Embracing Organisational Development and Change: An Interdisciplinary Approach Based on Social Constructionism, Systems Thinking, and Complexity Science (Springer Texts in Business and Economics) 303051255X, 9783030512552

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Springer Texts in Business and Economics

Antonie van Nistelrooij

Embracing Organisational Development and Change An Interdisciplinary Approach Based on Social Constructionism, Systems Thinking, and Complexity Science

Springer Texts in Business and Economics

Springer Texts in Business and Economics (STBE) delivers high-quality instructional content for undergraduates and graduates in all areas of Business/Management Science and Economics. The series is comprised of self-contained books with a broad and comprehensive coverage that are suitable for class as well as for individual self-study. All texts are authored by established experts in their fields and offer a solid methodological background, often accompanied by problems and exercises.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10099

Antonie van Nistelrooij

Embracing Organisational Development and Change An Interdisciplinary Approach Based on Social Constructionism, Systems Thinking, and Complexity Science

Antonie van Nistelrooij VU University Amsterdam Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN 2192-4341 (electronic) ISSN 2192-4333 Springer Texts in Business and Economics ISBN 978-3-030-51255-2 ISBN 978-3-030-51256-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51256-9 # The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Dedicated to Prof. Dr. Léon de Caluwé{

Preface

Most people who are interested in the field of organisation development and change (ODC) will have heard of Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), whose work focused on the use of human dynamics as a way of generating change. His research has influenced many practitioners interested in helping others to cope with change. Among these figures are well-known names in the ODC field such as Douglas McGregor, Chris Argyris, Edgar Schein, Robert Marshak and Gervase Bushe, to name but a few of those who have continued and developed Lewin’s work. Just like Lewin, they are not only practising scholars but also academic practitioners: their publications achieve a neat balance between theoretical insights and empirical findings. With this book, we build upon their publications, introducing theory with practical examples and offering case study-led insights with theoretical reflections. As a scholar, lecturer and practitioner for more than 25 years in the field of ODC, it has always been my experience that managers and students benefit from active mutual reflection on the issues at hand. It does not matter whether they are managers following a Master of Business Administration (MBA) or students completing a Master of Science (MSc). Everyone benefits in their own way from the open exchange of ideas, regardless of whether the subject in question is theoretical or practical. In this regard, managers are sometimes a little reluctant to investigate the theoretical implications of their practical experience, while students often seem to be reluctant to accept different shades of grey in the practical implications of their theoretical knowledge. However, both benefit to the greatest extent if the applicable themes are reflected upon, both from a practical and a theoretical perspective. As it turned out, replicating this duality and maintaining the right balance between theory and practice proved to be one of the main challenges in writing this book. The focus of this book is on the manager and the consultant who intervene in the matters of others with the purpose of changing their way of working in relation to their context. In today’s business world, such interventionists are presented with challenges like: 1. Prioritising and focusing in a continuously changing world Faced with complex, paradoxical situations, competing goals and changing obligations, interventionists are constantly weighing up the interests and stakes of all involved. Under these circumstances, one of the main contemporary vii

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Preface

challenges is probably keeping one’s eye on the ball and prioritising high-valued work in a dynamic field of opposing forces. This is why it is so important for interventionists to assist in figuring out what is needed, to support participants in targeted ways and to continue finding common ground. 2. Committing various stakeholders in sharing one change purpose Organisational change is not always successful and the high frequency of change initiatives in companies can stress out everybody involved. Therefore, one of the contemporary challenges for interventionists is to help all involved to commit anew to every new change initiative. This is why it is so important for interventionists to construct a change philosophy that enables people to cope and commit themselves to the change purpose. 3. Changing while keeping the whole aligned Companies are evolving with each passing day. As business evolves, people need to evolve as well. This leads to questions such as ‘How can interventionists help people to keep up with the pace of change?’ Thus, one of the contemporary challenges for interventionists is helping people to learn and to change while maintaining the integrity of the whole. This is why it is important for interventionists to help participants in respecting the existing diversity in perspectives and at the same time keep them aligned. Beneath these challenges lies the assumption that people want to be helped with changes that are generally imposed upon them. Just like Marilyn Ferguson, an American feminist writer, has observed: ‘No one can persuade another to change’. According to her conviction, each of us guards a gate of change that can only be opened from the inside. We cannot open the gate of another, either by argument or by emotional appeal. The point here is that, as management guru Stephen Covey argues, if we want to change others, we first have to change ourselves. To change ourselves effectively, we first need to take stock of our own way of looking at things. In fact, as Covey maintains, until we take how we see ourselves (and how we see others and our relations with them) into account, we will be unable to understand how others see their world. If our attempts to change others are unsuccessful, the cause we generally articulate is that others are resisting our good intentions to change them. However, what we like to underscore with this argument is that it is unlikely that we will be able to improve ourselves as interventionists simply by blaming others for failing to behave according to our intentions. So, the primary challenge for contemporary interventionists is that when we accept that our own assumptions lie at the heart of our own professional development and of each change approach we construct, then we must consider different explanations for unsuccessful change initiatives. Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Antonie van Nistelrooij

Acknowledgements

The writing of this book got underway during my sabbatical while I was reflecting on my experiences as a scholar and practitioner. While doing so, I gained the impression that I was seemingly bound up on a path that was progressively limiting my scope as a practitioner—and increasingly also as a scholar. Apparently, I was no longer learning in such a way that I was critically scrutinising my own assumptions. I can say that the process of writing this book challenged me in many ways in trying to deal with, for example, what I in hindsight recognised as an unfruitful tendency to want to be in control of a changing situation—not only that of others, but also of that of myself. In line with the inspiring practical, communicative psychotherapeutical theories of Paul Watzlawick, Bill O’Hanlon, Bradford Keeney and Milton Erickson, therefore, this book’s main point is that when we are trying to change others, we need to stay open for challenging our own assumptions—and in the same fashion— letting our own assumptions to be challenged by those we are trying to change.

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Aims of the Book

With this book I criticise the dominant managerial and prescriptive character of the field of ODC in general and aim to contribute to the shift towards a more dialogic approach by: • Focusing on the individual in relation to his or her context as being the basic unit of analysis. • Seeking to understand patterns of relationships, connections and interdependencies between organisational phenomena rather than attempting to break things down into their component parts. • Combining contemporary ODC insights with insights from social constructionism, systems thinking, learning and complexity science, helping us to focus on relationships, communication and interdependence (i.e. mutual dependence) between processes and people. Interdependence in a given situation means that two or more people are dependent upon each other—for example, of their work, their place in a daily production/service process and/or because of their mutual need of information to effectuate the change they are all supposed to generate. In today’s world, we can conceive that increasing globalisation and interdependence mean that the number of unexpected events—such as the outbreak of COVID19 virus—is increasing spectacularly. At the same time, the agility of the governments of countries and top management of companies and institutions seems to be decreasing proportionately. Subsequently, it becomes clear that the things we do are not per se developing in a sequential and linear way and that we urgently need to find a way to deal with complexity and non-linear occurrences. By bringing the fields of ODC, social constructionism, systems thinking, learning and complexity science together, this book emphasises the importance of interdependence as a key to successful management of change, not only in the workplace but in every form of human endeavour. Reality is determined in and through relationships. Therefore, changing this reality starts with making people aware of the importance of their relationships with others. Thus, the role of an interventionist, xi

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e.g. a manager or a consultant, is, in essence, not to solve other people’s problems but to be aware and raise awareness by ourselves and others of the current situation we are in. With this book I attempt to do this by trying to critically re-conceptualise the main assumptions underneath the field of organisation development and change.

About the Business Cases in This Book

After introducing a social constructionist way of looking at ‘reality’, this book introduces three business cases, which are elaborated as practical examples of the theory throughout the rest of the book. These business cases are intended to illustrate the following: 1. The difficulty of perceiving and conceiving change when we find ourselves in a blurry changing situation. 2. The difficulty of seeing interdependency in our relationships with others while we are supposed to pass change to the same people. 3. The increasing problems that can be expected when we intervene in a complex, paradoxical situation as being simple. 4. The way an interventionist is anticipating and/or handling ‘resistance’ while he/she is ignoring the possibility that ‘resistance’ can be a circular, intertwined human action-reaction behavioural pattern, being the result of his or her own doing.

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Expressions of Gratitude

The ‘we’ in this book indicates more than the perspective of the author; it refers to the colleagues, friends, students and others who were integral to the preparation of this book. Therefore, I would like to thank my colleague, the late, emeritus professor Léon de Caluwé for the opportunity he has given me to carry out research with him on the assumptions of managers and consultants regarding changing and intervening. The empirical findings give rise to some interesting new insights and publications. In the same vein, I would like to thank professor Thijs Homan for expanding my insight into the world of complexity science while writing together the narrative in Chap. 8 for an international academic journal. Next, I would like to acknowledge Dick Axelrod for introducing me in the 1990s to his seminars on applying ‘the conference model’, my first acquaintance with large group interventions (LGIs), catapulting forward my work as a process consultant. I would also like to thank Rob de Wilde, not only for co-developing LGI practices in the 2000s and 2010s in the Netherlands but also for co-writing several Dutch articles and books on the subject. In addition, I wish to extend my appreciation to the organisations, institutions and staff that assisted me in exploring and intervening in their midst. Most of this work has been done within the real-time group dynamics of the moment, which makes most of my work not only complex and something of a blur but also a challenge to keep in touch with one’s own assumptions regarding how to help people to embrace change. Many personal thanks go to the hundreds of people who have helped me with this challenge over the last 25 years. In this regard, I would especially like to thank Sander Harperink, Hettie Keijzers, Marcel Kuhlman, Saskia Tjepkema, Eva van der Fluit, Martijn van Ooijen, Tonnie van der Zouwen, Linda van Laarhoven, Jimmy Hendriks, Dorothe Brinkman, Betsy van Oortmarssen, Cees Sprenger, Anja Dijkman. For developing new educational insights and experimenting with all sorts of didactical features, I am grateful to the BCO master’s students that followed the course ‘organisation development and change’ in the last 20 years at the Department of Organisation Sciences of the VU University in Amsterdam, and especially for their feedback on two pre-publications of this book, namely Christine Teelken, Sierk Ybema, Kim van der Heide, Eveline Lek, Daphne van den Hazel, Ilja Boot, Madelon Keet, Moulay Anass El Idrissi, Kelly Rozen, Thaiza Kwas, Ineke Wittermans and Waiyin Choi. For sharing their insights and experiences over the last 15 years, and xv

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for exchanging their practical perspectives and exploring each other’s experiences and opinions in an open way regarding the change issues they are dealing with, I would like to thank the MBA students of the TSM Business School and the participants of the post-academic VU University module ‘Change Management’. Last but not least, my girlfriend Mariken de Vaan, for being proud and staying enthusiastic during the whole process of writing this book.

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2

Change Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

3

Organisation Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

4

Beyond Organisation Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

5

Large-Group Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

6

Changing and Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

7

Change Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

8

A Complexity Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

xvii

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2 Fig. 1.3 Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 2.4 Fig. 2.5 Fig. 2.6 Fig. 2.7 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 5.1

An interventionists’ guide to simple, complicated and complex contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A shift in perspective, from change to changing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overview of main theories, approaches and methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kotter’s eight-step model . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . An illustration of the way change activities are organised in a parallel temporary structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A change process depicted as an emotional roller-coaster ride . .. . The McKinsey diagnostic 7-S framework (Peters 1980) . . . . . . . . . . The main ingredients of a strategic change strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Examples of both archetypical change types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An ‘action-reaction’ behavioural pattern depicted as a seesaw pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24 24 29 43 45 51 55 64 66 68

A schematic illustration of Lewin’s action research, forcefield theory and change theory .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 92 The system components of, and questions for, identifying a preliminary scope from the bottom up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 The attraction relations of the Bull Dogs and the Red Devils as sociometrically analysed by Sherif and Sherif in their field studies on group processes (Both sociograms are taken from: : Sherif and Sherif 1964). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Differentiating two ODs (Marshak and Grant 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Classic conception of planned behaviour (Van Nistelrooij and De Caluwé 2016) . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . Prochaska’s iterative progression of change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Examples of psychological interventions (Kottler 2018, p. 11) . . . Contrasting a ‘process’ perspective with that of a ‘generative’ perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

132 134 139 141 158

Examples of types of large-group interventions and selected sources for gaining more information about each type of intervention (Axelrod and Axelrod 2006; Beedon and Christie 2006; Brown and Isaacs 2005; Dannemiller Tyson xix

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Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 5.4 Fig. 5.5 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5 Fig. 6.6 Fig. 6.7

Fig. 6.8 Fig. 6.9 Fig. 6.10 Fig. 6.11 Fig. 6.12 Fig. 7.1

List of Figures

Associates 1999; Emery and Devane 2007; Emery and Purser 1996; Jacobs 1994; Klein 1992; Ludema et al. 2003a; Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2005; Owen 2008b; Spencer 1989; Ulrich et al. 2002; Weisbord and Janoff 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bales and Strodtbeck’s phasing with corresponding main questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Communication cycle during a demarcated phase in an LGI programme .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . Phasing in a generic LGI programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An illustration of a learning infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An integrated and dynamic concept of what is determining our behaviour (Van Nistelrooij and De Caluwé 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The original X and Y assumptions by Douglas McGregor (McGregor 1960, pp. 33–42) . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . Two different types of language based on two different sets of assumptions (Covey 1989, p. 78) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assumptions: advocacy (Model I) and inquiry (Model II) (Argyris 1982) . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . State and ask (Noonan 2007, p. 35) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Single- and double-loop learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Different intervention levels, their main characteristics and main foci (Originally these different levels or orders are fundamentally rooted in the groundbreaking paper by Bateson, ‘The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication’, in which his thinking is based on Whitehead and Russell’s theory of logical types. In this paper, he distinguished between ‘what he termed “zero learning”, the acquisition of data or information that does not create a difference or change; “Learning I”, in which skill learning is acquired through trial and error selection of a possibility within a set of options; and “Learning II”, where second order or double-loop learning occurs through shifting the frame or set in which one is making level one choices.’ (Bateson 1972; Hawkins 2004, p. 415)) .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . Learning acts and tools in bringing to the surface and challenging assumptions . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . The ladder of inference (Argyris 1982, p. 181) . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . Questions that limit and support learning (Tompkins 2001, p. 559) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Senge’s example of the use of a ‘left-hand column’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Different ‘perspectives’ in co-inquiry (Coghlan and Shani 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

172 174 175 175 177 206 209 211 213 214 215

219 223 226 227 229 230

The main archetypical individual defence mechanisms as conceptualised by Freud (Polster and Polster 1973; see also: Stevenson 2004) . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . 247

List of Figures

Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3 Fig. 7.4 Fig. 7.5 Fig. 7.6 Fig. 8.1

A comparison of ‘defensive reasoning’, ‘groupthink’ and the ‘Abilene paradox’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘Walking on eggshells’: Kegan and Lahey’s ‘change immunity map’ (Kegan and Lahey 2009, p. 120) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A reinforcing loop . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . A balancing loop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gestalt picture of the goblet and the two faces in one picture . . . . .

xxi

257 266 272 273 276

Consulting activities seen from a ‘planned change’ and a ‘complexity’ perspective (cf. Shaw 1997, p. 241) . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . 295

1

Introduction The Challenge of Perceiving Change

[I]f we wanted to change others, we would first have to change ourselves. And to change ourselves effectively, we first have to change our own perceptions. Covey (1989)

1.1

Introduction

Leading change is an inherently complex endeavour and requires an understanding of the emotional and self-contradictory human aspects of coping with transition. The motives of employees who want change are very much like the motives of other employees who are moved to do the opposite and hang on to what they have. Whether an individual is inspired by these motives to agitate for reform or to stand fast on the status quo is determined by a person’s position in, and perceptions of, what is going on in his or her surroundings (Kaufman 1971). In short, every leader of change or interventionist as we call it in this book will be confronted with innovators and adapters as well as with defenders of the same change initiative. Whatever their position, the best plans will go awry when employees are not helped to actively engage in a process of exchanging their perceptions (Farr-Wharton and Brunetto 2007; Neves and Caetano 2006). First of all, involving employees is essential for change effectiveness (Bridges 2003). Secondly, this means that we need to face contradictory human aspects as they are. Therefore, for change to be embraced by all involved, interventionists must be skilled in organising a process that deals with arising contradictory human tensions (Wolf 2015). In this first chapter, we explore the specific challenges and assumptions behind the above statements. In doing so, we will introduce and explore the following:

# The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. van Nistelrooij, Embracing Organisational Development and Change, Springer Texts in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51256-9_1

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1 Introduction

• A short introduction of some of the main differences between a ‘positivist’ and a ‘postmodern’ worldview, followed by the introduction of the premises underlying a ‘social constructionist’ perspective as being the main paradigm of this book. • Three business cases, introducing the nature of the challenge of engaging people in change. Augmenting the need to include the interventionist and his or her assumptions in the process and therefore the need for a different change paradigm. • The challenge of perceiving and conceiving change. Augmenting that change management is an oxymoron and that organisational change is an intertwined process that takes place on an individual level and at the same time on a more collaborative level. • A leadership’s guide to varying complex contexts. Augmenting the importance of making sense of the context of change by diagnosing the perceived complexity, interrelated human patterns and their ‘current reality’. • A framework with an overview of three different interrelated theoretical approaches: social constructionism, systems thinking and complexity science. We start this chapter by describing what it means to look at change and to intervene from a social constructionist perspective. After this we introduce three business cases. With these cases we want to stress that the challenges that today’s leaders and employees face when confronted with organisational change are not necessarily problems that come down to merely ‘resistance’ of others. In Paragraph 1.4, we aim to deconstruct the way we look at change management, change and organisational change. Changing organisations is not about changing a simple machine but about changing complex social systems, which in itself is seldom a linear endeavour. We take this a step further in Paragraph 1.5, where we will discuss paradox and complexity and introduce the pivotal role of feedback. The chapter closes with some reflections, a recap of the main findings and some key discussion points.

1.2

Introducing a Social Constructionist Perspective on Change

As a field, ODC began in the 1950s as organisation development (OD) and in its origins is based on insights from traditional scientific disciplines such as psychology, sociology and anthropology. Later, during the 1980s, OD integrated insights from management and business studies and became a more interdisciplinary field, just like—and overlapping with—hybrid fields such as organisation sciences, organisational behaviour, strategic management and the upcoming field of change management and management consulting. As a result, it became known as the field of organisational development and change (ODC). Since the 2000s, ODC and, in a broader sense, the social sciences as a whole, have experienced ‘a relational turn’. Specifically, it is no longer perceived as possible to successfully apply positivist scientific assumptions based on physical science to the study of human relationships.

1.2 Introducing a Social Constructionist Perspective on Change

3

Instead, we should aim to create a social science focused on its ‘generative capacity’, that is, a capacity to challenge our guiding assumptions, to foster reconsideration of what is ‘taken for granted’ and thereby furnish new alternatives for social actions (Gergen 1978). This is one of the reasons why scholars in the social sciences started to question their ‘objective’ and reductionist assumptions as well as their focus on the ‘individual’ or the ‘organisation’ as the basic unit of analysis (Chidiac 2018). Recently, the broadening of the ODC field together with the development of new theoretical insights and intervention techniques have led to a contrast between the traditional, positivist roots of the field and more contemporary, postmodern assumptions of how to engage people in change. In general, the positivist paradigm is based on the assumption that there is one objective reality out there (to be measured), in contrast to the postmodernist paradigm, which is based on the assumption that there is an intersubjective reality (to be co-constructed). Assumptions are general frames of insight that determine how we understand the world and how we translate that understanding into action. There are myriad other terms for these internal frames such as ‘schemas’, ‘mental models’ or ‘scripts’. They can become so deeply ingrained that they are accepted as the truth and function as a human being’s navigation system with which we ‘see’ the world—not in terms of our visual sense of sight, but in terms of perceiving, understanding and interpreting (Walsh 1995). Translating a postmodern worldview to a theory-based approach to organisational development and change means that we need to address a richer and more nuanced picture of what is going on in the contemporary field of ODC. We attempt to do this by approaching change management, organisational development, organisational learning and change dynamics from an overarching postmodern, social constructionist perspective. Social constructionism can be seen as a broad philosophy about relationships and the way people co-construct their reality within these relationships. Scholars and practitioners in sociology, psychology and communication sciences who work from this perspective examine mainly the development of jointly constructed understandings of the world as a means of change. Given that it concerns the main perspective in this book, it appears necessary to ensure an understanding of what we mean by social constructionism. Therefore, we simply seek to identify some background and common tenets apparent in this work. In terms of background, social constructionism has roots in symbolic interactionism (Mead 1934) and phenomenology (Schutz 1970), but it was with Berger and Luckman’s (1966) The Social Construction of Reality (Berger and Luckman 1966) that it really took hold. More than six decades later, a considerable amount of theory

4

1 Introduction

and research subscribe to the basic tenet that people make their social and cultural worlds at the same time as these worlds make them (Gibeau et al. 2020; WåhlinJacobsen 2020; Kopaneval and Sias 2015). A social constructionist perspective brings to the fore social processes that are ‘simultaneously playful and serious, by which reality is both revealed and concealed, created and destroyed by our activities’ (Pearce 1995; Cronen 2001). Social constructionists also assume that reality is not some objectifiable truth waiting to be uncovered; rather, they perceive that there can be multiple realities at the same moment in time that compete for truth and legitimacy. Furthermore, they believe that these realties are constructed through social interaction, in which meanings are negotiated, negotiated order is formed and contestation is possible (Fairhurst and Grant 2010). A social constructionist view shows us how meanings that are produced and reproduced on an ongoing basis create structures that are both stable and yet open to change, as interactions evolve over time (Giddens 1984). As argued, for example, by Gioia, we act as if these structures are real, but in fact they are (intersubjectively) produced phenomena (Gioia 2003). Given its emphasis on social interaction, it is not surprising that social constructionism recognises the fundamental role of language and communication (Barge and Little 2002). Such a realisation has contributed to the linguistic turn and, more recently, the turn to discourse theory (Alvesson and Kärreman 2000). As a result, researchers in the social sciences have turned to constructionist approaches, and, with this perspective’s ascendancy, there has been a greater focus on communicative issues. Therefore, looking at change from a social constructionist perspective means that we view reality as multilayered and as continuously socially negotiated. Seen from this perspective, changing people within their daily contexts means that we are focused on how they subjectively perceive their social surroundings and how they (inter)act accordingly. In the scientific literature, this way of looking at reality and how to change it assumes varied forms,1 based on the following premises (Fairhurst and Grant 2010; Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010; Burr 1995; Shotter 2005; Crotty 1998; Hacking 1999; Harre 1986; Potter 1996; Gergen 1999, 2001): 1. Humans perceive reality through their senses. Consequently, any statement about how people perceive reality is idiosyncratic, but not necessarily non-real in its consequences. 2. Therefore, a so-called ‘objective’ reality is elusive for people, and, to the extent that a reality exists, it is a multilayered co-construction that is continuously socially negotiated and hence exists in a constant dynamic equilibrium. 3. Knowledge about how and why humans act, learn and change as they do is culturally specific and therefore contextual.

1

In some publications, the authors have drawn a distinction between constructivism and constructionism—the former being more individual and cognitive and the latter being more social and interactive (Hoffman 1992).

1.2 Introducing a Social Constructionist Perspective on Change

5

Based on these premises, we can assume that: 1. People construct meaning among themselves because of their day-to-day interactions to understand what is going on. 2. Changing people in their daily routine is something that can be best realised through their direct participation and active involvement. 3. People’s daily social surroundings are to be seen as a frame of reference that has been produced through past interactions, influencing ongoing interactions and changes because of the novel meanings generated. 4. Human learning and changing are related to the quality of the ways in which people interact, and with the relevance of their conversation partners with regard to the purpose of their interactions. These premises have been reworked in, for example, system theory (Watzlawick et al. 1967), leadership theory (Fairhurst and Grant 2010) and are applied in professional fields such as psychotherapy, pedagogy and mediation (Warhus 2001; Watzlawick 1990; Wortham 2001; Winslade and Monk 2000). Within organisation sciences, and especially organisational change, these premises have only been used relatively recently (Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010). When we intervene from a social constructionist perspective, we relate ourselves directly to ‘what is going on’ in the way relevant others perceive this themselves. The reason for this is relatively simple: ‘[I]f you want to know where you want to be, begin finding out where you are.’ (Bate 1994) In this way, we generate directly practical knowledge (Susman and Evered 1978). As one of the leading English scholars in the field of social constructionism, Kenneth Gergen wrote: Social constructionist inquiry is principally concerned with explicating the processes by which people come to describe, explain or otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in which they live (Gergen 1985).

That is why, concepts such as dialogue and co-inquiry (Torbert 2000) have a major role in doing social constructionist research. Co-inquiry is an abbreviation of ‘collaborative inquiry’, in which the participants work together as co-researchers and as co-research subjects. The participants, including the interventionist(s), research a topic through their own experience of it in order to understand their world, make sense of their life, develop new and creative ways of looking at things and learn how to act to change things they might want to change and find out how to do things better (Heron and Reason 2008). As a form of action research, the ‘co’ is also about being ‘cooperative’ by introducing an issue that is related to their shared change purpose.

6

1 Introduction

In contrast to a positivist scientific paradigm whose focus is entirely on truths in the ‘out there’ world, social constructionism has a focus on awareness and inquiry into the present relationships among the ‘in here’, subjective world and the ‘among us’, interactional world (Reason and Torbert 2001). So, a social constructionist perspective is directly related to ‘what is going on’ in the real world. Thus, it opens up more possibilities for seeing emerging differences and disturbances and appraising them together, collaboratively creating space and new insights. Viewed in this way, change is an emergent phenomenon, always happening where people interact with each other. Basically, embracing organisational change from a social constructionist perspective means that we want to find out what is happening by focusing on generating feedback with a constant awareness of the communicated values, beliefs and assumptions.

1.3

Introducing the Three Main Business Cases in this Book

When change has been introduced in an organisation, we can expect several forces that can drive individuals in all kinds of directions. Consequently, a change initiative can lead to lots of initial enthusiasm and an intense and widespread sense of involvement, unlocking lots of energy. However, when not properly facilitated, managed and enacted, things can become needlessly complex. To illustrate this, we will briefly present some contemporary examples in which all those directly involved initially expressed a lot of involvement. However, as the process continues, everything seems to get cluttered, and in the final analysis, nothing has changed. We shall return in more detail to these cases throughout the book.

1.3.1

The First Case: A Lot of Sense But No Impact in a Labour Union

For a union to be successful, it is important to have enough members who are satisfied with the services offered by the union representatives. Confronted with a continuous decrease in the number of members over the last 3 years, a business manager of a union expected the employees to become more accountable in delivering union services, recruiting members and realising strategic targets over the next 2 years. In several interactive sessions, union leaders and managers discussed the urgency of these measures and searched for ways to implement them. After 2 years, it became clear that nothing had changed for the better; in fact, nothing had happened at all, and members were still leaving the union in substantial numbers. It became clear that in a worst-case scenario, there would be no union members left. But what could be done? All those involved were aware of the urgency of the situation. Everybody was eager to do something and really wanted to change the way the union operated. But instead of pulling together to cope with the serious challenges the union faced at that time, people went about their work in their own idiosyncratic ways, did not find ways to act collaboratively and, in fact, worked against each

1.3 Introducing the Three Main Business Cases in this Book

7

other’s ideas for change. In this case, from a managerial point of view, the union leaders’ behaviours could be labelled as a display of ‘resistance’. However, the union leaders themselves felt that their behaviours were a display of their genuinely felt sense of ‘ownership’. In other words, what was regarded by management as ‘resisting’ could also be interpreted as ‘being involved’. The union leaders regarded the labelling of ‘resisting’ by their management as an act of disrespect that reduced their own involvement. Interlocked as their mutual perceptions and behaviours were, the whole process became a self-fulfilling prophecy: the behaviours of all involved, those of union leaders and managers alike, came down to resisting each other’s suggestions. Our actions (towards others)

Our Assumptions (about ourselves)

SelfFulfilling Prophecy

Other’s Assumptions (about us)

Other’s actions (towards us)

Self-Fulfilling Prophecy starts with a false definition (or pseudo explanation) of a situation evoking a new behaviour that makes the originally false conception come true. The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error as the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning (Merton 1968). Based on this short description, the following observations can be made regarding the first business case. First, it seems to illustrate that the challenges that today’s leaders and employees face when confronted with organisational change are not necessarily problems that come down to merely ‘resistance’.2 Second, this case also illustrates that organisational change is not a simple, linear and sequential process in which change is realised in a programmed progressive way. What someone perceives as an ‘effect’ may be a ‘cause’ for others, and vice versa.

2

Which is in most cases, especially in the case of the labour union, a pseudo explanation.

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1 Introduction

Linear and sequential change, since the 1950s the dominant mindset concerning organisational change, can be described as largely programmatic, initiated on a ‘top-down’ basis: the need for change is identified and the plans for the implementation are developed by (top) management and then cascaded down through the organisation. Basically, it is a mindset that sees change implementation as employing clearly defined succeeding interventions with the idea that the outcome of each intervention (Aitken and Higgs 2010) can be predicted beforehand. Third, the case of the labour union also seems to illustrate that human perceptions play a much more pivotal role than we may believe. This brings us to the idea that the challenge may be more about establishing, with all those involved, what it is that they are doing, to obtain a shared picture of their current reality, than about trying to change their behaviour. Establishing such a shared image of what is happening helps in ‘know[ing] what we are doing’ (Tsoukas 2005) in the here and now and is about finding common ground. A ‘current reality’ refers to the here and now of a given situation; it also refers to a way of diagnosing, with multiple stakeholders, a so-called differential diagnosis. This process is intended to help all those involved gain an understanding of what is going on in a situation they want to improve. By diagnosing a given situation from multiple (subjective) perspectives, all those involved are creating a shared and enriched picture of what is going on— which functions as a common ground. This in general is a state that involves positive affect, a sense of connection to others, transcendence and common purpose (Kinjerski and Skrypnek 2004). In short, when we perceive things as ‘not my problem’, or as being different and separate when they are in fact interrelated, we tend to make things much more complex than they already are. For most of us, when we find ourselves in complex situations, it seems impossible to react in a straightforward and consistent way. It is more likely, just as happened in this first case, that people are simultaneously ‘pushing the gas and hitting the brakes’. This is similar to what we might do when driving a car, i.e. spin around in a circle, producing a lot of noise and smoke, but never moving an inch forward.3

3

A phenomenon that has all the ingredients of a particular story in Lewis Carroll’s well-known novel Through the Looking Glass, in which the Red Queen (one of the famous characters) tries to run as fast as she can around a tree to stay in the same place.

1.3 Introducing the Three Main Business Cases in this Book

9

In Interlude 6.3 in Chap. 6, we have another, more in-depth example of this union case when we discuss learning processes at different levels.

1.3.2

The Second Case: Being Stuck in a Business University

A business university specialising in offering MBA education and in-company management development programmes had just survived severe cutbacks in which half of the staff lost their jobs. In the following months, the remaining employees, who successfully applied for their current upgraded jobs, did not seem to manage their daily challenges and opportunities after the restructuring. In fact, they did not seem to cope at all. After more than 6 months of unproductive behaviour and internal dissatisfaction, the CEO decided that something drastic had to be done. Therefore, he hired an external specialist who started with a series of individual interviews. The interviews showed that everybody was aware of the urgent financial situation and that most employees were struggling with impressions and perceptions of how things had gone during the cutbacks and the following period of reapplication as instigated and directed by the CEO. Despite all this, most employees seemed to know exactly what had to be done. During a collaborative dialogue session based on large-group intervention techniques, the problems, results and suggestions for the follow-up were discussed and validated with the entire staff. Although there was much agreement on the main points, there was a lack of agreement on the specifics. To cope with this, a procedure was agreed upon with the works council. The outcomes would give the CEO clear and specific advice about what to do. He copy-pasted this advice and presented it back to the works council. However, to his surprise, the works council gave a negative advice, disapproved of his proposals and questioned his ability to implement the decisions. This led to new disputes within the organisation and the whole process came to a halt (again). A collaborative dialogue session is a dialogue or an open, equal and reciprocal conversational exchange of personal perspectives between two or more people. A collaborative dialogue session exceeds the size of a small group and starts with a minimum of 40 participants. Large-group intervention techniques are based on the organisation development intervention methodology developed between the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Again, what we see here is an example of people who were involved as much as possible, under the condition of substantial cutbacks and serious consequences for

10

1 Introduction

everyone involved. And just like the first example, we can view the behaviours of the people involved as ‘resisting’ but also as a display of a genuinely felt ‘sense of urgency’.

Creating ‘a sense of urgency’ generally refers to communicating to members of the organisation that it’s imperative to act promptly, decisively and without delay. One of the three underlying assumptions behind this concept is that if you cannot persuade someone to act the moment the information is received, change won’t happen at all. Secondly, a failure to act promptly means that opportunities may be lost, and ultimately this will negatively affect the financial health of the company. Thirdly, and more generally, complacency is the enemy of progress and change. Because there were several contradictory perspectives involved in the business university, it became extremely difficult to come to a shared sense of what was going on and what has to be done under these ambiguous circumstances. In this case, the whole process ends up in what seems to be a typical catch-22 situation in which the only solution is denied by a colleague’s vision about what has to be done, which is as ‘true’ and well-motivated as that of our own. In these kinds of ambiguous contexts, we find ourselves in a blurry situation, not being able to name or see the contradiction itself; we are involved, feel committed and know that our jobs are on the line, but eventually we ask ourselves how much responsibility we need to display to be heard and to overcome this mess. The term “catch-22” was coined in 1961 by Joseph Heller in his novel of the same name and refers to a problematic situation for which the only solution is denied by a circumstance inherent in the problem. A catch-22 is a paradoxical situation from which there is no escape because it involves mutually conflicting or dependent conditions, for example, “How am I supposed to gain experience if I am constantly not hired because I don’t have experience?”

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11

In Sect. 7.2.4 and in Interlude 7.5 in Chap. 7, we have more in-depth examples of this case when we discuss feedback loops and paradoxical processes, respectively.

1.3.3

The Third Case: The Dance Around the Symbolic Totem Pole in a Healthcare Organisation

In order to make the just merged healthcare organisation more cost-efficient and their tactical decisions more effective, the two-headed board of directors decided to remove the second echelon of regional executive managers and regroup the locations. This resulted in an organisation with approximately 850 employees, who together attend to 2500 clients, and 40 executive (staff and location) managers divided over 8 different municipalities and 25 locations. With the regional managers out of the way, the board of directors now had short hierarchical ‘lines’, with the location and staff executives assigning them tactical and strategical tasks directly. However, after several years, these structural changes and new ways of working did not add up. In fact, the staff and location executives did not seem to execute their tactical assignments at the right time, with the right quality, or worse, with the muchneeded impact on the organisation. When interviewed individually, the majority of the executives indicated that the new structure did not motivate them to engage with one another. The monthly board meeting, with the whole tactical unit of 40 people, was not only ‘too much too little’, but also, according to the interviewees, ‘all one-way traffic with only the chair’s points’. However, most awkwardly, none of the interviewees wanted to discuss their dissatisfaction publicly. As a result, their experiences were not shared and there seemed to be fatigue with regard to dealing with the same problems time and again. This came out during a first collaborative dialogue session based on large-group intervention techniques with a critical mass of 250 organisation members, leading to follow-up collaborative dialogical meetings with smaller groups of up to 40–50 participants focused on some of the issues brought forward. Although the whole organisation seems to be moving and little things really seem to be picked up now, the ‘frustrating board meetings’ never did, which seemed to prevent the ‘tactical’ whole from implementing significant changes. Thus, the board meetings became a symbolic totem pole that everyone kept dancing around, and sometimes inadvertently kicked, leading to the frustration of all those involved, who resigned themselves in silence. In Interlude 7.4 in Chap. 7, and in the final chapter, we introduce a more in-depth example of this healthcare case as we go into a personal narrative.

1.3.4

Some Thematising Reflections: Dealing with Dilemmas, Defensiveness and Polarisation

What the three different business cases show is that when confronted with organisational change, things can become unclear, less certain and even less safe and secure, creating all kinds of tensions. These tensions are feeling states, which are

12

1 Introduction

often accompanied by anxiety, distress, discomfort or tightness in making choices (Putnam et al. 2016). In the above cases, tensions seem to increase every time the members of the organisation encounter a dilemma. As a point of distinction, dilemmas refer to either-or choices, in which one alternative must be selected from mutually attractive (or unattractive) and not necessarily incompatible options (Cameron and Quinn 1988). The occurrence of a dilemma in these cases seems to have something to do with the fact that people are stuck in an undesirable situation, one that renders them intrinsically motivated to change things for the better. However, at the same time they find themselves among colleagues who apparently do not agree with their vision and do not support their efforts to make the requisite change. In this way, the other represents a threat to one’s identity and reality, circumstances that form a breeding ground for dualism, duality and/or polarisation in terms of distrust and opposition. However, at the same time, a self-conscious person needs to be seen and recognised by (the same) colleagues in order to maintain their sense of realness and (social) identity (Laing 1969). In such cases, the process can be recognised through the ways in which people constantly make distinctions in terms of ‘we’ versus ‘they’: in Case 1, the union leaders versus management; in Case 2, the employees versus the CEO; and in Case 3, the board members versus the executives.

Dualism refers to opposite poles, dichotomies, binary relationships or bipolar opposites. It lies at the heart of contradictions and paradoxes in that they set up bipolar relationships that often permeate dualities in the field (Janssens and Steyaert 1999), but these relationships are not necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive. In contrast, duality refers to the interdependence of opposites that form a both-and relationship. With this concept, scholars are now addressing organisational complexity through embracing both poles simultaneously. Like the North Pole and the South Pole or the opposite ends of a magnet, poles represent extreme end points, and polarisation indicates movement towards those extremes. Under the described conditions in the three cases people easily become defensive. Being defensive doesn’t stimulate change and may even spur a negative reinforcing cycle (Smith and Berg 1987a). Such a reinforcing process makes people increasingly

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13

want to stay out of the spotlight and distance themselves from what is happening. Moreover, in their ongoing struggle against uncertainty, insecurity and anxiety, people develop certain defence mechanisms. These can develop, often unconsciously, over time as a result of collusive interaction, appearing as a typical element of the culture of the group or even as a mode of functioning of the whole organisation (Jaques 1955). In other words, defence mechanisms tend to become an aspect of a daily reality with which all those involved must come to terms (Menzies-Lyth 1960). However, under the circumstances as described in the above cases, polarisation becomes a defence mechanism (if you are not with me, you are against me). Without proper interventions (see Interlude 1.1 for a definition of interventions), polarisation can lead to another, more intense defence mechanism: splitting. Polarisation and especially splitting contribute to further escalation, unstable relationships and intense emotional experiences (Carser 1979). Splitting is a defence mechanism in which people have learned to think in terms of all or nothing (an individual’s actions and motivations are all good or all bad with no middle ground), which seems to be the case, for example, in the perception of the employees of the functioning of the CEO in the second case. Splitting is something that can be recognised when people fail in their thinking to bring together the dichotomy of both positive and negative qualities of the self and others into a cohesive, realistic whole.

Interlude 1.1 Intervening, Sense Making and Sense Giving Basically, an intervention is about relationships and interaction and can be seen as the act of inserting one thing between others. It is about one or more individuals acting in the affairs, situation and/or personal space of one or more other people. Most interventions are based on an expectation that a given intervention accomplishes a change in the intended direction by means of certain processes or structures that are built into the intervention or evoked by it (Bartunek et al. 2008). Cummings and Worley in their book on ODC, define interventions as ‘a set of sequenced planned actions or events intended to help an organisation increase its effectiveness’ (Cummings and Worley 2001). These authors see interventions as deliberate acts that disturb the status quo. Furthermore, Argyris, one of the leading academic authors in the field of ODC, defines intervening as ‘entering into an ongoing relationship system, coming between or among persons, groups or objects for the purpose of helping them’ (Argyris 1970). In conclusion, an intervention is about intervening in the affairs of a client’s system with the purpose of introducing a difference. Interventions are usually carried out in particular circumstances, which will influence the intent and the process of the intervention. Thus, the variation in (continued)

14

1 Introduction

Interlude 1.1 (continued) particularities is infinite (Jönsson 2010). This makes the undertaking of intervening reasonably unique. A nice illustration of the need for attention to uniqueness is given by Chester Barnard, who in 1938 wrote one of the first management books on the functioning of executives. Issues that require a response from executives may arise from, for example, the novelty of conditions or raising intra-organisational differences. Barnard suggested calling such cases ‘appellate cases’ (Barnard 1938). Barnard’s ‘appellate cases’ denote managerial executive situations where a problem is referred to a top management team for a decision because it is complex or controversial, and where the decision is expected to guide the development or learning processes of employees in emerging new practices. The decision and the follow-up in which the executive guides their fellow employees represent, according to Barnard, ‘the most important test of his [or her] capacity’ (Barnard 1938). Based on the executive’s understanding of the situation, which depends upon their ability and initiative, and on the nature of the way in which it is communicated, it follows that the change will be embraced. The way Barnard’s ‘appellate cases’ are handled seems to have a lot in common with today’s approach to decision-making and intervening when there is a need for change. When differences arise, new possibilities emerge, and things become ambiguous and more and more uncertain, it is expected that people at the top of the organisation will accept their responsibility and decide what to do. However, making decisions is as sense making and something completely different then communicating the sense of that decision to others (i.e. sense giving) that did not participate in the decision-making. ‘Sense making’ is part of decision-making and means sorting out the facts (as we perceive them) and giving them relevance and meaning (Weick 2001). Under ambiguous circumstances, there is the added problem that the relevant facts are not yet recognisable. To bring them forth under circumstances with emerging differences and disturbances, we need to insert our own agency and invite the commitment and help of others. This latter part is sense giving, which influences the meaning construction of others towards a redefinition or reframing of the current organisational reality. According to Goffman, the concept of ‘frame’ is consciously used to recontextualise a problem (Goffman 1981). In the same vein, reframing as an activity can be conceptualised in general as ‘chang[ing] the conceptual and or emotional setting or viewpoint in relation to which a situation is experienced and placing it in another frame that fits the “facts” of the same concrete situation equally well or even better, and thereby changes its entire meaning’ (Watzlawick 1989). Sense giving is thus ultimately concerned with inserting action—one’s own and that of others—and is by definition a form of intervening. In conclusion, (continued)

1.4 Introducing the Management of (Organisational) Change

15

Interlude 1.1 (continued) sense making must be accompanied by sense giving to give organisational members the opportunity to frame new sets of managerial acts (Kokk et al. 2012). Moreover, to bring about a possible and jointly desired future, sense giving is best done with the active involvement or participation of those who are supposed to reframe their current sense of their organisational reality. Chester Barnard (1886 - 1961) Was an American business executive and the author of pioneering work in management theory and organizational studies. His landmark 1938 book, ‘The Functions of the Executive’, sets out a theory of organization and of the functions of executives in organizations.

Together, the three business cases emphasise the difficulty of aligning the different perspectives of all those involved to make progress as a whole. Insofar as the participants try to make sense of the decision and act coherently, significant change does not happen. Moreover, as these cases seem to illustrate, these kinds of processes are not exclusive to typical top-down change initiatives (Romanelli and Tushman 1994).

1.4

Introducing the Management of (Organisational) Change

In an increasingly complex world, organisations built on traditional assumptions of stability, equilibrium, alignment and predictability will increasingly be out of touch and ineffective. For example, as Lawler and Worley argue: Pursuing the latest management fad that is sold as a way to make organisations more efficient, more agile, more re-engineered or more whatever doesn’t address the fundamental need for organisations to change more quickly and effectively (Lawler and Worley 2006).

In general, textbooks for courses such as organisational behaviour, management of organisations, organisational theory, and organisational development and change manifest a worldview based on reducing tension and complexity, with change introduced as an aberration in itself and organisational change as something that is manageable. However, it seems legitimate to ask ourselves whether organisational change is something that can be planned and controlled from the beginning until the end. Our answer is that no one is able to tell you beforehand whether changes will actually lead to the predefined objectives. Furthermore, we believe that the emphasis needs to be on the process of creating and maintaining ‘change’ capacity and helping people to get there. This is why we need to look for new language to help us move beyond the assumptions that are embedded in typical management books and that we currently hold ourselves in thinking about change, organisational change and change management.

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1 Introduction

1.4.1

Introducing Change Management

Traditionally, change management is presented as a temporary linear endeavour, based on a series of ‘planned’ cause-and-effect relationships in which an effect (the change) has a single cause (the intervention). Since Henri Fayol wrote his Industrial and General Administration in 1916 (Fayol 1930; Daft 1983; Rodrigues 2001), the general point of view has been that management is the art of planning, organising, leading, controlling and forecasting. In other words, managing implies consistency, efficiency and predictability, focusing on what is known. On the other hand, change implies disturbance, irrationality and moving into the unknown. Therefore, the term ‘change management’ is an oxymoron that lends a pseudoscientific aura to an activity that is rarely logical, frequently irrational and most definitely unpredictable (Lesormonde 2010). With the suffix ‘management’, we seem to emphasise consistency and predictability and making ‘what is known’ more effective. With ‘change’ we seem to emphasise disturbance, irrationality and making things more effective by taking a step into ‘the unknown’. Together they make change management an oxymoron, i.e. a phrase or statement that seems to say two opposite things, comparable with oxymorons like ‘anarchy rules’, ‘exact estimate’ and ‘business casual’ (McKinsey Global Survey 2006). The label ‘change management’ not only creates a false yet comforting feeling of management control but can also be a necessity. We are talking about changing organisations, which as an activity, costs money and requires people’s time and capacity. Change and keeping things running are not per se compatible, especially if we want people to be actively involved in the change process itself. Therefore, we assume that change activities need to be planned and plotted in a programme, preferable with a road map, with elaborate phasing and a detailed action plan, not least because it provides a suggestion of certainty and security about what is going to happen. Although such an action plan represents a model of reality, and in a sense is feasible, whether it is also accepted as such depends on how people perceive it as their reality. ‘Reality’ is not an absolute; it differs according to the individual and the group to which the individual belongs. However, neither the model nor the road map speaks for the ‘reality’ of others as Interlude 1.2 illustrates. Interlude 1.2 Following a Wrong Map and Still Getting there (Barret 2012) A group of Hungarian soldiers were hiking in the Austrian Alps and got lost. After wandering aimlessly for days, some had given up hope of being found, while others had resigned themselves to death—until, that is, one of the (continued)

1.4 Introducing the Management of (Organisational) Change

17

Interlude 1.2 (continued) soldiers found a map in his pocket. He used the map to help his fellow soldiers get their bearings and feel comfortable that they were heading in a hopeful direction. Indeed, the group eventually did return safely. Only then did they realise that the map that saved their lives was of the Spanish Pyrenees mountains, not the Alps. According to Barrett, who heard this story from organisational theorist Karl Weick, the story demonstrates that we should not fall in love with strategic plans and that when we are lost and face a radically unfamiliar situation, any old map will do. That is, any plan will work because it will turn us into a learner by helping people to act and venture forth into the unknown mindfully. We take a few steps and then new pathways emerge as we discover what to do next. Having a map helped turn the soldiers into learners precisely because they were able to experiment; with each tentative path, they compared their progress to the map, and this comparison heightened their awareness. They became more mindful. The soldiers could see more features of the landscape that might have gone unnoticed. The Pyrenees map tracked a different range, but it served to orient the soldiers and gave them a temporary sense of confidence that there was enough structure within the chaos and a loose belief that if they started down the path, they would eventually find their way out of their dilemma. Acting turned them into learners. In short, act first as if this will work. Pay attention to what presents itself. Venture forth. Make sense of it later. According to Weick the story is intended to shape our thinking about sense making, to serve as a—frame or—gestalt4 for observing organisations, and while this is sometimes all he takes theory to be, what he calls—theorising. As illustrated in Interlude 1.2, having a map gives a sort of false security that comforts and assures people that they are doing things in the ‘right’ way and things are ‘under control as predicted’. Notions of control have been closely linked to notions of stability and equilibrium. These notions have major implications for the way we view change and our understanding of order, disorder and control. This means that in this regard, the opposite of ‘planned change’; ‘emerging change’ is not per se an unsteady state of uncontrolled disorder but can also be seen as a steady state of unintended order (Mintzberg and Waters 1989). Mapping organisational change is a paradoxical activity: it is both needed for people to create a collectively sense of ‘security’ and ‘certainty’ and not needed because it leaves less room for emerging and more individual processes of sense making. Organisational change is predicated on dynamic movement, not simply on the management of this movement. There are a lot of realistic and non-realistic assumptions underlying the activity of managing change, which, as scholars like By and his colleagues argue, are handled 4 Gestalt is ‘an overall picture’, where the whole is more than the sum of the component parts (Weick 2004).

18

1 Introduction

as ‘accepted truths’ and hinder the further development of how to realise change (By et al. 2016). A typical example of such an ‘accepted truth’ is the constant reference to the claim that 70% of all change initiatives fail. We do this despite the claim having been discredited almost a decade ago (Hughes 2011). Other examples of these typical thriving assumptions regarding the ‘management of change’ are: 1. Managers are not employees. Hence, we keep referring to perceived and often created ‘conflicts’ between management and non-management employees and by doing so we are supporting a confrontational ‘us and them’ stance and culture within organisations. 2. The outcomes of a change programme are clear; they are specified, prior to the inception of the programme. That makes that employees are seen as passive recipients of prescriptions for behaviour. 3. We need management to take the responsibility for realising change. Instead, we could also be focusing on the activity of leadership, changing organisations and human dynamics, which is much more of a shared responsibility. 4. ‘It goes without saying’ that change provokes ‘resistance’, which is why it is important for the change to succeed that ‘resistance’ is managed (Leybourne 2006). 5. Environmental turbulence contributes to the difficulties in planning organisational change, offering opportunities for more experimental and less structured approaches to change. Which means that ‘planning’, as a typical management skill becomes less important and ‘improvisation’ just more and more (Moorman and Miner 1998). Change simply happens or is made to happen in places where people have the need to change their way of doing things and/or change the circumstances they are working in. This is exactly why experts in the field such as organisation guru Gary Hamel argue that when we start at the top, trying to gain commitment from management first, most change programmes are doomed to be ‘catch-up’ programmes (Garyhamel 2020). Trying to change an organisation in this way is, almost by definition, going to be too little too late, which means that when we are managing change as something that needs to be engineered and cascaded down through the organisation, we are in fact restricting emerging change.

1.4.2

Introducing Change

All definitions of change are problematic (Tichy 1983). This is because there seems to be an assumption that we humans can differentiate between states of change and stability. As organisations are always changing, sometimes in subtle and incremental ways, defining change turns out not to be so simple. Further, change is unlikely to be a single event that can be analysed in isolation and examined dispassionately, even in retrospect; rather, it develops over time and envelops those who experience it.

1.4 Introducing the Management of (Organisational) Change

19

Change is an abstract, theoretical construct. In a more fundamental philosophical sense, it has something to do with time (no change without progress in time), energy (no change without any kind of movement), the same entity (no change as it is not the same entity), perception (no change when we are not aware of it) and exchanging our impressions (no change if we do not conceive or comprehend it by sharing our impressions with relevant others). Although change at its most basic level has been said to consist of the stages of unfreezing, moving and refreezing, progress through these stages involves more than sequential activities and behaviours (Quinn and Kimberly 1984). It can also be said that the course of change is not bound by trend projection but is itself subject to change (Macdonald 1995). Or as Isabella argues – based on her in-depth case study: Transitions are themselves transitional. As they evolve, different emphases on a different combination of values and assumptions may be required. When a change is initiated, existing patterns are disrupted, and this results in a period of uncertainty and conflict. If key people accept and support the change, novelty turns to confirmation and eventually the innovation is routinised. As the process unfolds, managers are required to take on different orientations and styles (Isabella 1990).

As a change unfolds, different assumptions and orientations are required at different times in the process. All those involved (need to) undergo an alteration of the way they conceive the need to change, the process of changing and the maintenance of what has been changed. In other words, the perspective through which people view an event (i.e. a frame of reference)—shifts during an unfolding change process. To conceive is to form something in our mind or to develop an understanding of what we perceive. Logically, this means that conceiving is about comprehending and is preceded by perceiving. Apparently, to perceive is to become aware of something directly through our senses. Becoming aware is also a social process in which meaning emerges in the social act of gesture and response, where the gesture can never be separated from the response. Meaning does not lie in the gesture, the word, alone but in the gesture taken together with the response to it in a given context as one social act. For change to be perceived and conceived, we need to know ‘what is going on’ and make sense of it by exchanging our perceptions with relevant others. Therefore, we have to be aware of a lot of things altogether, at the same moment. In his lecture ‘The Perception of Change’ at Oxford in 1911, Nobel Prize winner Henri Bergson stated: The point is that usually we look at change, but we do not see it. We speak of change, but we do not think it. We say that change exists, that everything changes, that change is the very law of things. Yes, we say it and we repeat it, but those are only words and we reason and philosophise as though change does not exist (Bergson 1946).

Following the statement of Bergson, change is predominantly a perceptual phenomenon, understandable only in terms of individuals’ accounts of definitions of a

20

1 Introduction

situation. More basically, all knowing is rooted in sensing, feeling, thinking and attending to the experiential presence of us human beings in our world (Reason and Torbert 2001). However, we can rarely experience immediacy in a pure form and most of the time we make inferences about, and add meanings to, our immediate sense experience. That is why we live in a world mediated by meaning, which is constructed by the experiences, understandings, judgements and decisions that we have made alone and/or in groups in which we have learned to name things and to interpret them. This is what human perception is about and what makes it into an extraordinary phenomenon: it links people to themselves, to their environment and to the way in which they are connected with each other.5

1.4.3

Introducing Organisational Change

As the business cases show in the beginning of this chapter, changing organisations is not about changing a simple machine but about changing complex social systems, which in itself is seldom a linear endeavour. Clearly, we need another way of looking at organisational change that does capture the kind of ambivalence and circular movements people engage in when they are supposed to change their ways. A way of looking focused on the emerging human dynamics when people are encouraged, challenged and even forced to change their way of working and their situation without fully conceive the extent to which it is a solution to the daily problems that they experience. While increasing duality can lead to schisms during change, there is also the potential that efforts to engage in coexisting opposites will lead to movement. Movement can be defined as ‘the exploration of new ground [and] the leaving of old patterns’ (Smith and Berg 1987b). As introduced in the last section, movement is critical for change to happen and to be perceived. The question then is how can we achieve movement? One possibility is while individuals and groups are trying to cope with the emergence of differences, disruptions, disturbances, dissonance and duality. Emergence is perhaps one of complexity science’s most critical concepts. Emergence is about the perception of the new arising out of connections and contexts that were not perceived just moments before. Emergence can be characterised by the following key elements: (continued) As a process, ‘perception’ is about sense making; it actively constructs rather than passively records ‘reality’ (Heuer Jr. 1999). Without any conscious effort, our perception determines our observations and interpretations. For example, we perceive matters that interest us better than things that do not interest us. The same is true for phenomena that are in our proximity and are less ambiguous, as we tend to perceive these better than the same phenomena that are in our periphery and are more ambiguous (Reis et al. 2011; Stephan et al. 2011). We see connections where none exist and perceive differences more easily than similarities.

5

1.4 Introducing the Management of (Organisational) Change

• • • •

21

It is based on internally generated patterns. There is an absence of centralised control. No single part coordinates the macro-level behaviour of the whole. It uses only local dynamics.

Although emerging movement and change on an individual and group level can be seen as conditional for organisational change to happen, they are in itself not sufficient. Change on an organisational level means also that a critical mass, representative for the involved whole is trying to accommodate, and experiment with the individual and group learnings. However, organisational change is also about repeating and sharing what is learned, amplifying and making decisions in how to go on further. Organisational change is an interactional process that takes place on two levels: first, and at its core, the microprocess of individual learning, and second, interconnected with the first, the collaborative process of exchange of the ‘learnings’ between people who are relevant for the change because of their stake in (not) realising it. The exchange process is conditional and at the same time supportive of the individual learning process, just as the latter is conditional and supportive of the collaborative exchange process. To sum up, all organisational change begins with a status quo being disturbed, resulting in emerging differences, disruptions, disturbances and dissonance being perceived but not necessarily conceived. This means that our senses register that something different is going on without that we know what it means or foresee its consequences. The way we make sense of these disturbances is through developing a language that enables us to tease out useful distinctions. As the vocabulary to describe what is emerging becomes more familiar, our understanding increases (Holman 2010), providing room to challenge our assumptions. To sum up, organisational change is to be considered as a process that: 1. Has something to do with time, energy, focusing on the same entity, perception and exchanging our own perspective with relevant others. 2. Takes place on two interrelated levels: at a micro level as an individual process of learning to cope and on a more meso or macro level as a process of exchanging the ‘learnings’. 3. Is evoked by emerging disturbances, disruptions and dissonance, which, from a certain point, involves a critical mass that is representative of the involved social whole. 4. Consists the exchange of various points of view (i.e. perspectives), stakes and possible opposing perspectives and forces with which participants actively try to make a different, more shared meaning out of their ‘current reality’.

22

1 Introduction

1.5

Introducing Paradox and Complexity

When people really believe that things are simple and that there is only one truth or reality, they tend to do the same thing over and over again. This may be a good course of action; it is proven effective and also efficient. However, this is only true in a simple context and as we discuss in this paragraph, when a situation becomes paradoxical and therefore more complicated, keep doing the same things is not making things simpler but even more complex.

1.5.1

Introducing Paradox

As first suggested by Eisenhardt (2000) in a special issue of the Academy of Management Review in 2000, vibrant organisations drive change (into the unknown) and continuity (keep performing in the known) through their ability to simultaneously hold the two states in a paradox. Eisenhardt asserts that this action is not simply finding a bland halfway point between the two extremes, but rather exploring and capitalising on its creative tension. Paradox denotes ‘contradictory yet interrelated elements—elements that seem logical in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously’ (Lewis 2000). When we cannot make a choice between two or more contradictions because all contradictory perspectives are acceptable and present, the situation can easily become paradoxical. In such a situation, there is a lot of energy flowing between and around these mutually exclusive and opposite poles. In fact, both opposites are related to each other as a sort of interdependent whole. Understanding and/or addressing paradoxicality in a situation does not solve problems per se, but it can create the potential for new possibilities. By staying within the duality and by immersing oneself in the opposing forces, it becomes possible to discover the link between them as well as the framework that gives meaning to apparent contradictions in the experience. The discovery of the link can provide the release of ‘generative’ energy essential for movement, action and organisational change (Ford and Backoff 1988) Moreover, to capitalise on paradox, some scholars suggest that organisations must use ‘the inherent tensions to one’s advantage rather than ignoring or resolving them’ (Fiol 2002). Therefore, it can be argued that organisational success lies in sustaining the optimal edge between stability and instability (Stacey 1995). So, the point we are trying to make here is that organisational change does not originate in ignoring upcoming tensions or problem-solving, but in managing the coexistence of tensions between present polarities. Handling a paradoxical situation in this way entails:

1.5 Introducing Paradox and Complexity

23

1. Exploring synergistic possibilities for coping with enduring tensions. 2. Enabling participants to live and thrive with tensions. 3. Facilitating acceptance and active engagement (Lewis and Smith 2014). Coping is proposed as being key to people maintaining well-being and satisfactory performance. In the changing workplace, employees are continually evaluating what is going on and what the significance is for them. They assess whether changes have any relevance for their well-being, and if so, in what ways. Such evaluations are of two kinds: a primary appraisal—What will I gain? What will I lose? What are the potential benefits or harm to me? Is what is happening irrelevant, can I ignore it?; and a secondary appraisal: What can I do to overcome or prevent the negative effects? What can I do to improve my prospects of benefiting from change? What coping options might be worth adopting? What are the likely consequences? Will I accomplish what I want to achieve? In addition, employees reappraise the outcomes that have been achieved as a result of their coping strategies within a changing environment, learn of the consequences and make further appraisals (Woodward and Hendry 2004). Coping is seen, therefore, as constantly changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific external or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person (Lazarus and Folkman 1984).

1.5.2

Introducing Complexity

The complexity of a context can vary, requiring interventionists to regularly check if all participants are still seeing their reality in a comparable and mutually comprehending way. In Fig. 1.1 we present Snowden and Boon’s ‘Cynefin model’,6 which helps people to identify how they perceive their context. The framework draws on research into systems theory, complexity theory and learning theories (Williams and Hummelbrunner 2010). As illustrated in Fig. 1.2, a simple context can be characterised by stability and clear cause-effect relationships that are easily discernible by everyone involved (Snowden and Boone 2007). A more complicated perspective implies that effective leaders are those who have the cognitive and behavioural capacity to recognise and react to paradox, contradiction and complexity in their environments. In general, complexity can be characterised as: [F]ull of interdependencies—hard to detect—and nonlinear responses. “Nonlinear” means that when you double the dose of, say a medication, or when you double the number of

6

Cynefin, pronounced kunev-in, is a Welsh word that signifies the multiple factors in our environment and our experience that influence us in ways we can never understand (Snowden and Boone 2007).

24

1 Introduction Context characteristics Clear cause-andeffect relationships evident to everyone. Right answers exist.

Danger signals

Interventionists are dealing through

Entrained thinking. Overreliance on best practice.

Complicated

Cause-and-effect relationships are to be discovered. More than one right answer possible.

Overconfident experts excluding viewpoints of others.

Complex

Many competing perspectives and ideas. Non-linear causeeffect relationships are only perceptible in retrospect.

Applying a command-and-control approach longer than needed.

• Sensing, categorising and responding. • Being delegative when possible. • Using best practices. Recognising both the value and the limitation of best practice. • Sensing, analysing and responding. • Being clear in communication, and preferably face to face. • Listening to conflicting advice. • Encouraging people in dialogue to challenge expert opinions. • Probing, sensing and responding. • Being participative, involving others actively so new patterns can emerge. • Looking for automatic behavioural patterns (in response to the probing).

Simple

Fig. 1.1 An interventionists’ guide to simple, complicated and complex contexts

From a reductionist, linear perspective • Seeing individual parts • • • • • • • • •

To a holistic, dynamic perspective • Seeing interconnected parts and the whole • Focus on relationships and dynamics Focus on objects and entities • Mapping patterns Measuring ‘objective’ results • Working with process and context Working with content • Multiple issues within and Single issue within a single between multiple groups unit • Organising principles Designing blocks • Non-linear, iterative and circular Linear, cause and effect • Diversity Uniformity • Coordination via heterarchy in a learning infrastructure Coordination via hierarchy • Highly connected by network Limited connections by function, echelon or department

Fig. 1.2 A shift in perspective, from change to changing

1.5 Introducing Paradox and Complexity

25

employees in a factory, you don't get twice the initial effect, but rather a lot more or a lot less. [. . .] When the response is plotted on a graph, it does not show a straight line (“linear”), rather as a curve. In such environments, simple causal associations are misplaced; it is hard to see how things work by looking at single parts (Taleb 2012)

As argued by Snowden and Boone, in a simple context, the right answer is, for everyone involved, self-evident and undisputed. Often, in such simple contexts, decisions made by managers are unquestioned because all participants share an understanding. Simple contexts, properly assessed, require straightforward interventions and monitoring. This involves assessing the facts of the situation, categorising them and then basing the response on established practice. Exhaustive communication among managers and employees is not usually required because disagreement about what needs to be done is rare. It seems plausible that in a simple context, interventionists need to avoid micromanaging and stay connected to what is happening in order to spot a change in context (Snowden and Boone 2007). Circumstances change, however, and as they become more complex, the simplifications can fail. In this regard, effective leadership, just as effective intervening, is not a one-size-fits-all proposition. The concept of complexity allows for the interventionist to be defined in a way that is compatible with the so-called law of requisite variety. The law of requisite variety says that in order to deal properly with the diversity of problems in a given context, an interventionist needs to have a repertoire of responses that is (at least) as nuanced as the problems they face (Ashby 1956). Both complexity and requisite variety lead to a simple definition of effective intervening as the ability to perform the multiple roles and behaviours that circumscribe the requisite variety implied by the degree of complexity of a certain context. The shorthand version of this relationship is that only complexity can handle complexity (Ashby 1958). Complexity that goes unnoticed remains free to be expressed in unintended ways. For example, consider the rules for the flocking behaviour of birds: fly to the centre of the flock, match speed and avoid collision. This simple-rule theory was applied to industrial modelling and production early on, and it promised much, but it did not deliver in isolation. Human complex systems are very different from those in nature and cannot be modelled in the same ways because of human unpredictability and (self-referential) intellect. This is why simple contexts can easily become complicated when not regarded properly and can obviously become too complex to handle as we try to illustrate with the three business cases. This is most likely the case when interventionists, for example: 1. Incorrectly classify complex issues within a given context in a simple way because they oversimplify these issues.

26

1 Introduction

2. Respond in a conditioned way, caused by entrained thinking, which usually occurs when they are blinded to new ways of thinking by holding on their own assumptions, they acquired earlier through past experience, training and success. 3. Become complacent, under the impression that things are going smoothly. If the context changes at that point, they are likely to miss what is actually happening (Snowden and Boone 2007, pp. 70–71). To sum up in the words of Snowden and Boone, ‘those who try to impose order in a complex context will fail, but those who set the stage, step back a bit, allow patterns to emerge and determine which ones are desirable will succeed’ (Snowden and Boone 2007, p. 74). In other words, for change to be embraced, all participants’ best can be facilitated to become skilled in recognising and managing arising, contradictory tensions (Wolf 2015, p. 81). Under these circumstances, instead of going for the one ‘true’ or ‘right’ answer, an interventionist steps back a bit, probes and sees what is happening. For this to be effective, the context we are in has to be at least complicated, which means that there is more than one ‘right’ answer, resulting in contradictions and ambivalence.

1.5.3

Dealing with Paradox and Complexity: The Importance of Systems Thinking

Staying within a paradox by trying to manage the tensions between the opposite forces does not mean that we as interventionists are going to solve the paradoxical situation. As argued before, as interventionists, we need the energy that goes around and between the existing poles. Therefore, we need a more holistic and dynamic perspective: to see the whole picture while we also see what is going on between and within individual participants. This means that we look specifically at how outcomes are continuously fed back to the performing whole. Such a whole, whose essential properties arise from the relationships between its parts, is what is called a ‘whole social system’, and this way of looking and scoping whole social systems is called systems thinking. Systems thinking lies in a shift of mind: ‘seeing interrelationships rather than linear cause-and-effect chains, and seeing processes of change rather than snapshots’. (Senge 1990) It is about the understanding of a phenomenon within the context of a larger whole (Capra 1996), which we can assess (or scope) by defining its boundaries. Systems thinking is most often associated with the study of complexity, feedback and change (Flood 1999).

1.6 Looking Further

27

Feedback is a process in which the effect or output of an action is ‘returned’ (fed back) to modify the next action. Feedback is a two-way flow, inherent to all interactions, and is about the information sent back to a social whole or an interacting group of individuals about its prior behaviour so that the group as a social whole may adjust their current and future behaviour to achieve the desired result. In this regard, feedback is more than ‘a report given back’, but rather entails all news (conveyed as a ‘difference’) that made a subsequent ‘difference’ in a future conduct (Tompkins 1982). To sum up, dealing with paradox and complexity means that we: 1. Keep an eye on the variety of relevant perspectives and the possibilities that they mutually connect. 2. Divert our focus from the content to the context: the social whole. 3. Start asking questions instead of giving answers.

1.6

Looking Further

1.6.1

Introducing ‘Change’ and ‘Changing’

For didactic purposes, we consider a difference between change and changing. We reflect here upon them both in an opposing, slightly stereotypical way. For example, when an all-encompassing change programme is necessary in a medium-sized organisation, as was the case in our business examples in this chapter, it is plausible to assume that there is something seriously wrong with the way the organisation functions. For example, that the members of the organisation, including management, have not been aligned and/or not been affiliated enough with each other. Or that the organisation is lacking the change capacity to facilitate emerging developments and/or make sense of what is going on in and outside the organisation. Organisational change capacity is the organisation’s ability of analysing and realising change on a number of change dimensions: analysing change as content (what it is that changes), as process of interaction (how it changes in a series of interrelating elements of actions, reactions and interactions) and as context (why change is needed) (Soparnot 2011). The simplest way to compensate for its own inertia and ignorance in the previous years is to catch up and force change with an intelligently engineered all-encompassing programme as we will introduce in Chap. 2. It is about going for the short-term effect, being efficient, planning interventions in the right sequence and management taking their responsibility. However, it is likely that this is too little

28

1 Introduction

too late. Moreover, forcing change, top-down, cascading down the organisation in a linear way can be just a shot in the arm, overreaching its aim and without the necessary effect on the internal commitment of those for whom it was supposed to be in the first place: the employees. To be effective, ‘changing’ should be part of the daily workflow with people working together across the boundaries of their units and departments. Changing is about direct contact, direct feedback and working together in real time.

1.6.2

Introducing Co-Inquiry, Dialogue and LGIs

A collaborative process of co-inquiry has to be, by all accounts, interactive and multilateral—something we will relate to action research and appreciative inquiry in Chap. 3 – to dialogue in Chap. 4 and to large-group interventions (LGIs) in Chap. 5. As shown earlier in the business cases in this chapter, interactive collaborative sessions are not a panacea for all things that are going wrong when we introduce change in an organisation. In fact, for people to embrace change, we need more than just a ‘stand-alone’ collaborative dialogue session. As a way of intervening, co-inquiry is about encouraging people to espouse what they see as actually happening, and in dialogue comes to an adapted and more shared ‘sense making’ of the current reality. Organising an ongoing dialogue as a way of ‘changing’ is not a sinecure and requires as we introduce in Chap. 5 a developing learning infrastructure. We start by discussing the main principles of ‘co-inquiry’ in Chap. 3 by describing the bedrock that Kurt Lewin laid in the 1940s with his action research, force-field theory and theory of change. The field of ODC is built on this bedrock, and it is intriguing to see how Lewin’s work is still relevant for looking at, and intervening in, today’s business problems.

1.6.3

Introducing Intervening, Enabling and Learning

Any organisational change that requires a change in ingrained behaviour patterns requires direct involvement on the part of those whose behaviour it concerns; it requires a certain level of quality in exchanging perspectives and perhaps also a social movement at some level. To enable others and to support them in emerging processes, an interventionist is supposed to strive for inclusion, openness and reciprocity minimising the need for hierarchy (Quinn et al. 2000). Enabling others to cope with the ongoing change requires also a certain level of personal discipline from the interventionist to cope with paradoxical situations and maintain integrity. In fact, it requires of all involved – participants as well as interventionists—that they critical examine the potential for self-hypocrisy and or for patterns of self-deception. Turning inwards, working from the inside out, clears our minds of the clutter and obstruction that so often we try to pass off as wisdom of experience (Revans 1966). Dissolving the boundaries between seer and seen helps. As we continue to argue in the Chaps. 6 and 7, this will lead not only to a deep sense of connection but also to a

1.7 Introducing Perspective and Perceiving

29

heightened sense of possibilities for change. What first appeared as fixed or even rigid begins to appear in our interactions with the other participants as fluid and dynamic because we are sensing the reality as it is being created (as we speak), and as we become to see our part in creating it. This, of course, applies to knowledge and understanding of ourselves, and in that sense, the understanding of the microprocesses in ourselves and between us and other people. In Chap. 8, we present a narrative in which the interventionist in hindsight engages in autoethnography to recognise, evaluate and test his leading assumptions with which he construes and chooses to intervene in the business case of the healthcare organisation.

1.7

Introducing Perspective and Perceiving

As we will develop further in Chap. 2, there are a lot of assumptions on ‘change’ and ‘change management’ that are handled as ‘accepted truths’ and that hinder not only the process of changing itself, but also the further development of the field of ODC. As we experienced it ourselves, it is a challenge to stay away from a reductionist, linear world view and try to keep seeing things from a more holistic and dynamic perspective. This assumes that we are in need of a shift in our perspective on change and change management as illustrated schematically in Fig. 1.2. As schematically displayed in the next Fig. 1.3, using insights from theories like social constructionism, systems thinking and complexity theory helps us to perceive circularity in how people interact and create complex situations. These perspectives also give a certain way of looking at the two main change approaches in this book, namely, organisation development and change management, as we use both for developing concepts that can be used as intervention methods.

Theories

Approaches

Social constructionism Lewin’s action research Lewin’s theory of change

Organisation Development

Systems thinking

Diagnostic OD Dialogical OD

Lewin’s forcefield theory Gestalt theory

Complexity theory Complex responsive process perspective Emergence

Methods Developing learning infrastructure Large-group interventions Action learning

Change management Strategic change

Fig. 1.3 Overview of main theories, approaches and methods

Perspective taking Generativity Process group Scoping

30

1 Introduction

Recap • From a social constructionist perspective, ‘reality’ is something that can differ according to the individual and the group to which the individual belongs and, therefore, is not an absolute. When we intervene from a social constructionist perspective, we relate ourselves directly to ‘what is going on’ in the way people perceive this themselves. • Basically, an intervention is about relationships and interaction and can be seen as an act of inserting one thing between others. Ultimately, as shown with Barnard’s ‘appellate cases’, sense giving is concerned with inserting a new meaning to a given situation, and by definition, an intervention towards a reframing of the current ‘reality’. • The process of managing implies being consistent and efficient and focusing on what is known. On the other hand, the process of changing implies introducing disturbance, experimenting and moving into the unknown. Together they make ‘change management’ an oxymoron, a phrase or statement that seems to say two opposite things. • Organisational change begins with a status quo being disturbed, resulting in emerging differences, disruptions, disturbances and dissonance being perceived but not necessarily conceived. As a process, (organisational) change fundamentally (1) has something to do with time, energy, the same entity, perception and exchanging and (2) takes place on two interrelated levels: at a micro level as an individual process of learning to cope and at a meso or macro level as a process of exchanging the ‘learnings’. • With different interpretations of what is going on and what to do about it, we can easily find ourselves stuck in an undesirable, paradoxical situation, that is, in a situation among colleagues who apparently do not agree with our vision and do not support our efforts to make the requisite change. In this way, changing circumstances form a breeding ground for dualism and/or polarisation in terms of distrust and opposition. • In a paradoxical situation, it is hard to see how things work by looking at single (individual) acts. That is why it is important that an interventionist tries to keep an eye on the whole of human dynamics within a certain context. Only then is an interventionist able to see the circular nature of a paradoxical situation. • A complex context can be characterised by interdependencies and non-linear responses. As Snowden and Boon’s ‘Cynefin model’ suggests, those who try to impose order in a complex context will fail, but those who set the stage, step back a bit, allow patterns to emerge and determine which ones are desirable will succeed. This statement echoes Ashby’s law of ‘requisite variety’, leading to a definition of effective leadership as ‘the ability to perform the multiple roles and behaviours that circumscribe the requisite variety implied by the degree of complexity of a certain context’. • This brings us to the conclusion that for organisational change to be embraced, people must be facilitated in recognising and dealing with arising contradictory human dynamics. However, with management less trying to manage

1.7 Introducing Perspective and Perceiving

31

organisational change, there are probably less contradicting human dynamics to facilitate. Key Discussion Points 1. Seeing change as a non-linear process. Apparently, we need a non-linear way of looking at change—a way of looking that captures the kind of complexity, ambivalence and circular movements people engage in. • Argue why this is important. • Argue, in this regard, what the benefits and blind spots are in Fig. 1.2. • Describe the main characteristics of linear and circular thinking. 2. Human prerequisites for perceiving change. Perceiving and conceiving change apparently has something to do with some prerequisites. • Describe the main differences between perceiving and conceiving. • Discuss the main prerequisites of perceiving change. Are these sufficient to be able to see or experience change? 3. Planned change ‘versus’ emergent change. In this chapter, management is regarded as the art of planning, organising, leading, controlling and forecasting. Consequently, change management implies consistency, efficiency and predictability, i.e. focusing on what is known. On the other hand, emergent change seems to suggest something new arising out of connections and contexts that were not perceived just moments before, which seems to imply that stepping back, letting it happen, and asking questions is the best course of action. • Argue why change management is an oxymoron. • Define change management in your own words based on the information in this chapter. • Argue why you believe that change can/cannot be managed. If you have the conviction that change can be managed, what is it that you manage? If you don’t have this conviction, what do you have to do to realise organisational change? 4. All definitions of change are problematic. Based on Fig. 1.3, it seems that ‘changing’ can be compared with ‘continuous change’. However, it seems that with an organisation continually changing we don’t need change management as we defined it in this chapter.

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1 Introduction

• Discuss the main viewpoint here, is it plausible? Why do you think it is? Or if you think it isn’t, can you argue why it isn’t? Make use of the information in this chapter in your arguments. • Argue which viewpoint on change you prefer: the viewpoint of change or the viewpoint of changing? Be clear about your arguments. 5. Social constructionism—what’s in a (theoretical) perspective? Social constructionism is introduced in this chapter as a scientific paradigm with a unique set of premises, with which we can look at what is going on when people are acting and changing. • Define what you regard as the unique characteristics of social constructionism as a perspective on organisational change. Base your descriptions on the information in this chapter and try to be as complete as possible. • Define what it is that you see when you look at organisational change from a social constructionist perspective. Be as explicit as possible.

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2

Change Management A Slight Return

Of course, our theory of change is yet another mythology; but it seems to us that, to paraphrase Orwell, some mythologies are less mythological than others. Watzlawick et al. (1974) Despite assertions to the contrary, people are not against change, but against royal edicts. Hamel and Zanini (2014)

2.1

Introduction

One of the classic management books on organisational development and change, that of French and Bell, describes ‘change’ as ‘a new state of things, different from the old state of things’ (French and Bell 1999). Another great classic on the subject, that of Cummings and Worley, describes ‘organisational change’ as ‘a state of transition between the current state and a future one, towards which the organisation is directed’ (Cummings and Huse 1985). Therefore, it seems plausible in this line of reasoning to assume that ‘change management’ has something to do with ‘managing’ this ‘state of transition’. Moreover, as Goodstein and Burke argue, this ‘managing’ should be about ‘recognising and accepting the disorganisation and temporary lowered effectiveness that characterize this transition’ (Goodstein and Burke 1991). According to Worren and his colleagues (Worren et al. 1999), compared with OD, change management is a relatively recent phenomenon with certain distinctive characteristics and with a certain practical relevance that gained traction in the 1990s and has continued to grow in the subsequent decades.1 As a practical approach

By and his co-authors go even further and arguably are saying that ‘change management’ has emerged as a new and novel alternative to OD (By et al. 2014). 1

# The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. van Nistelrooij, Embracing Organisational Development and Change, Springer Texts in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51256-9_2

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to change, change management is characterised by an abundantly clear framework (By 2005), and there seems to be a majority of scholars in this field who agree that it is about ‘planned change’ historically rooted in Lewin’s original three-step model, ‘unfreezing-moving-refreezing’ (Laine and Kuoppakangas 2015). However, in a constantly expanding global business environment, where organisational change has become the norm for organisations in sustaining their success, defining ‘change management’ as the management of only a period of transition seems not that obvious. For organisational change to be managed in a more sustainable way, there is a serious need to question the assumptions that change management is based on. The aim of this chapter is to examine the main assumptions behind and beyond interrelated change constructs as ‘change strategy’ and ‘change management’. Therefore, we explore the specific challenges and assumptions behind these constructs. In doing so, we will introduce and explore the following: • The main leading assumptions behind change management in management literature and how we use them in our language when we talk about ‘managing change’ • The original and fundamental types of change strategies and the way they are believed to have relevance for contemporary change practices • The three change dimensions, content, process and context, as conceptual tools for engineering a change strategy. • The counterpart of change management: ‘emerging change’, with concepts taken from the field of modern biology The way we intend to discuss change management in this chapter is slightly different to how we positioned it in Chap. 1—not as a theoretical construct per se, emphasising the two opposite concepts, but as a practical approach to organisational change with certain embedded assumptions. In this chapter, we focus on the ‘management’ part of organisational change, which suggests consistency, predictable outcomes and ‘making what is known’ more effective. That’s why we start, based on a review of the extensive body of organisational change literature, with a critical discussion of some of the main ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions behind and beyond ‘change management’. In Paragraph 2.3, we describe what is meant by a ‘change strategy’, discuss the classic strategies and relate them to the primary dimensions of change, with which we seem to engineer change and work with it as a construct. In Paragraph 2.4, we discuss in more detail what can be considered the counterpart of ‘planned change’: ‘emergent change’ and its main concepts. The chapter closes with some reflections, a recap of the main findings and some key discussion points.

2.2 Typical Managerial Points of View on ‘Change Management’

2.2

39

Typical Managerial Points of View on ‘Change Management’

As a discipline on its own, ‘change management’ began to emerge in the 1980s, driven by leading consulting firms working with Fortune 500 companies. Early adopters, such as GE, Ford, Philips and AT&T, were global corporations that could derive significant savings by more efficiently implementing change programmes on a large scale. Since then, ‘change management’ has become ‘an ubiquitous theme in the management literature’ (Stewart and Kringas 2003) and ‘one of the great themes in the social sciences’. (Pettigrew et al. 2001) With upcoming complexity and turbulence, the need to manage organisation-wide change has become one of the most critical and challenging responsibilities of top management. In this section, we answer the following question: ‘what are the main assumptions, in general, about how to manage change effectively?’ To answer this question, we took a closer look at some typical areas of metalanguage regarding ‘change management’ in the existing management literature. Together with the assumptions behind each area, we present them here, thematically clustered in the following way: (1) the way management positions itself; (2) the way management regards change management; (3) the way change is managed by a parallel organisation; (4) the way the need for change is managed by constructing a ‘burning platform’; (5) the usage of top-down communication; and (6) the way management perceives the process of change as an ‘emotional transition’.

2.2.1

The Way (Top) Management Positions Itself

The first and probably most obvious area in the metalanguage on change management in the management literature is that it seems obvious that (top) managers are those who manage the change and that they are not those who are supposed to receive the change. Ergo, as the change management literature seems to suggest, (top) managers aren’t supposed to change themselves. The underlying assumptions regarding this managerial position are that: 1a ‘Change’ is meant for those who are not managers. 1b Managers are seen as interventionists or change agents, who themselves ‘never’ resist change. 1c Initiative for change lies in the hands of management and they are best positioned to judge when a change initiative is necessary. 1d (Top) management has the hierarchical overview to ensure the effective implementation of organisational change, which means, in particular, reviewing the role of all actors involved (Laine and Kuoppakangas 2015, p. 335).

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Implementation refers to a process of putting changes in place within an organisation (Lewis 2007). Such implementations require communication to articulate concepts, provide social support and coordinate feedback between the involved parties (Deline 2019). The above assumptions emphasise a demarcation between management and non-management employees, meaning that every change initiative introduces a taken-for-granted dichotomy: we ‘the management’ versus they ‘the employees’ (By 2016). This kind of reasoning, as Argyris argues, makes reflection and learning quite impossible (Argyris 1976)—certainly when the targeted change is about affiliating different groups, bridging units and unifying departments that function as silos. Furthermore, the assumption that (top) management is in the best place for initiating change is also questionable. For example, for the ‘appellate cases’ (see Interlude 1.1) to work probably, top management needs to have a direct line with operations and a good upwards-functioning communication channel. However, in most organisations, (top) management is insulated by layers of management who are not always that eager to sound an alarm—certainly not when the issue at hand concerns their direct responsibility. In these cases, by the time an issue is big enough and unavoidable enough to attract the attention of the top, in most cases the board and/or the CEO, the organisation is already on the back foot (Hamel and Zanini 2014, p. 2). As already mentioned in Chap. 1, this turns change programmes into catch-up programmes. As a result, change programmes are usually too little, too late. Moreover, just as (top) management says it needs buy-in from colleagues/employees to make the change initiative work, the same is true for employees who say they need the position to take the initiative. In fact, they need each other to make the change work. Consequently, to be embraced by all involved, a change effort must be socially co-constructed in a process that gives everyone the right to set priorities, diagnose barriers and generate options (Hamel and Zanini 2014, p. 1).

2.2.2

The Way Top Management Regards Change Management

The second area of metalanguage on ‘change management’ in the management literature concerns the idea that change is considered to be being manageable. The underlying assumptions here are that change management is seen as a necessity to: 2a Deal as efficiently as possible with the costly and annoying evil that change ‘is’—if (top) management does not control progress, it will end badly 2b Avoid unnecessary disturbance and ‘fuzz’ during the transition, which is why the ‘process of change’ is plotted as a linear route (one way and progressively) 2c Implement change as quickly as possible to respond in time to the perceived opportunities for improving organisational performance or a better ‘fit’ with the continuing environmental developments (Orlikowski 1996)

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2d Implement a sound and uniform organisation-wide transformation and/or conversion of a technology, product or idea from conceptual knowledge into some form of organisational practice (Lewis and Seibold 1998) The uneasy alliance between maintaining the status quo and the disruptive character of change has frequently been reported as challenging the existing managerial ideas and as a typical source of concern (Swanson and Creed 2014). This is because, for operations to continue, (top) management needs to be as sure as possible that things stay within the programmed time frame and budget. As Spencer argues, it seems that there is an inverse relationship between the degree of profitable planning and the degree of ‘acceptable’ uncertainty (Spencer 1962). Obviously, management’s objective seems to be to increase (preferably maximise) the former and to decrease (preferably minimise) the latter. Consequently, the most distinguishing aspects of today’s organisational change programmes are their episodic nature and the way all efforts are pre-planned in linear and sequential phases. However, change is perennially difficult to plan for, yet remains fundamentally necessary for survival. The very reason for conceiving the targeted change in advance seems to be the idea that this way of moving ‘forward’ is the least timeconsuming and offers the best possibility of planning and monitoring the upcoming events. In the 1960s and 1970s, authors like Chin and Benne (Bennis et al. 1989), and later on French and Bell (1999, p. 24), were the first to introduce change strategies for ‘planned change’ to be executed from the top down, containing managerial activities such as designing a detailed road map, programming an elaborate phasing and, with this, plotting a trajectory to a desired end point. These first initiatives seem to be echoed in one of the most popular change management models of the last decades: ‘the eight steps of Kotter’. In Interlude 2.1, we give a short impression of the model and the recent discussion in regard to its presumed effectiveness. Interlude 2.1 Kotter’s Pivotal Model of Managing Change According to Kotter, successful change occurs when there is commitment, a sense of urgency, stakeholder engagement, good and clear communication, strong leadership and a well-executed plan (Kotter 1995; Appelbaum et al. 2012). In this regard, Kotter believes that change strategies fail because of bad execution, not because of a bad strategy. This is also one of the major reasons why Kotter’s article ‘Leading Change’ in the Harvard Business Review (HBR) in 1995 is still immensely popular. Moreover, as such, it is a key reference in the field of change management. It is also an appealing model in general because of its practical value and suggestion of giving control. The article is based on analysis of dozens of organisations that had the same goal in almost every case to implement change and make it work. The article outlined eight fundamental pitfalls when implementing change in an organisation. In the (continued)

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Interlude 2.1 (continued) following year, it was published in greater detail as a book, and in 2001, it was republished in the HBR as a classical article. Kotter’s model is based on his personal consultancy business and research experience. The model lacks rigorous theoretical foundations and makes no reference to any outside sources. Based on his own observations, Kotter proposes that the most general lesson to be learned from the more successful cases in his data set is that the change process goes through a series of phases, which usually require a considerable length of time (Kotter 1995, p. 59). According to his own conceptualisation of successfully managing organisational change, it is necessary and essential to go through these phases exactly in the way he prescribes it (Kotter 1995, p. 23). He holds that guiding people through these eight steps, as described in Fig. 2.1, during a ‘major change reduces the error rate’ (Kotter 1995, p. 67). Moreover, he also believes that skipping one of these phases creates only the illusion of speed and never produces a satisfying result. Kotter’s eight-step approach assumes that resistance is an obstacle to change happening, and the message to interventionists is that resistance must be reduced or removed. Kotter explains: ‘Too often, an employee understands the new strategy and wants to help make it happen. But an elephant appears to be blocking the path. In some cases, the elephant is in the person’s head, and the challenge is to convince the individual that no external obstacle exists. But in most cases, the blockers are very real’. (Kotter 1995, p. 64) According to this popular and widespread perspective on change, to become something we have to adapt, remove obstacles, learn and change. As displayed in Fig. 2.1, the first three steps in his model resemble Lewin’s ‘unfreezing’ phase where resistance to change is supposed to be reduced. Steps four, five and six form together the transition phase, resembling Lewin’s ‘moving phase’ where new behaviours, values and attitudes are developed. The last two steps are related to Lewin’s ‘freezing phase’ where changes are reinforced in the company. To do this effectively, a lot of people in the ODC field are convinced that Kotter’s eightstep model has to be followed and that the change itself follows a pre-planned programme with the use of the right change management principles. Kotter’s eight-step model is also an example or manifestation of a so-called ‘discontinuous episodic change’ type. Furthermore, as Burnes argues, Kotter’s prescriptive approach does not correlate well with studies that suggest that organisations prefer to use approaches to change that stem from their culture and thus cannot easily be amended or replaced (Burnes 1996). When such prescriptions run counter to the organisation’s culture, they will be either ignored or ineffective. Or as Kotter argues himself, ‘[c]hange sticks when it becomes ‘the way we do things around here’, when it seeps into the bloodstream of the corporate body. Until new behaviours are rooted in social norms and shared values, they are subject to degradation as soon as the pressure for change is removed’ (Kotter 1995, p. 64). Kotter admits that there are more (continued)

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Interlude 2.1 (continued) mistakes that people can make during a change process. He also admits that even successful change efforts can be messy and full of surprises. His eightstep approach is most appealing for the simple suggestion that change is a process that you can control totally, and there is seemingly one way to change, namely, by doing the right things at the right moment. Kotter’s recipe for successful organisational change is in essence about (top) management planning change, having competent change leaders in key positions, organising commitment and creating a critical level of urgency. The eight steps give a really good idea of what really matters and what provides focus in each phase of the change process. However, one of the main questions that remain unanswered is ‘What do we have to do to commit people to change goals, and create a critical level of urgency’? For example, phase one, ‘Create a sense of urgency’, sounds fairly easy, but it is not. As De Geus argues, ‘[s] ociologists and psychologists tell us it is pain that makes people and living systems change. And certainly, corporations have their share of painful crises, (. . .). But crisis management—pain management—is a dangerous way to evoke change. By necessity, it becomes autocratic management. The positive characteristic of a crisis is that the decisions are quick. The other side of that coin is that the implementation is rarely good; thus, many companies fail to survive’ (De Geus 1988). Or as Kotter puts it, ‘[w]ithout motivation, people won’t help and the effort goes nowhere’ (Kotter 1995, p. 60). John Kotter Is a emeritus at the Harvard Business School and a graduate of MIT and Harvard. His book 'Leading change' is listed by Time magazine as one of the twenty-five most influential business/management books ever written.

As Kotter’s eight steps suggest in Interlude 2.1, much seems to do with the assumed (top) management’s desire to control the outcomes, being efficient and succeeding within the pre-set budget and time frame. Kotter’s model, as presented in Creating a climate for change

Engaging and enabling the whole (organisation)

Implementing and Sustaining change

1. Create 2. Build 3. Form A sense of A guiding A strategic coalition vision urgency and initiatives

4. Enlist 5. Enable 6. Generate A volunteer Action by Short-term army removing wins barriers

7. Sustain 8. Institute Acceleration Change

Moving

Refreezing

Unfreezing

Fig. 2.1 Kotter’s eight-step model

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Fig. 2.1, provides transparency in what is to be done, creating a certain sense of security and certainty in how the events are linked to successful implementation of the intended change. However, we are still talking about planning, designing and plotting, which can make things transparent, but not necessarily with a guarantee that things will happen as planned. In fact, the eight steps are in a sense a detailed change strategy representing the assumptions of the designers. As a rule, neither the programme, the road map nor the trajectory will speak for ‘the territory’, that is, the current reality as perceived by the diversity of all involved. Developing a change programme and a trajectory, including an elaborate phasing and a detailed action plan, may provide a sense of security—but it is, in fact, a false sense of security. In this regard, Hamel and Zanini provocatively stated: ‘When change programmes are engineered, the solution space is limited by what people at the top can imagine’.2

2.2.3

The Way Change Is Managed in a Parallel Project Organisation

The third area of metalanguage in the change management literature concerns the ‘parallel organisation’. Since the beginning of the 1990s, this has been considered the most efficient governance structure for implementing a change process as it has become seemingly synonymous with ‘change management’ (Axelrod 2000). In order to manage change properly, it is apparently a standard procedure to separate from the beginning the change activities from the daily operational activities. Therefore, as we illustrate in Fig. 2.2, it is usance to install a temporary parallel organisation and ask people to free themselves from their work and engage in separate ‘work’ or ‘project’ work groups. In general, as illustrated in Fig. 2.2, a parallel organisation is composed of people representing the echelons and units that are involved in the change initiative, exactly as demarcated in the organisational chart. In this temporary parallel organisation, it is common practice for each hierarchical level/department to have its own team, with a steering team composed of executives and central staff members for designing and managing/monitoring the change process. The underlying assumptions here are the following: 3a Paralleling the change activities with the daily business activities makes both activities easier to plan, monitor and manage. 3b The parallel change activities need to be managed/monitored in the same way and by the same managers as the daily activities.

2

It seems to be exactly the opposite of what George Bernard Shaw tried to convey in his play, Man and Superman, that ‘The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man’. It raises questions like ‘How reasonable is it that change starts at the top?’, and ‘Why do we need change to roll out or be engineered beforehand’? (Hamel and Zanini 2014)

2.2 Typical Managerial Points of View on ‘Change Management’

Organisation

45

Parallel organisation Steering group

Top management

e.g. HRM

Purchase

Production

Sale

Representative work or project groups

Fig. 2.2 An illustration of the way change activities are organised in a parallel temporary structure

3c The key decision-makers together in one room are assumed to provide a vehicle for overcoming organisational red tape and are, therefore, the most efficient governance structure for the change process. 3d High-quality solutions from the parallel organisation are ensured by populating it with the ‘best and brightest’ from the organisation (Axelrod 2000, p. 17). With these assumptions, we are allowing the few to think, work and decide for the many. Further, we provide room for all kinds of emotions, such as the feeling of not being heard, that their voices are not relevant and that those directly involved are the ‘best and brightest’, and the majority is not. Most probably this gives room for feeding the rumour mill, and as Axelrod argues, ‘this typically does not feel like an opportunity at all, but more like a manipulation’ (Axelrod 2000, p. 17). On the other hand, in the eyes of the few who are directly involved in the parallel organisation, the majority seems to resist what they have been so carefully building. Most importantly, often these ‘best and brightest’ are picked arbitrarily by management because they, for example, did a good job in the last change project, have union influence or are always speaking their minds—so, as we suggest here, not because they represent the whole, but just because they belong to the group of ‘usual suspects’. As such, this selected group is often: (1) not representative of the current organisation reality; (2) giving rise to the so-called ‘not invented here’ syndrome; and (3) in the worstcase scenario, being held responsible for implementing all their ‘own’ good ideas.

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A ‘not invented here syndrome’ is a stance adopted by social, corporate or institutional (sub)cultures that avoid using or accepting ideas that already exist elsewhere because of their external origins. Applied to change initiatives, it appears that this phenomenon has something to do with a desire to support local initiative, a lack of understanding, an unwillingness to acknowledge or value the work of others and/or jealousy or a form of xenophobia or tribalism. As a social syndrome, it can manifest itself as an unwillingness to adopt an initiative for change because it originates from another (sub)culture, group or organisational unit.

2.2.4

The Way the Need for Change Is Managed by Constructing a Burning Platform

The fourth area of metalanguage in the management literature on ‘change management’ is that change needs apparently some sense of urgency organised by executing a so-called gap analysis. In itself, it is a well-known exercise (McCaughan and Palmer 1994) that is fundamentally based on answering three questions: (1) Where are we now? (2) Where do we want to be? and (3) How can we get there? It seems that creating this kind of discrepancy (Armenakis et al. 1993) is, from a managerial perspective, an obligatory activity that is supposed to stimulate members of an organisation to embrace the change initiative. Similarly, leading authors in the field of change management speak of the importance of creating what can be called a ‘burning platform’ (Hamel and Zanini 2014, p. 2; Bandura 1977, 1982), in the same way as, for example, Nadler and Tushman write about creating intellectual pain and/or the urge to communicate that something is awry (Nadler and Tushman 1989). It appears, again from a (top) management perspective, that for change to be embraced, it is important that initially—that is, for a successful start—there is a sort of diffusing dissatisfaction created throughout the organisation to make appropriate discrepancies self-evident (Beck and Frankel 1981). Once there is the belief that a discrepancy (‘the gap’) exists, a related belief must also be established, namely, that a specific change process is necessary to eliminate the discrepancy. This starts when we acknowledge that we have a problem (the need) and begin to think seriously about solving it (by changing) (Prochaska and Norcross 2010). While the realisation that a discrepancy exists can be a powerful motivator for change, it is believed that we should also build confidence that we have the capability to correct the discrepancy (Maddux and Rogers 1983). Behind these arguments, there are seemingly some assumptions that are supposed to generate the need for: 4a Constructing a discrepancy between the desired end state and the present state 4b Undoing people’s existing taken-for-granted convictions about ‘how things ought to be done’ 4c Bolstering a sort of collective self-efficacy, i.e. the perceived ability and confidence to bridge the discrepancy (Armenakis et al. 1993)

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Self-efficacy can be viewed as the perceived capability to overcome a discrepancy between where we are now and where we want to be. In this regard, expectations of self-efficacy determine whether an individual will be able to exhibit coping behaviour and how long change efforts will be sustained in the face of obstacles. Based on his experimental research, Bandura (Bandura 2007) reports that individuals will avoid activities believed to exceed their coping capabilities but will undertake and perform those that they judge themselves to be capable of. Therefore, it is believed in the change management literature that for change, (top) management supposedly not only must communicate/frame a salient discrepancy but also must bolster the self-efficacy of organisational members regarding the proposed changes to reduce the discrepancy.

2.2.5

The Way Change Communication Is Managed: Top Down

The fifth area of metalanguage in the management literature regarding ‘change management’ is that change is a communicative action and ‘managing change is nothing more than managing communication. Communication in the management literature on ‘change management’ plays a central role in how the change initiative is formulated, the way it is announced from a (top) management perspective and is explained to members of the organisation (Jian 2011). Communication within the context of ‘change management’ is regarded as pivotal, one-directional, from the top down and all about framing or giving sense to the upcoming change (Cornelissen 2008). For this, (top) management uses organisation-wide media such as the intranet, start-up meetings and one-way audio or video messages.3 Behind these ways of communicating change, there are seemingly three primary assumptions:

3

According to Larkin and Larkin, communication has the best chance of changing frontline behaviour if it comes from the most desired and credible source, the immediate supervisor (Larkin and Larkin 1994).

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5a A (top) manager’s activities are fundamentally one-directional communications exemplified by announcing and explaining the change purpose. 5b The receivers of the change communication are to be treated as a single entity (Lewis et al. 2001). 5c One-directional organisation-wide change communication is an effective way of controlling the way the upcoming change is to be conceived. As put forwards in the management of communication literature, these assumptions give the impression that (top) management tends to use communication as a ‘thing’, like an entity with dimensions and volume that can be disseminated (Wheatley 2006). However, communicating in the sense of communis opinio, which means literally ‘making it jointly shared’, requires more than a top-down transfer of information. That is why the so-called ‘spray and pray’ communication strategies4 are seldom effective in influencing the receiver’s behaviour. Spray and pray communication strategies are based on the idea that management should spray or shower employees with all kinds of information. The motives behind this communication strategy seem admirable because managers often assume that more information equals better communication and decision-making. A spray and pray communication strategy is seldom effective, as Clampitt and his colleagues illustrate with the following example: A CEO was perplexed by a communication assessment that suggested that employees were confused about the direction of the organisation. He told us that he sent out detailed email messages about ‘what’s happening’ on a weekly basis. But most of the employees were ill equipped to discern the differences between messages that were salient and those that were less so. Many complained that even if they knew what was ‘happening’, they did not have a clue about why decisions were made. Some employees only paid attention to the communicated information that supported their own personal agenda, while others were overwhelmed by the amount of information. In short, as Clampitt and his fellow authors maintain, the CEO’s implicit prayers were rarely answered (Clampitt et al. 2000). Together with the communication department, (top) management can design the communication message in such a way that it frames the upcoming change in a positive way. Next, (top) management can do its best to get the message across repetitively by, for example, touring around the country/world to visit all their company’s locations and make their change intentions known by telling the local organisation members what is to be expected. Nevertheless, as soon as the process changes from plan making to actual changing, everything can remain quiet

4

Mass communication, for example, by internally distributing brochures, leaflets, pamphlets and digital messages about what and how people should change, often ends up reinforcing existing behaviour (Clampitt et al. 2000).

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without anything happening. In these cases, it is likely that the local organisation members will complain that they have not been heard and that the plans do not match what they think is needed. Moreover, when the information only goes one way, cascaded linearly downwards, the decisions made completely miss the multiple and divergent points of view regarding change to be embraced. If people within an organisation feel that they cannot openly express their points of view on top-downcommunicated critical issues, then most probably the expressed points of view will remain largely monolithic, which can be seen as a potentially dangerous impediment to the targeted change goals.

2.2.6

The Way Management Perceives the Process of Change as an Emotional Transition

The sixth area of metalanguage in the change management literature is that the process of change is inherently seen as about coping with an emotional process that needs to be managed at forehand. Apparently, organisational change involves the ending of something and the beginning of something else. If left unaddressed, the emotions experienced throughout the stages of change may be expressed, as Henderson-Loney argues, ‘by employees in behaviours which can be destructive to the goals of the change’ (Henderson-Loney 1996). Thus, as it seems, change in the management literature is viewed as a period of disorientation, uncertainty, self-doubt and anxiety and as such as a nuisance. While these changes might be carefully planned for a predetermined date, it is widely believed that it might take some time before those involved have adapted to their new circumstances (Hayes 2018). Thus, as an activity, ‘change management’ is believed to shed greater light on the psychological process of transition and the kinds of actions they can engage in to avoiding human emotions and facilitate adaptation (Elrod II and Tippett 2002). A typical example of such a psychological transition process is depicted in Interlude 2.2. Interlude 2.2 Emotional Coping Stages Popularly Known by the Acronym DABDA (Santrock 2007; Kastenbaum 1998; Corr et al. 1999) In the autumn of 1965, four students at the Chicago Theological Seminary approached Dr Elisabeth Kübler-Ross for assistance with a research project. Their task was to write a paper on ‘crisis in human life’. They had decided that death was the greatest crisis faced by humans. This was the start of the seminal research done by this group on the transition process associated with death. Kübler-Ross built on this work by documenting the phases through which individuals pass when coping with trauma or serious illness. She identified the following five phases, which in Fig. 2.3 are coupled with Lewin’s phases of ‘unfreezing, moving and refreezing’: (continued)

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Interlude 2.2 (continued) Denial: The first reaction according to Kübler-Ross is denial. In this stage, individuals believe the diagnosis is somehow mistaken, and cling to a false, preferable reality. Anger: When the individual recognises that denial cannot continue, they become frustrated. Certain psychological responses of a person undergoing this phase would be ‘Why me? It's not fair!’; ‘How can this happen to me?’; ‘Who is to blame?’; ‘Why would this happen’? Bargaining: The third stage involves the hope that the individual can avoid a cause of grief. Usually, the negotiation for an extended life is made in exchange for a reformed lifestyle. People facing less serious trauma can bargain or seek compromise. Depression: During the fourth stage, the individual despairs at the recognition of their mortality. In this state, the individual may become silent, refuse visitors and spend much of the time being mournful and sullen, making comments such as ‘I'm so sad, why bother with anything?’; ‘I'm going to die soon, so what’s the point?’; ‘I miss my loved one; why go on?’ Acceptance: In the last stage, individuals, according to Kübler-Ross, embrace mortality or an inevitable future, or that of a loved one, or another tragic event, which typically comes with a calm, retrospective view for the individual, and a stable condition of emotions, with comments such as ‘It’s going to be okay’; ‘I can’t fight it; I may as well prepare for it’. There are also some criticisms of using the DABDA model as an inspiration for organisational change. One of the main criticisms is that Kübler-Ross mainly studied the change-response of individuals facing their own death, and not of those who are bereaved by the passing of a close friend or family member (Parkes 1979). Others noted that Kübler-Ross deals with death and dying on an individual level, which is something different from dealing with loss on a social or even collective level (Perlman and Takacs 1990). The DABDA model has also been criticised because of the lack of empirical research and evidence supporting the stages as described by Kübler-Ross. Moreover, over the years, the following points have been raised: • The existence of these stages, as such, has not yet been practically demonstrated. • No empirical evidence has been presented indicating that people actually do move through these stages. • The line is blurred between description and prescription and between the phases as such. The resources, pressures and characteristics of the immediate environment, which can make a tremendous difference, don’t seem to be considered. (continued)

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Interlude 2.2 (continued) Elisabeth Kübler-Ross (1926 –2004) Was a Swiss-American psychiatrist, a pioneer in near-death studies, and author of the internationally best-selling book, On dearth and dying (1969), where she first discussed her theory of the five stages of grief, also known as the “DABDA model".

The consistency of the emotional transition models across multiple fields of study and the breadth of their applicability (Elrod II and Tippett 2002) illustrate the following underlying assumptions. For ‘change management’ to be effective, it is assumed to: 6a Recognise that change takes time and energy and that the true cost of change must include the inevitable initial decline in performance 6b Adequately and effectively prepare (top) management, CEOs, owners, employees and customers for the upcoming change process so that expectations do not clash with the shifting organisational reality—meaning that change management is supposed to be about ‘managing expectations’ to avoid ‘emotional nuisances’ (see Fig. 2.3) as much as possible

5. Acceptance

Active

2. Anger

3. Bargaining

"I feel fine” "This can't be happening, not to me.”

1. Denial

"I can't fight it, I may as well prepare for it.”

"Why me? It's not fair!” "How can this happen to me?” "Who is to blame?"

4. Depression

"I'm so sad, why bother with anything?”

Time

Passive Helplessness

UNFREEZING

Utilising opportunities

Seeing possibilities

MOVING

Fig. 2.3 A change process depicted as an emotional roller-coaster ride

REFREEZING

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6c Serve as a guide to those journeying through the change process so they will persevere Based on these assumptions, the responsibility of ‘change management’ therefore seems to understand the path, communicate the expectations, establish the handholds and encourage the travellers. Doing so will ensure that time spent in the ‘emotional transition’ of change is minimised and the individual and/or organisation can reach the summit of increased performance on the end of the change process (Elrod II and Tippett 2002, p. 289).

2.3

Changing Organisations by Engineering a Change Strategy

For our purpose, we broadly define a change strategy as the ‘macro-level choices and trade-offs (top) management makes based on the organisational goals and judgements about others’ reactions, which serves as a basis for interdepartmental change’ (Clampitt et al. 2000). Such a change strategy can be seen as how (top) management forecasts what is to be done and what is to be expected from the receivers of the change message, especially their reactions, which need to be anticipated by decisive managerial actions from (top) management. In this regard, the engineering of a change strategy by (top) management fits seamlessly with the ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions from the previous paragraph. As a concept, change strategy was first introduced in the 1970s by Chin and Benne, who in their early research focused on identifying the range of approaches used to guide and frame change efforts. A change strategy includes the approach, method or manner in which changes are implemented in an organisation. It is a unique combination of means, conscious and deliberated, brought together in a coherent plan of planned action with the attempt to bring about a change (Chin and Benne 1976a). In the first subsection of this paragraph, we go into three principal change components by introducing them as the main dimensions for engineering a change strategy. In the second subsection, we discuss, from a more contemporary perspective, the assumptions behind Benne and Chin’s original change strategies. In the third subsection, we go into a specific change strategy regarding the social re-engineering of an organisation’s culture. In the fourth and last subsection, we discuss the typical components of a typical contemporary strategic change strategy.

2.3 Changing Organisations by Engineering a Change Strategy

2.3.1

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The Main Change Dimensions for Engineering a Change Strategy

In the literature on change management, the attention of academic researchers and practitioners has been mainly focused on three principal questions: why change, what changes and how to realise change (Pettigrew 1987a). These principal questions can be seen as the key topics, main causes and characteristics but can also be considered as the three main dimensions for engineering a change strategy. These dimensions are: 1. The content or what is to be changed (e.g. structure, culture and/or strategy) 2. The process itself or how the content is going to be changed (e.g. the sequence of interventions, the level of active involvement and/or the style of leadership) 3. The context or why the content is going to be changed in the way it is described (e.g. with what impact and on what scale) In discussing these dimensions, we tend to differentiate between the content of the change that comes about within a process and the context(s) in which it continues to come about during the process. Although organisational science researchers acknowledge the importance of these dimensions, there is insufficient empirical evidence of these variables being systematically assessed simultaneously in organisational change efforts (Self et al. 2007). The content dimension: what is going to be changed? The content of change is related to the substance of change and identifies the ‘what’ in the change. Among the content issues are changes in structure, human resource practices, the technology used, sociocultural issues, physical settings and the organisation’s strategy (Kotter 1978). These content issues describe the management and organisational factors that relate to an organisation’s performance. Hence, if the organisation is not performing to a predetermined standard, then changes in some or all of these factors are usually named first, labelling it as a target/goal for what needs to be changed for improved organisational effectiveness. The content issues refer to labels, such as ‘structural’, ‘cultural’ and ‘strategic’, as they are linked to classic diagnostic models, like that of the McKinsey 7-S framework (Peters and Waterman 1982) (see Interlude 2.3). Interlude 2.3 The McKinsey 7-s Framework The framework as depicted in Fig. 2.4 was developed in the early 1980s by Peters and Waterman, two consultants working at the McKinsey & Company consulting firm and authors of one of the greatest management sellers of all time, In Search of Excellence. While some models of organisational effectiveness go in and out of fashion, one that has persisted is the McKinsey 7-S framework. One of the basic premises of the model in Fig. 2.4 is that there are seven internal interdependent aspects or elements of an organisation that need (continued)

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Interlude 2.3 (continued) to be aligned if it is to be successful. This indicates how one single change intervention can affect all other ongoing interventions. Another is that these interdependent elements can be categorised as either ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. According to both authors, ‘hard’ elements are easier to define or identify and for management supposedly easier to influence; these are strategy statements, organisation charts and reporting lines and formal processes and IT systems. ‘Soft’ elements, on the other hand, are more difficult to describe, less tangible and more influenced by culture. However, these soft elements are as important as the hard elements if the organisation is going to be successful. The framework is most often used as an organisational analysis tool to assess and monitor changes in the internal situation of an organisation. In June 1980, Peters published an article in the ‘Manager’s Journal’ section of the Wall Street Journal titled ‘The Planning Fetish’. In this article, he ‘stressed the importance of execution and dismissed the whole idea of strategy’ (Waterman et al. 1980). The primary ‘innovative’ theme that undergirded what would become the well-known In Search of Excellence book was that ‘structure is not organisation’. This also happened to be the title of a 1980 journal article authored by Waterman and Peters, in which they argue that the ‘picture of the thing is not the thing.... An organisational structure is not an organisation’ (Self et al. 2007, p. 214). In fact, it is this article that introduced what would become known as the McKinsey 7-S framework.

Thomas Peters & Robert Waterman jr. In ‘Search of Excellence’ (1982) became a bestseller being the most widely held monograph in the United States from 1989 to 2006. The primary idea espoused was that was that of solving business problems with as little business process overhead as possible.

The process dimension: how to change? The change process itself is the ‘how’ factor of change. More specifically, the process variable embodies the specific methods and interventions utilised to implement the targeted change. Furthermore, the process dimension encompasses the ‘road map’ or phases through which successful organisational change is supposed to progress (Self et al. 2007, p. 213). At its simplest, the process issue refers to the time period over which change occurs from the conception of the need to change (the targeted change) until the change is integrated fully into the daily routine operations. The process dimension is also concerned with the way certain tasks and decision-making activities may overlap

2.3 Changing Organisations by Engineering a Change Strategy Fig. 2.4 The McKinsey diagnostic 7-S framework (Peters 1980)

55

‘Hard’ Strategy (ICT)

Structure

Systems

Shared values

‘Soft’ Skills

Style

Staff

and interlock. Moreover, the process dimension is about communication, involving people and the (process of) intervening itself. The context dimension: why change (in this way)? As Pettigrew and his co-authors point out, contextual factors are the why part of change—they explain or make sense why the change is necessary (Pettigrew 1987b). It has two interrelating meanings: 1. In a more physical sense—as the space within which we interact, which can be expressed in terms of scale, the number of people, departments, divisions and/or organisations 2. In a more psychological or relational sense—as the perspectives that are represented by the participants and which gives participants and their behaviour sense Looking at the context dimension in both ways is of importance to fully understand the (developing) ‘current reality’ and to achieve an understanding of the appreciation of relevant others with whom we share the same context. Maintaining a shared perspective within a context helps the participants with their understanding of the opportunities and handling the constraints (Self et al. 2007, p. 213). The context dimension can be seen as a moderator of the relationship between the other two change dimensions and hence is the most central. This is because, as discussed in Interlude 2.4, most of what we do to, and how we change, will be (greatly) influenced by the context where the change is supposed to be taking place and is interpreted. The context dimension can best be regarded as the factor that explains why a change effort did not produce the forecasted, favourable impact, even though the interventionists employed an appropriate change strategy. However, as for example, Self and his colleagues argue, context is not a static factor (Clampitt et al. 2000). Indeed, context can be, and often is, influenced by the ongoing process

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and as such can influence what needs to be changed (i.e. the content) during the ongoing organisational change efforts. Interlude 2.4 The Interrelatedness of the Three Change Dimensions A change strategy is seen as a change management tool for anticipating upcoming change dynamics. As such, a change strategy is engineered with the intention of channelling purpose-directed energy by making sense of the ambiguous and confusing things to be expected (from a (top) management perspective). For example, it states explicitly what to talk about and what to ignore, what the main change aspects are and in which order they are going to be handled for the well-being of all involved. Engineering a change strategy is an activity that precedes the actual interventions. So traditionally, after it is decided that there is going to be a change, engineering a change strategy is, for those who believe in planned change, a reasonably good starting point. Because we tend to define the need for change in terms of ‘what’ needs to be done, it seems plausible that the ‘what’ question dominates the initial conversations. However, answering the ‘what’ question has consequences for answering the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions. It is therefore important to answer these three questions in a mutually coherent way. The content relates to functional areas such as ‘human resources (HR)’, ‘finance’ and ‘operational management (OM)’ in which members of (top) management each have their own responsibilities. Thus, it is obvious then to formulate the change target/goal in terms of, for example, ‘improved commitment of the employees of department “X” or ‘improved task performance/ measurable results of department “Y”’. Both targets/goals are content related, respectively to the functional areas of ‘human resources’ and ‘operational management’. Therefore, it is to be expected that the HR manager will have the sole responsibility for making the change successful in case of the ‘improved commitment of the employees of department X’ and the OM manager that of the improved task performance/measurable results of department Y. It is to be expected that the HR manager picks up the assignment by relating commitment to (mutual) trust, motivation and improved leadership, while improving task performance will be related by the OM manager to improving the skills and knowledge of the employees and their use of monitoring tools. In this way, both targets/goals are formulated specifically in terms of content. However, to be accomplished, they probably both need a different process, with a different context and different level of involvement. For example, improving task performance and the use of monitoring tools is about learning on the job/teaching and more of a ‘one-way’ process between an expert/ teacher and the employees. On the other hand, the improving of commitment (continued)

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Interlude 2.4 (continued) is about the quality of interaction between employees and their departments’ management and therefore, much more in need of a ‘two-way’ process. So far, we have only addressed the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ question. In both assignments, each context is most likely to be that of the department. Let’s say that both departments are mutually dependent of each other for producing the same goods/services. In this case, changing one department independently of the other and sequentially in time can be a good idea because the content and the processes are different. However, although the cooperation between both departments is not a target in itself to be improved, they aren’t functioning independently of each other. Therefore, it is to be expected that changing both departments in different ways independently of each other will most likely have consequences for the way they work together, during the change process but also afterwards. It is probably more purposeful—and making sense for the whole—i.e. the people in departments X and Y and their mutual relationships – that they all improve the same monitoring tools in the same way and develop in the same way a corresponding level of expertise and commitment. Therefore, that they are both involved in the same change process at a same level and at the same time. However, the point that we are trying to make with this example is not to favour the latter alternative per se, but that the less the ‘what’, the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ questions are explicitly related to each other, the less there is an eye to the implicit trade-offs in terms of maximising synergy and/or minimising troubles popping up.

2.3.2

Contemporary Reflections on the Classic Change Strategies

As introduced earlier with Barnard’s ‘appellate cases’ in Interlude 1.1, traditionally a change strategy is considered to be a product of a decision-making process by (top) management. This is why a change strategy is, in general, about the planning of interventions in a certain logical and orderly way. It is about designing a process consisting of a sequence of pre-planned contexts of people in which the participants are enabled—in a coherent way—to deconstruct, construct and reconstruct the change-related content. In fact, engineering a change strategy in this way is ‘change management’ in optima forma. In this section, we discuss as an example three of those change strategies that were presented for the first time in the 1970s. The authors, Chin and Benne, present their change strategies in an overall framework cataloguing the then-utilised approaches to change management. Further, they position their strategies in connection with the wider societal change going on at that time, focusing on influencing social cultural patterns. Nowadays, despite their slightly rudimentary character, these original strategies have a classical status in the change management literature and are still relatively popular in today’s change management practices across all kinds of cultural boundaries (Pettigrew 1975).

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Each of these classical change strategies has its own explicitly described guidelines on how to generate organisational change. However, in this section, we focus not only on describing these classical strategies but also on their unique ontological and practice-based sets of assumptions in which they are supposed to be changing people and organisations. The power-coercive strategy In general, this classical change strategy emphasises the use of political and economic sanctions as the principal strategy for forcing change on people. This change strategy is based on the line of reasoning that we humans are more likely to change because of the assumptions that we: 1. Are convinced in general that power is legitimate and carries rights with it (i.e. we should listen to those who hold power, especially in an employee-employer relationship). 2. Believe that power-bearing derivatives such as having more knowledge, seniority or popularity, earning more money and/or being part of a dominant coalition are also legitimate power resources and carry rights with them: for example, those who sit in a lower hierarchical position, who have less knowledge or less seniority, who are less popular and so forth should listen to people who outrank them in these matters. 3. Are prone to punishment when we do not follow the directions of those who outrank us. These sociopolitical and social psychology concepts have a lot to do with interests, conflicts and power play (Reynolds 2011; Revans 1998). This way of realising change seems to be related to McGregor’s X paradigm (see Fig. 6.1 in Chap. 6), in which we assume that people are basically afraid, need to be motivated and can be overruled or even manipulated, mostly just by considering their interests, weaknesses or wishes. Forming coalitions of power blocks, lobbying and deploying coercive change in appraisal conversations are intervention methods that can be related to this specific change strategy. Conducting interventions based on the above assumptions has something to do with the conviction that the most feasible results are realised in exercising personal coercive negotiation practices within an individual and/or small-group context. In a power-coercive change strategy, the underlying philosophy of realising change seems to have the tendency of focusing on the deliberate development of a sense of outranking and dividing and conquering the change recipients. The empirical-rational strategy The key assumption behind this classical change strategy can be summarised as ‘[O]nce presented with information that demonstrates that a particular change is in their self-interest, people are more willing to accept the change as a means of achieving that interest’. According to this line of reasoning, we humans are more likely to change because of the assumptions that we are:

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1. Rational and driven primarily by self-interest, on the condition that the right information that interests us is put forwards in an engaging and convincing manner. 2. Especially susceptible when this information is gathered by ‘experts’, who try to ‘ensure’ us that the information is accurate and gained through professional methodological protocols. 3. Under the impression that certain relevant others have a preference to follow the presented information. 4. In need of clarity and structure, and as such are influenced by a well-augmented, structured change design with clearly specified results, which are laid down beforehand. 5. Susceptible to feelings or impressions of being in control by managing the process in the direction of the previously mentioned set of rules. 6. Result driven, decisive, accurate and dedicated to what we have planned. These empirical-rational assumptions have a lot to do with controlling the change by managing, planning and monitoring the process aiming at the best possible solution. In its implementation, the empirical-rational strategy works as follows: a change is put forwards by an interventionist(s) who believes that what they are proposing is desirable and in line with the self-interest of all change recipients. In the process of putting forwards the change proposal, the interventionist(s) rationally justifies the change, pointing out elements by linking them to the (perceived) interests of the change recipients and showing how they will benefit from the proposed change. In the empirical-rational approach, power is based, for example, on an intervention tool called ‘survey feedback’, in which information that is gained through, for example, interviews and/or a survey is fed back to the respondents.

The survey feedback intervention involves using surveys and/or interviews to collect information from members of an organisation. After it has been collated, it is fed back to all those who have participated. As an important tool in an empirical-rational strategy, the interventionist starts by analysing the (continued)

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results, after which the feedback process is supposed to start by sharing the data firstly with (top) management. After they have collaboratively worked on the data, they identified issues that need attention and started to make plans to deliver improvements, the data cascades as agreed upon, to the next lower level. The members of each lower level, after reviewing and working on the data, continue to cascade the process down the organisation by working on the data with their own groups, and so the process continues. In an empirical-rational strategy, those who possess information or knowledge hold power in the system. Judicious use of this information or knowledge represents a clear application of power in cases when systems are prone to change driven by knowledge. The normative-re-educative strategy Behind this classical change strategy lies the key assumption that intelligence is social rather than rational, and furthermore that change is intrinsically motivated when individuals and/or groups identify some level of (shared) dissatisfaction with the status quo. This reasoning suggests that we humans are more likely to change because we are: 1. Susceptible to the feeling or idea of ownership of the things we develop, which can be stimulated by actively involving organisation members in working out programmes of change under their own direction 2. Susceptible to changes in our social position, identity, membership and the relationships we have with colleagues, so that when we change, our perception and behaviour change accordingly 3. Loyal to relevant others, our own group, department and/or organisation 4. Convinced that change suits our (perceived mutual) social needs and selffulfilment, and gives us opportunities to learn and develop ourselves, resulting in boosting our commitment and motivation Change based on these concepts is supposed to allow and help people to take ownership of their own learning and development processes. Further, by doing so, it is supposed that the change recipients create a safe environment in which they have the opportunity to experiment with giving each other feedback and coaching each other. This classic change strategy resembles most what later became known as action learning.

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Action learning is about solving real-life problems and involves two essential activities: acting and reflecting upon the results (Chin and Benne 1976b; Nickols 2010). Central to action learning is the rigorous exploration of the resolution of an issue through cycles of action and reflection, characterised by the quality of the interaction between those involved and the engagement with real problems rather than with fabrications. Action learning is supposed to lead to working towards the solution for which there is the most consensus. The key task for those who follow this kind of reasoning is not to find the right information to guide a rational change process, but to find a proper and effective relationship between the values of the system (and its members) and the values of the organisational environment.

2.3.3

A Change Strategy for Social Re-engineering of an Organisational Culture

The way the classic change strategies became known in the change management literature implies that they, by definition, are about planning and managing change. Change strategies, primarily these classical ones, are for the most part based on (sharing) knowledge of, and insights into, current organisational behavioural patterns, culture and preferences on how to change the change recipients (Ravasi and Schultz 2006). Ravasi and Schultz consider these preferences as being part of the ubiquitous organisational culture, that is, as a set of shared assumptions that guide the organisational members’ behaviours (Schein 1992).

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Artefacts surface Beliefs & Values

Basic assumptions

An organisational culture can be seen as a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group of people as it solves its problems of external adaptation and internal integration. This pattern is considered the most essential of three layers, the other two being at the surface the artefacts and in the middle the espoused beliefs and values. As Schein argues, once a group has learned to hold common assumptions, the resulting automatic patterns of perceiving, thinking, feeling and behaving provide meaning, stability and comfort (Schein 1990). In his opinion, based on a lifetime of scientific research, intervening and publishing on organisation culture-related issues, the most visible layer of an organisation’s culture is the artefacts, or the cultural symptoms of its culture (Schein 1990). Interventionists who are not members of the same context, such as (external) consultants, are in fact relative outsiders in regard to this ‘culture’. Such relative outsiders will readily note the artefacts of a group/ organisation without really knowing what they mean. In other words, these artefacts seem palpable but are hard for an outsider to decipher accurately. With a certain naive attitude, a relative outsider does observations; notes anomalies and things that seem different, upsetting or difficult to understand; and can ask questions about their meaning—which, in turn, can help the participants to develop a different perspective on what they are doing, decipher the meaning of their various behavioural and artefactual phenomena and eventually get in touch with, respectively, their own beliefs, values and taken-for-granted assumptions (Schein 1990, p. 112). As Schein maintains, individual interviews, as well as starting a collaborative dialogue with a small/large group, if conducted with a focus on the quality of the interaction, can give opportunities to reveal the underlying assumptions. As these assumptions surface, the interventionist will most likely begin to notice inconsistencies between what is claimed (i.e. espoused) and what has been observed (i.e. in use). Thus, interacting with ‘inside’ participants is essential because only they can bring to the surface their own assumptions and articulate how they basically perceive the world around them (Schein 1990, p. 112). In sum, if we combine insider knowledge with (naive) outsider questions, assumptions can be brought to the surface, but the process of inquiry has to be interactive, with the outsider continuing to probe until assumptions have really been teased out and have led to a feeling of greater

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understanding on the part of both the outsiders and the insiders (Clampitt et al. 2000, pp. 41–42).

2.3.4

Engineering a Strategic Change Strategy

The word ‘strategy’ is indirectly derived from the Greek word strategos, which denotes generalship. Generals are concerned with the big picture. Typically, strategy occurs at higher organisational and abstraction levels than tactical issues. Therefore, a corporate strategy is believed to be less easily changed than the organisational tactics (De Wit and Meyer 2005). We speak of strategic change when fundamental alterations need to be made in more than one aspect of the organisation’s system (De Wit and Meyer 2005). There are many actions that constitute a strategic change—a reorganisation, a diversification move, a shift in core technology, a structural redesign and/or a product portfolio reshuffle, to name but a few (Sminia and Van Nistelrooij 2006). The reasons for strategic change can also be found in abrupt and predominantly exogenous jolts such as changing policies or legislation and top management replacements. Strategic change is, by definition, far-reaching, and it is mainly during the first steps that strategic change is supposedly different from change management in general. As part of a strategic change, change management is, for example, assumed to reflect the organisation’s attempts to manage uncertainty following the earlier strategic decisions made by top management. In this regard, change management is seen as a ‘tool’, assumed to effectively focus on the implementation of the change in several interrelated aspects of the organisation. That is why we emphasise in this section the first main strategic activities as depicted in the left-hand column in Fig. 2.5. The exact boundary between strategic management, change management and operational management is much more blurred as depicted in Fig. 2.5. For example, seen from a more practical perspective, it is much more effective when we develop a corporate strategy together with operational management. However, for the point we want to make here, we focus on the following two strategical change activities that in the strategic management literature are seen as being part of Lewin’s unfreezing stage: (De Wit and Meyer 2005, pp. 80–81) Diagnosing: Understanding the Necessity The formulation of a strategic change strategy entails diagnosing by aligning a firm’s strengths and weaknesses with the problems and opportunities in its environment (Wiersma and Bantel 1992). As the strategic decision-making process is by its very nature ambiguous, complex and unstructured, the perceptions and interpretations of top management’s members critically influence strategic decisions (De Wit and Meyer 2005). In other words, a top management decision to initiate change will be based on its members’ perceptions, their assumptions and the way they make sense of opportunities and constraints.

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Unfreezing

Refreezing

Moving

Leading activities Diagnosing Scoping

Defining the approach Making up a Plan of action

Strategic management

Deploying Cascading Bringing it to executives and other employees

Facilitating & Engaging employees

Change management

Accepting Enforcing Conditioning Rewarding

Operational management

Leading questions Why is it necessary? What does this mean for the long term?

Planning & Budgeting

What needs to be done? What are the first steps?

How we are going to do it? With what intervention/met hods?

Who is going to do it?

Executing & Implementing

How do we continue?

Effectuation & Continuation

Fig. 2.5 The main ingredients of a strategic change strategy

Scoping: Determining the Approach and the Impact After setting the diagnosis and the decision to change is made by top management, the first major step is having a clear understanding of the approach that is going to be employed within the organisation. In strategic management terms, in this phase, top management is supposed to be decisive about the scope and the pace of the intended change. As discussed in Interlude 2.5, as part of the first strategic activities, both scope and pace are used as ingredients to identify a fitting change type that is used as the bedrock for the change approach to be executed in the next stage. Interlude 2.5 Two Archetypical Types of Change A ‘change type’ can be defined as the whole of essential characteristics that describe the general kind and form of a change approach (Al-Haddad and Kotnour 2015). The two main ingredients that are used in the strategic management literature for identifying a change type are the scope and the pace of change. (continued)

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Interlude 2.5 (continued) Purpose (Result)

Context (Why)

Process (How)

Content What?

A scope is about finding a fitting impact and scale for the intended content, process and context of the change. A scope of change can vary from broad to narrow and is called ‘broad’ when many content aspects, stakeholders and their mutual relationships are supposed to be altered at the same time. However, a scope can also be narrow, only focused on a specific aspect and/or a specific stakeholder and/or a specific relationship. The pace of change concerns the timing of the interventions and the speed with which the intended change is to be progressing. The pace of change depends on the moment at which changes are initiated. Based on the strategic management literature, there are two archetypical change types that can be classified based on the characteristics as displayed in Fig. 2.6 (Weick and Quinn 1999) In the mainstream strategic management literature, strategic change is seldomly projected/plotted as a non-linear and/or regressive curve in time. That is why both depicted change types in Fig. 2.6 suggest a projected/plotted lineal-progressive movement. Change type A in Fig. 2.6 is much more episodic and disruptive than change type B, which is projected as to be progressing in time as more gradual and continuous. Disruptive change, as depicted in change type A, is referred to as radical or revolutionary in which top management is going for intermitted, intensive transformational change in a short episodic ‘breakthroughs’ (a large jump along the Y-axis). Gradual change, as depicted in change type B, is referred to as ‘evolutionary’ in which top management planned for keeping enough space for local initiatives and regular voluntary actions (Greiner 1998; Tushman et al. 1998). There are scholars in the field of strategic management who argue against rigid top-down decisions, suggesting that responsible management must involve multiple stakeholder groups in decision-making because doing so supports the firm’s longterm sustainability of the intended change (Waldman and Galvin 2008). That is why, in contemporary strategic management practice, it is usance that, as part of the first stage, top management makes use of a management tool called ‘stakeholder analysis’ (Varvasov and Brugha 2000) as discussed in Interlude 2.6.

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Accumulated Change

Change type B

Change type A

Time

T0 T1

T2 T3 T4

T5

T0 T1T2

T3

T4

T5

Fig. 2.6 Examples of both archetypical change types

Interlude 2.6 Scoping Based on a Top-Down Strategic Stakeholder Analysis In the strategic management literature, a ‘stake’ in an organisation is seen as resting on ‘legal, moral or presumed’ claims or on the capacity to influence an organisation’s ‘behaviour, direction, process or outcomes’ (Varvasov and Brugha 2000). This makes a stakeholder anyone concerned with the intended change, who is seen as going to be affected by the change or has a stake in (not) realising the purpose of the change. At its core, the main premise behind a strategic stakeholder analysis is that not everyone in an organisation will respond in the same way to change. Anticipating these reactions becomes possible when one identifies and understands each stakeholder (or stakeholder group). Since its origin, stakeholder analysis is a practical strategic device (Varvasov and Brugha 2000), based on systematically gathering and analysing information in advance to determine whose interests should be taken into account when implementing change. As an activity, the analysing can be broken down into four phases: 1. Identifying: determining the relevant groups/individuals by looking at the three separate change dimensions 2. Analysing: understanding their stakeholder perspectives and interests 3. Mapping: visualising relationships with objectives and other stakeholders 4. Prioritising: ranking stakeholder relevance and identifying issues In sum, a strategic change strategy involves activities with which top management intent to manage, for example, the technical, structural, cultural and political issues all together in an interconnected way. In the words of Argyris and Schon, such a viewpoint is rather instrumental because the focus is upon the acquisition and application of knowledge useful for the presumed effective change interventions and

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in which the organisational world is conceived as fundamentally knowable through rational applied methods (Argyris and Schön 1978). However, the use of this kind of rational methods will probably result in a more sustainable change when we look at things from a more balanced and contingent perspective with a focus on the relationships between issues and people. Building on the words of Dunphy and Stace, we can argue that we are in need of a (strategic) model of change management that is essentially situationally and locally balanced, one that indicates how to vary change strategies to achieve ‘optimum fit’ with what internally is needed and what is needed from the changing environment (Dunphy and Stace 1993). Having arrived at this point in this chapter, based on the literature on strategic change and change management, we can conclude that they are about managing interventions, but that we still know relatively little about ‘how to manage change itself’.

2.4

Change Management: Provoking ‘Emergent’ Change to Happen!

As asserted by management guru Drucker, in periods of equilibrium (relative stability), assumptions about what is good for business often go unchallenged, and organisational members fail to give sufficient attention to the possibility of doing things differently or even doing different things (Drucker 1994). As argued in Chap. 1, the more the field of ODC seems to evolve, the more scholars and practitioners seem to believe that discontinuities, conflicts, jolts, revolts, contradictions, paradoxes and the like are in fact sources for initiating change. In fact, it is increasingly believed that we need these disturbances to be confronted for developing ourselves and the way we work (together). In this section, we will firstly discuss the importance of recognising an emerging ‘action-reaction’ behavioural pattern that can be compared with a typical seesaw pattern, after which we go into some typical modern biological concepts regarding how radical change emerges under pressure of a power-coercive change strategy. We end this section with a short description of the differences between first- and second-order change.

2.4.1

An ‘Action-Reaction’ Behavioural Pattern

In our daily activities, we tend to lose sight of the big picture—particularly when things are uncertain and even become threatening, as was, for example, the case in the second example of the business university from the first chapter. In this case, the CEO of the business university was convinced that the university employees needed to be informed weekly about the latest financial situation. Because nothing appeared to be changing for the better, it seems from his point of view, as if they were lacking the right amount of urgency. In the same way, the employees perceived their weekly financial update as proof that the CEO was not on top of things and certainly was not managing things in a hands-on way. These weekly gatherings with the whole staff seemed to be stuck in a so-called vicious circle or ‘action-reaction’ behavioural

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A seesaw pattern

Active

Dissipative An appearing threshold

Behavioural flux

A point of bifurcation

Zero change Decaying perturbations (small or no fluctuations)

Passive

Time

T0 Tn Tn+1 Tn+2 Tn+3 Tn+4 Fig. 2.7 An ‘action-reaction’ behavioural pattern depicted as a seesaw pattern

pattern (Keeney 1983), which, when set out on a timeline, can be depicted as a so-called ‘seesaw’ pattern (as illustrated in the middle of Fig. 2.7). An action-reaction behavioural pattern is an oscillating, rapid, repeated behavioural process that can be depicted with a typical ‘seesaw’ pattern. Such a pattern is believed to originate under escalating pressure. An ‘actionreaction’ behavioural pattern can also be seen as a paradox framed as a challenge for both sides. Or as Handy puts it: Living with paradox is like riding a seesaw. If you know how the process works, and if the person at the other end also knows, then the ride can be exhilarating. If, however, your opposer does not understand, or wilfully upsets the pattern, you can receive a very uncomfortable and unexpected shock (Handy 1994). A ‘seesaw’ pattern is in the making when a party, for example, the CEO, forces another party, the employees in this example at moment T0 and Tn (see Fig. 2.7), to engage in certain behaviour: to come to the weekly meetings. Although the meetings initially seem to have some effect (in terms of activities), after a short period of time, these effects fade away and the whole becomes more and more inert. The CEO feels as if he is standing alone in this communal deplorable situation and feels irritated by what he perceives as a (declining) lack of urgency by his staff and starts trying even harder (at moment Tn+1 and Tn+2) as the employees continue to relapse after a short while. As it seems, the employees feel that they are being pushed and that they were looking out for safety and security, purposely rearranging their social arrangements when they could no longer trust their CEO to take care of the business. As a result,

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they seem to just passively reacted to everything the CEO initiated, in a way that can best be described as what Markovic called a ‘negation of the negation’ which refers to the unity of opposites (Markovic 1974). Or in other words, as suggested by Benson, a thesis follows antithesis in a never-ending succession, where a given dynamic is followed by its opposite, only to emerge again (Benson 1977). Ultimately, the activities in the business university seem to be ended up in a kind of never-ending vicious circle (Rapoport 1956). In such cases, a control action, such that of the CEO, is not based on the current state but on some previous state or value. Using dated information to control the approach to a change target is as reacting on delayed feedback and is likely to cause people to miss their goal and to get into an escalating ‘action-reaction’ behavioural pattern. What can be seen here is that both parties have interpreted the behaviour of the other without really being in contact about it; consequently, the ongoing repetitive communicative actions are being mutually inadequately understood. In fact, it’s creating a delay in the feedback loop between both parties, leading to clumsy and/or escalating behaviour by both parties. This kind of problematic behaviour results in a rapidly accelerating ‘action-reaction’ sequence in which every new episode starts with an oversteering in the other direction. As we will discuss in more detail in Chap. 7, this process is an example of a reinforcing, positive feedback loop with a ‘deviation-amplifying’ effect that gives rise to tunnel vision (the reluctance to consider alternatives to one’s preferred line of thought) leading to further escalation.

2.4.2

Modern Biological Concepts Regarding ‘Emerging’ Change

As depicted in Fig. 2.7, when both parties push each other beyond a certain limit, people can feel flabbergasted, which works as an appearing threshold, as was the case, for example, with the CEO when he was confronted with the disagreement of the work council with his own (copy-pasted) proposal. When, in such cases, the corrective behaviour overshoots its aim, actions and reactions will wildly oscillate, bringing the system (all involved parties) to a so-called far from equilibrium, which brings the behavioural escalation to a hold. According to the Belgian chemist and Nobel laureate Prigogine, this means that, just like after the temperature of a house, the system becomes ‘overheated’, ‘fluid’, ‘chaotic’ and ‘unbearable’, a radical (or second-order) change of the system is caused. As depicted in Fig. 2.7, the system (in this example the employees and the CEO), after reaching the appearing threshold, arrives at what is called in modern biology a bifurcation point (see also Interlude 2.7) (Prigogine 1997).

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Interlude 2.7 A Modern Biology Perspective on Emerging Change (Kauffman 1995) According to Prigogine, emerging refers to a constantly changing state of a system, struggling with the way it is organised, at the edge of chaos, and at the edge of losing its integrity. Much like Von Bertalanffy, Prigogine was strongly inspired by thermodynamics in the formulation of a general systems theory and extended Von Bertalanffy’s theory of open systems to dissipative structures. These structures are ‘far from equilibrium’, their energy levels are constantly changing and they are characterised by instability rather than stability. This is the major theme of Prigogine’s popular work Order out of Chaos. Where traditional management books used to emphasise permanence, Prigogine sought to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the principles of evolution (increasing order) and entropy (increasing disorder) (Ramage and Shipp 2009). At some critical distance from equilibrium, at a certain point, which Prigogine called a bifurcation point of, a structure, a process or whatever natural matter loses its (existing) integrity. A bifurcation point is a point of a breakdown in stability (i.e. equilibrium) located between the stretched balance and the beginning of the imbalance. It is a scientific way of saying that something splits into two branches or kinds of behaviour. If patterns bifurcate quickly enough, they can become very complex, leading to bifurcation cascades and chaos. Beyond the bifurcation point, a set of new phenomena arises: we may have oscillating chemical reactions, non-equilibrium spatial structures or chemical waves. Prigogine and his team have given the name dissipative structures to these spatiotemporal organisations. In fact, this bifurcation point is something that resembles what in chemistry is also known as the ‘Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction’.5 However, the findings of Prigogine and his team are historic because they proved that matter far from equilibrium acquires new properties. These chemical reactions are generally non-linear, which suggests the existence of long-range correlations in far-from-equilibrium conditions that are absent in a state of equilibrium. We can say that matter in equilibrium is ‘blind’, but far from equilibrium it begins to ‘see’. If we were to suppress fluctuations, the system would maintain itself in an unstable state. Bifurcations are a source of symmetry breaking. They are the manifestation of an intrinsic differentiation between the parts of the system itself and the system and its (continued)

5 A Belousov-Zhabotinsky (BZ) reaction is one of a class of reactions that serves as a classical example of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, resulting in the establishment of a non-linear chemical oscillator. The reactions are important to theoretical chemistry in that they show that chemical reactions do not have to be dominated by equilibrium behaviour. These reactions are far from equilibrium and remain so for a significant length of time and evolve chaotically. In this sense, they provide an interesting model of non-equilibrium phenomena (Zhang et al. 1993).

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Interlude 2.7 (continued) context. Once we have dissipative structures, we can speak of selforganisation.

Ilya Prigogine (1917 – 2003) Was a Belgian professor and 1977 Nobel Prize in Chemistry. His theory of dissipative structures, which describes the self-organising activity of systems ‘far from equilibrium’, has been foundational in complexity theory. It appears from the case of the business university that everybody wanted to change the situation they were in. However, nobody seemed to know for sure what it was that needed to be changed. To be more precise, some organisation members had explicit opinions about certain change aspects, while others didn’t seem to care about the content, as long as something was going to be changed, and others just wanted the CEO to be gone, period. For these people, it was definitely clear that the CEO was initiating change by force, in the same way as he seemed to have done—in the eyes of this same group—during the severe cutbacks some months before. Apparently, this was exactly what happened after the disapproval of the work council. With conviction, the CEO decided that when the going gets tough, the tough gets going, resulting in what in hindsight can be interpreted as a disruptive clash initiating a point of bifurcation. From this point on, there were two mutually exclusive leads: on the one hand, the council’s disapproval, which was an explicit motion of distrust towards the course of action of the CEO, and on the other, the ‘tough’ CEO taking matters into his own hands, which was an explicit motion. Obviously, these two leads were combined making things chaotic, or in the biological terms of Interlude 2.7, making things completely ‘dissipative’. In hindsight, the dissipative situation also seems to have created space for the disturbed whole to correct and/or change itself. After the work council was confronted with the CEO enforcing change upon them, they put pressure on the supervisory board to change things for the better. Firstly, an ad interim executive was appointed to manage daily operations, and secondly, after the board and the CEO had come to an arrangement regarding the CEO’s institutional shares, both parties came to the decision to disband. Looking back, seeing things from this ‘emerging’ point of view, it seems as if things improved for the business university as a whole— the ‘action-reaction’ behavioural pattern, leading to a dissipative situation and the following disruptive intervention from the board leading to what may be called a change of a ‘second-order’. After this the business university reinvented itself by rearranging its own processes, vision on its own future, structure and relationships with its internal and external stakeholders.

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2.4.3

First- and Second-Order Change

First-order change is about adaptations—changing in a piecemeal, incremental way. They include behavioural feedback on what is considered to be appropriate within the existing set of tacit assumptions about how the group does or should act (Bartunek and Moch 1987). In this regard, Bartunek and her colleagues talk about the tacit reinforcement of present understandings (Bartunek and Moch 1987). Behavioural feedback can be seen as an intervention and can be executed in an almost infinite number of ways (Watzlawick et al. 1967). All of these ways are relevant and can be successful when applied to disturbances, conflicts, jolts, revolts and contradictions that do not involve a shift to another set of assumptions. We speak of second-order change when feedback loops are leading to another shared perspective of the situation, because, for example, it becomes clear that the existing set of assumptions turns out to be inadequate (Bartunek and Moch 1987, p. 486). Based on this short summary, it seems relatively difficult to make this distinction in real-life situations. However, as we metaphorically try to illustrate in Interlude 2.8, this same distinction can be made relatively easy. Interlude 2.8 Ashby’s Metaphor on Two Levels of Intervening (Watzlawick et al. 1974, p. 9) A useful analogy is supplied by a car with a conventional gear shift. The performance of the engine can be changed in two very different ways, namely, by pressing/releasing the accelerator pedal (i.e. increasing/decreasing the supply of fuel to the cylinders) or by shifting gears. Let us strain the analogy just a little and say that in each gear the car has a certain range of ‘behaviours’ (i.e. of power output and consequently of speed, acceleration, climbing capacity, etc.). Within that range (i.e. class of behaviours), appropriate use of the accelerator pedal will produce the desired change in performance. But if the required performance falls outside this range, the driver must shift gears to obtain the desired change. Gear shifting is thus a phenomenon of a higher logical type than accelerating, and it would be patently nonsensical to talk about the mechanics of complex gears in the language of the thermodynamics of fuel supply.

W. Ross Ashby (1903 –1972) Was an English psychiatrist and a pioneer in cybernetics, the study of the science of communications and automatic control systems in both machines and living things.

As second-order interventions are focused on helping people to do things in a substantially different way, intervening on a second-order level in a direct way is

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tricky. Telling people that they need to perceive things differently, for example, in the way that the CEO in the case of the business university did, seldomly works. Seemingly, it needs a different approach, more indirect, more with a focus towards people’s own perceptions of the situation. As we will discuss in more detail in Chap. 6, second-order interventions are in essence about asking about these perceptions and exchanging our own.

2.5

Closing Reflections

2.5.1

Change Management Is an N-Step Approach

There is no ‘one best way’ to manage change (Nadler and Tushman 1995), or as Dunphy puts it, ‘the notion is illusory—a search for a chimera’ (Dunphy 1996). In other words, there is no agreed theory of managing change, and there is unlikely to be one. Confusingly, in the literature on change management, there are quite a few authors who claim to present ‘one best way’ approaches (Burnes and Jackson 2011; Collins 1998; By 2005). Besides Lewin’s three steps and Kotter’s eight steps, there are, to name just a few, Lippitt’s elaborated seven successful helping stages of Lewin’s original steps (Lippit et al. 1958), Kanter’s ten commandments for successful change (Kanter et al. 1992), Eccles’ 14 factors for successfully implementing action-driven change strategies (Eccles 1994), Ulrich’s seven-step guide to change (Ulrich 1998) and Pugh’s four principles of change (Pugh 1993). Collins refers to all these prescriptive approaches as ‘n-step guides for change’ or simply ‘recipes’. As Huczynski and Buchanan argue, these ‘n-step’ models of change have one striking feature in common. As discussed in this chapter, these models seem to assume that planned change unfolds in a logical lineal sequence. For example, solutions are not identified until the problem has been clearly defined. The best solution is not chosen until the options have been properly evaluated. Implementation does not begin until there is agreement on the solution. Implementation is carefully monitored and deviations from the original plan are corrected.

2.5.2

‘Change Management’ Is a Commodity Skill, Emphasising the ‘Map’ and Not the ‘Territory’

Most change in organisations is ‘programmatic’, episodic and with a clear and distinct beginning, middle and end. It proceeds in ‘cascades’ from top management to middle management and further down the existing hierarchical lines (Edmonstone 1995). This makes ‘change management’ a commodity skill that can be contracted on a short-term basis with measurable outcomes that fit logically into a programme or project structure and schedule (Brown et al. 2016). As discussed, this has embodied and enacted many managerial assumptions, such as the following:

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• Promulgating organisation-wide change programmes is done through top-down ‘spray and pray’ communications, mission statements and culture change programmes covering all to be expected behavioural aspects, wrapped in prefabricated programmes such as ‘Total Quality Management’, ‘Balanced Scorecard’ and ‘Lean Management’. • The primary focus of ‘change management’ is assumed to be on the content of ideas, and the implementation of these ideas, the process, the way the change is handled and the context in which the change takes place are assumed to be secondary. • ‘Bracketing off’ a problematic aspect of management into a change programme with different, parallel management arrangements is seen as conventional wisdom. • Change programmes should be driven by an exclusive core group who are—in due course—seen as the sole or main owners of the problem and therefore of its solution, causing all kinds of tensions such as a ‘not invented here syndrome’.

2.5.3

‘Change Management’ Is Growing Strong but Is Still Fundamentally Flawed

Ongoing, pre-planned change programmes are prone to being overhauled by reality—certainly when they are based on the assumptions as discussed in this chapter. In fact, these assumptions make change initiatives in contemporary fast-changing times extremely vulnerable. And as Beer and his colleagues argue, these assumptions together make up a guiding theory that is fundamentally flawed (Beer et al. 1990). Probably—in a certain way—they are right, as within most organisations it is not uncommon to need a clear commitment from those in power. However, for a change programme to succeed, we are not so much in need of a ‘buy-in’ as an ‘all-in’ by those who are in power and who are supposed to execute the change. Such an approach to change is founded on a very different set of assumptions, including the following: • Organisations cannot sustain excellent performance unless the higher echelons are capable of managing the paradoxical forces of continuity and change (Collins and Porras 2004). • Essentially, continuity and change can be viewed as two key organisational dimensions, and they coexist as interdependent and complementary by virtue of their interlinked nature (Morin et al. 2016). Acknowledging this tension and incorporating its paradoxical nature into the way we think about change enables rather than impedes change. • The primary focus of change should be on the context, on the interdependent part forming (temporary) social wholes, regardless of the existing hierarchical structure or their scale.

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• For change to happen, it needs to be on the level of relationships, roles and responsibilities, led by local leaders, who are in touch with and not led by the higher echelons. • Ad hoc local arrangements are the best solutions to local business problems—and probably all local initiatives also need to be aligned from the bottom up with personal accountability and the commitment everyone shares in achieving the organisational goals and quality of the ongoing exchange processes. • By aligning the relationships and roles of managers, staff and employees by addressing issues, tasks and responsibilities, energy can be focused on solving real problems as they are perceived by all involved.

2.5.4

Change Is Not Manageable, Interventions Are!

Change can be ignored, resisted, responded to, capitalised upon and created. However, it cannot be managed and made to march through some orderly step-by-step process. Whether change is a threat or an opportunity depends on how prepared we are. According to Clemmer, the former president of the United States, Abraham Lincoln once said, ‘I will prepare myself and my time must come’. (Clemmer 1995) That is how change is managed. This makes ‘change management’ mostly a matter of managing expectations. To effectively deal with change, we need to stop focusing on change as some kind of manageable force. We can schedule a process, divide it into phases, plan sequential steps and manage the interventions in terms of scope, and timing, but without any guarantee that the ‘planned’ change is the outcome. Change as an activity is not manageable, interventions are.

2.5.5

‘Change Management’ Is an Oxymoron, by Definition to Be Treated as a Paradox

Not all organisations need to change all the time. In this sense, the ability to manage continuity and change is said to be ‘the secret to an enduring great company’ (Mintzberg et al. 1998). Moreover, most organisations simply cannot sustain excellent performance unless they are capable of managing the paradoxical forces of continuity and change. These forces are an inevitable part of organisational life. Moreover, one of management’s mandates is to minimise risk and to keep the current system operating, which is, at the same time, the one thing that is jeopardised by trying to change the status quo—or as Creed reminds us, ‘[p]eople like to feel stable and yet survival demands change, thus the manager is faced with a paradox that is difficult to resolve to everyone’s satisfaction’ (Creed 2011). Just as opposing atoms of change and stability can alter their own polarities, depending upon the context, people can perceive a single factor as an enabler in one instance and as a constraint in another (Swanson and Creed 2014). Having said that, it also shows that continuity and change are interrelated and in a kind of dynamic relationship—a dialectical tension. Essentially, continuity and change can be viewed as two key organisational

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dimensions, and they coexist as interdependent and complementary by virtue of their interlinked nature (Leana and Barry 2000). Acknowledging this tension and incorporating its paradoxical nature into the way we think about change enables rather than impedes change.

2.5.6

‘Change Management’ Is About Sense Giving to Others’ Change Initiatives

As the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard once said, history is like prophecy— just directed backwards, not forwards in time. He also states that ‘we live our lives much as a spider spins a thread to let itself down from the ceiling to the floor: we have nothing in front of us but as we travel through space we produce a thread, a narrative behind us’ (Carter et al. 2008). With organisational change, there seems to be a similar thing going on, as it produces arguments that strive to make sense of where we have come from and where we are heading. However, it is mainly just like an old slot machine: ‘a penny placed in the top can take many different paths so that you can’t know in advance what you will get out at the bottom’ (Balogun and Johnson 2005). It is a bit like the following witty remark from Robert Pirsig: ‘You look at where you’re going and where you are, and it never makes sense, but then you look back at where you’ve been, and a pattern seems to emerge. And if you project forward from that pattern, then sometimes you can come up with something’. (Pirsig 1974) In greater and greater numbers, change initiatives are more agile, flexible and based on local initiatives as a form of constant updating, leading to new patterns for how organisational members organise themselves in the absence of an a priori change intention (Worley et al. 2011). You don’t always need something more to get something more. That’s what emergence means (Quote taken from a TED talk 2007). Research that builds on these insights is growing, but there remains much to be understood about the role of organisational actors outside of top management teams and how they actually can participate in an active and direct way (Balogun and Johnson 2005).

2.5.7

‘Change Management’ Is About Treating People as if They Are Rational (but They Are Not)

The Nobel Prize-winning physicist Murray Gell-Mann once asked people to consider ‘how hard physics would be if particles could think’ (Gell-Man 1994). The ‘particles’ in the physics of change—employees—think, but often do so in seemingly irrational ways. As the change journey unfolds, smart leaders must therefore understand the social science of ‘predictable irrationality’ (Ariely 2008). This implies that when change concerns human behaviour, it is better not to view the future as a fixed outcome that is destined to happen and that is capable of being predicted, but rather as a range of possibilities. The human biases that promote seemingly irrational decisions are well understood by, for example, the field of

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behavioural economics. This is not the case for change management and organisational leadership, but it should be (Keller and Schaninger 2019a; Johnson 1999). Now consider Hamel and Prahalad’s management fable of four monkeys sitting in a cage staring at a bunch of bananas accessible only by steps hanging from the roof. Whenever the monkeys try to climb the steps to reach the bananas, a blast of cold water blocks them. After a few days, realising there’s no point in trying to get the ‘forbidden fruit’, they naturally give up. Some humans in the room then remove the water hose and, at the same time, replace one of the original monkeys with a new one. On seeing the bananas, it starts up the steps, but the other simians, being social creatures, pull it down before it gets blasted by water. The new monkey is startled, looks around and tries repeatedly to scale the ladder, only to be repeatedly pulled back. Finally, the new monkey accepts the group code of conduct and doesn’t bother to go for the bananas. Over the next few weeks, the onlookers remove the rest of the original monkeys, one at a time, and replace them with new monkeys that have never seen the water. By the end of the experiment, with perfectly ripe bananas sitting on the platform above, and monkeys that have never seen a jet of water, none of the animals tries to climb the steps. They’ve all learned the unwritten rule: ‘you don’t grab the bananas around here’. Hamel and Prahalad created this story not to represent any actual findings from the field of primatology but instead as a potent and memorable way to demonstrate a wider truth about irrational organisational life—namely, that mindsets ingrained by past management practices remain ingrained in the organisational culture far beyond the existence of the practices that formed them, even when new management practices have been put in place (Hamel and Prahalad 1994). Recap • The original field of organisation development (OD) lies at the core of the hybrid field of organisation development and change (ODC). Since the 1980s, ODC has integrated insights from management and business studies and becomes a more interdisciplinary field, overlapping with change management and management consulting. • Compared with OD, change management is a relatively recent field of practice with certain distinctive characteristics that gained traction in the 1990s. It has continued to grow in the subsequent decades. As a change approach, change management can be characterised by its pre-programmed character, following Lewin’s original three-step model, ‘unfreezing-moving-refreezing’. • Based on the existing management literature, there are five typical areas of metalanguage on how to manage organisational change, thematically clustered by (1) the way management positions itself; (2) the way management regards change management; (3) the way change is managed by a parallel organisation; (4) the way the need for change is managed by constructing a ‘burning platform’; (5) the usage of top-down communication; and (6) the way management perceives the process of change as an ‘emotional transition’.

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• As part of strategic change, change management is a commodity skill directed towards the effectively top-down implementation of the change in several interrelated aspects of the organisation. • As a counterpart of implementing pre-planned change, ‘emergent change’ is about perceiving and conceiving of change arising out of interactions. As the main concept of complexity sciences, ‘emergence’ can be characterised by the following key elements: (1) it is based on internally generated patterns; (2) there is an absence of centralized control; (3) no single part coordinates the macro-level behaviour of the whole; and (4) it uses only local dynamics. • An ‘action-reaction’ behavioural pattern is in the making when (top) management forces employees to engage in pre-planned behaviour. • When a situation is perceived as a dichotomy consisting of two opposing parties, and nothing is done to uphold the diversity, it can be expected that both parties push each other beyond a certain limit, which ultimately works as an appearing threshold. After arriving at this threshold, the corrective behaviour of (top) management overshoots its aim, and actions and reactions will wildly oscillate, bringing the whole to a so-called far from equilibrium, into the direction of a bifurcation point. Beyond this bifurcation point, a so-called non-equilibrium spatial structure or dissipative structure arises. • This brings us to the conclusion that change management is about mapping upcoming change in a strategic, top-down way, making it clear for everyone involved what is to be expected. However, when not facilitated in a proper way, the process itself can oscillate into an ‘action-reaction behavioural pattern. Key Discussion Points 1. Relating change strategies to change dimensions A ‘change strategy’ is a product of a decision-making process—a ‘unique combination of means’ requiring conscious and intentional decisions concerning the essential dimensions of change: context, process and content. The context dimension can be described as a moderator of the relationship between the other two change dimensions. • Argue the importance of having a change strategy. • Argue what the relevance is of having a change strategy when you are going for self-initiative. • Discuss the relevance of defining change in terms of context, process and content and what you can accomplish with these dimensions. • Explain why the context dimension can be regarded as a moderator and the differences between the way context is described in Chap. 2 and, for example, in Chap. 4.

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2. A normative-re-educative change strategy and OD Intelligence is social rather than rational, and change is motivated when an individual identifies some level of dissatisfaction with the social status quo. As such, it is this line of reasoning that conforms the closest to the original work of Kurt Lewin (as described in Chap. 3). • Argue why this change strategy is supposed to be the closest to the original work of Lewin. • Explain the underlying assumption of ‘ownership’ beneath this change strategy and in what way it is supposed to be helping people to change. • Discuss the statement ‘intelligence is social rather than rational’ in the light of the concept of, for example, ‘groupthink’ from Chap. 7.

3. Confronting planned with emergent change As stated in this chapter, change can be defined as ‘a state of transition between the current state and a future one, towards which the organisation is directed’. According to Clemmer, it is possible to ‘objectively plot a course of action like Jean-Luc Picard on the starship Enterprise and then “make it so”’ (Clemmer 1995). But if that was ever possible, it certainly is not in today’s business world of high complexity, turbulence and uncertainty. • Which assumptions, as discussed in this chapter, can you recognise as underlying Clemmer’s definition of change? • Discuss why the above statement (plot objectively a course of action and then make it so) is probably not possible in today’s business world. • Argue why change management as defined in this chapter is as popular as it is.

4. Change management doesn’t seem to regard management as a stakeholder As discussed in this chapter, based on the ‘change management’ literature, ‘[m]anagers ought to manage the change without changing themselves’. This kind of reasoning, as Argyris argues, makes reflection and learning quite impossible. And as Hamel and Zanini continue, and as should be embraced, a change effort must be socially constructed in a process that gives everyone the right to set priorities, diagnose barriers and generate options. Despite assertions to the contrary, people are not against change— they are against, as Hamel and Zanini argue, royal edicts (Hamel and Zanini 2014). • Discuss the first statement. Is it something that is taken for granted in your organisation? • Argue why the first statement makes reflection and learning quite impossible.

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• What does it mean that a change effort needs to be socially constructed to be embraced? • What arguments can you think of that indicate that it is self-evident that the latter statement of Hamel and Zanini about ‘royal edicts’ links up with the first statement, that managers ought to manage change without changing themselves? • If it isn’t change itself, what is it precisely that they are against? Be as specific as possible.

5. Bottom-up communication In the case of bottom-up communication, the need for communication efficiency is supposed to be higher than in other forms of communication. Communication efficiency can be defined as the accomplishment of change communication with a minimum expenditure of time, effort and resources. • Describe the main characteristics of bottom-up communication. • Argue why bottom-up communication is supposed to be inefficient.

6. A parallel organisation The effectiveness of attempts to introduce change, especially at the strategic level, is dependent on the actions and behaviours of everybody affected by the change. A typical intervention used to develop a shared vision and an agreed strategic plan is to set up a temporary parallel organisation involving representatives from different groups (and levels) across the regular organisation to work together in various committees and task forces to produce the desired output (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007; Keller and Schaninger 2019b). It is assumed that this kind of approach creates a wide feeling of involvement and gains the commitment of all organisational members. Often, however, only the representatives and those close to them feel involved. While this minority may become excited and passionate about the changes, others may feel left out and unable to influence developments. This can undermine their commitment to the vision and strategic plan produced by this process. • Describe the main characteristics of a parallel organisation. • Argue why it is supposed to be effective in introducing change in organisations by creating a wide feeling of involvement. • What are the conditions for realising such a wide feeling?

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7. Stop and think How would you respond to these three ‘true or false’ questions? (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007; Keller and Schaninger 2019b) ‘People have a natural resistance to change’. True or false? ‘People get bored with routine and seek out new experiences’. True or false? ‘Older people are more resistant to change’. True or false? Did you answer ‘true’ to all three statements? According to Huczynski and Buchanan, a moment’s reflection should suggest that these positive responses are inconsistent with each other and contradict the evidence. For example, many people when they retire from work take up radically new activities and hobbies, e.g. painting, acting, community involvement or learning a musical instrument. As Huczynski and Buchanan maintain, we cannot have natural resistance to change and seek new experience at the same time. True or false?

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Laine, P., & Kuoppakangas, P. (2015). A reconceptualization of change strategy – One application of dilemma theory. Journal of Change Management, 15(4), 332–352. p. 337. Larkin, T. J., & Larkin, S. (1994). Communicating change; Winning employee support for new business goals (pp. 4–5). New York: Mc Graw-Hill. Leana, C. R., & Barry, B. (2000). Stability and change as simultaneous experiences in organizational life. Academy of Management Review, 25(4), 753–759. p. 755–56. Lewis, L. (2007). An organizational stakeholder model of change implementation communication. Communication Theory, 17, 176–204. Lewis, L. K., & Seibold, D. R. (1998). Reconceptualizing organisational change implementation as a communication problem: A review of literature and research agenda. In M. E. Roloff (Ed.), Communication yearbook (Vol. 21, pp. 93–151). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Lewis, L. K., Hamel, S. A., & Richardson, B. K. (2001). Communicating change to nonprofit stakeholders; models and predictors of implementers’ approaches. Management Communication Quarterly, 15(1), 5–41. p. 13. Lippit, R., Watson, J., & Westley, B. (1958). The dynamics of planned change. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Maddux, J. E., & Rogers, R. W. (1983). Protection motivation and self-efficacy: A revised theory of fear appeals and attitude change. Journal of experimental social psychology, 19, 469–479. Markovic, M. (1974). From affluence to praxis (p. 24). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. McCaughan, N., & Palmer, B. (1994). Systems thinking for harassed managers (p. 79). London: Karnac. Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B., & Lampel, J. (1998). Strategy Safari: the complete guide through the wilds of strategic management (p. 331). Singapore: Pearson Education. Morin, A. J. S., Meyer, J. P., Bélanger, É., Boudrias, J. S., Gagné, M., & Parker, P. D. (2016). Longitudinal associations between employees’ beliefs about the quality of the change management process, affective commitment to change and psychological empowerment. Human Relations, 69(3), 839–867. p. 839. Nadler, D. A., & Tushman, M. L. (1989). Organizational Frame Bending: Principles for Managing Reorientation. Academy of Management Executive, 3(3), 194–204. Nadler, D. A., & Tushman, M. L. (1995). Types of organizational change: From incremental improvement to discontinuous transformation. In D. A. Nadler, R. B. Shaw, A. E. Walton, et al. (Eds.), Discontinuous change: leading organizational transformation (pp. 15–34). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. p. 20. Nickols, F. (2010). Four change management strategies. Distance Consulting. Retrieved from http://www.nickols.us/ Orlikowski, W. J. (1996). Improvising organizational transformation over time: A situated change perspective. Information Systems Research, 7, 63–92. p. 63. Parkes, C. M. (1979). Bereavement: Studies of grief in adult life. London: Tavistock Institute of Human Relations. Perlman, D., & Takacs, G. J. (1990). The ten stages of change. Nursing Management, 21(4), 33–38. Peters, T., (1980). The planning Fetish. Manager’s Journal. Wall Street Journal. Peters, T. J., & Waterman, H. (1982). In search of excellence; lessons from America's best-run companies (p. 10). New York: Harper & Row. Pettigrew, A. M. (1975). Towards a political theory of organization intervention. Human Relations, 28(3), 191–208. p. 205. Pettigrew, A. (1987a). Introduction: researching strategic change. In A. Pettigrew (Ed.), Management of strategic change (pp. 1–7). London: Basil Blackwell. Pettigrew, A. (1987b). Context and action in the transformation of the firm. Journal of Management Studies, 24(6), 649–670. Pettigrew, A. M., Woodman, R. W., & Cameron, K. S. (2001). Studying organizational change and development: Challenges for future research. Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 697–713. p. 697.

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3

Organisation Development As Coupled to the Original Work of Kurt Lewin

The whole, as Lewin argued, is not necessarily superior, nor does it add up to ‘more’. According to Marrow, Lewin’s biographer, Lewin’s general formulation was simple: ‘The whole is different from the sum of its parts: it has definite properties of its own’ Marrow (1969)

3.1

Introduction

Few social scientists can have received the level of praise that has been heaped upon Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) (Burnes 2004). Indeed, his reputation was such that at the 1947 Convention of the American Psychological Association, Tolman gave his memorial address for Kurt Lewin stating that ‘Freud the clinician and Lewin the experimentalist—these are the two men whose names will stand out before all others in the history of our psychological era’. (Marrow 1969) Echoing this praise some 40 years later, Schein referred to him as ‘the intellectual father of contemporary theories of applied behavioural science’ (Schein 1988). Being a practitioner and scholar, Lewin combined abstract thinking with great personal interest in real-life phenomena and had an unusual knack for turning everyday events and observations into useful practical theories (Weisbord 2004). This renders Lewin’s work an endless and overwhelming source of inspiration regarding what is really happening when we engage in change processes. It may be rightly said that Lewin’s work was concerned primarily with the activities of people’s daily lives with one another. Lewin’s work is based on a relational understanding of organisational change that helps people and organisations continually expand the realm of the possible. In conducting action research, Lewin simultaneously observed what was happening, intervened by asking questions and brought about change by developing self-help competencies and adding scientific knowledge to the workplace, all undertaken in a spirit of collaboration and co-inquiry (Friedman 2011). The same is true for Lewin’s forcefield theory, which underpins the action research approach by scoping a # The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. van Nistelrooij, Embracing Organisational Development and Change, Springer Texts in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51256-9_3

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systemic social whole in which the co-inquiry takes place. Just like systems theory, Lewin’s forcefield theory is in fact a meta-theory, which he based on his work with gestalt psychologists during his Berlin years (Ash 1995). Action research and forcefield theory, together with Lewin’s change theory, can be regarded as a single well-integrated approach to organisational change. In this chapter, we explore the specific contribution of this integrated approach to the field of ODC, from which we interpret recent developments in the field of ODC to look forwards. In doing so, we will introduce and explore the following: • The role of employee participation as the bedrock of Lewin’s work and that of what nowadays is called ‘dialogical organisation development’. • The importance of talking with people and not over people—that if we want to change things, we need to see all the forces operating at a given moment in their totality as perceived by all relevant participants. • That co-inquiry, as an action research approach to organisational change, is not so much about a so-called objective reality, but rather about the subjective reality that people create through their daily interaction with each other. • That as we look at what is happening, we have to focus on the three-way relationship between context, perception and interaction in the ‘here and now’. Through this focus, we ought to become more aware of the participants’ social perception in the way they perceive how their environment responds to the interventions in relation to their own reactions. • That despite our inborn need for stability, ‘unfreezing’ is needed, which involves a process of reinterpreting the way we perceive our social surroundings, making us aware of our ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions, and that by doing so we develop a generative capacity in what is going on and in what is needed. After a short overview of Lewin’s work, we start this chapter by emphasising the way Lewin framed the social sciences as the study of real-life problems and how he connected these problems to theory. In Paragraph 3.3, we relate Lewin’s work to recent developments in doing action research by looking into the process of co-inquiry. After this, we emphasise how Lewin framed the whole social space as connected by people’s relationships. We emphasise this by linking together his forcefield theory, gestalt psychology and systems thinking. In Paragraph 3.5, we discuss briefly Lewin’s original ‘change theory’ and concentrate on the pivotal process of ‘unfreezing’, which we link to ‘appreciative inquiry’s’ concept of ‘generativity’. In Paragraph 3.6, we discuss some of the continuing trends in the field of ODC based on Lewin’s work. The chapter closes with some reflections, a recap of the main findings and some key discussion points.

3.2 Lewin’s Work and Life

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Lewin was one of the first social scientists who was intrinsically interested in intervening in human dynamics and, as such, in the process of human change itself. Lewin’s way of working was cyclic, meaning that he started by formulating some theoretical notions, after which he carried out a well-considered intervention in a certain social setting, observed what happened due to this intervention and evaluated the outcomes directly with the participants. He then reflected back on his original theoretical notions and expanded on them in terms of theoretical premises. Every step involved the full participation of the participants themselves (see Interlude 3.1). Indeed, Lewin’s work in general is mainly about the ability to stimulate people to interact and to focus on their interaction regarding the subject at hand (Likert 1961), in which the role of an interventionist is seen as a mediator, or facilitator (Lippitt 1939). Interlude 3.1 Participation and Lewin’s Harwood Studies Participation is ‘a conscious and intended effort by individuals at a higher management level in an organisation to provide visible extra-role or roleexpanding opportunities for individuals or groups at a lower level in the organisation to have a greater voice in one or more areas of organisational performance’. (Glew et al. 1995) In essence, participative change refers to ‘the why, what, where and how aspects of involvement in organisational change processes’ (Vandervelde 1979). Participation can also be related to the process of empowering people by sharing information, providing structure and offering relevant training opportunities, but always in combination with certain fundamental beliefs and personal orientations, like self-determination, selforganisation, a sense of meaning, competence and impact, that people already have (Quinn and Spreitzer 1997). Scholarly attention to participation dates back to the earliest works in the field of ODC. For example, in his seminal treatise Psychology and Industrial Efficiency, Munsterberg wrote in 1913 about the potential benefits to be derived from collaboration between management and employees (Munsterberg 1913). Elements and underlying themes of participation were also reflected in reports of the 1930’s Hawthorne studies (Mayo 1933; Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939). However, the classic works of Coch and French in the 1940s at the Harwood Manufacturing Corporation placed participation squarely in the mainstream of organisational behaviour (Coch and French 1948). To bring about social change, Lewin had to move his research out of the laboratory and into the real world where people lived and worked (Burnes 2007). The Harwood studies offered Lewin a significant opportunity to do this. The studies began in 1939 and can be divided into a three-time frame: the (continued)

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Interlude 3.1 (continued) Lewin years, 1939 to 1947; the post-Lewin years, 1947 to 1962; and the Weldon years (after Harwood took over the Weldon Manufacturing Corporation), 1962 onwards. Marrow, the owner of Harwood factory, stated in his biography of Lewin’s working life, that of the many studies that took place, the key ones concerned group decision (conducted by Bavelas),1 self-management (conducted by Bavelas), leadership training (conducted by French), changing stereotypes (conducted by French) and overcoming resistance to change (conducted by Coch and French). These were in effect very early robust field experiments all supervised by Lewin (Harrison and List 2004). Because of the main subject of this interlude, i.e. participation, we concentrate here on the study of Coch and French. The Study of Coch and French (Huczynski and Buchanan 2005) The Harwood company made pyjamas, and employees were complaining about frequent changes in work methods and pay rates. Absenteeism was high, efficiency was low, output was deliberately restricted and employees were aggressive towards supervisors. Most of the grievances concerned the fact that, as soon as they had learned a new job and started to earn bonuses, they were moved to another task. This meant that they had to learn all over again, during which time they lost the bonus. Coch and French designed an experiment with three production groups, each with a different level of participation in introducing changes. One group of 18 hand pressers were not allowed to participate and had to accept changes imposed by the production department. A second group of 13 pyjama folders were allowed to send three representatives to discuss and approve new methods. In a third group of 15 pyjama examiners, everyone participated in the changes. The performance of the non-participation group did not improve, and hostility to management remained high. In contrast, the performance of the ‘total participation’ group rose to a level higher than before the experiment began. Two and a half months later, the remaining 13 members of the initial non-participation group were brought together again for a new pressing job. This time, however, they participated fully in the changes, which resulted in a rapid increase in efficiency. This result confirmed that it was not the people involved but the way in (continued)

1

The story of Lewin’s influence on work begins with Alex Bavelas, one of his students at the University of Iowa, who worked with Alfred Marrow’s Harwood manufacturing company to conduct action research into ways to enhance job performance by having workers participate in experimental changes in work methods. The conditions they created resulted in what we would call a ‘learning organisation’ today: workers were encouraged to experiment with different methods, to discuss them among themselves and to choose the methods which they agreed were most effective. Groups of workers increased their own quotas after discovering and employing new methods and increased their job satisfaction as well (Marrow 1969, p. xi).

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Interlude 3.1 (continued) which they were treated that affected resistance to, or acceptance of, change. The Harwood experiments produced two key findings: (Burnes 2015) 1. ‘Resistance’ does not arise from the individual, but from the context in which the change takes place (Dent and Goldberg 1999). 2. The way to change the forces in a given field such that of a group in this case, to achieve a desired outcome is not to attempt to impose change, but to encourage participative decision-making through action research. In general, as turned out in the Coch and French study, given the opportunity, people are believed to want to have a voice in the decisions concerning their workplace (Pasmore and Fagans 1992). Most notably, as it assumed in this study, that involvement of those affected by a change will reduce organisational ‘resistance’ and create a higher level of commitment among employees towards the proposed change (Lines 2004). Also, participation has been argued to lead to qualitatively better strategic decisions (Kim and Mauborgne 1998). Participation is further believed to make the political realities of the organisation more salient (Lines 2004, p. 194). In sum, these and other putative effects based on this classical study are believed to lead to successful generating change. However, despite the centrality of participation as a concept in the organisational change literature, our understandings and assumptions regarding participation are often simplistic (Woodman 1989; Pasmore and Fagans 1992, p. 375; Gardner 1977; Bartlem and Locke 1981; Van Nistelrooij et al. 2010). As illustrated in Interlude 3.1, Lewin worked in a highly collaborative manner based on free exchanging of theoretical ideas, reflections and everyday life experiences (Ramage and Shipp 2009). Further, Lewin had a profound faith in democracy, which to him was ‘ [a] way of life, based on mutual participation and continual interaction in decision-making’ (Schellenberg 1978). The variety of Lewin’s concerns served a single purpose: ‘to seek deeper explanations of why people behave as they do and to discover how they may learn to behave better’ (Marrow 1969, p. xi). This is exactly why there is a growing recognition of the relevance of the breadth of Lewin’s work to contemporary organisational concerns, especially organisational change, ethics and values (Burnes and Bargai 2017; Coghlan and Shani 2017; Burnes and Cooke 2013; Bargal 2006b; Burke 2006; Coghlan and Jacobs 2005; Burnes 2004; Coghlan and Brannick 2004; Levasseur 2001; Telford and Baker 2000; Kippenberger 1998; Argyris 1997; Schein 1996; Adelman 1993; Bargal et al. 1992; Papanek 1973). Moreover, by combining the three core elements of Lewin’s change approach as is done in Fig. 3.1—action research (with the participants of a whole social system), forcefield theory (diagnosing the restraining and driving forces of the whole social system) and his

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Restraining forces Whole social system

Driving forces UNFREEZING

Restraining forces Whole social system

Driving forces MOVING

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Restraining forces Whole social system

Driving forces

Time

FREEZING

Fig. 3.1 A schematic illustration of Lewin’s action research, forcefield theory and change theory

‘three-step theory of change’ (unfreezing, moving and freezing)—one is presented with a powerful approach to generating change. Towards the end of his career, and particularly during his association with Douglas McGregor at MIT’s Research Centre for Group Dynamics, Lewin became more interested in the effects of groups on the behaviour of individuals.2 Lewin and McGregor experimented with applications of action research to group dynamics in efforts to bring about changes in industry, educational institutions and society. After Lewin’s death, his work was embraced by other scholars and practitioners, mainly because of his most impressive developments in social intervention technologies. His main accomplishments were focused upon inducing perceptual change using more powerful forms of feedback (Benne 1976a), including extended awareness of previously unnoticed processes and feelings, bodily and otherwise. This is, in essence, what Lewin meant by, for example, the process of ‘unfreezing’, which is about cleansing, opening and refining the doors of perception that over the years, combined with upcoming social constructionist insights, have been developed by practitioners and theorists into a more dialogical approach to ODC.

2 The idea of action research and social change was the last conceptual topic to engage Kurt Lewin’s attention and energy prior to his untimely death in February 1947. He first introduced the idea in 1946, in an article entitled ‘Action research and minority problems’. Subsequently, he elaborated on the idea in two articles that appeared in Human Relations in 1947, as one of the journal’s founders and as a member of its editorial board. However, because of his sudden death, Lewin never systematically formulated the principles of action research. However, the ideas of ‘action research’, ‘research in action’ and ‘cooperative research’ were mentioned and utilised in several of his early writings and projects (Bargal 2006a).

3.3 Linking Lewin’s ‘Action Research’ to the Process of Co-inquiry

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Linking Lewin’s ‘Action Research’ to the Process of Co-inquiry

Lewin believed that ‘there is nothing so practical as a good theory’.3 Theory is not only the path to significant inquiry and research but also a practical guide to performing human interventions in social practices in the here and now (Benne 1976b). He argued that in this regard, ‘research that produces nothing but books will not suffice’ (Lewin 1947a), which can be vividly demonstrated by his practice of action research in a cafe in Berlin (see Interlude 3.2). Interlude 3.2 Intertwining Science with Everyday Life—an Example: The Zeigarnik Effect As a young professor in the 1920s, Lewin attracted a legion of mavericks to Berlin. Bluma Zeigarnik, for example, a Russian PhD student, discovered a phenomenon that now bears her name. She was among the students Lewin met with regularly at a Berlin coffee house. The waiter tracked the bill accurately in his head for hours. One day Zeigarnik, half an hour after paying, asked for a repeat of the total. The waiter could not remember it because, he said, the bill had been paid. Zeigarnik and Lewin instantly formed a new concept: the waiter’s memory was erased by completion (Weisbord 2004, pp. 84–85). Zeigarnik went on to prove experimentally that people tend to remember interrupted and not yet finished tasks better than completed ones (Zeigarnik 1927). This is what is now called the ‘Zeigarnik effect’ (Baumeister and Bushman 2008) in reference to the tendency to experience intrusive thoughts about an objective that was once pursued and left incomplete. The advantage of remembrance can be explained by looking at Lewin’s field theory: a task that has already been started establishes a task-specific tension, which improves the cognitive accessibility of the relevant contents (Koffka 1935). This tension that has formerly been established is relieved upon completion of the task. In the case of task interruption, the reduction of tension is being impeded. Through continuous tension, the content is supposed to be more accessible and can be more easily remembered. The ‘Zeigarnik effect’ has one caveat: it does not work properly when people are not particularly motivated to do the task, or when people do not expect to perform well in a task (Einstein et al. 2003). This seems to be true of tasks in general, because when they are unattractive or impossible, we do not feel motivated to do them. (continued)

3 Based on the testimony of his wife Gertrud Weis, Lewin regarding the interdependence of theory and practice, Burnes and Bargal assume that had Lewin survived, he probably would have changed this famous statement to ‘There is nothing as effective as the interdependence between theory, research and practice’ (Burnes and Bargal 2017).

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Interlude 3.2 (continued)

Kurt Lewin (1890 –1947) Was a German-American psychologist, known as the founder of group dynamics, action research, and field-force theory, and an inspiring direct colleague of: Gordon Allport, Margaret Mead, Alex Bavelas, Leon Festinger, Ron Lippitt, Kenneth Benne and Douglas McGregor.

As the above interlude illustrates, Lewin and Zeigarnik intervene directly in the social setting of the Berlin coffee house, asking questions, suggesting alternative actions, translating their findings into a concept, formulating one or more hypotheses and conducting a series of experiments—and while doing so, constructing a practical theory on the relevance of an unfinished task and the motivation for people to continue their efforts. As Lewin pointed out, phenomena such as the ‘Zeigarnik effect’ are only valid if they are grasped in their totality: it is not the frequency of a case’s occurrence that is decisive, but the exact description of all the forces operating in and upon it at a given moment. He showed that the experimental mode could be placed into the service of change and that one of the most rigorous tests of understanding phenomena is to change them (Marrow 1969, p. 156). Lewin was convinced that if you want to describe and explain the essence of human phenomena, you have to intervene directly in the processes as they are occurring, just to observe what happens. According to Schein, this approach to change is correct, and we must all: approach our consulting work from a clinical perspective that starts with the assumption that everything we do with a social system is an intervention and that, unless we intervene, we will not learn what some of the essential dynamics of the system really are (Schein 1996, p. 34).

3.3.1

Action Research as a Process of Co-inquiry

Lewin was convinced that if we want to describe and explain the essence of human phenomena, we have to intervene directly in the processes as they occur in order to observe what happens. He translated this into the following three general principles of action research: (Coghlan and Shani 2017) 1. Wholeness: Involving the Whole Social System It is important when bringing about change to look at the entire social setting involved, rather than isolated (individual) actions or decisions. Action research means looking at human dynamics as an integrated whole: the involved individuals, their relationships and their mutual behaviours.

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2. Practical Present Knowing: The Here and Now Action research is grounded in a philosophy of practical knowing in the present tense. That is why action research emphasises the following characteristics: the everyday concerns of those who are to be influenced by the change initiative, how their practical knowing is socially delivered and constructed and how it in each unique situation needs to be attended to. 3. Co-inquiry: Intervening Directly with Participants Action research is not only about observing what is happening but also about intervening directly in the status quo. This is undertaken in the spirit of co-inquiry, whereby the observed is constructed, enacted and evaluated with the participants, rather than on or for them (Schein 2009). As an emergent co-inquiry process, action research engages in an unfolding story, where data shift as a consequence of intervening and where it is not possible to predict or control what takes place (Coghlan and Shani 2017). Using these principles in, for example, diagnosing a situation, we take only into account what is contemporary (Lewin 1936). The purpose of such a diagnosis is to link the change with the concrete conditions in the ‘here and now’ that motivate or otherwise influence people and their current perceived environment (Lewin 1942). Lewin’s emphasis upon the ‘here and now’ is a key factor in directing the focus away from a (problematic) group’s history (Deutsch 1968). Lewin also postulated that what has an effect at any given moment is not a past event itself but, rather, the nature of present awareness of that event (Neumann 2005). The argument here is that effects can only be produced by that which is concrete, that actual exists—as perceived by all participants—at the same moment that it is being addressed. Nowadays, when discussing Lewin’s action research principles, we talk in terms of a collaborative (co-)inquiry process as its historical development is described in Interlude 3.3. Interlude 3.3 The Development of Action Research from the Early Years On (This Interlude is an eclectic paraphrased summary of a passage of: Bradbury et al. 2008) Towards the end of his career, and particularly during his association with Douglas McGregor at MIT’s Research Centre for Group Dynamics, they come to the conception of the T-group (Training group), a form of ‘laboratory’ education where individuals would join together in a leaderless group of 8 to 15 individuals. As the method developed, the T-group proved an ideal medium for action research into the psychological processes of change and for selfstudy of these processes by the participants Later, as Lewin observed participants struggling to understand the importance of their own behaviour in a T-group, he said: ‘One must be helped to re-examine many cherished assumptions about oneself and one’s relations to others’. (Bradbury et al. (continued)

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Interlude 3.3 (continued) 2008, pp. 88–90) The underlying notion is that self-study in T-groups helped to expand people’s awareness of ‘taken-for-granted assumptions’ about individual and group behaviour and thereby allowed them to make choices about their own behaviour. Interestingly, laboratory-type education has had a rebirth in more recent years and draws on action research in new ways. Peck (Peck 1987), and later on, Agazarian (1997), each in their own way, developed a ‘community’ and group-building’ process that has the same unstructured form as the T-group but, when needed, can involve larger numbers of people (from 50 to 75) and draws from psychological principles to frame and interpret group development. Isaacs, in turn, drew on the work of the physicist David Bohm to propose a group conversation framework, which can be described as ‘collaborative dialogue sessions’ that had some similar characteristics applied to group life (Isaacs 1993). In the view of Bohm, people create a connective field between observer and observed. By ‘holding’ this field, in turn, a group can ‘contain’ both energy and matter and investigate more fully what it is producing (Bohm 1986, 1989). Nowadays, action research methods are used to deepen the capacity of individuals and the group as a whole to understand themselves in relation to their purpose (Isaacs 1999). In turn, as we elaborate in more depth in Chap. 4, the focus in these sessions is on interrelating human dynamics, and interpretive comments, aimed at the group as a whole. Furthermore, the intent is not to ‘work through’ these dynamics by confronting them directly. Rather, the group serves as a contained whole or as a ‘container’—to hold differences and conflicts up for ongoing exploration. This facilitates the development of group consciousness by counteracting tendencies towards ‘splitting’ in group dynamics, whereby people identify with the ‘good part’ of their group and reject the ‘bad part’ within the same group (Schein 1995).

3.3.2

Action Research as a Process of Appreciative Inquiry

The collaborative, emerging nature of action research in exploring new possibilities for change as introduced by Lewin can be directly linked to the unconditional way in which ‘appreciative inquiry’ nowadays approaches organisational development. ‘Appreciative inquiry’, first introduced in an article written in 1987 by Cooperrider and Srivastva (1987), is based on the assumptions that organisations are socially constructed phenomena, which have no tangible reality, and that ways of organising are limited only by human imagination and the agreements people make with each other (Ludema et al. 2001). As such, ‘appreciative inquiry’ seeks to create processes of co-inquiry that will result in better, more effective, convivial, sustainable and vital

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social systems. The main five fundamental principles of appreciative inquiry are described in Interlude 3.4 (Bushe 2013). Interlude 3.4 The Five Principles of Appreciative Inquiry (Cooperrider and Srivastva 1987) 1. The constructionist principle proposes that what we believe to be true determines what we do and think, and action emerges from relationships. Through the language and discourse of day-to-day interactions, people co-construct the organisations they inhabit. The purpose of inquiry is to stimulate new ideas, stories and images that generate new possibilities for action. 2. The principle of simultaneity proposes that as we inquire into human dynamics, we change them. The things people think and talk about, what they discover and learn, are implicit in the very first questions asked. Questions are never neutral; they are fateful. Social systems move in the direction of the questions that are most persistently and passionately asked. 3. The poetic principle proposes that organisational life is expressed in the stories people tell each other every day. The words and topics chosen for inquiry have an impact far beyond just the words themselves. They invoke sentiments, understandings and worlds of meaning. In all phases of the inquiry, effort is put into using words that point to enliven and inspire the best in people. 4. The anticipatory principle posits that what we do today is guided by our image of the future. Groups and organisations are projecting ahead of themselves—a horizon of expectation that brings the future powerfully into the present as a mobilising agent. ‘Appreciative inquiry’ uses artful creation of positive imagery on a collective basis to refashion anticipatory reality. 5. The positive principle proposes that momentum and sustainable change requires positive affect and social bonding. Sentiments like hope, excitement, inspiration, camaraderie and joy increase creativity, openness to new ideas and people and cognitive flexibility. They also promote the strong connections and relationships between people, particularly between groups in conflict, required for collective inquiry and change.

David Cooperrider (1954 Founder of the theory of Appreciative Inquiry, creating a positive revolution in the leadership of change. Appreciative Inquiry is related to theories and practices such as organization development change management, social constructionism, and learning theory.

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In short, a process of appreciative inquiry examines the perception, behaviour, communication and dynamics with which people create their individual and organisational realities. As stated with the first principle in Interlude 3.4, a process of appreciative inquiry is not so much directed towards obtaining a so-called objective reality, but is rather about the socially constructed reality that people create through their daily interaction with each other, in order to understand what is going on. This reality becomes ‘real’ when a sufficient number of others in the direct environment are convinced that their constructed understandings represent the current reality—which means that appreciative inquiry departs from the social constructionist premise that within one and the same organisation, multiple, sometimes even contrasting, realities exist side by side. Engaging in a process of co-inquiry in an appreciative way is an important skill, not just for action researchers but for all interventionists in real-life organisational problems. It creates opportunities for interventionists to get in direct contact with people and real-life data offering possibilities for direct engagement in real-life settings.

3.4

Linking Lewin’s ‘Forcefield Theory’ to Systems Thinking

The world in which we act is the world as we perceive it. Or, in the words of Lewin himself: ‘[W]hat exists as “reality” for the individual is, to a high degree, determined by what is socially accepted as “reality”’. (Lewin and Grabbe 1948) ‘Reality’, therefore, is not absolute; it differs with the context, group or total social setting to which the individual belongs. This is exactly what Lewin, together with Grabbe, meant to say with one of their premises that ‘our social actions are steered by the position in which we perceive ourselves and others within the total social setting’ (Lewin and Grabbe 1948). These premises emphasise the relativity and the relational nature of what we do and the importance of looking at it from the context, or whole social system or ‘forcefield’ as Lewin initially called it. With his forcefield theory, Lewin argues that behaviour is derived from a person’s or group’s forcefield of coexisting and interdependent forces that are impinged by and upon them. A ‘forcefield’ is Lewin’s equivalent of the whole (social-)psychological environment or the whole social system that a person/group experiences subjectively and mostly on an unconscious level (Wheeler 2008). As such, it relates the facts of the situation to the perception of the people in it (Swanson and Creed 2014). A forcefield is characterised by: 1. An emphasis on a person’s subjective perspective 2. The incorporation of all that is subjectively relevant to the participants that is part of the same field: for example, their perceptions, emotional goals, needs, desires, intentions, tensions and cognitive processes (continued)

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3. The relations between the participants, which are to be regarded as interdependent All these aspects influence a participant’s behaviour at a given moment— which can be expressed as a function of a force field, as stated in Lewin’s formula, B¼f(p,e), where B stands for behaviour, which is a function (f) of a person’s characteristics (p) and those of the direct environment (e) or context. As indicated by this formula, Lewin’s ‘forcefield’ focuses on the three-way relationship between context, perception and interaction (Wagemans et al. 2012). Lewin’s formula stresses also that looking at an individual separately from other individuals and separately from their perceptions produces a misleading view of the causes of human behaviour and how it can be changed (Lewin 1951). Therefore, how a person behaves depends not just on the forces that impinge on them but also on their subjective perceptions of these forces. As discussed in the last paragraph, present conditions regulate and redefine past experiences and their application to the present moment. By achieving greater clarity of awareness of the present situation, one is believed to see how and in what way past learning may be utilised (Chidiac 2018; Stevenson 2005). In this regard, it can be said that Lewin’s forcefield theory is a way of understanding how one’s context influences and how one experiences oneself, others and their mutual relationships within this context (Allport 1948).

3.4.1

A Forcefield as a Complementary Gestalt

A ‘whole-part’ relationship has the same quality as an ‘inside-outside’ relationship, a ‘back-front’ or a ‘we-they’ or ‘cause-effect’ relationship. These relationships all consist of two interlinked, apparently opposite parts, as if they were dichotomies. However, from a gestalt perspective, they are interdependent, because one cannot exist without the other. As such, they form a perceptual whole or a ‘complementary gestalt’. A complementary gestalt exists of two mutual exclusive and opposite poles that are nevertheless related to each other, together with the energy flowing between the two poles, forming an integrated whole. A typical example of a complementary gestalt is when we humans construct a ‘we’ with which we automatically construct a ‘they’ and we automatically generate a recursive closed psychological circuit between them in which ‘we’ act as if there is no other reality than this dichotomy. In other words, when we focus on one part, we automatically generate a connection to the other part, keeping things balanced. Although gestalt theory, as we discuss it in more detail in Interlude 3.5, emerged

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in the early 1930s, it also recognised, for example, the interconnectedness of people, relationships and things, as well as a view of selfhood that is fluid, dynamic and constantly changing in contact with others and the environment (Chidiac 2018, p. 15). Interlude 3.5 Linking Lewin’s Field Theory with Gestalt Theory In the early part of the twentieth century, Max Wertheimer published a paper demonstrating that individuals perceived motion in rapidly flickering static images. Together with his colleagues Wolfgang Kohler and Kurt Koffka, Wertheimer believed that perception involved more than simply combining sensory stimuli. This belief led to a new movement within the field of psychology known as gestalt theory. Gestalt theory is an attempt to understand the laws behind the ability to acquire and maintain meaningful perceptions in an apparently chaotic world. The word ‘gestalt’ literally means ‘form’ or ‘pattern’, but its use reflects the idea that the whole is different from the sum of its parts. In his Berlin years (in the years before 1933 when he immigrated to Iowa, USA), Lewin met with these gestalt theorists and started to share their commitment to holism. He specifically refers to ‘action wholes’ as the units of study in his Berlin research programme on the psychology of action and emotion (Ash 1992). According to his biographer Marrow (1969, pp. 58– 59), he attended, together with Wertheimer, the first two Macy conferences in 1946 on the subject of systems thinking and gestalt theory (Ramage and Shipp 2009, p. 263). After this, it was especially the holistic nature of gestalt theory that attracted Lewin. As a scientific approach, gestalt theory tries to understand the principles of our ability to acquire and maintain meaningful perceptions when things become ambiguous. As it turns out from this still ongoing research (Wagemans et al. 2012) is that we humans have: • A sort of unconditioned preference for simple connections. • A built-in human tendency to prefer and recognise things that are simple and clear rather than complex and ambiguous. • An inclination to complete shapes and group things that appear together in time and proximity. • An automatic preference to see things according to the way we interpret them. In the same way, it seems difficult for us to see things not as we are used to seeing them. • A preference to organise our perception of our own interaction with our surroundings—mostly unconsciously—in the most balanced, simple and stable way possible. From a gestalt perspective, behaviour is not just a product of external stimuli; rather, it arises from how the individual perceives these stimuli. In (continued)

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Interlude 3.5 (continued) other words, how a person behaves is not just dependent on the forces that impinge on them, but also on their subjective impressions of these forces. And this is exactly how we need to interpret Lewin’s definition of a field: namely, not as the sum of its elements, but as a product of an interaction of these elements.4

Max Wertheimer (1880 –1943) Was an Austro-Hungarian-born psychologist who was one of the three founders of Gestalt psychology, along with Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Köhler. He is known for his book, Productive Thinking,

The way Lewin’s forcefield theory is linked with gestalt theory in Interlude 3.5 gives rise to exploring another linkage, that with systems thinking. According to Burnes and Cooke (2013), there is a clear line between these three fields as introduced before with Lewin’s formula, laid down in the three-way relationship between context, perception and interaction (Chidiac 2018). In sum, a whole social system can be regarded as a conceptual forcefield—or a ‘complementary gestalt with interdependent parts’. When we try to see the interdependence within a whole, we focus on the three-way relationship between context, perception and interaction. Or as Lewin and Grabbe formulate it in one of their premises: ‘ [S]ocial action no less than physical action is steered by perception’,5 which for us is the key insight that much of what we do is relational and that relationships as they determine the right context is the main focus for generating change.

3.4.2

A Whole Social System as the Right Scope for Intervening

Gestalt and systems theorists both place an emphasis on the whole and the interconnectedness of people and their relationships than on the individual elements

4 Or as Koffka wrote: ‘It has been said: the whole is more than the sum of its elements. It is more correct to say that the whole is something else than the sum of its elements, because summing up is a meaningless procedure, whereas the whole-part relationship, for example, is meaningful’ (Koffka 1935, p. 176). 5 This premise seems to be an elaboration of George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) argumentation ‘To be, is to be perceived’ (Esse est percipi), which stands for ‘Reality has no need of other realities to bolster it’. There are no divinities hidden in the trees, nor any elusive thing-in-itself behind appearances, nor a mythological self that orders our actions. Life is truthful appearance. The senses do not deceive; it is the mind that deceives (Lewin and Grabbe 1948).

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themselves. This brings us to the following practical features of how to decipher a social system as being the right scope for intervening: 1. Purpose As introduced in Chap. 2, the purpose of a (strategic) change can be determined and imposed by others – from the top down. However, as we have tried to argue in this chapter, the purpose can also participatively emerge from the bottom up. In other words, a change purpose can be set out by espoused goals and/or be deduced from, for example, actual (symptomatic) behaviour. According to some who believe in the latter, the best way to deduce a change purpose of a group of people is to watch for a while to see how they (re-)act as a whole on direct interventions from the outside,6 a typical systems dynamic that we are going to discuss in more detail in Interlude 5.3 in Chap. 5. 2. Relationships Not every interaction between people within a given context has the same intensity or reciprocity. Sometimes people don’t (re-)act at all, for example, because they don’t relate to the same purpose, or because they perceive a given purpose as less important for their selves. Sometimes people share a same purpose without knowing it, for example, when people work in the same, but departmentalised, work process, only focusing on their own part of the process. This so-called silo mentality makes relationships with relevant others less dense and less strong, and in essence less mutual, but in no way less relevant. When people need each other to do their job properly, they have in fact an interdependent relationship – if they wanted or not. For people to see their own interdependence is as seeing the metaphorical trees and the forest at one glance. To see the whole, they are genuinely part of, they need to interact repeatedly with relevant others—ask questions, check their own assumptions and reflect verbally on what they see is happening (Meadows 2008). 3. People We tend to assume that because we understand the people involved, we understand the connection between them, and therefore that we understand their purpose, because one and one (and one) makes the whole. We forget, however, that we must also understand the meaning of ‘and’. Only trying to change people usually has the least effect on the whole (Meadows 2008, p. 16). If, for example, we replace all the players in a soccer team, it is still recognisable as a soccer team. The team may play much better or much worse. Since they are interdependent on each other, they will most likely not play better as a team if we change each player

Or in the words of Lewin himself: ‘You cannot understand a system until you try to change it!’ Or as Edgar Schein puts it: ‘It is my contention that Lewin was correct with this statement and that we must all approach our consulting work from a clinical perspective that starts with the assumption that everything we do with a client system is an intervention and that, unless we intervene, we will not learn what some of the essential dynamics of the system really are. . .’. Or as Heinz von Foerster puts it: ‘If you desire to see, then learn to act’ (Lewin 1947a, p. 153) (Schein 1996, p. 34) (von Foerster 1981), 6

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separately. To make the team better by changing the individual players, we must change the players in a coherent way, in a way that is suited to the roles they play in the team and strengthens their interconnectedness (as we discuss in more detail in Interlude 3.6). Interlude 3.6 A Soccer Team Operating as a (Dialogical) System A top-level football team is comprised of 11 superbly fit, independently wilful individuals, each of whom is more than capable of ‘doing their own thing’. However, if every soccer star actually did their own thing, hogging the ball, never passing, trying to keep the limelight to himself and denying the limelight to everyone else, the team would fail disastrously. For the team to show the emergent behaviour of high performance, the behaviour of the individual must be constrained, so that of all the possible choices an individual player could make at any instant, the choice he actually makes is the one that works best for the team as a whole. For this to happen, each player must continuously be receiving and processing a flow of information concerning the positions of the opposing team’s players and those of his teammates. It is the continuous processing of this kind of information, coupled with the personal willingness of every player to constrain individual action, that allows the team, as a team, to display those wonderful moments when the emergent behaviour of high performance shines through. A system’s function or purpose is not necessarily spoken, written or expressed explicitly, except through the way it operates (Sherwood 2002). Thus, to deduce the soccer team’s purpose, one can watch it for a while to see the recursive patterns in the way it is behaving as a system. For example, in the case of this soccer team, we can observe their behaviour from the side-line of the field. We can see that some of the players seem to give priority to their public image (by being more of a dribbler or goal-getter instead of being a team player). However, we can do this and also act directly in the system itself, to see what symptomatic behaviours it produces in reaction to our intervention. Intervening directly in this football team, as a dialogical system, means that we primarily invite all the internal stakeholders (the elements) of the system into one room: for example, all 11 players, all reserves, all members of the assisting staff and probably also all members of the technical managerial staff. We treat them as a whole in a coherent way, by composing several subgroups, in such a mixed way that each subgroup consists of six or seven persons representing all stakeholders. Thus, in this way composed, each subgroup is a systemic whole in itself. Additionally, we can ask all participants to exchange their perceptions of their own role and that of others in the team: for example, what their personal purpose is or what they perceive as the collective purpose of the team for the upcoming match, next season and so on. And we can do this more than once within varying compositions of the subgroups. Taking our own (continued)

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Interlude 3.6 (continued) perspective and that of others into account increases our awareness of the situation. ‘Perspective taking’ builds upon distinction making—by recognising the other, we are able to proverbially walk in the other’s shoes. For the football players to understand their own relationships and their interdependency ideally makes them less likely to harm others or themselves. Thus, all participants can come to appreciate their own embeddedness as they recognise the complex forms of interdependence that mark their mutual relationships. It can also promote a broader definition of one’s interests as incorporating the well-being of the whole social system: the team and staff as one community. A whole social system generally goes on being itself, changing only slowly if at all, even with complete substitutions of its elements—as long as the relationships and purposes remain intact. Or as Meadows puts it: ‘If the interconnections change, the system may be greatly altered’. (Meadows 2008, p. 16) If, for example, in a university the students graded the professors, or the administrators took over lecturing, or if arguments were won by force instead of reason, the place would need a different name. It might be an interesting organisation, but it would not be a university. As displayed in Fig. 3.2, ‘purpose’, ‘relationships’ and ‘people’ are Fig. 3.2 The system components of, and questions for, identifying a preliminary scope from the bottom up

Purpose (wherefore?) Define objectives (push and pull)

Define in an affected way the related issues and challenges: What is it that we want to get rid of (push)? What is it what we want to realise (pull)?

Which individuals or groups have a Stakeholders (who?) Define the scope and rele- stake in (not) realising these objectives? Which do we need in the provant participants cess of realising these objectives? Which do we need because they passionately obstruct the process of realising? Define current reality (what is going on?) With all relevant participants from different perspectives

What are the problematic issues and what are the problem-solving behaviours? How do they differ according to the various perspectives of all participants?

First actions (what needs to be done first?) Recursive activities, which repeatedly validate the above

Compose a group that is in terms of composition representative for the whole and validate all the above for the first actions.

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interlinked components, which can help to decipher and demarcate a social system by establishing some preliminary boundaries. Discussing them with the participants helps us to define—from the bottom down—the scope of the intended change. Bringing (presumed) relevant participants together physically in one room can be an influential first action. In fact, it is a direct intervention in the participants’ social perception.7 Today, dialogical OD practitioners such as Bushe describe the importance of intervening in the right context and interactively address the right issues at the right time with the right people.

3.5

Linking Lewin’s ‘Change Theory’ to Generativity

Lewin’s ‘change theory’ is also known as his ‘three-step model’: unfreezing, moving and refreezing’. It is Lewin’s lasting contribution to changing organisations or as recently remarked: ‘Scratch any account of creating and managing change and the idea that change is a three-stage process that necessarily begins with a process of unfreezing will not be far below the surface’. (Hendry 1996) In his own words, Lewin describes the process of change as follows: A change toward a higher level of group performance is frequently short-lived; after a ‘shot in the arm’, group life soon returns to the previous level. This indicates that it does not suffice to define the objective of a planned change in group performance as the reaching of a different level. Permanency of the new level, or permanency for a desired period, should be included in the objective. A successful change includes therefore three aspects: unfreezing (if necessary) the present level L1, moving to the new level L2 and freezing group life on the new level (Lewin 1951).

Lewin’s change theory became widely applied in the field of ODC and later also widely criticised because of its discontinuous and apparent overly simplistic nature, especially regarding the ‘refreezing’ of change.8 For example, Kanter and her co-writers claim that ‘Lewin’s . . . quaintly linear and static conception—the organisation as an ice cube—is so wildly inappropriate that it is difficult to see why it has not only survived but prospered’ (Kanter et al. 1992), while Child points out that Lewin’s rigid idea of ‘refreezing’ is inappropriate in today’s complex world that requires flexibility and adaptation (Child 2005). These criticisms seem plausible,

In the words of Lewin and Grabbe, this is important because ‘[o]nly through this change in social perception can change in the individual’s social action be realised’. Or as Allport comments: ‘changing an individual is difficult and most likely to happen when the direct environment, the total social interactive setting, of the individual is included in the change intention’ (Lewin and Grabbe 1948; Allport 1948). 8 These critics seem to focus on the idea that Lewin’s ‘theory of change’ is based on assumptions that change is something that is supposed to be linear-progressive, moving from one (lesser) state to another (better) state, and that it is a timely restricted state in between those two steady states (which later became known as Ist (lage) and Soll (lage)) (Heckhausen 1963; Marshak 1994; Orlikowski and Hofman 1997). 7

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because Lewin’s first conceptualisation on change stems from the early 1940s and since then we have had to cope not only with fast-changing times and fast-flowing uncertainties but also with an increasing complexity, involving speeding up decisions, upscaling businesses and incorporating new and challenging technological and social innovations. Over the years, we see that what we know of Lewin’s ‘change theory’ is more than this ‘changing as three steps’. First, and above all, the three-step model is largely a post hoc reconstruction (Cummings et al. 2016) where Lewin’s original view is much more an empirically supported plea for a more holistic and dynamic perspective on change. Second, and not our least important point here, it is interesting to take a deeper look at how Lewin himself thought about change. For example, we know that Lewin: 1. Did not write ‘refreezing’, as you can read for yourself in the above quote, and as Cummings and his colleagues argue at great length, he actually never did and in fact only wrote ‘unfreezing’ and ‘freezing’9 2. Was adamant that group dynamics must not be seen in simplistic or static terms and believed that groups are in a continuous steady state (Lewin 1951, p. 199) 3. Connects to the view that while change and constancy in the life of an individual and in language may seem paradoxical, their coexistence in the life of a group is not (Lewin 1947b) 4. Proved that the participative approach to change that met with most success involved all stakeholders in which unfreezing of the whole social system plays an immanent role (Marrow et al. 1967) Based on these observations, in regard to today’s complex world that requires flexibility and adaptation, we conclude that the relevance of Lewin’s change theory nowadays lies in the ‘unfreezing’ stage. It relates to the need of keeping people alert in a continuing steady state, which according to Lewin is supposed to be a natural state people are in. However, emphasising unfreezing raises also questions as ‘what is meant with unfreezing’? and ‘how can we realise such a (common) steady state’?

As far as Cummings et al. can ascertain, the re-phrasing of Lewin’s freezing to ‘refreezing’ happened first in a 1950 conference paper by Lewin’s former student Leon Festinger. The most significant about this aberration may be that the word ‘refreezing’ as being the full stop at the end of ‘an implementation of the change’ would become change management’s foundational framework, with which it is implied that this ‘frozen state’ is an organisation’s natural state until an agent intervenes and zaps it (And as Cummings et al illustrate on the same page: “as later textbooks such as that of Robbins, “Organizational Behavior” 5th ed., 1991 (p. 646) promote Lewin’s ‘classic three step model of change’ by writing ‘refreezing the new change makes it permanent.”: Cummings et al. 2016, p. 37). 9

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Unfreezing as a Process of Keeping People Away from Entrained Thinking

‘Unfreezing’ is about cleansing, opening and refining our doors of perception, and it involves a complex process of reinterpreting the way we perceive our surroundings. It makes us aware of our ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions, what is needed to keep people away from being susceptible to entrained thinking and to intrinsically recognise the need for change (Argyris 1998). As a process, unfreezing involves an ‘emotional catharsis’, which is believed to be necessary before prejudices can be removed (Allport 1945). It can also be linked to Kotter’s process of ‘creating a sense of urgency’ as we discussed in Chap. 2. To sum it up, it seems that to break open the shell of complacency and self-righteousness, it is necessary to deliberately bring about an emotional stirring up. This seems even true in a corporate setting, as Beer argues in Interlude 3.7. Interlude 3.7 ‘Unfreezing’ in a Corporate Setting One particular article related Lewin’s notion of ‘unfreezing’ to a practitioner case. The author, Beer, states in introducing this case: ‘My own research and experience in organisational change has led me to define three conditions that must be managed in corporate transformations’. (Beer 1987) These are: 1. Dissatisfaction with the status quo among employees who must change their behaviour 2. The need for a model or vision of the future, which will guide the redesign of the organisation 3. The need for a well-managed process of change to help employees modify their attitudes and behaviour According to Beer, these three conditions must be present in sufficient strength to overcome the resistance to change that comes from the inevitable losses that managers and workers experience when things are changing. As Beer continues, changes usually mean losses of power as responsibility and accountability are shifted; losses in relationships as new patterns of interaction are demanded by new approaches to management; losses in rewards, particularly status, money and prerequisites as power shifts; and losses in identity as the meaning people make of their work lives is threatened by changes in the firm’s strategy and allocation of responsibility. An American telephone company, in Beer’s example, separated the publications, telecommunications equipment and mobile communications system (cellular) businesses from their telephone business. Although not explicitly mentioned in the description of this case, this restructuring process typically includes a shrinking of corporate staff groups through elimination or (continued)

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Interlude 3.7 (continued) reorganisation into business units. Beer introduced the role of top management in this process as ‘to recognise competitive pressures and to translate them for employees into an agenda for change’. Because of the divestiture, many employees felt a sense of personal loss at no longer being a part of the same corporate family. ‘It is the identification with the corporation and its threatened loss’, (Beer 1987) as Beer argues, ‘including the potential for other personal losses associated with change, that is the root of potential resistance’. (Beer 1987) To cope with this emotional content, top management staged a gigantic electronic get together that linked 55,000 employees and spouses. The objective was to provide a vent for emotions and a catharsis. It would appear that when change is mandated by clear and unalterable external forces, the job of managing change starts with helping employees accept their sense of loss as a first step in developing readiness to change. They did this through various data feedback and diagnostic activities, often aided by consultants.

Michael Beer Michael Beer is a Canadian-American Emeritus Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Graduate School of Business. He is known as co-author of ‘Breaking the code of change’ (2001) in which he argues that successful change is about managing change by integrating the economical and the psychological change aspects.

3.5.2

Unfreezing as a Process of Becoming Conscious of One’s Own Assumptions and Perceptions

According to Schein, the reason that so many change efforts are ineffective is usually directly traceable to their not providing the right attention to the feeling of loss processes (Schein 1979a) as described in Interlude 3.7. The reason for this is probably that without proper attention, the change effort will be nothing more than what Lewin calls a ‘shot in the arm’. As described in the above interlude, the process of ‘unfreezing’ is about organising time and space for coping with and accepting loss. Others compare it to what Freud described as a process of ‘making the unconscious conscious’ (Prochaska et al. 1994). However, as we stated at the beginning of this section, ‘unfreezing’ is not limited to uncovering hidden thoughts and feelings. It also has something to do, as we describe in Interlude 3.8, with becoming conscious of one’s own ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions and perceptions regarding the change proposals and the extent to which we find ourselves capable of successfully realising these changes.

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Interlude 3.8 Unfreezing as a Process of Handling and Accepting Loss As Schein made clear in several publications, there is more to the endeavour of ‘unfreezing’ than only managing the process of dissatisfaction. In fact, he describes it as ‘intertwining processes of unlearning (deconstruction) and learning (reconstruction)’ together, consisting basically of the following four subprocesses:10 1. Disconfirmation and survival anxiety All forms of learning and changing start with some form of dissatisfaction or frustration generated by data that disconfirm our expectations or hopes. Some disequilibrium based on disconfirming information or cognitive dissonance, as Lewin’s associate Festinger (1957) calls it, is a prerequisite. Disconfirming information is not enough, however, because we can ignore the information, dismiss it as irrelevant, blame the undesired outcome on others or fate or, as is most common, simply deny its validity (Fink et al. 1971). In order to become motivated to change, we must accept the information and connect it to something we care about. The disconfirmation must arouse what Schein calls ‘survival anxiety’ or the feeling of guilt that if we do not change, we will fail to meet our needs or fail to achieve some goals or ideals that we have set for ourselves. In order to feel survival anxiety or guilt, we must accept the disconfirming data as valid and relevant. 2. Learning anxiety What causes us to react defensively is a second kind of anxiety that Schein calls ‘learning anxiety’. This refers to the following statement: ‘[I]f we admit to ourselves and others that something in what we do is wrong or imperfect, we will lose our effectiveness, our self-esteem and maybe even our identity’. (Schein 1979b) Learning anxiety is a fundamental restraining force that can extend in direct proportion to the amount of disconfirmation, leading to the maintenance of equilibrium through defensive avoidance of the disconfirming information. It is the dealing with ‘learning anxiety’, then, that is the key to embracing change. 3. Creation of psychological safety Schein’s basic argument is that unless sufficient psychological safety is created, the disconfirming information will be denied or in other ways (continued)

10 One of Schein’s own defining experiences was to be involved in the interviewing and debriefing of repatriated prisoners of war who had been held by the Chinese Communists during the Korean War. Schein found that Lewin’s model of unfreezing provided a solid theoretical foundation for what had happened. Or has he reflected upon it in his own words: ‘In trying to explain what happened to POWs, I was led to the necessity to “unpack” further the concept of unfreezing and to highlight what really goes on there’ (Schein 1996, p. 34).

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Interlude 3.8 (continued) defended against, no survival anxiety will be felt and consequently no change will take place. The key to embracing change, then, becomes the ability to balance the amount of threat produced by disconfirming data with enough psychological safety to allow a person to accept the information, feel the survival anxiety and become motivated to change. Unfortunately, when we talk about organisational change, this kind of internal commitment is in itself a substantial step towards actual change, but in itself not enough. We not only need the motivation but also a sort of cognitive reframing of what is happening/what we are doing. A theory or model of change can help explain the actual learning and change mechanisms, and here Lewin’s visionary concepts are also very helpful in providing a practical-theoretical base for reframing. 4. Heightening awareness through (cognitive) reframing By what means does a motivated learner learn something new when we are dealing with thought processes, feelings, values and attitudes? Fundamentally, it is a process of ‘cognitive framing’, which occurs by taking in new information that has one or more of the following impacts: (1) semantic redefinition,—we learn that words can mean something different from what we had assumed; (2) cognitive broadening,—we learn that a given concept can be much more broadly interpreted than what we had assumed; and (3) new standards of judgement or evaluation,—we learn that the assumptions we use for judgement and comparison are not absolute, and if we use different ones, our scale of judgement shifts (Schein 1979, p. 136). As argued by Beer, it seems that the process of unfreezing needs to be managed. Schein doesn’t seem to agree on the management part but seem to agree with Beer as he argues that all change starts with some form of dissatisfaction or frustration generated by data that disconfirm our expectations or hopes. Apparently, the process of unfreezing starts with stirring up emotions (e.g. survival anxiety) to develop some kind of urgency to change as Kotter names it. Schein’s following argument is that, unless sufficient psychological safety is created, the disconfirming information will be denied, no survival anxiety or urgency will be felt and consequently no one will take the initiative to change. Psychological safety is an abstract concept and can easily be used for all kinds of arguments, even contra arguments as ‘I don’t feel safe here, so I don’t feel like participating in this process’, ‘as usual it is unsafe to say something here so I don’t put much trust in the process to come’. That is why the process of creating psychological safety can be easily a change process in itself. However, in the arguments of Schein and Beer, it is a mean for unfreezing, not a goal in itself. To take place, it is important that safety is created by introducing some dialogue principles which guide the way people interact with each other (see Chaps. 4 and 5 for more details). Others, such as Beer, are arguing for a road map,

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plan or vision for guidance during these early steps. In other words, as he maintains, managing the process can also provide in the need of psychological safety.

3.5.3

Unfreezing as a Process of Developing ‘Generative Capacity’

The way Schein describes the intertwined psychological subprocesses of unfreezing, it seems to have a lot in common with what Gergen introduced in the social sciences as generativity as later on, in 2007, it was picked up by Bushe as being the distinct virtue of appreciative inquiry and dialogical OD (see Interlude 3.9) (Bushe 2013b). Interlude 3.9 Generativity and Organisation Development and Change ‘Generative’ is an adjective and, according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, means having the power or function of generating, originating, producing or reproducing. Sometimes it is used to describe a process of interaction that produces something more than the process itself. Generativity can be defined as ‘...nothing less than how we come to see things in new ways’ (Schön 1979). A process of generativity can change how people think so that new options for decisions and/or actions become available to them and can generate outcomes that are compelling enough for people to want to act on (Bushe 2013, pp. 89–113). Application of the idea of ‘generativity’ to the field of ODC was first presented in a publication by Cooperrider and Srivastva (1987), who based their line of thinking on the work of Argyris, Gergen and Schön. As argued in their publication, one of the main barriers limiting the development of the field of ODC seems to be its romance with problem-solving and association with planned change. In their view, based on Argyris’s premises underlying ‘action science’, ODC practitioners have become so client-centred that they fail to question their clients’ own definition of a problem and thereby to build testable propositions and theories that are embedded in everyday life (Argyris 1973). Furthermore, Schön argues that ‘problems are not given, nor are they reducible to arbitrary choices that lie beyond inquiry’ (Schön 1979, p. 150). And as Cooperrider and Srivastva argue, the fundamental attitude embodied in the problem-solving view is separationist. It views the world as something external to our consciousness of it, something ‘out there’. As such, it tends to identify problems not here but ‘over there’—not a condition common to all, but a condition belonging to a certain person or group. Applied to the field of ODC, Friedlander and Brown stated already in 1974 that the field has ‘generally failed to produce a theory of change that emerges from the change process itself. We need a way of enriching our understanding and action synergistically, [. . .] and one that is valuable to all parties involved’ (Friedlander and Brown 1974). That is why Cooperrider and Srivastva (continued)

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Interlude 3.9 (continued) challenged the field of ODC with their renewed focus on inquiring and improving as main ODC activities (Cooperrider and Srivastva 1987). It is the quest for new ideas, images, theories and (mental) models that liberates our collective aspirations, alters the social construction of reality and, in the process, makes available decisions and actions that weren’t available or didn’t occur to us before (Bushe 2007). This broadside opened up a field of system-width inquiry practices and dialogic approaches and led to the emergence of what is called ‘dialogic OD’ (see Paragraph 4.4). Within dialogic OD, generativity is believed to occur when a group of people discover and/or create themselves a shared image that allows them to experience their work and organisation differently (Bushe 2013, p. 90). According to Bushe, the chances of producing generative outcomes are enhanced when ODC practitioners ask generative questions, which have at least the following four qualities: (Bushe 2007, p. 34) 1. They are surprising. 2. They touch people’s heart and spirit. 3. Talking about and listening to these stories and answers will build relationships. 4. The questions force us to look at reality a little differently, either because of how they ask us to think or because of whom we are listening to.

Kenneth J. Gergen (1935 Is an American social psychologist and emeritus professor at Swarthmore College who argued that normal scientific assumptions could not be successfully applied to studying human relationships. He suggested that, instead, we should aim to create a social science focused on its "generative capacity”.

As introduced in Interlude 3.9, generativity is about generating images and ideas that create an inspiring sense of possibility that energises those who are involved to jointly shape those ideas into action (Bushe 2013, p. 90). However, long before Gergen, Schön, Cooperrider and Srivastva introduced generativity at the end of the 1980s in the field of ODC, it already existed in the social sciences, generally in two key ways: (Slater 2003) on the one hand, as a stage in adult development, as defined by Erikson as ‘the concern for guiding and promoting the next generation through such creative behaviour as parenting, teaching, mentoring, leading, and generating products and outcomes that benefit others’, (Erikson 1950) and on the other hand, as a process of self-actualisation and self-reflection as described by Maslow. Maslow discussed self-actualisation generally in terms of the notion that in making actual life choices, the human self keeps itself responsible for who it is becoming, in tandem with self-actualisation as the ability of the human self to capture the meaning and significance of its own actualisation (Maslow 1971). In other words, as a process of

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consciousness raising, semantic redefinition, cognitive broadening and/or reframing, generativity enables people to change the way they perceive an existing situation they are part of. Just as in Lewin’s ‘unfreezing’, both early views on generativity are about a process in which personal defences and group norms are collaboratively unfrozen.

3.6

Based on Lewin’s Work: Continuing Trends in ODC

Three continuing trends allow for the possibility that OD scholarship can offer much to those concerned with issues of changing and, for example, creating sustainability. These three trends are related to the following core elements: 1. Systems thinking—in dialogue with the whole system 2. Relational know-how—engaging people collectively and fully 3. Generativity—defining ourselves through what we wish to create for the future (Bradbury et al. 2008, p. 89)

3.6.1

Systems Thinking: In Dialogue with the Whole System

Since the 1990s, more people from more organisations have been gathering inside and across organisations in networks, partnerships and joint ventures (Crossan and Guatto 1996). That is why it is important to keep giving attention to how we develop in a social way rather than execute change in a more mechanical way. We cannot so easily ‘freeze and unfreeze’ quite as much or as easily as we might pretend. As such, we might help interventionists think of finding opportunities for changing within what is already happening as we keep our eye on the goal of establishing collaborative agency. In this regard, Weick has rendered useful Heidegger’s idea of ‘thrownness’ for scholars of change (Weick 2004). The concept helps to remind us that we always find ourselves muddling around in human systems.

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Thrown-ness is a concept introduced by German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) to describe humans’ individual existences as ‘being thrown’ into the world. Thus, awareness and acknowledgement of the arbitrariness of being is characterised as a state of ‘thrown-ness’ in the present with all its attendant frustrations, sufferings and demands (Richardson 1963). As stated earlier in this chapter, putting together the idea of bringing the whole system to learn together, developing deeper relationships among system participants and focusing on generative images for the future allows us to understand perceptions, images, interpretations and convictions that sustain participants’ uncertainties. Moreover, this also identifies those forces that would need to be either strengthened or weakened in order to cope with uncertainties and bring change. Central in this notion is the idea of dialogue, which links facilitation of human development with dialogic OD (Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010). Some proponents of dialogic OD see it as a way in which the various parties involved in the change process can gain insights into each other’s organisational reality (Barrett et al. 1995). Dialogue is one of the primary methods whereby a plurality of perspectives is created, sustained and revealed, and as such, it is central to many contemporary intervention techniques in the field of ODC. One related area in which supporters of dialogic OD have shown an interest is that of organisational storytelling, which has links with both dialogic OD and social constructionism (Burnes and Cooke 2012). Storytelling is seen as enabling the exploration of the dialogic nature of organisations in which the organisation is seen as a ‘multiplicity of discourses’

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that reflect different perspectives on reality (Grant et al. 1998). In addition, it has much common ground with sense making, which has also found favour among proponents of dialogic OD (Werkman 2010).

3.6.2

Relational Know-How: Engaging People Collectively and Fully

Lewin’s conceptions of action research, field theory and his change theory were originally aimed at engaging in broadening and deepening people’s engagement in a change process. Engaging people is not about telling people what is expected from them but is about asking questions like ‘What is going on?’, ‘How do we perceive a given situation?’ and ‘What do my reactions tell me about my own assumptions about how things are going and what can be done to improve them?’ Schein calls this ‘listening to ourselves’ (Schein 2003). At the same time, attention also turns to imagining: ‘Why do people see things the way they do?’ and ‘What are this person’s circumstances to interpret the situation as they do?’ This is a different sort of selflistening in which the self makes inferences about what makes others tick and how they relate to their world (Bradbury et al. 2008, p. 89). In a competitive business atmosphere, it is difficult to ‘lower the guard’, as Bradbury et al. put it by repeating what a manager said in their research: ‘The initial step of sharing personal information was difficult, but once you sensed the value of truly connecting, building on it seemed relatively easy’. (Bradbury et al. 2008, p. 89) As these authors seem to emphasise with this citation, the important thing to do seems to be to engage in a process of co-inquiry into each other’s perceptions of what is going on and, further, while doing so, become more aware of: 1. The relationships we have that do matter in our work 2. Others in relation to the work that we do 3. What makes us relevant to others and others to us To achieve this is like seeing the world through another participant’s perspective, which helps all participants to grow beyond their egocentrism and ethnocentrism. So becoming more aware of our relationships and empathising with relevant others is the antidote to social defence mechanisms, to thinking in terms of all-or-nothing processes and to polarisation and splitting (Carser 1979). As Burnes and Cook argue, the philosophy of Lewin, with its emphasis on democracy and fairness, fits neatly with the egalitarian essence of contemporary, postmodern perspectives on organising and changing (Burnes and Cooke 2012).

3.6.3

Redefining Action Research: From Problem-Solving to Developing ‘Generative Capacity’

In their conceptual reconfiguration of action research, Cooperrider and Srivastva challenge its traditional focus on problem-solving (Cooperrider and Srivastva 2017).

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Action research as proposed by Lewin and after him is developed to—what nowadays is called ‘diagnostic organisational development’ (see Paragraph 4.3), which begins with identifying a problem. With a focus on problem-solving, it is assumed that something is broken and fragmented; that it needs to be fixed. Thus, according to Cooperrider and Srivastva, the function of problem-solving is to integrate, stabilise and help raise to its full potential the workings of the status quo (Cooperrider and Srivastva 2017). By definition, a problem implies that one already has knowledge of what ‘should be’; thus, one’s research is guided by an instrumental purpose tied to what is already known. Hence, problem-solving tends to be inherently conservative. Stated in this way, its focus is on realising first-order change (see Interlude 2.8) and usually considered to include the following steps in practice: entry, contracting, data collection, data feedback, diagnosis, action planning, interventions and evaluation (Marshak and Bushe 2018). Cooperrider and Srivastva propose an alternative understanding that defines social and behavioural science in terms of its ‘generative capacity’. In the words of Gergen, this means ‘the capacity to challenge the guiding assumptions of the culture, to raise fundamental questions regarding contemporary social life, to foster reconsideration of that which is ‘taken for granted’ and thereby furnish new alternatives for social actions’ (Gergen 1978). Therefore, when we try to enlarge people’s generative capacity, we are much more focused on realising second-order change (see Interlude 2.8). This generative approach of action research or dialogical organisational development (see Paragraph 4.4) generally contains the following steps: entry and contracting; identification of a purpose that is future focused and possibility-centric; the engagement of diverse stakeholders in ways that generate new conversations; the stimulation of self-generated innovations among those stakeholders; leadership actions that monitor, scale up and embed promising innovations; and lessons learned from successes and failures that lead to new adaptive moves (Marshak and Bushe 2018).

3.7

Some Closing Reflections

3.7.1

The Work and Impact of Lewin Himself

The immense influence of Lewin’s work is a complete puzzle if we look only at his writings (Cooperrider and Srivastva 2017, p. 114). Indeed, it has been argued before, for example, by Peters and Robinson, that his enduring influence is attributable not to his writings but to the sheer force and presence of the man himself (Peters and Robinson 1984). The intensity of his presence was fuelled by the belief that inquiry itself could be used to construct a more democratic and dignified future. At least this was his hope and dream, as Lewin had not forgotten his experience as a refugee from fascism in the late 1930s. Understanding this background, then, it is, as Cooperrider and Srivastva suggest, ‘clear why he revolted so strongly against a detached ivorytower and ‘objectivistic’ view of science, a science that is immersed in trivial matters, tranquillised by its standardised methods and limited in its field of inquiry’

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(Cooperrider and Srivastva 2017, p. 114). Thus, the picture we have of Lewin shows him to have been a committed social scientist pioneering uncharted territory for the purpose of creating new knowledge about groups and societies that might advance the democratic ideal. Another point is the epistemological ambiguity inherent in Lewin’s writing, which has been cited as perhaps the critical shortcoming of all his work (Cooperrider and Srivastva 2017, p. 114). As we elaborate on in the next chapter, Lewin’s work and classical (diagnostic) OD are seen as being based on a positivist, unitary view of reality, while dialogic OD is based on the multiple reality of a social constructionist perspective. However, as we stated in an earlier publication in 2010, there is also a different picture we can paint of Lewin’s work (Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010), one that sees his work as more in line with a social constructionist view of the world—a picture we have tried to complete in this chapter, arguing that individuals and groups see and experience the world from their own perspectives. In conclusion, as suggested by Gergen, the metatheoretical ambiguity in Lewin’s work might well have been a protective measure, an attempt to shield his fresh vision of an action science from the fully dominant logical positivist mood of his time (Gergen 1982). In any event, whether planned or not, as Cooperrider and Srivastva argued, ‘Lewin walked a tightrope between two fundamentally opposed views of science and never did make clear how theory could be used as both an interpretive and a creative element’ (Cooperrider and Srivastva 2017, p. 114).

3.7.2

Diverse Fields of Action Research Modalities

The thrust of Lewin’s work centred on the need to bridge the gap between science and the realm of practical affairs (Peters and Robinson 1984, p. 141). Lewin’s progressive vision of an action science fell short of offering a clear metatheoretical alternative to conventional conceptions of science (Bradford 1964), which in itself can be seen as a reason why Lewin’s way of combining intervening and doing research has led to a diverse field of multiple ‘action research modalities’. One of the first examples of these action research modalities is Revans’s ‘action learning’, as introduced in Chap. 2. In this chapter, we already introduced Cooperrider’s ‘appreciative inquiry’, and here, at the end of this chapter, we like to compare both with Argyris’ ‘action science’. The main characteristics of these three different forms of action research are:

3.7.2.1 Revans’s Action Learning ‘Action learning’ can be seen as the bedrock of all other forms of action-related (research) intervention strategies. In addition to the way we introduced action learning before in Chap. 2, it has been directed towards enabling professionals to learn and develop through engaging in reflecting on their experience as they seek to solve real-life problems in their own organisational settings. Related to a normativere-educative change strategy, it has also been seen as the main way of applying an OD approach (O’Neil and Marsick 2007). While its practice is demonstrated through

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many different approaches, two core elements are consistently in evidence: participants work on real organisational problems that do not appear to have clear solutions; and participants meet on equal terms to report in a cyclic way and to discuss their problems, experiences and progress (Ludema and Fry 2008).

3.7.2.2 Cooperrider’s Appreciative Inquiry As introduced through its basic principles in this chapter, ‘appreciative inquiry’ is aimed at large system change through an appreciative focus on what already works in a system, rather than what is deficient. It utilises a cycle of inquiry, which is sometimes expressed as the four Ds (Discovery, Dream, Design, Delivery/Destiny) or alternatively the four Is (Initiate, Inquire, Imagine, Innovate) (Watkins and Mohr 2001; Jossey-Bass and Reed 2007). Although ‘appreciative inquiry’ is often misunderstood and perceived to be a simple process of focusing on the positive, it still meets the criteria of science as spelled out in generative-theoretical terms. More than a method or technique, the appreciative mode of inquiry is a way of living with, being with and directly participating in the variety of organisations we are compelled to study. It encourages the participants to inquire beyond superficial appearances to deeper levels of the life-generating essentials and potentials of social existence (Coghlan 2011). Accordingly, as Bushe argues, it is a deeper and richer process than just an intervention technique and has an underlying capacity to leverage the generative capacity of metaphors and conversation in order to facilitate transformational action (Bushe 2010). Recently, ‘appreciative inquiry’ has been recognised as a prolific way of engaging in dialogic organisational development (OD) (Yaeger et al. 2005).

3.7.2.3 Argyris’s Action Science ‘Action science’ is a term used by Argyris who considered at the beginning of the 1980s that action research had lost its scientific edge, and so he wanted to bring the word ‘science’ back into the study of practice and intervention. As we will discuss at great length in Chap. 6, Argyris places an emphasis on the cognitive processes of individuals’ ‘theories in use’, which he describes in terms of Model I (strategies of control, self-protection, defensiveness and covering up embarrassment) and Model II (strategies eliciting valid information, free choice and commitment).

3.7.3

Reinterpreting Lewin’s Work

Looking at this chapter, we can say that reinterpreting Lewin’s work finds that: • Picked up as a process of co-inquiry, it includes in a short overview: asking participants questions in an appreciative way, gathering real-life data, acting directly together with the participants, experimenting and then evaluating the outcomes in order to take, in a collaborative way, further action. • As the heirs of Lewin’s work mentioned back in the 1960s, ‘the essence of a learning experience is a transactional process in which participants exchange their

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interpretations of what is happening’ (Bradford 1964, p. 193), which can be interpreted as interventionists having to encourage participants to espouse what they see as actually happening, and to be frank and open about it. • There is an important task for interventionists in which they have to play two roles: first, being a participant bringing in openly and reciprocally their own perspective, and second, being a guide, facilitating an alternative ‘reality’ and ditto ways of interacting in future practice. • It is quite important to see the purpose and relationships first, but also, and more importantly, that scoping a problematic situation isn’t a linear process per se, in which we try to see these kinds of elements, one after the other, but rather a cyclic one, because they are interconnected. To ask whether one of the components of a social system is most important is to ask an unsystemic question. Recap • Lewin’s action research, forcefield theory and change theory together make a well-integrated approach to organisational change. This approach underscores the importance of (1) demarcating an interconnected whole social system as a contained space for the development of new meaning and new practical knowledge, (2) engaging with this contained dialogical system in a collaboration or co-inquiry and (3) doing this in an incremental piecemeal three-step way, starting with a generative unfreezing of the existing equilibrium, moving and freezing or sustaining the change. • Gestalt and systems theorists both emphasise the whole as a mean of intervening, focusing on (1) purpose that people seem to share regarding the change initiative, (2) relationships between the participants in upholding the steady state they are in and (3) people’s perceptions of the purpose, their relationship with it and the reciprocal relationships they have with others who a stake in realising/obstructing the purpose. • Nowadays, the focus of Lewin’s change theory lies on the process of ‘unfreezing’. It relates to the need of keeping people alert in a continuing steady state. According to Beer, this means that there are three conditions that need to be managed: (1) dissatisfaction with the status quo, (2) a model or vision of the future and (3) a well-managed process of change. However, according to Schein, the process of unfreezing is mainly about facilitating the ‘intertwining subprocesses of unlearning and learning. These are (1) disconfirmation and survival anxiety, (2) learning anxiety, (3) creation of psychological safety and (4) heightening awareness through (cognitive) reframing. • This brings us to the conclusion that Lewin’s process of unfreezing can be compared with the process of ‘generativity’. Generativity is about generating images and ideas that create an inspiring sense of possibility that energises those who are involved to jointly shape those ideas into action. Defined in this way, generativity can be coupled with consciousness raising, semantic redefinition, cognitive broadening and/or reframing, helping people to change the way they perceive an existing situation of which they are part.

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Key Discussion Points 1. The ‘Zeigarnik effect’ In gestalt theory, the ‘Zeigarnik effect’ has been used to demonstrate the general presence of gestalt phenomena, showing that these phenomena do not just appear as perceptual effects, but are also present in cognition. • Argue why this effect can be used as an intervention technique. • Describe a short example. 2. Research that produces nothing, but books will not suffice Lewin was convinced that if you want to describe and explain the essence of human phenomena, you have to intervene directly in the processes as they are occurring, just to observe what happens. • Related to the text of this chapter, what arguments do you have for substantiating this statement? • Argue why it is important to intervene directly in a social system instead of observing it from a distance. • Describe what you see as a connection between this suggestion and one of Snowden and Boone’s suggestions on coping with a complex situation as suggested in Chap. 1. 3. Action research The collaborative, emerging nature of action research in doing inquiry and exploring new possibilities for change can be directly linked to the unconditional way ‘appreciative inquiry’, nowadays, approaches organisational development. • Describe the distinctive characteristics of applying action research as a way of intervening in a client’s problematic situation. • Describe, in general, the benefits of applying ‘appreciative inquiry’ in intervening in a client’s problematic situation. 4. The central tenet of gestalt theory According to gestalt theory, the whole is more than the sum of its parts, which in general means that a whole cannot be understood completely simply by looking at the parts. • Describe in a few sentences the consequences of this statement in terms of approaching a client’s problematic situation. • Describe in a few sentences what the benefits are of regarding a client’s problematic situation in a systemic way (i.e. regard it as a social system).

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5. A complementary gestalt From a gestalt perspective, behaviour is not just a product of (factual) external stimuli; rather, it arises from how the individual perceives these stimuli. In other words, how a person behaves is not just dependent on the forces that impinge on them, but also depends on their subjective perception of these forces. • Describe the essence of Lewin’s formula, B¼f(P,E), in terms of its relevance for diagnosing a client’s problematic situation. • In Chap. 1 we introduced the concept of a complementary gestalt; relate in a few sentences this concept to Lewin’s forcefield theory as discussed in this chapter. 6. Scoping a whole social system To ask whether Purpose’, ‘Relationships’ or ‘People’ are most important in scoping a system is to ask an unsystemic question. All are essential and all are interconnected. • Explain why the above question is an unsystemic question. • Decipher a group or a team you are a member of in terms of a system and try to describe its purpose, its relationships and the people involved as functioning as a social whole. 7. Analysing the forces of unfreezing As discussed in this chapter, there is more to the endeavour of ‘unfreezing’ than only managing the feeling of urgency as suggested by Kotter. As suggested by Schein, unfreezing basically consists of four processes. However, these processes don’t always enable change as they can also restrain it. • Categorise the four forces into driving or restraining forces. • Construct these forces together into a change strategy in which you augment the sequence of your interventions in relation to the plotted order of the forces in the previous question. 8. An exercise in deciphering a system: the case of the Bull Dogs In Fig. 3.3, we introduce an original picture from a 1950s classic field study by Sherif and Sherif. In this figure, two groups of adolescents are introduced: the ‘Bull Dogs’ and the ‘Red Devils’. As displayed in the figure, both groups are sociometrically scored by individually asking the members which other members of their group they liked the most. As a result, you can see which relationships are reciprocal in their likings and which are not. As a group, they depend on their functioning as a whole, on the functioning of each and every individual group member and on their internal relationships. In general, it can be assumed, based on Deutsch’s variables, that a

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Fig. 3.3 The attraction relations of the Bull Dogs and the Red Devils as sociometrically analysed by Sherif and Sherif in their field studies on group processes (Both sociograms are taken from: : Sherif and Sherif 1964).

group whose members have an explicit perceived shared group purpose is more likely to develop interdependent relations. So, the more explicit the group’s purpose, the more their internal relations are reciprocal, the higher the cohesion of the group and the better the group is supposed to function as a whole. However, as the purpose of the group (e.g. to perform as well as possible as a whole) is not shared with the same intensity by all its members, it is most likely that it is performing less well as a whole. • Based on the graphics in Fig. 3.3, can we infer a shared purpose in (one of) the groups? Argue why. As Fig. 3.3 indicates, as a group, the Red Devils are more stratified than the Bull Dogs. When the adolescents were asked to name whom they liked in their own group, 9 of the 12 Bull Dogs named each other in a tightly knit pattern of reciprocal and overlapping choices. The remaining three individuals in this group received no friendship nominations, but they picked others who were part of the main cluster as friends and were not rejected. In the Red Devils, liking was more concentrated: the two most-liked individuals in the group garnered 50% of all friendship choices. The Red Devils also included several cliques, as well as one member who was rejected by the other group members. During Sherif and Sherif’s field study, the Red Devils lost the main competition between the two groups (Forsyth 2010).

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• Explain why the Bull Dogs won the main competition with the Red Devils in terms of interdependence and interactional patterns. Let’s turn things around by assuming that the Bull Dogs weren’t that successful at all, and let’s assume that, in fact, they performed badly. To explain the hypothetical loss of the Bull Dogs, we got the opportunity to interview the individual group members and observe them as a group in a more detailed way. It turns out from these investigations that T(3) of the Bull Dogs, in which the 3 stands for the unique number of choices (likings), is the leader of the group and that there seems a lot of turmoil going on about his leadership. Although T(3) emphasises the benefits of the status quo and his leadership, he doesn’t seem to have a grip on the quarrels within the group. Further, as it turns out, these quarrels have something to do with C(8), the most popular member of the group. Apparently, he wants the group to be changed, in particular the way it is led by T(3). He shares this explicitly with E(7), B(3), H(5) and L(5). Although H(5) likes C(8) in several ways, he doesn’t seem to trust his intentions. As H(5) sees it, C(8) causes the turmoil because he has plans to take over the leadership. He shares this with T(3), B(3) and C(5), who seem to believe he is right. As an interventionist, you have an assignment to clear up this mess. • Describe Bull Dogs’ situation in terms of purpose(s), relationships and people. • Based on the information presented in this chapter, describe what you would do if you were asked to help them achieve a better performance as a group.

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4

Beyond Organisation Development Exploring Diagnostic and Dialogic OD

‘Awareness is about what; purpose is about why. People who aren’t involved in the planning need to understand not only what is about to change but also why their jobs are being upended’. (Ford and Ford 2009)

4.1

Introduction

Emerging from Lewin’s original work, OD grew in the 1950s towards an identifiable field of practice that included action research, T-groups, systems thinking and process consultation. In the 1960s it was officially given its name (Shull et al. 2014), and it became known as a practical intervention approach that improved the functioning of overly bounded, hierarchical organisations by regarding them as living, open systems (Marshak and Bush 2013). Throughout the 1960s OD also became more and more grounded in theory (Lewin 1948) and applied research (Marrow et al. 1967), with roots from a variety of practice areas including psychotherapy (Bion 1959), participative management (McGregor 1960), survey methodology (Likert 1967) and social psychology (Katz and Kahn 1978). Since then, ideas, experience and intervention methods have enriched each other and expanded the field’s range of theories and approaches (Bushe and Marshak 2013). From the 1970s on, OD was known as a field of research and application (Beckhard 1969). Later, during the 1980s, OD integrated insights from management and business studies and became a more interdisciplinary field just like, and overlapping with, hybrid fields such as organisation sciences, organisational behaviour and strategic management (Burnes and Cooke 2012). Since the 1990s, boundaries of the field have become even more blurred with the adoption of new practices and the growing popularity of closely related fields such as change management. Together with the recent ‘relational turn’ in the social sciences, many of the original ideas, methods and characteristics of the field of OD have converged into approaches to organisational # The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. van Nistelrooij, Embracing Organisational Development and Change, Springer Texts in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51256-9_4

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change that differ in important ways, from earlier OD theories and practices (Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010). Recently, the broadening of the field of OD has led to a contrast between traditional OD, called ‘diagnostic OD’, and a recently developing ‘dialogic OD’. The former has a focus on diagnose organisational problems that need to be ‘solved’, and the latter focuses on promoting dialogue and the notion that through dialogue, organisational change occurs (Bushe and Marshak 2013). Both share the original OD values such as a focus on humanistic and democratic values, the search for awareness and understanding of the social whole/context and the process role of the consultant (Shull et al. 2014, p. 5). With the recent upcoming field of dialogical OD, there is a substantial body of evidence emerging showing that OD is going through a renaissance in its traditional heartlands and that Lewin’s work lies at the centre of this renaissance (Mozenter 2002; Ramos and Rees 2008; Wirtenberg et al. 2007; Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010). In this chapter we introduce and explore what dialogic OD is and in what ways it is both similar to and different from diagnostic OD. In doing so, we will introduce and explore the following: • OD as a major scientific and practical field to approach organisational change, and how it recently evolved into two narrowly related subdisciplines with each having a unique set of characteristics. • The main assumptions of both ODs on how to engage people in change. • The transtheoretical model of behaviour change (TTM) of Prochaska and his colleagues, which indicates what the main phases and interventions are in successful individual change. • The relevance and characteristics of doing psychological interventions. • Dialogue as a way of intervening, based on perspective taking in a shifting context and enacting for generating change by altering perceptions and conversations. • The contrasts and similarities between the roles of a process interventionist and that of a generative interventionist. After a short introduction of the key characteristics of both ODs, we elaborate on the assumptions behind them. In the third section, we detail ‘diagnostic OD’, explaining why conscious raising, attitudinal change and psychological interventions are still relevant for contemporary change practices. In the fourth section, we first discuss the main underlying assumptions of dialogical OD, after which we explain the possibilities of perspective taking in a shifting context, dialogue, enacting change and dialogical systems as ways of engaging change. The chapter closes with some reflections, a recap of the main findings and some key discussion points.

4.3 Assumptions behind Diagnostic OD

4.2

131

Introducing Two Types of OD

Since the 1970s, organisation development (OD) has been defined as ‘a system-wide application and transfer of behavioural science knowledge to the planned development, improvement and reinforcement of the strategies, structures and processes that lead to organisation effectiveness’ (Cummings and Worley 2009). This and other original formulations of OD in the 1970s included a strong positivist orientation based on mid-twentieth-century research methodologies. This positivist orientation assumes the existence and validity of an objective, discernible reality as contrasted with the perceptions of organisational members about that reality (Alderfer 1977, p. 206). Moreover, as argued by Marshak and Grant, these original OD formulations treat differences in individual perception as ‘misperceptions’ when they are believed to deviate too much from the main approach that may need to be corrected or integrated in new ways (Marshak and Grant 2008). Since the 1970s it has been seen as a basic and conditional requirement for doing ‘effective’ OD interventions to generate first valid data and information (Argyris 1970) before intervening (Chin and Benne 1976). The relational turn in the social sciences has been influential in altering ideas about change and change practices. With this turn, organisations are considered to be complex phenomena, where non-linear ‘prevailing narratives and conversations are created and sustained through which people make meaning about their experiences’ (Holman 2013; Marshak 2013; Shaw 2002). Instead of change driven by diagnosing how to ‘objectively’ align organisational elements with the demands of the environment, these recent developments consider how to induce new ways of perceiving and thinking by engaging people in contained dialogic systems. A summary of the key characteristics of diagnostic and dialogic OD are presented opposite each other in Fig. 4.1. In the next two paragraphs, we discuss the main characteristics of both ODs separately, first those of diagnostic OD, and in Paragraph 4.4 we discuss the characteristics of dialogic OD.

4.3

Assumptions behind Diagnostic OD

Because of its planned and problem-solving-centred approach to organisational change, interest in OD waned at the end of the twentieth century (By et al. 2014; Burnes and Cooke 2012; Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010, p. 408). Although this may be true, some of the main characteristic assumptions—what now, with the upcoming shift in focus on dialogue, retroactively, is labelled ‘diagnostic OD’—are still relevant. In this section, we critically discuss these assumptions by going into their assumed added value in contemporary change practice.

132 Fig. 4.1 Differentiating two ODs (Marshak and Grant 2008)

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Beyond Organisation Development

Diagnostic OD (1950s onward)

Dialogical OD (1990s onward)

• Based on a positivist’s thoughts and philosophies. • Truth is transcendent and discoverable; there is a single, objective reality ‘out there’. • Reality can be discovered using rational, analytic and planned processes.

• Based on social constructionist philosophies. • Truth is immanent and emerges from interactions; there are multiple, socially constructed realities.

• Reality is an intermediate result of an ongoing social exchange process using relational, communicative and emergent processes. • Collecting and applying val- • Creating new mindsets or social agreements, through explicid data using problemit/implicit interaction and diasolving methods as a condilogue, as a way of changing. tional requirement for change. • Focus on generativity by creating • Focus on consciousness shifting contexts, influencing soraising through psychologicial perception. cal interventions influencing employees’ attitudes. • Emphasis on changing language • Emphasis on changing beand perception and how one haviour and what one does. thinks.

Main Assumptions behind Diagnostic OD Change is created by: • Attitude change When people possess a strong, positive attitude towards change, they are likely to behave in focused, persistent and effortful ways that support and facilitate the change initiative being implemented. • Consciousness raising People are more likely to change their own behaviour when they realise, as a function of their raised consciousness, that what they have taken for granted is no longer in line with reality. • (Social) Psychological interventions (social) Psychological interventions are believed to have lasting effects because they use persuasive, yet ‘stealthy’ methods for conveying psychological ideas, and tapping into recursive processes present in the direct social surroundings.

4.3 Assumptions behind Diagnostic OD

4.3.1

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Attitude Change

Human and democratic values have always played a key role in OD and the desire to ‘humanise’ organisations, that is, to enable organisations to be more responsive to the human concerns of members (Alderfer 1977, p. 198; Faucheux et al. 1982; Friedlander and Brown 1974). These human and democratic values prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s are stated quite explicitly in the OD literature’ (Friedlander and Brown 1974; Tannenbaum and Davis 1969). In this period, a great proportion of the research in OD focused on the question of how people adapt, develop and grow (Kolb et al. 1971). Most of this OD research falls into research areas concerning attitude change. Attitude change refers to the change of an individual’s predisposition regarding a certain object/subject. An attitude is supposed to have a cognitive (expectations and evaluations) and an affective (favourable/unfavourable feeling) component (Kelman 1958). Because of the coexistence of these two components, an attitude is not always that stable or consistent. Therefore, attitudes are supposed to be subject to change due to social influences, as well as to the individual’s motivation to maintain a certain consistency between the two components. The early OD studies had identified a strong human need for cognitive consistency, avoiding cognitive dissonance and striving for balance. Cognitive dissonance is an adverse psychological state because human beings desire consistency between their emotions and cognitions and their assumptions and behaviours. As a concept it is based on the following premises: • Dissonance is a result of inconsistencies between the affective and cognitive components of an attitude and/or someone’s assumptions regarding his/her behaviour regarding the same object/subject. • Dissonance is believed to be an aversive state that drives people to actions to avoid it and/or to restore consistency (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959; Brehm 1956). The reduction of such cognitive dissonance is aimed at maintaining a sense of competence and morality through justification of the discrepant behaviour. Authors such as Elias believe that when people possess a strong, positive attitude towards change, they are likely to behave in focused, persistent and effortful ways that support and facilitate the change initiative being implemented. However, when people possess a strong and negative attitude towards change, they are more likely to

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Fig. 4.2 Classic conception of planned behaviour (Van Nistelrooij and De Caluwé 2016)

resist, oppose, scorn, thwart and attempt to sabotage the change initiative. Among the most cited studies that support these claims are the 1970s and 1980s studies of Azjen and Fishbein. Their studies suggest that increased knowledge of attitudes in this way will lead to a better understanding and prediction of behaviour. Their studies have led to one of the classic models in psychology, called ‘planned behaviour’ (Ajzen and Fishbein 1974; Ajzen and Fishbein 1973; Azjen 1988; Fishbein and Azjen 1975). The underlying theory of ‘planned behaviour’ states that an attitude towards behaviour, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control together shape our behavioural intentions and, with this, eventually, our behaviours (Ajzen 1991). The central point of view in this model is that change is based on the premise that the intention to engage in a new particular behaviour is the result of a rational linear process that is goal oriented, as shown in Fig. 4.2. As presented in Fig. 4.2, change in the traditional planned behaviour model follows a logical linear sequence from cognition/emotion and attitude, via intention to change behaviour (Gibbons et al. 1998). As many empirical studies based on this model demonstrate, strong intentions (e.g. ‘I strongly intend to do x’) are reliably observed to be realised more often than weak intentions (Ajzen 1991). However, the correlations between intentions and behaviour are modest: intentions account for only 20% to 30% of the variance in behaviour. Also, the strength of the intentionbehaviour relation varies drastically with the type of behaviour that is specified, and people’s past behaviour commonly turns out to be a better predictor than their intentions. Most interestingly, the weak intention-behaviour relation is largely due

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to people having good intentions but failing to act on them (Orbell and Sheeran 1998). That is why, for quite a few scholars, the concept of an ‘intention-behaviour relation’ is far too simplistic (Sniehotta 2009). For example, Elias showed that our beliefs and attitudes are linked with our assumptions and these latter are to be regarded as the starting point for a positive or negative evaluative judgement (Elias 2009). Furthermore, as Wood concluded, cognitions, emotions and attitudes are social phenomena that emerge from, and are embedded in, social interaction (Wood 2000). This is an important link in interpreting resistance and coping with it. And as such, the link is, strangely enough, completely absent in the classic planned behaviour model. In conclusion, change is not simple, and consequently the way people react is less certain and far more unpredictable, as suggested by sequences in the classic planned behaviour models. Lewin, for example, stated back in the 1940s: ‘If cognitions, emotions, attitudes—and the processes that give rise to them—were governed by the same laws, change itself would be much simpler’. (Lewin and Grabbe 1948) Relatively recent studies showed that all three—cognitions, emotions and attitudes—have in their own respect different characteristics, different processing speeds and different behaviour-influencing capabilities.1 They are based on different types of human processing, and, as shown in these studies, participants fail to make the behavioural changes that they predict they will: changes in attitude and motivation seldom suffice for long-term behavioural change (Cohen and Sherman 2014; Ross and Nisbett 2011). Moreover, the outcome in terms of new behaviours is not only much less predictable but also far more diffuse and inconsistent.

4.3.2

Consciousness Raising

A typical OD process starts initially with interventions directed to initiating a process of consciousness raising (Porras and Silvers 1991; Bushe and Marshak 2009, p. 194). The purpose of consciousness raising has a staggering resemblance with the purpose of Lewin’s process of unfreezing as discussed in Sect. 3.5. They are both directed at increasing people’s concerned awareness in relation to becoming more perceptive for the amount of information available to them in their social surroundings. Consciousness raising is considered to increase the likelihood that participants

1

One interesting example in particular is Labaw’s (1980) approach to questionnaire design developed as a result of her lack of success using the accepted attitudinal approach to predicting behaviour. Labaw does not believe that accurate prediction of human behaviour using attitude concepts is possible in using questionnaire techniques. She states: ‘Frustrated with the lack of predictability of purely attitudinal questions, and rather stunned by the huge gap between what people say and what they then do, I felt it necessary to re-evaluate the role of these types of questions within surveys and to find alternatives to them which could be used in predicting behaviour. Consequently, attitude questions have become a minute part of surveys I design’. (Labaw 1980; Lord and Levy 1994; Johnson et al. 2006; Douglas et al. 2008; Sniehotta et al. 2014)

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will make easier self-conscious decisions concerning the problems the organisation is facing (Prochaska and DiClemente 2005). According to the extensive empirical data of Prochaska and his colleagues as discussed in Interlude 4.1, raised consciousness is claimed to help people to adjust their approach to organisational challenges and is also believed to make individual organisation members more aware of their defence mechanisms against change (Prochaska et al. 1992). Interlude 4.1 Prochaska’s Transtheoretical Model of Behaviour Change (Prochaska and DiClemente 2005) The transtheoretical model of behaviour change (TTM) is an integrative theory of therapy that assesses an individual’s readiness to act on a new healthier behaviour and provides strategies or processes of change to guide the individual through the process of change (Prochaska and DiClemente 2005).The model is the outcome of a research programme consisting of more than 50 studies on thousands of individuals that lasted for more than 12 years. According to the authors, most of the studies have been tested, revised and improved through scores of empirical studies and are in use all over the world. The programme was dedicated to solving the puzzle of how people intentionally change, which means that the researchers have been concentrating on the phenomenon of intentional individual change as opposed to organisational, developmental or planned (imposed) change. In a comprehensive summary of their research, they framed their basic research question as: ‘Because successful change of complex addictions can be demonstrated in both psychotherapy and processes of self-change, are there basic, common principles that can reveal the structure of (successful) change occurring with and without psychotherapy?’ (Prochaska et al. 1992) As the research turns out, individuals who successfully modify their own addictive behaviours move through the following stages: (Prochaska et al. 1994) Precontemplation

Contemplation

A typical response of someone in this phase is: ‘It isn’t that I can’t see the solution. It is clear that I can’t see the problem’. (Prochaska et al. 1994, p. 41) People have no intentions to change their behaviour and deny having a problem. They ignore conversations, information and images about the subject. But in fact, they lack information about their problem, and they intend to maintain ignorant bliss at all costs. A typical response of someone in this phase is: ‘I want to stop feeling so stuck’. In this stage, people acknowledge that they have a problem and begin to think seriously about solving it. They struggle to understand their problem and see its causes and wonder about possible (continued)

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Interlude 4.1 (continued) solutions (Prochaska et al. 1994, p. 42). Contemplators, however, may be far from actually making a commitment to action. That is often the nature of contemplation: you know your destination, and even how to get there, but you are not quite ready to go yet. Preparation Most people in the preparation stage are planning to take action within the very next month and are making the final adjustments before they begin to change their behaviour. People who cut short the preparation stage lower their ultimate chances of success. Action The stage in which people most overtly modify their behaviour. However, the action stage is not the only time somebody can make progress towards overcoming his/her problem. Any movement from one stage to the next represents considerable progress (Prochaska et al. 1994, p. 45). The transition from precontemplation to contemplation is no less significant than from preparation to action. Maintenance As it turns out, successful individual change in this programme never ends with action. Without a strong commitment to maintenance, there will surely be relapse, usually to the precontemplation or contemplation stage. Initially, Prochaska and his colleagues conceptualised change as people progressing simply and step by step through the above stages (Prochaska et al. 1992, pp. 1104–1105). However, because relapse is the rule rather than the exception and linear progression is a possible but relatively rare phenomenon with addictive behaviours, the authors suggested later in their research that there is more often a spiral progression (see Fig. 4.3). In this spiral pattern, people can progress but will in time relapse. In general, successful selfchangers relapse three to four times before they have changed themselves successfully. During relapse, individuals regress to an earlier stage. As their data show, these relapses feel like failures, which apparently overwhelm the addicted person with embarrassment, shame and guilt. Although these individuals seem to become demoralised and resist thinking about behaviour change, eventually they learn from their experiences and move on (Prochaska et al. 1992, pp. 1104–1105). Figure 4.3 suggests that most people who regress do not revolve endlessly in circles and that they do not regress all the way back to where they began. Instead, each time people cycle through the stages, they potentially learn from (continued)

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Interlude 4.1 (continued) their mistakes and can try something different the next time around. At the end, the authors draw the following conclusions: • People do change. • People do overcome problems of smoking and alcohol abuse, emotional distress and weight control. • Relapse is the rule rather than the exception. • Successful self-change requires you to know what stage you are in for the problem you want to overcome. • Successful changers use certain tools only at specific times, choosing a different one whenever the situation demands a new approach. These specific times are constant from one person to the next, regardless of what their problem is (Prochaska et al. 1994, p. 41). So the key is always to use the right intervention at the right time. • The key to success is the appropriately timed use of a variety of coping skills. • Intervention tools traditionally associated with the cognitive and psychoanalytic traditions are most useful during the precontemplation and contemplation stages. This was significantly true for the intervention ‘consciousness raising’, with which people attempt to increase the information available to them, so they can make the most effective response to the changing situation they are in (Prochaska and Norcross 2010). • Intervention tools traditionally associated with the behavioural traditions, by contrast, are most useful during the stages of ‘action’ and ‘maintenance’ (Prochaska and DiClemente 1992). This was significantly true for interventions with which the external environment can give somebody (passively or actively) new alternatives to continue their change efforts (Prochaska and Norcross 2010, p. 28).

James O. Prochaska (1942 Is a professor of psychology and director of the Cancer Prevention Research Center at the University of Rhode Island. He is the lead developer of the Transtheoretical Model of Behavior Change (TTM) as laid down in the book ‘Changing for good’ (2007).

4.3.3

Psychological Interventions

From its conception in the 1950s, OD practitioners have been supposed to achieve their goals through pre-planned interventions using behavioural science knowledge, mostly coming from the field of (social) psychology (Alderfer 1977, p. 206; Hartman 1979; Tajfel 1982; Cohen and Sherman 2014; Ross and Nisbett 2011). Psychology is the study of behaviour and mind, embracing all aspects of conscious and

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Fig. 4.3 Prochaska’s iterative progression of change

unconscious experience. As an academic discipline, it explores concepts such as perception, cognition and emotion and change-related phenomena such as coping mechanisms and psychological resilience (Powers et al. 2016). From psychologically oriented organisational behaviour books (Katz and Kahn 1978; French and Bell 1999; Jamieson and Worley 2008), we learn that psychological interventions are supposed to have lasting effects because they use persuasive yet ‘stealthy’ methods for conveying psychological ideas (see Interlude 4.2) (Yeager and Walton 2011). Interlude 4.2The Characteristics of Psychological Interventions Psychological interventions supposedly do not bring other or new content but rather are believed to target and align the individual’s subjective perceptions and assumptions, so they can take greater advantage of available learning opportunities (Yeager and Walton 2011, p. 274). Put simply, in the management literature, it is said that psychological interventions can take place on three levels of intervening, in which the third level is the most in depth because it concerns the most intimate psychological aspects: 1. Doing more of the same (continued)

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Interlude 4.2 (continued) 2. Adjusting existing behavioural practices, i.e. change in line with an existing paradigm on a first-order level 3. Adjusting the existing paradigm, by changing assumptions on a secondorder level (Harrison 1970; Huczynski and Buchanan 2007) For this third level of change to occur, people need to surrender their strategies. In other words, they have to acknowledge that these strategies are clearly not working for them and try something new and different. However, as psychotherapist Jeffrey Kottler, for example, convincingly argues, ‘[i]t is one of the mysteries of human behaviour that people will continue to engage in actions that are spectacularly counterproductive and even self-destructive and yet not give them up in the face of overwhelming evidence’ (Kottler 2018). Based on his many years of experience in working with individual clients, he also argues that it also interesting to observe, on the other hand, how small insignificant interventions can lead to deep individual change. As he continues, when we try to trace back in our recollection the trajectory of how and why this deep change is realised, there is rarely a single action or incident that, in hindsight, can be isolated and pinpointed as the factor that made it happen. But when it happens, it is not rare that change is occurring, in spite of the simple story we tell ourselves and others. There seems to be, as Kottler maintains, a series of events, often initially unrelated, that feed on one another and eventually multiply and pool their influences to lead us in a given direction. Based on his many years of individual psychotherapeutical experience, underpinned by several meta-studies on this subject (Gould and Clum 1993; Bohart and Tallman 1999; Carey et al. 2007), Kottler argues that these psychological processes can be organised in several broad categories and, furthermore, that they basically lend support to the rather obvious idea that change in a psychological sense can occur on a number of levels, as depicted in Fig. 4.4, leading to significant alterations in the ways that people think, perceive, feel or behave. In addition to Fig. 4.4, the mystery around psychological interventions is the reality that people are generally pretty unaware of their own behaviour and especially the reasons why they do the things they do. One of the explanations that the psychotherapeutical literature has come up with is that the reluctance that most people have about making changes in their lives is related to their misguided belief that they are already fully formed and impervious to most future changes. Moreover, it seems that they willingly embrace changes, while they might stubbornly resist them in other contexts that are far more meaningful and significant. Thus, seen from a psychotherapeutical perspective, change is supposed to be ‘all about perceptions and interpretations of experience and reframing those that are more solidly based in reality’ (Kottler 2018, p. 3). (continued)

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Interlude 4.2 (continued)

Jeffrey A. Kottler Jeffrey A. Kottler is a professor, psychologist, author, consultant, workshop leader, keynote speaker, and social justice advocate who has spent the past 40 years working throughout the world to promote personal and professional development among professionals and marginalized groups.

Besides the general intervention techniques in diagnosing problems, and designing and generating change, OD practitioners are believed, more than any other types of interventionists, to be in need of: (White and Mitchell 1976). 1. Intrapersonal skills: for example, empathic skills in perspective taking and regarding themselves as a person with introspective skills in self-reflection 2. Interpersonal skills: for example, counselling and coaching skills in order to work with groups and gain their trust, which is necessary for developing self-reflection and self-corrective behaviours (Reynolds and Branscombe 2015; Rogers 1975; Floyd et al. 2000)

Fig. 4.4 Examples of psychological interventions (Kottler 2018, p. 11)

Change process

• Attitude shift

•

•

• •

•

Examples

• Self-acceptance, acceptance of what is going on, reduced blame of self and others. • Shift in attention, letting go, searching Experimentation for other options, trying new behavwith alternatives iours, doing something different, reinventing oneself. • Tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainSkill development ty, resilience, evaluating goals and outcomes, building deficits. • Expressing feelings to others, expandSupport ing social world, resolving conflicts. • Shift in perspective, reframing probCognitive restructurlems more constructively, confronting ing self-deception, challenging negative beliefs, looking from the whole to what is happening. Meaning making • Exploring new ways of understanding life and situation, finding higher purpose, making connections with other domains of interest and people.

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Diagnostic OD: The Role of a Process Interventionist

Because of the early T-group experiences, OD developed into an approach with a focus on the functioning of groups. That is why OD consultants are, in general, expected to have highly developed interpersonal competencies in small-group dynamics and in process consultation (Schein 1969). Following firstly Lewin, and later on his successors, Lippitt and Bradford, small groups were considered to be both the target of and vehicle for planned change using action research methodologies (Lippitt and Lippitt 1986; Bradford et al. 1964). Their experiences were later on translated into the ‘normative-re-educative strategy’ (see Sect. 2.3.2). Based on these experiences, Schein developed a role description of an ‘OD consultant’, which he called ‘process consultation’ (Schein 2006), based on ‘the creation of a relationship with the client that permits the client to perceive, understand and act on the process events that occur in the client’s internal and external environment in order to improve the situation as defined by the client system’.2 Process consulting is based on the following assumptions: (Schein 1969, p. 8) 1. The client (and/or client system) has a problem, and the consultant is an expert in facilitating the process, especially in how to do a joint diagnosis, how to establish an effective helping relationship and how to collaborate in generating a remedy. 2. In this relationship, the client (and/or client system) who needs help takes an active role in solving their own problem, rather than solely relying on the consultant’s expert opinion. 3. In this relationship, a client (and/or client system) must learn to see the problem for themself, to share in the diagnosis and to know what kind of help they need, and a consultant must first learn enough about the organisation’s culture before suggesting reliable new courses of action. 4. Both accept that the consultant is helping the client (and/or client system) to help themself. 5. Every problem a client (and/or client system) comes up with has a cause, but the first one may not be the root cause, and as a result, a process consultant helps the client to identify other stakeholders to help them define this root cause. Schein writes: ‘Process consultation does not assume that the client or the client system knows what is wrong, or what is needed, or what the consultant should do’. (Schein 1969, p. 4) Therefore, one of the major challenges in executing the role of a process facilitator is how to diagnose a situation that the interventionist him or herself is not part of. This is tricky, since it requires a conscious recognition of what the inhabitants (the stakeholders from the client system) are communicating

2

The client system is to be considered in this context as the whole of relevant people with a stake associated with the purpose of the change. That is why a client system can also be defined as the whole of stakeholders (Schein 1969, p. 9).

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verbally and non-verbally. Exactly 40 year after writing his classical book on process consultation, Schein writes: I have come to believe that the decisive factor as to whether or not help will occur in human situations involving personality, group dynamics and culture is the relationship between the helper and the person, group or organisation that needs help. From that point of view, every action I take, from the initial contact with a client, should be an intervention that simultaneously allows both the client and me to diagnose what is going on and that builds a relationship between us. When all is said and done, I measure my success in every contact by whether or not I feel the relationship has been helpful and whether or not the client feels helped (Schein et al. 2009).

As demonstrated in Interlude 4.3, in the revised 1999 version of Process Consultation, Schein describes ten assumptions that, as he sees it, help to build a helping relationship with a client and the client system. Interlude 4.3 Schein’s Revised Assumptions Regarding a Process Interventionist (Schein 1999) 1. Always try to be careful. Obviously, if an interventionist has no intention of being helpful and hardworking, it is unlikely the intervention will lead to a helping relationship. Schein has found that the intention to be helpful is the best guarantee of a relationship that is rewarding and leads to mutual learning. 2. Always stay in touch with the current reality. An interventionist cannot be helpful if he or she cannot decipher what is going on in the situation and in the client. According to Schein, much of what an interventionist does depends on whether he or she correctly co-inquires the current reality together with the involved participants. The importance of doing a co-inquiry derives from the fact that the interventionist can seldom learn enough about any given organisation to really know what a better course of action would be. Moreover, members of the organisation perceive, think about and react to information in terms of their shared tacit assumptions. Because perceptions and assumptions can change (as a result of the interventions), it can be helpful to do several ‘co-inquiries’ at different times in the process. 3. Access your ignorance. The only way an interventionist can discover his or her own inner reality is to learn to distinguish what he or she knows from what he or she truly does not know. According to Schein, it is generally most helpful to work on those areas where an interventionist truly does not know. Accessing is the key, in the sense that Schein has learned that to overcome expectations and assumptions, he must try to locate within himself what he really does not know and thus should be asking about. (continued)

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Interlude 4.3 (continued) 4. Realise that everything you do is an intervention. Just as every interaction reveals diagnostic information, every interaction is an intervention with real consequences both for the client and for the interventionist. Schein is convinced, therefore, that he has to own everything he does and assess the consequences to be sure that they fit his goal of creating a helping relationship. 5. Understand that it is the client who owns the problem and the solution. Schein is convinced that his job as an interventionist is to create a relationship in which the client can get help. It is not his job to take the client’s problems on his own shoulders, nor does he see it as his job to offer advice and solutions in a situation that he does not live in himself. 6. Go with the flow. Inasmuch as an interventionist does not know the client’s reality, he or she must respect as much as possible the natural flow in that reality and not impose his or her own sense of flow on an unknown situation. Once the relationship reaches a certain level of trust, and once the client and interventionist have a shared set of insights into what is going on, flow itself becomes a shared process. 7. Remember that timing is crucial. Again and again, Schein has learned that the introduction of his perspective, the asking of a clarifying question, the suggestion of alternatives or whatever else he wants to introduce from his own point of view has to be timed to those moments when the client’s attention is available. The same remark uttered at two different times can have completely different results. 8. Be constructively opportunistic with confrontational interventions. When the client signals a moment of openness, a moment when his or her attention to a new input appears to be available, Schein finds he seizes those moments and tries to make the most of them. In listening for those moments, he finds it most important to look for areas in which he can build on the client’s strengths and positive motivations. Those moments also occur when the client has revealed some data signifying readiness to pay attention to a new point of view. 9. Learn from errors; everything is a source of data and errors are inevitable. No matter how well he has observed the previously stated principles, Schein will say and do things that produce unexpected and undesirable reactions in the client. An interventionist must learn from these mistakes and at all costs avoid defensiveness, shame or guilt. An interventionist can never know enough of the client’s reality to avoid errors, but each error produces reactions from which he or she can learn a great deal about his or her own and the client’s reality. (continued)

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Interlude 4.3 (continued) 10. When in doubt, share the problem. Inevitably, there will be times in the relationship with a client when an interventionist runs out of gas, doesn’t know what to do next, feels frustrated and in other ways becomes paralysed. In situations like this, Schein has found that the most helpful thing he can do is to share his ‘problem’ with the client. Inasmuch as it is the client’s problem and reality we are dealing with, it is entirely appropriate for an interventionist to involve the client in his or her own efforts to be helpful. Edgar Schein (1928 Is a former professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management, has made a notable mark on the field of organizational development in many areas, including career development, group process consultation, and organizational culture.

4.4

Assumptions behind ‘Dialogical OD’

As introduced at the end of Chap. 3, ‘generativity’ requires identification of the purpose that needs to be addressed and validated together with the participants who have a stake in/with this purpose. These participants, the so-called ‘stakeholders’, together form the whole social system as being the base for working with a contained dialogical system. Within this dialogical system, people actively co-construct their own subjective representations of what each of them considers to be the ‘reality’ (Vygotsky 1978). This echoes the philosophical view of the Russian psychologist Vygotsky, who suggested that social interaction precedes development, consciousness and cognition. Thus, acquiring new information is not about doing a diagnosis but mainly about an active process of exchanging our interpretations of our surroundings. Vygotsky’s social development theory is considered one of the precursors of a ‘social constructionist’ perspective. Part of this perspective includes the notion that if there are multiple realities, there can be no one transcendent, objective truth to be discovered. In this regard, dialogical OD is primarily based on a social constructionist perspective, emphasising change as a socially constructed process in which multiple interpretations are exchanged through dialogue (Bryant and Wolfram Cox 2014). In this section, we challenge the following main assumptions behind dialogic OD.

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Main Assumptions behind Dialogic OD Change is created by: • Perspective taking and shifting contexts. Perspective taking and shifting contextual conditions entice participants to perceive the same (own and others’) behaviour differently, and that emerging small changes in perception and sense making can lead to a radical pattern of changes. • Dialogue and enacting change. When people participate in a dialogue, they engage in multiple exchange processes with relevant others, they become more aware of their (position in their) surroundings, share, align and enact change. • Contained dialogical systems. In a temporary contained space in which people can try out things that are too risky to permit in day-to-day work, there is a safety in the confines of the dialogical system where people agree to function and interact differently but also agree to time and space limits.

4.4.1

Perspective Taking, Shifting Contexts and Emerging Change

As a scholarly way of looking at processes of organising and changing, social construction has gained more prominence in the last few decades (Campbell 2000; Cummings and Worley 2009; Jackson and Carter 2007; Worley and Feyerherm 2003; Bushe and Marshak 2009, p. 194). It is even believed that it has become one of the more promising theoretical approaches to developing OD further as a field, providing it with a more coherent theoretical underpinning (Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010). For example, dialogic OD has an inherently contextual nature that can help advance our understanding of dialogic processes in and between different groups of people (Heracleous et al. 2017). As previously introduced in Chap. 2, as a dimension of change, ‘context’ attributes meaning to ‘content’ and ‘process’ and ensures a logical coherence between all three. It has the function of an intermediary. Furthermore, as formulated by Lewin’s formula, B ¼ f(P, E), in Chap. 3, someone’s social perception cannot be seen as separate from the group or context that he or she is part of. In other words, there is an interdependent relationship between our social perception (as influenced by the context we are in) and the context we are in (as influenced by our social perception). Therefore, what we perceive as ‘reality’ differs with every change in the composition of the group/context. Thus, shifting a context by make changes in a group’s composition can be regarded as a means for shifting the members’ social perception of what they consider to be ‘reality’. This is also true when people start conversations with others from outside their own daily context. In sum, ‘context’ has a central and intermediary role and can be defined as ‘the social cohesion within which interaction takes place, and which is reproduced

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through interaction itself, and thus is itself content that has been established in an earlier phase of the process’ (Van Nistelrooij et al. 2013). Taking a social constructionist perspective helps us to look at certain issues from different angles and, while doing so, takes different (relevant) viewpoints into account. In the same vein, as a way of looking, and as a way of intervening, perspective taking has been shown to stimulate a social shared understanding within a diverse and even contradictory range of opinions as illustrated in Interlude 4.4. Interlude 4.4 Two (Sufi) Parables on Perspective Taking and Shifting Contexts Perspective taking is the cognitive capacity to consider the world from other viewpoints and ‘allows an individual to anticipate the behaviour and reactions of others’ (Davis 1983). Our individual perspective may be different from others because we each encounter only one small part of the surrounding reality that we are part of. Perspective taking is more than just being able to play back others’ arguments in order to check them for accuracy. It is the ability to comprehend and voice how the situation appears from another’s point of view (Goldsteing 2009). The first ancient (Sufi) parable, which is about an elephant and six blind men—wherein each man describes only the part of the elephant he is touching, thereby forming an incomplete representation of the whole—is an illustration of such differences. The parable has been put into verse as follows: The elephant and the six blind men (Hampden-Turner 1981; Shah 1970). Six wise men of India. An elephant did find. And carefully they felt its shape. (For all of them were blind). The first he felt towards the tusk, ‘It does to me appear, This marvel of an elephant. is very like a spear’. The second sensed the creature’s side. Extended flat and tall, ‘Ahah!’ he cried and did conclude, This animal’s a wall. The third had reached towards a leg. And said, ‘it’s clear to me. What we should all have instead. This creature’s like a tree’. (continued)

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Interlude 4.4 (continued) The fourth had come upon the trunk. Which he did seize and shake, Quoth he, ‘This so-called elephant. is really just a snake’. The fifth had felt the creature’s ear. And fingers o’er it ran, ‘I have the answer, never fear, The creature’s like a fan!’ The sixth had come upon the tail. As blindly he did grope, ‘Let my conviction now prevail. This creature’s like a rope’. And so, these men of missing sight. Each argued loud and long. Though each was partly in the right. They all were in the wrong. The problems, as suggested in this Sufi parable, arise partly because things normally perceived in three dimensions are being represented in only two. Even if the blind men in the first parable had agreed on the surface shape of the elephant, this would only have been one level of a ‘really true’ description. The Sufi story shows that ‘appearance is not necessarily reality’. There is also the question of point of view: looking at the same object from a different viewpoint or angle also gives the illusion of looking from a different context, which entices the observer to perceive the same object differently. This is illustrated in the second (Sufi) parable: The Zen master and his seven pupils One day a Zen master assembled his seven pupils for a morning walk. The dewdrops were shining beautifully in the light of the sunrise, looking far more precious than any pearls. At one of the larger dewdrops the Zen master stopped. He asked the pupils to gather around the dewdrop in such a way that they did not block the sun. The Zen master asked every pupil what colour the dewdrop was. The first said ‘red’, the second said ‘orange’, the third said ‘yellow’, the fourth said ‘green’, the fifth said ‘blue’, the sixth said ‘purple’ and the last pupil said ‘violet’. They were astonished by their differences, but all were confident about their own colour. They began to argue passionately, trying to convince the others of the accuracy of their description of the dewdrop’s colour. Then the Zen master asked the pupils to exchange places (continued)

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Interlude 4.4 (continued) and again say what colour the dewdrop was. And slowly they realised that despite their differences in perception, they had all told the truth. The above Sufi stories were told to teach a simple lesson but one that we often ignore: we all feel only one part out of many. Each of us perceives our own partial reality as a complete reality, experiencing it not as a part but as an independent, unique thing. Both stories also make an illustrative case for making good use of the existing different points of views to come to a new, more real, broadened reality. Or as Benne points out, ‘someone’s social perception changes according to whether, in a group context, people exchange different perspectives on the same situation open-mindedly’ (Pedler et al. 2003). In his own words, Benne writes: [I]t is about awareness of, empathy for and trying alternatives to how individuals perceive themselves and their environment. So, change in this regard is mostly a process of trying to feel the world as others in one’s group perceive and feel it. In this process, our own perceptual frames may be modified or at least recognised as belonging to us and operating as one among many other constructions of social reality (Tosey 1993). As illustrated by both parables in Interlude 4.4, perspective taking is the act of perceiving a situation or understanding a concept from an alternative point of view, such as that of another individual (Galinsky et al. 2008). In doing so, a person’s perspective shifts from any single place to a shared place with an overview of the whole. Traditionally, scholars of sense making and organisational change have examined the influence of actors’ processes of sense making within the context they are part of (Lockett et al. 2014, p. 1102). However, as illustrated in the above interlude, the reverse is also true: the way people make sense also depends on their unique individual angle, within the same context (Lockett et al. 2014, p. 1103). Thus, perspective taking and shifting contextual conditions go together with the emergence of small changes in our own processes of perception and sense making, which can eventually lead to a radical pattern of changes as shown by the research of Plowman and her colleagues (Plowman et al. 2007). Based on their empirical findings, it is amazing how quickly and easily language, gestures and opinions shift with even a slight enlargement of the bounded rationality people are in, because of their daily activities (Watzlawick 1989).

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Bounded Rationality

is the idea that human rationality is limited by, for example, the tractability of the problem, the cognitive limitations of the mind and the time available to make the decision. Participants, in this perspective, act as if they are seeking a satisfactory rational solution rather than an optimal one bearing in mind the limitations of the context they are in (Simon 1991). Nowadays, we (ought to) know that people are only partly rational and are irrational in the rest of their actions. Self-consciousness arises when an individual becomes an object to him or herself. However, as Mead and later Heidegger and Sartre argue, we are objects firstly to other people and secondarily—by taking the perspective of other people—to ourselves (Gillespie 2006). In joint activity, which Mead called ‘social acts’, people learn to see themselves from the standpoint of their co-actors (Mead 1934). Thus, every interaction contributes to the mental make-up of ourselves, the other and that which we are talking about. This means that after an interaction with someone, we go away as a (slightly) different person. According to Dixon, the additional information and the fuller comprehension of an alternative perspective both work to increase the development of new knowledge, especially in complex and socially ambiguous situations that continuously emerge in a changing context (Dixon 1998). This is of utmost importance when people’s work is isolating them from the rest of the organisation, in what can be called ‘silos’, leading to turf-territory disputes, ‘no-go areas’ and, because of the underlying processes of ‘splitting’ as introduced in Chap. 1, to the development of in- and out-groups (Briody and Erickson 2014). These examples involve difficulties with more or less mutually polarising perceptions, which can be slowed down when one voices the perspective of another. Such an intent inclines the other to disclose information more fully than if the other does not, emphatically, voice the other’s perspective. Thus, a fuller comprehension of all involved perspectives helps to increase the development of new knowledge on a complex issue (Dixon 1998).

4.4 Assumptions behind ‘Dialogical OD’

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Dialogue and Enacting Change

Ontologically, an organisation can be understood as an emergent property of dialogue3 as discussed in Interlude 4.5. Interlude 4.5 Dialogue as a Medium for Changing A dialogue is an open, equal and reciprocal conversational exchange of personal perspectives between two or more persons. Montagu and Matson, who did a lot of research in the 1970s on the impact of dialogue on human relationships, talk of dialogue when there is an open exchange of perceptions, where participants accept mutual differences and look for the right synthesis (Montagu and Matson 1979). More recently, ‘dialogue’ was introduced as a medium for organisation development, based on the work of quantum physicist David Bohm. He conceptualises dialogue as a meaning passing or moving through, a free flow of meaning between people in which the context is crucial to the process of sense making (Senge 1990; Schein 1993; Dixon 1998, p. 28; Isaacs 1999, p. 25, 1999, p. 19). In addition, Bohm emphasises the collective character of dialogue and the importance of the flow of meaning attributions (dia and logos). In this regard, dialogue can be defined as a well-organised conversation that allows for multiple exchange processes, constituting an intervention for realising change (Shaw 2002). Dialogue Is About Exchange and Not About Discussion As a tool for intervening, dialogue is much more an exchange process than a platform for discussion or debate. When people start a conversation in which they discuss what the suggested change means from where they stand, they typically take a position and defend it, holding to it. Others take up opposite positions with polarising results. In a discussion or debate, you fundamentally want your view to prevail. A sustained emphasis on winning is not compatible, however, with giving first priority to coherence, developing common ground or gaining mutual trust. In a dialogue, people start a conversation in which they exchange what they perceive as being the suggested change from their own perspective. Dialogue Is Based on Guiding Principles The use of dialogue principles is probably best illustrated by Foulkes’s analogy with the traffic in a town. The traffic corresponds to what we can call ‘transpersonal processes’ of emotions, experiences and reflections in a group. (continued)

Or as Sztompka conceptualises this point as ‘the illusion of reification’, ‘We think of states, bureaucracies, economies, social systems, etc. as super-individual, towering, often oppressive edifies, standing above us, distant from us, independent of our will land yet controlling our lives. But is only an illusion of our distorted imagination, the tendency to create hypostases (Sztompka 1991). 3

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Interlude 4.5 (continued) The individual houses and other buildings that together form a town represent the idea of several different people forming a social collective such as a group. As such, a town is a nodal point in a larger whole, the system, and dialogue is the traffic control system that keeps the traffic moving based on some principles or rules (Foulkes 1975). These so-called ‘guiding principles’ have no relation with the content whatsoever and can best be seen as the rules of a game, without which there would be traffic jams and roadblocks everywhere. In real group life, without these simple rules of engagement, we can expect the occurrence of dysfunctional group processes. Guiding Dialogue Principles Some simple rules of engagement (Weisbord and Janoff 2010)include: • • • • •

There are no bad ideas, so all ideas are valid. Listen to each other; ask questions for a good understanding. Accept deviant opinions and look for common ground. Monitor the given time frame. Write everything that is said at the table on flip charts.

David Bohm (1917 – 1992) Was a theoretical physicists and participant of the Manhattan Project who contributed to quantum theory, neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind. In ‘On dialogue’ (1990) dialogue is presented as a freely flowing group conversation in which participants attempt to reach a common understanding, experiencing everyone's point of view fully.

The purpose of starting a dialogue is to try to go beyond any one individual’s understanding, in which the principle of ‘perspective taking’ has an important role. As such, ‘perspective taking’ is a way of looking at how to help participants to extend their individual awareness of what is going on in their daily work. However, in itself it is not going to lead to organisational change per se. As discussed in more detail in Interlude 4.6, it is a welcome condition for starting and maintaining a dialogue as a process of co-inquiry, in which the participants are coming to a shared meaning. Interlude 4.6 Enacting Change We humans are real pros at deceiving others but firstly ourselves. To a large extent, this has something to do with the idea that our assumptions are continually in motion to justify our past, rationalise our current behaviour and make sense of events and circumstances in our lives (Lieberman 2005). (continued)

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Interlude 4.6 (continued) We often think that change is merely about rationally doing what makes sense, about doing things for the better—but to our disappointment, as, in general, the business cases in Chap. 1 show conscious rationalisation does not always work in our favour. Making sense of our situation is also a process of unconscious calculation. Making sense, as Weick argues, is not only about passively being but first and foremost about actively speaking out to explain our perspective. In this regard, exchanging our perspective with relevant others is about enacting change (Weick 1979). When people are enacting change, they are performing it by acting. According to Weick (1979, p. 5), acting is a form of enactment that occurs when people perceive differences in their stream of experience and give these differences closer attention. It is about giving attention, focus and making sense through which we create an environment that imposes on us. In an organisation context, as an activity, enactment consists of reconstructing plausible histories after the fact to explain where we are now, which Weick brings down to the following (iconic) question: ‘How can I know what I think until I see what I say?’ (Weick 1979, p. 5)

As a process, enacting gives us feedback to ourselves—so we hear for ourselves what it is that we are thinking and assuming. But it also gives us feedback on how our perspective relates to that of relevant others. Sometimes it surprises us when it turns out that these relevant others perceive the same context in a different way. While we truly believe that how we see things includes the best course of action to improve our common situation for the better, relevant others may disagree. The situation is not getting any better when we repeat our perspective, emphasising the unique features of our perspective. Moreover, things can even become unbearable as these others oppose us, more and more directly and more reluctantly. As it turns out in the business cases as introduced in Chap. 1, people become tired, experiencing that they are in an unsafe environment and, just like a rubber band, stretching only as far as they can before they snap back into their original position (Lieberman 2005, p. 79).Being true to our self and our convictions passively is, under these circumstances, more important than actively trying to realise a better situation.

Karl E. Weick (1936 Is an American organizational theorist who introduced the concepts of "loose coupling", "mindfulness", "sensemaking" ”enacting change” into organizational studies. In his book ‘The social psychology of organizing’ (1979) he introduces the means of the sensemaking recipe: “how can I/we know what I/we think until I/we see what I/we say.” Saying was enacting, seeing was selecting, thinking was retaining.

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Since Lewin’s days, experiences and developments in the field of OD have been focused on experimenting with inducing participants through altering their conversations to try out adopting ways of perceiving themselves and their situations (Lieberman 2005, p. 79). Habitual perceptions are considered to be challenged through an exchange of feedback between participants—a process that requires mutual trust and safety, which is why participants build up experience in attaching positive value to what others are saying, guided by the dialogue principles from, for example, Interlude 4.5. Almost regrettably, it is under these conditions that participants in the long run will proactively perceive and feel the world as relevant others perceive and feel it. During this process, their own perceptual frames may be modified, or at least recognised, as belonging to themselves and operating as one among many other constructions of the ‘current reality’.

4.4.3

Dialogical Systems

From a social constructionist perspective, ‘reality’ is not an absolute: it differs with the group or context to which the individual belongs. As a consequence, what exists as a reality for the individual is, to a large degree, determined by what is socially accepted as a reality within the total social setting of which we perceive ourselves and others to be part (Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010, p. 408)—a remark that echoes Allport’s 1948 foreword to Lewin’s book that ‘changing an individual is difficult and most likely to happen when the direct environment, the total social interactive setting, of the individual is included in the change intention’ (Allport 1948). In almost exactly the same terms, contemporary dialogical OD practitioners such as Bushe describe the importance of seeing the whole social setting reflected in the composition of a contained ‘dialogical system’. In other words, the more diverse the composition and representative a dialogical system, the more generative the outcomes are likely to be, as discussed in more detail in Interlude 4.7. Interlude 4.7 Working with Dialogical Systems A common image used to describe a dialogical system is what Bushe calls a container: ‘a time and space where normal business as usual ways of interacting is suspended so that different, generative conversations can take place’. (Bushe 2013) Such a container is, according to Dixon, about ‘a temporary contained space in which people can try out things that are too risky to permit in day-to-day work’ (Dixon 1998, pp. 77–78). There is a safety in the confines of the container where people agree to function and interact differently but also agree to time and space limits. Organisations may initially need these ‘contained’ times and spaces where ‘organisational members can experience what it is like to be in a different type of relationship with each other’ (Dixon 1998, p. 78). It is here where conversations shift and is what (continued)

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Interlude 4.7 (continued) most differentiates dialogic OD from diagnostic OD, especially the techniques or guidelines for how to create and facilitate those containers (Keeney 1983). The image of the facilitation of conventional OD interventions is grounded in social psychology and small-group dynamics but those do not fit in terms of working with ‘dialogic systems’. A dialogic system is about small groups with 15 to 20 participants, as long as it is a contained space, as we will discuss in more detail in Chap. 5. It is not their size that matters, it is the fact that they have a systemic composition representing the whole social system, that the space in which they exchange their perspectives is ‘safe’ and that they are designed to set the conditions for self-generated and self-regulated conversations to take place.

Gervase, Bushe & Bob Marshak Bushe is Professor of Leadership and Organization Development at the Beedie School of Business in Vancouver. Marshak has served on the Boards of NTL Institute and the Organization Development Network, and was Acting Editor of the Journal of Applied Behavioral Science. Their Generative Change Model, is a way to approach organizational change more aligned with today’s needs for an agile and engaged workforce.

4.4.4

Dialogical OD: The Role of a Generative OD Interventionist

When working with ‘dialogic systems’ in particular, the role of an interventionist is no longer seen solely as that of a ‘process facilitator’. Rather, as Bushe and Marshak stated, a generative interventionist is more of a ‘choreographer’, fostering conversations among participants and planning and designing the conditions for ‘disturbances’ and different perspectives to emerge (Bushe and Marshak 2013, pp. 195–196).Thus, a generative OD interventionist is referred to as someone who is ‘hosting’ (Brown and Isaacs 2005) or ‘convening’ (Neal and Neal 2011),and they are supposed to: 1. Not see themselves as problem solvers but as partakers in a dialogic process, always inviting local participants to jointly explore indeterminate situations and possible new pathways in a co-inquiry process. 2. Be a co-constructor, by acknowledging that participants play an equal part in the meaning construction processes during the inquiries and, while doing so, developing ‘relationally responsive’ practices with the participants instead of talking about them (Madsen et al. 2018).

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3. Immerse themselves, together with the participants, in the flow of meaning creation, encouraging participants to join in a shared journey and walk down unfolding and multiple pathways through shared explorations of what is going on (Madsen et al. 2018). 4. Be able to uncover and equally share their own ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions by constantly questioning their own experience before, during and after the exploration (Madsen et al. 2018). 5. Construct living, dialogically structured relations with the participants, and allow them to draw out spontaneous reactions from them, under which circumstances an engaged, responsive understanding becomes available to them from within (Shotter 2006). 6. Apply the idea of ‘withness’ thinking instead of ‘aboutness’ thinking (Shotter 2006, p. 599) (as introduced in Interlude 4.8) and explore how participants can unfold their own ideas and co-construct knowledge in new and innovative ways by adopting an approach that encourages collaborative reflexivity and a particular way of listening to the other participants. 7. Have a perspective in which notions of change contain paradoxical elements, whereby different and even opposite things are to be considered part of the same whole.4 This is usually done by asking generative questions that shift the focus from problems to possibilities. 8. Foster a contained save place for different conversations to take place, and host interactions intended to lead to useful outcomes. Interlude 4.8 ‘Aboutness’ Versus ‘Withness’ Thinking (Shotter 2006, p. 599) Aboutness is about monologic talk/thinking and being unresponsive to another’s expressions; it works simply in terms of an individual thinker’s ‘theoretical pictures’, which they must try to ‘get across’ to us in their talk. Thus, in aboutness thinking, as Bakhtin puts it, ‘another person remains wholly and merely an object of consciousness, and not another consciousness (continued)

4 According to the Greek Sophist, Heraclitus,’ things are not fixed, and nothing exists forever in a fixed state of being. In its clearest form, Heraclitus’ unification of apparent opposites depended upon an unfailing reciprocal movement between extremes. For example, night succeeds day and day night; therefore, night-day is a single continuum. This holds true for the other pairs of opposites as well. Therefore, he concluded with an intolerable leap of the imagination, all things are one. If the succession fails, the unity is destroyed, and with it the logic which relates man to his surroundings and is therefore so important to understand. The reciprocity must continue, and it does so, says Heraclitus. This is a reciprocal, cyclical movement—an unending vicious circle. As Kirk suggests, he would probably consider typical dichotomies like ‘physical-mental’, ‘organization-environment’ and ‘structure-culture’ to be false, because they are, in fact, ‘human constructs’ or ‘complementary gestalts’ as we called them in Chap. 3, with no fixed discrete boundaries, just fluent ones, which mostly depend on who’s looking (Kirk 1951).

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Interlude 4.8 (continued) (Bakhtin 1984). Monologue is finalised and deaf to the other’s response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any decisive force’. In other words, as Shotter argues, “it works simply in terms of ‘pictures’, thus, even when we ‘get the picture’, we still have to decide, intellectually, on a right course of action—‘The cat sat on the mat, the mat was red, the cat was black— get the picture?’ ‘Yes, so what?’ Such representational-referential talk does not engage us; it doesn’t spontaneously draw out any distinctive responses from us; and consequently, no action-guiding calls are aroused in us. Such talk leaves us ‘cold’, we say” (Shotter 2006, p. 599). Withness is about dialogic talk/thinking and occurs in those reflective interactions, with their utterances, with their bodily expressions, with their words—in such a way that the participants come into ‘contact’ with each other (Bateson 1972). Developing a more positive relationship with difference, for example, in opinion and perspective is not a matter of constructing identities but of a moving alterity (Levinas 1999; Serres 1995). Alterity is a philosophical term that refers to ‘otherness’ and to the encounter with ‘the other’, or what Martin Buber calls the ‘I-Thou meeting’.5 However, as Buber argues, ‘all real living is meeting’, and in our meetings with other humans, we generate the foundations of new consciousness (Winquist 1978). In other words, this meeting with the ‘other’ takes me out of myself and creates new understanding, that is, alterity, and as such it relates to an ontology of becoming (Steyart 2001). To sum up, a generative OD interventionist can be seen as a co-constructor, seeking to help participants to reflect on their world. He or she can try to help participants to learn to understand and change their perspectives in ways that are more congruent with the values and theories they espouse, meaning that ‘attributions and evaluations are illustrated with relatively directly observable data and the surfacing of conflicting views is encouraged in order to facilitate public testing’ (Argyris 1999). In Chap. 6, we are going to name this, while finding the right balance between advocacy and inquiry.

5 ‘All real living is meeting.’ With this statement Martin Buber refers to a particular kind of personto-person meeting that finds its highest expression in what he called the I-Thou meeting. Buber distinguished between two modes of relating, which he termed the I-Thou and I-It, as being extreme points on a relational spectrum. All of our contact with our human environment is located somewhere in between the I-Thou and the I-It positions. The I-Thou refers to a way of seeing and meeting the other as a person, or as Buber said, as an ‘end in itself’. It includes a mutual reaching towards and confirming of each other. It is a horizontal relating in which the other is seen and accepted as he or she is. Often a loving friendship or a caring parent-child relationship naturally displays qualities of an I-Thou meeting. The I-It refers to a way of relating to the other person as an object (Buber 1937).

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‘Process’ interven- ‘Generative’ ing ing

Interven-

Approach

• Diagnostic OD. • Identify (root of the) problem and desired change.

• Dialogical OD. • Identify common ground and shared purpose.

Activity

• Validate together with stakeholders the suggested interventions.

• Engage with stakeholders in a dialogue, exchange possibilities and possible interventions.

Method

• Joint diagnosis. • Sense – analyse – respond.

• Joint journey. – • amplify/scale up.

–

Change through

• Convergence on a • Generative process. solution and topdown implementation.

Desired outcomes

• Self-organising adaptive • Acceptance and actions that can be implementation of scaled up and embedded changes that adin ongoing practices in dress problems or timely ways. achieve desired results as quickly as feasible.

Role of interventionist

Style

• Performance• Possibility-oriented and oriented, directive supportive, back-endand front-loaded loaded effort. effort. • Co-construct the pur• Provide vision of pose that motivates desired future stakeholders and prostate, resources vide resources and clear and clear roles and frameworks and boundgoals. aries. • Talks about and looks from an “aboutness” perspective.

• Talks from within and looks from a “withness” perspective.

Fig. 4.5 Contrasting a ‘process’ perspective with that of a ‘generative’ perspective

4.5 Some Closing Reflections

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Some Closing Reflections

1. Contrasting a ‘Process’ with a ‘Generative’ OD Interventionist. In a diagnosing process, the interventionist seeks to give the client and/or the client system ‘insight’ into what is going on respectively around the client as a person, between him/her and the rest of the client system and/or within the client system as a whole. Process intervening, as summarised in Fig. 4.5, is also about validating, together with the participants, the outcome of a diagnosis. As the initiator, process designer and facilitator of the process, an interventionist can be more easily invited to position him/herself outside the system being observed— for example, as a director who oversees and monitors all that is happening— without participating as a co-constructor in the process. Intervening from a generative perspective assumes that people are more self-organising, sensemaking beings who act on the interpretations they develop about what things mean during the process (Bushe 2019). Often, new interpretations and meanings arise out of the (in) formal interactions people have with relevant and/or trusted others with whom they talk. Further, generative intervening is sensitive to the ways in which people interact and is focused on the changing conversations and the narratives people hold. Thus, the interventionist is much more part of the process, hosting the conversation, not as a facilitator per se but as a participant in conversation with the other participants as displayed in Fig. 4.5. 2. Managerial Consequences of Taking a ‘Generative’ Perspective. In contrast with the assumptions from Chap. 2, a managerial point of view is one among many ‘realities’ that are part of the same social system and that need to be brought forwards in the exchange process alongside all other relevant perspectives. This means that from a ‘generative’ perspective, (top) management is also a stakeholder and, as such, a participant in the ongoing dialogue. Because of the egalitarian and reciprocal way in which a dialogue develops, this can be a quite a challenge, not least because of contradicting assumptions about the role of management within the organisation by employees as well as by (top) management itself—for example, whether (top) management is supposed to be authoritarian (versus egalitarian), directive (versus participative) and unilaterally in control (versus co-constructive). Not explicating these assumptions can lead to confusion and even to tensions between the two parties. This is why it is always strongly advisable to: • Work with a contained dialogical system or a ‘process group’, as we are going to call it in the following chapters. • Spend time with the participants, considering each role—and especially that of (top) management—in terms of what is to be expected from each other. 3. Some Practical Consequences of Starting a Dialogue. A process in which specific stakeholders have the opportunity to unilaterally impose their perspective on the situation cannot be called a dialogue. The simple reason for this is that there is no equal and mutual exchange process of perspectives. Calling such a process a dialogue is like sailing under false colours and causes an inflation of the meaning of dialogue. Moreover, this is remarkably

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often the reason why participants distance themselves from what is happening. Consequently, they pull back within the boundaries of their own group, harness themselves to their own unchanged routines and sharpen their own opinions. Ultimately, this adds up to a breeding ground for unsupported accusations and palavering, which eventually results in a polarised us-versus-them atmosphere, as we describe in Chap. 1. Exchanging perspectives—as we have mentioned here— is not about trying to convince other people but is simply about mutual understanding. By using a dialogue as a vehicle for organisational development, we see at least two points of interest: (Senge 1990, pp. 66–67). • Sharing a purpose. As we see it, to establish a common ground, it is important that participants share a purpose and/or have a substantial stake in this purpose and its consequences. The conscious act of thinking of each other as stakeholders with a shared purpose contributes towards creating a higher-quality exchange process. This is why it is important to establish the right purpose, with the right participants, and come up with the right agenda. This cannot be done if we are defending our opinions, nor can it be done if we are convinced that our opinions are inconvertible facts. • Applying dialogue principles. Introducing a set of dialogue principles at the beginning of, and monitoring them during, the meeting may be handy. It helps participants to focus on how a dialogue works—that it is not about winning and that we all win if we do it right. It invites people to explore the thinking behind their views in such a way that it may become natural in their daily conversations.

Recap • Organisation development (OD) is grounded in the field of social psychology and originally known as an organisational change effort that is based on Lewin’s theory of change, is based on human and democratic values but also managed from the top downwards and that uses behavioural-science knowledge. • Since the turn of the millennium, there has been a relational turn in the social sciences, which has been influential in altering ideas about human change and human change practices. With this turn, there has been a differentiation within the field of ODC between diagnostic and dialogical OD. • Some of the main characteristic assumptions underlying—what now, with the upcoming shift in focus on dialogue, is retroactively labelled ‘diagnostic OD’— are still relevant to contemporary change practices, such as the assumption that people are more likely to change their own behaviour when they realise, as a function of their raised consciousness, that what they have taken for granted is no longer in line with reality. • In general, ‘dialogical OD’ is based on a social constructionist perspective, making use of dialogue intervention techniques such as appreciate inquiry and large-group interventions. As an approach to organisation change, it is primarily

4.6 Key Discussion Points

•

•

•

•

161

focused on helping organisations to engage people and identify common ground to arrive at decisions and actions in a bottom-up fashion. A dialogue is an open, equal and reciprocal conversational exchange of perspectives between two or more persons. During this exchange process, participants may experience that their own perceptual frames are being modified, or at least recognised as belonging to themselves and operating as one among many other constructions of the ‘current reality’. Contemporary dialogical OD practitioners describe the importance of seeing the whole social system reflected in the composition of a contained ‘dialogical system’. The more diverse the composition and representatives of the dialogic system, the more generative the outcomes are likely to be. In contrast to a process interventionist, a generative interventionist can be seen as a co-constructor, seeking to help participants to reflect on their world. They can help participants learn to understand and change their perspectives in ways that are more congruent with the values and theories they espouse. This brings us to the conclusion that exchanging perspectives as being part of an ongoing dialogue is not about trying to convince other people but is simply about mutual understanding of what is going on, what needs to be done and how it is going to be done.

4.6

Key Discussion Points

1. Open systems and dialogical systems. Rather than focusing on diagnosing organisations as being open systems, dialogic OD is focused on dialogue within a contained dialogic system. • Argue what the benefits are of working with a dialogic system. • Argue why this dialogical system is ‘contained’. 2. Unfreezing as a process of consciousness raising. The process of ‘unfreezing’ is about cleansing, opening and refining the doors of perception that over the years, combined with upcoming social constructionist insights, have been developed by practitioners and theorists into a process of generating generativity. Both have a staggering resemblance to consciousness raising, which, in line with Lewin’s convictions, is best done in a group whose members can share the diversity of their experiences and discover a core of similarity among them. • Describe the essence of being generative and compare this with the process of unfreezing; what are the major similarities and differences? • Argue why the process of consciousness raising is in fact also important within dialogical OD. • Argue why perspective taking stimulates generativity. • Argue why the processes of unfreezing, generativity and creating a sense of urgency can be related to each other. In what are they comparable?

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3. Differentiation between interventionist roles. In dialogic OD, the role of the interventionist is, as suggested, not solely that of a ‘facilitator’ as it is in diagnostic OD. Further, in dialogic OD the role of the interventionist is believed to be more of a host and/or a person who convenes meetings. • Describe the main distinctions between the two roles. • Argue which role you prefer (based on arguments coming from the text of this chapter). 4. Psychologically intervening from an OD perspective. From psychologically oriented organisational behaviour books, we learn that there are three levels of intervening as discussed in this chapter. The last of these is supposed to be the most in depth because it concerns the most personal and intimate aspects. • Argue if you think that this is also why change at this level is the hardest to achieve. • Argue which of the two OD variations you think is to be acted on at this third level. • Argue why this third level is about ‘second-order’ change. 5. Comparing diagnostic and dialogical OD with change management. OD and change management are supposed to help people generate organisational change. Try the following exercise. Get some paper and write down the first thing that comes to your mind in response to each question: • Who should be involved in an organisation change effort, and how should they be involved? • Who should make decisions about ‘what is going on?’ and ‘what we are going to do about it?’ Now, compare your answers with the (normative) descriptions and underlying assumptions of change management and OD (in general). • With which approach are your answers most linked? • Argue which approach you prefer: change management, OD or do you think it is possible to combine them? 6. A social constructionist strategy. If we ask you to construct a social constructionist change strategy, we presume that ‘context’ is going to be the main change dimension. • Argue why ‘context’ is the main dimension in such a strategy. • Describe the main assumptions behind such a strategy in the same regard as they are formulated in Sect. 2.3.2 regarding the classic change strategies. • Argue why you think it is (not) possible to engineer a planned change approach based on a social constructionist change strategy.

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5

Large-Group Interventions As Part of a Developing Learning Infrastructure

‘No one can force change on anyone else. It has to be experienced. Unless we invent ways where paradigm shifts can be experienced by large numbers of people, [organisational] change will remain a myth’ (Weisbord and Janoff 1995).

5.1

Introduction

Large-group interventions (LGIs) are a relatively new group of organisational change methods for involving ‘the whole system’ in a change process. As an intervention technique, LGIs are closely linked with Lewin’s action research, field theory and theory of change (Bunker and Alban 1997; Heracleous et al. 2017; Bartunek et al. 2011, p. 1). One of their denominators is that they all ‘get the whole system in one room’ (Weisbord 1987). In recent decades, ‘these large-group methods have been used in change efforts concerning (1) changes in strategic direction, (2) acceptance and implementation of quality programmes or redesign projects, (5) changes in relationships with customers and suppliers and (6) changes in structures, policies or procedures’ (Bunker and Alban 1997, p. xvi). Organising an LGI means we enable those who have a stake in the change purpose to exchange directly, face to face, their perspectives for establishing a common ground. Besides identifying a common ground, Weisbord speaks about four more activities that take place in most LGIs: reviewing the past, exploring the present, creating an ideal future scenario and making action plans (Weisbord and Janoff 1996). In the same vein, Coghlan also argues (Coghlan 1998) that the purpose of LGIs is not only to engage actors with a stake in a situation but also to promote ownership and create a commitment to act on the identified common ground and jointly developed plans. In this chapter we explore the possibilities of LGIs as a modular part of a participative process design, in which there is a need to systemically engage a

# The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. van Nistelrooij, Embracing Organisational Development and Change, Springer Texts in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51256-9_5

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large number of stakeholders in a collaborative dialogue session. Therefore, we will introduce and explore the following: • The most current LGIs, their historical background, their main sources and their added value in a change process. • How to combine social scientific research, based on action learning for building an LGI programme. • The main components of a learning infrastructure, its main activities, points of interest and how to develop it and how to use an LGI as part of such an infrastructure. • The pivotal role of a contained dialogical system, or ‘process group’ as we call it, and the way it prepares an LGI by doing one or more differential diagnosis. • The challenges and skills of being a generative interventionist facilitating an ongoing dialogue in a process group and an LGI. • Dilemmas and paradoxes regarding, for example, combining a dialogue with planned change, and the role of (top) management as a stakeholder or participant in the ongoing dialogue. We start this chapter with a short exploration of the historical background, main strands, types and characteristics of LGIs, after which we describe the possibilities of working with a developing learning infrastructure, action learning, a process group and doing a differential diagnosis. In Paragraph 5.4 we discuss some practical dilemmas regarding working with a developing learning infrastructure within the context of planned change. In Paragraph 5.5 we go into more detail about some of the practicalities of hosting a process group while developing a learning infrastructure. The chapter closes with some reflections, a recap of the main findings and some key discussion points.

5.2

LGIs: Background, Characteristics and Main Premises

LGIs have been used in recent decades in organisational change initiatives with a growing base of experience and empirical evidence (Bunker and Alban 1997, p. xv). As, for example, Worley and colleagues argue, LGIs can vary in several dimensions, including purpose (e.g. vision, strategy formulation, organisation design, implementation planning), size (from less than 50 to more than 2000 people), composition (mix of internal and external stakeholders), length (usually lasting between 2 and 4 days), structure (the agenda can be very rigid and formal or loose and informal) and number (single events or a series of linked conferences) (Worley et al. 2011). LGIs are based on a dialogic OD perspective and tend to have a common set of features, including the active participation of all stakeholders, an intense period of alignment prior to the collaborative dialogue session and a combination of divergent, creative and convergent decision throughout the process (Bramson and Buss 2002; Manning and Binzagr 1996; Garcia 2007).

5.2 LGIs: Background, Characteristics and Main Premises

5.2.1

171

Historical Background

In 1997, it was Bunker and Alban’s book Large Group Interventions that propelled LGIs into the mainstream of ODC. Since then, there has been a lot of activity and a number of publications and stories about the use of large-group methods for enacting large-scale change in the late 1990s and early 2000s, including the most recent volumes by Bunker and Alban and others (Bryson and Anderson 2000; Bunker and Alban 2006; Holman et al. 2007; Bunker 2010). However, little summative analysis has been written to inform scholars and practitioners (Arena 2009). Bunker and Alban observe that LGIs evolved out of four strands. The first is the development of the understanding of organisations as open systems. The second is ‘a shift from focusing on organisational problems that are rooted in the past to focusing on the future and its potential’ (Bunker and Alban 2006, p. 5). Particularly prominent in creating this shift was Lippitt’s ‘futuring technique’ (Lippitt 1980). Lippitt noticed that there was much more energy generated among people when they focused on a future they preferred than when solving problems. The third strand is the work done in the 1960s by the National Training Laboratory in which trainers worked with large groups ‘by creating small groups within a larger framework’ (Bunker and Alban 2006, p. 6). The fourth strand is that of the Tavistock Institute in the same era, focusing on the ‘living-learning experience’ and Lewin’s action research principle of ‘the here and now’ of a large-group setting for ‘the discovery, exploration and resolution of intragroup and intergroup tensions’ (Kreeger 1975a). These strands came together in the 1980s with Weisbord’s recognition that it was possible for OD consultants to work with all stakeholders, both internal and external to a system, linked with particular issues an organisation wanted to address (Bartunek et al. 2011, p. 5). In the late 2000s, Marshak and his collaborators highlighted a new (and fifth) strand that had a strong impact on the recent development of LGIs, namely, the dialogic approach that assumes that organisations are ‘meaning-making’ systems (Bushe and Marshak 2009, p. 353). In this regard, LGIs have been influential in the emergence of certain variants of appreciative inquiry, such as The Appreciative Inquiry Summit (Ludema et al. 2003b). As we discussed before in Chap. 4, these authors suggest that a dialogic model ‘starts from common aspirations and shared visions, making engagement in the change process more appealing’ (Bushe and Marshak 2009, p. 354). Today, LGIs are often applied as part of a change trajectory when people are trying to accomplish strategically meaningful change, and when emotions are running high (Shmulyian et al. 2010). However, when designed from a more social constructionist orientation, based on ‘dialogical OD’ principles, LGIs can also provide a strategic element that focuses on proactively creating the future together (Bartunek et al. 2011, pp. 6–7). In addition, LGIs provide an opportunity to co-inquire about the taken-for-granted assumptions regarding ‘the nature of the organisation’, ‘the way of doing things around here’ and ‘the way we change in the way needed to effect shifts in intended and realised strategies’ (Bartunek et al. 2011, p. 8).

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Examples LGIs for proactively creating the future

Examples LGIs for system-wide work design

The Search Conference

The Conference Model

(Emery & Purser, 1996)

(Axelrod & Axelrod, 2006)

Future Search (Weisbord & Janoff, 2010)

Whole-Scale™ Change (Beedon & Christie, 2006; Dannemiller Tyson Associates, 1999)

ICA Strategic Planning Process (Spencer, 1989)

Participative Design (Emery & Devane, 2007)

Real Time Strategic Change (Jacobs, 1994)

Large-Group Interventions

Examples of LGIsfor WholeScale™ participative work SimuReal (Klein, 1992)

Open Space Technology (Owen, 2008)

Work Out (Ulrich, Kerr & Ashkenas, 2002)

The World Café (Brown & Isaacs, 2005)

America Speaks (Lukensmeyer & Brigham, 2005)

Appreciative Inquiry Summit (Ludema, Whitney, Mohr & Griffin, 2003)

Fig. 5.1 Examples of types of large-group interventions and selected sources for gaining more information about each type of intervention (Axelrod and Axelrod 2006; Beedon and Christie 2006; Brown and Isaacs 2005; Dannemiller Tyson Associates 1999; Emery and Devane 2007; Emery and Purser 1996; Jacobs 1994; Klein 1992; Ludema et al. 2003a; Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2005; Owen 2008b; Spencer 1989; Ulrich et al. 2002; Weisbord and Janoff 2010)

5.2.2

Different Types with Different Change Purposes

Bunker and Alban distinguish LGIs based on proactively creating a desired future together compared to simply responding to what happens, redesigning work together as a whole system and whole-scale participative work that brings ‘the system together to do real work in real time on [immediate] problems, issues and agendas that need to be addressed’ (Bunker and Alban 1997, p. 155). Examples of all three types of interventions are shown in Fig. 5.1. Also included in this figure are sources from which more information about each of the LGIs can be gained. Each of these different LGI methods has its own specific set-up, programme and arrangements for stimulating a free flow of meaning in the whole system (www. futuresearch.net n.d.). For example, in a typical ‘Open Space’, the collective starts in one room with people seated in one or more large circles in which they can freely

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participate. Other typical LGI methods, such as Real Time Strategic Change, WholeScale Change, Future Search and The World Café, have the whole system in the room mainly arranged in small table groups of seven to eight people.1 Each table group represents the diversity of the invited stakeholders.

5.2.3

Action Learning as the Backbone of an LGI Programme

Most of the LGIs in Fig. 5.1 are based on a small table group arrangement and are divided into several successive activities, which through their sequence build up a common ground for one or more change objectives. These activities are prepared by a ‘container’ or ‘design team’ or, as we prefer to call it, a ‘process group’. As we discuss in Interlude 5.1, the phasing during an LGI is based on sociological and social psychological research, as was done in the 1950s, in which people ‘tend to move in their interaction from a relative emphasis on problems of orientation to problems of evaluation, and subsequently to problems of control’ (Bales and Strodtbeck 1951). Interlude 5.1 Generic Phasing during an LGI Dewey is often credited with the early formulation of a structured approach to problem solving in groups (Seeger 1983). He postulated five distinctive aspects of ‘reflective thought’—the process leading from a ‘perplexed, troubled or confused situation at the beginning’ to a ‘cleared-up, unified, resolved situation at the close’—namely (1) suggestion, (2) problem identification, (3) hypothesis generation, (4) reasoning and (5) testing (Dewey 1933). Based on their analysis of 22 group discussions, Bales and Strodtbeck report that group members, working on one specific kind of problem, would ‘tend to move in their interaction from a relative emphasis on problems of orientation to problems of evaluation, and subsequently to problems of control, and that, concurrent with this transition, the relative frequencies of both negative reactions and positive reactions tend to increase’ (emphasis in original) (Bales and Strodtbeck 1951). These phases are summarised in Fig. 5.2 with subsequent practical leading questions. These phases and their corresponding main questions can be applied for building up a generic LGI programme— certainly those LGIs with a small table group arrangement as depicted in Fig. 5.1. Such a programme starts with an introduction by the person who is hosting the collaborative meeting. After the introduction, he or she asks the (continued)

1

These tables need to be round because a circle is the only configuration that manifests equal participation—which is so central to dialogue. In round tables there is no ‘head of the table’, no place where all eyes are naturally focused (Dixon 1998, p. 101).

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Interlude 5.1 (continued) participants in the room to define first their own (micro) perspective regarding the subject at hand. After this, the participants explicate their own individual frame at their own table. Subsequently, the participants compare their own perspective with the perspectives of other stakeholders at their own table and by doing so create a more or less shared perspective on a meso level. After this, each table group shares its findings with the people in the room through a short presentation—contributing to a shared perspective on a macro level. This process contains a full communication cycle during this phase in this part of the programme, as is schematically illustrated in Fig. 5.3. As Dixon argues, this process is important because ‘individuals organise information differently if they are going to present it to others than if they are trying to understand it solely for their own use. It is in the act of speaking that people tend to organise cognitively what they know’ (Dixon 1998, p. 44). With this in mind, a generic LGI programme can have an outline as depicted in Fig. 5.4.

John Dewey (1859 - 1952) Was an American philosopher, psychologist, and educational reformer whose ideas have been influential in education and social reform. He is regarded as one of the most prominent American scholars in the first half of the twentieth century

As described in Interlude 5.1, LGI activities are primarily conceived and designed to focus on people’s learning abilities. The consecutive activities and exercises are designed in a cyclical process that provides opportunities to reconsider existing individual experiences and actions through collective reflection. After this, the participants generate new exchange processes, devise new actions, experiment with them, analyse the outcomes and incorporate the analysis into new terms and

Orientation

Evaluation

Control

(Imaging)

(Focusing & Selecting)

(Deciding)

• What is going on? • What do we know? • What do we not know? • What do we like? • What do we dislike?

• What is our purpose? • What do we accept? • What do we care • What do we decide? about? • Does everyone • What makes us sad? know what the decision is? • What makes us mad? • What are the condi- • Does everyone tions?

agree?

Fig. 5.2 Bales and Strodtbeck’s phasing with corresponding main questions

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Fig. 5.3 Communication cycle during a demarcated phase in an LGI programme

Fig. 5.4 Phasing in a generic LGI programme

concepts. Finally, it ends with a round for gathering initiatives and planning for action. Designing an LGI programme that follows such an action learning cycle promotes a transfer in one’s own and others’ insights. Revans, one of the original initiators behind action learning, argues that ‘[p]eople have to be prepared to explore the area of their ignorance with suitable questions and help from other people in similar positions’ (Revans 1966). One of his most

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influential successors, Kolb, argues that experience constitutes the driving force behind learning, which is why he maintains that immediate concrete experience, subsequent observation and reflection are the fundament from which new implications for action can be initiated. These implications then serve as guides in acting to create new experiences (Kolb 1976). As such, this sequence constitutes a cyclic learning process that can also begin with other steps, as long as it goes through the entire cycle. According to Kolb, only in this way can one arrive at personalised and meaningful knowledge, to be shared with all those involved. In this regard, it is also important to paraphrase Revans, who suggested that people learn more from reinterpretations and reconsiderations of their own experiences than from the acquisition of new knowledge (Revans 1966). In other words, rethinking information that is already stored in a human’s cerebral cortex leads more easily to new behaviour than further accumulation of new knowledge. Previous experiences are obviously subjective, complex and often poorly structured and as such difficult to access and open to multiple interpretations. In a typical LGI programme, such interpretations eventually seem to converge. This process of converging can be related to what nowadays is called ‘consensual validation’, which is based on the ‘assumption that any unbiased group that had access to the same information would arrive at a similar conclusion’ (Dixon 1998, p. 36). Because consensus can also be reached through coercion, relying on the interpretation of someone who claims authority through position, tradition, force or divine right, it is necessary to introduce some dialogue principles, such as those we introduced before in Interlude 4.5.

5.3

LGIs as Part of a Learning Infrastructure

For organisational change to happen, we need to develop a common ground (see Chap. 1) with those who have a stake regarding the change purpose. This is not only enabled by an LGI but primarily by working with a process group as the central part in a dynamic learning infrastructure, as we will illustrate in this section.

5.3.1

The Process of Developing a Learning Infrastructure

Learning is as much cognitive and behavioural as it is interpretative and interactive. In its essence it is about individual learning taking place in a social context with relevant others. ‘Relevant’ means those who share the same (change) purpose—in a context that facilitates experimenting with new behaviours, making observations and sharing reflections. In this regard, a learning infrastructure as meant here (see Interlude 5.2) is a multi-faceted and multi-group structure (see Fig. 5.5) in which the social context, the individual’s behaviour and interpretations all reciprocally influence each other and in which the context shifts with each new change purpose. However, it appears that such a learning infrastructure does not automatically form a

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The elephant from Interlude 24

Differentiating, validating and diagnosing

Management alignment

Process group (functioning as a dialogical system or container

Collaborative dialogue session

Management Feedback loop for management for decision-making

Fig. 5.5 An illustration of a learning infrastructure

nurturing environment for learning from the beginning. Supporting and facilitating learning in being self-corrective requires not only a specific (dynamic and cyclic) structure but also specific attention from the interventionist(s). Interlude 5.2 A Developing Learning Infrastructure With information flooding companies, management must ensure that employees see that the change process is a priority and is permanently present and that key information that is brought in by its participants is not lost. Therefore, one key requirement under these circumstances is maintaining the exchange process between stakeholders, not by controlling it but by developing and installing new feedback devices that will facilitate monitoring progress towards the stated change purpose, and not only for those who participate directly (Nadler 1993). Another key requirement that is associated with managing change in such pluralistic settings is the development of sufficient coherence. Denis, Lamothe and Langley argue that in situations where power is diffused and there are divergent objectives, change initiatives need to be led by a collective leadership group rather than a single individual (Denis et al. 2001, p. 8.16). (continued)

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Interlude 5.2 (continued) Collective leadership embraces the idea that many individuals within a system may lead or that groups, structures and processes may exercise leadership to help networks advance towards a shared goal. It is essential where a single individual is unable to formulate and implement, for example, a vision that is acceptable to a sufficient body of powerful stakeholders. Collective leadership is characterised by: (Ospina and Foldy 2015) – Connecting people within diversity. – Shaping the way participants view their work and how they perceive themselves and others and how they understand leadership itself. – Committing to take up leadership at all levels by people from all backgrounds, with varying perspectives and expertise. – Combining directive behaviours and collaborative approaches. – Aiming to transgress boundaries that are often taken for granted. We speak of a learning infrastructure when: 1. A temporary organisation structure is formed that takes us out of the day-today pressures into a contained space/dialogical system, called a process group, in which we can safely experiment, practise and learn (Kim 1994). This process group is treated as the core of the learning infrastructure. 2. Within this process group a learning atmosphere is created through direct, face-to face communication, open exchange of perspectives and reflections (Worley et al. 2011). 3. One or more differential diagnosis, as we will discuss further on in this chapter, is carried out by the process group, validating, for example, the change purpose, the scope of the process, the level of participation and every upcoming relevant (in between) process outcome. 4. There is a feed-forward loop (e.g. an assignment) and a feedback loop (e.g. the outcome of the differential diagnosis) linking the process group directly and reciprocal with management, maintaining an open and interactive contact during the ongoing process. 5. There is a form of collective leadership that is acceptable to a sufficient body of powerful stakeholders. 6. The process group decided to organise an LGI in which a critical mass of people is invited that is representative for all the involved stakeholders. The learning infrastructure as, for example, schematically depicted in Fig. 5.5 can be regarded as a participative architecture creating the scaffolding in a project-oriented way that can initiate a dialogue with multi-stakeholders. (continued)

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Interlude 5.2 (continued) As depicted in Fig. 5.5, a developing learning infrastructure consists of four main processes: 1. The ongoing process of management alignment. 2. The ongoing process of perspective taking, exchanging possibilities, validating and diagnosing within a contained dialogical system, called a ‘process group’. 3. The optional collective sharing, exchanging and imaging process during a collaborative dialogue session (the LGI). 4. The ongoing process of feedback, decision-making and feed forward. Management alignment is the process of coming to unified collective leadership, in which members of a ‘leadership constellation’ (collective leadership group) work together and having different but complementary roles (Hodgson et al. 1965). For example, some may focus their attention on communication with external relations and the management of the relations with other parts of the organisation, whereas others may manage relationships with particular internal specialised constituencies (e.g. HRM, Operations, Logistics). At the core of the learning infrastructure (in the middle of Fig. 5.5) is the process group, which contains 15 to 20 people. The members of this process group are invited because of their representative perspectives, which are believed to be needed to see the whole situation as the metaphorical elephant in Interlude 4.4. This means that the process group is a cross section of all stakeholders resembling the total force field or social system, which: 1. Consists of all stakeholders, and its composition reflects the dynamics of the system. 2. Starts as early in the process as possible. 3. Introduces not only a more reflective way of working together but also helps in validating the system boundaries, the level of participation and the scope of the process from all the combined, relevant perspectives. 4. Prepares and computes the outcomes of the collective dialogue sessions. 5. Establishes feed-forward and feedback processes with management (Kim 1993).

5.3.2

The Process of Scoping from the Bottom Up

Realising generativity is about handling the right issues with the right people in the here and now, starting with determining the scope of what needed to be changed (see Interlude 2.5). From a strategic point of view, scoping is about determining impact

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and scale of the change by (top)management. However, from a ‘generative’ point of view, scoping is about determining the boundaries of a dialogical system together with participants who are (supposed to be) representative for the whole social system. By asking the participants during the first meetings questions about how they perceive the change purpose in relation to their daily work, we can observe in a direct way how they perceive what is essential and what other people/perspectives need to be included. Or as Hall and Fagen have put it: ‘The decision as to which relationships are important and which trivial is up to the person dealing with the issue, i.e. the question of triviality turns out to be relative to one’s interest’. (Hall and Fagen 1956) By asking the others present to respond on this from their own perspective, they all get quickly a rich picture of their current reality. If participants perceive their own relationship with the change purpose as essential, it seems obvious that they are indeed part of the whole social system and that their place in the process group is essential. However, until now, we have only figured out two of the three elements needed for scoping a whole social system: ‘purpose’ and ‘people’(see Sect. 3.4.2). To establish definitive boundaries of the whole social system as it relates to the current purpose, it is necessary to look also at the mutual relationships, that is, to look at the way participants react on each other’s perspective. For example, when people don’t react at all, it is important to ask them why they don’t. If they, for example, don’t see the connection themselves, and/or don’t believe that it affect them, while it should be—because their daily work is interrelated with that of the other—the situation can become quite complex. It is also possible that their work isn’t actual interrelated, or the opposite, that it completely resembles. Subsequently, the question becomes if these perspectives are essential/ relevant in regard to the change purpose. If people feel connected and affected by each other’s perspectives, it is to be expected that they react in a way all participants know too well. In these cases, we speak of predominantly autonomous behaviours that participants have developed— in reaction to each other’s actions in the (recent) past.2 As we discuss them in more detail in Interlude 5.3, these autonomous or symptomatic behaviours are in fact, action-reaction patterns (see Sect. 2.4). In general, they have the function of maintaining the equilibrium of the whole social system: to keep things as they are—in a continuing steady state. Interlude 5.3 ‘Scratching an Itch’: An Example of Symptomatic Behaviour Keeney compares symptomatic behaviours to the kinds of behaviours that occur when ‘scratching an itch’ or during a so-called bugle call. In the first (continued)

2

By its very nature a social system consists of interaction, and this means that a sequential process of action and reaction has to take place before we are able to describe any state of the system or any change of state (Lennard et al. 1960).

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Interlude 5.3 (continued) metaphor, that of an ‘itch’, individuals experience an unpleasant sensation that evokes a scratching reflex. As such, ‘scratching’ is a reflex, an automatic response with one purpose, namely, removing the itch, which in turn might be a symptom of a problem that lies at an underlying, deeper level. Both the ‘problem’ (the itch) and the ‘solution’ (the scratching) are ‘symptomatic behaviours’ that keep each other ‘locked’ in a vicious circle. The second metaphor, that of the so-called bugle call, starts with the commander’s order for a trumpet cue to activate their regiment. Conditioned by intensive training, the response of every individual soldier to a ‘bugle call’ is identical, and the entire regiment behaves in unison, in an unconscious and automatic way. Both of Keeney’s metaphors can be related to the example of the business university, as we discussed in more detail in Sect. 2.4. In this example, the CEO calls weekly for another ‘all-consuming’ latest update of the financial status of the business university. As was the case in this example, people respond reflexively, doing what they are used to doing, diving away, while crying out loud ‘BOHECA!’3 and without looking at the consequences of their own behaviour. Mostly, these kinds of automatically induced behaviours are carried out without any goal-directed intervention, but as the example of the ‘bugle call’ shows, this is not necessarily so. Nevertheless, what we try to argue here is that a social system adjusts itself by generating symptomatic behaviours: the ‘itch’, ‘the scratching’, ‘the bugle call’ as well as the wellconditioned response. The underlying principle is that of co-emergence, as illustrated by the earlier discussed seesaw pattern in Fig. 2.6 that requires at least two parties to keep it moving.

Bradford Keeney (1951 Has served as a professor, founder, and director of clinical doctoral programs in numerous universities. He was mentored by anthropologist Gregory Bateson, and cybernetic scientist Heinz von Foerster. In ‘Aesthetics of Change’ (1982) he argues that the full benefits of the therapeutic process cannot be realized without fundamental revision of the concept of change itself

3 BOHECA” (“Bend Over HEre Comes Another”), for as we know, used for the first time in the article of Connell and Waring in a slightly different manner as ‘Bohica’ (Bend over here it come again), to be believed as a cry out loud for a sense of cynicism, which the authors define as uncertainty, doubt, scepticism and distrust towards any proposed change, or as a common usage among ‘change-weary’ employees. However, as a concept in the organizational change literature, it became well-known as ‘BOHECA’, used openly in the publication of Clegg and Walsh introduced as the words cry out loud when employees are suffering from initiative fatigue (Connell and Waring 2002; Clegg and Walsh 2004).

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When (part of the) individual participants present in the process group, display symptomatic action-reaction patterns during the first meetings of the process group, it is probably a good assumption that their mutual relation is interdependent. Something that can be checked by asking them personally how they themselves perceive this, but also by asking the others present. In fact, with this line of follow-up questioning, we can activate new symptomatic behaviours also from the others. Which gives an indication if they are part of the same social system and/or if there are any subsystems present. There are two general types of symptomatic behaviours that can be distinguished: the type that is symptomatic for maintaining the existing problematic issues and one that is symptomatic for trying to solve these issues. Intertwined as these opposite types of symptomatic behaviours are, they are both equally related to the system’s purpose, and as such form a complementary gestalt, as introduced earlier in Chap. 3. In other words, while the involved parties are continuously, automatically acting and reacting on each other’s proposals, (perceived) intentions and actions, together they are compensating for each other, keeping the whole in a dynamic balance. These actions and counteractions can be seen as a back and forth movement, which often happens automatically and unconsciously and, for those involved, is frequently even self-explanatory. In this way executed, scoping from the bottom up is much more an iterative process. The iteratively can be seen as a symptom of the fact that the participants are dealing with interdependence in regard to: 1. The change dimensions: content, process and context—for example because of the exchange of perspectives regarding questions like: ‘What is the change initiative about?’, ‘What does it mean to us?’, ‘What is going to be the impact and for whom?’ and ‘What is to be expected during the process?’ 2. The personal perspectives within the process group—a person has to think not only about what he or she believes is real but also about what other participants in the process group think is real—or in other words, by exchanging our perspective, each person does affect and depend on what everyone else does. 3. The overarching change purpose of the whole (macro), the purpose as the participants perceive it for themselves (micro) and how both contribute to the development of a common ground.

5.3.3

The Process of Executing a Differential Diagnosis

To make good use of the existing various relevant points of view that broaden our existing perception of reality, we introduce a process that probably best can be compared with the way a differential diagnosis is developed in medicine. This method was popularised in the TV series House, M.D., as discussed in Interlude 5.4.

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Interlude 5.4 House M.D., an Example of Doing a Differential Diagnosis In the popular American medical drama series House M.D., which ran from 2002 until 2012, the viewer becomes well acquainted with a powerful diagnostic method used in medicine known as a ‘differential diagnosis’ (Sanders 2009). In general, a differential diagnostic procedure is a systematic diagnostic method used to identify the presence of a disease entity where multiple alternatives are possible. This method takes advantage of different angles, points of view and specialised backgrounds and is essentially a process of obtaining information that shrinks the ‘probabilities’ of candidate conditions to negligible levels. In the ‘differential’, all diseases that cause the symptoms seen in the patient are considered. In the series, the diagnosis is done by a team of multiple-discipline diagnosticians. The way the patients’ symptoms are diagnosed in the series is a typical illustration of applying Bateson’s ‘double description’. The diversity of the physicians’ backgrounds guarantees a broad and ‘binocular vision’, and the way possible diseases are eliminated is a nice example of how to realise a moiré effect between different colleagues.

A moiré effect is an interference pattern produced by overlaying similar but slightly offset templates. A simple example is obtained by taking two identical ruled transparent sheets of plastic, superposing them and rotating one about its centre as the other is held fixed. What is meant here is the combination of two similar but slightly different perspectives on the same situation brought together causing an effect of a (synergetic) new perspective on the same situation. A ‘differential diagnosis’ is less straightforward, but as a process of freely exchanging perspectives on the same situation, it can be very effective. A differential diagnosis can be seen as a never-ending cycle in which we: 1. Observe what is happening as we work. 2. Capture our observations and reflect upon them. 3. Meet on a regular basis to reflect so that we can classify, prioritise and select problems. 4. Solve the problems we have selected. (continued)

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Interlude 5.4 (continued) Here, we apply a differential diagnosis to all areas, aspects and perspectives that are relevant for establishing a jointly shared vision of the current reality. Such a shared vision represents all perspectives of the people with a stake in the change purpose (e.g. employees, managers and even external parties when needed), as we will illustrate with an extended case description in Chap. 10. This ensures that the problems selected address the real needs of the business and its customers. The process of establishing a differential diagnosis as introduced in Interlude 5.4 is a recursive process of changing the way people perceive things in relation to the other perspectives of what is going on in their context. Although it is elementary in theory, it is very challenging to apply in practice (Palazzoli et al. 1978). Just like the two Sufi parables in Interlude 4.4, it illustrates that the potential effect of ‘perspective taking’ lies in establishing a shift of the participants’ individual and idiosyncratic perspectives towards a more interrelated and interdependent perspective.

5.3.4

The Process of Preparing an LGI

In contrast to the small process group, an LGI is a collaborative meeting that includes at least 40 to 50 participants (Hopper and Weyman 1975). The combination of small and large groups as depicted in Fig. 5.5 is not based on an iron law. In fact, it is flexible, context-dependent and tailor-made (Pedler et al. 2003). There are several reasons for organising an LGI as a part of a learning infrastructure, for example: 1. To address organisational problems and opportunities from different angles with a so-called ‘critical mass’ representative for the whole social system (Worley et al. 2011). 2. To accelerate, by creating common ground during the LGI with this critical mass on the why, how and what of the change initiative. 3. To create generativity by doing a differential diagnosis with this critical mass, by ‘unfreezing’ the existing perceptions of reality by focusing on questions like ‘what is happening in the here and now?’ and ‘what is needed to make this change initiative successful?’ 4. To learn in real time with all stakeholders interacting with each other in the same room. After ending a full cycle as depicted in Fig. 5.5, and with every new assignment, a new purpose is to be constructed, a new social system is demarcated, and eventually a new correlating composition of the process group is made up that fits the new purpose. With each start, there is also the opportunity to identify a distinct set of problems and challenges that need to be addressed in real time. Moreover, we can

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pull these problems and challenges apart and explore them while being mindful of the whole. However, before all those involved engage in an LGI, it is believed to critical, in terms of achieving success, that: 1. The process has gone through a full process of management alignment concerning its own role related to the scope, the assignment and the purpose. 2. There have been enough gatherings with the process group to design a mature LGI programme, and there is a certain amount of security felt that the LGI is going well. 3. The process has gone fully through the scoping process.

5.4

Some General Challenges with Organising LGIs

In greater numbers, organisations are implementing more agile, flexible and changeable structural designs, accelerating the need to initiate learning processes for their members and manage change more suited to this need (Worley et al. 2011). Among the practices addressing organisation agility and innovation, LGIs are one of the fastest-growing and most popular OD interventions (Stacey 2005). This is because LGIs provide space for emergent processes to occur; that is, they provide an opportunity for ‘dialogue and emergent self-organisation within certain boundaries and demarcations’ (Stacey 1996; Axelrod and Cohen 1999). Some of these boundaries have something to do with the scope, the number of LGI-participants and its pre-planned phasing as suggested in Interlude 5.1. When freedom of choice is a prerequisite for internally committed change to emerge, we suspect at least some typical dilemmas and a paradox when a dialogue is to be planned.

5.4.1

Pre-Planning ‘Emerging’ Objectives: A Participation Dilemma?

Because a collaborative dialogue session has to be planned, people can get the feeling that they are being manipulated by the suggestion of the ‘open’ character of the dialogue they are supposed to engage in during an LGI. It was Lewin who was able to summarise the essence of this so-called ‘participation dilemma’ in one sentence. He (and Grabbe) writes: Many people assume that the creation [. . .] of an atmosphere of informality and freedom of choice cannot possibly mean anything else but that the re-educator [the interventionist] must be clever enough at manipulating the subjects to have them think that they are running the show (Lewin and Grabbe 1948).

The feeling of being manipulated can be exacerbated by, for example, frustrating previous experiences during earlier interventions, an (perceived) existing authoritarian organisational culture and/or a dominant interventionist style. In these cases, people can easily be distrustful regarding the large scale of these gatherings. This makes it a challenge to:

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1. Organise a match between what is expected by the participants and what management has pre-planned as objectives. 2. Overcome the expected roles of everyone involved concerning their underlying assumptions regarding how we ‘ought to do things around here’. 3. Explicate some typical assumptions of (top) management on the subject of change and participation during the process of management alignment (see Fig. 5.5). With regard to this ‘participation paradox’, it can be useful for the interventionist to take a critical look inwards regarding his or her own personal assumptions in relation to the purpose of starting a participative change process, especially when it involves developing a learning infrastructure consisting of an LGI.

5.4.2

Individual ‘Airtime’ within an LGI: A Counter-Intuitive Point of Critique?

Lewin and Grabbe have a point of critique regarding the insistence on freedom of acceptance when they argue that since an intervention: [. . .] aims to change the system of values and beliefs of an individual or group, to change it so as to bring it in line with (perceived) reality, it seems illogical to expect that this change will be made by the subjects themselves (Lewin and Grabbe 1948).

Weick and Quinn seem to have the same point of critique when they suggest that getting enough individual space during a collaborative dialogue session appears to be difficult to reconcile with its collective and system-wide nature. They suggest that ‘large-scale change in large groups is counter-intuitive, since size and participation tend to be negatively related’ (Weick and Quinn 1999). This is certainly true in unstructured crowds as discussed earlier by, for example, Freud, Le Bon and Kreeger? (Freud 1922; LeBon 1903/1895; Kreeger 1975b; Van Nistelrooij 2018) This counter-intuitive point of critique can be circumvented when the programmed process offers enough freedom for the individual participants to be able to exchange perspectives in an equal and mutual manner, to experiment and to voice their opinions in a constructive way. By listening to others—learning how they experience the change issues and challenges—participants seem to realise that there is more to these problems than they can see and that they in fact need each other to handle them. All these insights, experiences and feelings ensure that the participants leave slightly changed from there where they came from; this includes those actively engaged members of (top) management. So, as it seems, there are some design criteria to gather a large group of people to involve individual participants in such a way that there is enough space to voice their own perspective. That is why: 1. Although LGIs work with critical masses of people, this does not mean they involve a large group per se. An LGI is not about numbers per se but about to

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have at least 40 to 50 people in one room that together form a systemic whole representing all relevant perspectives, including those from the higher management layers when they have a direct stake in realising the change purpose. 2. Regarding the composition of how the participations are seated, the layout of most LGI sessions is structured and can best be compared to that of a café. For example, a large group of 300 people can be divided into about 40 small table groups. Such a table group forms a microcosm of the whole social system, which means that at each table all stakeholders are represented, which means that at these tables, each participant has enough airtime to voice his or her perspective. As in a café, the exchange of these individual perspectives can be interesting and personal, no matter how many other people are present in the room. Moreover, such a café layout permits a lot of people to talk simultaneously about the same question. 3. As discussed and illustrated before in, for example, Interlude 5.1, the individual insights are converged with short table presentations to the other participants seated at the other tables in the room.

5.4.3

Managing a Participative Change Process: A Wicked Two-Way Effort?

Because people are given the feeling that they are supposed to speak out ‘freely’, a collaborative dialogue session can easily give participants the idea of being ‘empowered’. However, to be really empowering people it means also that (top)management has to accept the outcomes of an LGI even if it leads to the challenging, or even the abandoning, of the existing managerial practice. That is why it is important that the scoping regarding the purpose, scope, impact and level of participation is set early in interaction with a systemic composed process group, preferable with a member of (top) management in their midst. That is why: 1. That (top) management and relevant executives are involved in co-constructing the scope and also that they are aware of the implications of these demarcations and the consequences for their roles during the upcoming process, especially during their possible appearance in the process group and in the LGI. 2. Those members of (top)management who have a stake need to know that their wisdom is seldom wiser than the wisdom of the crowd (Surowiecki 2004). The reason for this is that when a critical mass during an LGI develops an emerging wisdom, (top) management knows what to be expected from a true participative process and regarding their role in a developing learning infrastructure. 3. It is important that those of (top) management identify themselves as stakeholder and are truly accepted as such by the other process group members. The idea behind this is that once people are part of a process group, they are not only more informed but also more involved, in what is going on and what is to be expected regarding the outcomes. Therefore, in general, (top) management is, despite its busy schedule, mostly better off having an open exchange with other stakeholders

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in the process group, not only in building trust and mutual commitment but also to enrich their own perspective. That is why, as will be discussed in more detail at the end of Chap. 8, it is a prerequisite during the first encounters with a client system to elaborate in more detail the demarcations of the purpose, scope, impact and level of participation. In order to co-construct these demarcations as effectively as possibly during these first encounters, it is also necessary to go into closed issues with the client, asking the members of the process group the same questions and reporting the findings back to the client for further elaboration. This includes an iterative process that serves validation purposes but also the commitment of all those who are to be involved in the upcoming change process.

5.4.4

On Consensus and Conformity: A Polluted Process?

During an LGI there is always a risk that one or a limited number of dominant perspectives quickly lead to the establishment of a one-dimensional current reality, which insufficiently fits the practical facts and therefore does not adequately exchange the perspectives regarding the change issues at hand. In this case, it is as if there is a consensus, a broad shared opinion, but in fact, there is only an illusion of unanimity. In this regard, Salomon Asch, famous for his ‘line’ experiments on judgement and perception, stated that: Life in society requires consensus as an indispensable condition. But consensus, to be productive, requires that each individual contributes independently out of his own personal experience and insight. When consensus comes under the dominance of conformity, the social process is polluted and the individual at the same time surrenders the powers on which his functioning as a feeling and thinking being depends (Asch 1955).

The collaborative gathering during an LGI is not about gaining consensus or having a debate about who is right but about the quality of the exchange process itself. It is about developing generativity, a shared and enriched picture, or better, a series of generative pictures, as realistically as possible. Thus, all who are contributing develop insights while doing so regarding ‘what is going on’ and ‘what needs to be done’. However, this means that a lot of the success of an LGI depends on the quality of the process of the dialogue during the meetings of the process group as well as during the LGI itself. In fact, the quality of the process depends hugely on the following criteria: 1. The diversity and representativity of the systemic composition of the process group. 2. The discipline of the individual participants, in terms of respecting the guiding dialogue principles as introduced in Interlude 4.5.

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3. The quality of the interventionist in generating ‘generativity’ within the process group and later on, during the LGI. Under ‘normal’ circumstances, these simple criteria are picked up very quickly by the participants and seem to work very well as guidelines for a qualitative exchange process. However, as we are going to discuss in Sect. 7.3, these gatherings do not always take place under ‘normal’ circumstances. That is why an LGI on itself is not a panacea. Starting a dialogue within a contained space as is the case in a process group can give early in the process an indication of the presence of processes such as ‘defensive reasoning’, ‘groupthink’ and the ‘Abilene paradox’. When present as such, the current reality is polluted indicating that there is—in general—a contraindication to go forwards with starting an LGI.

5.5

Typical ‘Generative’ Skills in Working with a Process Group

Where there are disturbances, and or differences in opinion, there is tension, energy, movement and more awareness of things becoming less taken for granted. That is, those things are changing as we speak. When things are changing, or are bound to change, things may be perceived as less solid and more fluent. That is why it is important that the composition of the process group is as diverse as the composition of the whole system. This means that the perspectives, as presented in the process group, originate from different parts and/or echelons of the whole social system they together represent. Being in such a contained representative dialogical system helps to unfreeze participants from the way they are used to perceive what is going on within the boundaries of their own department. It also helps them to focus on the ‘real’ connections and relationships in their daily work—that extend these boundaries. In this section we discuss some of the main skills of an interventionist, needed for helping participants with this process of ‘unfreezing’.

5.5.1

The Skill of Working in a Heterarchical Way by Abductive Reasoning

In a process group, a generative interventionist can try to do things more in a heterarchical or egalitarian way by stimulating a more equal exchange of perspectives.

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Heterarchy involves all possible relations that are within a certain contained group of people at a certain moment in time. Heterarchy enables both positive and negative feedback between the members of this group. As Plowman and his colleagues argue, it stimulates the members towards a bounded instability as a way of working (Plowman et al. 2007; Dougherty 2016). For this a generative interventionist stimulates from the start abductive reasoning and self-correcting feedback skills.

Deductive logic

Inductive logic

Abductive logic

Lead down

Lead into

Lead away

Conclusion Is guaranteed true

Conclusion Is probably true

Conclusion Is a best guess

Abductive reasoning is a form of logical inference that starts with an observation or set of observations and then seeks to find the simplest and most likely explanation. This process, unlike deductive reasoning, yields a plausible conclusion but does not positively verify it. Abductive conclusions are thus qualified as having a remnant of uncertainty or doubt, which is expressed in terms such as ‘best available’ or ‘most likely’ (Magnani 2001). At first, this can be a bit provocative for those who are used to having hierarchical power over others. On the other hand, others who are not used to communicating directly with senior management, or even with people from different departments, may be a bit reluctant to speak out freely. In these cases, participants try to avoid awkward situations and anxiety. Uncertainty, mistrust and anxiety are dysfunctional for learning and participative processes (Van Nistelrooij 2018). As Bushe argues, a process group that functions, in the first place, as a contained dialogical system will help to lower the participants’ anxiety level (Bushe 2010). Speaking out freely is about having the feeling it is ‘save’ to do so, getting enough space to describe your own perspective on the issue and about letting two or more of such descriptions of the same issue be as they are. The in-depth exploration within a process group is about offering each individual member the opportunity to come forwards with his or her own interpretation of what they perceive as problematic or as a ‘solution’. Allowing two different descriptions of the same issue is in fact a ‘double

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description’. These double descriptions can, when well facilitated, create a more in-depth experienced reality. A double description refers to two or more descriptions or interpretations of the same situation that make a difference in our own (social) perception of what is happening in this situation. The effect can be compared with a moiré effect as described in Interlude 5.4.

5.5.2

The Skill of Reducing and Absorbing Anxiety by Monitoring the Quality of the Ongoing Dialogue

Hosting a process group can be a real challenge when the generative interventionist is the target of process group participants projecting their insecurity and/or anxiety. In this regard, a generative interventionist needs to have ways of containing and reducing his or her own anxiety as well as that of the other participants.4 In other words, he/she is supposed to take action to deal with his/her own anxiety, instead of trying to hide it, just by giving the right example, reacting to what is being said and trying to encourage others to be as open about things as he/she is, as well as displaying their own curiosity, displaying openness and interest in the others’ experience without necessarily taking responsibility for it.5 A generative interventionist can increase the quality of an ongoing dialogue when he or she pays attention to and seeks the flow of energy in the group. In other words, the interventionist aids the emergence of the group’s development by focusing on questions like: ‘What do people have energy for?’, ‘Who is energised?’ and ‘What issues are energising people at this moment?’ The ability and willingness to let go and follow the energy in the room can make a big difference in how much people are willing to reflect on their own taken-for-granted assumptions. Human development requires direct and active participation and an open, reciprocal and preferably an equal exchange of all relevant perspectives. Obviously, this is not facilitated via authority or coercion as ‘materialised’ by, for example, an organisation chart. Authority (which includes laws and formal procedures) has only a limited reach over the dealings of people. At the heart of all learning challenges is the question: ‘How can people voluntarily—that is, without anyone telling them what to do—develop new insights in an effective and orderly way?’ What certainly

Bushe referrers to the ‘Heartmath Institute’ which has, according to him, some tested methods that are simple and effective, like ‘freeze frame’. The ‘emotional freedom technique’ while having much less testing behind it, is used successfully by many people. Both are easily found through Google. Techniques for centring and grounding originating in Hindu and Buddhist meditation practices are also effective (Bushe 2010). 5 As Bushe argues, grounding of the group is aided by some knowledge of practices that originate in the management of life energy, chi or ki as it’s known in Asia. These processes can easily be adapted to the practice of ‘grounding out’. (Bushe 2010) 4

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helps in answering this question is creating a dialogical system in which participants realise that: 1. There is a certain level of interdependency between them in such a way that they grasp the feeling that they needed each other for getting things done. 2. What they want to do has a certain impact on what everyone else in the process group wants to do. 3. Every decision within this context affects every other decision. 4. There is no outside reference point needed within this context that can stop the self-reflexive spiral. 5. Adapting to real-time feedback and feed forwards leads to integration not by hierarchy but by heterarchy.

5.5.3

The Skill of Being a ‘Catalyser’ by Introducing a ‘Wu-Wei’ Attitude

Developing a learning infrastructure is a process of emergence that by its very nature cannot be controlled (Magnani 2001). Hosting a process group is focused on allowing the raised issues to reach full maturity, in order to capture them in their entirety (Owen 2008a). This means that the interventionist helps the participants to express their own views on the issues at hand. The interventionist reflects, asks questions and focuses on letting all members of the process group express their views on what is being said as openly as possible. A generative interventionist does this not by answering but mainly by asking for responses from the group members. As such, the interventionist is asking for self-correcting feedback behaviours. For this, an interventionist can choose to have different roles, such as that of ‘a catalyser’ or ‘a devil’s advocate’, in an attempt to collect alternating descriptions of how the participants are perceiving what is happening. In this way, the professionalism of the generative interventionist will stimulate a positively critical atmosphere, which goes beyond just leading the process and resembles what is known as ‘Wu-Wei’, as introduced in Interlude 5.5. Interlude 5.5 Introducing a Wu-Wei Attitude In an article on cybernetic organisations, the American psychiatrist and psychologist Milton H. Erickson and his colleagues describe a vision in which formal leadership is diminished as a visible force (Ericson 1972; Beer 1960). To take the place of a formal leader, the authors introduce the Taoist notion of inaction, or Wu-Wei, the prevailing principle of which is: ‘Do nothing, yet there is nothing that is not done’. This principle is in accord with the systems scientist Stafford Beer’s vision, enunciated some decades ago, that ‘[m] anagement is the restoring of natural order to a system that has been disturbed, (continued)

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Interlude 5.5 (continued) and that is trying to regain its equilibrium’ (Beer 1960). In Taoism, Wu-Wei is often associated with the element of water and the way in which water behaves. Even though water flows and offers no resistance, it has the power to erode granite. Water is not solid-like rock or wood; it flows everywhere, passing through the tiniest spaces. It seems as though water does nothing, but it has an effect nevertheless. Taoism is about not resisting water’s flow and instead choosing from the many directions in which it flows and accepting whatever happens. For a generative interventionist, Wu-Wei represents a certain attitude in which he or she concentrates on examples in which the logic of change itself undergoes change and the expected is often reversed. For example, in martial arts it can mean taking the momentum that an opponent or problem presents and using it to our advantage. This need not happen intentionally, and it can ‘hook’ members of the process group into a certain helping mode. In other words, the interventionist’s behaviour can unintentionally elicit the kind of responses the members were conditioned to give. This attitude can also be very helpful in creating a notion of developing ‘double descriptions’ rather than searching for one linear, causal explanation. Through positive feedback, differences are amplified, exaggerated or escalated, and through negative feedback, differences are diminished. Patterns do not operate under the linear rule of indefinite increase, of ‘more of what’s good is necessarily better’; exaggeration can lead to a discontinuity—a point of threshold or catastrophe—beyond which the patterns transform, enabling insight and re-evaluation. This is reminiscent of yet another Taoist principle, embodied in the yin-yang symbol: when yin increases to the point of domination, it heralds the germination of the seed of yang.

Milton H. Erickson (1901 – 1980) Was an American psychiatrist, psychologist, founder of modern hypnotherapy and the inspiration behind the N.L.P. (Neuro Linguistic Programming). To bring about changes in the unconscious of his patients, he used paradoxes, anecdotes, surprises and confusion. In ‘My voice will go with you’ (1982), Erickson, compiled about a hundred stories about his work with patients.

The Wu-Wei philosophy, as described in Interlude 5.5, can be applied as an attitude of a generative interventionist helping a process group to become a selfcorrective unity. To establish this, a generative interventionist asks questions in a step-by-step manner, starting by exploring the individual perspectives. And from there on, they explore what they perceive in the outspoken perspectives of the other members of the process group. During this, a generative interventionist continuously gathers and registers the members’ remarks in relating them to their (perceived) interconnectedness. This is done simply by asking the members of the process

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group, for example, to what extent they perceive their perspectives as being mutually influenced. Sometimes, this leads to an ‘action-reaction’ chain, as introduced in Sect. 2.4, which in itself is a welcome display of symptomatic behaviours indicating there is a common issue within the process group that needs to be brought to the surface. One typical thing that a generative-oriented interventionist must not do is try to hush things up. When things escalate, an interventionist can also introduce a ‘reductio ad absurdum’ as explained in the next section.

5.5.4

Introducing a ‘Reductio Ad Absurdum’

Ridicule, contradict, stimulating self-response and passivity in a conversation often have a deregulating effect. As a technique of intervention, this is also known as introducing a reductio ad absurdum (Keeney 1983). Introducing a reductio ad absurdum means that we present a mirror instead of a concrete solution. Presenting a mirror is meant to offer individual members of a contained group the space to take their own initiative, rather than look to others to advance solutions. Introducing a reductio ad absurdum is especially important when an interventionist as a ‘generative’ is unwillingly presented as an experienced professional regarding the content of the matter. The objective here is to generate a raised consciousness by trying to make the participants more aware of their own behavioural interactional patterns—not only of their ‘problematic’ interactional patterns but also of their behaviour in which they try to solve these. This process of awareness is happening when the participants are talking about fulfilling their daily tasks and are remarking that the realisation of these tasks is related to what the other participants are doing.

5.6

Some Closing Reflections

1. Emphasising a collective, ‘processual’ perspective on leadership. In this chapter we present leadership as a collective and processual phenomenon (Denis et al. 2001, p. 810) to which the focus is primarily on what management do to mobilise others in a dialogical system of interrelationships rather than on what they are. Such a view presumes that our understanding of leadership is socially constructed over time, as individual interact with one another, rather than being something embodied in individuals or possessed by them. The idea here is that leadership is relational—or as Sorenson says ‘emerging in the space between’ people rather than ‘in’ a person (Sorenson 1992). That makes managing in a developing learning infrastructure less about position and more about roles.

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Hodgson and colleagues (1965) posited that the effectiveness of leadership role constellations depends on the degree of complementarity among their members. Complementarity implies both adequate coverage of all activity domains within the system and the existence of mechanisms allowing participants to play their respective roles in a concerted manner (Denis et al. 2001, p. 811). Clearly, a perfectly harmonious and complementary constellation may be difficult to achieve. That is why the participants (managerial and non-managerial) have to find some kind of modus vivendi or, to put it more, theoretically, a ‘negotiated order’ (Bucher and Stelling 1969; Strauss et al. 1963), in which, through ongoing interactions based on control, affinity and experience, the different participants negotiate their space and come to take on different roles that may be more or less harmoniously aligned (i.e. complementary) (Denis et al. 2001, p. 816). 2. Emphasising the Importance of Group Composition. A process group is to be composed of diverse stakeholders related to the same purpose. In other words, from the start, the (preliminary) composition of the process group needs to be representative of the same whole social system as is discussed with the client during the first encounters (see Sect. 8.4 for more details). Thus, the quality of the dialogue in the process group, and later on also during the LGI, depends on the right representative composition. If the group’s composition is composed of the ‘usual suspects’, or dominated by a random subgroup, particularly by top management, then the group’s meetings will be mirroring the same kinds of conversations the organisation always has (Worley et al. 2011). 3. Emphasising the Process of Perspective Taking. Participants in a process group learn from the first beginnings to exchange their perspectives in an equal and reciprocal manner. While doing so, they are constructing a preliminary ‘current reality’. This is an important and recurring process. It is the vehicle with which the process group: • Validates the assignment from (top) management. • Validates the change purpose and with that critically demarcates the system and the composition of the process group. • When necessary, designs and organises a collaborative meeting based on LGI principles. • After the LGI, establishes a common ground in what is going to be fed back to the organisation/(top) management. • Continuously develops new ‘current’ realities, giving rise to new initiatives.

Recap • Large-group interventions (LGIs) are a relatively new group of organisational change methods for involving ‘the whole system’ in a change process. As an intervention technique, LGIs are closely linked with Lewin’s action research and force-field theory. One of the denominators of LGIs is that they all ‘get the whole system in one room’.

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• LGIs evolve out of five strands: (1) the understanding of organisations as open systems, (2) the shift from focusing on organisational problems that are rooted in the past to focusing on the future and its potential, (3) the possibility of working with large groups by creating small groups within a larger framework, (4) the focus on the ‘living-learning experience’ and Lewin’s action research principle of ‘the here and now’ and (5) the dialogic approach that assumes that organisations are ‘meaning-making’ systems. • The consecutive activities and exercises during a typical LGI programme are designed in a cyclical process that provides opportunities to reconsider existing individual experiences and actions through collective reflection. • With information flooding companies, management must ensure that employees see that the change process is a priority that is permanently present and that key information that is brought in by its participants is not lost. Therefore, the following key requirements are to be taken into account: (1) maintaining the exchange process between stakeholders, not by controlling it; (2) maintaining sufficient coherence, that is, in situations where power is diffused and there are divergent objectives, change initiatives need to be led by a collective leadership group rather than a single individual; (3) forming a temporary organisation structure that takes us out of the day-to-day pressures into a contained space/ dialogical system, called a process group, in which we can safely experiment, practise and learn; (4) executing one or more differential diagnoses carried out by the process group, validating, for example, the change purpose and the scope of the process; and (5) initiating a feed-forward loop and a feedback loop linking the process group directly and reciprocally with management, maintaining an open and interactive contact during the ongoing process. • Identifying a preliminary dialogical system can be done in a top-down way, as discussed in Sect. 2.3.4, but it can also be done in a bottom-up way, as discussed in Sects. 3.4.2 and 5.3.3. • This brings us to the conclusion that the main reason for organising an LGI as part of a learning infrastructure is to work with a critical mass to accelerate change by creating common ground.

5.7

Key Discussion Points

1. Identifying a preliminary dialogical system such as a process group from the bottom up. In Sect. 2.3.4 we discussed scoping and stakeholder analysis as processes of defining a fitting scope for the change initiative. As discussed, this way of defining a social system is from the top down and in essence macro-oriented. In Sect. 5.3.3 we do the same, however, from the bottom up, starting with people’s individual behavioural reactions, thus, more on a micro level. • Argue what you see as the pro’s and contras of each way of identifying a social system/scope. 2. Working with a learning infrastructure.

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For emerging organisational change to happen, we need to develop a common ground with those who have a stake in the change purpose. As argued in this chapter, this is enabled by working with a process group as the central part in a dynamic learning structure. • Describe some of the critical components and characteristics of a learning infrastructure. • What is the essence of a common ground and argue in what way developing common ground relates to generativity, unfreezing and consciousness raising? • Why is developing common ground so important for generating change? • Describe the main function and main activities of a process group. 3. The purpose of an LGI as part of a learning infrastructure. An LGI doesn’t have to be a standard part of a learning infrastructure—that is, not with every new starting change project as the process starts anew as shown in Fig. 5.5. • Describe some of the main challenges in developing a learning infrastructure. • Describe the main advantages of using an LGI in a developing learning infrastructure. • Do the same for the main contraindications for using an LGI in a developing learning infrastructure. 4. The role of a manager as being part/a member of a process group. As introduced in this chapter, ‘management alignment’ is an important process in itself but certainly as part of developing a learning infrastructure. • Describe some plausible implications for (top) managers in being part/a member of a process group—regarding their role within the process group as well as for their own daily managerial role. • Argue why it could be important that (top) managers who are going to be part/ a member of a process group need to be aware of these possible implications. • Describe what needs to be done for managers to see themselves as partakers in dialogic processes, instead of seeing themselves as problem solvers? 5. Not giving advice but keeping enough space for group members to do so. According to Schein, the most effective intervention is not giving advice on how things ought to be done but (1) facilitating the participant’s own understanding of his or her own problem and (2) teaming up with them in jointly developing a solution (Schein 2006). With this statement, Schein seems to be arguing that one does not really understand a situation until the participants have explored it themselves and that the solutions to problems have to come from the participants if they are to be implemented. • Relate Schein’s statement to the main mechanisms, as described in Sect. 5.5. Which one(s) seems to fit with this statement and which one(s) not? Argue why. • Relate Schein’s statement to the change management assumptions regarding communication from Sect. 2.2.5. How would you characterise his statement in terms of a (change) communication strategy?

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• Relate Schein’s statement to the change management assumptions regarding the suggested transition of emotions from Sect. 2.2.6. Substantiate Schein’s statement, based on the assumptions from Sect. 2.2.6. • Relate Schein’s statement to two or more assumptions behind (diagnostic and dialogical) OD from Chap. 4. Argue why they are related. 6. A parallel organisation versus a developing learning infrastructure. The effectiveness of attempts to introduce change is dependent on the actions and behaviours of everybody affected by the change (Hayes 2014). Therefore, wherever practicable, everybody should be involved in the change process. As discussed before in Chap. 2, a typical intervention for this is to set up a temporary parallel organisation. It is assumed in the change management literature that this parallel organisation creates a wide feeling of involvement and gains the commitment of all organisational members. As introduced in this chapter, an alternative approach is organising an LGI that is the whole system in the room. It is assumed that this permits everybody to contribute. • Relate the above statement (note 79) to the not-invented-here syndrome from Sect. 2.2.3. Argue why it so hard to prevent/suppress this syndrome. • Compare the ‘parallel structure’ and the ‘developing learning infrastructure’ and describe, on the one hand, the main similarities and, on the other, the main differences. • Argue, based on the descriptions taken from this book, which of the two interventions you prefer. 7. Creating commitment with an LGI: a counter-intuitive concept? It is not uncommon to accommodate 500 or more members of an organisation in a single LGI. Weick and Quinn suggest that getting enough individual space during a collaborative dialogue session appears to be difficult to reconcile with its collective and system-wide nature. They suggest that ‘large-scale change in large groups is counter-intuitive, since size and participation tend to be negatively related’ (Weick and Quinn 1999). • Argue why an LGI can be seen as a counter-intuitive concept if we want a critical mass to be engaged in the change process. • Does this also relate to Schein’s statement from critical point 4? Argue why/why not. 8. Organisational biographies: understanding the past and present as a basis for exploring a preferred future. All too often, organisational members are unaware of the assumptions and consistent patterns that guide how they interpret and respond to situations. Yet these assumptions and consistent patterns may blind them to threats and opportunities. As Hayes argues, ‘[w]hat an organisation is today has been influenced by the way organisational members have interpreted and responded to opportunities and threats in the past’ (Hayes 2014). As argued by Weisbord earlier on in this chapter, with LGIs it is also possible to learn from past experience and use this learning to challenge and modify assumptions and identify new possibilities and what needs to happen if these possibilities are to become reality.

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• Argue why an LGI can be used in a way to challenge and even to modify people’s existing assumptions. • Relate this to Schein’s organisation culture from Sect. 2.3.3 and describe the main steps in an LGI programme by combining the essence of this model and the essence of an LGI programme as described in this chapter.

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Connell, J., & Waring, P. (2002). BOHICA syndrome: A symptom of cynicism towards change initiatives? Strategic Change., 11, 347–356. Dannemiller Tyson Associates. (1999). Whole-scale change: Unleashing the magic in organizations. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. Denis, J.-L., Lamothe, L., & Langley, A. (2001). The dynamics of collective leadership and strategic change in pluralistic organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 809–837. Dewey, J. (1933). How we think (Rev ed.). Chicago: Henry Regnery. Dixon, N. M. (1998). Dialogue at work; making talk developmental for people and organizations. London: Lemos and Crane. Dougherty, D. (2016). Taking advantage of emergence; productively innovating in complex innovation systems (p. 11). Oxford: Oxford university press. Emery, M., & Devane, T. (2007). Participative design workshop. In P. Holman, T. Devane, & S. Cady (Eds.), The change handbook: The definitive resource on today’s best methods for engaging whole systems (pp. 419–435). San Francisco: Berrett-Kohler. Emery, M., & Purser, R. (1996). The search conference: A powerful method for planning organizational change and community action. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Ericson, R. F. (1972). Visions of cybernetic organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 15 (4), 427–443. p. 440. Freud, S. (1922). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. London: Hogarth press. Garcia, S. (2007). Developing social network propositions to explain large-group intervention theory and practice. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 9, 341–358. Hall, A. D., & Fagen, R. E. (1956). Definition of system. General systems yearbook, 1, 18–28. Hayes, J. (2014). The theory and practice of change management (3th ed., p. 333). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Heracleous, L., Gößwein, J., & Beaudette, P. (2017). Open strategy-making at the Wikimedia foundation: A dialogic perspective. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 0, 1–31. p. 4. Hodgson, R. G., Levinson, D. J., & Zaleznik, A. (1965). The executive role constellation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Holman, P., Devane, T., & Cady, S. (2007). The change handbook. San Francisco, CA: BerrettKoehler. Hopper, E., & Weyman, A. (1975). A sociological view of large groups. In L. Kreeger (Ed.), The large group (pp. 159–189). Londen: Karnac Books. Jacobs, R. (1994). Real time strategic change: How to involve an entire organization in fast and far reaching change. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. Keeney, B. P. (1983). Aesthetics of change (pp. 165–166). New York: The Guilford Press. Kim, D. H. (1993). The link between individual and organizational learning (pp. 37–50). Fall: Harvard Business Review. Kim, D. H. (1994). Building learning infrastructures, The Systems thinker. Building shared understanding, 5(3), 1–3. Klein, D. (1992). Simu-real: A simulation approach to organizational change. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 28(4), 566–578. Kolb, D. A. (1976). Management and the learning process. California Management Review, 17(3), 21–31. p. 21. Kreeger, L. (1975a). Introduction. In L. Kreeger (Ed.), The large group; dynamics and therapy (pp. 13–29). London: Karnac Books. p. 18. Kreeger, L. (1975b). The large group; dynamics and therapy. London: Karnac Books. LeBon, G. (1903/1895). The crowd. London: Unwin. Lennard, H. L., Bernstein, A., Hendin, H., & Palmore, E. (1960). The anatomy of psychotherapy (pp. 13–14). New York: Columbia University press. Lewin, K., & Grabbe, P. (1948). Conduct, knowledge, and acceptance of new values. In G. W. Lewin (Ed.), Resolving social conflicts; selected papers on group dynamics (pp. 56–68). New York: Harper & Row. p. 65. Lippitt, R. (1980). Choosing the future you prefer. Washington DC: Development Publishers.

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Ulrich, D., Kerr, S., & Ashkenas, R. (2002). The GE work-out: How to implement GE’s revolutionary method for busting bureaucracy and attacking organizational problems – Fast. New York: McGraw Hill. Van Nistelrooij, A. T. M. (2018). Coping with uncertainty during change: A relational approach inspired by Kurt Lewin. Challenging Organisations and society., 7, 1270–1280. Weick, K. E., & Quinn, R. E. (1999). Organizational change and development. Annual Review Psychology, 50, 361–386. p. 374. Weisbord, M. (1987). Productive workplaces: Organizing and managing for dignity, meaning and community. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Weisbord, M., & Janoff, S. (1995). Future search. An action guide to finding common ground in organizations and communities (p. 25). San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers. Weisbord, M., & Janoff, S. (1996). Future search: Finding common ground in organizations and communities. Systems Practice, 9(1), 71–84. Weisbord, M., & Janoff, S. (2010). Future Search: Getting the whole system in the room for vision, commitment and action (3rd ed.). San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. Worley, C. G., Mohrman, S. A., & Nevitt, J. A. (2011). Large group interventions: An empirical field study of their composition, process, and outcomes. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 47, 404–431. p. 405.

6

Changing and Learning Bringing Assumptions to the Surface and Challenging Them

Sigmund Freud described denial as a state of “knowing but not knowing”. The distance between the world as it is and the world as you want it to be is simply too great, and you freeze in your tracks. Freud saw denial, in the words of his leading biographer, Peter Gay, as a state of rational apprehension that does not result in appropriate action. (Tedlow 2008) The key is to learn to operate with freedom at the level of one’s own assumptions. Put more crudely, have you got a theory or has the theory got you? And if you’re stuck with a theory, doesn’t your client get stuck with it too? (O’Hanlon and Wilk 1987).

6.1

Introduction

Traditional teaching and learning can be a very weak experience compared to the immediate here-and-now feedback that occurs when groups diagnose their own process and members give each other face-to-face feedback (Schein 2006, p. 287). In this regard, learning is an inevitable consequence of daily work, processes of feedback and interaction within organisations (Orr 1990). Although not all organisational change is the consequence of learning, individual and collective learning can be a substantial driver of organisational change. Furthermore, organisational learning can be affected by the way members are invited to participate actively in the process of changing (Tsang 1997) what managers say and do (Vera and Crossan 2004). However, most often learning is a by-product of decisions made and actions that are taken for other purposes (Lines et al. 2011). For example, participative collective leadership as introduced in the last Chapter, can be introduced in order to boost employee morale, but simultaneously it can affect what is learnt, as well as the rate at which learning occurs (Lines 2005). What these remarks show us in general is that the concepts of learning and change are interrelated: where it says ‘changing’ it could also say ‘learning’ and vice versa. # The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. van Nistelrooij, Embracing Organisational Development and Change, Springer Texts in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51256-9_6

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People may be said to develop theories of action to guide their behaviour, to make it more consistent, to maintain their sense of being personally responsible—of being an origin of their behaviour (Argyris 1976). Behaviour that is guided by theories, that is, consistent and for which the producers accept responsibility, appears to others as rational and responsible. These theories are based on assumptions constructed to help us to explain, predict or control human behaviour—ours, but also that of others. The effectiveness of these theories in many ways depends on sets of stated or unstated underlying assumptions: presuppositions or prepossessed general forms of insight/ways of looking. These assumptions can become so deeply ingrained that they are accepted as the truth and function as a human’s navigation system with which they ‘see’ the world—not in terms of our visual sense of sight but in terms of perceiving, understanding and interpreting. With these assumptions functioning as a map we not only navigate through the world, but we see the world itself. However, the map is not per se the thing mapped,1 which makes it very challenging to keep seeing the difference between the way we look as influenced by our assumptions (i.e. the map) and what we are looking at (i.e. the territory). When map and territory are not distinguished, features of, and limitations in, our assumptions we hold may become projected onto the ‘territory’. When this happens, we enter the ‘looking-glass world’ of Lewis Carroll with its logical contradictions, vicious circles, paradoxes and recursions. Although confusing the map and the territory may lead easily to error,2 especially during processes of changing, these are natural, and common, phenomena, which we are going to discuss in the next chapter. In this chapter we mainly follow the pivotal work of Argyris and that of Senge and their central thesis that changing others requires changing ourselves. The fantasy, as Senge calls it, that somehow organisations can change without personal change, and especially without change on the part of people in leadership positions, underlies many change efforts doomed from the start (Quinn et al. 2000). In this regard, it is considered key to learn to operate with freedom at the level of one’s own assumptions, which of course requires us to be aware of them. Therefore, we will introduce and explore the following:

1

Originally, this phrase was an epigram coming from mathematician Eric Temple Bell, but probably more well-known by Korzybski’s expression ‘A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness’. Later, another intriguing example of this dictum is given by the Belgian surrealist artist René Magritte. He remarked that ‘perception always intercedes between reality and ourselves’ which he tried to catch in a number of paintings including his famous work entitled ‘The Treachery of Images’, which consists of a drawing of a pipe with the caption, ‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’ (This is not a pipe) (Temple Bell, 1933; Korzybski, 1933; Bateson and Bateson, 1987). 2 In our search for sense making or explanation, for example, we may look for significant factors that are assumed to have external validity, such as ‘job satisfaction’, ‘leadership style’, ‘organisational culture’ or ‘motivation’. Similarly, we often represent the world as binary pairs of constructs such as ‘good and bad’. When we forget that these theoretical constructs are maps, we may project these polarities back onto our experience, creating an either-or, us them world, as we mentioned in the first chapter.

6.2 Examples of Opposing Sets of Executives’ Assumptions

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• Assumptions as a navigation tool that constantly needs to be recalibrated together with (that of) relevant others and that this will help us not to fall into the habit of seeing the territory as a constant that we have to act upon as if it is the absolute truth. • Argyris’ and Senge’s set of assumptions behind ‘advocacy’ and ‘inquiry’ and relate it to McGregor’s set of assumptions, which he called ‘Theory X’ and ‘Theory Y’ and Covey’s ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ set of assumptions, and that with a good balance between all sets of assumptions, a search for meaning is more likely to arise. • That ‘doing more of the same’ can lead to processes like ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ and ‘escalating commitment’, in which people blindly seem ‘to bite their own tail’, just like the age-old symbol of the ouroboros. • An extended description of an incident within the union as a base for discussing the pros and cons of Argyris’ ‘single-’ and ‘double-loop’ learning and Bateson’s learning intervention levels. • The iterative process of bringing to the surface and challenging assumptions by breaking it down into three interconnected acts of learning. We start this chapter with three examples of opposing sets of assumptions. In Paragraph 6.3 we discuss the difficulty of making a shift from one set of assumptions to another by introducing two well-known ways of looking at this paradoxical process in the management literature: Argyris’ ‘single- and double-loop learning’ and Bateson’s ‘learning types’. After this, we introduce and describe the process of ‘co-inquiry’ as a collaborative way of learning. The chapter closes with some reflections, a recap of the main findings and some key discussion points.

6.2

Examples of Opposing Sets of Executives’ Assumptions

As first pointed out by the eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant, all behaviour seems to be organised according to certain categories of assumptions related to the way we deeply think about space, time, matter, substance, causality, contingency and necessity. It is believed that developing the capacity to work with and balancing these categories or sets of assumptions involves learning new interpersonal skills and implementing institutional innovations that help bring these skills into regular practice (Van de Ven and Poole 1995). This is vital, as Argyris argues, to any company, because the most crucial paradigms in any organisation are those shared by key decision-makers. Those assumptions, if unexamined, limit an organisation’s range of actions to what is taken for granted, familiar and comfortable. Therefore, institutionalising these skills requires managerial structures that make learning practices unavoidable. Therefore, we are in need of understanding that our assumptions work as a navigation tool that constantly needs to be recalibrated together with (that of) relevant others. The idea is that this will help us not to fall into the habit of seeing the territory as a constant that we have to act upon as if it is the absolute truth. Thus, we start this chapter with the idea that our

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Attitude

Cognitions

Assumptions

Perception: Energy & Focus

Behaviour

Emotions

Latent

Manifest

Fig. 6.1 An integrated and dynamic concept of what is determining our behaviour (Van Nistelrooij and De Caluwé 2016)

assumptions are sources of information about ourselves and how we act. However, as depicted in Fig. 6.1, our actions generate feedback while we act. This feedback we obtain from others is influenced by the other’s perception of our actions, as our subsequent reaction is influenced by our own perception of this feedback and so on. Presented in this way, we can understand how important our and others’ perceptions are in what we do and say as well as in what we do not do and do not say. As implied in Fig. 6.1, perception is directly interlinked with our assumptions and the way we behave, as well as with the way we focus and give meaning to our own behaviour and that of others in a given situation. Thus, assumptions regulate indirectly not only how we make sense of the world but also how we act. We use the generic term ‘assumptions’ to denote the knowledge structures or ‘mental models’ (Senge 1990, p. 198) that individuals impose on an information environment to give it form, meaning or sense (Walsh 1995). As several scholars, including Argyris, Senge and Weick, have made clear, there are myriad other terms for these internal filters, such as ‘schemas’ or ‘scripts’. Assumptions determine to a great extent how we understand the world and how we translate that understanding into action. For example, if I assume that the person I am dealing with is not very bright, I will act differently towards them to if I believe the same person is brilliant. Taking action, based on assuming things, will lead to particular outcomes that can be completely different to when we do this based on validated facts in interaction with others. The same is true for perception and the triggering of cognitions and emotions in response to our process of perception: both are supposed to be filtered by our assumptions. Learning something new in this realm requires us to resurrect,

6.2 Examples of Opposing Sets of Executives’ Assumptions

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re-examine and possibly change some of the more stable portions of our cognitive structure—a process that Argyris and others have called ‘frame breaking’ or ‘doubleloop’ learning (Argyris et al. 1985; Bartunek 1984). ‘Double-loop’ learning refers to what we called earlier in Interlude 2, a shift in paradigm, like trading in an existing set of assumptions for another one. In this section, we present some of the most popular sets of assumptions from the management literature, presented as opposite paradigms or dichotomies, starting with McGregor’s seminal X versus Y set, followed by Covey’s set of reactive and proactive assumptions, and ending with Argyris’ ‘advocacy and inquiry’ set, which he calls, respectively, Model I and Model II.

6.2.1

McGregor’s Seminal X and Y Theory

McGregor’s lasting contribution to the field of management and organisation studies (Bedeian and Wren 2001) is his idea that it is the assumptions of people in managerial functions that determine their effectiveness, and the effectiveness of organisations (Schein 1974). Or as McGregor writes himself in his still inspiring book The Human Side of Enterprise, ‘Human behaviour is predictable, but, as in physical science, accurate prediction hinges on the correctness of the underlying assumptions’ (see Interlude 6.1) (McGregor 1960). Interlude 6.1 An Excerpt from McGregor’s Vision on Executives’ Assumptions ‘It seems to me that the making of managers, in so far as they are made, is only to a rather small degree the result of management’s formal efforts in management development. It is to a much greater degree the result of management’s conception of the nature of its task and of all the policies and practices that are constructed to implement this conception (McGregor 1960, p. vi). [. . .] We go of on the wrong track when we seek to study management development in terms of the formal machinery of programmes carrying this label. [. . .] I have come to the conviction that some of our most important problems lie elsewhere. [. . .] That is, that we have not learned enough about the utilisation of talent, about the creation of an organisation climate conducive to human growth. [. . .] The human side of enterprise is ‘all of a piece’—that the theoretical assumptions management holds about controlling its human resources determine the whole character of the enterprise. [. . .] Of course, the process is circular, and herein lies the possibility and the hope of future progress. The key question for top management is: ‘What are your assumptions (implicit as well as explicit) about the most effective way to manage people?’ (McGregor 1960, p. vii) [. . .] Human behaviour is predictable, but as in physical science, accurate prediction hinges on the correctness (continued)

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Interlude 6.1 (continued) of underlying theoretical assumptions. There is, in fact, no prediction without theory; all managerial decisions and actions rest on assumptions about behaviour. [. . .] Only as we examine and test our theoretical assumptions can we hope to make them more adequate, to remove inconsistencies and thus to improve our ability to predict. This excerpt brings us to the following statement.’ The development for me as a manager has something to with the extent to which I: 1. Test my own assumptions; for that I have to be aware of my assumptions and the way they guide my behaviour. 2. Share my own assumptions with that of the group I am part of; for that I have to be aware of the shared assumptions of the group and how they guide their behaviour.

Douglas McGregor (1906 – 1964) Was a management professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He began his management classic ‘The human side of organizations’ (1960) with the question: “What are your assumptions (implicit as well as explicit) about the most effective way to manage people?” Today, with the growth of complexity and knowledge-driven work, McGregor's simple but provocative question continues to resonate-perhaps more powerfully than ever before.

The excerpt from Interlude 6.1 is also a reflection of his experience in working with executives for more than 30 years. Based on this experience, McGregor identified two general managerial approaches to creating an environment within which employees are motivated via authoritative direction and control or via integration and self-control, which he respectively called ‘Theory X’ and ‘Theory Y’, as elaborated in Fig. 6.2. As he sees it, these sets of assumptions about ‘human nature’ become the basis of management and control systems that perpetuate themselves because if people are treated consistently in terms of certain basic assumptions, they come eventually to behave according to those assumptions to make their world stable and predictable (Schein 1992). McGregor noted that Theory X and Theory Y are not managerial strategies but sets of assumptions that guide their actions. For example, according to Schein, ‘Theory Y does not imply participative management or any other kind of management—it is only a statement about what people are fundamentally like, and what kind of organisational behaviour they are capable of, if the conditions within the organisation are appropriate’ (Schein 1974, p. 6). So McGregor’s sets of X and Y assumptions can best be seen as a theory of motivation, not a theory of how to run an

6.2 Examples of Opposing Sets of Executives’ Assumptions Fig. 6.2 The original X and Y assumptions by Douglas McGregor (McGregor 1960, pp. 33–42)

Theory X: The traditional view of direction and control • The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if he/she can. • Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people must be coerced, controlled, directed and threatened with punishment to get them to put in adequate effort toward the achievement of organisational objectives. • The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little ambition and wants security above all.

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Theory Y: The integration of individual and organisational goals • The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest. • Humans will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which they are committed. • Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their achievement. • The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility. • The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity and creativity in the solution of organisational problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population.

organisation. Kay, owner/CEO of a company in the 1960s, was profoundly influenced by McGregor’s book and tried to run the company completely designed as a Theory Y organisation. Kay implemented dramatic organisational changes and hired the well-known organisation psychologist of those days Abraham Maslow to be the ‘resident guru’ during the summer of 1961. However, 3 years into the experiment, profits declined, lay-offs were implemented and the organisational changes were abandoned. In hindsight, Kay confessed: ‘I must have lost sight of the purpose of the business, which is not to develop new theories of management. We were being nice to workers, which didn’t work’. (Guion 1973) Similarly, running a business with a ‘one best way’ approach, based for example, on fostering only autonomy, participation and authenticity, is, as the comparative study of Heynoski and Quinn, for example, also shows, insufficient for improving organisational functioning (Heynoski and Quinn 2012).

6.2.2

Covey’s Assumptions on ‘Reactivity and Proactivity’

Viktor Frankl, a Viennese psychiatrist and neurologist, is the pioneer who promoted the idea that the primary motivational force in life is to find meaning (Frankl 1959; Zaiser 2005). Frankl’s book outlines his horrific experiences in the Nazi’s concentration camps and provides a basic introduction to his therapeutic practice of logotherapy. One day during his imprisonment, he began to become aware of what he later called ‘the last of the human freedoms’—the freedom his Nazi captors could

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not take away. He could decide within himself how all of this was going to affect him. Between what happened to him, or the stimulus, and his response to it was his freedom or power to choose that response. In discovering the basic principle of human nature, Frankl described an accurate self-map from which he began to develop a concept that Covey conceptualises as the first and most basic habit of a highly effective manager: proactivity (Covey 1989). In his The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People, a self-improvement book and also one of the best-sold management books, Covey writes that the way we see the world is entirely based on our own perceptions. In order to change a given situation, he believes that we must change ourselves, and in order to change ourselves, we must be able to change our perceptions.

According to Covey, proactivity means more than merely taking initiative. It means that as a human being we are responsible (response-ability ¼ the ability to choose our own response) for our own lives. As Eleanor Roosevelt observed, ‘[n]o one can hurt you without your consent’. Or in the words of Gandhi, ‘[t]hey cannot take away our self-respect if we don’t give it to the’. As these quotes seem to show, it is our willingness, permission and consent to what happens to us that hurt us far more than what happens to us in the first place. Or as Covey suggests, ‘[i]t’s not what happens to us but our response to what happens to us that hurts us’. (Covey 1989, p. 73) One of the most robust and costly decision errors addressed in the organisational sciences has been the proclivity for decision-makers to maintain commitment to losing courses of action and be reactive about it (Sleesman et al. 2012). A serious problem with reactive language, as Covey argues, is that it can become a negative self-fulfilling prophecy (see Chap. 1) (Covey 1989, p. 78), in which people’s assumptions are confirmed, and they go on to produce evidence to support their inadequate world view. In doing so, a process of escalation of commitment (Staw 1997) can set in.

6.2 Examples of Opposing Sets of Executives’ Assumptions Fig. 6.3 Two different types of language based on two different sets of assumptions (Covey 1989, p. 78)

Reactive thinking and language • You feel as if you have no mastery over yourself or the circumstances you are in. • Problematic symptoms are to be dealt with in the here and now using a quick fix. • There’s nothing I can do. • That’s just the way I am. • He makes me so mad. • • • • •

They won’t allow that. I have to do that. Yes, but…. I must. If only.

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Proactive thinking and language • You like and control yourself; you have been mastering a kind of independency. • The acute pain that is being felt is an outcome of a deeper, chronic problem and is to be dealt with by looking at the bigger picture. • Let’s look at our alternatives. • I can choose a different approach. • I control my own feelings, based on my own values. • I consciously expand my perspective based on new experiences. • I will choose an appropriate response. • I choose, just by saying “yes” or “no”. • I prefer. • I will.

Escalation of commitment is a reactive behavioural pattern in which an individual or group facing increasingly negative outcomes from a decision, action or investment nevertheless continues the behaviour instead of altering course. The actor is maintaining behaviours that are irrational but align with previous decisions and actions (Brockner 1992). Some of the more common explanations for escalation of commitment as a reactive behavioural pattern that have been offered include a sense of personal responsibility for the initial decision that led to the failing course of action (Staw 1976), the extent of sunk costs (Arkes and Blumer 1985) and the extent to which the failing project is near completion (Conlon and Garland 1993). As Covey suggests, people with a reactive paradigm feel increasingly victimised and out of control, not in charge of their life or their destiny. The language of reactive people absolves them of responsibility, in contrast to proactive people who respect the proactive nature of other people, take initiative and responsibility, and subordinate feelings to values (Covey 1989, p. 78). In Fig. 6.3, both types of language are schematically compared to each other. To sum up, according to Covey, proactive people are driven by values or principles, not by feelings that there is a problem ‘out there’. In essence, this is the problem. As a result, we empower what is out there to control us. Their assumption is, in general, ‘[w]hat’s out there has to change before I can change’. Moreover, concern, attention, appreciation and love are values, actualised through actions, by

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doing. In other words, proactive people subordinate feelings to values, principles, convictions and commitments. To sum up, proactive people work on things they can do something about, and by doing so, they also generate a self-fulfilling prophecy (Edwards 2001; Merton 1948; Madon et al. 2004)—but in this case, it is a positive one. It confirms their positive attitude, their right doing and, as Covey argues, enlarges their circle of influence.

6.2.3

Argyris’ Advocacy (Model I) and Inquiry (Model II)

In hindsight, we can say that McGregor’s Theory X and Y was a precursor to what we know today as values-based leadership (Burke 2009; O’Toole 1995) and, for example, to Argyris’ management behavioural or interventionist Model I and Model II style. In these models, Argyris took McGregor’s theory a step further and contended that a manager who held Theory X assumptions, if logical and consistent with respect to beliefs that lead to actions, would behave differently. In other words, with a ‘Model I pattern’ (Advocacy), a manager holding Theory Y assumptions would, if consistent, behave with a ‘Model II pattern’ (Inquiry). The term ‘advocacy’ (Model I pattern) refers to making our thinking process visible and publicly testing our conclusions and assumptions through the use of the following three techniques: (a) giving examples to illustrate thinking, (b) sharing the data or steps used to reach conclusions and (c) thinking systemically so that the person providing the information recognises that others may have a different view (Smith 1987). ‘Inquiry’ (Model II pattern) involves asking others to make their thinking process visible. It also involves three techniques, as follows: (a) encouraging challenges, (b) probing others’ thinking and (c) seeking others’ views (Tompkins 2001, p. 554). Basically, advocacy is expressing a view or making a statement about our position. Inquiry is exploring the views of others through questions. Both can be seen as the basic units of a conversation. How we state our view and inquire into others’ perspectives determines the quality of the conversation (Noonan 2007). Argyris sees both units as separate styles of intervening, in which we can be successful when we are (1) persuasive (Model I), being articulate and good at professional advocacy, or (2) appreciative (Model II), being good at inviting others to inquire and reflect upon one’s perspective. Both sets of assumptions are displayed in Fig. 6.4. A Model I behavioural pattern (advocacy) goes without inquiring into the values that underlie the actions of others. Dominant Model I behaviour is about minimising emotionality and being rational and convinced of the quality of the interventions in which the quality of the dimension ‘content’ is more important than that of the ‘process’ or ‘context’. This is supposed to increase the speed with which things are

6.2 Examples of Opposing Sets of Executives’ Assumptions Fig. 6.4 Assumptions: advocacy (Model I) and inquiry (Model II) (Argyris 1982)

Model I ‘Advocacy’ • Achieving the purpose as the actor defines it by unilateral control • Focusing on winning not losing • Emphasising rationality • Suppressing negative feelings

213 Model II ‘Inquiry’ • Achieving the most valid information possible • Assuming equality and inquiring about values • Emphasising internal commitment • Free and informed choice

done and decided but it also increases the chance of becoming reactive and defensive. As a consequence, it may most likely decrease the freedom of choice and the internal commitment of the participants. The assumptions underlying Model II (inquiry), in the right column of Fig. 6.4, are directed to produce action based on the most complete, valid information possible (Argyris 1977, p. 118). Based on these assumptions, interventionists inquire, ask questions and challenge the leading opinion. This can best be done by designing situations or encounters where participants feel responsible for what they do and say. This may decrease the speed with which things are being done but on the other hand, it increases their freedom of choice and their internal commitment. In general, Model II behaviour involves sharing power. As Argyris argues, when used, the degree of reactiveness and defensiveness in and between individuals and groups is supposed to decrease (Argyris 1982, p. 104). For example, an ‘actionreaction’ behavioural pattern, as introduced before in Sect. 2.4.1 can be stopped by beginning to ask questions like: ‘What is it that leads you to that position?’, ‘Can you illustrate your point for me?’, ‘What is your reaction to what I have said?’, ‘Do others see it the same or differently?’ and ‘What might I be missing?’ Or even simpler, ending our advocacy with ‘You agree, don’t you?’ and ‘Do you see it the same or differently?’ Such questions are seen as being particularly useful when there is a: 1. Potential disconnect in how people understand what others have said or meant. 2. Suggestion or proposal for action that could potentially create difficulties. 3. Difference in how people describe a problem (Noonan 2007, p. 35). The tricky part here is that it seems appealing to ask questions all the time and do all kinds of inquiry. However, as Senge argues, the process of inquiry is not a guarantee of successful change, nor does it per se result in a rapid transformation of professional behaviours. Only asking questions can also be a way of avoiding learning—because we are hiding our own view behind a wall of incessant questioning (Senge 1990, p. 198). Thus, questioning can be crucial for breaking the spiral of mutual reinforcing advocacy, but until a team or an individual learns to combine inquiry with advocacy, learning skills are very limited. Balancing advocacy and inquiry also acknowledge the partiality and limitations of our own thinking.

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Fig. 6.5 State and ask (Noonan 2007, p. 35)

Advocacy Share your data. Tell others about your reasoning. Acknowledge your assumptions. Test your conclusions, rather than stating them as facts. Explore alternative interpretations.

Inquiry Ask questions that surface. reasoning and data. Search for alternative views. Keep your curiosity going.

Figure 6.5 illustrates a typical approach to balancing advocacy and inquiry in practice (Noonan 2007, p. 35).

6.3

Realising a Paradigm Shift from One Set of Assumptions to another

Many professionals have learned to do their job successfully. That is why, as Argyris argues, they rarely experience failure, which is why most of the time they are good at ‘single-loop’ learning (Argyris 1999). But ironically, this very fact also helps explain why professionals are often so bad at ‘double-loop’ learning. Solving problems on a ‘single-loop’ level is important. But when (the same) problems recur, we need to stop doing more of the same, and reflect together on our own actions and those of others. Learning must continue to persist, but now at a deeper level in which people need to look more inwards—a process that Argyris coined as ‘double-loop’ learning (Argyris 1991), and a process that consists of developing a capacity to bring to the surface and challenge assumptions that require the development of new skills, such as deliberate reflection and awareness expansion, while engaged in outer action (Torbert and Taylor 2007). However, it also needs the development of a learning environment that makes learning practices such as these unavoidable (Senge 1990, p. 186). In other words, it requires much practice and, while building up this practice, warrants at least a fundamental shift in thinking from a ‘single-loop’ to a ‘doubleloop’ learning set of assumptions. Besides Argyris‘s ‘single-’ and ‘double-loop’ learning, which we discuss in this section, another well-known comparable classification is that of Bateson’s L0, LI and LII.

6.3.1

Argyris’ Single- and Double-Loop Learning

‘Single-loop’ learning is about routine problem-solving activities, just like a thermostat that learns when it is too hot or too cold and turns the heat on or off. The thermostat can perform this task because it can receive information (the temperature of the room) and modify the temperature by taking corrective action. ‘Single-loop’ learning is about observing the mismatch or the error, reflecting on the right course

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Attitude Cognitions

Assumptions

Perception: Energy & Focus

Behaviour

Mismatch or errors

Observe Emotions

Modify Reflect

Modify Double-loop learning

Challenge

Latent

Single-loop learning

Surface

Manifest

Fig. 6.6 Single- and double-loop learning

of action and deciding to modify our or others’ behaviour. As depicted in Fig. 6.6, in ‘double-loop’ learning someone observes a mismatch or an error, and together with relevant others reflects on what is happening, tries to bring the underlying assumptions to the surface, challenges the way they operate and, when necessary, modifies them. In a single loop we modify just our behaviour, and in a double-loop we try to do the same but then also on a deeper level through the underlying assumptions by which the same behaviour is constantly fuelled. Or, as defined by Argyris, ‘single-loop’ learning occurs ‘whenever an error is detected and corrected without questioning or altering the underlying values of the system’, and ‘doubleloop’ learning occurs ‘when mismatches are corrected by first examining and altering the governing variables and then the actions’ (Argyris 1999, p. 68). As depicted in Fig. 6.6, double-loop learning is about questioning why the goal is set at the given point, thereby questioning the effectiveness of the existing strategy in reaching this goal, or even whether there should be a goal at all. In an environment that stimulates ‘double-loop’ learning, people attempt to scan, reflect and test ideas in order to continually learn and grow as a person together with relevant others as a whole. Thus, ‘double-loop’ learning takes an additional step, or, more often than not, several additional steps. It turns the question back on the questioner. In the case of the thermostat, for instance, double-loop learning would wonder whether the current setting was actually the most effective temperature at which to keep the room, and, if so, whether the present heat source was the most effective means of achieving it. A ‘double-loop’ learning process might also ask why the current setting was chosen in

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the first place. In other words, ‘double-loop’ learning asks questions not only about objective facts but also about the reasons and assumptions behind those facts (Argyris 1994). In the literature on organisational learning, ‘learning to learn’ is regarded as highly desirable (Garratt 1999). However, much depends on the context. When only routinised problem-solving is needed, it may be equally important to learn this in a ‘single-loop way’. Just as more learning is not always better (Tosey 2005, p. 339), not every change requires learning. That is why authors such as Keeney (Keeney 1983), Bateson (Bateson 1979) and Watzlawick (Watzlawick et al. 1974) comment on the epistemological flaws of these and other ‘organisational’ learning principles. Given the unintended consequences of having only ‘good learning ideas’, they argue for a more systemic ‘logic’ that works with optimisation and self-regulatory limits rather than maximisation. The point here is not per se whether one can have ‘too much of a good thing’, but the idea that learning itself may have unintended as well as intended, and undesirable as well as desirable, faces. We try to illustrate this in Interlude 6.2 with a short additional description of an incident within the union case from Chap. 1. In the incident we try to highlight some of the inconsistencies in the way people regard learning, which we are going to use in the rest of the chapter to illustrate the complexities when we try to connect learning with changing. Interlude 6.2 “Closing the Ranks” in the Union Case Although union work is not our field, it was not difficult to see the games being played during a top management meeting consisting entirely of top management and the CEO. As a consequence, it wasn’t hard to identify some of the possible dangers for the union organisation as a whole. However, when we, in our role as external consultants, raised some questions about the urgency of the intended change, the observed inertia (see for more details the business case in Sect. 1.2.1) and the way senior managers seem to handle both, the participants responded that we did not understand the union’s way of doing things. Ultimately, they insisted that no one would let a big union go bankrupt—not their members, not the government and not even the employer organisations. So, urgency was not an issue, and there was no need to go into these lines of questioning. Later on, in the second half of the meeting, a decision needed to be made regarding a particular framework as the central philosophy of a ‘Management Development (MD)’ programme—a programme that was supposed to support the ongoing organisational change process by starting what the group called a process of ‘double-loop’ learning for all executives within the organisation. During the meeting it seemed as if the top management and the CEO had already made up their mind regarding the framework and that the decision seemed just a formality. So, the consultant asked the participants: ‘In relation to the observed managerial issues, what were their arguments for choosing this particular framework?’ The CEO immediately replied ‘This is (continued)

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Interlude 6.2 (continued) the best tool for realising change as the whole senior management sees it!’, to which the consultant reacted with the question ‘But do you think it also applies, for example, to the problems the executives seem to be facing?’ ‘I don’t think you heard me,’ replied the CEO. ‘This is the framework we are going to work with.’ ‘That I heard’, the consultant continued, ‘but I am just curious about your arguments.’ The CEO fixed her gaze on the consultant, then looked him in the eye and riposted, ‘You do your thing, we do ours! We are not going to waste any more time on this!’ before closing the meeting. Looking in hindsight at this incident, the consultant seems to hold back in coming up with a personal reflection. Although this often helps a client feel heard, sometimes it just provides enough leverage to keep away from this ‘action-reaction’ loop. In any case, the ‘action-reaction’ loop didn’t seem to invite the two parties to reveal their thinking. Furthermore, the withholding seems to sugar-coat the slightly awkward situation. In ‘double-loop’ learning vocabulary, as described by Argyris, ‘[t]hey were not sharing in a mutual and open way their private perspective on the matter’ (Argyris 1977, pp. 115–125). In hindsight, the CEO response seems to demonstrate ‘Model I’ behaviour, likely to militate against the change the union appears to be seeking. When the interventionist asked the director on a later occasion in a more private setting the same question, the answer was completely different: ‘I know being open is the way to realise a double-loop learning process, which is, as I see it, of great importance for changing the union. However, practically, being open doesn’t seem to fit the way we do things around here.’

6.3.2

Bateson’s Learning ‘Intervention’ Levels L0, LI and LII

The consultant in Interlude 6.2, perhaps naively in retrospect, took literally the encouragement to pursue inquiry in what was going on and what the underlying assumptions were at that moment regarding the framework of the MD programme. However, pursuing inquiry via asking some ‘one-directional’ questions is something completely different to engaging in a co-inquiry with all the relevant others in the room. Presented in this way, it seems as if the CEO’s displayed behaviour is the opposite of what can be called ‘learning’ behaviour. However, based on this example, we cannot be (completely) sure that this is the case. For example, one can also argue that the CEO’s response was likely to serve the management’s declared interests in its purpose to be efficient: ‘[W]e are not going to waste any more time on this subject!’ And to be seen as firm, decisive and unified in difficult times she said: ‘The MD programme is the best tool for the intended change as the whole senior management sees it!’ while being open about it by disclosing these arguments. Although the framework of the MD programme seems to be chosen without any argument exchanged, these are in fact the arguments that are revealed.

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That is why, for example, it can be argued that this ‘game playing’ and the outspoken ‘espoused arguments’ are also unavoidably part of learning in organisations (Tosey 2005, p. 340). What if we were to see this ‘shadow side’ of learning within a wider picture as an integral component of learning activities in organisations, instead of concluding that people’s skills at learning and changing are somehow deficient, i.e., if they were only better at it, the consultant in the Interlude 6.2 could have connoted apparent ‘non-learning’ positively and regarded apparently troublesome patterns of behaviour as skilled accomplishments? This alternative frame presents the possibility of keeping things in a more neutral-positive flow, without any recrimination or objurgations. In other words, this alternative frame gives the idea that any act of learning in organisations necessarily entails—as depicted in Fig. 6.7—simultaneous layers of ‘non-learning’ (Learning L0), ‘learning’ (‘Learning LI’), ‘learning to learn’ (Learning LII) and ‘learning about [learning to learn]’ (Learning LIII). Using Bateson’s levels of learning, as presented in Fig. 6.7, apprehending, positive relabelling non-learning (L0), enhancing learning (LI) necessarily engages us in learning how to learn in that context (LII), and also in learning how to learn to learn, by managing paradoxes (LIII) (Tosey 2005, p. 340). The last level (LIII) will be discussed later in the next section. The first-level intervention is, in general, about giving guidance by designing clever interventions and asking keen questions. On this level, we don’t per se let the participants participate in a learning process. Mostly, these interventions are instrumental, inviting people to behave in controlled ways towards themselves and the processes they are involved in. Besides non-learning and learning, Bateson writes in terms of ‘learning to learn (LII)’ as a contextual affair. So intervening on a second level of learning (LII) refers to learning about the context, ‘in which the subject improves his or her ability to deal with contexts (. . .) and the subject comes to act more and more as if contexts of this type were expectable in his universe’ (Bateson 1991). Bateson often refers to improvements in skills of learning, equating perhaps improving study skills, or learning about one’s learning style, or, referring to Argyris’ ‘double-loop’ learning, denoting a more reflective kind of thinking that questions and seeks to correct the norms or goals of action on a deeper level (as we discussed before in Interlude 4.2 in Chap. 4). Coming to this point in our overview, we sum up as follows: 1. It can be helpful to label apparent non-learning activities (L0) as neutral positive, which gives more possibilities for further learning. 2. The two levels LI and LII necessarily coexist and are intertwined in organisational settings, which mean that, for example, learning on the first level (LI) cannot occur without learning on the contextual LII level and vice versa. 3. There is a hierarchical and recursive relationship between these putative levels LI and LII, such that changes at LII will influence (not determine) what is possible at LI. The contextual level can best be regarded as serving, legitimising, limiting, encouraging or discouraging learning at LI (Tosey 2005, p. 343). 4. Learning on level LII is about the rules and norms as they apply in a specific context, which seems to correspond with rung three of Argyris’ ‘Ladder of Inference’.

6.3 Realising a Paradigm Shift from One Set of Assumptions to another Fig. 6.7 Different intervention levels, their main characteristics and main foci (Originally these different levels or orders are fundamentally rooted in the groundbreaking paper by Bateson, ‘The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication’, in which his thinking is based on Whitehead and Russell’s theory of logical types. In this paper, he distinguished between ‘what he termed “zero learning”, the acquisition of data or information that does not create a difference or change; “Learning I”, in which skill learning is acquired through trial and error selection of a possibility within a set of options; and “Learning II”, where second order or doubleloop learning occurs through shifting the frame or set in which one is making level one choices.’ (Bateson 1972; Hawkins 2004, p. 415))

Level of Intervention Third level (LIII)

Second (LII)

First (LI)

Zero (L0)

Main Characteristics Dialogue ‘Learning to [learn to learn]’. Minimising hierarchy. Multiple perspectives. Circular questions. Inside-out perspective by interventionist. Withness

219

Focus

Meta-principles and metacommunication For managing dilemmas, paradoxes and double binds (see next Chapter). Multiple aspects, layers and levels. Regarding an observed person as being part of a context. How the observer is being part of the observed by their act of observation. Doubleloop learning level Participatory Context, relationships, in‘Learning to learn’. teraction Multiple perspecContextual rules of participatives (stakeholders). tion. Circular questions. Multiple aspects, layers and Outside-in perspec- levels. tive by intervention- Regarding an observed perist. son as a subject. Aboutness Single-loop with possibilities for double-loop learning level Instrumental Product, person, process ‘Enhanced learning’. Mostly one aspect at a time. Keen questions with Within one level. open answers. Regarding an observed perOutside-in perspec- son as an object from one tive by intervention- perspective, mostly an interist. ventionist one. Aboutness Single-loop learning level Awareness Apprehending what is hapOf non-learning ac- pening. tivities. Reframing and positive relaOne perspective, belling of what is happening. mostly a managerial Asking for alternative views one. on the same subject and stayDirect questions ing away from pseudo exasked with direct an- planations (see Paragraph swers. 8.5). Aboutness Single-loop learning

The incident in Interlude 6.2 shows that on a contextual level (LII), ‘keeping the ranks closed’ is the normal thing to do. The same seems true for being clear, direct, ‘reactive’ and advocative about the notion that questioning managerial hegemony is outside the boundary of what the present senior managers may consider ‘useful’ inquiry (Tosey 2005, p. 340). At the same time, on a more personal level, the CEO

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seems to be convinced that being open is to be regarded as a learning opportunity. Apparently, our ‘espoused theory’—what we say and believe about how we interact—can be different from our ‘theory in use’: how we really do interact as observed by others (Argyris 1999, p. 58). Although people do not always behave congruently with their espoused convictions, they tend to do so with their ‘theories in use’ and to be mostly unaware of it. Of further interest here is that the director from our example in Interlude 6.2 apparently finds the inconsistencies and contradictions to be something that she can handle. The fact that she handles the rather paradoxical situation can be considered an example of Bateson’s ‘contextual (LII) learning’. However, the question is how the inconsistencies and contradictions in their behaviour are going to help change the organisation, especially when they are in fact not discussable, and this undiscussability also seems undiscussable (Argyris 1999, p. 141). Apparently, if we want to change by learning in a frame-breaking way, we need a certain extra reflexive layer with which we bring to the surface and challenge the paradox and underlying (opposing) assumptions.

6.3.3

Bateson’s Learning ‘Intervention’ Level LIII

Intervening on a second level (LII) does very little good in the long run if we fail to examine the assumptions from which those decisions and behaviours flow (Covey 1989, p. 28). Moreover, if we want to take every day’s paradoxes and dilemmas into account, we need to take action on a more meta level while simultaneously reflecting on this action to learn from it with all participants (Argyris and Schön 1996). At level LIII of intervening, we: 1. Go beyond the rational, individual and aspect-focused ways of intervening, which means that we are not primarily looking at what we (seem to) know about what we are doing, but at what we perceive as odd, peculiar or coincidental, and what we consider for ourselves to be blind spots. 2. Emphasise looking at relationships, interactive patterns, shifting contexts and the whole of interactive patterns between people. 3. Are not going to search for causes, as they are a red herring,3 misleading us and luring us into a discussion about the ‘real cause’, which never exists when there are more realities coexisting next to each other. 4. Reflect explicitly on what we hear and see from others but also perceive what we hear and see within ourselves. 5. Have no outside privileged viewpoint, because we are aware of the fact that observer and observed cannot be separated, that what we observe (i.e. content) depends completely on our interaction (i.e. process) between us and the participants of the social system (i.e. context) we observe (Heylighen and Joslyn 2001).

3

A red herring is something that misleads or distracts from a relevant or important issue.

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At this LIII level, an interventionist acts as part of the very system undergoing the intervention, and is therefore more incapable of detached objectivity (Freedman and Combs 1996). As suggested first by Bateson, this third level of intervening involves a transcendence of the ego world, where experience is orientated towards, and made sense of through, some rational self-assumptions and beliefs: for example, on ‘what I call my role’, ‘what I believe about how to motivate and manage people’ and ‘what I believe about what changes people’ (Hawkins 2004, p. 416; Bredo 1989). What is meant here is the exact opposite of ‘detached thinking’ as mentioned earlier in Interlude 4.8. As argued by Bateson, intervening on a third level means that we depart from the conception that ‘knowing about the other is not separate from knowing about oneself’, which what we called earlier in Interlude 4.8, ‘withness thinking’ (Keeney 1983, p. 59). As a consequence, what an interventionist observes and shares is not only information about the situation and the other participants he or she observes but also about his/her own assumptions, which means that as an observer the interventionist will always be among the observed (Keeney 2007). That is why initiating double-loop learning, which in fact is about trying to change assumptions, most likely is not going to be successful on earlier levels of intervention than LIII. So, for example, if an interventionist sees a client situation as something that is not worth the trouble of trying to help people to see their current reality in a different way, he or she is intervening on L0. Despite how clever his/her interventions may be, they are and stay at level zero. If an interventionist sees the client situation as something that needs to be fixed, he or she thinks and acts as a repair person, that is, ‘things’ are dysfunctional out there (Hoffman 1988). Despite how clever his/her interventions may be, in this case they are and stay at a first level, inviting people to focus on what is dysfunctional and not on what people’s strengths and resources are (Freedman and Combs 1996). When being reflective and acting on the level of his own assumptions, the interventionist is supposed to intervene on LIII, inviting people to do the same. At the end of this section, we emphasise that handling, based on just one of the columns of each presented set of assumptions in Paragraph 6.2 and for the same reasons, within one of the levels of Fig. 6.7 brings us only reactiveness, in ourselves and also in the people who surround us. Doing more of the same4 in this way is thus one of the main reasons why people are getting into comparable processes like that of a self-fulfilling prophecy and escalating commitment. This means that without a good balance between both sets of assumptions or the different levels of intervening, a search for meaning will not arise, the assumptions of those involved will not be examined and the interventionist will bite its own tail, just like the age-old symbol of the ouroboros.

4 This is what Watzlawick called a ‘Game without End’, that is, a game that has no rules for the change of its rules or for its termination (Watzlawick 1990).

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An ouroboros is an ancient symbol depicting a serpent or dragon eating its own tail, continually devouring itself and being reborn from itself. As a symbol, in particular, it expresses the recursiveness and the unity of all things, material and spiritual, which never disappear but perpetually change form in an eternal cycle of destruction and recreation.

6.4

Co-Inquiry as a Process of Collaborative Learning

In this section, we break down the process of collaborative learning down into three acts of learning: (1) Being generative, generating new insights, images and so on through perspective taking in a shifting context; (2) Bringing to the surface, recognising one’s own contribution while doing a differential diagnosis; and (3) Challenging, taking collaborative action to reshape one’s own and others’ constructions. A reflective practice requires a constant intermingling of these three ‘learning acts’ (Taylor et al. 2011). Figure 6.8 outlines the three interconnected learning acts with their key supporting tools.

6.4.1

Being Generative

The essence of this ‘learning act’ is that, as Schein writes, ‘that people react not to an objective world but to a world fashioned out of their own perceptions, assumptions and theories of what the world is like’ (Schein 1967). Probably this principle is more well-known by Thomas’s often-quoted axiom: ‘It is not important whether or not the interpretation is correct—if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.’ (Thomas and Thomas 1928) For us, this cognitive representation is the reality with which to work with. Firstly, this means making sense of a changing situation, and then giving sense to the joint opinion. Secondly, this means staying attuned with our heightened awareness and keeping it linked with the ongoing actions. For this to happen, it is important that participants understand, that they

6.4 Co-Inquiry as a Process of Collaborative Learning Fig. 6.8 Learning acts and tools in bringing to the surface and challenging assumptions

‘Learning acts’ 1. Being generative Perspective taking in a shifting context. 2. Bringing to the surface Recognising one’s own contribution by doing differential diagnosis.

3. Challenging each other’s assumptions Taking collaborative action to reshape our own and others’ constructions.

223

Tools • Argyris’s ‘Ladder of inference’.

• Senge’s ‘Left-hand column technique’. • Kegan and Lahey’s ‘Change immunity map’ (Chapter 7). • Questions regarding linking awareness to action.

co-create themselves the reality in which they move—in other words – that they understand that what exists as ‘reality’ for them is, to a high degree, determined by what they themselves accept as reality. In fact, this is the main theme of the first ‘learning act’, helping participants to see how their assumptions, emotional reactions and actions influence and co-create their mutual organisational practices. A typical practical tool for making sense in this way, is the ‘ladder of inference’, which is a ‘schematic representation of the steps by which human beings select from and read into interactions as they make sense of everyday life’ (Thomas and Thomas 1928). The ladder of inference is described extensively in Interlude 6.3. Interlude 6.3 ‘The Ladder of Inference’ The ladder of inference helps people use the diversity of perspectives in a group. The results are an improved reasoning process in which people have learned to listen what others actually are saying and doing. The ladder of inference, as displayed in Fig. 6.9, is a continuum in which data, facts and events are at one end (the bottom), and action, theories and synthesised concepts are at the other end (the top). As Tomkins argues, the way raw data are synthesised into theory is very similar to doing grounded theory (Tompkins 2001, p. 555). In general, we tend to communicate at the abstract or high end of the ladder of inference because we make statements that may mean something to us but may be interpreted differently by someone else.5 (continued)

5

As argued by Tompkins, many communication problems occur because we operate from the high end of the ladder of inference. Our interpretations are not explained or revealed, and yet we act as if

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Interlude 6.3 (continued) The ladder of inference can be used in group situations to reflect upon interactions, starting with what people are actually saying and doing and ending with mutual insights about what it all means (Mclain Smith 2011, p. 244). By reflecting on interactions one step (rung) at a time, we are much less likely to jump to premature conclusions and much more likely to see gaps in our perspectives or to see alternative interpretations, especially when we reflect with other people who are taking it one step (rung) at a time. How are people’s reasoning processes ordered on a ladder of inference? The First Rung (Selecting) The act of creating a meaning is an act of making an inference from data, so the first rung is whatever the person considers to be the relatively directly observable data. People’s meanings are to be considered as raw data. As McLain Smith writes, in a group there is a lot going on, which means that we have to focus and select, and the best way to start is with what people are actually saying and doing in here-we-go-again moments. These are moments that are easy to recognise but hard to understand or alter (Mclain Smith 2011, p. 246). On the first rung our advocacy can be improved by providing specific examples and making our steps clear, by using, for example, sentences like ‘The evidence I’m using to draw this conclusion is based on the following observations. . .’ However, in this phase, it seems more customary to use inquiry sentences like ‘Can anyone give an example. . .?’ In this regard, it is advisable to ask participants to observe phenomena or explore facts with probing questions such as: ‘How many people were in the group?’, ‘What did you observe about their behaviour?’, ‘What happened when they realised they were almost out of time?’ and ‘How did you react to the feedback?’ Together, the participants, including the interventionist, learn to encourage challenges, probe each other’s thinking and seek each other’s views (Bateman 1990). The Second Rung (Describing) This rung represents the culturally understood and acceptable meanings embedded in the data as unveiled on the first rung. Once we focus and all present agree on which behaviours to select, we can describe them in relatively observable terms without speculating about motives, feelings, intentions, frames or the like. On this rung, it is vital that we stick to what we see or hear and describe these manifest behaviours as neutrally as possible. This makes it easier for all those involved to point out behaviour we might have missed or to understand which behaviour we think needs to change. Either (continued) our interpretations are correct, without inviting challenges. This is called ‘single-loop’ learning as we will discuss further on (Tompkins, 2001).

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Interlude 6.3 (continued) way, it is the single most important step—and the one most people skip (Mclain Smith 2011, p. 247). In this phase it is important to use inquiry skills, for example, by asking others to make their thinking process visible and asking for help in seeing any gaps or limitations in our own thinking. The most common techniques that Bateman describes include: 1. Encouraging challenges: encouraging others to question the reasoning of the interventionist. 2. Probing thinking: asking someone to explain their thinking or provide examples by moving down the ladder of inference from generalisations to specific data or by moving up the ladder of inference from specific data to generalisations. 3. Seeking other views: asking others to provide alternative interpretations (Bateman 1990, p. 89). The Third Rung (Explaining) If the previous step is the most important, this one is the trickiest, because we now have to explain the behaviour, we think contributes to some patterns by drawing on theory. This is the first rung an interventionist comes to with his or her (tacit) assumptions for a first diagnosis. The definition of the problem begins on this third rung and may be continued on higher levels of inference. Whatever meanings people produce on the third rung of the ladder, they see it as obvious. Here, it may be advisable to use a question like ‘What led you to that conclusion?’ instead of ‘Is that because of A or B?’ Fig. 6.10 provides more examples of these two types of questions. The Fourth Rung (Predicting) Predicting is related to the action strategies that we started on the third rung. A fitting question in this phase may be ‘What might we not see if we go off in this direction?’ Questions like this one help participants to broaden or extend their perspectives—not only on an individual level but also as a group. The Fifth Rung (Evaluating) Evaluating is related to the consequences of the fourth rung and draws on all the others to assess whether we like what we see. Just as the previous two steps required a theory, so does this one. But it requires something else too, something that is not always easy to see: again, our own assumptions. In this last step, we look back at our own explanations and predictions and say whether some behaviour is ‘effective’ or ‘ineffective’, and whether it is value-added or not (Mclain Smith 2011, p. 251). As Tompkins concludes, the ladder of inference can providing the facts and raw data from lower on the ladder of inference helps illustrate the participants’ thinking, thereby giving the listener the opportunity to interpret the (continued)

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Interlude 6.3 (continued) information for himself or herself (Tompkins 2001, p. 569). The longer the ladder of inference—i.e. the further the inference is from the relatively directly observable data—the greater the difficulty of testing the validity of the meanings, and hence the greater the likelihood of misunderstandings (Argyris 1982, p. 49). McLain Smith warns us about getting caught in an endless loop of relatively directly observable data, which is why it is important to find common ground, taking into consideration not just our assumptions but also the assumptions of others (Mclain Smith 2011, p. 252). With the temptation for the interventionist to overuse inquiry, however, as Argyris, Tompkins and McLain Smith warn us, it is important to balance the use of advocacy (giving information) and inquiry (seeking information).

Chris Argyris (1923 – 2013) Was an American business theorist, Professor Emeritus at Harvard Business School, and known for seminal work like ‘On organizational learning’ (1992). His underlying theory, supported by years of empirical research, is that the reasoning processes employed by individuals in organizations inhibit the exchange of relevant information in ways that make double-loop learning difficult – and all but impossible in situations in which much is at stake.

Is it value-added or not? Evaluate

Predict

Explain

Describe

What do we assume causes our behaviour? What explains our behaviour?

What are we actually saying and doing in “here we go again” moments?

Select

What is happening?

Fig. 6.9 The ladder of inference (Argyris 1982, p. 181)

6.4 Co-Inquiry as a Process of Collaborative Learning

• • • • •

Limits learning You agree, don’t you? Is that because of X or Y? So you think X? (active listening) Don’t you agree with him/her? I think you are totally wrong about that.

•

• • •

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Supports learning Do you have a different idea? What led you to that conclusion? What evidence from the case leads you to that statement? What is your concern? l think it is X because of Y and Z evidence. Do you have a different interpretation?

Fig. 6.10 Questions that limit and support learning (Tompkins 2001, p. 559)

During the ‘learning act’ of being generative, it is important to convey that: 1. Categorising and drawing inferences is absolutely necessary to allow us to act in the world—otherwise we face a world of undifferentiated ‘buzzing, blooming confusion’ (James 1890). 2. Inference drawing is so powerful and potentially dangerous because it is easy to lose sight of the fact that we have drawn an inference. 3. If people forget to treat their inferences as inferences, it undermines effective action (Kegan and Lahey 2001).

6.4.2

Bringing to the Surface

This ‘learning act’ is about participants developing responsibility for their contribution in the process and for its outcomes. This is exactly where ‘forcefield theory’ and ‘systems thinking’ may come in handy. It helps us to perceive how we are part of a greater whole social system and that the way we perceive things is interconnected with the behaviour of others and that of our own. Taking responsibility for this isn’t easy, and ‘the left-hand column technique’, as introduced by Argyris and Senge as described in Interlude 6.4, can be of help.

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Interlude 6.4 The Left-Hand Column Technique (Senge 1990, p. 195) The left-hand column technique comes from a type of case presentation introduced by Argyris and his colleagues and later on picked up by Senge. In this interlude we will use the example that Senge uses in his book The Fifth Discipline. It starts by selecting a specific situation where the ‘I’ interacts with one or several other people in a way the ‘I’ feels is not working—specifically, that it is not producing any apparent learning or moving ahead. The ‘I’ writes out a sample of the exchange, in the form of a script. Subsequently, the facilitator writes the script on the right-hand side of a page. On the left-hand side of Fig. 6.11, the ‘I’ writes what he or she is thinking but not saying at each stage of the exchange. To make this more concrete, we use here an example from Senge regarding an exchange with his colleague Bill after a big presentation to their boss on a project they did together. As Senge describes, he had to miss the presentation and heard that it was poorly received. Senge: Well, what do you think we should do? I believe that the issues you were raising are important. Bill: I’m not so sure. Let’s just wait and see what happens. Senge: You may be right, but I think we may need to do more than just wait. Now here is what the exchange looks like with his ‘left-hand column’. The left-hand column exercise, as depicted in Fig. 6.11, tries to succeed in bringing hidden assumptions to the surface and showing how they influence behaviour. In the above example, Senge is making two key assumptions about Bill: he lacks confidence, especially in regard to facing up to his poor performance, and as he sees it, he lacks initiative. Neither may be literally true, but both are evident in Senge’s internal dialogue and both influence the way he handles the situation. Senge’s belief in Bill’s lack of confidence shows up in his skirting the fact that he has heard that the presentation was a bomb. He seems afraid that if he said this directly, he would lose what little confidence he has. His belief in Bill’s lack of initiative comes up when they discuss what to do next. Bill gives no specific course of action despite Senge’s question. The most important lesson that comes from this example is how we undermine opportunities for learning in conflictual situations. Rather than squarely facing our problems, Bill and Senge talk around the subject. Instead of determining how to move forward to resolve their problems, they end their exchange with no clear course of action—in fact, with no clear definition of a problem requiring action. The practice of using the above exercise starts by having each participant write a short two-column case about an interpersonal interaction with one of (continued)

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Interlude 6.4 (continued) the other group members in the room that turned out badly. The case they choose includes a brief description of the context of the interaction, actual or remembered dialogue from the encounter in the right-hand column, and a lefthand column that captures what the participant thought and felt but did not say.

Peter M. Senge (1947 Is an American systems scientist, founder and director of the Society for Organisational Learning and a senior lecturer at the MIT Sloan School of Management. In ‘The Fifth Discipline’ (1990), he draws the blueprints for an organisation where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nutured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are contually learning together.

Using the ‘left-hand column technique’ generally provides the richest insights into how participants collaboratively contribute to problematic outcomes in the same situation. The analysis identifies the actual outcomes in the situation, the actual actions that were taken that led to the outcomes and the salient actual perceptive frames or assumptions that led to those actions. It is a start in making explicit the connections between the participants’ assumptions, actions and the outcomes in relation to those of relevant others within the group. Seeing the whole, the connection and in the first place our own contribution can very much encourage the participants to reconsider their own thoughts and behaviours.

Fig. 6.11 Senge’s example of the use of a ‘left-hand column’

What Senge is thinking What is said Everyone says the presentation Senge: How did the presentawas a bomb. tion go? Does he really not know how Bill: Well, I don’t know. It’s rebad it was? Or is he not willing ally too early to say. Besides, to face up to it? we’re breaking new ground here. Senge: Well, what do you think we should do? I believe that the He really is afraid to see the issues you were raising are imtruth. portant. If he only had more confidence, Bill: I’m not so sure. Let’s just he could probably learn from a wait and see what happens. situation like this. I can’t believe he doesn’t realise how disastrous that presentation was to our moving ahead. Senge: You may be right, but I I’ve got to find some way to think we may need to do more light a fire under the guy. than just wait.

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Challenging Assumptions

This ‘learning act’ is about participants explicating what they think. We often act as if an idea we have ‘in our head’ defines what the situation is. But these ideas are in fact most of the time reasonably nebulous. They have to be acted upon or confirmed by the others in the situation before they can become ‘real’ or ‘actual’. For example, our social norms are created by successive outspoken definitions of the situation. That is why this ‘learning act’ is also about learning to challenge our and others’ assumptions in an open and constructive way, for example, by asking reflective questions as described in Fig. 6.12 in Interlude 6.5. This provides a guiding template for reflecting on three broad action-practice strategies in doing co-inquiry as a form of critical mutual self-exploration (Reason and Torbert 2001).

Experienc- Undering standing Firstperson

Secondprsone

Thirdperson

What am I thinking, feeling?

What sense am I making of my thoughts, feelings?

Judging/valuing

Deciding/taking action What will I say, do… now?

Have I verified my understanding? What value judgement am I making? What is What does Have we What will we happening this mean? agreed on our do? in the What does it shared meaning and its group, say about what is be- our relation- value? ship with ing others? said/not said? How does How do we Is that under- How do we my firstunderstand standing sup- disseminate person and my firstported by the our learning? our secperson and evidence? ond-person our second- What actionexperience person expe- able contribute rience? knowledge is to actionabeing generble ated? knowledge ?

Fig. 6.12 Different ‘perspectives’ in co-inquiry (Coghlan and Shani 2017)

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Interlude 6.5 Challenging: First-, Second- and Third-Person Questions The encompassing aims in co-inquiry are to increase one’s own and others’ capacity to appreciate and cultivate transformation, integrity, mutuality, justice and sustainability for ourselves, for our groups and for our institutions (Torbert and Taylor 2011). Co-inquiry is a process for searching, not just regarding things and/or practices outside the inquirer (third-person objects and practices), but also the inquirer’s own changing practices, ways of thinking and quality of attention (first-person research on ‘my’-self), as well as the interactions, norms, governance and mission of the specific persons and groups with whom one is working or playing (second-person research on ‘our’ communicational process) (Chandler et al. 2003; Heron 1996). A firstperson action practice addresses the ability of a person to foster an inquiring approach to his or her own life (Ellis and Bochner 2000), which can be characterised as a form of inquiry and practice that is about our own selflearning as we engage in an appreciative process of co-inquiry. The questions in the first row of Fig. 6.12 can, for example, help in exploring how we interfere and attribute what we perceive (Marshall 2016). A second-person action practice strategy is about engaging in a face-to-face collaborative inquiry within a group setting. It refers to mutual and reciprocal inquiries of groups as co-researchers engaged together in asking questions about, for example, ‘what is happening?’ and ‘what do we want to happen?’ A thirdperson action practice strategy is aimed at establishing an ‘community of inquiry’ (as we will discuss in Interlude 8.1 in Chap. 8) that reaches beyond the immediate group to engage with whole social systems, organisations, communities and/or networks (Torbert and Taylor 2011). The main point in introducing these questions is that there are three kinds of voices, that together: 1. Increase the validity of the knowledge we use in our moment-to-moment living. 2. Increase the effectiveness of our actions in real time (Reason and Torbert 2001). Once surfaced, the process of challenging our and others’ assumptions goes up and down the first rungs of the ladder of inference. This is because, even when we have recognised that our own assumptions lead to actions, we are often unable to act differently because those assumptions have been influencing our reality for so long that we can’t imagine alternatives (Senge 1990, p. 186), which makes it a non-linear, recursive process, full of repetitive actions, with most probably a lot of ‘there we go again’ moments. Such a sequence of confrontation with each other’s assumptions can be somewhat disorderly, in which alternating perspectives will have been stacked on each other in a seemingly random fashion, mixing rational aspects with emotional and deontic ones. When difficulties arise, it is to be expected that

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participants will behave in accordance with their private assumptions (Argyris 1977, p. 120). Moreover, as Sminia and Van Nistelrooij illustrate with their case study of a change trajectory of a Dutch governmental agency, when things get into a rift, stalling further progress, top management can easily decide to intervene and regain unilateral control (Sminia and van Nistelrooij 2006). As it turns out, confronted with the stalling progress, top management in this case: • Behaved in accordance with its private assumptions and strives to regain unilateral control. • Reduced the scope of participation. • Made past events accountable by narrating only the relevant aspects. • Reduced the number of different perspectives (and with that the number of direct participating stakeholders). • Ignored the (quality of the) process and sticks to the content of what is to be accomplished. • Improved preparedness for action by concentrating on one-directional sense giving. The process of bringing to the surface and challenging our assumptions can be pretty tiresome, and a unilateral intervention can therefore be very relieving for the time being. However, as the findings of Sminia and Van Nistelrooij show, it can also be pretty fatal for the process of building trust, commitment and readiness to embrace change. The predisposition to polarise in order to ignore or to suppress dilemmas and paradoxes is a crucial problem for interventionists trying to deal with ‘double-loop’ issues. Thus, unilateral interventions and unilateral sense giving can lead to the process being stuck on a single-loop level, which in itself does not have to be a problem, as long as the problem itself or the context is simple with a clear causality chain of events (see Fig. 1.2 in Chap. 1). However, if we want to avoid the initiatives only leading to superficial change and to avoid a stuck feeling the next time the same issue comes up, the need for a ‘double-loop’ initiative or LIII intervention seems to be evident. One of the main reasons for this is that when we face possible futures, there is the added problem that the relevant facts are not yet there (Maitlis 2005; Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991). To bring them forth into an emerging prospect we need to insert our own agency and invite the commitment of other participants to help. This is sense giving in a more mutual way, sorting out our own sense making process and inserting action—one’s own and that of others— to bring about a possible and desired future. Therefore, sense giving and sense making are truly social processes, and all relevant participants and their perspectives need to be an active part of it.

6.5 Some Closing Reflections

6.5

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Some Closing Reflections

1. Learning as a Continuous Mode of Changing. Not everybody wants constant change and to be continuously in a learning mode (Greco 1996). For example, Argyris, in his first Harvard Business Review article in 1977, suggested that executives, especially chief executives, have three characteristics in common—they are articulate, competitive and persuasive. According to Argyris, these are not the best characteristics to encourage and develop learning skills. Argyris continued in 1991 by saying it can be especially difficult for ‘smart people to learn—not because they have little to learn but because they have a lot invested in appearing not to need to’ (Argyris 1991, p. 89). Moreover, as Senge argues, ‘[c]hildren in school learn how to display behaviours that teachers judge as competent, to get ‘right’ answers and avoid ‘wrong’ ones. From the beginning of one’s professional work career, all manner of attention is devoted to extending this impression of competence’ (Senge 2003). This remark suggests that people fear that acknowledging their uncertainties will cause them to lose credibility, just as employees fear admitting that they are not in control of tasks for which they are accountable. Therefore, learning as an integral part of our daily work seems to constitute an attractive and important skill for continuously changing, but it is not necessarily easy to apply and maintain. 2. Learning as an Analytical and Cognitive Activity. Argyris will most likely remain known as an action researcher who has pursued social-relational and learning process issues with singular tenacity over nearly three decades. However, Argyris’ perspective on organisational learning is analytic, cognitive and rational. As a perspective on organisational learning it is considered to be an accepted scientific practice and self-evident in management literature (Dachler 1994; DeLodzia 1977). However an analytical and cognitive approach can easily lose touch with the ‘existential agony’ of the learning process itself. Moreover, when applied in a context in which we are helping participants to change, such an analytical, cognitive and rational approach might itself create the ‘resistance’ upon which Argyris commented and for which he sought a solution. As argued earlier, a learning approach that focuses more on what we have spoken of as the quality of dialogue might be of greater use in helping people to embrace change. Dialogue lies at the core of organisational learning, as without dialogue, individuals and groups cannot effectively exchange ideas, nor can they develop shared understanding. Among other things, this means that we cannot treat paradoxes in our daily practice as abstract, cognitive puzzles, just as we as stakeholders/participants cannot stand outside the system, nor control it unilaterally. All participants, including managers, are embedded in the ongoing process. Or as Tosey puts it, ‘[w]e feel the emotional tension of dilemmas, we cannot take ‘time out’ to go away and consider a solution, and our responses carry real consequences and risks. It may be that such dilemmas hold especially rich possibilities for learning if they can be made subject to inquiry’ (Tosey 2005, p. 346).

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3. Learning as a Negative Activity. The application of Bateson’s levels of learning to the field of organisational learning forms the basis of Senge’s organisational learning and Argyris’ work on single- and double-loop learning. Both publications are seen as being part of ‘the first wave’ that introduced concepts such as ‘learning organisation’ and ‘organisational learning’ into management literature in the 1970s through until the 1990s. In this emergent phase, the predominant discourse of both concepts is seen as a ‘good thing’ and as means to better organisational performance in terms of innovation, competitiveness, effectiveness and efficiency. Because learning is a social activity, it is always power-laden: ‘[A]s constructed in specific social settings, which are sites of power relations and political activity, learning activities serve particular purposes.’ (Pedler and Hsu 2019) For example, learning can promote a particular view of what it means to be a good worker or citizen, or employees may be urged to develop themselves on a continuous basis, both as a necessary response to changing environments and to maintain their market value. Learning can therefore sometimes also be a negative activity. A sceptical view of ‘organisational learning’ can, for example, reveal its political and controlling nature and show a dark dimension that is in stark contrast to the hopeful scenarios of the original publications of Senge and Argyris. As we will discuss in the next chapter, the work of Argyris and Senge gives us insights into the ‘normality’ with which people deal with difficult and threatening problems by creating inhibiting feedback loops—in other words, creating conditions of undiscussability, self-fulfilling prophecies, self-sealing processes and hence escalating error, and most difficult of all, they seem to be unaware of their part in creating these conditions. Even if one disagrees with Argyris’ approach, style and application, we have his thoughts and ideas in print to chew on. It is easy to criticise but more difficult to propose these ideas and try them out. Recap • Although not all organisational change is the consequence of learning, individual and collective learning can be a substantial driver of organisational change. In this regard, we speak of immediate here-and-now feedback that occurs when groups diagnose their own process and members give each other face-to-face feedback. Learning in this way can be broken down into the following three (succeeding) core learning dimensions: (1) being generative, generating new insights, images and so on through perspective taking in a shifting context; (2) bringing to the surface, recognising one’s own contribution while doing a differential diagnosis; and (3) challenging, taking collaborative action to reshape one’s own and others’ constructions. • Learning something new requires us to resurrect, re-examine and possibly change some of the more stable portions of our cognitive structure such as our assumptions—a process that Argyris and others have called ‘frame breaking’ or ‘double-loop’ learning, which refers to a shift in paradigm, like trading in an existing set of assumptions for another one.

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• ‘Single-loop’ learning is about routine problem-solving activities, just like a thermostat that learns when it is too hot or too cold and turns the heat on or off. The thermostat can perform this task because it can receive information (the temperature of the room) and modify the temperature by taking corrective action. Double-loop learning is about questioning the underlying assumptions for setting the goal at the given point, or even whether there should be a goal at all. In the case of the thermostat, for instance, double-loop learning would examine whether the current setting was actually the most effective temperature at which to keep the room, and if so, whether the present heat source was the most effective means of achieving it. • About Bateson’s levels of learning, we conclude that (1) it can be helpful to label apparent non-learning activities (L0) as neutral positive, which creates more possibilities for further learning; (2) the two levels (LI) and (LII) necessarily coexist and are intertwined in organisational settings, which means that, for example, learning on the first level (LI) cannot occur without learning on the contextual LII level and vice versa; (3) there is a hierarchical and recursive relationship between the levels LI and LII, such that changes at LII will influence (not determine) what is possible at LI; (4) learning on level LII is about the rules and norms as they apply in a specific context, which seems to correspond with rung three of Argyris’ ‘Ladder of Inference’; and (5) learning on level (LIII) concerns double-loop learning, learning in a frame-breaking way, for which we need a certain extra reflexive layer with which we bring underlying (opposing) assumptions to the surface and challenge them. • This brings us to the conclusion that ‘double-loop’ learning takes several additional steps and that it turns the question back on the questioner.

6.6

Key Discussion Points

1. Relating different sets of assumptions ‘Management is too complex to be encapsulated by a single assumption’. • Try to formulate one or two assumption that may be behind this remark. 2. Change strategies and sets of assumptions A power-coercive change strategy (see Chap. 2) can be related to McGregor’s X paradigm in which we assume that people, to be changed, need to be motivated and can be overruled or even manipulated, mostly just by considering their interests, anxieties, weaknesses and/or wishes. The underlying assumption here is that this kind of change strategy works best when people basically have a sort of predisposition that can be associated with McGregor’s X paradigm. • Argue why this viewpoint makes sense, for example, in terms of Kotter’s ‘sense of urgency’ (from Chap. 2). • Argue whether there is any fit at all between the different sets of assumptions in this chapter and the different classic change strategies from Chap. 2. • Describe what will happen when an interventionist introduces double-loop learning, with a behavioural style based on Model I assumptions.

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3. Self-fulfilling prophecy People will respond in accordance with the theory with which they are approached, which can be become a self-fulfilling prophecy—a term that refers to a certain belief that leads to its own fulfilment. Especially within a dominant organisational Model I behaviour pattern, people are usually blind to the fact that they tend to do ‘more of the same’. • Compared to Model II, why, within a dominant Model I pattern, are people usually blind to the fact that they tend to do ‘more of the same’? • Argue why a self-fulfilling prophecy is comparable to an ouroboros. • Argue why ‘more of the same’ can easily lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. 4. Different levels of learning The director’s response from Interlude 6.2 can be interpreted as an act of learning at different levels. • Describe the different learning levels in the incident from Interlude 6.2. What would you describe as L0 behaviour in this example? And what can be regarded as LI learning? • Describe some of the conditions that must be met in this case before learning on LII and even LII will occur in this case. • Have to do with the underlying (big) assumption that withholds her in the first place. 5. Taking a ‘quantum leap’ based on the opposite set of assumptions Taking the reported incident from Interlude 6.1 again into consideration, the director wants to see the union as a learning organisation and wants to introduce an MD programme to encourage managers to initiate processes of double-loop learning, as it seems this is a decision made by senior management to be implemented, cascaded from the top down. • Describe the reason for the introduction of the MD programme; what do you think is the underlying set of assumptions here in terms of those of McGregor, Covey and Argyris? • Argue why the way the programme is going to be ‘implemented’ is paradoxical regarding its purpose of ‘initiating double-loop processes’. 6. Traditional seminars and workshops There appear to be at least two different ways to alter people. Besides the one we discussed in Sect. 6.4 as being part of a developing infrastructure (see Sect. 5.5), the other one is the use of workshops and seminars out of the (systemic) context of the daily practice. The strategy is to get a group of people (usually from the same department or echelon) to sit down and level with each other. The sessions are managed by an expert in group dynamics and problem-solving. The manager gives his or her blessing and assures people that no one will be hurt if he or she speaks the truth. The manager does the introduction, leaves the room and visits again afterwards to collect the results, but they themselves do not participate. Problems come to the surface and get discussed. Moreover, solutions are devised, and schedules for implementation are defined. After a month or so back in the office/workshop, the spirit seems to wane. Also, if someone tries to say something risky, it is usually accompanied by the comment: ‘In the spirit of our meeting. . . .’ (Argyris 1977, p. 121). The idea is to invoke the conditions of openness that had

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been created temporarily during the workshop. Discuss the effectiveness of the workshops and seminars as described here. What can you say about: • Their generative unfreezing effect, and the way they seem to bring to the surface and challenge assumptions? And how do you explain this? • The way the increased problem-solving effectiveness continued or extended to other problems? And how do you explain this? Argyris adds the following: ‘What happens, is that people provide incomplete and distorted feedback to each other. Each knows that this is the case, each knows that the other knows and each knows that this game is not usually discussable.’ (Argyris 1977, p. 120) • In regard to this remark, what do these workshops and seminars need to be more effective? 7. Surrendering and letting go For organisational change to happen, everyone involved needs to step outside the known patterns of behaviour. Or as Quinn, Spreitzer and Brown argue, ‘they must surrender their present selves and put themselves in jeopardy by becoming part of an emergent system’ (Quinn et al. 2000). This process usually requires, especially for management, the surrender of personal control, tolerance of uncertainty and reconception of the way we perceive our social surroundings. • Describe what it means to surrender our present self. • In regard to these remarks, argue why this is important—especially for management. The re-examination of assumptions temporarily destabilises our cognitive and interpersonal world, releasing quantities of basic anxiety (Schein 1992). Rather than tolerating anxiety, we tend to perceive the events/circumstances as congruent with our assumptions, even if that means distorting, denying, projecting or in other ways falsifying to ourselves what is going on. • Argue why the re-examination of assumptions releases quantities of basic anxiety. • Argue why these kinds of processes need professional facilitation, and especially those of management. 8. Stop and think How would you respond to these three ‘true or false’ questions? (Schein 2006, p. 297). Assumptions that work, i.e. enable the group to survive. True or false? In its environment and to integrate internally, assumptions become more stable and unchangeable. The organisation’s culture can be destroyed by destroying the organisation as a cultural entity (by removing key people who are culture carriers), but the assumptions will live on in the individuals as parts of their identity. True or false? With growth and success, organisations evolve subgroups that evolve subcultures; if those subcultures are not aligned, if they begin to conflict with each other, such conflicts are the greatest source of systems pathology. True or false?

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7

Change Dynamics Towards a Recursive Perspective on ‘Resistance’

In addition to his well-known dictum about the impossibility of stepping into the same river twice, Heraclitus, the Greek ‘great philosopher of change’, asserts that ‘[a]ll change is contradictory; therefore, contradiction is the very essence of reality (Watzlawick et al. 1974). Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously and accepting both of them (Orwell 1949).

7.1

Introduction

The intention to change is never enough (Kottler 2018, p. 300). There are limits to one’s willpower and desire to do something that we claim is important. There are so many things that happen between the moment of committing to an action and actually following through on it. It is not that we change our mind per se as much as other diversions and distractions interrupt our focus: interruptions coming from within us, from others, coming from all kinds of influences, in many cases even beyond our awareness. Added to these distractions, we do not have nearly as much control over our actions as we would like to believe (Kottler 2018, p. 300). Psychology research into consumer habits shows, for example, that nearly half of all the actions that people engage in during a typical day are not guided by any conscious decisions, but rather represent habitual responses (Verplanken and Wood 2006). As psychologists such as Wegner, Dijksterhuis and Bargh argue, humans are able to respond instantly to certain situations or dangers without a needlessly timeconsuming delay of making conscious decisions (Dijksterhuis 2004; Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Hassin et al. 2007). This enables us to mindlessly undertake routine activities or react automatically without thinking, but it also makes it much more challenging to alter our ingrained habits, as illustrated by the classic statements of Veblen and McDougall in Interlude 7.1. # The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. van Nistelrooij, Embracing Organisational Development and Change, Springer Texts in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51256-9_7

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Interlude 7.1 Classic Statements on Habit Forming and Changing ‘All change in habits of life and of thought is irksome’ and ‘human nature’, as Veblen argues, ‘contains an instinctive revulsion at any departure from the accepted way of doing and of looking at things—a revulsion common to all men and only to be overcome by the stress of circumstances’ (Veblen 1899). Veblen’s nineteenth-century views about habits of thought and action were shared later on by the psychologist McDougall, who argued: ‘[Among] the great general tendencies common to the minds of all men of all ages . . . [is] the tendency for all mental processes to become facilitated by repetition, the tendency to the formation of habits of thought and action that become more and more fixed in the individual as he or she grows older’ (McDougall 1908). Customs, which McDougall regarded as collective habits, formed through social repetition, also become ends in themselves, and he noted that people are prepared to maintain a custom ‘often at great cost of effort or discomfort, long after it serves any useful end’ (Jost 2015). More recently, brain research has shown that old habits are never completely eliminated but remain permanently etched in the basal ganglia region of the brain (Kottler 2018, p. 301). Rerouting and overwriting existing neural pathways, replacing old habits with new ones, seems the best we can do (Duhigg 2012). Given that we are not living in an isolated environment and much of our behaviour is socially conditioned by our surroundings, it seems that much of this has to be realised through peer pressure, modelling and environmental constraints as well as, for example, as McDougall argues in Interlude 7.1, through social repetition. Lewin, as one of the first researchers who used his forcefield theory to actively observe these processes, wondered at some point why changing personal and especially social habits seems to be so difficult and so gradual. In Lewin’s view, resistance (In fact, Lewin didn’t write about ‘resistance’ but about ‘group dynamics.’) to change stems from the fact that we ‘value the groups to which we belong, and therefore changing our attitudes or behaviour is tantamount to leaving the comfortable embrace of a social reality of which we are a part—a social reality that is largely shared by colleagues, friends and/or family members’ (Hardin and Higgins 1996). In this chapter we explore some of the well-known and less known processes that can be regarded as ‘change dynamics’ that seem to occur when change is introduced in a social setting. Therefore, before we go any further, we first discuss the derivation of the word ‘dynamics’ and introduce the main perspectives in play. The term comes from a Greek word meaning ‘force’. In careful usage of the phrase, ‘change dynamics’ refers to the forces operating in and between people when they are supposed to change their habits. Investigation of change dynamics thus consists of the study of these forces, for example, what gives rise to resistance to change, what conditions modify these forces, what consequences they have and so on Cartwright (1951, p. 382). The perspectives in play in studying change dynamics are:

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• An intra-individual psychodynamic perspective • A social-interactive group dynamic perspective • A social systems dynamics perspective As it comes to understanding human resistance to change, an intra-individual perspective is needed to understand and explain individual idiosyncrasies, a group perspective is needed to understand and explain group anomalies and a systems perspective is needed not only to understand and explain but also to handle paradoxical situations and people’s counter-intuitive actions. Together, these perspectives offer a wide range of possible explanations for what can be perceived as ‘resistance’. Although the intra-individual perspective offers a lot of interesting insights in intrahuman dynamics, it is deemed less relevant for the purpose of this book. Therefore, after a short description of the main individual defence mechanisms in Paragraph 7.2, we will focus in the rest of this chapter on group dynamics and on human dynamics at the level of the whole social system. This is why we introduce and explore the following: • How resistance to change as a scholarly concept has evolved in recent decades. That, for example, ‘resistance’ is not per se a nuisance, but may also be a resource and that it is not per se a simple one-way concept but can also be seen as a recursive concept that works for both interventionist as well as the receiver. • That the ‘resistance’ of a group can also owe to mostly unconsciousness, dysfunctional group behaviour, which come into play when group members increasingly become blind to their own inhibiting personal and interactive patterns. • That the ‘resistance’ of people can also be the result of a paradoxical situation in which they are stuck, or through a paradoxical ‘double bind’ message, a double commitment and/or a delay in a feedback loop. In Paragraph 7.2 we start with a short historical synopsis of how resistance to change as a scholarly concept has evolved in the last decennia. In Paragraph 7.3 we go into how resistance to change can be interpreted from a group perspective by examining three of the best-known (dysfunctional) group dynamics, that of Argyris’ ‘defensive reasoning’, Janis’ groupthink and Harvey’s ‘Abilene paradox’. In Paragraph 7.4 we interpret resistance to change from a systemic perspective by introducing the characteristics of a paradoxical situation, of a paradoxical ‘double bind’ message, the paradoxical concept of a ‘competing commitment’ and the counter-intuitive phenomenon of the ‘pocket veto’. The chapter closes with some reflections, a recap of the main findings and some key discussion points.

7.2

A Historical Synopsis on Resistance to Change

Despite its long history, there is a lack of consensus concerning what resistance to change represents and how to explain it (Deline 2019). This lack of consensus is unsurprising given that ‘resistance’ is investigated in fields as diverse as psychology

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(Oreg et al. 2011), sociology (Hollander and Einwohner 2004), organisational studies (Ford et al. 2008) and organisational communication (Garner 2013). According to several scholars (Ijaz and Vitalis 2011, p. 116), the first appearance of the notion of resistance to change in the literature on organisational change can be found in Coch and French’s classic study (Coch and French 1948; Burnes 2015, p. 99; Dent and Goldberg 1999, p. 25), as introduced in Interlude 3.1. The theoretical underpinnings of this approach to resistance to change derive from Lewin’s forcefield theory (see Chap. 3), which stresses the importance of context in shaping human actions (Burnes 2015, p. 25). From the beginning, Lewin introduces resistance to change as a concept that can be studied by focusing on the influence of contextual factors on how people perceive behaviour and change messages (Burnes 2015, p. 9). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, interest in contextual factors diminished and interest in an individual perspective regarding ‘resistance’ grew. The dominant perspective on resistance to change in these eras was in its essence about ‘active or passive responses on the part of a person that militate against a particular change notification, a programme of changes or change in general’ (Peiperl 2005). The importance of seeing resistance to change as a key factor when initiating organisational change is reflected in, for example, Diamond’s study at the end of the 1980s. In this investigation, the author focuses on human psychology, arguing that resistance to organisational change is innate to individual members of an organisation (Diamond 1986). Perhaps the most significant theoretical development work in relation to personality and individual factors pertaining to organisational change is Oreg’s work in the 2000s on dispositional resistance, which maintains that all employees are disposed to resisting change, although, as the author argues, some are more disposed to resisting upcoming change than others (Oreg et al. 2011, p. 16). This perspective reflects an internal conflict or difficulty that comes into play within a given individual: the so-called psychodynamic perspective.1 This perspective is especially interested in the dynamics between conscious motivation and unconscious motivation within a person, and the resulting individual defence mechanisms (against the proposed organisational change). These intra-individual mechanisms generally arise to avoid some form of shame, whether real or imagined, potentially related to some of the archetypical individual defence mechanisms, as first conceptualised by Sigmund Freud (Perls et al. 1994) (see Fig. 7.1). Individual mechanisms may emerge as Dent and Goldberg argue, when individual employees may perceive/actual experience loss of status, loss of pay or loss of comfort, but resisting such perceived/experienced loss is not the same as resisting change (Dent and Goldberg 1999). In a certain way, when individual employees engage in individual defence mechanisms as presented in Fig. 7.1, it is possible that they feel that they have little choice (Fleming 2016, p. 106). In other words, understood 1

Psychodynamics, also known as psychodynamic psychology, in its broadest sense, is an approach to psychology that emphasises study of the psychological forces that underlie human behavior, feelings and emotions and how they might relate to early experience. It is especially interested in the dynamic relations between conscious motivation and unconscious motivation (Taken from: Bowlby 1999; Stedman 2006).

7.2 A Historical Synopsis on Resistance to Change Fig. 7.1 The main archetypical individual defence mechanisms as conceptualised by Freud (Polster and Polster 1973; see also: Stevenson 2004)

Individual defence mechanism Introjection

247

Description

Not filtering experiences for what resonates with personal truth. Being naive or gullible.

Projection

Attributing one’s own feelings or actions to another. Blaming.

Retroflection

Doing to yourself what you want to do to others, or what you want others to do to you.

Deflection

Avoiding direct contact with another person. For example, using jokes to block the seriousness of a situation or to ignore a compliment.

Confluence

The inability to differentiate oneself. For example, merging with others’ opinions to avoid having to take a position, being often perceived as a “yes” person with no personal opinion.

De-sensitisation

Numbing sensations. For example, avoiding awareness physically, emotionally or mentally.

in this way, resistance to change is initiated because individuals refuse the present changing social reality, which, as they unconsciously perceive/conceive it, appears to be impossible to negotiate. In the 1970s, the research of Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) led many scholars to conclude that strategies for change had to be tailored to overcome resistance to change by employees. The dominance of this perspective in the change literature was maintained during the 1980s and 1990s, as the various survey outcomes in Interlude 7.2 indicate. Interlude 7.2 Survey Research Regarding Resistance to Change Resistance to change is often cited as a reason for difficulties in implementing, and the failure of, change initiatives (Erwin and Garman 2010). For example, Isern and Pung (2007) found in their survey of 1536 executives an indication that only 38% of the initiated change initiatives were successful and that resistance to change was one of the most often cited reasons. Prochaska et al. (2001) cited a survey of 400 organisations indicating resistance to change as the number one reason for failures of organisational change initiatives. Bovey and Hede (2001) cited numerous studies, including one of 500 large Australian organisations, indicating resistance as the most common problem (continued)

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Interlude 7.2 (continued) faced by management in implementing change. What these studies indicate is that people resist change is not only a deeply ingrained belief in organisational life but is also seen as one of the most important reasons for organisational change to fail. The popularity of Kotter’s publications in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in a dominant view in the management literature: that resistance to change has to be perceived as a problem to be worked through. Kotter’s message to interventionists seemed to be that ‘resistance’ needs to be reduced or removed, an analogy apparently taken from Newtonian physics, where ‘resistance’ is understood as an inevitable consequence of motion (when it is not in a vacuum, of course). Thus, in Kotter’s way of presenting resistance to change, it is a threat with a clear causal and linear pattern (Mathews and Linski 2016) and hence represents a simple concept (Ford et al. 2002; Van Nistelrooij and Caluwe 2016) in which ‘every primary action has an equal and opposite reaction’ (Fleming 2005). Despite this dominant notion that ‘resistance’ is an inherently negative (individual) phenomenon that must be eliminated for change efforts to be successful, there are a considerable number of arguments that emphasise the positive role of ‘resistance’ (Ijaz and Vitalis 2011, pp. 115–116). In the 1990s and 2000s, authors continued to draw attention to the importance of personality factors when examining how managers cope with change (Judge et al. 1999). For example, Piderit recognised that resistance to change is used to dismiss valid individual employees’ concerns about proposed changes in an organisation (Piderit 2000). She contended that by acquiring such behaviours, individual employees might be seeking to compel management to pay attention to previously ignored, vital issues. In this regard, resistors seem to strive to be recognised as a legitimate voice so that certain grievances and claims can be made (Fleming 2016, p. 108). In the same way, Ford, Ford and D’Amelio viewed individual resistance to change as a resource that can boost individual awareness, helping the return to purpose of the change initiative, building participation and engagement and helping individuals to learn (Ford et al. 2008). Based on their research, Connell and Waring contended that individual employees’ reactions, whether interpreted as ‘resistance’ or not, are pivotal to the long-term success of any change programme (Connell and Waring 2002, p. 347). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, leading authors in the field of ODC, such as Weick and Quinn (1999), Beer and Nohria (2000a) and Pettigrew et al. (2001), indicated in their reviews of the change literature to date that the core assumption is that ‘change is good, stability is bad’ and that ‘resistance to change therefore, should be managed’. According to these authors, instead of individual predispositions, resistance to change can also occur, for example, as a response to ‘the fallacy of programmatic change’ (Beer et al. 1990), as a response to a general perceived threat to the status quo (Fiorina 2007), as a response to the threat of established relationships within a group (Lawrence 1969) as a violation of the psychological

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contract with the employer (Connell and Waring 2002, p. 354), in the way that people make general sense of changes in society (Connell and Waring 2002, p. 354), or even as a response to the word ‘change’ itself (Cartwright 1951, p. 381). Apparently, we continue to encounter a mental model that is almost universally accepted in organisational life: that people resist change. This is a statement that can be found in nearly every 1980s and 1990s textbook on management or organisational behaviour (Aldag and Stearns 1991; Dubrin and Ireland 1993; Griffin 1993; Kreitner 1992; Schermerhorn 1989). It suggests that at the end of the twentieth century, the concept of resistance to change and its connotations had become a standard part of management vocabulary and a reminder of the way in which the idea is inculcated in the assumptions of new generations of managers (Dent and Goldberg 1999, p. 27). It seems that resistance to change is taken as a fact of life by those people who have not had the opportunity to specifically study in depth the question of how people change. As Dent and Goldberg argued in 1999: Those of us in academia have to realize that, in spite of our best intentions and efforts, the conventional wisdom concerning resistance to change has not been significantly altered by academic work in the past 30 years. [. . .] We assert, however, that the best way to challenge the conventional wisdom is to suggest that people do not resist change, per se (Dent and Goldberg 1999, p. 26).

At the end of the 1990s, Spreitzer and Quinn published an empirical study in which middle managers blamed executives above them for resisting change efforts (Spreitzer and Quinn 1996), an empirical finding, consistent with Smith’s earlier results that people in power will work towards maintaining the status quo and are not specifically seeking to change it (Smith 1982). Thus, it seems that the idea that an unsuccessful change effort primarily owes to individual employees’ resistance to change is a fundamental flaw in the research in explaining why so many organisational change efforts are failing.2 This is something with which even Kotter seemed to agree when stating later in the second half of the 1990s that ‘individual resistance is rare and more often, the obstacle is in the organization’s structure or in a performance- appraisal system [that] makes people choose between the new vision and their own self-interest’ (Kotter 1995). In the new millennium, Ford et al. (2008) came forward with the argument that with the focus on the individual change recipient and not on the context, ‘resistance’ was increasingly carried forward as a psychological concept: as an individual-based phenomena located ‘over there, in them’, the change recipients. In the same article, the authors convincingly argue that a sole focus on an individual perspective precludes a better understanding of the social dynamics of resistance as it occurs, 2 Considering that research suggests that failed organisational change initiatives range from one-third to as high as 80% of attempted change efforts. Considerable research efforts have been deployed to fill that knowledge gap and support executives in the field of change management (For example: Fisher 1994; Beer and Nohria 2000b; Higgs and Rowland 2000; Hirschhorn 2002; Knodel 2004; Sirkin et al. 2005; Kleiner 1996; Kotter 2008; Meaney and Pung 2008; Whelan-Berry and Somerville 2010; Pettigrew 2000; By 2005; Doyle 2002).

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for example, within groups. Furthermore, letting go of the model that ‘resistance’ is an intra-individual phenomenon will afford space for more useful models of ‘change dynamics’ as they occur when a new organisational change initiative is presented. By taking this line of reasoning, there is also room for resistance to change to be treated as a relational phenomenon not only between group members but also between interventionists and recipients. This means that ‘resistance’ as a phenomenon should be seen as relational rather than individual and be handled as something that is co-created by multiple actors. Since the early 2000s, typical managerial publications of change still appear to take the perspective—or bias—that those seeking to bring about change are doing the right and proper things, while change recipients throw up unreasonable obstacles or barriers intent on ‘doing in’ or ‘screwing up’ the change. This way of looking at ‘resistance’ presumes, as Ford, Ford and D’Angelio argue, that the interventionist is an expert who provides an accurate description of an ‘objective’ reality (Ford et al. 2008). In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that these so-called ‘objective’ experts do not portray themselves as being participants who co-enact or co-construct these realities, but rather as people who deal with and address the ‘objective’, ‘real resistance’ of change recipients. Therefore, it is also possible that what looks like ‘resistance’ in the eyes of an interventionist may be an automatic response or mutually learned, conditioned social behaviour as part of an ongoing feedback loop between the interventionist and the change recipient(s) (as discussed earlier in Interlude 5.3). In this way, ‘resistance’ can also be seen as a label that interventionists all too quickly ‘attach’ to the behaviour of recipients. That is, as a kind of ‘pseudo explanation’. The term ‘pseudo’ means ‘false’ or ‘pretend’ and is used to mark something that superficially appears to be, as the explanation of what is happening. A diagnosis of a problem that has not been validated by those who created and sustained it in the first place can, for example, easily be a pseudo explanation. Such a diagnosis is not anchored and/or aligned with other relevant perspectives and therefore false or unfounded. By doing so, they are most likely to start an ‘action-reaction’ behavioural pattern as discussed in Sect. 2.4.1, ensuring that things become needlessly complex. In this way, handling individual recipients’ behaviour as resistance operates as a selffulfilling prophecy in which the interventionist is metaphorically biting its own tail (i.e. the ouroboros from Sect. 6.3.3). Such a reciprocal model of ‘resistance’ stipulates that this co-construction uses both socially shared communication actions (such as framing what occurs during the sending and receiving of messages between parties) and individual processes (such as using frames to interpret messages and making sense) (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012). One potential area for theory extension using this interactional analysis, as we will do in Chap. 8, relates to Weick’s (1993)

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theorising on how systems of change and resistance function as well as how, for example, relational uncertainty can be associated with shared ‘resistance’ frames.

7.3

Change Dynamics as Group Dynamics

Lewin was also the first to coin the term ‘group dynamics’ (Burnes 2004; Forsyth 1980), stressing that interaction patterns rather than individual characteristics should be the main focus of change. He pointed out that it is fruitless to concentrate on changing the behaviour of individuals, because the individual—as he saw it—is constrained by group pressures to conform (Lewin 1959). As the classic ‘conformity’ experiments in the 1940s by Asch made clear, dealing with (perceived) group pressure on individual group members shows that what exists as ‘reality’ for an individual is to a considerable degree determined by what he or she perceives as being socially accepted within the social setting he/she is part of Asch (1940). In other words, what Asch’s classic research shows is that the way we try to make sense of change initiatives and organisational change in general is largely influenced by the position in which we perceive ourselves related to relevant others within the social setting of a group. On a social-interactive level, ‘resistance’ is about manifest behaviour, conations, language, defence mechanisms and coping skills that we bring to a given social context. In interacting with others who are relevant for us, we influence and trigger the perception processes, emotions and responses of others and, with this, those of ourselves. To some extent, change is inevitably an excursion into the unknown. It implies, as Menzies-Lyth notes, a commitment to future events that are not entirely predictable as well as to their consequences; it inevitably provokes uncertainty, doubt and anxiety Menzies-Lyth 1960). The same is true for a group that has learned to hold a common set of assumptions and thus perceives, feels and sees the external world in a certain jointly shared way, automatically generating symptomatic behaviour patterns (as discussed earlier in Interlude 5.3) that are typical for this group. These patterns provide meaning, comfort, order and social ways of coping with such uncertainty, doubt and anxiety. Anxiety is likely to be more manifest and intense when people perceive an upcoming change as having an impact on their social relationships and their social identity as a group (Lawrence 1969). To understand why group members behave in the way they do when subjected to change initiatives, we also need to take a further look into subtle interactive cues, social perception processes and information that is apparently not readily accessible to our own consciousness (Park 1999). In Interlude 7.3 we introduce an example that extends the third business case from the first chapter, in which it appears that ‘everybody is on the same page’. However, as it turns out, there is something deeply wrong in the way people perceive their mutual situation and express their opinion about it.

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Interlude 7.3 The Flabbergasted Board Member The board of directors of the health-care organisation we introduced as the third business case in Chap. 1 has hired an external consultant to help discover the reasons for the poor performance of the tactical assignments they set out for the senior management team and the low morale in particular. During the first introduction meeting with the members of the management team of the health-care organisation, we asked them to tell us, individually, something about what they think was going on and what they intended to do about it. Each of the present managers told us in front of the group that they did not have a problem in their work, that everything was going smoothly and that their intentions to change things had been met. Moreover, they also argued convincingly that there was no real reason for the presence of an external consultant or to start a new change process. When the board member was asked at the end to share his vision, he riposted that he could not believe the stories he had just heard. He was flabbergasted, and he cried out that he ‘didn’t understand his fellow team members’, and that ‘they must be totally incompetent not to see any problem whatsoever’. However, the most peculiar thing was that the managers present subsequently behaved as if nothing had been said— moreover – as if the board member was not even in the same room as they were. Even when asked, they did not respond to the reaction of the board member. Apparently, their underground dynamics were taken for granted and were obviously undiscussable, and as it turned out during this first meeting, their undiscussability was also undiscussable. As we will see in this section, Wittgenstein’s premise that ‘from its seeming to me—or even to everyone—to be so, it does not follow that it is so’(Wittgenstein 1969) remains prominent in an organisational setting as described in Interlude 7.3. Despite the opposing opinion of the flabbergasted board member, each of the present managers seems to have in common that a need for change—or for that matter a sense of urgency –was not evident. As discussed throughout this section, there are also other possible interpretations that seem to exhibit the symptoms of this detrimental display of group dynamics, starting with what we introduced in Sect. 6.3.1 as ‘defensive reasoning’. However, it seems that it also applies to what Janis describes as a case of ‘groupthink’ or what Harvey views as a case of an ‘Abilene paradox’.

7.3.1

Argyris’ Defensive Reasoning

One way by which the individual senior managers in the case example in Interlude 7.4 might deal with their apparently pent-up feelings is to redefine their own authority and responsibility. They could do that in such a way as to change the meaning of these terms whenever they are confronted with the possibility that they or others, such as the present board member, might become aware of their shame and

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guilt. This renders it a social phenomenon that is inherent in a non-balanced group of people who are supposed to work together as a team. Individual defensive mechanisms, as displayed in Fig. 7.1, are individual learned behaviours that are used to protect ourselves from embarrassment and the possibility of a threat arising from exposing our thinking. However, Argyris’ ‘defensive reasoning’, or what is also known as managerial ‘fancy footwork’ (see for examples the cases in the publications of Argyris 1990; Menzies-Lyth 1960, p. 69; Shapiro and Carr 1991), is not simply about ‘diving away’ from learning about the validity of our individual reasoning, but fundamentally concerns the desire to preserve our social position within a group, maintaining its social relations as they are. Real world Information feedback Decision

Decisionmaking rules Assumptions

Defensive reasoning entails actions that permit individuals to be blind to inconsistencies in their actions, to deny that these inconsistencies even exist, or, if they cannot do either, to place blame on other people. As a phenomenon, Argyris also called defensive reasoning ‘fancy footwork’. According to Argyris, these reasoning processes become defensive when individuals: • Hold assumptions of questionable validity • Make inferences that do not necessarily follow from their assumptions • Reach conclusions that they believe they have tested carefully, even though the way they personally framed these conclusions renders them untestable (Argyris 1990, p. 46). Individuals who have distanced themselves from the issues at hand have chosen to play it safe by avoiding the idea that they have a serious personal problem. They find comfort and protection in their personal defensive mechanisms and their consequences (Argyris 1990, p. 46). This does not mean, as Argyris argues, that they do not genuinely care about organisational performance, that they do not feel proud to aspire to excellence, that they are not committed or that they do not want to be involved. For them, the intended change raises all kinds of internal tensions and

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they cannot accept the situation as it is, stimulating them to ultimately violate their own sense of integrity. More generally, when we trap ourselves with these ‘defensive routines’, insulating our assumptions from examination as we go on, we consequently—eventually—develop what Argyris calls ‘skilled incompetence’ (Which is, just like ‘change management’ as introduced before in Chapter 1, another marvellous oxymoron). In the case as described in Interlude 7.4, the phenomenon of ‘skilled incompetence’ refers to how the present managers were seemingly highly skilful at protecting themselves from pain and the threats posed by apparent learning as a group. However, as a consequence, they failed to learn how to produce the results they really wanted (Senge 1990). To sum up, the symptoms of defensive reasoning include: 1. An objective that protects and defends the actor(s) or supra-individual unities such as groups against anticipated pain and shame, when confronted. 2. A tautological reasoning process in which arguments are tacit, assuming that they are valid. The underlying assumptions are tested only by the use of self-referential logic. Self-referential logic means using logic to test a claim that is the same as the logic used to create it in the first place. For example, the claim ‘Trust me, I know this organisation’ means that any other person could use the same reasoning as the one making the claim. 3. Avoidance of transparency in the service of protecting self-denial and selfdeception. 4. Self-deception, which is denied by cover-up. In order for the cover-up to work, it too must be covered up. The strategy used to cover up the cover-up is to make both undiscussable. Undiscussability is protected by making the undiscussability undiscussable (Argyris 2003).

7.3.2

Janis’ ‘Groupthink’

In his book Victims of Groupthink, Janis applies, in an unprecedented way, ideas from small-group analysis to the explanation of policy fiascos. Janis includes the failure to foresee historic events such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, the escalation of the Vietnam War and the political scandal of Watergate. According to the author, groupthink can be interpreted as a ‘quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive group, when the members striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action’ (Janis 1982). However, groupthink can be excessive, to the extent that group members come to value the group (and their being part of it) more than anything else. This causes them to strive for a quick and painless unanimity on the issues that the group must confront. To avoid unnecessary emotions and escalating anxiety, group members tend to preserve the clubby atmosphere and suppress their personal doubts. Consequently, silent dissenters and everybody else docilely follow the group leader’s suggestions. The results can be devastating: a distorted view of

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reality, excessive optimism producing hasty and reckless policies and a neglect of ethical issues. The combination of these deficiencies makes these groups particularly vulnerable to initiating or sustaining projects that turn out to be fiascos. Janis makes plausible the hypothesis that every group can, to a considerable extent, be confronted with such a detrimental situation developing the following symptoms: 1. ‘Illusion of invulnerability’: members ignore obvious danger, take extreme risks and are overly optimistic. 2. ‘Collective rationalisation’: members discredit and explain away warnings contrary to groupthinking. 3. ‘Illusion of morality’: members believe their decisions are morally correct, ignoring their ethical consequences. 4. ‘Excessive stereotyping’: the group constructs negative stereotypes of rivals outside the group. 5. ‘Pressure for conformity’: members pressure anyone in the group who expresses arguments against the group’s stereotypes, illusions or commitments, viewing such opposition as disloyalty. 6. ‘Self-censorship’: members withhold their dissenting views and counterarguments. 7. ‘Illusion of unanimity’: members falsely perceive that everyone agrees with the group’s decision; silence is understood as consent. 8. ‘Mind-guards’: some members appoint themselves to the role of protecting the group from adverse information that might threaten group complacency.

7.3.3

Harvey’s ‘Abilene Paradox’

Another explanation of what was happening in the meeting from the example in Interlude 7.4 can be found in what Harvey describes as the ‘Abilene paradox’. The name of this phenomenon derives from a trip to the American village of Abilene made by the author and his family. On a hot day in July, Harvey and his family were contently sitting on the back porch of his father-in-law’s house. His father-in-law suggested a trip to Abilene for a meal. Harvey thought it was a bad idea but kept his view to himself when everyone else agreed. The trip and the meal were ‘brutal’, to use Harvey’s phrase. On their return, they gradually started to admit that it had been a bad idea. What was interesting—representing the paradox of the phenomenon’s name—was that the family members started to blame each other for the trip. Every member stated that they had not really wanted to go. Even the initiator of the trip, his father-in-law, admitted that he never wanted to make the trip; he only proposed it as he thought the others would want to go. Harvey describes this as the ‘Abilene paradox’, whereby people take actions that no one actually wants (Harvey 1974). Harvey interprets this scene as an inability to manage agreement, not an inability to manage conflict as in the case of ‘groupthink’ (McAvoy and Butler 2007). Under the Abilene paradox, actors collectively decide on a course of action that is counter to the preferences of many or all of the individuals in the group. Moreover, it represents

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a process that they themselves cannot adequately explain nor account for why they had resisted change initiatives for an alternative course of action. This phenomenon occurs in a diversity of business contexts (McAvoy and Butler 2007). The inability to manage agreement is further expressed by Harvey through the following symptoms: 1. Participants privately agree to the nature of the situation and/or the problem at hand as well as to the steps required to cope with it. This is mostly ‘more of the same’, a solution that would have adequately satisfied their individual and collective desires in the past. 2. Participants fail to accurately communicate their desires, feelings and beliefs to one another. In fact, they do just the opposite and thereby lead one another into misperceiving the collective reality. 3. With such invalid and inaccurate information, participants make collective decisions that lead them to take actions contrary to what they want to do and thereby arrive at results that are counterproductive to their intents and purposes. 4. As a result of taking actions that are counterproductive, participants experience frustration, anger, irritation and dissatisfaction with their group/organisation. Consequently, they form subgroups with trusted acquaintances and blame other subgroups for the organisation’s dilemma. Frequently, they also blame authority figures and one another. 5. Finally, if participants do not deal with the generic issue—the inability to manage agreement—the cycle repeats itself with greater intensity.

7.3.4

A Comparison Between ‘Defensive Reasoning’, ‘Groupthink’ and the ‘Abilene Paradox’

The three examples discussed in this section all contain certain individual defensive mechanisms that prevent individual group members from articulating their true opinions. Contrary to Janis and Harvey, Argyris conducted numerous case studies, discussing the results in several publications (Argyris 1982, 1986, 1990, 1992). In these publications, Argyris goes into specific examples of how the board and management team members he observed in his studies expressed themselves in a tautological and self-referential logical way. Although Janis describes several examples of groupthink, they function more as examples than in-depth studies. In later publications (Harvey 1997, 1988; Harvey and Brown 2001), Harvey and other authors have provided some more examples of the ‘Abilene paradox’. However, in his first publication in the summer of 1974 (Harvey 1974), the case was just a result of something he experienced together with his family and which he concocted 2 h before a presentation on neurotic organisations (Harvey 1974, p. 35). As displayed in Fig. 7.2, there are other several similarities and differences between the three group phenomena. As displayed in Fig. 7.2, in ‘groupthink’ individuals do not act against their conscious wishes and generally feel good about the decisions reached by the group

7.3 Change Dynamics as Group Dynamics Fig. 7.2 A comparison of ‘defensive reasoning’, ‘groupthink’ and the ‘Abilene paradox’

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Differences Similarities • ‘Groupthink’ is more of an un• All phenomena show conscious rather than a conscious that groups have potenprocess (as is the case in the other tial problems with mantwo phenomena) and in general aging conformity (but participants feel more comfortable also with the lack with the decisions made. thereof). • Because of the anticipated shame • All phenomena can be ‘Defensive reasoning’ decisions explained by conformiare often more emotionally motity (group presvated. sure/social influence). • ‘Defensive reasoning’ and • All phenomena give the ‘Groupthink’ lowers mental effiimpression that they ciency, moral judgement and rehave something to do finements in decision-making. with ‘learning/action anxiety’, ‘abandonment • Compared to the other two, in an anxiety’ and the idea of ‘Abilene paradox’ situation, indi‘falling outside the viduals behave in opposite ways group’. to their own preferences and therefore have more negative feelings about the decisions made.

(Sims 1994). ‘Groupthink’ decisions, just like those in the case of ‘defensive reasoning’, reduce the group’s moral judgement and mental efficiency and necessitate reality testing (Kim 2001). In the ‘Abilene paradox’, members of the group act against their own wishes and are more likely to have negative feelings about the outcome. Owing to the more unconscious way in which people make decisions in the case of ‘groupthink’, they are more likely to have fewer negative feelings about the outcome. During the early stages of ‘defensive reasoning’, people make conscious, individual decisions that they perceive as being in their own (best) interests. It is mostly only during these early stages that people are conscious of their own actions; after a while they become more of a routine and people act automatically in a ‘defensive’ way. However, when they make conscious decisions that do not only harm their own effectiveness, it is to be expected that they are also aware of the negative impact of their own actions on the group outcome. Finally, the three group phenomena are used to illustrate that groups not only have problems in managing disagreements, but that agreements may also be a problem. The described phenomena can be explained by social psychology theories of social conformity and social influence, which suggest that human beings are often very averse to acting against the trend of a group. It seems that (one of) these phenomena may occur when individuals experience: • ‘Action anxiety’: stress concerning the group potentially expressing negative attitudes towards them if they do not acquiesce

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• ‘Negative fantasies’: unpleasant visualisations of what the group might say or do if individuals are honest about their opinions, when there is ‘real risk’ of displeasure and negative consequences for not concurring • ‘Separation anxiety’: fearing exclusion from the group

7.4

Change Dynamics as Characteristics of a Social System

The notion that organisational change involves an intricate set of recurring dynamics, tensions and conflicts as part of a paradoxical situation is well established in the organisational literature (Putnam et al. 2016; Smith et al. 2017). However, humans are wired for meaning (Wheeler 1998), and rendering making sense of a paradoxical situation may be a troublesome process (Maitlis and Christianson 2014). As the case example in Interlude 7.4 illustrates, it is very difficult to reconceive and unravel our own doings and make sense of the interaction of which we are inherently part. Interlude 7.4 A Further Elaboration of the ‘Business University’ from Chap. 1 After the severe cutbacks a year before, the CEO of the business university, whom we introduced in Chap. 1, saw himself confronted by employees who did not seem to be able to cope with the new challenges. He admitted that he really did not understand what motivated “them” to complain about the evolving situation in which “things” only seemed to get worse and “they” seemed to thwart every change initiative he was taking to make things better. Every Monday morning, for example, he started with a short financial presentation of the performance of the business university. He was urged to be as open as he could—sharing all the information he had and doing a lot of ‘Q&As’. Updating all personnel on a weekly basis was important, in his opinion, to keep the employees informed. However, he was saying the situation was still financially precarious and he needed them to be ‘on their toes’. That is why he did not understand the general lack of urgency, the inertia and the games they seemed to be playing. However, when we individually interviewed the employees, they seemed to associate the CEO’s interventions with the painful cutbacks from a year before, which made them very distrustful of his intentions. Overall, there seemed to be a spiralling ‘contagion effect’ going on, tacit and not spoken about in public meetings, making things fuzzy and incomprehensible. People were impulsively pulling themselves back to their individual workplaces, trying to ‘mind their own business’. Meanwhile, the mistrust contaminated not only their relationship with the CEO but also their relationships with each other. Although the CEO copy-pasted the text on the advice of the employees’ work council, the situation worsened further, because there was simply no trust in him. In the eyes of the members of the (continued)

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Interlude 7.4 (continued) council, the suggested solutions did not comply with the employees’ need for a safe place. In the end, with the mutual agreement of the CEO, the supervisory board decided to appoint an operational manager ad interim to clear things up. The features of daily organisational complexity can, as described in Interlude 7.4, simultaneously promote stability and change and do not have to exclusively promote one or the other (Smith and Tushman 2005). Factors such as trust or mistrust underpin both stability and change. A lack of trust can keep things inert, but at the same time it can stimulate people to take the initiative and move behind the back of their CEO to try to make things go their way. The paradox seems evident in this case: on the one hand, the CEO tries to stimulate the business school employees to take the initiative, to be independent and creative; on the other hand, the employees remain inert and perceive his intentions to make them more assertive as a form of unilateral control. Apparently, people produce a social reality that stands over them, constraining their actions. Nevertheless, the efforts of people to transcend their existing limits bring them into conflict with established arrangements, eventually—as the example in Interlude 7.4 describes—leading to an unexpected change in the situation (Benson 1977). In this section we interpret resistance to change from a systemic perspective while discussing the characteristics of a paradoxical situation and paradoxical phenomena, such as a ‘double bind’ message, a ‘competing commitment’ and the counterintuitive phenomenon of the ‘pocket veto’.

7.4.1

Handling Paradoxical Change Dynamics

In complex situations when we cannot make a choice between two or more contradictions because all contradictory perspectives are acceptable and present, the situation can become paradoxical.

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A paradoxical situation is a situation in which two seemingly contradictory, or even mutually exclusive, factors appear to be true at the same time. As introduced in Chap. 1, a problem that is a paradox has no definitive solution, as there is no way to logically integrate the two opposites into an internally consistent understanding of the problem. Hence, ‘a problem owner must resolve a paradox by trying to find a way to reconcile the opposites in the most productive manner’ (De Wit and Meyer 1999). One tenet of a paradox is its circular nature. This means that when there is tension between two equally attractive possibilities or competing realities, energy flows between and around these two poles. A problem that can arise by focusing on only one pole of the differentiation is that it swings the pendulum to the other side and makes what is not working implicit to what is working. It seems that we find it difficult to reconcile the two opposing options. It is as if we cannot choose one as a ‘solution’ and neglect the other. This is why a paradoxical situation can be compared with a catch-22 situation, as introduced in Sect. 1.3.2, in which the only solution is denied by a circumstance inherent in the same situation (Markovic 1974), leading to the impression that what the mind seemingly cannot think, it must think, and/or what reason it is reluctant to express, it must express (Burhans 1973). In a complex paradoxical situation, we find ourselves easy in a blurry situation, mostly unable to name or see the contradictions itself. We become increasingly tense as we realise that we are in a situation that we do not want to be in and cannot find our way out of without the help of others (Van Nistelrooij and De Caluwe 2016), not to mention the fact that we do not seem to have the capacity to combine or integrate the different perspectives relevant for making progress in these kinds of ambiguous situations that are inherent as things are changing (Van Nistelrooij and De Caluwe 2016). In other words, choosing one or the other will have, as we perceive it, serious negative effects (Johnson 1992). The ability to address in an appropriate way a paradoxical situation begins with the comprehension that they include: • A polarity, a set of one or more apparently interdependent opposite choices that reveal themselves at the same time, inherent in the situation at hand • Reoccurring problems that cannot per se be solved and that do not have a clear endpoint solution. Moreover, when people opt for one of the two choices, a neverending shift in emphasis is initiated from one pole to the other and back (Johnson 1992, p. 81). • An escalating polarisation between individuals divided into (sub)groups in which there is a ‘we’ and an ‘opposite’ perceived ‘they’ While the literature identifies the existence of paradoxes as an unavoidable part of organisational life, it also regards a paradoxical situation as a dysfunctional state that should be eliminated (Wolf 2015). Together with Seo and Creek, Lewis provides an

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alternative perspective, suggesting that rather than attempting to reduce the tension of a paradox or rationalise its existence, we should use such a situation to generate insight and view it as an opportunity to initiate change (Clegg et al. 2002). Following this suggestion, there are two alternatives in handling a paradoxical situation: 1. Integrate opposites and manage tensions through synthesis 2. Face the co-presence of the opposites by regarding them as a complementary gestalt/whole The first alternative exhibits some limitations because it risks oversimplifying the complexity as it is experienced by most of the participants. Moreover, the temptation of perceiving a complex situation as simple by engaging in neat compromises prevents everyone involved from taking initiatives for change (Lewis 2000). The second alternative suggest that we take a paradoxical situation as one with a positive regard for the co-presence of opposites, as one that allows the opposites to be as they are. This gives space to take seriously the potential relationship between these (perceived) opposites (Seo and Creed 2002). In this second alternative, the main question is not ‘if’ we are going to manage the polarity but rather ‘how well?’ (Clegg et al. 2002). With this, the issue becomes ‘How do we bring adequate clarity to a situation without being rigid?’ and ‘How do we bring adequate flexibility to the same situation without being ambiguous?’ (Johnson 1992, p. 5). Moreover, instead of looking at the situation as ‘either. . . or. . .’, it can also be ‘. . . and. . . and. . .’ Stated in this way, the second alternative of handling a paradoxical situation seems to simply be a way of reframing, with a central role afforded to the way in which we perceive the situation.

7.4.2

Making Sense of a Paradoxical ‘Double Bind’ Message

People can find themselves in lose/lose situations that present intractable dilemmas (Johnson 1992, p. 13). For example, a school principal repeatedly confronted with a poorly performing teacher wants to establish a common ground on the causes of the latter’s poor performance. That is, without this yet again culminating in an emotional, heated debate. Fearing an emotional confrontation, the principal is hesitant and, while hesitating to confront the teacher, finds himself feeling increasingly indecisive and consequently vulnerable to being seen as ineffective. However, the prospect of a more direct confrontation does not appeal because the principal ‘knows’ that would also be ineffective. The resulting dilemma is one that can be solved in an (self-)enquiring way. For this, the principal needs to bring to the surface his assumptions and speak about them with the teacher. For many people in this situation, this is not the first thing to do. Why? Because it appears too difficult to do on one’s own and for many people in such a (top) function, doing self-enquiry, showing our vulnerability, is something that can easily be regarded as a sign of weakness, which in itself, while anticipating the confrontation, could be experienced

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as a (self-)judgement that would again increase our doubts and perceived feelings of vulnerability. In general, these situations come down to people in charge: • • • • •

Giving out a message that is inconsistent Acting as if it is not inconsistent Making all this undiscussable Making the undiscussability undiscussable Again, acting as if they are not doing so (Johnson 1992, p. 13).

These situations meet the conditions laid down by Bateson and his colleagues for ‘double binds’ (see Interlude 7.5) (Johnson 1992, p. 13), in which all those involved are caught in a no-win game and the rules of the game are undiscussable. Interlude 7.5 A ‘Double Bind’ as Paradoxical Communication As described in Watzlawick’s Pragmatics of Human Communication, the effects of paradox in human interaction are first introduced by Bateson’s research group. They found that double binds were a frequent pattern of communication among family members and a patient, and they proposed that growing up amidst perpetual double binds could lead to learned patterns of confusion in thinking and communicating (Watzlawick et al. 1967). A ‘double bind’ occurs when a person cannot confront the inherent dilemma and therefore cannot resolve it or opt out of the situation. Moreover, double binds are most likely to occur in a change situation in which: (a) The individual, the recipient of a change message, is involved in an intense relationship in which he or she feels he or she must get the communication right. (b) The other party, mostly the interventionist, expresses two levels of messages, in which one message denies the other. (c) The change recipient is unable to comment on the contradiction, that is, he or she is unable to make ‘meta-communicative statements’ that might help to resolve the mess (Visser and Van der Heijden 2015). Since its formulation as a concept, ‘double bind’ has gained considerable attention in psychiatry and the social sciences in general (Watzlawick 1963; Sluzki and Ransom 1976) and as Watzlawick concludes, ‘there can be no doubt that the world we live in is far from logical and that we all have been exposed to double binds, yet most of us manage to preserve our sanity’ (Watzlawick et al. 1967, p. 213). However, most of these experiences are isolated and spurious, even though during ambiguous situations such as is the (continued)

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Interlude 7.5 (continued) case with organisational change, they can be of a traumatic nature, but are mostly created by ourselves. For example, when we tell someone else to ‘be more spontaneous’ or to ‘do their own thing—the way we tells them.’

Paul Watzlawick (1921 – 2007) Was an Austrian-American philosopher, analytical psychologist and a theoretician in communication theory and radical constructivism. He was one of the most influential figures at the Mental Research Institute and co-author of books like ‘The pragmatics of human communication’ (1967) and ‘Change: principles of problem formation and problem resolution’ (1974).

Gregory Bateson (1904 – 1980) Was an English anthropologist, social scientist, and linguist. In his influential book ‘Steps to an Ecology of Mind’ (1972), he applied cybernetics to the field of ecological anthropology and the concept of homeostasis. In which he saw the world as a series of systems containing individuals, societies and ecosystems. Each of these systems has adaptive changes which depend upon feedback loops to control balance.

A double bind is in the making if, for example, a CEO—as in the case of the ‘business university’ (see Interlude 7.4)—wants employees to take more responsibility for their own destiny and encourages them to develop internal commitment with ‘the change initiative as presented to them.’ For internal commitment to occur, individuals need to be intrinsically motivated to go for a particular project, person or programme, based on their own reasons or motivations. Internal commitment is by definition developed in a participatory manner directly with an individual and can be connected with the assumptions of McGregor’s Y Theory. External commitment is more of a contractual compliance which can be connected with the assumptions of McGregor’s X Theory. Examples of external incentives are: higher compensation, better career paths, and ‘employee of the month’ recognition awards (Argyris 1998). As the name implies, ‘internal commitment’ comes largely from within. The more that management wants participants to be internally committed, the more management must try to involve employees in defining their work objectives, specifying how to achieve them and setting stretch targets. Clearly, if it is internal commitment

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that provides the kinds of outcomes that management claims it wants, then it must be realistic and judicious in its demands, in its way of communicating and in its way of trying to change things. Attempting to change people based on assumptions such as discussed in Paragraph 2.2 means that the actions of employees are defined only from the outside and that only external commitment is encouraged. However, the point here is not that internal commitment is a better option in changing people per se, but that an interventionist needs to avoid that what he or she espouses contradicts with what he or she is actually doing. In other words, that he or she avoids communicating a double bind message. If for example, the CEO from the business university in Interlude 7.4 wants employees to take more responsibility for the destiny of their organisation, he is supposed to empower the employees by starting a dialogue about what is needed for the organisation to survive. However, starting a dialogue often enters the realm of political correctness as was the case in the business university. In this case—during the Monday morning update sessions—the CEO shared as much financial information as he has and tried to answer all the questions. However, during these sessions the employees didn’t get a chance to say what they were thinking and had no say in what they perceive what was going on. In this instance the CEO could claim that he was in dialogue with the employees, but in fact he wasn’t. As discussed in Interlude 4.5, there was no question of a dialogue, because the CEO left no room for exchanging perspectives in an equal and reciprocal way. Instead, he wanted the employees to be ‘on their toes’ and take responsibility by saying that: ‘If we don’t do this now, we can be sure that redundancies will start again in the near future.’ In this power-coercive scenario, if an employee should challenge the CEO, he or she will become not only a ‘resistor of change’ but most likely a betrayer of the righteous cause. So instead of taking more responsibility, people throughout the business university felt more and more trapped and less able to talk openly about what’s really going on as they saw it. As it turns out, the business university employees resented their CEO preaching internal commitment while he was enforcing external commitment based on his rank and file. In hindsight it is clear that the CEO had risked his credibility by espousing internal commitment and empowerment too glibly. With communicating such mixed signals, change efforts do not and cannot foster the behaviour it is supposed to inspire. If there is room for discussing these inner contradictions, bringing them to the surface and addressing them in time, they can probably be dealt with more successfully. That is, they will not inhibit the kind of personal commitment that management says it wants. However, if the contradictions remain buried and unacknowledged, as they usually do when a change programme has its own pre-set deadlines and targets, they can easily become a destructive force. Not only do they tend to stifle the development of engaging and enabling the participants, but they also end up poisoning the entire corporation with long-lasting mixed messages (Argyris 1998).

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7.4.3

265

Handling Change Dynamics as ‘Competing Commitments’

Kegan and Lahey have developed the concept of ‘competing commitments’ as a replacement for the notion of resistance to change (Kegan and Lahey 2001). Competing commitments can be described as commitments that compete with our conscious desires. Unless we can acknowledge the specific fears or concerns that we have regarding our situation, we are likely to become immobilised by the conflicting internal forces that are generally present within us whenever we are seeking any kind of a change. The resulting dynamic equilibrium stalls the effort in what looks like resistance but is in fact a kind of personal ‘immunity to change’. According to Kegan and Lahey, people can make some things more important than their own happiness (Kegan and Lahey 2001, p. 116). Unless we can acknowledge the specific fears or concerns that people have regarding their situation, they are likely to become immobilised by the conflicting internal forces that are generally present within them whenever they are seeking any form of change. Consequently, what looks like resistance is in fact a kind of personal ‘immunity to change’. Kegan and Lahey argue that change is difficult not because individuals are resistant for their own sake but because they have very good reasons to avoid change, just as they do to pursue it (Kegan and Lahey 2001, p. 116). In fact, as both authors maintain, when change seems difficult, it is the result of a competing commitment that pulls people in opposite directions. Only by bringing such a commitment to the surface, do they do the same to the internal conflict that goes with it. For example, powerful desires to stay safe can be in dynamic tension with desires to try new things. Once individuals bring their counterpart to the surface in the unconscious process that is going on and acknowledge it, they can start to identify the underlying need or concern and therefore address it. Investigating people’s ulterior motives that come into conflict with their conscious intentions can illuminate hidden anxieties that they fear may cause us pain or loss. Competing commitments are sustained by assumptions and these assumptions form the entrance to a process of growing awareness. The process itself is mainly a chain of face-toface interventions based on: 1. Identifying individuals’ competing commitments: let them make a self-disclosing statement about it 2. Receiving clarification and recognition by the owner of the underlying assumption 3. Taking some immediate action to overcome their so-called ‘immunity for change’ (Kegan and Lahey 2001, p. 116). The proper technique to explore this is Kegan and Lahey’s ‘change immunity map’, as described in Interlude 7.6.

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Interlude 7.6 The Change Immunity Map To help participants uncover their own competing commitments, it can be helpful to use a ‘change immunity map’ (Kegan and Lahey 2009) as depicted in Fig. 7.3. This map starts—in the left-hand column—with the participants’ complaints and thus provides an easy way in. It moves from complaints to the commitments (in the second column) underneath the complaint, then onto what the participant is doing or not doing that prevents the commitment from being fully realised. It is here that the participants really start to see how they are implicated. In the example in Fig. 7.3, one participant analyses his relationship with his colleague, beginning with his complaint that he felt he was constantly walking on eggshells around this colleague. The process took him through unfolding realisations that ultimately revealed his ‘big assumption’— that he was scared of losing this relationship. The ‘change immunity map’ offers a view of how the participants own competing commitments and internal protective routines lead to the very outcomes that they complain about, thereby implicating themselves. The big assumption suggests a potential point of leverage, a problematic frame for the participant to address.

Robert Kegan (1946 Is an American Professor in Adult Learning and Professional Development at Harvard Graduate School of Education. In ‘Immunity to Change’ (2007) he and his co-author show how our individual beliefs - along with the collective mind-sets in our organizations combine to create a natural but powerful immunity to change.

In addition to analysing what is actually happening, the ‘change immunity map’ adds space for suggesting different ways of cognitively reframing the same situation.

Fig. 7.3 ‘Walking on eggshells’: Kegan and Lahey’s ‘change immunity map’ (Kegan and Lahey 2009, p. 120)

Complaint

Commitment

Walking on eggshells around my colleague.

A real, open and honest relationship between two caring people.

Doing/not doing Suppress true feelings.

Competing commitment I am committed to not arguing with my colleague.

Big assumption If I share my true feelings with my colleague, we will get in a big argument and I will lose the relationship.

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In other words, it may contribute to an individual and collectively reframe the situation in which participants find themselves. In this regard, it connects enhanced awareness with action. Although the ‘change immunity map’ provides insights into how a particular participant is implicated in co-creating the problematic situation, it is still challenging to provide this same deep insight for all participants. Although doing this exercise provides an exemplary insight into how our thinking can hold us trapped, it is an exercise that preferably all participants need to experience for themselves in order to collaboratively enact a different frame of the situation. Although awareness building itself is a powerful intervention, by moving beyond the presumption of Kegan and Lahey’s ‘awareness creates resolution’, one might also discover that competing commitments are actually sufficiently based on organisational reality to be something beyond mere ‘big assumptions’. When applied to groups and/or organisations, the existing polarity creates a dynamic equilibrium that is immune to change. Hence, when a change initiative is introduced, this immune system is part and parcel of the organisation and therefore pre-programmed to acquire, neutralise and/or destroy the attempt to destabilise the system. We cannot see and often are not aware of these immunities to change because, as Kegan and Lahey argue, ‘we live inside them. We do not “have them”, they “have us”. We cannot see them because we too are caught up in them’ (Kegan and Lahey 2001, p. 116).

7.4.4

Handling Change Dynamics as Counter-Intuitive Systems Dynamics

As a scientific discipline, systems thinking has its roots in a diverse range of sources, from Jan Smuts’ holism in the 1920s to Kurt Lewin’s forcefield and gestalt theories in the 1930s and the general systems theory advanced by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 1940s. As suggested by Lewin’s formula in Paragraph 3.4, we humans do not exist independently of a context (Wheeler 1998). This is why, as seen from a systems perspective, change dynamics must be understood within the total social field or whole social system. Applied to organisational change, systems thinking is a discipline for seeing and working with relationships between people as a means of constructing different social groupings. In this way, it introduces a difference in the way people are used to (socially) perceiving their daily surroundings. As illustrated in Interlude 7.7, it helps participants to become more aware of the things they share—their interconnectedness—which is supposed to help them in developing a common ground. Further, as illustrated in the same interlude, systems thinking not only concerns small-group change dynamics but also large-group dynamics.

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Interlude 7.7 My God, Look What We’re Doing to Ourselves! When he was an MIT doctoral student, Daniel Kim spent several years working with a large engineering programme, applying systems thinking to improve cost and timing performance in developing a new car (This project is described in detail in a “learning history.” See Roth and Kleiner 2000). The programme covered about a thousand full-time equivalent engineers, divided into more than a dozen engineering subspecialty teams, each responsible for an aspect of the product. After several years of analysis of what was preventing auto engineering teams from working together effectively in order to meet critical timing targets, all the team members were working together being reflexive about the way they were communicating to other teams. The interventionist who was helping them uses a typical system intervention technique, called ‘causal loop diagrams’ or ‘CLDs’. We will describe these in greater detail in Interlude 7.8. A CLD is useful for communicating the assumptions held by individuals or groups about how actions are fed back to other engineering teams within the same production process. As it turned out during this exercise, when a particular team faced a difficult design issue, they often had a choice: implement quick fixes on their own or discuss them first with the other teams. As they came to find out during the exercise, every team was under intense time pressure, which was why quick fixes became the norm, albeit unfortunately often with unrecognised side effects for other teams. For example, when NVH (noise, vibration and harshness) engineers solved a vibration problem by adding some structural reinforcements, they eventually created new problems for the chassis team, who were responsible for overall car weight. During the collaborative drawing of the CLDs, with all the teams present in the same room, it was as if they suddenly saw what they all knew but did not know they knew. All the details were very familiar to them—the problems, the reactions and the strained relationships that characterised their work environment. Now they were actually seeing the interdependent pattern that caused this, and they could see that no one individual team was to blame. They realised that they had created this pattern together. Each team did what made sense to them, but no one saw the larger system—that their individual reactions created—a system that consistently produced poor technical solutions, stress and late cars. As the implications of the system began to sink in, one of the group members said: ‘My God, look what we’re doing to ourselves!’ The keyword in this statement was ‘we’. Up to this point, there had been someone to blame for every problem: the other teams, their bosses and not enough time. When the ‘they’ go away and the ‘we’ shows up, people’s awareness and capabilities change. The example of the various teams not seeing their interdependent relations in Interlude 7.7 demonstrates that the parts of a system can frequently take actions in contradiction to the benefit of the whole. Phrased in other words, people seem to

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have the capacity to behave in counter-intuitive behavioural patterns (Forrester 1971), that is, they do not act in consonance with the long-term best interests of the whole system of which they are ‘obviously’ part. On the surface, it makes little sense to take actions that are diametrically opposed to the data people possess for solving crucial organisational problems. Such actions are particularly absurd because they tend to compound the very problems they are designed to solve and thereby defeat the purposes the organisation as a whole is trying to achieve. People in this situation seem to have only two options: either they trust their perceptions, which bring them into conflict with the whole, or they avoid the conflict, albeit at the price of having to distrust their senses and their normalcy (Watzlawick 1989, p. 61). This is a way of thinking that ultimately leads to one of the dysfunctional group situations described in Paragraph 7.3. Unexpected counter-intuitive dynamics—such as those described in Interlude 7.8—can also be regarded as an intrinsic response to the way in which a ‘system’ handles its own problems. Seen in this way, ‘resistance’ is just an ‘intrinsic response’ to a decision/intervention with a tendency to delay, dilute or defeat the effect of the decision/intervention (Sterman 1989). When we are dissatisfied and are anxious to fix the situation, or perhaps even ashamed that things have come this far, we cannot just step in and set about fixing with much hope of helping. The issue is as Thomas writes: ‘We cannot meddle with one part of a complex social system from the outside without the almost certain risk of setting off disastrous events that you hadn’t counted on in other, remote parts. If we want to fix something, we are first obliged to understand the whole system. As such, intervening is a way of causing trouble’ (Thomas 1974). In conclusion, according to a systems perspective, change dynamics arise because, as wonderful as the human mind is, the complexity of the world dwarfs our understanding. Our assumptions are limited, internally inconsistent and unreliable (See the late Herbert Simon’s concept of bounded rationality. Simon 1996). Moreover, as Sterman argues, ‘[o]ur ability to understand the unfolding impacts of our decisions is poor. We take actions that make sense from our shortterm and parochial perspectives, but due to our imperfect appreciation of complexity, these decisions often return to hurt us in the long run’ (Sterman 2000, p. 10).

7.4.5

Handling Change Dynamics as (Delayed) Feedback Processes

A feedback loop can be quite simple and direct, but it can also be rather complex and indirect. For example, it can develop via internal dialogue, or through different communication channels and at different moments in time. What makes the effect of feedback even more difficult to understand is where there is already a feedback loop in the making when we perceive our interpretations of someone else’s behaviour as the real thing. As a concept, ‘feedback’ was coined by Wiener, who later with his colleagues argued that ‘all purposeful behaviour may be considered to require feedback’ (Wiener 1948). In other words, the processes of changing and learning involve a growing awareness of the importance of being open to receiving feedback on our own doings. Contexts of learning and changing are therefore

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principally concerned with establishing or altering feedback, or as Keeney states, ‘successful interventions require the creation of alternative forms of feedback that will provide an avenue for appropriate change’ (Keeney 2007). The purpose of feedback is not exclusively to control, limit or constrain; sometimes feedback operates to exaggerate or to amplify. In other words, feedback sometimes works as a reinforcement and sometimes to correct a deviation. Thus, there are, as described in Interlude 7.8, basically two kinds of feedback loops: reinforcing and balancing loops. Interlude 7.8 The Use of Causal Loop Diagrams (CLDs) Reinforcing or positive loops tend to lead to instability, exponential growth and oscillation via positive feedback. Balancing or negative loops are about settling to diminish a difference, reducing the effects of perturbations via negative feedback (Hanson 1995). Negative feedback loops in which just the right amount of correction is applied with optimum timing can ultimately be very stabilising. Where standardised models are of little help with deciphering feedback loops, the so-called ‘causal loop diagram’ (CLD) (Atwater et al. 2008) supports a systemic and interactive approach (Sterman 2000, pp. 3–39). Causal loop diagramming was popularised in the management arena by Senge in the 1990s but never translated itself into wide application (Warren 2004). One explanation is that a perfect diagram rarely suffices to bring about change. It is mainly an analytic tool, making complex situations more insightful, but this doesn’t mean that these insights make them per se easier to change. In this interlude we discuss two of the most basic ones: an example of a typical (positive) reinforcing loop and an example of a balancing (negative) loop. Reinforcing Loops: Pushing Escalation Through Positive Feedback A reinforcing loop is known as amplifying, reinforcing, self-multiplying or snowballing—a vicious or virtuous circle that can cause healthy growth or runaway destruction. As depicted with the CLD in Fig. 7.4, we introduce a simple example and also a very common situation of such a reinforcing feedback loop: it’s been a long day, the trains are late and it’s been pouring with rain. A husband finally arrives home, feeling grumpy and wanting his wife to fuss over him. Starting at the top, going anticlockwise, there is an S by the head of the arrow because it is the Same direction (the grumpy feelings are reinforcing the husband’s unwillingness to give his wife attention). However, his wife has also had a hard day, doing the shopping, taking the children to school, listening to her nagging mother and so on. All she wants is her husband to come home and take care of her. When the husband actually arrives home he waits for his wife to come to him to give him the attention he needs, and since she doesn’t do it makes him even grumpier. A reinforcing loop is one in which an action produces a result that influences more of the same action, thereby resulting in growth or decline. (continued)

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Interlude 7.8 (continued) They are self-enhancing, leading to exponential growth or to runaway collapses over time (Meadows 2008). If caught in a reinforcing type, people may say, ‘the sky’s the limit’ or ‘we’re on a roll’ or ‘this is our ticket to heaven’ heading in the “virtuous” direction they prefer. They generally ‘snowball’ into highly amplified growth or decline. A reinforcing loop in an organisational context is, under common conditions, incomplete. We never have a vicious or virtuous cycle by itself (Citations adopted from website Bellinger 2004). Somewhere, sometime, it will run up against at least one balancing mechanism for reasons that have something to do with extremities regarding the use of budgets, human health or the continuity of the organisation. Such a balancing loop may not appear in our lifetime, but we can assume it will. Reinforcing loops are found wherever a system element has the ability to reproduce itself or to grow as a constant fraction of itself. However, nothing grows or declines forever. The best thing to do is to look for these limits before we run into them. Balancing Loops: Pushing Stability via Negative Feedback A balancing loop attempts to move some current state (the way things are) to a desired state (the way things ought to be) through some action (whatever is done to reach the latter). It is one of the simplest structures, representing any situation where there is a goal or an objective and action is taken to achieve that goal or objective. In other words, a balancing loop can start when someone attempts, for example, based on a gap analysis, (see Chap. 2) to move from some current state, the way things are (historically first called the ‘ist-lage’), to a desired state, the way things ought to be (‘soll-lage’) (Heckhausen 1963) By doing so, there is a discrepancy created between the two states, which the person tries to reduce. In essence, balancing loops, or negative feedback loops, are circles of action and reaction that counter a change with eventually a push in the opposite direction. Simply put, the harder the push from outside the system (towards the desired state), the harder the system pushes back (and stays as it is). Balancing feedback loops bring stability or stubbornness to a system, depending on how the intervention from outside is perceived. For example, if I decide I want to change the way a department works to achieve an output increase of, say, 10%, I have just created a balancing loop. If I decide I want a new leadership style, I have just created a balancing loop. This pattern is very common and is illustrated in Fig. 7.5. What is happening when we set a new output target is that we have an objective in mind that is 10% higher than the actual output at that particular moment. As we start, we are assessing the gap between the set-out target and the actual level. It is this assessment that controls our actions and that of the colleagues in the department. At the start, when the gap between the target and the actual level is relatively large, the joint efforts will also be relatively (continued)

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Interlude 7.8 (continued) substantial. Because the action (in Fig. 7.5, starting at the top left) is in the Same direction, we put an S by the head of the arrow. The joint effort, of course, affects the actual output level, such that the greater this effort the greater our output, hence there is an S here too. However, as the department’s actual output rises, the gap between the target and actual output level decreases. Therefore, they move in Opposite directions, hence the O. As the gap between the target and the actual output level gets progressively smaller, our joint effort decreases progressively, until a time is reached when the gap between the target and the actual output level becomes zero. This form of feedback, in which a system is seeking a particular goal, is known as ‘negative feedback’, and the corresponding causal loops are called ‘negative feedback loops’ or ‘balancing loops’. Balancing loops (i.e. negative feedback loops) are often found in situations that seem to be self-correcting and self-regulating, whether the participants like it or not. If people talk about ‘being on a roller coaster’, or ‘being flung up and down like a yo-yo’, they are probably caught in a balancing feedback structure (see websites: Bellinger 2004; Goodman et al. n.d.). Despite the frustration they often engender, balancing loops are not innately bad. They ensure, for example, that there is usually some way to stop a runaway ‘action-reaction’ behavioural pattern. Balancing processes are always bound to a target: a constraint or a goal. Whenever current reality does not match the balancing loop’s target, the resulting gap between the target and the system’s actual performance generates a kind of pressure that the system cannot ignore. The greater the gap, the greater the pressure. It is as if the system itself has a single-minded awareness of ‘how things ought to be’ and will do everything in its

+/+

Grumpy feelings

S

+/+ S

Unwillingness of the husband to give attention to his wife

Unwillingness of his wife to give attention to her husband

S +/+

Fig. 7.4 A reinforcing loop

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Target level of output S

+/+

Gap between the target and the actual output level

O

-/S

Taking action for motivating people to accomplish the target Actual output level of the department

S +/+

Fig. 7.5 A balancing loop

power to return to that state. Until we recognise the gap and identify the goal or constraint that drives it, we will not understand the behaviour of the balancing loop. Sometimes a balancing loop initiates behaviour that at first glance can be interpreted as ‘resistance’ but, as we will illustrate in Interlude 7.9, it can also be seen as typical behaviour, such as in the example of a phenomenon known as the ‘pocket veto’. Interlude 7.9 An Example of a Balancing Loop: The Pocket Veto The term ‘pocket veto’ originates from the political sciences. It describes, for example, the right of the president of the United States not to approve a bill that has already been passed by Congress, by not signing it into law (Taken from: https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/pocket_veto.htm. For more specific information: https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-a-pocketveto-3368112). The president can put it, metaphorically speaking, in his back pocket until the time for approving the bill has expired. Congress is aware of this and has no choice but to accept this prerogative. Hanson used this term to describe the power that (for instance) professionals have when changes or innovations are introduced: ‘The power is exerted through inaction; in other words: the professionals simply do not respond to requests or mandates for change’ (Hanson 2002). Pocket vetoes come to the surface in situations of pressure, top-down decisions and hierarchy. When you force people to do things they do not believe in, they will learn to use the pocket veto. As a consequence, the whole system can become stuck in a balancing feedback (continued)

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Interlude 7.9 (continued) loop, in which a lot seems to be going on, but nothing is actually changing. The pressure can come from an individual manager, a group or a department. Managers often see pocket vetoes as sabotage, as people are not doing what they were asked to do. From the standpoint of an employee, a pocket veto is a way of surviving in an unfriendly and unsafe environment, or a wish that is not taken seriously or something one should not be asked. The employee is then able to do what he or she really believes is the right thing to do. A pocket veto is, in many organisational cases, not a conscious act. It emerges as a selfevident act in line with unconscious beliefs and assumptions: ‘I do not do this or believe this’ or ‘This is not a good thing to do’ or ‘My boss is only a human being and he doesn’t have this right’. Managers can create pocket vetoes in just minutes. Getting rid of them might take months or longer. Pocket vetoes can have serious consequences, as they clog up communication channels, especially from the bottom to the top, causing delays in important feedback information for management to make adequate decisions. Only unimportant matters will get through those channels, and, for example, a big wall might develop between the upper management echelons and the shop floor. What makes it difficult for an interventionist to comprehend the way in which a feedback loop operates is mostly the delay between the intervention and the expected reaction of the receivers, not only because of the delay itself, as true of ‘the pocket veto’ from Interlude 7.9, but also because the behaviour of the receivers is not recognised as a reaction. A typical pitfall in this case is that the interventionist immediately repeats the intervention, unintentionally causing the behaviour of the receivers to oscillate (see, for example, the way in which we described the business case in Sect. 2.4.1). In other words, the delay itself can cause the oscillating effect. It is always interesting to be aware of these delays and to be critical of our own patience and how we perceive things. However, determining how much of a delay causes what kind of oscillation under what circumstances is not a simple matter. Shortening the delay, for example, by making the change message more understandable, can encourage the receiver to do just the opposite to what is expected. It is still a one-way manner of intervening. Another way to overcome this is by trying to determine how long the delays will be and what triggers them exactly, especially in the eyes of the participants. However, in general the right thing to do is to ask questions and reflect on our own assumptions and expectations, as discussed in the previous chapters.

7.5 Some Closing Reflections

7.5

275

Some Closing Reflections

1. Handling Polarity A paradox, a double bind and a competing commitment share in common the fact that they pertain to a polarity of two opposite and interdependent poles. If we accept the notion that it is worth determining that we have a polarity to manage or a problem to solve, how do we work out which we have? Johnson has found two questions useful in distinguishing between the two (Johnson 1992, p. 82): 1. Is the Difficulty Ongoing? Problems to solve have a solution that can be considered the endpoint of a process, i.e. they are solvable. On the other hand, polarities to manage do not get ‘solved’. They are ongoing. They do not have a clear endpoint solution. There is a never-ending shift in emphasis of focus from one pole to the other and back. 2. How to Manage Two Opposite Poles? Polarities to manage require a shift in emphasis between opposites such that neither can stand alone. It is a ‘both/and’ difficulty. Both one pole and its apparent opposite depend on each other. The pair is involved in an ongoing balancing process over an extended period of time. We need to understand that they need each other (Rittel 1972).

Given that both poles have their own particular values and strengths, seeing both as part of a larger picture is the crucial first step in being able to use all their values and strengths in the best interests of the individual, group or organisation. Creating an awareness that ‘a polarity to manage’ exists instead of ‘a problem to be solved’ helps to open the doors to a ‘both/and’ solution. As Polster and Polster have claimed, this awareness allows the warring parties to ‘become allies in the common search for a good life, rather than uneasy opponents maintaining the split’ (Fantz 1987). Once the situation is clearly established in this way, the focus turns towards unfolding how the opposing forces of the polarity depend upon each other. 2. Letting Go to Get More The figure-ground principle displayed in Fig. 7.6 is one of the core concepts of perception in gestalt theory. In the case of the picture of the two heads/goblet, we cannot see both at the same time. However, without the goblet there would be no heads and without the heads there would be no goblet. Neither part can exist without the other. Again, we have the paradoxical relationship of interdependent opposites (Clarkson 2000). The process of trying to see both describes the ‘emergence, prioritising and satiation of needs and is the basic perceptual principle of making the wholes of human needs or experiences meaningful’ (Johnson 1992, p. 81). It is the incompleteness combined with the conviction of the rightness (accuracy) of our perception that is the source of a potential problem (Perls et al. 1994, p. 25). In this, the figure is the focus of interest—an object, a pattern and a behaviour— for which the ground is the background, setting or context. The interplay between figure and ground is dynamic and ongoing. The same ground may, with differing

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Fig. 7.6 Gestalt picture of the goblet and the two faces in one picture

interests and shifts of attention, give rise to further different figures, or a given complex figure may itself become the ground in the event that some detail of its own emerges as the figure (Polster and Polster 1973, p. 31). The essence of figuring out a paradoxical situation is not about contradicting its reality, it is about confirming its reality (Johnson 1992, p. 81), with which we want to clarify that it is easier to expand our view than to stimulate those with an opposing view to expand theirs. Exploring an oppositional view requires a willingness to temporarily let go of our own view and put some effort into seeing and understanding the other’s view. We are in control of the decision to let go of our view and to put our effort into seeing the other’s view. We are not in control of the decision on the part of other people to let go of their view and make the effort to see our view (Johnson 1992, p. 81). In conclusion, there are at least four reasons for looking beyond our own view: 1. Because someone else sees it differently 2. In order to expand our own reality 3. If we can see another’s point of view, we are more likely to accept an invitation to see ours 4. If we have a polarity to manage, seeing the other half of the polarity will help us manage the situation better (because we see the whole picture) 3. Reframing as a Means of Making a Breakthrough After many years of working with managers, McGregor observed that the common practice of proceeding without explicit examination of assumptions leads, at times, to remarkable inconsistencies in human behaviour. Based on their therapeutic experiments, seminars and workshops, Kegan and Lahey have suggested that people rarely realise that they hold these assumptions because they accept them as a given and self-evident reality. One of the reasons that we do not attend to these

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inconsistencies and inner subconscious-rivalling commitments is that this strategy leads to success. The resulting dynamic equilibrium stalls the effort in what looks like resistance but can also be seen as an automatic response or learned conditioned behaviour. According to Watzlawick, asking direct questions is not very helpful in breaking through a dynamic equilibrium because every description presupposes one step outside the perceptual frame of that being described. Watzlawick as well as Tsoukas and Chia have referred to the fence whitewashing scene from the novel Tom Sawyer as an example of how to create a breakthrough (Tsoukas and Chia 2002). In this scene, the hero is punished by having to whitewash a fence on a Saturday afternoon while all the other boys are free to go swimming. To save face and escape his friends’ derision, he reinterprets the whole situation and acts as if painting the fence were a rare and highly desirable privilege. This reinterpreting or reframing can be seen as ‘an intervention that constructs a new reality aspect in place of a former one, whereby the new aspect fits the new becoming situation just as well or better than the old view’ (Watzlawick 1989, p. 147). If the reframing is successful, it can block the often-desperate feeling of ‘I feel ashamed, I should react, but I cannot’. It is not acquiring new information, but reinterpreting or reconstructing the same data. 4. ‘Resistance’ as a Co-construction Most of us can quite easily identify the counterproductive actions other people cause. In contexts in which we as interventionists have to bring about change, these counterproductive actions are easily interpreted as ‘resistance’. In the same way, we seem to experience difficulty in perceiving our own actions as counterproductive or identifying them as ‘resistance’ (Argyris 1990, p. 13). Being the recipients of the change initiative, it is reasonable to understand that we are experiencing difficulties when we are confronted with an interventionist who perceives our well-intended actions as ‘resisting’ his or her change initiative. In the same way, it does not take much consideration to comprehend that change recipients can experience difficulty in conceiving a ‘double bind’ message and act on one of the two inconsistent parts of the message. Consequently, an interventionist can interpret the recipient’s choice as an act contra his/her intervention. Under these conditions, it is very likely that an interventionist labels the recipient’s behaviour as resistance to change. This is why seeing the initiation of change as a co-construction, that is, as a reciprocal interaction process between the interventionist and the recipient, helps both to maintain the process’ neutrality, protecting it from dysfunctionalities. Weick calls this reciprocal way of looking a ‘double interact’ (Weick 1979). In the way he describes it, communicating change can best be seen as a double interact consisting of three stages: a message sent, a behavioural interpretation of the message and finally an interpretation of the behavioural reaction based on the interpreted message. As we will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, this means that the smallest entity, which we consider from a systems perspective, is that of the individual’s interaction, i.e. circular (feedback) loops with their direct environment.

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Recap • Lewin introduces resistance to change as a concept that can be studied by focusing on the influence of contextual factors on how people perceive behaviour and change initiatives from others. Throughout the years, interest in contextual factors diminished and interest in an individual perspective regarding ‘resistance’ grew and became the dominant perspective. • The intention to change is never enough. There are limits to one’s willpower and desire to do something that is claimed to be important. There are so many things that happen between the moment of committing to an action and actually following through on it. It is not that we change our mind per se, as much as other diversions and distractions interrupt our focus: interruptions coming from within us, from others, coming from all kinds of (unconscious) influences, leading to all kinds of change dynamics. • The perspectives in play in studying change dynamics are (1) intra-individual psychodynamics, especially individual defence mechanisms and idiosyncrasies; (2) group dynamics, especially social anxiety and group anomalies; and (3) systems dynamics, especially paradoxical situations and counter-intuitive actions. • Psychodynamics. With the focus on the individual change recipient and not on the context, ‘resistance’ is increasingly carried forward as a psychological concept: as an individual-based phenomenon located ‘over there, in them’. These intraindividual mechanisms generally arise to avoid some form of shame, whether real or imagined, potentially related to some of Freud’s archetypical individual defence mechanisms. However, a sole focus on an individual perspective precludes a better understanding of the social dynamics of resistance as it occurs, for example, within groups/social systems. • Group dynamics. A group that has learned to hold a common set of assumptions and thus perceives, feels and sees the external world in a jointly shared way, automatically generating symptomatic behaviour patterns that are typical for this group. These patterns provide meaning, comfort, order and social ways of coping with uncertainty, doubt and ‘social anxiety’. • System dynamics. If they share a purpose, a group of people who interact daily can be considered as a whole social system. As being part of a system, we try to balance opposite forces to keep the whole in a steady state or equilibrium, so that we have the tendency to compensate for other members’ actions. • This brings us to the conclusion that we do not have nearly as much control over our actions as we would like to believe. Furthermore, nearly half of all the actions that people engage in during a typical day are not guided by any conscious decisions but rather represent habitual responses. Key Discussion Points 1. Unconsciously Learned Group Processes Resistance to substantive changes in individual professional behaviour does not necessarily indicate a lack of commitment to one’s primary stated goals.

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Counterproductive behaviour may also reflect the existence of unconsciously learned (group) behaviours. • Argue why resistance to change has at least something to do with (unconscious) dysfunctional group dynamics. • Argue why the ‘self-sealing’ in ‘self-sealing defensive routines’ is of importance. • Relate the mechanism of a defensive routine to one of Freud’s archetypical individual defence mechanisms and argue why your example also works for groups. • Argue why it seems that we need unconscious processes to be made conscious first before we can change them. 2. ‘Defensive Reasoning’, ‘Groupthink’ and ‘Abilene Paradox’ These phenomena show that groups of people can take action contrary to the desires of their individual members, defeating the very purpose they set out to achieve for the whole. • Argue why people are able to act averse against the trend of a group. • Argue why people can do things that are contrary to the desires of a group they are a member of? • Argue in which of the three phenomena it is most likely that group members are conscious of their counterproductive behaviour. 3. Competing Commitments The essence of the problem with change seems to be the inability to close the gap between what we genuinely, even passionately, want and what we are actually able to do. Our reasoning seems obvious to us. However, when we take a closer look, much is also hidden or subconscious, or even completely embedded in the way we perceive ourselves in relation to others. Use the example of the director in the incident from Interlude 6.2 from Chap. 6 to describe the process of application of the ‘change immunity map’ from left to right. Try to fill in what may have been the things that: • Cause problems (the complaint) • Motivate her to introduce double-loop learning in the management team (the commitment) • Seem to block/stimulate her in actually doing so (doing/not doing) • Can be seen as an indication of the existence of a counter/competing commitment

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4. The Circular Nature of Paradoxes One tenet of paradox is its circular nature. This means that when there is a tension between two equally attractive possibilities, competing commitments or realities, energy flows between and around these two poles. • Argue why a competing commitment can be compared with a paradox. • Argue what the best way is of handling a recurring paradoxical situation. • Argue what the main differences are between competing commitments and a double bind message. 5. Feedback Loops and Recursions There are basically two kinds of feedback loops: balancing and reinforcing loops. Balancing loops are about a settling to equilibrium, reducing the effects of perturbations via negative feedback. Reinforcing loops tend to lead to instability, exponential growth and oscillation via positive feedback. Things become more ‘dynamic’ because of the perceived delay in the feedback loops between people. • Argue why it is important to look at feedback loops when we are helping people with changing. • Argue why things escalate more easily when feedback is perceived as delayed. • Argue, in this regard, why a pocket veto is a balancing feedback loop and draw it as a CLD. 6. Burning Platform, Gap Analysis and a Negative Feedback Loop In itself, a gap analysis is a well-known exercise based on answering three questions: (1) Where are we now? (2) Where do we want to get to? and (3) How can we get there? A balancing loop starts mostly with a gap analysis, when someone attempts to move from some current state, the way things are (‘ist-lage’), to a desired state, the way things ought to be (‘soll-lage’). • Describe the relevance of creating ‘a burning platform’ in regard to (1) the process of unfreezing; (2) creating a ‘sense of urgency’; and (3) developing ‘common ground’. • Argue why a gap analysis initiates (easily) a balancing loop.

7. The Dynamics of Change and Fear As the former chief executive officer of the personal computer manufacturer Hewlett Packard (from 1999 to 2005) and candidate in the 2016 Republican presidential primary, Carly Fiorina has a lot of experience with generating change. In a broadcast

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of the Stanford Technology Ventures Program, she speaks about the dynamics of change and fear (see her speech at: www.youtube.com/watch?v¼w3IbKbDhfKw). • What seems to be her two main interrelated points regarding the way change can be accomplished? • How do these points relate to the described dynamics in this chapter? 8. An ‘Action-Reaction’ Behavioural Pattern as a Result of a Delay in Feedback From Sect. 2.4.1 we know that an ‘action-reaction’ behavioural pattern is an oscillating, rapidly repeated interaction process that can be depicted with a typical ‘seesaw’ pattern. It refers to the characteristic symptom in complex contexts in which the information used to take goal-seeking action is delayed, leading to recurring dynamics. Using dated information to control the approach to a change target is likely to cause people to miss their goal and to get into an escalating ‘actionreaction’ behavioural pattern. • What seems to be the essence in the relationship between an ‘action-reaction’ behavioural pattern and a delay in feedback? • Describe what causes both phenomena and try to be as full in your description as possible.

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A Complexity Perspective Consultants Experiences Related to (Their Own) Change Dynamics

Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results (O’Hanlon 1999). I am not fond of the word ‘psychological’. There is no such thing as the psychological (Jean Paul Sartre cited in: Laing 1969).

8.1

Introduction

Complexity science is studying the nature of dynamics in interacting people and suggests that ‘order emerges for free’ without any central or governing control or intention when the whole is operating in ‘edge of chaos’ conditions (Shaw 1997, p. 235). Complexity science invites us to think more in wholes and see organisations as ecosystems. Central to this perspective is the view that organisations can be seen as networks of multiple, interacting individuals and groups that are fairly autonomous (Dent 2003). Each individual/group is constantly acting and reacting to what the other individuals/groups are doing. Interacting people are co-adaptive, taking ‘mutual advantage of each other in order to change more effectively’ (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). Organisations whose members see themselves as part of an ecosystem are often highly decentralised, collaborative (focus on relationships) and adaptive and see change as normal and value based (Dent 2003). In this regard, Stacey argues that self-organising processes are to be found primarily in what he calls an organisation’s ‘shadow system’—that is, the complex web of interactions in which social, covert, political and psychodynamic (informal) systems coexist in tension with the legitimate (formal) system (Stacey 1996). For a generative OD interventionist, this means actively working with a paradox—on the one hand, working in an official role, being part of a legitimate control system, facilitating an intended change effort, while on the other hand, simultaneously participating in a (informal) shadow system in which no one is ‘in control’ (Shaw 1997, p. 235). # The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. van Nistelrooij, Embracing Organisational Development and Change, Springer Texts in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51256-9_8

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In this chapter, we go into, in particular, the ‘complex responsive processes of human relating’ or in short, the ‘complex responsive process’. This specific complexity perspective was developed by Stacey, Griffin and Shaw as a way of thinking that emphasises the self-organising patterning of communicative action (Stacey et al. 2000). This way of thinking, as Shaw explains, invites us to ‘stay in the movement of communicating, learning and organising, to think from within our living participation in the evolution of forms of identity’ (Shaw 1997, p. 235). Our blindness to the way we participate in fabricating the conversational realities of organising is compounded by the difficulty we have in thinking from within, in thinking as participants, in thinking in process terms and, above all, in thinking paradoxically. Another way of thinking about the issues raised by our participation, our interdependence and our contextual embeddedness is tackled in recent developments in systems thinking and particularly in second-order intervening on a LIII learning level as introduced in Chap. 6. In this regard, it is a matter of course that the interventionist is part of the picture when studying the recursive nature of what is going on between those who intervene and those who are supposed to be changing (Vanderstraeten 2001). With this point, we argue in this chapter that the so-called objective assumptions are to be replaced by assumptions that reckon with the existence of a co-constructed world. Following Bateson in this, our knowledge of what we think we know is the end result at that moment of our inner perceptions of what we think we have learned and think we know as a basis for how to change others. In other words, our inner world is a metaphor for the outer world or as Bateson formulated it, ‘[e]ach person is his own central metaphor’ (Bateson 1972a). In this chapter, we explore the complexity perspective regarding the practice of consultancy and intervening. In doing so, we will introduce and explore the following: • The historical background of this field, how it relates to change and changing, the contemporary debate in the consultancy literature and its main components as a scientific field of research • How to look at change from a first-person perspective by introducing a narrative, with which we try to make a personal experience meaningful in such a way that the reader can stand in a consultant’s shoes and relate to their own experiences • How research practices such as autoethnographic research and community inquiry can be used as an approach to research to describe and systematically analyse personal interactive experience in order to understand cultural experience in relation to other perspectives regarding this experience • Looking into the first encounters between a consultant and a client, by taking a closer look at the particular challenges and dynamics that are part of the conversations regarding a contracting and the preliminary scoping of the system between a consultant and a client • The concept of a ‘pseudo exploration’, which can cause things to be really complex, giving rise to insurmountable obstructions

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We start this chapter with a short overview of the development of complexity theories in relation to organisational change. In Paragraph 8.3, we introduce a personal narrative from a consultant’s perspective in which we discuss his inner world and how it reflects on the way he intervenes in the outer world. It is a hindsight reflection on a series of interventions undertaken in the health-care organisation as introduced in Chap. 1, originally written together with Thijs Homan as an article for the Journal of Organizational Change Management. In the same paragraph, we stay with the narrative and discuss the research method and emerging themes and reflect upon the things learned in the last chapters. In Paragraph 8.5, we introduce some of the main challenges during the first encounters between a consultant and a client system. The chapter closes with some reflections, a recap of the main findings and some key discussion points.

8.2

Introducing a Complex Responsive Process Perspective

Understanding the complexity of organisations has been a long-standing concern of organisation theory, starting in 1948 with Wiener’s ‘cybernetics’ (Wiener 1961), which approached complexity as the science of control and communication processes (Boulanger 1969). In the early days, cybernetics had a crucial influence on the birth of various modern sciences, such as control theory, computer science, artificial intelligence and especially systems theory (Heylighen and Joslyn 2001). The basic idea behind these modern theories is that a complex organism could not be truly understood by breaking it down into and studying its apparent parts—to do so was to overlook the crucial relationship between its components (Fitzgerald 1999). Later on, through the 1960s, cybernetics as a field came to focus more specifically on goaldirected (social) systems that have some form of control relation, emphasising autonomy, self-organisation, cognition and the role of the observer in modelling a system. These so-called second-order cybernetics offer insights in how human wholes use information to steer themselves towards their goals while counteracting various disturbances (Boulanger 1969). As such, cybernetics promised to teach us a great deal about human communication and changing organisations, but the promise has been unfulfilled yet (Tompkins 1982). During the 1990s, there was an explosion of interest in complexity as it relates to organisations and strategy. Many of the articles that were published in this period stem from attempts by meteorologists, biologists, chemists, physicists and other natural scientists to build mathematical models of systems in nature (Gleick 1988; Styhre 2002). In the process, a number of different but related nonlinearity theories have emerged, the key ones being ‘chaos theory’ (Lorenz 1993), ‘dissipative structures theory’, (Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Prigogine 1996) the theory of ‘complex adaptive systems (CAS)’ (Kauffman 1993) and the ‘complex responsive theory’ (Stacey et al. 2002). Many of these theories arose from studies in the natural sciences (e.g. Prigogine’s work on chemical reactions) (Prigogine and Stengers 1984), mechanical or electrical systems (e.g. Kaufmann’s studies of electrical circuits) (Kauffman 1993) or animals (e.g. Goodwin’s studies of ant behaviour)

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(Goodwin 1994). According to Stacey (2003a), the main difference between these theories is that chaos and dissipative structure theories seek to construct mathematical models of systems at the macro level, while complex adaptive systems and his own complex responsive theory attempt to model the same phenomena by using an agent-based approach. This means that instead of formulating rules for the whole population, these theories seek to formulate rules of interaction for the individual entities making up a system in which issues are incorporated such as voluntary behaviour, participation and reflexivity (MacIntosh and MacLean 2003). Thus, these latter complexity theories can and should be seen as a continuation of earlier ‘cybernetic’ and ‘systems’ efforts rather than a complete paradigm shift. Compared with the complex responsive theory, the traditional theory of ‘complex adaptive systems’ (CAS) sees the individual actor constituted as a rule-driven agent, reacting to other nearby agents, who in their turn react to the focal agent being informed by their own ‘internal’ rules (MacIntosh and MacLean 2001). A frequently used metaphor for this way of reasoning is ‘a flock of starlings showing amazing and unexpected global patterns’ (Homan 2016, p. 495). In the CAS framework, this emergent collective behaviour is explained as a non-linear result of countless local interactions of the rule-governed individual starlings (Homan 2016, p. 495). In comparison, in the ‘complex responsive process theory’, attention is paid to the micro-dynamics of local interactions and the ways global patterns can arise from local interacting agent behaviour. Focusing on the profound understandings of group and social processes, the complex responsive process research encourages researchers to take seriously their own daily experiences (Stacey and Griffin 2005, p. 35). For this, researchers of the complex responsive perspective use narratives and develop reflective and reflexive inquiries and arguments about the way their experiences can be understood. Narratives are spoken or written accounts of connected events, making them stories. From a research and interventionist perspective, narratives are important sense-making devices when facing uncertainty, helping people to structure their thoughts and bringing them into conversation with others. Although narrative analysis has received some attention from scholars, it is still an unexplored frontier (Van Ooijen et al. 2018). As Polster argues, much of the verbal exchange between people during interventions is the telling of stories. These stories report the critical events of a person’s/group’s life as seen, ordered and interpreted by themselves, and as such they “reveal personal qualities, replicate previous experience, accentuate conflict, communicate a connectedness among people and evoke the drama of the experiences from which the self is formed” (Polster 1995). The awareness that results can redirect the perceptions of the person/group and increase the contact with the self, others and the context. Once a theme has been identified, work can begin on assisting the storyteller to reflect on the story in which new thematic connections encourage new perceptions of the self, the other and the environment, that is, new perceptions of ‘reality’ (Wheeler 1998).

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The use of narratives implies that the ‘unit of analysis’ in the complex responsive process approach is the experience of interacting with others in local social settings. Here the concept of complexity is not used to describe the context ‘in’ which the individuals interact but as a fundamental attribute of the quality of the interaction of interdependent participants (Stacey 2003b). Taking a complex responsive perspective provides a radically different way of conceptualising how organisations change. This shifts a consultant’s attention away from the macro-perspective of change management to the ‘messy’ micro-processes of our own interaction producing unpredictable emerging differences and changes. Homan links the complex responsive ontology to ontological discourses like Alvesson’s ‘local positionism’ (Alvesson 2003); he positions it at the local emergent side of Deetz’s metatheory of representational practices (Deetz 1996) and also relates it to Hardy and Clegg’s categorisation of the dialogic approach, emphasising the role of researcher reflection and reflexion (Hardy and Clegg 1997). As we will further elaborate on in the next section, what the complex responsive process research approach has in common with organisational ethnography (Ybema et al. 2009) is its primary focus of study: the everyday experience of living and working in an organisation.

8.3

Introducing a Narrative from a Consultant’s Perspective (Van Nistelrooij and Homan 2019)

The following narrative is built around an incident that took place during the ‘healthcare organisation’ case we introduced before in Chap. 1. With this narrative, we try to make a personal experience meaningful in such a way that the reader can stand in a consultant’s shoes and vicariously learn about and relate to their own experiences. Following the first section in which we introduce the incident, we interpret the incident briefly from contemporary consultancy literature. After this, we go into the research methodology, introducing first-person inquiry and autoethnography as an entrance for looking inwards. After the methodology section, we describe briefly the follow-up of the incident and the main emerging themes we pick up during the ‘community inquiry’ sessions with several Dutch senior consultants. After a short discussion, we end the narrative with some reflections and conclusions.

8.3.1

Introducing the Incident

“You called it ‘a structure taboo’, God knows why, but as far as I am concerned, there is no taboo with regard to talking about structure here,” exclaimed the male half of the two-headed board of directors directly to me (the consultant). He said this during a collaborative large-group session in front of a full room of 40 executive managers, all working in the same Dutch health-care organisation. When confronted with this exclamation, it flashed through my mind: ‘Yeah, what do I know?’ My gut feeling tells me that ‘structure’ was apparently not debatable. Perhaps I picked it up during an earlier session with the preparation group or

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probably, and more likely, during one of the personal interviews I held with the executives. I know for sure that I shared it on an earlier occasion with my client, the same director who seems to use it now as something he could use against me in front of the group. I was baffled. How should I respond? Is this something that all the executives in the room know and share as ‘how things are’ or was it just something I assumed? It was remarkably silent in the packed room, and I noticed that in reaction to the emotional, somewhat angry and indignant words of the director, a sort of shiver went through the audience. And not just through the audience—his direct way of speaking clearly threw me off balance too. It felt as if everyone was looking at me, thinking, ‘What will he say? Or was I imagining that?’ The silence continued, as everyone was waiting for what would come next. About 6 months before this incident happened, I (the consultant) accepted an assignment from the two-headed board of directors. For my assignment, I was told ‘to help them [. . .] make the strategic apex of the institute function more effectively’. Approximately 850 employees worked at the health-care organisation at that time, attending to 2500 clients divided across eight different municipalities and 25 locations. Together with both directors, the executive managers—consisting of heads of staff, branch managers and location managers—formed the strategic apex. Both the directors and all the executives carried out tactical assignments on top of their regular work. In fact, both directors quickly articulated that they wanted me to help them to enter into a more constructive dialogue with the executive managers about ‘what the new challenges in their work are’ and ‘why these challenges have not been taken up’. According to the two directors, these challenges concern the execution of tactical assignments. These tactical tasks were instigated by the directors in order to bridge a vacuum between the strategical and operational level, as a result of a reorganisation that was necessary. In their words, it was an act ‘to clean up the administrative layer of regional managers and make the remaining executive managers more responsible for the whole institute’. The session did end happily—not because of what I did but because of my hesitation to act, fundamentally doubting my own assumptions. This is the main theme we will elaborate on in this section. Initially my assignment for this change project made me enthusiastic. My role was to empower people, helping them break out of what I saw as their ‘defensive routines’ (see Chap. 7). Some months before, I started a dialogue with the whole system through a large-group intervention (Van Nistelrooij et al. 2013). According to Letiche, health-care organisations seem to lack a process both for engaging in dialogue and committing to doing so (Letiche 2008). Such a dialogue requires the participants to take some time to step out of roles and engage in a reflective process of exchanging impressions of what is occurring, what is perceived to be at stake and what the context of the moment brings to bear. This was exactly what I tried to realise with the first group intervention with a critical mass of 200 people (see Chap. 5), which resulted in what I perceived as enthusiasm to do something to break through the collectively felt impasse. Following the first intervention, I conducted 20 interviews with a representative selection of the 40 executives, who were all invited to the aforementioned narrative session. This meeting had a dialogical set-up, in which the results of the interviews were

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comprehensively discussed. However, at the described moment in the narrative, it did not feel as though a dialogue was taking place, and I experienced a deeply unsettling mixture of conviction and indecisiveness. I felt confronted with the boundaries of my own assumptions, hesitating to step outside my own pattern of behaviour. As all these thoughts and emotions rumbled through my head in a split second, I was reluctant to surrender my present self-construct, thinking I would put myself in jeopardy and lose control of what—in my eyes—had to be done. From an outsider’s perspective, the above-described incident may appear to be easily resolved. Yet there is more in this moment than meets the eye. The personal confrontation with my client, directly in front of a packed room of people, is probably the most obvious. In general, situations like this do not usually make me feel uncomfortable. Mostly, I handle them by asking the participants what they think about the—in this case—statement of the board member; however, in this situation, I hesitated to do so. I knew that his words had been picked up by the audience as a message that was personally addressed to me—as something that I needed to take care of personally, right at that moment. Yet, the theme of ‘organisation structure’ was beyond the formal scope of the assignment that I agreed upon with the director. As we discuss in Interlude 8.1, the subject of scoping during the first encounters with a client is not something to be spoken about lightly. Interlude 8.1 The Importance of Scoping In addition to our earlier introduction of this subject in Interlude 2.3, Interlude 3.6, and Interlude 5.3 and in Fig. 4.5, change is in the making when people step outside the limited information that can be seen from any single place in the system and shift towards developing an overview of the whole they are (apparently) part of. It is amazing how quickly and easily behavioural change can come with even a slight enlargement of our own perspective/context, as this provides better, more complete and timelier information. As Meadows warns us, it is a great art to remember that distinctions or boundaries are of our own making (Meadows 2008). Finding a fitting context requires a diagnosis that surpasses the immediate and goes beyond the initial reactions, beyond the simple, beyond the ‘I’ and also beyond the mundane. This endeavour not only requires the employees’ active participation but also that of management, or even that of members of higher echelons as long as they have a stake or a relevant perspective that relates to the purpose at hand. The premise here is that by finding a fitting context, individuals will feel more attachment to the results and outcomes, especially when there is a direct interaction with the members of the higher echelons. This is a typical case of the so-called participation dilemma (see Sect. 5.4.1)—management is necessary in order to reach selforganisation, not only in terms of providing the right space for co-inquiry but also to enable management representatives to engage in the process themselves. (continued)

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Interlude 8.1 (continued)

Donella “Dana” Meadows (1941 – 2001) Was a pioneering American environmental scientist at M.I.T, teacher, and writer. She is best known as lead author of the influential books The Limits to Growth and ‘Thinking in Systems’ (2015). In this book the author leads readers through the increasingly complex ways that feedback loops operate to create self-organizing systems, in nature (from viruses to redwood trees ) and human endeavor.

At the moment of the above incident, it seemed to me that, with the subject also being out of scope, I could not say anything that would make sense whatsoever. What is also interesting here is that what happened during the incident was completely against my presumed role identity, underlying role assumptions and convictions largely based on the publications of Schein (2009) and Argyris (1991)—and contrary to the assignment to engage in a dialogue about the challenges the participants face concerning tactical assignments.

8.3.2

Debates in the Consultancy Literature

Sturdy and his colleagues argue: The success of the [consultancy] industry fuelled the belief that it was consultants who were active and influential, a view that corresponded with the prevailing top-down depiction of management innovation and knowledge. Consultants appeared to be powerful, high status, new and important in what was happening in public- and private-sector organisational reform. They were also relatively easy to identify, and, perhaps, identify with, as experts and as abstract thinkers. Both management gurus and consultants seemed to have the “answers” to increasingly complex problems and challenges (Sturdy et al. 2009a, p. 247).

Some scholars see consultants as instruments used by managers, as well as symbolic and rhetorical devices, to legitimise their initiatives for impactful change projects (Bouwmeester and van Werven 2011). Others see them as ‘experts’ in ‘managing transition processes’ (Goodstein and Burke 1991), by recognising and accepting the disorganisation and momentarily reduced effectiveness that characterise this transition. Schein sees consultants in a ‘helping role’, based on the general concept of ‘process consultation’ (Schein 2009, p. 147) as introduced earlier in Interlude 4.3. This implies that a consultant should always select whatever intervention will be most helpful at any given moment, given all one knows about the total situation. In this way of looking, great importance is attached to the development of a cooperative relationship with the client, one that is based on mutual trust (Chalutz Ben-Gal and Tzafrir 2011) and on the mobilisation of all stakeholders around the

8.3 Introducing a Narrative from a Consultant’s Perspective (Van Nistelrooij and. . . Fig. 8.1 Consulting activities seen from a ‘planned change’ and a ‘complexity’ perspective (cf. Shaw 1997, p. 241)

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From a planned change perspec- From a complexity perspective, the consultant: tive, the consultant: • Understands change as a consequence of designing and implementing a developmental strategy together with the client system. • Sees large-scale project plans and political and ideological control strategies as legitimate ways of realising prior intentions. • Contracts to deliver a predetermined unilateral objective, with management favourite’ usual suspects following a pre-plotted roadmap. • As an ‘expert’ practitioner chooses a relative outside or boundary (‘aboutness’) position from which to diagnose, propose and execute interventions. • Tries to create a change in people’s individual and shared beliefs, values and attitudes.

• Understands change as unfolding in the ongoing paradoxical tensions during dialogical sessions, in which the participants co-evolve. • Dissuades managers from using inappropriate forms of control to manage the anxieties raised when operating far from certainty. • Contracts for an emergent process with a developing learning infrastructure resulting in realising a coconstructed purpose. • As a ‘generative’ practitioner participates from a (‘withness’) position and becomes a co-creator of organisational change. • Seeks to stimulate and provoke conditions in which people’s co-constructed worlds of meaning that are spontaneously revised in interaction • Focuses on relating and connect- • Focuses on changing interacing various individuals, groups, tion patterns and feedback and layers to the developing loops operating at a local level large scale (organisational) within systemic configured change. groups that are representative for the whole to change.

achievement of planned goals (Lalonde and Gilbert 2016). In the mainstream literature on consultants and consultancy, the role and identity of the consultant are generally clear: consultants are the ‘experts’ who know how to behave in a pragmatic evidence-based way by rationally applying a universal set of applicable tools and techniques (Kubr 2002). At the time of the narrative, I identified myself as a process consultant (Schein 2009) who helps to design and implement beneficial dialogical interventions and helps people to engage in learning processes (Argyris 1991). At that moment, this way of thinking didn’t help me. I really felt overwhelmed by my feelings, incapable of formulating my ideas in a coherent way, let alone rationally recalling suggestions from academic literature on how to react adequately. Reflecting on this selfconception afterwards, I realise that one of my most emotional experiences during the meeting described in the narrative was that it dawned upon me that my identity and role were completely fluid and undetermined. In the joint reflections afterwards

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on what happened in the narrative, we realised that mainstream literature on consulting seems to assume a ‘reflective’ practitioner—one who is able to look at his experiences in an emotionally detached way and rationally make decisions on how to move forward while selecting and using academic literature as a guide. Yet, when combing the literature about the possibility of reflecting in action, we came across Stacey and Griffin, who state that in the process of distancing ourselves from our actual experience, we rationally make invisible what we actually experience (Stacey and Griffin 2005, p. 62). Moreover, as we went through other publications of these authors, who assume a ‘complex responsive process perspective’ on organisations (Stacey 2001), it became clear to us that the mainstream literature on consultancy seems to promote an ‘aboutness’ perspective, focusing solely on thinking about the client situation, helping the client and reflecting on the local dynamics at hand and not on an ‘withness’ perspective (see Interlude 4.8). As we recognised many elements of what happened in the narrative in Stacey and his colleagues’ complex responsive process perspective, we decided to take up that perspective to get a deeper understanding of what happened in the narrative. Central in this complex responsive process perspective is, as Stacey puts it, the necessity to take our everyday experience seriously and to move away from detached thinking (Stacey 2007). From experience, Stacey means ‘the actual experience of interaction in which we express hatred, aggression, greed as well as love, compassion and care’ (Stacey 2007), focusing not only on what consultants and leaders should do or ought to be doing but also on what they are doing and experiencing in Lewin’s ‘here and now’. Once involved in a local interaction, it is impossible to analytically step out of it to rationally observe and diagnose what is going on. In the complex responsive process perspective, thoughts, emotions and bodily reactions are regarded as being co-constituted in interaction dynamics, making the stance of the distanced, objective observer impossible, as one is completely involved in the local interaction: as in a state of ‘thrown-ness’ as introduced before in Sect. 3.6.1. Taking the experience of what one is actually doing in local interactions seriously, and subsequently reflecting upon it, gives room for different views of what was happening at that specific moment (Van Nistelrooij and Sminia 2010). In this view, self-consciousness, selfimage and our assumptions about how to react within a role we presume to have are all regarded as emerging in the concrete local interaction, where at the same time we continuously ‘take the attitude of the other’ (Mead 1934) when trying to make sense of what is going on. In contrast to the conventional framing of consultants, where consultants are understood as coherent entities with a more or less fixed set of competencies and skills, the complex responsive process perspective takes up Mead’s descriptive concept of the ‘I-me’ dialectic (Inghilleri 1999) to understand the rumbling of thoughts and emotions as described in the narrative. Mead assumes that we understand ourselves by looking at the reactions of others to our gestures and utterances. In countless interactions during our life, we see how others react to our deeds. We internalise and represent these reactions in ourselves as ‘me’s’, for instance: ‘[A] s people usually react to me in this way, this is who I am as a child; as a consultant’. In many different experiences and situations, different kinds of ‘me’s develop’.

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Furthermore, according to Mead, we develop a ‘generalised other’: a summarisation of who we think we are (our self-construct), based on our own generalisations of others’ reactions to our actions. Once involved in actual interactions, ‘me’s’ pop up in our mind as voices, advising us what to do. Typically, more than one ‘me’ is evoked in any interaction. When buying a car, for instance, two ‘me’s’ can emerge: one boyishly saying, ‘Wow, with this car the girls will look at you!’, the other warning, ‘this car is way too expensive’. Thus, ‘me’s’ pop up in actual conversations as accumulated past voices of others re-emerging in the now. Next to the me’s there is also an ‘I’ partaking in this dynamic. The ‘I’ is that which listens to the discussion of the me’s. Furthermore, the ‘I’ is the one who acts; it is our spontaneous and creative part, which sometimes follows the commandments of the me’s and sometimes acts completely unexpectedly (Inghilleri 1999). To sum up, from a complex responsive process perspective, a consultant is not a fixed entity with a predictable identity and a stable set of characteristics. According to this perspective, who the consultant is and who the consultant thinks he or she is, is intrinsically linked to the concrete interaction in which the consultant is involved. Each specific interaction calls forth different ‘me’s’, leading to different ‘I-me’ dialectics. While interacting with an individual—the consultant continuously ‘takes the attitude of the other’. Hefty emotions can occur when the others do not react in line with the consultant’s predictions, particularly when these reactions seem to refute the generalised other (the self-construct). In the narrative, this concerns the actual role and identity of the consultant. The actual interaction process can be understood as a responsive process that is influenced by everyone yet controlled by no one.

8.3.3

A Complex Responsive Process Perspective on Research

Taking on the complex responsive process perspective implies that we ground our approach in the philosophical practice of first-person inquiry. First-person inquiry is a self-reflective practice involving enacting inquiry in a manner that is distinct for each person, suggesting that each consultant must craft his or her own practice and pay attention to enacting cycles of action and reflection, being both active and receptive. Such a self-reflective consultant pays attention to how to bring him or herself into inquiry, reflecting upon apparent intentions, assumptions and choices. It involves curiosity—through inner and outer arcs of attention—about what is happening and what part one is playing in creating and sustaining patterns of action, interaction and nonaction. Which relates to Weick’s iconic question regarding enacting change from Interlude 4.6: ‘[H]ow can we know what we do until we see what we have produced?’ (Weick 1995). In this regard, narratives are used as ‘vehicles’ to translate these actual experiences to the reader in such a way that the reader (virtually) can stand in the shoes of (here) the consultant. This function of narratives relates to their quality criteria, as formulated by Connelly and Clandinin (1990), and, for example, to the autoethnographic research approach of Ellis et al. (2011)

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Autoethnographic research is an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and systematically analyse (graphy) personal experience (auto) in order to understand cultural experience (ethno). Under autoethnography, the researcher’s own experience becomes the topic of investigation. In this line of research, the topic of investigation is the researcher’s own experience as part of a local interaction dynamic that can also be compared with Denzin’s “thick descriptions” (Denzin 2001), or, to be more precise, “thick inscriptions”, as narratives are the researcher’s own selections and impressions highlighting aspects of the situation deemed relevant by him. Thus, narratives function as a specific “window” to certain subjective experiences rather than an “objective” representation of organisational reality (Bate 1997). As a method, autoethnography is a useful approach to understanding a case as a personal narrative (Ellis et al. 2011) as we present here from an insider perspective—a lens that is often neglected in today’s management literature (Stewart and Aldrich 2015), especially within consultancy practice literature. Furthermore, autoethnography is to be considered both process and product. Consequently, autoethnography is one of the approaches that acknowledges and accommodates subjectivity, emotionality and the researcher’s influence on research, rather than hiding from these matters or assuming they don’t exist (Van Nistelrooij and Homan 2019). One of the major difficulties of such a first-person inquiry is that it requires self-questioning and confronting things that are likely less than flattering about oneself. This is probably why, despite its potential, building on personal experiences as a source of data, it ‘has been criticised for being self-indulgent, narcissistic, introspective and individualised’ (Wall 2006). In response to this criticism, authors who support autoethnography have argued that this approach ‘is more authentic than traditional research approaches, precisely because of the researcher’s use of self, the voice of the insider being more than that of the outsider’ (Reed-Danahay in: Wall 2006). That is why, in recounting experiences, autoethnographers are supposed to use not only their methodological tools and literature to analyse experience but also their personal experience to illustrate facets of cultural experience, and, in so doing, make characteristics of a culture familiar to insiders and outsiders. However, we recognise with Chang (2008) that it is almost impossible to engage in autoethnographic research without implicating others in the above-sketched incident in Sect. 8.3.1. We don’t think that simply applying a universal set of ethical parameters is an inadequate solution. When we read, for example, Tolich’s (Wall 2006) concrete suggestions for how to apply ethical guidelines to autoethnography, we are uneasy with what we perceive as the unexamined privilege inherent in this position. Nevertheless, we think it applies, because we seek to describe and systematically analyse personal experience in order to understand cultural experience (Ellis and Bochner 2000, p. 273). Moreover, the autoethnography researcher ‘retroactively and selectively writes about past experiences’ (Ellis and Bochner 2000, p. 275), which are not necessarily experiences garnered in research activities. In sum,

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autoethnography can be a useful approach to enable understanding of social processes from an insider perspective—a lens that is often neglected in today’s management literature (Stewart and Aldrich 2015) and especially applied to consultancy practices. Stacey’s complex responsive process perspective encourages researchers not only to take their daily experiences seriously (Stacey and Griffin 2005, p. 35) but also to use narratives as raw material, to be reflected upon by the researcher together with a group of fellow researchers. In correspondence with this line of reasoning, the development of the narrative and the argument in this research effort was part of a broader project of seven Dutch senior consultants (Van Ooijen et al. 2017). The project started with the consultants writing a narrative about what they considered to be an episode of ‘imperfection’ in their work, preferably an interactive moment with a client or client system. After writing the narratives, a new round started in which these narratives were reflected upon by several Dutch senior consultants. This round took place over ten interactive meetings, in which all narratives were reflected upon by all those present and all reflections were recorded. In these reflective conversations, we emphasised the identification of important, central themes (‘what is this narrative about?’, ‘what is the central plot?’), and an extensive and critical literature review of these themes (‘what is known about these themes?’ and ‘does this theory/concept/model explain what is going on in the narrative?’). In line with the complex responsive process assumptions (Homan 2016, p. 497), this reflective process was not a solo activity conducted by the consultant (the ‘I’ in the narrative) but a collective process of theorising and reflecting with relevant others. In this case, the second author of the original paper brought in his expertise to accurately interpret the first author’s experiences from a complex responsive perspective. The regular meetings in which the consultant participated together with the other co-inquiring consultants can be compared with Peirce’s ‘communities of inquiry’ (Seixas 1993) as introduced and discussed in Interlude 8.2. Interlude 8.2 Peirce’s Practice of ‘Communities of Inquiry’ A ‘community of inquiry’ is a fundamental notion in the philosophy of pragmatism, which Charles Peirce is generally considered to have founded (Shields 2003). Peirce believed that a distinguishing feature of science was its social nature and that communication and community were key factors in scientific discoveries (Peirce 1958). His work suggests that participants learn not only by actively ‘making’ knowledge of their own but also by doing so within a community that shares a common interest (Bruner 1986). In his 1877 original paper, Peirce starts to define inquiry by criticising ways of thinking that ‘fixate’ on ingrained assumptions, thereby making them impervious to change. Ideally, a ‘community of inquiry’ is a group of people that are united by a shared interest, problem or issue. They have a commitment to address the issue, problem or interest through a method akin to Lewin’s action research. Central in a ‘community of inquiry’ is: (continued)

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Interlude 8.2 (continued) 1. The ‘community’ which is not defined by time or space is something that, nowadays, can be compared with a contained ‘dialogical system’. A common question, problem or interest helps to forge the connection. Is a focus on the ‘here and now’ situation which requires further investigation and action. 2. The ‘here and now’ situation which is a catalyst that helps or causes a dialogic system to form, and it provides a reason to undertake co-inquiry (Shields 2003, p. 511). The conceptualisation of the situation at hand by its participants appears to be adaptable enough to be easily applied to everyday life. 3. Its participants bringing in an ‘co-inquiry’ attitude to the problematic situation. 4. The ‘co-inquiry’ attitude or experimental willingness to tackle the problem using working hypotheses that guide the collection and interpretation of data or facts. 5. That the outspoken assumptions and dialogue guidelines are viewed as tools to address a given situation in the ‘here and now’. To Peirce, the scientific method of ‘community of inquiry’ represents the opposite of individualism, and just as Lewin after him later on, Peirce contested that ‘the broadest speculative theories should be experimentally, cooperatively and publicly verifiable’ (Buchler 1955). No individual alone, according to Peirce, is worthy of trust (Haskell 1984). Therefore, the main premise behind ‘community of inquiry’ as a scientific endeavour is that human development requires cooperation and active participation of all those who are involved in the process (Seigfried 1996). Presented in this way, a community of practice is closely linked to the way of working as we described with action research in Interlude 3.2, with dialogical systems in Interlude 4.7 and with working with a process group as discussed in Paragraph 5.5.

Charles Peirce (1839–1914) Was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician, and scientist who is known as "the father of pragmatism“ and who introduces ‘abductive reasoning’.

As discussed in Interlude 8.2, the results of the deliberations within the community of inquiry, consisting of seven Dutch senior consultants, were not constituted as

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‘the truth’, but rather as the ‘community’s’ current best opinions at that moment. The truth that emerged is provisional, but, ‘in high wind and shoal water, even a light anchor is vastly superior to none at all’ (Seixas 1993, p. 308). Moreover, this whole research process of (re)writing, literature review, reflection and new experiences can be seen as a process of increased objectivation where the researchers become more detached while at the same time allowing them to immerse themselves more deeply in their own and mutual experience (Mowles in: Homan 2016, p. 497).

8.3.4

The Follow-Up of the Narrative and the Resulting, Emerging Themes

In this section, we will share what happened next in the above introduced incident during the large-group session in Sect. 8.3.1. After that, some of the emerging themes from our community of Dutch consultants discussions are presented, through which it became painfully clear for the consultant (the ‘I’ in the incident) that he was not embodying the organisational change that he was seeking and the importance of not doing so: Because I (the consultant) did not immediately react, the statement of the director hung heavily in the air, which gave a feeling of discomfort. After all, the board hired me to help them, right? However, at the same time, I also believed that my ineffectiveness to team up with my client at that particular moment had much to do with how I interpreted the situation. I found it difficult to parry in public or even to deflect the question back to the audience. The question was posed directly at me. Moreover, the man who was also my client had said it in a way that clearly did not tolerate opposition. It would also be useless to react to the content; in that case, it would remain between us, which would make the rest of the audience (passive) spectators. Yet, that definitely was not my intent—in fact, the opposite was true. In consultation with both directors, the aim of this session was to enter into dialogue with them and the executives. However, while all of this flashed through my mind, the female member of the board of directors reacted, trying to save the situation and perhaps compensate for her colleague-director. She suggested that the interviews I had done had apparently invoked this idea. A meaningful silence followed her reaction. I directly asked those present if there was anyone who could confirm this. Thankfully, there was, but it was clear that there was an (allegorical) elephant in the room—which no one dared to point out.

During the Dutch consultants’ group discussions, the following two themes quickly emerged. Theme 1 The Structure Taboo The word “taboo” presupposed that within the organisation, there was a fear of talking about the ‘organisation structure’. This became evident from statements like ‘We just had a structural reorganisation with a lot of hurdles; we have to move forward instead of looking back continuously’. Taboos relate to emotions by placing things in an intimate context. Therefore, in hindsight, it seems paradoxical to connect the word ‘taboo’ to the word ‘structure’. Structure and taboo are two concepts that instinctively do not match, and the application of taboo—as a suffix to structure— makes it more difficult to discuss it. This appears to be illustrated by the fact that the

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director fairly but paradoxically states that he does not want to discuss ‘structure’, albeit by saying that it is not a taboo. It seems to block everything. How great would it have been if the director (or I, the consultant) had said at that particular moment in time, ‘we/you have just been through an entire structural reorganisation yet, apparently, issues relating to structure remain, and it would be great if we could discuss them’. Theme 2 Self-sealing Defensive Routines At the time of the narrative, there seemed to be a practice of fairly capable leaders and executives who, as a whole, maintained an ineffective situation. Instead of dealing with this, reference is made to a ‘structure taboo’. In other words, a grateful excuse was given because everyone was in this slump, and everyone agreed with this explanation for the apparent collective failing. This is remarkably similar to what we describe in Sect. 7.3.1 as a situation dominated by ‘defensive routines’ (Argyris 1991, p. 100). These types of behaviour-entrenched habits, as Argyris argues, ‘protect ourselves from the embarrassment and threats that come with exposing our thinking’ (Argyris 1991, p. 100). As discussed in Sect. 7.3.1, defensive routines form a protective shell around our deepest assumptions, defending us against shame but also keeping us from learning about the causes of such shame. As Argyris continues, executives who take on the burden of having to know the answers become highly skilful in defensive routines that preserve their aura as capable decisionmakers by not revealing the thinking behind their decisions. This defensiveness can become an accepted part of organisational culture and blocks the flow of energy and meaning in an organisation, preventing its members from collectively learning. Moreover, these defensive routines are ‘self-sealing’; thus, they obscure their own existence. This makes them overwhelmingly effective because it is very difficult to acknowledge them, even if we know that we are being defensive. In fact, as was the case in the health-care organisation, no one viewed the defensiveness as a problem, and thus, the urgency needed to tackle it collectively was missing. The problem, however, is that the health-care organisation as a whole was inert and failed to function properly; it was even at risk of losing its position in the region. Themes 1 and 2 above were the first to emerge during our reflective discussions. In subsequent conversations, we began to see that these themes still had a high ‘aboutness’ character. Rational ideas and explanations surfaced about what was going on in the narrative. At that moment, new questions emerged, like: who is looking here? For example, ‘me’ as a researcher, an external consultant, a participant or a stakeholder? And is this ‘me’ a constant, or does it change each time we talk about this? Theme 3 I Spy with My Little Eye What was going on in the mind and body of the consultant at the time of the incident can be described as an ‘I-me’ dialectic. In fact, even the term ‘dialectic’ is too ‘tidy’; it felt as though a tremendously loud cacophony of voices were all frantically shouting for attention, with questions like ‘To what extent is it useful to share my analysis with the stakeholders, particularly when I have the sense that the participants in the room are reluctant to take ownership of the problem?’ Moreover,

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‘How far can I, as a consultant, go when I am not part of the stakeholders’ constructed reality?’ And, ‘Is this whole set-up not my own creation, and are the participants playing more than just a mere role in this construction as perceived by me?’ Furthermore, the intense emotions can be understood as the experience of the generalised other, the consultants’ self-construct of a ‘warm Scheinerian helping consultant’, going down the drain. This very experience called forth more ‘me’s’, giving all kinds of additional suggestions and ideas about what was going on and how to ideally react. Apparently, this melee of cognitions and emotions was so overwhelming that eventually the ‘I’ became paralysed. Unequivocal answers to questions like ‘who am I as a consultant?’, ‘what is my role here?’ and ‘what evidence-based dialogical interventions can I do to help these people to empower themselves?’ went out of the window. In an ideal situation, one of the ‘me’s’ would have swiftly taken control, making it clear what to do next. Hand in hand with this ideal ‘me’, a unique set of assumptions regarding ‘what is real’, ‘what seems to be true’, ‘how things work’ and ‘how to intervene’ would also present itself. Yet, building on Mead’s insights, this set of assumptions is not regarded as an individualistic ‘possession’ or ‘competence’ of the consultant. First of all, it was the actual interaction that locally brought forth this ‘me’. Second, this ‘me’ is not something invented by the consultant but is rather the result of many years of experiences being internalised by the consultant. This amounts to the conclusion that the ‘knowledge’, ‘competencies’ and ‘facilitating role’ of the consultant are not individually fixed but deeply social. It is this specific set of ‘me’s’, triggered in this specific situation, where the ‘me’s’ are subjective inner mirrors of countless earlier social experiences. Worse still: as described, the ‘battle’ between all the ‘me’s’ (and their respective assumptions) that popped up at the largegroup intervention was so fierce and evoked so many emotions that it became impossible to react. When attempting to understand the experiences described in the narrative in this way, new questions emerge about what a consultant is and does. ‘When will I know things for sure?’ And “what does ‘sure’ mean, when I understand it as one of the ‘me’s’ who has become dominant in my ‘I-me’ dialectic?” “How do I get to know that ‘my’ assumptions are solid for a sound and effective intervention when there are several ‘me’s’ in me vying for their own definition of ‘sound’, bearing in mind that apparently these ‘me’s’ were evoked in this situation?” What does the concept of ‘diagnosis’ mean? Is a consultant someone who unilaterally determines the imperfect way in which the client system works and starts to communicate this as a reality with which all have to comply? Or is the ‘diagnosis’ something that does not reside ‘between the ears’ of the consultant but ‘between the noses’ of those interacting, reflecting the power relations that develop amongst them? The challenge, as we saw in hindsight, is that a consultant has to be aware not just of this unilateralism alone but also of the themes that emerge in the interaction during the intervention. Yet, in our reflections, even this last conclusion seemed to be too ‘aboutness’. Is it at all possible to think, feel, experience and reflect while simultaneously interacting with others? Moreover, aren’t we yet again rationalising away our daily experience of ‘thrown-ness’?

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An Epistemological Knot

The understandings of what was going on in the narrative, using Mead’s concepts, trigger all kinds of epistemological questions, like: ‘How [does] the interventionist [come to] know about another system’s knowing?’ (Keeney 1983, p. 21), and ‘How can we be certain of our intervention’s effectiveness?’ Such questions lead to what Keeney calls an ‘epistemological knot’ (Keeney 1983, p. 28). An ‘Epistemological knot’ Epistemology is the study of the justifiability of claims to know. The examination of what consultants and clients think they know, what they can know with certainty, and how they know what they can know constitutes the area in which things can easily become quarried and tangled up. Afterwards, all the involved consultants learned from this personal inquiry and interactive reflections that as every consultant will operate on the basis of some set of assumptions (one or more dominant ‘me’s’), the key is to learn to operate with freedom at the level of one’s own assumptions. As O’Hanlon and Wilk put it more crudely, ‘have you got a theory or has the theory got you? And if you’re stuck with a theory, doesn’t your client get stuck with it too?’ (O’Hanlon and Wilk 1987). What we also came to see is that when conceiving and facilitating the collaborative largegroup session and thinking about change, I (the consultant) was focused more on the behaviour of the executives and directors than on my own interventions. I had asked them to reflect upon the presented outcomes of the interviews as I analysed them, and I challenged the participants to stimulate self-reflection and reflexivity. I acted as if I was an outside observer of what was unfolding between us; thus, I did not think about myself as a subject of the change and interaction dynamics.

8.3.6

A Short Discussion Regarding the Narrative

As Eriksen argues, organisational policies can change; however, it is only through a fundamental change in who organisational members are in relation to one another (as in the interrelated connection between LII and LII as discussed in Sect. 6.3.2) that an organisation can meaningfully change (Eriksen 2008). This self-transformation is not conceived as a soloistic activity within the consultant but as a dynamic and emerging responsive process going on in the (‘inner’ and ‘outer’) conversations of everyone involved in the change interactions. This is also the central premise of Stacey’s complex responsive process perspective, which we utilised in this paragraph to get a deeper understanding of the experiences as lived through and described in the narrative. As we would like to demonstrate with the narrative, reflections and analysis, is that unpredictable developments and direct attacks on the (power) position and the role of the consultant do not always fit into the self-

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perceived role of a consultant nor in the occasionally heroic images of consultants presented in the mainstream literature. In the conventional literature (Kubr 2002), these developments are regarded as noise or, at best, as exceptions to the rules and as deviations from predictions, which are to be expected and framed as ‘resistance to change’. Once framed in this way, the consultant is, yet again, usually in familiar territory, where he or she can use additional diagnostic tools, theoretical models and an evidence-based repertoire of interventions to ‘overcome’ this resistance. In line with the complex responsive process perspective used in this paragraph, we contend that, as with every other person, a consultant’s language, position, identity and behaviour are a reflection of his or her underlying ‘personal’ assumptions: the ‘me’s’ that are triggered in a specific interaction situation and the emerging dialectic processes between the ‘me’s’ and the ‘I’. The combination of being ‘thrown’ into local interactions, together with the physical impossibility of overseeing all possible interactions, implies that no one is able to have a complete, distanced and objective overview. Understanding experiences described in the narrative from a complex responsive process perspective implies that the classical notion that ‘a consultant should always select whatever intervention will be most helpful at any given moment, given all he knows about the total situation’ becomes an illusion. Any understanding of the ‘total social setting’ is nothing more than a local theme emerging in a specific interaction, reflecting the ‘dance of I’s and me’s’ going on in the minds of the consultant and of all the other interlocuters. Yet, sometimes consultants have the tendency to myopically see their truth as ‘the truth’. This opens the possibility that they are sometimes surprised and dumbfounded once they are confronted by completely different sense makings about existing situations and the role and identity they possess.

8.3.7

Some Concluding Reflections Regarding the Narrative

The intense experiences of the consultant in the narrative are difficult to explain and to understand using only mainstream consulting literature. Having used several concepts and ideas from the complex responsive process perspective on organisations, we contend that this perspective can shed complementary light on the realities of the work of consultants. Interaction processes can have a non-linear quality, where even the smallest gestures can provoke major changes in the emergent meanings and power balances going on in the client system. The complex responsive process perspective is able to give a central stage to developments and processes that, in mainstream literature on consulting, are regarded as noise, deviations and distractions. This implies that the broadly accepted image of the ‘flawless’ consultant (Block 2011) becomes an almost unattainable idealistic and normative image, which has little explanatory power for understanding the daily experiences of intervening. Furthermore, a consultant is not only understood anymore as the heroic one who knows, oversees and acts purposefully but as a human whose thoughts, emotions and actions and identity emerge in local interactions hand in hand with the development of local power balances. Trying to think rationally is only one of the

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dynamics going on—one ‘me’ who thinks that he is right. Furthermore, going through intense emotions, being completely surprised and not knowing what to do next are all regarded as integral parts of the daily practice of consultants. Even the meaning of concepts such as ‘consultant’ and ‘client’ can only be understood from a local, contextual and historical perspective as we will try to do in the next paragraph. To sum up, we suggest that additional research that takes up a complex responsive process perspective on consulting can assist in obtaining a richer and more practical understanding of the praxis of consulting (Billing 2007). Furthermore, we suggest that collective theorising about, and reflecting on, consulting experiences, using narratives as raw material, can be a fruitful method for deepening our understanding of the praxis of consultants. De-emphasising the ideal image of the modern consultant opens a new window for the consultant as someone who only understands what he is once engaged in local interactions with people of a client system—not an actor who is the primum movens but just one of the agents partaking in local interactions and relational networks, where understandings of identity emerge and develop in each conversation at the time.

8.4

Consultants’ Challenges During the First Encounters with a ‘Client’

As we tried to show with the above narrative, a consultant who intends to ‘objectively’ assess, as a relative outsider, the various perspectives of a client system’s stakeholders are prone to placing him/herself, including his or her diagnosis, outside that same system. As with every other person, a consultant’s language and behaviour reflect his or her personal perspective, and new realities emerge and are maintained in and through conversations with others (Ford 1999). This is especially true for the first encounters between a consultant and a ‘client’. In this section, we take a closer look at these first encounters and their particular dynamics as being part of the conversations regarding the contracting and the preliminary scoping of a social system as co-constructed in the interaction between a consultant and a ‘client’. In general, these first encounters consist in gaining and establishing an entry; agreeing on a working contract; formulating preliminary proposals and decisions to act; and a first round of data gathering. These first encounters with a ‘client’ and/or various members of the client system are interactive and collaborative, with the consultant taking a variety of facilitative stances (Block 2011, p. 99). These encounters are themselves understood as significant ‘interventions’ in an evolving assignment (Ford 1999). In this section, we discuss four of the major challenges that may occur during these first encounters.

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The First Consultant’s Challenge: Defining the Client and a Client System

As Schein argues, we refer to ‘clients’ as if they were always clearly identifiable, but in reality, the question of who actually is the client can be ambiguous and problematical (Schein 1997). Since the 1990s, there has been a significant growth of academic interest in the consultancy industry (Hislop 2002; Sturdy et al. 2009a). Consultants only exist in relation to clients, and the nature of the client-consultant relationship and the role of the client in shaping this relationship have tended to remain neglected and unexplored (Hislop 2002). So, what is a client? Matching dictionary and everyday definitions, the response might seem straightforward: someone who receives help from a professional person (Alvesson et al. 2009, p. 253). However, as Alvesson and his colleagues argue, clients are typically presented as relatively monolithic, organisational entities with attention given to diversity between firms and projects rather than client diversity within them (Alvesson et al. 2009, p. 253). In general, the myth of the unitary client still remains today—in which he, the client, is mostly portrayed as an individual. As Schön sees it, the first encounters between a consultant and a client system are of utmost importance for the potential success of an organisational change (Schön 1983). For this, it is of great importance that a consultant and the targeted ‘client’, during these first encounters, establish a clear and thorough picture of their reciprocal interests and expectations. However, as Alvesson and his cowriters argue, one of the counterintuitive reasons for establishing such a picture is that a consultant cannot blindly assume that the targeted ‘client’ is acting in the interest of the whole organisation, or at least not wholly so, even if such an interest is articulated. In this regard, compared to the practitioner-oriented literature, the academic literature is a bit more rigorous in pointing out, for example, that there is a possibility that the targeted ‘client’ can also use his or her role for their own individual, functional or managerial political purposes—legitimation and control—or as a scapegoat for early failed initiatives (Alvesson and Johansson 2002; McKenna 2006; Sturdy 1997). This also presents, however, a partial conception of the targeted ‘client’, overemphasising a fixed role or position. It is thus important to de-centralise and pluralise ideas around the targeted ‘client’ at even the most basic structural level—to move from stakeholder to stakeholder positions and their interrelated dynamics (Alvesson et al. 2009, p. 255). The neglect of exploring first encounters with a targeted ‘client’ is less evident in the more prescriptive practitioners’ literature on consultancy, often written by consultants themselves. For example, one of the first rules of consultancy practice seems to be to identify the key power brokers and decision-makers in a client organisation, especially those with the authority to commission external advisors (Buchanan and Badham 1999). These presumed decision-makers can be the first ‘contact’ and also the one who is responsible for taking care of the problem (Schein 1997). But this isn’t a rule per se. It is also possible that this first contact is the targeted ‘client’ but not the one who makes decisions. For example, in the narrative in Sect. 8.3.1, both decision-makers (the members of the board) were also primary

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responsible, but as it turns out, and what complicated things, they held the executives responsible for not executing the tactical assignments in the right way. So, we have two ‘clients’ and all the executives as primary stakeholders, together forming the ‘client system’.1 Similarly, and more generally, Arnaud suggests that “the word ‘client’ only rarely designates a single unique person” (Arnaud 1998), which is why most scholars, in this regard, seem to prefer to use the term ‘client system’. That is why doing a ‘differential diagnosis’ (see Interlude 5.4) is always executed with more than one person and preferably with all who represent this (client) system. Who is going to be part of the client system depends on the process of scoping, especially regarding: 1. The purpose—the goal or targets of the interventions, and in relation to this 2. People—who has a stake or feels directly affected, in other words, who is a stakeholder, belonging to ‘the client system’ and is to be invited to participate in the upcoming meetings of the process groups 3. Relationships between participants on the one hand and with the purpose on the other hand It is important to try and understand the perspectives of the preliminary participants themselves—the ‘native’s’ or ‘inside’ points of view, even if we delimit interest to those who are broadly supportive or ‘pro’ realising the purpose. As a procedure for establishing the right scope, this suggestion can be useful in serving as a key starting point. It is less static, and also less focused on the consultant’s perspective or, for that same reason, on that of an individual targeted ‘client’. Furthermore, it is primarily based on direct contact with people who are supposed to have relevant perspectives or at least know who has and who, therefore, can be invited to the following meeting. Trying to establish a full representative picture in which we try not to focus too much on the consultant/‘client’ perspective is not because these particular perspectives aren’t relevant, but, as we will discuss in the next section, we don’t want them to dominate the other perspectives.

8.4.2

The Second Consultant’s Challenge: Avoiding a Pseudo Explanation

In the behaviourist-oriented research tradition within the field of psychology, there is still a lively conviction that, all things being equal, people’s past actions are often a good predictor of their future behaviour. In other words, people who have behaved in a certain way at one point in time are likely to do so again (Bentler and Speckart

1 What really complicated things in the case of the narrative was the absence of a consensus on who was responsible for what (and why). In other words, there was no shared ‘current reality’—not regarding the solution and, more importantly, not even regarding the problem at hand in the ‘here and now’.

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1981; Ouellette and Wood 1998). The data of the research in this tradition suggest that participants’ perceptions of their past behaviour often influence their decisions to repeat the behaviour in the future (Albarracín and Wyer 2000). However, these studies also mention many exceptions to this general rule, and many of these exceptions are related to the fact that these studies are conducted under ‘artificial’, laboratory circumstances. Be that as it may, consultants with a psychological/ analytical disposition are more prone to trying to understand people’s behaviour in which they shape and execute their work and interactions with others. But when we are talking about real daily circumstances, to what extent is knowing why others did do certain things in the past a vantage point for helping them to initiate change in their daily work? We wish to point out here that when diagnosing a situation, it is important to ask questions to those who co-construct the situation, questions that are about the here and now, and not why someone behaved the way he or she did. In this regard, it is illustrative to paraphrase O’Hanlon’s rhetorical question, namely, ‘What is the sense of letting ‘psychology’, or ideas about [. . .]why things are wrong in what other people do, dictate the course of their lives?’ (O’Hanlon 1999, p. 3). It is obvious that in order to be solved, a problem first has to be an existing problem, formulated in the participants’ own concrete terms as they relate to the (change) purpose at hand. As Watzlawick and his fellow authors explain, the translation of a vaguely stated problem into concrete terms permits the crucial separation of problems from pseudo problems (Watzlawick et al. 1974, p. 111). In the case of formulating a pseudo problem, elucidation produces not a solution but a dissolution, i.e. it worsens the existing problem and the perceived complexity of it. The same is true for the narrowly related pseudo explanation, as we discuss in Interlude 8.3. Interlude 8.3 Pseudo Explanation As stated by Robine, ‘there is no other reality than that which we co-construct in a relationship’ (Robine 2011). The early interactionist Thomas wrote that ‘facts’ do not have an existence apart from the people who observe and interpret them and depend for their existence on different people entering a situation and defining certain elements of it as real. This condition is summarised by his often-quoted axiom that we introduced before in Sect. 6. 4.3: ‘(. . .) if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas and Thomas 1928). In other words, perception and meaning can be— and mostly are—transformed and modified by context and interaction, which as a process has a certain circularity in it. Typical examples of pseudo explanations produced by interventionists include “People stay inert because they experience a lack of ‘ownership’”; “People don’t want to change because there is ‘a taboo’ on discussing change (as was the case in the narrative)”; and “People resist change because they have a low ‘readiness for change’”. These pseudo explanations seem to (continued)

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Interlude 8.3 (continued) correspond to the analysis as described in the third theme in the above narrative and also seem to lack the wisdom of an alternative frame—that of the executives themselves, who are supposed to realise the change in the first place. These explanations are tautological in themselves and orient us towards what cannot be changed. They focus us, for example, on past experiences, people’s assumed personality, and as in the case in the narrative, on the claimed ‘untouchable’ organisational structure. As we discuss before in Sect. 7.3.1, this kind of tautological reasoning can also be regarded as a (social) defence mechanism. Creating and communicating a pseudo explanation make change unattainable and create real problems because the suffering it entails is very real (Watzlawick et al. 1974 p. 56). To quote the America screenwriter Robert Ardrey in this regard, ‘while we pursue the unattainable we make impossible the realisable’ (Audrey 1970). A wisdom that is perhaps best illustrated by Watzlawick and his colleagues’ joke about the drunk who is searching for his keys, not where he really lost them, but under the street lamp, because that’s where the light is best. This sounds funny, but only because the joke makes it explicit that a solution is attempted not only away from the problem (and is therefore doomed to fail) but also because the fruitless search could go on forever—again, the attempted solution is the problem. In everyday life situations, this fact usually remains outside the awareness of all concerned; the cure is not simply worse than the disease but rather is the disease. As if in a logical salto mortale, these consequences can intensify the existing problem but can also become the cause of new problems. It then makes sense to try and change them. Acting on a pseudo explanation, therefore, can give rise to a delay in the communication between the interventionist and the receivers of the change message, as is the case with a pocket veto, in the way we describe it in Interlude 7.9. This is the case because the receivers don’t acknowledge the explanation and, because of this, don’t react as expected (in the eyes of the interventionist). When confronted with such a non-reaction, the interventionist easily becomes irritated, doing more of the same and thus initiating a circle of escalating commitment (as described in Sect. 6.2.2). In sum, interventionists who do not take sufficient account of the construction margins of the participants can give rise to these participants being forced into pseudo realities that are unbelievable and unworkable for them, thereby creating insurmountable obstructions, making the situation more complex as it already is. If, however, an interventionist respects the participants’ construction margins and co-constructs in the here and now—what the problem is, what it contains, what the whole is and what the parts are—there is a greater chance that the resulting diagnosis or explanation of their situation will be as it is (Czarniawska-Joerges

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1991). Under these conditions, they create not only insight into what is going on, thereby reducing the perceived complexity, but also create a workable perspective for the nearby future.

8.4.3

The Third Consultant’s Challenge: Starting ‘Fresh’ on a ‘Myth of Objectivity’

Questioning a client perspective on ‘what happened’ might clarify what actions have been taken in the recent past to address a persisting ‘problematic’ situation and the perceived connection between the ‘problematic’ situation and the way in which it has previously been addressed. With this, a first impression is established of the experiences, opinions and the lived reality of the ‘client system’. The premise here is that the way in which the problem is framed by the targeted ‘client’ relates to how it is (subjectively) defined and ultimately is being addressed and recently has been approached through the whole social system. Consultants are usually ‘strangers’ to the organisational routines in question (Simmel 1992). In order to become effective, a consultant is supposed to work out during the first encounters with the client system a preliminary consensus regarding the current reality that the client system is in. To reach this consensus, it is plausible that a consultant will relate him or herself to the internal interactional patterns and at the same time disturb the client system’s perception of these routines to establish different possible points of leverage. This means that the position of a consultant has to be close and distanced at the same time (Elias 1987). The client system’s patterns of interaction are neither written nor are they thoroughly conscious or rigorous objectively stated facts. As introduced with diagnostic OD in Chap. 4, it is plausible that one of the first challenges for a consultant has to be the stimulation of a self-conscious reflection by all involved in order to deconstruct this first impression before he or she can co-construct a new one (Baitsch and Heideloff 1997). Relatively recent studies depict the first encounters between a consultant and a ‘client’ as a process of constant indeterminacy, within which boundaries constantly get negotiated and reframed as the consulting project unfolds (Czarniawska and Mazza 2003; Fincham 1999; Pellegrini 2002; Sturdy et al. 2009b). For example, approached from a complex response perspective, it is believed that the first encounters between a consultant and a client are far more recursive and dynamic. For example, as Stacey argues, ‘every time two humans interact with each other the actions of one person has consequences for the other, leading to others reacting in ways that have consequences for the first, requiring in turn a response from the first and so on through time’ (Stacey 1995). Thus, an action taken by a person in one period of time feeds back to determine, at least in part, the next action of that person. The feedback loops that people set up when they interact with each other are non-linear. This is because the choices of people are based on perceptions that lead to nonproportional, unpredictable and an infinitive number of reactions. There can be all sorts of nonconscious reciprocal influences going on during the first encounters between a consultant and a ‘client’, which can even, probably somewhat

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oddly, be compared with the idea of a chameleon on a mirror, as described in Interlude 8.4. Interlude 8.4 A Chameleon on a Mirror?! (Keeney 1983, pp. 172–174) It is well-known that a chameleon cannot prevent its colours from changing when there is a change of colours in his direct surroundings. So, imagine placing a chameleon on a mirror or in a mirror box (https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v¼kdycRpWOAu0). If a chameleon is, for example, placed in a blue environment, something (not so) peculiar happens: the chameleon changes its colours to blue. Apparently, the colour blue in the direct environment of a chameleon acts as some type of threshold, after which the colour of the chameleon changes in a matter of time. This image of a chameleon on a mirror is a good example of the smallest divisible unit for which one can speak of systemic circular relations, for example, between the first encounters of a consultant and a client. Placed on a mirror, a chameleon generates a feedback process whereby a change of colour in the mirror leads to a change of colour in the chameleon. This phenomenon arises when there is sufficient time between the chameleon’s sensor and the effector—the colour as it is reflected by its environment, directly in the mirror. Because the colour changes between the chameleon and the mirror are out of phase, the chameleon tries continuously to adapt when it senses a change of colour in the mirror. It tries to reduce the difference but ensures—because of its attempts to reduce differences—a recursive pattern leading to endless repetition. This is an example of how a solution ensures the continuation of a problem, as can be the case in the first encounters between a consultant and a client as discussed in Sect. 8.4.2 regarding a ‘pseudo explanation’. Keeney, from whom this metaphor originates, poses the following questions: ‘Is the consultant a kind of active mirror?’, ‘Is the client the mirror, motivated to ask questions by the interventionist’s changes in colour?’ Or, in other words, are the changes in colour between the chameleon and its direct environment a metaphor for a complex circular systemic pattern between the consultant and a client? With the metaphor in Interlude 8.4, we want to argue that the first encounters between a consultant and a ‘client’ don’t start as if the starting situation is a tabula rasa; there is no such thing as a ‘fresh’ or ‘neutral’ start in change processes. The intention to come to a noninfluenced first impression in this regard is in itself admirable but also nonrealistic. This is because of: 1. The simple fact that a client invited a consultant who is, as in the example of the case in the above narrative, specialised in organising a dialogue with the whole system gives the impression that the client is already thinking in solutions.2 2

[sic] Organising a dialogue with the whole system is not a solution in itself; it is an instrument or in other words, a mean to an end.

8.4 Consultants’ Challenges During the First Encounters with a

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2. The idea that a consultant couldn’t come into a client’s office and not influence the data that he or she observes, because things are interactionally influenced as they speak (O’Hanlon and Wilk 1987, p. 267). The reason for this is that a consultant not only brings a specific ‘outside’ perspective but also uses specific language and implicitly or explicitly expresses assumptions that do not per se correspond with the ‘current reality’ as the ‘client’ perceives it.3 In the words of Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, consultants ‘represent reality in order to act on it, control it or dominate it, as well as to secure the compliance of others in that domination’ (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 1994). If these conditions appear favourable for the ‘client’ as well as for the consultant, habitual, routinised use may be expected, which could pave the way to short cuts, making the first preliminary diagnosis prone to establishing a ‘pseudo explanation’. In light of this practice and underlying motives, it is nearly to be expected that a pseudo explanation is in the making, as was in hindsight one of the first things that went wrong in the above narrative in Sect. 8.3.1. As convincing as these arguments may be, it doesn’t mean per se that things during these first encounters have to go wrong. For things to go as constructively as possible, it is conditional that both the consultant and the members of the client system are convinced that, whatever the outcome of their first encounters may be, it is not the definitive diagnosis of the client system’s ‘current reality’, and moreover, that it also does not imply the definitive solution. Furthermore, Schön describes the first encounters between a consultant and a client system as ‘a web of moves’ (Schön 1983, p. 131), which begins with explicating both their respective frames and the interpretative schemes that they use to make sense of the situation. Thus, as Schön continues, the problematic situation gets assessed in a co-constructed preliminary diagnosis that helps the consultant to explore and evaluate his or her frame’s consequences and necessary conditions for future interventions. Presented in this way, during their first encounters, a consultant and the representatives of a client system discursively frame problems and solutions to ensure they are acceptable, and that possible reciprocal uncertainties or anxieties are removed (Clark 1995; Turdy 1997).

3 O Hanlon and Wilk cited Bateson who was apparently fond of quipping that one cannot not have an epistemology, and this would apply both to interventionists and to clients. Both the client’s and the interventionist’s respective epistemological presuppositions cannot not influence how they decide what the situation ‘is’ cannot not influence (From: O’Hanlon and Wilk 1987, pp. 7–8). Which seems closely related to Watzlawick c.s.’ Communication Axiom that, ‘One cannot not communicate.’ Because every behaviour is a kind of communication, people who are aware of each other are constantly communicating. Any perceivable behaviour, including the absence of action, has the potential to be interpreted by other people as having some meaning (From: Watzlawick et al. 1967).

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8 A Complexity Perspective

The Fourth Consultant’s Challenge: Formulating a Leading Question with a ‘Dialogical System’

Confronted with all kinds of possible differences between existing perspectives in a process group, it is to be expected that participants will initially use persuasion to strive to create some form of consensus on what is going on. Although reaching for a consensus seems to be the overarching goal, it is not the first objective that the first meeting(s) of a process group should realise. Rather, the participants, including the consultant, need to stay focused on exploring, inquiring and establishing a common ground of what is to be expected from being a member of the process group, what is to be expected of their role and what is to be established in the first meetings. One of the things that helps during these first meetings of a process group is to establish a so-called leading question. A leading question should be sufficiently abstract to allow for the unification of all perspectives present in the process group and sufficiently concrete to demarcate the problematic situation and provide enough energy and direction for undertaking the next steps. A leading question includes the following components: 1. An unambiguous demarcation of the purpose (i.e. content) 2. Identification and denomination of the most important stakeholders (i.e. context) 3. A description of the level of ambition and measure of participation (i.e. process) Examples of a leading question, formulated during the first encounters with a process group, are: Example 1: How can we work together as one team, so that together we may reach a faster pace, focused on three focus points with simple management? Example 2: Why are no steps forward being made, despite having knowledge of our problematic cooperation, management and client relations? A preliminary scope of a system can be helpful in determining a leading question during the first sessions. When the leading question needs some adjustment during the later sessions, it is possible that the preliminary scope needs to be scaled up as we discussed before in Sect. 4.4.3. Scaling up the scope may well involve sweeping in new stakeholders shedding new light on things at hand (Midgley et al. 1998). Adjusting the scope repeatedly during these first meetings makes the process rather iterative—that is with two steps forwards and one step back. Because of repetitive adjusting of the composition the group while keeping the same items on the agenda during these first sessions, participants may perceive a lack (of linear) progress. That

8.5 Some Closing Reflections

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is why, during the first sessions with a process group, it is important to that the participants define for themselves: 1. If they are stakeholder or not. That is, if they feel directly affected by the issues in their work. 2. The meaning of this and its consequences in terms of scope and impact and then together demarcate the preliminary scope of the client system. 3. The reciprocity in their mutual relationships so that there is no dividing line between them and as such no subgroups within the process group. 4. The interventionist-client system relationship, which means that the consultant and the targeted client both are being received as stakeholders and thus as full members of the process group. 5. Define the coherence of the process group by stressing the sharing of the same change purpose and with this, trying to establish a common ground amongst them. 6. What makes the process group a safe place in which openness, community inquiry and self-disclosure are the norm and something we can speak up about?

8.5

Some Closing Reflections

1. Some General Denominators of Intervening from a ‘Complexity’ Perspective From a ‘complexity’ perspective, intervening means we intervene: 1. On more than one level in the same instance. For example, recognising the importance of positive labelling and staying away from pseudo explanations (L0) and acting on a manifest, explicit level (LI), but always in combination with a intervention on a meta level (LIII): simultaneously reflecting on our action to learn from it with all participants. 2. From an inside-out perspective (based on ‘withness’ thinking). 3. With an open mind regarding what is happening, not why it is happening or why the situation has developed or escalated to the state it is in. In other words, we are dealing with the situation as it is, in the here and now with the—effects and not with their presumed causes. The premise underlying these points is that intervening from a ‘complexity’ perspective means that we do this in a world that is not only ours but in fact is a world we share with others. To sum up, we can only understand our world as a whole if we see ourselves as being part of it; as soon as we attempt to stand outside, we divide and separate. Bateson stated that we can only speak of a participative world

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view when all those involved are restored to the circle of community and the community to the context of the wider interrelated, social world.4 2. A ‘Complexity’ Consultant’s Perspective Compared with that of a Planned Change Perspective Planned change is supposed to be achieved by working through the stages or phases of a process, based on Lewin’s original ‘theory of change’ (Schein 1988). As first elaborated and applied to diagnostic OD by French and Bell (1999), there are many variations based on this original conceptualisation of how to change organisations (Shaw 1997, p. 236). In the same vein, change management, as conceptualised by Kotter, is viewed as a series of sequential steps in terms of partly overlapping simultaneous activities, so that all phases are themselves understood as significant ‘interventions’ in an evolving assignment (Kotter 1995; Appelbaum et al. 2012). This paradigm of planned change consulting has come to be shared over the last 25 years by both consultants and their actual and potential clients (Shaw 1997, p. 236). Instead of offer a preplanned change programme, a ‘complexity’ perspective seems to offer an emergent, one-step-at-a-time approach on a local basis. As depicted in Fig. 8.1, with this approach, a consultant tries to discover and create opportunities to work with the lived issues and tasks that exercise people formally and informally in their daily working environment. 3. Understanding First Encounters as the Subject of Research The first encounters between a consultant and a targeted ‘client’ can be regarded as a process of pragmatic experimentation, in which a unique situation is then ‘understood through the attempt to change it’ (Heusinkveld and Visscher 2012, p. 287). As Heusinkveld and Visscher argue, consultants’ sociopolitical skills, and particularly their use of language, have special significance for shaping a client’s perception regarding the situation of the client system (Heusinkveld and Visscher 2012, p. 287). Normally, the consultant and the client discursively frame problems and solutions during these first encounters to ensure they are acceptable and remove possible client uncertainties or anxieties. That is why the way a consultant frames a perceived situation as an enacted practice is not only relevant in terms of success and being effective for initiating change in a client system; it is also theoretically relevant for taking this practice into account for further research. In the words of Heusinkveld and Visscher:

4 In ‘Steps to the ecology of mind’, Bateson writes, ‘The more we align and are in service to the greater systemic whole, then the more graceful and harmonious are we in our own living and movement. Internal harmony is only possible when there is harmony in the collective circuits of mind and in the wider ecology. It is only when we live gracefully in service of the greater system of which we are part that we receive the grace of beneficence bestowed from the greater system on its parts’ (Bateson 1972b).

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In turn, we argue that to better understand the possible impact of consultants and their commodified forms of management knowledge on management and organisational practice, we need to examine how consultants frame organisation concepts as enacted practices. Informed by practice-based approaches, we seek to explore empirically how consultants’ framing moves, related to their dispositions and perceptions of what is feasible in a specific situation, encourage or inhibit possible translations of management concepts within the context of a consulting assignment (Heusinkveld and Visscher 2012, p. 288).

Recap • Complexity science studies the nature of dynamics between interconnected people and suggests that ‘order emerges for free’ without any central or governing control or intention when the whole is operating in ‘edge of chaos’ conditions. Complexity science invites us to think in wholes and see organisations as ecosystems. Central to this perspective is the view that organisations can be seen as networks of multiple, interacting individuals and groups that are fairly autonomous. • The ‘complex responsive process’ perspective is a subdiscipline within the field of complexity science that emphasises the self-organising patterning of communicative action. The ‘unit of analysis’ of this subdiscipline is the experience of interacting with others in local social settings. The concept of complexity is not used to describe the context ‘in’ which the individuals interact but as a fundamental attribute of the quality of the interaction of interdependent humans. As such, it is focused on the everyday experience of living and working in an organisation. • In contrast to the conventional framing of consultants, where consultants are understood as coherent entities, the complex responsive process perspective takes up Mead’s descriptive concept of the ‘I-me’ dialectic. The ‘I’ is the one who acts; it is our spontaneous and creative part, which sometimes follows the commandments of the me’s and sometimes acts completely unexpectedly. According to a complex responsive process perspective, who the consultant is and who the consultant thinks he or she is, is intrinsically linked to the concrete interaction in which the consultant is involved. Each specific interaction calls forth different ‘me’s’, leading to different ‘I-me’ dialectics. • Additional research that takes up a complex responsive process perspective on consulting can assist in obtaining a richer and more practical understanding of the praxis of consulting. Furthermore, collective theorising about, and reflecting on, consulting experiences, using narratives as raw material, can be a fruitful method for deepening our understanding of the praxis of consultants. • Seen from a complex responsive process perspective, there are at least three challenges during the first encounters with a ‘client’: (1) defining the client and a client system; (2) avoiding a pseudo-explanation; (3) starting ‘fresh’ on a ‘myth of objectivity’; and (4) formulating a leading question with a process group. • This brings us to the conclusion that de-emphasising the ideal image of the contemporary consultant opens a new window for research.

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Key Discussion Points 1. Seeing Leadership from a Complexity Perspective Perceiving consultancy from a ‘complexity’ perspective means that we try to see more things at the same time, from an ‘either/or’ to a ‘both/and’ perspective. Thus, we shift our perspective to seeing ‘a complementary gestalt’ with connecting patterns and mutual dependencies. By doing so, we soon recognise that to enhance leadership competences, we need to attend to the leadership flow between both parts. Yet most leadership development efforts still focus on the individual out of context and act as if leadership resides solely inside the leader. • Define what seems to be distinctive for the field of ‘complexity science’ and discuss its relevance for the field of consultancy. • What are the parts of the complementary gestalt mentioned here? • What does it mean in terms of consultancy development training programmes that we need to attend to the flow between the parts of this gestalt?

2. Double Descriptions and Doing a Differential According to Gregory Bateson, for change to happen, it is better to have two or more descriptions of the same context rather than one—what he calls the principle of ‘double description’. • Define ‘a double description’ and argue why it is important for generating change. • Argue why a differential diagnosis is in essence a double description—creating ‘a moiré effect’.

3. The Map Is Not the Thing Mapped Korzybski’s dictum is also cited as an underlying principle of neurolinguistic programming, where it is used to signify that individual people do not in fact have access to ‘objective’ knowledge, but only to a set of beliefs they have built up over time regarding reality. Therefore, it is considered important to be aware that people’s beliefs about reality and their awareness of things (the ‘map’) are not reality itself or everything they could be aware of (‘the territory’). • Argue why it is important for interventionists to be aware of the distinction between ‘the map’ and ‘the territory’. • What could happen if they weren’t? • Relate Korzybski’s dictum to the social constructionist premises from Chap. 1. Describe some of the similarities in reasoning.

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4. An Epistemological Knot Obviously there seemed to be some hesitation on behalf of the consultant’s behaviour in the narrative; this can be interpreted as doubting the effectiveness of his assumptions, with questions like ‘What do I know?’ and ‘What do I not know? The understandings of what was going on in the narrative, using Mead’s concepts, trigger all kinds of epistemological questions, such as: “How does the interventionist come to know about another system’s knowing?’ Such questions lead to what Keeney calls an ‘epistemological knot’. • Define an epistemological knot and discuss its relevance for the role of interventionists. • What seems to be the right way to avoid or to cope with such an epistemological tangle? • Discuss the relevance and effectiveness of using Mead’s ‘I-me’ concept for interventionists. • Describe the essence of the pseudo explanation used by the consultant in the narrative and argue why this pseudo explanation stood in the way of generating change.

5. Defining the Client in the Narrative As Alvesson argues, a consultant can also be in a situation in which he or she does not know for whom he or she is working or where he or she is working with several clients whose goals are in conflict with each other. In the same vein, a consultant can identify different purposes that differ from those identified by the client (system). • Argue why a demarcated system has to have one change purpose that relates to all stakeholders. • Argue whether you think there were one or more purposes in the demarcated system in the health-care organisation in the narrative. • Formulate as specifically as possible the purpose(s) you identify in this case. • Do the consultant and the client system seem to have consensus about this? Argue why or why not. Moreover, as was the case in the narrative, the consultant can identify others who for themselves: (a) do not see their own problems and (b) would resist being seen as ‘clients’ in the meaning of primary owners or (c) even as ‘stakeholders’. • Argue what this means in terms of system demarcating—intervening and changing.

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Index

A Abductive reasoning, 189–191 Abilene paradox, 255–258 Aboutness, 28, 156–159, 173–174, 302, 303, 317 Accumulated change, 66 Action learning, 60, 61, 117–118, 170 Action research, 90–98, 117–118, 142 Advocacy, 212–214, 228–229 Alignment, see Management alignment Alterity, 157 Ambidexterity, 14 Appellate cases, 13–15, 40, 57 Appreciative inquiry (AI), 96–98, 100–101 Assumptions, 1, 2, 205–214 Attitude change, 133–135 Autoethnographic research, 297, 298

B Balancing feedback loops, 271 Bateson’s logical learning types, 217–220 Behavioural flux, 68 Behavioural oscillation, 18, 274, 281 Belousov-Zhabotinski reaction, 70 Bifurcation (point), 70 Bounded rationality, 149, 150 Burning platform, 41–43, 46–47

C Catch-22 situation, 10, 260 Causal loop diagrams (CLDs), 268, 270–272 Change, 10 Change communication, 47–49 Change dimension, 53–57 Change dynamics, 250–274, 278 Change immunity map, 266

Change management, 7, 8 Change strategy, 52–67 Change types, 64–65 Changing, 27–28 Changing as three steps (CATS), 106 Client system, 306–308, 311, 313, 315 Closure, see Gestalt theory Cognitive dissonance, 133 Co-inquiry, 28, 93–98, 222–232 Collaborative dialogue session, 9, 96, 180–181, 185, 187 Collaborative participative process of inquiry, see Co-inquiry Common ground, 152, 173, 176, 182, 184, 226 Communities of practice, 300 Competing commitments, 265–267 Complementary gestalt, 74, 100 Complexity science, 289 Complex responsive process perspective, 289–291 Confluence, 247 See also Defence mechanisms (individual) Conformity, 188–189, 251, 257 Consciousness raising, 135–138 Contagion effect, 258 Container, 96, 116, 154, 155 Content, see Change dimension Context (change dimension), 53–57, 146 Continuity, see Gestalt theory Continuous change, 65 Coping, 251 Current reality, 55, 98, 143, 272, 311, 313 Cybernetics, 289, 290

D Defence mechanisms (individual), 246, 247 Defensive reasoning, 223–226

# The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. van Nistelrooij, Embracing Organisational Development and Change, Springer Texts in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51256-9

325

326 Defensive routines, 254 Deflection, 247 See also Defence mechanisms (individual) De-sensitisation, 247 See also Defence mechanisms (individual) Detached thinking, 221, 296 Diagnostic OD, 131–145, 311 Dialogical consultant, see Generative OD interventionist Dialogical OD, 114, 115, 117, 145–160 Dialogical system, 154 See also Container Dialogue, 145, 146, 151–154, 158, 180–181, 185–189, 228, 229 Dialogue principles, 152 Differential diagnosis, 8, 41–43, 147–149, 178, 184, 192–193, 222, 223, 318 Dilemma, 11–15, 17, 219, 233 Disconfirmation, see Survival anxiety Dissipative structure, 70–72, 289, 290 Double bind, 219, 261–264 Double description, 193, 207–208 Double-loop learning, 207, 214–217 Dualism, 12 Dynamic equilibrium, see Steady state

E Emergent change (Emergence), 20, 67–73 Empirical-rational change strategy, 58–60 Empowerment, 264 Enacting change, 152–153 Entrained thinking, 24, 26, 107–108 Episodic change, 65 Epistemological knot, 304 Epistemological tangle, see Epistemological knot Equilibrium, 15, 17, 67, 69–71 Escalation of commitment, 210, 211 Espoused theories, 145, 220, 246, 250

F Facilitator, see Process interventionist Fancy footwork, see Defensive reasoning Far-from-equilibrium, see Dissipative structure Feedback loop, 26, 69, 270, 271, 273, 277, 280 Field, see Social system Field theory, 98–105, 275, 312 Figure-ground, 275 See also Gestalt theory First encounters, 188, 306–315

Index First-order change, 30, 72–73, 140

G Gap analysis, 46, 271 Generative OD interventionist, 155–158 Generativity, 21, 111–113, 145 Gestalt principles, see Gestalt theory Gestalt theory, 99–101, 275 Group phasing (during a LGI), 173–174 Groupthink, 233, 234, 254–258

H Habit forming, 244 Harwood studies, 89–90 Heterarchy, 190, 192

I Implementation, 39, 40 Individual defence mechanisms, see Defence mechanisms (individual) Inertia, 27, 63–67, 216, 258 Insider-outsider perspective, 62, 63, 298 Interdependence, xi Internal commitment, 263, 264 Intersubjective/interpersonal reality, 3 Intervention, 3, 5 Introjection, see Defence mechanisms (individual)

K Korzybski’s map, see Korzybski’s “territorymap” problem Korzybski’s “territory-map” problem, 204

L Ladder of inference, 223–226 Large-group interventions (LGIs), 28, 169, 170 Law of Prägnanz, see Gestalt theory Law of requisite variety, see Requisite variety (the law of) Leadership (of change), 18, 25 Leading question, 314–315 Learning anxiety, 109 Learning infrastructure, 176–185 Learning to learn, 216, 218, 219 Left-hand column technique, 228–229 Lewin’s formula, 99, 101, 146 Linear sequential change, 7, 8

Index M Magnitude of change, 66 Management alignment, 179, 185 Map, see Korzybski’s “territory-map” problem Mental model, 2, 3, 6 Model I behaviour, 212–214 Model II behaviour, 212–214 Moiré effect, 183

N Negative feedback loop, see Balancing feedback loops Normative-re-educative change strategy, 60 Not invented here syndrome, 45, 46, 73

O Oparadox, 2, 22–27, 68, 75–76, 185, 186, 189, 220, 245, 252, 255–262, 275, 279, 280, 287 Organisational change, 20–21 Ouroboros, 221, 222 Ownership, 7, 302, 309

P Pace of change, 64, 65 Paradoxical situation, 220, 260 Parallel (project) organisation, 44–46 Participation, 89–91 Perceptions, 1, 7–9, 13, 19–21, 30, 60, 63, 73, 88, 92, 98–101, 103, 105, 107, 108–111, 114, 115, 119, 121, 130–132, 139, 140, 143, 146, 149–151, 154, 161, 182, 184, 188, 191, 204, 206, 210, 215, 222, 251, 269, 275, 288, 290, 309, 311, 316, 317 Perspective taking, 104, 146–152, 222, 223 Planned behaviour, 134, 135 Planned change, 56 Pocket veto, 273–274, 310 Positive feedback loop, see Reinforcing feedback loop Power-coercive change strategy, 58 Prägnanz, see Gestalt theory Proactivity, 209–212 Process group, 176, 178–180, 182, 184, 185, 189–194, 196, 308 Process interventionist, 142–145, 161

327 Projection, see Defence mechanisms (individual) Proximity, see Gestalt theory Pseudo explanations, 308–311 Psychological interventions, 139–141 Psychological safety, 109, 110 Purpose, 13, 66, 102–104, 307, 308, 314, 315

R Reductio ad absurdum, 194 Reflexivity, see Self-reflective Reframing, 14, 110, 113, 140, 276, 277 Reinforcing feedback loop, 270 Relational gestalt, 99–101 Relationships, 101, 102, 104, 107, 112, 119, 121, 123, 169, 230, 258, 275, 281 Requisite variety (the law of), 25 Resistance to change, 245–251 Retroflection, see Defence mechanisms (individual)

S Scope/scoping, 293–294 Second-order change, 72–73 Self-efficacy, 46, 47 Self-fulfilling prophecy, 7 Self-reflection, see Self-reflective Self-reflective, 297 Self-reflexive, see Self-reflective Self-sealing defensive routines, see Defensive routines Sense giving, 13–15, 232 Sense making, 13–15, 17, 20, 28, 115 Sense of urgency, 10 Shifting contexts, 223 Similarity, see Gestalt theory Single-loop learning, 214–217 Social constructionism, 2 Social constructionist perspective, see Social constructionism Social perception, 105, 132, 146, 149 Social system, 20, 26, 97, 98, 101–105, 179–182, 227, 278 Splitting, 13, 150 Spray & pray strategy, 48 Stakeholder analysis, 66

328 Steady state, 17, 106 Sufi parable, 147–149 Survey feedback intervention, 59 Survival anxiety, 109, 110 Symptomatic behaviours, 180–181 System, see Social system Systems thinking, 26–27, 227

T Table group arrangements, 173 Territory, see Korzybski’s “territory-map” problem Theory of change (Lewin), see Changing as three steps (CATS) Thrown-ness, 114

U Unfreezing, 42, 49, 105–111, 113, 138, 184

Index V Vicious cycles, 67, 69, 181, 270, 271

W Whole social life, see Social system Withness, 156–157 Wu-Wei attitude, 192–193

X X theory, 207–209

Y Y theory, 207–209

Z Zeigarnik effect, 93–94