Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making 9781846639418, 9781846639401

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EMOTIONS, ETHICS AND DECISION-MAKING

RESEARCH ON EMOTION IN ORGANIZATIONS Series Editors: Wilfred J. Zerbe, Charmine E. J. Ha¨rtel, and Neal M. Ashkanasy Recent Volumes: Volume 1:

The Effect of Affect in Organizational Settings. Edited by Neal M. Ashkanasy, Wilfred J. Zerbe, and Charmine E. J. Ha¨rtel

Volume 2:

Individual and Organizational Perspectives on Emotion Management and Display. Edited by Wilfred J. Zerbe, Neal M. Ashkanasy, and Charmine E. J. Ha¨rtel

Volume 3:

Functionality, Intentionality, and Morality Edited by Charmine E. J. Ha¨rtel, Neal M. Ashkanasy, and Wilfred J. Zerbe

RESEARCH ON EMOTION IN ORGANIZATIONS VOLUME 4

EMOTIONS, ETHICS AND DECISION-MAKING EDITED BY

WILFRED J. ZERBE University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada

CHARMINE E. J. HA¨RTEL Monash University, Victoria, Australia

NEAL M. ASHKANASY University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

United Kingdom – North America – Japan India – Malaysia – China

JAI Press is an imprint of Emerald Group Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2008 Copyright r 2008 Emerald Group Publishing Limited Reprints and permission service Contact: [email protected] No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. No responsibility is accepted for the accuracy of information contained in the text, illustrations, or advertisements. The opinions expressed in these chapters are not necessarily those of the Editor or the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-84663-940-1 ISSN: 1746-9791 (Series)

Awarded in recognition of Emerald’s production department’s adherence to quality systems and processes when preparing scholarly journals for print

CONTENTS ABOUT THE EDITORS

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

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OVERVIEW: EMOTIONS, ETHICS, AND DECISION-MAKING Wilfred J. Zerbe, Charmine E. J. Ha¨rtel and Neal M. Ashkanasy CHAPTER 1 AFFECTIVE EVENTS THEORY: A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE Claire E. Ashton-James and Neal M. Ashkanasy CHAPTER 2 A MATTER OF FEELING? THE ROLE OF INTUITION IN ENTREPRENEURIAL DECISION-MAKING AND BEHAVIOR Eugene Sadler-Smith, Gerard P. Hodgkinson and Marta Sinclair CHAPTER 3 THE EFFECT OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COGNITIVE INTELLIGENCE ON THE SOLUTIONS GENERATED TO ILL-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS Anne E. Herman and Lisa L. Scherer

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CHAPTER 4 THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN DRIVING WORKPLACE PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIORS Sally Russell and Andrew Griffiths

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CHAPTER 5 FEELINGS ABOUT ETHICAL DECISIONS: THE EMOTIONS OF MORAL RESIDUE Wilfred J. Zerbe

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CHAPTER 6 WHEN EXECUTIVES GET ANGRY: THE IMPORTANCE OF ANGER AND ITS TRIGGERS TO ETHICAL AWARENESS AND SENSITIVITY Amy E. Mickel and Hakan Ozcelik

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CHAPTER 7 ROLE OF AFFECT AND INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE IN MORAL LEADERSHIP Charmine E. J. Ha¨rtel and Deshani B. Ganegoda

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CHAPTER 8 ON NOT BLOWING THE WHISTLE: QUIESCENT SILENCE AS AN EMOTION EPISODE John Blenkinsopp and Marissa S. Edwards

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CHAPTER 9 LEADERSHIP NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE: EMOTIONAL TOXICITY AT SKYWAVES AEROSPACE INTERNATIONAL Alan Goldman

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CHAPTER 10 THE ROLE OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN INTEGRITY AND ETHICS PERCEPTIONS Jessica Mesmer-Magnus, Chockalingam Viswesvaran, Jacob Joseph and Satish P. Deshpande

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CHAPTER 11 SOCIETAL NORMS AND CONTEXTUAL EMOTIONAL LABOR Jawad Syed

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CHAPTER 12 A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ATTRIBUTION–EMOTION–BEHAVIOR FRAMEWORK IN THE CONTEXT OF UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR Paul Harvey, Mark J. Martinko and Nancy Borkowski

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CHAPTER 13 THE EFFECTS OF EMPATHY ON JUDGMENTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS Roni Reiter-Palmon, Richard L. Wiener, Gregory Ashley, Ryan J. Winter, Ronda M. Smith, Erin M. Richter and Amy Voss-Humke

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CHAPTER 14 PRACTICAL WISDOM AND EMOTIONAL CAPABILITY AS ANTECEDENTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE PROCESSES Rodolphe Durand and Quy Huy

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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ABOUT THE EDITORS Neal M. Ashkanasy is Professor of Management in the UQ Business School at the University of Queensland. His PhD is in Social and Organizational Psychology from UQ and he is a Fellow of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology and the Australia and New Zealand Academy of Management. His research focuses on leadership, culture, ethics and, more recently, on the role of emotion in organizational life. He has published in journals such as the Academy of Management Review, the Journal of Management, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. He is Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Organizational Behavior, Associate Editor of Academy of Management Learning and Education and Emotion Review, and book series editor for Research on Emotion in Organizations. He administers two ListServs (Orgcult – The organizational Culture Caucus; and Emonet – Emotions in Organizations), and is a past Chair of the Managerial and Organizational Cognition Division of the Academy of Management. Charmine E. J. Ha¨rtel is Professor of Organizational Behavior and Associate Dean (Research Staff Development) in the Faculty of Business and Economics at Monash University. Her current research activities focus on emotions and patterns of relating at work; development of socioemotional well being in organizations, diversity and social inclusion; leadership, and team effectiveness. She has authored seven books and over 50 refereed journal articles, which have appeared in journals such as the Journal of Management, Academy of Management Review, Applied Psychology: An International Review, Leadership Quarterly, and Journal of Applied Psychology and is on the editorial board of Human Relations and Academy of Management Learning and Education. Wilfred J. Zerbe is Professor of Human Resources and Organizational Dynamics in the Haskayne School of Business at the University of Calgary, and Adjunct Professor, Theseus International Management Institute, Nice, France. His research interests focus on emotions in organizations, organizational research methods, service sector management, business ix

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ethics, and leadership. His publications have appeared in books and journals including The Academy of Management Review, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Psychology, Journal of Services Marketing, and Journal of Research in Higher Education. He is also an active consultant and executive educator.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Neal M. Ashkanasy

University of Queensland Business School, Faculty of Business, Economics and Law, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

Gregory Ashley

Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA

Claire E. AshtonJames

Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

John Blenkinsopp

Teesside Business School, University of Teesside, Middlesbrough, UK

Nancy Borkowski

Stemple School of Public Health, Department of Health Policy and Management, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA

Satish P. Deshpande

Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, USA

Rodolphe Durand

HEC School of Management, Jouy en Josas, France

Marissa S. Edwards

UQ Business School, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

Deshani B. Ganegoda

NUS Business School, Department of Management and Organization, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Alan Goldman

School of Global Management and Leadership, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA

Andrew Griffiths

UQ Business School, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

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Charmine E. J. Ha¨rtel

Department of Management, Faculty of Business and Economics, Monash University, Clayton VIC, Australia

Paul Harvey

Whittemore School of Business and Economics, Department of Management, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH, USA

Anne E. Herman

Kenexa, Inc., University of Nebraska Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA

Gerard P. Hodgkinson

University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

Quy Huy

INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France

Jacob Joseph

School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, AK, USA

Mark J. Martinko

College of Business, Department of Management, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA

Jessica MesmerMagnus

UNC Wilmington, Cameron School of Business, Wilmington, NC, USA

Amy E. Mickel

College of Business Administration, California State University, Sacramento, CA, USA

Hakan Ozcelik

College of Business Administration, California State University, Sacramento, CA, USA

Roni Reiter-Palmon

Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA

Erin M. Richter

University of Nebraska – Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA

Sally Russell

UQ Business School, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

Eugene Sadler-Smith

School of Management, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK

Lisa L. Scherer

University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA

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Marta Sinclair

Griffith Business School IBAS, Griffith University, Gold Coast campus, Queensland, Australia

Ronda M. Smith

College of Business Administration, Department of Management, University of Nebraska – Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA

Jawad Syed

Kent Business School, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, UK

Chockalingam Viswesvaran

Department of Psychology, Florida International University, UP Campus, Miami, FL, USA

Amy Voss-Humke

294 Spring Valley Way, Round Lake, IL, USA

Richard L. Wiener

Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska – Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA

Ryan J. Winter

Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA

Wilfred J. Zerbe

Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

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OVERVIEW: EMOTIONS, ETHICS, AND DECISION-MAKING The burgeoning interest in and recognition of the role of emotions in organizational life has had both universal and particular effect on management research. On the one hand, scholars now routinely acknowledge the importance of emotion-related constructs as explanatory mechanisms that may very well be relevant to their questions of interest. That is, although emotions may not be the specific focus of an empirical investigation or a theoretical discussion, they are recognized as a pervasive and potentially powerful source of improved understanding (Barsade & Gibson, 2007). At the same time, the increased prevalence of research on emotions has facilitated the development of sub-topics into coherent streams of inquiry. As a result, in this volume we were able to choose to focus examination of emotions in organizations on the areas of ethics and decision-making and to assemble a set of contributions that complement each other and contribute to a broader understanding of the role that emotions play in decision-making, in ethics, and in ethical decision-making.

THE 2006 ‘‘EMONET’’ CONFERENCE The chapters in this volume are drawn from the best contributions to the 2006 International Conference on Emotion and Organizational Life held in Atlanta, in conjunction with the Academy of Management’s Annual Meetings. (This bi-annual conference has come to be known as the Emonet conference, after the listserv of members). The selected conference papers were then complemented by additional invited chapters. This volume contains six chapters selected from conference contributions for their quality, interest, and appropriateness to the theme of this volume, as well as eight invited chapters. We acknowledge in particular the assistance of the conference paper reviewers (see Appendix). In the year of publication of this volume the 2008 Emonet conference will be held in France, and will be followed by Volumes 5 and 6 of Research on Emotion in Organizations. xv

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Readers interested in learning more about the conferences or the Emonet list should check the Emonet website http://www.uq.edu.au/emonet/.

THE THEME OF THIS VOLUME It could be said that research on ethics is really about decision-making, albeit in a particular realm. Indeed, the theme of this volume, Emotions, Ethics, and Decision-Making, concerns the role of emotions as antecedents and consequences of decisions, both in general and when those decisions concern matters of right and wrong, or good and bad, as opposed to effective and ineffective. And although each chapter has its own unique approach and perspective, they share many commonalities.

THE CHAPTERS In the opening chapter to this volume, Claire E. Ashton-James and Neal M. Ashkanasy use Affective Events Theory (AET, see Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) to structure and inform an examination of strategic decision-making. They point out that the prevailing myth is that strategic management is a cold, rational process, despite theories such as AET and the wealth of empirical evidence demonstrating affective influences on cognition and behavior. Ashton-James and Ashkanasy show how events at the organizational level can create emotional reactions in organizational actors and have subsequent consequences, and highlight the effect of specific emotions and mood states on outcomes relevant to strategic decision-making such as risktaking, creative thinking, vigilance in decision-making, resistance to change, and the motivation and inhibition of behavior, and on such processes as the recognition and interpretation of information, the formulation of strategic alternatives, and the implementation of decisions. The authors point out in particular that the domain of strategic decision-making, rather than being devoid of emotional content, is in fact more likely to involve affect than decisions at lower levels. Using Forgas’ (1995) Affect Infusion Model (AIM), they show how decisions characterized by high risk, complexity, and incomplete information, i.e., strategic decisions, are likely to be influenced by the mood state of the decision maker. Unfortunately, as the authors point out, this has not been recognized and therefore not been subject to empirical examination. Ashton-James and Ashkanasy, by detailing and

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explicating the dynamics that are likely to underlie the impact of emotions in strategic decision-making, provide a roadmap to such inquiry. In Chapter 2, Eugene Sadler-Smith, Gerard P. Hodgkinson, and Marta Sinclair continue the examination of the role of emotion in decision-making through the lenses of intuition and entrepreneurial decision-making. They conceive of intuition in such terms as ‘‘affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, non conscious, and holistic associations’’ (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p. 40) and as ‘‘operating beyond the realms of rational processes and encompass(ing) affective elements.’’ Like Ashton-James and Ashkanasy, Sadler-Smith and his colleagues delineate the interplay between affective and cognitive processes, albeit using different theoretical springboards, notably Klein’s (1997) model of Recognition Primed Decision Making, and dual-process formulations of cognition such as Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory developed by Epstein and his colleagues (Epstein, 1991, and see Chapter 2 for additional references). Sadler-Smith and his associates go on to describe how these and other processes are likely to affect elements of the entrepreneur’s decision-making process. Unlike the case of strategic decision-making, however, where affect has been ignored, the role of intuition is often cited in anecdotal or qualitative accounts of entrepreneurial decision-making. What Sadler-Smith and his colleagues have done is to add substance and depth to this recognition. Considerable research has investigated levels of cognitive intelligence in decision-making processes. In Chapter 3, Anne E. Herman and Lisa L. Scherer investigated individual differences in decision-making for solution generation and how emotional intelligence as well as cognitive intelligence impact on the process. The authors explored the impact of emotional intelligence on the quantity, quality, and flexibility of generated solutions to an emotion-evoking ill-structured problem. They hypothesized that emotional intelligence ought to aid the cognitive process and that those higher in emotional intelligence will be better equipped for delivering a greater number of flexible, quality solutions. Utilizing an undergraduate sample of convenience (99 participants with a reasonably equal gender split), Herman and Scherer assessed mood, cognitive intelligence, and emotional intelligence. Participants were provided with two pen-and-paper problem scenarios: the workplace sexual harassment of a female lawyer and a management problem on employee retention. Participants were subsequently asked to list as many solutions as possible within a set time-frame. Contrary to predictions, emotional intelligence was only associated with average resolving power of solutions and not to quality, flexibility, or quantity of solutions.

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The previous chapters in this volume considered decision making in strategic and entrepreneurial realms, and with respect to the impact of cognitive and emotional intelligence, with the target of that decision-making arguably being the ‘‘smart’’ thing to do. In contrast, in the next chapter, authors Sally V. Russell and Andrew Griffiths consider workplace decisions about the ‘‘right’’ thing to do, specifically about pro-environmental behaviors. Russell and Griffiths begin by reviewing the literature that has previously examined the determinants of individual decisions to initiate proenvironmental action. Like the discussion above, these have been almost exclusively cognitive. Using the literature on issue ownership (Pratt & Dutton, 2000) and identity (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), and drawing from empirical results in environmental psychology, the authors link emotional reactions and identification to issues ownership. Specifically, they propose that emotional valence and intensity contribute to issue ownership, but are mediated by the fit with current and future identities. Further, they introduce the extent to which the climate of the organization is proenvironment as a moderator of the relationship between organizational identification and issue ownership. And, akin to the first chapter in this volume, they highlight the importance of top-management teams in taking pro-environmental action. Chapter 6, by Amy E. Mickel and Hakan Ozcelik, asks the question: Why do executives experience anger when making organizational decisions? Using a qualitative frame, they explored anger triggers as experienced and reported by 24 business executives from various organizations and industries residing in a West-coast US city. Via semi-structured interviews, participants were requested to describe situations where they had experienced anger in relation to a decision-making process at work. Initial inter-rater analysis was conducted on the executives’ language targeting thematic ‘‘thought units.’’ Triggers were categorized into ‘‘self’’ and ‘‘other.’’ The three consistent findings of the study were that (1) all triggers in the study can be classified as having an ethical basis; (2) two distinct attitudes toward anger expression in the workplace were expressed: anger can be instrumental and used accordingly to achieve goals (integrated attitude), or conversely, anger should be suppressed and is not appropriate to express (negative attitude); and (3) anger arousal in the study’s context acted as an ‘‘ethical barometer’’ for participants, alerting them to manifestations of behavior in anger sources that violated the responders’ ethical values. Whereas Mickel and Ozcelik were looking at anger in decision-making and discovered that the situations that elicited it had an ethical base, in the previous chapter Wilfred J. Zerbe focuses specifically on the role of emotion

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in ethical decision-making. Zerbe explores ‘‘moral residue,’’ an area of ethical reasoning that is familiar territory to philosophers but has not been empirically tested in the business or psychology domain. Business studies suggest that when a person is required to solve an ethical dilemma, the resolution will essentially be an end to the emotional involvement in the dilemma. Philosophers, however, suggest that an individual faced with an ethical dilemma – an imperative to choose between two similarly weighted ethical choices – will experience regret as a result of having to forfeit one of the ethical options. In this chapter, Zerbe proposes a theoretical framework from which to test the concept of moral residue resulting from ethical dilemmas. Employee characteristics and consequences of emotions experienced are incorporated into the theoretical proposal as well as recognition of the impact moral residue has on individual and organizational functioning. In Chapter 7, Charmine E. J. Ha¨rtel and Deshani B. Ganegoda make the point that modern leadership embodies a moral dimension that can often override financial and economic considerations. They develop models of moral and immoral leadership that take into account the role of positive and negative affect and interactional justice. In a series of five proposition sets, Ha¨rtel and Ganegoda suggest that organizational leaders’ decisions (moral or immoral) result in affective reactions that combine with perceptions of interactional justice to determine members’ behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions. The resulting organizational culture, which can be seen to be ‘‘healthy’’ (a result of moral decisions) or ‘‘toxic’’ (following immoral decisions), then feeds back into the organizational leaders’ decision-making, resulting in a virtual or vicious cycle. The implication of their model is that morality is appropriately seen as the ‘‘heart of leadership, not an appendage.’’ The authors conclude with a discussion of the research and practical ramifications of their model. Next, John Blenkinsopp and Marissa S. Edwards examine a heretofore ‘‘unexaminable’’ moral issue: whistle-blowing. However, whereas most previous studies have looked at the determinants of employee decisions to break silence, Blenkinsopp and Edwards problematize the question, pointing out that most treatments of whistle-blowing shed little light on the dynamics of the decision-making process, have paid only limited attention to the role of emotion, and have not considered the most common response to wrongdoing, which is inaction. They bring light to this question of ‘‘quiescent silence’’ through analysis of the findings of an investigation into allegations of patient abuse by a hospital nurse. While this investigation was initiated following one employee’s decision to speak up, it was evident that many other employees were aware of the abusive behavior

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and had chosen to keep silent. Blenkinsopp and Edwards describe, through fictionalized narrative accounts, the experience of employees and the dynamics in the setting. Drawing upon emotion feedback theory (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007) and the sensemaking paradigm (Weick, 1995), the authors propose that quiescence is encouraged by ‘‘cues for inaction’’ – ‘‘elements of the situation to which the individuals attend which lead to an interpretation of the situation which justifies their silence.’’ Moreover, they show that quiescent silence is a highly emotional context and that emotions are not only features of such situations, but play an important role in both the continuation and disruption of employee silence. In Chapter 9, Alan Goldman describes the ‘‘leadership negligence and malpractice’’ he observed while a consultant to SkyWaves Aerospace International (pseudonym). The presenting issue concerned a long-term morale issue with antecedents from interpersonal conflict between two engineer employees. The resultant study was based on interviews with involved company employees/management. Lack of toxin detection and handling skills, a culture of emotional suppression and management negligence are viewed as the main determinants of the resulting destructive corporate culture. The author demonstrates how an initially unresolved conflict dealt with poorly by management can be fueled by ill-informed stereotypical assumptions and judgments from observer employees, leading to a mood of antagonism, partisan loyalties, low morale, and high turnover. Following an informal analysis of the dynamics, Goldman explores the factors leading to a resolution of the dilemma and offers insights into how companies need to act differently in relation to emotional health within the corporate culture, and more specifically, when faced with work-based interpersonal conflict. One view of the previous chapter is that it demonstrates how a lack of organizational level emotional intelligence can result in what amounts to an ethical breach on the part of organizational leaders. In Chapter 10, Jessica Mesmer-Magnus, Chockalingam Viswesvaran, Jacob Joseph, and Satish P. Deshpande, argue for the application of the emotional intelligence construct in organizational members’ perceptions of integrity and ethics in work settings. They develop six hypotheses and test them in a sample of undergraduate students in a mid-western US university. An interesting aspect of this research is that the authors also controlled for potential bias caused by socially desirable responding. Results confirmed that emotional intelligence not only predicted ethicality in both self and others, but also explained perceptions of others’ ethics over and above that which is explained by individual ethicality. The implication of this finding is that

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emotional intelligence may be an important factor in the way employees read the ethicality (or otherwise) of their associates’ behavior. The authors conclude with a discussion of the implications of their findings for research and practice. In the next chapter, author Jawad Syed examines a topic that has been strangely absent from the literature to date: the implications of societal norms for emotional labor in workplace. In particular, Syed makes the intriguing point that societal norms and job contexts may sometimes be in conflict, so that employees are left in the invidious position of having to violate their own societal norms to fulfill job requirements. Understandably, this sets up a powerful and emotional dynamic that can have profound implications for an employee’s behavior and performance. In effect, the employee may be asked to transgress her or his societal norms in order to meet the performance expectations of an employer. For example, women raised in a traditional Muslim society may react in different ways to an employer’s dress rules. The resulting personal perceptions of transgression can evoke emotional responses of guilt, shame, and embarrassment that in turn trigger complex emotional responses. In Chapter 12, Paul Harvey, Mark J. Martinko, and Nancy Borkowski describe a recent research project designed to shed new light on the role of attributional processes in determining emotions and behaviors at work. In the study, US undergraduate students read hypothetical scenarios where poor performance, attributable to causes that varied in terms of locus of causality (internal vs. external), stability, and controllability, could be redressed through engaging in ethically questionable behavior. Participants were then asked to complete measures of attribution, emotion, and behavioral justification. Results supported the authors’ predictions that causal attributions were associated with affective states and behavioral justification, but also indicated unexpectedly that affective states were not associated with behavior justification. The authors conclude with a discussion of the implications of their findings for future research on attributions and emotions in organizational contexts. In the following chapter, Roni Reiter-Palmon and her colleagues Richard L. Wiener, Gregory Ashley, Ryan J. Winter, Ronda M. Smith, Erin M. Richter, and Amy Voss-Humke examine whether the tendency of employees to react emotionally, specifically to experience empathy, were related to judgments of sexual harassment. They showed male and female employees video cases containing reenactments of actual cases alleging sexual harassment. Employees were asked about their perceptions of what happened in the cases, and were assessed as to their tendency to hold both

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hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes, and to experience self- and otheroriented empathy of both a cognitive and affective nature. The authors’ analyses focus on the relationship between these individual difference variables and judgments of sexual harassment. As in previous studies, they found that women were more likely to find evidence of unwelcome behavior than men, but that gender interacted with empathic perspective-taking, to explain judgments. Contrary to the author’s expectations, however, perspective-taking magnified rather than eliminated gender differences. With our final chapter we come full circle: Rodolphe Durand and Quy Huy examine the role of emotions from a strategic perspective, involving top executives engaging in ‘‘revolutionary change.’’ They address in particular the role of emotional capability as a determinant of what whey refer to as ‘‘organizational accountability,’’ which they define as the organization displaying ‘‘actions and accounts that are congruent with its expressed values and with the expectations of relevant external and internal constituencies.’’ Based on this definition, Durand and Quy identify four situations, varying in terms of top management’s levels of practical wisdom and emotional capability, and derive associated propositions predicting the level and durability of an organization’s accountability. The authors argue that their model and propositions contribute to the literature by articulating the antecedents of organizational accountability, and emphasize the relevance of considering organizational ethics and emotion management in strategic management.

CONCLUSION In previous volumes of this series we have often called for researchers to draw on existing work and to further develop particular lines of inquiry. It is a sign of the growing paradigmatic maturity of the field of emotions in organizations that the chapters in this volume share common theoretical foundations and definitions, while making their own individual contributions. Indeed, the development of scholarship in the field of emotions in organizations has been greatly facilitated by the widespread acceptance of general theoretical frameworks and approaches and constructs, whose function has been to guide the design of particular inquiries and the interpretation of results. For example, in the chapters in this volume we see the influence of such theories and constructs as Affective Events Theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; Weiss & Beal, 2005), the Affect Infusion Model (Forgas, 1995), the Affect-as-Information-Model (Schwarz, 1990;

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Schwarz & Clore, 2003), and Emotional Intelligence (Goleman, 1995; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). These works and their associated literatures recur as organizing mechanisms, promoting clarity and accumulation of understanding. Even as what might be thought of as increased homogeneity can be a good thing, we are also very pleased to see that the study of emotions in organizational life continues to enjoy methodological diversity. The chapters in this volume represent both theory development and theory testing, and both qualitative and quantitative approaches. And finally, the contributors continue to reflect the internationally diverse character of the study of emotions in organizations.

REFERENCES Ashforth, B. E., & Mael, F. (1989). Social identity theory and the organization. Academy of Management Review, 14, 20–39. Barsade, S. G., & Gibson, D. E. (2007). Why does affect matter in organizations? Academy of Management Perspectives, 21(1), 36–59. Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., DeWall, C. N., & Zhang, L. (2007). How emotion shapes behavior: Feedback, anticipation, and reflection, rather than direct causation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 167–203. Dane, E., & Pratt, M. G. (2007). Exploring intuition and its role in managerial decision-making. Academy of Management Review, 32, 33–54. Epstein, S. (1991). Cognitive-experiential self theory: An integrative theory of personality. In: R. C. Curtis (Ed.), The relational self: Theoretical convergences in psychoanalysis and social psychology (pp. 111–137). New York: Guilford Press. Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM). Psychological Bulletin, 117, 39–66. Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ. New York: Bantam Books. Klein, G. (1997). The recognition primed decision (RPD) model: Looking back, looking forward. In: C. E. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds), Naturalistic decision-making (pp. 383–397). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Pratt, M. G., & Dutton, J. E. (2000). Owning up or opting out: The role of emotions and identities in issue ownership. In: N. M. Ashkanasy, C. E. J. Ha¨rtel & W. J. Zerbe (Eds), Emotions in the workplace: Research, theory, and practice (pp. 103–129). Westport, CT: Quorum Books. Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 9, 185–211. Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and motivational functions of affective states. In: T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 527–561). New York: Guilford Press.

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Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (2003). Mood as information: 20 years later. Psychological Inquiry, 14, 296–303. Weiss, H. M., & Beal, D. J. (2005). Reflections on affective events theory. In: N. Ashkanasy, C. Hartel & W. J. Zerbe (Eds), Research on emotion in organizations, Volume 1: The effect of affect in organizational settings (pp. 1–22). Oxford, UK: Elsevier JAI. Weiss, H. M., & Cropanzano, R. (1996). Affective events theory: A theoretical discussion of the structure, causes and consequences of affective experiences at work. Research in Organizational Behavior, 18, 1–74. Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. London: Sage.

APPENDIX. CONFERENCE REVIEWERS Ishroop Singh Aneja Claire Ashton-James Yvonne Athanasaw Remi Ayoko Liuba Belkin Rebekah Bennett Geetu Bharwaney John Blenkinsopp Ce´leste M. Brotheridge Judith Chapman Dan S Chiaburu Shane Connelly Panikkos Constanti James Diefendorff Lorna Doucet Vanessa Druskat Marissa Edwards Dorthe Eide Hillary Anger Elfenbein Aimee Ellis Ethel Brundin Gerard Finnemore

Christina Fong Kevin Fox Yuka Fujimoto Donald G Gardner Markus Groth Anne Herman Elaine Hollensbe Alice Hsu Hazel-Anne Johnson Bob Jones Kostas Kafetsios Janet B. Kellett Nell Kimberley Gail Kinman Yongmei Liu Patti Madrill Annabelle Mark Gordon Mueller-Seitz Jane Murray Peter Noordink Suzyn Ornstein Liam Page

Tuck Pescosolido Alberto Ramirez Roni Reiter-Palmon Erin M. Richard Sally V.Russell Lisa Scherer Dave Schmidt Aiwa Shirako Marta Sinclair Roy Smollan Micheal Stratton Joo-Seng Tan Sue Vickers-Thompson Bernd Vogel Terry Waters-Marsh Lu Wang Kate Watland

Wilfred J. Zerbe Charmine E.J. Ha¨rtel Neal M. Ashkanasy Editors

CHAPTER 1 AFFECTIVE EVENTS THEORY: A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE Claire E. Ashton-James and Neal M. Ashkanasy ABSTRACT Although there has been increasing interest in the role of affect in work settings, the impact of moods and emotions in strategic decision making remains largely unexplored. In this essay, we address this shortcoming by proposing a conceptual model of strategic decision making that incorporates, at its core, the impact of affective states on cognitive processes that are integral to the decision outcome. The model is based on the principles of Affective Events Theory, which holds that environmental exigencies generate ‘‘affective events’’ that cause emotional reactions in organizational members which, in turn, determine members’ attitudes and behaviors. We extend this model to include the effect of the extraorganizational environment, and propose that emotions ‘‘infuse’’ those cognitive processes that are critical to the strategic decision making process. We conclude that strategic decision making in organizations is not always a controlled, deliberate, purely cognitive process, as it is often described. Rather, we contend that the moods and emotions that managers experience in response to positive and negative workplace events have a significant affect on strategic decision-making processes and ultimately, organizational-level outcomes. We discuss the implications of our model for theory, research, and practice.

Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 1–34 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04001-7

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INTRODUCTION Since publication of the groundbreaking article by Pekrun and Frese (1992), the topic of emotion and affect in organizational settings has steadily gained credence, to the point that it is now attracting considerable attention in the mainstream management and IO psychology literature. This is evidenced in recent special issues of journals (e.g., Ashkanasy, 2004; Fisher & Ashkanasy, 2000; Fox, 2002; Humphrey, 2002; Weiss, 2001, 2002) and edited books (e.g., Ashkanasy, Ha¨rtel, & Zerbe, 2000; Ashkanasy, Zerbe, & Ha¨rtel, 2002, 2005; Fineman, 1993, 2000; Ha¨rtel, Zerbe, & Ashkanasy, 2005; Lord, Klimoski, & Kanfer, 2002; Payne & Cooper, 2001). Indeed, Barsade, Brief, and Spataro (2003) have gone so far as to declare that an ‘‘affective revolution’’ is under way in the study of organizational behavior. To date, however, with the notable exception of Daniels (1999, 2000), there has been little written of the application of affect theories of organizational behavior in the context of strategic management. Thus, although Weick (1979) asked 25 years ago, ‘‘Where’s the heat?’’ (see Ray, 1995), the myth that strategic management is a cold, rational process persists. In particular, no one to date appears to have attempted to apply some of the plethora of recent research findings on affect and cognition to the decision-making processes that underpin strategic management. In this article, we attempt to redress this situation by presenting a critical review of the role played by affect in organizational settings, with a focus on the impact of affect on the cognitive processes of strategic decision making. Our analysis of the role played by moods and emotions in strategic decision outcomes in organizations is based on Affective Events Theory (AET) (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) as well as social cognitive research on affective influences on cognition and behavior (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 2002; Schwarz, 1990). AET holds that organizational events trigger affective responses in organizational members, with consequences for workplace attitudes, cognition, and behavior. Although Weiss and Cropanzano developed their theory with specific reference to micro-level attitudes and behaviors within the organization, we apply this basic model of affective influence in organizations to strategic management. Specifically, we argue that workplace events elicit affective responses (moods and emotions) that in turn influence both the content and process of strategic decision-making. Thus, we offer an extension and application of Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) AET to strategic management, and in particular, strategic decisionmaking. In the remainder of the article, we highlight the importance of understanding the impact of affect on strategic decision processes and set

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out the justification for each component of our conceptual model starting with the antecedents of affect in organizational settings before discussing the nature of affect and the implications of affect for organizational cognition. Following this, we review the cognitive processes involved in strategic decision-making in organizations. Finally, and drawing upon recent advances in affect and cognition research, we explore the impact that individual’s affective responses to organizational events have on organizational cognition and strategic management. We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of the model for theory, research, and practice.

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF AFFECT IN STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING In this essay, we deal with role of affect in strategic management, which has been defined by Porter (1987) as ‘‘what makes the corporate whole add up to more than the sum of its business unit parts’’ (p. 251). In effect, strategic management concerns issues pertaining to the fundamental nature of the organization itself and its relationships with the environment. Strategic management therefore involves making decisions about the activities that the organization should engage in, acquiring and divesting resources (including human resources), delineation of the goals the organization and its members should be aiming for, and the identity and culture of the organization itself (Asch & Bowman, 1989). A corollary of this is that strategic management is also characterized by complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994). Strategic decision making is manifest in various organizational contexts such as negotiation, problemsolving, and performance-evaluation – all involving assessing organizational adaptation to environmental demands and setting goals. Researchers working in this tradition have highlighted several individual and organizational factors that impact upon organizational decisionmaking processes, including the power or status of the decision maker, locus of control, success or failure expectations, and personality types. It may be observed, however, that the impact of affect on organizational decision processes has been largely neglected (see Daniels, 1999; Hodgkinson, 2002; Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada, & Saint-Macary, 1995; Neale & Northcraft, 1990). Within the plethora of literature in this field, the lack of attention to affect in strategic decision-making is of particular interest, since

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recent developments in social psychology have demonstrated that the impact of affect on cognition is particularly salient in situations that are complex, require substantive information processing, and especially when incomplete information is available (Forgas, 2002). As such, strategic decision processes in organizations are likely to be significantly influenced by the affective states of individual decision-makers. A further characteristic of strategic management is that it is related to the need to exploit perceived opportunities and avoid apparent threats to the attainment of organizational goals, and the achievement of ‘‘competitive advantage’’ (Porter, 1987, p. 251). If organizational goals and personal performance goals are aligned, as may be the case for top management teams, stakeholders, and CEOs, an opportunity or threat to organizational survival may have consequences for individual well-being, or the attainment of personal goals (Ashkanasy, Ashton-James, & Jordan, 2004). As such, our first objective in this essay is to argue that organizational events that have the potential to impact upon organizational goals may induce positive or negative affective states in organizational members for whom personal and organizational goals are aligned. We follow this analysis with an examination of the impact of organizational members’ affective states on strategic decision-making processes and organizational outcomes.

A MODEL OF AFFECT IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT Arising from the foregoing discussion, the model of affect in strategic management that we propose in this article is set out diagrammatically in Fig. 1. In the proposed model, intra-organizational and extra-organizational environments generate ‘‘affective events,’’ which result in emotional responses on the behalf of the organizational actors – in this instance, the top management team responsible for strategic decision-making. Intraorganizational affective events include stress-related workplace events, the physical setting, work-group characteristics, and leader–member exchanges – ultimately all derived from the goals set in place by top management strategic decisions. Extra-organizational affective events include: (1) organizational change events; (2) economic, legal, and political events; and (3) inter-organizational negotiations. The emotions that are invoked are the negative emotions of anger, disgust, and fear/anxiety, and the positive emotions of joy and happiness. Each of these emotions has a

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Affective Events

Organizational change events

Economic, legal, and political events

intraorganizational negotiation

Emotions and moods

Action tendencies and processing style

Strategic Decision Processes Perception Formulation Implementation Impulsive affect-driven decisions Strategic organizational outcomes

Fig. 1.

A model of affect and cognition in strategic decision-making.

discrete effect on cognitive functioning which underpins strategic management and decision-making, which is based on a process of matching organizational goals with events and contingencies in the environment. These decisions are ultimately reflected in the nature of the organizational

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goals that are set by the strategy maker for the organization as a whole which, in turn, generate intra-organizational affective events. We propose in particular that affective states influence the content or valence of the cognitive processes that are involved in strategic decision making, as well as the information processing style used to formulate strategic decisions. In the remainder of this article, we discuss each of the elements of Fig. 1 in turn, beginning with the antecedents of affect.

ANTECEDENTS OF AFFECT IN ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS As we have noted earlier, the analysis we present here is founded on the principles of AET (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). The crux of AET is that elements of the organizational environment that are perceived to facilitate or to impair an organizational member’s progress toward workplace goals (i.e., experienced hassles or uplifts, often in response to events derived from top managers’ strategic decisions) lead to transient positive or negative affective responses (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). In the traditional sense of AET, however, events are construed to be intra-organization, and include stress-related workplace events (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988), elements of the physical setting (e.g., see Wasserman, Rafaeli, & Kluger, 2000), work-group characteristics (see Barsade, 2002), and leader–member relationships and exchange (Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002). In this essay, however, we extend Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) analysis of affective events to include extra-organizational events that impact on the organization as a whole. These are described in the following paragraphs. Organizational Change Organizational change has been identified as a major source of stress for managers and employees (Mak & Mueller, 2001; Mack, Nelson, & Quick, 1998; Weiss, 2002). In recent years, researchers have studied organizational members’ emotional responses to a variety of organizational change situations such as downsizing (Brockner, 1988; Torkelson, & Muhonen, 2003), mergers (Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991), job redesign (Mak & Mueller, 2001), and others associated with organizational restructuring (Begley, 1998; Everly, 1999). Collectively, this research demonstrates that organizational change causes chronic occupational stress

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that has carry-over effects on family functioning (Dowd & Bolus, 1998), psychological health (Everly, 1999), physical health (Torkelson & Muhonen, 2003), job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and loyalty (Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991). There are several social, cognitive and psychological consequences of organizational change that have a negative impact upon employees’ affective wellbeing. Organizational restructuring is associated with decreased job security (Ashford, Lee, & Bobko, 1989; Jordan, Ashkanasy, & Ha¨rtel, 2002), role conflict (Yousef, 2000), ambiguity and uncertainty (French, 2001), and decreased social support as work teams are redistributed (Swanson & Power, 2001). While the impact of organizational change on employees’ affective wellbeing is negative in the short-term, organizational restructuring and innovation is necessary for organizations to adapt to changing environmental demands in order to remain competitive. Furthermore, if the outcome of organizational restructuring is increased efficiency, promotion, increased wages or increased social support, then organizational change may have a positive impact on employee’s affect (Begley, 1998). For example, technological change is associated with increased efficiency, decreased administrative burden and, as a result, has been found to increase job satisfaction and wellbeing (Begley, 1998). Affective responses during the process of organizational change are therefore dependent upon the nature of organizational change, and exposure to or involvement in organizational change. While organizational change may, in the longer term, result in positive outcomes for the organization and the personal wellbeing of its members, the majority of research suggests that employees associate organizational change with negative emotional responses (French, 2001). As such, we propose that organizational events, which may be economic, legal, political, technological, or socio-cultural, pose a real or perceived threat to organizational functioning, and may impact upon the affective states of organizational participants, as these events are associated with organizational adaptation and, consequently, change. As discussed in the following, however, organizational events that are external to the workplace environment, and that affect organizational performance, may have a more direct impact upon the emotions of the top management team, for whom organizational goals are synonymous with workplace performance, which we argue is therefore an important personal goal for these managers. Since strategic management in organizations is primarily the responsibility of top management, it is important to understand the impact of organizational events on the affect of top-management team members, as it is likely to impact upon their strategic management related decisions and behaviors.

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Economic, Legal, and Political Events Research by Loewenstein and his colleagues (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004; Loewenstein, 2000) has demonstrated, especially through studies of the ‘‘endowment effect,’’ that emotional reactions to economic decisions play a central role in economic decision making and behavior. While much of this research has focused on individual behavior, senior managers involved in economic decisions affecting their organization are not going to be immune from the affective consequences of their decisions. In the endowment effect, for instance (Loewenstein & Issacharoff, 1994), ‘‘endowed’’ economic benefits come to be viewed as entitlements, even when the recipient was not expecting to receive anything. Loewenstein and his colleagues have demonstrated that this process is driven not by cognitive appraisal, but by deeply embedded affective reactions that drive subsequent decision-making. On the broader scale, events that impact organizations are also derived from the wider political, legal, and economic milieu in which modern organizations exist. Venkataraman and Van de Ven (1998), for instance, found that managers experiencing ‘‘environmental jolts’’ experience a range of effects, including emotional reactions, that led to a radical restructuring of business relationships. Similarly, Keck and Tushman (1993) reported that executive teams reacted to environmental jolts by engaging in radical change and reorientation. Although neither of these studies dealt with affective reactions specifically, both carry the implication that ‘‘jolts’’ result in spontaneous and often quite radical responses from top management that are clearly driven, at least in the first instance, by initial affective reactions. Meyer (1982), who introduced the term ‘‘environmental jolt’’ in a study of strategic reactions to changes in the healthcare industry, documented reactions to the changing administrative and legal environment that were clearly affective in their manifestation.

Inter-Organizational Negotiation Inter-organizational negotiation is a process by which parties with different preferences and goals allocate resources through interpersonal activity (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thompson, 1990). Negotiations give rise to either positive or negative affective states depending on the extent to which the negotiating parties are achieving individual goals (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1987; Ortony, Clore, &

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Collins, 1988). As such, if the process of negotiating a desired outcome is swifter than expected, positive affect may arise in the negotiator. On the other hand, if the negotiator evaluates the other party’s behavior as impeding progress towards the negotiation of desired outcomes, negative emotions emerge (Kumar, 1997). In summary, while research in respect of affective reactions to external environmental events is not as extensive or as detailed as the research relating to events in the internal environment, the three aspects of the environment that we have discussed above provide sufficient indicative evidence to justify our assertion that events external to the organization do, indeed, constitute affective events. In particular, there are the events that are arguably likely to have the most impact on the top management teams, who have responsibility for strategic decision-making (e.g., as evidenced in Keck & Tushman, 1993).

CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE EVENTS FOR COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR A key component of AET is that organizational members’ cognitions and behavior at work are much more likely to be affected by the way they feel on a moment-to-moment basis than by stable belief systems or previously formed attitudes about those workplace events (Fisher, 2000; Weiss, Nicholas, & Daus, 1999). Furthermore, an essential property of emotions is that they constitute ‘‘action tendencies’’ to engage in specific forms of behavior directed towards the reversal or maintenance of the felt affective state (Frijda, 1986). As Frijda observes, ‘‘Emotions, then, can be defined as modes of relational action readiness, either in the form of tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt a relationship with the environment or in the form of relational readiness as such’’ (p. 71). Weiss and Cropanzano refer to behavior that is motivated by emotional state as being ‘‘affect-driven,’’ as opposed to ‘‘judgment-driven.’’ Typical negative affect-driven behaviors include emotional outbursts, sensation-seeking behaviors such as risk-taking and rule-breaking (Ashkanasy, Ha¨rtel, & Daus, 2002). Research has shown, however, that specific emotional states lead to specific action tendencies and thus different affect-driven behavior (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000). In the following section of this article, therefore, we deal with the effects of different emotions, with reference to the specific action tendencies that

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each emotion has been observed to provoke. We focus on five basic emotions identified by Ekman (1984).1

Emotion and Action Tendencies The impact of incidental emotions on an individual’s reactions to and evaluations of unrelated events is well documented (for a review, see Loewenstein & Lerner, 2002). Although emotions function to help the individual respond to the emotion-eliciting event, action tendencies associated with specific emotions persist beyond the target situation, and affect behaviors in subsequent situations (Forgas, 1995; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). It is important, therefore, to understand how specific emotions elicited within or outside the organization may affect behavior, cognition, and decision-making processes within the organizational context. Anger The emotion of anger is triggered by an event or object in the environment that is perceived to be a demeaning offence against oneself or one’s own (Lazarus, 1991). As such, anger provokes the action tendency to preserve or to enhance self-esteem against assault. Although it is often inhibited for personal and social reasons, the innate action tendency in anger is attack on the agent held to be blameworthy for the offence (Averill, 1980, 1982, 1983). Accordingly, this action tendency is facilitated by heightened physiological arousal (increased heart rate, adrenal secretions, sweat gland activity) in aid of action readiness. In a state of anger, there is an increased likelihood of impulsive behavior (Parrott & Zeichner, 2003) and social or personal risk taking (Harmon-Jones, 2003). Lerner and Keltner (2001) found in an experimental study that angry people express more optimistic risk assessments and display more risk-seeking behavior. This finding is consistent with Lerner and Keltner’s (2000) appraisal tendency theory, according to which anger is associated with perceived certainty and control over the outcomes of behaviors and decisions. Alternatively, Bushman, Baumeister, and Phillips (2001) propose that risk-taking behavior is a form of mood repair. It may also be the case that risky decision-making associated with anger is a manifestation of a need to exert control over the environment that has, in an unrelated incident, caused offence or harm (Follingstad, Bradley, Helff, & Laughlin, 2002).

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Sadness Sadness is triggered by a real or perceived absence or loss, or threat of loss (Ekman, 1984). Sadness, as opposed to anger, is not characterized by heightened action readiness and physiological arousal. While anger and other emotions such as fear/anxiety and disgust are associated with psychological engagement and activity, sadness involves resignation and disengagement. Sadness is accompanied by the appraisal tendency for helplessness in the face of irrevocable loss. Correspondingly, sadness evokes the implicit goal of changing personal circumstances (Lerner et al., 2004; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2002). As such, sadness is also associated with increased willingness to spend money compulsively (Faber & Christenson, 1996). Lerner et al. (2004) found that experimentally induced sadness was associated with decreased selling prices and increased buying prices. While these results were explained in terms of a change in situation, the dispositional variable, openness to change, may also be associated with mood repair (Erber & Erber, 2001). Furthermore, while negative affect is generally associated with increased vigilance in behavioral decision making and increased social motivation (Forgas, 2002), the feeling of helplessness and lack of control that is characteristic of sadness has been found to decrease risk aversion, as the consequences of decisions are more likely to be attributed to situational rather than personal factors (DeSteno et al., 2000). Disgust Disgust involves a strong, innate impulse to avoid or to be rid of something offensive. According to Keltner and Haidt (1999), the social function of disgust is to facilitate avoidance or removal of noxious or aversive stimuli that poses a threat to wellbeing. Accordingly, disgust is associated with an acute psycho-physiological response and intensified action readiness, corresponding to the strong desire to remove or to avoid stimuli that pose a threat to psychological, social, or physical integrity (Lazarus, 1991). As we noted above, the appraisal patterns and subsequent action tendencies triggered by an emotion-eliciting event or object may have carry-over effects in other, unrelated situations. As such, disgust elicited by an object or event unrelated to a workplace event may nevertheless affect the way in which one appraises and responds to a workplace situation. Lerner et al. (2004) recently demonstrated the way in which disgust induced by a movie could influence subsequent financial decisions. Since disgust induces the action tendency to expel, Lerner and her colleagues hypothesized and found that experimentally induced disgust reduced the selling prices set by participants who owned the experimental object. This finding is consistent

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with findings that disgust is associated with an increased sensitivity for threat and resistance to change (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993). As such, in an organizational setting, disgust may affect strategic management and decision-making processes since the risks associated with innovation or organizational change become exaggerated. Fear/Anxiety While fear and anxiety are not synonymous emotions, they nonetheless share a common action tendency: avoidance or escape (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Suesser, 1994; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Hence, the psycho-physiological correlates of these emotions are arousal and action readiness, intensified in the case of fear. In effect, fear relates to a knowable object, while anxiety results from ambiguity, where threat is posed by a lack of certainty regarding future states and possible outcomes for individual wellbeing. As such, while they share an action tendency for escape, accompanied by physiological arousal, the specific behavioral manifestation of fear is certain avoidance (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). In a state of anxiety, on the other hand, there is no concrete harm to avoid or to flee, and thus it is an action tendency without a certain goal or anything specific from which to escape. As such, the behavioral correlates of anxiety are more diffuse, and the effects of anxiety on behavior more pervasive and enduring (Lazarus, 1991). Fear and anxiety arise from and evoke appraisals of uncertainty and lack of situational control. In contrast to anger, fear and anxiety are associated with pessimistic assessments of environmental conditions. People in a state of fear and anxiety therefore tend to exhibit the reverse action tendency; rather than demonstrating optimistic judgments of risk, they exhibit a tendency to be risk-averse and to demonstrate pessimistic situation appraisals (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). This action tendency is best explained by the ‘‘affect-as-information model’’ proposed by Schwarz (1990). According to this model of behavior, emotions act as a source of information about the environment. In this case, anxiety or fear signals environmental threat. Thus, strategic managers feeling anxiety or fear are likely to engage in more vigilant behavioral monitoring and to assess of risk more negatively (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischoff, 2005). Joy/Happiness Happiness and joy are positive emotions that arise out of the attainment of a goal (Ekman, 1984). Joy is a more intense form of happiness, and is associated with the unexpected attainment of a personal goal. According to

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Lazarus (1991), it is the degree to which the goal-congruent event is incongruent with expectations that determines the intensity of positive emotion experienced. Happiness associated with contentment of expected outcomes is, therefore a milder and less arousing variant; whereas joy, which extends to ecstasy, can be a powerful and even intoxicating emotion. In this respect, intense pleasure or joy is intoxicating insofar as it impairs cognitive functioning and behavioral inhibition (Diamond & Aspinwall, 2003; Silvia, 2003). As is the case with intense negative emotions such as anger, the joyful person is in a heightened state of physiological arousal which motivates action and facilitates impulsive behaviors and decision-making (Isen, 2000). A large body of work in both laboratory and organizational settings indicates that happiness and joy promote helpful and sociable behavior towards others, reduce interpersonal conflict, and lead to a tendency towards cooperative behavior (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Isen, 1987; Isen & Baron, 1991). At the same time, happiness and joy are also associated with optimistic assessments of environmental risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). As is the case with anger, Lerner and Keltner (2001) found that happiness induces appraisals of certainty and perceived control over the environment, and also that people in a happy state are more likely to make risky decisions. In summary of the five basic emotions discussed above, it is clear that each has an identifiable and discrete effect on organizational members. Anger, sadness, and joy/happiness appear to promote increased risk taking, although through different mechanisms. Disgust, fear, and anxiety, on the other hand, appear to lead to more risk-adverse approaches. In this respect, affective events – derived either internal to the organization or externally – have different effects depending on which particular emotion is evoked. Finally, we note that, while anger and joy are the emotions most likely to be associated with impulsive emotional behavior and decisions, any of the emotions we have described can result in impulsiveness (see Ashkanasy, 2003; Goleman, 1995). In this instance, emotional activation may result in impulsive decision-making that short-circuits the cognitive processes altogether – shown in Fig. 1 as the dashed curved line we mentioned earlier. In addressing strategic management and decision-making, however, there is presumption that decisions will be made after at least a modicum of thought (although recent disclosures in the press leave even this presumption in doubt in many instances). Our main focus, then, is on the effects of affect on the cognitive-rational processes of strategic decision-making. In this respect, Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) note that an individual’s affective states give rise to ‘mental readiness’ or cognitive processing tendencies that influence

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judgment-driven behaviors. Judgment-driven behaviors involve the conscious evaluation of environmental information. The key distinction between affect-driven and judgment-driven behavior is that that judgment-driven behavior takes place in complex and ambiguous situations that require the use of active, constructive information processing strategies. Judgment-driven behaviors are commonly, although not necessarily, strategic. That is, they purport to maintain or to facilitate adaptation to environmental demands. As such, individuals are motivated by the consequences of their judgment to use controlled cognition in the formulation and implementation of that decision. In addition, judgment-driven behaviors are those that require actors to perceive, to integrate, and to assess complex environmental information, and involve inferential processes that often require actors to go beyond the information given. In the organizational environment, examples of judgmentdriven, or strategic behaviors, include risk assessment, performance evaluation, economic transactions such as substantial acquisitions and mergers, and other intra-organizational negotiations with consequences for organizational performance. While the carry-over effects of discrete emotions on affect-driven behavior are well documented, as reviewed above, the impact of discrete emotions on strategic or judgment-driven behavior (complex cognitive processing) is relatively less known. The majority of research into the impact of affective states on strategic behavior has focused on the impact of positive and negative mood states on information processing strategies used in behavioral decision-making processes that precede strategic behavior. Positive and negative moods are associated with different cognitive styles, which influence the strategic decision-making processes and subsequent behavior.

Mood and its Effect on Cognitive Processing Research initially suggested that people experiencing positive affect tend to employ less effortful and more superficial processing strategies, reach decisions more quickly, use less information, avoid demanding, systematic thinking, and are more confident about their decisions. In contrast, negative affect seemed to trigger a more effortful, analytic, and vigilant processing style (Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990). More recent studies, moreover, have demonstrated that positive affect also produces distinct processing advantages. People in a positive mood are more likely to adopt more creative, open, constructive, and flexible cognitive

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processing styles (Bless, 2000; Fiedler, 2000; Isen, 1987, 2002). Based on such evidence, Fiedler and Bless (2000) argued that the processing consequences of affect are best understood in terms of a fundamental dichotomy between ‘‘accommodation’’ and ‘‘assimilation.’’ Accommodation involves focusing on the demands of the external world (Fiedler & Bless, 2000). In information processing terms, this requires exhaustive processing and careful attention to and conservation of external stimulus material (Forgas, 2002). Assimilation is a complementary process wherein the individual relies on well-established internal knowledge-schemas and behavioral scripts to respond to a situation (Fiedler & Bless, 2000). In contrast to accommodation processing strategies, assimilation involves the active cognitive elaboration and transformation of information using internal knowledge structures (Bless, 2000; Fiedler, 2000, 2001). Most cognitive tasks, including strategic decision-making, involve both accommodation and assimilation in different proportions. Frijda (1986) and Higgins (1987) suggest that the extent to which environmental information and strategic responses are deliberated corresponds to the adaptive significance of the decision. That is, if the prospect of an actor’s decision having aversive consequences does not pose a significant risk to organizational functioning, then assimilative processing strategies are more likely to be employed than accommodative. Thus, positive affective information tends to promote a more assimilative, schema-based, top–down processing style, whereas negative affect induces a more accommodative, bottom-up, and externally focused processing strategy (Bless, 2000; Fiedler, 2000). Despite strong cumulative empirical support for the forgoing mood effects, experimental research shows that these models are context-dependent. Sometimes positive and negative affective states will not influence peoples’ thoughts, or may have incongruent mood effects (Parrott & Sabini, 1990; Sedikides, 1994). For example, Forgas (1990, 1991) and others (Berkowitz, Jaffee, Jo, & Troccoli, 2000; Fiedler, 1991) reported that the affective impact on information processing strategies was easily eliminated when a response could be based on reproducing prior reactions or when motivational goals came to dominate responding. Research by Forgas (1995) demonstrates that the impact of positive and negative affect on cognitive processing is also task-dependent. According to the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) Forgas (1995), supported by substantial empirical research, the influence of transient affective states on thoughts and subsequent behaviors depends on the way information is processed, and the cognitive strategy by which information is processed depends upon the complexity and familiarity of the task at hand.

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Clearly, this point is critical in our discussion of the role of affect in strategic management. The Affect Infusion Model: Mood Effects Depend On Task Complexity The central argument of the AIM is that affect infusion should only occur in circumstances that promote an open, constructive processing style, and that affective cognitive processing strategies are determined by factors relating to the task, situation, person, and affective state. Forgas (1995) identified four alternative processing strategies (described below) that differ in terms of two basic dimensions: the degree of effort exerted in seeking an adaptive response to the situation, and the degree of openness and constructiveness of the information search strategy (Forgas, 1995). The combination of these two affect cognition dimensions of quality (effort) and quantity (constructiveness) produces four distinct processing styles: (1) direct access (low effort, closed – not constructive), (2) motivated processing (high effort, closed), (3) heuristic processing (low effort, open – constructive), and (4) substantive processing (high effort, open). According to the AIM, affect infusion is most likely to occur when an open processing strategy is used, such as substantive or heuristic processing. In contrast, affect should not influence the outcomes of closed, merely reconstructive or goal-directed decisions involving motivated or direct-access processing (see also Forgas, 1991, 2002). Importantly, the AIM makes the ostensibly counterintuitive prediction that affect infusion should be greater the more substantive and constructive the information search (Forgas, 1995). This phenomenon is explained by affective priming theory (Forgas & Bower, 1987). Based on the affectpriming model, originally conceptualized by Bower (1981), affect is an integral component of our cognitive schemas about the social world. That is, memories for social stimuli are associated with a particular affect value (positive or negative). As such, when in a positive or negative affective state, and especially when experiencing a particular emotion, access to memories, ideas, thoughts, and biases that are associated with this affective state are cognitively primed such that access to these knowledge stores is facilitated. Affect priming in complex or demanding situations, in which substantive processing would be used, has been confirmed in numerous laboratory and field studies (Fiedler & Stroehm, 1986; Forgas, 1992, 1993; Forgas & Bower, 1987). Now, organizational decision-making is characterized, in top management roles at least, by high risk, complexity, and incomplete information. Organizational decision-making therefore requires constructive, substantive

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processing (Daly & Weimann, 1994). Following the AIM, therefore, strategic decision-making in organizations, which is judgment driven, should demonstrate ‘‘mood-congruent’’ effects. In other words, the decision making processes of strategic managers are likely to be affected by their current mood state. Note that this also implies, contrary to the way that strategic management is often thought about, that strategic management decision-making involves more, rather than less affect than decisions made at lower levels in organizations, where the decisions are likely to be less complex and less risky. To this point in our discussion, based on AET, we have discussed the antecedents of affect from the perspective of intra- and extra-organizational affective events and the consequences of affect and emotion on behavior and cognition, with a focus on top-management. As we have already discussed, however, cognitive processes in strategic management are complex and often involve more than one stage of thought. In the next section of this essay, therefore, we examine in more detail the cognitive processes underpinning strategic management, and make more explicit the role of effect in these processes.

COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT In developing a framework for understanding cognitive processes involved in strategic management, it is necessary first to define what is meant by cognition in the organizational context, and then to distinguish between behavioral and organizational contexts. Drawing from cognitive science (Johnson-Laird, 1983), we define cognition as a process of information processing. Individuals perceive, interpret, and respond to their environmental information by assimilating and accommodating external events or objects into internal symbolic representations or mental models (Ocasio, 2001). Mental models in this context comprise working, integrated symbolic representations of goals, data, inferences, and plans that enable the actor to interpret and to attend to environmental stimuli, construct inferences, and ultimately to make decisions (see Ocasio, 2001). In order to understand organizational cognition or, more specifically, cognitive processes within organizations, we must also identify our conceptualization of organization, for there are competing perspectives in this respect. Based on Weick (1977), we see organizations to be defined as

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social systems in which the behaviors and cognitions of members are regulated and influenced by its rules, resources, expectations, and relations. Organizational cognition, therefore, refers to the thoughts and decisions of individuals within the organizational context, such that the schemas, resources, expectations, and decision rules that they use to frame their interpretation of the organizational environment are shared by all organizational members. This is because all members of an organization share common social, cultural, economic, and physical conditions and experiences, which ultimately shape the experiences and heuristics of the organizational environment, and regulate or structure the way in which events are interpreted within the organizational environment (Weick, 1977). In the following, we describe the processes involved in strategic organizational decision making, which are derived from models of organizational cognition. We integrate these various processes into three phases of strategic decision-making: perception, formulation, and implementation. While it is clear that strategic decision-making is neither rational nor linear, research converges upon these three phases of information processing (Langley et al., 1995). Finally, it needs to be understood that strategic decision making is an iterative process (represented in Fig. 1 by the feedback loops), so these phases may be repeated several times as decision alternatives are implemented and adjusted as the success or failure of each alternative is gauged (Daniels, 1999; Hodgkinson, 2002).

Perception Perception involves two stages. First, recognition of environmental and organizational events signals a need for organizational adaptation. The second phase involves interpretation of the perceived signal, event, or stimulus. We deal with each stage in the following paragraphs. Recognition According to Weick (1979), strategic decision-making is triggered by the recognition of an environmental event, or an opportunity or threat to the attainment of organizational goals. The recognition of opportunity or threat requires managers to attend to fluctuations in the external organizational environment (economic, socio-cultural, political, legal, or technological) and to locate key issues that may influence organizational performance. The perception of environmental events of significance to the adaptive success of the organization is an active and constructive process

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(Weick, 1979). As humans, we have a limited attention, storage, and information processing capacity, which means that we cannot attend to all available environmental information at once (March & Simon, 1958). Consequently, managers rely on mental models, or schematized knowledge of organizational processes and organization–environment interactions, to facilitate the recognition of potentially beneficial or threatening organizational events (Maule & Hodgkinson, 2002). The perception of issues for strategic consideration is thus biased by a manager’s existing strategic decision-making heuristics and rules of responding that are based on experience of environmental patterns and exposure to organizational norms of decision-making behavior (Ocasio, 2001). Organizations also possess a repertoire of issue categories for making sense of the organizational environment: problems, opportunities, and threats. Organizational participants possess a cultural repertoire of possible problems, opportunities, and threats that have been encountered in the past, both by the organization and in its environment (Hutchins, 1995; Schein, 1985). As cultural products, the issues that are recognized by the organization are reflected in the technology, archives, documents, education, vocabulary, experience, and narratives that constitute individuals, and collectively, organizational memory (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Interpretation Bias in judgment and decision-making processes is not exclusive to the recognition of environmental events or perception of risk. Once attention is focused upon the event, the significance or meaning of that event must be interpreted, and the risk associated with the event assessed (Daniels, 1999). That is, it must be considered whether the stimuli is of adaptive significance, in the sense that failure to respond to the event will result in a failure to meet organizational goals. Furthermore, the extent of the opportunity or threat to the organization posed by the perceived event must be assessed. This process of evaluating the strategic significance of the environmental events determines the extent to which organizational resources will be allocated and expended in the formulation of a strategic response (Hodgkinson, 2002).

Formulation After perceiving the issue, the next phase of cognition involves formulation of a decision approach. Like perception, this phase also involves two

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sequential stages: (1) information search and (2) information evaluation. We discuss each of these stages next. Information Search Information search is the process whereby information – required to respond accurately to the event – is obtained, and a range of alternative decision responses are generated. In order to generate accurate and effective responses to the opportunity or threat, the costs and benefits, and associated risk of each decision alternative must be considered. Information search involves the retrieval of new and stored information regarding the organizational event. Information is retrieved from levels of the organizational memory, including individual memory or knowledge bases, group memory, and institutional memory (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). A critical aspect of information search is that, like issue recognition and interpretation, it is limited by attentional capabilities and resources (Ocasio, 2001; Pashler, 1988; Simon, 1976). Information search in organizations is therefore affected by selectivity or direction, and intensity or effort involved in the search (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Information searches are exhaustive, limited by resource constraints and informational source constraints. Thus the information that is retrieved is biased by method and extent of the search. Information Evaluation Information evaluation is the next phase of strategic formulation. It is the process by which a strategic response is formulated in light of the available information. Information is evaluated, and integrated into the formulation of a strategy. In effect, the decision-maker needs to decide upon a preferred strategy amongst the feasible and available alternatives identified in the information search phase. In this respect, Scott and Bruce (1995), define four styles of evaluation: (1) rational, (2) intuitive, (2) dependent, or (4) avoidant. Using a rational evaluation style, the decision-maker evaluates alternatives using defined criteria to determine the optimal solution (Simon, 1987). In the intuitive approach, evaluation of alternatives is based upon hunches of heuristics, although these can be affected by inherent biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The dependent style involves consultation with others, while the avoidant style implies procrastination. Choice of evaluation style is affected by situational contingencies, including affective states. Beach and Mitchell (1978), for example, propose that choice of an analytical approach depends on the

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availability of analytical tools. Finally, dispositional traits can also play an important role in the determination of the evaluation approach (Gallen, 1997).

Implementation The implementation of a strategic organizational response to environmental demands requires the coordination of several individuals, groups, and leaders (Porter, 1987). In the same way that the implementation of a behavioral response requires attentional resources to coordinate action, an organizational response requires the careful attention of management to monitor implementation and to maintain progress toward the intended goal. Implementation of strategic decisions is an iterative process that, in itself, involves strategic decision processes, similar to those we have outlined above (Daniels, 1999). Managers must perceive the impact of decision implementation on the organizational environment, recognizing and interpreting issues as they arise, and in response to issues of implementation, managers must formulate alternative responses, based on information search and evaluation. Having established to this point the primary phases of cognition involved in strategic decision-making, the question arises as to the impact of on this process. We address this in the following section.

THE IMPACT OF AFFECT ON STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING As we have already pointed out, strategic management and decision making involves substantive and constructive information processing of novel and ill-structured information in order to deal with events and contingencies in the organization’s environmental milieu. Therefore substantive information processing strategies are likely to be used (although we do allow for the possibility of impulsive affect-driven decisions, as discussed earlier). Hence, in accordance with the AIM, its affect is likely to impact on the strategic decision-making processes of perception, formulation, and implementation in a fashion congruent with the particular affective and emotional frame of the decision-making context.

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The Influence of Affect on Perceptions As discussed above, a strategic manager’s perceptions (recognition and interpretation) of organizational issues depend upon attentional resources and mental models. While temporary affective states do not alter existing mental models, they can bias allocation of attention to the interpretation of potential environmental risks. Negative affect, for example, can make the actor more likely to recognize negative environmental events (Brief, Burke, George, Robinson, & Webster, 1988). Furthermore, negative affect is associated with mood-congruent, negative interpretations of environmental cues. For example, Forgas (1998) found that positive mood produces more positive and optimistic attitudes about the success of the negotiation process, while negative affect leads to a pessimistic interpretation of progress towards the achievement of personal goals of the negotiation, and a negative attitude towards negotiating partners. Consequently, managers in a positive affective state may be more optimistic about the consequences of organizational events and perceive less environmental threat (Bower, 1981, 1991; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Schwarz & Clore, 2003). Similarly, such managers are less likely to interpret environmental events as potential threat and more likely to interpret events as opportunities (Forgas, 1995, 1998).

The Influence of Affect on Formulation Positive and negative affect have systematic effects on the interpretation of decision-relevant cues such that decision-makers selectively attend to, encode, and retrieve emotion-relevant information (Bower, 1981, 1991; Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994). Forgas (1989, 1995) suggests that positive and negative affect also determines the nature of subsequent processing, and the effort (quality) and attentional resources (quantity, or depth of processing) allocated to the information processing task (see also Forgas & Moylan, 1991). For example, studies by Basso, Schefft, Ris, and Dember (1996) and Conway and Giannopoulos (1993) found that people in negative mood states had a narrowed attentional focus, and are more goal-directed, than people in a positive affective state. In their research, people in a negative affective state were motivated to spend more time and attentional resources on information search and consideration of alternatives than people in a positive affective state, considered fewer alternatives, and evaluated decision alternatives more rapidly.

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Several theorists have posited that negative emotions trigger more systematic processing than positive emotions (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Shapiro & Spence, 1997; Simon, 1987). As discussed earlier, the affect-as-information model of affective influences on information processing explains this phenomenon in terms of the signal value of feelings. That is, negative emotions signal that threat is near, and that attentional resources need to be allocated to the situation, whereas positive emotions signal that ‘‘all is well.’’ In line with this theoretical perspective, several studies have found that negative moods are associated with vigilant, substantive, and thorough information processing (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), where as happiness is associated with heuristic processing (Forgas, 1998). For example, Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found that happiness increased reliance on the use of stereotypes, which indicated categorical and less substantive processing, or assimilative, rather than accommodative processing. As such, positive and negative affective states can impact upon depth of information search, and depth of processing and evaluation of that information. Managers in a positive affective state, therefore, would be expected to engage minimal resources in information search in order to discover or to understand the nature of organizational issues and possible responses, whereas managers in a negative affective state are more likely to engage in a more extensive and thorough search for knowledge regarding the problem, generate more decision alternatives, and evaluate these alternatives more carefully. The evaluation of decision alternatives is also influenced by mood. In the evaluation of choice decisions, Johnson and Tversky (1983) and others (Mittal & Ross, 1998; Nygren, 1998) have found systematic evidence to suggest that people in a positive affective state are more likely to choose a risky alternative with high possible gain, whereas people in a negative affective state are more risk aversive (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Note, however, as we discussed earlier, this can often depend on the particular emotion represented within the affect circumplex.

The Influence of Affect on Implementation Several researchers have shown that people in a negative affective state tend to demonstrate more vigilant behavioral monitoring and self-regulation than people in a positive affective state (e.g., see Diamond & Aspinwall, 2003). This relationship is, however, moderated by intensity of affect.

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Anger and joy, for example, are opposite in valence (negative and positive). They are, however, similar in intensity and, as found by Lerner and Keltner (2001), both are associated with illusion of control and certainty. Consequently, both anger and joy are associated with impaired behavior and self-regulation, and limited behavioral self-monitoring. Finally, in an organizational setting, affect may influence the attentional resources managers allocate to monitoring organizational processes. In a state of positive affect, managers may be less vigilant in their monitoring of decision-implementation, whereas managers in a negative affective state are more likely to expect, to recognize, and to interpret implementation procedures if they are seen to be awry. In summary, through processes of affective priming and affectas-information, moods and emotions directly impinge upon all aspects of cognitive functioning underlying strategic decision-making. This includes the perception, facilitation, and implementation stages of decision-making cognition. In the next and final substantive section of our review, we discuss the effect of two variables of personal disposition – trait affect and emotional intelligence.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS In this essay, we have presented a model of affect in strategic management and, more specifically, in the strategic decision-making process. The model is based on the principles of AET (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), where environmental events trigger affective responses that, in turn, affect cognitive and behavioral outcomes. We have extended the idea of AET to the realm of strategic management by incorporating extra-organizational events, along with intra-organizational events in the theory. In our model, moods and emotions influence the cognitive decision processes that underlie strategic management by affecting the valence of environmental evaluations, as well as the information processing style. Strategic management is fundamentally a process of cognitive and ostensibly rational decision-making. The argument that we present is that the persistent view that strategic management relies entirely on cold, rational, cognitive analysis is deficient in view of the pervasive effect that emotions and affect have on cognition. As Ashkanasy (2003) has pointed out, human cognitive functioning is ultimately at the mercy of unconscious processes of emotion based in the neurobiology of the human limbic system.

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The model that we present, however, is not meant to be a comprehensive explanation of the role of affect in strategic management. Indeed, many of the components of the theory, while based in extensive research in psychology, organizational behavior, and behavioral economics, have not yet been tested in the specific context of strategic management. Indeed, it is not hard to think of a raft of personal and environmental factors that could be included in the model (e.g., see Gallen, 1997, for discussion of the effects of personal ‘‘cognitive style’’ in strategic management). Instead, our aim has been to incorporate those factors that can be derived from the literature that bear direct relevance to the affect-cognition process, with a focus on organizational settings. As such, we believe that the model we present in this essay has implications for theory, research, and practice. Theories of strategic management have traditionally focused on behavioral and cognitive aspects of decision-making (Hodgkinson, 2002). Although some theorists, especially in organization cognition (e.g., Weick, 1979), have bemoaned the lack of an affective component to functionalist models of strategic management, only critical management scholars (e.g., Mumby & Putnam, 1992; van Maanen & Kunda, 1989) have addressed the issue of emotion in strategy formulation, but then only from a broad perspective that does not help to explain the fundamental processes of human cognition that actually drive decision-making in the context of strategic management. In this respect, we believe that the model we present in the present article represents an initial attempt to identify the ‘‘heat’’ in managerial cognition and strategic management that Weick (1979) spoke of, albeit within the limitations we outline above. Although based on a wide body of research in emotion and affect in the social psychology literature, the ideas that we put forward in this article are largely untested in the context of strategic management. Perhaps the best known research team (as cited frequently in this essay) is that led by George Loewenstein at Carnegie-Mellon University, although this research tends to be more in the domain of experimental behavioral economics, rather than addressing the larger picture of strategic management. In this respect, researchers are going to need to venture more into field settings, making use of qualitative data collection, think-aloud protocols, and diary studies. Many of the basic tenets of the theories we have presented in this article are still subject to empirical confirmation, but they are also based principally on evidence obtained in rigorous research. For example, the AIM has been tested by Forgas and his associates in a variety of settings (Forgas, 1998, 1999; Forgas & Moylan, 1991), and shown to be a robust and illuminating

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model of reality. Similarly, research based on AET has consistently supported the core idea of the theory, that emotion mediates the effect of environmentally derived affective events on organization members’ attitudes and behaviors (e.g., see Weiss et al., 1999; Weiss & Beal, 2005). In this case, we believe that the accumulating weight of evidence is already breaking down the myth that strategic management is somehow immune from the ‘‘irrationality’’ of affect and emotion. In this instance, although we disagree with the models of emotional intelligence postulated by Goleman (1995, 1998), at least he and his colleagues are acquainting managers with the need to understand that their decisions and attitudes are ‘‘infused’’ with emotion, and that understanding the role of emotion and how to manage it is a critical ingredient for a deeper and more productive understanding of strategic management.

NOTE 1. Ekman also identified ‘‘surprise’’ as a basic for of emotional expression, but notes that this is in a special category, and distinct from the other basic emotions.

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CHAPTER 2 A MATTER OF FEELING? THE ROLE OF INTUITION IN ENTREPRENEURIAL DECISION-MAKING AND BEHAVIOR Eugene Sadler-Smith, Gerard P. Hodgkinson and Marta Sinclair ABSTRACT In recent years there has been a growth of interest in the role played by intuition in entrepreneurial cognition and behavior. However, the significance of the role of affect in intuitive judgment has been underplayed by entrepreneurship researchers. In response to this theoretical and empirical shortcoming we propose recognition-primed decision-making (RPD), the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH), and dual-process theories (in particular Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory: CEST) as complementary frameworks for advancing understanding of the dynamic interplay of cognition and affect in entrepreneurial judgment and decision-making.

Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 35–55 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04002-9

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INTRODUCTION In recent years a growing number of researchers have turned their attention to the role played by intuitive judgment in entrepreneurial cognition and behavior (Acedo & Florin, 2006; Allinson, Chell, & Hayes, 2000; Chapman, 2000; Dutta & Crossan, 2005; Gaglio, 2004; Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002; Kakkonen, 2005; Mitchell, Friga, & Mitchell, 2005; Politis, 2005; Sadler-Smith, 2004; Schindehutte, Morris, & Allen, 2006). There are at least two reasons for this burgeoning interest: firstly, business venturing often encompasses a degree of uncertainty and ambiguity which decision makers alleviate by employing intuitive judgments (Khatri & Ng, 2000; Klein, 2003; Shapiro & Spence, 1997); secondly, it has long been recognized that intuition supports creativity, innovation, and foresight (Agor, 1989; Bastick, 1982; Hayashi, 2001; Isenberg, 1984; Parikh, Neubauer, & Lank, 1994; Rowan, 1986), vital ingredients for business start-up and growth (Bilton, 2007; Kirby, 2002; Ray & Myers, 1989). Mitchell et al. (2005) defined entrepreneurial intuition, as follows: ‘‘The dynamic process by which entrepreneurial alertness cognitions interact with domain competence (e.g., culture, industry, specific circumstances, technology, etc.) to bring to consciousness an opportunity to create new value’’ (p. 667). Their definition of entrepreneurial intuition, which incorporates the insights of a number of earlier scholarly writings, including Schneider and Detweiler (1987), Moscovitch (1989), Schacter (1989), and Gordon (1992), provides a useful basis for theorizing the attributes of, and antecedents to, entrepreneurial intuition. A central message of the present chapter, however, is that contemporary theory and research on entrepreneurial intuition has much to gain by drawing upon more recent advances in social cognition, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience in order to formulate a more complete explanation of the role of intuition and affect in the entrepreneurial process. Specifically, we seek to address the role played by affectively charged judgments – the phenomenon popularly known as ‘‘gut feel’’ – in entrepreneurial cognition and behavior. We propose recognition-primed decision-making (RPD) (Klein, 1998, 2003), the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997), and cognitiveexperiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994) as complementary frameworks for advancing understanding of the dynamic interplay of cognition and affect in entrepreneurial judgment and decision-making.

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RECOGNITION-PRIMED DECISION-MAKING Critiques of rational analysis in organizational decision-making can be traced back at least as far as the writings of AT&T executive Chester I. Barnard in the appendix to his book The Functions of the Executive (Barnard, 1938). In this treatise entitled ‘‘The mind in everyday affairs,’’ based on a lecture he gave to the engineering faculty at Princeton, Barnard drew a distinction between ‘‘logical mental processes’’ and ‘‘nonlogical mental processes.’’ The former encapsulated conscious thinking (i.e., reasoning) expressible in words or other symbols. He maintained that individuals processed knowledge within the nonlogical mode of cognition unconsciously or without conscious effort. Hence, by definition, nonconscious processes could not be analyzed reliably through self-reflection. Barnard’s explanation of these processes was, not surprisingly, limited with regard to its level of scientific rigor. It was not until some 20 years later that Herbert Simon, through his notion of ‘‘bounded rationality’’ (Simon, 1957), built upon Barnard’s insights to develop a plausible account of the role of intuition in decision-making. Given the cognitive limitations of decision makers, relative to the complexity of their environments, human behavior is intendedly rational, but only in so far as this is possible within the bounds of the human information-processing system; hence, human beings ‘‘satisfice’’ rather than maximize in decision-making. Simon (1957) argued that decision makers set a minimally acceptable standard that must be met, and search only until the first available alternative is found that meets that threshold criterion (see also: March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1989, 1997). Simon’s position on the role that intuition plays is summarized thus: ‘‘Intuition and judgment – at least good judgment – are simply analyses frozen into habit and the capacity for rapid response through recognition’’ (Simon, 1987, p. 63). According to this view, experts store pertinent information in long-term memory in the form of coherent patterns, expert judgment being a product of pattern recognition. Simon (1987) also acknowledged the role of emotion in decision-making, but concluded that ‘‘emotion-driven intuition’’ results in ‘‘irrational decisions.’’ It should be noted that in this conception intuitions are neither emotion-driven nor emotional decisions. Simon’s view of intuition as ‘‘analyses frozen into habit’’ or pattern recognition is commensurate with the perspective of naturalistic decisionmaking (NDM). The latter approach examines the ways in which people use their experience to make decisions in field settings (as opposed to the

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artificial laboratory settings employed in other areas of decision research) under critical conditions (Klein, 1997; Zsambok, 1997). In other words, emphasizing the crucial role of situation awareness in field settings, NDM researchers focus upon the ways in which decision makers deploy intuitive processing in situ in circumstances where the opportunity to engage in deliberative, reasoned analysis is limited by pressures of time, complexity, and incompleteness of information. By way of illustration, Gary Klein and his colleagues have examined the decision choices made by highly experienced firefighters in the US Army. This body of work, which gave rise to the development of the RPD model, has shown that such individuals do not necessarily follow a rational choice model in which several options are identified and weighed-up at each stage in the process. Instead, many of the respondents in Klein’s studies identified a single course of action and followed it through: Fire-fighters in a one storey building which is on fire: the commander and his team spray the fire with water but the fire roars back at them. This just doesn’t fit with experience. They try again – and again dousing with water doesn’t work – the fire flares back. The commander senses something is not right. He decides to order his team to leave the building immediately. Seconds later the floor they had been standing on collapses – unbeknownst to them the building had a basement and this is where the fire was emanating from. (Klein, 1998, p. 32)

In this case the fire ground commander, as a result of learning, experience, and accumulated expertise had an extensive knowledge base stored as complex associations and action scripts which afforded him a highly tuned awareness of the situation. Consequently, the commander had enough of a ‘‘sense of unease’’ that things were ‘‘out of kilter’’ that he decided to evacuate the building immediately. At first glance, Klein’s RPD model implies a use of intuition that seems to accord closely with the analysis-frozen-into-habit view of Herbert Simon. However, a distinction exists between the understanding of intuition offered by Simon (i.e., analyses frozen into habit with the capacity for fast recognition and response) in which the issue of affect is overlooked or at least played-down, and more recent conceptions (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005), in which the role played by affect in intuitive judgment is given a greater emphasis. Commensurate with the latter view it is clear from the case studies upon which Klein’s RPD model is based that affect is also of vital importance. This is the case, for example, when an experienced decision maker’s contextual awareness results in a particular combination of cues not ‘‘feeling’’ right, but without him or her being able to say why. Decision makers involved

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in the sorts of life-or-death situations examined by NDM researchers are often unable to reflect upon the reasoning mechanisms underpinning their judgments. Indeed, in a number of such cases decision makers have even been known to misattribute their success to extra-sensory perception (ESP) rather than their own underlying expertise (Klein, 1998, p. 33). However, not withstanding the undoubted value of the RPD model as an explanation of expert intuition in field settings, a more complete account needs to embrace a wider conception of intuition than that offered by Klein (1998, 2003). It should recognize the fact that decision makers base their judgments not only on cognitive responses but also on affective responses, underpinned by distinct neural mechanisms.

THE SOMATIC MARKER HYPOTHESIS At a psychological level, a preliminary understanding of affect’s role in intuitive judgment has benefited significantly from research in cognitive neuroscience and related fields that has explored the somatic aspects of decision-making. For example, Bechara et al. (1997) compared the performance on a high-risk gambling task of normal participants and patients with damage to the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) – a brain region implicated in the induction of emotions. Damage to the VMPC region can result in the impoverishment of ‘‘decision-making apparatus to a dramatic degree’’ (Damasio, 1999, p. 280). In an experimental setting, Bechara et al. (1997) observed that normal participants (i.e., ones without damage to the prefrontal cortex) began to choose advantageously before they were consciously aware which strategy worked best; moreover, they generated anticipatory skin conductance responses (SCRs) before they exercised a risky choice and before they became consciously aware of the strategy they were adopting. In contrast, patients with prefrontal cortex damage continued to choose disadvantageously; even after they realized the correct strategy, they failed to demonstrate any anticipatory SCRs. These mechanisms are not only implicated in the processing of emotionally arousing tasks, but also in several higher-order cognitive activities, such as planning and decision-making (Adolphs & Damasio, 2001). It is also worth noting that the amygdala, as well as the VMPC, is involved in processing that is automatic, fast, and involuntary (Le Doux, 1996). Taken as a whole, the above findings indicate that the autonomic responses associated with intuitions based upon previous experience and emotional states have the potential to guide decision-making and outcomes

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in advance of conscious awareness. It has been argued that the intuitive system underpinning such processes may have evolved in humans earlier than did the rational system (Cappon, 1993, 1994; Epstein, 1994). Viewed from such an evolutionary perspective, the pattern of somatic and visceral signals from the body acts as a warning; these signals are adaptive in that they allow the decision maker to anticipate the ‘‘pain’’ or ‘‘pleasure’’ of particular outcomes (Bechara, 2004; Le Doux, 1996; Shafir & LeBouef, 2002). In explaining the neuro-psychological processes underpinning the SMH, Bechara (2004) proposed a ‘‘body loop’’ mechanism. According to this view, a somatic state is actually re-enacted and its signal relayed back to pertinent cortical and sub-cortical regions of the brain, i.e., those neural structures underpinning conscious and nonconscious decision processes. Previously encountered situations and stored representations thus play a key role. When an emotion has been expressed more than once, representations of it are formed in the somato-sensory and insular cortices. The body loop may be by-passed, and a fainter image of the emotional or somatic state created. Hence, bodily feedback is ‘‘imagined’’ and represented cognitively in working memory and thus influences feelings and decisions. Bechara refers to this mechanism as the ‘‘as-if ’’ loop.

COGNITIVE-EXPERIENTIAL SELF-THEORY Entrepreneurial individuals embrace change readily, identify and pursue opportunities, and generate innovative ideas, all of which are conducive to the use of intuition (Allinson et al., 2000). As highlighted above, intuition appears to operate beyond the realms of rational processes and encompasses affective elements. Hence, a plausible psychological framework for the study of intuition and affect in entrepreneurial decision-making must be capable of accommodating recent developments concerning the limits of rationality, the significance of nonconscious pattern recognition, and the role of affect in organizational decision-making. We maintain that dual-process formulations of cognition (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Gilovich, Griffith, & Kahneman, 2002) present the fields of management and entrepreneurship with such a framework. One theory, typical of dual-process conceptions more generally, that provides a particularly convenient framework for advancing understanding of the complementary roles played by analysis and intuition in entrepreneurial decision-making is the Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST),

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developed by Epstein and his colleagues (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Epstein, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Epstein, Pacini, & Norris, 1998; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Epstein et al. (1996, p. 391) maintain that: ‘‘people process information by two parallel, interactive systems’’, which interface harmoniously but operate in different ways. The rational system, falling within the realms of conscious control, is analytical in nature, whereas the experiential system operates at a nonconscious level, on the basis of affect and intuition. In this model the experiential mode acts as the default, unless the rational processing mode is consciously activated. More specifically: ‘‘The rational systemy is conscious, relatively slow, analytical, primarily verbal, and relatively affect freey The experiential systemyis preconscious, rapid, automatic, holistic, primarily nonverbal, intimately associated with affecty’’. (Pacini & Epstein, 1999, p. 972)

Epstein and his colleagues maintain that the extent to which rationalanalytical and/or experiential-intuitive processing predominates is an interactive function of dispositional and situational factors, thus implying not only a dynamic relationship between the two cognitive systems but also a complex structure within each system (for details see Sinclair, Ashkanasy, Chattopadhyay, & Boyle, 2002). This line of reasoning has found support in recent cognitive neuroscience research that has identified separate neural pathways for certain affective and cognitive processes (for further details see the discussion of the SMH, above, and: Adolphs & Damasio, 2001; Bechara, 2004; Damasio, 1994, 1999; Isen, 2000; Le Doux, 1996) and differential patterns of activation across several specific regions of the brain (Lieberman, 2000, 2007; Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004). CEST is but one of a family of dual-process theories, the essential elements of which closely resemble one another (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Gilovich et al., 2002). Indeed, such are the overall similarities among the various dual-process conceptions that Stanovich and West (2000) have proposed the generic terms System 1 and System 2, with a view to characterizing at a more general level of abstraction the basic idea that two systems underpin human cognition. The essential differences between the intuitive system (System 1) and the analytical system (System 2) are summarized in Table 1. For a more detailed summary of the distinction between these two systems in the context of fundamental psychological research on intuition see Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, and Sadler-Smith (2008).

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Table 1.

Characteristics of the Intuitive and Analytical Systems.

Intuitive System Affect-laden; comparatively fast in operation, slow in formation; parallel and holistic; involuntary; cognitively undemanding; imagistic/narrative-based; unavailable to conscious awareness

Analytical System Affect free; comparatively slow in operation, fast in formation; serial and detail-focused; intentional; cognitively demanding; abstract/symbolic-based; open to conscious awareness

Sources Epstein (1994); Lieberman (2007); Sloman (2002); Smith and DeCoster (1999); Stanovich and West (2000)

INTUITION AND AFFECT IN DECISION-MAKING Intuitions are defined as ‘‘affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, non-conscious and holistic associations’’ (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p. 40). Associations above and below the level of conscious awareness can include the level of danger or opportunity and the feelings of elation or disappointment that a particular pattern of experience may have induced in past successes or failures. One implication of this assertion is that memories may be embodied in a resonating emotion as somatic markers that can be re-activated in a context-congruent situation (Bechara, 2004; Damasio, 1994). Hence, patterns, or at least the judgments that arise from the use of those patterns, may be affect-laden. It is conceivable that intuitive judgments are differentiated in terms of the strength of the ‘‘affective tag’’ associated with the judgment (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). A continuum can be envisaged in which the nonconscious cognitive processes that support the interpretation of the relevant environmental cues, their matching with an extant pattern or the detection of a mis-match (when the decision maker recognizes that something is ‘‘out of kilter’’ or simply ‘‘doesn’t feel right’’ – see Klein, 1998) are accompanied to a greater or lesser extent by affect (i.e., an affective tag in Finucane et al.’s terminology). Our proposal for the differential strength of affect in intuitive judgments is in keeping with the argument for the importance of the affect heuristic more generally in human judgment put forward by Finucane, Slovic, and colleagues, who in turn built upon the work of Zajonc (1980). Slovic et al. (2004) suggested that we each have our own ‘‘affect pool’’ which contains positive and negative markers that consciously or unconsciously ‘‘tag’’ to

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varying degrees ‘‘all of the images in people’s minds’’ (Slovic et al., 2004, p. 314). The affect pool is implicated via an involuntary ‘‘sensing’’ process when people make a wide variety of judgments, including probability judgments (Slovic, 2000). At the onset of the decision-making process affect may assist or impede access to intuitive processing; for example, negative mood states may predispose an individual to engage in rational analyses to a greater extent (Elsbach & Barr, 1999; King, Burton, Hicks, & Drigotas, 2007; Sinclair et al., 2002). Moreover, the experiences and the associated learning through which intuitions are acquired may be affectively encoded, thus making affect an integral element of the mental models and mental simulations upon which intuition draws (cf. Forgas, 1994, 1995; Klein, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). This argument is consistent with the notion of affective tags advanced by Slovic and his colleagues. If, as argued by Slovic et al. (2004), mental representations are affectively tagged, this is likely to be as true of the mental representations that underpin entrepreneurial decisions as those underpinning other forms of decision-making. The affective charge (Dane & Pratt, 2007) or tag associated with a particular business venturing experience may be used as a short-cut in opportunity recognition and decision-making (cf. Blake, 2008, p. 47) and opportunity recognition. The question of which decisions engage the body loop and which engage the as-if loop is the subject of on-going investigations. Bechara (2004) argues that in decision-making under certainty, i.e., where the outcome is predictable and explicit, it is the as-if loop that is activated, whereas in decision-making under uncertainty, i.e., where the outcome is unpredictable or unknown and thus cannot be estimated, the body loop proper is activated. Although the detailed program of scientifically rigorous empirical work to validate this theory has yet to be undertaken, nevertheless, it seems reasonable at this juncture to speculate that the various loop mechanisms postulated by Bechara (2004), i.e., the ‘‘body loop’’ and the fainter ‘‘as-if’’ loop, might account for variations in the degree of affect accompanying intuitive-based judgments in many decision processes, including those involving the perception and judgment of new business opportunities. It is to this area of decision-making and judgment that we now turn our attention.

INTUITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP In a review of the contributions of Cantillon (1931), Schumpeter (1934), Schultz (1975), and Kirzner (1979), He´bert and Link (1989) define an

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entrepreneur as someone who specializes in taking responsibility for and making judgmental decisions that affect the location, form and use of goods, resources, and/or institutions. Successful entrepreneurs exhibit this ability with positive results in a repeated fashion, which is why Wright and colleagues call them ‘‘serial entrepreneurs’’ (Wright, Robbie, & Ennew, 1997). They are seen as symbols of ‘‘individualism, drive, and intuition’’ (Ehrlich, 1986, p. 33 emphasis added). Timmons’ definition of ‘‘entrepreneurship’’ is pertinent to our discussion of the role that cognition and affect play in entrepreneurial judgment and behavior: ‘‘yinitiating, doing, achieving and building an enterprise or organization, rather than just watching, analyzing or describing one. It is the knack for sensing an opportunity where others see chaos, contradiction and confusion’’ (Timmons, 1989, p. 1, emphasis added). Alvarez and Busenitz’s (2001) definition of entrepreneurial cognition accords with Epstein’s (1994) notion of experientiality in CEST. They define entrepreneurial cognition as ‘‘the extensive use of individual heuristics’’ built up from ‘‘key experiences and beliefs.’’ In contrast, they consider managerial cognition to be more fact-based, concerned with systematic decision-making and the structural coordination of business activities across different business units (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001, p. 758). A fundamental precept of trait-based theories of entrepreneurship is that the prototypical entrepreneur thrives on change, is adventurous, pursues opportunities, generates ideas, is proactive and innovative, and is ‘‘of necessity intuitive because of the characteristics [i.e., incomplete information, time pressure, ambiguity and uncertainty] of the environment in which they are operating’’ (Allinson et al., 2000, pp. 32–33 emphasis added). Indeed, the uniqueness of an entrepreneur’s business idea or hunch may be such that there are no historical data or clear criteria against which to evaluate its merits, and hence it may be left to intuition to fill in the gaps in knowledge (Goop, Gopalan, & Thakor, 2006). Adaman and Devine (2002, p. 341) included intuition as one aspect of the ability to ‘‘sense direction.’’ The other facets were: willingness to undertake risks; identifying and correcting mistakes; experimentation; feeding acquired experiences back into intuition; and mental flexibility (see also Cappon, 1993; Eliasson, 1990). In order to pursue an opportunity an individual must first of all be able to perceive those opportunities that have potential commercial value, and discriminate between those that are worth pursuing and those that are not. The term ‘‘entrepreneurial alertness’’ was developed by Kirzner (1979) to refer to the ‘‘insight’’ into the value of a given resource which is possessed by

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some individuals and not others. According to this view an entrepreneur’s alertness is founded not so much upon expert (subject matter) knowledge as on a tacit appreciation of the value of, and opportunities created by, a variety of factors including the environment, new or existing knowledge, technology, new products and/or services (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001); alertness is considered to encompass both the perception (noticing) and judgment (appraisal) of potential business opportunities and the attendant risks. Alertness, as expressed in terms of the operation of the intuitive system, pattern recognition, and related somatic processes, has the potential to add to our understanding of entrepreneurial intuition. For example, Baron and Ensley (2006) argue that the identification of new business opportunities is supported by pattern recognition processes ‘‘Applying pattern recognition to the identification of business opportunities, it seems possible that specific persons recognize opportunities for new ventures because they perceive connections between apparently independent events and then detect meaningful patterns in these connections’’ (Baron & Ensley, 2006, p. 1332). New patterns are to be found in a complex array of factors including advances in technology, changes in markets, shifts in government policy (Baron & Ensley, 2006). An alert entrepreneur is able to perceive a pattern that others overlook and is able to judge (without necessarily being able to articulate any explicit reasoning processes) whether or not the pattern points to a new business opportunity. In contrast with skilful managers, an entrepreneur is able to draw upon and creatively connect memories and patterns from unrelated domains (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2002/2003). This enables the formation of novel connections, a likely result of noticing (and acting upon) information on the periphery or outside of commonly accepted framings of the situations encountered (Cappon, 1993; Kahneman, 2003). One explanation for the notion of entrepreneurial alertness is to be found in the RPD formulation outlined above. Klein’s (1998, 2003) notion of pattern recognition is predicated upon the role played by the cognitive frameworks (described by Baron and Ensley as ‘‘prototypes’’) that particular individuals possess, developed through their unique life experiences. As noted by Simon (1947), Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), and others, intuition is a manifestation of expertise, and the ability of experts to exercise fast, nonconscious pattern recognition and pattern matching. For example, Simon (1997, p. 134) estimated that chess experts are likely to have internalized around 50,000 familiar patterns gained over 10 years or more of intense practice (Ericsson & Charness, 1994). With increasing

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experience an individual’s prototypes gain in clarity, richness of content and degree of focus on key attributes of the content domain and context-relevant cues (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Klein, 1998; Zsambok & Klein, 1997). Pattern recognition accounts well for the ability of an expert to ‘‘do what normally works’’ without explicit awareness of the rules of inference being employed in a given situation (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986) and without thinking consciously about action (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999). Indeed such automated processing is one of the defining features of ‘‘expert intuition.’’ This ‘‘automated expertise’’ corresponds to ‘‘recognition of a familiar situation and the straightforward but partially subconscious application of previous learning related to that situation,’’ as described by Miller and Ireland, (2005, p. 21). However, simple pattern recognition is less convincing as an explanation for the creation of novel connections, i.e., connections that characterize entrepreneurial alertness, than as an account of intuition viewed as a form of expertise. The insights provided by Dutta and Crossan (2005) are helpful in distinguishing further between expert intuition and entrepreneurial intuition. Expert intuition: (a) is based on a process of pattern recognition; (b) parallels the Kirznerian view of alertness which emphasizes the complex knowledge base of the individual; (c) is past pattern-oriented and supports idea exploitation (Crossan et al., 1999). Entrepreneurial intuition, in contrast: (a) relies less on the expert knowledge base of individuals, and more on the creative capacity to recognize gaps and identify possibilities; (b) accords with the Schumpeterian view of entrepreneurs as change agents who ‘‘initiate innovation and transformation in the economy on the basis of their intuition about the emerging future’’ (Dutta & Crossan, 2005, p. 437); (c) is future possibility-oriented and supports idea exploration (Crossan et al., 1999). Moreover, it fosters foresight as a result of the ability to perceive opportunities by quickly drawing on disparate patterns outside of decision makers’ usual boundaries (Cappon, 1993). Dutta and Crossan’s framework accords importance both to experience and to the ‘‘preconscious’’ cognitive processes that support intuition (Dutta & Crossan, 2005, p. 440). Both expert and entrepreneurial intuitions may be preverbal, for example as a precursor to insight (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Sadler-Smith, 2008) or nonverbal, for example as affective judgments for which verbalizations may only be a proxy (Crossan et al., 1999). An additional aspect of this line of inquiry has been an extension of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959) to include entrepreneurs’ cognitions, and specifically the role played by cognitive and affective shortcuts (heuristics). For example, Alvarez and

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Busenitz (2001, p. 758) argue that entrepreneurs rely on heuristics in order to make ‘‘significant leaps in their thinking’’ in the face of complex, highly ambiguous, and uncertain situations, thus enabling them to quickly make sense under such circumstances, exploit brief windows of opportunity, and adopt forward-looking approaches (see also Busenitz & Barney, 1997). Hence, intuition, as a facet of entrepreneurial cognition, has the potential to be a source of competitive advantage which is valuable, rare and difficult to imitate (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Barney, 1991). The incorporation of cognition into the RBV is an important step forward for entrepreneurship research. However one caveat in this connection is that the potentially beneficial insight afforded by viewing entrepreneurs’ unique cognitive attributes as a source of competitive advantage is undermined by assuming equivalence between ‘‘heuristic processing’’ and intuition. For example, Alvarez and Busenitz (2001) appear to use the term heuristic processing as a proxy for intuition, thus running the risk of equating intuitions (which we consider to be affectively charged judgments that arise though rapid, nonconscious, and holistic associations – see Dane & Pratt, 2007) with the volitional deployment of cognitive and affective shortcuts that can, on occasion, result in biases (Kahneman, 2003). However, as Sadler-Smith and Sparrow (2008) noted, although heuristics share some of the features of intuition (they are a fast and cognitively economical response, in terms of conscious processing, to complex problems), they are not equivalent to intitutions. Heuristics, as generally conceived, enable a deliberative, affect-free evaluation of options using minimal conscious cognitive effort (see Gilovich et al., 2002). Intuition on the other hand circumvents this process altogether; there is an absence of awareness of the processes used to arrive at a decision, and it is the affective tag posted directly into conscious awareness that serves as the criterion for choosing from among the available options. Hence, there is a difference between the direct knowing associated with intuition and the (consciously or nonconsciously) deliberative approach associated with the deployment of judgmental heuristics. This debate concerning the delineation of heuristic vs. intuitive processing is especially important given that ‘‘intuition’’ is an oft-used term, albeit at times loosely, both in the academic and practitioner entrepreneurship literatures (Champion & Carr, 2000; Diener, 2006; Ehrlich, 1986). If one accepts the view that intuitions constitute affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, nonconscious, and holistic associations (Dane & Pratt, 2007), the over-emphasis placed on cognition in entrepreneurship research has been at the expense of a more detailed analysis of the affective processes which, of necessity, accompany intuitions. The

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experientiality-based intuitive system as defined within CEST enables researchers to explain the roles of cognition and affect in entrepreneurial judgment. Moreover, the affective charge (i.e., the emotional tag) that can be inferred from the SMH is one possible means of accounting for the ‘‘gut feeling’’ that accompanies the nonconscious recognition and judgment of complex patterns, i.e., informed intuition grounded in prior learning and experience (Sadler-Smith, 2008).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS Research into entrepreneurial intuition stands to gain from the insights provided by the RPD, SMH, and dual-process theories (particularly CEST). Nonetheless, in common with other aspects of business and management, entrepreneurship cannot be considered to rely exclusively on intuition or analysis, nor indeed cognition or affect. Rather as Bird (1988) noted, entrepreneurial intentionality is best-served by two interacting and mutually reinforcing sets of processes (cf. Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007; Louis & Sutton, 1991): (a) rational, analytic, and cause-and-effect related processes structure intention and action and underlie goal setting, formal business planning, resource acquisition, and allocation; (b) intuitive, holistic, and contextual thinking support vision, hunch, an expanded view of untapped resources, and a ‘‘feeling of the potential of the enterprise’’ (Bird, 1988, p. 443). The study of intuition and of the interplay of the systems that underpin reason and affect in entrepreneurial decision-making are in their infancy; hence, many conceptual, theoretical, and methodological challenges and opportunities present themselves to entrepreneurship researchers. One priority must be the development of better psychometric instruments for the assessment of individual differences in entrepreneurial intuition. Such measures should be commensurate with dual-process conceptions. A number of the currently available instruments are found wanting on reliability and, to some extent, construct validity, grounds (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2003a, 2003b; Hodgkinson et al., 2008). Moreover, the assessment of entrepreneurial intuition must go beyond simple self-report measures of the personality predispositions indicated by instruments such as the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). Mitchell et al. (2005, pp. 669– 670) argue that researchers need to develop better ways to capture the dynamism between alertness and domain competence, and must also accommodate the investigation of both conscious and unconscious

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processes (using, e.g., verbal protocols, cognitive mapping, and conjoint analysis; see also Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002). However, due to the nonverbal nature of intuition, it is also necessary to augment such methods with procedures less dependent upon verbalization. For example, the use of a visual test that evaluates eye movements and the ability to detect patterns by peripheral scanning (Cappon, 1993) is one alternative, whilst other well-established experimental procedures measure anticipatory SCRs (Bechara et al., 1997). As well as acknowledging and incorporating the role played by affect into future entrepreneurial cognition research, a number of other vital issues need to be addressed, for example: (a) is entrepreneurial intuition learned or the result of innate dispositions and is it developable; (b) can entrepreneurs adapt their preferred styles of information-processing to accommodate the shifting contingencies that come into play in decision-making in complex, judgmental situations such as those associated with business venturing (cf. Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007) and in this connection; (c) is it possible to train nascent entrepreneurs in the vital skill of ‘‘switching cognitive gears’’ (Louis & Sutton, 1991); (d) should entrepreneurs search for partnerships to ensure that decision-making within the enterprise has the requisite mix of preferred processing styles for optimal decision-making (cf. Kirton & McCarthy, 1988); (e) to what extent and in what ways does mood influence entrepreneurs’ reliance upon intuitive judgment (cf. Baron, 2008; King et al., 2007; Seo & Barrett, 2007); (f) do entrepreneurial intuitions, as argued by Blake (2008), lead to the commercially successful exploitation of ideas for new businesses, products or services, given that successful intuitions tend to be highly visible (i.e., reported and celebrated) whilst unsuccessful intuitions are more invisible? While the study of intuition, both in general and in the entrepreneurial process, is in its infancy, significant progress has been attained, both in clarifying its nature and in identifying its psychological foundations. Dual-process theories, along with the RPD model and the SMH, have the potential to greatly advance our understanding of the complementary roles played by intuition and its counterpart, analysis, in entrepreneurial judgment, and decision-making. Furthermore, a growing body of theory and research in the field of management, organization, and entrepreneurship has begun to suggest a variety of approaches that might enable present and future generations of entrepreneurs and decision makers more generally to foster greater awareness of these fundamental processes and how the vital entrepreneurial competence of informed intuitive judgment might be harnessed more effectively.

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At the end of the day the question of whether or not intuition can be improved is an open one. The more pressing concern is whether or not entrepreneurs can be educated in order that they can understand intuition and thus to manage better their intuitive judgments in an intelligent, i.e., discerning and informed, fashion (see also Burke & Sadler-Smith, 2006; Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007; Hogarth, 2001; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004). Entrepreneurial intuition, like any other form of intuition, should be informed by prior knowledge, experience and learning, and exercised with sensitivity and awareness and, given the power that affect has to influence human judgment, caution as well.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT The financial support of the UK ESRC/EPSRC Advanced Institute of Management (AIM) Research to the second author (under Grant RES-331-25-0028) in the preparation of this article is gratefully acknowledged.

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CHAPTER 3 THE EFFECT OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COGNITIVE INTELLIGENCE ON THE SOLUTIONS GENERATED TO ILL-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS Anne E. Herman and Lisa L. Scherer ABSTRACT Many organizational problems are poorly defined, emotionally laden, and ambiguous. These types of problems rarely have one right answer and the criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of solutions is likely to be context dependent. Further, although cognitive skills are important to effective problem solving, the nature of these problems may also require emotional skills as well. This chapter presents a study which set out to determine whether emotional intelligence as an ability contributes above and beyond cognitive intelligence to the quantity, flexibility, and quality of solutions generated to ill-structured problems. Although support was not found for the notion that emotional intelligence explains the indices of solution generation beyond that of cognitive intelligence, the findings did show that emotional intelligence was a significant predictor of one of the solution metrics, namely the average resolving power of solutions across the two problems. The findings demonstrate that emotional intelligence Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 57–81 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04003-0

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and cognitive intelligence are separate constructs and suggest that caution be used in proposing the pervasive effects of emotional intelligence. In particular, the results of this study suggest that emotional intelligence may not equally influence all activities, highlighting the need to investigate which steps of the problem-solving process it does indeed impact.

INTRODUCTION Few would dispute the importance of understanding problem-solving behavior, as it is a vital activity in all organizations, and the impact of problem solving can be seen in activities such as personnel decisions and marketing strategies. Much of the research to date has focused primarily on how people process, evaluate, and choose among decision alternatives provided for them rather than examining processes and outcomes when problems are ill-structured or ill-defined (e.g., Wilson & Arvai, 2006; Zhang, Hsee, & Xiao, 2006). Ill-structured problems are defined as those with incomplete or ambiguous information presented for which the decision maker must generate solutions from which to choose (Abelson & Levi, 1985; p. 269). Many organizational problems are ill-structured, and it is therefore important for both scholarly and practical reasons to further study influences on solution generation when a decision maker or problem solver is confronted with poorly defined problems. Furthermore, ill-structured decision problems rarely have only one right answer, and in fact often involve multiple correct and incorrect solutions. Unlike the typical evaluation of a solution provided to a well-defined problem (e.g., mathematical problem), the accuracy, or correctness, of a solution to an ill-structured problem may not be the only relevant criteria. Instead the criteria for evaluating the solutions to ill-structured problems may often be context dependent. The quality of a solution can be evaluated in multiple ways (e.g., resolving power, originality, appropriateness), and the evaluation will most likely be determined by the situation. Additionally, many of these same problems deal with complex situations involving people and emotional topics (e.g., restructuring, retaining talent). All problems involve thinking or cognition to some level, but depending on the person or the situation, some problems can evoke an affective reaction. Though researchers have often investigated the cognitive reactions to these problems, they have ignored the emotional reactions that problem solvers have to these problems, and as such our understanding

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of how the affective reactions evoked by problems influence solution generation. There is an obvious practical need for investigating solution generation, and more specifically the quantity and quality of solutions generated to ill-structured emotional problems. In the past, many solution generation studies focused on responses to rational, emotionless problems and have ignored the emotions of the person confronting the problem. Another important research and practical goal is to be able to understand and predict the ways in which a decision maker can maximize the quality and quantity of solutions from which they can choose. The failure to identify high-quality solutions early in the problem-solving process undermines the effectiveness of the ultimate solution or decision reached. Clearly situational, task, and individual difference influences on the solutions generated to ill-structured, emotion-laden problems need to be explored. The focus of this investigation is on individual difference influences on solution generation. Often the individual differences that have been investigated with respect to problem solving and solution generation have been of a technical nature, such as cognitive intelligence or analytical skills. Though cognitive skills are important, identifying an individual characteristic that can temper the influence of interpersonal or emotional conditions on solution generation would be of great importance when confronted with an issue of a social and emotional nature. Emotional intelligence is examined in order to determine if this individual difference will assist people when they are confronted with an interpersonal problem-solving scenario. Emotional intelligence may be able to help us better understand which type of people will perform better when confronted with problems with emotional content. Specifically, this study will explore emotional intelligence as a key difference among problem solvers that may affect the quantity and quality of solutions generated to problems that tend to evoke emotion. Emotional intelligence is conceptualized and measured in different ways; it has been conceived as a set of personality traits, a mixed model of personality and ability, and in an ability model. Though there are a variety of definitions, this study will focus on the ability-based model because ability plays such an important role in problem-solving contexts. Therefore, we will define emotional intelligence as the ‘‘ability to perceive, express, integrate, understand, and regulate emotion’’ (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000; p. 396). More specifically, Mayer et al. (2000) model of emotional intelligence consists of the ability to: (a) perceive emotions, (b) to access and generate emotions so as to assist thought, (c) to understand emotions and

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emotional knowledge, and (d) maintain the ability to regulate emotions so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth. Mayer and Salovey’s ability model focuses on four branches of emotional abilities ranging from basic competencies to higher levels of abilities. The first branch, representing the most rudimentary skills, is comprised of the perception, appraisal, and expression of emotion. This branch includes the ability to identify emotion in one’s physical states, thoughts and feelings, as well as identifying emotions in other people’s language, appearance, and behavior. The second aspect of Mayer et al.’s (2000) model is the emotional facilitation of thinking, which incorporates allowing emotions to prioritize thinking as well as to encourage multiple points of view due to changes in an individual’s perception when they experience different emotional states. The third factor facilitates the understanding and analyzing emotions, and employing emotional knowledge. The fourth part is the reflective regulation of emotions, which includes the ability to stay open to feelings as well as the ability to reflectively engage or detach from an emotion depending on its judged utility. The Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) was derived to measure emotional intelligence as an ability. In contrast to the self-report measures used to ascertain emotional intelligence from the standpoint of the mixed models, the MSCEIT was designed to be an objective test that measures ‘‘how well people perform tasks and solve emotional problems’’ (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 1999; p. 1). The MSCEIT is based largely on the work that was done on the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS), which was the first ability measure of emotional intelligence (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 1997; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003; Mayer et al., 1999). Testing of the MSCEIT has demonstrated evidence of the measure’s reliability and validity measure of the ability model put forth by Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (Brackett & Geher, 2006; Law, Wong, & Song, 2004; Mayer, Panter, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2005; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004; Mayer et al., 2003). The ability model of emotional intelligence encompasses the aptitude for obtaining information from emotion. We propose that the ability model of emotional intelligence as defined by Mayer and Salovey (1997) (Mayer et al., 2000) would appear to be most relevant to problem solving due to the proposed relationship between emotion and information. The proposed relationship centers on the idea that emotion can provide information that may be necessary to solve problems that are based on those patterns of information. The ability model’s more narrow definition allows for a more specific interpretation of what emotional intelligence is and what it may

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contribute to cognitive tasks such as problem solving, above and beyond existing psychological constructs. This more technical, or cognitive aspect, of emotional intelligence, has however, led to criticisms that the emotional intelligence ability model is possibly redundant with cognitive intelligence. This critique will require us to experimentally control for the possible relationship among these constructs. In addition to the criticism that emotional intelligence may be redundant with cognitive intelligence, a contrasting account has been presented. Some scholars have argued that emotional intelligence does not meet the criteria to be considered ‘‘intelligent’’ (e.g., Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner, 2004). Intelligence has been defined by many people in many ways (Sternberg, 2000), and many researchers argue for a theory of multiple intelligences (Gardner, 1998). Through the theory of multiple intelligences, Gardner (1983) defines intelligence as problem-solving ability or the creation of products that are culturally valued. What is most relevant to this study is the distinction and connection of what is traditionally considered cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence. Gottfredson (1997, p. 13) defined cognitive intelligence as a ‘‘very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience.’’ For many years, the bulk of research has been on the effect of cognitive intelligence on performance, success, behavior, etc. However, in the context of decision-making and problem solving, many of the studies have focused on analytic tasks. Due to the controversy over emotional intelligence versus cognitive intelligence, a second objective of the study is to examine the role of emotional intelligence versus cognitive intelligence on solution generation. Reiter-Palmon and Scherer (2002) started to answer this question when they investigated the effect of cognitive intelligence as measured by the Wonderlic cognitive ability test on ideational fluency, or the quantity of solutions generated to ill-structured problems. Reiter-Palmon and Scherer (2002) found that people with higher cognitive intelligence generated more solutions to problems than people with lower intelligence. This finding is important to the present study because it explicitly connects cognitive intelligence to solution generation in the context of ill-structured problems. The focus of the present study goes beyond the information ascertained by ideational fluency, or the number of different ideas generated, and examines the effect of cognitive intelligence on the quality and flexibility of the solutions generated. Understanding more about solutions than simply the quantity is an important aspect of problem-solving research that has

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been missing. The quality of the solutions, which for this study is focused on the resolving power or the extent to which the solution resolves the conflicting aspects of the problem, is a critical piece of information which allows for the evaluation of how well the solution solves the problem. Further, we can find out about the breadth of possible solutions by analyzing the flexibility of solutions, or the number of different categories that the solution set encompasses (Vosberg, 1998). In addition to improving our understanding of problem-solving outcomes, it is also our intention to investigate the unique effects of cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence on solution generation. Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) ability model definition connects intelligence and emotion by combining the ideas that emotion makes thinking more intelligent and that one thinks intelligently about emotion. In addition, the ability model posits emotional intelligence to meet three empirical criteria that other intelligences meet: (a) mental problems have right or wrong answers, (b) the measured skills correlate with other assessments of cognitive ability, (c) the absolute ability level increases as age increases (Mayer et al., 2000). In the Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, the items have correct and incorrect answers and are assessed by the combination of alternative scoring procedures. In addition, the skills assessed do correlate with other measures of mental ability. Finally, similar to other measures of intelligence, the older individuals had higher emotional intelligence scores. Though few studies have empirically investigated the influence of emotional intelligence on cognitive performance, Lam and Kirby (2002) found evidence to support this notion. They assessed individual performance using the following three assessments: (a) eight anagram problems from the Burney logical reasoning test (Burney, 1974), (b) emotional intelligence as measured by the short version of the MEIS (Mayer et al., 1997), and (c) cognitive intelligence as measured by the Shipley Institute of Living IQ scale (Western Psychological Services, 1967). Participants were placed in stressful situations manipulated through the researchers’ choice of very difficult reasoning problems and limited the amount of time the participants were given to complete them. The researchers hypothesized that overall emotional intelligence would contribute to cognitive performance over and above what was attributable to cognitive intelligence. In addition, Lam and Kirby (2002) posited that performance could also be explained by the ability to perceive emotions, the ability to understand emotions, and the ability to regulate emotions. The results supported the contribution of overall emotional

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intelligence in explaining the variance in the performance on the cognitive reasoning tasks. These results suggest that emotional intelligence does contribute to better performance on cognitive tasks over and above the contributions of cognitive intelligence. This finding is groundbreaking in its investigation of emotional intelligence with empirical studies concerning performance on cognitive tasks, but also recognizes the impractical nature of anagram tasks from a ‘‘real world’’ problem-solving approach. A more realistic simulation of daily problem-solving activities can be achieved through solving ill-structured and emotionally laden problems. It is the intention of this study to add to the findings of Lam and Kirby (2002) while considering the context of the problem-solving task itself. In addition, Lam and Kirby’s study might have benefited from also assessing emotional intelligence from the perspective of the ability model. Fox and Spector (2000) investigated the effect of emotional intelligence, practical intelligence, cognitive intelligence, and trait affectivity on interview outcomes. Researchers assessed three components of emotional intelligence as defined by the mixed model of emotional intelligence (empathy, selfregulation of mood, and self-presentation) as well as cognitive intelligence, social intelligence, and practical intelligence. Controlling the influence of cognitive and practical intelligence, emotional intelligence was related to interview outcomes. Interview outcomes were operationalized by the ratings concerning the interviewer’s decision to hire, perceptions of qualifications of candidates, perceived similarity, and liking. In addition, the finding that emotional intelligence and cognitive intelligence are unique contributors to successful interview outcomes was important. Fox and Spector’s (2000) study again established the potential for emotional intelligence to contribute to explaining performance beyond the contributions of cognitive intelligence. It is important to note the implications of this study distinguish emotional intelligence from intelligence in the area of personal interaction. A premise of emotional intelligence is the interpersonal nature of the construct, and it is important to assess this premise when trying to predict performance that is related to interpersonal awareness and related behavior. The studies that have been reviewed utilized tasks that have an interpersonal or emotional nature to them. Emotional intelligence distinguishes itself from other potential predictors of performance in domains where emotion is present. The impact of emotion has been overlooked for some time, and the potential for a more thorough understanding of how emotion can change the process by which a situation is addressed, or even more so

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the outcome of that situation is vital to improving the current climate in organizations. Emotion can be evoked in the problem-solving process in two ways, by the problem itself and by the problem solver. For example, if someone is confronted with a need for additional work to be done at 4:45 p.m. and they are trying to leave to get to another post-work activity he/she may be frustrated by the situation. In contrast, someone who wakes up late prior to the beginning of a busy school day may bring his/her distress into a scenario where they are asked to find a solution for a problem later that morning. A goal of this study is to identify a potential moderating factor for the instances when the emotion would interfere with the resolution of this issue. Similar to the potential for emotion to make a problem resolution more difficult, emotion may be able to provide important information to the problem solver. The Salovey, Mayer, and Caruso model contains a hypothesized dimension concerned with utilization of emotion to facilitate cognitive processes. This assertion highlights the need to investigate the effect of emotional intelligence on the problem-solving process. This empirical investigation by Salovey and colleagues into the definition of emotional intelligence will also help us further understand potential contributors to performance when situations are emotionally charged. Finally, no study to date has examined the effects of emotional intelligence on solution generation to ill-structured problems. There is another important objective of this study: separating the effects of cognitive versus emotional intelligence on solution generation. Furthermore, it is important to determine if emotional intelligence will add to our understanding of solution generation above and beyond the contribution of cognitive intelligence. There is much disagreement as to the independence, or non-independence, of emotional intelligence and cognitive intelligence, therefore when doing research one must account for the possibility of a relationship between these two constructs. To summarize, the purpose of this study was to contribute to our understanding of variables that influence solution generation; specifically the goal is to examine the role of emotional intelligence and cognitive intelligence on the quantity, quality, and flexibility of solutions generated to ill-structured problems. Quantity of solutions is defined as the number of non-repeating solutions provided by each participant. The conceptual definition which was used when evaluating solution quality is that of resolving power, or the degree to which a solution addresses the conflicting aspects of the problem (Scherer, 1985). Better problem solvers should be

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able to generate solutions that resolve the problems presented to them. Flexibility of solutions comes from the creative problem-solving literature and refers to the number of categories for which ideas are generated for each problem (Vosberg, 1998). Problem solvers who are able to generate more different types of solutions may be more likely to address multiple aspects of the issue, and therefore may be better at addressing the overall issue. We hypothesize that after controlling for the effects of cognitive intelligence, those higher in emotional intelligence relative to those lower in emotional intelligence will generate solutions to the problems that are higher in average resolving power of all the solutions, a greater number of high resolving power solutions, and the highest quality of the highest rated resolving power solution across both ill-structured emotional problems. Further, after controlling for cognitive intelligence, those higher in emotional intelligence will generate a higher quantity of solutions overall as well as will exhibit more flexibility in thinking by generating solutions that belong in a greater number of different categories across both problems than those lower in emotional intelligence. Cognitive intelligence has often been theorized to be a relevant ability that improves problem-solving outcomes (e.g. Gottfredson, 1997). Few researchers, however, have explicitly investigated the relationship between cognitive intelligence and ill-structured problem solving. Recall that one of the few studies was done by Reiter-Palmon and Scherer (2002), where they found that people with higher cognitive intelligence generated more solutions to problems than people with lower intelligence. This finding was important because it explicitly connected cognitive intelligence to solution generation, and as such an attempt is made to replicate the finding. In addition, a goal of this study is to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between cognitive intelligence and solution generation by assessing the influence on the solution outcomes. Similar to the hypotheses related to emotional intelligence, those higher in cognitive intelligence relative to those lower in cognitive intelligence will generate a greater quantity of high resolving power solutions, will have a higher average solution rating, and will generate a higher quality of the highest rated resolving power solution across both problems. Additionally, those with higher cognitive intelligence will generate a greater quantity of non-repeating solutions as well as will exhibit more flexibility in thinking by generating solutions that belong in a greater number of different categories across both problems compared to those lower in cognitive intelligence.

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METHOD Participants Participants were 99 undergraduates, 54 females and 45 males, with an average age of 24.07, SD ¼ 6.00. Data were collected from 102 participants, but three were removed from the analyses due to complications in completing the experiment.

Study Materials Cognitive Intelligence The Wonderlic Personnel Test (Wonderlic, 2002) was used to assess the participants’ cognitive intelligence. Previous uses of this questionnaire have shown internal consistency values for this measure ranged from 0.88 to 0.94 (Wonderlic, 2002). The reliability of this test administration was unable to be calculated due to the differential completion by the participants.

Mood Measure Participants’ mood was assessed in order to rule out any influence on the participants’ reactions to the problems. A four-item measure was constructed by the authors and used to measure the present state of the participants’ mood. Participants were asked to indicate the which mood they were more likely feeling at that moment. Participants were presented with the dichotomous choices of happy/sad, displeased/pleased, depressed/ upbeat, and disappointed/delighted. Cronbach’s alpha indicated an acceptable level of reliability, a ¼ 0.86. Emotional Intelligence The Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT v 2.0) was used to assess the participants’ emotional intelligence ability (Mayer et al., 1999). The measure consisted of eight sections that assess the four proposed branches of emotional intelligence via the ability model. The splithalf reliability previously calculated for the standardization sample, which included over 5,000 participants, for this measure was 0.91 (MSCEIT, 2002).

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Ill-Structured Problems A management problem describing the retention of employees and a sexual harassment problem depicting a female lawyer being harassed by a male partner were used in order to facilitate the solution generation behavior that is of interest in the present study (see Appendix A and B, respectively). Both of these problems were chosen because they were previously shown to be moderately high in emotive content (Scherer, Butler, Reiter-Palmon, & Weiss, 1994). Demographic Questionnaire Demographic information was obtained from all participants. Mood Manipulation In order to induce a neutral mood, participants were asked to read the article ‘‘On Comparison Meaningfulness of Aggregation Functions’’ (Marichal & Mathonet, 2000) under the guise that they were providing information for a future study.

Dependent Measures Quantity of Non-Repeating Alternatives Two graduate student raters, who were unaware of the purpose of the experiment, counted the number of non-redundant solutions generated to each problem by each participant. They were instructed to consider a solution redundant if it is simply a restatement of another solution using different word order or usage. Measurement of Resolving Power Resolving power was defined by Scherer (1985) as the degree to which a solution addresses the conflicting aspects of the problem. Alternatives that attempted to resolve only one aspect of the problem were considered low in resolving power, and those that attempted to resolve the conflicting aspects of the problem were considered high in resolving power. Each alternative was rated on a 6-point scale on the extent to which it resolved the problem. A rating of 1 indicated that the alternative did a poor job of addressing any aspects of the problem and a rating of 6 indicated the alternative resolves both of the conflicting aspects of the problem. Two graduate students in psychology completed the ratings of resolving power. The rating scale is presented in Appendix C.

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Prior to the start of the rating process, the raters were instructed on the meaning of resolving power and the use of the resolving power anchors. The experimenter utilized Carol’s problem to provide examples of alternatives that were exemplars of the resolving power anchors. The ratings were discussed and the experimenter further clarified how the rating scale should be used. After the rater training was completed, the raters were asked to read both problems and to reach agreement on the essential conflicts for each problem. This was completed without any input from the experimenter. Following this, the raters were asked to read all the solutions generated by the study participants and independently generate a list of possible categories for those solutions. The categorization process was done because it facilitates the rating process by grouping similar solutions together. Following a consensus on the list of categories, the raters divided the solutions into categories independently and then came together to resolve any discrepancies and to reach a consensus on the category of an alternative. After the category assignment reached consensus, raters began to independently rate the solutions based on the 1–6 scale of resolving power ratings. Raters came to consensus on the ratings and analyses were conducted on their rating consistency. The inter-rater reliability of the original assessments was calculated using kappa, which gauges the consensus among raters. A value of 1 would indicate perfect agreement, whereas a value of 0 would indicate no agreement. Morgan and Griego (1998) advised that the realized value for the raters’ agreement was acceptable because it was higher than 0.70 (kappa ¼ 0.72, t ¼ 51.46, po0.05). Three indices of the resolving power of solutions were created, representing the combined values across problems: (a) the quantity of high resolving power solutions, (b) the highest resolving power rating, and (c) the average resolving power. These each capture a different aspect of quality, specifically through resolving power. The quantity of high resolving power solutions provides a measure of how many solutions by each participant were rated a high solution (4–6). The highest resolving power rating denotes the highest rated solution given by each participant. The average resolving power assesses the mean quality of all solutions provided by each participant. Flexible Thinking We defined flexible thinking as the behavior of identifying solutions that focused on different aspects of the problem. Solution raters identified

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multiple categories that best described the solutions provided by all participants. Following the development of all categories, the raters assigned each solution into only one category.

Procedure First, participants completed the Wonderlic intelligence measure. Following the Wonderlic, the participants read the mood neutralizing journal article and filled out a questionnaire to assess their mood. Both of these activities were done under the pretext of gathering information for a future study. Following these activities, participants either started by generating solutions to the two problems or by completing the MSCEIT questionnaire. Problem order was counterbalanced with half the participants receiving the management problem first, and the other half receiving the sexual harassment problem first. Participants then completed the demographic questionnaire. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked. The study took participants approximately 1 h and 45 min to complete.

RESULTS Descriptive statistics and correlations were calculated for the study variables. The statistics show a noteworthy amount of variability with respect to the quantity and quality of solutions generated. Correlations among the study variables were also calculated. Of particular importance was the correlation between cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence. A positive correlation was expected; however, no relationship was found. Emotional intelligence, however, was significantly related to gender, r ¼ 0.34, po0.01, such that females had higher levels of emotional intelligence than males. Further, gender was correlated with the quantity of high resolving power solutions generated; female participants generated more high resolving power solutions than male participants, r ¼ 0.24, po0.05. Gender was also correlated with the highest rated resolving power solution across problems, where females had significantly higher rated solutions than males did, r ¼ 0.20, po0.05. Further, gender was correlated with the flexibility of solutions, where females generated solutions that belonged in more different categories than males did, r ¼ 0.22, po0.05 (Tables 1 and 2).

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Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables.

Variable Cognitive intelligence Emotional intelligence Quantity of high resolving power solutions Highest rated solution Average resolving power rating Quantity of solutions Flexibility

M

SD

Possible Range

Actual Range

24.48 96.37 4.84 10.16 6.82 10.32 4.31

5.28 11.07 2.02 1.65 1.24 4.58 1.51

0–50 0–135 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1–46

13–36 72–122 66–129 65–129 75–115 70–116 1–11

Note: N ¼ 99.

Table 2.

Intercorrelations Among Study Variables.

Variable

2

Gender 0.19 Cognitive intelligence – Emotional intelligence Quantity of high resolving power across problems Highest resolving power across problems Average resolving power across problems Quantity across problems Flexibility across problems

3

4

5

0.34

0.24

0.20

0.04 –

0.12 0.08 –

6

7

8

0.13 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.21 0.14 0.25 0.03 0.57 0.27 0.67

0.22 0.24 0.02 0.68

0.58 0.29

0.43

–

–

0.27 0.23 –

0.86 –

po0.05, po0.01. N ¼ 99.

In an effort to determine whether emotional intelligence predicted variance in problem-solving behaviors (resolving power quality, flexibility, quantity) beyond the contribution of cognitive intelligence hierarchical multiple regressions were used. Although no specific predictions were rendered with respect to gender, it was included in these analyses because of the relationships indicated from the zero-order correlation between gender and emotional intelligence, as well as the quantity of high resolving power solutions, the highest rated resolving power solution, and solution flexibility. With respect to the predictions regarding emotional intelligence and problem-solving quality outcomes, only one relationship was significant above and beyond the contribution of cognitive intelligence and gender. No significant findings occurred with respect to the quantity of high resolving power solutions, the highest rated resolving power solution, the

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quantity of solutions, or the flexibility of solutions. There was, however, a significant relationship found for the average resolving power rating across problems. Though the overall model was not significant, emotional intelligence accounted for a significant amount of variance in the average resolving power of solutions across problems, such that people higher in emotional intelligence also generated solutions to both problems which were higher in resolving power, (b ¼ 0.25, t (96) ¼ 2.34, po0.05), accounting for approximately 5% of the variance in average resolving power ratings. Cognitive intelligence had differential relationships with the problemsolving behaviors of interest. Though there was no relationship between cognitive intelligence and any of the resolving power quality indices, there were significant predictive relationships with both the quantity of solutions generated as well as the flexibility of those solutions. Those with higher cognitive intelligence generated more solutions to the problems, (b ¼ 0.25, t (96) ¼ 2.50, po0.05), with an effect size of approximately 4%. Furthermore, those higher in cognitive intelligence were more flexible in generating solutions than those lower in cognitive intelligence (b ¼ 0.30, t (96) ¼ 3.06, po0.05), accounting for approximately 7% of the variance in flexibility.

DISCUSSION Overview Recall that the purpose of this study was to add to the understanding of predictors that contribute to explaining solution generation, and specifically the goal was to examine the role of cognitive and emotional intelligence on the quantity, quality, and flexibility of solutions generated to emotional ill-structured problems.

Summary of Results from Predictions Emotional Intelligence and Total Average Resolving Power One of the analyses to test the study’s hypotheses with respect to emotional intelligence resulted in a realized prediction. We predicted that emotional intelligence would contribute to explaining average resolving power across problems above and beyond cognitive intelligence. The data in this study affirmed that people higher in emotional intelligence generated solutions

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that resulted in a higher average resolving power across problems than people lower in emotional intelligence. Recall that the reasoning for this prediction was because the problems were of a social and affective nature, and that because emotional intelligence is posited to facilitate thinking and problem solving, emotional intelligence should be related to solution generation. Therefore, we predicted that people higher in emotional intelligence would generate more high quality solutions than someone lower in emotional intelligence for these ‘‘hot’’ problems, or those of an emotive nature. For ‘‘cold’’ problems, or those that are more rational and less emotional, emotional intelligence may not be as important to other aspects of the problem solver such as cognitive intelligence. Cognitive Intelligence and Solution Quantity Cognitive intelligence was related to solution quantity such that participants higher in cognitive intelligence generated more solutions across problems than those lower in cognitive intelligence. This finding was not surprising as it replicated a previous finding by Reiter-Palmon and Scherer (2002). Cognitive Intelligence and Flexibility Cognitive intelligence was related to solution flexibility such that participants higher in cognitive intelligence were more flexible in generating solutions across rating categories than participants lower in cognitive intelligence. No previous studies have explicitly examined cognitive intelligence and the flexibility of solution generated in an ill-structured problem-solving context.

Summary of Unexpected Findings This study was designed to investigate the relationship between EI, as measured by the MSCEIT, and cognitive intelligence. Though the results of this study did not support a relationship between the two, it may be an artifact of this sample. Specifically, this sample showed range restriction biased toward higher scores only for the MSCEIT, whereas scores were clustered around the middle of the range for the Wonderlic. Additionally, gender was not originally considered to play a role in solution generation. However because of the significant relationship between emotional intelligence and gender such that females have higher emotional intelligence than males, gender was included and was related to

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the quantity of high resolving power solutions, the highest rated resolving power solution, and solution flexibility. Females generated a greater number of high-quality solutions than males for both problems. Further, females had a higher rated highest resolving power solution compared to males. Finally, females generated more different kinds of solutions than did males, and were therefore more flexible in the solutions they provided to the problems. Interpretation of Findings It was interesting to find that gender was a strong determinant of the problem-solving outcomes, such that females performed better than males. In the past many studies concluded that males were better problem solvers than females (e.g., Milton, 1957). Most of those studies focused on math problems, and did not include ill-structured interpersonal scenarios. Females may be better able to deal with problems of an interpersonal nature relative to males. It may be that females are more familiar with these types of issues, especially the sexual harassment problem, compared to males. Females may have thought more about sexual harassment situations, and therefore have a better understanding of what they would do if confronted with the situation. Further, females may be more akin to the possibility of being confronted with sexual harassment in a workplace situation. This ‘‘preparedness’’ may have resulted in an ability to easily access ideas for dealing with this type of problem. This gender difference may also be related to a value-based versus outcome-based distinction. Females may feel more strongly about being sexually harassed, and may therefore be more likely to have thought about their values as well as what the outcome should be in similar situations. The gender difference finding with respect to the sexual harassment scenario may show a related finding to the work done by Wiener and colleagues. Wiener et al. (2002) found that women were more likely to believe that a complainant had been exposed to ‘‘unwelcome sexual conduct,’’ and that the conduct was harsh and all-encompassing. Wiener et al. (2002) concluded that the assessment of social-sexual scenarios, and the influence that gender has on the evaluation is quite ‘‘complex.’’ One possible explanation for these differences is that there is a disparity between genders and their value-based and outcome-based reactions to sexual harassment scenarios. This disparity may be something to further investigate in order to get a better understanding of the gender differences found in this and other studies.

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In terms of the management problem, it may be that females are paying more attention to both sides of the issue (i.e., the needs of the organization as well as the needs/desires of the staff). A follow-up to the exploratory analyses regarding gender was conducted. A frequency analysis showed that 10 female participants generated at least one solution that addressed multiple aspects of the problem relative to only 6 male participants. Males may be more focused on only one aspect of the problem, such as the requirements of the organization, and therefore may not be as adept at solving the problem. Though cognitive intelligence was related to the quantity and flexibility of solutions, we found no relationship between cognitive intelligence and any of the three quality measures of solutions. It was somewhat surprising that emotional intelligence was only significantly related to the average resolving power of solutions, yet had no significant relationships with the other measures of solution quality, flexibility, and quantity.

Implications from this Study This study has provided some interesting things to ponder. Though there is so much that has not been accounted for by technical or cognitive skills alone, and even though emotional intelligence has emerged as a popular solution to many problems, we may want to be cautious in proposing that emotional intelligence is an all-important individual difference. The results of this study suggest that emotional intelligence may not equally influence all activities. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that although the concept of emotional intelligence has been around for over 10 years, the body of research investigating its influence is relatively small. Future studies should continue to investigate which activities, specifically which steps of the problem-solving process, are most strongly influenced by emotional intelligence. In addition, the individuals chosen appointed to solve particular problems should possess certain qualities. Though premature, this study suggests that people higher in emotional intelligence will generate higher quality solutions on average for problems of varying emotional qualities than those lower in emotional intelligence. Further, people higher in cognitive intelligence will generate more solutions and should be more flexible in their solution production. Because flexibility gives us an indication of how many different types of solutions are generated by the problem solver, it may be advantageous to utilize problem solvers higher in cognitive intelligence when generating diverse options is important.

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Finally, this study has provided evidence that emotional intelligence, as measured by the MSCEIT, and cognitive intelligence are two separate aspects of an individual that have differential effects on outcomes. There has been much debate about the similarities and differences between emotional and cognitive intelligence (e.g., Brody, 2004). In addition to showing no relationship between these variables in the student, our results should help to identify predictive differences in related performance domains, which again highlight the differences between emotional and cognitive intelligence as well as the predictive value of knowing about both aspects of an individual.

Methodological Limitations and Future Research The pattern of results from this study has provided some interesting questions to be answered with future research. There is a possible limitation with respect to the instructions given for the solution generation task. Participants were instructed to generate as many solutions as they could. This was done for all participants in order to deliberately reduce the probability of the participants prematurely stopping their generation of solutions. However, the prompt to generate multiple solutions may have encouraged participants to maximize the quantity of their solutions at the cost of quality. Rather than integrating their best and most complete responses, participants may have kept their ideas separate and disconnected. These solutions, therefore, may not have reflected their ability to provide their best quality solution. Though some work has investigated how the instructions of the problem-solving task influence solution generation performance (e.g. Butler & Scherer, 1997; Pitz, Sachs, & Heerboth, 1980; Wightman, 1999), future efforts should focus on how task instructions differentially influence the integration and separation of ideas. This study focused specifically on solution generation. It may be that the influence of emotional intelligence as well as cognitive intelligence might be realized in one of the other steps in the decision-making process. Future studies should investigate the influence of emotional and cognitive intelligence on other steps of the problem-solving process such as problem definition because the construction of the problem has a profound effect on the solutions generated to solve that problem (Reiter-Palmon & Illies, 2004). It may be that the influence of emotional intelligence and cognitive intelligence on solution generation occurs because of the impact on the problem construction, or definition.

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In addition to differentiating the process, or processes, that cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence have an impact on, efforts should be made to differentiate between which types of problems these variables would be more influential. It may be that emotional intelligence would be more important for highly emotional, or hot problems, whereas cognitive intelligence would be more important for less emotional and more rational, or cold problems. Future research should directly compare very cold, rational, and analytical problems with those that are highly emotional. In addition, this study concentrated on the influence of only a few individual difference variables on solution generation (i.e. cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence). Other individual difference variables, such as emotional stability, emotional creativity, self-monitoring, and social intelligence, should be investigated with respect to their relationship with emotional intelligence and cognitive intelligence in the solution generation domain. Similarly, these investigations should also be applied to other steps of the decision-making process. Future studies might also look at other measures of resolving power quality, such as the proportion of high resolving power solutions. In addition, other quality ratings such as originality, or appropriateness may also provide additional insight into how individual differences are related to different aspects of solution quality. Finally, forthcoming research efforts could use a combination of dependent variables. It is possible that the three measures of interest in this study (i.e. quantity of high resolving power solutions, average resolving power, and the highest related solution) together would evince in an overall pattern that is more consistent with the study’s primary premise that problem type and emotional intelligence would interact to influence solution quality. Though this study did not show all of the predicted relationships that were stated, it did provide some interesting results with respect to two prominent individual differences in current research. Obviously the importance of improving problem-solving processes and outcomes requires that continued research is imperative.

REFERENCES Abelson, R. P., & Levi, A. (1985). Decision-making and decision theory. In: G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds), The handbook of social psychology: Vol. 1. Theory and method (3rd ed., pp. 231–309). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

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Brackett, M. A., & Geher, G. (2006). Measuring emotional intelligence: Paradigmatic diversity and common ground. In: J. Ciarrochi, J. Forgas & J. D. Mayer (Eds), E.I. in everyday life (2nd ed., pp. 27–50). New York, NY: Psychology Press. Brody, N. (2004). What cognitive intelligence is and what emotional intelligence is not: Commentary. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 234–238. Burney, G. M. (1974). The construction and validation of an objective formal reasoning instrument. Xerox University Microfilms (No. 75-5403). Butler, A. B., & Scherer, L. L. (1997). The effects of elicitation aids, knowledge, and problem content on option quantity and quality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 72, 184–202. Fox, S., & Spector, P. E. (2000). Relations of emotional intelligence, practical intelligence, general intelligence, and trait affectivity with interview outcomes: It’s not all just ‘G’. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 21, 203–220. Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York, NY: Basic Books. Gardner, H. (1998). Are there additional intelligences? The case for naturalist, spiritual, and existential intelligences. In: J. Kane (Ed.), Education, information, and transformation. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Gottfredson, L. S. (1997). Intelligence and social policy. Intelligence, 24, 13–25. Lam, L. T., & Kirby, S. L. (2002). Is emotional intelligence and advantage? An exploration of the impact of emotional and general intelligence on individual performance. Journal of Social Psychology, 142, 133–144. Law, K. S., Wong, C. S., & Song, L. J. (2004). The construct and criterion validity of emotional intelligence and its potential utility for management studies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 483–496. Marichal, J. L., & Mathonet, P. (2000). On comparison meaningfulness of aggregation functions. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 45, 213–223. Matthews, G., Roberts, R. D., & Zeidner, M. (2004). Seven myths about emotional intelligence. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 179–196. Mayer, J. D., Panter, A. T., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R., & Sitarenios, G. (2005). A discrepancy in analyses of the MSCEIT — Resolving the mystery and understanding its implications: A reply to Gignac (2005). Emotion, 5, 236–237. Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1997). What is emotional intelligence? In: P. Salovey & D. J. Sluyter (Eds), Emotional development and emotional intelligence: Educational implications. New York, NY: HarperCollins. Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (1997). The Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale. Information at http://www.eiconsortium.org/measures/meis.htm Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. (1999). Working Manual for the MSCEIT Research Version 1.1. Toronto, Canada: Multi-Health Systems. Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. (2000). Emotional intelligence. In: R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of intelligence (2nd ed., pp. 396–421). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. (2004). A further consideration of the issues of emotional intelligence. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 249–255. Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R., & Sitarenios, G. (2003). Measuring emotional intelligence with the MSCEIT V2.0. Emotion, 3, 97–105.

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Milton, G. A. (1957). The effects of sex-role identification upon problem-solving skill. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 55, 208–212. Morgan, G. A., & Griego, O. V. (1998). Easy use and interpretation of SPSS for windows: Answering research questions with statistics. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Pitz, G. F., Sachs, N. J., & Heerboth, J. (1980). Procedures for eliciting choices in the analysis of individual decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 26, 396–408. Reiter-Palmon, R., & Illies, J. J. (2004). Leadership and creativity: Understanding leadership from a creative problem-solving perspective. Leadership Quarterly, 15, 55–77. Reiter-Palmon, R., & Scherer, L. L. (2002). The relationship between ability, problem type, and alternative solution generation. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision-Making, Kansas City. Scherer, L. L. (1985). The impact of problem structuring and identifiability on the quantity and quality of alternatives a decision maker generates. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of Midwest Academy of Management, Toledo, Ohio. Scherer, L. L., Butler, A. B., Reiter-Palmon, R., & Weiss, R. J. (1994). Toward a taxonomy of reactions for ill-structured problems. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision-making, St. Louis. Sternberg, R. J. (2000). Handbook of intelligence. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Vosberg, S. K. (1998). Mood and the quantity and quality of ideas. Creativity Research Journal, 11, 315–324. Western Psychological Services. (1967). Shipley institute of living scale. Los Angeles, CA: Author. Wiener, R. L., Hackney, A., Kadela, K., Rauch, S., Seib, H., Warren, L., & Hurt, L. E. (2002). The fit and implementation of sexual harassment law to workplace evaluations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 747–764. Wightman, J. A. (1999). Trait anxiety as a moderator of problem structuring effects on solution generation. Unpublished master’s thesis. University of Nebraska Omaha, Omaha, Nebraska. Wilson, R. S., & Arvai, J. L. (2006). When less is more: How affect influences preferences when comparing low and high-risk options. Journal of Risk Research, 9, 165–178. Wonderlic Personnel Test and Scholastic Level Exam User’s Manual. (2002). Libertyville, IL: Wonderlic, Inc. Zhang, J., Hsee, C. K., & Xiao, Z. (2006). The majority rule in individual decision-making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99, 102–111.

APPENDIX A. SCOTT’S PROBLEM AND DIRECTIONS Please read the following problem confronting Scott, a manager. Scott is the manager of the Acme Engineering Department. The Upper Management of Acme Company has been holding wage increases to a 6% level. The decision to hold wage increases came about from an effort to reduce product costs twice in the past year due to increased shipping costs of materials, and upper management does not feel that Acme can remain competitive if there are any future increases in the cost of their product.

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Unfortunately, the engineering job market in the area stands at about 12 jobs for every one trained engineer. Because of this, recruiters are cropping up and are enticing Acme’s engineers with ‘‘better’’ jobs and ‘‘better’’ benefits. As of late, turnover among Acme’s engineers has increased and productivity has decreased. Also, there is a considerable grumbling among current engineers about Acme’s policy on wage increases. Mr. Wentworth, an executive vice president, has directed Scott to improve the situation in the engineering department. Mr. Wentworth feels that much of the dissatisfaction is based upon the recruiters’ enticements of better opportunities in other places. The concern at Acme is to maintain a quality group of engineers at a high level of productivity. Scott does not know how to solve this problem. We need you to do three things: 1. Think of as many solutions as you can that will address Scott’s dilemma. 2. Record your ideas on the following pages entitled Scott’s Solutions Sheets. Each of your solutions should be recorded in one of the squares. Use as many or as few squares as you need. Feel free to reread the problem as you are thinking of solutions. 3. After you cannot come up with any more ideas to help Scott, circle the solution you believe is the best resolution to the problem.

APPENDIX B. CAROL’S PROBLEM AND DECISION Please read the following problem confronting Carol, an attorney. Carol is a single, 29-year-old lawyer who recently began working for a large law firm. Most of her work involves acting as a junior lawyer, assisting Frank, one of the senior partners in the firm. Frank is a highly respected corporate lawyer who is well-connected and a shrewd and successful attorney. Carol enjoyed her job very much at first. Frank saw to it that she was given more and more responsibility, and Carol was convinced that she was well launched into a very successful and fulfiling career. When Frank starting asking Carol to accompany him to 2-h ‘‘working’’ lunches and suggesting they work late into the evening, she thought nothing of it. In fact, she was pleased that Frank had such confidence in her work and opinions. Carol began to feel uncomfortable, though, when she noticed that Frank frequently stared at her body. One afternoon during lunch, Frank began questioning Carol intensely about her previous romantic relationships. Suddenly he confessed in a roundabout way that he was interested in

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her romantically. Carol said she was not interested in a relationship. Subsequently, Frank has been overly critical of her performance in front of other partners and has been giving her less desirable assignments. Carol would like to switch to another law firm, but it took her a year to find this job because there are so many lawyers looking for work. She does not know what to do. We need you to do three things: 1. Think of as many solutions as you can that will address Carol’s dilemma. 2. Record your ideas on the following pages entitled Carol’s Solutions Sheets. Each of your solutions should be recorded in one of the squares. Use as many or as few squares as you need. Feel free to reread the problem as you are thinking of solutions. 3. After you cannot come up with any more ideas to help Carol, circle the solution you believe is the best resolution to the problem.

APPENDIX C. RESOLVING POWER ANCHORS Rating 1

2

Requirement Doesn’t do a very good job of addressing any aspects of problem addresses one sub-aspect of one aspect/side poorly  Exemplar Carol: Deal with the criticism because it will ultimately make her a better lawyer  Exemplar Scott: Talk to a recruiter to see how good the other options are Addresses one aspect of the problem moderately well only dealing with one sub-aspect of one aspect/ side moderately well or more than one sub-aspect on one aspect/ side not so well  Exemplar Carol: Use the hypercritical feedback from her boss as an opportunity to identify and correct mistakes. Once she has proven her ability to excel even under trying circumstances she should have many high-quality job opportunities available to her  Exemplar Scott: They could give them freedom and flexible work schedules as long as they get their work done

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APPENDIX C. (Continued ) Rating 3

4

5

6

Requirement Effectively addresses one aspect of the problem two out of three sub-aspects are effectively addressed on one aspect/ side  Exemplar Carol: File a sexual harassment lawsuit against him  Exemplar Scott: They can restructure their company so they can pay them more Seems to attempt to address more than one aspect of the problem addresses both aspects/ sides vaguely or addresses one aspect/ side moderately well and one vaguely  Exemplar Carol: Start a romantic relationship with him simply for the advancement of her career  Exemplar Scott: Bring in less experienced engineers and train them to do the job Resolves the conflicting aspect of the problem moderately well both sides mentioned: two sub-aspects addressed moderately well or a total of three sub-aspects mentioned vaguely  Exemplar Carol: Talk to Frank’s superior about his actions  Exemplar Scott: Make teams for recruiting engineers and give prizes to those who recruit Does a very good job resolving conflicting aspects of the problem both sides mentioned: four sub-aspects addressed with two addressed very well or total of three sub-aspects addressed moderately well  Exemplar Carol: Talk with Frank privately about the situation  Exemplar Scott: Try to get pay based on productivity. That will improve the recent drop

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CHAPTER 4 THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN DRIVING WORKPLACE PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIORS Sally Russell and Andrew Griffiths ABSTRACT In this chapter we argue for further research that examines the role of the individual in addressing environmental issues. We review current research that examines emotionality as it relates to issues of the natural environment and identify disparate findings in the literature. In order to integrate findings from environmental psychology and management we draw on the theories of issue ownership, and organizational identification as a frame with which to examine emotionality and pro-environmental behavior in organizations. In doing so, we put forward a conceptual model and testable propositions as a basis for future research.

INTRODUCTION Environmental issues are becoming more commonplace for organizations. Current concerns over climate change and increasingly common severe Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 83–107 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04004-2

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weather events have increased the global significance and public awareness of the negative impacts and costs of environmental degradation (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007; Loh & Wackernagel, 2004). Scholars such as Bebbington (2001) and Dunphy, Griffiths, and Benn (2007) argue that the proportion of environmental degradation and global warming caused by organizations is a large part of the problem, and that organizations must therefore play a role in addressing environmental issues. Exactly what this role entails is much less certain. Hoffman (2005), for instance, argues that climate change presents organizations with strategic opportunities to change production in order to reduce costs and create value. Others argue that cultural and values driven change is what is needed; change that involves the creation of an organizational culture that is ‘‘ecocentric’’ and supportive of pro-environmental initiatives (Fineman, 1996; Nilsson, von Borgstede, & Biel, 2004; Shrivastava, 1995). Despite variation in what type of change is prescribed, it is clear that organizations and their managers are now facing increasing pressure to respond to environmental issues (KPMG, 2005). The dominant focus of the literature on environmental issues in organizations has been at the macro-level, examining influences ranging from institutional forces (Hoffman, 1999) and environmental regulation (Majumdar & Marcus, 2001), to market and competitive forces (Hart, 1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997), organizational design (Ramus & Steger, 2000; Sharma, 2000), and corporate strategy and policy (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Scholars have recently urged a shift in research focus from changing collective organizational behavior to changing individual behavior within organizations (Cordano, Frieze, & Ellis, 2004; Sharma, 2002; Vining & Ebreo, 2002). Indeed, Sharma (2002, p. 11) notes that ‘‘the role of individuals in affecting environmental change in organizations has been under-researched.’’ Literatures from both environmental psychology and environmental management have been important in identifying the role of individuals in initiating pro-environmental action (Andersson & Bateman, 2000; Bansal, 2003; Ramus & Steger, 2000; Stern, 1992). Researchers who examine individual-level phenomena within the environmental management literature, such as Marshall, Cordano, and Silverman (2005), and Ramus and Killmer (2007) often employ cognitive theories as a basis for their studies of individual pro-environmental behavior. For example, Marshall et al. (2005) draw on the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) to explore managerial decision making in response to environmental issues. Similarly, Ramus and Killmer (2007) present a model that brings together expectancy

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theory (Vroom, 1964) and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) in order to explain the dominant factors that motivate employees to engage in pro-environmental behavior in organizations. The environmental psychology literature also relies heavily on attitude theories to inform their research. Research based on the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) show that intentions are often the strongest predictors of environmental behavior. According to the theory of reasoned action, behavioral intentions are determined by the two factors of attitudes toward a behavior, and the perceived norms surrounding the behavior; these factors in turn, mediate beliefs (Vining & Ebreo, 2002). The theory of planned behavior adds another dimension, suggesting that perceived behavioral control mediates the relationship between beliefs and behavioral performance. Both of these theories have been applied widely within the environmental psychology literature. They have been used to predict behaviors such as recycling (Jones, 1990), water conservation (Kantola, Syme, & Campbell, 1983), and participation in conservation programs (Luzar & Diagne, 1999). One of the main limitations of extant studies examining proenvironmental behaviors using attitude theories is that they have been primarily focused on the cognitive aspects of attitude, and have largely neglected the emotional or affective aspects (Carrus, Passafaro, & Bonnes, 2008; Vining & Ebreo, 2002). Research on the affective domain of organizational behavior has continued to receive growing attention in the environmental psychology literature (Carrus et al., 2008; Grob, 1995; Vining & Ebreo, 2002), and management literature more generally (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Ashkanasy, Ha¨rtel, & Zerbe, 2000a). While environmental management research does mention emotive components of pro-environmental behavior (Andersson & Bateman, 2000; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Ramus & Steger, 2000), there are very few studies that examine emotion directly. A notable exception is the work of Fineman from the late 1990s (Fineman, 1996, 2000; Fineman & Sturdy, 1999), however few studies have examined the issue in recent years. The lack of affective research on environmental issues has meant that environmental management research has not kept pace with the theoretical and empirical developments in wider management literature that provide evidence that emotion is an inescapable part of work-life (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Fineman, 2003; Ha¨rtel, Zerbe, & Ashkanasy, 2005). Therefore, we make a unique contribution to these literatures by further investigating the affective elements of proenvironmental behaviors in organizations.

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We also make a second contribution by attempting to reconcile competing findings from the environmental management and environmental psychology literatures. In doing so we draw on the theory of issue ownership (Pratt & Dutton, 2000) and suggest that the strength of environmental issue ownership is useful in explaining why some environmental issues are owned and acted upon in organizations, and others are not. Furthermore, we suggest that an individual’s emotional reaction to an issue is a strong predictor of his or her ownership of that issue. We also draw upon the theory of identification (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Mael & Ashforth, 1992), which provides a useful framework for explaining differences in issue ownership due to different targets of identification. Finally, we make a third contribution by introducing the concept of pro-environmental climate, which is a key moderating variable likely to impact on issue ownership and subsequent pro-environmental action within organizations. In the first section of this chapter we define two of the main constructs used throughout the chapter, pro-environmental behavior and emotion. While we do not attempt to discount other definitions, or definitional debates, the definitions selected for this chapter are considered to be the most elegant choices to address the research problem; namely reconciling competing findings on the role of emotions across two research areas. Following the outline of definitions, we review current research that examines emotions and pro-environmental behavior from the literatures of environmental psychology and environmental management. These literatures are then drawn together using the theoretical frameworks of identification (Dutton et al., 1994) and issue ownership (Pratt & Dutton, 2000), and a conceptual model and propositions are developed.

PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR There is much disparity in how pro-environmental behavior is described, measured, and reported across different fields of research. Environmental psychology research generally defines pro-environmental behavior narrowly and most often measures variables using strictly quantifiable measures. For example, previous research has measured water consumed and conserved through household water gauges (Aitken, McMahon, Wearing, & Finlayson, 1994; Kantola et al., 1983). Similarly, energy consumption has been studied with the participation of local electricity distributors who provided reports from household electricity meters (Kantola, Syme, & Campbell, 1984).

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Other studies have measured the proportions of general waste and recycling per household (Jones, 1990). In contrast, researchers in management generally measure proenvironmental behavior more broadly. For example, Ramus and Steger (2000, p. 606) use the term ecoinitiatives to describe ‘‘any action taken by employees that she or he thought would improve the environmental performance of the company.’’ In a more recent paper, Ramus and Killmer (2007) again define their dependent variable broadly as ‘‘corporate greening behaviorsy defined as the changing of organizational practices to more environmentally sound ones.’’ Similarly, Egri and Herman (2000, p. 572) define their dependent variable, environmental leadership, ‘‘as the ability to influence individuals and mobilize organizations to realize a vision of long-term ecological sustainability.’’ Other studies have avoided definitional debates and used behavioral intent as a proxy for pro-environmental behavior (Cordano & Frieze, 2000; Cordano et al., 2004). For the purposes of this paper we follow Ramus and Steger’s (2000, p. 606) definition; that pro-environmental behaviors are ‘‘any action taken by employees that she or he thought would improve the environmental performance of the company.’’ Defined this way, pro-environmental behavior is an individual-level phenomena that is distinct from organizational-level constructs such as environmental strategy or level of firm proactivity (Roome, 1992; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). We argue that this individual-level definition is broad enough to capture a wide range of behaviors, and enables the drawing together of theoretical and empirical evidence from both environmental psychology and management. For example, this definition includes behaviors common in environmental psychology literature such as conservation of resources such as water and energy (Aitken et al., 1994; Kantola et al., 1983), and it is also inclusive of behaviors described by environmental management literature, such as environmental championing (Andersson & Bateman, 2000), recycling, and pollution prevention (Cordano & Frieze, 2000; Egri & Herman, 2000).

AFFECT, MOOD, AND EMOTION Within this chapter we predominantly use the term emotion to describe the construct of interest, however, we note that there are many conceptions, and indeed confusions, regarding the meaning of the terms affect, mood, and emotion. We follow Forgas (1994) in defining emotion as being quite intense and directed at a specific object or person. Conversely, moods are thought to

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be longer lasting, less intense, and lacking in object specificity (Forgas, 1994). Affect on the other hand is often used as an umbrella term for both mood and emotion (Forgas, 1994; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Throughout this chapter we use the term ‘‘emotion’’ as it is the object specificity toward environmental issues that we are most interested in. We therefore consider the term emotion to be most representative of the construct under study. Another important distinction is that emotion is derived of two components; namely valence and intensity. Intensity is described as the strength of the emotional experience (Pratt & Dutton, 2000). The second component is valence, or direction; whether the emotion is positive or negative (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). In the following review of the literature, we describe evidence that leads us to propose that greater emotional intensity leads to pro-environmental behaviors and that the valence of emotion is an important antecedent to pro-environmental behavior when taken into consideration with identification.

EMOTION AND MOTIVATION Researchers within environmental psychology have demonstrated that behavior change can be accomplished through interventions designed to cause negative emotion. For example, Aronson (1980) argued that persuasive attempts that generate negative emotion by direct challenges to a person’s self-concept are more effective in stimulating behavioral change than persuasive communications that are merely informational in nature. Other researchers have had similar results. For example, in their study of water conservation behavior, Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, and Miller (1992) found that participants were more likely to display proenvironmental behaviors if they made conservation commitments directly after being aroused into a negative emotional state. Similarly, Kantola et al. (1984) and Aitken et al. (1994) used experimental methodologies to examine the effect of provoking negative emotion on residential energy (Kantola et al., 1984), and water (Aitken et al., 1994) conservation behaviors. The results from both studies showed that the participants who received an intervention designed to cause negative emotion achieved the most significant improvement in resource conservation. There is also empirical evidence to suggest that both positive and negative emotions play a significant role in motivating pro-environmental behavior. For example, Vining (1992) argued that positive emotional affinity for nature was a strong motivational force for individuals who entered careers

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in environmental and resource management. Pooley and O’Connor (2000) also examined emotion as an antecedent of motivation and found that the inclusion of both cognitive and affective variables as antecedents for environmental attitudes greatly improved the strength of their model predicting pro-environmental behavior. Similarly, Kals, Schumacher, and Montada (1999) found that pro-environmental behavior, or nature protective behavior as they term it, could not be sufficiently explained using a purely rational-cognitive approach; rather, they found that both positive and negative emotions serve as predictors of conservation behaviors. Vining and Ebreo (2002) argue that self-conscious or self-evaluative emotions, such as pride, shame and guilt, are central to the motivation to behave proactively. These emotions result from evaluations of the self and one’s behavior with respect to internal or external norms and values. For example, guilt is most likely to result from behavior that is inconsistent with an individual’s values or societal norms, and shame results when an individual interprets the entire self negatively (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Despite acknowledgment of the merit of examining self-conscious emotions in relation to pro-environmental behavior there is little empirical evidence focused on the specific role of these types of emotions (Vining & Ebreo, 2002). One of the few researchers that have investigated the role of emotion in motivating pro-environmental behavior in organizations is Fineman (1996, 1997). In his study of supermarket managers, Fineman (1996) found that both positive and negative emotions play a strategic role in the adoption of pro-environmental behaviors within organizations. In the more environmentally proactive organizations he studied, he found that managers spoke of positive emotions in relation to commitment to environmental issues, citing emotions such as belonging, respect, awe, and loyalty. However, he also found that negative emotions, such as fear and embarrassment also played a role. In explaining these findings he suggests that the most proactive organizations, and those with the highest public profile, had the most to fear from public embarrassment. The managers in these organizations had ‘‘invested their image and reputation in claims for environmental care, loss of face could be a blow to role identity, to professional status within the company and to corporate image’’ (Fineman, 1996, p. 491). Managers from less environmentally committed supermarkets did not display the same level of fear of embarrassment. Fineman (1996) suggested that these organizations and their managers had, in effect, less to lose. As they did not claim to be going beyond minimum levels of environmental

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compliance, they had no environmental reputation to defend, and therefore believed they could not be significantly embarrassed by public criticism (Fineman, 1996). These findings parallel theoretical perspectives of selfconscious emotions described by Vining and Ebreo (2002). Particularly, the role of fear as described by Fineman suggests that managers’ displays of emotion are based on their organization’s environmental paradigm and commitment. This finding is comparable to other findings from research examining emotion and communication in relation to environmental issues, as discussed in the following section of this review. In another study Fineman (1997) arrived at different results. Examining responses of automotive company managers, he found the managers did not display strong emotions toward environmental issues within their organizations, nor in their private lives. Rather, he found the automotive firm managers described their role in purely technical terms and attributed emotion only to conservation groups and environmental activists. He also found these managers did not ascribe their role to any strong values or moral obligations toward the environment. This was coupled with Fineman’s description of a lack of evidence for any organizational norms or mission statements associated with ‘‘greening’’ behaviors. From these results Fineman concluded that without substantial changes in thinking and practice at the organizational level, there will be little evidence of proenvironmental behavior in individual managers. These findings indicate a potential relationship between the climate of the organization and the behavior of individuals, a relationship we examine further in the next section of this chapter.

EMOTION AND COMMUNICATION In addition to its role in motivation, emotion is also important in interpersonal communication and persuasion, and this is another area that has been considered in research examining environmental issues. Emotion has been shown to be an important signal of message importance or relevancy in communication (Clore, 1994). Similarly, emotions displayed via facial expressions, voice tone, and body language have also been shown to indicate the importance of a message (Ekman, 1982). The communicative function of emotion has received attention in both environmental psychology and management research. Evidence from environmental psychology suggests that valence and intensity of emotion in communication has an impact on pro-environmental

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behaviors. For example, Lord’s (1994) findings show that both positive and negative messages have a significant impact on pro-environmental behavior and attitudes. In his experimental study of recycling behavior he found that messages that were positively framed tended to engender positive attitudes, belief in the recycling message, and inducement of pro-environmental behavior. However, contrary to his hypotheses he found that fear-based and negatively framed appeals were also an effective means of increasing recycling behavior. Such findings suggest that both positive and negative emotions can be inducements of pro-environmental behavior. Vining (1987) has also conducted experimental research using variables of emotional communication. In this case, however, she did not test the valence of emotion, but, rather, the intensity. In her study she presented scenarios where participants were forced to decide for or against a development application based on the environmental information they were given. Vining found that individuals presented with information using a ‘‘hot’’ emotional style were more likely to make a pro-conservation decision, compared to those who received information that was less emotive, or ‘‘cool.’’ Based on these findings, it is possible to argue that the intensity of emotion (hot or cool) is likely to impact on the pro-environmental behaviors of individuals. While valence was not controlled for in Vining’s (1987) experiment, she did measure the correlation between specific emotions and the outcome decision. She found that the emotions Happy (positive valence), Nervous (negative valence), and Surprised (neutral valence) were related to development decisions (anti-environmental) and Distressed (negative valence), Alert (neutral valence), and Angry (negative valence) were related to pro-environmental decisions. Her findings therefore suggest that the valences in both pro- and anti-environment decisions were mixed, and it was those in the more intense condition (hot) that were more likely to make proenvironmental decisions. These findings suggest that it is the intensity of emotion, more so than valence that determines pro-environmental behavior. In contrast, findings from within the environmental management literature indicate that emotion is not as strongly related to the communication of proenvironmental issues as the environmental psychology literature suggests. In their study of environmental champions, Andersson and Bateman (2000) hypothesized that the use of a dramatic and emotional, or ‘‘hot,’’ style in presenting environmental issues to gain top-management support would be positively related to championing success. What they found, however, was that the use of drama and emotion was not a significant predictor in the outcome of any championing episodes. Additionally, their results were in the opposite of their hypothesized direction, suggesting that the use of drama

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and emotion may have had a negative impact on the success of the championing episodes. Their qualitative results also support this conclusion, as they state none of the interviewed champions mentioned the use of dramatic or emotional language as contributing to their success; in fact, several champions attributed their success to the use of formal and businesslike, rather than dramatic and emotional, language. Andersson and Bateman’s (2000) findings indicate disparity between environmental management and environmental psychology. We suggest that this highlights an issue worthy of further research. In explaining these findings, it is possible that emotional restraint was expected in the organizations Andersson and Bateman studied. If this were the case, then emotions may be initially influential in driving individual action, but then their influence might be tempered or even reversed by deliberate attempts to remain ‘‘unemotional’’ or ‘‘rational.’’ In other words, the organizational context might encourage people to repress or reverse their own emotionally driven reactions, or to find a post-hoc ‘‘rational’’ justification for their emotion-driven behavior that does not rely on emotional antecedents. This is reinforced by Andersson and Bateman’s findings regarding the moderating effect of the organizational environmental paradigm. Specifically, Andersson and Bateman (2000) found that when the environmental paradigm of the organization was strong, drama and emotion was a significant predictor of champion success. In their study, they define the environmental paradigm as the ‘‘collective values and beliefs of an organization’s members’’ in relation to the environment (Andersson & Bateman, 2000, p. 553). In other words, champions employing drama and emotion in issue selling were successful only when the organizational paradigm was supportive of addressing environmental issues. These findings suggest that champions may have assessed their organizations’ environmental paradigms and decided whether or not to use emotion and drama in their issue presentation. Similar to Andersson and Bateman’s (2000) findings, Fineman and Sturdy’s (1999) results suggest that emotion may be tempered in relation to environmental issues. For example, Fineman and Sturdy (1999) found that regulatory inspectors commonly managed emotions in their interpersonal relationships with representatives of the regulated organization. They demonstrated that the emotional dynamics of interactions around environmental issues were important considerations ‘‘even when they appear not to be strongly felt or displayed’’ (Fineman & Sturdy, 1999, p. 660). This parallels Fineman’s earlier work where emotions were displayed freely in more pro-environmental organizations (1996), and withheld in

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organizations that were not proactive in addressing environmental issues (1997). These findings are further supported by the work of Egri and Herman (2000) who found that the presence of an environmental policy signaled an organization’s encouragement of pro-environmental behavior. Together, these studies imply that the context of the organization influences the propensity of individuals to perform pro-environmental behaviors. We propose that many of the studies that examine contextual variables at the organizational level are in fact measuring the same construct, which we term the organizational pro-environmental climate.

ORGANIZATIONAL PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL CLIMATE Studies that examine pro-environmental behavior within organizations, often also examine contextual variables at the organizational-level. For example, Fineman (1996) found that organizational commitment to the environment was an important factor in pro-environmental behavior. Similarly, Andersson and Bateman (2000) explored the impact of the corporate environmental paradigm on behavior, and Ramus and Steger (2000) found the environmental policy of the organization impacted on individual environmental initiatives. Table 1 shows how individual-level behaviors and organizational-level contextual variables related to environmental issues have been described and measured in the literature. Based on this comparison we suggest that each of these studies are in effect describing the same construct; that of the organization’s underlying characteristics that are supportive of issues of the natural environment, which we term the pro-environmental climate of the organization. This is a broad term that encompasses many of the previously used contextual variables and therefore allows the consideration of a wide range of studies to inform our review and analysis. In addressing debate regarding the differences and similarities between the concepts of organizational climate and culture we suggest that climate is the most appropriate term for the purposes of this analysis. Furthermore, climate most accurately reflects the use of the concept in previous studies. Climate can be said to refer to social processes and attitudes, and is predominantly examined quantitatively (Ashkanasy, Wilderom, & Peterson, 2000b; Denison, 1996). The concept of culture, in contrast, is more strongly related to underlying values and assumptions within the organization, and is

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Table 1. Previous Research Using Organization-level Contextual Variables. Study

Concept

Measures Used

Relationships Found

Andersson and Bateman (2000)

Corporate Environmental reward The corporate environmental environmental system, and Business paradigm did not directly paradigm Environment Scale predict success of (Shetzer et al., 1991) environmental championing, but was found to be a moderating variable Arago´n-Correa, Environmental Environmental situation Environmental commitment Matı´ as-Reche, commitment index (ESI) was greater in organizations and Senisewith individuals responsible Barrio (2004) for environmental issues Fineman (1996) Organizational ‘‘Greenness’’ of the Participants controlled their commitment to organization emotional responses the depending on the environment organizational commitment to the environment Henriques and Corporate Environmental Environmental commitment Sadorsky commitment to commitment profiles profiles influenced managers’ (1999) the natural perceptions of stakeholders environment Ramus and Environmental Corporate A strong and wellSteger (2000) policy environmental communicated policy of policies scale environmental protection was a strong predictor of employee environmental initiatives Sharma (2000) Organizational Issue legitimation as an Organizational context was found to be a significant context integral aspect of influence on the framing of corporate identity; managerial interpretations of discretionary slack; environmental issues and integration of environmental criteria into employee performance evaluation systems

often researched using a qualitative methodology (Ashkanasy et al., 2000b; Denison, 1996). Most studies we refer to within this area examine the collective attitudes and processes within the organization, rather than the underlying values and beliefs. Therefore, we consider the term climate to be most appropriate.

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ISSUE OWNERSHIP We have examined extant research that describes some part of the role of emotion in pro-environmental behavior from the research streams of environmental psychology and management. We now draw on the theories of organizational identification (Dutton et al., 1994) and issue ownership (Pratt & Dutton, 2000) to frame the sometimes incongruous results from both areas. In this section of the chapter, we derive testable propositions to explain the role of emotion in pro-environmental behavior based on these two theoretical frameworks, and the empirical findings from psychology and management literature reviewed thus far. The propositions developed are graphically represented in Fig. 1. In their study of social issues, Pratt and Dutton (2000) developed theoretical insights into how organizational members deal with social issues that impact on the organization. The focus of their study was on the social issue of homeless people occupying space in a public library, however, they also gave the example of environmental issues being relevant to their theory. They found that the strength of issue ownership in their study explained why some issues were strongly owned and acted upon within the organization, while others were not. They defined issue ownership as ‘‘a concept that involves a feeling of possession of an issue, and a feeling that the issue is a legitimate action focus’’ (Pratt & Dutton, 2000, p. 123). Furthermore, they suggest that emotional reactions to, and interpretations of, organizational issues can either promote or retard an individual’s sense of issue ownership.

Identification with Personal Values Emotional Response Emotional Valence

Organisational Identification

Future Identity

Issue Recognition

Climate

Current Identity Degree of Issue Ownership

Degree of Behavior

Emotional Intensity

Fig. 1.

Conceptual Model of Antecedents of Pro-environmental Behavior. Source: Based on Pratt and Dutton (2000).

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The work of Pratt and Dutton (2000) builds upon research on issue interpretation in organizations and subsequent links to patterns of action. We examine this notion further and apply their theoretical frame to current research that investigates the relationship between environmental issues and emotion. We find the application of this theory useful in explaining seemingly contradictory results between environmental psychology and management research findings. One of the main assumptions underlying Pratt and Dutton’s (2000) work is that there is a strong relationship between issue ownership and action. While their findings imply that such a link exists, they also assert that there were not sufficient data to thoroughly examine this relationship. Research in the area of environmental management also relies heavily on similar assumptions. Many studies rely on the use of intention to perform behavior as a direct predictor of actual behavior, without measuring the outcome of behavior directly (Cordano & Frieze, 2000; Do Valle, 2005). There is evidence from within environmental psychology, however, to suggest that this relationship may not be as strong as many assume (Aitken et al., 1994; Kantola et al., 1984). The conceptual model presented in Fig. 1 also rests largely on this assumption. In order to strengthen the research and the applicability of findings, this assumption needs to be tested empirically; thus our first proposition is Proposition 1. The degree of environmental issue ownership is strongly related to the degree of pro-environmental behavior. One of the key findings from Pratt and Dutton’s (2000) study was that emotional intensity differentiated issues that were fully owned from those that were not. They found that those issues that were strongly owned were associated with a narrow range of similar emotions with a high average intensity. Conversely, issues that were not owned, or had limited ownership were associated with a low average intensity and ambivalence. Interestingly, their findings also suggested that both positive and negative emotions resulted in strong ownership, and it was shown that the intensity of the emotion was more important than the valence of emotion in determining whether an issue was strongly owned. This is likely also true for environmental issues. For example, Vining’s (1987) study of environmental decision making found that ‘‘hot’’ emotional messages were more likely to elicit pro-conservation decisions by respondents. Additionally, other studies have shown that both positive and negative emotions are significant predictors of pro-environmental behavior (Kals et al., 1999; Lord, 1994; Pooley & O’Connor, 2000).

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Within an organizational context, Fineman’s (1996) findings also hint at the issue of emotional intensity. For example, in describing his findings in relation to fear, he suggests that those managers in less environmentally committed organizations did not display the same level of fear from embarrassment as did those in more ‘‘green’’ organizations. Based on these findings we suggest that Proposition 2. Individuals who display greater emotional intensity toward an environmental issue are likely to have stronger ownership of the issue. Pratt and Dutton (2000) found that while emotional intensity was most important in differentiating issue ownership, the valence of emotion also became important when it was examined in relation to the social identities of the individuals in their study. They identified both work and non-work identities as relating to social issues. For example, where issues were strongly owned, participants identified a small range of negative emotions (annoyance and frustration) with the current organizational identity, and a small range of positive emotions (hope and excitement) with the ideal organizational identity. In contrast, issues that were not strongly owned were associated with general ambivalence, with no clear differentiation between the current and ideal organizational identities (Pratt & Dutton, 2000). Further support for this notion is provided by Markus and Nurius’ (1986) work on the possible self. Markus and Nurius (1986) suggest that possible selves are ‘‘the cognitive manifestation of enduring goals, aspirations, motives, fears and threatsy they provide the essential link between the selfconcept and motivation’’ (1986, p. 954). Their work suggests that possible selves are important as incentives for future behavior and also because they provide an evaluative and interpretive context for the current view of self. We extend this idea to the individual’s perception of current and possible future identities of the organization, which when examined with the valence of emotional response is likely to predict the degree of issue ownership (Pratt & Dutton, 2000). These findings may also be relevant to environmental issues and we argue that this is an area worthy of further research. As noted previously, there is evidence to suggest that both positive and negative emotions can result in pro-environmental behavior (Aitken et al., 1994; Fineman, 1996; Kals et al., 1999; Lord, 1994; Pooley & O’Connor, 2000). However, it is not clear from these studies how the valence of emotion impacts on individual action, only that both positive and negative valences were observed (Fineman, 1996) or

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could be used to induce pro-environmental behavior (Aitken et al., 1994; Kals et al., 1999). Therefore, based on these studies, we suggest that Proposition 3. The degree of an individual’s issue ownership is related to the emotional valence ascribed to the individual’s current and future organizational identities. In the organization they studied, Pratt and Dutton (2000) also found that issues were only fully owned by organizational members when issues were linked to organizational identities. A tight connection between an organizational identity and an organizational issue allows members to feel connected, attached, and part of the issue. Therefore, we suggest that identification with the organization is likely to be an important variable when examining ownership of environmental issues within organizations. Organizational identification is defined by Dutton et al. (1994, p. 239) as the cognitive connection that occurs when a person’s self-concept contains the same attributes as those they perceive to be in their organization. In other words, it is the degree to which an individual defines themselves by the same attributes that they believe define the organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Mael & Ashforth, 1992). Using this definition of organizational identification, there is support for the proposition that organizational identification can result in stronger issue ownership. Bansal (2003) conducted an ethnographic study of the flow of environmental issues in two organizations. Her findings suggest that the congruence between an individual’s concern about an issue and the values of the organization were key variables in the success of addressing environmental issues; that is, without alignment between the values of the individual and the organization, the issue would remain unresolved. It is likely that what Bansal is suggesting could also be described through the framework of organizational identification (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton et al., 1994). We argue that the congruence Bansal describes between the values or concerns of an individual and their organization suggests strong organizational identification. Both Bansal’s (2003) work and the theoretical framework of identification (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton et al., 1994; Pratt & Dutton, 2000) suggest organizational identification is a necessary condition for organizational action. There is also evidence to suggest that the pro-environmental climate of the organization may moderate the relationship between identification and environmental issue ownership. For example, in Fineman’s studies of supermarkets (1996) and the automotive industry (1997) he found considerable variance in the emotions and action taken in response to environmental

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issues from managers in different organizations. Particularly, he found that those managers who were members of organizations with strong commitment to environmental issues displayed more intense emotion and greater orientation toward pro-environmental behavior, and were also likely to display stronger environmental issue ownership. Andersson and Bateman’s (2000) study supports this notion. They found that emotional communication was a predictor of pro-environmental behavior only when the environmental paradigm of the organization was strong. By contrast, individuals are perhaps just as likely to identify with organizations that do not have a strong pro-environmental climate. For example, in Fineman’s (1997) study of the automobile industry, his respondents did not display strong emotional commitment or values toward natural environment issues. This is not to say, however, that they did not strongly identify with their organizations. It is possible, and perhaps also likely, that those who identify strongly with an organizational climate that is not pro-environmental will be less likely to show strong ownership of environmental issues. We therefore suggest that for those who have strong identification with their organization, a pro-environmental organizational climate is a necessary condition for environmental issue ownership. Proposition 4. The relationship between organizational identification and issue ownership is moderated by the pro-environmental climate of the organization. More specifically Proposition 4a. Where the pro-environmental climate of the organization is strong, individuals who identify with the organization are likely to have stronger ownership of environmental issues. Proposition 4b. Where the pro-environmental climate of the organization is weak, individuals who identify with the organization are less likely to display ownership of environmental issues. It is also possible that individuals may display environmental issue ownership when they do not strongly identify with their organization. For instance, Pratt and Dutton (2000) suggest that individuals may interpret issues differently based on identities outside their organization. So if an individual identifies strongly with pro-environmental values outside the organization, this may also be translated to the organizational context. For example, there is some evidence that those who are initiators or leaders of pro-environmental behaviors in organizations often have strong personal

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environmental values (Andersson & Bateman, 2000; Bansal, 2003; Ramus & Steger, 2000). However, we also argue that the context of the organization is likely to moderate environmental issue ownership that is based on personal values. We therefore propose that Proposition 5. The relationship between the strength of an individual’s personal pro-environmental values and issue ownership will be moderated by the organization’s pro-environmental climate. More specifically Proposition 5a. Where the pro-environmental climate of the organization is strong, individuals identify with strong pro-environmental values are more likely to display ownership of environmental issues in their organization. Proposition 5b. Where the pro-environmental climate of the organization is weak, individuals who identify with strong pro-environmental values are less likely to display ownership of environmental issues in their organization. The above propositions identify a potential research area which could further draw together literature from both psychology and management. For example, it is likely that research from the perspective of environmental psychology is predominately determined based on non-work identification. This contrasts with research from environmental management which would likely be based predominantly on organizational identification. However, environmental issues cannot be said to be purely social, or purely organizational, and therefore some overlap between identification is inevitable. By drawing these two literatures together through this lens we make a unique contribution to both environmental psychology and environmental management literatures.

IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS We have argued that examining environmental issues through the lens of issue ownership (Pratt & Dutton, 2000) is a useful framework for examining pro-environmental behavior within organizations. Empirical research that examines environmental issues from psychology or management perspectives

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aligns well within this theoretical framework, and we suggest it is a useful platform for the development of future research. In order to test our propositions further empirical research is necessary. Particularly, we argue for research that examines the role of emotional intensity, identification, personal environmental values, and the pro-environmental climate of the organization as antecedents of environmental issue ownership, and subsequent pro-environmental behavior. We make a unique contribution to the literature by integrating environmental psychology findings into the context of organizations. As Pratt and Dutton (2000) suggest, individuals may identify more strongly with personal values from a non-work perspective when interpreting organizational issues. This makes findings from environmental psychology particularly relevant to an organizational context, as it gives unique insights into the cognitive and affective process of environmental issue interpretation in a non-work context. Furthermore, in examining emotions it is clear that individuals do not turn off their moods and emotions on coming to work (Ashkanasy, Zerbe, & Ha¨rtel, 2002). We therefore argue that future empirical research that examines emotions in the context of environmental management research would make a significant contribution to the expansion of this field. By integrating the management and psychology research in relation to environmental issues we have developed a set of five propositions. These represent just a small part of the many potential research questions that could be examined regarding the role of emotion as it relates to environmental issues. For example, we have offered a broad perspective on emotions and pro-environmental behavior and we have not focused on any particular group within the organization. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that top-management teams have a particularly salient role in the dissemination of pro-environmental behavior within organizations (Banerjee, Iyer, & Kashyap, 2003; Fineman, 1996; Ramus & Steger, 2000). Further research would benefit from a focus on the emotionality of this group and how this impacts on the organizational response to environmental issues. Other research areas could include research on specific emotion groups. For example, Vining and Ebreo (2002) suggest that self-conscious emotions may be particularly relevant to environmental issues. The findings from Fineman’s (1996) studies certainly reflect the prevalence of fear, embarrassment, shame, and pride. These emotions are self-conscious in that they are derived from evaluations of the self against social or personal norms (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Evidence showing links between environmental

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values and behaviors may benefit from also considering the self-conscious emotions that result from evaluation of the self against these values and norms. We therefore argue that this category of emotion offers numerous avenues for future research. Testing assumptions on which our propositions are based would also be a fruitful area for future research. Our main assumption, in line with Pratt and Dutton (2000), is that strong environmental issue ownership will result in pro-environmental behavior. While many studies use intention to perform behavior as a direct predictor of behavior itself (Cordano & Frieze, 2000; Do Valle, 2005), our assumption of a strong correlation between issue ownership and behavior is yet to be tested empirically. Studies that conduct this test would be a valuable avenue for the development of this research area. Finally, our propositions are strongly tied to the individual level of analysis. However, future research that examines multiple levels of analysis would also be beneficial to this research area. We note that neo-institutional theorists have called for further research to examine the micro-foundations of institutions (DiMaggio, 1997; George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Scott, 1995; Zucker, 1987). While the analysis we have provided here makes a contribution toward this purpose, further research that examines links between individual and organizational action would further assist in developing neo-institutional theory. Furthermore, there have been numerous calls for examining multiple levels of analysis within the literature, particularly within the area of organizations and the natural environment (Sharma & Ruud, 2003; Starik & Rands, 1995). There are, however, few studies that examine multilevel relationships.

CONCLUSION The role of emotions in relation to the pro-environmental behavior of individuals within organizations is an area worthy of further investigation. We have reviewed current literature that examines emotions in relation to the natural environment, from both management and psychology research paradigms. We have integrated these empirical findings using the theories of issue ownership and organizational identification in order to suggest possible explanations for seemingly contradictory research findings. In doing so we developed a set of propositions that provide several interesting avenues for future empirical and theoretical considerations. We argue that environmental issue ownership is a concept that assists in reconciling

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empirical findings from environmental psychology and management research. Particularly, we argue for research that examines the role of emotional intensity, identification, personal values, and the pro-environmental climate of the organization as antecedents of environmental issue ownership and subsequent pro-environmental behavior. These arguments highlight the importance of emotion in developing pro-environmental behaviors in organizations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The preparation of this manuscript was supported in part by an Australian Postgraduate Award and a Smart State Ph.D. Scholarship to the first author. The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable comments provided by three anonymous reviewers.

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CHAPTER 5 FEELINGS ABOUT ETHICAL DECISIONS: THE EMOTIONS OF MORAL RESIDUE Wilfred J. Zerbe ABSTRACT Scholars in philosophy have proposed that individuals who choose among two equally ethical alternatives will experience regret as a result of the ‘‘moral residue’’ that remains from not having been able to select both alternatives. Although posed and often discussed by philosophers, the veracity of this proposition has not been empirically tested. This chapter proposes a theoretical framework which synthesizes propositions from Philosophy with theory and research on emotions in the workplace to address questions concerning how the characteristics of ethical dilemmas give rise to different emotions, how the characteristics of employees affect the experience of emotions, and the consequences of the experience of emotions as a result of ethical decision making.

INTRODUCTION When an employee is faced with an ethical dilemma and chooses what he or she deems is an ethical response from two equally ethical alternatives, is the Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 109–129 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04005-4

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dilemma resolved? Most models of ethical decision making assume so. They assume that by having made a ‘‘right’’ choice the employee’s ethical obligation is met in full. Although models of ethical decision are silent on the question of employee feelings, it follows from having made a ‘‘right’’ choice that employees should feel good about having made an ethical decision, or at best feel indifferent about having chosen between two equal alternatives. Yet consider the following scenario, presented by Nixon (1994): Karen, a CPA, has just completed the tax return for a new client, Peter. Peter, a sole proprietor, was referred to Karen by Robert (Peter’s brother), who is a substantial and long term client of Karen’s. Peter told Karen that when the tax return was completed it would be used by a bank to document his income in order to qualify for a large business loan. Peter provided adequate documentation and Karen had no difficulties in preparing the tax return. Upon delivery of the tax return and original documents, Peter commented that he was satisfied with Karen’s work, particularly since the return indicated sufficient income to qualify for the business loan. However, Peter complained that the total tax due was much more than he could afford. Peter then indicated he was going to prepare his own return for filing with the IRS in order to show a much smaller tax liability. Karen firmly and clearly explained that if Peter reduced the income or increased the expenses in any material way he would be filing a fraudulent tax return. Further, Karen informed Peter she knew the bank required that the tax return used for income documentation had to be the same as the one filed with the IRS. In addition, Karen stated that to file a tax return that was materially different from the return submitted to the bank, would be committing fraud against the bank. Peter informed Karen that he simply could not afford to pay the taxes and would ‘‘take his chances.’’ Karen is especially concerned because she is also the independent auditor of the small local bank where Peter’s loan will be considered. This loan would be considered large for the bank. Karen is aware that the current loan loss provisions for the bank are barely adequate. A loan loss of this magnitude would have serious repercussions to the bank.

Nixon uses the case above to illustrate a process of moral reasoning that attempts to resolve dilemmas created by the strict application of the CPA Code of Professional Conduct, in situations where articles of the Code advocate contradictory actions. In the example, Karen is faced with two equally ethical choices: (a) maintaining confidential client information, consistent with Rule 301 of the Code of Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and (b) releasing this information, consistent with Article III: ‘‘members should perform all professional responsibilities with the highest sense of integrity’’ (cited in Nixon, 1994, p. 572). Notwithstanding the difficulty in choosing between these alternatives, once Karen has taken action; done the ‘‘right thing,’’ she should feel satisfied, shouldn’t she?

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Some philosophers say ‘‘no.’’ They propose the existence of ‘‘moral residue’’ (Marcus, 1982; Williams, 1965). The notion of moral residue posits that individuals feel regret after choosing between two mutually exclusive, ‘‘ethical’’ alternatives. They are posited to feel regret because by being able to pursue only one course they feel their obligation to behave ethically has not been completely discharged. This occurs even though they have made an ethical choice and regardless of which option they chose to pursue. This remainder of obligation constitutes the ‘‘moral residue’’: Since the choices presented by an ethical dilemma conflict with one another, no matter what course of conduct the agent chooses, the agent will experience remorse, regret, or guilt. (Greenspan, 1995)

These powerful emotions certainly figure prominently in an ethical dilemma and, rightly so, because the agent must sacrifice one value for another. (McConnell, 2002)

Gardiner (2003), writing in the medical ethics literature, describes the phenomenon succinctly: In much of the ethical literature there is a drive to find the correct solution, to try to decide which principles should take precedence or which consequences are preferable. After considerable debate, a course of action is chosen and deemed to be the right thing to do. The moral agent need worry no more; they have done the right thing. It is likely, however, that whatever actually happens, there will be regret for those involved; regret for what might have been, for the situation arising in the first place or for the undesirable effects of the action on those involved. (p. 300)

The purpose of this chapter is to propose a model of moral residue in ethical decision making, incorporating current theory and research on the causes and consequences of emotions in organizations. I begin with a review of previous studies of the role of emotion in ethical decision making, and then consider the structure of ethical dilemmas. Decision making in the face of ethical dilemmas is then situated in the context of Affective Events Theory (AET) (Weiss & Beal, 2005; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) as a guiding framework. Finally, I specify research propositions and hypotheses, based on a synthesis of understanding from the study in Philosophy of moral dilemmas and from Psychology and Organizational Behavior of emotions in organizations, and present some ideas for testing these hypotheses.

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Studies of Emotion and Ethical Decision-Making The business ethics literature can be divided into two approaches: a normative approach, which seeks to describe how an individual ought to reason ethically, and an empirical, descriptive approach which seeks to describe how individuals actually reason ethically (or not). Descriptive, empirical studies have generally proposed and tested models of the process associated with ethical decision making and of the relative importance of specific elements of that process (e.g. individual, organizational, etc. factors; see Ford & Richardson, 1994, and Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000). Examples of process models are the contingency model of Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Hunt and Vitell’s (1986) ‘‘general’’ theory of ethics, the situational-individual model of Trevino (1986), the behavioral model of Brommer, Gratto, Gravender, and Tuttle (1997), and the Moral Intensity Model of Jones (1991). Jones’ model incorporates elements of Rest’s (1986) four-stage process model, whereby individuals are said to (1) recognize moral issues, (2) engage in moral reasoning and make ethical judgments, (3) establish moral intent, and (4) engage in moral behavior. More recently, Brass, Butterfield, and Skaggs (1998) have proposed a social network model and Street, Douglas, Geiger, and Martinko (2001) have proposed a cognitive elaboration model of ethical decision making. Although each of these models differs somewhat in focus and emphasis, all include some variation of the first two of Rest’s (1986) stages, namely recognition and reasoning/judgment. All have as their dependent variable the ‘‘goodness,’’ in ethical terms, of the judgments made. Most germane here, none have incorporated how the individuals making the judgment feel about their decision. Emotion, or more generally, affect, has been studied by some scholars as an influence on decision making. Examples of this type of research include Staw and Barsade’s (1993) finding that individuals experiencing positive affect use decision-making heuristics more effectively to manage large amounts of potentially relevant information, and Isen and colleagues’ (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). findings that positive affect results in broader and more flexible categorization of information. The consequences of negative affect have also been examined by, for example, Lerner and Tiedens (2006) who identified both functional and dysfunctional effects of anger. Furthermore, the role of affective intensity was studied by Seo and Feldman-Barrett (2007) who found that investment decision-making performance was enhanced by intensity of feeling.

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Gaudine and Thorne (2001) and Connelly, Helton-Fauth, and Mumford (2004) have recently extended this and other research on emotions and decision making to examine how emotions influence ethical choice. Gaudine and Thorne point out that emotions have generally been neglected in the study of ethical decision making, consistent with the dominance of cognitive approaches to decision making generally (see Etzioni, 1988 for a notable exception). Gaudine and Thorne adopt the circumplex model to describing emotions (Russell, 1979, 1980; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977; Watson & Tellegen, 1985) to develop propositions that relate felt emotions to elements of the ethical decision-making process. Circumplex models posit that two continuous, orthogonal dimensions can be used to define and describe emotional experience. Firstly, valence (e.g. positive–negative or pleasure– displeasure) and secondly, arousal or activation. Gaudine and Thorne propose that valence and arousal will effect how individuals recognize that an ethical dilemma exists, their prescriptive reasoning as to what constitutes an ideal resolution of a dilemma, the motivation and intention to comply with this judgment, and the ethical action itself. While Gaudine and Thorne (2001) do not go on to test their propositions, Connelly et al. (2004) undertook an in-basket study of the impact of trait emotions on ethical choice. In contrast to Gaudine and Thorne’s use of the circumplex approach to emotion, Connelly et al. adopt a discrete emotions approach, which holds that the domain of emotion is best represented by a set of specific feelings states. Izard (1972), for example, proposes ten discrete emotions: fear, anger, enjoyment, disgust, interest, surprise, contempt, shame, sadness, and guilt. Tomkins (1962, 1980) proposes nine: distress replaces sadness and guilt from Izard’s list. Ironically, although Connelly et al. purport to use a discrete emotions framework, they group the emotions they measure into ‘‘positive’’ and ‘‘negative’’ in order to formulate and test hypotheses about the effect of emotions on ethical choices. More problematically, rather than assess felt emotion and thus its effect on ethical decision making, they admittedly measure trait emotion or the propensity to experience particular emotions. Although situational or state emotions and trait emotions are empirically related, conceptually they are distinct and, more importantly, most theoretical frameworks linking emotions to decision making emphasize the role of the feeling state of the individual. Connelly et al. (2004, p. 245) say in their introduction that ‘‘there are no empirical studies directly examining the influence of emotions on ethical choices’’ (and arguably their own empirical study has not contributed to a change in this state of affairs). However, notwithstanding their statement to the contrary, some scholars have examined the relationship between

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emotions and ethical choices. Skoe, Eisenberg, and Cumberland (2002), for example, examined the emotions that individuals reported experiencing in response to real life and hypothetical moral dilemmas. They asked individuals to describe dilemmas that they had experienced, what they did and why, and to rate their experience of specific emotions. Similarly, they provided individuals with hypothetical dilemmas to which they asked them to respond. Skoe et al. found that dilemmas were associated with felt emotions. Specifically, dilemmas that were rated as more difficult and important generated greater emotion, dilemmas that involved ongoing significant relationships generated more emotion than those that involved weak relationships or only impersonal issues, and emotions were differentially associated with the adoption of care-related as opposed to justice-related moral reasoning. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001) provided a dramatic demonstration of how ethical dilemmas can evoke emotions, and in particular how personal dilemmas do so more than impersonal ones. Greene et al. used functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) to view activity within brain centers associated with emotional processing when individuals were presented with moral dilemmas. FMRI is a technique for determining which parts of the brain are activated by different types of physical sensation or activity, such as sight, sound, or the movement of a subject’s fingers. The dilemmas were (1) ‘‘nonmoral’’ (i.e. choices between bus and train travel), (2) ‘‘moral-impersonal’’ (i.e. whether a poor person should keep money found in the lost wallet of a rich person), and (3) ‘‘moral-personal’’ (i.e. throwing old people off a sinking lifeboat in order to save others’’). In two studies, the results showed significantly more brain activity in emotion-related centers in the moralpersonal condition that the moral-impersonal and non-moral conditions. In their second study Greene et al. showed that individuals who gave a verbal response of ‘‘appropriate’’ in response to moral-personal dilemmas (thus making a choice that although ethical would have harmful consequences) took longer to respond than those who responded with ‘‘inappropriate.’’ Hence, the above study suggests that personal moral dilemmas generate greater emotional responses for people than non-moral or non-personal dilemmas. Greene et al. say that this shows an interference effect between felt emotion and behavior which is inconsistent with that emotion. Greene et al. did not report whether emotion-related brain activity differed as a function of verbal response. It is noteworthy that both Skoe et al. (2002) and Greene et al. (2001) focused on feelings while making an ethical decision. While prima facie they did not consider the question of how individuals feel after making an ethical

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choice, it is likely that their results are relevant to the question posed here: ‘‘is there moral residue?’’ This is because it is likely that the feelings of individuals during an ethical decision-making process are anticipatory of their feelings following their choice. That is, while deciding the feelings of individuals may be a function of their feelings about the outcomes of their decision. Nevertheless in the hypotheses proposed here emotions should be assessed following the choice of an action. Further, and unlike Skoe et al. and Greene et al., I propose to consider the degree to which dilemmas represent situations involving equal and mutually exclusive options.

The Nature and Structure of Ethical Dilemmas The discussion above begs the question of the definition of an ‘‘ethical dilemma.’’ Wikipedia (2005) defines an ethical dilemma as ‘‘a situation that often involves an apparent conflict between moral imperatives, in which to obey one would result in transgressing another.’’1 This definition recognizes that authentic ethical dilemmas involve choices among alternatives that have ethical or moral content. An example would be having to choose between maintaining someone’s right to privacy and revealing private information in order to prevent injury. In contrast, as used in popular language ‘‘ethical dilemma’’ can mean a difficult decision between two alternatives only one of which need represent a choice with moral content. Business people who are faced with the choice of whether or not to reveal unethical business practices and possibly lose their jobs are not faced with an ethical dilemma, according to the Wikipedia definition. Rather they are faced with the question of whether to act ethically or in their own selfinterest. Godfrey (2004) captures differences in use of the term dilemma in his description of Cicero’s ethical challenges: Writing just under 2000 years ago the Roman orator Cicero outlined 4 types of ethical challenges individuals face:    

The The The The

challenge challenge challenge challenge

of of of of

choosing choosing choosing choosing

good vs. evil what is expedient vs. what is not expedient the good vs. the expedient between two goods (good vs. good)

The first two challenges represent temptations; the first tempts our moral character while the second tempts our rational faculties. The third and fourth challenges represent dilemmas; the third forces choice between the moral and the rational, while the fourth forces choice between two morally valued outcomes.

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These distinctions are important here because when philosophers are positing the existence of moral residue in ethical dilemmas, they are limiting themselves to cases of the fourth kind, above. That is, a true ethical dilemma consists of a choice between two ethical goods. As Foulk, Keffer, and Keffer (1998) make plain, an ethical dilemma is not ‘‘1. the mere presence of disagreement about moral value, 2. a conflict between morality and the law, 3. a conflict between morality and self-interest, 4. the urgent need to make a moral decision or choice.’’ For the purposes of the research I am proposing here, however, two types of dilemmas will be investigated: ‘‘true’’ dilemmas involving choices between two ‘‘goods’’ and dilemmas involving choices between morality and self-interest. It is also important to note, although this is not a point of disagreement between Philosophy and the broader field of Business Ethics, that the term ‘‘dilemma’’ means a choice between mutually exclusive alternatives (McConnell, 2002; Williams, 1965; Sorensen, 1991). As Williams (1965, p. 109) represents this: ‘‘I ought to do a and I ought to do b, but I cannot do both a and b.’’ More importantly, true ethical dilemmas are symmetrical (McConnell, 2002; Sorensen, 1991; Williams, 1965). That is, the moral imperatives or ethical responsibilities underlying the two choices are equal in precedence. If one takes precedence over the other then there is no dilemma as to the correct course of action. A great deal of discussion has taken place among philosophers as to whether it is possible to logically preclude genuine moral dilemmas. This is referred to as the question of ‘‘consistency’’ (e.g. McConnell, 2002; Williams, 1965; Marcus, 1982), as follows: ‘‘At the intuitive level, the existence of moral dilemmas suggests some sort of inconsistency. An agent caught in a genuine dilemma is required to do each of two acts but cannot do both. And since he cannot do both, not doing one is a condition of doing the other. Thus, it seems that the same act is both required and forbidden’’ (McConnell, 2002, Part 4, ‘‘Dilemmas and Consistency’’). One recourse has been to attempt to determine a universally and a priori correct ordering of precedence for ethical principles. Nixon (1994), in an examination of possible conflicts among the ethical prescriptions in the Certified Public Accountants Code of Professional Conduct, has shown that this is not possible. True ethical dilemmas, then, involve a conflict between ethical imperatives only where one of two mutually exclusive, equally ethical options must be chosen. In addition to this structure, ethical dilemmas can be of a variety of types. McConnell (2002) has enumerated two of these. First, dilemmas can be self-imposed or externally imposed by someone else or by the environment – ‘‘by the world,’’ as McConnell puts it. Second, dilemmas can be either

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obligation dilemmas or prohibition dilemmas. ‘‘The former are situations in which more than one feasible action is obligatory. The latter involve cases in which all feasible actions are forbidden’’ (McConnell, 2002, Part 7, ‘‘Types of Moral Dilemmas’’). Another way of putting this is that obligation dilemmas create sins of omission whereas prohibition dilemmas create sins of commission. As described above, dilemmas can also differ in whether they involve relational or non-relational situations (Skoe et al., 2002).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS This proposal began with the proposition from Philosophy that the making of a decision in the face of an ethical dilemma gives rise to the emotion of regret. It then went on to present existing studies demonstrating that emotions play a role in ethical decision making. Finally, it described the nature and structure of ethical dilemmas. This background forms the foundation for the research questions to be addressed here. Specifically, the following research questions are addressed: 1. Do differences in the characteristics of ethical dilemmas give rise to different emotions? 2. When employees are faced with an ethical dilemma, what emotions do they experience? 3. Which kinds of employees are more likely to experience emotions as a consequence of resolving a dilemma than others? 4. What consequences does the experience of emotions as a result of ethical decision-making have? What are the implications of this for organizations? 5. Are different consequences associated with the experience of different emotions? 6. How does the choice made in an ethical dilemma influence the experience of emotion?

The Effect of Dilemma Characteristics on the Level of Emotional Experience Making a decision in the face of an ethical dilemma can be considered a special case of an affective event in Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) AET

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(c.f. Weiss & Beal, 2005). AET provides a framework for understanding how events in organizations result in emotions and other consequences and how characteristics of the work environment and of individuals influence workplace emotions. Fig. 1 shows the ‘‘macrostructure’’ of AET. As a general model of emotions in organizations, AET can be used to organize the framing of hypotheses with respect to moral residue. Specifically, the ‘‘work events’’ component would correspond to the ethical dilemma, the ‘‘experienced emotions’’ component to the feeling of regret or other emotion, and the ‘‘affect-driven behaviors’’ component to the ethical judgment made. AET also posits that personal dispositions have both a direct effect on experienced emotions and a moderating effect on the relationship between (in this case) ethical dilemmas and the experience of emotion. These four elements, shown as shaded boxes in Fig. 1, form the framework for this investigation and guide the development of the specific research propositions presented in the following sections. Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) propose that events that give rise to emotions are those that are appraised by the individual as relevant to his or her well being. This is the first stage in a two-stage appraisal process advocated by most cognitively oriented emotion theorists as describing how emotions are elicited (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). ‘‘Initial appraisal leads to further, more specific, appraisal of context focusing on consequences, attributions, coping potential and so forth. While different theorists offer

Work Environment

Work Events

Personal Dispositions

Fig. 1.

Judgment Driven Behaviors

Experienced Emotions

Work Attitudes

Affect Driven Behaviors

Affective Events Theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).

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different appraisal dimensions, all suggest that it is this secondary level of appraisal which results in the experience of discrete emotions like anger, sadness, or joy’’ (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996, p. 31). Moreover, during primary appraisal, events with greater relevance to the goals of the individual are seen as giving rise to stronger emotions. Integrating goal relevance with the discussion of the characteristics of dilemmas, the following relationships between dilemma characteristics and emotional experience are hypothesized: Hypothesis 1. The stronger the dilemma (greater symmetry and greater salience) the more likely the experience of emotion. Hypothesis 2. Good vs. good dilemmas are more likely to result in emotion than good vs. expedient dilemmas. Hypothesis 3. Self-imposed dilemmas are more likely to result in experienced emotion vs. Externally imposed dilemmas. Hypothesis 4. Obligation dilemmas are more likely to result in experienced emotion vs. Prohibition dilemmas. Hypothesis 3 is consistent with the findings of Skoe et al. (2002) and Greene et al. (2001) who, as described above, found that personally relevant dilemmas resulted in greater emotion. Hypothesis 4 follows the Greene et al. finding that individuals who made a choice that was inconsistent with their emotional reaction took longer to verbalize that choice, compared to those that made a consistent choice. Making an inconsistent choice represents a ‘‘sin of commission’’ which is more likely to occur in obligation dilemmas.

The Effect of Dilemma Characteristics on the Nature of Emotional Experience The original proponents of moral residue as a precursor of emotion framed the emotional experience as regret. Clearly, however, regret is only one possible emotional reaction. Indeed, philosophers studying emotions in the context of dilemmas also talk about ‘‘guilt’’ and ‘‘remorse’’ among other emotions. Although this discourse is purportedly intended to capture issues of definition (i.e. under what circumstances should a particular emotion word be used to describe an experience) it often strays to the realm of experience (i.e. in these circumstances individuals will experience a

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particular emotion) (e.g. Betzler, 2000). Nevertheless this latter, phenomenological, question is the purview of psychologists and sociologists with philosophers best limiting themselves to deontological questions. Indeed, psychologists have developed explanatory frameworks to understand and predict when individuals will experience particular emotions. This secondary appraisal, or ‘‘meaning analysis’’ (Smith & Pope, 1992) involves the evaluation of personal and situational cues that results in the elicitation of a discrete emotional response. Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) list some of the dimensions used by various scholars to describe this process, and note that these frameworks are able to predict emotional response, even as ‘‘no definitive conclusions about the usefulness of one configuration over another can yet be made’’ (p. 34). The choice of a framework, then, depends on the context in which it is to be used. Here, what is useful is a framework that uses dimensions relevant to understanding the question at hand: ‘‘When employees are faced with an ethical dilemma, what emotions do they experience?’’ A framework with dimensions that map onto the characteristics of dilemmas would be particularly useful. Scherer’s (1984, 1986, 1988, 1993) component process theory provides such a framework. In Scherer’s approach the appraisal criteria, which he calls ‘‘stimulus evaluation checks’’ (SEC), occur in an invariant sequence, and include dimensions shared by other appraisal theorists such as novelty and goal relevance. Of most relevance to the hypotheses being proposed here, however, is the fact that Scherer’s SECs assess agency (e.g. self vs. other), intentionality, compatibility with internal and external standards of morality, and coping power. For example, coping power, or the ability of an individual to respond to a situation, and agency (who is responsible for the situation) map onto whether a dilemma is self-caused or externally caused. All other things being equal, Scherer’s theory predicts that a SEC of low coping power is more likely to result in the experience of sadness, despair, anxiety, and fear; a SEC of external agency is more likely to result in the experience of despair, anxiety, and fear. The reader is referred to Scherer (1993) for a complete specification of the relationship between the 15 SECs in Scherer’s theory and the emotions that are predicted to result. The following three hypotheses are based on predictions that follow from its application to the characteristics of ethical dilemmas: Hypothesis 5. Externally imposed dilemmas are more likely to result in (a) sadness, despair, anxiety, fear (emotions for which the stimulus

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evaluation is of less power and control), and (b) despair, anxiety, fear (emotions for which the stimulus evaluation is of other-caused) than internally caused dilemmas. Hypothesis 6. Internally imposed dilemmas are more likely to result in (a) irritation, rage (emotions for which the stimulus evaluation is of more power and control), and (b) shame, guilt, pride (emotions for which the stimulus evaluation is of self-caused) that externally caused dilemmas. Hypothesis 7. Obligation dilemmas are more likely to result in (a) shame, guilt, pride (emotions for which the stimulus evaluation is of that the self is the agent and the action is intentional), and (b) sadness, despair, anxiety, fear, rage (emotions for which the stimulus evaluation is of that the self is an other, natural causes, or chance) than prohibition dilemmas.

The Effect of Employee Characteristics AET points out that employee characteristics are likely to have a direct effect on the experience of emotion and to moderate the relationship between events and emotions. For example, trait negative affectivity and Neuroticism have been associated with greater likelihood of experiencing negative emotions (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). To the extent that individuals who are more likely to experience negative emotion in general are more likely to experience it in the face of a dilemma, the following hypothesis is likely to be supported: Hypothesis 8. Individuals high in Negative Affectivity and Neuroticism will be more likely to experience negative emotions associated with ethical decision making. Similarly, research on individual differences as predictors of ethical decision making has shown that dispositional factors influence how individuals respond to ethical dilemmas. Many such factors have been studied (see Ford & Richardson, 1994, for a review). Examples of individual differences that are associated with decision making that is ‘‘more ethical’’ include higher moral development, higher moral reasoning complexity, internal locus of control, lower Machiavellianism, and being female (see Bass, Barnett, & Brown, 1999; Beu, Buckley, & Harvey, 2003; McCabe & Trevino, 1997; Trevino, 1986). Some individual differences may be linked

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not only to ethical choice, such as those listed above, but more specifically to the experience of emotion in the face of a dilemma. Mason and Mudrack (1997), for example, found that individuals who were complex moral reasoners were more likely to perceive conflict between personal and organizational ethical principles. To the extent that the tendency to choose a ‘‘more ethical’’ response reflects a stronger emotional reaction to an ethical dilemma we would expect the following to hold: Hypothesis 9. Individuals who are complex moral reasoners, or who have higher moral maturity will be more likely to experience negative emotions associated with ethical decision making. Hypothesis 10. Women will be more likely to experience negative emotions associated with ethical decision making. Hypothesis 11. Individuals who are high in Machiavellianism will be less likely to experience negative emotions associated with ethical decision making.

The Consequences of Moral Residue Besides eliciting emotions in individuals, it must be asked whether moral residue and the emotions that follow it have consequences for employees and organizations. According to AET, the experience of emotion is likely to influence work attitudes and affect-driven behaviors. In the context of ethical dilemmas, what might such specific effects be? Considering the sequence in which employees are likely to encounter moral residue, a number of behavioral effects are possible. Using Rest’s (1986) four stages of ethical decision making as a guide, moral residue and the emotions that it engenders are likely to influence employees’ ethical recognition, judgment, intentions, and actions. First, to the extent that ethical dilemmas elicit unpleasant emotions, they may avoid recognizing the dilemma, or may be motivated to seek to avoid situations in which they face such a dilemma. This may occur through the avoidance, sharing or passing of responsibility, appeals to organizational or professional ethical codes, and so on. Employees may then seek information which reduces the strength or symmetry of the dilemma, in order to aid in making an ethical judgment, particularly when avoidance is not possible. And, having made a judgment,

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individuals may seek information which validates the correctness of the decision, consistent with cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). This latter behavior is an example of the use of a coping strategy in response to a negative emotional event. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) and Lazarus (1991) have identified a number of coping strategies that fall into two categories: (1) problem focused coping (dealing directly with the emotion eliciting situation through problem solving or confrontation), and (2) emotion focused coping (dealing with the affective state through denial, affective regulation, seeking support, etc.). Both are likely consequences of moral residue. Hypothesis 12. Employees will seek to avoid situations that require them to make ethical decisions that have moral residue. Hypothesis 13. Employees will make decisions in such a way as to minimize moral residue. Hypothesis 14. Employees will seek information which reduces the strength and symmetry of the ethical dilemma. Hypothesis 15. Employees will seek information that confirms the ‘‘rightness’’ of their behavior. Hypothesis 16. Experienced emotion may interfere with or distract employees from job performance. Hypothesis 17. Employees will seek to cope through problem focused coping; (dealing directly with the emotion eliciting situation through problem solving or confrontation) or emotion focused coping (dealing with the affective state through denial, control, or social support).

Perhaps Choice Matters: The Effect of Ethical Choice on Emotions ‘‘Action’’ in the recognition–judgment–intention–action sequence used above means employee choice of one of the alternatives present in the dilemma. The reader will recall that in the preceding discussion of what moral residue is it was made plain that, according to the essential moral residue notion, regret results independent of which choice the individual makes. The theory suggests regret does follow the choice, but it does not

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depend on the content of the choice. And to this point the hypotheses posed have not considered this content, again consistent with the essential notion of moral residue. But what if choice does matter? First, there is theory to suggest that ethical choice influences the experience of emotion. Again, Scherer’s component process theory provides a predictive framework. Scherer’s theory includes a stimulus evaluation check for compatibility of the action with external norms. Specifically, pride is predicted to follow from decisions consistent with external norms and contempt, irritation and guilt from decisions that are inconsistent with external norms. The former is likely to occur when individuals choose morality over self-interest, and the latter when they choose the opposite. Thus: Hypothesis 18. When employees choose morality over self-interest, they will be more likely to experience pride (an emotion for which the stimulus evaluation is of high external norm compatibility). Hypothesis 19. When employees choose self-interest over morality, they will be more likely to experience contempt, irritation, guilt (emotions for which the stimulus evaluation is of low external norm compatibility). Second, there is theory to suggest that emotion influences ethical choice. Haidt (2001) has proposed that moral reasoning is a post hoc construction generated after a judgment has been reached. He argues that moral judgments result from automatic, intuitive, emotional evaluations rather than rational processes of reasoning and reflection. Clore and colleagues (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), have proposed the more general model of ‘‘affect as information,’’ which holds that people use affect as information ‘‘when they lack the ability and motivation to think about the issues being considered’’ (Albarracin & Kumkale, 2003, p. 453). In situations like dilemmas in which rational information about the ‘‘correct’’ course of action is absent, affect may be more likely to be relied on. The particular form of the effect of emotion on the ethical judgments of employees will require investigation, as different discrete emotions may have different influences depending on the form of the dilemma facing individuals. Hypothesis 20. The experience of emotion will influence ethical choices. Ketelaar and Au (2003), for example, showed that guilt influenced individuals to be more cooperative in subsequent social interactions. Extending this to the realm of ethical dilemmas, individuals may use the

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experience or anticipation of specific emotions in a dilemma situation in deciding how to act.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS Fig. 2 shows the framework for the research model proposed, incorporating the elements and hypotheses outlined above. Empirical testing of this model requires associating the experience of ethical dilemmas of various kinds with experienced emotions, employee characteristics, ethical choices, and individual outcomes. Previous research investigating reactions to ethical dilemmas has taken either (or both) of two possible general approaches: the collection (and classification) of real-life ethical dilemmas, or the presentation of hypothetical dilemmas, sometimes as part of a ‘‘managerial, in-basket’’ scenario. In-basket exercises ask participants to role-play an employee who has to respond to various memoranda in his or her in-basket. In-basket studies have been used to simulate a variety of managerial decision-making tasks, including ethical decision making (Dietz & Pugh, 2004; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). Compared to ‘‘real-life,’’ in-basket or scenario-based studies have the advantage of allowing the researcher to control and systematically vary E. Ethical Choice self-interest principled

A. Ethical Dilemmas symmetry salience interest agency action

B. Experienced Emotions sadness anxiety guilt irritation

fear shame pride rage

C. Employee Characteristics negative affectivity, neuroticism, locus of control, field dependence moral reasoning, moral maturity gender, Machiavellianism

Fig. 2.

Theoretical Framework.

D. Consequences avoidance information seeking performance coping

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the characteristics of the ethical dilemmas to which respondents react. The disadvantage is that they may be less salient for respondents and subject to demand characteristics and social desirability bias. Nevertheless, Bartol and Martin (1990) have noted that ‘‘evidence exists that such exercises can realistically simulate the actual decision-making environments of decision makers andythat managerial decisions in simulated decisions parallel those ultimately exhibited on the job’’ (p. 602). Future research would do well to use a combination of collection of real-life dilemmas and reaction to scenario-based dilemmas. That is, as demonstrated by Skoe et al. (2002), research participants can be asked about ethical dilemmas they have faced in addition to responding to dilemmas presented to them. To conclude, the model proposed above seeks to integrate and synthesize research on ethical decision making and on emotions in organizations with concepts from Philosophy to develop our understanding of and lay a foundation for investigation of a new area of research. By examining how the making of moral, ethical decisions can arouse emotions in individuals we can improve our understanding of the dynamics of emotional experience and of the factors that promote ethical decision making. The practical implications of such understanding include improving the well-being and satisfaction of individuals facing ethical dilemmas and the improved effectiveness of organizations which want their employees to make ethical decisions.

NOTES 1. Wikipedia defines a moral imperative as ‘‘an ethical responsibility. A line of conduct or behavior judged as the right one, by a majority of people within a community.’’

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CHAPTER 6 WHEN EXECUTIVES GET ANGRY: THE IMPORTANCE OF ANGER AND ITS TRIGGERS TO ETHICAL AWARENESS AND SENSITIVITY Amy E. Mickel and Hakan Ozcelik ABSTRACT In this study, we explore what incites anger in business executives when making organizational decisions. In an inductive analysis of interviews with business executives about decisions where they experienced anger, six different triggers of anger – all related to behavioral-ethics issues – emerged. Two distinct attitudes toward anger – ‘‘negative’’ and ‘‘integrated’’ – also emerged as a significant theme. Based on our findings, we argue that anger may operate like an ‘‘ethical barometer’’ that informs an individual of potential ethical violations at any point in a decisionmaking process. The implications of these emergent findings for organizational practice and research on affect and decision-making are discussed.

INTRODUCTION For decades, scholars have considered decision-making as a predominantly cognitive process and treated emotions as a residual to be controlled. Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 131–154 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04006-6

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Classical models depict decision makers as rational agents who state problems and goals, identify alternatives, and make decisions based on a stable set of preferences (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). Studies focusing on the political aspects of decision processes, however, also argue that decision-making in organizations can be considered as a political game filled with conflict, tactics, alliances, and individualistic maneuverings (Wilson, 1982), suggesting that emotions can play an important role in organizational decision-making. Despite the potential linkages between emotions and decision-making, with an overemphasis on rationality, prior research in management literature has paid relatively less attention to the topic. Thus, for decades, we were pretty much left with the image of a manager who ‘‘thinks a lot, plans, plots and struggles to look the right part at the right time; but we do not hear about the actor’s feelings, and how such feelings relates to actions’’ (Fineman, 2000, p. 14). With an attempt to fill this gap, this study aims to inductively explore how anger relates to the decision-making of business executives. Anger is one of the most prevalent emotions in organizations. Recent studies suggest that almost one in four Americans experience chronic anger in the workplace (Gibson & Barsade, 1999; Pearson, Andersson, & Porath, 2000). Conflict of interests (Pratt & Dutton, 2000), structural power differences between managers and subordinates (Fitness, 2000), lack of communication or miscommunication among people (Bryant & Miron, 2003), and perceptions of unfairness (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997) are some of the inherent factors that incite anger in organizations. Anger is a very strong emotion that creates an inner tension and discomfort in the person experiencing it and can mobilize his/her psychological resources to take action to tackle the anger-eliciting situation (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). Anger has also been closely linked with power and influence in interpersonal relationships (Collins, 1990). Studies have shown how people in different organizational roles, such as bill collectors (Sutton, 1991) and inspectors (Fineman, 2004), have strategically used their expression of anger to influence and exert power over others. In the context of work environments, it can be argued that executives may use anger in similar ways to increase their power and influence in decision-making. Drawing on insights from the literature discussed above, in this chapter, we focus on the following specific research question: Why do executives experience anger when making organizational decisions? Through the analysis of the data from in-depth interviews with 24 top-level business executives, we have identified several themes – including six triggers for experienced anger in decision-making processes – which we present in this chapter. In the

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next section, we provide an overview of previous research informing us about the relationship between affect and decision-making, identify the current gaps in this literature, and discuss how our study attempts to fill some of these gaps. Then we describe the research methods used in our study, followed by a discussion of our findings. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for research on affect and decision-making as well as for organizational practice.

BACKGROUND Affect and Decision-Making Previous research has mostly studied emotional factors in decision-making from four major streams, including research that focuses on how decisionmaking is related to: (a) affective states (i.e., moods), (b) affective traits (i.e., dispositions), (c) anticipated emotions (in general terms), and (d) discrete emotions. In the first stream, a substantial body of research has experimentally analyzed the linkages between induced positive affective states and individual decision-making processes. Isen and her colleagues, for instance, have shown that pleasant feelings induced by commonplace events or circumstances can influence decision-making processes by promoting simplification of complex decision-making tasks through intuition and heuristics (Isen & Means, 1983; Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982) and by enhancing cognitive flexibility, creativity, (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985), and the capacity to integrate newly presented information (Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1997). It has also been shown that people in a positive affect condition tend to be more conservative or self protective compared to those in a neutral state while making risky decisions with a high probability of loss (Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988). Nygren, Isen, Taylor, and Dulin (1996) explained this tendency by suggesting that positive affect can make people shift their focus from outcome probabilities to outcome values and utilities when thinking about losses in risky situations. Previous studies have also analyzed the influence of negative affective states on individual decision-making processes and compared it with that of positive affect (Mittal & Ross, 1998; Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Sinclair and Mark (1992) showed that people in a negative affective state are more likely to engage in systematic processing when making decisions compared to

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those in a state of positive affect. They explained this finding by suggesting that people in a negative mood may be more inclined to engage in systematic processing as a distraction to help eliminate their negative mood (i.e., a mood repair process), whereas those in a positive mood may refrain from spending effort for this cognitive task as it may reduce their positive mood (i.e., a mood maintenance process). Focusing on the linkages between negative affect and strategic decision-making in their study, Mittal and Ross (1998) showed that people in negative moods were less likely to interpret the strategic issue as an opportunity and more likely to engage in risk-seeking behavior when making strategic decisions compared to those in positive moods. In the second stream of research, researchers have studied positive or negative affect as a predisposition rather than a temporarily induced mood state (Daniels, 1996; Staw & Barsade, 1993). For example, Staw and Barsade (1993) examined the effects of affective traits on decision-making performance of first year MBA students who participated in an in-basket exercise. Their results suggested that people with a high positive affective disposition performed better in decision-making tasks by requesting more information when there were insufficient data, better recognizing situational contingencies, and making greater use of the data provided in the exercise compared to those with medium or low trait positive affect. In a similar vein, Daniels (1996) demonstrated that managers with a high negative affective disposition were more likely to perceive the negative aspects of their environment such as poor performance, greater environmental complexity, industry decline, and decreased competition, and, therefore, tend to be more pessimistic while interpreting the strategic environment. The third stream of research, from the decision-making literature, has also recognized the role of emotions as an antecedent to decision-making. Several theoretical (Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 1982) and empirical studies (Beattie, Baron, Hershey, & Spranca, 1994; Inman & Zeenlenberg, 1998; Larrick & Boles, 1995; Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 2000) suggested that before making an actual decision, people anticipate the emotions they will experience with possible outcomes, and take them into account while choosing among the alternatives. Studies in neuropsychology go even further and suggest that effective decision-making would not be possible in daily life without the role of emotions. For instance, in his somatic-marker hypothesis, Damasio (1994) argued that emotions guide people in their decision-making by helping them to eliminate some options and to highlight others. Supporting this view, he also demonstrated that without the guidance of these emotions, people end up not being able to make a decision

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at all by depleting their cognitive capacity in the process of calculating and comparing different aspects of possible decision outcomes, without relying on any heuristics. More recently, a fourth stream of research has started to reveal the role of discrete emotions in decision-making. In a qualitative study, Maitlis and Ozcelik (2004) showed how decision-making processes in three symphony orchestras unfolded through the interplay between organizational members’ actions and a combination of discrete negative emotions. In a longitudinal study using decision-making simulations, Seo and Feldman-Barrett (2007) found that individuals who were better able to identify and distinguish among their discrete emotions when making decisions performed better in investment decisions. Taken together, the studies discussed above lay the foundation for the present study by revealing that emotions, in general, influence decisionmaking. A closer overview of these studies, however, also reveals a number of important areas that are under-explored in affect and decision-making research. First, although the extant research has mostly focused on affect as antecedents to decision-making, our knowledge is more limited when it comes to explaining the potential factors that trigger discrete emotions (i.e., antecedents to emotions) in decision-making processes. In addition, except for the fourth stream discussed above, previous research has mostly considered emotional factors in decision-making in more general terms, such as mood state or affective trait, providing us with relatively less information about the potential role of discrete emotions in decision-making. Focusing on discrete emotions and their triggers in decision-making is important because organizational life is entwined with a wide range of discrete emotions, with distinct psychological processes and action tendencies (Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001), and thus different implications for organizational outcomes. A more complete understanding of the relationship between emotions and organizational decision-making would not be possible unless researchers specifically focus on these discrete emotions. In this study, we attempt to fill these gaps by specifically focusing on one discrete emotion – anger – and its triggers within the context of organizational decision-making.

Why Anger? Among several discrete emotions, anger seems to be one of the best candidates to study within the context of organizational decision-making for

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several reasons. First, anger is a complex emotion that can potentially lead to both functional and dysfunctional outcomes (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). On the one hand, anger mobilizes energy for action, induces a sense of vigor and self confidence, and makes people more capable of defending themselves (Izard, 1991). On the other hand, anger may result in hostility, distraction, and lack of personal control (Berkowitz, 1990; Booth & Mann, 2005). Thus, one can argue that anger may factor into organizational decision-making in various ways; it may lead to both functional and dysfunctional outcomes, making it an interesting emotion to study as a part of decision-making processes. Second, anger is an emotion that is prevalent in organizational life. Recent studies have found that almost one in four Americans experience chronic anger in the workplace (Gibson & Barsade, 1999; Pearson et al., 2000), suggesting that anger may be frequently experienced in decisionmaking processes. In addition, anger is predominantly a social emotion, which occurs more frequently in the presence of others, as compared to some other emotions such as sadness, fear, and anxiety (Scherer, 1986; Tavris, 1989). Previous research also shows that people are more likely to experience anger in close relationships, with someone they know well (Averill, 1982), rather than in distant relationships. Given the social and political nature of organizational decision-making processes (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992), one would expect anger to be closely related to the interactions that drive organizational decisions. Finally, anger is a high-activation emotion that increases people’s attention to the anger-eliciting situation, mobilizes their energy to overcome barriers to their ongoing efforts, and motivates them to take action (Collins, 1990; Larsen & Diener, 1992). Accordingly, the anger experienced by a decision maker has the potential to influence his or her actions and interactions with others in a decision-making process, thereby possibly impacting decisional outcomes. Considering the characteristics of anger discussed above, we designed this study to explore the factors that trigger anger in the decision-making of business executives.

Why Business Executives? Business executives significantly shape organizational decision-making processes because of their formal leadership role and the power and influence they have on others (Yukl, 1989). Since anger influences actions, as discussed above, and business executives’ actions influence organizational

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decisions, focusing on business executives would be an effective way to explore the linkages between anger and organizational decision-making. However, the extant research on affect and decision-making, reviewed in the previous section, mostly focuses on lower rank managers, employees, and students, providing us with little information about whether and how emotions are related to the decision-making of business executives. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which assumes that organizational leaders should be purely cognitive, recent studies suggest that business executives are more likely to express their anger, as compared to other employees. Geddes and Callister (2007), for instance, argued that employees who are given legitimacy within an organization through status, competence, and/or reputation will be less likely to experience the sanctions associated with violating emotional display norms and more likely to express their anger. In line with this view, Sloan (2004) has empirically shown that organizational members with higher status are more likely to directly express their anger in their work interactions. Drawing on these studies, it could be argued that business executives will be more likely to express their anger in decision-making processes as compared to other decision makers. In addition, there is evidence that leaders’ anger expressions influence their followers’ perceptions about the leaders’ status and competence (Lewis, 2000; Tiedens, 2001). As a result of this influence, one would expect the anger of business executives to play a more salient role in organizational decisions than that of other organizational members.

Why Qualitative Research? Previous research has examined the relationship between affect and decision-making mostly through quantitative methods such as experiments, simulations, and surveys, by focusing on the affective states temporarily aroused in settings outside the organizational context (Isen et al., 1988; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Seo & Feldman-Barrett, 2007; Sinclair & Mark, 1992) or the affective predispositions of people (Staw & Barsade, 1993). These methods, however, might not sufficiently capture the complex nature of discrete emotions (Barsade & Gibson, 2007) and their subtle dynamics in decision-making processes. Furthermore, considering the common-sense belief that managers should be ‘‘cool-headed’’ and ignore emotions to avoid ‘‘irrational biases’’ when making organizational decisions (Damasio, 1994; Gaudine & Thorne, 2001), business executives might be reluctant to admit experiencing emotions, especially anger, in their

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decision-making when responding to a structured survey, increasing the possibility of response bias. Considering the factors discussed above, we decided to employ qualitative research methods involving face-to-face interviews using open-ended probing questions, which we believed would increase the likelihood that the executives would reveal and reflect on the anger they experienced in a decision-making process.1 In addition, since each organizational decision process is unique, the spontaneous nature of face-to-face interviews would allow us: (a) to gather some of the nuanced information specific to each decision-making process, and therefore (b) to obtain a set of contextually rich data that would aid us in a more thorough exploration of the links between anger and executive decision-making.

METHODS The exploratory nature of our research question suggests the need for a qualitative-inductive approach. A grounded-theory (i.e., inductive) approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and use of qualitative methods are particularly appropriate when searching for meanings, examining phenomena that may not be well understood, and in generating propositions (Maxwell, 1996; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Data were collected by interviewing 24 business executives from a large city on the west coast of the United States. The participants worked in organizations across a wide a range of sectors including finance, manufacturing, retail, and real estate, and these executives held such positions as chief executive officer, chief technical officer, vice-president, partner, and founder. Nineteen of our participants were men, and 5 were women. Their ages ranged from mid 30s to early 70s. Participants were asked to describe decision stories where they experienced the emotion of anger in an organizational context. These in-depth interviews were semi-structured (Fontana & Frey, 2000), conducted face-to-face, audiorecorded, and professionally transcribed. When interviewing the business executives, the first question we asked was: ‘‘Tell us about a decision-making process at your organization in which you felt and/or expressed considerable anger.’’ In addition to other questions, we followed up our initial question with the following questions: (a) ‘‘What was the decision about?’’ (b) ‘‘What was your role in the decision-making process?’’ (c) ‘‘At which point did you feel anger? Why did you feel angry?’’ and (d) ‘‘Who and/or what was the source of anger?’’ The decision stories told by participants covered a wide

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range of issues, including ones related to budgets, promotion, personnel matters, and performance improvement. In our initial analyses, we focused on respondents’ language. Their discourse was segmented into thematic ‘‘thought’’ units2 and open coded (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These ‘‘thought’’ units are main ideas contained in a phrase, sentence, or paragraph. A sentence or paragraph was given two or three codes if it contained more than one main idea. In this study, ‘‘thought’’ units are the basic unit of analysis. After the initial analyses, a coding scheme was created and updated on a continual basis. Each theme, category, and subcategory had letter codes and descriptions (coding schemes, descriptions, and exemplars are included as Tables 1 and 2). Constant comparative analysis was used in coding and recoding the data as categories emerged (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and in generating themes (Becker, 1998) based on their recurrence, repetition, and forcefulness (Owen, 1984). Concerned with generating many ‘‘properties and hypotheses’’ about a general phenomenon, we were able to ‘‘generate assertions’’ from the data (Erickson, 1990) by noting the themes and patterns that emerged and through clustering of the data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). We were able to move beyond description of the data and generate assertions about anger and decision-making. The authors identified categories through constant comparison of the data, finalized the coding schemes, and then coded the data. Subsequently, a second coder conducted ‘‘check-coding’’ for approximately 60% of the data, which ‘‘not only aids definitional clarity but also is a good reliability check’’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 64). The post-discussion intercoder reliability (Holsti, 1963) was 97.2%. The data were then entered into a database. Frequencies were run to quantify categories and themes.

RESULTS Triggers of Anger in Organizational Decision-making In an effort to investigate our question of interest – Why do executives experience anger when making organizational decisions? – we focused our analysis on what provoked or triggered executives to experience anger (Table 1). We refer to these as ‘‘triggers’’ throughout the paper. In all decision stories, a person and his/her action(s) triggered anger in the executives. We refer to the person who triggered anger in the executives as the ‘‘anger source.’’

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Table 1. Category

A. Trigger self

Codes/ Sub-Codes TR.SLF

1. Attacked

(Attk)

2. Misjudged/ misperceived

(Mis)

3. Ignored

(Ignr)

B. Trigger Other

TR.OTH

1. Work ethic

(Wk_eth)

2. Integrity

(Integ)

Triggers of Anger. Descriptions and Example Responses

(i.e., participant’s anger is triggered by being personally mistreated by anger source) 10 respondents reported this trigger. (i.e., personally attacked by anger source – deliberate and intentional attack on reputation, ability) Ex: ‘‘I was angry because he was angry. He yelled at mey. He started yelling and cussing.’’ ‘‘He [colleague] blamed me for a project that failed. Instead of coming to me, he went to the President and CEO and reported an inaccurate subjective evaluation of me to my boss.’’ (i.e., misjudged or misperceived by anger source – misjudged which may result in no promotion or being micromanaged) Ex: ‘‘That was probably the most angry in my career in that I felt like that I was certainly capable and I was the best person for the promotion and I didn’t get the promotion and I was number two.’’ ‘‘He had a belief that I was pro-paper bag and anti-plastic, so where I had placed it on the check stand holder, he felt that I trying to make the plastic bags fail or make them difficult to usey. [It made me angry] because that wasn’t the case.’’ (i.e., participant’s desires, opinions, or needs not considered by anger source) Ex: ‘‘I guess the underlying source of my anger would’ve been that I was not asked if I was interested in retiring. I wasn’t asked when I was going to be retiring.’’ ‘‘[I was angry] because he wouldn’t listen to me.’’ (i.e., participant’s anger is triggered by behavior of anger source) 14 respondents reported this trigger. (i.e., anger source’s work ethic such as repeated poor performance, lack of effort, or not being conscientious) Ex: ‘‘y[his] performance has really been sub-par.’’ ‘‘I’m not usually angry the first time [a mistake] happens. It’s if it’s that second time or the third time, that’s when I get frustrated. And this was a third generation of budget numbers and they were still wrong. I just said ‘I can’t handle this’.’’ (i.e., anger source’s behaviors lacking integrity such as lying, cheating, or betraying) Ex: ‘‘That’s unacceptable. If you cannot trust your partner, then like I said, forget it. That made me very angry. Because he lied, as simple as that.’’

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Table 1. (Continued ) Category

3. Treatment of others

Codes/ Sub-Codes

(Treat)

Descriptions and Example Responses

‘‘She had a key position and that key position required trust, confidential trust. And she betrayed the confidentiality. Her position required confidentiality. She betrayed the confidentiality not once but for a second timey. I’m not into betrayal.’’ (i.e., anger source’s mistreatment of another person/group including discrimination) Ex: ‘‘yseeing her hostility towards him’’ ‘‘I was angryy. I reached out to city council people that I know. I reached out, I wrote a long letter to city council people, to attorneys, letting them know that there is an element I believe here of race discriminationy.’’

In analyzing the decision stories, we categorized the triggers into two main categories: ‘‘self ’’ and ‘‘other.’’ Our findings suggest that 42% of the business executives experienced anger in a decision-making process when they personally felt mistreated in some way by the anger source, which aligns with the self-category. The self-related triggers can be further grouped into the following subcategories: (a) personally attacked by anger source such as interviewee’s reputation or ability, (b) misperceived or misjudged by anger source such as his/her ability (which often results in being overlooked for a promotion or pay raise), or (c) ignored and/or not considered by anger source such as ignoring his/her needs, desires, or opinions. In addition, 58% of the participants described their anger being triggered by issues related to the anger source’s behaviors toward work and others, which aligns with the other-category. The other-related triggers can also be grouped into three subcategories: (a) anger source’s work ethic (e.g., repeated poor job performance or lack of effort), (b) anger source’s actions lacking integrity (e.g., deceives, lies, or betrays), and (c) anger source’s mistreatment of others (e.g., discriminating or yelling at others). In describing their decision stories and anger, it is also worth noting that anger was triggered at different times during the decision-making processes for the various participants. For some executives, anger was triggered at the beginning of the decision-making process and may have been the catalyst for making a decision. For others, anger was experienced at some point during the decision-making process.

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Table 2. Executives’ Attitudes Toward Anger. Category

Code

A. Negative attitude

NA

B. Integrated attitude

IA

Descriptions and Example Responses (i.e., negative bias toward anger; focuses solely on the costs of anger; views anger as unprofessional, irrational, etc.) Ex: ‘‘I just think that no matter what the situation is you need to maintain emotional control. You never want to make decisions when you’re extremely mady. Nothing is going to be gained by that. That’s just my opinion.’’ ‘‘I wouldn’t make a big decision concerning this business under those conditions [being angry]. I would wait or let someone else [make the decision] ... you’ve got to be logical enough to let somebody handle the business.’’ ‘‘[Anger] can also color your decision-making significantlyy. Most of the things that you’re sorry for in life are decisions that you made while you were angry.’’ ‘‘I think when you use anger or shouting to make your point or to push your decision in your favor, good decisions aren’t made.’’ (i.e., more balanced, integrated view of anger; understands benefits and cost of anger; may use anger strategically) Ex: ‘‘But it [anger] is controlled. It’s not something that’s out of control. It’s something that’s absolutely controlled when you show that to them. I will, on occasion, pretend that I’m angry so that they will pay attention. Again, controlled anger when you really feel angry or a respectful false anger to get your point across – it works.’’ ‘‘I think in my opinion it [anger] does capture attention. If properly done it does strip away the fac- ade that people put up. You do get to the truth of things, hopefully, if you do it in a constructive controlled kind of way. If you can live through it, you become closer.’’ ‘‘I think that if – someone can use anger in a good way to inspire them to make them more determined to do things, but also anger can be misused if someone is being ignorant, arrogant and abusive.’’ ‘‘It’s more controlled and I know I’m doing it for a reason to make sure he knows that I’m mady. [My mentor] said ‘if you aren’t really mad you should pretend your mad because you can get more out of it.’’’

Attitudes Toward Anger: Negative and Integrated In addition to the triggers, another significant theme emerged from the data analysis – business executives’ attitudes toward anger. The executives’ attitudes toward anger (i.e., how they feel about and respond to anger) clustered into two categories: (a) those with a strong negative bias toward anger (i.e., they focus on the costs of anger and view expression of anger as ‘‘unprofessional’’), and (b) those with a more integrated attitude of

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anger (i.e., they understand the potential benefits as well as costs of anger) (Table 2). Interestingly, 50% of the study participants had a negative attitude, and 50% had an integrated attitude toward anger. The executives with the negative attitude toward anger strongly expressed their views throughout the interviews and highlighted the downsides of anger. These participants believed that feeling angry ‘‘clouds a manager’s judgment,’’ expressing anger is ‘‘very unprofessional,’’ and therefore managers should ‘‘avoid anger when making decisions.’’ Although the executives with an integrated attitude toward anger mentioned that getting angry can be ‘‘discomforting’’ for themselves and others around them, they understood the benefits of anger and sometimes used anger strategically. For example, these participants suggested that anger is beneficial for them since it helps them ‘‘focus their attention on issues’’ or motivates them to ‘‘be determined’’ in decision-making processes. The participants also suggested the expression of anger can be used strategically to influence others by using anger ‘‘to make a point,’’ ‘‘get attention,’’ or make other people ‘‘recognize the seriousness of the conversation.’’ In addition to the findings described above, there is a pattern between anger attitudes and anger triggers among the participants. Our findings suggest that those with an integrated attitude toward anger are more likely to describe a decision story where the trigger was other-related. Specifically, 83% of those participants with an integrated attitude described decision stories where triggers were other-related (the remaining 17% described self-related triggers). In addition, two-thirds of participants with a negative-anger attitude described decisions where triggers were related to self (i.e., 67% described triggers as self-related; the remaining 33% described other-related triggers).

DISCUSSION From our research findings, we highlight emergent themes which serve to foreground the key contributions of this research. These findings include: (a) six triggers of experienced anger – all related to ethical issues – in the context of decision-making, (b) two different attitudes toward anger: negative and integrated, and (c) anger as an ‘‘ethical barometer’’ experienced anytime throughout a decision-making process.

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Triggers As previously stated, anger was experienced by business executives as a result of a person and her/her actions (i.e., the anger source); these actions were identified as six different triggers3 that can be grouped into ‘‘self ’’ and ‘‘other.’’ An example of a self trigger is when an anger source questioned a district manager at a major retail company and his actions: ‘‘He questioned my motives. He questioned my integrity. He questioned everything.’’ In another example, the CEO and founder of several successful companies described how others and their behaviors triggered his anger: And maybe I’m wacko about stuff like that but if you steal from me or you lie you will be summarily dismissed when there’s no looking back. No matter how important the person is to the company I won’t tolerate thaty. If it got to where she admitted that she [lied] then I wanted her to be dismissed, fired on the spot. That’s what we did because that’s what she said.

Interestingly, 100% of the participants experienced anger as a result of ethical issues related to people’s behavior, suggesting that the six anger triggers are related to behavioral-ethics issues. Behavioral-ethics issues are related to ‘‘individual behavior that is subject to or judged according to generally accepted moral norms of behavior’’ (Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006, p. 952). Based on this definition, both self- and otherrelated triggers that emerged in our study can be considered unethical because they violate generally accepted moral norms of behavior in Western culture, which puts a strong emphasis on fairness, trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, caring, and citizenship (Schwartz, 2002). Self-related triggers such as mistreatment or misperception of self and/or others, lack of effort at work, aggression toward a co-worker, false accusations, and failure to fairly judge one’s efforts or contributions provoke executives to feel angry because they feel: (a) they are being treated unethically or unfairly or (b) they or their personal ethics are being violated in some way. An example of a self-related ethics issue that provoked anger is when the Chief Financial Officer of a large utility company described how a colleague ‘‘came down like a ton of bricks on mey.[He] made it look bad for me and I was being, kind of, pushed into the scapegoat.’’ Other-related triggers provoke executives to feel angry because they believe the individual(s) who is the source of the anger is: (a) lacking in work ethic (e.g., failure to pull own weight, lack of effort, or repeated poor performance), (b) engaging in unethical behaviors such as misrepresenting, betraying, cheating, or lying, or (c) treating someone or a group unfairly or

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unethically. For example, in an effort to protect Native American tribal burial sites, one participant (founder of an Inter-Tribal Council in California) described his anger trigger as the ‘‘betrayal’’ he experienced from members of the State who made a ‘‘sneaky’’ decision ‘‘without [the tribes’] consent, information, involvement, anything. We didn’t know anything.’’ In addition to being betrayed, he felt like the Native American tribes were being treated unfairly. Our findings suggest that when individuals sense injustice or unfairness resulting from these ethics-related triggers, they subsequently experience anger – a high-activation emotion. This reaction would be viewed by Folger, Cropanzano, and Goldman (2005) as a component of the ‘‘deontic response;’’ an automatic response to perceived injustice that includes a strong emotional response and behaviors that may be motivated by factors outside of economic self-interest (Folger et al., 2005). We believe that anger as a component of the deontic response may increase moral awareness and ethical sensitivity, which are described as precursors to behaviors in the context of ethical decision-making (e.g., Gaudine & Thorne, 2001; Rest 1986; Trevino et al., 2006). More specifically, we argue that anger operates as an ‘‘ethical barometer’’ by informing individuals of potential ethical violations. Moreover, because anger is a high-activation emotion that has the potential to motivate individuals to take action (Collins, 1990; Larsen & Diener, 1992), anger also may have an impact on moral/ethical motivation which is the feeling of obligation or intention to act on moral/ethical issues (e.g., Gaudine & Thorne, 2001; Rest, 1986; Trevino et al, 2006). It appears that anger has the potential of playing an important role in moral/ethical awareness, sensitivity, and motivation which are viewed as the first stages in dealing with ethical dilemmas and making ethical decisions (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001; Rest, 1986; Trevino et al., 2006).

Attitudes Toward Anger As previously mentioned, business executives expressed one of two distinct attitudes toward anger – a negative or integrated attitude. Fifty percent of the executives had a negative attitude, and 50% had an integrated attitude toward anger. An example of an executive who has a negative-anger attitude is a vice-president of business planning in a mid-size steel company; he states: Anger doesn’t solve anything so I don’t get angry a lot. I’m not going to make a decision out of anger at work. That’s just dumb. You get a bad decisiony. It clouds your

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judgment. You don’t think as rationally. You don’t think it throughy.[B]eing angry – I don’t think that’s an acceptable way to act in business.

In contrast a director of strategic marketing of a very large hospital (and entrepreneur) has a more integrated attitude toward anger: Anger is an essential emotional barometer to let us know that emotionally something is wrongy. It’s an essential God given characteristic emotion that everyone hasy. I think it’s a very important emotion that we have that can be used for good and in an irrational way can be used for bad. I think it’s a very vital part of who we are. I’m glad that I have it because, and not just have it, but because I have the will and desire to respond to it because some people may get angry but they just won’t do a doggone thingy. I think anger is important and then the action or response to that is equally important whether it’s good action or bad action because both are going to have a consequence. Even the lack of action is going to have a consequence.

These findings reveal that people’s attitudes toward a particular discrete emotion can be as influential as the emotion itself in a decision-making process. One of the basic functions of emotions is that they provide cues to people regarding their environment (Izard, 1991). The results of our study suggest that if people have a negative attitude toward anger with beliefs such as it ‘‘clouds judgment’’ and is ‘‘irrational,’’ they may be more reluctant to acknowledge this emotion, reflect on it to make sense of potential cues, and let these cues guide their actions. Conversely, if people have a more integrated attitude toward anger, they may be more likely to use the anger as a source of information to identify issues that need attention in a decisionmaking process and act accordingly on these issues. Interestingly, it appears that our participants’ anger attitudes may be related to the type of trigger that characterized the decision story they chose to describe. Two-thirds (67%) of the participants with a negative-anger attitude described self-related anger triggers, and the majority (83%) of those with an integrated attitude described other-related triggers. Thus, for the majority of those who believed that anger is ‘‘unprofessional’’ and ‘‘clouds judgment,’’ it was acceptable to experience anger when they were being treated unethically or violated by another (e.g., attacked, misjudged, or ignored). This finding suggests that even those with a negative-anger attitude experience anger in a decision-making process when they feel personal mistreatment. Those participants with an integrated attitude toward anger chose to describe a decision story where anger was experienced due to questionable behaviors of others that may or may not have a direct impact on the participants. Thus, these individuals often described standing up for a principle or on behalf of others, including the organization as a whole as

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well as themselves. They also often described using their anger strategically to influence others into action to promote and ensure that ethical behaviors prevailed. The following example illustrates this. A co-founder of a nonprofit organization promoting healthier lifestyles for African-Americans stated: .

I’m very strategic about my anger because I’m very laid back. I was angry. And strategically angry to where I reached out to city council people that I know. I reached out, I wrote a long letter to city council people, to attorneys, letting them know that there is an element I believe here of race discrimination, he’s unjustifiably blocking our ability to have our event that we initially agreed upon. So that anger incited me to do something, to reach out to my local, political, social resources making them aware of what was going on. A lot of this stuff is very rare for me, but it was just so blatant that I felt that something had to be done. I just started to access my resources that could influence him from a political perspective, get him to reevaluate his position and ultimately even impact, from a funding perspective, public dollars that are used to fund the Pavilion on an annual basis.

This example also illustrates that, for some executives, anger ‘‘serves as a catalyst’’ to start a decision-making process. In some instances, like the example above, anger may be experienced at the beginning of a decisionmaking process or may serve as the reason to make a decision. For others, anger may be triggered at some point during a decision-making process or at the end of the process. For example, an executive director in the aerospace industry described feeling angry in the middle of a meeting by a subordinate who took on an ‘‘I-know-it-all attitude’’ and who kept saying that her decision was ‘‘just stupid.’’ Therefore, our findings suggest that anger may be experienced at various stages of a decision-making process. As previously suggested, we can argue that anger operates like an ‘‘ethical barometer’’ that informs business executives of potential ethical violations at any point in a decision-making process.

CONCLUSION Our findings have implications for affect and decision-making research in a number of ways. Although a considerable amount of previous research has documented that negative and positive moods instigate different cognitive processes, our study suggests that the role of anger in decision-making is distinct from that of moods. In specific terms, previous research found that positive mood leads to more creativity and cognitive flexibility (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen et al., 1985), and negative mood leads to more

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systematic processing (Sinclair & Mark, 1992). In our study, anger appears to lead to increased ethical awareness and sensitivity which was not captured in these previous studies on mood and decision-making. This finding highlights the possibility that there may be substantial differences between moods and discrete emotions in terms of their influence on decision-making. Therefore, we advocate future research to uncover the distinct roles of other discrete emotions, such as fear, anxiety, and pride, in decision-making. In addition, contrary to the traditional perception that experiencing anger can lead to dysfunctional outcomes (Berkowitz, 1990; Booth & Mann, 2005), our findings suggest that anger has potential benefits in decisionmaking (e.g., it can operate as an ethical barometer). Thus, our study provides additional empirical support to the emerging stream of research that purports the functional aspects of anger (Geddes & Callister, 2007; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). As previously noted in our background section, the extant research has mostly studied affect as an antecedent to decision-making through such methods as simulations and lab experiments in contexts outside of organizations. Therefore, our knowledge is more limited when it comes to explaining what causes individuals to experience discrete emotions during actual organizational decision-making processes. Our findings fill this gap by identifying six triggers of experienced anger based on inductive analyses of organizational decisions made by business executives. The results of our study also have implications for practice. We are living in an age where many organizations adopt a more negative attitude toward anger (Glomb & Hulin, 1997), as illustrated by one participant’s comment: ‘‘y at [my company] we’re taught to be, you know, as unemotional as possibley.’’ This is also reflected in the plethora of company-supported anger management programs which often encourage employees to avoid their anger. We argue that organizations should consider adopting a more integrated attitude toward anger, especially if they are concerned about improving their ethical climate (Schminke, Ambrose, & Neubaum, 2005; Victor & Cullen, 1988). In promoting and maintaining an ethical climate, organizations may want to consider establishing norms that feeling and constructively expressing anger is acceptable and appropriate. To enforce these norms, organizations can improve their communication channels, by encouraging such methods as ‘‘authentic dialogue’’ and ‘‘authentic discussion’’.4 Moreover, organizations may also want to consider actively training employees to have a more integrated attitude toward anger. This may lead to: (a) more employees standing up for oneself, (b) more

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employees standing up for others, and (c) discouragement of unethical action – all leading to a more ethical work climate. This exploratory study has a number of recognized limitations which we have chosen to address primarily in terms of areas for future research. The decision to draw our sample exclusively from the United States is recognized as a limitation in terms of the potential generalizability of our results to other populations. Future research should include people from other countries. For instance, individuals in other countries might differ in terms of how they experience and express anger (Matsumoto, 1989, 1992) and what they perceive as unethical behaviors due to differences in cultural and moral norms. An investigation of attitudes toward anger in different cultural contexts would also be worthwhile. The decision to focus on business executives could be viewed as a limitation. Future research which examines employees in middle and lower ranking positions would prove fruitful. We hypothesize that power and status related to one’s rank in the organization would have an impact on one’s anger experiences. For example, lower ranking employees’ anger may be triggered by factors other than self- and other-related ethical issues, such as being outperformed by a co-worker or experiencing role conflict. We also encourage future research to investigate anger and its triggers in other types of decision-making contexts (e.g., work-life decisions). We suggest future research build on this study’s findings. One area of future investigation would be to examine why executives with an integrated attitude are more likely to experience anger due to ‘‘other’’ triggers. Are they acting on behalf of their organizations as organizational representatives or advocates? Do they feel responsible for the protection of the organization and its members? In addition, future research should build on the two different anger attitudes. For example, if and how might anger attitudes contribute to perceptions of perceived costs and benefits of experiencing anger? What factors influence one’s attitude toward anger (e.g., personality traits, prior anger experiences, and/or upbringing)? Do those with different anger attitudes deal with their anger differently (e.g., suppress it, express it, or engage in deviant actions such as described by Geddes & Callister, 2007)? Future research could also examine how anger and its expression may influence organizational decision outcomes. Does expressing anger help organizational members reach their desired decision outcomes? The findings from this study highlight the important function anger serves in decision-making by operating as an ‘‘ethical barometer.’’ In addition, anger has the potential of playing an important role in moral awareness, ethical sensitivity, and moral motivation which are viewed as important

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stages in making ethical decisions (Rest, 1986; Trevino et al, 2006). We hope our findings stimulate thinking about anger’s influences on organizational members, decision-making processes, and in promoting and maintaining an ethical climate.

NOTES 1. Even with such probing questions, it took a considerable amount of time for a number of our respondents to feel comfortable enough to disclose a decision story involving anger. This suggests that conducting face-to-face interviews was the most appropriate way to collect data for this research. 2. The selection of the ‘‘thought’’ unit as our qualitative unit of analysis (rather than individual words or phrases) is consistent with those who argue that qualitative analysis is about ‘‘finding your story’’ (Patton, 2001, p. 432) which requires a focus on a larger unit of analysis to make sense of participants’ narratives. The justification for such an approach is not dissimilar to some of the rationale provided for adopting the think-aloud protocol (Ericsson & Simon, 1984/1993; Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995) or methods associated with it. 3. Although our study focus was on anger triggers for business executives in the context of organizational decision-making, it is interesting to note that some of our triggers are similar to Fitness’s (2000) findings on anger-eliciting events in the workplace. She found such events include: being treated unjustly by another, immoral behaviors of another, job incompetence of another, another acting in a disrespectful manner, and being publicly humiliated by another. 4. Authentic dialog ‘‘involves talking with our body and emotions, intellect, and spirit’’ and is about ‘‘shared inquiry, a way of thinking and reflectingy. The focus is on understanding the other person, not only making them understand youy.[It] involves questioning and sharing doubt, as opposed to debating’’ (Kohlrieser, 2006, p. 37). Often promoted in classroom environments, authentic discussions incorporate authentic dialog through diaologically oriented ‘‘interactions where participants present and consider multiple perspectives and often use others’ input in constructing their contributions’’ (Hadjiouannou, 2007, p. 370).

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CHAPTER 7 ROLE OF AFFECT AND INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE IN MORAL LEADERSHIP Charmine E. J. Ha¨rtel and Deshani B. Ganegoda ABSTRACT In an age where morality requires economic justification, it is a compelling task to explicate the deeper affecting implications of moral judgment than its mere financial costs. In this chapter, we explore the emotional, behavioral, and cognitive ramifications of moral leadership at both the individual and macro organizational levels; specifically, by summoning literature on leadership, affect, and organizational justice to build a conceptual model of affect and interactional justice in moral leadership. The aim of the model is to extend current theoretical frameworks and highlight the important ramifications that moral decision-making has on employee and organizational welfare including that of the decision maker. The chapter concludes with a call for research comparing moral and immoral leadership in terms of different influence and strategy processes adopted by leaders and their followers’ attributions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors.

Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 155–180 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04007-8

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INTRODUCTION In an era where corporate scandals make headline news, the need for business leaders to exert acceptable moral standards in leading others can not be over emphasized. Unfortunately, as Price (2006) observes, leaders often see themselves as having special obligations that would justify exempting themselves from commonly accepted moral standards. In an attempt to countervail this misconception, this chapter aims to build a conceptual model that summons the literature on leadership, affect, and justice to map the important ramifications moral decision-making has on employee and organizational welfare, including that of the decision maker. The concept of moral leadership chronicled in this chapter builds upon related, yet conceptually different notions of leadership such as: transformational leadership, spiritual leadership, and ethical leadership. Accordingly, throughout this chapter moral dimensions such as ethicality, authenticity, and fairness will be used in conjunction with moral leadership. A deeper review of the theoretical divergences and convergences of moral leadership in relation to other leadership styles is given in the next section of this chapter. The importance of making morally correct decisions by management has been highlighted extensively in the literature (e.g. Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Hosmer, 1994, 1995; Hosmer & Kiewitz, 2005; Rest, 1994; Thompson, 2004); a majority of this work is highly prescriptive in nature. In fact, Brown and Trevin˜o (2006) claim that the moral dimension of leadership has been predominantly approached from a normative or philosophical perspective, explicating what leaders should do; thus a social scientific approach to moral leadership remains largely under-developed. This is also reflected in Ciulla’s (1995, p. 5) comment about ethics in leadership: Most scholars and practitioners who write about leadership genuflect at the altar of ethics and speak with hushed reverence about its importance to leadership y Yet, given the central role of ethics in the practice of leadership, it’s remarkable that there has been little in the way of sustained and systematic treatment of the subject by scholars y For the most part, the discussion of ethics in the leadership literature is fragmented, there is little reference to other works on the subject and one gets the sense that most authors write as if they are starting from scratch.

Given due regard to the above claim, a theory-led conceptual model is developed in this chapter, in order to insinuate propositions that are empirically testable. In building this theoretical model, key concepts are specifically borrowed from the literature on moral leadership, affective events theory (AET), and organizational justice. The next section of this paper

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outlines these relevant theories and concepts that are fundamental to the model development.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Morality in Leadership Literature Leadership is one of the oldest concepts in the Social Sciences that people have tried to understand for centuries and still continue to do. The literature on leadership is vast, containing a plethora of definitions, theories, perspectives, and competing schools of thought. To give an extensive review of leadership theory is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, Ciulla (1995) provided a succinct summary of the most prevalent definitions of leadership and their evolution in the last 80 years of research. A review of these definitions suggests that leadership has been defined as: a person, an ability, a process, an authoritative power, an act, and a relationship. According to Ciulla (1995), the emphasis placed on each of these definitions over time characterizes the major paradigm shifts in the leadership literature in the past few decades. Throughout its history, however, the moral dimension of leadership has been a constant point of enquiry, with opinions dating back from Socratic and Confucian teachings. The reason that leaders are particularly scrutinized in ethically volatile situations could be that leaders are normatively bound to pursue collective goals and provide justifications for their decisions (Price, 2000). In fact, it can be argued that the higher the social standing and responsibility accorded a leader, correspondingly, the higher the moral risk associated with that leader’s decision-making. Morality has been viewed through two distinctive lenses in the leadership literature. The first view considers morality as a fundamental characteristic of leadership. For instance, Thompson (2004, p. 28) claims that: ‘‘Leadership, the exercise of social power (and often attendant economic and political power), is fundamentally a moral endeavor. There is an inescapable moral dimension to the exercise of power, whether or not it is formally acknowledged.’’ Taking a similar view, Ciulla (1995, p. 6) argues that ‘‘ethics is located in the heart of leadership studies and not in an appendage.’’ Juxtaposing this is a second view that treats moral leadership as a certain type of leadership as opposed to a defining factor in leadership. An example of this can be seen in the differentiation that Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) make between authentic transformational leaders and pseudo-transformational leaders. According to these authors, the difference between the two types

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of leaders lies in the fact that authentic leaders compared to pseudotransformational leaders exert high moral and ethical standards in their behaviors and influence strategies. Interestingly, according to this classification, an individual can still be identified as a leader irrespective of his or her moral judgments. This view, however, has been criticized by others for failing to consider morality as a core leadership characteristic. Another conceptual debate on moral leadership relates to the ethical predispositions or cognitive schema individuals utilize in moral decision-making (Brady & Wheeler, 1996). The prevailing frameworks on moral decisionmaking can be divided into two ethical doctrines: teleology and deontology. According to the teleological perspective, a leader’s moral status is solely determined by the consequences of his or her actions. As such, this framework adopts a utilitarian view in suggesting that the value of a decision’s outcome determines whether the act is moral or not (Reynolds, 2006). Alternatively, a deontological perspective determines a leader’s moral status by his or her intrinsic sense of duty and moral reasoning (Kanungo, 2001). This second framework, in general, highlights the importance of individual obligations, principles, and rules of behavior in moral decision-making. Empirical evidence suggests that these ethical predispositions can impact on the level of morality exerted by a leader. For example, a recent study conducted by Reynolds (2006) found that managers who have a deontological view on ethics have a greater awareness and a capacity to recognize moral issues as opposed to managers who have a teleological predisposition. Overall, both teleology and deontology presume that ethical decision-making, in essence, is a cognitive exercise. Countervailing such a view, recent academic work highlights the integral role of emotion in moral decision-making. For instance, Gaudine and Thorne (2001) argue that emotion is intrinsic, not antithetical to a rational ethical decision process; thus, rather than ignoring the role of emotions as ‘‘irrational biases,’’ giving attention to one’s emotions may result in better ethical decisions. Supporting this postulation, in this chapter, we aim to contribute to the discourse on moral leadership by elucidating the function of emotion in moral decision-making. Having established the epistemological viewpoints of morality in the leadership literature, the next section will conceptualize moral leadership with regard to other leadership theories. Moral Leadership The moral dimension of leadership is captured by a multitude of prominent theorizations of leadership such as: transformational leadership (Burns, 1978),

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authentic leadership (Avolio & Gardner, 2005), spiritual leadership (Fry, 2003), and ethical leadership (Brown & Trevin˜o, 2006). In addition to its portrayal in the Western leadership literature, the Chinese leadership literature, which is strongly influenced by Confucianism, places a strong emphasis on personal character, morality, and personal integrity (e.g., Li & Shi, 2005). According to Burns (1978), the basis of transformational leadership is its moral foundation, especially because transformational leaders inspire individuals to act beyond their self-interest toward a common goal. Building on the seminal work of Burns (1978), Bass and Steidlmeier (1999, p. 182) distinguished between authentic transformational leaders and pseudotransformational leaders based on; ‘‘(1) the moral character of the leaders and their concerns for self and others; (2) the ethical values embedded in the leaders’ vision, articulation, and program, which followers can embrace or reject; and (3) the morality of the processes of social ethical choices and action in which the leaders and followers engage and collectively pursue.’’ As such, an underlying rationale of transformational leadership is that when leaders are morally matured, individuals who follow them also tend to display higher levels of moral reasoning. Analogous to the concept of transformational leadership is the concept of authentic leadership. Avolio, Luthans, and Walumba (2004, p. 4) define authentic leaders as those ‘‘individuals who are deeply aware of how they think and behave and are perceived by others as being aware of their own and others’ values/moral perspectives, knowledge, and strengths; aware of the context in which they operate; and who are confident, hopeful, optimistic, resilient, and high on moral character’’ (as cited in Avolio & Gardner, 2005). The central premise of authentic leadership is that ‘‘through increased self-awareness, self-regulation and positive modeling, authentic leaders foster the development of authenticity in followers’’ (Avolio & Gardner, 2005, p. 317). The followers’ authenticity, in turn, is expected to contribute to their own well-being and increased performance. Spiritual leadership has a similar connotation of morality attached to it, and is thus comparable with authentic and transformational leadership styles. Spiritual leadership occurs when a ‘‘person in a leadership position embodies spiritual values such as integrity, honesty and humility, creating the self as an example of someone who can be trusted, relied upon, and admired’’ (Fry, 2003, p. 693). Parallel to authentic and transformational leaders, spiritual leaders are motivated by a genuine interest to make positive changes in followers. However, unlike authentic and transformational leaders, in the case of spiritual leaders, such a motivation may come from religious, idealistic, or superhuman beliefs.

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A last conceptual similarity that can be drawn from the leadership literature is between the aforementioned leadership theories and the notion of ethical leadership. According to Trevin˜o, Hartman, and Brown (2000), an ethical leader has two conceptually different aspects, namely; (1) the ‘‘moral person’’ aspect and (2) the ‘‘moral manager’’ aspect. The ‘‘moral person’’ aspect encapsulates the personal characteristics of a leader such as honesty, trustworthiness, and fair principles. Alternatively, the moral manager aspect of ethical leadership represents the leader’s proactive efforts to instill ethical standards in followers through such measures as explicit role modeling, communication of ethical values, and the use of reward systems to promote ethical behavior (Trevin˜o et al., 2000). Given that the theoretical grounding of ethical leadership relies heavily on morality, the question which arises then is – how does moral leadership fit into this array of leadership styles? An extensive review of where the above conceptualizations diverge and converge can be found in Avolio and Gardner (2005) and Brown and Trevin˜o (2006), and we do not replicate their effort here. However, it is pivotal to elucidate the theoretical benefit of using ‘‘moral leadership’’ as a key concept in the proposed model. Following the contention that morality is intrinsic to leadership (e.g. Ciulla, 1995; Thompson, 2004), it is futile to consider that moral leadership is another type of leadership or a superfluous appendage to existing styles of leadership. On the contrary, we posit that moral leadership should be used as an umbrella term that represents the moral dimensions of transformational, authentic, spiritual, and ethical leaders. In essence, this implies that moral leadership epitomizes ethicality, authenticity, and fairness of leaders, and is therefore an omnipresent construct in any given type of leadership. Moreover, the concept of moral leadership harmonizes different moral dimensions of leadership into one construct, thereby providing parsimony to operationalizations. In addition to the characteristics of ethicality, authenticity, and fairness (concepts that we have borrowed from existing leadership theories), another defining attribute of moral leadership is the leader’s self-concept. For leaders to be moral agents, and to make morally acceptable decisions, they must pay attention to their inner motives, their influence strategies, and most of all, to how their decisions will affect the welfare of others under their influence. An understanding of how one’s decisions impact on others is related to one’s self-concept or sense of unique identity differentiated from others (Brewer & Gardner, 1996, p. 83). One’s knowledge and perception of self has a significant influence on the way individuals relate to others (Brewer & Gardner, 1996) and their social motivations (Brickson, 2000). The relationship between self-identity and moral leadership will be looked at next.

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Self-Identity and Moral Leadership Brewer and Gardner’s (1996) tripartite conceptualization of self-identity postulates that different contextual features of organizations can activate three different types of identity orientations for individuals, namely, personal, collective, and relational. According to the authors, at the individual level, personal self is differentiated from others and comparisons are made between individuals. At the interpersonal level, an individual derives his or her relational self from connections and role relationships with significant others; at the group level, the collective self represents one’s social identity as part of a larger group (as explained by self categorization theory; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Each of these identity orientations is argued to reflect particular social motivations and engagement styles of individuals. As such, depending on one’s identity orientation, individuals tend to exert different cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses when dealing with others (Brickson, 2000). For instance, when a personal identity is primed, an individual’s actions will be primarily motivated by the desire to enhance one’s own well-being as opposed to one’s group or partners, while one’s relational identity motivates one to act for the benefit of others. Similarly, the priming of one’s collective identity motivates one to seek the welfare of that collective. In the context of leadership, if a leader has a personal identity orientation to relationships it means s/he makes decisions based on self-interest and what facilitates their personal ambition. This type of a leader could be expected to have negative emotional responses to doing things which are ethically correct but may risk self-interest or ambition. Similarly, such a leader may have positive emotional responses to doing things which are unethical in terms of unfairly treating another when the unethical act will benefit their own ambitions. A leader with a collective identity orientation to relationships, on the other hand, does things for the welfare of what they identify as their own group (e.g. members of one’s family or religion or social class). This sort of leader could be expected to have negative emotional responses to doing things which are ethically correct but may risk the good of the group. Similarly, such a leader could be expected to have positive emotional responses to doing things which are unethical in terms of unfairly treating someone not in one’s group when the unethical act will benefit their own group. We content that the moral leader manifests a relational identity orientation to relationships. To this end, a moral leader makes decisions based on the welfare of all, not a specific individual’s or a group’s interests

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nor self-interest. For instance, White (1993) states that moral acts always consider people as an end and never simply as a means, thereby seeing individuals as autonomous beings who are entitled to control their own fate and not as subjects that can be manipulated to pursue one’s own self interests. This sort of leader could be expected to have positive emotional responses to doing things ethically, and negative emotional responses to doing things unethically in terms of treating others. Although followers may have variant emotional responses to a single interaction with the leader, we argue that, over the long run, followers will have positive emotional dispositions towards the moral leader because they know that the leader’s character is not to behave from self-interest (collective or individual) but to take decisions and actions that are just. To this end, a leader’s self-identity becomes a fundamental concept that can be used to explicate motives behind moral judgments, and how leaders think their decisions will influence the emotions of employees under their power. Next, we use Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) AET to explain the interplay between moral decision-making and emotions as reciprocal antecedents and consequences.

Affective Events Theory (AET) According to Va¨stfja¨ll, Ga¨rling, and Kleiner (2004), emotions are commonly recognized as discrete feeling states such as love, anger, hate, and depression. Frijda and Mesquita (1994) further define emotions as ‘‘affective responses to what happens in the environment’’ (p. 51). The changes in emotional states in people are explained by AET, which posits that specific work events (termed ‘‘affective events’’) produced by environmental features can provoke either positive or negative affective experiences in a person. These experiences can subsequently interrupt an individual’s current behavior and lead to specific action tendencies and attitudinal changes in people. The emotional consequences of organizational events, therefore, affect the actions of organizational members (Ashton-James & Ashkanasy, Chapter this volume). Given that leaders are mostly in control of the internal environmental features of an organization and are in a position to shape such features through the decisions they make, it is reasonable to assume that leaders have considerable influence over the affective events that take place in an organization. Extending this line of reasoning, we contend that the affective events which occur under moral leadership will be significantly different to those that occur under immoral leadership. This proposition is supported by

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Hosmer (1994, 1995) who claimed that moral leaders engender positive feelings among stakeholders, which in turn, are reflected in the behaviors of stakeholders. In contrast, immoral leadership which is centered on the manipulation of others for one’s own self-serving purposes can be expected to engender negative feelings in people thereby increasing the probability of destructive behavioral tendencies and attitudes in individuals. From an alternative point of view, leaders themselves are subject to affective events in organizations. Therefore, the relationship between moral decision-making and emotions can be viewed as a dual process; (1) affective events (and resultant emotions) as outcomes of moral/immoral decisions of leaders; and (2) affective events (and resultant emotions) as contributing to moral/immoral decisions of leaders. The first proposed relationship has already been explained in the preceding paragraph. The second proposed relationship can be supported by Michie and Gooty’s (2005) work on authenticity of leadership. These authors argue that, although authentic leaders are expected to uphold high moral virtues (Luthans & Avolio, 2003), theoretical and empirical research suggests that the congruency between such values and actual behavior of leaders is tenuous (e.g. Price, 2000). To this end, Michie and Gooty (2005) argue that a leader’s capacity to experience otherdirected emotions (i.e. gratitude, goodwill, appreciation, concern for others) plays a significant role in strengthening the consistency between a leader’s moral values and moral actions. In effect, this suggests that a leader’s felt emotions have an impact on the moral virtues that are upheld behaviorally. As such, it can be argued that the affective events in organizations and resulting emotions can influence the level of morality that is explicitly demonstrated by the leaders. However, this is not to say that individuals do not experience negative feelings under moral leadership, or leaders who experience negative emotions do not uphold their moral virtues behaviorally. It is an extremely difficult task to keep all stakeholders happy at all times or to experience other-directed emotions at all times. Nevertheless, an important distinction can be made between moral and immoral leaders based on the pattern of the leader’s and follower’s emotions associated with the leader’s decision-making. Furthermore, even at times when negative emotion is inevitable, an important aspect of moral leadership that serves to mitigate such negativity is the ability of a leader to provide explanations and justifications pertaining to specific decisions, actions and organizational events. The notion of explaining decision outcomes in an acceptable interpersonal manner is termed interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986). This concept is considered next.

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Interactional Justice Justice has received much attention in the academic literature as a defining characteristic of a leader. For instance, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) consider liberty, utility, and distributive justice as major themes in Western ethical discourses, providing the foundation for transformational leadership. Similarly, Michie and Gooty (2005) assert that social justice is a self-transcendent value that is characteristic of authentic leadership. Theoretical and empirical research indicates that individuals display strong affective responses to perceived (in)justice in organizational settings (e.g. Flint, Hernandez-Marrero, & Wielemaker, 2005; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Therefore, an organizational justice perspective serves as a valuable addition to the discourse on moral leadership and emotions. In the organizational justice literature, perceptions of justice are considered to be tripartite, specifically in terms of: (1) distributive justice; (2) procedural justice; and (3) interactional justice. Distributive justice focuses on content – the fairness of the ends achieved; whereas procedural justice focuses on process – the fairness of the means used to achieve those ends (Bies & Moag, 1986; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988). In their seminal work, Leventhal et al. (1980) identified six dimensions of procedural justice as: (1) consistency (2) bias-suppression (3) accuracy (4) correctability (5) representativeness, and (6) ethicality of a decision-making process. By definition, both distributive justice and procedural justice clearly epitomize the outcomes and the process of moral decision-making. Specifically, under moral leadership, resource allocation is conducted in a fair manner based on sound decision criteria as opposed to verging on partiality or nepotism. However, in this chapter, the central focus is on the third form of justice – interactional justice as it relates to moral leadership. The reason for this is that interactional justice shows a direct link between decision-makers and those who get affected by their decisions (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000), whereas distributive justice is more closely linked to decision outcomes and procedural justice is more closely linked to decision-making systems (Colquitt, 2001). Bies and Moag (1986) introduced the concept of interactional justice into the justice literature as governing the interpersonal variables in justice perceptions. Interactional justice can be defined as ‘‘the quality of the interpersonal treatment people receive when procedures are implemented’’ (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001, p. 425). Interactional justice had been separated into two distinct aspects of justice. The first, labeled as ‘‘interpersonal justice,’’ is defined as ‘‘the degree to which people are treated

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with politeness, dignity, and respect by authorities or third parties involved in executing procedures or determining outcomes’’ (Colquitt et al., 2001, p. 425). The second, labeled as ‘‘informational justice,’’ is defined as: ‘‘the explanations provided to people that convey information about why procedures were used in a certain way or why outcomes were distributed in a certain fashion’’ (Colquitt et al., 2001, p. 425). The provision of causal accounts or justifications in regard to decisions appears to increase individual perceptions of interactional fairness (Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003). This is especially because such explanations allow individuals to determine whether a decision has been made conforming to the prevailing moral standards (Leventhal, 1980). Three studies conducted by Bies and Shapiro (1987) revealed that when people are given justification for decisions, their sense of interactional justice and support for decisions are high, even if the outcomes of the decision are unfavorable. Similarly, Shaw et al. (2003) reported that the provision of an adequate explanation for a decision decreases potential retaliatory behavior of employees by 43%. According to Hosmer (1994), interactional justice epitomizes the character of a moral leader. In commenting on moral decision-making, he pointed out that ‘‘while stakeholders might disagree on what is right, fair and just, they can agree that the process for arriving at the decision is fair and so there should be an increase in trust and commitment among all stakeholders, which in turn, will lead to an increase in effort and, therefore, success’’ (p. 191). In effect, this implies that moral leaders have the inherent quality of transparency in dealing with others and the decency to communicate one’s actions and decisions especially to those affected by them; a point which aligns with the adoption of a relational identity orientation. A similar connection can be made between interactional justice and transformational leadership. According to Bass (1985), transformational leadership contains four components: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. From these four components, close parallels can be drawn between the concept of individualized consideration and interactional justice. Individualized consideration essentially refers to ‘‘whether followers are treated as ends or means, whether their unique dignity and interest are respected or not’’ (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999, p. 185). From this, it is clear that the moral dimension of leadership is intrinsically linked to interactional justice, especially because it represents the dignity and respect a person receives from a leader who believes that those who get affected by his or her decisions deserve an explanation. From this line of argument and our earlier discussion of immoral leaders adoption of personal or collective identity orientations, it can also be seen

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that an immoral leader may not want others to know his or her self-serving motives. Therefore, true purposes or rationales behind decisions are only revealed as partial or distorted truths, or even hidden altogether under lies. A classic example of this type of immoral leadership style and decisionmaking was seen in the US technology giant Enron before its collapse. Although the example of Enron has been quoted numerous times in the management literature, it still serves as a fine example of the connection between immoral leadership and the lack of interactional justice towards stakeholders, especially in censoring the true financial status of the company to employees as well as shareholders. As such, it can be argued that together with self-identity orientation, leaders’ interactional justice can differentiate moral leaders from immoral leaders. So far we have discussed the key theoretical concepts underpinning the development of the model forwarded in this paper. The next section details the model itself.

A MODEL OF AFFECT AND INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE IN MORAL LEADERSHIP The model developed in this chapter draws from the literature on moral leadership, AET, and organizational justice. Essentially, the model explains the process through which moral leadership and decision-making affect employee emotions and moods at work, and how these emotions influence subsequent behaviors and attitudes in people. It then goes on to explain how such behavioral and attitudinal changes in people affect the macro emotional culture of the organization, which has a reciprocal relationship with the cognitive moral development of the leader. The process is modeled for moral leaders (see Fig. 1) as well as for immoral leaders (see Fig. 2) to facilitate comparison.

MODEL DEVELOPMENT Moral versus Immoral Decision-Making Individuals’ goals are subjective and situation-dependent, thus virtually any workplace event can elicit an affective response as long as it is perceived by the individual to affect their ability to achieve their individual workplace

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Affect and Interactional Justice in Moral Leadership More Positive Affect

Moral Decisionmaking

High Interactional

Affect-Driven Behavior: Positive/Neutral

Healthy Emotional

Less Negative Affect Affect Infusion into cognition

Fig. 1. Affect and Interactional Justice in Moral Leadership.

Less Positive Affect Immoral Decisionmaking

Low interactional

Affect Driven Behaviour: Negative

Toxic Emotional Culture

More Negative Affect Affect Infusion into cognition

Fig. 2.

Affect and Interactional Justice in Immoral Leadership.

goals (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). In this respect, decisions are bound to evoke some degree of emotional reaction in people who are affected by them, irrespective of the decision’s moral correctness. Consequently, a leader’s decisions may leave a person experiencing positive affect or negative affect depending on the decision outcome. The key argument here though is that, depending on the morality exerted by the decision-maker, the composition of positive and negative affect simultaneously experienced (i.e. emotional ambivalence) by those who are affected by the decision may vary. For instance, Hosmer (1994, 1995) claims that morally correct decisions would engender positive emotions leading to trust and commitment among stakeholders. Such a view is also supported by Sen (1993) and Solomon (1999) who argue that moral decision-making evokes shared trust and integrity whilst ensuring mutual confidence in the ethics of the different parties. The contention these scholars posit is that moral decision-making engenders positive emotions in people. However, this is not to say that

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decisions made by moral leaders would always evoke positive emotions in people. On the contrary, it is acknowledged that moral decisions may evoke negative affect in individuals as well. However, the ratio of positive to negative emotions over time is expected to be positive. The reverse can be argued for immoral leadership and decision-making. Research indicates that feelings of anger, despair and outrage are triggered when organizational decisions and managerial actions are deemed as unfair by employees (Folger & Skarlicki, 1999). In addition, strategic decisions made on a political basis evoke emotions such as frustration (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). As such, it can be argued that immoral decision-making will lead to the experience of more negative emotions in individuals than positive emotions. Nevertheless, immoral decisions may also trigger positive affect in people, particularly in those who benefit from such political game playing. However, the proportion of such individuals is more likely to be smaller compared to the proportion who are disadvantaged, and thus, the net effect on the organizational culture can be expected to be negative. This argument is also congruent with our earlier conceptualization of an immoral leader based on social identity orientations. It was argued that immoral leaders are motivated by self-interest (personal or collective) and therefore base their decisions on self-serving biases (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Thus, those who benefit from such decisions tend to be the leader him/ herself and the close group of people with whom the leader identifies with. Contrary to this, moral leaders predominantly envisage themselves in terms of their role in relation to others, and therefore are primarily motivated to make decisions that are justifiable and beneficial to others. Hence, it is natural for individuals to experience positive emotional ambivalence under moral leadership. This leads us to our first proposition: Proposition 1. Morality in leadership and decision-making will have a main effect on whether positive emotions are experienced more often over time than negative emotions by the collective employees of an organization or vice versa. We now turn our attention to the role of interactional justice in the relationship between positive and negative affect and subsequent behavior.

Affect and Affect-Driven Behavior According to Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) AET, workplaces are punctuated by a variety of emotion-evoking events. Over time, these emotions

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accumulate to have important ramifications on individual behavior, attitudes and intentions at work. Actions triggered by such affective experiences are coined ‘‘affect-driven behaviors’’ (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Contextualizing this in the present argument, it can be argued that affective experiences resulting from moral or immoral decision-making can create behavioral and attitudinal reactions in people who are affected by such decisions. For this reason, it can be argued that moral decision-making will lead to positive behavioral changes in people, whereas immoral decision-making will lead to negative behavioral consequences. The process by which moral decision-making results in positive affectdriven behavior is summarized by Gillian (1994) in his review of Hosmer’s (1944) work where he states: (1) treating people in ways that can be considered to be ‘‘right’’ and ‘‘just’’ and ‘‘fair’’ creates trust, (2) trust builds commitment, (3) commitment ensures effort, and (4) effort is essential for success (p. 730). A similar line of reasoning is apparent in the relationship proposed by Hosmer and Kiewitz (2005) between ethical managerial decision-making and organizational outcomes. Specifically, they argue that ethical decision-making impacts justice perceptions, which in turn impact attitudes and behaviors that translate into performance levels and quality. Following on from the foregoing argument, it can be said that negative affect triggered by immoral leadership and decision-making can lead to negative behavior and attitudinal changes in people. This assertion is supported by the findings of a study examining the effects on survivors after a corporate layoff, which showed that survivors reacted to the layoff negatively (e.g. non-compliance with task rules and withdrawal) if they associated a negative connotation to the following: (1) legitimacy of the layoff, (2) the way in which those laid off were informed, (3) the decision rule used to lay people off, and (4) the compensation that was offered (Brockner, Grover, Reed, DeWitt, & O’Malley, 1987). Similar affect-driven behavior and attitudinal changes are reported in other studies, including decreased productivity standards and quality (Pritchard, Dunnette, & Jorgenson, 1972), reduced cooperation (Schmitt & Marwell, 1972), and higher turnover intention (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987). Most of these affect-driven behaviors can also be viewed as coping strategies that individuals adopt in response to their felt emotions. Coping is conceptualized as ‘‘cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person’’ (Folkman & Lazarus, 1984, p. 141). Appraisals of failure, harm, and threat associated with specific work events can elicit a complex of negative emotions in a person (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).

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To this end, coping serves as a mechanism that restores emotional homeostasis of a person. However, when people have to constantly resort to coping tactics in relation to repeated negative emotions (that result from affective events), it is likely that they will experience a more permanent shift in their emotional homeostasis – leading to prolonged negative moods and affective states. Therefore, one way of evaluating the impact of moral and immoral leadership on emotions at work, is the type of discrete emotions that are felt in each context and the frequency by which they occur. So far we have argued that the emotional ambivalence felt in a moral leadership context tends to be more positive compared to an immoral leadership context. In addition to the moment-to-moment discrete emotions that are felt in relation to affective events, over time, the accumulation of such emotions can lead to more permanent changes in the moods of those who experience these emotions. In essence, this implies that leaders’ moral decision making and subsequent workplace events not only trigger immediate affective responses, but over time such responses become hardwired into organization systems. Proposition 2. Individual accumulated affect will mediate the relationship between leaders’ moral/immoral decision-making and individual behaviors and attitudes. Having established the premise that moral decision-making will lead to positive behavioral and attitudinal changes through accumulated positive affect and that immoral decision-making will lead to negative behavioral and attitudinal changes through accumulated negative affect, the next section explains the role of interactional justice in this relationship.

The Role of Interactional Justice Previously, it was argued that both moral and immoral decision-making can result in positive and negative affect in people (see Figs. 1 and 2). This raises the question of why only negative affect caused by immoral decision-making leads to negative affect-driven behavior, and why negative affect caused by moral decision-making does not result in the same sort of negative behavior. We contend that the answer to this question lies in the moderating role that interactional justice plays in this relationship. Research indicates that the extent to which people are treated in a fair and honest manner is a crucial determinant in predicting the acceptance of decision outcomes, employee commitment and trust in leadership

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(Kim & Mauborgne, 1991). As such, interactional justice which encapsulates both explanation provision and explanation adequacy regarding organizational decision-making is capable of moderating negativity resulting from decision outcomes (Shaw et al., 2003). Furthermore, work conducted by Sapienza, Korsgaard, and Schweiger (1997) and Skarlicki and Folger (1997) provides empirical support for positing interactional justice as a key moderator of the relationship between decision outcomes and affect-driven behavior. In addition to this, the importance of explanation provision in decision-making is reflected in Hosmer and Kiewitz’s (2005) claim: ‘‘the ultimate function of management is to logically explain the ethical principles that underlies their decisions and actions in order to achieve wholehearted cooperation, innovation and effort among all of the employees and other stakeholders of the firm’’ (p. 74). Therefore, it can be argued that as long as moral leaders demonstrate interactional justice in explaining decisions to individuals who are affected by those decisions (especially to individuals who are adversely affected), the negativity in affect-driven behavior can be mitigated or neutralized. As Hosmer (1997) argues, ‘‘it is the decision process that is important; not the decision outcome’’ (p. 141). However, if decisions are not based on ethical guidelines or acceptable moral principles, provision of interactional justice becomes difficult as it is impossible for a person to be ‘‘fair’’ and deceptive concurrently (Hosmer, 1997). Therefore, under immoral leadership, the negative affect caused by morally substandard decisions could only be heightened due to interactional injustice, thus leading to negative affect-driven behavior. Conversely, employees with low moral standards or who benefit from immoral decisions would have positive affect resulting from leaders’ immoral decision-making and would continue to support immoral leaders. Overall, people who benefit from immoral leaders are a minority compared to those who are disadvantaged, as such, the positive affect experienced by individuals will be comparatively less than the negative affect felt by the majority. Proposition 3. Interactional justice will moderate the relationship between individual affect and individual behaviors and attitudes. The next step of the model development will establish the connection between affect-driven behavior and the macro level, that is, the emotional culture of an organization. Emotional Culture Organizational culture refers to both the formal and informal shared perceptions of organizational procedures, policies, and practices (Carr,

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Schmidt, Ford, & DeShon, 2003). Emotional culture represents the emotional ambience in an organization and can be viewed as a subset (dimension) of the overarching organizational culture (Ha¨rtel, in press). Depending on the affective events that take place in an organization, and how those events are interpreted and reacted to, the emotional culture of an organization can transpire to be healthy or toxic for its members. A healthy organizational culture is represented by respectful encounters, compassion, forgiveness, dignity, integrity, wisdom, optimism, and positive affect (Pizer & Ha¨rtel, 2005). Conversely, a toxic emotional culture is represented by emotional pain (Frost, 2003), negative encounters and negative affect (Ha¨rtel, in press). According to AET, organizational culture serves as an environmental feature that shapes the type of affective events that take place in an organization (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), however, since culture is a dynamic phenomenon, it too can be changed by the nature of affective events occurring over time. Therefore, recurrent negative affect triggered in employees by immoral decisions and their resultant affect-driven behaviors can in fact transform a healthy emotional culture into a toxic emotional culture in an organization. The same rationale can be applied to explain the influence that moral decision-making has on creating a healthy emotional culture in the workplace. The process through which affect-driven behavior gets embedded in organizational culture and then proceeds to shape that culture can be explained by Kelman’s (1958) model of social influence. Specifically, Kelman (1958) elucidated three ways in which individuals interpret fairness and moral standards and internalize these standards over time. Firstly, individuals tend to internalize moral standards through ‘rules and conventions’ of an organization. The motivation underlying rule following is represented by compliance on the part of employees. Kelman (1958) argues that individuals will weigh the material gains or losses from adhering to the rules as opposed to breaking them. Therefore, the reward system of an organization should endorse the type of behaviors that the organization would like to see in its employees. If the leadership in an organization is morally corrupt, the type of behaviors that get endorsed or rewarded in an organization can not be righteous. Therefore, the moral standards of a leader are bound to be reflected in an organizational culture through its rules, conventions, and reward systems. Secondly, according to Kelman (1958), individuals internalize standards of behavior due to the social or relational implications of adhering to such standards. Since individuals are naturally motivated to build and maintain

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relationships with similar others, the social norms of appropriate moral standards become particularly relevant. In the context of moral leadership (which is characterized by interactional justice in regard to accuracy and adequacy of information provision and interpersonal respect), individuals would tend to endorse higher levels of integrity and respect to one another in their interactions. Whereas, under immoral leadership, the prevalent level of sincerity in social interactions would tend to be diminutive due to mistrust and the fear of being taken advantage of. The third and final way in which individuals internalize behaviors is by accepting certain action tendencies and behaviors as their own and including them into their own personal value systems. Therefore, over time, individuals are likely to think that behaving in a particular way (moral or immoral) is socially acceptable. This being the deepest internalization that occurs in individuals is an extensive process by which individuals get acculturated into a social system that can be toxic or healthy for the individual. Proposition 4a. Leaders’ moral/immoral decision-making influences the emotional culture of an organization through its influence on the behaviors and attitudes manifested by the collective employees in the organization. Proposition 4b. The individual behaviors and attitudes manifest in an organization over time will have a main effect on the emotional culture of the organization. The last step of the model explains how emotional culture impacts on the moral decision-making of the leader, and the leader’s cognitive moral development.

Affect Infusion into Cognition and Leader’s Cognitive Moral Development The process of decision-making, although cognitively oriented, is by no means an emotion-free exercise. According to Ashton-James and Ashkanasy (2005), the emotions surrounding decisions can have a critical influence on organizational functioning. Moreover, Forgas (1995) offered an analysis on how affective states indeed influence thoughts and subsequent behaviors of individuals through the Affect Infusion Model (AIM). Extending this line of thought, it can be argued that an organization’s emotional culture may in fact impact the type of decisions a leader makes (Hartel, in press). Such a contention can be supported by first, linking the concept of emotional culture to the literature on organizational ethical climate; and second, by explicating

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how a healthy emotional culture could facilitate the cognitive moral development of a leader. An individual’s morality is not solely dependant on an individual’s personal characteristics. In fact, there is widespread recognition that contextual factors have a significant influence on the moral behavior of individuals. Terms such as ‘‘moral atmosphere’’ (Higgins, Power, & Kohlberg, 1984) and ‘‘ethical climate’’ (Brown & Trevin˜o, 2006; Reynolds, 2006; Victor & Cullen, 1988) provide the basis to consider morality as embedded in a specific context, in addition to a specific person (i.e. moral leader). According to Martin and Cullen (2006, p. 177), ethical climate ‘‘is the perception of what constitutes right behavior, and thus becomes a psychological mechanism through which ethical issues are managed.’’ In an organization, the ethical climate influences decision-making and the subsequent behavior of individuals in response to ethical dilemmas. Continuing from the earlier discussion on healthy and toxic emotional cultures, it can be argued that a healthy emotional culture is more likely to be associated with an ethical work climate, and conversely, a toxic emotional culture is most likely to be associated with an unethical work climate. Such a proposition can be supported by the work of Gaudine and Thorne (2001), who contended that positive affect increases a person’s moral awareness. Theories of moral decision-making suggest that the initial point in the moral decision-making process is the awareness of a situation as a moral issue (Reynolds, 2006). Precisely, moral awareness can be defined as ‘‘a person’s determination that a situation contains moral content and legitimately can be considered from a moral point of view’’ (Reynolds, 2006, p. 233). A factor that contributes to the moral awareness of a leader is the moral intensity of a situation, which is the extent to which an organizational event is likely to be evaluated as a moral issue (Reynolds, 2006). An organizational event that is high in moral intensity is therefore likely to attain a high degree of moral awareness. Research indicates that the moral intensity of an organizational event is dependant upon; (1) perceived potential harm/no harm resulting from the event and (2) perceived social pressure. Out of these two factors, the second factor – perceived social pressure – is intrinsically linked to the ethical climate and emotional culture of an organization. To explain this further, consider an organizational context that fosters positive emotion through ethical behavior; such an organization is bound to have social norms that communicate high level expectations of moral behavior. Therefore, in such a context, the violation of expected behavioral norms could trigger significant reactions from others and attract considerable negative attention (DeRidder & Tripathi, 1992).

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Alternatively stated, in a healthy emotional culture, even a small scale act of immorality could trigger negative responses from significant others. This implies that, in a healthy emotional culture, the moral intensity pertaining to work events and decisions is high, and therefore leaders demonstrate high levels of moral awareness when dealing with work situations. This in turn can be argued to reflect in their decision-making. An emotional culture of an organization prescribes the emotional display rules and norms which provide guidance for individuals in the interpretation and expression of emotions (Hochschild, 1983; Morris & Feldman, 1996). Display rules are the social norms that dictate which emotions can be expressed when, by whom and to whom (Triandis, 1994). To this end, one of the main reasons why individuals abide by such display rules is because people who deviate from such culturally accepted display rules may have to face negative social sanctions (Hutson-Comeaux & Kelly, 2002). As such, emotional display rules and norms can be regarded as a reward/punishment mechanism of a given emotional culture, which provides external reinforcement for moral or immoral decision-making. For instance, Geddes and Callister (2007) claim that certain organizational emotional display norms (e.g. compassion) can insinuate positive outcomes even when the expressed emotions are negative (e.g. anger) and thus create work contexts that are infused with social awareness and responsibility. Therefore, in a healthy emotional culture, the emotional display norms provide a positive reinforcement for moral decisions. Conversely, a toxic emotional culture rewards toxic acts. Hence, it can be argued that a healthy emotional culture would provide a better foundation for moral leadership than would a toxic emotional culture. The proposed reciprocal relationship between moral leadership and emotional culture accords with Burns’ (1978) description of transformational leaders: transformation leadership ‘‘occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and moralityy’’ (p. 20). Furthermore, Burns (1978) explains that ‘‘the result of transforming leadership is a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral agents’’ (p. 4). In effect, this contention supports the feedback loop postulated in the proposed model to imply that critical ramifications of moral decision-making are experienced not only by those who are affected by such decisions, but also by those who make such decisions, especially in regard to the effect such decisions have on macro organizational level variables such as ethical climate and emotional culture.

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Proposition 5a. An organization’s ethical climate is positively related to a healthy emotional culture and negatively related to a toxic emotional culture. Proposition 5b. An organization’s emotional culture will have a positive main effect on the level of morality displayed in leader decision-making.

CONCLUSION In an age where morality requires economic justification, it is a compelling task to explicate the deeper affecting implications of moral judgment than its mere financial costs. This paper developed a model of affect and interactional justice in moral leadership, deriving propositions from the existing theory and literature. It is intended that these propositions will lead to future empirical research that is currently lacking in the area of emotions, organizational culture, moral leadership specifically and leadership generally. An important contribution of the chapter is its differentiation between moral leadership and immoral leadership. Research comparing these two processes, particularly with reference to the different influence strategies and processes used by leaders as well as the differences in attributions and emotions of followers, may have important implications for the selection, development and appraisal of leaders. Further insight is likely to be obtained by investigating the role of emotional culture on moral leadership and decision-making. From a practical point of view, the proposed conceptualization explicates how a leader’s moral standards can have important ramifications on the wellbeing of the individual and the organization. It is widely accepted that all forms of leadership gain credibility from moral standing and integrity (Kanungo, 2001), therefore, the contention that morality should be at the heart of leadership, not an appendage, is strongly supported in this chapter. According to the proposed model, leaders are accountable not only for the moral standards that they exert, but also the emotional culture such decisions create, and the resulting repercussions including the deterioration of moral standards and emotional well-being of followers.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Xiaoyu Liu for her helpful comments, especially with reference to the Chinese leadership literature.

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CHAPTER 8 ON NOT BLOWING THE WHISTLE: QUIESCENT SILENCE AS AN EMOTION EPISODE John Blenkinsopp and Marissa S. Edwards ABSTRACT The growth of research into whistle-blowing has produced some compelling insights into this important organizational phenomenon, but a number of areas remain under-explored, particularly the role of emotion and our understanding of the far more common response to wrongdoing, namely inaction. In this chapter we seek to problematize current conceptualizations of whistle-blowing and wrongdoing, as a basis for examining employee silence in the face of wrongdoing. We suggest that quiescent silence can be viewed as an emotion episode, and draw upon the feedback theory and the sensemaking paradigm to develop this proposition, illustrated through an analysis of accounts of quiescent silence in a clinical setting. We propose a new concept of ‘‘cues for inaction’’ which offers insights into the way quiescent silence arises and persists.

INTRODUCTION This chapter examines the role of emotion in one of the iconic ethical decisions of our age: whether or not to blow the whistle when faced with Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 181–206 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04008-X

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wrongdoing in an organization. Research into whistle-blowing has grown apace in the last two decades and the work has been very timely. It has added greatly to our understanding of the wide range of factors which might have a bearing on the likelihood (or otherwise) of whistle-blowing, such as organizational structure, national culture, personality and ethical climate (for a review, see Miceli & Near, 2005). However, the difficulties involved in researching whistle-blowing, as we discuss below, have led to some important omissions in the literature. Firstly, there tends to be an overly simplistic conceptualization of how individuals perceive and make attributions about wrongdoing in organizations. As we argue later in this chapter, the ambiguity surrounding many types of wrongdoing can play an important role in how individuals respond to such events. Secondly, there is an emphasis on the whistle-blowing decision. Generally, researchers have focused on investigating predictors of whether employees will speak up or not, and have neglected to explore the decision-making process itself. As a result, we currently know little about how employees make the decision to engage in silence or voice (Edwards, 2007). Thirdly, in focusing largely on whistle-blowing, researchers have neglected other possible responses to wrongdoing, including that which appears to be most common, namely inaction. Finally, there is limited attention to the role of emotion, even though field work with whistle-blowers reveals a highly charged emotional dimension to their experiences (Alford, 2001; Edwards & Gardner, 2007; Vinten, 1994). The link between emotion and inaction in the face of wrongdoing is the main focus of this chapter, but before examining this in more detail, we will briefly review and problematize the idea of wrongdoing and decision-making in the context of whistle-blowing.

Defining Wrongdoing Although many types of wrongdoing occur in organizational settings, ranging from minor to extremely serious (Robinson & Bennett, 1995), in this chapter we focus on wrongdoing that begins relatively innocuously and may escalate in severity over time. This type of wrongdoing is often ambiguous and difficult to detect, yet can have serious consequences for organizational members or clients, particularly in healthcare settings (Edwards & Gardner, 2006). In this sense, it is similar to insidious workplace behavior (Edwards & Greenberg, 2009), defined as minor but pervasive acts of deviance aimed at individual or organizational targets. As we discuss next, in an interpersonal context, bullying and sexual harassment are good examples of this type of

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behavior. We speculate that this type of wrongdoing may be particularly prevalent in clinical settings, where outrageous wrongdoing may be less likely, but acts of low level abuse can occur which are very bad for the patient but not sufficiently heinous to provoke an immediate response. Business ethics researchers tend to treat wrongdoing as a clear, unambiguous and observable phenomenon, which ignores the possibility that individuals’ perceptions of what amounts to wrongdoing may vary hugely. As Sackett (1985) notes, even on a matter as straightforwardly ‘‘wrong’’ as theft, people will distinguish very many shades of grey. Some acts of wrongdoing are so heinous that considering them as organizational phenomena hardly seems appropriate – they are serious criminal acts – yet as Pinder and Harlos (2001) illustrate through their examination of cases of rape and sexual assault in the Canadian military, these acts need to be understood in context, i.e. within the organizational setting. If we view wrongdoing on a continuum of seriousness, then in this chapter we are broadly concerned with acts of wrongdoing below a qualitative level of seriousness which can be pragmatically defined in terms of the likelihood of reporting. We assume that above this level of seriousness most people would consider the act to be so unacceptable as to trigger an almost immediate response to report the act. We recognize that this definition is problematic. It is inherently tautological and ignores the widespread evidence that acts of quite extraordinary seriousness can occur without provoking a whistle-blowing response. The relevant research on bystander intervention (Latane´ & Darley, 1970) offers some clarity on this issue. The model suggests that intervention initially involves a two-stage appraisal process involving two key questions: ‘‘Am I observing something that might require a response?’’ and ‘‘Should I be the one who responds?’’ Reviewing the considerable research on the model, Latane´ and Nida (1981) note the importance of ambiguity in understanding the response of bystanders. However, ambiguity is in the eye of the beholder and in some cases the desire to believe one does not need to act may drive a sensemaking process aimed at finding ambiguity and/or justifying inaction (Blenkinsopp, 2003). Building on the bystander intervention paradigm, Bowes-Sperry and O’Leary-Kelly (2005) suggest observers of sexual harassment may engage in a similar, albeit more complex decision-making process. For example, they suggest that, following an event, observers will consider firstly whether the situation requires action, and this decision will be influenced by the ambiguity of the conduct, the moral intensity of the incident and social influence effects. Consistent with this idea, we suggest there are several reasons why incidents

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of wrongdoing and the reactions of those who observe or experience these episodes are more complex than typically acknowledged. Firstly, individuals observing acts of wrongdoing may often have to judge whether they amount to wrongdoing on the basis of partial or ambiguous information. Sexual harassment offers a good example of this ambiguity, where even those employees who are targeted may still feel a high degree of uncertainty about whether the offending behavior is actually occurring (e.g. ‘‘Am I just being sensitive?’’, ‘‘Am I reading too much into this?’’). Even when the individual is sure the behavior is real and offensive, they may still be unsure whether the perpetrator knows this, and if the recipient believes that the behavior is not intended to be harmful, they may feel uncertain whether it constitutes wrongdoing. Secondly, there are cultural variations in what is perceived as wrongdoing. Nepotism, for example, is seen as immoral in some cultures, but is considered a highly moral act in others. Even where particular acts are universally perceived as wrongdoing, there are important cultural variations in what is seen as the appropriate response to witnessing such acts (Park, Blenkinsopp, Oktem, & Omurgonulsen, 2008). Whilst the difference between national cultures may be most pronounced, there may also be important influences from organizational and occupational culture (King, 1999; Lawton & Parker, 2002; Melia, 1987; Pithouse, 1994). Berry (2004), for example, identified seven dimensions of organizational culture that shape the employee reflection process that drives whistle-blowing, namely (1) vigilance; (2) engagement; (3) credibility; (4) accountability; (5) empowerment; (6) courage; and (7) options. The crux of Berry’s argument is that ‘‘cues embedded within each of these dimensions of culture hinder or facilitate whistleblowing behavior [while] the collective culture influences employee reflections that ultimately result in a decision to speak out, or not’’ (p. 2). The third reason why wrongdoing is not always easy to recognize and classify arises from the socialization effects of normalizing and rationalizing. Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi (2004) argue that fraud and corruption within organizations can become viewed as normal through normalization and rationalization. Chikudate (2002) showed how corruption in a Japanese bank remained in place over several decades, despite widespread knowledge of the practice within the company. As the activities associated with this corruption were no longer perceived as wrongdoing, they were unlikely to trigger a contemplation of whistle-blowing amongst employees. Chikudate suggests there was a ‘‘collective myopia’’, vividly illustrated by the genuine outrage expressed by the senior executives at being treated as criminals. They had long ago ceased to consider the practices as morally dubious, and instead

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viewed them as the right and proper actions of men tasked with preserving the reputation and integrity of the bank. In her discussion of the Challenger disaster at NASA, Vaughan (1996) proposed that various types of organizational deviance such as mistakes, episodes of wrongdoing and disaster are driven and encouraged by the development of shared worldviews among organizational members. Morrison and Milliken’s (2000) model of organizational silence, furthermore, suggests a critical role for sensemaking in the development of shared perceptions that can lead to the development of silence about organizational problems and concerns.

The Whistle-Blowing ‘‘Decision’’ If wrongdoing is not perceived by the individual in anything like the straightforward manner assumed by the researcher, then categorizing inaction as a decision not to blow the whistle appears to be an erroneous approach. Ofstad (1961) suggested that to say a person has made a decision means that they have done one of three things, namely: (1) started a series of behavioral reactions in favor of something; (2) made up his mind to do a certain action, which he has no doubts that he ought to do; or (3) made a judgment regarding what one ought to do in a certain situation after having deliberated on some alternative courses of action. The last definition seems to capture the implicit definition used in the whistle-blowing literature, with the most widely adopted definition of whistle-blowing being ‘‘the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action’’ (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 4). Yet the actual accounts of whistleblowers often seem closer to the first definition (Alford, 2001; Vinten, 1994). The simplistic view of the nature of the whistle-blowing decision appears to arise from researchers taking a functionalist perspective. If whistleblowing is viewed as a response to organizational wrongdoing then the individual either does or does not make the appropriate response. This leads researchers to focus upon the decision to blow the whistle as the key event. Framing the process in decision-making terms risks focusing our attention too tightly upon a ‘‘to blow or not to blow’’ dilemma. We think it is likely that relatively few people reach this stage; for many others, their sensemaking leads at an earlier point to enactment which treats the situation as one in which no wrongdoing is occurring (or at least, nothing serious), or no action is called for (or at least, none from them personally). As Blatt, Christianson, Sutcliffe, and Rosenthal (2006) observe, the decision about

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whether to speak up or not is not a single decision-point. Rather, it is an iterative process shaped by multiple factors, including events unfolding in real-time and interactions with other individuals (e.g. colleagues, management). Consequently, employees must continuously decide how to respond to organizational events – in this case, episodes of wrongdoing – in a complex, ambiguous and non-static environment. Indeed, as we will demonstrate in this chapter, the ‘‘decision’’ about how to respond to wrongdoing is actually best understood as a series of decisions, or more precisely, as an extended emotion episode (Frijda, 1993) which involves ongoing affect-influenced sensemaking. Weick (1995) suggests that sensemaking leads to enactment and it is this enactment which represents the ‘‘decision’’ to blow the whistle (or not).

Inaction as a Response to Wrongdoing The whistle-blowing literature appears implicitly to acknowledge that whistle-blowing is in many ways an atypical and uncommon response to wrongdoing. However, awareness of this fact has not so far lead to much research on ‘‘non-whistle-blowing’’. There is however a growing literature on employee silence (Milliken & Morrison, 2003; Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; Van Dyne, Ang, & Botero, 2003). The literature on employee voice had its roots in Hirschman’s (1970) seminal work, and it was only gradually that researchers began to consider the nature of silence – or the failure to speak up – in organizations. As noted, research into whistle-blowing has shown a similar neglect of its undoubtedly more common ‘‘opposite’’, employees’ failure to report or even challenge wrongdoing. Rothschild and Miethe (1999) describe such employees as ‘‘silent observers’’. Pinder and Harlos (2001, p. 334) define employee silence as ‘‘the withholding of any form of genuine expression about the individual’s behavioral, cognitive and/or affective evaluations of his or her organizational circumstances to persons who are perceived to be capable of effecting change or redress’’. (Note that this is almost a mirror image of the classic Near & Miceli definition of whistle-blowing.) They propose two forms of silence, quiescent and acquiescent, which differ centrally on whether people feel something should be said: Some people, for example, are silent while preparing themselves, with only the slightest provocation or opportunity, to break their silence. Others who are silent are much less close to expressing voice, and are less vigilant for opportunities to do so. Still others accept events and conditions that they find unjust for long periods of time while being minimally aware of their own silence, of alternatives to their circumstances, or of

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alternatives to their silent responses. Like Tannen (1985), we regard each of these silences as omissions that reflect different underlying evaluations of whether something should and/or can be said. (Pinder & Harlos, 2001, p. 348)

Pinder and Harlos argued that employee quiescence refers to an unpleasant, conscious state in which individuals choose to remain silent about organizational issues. This form of silence involves strong negative emotions, including anger, fear and cynicism, and is driven by fear of the unpleasant personal consequences of speaking up. In contrast, employee acquiescence is characterized by hopelessness, resignation and the perception that nothing can be done to change the situation. Van Dyne et al. (2003) extended the acquiescent versus quiescent distinction, and suggested that silence can be acquiescent, defensive or prosocial (e.g. withholding criticism in favor of maintaining a harmonious work environment). For silence in response to wrongdoing, we might assume defensive silence (self-protective behavior based on fear) is most relevant, but as we shall see prosocial silence may also be a feature of such situations.

The Role of Emotion in Whistle-Blowing and Employee Silence Alford’s extensive field work with members of whistle-blower support groups (Alford, 1999, 2001, 2007) provides an insight into the gamut of emotions, largely negative, which whistle-blowers experience before, during and after the act of blowing the whistle, yet this work has had limited impact upon organizational research. Similarly, the role of emotion has largely been neglected in the decision-making literature, with early researchers preferring to focus on the deliberative, rational nature of judgment and choice behavior (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). We argue that the neglect of emotion in the silence and whistle-blowing research is a significant omission, and indeed may be fundamental to understanding the whole process. Although we acknowledge that putting emotion back into the picture may make it ‘‘messier’’, doing so is likely to provide us with a deeper, more complete understanding of how and why people decide to speak up (or not). Researchers studying whistle-blowing have gradually begun to address the neglect of emotion, tackling obvious questions about how individuals feel when they encounter wrongdoing, and how emotion influences their thinking about possible courses of action (Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003; Henik, 2008). Here, we argue that emotion can be seen as having four possible areas of influence. Firstly, following Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (2005), it can be seen as a trigger for sensemaking. Secondly, following

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Anand et al. (2004), it can be seen to drive rationalizing. Thirdly, emotion can trigger whistle-blowing through affect ventilation, in that speaking up may represent the best way of coping with the multiple negative emotions associated with observing or experiencing wrongdoing (Edwards, Keeffe, & Ashkanasy, 2006). Finally, following Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, and Zhang (2007), anticipated emotion may influence behavior, a proposition we examine in more detail in the next section. A key element to all these approaches is that they involve what Baumeister et al. (2007) term conscious emotion, that is, emotion which is consciously experienced and actively reflected upon. The form which this reflection takes will vary, but we concur with Lazarus (2006) that it will be inescapably narrative in form and we will return to this theme in the next section.

Emotion as Feedback Drawing upon Baumeister et al.’s (2007) feedback theory of emotion, we can envisage a number of sequences which would produce employee silence as a logical response to wrongdoing. In their recent article, Baumeister et al. (2007) challenge the traditional assumption that emotion causes behavior, and suggest that the evidence directly linking emotion to behavior is conceptually and empirically flawed. They draw a distinction between automatic affective responses and conscious emotion, and argue that the major function of conscious emotion is to encourage cognitive processing, and in turn promote learning and influence rules for future behavior (cf. Weick et al., 2005). As the authors state, ‘‘Full-blown, conscious emotional experiences operate to stimulate cognitive processing after some outcome or behavior. They facilitate learning lessons and forge new associations between affect and various behavioral responses’’ (p. 168). The authors draw on Gollwitzer’s (1999) theory of action, which is built on the premise that a complex, shifting set of ‘‘if-then’’ rules help to shape human behavior (e.g. ‘‘If the weather is cold tomorrow, then I will wear a scarf ’’). Here, the authors suggest that emotion provides critical feedback about the appropriateness of such rules. While positive emotions confirm existing rules and encourage individuals to follow the same course of action in future, negative emotions indicate that the rules may need to be modified. A crucial proposition of the feedback theory is that anticipation of the emotions arising from behavior can influence whether individuals choose to engage in certain actions. Baumeister et al. suggest this may be particularly relevant when an individual is experiencing a negative emotion, and may be

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motivated to engage in behavior designed to alleviate their negative emotional state. They argue that memories of previous behaviors and emotional outcomes, together with current affect, ‘‘contribute to making people start anticipating emotional outcomes – and to choose their actions according to the emotions they expect will ensue’’ (p. 172). The feedback theory therefore offers two mechanisms by which emotion might influence future behavior. The first comes from the emotional response generated by the outcome of a behavior. This emotion triggers cognitive processing, from which a lesson is extracted. This in turn modifies or creates if-then rules which guide future behavior. All elements of the process contribute to creating an ‘‘affective residue’’ associated with this behavior. The second mechanism is related to the first, but in place of an actual behavior outcome-emotion sequence the individual engages in cognitive processing of an imagined sequence. Faced with a range of behavioral choices, the memory of previous experiences, mediated through their affective residue and existing if-then rules, allows the individual to anticipate the emotional outcomes of engaging in each available behavior and this will influence the behavior chosen. Drawing all together, we postulate three scenarios in which emotion arising as a response to behavior would seem likely to shape future behavior in a manner which makes whistle-blowing less likely: Behavior 1 – Attempting to report gets a lukewarm or negative response from organizational authorities (i.e., management), the individual feels resentment, and the behavioral outcome is a reluctance to report again. Behavior 2 – Attempting to challenge gets a savage response from the perpetrator, the individual feels fear and anxiety, and the behavioral outcome is a reluctance to challenge again. This scenario will be especially likely if it confirms the individual’s prior beliefs that challenging others would elicit a negative response. Behavior 3 – Sharing concerns with colleagues gets a response of apathy or shared frustration (but also resignation), the individual feels frustration, and anxiety about reporting might also increase (colleagues’ response confirms the impression that this would be difficult and unproductive). The individual is also likely, however, to feel somewhat reassured about their own silence, and the overall outcome is a reduced felt need to act. As a result, the behavioral outcome is a decreased likelihood of challenging or reporting.

Here we have provided specific examples of the individual effectively ‘‘testing out’’ the effect of certain behaviors, but the shaping effect of emotion on behavior does not require that the individual has actually engaged in the proposed behavior. It may also take place through the individual’s perception that a situation is analogous to one already

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encountered. Although a given situation may appear novel, it may have structural similarities and emotional resonance with many previously encountered situations, stretching back to childhood. This may be one reason why childhood norms against telling tales can exert an influence on the behavior of adults. The way in which this will be processed may be partly unconscious (Baumeister et al., 2007) but can also be understood in terms of how the current event(s) trigger an emotion narrative, and we now turn to a closer examination of this process.

Treating Response to Wrongdoing as an Emotion Episode In his final article, published posthumously, Richard S. Lazarus stated, ‘‘I have come to believe that emotions are best regarded and studied as dramatic stories or narratives’’ (Lazarus, 2006, p. 28). This statement seems to capture a prevailing mood amongst many emotions researchers albeit one which, as yet, has not translated to a substantial shift in orientation. Lazarus defines an emotion narrative as: A dramatic story or plot that describes the provocation of the emotion and its background, which helps define what made some action, or lack of action when it is desired, provocative, and how it progressed and turned out. The drama begins with the provoking action and proceeds through the continuing transaction – usually interpersonal. The provocation is best viewed as the figure in a figure-ground relationship. (Lazarus, 1999, p. 205)

He stresses the ongoing nature of emotion narratives: Emotional encounters proceed continuously over time, as in a drama or motion picture film, and when they end – if they ever do – it may be only temporarily, as the parties separate, resolve their conflict, or terminate the transaction or businessy In most relationships, each new transaction tends to repeat previous ones, though the details are likely to differ and new issues may emerge. (Lazarus, 1999, p. 206)

This formulation of the emotion narrative is consistent with the idea of an emotion episode (Frijda, 1993) and suggests an even greater temporal range to this concept. Family get-togethers provide the perfect illustration of this phenomenon. Within minutes of meeting up, relatives separated for years may nevertheless fall into emotional transactions which replay old transactions (good or bad). The significance of this conceptualization for analysis of responses to wrongdoing will be readily apparent. If, as we have argued, wrongdoing rarely occurs as an unambiguous, singular event then the individual will

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encounter a range of events directly or indirectly related to the wrongdoing. Each event will elicit an emotional response which in turn triggers sensemaking, a response which Weick et al. (2005) suggest can be captured as the individual asking, ‘‘What’s the story here?’’ Following Lazarus and Frijda, this cannot be understood as an isolated act of sensemaking but instead must be placed in the context of an ongoing process of sensemaking in which the current event is understood by the individual against the backdrop of many preceding events. We might draw a comparison between a film and a long-running TV series. In the latter, the audience can and does make sense of current events on the basis of often quite detailed knowledge of the characters and their histories built up over years of viewing, and writers can draw upon this to communicate highly nuanced information in ‘‘shorthand’’. In the context of employee silence, we can see that each event may lead quiescent individuals to revisit their previous appraisal(s) of the situation, recall earlier events, and re-examine their justification/ rationalization for remaining silent. This only serves to underline the case made by Pinder and Harlos (2001) against viewing employee silence as a steady state non-behavior. But what factors influence the sensemaking process? In addition to the impact of emotion on future learning, Baumeister et al. (2007) stress the importance of anticipated emotion. Here, we can see sensemaking as being stimulated by actual emotion, and shaped by anticipated emotion. Weick (1995) originally stressed that sensemaking is retrospective, drawing upon ideas of behavioral commitment and cognitive dissonance, but there is ample evidence for our ability to engage in prospective sensemaking, in other words, to engage in sensemaking about how we would feel if we committed to a particular line of action (Blenkinsopp, 2003). This approach takes us back to the symbolic interactionist roots of sensemaking, which emphasized the idea that the meaning of the situation for an individual comes in part from the process of mentally trying out various possible lines of action.

METHODOLOGY For researchers interested in employee silence, there are significant methodological challenges involved in attempting to study what can be viewed as a non-behavior (Pinder & Harlos, 2001). For silence related to wrongdoing, the challenges are particularly great. Researchers will only become aware of the silence if it is broken by a whistle-blower. Such cases are relatively infrequent, few come to public attention, and when they do the sensitivity surrounding

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them will hinder access, especially if legal proceedings are likely. The actions of those who remained silent come under particular scrutiny at such times and they are unlikely to cooperate with a researcher curious about their motives. This absence of opportunities for empirical work on inaction as a response to wrongdoing has produced a void which has so far been filled by theorizing based on existing research on whistle-blowing and the largely theoretical work on employee silence. There is a pressing need for data, particularly rich data emerging from qualitative research which can help to develop our understanding of the complex, ambiguous and emotion-laden processes involved. The first author was involved in investigating allegations of patient abuse by a hospital nurse (Blenkinsopp, 2004). The investigation was triggered, in part, by a whistle-blower on the nurse’s ward. In the course of the investigation it quickly became clear that the behavior observed by the whistle-blower had been observed by almost everyone else on the ward. Indeed, in the subsequent disciplinary hearing it was noticeable that the whistle-blower’s evidence was among the least significant – what she had seen and blown the whistle on proved to be just the tip of the iceberg. The investigation involved interviewing all nurses who had worked on the ward during the period in question. Since nurses are bound by a professional code of practice to act in the best interests of the patient, the interviews inevitably needed to address the question of what they had done to safeguard the patient, and why they had failed to report their colleague’s behavior. This therefore offered unusually direct access to data on employee silence. Although this investigation was particularly thorough and prolonged, and the allegations especially serious, the narratives of the nurses involved sadly proved to be far from unique. Similar accounts emerged many times in subsequent investigations undertaken by the first author, and in research interviews later carried out independently by both authors. In order to draw out the key issues in detail, we present two narratives of individuals who observed serious wrongdoing. Both narratives describe extended periods of quiescent silence, but the second narrative also describes how an individual eventually came to blow the whistle. The narratives are based upon ‘‘composite characters’’, that is to say, on a synthesis of the narratives of many different people. This approach draws upon the ethnographic tradition of using literary devices to convey the key elements of a situation (Watson, 2000, 2004) and is very useful for research on employee silence and whistleblowing, since it serves to provide an additional level of anonymity and confidentiality. This can be very important for ensuring protection of the individuals involved, who may have serious concerns about the risk of

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participation in research (see Renzetti and Lee (1993) for an extended discussion of the difficulties involved in researching sensitive issues). Since the narratives presented below are fictionalized accounts rather than transcripts, it is not possible to subject them to the more formal types of textual analysis. Yet they are more than mere illustrations; they are consistent with the statements made by individuals who have been involved in exactly the sort of situations described by ‘‘Sean’’ and ‘‘Mandy’’ in both formal interviews and numerous informal conversations. Given that the basic proposition of this chapter is that quiescent silence can be understood as an emotion episode, these narratives allow us to examine something of the sensemaking process involved. There is no claim to objectivity or validity here. The reader who protests that we could have written the narratives to fit our ideas is entirely correct, but that rather misses the point. We are not making that sort of ‘‘truth claim’’. Instead, we have highlighted a significant gap in our current understanding of employee responses to wrongdoing, and proposed a possible theoretical lens which might be used to address this gap. Within psychology there is a tradition of jumping straight to gathering data in a narrow yet rigorous fashion and continuing to do so without having first explored what existing real world data might suggest are the key issues, an approach sometimes termed ‘‘dustbowl empiricism’’. Within the confines of this chapter, the litmus test is merely whether the proposed model is consistent with the rich but largely serendipitous data we have already gathered. Testing the proposition more rigorously is a task for another day.

ACCOUNTS OF QUIESCENT SILENCE Case 1: Sean’s Story The first time I worked with her she was OK, a bit abrupt but a few of the older nurses are like that. One of the elderly patients made some comment about her, I can’t remember exactly what she called her, but it was fairly cryptic. Later I found out most of the elderly patients were really scared of her. I worked a few more shifts with her and I started to view her manner as being a bit more than simply abrupt. She was really quite intimidating. She was very tall for a woman, and did kick-boxing or something, I can’t remember what but I know it was to a pretty high standard. It’s hard to describe the impression she created. I suppose the best illustration is to say that when drunks were admitted to the ward she never had any trouble from them, and if even a big, drunk aggressive guy gets the vibe that he should

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behave himself or else, you can imagine how easily the rest of us were intimidated by her. She was a nightmare to work with. Everything was too much trouble, she would sigh if you asked her to do anything, and mutter about it, she would question why certain things needed to be done even if they were quite explicitly laid down in the care plan. At first I thought of this as my problem, I was pretty new and I’m not the most assertive of people, but I began to realize that she did this with almost everyone. For the first couple of months I basically thought of this as a problem with a colleague. It was only gradually that I started to see it as a problem for the patients. The first time I noticed this was on a night shift. There are fewer staff on nights, so patients are more reliant on any given nurse, which means if someone is unhelpful (or worse) it’s not as easy to ask a different nurse for help. She made a big fuss of anything that created work for her, so patients asking for a bed pan, or for pain relief, or any kind of help would get the same attitude that staff got – sighing, muttering, questioning why they needed it, and in some cases just outright refusal to help. I had a really low opinion of her by this time but something that made me re-evaluate this was the first time I had a patient have a cardiac arrest. I really panicked but I pressed the alarm and she was there within seconds and just took over. Talking to people afterwards I was told that she had a reputation for being brilliant in those situations, and the medical staff really rated her for that. A lot of people made comments along the lines of, ‘‘Not the most caring nurse you’ll ever meet, but really good in an emergency’’. I think that was seen as her saving grace. Certainly, it led me to make some allowances for her manner, though now I’m rather cynical about the idea that she was good in a crisis – it’s easy to be calm in an emergency situation when you basically just don’t care. However, at the time it was certainly something I kind of believed in. Maybe I wanted to believe it, since the alternative was to have to admit she was a crap nurse with a terrible attitude. I realize what I’ve described probably doesn’t sound too serious, but the way she behaved had a really negative effect on patients, especially the elderly ones or those who were long-stay. This business of her making a big deal about getting them a bed pan or helping them to the bathroom during the night meant a lot of them would stop taking anything to drink from late afternoon to ensure they didn’t need the bathroom during the night y and yet dehydration is a big problem with elderly patients, and nursing staff are meant to do all we can to ensure they get a good fluid intake. And we had a number of patients who suffered a long, painful night because she had been

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really abrupt with them when they’d first asked for something for the pain, and they were too scared to ask again. Because of the way our shifts work, I could end up working with her for several shifts in a row, then not seeing her for a few weeks. I used to dread it when I saw her name on the same shift as mine, and be so relieved if a fourweek roster came up when we weren’t on any shifts together. She used to do quite a few extra shifts though, so sometimes I would come on duty and find her there and my heart would sink. I thought about raising the issue with someone, but I wasn’t sure who. She had a reputation on the ward, in fact her reputation went even wider than that, so I sort of felt unsure who I could tell – the obvious people (the Ward Manager, Duty Managers etc.) all seemed to know what she was like. I used to talk about it sometimes with colleagues, I get the impression that we all tended to tell each other about the latest example of her behavior. The very first time she did something that shocked me, I can remember talking to a senior staff nurse who shrugged and said, ‘‘That’s just Annie being Annie’’. In a way that was reassuring, the fact that it wasn’t just me, but looking back it’s a bit worrying that people had become so blase´ about it. I can remember something happened with her when another nurse, Mandy, was also on duty. Mandy was a senior staff nurse and one of the few people who didn’t seem intimidated by Annie, and I noticed Annie was usually on her best behavior around her. Anyway, Mandy noticed my shocked reaction and had a word with me about it. I think she was the only person who really seemed to still be shocked, or at least, to still find Annie’s behavior really unacceptable. It was Mandy who finally blew the whistle, and that didn’t really surprise me, I think she really struggled with the attitude on the ward that we should all just tolerate Annie. I remember when the managers started their disciplinary investigation and they asked me why I hadn’t said something, and I really didn’t have an answer. They were quite nice to us in the interviews, surprisingly so really given that we’d all seen all this stuff over months and years and only Mandy had actually had the guts to stand up and say something. I think I basically admitted to them that I was scared of her. But I also pointed out (well, maybe hinted) that the Ward Manager knew as much as everyone. I did feel guilty about not having said anything, but at the time I’d felt like I compensated for her, though I’m not sure how true that was. If a patient was upset, I’d spend time with them, if Annie had refused to call a doctor about getting some pain meds written up, I’d call them. I think we all felt we should do something, but it was a daunting prospect. I didn’t dare challenge her directly, and no-one seemed to think the Ward Manager would do anything. It would have been a big step to go to anyone more senior, not that it ever occurred to me.

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I just want to mention one more thing, because this only really became clear afterwards. People always said that Annie had a hard life – she was always short of money and her home life had been pretty rough in various ways – and I think in some ways no-one wanted to make things even worse for her, that is, get her fired. Yet at the same time, I think people were nervous that if they did say something, and she wasn’t fired, they’d have to face her afterwards. So there was this kind of paradox: if it was viewed as serious, and she got fired people would feel bad for her, but if it wasn’t viewed as serious enough to get her fired and she stayed working with us, that would be even worse than before! And I think maybe some people who might have said something got stuck between those two possibilities and ended up saying nothing.

Case 2: Mandy’s Story I’ve read what Sean had to say, and I think he has described the situation pretty well. He’s right that I really struggled with the way the ward just seemed to accept Annie’s behavior, but I don’t think he quite realizes how long I struggled with it. I’d had a few run-ins with Annie over the years, when I was working on other wards, mainly over the phone. She would be quite unbelievably rude if you phoned down to find out some information about a patient that had come up from their ward. It’s quite something when you find yourself moaning to colleagues often and at length about the behavior of a nurse on a completely different ward that you’ve never actually met! So when I moved to the same ward as her, there was part of me that was both nervous and intrigued at finally working with this ‘‘living legend’’. I have to say I found her as bad as I expected pretty much from day one, though I don’t think she was quite as bad back then. It’s hard to be certain but I’d say some of the more serious things Sean describes, like refusing to give pain relief, were part of a worsening of her behavior. I’m really torn about this, part of me is pretty sure that’s right, but a more self-critical part says that I’m just trying to let myself off the hook for not speaking up sooner. I’ve said to myself, ‘‘Who are you trying to kid? She was always a bloody nightmare!’’ Anyway, that thing he says about the Ward Manager, Susan, that was really important for me. If you ask her now, she totally denies that she knew anything about Annie’s behavior, but I’m still not convinced. And at the time I felt sure she knew damn nicely what was going on, but wasn’t prepared to do anything about it. You see, in a weird way Annie was Susan’s kind of nurse. Don’t get me wrong, Susan didn’t have Annie’s nasty streak but what

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she did have was a preference for efficiency first and care second. The thing Sean mentions about Annie’s reputation for being good in an emergency, Susan loved that sort of thing. She was good in a crisis too and I can imagine her thinking, ‘‘Well, she might not be good at the tea and sympathy, but when the buggers are about to peg out, she’s in there saving their lives’’. Anyway, the upshot of all this was that when it really started to get to a point where I felt something had to be done, I didn’t feel able to go to Susan. Instead I talked to a few other senior nurses and we got together to have a chat about it. Nothing really definite came out of that meeting and I sometimes wish we’d never had it, because looking back I can see that it sort of ‘‘fixed’’ me for about another year. What I mean is that knowing that colleagues were also concerned and keeping an eye on her made me feel a bit better about it for quite a while. It was only gradually that it dawned on me that nothing had actually changed: she was no better, in fact she was probably getting worse. So, in terms of actually blowing the whistle on the situation, I probably stayed silent for about another 18 months after the point at which I’d decided that enough was enough and had sort of made up my mind to say something. Looking back on all the things I witnessed, and the patients I saw upset and had to comfort, it’s strange to say that the thing that brought matters to a head wasn’t either of those, but the attitude of Mr. Thompson, a regular visitor to a elderly patient who seemed particularly scared of Annie. He was very upset and angry by what the patient told him, and I was very sympathetic and helpful y I was sort of angling for him to make a formal complaint about Annie, which he eventually did, but the thing which really shocked me was that he completely rejected the idea of focusing only on her. He quite agreed that Annie was the main culprit, but was equally outraged about the behavior of the rest of us in letting her get away with it. Though he didn’t say as much, I think his attitude was, ‘‘Well, Annie is just a nasty piece of work, what’s your excuse?’’ And he was dead right. Over time I’ve come around to the view that maybe Annie had psychological problems, but the rest of us didn’t and we were the ones who let her get away with it. After that I felt completely unable to justify to myself the idea of keeping an eye on her, and making sure the patients were looked after – it clearly wasn’t working and it was never going to work. I eventually made an appointment to see a senior manager a week or so later, and after that all hell broke loose. I very much agree with Sean’s last comment. Even now, I think some people feel as guilty about what happened to Annie [she was fired] as they do about their own failure to prevent what happened to her patients. I think we were wrong to put her welfare ahead of the patients, but I think maybe we

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did that y though I also agree that part of it was people being chicken! The best thing would have been for us to raise our concerns much earlier, when management might have given her a warning and taken steps to make her change. That would have been better for Annie and for the patients, but it would have been uncomfortable for us having to work with her – she’d have made life hell for us!

DISCUSSION The two cases offer retrospective accounts of the experience of quiescent silence in the face of wrongdoing. The fact that they are looking back over an extended period is important, as this allows us to appreciate the differing perspectives of the situation. Researchers examining situations such as these have the benefit of hindsight, which can sometimes make it difficult to understand how individuals could fail to act. The more heinous the wrongdoing, the more unfathomable inaction can seem. It is interesting therefore to see that this difficulty is shared by the narrators of these accounts, who at various points explore the ambiguity around the difference between what was known then and is known now, and what they thought then and what they think now. In their discussions of events, they appear to suggest that their current view of the situation could equally well have been their view of the situation at the time. They recognize that the information required to understand the situation and act appropriately was available to them. This is partly why quiescent silence is so emotional, why inaction can be so difficult to come to terms with (then but especially later), and why it is so difficult for the observer to understand. Regret is a dominant emotion in these accounts. The perceived ambiguity of the situation is touched upon in both accounts, with the narrators describing their dilemmas over how to interpret certain events or patterns of behavior. It is tempting to see the accounts as portraying a serious situation that gradually became more apparent over time, but it seems unlikely that this reflects how it was experienced. We might draw an analogy with media criticism of murder investigations in which delays in catching the killer occur even though police seemed to have all the evidence they needed to solve the case. Such criticisms coming from outside the situation and with the benefit of hindsight can misrepresent the lived experience of officers wading through mounds of potential evidence to try and ascertain what is relevant and useful. We suggest that the sensemaking paradigm offers a useful basis for analysis of these accounts. Weick (1995) notes that his ideas on sensemaking

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came out of his early work on cognitive dissonance, allied to Salancik’s (1977) notion of behavioral commitment. Weick et al. (2005) suggest that for much of the time we are submersed in projects, and disruption to these projects causes an emotional reaction and triggers sensemaking which will allow us to resubmerge. In the case of employee silence, disruptive ‘‘events’’ may serve to surface us from acquiescent silence to quiescent silence, and from quiescent silence to voice, if we find ourselves unable to narrate a version of events which permits us to re-submerge. Weick et al. propose that submersion in projects is the normal mode, with behavioral commitment creating a pressure to make sense of events (in this instance, of wrongdoing) in a manner which allows the individual to persist with the status quo. This has parallels with ideas on how normalizing effects allow individuals to be able to cope with ‘‘dirty work’’ (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002) and tolerate corruption (Anand et al., 2004). Weick (1995) notes that sensemaking is based upon extracted cues. These are elements of a situation which we bracket off for closer attention and from which we make sense of the whole. These accounts contain descriptions of what we term cues for inaction, that is to say, elements of the situation to which the individuals attend which lead to an interpretation of the situation which justifies their silence. Three key cues for inaction emerge from the narratives: (1) Annie’s competence in emergency situations; (2) the attitude/ stance of management (both her perceived close relationship with the Ward Manager, and the employees’ perception that certain management figures knew about Annie and did nothing); and (3) the view that hers was a difficult life, not to be made harder by putting her job at risk. Let us consider the first of these. Emergency situations of the type described (essentially cardiac arrests) are much rarer in the day-to-day life of a ward than one might imagine from hospital-based TV shows and represented only a tiny fraction of her work. This extracted cue, however, was sufficient to allow Sean to develop an interpretation of the overall situation, and in particular of Annie’s competence as a nurse, which meant that he continued to remain silent. Both narratives clearly illustrate the iterative nature of the sensemaking process. Indeed, there is no sense that either Sean or Mandy arrived at a settled interpretation of the situation. Any interpretation can be disrupted by ‘‘events’’ – occurrences which trigger sensemaking by provoking the question ‘‘What’s the story here?’’ (Weick et al., 2005). The accounts above show an emphasis on events, but also on what Ricoeur (1988) terms emplotment, that is, the events are not isolated but are understood in context and form part of an ongoing narrative. The concept of emplotment highlights the provisional

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nature of sensemaking. As Glanz (2003) notes, new events or information serve to recast previous events in a different light, leading to significant revision of the narrative. Whilst sensemaking is seen to lead to enactment, Weick (1995) stresses that this does not necessarily mean action. Indeed, Feldman suggests that sensemaking often leads not to action, but to an understanding ‘‘that an action should not be taken or that a better understanding of the event or situation is needed’’ (Feldman, 1989, p. 20). One of the features of these accounts of quiescent silence is that this ‘‘sensemaking leading to inaction’’ is a long-term feature of the situation. Although successive events trigger sensemaking, in each case the outcome remains inaction. We have described these narratives as accounts of quiescent silence, and this seems consistent with the concept if we define employee silence and voice in terms of upward communication. Although the accounts suggest that nursing staff discussed the situation extensively among themselves, we can still describe the situation as silence because this lateral communication did not develop into upward communication (voice) aimed at changing the situation. However, the importance of this lateral communication needs to be stressed. Blenkinsopp (2004) suggests these interactions can be seen as sensemaking resources, which may serve to facilitate the development of a shared view of the situation as something acceptable, or at least not requiring action. Given the focus of this chapter, it is striking that both accounts place limited emphasis upon the notion of making a decision. Certainly, they offer little that resembles classic economic and psychological notions of the nature of a decision. Whilst we acknowledge that the process which occurred could fit within a broad definition of decision-making, we suggest that to do so would leave the field wedded to a particular conceptualization of whistleblowing (and failure to blow the whistle) which is markedly at odds with that observed and experienced. Sean’s ‘‘decision’’ to remain silent hardly fits the term. Although it seems clear that at times he felt he ought to act, it is less clear that we can say he ‘‘decided’’ not to act. Mandy’s decision to blow the whistle has something more of an event-based quality to it, but even here we can see that it takes the form of an inability to sustain an existing line of action, rather than a choice taken after an evaluation of the alternatives. Mandy describes how the attitude of Mr. Thompson left her unable to maintain her ‘‘holding position’’ towards Annie’s behavior. The difficulty she describes is consistent with what various authors describe as an inability to narrate one’s life (Crites, 1986; Crossley, 2000; Goldie, 2003). Crites suggests our life narratives implicitly require an anticipated future and when events

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occur which disrupt that future, not only do our existing narratives become implausible, we can also find ourselves unable to develop new narratives. This is well illustrated by Crossley’s work with people who were diagnosed as HIV positive, and Alford (2007) suggests similar problems can beset whistleblowers if the aftermath of their actions destroys their belief in an essentially just world. Goldie (2003) suggests that an inability to narrate can occur in the aftermath of traumatic events, such as bereavement. Whilst Mandy’s situation was clearly less traumatic, we can see that if major events can stymie our ability to narrate our lives, less serious events might logically be able to leave us unable to narrate one particular aspect of our lives. Pinder and Harlos (2001) suggest individuals can move through different forms of silence to voice, but we might assume that either acquiescent silence or voice would be the normal position for employees, since they appear to be the stable positions. Framed in this way, quiescent silence is a perennially emotional state, in which the individual is actively engaged in sensemaking aimed at achieving submersion (that is, a shift to acquiescent silence) but is prevented from doing so by ongoing events which disrupt the individual’s ability to develop a plausible ‘‘acquiescence narrative’’.

CONCLUSION In this chapter we have sought to problematize existing notions of decisionmaking and wrongdoing in order to deepen our understanding of the processes which underpin whistle-blowing and employee silence, and have considered explicitly the role of emotion in these processes. Specifically, we have drawn upon the feedback theory (Baumeister et al., 2007) and the sensemaking paradigm (Weick, 1995), and sought to emphasize a narrative approach to this issue. We conclude by examining possible avenues for further research, and considering the methodological issues involved. The idea of cues for inaction seems to be an important avenue for further investigation, and one which could guide organizational efforts to encourage reporting of wrongdoing. Two questions present themselves: do cues for inaction have any particular characteristics, and are there any ways in which organizations might seek to reduce the cues for inaction? We can see that by reducing cues for inaction, and facilitating the provision of sensemaking resources which lead to voice narratives, organizations might encourage greater reporting and valuable internal critique. Crucial to this may be the need to find ways to publicize actions taken to address employee wrongdoing. In the current scenario, Sean and Mandy both express

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scepticism about managers’ willingness to do anything about the problem, suggesting they were unaware of previous managerial action taken on somewhat similar cases. Following the feedback theory, we suggest that organizations also need to pay attention to the emotion and anticipated emotion associated with challenging and/or reporting of wrongdoing. A hostile or indifferent managerial response is likely to lead to the lesson that such behavior is undesirable, so organizations may want to take steps to ensure that reporting is as painless as possible. A further issue, which is hinted at in the narratives and was discussed in some detail in the aftermath of this case, was the question of whether these matters had been to some degree manipulated by Annie herself, i.e. had she drawn upon certain elements of the situation in order to reduce the likelihood of her behavior being challenged and/or reported? (This was certainly the claim of the Ward Manager, who argued strongly that Annie had deliberately sought to impress upon ward staff the false impression that they had a close relationship.) Although such research might not draw directly upon the silence or whistleblowing literature, there would be considerable value in having a greater understanding of how the perpetrators of wrongdoing seek to manipulate the situation, particularly when (as in this case) the perpetrator is not in a formal position of power. Another important area to explore would be the nature of the emotions involved. As Henik (2008) suggests, whilst whistle-blowing may involve a range of emotions, it is still important to understand the discrete emotions involved and in particular which emotions appear to lead to silence or voice. For example, was Mandy’s whistle-blowing triggered by feelings of shame engendered by seeing herself through Mr. Thompson’s eyes as a decent person allowing bad things to happen? The feedback theory suggests that the affective residue of the outcome of a behavior will affect later behavior; it would be worthwhile investigating how this effect is moderated by the specific emotion and by the context. Would a hostile response from management, which produces fear, inhibit future reporting more than a disinterested response, which produces frustration and anger? We have suggested that anticipated emotion will influence behavior in situations which are analogous but not identical to the current situation, but how similar do the situations have to be for the effects to occur? This was important in the current case, where despite a significant change to a more proactive and responsive style of management over the previous few years, staff clearly still believed, on the basis of their experience with former managers, that management would not act. Having proposed a number of areas for future research, we need to consider the methodological issues involved. Earlier in this chapter, we identified

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significant methodological challenges to the investigation of whistle-blowing and silence. The method used in this chapter, which amounts to a retrospective analysis of unintended participant observation, is not easily replicated but does point towards a number of issues which any research design must address. First, we emphasize the importance of gathering detailed accounts of individuals’ responses to wrongdoing in organizations. Second, data must be gathered with sensitivity to the risks perceived by potential participants. Third, a clear understanding of the context must be obtained. Both accounts in this chapter draw the reader’s attention to the context in which these events took place. While the participants’ eagerness to do so was probably driven partly by their desire to justify themselves, it is crucial for understanding what took place and the actions (and inaction) of the participants. It is therefore important to ensure that researchers’ chosen methods elicit information on the context of the events. There are a number of techniques which could fulfil these criteria, but we suggest that diary studies offer a particularly attractive approach. Bolger, Davis, and Rafaeli (2003) suggest diary studies are especially suited to three types of research goals: (a) obtaining reliable person-level information; (b) obtaining estimates of within-person change over time, as well as individual differences in such change; and (c) conducting a causal analysis of within-person changes and individual differences in these changes. (Bolger et al., 2003, p. 581)

Diary studies and experience sampling might allow researchers to capture those daily events related to the wrongdoing, especially in cases where the wrongdoing is relatively low-level but ongoing. This is important because the accounts above suggest that minor events were significant in understanding the situation and in prolonging silence. Diary studies may be especially suited to environments such as health and social care, where there is an emphasis on the use of reflective learning diaries. This could obviate the problem of high participant drop-out which is a common problem with experience sampling and diary studies (van Eerde, Holman, & Totterdell, 2005). Through the use of such methodological approaches, researchers can seek to capture the messy, emotional nature of these organizational phenomena, producing rich contextualized data which can deepen our understanding of silence and voice in organizational settings. At the start of the chapter we described the decision about whether or not to blow the whistle as one of the iconic ethical decisions of our time. Given the relative rarity of whistle-blowing, and the ubiquity of employee silence, we suggest that silence is a topic deserving of much greater research attention. It is through

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understanding silence in the face of wrongdoing that we are most likely to make a contribution to raising the standard of ethical conduct in and by organizations.

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Milliken, F. J., Morrison, E. W., & Hewlin, P. F. (2003). An exploratory study of employee silence: Issues that employees don’t communicate upward and why. Journal of Management Studies, 40, 1453–1476. Morrison, E. W., & Milliken, F. J. (2000). Organizational silence: A barrier to change and development in a pluralistic world. Academy of Management Review, 25, 706–725. Near, J. P., & Miceli, M. P. (1985). Organizational dissidence: The case of whistleblowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 4(1), 1–16. Ofstad, H. (1961). An inquiry into the freedom of decision. London: Allen and Unwin. Park, H., Blenkinsopp, J., Oktem, M. K., & Omurgonulsen, U. (2008). Cultural orientation and attitudes towards types of whistle-blowing: A comparison of Turkey, South Korea and the UK. Journal of Business Ethics, 82(3). Pinder, C., & Harlos, K. (2001). Employee silence: Quiescence and acquiescence as responses to perceived injustice. In: G. Ferris & K. Rowland (Eds), Research in personnel and human resource management (Vol. 20, pp. 331–369). New York: JAI Press. Pithouse, A. (1994). The happy family: Learning colleagueship in a social work team. In: A. Coffey & P. Atkinson (Eds), Occupational socialization and working lives. Aldershot: Averbury. Renzetti, C. M., & Lee, R. M. (Eds). (1993). Researching sensitive topics. London: Sage. Ricoeur, P. (1988). Time and narrative (Vol. 3). London: University of Chicago Press. Robinson, S. L., & Bennett, R. J. (1995). A typology of deviant workplace behaviors: A multidimensional scaling study. Academy of Management Journal, 38(2), 555–572. Rothschild, J., & Miethe, T. D. (1999). Whistle-blower disclosures and management retaliation: The battle to control information about organization corruption. Work and Occupations, 26(1), 107–128. Sackett, P. R. (1985). Honesty research and the person situation debate. In: W. Terris (Ed.), Employee theft: Research, theory, and applications. London: House Press. Salancik, G. R. (1977). Commitment and the control of organizational behavior and belief. In: B. M. Staw & G. R. Salancik (Eds), New directions in organizational behavior (pp. 1–54). Chicago, IL: St. Clair. Shafir, E., Simonson, I., & Tversky, A. (1993). Reason-based choice. Cognition, 49, 11–36. Tannen, D. (1985). Silence: Anything but. In: D. Tannen & M. Saville-Troike (Eds), Perspectives on silence (pp. 93–112). Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Co. Van Dyne, L., Ang, S., & Botero, I. C. (2003). Conceptualizing employee silence and employee voice as multidimensional constructs. Journal of Management Studies, 40, 1359–1392. van Eerde, W., Holman, D., & Totterdell, P. (Eds). (2005). Guest editorial. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 78, 151–154. Vaughan, D. (1996). The challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture and deviance at NASA. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Vinten, G. (1994). Whistleblowing-subversion of corporate citizenship? London: Paul Chapman. Watson, T. J. (2000). Ethnographic fiction science: Making sense of managerial work and organisational research processes with Caroline and Terry. Organization, 7(3), 31–38. Watson, T. J. (2004). Shy William and the Gaberlunzie girl. In: Y. Gabriel (Ed.), Storytelling, myths, stories, and organizations: Premodern narratives for our times. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. London: Sage. Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the process of sensemaking. Organization Science, 16, 409–421.

CHAPTER 9 LEADERSHIP NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE: EMOTIONAL TOXICITY AT SKYWAVES AEROSPACE INTERNATIONAL Alan Goldman ABSTRACT This chapter presents a case which illustrates how the external management consultant may function as an organizational anthropologist and provide insights and alternative strategies for human resource professionals and leadership faced with high toxicity levels. The long-term failure to timely detect toxins and intervene in a destructive conflict results in the spread of dysfunctional behavior in the case company, pointing to leadership negligence and malpractice. The deeply entrenched ‘‘no emotions allowed’’ culture evokes massive turnover and plunging motivation and productivity. The case concludes with specific recommendations for avoiding or repairing a toxic workplace culture.

INTRODUCTION Dysfunctional behavior has emerged as a recent focal point for management researchers and consultants in the ongoing dialog over negative deviance and Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 207–224 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04009-1

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pathology in organizations (e.g., see Analoui, 1995; Frost, 2003; Frost & Robinson, 1999; Goldman, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Kellerman, 2004; Kets de Vries, 1984; Kets de Vries & Associates, 1991; Levinson, 1976, 1981, 1987; Lipman-Blumen, 2005; Lowman, 2002; Lubit, 2004; Spector & Fox, 2005). This interest has been echoed among practicing managers as much conversation has surrounded emotional unintelligence and toxicity levels in organizations (e.g., see Frost, 2003). Faced with intolerance, bullying, narcissism, burnout, workplace violence, and a myriad of people problems, organizational dysfunction is under incessant scrutiny (e.g., see Neuman, 2001). The darker, toxic side of organizations and leadership has been observed and dissected from a myriad of consulting, research, and disciplinary perspectives including but not limited to: organizational development (Bradford & Burke, 2005); psychoanalysis (Kets de Vries, 2006; Koortzen & Cilliers, 2002); psychiatry (Cloninger, 1987); appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider, Sorensen, Whitney, & Yaeger, 2000; Whitney & Trosten-Bloom, 2003); industrial and consulting psychology (Kilburg, 2000; Lowman, 2002); systems theory (Fuqua & Newman, 2002); trait psychology (Barrick & Mount, 1991); cultural anthropology (Schein, 2004), emotional and social intelligence (Goleman, 2000, 2006; Robins, 2002); systems consulting (Levinson, 2002; Von Bertalanffy, 1950); family systems counseling (e.g., see Minuchin, 1974); and high-impact management consulting (Schaffer, 2002). In this chapter, I assume an eclectic position, viewing organizational toxicity as the impetus for placing the ‘‘company on the couch’’ in an effort to trace the nexus of dysfunctional behavior. Organizations have recognized that dysfunctional leadership, policies, and relationships impact individuals, teams, and entire systems and may spread insidiously and undetected (Frost & Robinson, 1999; Lipman-Blumen, 2005; Lubit, 2004). Dysfunctional behavior creates impairment and may be traced to individual leaders and employees or may be a function of detrimental company behavior as ‘‘organizations themselves create conditions for toxicity through policies and practices that fail to include the human factor in their execution’’ (Frost, 2003, p. 59). Companies search for explanations and relief from the demoralization, executive abuses, deliberate undermining, and toxic behaviors that demean, trivialize, subvert, mislead, ignore, and squash constructive criticism or dialog. Viewing the company as patient, Frost (2003) has likened dysfunctional behavior in organizational systems to attacks on the human immune system, ranging from low-level viruses to the highly toxic melanoma cancer that metastasized into his own lymph nodes. Counterproductive behavior in an organization’s leader, for example, may turn members of the system increasingly dysfunctional, raising the prospects

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for enduring and serious harm. Lipman-Blumen, in ‘‘The Allure of Toxic Leaders’’ speaks of followers who, when faced with the likes of Sunbeam’s Al ‘‘Chainsaw’’ Dunlap, ‘‘feel quite impotent when it comes to challenging toxic leaders or altering the dysfunctional systems they have put in place’’ (p. 43). Dysfunctional behavior is widespread in human systems and in the words of Frost (2003), ‘‘toxicity is a normal by-product of organizational life’’ (p. 8). Managers, HR, and consultants necessarily face the dynamics of conflict and its dysfunctional effects. When adequate solutions to dysfunctional behavior cannot be generated from within, organizations turn to executive coaches, industrial psychologists, and management consultants. It is commonplace for upper management to seek prescriptions and remedies befitting a patient. This is evident in Gallesich’s description of the ‘‘doctor–patient model’’ characterized by the executive ‘‘requesting a consultant to make a diagnosis of troubles that they do not understand’’ (Gallessich, 1983, p. 93). Leadership may be baffled as to whether organizational dysfunction is at root more individual or companywide in origin as complex systems do not typically lend themselves to clear-cut, simple cause-and-effect explanations. Companies seek enhanced detection, assessment, and intervention strategies in response to disturbing workplace behavior, threats and volatility, troubled individuals, and dysfunctional systems. People conflicts, anger management issues, and emotional unintelligence result in escalating conflicts that adversely impact quality, productivity, teams, retention, and bottom lines. Further complicating detection is the perception shared by some managers that dysfunctional behavior frequently appears ‘‘off the radar screen’’ and may be invisible to all but the most experienced eye. Even minor emotional pain suffered from public embarrassments, face threats, and reprimands by superiors may turn increasingly dysfunctional as the contagiousness of negative emotions rubs off on coworkers and colleagues and escalates and permeates organizational culture (Goleman, 2000). Of particular interest in this study are instances when common workplace problems are mismanaged and slip through the cracks, evade detection, and reach high toxicity levels (Goldman, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Lipman-Blumen, 2005; Lubit, 2004). In this chapter, I present examples of mismanagement in the detection and assessment of toxicity and provide suggestions for successful intervention. My emphasis is primarily upon increasing the capacity for internal organizational readiness for dysfunctional behavior in the form of more timely and accurate assessment and interventions (cf. Lowman, 2002; Schaffer, 2002, 2005). This entails the development of internal consultants who oversee and troubleshoot dysfunctional behavior and personally function as toxin detectors and toxin handlers. I recommend the utilization

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of the external consultant more as a backup or second line of defense when dealing with what Frost (2003) referred to as ‘‘normal toxicity.’’ The role of the external consultant increases when companies face highly toxic people problems as managers typically do not have training in clinical psychology, pathology, or abnormal behavior. The highly toxic terrain is better approached by experts in consulting psychology, industrial psychology, and psychiatry. Expanding upon the repertoire of internal leadership and management consultants, psychological and psychiatric specialists bring clinical expertise and utilize a much needed classification system such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association or the DSM IV-TR (2000).

CONSULTANT AS ORGANIZATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGIST In the toxicity and dysfunctional management literature, there is a notable absence of case studies or consultation narratives illustrating the complex assessment and intervention decisions required of organizational leaders, HR directors, employee assistance programs, and collaborating external experts. This chapter addresses this gap by providing case studies intended to provide prototypes for vigorous dialog and debate on core issues in toxic behavior and dysfunctional organizations. In the case study that follows, I illustrate how the toxicity level in a company was initially manageable but inability to assess, lack of readiness, avoidance, resistance, denial, and failures in leadership resulted in an escalation of dysfunctional effects. Qualitative interpretation, commentary, and suggestions are offered to practicing managers and consultants for addressing, preventing, identifying, and not colluding in toxicity. Laced throughout the case study are narratives of the SkyWaves Aerospace: company culture; dysfunctional relationships; the interplay of personal, interpersonal, and organizational variables; and analysis of the state of readiness of leadership to head warning signals. Central is the fact that a failure to provide timely assessment of company conflict may morph into organizational dysfunction and signify leadership negligence and malpractice. The case presented is based upon a real life consultation. I was contracted by the organization as a ‘‘9th inning’’ external consultant and coach. I was hired to assess the efforts of the company’s team of supervisors, HR, upper management, and EAP’s in dealing with organizational dysfunction. My vantage point in telling the case study is that of a narrator and consultant.

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I assess the strengths and weaknesses of the internal players and provide alternatives. I speak to my readers as I spoke to my contracting companies. When assessments and interpretations were accepted by the companies they led to some of the concrete recommendations and initiatives provided in the final section of this chapter. Due to privileged communication agreements, real names have been withheld and scenarios have been sufficiently altered to preserve the anonymity of client companies and employees.

EMOTIONAL UNINTELLIGENCE AT SKYWAVES AEROSPACE Over the past 3 years 22% of the engineers in the R&D division of SkyWaves Aerospace International applied for a transfer. This once stable R&D division was known throughout the SkyWaves Aerospace global network as ‘‘the human turnstile.’’ During this period of time, productivity dropped by one-third and profits plunged. Gossip spread all the way back to the Amsterdam and Brussels Euro-subsidiaries that ‘‘there was a psychodrama in the U.S. aerospace facility headed by a few pathological engineers.’’ Kathy Warner, the new HR director, took notice of the toxic situations within approximately 3 months of assuming her position. At first glance, Warner observed hard working, innovative engineers collaborating effectively in their think tanks. Repeated observations led to another view as the atmosphere in R&D was at times rude, abrasive, volatile, hostile, and loud voices were constantly erupting. Despite R&D’s reputation for productivity and high-level creativity there was also a darker, troubled, and dysfunctional side to this division. Warner was a bit baffled by the transfer data but was even more concerned by the fact that the former HR leader, Melissa JonesSeaver, made no mention of personnel disturbances in R&D during their transition. Why did her predecessor not mention this problem? Was something being hidden? Avoided?

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNAL TOXIN DETECTOR Finally, opportunity knocked in the form of another transfer request. Lucas Fraizer, a 9-year veteran of SkyWaves, sent through the necessary paperwork for a transfer to the Burlingame, California location. Warner set up a

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‘‘transfer interview,’’ a first cousin of an exit interview – developed several years ago due to the high SkyWaves Aerospace transfer rate. Apparently, a slew of grievances filed from the R&D division were resulting in transfers to other locations in SkyWaves’ global network. Frazier responded to Warner’s non-threatening, personable line of questioning with candor. Warner asked what Frazier’s reasons were for requesting the transfer and he replied with a story about ‘‘intolerable conflict, backbiting behavior, and a culture of intolerance and emotional terrorism.’’ Warner patiently asked for some insight into how this culture of conflict all came about. Frazier complied by offering, ‘‘here’s the nasty story as I see it. Don’t quote me, but it’s pretty accurate.’’ For some 5 years there had been a ‘‘serious feud’’ between two senior cockpit engineers. David Cutter and Eugene McKenna had it in for each other. Several years ago, the former HR director, Ms. Jones-Seaver responded by sending both McKenna and Cutter off to the EAP for psychological counseling. According to Frazier, the former HR director never spoke a word about the problem and spent little if any time with the two engineers. What about Julius Jefferson, the R&D division chief ? Frazier colorfully commented that: y our illustrious leader was a non-factor. He didn’t buy into the whole people conflict, psychological thing. Jefferson is about work. If you had a human drama you went off to HR. And HR seemed to automatically send the rotten apples off to EAP.

Talk seemed to leak out from the EAP. Or maybe they were just rumors. The word around the engineer cockpit people was that McKenna was ‘‘dangerously hostile.’’ A few of the engineers spoke in hushed tones gossiping that McKenna was a ‘‘manic depressive’’ and suffered from some kind of ‘‘personality disorder.’’ Whatever the truth was, Frazier offered that the whole division had to tiptoe around these two ‘‘nut cases’’ as ‘‘there was no escape from this lethal feud. It never ended!’’ But what about Cutter? According to Frazier, Cutter was very introverted and appeared to be baiting McKenna and got him angry. Frazier offered that it was well known that one engineer secretly mocked Cutter behind the scenes, saying he was a ‘‘pathetic passive aggressive.’’ But who really knew? Something was behind it all and meanwhile everyone was suffering. Warner dug deeper in order to determine whether Frazier’s coming forth and account were reliable. Upon further investigation, Warner learned that Frazier had been best friends with McKenna for many years, but they recently had a falling out. Apparently, McKenna was livid at Frazier for his attempt to intervene and serve as a peace-maker in the 6-year-old feud. As a

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result, Frazier was hurt, frustrated and determined to get to the bottom of the conflict by coming forth to the new and amiable HR director, Warner. In an effort to follow up on the Frazier interview, Warner proceeded to individually interview all 44 members of the R&D division. The gist of the narratives matched fairly closely with Frazier’s recollection. Finally, the smoking gun emerged when Warner sat down with McKenna. McKenna was ready to talk. He felt comfortable with Warner. What was the origin of all this toxic behavior and dysfunctional impact?

THE MANAGER AS TOXIN HANDLER Approximately 6 years ago, Cutter made an allegedly highly insulting public statement about McKenna’s father who had just died from a brain aneurism. The statement instantly caused loss of face to McKenna as it was uttered at a large divisional meeting at SkyWaves Aerospace. McKenna recalled that he had recently spent the worst weeks of his life living through a botched surgery and a family tragedy that struck him very hard. Despite it all, McKenna only took off 4 days from work and continued to come in and do his best to be innovative and helpful to his work team. Warner was more than a little surprised to find out that McKenna had carried these unexpressed emotions with him for 6 years and there had never been a face-to-face discussion with Cutter. Even more surprising was what McKenna revealed to Warner. I was totally uncomfortable telling this to anyone in the company. I’d never tell that former HR lady or ever tell Jefferson. They would just mock me. Check your emotions in at the door. The workplace is not for confessionals. No emotions allowed! Besides, if you dared talk about people conflicts that would automatically kick me up to the funny farm y you know. y EAP. I certainly am not buying into that tar pit y

Returning to his assessment of Cutter, the object of his venom, McKenna labeled Cutter a ‘‘passive aggressive’’ and ‘‘psycho’’ who ‘‘tried to set me up to freak out and look wacko in front of my team.’’ Upon questioning as to whether other workers shared McKenna’s assessment, he whispered, y yeah, plenty of engineers knew the story. Not that they were truly interested y but they knew what was going on. I probably shouldn’t have, but I let some of my colleagues know that Carter’s a psycho passive-aggressive. Look, if I didn’t brief them on his disturbances then they’d turn around and think I’m the one who’s unbalanced. I was just dealing in the trenches with a colleague who had a contract y a vendetta out on me y in his troubled head. Besides, I have my connections upstairs in EAP. I got sourcesy.

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Clearly there was a lot of psychobabble in the form of dangerously unqualified DSM styled pseudo-diagnoses being spewed about – in the form of character assassinations. Moreover, there was no shortage of unexpressed hostility to sort through. Warner cautiously arranged a formal meeting between McKenna and Cutter where she would serve as mediator, coach, negotiator, and attempt to open the troubled and derailed lines of communication.

A NARRATIVE OF DYSFUNCTION Warner learned that both engineers perceived their company as a place where ‘‘no emotions were allowed in the workplace.’’ As the narrative of dysfunction unfolded under the guidance of Warner, Cutter appeared to be somewhat disturbed when he learned that over 6 years ago he had gravely insulted McKenna in a comment made to him about his then recently deceased father. Cutter was apologetic and offered that, ‘‘I had no intention of disrespecting your (McKenna’s) fathery. I wanted to nail you and put you in your placeybut not your fathery’’ In fact, Cutter convincingly stated that he had no knowledge of the death of McKenna’s father at the time of the incident and could only provide a ‘‘belated apology.’’ McKenna appeared skeptical, confused, and at the same time strangely relieved. After a dense, awkward period of approximately 15 min of silence and reflection (the atmosphere was so thick that it seemed as if an hour had passed), an emotionally laden dialog unfolded. Some cuss words were exchanged, allegations flew about the room, and it grew increasingly uncomfortable. After a period of verbal and emotional combat, McKenna finally responded in a reluctant but mildly favorable way to Cutter’s apologies. After further prompting by Warner, McKenna in turn partially apologized. Cutter offered some words along the lines of, ‘‘we probably should have brought this nastiness to a head six years ago.’’ McKenna stated that, ‘‘you and I have caused a little bit of pain and suffering around hereywhat do you think? It’s been like we seeded the whole company with land minesy’’ They agreed that their conflict had turned into an ugly family and divisional feud. It was in fact a very dark chapter that impacted all of SkyWaves Aerospace. Their coworkers had been dragged into the affair. During 6 years of conflict, there had been an overall atmosphere of incivility in the R&D division mirroring the toxic relationship between Cutter and McKenna and characterized by constant bickering; nasty gossip; the informal establishment of Cutter and McKenna factions in R&D; escalating

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levels of verbal abuse between the supervisor, staff and engineers; public acts of severe criticism and embarrassment between colleagues leading to loss of face; chronic absenteeism; a pessimistic and agitated atmosphere at most work team meetings; a growing incidence of loud altercations; and various acts of workplace sabotage including the withholding of strategic information necessary to successfully complete projects, and deviant competitions between engineers over who could do as little work as possible during the course of the week. In retrospect, the toxicity had progressed far beyond a mere one-on-one conflict. It had readily metastasized unchecked over a 6-year period rendering the division increasingly dysfunctional through the contamination of numerous colleagues.

DIVISIONAL HEALING PROCESS: CRITICAL ROLE OF HRM Following the Cutter–McKenna dialog, Warner proposed a divisional meeting to attempt to ‘‘bring our division into a healthier place and out of the dark ages.’’ The HR director suggested that ‘‘six years of anger, hostility and silent scorn could not be erased due to any sudden revelation or catharsis between McKenna and Cutter.’’ An insidious dispute had contaminated the division and there was no reversing the costly devastation of transfers, turnover, and plunging productivity, creativity and profits. Toxicity had taken root and spread deep within the psyche and culture of SkyWaves Aerospace. At the time of Warner’s call for a divisional meeting and healing process, eleven engineers had already reported ongoing counseling and psychotherapy appointments as the reason for missed hours and days from work. Timeliness and team work on strategic projects suffered. Warner was concerned that ‘‘the innovative, intuitive smarts of some of the engineers appeared to be receding and increasingly dormant.’’ Warner’s proposal for a divisional meeting was initially rejected by both McKenna and Cutter, but after several discussions with Warner both parties eventually agreed, with reservations. They were influenced by their trust in the new HR director. The next step entailed that Warner bring the Engineering R&D leader, Julius Jefferson into the picture. Jefferson was hesitant in response to Warner’s request that he participate in the ‘‘divisional healing process.’’ Jefferson wanted to know whether the high number of transfers and the general turnstile experienced in his division would serve to dismantle the ‘‘good intentions’’ of this ‘‘emotional encounter group.’’ Warner assured Jefferson that this was a worthy and potentially fruitful

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endeavor as there was dire need to clear the air, address conflicts deeply entrenched in the division’s culture, and to provide some resolution and alternatives to all of the dysfunctional behavior. Jefferson quietly agreed. The breakthroughs in the McKenna–Cutter conflict were witnessed by the entire division: engineers, administrators, IT professionals, and staff. Curiously, the peace-making between the two opened the flood gates of confessionals. At least three quarters of the division’s members had experienced and participated in the conflict. More than a handful of engineers dated way back to the genesis of the conflict. A number of engineers, one IT professional, and several staff members individually acknowledged their role in spreading gossip, taking sides, and adding to the emotional turbulence. Warner explained to the division that the unexpressed emotions between McKenna and Cutter had escalated and turned into an insidious and toxic contaminant throughout the company. In the words of Warner, ‘‘the extremely negative emotions of the McKenna–Cutter affair poisoned the innovative spirit, team work and kept us caught up in the middle of a feud that drives people out and breaks the spirit.’’ It was difficult to fathom that the 6-year-old conflict was the eye of the storm, ground zero, and the point from which the organizational cancer began to take hold.

‘‘LIGHT TOXICITY’’ METASTASIZES A simple exchange of hurtful comments escalated into companywide dysfunctional behavior. A case of light toxicity grew into a highly toxic conflict. Difficulty between two engineers eventually encompassed 44 engineers, the entire R&D division, and metastasized throughout the global SkyWaves Aerospace network. The engineers enjoyed the privileges and freedom of a team-oriented, empowered workplace. Yet when two engineers were in conflict they were quite human and struggled with how to respond. They regularly communicated in teams and despite the fact that much of R&D innovation was contingent upon successful collaborations, they nevertheless stumbled when it came to toxin detection and handling. There is plenty of blame to go around and the fault does not simply lie with the two feuding engineers. Their battle was waged within a culture that worked hard at avoiding conflict. As stated by McKenna, it was expected that employees leave their emotions at the door; no emotions allowed at Seattle Aerospace. Was this written into formal company policy? Of course not. It was part of an informal organizational manifesto that was modeled

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and enforced by leadership. Refusing to sufficiently recognize or incorporate emotional intelligence and toxin handling into their own leadership styles, Jefferson and Jones-Seaver had an ‘‘emotionally negligent’’ track record. When faced with people problems in the workplace they had a quick remedy. Send them off to the employee assistance program. Seattle Aerospace provided their feuding employees with eight EAP therapy sessions that were fully covered. The EAP was internal. But were McKenna and Cutter necessarily candidates for the EAP? Had other options been exhausted? My reading on this predicament was that EAP was the local organizational dumping ground for human capital issues. I thoroughly believe that McKenna and Cutter would have responded quite well to an emotionally intelligent R&D chief or HR director who was willing to empathically listen and invest sufficient time to hear the intricacies of a volatile narrative. How do we remedy this? We must learn from our mistakes. As the external consultant I strongly recommended that Jefferson be provided emotional intelligence training for leadership and also be asked to participate in workplace negotiation and conflict resolution training programs offered by the Harvard University based Project on Negotiation (PON). Unfortunately, Jefferson and Jones-Seaver were not effectively addressing the dysfunction but were rather in unwitting collusion with the conflict initiated by McKenna and Cutter. They did not have the skill or insight to serve as toxin detectors or handlers (cf. Frost, 2003; Frost & Robinson, 1999) and did not adequately recognize or address the early warning sides of dysfunctional behavior. Eventually, when the toxicity level escalated and it was very obvious that organizational dysfunction was spreading, the remedy was to send the pair off to the EAP. Unclear, however, is why the EAP regiments did not appear to have any notably positive impact on the Cutter– McKenna conflict. When the new HR director, Ms. Warner inquired into the EAP finding, she was only told that the ‘‘records were sealed and constituted privileged communication.’’ She was further informed by the EAP that since there was no diagnosis of danger to self (DTS) or danger to others (DTO) for either patient, that any disclosure would be in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as it specifically applies to psychological assessment and treatment. Moreover, due to the fact that Cutter and McKenna did not request unusual or out-of-the-ordinary workplace accommodation, full confidentiality had to be enforced without any briefing of upper management. This leads to my final area of concern – the role of psychological analysis and treatment in workplace conflicts. In this case, it initially appears as if there may have been symptoms suggesting a diagnosis. It is highly unlikely, however, that either McKenna or Cutter suffered from deeply rooted

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psychological disturbances. As a clinician who regularly uses the DSM IVTR in executive coaching, therapy, and management consulting, I had more concern with the negligent leadership of Mr. Jefferson and the HR director, Jones-Seaver, than I did with any psychological issues pertaining to McKenna or Cutter. While the engineers failed themselves and each other, leadership failed in a larger sense. A special warning sign goes up for the highly destructive DSM IV-TR ‘‘pseudo-diagnoses’’ of McKenna and Cutter by unqualified lay colleagues with hostile agendas. Colleagues and staff further served to escalate the conflict by throwing around uninformed psychological descriptions of the two engineers (e.g. manic depressive). Diagnoses utilizing the DSM IV-TR obviously require clinical experience and training. While we may have depressed days and narcissistic tendencies at times it is quite another matter to label and stigmatize individuals in the workplace – especially when the assessments or diagnoses are without merit and serve to further escalate toxicity and dysfunction.

LEADERSHIP NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE In the case study presented in this chapter, I have attempted to draw attention to how mismanagement of dysfunctional behavior in the everyday workplace only serves to escalate its toxic effects. Low toxicity turns high, and mildly counterproductive behavior morphs into a dysfunctional team, division, and organization. The response to not-out-of-the-ordinary workplace problems was rather inadequate and erratic, with mismanagement resulting in leadership collusion in the toxicity. I urge managers to systematically and strategically approach the inevitability of dysfunctional behavior (cf. Levinson, 2002). Toxicity does not typically self-repair when avoided and cannot be dealt with impulsively via discretionary, reactive decision-making on the company floor. Dysfunctional behavior must be addressed more in a proactive rather than a reactive fashion. It requires strategic planning and anticipation. Clearly, SkyWaves Aerospace did not adequately prepare for or address dysfunctional organizational contingencies. What is required is a companywide cognizance and response to toxicity – whereby dysfunctional behavior becomes everybody’s business. In addition to the establishment of informal protocols, companies can also consider discussion of a more official and mandatory strategy for handling disturbances via designated (line and staff) toxin handlers (Frost, 2003). SkyWaves Aerospace cultivated a ‘‘no emotions’’ policy that unofficially prohibited dialog over personnel conflicts. The company avoided the

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emotional and darker side of the human psyche and workplace behavior deeming it as the unspeakable and delegating it to a black box never to be attended to. This was a case in point of how an organization can yield its own toxins (Lipman-Blumen, 2005). The engineers in question lacked adequate emotional intelligence and communication skills to resolve the issue on their own and simple interpersonal differences became quite toxic resulting in a high percentage of costly transfers within the R&D division. When a company winds up suffering for 6 years due to unexpressed hurt and negative emotions between two employees – it summons a response and requires appropriate measures be taken. Whatever the emotional and communication shortcomings of Cutter and McKenna might have been, the ‘‘no emotions’’ SkyWaves Aerospace culture obviously fueled the dysfunctional behavior and provided a fertile context. There was no venue available for constructively communicating emotional conflict and turbulence to third parties or toxin handlers until the belated appearance of the effective HR director, Kathy Warner. This was a dire leadership error, as Goleman (2000, 2006) has repeatedly pointed out, emotions are not only powerful, they always find a channel for expression within the workplace – be it functional or dysfunctional. The mismanagement of toxic behavior at SkyWaves Aerospace subsequently raises questions as to the need for managers and HR to be prepared to function as internal counselors, coaches, consultants, and facilitators for their employees (cf. Schaffer, 2002, 2005; Whetten & Cameron, 2007). In the SkyWaves case study, the first HR director, Jones-Seaver, and the R&D division chief, Julius Jefferson, both failed to adequately function in these relationship capacities. Their approach to conflict was avoidance and to immediately pass problem employees along to the EAP. The case clearly shows that the failure of leaders to timely detect and work with personnel disturbances inadvertently increases the toxicity level and the necessity of contracting with EAP and outside coaching and consulting experts. Accordingly, I strongly recommend that organizations place the highest priority on developing toxin detection and handling skills for management and leadership. Successful internal toxin detection, coaching, and counseling may prove adequate for many commonplace, low toxicity conflicts.

CONCLUSION The disciplinary lines have been blurred between management and psychology as under the threat of dysfunctional behavior we must seek

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both short-range and deep-structure solutions. Mismanagement and failure to accurately and timely identify people problems is in itself a form of dysfunctional leadership. Managerial negligence undetected may contribute to malpractice and company-wide toxicity. As illustrated, complex webs of organizational dysfunction are frequently an outgrowth of mild, unchecked toxicity in the workplace. In response, I submit that common organizational disturbances can be increasingly red flagged by organizations as the responsibility of designated internal line and staff toxin detectors and handlers. As herein conceived, the toxin function may be viewed as part of an expanded relationship and interpersonal function of managers and HR – rather than the province of exclusive toxin experts. Along these lines, companies can incorporate external experts to aid in the training and development of internal toxin handlers and detection skills among supervisors, managers and HR, culminating in a train-the-trainer agenda. In addition, organizations may want to consider strategies for incorporating large numbers of employees or even the entire workforce in the capacity of toxin detectors. Echoing the TQM mantra that ‘‘quality is everybody’s business,’’ I suggest leadership consider that ‘‘dysfunctional behavior is everybody’s business.’’ Open door, collaborative, empowerment approaches to people problems are pivotal and may be combined with companywide continuous improvement via training in dysfunctional behavior. Finally, as the company lies on the couch it learns that it is not exactly easy to distinguish where the nexus of dysfunctional behavior resides, or how to accurately determine between milder and higher levels of toxicity, or whether particular people problems are better handled internally or by external agents. Early internal detection is preventative and roughly approximates the timely X-ray or MRI identifying cancer cells before they metastasize. Cancer researchers have unveiled that there are preventative ‘‘wild P-53’’ cancer detection and cancer fighting genes in the human system. Are there wild P-53 equivalents on notice within our organizational systems, ready to timely identify and resolve destructive leadership, dysfunctional personality traits, and toxic company policies? Leadership and HR must address, initiate and operationalize readiness and toxin safeguards throughout the organization. This may entail the assistance of external consultants especially when faced with long-term avoidance of conflict, systemic dysfunction, threats of terrorism, and workplace violence and in instances where psychopathology is a possibility (Van Fleet & Van Fleet, 2006).

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POST SCRIPT As a qualitative and interpretative inquiry, this chapter provides a ‘‘soft tissue’’ analysis of hard-core people problems that, in turn, invites subsequent quantitative assessment. Consultants and management researchers may investigate correlations in organizations between such variables as toxin reduction and turnover, grievances, and law-suits citing people conflicts. In addition, I invite alternative interpretations and explanations of the case studies presented as limitations are inherit in any critique.

CONCRETE RECOMMENDATIONS AND INITIATIVES In summary, what can managers do to better prepare for the costly impact of undetected or mismanaged toxicity in the workplace? 1. Assume a pro-active, preventative approach to dysfunctional behavior committed to innovating and articulating company-wide strategies for detection and handling; 2. Remove the ‘‘company from the couch’’ as the organization must be an increasingly active initiator and innovator in solving its own internal toxicity problems; 3. In high-toxicity cases when an organization turns to an external management consultant, executive coach, or other expert – this is best conceived of as a partnership – not as a patient looking for a prescription or hypodermic needle to fix the organization’s emotional unintelligence; 4. Provide emotional intelligence training for leadership and employees as high-level emotional competence is central to improving relationship management and developing toxin detection and handling skills; 5. Provide negotiation and conflict resolution training for upper management and HR leaders; contact the Harvard University ‘‘project on negotiation’’ web-site for training schedules and options; 6. Develop organizational protocols for preventing, assessing and treating toxic behaviors in the workplace; this may require the services of a management consultant with expertise in this area; 7. Designate managers or HR leaders who will function as toxin detectors and toxin handlers; along these lines I urge that ‘‘toxicity is everybody’s

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business’’ (similar to ‘‘quality is everybody’s business’’ in TQM); accordingly, training company-wide in recognizing and inoculating against toxicity and counterproductive behavior is recommended; Review your organization’s (and individual leaders’) current orientation toward workplace problems especially as it pertains to personnel and relationship conflicts and toxin detection; I urge an open door, ‘‘discuss as early as possible’’ culture with minimal risk and a ‘‘no stigma’’ guarantee to participants; Review your current grievance, mediation, arbitration, and/or ombudsperson policies to see whether they are compatible with and potentially supportive of the other toxin-related initiatives raised on this list and in this chapter; Provide basic DSM IV-TR training in psychological disturbances and pathology to managers and HR to enable leaders to better discern between low toxicity/common workplace problems and high toxicity issues derivative of a more deeply rooted, pre-existing psychological or pathological basis; for example, with a basic understanding of the DSM IV-TR, SkyWaves leadership would have been in a better position to respond to the hurtful, pseudo-diagnoses being cast about by Cutter, McKenna, and R&D engineers; Annual individual performance appraisals are to be in part determined by team and relationship skills; relationship skills become high priority; and 360 degree feedback is recommended as a means for providing early detection of interpersonal problems and dysfunctional behavior; 360 degree feedback supplies a venue for communicating a broad spectrum of employee perceptions of leadership behavior. In the case of SkyWaves Aeronautics, appropriate use of 360 degree feedback might have been a useful method for identifying the failure of leadership to timely respond to the conflict in the R&D division, and raise questions and enhance awareness of leadership’s oversights and/or avoidance of the escalating toxic behavior.

NOTE An earlier version of this chapter received the Academy of Management ‘‘Top Paper Award’’ in the Management Consulting Division, August, 2007, Philadelphia, PA.

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REFERENCES American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. DSM-IV-TR. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association. Analoui, F. (1995). Workplace sabotage: Its styles, motives and management. Journal of Management Development, 14(7), 48–65. Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. (1991). The big five personality dimensions and job performance. Personnel Psychology, 44, 1–26. Bradford, D. L., & Burke, W. (2005). The crisis in organizational development. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Cloninger, C. R. (1987). A systematic method for clinical description and classification of personality variants. Archives of General Psychiatry, 44, 573–588. Cooperrider, D., Sorensen, P., Whitney, D., & Yaeger, T. (2000). Appreciative inquiry: Rethinking human organization toward a positive theory of change. Champaign, IL: Stipes. Frost, P. (2003). Toxic emotions at work. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Frost, P., & Robinson, S. (1999). The toxic handler: Organizational hero- and casualty. Harvard Business Review, July–August, 96–106. Fuqua, D., & Newman, J. (2002). The role of systems theory in consulting psychology. In: R. Lowman (Ed.), Handbook of organizational consulting psychology. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass. Gallessich, J. (1983). The profession and practice of consultation. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Goldman, A. (2005). Leadership pathology as a nexus of dysfunctional organizations. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Conference. Honolulu, Hawaii. Goldman, A. (2006a). Personality disorders in leaders: Implications of the DSM IV-TR in assessing dysfunctional organizations. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 21(5), 392–414. Goldman, A. (2006b). High toxicity leadership: Borderline personality disorder and the dysfunctional organization. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 21(8), 733–746. Goleman, D. (2000). Working with emotional intelligence. New York, NY: Bantam. Goleman, D. (2006). Social intelligence: The new science of human relationships. New York, NY: Bantam Books. Kellerman, B. (2004). Bad leadership: What it is, how it happens, why it matters. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Kets de Vries, M. (1984). The irrational executive: Psychoanalytic explorations in management. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Kets de Vries, M. (2006). The leader on the couch: A clinical approach to changing people and organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Kets de Vries, M. & Associates. (1991). Organizations on the couch: Clinical perspectives organizational behavior and change. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Kilburg, R. (2000). Executive coaching: Developing managerial wisdom in a world of chaos. Washington, DC: American Psychological Society. Koortzen, P., & Cilliers, F. (2002). The psychoanalytic approach to team development. In: R. Lowman (Ed.), Handbook of organizational consulting psychology. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Levinson, H. (1976). Psychological man. Boston, MA: Levinson Institute. Levinson, H. (1981). Executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Levinson, H. (1987). Psychoanalytic theory in organizational behavior. In: J. W. Lorsch (Ed.), Handbook of organizational behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Levinson, H. (2002). Organizational assessment: A step-by-step guide to effective consulting. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Lipman-Blumen, J. (2005). The allure of toxic leaders. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Lowman, R. (2002). Handbook of organizational consulting psychology. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Lubit, R. (2004). Coping with toxic managers, subordinates and other difficult people. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Financial Times. Minuchin, S. (1974). Families and family therapy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Neuman, J. (2001). Injustice, stress and bullying can be expensive! Paper Presented at the Workplace Bullying 2000 Conference, Oakland, CA. Robins, S. (2002). A consultant’s guide to understanding and promoting emotional intelligence in the workplace. In: R. Lowman (Ed.), Handbook of organizational consulting psychology. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Schaffer, R. (2002). High-impact consulting. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Schaffer, R. (2005). Rapid results! how 100-day projects build the capacity for large-scale change. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Schein, E. (2004). Organizational culture and leaders. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Spector, P., & Fox, S. (2005). Counterproductive work behavior: Investigations of actors and targets. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Van Fleet, D., & Van Fleet, E. (2006). Organizational terrorism. The Journal of Managerial Psychology, 21(8), 763–774. Von Bertalanffy, L. (1950). The theory of opens systems in physics & biology. Science, 13, 23–29. Whetten, D., & Cameron, K. (2007). Developing management skills. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson/Prentice Hall. Whitney, D., & Trosten-Bloom, A. (2003). The power of appreciative inquiry. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.

CHAPTER 10 THE ROLE OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN INTEGRITY AND ETHICS PERCEPTIONS Jessica Mesmer-Magnus, Chockalingam Viswesvaran, Jacob Joseph and Satish P. Deshpande ABSTRACT Emotional intelligence (EI) is thought to offer significant benefit to organizational productivity through enhanced employee performance and satisfaction, decreased burnout, and better teamwork. EI may also have implications for the incidence of counterproductive workplace behavior. Survey results suggest EI is a significant predictor of individuals’ ethicality and their perceptions of others’ ethicality. Further, EI explains incremental variance in perceptions of others’ ethics over and above that which is explained by individual ethicality. High EI employees may be more adept at interpreting the ethicality of others’ actions, which has positive implications for ethical decision-making. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 225–239 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04010-8

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INTRODUCTION Wrongdoing in and by organizations has received unprecedented attention in the media and academic literature (Grossman, 2005; Low, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000; Meisinger, 2002, 2005; Near & Miceli, 1985). Negative ramifications to the employers of individuals engaged in unethical activities have become more severe in recent years and the media coverage more intense. Such negative press has considerable implications for the organization’s image and competitive ability within the marketplace. A heightened awareness of the prevalence of organizational misconduct has generated increased interest in identifying the causes of unethical business practices and counterproductive workplace behaviors (Carlson, Kacmar, & Wadsworth, 2002). So, when and why do individuals engage in counterproductive behavior? A number of individual (e.g., personality) and contextual (e.g., job characteristics, work group characteristics, organizational culture) factors may predict such behavior (Sackett & DeVore, 2001). One unexplored variable with the potential to impact ethical behavior and decision-making is emotional intelligence (EI). This study explores two key questions in this area: What value does EI have for (1) predicting incidence of counterproductive behavior, and (2) predicting perceptions of others’ ethical behavior?

Ethics and Counterproductive Behavior Counterproductive behavior, often viewed as a facet of job performance, constitutes any intentional employee behavior which operates contrary to the legitimate interests of the organization (Sackett & DeVore, 2001). Researchers have identified a number of individual, perceptual, and contextual variables that impact when employees choose to engage in questionable activities. For example, personality variables (e.g., conscientiousness), job characteristics (e.g., autonomy), and work environment characteristics (e.g., ‘‘honesty climate’’) are known to correlate with counterproductive behavior (Sackett & DeVore, 2001). Not surprisingly, an individual’s morality and personal beliefs of what constitutes (un)ethical behavior (i.e., individual ethicality) correlates with a tendency toward engaging in unethical behavior (Terpstra, Rozell, & Robinson, 1993). Ethics refers to ‘‘the rules or principles that define right and wrong conduct’’ (Davis & Frederick, 1984, p. 76). Individuals develop rules of ethics from their moral philosophies and value base (Carlson et al., 2002),

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and apply these rules when faced with making an ethical decision. Ethics is therefore a decision-making process whereby one’s rules of right and wrong are applied to assess the ethicality of a particular issue. Employee ethics have been linked with a number of counterproductive behaviors of great financial consequence to organizations, including absenteeism, sabotage, production and quality loss, theft, aggression, job withdrawal, and even insider trading (Sackett & DeVore, 2001; Terpstra et al., 1993). Interestingly, in their confessions of wrongdoing, wrongdoers often cite as reason for their actions a belief that such behavior was a necessary prerequisite to succeeding in an otherwise unethical world (Terpstra et al., 1993; Tyson, 1990). Specifically, many wrongdoers report feeling that others around them are engaging in (far worse) unethical actions, and that in order to compete, they must compromise their own ethical standards (Bersoff, 1999). Thus, ethical decision-making (and, hence, unethical action) likely involves not only the individual’s ethical standards, but also his or her perceptions of the prevalence of wrongdoing occurring around them (Newstrom & Ruch, 1975). It is unfortunate that, on average, workers believe their coworkers, managers, and subordinates are engaging in a great deal of unethical behavior (Morgan, 1993; Vitell & Davis, 1990). Further, individuals tend to (wrongly) believe they are more ethical than their counterparts (McDonald & Zepp, 1988; Tyson, 1990). Taken as a whole, it appears that even the most ethical employee may resort to engaging in counterproductive behavior, and justify doing so on the basis of perceptions that ‘‘everyone else is doing it,’’ or ‘‘it is not as bad as what others are doing’’ (Newstrom & Ruch, 1975, p. 36). Our purpose in conducting this research was to explore the role of EI in ethical decision-making, specifically in (1) individual ethicality, (2) perceptions of others’ ethics, and (3) the discrepancy between perceptions of selfand others’ ethics. We propose the following hypotheses based upon the above literature review. An introduction to the extant literature on EI follows. Hypothesis 1. Individuals’ self-reported unethical behaviors predict their perceptions of others’ ethicality, such that the more likely an individual is to engage in an unethical practice, the more likely they believe others are doing the same. Hypothesis 2. Individuals perceive themselves to be more ethical than counterpart others. Self-reported tendency to engage in unethical

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behaviors will reflect a greater degree of ethicality than perceptions of others’ ethicality.

Emotional Intelligence EI, also referred to as emotional literacy, the emotional quotient, and personal, social, or interpersonal intelligence (Dulewicz & Higgs, 2000), has received increasing attention since the 1995 publication of the Goleman book popularizing the construct. While several definitions exist, EI may be broadly defined as the set of verbal and non-verbal abilities that enable a person to generate, recognize, express, understand, and evaluate their own and others’ emotions, in order to guide the necessary thinking and action to successfully cope with environmental demands and pressures (Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). Individuals high in EI are able to effectively understand and perceive emotion within themselves and others, and successfully regulate and utilize their emotions for purposeful action (Law, Wong, & Song, 2004). EI is known to be predictive of successful performance across employment, academic, and life settings (Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). Might EI also have value for predicting counterproductive (unethical) behavior within these contexts? To the extent that moral reasoning develops from perceptions of the ethicality of others, individual ethicality will be influenced by perceptions of the behaviors of others (cf. Kohlberg, 1984). Further, to the extent that perceptions of unethical behavior (e.g., its perceived acceptability, antecedents, and consequences) are predicated on understanding and empathizing with the origins of self and other behavior (cf. Hoffman, 1984), EI will be related to ethicality. In addition, high EI individuals are more adept at reasoning through the (emotional) antecedents of their own and others’ behavior and using this information to guide thinking and action (Mayer & Salovey, 1993). Individuals high on EI will be able to manage their emotions and react less aggressively to the behaviors of others. Although research suggests individual ethicality is correlated with perceptions of others’ ethicality (Terpstra et al., 1993), it seems that high EI individuals would be more adept at deciphering others’ (ethical or unethical) behaviors than low EI individuals. This ability would contribute to their capacity to discern another person’s ethicality and ethics-related behaviors. Specifically, individuals high on EI will also more likely empathize with others’ behaviors and attribute less negative motives to others’ behaviors. Since emotionally intelligent individuals are better able to correctly deduce others’

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emotions, they may be more likely to overlook others’ unethical behavior on the grounds of mitigating circumstances. This is not to say that those high in EI will condone such behaviors, it is only asserted that they will likely attribute less un-ethicality to others. Given this, we propose the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 3. Emotional intelligence is predictive of individual ethicality, such that high EI individuals will report engaging in fewer unethical behaviors than low EI individuals. Hypothesis 4. Emotional intelligence is predictive of perceptions of others’ ethicality, such that low EI individuals perceive others as more likely to engage in unethical behaviors than high EI individuals. Not only should EI contribute additional variance to our understanding of others’ ethicality perceptions, it may even inform our understanding of the oft-cited discrepancy between perceptions of individual ethicality and perceptions of others’ ethicality (Pitt & Abratt, 1986; Tyson, 1990). Specifically, high EI individuals are likely to be more accurate in their evaluations of others’ ethicality; they will be less likely to rate others in the extremes of ethicality (e.g., very high or low). Low EI individuals are less adept at interpreting the origins of others’ behaviors and are more likely to over- or under-rate the extent to which others’ behaviors are unethical. Given this, we propose the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 5. Emotional intelligence will explain variance in perceptions of others’ ethics over and above that which can be explained by individual ethicality alone. Hypothesis 6. Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between perceptions of individual ethicality and others’ ethicality perceptions, such that high EI individuals will report less discrepancy between self and other ethics perceptions than low EI individuals. In sum, we sought to explore the role of EI in individual ethicality and in individuals’ perceptions of others’ ethicality. However, we realize that social desirability response bias has the potential to obscure research findings in ethics-related research (e.g., Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996; Randall & Fernandes, 1991). Specifically, the nature of questions asked in ethics research sets the stage for an individual to respond in a socially desirable manner, potentially masking/obscuring more accurate/truthful responses. As such, we measure respondent tendency

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toward socially desirable responding, and examine the above hypothesized relationships controlling for the potential effects of such response distortion.

METHOD Participants and Procedure To examine these hypotheses, we surveyed 198 undergraduate students (45% male, 55% female) as to their own ethics and their perceptions of others’ ethics, and assessed their EI. Participants were solicited from undergraduate business administration and psychology courses in a mid-size Midwestern university and participated in this study in exchange for course credit. Participant age averaged 24 years old, and ranged from 17 to 52. Seventy-three percent were Caucasian, 4% African-American, 5% Hispanic, 6% Asian/Pacific Islander, 10% Alaska Native/American Indian. Thirtyseven percent were currently employed on a full-time basis; the remaining were currently not employed (31%) or employed on a part-time basis (31%). Participants reported having worked an average of 7.7 years, at least on a part-time basis (84% of the sample had worked for 10 or fewer years). Eighty-one participants (41%) reported having taken a college-level course in business ethics. Participants were asked to be candid when answering the survey, and were assured of their anonymity and confidentiality.

Measures Surveys included measures of individual ethicality, perceived ethicality of others, EI, social desirability, and sample demographics. All items were scaled on a 4-point Likert-type scale (4 ¼ ‘‘mostly agree’’; 1 ¼ ‘‘mostly disagree’’). Scale reliabilities (coefficient alpha) are reported in Table 1. Individual Ethicality Twelve items were used to assess participant ethicality. Respondents indicated on a four-point Likert-type scale (4 ¼ mostly agree; 1 ¼ mostly disagree) the extent to which they would engage in a number of unethical behaviors (e.g., I’d make personal calls from work, I’d use a fake ID to gain access to a bar, I’d cheat on an exam). Items were adapted from a scale used by Lawson (2004) for use with a student population.

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Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Key Study Variables (N ¼ 198).

Variable

Mean

SD

1.

2.

3.

4.

1. 2. 3. 4.

24.08 34.64 50.35 86.13

7.16 7.97 7.36 9.97

(.81) .45 .02 .45

(.90) .10 .35

(.88) .48

(.74)

Individual ethicality Other ethicality Emotional intelligence Social desirability

po.01.

Others’ Ethicality Perceptions Participant perceptions of the ethicality of others were assessed using the same behaviors as posed in the individual ethicality scale; the scale items were the same, only the referent changed. Students were asked to rate their perceptions, based upon previous experience, about the ethicality of college students at their university (e.g., ‘‘Students make personal calls from work’’).

Emotional Intelligence EI was assessed using a 16-item measure published by Law et al. (2004; e.g., ‘‘I have a good sense of why I have certain feelings most of the time’’, ‘‘I am a good observer of other’s emotions’’) which purports to measure selfemotions appraisal, other-emotions appraisal, use of emotion, and regulation of emotion.

Social Desirability Research suggests social desirability (SD) response bias has the potential to alter self-reported ethical behaviors in ethics research (Randall & Fernandes, 1991). To control for the potential that SD would cloud our understanding of the role of EI in perceptions of ethics, we assessed tendency toward socially desirable responding as a potential control variable using Marlow and Crowne’s (1961) 33-item social desirability scale. Sample items include ‘‘No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener’’ and ‘‘My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out at a restaurant.’’ Higher scores on this scale indicate greater socially desirable responding.

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RESULTS Descriptive statistics and correlations for key study variables are presented in Table 1. As expected, SD correlated with both reports of individual ethicality and perceptions of others’ ethicality, such that the greater an individual’s tendency toward socially desirable responding the less likely participants were to report (1) tendencies to engage in unethical behavior (r ¼ .42, po.01) and (2) perceptions others engage in such behaviors (r ¼ .36, po.01). As such, SD was retained as a control variable where appropriate in subsequent analyses. Partial correlations between individual ethicality, others’ ethicality, and EI, removing the variability explained by social desirability in both variables, are presented in Table 2. Although the zero-order correlations did not indicate a statistically significant correlation between EI and either selfor others’ ethicality, partial correlations reflect a significant relationship. Indeed, 4% of the variance in individual ethicality and 10% of the variance in perceptions of others’ ethicality can be explained by EI. Hypothesis 1 predicted individual ethicality would be correlated with others’ ethicality, such that the greater self-reported tendency to engage in unethical behavior, the greater perceptions of others’ ethicality. Indeed, these variables were correlated at .45, po.01, indicating approximately 20% shared variance. Importantly, the significant positive relationship between individual ethicality and others’ ethicality remained even after partialing out the effects of SD (partial r ¼ .37, po.01). Hypothesis 2 predicted self-reported tendency to engage in unethical behaviors would reflect a greater degree of ethicality than would perceptions of others’ ethics. A t-test was used to compare the mean self-reported ethicality with the mean of perceptions of others’ ethicality. On average, participants rated themselves as more ethical than their counterparts (t ¼ 18.34, df ¼ 196, po.01). This pattern was seen consistently for each of the 12 unethical behaviors rated. Table 2. Correlations between Key Study Variables Partialing Out the Effects of Social Desirability in Both Variables. Variable 1. Individual ethicality 2. Other ethicality 3. Emotional intelligence po.01.

1.

2.

3.

– .37 .21

– .32

–

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While not hypothesized, we examined potential differences in perceptions of self- and others’ ethicality based upon whether the participant had ever taken or was currently enrolled in a college-level business ethics course. The results of an independent samples t-test indicate participants who have participated in a business-ethics course were somewhat more likely to indicate they would engage in unethical behaviors (x ¼ 25.41 and 23.21, respectively; t ¼ 2.07, df ¼ 196, po.05). Interestingly, ethics course participation did not affect perceptions of others’ ethicality (x ¼ 34.38 and 35.25, t ¼ .75, df ¼ 196, pW.05). Participants and non-participants of a business ethics course were equally likely to perceive others engaged in unethical behaviors. Similarly, participants and non-participants were equally likely to rate others as being more unethical than themselves. There was no difference in levels of EI for participants and non-participants of a business ethics course (x ¼ 50.19 and 50.48, respectively; t ¼ .27, df ¼ 196, pW.05). Hypotheses 3 and 4 predicted EI would predict individual ethicality and others’ ethicality, respectively. These hypotheses were tested using linear regression analysis, controlling for the effects of SD. EI and SD each contributed significantly to perceptions of self and other ethics, and their resulting models were significant (Individual Ethicality ¼ .51SD þ .22EI, R2 ¼ .21, po.01; Other Ethics ¼ .51SD þ .34EI, R2 ¼ .21, po.01). These relationships can also be seen in the partial correlations reported in Table 2. Hypothesis 5 predicted EI would explain variance in others’ ethicality over and above that explained by individual ethicality. This hypothesis was tested using hierarchical regression analysis. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3. In the first step, others’ ethicality was regressed on SD and individual ethicality. The model was significant (R2 ¼ .24, po.01). EI was added in the second step. The resulting change in R2 was significant at the po.01 level (R2 ¼ .29, DR2 ¼ .05), indicating that EI explained Table 3.

Hierarchical Regression Results for Perceptions of the Ethicality of Others (N ¼ 198).

Social desirability (SD) Individual ethicality (SE) Emotional intelligence (EI) Total R2 DR2

Step 1

Step 2

.20 .37

.35 .32 .27

.24

.29 .05

Note: All regression coefficients are standardized. po.01.

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Table 4. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Results for Emotional Intelligence as a Potential Moderator of the Discrepancy between Individual Ethicality and Perceptions of Others’ Ethicality.

Social desirability (SD) Individual ethicality (SE) Emotional intelligence (EI) SE  EI Total R2 DR2

Step 1

Step 2

.35 .32 .27

.36 .44 .39 .19

.29

.30 .01

Note: All regression coefficients are standardized. po.01.

additional variance in perceptions of other ethics, over and above that which is explained by individual ethicality. Hypothesis 6 predicted EI would moderate the relationship between individual ethicality and others’ ethicality, such that the difference between individual ethicality and others’ ethicality would be less for high EI individuals than for low EI. This hypothesis was tested using a moderated regression analysis. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. In the first step, other-ethics was regressed on SD, individual ethicality, and EI (R2 ¼ .29, po.01). In the second step, a multiplicative term representing the interaction between EI and individual ethicality was added. The change in R2 was not significant at the p ¼ .05 level, providing no support for the moderation hypothesis.

DISCUSSION We explored the role of EI in counterproductive behavior and ethics. Overall, our results suggest EI is predictive of individual ethicality and perceptions of others’ ethics. While we did not find support for our hypothesis that EI moderates the relationship (difference) between individual ethicality and others’ ethicality, we did find evidence that EI explains incremental variance in perceptions of others’ ethicality, over and above that which is explained by individual ethicality. Research suggests employee perception that others are engaging in unethical behaviors is instrumental to decisions regarding whether to engage in counterproductive behaviors themselves (Bersoff, 1999; Terpstra et al., 1993). Our findings

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suggest high EI employees may be less likely than low EI employees to interpret others’ unethical actions as justification for their own unethical behavior. Rather, since high EI employees are more adept at sensing and acknowledging their own and others’ emotions and actions and use this information to inform purposeful action (Law et al., 2004), they may be more likely to weigh other, potentially more relevant contextual cues when determining the usefulness and ethicality of engaging in a counterproductive action.

Implications for Research and Practice Organizations could realize cost savings, performance improvement, and wider profit margins if EI could be enhanced within their workforce. Not only has EI been tied to increased job performance and satisfaction (Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004), our findings suggest EI may also be linked with the incidence of counterproductive workplace behavior. While EI explains up to only 4% of the variance in individual ethicality (after controlling for social desirability), this effect may be large enough to generate significant improvements and savings for organizations that incorporate measures of EI in selection systems and training initiatives. In addition, while integrity tests have had good success as predictors of job performance and counterproductive behaviors (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993), our findings indicate that training initiatives aimed at improving ethics (e.g., college ethics courses) may not be as successful as we would hope. To the extent that EI is malleable (cf. Dulewicz & Higgs, 1999), interventions aimed at enhancing employee EI may be successful in reducing the prevalence of counterproductive workplace behavior. From a decision-making perspective, EI may improve our understanding of why individuals choose to engage in unethical behavior. Research suggests most individuals believe others are less ethical than themselves (Tyson, 1990). Such perceptions may fuel justifications for engaging in unethical acts (e.g., ‘‘Everyone else is doing this, so how else can I compete?’’). The results of this research suggest high EI individuals may be less prone to these perceptions. Though high EI individuals still tend to believe others are more unethical than they are, they tend to rate the level of others’ integrity higher than low EI individuals. Given the apparent role of EI in ethicality and ethical perceptions, future research may benefit from an examination of the role of EI in the whistleblowing process and in the incidence of retaliation against

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whistleblowers. High EI individuals appear to have a stronger sense of integrity than do low EI individuals. In addition, high EI individuals are less likely to believe that all others are engaging in questionable acts. These perceptions, in combination with a keener awareness of others’ emotions and a better sense of the origin of others’ behaviors, may improve the potential that an individual will report incidence of wrongdoing. Furthermore, whistleblowing research indicates that whistleblowers are not always willing or able to see their reports of wrongdoing through all stages of the whistleblowing and investigation process (Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003; Miceli & Near, 1985). Rather, many potential whistleblowers withdraw claims prior to the initiation of an investigation. Future research might explore the role of EI in improving the success of whistleblowing claims. On a related note, EI may play a role in the incidence of retaliation against whistleblowers. Specifically, low EI individuals, who are more likely to believe the extent of unethical behavior around them is high and to be more unethical themselves, may have little patience for a whistleblower and be more likely to retaliate against those making a claim. In this case, a low EI individual may perceive the whistleblower as breaking unspoken norms that support such behavior. Research in group dynamics indicates that a group member who is perceived to have deviated from the norms of the group often experiences retaliation from group members (Levine & Moreland, 1990).

Limitations One potential limitation to the generalizability of our research is our use of a student sample. While the use of a working sample may offer more clear applicability to counterproductive workplace behavior, research suggests practicing managers and student populations are similar in their perceptions of ethical issues (Lysonski & Gaidis, 1991). Importantly, our participants all had work experience (some were working currently) and were not asked to evaluate behaviors/situations that would likely be foreign to them (e.g., insider trading). In addition, recognizing the ethicality of behaviors is a decision-making process not specific to the work context (Low et al., 2000). Self-report questionnaires are particularly common to ethics research; however, research suggests respondents may be particularly sensitive to questions about ethics (Victor & Cullen, 1988). Given the nature of questions posed in ethics research (e.g., agreeing to statements like ‘‘I’d used

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a fake ID to purchase alcohol’’), it is not surprising that social desirability response bias poses a threat to the validity of findings (Randall & Fernandes, 1991). Though our study relied upon self-reports, we attempted to mitigate the effects of SD by statistically controlling for respondent tendency toward socially desirable responding. We recognize this is not a panacea for the potential problems of self-report measures in ethics research. But, other sources of integrity information also face potential limitations (e.g., supervisor reports are affected by halo error; Sackett & DeVore, 2001). Future research using other methods is needed to triangulate our findings.

Conclusion EI has received much attention in the academic literature. Research suggests employees high in EI are better performers on the job, more satisfied with their work context, less likely to experience burnout, better able to adjust to changing work conditions, more adept at engaging the diverse workforce, and better team members (cf. Goleman, 1995; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). Our research suggests EI is also a significant predictor of individual ethicality and of perceptions of others’ ethics. EI explains variance in perceptions of others’ ethics over and above that which may be explained by self-ethicality alone. The perception that others are engaging in unethical actions is known to have implications for an individual’s decision to behave unethically (Tyson, 1990). Our research suggests high EI individuals may be less prone to this error. This study provides additional support to the idea that enhancing EI in the workplace may offer significant benefit to organizational productivity.

REFERENCES Bersoff, D. M. (1999). Why good people sometimes do bad things: Motivated reasoning and unethical behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(1), 28–39. Carlson, D. S., Kacmar, K. M., & Wadsworth, L. L. (2002). The impact of moral intensity dimensions on ethical decision making: Assessing the relevance of orientation. Journal of Managerial Issues, 14(1), 15–30. Davis, K., & Frederick, W. C. (1984). Business and society: Management, public policy, ethics (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Dulewicz, W., & Higgs, M. (1999). Can emotional intelligence be measured and developed? Leadership and Organization Development Journal, 20, 242–252.

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Dulewicz, V., & Higgs, M. (2000). Emotional intelligence: A review and evaluation study. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 15(4), 341–372. Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ. New York: Bantam. Grossman, R. J. (2005). Executive discipline: Whether they deserve a slap on the wrist or the slap of handcuffs, executives accused of inappropriate behavior create a challenging situation for HR. HR Magazine, 50(8). Gundlach, M. J., Douglas, S. C., & Martinko, M. J. (2003). The decision to blow the whistle: A social information processing framework. Academy of Management Review, 28, 107–123. Hoffman, M. L. (1984). Empathy, its limitations, and its role in a comprehensive moral theory. In: J. Gewirtz & W. Kurtines (Eds), Morality, moral development, and moral behavior (pp. 283–302). New York: Wiley. Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays on moral development (Vol. 2): The psychology of moral development. New York: Harper and Row. Law, K. S., Wong, C. S., & Song, L. J. (2004). The construct and criterion validity of emotional intelligence and its potential utility for management studies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89(3), 483–496. Lawson, R. A. (2004). Is classroom cheating related to business students’ propensity to cheat in the ‘‘real world’’? Journal of Business Ethics, 49, 189–199. Levine, J. M., & Moreland, R. L. (1990). Progress in small group research. Annual Review of Psychology, 41, 585–634. Low, T. W., Ferrell, L., & Mansfield, P. (2000). A review of empirical studies assessing ethical decision making in business. Journal of Business Ethics, 25(3), 185–204. Lysonski, S., & Gaidis, W. (1991). A cross-cultural comparison of the ethics of business students. Journal of Business Ethics, 10(2), 141–150. Marlow, D., & Crowne, D. P. (1961). Social desirability and response to perceived situational demands. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 25, 109–115. Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1993). The intelligence of emotional intelligence. Intelligence, 17, 433–442. McDonald, G. M., & Zepp, R. A. (1988). Ethical perceptions of Hong Kong Chinese business managers. Journal of Business Ethics, 7, 835–845. Meisinger, S. (2002). Trust in the top. HR Magazine, 47(10). Meisinger, S. (2005). It’s the culture, stupid! The organizational cultures that HR professionals help to cultivate are key to ethical conduct in workplaces. HR Magazine, 50(11). Miceli, & Near (1985). Characteristics of organizational climate and perceived wrongdoing associated with whistle-blowing decisions. Personnel Psychology, 38, 525–544. Morgan, R. B. (1993). Self- and co-worker perceptions of ethics and their relationships to leadership and salary. Academy of Management Journal, 36(1), 200–214. Near, J. P., & Miceli, M. P. (1985). Organizational dissidence: The case of whistle-blowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 4, 1–16. Newstrom, J. W., & Ruch, W. A. (1975). The ethics of management and the management of ethics. MSU Business Topics, 29–37. Ones, D. S., & Viswesvaran, C. (1998). The effects of social desirability and faking on personality and integrity assessment for personnel selection. Human Performance, 11(2/3), 245–269.

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Ones, D. S., Viswesvaran, C., & Reiss, A. D. (1996). Role of social desirability in personality testing for personnel selection: The red herring. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81(6), 660–679. Ones, D. S., Viswesvaran, C., & Schmidt, F. L. (1993). Comprehensive meta-analysis of integrity test validities: Findings and implications for personnel selection and theories for job performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(4), 679–703. Pitt, L. F., & Abratt, R. (1986). Corruption in business: Are management attitudes right? Journal of Business Ethics, 5, 39–44. Randall, D. M., & Fernandes, M. F. (1991). The social desirability response bias in ethics research. Journal of Business Ethics, 10, 805–817. Sackett, P. R., & DeVore, C. (2001). Counterproductive behaviors at work. In: N. Anderson, D. S. Ones, H. K. Sinangil & C. Viswesvaran (Eds), Handbook of industrial, work, and organizational psychology: Personnel psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 145–164). London: Sage. Terpstra, D. E., Rozell, E. J., & Robinson, R. K. (1993). The influence of personality and demographic variables on ethical decisions related to insider trading. The Journal of Personality, 127(4), 375–389. Tyson, T. (1990). Believing that everyone else is less ethical: Implications for work behavior and ethics instruction. Journal of Business Ethics, 9(9), 715. Van Rooy, D., & Viswesvaran, C. (2004). Emotional intelligence: A meta-analytic investigation of predictive validity and nomological net. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 65, 71–95. Victor, B., & Cullen, J. B. (1988). The organizational bases of ethical work climates. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 101–125. Vitell, S. J., & Davis, D. L. (1990). Ethical beliefs of MIS professionals: The frequency and opportunity for unethical behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 9(1), 63–70.

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CHAPTER 11 SOCIETAL NORMS AND CONTEXTUAL EMOTIONAL LABOR Jawad Syed ABSTRACT This chapter examines the implications of societal norms for emotional labor in the workplace. It argues that the conflicting requirements of societal and job contexts may require one to violate one’s societal norms to fulfill job requirements. It is, therefore, important to examine the aversive states that may follow such transgression and the manners in which they are managed.

INTRODUCTION It is now widely known that moral transgressions and other serious breaches of societal norms may result in shame, embarrassment, fear, and other forms of negative emotions (Lewis, 1992; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). An increasing number of researchers are engaged in exploring the nature of societal norms and their possible influence on motivational, organizational, and adaptive functions of emotions (e.g. Barlow, 1988; Grandey, 2000; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Simpson & Stroh, 2004). This chapter endeavors to develop a conceptual perspective of moral values and social experiences and their implications for Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 241–258 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04011-X

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emotion regulation in employment contexts. It draws on social psychology and emotional labor literature to explore the contextual dimension of emotional labor (Syed, Ali, & Winstanley, 2005). The chapter argues that the conflicting requirements of one’s societal and employment contexts may require one to transgress one’s moral values to fulfill job requirements. It is, therefore, important to examine the aversive states that may follow one’s transgressions of societal norms. The chapter also considers the effects of early social experiences of a person’s life on her alternative dispositions which may influence the development of certain emotions, such as aggression, power, and pleasure. This may result in a person internalizing the morally right behavior as is expected of her by her society. The chapter argues that such internalization process may have important implications for the nature and the extent of emotional labor experienced by employees in the workplace.

DISPLAY RULES, JOB REQUIREMENTS, AND SOCIETAL NORMS Previous research suggests that employees experience emotional labor when their organization requires them to adopt certain display rules as a part of their jobs. Display rules have been defined as prescriptive societal norms, dictating how, when, and where emotions should be suppressed or expressed (Simpson & Stroh, 2004, p. 715). Such rules may conform to social stereotypes, such as on the basis of one’s race and gender (Brody, 2000), and appear also to vary as a function of objective job characteristics (Humphrey, 2000). Empirical studies have documented the salience of display rules contributing to emotional labor in a variety of employment contexts (Hochschild, 1983; Leidner, 1993; O’Brien, 1994; Pugliesi, 1999). Hochschild (1983) argued that the false nature of feelings and displayed expressions was particularly deleterious to workers involves in customer service. Subsequently, many researchers have focused on emotional labor in service occupations in which interpersonal emotion management is embedded in the non-personal relationships between workers and clients (Jones, 1997; Pugliesi, 1999). However, the incidence of emotional labor is not confined to customer service. Workers in a variety of occupational positions are likely to experience emotional labor (Morris & Feldman, 1996; Pugliesi & Shook, 1997).

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Differences in the character of emotional labor are usually related to the nature of job, such as providing medical assistance or debt collecting, but may not be entirely explained by occupational imperatives (Pugliesi, 1999, p. 128). For example, previous research suggests that women are expected to perform emotional labor to a greater extent than are men (James, 1989; Pierce, 1995; Pugliesi & Shook, 1997). Syed et al. (2005) suggest that emotional labor may also be caused by societal and cultural contexts of workers and that the experience of emotional labor may vary on the basis of one’s gender. Thus, not all emotional labor occurs in impersonal relations with clients nor is it always guided by organizational experiences and experienced as inauthentic (Erickson & Wharton, 1997; Pugliesi & Shook, 1997; Pugliesi, 1999). Rather, emotion is inherent in all social relations in organizational contexts (Gibson, 1997) and emotional labor involves diverse forms of emotion management (Leidner, 1993). Similarly, the audiences or subjects of emotional labor are diverse. Workers in a variety of occupations engage in both client- and co-worker focused emotional labor. Actually, some studies have found that the emotion work that occurs in the context of the social relations of the workplace is the most salient and distressing to workers (Pierce, 1995; Pugliesi, 1999; Pugliesi & Shook, 1997). Most organizations have implicit or explicit requirements related to emotion regulation and display by employees. These requirements are particularly central in jobs that involve high levels of interaction with customers, such as customer service roles (Totterdell & Holman, 2003). In such roles, the manner in which employees manage their feelings and expressions can influence the effectiveness of their interactions with customers and is considered a critical requirement of customer service (Hochschild, 1983; Parkinson, 1991; Pugh, 2001; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Sutton, 1991). When people regulate their emotions as part of their job, they are said to be undertaking emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983). The consequences of emotional labor for employees are complex and are based on a variety of perspectives (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Hochschild, 1983; Morris & Feldman, 1996). Grandey (2000) suggests that a broad emotion theory is important to understand and make predictions about the mechanism of emotional labor. Gross (1998, p. 275) defines emotion regulation as ‘the processes by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions’. Grandey defines emotional labor as the process of regulating both feelings and expressions for organizational goals, which involves surface acting and deep action. The process of surface acting

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denotes the management of external expressions) and deep acting involves the process of managing internal feelings. The notion of management of emotions within one’s internal self and also in relations to one’s external environment is also shared by other scholars (e.g. Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989; Dodge, 1989). Fig. 1 offers a graphical representation of three forms of emotion regulation: intra-domain (self), inter-domain (environment), and interpersonal emotion regulation. Dodge (1989, p. 340) describes emotion regulation as the process ‘‘by which activation in one response domain serves to alter, titrate, or modulate activation in another response domain.’’ The type of regulation is the usual way in which children learn how to control emotional response and to become skilled at it (Kopp, 1989). Fig. 1 shows that one’s social and organizational environments comprise many supportive and disruptive forces that have implications for biological, cognitive, and behavioral domains of one’s personality. The intra-domain type of emotion regulation, which may occur at many stages in life including childhood, deals with the modulation of one aspect of responding in a particular domain according to another aspect of responding in the same domain (Porges, 1991). Campos et al. (1989) suggest that interpersonal emotion regulation is associated with one’s interaction and manipulation of one’s social environment. In the next section, the modulation of one’s response in a particular domain based on one’s interaction with and manipulation of one’s social

INTERPERSONAL ENVIRONMENT

SELF NeuroPhysiologicalBiochemical Domain

CognitiveExperiential Domain

Fig. 1.

Supportive Elements

MotorBehavioral Domain

Disruptive Elements

Three Domains of Emotion Regulation (Source: Reproduced with permission from Dodge & Garber, 1991).

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environment will be examined. The analysis will highlight some of the possible implications of employees’ social experiences on the emotion regulation process.

SOCIAL DOMAIN AND EMOTION REGULATION Emotions are socially regulated, prescribed, and learned as part of our predispositions or habitus and therefore appear deeply natural (Bourdieu, 1986; Colley, 2003; Heller, 1979; Raz & Rafaeli, 2007). Emotion norms in a society differ on the basis of gender, class, and other forms of social identity. They are also determined by the different tasks allocated to each social grouping within the division of labor exercised by the prevailing mode of production. Such tasks are themselves ascribed different values. For example, ‘‘working-class’’ women in patriarchal capitalist societies undertake the more difficult and demanding tasks of caring and other ‘‘feminine’’ jobs, such as teaching and nursing. Irrespective of their actual significance, these jobs are not highly valued within social and organizational contexts and hence remain low-paid and low-status (Colley, 2003). There is some evidence that the gendering and classing of jobs and the related emotional labor is closely linked to another phenomenon, i.e. social representation of individuals. The notion of social representation is instrumental in understanding how individuals behave within different social and organizational contexts. It explains how systems of values, ideas, and practices influence individuals’ orientations and interactions within social and material contexts. The concept has been used to study religious beliefs (Moscovici, 1983, p. 135), class struggle (Moscovici, 1984), health (Herzlich, 1973) as well as childhood, urban space, the human body, and interpersonal relations (Farrr & Moscovici, 1984). For the purposes of exploring contextual emotional labor, it is important to investigate how social representations differ as function of group membership and of the social conditions that produce such variations (Campbell, Muncer, & Coyle, 1992, p. 96). A person’s social conditions may render him vulnerable to the effects of emotional dissonance (Simpson & Stroh, 2004). The dissonance is shaped by such persons’ social identities, such as gender and/or social class, and how these identities are treated within different contexts. The phenomenon can be explained through the concept of emotional expressiveness, which refers to the degree to which actually felt emotions are communicated in interpersonal interactions (Ganong & Coleman, 1985). Emotional

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expressiveness is shaped by the social construct of one’s individual attributes such as gender, age, and class. For example, research has shown that being female is associated with the unconstrained communication of actually felt emotions to others. In contrast, males have a greater ability to hide experienced emotions from others and pretend alternative emotional states (Ashmore, Del Boca, & Wohlers, 1986; Fabes & Martin, 1991). Thus, the experiences of emotional labor are generally likely to be more demanding for some persons, such as female employees, based on their social identity.

Moral Values and Cognitive Structures The term moral is usually described as behavioral conformance with socially acceptable values or standards. The violation of morality results in a number of specific cognitive structures that determine one’s qualitative experience of the aversive changes of affective state, which are influenced by the socialization process. Aronfreed (1968) identifies three types of cognitive structures – fear, guilt, and shame – that may help in distinguishing among the aversive affective states in reaction to transgressions (p. 243). Shame arises from violations of one’s ideal self whereas embarrassment arises from violations of one’s personal or situated identity (Babcock & Sabini, 1990). It is a self-referent emotion because of centrality of individual understanding of self in this emotional experience (Eisenberg, 2000; McNally, 2003). Shame is usually related to negative behavioral experiences including depression, self-degradation, interpersonal anxiety, and perfectionism (Lutwak, Panish, Ferrari, & Razzino, 2001). Fear may be described as a qualitative experience determined by cognitive orientation of the subject (Aronfreed, 1968, p. 244). The anticipation of being shamed or ridiculed can be classified as fear since it signifies a cognitive focus on a source of anxiety. Many reactions to transgression in the Western societies, such as the Christian tradition of confession, are equally likely to occur in a cognitive context more close to fear. A Muslim working woman, for example, remains fearful of the dishonor that she can bring to her family by indulging in anything perceived immodest by her society. She at the same time experiences anxiety and depression about the negative backlash by her mere presence and participation in a supposedly male economic order (Syed et al., 2005). The case of Muslim woman, in the remainder of this chapter, will be explained in detail as an exemplar of the emotional labor caused by the inconsistency of one’s societal and organizational norms.

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A Muslim woman by virtue of her social and early childhood experiences may face the aversive states, which are simultaneously characterized by fear, guilt, and shame, depending upon the nature of her transgression (Syed et al., 2005). Her transgression may be a slight one, for instance, not wearing a headscarf or Chador (a big loose cloth to wrap around the body) in the presence of Mehram males (i.e. those related to them). Or it may be of a more defiant nature such as her decision to seek formal employment in a male-dominated organization. Higher the intensity of transgression, higher is the likelihood of her feelings of guilt, fear, and shame in front of her society and her own person. According to Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf, and Cooper (2003), some of these experiences may be personal in origin, such as name calling, insulting, or ridicule, while others may be organizationally derived, such as work type–gender type discrimination, assigning demeaning work, excessive performance monitoring. However, the interpretation of such experiences and corresponding feelings of shame and embarrassment remains a highly contextual phenomenon. The concepts of guilt and shame are closely associated despite their significant differences (Harder & Lewis, 1986; Lutwak et al., 2001). Both may be categorized as aversive states that follow a transgression. Guilt is related to the quality of the transgressor’s affective experience determined by moral evaluation of transgression. The term is sometimes used indiscriminately to refer to a variety of different aversive affective experiences. Shame is related to transgressor’s experience determined by a cognitive orientation toward the visibility of transgression (Aronfreed, 1968, p. 249). A Muslim woman, who defies social and religious norms, by stepping out of her house and working with her male colleagues and customers (Syed, 2008), remains vulnerable to both of these emotions. Her moral evaluation of the transgression (breach of the religious and/or cultural norms of modesty and sexual segregation) makes her guilty of defiance of moral values (Syed et al., 2005). Because of the visibility of this defiance, she may bring shame for herself and possibly for her family. Due to the existing structural barriers, such as restrictions on her mobility outside four walls of her house, a Muslim working woman experiences the feelings of shame and related negative behavioral outcomes. By working in the male order of formal employment, she experiences ‘‘a self conscious awareness that is being viewed, or might be viewed, by others with an unflattering gaze’’ (Greenwald & Harder, 1998, p. 227). Her feelings of shame may make her want to shrink from others (Trumbull, 2003). She suffers from humiliation that accompanies an ‘‘undeserved image of oneself ’’ which ‘‘can mobilize a conscious intention to right the wrong’’ (p. 234).

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The experience may generate the internal concept of self as ‘‘no good’’ where focus on her own person is completely on ‘‘self ’’ resulting in uncertainty, inability to think clearly, inability to talk, and inability to act (Lewis, 1992, p. 35). Moreover, there is clear clinical and empirical evidence for link between shame, guilt, depression, and anxiety (Ghatavi, Nicolson, Macdonald, Osher, & Levitt, 2002; Harder, Cutler, & Rockart, 1992). She thus remains vulnerable to the feelings of shame, guilt, depression, and anxiety, as a result of her decision to work outside her house. The essence of shame is a cognitive focus on the appearance that ought not to show. A Muslim woman’s very decision to step out of her house reduces her to a visible object of observation and criticism. She experiences shame in addition to fear and guilt by transgressing the Islamic code of modesty. Her feelings of vulnerability to observation are intimately associated with shame. For instance, many Muslim women from elite families in rural areas of Pakistan toss off their Burqa (an extreme kind of veil covering a woman from head to toe) or Chador as soon as they reach urban cities of Lahore, Karachi, or Islamabad. The same women take care to be clad in their original Burqa while returning to their hometowns so that the transgression may remain invisible to their immediate society. Shame and fear are thus closely intertwined in the traditional Islamic society, as a cognitive focus on the visibility of transgression will blend with the focus on its punitive consequences for the transgressor. The phenomenon was clearly witnessed during the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan (Hirschkind & Mahmood, 2002). There is, thus, a gendered dimension to the experiences of emotional labor. Men and women differ in dominant direction of control that they experience in their interaction with their social environment (Aronfreed, 1968, p. 329). The difference is attributable to their respective status in professional or social organizations (Aronfreed, 1961; Parsons, 1953). For example, persons in Islamic order are expected to observe Islamic values that are somewhat different for both genders. As Doi (1989) explains, the code of modesty is practically more stringent for women than for men due to evils present in the society. From a psychological perspective, the values that are relevant to the control of conduct (such as modesty in dress and conversation) can be changed substantially when one is in a stressful situation (Lifton, 1961). The values may also be changed due to persuasion (such as religious concepts of modesty and virtue) and by a person’s conformity to behavioral demands (such as safeguarding family honor), which are initially discrepant with her personal values and by other ordinary modes of social influence (Brock & Buss, 1964; Kelman, 1965). While the

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dimensions of cognitive structures are generally formed throughout the entire course of socialization in a Muslim woman’s lifetime, their roots are laid in early patterns of social interaction in her home and family. This point has been further explained in the following section.

Internalization of Aversive Control Internalization refers to one’s adoption of societal norms or role as one’s own and to the resulting evaluative control of one’s behavior by some of the most complex function of cognitive and verbal processes (Kohlberg, 1969). The mechanisms of internalized control of behavior are superimposed upon, often displacing the functional characteristics of concrete external events (Aronfreed, 1968). For example, a girl child in a Muslim family is likely to internalize the morally right behavior as is expected of her by her society. Many such forms of human behavior, such as the suppression of emotions and constraints on the manner and place of eliminative functions, are a result of initial acquisitions under conditions of relatively high magnitudes of aversive and other psychological experiences. There are two types of internal monitors that offer mediation of conditioned affectivity and the control of one’s own behavior (Aronfreed, 1968). The first monitor consists of behavioral cues directly inherent in one’s performance of an act, generally during one’s childhood. The second monitor comprises more complex information in cognitive processes related to the capacity to represent and evaluate personal behavior and the external context. The cognitive control of affective states gradually emerges with advancing development in one’s life. Cognition acquires more representational and anticipatory function. The affective states may be further classified into two categories: positive (pleasant) and aversive (unpleasant or painful). Schachter (1964) reported experiments illustrating the quality of a person’s affective arousal by information from the social environment. The distinction between positive and negative affective states offers the broad outline of the internalization process in one’s personality. An understanding of the mechanisms of socialization needs a general understanding of the affective and cognitive components of learning. Behavioral suppression has been broadly defined to include ‘‘any reduction in the probability of one form of behavior, relative to the probabilities of other forms, as a result of punishment or other avenues of aversive learning’’ (Aronfreed, 1968, p. 162). A person’s entire experience of internalized behavior is attributable to both positive and aversive controls.

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There is, however, some evidence of internalization in situational assessment of the suppression of behavior that is under social prohibition, for instance, in assessment of the conformity to rules in the absence of external monitoring (e.g. Grinder, 1962; Sears, Rau, & Alpert, 1965). In these situations, there is a large component of aversive control. The suppression of an active form of behavior, such as confident interaction of a Muslim working woman with her male colleagues, offers an example of the internalization of aversive control over one’s social conduct. The phenomenon explains the typically shy and inhibitive nature of women in Islamic society. Early social experiences of a girl child (e.g. the way she is treated second to her male brother) may establish her alternative dispositions, which curtail the development of certain emotions, such as aggression, confidence, and self-assurance (Whiting & Child, 1953).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The chapter has examined the sociological and psychological implications of moral values and social experiences for emotion regulation within employment contexts. It has argued that emotional tension set up between the socio-cultural contexts of the organization and common workplace cultures suggests many intersections with undertaking emotion work. The chapter has incorporated the socio-cultural and business contexts into a model of emotional labor. This moves the focus always from a concept of emotional labor primarily based around a work-role and instead looks at the tension between job, managerial culture, individual identity, and wider social contexts. The chapter has discussed that display rules are not only subject to occupational and organizational norms but also to societal norms. The content of display rules my conform to racial, ethnic and gender stereotypes. The possible conflict between organizational and societal display rules may cause emotional labor for the job incumbents. Furthermore, the pre-market socialization processes render some persons more vulnerable to the effects of emotional dissonance. Table 1 offers a summary of the key arguments presented in this chapter. It shows that socialization processes affect emotional labor experienced by individuals, and that, in addition to occupational and organizational norms, display rules remain subject to societal norms. Such perspective supports the argument that emotions arise through social interaction; are shaped by interpersonal, cultural, and

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Table 1.

Implications of Societal Norms on Emotional Labor.

Factor

Description

Implication

Socialization process

 Emotions arise through social interaction, are shaped by interpersonal, cultural and situational conditions, and are managed by workers along with physical and mental labor in their organizations (Martin, 1999; Syed et al., 2005)  Emotions are socially regulated, prescribed and learned as part of our pre-dispositions or habitus, and therefore appear deeply natural (Bourdieu, 1986; Colley, 2003; Heller, 1979; Jaspers & Fraser, 1984)  The pre-market socialization processes operate to make some persons more vulnerable to the effects of emotional dissonance (Simpson & Stroh, 2004)  Emotion work that occurs in the context of the social relations of the workplace is the most salient and distressing to workers (Pierce, 1995; Pugliesi & Shook, 1997; Pugliesi, 1999)

Socialization processes affect emotional labor experienced by individuals

Display rules

 Display rules are prescriptive social norms, dictating how, when, and where emotions should be suppressed or expressed (Simpson & Stroh, 2004)  Are subject to occupational norms but also to societal and organizational norms (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993)  May conform to racial, ethnic, and gender stereotypes (Brody, 2000)  Occupational and organizational norms are not always consistent with societal norms (Syed et al., 2005)

Display rules are subject to organizational as well as societal norms

Cognitive reaction

 Three types of cognitive structures – fear, guilt, and shame – may arise in reaction to transgression (Aronfreed, 1968)

Fear, guilt and shame may arise in reaction to transgression

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Table 1. (Continued ) Factor

Description

Implication

 Shame results from moral transgressions. It is related to negative behavioral experiences including depression, self-degradation, interpersonal anxiety, and perfectionism (Davidoff, 2002; Eisenberg, 2000; Ghatavi et al., 2002; Harder et al., 1992; Lewis, 2004; Lutwak et al., 2001; McNally, 2003; Ortony et al., 1988; Tangney et al., 1996)  A person is expected to find it distasteful or aversive to have two cognitions, which are significantly inconsistent with one another (Festinger, 1957). Guilt, shame, and derision are both distal antecedents and central elements of the disorder (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1991) Behavioral suppression

 Moral values convey a sense of attachment and obligation to other human beings (Aronfreed, 1968)  Internalization refers to one’s adoption of social norms or role as one’s own, and to the resulting evaluative control of one’s behavior by some of the most complex function of cognitive and verbal processes (Kohlberg, 1969)  Behavioral suppression involves any reduction in the probability of one form of behavior, relative to other forms, as a result of punishment or other forms of aversive learning (Aronfreed, 1968)

Moral values may result in behavioral suppression

situational conditions, and are managed by workers along with physical and mental labor in their organizations (Martin, 1999). As shown in Table 1, there are a number of important implications of moral values for emotion regulation in organizations. For example, moral values may result in behavioral suppression and certain cognitive structures,

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such as fear, guilt and shame, may arise in reaction to the transgression of moral values. As discussed, the conflicting requirements of one’s social and employment contexts may require one to transgress one’s moral values to fulfill job requirements. It is, therefore, important to examine the aversive states that may follow one’s transgression within social and employment contexts and the manners in which they are managed. The chapter has discussed that the effects of early social experiences of a person’s life on her alternative dispositions are important which may influence the development of certain emotions, such as aggression, power and pleasure. Accordingly, a person is likely to internalize the morally right behavior as is expected of her by their society. The nature and the extent of transgression may have adverse effects on her personal identity creating corresponding feelings of exposure, degradation, situational avoidance, and silence. The example of Muslim working woman was offered in this chapter to illustrate the emotional challenge that a person may face because of the conflicting requirements of the display rules imposed by work and society. Her emotional struggle is not confined to or dictated by the nature of a specific job. Instead, her very decision to work in a formal organization may bring her in face to face with a highly sensitive social impasse. He work and societal roles may require her to display or suppress two conflicting sets of emotions, such as shyness and aggression, fear, and strength. Due to the Islamic concept of female modesty and the related institution of sexual segregation, her organizational experiences may comprise a blend of differentiating (such as fear and anxiety), and masking emotions (such as restraint and inhibition) instead of integrative ones (such as love, friendliness, pride, and pleasure) (Kemper, 1984; Mann, 1997; Wharton & Erickson, 1993). It must, however, be acknowledged that the contextual emotional labor is moderated by one’s individual personality. One’s social identities and corresponding social values require one to conform to specific societal display norms. Indeed, pre-socialization processes render some employees more vulnerable to the effects of emotional dissonance. The dissonance is shaped by one’s social identities, such as gender and ethnicity, and the way in which such identities are treated within social and organizational contexts. For example, research has shown that being female is associated with the unconstrained communication of actually felt emotions to others. On the contrary, males have a greater ability to conceal or mask experienced emotions from others and pretend alternative emotional states (Ashmore et al., 1986; Fabes & Martin, 1991). The relationship between gender and emotional dissonance is also supported by Kruml and Geddes (1998) whose study suggests that women are usually more likely to report feeling

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differently than experienced. This also explains Hochschild’s (1983) early finding that the social construct of gender is an important issue for emotional labor, evident by the fact that the majority of service jobs are performed by women. In contrast, one’s organizational contexts require one to conform to organizational or occupational display norms which may be inconsistent with one’s societal display rules. It results in the contextual emotion regulation, which may involve suppressing, intensifying, or faking emotions, achieved either cognitively or behaviorally (Totterdell & Holman, 2003, p. 57). A person is expected to find it distasteful or aversive to have a cognition that is significantly different from required behavior (Festinger, 1957). Such a person will be motivated either to change her cognition to match the behavior or to cease the behavior.

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CHAPTER 12 A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ATTRIBUTION–EMOTION– BEHAVIOR FRAMEWORK IN THE CONTEXT OF UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR Paul Harvey, Mark J. Martinko and Nancy Borkowski ABSTRACT Building on a recent study of Weiner’s (1985a) attribution–emotion– behavior model, we examine the extent to which negative affective states mediate the relationship between attributions for undesirable outcomes and the ability to justify ethically questionable behaviors. Results of a scenario-based study indicated that causal attributions were associated with affective states and behavioral justification in the general manner predicted. Affective states were not associated with behavior justification, however, indicating that only a direct association between attributions and justification existed. Implications for future research on attributions and emotions are discussed.

Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 259–283 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04012-1

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INTRODUCTION Since it was published in 1985, Weiner’s (1985a) achievement–motivation model has frequently served as the theoretical foundation for research linking attributions and behaviors. Based on the premise that causal perceptions for unexpected and/or personally relevant events help to shape emotional reactions, and that these emotions motivate behaviors, Weiner’s framework provides a means for applying attribution theory to the study of organizational behavior. In spite of, or perhaps because of, the logical soundness of Weiner’s (1985a) arguments, many aspects of his model, including the links between attributions, emotions, and behaviors, have not been subject to empirical testing. A recent study by Harvey, Martinko, and Borkowski (2007) addressed this research gap but indicated only mixed support for Weiner’s (1985a) propositions. In response, we have developed and tested a refined model linking attributions, affective states, and behaviors. In this chapter we will discuss the results of the follow-up study, along with implications for Weiner’s (1985a) model and the study of attributions and emotions. The chapter begins with an overview of attribution theory and the achievement–motivation model. The results of the aforementioned Harvey et al. (2007) study are then summarized, followed by a description of the rationale, results, and implications of a new study designed to improve our understanding of the attribution–emotion–behavior relationship.

ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND THE ACHIEVEMENT–MOTIVATION MODEL Attribution theory is based on the notion that individuals have an innate desire to understand the causes of outcomes and behaviors that are relevant to their lives (Heider, 1958). Attributions are the causal perceptions that individuals form when trying to explain these outcomes and behaviors. Heider argued that the cognitive process associated with the formation of attributions represents an important adaptive mechanism by which individuals learn to cope with their environments. By helping individuals understand the causes of positive and negative events, attributions allow people to encourage the former while avoiding the latter. Since Heider’s (1958) book was published, attribution theory has been used to explain a number of organizationally relevant outcomes and behaviors.

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Green and Mitchell (1979) developed, and subsequently tested (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981, 1982; Mitchell & Wood, 1980; Wood & Mitchell, 1981), an attributional model of leader responses to poor subordinate performance. Results of this research generally supported the notion that leaders respond to poor performance more harshly when the performance is attributed to insufficient effort as opposed to insufficient ability (see Martinko, Harvey, & Douglas, 2007 for a review). Researchers have also used attribution theory to help explain managers’ decisions during selection processes (Kimble & Moriarty, 1979; Silvester, 1997; Silvester, Anderson-Gough, Anderson, & Mohamed, 2002). Additionally, attributional perceptions have been linked to aggression (Douglas & Martinko, 2001), deviance (Harvey et al., 2007), motivation levels (Campbell & Martinko, 1998), leader evaluations (Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002), leader–member relationship quality (Martinko & Gardner, 1987; Martinko, Moss, Douglas, & Borkowski, 2007), and a host of other outcomes.

The Achievement–Motivation Model Much, though not all, of the aforementioned attributional research has recognized that there is likely to be an emotional component in the relationship between attributions and behaviors. For example, Douglas and Martinko (2001) argued that undesirable workplace outcomes that were attributed to external causes would be associated with feelings of anger that would, in turn, increase the likelihood of an aggressive response. This attribution–emotion–behavior relationship is a key component of Weiner’s (1985a) model. More specifically, Weiner (1985a) argued that personally relevant and/or unexpected outcomes (e.g., getting fired, receiving a promotion) initiate a rudimentary positive or negative affective response. This initial emotional response is argued to initiate a causal search process in which an attribution for the outcome is formed. This attribution can be internal or external in nature, stable or unstable, controllable or uncontrollable, intentional or unintentional. Based on the type of attribution formed in this process, a more refined, discrete emotional response is thought to form. According to Weiner’s (1985a) logic, negative outcomes that are attributed to external and controllable factors (e.g., attributing job loss to organizational injustice) will promote feelings of anger. This is because an external entity is perceived to have deliberately wronged the perceiver. Conversely, the attribution of negative outcomes to internal and controllable factors (e.g., attributing a

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poor performance review to insufficient effort) is thought to cause guilt, because the perceiver understands that the outcome could have been avoided. Weiner’s model also indicated that a third emotional response, shame, is likely when negative outcomes are associated to internal and uncontrollable factors (e.g., attributing poor performance to insufficient intelligence). These attribution-driven emotions, in turn, are thought to help shape behavioral responses to the outcome or event that initiated the attributional process. The model also makes predictions concerning positive emotions (e.g., internal attributions for positive outcomes are associated with pride, external attributions for positive outcomes are associated with gratitude). In this chapter, as with most attributional research, we will limit our focus to attributions and emotions stemming from negative outcomes. The reason for this is, as Weiner (1985b) and others have noted, deliberate and detailed attributional searches are most likely to occur in response to negative events, which are more likely than positive events to meet the criteria of being unexpected. While Weiner’s (1985a) framework provides a logical means for understanding the relationship between attributions, emotions, and behaviors, it does have several limitations. First, and perhaps most importantly, it does not explicitly consider an exhaustive range of attributions. For example, the emotional consequences of externally controllable causes are considered but the effects of external and uncontrollable attributions are not specifically analyzed. Instead, Weiner discusses several discrete emotions and identifies the attributions that are likely to promote each. This is an effective means for understanding the attributional bases of specific emotions, but leaves the emotional consequences of other attributions unexplored. Secondly, as noted above, many aspects of Weiner’s model have not been empirically tested. In the next section we summarize a study that tested these attributional components of the model.

EXPANDING AND TESTING THE ACHIEVEMENT–MOTIVATION MODEL Harvey et al.’s (2007) study was designed to empirically test the attribution– emotion–behavior component of Weiner’s (1985a) model. Unlike Weiner, who identified discrete emotions and then developed arguments concerning the attributional foundations for each, Harvey et al. (2007) began by

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identifying attributions and then developed hypotheses concerning the emotional consequences of each. High and low levels of three attributional dimensions, locus of causality, stability, and controllability, were examined, resulting in a 2  2  2 study design with eight attributional combinations. Where applicable, Weiner’s (1985a) logic was used to hypothesize attribution–emotion relationships. In other cases, exploratory hypotheses were developed. The influence of each emotion on behavioral responses was also examined.

Study Design The Harvey et al. (2007) study used a scenario design with eight different scenarios, one corresponding to each of the attributional conditions described in Table 1. Participants were randomly placed into one of these eight experimental groups. The study included two distinct samples; one consisted of undergraduate students, the other consisted of physicians. A separate set of scenarios was developed for each sample. In both cases, the scenarios presented a negative outcome (i.e., receiving a bad grade or forgetting to order a test for a patient). To cue the intended attributions, the cause of the outcome was manipulated in terms of locus of causality (i.e., internal or external cause), stability, and controllability. For example, in the student study, the scenario for the externally controllable and stable condition informed participants that their bad grade was due to their instructors’ refusal to clarify consistently unclear instructions. Attributions were measured using modified items from the Organizational Attribution Style Questionnaire (OASQ, Kent & Martinko, 1995) and Table 1.

Summary of Attributional Manipulations Tested by Harvey et al. (2007).

Experimental Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Attributional Manipulation External, stable, controllable Internal, stable, uncontrollable Internal, unstable, controllable Internal, stable, controllable External, unstable, uncontrollable External, stable, uncontrollable Internal, unstable, uncontrollable External, unstable, controllable

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discrete emotions were measured using a modified version of the PANAS scale (Watson & Clark, 1994). After responding to measures of these variables, participants were asked to read a second part of the scenario in which they were told that they could engage in an ethically questionable behavior that would reverse the problem described in the first part of the scenario. Student participants were told that their instructor had lost their grade and they had the opportunity to report a higher grade than they actually earned without getting caught. The physician participants were told they could alter their paperwork to make it look like the mistake had not occurred. Participants’ ability to justify this behavior was measured using a modified version of Reidenbach and Robin’s (1990) scale. Study Hypotheses Harvey et al.’s (2007) study consisted of two sets of hypotheses, four based on the logic of Weiner (1985a) and others, and four that were more exploratory in nature. In this section we will briefly describe each. Please see Harvey et al. (2007) for a more thorough description of the rationale behind these arguments. The first hypothesis corresponded to the first condition described in Table 1 and predicted that negative outcomes that were attributable to external, stable, and controllable factors would promote anger. This hypothesis was based on Weiner’s (1985a) model and other research (Averill, 1983), suggesting that anger is likely when responsibility for a negative outcome is assigned to an external person or entity. This anger, in turn, was expected to facilitate the ethically questionable behavior by making it appear more justifiable (see Greenberg, 1990 for a similar argument). The next hypothesis predicted that negative outcomes attributed to internal, stable, and uncontrollable factors would promote shame. As Weiner (1985a) explained, shame is generally associated with perceptions of inability and low levels of control. This shame, in turn, was predicted to facilitate the justification of the unethical behavior as a means for hiding the source of the shame. The third and fourth hypotheses were based on Weiner’s (1985a) argument that internal and controllable attributions for negative events would promote guilt. This argument was split into two hypotheses so that the influence of high and low levels of stability on guilt could also be examined. Feelings of guilt were predicted to inhibit justification of the

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behavior, based on the notion that ethical and constructive solutions are usually available to solve problems caused by internally controllable factors (e.g., working harder). The remaining hypotheses corresponded to Conditions 4–8 in Table 1. These attributional conditions have not received direct theoretical or empirical attention in past research. It was predicted that each of these attributions would be associated with frustration and that, if any relationship existed at all, they would be negatively associated with the ethically questionable behaviors.

Study Results A large amount of variation between the results of the two samples was observed. In the student sample, participants in the external, stable, and controllable condition reported the highest levels of anger. Those in conditions where internal factors caused the negative outcomes reported the highest levels of shame and guilt, although internally controllable attributions were more strongly associated with shame than were internally uncontrollable attributions. The attributions in Conditions 4–8 were only moderately associated with frustration and were not strongly associated with the other three emotions. Participants in conditions where the negative outcomes were associated with external and stable causes reported the highest justification scores, followed by those in external and unstable conditions. Contrary to expectations, none of the discrete emotions measured mediated the attribution–justification relationships, per Baron and Kenny’s (1986) criteria. Anger, shame, and guilt did influence justification scores independently, however, with anger positively predicting justification and shame and guilt inhibiting justification. Attribution–emotion relationships in the physician sample were relatively muted. Only anger was associated with attributions, and was unexpectedly highest in the internally controllable conditions. Justification scores for the physicians were substantially lower than they were in the student group, and were highest among those in the stable and uncontrollable cause conditions (locus of causality did not influence these scores). Additionally, none of the emotions measured were significantly associated with justification scores. The authors concluded that these muted and somewhat counter-intuitive findings could likely be explained by the employment of schemata that were the result of unique social norms, experiences, education, and moral development commonly observed among physicians. As such, this appears

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to be an example of a population in which situational forces evoked schemata that were strong enough to override the specifics of the situations such that they did not have a strong influence on expressed attributions and the emotions did not have a strong impact on behaviors that were evoked (Harvey et al., 2007).

Conclusions In both of the samples just described, a number of findings were observed that were inconsistent with Weiner’s (1985a) logic. Because the findings in the physician sample may have been influenced by very unique situationspecific influences that evoked schemata rather than explicit attributions, it can be argued that the findings from the student sample are most representative of the process by which attributions and emotions influence behaviors, at least in the context of ethically ambiguous situations. Even in this sample, however, Harvey et al. (2007) observed two broad and unexpected trends. First, the relationship between attributions and discrete emotions often took unexpected forms. The distinction between internal and external causes was not as strong as predicted and levels of stability and control often influenced emotions in ways that were contrary to Weiner’s (1985a) expectations (e.g., the aforementioned case of shame). Further, the distinction between the discrete emotions was more blurred than had been expected, with shame–guilt and anger–frustration having similar attributional roots. These findings suggest that participants may not see these negative emotions as being highly distinct affective states. Second, although attributions and emotions both appeared to influence participants’ ability to justify ethically questionable behaviors, they appeared to do so independently. Combined with the fact that the association between attributions and these emotions often took unexpected forms, we are left to question whether attribution–emotion relationships may be more complex and schema-driven than previously thought. In looking at these results on the whole, we are also led to question whether it is advisable to try to peg specific attributions to discrete emotional responses. Instead, these findings lead us to suspect that it may be more efficacious to examine variance in broader affective states as a result of different attributions. This approach may help to avoid the possibility that different participants define specific emotions in different ways, and may facilitate attributional research by not requiring that researchers

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pre-determine which specific emotions to measure in a given study. To examine the usefulness of this approach, a follow-up to the Harvey et al. (2007) study was developed. We now turn our attention to this study.

A REVISED PERSPECTIVE ON THE ATTRIBUTION– EMOTION–BEHAVIOR RELATIONSHIP In the present study, the same basic experimental design used in the Harvey et al. (2007) study was employed. The same scenarios were used, along with the same measurement scales, with the exception of the emotion measure (see below). The scope of this study was reduced, however, to focus specifically on the more interesting findings from the previous study. As such, only the experimental conditions that were rooted in existing theory (i.e., Conditions 1–4 in Table 1) were included in this study. These conditions are most relevant to Weiner’s (1985a) model and also had the most pronounced affect on emotions and behaviors in the Harvey et al. (2007) study. In order to maximize the extent to which the results from the two studies could be compared, a student sample similar to the one examined in the previous study was used (i.e., similar age range, enrolled in the same course). The key difference in the present study is that affective states, as opposed to discrete emotions, were examined. Affective states are more general than discrete emotions such as anger or guilt, and often lack a specific cause (Forgas, 1995). In the context of Weiner’s (1985a) framework, affective states are similar to the unrefined affective reactions thought to precede the formation of attributions. We argue, however, that measures of affective states, such as Watson and Clark’s (1994) PANAS-X scale, might be useful in capturing the full range of emotions individuals experience after encountering a negative outcome. Because the Harvey et al. (2007) study suggested that participants might vary in their conceptualizations of discrete emotions, we suspect that a broader measure of affect might reveal a more realistic picture of emotional responses. Thus, while we predict that attributions are associated with emotional responses in the manner that Weiner (1985a) predicted, it may be more efficacious to measure affective states. Additionally, although broad mood states are thought to have less direct influences on behavioral responses than discrete emotions, studies have shown that positive and negative affective states can influence behaviors such as helping (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973), creativity

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(Martin & Stoner, 1996), and risk-taking (Isen, 1984). As such, the hypotheses developed in the next section are based on the notion that causal attributions help shape behaviors, and that this relationship is at least partially due to the influence of attributions on affective states.

Hypotheses Like the Harvey et al. (2007) study, it is predicted that negative outcomes caused by externally controllable and stable factors are positively associated with strong negative emotions. Instead of linking these attributions to anger specifically, however, we predict that they will be associated with more strongly negative affective states than any of the other attributional combinations described below. Similar to the arguments described above, the logic behind this relationship is that individuals experience resentment when they feel that another person or entity is responsible for a negative outcome and could have prevented it from occurring (Averill, 1983; Weiner, 1985a). Thus, the greater the extent to which a negative outcome can be attributed to external, stable, and controllable factors, the more negative the resulting emotional state is expected to be. Hypothesis 1. Negative outcomes attributable to stable and externally controllable factors are associated with more negative affective states than are negative outcomes attributable to other factors. Our second hypothesis concerns the Condition 2 attributions noted in Table 1 (i.e., internally uncontrollable and stable attributions for negative outcomes). These attributions are also predicted to promote negative affective states, but we predict that they will be slightly less severe than those associated with the stable and externally controllable attributions described in Hypothesis 1. This is because negative emotions are thought to be strongest when they are focused on an external target and when someone can be deemed responsible for the negative trigger event (Averill, 1983; Weiner, 1980). In the case of internally uncontrollable emotions, there is no external target and the uncontrollable nature of the cause (e.g., insufficient intelligence) indicates a lack of responsibility. Combined, these factors are thought to attenuate the strength of the negative affective state. The stability of the cause, however, affects expectations for future outcomes in a negative manner, causing individuals to expect similar outcomes in the future. This attributional aspect is likely to offset some of the aforementioned attenuation, making a negative affective state more likely than a positive

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state. This affective state, however, is not expected to be as strong as that associated with externally controllable and stable attributions. Hypothesis 2. Negative outcomes attributable to stable and internally uncontrollable factors are associated with less negative affective states than are negative outcomes attributable to stable and externally controllable factors. Our next hypothesis concerns stable or unstable attributions for negative outcomes that are internal and controllable in nature. Though similar to the attributions noted in Hypothesis 2, their controllable nature is an important distinction. When negative outcomes can be attributed to factors over which the perceiver has control, which are almost always internal factors, individuals typically realize that they have the ability to remedy the undesirable situation. This presents a far less imposing set of circumstances for individuals than situations where problems are caused by an external entity (e.g., unjust treatment), or by factors that are beyond anyone’s control (e.g., lack of intelligence). Because of the relatively optimistic outlook for those who experience negative outcomes caused by internally controllable factors, such as insufficient effort, it is predicted that these attributions will be associated with relatively positive affective states. Hypothesis 3. Negative outcomes attributable to stable or unstable and internally controllable factors are associated with less negative affective states than are negative outcomes attributable to stable, externally controllable factors or to stable, internally uncontrollable factors. In our final hypothesis, we revisit the notion that negative emotional reactions to causal attributions can influence behaviors. The Harvey et al. (2007) study found some support for the notion that negative emotions facilitated the justification of ethically questionable behavior but indicated that these discrete emotions did not act as mediators of the attribution– behavior relationship. As noted, it is possible that the use of discrete emotions, as opposed to affective states, might have been overly restrictive and might have failed to capture the full influence of attributions on emotions. Thus, in the present study we investigate the possibility that broad negative affective states, which capture a wider range of negative emotions, might better explain the relationship between attributions and behaviors. We recognize that discrete emotions are more commonly associated with specific behavioral responses than affective states but argue that, in the

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context of attribution-driven behaviors, these more general emotional responses may interact with causal perceptions to drive behaviors. As noted in Hypothesis 1, externally controllable and stable attributions for negative outcomes are expected to cause especially negative affective states. We further argue that negative affective reactions such as this can help provoke a retaliatory response that may override a person’s desire to behave ethically (Greenberg, 1990; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). As Kemper (1966) noted, retaliatory behavior is often motivated by a desire to alleviate unpleasant negative emotions by ‘‘getting even’’ with those that have caused harm. It follows that more strongly negative emotional states will promote a greater desire to engage in retaliatory behaviors than less negative emotions. The attributions described in Hypotheses 2 and 3 are predicted to cause relatively less negative affective states. Although unpleasant and negative emotions are likely to occur when these attributions are made, the milder strength of the emotional states is predicted to make ethically questionable, retaliatory behaviors less justifiable. That is, these emotional states are not thought to be so strong that individuals are willing to engage in questionable behavior for the purposes of alleviating them. Additionally, Harvey et al. (2007) found that the attributions described in these hypotheses were not associated with unethical behavioral tendencies, further supporting the notion that the emotional response to these attributions is not negative enough to distort one’s judgment and make ethically questionable behaviors justifiable. Based on these arguments, we predict that a positive relationship exists between negative emotional states and the justification of ethically questionable behaviors. Hypothesis 4. Negative affective states associated with attributions for undesirable outcomes are positively related to the justification of ethically questionable behavior. Method Sample Three hundred and forty-seven students enrolled in an undergraduate management course participated in the study. Participants were offered nominal course credit for their participation. The sample consisted of 163 females (46.9%) and 184 males (53.1%). The mean age of the study participants was 21.8 years.

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Procedure As with the Harvey et al. (2007) study, a 2  2  2 study design was used with eight survey scenarios corresponding to the eight attributional conditions shown in Table 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental conditions. Although the present study only tested hypotheses based on Conditions 1–4, all eight scenarios were used in order to create a sample in which high and low levels of each attributional dimension existed. This allowed us to base our analyses on participants’ actual attributional perceptions, regardless of which of the eight scenarios they were given. The content of the scenarios was the same as that used in the Harvey et al. (2007) study. In each, students were informed of a hypothetical negative outcome (i.e., a poor grade) along with the cause of the outcome, which was manipulated across the eight conditions. Participants were then asked to respond to items that measured the strength of the attributional manipulation, followed by a measure of affective state. Participants were then asked to read the second part of the scenario, in which they were informed that they could misrepresent their performance and manipulate their grade. The final measure asked participants to rate the justifiability of this behavior.

Measures Attributions were measured using items adapted from the OASQ (Kent & Martinko, 1995). Responses were scored using a 7-point scale (Locus of Control: 1 ¼ ‘‘Completely due to me,’’ 7 ¼ ‘‘Completely due to other people or circumstances’’; Stability: 1= ‘‘Never present,’’ 7 ¼ ‘‘Always present’’; Controllability: 1 ¼ ‘‘Completely uncontrollable,’’ 7 ¼ ‘‘Completely controllable’’). Affective state was measured using the 10-item negative affect measure (a ¼ .83) from the PANAS scale (Watson & Clark, 1994). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which the hypothetical negative outcome would make them feel each of 10 negative emotions. As suggested by Watson and Clark (1994), the scale was adapted so that the study participants were asked to rate their anticipated emotion in the immediate time frame (i.e., right after experiencing the negative outcome). In this way, participants’ negative affective state, as opposed to the more dispositional negative affect trait, was measured. Responses were recorded using a 5-point scale (1 ¼ ‘‘Not at all,’’ 5 ¼ ‘‘Very strongly’’). Participants’ ability to justify the ethically questionable behavior was measured using an adapted version of Reidenbach and Robin’s (1990) scale (a ¼ .74).

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Responses were recorded on a 5-point scale (e.g., 1 ¼ ‘‘Definitely not justifiable,’’ 5 ¼ ‘‘Definitely Justifiable’’). Controls Age and gender were controlled, given their potential influence on emotions (Brody & Hall, 2000), and ethicality (Ambrose & Schminke, 1999). Results Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study variables are shown in Table 2. Hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regression analysis. The first set of analyses examined the relationship between causal attributions and affective states. For this analysis, as well as the subsequent analyses described below, centered attribution scores for each dimension were multiplied to create the interaction term that served as the predictor variable. These results, shown in Table 3, indicated that the interaction of the locus of causality and stability dimensions was related to affective states. The nature of this interaction is shown in Fig. 1. Following Aiken and West (1991) and Cohen and Cohen (1983), the relationship between attributions and affective states was plotted at low (one standard deviation below the mean) and high (one standard deviation above the mean) levels of stability and externality, and slopes were calculated based on these associations. This analysis indicated that the strongest relationship between attributions and negative affective state occurred when negative outcomes were attributed to

Table 2.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Gender Age Locus of causality Stability Controllability Negative affective state Behavioral justification

Note: N ¼ 347. po.05. po.01.

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations. Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

1.47 21.80 3.22 4.07 4.80 2.61 4.31

0.50 4.35 1.52 1.44 1.53 0.75 1.25

.10 .01 .03 .11 .03 .02

.01 .15 .07 .16 .07

.01 .39 .08 .02

.08 .04 .02

.13 .06

.09

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Table 3.

Results of Regression Analyses – Negative Affective State Regressed on Attributions.

Steps Step 1 Age Gender DR2

b .15 .02 .03

Step 2 Externality (A)a Stability (B) Control (C) DR2

.07 .04 .10 .02

Step 3 AB AC BC DR2

.12 .01 .02 .02

Step 4 ABC DR2

.05 .01

Note: N ¼ 347. po.05. po.01. a Centered attribution scores were used in this analysis.

external causes (slope b ¼ .10, po.05). The relationship between attributions and affective state did not reach significance when negative outcomes were attributed to internal factors (slope b ¼ .03, ns). As Fig. 1 indicates, the most negative affective states were associated with external and stable attributions for negative outcomes while the least negative affective states were associated with internal and stable attributions for these outcomes. The controllability dimension was not associated with negative affective states. The second set of analyses examined the association between attributions for the hypothetical negative outcomes and justification of the ethically questionable behaviors, in accordance with Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation test. As Table 4 shows, the interaction of the three attributional dimensions exhibited a significant influence on justification scores. This interaction is shown in Fig. 2. Simple effects analysis, in which the relationship between attributions and justification was plotted at high and

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Negative Affective State

2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2 Low Externality High Externality

1.9 1.8 Low

High Stability

Fig. 1.

Influence of Externality and Stability Attributions on Negative Affective State.

low levels of externality, stability, and controllability, indicated that the relationship between the stability of attributions and justification was strongest when the negative outcome was attributed to external and controllable factors (slope b ¼ .19, po.05). A weaker relationship was observed when attributions were external and uncontrollable (slope b ¼ .12, po.05), internal and controllable (slope b ¼ .07, ns), or internal and uncontrollable (slope b ¼ .03, ns). As Fig. 2 indicates, the ethically questionable behaviors were most easily justified among those who attributed negative outcomes to stable and externally controllable factors. The lowest justification levels were associated with unstable and internally controllable attributions. More generally, these results suggest that the behaviors appear more justifiable when negative outcomes are associated with external as opposed to internal causes, and stable as opposed to unstable causes. In the next set of analyses, justification scores were regressed onto affective state scores. Results did not indicate a significant association, suggesting that affective states were not associated with the justification of ethically questionable behaviors. This finding suggests that a mediated

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Table 4. Results of Regression Analyses – Justification of Ethically Questionable Behavior Regressed on Attributions. Steps

b

Step 1 Age Gender DR2

.08 .03 .01

Step 2 Externality (A)a Stability (B) Control (C) DR2

.02 .01 .08 .01

Step 3 AB AC BC DR2

.10 .07 .05 .02

Step 4 ABC DR2

.14 .02

Note: N ¼ 347. po.05. po.01. a Centered attribution scores were used in this analysis.

relationship between attributions, affective states, and the ability to justify ethically questionable behaviors does not exist (Baron & Kenny, 1986). As such, the final stage of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) test, in which the outcome variable (justification) is regressed onto the independent (attributional) and mediating (affective state) variables simultaneously was not performed.

DISCUSSION The purpose of this study was to re-examine Weiner’s (1985a) achievement– motivation model in the context of ethically questionable behavior, using broad affective states as opposed to discrete emotions to explain the relationship between attributions and behaviors. As with the Harvey et al. (2007) study summarized above, the present research was intended to test some of the tenets of Weiner’s (1985a) model that had received little or no

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7.0

6.0

5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

0.0 Low

High Stability

Fig. 2.

Low Controllability Low Externality

High Controllability Low Externality

Low Controllability High Externality

High Controllability High Externality

Influence of Externality, Stability, and Controllability Attributions on Justification of Ethically Questionable Behavior.

previous empirical investigation. Unlike the Harvey et al. (2007) study, however, the present study also examined the efficacy of using affective states to better understand the relationship between attributions and behaviors. Overall, the results did not indicate that affective states are better mediator of attribution-driven behaviors than discrete emotions, as we discuss below. Attribution–Affective State Relationships In Hypothesis 1, it was predicted that external, stable, and controllable attributions for undesirable outcomes would be associated with more negative affective states than other attributions. Although the controllability

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dimension did not influence justification scores in this sample, the locus of causality and stability dimensions were related to affective states in the predicted manner (see Fig. 1). As expected, the most strongly negative affective states were observed in the external and stable attribution conditions. As such, Hypothesis 1 was generally supported, with the exception of the controllability dimension. In the Harvey et al. (2007) all three dimensions were associated with anger emotions. Thus, it appears that attributions of control are associated with discrete anger emotions but not with broader affective states. This finding is not entirely surprising, given that the belief that someone else had control over a negative outcome is a key component of anger (Weiner, 1985a). In Hypothesis 2, it was reasoned that stable and internally uncontrollable attributions would be related to negative affective states that were less severe than those associated with externally controllable and stable factors. Results indicated that, although the controllability dimension was not associated with affective state, internal and stable attributions were associated with affective states that were significantly less negative than those associated with external and stable attributions (see Fig. 1). As such, Hypothesis 2 was generally supported, indicating that the attribution of negative events to factors such as insufficient intelligence are associated with less negative emotional states than the attribution of similar events to external factors. The third hypothesis predicted that stable or unstable and internally controllable attributions for undesirable events would be related to less negative affective states than the attributions described in Hypotheses 1 and 2. The fact that the controllability dimension of attributions was not associated with affective states makes it difficult to interpret the results in the context of this hypothesis, given that personal control attributions are the key element that differentiates these attributions from those described in Hypothesis 2. As Fig. 1 indicates, however, internal and unstable attributions were associated with negative affective states that were less negative than were external and stable attributions, a finding that lends partial support to Hypothesis 3. Internal and unstable attributions were also associated with more negative emotional states than internal and stable attributions, however, contrary to Hypothesis 3. This finding was surprising, given that internal and unstable causal factors are generally remediable (i.e., they imply a level of personal control over the outcome). Based on these results, we suspect that attributions of this sort are more closely associated with discrete emotions such as guilt and shame, as the Harvey et al. (2007) study indicated, as opposed to affective states.

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The final hypothesis predicted that a positive association would exist between negative affective states and the ability to justify ethically questionable behaviors. There was no association between these variables, however, indicating a lack of support for Hypothesis 4. Attribution–Justification Relationships Although not an explicit component of our hypotheses, we examined the direct relationships between attributions and justification scores as part of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation test. The results of this analysis, shown in Fig. 2, are consistent with our a priori expectations. As the figure shows, participants who attributed negative outcomes to externally controllable factors were most able to justify ethically questionable behaviors. This effect was exacerbated when the causal factor was also perceived to be stable in nature. External and uncontrollable attributions were associated with the next highest level of justification, followed by internal and controllable attributions. Internal and uncontrollable attributions were associated with the lowest levels of justification. In each case, justification scores were higher when the perceived cause was also stable in nature. Implications for the Study of Attributions and Emotions It is worth noting that, taken together, these results bear an important similarity to those in the Harvey et al. (2007) study. The results of both studies indicated that attributions were associated with the ability to justify ethically questionable behaviors. In this case, causal perceptions influenced justification scores in the exact manner that existing logic (Harvey et al., 2007; Weiner, 1985a) would have predicted. This lends support to the notion that attributions are an important predictor of behavior. Another similarity between the two studies is that the expected role of emotions in the attribution–behavior relationship was not supported. In the Harvey et al. (2007) study, anger, shame, and guilt all influenced justification scores but were not associated with attributions in the manner predicted. In the present study, attributions were associated with negative affective states, but these affective states were not associated with behavioral responses. The difference between the two studies can potentially be explained by the fact that affective states are generally less specific and focused than discrete emotions (Forgas, 1995), and therefore are not strong enough to predict specific behaviors.

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The larger issue, however, is the fact that in both studies the attribution– emotion–behavior relationship predicted in Weiner’s (1985a) model was not supported. We suspect that there are at least two possible explanations for this finding. First, it is possible that in the context of unethical behaviors like those included in this scenario-based survey, there is a direct link between attributions and behaviors that is not mediated by emotions. Instead, a more automatic schema-driven process such as that described by Lord and his colleagues (Cronshaw & Lord, 1987; Lord & Maher, 1990; Lord & Smith, 1983; Phillips & Lord, 1986), may exist in which a causal perception results in a response with little cognition or emotional evaluation. Given that the negative outcomes occurred in the context of a familiar (classroom) environment, it is possible that the student participants had already developed behavioral schema and heuristics triggered by the causal manipulations contained in the scenarios. This could also explain the lack of an emotional influence observed among physicians in the Harvey et al. (2007) study. A second alternative explanation is that the methodology of these two studies artificially attenuated the influence of emotions. We recognize that study participants are unlikely to experience vivid emotional responses to hypothetical outcomes presented in scenarios, a fact which limits the extent to which these results can be assumed to reflect the dynamic cognitive and emotional processes that occur in real-world situations. Both of these explanations suggest that, while the relevance of Weiner’s (1985a) model to hypothetical unethical behaviors appears unclear, it would be premature, and probably erroneous, to say that the model cannot be used to explain the attribution–behavior process in other settings. In addition to the aforementioned methodological shortcomings, we must also acknowledge the limitations that common method bias and the lack of a longitudinal design place on the present study. Thus, it is important not to draw overly broad conclusions concerning Weiner’s (1985a) logic from this study. Suggestions for future research on Weiner’s framework are summarized in the next section.

Suggestions for Future Research on the Attribution–Emotion–Behavior Framework Based on the limitations described in the previous section, we offer several suggestions for testing the relationships between attributions, emotions, and behaviors. First, to address the fact that emotional reactions to hypothetical events, and the implication of these emotional reactions for behavioral

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outcomes, is likely to be muted, laboratory experiments that allow a more realistic manipulation of outcomes and emotions may be useful. The present study and the Harvey et al. (2007) study suggest that if emotions are in fact relevant to the attribution–behavior relationship, survey-based research methods may not be effective at demonstrating their influence. A laboratory setting may be more appropriate for addressing this research question, as experimenters can manipulate actual success/failure outcomes and attributions, likely leading to more tangible emotional responses. A second possible extension of this research is to examine a behavioral response other than ethically questionable behaviors. A number of factors, such as individual levels of moral development (Colby, Kohlberg, Biggs, & Lieberman, 1983; Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984) and overall ethicality, can also influence one’s ability to justify such behaviors. Given the potential consequences of these behaviors, it is possible that individuals will deliberately try to avoid basing them on emotions. This might explain why, in the current study and in the physician sample of the Harvey et al. (2007) study, attributions were associated with the ethically questionable behaviors but emotions were completely unrelated. A third suggestion is to broaden the scope of attributions considered when testing the influence of attributions on emotions and emotion-driven behaviors. Whereas we explored the influence of the locus of causality, stability, and controllability dimensions, Weiner’s (1985a) model also invokes the intentionality dimension. We omitted this dimension because there is some logical overlap between the notion of intentional causal factors and causal factors that are, for example, internal and controllable. It is possible, however, that more explicitly isolating and manipulating the extent to which an undesirable outcome is intentionally or accidentally caused could invoke a more distinct and powerful emotional response.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS This study reinforces Harvey et al.’s (2007) conclusion that the relationship between attributions for undesirable events, emotional responses, and ethically questionable behaviors may be more complex than Weiner’s (1985a) framework would suggest. The extent to which these findings are due to methodological limitations, situational factors, or deficiencies in Weiner’s logic is unclear. Perhaps more importantly, it should also be noted that this study reinforces the notion that causal attributions are significant predictors of behavioral responses to personally relevant outcomes.

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Although additional research is needed to better understand the role of emotions in this relationship, the finding that behavioral outcomes can be linked to high or low levels of specific attributional dimensions reinforces the notion that attribution theory is a useful tool for understanding and predicting behaviors. Our findings indicating that emotions do not always mediate the attribution–behavior relationship may help to address past criticisms of attribution theory. Some scholars have argued that individuals lack the cognitive resources to engage in a causal and emotional evaluation of every event that affects their lives (Cronshaw & Lord, 1987; Lord & Maher, 1990; Lord & Smith, 1983; Phillips & Lord, 1986). As we noted in our discussion above, it is possible that our findings reflect the use of cognitive schema, such that causal perceptions are directly linked to pre-established behavioral patterns. Although emotional responses may be tangential to these relationships, the fact that causal perceptions are directly related to behaviors is a significant finding. In conclusion, we feel that our results underscore the importance of understanding the cognitive processes associated with attribution-driven behaviors. We hope that additional research will continue to clarify and expand our understanding of the role of emotions in these processes, and that this chapter will help to move future research in that direction.

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CHAPTER 13 THE EFFECTS OF EMPATHY ON JUDGMENTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS Roni Reiter-Palmon, Richard L. Wiener, Gregory Ashley, Ryan J. Winter, Ronda M. Smith, Erin M. Richter and Amy Voss-Humke ABSTRACT Recent research suggests that individual difference variables that measure emotional reactions may be useful in understanding sexual harassment judgments. In the present study, 503 male and female working adults viewed two videos of sexual harassment cases and were asked to make judgments about the nature of the behavior. Participants also completed measures of sexism and empathy. Results indicated that Perspective Taking (PT), a component of empathy, interacted with gender to explain judgments regarding sexual harassment. Contrary to expectations, PT did not eliminate the typical gender differences found, but rather magnified them.

Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 285–310 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04013-3

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INTRODUCTION Sexual harassment has been identified as a damaging experience both to those that experience it and to the organization. A recent meta-analysis by Willness, Steel, and Lee (2007) suggests that experiencing sexual harassment has wide-ranging consequences for the organization, including lower job satisfaction and organizational commitment, increase in work withdrawal behavior (such as absences or not completing work), and decreased productivity. Willness et al. also found strong effects on measures of psychological health such as symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder, depression, and physical symptoms such as headaches or nausea. Given these outcomes, it is not surprising that in the last few decades research on sexual harassment has received increased attention. Much of the empirical and theoretical work on sexual harassment has focused on the antecedents and consequences of sexual harassment (Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Hulin, Gelfand, & Magley, 1997; Willness et al., 2007). Less attention has been paid, in both research and theory, to how individuals determine whether the behavior in question is indeed sexual harassment (Wiener, Winter, Rogers, & Arnot, 2004). Understanding how decisions about sexual harassment are made, and the factors that influence the decisions of those observing or hearing about sexually harassing behavior, is important to the understanding of the organizational response to sexual harassment. Organizational members, peers, co-workers, managers, and human resources personnel all play a role in how organizations respond to both the victim and the aggressor. This response may have a direct effect on the psychological health of the victim, the decision to complain in different avenues such as EEOC, and perceptions of other individuals in the organization about the acceptability of sexually harassing behavior. Before turning to understanding how individuals make judgments of sexual harassment, it is important to briefly describe pertinent law.

The Legal Context Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. American case law forbids employers to engage in sexual contact with employees in exchange for compensation or advancement (i.e., quid pro quo harassment, Henson v. City of Dundee, 1982 and Miller v. Bank of America, 1979) or to subject workers to intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environments because of their

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sex (i.e., hostile work environment harassment, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc, 1993 and Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 1986). In Meritor (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court held that for a hostile work environment to be present requires that plaintiffs experienced unwelcome social-sexual misconduct because of their sex. Further, the misconduct must have been ‘‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment’’ (Meritor, 1986, p. 60). Normally, the law requires a pattern of offensive behaviors unless the conduct is exceptionally severe (e.g., assault).

Effect of Individual Differences Previous research on legal decision making within the sexual harassment context has identified multiple social and environmental factors that affect the decision. These factors include legal standards presented to participants (e.g., Wiener, Hurt, & Russell, 1997), the ambiguity of the case (e.g., Wiener & Hurt, 2000), the nature of the work environment in which the harassment took place (e.g., O’Connor, Gutek, Stockdale, Geer, & Melanc- on, 2004), and the attractiveness of the victim and harasser (Golden, Johnson, & Lopez, 2001). Research on individual differences of the decision maker that may affect sexual harassment judgments have typically focused on gender. In a metaanalysis of 62 studies, Rotundo, Nguyen, and Sackett (2001) found that women are more likely than men to find evidence of sexual harassment. Further, these differences were larger for cases where the complaint was of a hostile work environment, especially if the harassing behavior was ambiguous. In addition to gender, another individual difference variable that has received attention has been attitudes towards women. Glick and Fiske (1996) developed a measure of sexism, which includes two components: hostile sexism (negative attitudes toward women) and benevolent sexism (protective attitudes toward women). Research using these measures has found that those high in hostile sexism are less likely to find evidence of sexual harassment (O’Conner et al., 2004; Wiener & Hurt, 2000; Wiener et al., 2004, under review). An additional individual difference variable that has not been researched extensively, but may have powerful effects, is past experience with sexual harassment. These prior experiences could act to activate attitudes and beliefs about ongoing or future cases (Maeder, Wiener, & Winter, 2007; Wiener, Voss, Winter, & Arnot, 2005; Wiener et al., 2004). Wiener et al. (2004, 2005)

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found that workers’ evaluations of harassment allegations depended upon their experience with prior allegations, the availability of examples of harassment in memory and from the media, and individual differences in workers’ ratings of the hostile work environments. These latter findings are particularly important as the law assumes that people decide cases solely based on the facts of the specific case and that specific-case decisions are not contaminated by the past experiences of the decision makers. Other constructs may also prove useful in understanding differences in judgments regarding sexual harassment, such as factors related to gender differences that routinely emerge in research. In addition, observers of sexual harassment may view the problem as a moral or ethical issue, and as a result experience strong and sometimes complicated feelings (O’LearyKelly & Bowes-Sperry, 2001; Pierce & Aguinis, 2005). Research by BowesSperry and Powell (1999) suggests that reactions of observers to sexual harassment differ based on whether or not they frame the situation as a moral dilemma or ethical issue. Those individuals who frame the situation as an ethical issue are more likely to respond and intervene. In addition, Bowes-Sperry and Powell found that individuals were more likely to frame a sexual harassment situation as an ethical issue if they perceived negative consequences to the victim of harassment.

Affect and Decision Making In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the study of emotions in the workplace. Research suggests that both emotional states and enduring affect-related traits influence various outcomes of interest to organizations ranging from general performance, creative problem solving, organizational citizenship behaviors, and judgment and decision making (Ashkanasy, Ha¨rtel, & Daus, 2002; Brief & Weiss, 2002; Forgas & George, 2001). The role emotions play in cognitive activities such as judgment and decision making is of particular importance to researchers interested in understanding judgments regarding sexual harassment. Research on the effect of ‘‘hot processes’’ on judgment and decision making suggests that emotions can influence decision making in multiple ways. Affect sometimes influences recall, alters perceptions of and attention to certain types of information, and serves as direct information to the decision maker (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001; Forgas, 1995; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Rusting, 1998). While typically the study of affect and cognition has focused on affective states, more research is being conducted on affective traits such as positive

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affectivity (or extraversion) and negative affectivity (or neuroticism) (Elfenbein, 2007; Rusting, 1998, 2001). Decisions regarding sexual harassment are characterized not only by their affective tone, but also by the fact that these decisions pertain to a relationship. That is, these decisions are made in an interpersonal context. One individual difference variable that has received a great deal of attention in recent years is emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is defined as ‘‘the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use the information to guide one’s thinking and actions’’ (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 189). Theories of emotional intelligence suggest a relationship between emotional intelligence and effective decision making, especially in a social context (George, 2000; Jordan, Ashton-James, & Ashkanasy, 2006; Mayer & Salovey, 1997), although research findings have been mixed (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Coˆte´ & Miners, 2006; Herman & Scherer, 2008; Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2004). Some studies suggest that emotional intelligence is linked to successful managerial performance, including decision making (Rosete & Ciarrochi, 2005; Semadar, Robbins, & Ferris, 2006). In this vein, Day and Carroll (2004) found that perception of emotions, a dimension of emotional intelligence, predicts decision making. However, Coˆte´ and Miners (2006) found that emotional intelligence was predictive of task performance, including decision making, only when cognitive intelligence was low. For those high in cognitive intelligence, no relationship was found between emotional intelligence and job performance. Herman and Scherer (2008) also reported mixed results. In a laboratory study of decision quality in a real-life problem, four out of five measures of decision quality showed no relationship to emotional intelligence. Elfenbein (2007) suggests that one reason for these inconsistent findings is that emotional intelligence measures contain multiple components, which may or may not be related to specific outcomes of interest. Elfenbein suggests that a more productive approach to the study of emotional intelligence in an organizational context would be to look at the relationships between individual components of emotional intelligence and specific outcomes. One important aspect of emotional intelligence that may be of particular interest to the study of judgments regarding sexual harassment is emotional recognition. Perceiving, recognizing, or understanding the emotions of other individuals are included in every model of emotional intelligence as a core dimension (Goleman, 1998; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Zeidner et al., 2004). Further, these aspects of emotional intelligence have been found to emerge uniquely in factor analyses of emotional intelligence

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(Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998) and to predict performance on a cognitive decision-making task (Day & Carroll, 2004). Most importantly, others have found that these dimensions of emotional intelligence to be both theoretically and empirically related to empathy (Davies et al., 1998; Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Wolff, Pescosolido, & Druskat, 2002).

Empathy While the current theories of emotional intelligence view empathy as a distinct dimension, research on empathy as a construct predates its inclusion as a dimension of emotional intelligence. In their review of the literature on empathy, Duan and Hill (1996) suggest that the term empathy has been in use as a psychological term since the 1920s. Early work focused on empathy from a psychoanalytic perspective and using the construct to explain how and when therapy is effective. Later work focused on the personality and social psychology of empathy such as its relation to altruism, prosocial behavior, and moral development. In terms of defining empathy, two broad approaches have emerged, one focusing on the cognitive reaction to the experience of another person, labeled cognitive empathy, and the second, labeled affective empathy, focuses on emotional reactions (Gladstein, 1983). Cognitive empathy, also identified as Perspective Taking (PT), focuses on the ability of individuals to accurately understand how others are feeling (Losoya & Eisenberg, 2001). Affective empathy is defined as ‘‘a state of emotional arousal that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s affective statey’’ (Losoya & Eisenberg, 2001, p. 22). Affective reactions include both a self-oriented approach, where the focus on the affective reaction is on the emotions that are felt by the observer (apprehensions) and an other-oriented approach, where the focus is on the person who is the target of the empathy (comprehension) (Eisenberg, 2000; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Research suggests that these components of empathy may have different relationships and outcomes including but not limited to enactment of prosocial behaviors (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Gladstein, 1983). Specifically, Gladstein suggested that the cognitive component of empathy would be predictive of behavior in situations that require problem-solving activity or action. Davis (1994) further elaborates that cognitive empathy is a required first step toward helping or prosocial behavior. The cognitive component has been empirically associated with higher social functioning and negatively associated with emotionality (Davis, 1983a, 1983b). In the

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organizational literature, it has been associated with engagement in organizational citizenship behaviors (Kamdar, McAllister, & Turban, 2006; Settoon & Mossholder, 2002). Because the focus of the current research is on the decision making process, we expect, in accordance with Gladstein, the cognitive component of empathy to be related to judgments regarding the nature of social sexual behavior at work. Therefore: Hypothesis 1. Individuals scoring higher on the cognitive component of empathy will find more evidence of sexual harassment than those scoring lower on the cognitive component of empathy. Other-oriented affective empathy has been consistently linked to helping behaviors. A meta-analysis by Eisenberg and Miller (1987) found moderate relationships between measures of other-oriented affective empathy and prosocial and altruistic behaviors, especially for adults. Similarly, organizational researchers found that other-oriented affective empathy has been associated with engagement in organizational citizenship behaviors (Kamdar et al., 2006; Settoon & Mossholder, 2002). Because identifying the behavior as unethical is necessary before intervening (Bowes-Sperry & Powell, 1999), we expect the other-oriented affective component of empathy to be related to judgments regarding the nature of social sexual behavior at work. Hypothesis 2. Individuals scoring higher on the other-oriented affective component of empathy will find more evidence of sexual harassment than those scoring lower on that dimension. The findings regarding self-oriented affective empathy, however, are mixed. Some research suggests that self-oriented affective reactions lead to withdrawal from the situation, but other investigations have found that they motivate prosocial behavior in an effort to reduce distress (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Therefore, we make no specific hypotheses for this variable and include it only as an exploratory factor. Previous research on gender and judgments of sexual harassment has found moderate but consistent effects, such that females find more evidence of sexual harassment compared to males (e.g., Rotundo et al., 2001). Further, situational variables (i.e., legal instructions) that called attention to the victim, such as taking a ‘‘reasonable women’’ perspective in determining whether harassment occurred, moderated some of the typical gender differences (Wiener et al., 2002, 2004; Wiener & Hurt, 2000). We therefore hypothesize that those high on empathy (cognitive or other-oriented

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affective components) will show attenuated gender differences in evaluation of social sexual conduct at work. Hypothesis 3. There will be an interaction between gender and the cognitive component of empathy, such that for those low in empathy, the typical gender effects will emerge, but those high in the cognitive component of empathy will show attenuated gender effects. Hypothesis 4. There will be an interaction between gender and the otheroriented affective component of empathy, such that for those low in empathy, the typical gender effects will emerge, but those high in empathy will show attenuated gender effects.

METHOD Participants Participants in this study were 503 full-time workers, recruited from two metropolitan areas in Nebraska, Lincoln and Omaha, via newspaper ads and posters distributed to local businesses and community groups. Potential participants were instructed to contact the laboratory where researchers screened them for eligibility based on employment status. Of the 496 participants who provided complete demographic information when they arrived at the lab, 237 were men (48%), 259 were women (52%). Four hundred and twelve (83%) were European Americans, 35 (8%) were African American, 20 (4%) were Hispanic, 6 (1%) were Asian, and 20 (4%) either failed to report their ethnic background or reported an ethnic background other than the ones indicated above. The sample was reasonably well educated in that 470 (94%) had graduated from high school, 389 (78%) had completed at least some college, and 222 (47%) had earned a bachelor’s degree or higher. Participants provided 2–3 possible times they could attend the laboratory session. Research assistants scheduled each participant to one of the sessions selected. In response to earlier studies which found past experience with harassment to be an important predictor of judgments about harassment, each participant viewed two cases. The order of the cases was counterbalanced so that we can examine order as a within subject variable. As each participant viewed two different cases, the specific case was used as a covariate in this study.

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Overview of the Procedure Participants watched two short sexual harassment videos. Each recreated the work environments and reenacted the complained after events. After viewing each video, participants evaluated the main characters in the scenario and determined whether the complaint occurring after social sexual conduct constituted sexual harassment. Participants were instructed to use the ‘‘severity or pervasiveness’’ test as well as rate a general indicator of gender-based discrimination. Finally, participants completed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, a measure of attitudes toward women (Glick & Fiske, 1996), Davis’ measure of empathy (IRI, Davis, 1983a), and demographic questionnaires.

Cases To create the videos, we hired a production crew and professional actors to reenact scripts that were modeled after the fact patterns in two Title VII cases: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998) and Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. (1986). We based the scripts on the essential facts in both cases but modified the facts slightly in the interests of efficiency, the need for experimental control, and the demands of the New York winter (where the second author created the reenactments). In our Faragher case, Ms. Faragher was a college student who worked part time as a lifeguard for a local indoor swimming pool rather than for a city beach club. Faragher claimed that two of her supervisors created a hostile work environment by repeatedly subjecting her and other female lifeguards to ‘‘uninvited and offensive touching,’’ making lewd remarks, and speaking about women in ‘‘offensive terms’’ (Faragher v. Boca Raton, p. 780). In the second case, Ms. Rabidue, an executive assistant, complained about a male coworker who made crude and extremely vulgar comments about her and other women. The alleged perpetrator treated women with little respect, often downplaying their abilities to complete their assignments successfully. Ms. Rabidue claimed that some of the male employees displayed pictures of nude or scantily clad women in the workplace. In order to minimize the unlikely possibility that participants would recognize the cases, we renamed the scenarios (The Faragher v. City of Boca Raton case became Farell v. City of Clearwater and the Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. case became Reynolds v. River City Refining Co.). Participants watched both the Farell and Reynolds scenarios in

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counterbalanced order. Thus, Farell was presented first and Reynolds was second for half of the participants, while Reynolds was presented first and Farell was second for remaining participants. Each scenario ranged from 23 to 25 min in length, followed by 3 min of legal definitions and instructions. At the conclusion of each video, a male and female narrator presented participants with legal definitions and instructions to use to determine whether sexual harassment had occurred in the vignette. Written instructions repeated the oral content on the questionnaires. The narrators also presented dictionary definitions of severe, pervasive, and abusive. In this manner, we provided guidelines for evaluating hostile workplace harassment that required participants to contemplate the criteria outlined in federal law. This language came directly from case law and publications from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Dependent Measures Participants completed dependent measures at the conclusion of each video. Using nine-point Likert scales, all participants rated the following dependent measures for the first case based upon the elements of the ‘‘severity or pervasiveness’’ test: whether the sexual conduct was unwelcome, severity of the sexual conduct, pervasiveness of the sexual conduct, and the likelihood that the plaintiff was subjected to hostile work environment sexual harassment. The next question asked participants for a general rating of gender discrimination (using a nine-point scale from very unlikely to very likely). It asked, ‘‘How likely was it that Suzanne Farell/Kathy Reynolds was the victim of sex-based discrimination at her work place?’’ Next, participants answered 10 true/false questions that tested participants’ knowledge about facts represented in the video for the appropriate case. These items, for which there were correct and incorrect answers, served as checks to assure that the participants had paid attention to the reenactments. Examples of questions for the Farell case were: (1) Jim was always on time when relieving Suzanne Farell from her shift (False); (2) The EEO officer wanted to know why Suzanne Farell waited so long to file a sexual harassment complaint (True). Examples of questions for the Reynolds case were: (1) Dorothy Simon, a friend of Kathy Reynolds, found Bob Hayward a person with whom she could easily get along (False); (2) Some of the workers at River City Refining Company enjoyed looking at a calendar with pictures of scantily dressed women (True).

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Participants next viewed the second video. Following the second case, participants answered the same questions as they answered for the first case but with the other complainant as the object of the Likert measures.

Individual Differences Measures Ambivalent Sexism Inventory Participants completed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI, Glick & Fiske, 1996), which measures hostile and benevolent sexism with 22 selfreport items on which respondents rate their agreement using six-point Likert scales. Examples of hostile and benevolent sexism items are, respectively, ‘‘Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist,’’ and ‘‘Women should be cherished and protected by men.’’ Prior work by Glick and Fiske (1996) demonstrated the ASI to be a psychometrically sound instrument and work by Wiener et al. (2004, under review) and Wiener and Hurt (2000) demonstrated that the constructs work well in predicting judgments of sexual harassment. In the current study, internal consistency scores for both hostile and benevolent sexism were more than adequate (coefficient alpha for hostile sexism ¼ 0.83, N ¼ 493 and for benevolent sexism alpha ¼ 0.84, N ¼ 491). The ASI is a trait-based measure uninfluenced by situational manipulations. We presented it after the videos so that it would not interfere with participants evaluations of the videos.

Empathy Empathy was measured using Davis (1983a) Interpersonal Reactivity Index. This measure includes both the cognitive and affective components of empathy as well as the self versus other-oriented components of affective empathy. The IRI consists of 28 items for which participants rate their agreement on a seven-point Likert scale. The scale includes four dimensions, two cognitive and two affective. The first cognitive dimensions is PT, which assesses the tendency to adopt the point of view of another (sample item: When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to ‘‘put myself in his shoes’’ for a while). The second dimension is Fantasy, which evaluates whether participants identify with fictional characters (sample item: I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel). The two affective dimensions are Empathic Concern (EC), which assesses sympathy and concern for others or other-oriented emotions (sample item: I sometimes try

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to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective), and Personal Distress (PD), which evaluates feelings of anxiety and unease in difficult interpersonal situations, or a self-oriented dimension (sample item: When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces). Davis (1983a) reported internal consistency reliabilities ranging from 0.71 to 0.77 and test–retest reliabilities ranging from 0.62 to 0.71. In this study, coefficient alphas were 0.72 for PT, 0.73 for EC, and 0.79 for PD. Only scores on the two affective scales (EC and PD) and the PT scale were used, as Fantasy has found to be both less likely to be related to constructs of interest and no theoretical relationships of interest could be identified with this dimension. After completing the IRI, participants answered a demographic questionnaire; the researchers paid them, thanked for their participation, and debriefed the respondents.

RESULTS The first analysis evaluated whether participants were paying attention to facts of the case by evaluating the responses to the knowledge test. With regards to the Farell case, 493 participants completing the measure answered an average 9.5 out of 10 questions correctly. For the Reynolds case, 495 participants answered an average 9.7 out of 10 questions correctly. These results indicate that the participants paid attention to the video and were able to understand and recall the facts in each case. As previous research on empathy has found gender effects, we evaluated whether male and female participants differed in terms of the three empathy scales. No gender differences were found for the PT scale (t(487) ¼ 0.358, pW0.05), however, gender differences were found for both PD (t(488) ¼ 1.936, po0.05) and EC (t(488) ¼ 2.538, po0.01). Females had higher scores than males on both PD and ECs. The General Linear Model (GLM) procedure was used to test hypotheses on the five dependent variables. Analyses were conducted separately for each of the three empathy sub-scales using a median split to assign participants to high and low categories. In each analysis we used a 2 (gender) by 2 (order) by 2 (empathy subscale: high vs. low) analysis of covariance, with case (dummy coded) and hostile and benevolent sexism serving as covariates. Gender and empathy sub-scales were between subjects variables, while order was a within subject variable. As our focus was the effect of the empathy subscales, and in order to increase power, we tested only the hypothesized interaction between the empathy sub-scales and gender and not all the

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possible interactions. All main effects were tested, as well as the interactions with the within subject variable (order) because the latter were found to be important in prior research on experience with sexual harassment complaints. Results for the analyses will be presented for each of the empathy sub-scales, first for the legal process variables and then for the legal outcome variable. Estimated means are presented for significant results.

Cognitive Sub-Scale: Perspective Taking The GLM results for the five different judgment variables are presented in Table 1. The first DV was the degree to which the behavior is viewed as unwelcome. Testing Hypothesis 1, a main effect was found for PT (F(1,481) ¼ 5.678, po0.05, Z2 ¼ 0.012), such that those high in PT found the behavior more unwelcome (M ¼ 7.62) compared to those lower in PT (M ¼ 7.3). Testing Hypothesis 3, the interaction between gender and PT was marginally significant (F(1,481) ¼ 3.023, p ¼ 0.083, Z2 ¼ 0.006). However, post-hoc analyses revealed that the nature of this interaction was not as hypothesized. Females high in PT were more likely to judge the behavior as unwelcome (M ¼ 7.93) compared to all other groups (M ¼ 7.22 for males low is PT, M ¼ 7.31 for males high in PT, and M ¼ 7.38 for females low in PT). Fig. 1 provides a representation of this interaction. While not specifically hypothesized in this study, the typical gender effect did emerge, showing that females found more evidence of unwelcome behavior than males (M ¼ 7.65 for females M ¼ 7.26 for males). In addition, and replicating previous findings, an order effect was found. This effect was qualified by an order by case effect. The order by case effect indicates that those who viewed the Reynolds case as the second case found the behavior less unwelcome (M ¼ 6.89), followed by those that viewed Reynolds as the first case (M ¼ 7.29), and lastly, the behavior in the Farell case was judged as the most unwelcome (M ¼ 7.77 Farell second, M ¼ 7.95 Farell first). These findings replicate previous findings of gender, order, and case effects (Hurt, Wiener, Russell, & Mannen, 1999; Wiener et al., 2002). Judgments regarding the severity of the behavior were analyzed next. Analyses for the main effect of PT and the interaction between PT and gender (Hypotheses 1 and 3) were not significant. However, similar to the previous analysis, a main effect for gender and order, and an interaction between order and case were significant. Females found the behavior more severe than males (M ¼ 6.73 and M ¼ 6.41, respectively). A main effect for order was found, but was qualified by an order by case interaction.

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Table 1. Results of the General Linear Model for the Legal Judgments that make up the Severe or Pervasive Test for Perspective Taking. Measure Case (A) (covariate) F value (d.f.) Z2 Hostile (B) (covariate) F value (d.f.) Z2 Benevolent (C) (covariate) F value (d.f.) Z2 Gender (D) F value (d.f.) Z2 Order (E) F value (d.f.) Z2 PT F value (d.f.) Z2 D  PT F value (d.f.) Z2 A  E F value (d.f.) Z2 E  PT F value (d.f.) Z2

Unwelcome

Severe

Pervasive

Harassment

Discrimination

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

0.000 21.24 (1,481) 0.042 0.013 6.16 (1,481) 0.013 0.007 7.35 (1.481) 0.015 0.000 16.25 (1,481) 0.033 0.018 5.68 (1,481) 0.012 0.083 3.023 (1,481) 0.006 0.000 36.42 (1,481) 0.07 n.s.

0.000 22.95 (1,482) 0.045 0.000 17.01 (1,482) 0.034 0.03 4.72 (1,482) 0.01 0.007 7.46 (1,482) 0.015 n.s.

0.000 20.19 (1,480) 0.04 0.015 5.95 (1,480) 0.012 0.001 11.94 (1,480) 0.024 0.000 14.24 (1,480) 0.029 n.s.

0.000 30.16 (1,481) 0.059 0.001 11.92 (1,480) 0.024 0.048 3.94 (1,481) 0.008 n.s.

0.000 18.66 (1,482) 0.037 0.027 4.95 (1,482) 0.01 0.000 19.35 (1,482) 0.039 n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

0.023 5.22 (1,482) 0.011 n.s.

0.000 23.56 (1,480) 0.047 n.s.

n.s.

0.059 3.59 (1,482) 0.007 n.s.

n.s.

0.042 4.16 (1,482) 0.009

Participants viewing the Reynolds case first found the behavior less severe (M ¼ 6.41), followed by viewing Reynolds second (M ¼ 6.5), and lastly, viewing Farell first (M ¼ 6.58). Participants viewing Farell second, found the behavior the most severe (M ¼ 6.85).

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Fig. 1.

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Interaction between Gender and Perspective Taking (PT) on Perception of Unwelcome Behavior.

Analysis for the final legal process variable, pervasiveness, is shown in the third column of Table 1. Analyses for the main effect of PT and the interaction between PT and gender (Hypotheses 1 and 3) were not significant. However, similar to the previous analyses, a main effect for gender, order, and case by order interaction were significant. Similar to the results for unwelcome behavior, females found the behavior more pervasive (M ¼ 6.85) compared to males (M ¼ 6.35). Regarding the qualifying case by order interaction, those who viewed the Reynolds case found the behavior less pervasive (M ¼ 6.28 when Reynolds was viewed first, M ¼ 6.38 when Reynolds was viewed second) compared to the Farell case, especially when Farell was the second case viewed (M ¼ 6.73 when Farell was viewed first and M ¼ 7.09 when Farell was viewed second). The final analyses used the legal outcomes as dependent variables. The first variable tested was the likelihood that the complainant was subjected to sexual harassment. Testing Hypothesis 1, no main effect was found for PT. However, testing for Hypothesis 3, the interaction between gender and PT was significant (F(1,481) ¼ 4.388, po0.05, Z2 ¼ 0.009). Post-hoc analyses revealed that the difference occurred between males and females high in PT. Females high in PT were more likely to judge that the person suffered sexual harassment (M ¼ 7.83) compared to males high in PT (M ¼ 7.25).

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Fig. 2.

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Interaction between Gender and PT on Judgment of Likelihood Sexual Harassment.

No differences were found between males and females low in PT (M ¼ 7.39 for both males and females). This interaction is depicted in Fig. 2. While not specifically hypothesized in this study, the typical gender effect has been found, such that females find more evidence of unwelcome behavior than males (M ¼ 7.61 for females, M ¼ 7.32 for males). For the second legal outcome variable, whether the plaintiff suffered discrimination, no main effects for PT were found, thus not supporting Hypothesis 1. However, the interaction between gender and PT was marginally significant (F(1,481) ¼ 3.594, p ¼ 0.059, Z2 ¼ 0.007). A review of the means suggests that while the interaction was significant, the means were not in the expected direction. Females, either high in PT (M ¼ 7.86) or low in PT (M ¼ 7.53) found more evidence of discrimination compared to males high in PT (M ¼ 6.9). Males low in PT (M ¼ 7.11) differed only from females high in PT. The means are presented in Fig. 3. In addition, a main effect for gender was found. Females found more evidence of discrimination (M ¼ 7.69) compared to males (M ¼ 7.01). Finally, an order by PT interaction was found (F(1,481) ¼ 4.162, po0.05, Z2 ¼ 0.009). Those high on PT found more evidence of discrimination for the second case they observed (M ¼ 7.56) compared with the other three groups

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Fig. 3.

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Interaction between Gender and PT on Judgment of Discrimination.

(first case: M ¼ 7.39 low PT, M ¼ 7.29 high PT, second case, low PT M ¼ 7.2). These means are presented in Fig. 4.

Affective, Other-Oriented Sub-Scale: Empathic Concerns The GLM results for all five dependent variables are presented in Table 2. Although Table 2 presents all results, we note that none of the analyses that involved EC produced significant results. We do not comment in the text on the effects of gender and order, which appear above in the discussion of PT. There were no other significant findings for Empathetic Concern.

Affective Sub-Scale, Self-Oriented: Personal Distress GLM results for the five dependent variables are presented in Table 3. While we made no specific hypotheses for this scale, we studied its results with a set of exploratory analyses carried out in the same fashion as for PT, above. Although Table 3 presents all results, we comment only on those effects that involve the additional dimension of self-oriented affective reaction of PD.

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Fig. 4.

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Interaction between PT and Presentation Order on Judgment of Discrimination.

There was an interaction between PD and order (F(1,482) ¼ 4.211, po0.05, Z2 ¼ 0.009). No differences resulted in the first case between those high and low in PD (M ¼ 7.64 for low distress and M ¼ 7.61 for high distress). Those low in PD perceived the least amount of unwelcomeness when viewing the second case (M ¼ 7.15). Individuals high in PD viewing the second case judged the behavior midway (M ¼ 7.49). These means are depicted in Fig. 5. For the other legal judgments (severity and pervasiveness) and the two legal outcome variables (likelihood of harassment and discrimination) there were no significant effects involving self-oriented PD.

DISCUSSION The purpose of the current study was to determine whether individual difference variables of empathy are related to judgments regarding whether a behavior is sexually harassing. Specifically, we were interested in whether empathy may offset the typical gender differences found in sexual harassment research (Rotundo et al., 2001). In addition, we evaluated the effect for empathy after controlling for the effect of an additional set of

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Table 2. Results of the General Linear Model for the Legal Judgments that make up the Severe or Pervasive Test for Empathic Concerns. Measure Case (A) (covariate) F value (d.f.) Z2 Hostile (B) (covariate) F value (d.f.) Z2 Benevolent (C) (covariate) F value (d.f.) Z2 Gender (D) F value (d.f.) Z2 Order (E) F value (d.f.) Z2 Empathic concerns (F) F value (d.f.) Z2 D  F F value (d.f.) Z2 A  E F value (d.f.) Z2

Unwelcome

Severe

Pervasive

Harassment Discrimination

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

0.000 21.38 (1,482) 0.042 0.012

0.000 22.07 (1,483) 0.044 0.000

0.000 21.45 (1,481) 0.043 0.009

0.000 30.32 (1,482) 0.059 0.000

0.000 18.38 (1,483) 0.037 0.017

6.33 (1,482) 0.013 0.01 6.68 (1,482) 0.014 0.000 16.95 (1,482) 0.034 n.s.

17.04 (1,483) 0.034 0.031 4.69 (1,483) 0.01 0.004 8.15 (1,483) 0.017 n.s.

6.97 (1,481) 0.014 0.001 11.55 (1,481) 0.023 0.000 15.37 (1,481) 0.031 n.s.

12.59 (1,482) 0.025 0.053 3.77 (1,482) 0.008 n.s.

5.7 (1,483) 0.012 0.000 19.67 (1,483) 0.039 n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

0.000 37.5 (1,482) 0.072

0.022 5.29 (1,483) 0.011

0.000 24.74 (1,481) 0.049

n.s.

n.s.

individual difference variables found to influence these judgments, benevolent, and hostile sexism (Wiener & Hurt, 2000). The study used two different cases to determine whether the effects found might be generalized across cases, or whether they were specific to a particular set of facts and behaviors. The use of two cases also allowed us to evaluate the effects of exposure to one case or experience on the judgments in the second case.

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Table 3. Results of the General Linear Model for the Legal Judgments that make up the Severe or Pervasive Test for Personal Distress. Measure Case (A) (covariate) F value (d.f.) Z2 Hostile (B) (covariate) F value (d.f.) Z2 Benevolent (C) (covariate) F value (d.f.) Z2 Gender (D) F value (d.f.) Z2 Order (E) F value (d.f.) Z2 Personal distress (F) F value (d.f.) Z2 D  F F value (d.f.) Z2 A  E F value (d.f.) Z2 E  F F value (d.f.) Z2

Unwelcome

Severe

Pervasive

Harassment Discrimination

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

0.000 23.46 (1,482) 0.046 0.015

0.000 24.48 (1,483) 0.048 0.000

0.000 21.31 (1,481) 0.042 0.015

0.000 32.29 (1,482) 0.063 0.001

0.000 19.1 (1,483) 0.038 0.029

5.91 (1,482) 0.012 0.01 6.71 (1,482) 0.014 0.000 18.84 (1,482) 0.038 n.s.

16.91 (1,483) 0.034 0.033 4.57 (1,483) 0.009 0.003 9.04 (1,483) 0.018 n.s.

5.97 (1,481) 0.012 0.001 11.44 (1,481) 0.023 0.000 15.92 (1,481) 0.032 n.s.

12.19 (1,482) 0.025 0.041 4.19 (1,482) 0.009 n.s.

4.82 (1,483) 0.01 0.000 19.1 (1,483) 0.038 n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

0.000 38.86 (1,482) 0.075 0.041 4.21 (1,482) 0.009

0.015 5.91 (1,483) 0.012 n.s.

0.000 25.31 (1,481) 0.05 n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

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Fig. 5.

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Interaction between Personal Distress and Presentation Order on Perception of Unwelcome Behavior.

While the law indicates that every case should be judged on its own merit, individuals making these judgments cannot always separate their own past experiences from the current case. Concerning this latter point, a case by order effect consistently emerged across for the three legal process variables (unwelcome, severe, and pervasive behavior). This interaction clearly indicates that the judgments about these legal process variables were related not only to the case facts but also to the order in which the case was viewed, indicating that experience with or exposure to other sexual harassment cases plays a role in these judgments. Typically, viewing the more ambiguous case (Reynolds) first resulted in finding the behavior less unwelcome, severe, and pervasive. In contrast, viewing the less ambiguous case second, resulted in finding more evidence of sexually harassing behavior. This pattern suggests an accommodation effect, that is, by viewing the more ambiguous case first, the behavior in the second case was seen as more unwelcome, severe, and pervasive. This supports earlier findings that Wiener et al. (2004) describe with a study of undergraduate respondents. In addition, two interactions between empathy and order were found further suggesting that prior exposure plays a role in judgments regarding

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sexual harassment. The first, between PT and order on discrimination, suggests that those high on PT found more evidence of discrimination for the second case they observed. The second interaction between PD and order on unwelcomeness, indicates that those low on PD found the behavior less unwelcome when viewing the second case. It may be that those low on PD were less distressed by the behavior, so that the first video may have provided a habituating effect. Participants viewing the first ambiguous set of case facts may have interpreted that case as a signal that the behavior was not so objectionable. In both interactions, the differences were in the second case viewed, again suggesting that prior exposure may set off an empathetic response. These results indicate that the prior exposure effect may depend on individual differences in empathy, and may not always benefit the victim. While these results are intriguing, we found them for only one of the five dependent variables in each instance. Therefore, caution must be taken in interpretation, and further research is necessary. The results presented here replicate previous findings relating to gender effects. Specifically, we found that females consistently found the behavior more sexually harassing across the various dependent variables. This gender difference was evident even after the effects of sexism were controlled with measures of hostile and benevolent sexism. Concerning the specific hypotheses of this study, the hypotheses regarding the affective other-oriented component of empathy, EC, were not supported. Results for the hypotheses regarding the cognitive component of empathy, PT, were partially supported. With regard to the specific hypotheses pertaining to PT, the hypothesis of a main effect for PT (Hypothesis 1) was supported for only judgments of whether the conduct was unwelcome, suggesting weak support for this hypothesis. However, for Hypothesis 3, the interaction between gender and PT, we found support for three dependent variables, including the two legal outcome variables. Still the specific outcome of the interaction was not as expected. High PT males were not more likely to find the behavior unwelcome, or judge that the plaintiff experienced harassment or discrimination as hypothesized. Quite the opposite, for the two legal outcome variables, males high in PT were less likely to find evidence of harassment or discrimination. That is, instead of eliminating the gender differences, high PT actually magnified them. This finding is particularly striking given that it occurred after controlling for the effects of hostile and benevolent sexism. Benevolent and especially hostile sexism are other individual difference measures that have been found to influence the relationship between gender and judgments about sexual harassment (Wiener et al., 1997, 2004, under review; Wiener & Hurt, 2000).

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A review of the PT scale may suggest a clue to the unexpected nature of the interaction. The PT scale includes general items that ask about the ability to see things from someone else’s perspective; however, the items do not specify which perspective to take. The presentation of the cases for this study used a neutral approach, that is, the case was presented from a neutral, factually-oriented perspective, and not from the perspective of the victim or the alleged harasser. It is therefore possible that females in this study took the perspective of the female victim, while males took the perspective of the male aggressor, resulting in females high in PT finding the behavior harassing, while males high PT find the behavior less harassing. Unfortunately, the data do not allow follow-up analyses to determine if this indeed was the case. Additional research needs to include measures that inquire about whose perspective the observers adopt. Because both cases depicted female victims and male aggressors, it is not possible to determine whether females took the perspective of the female victim because she was female or because she was a victim. Similarly, we cannot determine if males took the perspective of the male harasser because he was male or because he was the aggressor. Future studies will have to evaluate whether males and females indeed focus on different perspectives when making judgments about sexual harassment, and determine what aspect they focus on (gender or victim/aggressor). We are in the process of designing these studies and invite others to join us in looking at the role of observer empathy in judgments of sexual harassment and other types of workplace.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research was supported by a research award to the second author from the Social Science and Law Program at the National Science Foundation.

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CHAPTER 14 PRACTICAL WISDOM AND EMOTIONAL CAPABILITY AS ANTECEDENTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE PROCESSES Rodolphe Durand and Quy Huy ABSTRACT This chapter explains organizational accountability in context of a revolutionary change by the emotional capability of an organization and the ethical orientation of its top executives. Four situations lead to four propositions accounting for the level and durability of an organization’s accountability. This chapter fills a gap in the literature by articulating two antecedents of organizational accountability, underlines the relevance of organizational ethics, and extends the realm of emotion management to strategic organizational outcomes.

Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 4, 311–332 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1016/S1746-9791(08)04014-5

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INTRODUCTION This chapter draws on organizational ethics (OE) and the management of emotions to explore the evolution of organizational accountability in the context of a revolutionary organizational change process. Over the last decades, organization and management research have increasingly focused on exploring firm performance and explicating its link to business strategies. Relatively less attention has been devoted to the social role of organizations and their impact on human and social welfare (Walsh, Weber, & Margolis, 2003) and how business firms have been confronting growing social expectations (d’Aunno, Succi, & Alexander, 2000). The need for more research on managers’ philosophical and emotional orientations and their consequences on organizational accountability vis-a`-vis internal and external stakeholders seems overdue (Hinings & Greenwood, 2002; Perrow, 2000; Stern & Barley, 1996). Organizational accountability refers to the organizational ability to construct ‘‘rational’’ accounts for an organization’s actions (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Tetlock, 1992, 2000). Organizational accountability is a fundamental attribute that impacts an organization’s ability to build ties, trust, and reputation. It is central to stakeholder management by guaranteeing shareholders’ confidence, reinforcing employees’ loyalty, and crediting clients’ claims and needs. Existing research on accountability has developed at two levels. First, at an organizational level, research has concentrated on explaining how accountability influences firms’ policy, strategic behaviors, and structural inertia. Accountability constrains a firm’s actions to be congruent with former actions and to conform to established reputation (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Second, at an intraorganizational level, accountability has been shown to bias managerial action and accounts of action and results. Powerful hierarchies drive lower level (including middle) managers’ thoughts and behavior in accordance with their superiors’ expressed wishes and entail what some authors have called a ‘‘threatening accountability’’ (Morris & Moore, 2000). Accountability to various audiences affects an individual’s public statements as well as private judgments (Tetlock, 1992). Personal epistemologies and political ideologies influence managers’ evaluation of decisions (Tetlock, 2000) and impact in turn on how an organization accounts for its collective actions and outcomes. There are several major gaps in the literature on organizational accountability. First, the organizational accountability stream has not fully explicated to what extent such accountability depends on individual ethical orientations and attitudes. Second, the intra-organizational accountability stream has tended to focus on individual characteristics but has not

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explicitly considered how the nature of organizational change processes influences organizational accountability. Finally, both streams of research have seldom treated organizational accountability as an outcome, but rather as a prerequisite for organizational survival or as a given constraint affecting individual managers’ behavior and choices. In this chapter, we explore the extent to which radical changes lead to gains and declines in accountability. Currently, we know relatively little about the process by which accountability emerges from the inside of organizations, who the involved actors are, and what the nature and consequences of their actions on accountability are. In order to disentangle these complex relationships, we concentrate on certain agents inside an organization who greatly influence organization behaviors (Jones, 1995; Trevino & Weaver, 2001): top executives and middle managers. We focus on ethics and emotions because we believe both have been underexplored in the literature as antecedents of organizational accountability, especially in the context of organizational change. We draw on these literatures, and particularly on the emotional capability model (Huy, 1999) and a subfield of OE (Durand & Calori, 2006), to suggest how certain dimensions of ethical enactment and emotion management practiced by different groups of organization members during change can affect how they interact and communicate accounts of change to one another. It is the nature of this interaction that affects the level and durability of organizational accountability. This chapter is organized into four parts. First, we define the elements of the framework: organizational accountability, revolutionary change processes, emotional capability, and an ethical orientation called ‘‘practical wisdom.’’ Second, we generate a typology combining the salient emotion management actions and relate them to top executives’ openness to others (i.e., practical wisdom) versus closure to middle managers’ thoughts and emotions. Third, we elaborate four propositions on the level and durability of accountability that depend on these dimensions. Finally, we discuss the model and its implications for future research on organizational accountability, ethics, and emotional capability.

DEFINITIONS Outcome Variable: Organizational Accountability Accountability ‘‘means the ability to construct rational accounts for one’s actions’’ (Carroll & Hannan, 2000, p. 364). At the organizational level,

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institutional theory and population ecology postulate that the social framework of norms, values, and expectations constrains and influences an organization’s actions, as well as its ability to explain and justify past and current choices and their congruence vis-a`-vis the organization’s history and societal concerns. Organizational accountability is a crucial organizational quality to build confidence and trust among an organization’s stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995). Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 73) suggested that ‘‘organizations must be able to document how resources have been used and to reconstruct the sequences of organizational decisions, rules, and actions that produced particular outcomes. This does not necessarily mean that organizations must tell the truth to their members and to the public about how resources were used or how some debacle came about; what matters is that organizations produce internally consistent accounts indicating that appropriate rules and procedures existed to produce rational allocations of resources and appropriate organizational actions’’ (emphasis added). Our definition of organizational accountability differs from the above and refers to aligned internal and external accountability. An organization is held accountable both to the (internal) constituencies and to the (external) larger community in which the group and the organization are embedded. We assume internal accountability represents a necessary condition for sustained external accountability. An organization is accountable when it displays actions and accounts that are congruent with its expressed values and with the expectations of relevant external and internal constituencies. Organizational accountability starts with the internal production of organizational logics and reports on its activities. Organizations seek to achieve a high degree of accountability; but problems could arise when internal constituencies are at odds about the actions or content of the accounts to be conveyed to external constituencies. Within the organization, the nature of managers’ beliefs (e.g., philosophical and political ideologies) and structuring actions (e.g., control systems) can influence organizational accounts and accountability (Robertson & Anderson, 1993; Tetlock, 2000; Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999). Accountability is important because valuable resources accrue to organizations that are perceived as accountable (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Oliver, 1997) and provide them with additional strategic flexibility. Accountability is even more critical in ambiguous contexts involving resource scarcity that requires changes from organizations, as organizations will prefer to undertake those actions they can account for. Accountability tends to favor organizational inertia because selection often hinges on

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rational accounts of past successes and attempts to prolong this success with timid, conservative changes (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Miller & Friesen, 1984). This brings us to the discussion of the kinds of change processes that contextualize organizational accountability.

Revolutionary Change Processes Organizational changes are challenging for many organizations and have often been described under several bipolar categories (Weick & Quinn, 1999) such as first-order versus second-order changes, incremental versus radical changes, and core versus non-core changes, among others. In this chapter we focus on revolutionary change processes as suggested by prior research (Huy, 1999, 2002). A revolutionary organizational change process is episodic, disruptive, and marked with sudden, fast, and major changes in the organization’s main dimensions, such as size, structure, competence, and product portfolios. Radically new orientations prevail over past decisions and trajectories. Strategic reorientations, extensive changes in governance and ownership, and mergers or downsizing often accompany revolutionary change (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).

Emotional Capability Revolutionary changes jeopardize managers’ and organizations’ perceived and experienced reality. They elicit emotional responses, which individuals and organizations cater to differently. First, at the individual level, an individual’s emotional intelligence is positively related to the individual’s ability to change and adapt (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Neurological and psychological research has found that the presence of emotion is essential to the value judgments, social and ethical considerations, and, more importantly, to the value-laden behavior (Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001) that will most likely come into play when conflicts about issues of organizational accountability arise. Second, certain specific emotions can foster ethical behavior over and above material considerations, such as the prospective fear of experiencing guilt, shame, or embarrassment (Izard & Ackerman, 2000; Frijda, Manstead, & Bem, 2001). At the organizational level, according to Huy’s (1999) model, an emotionally capable organization is one that can systematically perform appropriate emotion management actions or routines (called emotional

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dynamics) to attend to organization members’ emotions elicited by disruptive change. These actions in turn help members become more receptive to change, effective in mobilizing for change, and able to learn from the results of the initial change efforts and to adjust their course if necessary. Examples of these emotional dynamics are authenticity and the dynamic of display freedom, empathy and the dynamic of experiencing, sympathy and the dynamic of reconciliation. We focus on organizational emotional capability as a key antecedent of organizational accountability because we believe the relationship between emotion and accountability at the organizational level is important, though as yet underexplored. One of the central enablers of emotional capability is the emotional dynamic of display freedom, which refers to an organization’s ability to facilitate the variety of authentic emotions that can be legitimately displayed and felt during change (Huy, 1999). Feelings can act as an important element of information under uncertainty (Schwartz, 1990). The extent to which people experience that they can safely express their true feelings could influence the account they give of change processes and outcomes and also affect the degree of authentic information shared between groups with asymmetrical power (Westley, 1990).

Change Agents’ Practical Wisdom Beyond the emotion and organizational change literatures, we also draw on the OE stream. OE is broadly defined as the literature concerned with ethical principles and behavior at the organizational and individual levels. OE helps us to understand how moral behavior occurs, how organizations ought to behave, and why they should respect normative principles. Exemplary are the works on business ethics (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994), on reconciliation of ethical principles with economic logic and practice (Soule, 2002), and on stakeholder theory (Jones, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). For much of this research stream, there would be a positive relationship between key organizational representatives’ moral behavior and corporate benefits (e.g., reputation, long-standing relationships, lower incentive problems, lower monitoring costs) resulting in performance advantages (Hosmer, 1994; Jones, 1995). Moreover, most OE research assumes a relative ethos of cohesiveness inside organizations, i.e., the supposition that every organizational member is able to absorb and integrate superior norms. As a result, it is likely that organizational morality will be shaped by top executives’ morality (Jones, 1995). Furthermore, recent research has attempted to

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connect openness to others with the nature of organizational change processes (Durand & Calori, 2006). In this chapter, we do not seek to be either normative or prescriptive on the ethical content of organizational accounts, but to concentrate on (1) how an orientation towards others, including their emotions, characterizes a ‘‘practically wise’’ agent, and (2) how this orientation influences organizational accountability. To make our arguments more textured but at the same time tractable, we narrow our analysis to two groups of influential organizational agents whose ethos may differ: top executives and middle managers. These two groups often play an influential role in the conduct of organizational change (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Westley, 1990). This does not dismiss the importance of other groups such as unions. Moreover, we do not qualify the change agents’ behavior per se as just or unjust, moral or immoral, but rather their attitude towards others – in particular, top executives’ views of middle managers who have been identified as being instrumental in realizing change (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Huy, 2002). Members who hold hierarchically superior positions often influence an organization’s behavior and changes thereof, especially in large traditional bureaucracies, and are also entitled to speak on behalf of the organization (Mintzberg, 1984). They profess the organization’s accounts of its actions. Top executives have traditionally been regarded as key decision makers in regard to strategic choices and organizational performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984); they act as cultural shapers, role models, and symbolic managers (Morgan, 1993; Pfeffer, 1981), as well as shapers of the structural and strategic contexts that influence middle managers’ thinking and actions (Burgelman, 1983, 1994). Beyond their traditional roles of linking and coordinating people and processes for routine operations, middle managers could also perform valuable interpersonal tasks that top executives may be less effective at when they have to deal with a large number of employees. For example, middle managers could (1) adapt the general corporate communications to the local needs and understanding of their employees; (2) act as dynamic balancers between excessive chaotic change and organizational inertia, and (3) attend to their workers’ personal needs and emotions (Huy, 2001, 2002). We focus on the emotion management role and use the practical wisdom concept to qualify top executives’ orientation toward respecting and accepting others’ (including middle managers’) perspectives and feelings. At the organizational level, top executives act as shapers of the ethical context: they define and reward the nature and boundaries of ethical beliefs of their organization. They can do so by formulating explicitly the

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ethical code, acting as role models, and allocating organizational resources such as time and money to diffuse, train, monitor, reward, and sanction the skillful and consistent enactment of ethical principles in organizational actions. Although top executives may not have the time to deal with a large number of employees on an individual emotional basis, they could still indirectly influence the development of emotional capability in their organizations by selecting, monitoring, training, and rewarding middle managers who are apt to carry out this role during change, and by placing those middle managers who are less skillful in less people-sensitive roles. The relatively value-free nature of emotional competencies can be driven by organizational ethical values thanks to the influence of ‘‘practically wise’’ top executives.

Practical Wisdom Practical wisdom (classically, phronesis) is an applied philosophy of respect for others and their a priori (before experience and action) right to be different. Several philosophers have developed this notion, among them are Aristotle (1976), Levinas (1989), and Ricoeur (1992). ‘‘Practical’’ connotes the concept’s applied nature, useful and present in common situations; and ‘‘wisdom’’ suggests a process of attunement associated with cultural and normative principles, including respect for individuality, freedom to think and speak, and the keeping of promises. Two major dimensions underlie practical wisdom: the ontological and the relational. Ontological Practical wisdom represents the ability of a person to comprehend her own as well as another person’s distinctive nature and to integrate this comprehension into her actions. Ricoeur (1992) anchors practical wisdom in the definition of the self that by its very nature influences relationships with others. Any self faces the dilemma of persevering as the same self over time (one’s character) and evolving a personal history made of encounters, bifurcations, and decisions. This personal history or narrative underlines the points where one distances oneself from oneself to envisage oneself as another. Reconciling the evolution of oneself with the ‘‘irreducible’’ permanence of one’s character is difficult for anyone. Coming to terms with this dilemma requires both the recognition of others’ rights and the dialectical nature of oneself as both permanent and evolving (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Levinas, 1989). Therefore, in her dealings with others, a

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‘‘practically wise’’ person does not only enact her self-character, but also changes herself – and accepts the undergoing changes – via narratives, argumentation, and conversations with others (Ricoeur, 1992). Relational Furthermore, practical wisdom is an individual quality that is manifested in organizational and social contexts through the practice of (1) reciprocity and (2) moral exemplarity (Durand & Calori, 2006). Reciprocity supposes the a priori acknowledgment that others’ opinions and judgments are of value and interest. The ability to accept others, change oneself, and accept the bifurcation of one’s identity is valued in many societies. Reciprocity refers to full respect for the other in her constitutive traits. It involves mutual abandonment of self-certitudes and the creation of balanced interpersonal relationships in which the powerful agent restrains herself from the urge to dominate the other (Ricoeur, 1992). Reciprocity involves projective feelings of empathy in as much as the change agent could become the change recipient under other circumstances. Moral exemplarity characterizes an agent who subsumes her goals and actions under others’ capacity to accept them, and who by this very action, whether consciously or unconsciously, induces collective support about the values underlying such behavior. In large hierarchical organizations, top executives’ words and actions toward others are heeded and diffused to the lower levels of the organization. To illustrate, moral exemplarity expresses itself positively when middle managers follow top executives’ example by attending to employees’ prolonged and intensely agitated emotions (e.g., fear, anger, depression, hopelessness) caused by disruptive changes that could cause lasting harm to employees’ work and personal lives (Huy, 2001, 2002). Reciprocity and moral exemplarity constitute two main dimensions of the relational dimension of practical wisdom. We can now proceed to relate practical wisdom to types of change process. Given the concept of practical wisdom previously discussed, top executives display practical wisdom when they act in a way that expresses respect of others’ identities, are open to others’ feedback, are parsimonious in their use of coercive power, set more realistic goals and time for others to absorb novel ideas and reconstruct their individual and collective identities. As change agents, they are more likely to adopt less disruptive and dramatic change actions, such as large downsizings or mergers, and practice a more evolutionary process when this is feasible (Durand & Calori, 2006). The practice of reciprocity and moral exemplarity underlies poised change processes. Exemplarity narratives, i.e., narratives extolling salient

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organizational and ethical values reflected in top executives’ behavior, are present in the change process. Conversation spaces, i.e., physical or virtual spaces where conversations and dialogs can occur, further facilitate the patient and gradual process of change (Ford & Ford, 1995). However, if and when a revolutionary process is required, top executives may not be able to perform as wide a range of roles as they can in calmer environments. Top executives may be overwhelmed with the continuous demands of numerous external stakeholders to provide them with frequent accounts of the progress of revolutionary change and organizational performance, and may have less time to deal with internal groups. Aware of their own limitations, practically wise top executives are likely to solicit middle managers to help them actively define and carry out ambitious change instead of trying to perform most critical change activities on their own, especially when they concern emotional capability. In large hierarchical organizations, middle managers are likely to be more effective than top executives in enacting emotional capability because these managers are structurally closer to their employees and are thus more likely to be attuned to their subordinates’ emotional needs. Secondly, compared to executives caught up with many external demands, middle managers are likely to have more time to interact with their employees. Middle managers rather than executives are more likely to be effective in dealing with their workers’ emotions because emotion management must be highly appropriate in order to be effective. Different individuals’ emotional responses, needs, or coping mechanisms need to be recognized and attended to according to their specific situations (Huy, 2002).

PROPOSITIONS From the factors influencing organizational accountability in revolutionary change processes, four combinations exist, depending on whether middle managers enact emotional capability appropriately or not, and top executives are practically wise or not. These cases lead to the propositions summarized in Table 1. Our outcome variable – organizational accountability – is defined by its level (low, moderate, and high), its trend (increasing or decreasing), and its durability (persistent or ephemeral). A high (low) organizational accountability indicates that the organizational accounts provided by influential organization members are very (barely) congruent/aligned with the organization’s expressed values, actions, or outcomes and with relevant constituencies’ expectations.

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Table 1.

Level and Durability of Organizational Accountability in Revolutionary Change Processes. Emotional Capability (Middle Managers)

Practically wise influential agents (Top executives) High moral exemplarity and high reciprocity Not practically wise influential agents (Top executives) Low moral exemplarity and low reciprocity

No Emotional Capability (Middle Managers)

[Case 1]: Moderate/high and persistent organizational accountability

[Case 2]: Low and persistent organizational accountability

[Case 3]: Moderate but decreasing organizational accountability

[Case 4]: High but ephemeral organizational accountability

Case 1: Practically Wise Top Executives þ Emotional Capability The starting point seems favorable for accountability in this first case. However, whereas practically wise top executives are probably more able to lead and monitor an evolutionary change process because of the gradual pace and content of changes, they will be less able to do so for revolutionary change. Top executives will have to devote a significant proportion of their time to updating external stakeholders who are concerned about the progress and results of change, negotiating with other executives about alliances and acquisitions, or placating politicians who may be concerned about the impact of plant closings on their communities (Pettigrew, 1985). Even if top executives are aware of the need to devote significant time to internal issues, they may not be able to do so. Moreover, revolutionary change also imposes a cognitive and emotional burden on the executives who have to detach themselves from what they were proud of and were good at doing in order to invest in learning rapidly new competences and industry sectors they are less familiar with and that could therefore present significant risks to their business and personal prestige (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). All this could elicit high anxiety among these executives. Practically wise executives recognize that in a large and variegated organization, it is not realistic to expect everybody to experience the same feelings about change. Conscious of their personal limits in regard to time availability, knowledge, and physical and emotional resources, practically

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wise top executives know that they have to rely on many veteran people in a large organization, including middle managers, to cooperate with them if they want to garner a reasonable chance of success. One criterion for selecting these middle managers is that they are also emotionally capable and are respected as natural leaders by their local peers and subordinates (Huy, 2001). These veterans know the tacit ways of working, are familiar with the organization’s subcultures and can speak their local language; thus they are likely to be able to convince their peers and make things happen more quickly (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, & Lawrence, 2001). To elicit this group of veterans’ voluntary and eager cooperation, top executives have to display ‘‘otherness,’’ that is, respect for middle managers’ competences and contributions, and to practice ‘‘reciprocity’’ by engaging with them as equals in co-shaping the company’s strategic direction (Westley, 1990). Reciprocity supposes the a priori (before action) acknowledgment that others’ opinions are of value and interest (Durand & Calori, 2006). Such respect is likely to elicit honest, open accounts originating from various, deep layers of the organization, with middle managers acting as spokespersons. The change goals and the process of implementing them will be openly examined and debated with these veteran middle managers in a respectful climate, to ensure the maximum chance of acceptance by the recipients when the content and process of the revolutionary change are announced to the wider organization. This procedure illustrates ‘‘moral exemplarity,’’ that is, the quality of an agent who subsumes her goals and actions under others’ capacity to accept them. In turn, middle managers are likely to feel energized that their ideas and competences are truly heeded by top executives and are materially incorporated in shaping the strategic direction of the company in a way that seems compatible with the values and aspirations of the local constituents they represent (Huy, 2001; Westley, 1990). They are more likely to exert extra efforts to make change happen because they are proud of their plan. It is built by them and for them. These people will be likely to enact all the skills and knowledge they have at their disposal, including locally appropriate emotion management actions (Huy, 2002). The consequence on the level of accountability is that the accounts will be detailed, multi-level, i.e., contingent upon different activities or geographies, while accurate and trustworthy. However, the multiplicity of details and conditions risk blurring the message and present the risk of misinterpretation. Therefore, accountability is likely to be moderate-to-high. However, that level will probably not deteriorate because coherence exists between top executives’ other-orientation and middle managers’ emotional capabilities.

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Proposition 1. In revolutionary change processes, the presence of an emotional capability implemented by middle managers offsets the relative inadequacy of practically wise top executives and produces a moderateto-high, persistent organizational accountability.

Case 2: Practically Wise Top Executives þ No Emotional Capability Two disabling factors are at work in this case. First, top executives are constrained in their ability to attend on their own to the revolutionary change process. Second, the absence of particular emotional capability from middle managers deprives them from the valuable knowledge and continuous feedback embedded in employees’ feelings. Third, the relaying veterans are unlikely to emerge as a coherent group by contrast with Case 1. This situation is typical of cases in which middle managers are part of inertial systems (Biggart, 1977; Floyd & Woolridge, 1996). Top executives face moral discomfort and may over-invest to get access to other employees’ feelings and thoughts, but achieve limited success. Middle managers may not consider top executives as credible leaders to conduct the necessary change and may resist covertly, diffuse erroneous information, and vie for personal advantages. They are not likely to devote their time and effort to encourage others around and below them to display freely their emotions and thoughts, may dampen individual attachment to top executives and, at the organizational level, weaken the process of identification (Pratt, 2000). Altogether, the level of accountability is persistently low because antagonistic forces create a vicious circle of defensive mechanisms (Argyris, 1990). Proposition 2. In revolutionary change processes, the constraints upon practically wise top executives combine with the absence of emotional capability to produce low and persistent organizational accountability.

Case 3: No Practically Wise Top ExecutivesþEmotional Capability In this case, thanks to middle managers’ enactment of emotional capability, employees develop authentic accounts at the lower levels of an organization, but top executives are not receptive to their subordinates’ accounts and feelings. Invoking the reason that emotion can impair rational business

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logic, top executives dismiss emotional states as ‘‘irrational’’ or illegitimate in business organizations. These discouraging views are likely to lead middle managers who are concerned about the link between their employees’ emotional states and business results to go underground or exit (Hirschman, 1970; Huy, 2002). The result is a moderate-to-high level of accountability because muzzled middle managers do not participate in the production of the organizational account. Depending on the level of identification with the organization, some middle managers may stay longer with the organization and delay leaving from an altruistic concern that the organization might go from bad to worse if they were to leave (Hirschman, 1970). They postpone exit and suffer in silence, hoping that the situation will improve. However, sooner or later, the accumulation of unfaithful testimonies and rival accounts will probably emerge, be diffused, and reduce the initially moderate-to-high level of organizational accountability that was forged by top-level executives. Proposition 3. In revolutionary change processes, the absence of practically wise top executives reduces the benefits of emotional capability implemented by middle managers and produces a moderate, but decreasing organizational accountability.

Case 4: No Practically Wise Top Executives þ No Emotional Capability Here, insensitivity to others and absence of emotional capability combine to enable top executives to produce a plausible account of organizational actions and results, at least initially. Through a combination of hard and soft control systems (Simons, 1994), top executives may be able to persuade emotionally middle managers to buy in to or comply blindly with the executives’ wishes for revolutionary change. Other groups may not be kept adequately informed about the reasons for and timing of change. As a result, the initial level of organizational accountability is likely to be high, as two internal groups cooperate in promoting clear and coherent messages about the organization’s urgent needs for revolutionary change. However, subsequent implementation actions may be quite different from initial intentions and rhetoric and may undermine the durability of organizational accountability. Successive accounts of organizational actions lack coherence and appear to be implausible. As a result, mistrust and cynicism set in and demands for substantial evidence validating previous rhetorical pronouncements increase from the lower levels of the

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organization and make open conversation and collective alignment difficult and protracted (Reichers, Wanous, & Austin, 1997). New conversation spaces are likely to open and rival stories become widespread. Over time, the top executives’ credibility erodes and, with it, organizational accountability. Proposition 4. In revolutionary change processes, the absence of practically wise top executives interacts with an absence of emotional capability implemented by middle managers to produce a high, but ephemeral organizational accountability.

DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH In this chapter, we propose the beginning of a model that links some elements of ethics (practical wisdom) to emotional intelligence at the organizational level (emotional capability) to show how the enactment of ethics and emotion can interact and influence organizational accountability, which is critical for an organization’s sustainability. To simplify our discussion, we model top executives as shapers of the ethical context (by enacting practical wisdom) and middle managers as shapers of the emotional context (by enacting emotional capability) but also attempt to nuance the predictive power of our model by embedding it in the context of revolutionary change processes. By focusing on a small set of actions performed by top executives and middle managers, we do not imply that these groups are the only two important ones inside an organization that can influence accountability. Further inquiry is required to identify additional factors that could influence the predictability of our propositions. For example, external factors (e.g., unions, social movements) and internal factors (e.g., in- and out-group effects, corporate governance, organizational structure, organizational identity and cultures) may usefully complement our current framework. Moreover, to increase the generalizability of our propositions, considering other social and organizational contexts could help refine the current model. For instance, in a small to medium size organization, the roles of top executives versus middle managers as described in our model could overlap. Finally, extension to other types of changes (e.g., evolutionary changes) would be another avenue for research. Despite these simplifications, we believe this research can contribute to at least three literatures.

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Contributions to Organizational Accountability The literature on organizational accountability seems to fall short in explaining its antecedents. It typically indicates how accountability constrains both organizational development (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Hannan & Freeman, 1984) and individual behaviors (Morris & Moore, 2000; Tetlock, 1992, 2000). We propose a framework that positions the level and durability of organizational accountability as a dynamic outcome that takes into account top executives’ orientation toward others, and middle management’s emotional capability. Whereas some researchers emphasize the role of an organizational account’s rationality and coherence independently of its authentic content (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), we argue that in case of revolutionary changes durable organizational accountability results from situations in which top executives are practically wise, i.e., respect others, exhibit moral exemplarity, and practice reciprocity (in Table 1, Case 1). However, not telling the truth, pursuing self-interested goals, and being closed to others’ thoughts and feelings can be associated with high but less durable (even ephemeral) and declining levels of organizational accountability (Table 1, Case 4). At an intra-organizational level, some authors have shown how accountability affects individual behavior (Tetlock, 1992). Directive reporting procedures may entice managers to take refuge in a fractional treatment of problem-solution dyads for which they are responsible and accountable to the exclusion of the ‘‘great organizational accountability picture’’ about which they may feel not chiefly concerned (Clegg, 2002). Accordingly, using a method based on the study of scenario-based reflections and imagined experiences, Morris and Moore (2000) showed that a threatening accountability and a strategy of ‘‘pre-empting self criticism’’ inhibit individual learning. Tetlock (2000) explored how personal ideologies influence people’s rationalizing behavior in organizations. Complementary to these studies of top executives’ personal ideologies and individual strategies, we theorize that (1) top executives’ ‘‘philosophy of the others’’ in interaction with middle managers’ emotional capability leads to differing levels and durability of organizational accountability, and that (2) in the context of change that affects many organizations today, organizational accountability is not a given but an ongoing outcome of individual dispositions and group interactions. Many managerial prescriptions exist to improve the fac- ade of organizational accountability: matrix structures, employee surveys, external consultancy, HR toolkit (360-degree feedback), ‘‘forced’’ open conversations,

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governance, and executive compensation schemes (Beer, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). These prescriptions focus generally on technical aspects such as more data collection and physical structures and processes that enable middle managers to express themselves. What seems underdeveloped in these prescriptions is a clearer articulation about the deeper understanding of and rationale for human action, managers’ philosophical and ethical dispositions, and their inner and expressed feelings. We suggest that such prescriptions could enhance organizational accountability durably only if openness to others and emotional sensitivity are central to human actions.

Contribution to Organizational Ethics Literature OE has mainly developed along two lines of research (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Soule, 2002). On one hand, the instrumental research program reflects on the link between ethics and organizational benefits. On the other hand, normative principles focus on advising people what ought to be done in different situations. The instrumental line of research seems to under-specify the link between ethical principles and theories of action, whereas the normative thrust often appears to be disconnected from many ethical dilemmas that characterize business reality. Our propositions contribute to the OE literature because we believe, first, that they guide organizational action without being disconnected from ethical principles. They do not just proclaim the benefits of an idealistic proethical stance, but describe the causal mechanisms and interactions that predict different qualities of organizational accountability. Second, the propositions are not purely normative. We do not judge agents’ actions as being good or bad, just or unjust. We show the cross-level interaction between individual and organizational attributes in specific contexts of change, including how individual top executives’ philosophy about dealing with others influences both how other organizational members behave and what quality of organizational accountability results from their aggregate actions. We describe how top executives’ practical wisdom and middle managers’ emotional capability can dynamically influence organizational accountability and enable it to persist (or not) over time. Moreover, as distinct from previous research, our theorizing does not assume an ethos of cohesiveness where top executives and middle managers agree on collective goals, values, or actions. Nor do we automatically relate ethical behavior to some pre-supposed advantage by showing how some contextual cross-effects could produce situations in

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which the desirable outcome (high organizational accountability) is not caused directly by actors’ ethical behaviors. Future research can integrate and nuance how actions enacting certain principles or values (such as respecting others’ opinions and feelings) link OE more richly to organization theory. Inspired by the philosophy of the ‘‘other’’ and by classical ethical writings, we seek to extend OE research to organizational outcomes stemming from influential agents’ ethical and philosophical orientations. We foresee the potential for OE to contribute meaningfully to important organizational processes, such as organizational creativity, identification, and conflict resolution issues, with an approach that eschews the extreme ends of instrumental and decontextualized moral prescriptions, and which integrates select insights from economics and the organizational behavior and business strategy literatures.

Contributions to Emotion Management Research Research on emotion management in organizations has largely been silent on ethical considerations (Huy, 2002; Rafaeli & Sutton 1991; Sutton, 1991; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989). This may have led some scholars to question whether advances in emotion research, including that of measuring emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990 represents another form of perhaps more insidious management control over employees (Martin, Knopoff, & Beckman, 1998). Our research seems rare in that it explicitly links ethical principles to emotion management actions and reveals how such linkages influence organizational actions and outcomes. We propose that principles of moral exemplarity, reciprocity, and respect of others provide a partial answer to potential ethical dilemmas about using emotion management as an additional means to achieve business objectives. Such principles are reflected in a clear articulation of organizationally sanctioned emotion management practices that are transparent to change agents and recipients. It can be seen how systematic training and monitoring of the skillful and ethical use of emotion management as a subset of human resource practices can be imparted as a priority to top executives and middle management involved in managing organizational change. We propose that attention to emotions and resulting thoughts and behavior is important to the study of change processes and organizational accountability. More research, however, is needed in this area. In particular, the modeling role of top and middle managers is critical in initiating, displaying, and diffusing appropriate sentiments toward others, whether they are internal or external stakeholders.

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Our study calls for more research on ethical awareness specific to emotion management in organizations. Moral exemplarity and reciprocity allow change agents and recipients to discuss openly the need for and application of various emotion management strategies and organizational ends in a quest for continuous improvement. While such an aspiration may seem unduly idealistic, it is nonetheless worth pursuing in light of recent scandals that have undermined trust in institutions as diverse as government security agencies, like the CIA and FBI, hospitals, and corporations like Enron, Shell, and March & McLennan.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS Gregory Ashley is a Ph.D. student at the University of Nebraska at Omaha in the area of Industrial/Organizational (I/O) Psychology. Greg holds undergraduate degrees in Psychology and telecommunications, and Masters degrees in Business and Economics. His research has been published in both economic and psychology-related publications. Prior to entering academia, Greg accrued over 20 years of hands-on business experience working in a variety of management positions in the telecommunications industry. Claire E. Ashton-James has a Ph.D. in Social Psychology from the University of New South Wales and an Honors degree in Business Management from the University of Queensland Business School, which she earned under the supervision of Professor Neal M. Ashkanasy. Dr. Ashton-James taught a number of management and marketing courses at Duke University in 2005 and 2006 before moving to the University of British Columbia, where she is currently teaching psychology as a Post Doctoral Teaching Fellow. Current research explores the impact of moods and emotions on automatic behavior as well as controlled judgment and decision making. John Blenkinsopp is Reader in Management at Teesside Business School, University of Teesside. His professional background is as an HR professional in the UK’s National Health Service, his academic background is occupational psychology, with an MSc from Birkbeck College and a Ph.D. from University of Newcastle upon Tyne. His main research interests are in whistle-blowing and careers, and in particular the role of emotion in both. Other research interests include leadership and cross-cultural management. He is Associate Editor of Personnel Review. Nancy Borkowski, DBA, CPA, FACHE is visiting professor in the Department of Health Policy and Management at Florida International University’s Robert Stempel School of Public Health. Dr. Borkowski has served on the editorial boards of the Journal of Healthcare Administration Education, Journal of Healthcare Management and the Journal of Business and Management. She has published two books and many articles on a wide range 333

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of healthcare and management issues. Her first book, Organizational Behavior in Health Care, won the 2005 Book of the Year Award from the American Journal of Nursing (AJN) for nursing leadership and management. Satish P. Deshpande (Ph.D., The University of Iowa) is a Professor of Management at the Haworth College of Business, Western Michigan University. His current research interests include business ethics, unionization in healthcare, and applied psychology in human resource issues. His publications include articles in the Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Business Logistics, Journal of Business Ethics, Human Relations, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Rodolphe Durand is Associate Professor at HEC, Paris. His primary research interests concern the analysis of organizational evolution from a dynamic perspective using philosophical and sociological approaches. His works have been published in journals including Academy of Management Review, American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, and Strategic Management Journal. His last book, Organizational Evolution and Strategic Management was published by Sage in 2006. Marissa S. Edwards is a doctoral candidate at the University of Queensland Business School, Australia. She has an honors degree in Psychology from the University of Queensland. Her research interests include emotions in organizations, employee silence, whistle-blowing, and employee deviance. She is co-editor (with Jerald Greenberg) of Voice and Silence in Organizations. Deshani B. Ganegoda is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Management and Organisation at National University of Singapore. She earned her Bachelor of Business degree and Honors degree (First Class) in Management at Monash University, Australia. Her research interests include organizational justice, morality, ethics, organizational change, and emotions. Alan Goldman is Professor of Management in the School of Global Management and Leadership, Arizona State University, Phoenix, USA. His recent activities include serving as Guest Editor of the Journal of Managerial Psychology for a special edition on ‘‘Dysfunctional Leadership and Organizations.’’ Goldman is the recipient of Best Paper Awards from the Academy of Management in 2005 and 2007. He is the author of six books, over 50 articles, and is currently under contract and writing a book on toxic

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leadership and organizations. Alan Goldman is also active as a management consultant and leadership coach. Andrew Griffiths is a Professor in Business Sustainability and Strategy at the University of Queensland Business School. Andrew’s areas of expertise include business impacts of climate change, corporate sustainability strategy, and change. He has co-authored three books, The Sustainable Corporation (1998), Sustainability (2000), and Organisational Change for Sustainability (2007). Andrew is the recipient of the UQ Foundation Research Excellence Award, the UQ Business School Research Excellence Award, and the Academy of Management, Best Paper Award (Organizations and Natural Environment Interest Group). His work has been published in leading international journals, including The Academy of Management Review and the Journal of Management Studies. Paul Harvey is an Assistant Professor of Management at the University of New Hampshire Whittemore School of Business and Economics. He received his Ph.D. in organizational behavior from Florida State University. His professional background includes work in corporate finance and recruiting, as well as small business management. His research interests include cognitive and emotional predictors of behavior, as well as ethics and leadership. Anne E. Herman holds a Master of Arts degree in Psychology and is currently a Doctoral candidate in Industrial and Organizational Psychology at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Ms. Herman has consulting experience in performance management, organizational assessment and change, creativity and innovation, employee selection and promotion, organizational strategy, program evaluation and statistical methodology. Her research interests include problem solving and decision making, creativity and innovation, leadership, organizational motivation, survey design and program effectiveness. Ms. Herman is a member of the Society of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Academy of Management, American Psychological Association, and the Organization Development Network. Gerard P. Hodgkinson is Professor of Organizational Behavior and Strategic Management and Director of the Centre for Organizational Strategy, Learning and Change at the University of Leeds, UK. The author of three books and over 50 articles and chapters in scholarly journals and edited volumes, he is a Fellow of both the British Psychological Society and the British Academy of Management. He is also a Senior Fellow of the UK

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ESRC/EPSRC Advanced Institute of Management (AIM) Research, a former Editor of the British Journal of Management, and serves on the editorial boards of several other journals, including the Academy of Management Review and Organization Science. He currently co-edits (with J. Kevin Ford) the International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, and with William H. Starbuck he has recently co-edited the Oxford Handbook of Organizational Decision Making. Quy Nguyen Huy is Associate Professor of Strategic Management at INSEAD. His current research interests include how soft factors such as emotion, time, and symbol-related actions influence the success of strategic change in established organizations or the creation of new organizations. His publications related to emotion research have appeared in Organization Science, Advances of Strategic Management, Administrative Science Quarterly, and The Academy of Management Review. He holds a Ph.D. in Strategy from McGill University. Jacob Joseph (Ph.D., The University of Iowa) is a Professor of Business Administration at the School of Management, University of Alaska. His research interests include such topics as business ethics, healthcare and ethical climates, and issues concerning human resource management. He has published articles in the Journal of Business Ethics, Human Relations, Journal of Psychology, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, and other related journals. Mark J. Martinko is the Bank of America Professor of Management at Florida State University. His research is in the area attribution theory, organizational aggression, and leadership. His most recent books are Thinking Like a Winner: A Guide to High Performance Leadership (2002) and Attribution Theory in the Organizational Sciences: Theoretical and Empirical Contributions (2004). Jessica Mesmer-Magnus (Ph.D., Florida International University) is an Assistant Professor of Management with the Cameron School of Business at the University of North Carolina-Wilmington. Her research interests include business ethics, work/family conflict, training program design, and whistle-blowing/counterproductive behavior. Her publications include articles in Human Performance, Journal of Vocational Behavior, Journal of Business Ethics, and Journal of Labor Research. She is certified as a Senior

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Professional in Human Resources and has worked as a Human Resources Manager for a US-based national consulting firm. Amy E. Mickel is an Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior in the College of Business Administration at California State University, Sacramento. Her research interests include: life-quality and work-life issues, emotions, topics related to money, and interactive teaching techniques. Her articles have appeared in journals such as Academy of Management Review, Human Relations, Journal of Management Education, and Journal of Management Inquiry. Dr. Mickel earned her doctorate in Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management from University of Washington. Hakan Ozcelik is an Assistant Professor in the College of Business Administration at the California State University, Sacramento. He received his Ph.D. in Organizational Behavior from the University of British Columbia, Canada. He holds a double-major degree in Management and Political Science, and an MBA from Bosphorus University, Turkey. His current research interests revolve around understanding the role of emotions in organizational life, focusing on such topics as emotional climate and emotional fit; emotions and decision making; emotions and communication; and discrete emotions such as anger and loneliness. Sally Russell is a Ph.D. student at the University of Queensland Business School. Her research focuses on the antecedents of pro-environmental behavior in organizations; particularly the role of emotions. Her Ph.D. research draws together evidence from management and psychology using the theoretical frameworks of issue ownership and identification. She is the recipient of an Australian Postgraduate Award and a Smart State Ph.D. Scholarship from the Queensland Government Department of State Development, Trade and Innovation. Roni Reiter-Palmon is the Isaacson Professor of I/O Psychology and the Director of the I/O Psychology Graduate Program at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO). She also serves as the Director of Research for the Institute of Collaboration Science, an inter-disciplinary program at UNO. She received her Ph.D. in I/O Psychology from George Mason University. Her research focuses on the effect of individual differences, specifically personality and cognitive thought processes, on organizational

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outcomes. Her research has been published in Journal of Applied Psychology, Creativity Research Journal, and Leadership Quarterly. Erin M. Richter, a Ph.D./MLS student in the Law-Psychology Program at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, conducts research in the area of jury decision making in both the criminal and civil arenas of the law. Her topics of interest include juror’s perceptions of symbolic hate speech, death penalty issues, the treatment of sexual harassment in the workplace, and attitudes of anti-corporate bias. She has interned with a nationally renowned trial consulting firm and currently serves as the Executive Director for the trial consulting firm of Scientific Resources for the Law, Inc. Eugene Sadler-Smith is Professor of Management Development and Organizational Behavior in the School of Management, University of Surrey. His research interests center upon the role of intuitive judgment in management decision making and management development. His research has been published in journals such as the Academy of Management Executive, Academy of Management Learning and Education, British Journal of Psychology, Journal of Occupational & Organizational Psychology, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Management Learning and Organization Studies. He is author of Learning and Development for Managers, Learning in Organizations (with Peter J. Smith), and Inside Intuition. Lisa L. Scherer is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO). She received her doctorate in industrialorganizational (I/O) psychology from the Ohio State University in 1988 before coming to UNO. Her research interests include the role of emotions and moods in predicting problem solving and decision-making behavior, situational and emotional antecedents of deviant and counterproductive behavior, and the effect of age and generational membership on workplace attitudes, emotions, and behavior. She has mentored over 120 graduate students and 80 undergraduate students and has received both the UNO Excellence in Teaching Award and the Outstanding Graduate Mentor Award. Marta Sinclair is currently a Lecturer of Comparative and Cross-cultural Management and the Acting Director of Bachelor and Master of International Business programs in Griffith Business School at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. She received her BA (Linguistics) from Charles University, her MA (Education and Human Development) from

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George Washington University, and her Ph.D. (Organizational Behavior) from The University of Queensland. She has extensive management experience in software localization, intercultural training, broadcasting, leisure and hospitality, real estate, and translation services from USA and Europe. Her research focuses on the use of intuition and emotions in managerial decision making and problem solving. At present, she explores how these aspects affect knowledge transfer and team creativity. Ronda M. Smith earned her BS in Business Administration from University of Nebraska, Lincoln (UNL) and her MS in Industrial/Organizational Psychology from University of Nebraska, Omaha. She is currently pursuing her Ph.D. in Human Resources, Leadership and Organizational Behavior from UNL and is affiliated with the Gallup Leadership Institute. She has over 15 years experience in small business startups and corporations in areas of Human Resources, Marketing, Organizational Change, and Business Process with companies including Walt Disney World, ConAgra Foods, and Union Pacific Railroad. Jawad Syed is a Lecturer in Human Resource Management at Kent Business School, University of Kent, UK. His research interests include gender and diversity in organizations, emotional labor, and organizational learning. His articles on these topics have appeared in scholarly journals, such as International Journal of Human Resource Management, International Journal of Work, Organisation and Emotion, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, and Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources. In the organizational learning stream, Jawad is particularly interested in team learning and strategic renewal. For gender and diversity, his research interests relate to developing diversity management models in less developed and emerging societies. Chockalingam Viswesvaran (Ph.D., University of Iowa) is a Professor of Psychology at Florida International University. His research interests include business ethics, personnel selection, and human resource management. He has published in Journal of Applied Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Psychological Bulletin. He has served on five editorial boards and as an Associate Editor of the International Journal of Selection and Assessment. He is an elected fellow of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology as well as Divisions 5 (Measurement) and 14 (Industrial-Organizational Psychology) of the American Psychological Association.

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Amy Voss-Humke holds a Masters degree in Social Psychology and a Masters in Legal Studies from the University of Nebraska at Lincoln and is pursuing a Ph.D. in Social Psychology. Ms. Voss-Humke currently works as a trial consultant at DecisionQuest. She has published articles in the area of legal decision making, including in the area of sexual harassment. Richard L. Wiener, who holds a doctorate degree in Social Psychology from the University of Houston and a Masters in Legal Studies from the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, is the Director of the Law and Psychology Program at the University of Nebraska/Lincoln. Dr. Wiener has published numerous articles in the area of legal decision making especially in the area of sexual harassment. Dr. Wiener’s work is largely supported by grants from the National Science Foundation. Professor Wiener applies social cognitive theory to problems in criminal and civil law including the death penalty, hate crime, negligence judgments, and bankruptcy regulation. Ryan J. Winter, Assistant Professor at Florida International University, conducts research on the relationship between psychology and legal issues, focusing in part on jury decision making. He has investigated jurors’ comprehension of death penalty instructions, jurors’ use of inadmissible evidence, bilingualism in jurors, and how jurors make liability and damage award determinations in civil cases. He also focuses on legal decisions in sexual harassment cases. He teaches courses in social psychology, trial consulting, psychology and law, and social cognition. He received his Ph.D. from the City University of New York and his Masters of Legal Studies degree from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.