Elusive Tipping Point, The: China-India Ties for a New Order 9811225818, 9789811225819

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Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Suryanarayana, P. S. (Pisupati Sadasiva), 1949– author. Title: The elusive tipping point : China-India ties for a new order / P. S. Suryanarayana. Description: First Edition. | Hackensack : World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020043069 (print) | LCCN 2020043070 (ebook) | ISBN 9789811225819 (hardcover) | ISBN 9789811225826 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: China--Foreign relations--India. | India--Foreign relations--China. | China--Foreign relations--21st century. | India--Foreign relations--21st century. Classification: LCC DS740.5.I5 S867 2020 (print) | LCC DS740.5.I5 (ebook) | DDC 327.51054--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020043069 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020043070 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Copyright © 2021 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher. For any available supplementary material, please visit https://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/11982#t=suppl Desk Editor: Sandhya Venkatesh Typeset by Stallion Press Email: [email protected] Printed in Singapore

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This book is dedicated to S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Inspiring is the motto of RSIS: Ponder the Improbable

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CONTENTS

Forewordix Preface xi About the Authorxvii Acronyms xix Disputed Map in Words xxiii Chapter 1

A Glimpse of the Past

1

Chapter 2

Re-Setting the Present

23

Chapter 3

The Strategic Climate

43

Chapter 4

Fragile Partnership Under the Sun

63

Chapter 5

Linking of Tibet and Kashmir Issues

85

Chapter 6

The Tense Doklam Face-off

109

Chapter 7

Scanning Old Turf for New Games

129

Chapter 8

A Collective-Win Approach

151

Chapter 9

Diplomacy of Smart Power

171

Chapter 10 Towards a Post-Modern Order

193

Epilogue  Creating a Realistic Future Index

221 239

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FOREWORD

This is not simply another book on the relations between India and China, and their neighbour, Pakistan. It is about the search for that “something” which Beijing, Delhi, and Islamabad can bank on to transform their attitude and approach for better ties among the three countries. To put it in other words, it is revisiting 70 years of missed opportunities and hopefully, finding that “oh, yes, of course; we can do it!” It is a rich collection of the historical details and contemporary developments that have troubled the legacy of British imperialism in southern Asia and the ties of two Asian giants originating from distinct ancient civilisations. There are personalised injects of encounters and discussions with wellinformed diplomats and relevant players in the complicated play. Thankfully, the author, P. S. Suryanarayana has cleverly written his essays in an uncomplicated style, and we can read each chapter at a time to avoid being overwhelmed by the many aspirations and antonyms of cooperation and coexistence. Surya, like all peace-loving fellows, yearns for the tipping point which will take China, India, and Pakistan to a shared future of 21st century collaboration and security. A Buddhist friend reminds me: “Patience is not about the ability to wait, but the ability to keep a good attitude while waiting”. Thus, Surya has used the many years of his assignment in Singapore as a professional media correspondent to follow what is happening in the SinoIndian relationship and understand its dynamics. I have known him for more ix

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than 25 years and as I had the chance to do it, I welcomed him to the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) to “download” his accumulated knowledge for the benefit of students, scholars, and society. A clear idea about important developments affecting the affairs of state and society will ensure peace, prosperity, and progress for all. In essence, good neighbourliness is especially important and relevant in our very inter-connected world today. There is increasingly tight living space on Planet Earth as billions of people and animals share the overcrowded globe. If humanity does not learn to accommodate each other and profit from such mutual respect and coexistence, the alternative scenario is destruction, subjugation, and war among nations. The key takeaway for me from reading the essays of this book is that whatever happens to the relations among China, India, and Pakistan, it will affect their respective neighbours and that will cascade to many other countries and people farther away. As such Sino-Indian diplomacy is not about bilateral ties alone. Appreciating the nuances in the Kashmir issue is not just about the Indo-Pakistani partition or Hindu–Muslim divide. They all have an impact on the wider international stage and will trigger off actions and consequences beyond the immediate arena. Enjoy your reading! Ong Keng Yong Executive Deputy Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 27 May 2020 Ambassador Ong Keng Yong is a former Secretary General of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)

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PREFACE

China’s real quest to lead the international community is clear like sunlight. One can see a Chinese surge towards the tipping point for this role. The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) was launched in Beijing on 14 May 2017. As a BRF delegate, I saw Chinese President Xi Jinping unveil his initiative for worldwide connectivity. It was evident that he conceptualised the world as a single geopolitical and geo-economic space under ‘benign’ Chinese leadership. China’s biggest Asian neighbour, India, stayed away from BRF. India apparently saw Xi’s plan as a vision of China, by China, for China. Conspicuous at the BRF launch, though, was Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, China’s Eurasian neighbour. The far-away United States was represented by an official. Much has been written about BRF and its driving force — the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The substance of BRI is a matrix of multimodal connectivity projects. Some of them radiate out of China. At this writing, though, the jury on BRI is still out. This is partly due to the likely geoeconomic and geopolitical fallout of the Novel Corona Virus Disease (COVID-19), which was first reported in China in 2019. In this context, signs of China’s aspirational surge towards global leadership have now reemerged. Xi is placing China at the frontline of fighting COVID-19 to protect the international “community of shared destiny”. Some international circles are criticising China for causing this pandemic, an allegation Beijing rejects. One cannot miss China’s looking-out for the tipping point for leadership in this global health situation as well. xi

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A potential saga of a different kind is fast receding, though. I think of the elusive tipping point for good neighbourliness in China–India diplomacy. India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established diplomatic relations on 1 April 1950. Mao’s PRC reciprocated the initiative of Nehru’s India for that purpose. And, despite their mood swings in the 1950s, the two populous civilisation-states saw the possibility of a tipping point in their own diplomacy. Neighbourly amity and global good were their objectives in proclaiming the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1954. But giving up that pursuit, PRC and India fought a war in 1962. Although the war is now increasingly re-imagined as an ordinary border conflict, it was characterised by nationalistic fervour. Inevitably after 1962, there was much ebb and some flow in Sino-Indian diplomacy until 1988. In that year, the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi called on PRC’s then paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping. Rays of hope resulted. The momentum was sustained. In 1993, India and China, under Narasimha Rao and Jiang Zemin, respectively, began a process of confidence-building measures (CBMs). The CBMs-process has continued, reflecting how difficult it is for these two Asian neighbours to trust each other. Yet, in 2014, China’s and India’s leaders, Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, respectively, agreed that the world would notice if the two countries were to cooperate. An updated notion of a tipping point in PRC–India diplomacy for friendliness and global good! I analyse how elusive this notion has become. Until India and China stabilise their bilateral equation, a tipping point in their diplomacy will remain elusive. For this obvious reason, there is an elaborate coverage of Sino-Indian bilateral strategic affairs in this book. Moreover, with 1 April 2020 marking 70 years of PRC–India diplomacy, seven decades were long enough for maturity in Sino-Indian ties. Throughout this book, I have viewed Sino-Indian strategic affairs as geopolitics with a modicum of military deterrence. My participation in the 9th Beijing Xiangshan Forum in October 2019 helped me understand the new dynamics of China’s diplomacy relating to defence matters. Because of my focus on the strategic basics in China–India diplomacy, I have reserved their economic interactions for a later study. In my earlier book, Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China–India Synergy (published by World Century in 2016), I scrutinised the decade-long strategic partnership between these two “sunrise powers”. Three developments since 2016

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Preface  xiii

have sharpened the PRC–India bilateral dynamics. A resolute India–China military face-off occurred in 2017, followed by “informal” dialogue at the highest political level since 2018. An outbreak of military hostilities in 2020, despite such an extraordinary process of ‘dialogue’, further eclipsed the idea of a positive Sino-Indian tipping point. China’s skyrocketing interest in the Kashmir issue may now become a game-changer in Sino-Indian strategic affairs. Esteemed readers will, therefore, encounter a dense coverage of this issue. I have tried to present each chapter as a stand-alone topic or thesis as far as possible. For this purpose, the repetition of relevant facts has become necessary in several places. Hope this will facilitate a relatively easier reading of an otherwise complex subject. Also, familiarity with the acronyms and disputed areas will greatly help. I seek the indulgence of esteemed readers. ‘Disputed Map in Words’ and amateurish ‘diagrams’ of the Himalayan Region precede the chapters. The objective is to be dispassionate about the contested boundaries of India, China, and Pakistan. Overall, the book focuses sequentially on the past, the present clouded by lingering and new disputes, and finally the future of Sino-Indian diplomacy. The first chapter encapsulates the diplomatic and strategic history of the seven decades of relevance to this study. The second, third, and fourth chapters focus on the present, especially the “informal” dialogue between the highest-ranking Chinese and Indian leaders in 2018 and 2019. In this new light, I chart, in the fifth chapter, the imponderable positive course that China–India diplomacy could have taken in regard to the Tibet and Kashmir issues before mid-1950s. The sixth chapter briefly recalls the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and examines the recent crisis at Doklam in 2017. Having thus noticed how elusive a positive tipping point in China–India diplomacy has been, I utilise the seventh chapter to scan their old strategic turf for their new games. The eighth chapter is, therefore, an exploration of a collective-win approach for the potential good of China and India. This sets the stage for the ninth chapter, which traces the emerging trajectory of China’s and India’s diplomacy of smart power. Finally, the tenth chapter emphasises the relevance of a positive Sino-Indian tipping point for a potential postCOVID (post-modern) world order. The epilogue takes note of the paradoxical physical clash between Chinese and Indian soldiers in mid-June 2020 and their unprecedented hostilities over the Kashmir issue. A future is glimpsed.

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For inspiration to write this book, I sincerely thank Ong Keng Yong, Singapore’s Ambassador-at-Large and Executive Deputy Chairman of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. His other postings in a long and distinguished career include those as Singapore’s High Commissioner to India, and Secretary General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He has given me the time and space to write this book as a full-time senior researcher at RSIS from 1 June 2018 to 30 June 2020. In addition, I thank Ambassador Ong for his incisive comments on my draft of this book. I have relied entirely on my own research and my interactions with policy makers — first as a journalist and now as a researcher. The pluses and minuses, if any, in this book are entirely mine alone. I have interacted with many high-ranking diplomats and several military officers of PRC and India over the years. My purpose has been consistent: try and learn about the policy trends in Sino-Indian diplomacy and strategic affairs. I shall resist the temptation to identify the insiders who spoke to me confidentially. My interviews with several leaders of India, China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Japan, among others, have been stimulating. English has been the medium of my interactions with diplomats and leaders of the countries specified. As for PRC’s official statements, I have relied on Beijing’s authoritative English versions. In conformity with the standard diplomatic practice, the terms ‘China’ and ‘People’s Republic of China (PRC)’ have been used interchangeably in this book. In a few sections, however, a distinction has been maintained between PRC and ‘Republic of China’ (‘ROC’), which occupied China’s seat at United Nations until 1971. This is clearly stated in those sections. Numerous professionals, relatives, and friends have encouraged me in different ways at different times. The list is long; I shall thank some in particular. Besides Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, Ambassadors Gopinath Pillai, Tommy Koh, and K. Kesavapany; Professor Tan Tai Yong; Mr. Johnson Paul; and Mr. Hernaikh Singh are among those in Singapore I thank. My wife Dr. P. Jayanthi has always supported me cheerfully. I am thankful to my brothers Dr. P. S. Subramanyam and Mr. P. S. V. Krishna; my sisters-in-law Mrs. Radha Subramanyam and Mrs. V Lakshmi; my sisters Mrs. Premalatha Prasad, Mrs. Swarnalatha, and Mrs. Snehalatha; my brothers-inlaw Mr. K. R. K. Prasad, Mr. B. Suryanarayana Murthy, and Mr. G. Gopalakrishnan; my close family members Mrs. Papammal Padmanabhan,

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Preface  xv

Mr. P. Bharathan, Mrs. Mahalakshmi, Mr. P. Ramanan, Mrs. Radha Ramanan, Mr. B. Pugazhendhi, Mrs. Shanthi, Mr. S. Viswa Kumar, Mrs. Uma, and Mr. P Mohan; my old friend Mr. D. V. Sundar; and long-ago benefactors Mr. Bhagavatula Venkateswarlu, Mr. G. P. Ramnath, Mr. Malladi Dakshinamurthi, Mr. Anjaneyulu, Mr. Venkateswara Rao and his family, and Professor V. Suryanarayan of Madras University. Among journalists who encouraged and supported me, I thank Mr. N. Ram, Mr. N. Ravi, Dr. (Ms.) Malini Parthasarathy, Mr. K Venugopal, Mr. K. Narayanan, and Mr. R. Vijaya Sankar of The Hindu/Frontline group; Mr. Arun Shourie, Mr. M. K. Das, Mr. D. Subbaram, Mr. S. C. Nair, Mr. R. M. T. Sambandam, and Mr. Pushp Saraf of The Indian Express group; and Mr. K. J. M. Varma of Press Trust of India; besides Mr. N. Murali and Mrs. Akila Iyengar of The Hindu/Frontline Management. I have previously expressed my gratitude to others who played memorable roles in my life. I remain thankful to my teachers for emphasising creative and conscientious thinking, and friends for helping me along the way. Professor Qingmin Zhang, with his insightful knowledge of PRC’s diplomacy, and Professor C. Raja Mohan, well-known for his expertise on strategic affairs, commended my manuscript. I sincerely thank them. I also thank Mr. Vijay Lakshminarayanan for his considerable help in creating the non-partisan ‘diagrams’ of disputed areas in the China-India-Pakistan neighbourhood. In conclusion and with equal sincerity, I thank In-house Editor Ms. Sandhya Venkatesh and her team at World Scientific for their understanding and meticulous editing of this book. On this note of gratefulness, I hope you will find this book worth reading! P. S. Suryanarayana Singapore 24 May 2020/28 June 2020 Post-Script: In writing this book, I have experienced the challenge and excitement of tracking an elusive and fast-moving target. With a military crisis between PRC and India on-going, I have updated the saga of their relationship until late-December 2020. A diplomatic story must be told when it matters.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

P. S. Suryanarayana (Pisupati Sadasiva SURYANARAYANA) is a journalistturned researcher with deep interest in China–India diplomacy and strategic affairs. Working full-time at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore, he has authored The Elusive Tipping Point: China–India Ties for a New Order. This follows the appreciation he won, in diplomatic and scholarly circles, for his previous book, Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China–India Synergy (World Century, 2016). In a long and distinguished career as full-time professional, Suryanarayana worked for The Indian Express and The Hindu at different times until 2011. He covered the diplomatic beat for The Indian Express. As foreign correspondent of The Hindu for many years, he served successively in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Asia–Pacific region. Based in Singapore, as Southeast Asia Correspondent from 1998 and Asia–Pacific Correspondent from 2002, he regularly travelled across ASEAN countries and Northeast Asia to fulfil his journalistic work. Suryanarayana interviewed national leaders and diplomats of South Asian and East Asian countries including China, Japan, ASEAN countries including Singapore, Australia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and others. He also interacted with several key militant leaders for journalistic purposes. His journalistic assignments included civil wars in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan; political unrest in Pakistan, “East Timor” and Fiji; and the US-led “Desert Storm” in the Gulf, at different times. Significantly, he reported from the

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capitals of four permanent member-countries of the United Nations — Beijing (PRC), Washington (USA), Moscow (Russia), and London (UK). From late-2011 — first at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) and later at RSIS, both in Singapore — he has interviewed diplomats and officials relevant to his research. They include Chinese and Indian policy makers in Beijing and Delhi. Suryanarayana was a delegate at the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s launch of Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in 2017 and a participant at the Beijing Xiangshan Forum in 2019. From September 2020, Suryanarayana has been working as Adjunct Senior Fellow of RSIS, Singapore. In all, the author’s publications include numerous news “scoops”, op-eds, “insights”, commentaries, two chapters in books edited by others, and his three books — The Peace Trap: An Indo-Sri Lankan Political Crisis (1988); Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China-India Synergy (2016) and The Elusive Tipping Point: China-India Ties for a New Order (2021). Suryanarayana was awarded Master of Arts (Politics and Public Administration) by the University of Madras (India) in 1971. He participated in a four-week-long Media Seminar on US foreign policy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, USA, in the summer of 1992.

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ACRONYMS

AIIB: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. AK: Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Pakistani terminology). ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations. BCIM: Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (economic corridor). Beijing: Capital of People’s Republic of China (PRC) — used interchangeably for PRC. BIMSTEC: Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. BRF: Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. BRI: Belt and Road Initiative. BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (forum). China: Used interchangeably for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). COVID-19: Novel Corona Virus Disease (reported first in China in 2019). CPEC: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Delhi: New Delhi, capital of India — used interchangeably for India. EAS: East Asia Summit (consisting of ASEAN members and eight others including China and India). G20: Group of Twenty (20 countries, a mix of established and emerging economies). G-B: Gilgit-Baltistan (Pakistani terminology). GOI: Government of India. xix

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IMF: International Monetary Fund. ISJK: Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (author’s usage for this State until 31 October 2019). Islamabad: Capital of Pakistan — used interchangeably for Pakistan. JAI: Japan–America–India (forum — Indian terminology). Kashmir issue: Unresolved final political status of the Original princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK). LAC: Line of Actual Control (China–India line). LoC: Line of Control (India–Pakistan line). MEA: Ministry of External Affairs (India). MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in various countries). MOD: Ministry of Defence/National Defence (in various countries). NFU: No-First-Use (of nuclear weapons). NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group. OSJK: Original State of Jammu and Kashmir (originally princely state under British paramountcy in the Indian sub-continent). POK: Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Indian terminology). PPGP: Political Parameters and Guiding Principles (for resolving SinoIndian boundary dispute). PRC: People’s Republic of China (from October 1949). Quad: Quadrilateral forum (Australia, India, Japan, and United States of America). RCEP: Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (ASEAN initiative). RIC: Russia–India–China (forum — Russian terminology). ROC: Republic of China (pre-PRC China — member of United Nations, and permanent member of UN Security Council from 1945 to 1971). SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Sino-Indian (diplomacy, relations etc.): PRC-India (diplomacy, relations etc.).

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Acronyms  xxi

UN: United Nations. UNGA: United Nations General Assembly. UNSC: United Nations Security Council. US: United States of America. UTJK: Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (Indian terminology from 31 October 2019). UTL: Union Territory of Ladakh (Indian terminology from 31 October 2019). Washington: Capital of the United States of America (US) — used interchangeably for US. WHO: World Health Organisation. WTO: World Trade Organisation. 5G: Fifth Generation telecom technology and equipment. Notes: Many words and passages have been italicised to emphasise their importance to the relevant arguments or citations. Bold fonts serve the same purpose. Words within square brackets in citations are explanations which are not part of the citations. Double quotation marks (“”) denote citations and widely-accepted phrases. Single quotation marks (‘’) denote that the relevant phrase(s) may not be uniformly acceptable to all parties concerned. Web-links of citations were effective on the dates accessed. The same citations may be available through other links as well. In most places, including in Footnotes, datelines have been standardised to conform to the practice in Singapore, i.e. date-month-year.

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DISPUTED MAP IN WORDS Note on Key Strategic Locations in the China–India–Pakistan Neighbourhood

An authoritative map acceptable to India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not exist. For over 70 years, there has been no agreed boundary between East Asian PRC and South Asian India, and between India and Pakistan in South Asia. China and Pakistan, too, have only a “temporary” boundary agreement, signed in 1963. In the absence of a map acceptable to these three countries, the following guide to key strategic locations will be useful. § China is India’s northern neighbour. Their disputed boundary slopes from India’s northern crest-line to India’s north-east. § Pakistan is India’s north-western neighbour, as seen from southern India. (a) The following areas were parts of the Original (princely) State of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK) which acceded to independent India in 1947. OSJK encompasses all the strategic areas in the China–India–Pakistan neighbourhood.   Due to a number of reasons, OSJK got divided between India and Pakistan in 1947 itself. By the 1950s, PRC, too, began to administer a disputed ‘portion’ of OSJK. xxiii

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  In a west-to-easterly direction, the following disputed areas dot Pakistan, India, and China. § Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) are administered by Pakistan but claimed by India on grounds of its sovereignty. § The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in 2015, passes through G-B. India opposes this. § Siachen Glacier, the world’s highest-altitude battleground, lies off the eastern side of G-B. The Glacier is in the hands of the Indian Army. Sovereign control over this forbidding zone rests with India. § Shaksgam Valley, in the hands of China, lies off the northern side of the Siachen Glacier. § Karakorum mountain range, in a west-to-easterly direction, spans these areas. Karakorum Pass, ‘at’ or near the disputed China-India boundary, lies at the eastern end of this range. § Aksai Chin, off the eastern side of Karakorum Pass, is administered by China. Both India and China claim sovereignty over Aksai Chin. Viewed from the Chinese side, Aksai Chin lies at the western edge of Chinese Tibet (Xizang) which, in popular imagination, is the ‘Roof of the World’. Aksai Chin can be accessed from China’s Xinjiang region as well. § Since 1947, India has exercised sovereignty over the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK), the largest portion of OSJK. On 31 October 2019, India reconstituted ISJK as two separate units — Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (UTJK) and Union Territory of Ladakh (UTL). (b) The following areas are in the extreme eastern section of the disputed China–India boundary. (Pakistan does not figure in this region): § India’s Arunachal Pradesh State (APS) is separated from China’s Tibet (in the north) by the McMahon Line. China claims sovereignty over APS, calling the area ‘southern Tibet’. India does not accept China’s claim. § Strategic Tawang, a holy Buddhist site, is also a gateway to India’s APS from China’s Tibetan side in the north.

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Disputed Map in Words  xxv

Tawang is administered by India as an integral part of APS. § In the vicinity of the disputed PRC–India boundary, Kailash Mansarovar (located in Chinese Tibet or Xizang) is a holy Hindu site of interest to India. (The accompanying amateurish ‘diagrams’ indicate approximately the relative locations of the contested areas in the Himalayan region. Not drawn to scale, the exact geographical coordinates of these areas are also not reflected. These ‘diagrams’ are not meant to endorse the territorial claims by China or India or Pakistan.)

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AK – Azad Jammu & Kashmir KK Pass – Karakorum Pass

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b4008   The Elusive Tipping Point: China–India Ties for a New Order

CHAPTER 1

A GLIMPSE OF THE PAST

Seventy-Year History in a Capsule The dawn of the 70th anniversary of “neighbourly” Sino-Indian diplomacy coincided with the grim global fight against the novel coronavirus disease. A positive tipping point in China–India diplomacy has also been elusive. SinoIndian geopolitical competition concerns another neighbour, Pakistan, too. In this milieu, India and China themselves have unveiled imaginative principles, fought a war, and tried to remain engaged. A brief history of the eventful seven decades is a guide to the present realities and future possibilities.

China, formally the People’s Republic of China (PRC), exercises sovereignty over a vast area north of the Republic of India’s sloping crest-line and eastern shoulder. However, the boundary between India and China remains in dispute. The China-India military clash in mid-June 2020 and their follow-on hostility served as a grim reminder of this reality in the third decade of the 21st century. Following a civil war near the middle of the 20th century, China proclaimed itself as a revolutionary communist–socialist state on 1 October 1949. Two years earlier, India gained freedom from British imperial rule on 15 August 1947. For a couple of years thereafter, independent India was a democratic “dominion” with a British link. Finally, India proclaimed itself as a sovereign, democratic, constitutional republic on 26 January 1950.

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Significantly, India became the first non-socialist-bloc country to recognise PRC on 1 April 1950.1 The initial diplomatic engagement between these two new Asian states was quite normal despite their differences over the political future of Tibet. After PRC “liberated” and “annexed” Tibet in 1950–1951, India suddenly lost Tibet as a “buffer” zone vis-à-vis China. In PRC’s official narrative, however, “historical records” existed proving that “Tibet has been part of China since ancient times”. On 6 November 2019, Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, re-asserted these lines on China’s ancestral claim to Tibet.2 The Tibetan issue and the competitive instincts of China and India gradually drove them to the defining border war in 1962. Sino-Indian relations acquired greater complexity after that singular war. By third decade of the 21st century, India and China have come to view each other as formidable interlocutors, whenever their diplomatic engagement is on course. Striking examples of this phenomenon are the two “informal” or absolutely candid meetings between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Wuhan (China) in 2018 and Mahabalipuram (India) in 2019. They agreed to meet again “informally” in China. The significance of these meetings is discussed later in this book. In contrast to the Sino-Indian engagement, India and its north-western neighbour, Pakistan, have almost invariably seen each other as overt adversaries. India–Pakistan antagonism is shaped by geopolitics and their emotions of Partition3 following the departure of British imperialists. The consequential division of the Original State of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK) by the Line of Control (LoC) is a constant reminder of this intractable problem which troubles both sides.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), People’s Republic of China (PRC), https://www.fmprc. gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2711_663426/2712_ 663428/t15916.shtml (Accessed on 18 February 2019). See also Embassy of India, Beijing, PRC, https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/political-relation.php (accessed on 6 October 2019). 2  MFA, PRC, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/ t1713819.shtml (accessed on 8 November 2019). 3  ‘Partition’ denotes the creation of two independent states — India and Pakistan — through the bifurcation of British India in August 1947. 1 

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OSJK was originally a Muslim-majority princely state with a Hindu ruler, under British imperial paramountcy, in the Indian subcontinent. This political arrangement ended when Britain dismantled its colonial rule over the subcontinent and partitioned it in August 1947. Pakistan was carved out of British India and granted independence as a Muslim-majority country. This was done just one day before the rest of India gained independence as a Hindu-majority secular state on 15 August. OSJK was contiguous with the territories of independent India as well as Pakistan. Under the partition plan devised by the British, the Maharaja (or, ruler) of OSJK opted to join independent India instead of Pakistan on 27 October 1947.4 He did so only after realising that his manoeuvres to keep OSJK as a free entity were futile. Pakistan contested OSJK’s accession to India. Wars and crises followed. At this writing, India and Pakistan are still estranged, and the Jammu and Kashmir issue (in brief, Kashmir issue) remains unsettled. Throughout this book, “Kashmir issue” denotes the unsettled political future of OSJK. Overall, India has adopted customised bilateral approaches towards China and Pakistan. In late-1940s and the 1950s, India sought and then repudiated United Nations (UN) intervention over the status of OSJK. However, Pakistan continues to seek a UN role. As Pakistan’s “all-weather strategic cooperative partner” since 2015, China conspicuously supported Pakistan over the Jammu and Kashmir issue in August 2019.5 China has indeed raised its geostrategic and geo-economic stakes in Pakistan in the first quarter of the 21st century. As a result, a common but differential challenge for China, India, and Pakistan is to think out of the box. The original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir’s (OSJK’s) accession to the newly-independent India in October 1947 was accepted by Lord Mountbatten, Governor General of India, which was at that time a British-linked Dominion. See (1) Sir M James (formerly British High Commissioner to Pakistan first and India later), Pakistan Chronicle (Edited, with an Introduction, by Peter Lyon), Oxford University Press, Bangalore Town, Karachi, Pakistan, 1993, pp. 25–26 and (2) J N Dixit (India’s former Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor), India–Pakistan in War & Peace, Books Today (The India Today Group), New Delhi, 2002, pp. 117—118. 5  Ministry of National Defence (MOD), PRC, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-08/17/ content_4848396.htm (accessed on 17 August 2019). 4 

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As analysed in later chapters, China was driven by some strategic compulsions to keep its ties with India at an even keel, at the least. This was reflected in the new Sino-Indian “informal meetings” at the highest political level. A logical corollary is the salience of the China–India–Pakistan crosscurrents in the future. A peep into the diplomatic past involving these three Asian neighbours is relevant, therefore, as the first step in foreseeing the diplomatic future of Sino-Indian relations. Sino-Indian diplomacy and Indo-Pakistani engagement have so far lasted about seven decades. But the blip in the fullness of time has produced a long litany of challenges for all three neighbours. In particular, Sino-Indian boundary disputes and Indo-Pakistani arguments over Jammu and Kashmir remain unresolved. Therefore, the territorial integrity of all three — India, China, and Pakistan — is not settled! It will be tempting to see a commonality: the respective territorial integrity of China, India, and Pakistan is inviolable only on paper.

Early Markers in PRC–India Diplomacy PRC and independent India began their interactions amid a crescendo of aspirational notes in 1950. Beneath that overarching reality, Delhi harboured apprehensions following Beijing’s “liberation” of Tibet, a vast area bordering northern India, in 1950–1951. India and much of the international community saw the Chinese action as a clear “annexation” of Tibet. Delhi, in particular, woke up to a new geopolitical reality. PRC suddenly became the Republic of India’s contiguous neighbour. Until then, Delhi saw Tibet as a geostrategic “buffer” against old China at first and PRC later when it emerged officially as New China. Despite this sudden jolt to Delhi in 1950–1951, China and India enunciated the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1954. The Five Principles, applicable to this day in inter-state relations, are as follows: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) equal and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence.

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Sino-Indian togetherness in 1954 raised expectations of bilateral harmony. Why? PRC wanted to soften India’s dismay over losing the Tibetan “buffer”. For this, Beijing sought to humour Delhi by promising peaceful coexistence with India. Unsurprisingly in that context, India accepted PRC’s control over Tibet, and pledged peaceful coexistence. India’s calculation was that China might respond by granting genuine autonomy to the Tibetans and by refraining from militarising Tibet and posing a threat to India. It was in that milieu that India made common cause with China over its imaginative masterstroke of espousing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.6 However, New China’s and independent India’s nationalism soon crystallised into competing claims of entitlement to a historical boundary. This became an issue of great importance to both sides because of PRC’s total incorporation of Tibet as Chinese territory. In brief, the Sino-Indian boundary disputes, still unresolved at the turn of the third decade of the 21st century, can be traced to that seminal event in the 1950s. Shorn of historical niceties, Beijing saw Tibet as PRC’s positive inheritance from China’s own past imperial eras. For Beijing, therefore, a referral framework was a mental map of PRC’s inherited customary or traditional boundary with India. For Delhi, its mental map was shaped by the Indian inheritance of British India’s boundary with Tibet. This, in essence, was the genesis of the Sino-Indian boundary disputes. Beijing was also incensed over India’s granting of asylum to Tibet’s Buddhist leader, the 14th Dalai Lama, in 1959 amid the then Tibetan uprising, or unrest, against PRC. The Dalai Lama is still regarded by Beijing as a separatist rebel, not a spiritual leader. Moreover, China remains opposed to India’s benign attitude towards the Dalai Lama-controlled (or, -blessed) “Tibetan Government in Exile” on the Indian soil. But Delhi does not allow the Dalai Lama to engage in anti-PRC activities in India, although foreign dignitaries have occasionally met him at his Indian base. The expectations of China and India in proclaiming Peaceful Coexistence in 1954 are outlined by P S Suryanarayana (author of this book) on the basis of his conversations and interviews with Chinese and Indian diplomats over a number of years, first as a journalist and later as a researcher. 6 

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With the Dalai Lama issue in the background, China and India fought a border war in 1962.7 India’s under-equipped and under-prepared soldiers were defeated. This led to a deeply frosty phase of distrust between India and China. During that phase, the Chinese leaders took an India-wary Pakistan firmly under their wings. A complex triangle of complicated “coexistence” among these three Asian neighbours emerged. In that milieu, Beijing conducted its first nuclear-weapon test in 1964. As a result, China dramatically overshadowed India’s strategic profile. What did not matter was the military aid that India received from the United States (US) after the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Indeed, China’s first atomic-weapon test rattled India, an erstwhile pacifist opposed to the Atom Bomb. Delhi, therefore, decided to “keep [its] nuclear [-weapons] option open”.8 For Delhi, such a half-pacifist option turned out to be a fateful move that delayed India’s eventual decision to make and test nuclear weapons. The delayed decision continues to deprive India of its rightful place at the global high table. For a variety of reasons, five countries (including PRC), which were the first to test nuclear weapons, sit at this high table and seek to make or re-make the world order. This aspect of Sino-Indian tussle is discussed later in this book. In China, the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, launched in 1966, disrupted the Chinese society for over a decade. Another effect was a serious rupture in the Sino-Indian engagement, already affected by the 1962 war. Moreover, India demonstrated its technological capabilities by conducting a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974. Yet, Delhi refrained from making and deploying atomic weapons at that stage. Nonetheless, even a tentative idea of Sino-Indian rapprochement emerged only in 1988. At least two factors facilitated the incipient PRC–India rapprochement in 1988. In the first place, India came out of the shadows of its 1962 debacle and stood firm in a military confrontation with China at Sumdorong Chu in a disputed Two elaborate analyses of the factors that sparked the Sino-Indian war of 1962 are: (1) J W Garver, China’s Decision for War with India, 1962, http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline. com/web/china%20decision%20for%201962%20war%202003.pdf and (2) N. Maxwell, India’s China War, Pantheon Books, A Division of Random House, New York, 1970. 8  In 1964, the then Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri wanted the country to focus on its economic priorities and remember its recent heritage of a peaceful struggle for independence from Britain. So, he decided to keep India’s nuclear option open, refraining from matching China’s first atomic-weapon test in that year. 7 

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border area in 1986. So, Beijing took Delhi a little more seriously than before. Secondly, China’s then reformist leader Deng Xiaoping recognised India’s potential, under the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, as China’s economic partner.9 However, China quickly suffered an image crisis globally because of the “Tiananmen Incident” in 1989. Deng had forcefully quelled a serious domestic protest which took place in that year at the sprawling Tiananmen Square in Beijing. India, therefore, seized an opportune moment in China’s post-1989 efforts to re-emerge from isolation on the global stage. The result was the first-ever China–India political “treaty” in 1993. The 1993 accord enshrined the principle of “peace and tranquillity” along the unclear Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the disputed Sino-Indian border areas. A former Indian insider, privy to the process that culminated in the 1993 accord, has traced how the then Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao sagaciously crafted a new arrangement with China.10 This accord remains a referral template in Sino-Indian relations in the first quarter of the 21st century. In my view, a crucial contributing factor was Rao’s focus on China and South Korea as part of India’s ‘Look East Policy’ which he was conceptualising in 1993. A second Sino-Indian confidencebuilding accord, signed in 1996, spelt out military measures for stability along the disputed boundary.

Sino-Indian Ties Turn ‘Strategic’ Soon, however, India’s nuclear-weapons testing in 1998 shook the SinoIndian relationship to its core. By now, China was back in the global reckoning as a major power, mainly because of its economic success in a non-Western-style political system at home. Wary, therefore, of the potential Based on my interactions with Chinese and Indian diplomats, this is an assessment of the circumstances in 1988 that led to the then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s invitation to the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for a momentous summit meeting in Beijing in December that year. For the Chinese version, access MFA, PRC, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2711_663426/2712_6634 28/t15913.shtml. 10  S Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D C, 2016, pp. 7–33. Also, access MFA, PRC, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2711_663426/2712_6634 28/t15915.shtm. 9 

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emergence of neighbouring India as a military power, Beijing made a deterrence check on Delhi. Consequently, China decided in 2003 to engage India from a strategic standpoint.11 By then, the US had already started coming to terms with India having its own viable nuclear weapons. The US and India initiated a pragmatic dialogue between their respective representatives, Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh, after India’s nuclear-weapons testing in 1998. Those talks gradually led to a better US understanding of the Indian strategic calculus.12 This aspect, too, seemed to influence Beijing’s thinking. Delhi was also keen to ease the Sino-Indian tensions which erupted following India’s nuclear-weapons testing in 1998. So, in 2003, China and India tasked Special Representatives from both sides to negotiate a boundary settlement in a strategic framework. At this writing, however, the Special Representatives did not produce an accord even after 22 rounds of talks. Besides the agreement on the mechanism of Special Representatives in 2003, India solemnised its 1954 acceptance of PRC’s “annexation” of Tibet. In 2003, Delhi firmly recognised the Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of PRC’s territory.13 Reciprocating India’s solemn assurance, China gave up its ambivalent attitude towards a border state (province) in India. Beijing affirmed, on 11 April 2005, that Sikkim was an Indian state,14 after all. Sikkim, originally bordering India and Tibet during the British rule over the Indian subcontinent, became a “protectorate” of independent India in December 1950. Later, Sikkim “merged” with India in 1975. But Beijing, still in the throes of China’s “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, did not prevent Sikkim’s “merger” with India. Yet, having seen the “merger” as China’s view of India in 2003 is my interpretation based on my journalistic interviews with Chinese and Indian diplomats ahead of the China–India summit meeting in Beijing in June of that year. 12  For a detailed study of India’s strategic nuclear calculus, see, among others, C Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy, Viking Press, New Delhi, 2003. 13  Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India. Retrieved from the website of Chinese Embassy in Delhi, http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/zygxc/wx/t22852.htm. 14  China’s acknowledgment of Sikkim as an Indian state was embedded in an overall SinoIndian joint statement in 2005. See Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India (GOI), https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6577/Joint_Statement_of_the_ Republic_of_India_and_the_Peoples_Republic_of_China. 11 

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“annexation”, China finally accepted in 2005 that Sikkim could be a part of India. Significantly, China had signalled a practical counter to India a few days before accepting Sikkim as an Indian state. On 5 April 2005, China actually signed a comprehensive Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and GoodNeighbourly Relations with Pakistan. The almost-forgotten treaty, likely to acquire considerable strategic importance in the third decade of the 21st century, is discussed in a later chapter of this book. In April 2005 itself, China did try to soft-pedal the potential anti-India momentum generated by the Sino-Pakistani treaty. On 11 April 2005, therefore, China unveiled, along with India, the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles (PPGP) for an eventual settlement of the boundary disputes.15 A Sino-Indian Strategic Partnership was also launched on the same day. But Beijing quickly sensed a smart diplomatic coup by Delhi. Beijing was surprised that, on 18 July 2005, the US agreed to negotiate a civil nuclear deal with India. At that time, Delhi was suffering from the persistent denial of access to international civil nuclear commerce because of India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 and atomic-weapons testing in 1998. Surely, the US– India announcement in 2005 was in the making for some time before that. But Beijing saw the emerging Indo-American rapport16 as a net-negative for China because America was the sole superpower in the mid-2000s. In such a deeply layered strategic environment of 2005, China began insisting that the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh was “southern Tibet” historically and, therefore, PRC’s legitimate territory since 1949. Consequently, the positive momentum generated by the Sino-Indian initiatives in early 2005 was lost by 2008. The full text of a major China–India document in 2005, aimed at paving the way for a settlement of their boundary dispute, can be had from the website of MEA, GOI, https://www. mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6534/agreement+between+the+government+of+the+ republic+of+india+and+the+government+of+the+peoples+republic+of+china+on+the+political +parameters+and+guiding+principles+for+the+settlement+of+the+indiachina+boundary +question. 16  For a detailed account of India–US relations since 1947, see S Raghavan, The Most Dangerous Place: A History of the United States in South Asia, Penguin Random House India, Gurgaon, India, 2018. 15 

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The spectacular Beijing Olympics in 2008 gave China a sense of skyrocketing self-confidence. In the same year, the US and the West began experiencing a debilitating financial crisis. This encouraged China to stimulate its own economy. From then onwards, barring a few episodes, China continues to look at India from a far-higher position of comprehensive national strength. In 2008 itself, China of course suffered a strategic shock. The US and India began gravitating towards each other by consummating their earlier commitment to negotiate a bilateral civil nuclear deal. On 6 September of that year, India obtained exemption from the guidelines of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Until then, India was not eligible, under the NSG guidelines, to procure civil nuclear knowhow and equipment from the international market. The reason simply was that India had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in vogue since 1970. Under the NPT, only five countries — the US, Russia (the erstwhile Soviet Union), China, France, and the United Kingdom — can possess atomic arsenals. This “discriminatory” aspect, debatable on grounds of pure rationality and fairness to all other countries, remains unacceptable to India to this day. With the NSG waiver in September 2008, India gained access to the international civil nuclear market, arguably in perpetuity. This meant that India could, under relevant safeguards, buy civil nuclear knowhow, equipment, and materials for electricity generation from anywhere. All this, without India having to sign the “discriminatory” NPT! India could also export its own civil nuclear knowhow, etc. Washington, on its part, was eager to make up for lost time in cementing strategic ties with India. So, the US proactively piloted the NSG waiver for India. America ensured that China did not veto the hard-won pro-India consensus among the other NSG members.17 The story of India securing a waiver from NSG guidelines in 2008 is widely chronicled. Three among the notable accounts are by (a) T C Schaffer and H B Schaffer, India at the global high table: The quest for regional primacy and strategic autonomy, HarperCollins Publishers India, Noida, India, 2016, pp. 150–181; (b) S Saran, How India sees the world: Kautilya to the 21st century, juggernaut Books, New Delhi, 2017, pp. 192–239; and (c) S Menon, Choices: Inside the making of india’s foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2016, pp. 34–59. 17 

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China was resolutely opposed to India gaining exemption from NSG guidelines which barred non-NPT countries from international civil nuclear commerce. However, the then US President George W Bush telephoned his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao to secure support for a unique exemption for India at NSG’s deliberations in 2008.18 As a result, India was, at least in US eyes, a de facto nuclear power with an arsenal of atomic weapons and with new access to the global civil nuclear commerce. This was a pure diplomatic coup by both the US and India, because Delhi still remained outside NPT. At this writing, too, there is no indication that India will give up its nuclear arsenal and sign the “discriminatory” NPT as a “non-nuclear” state party. We have so far briefly traced the strategic history of Sino-Indian equation until 2008, a historical marker because of the global financial crisis that erupted in that year. As is well-known, the 2008 global financial crisis originated in the world’s largest economy, the US. Significantly, it was in the same year that China, hosting the spectacular Beijing Olympics, began emerging as America’s potential peer competitor. So, 2008 can be viewed as a logical marker in the turbulence or intermittent stability in the relations among China, India, and Pakistan in the first quarter of the 21st century. So, now, let us look at the strategic history of India– Pakistan engagement until 2008.

India–Pakistan Partition, Wars, and Crises The partition of the Indian subcontinent by its retreating British colonial masters in August 1947 resulted in the creation of a new state of Pakistan and collateral independence for the rest of India. Britain gave OSJK a choice to join either the secular Hindu-majority India or Islamic Pakistan. Initially, OSJK’s ruler tried to manoeuvre between India and Pakistan and keep his territory as an independent entity. In that uncertain ambience, Pakistan tried to capture OSJK through military means. This prompted India to take counter-military measures and also refer the issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in My information, as ascertained from international diplomats who were privy to NSG’s deliberations on India in September 2008. 18 

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January 1948. The UNSC passed a series of resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir in the 1940s and 1950s. By and large, those resolutions have remained infructuous. However, the UN brought about a cessation of the initial armed hostilities between Pakistan and India by 1 January 1949. A ceasefire line was also established on 27 July of the same year.19 For all practical purposes, this line divided OSJK between India and Pakistan. India continues to retain possession of the larger portion of OSJK. For the sake of clarity in discussion, this larger portion is described, throughout this book, as the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK). At the geopolitical level, Pakistan has often sought to throw at India the rule book of the UNSC resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir. The centrepiece of those resolutions was the possibility of a solution through UN-organised plebiscite in the entire territory of OSJK. After initially accepting the UN formula, Delhi began to reject the idea of plebiscite, citing three arguments. First, Delhi took the line that OSJK legitimately acceded to independent India under the Partition plan and began participating in the Indian democratic processes. Second, contrary to the UNSC’s stipulation, Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from the areas it occupied in OSJK.20 Pakistan, therefore, did not fulfil the primary pre-condition for UN-organised plebiscite in the entire territory of OSJK. India’s third reason against plebiscite was related to the status of the US as a founding permanent member of the UNSC. In 1954, India was a nonpartisan state (soon, a non-aligned state) in the prevailing Cold War between the US-led liberal-capitalist camp and the Soviet Union-led communist bloc. Therefore, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, argued that United Nations documents, Resolutions adopted and decisions taken by the security council in 1950. Resolution 80 (1950) of 14 March 1950 contains a firm acknowledgment of the cessation of initial armed hostilities between Pakistan and India in 1949. 20  A policy-relevant Indian account of diplomacy over the Jammu and Kashmir issue, covering also UNSC’s initial role, was provided by J N Dixit in his India–Pakistan in War & Peace, Books Today (The India Today Group), New Delhi, 2002, pp. 112–121 and 307–326. An account preferred in Pakistan was written by A Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846–1990, Oxford Pakistan Paperbacks, Oxford University Press, Bangalore Town, Karachi, Pakistan, 1993. 19 

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Pakistan’s military alliance with the US, signed in that year, nullified the context in which UNSC (spearheaded by America) had suggested plebiscite in OSJK.21 Since then, history has not stood still in OSJK and elsewhere. The Jammu and Kashmir issue is not the only one in the India–Pakistan argumentation. In May 1954, as noted above, Pakistan entered into a military pact with America. This development altered the dynamics of IndoPakistani relations during that phase in the now-bygone US–Soviet Cold War. Interestingly, in June of the same year, China and India, as noted earlier, enunciated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. At that point in time, China was not Pakistan’s all-pervasive patron-benefactor. Only about a year later, Pakistan made its first overture towards China at the Asian–African conference in Bandung in April 1955. Beijing evinced reciprocal interest.22 Significantly thereafter, China and Pakistan gradually moved closer while China and India drifted from each other over their respective territorial nationalism and even fought a war in 1962. To Pakistan’s chagrin, nonaligned India successfully courted Washington during that war. America was then vehemently anti-Chinese in its ideological outlook. More importantly from India’s perspective, the Sino-Pakistani border agreement of 1963 has, to this day, complicated the issue of OSJK’s final status on both sides of LoC. India’s concerns remain, although the 1963 agreement was projected by China as a provisional or “temporary” settlement. China promised to renegotiate the 1963 Sino-Pakistani accord with either India or Pakistan itself on the basis of their settlement of the “ownership” of OSJK.23 This is yet another nuance likely to determine the future of Sino-Indian relations and the possibility, or otherwise, of a tipping point for a new order in Asia. Two years after China signed the provisional boundary accord with Pakistan, the latter sought to eject India out of the ISJK itself in 1965. The Archival and analytical references to India’s disillusionment with the plebiscite option in OSJK are too plentiful to be cited extensively. For a more recent analytical study, see M Shankar, The Reputational Imperative: Nehru’s India in Territorial Conflict, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, USA, 2018. 22  J W Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2001, p. 191. 23  H Nianlong (Editor-in-Chief ), Diplomacy of Contemporary China, New Horizon Press, Chai Wan, Hong Kong, 1990, pp. 187–188. 21 

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then British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Sir Morrice James, among others, later chronicled that Pakistan ignited the 1965 war with India over Kashmir. As that war raged, the US and Britain failed to persuade India and Pakistan to end the conflict and settle the OSJK issue. The Soviet Union, therefore, stepped into that empty strategic space, bringing India and Pakistan together in Tashkent. The Tashkent Declaration of January 1966 de-escalated the then Indo-Pakistani crisis without paving the way for a Kashmir solution.24 Thereafter, Pakistan created for itself an existential crisis in 1971 by alienating the country’s eastern wing by denying it of its rightful place in the national polity. Geographically, northern India occupied a huge space between the then western wing of Pakistan, which housed its national capital and military headquarters, and the then eastern wing of the same country. Millions of East Pakistanis, feeling alienated by Pakistan’s military high command and western-wing political leaders, fled to neighbouring India as refugees. Coincidentally at that time, Pakistan was also actively facilitating US moves towards an anti-Soviet rapprochement with China. The momentous Sino-US rapprochement of 1971–1972 was catalysed by the Sino-Soviet ideological rift within the global communist movement at the height of the then Cold War. Another momentous event during that phase of diplomatic history was that “non-aligned” India signed a treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971. What emerged as a result was a montage of strategic manoeuvres which involved global and regional players. In that context, the humanitarian crisis, caused by the massive refugee influx into India from the then East Pakistan, acquired unusual importance. The US and China, both Pakistan’s benefactors then, and India as well as its treaty-partner, the Soviet Union, got sucked into that vortex of geopolitics. India’s then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stood her ground against the US and China, secured Soviet diplomatic support, and “liberated” East Pakistan, soon renamed as Bangladesh. As a result, a traumatised Pakistan (by For a ringside diplomatic account of the Anglo-American efforts to resolve Kashmir issue prior to the Pakistan–India war of 1965, the war itself, and the Indo-Pakistani Tashkent Declaration, see Sir M James, Pakistan Chronicle (Edited, with an Introduction, by Peter Lyon), Oxford University Press, Bangalore Town, Karachi, Pakistan, 1993, pp. 83–87 and 127–157. 24 

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now, just its original western wing) entered into what is known as the Shimla Accord with India in 1972. The old Indo-Pakistani ceasefire line was converted into LoC, although conforming to the new military realities on the ground. Thereafter, Delhi often threw the rule book of Shimla Accord at Pakistan, asking it to discuss all of its issues with India in a purely bilateral framework as both had agreed.25 In another development, Pakistan intensified a nuclear-weapons programme, particularly alerted by India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974. In this regard, China began helping Pakistan which also resorted to “clandestine” means to obtain nuclear-weapons knowhow and materials.26

Many Challenges and Some Hope A key event on the India-Pakistan military front in the 1980s was that Delhi gained control of the commanding heights of Siachen Glacier (of OSJK) in 1984. On a different plane, by late-1980s, Delhi began seeing Pakistan as the force behind the political unrest on the Indian side of LoC in OSJK. In late1990, Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif told me, a journalist at that time, that his country was extending moral, political, and diplomatic support to the “freedom fighters” on the Indian side in OSJK. In Delhi’s eyes, those fighters were Pakistan-sponsored anti-India militants and terrorists. This factor, with varying intensities, continues to bedevil Indo-Pakistani relations at this writing. With India testing atomic weapons in 1998 and proclaiming itself as a legitimate nuclear power, Pakistan followed suit, with suspected Chinese support. This complicated the Indo-Pakistani bilateral matrix further. But the civilian leaders of India and Pakistan tried to stabilise their ‘nuclear’ equation through a peace process in February 1999. Nonetheless, Pakistani military tried to take armed control of the strategic Kargil Heights in ISJK from May 1999. But India forced the intruders to retreat by mid-July of that year. The Title and Articles 1(ii) and 6 of the Shimla Agreement of 1972 (Agreement on Bilateral Relations between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan) enshrined the principle of bilateralism, while Article 4(ii) created the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir (i.e. OSJK). 26  The story of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missiles programmes, which were aided by China and by Pakistan’s clandestine methods, is widely chronicled. See M Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, Oxon (UK), March 2014; and A Small, The China–Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, Random House India, Gurgaon, India, 2015, pp. 27–46. 25 

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Pakistan’s Kargil bid was a failed riposte to India’s success in 1984 in taking full military control of Siachen Glacier, in an area not covered by LoC in OSJK. Pakistan did respond by challenging India from the nearby Soltoro range, but India continues to keep the formidable Siachen. The Siachen– Soltoro theatre, the world’s most-forbidding highest-altitude battleground, is strategically located.27 During the Kargil crisis in May–July 1999, America was eager to avert a major clash between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Washington, therefore, pressured Islamabad to roll back its intrusion.28 The Kargil crisis erased the hopes raised in February 1999 by India’s then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s peace journey by the inaugural bus service from Delhi to Lahore (Pakistan). Vajpayee hailed from an Indian political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, suspected to have wanted to overturn the creation of Pakistan. So, while on Pakistani soil, Vajpayee proclaimed India’s acceptance of Pakistan as a sovereign, independent state. In addition, on 21 February 1999, Vajpayee and Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration. It enshrined constructive bilateral engagement through the Composite Dialogue which was started in the previous year.29 But all was not well within Pakistan.30 Pervez Musharraf, the military architect of Pakistan’s failed Kargil initiative, staged a successful coup and captured power in October 1999. However, and contrary to conventional wisdom, Vajpayee invited Musharraf to a summit meeting which took place in Agra (India) in July 2001. There is still controversy about who, for what reasons, torpedoed a possible last-minute agreement at Agra on the steps to resolve the Kashmir issue. For a detailed narrative on the evolution of Siachen crisis between India and Pakistan, see Lt Gen V R Raghavan, Siachen: Conflict Without End, Viking (Penguin Books India), 2002. For a missed opportunity to resolve Siachen crisis, see S Saran, How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century, Juggernaut Books, New Delhi, 2017, pp. 88–92. 28  S Raghavan, op. cit., pp. 324–328. 29  A key element of the Lahore Declaration of 21 February 1999 was the agreement between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons”. 30  For a study of Pakistan’s military and civil profiles, see T V Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World, Random House India, Gurgaon, India, 2014. 27 

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However, the missed opportunity mattered little. In Delhi’s eyes, Pakistani terrorists were responsible for the attack on the ISJK Legislative Assembly in Srinagar (India) in October 2001. Thereafter, India was furious over the terrorist attack on the Parliament Complex in Delhi in December 2001. Both these terrorist strikes, which India traced to Pakistan, caught much international attention. India mobilised its troops along the border with Pakistan in the wake of the terrorist strike on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The IndoPakistani dialogue process was also suspended. The modest transport and trade links between the two countries, too, suffered. However, no IndoPakistani war broke out on that occasion. Partly because, India was glad that the US was already exerting pressure on Pakistan following Al Qaeda’s terrorist blitzkrieg on pivotal American targets in September 2001. America’s pressure on Pakistan appeared to work. Washington and Delhi received assurances, in 2002 and 2004, respectively, from Musharraf that he would not allow Pakistan and the territories under its control to be used for terrorist forays into India.31 The Pakistani assurances in 2002, as relayed to India by high-ranking US officials, eased the Indo-Pakistani tensions triggered by the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. Moving on, Vajpayee held out a “Hand of Friendship” towards Pakistan in April 2003. He also proposed cross-LoC bus services (as distinct from the earlier cross-border Delhi-Lahore bus service).32 This was followed by an Indo-Pakistani ceasefire agreement in November 2003. The truce was meant to be observed all along the India–Pakistan international boundary besides the India–Pakistan LoC and the Siachen sector which is not part of LoC in OSJK. In that overall milieu, cross-LoC bus services to facilitate people-topeople contacts were started despite administrative hurdles. Formal IndoPakistani dialogue was resumed in 2004.

As reported in the early-2000s, top US officials of George W Bush’s Administration — namely Colin Powell and Richard Armitage — got assurances from Pakistan to end the ongoing infiltration of militants into India. However, those reported assurances gradually went up in smoke, metaphorically and in reality. 32  Despite the failure of Vajpayee–Musharraf summit at Agra (India) in 2001, Vajpayee made a significant peace overture to Pakistan during a speech at Srinagar (India) in April 2003. 31 

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In addition, “back channel diplomacy” between India and Pakistan from 2004 to 2007 clarified the Kashmir issue in realistic terms and contributed towards a potential settlement. India’s well-known diplomat Satinder Lambah, who spearheaded the Indian side for the “back-channel” diplomacy towards Pakistan, sounded optimistic in a later informal meeting with this author. Moreover, Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri positively projected the “back-channel” diplomacy during the Musharraf regime as an effort that nearly succeeded.33 However, the “back-channel” peace process, affected by Musharraf ’s exit from power, ground to a halt when several prime targets in Mumbai were attacked by terrorists on 26 November 2008. There were a number of international victims, too; however, India has not succeeded in persuading or pressuring Pakistan to bring the suspects to justice. This aspect is among the many sore issues in Indo-Pakistani engagement, but the two sides have come to accept their complicated coexistence as more or less a normal phenomenon.

All-Weather Sino-Indian Dialogue Several significant events and episodes during 2008 and up to the end of second decade in the 21st century have variously impacted on India’s foreign policy towards China and Pakistan. Notable among those events and episodes in 2008 were (a) the onset of a full-blown global financial crisis; (b) China’s spectacular, go-global Beijing Olympics that completely overshadowed the preceding pro-Tibetan, anti-China protests in several countries; (c) a truly exceptional waiver for India from the NSG guidelines in September of that year; and (d) the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 which India traced to Pakistan. The stimulus package China unrolled for invigorating its domestic economy and insulating it from the global financial crisis brought smiles to the Chinese leadership. For India, a splendid feather in its cap was the NSG waiver. But the gruesome terrorist attacks in Mumbai showed up India’s K Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Penguin/Viking, Gurgaon, India, 2015, pp. 289–353. See also S Coll, The Back Channel: India and Pakistan’s secret Kashmir talks, The New Yorker, 2 March 2009, http:// www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/02/the-back-channel. 33 

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vulnerability in an asymmetrical tussle with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism (as viewed in Delhi and some world capitals). On a Sino-Indian issue, Delhi prevented the India-based Tibetan exiles from disrupting the Beijing Olympics’ Torch Relay through Delhi in 2008. A period of relative lull in Sino-Indian diplomacy ensued, not marked by any severe crisis. Thereafter, in 2012, China and India set up a civil-military “mechanism” to address allegations of ‘‘incursions” by either side across the un-demarcated Line of Actual Control. Indeed, both sides deployed this “mechanism” to assess the complexity of their military clash and follow-on hostility in 2020. Sino-Indian diplomacy had in fact entered a qualitatively new phase from 2013 onwards. The two sides began engaging each other in “all-weather dialogue” despite many challenges of perceptions about mutual intentions. The serious talks Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi have held until the end of 2019 were punctuated by a tense military standoff at Doklam during June–August 2017. Xi and Modi held a path-breaking “informal meeting” in April 2018 despite India’s boycott of Xi’s launch of the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017 for global connectivity. The second Xi–Modi “informal meeting” took place in October 2019 despite China’s new pro-Pakistan tilt over Kashmir in August of the same year. The diplomacy of “all-weather dialogue” is my conceptualisation of the Sino-Indian talks which were held despite differences between the two sides over their respective perceptions and actions. A caveat is necessary, though. Uncontrolled confrontation or outright war can cause a climate crisis in the Sino-Indian diplomacy.

‘Perpetual’ Pakistan–India Tensions Following the gruesome terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008, with India tracing the perpetrators and masterminds to Pakistan, a period of simmering distrust ensued on this parallel bilateral front. In May 2014, India’s newly-elected Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, invited South Asian leaders to his swearing-in ceremony. Topping the list of invitees was the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif. Persuading Pakistan’s sceptical military leaders, Sharif attended Modi’s inauguration and held ice-breaking talks with him. However, the positive momentum of that

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breakthrough soon dissipated over differences on how the two countries should deal with the native Kashmiri leaders. On a different front, a game-changer affected the complex “coexistence” among China, India, and Pakistan in the first quarter of the 21st century. Xi Jinping launched a mega initiative in the name and style of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in April 2015. Various nuances of this project, which has complicated the Sino-Indian tussle for normal relations, are discussed in later chapters. Despite CPEC, in December 2015, Modi made a dramatic air-dash to Lahore and met Sharif on Christmas Day in a bid to revive the stalled India– Pakistan diplomatic dialogue. However, the Modi–Sharif meeting was followed by two major terrorist attacks in India, at an air force base and at an army camp, in 2016. Delhi traced both those attacks to Pakistan. Predictably, those attacks destroyed the incipient hopes that the “perpetual” IndoPakistani tensions might be eased, if not erased. India has had a worsening relationship with Pakistan, even after the advent of “modernist” Imran Khan as Pakistan’s Prime Minister in August 2018. In 2019, India and Pakistan nearly went to war in February following a terrorist attack at Pulwama on the Indian side of LoC in OSJK. India raised the issue of Pakistani culpability. Significantly in that context, China is believed to have reined in Pakistan, as we discuss later in this book. India took a strategic decision to re-set the future of ISJK on 5 and 6 August 2019. On those two days, the two Houses of Indian Parliament scrapped the special autonomous status enjoyed by ISJK under the Constitution of India until then. In a follow-up action on 31 October 2019, Delhi split ISJK into two new and non-autonomous union territories under the overall jurisdiction of India’s central (federal) government. The new union territories are Jammu and Kashmir (UTJK) as a single entity, and Ladakh (UTL) as a separate unit. These developments alarmed Pakistan and produced serious concern in China. The growing Chinese and Pakistani stakes in Delhi’s long-term options to solve the Kashmir issue complicate the “coexistence” among these three Asian neighbours. A later chapter shines the spotlight on this real story. These events, among other factors, will be crucial for the future of SinoIndian relations and might determine the emergence, or otherwise, of a tipping point for a new order in Asia.

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Why a Tipping Point in Sino-Indian Ties is so Elusive? A tipping point is an episode or a confluence of circumstances that could, or does, lead to a desired outcome in any field. Reason and good sense suggest that the desired outcome in PRC–India diplomacy is a non-confrontational and cooperative relationship. Surely, the perceived national interest of these two mega-state neighbours will shape their good, bad, or indifferent relationship at any time. But a cooperative or non-confrontational equation will enable them to act with confidence towards each other and the rest of the world. Such diplomacy can produce a cascading effect in the strategic, political, economic, and social sectors of Sino-Indian engagement. Early leaders like PRC’s Zhou Enlai and India’s Nehru were quick to recognise this truism. So, arguably, their enunciation of “peaceful coexistence” in 1954 was a creative initiative. It was conceptualised to produce momentum towards a tipping point in PRC–India diplomacy for their own benefit and global good. But, at that time and later, disillusioned Indian critics saw that episode as China’s deceitful diplomacy and Delhi’s naive faith in a falsehood. This would, nonetheless, appear to have been either an ideological view or an afterthought following the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Actually, we have seen that peaceful coexistence was agreed upon by both sides through due deliberation. Moreover, as we shall observe in Chapter 5, the accord might have led to China–India rapport if certain other developments had taken place. The crucial events that did not happen in that decade were Beijing’s inclusion as a UNSC permanent member, and a heart-to-heart Sino-Indian dialogue on Tibet. If those developments had occurred, there could have been a better understanding between Beijing and Delhi on Kashmir issue, too. In such a scenario, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence would have actually served a feasible purpose. Relevant nuances are suitably discussed in that chapter. Quirks of history played a part in nullifying the Five Principles as a positive tipping point in Sino-Indian diplomacy. But the two sides did not also seek to understand each other sufficiently because of their competing nationalisms and claims of entitlement to a historical boundary. Much time was lost until almost 1993 when confidence-building measures were agreed upon for the first time. But the aim of this mutual effort, which is sustained into the third decade of the 21st century, was (and, is) stability, not a positive tipping point.

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As we noted above, the 1993 “treaty” was designed to ensure peace and tranquillity along the contested Sino-Indian boundary. By then, the baggage of Kashmir- and Tibet-issues had narrowed the strategic space of both sides. An ambitious goal like a transformative positive relationship was unthinkable in those circumstances. Thereafter, Beijing’s dismay over Delhi’s nuclear-weaponisation in 1998, PRC’s continuous strategic support for Pakistan, and the US–India entente in the first decade of the 21st century complicated Sino-Indian ties. But it was not darkness all round. There was intermittent progress in China–India diplomacy, punctuated by their cooperation on global issues like climate change until almost 2015. But such episodic progress did not place SinoIndian ties on a transformative trajectory of positive synergy. In that milieu, Xi’s and Modi’s arrival at the helm in Beijing and Delhi, and their initial interactions in 2014, promised a course correction for the better. Yet, the promise turned into a mirage because of two events. In 2015, Xi took Islamabad firmly under his wings by launching the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, whose route covers an area India claims as its sovereign domain. And, by design or default, Sino-Indian military face-off at Doklam (Dong Lang) in 2017 was another stormy affair, although no bullet was fired by either side. In all, it did not take long for Xi and Modi to recognise the need to pick up momentum towards the elusive tipping point. By the third decade of the 21st century, they had resumed the journey through their “informal meetings” for free and frank dialogue on bilateral and global issues. As night follows day, the PRC-India military clash in June 2020 and their follow-on hostility raised the stakes of bilateral statesmanship to a new high. In this context, as we track the past, present, and the future in PRC–India diplomacy, in a thematic fashion in this book, the tipping point remains elusive. So, the quest for cooperative or at least non-confrontational Sino-Indian diplomacy calls for sublime statesmanship. Surely, it is a task easier said than accomplished. But what are leaders for, especially if they can continue to talk freely and frankly in a setting of “informal” diplomacy! The future of SinoIndian relations will also depend on PRC-US ties and the strategic quotient of America’s engagement with India in the 2020s and beyond.

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CHAPTER 2

RE-SETTING THE PRESENT

China and India ‘Negotiate’ Trust Playing pioneers in 2018, the leaders of India and China sought rapprochement which did not, however, prevent their military clash and follow-on manoeuvres in 2020. Their unusual meeting in Wuhan (China) in 2018 was rich in re-stating fine principles in a new ambience. The shadow of a previous Sino-Indian military confrontation at Doklam receded. But specific initiatives were left to be decided in the future.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met “informally”, for a frank exchange of views, in Wuhan (China) on 27 and 28 April 2018. The troubled Sino-Indian diplomacy was high on the agenda. Xi and Modi met at a picturesque location in Wuhan, 20 months before the bustling city stirred the world’s conscience as never before. Novel Corona Virus disease (COVID-19) was detected and reported in Wuhan in late-2019. While the scientific and geographical ‘origin’ of COVID-19 remained unproven, the disease became a global pandemic in early-2020. As the crisis worsened, US President Donald Trump1 described COVID-19 as a disease caused by “Chinese virus”.2 China opposed Throughout this book (except the Epilogue), Trump’s comments and actions pertain to his term in office before the US presidential poll in November 2020. 2  MFA, PRC, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on March 18, 2020, 2020/03/19, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/ t1757799.shtml (accessed on 19 March 2020). 1 

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“stigmatisation” and suggested a “science-based assessment” to determine the origin of this virus.3 After some time, Trump was reported to have stopped associating China directly with the disease. Unrelated to this episode, Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, identified Wuhan as “the epicentre of the [COVID] epidemic”.4 He was referring to Xi’s visit to that city to boost the morale of those battling the outbreak. In contrast to US–China arguments over COVID-19, India evacuated the nationals of several countries from Wuhan.5 Sun Weidong wrote on 13 March 2020, thanking India: “China and India have maintained close communication and cooperation on epidemic prevention and control. In a letter to President Xi, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi has expressed support for China. We appreciate the medical supplies provided by India and [we] have helped facilitate the safe return of Indian nationals in Hubei [province]. I am also deeply touched by the understanding and support in various ways from all sectors of the Indian society”.6 Fine sentiments amid a roller-coaster ride in Sino-Indian engagement. China, too, sent medical supplies, including half-a-million test kits, to India after the latter was also affected by COVID-19 by March 2020.7 Soon, however, Beijing was “deeply concerned” over the decision by Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) to “stop using” those Chinese kits.8 Seeking to reassure India in that context, China affirmed that it “attaches great importance to the quality of exported medical products”.9 Regardless of the merits Ibid. Chinese Embassy in India, Chinese Ambassador to India, H E Sun Weidong Publishes Article in The Hindu (2020-03-13), http://in.china-embassy.org/ (accessed on 19 March 2020). 5  MEA, GOI, Press Release by Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (13.03.2020), https://www. mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32535/Press_Release_by_Ministry_of_Health_and_ Family_Welfare_13032020. 6  Chinese Embassy in India, op. cit. 7  Xinhua, India receives half-a-million COVID-19 testing kits from China: official 2020-04-16 20:19:23, xinhuanet.com (Date of access not recorded). 8  Chinese Embassy in India, Response to Media Query by Spokesperson of Chinese Embassy in India Counsellor Ji Rong on ICMR’s Announcement to Stop Using Rapid Antibody Test Kits Procured from Chinese Companies 2020/04/28, http://in.china-embassy.org (accessed on 8 May 2020). 9  Ibid. 3  4 

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of this case, it illustrated how elusive a positive China–India tipping point could be even during a global humanitarian emergency. The bright silver lining in the Sino-Indian Big Picture, though, was the unusual summit-level “informal” dialogue. Ahead of the onset of the 70th anniversary of Sino-Indian diplomacy in April 2020, Xi and Modi held two “informal meetings”. The first meeting in Wuhan in April 2018, our focus here, arrested a downslide in Sino-Indian diplomacy. But China’s tilt towards Pakistan over the Kashmir issue in August 2019 severely rocked the improving Sino-Indian ties. Although all three countries sought to advance their respective interests, a Sino-Indian tipping point receded farther on the horizon. Yet, undaunted, Xi and Modi met “informally” again in October to address the fragility in their diplomacy. So, let us first see how they tried to steer PRC–India diplomacy in Wuhan in April 2018. They were under no pressure to make headlines. However, their meeting itself was a headline-grabber. The reason was simple but significant. Xi and Modi had met at Xiamen (China) in September 2017, soon after the Sino-Indian military standoff at Doklam (Dong Lang) was de-escalated in late-August. Therefore, their main task in Wuhan in 2018 was to rise above Doklam ill-will. A higher objective was to chart a new course for Sino-Indian diplomacy for the foreseeable future. The summit-level “informal meeting” was the result of Modi’s diplomacy,10 senior Chinese and Indian diplomats have told me. The two countries should ensure that their “differences do not become disputes”, Modi and Xi agreed at Astana (Kazakhstan) on 9 June 2017. That was about a week before Doklam crisis. By then, apparently, the Chinese had notified India of their plan to build a strategic road at Doklam plateau. The terrain overlooks a key arterial road in India. In April 2018, Xi and Modi visualised a diplomatic roadmap for the future in broad outline. The roadmap held good for their second “informal meeting” in October 2019 despite serious new differences over Kashmir issue. The Wuhan roadmap (2018) was like the first-generation satellite imagery. It was like an impressive but non-detailed picture taken from a manmade, remote-sensing satellite in the sky! In fact, as Xi said later, the Wuhan “consensus” was a “top-level design”. Surely, any “top-level design” requires My conversations with a high-ranking Chinese diplomat in Beijing in October 2019 and with a senior Indian official in Delhi in December 2019. 10 

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follow-up action at lower levels. The Wuhan “consensus”, too, left much to be done at lower levels, including on the Sino-Indian boundary disputes. So, why a Wuhan “speciality”, sceptics are bound to ask. The reason follows. China and India recognise that strategic trust and mutual respect are essential for their stable ‘coexistence’ as contiguous neighbours.11 They want to build mutual trust, consistent with their respective aspirations. Therefore, the first apex-level “informal” dialogue was an exercise in negotiating SinoIndian trust and mutual respect. For this, Xi and Modi were expected to be truthful. Their Wuhan dialogue was, therefore, like a reality show in diplomacy. Unlike in some reality shows, the Xi–Modi meeting was not a televised or filmed event from start to finish. At their concerted initiative, this was an extraordinary exercise in a confidential dialogue in Sino-Indian diplomacy — an authentic reality show. The meeting took place in a pleasant feel-at-home ambience. But the jury is still out — to determine the magnitude of mutual trust at that diplomatic reality show. As agreed in Wuhan, Xi and Modi held a second “informal meeting” — at Mahabalipuram (India) in October 2019. But, at this writing, it is not clear when the COVID-19 pandemic will end, facilitating another Xi–Modi “informal meeting” as agreed at Mahabalipuram. Obviously, videoconferencing will not suit a candid “informal meeting”. By April 2020, the onset of the 70th anniversary of PRC–India diplomacy, Xi and Modi had met 19 times, including at multilateral events. Fruitless, sceptics would say. There is more grist to their mills! The two countries continue to label the “informal” dialogues very differently. China often describes them as no more than “informal meetings” as if their outcomes are not binding on both countries. India views these talks as higher-category “informal summits” as if their outcomes are writs. Also, Chinese mandarins are fond of characterising the outcomes as “consensus”. This implies a lower-grade agreement such as a near- or real-convergence of views — unlike a joint statement or treaty. But Indian officials talk about the Since the arrival of Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi at the helm in China and India, respectively, the two countries have issued a series of joint statements. A glance at these documents will suffice to glean that the two sides find it necessary to reaffirm the first principles of normal neighbourly relations. 11 

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“spirit” of these conversations. “Spirit” can imply a bonding, not a formal agreement or a proverbial meeting of minds. These nuances show that China is conscious of its higher status in forums like United Nations Security Council (UNSC). But India appears keen to assert its potential “equality” with China. Despite this asymmetry, China and India were not negotiating “asymmetric normalcy”. The reasoning follows. “Asymmetric normalcy” is a system in which the stronger country will not threaten its relatively weaker interlocutor’s autonomy. Reciprocating, the relatively weaker state will not challenge the stronger side.12 Now, China has not held out any guarantee of refraining from threatening or undermining India’s strategic autonomy. India, on its part, has not held out any guarantee of refraining from challenging China’s status and power. In fact, Delhi’s aspirational goal, not a firm game-plan, is parity with Beijing. In contrast, China appears determined to stay ahead of India in a dynamic situation. These realities will apply to a potential post-COVID-19 world, too, at least when a new order begins to take shape. So, instead of seeking “asymmetric normalcy” as defined here, China and India were actually negotiating mutual trust. Why were they do so? The answer lies in their aspirations, so that neither side can easily upset the other’s plans. With such a multi-dimensional background in view, let us now focus on the context and overarching outcome of the Xi–Modi “informal” dialogue in Wuhan.

A Grey Zone of Tentative Rapprochement Framing the political context in Wuhan were the memories of a non-lethal but resolute Sino-Indian military face-off. For over 70 days from mid-June 2017 to 28 August 2017, the two sides stood firm at Doklam (Dong Lang). Therefore, in April 2018, Xi and Modi tried to script a new discourse in SinoIndian diplomacy. Their key objective was to ensure that Doklam crisis would fade away from memory or serve as a point of reference. The terminology of “asymmetric normalcy” has been attributed to Brentley Womack. See Anthony Reid and Zheng Yangwen, Editors, Negotiating Asymmetry: China’s Place in Asia, NUS Press, Singapore, 2009, p. 3. 12 

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The military crisis at Doklam in 2017 did not escalate to exchanges of fire. But the face-off on a plateau in the harsh Himalayan mountain range remained unresolved for over two months. Well-armed Chinese and Indian military personnel figured in the non-lethal encounter. India and China prevented each other from making any territorial or psychological gain. Eventually, when they ended the crisis on 28 August 2017, Sino-Indian civil and military diplomacy was the winner. Throughout, the context was geopolitical diplomacy at the bottom-line. Before Doklam crisis, India had boycotted Xi’s launch of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in Beijing on 14 May 2017. And, when the crisis ended, it was time for a summit of BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in Xiamen (China). (See a later chapter for Doklam dynamics.) In the context of de-escalation of the Doklam crisis in 2017, Xi–Modi “informal meetings” in 2018 and 2019 raised hopes of a civilised management of Sino-Indian differences. But the future of this chequered relationship depends on trustworthy actions, not comforting words, by both sides. For this, China and India tried, in Wuhan, to understand each other’s dynamic world-view better than before. So, let us now take a nuanced view of the overarching outcome of the Wuhan meeting. PRC and India created a new grey zone for bilateral dialogue, going beyond their old beaten-tracks. The old stereotypes, to name a few, were the aspirational friendship between India and China in the mid-20th century, their uncontrolled ill-will after their 1962 war, and their ultra-wary efforts at easing tensions since 1988. In Wuhan, by contrast, Xi and Modi produced a tentative rapprochement in Sino-Indian diplomacy. Such rapprochement was, in turn, reinforced by their willingness to explore a new modus vivendi — consistent with China’s and India’s core interests and major concerns. China is determined to stay ahead of India in comprehensive national strength even in a stable bilateral relationship. India will want to preserve its strategic autonomy and avoid becoming subservient to China. Within these limits, I see the tentative rapprochement reached in Wuhan as a grey zone for bilateral dialogue. The greyness is coloured by China’s and India’s reservations to accommodate each other’s core interests.13 For a detailed analysis of China’s and India’s core interests and major concerns in engaging each other, see: P. S. Suryanarayana, Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China–India Synergy (Chapter 3: Interests and Concerns), World Century Publishing Corporation, Hackensack, New Jersey, USA, 2016. 13 

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Briefly, India’s core interests in its engagement with China are: (a) Delhi’s quest for political détente and peaceful coexistence with Beijing on the basis of “mutual and equal security”14; (b) Delhi’s imperative of securing Beijing’s acceptance of India’s territorial integrity, covering areas governed and claimed legally by the country; (c) India’s priority of securing balanced trade with China, and erasing or reducing Delhi’s economic and riparian concerns vis-à-vis Beijing; and (d) China’s acceptance of India’s “rightful” places in all institutions of international governance, especially UNSC, Nuclear Suppliers Group etc. China’s core interests vis-à-vis India are: (a) perpetuation of Beijing’s sovereign control over Tibet as a part of PRC; (b) preservation of ‘One-China’ concerning Taiwan, currently outside PRC’s geography, besides Tibet; (c) preservation and protection of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor; (d) prevention of deep linkages between India and the real or potential antiChina powers including US in particular; (e) retention of China’s asymmetric advantages over India. China’s and India’s core interests are practical propositions. Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is emblematic of PRC’s focus on the high stakes of being a great power. India’s high stakes are to ensure that its core interests and major concerns are not affected in a new global or Asian order. India may, therefore, want to maintain reasonably good terms with its powerful neighbour, China. Conversely, China, with a greater comprehensive national strength, need not feel the need to befriend India. Yet, China sees India as an ‘India+’ force because of its “strategic partnerships” with US, Japan, and even post-Soviet Russia. For China, America is the rival, Russia an ally by conviction or for convenience, while Japan (like India) is a difficult neighbour. Aware of this paradox of proximity, at this writing, China is seeking a mutually convenient modus vivendi with India. This calculus was The undefined principle of “mutual and equal security” has figured in several China–India confidence-building agreements since 1993. 14 

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the geostrategic rationale that encouraged Xi and Modi to reach some “consensus” in Wuhan. In this nuanced interpretation of the overarching outcome of the Wuhan meeting, there was scope for the two leaders to create a stable China–India environment. However, because of their contentious neighbourliness, they sought to re-set, not balance, their asymmetrical equation. Unsurprisingly, they achieved only a modest “consensus” to manage, merely manage, their diplomacy. By and large, the Wuhan “consensus” marked a post-Doklam search for some predictability and stability. But the search ran aground during the China-India border clash in June 2020 and their follow-on manoeuvres.

Life-Line of Sino-Indian Engagement If sustained, the Wuhan “consensus” and the follow-up sentiments at the Xi–Modi meeting at Mahabalipuram may constitute a life-line for China– India diplomacy in the near-term. Mutual trust and total rapprochement can be the relatively longer-term goals. But the trajectory will be shaped by a potential or real post-COVID Asian and global geostrategic and geoeconomic order. This is not to be scoffed at — by the third decade of the 21st century — if one goes by China’s hard-sell of the Wuhan “consensus”, our focus in this chapter. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi disclosed that the political wavelengths of conversations between Xi and Modi were compatible. Wang Yi noted further that Xi drew Modi into a serious conversation with a colourful preface. In Xi’s imagination, the Chinese “dragon” and the Indian “elephant” should engage in a stately “duet”, not a “duel”! Modi, desirous of turning over a new leaf in the chequered Sino-Indian relations, cheerfully responded to Xi. For Modi, if India and China were to work together on the global stage, one plus one, instead of becoming two, would synergise into eleven!15 An explanation for the metaphorical and arithmetical extravaganza of Xi and Modi, respectively, is easy to discern. Both leaders projected a comforting vision, respectively, in order to come out of the shadow of the Doklam MFA, PRC, Wang Yi Talks about China–India Relations: Explore the Path of Co-existence and Win–Win Results for Major Neighboring Countries 2018/12/11, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1621539.shtml (accessed on 25 December 2018). 15 

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crisis. Of course, their rhetorical idealism had a surreal quality. The strategic reality of the Doklam confrontation might have prompted Xi and Modi to trade in idealism as a political antidote.

‘Stability’ Story and a ‘New Starting Point’ Chinese and Indian diplomats have a story about the genesis of the Wuhan meeting. Xi and Modi met on the margins of the BRICS summit at Xiamen (China) on 4 September 2017. The Doklam crisis was de-escalated a few days earlier, on 28 August. The Xi–Modi meeting at Xiamen had no business-as-usual agenda. Therefore, they began to think of a “mechanism” to stabilise, not resolve, the rocky Sino-Indian equation. As we have observed, Modi had already suggested trouble-shooting talks by the leaders themselves. In that light, at Xiamen, Xi and Modi agreed on Sino-Indian summit-level “informal meetings” for candid and constructive talks whenever possible. Before the Wuhan meeting in April 2018, the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, confirmed the decision made at Xiamen in September 2017. Beyond Sino-Indian urgency, the idea of “heart-to-heart talks”, Luo said, was decided upon to meet the “backlash against globalization”.16 China’s rising global profile was at stake because of waning globalization. Hence, a sense of urgency on Beijing’s part. Xi–Modi conversation in Wuhan marked the first of their four meetings in quick succession in 2018. This was the best year in Sino-Indian diplomatic engagements since 1954, when the two sides proclaimed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Sixty-four years later, Xi and Modi agreed in Wuhan in 2018 to “carry forward the fine norms enshrined in the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”. Moreover, these Principles were now hailed as “a stellar example of joint initiatives by the two countries”.17 Luo Zhaohui’s media article, China–India cooperation outweighs our differences 2018/04/27, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1554988. shtml (accessed on 30 May 2018). 17  MFA, PRC, China, India reach broad consensus in informal summit 2018/04/30, http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1555656.shtml (accessed on 30 May 2018). All points of agreement between Xi and Modi at their Wuhan meeting in April 2018, as cited in this chapter, are from this Chinese official web-link. 16 

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To recap, the Five Principles are: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) equal and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. China has frequently pledged to pursue these Principles, especially since Deng Xiaoping’s ascent as the paramount leader in the late-1970s. For Delhi, though, these Principles sounded hollow after the Sino-Indian war in 1962. A high-ranking Chinese diplomat told me in Beijing on 16 November 2018 that China views the 1962 war as only “a border conflict”. He said “China does not really treat India as a defeated nation”. This is true, considering the intensity of Sino-Indian diplomatic exchanges, especially since 1988. In that year, Deng received the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Beijing. They decided that Sino-Indian diplomacy should be freed from the confrontational politics and divisive polemics triggered by the causes and consequences of the 1962 war. By the third decade of the 21st century, an enlightened ambience, which fleetingly enveloped Sino-Indian diplomacy in 1988, can still serve as a guide. However, India remains aggrieved over China’s perceived disdain for “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty”. Why? Mainly because the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through GilgitBaltistan (G-B), an area Islamabad holds but India claims as its sovereign domain. With China and India unable to see eye to eye on the critical CPEC issue, the Wuhan “consensus” or “spirit” was potentially fragile. So, Xi, while meeting Modi at Qingdao (China), for the second time in 2018, described their earlier Wuhan dialogue as “a new starting point” in Sino-Indian diplomacy. Modi reciprocated by characterising the Wuhan talks as “a milestone” in India’s diplomatic engagement with China. Xi spoke yet again about the future relevance of the Wuhan “consensus” when he met Modi, at Johannesburg (South Africa), for the third time in 2018. Addressing Modi directly, Xi said: “We have provided [in Wuhan] top-level design for bilateral ties from a macroscopic perspective and [in] a timely fashion, which is conducive to mobilizing the positive elements of all sectors in both countries and [conducive to] uniting the wills of the 2.6 billion people of the two countries, so as to form a force that would push bilateral ties into the future”.18 MFA, PRC, Xi says China to boost closer development partnership with India, 2018/07/27, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xgswfcxjxgjmlqs/t1580861.shtml (accessed on 12 August 2018). 18 

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A long sentence, but Xi’s message cannot be missed. He projected the Wuhan dialogue as a marker for the future of Chinese and Indian diplomacy. The overarching outcome in Wuhan was an agreed “broad consensus” on two aspects. These relate to (a) the national identities of China and India in the bilateral domain and (b) general, not specific, policy prescriptions to resolve issues in the bilateral and multilateral spheres.

Chinese, Indian Self-Images The trajectory of any bilateral diplomacy is determined by the way the states concerned see themselves. Let us consider the Xi–Modi “consensus” in the light of their respective national self-images. China and India were viewed as “celebrated civilizations” and “important countries with strategic autonomy”. First, consider strategic autonomy. As an elementary insight, strategic autonomy is the inherent attribute, or natural characteristic, of each and every sovereign state in the current international system. If not, a sovereign state cannot be deemed to be sovereign at all! Yet, PRC and India have exercised extraordinary strategic autonomy since their emergence as independent players on the global stage. This should explain why Xi and Modi affirmed their respective country’s strategic autonomy as a value to be cherished. The term, strategic autonomy, denotes a state’s preference for pursuing an independent foreign policy without interference from external actor(s). Also embedded in the term is a state’s ability to formulate and pursue an independent foreign policy. So viewed, the evolution of China’s and India’s foreign policies in the past will determine their future trajectories. The past evolution of PRC’s foreign policy is an interesting story. There were two distinctive phases during the formative era of Mao Zedong from 1949 to the mid-1970s. Initially, as a revolutionary communist state in alliance with the Soviet Union, China pursued an ideological struggle against the US until the early-1970s. Mao had, by the early-1970s, broken ranks with the Soviet Union over intra-communist ideologies and his vision of Chinese national interest. So, he dramatically befriended America for an anti-Soviet cause. Mao’s tectonic shift towards the US in 1971 enabled PRC to fulfil its diplomatic dream of becoming a UNSC permanent member with the coveted veto power. There was room for Mao’s shift because of America’s liberal-capitalist struggle against Soviet communism. UN witnessed an avalanche of support for PRC

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when the then US President Richard Nixon began preparing for an antiSoviet handshake with Mao. Ironically, the Soviet Union did not exercise its own veto to block PRC which, too, was paradoxically kept out of all UN bodies until then. Behind the US’s calculations to legitimise Mao in the early-1970s was an enduring reality in American politics since he won the Chinese civil war and founded PRC. Summarising this reality, Henry Kissinger, who played a pivotal role in US–PRC rapprochement in the 1970s, has written the following: “no American President [had] seriously considered a campaign to reverse the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war”.19 Originally, in my view, the US was aware of the potential costs of any optional “campaign” against Mao. PRC’s performance in the Korean War in early-1950s was a deterrent factor against a military “campaign” to unseat Mao. In 2020, however, Trump began challenging the legitimacy of PRC’s long-governing Communist Party, as Sino-American diplomacy hit a nadir. The original US pragmatism was a catalyst in PRC’s emergence on the global stage by early-1970s, as Kissinger pointed out. At the other end of US–PRC spectrum, Mao’s alliance with Soviet Union in the first instance, and his “quasi-alliance”20 with US later, were circumstantial necessities. But he displayed strategic autonomy when he left the Soviet bloc and moved towards America in early-1970s. That was classic realpolitik. Under Deng, in post-Mao period in the 20th century, China began asserting its strategic autonomy vigorously. In December 1988, when the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv visited Beijing, Deng sought to make common cause. They wanted to work towards the creation of a “new international political order”, “new international economic order”, and a world free of “power politics”. However, China and India signalled their independent strategic choices in this regard, agreeing to make their “own contributions”.21 H. Kissinger, On China, The Penguin Press, New York, USA, 2011, p. 152. Ibid, p. 276. 21  MFA, PRC, Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique (Beijing, 23 December 1988), https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2711_663426/ 2712_663428/t15913.shtml (accessed on 18 February 2019). Also, see: John W Garver, China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2016, pp. 443–444. 19  20 

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Deng’s successors sought to navigate in a world increasingly dominated by America’s ‘unipolar’ primacy. From the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 to the global financial crisis in 2008, America held sway. During that period, China generally improvised its foreign policy rather than adopting a doctrinaire approach. Thereafter, the global financial crisis and Beijing’s economic countermeasures facilitated China’s quest for comprehensive national strength in the political, economic and military domains. Consequently, China acquired enormous national strength as the second largest economy and a superior military power. From this vantage point, Xi has now projected his foreign policy as pure strategic autonomy. This is partially true with reference to India. As we shall see in later chapters, CPEC security and China’s ‘supremacy’, rather than Pakistan’s India-related concerns, animates Xi’s updated policy on Kashmir issue. The story of India’s strategic autonomy is equally interesting. Delhi struck a note of ‘creative’ nonalignment under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in the 1950s. Ideationally, such a policy could be construed as genuine strategic autonomy. Nehru would not join either America’s liberalcapitalist camp or Soviet Union’s communist bloc. He wanted to insulate a newly-independent India from the politics of Cold War protagonists. At the same time, he befriended communist PRC as an Asian partner until he got disillusioned before the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Nehru’s nonalignment completely collapsed in all but name during the 1962 war. Reeling under China’s military pressure on that occasion, Nehru sent an urgent appeal to the then US President John Kennedy for massive military help. The then US Secretary of State Dean Rusk de-coded Nehru’s appeal on the following lines: “[I]t amounts to a request for an active and practically speaking unlimited military partnership between the United States and India to take on [the then ongoing] Chinese invasion of India”. Rusk was amazed that Nehru sought “not only a military alliance between India and the United States but complete commitment by us [Americans] to a fighting war”.22 In the event, Mao called off the war before India’s survival might have become dependent on massive American aid.

A top American official’s archived comments on India’s urgent request for US military aid during the Sino-Indian war of 1962. See: S. Raghavan, The Most Dangerous Place: A History of the United States in South Asia, Penguin Random House India, Gurgaon, India, 2018, p. 221. 22 

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Unfazed by that existential dilemma, India after Nehru continued to pursue nonalignment, including under the banner of “genuine nonalignment” for some time. Realities forced other choices. In 1971, India’s then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed a friendship treaty with Soviet Kremlin and got a subtle security cover. Armed with that treaty, she faced what was seen in Delhi as a US–China–Pakistan ‘axis’ in all but name. Thereafter, as the treaty lost its rationale, it was time for the basics — strategic autonomy. In 2005, Delhi and Washington signed a defence partnership, which was extended in 2015 for another decade. At the same time, and in exercise of strategic autonomy, India retained its defence relationship with post-Soviet Russia. Delhi purchased from Moscow the state-of-the-art S-400 missile systems in 2018 despite potential US sanctions. Interestingly, Modi flaunted India’s strategic autonomy in 2018, after avoiding the terms ‘autonomy’ and ‘nonalignment’ when he came to power in 2014. At ‘Shangri-La Dialogue’ in Singapore on 1 June 2018, he emphasised India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy by his watch. For this, he cited India’s partnerships with Russia and US, and his Wuhan dialogue with Xi.23

India ‘Matters’ to China While China figured prominently in India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, does India similarly matter to China? The answer is a qualified “yes”. The Wuhan dialogue of 2018 and the Xi–Modi “informal meeting” at Mahabalipuram in 2019 illustrated China’s strategic experiment of intensive dialogue with India at the helm of affairs. This, despite China’s close ties with Pakistan, which has an adversarial relationship with India and vice versa. Take, for example, two cases which are analysed in a later chapter. China resorted to a balancing act of ensuring stability during the Pakistan–India crisis over a terrorist attack in India in February–March 2019. However, P. S. Suryanarayana, India’s Strategy of Connectivity and Autonomy, RSIS Commentary CO18095, 11 June 2018, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co18095-indias-strategy-of-connectivity-andautonomy/#.XqjDcG5uIn8; Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India (GOI), Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (01 June 2018), http:// www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime_Ministers_Keynote_Address_ at_Shangri_La_Dialogue_June_01_2018 (accessed on 1 June 2018). 23 

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Beijing began to extend strong support to Pakistan over Kashmir issue from August 2019. These two cases illustrated two different aspects of Xi’s strategic autonomy vis-à-vis India. In the first case in February–March 2019, China wanted to rise above its special ties with Pakistan while dealing with India. Why? In the issue at stake then, a Pakistan-based terrorist group acknowledged its culpability. And, as we discuss in a later chapter, China’s enlightened interest, too, was at stake. In the second case, triggered by Delhi’s new Kashmir policy from August 2019, Xi did not renounce China’s special ties with Pakistan. Mainly because, he would not promote India’s cause at the expense of his country’s own ‘interest’. In all, it appears that Xi has taken control of China’s ‘India file’.24 He has been proactively directing China’s full-scope engagement with both US and Russia. In this light, India may have acquired a niche position in Xi’s world view. This does matter because Xi is arguably the most powerful Chinese leader since at least Deng. Xi’s new focus on India shows his urgency to keep China’s neighbouring flanks secure as he pilots his country’s rise on the global stage. The same reason applies to Xi’s stake in Pakistan’s relations with India. Beijing also faces new challenges from Washington on trade, technology, security, and global public health since the outbreak of COVID-19. Xi would, therefore, like to safeguard China’s core interests in respect of both the Sino-Indian equation and the Pakistan-India relations. Beyond South Asia, China’s “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination” with Russia is the best example of Beijing’s strategic autonomy vis-à-vis America. At this writing, Beijing and Moscow, on one side, and Washington, on the other, have an unsettled relationship. Explicit from the above discussion is the common identity of China and India as neighbours pursuing strategic autonomy. This was indeed a major point that Xi and Modi agreed upon during their 2018 Wuhan dialogue. Another common identity recognised by these two leaders is the status of China and India as “celebrated civilizations”. They have long histories, rich cultural traditions, and linguistic attainments. Xi and Modi, therefore, China’s heightened interest in dealing with India, vis-à-vis the US and Russia, was characterised by a veteran Indian diplomat, Prabhat P Shukla, as Xi’s ‘India file’. 24 

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agreed to set up a new Sino-Indian “mechanism” for people-to-people and cultural exchanges. This “mechanism” was launched in Delhi in 2018; a second meeting was held in Beijing in 2019. In China’s view, this mechanism could create a “social foundation”25 and become a soft-power platform for diplomatic engagement. The stated objective is a full Sino-Indian rapprochement in due course or the long run.26 However laudable this might be, a caveat must be considered. A sensible approach of this kind will be a time-consuming exercise. Nonetheless, a project of rapprochement, driven entirely by the state leaderships on both sides, will require popular support for durable success. Otherwise, state-to-state rapprochement may collapse like a castle in the air, especially when the two sides pride themselves on being competitive civilisations. Yet, the diplomatic and political institutions of these two states, when endowed with expertise, cannot be supplanted by any social group. Another reality is that the people on both sides, aware of their civilisational heritage, may want to shape a Sino-Indian future by themselves. Logically, overall, it will take a long time to attain mutual trust by establishing a “social foundation”. In fact, innovative diplomacy, with a positive outlook at the state-to-state level, will be indispensable as a catalyst for a full Sino-Indian rapprochement. This is especially true, because there are no proactive ‘social’ constituencies in either China or India to champion a total rapprochement. The Wuhan dialogue was, therefore, designed to re-set Sino-Indian diplomacy. But the Wuhan re-set was severely rocked by a surge of nationalism in both countries against each other following the Sino-Indian military clash in mid-June 2020. Conspicuous was the absence of proactive constituencies in both countries for friendship towards each other. Moreover, the idea of building a MFA, PRC, Wang Yi: A Series of Important Consensuses Have Been Reached at the First Meeting of China–India High-level People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges Mechanism, 2018/12/22, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1625518.shtml (accessed on 3 January 2019). 26  P.S. Suryanarayana, ‘New Way’ to Manage Sino-Indian Engagement? RSIS Commentary CO19007, 10 January 2019, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, https:// www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/new-way-to-manage-sino-indian-engagement/#.XGLyv_ ZuLal; Also, see: P S Suryanarayana, The ‘softer’ side of Asia’s giants, 20 February 2019, East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/02/20/the-softer-side-of-asias-giants/#more-170309. 25 

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“social foundation” for Sino-Indian friendship, far from being a long-term proposition, appeared to be a lost cause, at least in the near-term.

No New Ideas on Parleys and Partnership The Wuhan “consensus” was eloquent on principles and selective on specifics. After discussing Sino-Indian boundary disputes, Xi and Modi adopted a highly generalised prescription for an eventual settlement. They merely agreed to “use the [existing] Special Representatives’ Meeting on the Boundary Question to seek a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable settlement”. It was, however, asserted that “[t]he two militaries will strengthen confidence-building measures and enhance communication and cooperation to uphold border peace and tranquillity”.27 But the China-India border clash in June 2020 and their follow-on manoeuvres exposed the challenges of military leaders on both sides to uphold peace and tranquillity. The “meeting” or “mechanism” of Special Representatives was decided by China and India in 2003. By then, both sides were frustrated over the failure of a series of official-level negotiations. So, the Special Representatives, appointed for the first time in 2003, were mandated to evolve a settlement on the basis of a strategic and political perspective. They were expected to avoid the beaten tracks of undue emphasis on each other’s historical claims and mere diplomatic bargaining. Armed with such an innovative mandate, successive Special Representatives from both countries have met 22 times, with no agreement, however, as of this writing. As a political principle, the mantra of “a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable settlement” was in vogue for years prior to the Wuhan meeting in 2018. Almost 30 years before, this principle was first agreed upon when India’s Rajiv called on China’s Deng in December 1988. According to a Chinese scholar, Liu Xuecheng, “Rajiv’s visit symbolised the [then] general [global] trend of transition from hostility and confrontation to détente and

MFA, PRC, China, India reach broad consensus in informal summit 2018/04/30, http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1555656.shtml (accessed on 30 May 2018). As already stated, all points of agreement between Xi and Modi at Wuhan in April 2018, as cited in this chapter, are traceable to this Chinese official web-link. 27 

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dialogue”.28 This was true, but Liu’s comment did not cover the relevant Sino-Indian context in 1988. As I ascertained later from Chinese and Indian diplomatic sources, the Sino-Indian context in 1988 was this: (1) Deng was aware of India matching China in a military confrontation at Sumdorongchu in 1986. (2) Deng made a pioneering appraisal of the potential for Sino-Indian economic cooperation. (3) US–PRC entente and Soviet-India treaty, both of which were fashioned in 1971, lost their importance by 1988. These factors defined the strategic climate for the Deng–Rajiv discussions in that year. In fact, back in 1982, Deng is believed to have assessed that Sino-Indian boundary disputes could be easily resolved. His counsel to those dealing with the boundary questions at that time was the following: “The problems between China and India are not very great. There is no threat posed by China to India and nor is there a threat India poses to China. It is no more than a boundary issue. As long as the two sides take reasonable and sensible measures, the border dispute, in my opinion, is not a hard nut to crack”.29 Another principle predating the Wuhan meeting in 2018 was that of upholding peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the disputed border areas. This concept actually formed the nucleus of the first-ever Sino-Indian confidence-building agreement, signed in 1993. The then Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao imagined the accord and made concerted efforts with China’s Jiang Zemin. At that time, PRC was still beset with foreign policy challenges because of international criticism of Deng’s strong-arm response to “pro-democracy” Chinese activists in 1989.30 Liu Xuecheng, Look Beyond the Sino-Indian Border Dispute, China Institute of International Studies, www.ciis.org.cn/english/2011-08/11/content_4401017.htm (accessed on 16 March 2020). 29  Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] 3, edited by Editorial Committee on Party Literature of the CPC [Communist Party of China] Central Committee, People’s Publishing House, Beijing, 1993, p. 15–as cited by Yin Bin, in China–India Relations: Review and Analysis, Volume 1, Chief Editor: Ye Hailin, Translator: Chen Mirong, Polisher: William White, Social Sciences Academic Press (China) and Paths International Ltd., UK, 2014, p. 2. 30  As noted earlier, for an “insider’s” account of how India’s Narasimha Rao crafted the “peace and tranquillity” agreement with China’s Jiang Zemin in 1993, see Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC., 2016, pp. 7–33. 28 

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It is clear that, in Wuhan in 2018, Xi and Modi reached no breakthrough on the boundary disputes. However, it was significant that the issues were deferred to the future, with no timeline set for a settlement, especially so after the 2017 Doklam crisis. A key outcome of the Wuhan meeting was a commitment to “strengthen the China–India Closer Developmental Partnership”. It may appear strange that a reaffirmation of an existing partnership can be viewed as progress. But the renewed commitment was meant to eclipse the Doklam crisis, the first serious phase in Sino-Indian relations in the 21st century. Xi and Modi decided as follows in Wuhan: “Both sides agree to advance all-round cooperation and strengthen the China–India Closer Developmental Partnership in an equal-footed, mutually beneficial, and sustainable manner to support their national modernisation”. To strengthen the developmental partnership, first agreed upon in 2014, is to facilitate “national modernization”. This was the Xi–Modi prescription. It can be argued, though, that China’s and India’s national modernisation or rejuvenation is best accomplished by their respective efforts at home. The “Chinese dream” or “China dream” or, more recently, China’s “new era” is very much a domestic agenda. The same is true of India’s development agenda. Given this basic truism, the China–India developmental partnership has to be carefully fine-tuned if it is to contribute to national rejuvenation in both countries. For such fine-tuning, bilateral trade and investments, and moves towards a full political rapprochement, will have to be stepped up. A total political rapprochement or at least a non-adversarial relationship is the overarching requirement for Sino-Indian trade and investments as well. The Wuhan meeting in 2018 signified post-Doklam search for political will on both sides to try and move towards a mutually acceptable nonadversarial relationship. But the clear absence of any problem-solving agreement showed in fresh light how elusive the positive Sino-Indian tipping point was for the two leaders. As for the transparent objective of negotiating mutual trust in Wuhan, the two sides remained far apart. The story was similar even after the Xi–Modi meeting at Mahabalipuram in 2019. The history of seven decades of Sino-Indian diplomatic relations is dotted with frequent despair, and fleeting hopes. Unsurprisingly, in this milieu, the geopolitical road from Wuhan to Mahabalipuram and beyond has not been smooth.

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CHAPTER 3

THE STRATEGIC CLIMATE

Coexistence of a Geopolitical Trinity Two crises, involving India and China besides Pakistan, defined the challenges in Sino-Indian diplomacy before Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi met “informally” at Mahabalipuram (India) in October 2019. China played a “mutual friend of India and Pakistan” during the first crisis, raising some hopes of a positive PRC–India tipping point. But it became as elusive as ever during the second crisis. The Sino-Indian military clash in June 2020 sparked a bilateral crisis which may shape the future of this relationship.

The Sino-Indian strategic environment during the run-up to the Xi–Modi “informal meeting” at Mahabalipuram (India) on 11 and 12 October 2019 was shaped by two crises. Both involved India, PRC, and Pakistan, China’s “all-weather strategic and cooperative partner”. Strategic nuances of ‘coexistence’ among China, India, and Pakistan defined both crises. These three Asian neighbours are, therefore, imagined as an unusual ‘geopolitical’ trinity. A series of candid “informal meetings”, if held, between China’s and India’s leaders may alter this reality for the good of all three countries over time. In the first crisis before the meeting at Mahabalipuram, China tried to de-escalate and defuse India–Pakistan tensions. To do so, Beijing refrained from overtly supporting Pakistan. Yet, Beijing pursued its strategic calculus of preserving and protecting the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC passes through an area which Pakistan administers but India deems as its own sovereign domain. So, Delhi has consistently opposed 43

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CPEC. Beijing’s attitude towards Delhi during this crisis was arguably a sign for the potential emergence of a PRC–India tipping point for their and global good. But India’s opposition to CPEC and Beijing’s strategic focus on the security of this project remain incompatible. In the second crisis, by contrast, China supported Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. India missed the Wuhan “spirit”, elusive indeed was a positive Sino-Indian tipping point. As a dual strategy, China championed its core interests and Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue. This appeared to be Beijing’s response to Delhi’s policy of fully integrating the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK) with the rest of India.1 Unsurprisingly, the goal of normal ‘coexistence’ among China, India, and Pakistan became more challenging than before. Kashmir is a generic term for the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK, in this study). As we know, OSJK acceded to India, instead of Pakistan, at the time of their independence from Britain in 1947. The accession was accepted by the then British Governor General of newlyindependent India. However, as a result of the political, military, and diplomatic events that followed, India retained the largest portion of OSJK, while Pakistan got two other portions. Delhi claims sovereign entitlement to those two portions, citing OSJK’s “irrevocable” accession to India. Pakistan named the portions it administers as Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AK) (simply Azad Kashmir at first) and Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) (Northern Areas at first). Until 31 October 2019, Delhi retained the largest portion of OSJK as an autonomous State under the Constitution of India. To avoid confusion, I refer to this portion as the autonomous Indian State (i.e. province) of Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK). Scrapping its autonomy on 31 October 2019, Delhi disbanded ISJK itself. It was, instead, reconstituted as two non-autonomous units which were immediately brought under India’s direct federal jurisdiction. India claims sovereign entitlement to all other units, too, of OSJK. These units are AK and G-B, both under Pakistan’s control; and Aksai Chin, which ISJK, for the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, is an acronym I have used. The original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK) acceded to India in 1947 but got divided between India and Pakistan in the same year. India retained the largest portion of OSJK. I use the acronym of ISJK to specify this portion which has remained with India. This does not mean or imply any political stance on my part. 1 

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PRC administers, claiming sovereignty over that area. In addition to these areas, a strip of land, known as Shaksgam Valley, is counted by Delhi as a part of OSJK and, therefore, an Indian domain. But Beijing views Shaksgam as an intrinsic part of Xinjiang and, therefore, PRC’s territory.

Warlike Tensions over Kashmir Issue, and China’s Diplomacy Defining the first strategic crisis before Mahabalipuram meeting, warlike hostilities broke out between India and Pakistan in late-February 2019. Skyrocketing tensions were sparked by a terrorist strike at Pulwama on the Indian side of Pakistan–India Line of Control (LoC) on 14 February. Pulwama lies near LoC, the de facto dividing line between India and Pakistan in a strategic region of OSJK. The suicide-bombing at Pulwama claimed the lives of at least 40 of India’s paramilitary personnel. As before, Delhi blamed Pakistan for this in a series of terrorist attacks that India suffered. India’s view was shared by the US. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval of India disclosed that the [then] US National Security Advisor John Bolton “supported India’s right to selfdefence against cross-border terrorism [from Pakistan]”.2 In a tweet, Bolton was more categorical. “Pakistan”, he said, “must crack down on JeM [Jaishe-Mohammad] and all terrorists operating from its territory”.3 Bolton was going by the fact that JeM, a Pakistan-based group, owned responsibility for the attack at Pulwama. JeM already figured in a list of terrorist organisations proscribed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). China took note of the involvement of this Pakistan-based group in the attack at Pulwama. Islamabad’s initial version was that a “resident” on the Indian side “ostensibly” carried out the attack in protest against Delhi’s hold over ISJK. However, China viewed the Pulwama incident as terrorism, while Pakistan sought UN’s active intervention on that occasion. China’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India (GOI), https://www.mea.gov.in/ press-releases.htm?dtl/31058/Readout_of_Telephonic_Conversation_between_National_ Security_Advisor_Ajit_Doval_and_US_NSA_Amb_John_Bolton (accessed on 21 November 2019). 3  John Bolton’s Twitter message, Feb 16, 2019, WH Digital, retrieved through Google on 21 November 2019. 2 

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diplomatic posture might have actually suited India. But the Modi government, acting autonomously, carried out a “pre-emptive” counterterror strike against a “training camp” at Balakot inside Pakistan on 26 February. This was possible because Indian Air Force planes entered the Pakistani airspace undetected.4 Pakistan retaliated through aerial action on the following day. India lost a plane whose pilot was captured by Pakistan. In turn, Delhi asserted that the Indian pilot shot down a Pakistani fighter jet which Pakistan had received from the US in the past. India and Pakistan broke into a war of words, too, about gains and losses in the high-voltage atmosphere. At that stage, China decided to play a new role as “a mutual friend of India and Pakistan” to defuse their warlike confrontation.5 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi discussed the crisis with the then Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj. Their discussion took place on the margins of a Russia–India–China (RIC) meeting at Wuzhen (China) on 27 February. Thereafter, Wang Yi briefed Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi about China’s “work on promoting peace talks” between India and Pakistan. China also hoped that “Pakistan and India will exercise restraint and earnestly fulfil their commitment to preventing the aggravation of the situation”.6 It was apparent from Wang Yi’s formulation that China was informed by India and Pakistan of their respective “commitment” to ease the situation. Following China’s ‘intervention’, Pakistan released the Indian pilot in March. India also did not press ahead with its apparent plans to take the fight into the Pakistani camp. China, therefore, projected itself as a proactive interlocutor acceptable to both India and Pakistan. MEA, GOI, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/31090/Statement_by_ Foreign_Secretary_on_26_February_2019_on_the_Strike_on_JeM_training_camp_at_ Balakot (accessed on 2 March 2019); Also, see: MEA, GOI, https://www.mea.gov.in/ media-briefings.htm?dtl/31137/Statement_by_the_Spokesperson_on_India_Pakistan_ Situation (accessed on 10 March 2019). 5  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), People’s Republic of China (PRC), Wang Yi Meets With External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj of India 2019/02/27, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1642046.shtml (accessed on 3 March 2019). 6  MFA, PRC, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Holds Telephone Talks with Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi of Pakistan 2019/02/28, https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1642047.shtml (accessed on 3 March 2019). 4 

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There were reports that America (not China) played a pivotal role in persuading Pakistan to release the captured Indian Air Force pilot. However, insofar as I ascertained from diplomatic sources, China (more than America) influenced Pakistan to free the pilot. There is no doubt that America, too, sought the Indian pilot’s freedom. But US–Pakistan strategic ties were not as strong in March 2019 as almost a year later, i.e. in February 2020. In the latter period, America struck a deal with the anti-US Afghan Taliban, a militant protégé of Pakistan. The accord was signed on 29 February 2020. Taliban agreed to enable the final pull-out of US troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s north-western neighbour. US President Donald Trump relied on Pakistan to persuade Afghan Taliban to facilitate the exit of his troops. Why? Mainly because, there was some US–Pakistan convergence of interests. At stake for Pakistan in February 2020 was American goodwill over Kashmir issue. US, too, needed Pakistani goodwill in Afghanistan. But, during the Pakistan–India crisis in March 2019, Islamabad was in no position to gain US goodwill by promising to guide Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. Only later, i.e. on 22 July of that year, Trump offered to mediate between India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over the Kashmir issue. Viewed in this light, it is doubtful that the US could have played a pivotal role in ensuring the release of the Indian pilot in March 2019. In contrast, China, Pakistan’s CPEC-benefactor, commanded far greater attention in Islamabad. China’s overall role in the India–Pakistan affairs in February–March 2019 was complex besides being subtle as we have seen. At the UN counterterrorism committee on 13 March, China disagreed, for the fourth time, to support an international proposal to designate Masood Azhar as a global terrorist. Azhar was heading Pakistan-based JeM, which owned responsibility for the suicide-bombing at Pulwama. Dismayed, India expressed “disappointment” over the attitude of “a [UN] member”, i.e. PRC, in protecting Azhar yet again. Delhi did not blame China by name. Why? JeM was already in a UN list of terrorist groups. Moreover, China’s decades-long geopolitical affinity with Pakistan would have become very clear to India during the Xi–Modi meeting in Wuhan in April 2018 itself. Above all, a diplomatic effort at building a new Sino-Indian modus vivendi was agreed then. This effort became a troubled experiment by the dawn of the 70th anniversary of the PRC–India diplomacy in April 2020.

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We will soon see how this phase in a tale of the elusive Sino-Indian tipping point unfolded. Briefly, back to the Azhar issue, China agreed, on 1 May 2019, to let the UN panel designate him as an individual global terrorist. China did so “after careful study of the revised materials [from] … relevant countries … and [after] taking into consideration the opinions of relevant parties”. India saw the Chinese statement as a diplomatic formulation to please Pakistan. China, too, pledged continued “support” for Pakistan.7 But an outright Pakistan–India war in February–March 2019 was averted, in part, due to China’s role behind the scenes. We have seen that, despite Pakistan being China’s “all-weather strategic cooperative partner”, Beijing positioned itself as “a mutual friend of India and Pakistan”. Maybe, the Xi–Modi “consensus”, reached in Wuhan in April 2018 induced China’s thinking in February–March 2019. But there was a realpolitik reason, too.

China’s Unusual Realpolitik Strategy In my view, Beijing’s new strategy was designed to protect CPEC. This was evident above Beijing’s other considerations. A real possibility was that CPEC could have suffered if a Pakistan–India war had broken out in March 2019. This is not a retrospective hypothesis. Easy to discern, even then, was China’s stake — a stable and secure environment to safeguard the multi-billion-dollar CPEC from a Pakistan–India military conflict.8 Roughly below the southern side of China, CPEC passes through G-B, a disputed area which Pakistan administers. For long, Delhi has been citing history to affirm Indian sovereignty over OSJK, including G-B. Because of this contestation between India and Pakistan, PRC is eager to safeguard its own geostrategic and geo-economic stakes in the multi-purpose CPEC. MFA, PRC, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Remarks on the Approval of the Listing of Masood by the 1267 Committee of the UN Security Council 2019/05/01, https://www.fmprc. gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1660201.shtml (accessed on 23 November 2019). 8  P. S. Suryanarayana, India–Pakistan Crisis: A New International Factor, RSIS Commentary CO19037, 06 March 2019, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, https:// www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/india-pakistan-crisis-a-new-international-factor/#. XIhvLvZuLak. 7 

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What are these stakes and how did China seek to safeguard them during the Pakistan–India crisis in February–March 2019? CPEC originates in China’s Xinjiang region which borders G-B. Xinjiang’s proximity to Pakistan is assured by the “temporary” Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement of 1963. Now, CPEC, a land-connectivity project through Pakistan, gives Beijing access to Gwadar on the coastline of the Arabian Sea. For China, Gwadar opens up vistas on the vast Indian Ocean further south. This is a key geostrategic quotient for China. Arabian Sea, which washes India’s western shores, too, offers China a passage to Indian Ocean further south. A quick glance at a precise geographical map will suffice to recognise this geopolitical reality. In addition, CPEC’s industrial and energy-producing projects — all Chinese-aided — are intended to benefit Pakistan. But some critics see these projects as PRC’s gesture to the Pakistanis to gain their consent for the passage to Gwadar through their land. Now, China has access to Gwadar across Pakistan’s length and width. So runs a realpolitik argument. CPEC may (metaphorically) facilitate China’s geostrategic ‘gold rush’ to the Indian Ocean. Given its location, this ocean, a transit route for the massive energy imports into China, is central to its strategic calculus.9 Surely, China commands military and civil capabilities to reach the Indian Ocean by navigating through the South China Sea. A simple glance at an accurate geographical map will reveal China’s sea-route to the Indian Ocean. But the US, the military superpower at this writing, has challenged Beijing’s proprietorial attitude towards South China Sea.10 Because of this Sino-American contestation, Beijing conceptualised CPEC as a relatively safer land-route through the ‘friendly’ terrain of Pakistan. However, India’s “counter-terror” air-strike on a Pakistani asset on 26 February 2019 was a new development. Beijing must have felt a sense of urgency to preserve CPEC as a safer route to the Indian Ocean. Unsurprisingly, in that context, China asked its “all-weather partner”, Pakistan, besides India, There is international consensus about the Indian Ocean as a life-line for China’s energy imports. The precise figures, which may vary from time to time, are not directly relevant to a discussion on CPEC security. 10  Beijing’s claims on the islands and artificial islands in South China Sea are asserted by Chinese military and civilian spokespersons. They frequently criticise America’s ‘provocative Freedom of Navigation’ operations in the region. 9 

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to restrain themselves. A factor that averted a major conflagration in South Asia on that occasion was China’s effort to be the “mutual friend of India and Pakistan”. Particularly relevant to that effort by China was its high acceptability quotient in Pakistan. Why did China want to safeguard CPEC in this manner? Mainly because China’s CPEC assets were within the firing range of India’s undetected warplanes on 26 February 2019.11 Surely, CPEC assets were not targeted by those Indian warplanes. Yet, a real or plausible scenario emerged. CPEC assets might be vulnerable to another stealth operation by Indian Air Force in the general area of G-B. CPEC was certainly protected at the time of India’s “counter-terror” raid over Balakot in February 2019. In fact, China’s enormous space-faring prowess, too, was (and remains) a protective shield for CPEC. Yet, India is also a frontline space-faring country. Therefore, from a Chinese perspective, the need for hyper-defence of CPEC in the disputed areas must have become very clear in February–March 2019. Noticing this, China aligned its position with India’s on the elimination of terrorism. Within hours after India’s “counter-terror” strike at Balakot, China publicly agreed with India and Russia to “strive to remove the breeding ground of terrorism”12 For the first time, on 27 February 2019, China supported India’s view that the “breeding ground of terrorism” be recognised as an issue to be addressed. By way of context here, India has consistently criticised Pakistan for using its soil and the areas it controls as the “breeding ground of terrorism”. Invariably, Pakistan has disclaimed itself as a breeding ground of terrorism. But, after the attack at Pulwama on 14 February 2019, China at first said that the Pakistani group, which owned responsibility, was listed under UN’s anti-terror “sanctions”.13 Moreover, China did not explicitly condemn India Details of the India–Pakistan military crisis on 26–27 February 2019 are based on my conversations with a senior Pakistani official on 19 March 2019 and a senior Pakistani military officer in Beijing on 21 October 2019. 12  MFA, PRC, Wang Yi Talks About the Eight-point Consensus Reached at the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of China, Russia and India 2019/02/27, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ zxxx_662805/t1642039.shtml (accessed on 2 March 2019). 13  MFA, PRC, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on February 15, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1638314.shtml (accessed on 16 February 2019). 11 

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for breaching Pakistani airspace to conduct a “counter-terrorism” raid on 26 February. Instead, China simply expressed a “hope” that “the two sides [India and Pakistan] will exercise restraint” and “can jointly advance counterterrorism cooperation”.14 These subtle aspects of the Chinese attitude were revealing. Xi’s administration wanted to preserve the gains of his “informal meeting” with Modi in Wuhan in 2018. Despite such signals, China began seeing CPEC security through an upgraded prism, too. On 19 March 2019, within days after the then India– Pakistan crisis tapered off, Beijing and Islamabad decided on a new course of action. They agreed to “take forceful measures to well safeguard the safe environment for the construction of the CPEC”.15 If this was a coded message, it was clear that China adopted, from the beginning, a proactive military posture to protect CPEC assets in the disputed G-B. By agreeing to “well safeguard” CPEC, China and Pakistan decided to protect the corridor better than before 19 March 2019. Given this inference, a new complexity may complicate the security dynamics of the China–India–Pakistan triangle. What does this mean? China’s potential or actual military presence in the disputed G-B area, even if only to “safeguard” CPEC, will be, or already is, designed to deter India. To recognise this is to analyse the issue dispassionately. India’s relevance, not centrality, to CPEC’s future is also a key factor in the calculations of Beijing and Islamabad. China certainly is pivotal to CPEC as its initiator and promoter. Yet, China has recognised India’s CPECrelevance. This is evident from Wang Yi’s role as a “mutual friend of India and Pakistan” during the warlike crisis between them in February–March 2019. Islamabad’s recognition of India’s CPEC-relevance is summed up by a scholar as follows: “Pakistan asserts that India is bent on sabotaging the CPEC by funding and training anti-state elements in Balochistan [Pakistani province where Gwadar port is located]. The [Pakistani] claim is supported MFA, PRC, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on February 26, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1641180.shtml (accessed, for the second time, on 26 November 2019). 15  MFA, PRC, China and Pakistan Hold the First Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue 2019/03/19, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1647212.shtml (accessed on 21 March 2019). 14 

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by India’s official concern over CPEC and a potential Chinese naval base in Gwadar to ensure Chinese maritime hegemony in the Indian Ocean”.16 At another level, Pakistan’s official narrative in February–March 2019 was that the crisis with India could be resolved by implementing UNSC resolutions on Kashmir issue. For a number of reasons, however, those UN resolutions, adopted in mid-20th century, have remained on paper. It would appear that China, therefore, refrained from supporting this Pakistani narrative in February–March 2019. Instead, China emphasised that India and Pakistan could settle the Kashmir issue and the related matters through “friendly consultation”.17 Significantly, PRC was not a UNSC permanent member when Kashmir resolutions were adopted in late-1940s and 1950s. In addition, PRC and India were on good political terms when several of those UNSC resolutions were passed. Some of those resolutions might not have been passed by UNSC, if PRC, instead of the pre-PRC regime (later-day Taiwan) with its questionable ‘sovereignty’, was a veto-right-empowered member then.18 This line of argument (discussed in a later chapter) is a big ‘if ’ of history! Yet, Beijing’s position in March 2019 was compatible with the fact that PRC was not privy to UNSC’s resolutions on the Kashmir issue (i.e. the future of OSJK). A high-ranking Chinese diplomat, talking to me in Beijing in October 2019, said “PRC is not a party to the Kashmir dispute”.19 This is certainly true of the origin of the Kashmir dispute i.e. the future of OSJK. So, China has now and then advocated that India and Pakistan themselves should settle their Kashmir dispute. However, Beijing does not rule out the idea of India or Pakistan, or both, consulting others, particularly China. Overarching K. Iqbal, Securing CPEC: Challenges, Responses and Outcomes, a Chapter in Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: Risk Assessment, Private Security and Special Insurances Along the New Wave of Chinese Outbound Investments, Edited by Alessandro Arduino and Xue Gong, Palgrave Macmillan imprint, Springer Nature, Singapore, 2018, p. 208. 17  MFA, PRC, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on March 14, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/ t1645493.shtml (accessed on 17 March 2019). 18  P. S. Suryanarayana, The Pakistan Challenge: Modi’s ‘China Card’, a chapter in Modi and the World: (Re)constructing Indian Foreign Policy, Edited by Sinderpal Singh, World Scientific, Singapore, 2017, pp. 98—100. 19  My interviews and informal conversations with China’s serving diplomats and scholars, as well as serving and retired military officials in Beijing in October 2019. 16 

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Beijing’s preference at any given time, PRC is relevant to a practical settlement of Kashmir issue. My view of this magnitude is discussed later in this book. In all, China’s interest in a stable situation on the Pakistan–India military frontier was too transparent to be missed in February–March 2019. The evidence was embedded in Wang Yi’s positioning of China as “a mutual friend of India and Pakistan”. Noteworthy, too, is an independent perception in Pakistan about its challenging task of ensuring CPEC security even before the Pakistan–India crises in 2019. In this view, the Sino-Pakistani relationship reached “a crossroads” in economic terms after the work on CPEC projects began. Moreover, Beijing needs to ensure CPEC’s security. In all, it was observed, “if China finds its investment [is] at stake, it might review the structure of its relationship with Pakistan”.20 However, I think, the structure of Sino-Pakistani relationship is not as fragile as this Pakistani opinion might indicate.

An Amalgam of China–Pakistan ‘Interests’ China’s strong support for Pakistan became a hallmark of the second SinoIndian strategic crisis before the Xi–Modi “informal meeting” at Mahabalipuram. In August 2019, China reviewed its South Asia policy and backed Pakistan over India’s redefined Kashmir policy. This was the crux of the second crisis. The Modi government in India dramatically altered the dynamics of the Kashmir issue on 5 and 6 August 2019. The Upper and Lower Houses of the Indian Parliament, acting one after another, annulled the maximal autonomy which ISJK enjoyed under the Indian Constitution until then. Under a “temporary” provision of the Indian Constitution — Article 370 — ISJK was originally empowered to deal with all matters except India’s defence, foreign affairs, and communications. Until August 2019, ISJK had its own flag and constitution to exercise a sweeping range of local autonomy. This arrangement, traceable to the circumstances in which OSJK acceded to India, was in vogue for nearly seven decades. But many in Modi’s entourage believed that seven decades were too long for a “temporary” dispensation. G. Ali, China–Pakistan Relations: A Historical Analysis, Oxford University Press, Karachi, Pakistan, Second Impression, 2018, p. 240. 20 

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Strategic and political reasons influenced Modi to engineer a constitutional restructuring of ISJK. He wanted India’s Union Government, the federative Centre, to take control of ISJK, which was in disarray by mid2019. Apart from India, US, in particular, was aware of Pakistan’s interest in ISJK. Bolton’s message to Doval, already cited, was emblematic of America’s awareness of Pakistan’s role in India. Delhi also felt that the spiralling antiIndia separatist sentiments in ISJK were not imaginatively and adequately dispelled by the local Kashmiri political elite. At another level, India faced internal and external allegations that its security forces were committing excesses to quell the separatist violence in ISJK. Other countries, including China, have also been accused of committing excesses in similar situations. For Delhi, though, the criticism was hurting more, because of Pakistan’s narrative against India about ISJK. To overcome the compounded situation, Modi decided to reinvent ISJK. So, besides stripping ISJK of its maximal autonomy, Indian Parliament passed legislation to bifurcate that province. Accordingly, two union territories — Jammu and Kashmir as a single unit and Ladakh as a separate entity — were created on 31 October 2019. The constitutional reconfiguration of India’s ISJK does not apply to AK and G-B which remain under Pakistan’s control. However, as with ISJK, the legislature of India’s new Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (UTJK) keeps some vacant seats reserved for AK and G-B. India’s Centre now controls the police and administers public order in the newly-created UTJK and Union Territory of Ladakh (UTL). New-look UTJK, with a Muslim majority and a sizable Hindu minority, borders Pakistan–administered AK. UTL, which has a slight BuddhistHindu majority and a substantial Muslim population, borders mainly G-B and Aksai Chin. China exercises complete authority over Aksai Chin, which India views as its historical entitlement. In India’s sovereignty calculus, UTL includes Aksai Chin. China contested but India asserted this aspect in 2020. A military clash, with fatalities on both sides, was emblematic of this contest. The clash, in turn, sparked military manoeuvres by both sides, besides a larger geopolitical tussle between them. Delhi argues that Aksai Chin was a part of OSJK which acceded to independent India in 1947. But India feels that it ‘lost’ Aksai Chin to China in the 1950s. This narrative continues to evoke strong

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emotions in India. However, since its independence, India has had no administrative presence in Aksai Chin. On the contrary, China’s sovereign writ has run throughout Aksai Chin from the 1950s. Yet, from August 2019, China has argued that its core interests are threatened by Modi’s geopolitics of making UTL a permanent Indian territory. Delhi’s response is that the creation of UTJK and UTL is entirely India’s “internal” matter. On balance, though, China is relevant to a durable settlement of the Kashmir issue — as discussed later in this book. Pakistan vehemently opposed Modi’s non-negotiable moves concerning the Kashmir issue. Unacceptable to Islamabad are the new-look UTJK and UTL as permanent and fully-fledged constituent parts of India. On 16 August 2019, China purveyed Pakistan’s viewpoint at a UNSC closed-door session on India’s Kashmir issue. The in-camera session, called at China’s initiative, marked a ‘first’. It was for the first time since 1965 that any aspect of Kashmir issue was raised at UNSC.21 No consensus against India emerged at the August-2019 in-camera meeting.22 But China’s UN Permanent Representative Zhang Jun said later that OSJK was still “an internationally recognised disputed area”.23 The Chinese view mirrored Pakistan’s position. Moreover, outlining what he described as “the consensus of the international community”, Zhang said, “The Kashmir issue should be resolved properly through peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter, relevant Security Council resolutions and [the] bilateral agreement [between India and Pakistan]”.24 Soon after Zhang spoke outside UNSC chamber, India’s then UN Permanent Representative Syed Akbaruddin disputed Zhang’s assertions. According to Akbaruddin, the international community reached no consensus at UNSC’s UN News, UN Security Council discusses Kashmir, China urges India and Pakistan to ease tensions, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/08/1044401 (accessed on 17 August 2019). 22  CNN, UN Security Council has its first meeting on Kashmir in decades — and fails to agree on a statement, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/16/asia/un-security-council-kashmir-intl/index. html (accessed on 17 August 2019). 23  Ministry of National Defence, PRC, Chinese UN envoy calls for peaceful means to resolve Kashmir issue, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-08/17/content_4848396.htm (accessed on 17 August 2019). 24  Ibid. 21 

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in-camera session on Kashmir issue on that day.25 Independent media reporting on the proceedings of that UNSC meeting confirmed Akbaruddin’s assertion.26 UNSC certainly did not ask India to change course on issues relating to Kashmir. Significantly, however, the Chinese had by now given up the position they adopted as recently as in February–March 2019. Then, the farthest that Beijing went was: India and Pakistan should resolve their Kashmir issue in conformity with UN Charter and “norms of international law”. China did not specify any particular UNSC resolution as the political nucleus or framework for a settlement of the Kashmir issue.27 So, why did the Xi administration change its position by mid-August 2019 and recommend UNSC’s resolutions on Kashmir? As already observed, India had reasons to repudiate those resolutions which were adopted in the late-1940s and 1950s. Moreover, the People’s Republic of China itself was not a UNSC permanent member or an ordinary UN member when those resolutions were adopted. Despite these realities, the Xi administration decided by mid-August 2019 to emphasise those old resolutions — for a strategic reason. For this, China seized the opportune moment provided in early-August by Modi’s Kashmir-related moves. Modi’s geopolitical objective was to incorporate UTJK and UTL as non-autonomous and fully-integral parts of India for ever. Xi, in my view, saw for the first time a chance to shape a settlement of the Kashmir issue so that China could preserve and protect CPEC. But Modi’s moves could pose a challenge to Xi. Modi wants to keep UTJK and UTL with India, without giving up its sense of entitlement to AK, G-B, and Aksai Chin. We can, therefore, see that a positive PRC–India tipping point will remain elusive if this strategic contradiction is not resolved. There are other material issues, too; but the contradiction in Sino-Indian strategies to resolve the Kashmir issue is the key. Why? This issue is critical to a final settlement of the borders of India, China, and Pakistan in the Kashmir region. Akbaruddin’s televised comments to the media outside UNSC chamber in New York on 16 August 2019 (Monitored by me in Singapore). 26  CNN, op. cit. 27  MFA, PRC, China and Pakistan Hold the First Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue, 2019/03/19, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1647212.shtml (accessed on 21 March 2019). 25 

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Unsurprising, therefore, is that the nuances of the Kashmir issue, by third decade of the 21st century, matter. The bottom-line in India’s calculation is this: China and Pakistan do not appear to view Kashmir issue through the same lens. Pakistan wants India to dispossess UTJK (if not also UTL) and give up entitlements to AK and G-B. In Pakistan’s view, UN-organised plebiscite in all these areas might go against India, the resident power in the restive UTJK, the most populous unit. For China, on the other hand, the portions now administered by Pakistan are paramount. These areas constitute CPEC’s strategic passage to the Arabian Sea and onward to the Indian Ocean. Arguably, since May-June 2020, China wants to gain strategic access to India’s UTL across the Line of Actual Control, besides retaining Aksai Chin. Xi launched CPEC in 2015 by showing confidence that there was little or no threat to Pakistan’s disputed control over AK and G-B. But, arguably, India’s stealth air-raid over Balakot in February 2019 undermined his calculation. So, the preservation of CPEC, through diplomacy with India, will be Xi’s option. UNSC’s old Kashmir resolutions might prove useful to China to pressure India through diplomacy for this purpose. To this extent, PRC’s calculations do not necessarily coincide with Pakistan’s wishes concerning the Kashmir issue. As for UTL, Beijing already holds Aksai Chin in that region. And, China does not claim UTJK. In fact, China does not have any political or cultural affinity with this Muslim-majority UTJK. Overall, therefore, Beijing’s core interest vis-à-vis Kashmir issue is to preserve CPEC’s strategic passage off the western side of UTJK and UTL. Apparently aware of China’s calculations, India began to adopt a maximalist position. Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar amplified as follows on 17 September 2019. India’s “position” on “POK [Pakistan-occupied Kashmir] is and has always been and will always be very clear”, Jaishankar said. “POK” consists of AK and G-B, both of which are controlled by Pakistan. He maintained that “POK is part of India and we [India] expect one day that we will have the physical jurisdiction over it”.28

MEA, GOI, Transcript of Press Conference by External Affairs Minister on 100 days of Government (September 17, 2019), https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/31833/ Transcript+of+Press+Conference+by+External+Affairs+Minister+on+100+days+of+Governm ent+September+17+2019 (accessed on 28 November 2019). 28 

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The creation of UTJK and UTL was not the end-game to settle the future of OSJK, he clearly messaged. Clarifying further, Jaishankar said he had already informed China that the formation of UTL “has not changed the external boundaries of India”.29 UTL, we know, includes Aksai Chin which remains under China’s jurisdiction. So, his assertion was no music to Beijing, which saw that India might challenge Chinese sovereignty over Aksai Chin more decisively than before. Mao had built in the 1950s a strategic road through Aksai Chin to link two of China’s sensitive regions, Xinjiang and Tibet (Xizang). Before Jaishankar laid bare India’s long-term goals in regard to AK, G-B, and Aksai Chin, China sought to sensitise UNSC to checkmate India. China’s first step was to reactivate the Kashmir issue as an item of UNSC agenda after nearly 55 years. As we have seen, UNSC, acting at Chinese behest, held the in-camera session on the Kashmir issue on 16 August 2019. However, India saw much more than a silver lining when the Council dispersed without censuring India, contrary to China’s apparent aim. PRC’s real aim, as we have seen, was to begin pressuring India through diplomacy so as to preserve and protect CPEC which passes through a disputed area. China’s success in reactivating the Kashmir issue at UNSC can prove problematic for India, going forward. At Beijing’s behest, the Council might seek to intervene, if India–Pakistan and/or Sino-Indian tensions rise again with reference to the Kashmir issue. We have already understood CPEC security as a critical factor in China– India–Pakistan triangular ‘coexistence’. So, at UNSC, it might not be fanciful to identify CPEC security as a potential issue in the triangle of nuclear-armed neighbours, i.e. China, India, and Pakistan. CPEC security could become a diplomatic issue at UNSC for reasons that follow. Beijing portrays CPEC as the prestigious showpiece of Xi’s universal Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Equally relevant is UNSC’s recognition of BRI as a public good in the global commons. UNSC had, through its Resolution 2344 of 17 March 2017, declared as follows in a longwinded commendation of BRI. Through Clause 34 of this Resolution, UNSC “welcomes and urges further efforts to strengthen the process of regional economic cooperation, including measures to facilitate regional connectivity, trade and transit, Ibid.

29 

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including through regional development initiatives such as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (the Belt and Road) Initiative ….”30 Several other initiatives by other states were also commended by UNSC in the same Clause of the Resolution. These other initiatives included India’s participation in the development of Chabahar port in Iran. But China’s BRI was given the pride of place among the initiatives UNSC appreciated on that occasion. So, China may find it easier in the future to seek UNSC’s intervention in the Kashmir issue by citing a potential or ‘real’ Indian ‘threat’ to CPEC security. Yet, UNSC’s intervention over CPEC security may never happen. The reason: China did not consult either India or UNSC before conceptualising the corridor.

Deeply Layered Strategic Environment Until 26 February 2019, Islamabad appeared to view India as a hesitant military power which might not avenge terrorist attacks despite tracing the proverbial smoking gun to Pakistan. For instance, India responded cautiously to the multi-target terrorist carnage in Mumbai in November 2008. The prevailing international strategic climate was important to India. Pakistan’s “allweather strategic partner”, China, was beginning to ride a wave of national rejuvenation after the Beijing Olympics in August 2008. In contrast, Washington’s gathering financial storm eroded the upbeat mood that Delhi savoured after the US–India civil nuclear deal became operational in October. The cumulative effect was one of two factors that restrained India, the other being Delhi’s own apparent desire to refrain from escalating tensions. In January 2016, too, Delhi did not avenge a terrorist attack on the Indian Air Force base at Pathankot. The attack occurred soon after Modi met Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Lahore on 25 December 2015. When the terrorist attack at Pathankot took place, the international ambience was the same as before. Moreover, India was also not keen to United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ RES/2344(2017); (accessed on 31 March 2017). 30 

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trigger an escalatory chain-reaction. Sharif, too, assured Modi of Pakistani desire to curb such attacks on India. Towards the end of 2015 itself, Islamabad “deployed” low-yield “tactical nuclear weapons” near Pakistan–India LoC. A debate about the veracity of such a reported deployment did begin in various quarters across the world. However, the reports represented a new factor which nuclear-armed India could not easily ignore. A former insider of Pakistani and Bangladeshi establishments traced Islamabad’s journey from a posture of ‘credible minimum’ nuclear deterrence to ‘full spectrum’ capability.31 In September 2016, however, India crossed the suspected psychological barrier of a ‘nuclearised’ LoC on the Pakistani side. Indian troops conducted a “surgical military strike” on terrorist camps in an area controlled by Pakistan, Delhi announced. This was in response to a terrorist attack on the Indian Army camp at Uri in ISJK (as it still was). Islamabad remained sceptical of the Indian announcement. Over two years later, on 14 February 2019, a suicide-bomber killed Indian paramilitary personnel at Pulwama in ISJK (as it still was). As we have discussed, the terrorist attack at Pulwama triggered the first Sino-Indian strategic crisis in 2019. By mid-March, this crisis subsided. The positive outcome on that occasion was made possible by China’s constructive role in defusing Pakistan–India tensions. The second major Sino-Indian strategic crisis in 2019 began in August. We have already traced this crisis, which was sparked by India’s reconfiguration of ISJK in early-August. Apart from China, America loomed large on the road to this second Sino-Indian crisis that occurred before Xi and Modi met at Mahabalipuram in October 2019. During the first China–India crisis in February–March of that year, Beijing began to prioritise CPEC security. But, on 22 July, US President Donald Trump surprised India by claiming that he was requested by Modi to mediate between Delhi and Islamabad over the Kashmir issue.32 Trump I. A. Chowdhury, Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence: From ‘Credible Minimum’ to ‘Full Spectrum’, ISAS Insights No. 295 (11 November 2015), Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore, http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg. 32  Donald Trump, meeting the press in the company of Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan in Washington on 22 July 2019, offered to mediate between India and Pakistan over Kashmir issue. Trump’s televised comments were monitored by me in Singapore. 31 

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emphasised his willingness to mediate, prompting India to emphasise that Modi did not request US President to mediate.33 With Modi evincing no interest in Trump’s offer, despite America’s growing strategic convergence with India, US President gradually toned down his offer. Trump started saying he would mediate only if requested by both India and Pakistan to do so. From Delhi’s perspective, Trump’s unsolicited initial offer, if accepted, would have nullified India’s new resolve in dealing with Pakistan as demonstrated in February and March 2019. Consequently, in early-August, Modi engineered the constitutional reconfiguration of ISJK to completely ‘internalise’ the Kashmir issue. He had another reason, too. Trump’s apparent willingness to accept Pakistan’s portrayal of ISJK, i.e. as a disputed area, prompted Modi to act quickly. So, India sought to reaffirm its sovereignty over ISJK through parliamentary legislations on 5 and 6 August 2019. The view in Islamabad, though, was that Trump, India’s recent strategic partner, had agreed in July to breathe down Modi’s neck over the Kashmir issue. From a Pakistani standpoint, this ‘opportunity’ was suddenly lost by early-August 2019.In that context, Pakistan’s Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa declared: “Pakistan Army firmly stands by the Kashmiris in their just struggle [against India] to the very end. We are prepared and shall go to any extent to fulfil our obligations in this regard”.34 Bajwa’s statement was seen in Delhi as Pakistan’s renewed ‘militarisation’ of Kashmir issue to meet India’s new ‘internalisation’ of the same issue. Non-official opinions in and outside Pakistan ranged from appreciations to criticisms of its approach.35 Before Xi and Modi met at Mahabalipuram, a new challenge for China was India’s move [as it still was] to create UTL. Implicit in that move, as MEA, GOI, External Affairs Minister’s statement in the Parliament on the remarks of President of the United States of America on mediating in the Kashmir issue, July 23, 2019, https://www. mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31647/External_Affairs_Ministers_statement_in_ the_Parliament_on_the_remarks_of_President_of_the_United_States_of_America_on_ mediating_in_the_Kashmir_issue (accessed on 27 July 2019). 34  Pakistan’s Inter-Services Press, Corps Commanders’ Conference presided by General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) held at General Head Quarters (GHQ) today on the single-point agenda of the situation regarding Kashmir, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-releasedetail.php?id=5390 (accessed on 9 August 2019). 35  K. K. Shahid, The End of Article 370: How Pakistan Surrendered Kashmir, https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/the-end-of-article-370-how-pakistan-surrendered-kashmir/ (published on 6 August 2019), (accessed on 9 August 2019). 33 

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Chinese saw it, was Modi’s claim of Indian sovereignty over Aksai Chin. So, as we have already observed, China re-activated the Kashmir issue at UNSC on 16 August 2019.36 In this deeply layered environment, four strategic issues animate the triangular ‘‘coexistence” among nuclear-armed China, India, and Pakistan. These issues are: (a) the enduring Sino-Pakistani “all-weather strategic and cooperative partnership”, (b) Beijing’s prioritisation of the security of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, (c) Chinese assertion of their sovereign jurisdiction over Aksai Chin, and (d) the emerging Indian willingness to ‘stand up’ to China as evident at Doklam (Dong Lang) in 2017 (Chapter 6) and during the Sino-Indian military confrontation in 2020 (Epilogue). These four strategic issues variously defined the two Sino-Indian crises ahead of the Xi–Modi “informal meeting” at Mahabalipuram on 11 and 12 October 2019. On the positive side, India and China had expanded their engagement in 2018 to re-set their equation after a major military face-off at Doklam in 2017. Throughout 2019, too, India and China tried to ride out their new tensions. This effort turned out to be the main objective of the Xi–Modi “informal meeting” at Mahabalipuram in October. The outcome of this meeting was a continuation of efforts at crisis management. We shall discuss this in the next chapter as an instructive lesson for the uncertain future in SinoIndian ties.

P. S. Suryanarayana, India’s new Kashmir policy challenges Pakistan and China (25 September 2019), East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/09/25/indias-new-kashmirpolicy-challenges-pakistan-and-china/. 36 

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CHAPTER 4

FRAGILE PARTNERSHIP UNDER THE SUN

Norms for an Uncertain Future Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi sustained ‘all-weather dialogue’ when they met ‘informally’ in October 2019. Instead of resolving Sino-Indian differences on a range of issues, the two leaders tried to focus on principles. Xi pledged “unwavering policy” of developing “good relations” with India. He also appeared keen to ‘balance’ PRC’s ties with India and Pakistan on parallel tracks. Modi did not want differences to become disputes. But the PRC-India military clash in June 2020, and their follow-on hostility and manoeuvres, overshadowed the importance of this dialogue.

Noteworthy for atmospherics was the second “informal meeting” between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi. Sun-lit Mahabalipuram in South India was the venue for that meeting on 11 and 12 October 2019. Modi showcased a few of India’s stunning monolithic monuments of the First Millennium, Common Era (CE). He also arranged his meeting with Xi under a makeshift tent facing the sea, near Chennai (originally, Chennapatnam and later Madras). The seaside seating symbolised India’s potential connectivity with China. The view from a Chinese perspective was somewhat different, though. Will India give up its continued opposition to China’s global-connectivity plan — the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? Maybe, Modi wanted to signal a preference for connectivity with China on India’s terms. If so, the practical 63

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outcome of this confidential meeting can be assessed only in the fullness of time. Yet, the atmospherics cannot be brushed aside. India’s ancient monuments attracted attention. Modi wore a local attire to welcome the Chinese leader when he arrived at Mahabalipuram. Critics saw Modi’s act as an attempt to befriend a sub-national province in India’s domestic politics, instead of conveying a foreign policy message. At the people’s level, uniformed students played an unusual part. They were choreographed in a formation that resembled the Chinese characters of Xi Jinping’s full name. In all, the attention-grabbing atmospherics were aplenty. Neither India nor China announced a game-changer in their strategic engagement. However, the meeting attracted considerable coverage by the state-media in China. The Indian media went into a noticeable “frenzy”, especially over the atmospherics, in the words of one observer. A Western diplomat told me in Beijing on 23 October 2019 that foreign envoys there were struck by the Chinese official media’s coverage of the Mahabalipuram meeting. The coverage of the Xi–Modi meeting far exceeded that of Pakistan Prime Minister’s visit to Beijing on 8 October. The Sino-Pakistani meeting took place in Beijing just a couple of days before the Xi–Modi parleys in India. Some in Beijing were surprised at this contrast. Their benchmark was a conventional view. Pakistan, China’s “all-weather partner”, ranks far higher than India in Xi’s strategic calculus. Therefore, the Chinese official media’s sumptuous coverage of the Mahabalipuram meeting was a surprise! But the surprise did not last long. In January and August 2020, China displayed a familiar pro-Pakistan stand at United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This showed where the Sino-Indian strategic realities were stuck at the start of the third decade in the 21st century. Interestingly, the Delhi Policy Group, monitoring the reactions in Beijing to the Xi–Modi meeting at Mahabalipuram, noted as follows: “Except for some feel-good stories in China’s state media, Chinese strategic community largely remained disillusioned about the future course of China– India relations. It is perceived [by the Chinese strategic analysts] that given the long-term conflict of interests, it is impossible for China–India to be the best of friends on the global stage”.1 Delhi Policy Group, DPG China Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 10, October 2019, p. 3.

1 

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In India, the Mahabalipuram meeting was widely seen as a stellar, if not an epochal, diplomatic engagement. The absence of a noticeable breakthrough in the chequered Sino-Indian relationship did not seem to matter! A key point was generally missed. The strategic ambience on the eve of this Xi–Modi meeting was mostly cloudy due to the Kashmir issue (discussed in the previous chapter). Nonetheless, the basic objective that influenced Xi and Modi at Mahabalipuram was to intensify their candid dialogue. They did not necessarily seek to resolve any long-pending issue. So, there was no breakthrough to announce. From this perspective, the second “informal meeting” — which India describes as a “summit” — was simply a work in progress. Xi invited Modi to their third “informal meeting”, to be held in China in 2020 (as announced before the outbreak of COVID-19 crisis). Modi cheerfully accepted Xi’s offer to sustain the informal dialogue. As discussed in the earlier chapters, the first such meeting in this unique genre of Sino-Indian diplomacy took place in Wuhan (China) in April 2018. India portrayed the 2019 meeting at Mahabalipuram as a striking example of the “role of leadership” in “steering” Sino-Indian engagement towards “a forward-looking direction”.2 Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, saw the outcome as a “blending” of the “Chinese and Indian dreams”. Separately, these two dreams mean national rejuvenation. Sun visualised four streams of the “future trajectory”. Strategic communication, win–win cooperation, the global character of Sino-Indian partnership, and people-to-people contacts would shape the trajectory. All of these should be promoted and strengthened.3 Contrary to these sanguine views of officials on either side, Chinese strategic analysts, distinct from the state and military leaders, displayed a more nuanced outlook. An opinion in the Chinese strategic circles was that Xi wanted a stable relationship between China and India to avoid a Thucydides Trap in Asia.4 Such MEA, GOI, Transcript of Media Briefing by Foreign Secretary on Conclusion of Chennai Informal Summit (October 12, 2019), https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/31939/ Transcript_of_Media_Briefing_by_Foreign_Secretary_on_conclusion_of_Chennai_ Informal_Summit_October_12_2019 (accessed on 13 October 2019). 3  S. Weidong, Chennai Meeting: Blending Chinese & Indian Dreams, News from China: ChinaIndia Review, Vol. XXXI, No. 10, October 2019, p. 3. 4  Junshi Kuaixun, October 13, 2019, https://www.fxing.cn/html/97/96954.html, in Chinese language, quoted in DPG China Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 10, October 2019, p. 4. 2 

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a quest for stability was projected as the force that drove Xi’s “informal meetings” with Modi. This larger goal might overarch the subsidiary objectives of a permanent peace settlement between China and India and/or an anti-US “alliance” between these two countries. So ran a strand of non-official Chinese perspective on Sino-Indian ties. In brief, the Thucydides Trap is an empirical observation pertaining to the ancient Greek city-states. Inevitably, Thucydides concluded, war would be triggered by a fierce competition between a leading power and a rising challenger in the inter-state affairs. The ancient observation is generally applied to the growing strategic rivalry between US and China in the third decade of this 21st century.5 Rare, though, was the suggestion of a Thucydides Trap in the China–India paradigm of limited competition at the end of two decades in the 21st century. Worth noting, therefore, is the thoughtful, though debatable, Chinese comment that Xi would want a stable Sino-Indian relationship to avoid a Thucydides Trap in Asia. Obviously, China is the established power, and India the rising challenger, in this paradigm.

Why Mahabalipuram for Xi–Modi Talks Mahabalipuram was selected on considerations other than the perceived need to avoid Thucydides Trap in the China–India equation. The choice of this venue was not decided in the light of whether India might get US’s support now or later or never against China. So, in deciding a venue acceptable to China, India wanted to match its big neighbour. What does this mean? Xi and Modi held their first “informal meeting” in Wuhan, an ancient Chinese centre which became a modern city. Ideally, therefore, the second SinoIndian “informal meeting” deserved a suitable venue in India. As I ascertained, China was inclined to consider a South Indian venue in order to diversify links with India. Xi and his wife had travelled to Ahmedabad in Modi’s home province of Gujarat in western India in 2014. In Ahmedabad, Xi was briefed on how Mahatma Gandhi stirred his Indian nation by using For a detailed analysis of the possibility, not exactly a certainty, of war between America and China in the 21st century, see: Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston and New York, 2017. 5 

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a simple cotton-spinning wheel. Gandhi’s objective was to empathise with his poor compatriots. He also demonstrated how they could earn a living by spinning cotton yarn despite Britain’s harsh colonial rule over India until mid-August 1947. Xi and his wife appeared satisfied with their visit to Ahmedabad on 17 September 2014. A day later, the formal talks between Modi and Xi in Delhi came under much international scrutiny. Grabbing attention was a military stand-off along the un-demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the disputed SinoIndian border areas. In contrast, at Mahabalipuram in October 2019, Modi and Xi held candid talks in an ambience of swirling differences over the Kashmir issue. Mahabalipuram, on the east coast of South India, was known for resplendent monolithic temples of India’s predominant religion, Hinduism. Magnificent relics are still there to savour. Mahabalipuram was also a commercial site during India’s Pallava era in the First Millennium CE. Going by the mainstream historical narratives, the early Pallava rulers of the Deccan (today’s Telugulinguistic Telangana) in South India, like King Vishnugopa, were subordinates of the externally-focused Andhra Satavahana emperors. Gradually thereafter, the Pallava rulers migrated further south from Andhra, the main homeland of Telugu language speakers, to the mainly Tamil language region. Despite this migration, the Pallava emperors mostly used India’s classical Sanskrit and popular Prakrit languages. In that sense, the Pallavas were pan-Indian in their outlook. They patronised arts and commerce, including overseas trade.6 In fact, the overseas-outreach of Pallavas lent credence to the choice of Mahabalipuram as the venue for the Xi–Modi parleys. South India is a distinctive ‘Dravidian’ homeland of the speakers of Kannada, Malayalam, Tamil, and Telugu languages and other affiliated languages or dialects. The four main languages named here are among India’s seven classical languages, the others being Odiya, Prakrit, and Sanskrit. Now, Xi’s visit to Mahabalipuram near Chennai, capital of Tamil Nadu State, placed this city on the geopolitical map in a big way. Two other South Indian cities have hosted the leaders of the ‘hyper-power’ US and the emerging Scholarly accounts on the Pallava Empire, including those by renowned historians like K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, are well-known. A concise but authoritative narrative can also be accessed from Britannica Encyclopaedia. See: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pallava-dynasty. 6 

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‘superpower’ China during the first decade of the 21st century. Successive US Presidents, Bill Clinton and George W Bush, visited Hyderabad, a cyber-tech city and capital of the Telugu State of Andhra Pradesh. Two Chinese Premiers, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji, visited Bengaluru, India’s first digital-tech city and capital of the mainly Kannada State of Karnataka. At a functional level, Hyderabad has also hosted an informal meeting between Chinese and Indian Special Representatives. Their unfinished mandate is to resolve the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Ancient Andhra Pradesh has a unique philosophical link, too, with China. As researched by Chinese diplomat and scholar Jiang Yili, Mahayana Buddhist philosophy of Nagarjuna spread to China and influenced Chinese thought for centuries.7 Interestingly, Nagarjuna’s name evokes the folklore image of the Chinese dragon.8 South India, including Kerala and Karnataka on the west coast, has had trading and intellectual links with China. The seaside venue for the Xi–Modi talks at Mahabalipuram did evoke some memories of those bygone eras. But the future, not present-day imagery of the past, matters the most for thought and action in Sino-Indian diplomacy. Let us, therefore, discuss the outcome of the Mahabalipuram meeting. Its informality was a smokescreen for the leaders to refrain from fully disclosing details.

Century-long ‘Plan’ for Sino-Indian Ties China is generally reputed to think long, deep, and far into the future. Unsurprising, therefore, was Xi’s long-term advocacy at Mahabalipuram. China and India “must…. map out a hundred-year plan for the relations from a strategic and long-term perspective”.9 Far from masking a counterpoint, his advocacy highlighted some urgency in Sino-Indian relations. The counter-point: China and India were unable to settle their boundary For a glimpse of Nagarjuna’s nativity and for an expansive view of his philosophical influence over ancient China, read Jiang Yili (Chinese female diplomat and scholar), Comparative Study between Buddhism and Hinduism, Candid Creation, Singapore, 2004. 8  Nagarjuna’s Telugu language name, derived from Indian mythology, is somewhat similar to a depiction of the dragon in China’s popular imagination. 9  Xinhua, Xi makes proposals on China–India Ties as meeting with Modi enters 2nd day, http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/13/c_138467153.htm (accessed on 13 October 2019). Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Xi Jinping’s proposals at Mahabalipuram on 11 and 12 October 2019 are traceable to this report by the Chinese state media. 7 

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dispute, or at least stabilise their relations, in nearly 70 years until October 2019. Aware of this, he made several proposals to aim at a longer 100-year future ‘plan’ for Sino-Indian ties. Xi affirmed that it “is China’s unwavering policy” to develop “good relations” with India. The “next few years” would be “crucial” in this regard, he told Modi. The “responsibilities” of the two countries “in safeguarding global stability” should also be borne. Critics view Xi’s preface of this order as a pious platitude. But a substantive context lent his preface a meaning that Modi might not have missed. Let us first examine the context of Xi’s preface before analysing his proposals. Just two days before meeting Modi at Mahabalipuram, Xi received Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan in Beijing. What’s more, Khan received the reassurance he was seeking. He was concerned that China might favour India despite backing Pakistan over the Kashmir issue at UNSC in August 2019. Xi, therefore, reassured Khan in these words on 9 October: “No matter how the international and regional situation changes, China–Pakistan friendship has always been unbreakable and rock-solid … The Chinese side has always taken Pakistan as a priority in its diplomacy, and will continue to firmly support the Pakistani side on issues concerning its core interests and major concerns”.10 Xi knows that Pakistan’s “core interests” in foreign and military policies centre on India. China’s reassurance to Pakistan in that emphatic fashion was something that Modi was aware of when he hosted Xi just two days later. Surprising, therefore, was Xi’s pledge, for the first time in PRC’s history, that developing “good relations” with India “is China’s unwavering policy”. Given the “informality” of this meeting, observers dismiss his commitment of this order as mere politeness. Because of the deeply chequered Sino-Indian relations, many do not also bet on Xi’s “unwavering policy” of friendliness towards India. In the eyes of many others, this ‘friendly’ interlude was overtaken by the ChinaIndia physical fight in June 2020 and their hostile brinkmanship thereafter (Epilogue). MFA, PRC, Xi Jinping Meets with Prime Minister Imran Khan of Pakistan 2019/10/09, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1707010.shtml (accessed on 12 October 2019); Xi’s statements in his conversation with Khan, as outlined in this chapter, are traceable to this official web-link.

10 

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Xi’s assurances to Khan and Modi in October 2019 raised the prospect of a new direction in Chinese diplomacy. This was my interpretation following conversations with high-ranking Chinese diplomats in Beijing and Indian officials in Delhi. They were privy to the “informal meetings” between Xi and Modi in Wuhan and Mahabalipuram.11 The new direction: China began to explore possible links with India and also enhance strategic ties with Pakistan on a parallel track.12 As we know, this was China’s worldview before the global COVID pandemic shook the planet and its geopolitics beyond imagination. This was also Xi’s South Asian perspective before India appeared to court America seriously in early-2020. By then, Beijing was beginning to sense the possibility of a freeze or even a ‘Cold War’ in China-US ties.

Xi’s ‘Balanced’ Charm Offensive What was Xi’s logic in seeking a deeper and stronger partnership with Pakistan and, at the same time, a better equation with India in October 2019? The answer: Evidently, the logic of such a ‘balanced’ charm offensive consisted of five cascading factors. (1) Beijing might have wanted to help Islamabad because of their longstanding strategic convergence in South Asia. The convergence crystallised in the early-1970s. India helped East Pakistan secede and become Bangladesh during that period. Furthermore, Islamabad played a behind-the-scenes role in bringing PRC and US together for the first time during the same period. (2) China had (and still has) a strategic imperative to keep Pakistan in greater good humour than at any time before. China needs unimpeded access to the entire territory of Pakistan and the areas the latter controls. Beijing has already acquired such access to carve and maintain the My interviews with high-ranking Chinese diplomats in Beijing in November 2018 and October 2019; my conversations with senior Chinese diplomats in Delhi in September and December 2018, and in June 2019; also my meetings with ranking Indian officials in Delhi in September and December 2018, in June and December 2019. 12  P. S. Suryanarayana, Xi-Modi Summit: Testing their Political Will?, Commentary (CO19208), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/xi-modi-summit-testing-their-political-will/#.XfncRG5uLal. 11 

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China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) along three routes since 2015. Together, these routes span the length and width of almost all the lands that Islamabad either owns or controls. (3) Beijing was (and still is) conscious of Delhi’s risk-taking calculus during Pakistan–India crises, especially since February 2019. Potentially, Delhi could harbour compulsions to strike against CPEC facilities in the disputed areas which India deems as its domain. Delhi’s claim on those disputed areas was (and still is) based on OSJK’s “irrevocable” accession to India in 1947.13 Given this reality, India’s potential strategic attitude towards CPEC came into some focus during the warlike Pakistan–India crisis in February 2019. To be sure, Delhi’s warplanes did not target CPEC facilities in the disputed areas. In realpolitik, however, Beijing needs to keep Delhi, too, in some good humour to protect CPEC during any future Pakistan–India crisis. We have considered the nuances of CPEC security in this triangular situation (Chapter 3). (4) Beijing could not (and cannot) ignore Delhi’s potential to gravitate towards Washington and vice versa to checkmate China. This is true of a potential or actual post-COVID global order. (5) China did not (and will not) want to lose the opportunities that India offers as a huge emerging market despite its ebb and flow. The five cascading factors constitute a logical sequence. Let us examine in some detail these five factors that drove Xi’s ‘balanced’ charm offensive towards Pakistan and India. The overall context for Xi’s ‘balanced’ charm offensive was coloured by China’s condemnation of the ‘Cold War mentality’. In its place, China advocates enlightened ‘win–win cooperation’. Beijing says that America, its allies, and partners (like India) continue to suffer from a ‘Cold War mind-set’ and pursue ‘zero-sum’ games in inter-state relations. Decoded, Beijing accuses these countries of viewing one’s gain as an equivalent loss for another in a bilateral or multilateral transaction as the case might be. Zero-sum games

In early-2020, Delhi reasserted that the accession of Original State of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK) to India in 1947 was “irrevocable”. India maintains that the disputed portion of the route chosen for China–Pakistan Economic Corridor was a part of OSJK, and argues that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) ignored this reality. 13 

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were emblematic of the US–Soviet Cold War that lasted from late-1940s to early-1990s. Ironically during the Cold War, China itself was a protagonist — first, firmly in the communist bloc led by Soviet Union, and later, informally with America. Glossing over or giving up that track record, China now says that its alternative to Cold War mind-set is ‘win–win cooperation’ between two countries or more. Xi must be aware that China’s “unbreakable and rock-solid” relationship with Pakistan can be viewed by his critics as Chinese-style ‘Cold War mindset’. Why? Pakistan’s utility to China in their efforts to checkmate India from the Cold War days is well known globally. This can be seen as normality in geopolitics. Of course, Chinese leaders rarely, if at all, portray their partnership with Pakistan as ‘containment’ of India. Nonetheless, Islamabad constantly projects its real and aspirational closeness to Beijing in a bid to keep Delhi guessing. Illustrative of this was Khan’s visit to Beijing just two days before Xi was to meet Modi at Mahabalipuram. Officially, Khan was invited by China for the meeting at which Xi spoke of a “rock-solid” Sino-Pakistani relationship. The reassurance was emblematic of the first factor in Xi’s ‘balanced’ charm offensive towards Pakistan and India. His compulsion to humour Khan, just before meeting Modi, was also a clear sign of Pakistan’s usefulness to China in dealing with India. Khan’s concern was that China might potentially abandon, or care less about, Pakistan in the new global geopolitics. This certainly was the perception about Khan in the Western diplomatic circles in Beijing in October 2019. Arising out of this view was the belief that Khan wanted to meet Xi before the latter travelled to India for talks with Modi. However, Xi gave nothing away to the speculators. Even while seeking better ties with India, he announced his decision to enhance the SinoPakistani partnership. Xi told Khan that both China and Pakistan “should… make the CPEC a demonstration project of the high-quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI]”. CPEC was Xi’s new reason for enhancing PRC’s already-strong partnership with Pakistan. Briefly, BRI is an overarching banner for Xi’s multi-modal connectivity projects in different parts of the world, especially Eurasia. Some of these projects, such as CPEC, radiate out of China. Above all, CPEC, in Xi’s calculus, is China’s arterial link to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan.

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The Indian Ocean is a major maritime highway for China’s massive energy imports and international trade. Of course, China continues to use Malacca Strait in Southeast Asia as the gateway to the Indian Ocean. But Beijing is also exploring alternative routes to reach this ocean. China’s explicit purpose is to overcome the “Malacca Dilemma”,14 namely a potential American blockade of this Strait to counter China in a crisis. Because of this thinking, CPEC has dominated China’s mind-space vis-à-vis Pakistan. CPEC was the second factor in Xi’s ‘balanced’ charm offensive towards Pakistan and India. Three other factors, all centred on India, propelled the logic of Xi’s ‘balanced’ charm offensive towards Delhi and Islamabad. Chinese President was (and is) cognisant of India as a potential concern vis-à-vis CPEC security (Chapter 3). Also influencing Xi’s thinking was the scenario of a potential US–India partnership to counter China. Furthermore, he viewed India as an emerging market with opportunities for China — not just a potential or real strategic competitor. These three considerations, it was evident, influenced Xi in October 2019 to explore a better equation with India. Xi’s choice of enhancing China’s strong ties with Pakistan, on a parallel track, signalled that he was not a supplicant for better ties with India. Modi, too, needed a new modus vivendi of stability in India’s ties with China to face global uncertainties by the third decade of the 21st century. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Xi and Modi took cover under a canopy of globalism while seeking a better bilateral relationship during their talks at Mahabalipuram. Xi’s proposals were particularly illuminating in this milieu.

Strategic Diplomacy: The ‘Should’ Soundbite China’s diplomatic discourse in dealing with other countries is mostly dominated by exhortations for actions. These imperatives are best captured by the word ‘should’, which is frequently used in the Chinese diplomatic engagement. At Mahabalipuram, Xi honoured this tradition. He also raised these exhortations to the status of norms for the unpredictable future in SinoIndian relationship. The uncertainties have since been compounded by the COVID crisis, besides the escalating Sino-Indian hostile brinkmanship and military manoeuvres in 2020. Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping’s predecessor as Chinese President, was the first to voice his country’s concerns about a potential ‘Malacca dilemma’. 14 

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The Chinese state media quoted Xi as telling Modi at Mahabalipuram as follows: “From any point of view, China and India should be good neighbours who live in harmony and work together as good partners”. By the official accounts of the Xi–Modi conversation, their second “informal meeting” was like a calibrated symphony of strategic sentiments. The Indian narrative on Modi’s conversations with Xi did not differ substantially from the authoritative Chinese version. First, topping Xi’s proposals was his prescription of “a scenario where the [Chinese] dragon and the [Indian] elephant dance together”. A conversion of this imaginary metaphor into a geostrategic reality “is the only correct choice for the two countries”. This was Xi’s first and foremost proposal at Mahabalipuram. For this, he said, the two countries “should correctly view their differences, and never let the differences dim the overall situation of bilateral cooperation”. Second, Xi advocated “timely and effective strategic communication” in China–India diplomacy. He said “they should also prudently deal with issues concerning each other’s core interests”. This proposal, too, bore the stamp of an exhortation in the category of “should diplomacy”. More significant, though, was Xi’s categorical reference to the “core interests” of both PRC and India. Often in the past, China insisted on safeguarding its core interests without an equal emphasis on India’s core interests in a reciprocal gesture. That, at least, was the general Indian perception. ‘Core interests’ constitute the essential oxygen for any state’s survival and well-being at all times. On the international stage, foremost among the core interests of a state are its internal and external security. Therefore, a nonthreatening situation at home and abroad is essential for every state. In addition, the vital interests of a country include its political, economic, and social stability and progress. Besides, human security, including public health at home and abroad, is necessary for every state. The external dimension of every state’s public health security was vividly exposed during the COVID-19 global crisis in 2020. A state’s concerns, as different from interests, are specific issues that might affect its comfort-level at any given time. India’s and China’s core interests have been outlined in Chapter 2, “Re-setting the Present”. Third, Xi’s suggestion of Sino-Indian security cooperation was unusual. He said China and India “should effectively improve military and security

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exchanges and cooperation”. Surely, this was yet another “should” mantra. But his additional call for Mil-to-Mil cooperation for “regional security and stability” was apparently a code for peace in the neighbourhood of China, India, and Pakistan. Let us analyse this call, with reference to the past and present times, before we consider Xi’s other proposals. Contextually, China’s and India’s Special Representatives, Wang Yi and Ajit Doval, respectively, met in Delhi on 21 December 2019. The meeting, 22nd at that high level, took place in the afterglow of the Xi–Modi parleys at Mahabalipuram. Wang Yi, also Chinese Foreign Minister, and Doval agreed to “set up hotlines between the relevant departments of the two [countries’] armed forces”.15 Military “hotlines” were agreed upon following “important instructions” from Xi and Modi. The idea of such hotlines was a recurrent theme earlier, too. Yet, the agreement, reached during the Wang Yi–Doval talks in December, appeared to fulfil Xi’s exhortation at Mahabalipuram in October. Additionally, Wang Yi and Doval decided to “actively advance boundary negotiations”. This would be done “in line with the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India– China Boundary Question”.16 This decision was portrayed as a mandate spelt out by Xi and Modi at their second “informal meeting”. The referral agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles (PPGP) was signed, way back, on 11 April 2005. Soon, however, China and India differed over the interpretation of some key provisions. Disagreement flared up over Delhi’s interpretation that PPGP precluded Chinese ‘claims’ over India’s north-eastern Arunachal Pradesh State (APS). It borders China’s Tibet. However, Beijing began asserting that India’s APS was historically “southern Tibet” and, therefore, a part of PRC. The genesis of this particular Sino-Indian dispute is illumined by a relevant sequence of events that took place as early as 2005. On 5 April, China signed a seminal “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighbourly Relations” with Pakistan. On 11 April, China established an unprecedented Chinese Embassy in Delhi, 22nd Meeting of Special Representatives of China and India Held in New Delhi 2019/12/22, http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/zywl/t1726805.htm (accessed on 27 December 2019). 16  Ibid. 15 

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“Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” with India. PPGP was unveiled, and Beijing endorsed Delhi’s sovereignty over Sikkim, which had “merged” with India 30 years earlier. Those developments on a single day in Delhi, and the earlier treaty signed in Islamabad signified China’s first-ever ‘balanced’ charm offensive vis-à-vis India and Pakistan. This was certainly a golden moment in China–India diplomacy. Soon, however, the potential tipping point in their diplomacy turned as elusive as before. How? From Beijing’s standpoint, the high point in Sino-Indian diplomacy on 11 April 2005 was soon overshadowed. On 18 July, Washington and Delhi announced their intention to negotiate a civil nuclear deal. Beijing quickly understood that the deal would ipso facto lead to US’s recognition of India as a de facto nuclear-armed power. This was psychologically unacceptable to China which detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964. In China’s worldview in 2005, there was simply no place for a nuclear-armed India as a competitor. Until this is written, China has treated India as a nuclear-armed outlier, not pretender, with no right to shape the global nuclear order. Whether or not China is right, we are focused here on the sequential developments in 2005 as outlined above. Those events did not happen suddenly; they were brewing for some time before. However, their sequence produced a strategic momentum that apparently influenced China to drive India out of its comfort zone regarding APS under PPGP. So, from Delhi’s perspective, too, a potential tipping point in Sino-Indian diplomacy became elusive again. Delhi had seen (and still sees) Articles V and VII of PPGP as safeguards against Chinese ‘claims’ on APS. The reason: India and China negotiated this sensible formula to reap an ‘early harvest’ in settling their boundary disputes. Article V states that “the two sides will take into account, inter alia, historical evidence, national sentiments, practical difficulties, and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border areas”.17 India continues to think that its entitlement to APS is based on three of these factors: (a) national sentiments of the people of APS; (b) practical MEA, GOI, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents. htm?dtl/6534/Agreement+between+the+... (accessed on 11 December 2014). 17 

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difficulties of transferring — for the sake of argument — the entire APS to China; and (c) actual state of border areas — a stipulation which places APS firmly within India’s official borders. In contrast, Beijing’s ‘claim’ on APS is based on “historical evidence” which, in Delhi’s view, is susceptible to differing interpretations. Moreover, India views in its favour a guiding principle contained in Article VII. It stipulates that, “in reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas”.18 Delhi believes that the “due interests” of “the settled population” in APS should help India retain this territory. Delhi points out that the settled people of APS, not migrants by any definition, continue to participate in India’s democratic process without protest. Despite such contestation over PPGP with regard to APS or ‘southern Tibet’, Wang Yi and Doval upheld this document on 21 December 2019. PPGP was acknowledged by both sides as the basis for a durable settlement of their boundary disputes. This does not mean that China has accepted India’s sovereign jurisdiction over APS. But China and India might have realised that jettisoning PPGP would not “effectively improve military and security exchanges and cooperation”. A paradigm of Sino-Indian military– security cooperation was Xi’s proposal at Mahabalipuram. And, apparently, Modi accepted Xi’s idea and persuaded him that PPGP would best promote military–security cooperation.

Economic and Cultural Imperatives Xi spoke to Modi about an economic opportunity as well. This was Xi’s fourth key proposal at Mahabalipuram in October 2019. Modi accepted Xi’s idea of a new “high-level economic and trade dialogue mechanism”. It could, in Xi’s view, “strengthen the [potential] alignment” of China’s and India’s evolving development strategies. This “pragmatic” process could also “tighten” Sino-Indian “ties of [economic] interests”, the Chinese leader prophesied. Xi wanted to invigorate the “Closer Developmental Partnership” which was at a sub-optimal level in 2019. China and India had agreed to build such Ibid.

18 

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a partnership in September 2014.19 Thereafter, by May 2015, this new catchphrase was fully deployed.20 It eclipsed, without erasing, the “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” which was identified as a bilateral paradigm a decade earlier. Both these partnerships — the strategic and developmental versions — were re-emphasised by the Xi administration at the dawn of the 70th anniversary of Sino-Indian diplomacy on 1 April 2020. PRC–India ties, which turned ‘strategic’ in 1998 (Chapter 1) and gathered further momentum in 2005 (as we have observed), acquired a ‘developmental’ orientation by 2014–2015. This was the context in which Xi and Modi focused attention on economics, too, at their meeting at Mahabalipuram in October 2019. But at this meeting, the two leaders would not have seen much common ground on economics, too. China stimulated its economy through a series of measures (outside the scope of this book) and rode out of the 2008 global financial crisis. Consequently, China’s economic and strategic interests acquired a truly global dimension. The daily dynamics of Beijing’s engagement with Washington became a priority for the Chinese leaders. This aspect acquired a sharper edge after a trade-and-technology war (outside the purview of this book) broke out between PRC and US in 2018. During the same time-span of 2005–2018, the Indian economy did rise but remained far behind China’s in macro-economic terms. More important, though, was India’s strategic engagement with America during this period. Illustratively, despite opposition from China in 2008, America successfully lobbied the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on behalf of India. The then US President George W Bush persuaded his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao to make a rare gesture towards India in America’s interest. Delhi gained access to the global civil nuclear market for tapping resources for electricity generation at home. For the first formalised mention of the mantra of ‘development’ in China–India documents, see: MEA, GOI, Joint Statement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Building a Closer Developmental Partnership, September 19, 2014, http://www.mea.gov.in/ bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24022/Joint+Statement+between+t... (accessed on 22 September 2014). The idea of Sino-Indian developmental partnership first figured in Xi–Modi talks at Fortaleza (Brazil) in July of the same year. 20  MEA, GOI, Joint Statement between the [sic] India and China during Prime Minister’s Visit to China, May 15, 2015, http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25240 (accessed on 15 May 2015). 19 

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Furthermore, India was allowed to remain a de facto nuclear-armed power, a situation China still opposes, at this writing. Inevitably, therefore, China and India decided, firmly by May 2015, to re-imagine their bilateral diplomacy. There occurred a subtle shift from a grand strategic orientation towards an economic imperative. The shift was mutually acceptable, although the strategic orientation was not abandoned. For Xi, circa 2015, India’s growing rapport with America was a new factor that might nullify PRC’s potential strategic gains from its own ties with Delhi. Evidence was already there to see. In January 2015, US and India took an unusual step. They wanted to plan a “roadmap” to “better respond” to “security” and other challenges in the region of South China Sea. Bounded by the “nine-dash line”, this sea is claimed by China as its legitimate domain.21 However, America and China themselves experienced a roller-coaster ride during this period. They first moved from their respective national interest to ‘global’ interest on climate-change issues before the Paris accord in December 2015. Thereafter, a US–China trade-and-technology war erupted by 2018 and defined the global landscape for the Xi–Modi talks at Mahabalipuram in 2019. In such a dynamic milieu, the idea of a joint US–India strategic effort in the region of South China Sea lost momentum. India, too, increasingly recognised the futility of challenging China in its own core maritime domain. At a different level, by May 2015 India lost enthusiasm for a strategic partnership with China in merely nominal terms. Why? In the previous month China took steps to elevate its relationship with Pakistan to a new strategic pinnacle. It was then that Xi, without consulting India, unveiled plans for the unique CPEC. We know why India opposes CPEC. And, in May 2015, Modi asked Xi to reconsider China’s India policy. In all, therefore, the troubled Sino-Indian strategic diplomacy clearly prompted Xi to focus on economics, too, in his talks with Modi at Mahabalipuram in October 2019. China and India should set up a new mechanism for “high-level economic and trade dialogue”, Xi said. Modi agreed. As this is narrated, the panel, headed by China’s vice premier and India’s finance minister, has not met. The panel’s mandate was to address India’s trade deficit with China and promote two-way investments. White House (US), US–India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia–Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic-vision-asiapacific-indian-ocean-region (accessed on 26 January 2015). 21 

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Xi and Modi further agreed that the possibility of a Sino-Indian “manufacturing partnership” should be explored.22 The idea flowed from China’s manufacturing strengths. At Mahabalipuram, the expectation was that a manufacturing partnership could figure in the high-level economic and trade dialogue. The economic dimension of China-India consensus at Mahabalipuram was eroded by their hostile brinkmanship and military actions in 2020. Moreover, Delhi has generally played a weaker hand in the economic and trade domains. In November 2019, within a few days after the Mahabalipuram meeting, this factor led to the collapse of the China–India trade talks. Those SinoIndian parleys were part of negotiations for a 16-member Asia–Pacific or Indo-Pacific accord — Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Because trade negotiators of India and China failed to agree, Modi withdrew himself from the RCEP process at the last possible moment. Defending Modi, India cited its domestic concerns over China’s trade ‘aggressiveness’ under the overall RCEP process. This meant that the ‘strategic’ mystique of the Xi–Modi meeting at Mahabalipuram did not catalyse a Sino-Indian win–win trade pact! Yet another proof of the elusive PRC–India tipping point for their own benefit and global or regional good! Before India withdrew from the RCEP process, Wang Yi appeared optimistic. He said Xi and Modi had “agreed [at Mahabalipuram] to work with other parties to conclude the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership at an early date”. However, India saw China’s asymmetric economic advantages as a structural constraint during the RCEP talks. The structural constraint was not nullified by the strategic consensus that Xi and Modi crafted just a few days before the RCEP denouement. On RCEP, as discussed at Mahabalipuram, the then Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said: “the President of China accepted that there are concerns [in India] and he said that he would take them into account”.23 MFA, PRC, The Road Ahead Is Long and Winding Though, A Start Will Bring An Arrival, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1707868.shtml (accessed on 15 October 2019). 23  MEA, GOI, Transcript of Media Briefing by Foreign Secretary on conclusion of Chennai Informal Summit (October 12, 2019), https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/31939/ Transcript_of_Media_Briefing_by_Foreign_Secretary_on_conclusion_of_Chennai_ Informal_Summit_October_12_2019 (accessed on 13 October 2019). 22 

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Surely, the highest-ranking leaders do not directly engage in trade negotiations. But two issues stood out: paucity of politico-economic will on either side, and the insufficient time before RCEP conclusion. The optics of the Xi–Modi meeting did not help. Now, even if Xi had taken India’s concerns into account, his trade negotiators could not translate political will into an economic win for both PRC and India. Under RCEP process, China and India did not crown themselves with glory at their first practical test of politico-economic will after the Xi–Modi meeting in October 2019. This cannot be wished away by the question of whose trade negotiators were more obstinate, India’s or China’s. India’s RCEP crisis reveals the limitations of ‘strategic’ dialogue to resolve day-to-day concerns in Sino-Indian economic relations. To strengthen ‘strategic’ dialogue, therefore, Xi’s suggestion at Mahabalipuram merits a close look. He said China and India “should enrich [their] cultural and people-to-people exchanges and consolidate the foundation of friendship”. This, his fifth proposal, was a call to invigorate the existing mechanism for people-to-people and cultural exchanges. In China’s view, these exchanges could build a “social foundation” for full-spectrum SinoIndian ties. Unexceptionable logic, indeed! But the construction of a “social foundation” brick by brick requires fullness of time. PRC and India have spent over 70 years, unable to accept that they became contiguous neighbours circa 1950. By 1 April 2020, the 70th anniversary of the establishment of PRC– India diplomatic ties, balanced trade received as much attention as Cinderella in the fairy tale. Bilateral strategic contestations retained gigantic proportions. Therefore, Xi’s “should” diplomacy can be seen as setting the ‘norms’ for Sino-Indian relations in the unpredictable future. A time-consuming mantra, surely; but, as Wang Yi said, a start will bring an arrival. Nonetheless, PRC–India diplomacy is not all about bilateralism.

Beyond Bilateralism Xi advocated that China and India “should strengthen cooperation in international and regional affairs”. In his sixth proposal, he outlined ideas for India and China to take clear and coordinated positions. In his view, the nucleus of world order, which deserves to be “safeguarded”, is United Nations (UN) at the “core” of political and strategic

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affairs. Although not a ‘founding member’ of UN, PRC was welcomed as a permanent member of UN Security Council (UNSC) in 1971. Beijing acquired that position, with the coveted veto right, as a result of a tectonic geopolitical shift in America’s PRC-policy and vice versa in 1971. India, UN’s founding member and an original champion of PRC’s rights, quickly realised the enormity of Beijing’s ‘windfall’ gain of veto power. But Delhi did not (and, does not) repudiate the world body. In fact, India needs PRC’s support to gain a comparable status at UNSC. So, Modi would have had no objection to Xi’s UN focus during their talks at Mahabalipuram. However, UN — especially its specialist agency, World Health Organisation — was not seen in good light in countries like US and India following the outbreak of the COVID pandemic. At Mahabalipuram, Xi wanted Modi’s support for treating World Trade Organisation (WTO) as the “core” of a multilateral trading system. India is not opposed to this imperative in global trade, but Delhi and Beijing have nuanced perceptions. Accounting for this is the disparity between China, a well- or para-developed country, and India, a slowly-developing country. Xi said, nonetheless, that China and India should, as members of several multilateral and mini-lateral forums, “safeguard the legitimate development rights of developing countries”. There is no ideological Sino-Indian dispute in this regard. As for Beijing’s outreach to Delhi, a priority theatre cited by Xi is the Russia–India–China (RIC) forum. Both PRC and India have generally viewed RIC as a credible platform for launching a multipolar world order, if necessary. But Delhi and Beijing do not necessarily see eye to eye on the contours of a potential multipolar world order. For China, multipolarity does not mean parity among the major powers. In contrast, Delhi desires such parity, but would not oppose an India-friendly super- or hyper-power like America. By the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century, these Sino-Indian differences were sharp. While China and Russia remained very close in strategic affairs, India and US were inching closer. Prospectively, therefore, Xi’s focus on RIC at Mahabalipuram in 2019 may come under fresh light in any discussion on a potential post-COVID world order. At Mahabalipuram, Xi also wanted “China–India–Plus” cooperation to be extended beyond Afghanistan. In the first attempt at “China–India–Plus” cooperation, Beijing and Delhi acted in concert to train Afghan diplomats. Yet, Afghanistan remains a sensitive issue in China–India geopolitics. The

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reasons: China’s partner, Pakistan, wants to enlarge its “strategic depth” by gaining friendly access to neighbouring Afghanistan. China, too, does not like Delhi to gain much strategic presence in Afghanistan and pose a potential challenge to CPEC from the Indian and Afghan territories. Xi further suggested, at Mahabalipuram, that Beijing and Delhi should “create a more unobstructed regional connectivity network”. By this, he was asking India to rise above its opposition to China’s BRI, a mega framework of multi-modal connectivity projects. But Modi did not bite the bait for associating India with BRI or exploring a multilateral Sino-Indian connectivity project. Overall, Modi told Xi at Mahabalipuram that China and India must “prevent differences from becoming disputes”. This was disclosed by Wang Yi. India believed that Xi was not averse to Modi’s sentiment in this regard. The reason for this belief was as follows. The fewer the Sino-Indian disputes, the greater would be Xi’s freedom to address China’s unsettled ties with America by the third decade of the 21st century. In my view, however, a litmus test in Sino-Indian diplomacy will be Kashmir issue, going forward. Closely linked to this is the Tibetan issue. These are discussed later in this book. Wang Yi cautioned on 15 October 2019 that a long and winding road lay ahead in promoting Sino-Indian diplomacy. Nonetheless, the two sides could arrive at a comfort-level because they had embarked on the journey, he noted. Such an earthy metaphor aptly captured the apparent reality in China–India diplomacy at the conclusion of the second Xi–Modi “informal meeting”. But diplomacy was beginning to look like a lost cause when a China-India border crisis worsened in 2020. For the first time in decades, the two sides accused each other of firing warning shots in war-like brinkmanship. Finally, a relevant reference to the Kashmir issue. As we saw in the previous chapter, nuances of this issue permeated the strategic climate before the Mahabalipuram meeting. Logically, Sino-Pakistani concerns about the geopolitics of high-altitude Kashmir figured in the seaside Xi–Modi talks at the ancient trading outpost of the Pallava era. Xi raised the subject while briefing Modi on Khan’s visit to Beijing two days before the Mahabalipuram meeting. The reality is that PRC has a stake in the Kashmir issue, at least because of CPEC. Therefore, I think, the Kashmir issue cannot be resolved through diplomacy without India and China engaging each other, at least informally.

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CHAPTER 5

LINKING OF TIBET AND KASHMIR ISSUES

Thoughts on a Lost Sino-Indian Trade-Off The strategic spring in PRC–India diplomacy in 1954 raised the prospect of a tipping point for their own benefit and global good. Nehru’s India recognised PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet by signing a bilateral trade agreement. To promote inter-state relations, the accord also outlined Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. But Nehru failed to ensure PRC’s reciprocal recognition of India’s sense of sovereignty over the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK). Arguably, therefore, the first possibility of a tipping point in Sino-Indian diplomacy disappeared. The complex nuances of that situation are traced, by placing the relevance of Pakistan in the context of that period. A peep at the past linkage between Kashmir and Tibet issues reveals a missed opportunity in PRC-India diplomacy — a factor of continuing relevance.

In October 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed his country’s “unwavering policy” of building “good relations”1 with India. But numerous Sino-sceptics doubt the credibility of his unprecedented pledge (especially after the China-India military clash in June 2020 and their consequent brinkmanship). In my view, it will be in India’s interest, though, to explore Xinhua, Xi makes proposals on China–India Ties as meeting with Modi enters 2nd day, http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/13/c_138467153.htm (accessed on 13 October 2019). 1 

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Xi’s policy2 fully before accepting or rejecting it. Such an exploration is necessary because China’s role will be pivotal to a potential or real post-COVID global or regional order. As we have already observed, Xi surely extended to Pakistan a blanket guarantee of support. Indeed, he did so, just before meeting the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Mahabalipuram in October 2019.3 Well known, too, is Pakistan’s constant expectation of China’s support for dealing with India. A proven caveat, though, is that there are no permanent friends in international politics.4 At any time, the foreign policy of each country is determined by its updated national interest. So viewed, the success or failure of a state depends on how wisely its leaders conceptualise their national interest at any given point. Such a self-evident framework applies to the foreign policies of India and China as well. An updated view in India is that Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first Prime Minister from 1947 to 1964, failed to conceptualise national interest in a forward-looking fashion. A warning was sounded, as early as in 1949– 1950, by his senior colleague, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. In a later-day terminology, Patel was a whistle-blower, who foresaw the potential ‘hostility’ of Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) towards India. So runs the criticism against Nehru who did not listen to Patel. The nature and significance of Patel’s warning to Nehru is best captured by John Garver who has studied PRC’s foreign relations for over 50 years. In Garver’s words: “As the [Chinese] PLA [People’s Liberation Army] marshaled to move into Tibet [which adjoins India] in 1949–1950, Indian leaders feared that Tibet would become, for the first time in history, a platform for Chinese military power. One of Nehru’s closest (and more realistic advisors), Home Minister Vallabhai [sic] Patel, argued at that juncture for a series of vigorous measures to counter the probable Chinese militarization of Tibet. Patel advocated a military build-up, road building in frontier regions, and P. S. Suryanarayana, Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China–India Synergy, World Century Publishing Corporation, Hackensack, New Jersey, USA, 2016 (Published before Xi’s stated goodwill towards India, the book advocates an exploration of Sino-Indian diplomatic synergy). 3  MFA, PRC, Xi Jinping Meets with Prime Minister Imran Khan of Pakistan 2019/10/09, https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1707010.shtml (accessed on 12 October 2019). 4  In international relations, the centrality of national interest was originally conceptualised without adequate focus on the fallibility of political leaders in foreseeing their national interest. 2 

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exploration of military ties with the United States. Nehru saw Patel’s course as antithetical to his [Nehru’s] vision of India’s non-aligned destiny, and opted instead for a friendship offensive toward China”.5 At first glance, Xi’s goodwill at Mahabalipuram in October 2019 reflected his calibrated offer of friendliness towards India. Sino-sceptics, however, saw his diplomatic offensive as a cleverly concealed containment of India. To them, this was much like Mao’s view of Nehru’s friendly policy as concealed containment of PRC. Either way, it is best that Modi and Xi fully explore the future possibilities in Sino-Indian diplomacy. In China today, Mao’s ‘India War’ of 1962,6 which proved Patel ‘right’, is seen as a “tragedy”, a “border conflict”, “not war” over national interests.7 Evident, therefore, is the reality that China’s and India’s perception of their respective national interest varies from time to time, besides being wise or otherwise. Xi is seeking to blaze a new direction in China’s policies towards India and Pakistan by the third decade of the 21st century. He is passionate about retaining Pakistan with him. At the same time, he does not want to drive India into a firm American embrace. But India may not wait for Xi to reap diminishing returns in his policy towards Pakistan. US, too, may not wait for him to influence India’s worldview. Xi has, therefore, tried to convince Modi that China will choose neither stubborn hostility nor false friendliness towards India. The reason: Xi seeks to benchmark PRC against US, not India.

‘Legitimacy’ of UN Formula on Kashmir Issue US, more than India, dominates Xi’s thinking.8 Moreover, his pursuit of calibrated diplomacy towards India may also depend on PRC’s close ties with Pakistan. PRC and Pakistan are not allied in the conventional sense of the term. J. W. Garver, China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2016, p. 111. 6  Mao’s ‘India War’ of 1962 is the studied view of some scholars, including in particular, Roderick Macfarquhar in The Origins of Cultural Revolution in China, Vol. 3, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 308. 7  A high-ranking Chinese diplomat’s view of the 1962 PRC–India War, as expressed by him in a conversation with me in Beijing in November 2018. 8  Chinese official statements since 2014, when Xi met the then US President Barack Obama at Sunnydale (USA), reveal how much China benchmarks itself against America. 5 

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But Xi will need Islamabad’s support to ensure the longevity of the China– Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan will, therefore, be keen that China reciprocates suitably. A general perception is that Pakistan benefits from the economic projects under CPEC, which is of strategic importance to China. Xi is aware of Pakistan’s adversarial relationship with India and vice versa. The question is whether this will suit Xi’s policy option of dealing with India on his own terms. So, it appears that PRC has begun to conceptualise its own ideas on the Kashmir issue since August 2019. This was evident during Xi’s “informal meeting” with Modi at Mahabalipuram in October. In this context, Modi’s Kashmir-related challenges were (and still are) mainly due to India’s helpless circumstances at the United Nations (UN) at its inception. At UN, India was a founding member in 1945. Until 15 August 1947, however, India was a British colony. Thereafter India remained a Britishlinked Dominion until 26 January 1950. India was, therefore, not considered for permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) at its inception. In the process, although Indians had fought bravely for the Allies, the eventual winners in the Second Word War, India did not get due credit. This is a lingering grievance in India. Interestingly, Mao was cognisant of the bravery of Indian soldiers in the Second World War. The winners of Second World War designed the UN. But they did not include India in their league. As a consequence, independent India had no ‘say’ over how UNSC discussed the Kashmir issue in late-1940s and 1950s. The strategic crux of the Kashmir issue is the India–Pakistan contention about who is entitled to the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK). As we know, OSJK acceded to India, instead of Pakistan, in October 1947 in circumstances that Pakistanis did not accept. With OSJK’s accession to India accomplished, against Pakistani wishes, Delhi requested UNSC in January 1948 to ensure the withdrawal of “Pakistani nationals” from OSJK. At that stage, Pakistan had not acknowledged that its troops had entered OSJK to liberate it from Indian hands. By July 1948, however, Pakistan confirmed its “military intervention” inside OSJK. Until then, a highlyplaced British diplomat wrote, the Pakistani troops were operating in OSJK in a “semi-surreptitious” mode.9 Sir M. James, former British High Commissioner to Pakistan first and India later, Pakistan Chronicle, Edited, with an introduction, by Peter Lyon, Oxford University Press, Bangalore Town, Karachi, Pakistan, 1993, p. 26. 9 

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Even before the Pakistani acknowledgement, UNSC prescribed the “withdrawal of Pakistani nationals”, who had entered OSJK for “the purpose of fighting”. Such a Pakistani withdrawal was to be the first step in a plan of UN-mediated solution.10 However, it is common knowledge that, by the third decade of the 21st century, Pakistan has not withdrawn its troops from the relevant parts of OSJK. These parts of OSJK — Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) — are administered by Pakistan. In another development in 1948, UNSC did not formally recognise OSJK’s accession to India. Instead, the Security Council wanted the issue to be settled afresh through a “plebiscite” across OSJK. But, in Delhi’s view, OSJK Maharaja’s (ruler’s) accession to India was accomplished in accordance with the British Plan for granting independence to India and Pakistan in 1947. According to an authoritative British account, Governor General Mountbatten of newly-independent India set a condition while accepting OSJK’s accession to Delhi. In this version, Mountbatten “said in his reply [to the Maharaja] that when the invaders [from Pakistan] had been expelled [from OSJK] and law and order was re-established, ‘the question of accession should be settled by a reference to the people’”.11 Significantly in 1948, Britain (a UNSC permanent member with veto right) followed Mountbatten’s conditional acceptance of OSJK’s accession to India. But UNSC’s consequential ‘unilateral’ action of ignoring OSJK’s accession altogether was unacceptable to the then newly-independent India. Britain had ruled over the Indian subcontinent until August 1947. Britain and America were (and, still are) UNSC permanent members, each with veto right. So, the Anglo-American team could claim expertise over the Kashmir issue. Therefore, in Delhi’s view, the Anglo-American team influenced UNSC to “convert” India’s plea for the roll-back of Pakistan’s “act of aggression” into an “Indo-Pakistan dispute”.12 India’s plea and UNSC’s agenda were two different propositions. However, according to a version acceptable to many Pakistanis, India did “not” initially call Pakistan an “aggressor”. In this version, the Indian delegate United Nations documents, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1948, ‘A. 1(a)’ in UNSC Resolution 47 (1948), adopted on 21 April 1948. 11  Sir M. James, op. cit., p. 26. 12  J. N. Dixit, India’s former Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, India–Pakistan in War & Peace, Books Today (The India Today Group), New Delhi, 2002, pp. 117–118. 10 

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first drew UNSC’s attention to Pakistan’s “error” of intervening in OSJK whose accession to India was “valid”.13 Somewhat later, India named Pakistan as an “aggressor”. So runs this popular version in Pakistan. In Delhi’s view, Pakistan’s “act of aggression” proved that India had a legitimate right to own OSJK as a whole from the beginning. However, UNSC focused on organising a “plebiscite” in all parts of OSJK. “Plebiscite” was recommended to decide whether the entire OSJK should belong to India or Pakistan. This, in essence, was [and, is] the substance of the relevant UNSC ‘agenda’ item, namely “The India–Pakistan Question”.14 Before recommending “plebiscite”, UNSC did not examine the merit of OSJK’s accession to India under the British legislation on transfer of power to India and Pakistan. Delhi saw this (and still sees this) as “bias” against India.15 However, Islamabad (backed by Beijing in August 2019 and January 2020) demands that UN-recommended “plebiscite” be held. Let us examine the Sino-Pakistani demand for UN-organised “plebiscite” in OSJK in the third decade of 21st century. There are five aspects to be considered. (1) The ‘lack’ of UN authority to enforce “plebiscite”: The ‘relevant’ UNSC resolutions, crafted at various intervals from 1948 to 1965, were not adopted under the enforceable provisions of UN Charter. This reality has also been emphasised by Alastair Lamb, who researched extensively on the evolution of China–India–Pakistan border issues.   Lamb framed the “unreality” of UNSC’s resolutions on Kashmir issue in clear terms: “In the Kashmir dispute the United Nations has never possessed either the power or the mandate to enforce a settlement: it could only advise and recommend. Thus [,] many of its discussions [on Kashmir issue] have contained within them a powerful element of unreality. The essence of the Kashmir problem is not to be found, except by inference, in the debates of the Security Council: it lies in the internal politics of India and Pakistan”.16 A. Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846–1990, (Paperback), Oxford University Press, Bangalore Town, Karachi, Pakistan, 1993, p. 165. 14  United Nations documents, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council (from 1948 to 1965). 15  J. N. Dixit, op. cit., p. 121. 16  A. Lamb, op. cit., p. 164. 13 

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(2) Exclusion of PRC from all UN forums from October 1949 to 1971: A concealed lack of legitimacy coloured a number of UNSC resolutions on the Kashmir issue. Xi must be aware of this reality which prevailed during almost the entire relevant period. What indeed is this matter about legitimacy? The answer: The ‘sovereignty’ of the Republic of China (ROC/Nationalists, Formosa/Taiwan) as a UNSC permanent member was questionable, perhaps untenable, from 1 October 1949 to 1971. Yet, ROC (not PRC) stayed as a UNSC permanent member with veto right, from October 1949 to 1971. ROC was unseated at UN and UNSC in 1971.   Doubts about ROC/Nationalists were first triggered by the escalating civil war in China in 1948. Soon, Mao’s proclamation of PRC on 1 October 1949 erased the ‘sovereignty’ of ROC/Nationalists. From that time, ROC/Nationalists were no longer ‘eligible’ to occupy China’s UNSC seat. In any case, their credentials came under a stormy cloud. But ROC (labelled as ‘China’ in UN records until 1971) stayed as a UNSC permanent member. The reason: America was strategically opposed to PRC until 1971; ROC/Nationalists were Washington’s protégé and ally. (3) Key abstentions by Soviet Union: On 21 April 1948, UNSC called for “plebiscite” in OSJK as a whole. But “no vote was taken on the text as a whole”.17 Moreover, when the Council adopted a follow-up “decision” on 23 April 1948, Soviet Union, a powerful UNSC permanent member with veto right, abstained.18   In fact, as is evident from the relevant UNSC records, Soviet Union abstained from voting on almost all resolutions on the Kashmir issue in late-1940s and 1950s. This aspect, too, raised doubts about the legitimacy of UNSC’s resolutions on the Kashmir issue, although abstentions, for whatever reasons, were not legalistic hurdles. For instance, key UNSC resolutions on the recognition of Israel and the 1950–1953 Korean War were adopted when Soviet Union had abstained from voting.   For whatever reason, even ROC (Formosa/Taiwan) abstained from voting on at least one UNSC resolution on the Kashmir issue. But ROC’s United Nations documents, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1948, Resolution 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948, United Nations, New York, USA, 1964. 18  Ibid. 17 

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membership in the UN Security Council was “factually absurd”, as the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru observed.19 It was clear as daylight that ROC’s ‘sovereign’ right to occupy China’s UNSC seat became untenable when PRC was proclaimed in Beijing on 1 October 1949. (4) Non-compliance by Pakistan: As of this writing, Pakistan has not withdrawn from the relevant areas of OSJK, contrary to the stipulation in “A. 1(a)” of UNSC Resolution 47 (1948) — a key “plebiscite” document. India’s view is that Pakistan has not, therefore, taken the first step for a UNSC “plebiscite” to be held, if at all, in OSJK.   But Pakistani officials make a counter-point. They would take the UN-mandated first step if India were to allow a “plebiscite” in the whole of OSJK.20 But a strategic poser remains. Just imagine how a UNSC formula, devised over 70 years ago, can be implemented in a different strategic environment in the third decade in the 21st century! (5) A dramatic new strategic environment: In the new strategic environment in the third decade of the 21st century, PRC is a shadow-superpower.21 Evidently, PRC is waiting for an opportunity to replace US as the leader in global affairs. For this reason, Beijing is aware that US is befriending India, PRC’s big Asian neighbour. This does not surprise Beijing, which has on its side India’s other Asian neighbour, Pakistan. Based on this logic, PRC elevated its “all-weather friendship” with Pakistan to the level of “allweather strategic cooperative partnership” in April 2015.22 Taken together, these five factors have not lent new relevance to UNSC’s old resolutions on the Kashmir issue. Yet, in August 2019, China voiced Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Second Series, Volume XXV, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, pp. 423–426, cited by Arun Shourie in Self-Deception: India’s China Policies: Origins, Premises, Lessons, Harper Collins Publishers India, Noida, India, 2013, p. 95. 20  My conversations with Pakistani diplomats and officials in Islamabad in the 1990s; I lived and worked there as Special Correspondent of the Indian newspaper, The Hindu, at that time. 21  ‘Shadow-superpower’ is my conceptualisation of a country (China, in this case) waiting in the wings to replace the dominant or sole superpower (US). This is like a shadow-cabinet waiting for a chance to replace an existing cabinet in a parliamentary democracy. 22  MFA, Government of Pakistan, Joint Statement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership, (2015-04-20), http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=2733 (accessed on 21 April 2015). 19 

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vigorous support for Pakistan, demanding the implementation of “relevant Security Council resolutions” on the Kashmir issue (i.e. the future of OSJK). Chinese Permanent Representative at UN, Zhang Jun, highlighted the relevance of the India–Pakistan “bilateral agreement”, too.23 In Delhi’s view, this bilateral agreement of 1972 superseded all UNSC resolutions on OSJK, dated mid-20th century.24 Enshrined in the 1972 accord is the principle of direct India–Pakistan negotiations, instead of UN-organised “plebiscite” in OSJK. In August 2019, therefore, China’s partial emphasis on the need for India– Pakistan bilateral talks, while no music to Pakistan, was acceptable to India, at least minimally. However, India was not pleased with Zhang’s simultaneous assertion that OSJK was still “an internationally recognised disputed area”.

Nuances of an India–PRC Imponderable This section and the following, ‘A Trade-Off Which Could Not Happen’, unfold my reflections on the international situation that created the Kashmir issue before the mid-1950s.25 These narratives are based entirely on my own inferences from my conversations with diplomats of the countries concerned over a number of years. It is paradoxical that Xi’s officials like Zhang should uphold UNSC resolutions on “plebiscite” in OSJK. As a definition, without reference to any country, plebiscite is a democratic test of the will of a people on any given issue. Those resolutions on “plebiscite” in OSJK were adopted when America did not let the People’s Republic of China26 into UN and UNSC. Ministry of National Defence, PRC, Chinese UN envoy calls for peaceful means to resolve Kashmir issue, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-08/17/content_4848396.htm (accessed on 17 August 2019). 24  During a televised press briefing at UN headquarters on 16 August 2019, India’s then Permanent Representative at UN, Syed Akbaruddin, drew attention to the supersession of events in India–Pakistan relations; monitored by me in Singapore. 25  Throughout this chapter, the time-span of ‘before mid-1950s’ refers to the period from 1 October 1949, when PRC was proclaimed, to 1955 when PRC–India fraternity reached a zenith at the Asia–Africa summit at Bandung (Indonesia). 26  Throughout the sections on ‘Nuances of an India–PRC Imponderable’ and ‘A Trade-Off Which Could Not Happen’, China is invariably referred to as the People’s Republic of China or PRC or Beijing. This has been done to avoid confusion. Because, under the label of ‘China’, Republic of China (ROC/Nationalist) — not PRC — was a UNSC permanent member 23 

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What if Mao’s legitimate right to China’s UNSC seat had been accepted in October 1949, instead of 1971? The answer: resolutions on “plebiscite” across OSJK might have been vetoed or modified by PRC. At the least, Beijing would have abstained from the Security Council’s voting on those resolutions in early-1950s. Surely, this scenario was conceivable because PRC’s then patron-ally, Soviet Union, had abstained. A 30-year Soviet–PRC (also, SinoSoviet) Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed in February 1950. Some Sino-Soviet differences surfaced in late-1956. Yet, it was only in 1958 that Soviet Union differed strongly with PRC over the latter’s “sovereignty”.27 Therefore, my argument is that Mao would have followed the Soviet line on those resolutions concerning OSJK in early-1950s, if PRC had been a UNSC permanent member then. The following arguments form an instructive ‘if ’ of UN history relating to the Kashmir issue. Let me examine this imponderable strategic factor in PRC–India diplomacy of the past. Such a line of inquiry concerning the past is necessary now. Mainly because, PRC has begun to evince unusual interest in the old UNSC resolutions on the Kashmir issue. On 16 August 2019 and 15 January 2020 as well as in August 2020, Beijing brought up the Kashmir issue at three separate in-camera sessions of UNSC. On all occasions, UNSC did not censure India. Between those attempts, Beijing appeared to have dropped the idea of one more attempt. However, India and PRC began their diplomatic engagement in a cordial, even friendly, spirit in the early-1950s. PRC was proclaimed on 1 October 1949. Mao ‘liberated’ or ‘annexed’ Tibet, which adjoins India, in the 1950s. The initial diplomacy between Beijing and Delhi was not unduly affected by their differences over Tibet’s political status. India was the first country, outside the socialist bloc, to establish diplomatic ties with PRC on 1 April 1950. Before that, Nehru and PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (later, Premier) exchanged telegrams to place strategic markers. Nehru wrote, on 30 December 1949, that he was keen to “further strengthen the immemorial friendship between India and China” (i.e. PRC).

during the period covered in these two sections — October 1949 to mid-1950s. PRC was admitted as a UNSC permanent member in 1971. 27  H. Nianlong, Editor-in-Chief, Diplomacy of Contemporary China, New Horizon Press, Chai Wan, Hong Kong, 1990, pp. 33, 138–139. (China in this book title refers to PRC, not ROC).

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He hoped his initiative “will conduce to the stability of Asia and the peace of the world”. Nehru’s eloquent sentiments were handsomely reciprocated by Zhou. On 4 January 1950, Zhou replied that PRC was willing to establish ties with India “on the basis of equality, mutual benefits, and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty”.28 For revolutionary Mao’s PRC, those norms for relations with a big noncommunist country like India were unusual. Zhou expected PRC and India to follow those concepts which were not publicly amplified by both sides. Their perceptions in this regard differed in late-1950s, and led to the SinoIndian war in 1962. Several years before that war, more precisely in the strategic spring of PRC–India diplomacy in 1954, the two countries enunciated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. These Principles were agreed upon as a benchmark for not only Sino-Indian relations but also inter-state diplomacy more generally. On a parallel diplomatic front in the 1950s, Beijing knew that Pakistan was more than a nominal ally of America in the latter’s anti-communist treaties. PRC, not just Soviet Union, was the target of those treaties during the early phase of the East–West Cold War. Mindful of that situation, Pakistan generally avoided antagonising PRC during that period. Mao and Zhou also recognised that Pakistan’s primary source of concern was India, not PRC. However, Mao and Zhou knew that the early Pakistani leaders would not be happy with a PRC–India entente that might affect Pakistan’s own ‘interest’. Indeed, as noticed by PRC and India, the Pakistani ‘interest’ at that time became clear very soon. In 1953, Pakistan firmly gravitated towards US which was then totally opposed to PRC. So, it became easier for PRC and India to sign an agreement in 1954 on peaceful coexistence and border trade. In PRC–India–Pakistan triangular context, critical indeed was a sequence of events between 1953 and 1955. In December 1953, America announced its intention to sign a “mutual assistance” military pact with Pakistan. This prompted Nehru to repudiate the option of “plebiscite” in

The telegrams exchanged between Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai in December 1949 and January 1950, respectively, were uploaded by PRC on its website in January 2002. See: https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2711_663 426/2712_663428/t15916.shtml (accessed on 18 February 2019). 28 

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OSJK. In his opinion, “plebiscite” was being foisted on India by UNSC under powerful Anglo-American influence. It was believed in Delhi that the British–American game-plan was to bolster Pakistan as a bastion against PRC and a bridge towards the Muslim world. And, Nehru did not want a “plebiscite” because OSJK had already acceded to India under a legally valid process (as seen in Delhi). A major strategic nuance came into play. Nehru’s repudiation of the idea of “plebiscite” in OSJK did serve PRC’s interest as well. Mao, too, was opposed to anything resembling plebiscite in Tibet. Of course, the idea of plebiscite in Tibet was not really in vogue in the public domain. Yet, the convergence of India’s and PRC’s interests at that time could not be missed. Unsurprisingly in that context, PRC and India signed the accord on Tibet in April 1954.29 Besides enshrining the Five Principles, the accord signified India’s acceptance of Tibet as an integral part of PRC. At that time, PRC was not a UNSC permanent member. Therefore, it would appear, Nehru did not bargain for PRC’s reciprocal acceptance of OSJK as India’s. Nearly 70 years later, Delhi continues to pay a strategic price for not seizing that realistic opportunity in 1954. In May 1954, i.e. soon after the PRC–India accord, US and Pakistan inked their military pact, in line with America’s announcement in 1953 itself. Following up, Pakistan joined the US-led South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the US-conceptualised Baghdad Pact (later reconfigured as Central Treaty Organisation — CENTO). Of those pacts, SEATO, which included Pakistan, was directly targeted against Mao’s PRC, not just Soviet Union. At one stage a few years later, Pakistan became “the most-allied ally” of America.30 Obviously, Mao’s PRC was not amused at Pakistan’s acceptability to the anti-communist West from early-1950s. Nonetheless, Pakistan, being Agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, signed in Peking (Beijing) on 29 April 1954, cited in full by Alastair Lamb in The McMahon Line Volumes I and II, Appendix XX, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, Great Britain, 1966. 30  Pakistan’s status in the 1950s as ‘the most-allied ally’ of America has been highlighted by a former Pakistani Foreign Minister among others. See Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Penguin/Viking, Gurgaon, India, 2015. 29 

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aware of PRC’s concerns, sought to befriend it while retaining close links with the West. For Nehru, India’s 1954 agreement on Tibet was, metaphorically, a strategic rendezvous with PRC in the geopolitical outer space, an ethereal diplomatic experience. Mao and Zhou, too, fostered for some time a scenario of potentially durable PRC–India friendship. Before mid-1950s, Mao and Zhou were focused on winning India’s total acceptance of their “liberation” of Tibet and its full integration with PRC. The sole foreign policy priority for Mao and Zhou vis-à-vis India, from 1 October 1949 to mid-1950s, was Tibet, not the Kashmir issue (i.e. the political future of OSJK). From the beginning, India and Pakistan have not seen the Kashmir issue through the same lens. Pakistan’s belief was (and still is) that OSJK’s accession to India in 1947 must be tested through a UNSC-suggested “plebiscite”.31 Delhi’s belief was (and still is) that the religious complexion of OSJK did not (and does not) nullify its legal accession to India. Moreover, Delhi has often projected the point that India had (and still has) the world’s largest Muslim minority. In early-1950s, therefore, Delhi expected PRC to recognise India’s sovereignty over all parts of OSJK. In a subtle sense, Delhi’s expectation was in line with Zhou’s offer of “mutual respect for territorial sovereignty”. Zhou made the offer as a qualitative dimension of PRC’s diplomacy towards India. As will be noticed in a later chapter, too, “territorial sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” are not synonymous. In the practice of foreign policy, “territorial sovereignty” means that an independent country is entitled to all areas it holds legally and all other areas it claims legally. “Territorial integrity” means that a free nation is entitled to only those areas it holds legally. Viewed in this light, Nehru appeared to have made a subtle pitch for recognition of India’s right to exercise sovereignty over the whole of OSJK. Delhi’s case was that OSJK had acceded to India legally under the due process of British transfer of power to India and Pakistan. Therefore, although all parts of OSJK were not with India, Delhi had a right to sovereignty over the whole of OSJK. This was as far as subtlety could go. In 1954, Nehru Pakistan’s belief about the Kashmir issue is my perception based on my interactions with Pakistani leaders, diplomats, and other officials while I was posted in that country as Special Correspondent of an Indian newspaper, The Hindu, in the 1990s. Pakistan’s subsequent attitudes and actions confirm my observation with reference to India’s new Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (UTJK) as well. 31 

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endorsed PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet, having veered to that view even earlier. But he did not specifically or adequately persuade PRC to recognise India’s sense of sovereignty over the entire OSJK. PRC’s non-membership at UNSC apparently gave him no sense of urgency. The discussion in this and the following section covers events until mid1950s — from October 1949 when PRC was proclaimed. During that phase, Delhi was in no position to influence the relevant major powers, US and Britain. So, India could have sought Beijing’s favourable interventions, if PRC had been a UNSC permanent member from October 1949. Such a line of thinking may appear to be astonishing; but it is entirely conceivable for two reasons. (1) Nehru’s India was on a “friendship offensive” towards PRC until at least mid-1950s. This aspect transcended Delhi’s differences with Beijing over the degree of ‘autonomy’ Tibet should enjoy within PRC. Moreover, although PRC was not a UN member in 1955, Nehru ensured that Zhou was invited to the unique Asia–Africa conference at Bandung (Indonesia) in April.32 During that conference, Pakistan, still firmly in the Western camp, made a friendly overture towards PRC for the first time at the highest political level. Yet, only in the 1960s did PRC begin cementing ties with Pakistan. (2) Mao was keen, before mid-1950s, to ensure that Nehru would not undermine PRC’s then-ballooning control over Tibet. Mao apparently calculated that India had the political will and capability to stoke Tibet’s resistance to PRC. He was conscious of India’s political, cultural and spiritual links with the mainly Buddhist Tibet. Initially, Delhi regarded those links as its legitimate inheritance from British colonial rule over India. Beijing did not recognise any such inheritance and, therefore, wanted to prevent Indian interference in Tibet. Because of those factors, PRC might have been willing to consider a reciprocal arrangement with India before mid-1950s. To gain a deal, both countries would have had to make concessions. India could have categorically accepted Mao’s Tibet policy and treated the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet as an anti-PRC leader. In fact, Nehru’s India quickly acted in that fashion J. W. Garver, op. cit. (China’s Quest …), p. 106.

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from October 1949 to mid-1950s. The 1954 PRC–India accord on Tibet was the clearest manifestation of that trend. For PRC, Tibet (not OSJK) was the overriding concern vis-à-vis India before mid-1950s. At UNSC, India’s sole concern before mid-1950s was to get Pakistan’s “aggression” in OSJK rolled back through diplomacy. So, India could have ‘lobbied’ for support from Mao and Zhou on OSJK if PRC had been a UNSC permanent member then itself. India could have reciprocated by vigorously supporting PRC’s Tibet policy during that time span. In the beginning, Nehru was hesitant to support Mao’s Tibet policy because of that region’s links with India. Soon, however, Nehru began supporting PRC substantially until Tibet’s resistance to Mao’s policies snowballed into a major revolt in 1959. So, there was ample room for a PRC–India trade-off relating to OSJK and Tibet in realpolitik terms before mid-1950s. Nonetheless, Nehru might not have easily convinced Zhou about the ‘correctness’ of India’s position on OSJK. Why? According to a Chinese version, Nehru asked Zhou in 1954 for PRC’s “support” for “India’s position on Kashmir” (i.e. OSJK). But Zhou, who was then visiting Delhi, “refused” to oblige Nehru. Zhou’s reason: it was “too early” for PRC to take a position on OSJK because “studies on the issue” were “pending” in Beijing at that time.33 This reported episode does not, however, stand much scrutiny. Zhou would have known that it was open to Nehru to say much the same thing about India’s position on Tibet. So, let us analyse this reported episode. Zhou’s reported refusal to support Nehru on OSJK was dated 1954, surprisingly when India formally recognised Tibet as a political region of PRC. So, did Zhou really cold-shoulder Nehru on OSJK in 1954? Doubtful, is the empirical answer. Mainly because, even a decade later, when the “temporary” Sino-Pakistani ‘boundary’ accord was signed in 1963, PRC did not endorse Pakistan’s stand on OSJK. Significantly, this was after Mao won his war against India, Pakistan’s ‘adversary’, in 1962. In fact, the “temporary” Sino-Pakistani ‘boundary’ agreement of 1963 covered some areas of OSJK. But PRC did not recognise Pakistan as the sovereign authority over those areas, i.e. AK and G-B. Instead, Beijing gave itself China’s Relations with Its Neighbouring Countries, a chapter in Contemporary China and Its Foreign Policy, Edited by Yang Fuchang, World Affairs Press, 2003, pp. 249–284. 33 

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the right to renegotiate this Sino-Pakistani agreement with the real “owner” of OSJK after a relevant settlement between India and Pakistan. So, what was PRC’s subtle message to India in 1963? The answer: Beijing would acknowledge India’s sovereignty over all areas of OSJK if the issue were to be settled in that fashion. So, rewind the discussion on this particular point to 1954. Nehru had the opportunity, at that time, to persuade Zhou about India’s sense of sovereignty over the entire OSJK. But Nehru did not have the necessary incentive to do so, because PRC was not yet a UNSC permanent member with vetoing privilege. Yet, Nehru tirelessly championed PRC’s UN membership because he apparently needed a ‘friendly’ neighbour at UNSC’s high table. His friendship offensive towards PRC could be traced to such an objective, at least in some measure. As early as in September 1950, India proposed a resolution at UN General Assembly (UNGA) for PRC’s admission to the world body. It is a different matter that UNGA rejected India’s resolution and a similar proposal by PRC’s ally, Soviet Union.34 Yet, Nehru did not give up his friendship offensive towards PRC until the late-1950s. By then, he could not harmonise his friendship offensive with the increasingly nationalistic stand by Zhou on Sino-Indian boundary issues. In all, a PRC–India trade-off on Tibet and OSJK before mid-1950s would have involved nearly-impossible choices. Popular sentiments in India in support of the Tibetans were very strong throughout the 1950s. In fact, Tibet was also viewed by some Indians as a potential ‘buffer zone’ between India and PRC. In realpolitik, though, PRC began to establish firm control over Tibet as early as in 1950–1951. Above all, Tibet was not intimately associated with the political destiny of historical India. The reason: India did not feel threatened by the pre-PRC Chinese links with Tibet. Moreover, before mid-1950s, the period of our focus, Nehru did not consider Tibet as a potential ‘buffer zone’ vis-à-vis PRC in realistic terms. Nehru’s unsentimental ‘strategic’ view was that he was in no position to roll back Mao’s “liberation” of Tibet and to sustain it as India’s ‘buffer zone’. Nehru’s India had, hesitantly at first and firmly soon thereafter, accepted PRC’s ‘core interest’ in Tibet. In fact, Nehru did not even sponsor Tibet’s draft appeal to United Nations against PRC in 1950. As a result, the Tibetan appeal was not placed H. Nianlong, op. cit., pp. 392–393.

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on UN’s agenda at all.35 Above all, the PRC–India agreement on Tibet in 1954 reflected Nehru’s goodwill towards Mao’s government on Tibetan issues. The accord settled PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet, although Nehru had already conceded the point. In fact, until 1956 when PRC established a road link between Xinjiang and Tibet, supplies to PLA’s personnel in Tibet went through India.36 This was a measure of India’s goodwill and PRC’s need for India’s goodwill before the mid-1950s. The general view in Beijing about India’s goodwill during that period was really dim, though. This was partly due to the difficulties of timely communications in that era and partly due to competitive nationalism. In PLA’s official view, the 1962 Sino-Indian war was caused by India’s moves, especially in the late-1950s, to turn Tibet into a “buffer zone”. According to scholar Zhao Weiwen, Nehru had, until 1952, “ardently hoped” to convert PRC’s full-scope ‘sovereignty’ over Tibet into ‘suzerainty’, a lesser form of control. However, according to her, Nehru changed course by 1952 because, in May 1951, an ascendant PRC and the 14th Dalai Lama agreed on autonomy for Tibet. It is a different story that Tibetans, dissatisfied with PRC’s implementation of autonomy, later rose in revolt under Dalai Lama’s leadership in 1959. Scholar Wang Hongwei criticised the perceived Indian support for Tibetan rebels.37 Dalai Lama secured asylum in India in the same year. Despite such dim views in PRC about India’s Tibet policy, especially in late-1950s, Zhou continued to engage Nehru to optimise Beijing’s leverage in Delhi. Strategically, therefore, the Zhou–Nehru diplomacy before the mid-1950s was an opportunity for the two countries to accommodate each other. But the missing catalyst was PRC’s UN membership, including as a UNSC permanent member. Nehru’s India was an ardent champion of PRC’s J. W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2001, p. 49. Also, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Second Series, Volume XV.II., Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, pp. 347–52 (as cited by Arun Shourie, op. cit., p. 67). 36  J. W. Garver, op. cit. (Protracted Contest …), p. 85. 37  Views of Chinese scholars Zhao Weiwen and Wang Hongwei, and those of PLA on PRC– India ties in the 1950s, were cited by John W Garver in China’s Decision for War with India in 1962,  http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/china%20decision%20for%20 1962%20war%202003.pdf, pp. 6–8 (accessed on 23 January 2020 and earlier too). 35 

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credentials for UNSC permanent membership. It was not until 1971 that United Nations opened its door to admit PRC.

A Trade-Off Which Could Not Happen What was the option open to Beijing to please India in the early-1950s and why? India had requested UNSC on 1 January 1948 to roll back Pakistan’s “aggression” in OSJK. In that context, it would have been possible for Mao to consider supporting India’s request in the early-1950s if PRC had been a UNSC permanent member then. The reason: as observed in this discussion, Tibet, not the Kashmir issue (i.e. not OSJK’s future), was Mao’s and Zhou’s foremost priority vis-à-vis India during that period. This does not mean that Mao would have ensured the rollback of Pakistan’s “aggression” from OSJK if PRC had been a UNSC permanent member from 1949. The vagaries and nuanced dynamics of diplomacy might have thwarted PRC in any such pro-India effort. Moreover, one or more of the other UNSC permanent members would have vetoed the unconditional rollback of Pakistan’s “aggression”. In that event, PRC might have supported, or sympathised with, India in its opposition to “plebiscite” in OSJK. It would not have mattered that a “plebiscite” in OSJK was recommended by UNSC before Mao proclaimed PRC. Throughout the 1950s, PRC faced popular resistance in Tibet. At that time, Mao would not have favoured any idea of a plebiscite in Tibet like in OSJK. Beijing’s self-interest would have been at stake. Therein lay the possibility that Nehru’s India and Mao’s PRC could have explored a strategic trade-off. Indeed, if PRC had been a UNSC permanent member before the mid-1950s, India could have sought Beijing’s intervention to oppose the plan for “plebiscite” in OSJK. The reason: Nehru was already pleasing PRC by following a hands-off policy towards PLA’s intervention in Tibet at that time. Mao saw his conquest of Tibet in the 1950s as a communist-style “liberation” of the people there. But many in the international community viewed Mao’s action as ‘annexation’ of Tibet. In that context, Nehru actually sought to bring about reconciliation between Mao and Dalai Lama until at least the mid-1950s. It was not until 1959 that Nehru gave Dalai Lama asylum in India. Before that, in 1956, Nehru’s advice to Dalai Lama was that he should opt

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for reconciliation with Mao. The following passage is from the official record of Nehru’s meeting with Dalai Lama in 1956: “D.L. [Dalai Lama] should become the leader of the reform [in Tibet]. Best way we [Indians] can help is by maintaining friendly relations with China, otherwise China would fear our designs in Tibet”.38 For Nehru, “China” was PRC, not ROC as at UN then. And, by “our designs in Tibet”, he meant India’s calls for Tibetan autonomy under PRC’s sovereignty. Furthermore, Nehru advised Dalai Lama to note India’s policy of “maintaining friendly relations with China [i.e. PRC]”. Critics have argued that Mao was either unaware of, or unwilling to recognise, Nehru’s pro-PRC advice to Dalai Lama until at least 1956. In any case, Mao, according to these critics, did not reciprocate Nehru’s friendliness. However, PRC did not actually support UNSC’s plan of a “plebiscite” in OSJK in the period before mid-1950s. PRC–India relations rapidly worsened only in the late-1950s. Even then, a “plebiscite” in OSJK was essentially a nonissue for PRC. In fact, as late as in February 1964, PRC did not invoke UNSC’s plan of a “plebiscite” in OSJK. Beijing was circumspect, despite Mao’s success in the 1962 war which he had planned as the means to “severely punish India” for its “hegemonist attitude” in the late-1950s. The 1962 war followed a period of “armed coexistence” between PRC and India in their disputed border areas.39 Beijing’s circumspection about “plebiscite” in OSJK, as late as in February 1964, was evident during Zhou’s visit to Karachi, the then capital of Pakistan. The communique during Zhou’s visit was revealing for PRC’s cautious attitude and Pakistan’s concurrence. PRC and Pakistan “expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute [i.e. the future of OSJK] would be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir, as pledged to them by India and Pakistan”.40 In India’s eyes, there was no dispute, after the issue of “plebiscite” in OSJK ceased to be a ‘live’ proposition in the 1950s. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume XXXV, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, India, pp. 520–522 (as cited by Arun Shourie, op. cit., p. 153). 39  PLA military historian Xu Yan’s account as cited by John W Garver in China’s Decision for War with India in 1962, http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/china%20decision%20for%201962%20war%202003.pdf, pp. 51, 54 (accessed on 23 January 2020 and earlier too). 40  PRC–Pakistan communique in February 1964, cited by Sir Morrice James, op. cit., pp. 112–113. 38 

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Significantly, even in 1964, PRC and Pakistan did not specifically mention UNSC’s resolutions on “plebiscite” in OSJK. In reality, PRC was not privy to those resolutions. So, the PRC–Pakistan prescription was about ascertaining “wishes of the people of Kashmir [i.e. OSJK]”. That could be accomplished by various means, not necessarily through a UNSC-organised “plebiscite”. And, a reference to India’s “pledge” was infructuous. As early as in December 1953, Nehru had repudiated the idea of a UNSC-organised “plebiscite” in OSJK. More significantly, as already observed, Nehru’s action suited plebisciteaverse PRC. In fact, this particular strategic context in late-1953 enabled PRC and India to agree on Tibet and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in April 1954. For Beijing, its accord with Delhi in 1954 sealed India’s acceptance of Tibet as PRC’s domain. This should explain PRC’s cautious attitude, as late as in 1964, towards the idea of a UNSC-organised “plebiscite” in OSJK. Mao’s realpolitik calculation was far more complex. In his view, Nehru’s discomfort with the West at UNSC was offset by the Indian leader’s perceived Western ways of thinking. Nehru was, therefore, an informal member of the Western league. This was proved, in Mao’s strategic view, when the US rushed to India’s aid, at Nehru’s request, during the Sino-Indian war in 1962. But, prior to 1962, US and the West, while being sceptical of Nehru’s ‘non-aligned’ tendency, were far more opposed to Mao’s PRC, especially in the 1950s. From Mao’s perspective, moreover, Pakistan voluntarily became America’s potential partner against PRC in the 1950s. In realpolitik, therefore, there was common ground between India and PRC before the mid1950s. Above all, PRC and Pakistan were not ‘partners’ before the 1960s. Overall, the past scenario of potential PRC–India collaboration before the mid-1950s would have become real if two inter-related developments had taken place. One, PRC should have been admitted as a UNSC permanent member with veto right in October 1949. This would have been in line with PRC’s legitimate right to China’s UN seat. And, Nehru’s India was highly supportive of PRC in that regard, especially before the mid-1950s. Two, India and PRC could have struck a realpolitik deal over Tibet and OSJK. The trade-off, simply put, would have been reciprocal

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acknowledgements of PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet and India’s sovereignty over OSJK. PRC’s perceived aversion to the idea of plebiscite, say, in Tibet, could have catalysed the trade-off. Nehru’s “friendship offensive” towards Beijing would have been a collateral factor. Nehru did actually acknowledge PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet by way of the 1954 Sino-Indian accord. But he did not gain Beijing’s acknowledgement of India’s sovereignty over OSJK. It is true that UN ignored PRC’s credentials until 1971. Nonetheless, Nehru could have, perhaps successfully, sought Beijing’s recognition of India’s sovereignty over OSJK — as reciprocity for Delhi’s recognition of PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet in 1954. The bottom line: OSJK was as important to Nehru as Tibet was to Mao and Zhou. In fact, if accomplished, such a strategic trade-off might have brought about a tipping point in the PRC–India diplomacy for their good by the mid-1950s itself. By third decade of the 21st century, a Sino-Indian tipping point still remains elusive. Surely, recognition of this ‘lost’ opportunity in Sino-Indian diplomacy does not imply insensitivity towards Pakistan’s view of OSJK. But in the realpolitik of the PRC–India diplomacy before the mid-1950s, Delhi and Beijing were sufficiently close to pull off a strategic trade-off. An authoritative narrative by a PRC ‘insider’, cited later in this chapter, reveals SinoIndian strategic convergence before the mid-1950s and for some time thereafter. During the same period, Pakistan was not close to PRC. Despite such a complex but credible matrix of strategic logic, critics may raise a counter-argument on the following lines. If PRC had been a UNSC permanent member before the mid-1950s, Beijing could have by itself nullified a potential Western move for plebiscite in Tibet. Mao and Zhou would have cast PRC’s veto instead of making common cause with Nehru against UNSC’s recommendation of a “plebiscite” in OSJK. So runs the potential counter-argument. But, in my view, any such counter-argument will not be consistent with the strategic realities before the mid-1950s. Why? In that period, Mao’s PRC was a strategic ally and camp-follower of Soviet Union, UNSC’s powerful permanent member. Because of the US–Soviet rivalry, Moscow abstained from voting on UNSC’s resolutions on “plebiscite” in OSJK. So, if PRC had been a UNSC permanent member before the mid-1950s itself, Mao’s delegates would have followed Moscow’s lead and abstained from voting on those resolutions. If that had happened,

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PRC would have had no reason to call for implementation of those UNSC resolutions in August 2019 and January as well as August 2020. Paradoxically, PRC has supported those resolutions in the third decade of the 21st century, despite not being present at UNSC when it passed them. An important point to note in this new context is this: In January 2020, Soviet Union’s successor-state, Russia, which is also PRC’s intimate strategic partner, disfavoured UNSC’s old resolutions on “plebiscite” in OSJK. Critics may see my sketch of the unrealised PRC–India strategic trade-off as raw realpolitik or crude cynicism. But, before the mid-1950s, Mao and Zhou were focused on their perceptions of PRC’s self-interest in Tibet, not on the idea of a “plebiscite” in OSJK. Above all, an authoritative book on the first four decades of PRC’s diplomacy reveals that the Beijing–Delhi equation was good before the mid-1950s. Han Nianlong, PRC’s one-time Acting Foreign Minister, was the editor-inchief of this volume. The following relevant comment is re-produced from the section (in that book) on “Friendly Relations Between China [i.e. PRC] and India in 1950s”: “China [i.e. PRC] supported India in the latter’s struggle for the recovery of Goa [from the Portuguese]; India stood for the restoration of China’s legitimate seat in the United Nations [to PRC] and the return of Taiwan to China [i.e. PRC]. During the Korean War period [1950–53], India opposed the UN resolution which slandered China as an ‘aggressor’; China asked India to help pass on its warning to the United States — a move which grew out of China’s trust in India, and later, China recommended India as Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission on the Korean POW [Prisoners of War] question. China also entrusted India with helping Chinese civilians in the United States to return to the motherland… “[All] this did not mean that there were no differences between them [PRC and India]. The question of Tibet was a case in point. But it had not undermined the general trend of friendly relations between China and India. On the contrary, it was precisely in the course of handling the question of Tibet that the two countries formulated together the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”.41 H. Nianlong, op. cit., pp. 213–214.

41 

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So, it is conceivable that Nehru and the Mao–Zhou team had an opportunity as sketched above if only PRC had been a UNSC permanent member from 1949. Moreover, intense diplomacy by Nehru in that regard would have been equally necessary. Delhi’s opposition to the idea of a “plebiscite” in OSJK was (and still is) premised on the finality of OSJK’s accession to India. Beijing’s perceived opposition to the generic idea of UNSC-organised plebiscite remains relevant in the third decade of the 21st Century. Beijing’s opposition will apply to mainly-Buddhist Tibet and mainly-Muslim Xinjiang within PRC. At this writing, there is surely no concerted international opinion in favour of a plebiscite in either Tibet or Xinjiang. Xi affirms the finality of both Tibet and Xinjiang as integral parts of PRC. Modi’s India, too, asserts its authority in the new Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (UTJK) and in the Union Territory of Ladakh (UTL). In India’s view, UTL should logically include the PRC-administered Aksai Chin. Why? Because, in Delhi’s historical perspective, Aksai Chin was a part of OSJK which acceded to India in 1947. So, an interesting poser deepens the mystery of why India and PRC missed a strategic trade-off before mid-1950s. Is it conceivable that PRC would have agreed to give up Aksai Chin in 1954 if Nehru had convinced Zhou that OSJK was India’s? Would India have given up Arunachal Pradesh (Northeast Frontier Agency in 1954) if Zhou had persuaded Nehru that the ‘greater Tibet included this area’? One may never know the answers. But both Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin figure prominently in the multi-dimensional PRC-India tussle by the third decade of the 21st century (Chapters 7—8 and Epilogue). More importantly, adopting the above mode of pondering the imponderable, we can foresee a future scenario in Sino-Indian diplomacy. Unlike in the past scenario (sketched above), where an opportunity did not arise, the future scenario may offer India and PRC an opportunity to grab. But before exploring an improbable future, we should grasp the significance of a relevant Sino-Indian crisis that occurred in 2017 — the Doklam military face-off. The PRC-India physical clash and their cascading military brinkmanship as well as manoeuvres in 2020 complicated the future prospects.

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CHAPTER 6

THE TENSE DOKLAM FACE-OFF

A Rare Calculus of Political Will A PRC–India military confrontation at a key site on the ‘roof of the world’ in 2017 tested the will and wisdom of both sides. The crisis followed India’s boycott of Xi Jinping’s launch of globalisation with Chinese characteristics. So, when the 70-day non-lethal stand off ended, it was clear that India was willing to strike a forward-defence posture. China had already demonstrated its strategic outreach by launching a corridor through areas India claims as its sovereign domain. New dynamics in the Sino-Indian relations have emerged. The SinoIndian physical clash in mid-June 2020 and the consequent hostile military brinkmanship sharpened this new dynamic (discussed separately in this book).

Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Jawaharlal Nehru’s Republic of India fought an asymmetrical war1 in 1962. The war was fought for about 10 days — from 20 to 24 October 1962 and, after a pause, from 16 to 20 November in the same year.2 Independent India’s soldiers were under-equipped and ill-prepared for the high-altitude war in the Himalayan winter of 1962. As a result, India received some international sympathy. Nehru’s troops were disadvantaged, unlike the Indian soldiers who PRC–India War of 1962 was asymmetrical, but not in the later-day sense of one side using non-conventional methods such as terrorism, etc. The asymmetry was about mismatched combat-readiness. 2  The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington, USA, Asia Policy Volume 14 Number 3, July 2019, pp. 181–182. 1 

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(according to Mao and others) had fought bravely in the Second World War (1939–1945). In 1962, Mao’s troops did him proud, reinforcing his image as a revolutionary leader at home and a fierce fighter abroad as in the Korean War (1950–1953). A Chinese estimate in 1962 was that the size of independent India’s Army was just about one-sixth of Mao’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). More important, PLA had already proved its mettle in the challenging Korean War in the early-1950s. Some argue that Mao’s armed ‘liberation’ or ‘annexation’ of Tibet in the 1950s was a lesson in high-altitude acclimatisation. Such a Sino-Indian asymmetry compounded India’s woes. Furthermore, the political fallout was Nehru’s colossal loss of prestige as a global ‘nonaligned’ statesman of the 20th century. China easily won the war against an arguably friendly India, traumatising the latter beyond imagination. Mao’s war aim was to subdue Nehru and gain “at least 30 years of peace” with India.3 In my view, though, China has not benefitted from Mao’s psychological victory over Nehru in 1962. Beijing has had no long-term strategic gains to show. The 1962 war, which aggravated the then latent Sino-Indian trust deficit, is still remembered in the official circles of India at this writing. This, surely, is not a moral or material gain for China. Above all, the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, a key issue in the 1962 war, remains unsettled by the beginning of third decade of the 21st century. Some good news. Xi Jinping’s China and Narendra Modi’s India successfully managed their resolute military confrontation at Doklam (Dong Lang in Chinese) between 16 June and 28 August in 2017. There was no exchange of fire between the Chinese and Indian troops at the high-altitude Doklam plateau in the inhospitable Himalayan mountain range.4 The Mao’s war aim, as quoted by Sun Shao and Chen Zhibin in their book which was later banned, has been cited by J W Garver, China’s Decision for War with India in 1962, http:// indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/china%20decision%20for%201962%20war%20 2003.pdf, p. 51. 4  In India’s reckoning, the Doklam military crisis began on 16 June 2017 when some troops of the Chinese PLA were spotted constructing a strategic road on that Himalayan plateau. However, Beijing regards the start-date as 18 June 2017 when the PLA troops at Doklam were confronted by Indian soldiers. 3 

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Sino-Indian face-off point at Doklam was not far from the eastern theatre of the 1962 war. I explore, in later chapters, whether the statesmanlike termination of the Doklam military crisis can lead to one of my two scenarios. A scenario is the possibility of a collective-win for China, India, and Pakistan. More probable is a different scenario: an elusive tipping point in the China–India diplomacy. For China and India, their 1962 war was an awkward irony. They fought after creatively propagating the high-minded Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. By and large, the Tibet issue (discussed in the previous chapter) triggered that war. Also, the US–Soviet ‘missile crisis’ in Cuba in 1962 freed Mao from the fear of major-power intervention. Over-simplified, Kennedy’s White House and Khrushchev’s Kremlin were too preoccupied to pay close attention to the Mao–Nehru tussle before it erupted into a war. Several other factors, beyond our current focus, caused the 1962 denouement. In contrast, the de-escalation of Doklam crisis in 2017 raised a new prospect: China’s and India’s maturity to refrain from waging full-scale war. But the onset of Doklam crisis was certainly a setback. A tipping point in the PRC–India diplomacy for their own benefit would not have been more elusive! Yet, the maturity, reflected by the crisis de-escalation at Doklam cannot be missed.

Geopolitics of Doklam Flashpoint To understand India’s concerns over Doklam and China’s response, we must first note the relevant geopolitical realities. In Beijing’s view, the Doklam (Dong Lang) plateau is historically Chinese sovereign territory. Beijing cites chapter and verse from the “Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet”. This “Convention” was signed by Imperial Britain and the pre-PRC Qing Rulers of China at Calcutta in British India on 17 March 1890.5 Authoritative text of the 1890 Convention between Britain and China’s Qing Dynasty has been retrieved from the relevant British official website. http://treaties.fco.uk/docs/pdf/1894/ TS0011.pdf. 5 

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PRC is generally unwilling to accept or honour old China’s “unequal” treaties with imperial powers. Nonetheless, Xi’s PRC cherishes the 1890 Convention as an honourable document to assert (or claim, in the Indian perspective) Chinese sovereignty over Doklam. Significantly, Bhutan (capital Thimphu) also claims sovereign jurisdiction over Doklam.6 Bhutan nestles between PRC’s Tibet Autonomous Region and India’s Northeast region. As a full-fledged UN member, landlocked Bhutan has, at this writing, an unsettled boundary with China. Doklam figures in the Sino-Bhutanese boundary dispute. More precisely, Bhutan’s northern and western frontiers are in dispute with China. The dispute remains unresolved despite a number of rounds of talks since the 1980s. In contrast, there is no dispute between India and Bhutan over the latter’s southern border. Moreover, Bhutan shares its eastern border with India’s north-eastern Arunachal Pradesh State (APS, a province). As this is written, though, China continues to dispute India’s sovereignty over APS. But India does not want to budge. For Beijing, another complicating factor is Thimphu’s special ties with Delhi under the Indo-Bhutanese treaties of 1949 and 2007.7 In this geopolitical maze of modest Bhutan, India does not have historical or sovereignty claims over Doklam. But Delhi’s strategic stake in Doklam is deep. Doklam plateau overlooks India’s Siliguri Corridor (also known as the Chicken Neck) on the southern side of Himalayas. As an arterial route, Siliguri Corridor connects the heartland of India with its Northeast including APS. Beijing of course claims APS as ‘southern Tibet’ and therefore ‘Chinese territory’, but India disagrees. Topographically and strategically, China can ‘threaten’ the security of Siliguri Corridor by ensuring a strong PLA presence at Doklam. So, Dong Lang (Doklam), claimed by both China and Bhutan but not India, is a key geostrategic theatre in Sino-Indian security calculus. Unsurprisingly, PLA’s road construction initiative at a strategic site at Doklam in June 2017 set off alarms in Delhi. Beijing had notified Delhi, in

MFA, The Royal Government of Bhutan, Press Release, 29 June 2017, http://www.mfa.gov. bt/press-releases/press-release-272.html (accessed on 24 July 2017). 7  Authoritative text of the 2007 India–Bhutan Treaty of Friendship is available at the website of MEA, GOI. 6 

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advance, about the relevant construction initiative. Moreover, this strategic road at Doklam might have been conceptualised before India boycotted Xi’s launch of his Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in Beijing in May. However, the timing of this construction project, soon after Modi boycotted Xi’s BRF launch, was carefully noticed in India and elsewhere. PLA’s road project at Doklam was seen in Delhi as a potential security threat to Siliguri Corridor. The construction work by PLA men apparently started near a mountain pass on the Doklam plateau on 16 June. The PLA troops were confronted by Indian soldiers from a nearby garrison on 18 June. The crisis lasted until 28 August. At one stage, as the crisis dragged on, details relevant to our discussion were outlined by the Chinese side. On 2 August, Beijing cited three objectives for the road project at Doklam. In Beijing’s order of priorities, these objectives were: “improving local transportation”, facilitation of “grazing by livestock”, and promotion of PLA’s “border troops’ patrolling”.8 Taken together, PLA’s ‘strategic’ objectives were local transportation and the patrolling by Chinese troops at Doklam. So, India viewed the matter with deep concern, because of the Siliguri factor. Surely, China could (and still can) ‘threaten’ the security of Siliguri Corridor by various other military means, too. Space-faring China’s ability of gaining perpetual control over terrestrial Doklam was (and still is) not the only avenue. Yet, in India’s perception, the site PLA chose in 2017 was potentially a strategic concern. From that high-altitude site, PLA could hope to cut off India’s links with its Northeast at least for some period of time. Alternatively, in Delhi’s view, PLA could use the high-altitude site to undertake daring but secret forays into India. In all, therefore, Indian soldiers were sent to intercept PLA men at Doklam on 18 June 2017.

MFA, PRC, The Facts and China’s Position Concerning the Indian Border Troops’ Crossing of the China–India Boundary in the Sikkim Sector into the Chinese Territory, 2 August 2017, http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/P020170802542676636134.pdf (accessed on 2 August 2017). Also, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Remarks on the Indian Border Troops’ Illegal Crossing of the China–India Boundary into the Chinese Territory, 3 August 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1482345.shtml (accessed on 4 August 2017). 8 

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The number of troops on both sides at the face-off point was not large enough for a major clash. Yet, the quick Indian reaction had ‘caught’ the Chinese by surprise. Prior to the crisis, the powerful PRC was not unduly concerned about India’s growing military strength. However, the Doklam crisis ended because of the stalemate caused by the resoluteness displayed by both militaries. So, China began to assess India’s overall military strength and stamina more “seriously” than before.9 Indeed, “during the Doklam crisis, the Indian Navy was fully prepared for any eventuality in the Indian Ocean region”. The high level of readiness was confirmed by the then Commander-in-Chief of India’s Eastern Naval Command, Vice Admiral Harish Bisht.10 Apparently, all defence wings of China and India, including their respective cyber arms, were sensitised for action, if necessary. Yet, naval preparedness by both sides was particularly relevant. Mainly because, China was seen to be capable of widening the geostrategic scope of the Doklam face-off. The Indian Navy routinely deploys its US-supplied aircraft to protect India’s security interests in the Bay of Bengal. India’s triservices command is located at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay. For both India and China, Bay of Bengal evokes some poignant memories. The year was 1971; Delhi was in the process of liberating East Pakistan from the latter’s sense of helplessness under the then Pakistani military rulers. India’s military victory over Pakistan in December that year enabled East Pakistan to secede from Pakistan and become Bangladesh. But before Delhi triumphed, Washington sought to frighten India on behalf of Pakistan. The then US President Richard Nixon, therefore, sent an aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise, into the Bay of Bengal. Nixon was pursuing his geo-strategy of reaching out to Mao through the good offices of Pakistan, China’s “allweather” partner-to-be. But Nixon’s efforts to frighten India came to naught. The Soviet Union, America’s Cold War rival and India’s “treaty” partner during that period, checkmated Washington’s naval move against Delhi in the Bay. During Doklam crisis in 2017, however, America and Russia (the nowdefunct Soviet Union’s successor-state) were not relevant. What ensued, My conversations with senior Chinese diplomats in Delhi and Beijing in September 2018 and November 2018, respectively. 10  My conversation with retired Vice Admiral Harish Bisht in Singapore on 31 January 2020. 9 

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therefore, was a battle of military wits between India and China. The two neighbours were accustomed to non-lethal military face-offs along the unmarked Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC). At Doklam, too, there was no exchange of fire. A major difference was that Doklam was not a site anywhere along the un-demarcated LAC. Why then did India choose to confront PRC at Doklam? On 3 August 2017, India’s then External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj adduced two reasons for challenging PLA at Doklam. (1) She portrayed the Chinese construction activity there as a matter of serious security implications for India.11 If secure, Siliguri Corridor could be (and, still can be) India’s life-line across land to APS, regarded by China as its entitlement. (2) Sushma noted, “the determination of the tri-junction boundary point between India, China, and Bhutan”12 would be affected. China’s actual and potential military moves at Doklam were, therefore, unacceptable, she pointed out. However, China had already prepared a counter to such a prevalent view in India. One day before Sushma spoke, Beijing said “matters concerning the boundary tri-junction have nothing to do with this incident”.13 In July 2017, the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, briefed me about the nuances at stake.14 He emphasised three points. (1) The Doklam crisis could be resolved under the 1890 Convention. Within its framework, Qing China and Britain, which was then ruling over India, settled the now-relevant issue. In Luo’s view, the 1890 MEA, GOI, Statement by External Affairs Minister in Rajya Sabha on Doklam Issue (Uncorrected transcript), 3 August 2017, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements. htm?dtl/28810/Statement_by_External_Affairs_Minister_in_Rajya_Sabha-on_Doklam_ Issue_Uncorrected_transcript (accessed on 4 August 2017). 12  Ibid. 13  MFA, PRC, op. cit. (The Facts and China’s Position ….). 14  In July 2017, the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui (later, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister) spoke to me in Delhi, appearing very confident that China would prevail in the Doklam tussle. When the crisis ended on 28 August, both sides claimed gains. 11 

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Convention clearly drew the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet. Britain and Qing China agreed to include Doklam in Tibet. So, “Doklam undoubtedly belongs to China” today, because of Tibet’s status as a part of PRC, he asserted. (2) PRC’s recognition of Sikkim as a part of India in 2005 was derived from the 1890 Convention. The Tibet–Sikkim boundary, as in this valid Convention, influenced Beijing to recognise Sikkim as an Indian province, Luo noted. (3) The Sikkim–Tibet frontier, as agreed in 1890, could now become the “early harvest” in the PRC–India boundary talks, Luo suggested. In PRC’s perspective, Doklam, claimed by Bhutan at India’s behest, falls in the Sikkim section. So, if Delhi accepts this Sino-Indian “early harvest”, Doklam would automatically become a newly-agreed part of PRC. Bhutan and India might have no further say over Doklam. In Beijing’s view, such an “early harvest” will settle for ever the tri-junction among India’s Sikkim, China, and Bhutan. At this writing, however, Delhi continues to demur. Delhi argues that the 1890 Convention is only a basis to determine the Sikkim–Tibet boundary alignment. Not also acceptable to Delhi is Beijing’s contention that Nehru had, in the 1950s, endorsed the 1890 Convention in the manner now interpreted by China. Sikkim, a protectorate under Delhi’s tutelage during Nehru’s time, merged with India in 1975.15

Diplomatic ‘Trigger’ of Doklam Crisis Sino-Indian geopolitics concerning Doklam will not fully explain the military crisis. Significantly, the crisis erupted about a month after Modi boycotted Xi’s BRF launch. Xi signalled the globalisation of his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by launching BRF in the presence of inter-continental delegates in Beijing on 14 May 2017. In Xi’s unfolding ‘China Story’, BRI and BRF epitomise his political will and risk-braving diplomacy for ‘global good’. In practical terms, BRI denotes a worldwide web of China-led projects concerning infrastructure, energy, An alternative view, not acceptable to Delhi, is that India ‘annexed’ Sikkim in 1975.

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digital-tech, and other economic aspects. Some key BRI projects, such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), radiate out of China. Scarcely recognised is a linkage between India’s boycott of the BRF launch in May 2017 and the outbreak of the Doklam crisis in June. India opposed BRI on two main grounds. First, CPEC was, from the beginning, Xi’s metaphor for a jewel in his BRI Crown. But CPEC passes through areas which Pakistan administers and India deems as its sovereign domain. For this, as we know, Delhi cites the “irrevocable” accession to India by the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK) in 1947. CPEC’s route covers an area of OSJK, an aspect in the maze of India–Pakistan arguments over the Kashmir issue. India set out its second concern on 13 May 2017, exactly on the eve of BRF launch. In doing so, India sat in critical judgment over BRI. But Xi zealously saw (and still views) BRI as China’s creative contribution to ‘global good’. Nonetheless, at the BRF launch, the Chinese leader did not counter India’s denunciation of BRI. He simply portrayed CPEC as a Sino-Pakistani cooperative venture.16 Xi had cordially invited Modi to the BRF launch. There was, therefore, a message to Modi in Xi’s silence over Delhi’s narrative against China’s connectivity norms. The message was about China’s then strategic imperative that India, a major Asian neighbour, should accept BRI. Mainly because, from Beijing’s standpoint, Delhi’s belated but blistering denunciation of BRI was, on close scrutiny, a devastating critique. India’s un-camouflaged critique of BRI contained two parts. The first part was a frontal attack on the perceived founding principles of BRI. Of course, Delhi projected its ‘principled’ attack on Beijing as a defence of the beneficiaries of the BRI projects. However, there was no smokescreen. India unleashed a laser beam of sharp words and ideas in a long sequence. Unsigned, India’s External Affairs Ministry advocated its own charter as follows: “We are of firm belief that connectivity initiatives [such as BRI] must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency, and equality. Connectivity initiatives must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid projects that I was present as a delegate at Xi’s launch of his Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in Beijing on 14 May 2017. 16 

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would create unsustainable debt burden for communities; [must follow] balanced ecological and environmental protection and preservation standards; transparent assessment of project costs; and skill and technology transfer to help long-term running and maintenance of the assets created by local communities. Connectivity projects must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity”.17 Clear as daylight was Delhi’s disdainful disapproval of BRI. China was accused of discarding basic economic principles in conceptualising and implementing its BRI projects in other countries. India portrayed BRI, in all but name, as a Chinese blueprint for imposing debt burdens on gullible countries. The alleged unwillingness of China to transfer technologies to its partners was implicitly cited as one cause of their debt burdens arising from BRI projects. In Delhi’s assessment, the other debt-generating factors were China’s perceived opaqueness in project-costing and casualness in protecting the environment. The second part of Delhi’s critique of China’s BRI was linked to India’s own concerns. Delhi’s statement in this respect ran as follows: “Guided by our principled position in the matter, we have been urging China to engage [us] in a meaningful dialogue on its connectivity initiative, ‘One Belt, One Road’, which was later renamed as ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. We are awaiting a positive response from the Chinese side. Regarding the so-called ‘China– Pakistan Economic Corridor’, which is being projected as the flagship project of the BRI/OBOR, the international community is well aware of India’s position. No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity”.18 Taken together, those two parts convinced the Chinese that India was trivialising the entire BRI paradigm. This went beyond India’s sovereignty calculus concerning CPEC. As I ascertained later, Chinese authorities feel that India ignited the scare about their “debt trap diplomacy” towards BRI–beneficiaries.19 MEA, GOI, Official Spokesperson’s response to a query on participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum 13 May 2017, http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official_ Spokespersons_response_to_a_query_on_participation_of_India_in_OBORBRI_Forum (accessed on 14 May 2017). 18  Ibid. 19  Comments by senior Chinese diplomats in their conversations with me in Delhi and Beijing in September 2018 and November 2018, respectively.

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At this writing, Beijing does not like India’s anti-BRI stand in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) which was founded by China and Russia. India is the lone hold-out against BRI in this organisation. Chinese diplomats feel that China paid this huge price by endorsing India’s admission to SCO at Russia’s “initiative”.20 At Beijing’s initiative, Pakistan formally joined SCO at the same time as India on 9 June 2018. However, the process of admitting India as an SCO member began before the BRF summit in May 2017 and the Doklam crisis in June–August 2017. We have seen Beijing’s frustration, not helplessness, over Delhi’s negative outlook on BRI. This was the precise context in which PLA men began building a strategic road through Doklam, when India confronted them in June 2017. For Beijing, the Doklam road was (and still is) simply a BRI-like connectivity venture — more importantly, within “Chinese territory”. Unstated but evident was PLA’s political or strategic move to confound a BRI-opponent, India, through a connectivity project at Doklam. For Delhi, though, the Chinese venture in Doklam was (and still is) not a routine BRI-like project. In it, Delhi sees negative strategic implications. More importantly, the sequence of events was significant. As we have noted, India boycotted BRF launch, which internationalised BRI, on 14 May 2017. Thereafter, the road project was timed for June in the same year, prompting India to intercept the PLA men. Moreover, Delhi was concerned about the perceived long-term strategic implications. When the Doklam crisis was de-escalated by end-August 2017, there was no certainty that the flashpoint was completely defused. By the third decade of the 21st century, Doklam (Dong Lang) became a metaphor for strategic surprise in Sino-Indian relations. Is there a precedent? Before Indian soldiers ‘surprised’ PLA at Doklam in 2017, Xi had sprung a seminal strategic ‘surprise’ on India by launching CEPC in 2015. In the 20th century, there was a well-recorded theatre-level surprise. At Sumdorongchu valley (Wangdong) along the eastern LAC in 1986, Indian soldiers successfully challenged a surprisingly ‘entrenched’ PLA contingent in the area the Indians were regularly patrolling. The non-lethal but resolute confrontation lasted several years.21 Until Doklam, Ibid. S. Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, USA, 2016, p. 15. 20  21 

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Sumdorongchu was the metaphor for matching military moves along the mountainous LAC after the asymmetric 1962 war, which China won easily. A relevant strategic detail is necessary to better-understand Sumdorongchu and Doklam. Sumdorongchu was the scene of a conventional military stand off, not a strategic confrontation. What does this mean? The answer follows. India demonstrated its nuclear-weapon capability in 1974 but maintained strategic ambiguity about actual weaponisation until 1998. Only after testing several nuclear weapons in 1998 did India declare itself a defensive nuclear power. Delhi wanted to deter China whose strong nuclear arsenal was a “threat” to India. Doklam, therefore, is a distinctive new metaphor (at this writing) on two counts. Doklam is not along the unmarked LAC. Additionally, the SinoIndian resoluteness at Doklam was the first strategic manifestation of political will by both sides. The reason: the lurking nuclear arsenals.

Nuclear Arsenal Shadow at Doklam The China–India war in 1962 was fought when both countries were not armed with nuclear weapons. It was only in October 1964 that China successfully tested its first atom bomb. Nearly a decade later, India conducted its first experimental atomic weapon test (dubbed as a “peaceful nuclear explosion”). Almost a quarter century thereafter, Delhi tested several atomic weapons in May 1998. India aimed at proving its capability for nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis China. Moreover, Delhi wanted to emerge as an Asian ‘rival’ to Beijing. Delhi was guided by the mystique of nuclear weapons as the currency of credible national security. As for the geopolitical ‘critical mass’22 that triggered those tests in 1998, the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee wrote to the then US President Bill Clinton. Vajpayee cited India’s sense of being constantly exposed to a threat from nuclear-armed China. He also noted China’s help to Pakistan in the latter’s nuclear-weapons programme as another threat to Scientifically, ‘critical mass’ is essential for nuclear explosions. The metaphor here applies to Vajpayee’s geopolitical logic. 22 

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India.23 Cognisant of these aspects, Henry Kissinger, a guru of global strategic affairs,24 later acknowledged the “rational” nature of India’s “nuclear [armament] objectives” in “a tough neighbourhood”.25 The Doklam confrontation occurred under the shadow of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles of both China and India. Islamabad was not involved in this confrontation. But Pakistan as a factor in the evolution of the PRC–India nuclear ‘equation’ is something that Delhi considers to be significant, as revealed by Vajpayee. Also, Sino-Indian nuclear ‘equation’ is not nullified by China’s perceived ‘condescension’ towards India. Even at this writing in the third decade of the 21st century, China refuses to acknowledge India as a de jure nuclear-armed state. Beijing’s attitude, under the ‘logic’ of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), does not nullify India’s status as a de facto nuclear-armed country with long-range ballistic missiles. So, despite China’s and India’s independent policies of “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons, the localised Doklam crisis occurred under the shadow of atomic arms. Dispassionately, NPT, which India never signed, remains flawed. Five states, the ‘early birds’ in exploding atom bombs (i.e. weapons of mass destruction), are allowed to keep and modernise them under the ‘legality’ of NPT. Signed by three ‘early-bird’ states — America, Soviet Union, and Britain — besides many other countries on 1 July 1968, the NPT came into effect from 5 March 1970. But PRC, despite being an ‘early-bird’ in acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, acceded to the NPT only in 1992. In fact, both France and PRC did not sign the NPT at its inception. Yet, they were included by the other three

T. C. Schaffer and H. B. Schaffer, India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy, HarperCollins Publishers India, Noida, India, 2016, p. 52. For Vajpayee’s letter to Bill Clinton on the Indian nuclear-weapons testing in 1998, see: New York Times, www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letter-to-clintonon-the-nuclear-testing.html. 24  H. Kissinger’s reputation as an American strategic wizard was dented by his failure in his efforts to prevent India from ‘liberating’ Bangladesh (East Pakistan) in 1971. However, his strategic acumen is recognised in India as well. 25  H. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, Simon & Schuster, New York, USA, 2001, pp. 158–159. 23 

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‘early-bird’ states in the club of five great powers. All other countries were barred from making, testing, acquiring, and possessing nuclear weapons. Viewing such ‘nuclear hegemony’ as insensitive discrimination in high matters of war and peace, India did not sign the NPT. Originally a pacifist, Delhi exploded nuclear weapons in 1974 and 1998. By 2008, however, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), piloted by America, conferred an exceptional status on India. Recognising Delhi as a responsible non-proliferating player on the international stage, NSG granted India access to the global civil nuclear market, arguably in perpetuity. This is purely for electricity generation for India’s energy security in the context of global climate-change concerns. India has also been allowed to remain a ‘legitimate’ nuclear-armed state, albeit without formal recognition of a similar ‘legal’ status under the NPT canopy. At this writing, India is the only non-NPT state to have secured a legitimate access to the international civil nuclear market since 2008. By 2008, when China became a global leader, NSG recognised India’s “impeccable” credentials of not exporting (i.e. not proliferating) its nucleararms knowhow and equipment.26 But China, the initially-reluctant party to NSG’s pro-Delhi decision in 2008, continues to dispute the ‘legality’ of India’s nuclear arsenal. China became a member of NSG in 2004, almost 30 years after the Group was formed. NSG, originally the London Club, was formed in 1975 to check-mate India after it conducted a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974.27 These paradoxes show that both China and India are important to the global nuclear non-proliferation drive. Overall, in this nuclear environment, PRC does not praise or dispute India’s non-proliferation credentials. Significantly, China itself was often monitored for supplying its nuclear-arms knowhow and equipment to Pakistan and Iran before 1992.28 On the issue of China aiding Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons, Chinese diplomats have told me that Beijing’s adherence to the NPT could not be doubted. What does this mean? China’s India’s “impeccable” non-proliferation credentials are recognised by America and a number of other countries, including Japan, France and Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. 27  Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks: A net assessment, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, UK, 2 May 2007, p. 10. 28  China’s assistance to Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is acknowledged by several diplomats in vantage positions, and chronicled by others like journalists, scholars, and institutions. 26 

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actual or alleged transfer of nuclear-arms knowhow and equipment to Pakistan pre-dated Beijing’s acceptance of NPT in 1992. And until PRC joined NSG in 2004, China was not bound by the Group’s restrictions on supplies of sensitive materials to Pakistan. As for China’s actual or alleged help to Pakistan to acquire ballistic-missile knowhow and equipment, Beijing remains outside the relevant Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Unlike China, India is a member of MTCR while continuing to oppose the NPT that ‘privileges’ just five countries. John Garver has narrated an interesting episode in China–Pakistan nucleararms cooperation. During the preparations for a US–China summit in Washington in October 1997, Beijing “flatly refused” to “suspend nuclear and missile cooperation” with Pakistan.29 This happened, significantly, after China joined the NPT in 1992. In 2003, I sent a question to the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on the similar nature of China-Pakistan relationship and the US-Israel equation in strategic characteristics.30 I got no response from the Chinese leader on this specific issue in his interview. But a US official in Beijing confirmed my information. A similarity between the US–Israel partnership and the Sino-Pakistani connection is reflected in Garver’s account in 2016, too.31 Surely, the nuances of the China–India–Pakistan nuclear-arsenal matrix did not determine the start or progress of the Doklam crisis. But China and India de-escalated their face-off before a flare-up could occur under the shadow of their nuclear arsenals. At Doklam, there certainly was no nucleararms sabre-rattling or brinkmanship by China or Pakistan or India. In my view, this was entirely due to China’s and India’s independent “no-first-use” policy. But a view is gaining ground that the potential risk of a Sino-Indian nuclear-armed confrontation cannot be ignored in the aftermath of the Doklam military crisis. Yet, there are some mitigating factors to consider. Surely, China and India do not seem poised for a direct nuclear-arms and ballistic-missiles race. Beijing’s acquisitions are considerably larger than J. W. Garver, China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2016, p. 640. 30  P. S. Suryanarayana, China for fair, reasonable solution to border row: Wen, The Hindu, 22 June 2003, http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2003/06/22/stories/2003062206050100.htm. 31  J. W. Garver, op. cit. (China’s Quest …), p. 640. A caveat, expressed in some diplomatic circles, is that the ‘organic’ vibrance of the US-Israel relations far exceeds that of SinoPakistani ties. 29 

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Delhi’s. Mainly because, China is preparing for its main purpose of deterring America, not India on the same scale. Beijing’s full-spectrum competition with Washington encompasses trade and high technology besides military capabilities. However, Rajesh Basrur argues, China’s preoccupation with deterring US is “not reassuring” in the context of the Sino-Indian nuclear-arms capabilities. Basrur points out: “In some ways, the risk [of miscalculation] may be higher if one side, in this case China, is not paying attention [to the other side, India]. China has been reluctant to engage in serious negotiations with India on nuclear confidence building and hence may underestimate the gains from agreeing on greater transparency and better communications as components of nuclear risk reduction [in the military domain]”.32 Moreover, the “gap” between China and India in their stockpiles of nuclear warheads is “not … a stabilizing factor”. This is revealed in the light of a review of the balance of the US–Soviet nuclear forces during the Cold War. Noting these nuances, Basrur adds that “the No-First-Use commitments by China and India do not [also] translate into a stabilising factor because they do not trust each other.”33 On balance, there was no nuclear-arms sabre-rattling or brinkmanship at Doklam, despite the unmistakable shadow of atomic arsenals that China and India possess. So, it was possible for these two giant Asian neighbours to prevent the crisis from spinning out of control. The Doklam crisis was localised, but a Sino-Pakistani territorial factor may have influenced India. This extra-locational aspect concerning Doklam crisis has been scarcely noticed. In focus, behind the scenes, was India’s subtle messaging to China.

A Tit-for-Tat Messaging There is a striking similarity between the Indian foray into Doklam and the Chinese presence in the disputed areas of CPEC route. We shall examine the nuances of this similarity. Through the Doklam crisis of 2017, Modi R. Basrur, India and China: A Managed Nuclear Rivalry? The Washington Quarterly, 42:3, 2019, p. 163. 33  Ibid. 32 

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signalled political will to go the extra mile to ensure India’s security. Delhi’s foray into Doklam, which is not an Indian domain, was a plan to push forward the perimeter of India’s security. Modi’s strategy in 2017 was similar to Xi’s launch of CPEC in 2015 through Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B), which is not a Chinese domain. Xi had, in fact, displayed political will to go the extra mile to promote China’s core interests. Taken together, China’s CPEC venture and India’s Doklam foray brought to the fore a nuanced calculus of competitive political will in Sino-Indian engagement. As already noted, China asserts sovereignty over Doklam under the 1890 Convention. But Bhutan also claims jurisdiction over the same area. India’s presence at Doklam was “inside Bhutanese territory” (as Thimphu stated on 29 June 2017).34 However, with Beijing asserting sovereignty over Doklam, India’s foray into that area in 2017 acquired an unusual trilateral dimension. The three countries in this geometrical dimension were (and, still are) China, India, and Bhutan. A parallel trilateral geometry involves India, China, and Pakistan. CPEC passes through G-B which is administered by Pakistan, as this is written. Also well known is India’s assertion of sovereignty over that area since October 1947. For this, Delhi cites the terms of British transfer of power to India in 1947. We also know that OSJK, with jurisdiction over G-B, acceded to India at that time. So, India claims sovereignty over G-B. Now, let us compare China’s stake in CPEC and India’s stake at Doklam. The terms of British transfer of power to India drive Delhi’s argument against China’s presence in the disputed areas of CPEC route. Comparably, Britain figures in PRC’s argument against India’s foray into Doklam in 2017. However, Britain itself has nothing to do with either Doklam or the disputed areas of the CPEC route. First, let us look at CPEC. China has invested funds and deployed its personnel for CPEC.35 At the same time, Beijing maintains that it has not deployed PLA soldiers along the CPEC route. Easily discernible, though, is China’s strategic interest in the CPEC as a passage to the Arabian Sea. CPEC, MFA, The Royal Government of Bhutan, op. cit. Estimates about China’s CPEC investments and personnel vary from time to time. A figure in the range of at least US$ 50 billion is generally taken as Chinese commitment, if not actual investment, at this writing. The total size of Chinese CPEC personnel is not generally discoursed. 34  35 

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as a corridor near India, should also be of strategic importance to PRC. Pakistan has raised a special force to protect CPEC. Obviously, China’s guidance in this regard was (and, still is) a critical factor.36 China’s compulsions are traceable to its core interests in CPEC (discussed in an earlier chapter). Now, let us look at Doklam. India sent its soldiers to challenge PLA troops at Doklam “inside Bhutanese territory”, which was (and, still is) claimed by PRC as its sovereign entitlement. By doing so, Delhi sought to pre-empt a potential Chinese threat to the Siliguri Corridor. The Indian aim was to strike a forward-defence posture. In Beijing’s perception, though, India sought to push forward its security perimeter in the eastern sector into “Chinese territory”. Senior Chinese diplomats and military officials argued that India’s game-plan was “ridiculous” and there was “no room for compromise”.37 A relevant question is whether the Indian foray into Doklam carried a tit-for-tat message to China vis-à-vis Pakistan. ‘Yes’ is my answer. Publicly unstated, Delhi’s game-plan was to surprise Beijing in “Chinese territory” away from the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control. This was Delhi’s retaliatory message for Xi surprising Modi by carving out CPEC through areas that India wants restored as its sovereign property. A nuanced difference cannot be ignored. CPEC is virtually a fait accompli. In contrast, Delhi’s foray into Doklam ended without India establishing a permanent presence at the face-off point. When the crisis was de-escalated, India spoke of a Sino-Indian “understanding” to disengage at the face-off point. But China indicated that Indian troops dispersed from the face-off site without any reciprocal commitment by PLA. Such a gloss apart, China is generally believed to have strengthened its capabilities in the larger Doklam theatre after the face-off with India ended. Whether or not as a matching move, India is also generally believed to monitor Doklam closely after the face-off was called off. For Delhi, much will depend on Bhutan’s continued willingness to give India adequate physical space to do so. During the crisis in 2017, China argued that there was no conclusive evidence that Bhutan China and Pakistan have rarely, if at all, revealed the finer details of CPEC security structure and the related operations to meet the ubiquitous terrorist threats. However, the close SinoPakistani collaboration is evident from Chinese official statements. 37  My conversations with Chinese Ambassador in Delhi in July 2017 and with a senior Chinese diplomat in Beijing in August 2017. 36 

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had requested India to stop PLA men in their tracks. Thimphu did not, however, dispute Delhi’s version that India and Bhutan acted in concert on that occasion. In any case, the Sino-Indian confrontation ended in time for Xi to host a summit of leaders from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). Political and defence diplomacy brought about the timely rollback of Doklam crisis. This was made possible by the inability of China and India to break each other’s military resolve. Another contributory factor was the enlightened approach of both sides to refrain from military escalation. The strategic baseline of Doklam crisis was this. Delhi saw PLA’s initiative for a strategic road as a potential threat to India’s Northeast, especially APS (claimed by China). To meet the Chinese challenge, India wanted to push forward its security perimeter in a bid for “mutual and equal security”. The doctrine of “mutual and equal security” embellishes as many as six Sino-Indian confidence-building agreements from 1993 to 2013. But the relevant aspiration remained undefined and, therefore, unexplored, complicating the Sino-Indian military crisis in 2020. China and India must clearly define “mutual and equal security” instead of counting their military gains, if any, at Doklam.

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CHAPTER 7

SCANNING OLD TURF FOR NEW GAMES

From CPEC to McMahon Line China, India, and Pakistan treat a treacherous battleground in the high Himalayan mountain range as a strategic playground. McMahon Line in the east, drawn by a British-India official in 1914, was in focus before, during, and for a while after the Sino-Indian war of 1962. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor was launched in the west in 2015. We take an updated look at these two markers and the area between them, as relevant to southern China, northern India, and northern Pakistan. The updated review brings this region under fresh light on the eve of an extraordinary Sino-Indian military crisis in 2020.

PRC and India began the eighth decade of their diplomatic relations in 2020. But Beijing’s strong reaction to Delhi’s updated policy on the Kashmir issue stirred old arguments in new strategic light. As already noted, Modi’s government secured parliamentary approval, on 5 and 6 August 2019, to reconfigure the then Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK). His proposal to scrap ISJK’s special autonomy was okayed. Simultaneously, the Indian Parliament approved his parallel move to divide the strategic province. Accordingly, on 31 October, two units were carved out of ISJK — the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (UTJK) and the Union Territory of Ladakh (UTL). From that day, both these union territories, with restructured local governance, are administered substantially by the Indian Government. However, India’s “internal affair” drew strong responses from China and 129

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Pakistan. In fact, the genesis of the extraordinary China-India military crisis in 2020 could be traced to Beijing’s dismay over Delhi’s reconfiguration of ISJK, among other factors (Epilogue). A brief recall of the finer background is necessary here. In August 1947, Imperial Britain carved a new state, called Pakistan, out of British India. Simultaneously, London freed the residual British India. As British India’s successor-state, independent India retained its original name, India (in English, and Bharat in the other official language of Hindi). Soon, newlyindependent Pakistan sought a stake in the future of the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK). Until then, OSJK was a distinctive unit under British paramountcy in the Indian subcontinent. In October 1947, OSJK acceded to India under a British formula for transfer of power to the two new neighbours, India and Pakistan. Thereafter, as noted before, OSJK got divided between India and Pakistan. By third decade of the 21st century, India and Pakistan continue to administer their respective portions. OSJK’s long-term future remains unsettled. Since 1947, Pakistan kept itself relevant to the future of ISJK, too. This is the larger portion of OSJK. Under Delhi’s sovereignty calculus, the entire OSJK is India’s legal and legitimate entitlement. However, Pakistan has pursued several means to try and influence events in ISJK, and in UTJK since 31 October 2019. Delhi has argued that Pakistan frequently triggered antiIndia terrorism in ISJK. With equal regularity, Pakistan has denied India’s assertions amid a chequered process of dialogue between the two countries. A major diplomatic challenge for India is China’s “strategic and cooperative partnership” with Pakistan. In the 2000s, Pakistan’s military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, pledged to rein in militant-infiltration into India. This sensitive aspect is best-narrated in the words of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister during Musharraf ’s regime, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri. Tracing the atmospherics and substance of a Pakistan–India unofficial ‘summit’ in Islamabad on 6 January 2004, Kasuri wrote in 2015 on these lines: “President Pervez Musharraf greeted the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee with a warm handshake and several newspapers all over the world later published the picture of the two leaders as the ‘handshake that changed history’. ….. President Musharraf assured Prime Minister Vajpayee that his [Musharraf ’s] government had taken all possible measures against

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extremist militant organizations and listed various details in that regard. However, he emphasized that he could not guarantee that such [militant] incidents would stop entirely [in India] as there were ‘freelancers’ engaging in militant activities and no assurances regarding them could be given”.1 The Joint Statement issued after the Musharraf–Vajpayee meeting on that day was much more categorical: “Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the [India–Pakistan] dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented. President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he [Musharraf ] will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. President Musharraf emphasized that a sustained and productive [India– Pakistan] dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results”.2 Moreover, as noted before, China recognised that a Pakistan-based and UN-designated terrorist group carried out an attack at Pulwama (India) in February 2019. In this overall context, China began extending unprecedented strategic support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue by the third decade of the 21st century. Mindful of this background, we focus on three ground realities in the triangular geopolitics of China, India, and Pakistan. The first ground reality is about the updated Sino-Indian differences over the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Secondly, we note the importance of GilgitBaltistan (G-B), under Pakistan’s control, and Aksai Chin (in China, at this writing). The third ground reality, pertaining to Tawang (in India now), is critical to the future of Sino-Indian relations. In the light of these ground realities, I explore, in the next chapter, a collective-win approach in China– India–Pakistan diplomacy. For now, we scan the old turf shared by China, India, and Pakistan. The foremost new strategic reality is China’s construction of CPEC. Furthermore, India’s updated policy on the Kashmir issue has been opposed by both China and Pakistan. Relevant to these unfolding realities are places like G-B, Aksai Chin, and Tawang. And, there can be no strategic discussion over Tawang K. M. Kasuri, Neither a Hawk nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Penguin/Viking, Penguin Books India, Gurgaon, India, 2015, pp. 167–168. 2  Pakistan–India Joint Statement, Islamabad, 6 January 2004, as reproduced by K. M. Kasuri, op. cit., pp. 169–170. 1 

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without McMahon Line as a referral ‘boundary’. Now, we begin our exploration of the old turf.

Ground Reality-1: CPEC and CPEC-Plus Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September 2019, questioned India’s “internal affair” of creating UTJK and UTL. He said “no actions that would unilaterally change the status quo should be taken”3 by India. For Wang Yi, India’s division of ISJK (as UTJK and UTL) was a “unilateral” action. He implied that China and Pakistan should have been consulted by India before such a division. He did not, however, refer to China’s launching of CPEC on the Pakistani side of OSJK in 2015, without consulting India. With this in mind, India reacted strongly to Wang Yi. Delhi called on Beijing to “desist from efforts to change the status quo through the illegal so-called China–Pakistan Economic Corridor in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir [POK]”.4 In effect, India blamed China for its unilateral action, albeit on the Pakistani side of OSJK. Delhi’s argument: India, not Pakistan, is entitled to the areas where China unilaterally began building CPEC. Two significant nuances must be noted. First, India denounced a portion of CPEC as an “illegal” route, because it passes through G-B in “POK”. As already narrated, India claims sovereign entitlement to “POK” as a whole. Secondly, and significantly, Delhi now chose to criticise the entire CPEC as the “so-called” project. In Delhi’s view, CPEC as a whole cannot be described as a joint China-Pakistan project. What is Delhi’s reasoning? The answer: China acknowledged in 1963 that “POK” (Indian terminology), including G-B, was an area that Delhi counted as its sovereign entitlement. In that year, China signed a “temporary” boundary agreement, not a treaty, with Pakistan. While doing so, China reserved its right to re-negotiate the “temporary” Sino-Pakistani boundary with the rightful “owner” of OSJK in its final MFA, PRC, Wang Yi on the Kashmir Issue: Hope to See the Dispute Effectively Managed, https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1704145.shtml (accessed on 29 September 2019). 4  MEA, GOI, Official Spokesperson’s response to a query regarding a reference made by Chinese Foreign Minister to Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in his address at the UNGA, September 28, 2019 (accessed on 29 September 2019). 3 

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status. By the third decade of the 21st century, there is, so far, no sign of an India–Pakistan settlement about the rightful “owner” of OSJK. The flare-up of harsh Sino-Indian diplomacy in September 2019 can be traced to Modi’s reinvention of ISJK in August. Earlier, in 2018, a highranking Chinese diplomat offered to solve the controversy over Beijing’s decision in 2015 to build CPEC without consulting India. We shall see how he tried. For that, some relevant background needs repetition. China had gone ahead with CPEC by practically treating Pakistan as the sovereign owner of the areas that India claims as its own. Delhi keeps reminding Beijing that those areas, including G-B, were in OSJK which acceded to India in 1947. Furthermore, in India’s book, there is no record of accession to Pakistan by OSJK. G-B is a key passage for digital connectivity and other aspects of CPEC. Aware of these arguments, Luo Zhaohui (when he was Chinese Ambassador to India until 2019) suggested that CPEC’s name could be altered to assuage India’s feelings. Another idea floated in the Chinese diplomatic circles in 2018 was that a separate China–India economic corridor was indeed conceivable to complement CPEC. However, because CPEC was Xi’s strategic move, Chinese officials could not carry forward their proposal of a China–India economic corridor. Apart from CPEC being Xi’s strategic choice, Delhi was not mollified by the suggestions of a new name for CPEC and an uncertain China– India corridor. Earlier, in January 2016, I wrote that Xi could have conceptualised a China–India–Pakistan Corridor, as a “CPEC-Plus project”, instead of CPEC. Suggesting that such a step would have been in harmony with PRC’s rising global profile, I wrote as follows: “[I]t was open to the Chinese authorities to have thought of a CPECPlus project, because of their self-projection as a rising force for regional and global harmony. A CPEC-Plus project would have spanned a China–India– Pakistan route, skirting entirely those territories that remain in dispute between New Delhi and Islamabad, at this writing. “Even a CPEC-Plus project-route will pass through the Himalayan terrain contested by China and India (instead of the territories in dispute between India and Pakistan). But this aspect can be addressed through Sino-Indian joint development of the economic corridor across the disputed China–India border. The individual ownership of the related joint projects can be settled after the final resolution of the Sino-Indian boundary questions. ….. However,

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Xi Jinping has, in my opinion, preferred to try and keep India off-balance by opting for a mere CPEC (not a CPEC-Plus project)”.5 Despite Delhi’s unrelenting opposition to CPEC, both India and China know that there is more to diplomacy than denunciations and attempts to keep a competitor off-balance. Modi, therefore, hosted Xi for their second “informal meeting” on 11 and 12 October 2019 (Chapter 4). This was done despite China’s denunciation of ISJK’s planned restructuring (as it still was). At that meeting, the two leaders shied away from an open face-off over the Kashmir issue and CPEC. The Kashmir issue did figure in their talks. But Modi and Xi did not discuss India’s “internal” moves concerning ISJK, Delhi clarified three months later. At first, India said Modi merely “listened” to Xi’s exposition on the Kashmir issue at that meeting.6 Although Xi appreciated his meeting with Modi, China criticised India after it formally carved two Union Territories out of ISJK on 31 October 2019. Xi was already aware of what was coming. Yet, China commented that Delhi was “placing [one] part of Chinese territory [Aksai Chin] under Indian administration”. In reality, India was (and, still is) in no position to extend the administrative jurisdiction of the new UTL to Aksai Chin. Nonetheless, Beijing called the creation of UTL “illegal, null, and void”.7 This created a situation which seemed ominous for India’s relations with its two ‘allied’ neighbours, China and Pakistan.

A Sudden ‘Recourse’ to UNSC Sometimes, polemical words get translated into political action in diplomacy. China once again successfully requisitioned a closed-door session of the P. S. Suryanarayana, Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China–India Synergy, World Century Publishing Corporation, Hackensack, New Jersey, USA, 2016, pp. 130–131. 6  MEA, GOI, Transcript of Weekly Media Briefing by Official Spokesperson (16 January 2020) 17 January 2020, https://mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/32312/Transcript_of_Weekly_ Media_Briefing_by_Official_Spokesperson_January_16_2020 (accessed on 27 February 2020). 7  MFA, PRC, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on 31 October 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1712371. shtml (accessed on 1 November 2019). 5 

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United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to discuss India’s “internal” matter concerning the Kashmir issue. The meeting took place on 15 January 2020, coinciding with the Raisina Dialogue, India’s annual defence talk-show. As in August 2019, UNSC neither censured India nor endorsed China’s and Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue. India’s refusal to ‘internationalise’ the Kashmir issue was supported by Russia — China’s and India’s strategic partner and a UNSC permanent member endowed with veto right. On 17 January 2020, two days after UNSC’s closed-door discussion on the Kashmir issue, Russia’s Acting Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov commented in Moscow as follows: “We [Russians] have always believed that the Kashmir problem should be settled through direct talks between India and Pakistan in accordance with the declarations and decision these two countries have adopted. We also adhere to this position when it is proposed that the Kashmir problem be discussed at the UN”.8 As emphasised by Lavrov, Russia’s support for India on this occasion reflected a decades-long position. We have observed that Russia’s parentstate, Soviet Union, did not vote for UNSC’s resolutions on the Kashmir issue in the late-1940s and early-1950s. But PRC, not a UNSC member during that period, invoked those resolutions in a completely different strategic environment in August 2019 and January as well as August 2020. India vehemently responded to the Chinese who, in its view, were acting on behalf of Pakistan at UNSC’s in-camera session. An Indian spokesman said on 16 January 2020: “In our [Indian] view, China should seriously reflect on this global consensus, draw the proper lessons, and refrain from taking such action in the future. On the question about who exactly supported and who were against [India], our sense is that [the] overwhelming support was for this forum not to be misused by Pakistan through a member of the UN Security Council [i.e. PRC]”.9 Two significant points must be noted. One, India asked China to note the “global consensus” against any future role for UNSC in the Kashmir issue. In Delhi’s view, the “global consensus” on the Kashmir issue was MFA, Russian Federation, Acting Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at a news conference on Russia’s diplomatic performance in 2019 Moscow, 17 January 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/ asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/4001740 (accessed on 24 January 2020). 9  MEA, GOI, op. cit. (Note 6). 8 

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evident in China’s failure in chessboard-moves to convince UNSC to force India to accept a plebiscite solution. UN-supervised plebiscite, if ever held, would cover all areas of OSJK — UTJK, UTL, G-B, AK, and Aksai Chin. Secondly, Delhi wants Islamabad to recognise the ‘limits’ of Beijing’s influence at UNSC in regard to the future of OSJK. In all, at this writing, Beijing does not share Delhi’s view that a “global consensus” has emerged against any future role for UNSC in the Kashmir issue. On 7 April 2020, the Spokesperson of China’s Permanent Mission at UN said: “The question of Kashmir remains high on the [Security] Council’s agenda”.10 Clear, therefore, is that China does not agree with its closest partner, Russia. Moscow’s stated position, at this writing, is that UNSC is not the forum to settle the future of OSJK. China’s statement on 17 January 2020 was categorically different from Russia’s and India’s positions: “The issue between India and Pakistan has all along been on the agenda of the UNSC, and the Security Council should continue to pay attention to Kashmir [i.e. OSJK] in [the] light of new developments. ….. It is true that the Security Council didn’t issue any statement after it reviewed the issue of Kashmir on January 15. ….. [But] China has constructively participated in the discussion on the issue of Kashmir at the UNSC. ….. This is entirely out of goodwill [towards India and Pakistan]”.11 For India, however, there was a stark reality to face, by the beginning of third decade in the 21st century. Chinese decisively departed from the stand they took during the Pakistan–India crisis in February–March 2019 (Chapter 3). The crisis in early-2019 was by far the most serious flare-up in Pakistan– India tensions in the first two decades of the 21st century. During that crisis, China advocated “friendly consultation” between Pakistan and India,12 i.e. with no UN intervention, in the Kashmir issue. Significant, therefore, was PRC’s Permanent Mission at UN, Spokesperson of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Answered Question on Kashmir 2020/04/07, http:// www.chnun.chinamission.org.cn/eng/ (accessed on 10 April 2020). 11  MFA, PRC, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on 17 January 2020,  https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/ t1733473.shtml (accessed on 29 February 2020). 12  MFA, PRC, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on 14 March 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/ t1645493.shtml (accessed on 17 March 2019 and 29 February 2020). 10 

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China’s new stand in January and April 2020. PRC began emphasising “new developments” and asserting that the issue “remains high on the [Security] Council’s agenda”. From Beijing’s perspective, these “new developments” — essentially, Modi’s creation of UTJK and UTL — have implications for both China and Pakistan. Beijing sees (or claims) a potential Indian threat to Aksai Chin. But Delhi’s actual control of UTL does not extend to Aksai Chin, which China administers undisturbed at this writing. As for other Sino-Pakistani concerns, Beijing has begun to evince unusual interest in the Pakistani narrative on the Kashmir issue. At the same time, Beijing remains mindful of the paramount importance of CPEC security. Beijing’s CPEC geopolitics appears focused on countering, through action, India’s blunt criticism of this Corridor as an “illegal socalled” project in “Pakistan-occupied Kashmir” (Indian terminology). To counter India’s strong opposition to CPEC, China and Pakistan may upgrade their “forceful” measures for CPEC security.

Ground Reality-2: ‘Status’ of G-B and Aksai Chin For China and Pakistan, CPEC security is linked to G-B’s geopolitics and India’s actual or potential intentions. These factors gained much credence after India conducted a stealthy ‘counter-terror’ raid by breaching Pakistani airspace in February 2019. Let us first look at the geopolitics of G-B as a ground reality that drives the China–India–Pakistan strategic tussle. Pakistan, India’s north-western neighbour, administers G-B, while China, India’s northern neighbour, retains and administers Aksai Chin as of this writing at the start of the third decade of the 21st century. As we have observed, India has consistently maintained that it has sovereign rights over both G-B and Aksai Chin. Islamabad has sometimes contested Delhi’s belief that G-B was an integral part of OSJK. India places G-B in “Pakistanoccupied Kashmir”. Islamabad’s aim in disputing the past status of G-B is to seek the area’s exclusion from India’s purview in future negotiations, if any, over the Kashmir issue. This is very important to both Islamabad and Beijing, because CPEC passes through G-B. By April–May 2020, Islamabad strengthened its administrative control over G-B, CPEC’s gateway into Pakistan. At this, Delhi asserted that the accession to India by OSJK, which

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included G-B, in 1947 was “fully legal and irrevocable” from the beginning.13 On the issue of Islamabad’s efforts to insulate G-B from India’s assertions, a former Pakistani leader has taken a clear historical view. In 2015, Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri outlined the relevant history on the following lines: “Before Independence [of India and  Pakistan in 1947], the Northern Areas including inter alia Gilgit and Baltistan, were part of the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir. ….. [But] Pakistan has always regarded Gilgit and Baltistan as [being] separate from other areas [which were] included in J&K over a period of time during the Dogra [Dynasty’s] annexation [of territories]. This area [G-B] was different ethnically and culturally from other areas which formed part of the former princely state”.14 Kasuri’s account matches India’s position that G-B was an intrinsic part of OSJK when it acceded to India. However, some doubts were raised in Pakistan, in the light of an action by OSJK’s Maharaja (king) before he transferred his state to independent India in 1947. The relevant action was this. In 1935, the Maharaja signed an agreement for Gilgit’s “lease (not cession)” to the British India Government.15 But, “despite the lease, the area [i.e. Gilgit] remained part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir [i.e. OSJK]”, according to Alastair Lamb’s interpretation of the relevant documents.16 Lamb, who intensively researched on OSJK, wrote that Hunza (near Gilgit and Baltistan), had links with the pre-PRC Qing Dynasty of China. But Hunza was treated by OSJK’s Maharaja as one of his several “tributaries”. Lamb noted further that “the new India inherited this view as part and parcel of Maharaja Hari Singh’s accession”.17 PRC has not claimed Hunza on the basis of the latter’s old Chinese links. However, Pakistan ceded to PRC another area, the nearby Shaksgam Valley, through their “temporary” boundary agreement in 1963. India maintains MEA, GOI, India protests efforts to bring material change in Pakistan-occupied territories and asks Pakistan to vacate them, May 04, 2020 (accessed on 14 May 2020). 14  K. M. Kasuri, op. cit., pp. 90 and 338. 15  A. Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846–1990 (paperback), Oxford University Press, Bangalore Town, Karachi, Pakistan, 1993, p. 60. 16  Ibid., p. 60. 17  Ibid., p. 61. 13 

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that the strategic Shaksgam Valley belonged to OSJK. India’s check list of sovereign entitlements includes this valley, although there has not been much public debate on this. Known as ‘Northern Areas’ until 2009, G-B, which borders China, has always been prominent in Pakistan’s strategic calculus. Indeed, Pakistan’s military dictator, Zia ul Haq, declared in 1982 that Gilgit, Hunza, and Baltistan’s Skardu, all in Northern Areas, were not part of the territories in dispute with India. Promptly, India’s then External Affairs Minister (later Prime Minister) Narasimha Rao countered that Northern Areas “are juridically and constitutionally part of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir”. Pakistan did not respond, but it gave up its earlier move to appoint an observer from Northern Areas to the country’s federal parliament.18 The aborted move was originally designed to symbolise Pakistan’s claim and contest Delhi’s sense of entitlement to G-B under OSJK’s accession to India. In 2018, Pakistan issued Gilgit-Baltistan Reform Order which superseded the self-governance order of 2009. But the new Order drew protests from the opposition parties in G-B and also India, albeit for totally different reasons. Opposition critics in G-B argued that the new Order enhanced the role of Pakistan’s federal government rather than ensuring substantive devolution of power to the local people. India, on the other hand, said Pakistan’s action concerning the “so-called Gilgit-Baltistan” “has no legal basis whatsoever”. Delhi re-emphasised that “the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir”, i.e. OSJK, “is an integral part of India”.19 Another critical aspect concerning G-B is its strategic relevance to the China–India–Pakistan triangle. Kasuri wrote in 2015 that “Defence of the Northern Areas [G-B] is of immense importance to Pakistan because of its common border with China which provides a strategic link between China and Pakistan”. Therefore, in Kasuri’s view, there would be “no way that we [Pakistanis] could countenance the presence of any troops other than our own in this region”.20 Kasuri made that assertion while outlining the dynamics of India–Pakistan backchannel diplomacy during the first decade of the S. K. Lambah (former Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of India and a veteran diplomat who served in Pakistan among other countries), The Unfortunate History of Gilgit-Baltistan Since 1947, Text of his speech at Annamalai University (India) on 9 August 2018. 19  Ibid. 20  K. M. Kasuri, op. cit., pp. 339–340. 18 

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21st century. Nonetheless, a question relevant to our discussion is whether Pakistan’s aversion to the presence of foreign troops in G-B applies to Chinese personnel for CPEC security. Some observers have sometimes referred to media reports that Chinese troops are deployed to protect CPEC assets including perhaps those in G-B.21 As we have seen, China and Pakistan agreed in March 2019 to “take forceful measures to well safeguard the safe environment for the construction of the CPEC”.22 The Sino-Pakistani agreement on those lines was reached in the wake of a serious Pakistan–India military crisis in February–March 2019. Now, “forceful measures” could include military deployments and other sophisticated security means. But, at this writing, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has not confirmed whether its own personnel are deployed at any particular point(s) along CPEC route. Any such PLA deployments constitute a strategic challenge for Delhi in the China–India–Pakistan triangular context. It is known that Pakistan itself has raised a special military unit to protect CPEC assets and Chinese personnel. So, it is possible that the CPEC-related Pakistani military unit liaises with China suitably and regularly. It is also well-known that Xi Jinping himself had exhorted Pakistani leaders to take steps to protect Chinese installations and personnel inside Pakistan.23 Xi met Pakistani military leaders, too, during his visit to Islamabad in April 2015. During that visit, CPEC was formally announced and launched at the highest level. At that time, the Sino-Pakistani “all-weather friendship” was upgraded to “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership”.24 G-B was, from the beginning, a theatre of strategic interest to both India and Pakistan. However, Xi’s CPEC-security concerns have converted G-B into a geostrategic arena for India–China contestation, too. Technically S. K. Lambah, op. cit. MFA, PRC, China and Pakistan Hold the First Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue, 2019/03/19, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1647212.shtml (accessed on 21 March 2019). 23  Xi Jinping’s concerns about the security of Chinese personnel and installations in Pakistan, as conveyed by him to Pakistani leaders in 2014 and 2015, can be gleaned from relevant releases on the website of Chinese Foreign Ministry. 24  Details of Xi Jinping’s visit to Islamabad in April 2015 can be had from relevant releases on the websites of Chinese and Pakistani foreign ministries. 21  22 

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unrelated to the future of G-B is the future status of Aksai Chin. However, in the larger scheme of Sino-Indian relations, the future of both G-B and Aksai Chin will be crucial.

‘Roof of the World’ 25 Indeed, Alastair Lamb, who has deeply researched this issue, wrote as far back as in 1973: “So long as the [sovereignty over] Aksai Chin question is unanswered, the whole Sino-Indian [boundary] issue, it can well be argued, remains unresolved”.26 His observation remains valid as this narrative unfolds. The reason: Beijing protested vigorously against Delhi’s renewed assertions about its sovereign entitlement to Aksai Chin following Modi’s creation of UTL in 2019. Aksai Chin lies at the western “edge of the Tibetan plateau”.27 Administered by China, this area, at the edge of the “roof of the world” (as some view Tibet), occupies the north-eastern corner of Ladakh in Delhi’s map of OSJK. In a historical account, Ladakh was originally a “province” of OSJK. Although outside British India, OSJK “enjoyed a unique position” from 1846 to 1947 under Britain’s paramountcy in the Indian subcontinent.28 The Maharaja of OSJK had acquired a strategic entitlement to Aksai Chin as the result of a British-era trigonometrical survey of that desolate wasteland. However, Lamb has cited the conclusions by three American authors to show that pre-PRC China missed an opportunity. According to him, most of the territory still in dispute between Delhi and Beijing in Ladakh could have been conceded to pre-PRC China in 1899 itself. Such a transfer of territory did not take place. But British India’s offer to pre-PRC In casual popular imagination, the term ‘roof of the world’ denotes the Tibetan plateau, without reference to rigorous scientific parameters. Relevant to us is the massive altitude of this strategic theatre in China–India ‘engagement’. 26  A. Lamb, The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1973, p. 4. 27  A. Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846–1990 (paperback), Oxford University Press, Bangalore Town, Karachi, Pakistan, 1993, p. 23. 28  A. Lamb, The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1973, pp. 1–2. 25 

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Qing rulers of China in 1899 would have facilitated the transaction. The boundary proposal, which remained unimplemented, was contained in a British Note to Qing China. That message is cited in this section as the 1899 note or the British Note. In the 1950s, PRC built a “motor road” through Aksai Chin to link Xinjiang (Sinkiang) with Tibet. Mao’s strategic objective in building the road, unknown to India, was to strengthen PRC’s hold over Tibet, which was still resisting its ‘liberation’ or ‘annexation’ by him. After Nehru became aware of the road and protested, PRC–India diplomatic tussle acquired a practical dimension. By the third decade of the 21st century, PRC continues to administer Aksai Chin, much to the chagrin of India. Delving into the complexity of the Aksai Chin issue, Lamb wrote in 1973: “Is the 1899 note [from British India to pre-PRC China] binding on the [independent] Indian Government? As a note, it does not have anything like the force of a treaty. Yet, it contained a clear indication of British intentions, and constituted, as it were, a firm offer to the [then] Chinese Government. ….. This cannot possibly mean that the 1899 note is still, as it were, in force. It does mean, however, that the [PRC] Chinese could still, taking the note at its face value, accept its terms and proceed to occupy Aksai Chin on the grounds that the British, acting on behalf of the then Government of India, had recognised their [Chinese] rights there. The [PRC] Chinese, during the course of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, have for some reason best known to themselves never done this ….”.29 The British were willing to recognise the “rights” of pre-PRC Qing China in Aksai Chin in 1899. But without reference to those “rights”, PRC took control of Aksai Chin in the 1950s. It is generally believed that PRC wants perpetual sovereignty over Aksai Chin to protect the Xinjiang–Tibet road. For PRC, this road, now a Chinese national highway, may be serving a key domestic connectivity purpose. Interestingly, however, Shyam Saran, India’s former Foreign Secretary, has written that, by the mid-1980s, Beijing was cognisant of “the diminishing strategic importance of the Aksai Chin road”. He traces this development A. Lamb, The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1973, p. 15. 29 

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to China’s “sustained building of infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang” by then.30 This is true insofar as China’s internal strategic requirements are concerned. Furthermore, to be fair, Shyam Saran made this point to explain the road’s relative importance to China vis-à-vis India by the mid-1980s. By third decade of the 21st century, Delhi appears to think that China’s perpetual control over Aksai Chin would pose a constant threat to India. The reason: Aksai Chin is located at an edge of the Tibetan plateau. Aksai Chin has been ‘accessible’ to the Chinese from Xinjiang besides Xizang (Tibet). Delhi’s concerns were at first articulated, in 1964, by Sarvepalli Gopal, the then Director of Historical Division of India’s External Affairs Ministry. Gopal contested PRC’s perceived entitlement to Aksai Chin. He wrote that the boundary line, proposed but not implemented by Britain in 1899, would have actually cut across the Xinjiang–Tibet road that was built by PRC later.31 Such a boundary line would not have given PRC any sovereign rights over Aksai Chin from the beginning. So, PRC would have had no right to build a road through Aksai Chin in the 1950s, Gopal concluded. The matter does not rest there, though. According to Lamb, Gopal’s argument would be true only “if we accepted the verbal definition of the [boundary] line in the 1899 note at its face value”. So, in Lamb’s counteranalysis, “if the 1899 [boundary line] is plotted on a modern map… it would not touch the [PRC’s] road at all” in Aksai Chin.32 A modern map of the 1970s, when Lamb drew his conclusion, would not have been available to the British and the pre-PRC Chinese in 1899. However, the implication in Lamb’s counter-analysis appears to be this: Britain, independent India’s predecessor in the subcontinent, was willing to consider giving Aksai Chin to pre-PRC China. A lurking irony, however, is difficult to ignore. An Indian Maharaja of OSJK had in the first place accessed Aksai Chin through a trigonometrical survey. The king’s paramount leader, Britain, had sponsored the survey. And the Indian Maharaja derived the benefits. PRC’s sovereign control over Aksai Chin is, therefore, unacceptable to the Indian nationalists. S. Saran, How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century, Juggernaut Books, New Delhi, 2017, p. 140. 31  Dr. S. [Sarvepalli] Gopal, Letter to Times Literary Supplement, 6 February 1964 (cited by Alastair Lamb, The Sino-Indian … p. 15). 32  A. Lamb (The Sino-Indian …) op. cit., pp. 15–16, 85, and 108–109. 30 

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Because of independent India’s nationalism and strategic considerations, Delhi does not accept PRC’s control over Aksai Chin. Beijing, too, has strategic calculations and the logic of the 1899 Note (as outlined by Lamb) to back PRC’s claim. So, both Beijing and Delhi can make out a case in their respective favour. In a colourful metaphor for effect, Aksai Chin is no longer distant and desolate like the Far Side of the Moon or Mars. The unfinished story of Aksai Chin pertains to the western sector of the disputed SinoIndian boundary. In fact, the de facto dividing line between UTL and Aksai Chin — the Line of Actual Control — was the epicentre of an extraordinary Sino-Indian military crisis in 2020.

Ground Reality-3: Tussle over Tawang in the East 33 As we have observed in the previous chapter, PRC swears by the 1890 “Convention between Great Britain and [Qing] China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet”. In Beijing’s calculus, this imperial inheritance provides a valid and viable formula for formalising the ‘settled’ boundary between PRC’s Tibet and India’s Sikkim. But, as evident during the Doklam crisis in 2017 (Chapter 6), Delhi demurs. India sees the Convention as only a basis to determine the India–PRC–Bhutan boundaries in the Sikkim section. Doklam does not fall in the eastern sector of the disputed Sino-Indian boundary. But a reference to this Convention shows that PRC values ‘beneficial’ imperial legacies while rejecting those deemed ‘unequal’. It must also be noted that there is a similarity between PRC’s and India’s attitudes towards their respective imperial inheritances. PRC cherishes the 1890 Convention. But, by seeing it as no more than a basis for talks, India has upset PRC. A view from Beijing was that India’s attitude was, in effect, a ‘ploy’ invented to stop the People’s Liberation Army in its tracks at Doklam in 2017. India, on the other hand, values the 1914 McMahon Line in the eastern sector. But PRC has rejected this Line after first appearing to accept it from the early- to mid-1950s. For India, the McMahon Line remains valid to draw a defining contour of the Sino-Indian boundary in the east. In particular, the alignment of the McMahon Line is critical to India’s possession Arunachal Pradesh State Throughout this Section on ‘‘Ground Reality-3”, the People’s Republic of China is referred to by its full name or as ‘PRC’ (not as China). This is to avoid any confusion with the erstwhile Republic of China (ROC) which, too, figures in this Section. 33 

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(APS) and Tawang in that province. Beijing does not accept this Line. But it is useful to PRC in portraying APS, inclusive of Tawang, as “southern Tibet”. So, we shall briefly study the geopolitics of this Line. PRC portrays the McMahon Line as the emblem of failure in 1914 by Colonial Britain to impose its will on the then nascent Republic of China (ROC). For independent India, though, the McMahon Line signified British India’s acceptance of Tibet, on the northern side of this Line, as Chinese territory for good. Significantly, in India’s inherited view, APS, inclusive of Tawang, is located on the southern side of the McMahon Line. So, as British India’s successor-state, independent India asserts sovereignty over APS, including Tawang. Briefly, the McMahon Line was the result of the “Simla Convention” of 27 April 1914.34 Simla (now, Shimla) was (and still is) a popular place with salubrious climate in India. The Convention was initialled by the representatives of British India, pre-PRC ROC, and the then ‘independent’ Tibetan Government — Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, Chen I-fan, and Lonchen Shatra, respectively. At that time, ROC was exercising “suzerainty” (not sovereignty) over Tibet (which, as we know, neighbours northern India). The Line came to be associated with McMahon, the then Foreign Secretary of British India. Some trace the genesis of the Line to a bilateral deal between British India and Tibet. According to Lamb, “by an exchange of notes on 24/25 March 1914, McMahon obtained Tibetan agreement to a boundary alignment which has since become famous as the McMahon Line”.35 Moreover, it is said, British India and Tibet did not take ROC into confidence while configuring the Line.36 Regardless, ROC’s delegate initialled Simla Convention of April 1914, which contained a map showing the McMahon Line. After Simla Convention was initialled (not signed) by all parties, British India and Tibet signed a bilateral Declaration on 3 July 1914. The Declaration, which brought the Convention into force, was “binding” on both British India and Tibet. However, the Declaration, signed by McMahon and Shatra, became A. Lamb, The McMahon Line Volumes I and II, Appendix XVII, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1966, pp. 620–625. Throughout this Section on “Ground Reality-3”, I am going by the text of the 1914 Simla Convention, as contained in the Appendix cited here. 35  Ibid., p. 530. 36  Ibid., p. 549. 34 

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conspicuous for a missing signature. No ROC representative signed this enabling document. Zhou Enlai upheld this historical fact in the run-up to the Sino-Indian War in 1962. He argued that the McMahon Line was not binding on Beijing as a potential marker for the PRC–India boundary in the east. Zhou had previously hinted that PRC might accept the Line.37 But Zhou’s initially positive hint about this matter preceded his thorough study of the McMahon Line and the Simla Convention of 1914, it was later explained. Unsurprisingly, following Zhou’s rejection of the McMahon Line, all successive PRC leaders have maintained this position until at least the Sino-Indian military crisis in 2020. It is, therefore, essential to decipher the mystery of the missing signature. Analysing the text of the Simla Convention of 1914, I trace the mystery to a significant stipulation in Article II. For PRC, the most objectionable stipulation is this: “The Government of China engages [i.e. pledges] not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province”. As we know, the reference to “the Government of China” in this Article applied to ROC. But an early action by PRC — ROC’s successor-state — was Mao’s ‘liberation’ (or, ‘annexation’) of Tibet. Quickly, the “liberated” Tibet was labelled as a “region of China” (i.e. People’s Republic of China). Mao’s action nullified the impugned stipulation in Article II of the 1914 Simla Convention, which was, in any case, controversially associated with ROC. Having initialled the Simla Convention, alongside British India and Tibet, ROC did not convert Tibet into a Chinese province. Regardless of ROC’s strength or weakness for any such attempt, there was an incentive to refrain from converting Tibet into a province of ROC. The incentive was contained in the same Article II: “The Government of Great Britain engages [i.e. pledges] not to annex Tibet or any portion of it”. So, ROC’s “suzerainty” over Tibet, guaranteed in the overall framework of the Convention, was reinforced under Article II. From PRC’s perspective, British India’s commitment to refrain from annexing any part or the whole of Tibet applies to independent India as well. Mainly because independent India has not disregarded the McMahon Line. In the 1950s, Nehru and Zhou exchanged elaborate letters, shining light on the evolution of Sino-Indian differences over the McMahon Line and several other aspects of the unsettled boundary. These letters are accessible in the public domain. 37 

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However, PRC initially harboured suspicions about independent India’s ‘designs’ in Tibet. Mao’s concerns were soon addressed through the 1954 PRC–India agreement on bilateral border trade. And, as we have already seen, the two countries had, in 1954 itself, agreed on principles of peaceful coexistence. By the third decade of the 21st century, the long-governing Communist Party of China has built a huge infrastructure network and major military facilities in Tibet. These constitute PRC’s best safeguard in Tibet. In any case, India has not crossed into Tibet from APS, which includes Tawang, on the southern side of the McMahon Line in the high and sloping Himalayas. PRC disputes India’s sovereign entitlement to APS. But, in 1962, Mao withdrew his troops from Tawang and the rest of APS (then known as Northeast Frontier Agency), after defeating a weak Indian Army. This brings us to the geopolitics of Tawang.

Fog of Geopolitics Over a Tiny Place Strategically located, Tawang is a gateway to Northeast India from Tibet — a fact first recognised by British India. According to Lamb, “it could be argued that portions of Tibet, such as Tawang, had passed into the British sphere of interest”38 before the 1914 Simla Convention. In his view, therefore, “the McMahon Line here [in the vicinity of Tawang] was less [of ] an international boundary”.39 It was, instead, “a line below which the [British] Indian Government would not tolerate the influence of any Power (i.e. China) other than [a friendly] Tibet”.40 In 1914, ‘China’, as mentioned by Lamb, was ROC. A similar view of the McMahon Line remains relevant to independent India’s strategic thinking vis-à-vis PRC, at this writing. The tale of Tawang has several interesting aspects. The people of Tawang are widely believed to be distinct from the mainstream population in Tibet. Furthermore, Tawang has been consistently sending representatives to independent India’s Parliament from its inception.

A. Lamb, op. cit. (The McMahon Line …), p. 549. Ibid. 40  Ibid. 38  39 

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Mao’s PLA, while “liberating” Tibet in 1950, gained notional control over Tawang, but left it virtually free, though. Seizing the opportunity, India quickly took possession of Tawang in 1951. The local Tibetan administrator, when approached by two formidable Indian officials that year, “signed a document transferring sovereignty of Tawang to India”.41 PRC was then preoccupied with consolidating its new hold over the Tibetan heartland. Thereafter, PLA overran Tawang during the 1962 Sino-Indian war. But the captured town was vacated when Mao withdrew his troops to the northern side of the McMahon Line. Since that time, Tawang has remained in India’s possession. A hawkish Indian view is that Delhi acted as rightly in capturing Tawang in 1951 as PRC did in seizing Tibet in the 1950s. However, PRC exudes a ‘revisionist’ sense of entitlement to Tawang after having vacated the captured town in 1962. This aspect is best-summarised in the words of a scholar, Jeff M Smith. Predating our current discussion, Smith wrote as follows in 2014: “Beijing argues Tawang was historically a part of Tibet, and Tibet is historically a part of China. Full stop”. Smith has added that “the [PRC’s] claim has not gone unchallenged by scholars”.42 Smith also cites a PRC-friendly analysis by Xuecheng Liu who argued that the McMahon Line was drawn differently in three relevant maps in 1914. In only one of those maps, the Line was shown running far north of Tawang. While Tawang was thus placed firmly in British India, the other two maps had no such clarity.43 Liu’s conclusion, in my assessment, is: Tawang’s status was not established by the 1914 Simla Convention, which is, however, upheld by independent India. Yet, Lamb, in his intensive study of the maps of the same Simla Convention, concluded that Tawang was “brought within British India by the McMahon Line”.44 As British India’s successor-state, independent India is, therefore, convinced of its sense of entitlement to Tawang. This is not to suggest that India is acting on the basis of Lamb’s conclusion. J. M. Smith, Cold Peace: China–India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century, Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, USA, 2014, p. 77. 42  Ibid., p. 73. 43  Xuecheng Liu, Look Beyond the Sino-Indian Border Dispute, China Institute of International Studies (quoted by J. M. Smith, op. cit., p. 80). 44  A. Lamb, op. cit. (The McMahon Line …), p. 558. 41 

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India’s sense of entitlement to Tawang flows from the clear map and two other factors. These two factors are Tawang’s unfailing representation in the Indian Parliament, and Tawang’s status as a border area with a firmly settled population. Significantly, India and PRC are authorised to retain the settled areas each side holds. This principle, as noted before, is embedded in the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles (PPGP) for resolving PRC–India boundary questions. PPGP was agreed upon in 2005. Two decades earlier, according to a former Indian official, PRC sought Tawang as a “concession” from India in the eastern sector in 1985.45 This episode was preceded by a few relevant messages from PRC. As for the referral McMahon Line, Zhou was reported to have told Nehru, as far back as in 1956: “Although the question is still undecided and it is unfair to us [PRC], still we feel that there is no better way than to recognise this Line”.46 Thereafter, in 1960, Zhou suggested the possibility of a swap. Beijing could recognise the McMahon Line in the east if India were to accept PRC’s claim line in Aksai Chin in the west, Zhou hinted. India’s former Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon, has explained this aspect. Zhou’s suggestion would have given PRC “strategic depth along the Aksai Chin road between Xinjiang and Tibet”.47 Apparently, for that reason, India did not respond positively to Zhou’s initiative. In that context, the Sino-Indian war occurred in 1962. Thereafter, in 1982, PRC’s then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping offered a similar swap in a conversation with Gopalaswami Parthasarathi, a policy associate of India’s then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.48 No progress was made at that time as well. As of this writing, Delhi has not accepted the idea of transferring Tawang to PRC even in a reciprocal fashion. The reason: Tawang has strategic value and a well-settled population with a clear ‘Indian identity’. Beijing, too, knows that Tawang is regularly represented in the Indian Parliament. S. Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., USA, 2016, p. 16. 46  Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume XXXVI, pp. 590–592, cited by Arun Shourie, Self-Deception: India’s China Policies: Origins, Premises, Lessons, HarperCollins Publishers India, Noida, India, 2013, p. 158. 47  S. Menon, op. cit., p. 16. 48  Ibid. 45 

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We have traced the significant ground realities in the traditional strategic turf shared by PRC, India, and Pakistan. The geopolitics of Aksai Chin and Tawang concerns India and PRC. CPEC geopolitics and the ‘status’ of G-B concern the three neighbours. Armed with this discussion, we shall explore, in the next chapter, a collective-win approach.

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CHAPTER 8

A COLLECTIVE-WIN APPROACH

Novel Focus on Borders The mist of history may have dimmed China’s and India’s vision when they surveyed their ‘inherited’ nebulous boundary in the 1950s. Moreover, after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, China signed a “temporary” boundary agreement with Pakistan in 1963. Beijing’s relevance to this triangular neighbourhood soared. In the 21st century, the launch of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor in 2015 added a new dimension to the ground realities. Above all, India remains alone among the three countries to have unsettled equations with the other two. For a collective-win approach, therefore, PRC–India border issues merit urgent attention since the outbreak of an extraordinary SinoIndian military crisis in 2020.

By third decade of the 21st century, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India have spent nearly 70 years as neighbours with a nebulous boundary. This applies to the China–India–Pakistan triangular neighbourhood as well. Independent India will celebrate its birth centenary in 2047, while PRC will turn 100 in 2049. Pakistan was created by the British at the same time as they freed India from colonial bondage. By any reckoning of statehood in the 21st century, it is time for these three neighbours to agree on their boundaries as soon as possible. As the most-populous and most-prosperous country among the three at this writing, China holds the key to the configuration of a realistic map for them all.

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I shall conceptualise a collective-win approach by focusing on key issues in fresh light.1 Why is PRC critical to the final settlement of Sino-Indian, India–Pakistan, and China–Pakistan boundary issues? The reason: China signed a “temporary” boundary agreement with Pakistan in 1963, and the accord covered (and still covers, at this writing) areas that India claims as its sovereign domain. Such a rare agreement was conceived by China to imagine a route to the Arabian Sea (and onward, to the Indian Ocean) through a ‘friendly’ Pakistan. Beijing avoided a via-India route and instead befriended Pakistan for that purpose, among other aims, after the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Some argue that, in 1963, PRC’s singular aim was to woo Pakistan to spite India. But Beijing was not myopic to have missed the potential access to the Arabian Sea as an opportunity in the future (as it then was). In addition, both before and after the 1962 War, China and India have had boundary disputes along a Line of Actual Control (LAC). These disputes were unresolved by April 2020, at the dawn of 70th anniversary of the PRC–India diplomacy. These two civilisation-states are yet to agree even on the LAC’s exact alignment. Indeed, the actual length of the disputed SinoIndian boundary is itself in dispute. At least, in the public domain. Above all, during the diplomatic efforts to defuse the China-India military conflict, which broke out later in 2020, the two sides began disputing LAC’s genesis. From my interviews with Chinese officials, it appears that Beijing believes that LAC took shape from about 1952 to 1959. For India, however, LAC, as decided with China in 1993, when they signed the “peace and tranquillity” agreement, seems important. Mainly because, the 1993 agreement was clinched during a period of Sino-Indian strategic comfort after nearly three decades of bilateral uncertainties. On 29 September 2020, therefore, Delhi officially rejected Beijing’s “untenable unilateral interpretation” of LAC. India’s message is that China’s tracing of LAC’s origin to 1959 is further complicating an already-complex boundary dispute. The distinction between ‘boundary’ and ‘border’ is important. Boundary is the exact alignment of the line that separates (and connects) any two contiguous states. This will apply to land-, sea-, and air-connections, as the case This chapter is based entirely on my inferences and conclusions from my conversations, often in the informal mode, with diplomats and experts from China, India, Pakistan, and several other countries for over 40 years. 1 

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might be. Border, on the other hand, is a region on either side of an agreed or even disputed boundary between any two contiguous states. Shivshankar Menon, who served as India’s Special Representative for boundary talks with his Chinese counterpart, came to a categorical conclusion in 2016. Menon’s assessment: “An assertive China is unlikely to seek an early settlement of the boundary issue no matter how reasonable India may be, even though the technical work has all been done. ….. China’s other interests, including its relationship with Pakistan, its suspicions about Tibet, and its desire to maintain levers in its relationship with India, suggest that a boundary settlement is not a Chinese priority at present. Add to this China’s dependence on the Indian Ocean and its suspicions about India–US defence cooperation and strategic coordination, forward motion seems unlikely. Taken together, these factors make it likely that China will keep the boundary issue alive as a lever in its relationship with India”.2 The unfinished saga of resolving the Sino-Indian boundary dispute has not always been gloomy. In fact, top Chinese diplomat Luo Zhaohui informed me in 2014 that China and India had, by then, “reached some preliminary consensus on the solution framework.”3 A final consensus on the “solution framework” will be the catalyst to resolve Sino-Indian boundary disputes. Negotiating the necessary “framework” is the mandate assigned to successive Special Representatives of PRC and India. The representatives were first tasked in 2003 to “explore from the perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement”. Luo’s and Menon’s separate disclosures, cited above, confirm substantial progress in preparing the ground for a realistic settlement. But Menon has cautioned that “settling the boundary, though technically possible, is politically unlikely” anytime soon. For this cautionary note, he cites nationalism on both sides and China’s demand for Tawang.4 (We have noted the geopolitics of Tawang in the previous chapter). As for India–Pakistan border issues, we have observed how a Line of Control (LoC) is a divider rather than a connector. It separates India’s Union S. Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, USA, 2016, p. 30. 3  Luo Zhaohui’s Interview to P. S. Suryanarayana, Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China–India Synergy, Appendix I, World Century Publishing Corporation, Hackensack, New Jersey, USA, 2016. 4  S. Menon, op. cit., p. 30. 2 

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Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (UTJK) and Union Territory of Ladakh (UTL) from Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) on the Pakistani side. We have understood the geopolitics of G-B in the context of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Let us remember that AK in general, but G-B in particular, has, therefore, become an India–China– Pakistan trilateral concern. Let us also remember the geopolitics of these places (already analysed) before we begin our main discussion in this chapter. Add to these places, Aksai Chin (whose geopolitics has been noted) and Shaksgam Valley. They will be critical to a durable settlement of Sino-Indian boundary disputes. In Beijing’s firm view, Shaksgam is very much a part of Chinese Xinjiang.5 Nonetheless, after 1947, the new Pakistani authorities took note of the geopolitical value of Shaksgam. That was after the original princely state of JK (OSJK) got divided between India and Pakistan in that year. So, Pakistan’s transfer of Shaksgam to PRC in 1963 ‘revealed’ this valley’s original status as an integral part of OSJK. Furthermore, the mainstream international narrative, at this writing, is that Pakistan ceded the valley to PRC in 1963.6 International atlases, too, reflect this. Regardless of all these substantive snippets, PRC was the first to grasp the strategic significance of Shaksgam far better than others. This is no post-facto inference, because PRC consciously obtained Shaksgam from Pakistan in 1963. On PRC’s consequential “new boundary”, Lieutenant General V R Raghavan wrote that “Chinese secured the Shaksgam valley and this pushed their territory further south towards Jammu & Kashmir”,7 i.e. ISJK. About two decades after China ‘received’ Shaksgam from Pakistan, the strategic relevance of this valley to India rose by leaps and bounds. The reason: In April 1984, the Indian Army captured unopposed the commanding heights of Siachen Glacier near Shaksgam in the world’s most treacherous terrain. This was no surprise, because Siachen was considered a part of OSJK when it acceded to India. Arguably, Siachen has given India a ‘strategic lever’ with As already cited, a high-ranking Chinese diplomat told me in Beijing in November 2018 that Shaksgam was indisputably a part of the historical Chinese Xinjiang. 6  While Shaksgam is not widely discussed, Pakistan’s transfer of this valley to China is generally noted. Read J M Smith, Cold Peace: China–India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century, Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, USA, 2014, pp. 24–25. 7  Lt Gen V. R. Raghavan, Siachen: Conflict Without End, Viking, Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 2002, p. 24. 5 

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reference to Pakistan off the western side of the glacier. Indian strategists also see Siachen as a useful lever with reference to China, which holds Shaksgam. India and China are not known to have confronted each other in the Shaksgam valley (at least, not known in the public domain). But international media has made much of a ‘constant’ India–Pakistan ‘fight’ on the Siachen Glacier, the world’s highest battleground. Yet Siachen is occupied solely by the Indian Army, according to a former ‘insider’, Lt Gen Raghavan. He has written as follows: “Pakistan has kept up the myth of fighting [India] on the Siachen glacier, even as its [Pakistani] forces are confined to the lower and western slopes of the Saltoro [Range]. The reality is that its military cannot even get a glimpse of the Siachen glacier [from Saltoro]. Local and foreign correspondents who file stories from Pakistan evocatively datelined ‘On the Siachen Glacier’, are not factually correct. However, this helps sustain the Pakistani myth of fighting on the glacier while the battles are all fought on the Saltoro”.8 By citing this Indian narrative dispassionately, I simply wish to show how complicated India–Pakistan differences are. Above all, Siachen, Shaksgam, and the adjoining areas are terribly inhospitable for normal human habitation, let alone military battles. However, geopolitics has been trumping most other considerations in the China–India–Pakistan triangular context. This reflective pause can be a take-off point for exploring a collective-win approach. However, a final settlement of the nebulous China–India–Pakistan boundaries will require political will among the highest leaders on all sides.

Psycho-Strategic Status Quo A common denominator defines the approaches of China, India, and Pakistan towards their respective boundary issues. Each side wants to keep its possessions as the minimal option. On this psychological basis, the least common denominator for the pursuit of a collective-win is the psycho-strategic status quo without war. China, India, and Pakistan share a common, but not coordinated, policy-priority in the relevant border regions. Each side wants to retain the areas it holds under its sovereign and/or administrative control. Therefore, realpolitik determines the psycho-strategic status quo without war. This differs from a purely military status quo i.e. a freeze on the deployments of each side in the relevant border regions and a ban on conquest of new areas. A Ibid., p. 57.

8 

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collective-win is largely about such psycho-strategic status quo, abbreviated as status quo without war. India and China will have to settle their major disputes. This applies to India and Pakistan as well. At another level, CPEC appears to have been conceptualised on the assumption that the China–Pakistan boundary is a settled contour. But the 1963 Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement is only a “temporary” arrangement. In this collective environment, if permanent boundary agreements are not possible, the three neighbours may have to settle for the status quo in the foreseeable future. An overarching strategic reason to sustain the status quo is simple and profoundly civilised. It is common sense that China or India or Pakistan should not seek self-centred settlements through war. Each has a powerful nuclear arsenal, complicating the calculations of war as ‘diplomacy’ by other means. The China–India military confrontation at Doklam (Dong Lang) in 2017 was defused partly because of their atomic weapons and ballistic missiles (Chapter 6). China’s and India’s policy of ‘no-first-use of nuclear weapons’ (NFU) and Beijing’s larger arsenal did not prevent de-escalation at Doklam. Chinese and Indian nuclear arms served the purpose, even if the two countries did not believe each other’s NFU proclamation. There has been speculation that China and India might give up their respective NFU policy. But, as rising powers, they do not want to appear belligerent as nuclear powers. For China, the future attitudes of America, Russia, India, and Japan will matter the most. For India, China’s future attitude will mean the most. No NFU dynamic can be counted upon during a Pakistan–India military crisis in the future. Pakistan does not practise NFU policy. ‘No-first-use’ is of “no use” to Pakistan because of its “inadequate” strategic depth and wariness of India, according to Pakistani protagonists. Furthermore, China does not seem to exert its influence over Pakistan’s military leaders and persuade them to adopt the NFU policy. From China’s standpoint, India can be kept guessing if Pakistan does not proclaim NFU policy. In this situation, the India–Pakistan Declaration, adopted at Lahore (Pakistan) on 21 February 1999, deserves mention. The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan agreed to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons”. Such a brake on using nuclear weapons was not a no-first-use pledge by Pakistan to match India’s. Pakistan, therefore, is not in concert with China and India. Yet, the overhang of

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nuclear weapons can serve as a military reason to sustain the status quo without full-scale war. Economic and social costs could deter the recourse to full-scale sub-nuclear war. In all, besides the military, economic, and social arguments against war, the best geopolitical requirement is that issues in China–India– Pakistan triangle be addressed. Let me now turn to some specific issues. The Kashmir issue, which we discussed in several chapters, involves not only India and Pakistan but also China. Pakistan’s transfer of Shaksgam to PRC in 1963 and Xi’s launch of CPEC in 2015 have deepened China’s relevance. CPEC passes through G-B which Pakistan administers but India views as its own land. At another level, the ownership of Aksai Chin is essentially a Sino-Indian dispute. But Pakistan’s relevance is not lost in the mist of history. The future of OSJK, including Aksai Chin, is of interest to Pakistan, too. But China, which administers Aksai Chin, is Pakistan’s “iron brother”. So, any agreement Beijing might reach with Delhi over Aksai Chin can be binding on Islamabad. The de facto ‘divide’ between Aksai Chin and India’s UTL is a major Sino-Indian military theatre since May 2020. So, the tussle between Beijing and Delhi over the future of this terrain is now intrinsic to the overall Kashmir issue. The future status of Aksai Chin and Shaksgam (in the overall framework of the Kashmir issue) is certainly a Sino-Indian dispute. All Sino-Indian disputes — Aksai Chin and Shaksgam in the west, Arunachal Pradesh (including Tawang) in the east — are bunched for a discussion after the trilateral aspects of the Kashmir issue are addressed.

Kashmir Issue: A ‘Trilateral Affair’ India, Pakistan, and China are deeply involved in the Kashmir issue. Officially India does not accept any role for China in resolving this issue. But Beijing often plays decisive roles. A powerful example is the construction of the CPEC through G-B. Delhi keeps telling Beijing that G-B “is in the territory of India that has been illegally occupied by Pakistan since 1947”.9 A former Pakistani Foreign Minister, too, has noted that Gilgit and Baltistan MEA, GOI, Official Spokesperson’s response to a query on reference to Jammu & Kashmir in the Joint Statement issued by China and Pakistan 17 March 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/ response-to-queries.htm?dtl/32546/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a_query_on_ reference_to_Jammu_amp_Kashmir_in_the_Joint_Statement_issued_by_China_and_ Pakistan (accessed on 19 March 2020). 9 

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were parts of OSJK.10 Such an acknowledgment does not, however, nullify the Pakistani view that OSJK’s ruler had, at one stage, ‘leased’ out Gilgit to British India. A follow-on inference in Islamabad is that G-B, now administered by Pakistan, should be treated as its domain. By mid-October 2020, Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders had taken incremental steps to incorporate G-B as the country’s new, perhaps ‘provisional’, province. In my view, Pakistan felt incentivised to do so in response to Delhi’s firm incorporation of UTJK and UTL as integral parts of India for ever. These two Union Territories, created in this constitutional format in 2019, covers all the areas of OSJK that India has been administering since 1947. But, as we know, Delhi claims G-B by citing OSJK’s irrevocable accession to India. Yet, at one stage, India and Pakistan had informally agreed to overcome their differences on the status of G-B and AK. As I have ascertained, the relevant informal consensus was reached during the India–Pakistan backchannel talks in the 2000s. At that time, both countries were willing to consider OSJK as the sum of just two integral units. Each integral unit would consist of all the areas administered by India, on one side, or Pakistan, on the other side. This arrangement was informally agreed upon — purely for negotiating the future of each of these two units of OSJK. So viewed, the future of these two units was not settled at that time. The status report remains the same, at this writing, too. The indication from those back-channel talks in the 2000s was that India and Pakistan might eventually accept LoC as a key factor in finalising the boundary. But, as we know, the CPEC was launched in 2015, after the India–Pakistan back-channel talks had ended in the 2000s. Furthermore, those informal talks did not lead to India–Pakistan negotiations on the tentative but relevant consensus. So, as this is written, it is not clear whether China will want a seat at the table to resolve the future of OSJK. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Beijing sought UNSC’s intervention in August 2019 and January as well as August 2020. Tit for tat, Delhi accused Beijing of violating international norms by building the CPEC through India’s ‘sovereign’ territory.11 Despite these arguments, the facts on the ground cannot be wished away by the parties concerned. The CPEC is a massive ground reality, and China is taking steps for a smarter security calculus to protect CPEC. K. M. Kasuri, Neither a Hawk nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Penguin/Viking, Penguin Books India, Gurgaon, India, 2015, p. 90. 11  MEA, GOI, op. cit. (Note 9). 10 

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The basic fact: China will not oblige India and dismantle any CPEC project. In China’s worldview, the one and only potential black swan in the CPEC context is the ‘inconceivable’ collapse of Sino-Pakistani partnership. In this situation, India is strengthening its authority over UTJK and UTL. By the third decade of the 21st century, China and India are consolidating their respective new ground realities in regard to the Kashmir issue. Beijing is reinforcing its CPEC stronghold (with or without ‘militarisation’) on the Pakistani side. However, PRC has made no sovereignty claim over G-B or any other area along the CPEC route. Delhi, for its part, is keen to insulate UTJK and UTL from ‘external’ influences. In my view, these realities raise the prospect of a creative proposition. The context is an official idea of a “China–India Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation”. In April 2019, the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui (Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, at this writing), floated the bold idea of a Sino-Indian treaty.12

The Treaty ‘Talisman’ Going beyond Luo’s proposal, I am conceptualising a binding clause as the strategic nucleus of the treaty he proposed.13 China can ‘legalise’ its informal assurances to India on a crucial aspect concerning CPEC. Until this is written, PRC has maintained that the CPEC, an economic venture, has not been conceived as the strategic means to settle the Kashmir issue. Relevant to the CPEC’s route is the political question of whether India or Pakistan has sovereignty over areas like G-B and AK. But Beijing has often assured that the construction of the CPEC does not preclude the settlement of the Kashmir issue by India and Pakistan. The apparent message from Beijing is that India and Pakistan could settle the Kashmir issue without being conditioned by China’s choice of CPEC’s route.14 My proposition is that China could Ambassador Luo Zhaohui, Dragon-Elephant Tango Creating the Asian Century 4 April 2019, Chinese Embassy in India, http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/embassy_news/t1651434.htm (accessed on 12 April 2019). 13  P. S. Suryanarayana, Modi’s Two-Front Diplomacy: An Opportunity Ahead? S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/ modis-two-front-diplomacy-an-opportunity-ahead/#.XncaJm5uIn8. 14  PRC’s message to India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, in the context of the CPEC, can be gleaned from a number of answers at regular press conferences by Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokespersons. 12 

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solemnise this assurance as a key part of the binding Sino-Indian treaty which Luo proposed. India has not evinced interest in Luo’s proposal of a treaty with China.15 Two factors may have influenced India’s disinterest in mid-2019 when Luo first announced his proposal. (1) In Delhi’s view, PRC’s “temporary” boundary agreement with Pakistan, signed in 1963, did not deter Xi from launching the CPEC in 2015 without consulting India. The “temporary” accord covered areas which India claimed. So, Delhi feels, China knew then itself (and still knows) that India has a sovereignty stake in the CPEC’s route. (2) China and Pakistan signed in 2005 a substantive “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighbourly Relations”. Luo’s proposal in April 2019 was packaged under a similar title without the same sequencing of commitments. This was surprising, because Pakistan was (and still is) China’s most-favoured country since mid-1960s, except on very rare occasions. Yet, in April 2019, any kind of bracketing of India with Pakistan was not acceptable to Delhi. In February– March of the same year a Pakistan-based group owned responsibility for a terrorist attack in India, and the two countries nearly went to war. It was probable, however, that Luo was encouraged by China’s intervention as a “mutual friend of India and Pakistan” to defuse their crisis in February–March 2019. In Delhi’s overall perspective, though, the Luo-proposed ‘treaty’ would not nullify the reality of CPEC which was (and still is) unacceptable to India. A relevant portion of the 2005 Sino-Pakistani Treaty reads as follows: “The Chinese side reiterates its respect for Pakistan’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese side appreciates and supports Pakistan’s efforts to settle peacefully all the problems with its neighboring countries and all efforts to safeguard its state sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence”.16 Careful reading of the operative phrases reveals that China expressed “respect” and “support” for Pakistan’s own efforts to preserve its “territorial integrity”. This did not amount to a Chinese pledge to guarantee that A senior Chinese diplomat’s impression, conveyed to me by him in Delhi in June 2019, was reaffirmed by a high-ranking Chinese diplomat in a conversation with me in Beijing in October 2019. 16  People’s Daily (official publication of the ruling Communist Party of China), China, Pakistan sign treaty for friendship, cooperation and good-neighbourly relations, http://english.people.com. cn/ (en.people.cn/200504/06/print20050406_179629.html) (accessed on 28 March 2020). 15 

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Pakistan would retain all areas it owned and/or controlled. A reality check is not easy. However, a ranking Chinese diplomat has told me that, as a general rule, “China does not guarantee the territorial integrity of other countries”. This applied to the Sino-Pakistani Treaty of 2005 as well, he noted.17 When the Pakistani President Arif Alvi called on Xi during the COVID-19 situation in Beijing in March 2020, the bilateral sentiment was understandably upbeat. Xi told Arif that “the special bond between China and Pakistan is the choice of history”.18 In the context of that high sentiment, the Joint Statement said: “The Chinese side reiterated solidarity with Pakistan in safeguarding its territorial sovereignty, independence and security”.19 It is elementary knowledge in the practice of international relations that ‘solidarity’ does not amount to a ‘guarantee’. In practice, ‘territorial sovereignty’ implies that the writ of a country is recognised, both internally and externally, in all areas it holds or controls legally, and all other areas it claims legally. We have observed this crucial aspect in discussing Zhou’s telegram to Nehru in 1950. Relevant to our present discussion is China’s view of Pakistan’s ‘territorial sovereignty’. The ‘legality’ of Pakistan’s control over G-B was not accepted by Beijing in the “temporary” Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement of 1963. This should explain PRC’s clarifications about CPEC’s route which passes through G-B. According to China, its decision to go ahead with CPEC does not prevent India and Pakistan from settling their territorial dispute over G-B. Significantly, there was no mention of Pakistan’s territorial integrity in the Sino-Pakistani Joint Statement of 17 March 2020. In practice, ‘territorial integrity’ connotes the entitlement of an independent state to the areas it controls legally. At this writing, India continues to dispute Pakistan’s administrative writ over G-B and a few other areas of OSJK.20 This aspect appears to be reflected in the Sino-Pakistani Joint Statement of 17 March 2020. China’s general position on a crucial issue, such as the safeguarding of other countries’ territorial integrity, was conveyed by a high-ranking Chinese diplomat in a conversation with me in Beijing in October 2019. 18  MFA, PRC, President Xi Jinping Held Talks with Pakistani President Arif Alvi 2020/03/17, https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1757461.shtml (accessed on 22 March 2020). 19  MFA, PRC, Deepening Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China 2020/03/17, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ zxxx_662805/t1757042.shtml (accessed on 19 March 2020). 20  As already noted, British Governor General of the Dominion of India accepted OSJK’s accession to independent India in 1947. 17 

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A precedent has been recorded by John Garver, a long-time expert on PRC’s foreign policy. At the time of Pakistan’s crisis in 1971, PRC promised support for the Pakistani “state, sovereignty and national independence”. The Chinese statement “did not mention defence of Pakistan’s ‘territorial integrity’”,21 Garver points out. Compare this with the Joint Statement of 17 March 2020. China did not firmly express support for Pakistan’s ‘territorial integrity’. But in international diplomacy there is no last word between partners. In this Sino-Pakistani context, Modi and Xi have the option of sustaining the prevalent status quo in the Kashmir issue for the foreseeable future. India has been consolidating its position inside UTJK and UTL. China has remained passionate about CPEC. There is also no clear and ready alternative to this new status quo. On 16 February 2020, following a visit to Islamabad by the UN Secretary General, India reacted on the following lines: “Jammu & Kashmir [i.e. OSJK] has been, is and will continue to be an integral part of India. The issue that needs to be addressed is that of vacation of the territories illegally and forcibly occupied by Pakistan. Further issues, if any, would be discussed bilaterally [with Pakistan]. There is no role or scope for thirdparty mediation”.22 PRC does not seek mediation between India and Pakistan. An influential role in the Kashmir issue, perhaps at UNSC, is something that China may relish.23 PRC was not privy to the old UNSC resolutions on the Kashmir issue. But Xi would not like to waste PRC’s great-power status in the 21st century. Such a China-centric perspective seems to animate Modi’s India. So, India opposes China’s perceived plans to influence UNSC in the 21st century. In Delhi’s worldview, Beijing has already ‘complicated’ the Kashmir issue by building the CPEC. Therefore, the CPEC is seen in Delhi as a major factor that prevents India and China from reaching the J. W. Garver, China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2016, p. 312. 22  MEA, GOI, Official Spokesperson’s response to a media query regarding comments made by UNSG in Islamabad February 16, 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/response-to-queries. htm?dtl/32398/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a_media_query_regarding_comments_ made_by_UNSG_in_Islamabad (accessed on 22 March 2020). 23  PRC’s evolving position on the Kashmir issue, as inferred by me in a conversation with a high-ranking Chinese diplomat in Beijing in October 2019. 21 

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elusive but positive tipping point in their diplomacy. From early-1950s, a tipping point in the PRC–India diplomacy has been no more than a talking-point at times. Now, to be sure, as we have already noted, the CPEC might have been conceptualised to meet China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’. Some Chinese, therefore, argue that India cannot question the CPEC, which aligns with the China–Pakistan Karakorum Highway, opened several decades ago. The Indian counter has two parts. One, India did not welcome the Karakorum Highway. Two, at that time, Delhi was not well-positioned to meet a threat to Indian ‘sovereignty’ over that area. But countries need not always live in the shadows of the past. In my view, a stable India–China–Pakistan triangular neighbourhood is possible only if Sino-Indian bilateral issues are suitably addressed. The reason is simple. Of the three, India alone has unsettled equations with the other two countries. So, if India and China can reach a mutually acceptable comfort level, the triangle will also benefit. Mainly because, PRC commands influence in Pakistan. Viewed from this perspective, a positive tipping point in PRC–India diplomacy can lead to a collective-win that will benefit Pakistan as well. Some in China argue that the CPEC, if accepted by India, can lead to such a collectivewin. But the CPEC has a strategic connotation that India is not comfortable with. Therefore, I think, PRC and India must first re-set their diplomacy for the future. With this in mind, let us now turn to a few key Sino-Indian boundary issues — Aksai Chin, Shaksgam, Tawang, and Arunachal Pradesh (APS).

Strategic Levers Our review of Aksai Chin geopolitics shows that PRC will not part with this territory. Add to this, a few other factors. Independent India’s administrative reach has never extended to Aksai Chin. So, Delhi can hardly hope to deploy diplomacy to displace China, the resident power in Aksai Chin. And, war is neither civilised nor sensible under an overhang of China’s and India’s nuclear arsenals and ballistic missiles. But the prolonged PRC-India military confrontation in 2020 — along the de facto Aksai Chin-UTL ‘divide’ — defies conventional wisdom. Nonetheless, the two sides began pursuing conflicting strategic purposes. China does not want to be constrained by a stronger India in this sub-sector. However, India wants to prevent China from dominating this area and posing a joint Sino-Pakistani military ‘threat’. Why? Mainly

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because, the strategic China-Pakistan Karakorum Highway, opened in 1979, is in the vicinity of the de facto dividing line between UTL and Aksai Chin. As an aside, Winston Churchill, former British leader, is said to have quipped that there is no sense in waging war, only a purpose. Such logic seems to be driving Beijing and Delhi in their strategic gamesmanship. We must recognise (like we did in the previous chapter) that China and India can make a case for their respective claims on Aksai Chin. So, a practical solution might be to let the status quo continue in Aksai Chin for the foreseeable future. By mid-October 2020, the sensible logic of status quo was reinforced by the resoluteness that both sides displayed during their latest military standoff. What does this mean? Neither China nor India succeeded in depriving each other of their respective administrative control over Aksai Chin and UTL. So, pending a peaceful settlement of this dispute, an option open to both sides is to respect the de facto dividing line between UTL and Aksai Chin. In addition, minor adjustments of this line can be considered, without prejudice to India’s historical ‘entitlement’ to Aksai Chin and China’s opposition. Additionally, perpetual Chinese presence in Aksai Chin can be balanced by perpetual Indian presence in Arunachal Pradesh. This is no apples-for-oranges bargain. An interesting anecdote relating to Aksai Chin requires urgent attention before Arunachal Pradesh is considered. In 1960, the then Indian Vice President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (later President) outlined a conceivable compromise formula to suit the reality in Aksai Chin. He said Delhi might be willing to let China enjoy de facto control in Ladakh (including or meaning Aksai Chin) if India could retain the prestige of sovereignty over that area. He was reported to have referred to such a conceivable formula, attributed to Nehru, as “substance” for China and the “shadow” for India.24 Regardless of whether Radhakrishnan, who briefed a foreign diplomat in Delhi on those lines, was sarcastic, this conceivable formula can still be considered, albeit for Aksai Chin alone. This may mean perpetual Chinese presence in Aksai Chin, i.e. absolute possession of the territory. For practical reasons, China may agree, without acknowledging India as the real or

S. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, USA, 2010, pp. 262–264, as cited by Mahesh Shankar, The Reputational Imperative: Nehru’s India in Territorial Conflict, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, USA, 2018, p. 126. 24 

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nominal sovereign authority in Aksai Chin. This might suit Beijing’s strategy of monitoring or ‘challenging’ India from a corner of the ‘roof of the world’. In the third decade of the 21st century, unlike in 1960, a peep at India from a corner of ‘the roof of the world’ may be superfluous. China’s constellation of military and civilian satellites in the sky can do more than watch, one may argue. However, Aksai Chin remains valuable to China as an internal conduit between Xinjiang and Tibet and as a ‘militarised’ platform ‘overlooking’ India’s Ladakh. As in the case of China in Aksai Chin, a perpetual Indian presence in Arunachal Pradesh can be argued for both practical and strategic reasons. This does not rule out the alternative idea of mutually-acceptable ‘adjustments’ concerning Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. However, China is keen to retain the whole of Aksai Chin. India does not want to give up even a square-inch of territory in Arunachal Pradesh. In October 2020, India disclosed that Modi had already conveyed to Xi that the future of Arunachal Pradesh was not negotiable. It is also true that each side wants to possess and exercise sovereignty over the whole of both Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. But maximal wishes are unattainable for practical and strategic reasons. In practical terms, both India and China would not like to budge from the area in their respective possession. So, diplomacy will not help either side fulfil its maximal wish. In strategic terms, war is not a cultured and convenient option in a nuclearized environment. China’s and India’s independent pledges of nofirst-use of nuclear weapons should mitigate the ultimate dangers in a SinoIndian war. But neither side really believes the NFU pledge of the other. This aspect complicates the calculations of last-resort war and raises its cost phenomenally. So, following the de-escalation of the mutually-deterred Doklam crisis in 2017, China and India appeared to recognise that war was a red line not to be trifled with. Now, fast-forward to the China-India military crisis along the de facto Aksai Chin-UTL ‘divide’ in 2020. Initially, messaging that a major war would be a ‘red line’, the two countries resorted to civil-military diplomacy to manage their escalating hostility and manoeuvres. But progress was slow and not steady. Regardless of this process, a ChinaIndia future, free of war, will depend on the resolution of their disputes over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, among other issues. Beijing has often portrayed India’s Arunachal Pradesh State (APS) as “southern Tibet” which should duly “belong” to PRC. More importantly,

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Beijing knows that APS, if acquired, could serve as a perpetual strategic lever against Delhi. For India, APS, bordering Tibet along the McMahon Line, can be a bastion, not just a border province. In APS, India has a settled population whose representative voice is heard in the Indian Parliament. China does not regard this reality as the clinching factor in Delhi’s favour. Yet, Beijing cannot easily drive a wedge between APS and the Union of India (federal polity with Indian characteristics). These factors prevent China and India from realising, through diplomacy, their respective maximal aim: perpetual possession of both Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. As for strategic limits, war to make maximal gains is irrational exuberance in a deeply nuclearized Sino-Indian environment. Both China and India, unlike Pakistan, possess ‘nuclear triads’, i.e. the fullspectrum capabilities for nuclear-armed deterrence. However, as Arun Shourie points out, an option (say, war) that appears foolish to one side need not necessarily be so to the other side. Such an aspect of emotional intelligence cannot also be ignored in full-spectrum strategic calculations. In this situation, India and China may wish to safeguard their current possessions in every sense, and seek adjustments. The issues of Tawang (north-western part of APS) and Shaksgam, therefore, come into focus.

Sensitive Bargains Beijing is keen to get Tawang because it is the strategic gateway to APS, in military terms, from PRC’s Tibet Autonomous Region. For another reason, too, China desires to control Tawang. As the birthplace of a former Dalai Lama, Tawang is already critical to China’s calculations. As this is written, the 14th Dalai Lama remains on asylum in India, and continues to control the India-based “Tibetan Government in Exile”. China, therefore, seeks to prevent him from picking his successor from Tawang. From Beijing’s standpoint, such a successor might influence those Tibetans who remain unreconciled to PRC’s sovereign control over Tibet. The rapturous reception the 14th Dalai Lama received at Tawang in 2017 was a pointer few could miss. Overall, China does not like to see Tawang as an external enclave of resistance to PRC’s rule over Tibet. But India remains keen to retain Tawang in order to safeguard APS in military terms. Delhi does not, however, consider Tawang as a military

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passage to Tibet which India has already recognised as China’s. Moreover, there has been considerable integration of Tawang with India. In fact, Mao left Tawang free while “liberating” Tibet in the 1950s and withdrew his troops from the town after the 1962 war. Overall, Delhi thinks that PRC has no locus standi in Tawang. In this contestation, the Tawang issue can perhaps be settled in religious terms (involving Kailash Mansarovar) or as a strategic bargain (involving Shaksgam). Kailash Mansarovar is a holy Hindu-pilgrimage site in Tibet. Beijing allows Indian pilgrims to visit Mansarovar except during crises. As the Doklam crisis began in 2017, Beijing closed one of the two routes to Kailash Mansarovar from India. After the crisis was de-escalated, the closed route was gradually reopened. As with Kailash Mansarovar, India can open Tawang to the Tibetan Buddhist pilgrims from China on a regular basis. India may of course wish to institute safeguards to ensure the genuineness of Buddhist pilgrims. China is believed to protect itself similarly in the case of Indian pilgrims travelling to Kailash Mansarovar. Such a neatly conceivable permanent arrangement, with both sides not losing any territory, has limitations. Mainly because, Beijing appears keen to gain strategic access to APS through Tawang. Additionally, Beijing’s psychological objective is to integrate the town with Tibet under PRC’s political canopy. Because of these factors, Beijing may not fancy the idea of a permanent religious bargain over Tawang. An alternative formula, i.e. a strategic bargain over Tawang and Shaksgam, can take one of two forms. In the first scenario, if China agrees to transfer Shaksgam to India, Delhi could give away Tawang to Beijing. In the second scenario, China may keep Shaksgam and India could retain Tawang. To be sure, the first scenario will be an almost-impossible bargain to pull off. China took Shaksgam from Pakistan’s nominal ‘control’ in a ‘temporary’ agreement in 1963. No reason was specified, but China was enamoured of Shaksgam’s proximity to the then ISJK, now split as UTJK and UTL. Having secured Shaksgam as a strategic gain in 1963, China might hardly be willing to part with that area in the 21st century. India, on its part, seized the strategic Tawang in 1951 while PRC was still ‘liberating’ or ‘annexing’ the Tibetan heartland. Delhi, too, cannot, therefore, afford to lose Tawang in a trice through diplomacy.

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If an exchange of Shaksgam for Tawang has to be ruled out, the second scenario of status quo will be a practical proposition. With Shaksgam still in hand, China can retain its proximity to India’s military stronghold of the Siachen Glacier in the world’s most treacherous terrain. In this bargain, therefore, Delhi can retain Tawang and hope to safeguard APS. India and China can, however, seek to define a boundary in the general area of Siachen and Shaksgam. Some believe that the Indian Army’s capture of the Siachen Glacier in 1984 eroded China’s strategic gain in securing the nearby Shaksgam valley from Pakistan in 1963. Delhi, according to Lt Gen Raghavan, “can ask the Chinese to renegotiate the boundary of the Shaksgam valley since India is in effective control of the border up to Indira Col in Siachen”. Indira Col overlooks the Shaksgam valley. This, he wrote, would only mean “asking the Chinese to do no more than what they did with Pakistan when they signed the [1963] boundary accord”.25 His proposal, made public in 2002, remains valid in the third decade of the 21st century. Should this happen, India would be conceding Shaksgam to China while retaining Siachen into the unforeseeable future. Siachen has never been in dispute between India and China. Significantly, however, Siachen occupies almost the entire glaciated area which is not covered by the India–Pakistan Line of Control. This line divided OSJK between these two neighbours. So, a clearly-defined Siachen–Shaksgam boundary alignment will leave Siachen entirely in India’s hands. This will shape the map of India’s UTL for all practical purposes. For a start, firm maps will suit India’s security interests in these areas. Of course, India has not given up its sovereignty claims over G-B and AK. As a counter, Pakistan continues to suggest “plebiscite” in the entire OSJK. So, Pakistan might not like a firm Siachen–Shaksgam boundary alignment. But Pakistan had already ceded Shaksgam to China. As a consequence, if China does agree to a firm Siachen–Shaksgam boundary alignment, in the overall interest of stabilising Sino-Indian relations, Pakistan cannot perhaps say ‘no’. Above all, a stable and predictable PRC–India equation, across the entire spectrum of their relations, must suit Pakistan’s interest as well. The reason is Lt Gen V. R. Raghavan, Siachen: Conflict Without End, Viking, Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 2002, p. 40. 25 

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simple but profound. As the weakest of these three nuclear-armed neighbours in comprehensive national strength, Pakistan should benefit if PRC and India strike a balanced strategic equation. The big puzzle is about the lack of political will in both China and India to settle their vast and varied boundary disputes. I have suggested some practical formulae. These call for matching political will on both sides at the same time. For synchronised political wills, China and India must recognise that each will lose more in a never-ending stalemate than through an agreed give-and-take settlement. These calculations are difficult to quantify, but political will itself is a qualitative phenomenon. Overall, as China and India ‘celebrate’ seven decades of bilateral diplomatic ties, a tipping point is as elusive as ever. The lack of adequate political will on either side is the missing motive force. This can only be explained by China’s and India’s competitive nationalism and their tendency to believe the worst about the other because of their 1962 war. The Sino-Indian military hostility in 2020 has further complicated any idea of a positive tipping point. Indeed, a China-India power struggle in Asia does not seem unthinkable any longer.

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CHAPTER 9

DIPLOMACY OF SMART POWER

In Search of Fresh Identities As two ancient civilisations with post-modern aspirations, both PRC and India have focused on smart power for not only economic advancement but also diplomatic purposes. This is an emerging domain in global politics. A preliminary review is considered essential. In fact, as neighbours with scientific bases, China and India should have been the first to conceptualise coordinated anti-COVID research. For missing this early opportunity, Beijing and Delhi can blame the enduring deficit of trust between them. But this humanitarian battle is worth their joint fight, going forward.

China is practising the diplomacy of smart power. India, too, is experimenting with similar diplomacy. For both these Asian neighbours, the diplomacy of smart power is a strategic choice. The respective places of China and India in any future international order will be determined by their ambitions and abilities to pursue smart power. China is perceivably seeking global leadership, being second only to the US in comprehensive national strength at the turn of the third decade in 21st century. At the same time, India, by its own declaration, wants to be a leading power. Commonly understood, genuine expertise in the newly emerging niche areas of science and technology (S&T) is generally recognised as smart power. The emerging niche areas of S&T include the Earth’s Outer Space, cyber space, digital technology, artificial intelligence, and more broadly the

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Fourth Industrial Revolution, etc. Gadgets based on expertise in at least one of the newly emerging niche areas of S&T are smart devices. At another level, a country’s proven expertise in building conventional infrastructure projects, like roads and energy plants, can also be viewed as smart power. A state’s innovativeness in creating viable multinational financial institutions and in operating the emerging financial-technology (fintech) sector is certainly smart power. The diplomacy of a country driven by its expertise in one or more of the newly emerging niche domains of S&T is diplomacy of smart power. This is also equally true of a state’s diplomacy based on smartness in the major conventional economic sectors. Expertise in the emerging niche areas of S&T can be deployed in the economic, military, commercial and even cultural spheres. Because of this evident reality, it should be possible for countries to utilise their smart power to upgrade their hard or sharp military strengths. Moreover, smart power applies to the softer side of a state, namely its economic and cultural profiles, as well. It must also be noted, however, that the diplomacy of smart power is different from smart diplomacy. Smart diplomacy (as in the title of this author’s earlier book on China–India relations) is the simple art of being intelligent, rational, prudent, or realistic in conducting a country’s foreign policy. By contrast, the diplomacy of smart power is the conscious strategy of a state to promote its external interests by using its extraordinary skills in the new niche domains of S&T and/or in the conventional economic sectors. Therefore, while all countries can engage in smart diplomacy, only the states with advanced capabilities will be able to pursue the diplomacy of smart power. The diplomacy of smart power can be practised in one or more geopolitical theatres. However, the impact of such diplomacy will be felt in the global commons. As an omnibus term, the global commons is a vast domain of public goods for the international community. Some of these goods are multi-modal international connectivity, infrastructure projects, maritime security and national security as a factor of global good, etc. In this perspective, what is the relevance of smart power to the diplomacy of China and India? To begin with, the deployment of smart power will enhance or sharpen their respective national strengths across a wide spectrum. Therefore, by exercising smart power as an instrument of diplomacy,

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Beijing and Delhi might be able to deter, influence, equal or outwit each other and/or other states. Why does the People’s Republic of China or the Republic of India seek to use smart power as a tool of diplomacy without actually claiming to do so? Their primary reason remains the natural ambition of every state to rise to its full potential as a player on the international stage. Moreover, China and India know that diplomacy of smart power is an answer to the call of creativity to reform the international order, especially in Asia, in the 21st century. Why should these two Asian neighbours seek to reform an existing order? Fundamentally, their objectives resonate with the natural aspirations of rising countries. China’s ‘natural’ ambition, in this milieu, is to rise and match or overtake America as the premier state. This may be seen as China’s civilisational tryst with destiny or as the manifestation of ‘natural law’ in international relations. To attain this status, while America is still ahead, the practising of diplomacy based on smart power could become Beijing’s winning strategy. For this, China seems to seek partner-countries and compete with the US for their goodwill. In addition, China tries to influence states other than its partners, too, in a bid to reach the top in the international system. India, too, is regarded as a civilisational-state. To attain its ‘rightful’ place in the world — a ‘natural’ ambition — the pursuit of diplomacy of smart power is India’s practical choice, too. While India remains focused primarily on its powerful neighbour — the PRC — America looms as Delhi’s potential partner.

‘Shared Future’ and ‘One Global Family’ Overarching China’s and India’s diplomacy of smart power are their compatible but unsynchronised and competing aspirations. These two neighbours express their goals as autonomous commitments. Since Xi Jinping became the PRC’s supreme leader in 2012, Chinese foreign policy has acquired a substantial global focus. “Mankind is a community with a shared future”, Xi wrote to Bill Gates in a letter dated 20 February 2020.1 Xi was thanking the Bill & Melinda MFA, PRC, President Xi Jinping Writes a Reply Letter to Bill Gates 2020/02/22, https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1748335.shtml (accessed on 23 February 2020). 1 

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Gates Foundation for its support in China’s fight against the Novel Corona Virus disease (COVID-19). Xi could not have chosen a more appropriate occasion to convey the globalised focus of his foreign policy in benign terms. The core message of Xi’s foreign policy began gaining much currency in the run-up to the second summit of China’s Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in Beijing in late April 2019.2 In addition, China floats the idea of “a new type of international relations” founded on “win–win” cooperation among countries. The People’s Republic of China has resorted to such portrayals since Xi Jinping became its supreme leader in 2012. Equally, Delhi depicts its foreign policy as the translation of India’s ancient adage that the entire world is a single global family.3 This has become a diplomatic mantra of the Republic of India since Narendra Modi became its Prime Minister in 2014. At least since 2015, China has packaged its foreign policy as a global good. The relevant official statements are numerous. Similarly, India’s official statements, especially in recent years, are replete with homages to the idea of a singular global family. Neither country has verifiably put its foreign policy to the litmus test of practical benefits for the world at large. Of course, nation-states hardly ever do this. However, global health security is a domain where India and China can verifiably test their individual and collective smart power for practical benefits. Concerted Sino-Indian anti-COVID research was (and remains) an opportunity for these two neighbours during the 70th anniversary of their diplomacy and thereafter, if necessary. Besides the issues of scientific patents in this and other medicinal fields, China–India trust deficit will require close attention. On balance, though, these challenges of cooperation, if addressed in a problem-solving manner, may lessen the elusiveness of a positive tipping point in the China–India diplomacy. This, in turn, can produce a cascading positive impact in their strategic engagement as a whole over time. Y. Jiechi, Politburo Member of the ruling Communist Party of China, defined the message of “a shared future for mankind”, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/ t1649905.shtml (accessed on 30 March 2019). 3  An evocative ancient Indian adage is often summed up in India’s classical Sanskrit language as “Vasudaiva Kutumbakam”, meaning that the entire world is a unified family of the Supreme. 2 

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India is already recognised as a global leader in producing generic vaccines. So, far from being utopian, coordinated Sino-Indian anti-COVID vaccine research, or any other concerted medical research, will be a new confidencebuilding measure (CBM). A nation’s smart power in the humanitarian domain is a global calling card, more so than in the economic, military, or cultural fields. If China and India act on this basis, a new CBM will result. But China and India are quite unique. Each claims exceptionalism as a civilisation-state and autonomously pursues its exclusive national interest. China’s and India’s sense of exceptionalism prevails regardless of whether they perceive their respective national interest accurately or otherwise at any given time. For both these countries, their diplomacy of smart power, not yet coordinated for global public health, is an instrument to promote their respective national interest.

Smart Power: Two Examples Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an example of Chinese smart power. The BRI is a ‘live’ strategic initiative that promotes Chinese-aided infrastructure and connectivity projects in China’s numerous partnercountries around the world. Arguably, therefore, the BRI is a tangible expression of China’s unfolding diplomacy of smart power. In executing the BRI, China deploys its considerable expertise in fastpacing the creation of physical infrastructure in partner-countries. The stateowned enterprises of China and its private companies are engaged in the BRI endeavour. This is a clear example of conventional smart power. Interestingly, digital connectivity is an example of exceptional smart power in this emerging techno-economic domain. China engages other countries in this domain, too, under the BRI framework and beyond. This, too, reflects China’s diplomacy of smart power. For China, however, the BRI is not all roses all the way. Answering the sharp criticisms of the BRI in several global quarters, Chinese officials argue that Beijing walks its benign BRI talk. Moreover, hardly any of China’s partner-states in the BRI universe has publicly and decisively dismissed Beijing’s claim through internationally verifiable data.4 The US and India have highlighted the perceived risk of “debt traps” which China’s partnercountries should guard against as they participate in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative of multi-modal connectivity projects. 4 

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On the contrary, China seeks more than one partner-state for some of the BRI projects. Suffice to note that the BRI embodies China’s diplomacy of smart power. But the governments in some of China’s partner-countries are perceived to have allowed Beijing to dictate unilateral terms for its BRI projects. In Sri Lanka (in South Asia), Malaysia (in Southeast Asia), and Maldives (in South Asia), such ‘pro-China’ governments were voted out in elections between 2015 and 2019. However, none of these countries snapped ties or entered into acrimonious disputes with China after such elections. Interestingly in Sri Lanka, a ‘pro-China’ leader, Mahinda Rajapaksa, was voted out as President in 2015. One of the factors was an opposition narrative which alleged that Mahinda favoured China and vice versa in the BRI projects in Sri Lanka. In 2019, however, Mahinda became Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister following the victory of his brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in the presidential election. On balance, therefore, the Chinese financial resources and smart power for fast-pacing infrastructure projects seem to be important to Beijing’s partner-states. India is yet to initiate a policy or projects to match the massive scale of China’s BRI. Interestingly, India and Japan, both neighbours of China, have conceptually launched an Asia–Africa Growth Corridor. But much work remains to be done by these two countries in this regard. Even as this is written, Delhi continues to face a financial crunch and the constraints of historical and contemporary geopolitics in parts of South Asia, India’s native neighbourhood. Consequently, India has begun to explore modest economic and strategic links with countries along the Bay of Bengal rim and the wider Indian Ocean rim. Among the Asian giants, therefore, India remains second to China, by a very long margin, in weaving a geopolitical web of smart power across the world. However, relevant and credible empirical studies are still few and far between. The (already discussed) Doklam crisis clouded India’s relations with China in the BRI context. Before the Sino-Indian military crisis in 2020, Delhi was relatively less allergic to China’s digital knowhow than the West. Digital connectivity, emblematic of exceptional smart power, figures prominently in China’s BRI master-plan. Yet, in this sector, Delhi dealt with China outside of the BRI compass altogether.

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In this fashion, Delhi had allowed some of China’s digital technology firms to enter the Indian market.5 China’s smartphone companies were the perceived beneficiaries. In April 2019, the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, emphasised India’s receptivity in this regard. According to him, “Chinese mobile phone brands such as Xiaomi, VIVO and OPPO have [in 2019] represented half of the Indian market”. He also drew attention to the nascent Sino-Indian synergy in the information technology (IT) sector at that time. Three Indian IT corridors were set up, one each at Dalian, Guizhou, and Xuzhou in China, he added.6 India’s nuanced attitude towards China’s digital knowhow differed from the critical scrutiny by several Western countries, notably America. For long, India has had concerns that its national security might be adversely targeted by any company with suspected links to the Communist Party of China or its government or People’s Liberation Army. Over time, these concerns centred on the Chinese knowhow in the 5G realm of telecommunications in particular. But India’s 5G story, unfinished at this writing, brings into focus the country’s delicate engagement with China in this exceptional domain of smart power. To begin with, India was more open-minded than the “Five Eyes” — the US, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand — towards China’s smart power in the 5G telecom sector. This was evident from India’s generally welcoming attitude towards Huawei, China’s 5G giant, towards the end of 2018. However, by mid-2019, Modi suddenly sought collaboration with the US to develop 5G telecom knowhow and gadgets under his government’s “Make in India” programme. He did so during his meeting with the US President Donald Trump at Osaka on 28 June 2019.7 Indian officials got For a perspective on India’s attitude towards China in the digital realm, see Archana Atmakuri and Chan Jia Hao, India: Integrating with China’s Digital Silk Road?, Guest Column, China– India Brief # 132, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, http://www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg. 6  Ambassador Luo Zhaohui, Dragon-Elephant Tango Creating the Asian Century, 4 April 2019, PRC Embassy in Delhi, see http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/embassy_news/t1651434.htm (accessed on 12 April 2019). 7  MEA, GOI, see https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/31514/Transcript_of_Media_ Briefing_by_Foreign_Secretary_after_JapanUSIndia_Trilateral_Meeting_on_the_sidelines_ of_G20_Summit_June_28_2019 (accessed on 5 July 2019). 5 

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the impression that Trump “welcomed” Modi’s proposal for a US–India corporate collaboration in the 5G domain.8 However, India and its 5G aspirations did not figure in Trump’s press conference later on the same day.9 This surely did not imply that America completely cold-shouldered India over its proposal for bilateral collaboration in the 5G realm. More interestingly, though, Trump indicated on the same day that the US and China “are going to be strategic partners” “if the right deal is structured” on a host of issues.10 As for the US–India “Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership” struck on 25 February 2020, Trump said in Delhi on that day that he and Modi “discussed the importance of a secure 5G wireless network”. Trump described 5G as “a tool for freedom, progress, [and] prosperity”. Therefore, there was no room for this “emerging technology” to be “even conceived as a conduit for suppression and censorship”.11 Apparently, this remark by Trump was directed against one of China’s alleged 5G aims at home. The other allegations or suspicions about China’s 5G system centre on its programming to spy on foreign buyers including governments through a concealed “back door”. In any case, Trump did not publicly commit the US to working with India in developing the 5G telecom system. A White House Fact Sheet noted that, on 25 February 2020, Trump and Modi “discussed the importance of building secure 5G systems to promote a trusted networking future” (emphasis added).12 There was no mention that the two leaders agreed on “building” such a 5G system through a firm US–India collaboration. Ibid. White House (US), Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference |Osaka, Japan, Foreign Policy, Issued on: June 29, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-press-conference-osaka-japan/ (accessed on 3 July 2019). 10  Ibid. 11  Televised press statement by Trump, in the presence of Modi, in Delhi on 25 February 2020, monitored by the author in Singapore. 12  White House (US), President Donald J. Trump Is Strengthening Our Strategic Partnership With India, Fact Sheets Issued on 25 February 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-strengthening-strategic-partnership-india/ (accessed on 26 February 2020). 8  9 

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Overall, though, India is apparently weighing its options for foreign collaboration to emerge as a digital major. The Xi–Modi “informal meeting” at Wuhan (China) in April 2018 opened a window of opportunity for the two countries to consider synergies across the board. India, too, appears to think that its comprehensive smart power, not just in digital technology, can be more competitive through suitable foreign collaboration. Obviously, the US and China hold the key to such an Indian calculus.

The Huawei Test in Sino-Indian Ties At the turn of third decade in the 21st century, China aspires to become a dominant player, going forward, in the sluggish but potentially dynamic Indian market. At the start of the decade, there was good news for China. On 30 December 2019, Delhi announced its decision to allow Huawei to compete freely in the trials for India’s rollout of 5G knowhow and equipment. In taking that decision, India brushed aside the global campaign by the US against Huawei’s 5G software. American protagonists were still alleging that the Huawei’s 5G software was ‘spyware’ that would give the Chinese government access to even the closely guarded data of other countries. Speaking after meeting Xi Jinping at Osaka, Japan, in June 2019, US President Donald Trump minced no words about his concerns regarding Huawei. He said, inter alia, that “Huawei is a complicated situation” and “we [Americans] have a national security problem” which “is paramount, very important”.13 It was not clear whether Huawei was indelibly detected by Trump’s “national security” radar. But the American-Canadian moves against the company’s top executive Meng Wanzhou from December 2018 had fuelled speculation in that regard. Therefore, India’s positive attitude towards Huawei in December 2019 should have mitigated some Chinese concerns about the perceived Indian proximity to the US. Moreover, China’s unresolved trade war with the US, despite their first phase agreement on 15 January 2020, appeared to have impelled Xi to eye the Indian market in a big way. Same source as in Footnote 9.

13 

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Hailing Delhi, therefore, for not shunning Huawei, the state-affiliated China Daily wrote: “For India, Washington’s claim that Huawei poses a serious national security threat is just too far-fetched, given the lack of any supportive evidence. And to ease New Delhi’s espionage fear, Huawei has agreed to sign a ‘no backdoor policy’ agreement with the Indian government, which allows the latter to ban the company from operating in the country if it is involved in any security breach”.14 The Chinese paper further emphasised: “India has always been late in embracing the latest technology. After missing the 3G and 4G bus, [sic] the country cannot afford to miss the 5G bus as well by jumping on Washington’s anti-Huawei bandwagon”.15 All this was fine as far as it went. In fact, the Chinese side virtually began seeing Huawei’s entry into India’s 5G trials as a trophy brought home by Xi Jinping from his talks with Modi at Mahabalipuram in October 2019. Such a perception flowed from China’s confidence that Huawei would certainly bag the Indian 5G contract following the relevant trials. Why? The ‘negative’ targeting of Huawei16 by the tech-superpower US had convinced the Chinese of their company’s superior credentials compared to those of its rivals from America and other countries. Huawei’s 5G knowhow was already projected as an emblem of China’s prowess in the Fourth Industrial Revolution that began in the ‘digitalising’ world. For instance, Chinese Ambassador to Britain, Liu Xiaoming, argued that “to wall off Huawei would be to move against a new round of technological revolution”.17 In all, Beijing had stopped viewing Huawei’s 5G as a product or service. The external acceptance or rejection of Huawei’s 5G package became a barometer of strategic trust in China. China Daily, India not led astray by US 5G ploy: China Daily editorial, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202001/02/WS5e0dd93ca310cf3e35582238.html (accessed on 4 January 2020). 15  Ibid. 16  Numerous are China’s wordy responses to the frequent comments in the US on Huawei’s alleged links with the Chinese deep-state. Beijing’s verbal counter-attacks can be gleaned from the barrage of comments by the spokespersons of China’s foreign and commerce ministries. 17  MFA, PRC, Ambassador Liu Xiaoming contributes an article to The Sunday Telegraph entitled Banning Huawei would leave Britain trailing behind on technology, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1729635.shtml (accessed on 9 January 2020). 14 

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Before the start of India’s 5G trials, the objective issue was how China might react if Delhi were to offer the contract to a party other than Huawei. This was no exercise in idle pastime. For instance, Delhi chose France’s Rafale for a Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft, instead of a competing warplane from the US, India’s “strategic global partner”18 at that time. With France, India has a “strategic partnership”, one nuanced-grade lower than the Indo-American “strategic global partnership”. The US–India partnership has been enhanced further to the level of a “comprehensive global strategic partnership”. This was not necessarily a cosmetic change because of the increasingly closer US–India links. So, if an American fighter aircraft, instead of Rafale, had been selected, Delhi could have got valuable strategic mileage from Washington. Regardless of this argument, the issues that propelled Delhi to choose Rafale are not relevant to the China–India diplomacy. Overarching the Huawei issue, Delhi’s decision to ban numerous Chinese software apps from mid-2020, following a China-India military crisis, exposed the fragility of their ties. In that context in 2020, India and Japan began exploring the possibilities for bilateral research and development (R&D) in the 5G telecom sector. Delhi might have more collaborative options, if America succeeds in its global plan, announced in 2020, for a ‘clean network’, i.e. a cyber-and-digital partnership without spyware concerns. In 2020 itself, Beijing, too, announced plans for a parallel coalition, apparently free of US ‘influence’ of the kind unacceptable to China. Another possibility was collaborative 5G R&D as a BRICS initiative (involving Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Before the Sino-Indian military crisis in 2020, Xi had suggested RussiaIndia-China collaboration over artificial intelligence and 5G. In all, at this writing, India’s renewed policy of ‘enlightened’ self-reliance does not preclude ‘benign’ foreign collaboration. But Delhi would have to make nuanced choices, mindful of the impact on Sino-Indian and US-India relations.

National Security and ‘Nuclear Triad’ We will now turn our attention to overall national security, not just in terms of 5G. China and India can pursue the diplomacy of smart power only if MEA, GOI, Joint Statement on the Second India–U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue December 19, 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32227/Joint_Statement_on_ the_Second_India–US_2432_Ministerial_Dialogue (accessed on 9 January 2020). 18 

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they feel secure internally and on their external fronts. Though axiomatic, this observation is supported by the argument that the military capabilities of major countries can be a global good instead of the opposite. In a sense, the argument is merely an extension of an economic reality. International financial institutions actually emphasise that the economic growth of major countries has been good for the global economy. The economic growth of major powers benefits other states through international trade and cooperation. But in the conventional strategic wisdom, there is no similar theory about the military strength of major powers. The conventional argument is as follows. When a state becomes stronger, its neighbours and/ or competitors face a “security dilemma” of how to safeguard themselves in the new situation. A non-conventional counter-argument is this. Major states, if they feel sufficiently secure, do not necessarily threaten other countries. In practice, therefore, China and India subscribe to the view that their respective military strength can be a global good. Applying this argument, they strengthen their militaries to deter, not necessarily threaten, each other and the wider international community. The security of a country depends primarily on its military inventories and combat capabilities. Military doctrine and training are essential for combat capabilities, which may also be enhanced through partnership(s) or alliance(s) with other countries. Conventional lethal hardware and traditional military practices promote a state’s national security substantially. However, China and India seek smart military power, too. They deploy smart military power in their diplomacy towards each other and the larger international community. One striking example of China’s and India’s smart military power is that they possess the “nuclear triad”. China has deployed the PLA Rocket Force which, among its other mandates, can “launch nuclear counter-attacks with strategic missiles”. The PLA Navy commands nuclear-powered and nucleararmed submarines, while the Air Force has nuclear-capable equipment. In addition, China has formed a Strategic Support Force which is “believed to be responsible for the PLA’s space and cyber capabilities”. These aspects highlight China’s smart military power which includes the “nuclear triad”, i.e. nuclear capabilities of army, navy, and the air force. Beijing’s comprehensive quest for smart military power is driven by the mantra of modernisation — an overarching objective in China’s national security policy.

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Xi has envisioned a thorough “modernisation” of all wings of the PLA by 2035. By 2049, the PRC’s first centenary year, the PLA wings are expected to become “world class forces”.19 The key objective, in Xi’s thinking, is China’s ability to win post-modern wars. During China’s annual ‘political season’ in March 2019, Xi called on the PLA to “concentrate on war preparedness” among other key objectives.20 A significant aspect of smart military power being mastered by China is the development and demonstration of a fifth-generation stealth warplane. China showcased its J-20 stealth fighter in several flying manoeuvres for 15 minutes at an air-show at Zhuhai in southern China in November 2018.21 Fifth-generation stealth warplanes do not figure in India’s military inventories, at this writing. But Delhi boasts an indigenous “nuclear triad”, with Modi himself going public about this. In some contrast, Xi has not officially flaunted the Chinese “nuclear triad” as an instrument of his diplomacy of smart power towards India. He may be driven by reasons other than national modesty. Now, regardless of Washington’s disposition towards Beijing at any given time, Xi appears to treat the US, not India, as the most-capable country to watch in military terms. Interestingly in this context, a scholar on “Chinese nuclear proliferation” has underscored a similar argument: “While many Western texts present the Sino-Indian relationship as precarious and as a possible pretext for a regional arms race [in Asia], India does not, from the Chinese perspective, present an acute threat to Chinese security”.22 Nonetheless, following the stalemated China–India military standoff in 2017, the Chinese PLA began to take the Indian Army more seriously than at any time before.23 However, China For an independent assessment of capabilities and aspirations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), see The Military Balance 2019, Routledge for IISS, United Kingdom, February 2019, pp. 232 and 256–265. 20  Ministry of National Defense (MOD), PRC, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-03/12/ content_4837628.htm (accessed on 16 March 2019). 21  MOD, PRC, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2018-11/07/content_4828819.htm (accessed on 8 November 2018). 22  S. T. Haynes, Chinese Nuclear Proliferation: How Global Politics Is Transforming China’s Weapons Buildup and Modernization, Potomac Books (an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press), USA, 2016, p. 107. 23  The Chinese PLA’s updated perspective on India is based on a top Chinese official’s briefing to me in Beijing in November 2018. 19 

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evidently believes that its security, vis-à-vis the US and India, is underpinned by the Chinese nuclear trump card. In April 2019, therefore, China reaffirmed its intention “to keep our [Chinese] nuclear strength at the lowest level required [for] maintenance of national security”.24 (Emphasis added.) India established its “nuclear triad” in November 2018. Modi projected the feat in nationalistic terms. Because nuclear weapons are not usable in a civilised international setting, they can surely serve as an instrument of the diplomacy of smart power. The salient aspects of India’s “nuclear triad”, as disclosed by Modi on 5 November 2018, are as follows. The first successful completion of a “deterrence patrol” by India’s “Strategic Strike Nuclear Submarine, INS Arihant”, marked “the establishment” of India’s “survivable nuclear triad”. This nuclear-powered submarine can launch atomic weapons. Its “deterrence patrol”, which Modi alluded to, was the submarine’s voyage as a strike force, undetected by other countries. With India’s Army and Air Force having previously acquired capabilities to launch nuclear weapons, INS Arihant’s success marked the attainment of a “nuclear triad”. Its “survivability”, a point made by Modi, is that India can absorb an adversary’s nuclear attack and yet retaliate. Having announced such a major feat in smart military power, Modi sought to fine-tune India’s overall diplomacy of smart power. He said: “As a responsible nation, India has put in place a robust nuclear command and control structure, effective safety assurance architecture, and strict political control, under its Nuclear Command Authority”. Despite attaining a “nuclear triad”, India “remains committed to the doctrine of Credible Minimum Deterrence and No First Use [of nuclear weapons]”.25 Beijing, too, has been articulating a policy of “no first use of nuclear weapons” since China detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964.26 However, far more than China, India proclaims its policy of “credible minimum nuclear MFA, PRC, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1653646. shtml (accessed on 12 April 2019). 25  Prime Minister of India website, https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pm-felicitates-crew-of-ins-arihant-on-completion-of-nuclear-triad/?comment=disable (accessed on 5 November 2018). 26  MFA, PRC, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1653646. shtml (Accessed on 12 April 2019. 24 

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deterrence”. This implies a minimal but potent arsenal to attain maximal impact in the diplomacy of smart power. For China, the diplomatic targets of its smart military power are the US and India. Arguably, China faces the US as a potential combatant in the 21st century. India, conceivably, is China’s potential competitor. For India, the diplomatic targets of its smart military power are China and Pakistan. Delhi has viewed China as a powerful neighbour and Pakistan as a neighbour to watch, from the time of Indian independence in 1947. In the first quarter of the 21st century, China and India continue to proclaim their respective policy of “no first use of nuclear weapons” against all countries. Such a declaration is purely diplomacy of smart power because nuclear weapons are unusable by civilised countries in this post-modern world. In this situation, Pakistan’s non-declaration of a policy of ‘no first use of nuclear weapons’ is a factor that India and China are aware of. This aspect does not, however, devalue China’s and India’s nuclear-arsenal strategies towards each other and the wider international community. It will be unrealistic to dismiss China’s and India’s nuclear postures as grandstanding words and not practical deeds. These words foster the diplomacy of smart power in a geopolitical climate in which nuclear weapons are the currency of deterrence rather than actual wars.

Space: For Smart Science China’s and India’s scientific explorations in Outer Space, if pursued for the global good, may produce benefits only in the future. Why? It generally takes time to convert proven scientific findings to technological or practical benefits. Nonetheless, Outer Space, which hosts man-made Earth-orbiting satellites, has become indispensable for optimal as well as current and future economic activities on the planet itself. Despite this reality, China’s and India’s lunar voyages, for instance, are generally viewed as demonstrations of smart power with potential rather than current utility. China’s robotic lunar mission, Chang’e-4, accomplished humanity’s firstever soft-landing on the far side of the Moon. The mission, launched in December 2018, was declared a “complete success” on 11 January 2019.27 Xinhua, China declares Chang’e-4 mission complete success, see http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2019-01/11/c_137736993.htm (accessed on 11 January 2019). 27 

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China indigenously developed the whole-of-mission technology. But the Chinese spacecraft also carried payloads from Germany, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, and Sweden. Commenting on this aspect, Wu Weiren, chief designer for China’s lunar exploration programme, said: “International cooperation is the future of lunar exploration. The participating countries will share the costs, risks and achievements, and learn from each other”. This echoes China’s “win–win” mantra for international cooperation. Significantly, however, China was the prime mover and pioneer in conceptualising and realising the voyage to the far side of the Moon. Spectacularly, China has also sent taikonauts (astronauts) into Outer Space on exploratory missions. The diplomatic message from China, therefore, is that its smart power in extra-terrestrial efforts is for global benefit, for now or in the future. On 1 October 2020, Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, highlighted his country’s recent space forays in the following manner. In May 2020, China “inaugurated the construction of a space station”. In June, the “deployment” of an indigenous “navigation system” in Space — BeiDou system — was accomplished. In July, China’s own first-ever inter-planetary mission to Mars, Tianwen-1, began. And, in September 2020, Sun said, his country successfully launched a reusable experimental spacecraft. Let us now get a glimpse of the panorama of India’s space exploration. India’s successful lunar mission in 2008 carried an American payload, symbolising Delhi’s diplomacy of smart power for the global good. The Indian Space Research Organisation and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration jointly discovered “water molecules on the Moon surface” during that mission in 2008.28 Practical applications, if any, of this laudatory scientific feat will be known in the future, not now. India’s continuing efforts to explore Space through unmanned as well as manned missions reflect the country’s urge for the diplomacy of futurist smart power. In a spectacular category was India’s Mars Orbiter’s rendezvous with the Red Planet in 2014. Delhi announced its interest in Mars in 2012 in the wake of the failure of a joint Russian-Chinese mission to Mars. Indeed India became the first country to succeed in its first Mars mission. Indian Space Research Organization, http://www.isro.org/scripts/internationalcooperations. aspx. (accessed on 9 December 2013). 28 

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Interestingly, an American Mars probe was successful at about the same time as India’s. This gave Modi a chance at strategic humour when he met the then US President Barack Obama soon after those two missions were accomplished. Modi quipped that he was meeting Obama on Earth after their two countries had already held a summit on Mars.29 To be precise, the Indian and US spacecraft had reached the orbital environment of the Red Planet at nearly the same time. As noted earlier, such scientific missions in Outer Space can produce global benefits only in the fullness of time. Nonetheless, international circles recognise the diplomatic signals that China’s and India’s scientific Space explorations emit. These diplomatic signals advertise China’s and India’s respective smart power which can potentially serve the global interest in techno-economic terms. Space has emerged as a key domain of global commons for two practical applications with direct relevance to India’s here-and-now diplomacy of smart power. To begin with, India accessed this domain to pursue economic diplomacy towards neighbouring countries in South Asia. Secondly and more significantly, India is using Space as a platform for economic and military security at home. In the process, Delhi seeks to send a diplomatic message to Beijing that India’s military deterrence against China is more secure now than ever before. As for the first of these two applications, India customised its ‘South Asia Satellite’ by 2016 and 2017. This was designed for the socio-economic benefit of the other countries in South Asia. But Delhi gathered little goodwill, because of the complex South Asian geopolitics which did not, however, debunk the efficacy of India’s ‘South Asia Satellite’.

Space: For Smart Defence Secondly, India sought to bolster its own national security by conducting an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Test on 27 March 2019. China “noticed [the] related reports”. This was China’s evidently reluctant way of recognising India as an MEA, GOI, Remarks by Prime Minister at the Joint Press Briefing with US President Barack Obama (Washington D.C., September 30, 2014), October 01, 2014, see http://www.mea.gov. in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/24052/Remarks+by+Prime+Minister+at+the+Joint+Press+Br iefing+with+US+President+Barack+Obama+Washington+DC+September+30+2014 (accessed on 3 October 2014). 29 

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extra-terrestrial competitor in national security matters. Beijing also expressed the hope that all countries could take “real actions” for “lasting peace and stability in Outer Space”.30 Significantly, India advocates a similar long-term Space policy. In fact, while announcing India’s successful ASAT test, codenamed “Mission Shakti” (Mission of Power), Modi proclaimed that India would continue to oppose the placement of weapons and any kind of arms race in Outer Space.31 Obviously, countries without ASAT-weapon capabilities will see China’s and India’s proclamations as no more than tongue-in-cheek expressions of good global citizenry. However, there is so far no universally-fair, or even a partisan, Space treaty banning the testing of ASAT weapons and the launching of other types of ballistic missiles. It was, therefore, difficult for China to condemn India for its successful anti-satellite test. Unsurprisingly, Modi assertively portrayed India’s indigenous ASAT 32 test as a guarantor of his country’s national security vis-à-vis China and the broader international community. He attributed the ASAT success to India’s scientists and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)33 which, like the other Indian institutions, is often criticised for falling short of the people’s expectations. A Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) interceptor, successfully developed by the DRDO as part of India’s ongoing BMD programme, was used in this ASAT test.34 Beijing conducted an ASAT test in January 2007 and the US as far back as in 1959. Russia is also known to have carried out an ASAT test for national security MOD, PRC, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-03/28/content_4838446.htm (accessed on 28 March 2019). 31  MEA, GOI, see https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31180/Speech_by_ Prime_Minister_on_Mission_Shakti_Indias_Anti-Satellite_Missile_test_conducted_on_27_ March_2019 (accessed on 27 March 2019). 32  MEA, GOI, op. cit. (on ‘Mission Shakti’) (accessed on 27 March 2019). 33  At the time of India’s ASAT test, the country’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was headed by G Satheesh Reddy, an expert on tactical and strategic missile systems and ballistic missile defence. For his profile, see Ministry of Defence (MOD), GOI, Release ID: 183070, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=33 (accessed on 30 August 2018). 34  For the DRDO’s role in India’s ASAT test, see MEA, GOI, https://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/31179/Frequently_Asked_Questions_on_Mission_Shakti_Indias_ AntiSatellite_Missile_test_conducted_on_27_March_2019 (accessed on 28 March 2019). 30 

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purposes. By this reckoner, the US, Russia, China, and India are in the elite league of “global space powers” — a view emphasised by Modi. It is, therefore, evident that India seeks its inclusion in the big league that might set global norms for international competition and cooperation at the final frontier, Outer Space. As for China, the PLA, as noted earlier, has a Strategic Support Force to harness the country’s space and cyber capabilities. Moreover, a scholarly view is that “the establishment of a unit to command space forces appears to signal that China’s space capabilities have reached a level of sophistication warranting their full integration into Chinese war-fighting”.35 India, too, is raising a “Defence Space Agency” with an apparent mandate to match the name.36 China’s first ASAT test signalled a stupendous (even if only a potential) challenge to the US along the final military frontier, Outer Space. This prompted Washington to regard China’s first successful ASAT test as America’s “second Sputnik moment”. It was the erstwhile Soviet Union which, on 4 October 1957, launched the Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite to orbit the earth. Stirred by that momentous event, the US took off as a space-faring colossus. Despite the massive American strides in Outer Space since then, Washington became cognisant of the military significance of the ‘second Sputnik moment’. In 2007, China destroyed “a spacecraft that was flying as fast — 7.42km per second — as an intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] re-entering the earth’s atmosphere”.37 In simpler terms, Beijing demonstrated its abilities to destroy incoming ICBMs that might be directed against it by its adversaries. Under Xi, China has sustained its diplomacy of smart power of this kind. The dividing line between diplomacy and defence becomes thin in matters concerning deterrence. China and India have also been acting as if the preservation of their respective national security is in itself a global good. However, it was not K. Pollpeter, Space, the new domain: Space operations and Chinese military reforms, in Reshaping the Chinese Military: The PLA’s Roles and Missions in the Xi Jinping Era, Edited by Richard A. Bitzinger and James Char, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, and New York, 2019, p. 154. 36  MOD, GOI, Release ID: 189899 at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=33 (accessed on 6 May 2019). 37  A. Tellis, ‘China’s Military Space Policy’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Volume 49, Number 3, Autumn 2007, IISS, pp. 41–42. 35 

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possible for China in 2007 and India in 2019 to present their respective ASAT test as a global good. An alarming reason is the dangerous Space debris that any country’s ASAT test creates for all of humanity.38 It was for this reason that Modi emphasised that his country’s ASAT test “does not violate any international law or treaty obligation to which India is a party”.39 Within these constraints, Modi depicted India’s ASAT test in 2019 as an instrument of diplomacy of smart power towards China. According to him, “[a] strong India can be a guarantor of peace in the [Asian] region and beyond”. He may have been guided by the fact that, increasingly, the assured security of major powers is being accepted as a factor of peace and stability in the global commons. Significantly in this context, a relevant and long-enduring reality has been the fact of China as Asia’s native military power with dominant capabilities. In view of this reality, the US, under President Donald Trump, renamed the Asia–Pacific region as the Indo-Pacific to enhance America’s strategic focus on China and co-opt India for this purpose. For decades before this development, the US military emphatically viewed itself as a “resident power” in Asia, more precisely in the Asia–Pacific region.40 Despite such US–China predominance in Asia, Modi has, in a not-so-subtle way, identified China as the real focus of India’s ASAT test. Furthermore, Modi also asserted that Delhi’s “strategic objective is to preserve peace, not prepare for war”.41 Contrast this with Xi’s exhortation, noted earlier, that the PLA should “concentrate on war preparedness”. In effect, therefore, Modi is signalling to Xi that India is now catching up with China in deploying Space for national security. Modi’s corollary is that India is preparing for a more assured deterrence of China — an aspect of diplomacy of smart power. Despite India’s assurances about its ASAT test in 2019, the US closely monitored the space debris created by that test. For the space debris caused by China’s ASAT test in 2007, see IISS, The Military Balance 2008, p. 359. 39  MEA, GOI, op. cit. (on ‘Mission Shakti’), (accessed on 27 March 2019). 40  In May 2008, the then US Defence Secretary Robert Gates categorically proclaimed his country as a “resident” Asia–Pacific power. He did so while addressing the 7th IISS Asia Security Summit in Singapore. The author of this book, then a journalist, was present at the Summit. 41  MEA, GOI, op. cit. (On ‘Mission Shakti’), (accessed on 27 March 2019). 38 

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What are the space-based assets in this China–India equation? China’s military and civil-military satellites totalled 103 in 2018.42 India’s tally was, according to one estimate, no more than 12 in the same year.43 However, another independent estimate placed India’s Space assets at a more robust figure of 42 satellites in 2016 itself.44 Authentic official data are hard to come by. Regardless of these numbers, the fact remains that China and India have come to view Space as a frontier of national security. On balance, however, the message from both India and China regarding their respective nuclearand space-capabilities in the military realms is much the same — the diplomacy of smart power.

New Shades of Financial Smart Power The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a new multilateral financial institution, is a cooperative venture pioneered by China and avidly supported by India. Delhi’s objectives in doing so are to acquire funds for its huge infrastructure needs and to team up with Beijing for some diplomacy of smart power in a vital area of the global commons. China and India rank first and second in holding the AIIB’s capital. At this writing, the bank is still boycotted by the US and Japan, despite both being India’s strategic partners. Interestingly, it was in Mumbai, India, in 2015, that representatives of 26 Asian countries first met to discuss the draft AIIB Charter. Later in that year (May), the draft of Articles of Agreement was accepted by 57 countries at a meeting in Singapore. In June 2015, 50 countries signed the AIIB Charter in Beijing, the other seven doing so later in the same year. Boasting an initial membership of 37 Asian countries and 20 non-Asian countries, the bank was formally launched in Beijing in January 2016.45 With each of these

The Military Balance 2019, Routledge for IISS, United Kingdom, February 2019, p. 257. Ibid., p. 267. 44  India’s tally of 42 satellites is cited by Sanjay Badri-Maharaj in his Indian Nuclear Strategy: Confronting the Potential Threat from both China and Pakistan, KW Publishers, New Delhi, 2019, p. 198. 45  N. Lichtenstein, A Comparative Guide to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2018, p. 2. 42  43 

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two categories consisting of both developed and developing economies, the bank could not have expected a brighter beginning. Outlining the institution’s core principles, AIIB President Jin Liqun wrote in 2018 that, from the outset, the founders “were not aiming for a bank that would be dominated by one or a few members”. Noting that the “AIIB was born expeditiously, carrying the DNA of its founders”, Jin Liqun elaborated as follows: “The bank would rest upon multilateralism and international cooperation. It would be inclusive, innovative, efficient and costeffective. It would be built on trust and partnership. It should remain in the gene pool of the [multilateral development banks] MDB family, but by no means should it become a clone of the existing members”.46 As the newest among the MDBs, the AIIB should, in his view, “represent the new [21st] century”, while closely collaborating with the well-established institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. China and India are also the founding members of the New Development Bank (NDB) floated by a mini-intercontinental forum that consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). With India initially placing the idea of such a bank on the BRICS agenda and with China becoming proactive in this regard, the NDB came into existence at about the same time as the AIIB. Surely, the AIIB has capitalised on its larger international support and reputation, in the face of American opposition, and overshadowed the NDB. Nonetheless, these two institutions represent a Sino-Indian collaborative effort in an area of diplomacy of smart power. In yet another financial sector, Modi outlined, at a meeting in Singapore in June 2018, how his government was using digital technology to reach out to the Indian masses for their national identity cards, bank accounts, etc. However, India is yet to demonstrate how it can leverage its domestic skills in financial technology to help other countries in their fin-tech domains. Such a caveat in just one emerging area does not negate the fact of new waves in the China–India competition: the diplomacy of smart power as portrayed in this chapter. Here, it bears repetition that both China and India do not actually claim that they practise diplomacy of smart power as rising powers. Yet, this attribute may eventually shape their ties in this 21st century.

Ibid., p. vi.

46 

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CHAPTER 10

TOWARDS A POST-MODERN ORDER

Relevance of Sino-Indian Tipping Point China’s dramatic rise in the early decades of the 21st century revealed the need for imaginative reform of the global governance system. The novel Corona Virus Disease (COVID-19), which hit the world in early-2020, has added a sense of urgency. So, as the idea of a post-COVID world order gains momentum, the elusive tipping point in China–India diplomacy becomes a more relevant factor than before. Actually, the summit-level “informal meetings” between China and India in 2018 and 2019 had raised some hope. But, by design or default, their unyielding military hostility in 2020 caused much concern to both sides. Going forward, if they do not wage a power struggle in Asia, the positive tipping point in their interactions for global good will become less elusive.

Ambitious leaders of major powers often aspire to create a new world order or reform an existing global system. Sometimes such a task becomes an existential necessity. The dawn of the 70th anniversary of PRC–India diplomacy in April 2020 coincided with a defining moment in world affairs. Many attributed this to the global impact of Corona Virus Disease (COVID19, hereinafter, COVID) which was first detected and reported in China in late-2019. Of course, a trend towards a post-modern order was evident before the pandemic exposed an apparent existential-need for reform. Unlike previous pandemics, COVID-19 caused a phenomenal disruption in global travel and trade, sparking calls for a new order. 193

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In any case, an increasingly powerful China is inclined to re-imagine the world order and lead it, if necessary. Beijing’s ambitions can be de-coded from its discourse on “win–win” inter-state cooperation in a “new era” of Chinese rejuvenation.1 COVID did not deflect Chinese President Xi Jinping from the goals for 2021 and 2049 — moderate national prosperity, and PRC’s world-class strength in all fields, respectively.2 A dissatisfied India, too, wants to reform the world and play a bigger role. As of this writing, PRC and India, led by Xi and Narendra Modi, respectively, espouse these ambitions. The signs in this regard are easy to detect. PRC is eager to shape a global “community of shared destiny”. Xi expressed this sentiment in benign terms after the COVID outbreak, as already observed.3 In his view, the world is a common place for people who share weal and woe. These ideas require a firm institutional structure to be effective. He seems aware, as reflected in the institutions he is creating. But his work is far from over. Modi has also called for reforms of existing international and multilateral institutions like the United Nations, World Trade Organisation, etc. A high-ranking Indian official T. S. Tirumurti draws attention to Modi’s focus on the need for “reformed multilateralism”.4 PRC and India are likely to sustain their ambitions to shape a post-modern world order. A post-modern world may be boosted by scientific smart power. As a nuance, modernity has been driven by the power of conventional sciences.5 We have seen how PRC and India seek to exercise diplomacy of smart power (Chapter 9). Such diplomacy will help them aspire for their individual niche roles in a post-modern world order. Our focus in this chapter is the elusive tipping point in a concerted Sino-Indian diplomacy for a new order. Beijing’s catch-phrases for its new diplomacy are dime a dozen, as it were, and can be gleaned from official statements. 2  COVID struck China ahead of its two centenary celebrations — 100th birthday of the longgoverning Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2021, and PRC’s 100th anniversary in 2049. 3  MFA, PRC, President Xi Jinping Writes a Reply Letter to Bill Gates 2020/02/22, https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1748335.shtml (accessed on 23 February 2020). 4  MEA, GOI, Transcript of Media Briefing by Secretary (ER) On Prime Minister’s visit to Brazil for BRICS Summit (November 13–14, 2019) November 14, 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/mediabriefings.htm?dtl/32044/Transcript_of_Media_Briefing_by_Secretary_ER_On_Prime_Ministers_ visit_to_Brazil_for _BRICS_Summit_November_1314_2019 (accessed on 13 December 2019). 5  The distinction between scientific smart power and conventional sciences is understood by many people through their personal experiences of using ‘smart’ devices. 1 

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We have elaborately observed how the PRC–India bilateral equation is affected by their differences and disputes. I have also explored a few solutions to address this equation in the light of strategic and practical considerations (Chapter 8). But it is for Beijing and Delhi themselves to resolve their strategic disputes and sovereignty claims. Positive momentum towards a tipping point for PRC–India good neighbourliness was, therefore, elusive at the start of the 70th anniversary of their diplomacy. Their military hostility in 2020 worsened the crisis of confidence in their relations. Having drawn this conclusion, let me focus on Sino-Indian divergence and convergence on some issues of global good. First, a peep at history in this regard.

China–India ‘Tipping Point’ History The first phase in a PRC–India ‘quest’ to reform the world order could be traced to early-1950s. Until both sides got disillusioned later in the same decade, anti-colonial and civilisational idealism animated the vibrant phase. They enunciated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1954.6 The Soviet-American Cold War had already polarised the world into communist and capitalist blocs. India’s “non-alignment” was yet to take a firm shape. So, Sino-Indian protagonists saw ‘peaceful coexistence’ as the creative core of a model for relations between countries with different political and social systems.7 But in late-1950s, the PRC–India diplomacy worsened due to the flareup of their latent boundary dispute. In addition, Beijing’s suspicions about Delhi’s ‘complicity’ in Tibet’s revolt against PRC in 1959 compounded the Sino-Indian crisis. Critics were quick to see the Five Principles in poor light. The enduring criticism is that Mao and Zhou designed these Principles as a smokescreen to mislead Nehru. In 2017, a former Indian diplomat K. P. Fabian wrote that Mao had “wanted to lull India into believing in China’s benevolent and pacific intentions”.8 Critics argue that PRC violated these Principles and secretly built a strategic road through Aksai Chin, claimed by As already outlined, the Five Principles are: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equal and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. 7  Popular in mid-1950s was the ‘Hindi-Chini bhai bhai’ (India–China brotherhood) slogan. 8  K. P. Fabian, Talking ties, Book Review in Frontline (Print Edition), 7 July 2017. 6 

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India, in the same decade. As a result, India’s initial enthusiasm waned but did not lead to a rejection of the Five Principles. By the third decade of the 21st century, these Principles figure among PRC’s building blocks for a “win–win” world order. This is not surprising. According to Han Nianlong, China’s former Acting Foreign Minister, these Principles were conceived, from the beginning, as a universal code, not a mere PRC–India talisman. Zhou and Nehru “jointly proposed” in 1954 that the “Principles of Peaceful Coexistence be applied not only to Sino-Indian relations but to international relations in general”.9 In fact, the two leaders upheld this universal code at the Asia–Africa summit in Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955. But these Principles did not provide positive momentum towards a tipping point for concerted Sino-Indian action for global good. Nehru’s India and Mao’s China did not have adequate national strength to project collective influence in the international arena. Moreover, the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and PRC’s decade-long Cultural Revolution, until 1976, put the clock back on any notion of Delhi– Beijing cooperation. But, in December 1988, China’s elderly Deng Xiaoping and India’s younger Rajiv Gandhi rose above their generation gap. They agreed on the need for a new international political order and a complementary economic order. But, as we have observed, they wanted to make their “own contributions” — code for individual national action.10 In any case, two major events left little room for a concerted Sino-Indian move for global good at that time. PRC was ‘isolated’ on the world stage for several years following Deng’s forceful action against ‘pro-democracy’ campaigners among his compatriots in 1989. India, too, needed a few years to regain its international standing after testing nuclear weapons in 1998. However, from 1993 to 2013, India and China took several confidence-building measures. Bilateral relations improved. This set the stage for a new opportunity in SinoIndian ties for global good. By 2014, one could sense the second phase in a concerted Sino-Indian diplomacy for global good. Xi and Modi emerged as the protagonists who H. Nianlong, Editor-in-Chief, Diplomacy of Contemporary China, New Horizon Press, Chai Wan, Hong Kong, 1990, p. 214. 10  MFA, PRC, Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique (Beijing, 23 December 1988), https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2711_663426/ 2712_663428/t15913.shtml (accessed on 18 February 2019). 9 

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might take their countries towards the potential tipping point. They first met on the margins of BRICS summit at Fortaleza (Brazil) on 14 July 2014.11 Xi told Modi: “If China and India speak with one voice, the whole world will listen. If China and India join hands in cooperation, the whole world will watch”.12 We know, this was not the first time that the PRC–India potential for global good was aired. On 18 September 1957, Mao welcomed the then Indian Vice President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, globally-recognised philosopher-statesman, in Beijing. Radhakrishnan said: the world would notice if PRC and India could work together. Mao was convinced, but said some countries did not like that.13 At that time, few foresaw the 1962 Sino-Indian war, in which India felt traumatised by its civilisational neighbour’s “aggression”.14 But, in discouraging India in 1957, just three years after the heady Five Principles, Mao saw realpolitik hurdles. He saw Cold War allies, US and Japan, as likely opponents of a PRC–India link-up. In contrast, in 2014, Xi displayed confidence about riding the new global realpolitik. He was encouraged by the gradual emergence of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), among other factors. China was the predominant prime mover in both these organisations. SCO welcomed India as a full-fledged member in 2018, but Delhi was a proactive founder of BRICS. By 2014, PRC and India were also members of G20 — a collective group of established and emerging economic powerhouses, numbering twenty in As already noted, BRICS is a forum consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 12  MFA, PRC, Xi Jinping Meets with Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, 2014/07/15, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1175135.shtml (accessed on 16 July 2014). 13  For an eye-witness account of the meeting between Mao Zedong and S. Radhakrishnan in Beijing in 1957, see: K. Natwar Singh, My China Diary 1956-88, Rupa & Co, New Delhi, 2009, p. 74. I have also briefly referred to the Mao–Radhakrishnan meeting in my Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China–India Synergy, World Century Publishing Corporation, Hackensack, New Jersey, USA, 2016. 14  Neither PRC nor India has fully publicized their respective official accounts of the 1962 war. For non-official interpretations, see: John Garver and Neville Maxwell (both cited in Chapter 1); and C. V. Ranganathan and V. C. Khanna, India and China: The Way Ahead After “Mao’s India War”, Har-Anand Publications, New Delhi, 2000. 11 

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all. G20 was a potential governing council to keep the global economy on track. This was the context when Xi and Modi met for the first time as national leaders — albeit on the side-lines of the BRICS summit in 2014. Earlier, at the BRICS summit in 2012, India had proposed the formation of a South-South financial institution for regional good. India’s then External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna told me: “The setting up of a BRICS-led South-South bank would…. supplement the effort of other multilateral institutions in meeting the investment requirement of BRICS and other developing countries”.15 For this purpose, Xi and Modi, meeting at Fortaleza in 2014, agreed to launch the New Development Bank (NDB) as a South-South institution. Other leaders of BRICS were also privy to the decision to form NDB. However, the greater economic importance of PRC and India, though in that descending order, catalysed the NDB decision. Separately, at Fortaleza, Modi welcomed Xi’s mega-proposal of starting the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Xi invited India as a stakeholder, next to China, at this pioneer bank. Why? India’s slow but steady emergence as an Asian economic powerhouse might help propel other developing countries. India and PRC have not publicly fallen out at either NDB or AIIB, at this writing. Yet, in 2019, India’s last-minute refusal to sign a regional trade pact dimmed Sino-Indian collaboration for global good. The pact was actually conceived by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). But India did not like the perceived prospect of getting swamped by China’s economic expansionism under this regional pact. The drift has been sharpened by differences in Sino-Indian commercial and economic ties. Chronologically, the China–India “closer development partnership” was another of Xi’s proposals which Modi accepted at Fortaleza in 2014.16 This partnership remained in force by 2020. Neither side seems satisfied. P. S. Suryanarayana, Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China–India Synergy, World Century Publishing Corporation, Hackensack, New Jersey, USA, 2016, p. 201. 16  Xi’s various proposals, in his talks with Modi at Fortaleza (Brazil) in July 2014, are sourced from PRC’s MFA and Xinhua. In September of the same year, PRC and India formally launched “closer development partnership” when Xi and Modi met in Delhi amid tensions along the disputed Sino-Indian boundary. 15 

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India is dissatisfied with its chronic trade imbalance with China. This has been caused mainly by the stronger and competitive Chinese manufacturing base and some non-tariff issues. Updated, India’s trade deficit with China, when Modi decided against signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2019, was US$54 billion. However, India’s trade deficit with all 14 other RCEP countries was less, at about US$51 billion.17 On the other hand, PRC is dissatisfied with its inability to become the leading investor in India. Delhi’s national security considerations and tight economic regulations are often seen by Beijing as hurdles. On 20 April 2020, after the onset of the 70th anniversary of Sino-Indian diplomacy, China complained against “additional barriers” in India for “investors from specific countries”.18 But India’s aim was different. Delhi, it was reported, did not want external takeovers of distressed Indian firms during the COVID crisis. Unofficial findings showed that China’s actual and ‘committed’ investments by 2020 were of the order of US$26 billion.19 Criticising India’s move, Beijing said the actual cumulative Chinese investments in India by December 2019 totalled more than US$8 billion. India’s “mobile phones, household electrical appliances, infrastructure and automobile” sectors were cited as beneficiaries of Chinese investments. Hinting that India should, therefore, be more open-minded, China emphasised the need for Sino-Indian “win–win cooperation”.20

Facets of Multilateralism “Win–win cooperation” is China’s mantra of multilateralism. In the universal sense, multilateralism means globalisation — i.e. worldwide system of institutions, norms, and inter-state cooperation in the global commons. In the exclusive sense, multilateralism is a similar system that applies only to coalitions of willing countries. United Nations and almost all its organs, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Health Organisation Official data for India’s trade imbalance with China varies from time to time. Chinese Embassy in India, Statement on Indian investment policy adjustment by Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in India Counselor Ji Rong 2020/04/20, http://in.china-embassy.org (accessed on 24 April 2020). 19  An estimate of Chinese investments in India is by journalist-researcher Ananth Krishnan. 20  Chinese Embassy in India, op. cit. 17  18 

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(WHO), World Trade Organisation (WTO), etc. showcase universal multilateralism. Asian Development Bank, AIIB, BRICS, NDB, SCO, etc. exemplify exclusive multilateralism. G20 is in a unique category that blends both exclusive and universal multilateralism. Seemingly, this compact group, consisting of established and emerging economies, can only have self-centred responsibilities. But G20 has a universal mandate to keep the global economy on course through suitable corrective actions. Another institution with both exclusive and universal multilateralism is the Permanent Five (P5), an elite caucus within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Although the caucus has only five permanent members, their mandate is to ensure universal peace and security. The mandate includes maintenance of peace and security among P5 members as well. P5 members are: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia (Soviet Union until 1991), and People’s Republic of China (pre-PRC Chinese regime i.e. later-day Taiwan, until 1971). The original P5 members, each seen as a full-fledged sovereign state in 1945, were the ‘main’ winners of the Second World War, arguably on behalf of all humanity. For that reason, each P5 member was armed with the veto right, a privilege denied to all other UN members from the beginning. The individual votes of all UN members collectively shape a decision. But no member outside P5 can veto the collective will of even the majority at UN. Surely, therefore, P5 does not conform to UN’s overall democratic character. PRC and Russia — P5 members from 1971 and 1991, respectively — are also armed with the veto power.21 Unsurprisingly, P5 is often viewed as the Privileged Five rather than Permanent Five with a unique mandate. The geopolitics of global security is the cause of such a negative perception of P5. In this context, several other countries aspire to reshape P5 as a larger and globally-representative caucus. India, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa, to name a few, are in this aspiring league. But their individual and collective aspirations can be held ‘hostage’ by one or more ‘wilful’ P5 members. For India in this regard, PRC is the country to watch, in particular. The strategic circumstances in which PRC and Russia became P5 members fall outside the scope of this chapter. In 1971, PRC took China’s UN seat, held by the pre-PRC Chinese regime until then. In 1991, Russia was recognized as the disintegrating Soviet Union’s successor-state. 21 

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Critics may see this as a mild understatement. Yet, the point to note is that P5 is a unique multilateral institution which India is keen to reform, enlarge and join. An interesting aspect of PRC’s profile at UN must be noted. PRC has often described itself as the world body’s founding member, although it took China’s seat only in 1971. PRC’s ‘One-China’ principle subsumes pre-PRC regime i.e. later-day Taiwan which occupied the Chinese seat at the UN until 1971. Furthermore, the Communist Party of China was represented in the original Chinese delegation to the talks on the formation of the UN in 1945. As for PRC’s privileges as a P5 member, Xi put them in ‘perspective’ in a conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 8 May 2020. Xi said China and Russia made “indelible contributions” in Asia and Europe during the Second World War, “saving mankind from demise”. Therefore, “as major victors” in the Second World War and UNSC permanent members, China and Russia “shoulder the special mission” of “maintaining the international order”, Xi emphasised.22 This international order, created after Second World War, is under review in several quarters, especially after the spread of the COVID pandemic in 2020. PRC and India had already placed ‘global good’, too, on their agenda following the Xi–Modi “informal meetings” in 2018 and 2019 (Chapters 2 and 4). Yet, paradoxically, the two countries did not appear to have coordinated their anti-COVID actions globally, at this writing.23 In my view, the strategic reason was China’s evolving assessment of the rising trajectory of the US–India “global” diplomacy. At one level, the Sino-Indian all-weather dialogue was not affected by the Doklam and Kashmir crises in 2017 and 2019. At another level, though, the display of bonhomie between US President Donald Trump and Modi, during the former’s visit to India in February 2020, was remarkable. According to C. Raja Mohan, a veteran observer of the US–India relationship, the two countries appear keen to seize opportunities for strategic convergence through such diplomacy. In these circumstances, one can expect China to take serious note of the future trajectory of the US–India diplomacy.

MFA, PRC, President Xi Jinping Speaks by Phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin 2020/05/08 (accessed on 15 May 2020). 23  Xi and Modi exchanged letters on COVID and separately spoke to leaders of a number of countries. 22 

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Equally important, PRC and India differ on multilateralism, which is the means to global good. By and large, China prefers several existing institutions including, especially, those it has pioneered. Indeed, Beijing conceptualised and created AIIB, SCO, and Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF). Preferring P5 and resisting its expansion, China would also want to retain the veto privilege. These are institutions where China has either a privileged status or a leading voice. Beijing has certainly shown bias towards the existing institutions like P5, AIIB, SCO, BRF, and WHO. A significant nuance should not be missed, though. Xi’s diplomacy has revealed his equal bias for re-imagining several other institutions as platforms for “win–win” inter-state cooperation. Such institutions include IMF and WTO, which do not reflect China’s economic strength in the global order, at this writing. Critics argue that China’s principle of “win–win cooperation” does not guarantee equal benefits for all concerned. Beijing has been accused of practising ‘debt trap diplomacy’ to execute Chinese-aided ‘Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)’ projects in partner-states. But there is no such wrong-doing of forcing partner-states to become indebted to China, counters Beijing. Yet, a few countries have certainly unseated their seemingly pro-China governments. On balance, independent empirical studies are scarce. Far from conclusive is the evidence for or against China’s “win–win” proposition.24 This is not surprising, because the whole issue got enmeshed in contestation in several quarters by the beginning of third decade in the 21st century. PRC’s vote for multilateralism became more emphatic after the US suspected that Beijing and WHO colluded to downplay the ‘origin’ and likely global impact of COVID in early-2020. The US suspended its funding of WHO. In contrast, China announced a grant of US$20 million and a top-up of US$30 million to help WHO play its mandated role better. On 23 April 2020, a PRC spokesperson said: “China’s $30 million cash donation to the WHO that I just announced is to support the global fight against

P. B. Rana, Chia Wai-Mun, Jason Ji Xianbai, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Perception Survey of Asian Opinion Leaders, RSIS Working Paper WP325, 25 November 2019, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/ cms/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-a-perception-survey-of-asian-opinion-leaders/#. Xqmns25uIn8. 24 

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COVID-19 and strengthen developing countries’ health systems. It has nothing to do with our annual contribution”.25 The Chinese spokesperson had earlier equated WHO with global multilateralism. He said: “To support WHO is to uphold the status and role of the UN, [and] champion the vision and principles of multilateralism”.26 What are the “vision and principles”? From various authoritative sources, it is clear that China’s “vision” of multilateralism is a global “community of shared destiny”. Under Xi, Beijing’s “principles of multilateralism” amount to “win–win cooperation” in the “new era” of Chinese “national rejuvenation”. Pursuing the multilateral “vision” and “principles”, China launched a high-profile campaign of helping other countries to combat COVID. Surely, therefore, PRC is bidding for global leadership in a possible post-COVID world order.27 The Chinese campaign for global leadership coincided with the dawn of the 70th anniversary of the PRC–India diplomacy in April 2020. A comparison between these two civilisational neighbours is, therefore, inevitable. In contrast to China’s emphatic renewal of commitment to multilateralism, India prefers “reformed multilateralism”. This means an Indian preference for a thorough review of all major institutions, with an eye on the possibility of creating a post-COVID world order. America and India are among potential partners to craft such a new global order. By mid-May 2020, just ahead of COVID-delayed annual ‘political sessions’ in Beijing, China claimed victory in rolling back and containing the disease. By then, neither the US nor India was ready with any proposal for a globally-representative post-COVID world order or a global coalition of like-minded countries. Both the US and India were caught in their own COVID crises, with America facing a presidential poll later in the MFA, PRC, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on April 23, 2020. (2020/04/23). He was responding to Press Trust of India’s China Correspondent K. J. M. Varma. 26  MFA, PRC, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on April 21, 2020 (2020/04/21). 27  Illustratively, China’s aspiration to lead a possible post-COVID world order was evident almost on a daily basis in April 2020. Chinese officials refuted the reported criticisms by some US leaders about Beijing’s ‘lack of transparency’ in handling the skyrocketing COVID crisis in its initial stage. 25 

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same year. But unlike the US and China, India is not a contender for potential global leadership in a possible post-COVID configuration. Nonetheless, Delhi is not expected to stand on the side-lines and lose a possible chance to become a key rule-maker in a post-COVID dispensation.

Issues and Institutions that Matter Xi and Modi may have placed ‘global good’ on their agenda, but they have not agreed to act in concert to address any universal concern. Their “informal meetings” in 2018 and 2019 were focused on deep bilateral concerns rather than specific issues in global governance. This does not mean that India and China have acted independently on the global stage all the time. A significant episode of PRC–India cooperation unfolded at the Climate Summit in Copenhagen (Denmark) in December 2009. Shyam Saran, a veteran diplomat and India’s expert on Climate Talks, has a vivid narrative on “One Long Day in Copenhagen”. He recalls how India’s then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh supported the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in efforts to safeguard “the interests of developing countries”.28 Gradually after 2009, China (under Xi) and later India (under Modi) contributed to the evolution of the Paris Climate Accord that was reached in December 2015. Sino-Indian focus on the interests of developing countries on climate issues has not disappeared. But diplomats on both sides have identified the pre-COVID economic progress of China, compared to India, as a new factor in global governance. In terms of a basic index, China’s Gross Domestic Product is of the order of US$14 trillion, while India’s is less than US$3 trillion, as of this writing. A question raised, not just in India but also at WTO, is whether PRC can still be regarded as a developing country in global governance. But China has repeatedly bracketed itself with India as the two most-populous developing countries and emerging economies. These generic issues will be relevant to governance in a possible post-COVID world order, too. PRC and India are not the only stake-holders for the reform of WTO, WHO, World Bank, IMF, etc. However, these two countries are key to the S. Saran, How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century, Juggernaut Books, New Delhi, 2017. pp. 240–257. 28 

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progress of AIIB, SCO, and NDB. Of these, both SCO and AIIB, while being multilateral institutions, owe much to China’s initiative. NDB is generally seen as an Indian idea. A relevant question is whether AIIB should be reformed to become a key fund-provider for projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).29 As we have already noted, India views itself as a conscientious opponent of BRI. Of late, China, too, has more or less ceased to ask or persuade India to participate in the BRI enterprise.30 Moreover, there is a view that India does not necessarily cooperate with China in seeking global-governance reform.31 This is certainly true insofar as China sees BRI as a public good in the global commons. So, hypothetically, AIIB’s reform can be one test of whether PRC and India can move towards a tipping point in their cooperation for a new order. We know that India and China have not allowed their perceptions and agendas to affect AIIB, at this writing. However, should America and China remain antagonistic, Beijing may prefer a robust reform of AIIB for a new global governance framework. Any such endeavour will reflect China’s postCOVID worldview. If so, India’s attitude will be relevant to China and vice versa. On NDB, too, Delhi has already noticed a potential Chinese move to widen the bank’s profile, according to a senior Indian official. The other members of BRICS may not necessarily share India’s perspective on Chinese moves on such matters. It appears that issues of this kind surfaced at, or on the margins, of a BRICS summit in Brazil in 2019.32 As for SCO, its functioning as a regional security organisation has not been hindered by PRC–India differences over BRI. In the third decade of the 21st century, however, China is expected to intensify its efforts towards “national rejuvenation” in all respects. If so, a reform of all Chinese initiatives to suit a post-COVID situation can be expected. India’s attitude, as China’s neighbour and a real or potential competitor, will matter.

For a study of BRI as an enterprise, read Joel Wuthnow, China’s Belt and Road: One Initiative, Three Strategies — a chapter in China’s Expanding Strategic Ambitions, Edited by Ashley J Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle and Washington DC, USA, 2019, pp. 212–245. 30  A high-ranking Chinese diplomat’s informal conversation with me in June 2019. 31  A high-ranking Chinese diplomat’s informal conversation with me in September 2018. 32  A senior Indian official’s informal conversation with me in December 2019. 29 

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The economic disparity between PRC and India is known (our focus in this book is geopolitics). They can move towards a tipping point to create a new order only if they could resolve their bilateral disputes and cooperate for global good. For this, in my view, PRC and India must also address their external linkages. What does this mean? Pakistan remains China’s external link of utmost interest to India, at this writing. We have elaborately discussed this aspect. China is expected to intensify its engagement with Pakistan, especially about the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The Corridor is China’s geostrategic passage to the Arabian Sea and further south to the Indian Ocean, through Pakistan. For CPEC security, China will be keen that India and Pakistan settle the Kashmir issue in a manner that would leave CPEC unaffected. From mid2020, the de facto dividing line between India’s Union Territory of Ladakh (UTL) and the Chinese-administered Aksai Chin became a zone of serious Sino-Indian contest. Furthermore, Beijing has begun to emphatically brand the entire UTL as an “illegal” entity, a view that Delhi flatly rejects. In contrast, Beijing continues to hail CPEC which India rejected ab initio. So, Beijing’s stakes in CPEC and at the UTL-Aksai Chin ‘divide’ reveal the Chinese manoeuvre for a key role in shaping and/or solving the Kashmir issue. By third decade of the 21st century, US is India’s external link of utmost interest to China. Domestic politics in America, and to a lesser extent in India, may change this reality before the end of this decade. But the US will perhaps remain India’s key external link if Beijing and Washington do not rise above their disputes over trade, technology, and global public health. The Sino-US equation is probably becoming more complex than any other bilateral relationship in global strategic affairs. In 2014, China had proposed to America that they practise “non-confrontation, nonconflict, mutual respect, and win–win cooperation” to promote global good.33 Washington did not reciprocate in the manner Beijing might have expected. But some saw these principles as the possible building blocks for a potential Sino-US Group of Two (G2) at the apex of a world order. A US–China G2 did not emerge. Moreover, in the initial stage of The White House (US), Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping in Joint Press Conference, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, 12 November 2014, available at White House website. 33 

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the COVID crisis in 2020, Beijing remained silent on these principles while facing criticism from Washington. This was seen as a sign of worsening Sino-US ties. In this new context, the Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi surprisingly reaffirmed these principles on 24 May 2020. In a balancing act, though, he also emphasised that some forces in the US were “pushing” Sino-American ties to “the brink of a new Cold War”.34 In a sense, such a COVID-time sparring between the US and China is relevant to SinoIndian diplomacy, too. Beijing knows that the US–India strategic partnership, with a “comprehensive global” focus, might become a factor in shaping a post-COVID geopolitical chessboard.35 Even beyond the US presidential poll in 2020, Beijing would be keen to monitor and respond to Washington’s interactions with Delhi and vice versa.

Strategic Relativity in PRC–India Ties Relevant to this scenario is Indo-Pacific, a vast maritime space covering much of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is a geostrategic theatre, whose name itself is not acceptable to Beijing, which prefers Asia–Pacific, instead, as a home turf. With a clear focus on China as the country to watch, Washington has conceptualised Indo-Pacific as a geostrategic and geo-economic theatre. For Delhi, however, Indo-Pacific offers an opportunity to grow up as a major regional and global player. In this milieu, China may see a few silver linings, too. Washington and Delhi have not set a realistic Indo-Pacific goal — either ‘containment’ of China, or its ‘inclusion’ for universal good in the global commons. India itself is a member of two groups, one of which does not collectively endorse the Indo-Pacific idea. The Russia–India–China (RIC) forum, pioneered by post-Soviet Kremlin in the 1990s, has been useful to India to explore avenues for a multi-polar world order. But China and Russia in RIC do not endorse Indo-Pacific at all. Worth Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s televised press conference during the country’s COVID-delayed annul political sessions in Beijing on 24 May 2020 — monitored by me in Singapore. 35  In February 2020, the US-India diplomatic equation was elevated to the status of “Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership”. 34 

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noting, in this context, is a point emphasised in discussions behind the scenes at the 9th Xiangshan Forum, China’s defence-diplomacy venue, in Beijing in October 2019. RIC was seen to have established for itself a “geopolitical basis” in a “multi-polar” context, despite “some differences” between China and India.36 Because of China’s and Russia’s aversion to the Indo-Pacific idea as a US ‘ploy’ against them, RIC is not focused on this geostrategic theatre. China and Russia have built an intimate geostrategic relationship in the 21st century, and hope to sustain the momentum. India and Russia, too, have a “privileged” partnership, a carry-over from the Indo-Soviet treaty which was fashioned during a critical phase in the Cold War. However, both Sino-Russian and Russo-Indian partnerships will come under fresh light if the US becomes a prime mover for global governance in a post-COVID situation. Delhi is present in the Japan–America–India (JAI) forum, too. Conceptualised by Tokyo, JAI (Indian terminology) can help promote infrastructure projects in Asia and Africa. This need not necessarily be seen as undermining China’s BRI agenda. In any case, the Japan–India outreach to Africa has not set the Nile on fire (as the old metaphor goes). Yet, at the Xiangshan Forum, cited above, a strong view was that the JAI, if aimed at “containment” of China, “is not going to work”.37 Such a perception is not to be scoffed at. As I ascertained, Japan’s view, after the first JAI summit in 2018, was that the forum could become the core of the IndoPacific structure. Both JAI and RIC had been meeting at summit-level until the COVID outbreak. Obviously, India wants to keep its options open, assessing its own comfort zone in the company of major powers. Quadrilateral (Quad), an evolving strategic-military forum, consists of Australia, India, Japan, and US (in alphabetical order). Originally proposed by Japan, US was initially sceptical of this idea in the first decade of the 21st century. And, soon after the forum was launched, Chinese torpedoed it; Australia was suspected to have been the weak link among the four. Thereafter, Quad was revived in the second decade and up-scaled to P. S. Suryanarayana, Xiangshan Forum: China’s Quest for Stability: Images and Realities, RSIS Commentary CO19229, 12 November 2019, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/xiangshan-forum-chinas-quest-forstability-images-and-realities/#.XqmhlG5uIn8. 37  Ibid. 36 

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ministerial-level dialogue in 2019. The US President Trump applauded this development, at a briefing at the beginning of the third decade. In Beijing’s worldview, Quad is, therefore, a real or potential smokescreen for ‘containment’ of PRC within the Indo-Pacific framework. Some non-official protagonists of Quad have begun to advocate its expansion as an “Asian NATO” to checkmate an increasingly “belligerent” China. They believe that an expanded Quad could be modelled on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which, under American leadership, had kept the erstwhile Soviet Union in check. However, this idea remained a non-starter even as India and China stayed on a collision course in 2020. But the strategic nuances of Indo-Pacific are still taking shape, at this writing. The US–India partnership in this regard is also far from settled. Scholar Sinderpal Singh has argued as follows: A key “issue concerns the difficulty for both countries [US and India] in managing China’s rise within seemingly more inclusive institutions and processes. Doing so will be vital for obtaining greater support from other key Indo-Pacific states”.38 This is virtually a prescription for China’s inclusion in the Indo-Pacific framework in some form. In such a context, PRC and India will be interested in each other’s access to the Indian Ocean Rim states in geostrategic terms. Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Djibouti are already in the line of vision of both PRC and India. Sino-Indian ‘competition’ to woo these countries has begun, with India lacking resources on the scale that China might be able to deploy. Sentimental affection for the Indo-Pacific idea is, of course, stronger in India. So, considering the possibility of a post-COVID world being different, India began trimming its sails by mid-May 2020. Delhi joined a US-led coalition of “select countries” of Indo-Pacific to “fight” the COVID-19 pandemic. The informal coalition consists of Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, US, and Vietnam (in alphabetical order). Weekly tele-conversations on COVID-19 provided the initial momentum for cooperation among these countries. For the longer-term, as India highlighted on 14 May 2020, the objective is virtually a new Indo-Pacific and world order. S. Singh, The Indo-Pacific and India–U.S. Strategic Convergence: An Assessment, Asia Policy, Volume 14, Number 1, January 2019, pp. 77–94. 38 

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These countries “have underlined the need for a new template of globalisation and for international institutions to reflect contemporary realities”.39 Substantively, the statement differs from Beijing’s focus on creating a global “community of shared destiny” based on “win–win cooperation” in the “new era” of Chinese “national rejuvenation”. Of equal importance is another fact, though. The new US-led informal coalition did not issue a joint statement endorsing the strategic aim reflected in the Indian press release of 14 May 2020. Furthermore, a major aspiring Indo-Pacific state like France was not included in this informal coalition, at least, to begin with. Above all, India itself did not want to break ranks with China. Despite issuing the COVID-related Indo-Pacific statement on 14 May 2020, Delhi carefully avoided blaming Beijing in a separate statement on the renewed Sino-Indian border tensions. Delhi emphasised that “India–China border has largely been peaceful” because of the Xi–Modi “informal summits” in 2018 and 2019 and the follow-up measures.40 However, Delhi recalled that Xi and Modi “had also directed their militaries” to implement, among other measures, “the principle of mutual and equal security”. This was essential to “prevent incidents in [Sino-Indian] border regions”, it was pointed out.41 On balance, this statement, also issued on 14 May 2020, revealed that India would like to pursue its post-COVID ambitions without antagonising China unduly. Nonetheless, as hostile environment engulfed the Sino-Indian border areas later in 2020 itself, Delhi minced no words against Beijing and vice versa. This dynamic will be relevant to a post-COVID order. Overall, in my view, the future of the Indo-Pacific theatre, as a part of a possible or potential post-COVID global governance system, will depend on three factors. We must scan the horizon for the future trajectories of (1) PRC–US relations, (2) China–India equation, and (3) Sino-Indian ‘engagement’ in the Bay of Bengal on India’s eastern flank.

MEA, GOI, Cooperation among select countries of the Indo-Pacific in fighting COVID-19 pandemic, May 14, 2020, www.mea.gov.in (accessed on 17 May 2020). https://www.mea.gov. in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32691/Cooperation_among_select_countries_of_the_IndoPacific_ in_fighting_COVID19_pandemic 40  MEA, GOI, Official Spokesperson’s response to media queries on developments on the LAC, [Line of Actual Control], May 14, 2020, www.mea.gov.in (accessed on 17 May 2020). 41  Ibid. 39 

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Briefly, compare the Bay with the South China Sea, where the ‘ninedash line’ shows the extent of Beijing’s strategic interest. Delhi has not carved out a similar core area of Indian strategic interest in the Bay of Bengal, at least at this writing. Surely, Beijing is already on a probing mission in the Bay, with Xi building close links with the littoral States of interest to India. But PRC is not present in the Bay of Bengal Initiative of vital interest to India — BIMSTEC. As we go to press, there is no forward movement in respect of Beijing’s initiative to link India and Bangladesh with China and Myanmar — BCIM. At another level, Beijing’s BRI-related activism in Sri Lanka — primarily economic but also strategic in scope — is seen by India as a competitive Chinese enterprise. On the other side of the India–PRC spectrum, India is present in the ASEAN-led East Asia Summit (EAS), a forum of vital interest to China as well. But this forum is not centred on South China Sea issues. And, India is not a party to China–ASEAN parleys on South China Sea issues. Nonetheless, Delhi is developing close ties with Vietnam, in particular, sparking China’s concern in the strategic potential of this burgeoning relationship. Also noticed in Beijing is Delhi’s new maritime interest along Indonesia’s Sumatra coastline, evident from 2018. In these and other ways, India and China have evinced strategic interest in each other’s maritime ‘turf ’. Viewed in this comparative light, the Bay of Bengal, as a theatre of SinoIndian ‘engagement’, merits an altogether separate and detailed study. The future trajectory of the US–China relationship, while being relevant to a potential PRC–India equation, merits a separate and detailed study, too. Yet, we should note an important future-relevant aspect. Apart from the Indo-Pacific puzzle, China is aware of India’s progress as America’s “major defence partner” since 2016. India has signed several “foundational” agreements with the US for closer defence cooperation. Also wellknown are the Malabar series of the US–India–Japan naval exercises of a very high war-fighting readiness. American access to Indian facilities and US– India inter-operability, both in geostrategic terms, have already captured headlines. US’ naval aircraft’s access to India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands in late-2020, and Australia’s inclusion in the Malabar exercises, are globally important. China has taken note. In this emerging context, China has shown “concerns” about the potential trajectory of the annual US–India ‘2+2 Dialogue’. These talks take place

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among the foreign and defence ministers of US and India (US terminology is: secretaries of state and defence). The process began in September 2018. At one stage, the idea of considering a PRC–India ‘2+2 Dialogue’ appeared to be within sight.42 That was before China took a dim view of India’s updated policy on the Kashmir issue in August 2019. In fact, a PRC–India ‘2+2 Dialogue’ and Delhi’s updated policy on Kashmir issue may turn out to be gamechangers in the Sino-Indian strategic engagement. The term ‘2+2 Dialogue’ is an acronym for high-level talks, generally between two states, among their foreign and defence ministers or officials. So, a process of ‘2+2 Dialogue’ between PRC and India, if started, can help them seek mutual trust at the highest policy-making levels. Significantly, China, too, held such a dialogue with America in 2018. A Politburo member of the ruling Communist Party of China participated, boosting the profile of that meeting. But the US and PRC see themselves as real or potential rivals for global supremacy, especially in a possible postCOVID world order. Therefore, China wants to monitor India’s increasing closeness to America on a real-time basis. For China, a systematic ‘2+2 Dialogue’ with India might be useful as a window on Delhi’s growing linkages with Washington. For Delhi, the same dialogue can serve as a window on China’s linkages with its “all-weather strategic cooperative partner”, Pakistan. This is not to imagine that ‘state secrets’ will be laid bare on the table. But ‘polite’ foreign ministers and ‘probing’ defence ministers can ascertain the truth as far as possible in the light of actual words and potential actions.

China–India Tipping Point for ‘Post-COVID’ Order is Elusive ‘Strategic relativity’ between China and India is not an imagined inter-state version of Albert Einstein’s scientific theories. Yet, Modi did not join Xi when he took a decisive step towards a tipping point in the China-led multilateralism and launched BRF in Beijing in May 2017. In fact, from Xi’s standpoint,

As ascertained by me in conversations with high-ranking Chinese diplomats in Delhi and Beijing in September, November and December 2018, China was concerned about the US–India ‘2+2 Dialogue’. The idea of PRC–India ‘2+2 Dialogue’ was also briefly discussed in one of the meetings. Indian officials were excited about the US–India Dialogue. 42 

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Modi moved in the opposite direction by opposing China’s BRI. We know that India cited economic and strategic reasons for opposing BRI. However, Modi’s conspicuous absence at the BRF launch showed how elusive a SinoIndian tipping point for global good can be. To recognise this is not to apportion blame but to show up a reality. At the First BRF’s closed-door roundtable discussion among select delegates, China amplified its position on India’s absence at the main summit. Answering a question from me, a high-ranking Chinese official Fu Ying said: “India can come in at any time on any [BRI] project ... China will never impose anything on others”.43 Xi had perhaps expected Modi to travel the extra mile to synergise with China. But geostrategic realities stood in the way. A key factor, as we know, was Xi’s decision to build the CPEC without consulting India about areas it claimed as its sovereign domain. Unaffected by India’s opposition, Chinese diplomats like Wu Jianmin and others were energetic in a hard-sell of BRI as a public good in the global commons. However, Delhi, on its part, was not willing to look at collaborative prospects under BRI, and Beijing took a non-negotiable position on the CPEC. All this does not mean that China and India cannot work with each other for global good. We have noted that India and China have collaborated in pursuing each other’s initiative in this regard — Delhi’s NDB idea and Beijing’s AIIB proposal. At this writing, India is actively promoting the International Solar Alliance, launched in collaboration with France in 2015. In 2019, India began campaigning for a worldwide coalition to promote disaster-resilient infrastructure. These are issues where India and PRC can collaborate into the distant future. For a number of years, India has been campaigning at the UN for a global convention against terrorism. China and India advocate universal adoption of the ultimate goals of weapons-free outer space and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, both PRC and India allow their respective realpolitik calculus to colour their commitments. This is not unusual among major powers. But China and India have a dismal record of

China’s theme for the specialist Roundtable discussion, on the margins of the First Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) summit in Beijing in May 2017, was: “Regional and Global Security: Situation and Prospect”. I participated in the discussion which was chaired by China’s high-ranking diplomat-official Fu Ying. 43 

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having spoilt their joint copybook on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Yet an aberrant past need not deter future cooperation. During the COVID crisis, on-going at this writing, China sought recognition as the first to fight the pandemic on the global stage. But PRC and India did not appear to coordinate their anti-COVID external-outreach. Separately, both countries were reaching out to others in need. At the same time, India and China helped each other, as noted by Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, in a television interview on 14 May 2020. In that context, “it is not fair to label Chinese [medical] products as ‘faulty’”, he said, refuting Indian criticism of COVID test kits received from China.44 India, being far less focused than China on the entire world, sought an anti-COVID leadership role in the immediate neighbourhood, South Asia. Modi launched a COVID Emergency Fund under the banner of a recentlydysfunctional South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, among other SAARC countries including Pakistan, contributed to the Fund, with India first announcing a sum of US$10 million. A veteran scholar Sukh Deo Muni has commended India’s SAARC initiative during the COVID crisis. A few years earlier, India launched a SAARC satellite for the socio-economic benefit of all countries in South Asia. China, too, kept its neighbourhood — especially Northeast and Southeast Asia — in focus for anti-COVID action, even while scanning the global horizon. Besides liaising with Japan and South Korea, China paid particular attention to ASEAN as well. Gaining currency, therefore, was speculation that Beijing might want to win over East Asia, for a start, and then seek global leadership in a potential post-COVID order. For Xi, the ASEAN-initiated RCEP, where China could occupy centre-stage, appeared to be the springboard for post-COVID leadership. India’s conspicuous absence from RCEP might not also be conducive to Sino-Indian cooperation in post-COVID global governance. In all, this was the broad picture as PRC and India began marking the 70th anniversary of their diplomacy. Geopolitics has often come in the way of Sino-Indian cooperation for global good on any major issue. In previous chapters, we have discussed several divisive aspects of China–India bilateral geopolitics. As for global 44  Chinese Embassy in India, Chinese Ambassador to India H.E. Sun Weidong Gave Interview to CNN News 18 on COVID-19, 2020/05/14, http://in.china-embassy.org (accessed on 17 May 2020).

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geopolitics, which also seems to keep India and China apart, two related aspects are: (1) the US factor, and (2) Delhi’s perception of China’s ‘condescending’ attitude towards India at the global high table. The US Factor: In the strategic landscape around PRC and India, the US seeks to remain the premier global superpower in the third decade of the 21st century and beyond. Significantly, though, China challenges US supremacy. But India lags behind both US and China in terms of sharp military power and soft economic strength.45 So, Delhi and Washington have some common ground, mainly because of India’s (mis)perception of China and vice versa. Such a PRC–India (mis)perception is caused by their strategic disparity. Let us, therefore, look at some random data as at the end of 2018. China: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) — US$13.5 trillion; Per Capita GDP — US$9,633; Growth Rate — 6.6 per cent; and Defence Expenditure — US$168 billion. India: GDP — US$2.69 trillion; Per Capita GDP — US$2,016; Growth Rate — 7.3 per cent; and Defence Expenditure — US$57.9 billion. US: GDP — US$20.5 trillion; Per Capita GDP — US$62,518; Growth Rate — 2.9 per cent; and Defence Expenditure — US$643 billion.46 US was ahead of both PRC and India in all indices except for the growth rate. This was alright for America because of its decades-long status as a developed economy. Post-COVID indices will matter, going forward, because all three countries have been affected. On 1 October 2020, Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, wrote that China’s GDP in 2019 was US$14.2 trillion. India, on the other hand, has set for itself a GDP target of US$5 trillion within the next few years. These indices show the relative economic strengths of these countries. Going forward, two key factors in a post-COVID world order will be the pandemic’s impact and the stimulus measures for economic recovery. Above all, a year after the COVID outbreak, there was no knowing when the global pandemic might subside or disappear. In this uncertain situation, the attitudes of Russia and US towards India and China in the defence domain, too, matter. Never in history has there been a viable regional or global order without weapons to reinforce it. Source: The Military Balance 2019, Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), United Kingdom, February 2019. 46  Ibid. 45 

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The following is a relevant excerpt from SIPRI Year Book 2019: “Russia accounted for 58 per cent of India’s arms imports in 2014–2018, compared with 76 per cent in 2009–2013. India ordered S-400 missile systems from Russia in 2018 despite pressure from the USA not to do so. At the same time, however, India cancelled its participation in the Russian Su-57 fifth generation combat aircraft. India had planned to order at least 100 under the designation Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), but there had been growing dissatisfaction [in India] with the agreement in recent years…. and US and European offers are on the table to replace the cancelled Su-57, including production in India and technology transfers”.47 While both Russia and US have nourished India’s defence profile in this manner and more, Russia has stood behind PRC. SIPRI narrated the following in 2019: “Russia accounted for 70 per cent of China’s arms imports in 2014–2018…. Notably, even the prototypes of China’s latest-generation combat aircraft (J-20 and J-31) still use Russian engines because development of Chinese engines has been delayed by technical problems”.48 Such details show that Russia and US are major players influencing the China– India equation. At the time of this writing, the US, in particular, is becoming more important to India. Besides acquisitions of weapon-systems from abroad, both PRC and India meet their defence needs through indigenous production as well. China does more so than India. However, their nuclear-weapons programmes are indigenous. SIPRI’s estimates of PRC’s and India’s stockpiles of “nuclear forces”, by January 2019, were 290 and 130–140 respectively.49 As we have noted, both PRC and India have the ‘nuclear triad’ i.e. atomic weapons at land, air, and sea. These illustrative geo-economic and geostrategic trends will change with changing priorities in the foreign policies of the US, India, and China. What does this imply for PRC and India? The answer: In 2020, even as the sudden China-India military hostility intensified, a dramatic shift occurred in US foreign policy. US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo placed his country’s

SIPRI Yearbook 2019: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2019, p. 255. 48  Ibid, p. 256. 49  Ibid, pp. 320 and 326. 47 

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China-policy at several light years away from its ‘Nixon moment’50 of 1971. The then US President Richard Nixon had supported PRC when it faced two challenges — confrontation with the Soviet Union and concerns over India. In contrast, in 2020, America voiced moral support for India in the early stages of its volatile military tussle with China. Predictably, Beijing seriously viewed this U-turn by the US. China–India Disparity: An aspect of global geopolitics that prevents the emergence of a tipping point in the PRC–India diplomacy for global good is their disparity at the UN in particular. All P5 members, except PRC, have supported India’s credentials for UNSC permanent membership. Unless UNSC becomes less relevant to a potential post-COVID governance system, India may continue to aspire for this position in the world’s apex security forum. Reasons often cited in favour of India are its size and political system, record of nuclear non-proliferation, and contributions towards UN peacekeeping over several decades, etc. China generally links the India question to the need for UN-wide consensus on a package of reforms for the entire global organisation inclusive of UNSC. The net effect is a ‘rational’ or ‘clever’ hold on India’s aspiration. As India sees this situation, it is a classic case of China’s actions speaking louder than its words. Another major Sino-Indian disagreement pertains to China’s position on India’s credentials for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). China insists that adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) should be the litmus test, instead of NSG’s recognition of India’s non-proliferation credentials in 2008. But India, as we have already observed, opposes NPT as a treaty that privileges five countries and places them above the law that applies to all other signatories. Generally overlooked in such discussions is the fact that PRC supplied uranium to India’s Tarapur nuclear power plant in January 1995.51 In mid-2020, US sought to revise or even abandon its nearly 50-year-long policy of deep engagement with PRC. See: US Department of State, July 23, 2020. https://www.state.gov/ communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/ (The astronomical terminology of ‘light years’, which denotes massive distances, has been used to emphasise US’ attempt to distance itself from PRC in mid-2020.) 51  Jonathan McLaughlin, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control: Stopping Arms Proliferation at the Source, India Nuclear Milestones: 1945–2018, October 31, 2018, https://www.wisconsinproject.org/india-nuclear-milestones/ (Date of access not recorded). 50 

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Paradoxically, Beijing had already acceded to NPT in 1992. However, it was not until 2004 that China joined NSG, which regulates nuclear supplies. Regardless of those technical aspects, Sino-Indian relations in 1995 were determined by the strategic context at that time. Just two years earlier, India and China had signed a path-breaking treaty, agreeing to maintain peace and tranquillity along their disputed frontiers. Moreover, China was yet to be fully rehabilitated on the international stage in 1995 following the ‘Tiananmen Incident’ in 1989. Furthermore, India’s nuclear-weaponization was yet to take place. In all, therefore, the unusual nuclear transaction was possible because of the PRC–India strategic comfort level in 1995. So viewed, technicalities at the UN or NSG are not likely to shape a Sino-Indian future in all respects. A positive tipping point in the PRC–India diplomacy is possible only if the two neighbours can attain a high degree of strategic comfort. Suggestions for a Way Forward: A tipping point in the PRC–India diplomacy — for their benefit and global good — will be less elusive if they can make difficult choices to attain strategic comfort. § In the pre-COVID world order, China had already secured maximal say over global governance issues, whether at UNSC, NSG, WHO, or WTO. As for some other institutions like IMF, China had already floated AIIB as a potential alternative, for a start. In any case, China and India did not oppose each other in seeking reforms at IMF or World Bank. At WTO, China’s rising status as a virtually developed trading economy placed it above India’s league. So, there was precious little that India could offer to China. In contrast, India was convinced that it might attain its ‘rightful’ place in the pre-COVID global governance system if China could help, or at least not hinder. To fulfil those perceived requirements, one avenue open to India was its informal meetings with China at the highest political level. Surely, India did also hope to influence the Chinese thinking through the good offices of one or more among the other P5 members. Yet, on balance, China’s asymmetric advantages over India in comprehensive national strength remained India’s disadvantages. § Despite those pre-COVID realities, both India and China will require good neighbourliness for their own individual national aspirations, going forward. This is plain common sense.

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§ Viewed from this perspective, it is suggested that a positive Sino-Indian tipping point will be less elusive if India could improve its comprehensive national strength. § As for a potential post-COVID global governance system, both PRC and India are expected to hedge their bets even while seeking prime roles. China will seek the leadership or a central role in such a new order, while a ‘rightful place’ might be India’s first priority.52 A post-COVID order in Asia and beyond, beneficial to both PRC and India, can be created only through their consultations, not military hostilities. The global legacy of Thucydides Trap, vis-à-vis two aspirational rising neighbours, is not fiction. In fact, Delhi and Beijing creatively launched “informal summits” in 2018. India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar wrote53 in 2020 that the Xi-Modi informal summits in 2018 and 2019 “were exercises in pure realism”. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has also propagated a positive narrative in this regard. But irrational exuberance by China or India or both, in pursuing their respective post-COVID aims, will ruin this bilateral process. § If a polarised post-COVID world order becomes inevitable, the two camps may be led by US and PRC, respectively. In that (hypothetical) event, as in 2020, India may have to compare and contrast its US-links with the imperative of neighbourliness towards China. For PRC, neighbourliness towards India will matter in a stark situation of a bipolar post-COVID global governance system. § To avoid the collapse of the PRC–India “informal summits”, it is suggested that the two countries must address their bilateral issues. We have already studied the possibility of a collective-win approach which, certainly, is not the last word. Psychological and strategic status quo without war, as at the dawn of the 70th anniversary of Sino-Indian diplomacy, is the best option for a new start. China’s ambitions for leadership in a potential or possible post-COVID global governance system can be gleaned from Chinese official and semi-official views. During the sparring with US in May 2020, a Chinese spokesperson described China as the global leader in combating COVID. On the other hand, Delhi’s willingness to join a US-led anti-COVID coalition in the Indo-Pacific region shows the Indian desire for a ‘rightful’ rather than leadership role in a future global order. 53  S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, HarperCollins Publishers, Noida, India, 2020, p. 151. 52 

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§ India and China have pioneered all-weather dialogue. Significantly, they also began pursuing it to explore the future soon after their soldiers clashed in mid-June 2020. As civilisational neighbours, PRC and India know that they must avoid a major war between them if their all-weather dialogue is not to collapse. However, strategic rationality is not always the norm in international politics. Ahead of the winter months of 2020-2021 in the Himalayas, we shall try to glimpse the immediate future in Sino-Indian ties!

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EPILOGUE

CREATING A REALISTIC FUTURE

A strategic epigram, attributed to Abraham Lincoln, is that the best way to predict the future is to create it. In this light, People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India face the task of creating a better future following a physical clash between their soldiers on 15 June 2020. In a cascading effect, a toxic environment of military hostility and manoeuvres engulfed several flashpoints in the western Himalayan sector of the disputed Sino-Indian boundary. Senior commanders of the two sides met eight times by before 2021 to manage the volatile situation. A firm agreement to disengage at the flashpoints and de-escalate tensions proved elusive, ahead of a harsh Himalayan winter of 2020–2021. The initial clash at Galwan Valley in the Ladakh region was unprecedented in more than four decades. In local Ladakhi folklore, Galwan is named after a brave Indian porter; the valley lies in the western sector of the much-disputed China–India boundary. Firearms were not used by soldiers on either side to honour a long-standing code of conduct. But the physical fight turned ferocious. Widely reported internationally was the death toll of 20 Indian soldiers, including a local commander. On the other side, state-controlled China Daily noted the following on 17 June: “China has not released details of the deaths and injuries on its side, in an attempt to avoid any notion of winners or losers”. Another objective was to “prevent any escalation of tensions”, the daily added, noting the “heavy casualties on both sides”. For both China and India, their clash at Galwan has tactical and strategic implications with possible global consequences. More poignantly, the clash 221

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has epitomised the elusiveness of a positive tipping point in China-India diplomacy and broader relations. First, an assessment of the bilateral implications. Since the China-India border war of 1962, a Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the referral point for their respective territorial integrity, pending a resolution of their boundary dispute. India has often proposed that LAC be “clarified” for demarcation. China’s conspicuous concern, though, is that such an exercise might shortcircuit the negotiated creation of an altogether new boundary. Yet, in the absence of a settlement, India has often viewed China’s preference for unmarked LAC as a pressure tactic. In contrast, China has taken seriously India’s military resoluteness at Doklam in 2017 (Chapter 6). Broadly, this was the bilateral strategic ambience in which the clash occurred at Galwan in mid-June 2020. The new flashpoint of Galwan Valley is claimed by China as its “sovereign” domain. But, in Delhi’s perspective, this valley lies entirely on the Indian side of LAC. So, India rejected China’s “untenable claim” and objected to Chinese military presence at Galwan from May 2020.1 Gradually, tensions mounted as the two sides sought to uphold their respective perceptions through military build-up. The pent-up emotions erupted into a physical fight in the twilight on 15 June 2020. It was paradoxical because an agreed de-escalation was set to pick up at that time. Frontline troops of both sides clashed in an effort to reaffirm their respective idea of where LAC ran with reference to that valley. Besides the casualties, what lay trampled were “peace and tranquillity” along LAC and “mutual and equal security” — two Sino-Indian principles agreed upon since 1993. The Galwan clash was the most unexemplary way of heralding the seventieth anniversary of PRC-India diplomacy in 2020. Ironic, too, was that the Asian giants came to deadly blows instead of collaborating to fight the global pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Although, at this writing, Chinese President Xi Jinping appeared to stay above the fray, it was widely believed that he alone was dictating China’s India-file. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initial remarks on the China’s and India’s civilian and military statements on the military crisis from May to December 2020 are suitably noted in this brief Epilogue, avoiding multiple references to save space. 1 

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Galwan clash gained currency in Beijing. Chinese believed that he did not accuse China of intruding into India. Soon, however, India indirectly clarified. Modi’s “observations that there was no Chinese presence” on the Indian side of LAC “pertained” to “the consequence of the bravery of our [Indian] armed forces”, Delhi said. The intended message was that Indian soldiers prevented Chinese troops from occupying areas inside India. Chinese saw the Indian statement as matching their argument that they were operating on their side all the time. Some ‘diplomatic’ congruence, intended or otherwise? There was no congruence, though, concerning tactics of the two sides. For long, Chinese, with their superior economic strength and higher defence expenditure, are known to have built robust military infrastructure on their side of LAC. In a belated ‘catch-up’ effort more recently, India built a 250-km-long arterial road near LAC and modernised a strategic airstrip near Karakorum Pass. Significant is the location of this Pass near Siachen Glacier, which India holds as its sovereign domain, and also near Shaksgam Valley which China similarly holds. Tactically, a long-term Chinese military presence at Galwan would give them potential ‘access’ to India’s new arterial road in this strategic mountainous region. In military terms, this was the context in which the Galwan fight took place. The political context was China’s dismay over India’s assumption of full federal control over Ladakh from 31 October 2019. In Delhi’s view, this new federal unit, the Union Territory of Ladakh (UTL), has always included Aksai Chin which PRC administers (Chapters 7 and 8). Significantly, Galwan valley, which India considers as its sovereign territory, nestles in or outside Aksai Chin, according to China’s or India’s respective account. Important, too, UTL’s earlier status as a part of the now-defunct “autonomous” Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK) had really suited Beijing. Viewing ISJK as an “internationally disputed” part of the old princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, PRC could then wait to settle its claims in this region. So, in the changing situation, PRC urgently but unsuccessfully sought United Nations Security Council’s censure of India twice (Chapters 3 and 7). This diplomatic reality, too, coloured the Galwan fight. In one more attempt after the Galwan clash, PRC failed to secure UNSC’s censure of India in August 2020. But Beijing was satisfied at keeping the Kashmir issue re-activated at UNSC after a gap of almost 55 years.

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Nationalist sentiments soared in both countries following the Galwan fight. Delhi banned the use of China’s software apps and announced plans to exclude Chinese companies from India’s infrastructure projects. India’s protagonists hailed this as a ‘digital counter-attack’ for national security. In China’s view, though, India was “artificially setting up barriers” that would not stand scrutiny in the World Trade Organisation. Beijing said “India should avoid a strategic miscalculation with regard to China” in both economic and military domains. Not forgotten, though, was that two “informal meetings” had taken place between Xi and Modi in 2018 and 2019 in trying times (Chapters 2,3,4). In the ambient light of such all-weather dialogue, I received a truly interesting online-chat message from a senior Chinese diplomat on 20 June 2020. He conveyed the Chinese position that “all options good for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in border area will be ok for consideration and discussion”. Unsurprisingly thereafter, Chinese and Indian Special Representatives held talks in a bid to “prevent more incidents that [could] undermine peace and tranquillity in the border areas”. Soon, “disengagement, de-escalation and full restoration of peace and tranquillity” were buzzwords. Some progress, no settlement, was reported by both sides. Another key issue — troop dispositions in the Pangong Lake area, also in Ladakh sector — remained more challenging, at this writing.

The Global Environment Coinciding with this crisis was Beijing’s rapid estrangement with Washington. The issues were COVID, US-China trade and technology, America’s alleged ‘anti-China involvement’ in South China Sea and Taiwan regions, and PRC’s political system. More importantly, a noticeable ‘tilt’ by the United States towards India over this Sino-Indian crisis punctuated it. Yet, India and China did not seek help from either US or its opponent Russia, respectively, to resolve this crisis. On balance, the possible global consequences of this serious setback in Sino-Indian relations cannot be missed. An emerging reality is China’s rapid repositioning of itself as a potential leader of a possible post-COVID world order in economic and strategic domains. Xi himself hinted at this when he addressed the opening ceremony of fifth annual meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

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in Beijing on 28 July 2020. Pioneered by Xi, AIIB has been supported by India which is distantly second to China in contributing to the bank’s capital. Xi praised AIIB for setting up a COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility. More importantly in that context, he said “AIIB may grow into a new platform that …. facilitates the building of a community with a shared future for mankind”. Xi’s major prescription “to make that happen” was “to make the AIIB a new type of multilateral development bank that promotes development across the world”.2 By this, he has sought to raise the profile of AIIB as a China-led global bank, not just an Asian institution. Beijing’s post-COVID global ambitions are evident, too, from remarks by a top Chinese diplomat Liu Xiaoming on China’s fifth-generation (5G) telecom prowess. Chinese tech-giant “Huawei is a leader in 5G” in the current Fourth Industrial Revolution, Liu has asserted. He also quoted Xi as saying that “China is leading the world in both [COVID] epidemic containment and economic recovery”.3 However, stung by US-led criticism of China for ‘globalising’ COVID, Xi has been leading a counter-attack, portraying his country as a benevolent force for global good into the future. In my view, Xi’s call for globalising AIIB is the first clear sign of Beijing’s desire to create and lead a concert of countries with economic linkages. I think that a ‘concert of economies’ will be an appropriate way of understanding Xi’s goal. Xi is propagating the idea of China creating such a concert, different from the traditional Western-style concert of powers, or power blocs, for political-strategic linkages. Xi’s targeted audience, therefore, includes America’s European allies so that he could reinforce “economic globalisation” during and beyond the COVID-induced global recession. In this context, there are also informal calls in China that India should not decouple itself from the Chinese economy in an angry mood because of a bilateral military crisis. The informal Chinese message is that India should not rely solely on expectations of US’ and other Western benefaction. Why MFA, PRC, Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China At the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 2020/07/28, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1801603.shtml (Accessed on 31 July 2020). 3  Liu Xiaoming’s remarks are sourced from website of PRC’s MFA. 2 

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should there be such messaging? Mainly because, a US proposal to expand the existing Group of Seven (G7) major industrialised economies excluded China but included India. G7-expansion has, however, remained a nonstarter, at this writing. This, in fact, is another reason why Xi appears to desire a concert of economies which could include India as a key AIIB member. In all these cross-currents, it is too early to predict the future of the existing Group of Twenty (G20) — practically, a forum for global economic governance. An example of the practical status of G20 was its move to ease the debt burden of countries during the global COVID crisis. G20 includes US and its allies as well as China and India. Also unpredictable is the future of United Nations, especially its Security Council (UNSC) which privileges five permanent members — US, Russia, United Kingdom, France and PRC — with individual veto right. India aspires to join them as a permanent member. This became clear, once again, during a video-conference of the foreign ministers of Russia-India-China (RIC) forum on 23 June 2020. India hoped for “convergence” with China and Russia on the “value of reformed multilateralism”. The hope was a thinly-concealed code for Delhi’s aspiration to become a UNSC permanent member. In fact, at this RIC meeting, “strategic independence” of both China and India prevented any discussion of the Galwan clash. The fight took place just a few days before this RIC meeting.

A Mini-Window of Opportunity In this new global environment of national aspirations and international uncertainties, China-India military crisis, which erupted in mid-2020, is unique. Unprecedented in more than four decades, soldiers have died on both sides. Also, for the first time since their peace and tranquillity accord in 1993, Sino-Indian tussle erupted at multiple ‘friction points’ along or across LAC in 2020. ‘Friction points’ are specific places where the patrolling soldiers of the two sides confront each other frequently. Differences over the exact alignment of the un-demarcated line of actual control in those places often cause confrontations. Furthermore, the de facto LAC between UTL and Aksai Chin is blurred by China’s refusal to accept India’s sovereignty over Ladakh. Delhi rejects Beijing’s action. But the two countries continue to disagree on the length and

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alignment of LAC in all sectors — western, central, and eastern. Why? Because, the two sides did not have mutually advantageous presence in their common border regions at the same time — in the referral years of 1952, 1959 and 1993. As a result, the idea of “mutual and equal security” has come into vogue since 1993, with no practical formula to ensure this. In this geostrategic milieu, China and India surprised each other in 2020 by their military manoeuvres and resolute political will in the western sector. At Beijing’s initiative, Chinese and Indian Defence Ministers, General Wei Fenghe and Rajnath Singh respectively, met in Moscow on 4 September. Both affirmed their resolve to defend the territorial sovereignty of their respective country at any cost. China-India strategic gap was not bridged. The issue was then left to the Chinese and Indian Foreign Ministers, Wang Yi and Jaishankar respectively. At their meeting, also in Moscow, on 10 September, they agreed to energise Sino-Indian diplomatic and military-level talks. The stated objective was to ensure “quick” disengagement by the troops on both sides, and de-escalation of tensions. By design or default, Wang Yi and Jaishankar recommended a potentially positive pathway. They agreed that “as the situation eases, the two sides should expedite work to conclude new confidence-building measures (CBMs)”. The stated purpose would be “to maintain and enhance peace and tranquillity in the border areas”. In my view, a new CBM can offer a miniwindow of opportunity to place China-India engagement on a positive trajectory. Regardless of whether the ministers share my view, significant is their stated objective to “enhance”, not just maintain, “peace and tranquillity”. Furthermore, their focus on “border areas”, instead of the disputed boundary, opens up a wider canvas for a new CBM. “Border areas” lie on either side of the disputed boundary line. China-India military crisis in 2020 has shown that their first priority is to defend their respective Patrolling Claim Lines (PCLs) at ‘friction points’ along LAC. A relevant caveat is that PCLs are not the same as Sovereignty Claim Lines (SCLs). Why? Because, SCLs define the limits of territorial claims by the two sides, while PCLs are meant to define the unmarked Line of Actual Control. This distinction is important. LAC has not been accepted by both sides as an interim Sino-Indian boundary until it is settled. The boundary is to be settled by resolving PRC’s and India’s overlapping territorial claims or SCLs.

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Generally, Beijing’s and Delhi’s Patrolling Claim Lines at ‘friction points’ do not run deep into each other’s ‘territory’. In contrast, Sovereignty Claim Lines run deep. The 38,000-sq-km Aksai Chin in the western sector, and the 90,000-sq-km Arunachal Pradesh in the east, are well-known. China administers Aksai Chin, while Arunachal Pradesh is a constituent state of the Indian Union. Each side claims both of these territories. Given these ground realities, I think, there are two options for a new CBM in the western sector. The first option, focused on the hope of creating trust, can centre on Beijing’s and Delhi’s Patrolling Claim Lines. This option can be exercised at any mutually-agreed time. A CBM is not a settlement of the overall boundary dispute. So, the creation of a demilitarised or buffer zone at each identified ‘friction point’ can lead to de-escalation of tensions. How can this be done? The answer follows. Each side can withdraw its soldiers to an agreed location behind the Patrolling Claim Line of the other side at each ‘friction point’. In this fashion, each side will withdraw its forward-deployed soldiers within the limits of its own PCL at each ‘friction point’. Such action, limited to PCLs at ‘friction points’, will not affect the sovereignty claims by PRC and India in their common border areas. Moreover, senior military commanders of the two countries “agreed”, on 22 September 2020, “to stop sending more troops to the frontline” in the UTL-Aksai Chin theatre. This accord, if it holds, could serve as a catalyst for the first option of a new CBM that I have outlined. But critics, especially some senior Indian military analysts, view any idea of a buffer or demilitarised zone in any Sino-Indian sector as a “nebulous” CBM. They argue that the Chinese attitude and actions in the Ladakh theatre since May 2020 have “undermined” all the existing Sino-Indian CBMs. The view from China is more complex. Not stating categorically, Chinese officials tend to believe that PRC’s equation with India must reflect the strategic and economic reality of their troubled relations. China has an asymmetric advantage in terms of the relevant macro-level indices, but India is trying catch-up. In such power-play, India and China may want to preserve what they achieved through their military manoeuvres in the western sector in 2020. The second option for a new CBM can take the form of a no-escalation agreement. In this scenario, both sides need not vacate their newly-acquired

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‘strongholds’. But no-escalation is not the same as de-escalation. Yet, the logic of a possible or potential no-escalation agreement is driven by the relative lull in the Sino-Indian confrontation at this writing. Each side had made some ‘gains’ through competitive military manoeuvres in the western sector. Moreover, the defence and foreign ministers of the two countries had also tried to assess each other’s moods and methods. Above all, as this is written, there was no exchange of fire since the crisis erupted in May. In a sense, this aspect facilitated the diplomatic process and the periodic talks between the senior military commanders. On 21 October 2020, India handed over to China a ‘missing’ Chinese soldier who had strayed into the Indian side in the much-contested UTL-Aksai Chin theatre. On balance, therefore, a no-escalation agreement can be the second option for a new CBM. For this to happen, each side must get convinced of the other’s political will and resolute military posture. Surely, though, any CBM is at best a palliative. There is, therefore, no long-term alternative to a settlement of the boundary dispute itself. Jaishankar has, unsurprisingly, written in his book, The India Way (2020), as follows: “The [settlement of ] border [dispute] and the future of [ChinaIndia] ties cannot be separated”. This linkage is not accepted by China. Wang Yi told Jaishankar in Moscow on 10 September on the following lines. “It is normal for China and India to have differences [on the boundary issue] as two neighbouring major countries. What is important is to put these differences in a proper context vis-à-vis [overall] bilateral relations.” Such Sino-Indian dissonance on the urgency of a peaceful settlement of the larger boundary dispute is worsened by a prevalent view. Many Indians believe that Chinese military leaders hold a decisive say over how their political colleagues should resolve the larger Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) incremental battle-ready exercises in Tibet, bordering northern India, are also seen in India as a new factor. Furthermore, the perceived efforts by Xi to assert his party’s “absolute leadership” over PLA frames the Indian belief. This is about PLA’s relative primacy, if not supremacy, in PRC. In all, therefore, the extraordinary Sino-Indian military crisis, which erupted in 2020, portends a long-term challenge for both Xi and Modi. Wang Yi’s summary of the Xi-Modi “consensus”, as in 2018 and 2019, reads as follows: “China and India are not competitive rivals or each other’s

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threats, but [are] cooperation partners and each other’s developmental opportunities”. Such bilateral sentiments were punctured by the military crisis in 2020. So, a reset of the China-India equation for the future depends on their political will as well as a few external factors. Moving forward, one such factor is America’s presidential foreign policy towards India and China. The baseline tussle in Asia is between India’s aspiration to become a rulemaker in world affairs and China’s aspiration to become a decisive creator of the post-COVID world. Statesmanship will be needed on both sides to harmonise these aspirations. Creating a realistic Sino-Indian future is a tall order at the best of times!

Towards Updated Reality Checks The politics of the American presidential poll on 3 November 2020 remained unsettled for several weeks, at this writing. Donald Trump’s challenger, Joseph Biden, declared victory in that poll. Soon, he was congratulated by a number of countries, including China. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had a telephone conversation with Biden on 17 November. In a press release, India said they “agreed to work closely to further advance the India — U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership”. It was built on “shared values” and “common interests”. The two leaders also “discussed … … cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region”. This was as good a start as Delhi could have hoped for. But, moving on, Biden may have to conduct a reality check on the US–PRC–India ties. Why? Mainly because Washington developed contrasting ties with Beijing and Delhi for most part of 2020 and earlier, especially under Trump’s presidency. As a result, easy to discern were some indications of the likely issues in America’s strategic diplomacy vis-à-vis the Sino-Indian front in 2021 and beyond. ‘Wisely’, Washington might assess the possible long-term consequences of the evolving US–PRC hostility. Their ill-will was about bilateral trade, transfer of American technology to China etc. If left unchecked, the US-PRC antagonism could become a new Cold War (as Wang Yi has said) or even worse. On a parallel track, it might not be ‘prudent’ for the US to risk rolling back its scaled-up strategic relations with India. A roll-back might badly affect America’s credibility in India and core interests in dealing with China. Why? Because, Washington and Delhi had begun to view each other as

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potential partners to address the regional and global impact of Beijing’s ascendance. This dichotomy was caused by the Trump Administration’s assessment of PRC as America’s global competitor and India as a potentially reliable global partner of the US. Some among Trump’s officials expressed support for Delhi in the Sino-Indian military confrontation that erupted in mid-2020. Trump’s presidential predecessor, Barack Obama, had designated India as a “major defence partner” of the US in 2016. Consequently, India has exercised vigorously with the US military forces, and received America’s advanced weapon-systems as well as logistical hardware. And, the previous American President George W. Bush masterminded and piloted the transformational US-India civil nuclear deal. Following up on the international stage, Bush ensured the legitimacy of India’s atomic arsenal. Moreover, Delhi secured perpetual access to the international nuclear market for electricity production at home. Beijing was quick to notice India’s double-gain of that magnitude as a strategic game-changer in Asia. Those were significant earlier developments in the US–India ties of concern to China. But the Trump Administration intensified America’s strategic cooperation with India through their annual bilateral ‘2+2 Dialogue’ from 2018. Under this format, foreign and defence ministers of the two countries have explored practical cooperation. Their objective was to enhance the viability of their partnership. India has signed “foundational” defence agreements with the US. The purpose was to ensure safe and secure communications as well as inter-operability between the armed forces of the two sides. Their logistical access to each other’s military facilities was another major feature. Furthermore, Delhi began actively associating itself with Trump’s IndoPacific strategy. But Beijing, as we know, continues to view the Indo-Pacific strategy as a US’ ploy for the ‘containment’ of PRC. As a corollary, Trump’s endorsement of the ‘militarisation’ of the Quad was (and still is) unacceptable to Beijing. Originally, the Quad was crafted as a platform for security-dialogue among the US, Japan, India, and Australia. Thereafter, the four-party forum suffered a setback before being revived. In November 2020, India hosted the revived group’s first military exercise, said to be of a high order. Both the Bay of Bengal along India’s east coast, and the Arabian Sea along India’s west coast were the venues chosen for this Quad-exercise. Not fanciful is PRC’s long-term ‘plan’ to access Bay of Bengal by creating an

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artificial canal, at Kra in Thailand. The Kra canal is ‘planned’ as an alternative to Malacca Strait. This remains a lurking factor in the global strategic calculations about the Bay. Furthermore, the Bay of Bengal is home to some of India’s vital strategic assets. As for the Arabian Sea, its proximity to Pakistan as well as West Asia and the Indian Ocean is important to both the Quad and China. In all, these aspects have brought the US in as a key factor in the SinoIndian relationship. Unsurprisingly, Wang Yi has characterised the IndoPacific strategy, underpinned by a militarising Quad, as “a new NATO”. It could, in his view, wind back the clock of history.4 As for the relevant context, the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) epitomised the ‘containment’ of erstwhile Soviet Union during the now-bygone SovietAmerican Cold War. Now, Beijing began seeing itself as the likely target of a potentially US-led “new NATO” in the Indo-Pacific region. If sustained into the future, the “new NATO” might advance America’s Indo-Pacific strategy, China argues. On a parallel track, India has been sensitive to PRC’s escalating military and political support for Pakistan. Therefore, long-term American policies towards Pakistan and the Sino-Pakistani collaboration will be acutely relevant to Delhi. These are critical aspects that the US might have to consider in dealing with PRC and India in 2021 and a long way beyond. An updated reality check by Washington on its recent legacy of interacting with Beijing and Delhi will substantially shape the future of Sino-Indian relations. The China–India military crisis, which erupted in 2020, prompted the two neighbours to re-assess their relations. COVID-time video-linked multilateral conferences towards the end of 2020 featured Xi and Modi. But, video-linked multilateral events constrain “informal” or confidential bilateral meetings. So, the Xi–Modi consensus in 2018 and 2019 (cited above) was treated by their diplomats and military commanders as ‘guidance’ to address the Sino-Indian border crisis in 2020. With this crisis remaining unresolved, as this is written, I have suggested a no-escalation agreement (as above). This proposal will allow mutual  Xinhua (PRC’s state news agency), U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy undermines peace, development prospect in East Asia: Wang Yi, 13 October 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/202010/13/c_139437326.htm 4

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accommodation in military terms. Each side can keep its vantage-positions, newly acquired through its military manoeuvres during this crisis.5 These competitive manoeuvres appeared to have averted an outright China–India war, giving their diplomats and military commanders a chance to resolve the crisis. But each side also remained poised to try to outwit the other sooner or later. Thereby hangs the tale of differential Sino-Indian world views. Xi’s and Modi’s world views were evident at the video-linked summit of SCO, hosted by Putin in Moscow on 10 November 2020. Furthermore, the two leaders outlined their world views in the video-linked BRICS summit, also hosted by Putin in Moscow on 17 November. Chinese and Indian officials, too, amplified aspects of these world views. A brief summary of the contrasting Sino-Indian world views6 follows.

Contrasting World Views • China advocates and strives for “multilateralism” as the keynote of global governance. The reason: in the existing multilateral order, the Chinese have a predominant say, next only to the Americans. Moreover, “unilateralism” or the perceived hegemonic attitude, as ‘practised’ by Trump towards China, is not acceptable to it. In contrast, India insists on the need for “reformed multilateralism”. Surely, China does want bigger roles in some global financial institutions. But it does not share India’s desire to bring about transformational reforms in global governance. For Delhi, however, its ‘rightful’ place in world affairs is attainable only through sweeping reforms of the existing multilateral and global institutions. • PRC swears by the existing international order as “centred” on the United Nations. The relevant logic is not far to seek. In 1971, as already noted, PRC was admitted as a privileged, veto-right-empowered,  P. S. Suryanarayana, China-India Border Crisis: Can a New CBM Avert War? RSIS Commentary CO20189, 02 November 2020, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, http://www.rsis.edu.sg 6  China’s and India’s world views were evident in Xi Jinping’s and Narendra Modi’s remarks/ speeches at the virtual-format summits of SCO and BRICS in Moscow on 10 and 17 November 2020. 5

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permanent member of the UN Security Council. Unlike PRC which was proclaimed in 1949, India was a founding member of the UN in 1945 itself. Yet, Delhi still remains outside the privileged UNSC caucus of five powers including PRC. Unsurprisingly, therefore, India continues to seek a similar privilege through “radical changes” in the UN system. It is also a paradox that a newly-risen great power like PRC prefers, by and large, institutional status quo in the world’s strategic order. • Xi is striving for “synergy” between PRC’s “Belt and Road Initiative” in partner-countries and their “national development strategies”. He is keen that BRI projects in partner-countries do not languish due to mismatch between their priorities and his goal of globalisation with Chinese characteristics. India, as we have observed, is a conscientious critic of BRI. Chinese-aided connectivity projects under BRI must be based on “core principles” and “respect for each other’s sovereignty”, says India. In this context, the potential jewel in Xi’s BRI-crown is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. But CPEC passes through areas under India’s “sovereignty”. So, in opposing CPEC, India has also raised questions about the perceived inadequacy of BRI’s core economic fundamentals. Delhi advocates “transparency”, “market viability” and environment-friendliness, among a host of other parameters which we have already noted. But China, on its part, has started emphasising that BRI enjoys a high acceptability quotient among many countries. • India has started calling for a “new template of globalisation” in economic terms. In this endeavour, Modi teamed up with Trump’s US and several other Sino-sceptic countries. The call itself translates into the need for dispersed and “resilient” global supply chains, instead of a perceived China-centric or China-dominated worldwide supply network. Beijing does not see its dominant role in “economic globalisation” as a net-negative for the world at large. Xi, therefore, cited an ancient Chinese epigram that “men of insight see the trend [of the times] while men of wisdom ride it”. People across the world yearn for peace and development: this universal desire, according to China, constitutes the global trend in the 21st century. China is simply riding this trend. So runs the counter-argument. • Delhi’s world view on the global fight against COVID-19 does not really differ from Beijing’s. The giant neighbours have even adopted similar

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approaches, but without collaborating with each other at the vanguard of the global anti-pandemic struggle. Both countries have separately assisted 150 others. India, priding itself as the pharmaceutical factory of the world, mostly supplied “essential medicines”, according to Modi. The array of Chinese supplies included medicines, protective equipment, testing kits etc. In step with China at the SCO summit in November 2020, Modi pledged to produce anti-COVID vaccine and supply it worldwide. He was confident that India’s reputation as the world’s largest producer of generic vaccines would extend to antiCOVID vaccines as well. But he did not specify India’s own progress in making anti-COVID vaccine. Xi did, however, pledge to supply any proven Chinese-made vaccine as a ‘global good’, with developing countries as the prime recipients. At the virtual-format BRICS summit, also in November 2020, he offered to cooperate with India, too. The context was the then ongoing clinical trials of Chinese-made anti-COVID vaccine in several other countries. Unconditional cooperation between Beijing and Delhi in the anti-COVID realm may be useful, but not a sufficient pathway to the Sino-Indian tipping point.

China–India Tipping Point in a Post-COVID Order Will PRC and India reach the elusive tipping point? A conditional answer — in economic, political, and strategic terms — is easy to imagine and difficult to accomplish. As this is written, during the 70th anniversary of PRC-India diplomacy, their great expectations do not match. The mismatch is explained by two factors. PRC’s asymmetric advantage over India, in comprehensive national strength, must be viewed in the context of India’s competitive aspiration. Neither factor can be wished away by either side. Historically, great powers rose and fell. Should PRC or India or both follow this pattern, the positive tipping point in their diplomacy will eventually become irrelevant. But the present study is not about the possible fall of either PRC or India or both. So, what exactly is the positive tipping point in PRC–India diplomacy? • The beauty of the positive Sino-Indian tipping point is in the eye of the beholder — PRC or India, as the case be. But the tipping point hardly

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•

•

•

•

figures in the diplomatic discourse of either country. What is, therefore, Beijing’s vision of the tipping point, if one can foresee it? The conceivable answer: India’s total acceptance of PRC as the leading architect of a post-COVID world order. But India itself is keen to play a significant role in building a post-COVID global order. Delhi’s statements indicate that it may want to do so by acting alone or in association with Sino-sceptic countries. Modi made this partially clear at the SCO in November 2020. His policy of ushering a “self-reliant India” in the post-pandemic world would be a “force multiplier” for the global economy, Modi said. To reach that status, India did not rule out ‘enlightened’ self-interest of building suitable linkages with the developed countries. Xi, too, projected China’s own development as a global good. So, he may want India to join his concert of economies. Xi envisioned a concert of economies, without using this terminology, as already discerned. From mid-2020, though, India sought to delink itself from the Chinese economy. This was due to the military crisis that shook the core of PRC– India relations. Moreover, Delhi stayed away from the ASEAN-initiated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in November 2020. By doing so, Delhi cut off some vital links with Beijing, in the latter’s perception. PRC is expected to be the force multiplier in the RCEP realm, a major East Asian economic network. In all, the positive Sino-Indian economic tipping point seems a distant, perhaps, unlikely prospect, at this writing. From Delhi’s perspective, a mutually acceptable Sino-Indian boundary settlement can become the political tipping point. But we have observed how such a settlement has remained a talking point. In strategic terms, the positive tipping point is conceivable if India gains its ‘rightful’ places in global governance. PRC’s realistic consent or acquiescence is needed. India’s strategic priorities are the UNSC permanent membership and membership of the NSG etc. in the same league as PRC. As this is narrated, PRC has not evinced interest in welcoming India as a peer competitor in these forums. The logic of PRC’s ‘proven’ asymmetric advantage over India influences Xi. Equally, India has not given up its competitive aspirations. Unsurprising, therefore, Xi–Modi “informal” or confidential meetings

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did not pave the way towards the positive tipping point in Sino-Indian diplomacy. But the search must continue. The reason is not far to seek. A stable post-COVID world order is inconceivable without a stable postCOVID order in Asia, where PRC and India are major aspirational players. Going forward, a post-COVID world order may require a transformative re-make of the international system that was designed after the Second World War. Such a future scenario will be determined by numerous factors. Geostrategic contour of the US–PRC equation, following the American presidential election in 2020, is just one key factor. PRC’s ties with India, Russia, Japan, and Europe in a post-pandemic situation will matter much. This is just an illustrative and not exhaustive check-list. Several other major developed and developing countries, too, may seek to reposition themselves in a post-COVID situation. New technologies, artificial intelligence, digital and cyber security such as China’s global initiative, industrial revolution beyond its fourth avatar, arms races, and the outer space will all matter. Overall, far from being a cliché, the world may not be the same as, when, and (if ) COVID-19 disappears from Planet Earth. So, viewed from a global perspective, too, creating a realistic China-India future is a tall order at the best of times!

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Abraham Lincoln, 221 Aksai Chin, xxiv, xxvii, 44, 54–58, 62, 107, 131, 134, 136, 137, 141–144, 149, 150, 154, 157, 163–166, 195, 206, 223, 226, 228, 229 Alastair Lamb (Lamb), 90, 96, 138, 141–145, 147, 148 Arunachal Pradesh (APS), xxiv, xxv, xxvii, 9, 75–77, 107, 112, 115, 127, 144, 145, 147, 157, 163–168, 228 a bastion [for India], 166 McMahon Line, 145, 147, 166 “southern Tibet”, xxiv, 9, 75, 77, 112, 145, 165 strategic lever [for Beijing], 166 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), xix, 191, 192, 198, 200, 202, 205, 213, 218, 224–226 Atal Bihari Vajpayee (Vajpayee), 16, 17, 120, 121, 130, 131

Beijing, ix, xi, xii, xiv, xviii, xix, 2, 4–11, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27–29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 43–45, 48–53, 56–60, 62, 64, 69, 70–73, 75–78, 82, 83, 87, 90, 92–96, 98–107, 110–126, 129, 130, 132–134, 136, 137, 141, 142, 144–146, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154, 156–162, 164–167, 171, 173–176, 180–184, 187–189, 191, 194–197, 199, 202, 203, 205–214, 217–219, 223–228 access to Gwadar, 49 adherence to the NPT, 122 CPEC without consulting India, 133, 213 LAC took shape [by 1959], 152 nuclear-weapon test, 6 official media, 64 strategic autonomy, 34, 37 UTL “illegal, null, and void”, 134 was surprised, 9 ‘windfall’ gain, 82 See also China and PRC

Bay of Bengal, xix, 114, 176, 210, 211 PRC’s long-term ‘plan’, 223 Washington’s naval move, 114

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Beijing Olympics, 10, 11, 18, 19, 59 Belt and Road Forum/Initiative (BRF/BRI), xi, xviii, xix, 19, 28, 29, 58, 63, 72, 113, 116, 117, 174, 175, 202, 205, 213 contribution to ‘global good’, 117 “debt trap diplomacy” [scare], 118 India’s boycott, 19, 117 not all roses all the way, 175 worldwide web, 116 Bhutan (Thimphu), 112, 115, 116, 125–127, 144 China, ix–xv, xvii–xx, xxiii–xxv, 1–11, 13–15, 18–41, 43–66, 68–83, 85–88, 90–94, 96, 98, 99, 101, 103, 104, 106, 109–127, 129–149, 151–169, 171–230 access to India’s UTL, 57 altogether new boundary, 222 ceased to ask or persuade India [BRI], 205 Cold War mentality, 71 core interests, 28, 29, 37, 44, 55, 69, 74, 125, 126 deterring America, 124 economic expansionism, 198 far side of the Moon, 144, 185, 186 Fourth Industrial Revolution, 172, 180, 225 ‘India file’, 37 influenced Pakistan [pilot issue], 47 informal assurances to India, 159 “Malacca Dilemma”, 73 mantra of multilateralism, 199 more “seriously” [assess India], 114

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“mutual friend of India and Pakistan”, 43, 50, 51, 160 new pro-Pakistan tilt, 19 “not war” over national interests, 87 only “a border conflict” [1962 war], 32 particular attention to ASEAN, 214 Pulwama incident [on], 45 reassurance to Pakistan, 69 role in the Kashmir issue, 162 sees India as an ‘India+’ force, 29 smart military power, 182, 183, 184, 185 soft-power platform, 38 South Indian venue, 66 strategic experiment, 36 strategic imperative, 70, 117 “temporary” boundary agreement, xxiii, 132, 138, 151, 152, 160 territorial integrity of other countries, 161 Tiananmen Incident, 218 See also Beijing and PRC China–India ties, xvii, 68, 85 brinkmanship, 69, 73, 80, 83, 85, 107, 109, 123, 124 disparity at the UN, 217 each other’s maritime ‘turf ’, 211 geopolitical tussle, 54 manoeuvres in 2020, 23, 73, 107 mini-window of opportunity, 226–230 no-escalation agreement, 228, 229 no first use [n-weapons], 184, 185 on-line chat message, 224 physical fight, 69, 221, 222 political “treaty” in 1993, 7 possess ‘nuclear triads’, 166

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red line, 165 sensitive issue [Afghanistan], 82 tipping point, ix, xi, xii, xiii, xvii, xviii, 1, 13, 20–22, 25, 41, 43, 44, 48, 56, 76, 80, 85, 105, 111, 163, 169, 174, 193–197, 205, 206, 212, 213, 217–219, 222 ‘Tipping Point’ History, 195–199 Tipping Point in a Post-COVID Order, 235–237 tit-for-tat message, 124–127 See also PRC–India/Sino-Indian diplomacy China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), xix, xxiv, 20, 22, 29, 32, 43, 62, 71, 88, 117, 118, 129, 131, 154, 206 CPEC-Plus project, 133, 134 demonstration project, 72 “forceful measures”, 140 hyper-defence of, 50 ‘inconceivable’ collapse, 159 Indian ‘threat’ to, 59 linked to G-B’s geopolitics, 137 longevity of, 88 non-negotiable position, 213 special force to protect, 126 strategic importance to PRC, 126 through Gilgit-Baltistan, 32, 125 unacceptable to India, 10, 160 “well safeguard” CPEC, 51 Coronavirus disease (COVID), (COVID-19), xi, xix, 1, 23, 24, 26, 27, 37, 65, 74, 161, 174, 193, 203, 209, 210, 214, 222, 225 did not deflect Chinese President, 194 geographical ‘origin’, 23

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global fight against, 1, 202 phenomenal disruption, 193 Cultural Revolution, 6, 8, 87, 196 Dalai Lama, 5, 6, 98, 101–103, 166 Delhi, ix, xviii, xix, 3–13, 15–17, 19–22, 25, 27, 29, 32, 35–38, 43–48, 54, 55, 59–61, 64, 67, 70–73, 75–80, 82, 83, 88–90, 92–94, 96–99, 101, 103–107, 112–122, 124–127, 129, 130, 132–137, 139–141, 143, 144, 148, 149, 152, 154, 157–160, 162–164, 166–168, 171, 173, 174, 176–181, 183, 185–187, 190, 191, 195–199, 204–213, 215, 219, 222–224, 226, 228 denunciation of BRI, 117 disbanded ISJK, 44 half-pacifist option, 6 proactive founder of BRICS, 197 risk-taking calculus, 71 See also India Deng Xiaoping (Deng), xii, 7, 32, 40, 149, 196 aware of India matching China, 40 recognised India’s potential, 7 strong-arm response, 40 Doklam (Dong Lang), vii, xiii, xxvii, 19, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 41, 62, 107, 109–117, 119–121, 123–127, 144, 156, 165, 167, 176, 201, 222 geostrategic scope, 114 India’s game-plan, 126 “inside Bhutanese territory”, 125, 126 no exchange of fire, 110, 115

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no nuclear-arms sabre-rattling, 123, 124 strategic road at, 25, 113 strategic surprise, 119 Donald Trump (Trump), 23, 24, 34, 47, 60, 61, 177–179, 190, 201, 209 concerns regarding Huawei, 179 contrasting ties with Beijing and Delhi, 230 Indo-Pacific strategy, 207 relied on Pakistan [Taliban issue], 47 surprised India, 60 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, xii, 4, 5, 13, 21, 31, 85, 95, 104, 106, 111, 195 Fu Ying, 213 Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B), xix, xxiv, xxvii, 32, 44, 89, 125, 131, 139, 154 Global-governance (global governance), 193, 204, 205, 208, 210, 214, 218, 219 [China] secured maximal say, 218 “multilateralism” as the keynote, 233 not necessarily cooperate [India, China], 205 post-COVID global governance, 210, 214, 219 robust reform of AIIB, 205 Gopalaswami Parthasarathi, 149

attitude towards Huawei, 177, 179 concealed containment of, 87 core interests, 28, 29, 37, 44, 55, 69, 74 “counter-terror” air-strike, 49 de facto nuclear power, 11 defensive nuclear power, 120 forward-defence posture, 109, 126 generic vaccines, 175 lunar mission, 185, 186 Mars Orbiter’s rendezvous, 186 nuclear-weapons testing, 7, 8, 121 Pallava era, 67, 83 peaceful nuclear explosion, 6, 9, 15, 120, 122 “radical changes” in the UN, 234 reasons for challenging PLA, 115 South-South financial institution, 198 values the 1914 McMahon Line, 144 withdrew from RCEP, 80 See also Delhi Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK), xx, xxiv, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 44, 45, 53, 54, 60, 61, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 139, 154, 167, 223 Indira Gandhi, 14, 36, 149 Indo-Pacific, 80, 122, 190, 207–211, 219 a ‘US’ ploy, 208 China as the country to watch, 207 new template of globalisation, 210 not set a realistic Indo-Pacific goal, 207

Han Nianlong, 106, 196 India, ix–xv, xvii,–xx, xxiii–xxv, 1–41, 43–83, 85–90, 92–107, 109–127, 129–169, 171–230 as the pharmaceutical factory, 235

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Japan-America-India (JAI), xx, 208 core of the Indo-Pacific, 208 “is not going to work”, 208 Jawaharlal Nehru (Nehru), xii, 12, 13, 21, 35, 36, 85, 86, 87, 92, 94–105,

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107, 109–111, 116, 142, 146, 149, 161, 164, 195, 196 championed PRC’s UN membership, 100 ‘creative’ nonalignment, 35 criticism against, 86 loss of prestige, 110 Patel’s warning to, 86 “plebiscite” in OSJK [repudiation], 90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 102–107 Jiang Yili, 68 Jin Liqun, 192 John Garver, 86, 123, 162, 197 Joseph Biden, 230 Kashmir issue, x, xiii, xx, 3, 12–14, 16, 18, 20, 25, 35, 37, 44, 47, 52, 53, 55–62, 65, 67, 69, 83, 87–94, 97, 102, 117, 129, 131, 132, 134–137, 157, 159, 162, 206, 212, 223 Chinese manoeuvre, 206 Delhi’s updated policy, 129, 212 “global consensus”, 135, 136 [India] altered the dynamics, 53 ‘militarisation’ of, 61 origin of, 24, 52 PRC has a stake, 83 PRC was not privy to, 52, 104, 162 re-activated at UNSC, 223 shape a settlement, 56 strategic crux, 88 ‘Trilateral Affair’, 157 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, 18, 71, 96, 130, 138 K. P. Fabian, 195 Line of Actual Control (LAC), xx, 7, 40, 67, 115, 119, 120, 152, 210, 222, 223, 226, 227

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Index  243

Line of Control (LoC), xx, 2, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 45, 60, 153, 158 Liu Xiaoming, 180, 225 Liu Xuecheng, 39, 40, 148 Lt Gen Raghavan, 155, 168 Luo Zhaohui (Luo), 31, 115, 116, 133, 153, 159, 160, 177 CPEC’s name could be altered, 133 encouraged by China’s intervention, 160 “heart-to-heart talks”, 31, 160 nuances at stake (Doklam), 115 preliminary consensus, 153 Mao Zedong (Mao), xii, 33–35, 58, 86–88, 91, 94–107, 109–111, 114, 142, 146–148, 167, 195–197 alliance with Soviet Union, 34 formative era of, 33 legitimate right, 90, 94, 104 psychological victory, 110 “quasi-alliance” with US, 34 McMahon Line, xxiv, xxvii, 96, 129, 132, 144–149 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 123 Nagarjuna, 68 Narasimha Rao (Rao), xii, 7, 40, 139 concerted efforts with China, 40 new arrangement with China, 7 Nawaz Sharif, 15, 16, 19, 59 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), xx, 10, 11, 121–123, 217, 218 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), xx, 10, 18, 78, 122, 217 Original State of Jammu and Kashmir (OSJK), (Princely State), xx, xxvii,

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2, 3, 44, 45, 48, 52, 54, 55, 58, 85, 88–90, 92–94, 96–99, 102–107, 117, 130, 138, 154, 223 a “province” [Ladakh], 141 “an internationally recognised disputed area”, 55, 93 distinctive unit, 130 “irrevocable” accession, 44, 71, 117 sum of just two integral units, 158 UN-organised plebiscite, 12, 57 Pakistan, ix, x, xiii–xv, xvii, xix, xx, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, 1–4, 6, 9, 11–20, 22, 25, 29, 32, 35–37, 43–64, 69–73, 75, 76, 79, 83, 85–90, 92, 93, 95–100, 102–105, 111, 114, 117–123, 125, 126, 129–141, 150–164, 166–169, 185, 191, 206, 212, 214 expectation of China’s support, 86 not withdrawn its troops, 89 overture towards China, 13 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 86, 110, 140, 144, 177, 183, 229 battle-ready exercises in Tibet, 229 “border troops’ patrolling”, 113 Indian Army more seriously [taken], 183 overran Tawang [1962], 148 road project, 113, 119 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles (PPGP), xx, 9, 75–77, 149 PRC, xii–xv, xviii–xx, xxiii, xxv, 1–9, 21–23, 25, 26, 28–35, 38–40, 43–53, 55–58, 63, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 78–83, 85–88, 91–107, 109, 111–116, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 129, 132–138, 140–154, 157, 159–163, 165–169, 171, 173, 177,

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180, 183, 184, 188, 193–207, 209–229 ‘beneficial’ imperial legacies, 144 cherishes the 1890 Convention, 112, 144 clarifications about CPEC, 161 concealed containment of, 87 message to India in 1963, 100 plebiscite-averse, 104 self-interest in Tibet, 106 shadow-superpower, 92 See also Beijing and China PRC–India/Sino-Indian diplomacy, x, xii–xiv, xx, 1, 4, 19, 21–23, 25–28, 32, 38, 43, 65, 68, 76, 78, 83, 85, 87, 105, 107, 133, 163, 194, 196, 199, 207, 219 a realpolitik deal, 104 all-weather dialogue, 19, 63, 201, 220, 224 bilateral crisis, 43 ‘developmental’ orientation, 78 dialogue on Tibet, 21 manoeuvres in 2020, 23, 73, 107 military clash in mid-June 2020, 1, 38 military confrontation in 2020, 62, 163 not affect the sovereignty claims, 228 not publicly fallen out [NDB or AIIB], 198 PRC–India ‘2+2 Dialogue’, 212 rapprochement, 6, 38 rapprochement in 1988, 6 security cooperation, 74, 77 social foundation, 38, 39, 81 strategic comfort level in 1995, 218 strategic spring, 85, 95

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tipping point, ix, xi–xiii, 1, 13, 20–22, 25, 41, 43, 44, 48, 56, 76, 80, 85, 105, 111, 163, 169, 174, 193–197, 205, 206, 212, 213, 217–219, 222 two options for a new CBM, 228 See also China–India ties President Xi Jinping, xi, xviii, 2, 23, 85, 161, 173, 194, 201, 206, 222 ancient Chinese epigram, 234 Chinese-style ‘Cold War mind-set’, 72 choice of history, 161 collaboration over artificial intelligence, 181 concert of economies, 225, 226, 236 globalisation with Chinese characteristics, 109 imaginary metaphor, 74 launch of the Belt and Road Forum, 19, 28 launched a mega initiative, 20 new direction [diplomacy], 70 ‘proven’ asymmetric advantage, 228, 236 riding the new global realpolitik, 197 South Asian perspective, 70 “unwavering policy”, 63, 69, 85 updated policy on Kashmir, 35, 212 Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Modi), xii, 2, 19, 20, 22–28, 30–33, 36, 37, 39, 41, 43, 46–48, 51–56, 59–70, 72–75, 77–83, 85–88, 107, 110, 113, 116, 117, 124–126, 129, 133, 134, 137, 141, 159, 162, 165, 174, 177–180, 183, 184, 187–190, 192, 194, 196–199,

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201, 204, 210, 212–214, 219, 222–224, 229 accepted Xi’s offer, 65 dramatic air-dash to Lahore, 20 “force multiplier” [global economy], 236 India’s “nuclear triad”, 184 indigenous ASAT test, 188 Kashmir-related challenges, 88 need for “reformed multilateralism”, 194 new modus vivendi, 28, 73 path-breaking “informal meeting”, 19 reinvent ISJK, 54 remarks on the Galwan clash, 222 result of Modi’s diplomacy, 25 strategic autonomy [flaunted], 27, 28, 33, 36 withdrew [RCEP], 80, 81 Qingmin Zhang, xv Quadrilateral (Quad), xx, 208 “a new NATO”, 209 for ‘containment’ of PRC, 209 ‘militarisation’ of, 231 Raja Mohan, xv, 8, 201 Rajesh Basrur (Basrur), 124 Rajiv Gandhi, xii, 7, 32, 196 ROC/pre-PRC regime, xiv, xx, 52, 91–94, 103, 144–147, 201 Russia-India-China (RIC), 46, 82, 181, 226 Sarvepalli Gopal (Gopal), 143 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (Radhakrishnan), 164, 197

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Satinder Kumar Lambah (Lambah), 18, 139, 140 Sergey Lavrov, 135 Shaksgam, xxiv, xxvii, 45, 138, 139, 154, 155, 157, 163, 166–168, 223 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), xx, 119, 197, 200, 202, 205 anti-COVID vaccine [Modi pledged], 175 India’s admission, 119 Xi’s and Modi’s world views, 233 Shimla Accord, 15 Shivshankar Menon, 7, 10, 40, 119, 149, 153 Shyam Saran, 142, 143, 204 Siachen, xxiv, xxvii, 15, 16, 154, 155, 168, 223 Sikkim, 8, 9, 76, 111, 113, 116, 144 Siliguri Corridor, 112, 113, 126 Simla Convention of 1914, 145–148 stipulation in Article II, 146 Sinderpal Singh, 52, 209 Sino-Pakistani border agreement, 13 Sino-Pakistani treaty, 9, 160, 161 Sino-US rapprochement, 14 Special Representatives, 39, 68, 75, 153, 224 Sukh Deo Muni, 214 Sun Weidong (Sun), 2, 24, 65, 186, 214, 215 China’s ancestral claim to Tibet, 2 “future trajectory”, 65 space forays [highlighted], 186 Tawang, xxiv, xxv, xxvii, 131, 144, 145, 147–150, 153, 157, 163, 166–168 Tibet, vii, xiii, xxiv, xxv, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 21, 22, 29, 58, 77, 85, 86, 94,

b4008_Index.indd 246

96–107, 110–112, 116, 141–149, 153, 165–167, 195, 229 Chinese militarization of, 86 potential ‘buffer zone’, 100 PRC’s sovereignty over, 85, 98, 101, 105 Tibetan Government in Exile, 5 Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (UTJK), xxi, xxiv, xxvii, 20, 54–58, 97, 107, 129, 130, 132, 136, 137, 153, 154, 158, 159, 162, 167 Union Territory of Ladakh (UTL), xxi, xxiv, xxvii, 20, 54– 58, 61, 107, 129, 132, 134, 136, 137, 141, 144, 154, 157–159, 162–165, 167, 168, 206, 223, 226, 228, 229 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), xxi, 11–13, 21, 27, 29, 33, 45, 52, 55–59, 62, 64, 69, 82, 88–94, 96–107, 134–136, 158, 162, 200, 201, 218, 223, 226 Chinese behest, 58 did not censure India, 94 elite caucus within the, 200 key abstentions, 91 lack of legitimacy, 91 ‘limits’ of Beijing’s influence, 136 merit of OSJK’s accession, 90 missing catalyst, 101 “withdrawal of Pakistani nationals”, 89 United States (US), 8–14, 16, 17, 22, 24, 29, 33–36, 40, 45, 47, 59–61, 66–68, 70, 72, 73, 76, 79, 82, 87, 89, 91, 95, 96, 181 Bush telephoned [Hu Jintao], 11

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“9x6”

b4008   The Elusive Tipping Point: China–India Ties for a New Order

Index  247



evolving US-PRC hostility, 216 factor [Sino-Indian relationship], 232 funding of WHO, 202 India’s atomic arsenal [legitimacy], 231 “major defence partner” [India], 211 ‘Nixon moment’ [away from], 217 US–China G2 did not emerge, 206 US–India strategic relations, 181 Vice Admiral Harish Bisht, 114 Wen Jiabao, 123, 204

b4008_Index.indd 247

Xi, 2, 19, 22–33, 35–37, 39, 41, 43, 47, 56, 57, 63–75, 77–83, 85–88, 91, 109, 110, 112, 113, 116, 117, 119, 125—127, 133, 134, 161, 162, 165, 174, 180, 181, 183, 189, 198, 201, 204, 210, 219, 222, 224, 225, 229, 232, 236 Zhou Enlai, 21, 94, 95, 97–103, 105–107, 146, 149, 161, 195, 196 “mutual respect for territorial sovereignty”, 97 reported refusal to support, 99 possibility of a swap, 149 visit to Karachi, 103

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