logismōi, A.C.]. And that, Meno my friend, is recollection [in Greek: anamnēsis, A.C.], as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge [in Greek: epistēmai gignontai, A.C.], and then they remain in place [in Greek: monimoi, A.C.].” Plato, Meno, 97e–98a, trans. Cooper. I leave as an open question whether, under which circumstances, and how far true opinions can be translated into proper knowledge or science. However, I would like to emphasize a number of points that are of importance for the questions being discussed in my reading of Plato’s notion of pistis. First, science or knowledge proper implies in itself stability, which is possible insofar as one can account for foundations and causes. Second, opinions and true opinions cannot be science or knowledge in the proper sense given the fact that they do not per se imply the stability specific to science—that is, they do not give reasons. In this connection, one might recall what Aristotle says at the very beginning of the Metaphysics (1.1.981a1‒982a3), where he highlights the essential difference between experience and science, which is very close

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It goes without saying that such specifications are not needed in the case of science or knowledge proper, which already implies the idea of solid and absolute foundations. According to Plato, science proper does not entail different possible degrees of certainty. It makes no sense to explicitly attribute certainty, stability, or truth to science by uttering phrases such as “true science,” “stable science” or “certain science.” Those phrases would sound redundant. In the Republic, the cognitive ascension described in the analogy of the divided line culminates in the noetic grasp of the ultimate principle, which is indeed unconditioned (hina mechri tou anypothetou epi tēn tou pantos archēn iōn).95 While pistis provides a relative (i.e., risky) reliance, science, or rather the highest level of scientific knowledge, produces an absolute stability. The interpretive clarifications just sketched can be fruitfully developed and worked out by examining an intriguing passage from the Cratylus, where we read: Of those we discussed, let’s reconsider the name “epistēmē” (“knowledge”) first and see how ambiguous it is. It seems to signify that it stops (histēsi) the movement of our soul towards (epi) things, rather than that it accompanies them in their movement, so that it’s more correct to pronounce the beginning of it as we now do than to insert an “e” and get “hepeïstēmē”—or rather, to insert an “i” instead of an “e.” Next, consider “bebaion” (“certain”), which is an imitation of being based (basis) or resting (stasis), not of motion. “Historia” (“inquiry”), which is somewhat the same, signifies the stopping (histēsi) of the flow (rhous). “Piston” (“confidence”), too, certainly signifies stopping (histan).96

Let us try to take these considerations seriously and concentrate on the relationship between epistēmē, bebaion, and pistis. If we read the passage against the background of the schematization outlined above, it might be possible to summarize Plato’s position by stating that both knowledge and pistis involve stability (bebaion), but to very different degrees, in accordance with the nature of their own objects. While knowledge as epistēmē signifies a reliance on the most stable foundations, pistis means a risky reliance. Despite the fact that pistis might be tested and double-checked (and become “firm”), the risk specific to to Plato’s distinction between (true) opinion and science. Experience allows us to know the fact that (hoti) certain phenomena happen regularly, while science is the knowledge of the causes (dioti) underlying those phenomena. Thus, what matters is the qualitative difference between experience and science. Analogously, (true) opinions in Plato are deficient in that they do not in themselves involve the knowledge of the causes, which is the condition of possibility of stable foundations. 95. Plato, Republic, 511b6‒7. See also Plato, Republic, 533d1. 96. Plato, Cratylus, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900), 437a2‒b2, trans. Cooper.

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it may not be removed completely. Compared to eikasia, pistis is indeed more stable, in that one may rely on (pisteuein) concrete objects, which are, however, changeable and subject to becoming. Within the domain of pistis itself, one may also ascertain different degrees of risk or certainty. The difference between pistis and knowledge may also be reconsidered in terms of the distinction between subjective certainty, which cannot rely on objectively stable foundations, and objective certainty, which can rely on objectively stable foundations. 4.2.3 Pistis and Reliance on Presuppositions In the last book of the Republic,97 the difference between pistis and knowledge (or science) is addressed again, although in a context that is not related to the Platonic analogy of the divided line. Here, however, Plato not only introduces the notion of pistis orthē (“correct belief ”), which further confirms the conceptual clarifications sketched above with regard to the different degrees of pistis, but also provides more information about how to conceive of the relationship between pistis and knowledge in the broad sense. The thesis is presented that the user of object x takes precedence over the producer of object x, to the extent to which the former is in the best position to say whether object x is produced appropriately—that is, in line with its use. In that context, the user is indeed the person who knows—that is, possesses science—whereas the producer has to follow the user’s instructions: Then doesn’t the one who knows give instructions about good and bad flutes, and doesn’t the other rely [in Greek: pisteuōn, A.C.] on him in making them? Yes. Therefore, a maker—through associating with and having to listen to the one who knows—has right opinion [in Greek: pistin orthēn, A.C.] about whether something he makes is fine or bad, but the one who knows is the user. That’s right.98

This intriguing passage leads to three considerations. First, the reliance that comes to the fore here concerns not only objects or a specific ontological domain—as is the case with the epistemological remarks of the analogy of the divided line—but also persons. For the epistemic aspect of that reliance has to be seen especially in the light of the hierarchical relationship between the user and the producer, with the latter confiding in the former. Second, the hierarchy is authority-based,99 in that the producer has to rely upon the user’s knowledge or science. Such a link between pistis and authority is indeed extremely interesting with regard to the developments the notion of pistis has undergone within religious tradition.100 Referring to both the epistemic aspect of Platonic 97. Plato, Republic, 601d8‒602b11. 98. Plato, Republic, 601e4–602a2, trans. Cooper. 99. See Van Ophuijsen, “Making Room for Faith,” 124. 100. See ibid.

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pistis and those aspects of it based on authority, Van Ophuijsen very aptly notes that “[y]our pistis is appropriate in proportion to the credibility of the object or authority that you place it in.”101 Third, one might go beyond the letter of the passage being interpreted and try to explore possible conceptual connections between the pistis discussed in the analogy of the line and the pistis mentioned in the last quote. I think one can adduce good reasons to establish a connection between those two notions of pistis, which are very different in Plato. In what follows, I will attempt to develop such a connection. Let us generalize the scheme introduced by Plato in the passage being examined by postulating that the term pistis designates the relation between two different epistemic levels. Thus, the lower one concerns the experience (or production) of certain objects, while the higher one concerns the knowledge (or science) of the causes specific to those objects. Accordingly, the pistis mentioned in the analogy of the divided line is determined as such because those who experience animals, plants, and artifacts—that is, the second level according to the analogy—have to rely upon the authority of those who possess science or knowledge proper. Following the proposed generalization, the same would apply to the relation between imagination and pistis—to the effect that those who reach the level of imagination have to rely upon those who have pistis—as well as to the relation between intuitive knowledge (noēsis) and discursive thought (dianoia): Those who reach the highest level and have intuitive knowledge are the authority that those who have discursive thought have to rely upon. My attempt to link the analogy of the line and the passage from the last book of the Republic can be further supported by recalling what Plato says about hypotheses, or presuppositions (hypotheseis), in the analogy of the line and in other passages.102 Mathematicians rely on presuppositions that they, however, are not capable of questioning and justifying. This is so because it is the dialectic that problematizes them (tas hypotheseis anairousa) and has the capacity to reach the final principle.103 Put differently, mathematicians do not have proper knowledge, or science, of their own presuppositions, which has to be attributed to dialectic (i.e., philosophy). In sum, the relationship of the mathematician to the philosopher can be described in terms of pistis, insofar as the former is supposed to rely on the latter. Some textual support for this exegetical proposal can be found in other passages from the Platonic dialogues, where the adjective pistos (“reliable,” “trust(worth)y,” “to be trust,” etc.) is used. In the Phaedon, there is talk of presuppositions that are supposed to be pistai for the interlocutors.104 Although the presuppositions mentioned here do not have anything to do with the presuppositions addressed in the above passages from the Republic, 101. Ibid. 102. See Plato, Republic, 510b4‒511e5 and especially 533b1‒533e5. 103. Plato, Republic, 533c8. 104. See Plato, Phaedo, 107b6.

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the interesting point in this context is that presuppositions themselves are said to be pistai. Now, we can describe the way mathematicians experience their own presuppositions precisely in terms of pistis. They do not question them. Nonetheless, they rely on these presuppositions by taking them to be self-evident (hōs panti phanerōn) and unquestionable (akinētous),105 that is, pistai. But this self-evident and unquestionable nature is relative, given that it disappears from the viewpoint of dialectic. As a matter of fact, a residual uncertainty still affects such presuppositions, in line with the essential character of pistis, which in itself entails risk. Accordingly, mathematicians let philosophers (dialecticians) give reasons for their own presuppositions. In other words, with regard to the ultimate foundations of their discipline, mathematicians rely on the authority of philosophers.106 Further passages confirm this use of the adjective pistos, which in such cases refers not to the presuppositions of scientific domains but, in a much broader sense, to discourse itself—that is, logos. In this regard, a passage from the Timaeus is worth mentioning: “in a way that employs a reliable and stable account [in Greek: houtōs hōste tini pistōi kai bebaiōi chrēsasthai logōi, A.C.].”107 The juxtaposition of pistos and bebaios is particularly intriguing in view of the interpretation I have developed above. One might, in fact, give two different interpretations of the kai that occurs in the phrase just quoted. One can read it as an explicative kai, in that it is supposed to define the meaning of pistos by adding the specification bebaios. Thus, the phrase can be translated in the following way: “a reliable, i.e., stable, logos.” Such a translation is in line with the etymological considerations proposed in the Cratylus, which link pistos to stability, although not in the sense of an objective certainty—otherwise the explication kai bebaiōi would not be necessary. With the second possible translation, which would read kai as a mere conjunction (“a reliable and stable logos”), one could argue that the addition kai bebaiōi alludes to a stability, or rather, a certain degree of stability that the adjective pistos does not imply per se. Both translations, however, account for the fact that a pistos logos is not objectively certain in itself, that is, is not scientific in the strict sense of epistēmē. To summarize, it is worth noting the extent to which the Platonic dialogues map the multifariousness of pistis by giving voice to its different correlates. In my analysis, I mainly concentrated on three types of correlates. (i) In the analogy of the divided line, pistis is the specific attitude directed at the concrete objects of the sensible world (living bodies, plants, artifacts). (ii) The attitude of pistis may also refer to authority-based relations within the framework of a hierarchical ranking of technical or scientific skills. (iii) Finally, pistis may qualify the relation to presuppositions—either in a very broad sense or in the 105. Plato, Republic, 510d1, 533c2. 106. See also Plato, Euthydemus, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), 290b7–c7. 107. Plato, Timaeus, 49b4–5, trans. Cooper.

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very specific sense of presuppositions underlying certain scientific domains— or to logos in general.108 At this juncture, it makes sense to recall the passages from the Gorgias mentioned above.109 This will allow me to further clarify the basic difference between pistis and science and also to specify the rhetorical function of pistis. In those passages, the question arises whether learning (mathēsis) and pistis are different or not. Gorgias and Socrates agree that they are not the same. A clear indication of the substantial difference is that pistis can be either true or false, while science is in itself true.110 However, learning and pistis share an overarching characteristic, to the effect that, as has already been mentioned, they may be referred to two different forms of persuasion (conviction, persuasiveness), that is, the “persuasion that produces belief [in Greek: pistin, A.C.] without knowledge [in Greek: aneu tou eidenai, A.C.]” and the persuasion that produces science (epistēmē).111 Against the background of such a distinction, one may define rhetoric as that which produces the type of persuasion (peithō poiei, peithous dēmiourgos) related to pistis (pisteutikēs, pistikos monon).112 Thus, rhetoric has no scientific function. This is an especially crucial point if we consider it in the light of the seminal elaborations of Aristotle on the structural distinction between different types (or functions) of rationality. Indeed, Aristotle developed these Platonic intuitions and systematized them within the coherent framework of a theory of logos. Accordingly, scientific rationality in the strict sense is not in a position to properly investigate domains that cannot be captured and articulated by means of its own conceptual frameworks. Put another way, scientific rationality cannot investigate domains that are not characterized by stability. The ethics developed by Aristotle himself is a concrete and paradigmatic example of a discourse that gives up any claim to exactitude because its own subject matter does not allow for that.113 The same applies mutatis mutandis to the domain of rhetoric. Delivering a speech in order to convince a certain audience never entails adducing mathematical proofs. The domain of pistis cannot be traced back to scientific knowledge in the strict sense—which does not mean, however, that scientific rationality is void of any form of pistis. As Plato himself argues, sciences are themselves ultimately characterized by their reliance on certain presuppositions, which they are not in a position to question. 108. See also Plato, Phaedo, 88d1; Laws, 798d7; Philebus, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 13a2–3; Parmenides, 142a1. 109. Plato, Gorgias, 454d1‒455a6. 110. This remark supports the reading sketched according to which pistis has different degrees (or levels) of certainty or truth, whereas science as such does not leave room for uncertainty. Thus, the phrasing “true science” is ultimately redundant. 111. Plato, Gorgias, 454e3‒4. 112. Plato, Gorgias, 454e5‒455a5. 113. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.3.1094b20.

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C. Literature Azzam, Abed. Nietzsche versus Paul. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Babich, Babette E., Alfred Denker, and Holger Zaborowski, eds. Heidegger and Nietzsche. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012. Backman, Jussi. “Towards a Genealogy of the Metaphysics of Sight: Seeing, Hearing, and Thinking in Heraclitus and Parmenides.” In Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Sight, edited by Antonio Cimino and Pavlos Kontos, 11‒34. Leiden: Brill, 2015. Beierwaltes, Werner. Denken des Einen: Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1985. Beierwaltes, Werner. “Plotins Metaphysik des Lichtes.” In Die Philosophie des Neuplatonismus, edited by Clemens Zintzen, 75‒117. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977. Biser, Eugen. Gottsucher oder Antichrist? Nietzsches provokative Kritik des Christentums. Salzburg: Mueller, 1982. Biser, Eugen. Nietzsche: Zerstörer oder Erneuerer des Christentums? Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2008.

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NAME INDEX Agamben, Giorgio 1–8, 24 n.64, 26–40, 43 n.138, 45, 47–8, 51–2, 77, 80–9, 91–5, 99–100, 109, 116 n.88, 119–27, 129–30, 132–3, 141–51, 156 n.89 Alcoff, Linda M. 6 n.3 Anidjar, Gil 53 n.5 Anscombe, G. E. M. 30 n.78 Aristotle 3, 15–19, 24, 27, 30 n.78, 33 n.94, 52, 70–2, 74–5, 78, 97 n.8, 103 n.17, 114, 130–2, 130 nn.10–11, 134–6, 139, 142–3, 147, 150–1, 158, 163 Assman, Aleida 93 n.5 Assman, Jan 93 n.5 Attell, Kevin 124 n.124 Augustine 15, 17, 50, 71, 148 n.70 Austin, John L. 35, 77 Azzam, Abed 9 n.8 Babich, Babette E. 12 n.26 Backman, Jussi 130 n.3 Badiou, Alain 1–9, 24 n.64, 39–49, 51–3, 85–95, 99–100, 109–19, 129–30, 132–3, 138–42, 144–51, 156 n.89 Ballan, Joseph N. 16 n.34 Beierwaltes, Werner 136 n.31 Benjamin, Walter 126 Betz, Hans Dieter 70 n.55 Biser, Eugen 9 n.8 Blanton, Ward 6 n.3, 11 n.17, 13 n.27, 39–40 nn.116–18, 92 n.2, 94 n.5, 113 n.64 Bloechl, Jeffrey 48 n.168 Brach, Markus J. 11 n.19 Brassier, Ray 5 n.2 Brejdak, Jaromir 10 n.17, 52 n.2 Breton, Stanislas 16 n.34, 48 n.168, 122 n.117 Browning, Don S. 70 n.55

Burnet, John 131 n.5, 131 nn.7–9, 132 n.10, 154 n.83, 155 n.86, 159 n.96, 162 n.106, 163 n.108 Bywater, Ingram 30 n.78 Calarco, Matthew 34 n.97 Camilleri, Sylvain 11 n.17 Campbell, Scott M. 49 n.173 Caputo, John D. 6 n.3 Casale, Rita 12 n.26 Castelli, Elizabeth A. 92 n.2 Cimino, Antonio 6 n.3, 11 n.18, 24 n.65, 25 n.67, 57 n.19, 58 n.20, 64 n.39, 101 nn.11–12, 119 n.101, 129 n.1, 130 n.3, 134 n.21 Clemens, Justin 31 n.84 Colony, Tracy 105 n.25 Conzelmann, Hans 13 n.27 Cooper, John M. 156 n.89 Cornish, C. L. 71 n.58 Critchley, Simon 11 n.17, 57 n.4 Crowe, Benjamin D. 66 n.24, 135 n.23 Dailey, Patricia 2 n.1 Davis, Chreston 6 n.3 De Boever, Arne 31 n.84 DeCaroli, Steven 34 n.97 Delahaye, Ezra 9 n.7 Del Caro, Adrian 10 n.14 De Meyere, Job 29 n.75 Denker, Alfred 12 n.26 Derrida, Jacques 52–4, 60, 62–3, 66, 69 Diels, Hermann 131 n.5 Dottori, Riccardo 101 n.11 Engberg-Pedersen, Troels 113 n.64 Fehér, István M. 61 n.30, 101 n.11 Feltham, Oliver 109 n.43 Finkelberg, Aryeh 154 n.81 Folkers, Horst 93 n.5

174

Name Index

Frick, Peter 6 n.3 Fritsch, Matthias 2 n.1 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 119–20 Giugliano, Antonello 12 n.26 Gonzalez, Francisco 158 nn.93–4 Gosetti-Ferencei, Jennifer Anna 2 n.1 Graham, Daniel W. 153 n.81 Greisch, Jean 61 n.30, 63 n.37 Grondin, Jean 49 n.172 Gründer, Karfried 130 n.4 Gullì, Bruno 34 n.97 Guyer, Paul 97 n.7 Hartwich, Wolf-Daniel 93 n.5 Havemann, Daniel 9 n.8 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 8, 27–9, 48–50 Heidegger, Martin 1–8, 10–26, 30 n.78, 32 n.87, 38 n.111, 45, 48–83, 85, 89, 91–5, 100–9, 111–14, 116, 120–1, 123–4, 129–30, 132–8, 141–2, 144–51, 156 n.89 Heiden, Gert-Jan van der 6 n.3, 51 n.1, 52 n.4, 54, 119 Heinz, Marion 12 n.26 Heller-Roazen, Daniel 33 n.94, 120 n.108 Herms, Eilert 66 n.45 Heron, Nicholas 31 n.84 Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von 134 n.19 Hertz, Peter D. 38 n.111 Hofstadter, Albert 19 n.43 Hollander, Dana 93 n.5 Hollingdale, R. J. 9 n.8 Holloway, Peter A. 13 n.27 Hübner, Hans 9 n.8 Husserl, Edmund 12, 15, 65, 101, 134, 137 Janowsky, Bernd 70 n.55 Jaspers, Karl 9 n.8 Jesus 9–10, 32, 36–7, 45, 67, 86, 112, 141–4 Jüngel, Eberhard 70 n.55 Kant, Immanuel 97 Kardaun, Maria 154 n.82

Kaufman, Eleanor 39 Kee, Alistair 9 n.8 Kesel, Marc de 40 n.117 Kierkegaard, Søren 50 Kim, Alan 11 n.19 Kisner, Matthew J. 95 n.6 König, Gert 130 n.4 Kontos, Pavlos 6 n.3, 129 n.1, 130 n.3 Kooten, Geurt Henk (George) van 6 n.3, 7 n.4, 21 n.48, 119 n.101 Kotsko, Adam 27 n.69 Kranz, Walther 131 n.5 Liddell, Henry Georg 70 n.55 Loxley, James 29 n.77 Lucretius 71 n.57 Luther, Martin 28, 50 Marshall, Donald G. 119 n.103 McGrath, Sean J. 11 n.17 McGuinness, Brian F. 32 n.87 McNeill, William 16 n.34, 17 n.35, 30 n.78 Metcalf, Robert D. 52 n.3 Milbank, Alisdair John 6 n.3 Mills, Catherine 26 n.68 Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo 132 n.10 Molinaro, Aniceto 11 n.17 Monod, Jean-Claude 92 n.2, 94 Morgan, Michael L. 7 n.5 Most, Glenn W. 143 n.56 Mueller, James R. 106 n.32 Müller-Lauter, Wolfgang 12 n.26 Murray, Alex 31 n.84 Neumann, Günther 53 n.8 Nietzsche, Friedrich 2, 6–10, 12, 26–7, 80, 93, 113, 132 Oates, Whitney J. 71 n.58 Olay, Csaba 101 n.11 Ophuijsen, Johannes M. van 154 n.82, 161 Parmenides 103 n.17, 153–4 Partenie, Catalin 11 n.18 Paulo, Craig J. N. de 15 n.31 Pears, David F. 32 n.87

Name Index Pellauer, David 6 n.3 Peluso, Rosalia 11 n.18 Petkovšek, Robert 11 n.18 Pickstock, Catherine 6 n.3 Plato 4, 11, 14–17, 24, 27, 30 n.79, 103 n.17, 108, 114, 130–6, 139, 147–63 Pöggeler, Otto 11 n.17 Pulte, Helmut 130 n.4 Ralkowski, Marc 11 n.18 Rausch, Hannelore 130 n.4 Reinhard, Kenneth 94 n.5 Reiss, H. S. 97 n.9 Rickert, Heinrich 12 n.24 Ricoeur, Paul 6 n.3 Ritter, Joachim 130 n.4 Rockmore, Tom 11 n.18 Rojcewicz, Richard 14 n.30, 50 n.176 Ross, William David 97 n.8, 136 n.35 Rouse, W. H. D. 71 n.57 Sadler, Ted 102 n.13 Sakenfeld, Katharine Doob 106 n.32 Sallis, John 12 n.26 Savarino, Luca 11 n.17 Schmidt, Dennis 8 n.6 Schmitt, Carl 94 n.5, 95 n.6, 124 Schulte, Christoph 93 n.5 Schuwer, André 14 n.30 Scilironi, Carlo 6 n.3 Scott, Robert 70 n.55 Seron, Denis 11 n.18 Shirley, Samuel 7 n.5 Sierksma-Agteres, Suzan 51 n.1 Smith, Martin Ferguson 71 n.57 Sommer, Christian 14 n.29

175

Spinoza, Baruch 7 n.5, 95 n.6, 131 n.5 Spruyt, Joke 154 n.82 Stambaugh, Joan 8 n.6, 113 n.71 Stowers, Stanley 40 n.118 Strauss, Leo 95 n.6 Strong, Tracy B. 95 n.6 Suggs, M. Jack 106 n.32 Tanzer, Mark B. 52 n.3 Tarditi, Claudio 6 n.3 Taubes, Jacob 92 n.2, 93, 104 n.21, 111 n.58 Terpstra, Marin 94 n.5 Valadier, Paul 9 n.8 Vedder, Ben 11 n.17, 12 n.26 Voegelin, Eric 129 n.1 Vries, Hent de 6 n.3, 11 n.17, 13 n.27, 39 n.116, 40 nn.117–18, 92 n.2, 94 n.5, 113 n.64 Walker, Nicholas 30 n.78 Wasserma, Emma 13 n.27 Weinsheimer, Joel 119 n.103 Welborn, L. L. 40 n.117 Welte, Bernhard 9 n.8 Welz, Claudia 66 n.45 Wieland, Wolfgang 154 n.84 Wiercinski, Andrzej 11 n.17 Wilde, Marc de 94 n.5 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 30 n.78, 32 n.87, 131 n.5, 142, 151 Wood, Allen W. 97 n.7 Zaborowski, Holger 12 n.26 Zintzen, Clemens 136 n.31

SUBJECT INDEX announcement 7 n.5, 19, 21–2, 32–5, 42, 44–5, 76, 82–3, 93, 100, 121 anthropology 14 n.29, 17–18, 21 anti-philosophy 7, 13–15, 40, 43 n.138, 48, 113, 150 apostleship 7 n.5, 9, 23–4, 40–2, 45, 80, 82, 89–90, 104, 112, 116, 141, 150 articulation 1–3, 5–6, 9, 14–15, 18–19, 23, 25, 36, 38, 41–8, 51–2, 56, 59, 63–4, 67, 73–4, 76–8, 81–3, 86–9, 91, 97, 104, 108, 112–14, 116, 118–19, 121, 130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 142–4, 147 attestation 3, 21–2, 52–5, 58–69, 75–7, 82–3, 85–8, 90, 141, 148–9 attitude 3, 16, 30–2, 103, 105–6, 108, 122, 126. See also ēthos radical 2, 51–90, 138, 150 theoretical 8, 11, 14–15, 112, 130–4, 137, 140, 142 authenticity 3, 17, 50, 55, 57, 59–61, 63–4, 66, 68, 69, 79, 81, 105–6, 135, 137, 145 being-with 68, 101 n.12 belief 36–7, 44, 70, 72, 75–6, 89, 97–8, 109, 138, 144–9, 154–6, 158, 160, 163. See also pistis calling 22, 29 n.75 certainty 24, 65, 88–9, 137, 148, 153, 157–60, 162 chrēsis 30–1, 36, 85 Christianity 7, 9–10, 16–17, 50, 66–7, 71, 91, 102, 104 n.21, 112, 114, 144 n.66 cogito 65 communication 76–7 community 100, 120–7 conceptuality 19, 24, 26, 30 n.78, 50, 69, 81

conflict 4, 93 n.4, 95–105, 109, 116–17, 123–4 conscience 18, 22, 53, 61–9, 135 n.24 consciousness 65, 101 n.12, 104 consistency 36, 38, 77, 88 n.138, 143–4, 153 content-sense 22, 25, 64, 67, 104, 137 contingency 49, 92, 115, 137 conviction 42 n.129, 44, 47, 87–9, 97–8, 116, 119, 138, 145–9, 153–4, 153 n.81, 158, 163. See also pistis credibility 75–7, 87, 161 curiosity 17, 138 Dasein 16, 22, 56, 58–62, 64, 66–8, 78–9, 85, 101 n.12 deactivation 27–8, 30, 36–7, 47–8, 122–6 death 16, 58–60, 81, 137 declaration 2, 3, 5, 41 n.122, 43–7, 51–2, 85–91, 110, 112, 116, 118–19, 138–40, 144, 146 destruction 8, 14, 16, 28, 71–2, 103, 120 n.105, 125–6, 134, 136 n.33 diahermeneutics 9 dialectic 8, 26–30, 34, 37, 48–50, 57, 81, 92, 121, 124, 126, 149, 161–2 dictum 36–7 discourse 39–43, 45–8, 82, 111, 140, 141 dogma 10, 27, 29, 33, 39, 72–4, 80, 93, 98–9, 104–6, 117, 121, 127, 132, 139 dualism 12, 152–3 enactment 2, 14–15, 17, 20–7, 30, 33, 55, 58, 62–70, 72–4, 78–9, 80–3, 89, 91, 93, 102–8, 123, 134, 136–7, 145, 150 eschatology 28, 40 essence 8, 10, 27, 37, 137, 149 ēthos 52, 70, 72, 74–7, 79, 82–3. See also attitude

Subject Index event 2, 5, 31–2, 38 n.111, 42–9, 88, 90–1, 111 n.55, 121, 138–9, 141, 146 ex-centeredness 112, 116 existence 2–3, 8, 12, 14–17, 19–23, 25, 37, 52–63, 65–7, 69, 71–2, 78–9, 81, 85, 101 n.12, 106, 133–5, 137–8, 143–6, 149–50 existential analytic 3, 21, 53–5, 57–8, 60, 62, 67, 69, 78 facticity 3, 8, 12–16, 18–24, 31, 49–50, 53–4, 60, 62–9, 72–4, 78, 80, 94, 100, 101–2, 104–6, 108–9, 112, 121, 123, 133–5 faith 10, 28–9, 33–9, 44, 47–8, 52–4, 69–71, 74–7, 82–3, 87–8, 116–19, 124, 133, 138, 142–3, 146, 148–9, 156 n.89. See also pistis finitude 15–16, 50, 78, 92, 134–5, 137 flesh 21 foundation 4, 15, 24, 42, 45, 56, 58–60, 63, 65, 69, 78, 86, 92, 107, 112, 115, 124, 126, 136, 138, 145, 148, 150–2, 157–60, 162 foundationalism 55, 60, 65 fundamentum inconcussum 65, 145 givenness 22, 56–60, 65, 131, 137, 139, 141 n.51 globalization 9, 133 hermeneutics 21, 25, 69, 119–20 of facticity 8, 12–20, 22, 25, 49–50, 54 n.9, 72, 94, 101–2, 106–8, 109, 116, 124, 133–4 historicity 8, 12, 15, 24, 49, 57, 68, 106–7, 133 history 10, 26, 29, 38 n.111, 107–8, 119–21, 124, 134, 145, 150 hōs mē 2–3, 16, 26, 30–2, 36–7, 51–2, 67, 73–4, 78–85, 106, 122–3, 126 ideology 9–10, 12, 97 imagination 7 n.5, 155, 156 n.89, 158, 161 inauthenticity 17, 50, 57, 81, 106, 135, 138, 145 insecurity 15, 106–7, 150

177

institution 3, 93, 99, 101–2, 101 n.12, 117, 120–1, 123, 127 institutionalization 8, 27, 30, 36, 39, 112, 127 intentionality 25, 102, 108 interest 4, 93 n.4, 95–101, 104–5, 109, 116–17, 123–4 intersubjectivity 58, 100–1 kairological 18–19 knowledge 4, 18–21, 43, 45, 53, 66–7, 73–4, 76, 104–7, 135–7, 145, 148–63 language 5, 8, 27, 29–30, 33–9, 45, 53, 70, 77, 91, 96, 113, 120, 124, 133, 146, 155 law 26–8, 30–1, 34–9, 46–7, 73, 88, 93, 100–3, 106, 109–11, 115, 117–19, 123–5. See also nomos letter (vs. spirit) 92–5, 106, 108–9 life 5, 10, 12–14, 17, 20–1, 23, 25–6, 39, 49–50, 53, 57, 67–9, 71–4, 78, 80, 82, 91–2, 100–4, 108, 124, 132–4, 137–8 authentic 15, 17–18, 26, 106, 135 way of 2, 10, 16, 31, 51, 79, 83, 121–2, 136, 149–50 life-world 8, 12, 150 logic 8, 27, 39, 48–9, 60, 73, 76, 104, 144, 147, 149 logos 34, 45, 111–12, 141, 143–4, 149, 162–3 love 88–9, 117–19, 138, 148 mastery 41–42, 45, 117 meontology 52 n.4 messianism 3, 8, 26–37, 26 n.68, 45, 47, 119 n.101, 120, 123, 126, 133 metaphysics –2, 5, 9, 23, 91, 113, 129, 136, 143, 145, 147, 150 of light 136 of presence 3, 108 of sight 4, 129–30, 135 miracle 41 nomos 28, 30, 32, 34, 37–9, 92–4, 99–100, 102–3, 109–26. See also law oath 34

178

Subject Index

objectification 3, 32, 39, 93 n.4, 106, 108, 109–12, 118–19 ontic 16, 55–63, 66, 69 ontology 5, 14, 16, 18, 20–1, 23–6, 43 n.138, 54, 56, 58, 65, 69, 78–9, 91, 95 n.6, 101 n.12, 108, 114, 134–5, 143–4, 148, 155 onto-theology 2, 4, 43, 92, 112–15, 129, 136 n.33, 145, 147–50 order 3, 41–2, 44, 86–7, 94, 101–3, 107–12, 115, 117, 119–27, 140 cosmic 41, 45–7, 141 legal 47, 99, 111, 115 political 3, 92–3, 95–9, 101 n.12, 110, 117–27, 140 paradigm 9, 14, 26, 41, 108, 129, 134–5, 137 metaphysical 10, 12, 15, 91, 102 optical 4, 130–3, 137–8, 140, 142 particularism 2, 9 Paulinism 3, 91–5, 106, 108–9, 116–18, 120 n.108 performativity 2–3, 5, 8, 26–39, 45, 52, 55, 57–8, 60, 62–5, 68, 77, 80–3, 91, 95, 120, 122, 133–4, 141, 143–4, 146 performativum fidei 2, 29–30, 35–6, 39, 80, 87, 89, 146 phenomenology 3, 13, 19, 22–3, 57–8, 62–5, 67, 69, 94, 101 n.12, 103, 107, 131, 134 phenomenon 19–23, 35 n.99, 39, 42, 51, 54, 56–7, 60–4, 67, 69, 100, 103–4, 108, 122, 137 pistis 1–6, 9, 26–39, 44–8, 51–3, 70–92, 95, 100, 102, 104, 109, 112–24, 129–63. See also belief; conviction; faith Platonism 8, 10–12, 19, 24, 102, 106–9, 112, 150, 152 pneuma 21, 105. See also spirit political, the 3–4, 8, 91–101, 109, 116–17, 120, 123–4 politics 27 n.69, 94, 96–9, 103 potentiality 27, 33 n.94, 39, 58–62, 64–5, 68, 85, 151

power 4, 30, 88, 92–3, 95–6, 98–104, 109, 113–14, 116–26 prelaw 34–5 presence 3, 16–19, 23, 108, 133–8 pre-theoretical 2, 5, 19–20, 66, 91 processuality 3, 49, 51, 89, 91–2, 95 proclamation 2, 3, 5, 21–4, 45, 51, 73, 76, 82, 89, 91 prophecy 7 n.5, 40–6, 141 rationality 4, 67, 73, 77, 91, 145–51, 163 reliance 150–3, 158–60, 163 religion 7–8, 10, 27, 33–5, 39, 53, 70 n.55, 71, 77, 96–8, 102–4, 112, 121 resurrection 32, 42–3, 45 n.148, 86 n.124, 141 revocation 31, 37, 122–3, 126 rhetoric 3, 71, 74–5, 111, 163 rupture 42, 49, 86 n.124, 111 security 67, 106, 135 self-assurance 15 sight 4, 17, 129–31, 135–6, 138, 141, 143, 156 n.89 sign 41–2, 45, 157 n.91 singularity (universal) 5, 9, 41–2, 44–8, 110, 115–19, 133, 140–1 situation 1, 5, 16, 19–20, 22–4, 31, 34–7, 43, 47–8, 51, 67, 73–4, 82, 86, 100, 102–4, 115–17, 140 solicitude 101 n.12 spirit 21, 92–8, 103–7, 118. See also pneuma subject 2, 8, 27, 37, 44, 46–8, 52, 88–9, 95, 109, 111 n.59, 115–16, 119, 138–9, 144, 146 subjectivity 3, 40, 43, 47–9, 101 n.12, 110, 116 sublation 8, 27–8, 48 substance 26, 37, 43 n.138, 47, 105, 107–8, 116, 134–5, 142, 144 suspension 36, 38, 125 temporality 8, 12, 15, 18–19, 24–5, 57, 68, 73, 78–9, 81–2, 91, 106, 108, 135

Subject Index testimony 52–3, 75–7, 82, 85–7, 141 n.51, 149 theology 26, 53, 72, 93 n.5, 114 thrownness 53 n.9, 65, 137 time 18–19, 28–9, 32, 40–1, 43, 47, 79, 84, 108, 126, 133 trust 75–7, 87, 145–8, 157 n.91, 161 truth 4, 22, 38 n.111, 44–8, 65, 88–91, 97, 110–11, 117–18, 129–63 universality 2, 5, 9, 41, 42, 44, 46–7, 82, 109–15, 118, 133, 140 untruth 129, 145–9

179

vocation 29 n.75, 31–2, 52, 80, 82, 85, 122–3 wisdom 13, 16–17, 41–2, 113 witness 42, 45–6, 59, 60, 75–6, 90, 141 n.51 word 29 n.75, 33 n.94, 35–9, 77, 82–3, 87, 91, 121, 143, 146 world 13, 15–16, 24 n.64, 26, 31–2, 37–9, 41, 44, 51, 54 n.9, 57–8, 64, 67–8, 74, 78–9, 82–6, 106, 108, 111–12, 126, 135, 137, 142, 145–6, 152–3, 155, 162