Elusive Pursuits: Lessons From Canada's Interventions Abroad 1928096115, 9781928096115

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CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2015

Elusive Pursuits: Lessons from Canada’s Interventions Abroad — the 29th volume of the influential Canada Among Nations series — examines Canada’s role in foreign military and security missions, including the country’s tendency to intervene under the auspices of international institutions. Canada is not just among nations in these efforts, but in nations on a regular basis. This book considers the longer-term impact of these interventions and draws the lessons to be learned from Canada’s past and current interventions, with the certainty that there will always be a next time.

Canada Among Nations 2015

Canada has been almost continuously involved in major international peace and security enforcement operations since the early 1990s, as part of multilateral efforts to stop wars, monitor peace, avert genocide, promote development or, occasionally, to topple dictators and even win wars. It has deployed anywhere from 1,000 to 4,000 personnel overseas annually since the Gulf War, and participated in missions in Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Libya, East Timor, Iraq and Syria. This volume looks at Canada’s role as interventionist within three broad themes: the lessons learned from interventions in Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia and Haiti; the domestic side of intervention, including Canadian foreign aid and the gender equation in military interventions; and the responsibility to protect, addressing the larger principles and patterns that influence Canada’s engagements.

Canada Among Nations has been the premier source for critical insight into Canadian foreign policy issues since 1984. This edition continues that tradition by providing students, policy makers and practitioners with a timely compendium of expert opinion on how Canada’s past and present military and peacekeeping missions can provide guidance for engagement in the future. FEN OSLER HAMPSON is a distinguished fellow and the director of the Global Security and Politics Program at CIGI. He is also co-director of the Global Commission on Internet Governance, a joint project with CIGI and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He is chancellor’s professor at Carleton University and a former Jennings Randolph Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.

Published by the Centre for International Governance Innovation in partnership with the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.

L E S S O N S F R O M C A N A D A’ S I N T E RV E N T I O N S A B R O A D

Hampson / Saideman

STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN is the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University. His research interests focus on the causes and consequences of intervention into intra-state conflicts. He was a Canada Research Chair and a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow. His current work focuses on the role of legislatures in the civilian control of militaries in the world’s democracies.

Elusive Pursuits

ISBN 978-1-928096-11-5

www.cigionline.org

9 781928 096115

Edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Stephen M. Saideman

Canada Among Nations 2015

Canada Among Nations 2015 ELUSIVE PURSUITS Lessons from Canada’s Interventions Abroad Edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Stephen M. Saideman

Published by the Centre for International Governance Innovation in partnership with the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University

© 2015 the Centre for International Governance Innovation and Carleton University This book has been compiled from the contributions of the author(s) indicated in each chapter, and the copyright in respect of each chapter resides with the author(s) of each chapter. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher and the author, application for which should be addressed to the Centre for International Governance Innovation, 67 Erb Street West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 6C2 or [email protected].

ISBN 978-1-928096-11-5 (paper) ISBN 978-1-928096-12-2 (ebook) The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Operating Board of Directors or International Board of Governors. The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Carleton University gratefully acknowledge and thank the International Development Research Centre for its financial support of this publication.

Published by the Centre for International Governance Innovation in partnership with the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. Printed and bound in Canada.

Cover design: Sara Moore

Centre for International Governance Innovation 67 Erb Street West Waterloo, ON Canada N2L 6C2 www.cigionline.org

Contents

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Rohinton Medhora and Dane Rowlands Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Hugh Segal Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Introduction: Learning Lessons from Canada’s Interventions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Fen Osler Hampson and Stephen M. Saideman Part One — Interventions: Lessons Learned 1

Mandating Responsibility: International Legal Lessons from the Military Intervention in Libya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Christopher K. Penny

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Navigating Troubled Waters: Canada in the Arab World. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Marie-Joëlle Zahar

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Lessons Learned?: Public Opinion and the Afghanistan Mission. . . . . . . . . . 59 Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Richard Nossal

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Canada and Somalia: Learning from the Legacy of Failed Intervention . . . . 79 Aisha Ahmad

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Living among the Population in Southern Afghanistan: A Canadian Approach to Counter-insurgency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Caroline Leprince

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Securing the Pearl of the Caribbean: The Canadian Contribution to Haiti’s Security and Stability, 2004–2014. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Gaëlle Rivard Piché

Part Two — The Domestic Side of Intervention 7

Canada’s Development Interventions: Unpacking Motives and Effectiveness in Canadian Foreign Aid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Stephen Brown

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The Gender Turn in Canadian Military Interventions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Stéfanie von Hlatky

Part Three — Responsibility to Protect 9

Syria and the Responsibility to Protect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Jane Boulden

10 The Call of Duty: Harper’s Doctrine on Military Intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Derek Burney, Fen Osler Hampson and Simon Palamar 11 Geriatric Interventions: The Demographic Horizon of Collective Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Christian Leuprecht Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Preface Rohinton Medhora and Dane Rowlands

Canada Among Nations has been a fixture of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) and the Canadian foreign policy community since the mid-1980s. The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) has been a frequent partner in the publication, having first collaborated with the 2005 volume. This 29th edition is the third of a three-year partnership between NPSIA, CIGI and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). With IDRC’s generous assistance, we have produced volumes on Canada-Africa relations, the global financial crisis and now this year’s volume on intervention and peace enforcement. The case for choosing the topic for this year’s edition was compelling. Contributing to the maintenance and enforcement of peace and security has been part and parcel of contemporary Canadian foreign policy. Canada’s shift from the traditional blue-helmet peacekeeping of the Cold War period to its increasingly more forceful post-Cold War variant reflected the changing international security environment, and contributed to a debate about the role and capability of the Canadian military. There was also a simultaneous recognition of the importance of dealing with violent conflict within states as a prerequisite for meaningful and sustained development. For many Canadians, the mission to Afghanistan was the embodiment of this new intervention reality, and its formal end in 2014 triggered our choice of topic for this year’s edition. Not only is there enough of a record of missions long over or of long standing to undertake this assessment, but enough time has elapsed since the end of the Afghanistan mission, the key exemplar of robust Canadian intervention, to begin the search for emerging lessons.

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Spoiler alert: the editors of this volume conclude that while each situation is obviously different, there has been “a failure to study and script some useful lessons for the future.” This conclusion is both unsurprising and surprising at the same time. It is unsurprising because, as several chapters point out, many missions have been reactions to emergencies rather than the result of a coherent strategic vision, let alone being based on scholarly preparation for a complex problem. Moreover, as a small (and it should always be said, team) player, Canada has been a “strategy consumer” not a “strategy producer.” What is surprising about the conclusion and the absence of sustained analysis of intervention is that these missions have caught the public eye domestically, and consume large amounts of public resources and, at times, public emotion. While this attention is most apparent in the Afghanistan and Somalia missions, it is an undercurrent in them all. And, as the final chapter of this volume notes, there is an urgent need to use our understanding of past interventions to inform our future policies in the face of impending structural changes in Canadian society. For example, the changing demographic pattern in this country is likely to affect Canada’s future interventions abroad. An aging population values the present more than it does the future, and requires greater levels of public services. Both factors militate against expansive (and expensive) ventures abroad in the name of peacekeeping and nation building. Yet we know there will be a next time. Helping to resolve fiendish conditions overseas will always matter at home, either for self-interested motives or for allegedly nobler ones. All the more reason to have the sort of careful, sustained assessment of this subject that the editors and authors of this volume provide. By providing the scholarly analysis of a crucial current and future foreign policy problem for Canada, this volume continues the original mission of the Canada Among Nations series and of NPSIA. By examining a foreign policy problem that raises both challenges and opportunities for governing the global system, the volume speaks to one important facet of CIGI’s work. And by dealing extensively with security in fragile and failed states, the volume wrestles with some of the most difficult obstacles to sustained development that institutions such as IDRC have to face each day. In finding resonance among the three partners of this edition, we trust it will also inform, enlighten and provoke debate within the community of students, scholars, policy makers and other followers of Canadian foreign policy.

Foreword Hugh Segal

Over the past decade or so, I have always advanced the notion that there can be precious little meaning to a concept such as “the responsibility to protect” without the actual capacity to deploy. Whether what needs to be deployed is humanitarian aid, boots on the ground, observer teams, a diplomatic initiative, well-targeted development aid or investment, technical assistance in the face of a bacterial outbreak or air, land or sea combat capacity, not being able to deploy is the ultimate national abdication in the face of international exigencies. At a time when Canada has just come off a high-tempo, multiyear combat operation in Afghanistan replete with many rotations, domestic debate, controversy and more than our fair share of casualties, and now faces — with the rest of the world — new risks in Eastern Europe and marauding, well-organized mass terrorist inhumanity in Syria, Iraq, Northern Africa and elsewhere, reflecting on how we deploy, what resources and approaches are used, what we can learn from the recent past and what we need to master before deploying again has never mattered more. Elusive Pursuits is a timely and essential primer on how we have faced recent deployment challenges and a multi-variant analytical frame on decisions made, choices embraced and challenges ahead. While mid-term controversies on national security laws, procurement delays and snafus, and the usual histrionics of a general election may unwittingly conspire to obscure the real issues around foreign deployments for a modern, democratic and middle-power country, these issues cannot be ignored. Facing them squarely is what the monographs in this year’s Canada Among Nations clearly does. Learning from the legal challenges around the Libyan

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deployment, understanding the context of Canada’s dynamic in the Arab world, reflecting on the public opinion backdrop of the Afghanistan mission or lessons learned from the Somali deployment, evaluating Canadian approaches to local security in Afghanistan and Haiti combined with a careful assessment of what did and did not happen in Syria, generates important questions and insights about how and why Canada has deployed abroad in recent times and for different purposes. The insights and questions raised in these analyses create a broad template for understanding the “operational” code through which a government can decide to deploy. Our four most recent prime ministers, Mulroney, Chrétien, Martin and Harper, all had differing approaches to the deployment question and the surrounding nuances that we are well-advised to understand. The drill-down inquiries into different aspects of Canada’s military deployments included in this volume serve one other compelling and important purpose. The end of the election season will occasion the need for both a fresh foreign policy and a defence policy review — even if the incumbent government is, perchance, returned. For those reviews to be meaningful, timely and well-informed, a rational comprehension of how and why Canada has deployed in recent times, the successes and setbacks, and the legal, foreign and domestic policy political contexts of those deployments need to be understood and assessed. In that goal, and toward that purpose, this volume makes a superb and very constructive contribution, and not a moment too soon.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMISOM African Union Mission to Somalia ANSF Afghan National Security Forces AU African Union BQ Bloc Québécois CAF Canadian Armed Forces CAR Canadian Airborne Regiment CFP Canadian foreign policy CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CIGI Centre for International Governance Innovation COIN counter-insurgency DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade DFATD Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development DND Department of National Defence FAd’H Forces Armées d’Haïti FM 3-24 U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 G8 Group of Eight GCC Gulf Corporation Council GFPS Global Peace and Security Fund ICC International Criminal Court ICHRDD International Center for Human Rights and Democracy Development ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ICJ International Court of Justice

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ICSC IDP IDRC ISAF ISIL ISIS LFTDS LOAC MIF MINUSTAH MNCH MP NAP NATO NDP NFZ NGO NPSIA OCC-D ODA OECD OEF OUP PNH R2P RCMP RCD SNA START SWINTER TFK TNC UNITAF UNMIH UNOAOM UNPol UNSC UNSCR USC WFP WPS

International Commission for Supervision and Control internally displaced person International Development Research Centre International Security Assistance Force Islamic State of Iraq and Levant Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham Land Force Doctrine and Training System Law of Armed Conflict Multinational Interim Force United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti maternal, newborn and child health Member of Parliament national action plan North Atlantic Treaty Organization New Democratic Party no-fly zone non-governmental organization Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Dand District Operational Coordination Centre official development assistance Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Operation Enduring Freedom Operation Unified Protector Police Nationale d’Haïti Responsibility to Protect Royal Canadian Mounted Police Royal Canadian Dragoons Somali National Alliance Stabilization and Reconstruction Team Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles Task Force Kandahar Transitional National Council Unified Task Force United Nations Mission in Haiti United Nations Operation in Somalia United Nations Police United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Resolution United Somali Congress World Food Programme women, peace and security

Introduction Learning Lessons from Canada’s Interventions Fen Osler Hampson and Stephen M. Saideman

When we speak of Canada “among” nations, we need to remember that Canada has frequently intervened in foreign countries as part of multilateral efforts to stop wars, monitor the peace, avert genocide, promote development and good governance, occasionally topple dictators and even win wars. Canada was one of many countries to intervene in Afghanistan for more than a decade. But it was also an intervention that cost Canada many lives and much treasure, with uncertain results. Afghanistan will almost certainly cast a long shadow over future debates about what Canada can and cannot do when it is asked to send troops abroad. However, Afghanistan is not the only country where Canada has intervened in the past two and a half decades: Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Libya, East Timor and now Iraq and Syria form a growing list of interventions in the elusive pursuit of peace and global security. The actual mission and level of Canada’s commitment varied in each case. Yet they all have one thing in common — a failure to study and script some useful lessons for the future. Modern militaries engage in “lessons learned” exercises regularly because the cost of failure on the battlefield can be tragically high. Other departments and agencies of government do so episodically at best. As the Canadian effort in Afghanistan wrapped up, the Privy Council Office apparently organized a formal lessons learned exercise to determine what went right and wrong with the “whole-of-government” approach to the mission. Many officials at different levels of seniority and in different departments were interviewed

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as part of the exercise, and the results of that assessment were penned in a formal report. Unfortunately, the report is now buried in a cabinet drawer.1 Not only are outsiders denied access to the report, but so too are those who work within government. This is a problem, since collecting first-hand accounts and writing a report are only the first two steps — the third is to disseminate the findings so that reforms can be made to improve performance. Perhaps the issue is that admitting mistakes is a painful thing to do and cannon fodder for the government’s critics if the findings become public. One motivation for this volume is to do what governments often cannot — to stimulate public debate and discussion about lessons learned from Canada’s post-Cold War military interventions by offering our own assessments that come from a careful scrutiny of the public record of such interventions. Despite Canada’s recurrent interventions in conflict zones around the world, we have surprisingly few comparative analyses of such efforts. It is true that there are many studies of individual cases, but there are few systematic comparisons across different cases. As a consequence, we do not know what Canada does well, what it does poorly and why (and where) we choose to intervene and why we sometimes do not.

Intervention Patterns Canada has intervened abroad many times over the years, but almost always with others, either as part of a UN-mandated mission or alongside other countries in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led coalition. When scholars speak of intervention, they tend to refer to the deployment of the military in an effort to affect the internal dynamics of another country. While much of the focus of this volume will be on this conventional idea of intervention, the contributors also consider less “kinetic” forms of involvement such as humanitarian aid and development assistance. The goals of such interventions can range from promoting regime change to peacemaking to peacekeeping to training to promoting stability and good governance. Indeed, one can even consider diplomatic efforts to be a form 1

The best evidence we have about this process, aside from a number of conversations with government officials who would rather stay anonymous, is the rejection of the Access to Information request submitted by Stephen M. Saideman. It acknowledged that this document exists, but that he could not see it. The denial is currently in its third year under appeal.

Introduction | 3

of intervention. Still, for most of this volume and for the public in general, intervention tends to mean the use of force to affect the domestic dynamics of another country, with the broad aim of contributing to international peace and security. These interventions tend to be the costliest for Canada in terms of lives and dollars. As a consequence, they receive the most media attention and political scrutiny. What have been the patterns of Canada’s interventions (narrowly defined)? Figure 1 illustrates the missions (number and size of contributions) in which Canadians have contributed troops in substantial numbers to both UN and NATO missions. Figure 1: Canadian Forces Deployment, UN and NATO 5000

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4500

Troop Numbers

3500 15

3000 2500 2000

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1500 1000

Number of Missions

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4000

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0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

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Data sources: For UN statistics, Kathman (2013). For Canada’s NATO deployments, we combined figures from NATO placemats for part of the Kosovo effort (www.aco.nato.int/kfor/ library/facts-figures/archive-kfor-placemate.aspx) and for all of the Afghanistan effort (www.isaf. nato.int/isaf-placemat-archives.html) with Canadian Armed Forces numbers for Bosnia (www. forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=canadian-forces-operations-in-bosnia-herzegovina/ hnps1u07) and Libya (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mobile). The Wikipedia numbers were linked to a Canadian Armed Forces document that is no longer accessible.

While the number of troops deployed in UN peacekeeping missions declined, mostly as Canada ramped up its efforts in Bosnia and then Afghanistan, the overall number of missions has not. Figure 1 indicates that Canada has been

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more or less continuously involved in major international peace and security enforcement operations since the early 1990s, dedicating anywhere between 1,000 and 4,000 personnel overseas. This figure also points to a basic reality that is easy to overlook — Canada always intervenes with other countries under the auspices of international institutions (Dawson 2003; Gordon 1994). It does not act independently nor without the formal blessing of global and/ or regional multilateral institutions. In fact, the only non-UN peacekeeping mission to which Canada was a party during the entire Cold War era was the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) established in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos following the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. One of the more noteworthy features of the new Iraq-Syria mission is that it is the first military effort in which Canada has participated without either the United Nations or NATO being involved. The only previous time Canada was offered such an opportunity, in Iraq in 2003, it declined (Fitzsimmons 2013). There are at least two ways to consider the multilateral nature of Canada’s interventions, one focusing on international norms and another on Canada’s limited abilities as a middle-sized power. Even before the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was enunciated, Canada was consistently and heavily involved in UN efforts to end wars and provide humanitarian relief to those caught up in conflict.2 In the aftermath of Bosnia and Rwanda, Canadian diplomats played an important role in defining R2P and getting UN support for it. Perhaps the spike in Canadian peacekeeping efforts at this time is no accident. The chapters in Part Three: Responsibility to Protect of this volume address R2P’s role in Canada’s interventions, as well as the competing imperatives that might be driving Canada’s selectivity when it comes to non-NATO efforts. That Canada never intervenes alone is most obviously tied to another key reality — Canada does not have the military capability to act unilaterally. Canada’s military is too small to perform most, if not all, interventions on its own. That Canada cannot operate militarily without some partners means that Canada’s ability to choose to intervene will always be severely constrained. The Jean Chrétien government discovered this when it was asked by the Bill Clinton administration to take the lead in 1996 to deal with a growing humanitarian crisis in what was then Eastern Zaire. The crisis dissipated 2

For a good chronology and summary of Canada’s UN efforts, see www.canadahistory. com/sections/war/Peace%20Keepers/peacekeeping.html.

Introduction | 5

before Canada was able to put any troops on the ground, but the burdens of planning and assembling a large multinational force almost brought the Canadian government to its knees, and was a prudent lesson in the limitations of middle-power management and intervention in complex humanitarian emergencies, especially when other major political interests are involved (Smith and Hay 1999). The lesson then and since is that Canada can only go where others are willing to go. Former Prime Minister Paul Martin criticized the Afghanistan operation after he lost the 2006 election, in large part because the growing commitment there crowded out other possible interventions, particularly in Darfur.3 At the time, however, NATO was not going to get involved militarily in Darfur, so Martin was really talking about an intervention that was not going to happen. Canada cannot intervene when it does not have partners, and even when it does have partners, its choices will be constrained by the choices its partners make. Until the early 1990s, Canada participated in every UN peacekeeping operation, but that pattern changed as the number of UN missions grew and Canada realized it had to be more selective about its commitments. However, Canada has participated in all NATO-led enforcement operations, including the missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. Of course, it is not just that NATO is more selective than the United Nations, but that the costs of opting out of NATO missions are seen by the Canadian government as being far greater.

Assessing Canada’s Impact If Canada always intervenes as part of a multilateral operation, what is the particular value that Canada adds to such undertakings? Like nearly every other country operating in Afghanistan, Canada claimed that it was punching above its weight and contributing more than one would expect from a country of its size. Indeed, the argument is easiest to make when the topic is Afghanistan, since Canada had responsibility for one of the most important areas in the country. Kandahar Province was a pivotal locale because the Taliban movement originated there. In her chapter, Caroline Leprince focuses on the key village program, where the Canadian Forces developed a new set of tactics that attracted much attention from those at International Security 3

Interview with Paul Martin, March 29, 2007, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

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Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters. This was a visible effort to make a difference. Scholars and other analysts will debate whether Canada made a sustainable difference, but it is clear that while Canadian Forces and Canadian whole-of-government officials were on the ground, they made an impact. In other NATO efforts, Canadian Forces also made significant contributions. Canada provided 10 percent of the sorties during the Kosovo campaign, which may not seem like much, but was one-third of the total non-American contribution (Dashwood 2000, 288). During the Libyan effort, Canada provided key resources, such as refuelling and reconnaissance aircraft, and was one of only eight NATO members to drop bombs (Auerswald and Saideman 2014). The rest of NATO was unwilling to participate in the bombing campaign. Nevertheless, the reality is that Canada is primarily a “strategy consumer” rather than a “strategy producer.” The big decisions about military operations are generally made by the United States and the American officers that head the missions. This limits how much of a leadership impact Canada can have. However, the general tendency of NATO efforts to distribute responsibility geographically means that Canada can and does run its area of operations as it sees fit within the broader rules of the operation. Moreover, because Canada has “punched above its weight,” Canadian officers have served in major command positions in Afghanistan (Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier served as commander of the ISAF in 2003-2004)4 and in Libya (LieutenantGeneral Charles Bouchard served as NATO’s operational commander of the Libyan mission). One of the key questions that the chapters in this volume also address concerns the longer-term impact of such interventions on the trajectory of politics and developments on the ground. Aisha Ahmad’s chapter on Somalia indicates that Canada had an impact that goes well beyond the immediate fallout of the widely publicized “Somalia Affair.” Ahmad argues that Canadian food assistance, which continued long after the Canadian Forces went home, actually exacerbated the power struggles among Somalia’s rival factions, thus furthering political instability and violent conflict. In her discussion of the Canadian effort in Haiti to train police, Gaëlle Rivard Piché finds that Canada’s focus on the technical aspects of police training have been 4

At the time he served as commander of the ISAF, Hillier was a lieutenant-general, but he was promoted to general and chief of defence staff in February 2005.

Introduction | 7

productive, but come at the expense of other elements of governance reform, such as repairing the country’s weak judicial system. Marie-Joëlle Zahar’s chapter considers Canadian diplomacy in the Middle East, where Canada is swimming in turbulent waters with limited impact. To be fair, Canada is only one of many countries involved in security sector reform and development, so it is hard to give Canada too much credit when things go well or to assign Canada blame when they go wrong.

The Style of Canadian Interventions How is the Canadian military distinct or similar to the military of other countries in the way it performs or carries out its missions? The key village program discussed by Leprince is one such distinctly Canadian effort, and was viewed as a potential model for other countries. Rivard Piché demonstrates that Canada does pursue its own course in Haiti, doing both more and less than what the other international actors are attempting to do. Ahmad’s chapter provides a split decision on this question, as the Somalia Affair produced a uniquely Canadian reaction — disbanding the Airborne Regiment — but the food assistance programs presented dynamics similar to those experienced by other contributors. In other ways, Canada is not that unique, especially when it comes to dealing with the legal aspects of a mission, as Christopher K. Penny documents in his chapter on Libya. Stéfanie von Hlatky suggests that there is not a single Canadian style of intervention, since agencies differ even in how they understand gender mainstreaming. Likewise, Stephen Brown demonstrates that Canadian aid has not had a single consistent pattern, which makes it hard to argue that Canada does aid differently than other countries. Derek Burney, Fen Osler Hampson and Simon Palamar do not put their chapter into comparative context, but one could see how the pressures facing all NATO leaders could lead to similar responses — doing as much as expected by their allies. Similarly, Zahar’s perspective on Canada’s diplomacy in the Middle East suggests that Canada is not that distinct — the focus on the threat of Islamist extremism has meant compromising values via supporting brutal regimes.

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The Domestic Politics of Intervention Under the Canadian Constitution, the executive branch of government is not formally required to secure parliamentary approval for declarations of war or when Canadian troops are deployed overseas in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations (see Hampson 2003, 128-29). Under the National Defence Act, the governor-in-council has the statutory authority to deploy Canadian forces in “active service” in Canada or overseas, as the situation requires. Until recently, however, the practice of most governments was to inform Parliament when Canadian Forces were being deployed overseas in peacekeeping or enforcement operations, usually in the form of “take note” debates. That practice changed under the Harper government, which not only went to Parliament to seek formal approval for the extension of the Afghanistan mission, but also for the subsequent mission in Libya.5 Whatever the political motivation, the decision by the Harper government to secure parliamentary approval for these foreign troop deployments is one that future governments may be obliged to follow, now that the precedent has been set. The Canadian public has rarely been warmly disposed or strongly opposed to these overseas military engagements and public support has been lukewarm at best. Politicians have struggled to articulate the purposes of these missions (Boucher 2009, 717) with indifferent results. As Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Richard Nossal document in their chapter, politicians do not get entirely clear signals from the Canadian public. Support also tends to be highly regionalized, being stronger in the West than it is in Quebec or Ontario. Brown suggests that domestic political interests drive Canada’s assistance policies, even as there are other ways to consider the broader patterns over time. This ambivalence or uncertainty gives Canadian politicians and parties significant room to operate. Constraints, however, do exist, as Chrétien clearly understood that the Canadian public would not accept participating in the American war in Iraq in 2003.

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The Iraq mission is confusing given that the language in the motion is not about approval but giving support.

Introduction | 9

The Road Ahead This volume is organized into three parts: focusing on the Afghanistan experience; considering Canada’s less violent efforts abroad; and then addressing the larger principles and patterns influencing Canada’s engagements. Afghanistan will clearly shape the imagination of Canadians as they consider interventions over the next 20 or more years. Analyses of the mission will fill many books, and we cannot adequately address the entire conflict in this volume. Instead, we have three chapters that take very clear and distinct angles providing us with some key lessons to be learned. Leprince examines the key village effort that the Canadian Forces initiated toward the end of the Canadian effort in Kandahar. When finally given a chance, not just to clear, but to hold and to build, the Canadian Forces were able to innovate and make more progress than before. The author draws upon this experience to assess the conditions for success in future efforts. Boucher and Nossal look at the home game, and seek to explain the patterns of public opinion that allowed this effort to continue, despite being the most costly intervention since Korea. Their assessment suggests that another prime minister could commit Canada to a similar effort, and ride the waves of ambivalence through elections and through mixed outcomes in the field. Von Hlatky uses the Afghanistan experience to consider the role of gender in the Canadian Forces. There was much irony involved, as the Canadian Forces’ stance on equality — that women should be treated exactly the same as men — ignored the added value that women brought to this distinct battlefield, where the population was highly segregated by gender. To get the most out of population-centric operations, the Canadian Forces had to engage the women of Afghanistan, which turned out to be “women’s work,” since the women of Afghanistan would not talk to the men of the Canadian Forces. The volume then turns to Canadian interventions that involved less or little violence, with some contradictory lessons to learn about Canadian ambition: should Canadians learn humility or should Canada try to do more? Canadians mostly remember the Somalia intervention for the scandal involving the beating and killing of Somalis. Ahmad puts those events into context by addressing the larger purpose of the intervention — feeding the starving Somalis — which had longer-lasting but deceptively pernicious effects.

10 | Fen Osler Hampson and Stephen M. Saideman

Canada’s good intentions here had quite tragic consequences. Rivard Piché considers the enduring effort to build Haiti’s justice system. Canada has been a significant contributor to Haiti’s development efforts, but Rivard Piché argues that the lesson to be learned is that much more needs to be done than improve the technical aspects of Haiti’s rule of law. Zahar examines Canada’s diplomacy in the Middle East, and finds significant contradictions between Canadian actions and values. Brown addresses Canada’s development assistance, seeking to assess the key dynamics driving the delivery of dollars and projects. The last section of the volume considers the larger lessons to be learned from the broad patterns of Canadian intervention. What does R2P require? Does it involve regime change? Penny’s perspective on the legal lessons drawn from the Libyan mission speaks to larger questions about how Canada can and should participate in these very complex operations. He raises issues about the complicated mandates of these efforts and how they impose significant responsibilities on those who join such efforts. Boulden considers the nonevent — the limited intervention against Assad in Syria — to examine the limits of R2P. Her chapter draws lessons about somewhat more subtle forms of intervention — the non-use but threat of force. Burney, Hampson and Palamar argue that Harper’s foreign policy toward various crises has not been driven by R2P, but instead by a principled duty to participate. The imperatives of joining with allies have meant that Canada engages in these missions even as the goals are less than clear. Leuprecht addresses the key lesson that might be learned from Afghanistan — not to intervene at all. His chapter considers the larger demographic trends that suggest that this lesson might be the most enduring of them all. The contributions in this volume do not provide a single set of recommendations, but they do help develop key themes that need to be considered the next time Canada is involved in an intervention. Indeed, the clear lesson here is that there is always a next time. Canada is not just among nations, but in nations on a regular basis. Perhaps the real lesson here is that Canadian politicians need to embrace humility — there is only so much Canada can contribute, the problems requiring intervention are increasingly complex, and the various alternatives tend to range from bad to worse. Domestic and international politics will push Canada again and again into these multilateral interventions,

Introduction | 11

even as many of them do not work out so well. By facing Canada’s limitations and strengths, perhaps we can pick and choose among the many intervention opportunities and implement better approaches.

Acknowledgement This introduction benefited significantly from research assistance provided by Uri Marantz.

Works Cited Auerswald, David P. and Stephen M. Saideman. 2014. NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Boucher, Jean-Christophe. 2009. “Selling Afghanistan: A Discourse Analysis of Canada’s Military Intervention, 2001–08.” International Journal 64 (3): 717–33. Dashwood, Hevina S. 2000. “Canada’s Participation in the NATO-led Intervention in Kosovo.” In Canada Among Nations 2000: Vanishing Borders, edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press Canada. Dawson, Grant. 2003. “A ‘Special Case’: Canada, Operation Apollo, and Multilateralism.” In Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus, edited by David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson and Norman Hillmer. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press Canada. Fitzsimmons, Dan. 2013. “Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.” International Journal 68 (2), Spring: 305–13. Gordon, Nancy. 1994. “Beyond Peacekeeping: Somalia, the United Nations and the Canadian Experience.” In Canada Among Nations 1994: A Part of the Peace, edited by Maureen Appel Molot and Harald Van Riekhoff. Ottawa, ON: Carleton University Press.

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Hampson, Fen Osler. 2003. “Canada: Committed Contributor of Idea and Forces, But with Growing Doubts and Problems.” In Democratic Accountabilty and the Use of Force in International Law, edited by Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Gordon and John Hay. 1999. “Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire.” In Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, 87–105. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Part One Interventions Lessons Learned

1 Mandating Responsibility International Legal Lessons from the Military Intervention in Libya Christopher K. Penny

Introduction Canada played a lead role in Operation Unified Protector (OUP), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation undertaken to protect the civilian population of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Commanded by Canadian Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, and conducted pursuant to a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate, OUP involved an extensive aerial and naval campaign in and around Libya from late March to October 31, 2011. This chapter addresses various international legal lessons arising for Canada and other states as a result of this multilateral operation, focusing in particular on the nature of its mandate and other related strategic legal issues (rather than its actual military activities or longer-term post-conflict implications).1 It begins with a brief overview of international military intervention in Libya, and Canadian participation in it, while the following section situates OUP 1

Canadian military intervention in Libya also raised a number of domestic legal issues, including the role of the Crown Prerogative as the basis for executive authorization of expeditionary military operations. While important, these domestic issues are also beyond the scope of this chapter.

15

16 | Christopher K. Penny

within its larger international legal framework. This chapter then addresses six specific legal issues from OUP of relevance to future operations, illustrating, in particular, the utility and potential risks of an open-ended and flexible Security Council mandate and the inherent challenges of reviewing and coordinating multinational military operations.

Intervention in Libya The immediate catalyst for international involvement in Libya in 2011 was the violent repression of internal dissent by military and paramilitary forces loyal to its leader, Colonel Moammar Muhammad al Gadhafi. Domestic public opposition to Gadhafi’s regime had begun early that year in the larger regional context of the Arab Spring. This initially peaceful dissent quickly invited a forceful state response and, by mid-February, had resulted in the outbreak of internal armed conflict in Libya. Concerned about ongoing attacks by regime forces against the civilian population of Libya, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1970 (February 26, 2011)2 to require and pressure Libyan authorities to refrain from further such acts. This unanimously adopted enforcement measure established a mandatory sanctions regime, which included a travel ban and asset freeze directed against key Libyan leaders, including Gadhafi, as well as a comprehensive arms embargo. It also referred the ongoing situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation and potential prosecution. Although the Security Council did not then authorize the use of remedial international force, it expressly indicated its intent to revisit the adequacy of these nonforceful measures in light of subsequent Libyan compliance. Only three weeks later, the Security Council authorized a more forceful international response in light of ongoing Libyan non-compliance — in particular, when Gadhafi himself appeared to threaten the entire civilian population of the rebel-held northeastern city of Benghazi. UNSC Resolution 1973 (March 17, 2011) demanded a ceasefire and authorized the use of remedial international military force “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack,”3 to establish a related no-fly zone and

2 See www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011). 3 www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011).

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to maintain the arms embargo against Libya, in addition to expanding the initial sanctions regime. An ad hoc multilateral coalition conducted the first armed strikes against Libyan regime forces pursuant to this UNSC mandate.4 NATO took control of these military operations in late March 2011, following the establishment of OUP. Various NATO and allied states subsequently conducted actual air strikes against regime targets in Libya — including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom — with substantial additional operational and logistical support from other states, in particular Sweden and the United States, and from NATO itself. Almost 10,000 strike sorties were flown during OUP, resulting in almost 6,000 targets in Libya reported destroyed (see NATO 2011). Various NATO and allied states were also involved in extensive related naval operations, in particular to enforce the maritime embargo component of OUP. At times, these also involved the direct application of military force, including naval shore bombardment. The Canadian contribution to OUP — designated Operation Mobile — included the deployment of a naval frigate (HMCS Charlottetown, followed by HMCS Vancouver), six CF-188 Hornets (CF-18s), additional air-to-air refuelling and air patrol assets, and associated Canadian Armed Forces personnel, along with various additional military and civilian personnel within the national and NATO operational headquarters and support elements. Canadian assets conducted approximately 10 percent of all OUP aerial strike sorties, in addition to substantial further naval operations supporting the maritime embargo (see Government of Canada, n.d.). The UNSC terminated its authorization to use force in Libya with Resolution 2016 (October 27, 2011), effective October 31, 2011. This decision followed the capture of Tripoli and the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime by Libyan opposition forces of the Transitional National Council (TNC) in August, and the subsequent killing of Gadhafi by these domestic forces in mid-October. OUP ended in conjunction with its underlying Security Council mandate.

4

Including Canada, but composed primarily of French, British and American strike assets, this initial military response is generally known under its US codename, Operation Odyssey Dawn.

18 | Christopher K. Penny

International Law and the Libyan Intervention A well-developed international legal framework governed the initiation and subsequent conduct of multinational military operations in Libya. A fundamental principle of this legal order — enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) and also reflected in customary international law — prohibits states from using military force in their international relations without the consent of the target state; however, this prohibition is not absolute. A clearly recognized exception permits the necessary and proportionate use of military force when it is expressly sanctioned by the UNSC pursuant to its binding authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.5 This was the case with Resolution 1973, which established both the principal legal basis for, and the overarching parameters of, the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya. As with all military engagements, OUP was further regulated by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC),6 also known as international humanitarian law or the laws of war. This specialized body of international law governs the conduct of hostilities, in particular, the actual application of military force, establishing various treaty and customary protections from the effects of conflict for civilians and also for combatants themselves. At the core of its universal principles governing the application of military force, LOAC requires all armed forces to direct their attacks only against military objectives (determined in accordance with their nature, location, purpose or use) and, when doing so, to take all feasible precautions to protect innocent civilians as well as civilian objects from the incidental effects of these attacks. Such otherwise lawful attacks must still be cancelled if their expected collateral civilian impact would be excessive in light of their anticipated military advantage. In addition to these basic targeting principles, LOAC also establishes various other obligations regulating the conduct of hostilities (for example, prohibitions or restrictions on the use of particular 5

6

See www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. The only other broadly accepted exception to this general legal prohibition permits the use of force in individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack. As a matter of law, the international use of force for any other purpose remains controversial — including (unauthorized) humanitarian intervention pursuant to the normative responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine. LOAC incorporates various treaties, in particular, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, along with a substantial body of customary international law. For an overview of key aspects of this international legal regime see, for example, www. icrc.org/en/war-and-law.

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weapons), many of general customary application and many others reliant on specific state treaty adherence. Violating either of these regimes may give rise to state international legal responsibility and corresponding obligations to cease such wrongful conduct and to provide effective remedies to affected states. Remedial obligations may require restoration of the status quo ante, financial compensation, satisfaction (such as a diplomatic apology) or a combination thereof. Although there are often limited judicial forums in which affected states might effectively pursue these legal options — for example, states must expressly consent to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and most have not yet done so in a comprehensive manner7 — violations may nonetheless also lead to significant domestic and international political costs, whether or not they result in formal judicial sanction. Increasingly, individuals themselves may also be held legally accountable and imprisoned for related misconduct, particularly with respect to serious LOAC violations, under both domestic and international criminal law regimes.8

Legal Lessons Viewing OUP through the prism of this general legal framework, a number of key lessons emerge of relevance to the establishment and conduct of future operations. In particular, this intervention highlighted both the utility and the potential risks of an open-ended and flexible Security Council mandate, while also demonstrating the inherent legal challenges of reviewing and coordinating multinational military operations.

Express UN Authority First and foremost of these lessons is the utility of obtaining prior express Security Council authorization to use military force. There is absolutely no doubt that Chapter VII authorization of “all necessary measures” provided 7

8

Although Canada has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, it has done so with exceptions and only on the condition of reciprocity. Most other states have not done so at all, apart from some specific treaty regimes that establish limited ICJ jurisdiction over related disputes. For example, in Canada, individual criminal responsibility for wartime misconduct may arise in various ways, including under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act or within the military justice system.

20 | Christopher K. Penny

a clear legal basis for any international military operations required to accomplish the protective mandate outlined in Resolution 1973. This express authorization — using well-understood UNSC language — substantially reduced the international legal risks for the various states subsequently conducting and supporting OUP. This contrasts favourably with Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO military intervention in the former Yugoslavia, in which Canada also participated. The absence of express Chapter VII authorization for this earlier operation required NATO states to rely upon more controversial legal arguments to support their intervention, including “implied” Security Council authorization, the maintenance of regional security and “humanitarian intervention” (to the extent that they were called upon to offer specific legal justifications at all). Although it does not necessarily follow that this earlier operation was unlawful,9 the absence of express Security Council authorization for any nonconsensual military intervention substantially increases the resulting legal risk for participating states. These risks can be significant, as the first use of armed force by one state against another generally constitutes an unlawful act of aggression, absent a demonstrated lawful justification. An express UNSC mandate directly and fully answers this legal concern (so long as the actual use of force is consistent with the mandate, an issue discussed in greater detail in the (Other) Consequences of Ambiguity section below). In addition to legal protection, an express UNSC mandate offers substantial political legitimacy to intervening forces. In the case of Libya, the lack of unanimous support for Resolution 1973 weakened this political effect to a degree; unlike earlier non-forceful measures against Libya, only 10 UNSC members supported the subsequent authorization to use remedial military force (with the remaining five abstaining, including permanent members China and Russia). Nonetheless, the approving states included all three African states then on the council — Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa — along with Lebanon, the only Arab state, which helped to demonstrate broader regional support for intervention than NATO states alone could have provided (coupled with expressions of support for limited intervention from

9

There has been no international judicial decision on this point. ICJ cases brought by Yugoslavia against Canada and the other intervening NATO states were ultimately rejected on jurisdictional grounds.

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the wider Arab League, to which the Security Council referred specifically in its preamble to this resolution10). These political divisions did not affect the legality of Resolution 1973 or its authorization to use force. Security Council unanimity may strengthen legitimacy, but it is not a legal requirement. Nor is the support of regional actors or organizations.11 Instead, the requisite UN Charter threshold for adopting any substantive UNSC resolution is nine affirmative votes and no negative vote from a permanent member. Even with 10 affirmative votes, it was the abstention of China and Russia that ultimately permitted passage of Resolution 1973; a negative vote from either one would have prevented this outcome. The support of regional actors likely helped overcome the initial unease of these two states concerning the use of force in Libya or, at least, substantially elevated the political cost of their continued opposition (indeed, both states referred specifically to the support of regional organizations in UNSC statements following their abstentions). Their subsequent concern that NATO abused its authority by supporting regime change in Libya may foreshadow future challenges for achieving Security Council support for similar resolutions (as discussed in greater detail below).

Open-ended Mandate Significantly, Resolution 1973 did not establish a fixed end date for the authorization to use remedial military force in Libya. The NATO intervention was not expected to last as long as it did — in the end, a full seven months — and this open-ended mandate ensured that intervening states were not required to seek a Security Council deadline extension in the midst of their ongoing military operations. From the perspective of contributing states, this flexibility was clearly important, in particular as international criticism of OUP mounted. Since China and Russia both argued that OUP exceeded its original mandate to use 10 11

The preamble also expressly noted prior condemnations by both the Arab League and the African Union of human rights and LOAC violations occurring in Libya. Though Chapter VIII of the UN Charter contemplates a role for regional arrangements, in particular in the peaceful settlement of local disputes, this does not override the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. See www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml.

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force, each might have vetoed any attempt to extend this authority without substantial additional constraints. A finite mandate could therefore have entrenched a looming threshold disaster for intervening states, while also permitting Libyan regime forces to simply outlast meaningful international involvement. Viewed from a broader perspective, however, an open-ended Chapter VII mandate to use force can present significant legal and practical risks. As an extreme example, the United Kingdom and the United States both controversially invoked the 1990 UNSC authorization to use force against Iraq, as a legal justification for their subsequent 2003 invasion of this country. Once given, open-ended authorization is difficult to clarify, restrict or revoke, as a new UNSC resolution will generally be required to do so, itself necessitating nine affirmative votes and subject to permanent member veto. This is a particular challenge if the states continuing to rely upon the initial open-ended mandate include one or more permanent members; this was the case with OUP, which involved France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Despite this concern, the Libyan intervention nonetheless illustrated that an open-ended Security Council mandate to use force need not always be an infinite one. Its express termination pursuant to Resolution 201612 eliminated any future “revival” arguments while also providing a clean break for NATO forces (which could no longer continue to operate lawfully in Libya, absent another legal basis to do so).

Flexible Objectives When it applied, the UNSC mandate provided substantial but not absolute operational flexibility to intervening NATO forces. The Security Council did not specifically countenance NATO assistance to opposition forces in Libya, let alone its support for or direct involvement in regime change. Instead, Resolution 1973 simply authorized the use of all force necessary for the protection of “civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack”13 and for the enforcement of the related no-fly zone and arms embargo. In doing so, it employed more permissive language than its previous similar 12 13

See www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2016(2011). See www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011).

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authorizations to use force to protect civilians under imminent threat of attack (for example, for UN peacekeeping forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Although the Security Council did not specifically identify the intended target of its protective measures, these were nonetheless plainly directed first and foremost at the Libyan regime. Its actions were the focus of UNSC discussions concerning the adoption of both Resolutions 1970 and 1973, and only state representatives and related family members were named in the resulting sanctions regime. However, the UNSC mandate clearly left open the possibility of also using protective force more generally against other actors in Libya, should the need arise. The interpretation of this mandate was, as usual, left largely to intervening forces themselves (albeit always subject to Security Council reconsideration and requiring reports to the UN Secretary-General). Initial NATO actions pursuant to the mandate generally targeted Libyan regime forces directly threatening civilians, particularly in the vicinity of Benghazi (which was specifically mentioned in Resolution 1973), or that posed a risk to coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone. NATO subsequently expanded its operations to include other military targets affiliated with the Libyan regime with the ongoing capacity to conduct or contribute to attacks against civilians, whether or not they posed an imminent threat of doing so at the time they were engaged, in light of the demonstrated regime intent to continue such attacks. While the Libyan regime change was ultimately effected by internal TNC opposition forces, there is no doubt that NATO air and sea operations contributed substantially to their success. While the UNSC mandate did not specifically authorize this result, neither did it prohibit it. So long as only the use of force against regime actors was required to protect the civilian population of Libya, it was consistent with the broad legal mandate established in Resolution 1973 — even if it necessarily served to benefit TNC forces and thereby contributed to actual regime change. This allowed NATO to tailor its intervention based on its own understanding of the evolving situation within Libya and, in particular, its own determination of the principal source of ongoing threats to the civilian population.

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(Other) Consequences of Ambiguity Nonetheless, while this Security Council mandate provided intervening forces with significant operational flexibility, its inherent ambiguity also supported competing narrower interpretations and thereby invited considerable political and legal controversy. In particular, NATO was characterized as using force well beyond its protective mandate (and heavily criticized for doing so) by, among others, China and Russia, as well as by South Africa, a non-permanent member of the Security Council that had initially supported Resolution 1973. Despite this controversy, in December 2011, Secretary-General Ban KiMoon (2011) stated unequivocally that “Security Council Resolution 1973, I believe, was strictly enforced within that limit, within the mandate.[14] This military operation done by the NATO forces was strictly within [Resolution] 1973 (2011).”15 While this alone does not establish the legality of OUP (as the Secretary-General does not have this authority), it nonetheless provides useful political support to intervening NATO states, particularly in light of his (limited) role overseeing the implementation of this protective mandate. As noted, the relevant UNSC resolutions and their supporting discussions all serve to identify regime forces as the principal threat to Libyan civilians. Indeed, it is rather disingenuous (or, at least, naïve) to suggest that the threat posed to civilians by regime-sponsored crimes against humanity could be ended without substantial changes to that very regime (a rhetorical point made by various NATO political leaders during OUP itself). Regardless, arguments that NATO overstepped or abused its mandate continue to undermine the legitimacy and legacy of its Libyan intervention (and the R2P doctrine itself). Warranted or not, these concerns will likely affect future UNSC Chapter VII authorizations in similar situations. Indeed, China and Russia have both already invoked the Libyan precedent to justify their continued opposition to forceful remedial measures to address the horrific civilian effects of the ongoing Syrian civil war. These concerns might have been raised in good

14 15

That is, within the R2P doctrine (as agreed at the 2005 UN World Summit). This was in response to the specific concern that NATO exceeded its Security Council mandate.

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faith; at minimum, they provide a principled public rationale for decisions taken in the national interest.16 That said, while the fear of mandate abuse may have complicated subsequent UNSC authorizations in some cases, it has not always prevented them. Since OUP, the Security Council has established or extended mandates to use remedial force in various African states, including the Central African Republic and Mali; however, these subsequent mandates have involved providing military support to state actors rather than implementing coercive measures against them. OUP does appear to have made obtaining Chapter VII mandates in these latter cases more difficult. For the Security Council, drafting future protective mandates to address these concerns while still providing needed operational flexibility to intervening states will be a significant challenge, in particular, for remedial campaigns such as OUP that will necessarily involve substantial targeting of state military forces. Even if the Security Council is able to agree upon such mandates in future, it will be difficult, both politically and practically, for it to do so without still enshrining considerable ambiguity. Indeed, as is often the case, ambiguity may be the very price of UNSC agreement. While such ambiguity will still provide some operational flexibility, it may also raise the legal risks for intervening states (in addition to facilitating their subsequent political condemnation).17 If coercive military operations extend beyond their underlying Security Council mandate, this will likely constitute unlawful aggression, absent another legal justification, giving rise to potentially significant state remedial obligations. The legality of OUP itself has not been examined by an international court, and it is doubtful that it will be; the current Libyan government has not pursued such a remedy, and there would be significant jurisdictional restrictions on it doing so. Among other things, Libya has not accepted the general compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. However, this may not be the case for future operations undertaken pursuant to ambiguous Security Council mandates. If other states 16

17

In chapter 9 of this volume, Jane Boulden addresses in greater detail these Chinese and Russian concerns about OUP and, in particular, their impact on subsequent international responses to the ongoing conflicts in Syria. As Boulden notes, the Libyan intervention affected not only related Security Council decision making, but also the broader international appeal of the R2P doctrine itself. Assuming, of course, that greater clarity would have established such flexibility rather than restricting it.

26 | Christopher K. Penny

can reach legal interpretations of these mandates other than those proposed by intervening states, then independent international tribunals may do so as well (though competing reasonable interpretations of ambiguous language may well be insufficient to establish illegality). These legal risks may extend beyond the intervening states themselves to also affect their individual political and military leaders. In particular, the ICC may in future be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, albeit no earlier than 2017.18 Although the Security Council possesses the legal authority to defer any resulting investigation or prosecution, its exercise is subject to permanent member veto. While not applicable to OUP, as the ICC does not yet have such jurisdiction, potential individual criminality may well present an additional strategic legal consideration — and potential impediment — for future military operations, in particular for attracting sufficient state contributions to ensure mission success and related political legitimacy.

Concurrent ICC Investigation The ICC clearly already did have a significant impact on various other aspects of the internal Libyan conflict and the related NATO intervention. As noted, Resolution 1970 expressly authorized its investigation of the situation in Libya after mid-February 2011; as Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute, this Chapter VII referral was a necessary legal prerequisite for ICC jurisdiction over Libyan actors in this case. The resulting investigation led the ICC to issue arrest warrants in late June 2011 for three key regime figures: Gadhafi, his son, Saif al-Islam, and the head of Libyan military intelligence, Abdullah al-Senussi. This ICC investigation and, in particular, these resulting arrest warrants, provided useful tools for intervening states to further marginalize the Libyan regime (in conjunction with the UNSC resolutions themselves). NATO also specifically invoked these warrants to undermine the loyalty of Libyan military and paramilitary forces to Gadhafi (for example, by highlighting them in propaganda leaflets), while the ongoing threat of ICC investigation 18 This remains subject to a two-thirds majority decision of the parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC and the subsequent ratification of necessary treaty amendments by 30 such states. See www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE940A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf and www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ RC2010/AMENDMENTS/CN.651.2010-ENG-CoA.pdf.

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and prosecution was used to discourage these forces from additional attacks against civilians. The ICC investigation may also have encouraged LOAC compliance by the TNC and other Libyan opposition forces, thereby further supporting the overall protective Security Council mandate. Not only did it establish a credible threat of potential individual criminal prosecution, particularly for political and military leaders, it also threatened the associated loss of international legitimacy — and related moral and material support — for the Libyan opposition movement as a whole. For the same reasons, though, ICC involvement in Libya was a potential double-edged sword for opposition and intervening NATO forces. Human Rights Watch and other similar organizations have raised serious concerns about the conduct of some opposition forces — among other things, relating to the alleged systematic mistreatment of detained regime forces, including the killing of Gadhafi. While the ICC investigation helped to delegitimize the Gadhafi regime, it could also have had the same effect on Libyan opposition forces had these allegations resulted in arrest warrants or actual war crimes prosecutions. As a matter of law, ICC jurisdiction over the situation in Libya also enabled its investigation and potential prosecution of OUP actors themselves, including most NATO military personnel and civilian political leaders. This is not the first time that an international tribunal has had criminal jurisdiction to review the conduct of NATO military operations. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia openly assessed NATO actions during the 1999 Kosovo campaign, but determined that they did not warrant further investigation or prosecution. Similarly, the ICC prosecutor has not pursued any charges relating to the conduct of OUP, although Human Rights Watch and some other human rights organizations have called for further investigation of specific NATO attacks that may have resulted in civilian casualties. In such circumstances, a credible independent decision not to prosecute intervening forces for LOAC violations may provide them additional political legitimacy (in particular, when coupled with arrest warrants against opposing regime leaders). However, warranted or not, both Yugoslavia and Libya also illustrate that doing so may undermine the reputation of the tribunals themselves, which may create additional political pressure for future such

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investigations and prosecutions. Regardless, impartial prosecutorial and judicial review of international military operations can, at times, provide an important additional oversight mechanism and a further significant incentive to comply with LOAC obligations. For most NATO states, including Canada, this is much more likely following the 2002 establishment of the ICC. As OUP illustrates, these states — and, in particular, their armed forces — must now always be aware of potential independent international legal review of their military operations. In turn, this requires the ongoing provision of effective legal advice to military commanders throughout these operations (which, in any event, LOAC already requires). While these states already have a legal obligation to comply with LOAC in good faith, and may also be subject to ICJ jurisdiction in some cases, the potential for independent ICC review and related individual criminal prosecution has, nonetheless, created an additional significant legal and political consideration for future military interventions — in particular, if it subsequently includes the crime of aggression. It is important to note that the legal basis for ICC jurisdiction over the conduct of OUP was not simply UNSC Resolution 1970. With the exception of Turkey and the United States, all NATO states are (and were then) parties to the Rome Statute. Their military and political leaders are therefore already subject to ICC investigation and prosecution (should these states prove unwilling or unable to do so themselves). For the same reason, the ICC also had jurisdiction over most NATO activities in Afghanistan, without the need for a Security Council reference at all. The ICC will continue to have jurisdiction over the military operations of all of these states, including Canada, absent their (unlikely) future withdrawal from the Rome Statute. The Security Council retains the authority to restrict the exercise of ICC jurisdiction in such situations, should it determine that the interests of international peace and security so require. With Resolution 1970, for example, although the Security Council otherwise referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, it explicitly precluded ICC jurisdiction over military personnel from intervening states not already parties to the Rome Statute. Among other things, this exemption no doubt facilitated subsequent United States participation in and extensive military support to OUP (without which the operation would have faced immense and possibly insurmountable practical challenges). However, while the Security Council may well also exercise this

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authority in future similar cases, it is unlikely to extend immunity to states such as Canada that have already voluntarily submitted to ICC jurisdiction.

Multilateral Legal Coordination This was not the only case where differential legal obligations arose in the context of the Libyan intervention. While LOAC establishes fundamental legal principles applicable to all states — such as the general targeting principles outlined earlier — some of its other provisions apply only to states that have ratified particular treaties. Indeed, this mixture of universally binding principles and state-specific obligations is a general characteristic of the international legal regime as a whole (as evidenced by the Rome Statute discussions above). As a result, many states (and their individual military personnel) are prohibited from engaging in conduct that may remain lawful for some or all of their allies. Among other things, not all NATO states have ratified the two 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions or other more specific LOAC treaties, such as the Ottawa Convention banning (most) anti-personnel landmines — for example, the United States is not a party to any of these international agreements. Not all of the principles enshrined in these treaties are reflected in universally binding customary international law either. Identifying and appreciating the implications of these differential LOAC and other international legal obligations are therefore essential when establishing and conducting any multinational military operation. Less obviously, states with the same treaty and customary LOAC obligations may nonetheless understand and apply these legal obligations quite differently. For example, in OUP, not all participating states publicly accepted that they were thereby involved in an international armed conflict in Libya (separate from the non-international armed conflict between opposition TNC forces and the Libyan regime). NATO has not established common organizational understandings of these threshold LOAC issues. Instead, these legal determinations are left to its individual member states, which can and does lead to substantive differences in interpretation and application. In practice, the effect of these differences in legal commitment and understanding can be substantially constrained by developing a common NATO Operational Plan and related organizational Rules of Engagement (ROE) prior to military intervention, as was the case with OUP. Among other

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things, each of these documents factors in not only legal considerations but also political and logistical restrictions, the latter two generally of narrow operational scope far beyond LOAC requirements alone. As a result, many national legal differences have no substantial operational effect. Nonetheless, national ROE can and do differ, as a result of individual state obligations, logistical constraints, and political and legal risk tolerance. For states with more restrictive parameters than the general NATO ROE — whether legal or otherwise — this will limit their ability to participate in related aspects of the operation. From an operational perspective, this will necessarily affect how various national forces are employed, whether as a result of their prior stated caveats or the case-specific refusal of these forces to undertake particular taskings. Conversely, states with broader interests and more flexible legal obligations or interpretations may, at times, decide to re-employ national assets outside of the multilateral command and control framework. NATO, as an organization, does not exercise full command over national military contingents, nor does such an absolute relationship apply between units or individual personnel of different member states (regardless of their operational roles). Instead, individual nations contributing forces to any NATO operation will retain full command over these forces. As a result, this always allows contributing nations to restrict the activities of their military forces or even to withdraw them, should they wish to do so, although this may come at a political cost. The absence of full command relationships poses related challenges for determining the legal responsibility of various actors in NATO military operations (in particular when these operations are conducted pursuant to a UNSC Chapter VII mandate). NATO does not have extensive international legal personality — unlike the United Nations, its important decisions remain controlled by member states operating on the basis of consensus. As a result, NATO will generally not bear international legal responsibility itself for all military activities carried out under its auspices. Instead, individual contributing states, such as Canada, will typically continue to bear responsibility for their own (wrongful) actions, and those of their individual personnel, which might include the assistance they provide to the military activities of other participating states (although political responsibility is clearly a different issue and the law on this point remains contentious).

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Conclusion Multinational military operations such as OUP are established and conducted in an increasingly complex international legal environment. Understanding this context and its resulting implications is essential for effective Canadian participation in these operations and the management of corresponding national and individual legal and political risks. This chapter has identified various strategic lessons related to such interventions, highlighting in particular the utility and potential dangers of open-ended and flexible Security Council mandates and the inherent legal difficulties of reviewing and coordinating multinational military operations. From a Canadian perspective, the general benefits of obtaining prior express Chapter VII authorization to use force internationally cannot be overstated (although this certainly does not preclude lawful interventions absent such authority, either in self-defence or with the consent of the target state19). To the extent that a clear Security Council mandate underpins international military operations, this will provide a strong bulwark against subsequent state legal responsibility for wrongful acts and corresponding remedial obligations. As OUP demonstrates, a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous mandate can also provide necessary operational flexibility, although this may also increase the resulting legal and political risks. For Canada, potential state responsibility is of particular concern in light of its general (albeit qualified) acceptance of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. Potential Canadian state responsibility is not the only material legal consideration in such cases, as individual criminal responsibility may also result from both the establishment and the conduct of international military operations. Like OUP, all future Canadian interventions will be conducted in the shadow of possible independent investigation and prosecution by the ICC.20 While this may be welcomed — and can even bolster the legitimacy of intervening forces — its potential negative consequences must nonetheless also be appreciated, especially if the ICC is empowered to exercise jurisdiction 19

20

For example, the ongoing Canadian military operation against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) is being conducted in Iraq with the consent of the government of that state, and therefore does not require Chapter VII authorization (or a valid claim to self-defence). Although a detailed examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this chapter, related Canadian actions against ISIL in Syria have been justified on the basis of self-defence, largely relating to the collective defence of Iraq. Absent (unlikely) Canadian withdrawal from the Rome Statute, which would itself not necessarily prevent the exercise of ICC jurisdiction in all cases.

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over the crime of aggression and Canada consents to it doing so with respect to its own political and military leaders. Clearly, the complexities of international military interventions extend far beyond these initial strategic legal considerations. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, the actual day-to-day conduct of such operations raises significant additional international legal concerns, associated in particular with specific targeting decisions and procedures, and the employment of particular weapons and tactics. OUP raises related questions concerning the legal and practical implications of conducting large-scale military operations with the prior stated expectation of causing zero civilian casualties, which far exceeds basic LOAC requirements. More generally, but perhaps most importantly, the Libyan intervention also raises larger systemic questions concerning the legal and political responsibility of various international actors (in particular, the United Nations) to provide effective support to post-conflict regimes — and the extent of corresponding state obligations to accept such support when it is offered. Conformity with UNSC authorization (in this case, Resolution 1973) and applicable LOAC and other international legal principles almost certainly precludes any direct legal responsibility for Canada and other intervening states to address this post-conflict issue. Nonetheless, while the Security Council demarcated the successful end of international military intervention in Libya with Resolution 2016, substantial internal and regional threats to Libyan civilians have clearly persisted. Military intervention may at times be necessary to protect threatened civilian populations in other states, but it is seldom, if ever, sufficient. Doing so lawfully and effectively is an important starting point for Canada and other states — and for the international community as a whole — but it should rarely be viewed as an end in itself.

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Works Cited Government of Canada. n.d. “Archived – Operation Mobile – Mission Metrics.” National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. www. forces.gc.ca/sites/FORCES_Internet/operations-abroad-past/op-mobilemetrics.page. Ki-Moon, Ban. 2011. Press Conference by Secretary-General Ban KiMoon at United Nations Headquarters, United Nations, Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York, UN Doc. SG/SM/14021, December 14. www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ sgsm14021.doc.htm. NATO. 2011. “Operation Unified Protector: Final Mission Stats.” November 2. www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf.

2 Navigating Troubled Waters Canada in the Arab World Marie-Joëlle Zahar

Introduction The uprisings that shook the Arab world in 2011 have set in motion a series of profound changes in the landscape of the Middle East.1 Leaders have fallen; others continue to hang on to power. But the fall of authoritarian regimes has not always paved the way for regime change. At the time of writing, Tunisia is on the road to democratic consolidation; Libya has two parliaments and is experiencing increasing turmoil; and Egypt has seen the Muslim Brotherhood come to power, only to be unseated a year later by a new and increasingly authoritarian regime. Where regimes have survived the uprisings, the cost has varied greatly. Syria has descended into civil war and Bahrain’s Sunni dynasty continues to harshly supress dissent by its Shi’a majority population. The Arab uprisings caught most world leaders and academic experts by surprise and, indeed, it would take some time to craft a response to the shifts that were taking place in the region (Gause 2011). Canada was no exception to the trend. It was not until the Group of Eight (G8) summit in Deauville, France, at the end of May 2011, a full five months after the beginning of the uprisings, that Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that Ottawa

1

For the purposes of this chapter, the Middle East is defined as the Arab World plus Iran, Turkey and Israel.

35

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would not provide direct aid to the faltering economies of Egypt and Tunisia, preferring instead to provide support through capital contributions to multilateral financial institutions. He did, however, strongly condemn leaders cracking down on democracy movements in Syria, Libya and Yemen (Clark 2011a). In positioning Canada as he did, Harper re-enacted what observers describe as a growing gap between Ottawa’s strong declaratory stances on Middle East foreign policy issues and Canada’s decreasing presence in the Middle East. Four years later, the time has come to take stock of Canada’s reaction to the Arab uprisings. How can we account for the fact that an initially cautious and noncommittal Harper government ultimately chose to participate in Operation Unified Protector in Libya? In 2015, how can we explain Canada’s continued relations with Bahrain and Egypt, when human rights organizations repeatedly criticize both countries for their human rights record? To answer these questions, this chapter focuses on Canadian foreign policy (CFP) toward the Arab world, more specifically toward those Arab countries that have experienced sustained popular mobilization during the Arab uprisings.2 As Fen Osler Hampson and Stephen M. Saideman note in the introduction of this volume, there are surprisingly few comparative analyses of Canada’s interventions. The Arab uprisings provide an opportunity to partially fill this gap by looking at the manner in which Canada reacted to a set of cases with important similarities — authoritarian regimes, serious economic challenges and youth bulges. In documenting Canada’s reaction to the Arab uprisings, this chapter argues that Ottawa’s foreign policy in the Arab world continues to be primarily driven by the war against global terror and the fight against “Islamicism” or the threat of Islamic-inspired terrorism at home. Following a brief analytical overview of CFP in the Middle East since the turn of the twenty-first century, the chapter documents the manner in which the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks as well as the arrival to power of the Conservative Party under the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper affected CFP toward the Arab world. Turning to an analysis of 2

In so doing, the chapter may incur criticism that it is not dealing with Iran, Turkey or Israel, all key states in the region. However, the decision to limit the argument to the countries at the heart of the Arab uprising is driven by the research question itself. Iran, Turkey or Israel — and for that matter, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan or Algeria — will only be addressed if and when relations between Canada and these countries affect, or are likely to be affected by, the dynamics set in motion during the Arab uprisings, or if they provide an interesting comparative vantage point.

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Ottawa’s reaction to the Arab uprisings of 2011, I argue that Ottawa’s response to developments on the ground reflects Canada’s “stability imperative” and its concern for the Islamist threat. In conclusion, I reflect on the increasing challenges of crafting a coherent CFP toward the Arab world, one that takes into account Canada’s interests, its domestic politics and its foreign relations and obligations.

CFP in the Middle East in the Twenty-first Century CFP in the Middle East reflects the government’s attempt to navigate troubled waters while protecting and promoting the “national interest.” What is the national interest and how does it relate to CFP in the Middle East? Canada’s national interest has been described as ensuring national security, political autonomy, national unity, economic prosperity and a principled selfimage (Holloway 2006). In 2005, Canada’s International Policy Statement reaffirmed the continued security and prosperity of Canadians as Canada’s fundamental interests (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2005, 4). This remains much the case, even though the Conservative Party has since replaced the Liberals at the helm. Various Canadian governments have conducted foreign policy differently. On the whole, however, ever since St. Laurent’s Gray Lecture (January 1947), three foundations for the conduct of foreign policy can be clearly identified: “close partnership with the USA and Britain; upholding and extending the international rule of law and rules-based institutions; and a strong commitment to multilateralism through the United Nations and the Commonwealth” (Robertson 2013). As Norman Hillmer and Jack Granatstein (2008) argue in From Empire to Umpire, Canada has historically relied on imperial strength (British, then American) for its security and economic prosperity. It has also displayed a strong impulse to do what is right in, and for, the world, something that has not always been compatible with its reliance on the United Kingdom and the United States (ibid.). Several foreign policy analysts have warned against foreign policy “romanticism,” arguing that a foreign policy that does not serve the national interest can quickly become “quixotic” or result in an “imperialism of values” (Gotlieb 2003, 42; Nossal 2003). Further, as much as a country may want to protect, promote and pursue its values and interests, its capabilities will go a long way toward determining how and to what extent it

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will be able to achieve these objectives. In other words, if values and interests determine foreign policy objectives, capabilities influence the choice of instruments that a country will privilege in pursuing these objectives. For instance, as Hampson and Saideman argue in the introduction, “[t]hat Canada never intervenes alone is most obviously tied to a key reality — Canada does not have the military capability to act unilaterally.” CFP analysis has long engaged in debates as to whether Canada’s national interest is any different from that of other nations, in particular that of its neighbour to the south (Thompson and Randall 1994; see also von Hlatky 2013). No matter where one stands on the issue, one must acknowledge that CFP has been profoundly reshaped by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11. These attacks put security and defence concerns at the heart of US foreign policy. Washington “signalled that not only will it focus with great intensity on any serious security threats it perceives to the U.S. homeland and U.S. citizens elsewhere, but that the political support of its allies for its military ventures abroad will be monitored closely” (Malone 2003, 12). The Paul Martin (and later Stephen Harper) government recalibrated CFP to address US concerns. “Not only could Ottawa not expect forbearance from the United States in bilateral security and defence relations, but also it could no longer expect leniency in case of divergence over foreign policy” (ibid.). Indeed, even as Canada made a significant contribution to the US-led effort in Afghanistan, the decision of Jean Chrétien’s government not to join the war in Iraq strained Canada-US relations. For Canada, which shares the longest border in the world with the United States and depends heavily on trade with it for its economic prosperity, strained relations with Washington were not an option. The “war on terror” and the threat of Islamic extremism had an impact on Canada’s Middle East policy. Regimes fighting Islamist extremists became allies; groups or states accused of resorting to terrorism became framed as threats to Canada’s security and to international peace and security. This change would first and foremost be reflected in Canada’s attitude on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The second intifada (Arabic for “upheaval” or “revolt”) began in September 2000, when then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon paid a visit to the Temple Mount. However, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Israeli government framed Palestinian

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violence in terms of the “fight against terror.” In turn, Canada began to abstain or vote against UN General Assembly resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian question. Initiated under the Martin government in 2003 and continued by Harper, this notable change was accompanied by a change in language. The Canadian government went from talking about Palestinian rights to speaking of “Palestinian aspirations,” and it decided to stop supporting resolutions regarding Palestinian self-determination. Ottawa explained this change by highlighting the asymmetry of UN resolutions that typically criticize the State of Israel while failing to condemn Palestinian terrorist actions against Israeli civilians. Canada, which had long served as gavel-holder of the Refugee Working Group in the Madrid Arab-Israeli Peace Process, was once perceived as a fair-minded actor; today, it is seen as a partial actor. In 2006, Canada became the first country to suspend all aid to the Palestinian Authority following the electoral victory of Hamas, which it considers a terrorist organization. Palestinians lament Ottawa’s propensity to quickly condemn the terrorist actions of Palestinian factions while turning a blind eye to the illegality of Israeli actions, such as the West Bank Security Barrier, Israeli settlement activity and resource exploitation in the occupied territories.3 During a visit to the West Bank in 2015, former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird experienced first-hand the frustrations that Canada’s new politics have created. Protesters pelted his convoy with eggs to express their dissatisfaction at Ottawa’s perceived pro-Israel tilt.4 A related consequence of the September 11 attacks is the focus of CFP on what Prime Minister Harper terms “Islamicism” or the threat of Islamicinspired terrorism to Canada’s security and to international security. On the 10-year anniversary of the attacks, when speaking to the CBC, Harper identified terrorist acts by Islamic radical groups as the top international threat, although a threat that is diffuse and takes multiple forms (CBC 2011).5 When he spoke to Maclean’s about his Conservative Party’s approach to foreign policy, the prime minister said in July 2011, “we take pretty clear stands. We take stands that we think reflect our own interests but…in a way that reflects…the wider interests of those nations with whom we share values 3 4 5

For a good review of Canada’s foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli peace process, see Brynen (2007). It is important to note, however, that Canada’s formal policies have not changed. Ottawa continues to support a two-state solution and it is opposed to the construction of further settlements in the West Bank. For the full video of Harper’s comments, see www.cbc.ca/player/News/TV+Shows/ Mansbridge+One+on+One/ID/2144864762/?page=7.

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and interests” (Whyte 2011). Elaborating on this, Harper sketched out a foreign policy tied to a set of values, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. He argued that over time, “those societies that promote those values tend to share our interests, and those that do not tend to, on occasion, if not frequently, become threats to us” (ibid.). The attacks on September 11 were not only threats to international peace and security; they were also perceived as attacks on Western values, including democracy. In Canada, supporting the advance of democracy has been viewed as “in the Canadian interest in the same way as the spread of international human rights norms and the rule of law” (Schmitz 2013, 3). At the heart of Canada’s democracy promotion projects lay fundamental values. “As foreign minister Peter MacKay…asserted, Canada’s partners in the Middle East respect and understand that Canada’s ‘firm and clear positions’ are based on principles of ‘freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law’” (Clark 2007, 94). Canada came relatively late to the democracy assistance game. Until 2006, Canadian support for democratic governance was primarily located in two institutions, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Established as an independent institution at arms’ length from the government, ICHRDD was the more politically risky of the two, providing support to oppositions in authoritarian regimes such as Burma. CIDA, on the other hand, sought to encourage respect for human rights and democratic development through more formal institution building and support for civil society in aid-recipient countries. Both anchored their work in a Canadian multi-party consensus that defined democratic development “in terms of a broad pluralistic human rights-based approach, usually in contradistinction to a U.S. style of intervention burdened by contested strategic motives” (ibid., 2). The post-September 11 changes to CFP and the Harper government’s arrival to power have influenced the manner in which Canada views the democracy question in the Middle East, as well as Ottawa’s willingness to engage with Islamist political forces in the region. In the same Maclean’s interview cited

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above, the prime minister described the challenge of staking out a position on the Middle East that differs from most other G8 members in the following terms: In my mind, the stakes are very clear, the issue is very clear and the stakes are very important. We all recognize there has to be a two-state solution, but we have in Israel essentially a Western democratic country that is an ally of ours, who’s the only state in the United Nations whose very existence is significantly questioned internationally and opposed by many, including by the other side of that particular conflict — still, to a large degree — and when I look around the world at those who most oppose the existence of Israel and seek its extinction, they are the very people who, in a security sense, are immediate — long-term but also immediate — threats to our own country. (Whyte 2011) Strategic motives have increasingly seeped into Canada’s democracy promotion work in the Middle East as Ottawa systematically rewarded Israel’s “friends” and criticized its “foes.” For instance, post-2006, Ottawa’s aid to the West Bank and Gaza was rerouted to support the Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas, not because of his democratic credentials, but to weaken and marginalize Hamas. Most of the aid has been provided in support of “Palestinian security system reform, particularly through Canadian Forces Operation Proteus, which aims to build a Palestinian security force, and through…contribution to the mission of the U.S. Security Coordinator, and to the European Union Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support” (Government of Canada 2014a). Security sector reform is an important element of Western-funded democracy promotion in the Palestinian territories, but Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2014 noted with concern that “Palestinian Authority…security services beat peaceful demonstrators, detained and harassed journalists, and arbitrarily detained hundreds” (Human Rights Watch 2014, 553). There are also credible allegations of torture committed by the Palestinian Authority’s security services, but the perpetrators continue to operate with complete impunity.

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Ottawa has also elected not to engage with Islamist organizations in the Middle East and it has increasingly penalized those Canadian non-governmental organizations that do.6 This is in spite of the fact that, as Janine A. Clark (2007) convincingly argues, if one of the objectives of democracy promotion is a pluralist political order, then one must include those one does not like, particularly when they are elected by a broad spectrum of people in the region to positions of political power.…Excluding the most popular voice in the region undermines both Canada’s programs and its credibility. Furthermore, given the antiwesternism in the region today and the heightened sensitivity to western interference, dealing with hand-picked civil society organizations to the exclusion of Islamist ones may serve to further lessen the popular legitimacy of the very groups with which Canada works. Other factors have worked to amplify the impact of the September 11 attacks on Canada’s domestic and foreign policy. The role of the Canadian Jewish lobby7 and the evangelical base of the Conservative Party (McDonald 2006) are often cited in this respect. The focus on terrorism and Islamist threats to peace and security has allowed the Harper government to simultaneously conquer the traditionally liberal Jewish vote in key electoral districts and to cater to the religious right.8 By the end of 2010, Canada had clearly identified Islamist-inspired violence as the major threat to national and international peace and security. Those states that fought against such violence and those who commit it were deemed an ally; those that supported it were considered an enemy. The subordination 6

7 8

In recent years, the Government of Canada has defunded organizations perceived to have channelled funds to, worked with or supported the stances of Islamist groups or groups critical of Israel. The cases of Toronto-based oecumenical charity KAIROS (see www.cbc. ca/news/politics/timeline-oda-and-the-kairos-funding-1.1027221 and www.kairoscanada. org/get-involved/kairos-cida-funding/) and Montreal-based Rights and Democracy (see www.cbc.ca/news/canada/rights-and-democracy-torn-by-dissent-1.885478 and www. huffingtonpost.ca/2012/04/03/rights-and-democracy-dead-funding_n_1399407.html) are among the most well-documented instances of this trend. See Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2010). This is linked to Harper’s desire to “conquer the Jewish vote, traditionally linked to the Liberals, in some important electoral districts” (Musu 2012, 71). See also Barry (2010). Musu (2012, 71) convincingly argues that, taken together, these can explain the success of the Canada-Israel Committee’s lobbying efforts since 2006.

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of all other considerations, including values such as democracy promotion, to this overarching strategic consideration became the hallmark of CFP in the Middle East. This, of course, was best illustrated by Canada’s unrelenting criticism of Iran. Between 2003, when Canadian-Iranian freelance photoreporter Zahra Kazemi was arrested and died under detention at Iran’s notorious Evin prison, and September 2012, when Canada officially closed its embassy in Iran, Canadian diplomats have listed Tehran’s role in the Syrian conflict, its refusal to comply with UN resolutions regarding its nuclear program, anti-Semitic rhetoric, incitement to genocide and routine threats to the existence of Israel, and “critically, its status as one of the world’s worst violators of human rights and sheltering and material support to terrorist groups” to formally list the country as a state sponsor of terrorism and label its government “the most significant threat to global peace and security in the world today” (Government of Canada 2014b).

Ottawa and the Arab Transitions In December 2010, a man set himself ablaze in Tunisia to protest the way he had been treated by police. His act would set in motion what we now know as the Arab uprisings (more commonly referred to as the Arab Spring).9 From Tunisia to Yemen — and passing through Libya, Egypt, Syria and Bahrain, among others — Arabs descended into the streets to protest against corrupt and authoritarian regimes and to demand change. Just as there was an array of Arab authoritarianisms, so the dynamics of opposition and protest in the countries of the Arab uprisings, although linked, have been quite different (Brynen et al. 2013, 2). By January 14, 2011, President Ben Ali of Tunisia had fled the country; on February 11, President Mubarak of Egypt resigned. But it would take the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for Libyan rebels to be able to move into Tripoli in August 2011 and a Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) intervention to strike the deal that would see President Ali Abdallah Saleh transfer his powers to his vice president in return for immunity from prosecution. Meanwhile, Syria descended into war and Bahrain quashed protests. And, in spite of their deep social divisions, Iraq,

9

Although readers may be most familiar with the term “Arab Spring,” I prefer to use the term “uprisings” because Arab Spring makes incorrect analogies to earlier mobilizations, notably, in Eastern Europe.

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Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza seemed to have weathered the storm. A cursory review of Canada’s reaction to the events in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen — the six Arab countries that experienced sustained popular mobilization against authoritarianism, may suggest that the government adopted a piecemeal approach. Upon further consideration, Canada’s reaction was consistent. In what follows, it is argued that Canada’s reaction to the Arab uprisings was determined first and foremost by what Ottawa viewed as the security implications of these mobilizations, with security defined as countering the threat of Islamist-inspired terrorism. Canada sought to maintain the stability of those regimes perceived as allies in the fight against Islamist-inspired violence. The Arab uprisings unfolded as Prime Minister Harper was campaigning for re-election. On May 2, 2011, the Conservative Party of Canada won a majority in Parliament. In his speech from the throne, the prime minister outlined a foreign policy that Roland Paris (2013a) described as “thin gruel.” Harper argued that Canada stands for what is right and good in the world, proceeding apace to assert: Our Government defends Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, the lone outpost of freedom and democracy in a dangerous region. And our Government stands opposed to those regimes that threaten their neighbours, slaughter their citizens, and imperil freedom. These regimes must ultimately be judged not by their words, but by their actions. (ibid.) Later that month, the prime minister attended the G8 Deauville summit, a meeting framed by world leaders as an occasion to seize a moment of opportunity for democracy and peace in the Arab world. Yet, the prime minister did not depart from his pre-2011 foreign policy approach to the Middle East. At Deauville, Harper blocked statements aimed at prodding Israel into peace talks because, he argued, one could not refer to Israel’s pre-1967 borders without, in the same breath, speaking of Palestinian concessions (Clark 2011b). And while participants announced that the World Bank and other multilateral development banks would provide US$20 billion and G8 nations would offer an additional US$10 billion in bilateral aid to help address urgent

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and widespread unemployment and other economic woes to steer Egypt and Tunisia toward democracy, the prime minister, according to one official, [did] not see Egypt and Tunisia as priority nations. Unlike Haiti, they are not relatively nearby, so direct aid would be more important for European nations, which are closer, and the United States, which has strategic ties to Egypt. They are also not among the world’s poorest countries, so Mr. Harper views development banks as the more appropriate avenue for its part of the aid. (ibid.) A closer look at the early Canadian response to the Arab uprisings underlines the Harper government’s concern for stability in the Middle East. This, in turn, was fuelled by concern over the potential arrival of Islamist forces to power. For the Harper government, Islamists pose a threat. Not only are they associated with terror and international insecurity, but they are also a primary threat to religious freedoms. In one of the rare systematic analyses of the Canadian response to changes in the Arab world published in 2012, Jonathan Paquin (2012, 1020) notes that, “taken together, stability and instability accounted for nearly 22 percent of all the coded themes in the Canadian official statements [on the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan crises].” This concern for stability was highlighted with the departure of Tunisian President Ben Ali and it characterized Ottawa’s response to the Egyptian uprising. A frequency distribution analysis also showed that, “in the case of the Libyan uprising, these concerns came up more often in Canada’s statements than in those issued by the United States” (ibid.). Where the Obama administration emphasized the need for political reform and the rights of people to choose their own democratic governments, Ottawa was less vocal about such rights. Ottawa’s concern for the stability of the region is intimately tied to its twin concerns about Islamist-inspired violence and the security of the State of Israel. When Egyptians ousted President Hosni Mubarak from power, then Foreign Affairs Minister Laurence Cannon conditioned Ottawa’s acceptance of the Egyptian transitional government on its recognition of the State of Israel and its adherence to existing peace treaties.10 When the Muslim Brotherhood was voted into power in June 2012, Canada did not lend full support to the 10

Other conditions included respect of freedom, democracy and human rights, in particular the rights of women, as well as respect of international law (Cannon 2011).

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government of Mohammed Morsi. To fully understand Canada’s hesitation, one must go back to the speech from the throne in which Prime Minister Harper underlined that governments would be judged not by their words but by their actions. One should also recall that following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, Islamist attacks targeting religious minorities, in particular the Coptic community, and Israel were on the rise. Between February and July 2011, a Salafi-jihadi organization — Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis — carried out a series of attacks on the pipeline exporting gas to Israel. According to an expert speaking at a May 2014 Canadian Security and Intelligence Service conference, the organization targeted Israel, specifically Eilat in August 2011 and Israel Defense Forces soldiers in September 2012. The transitional Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and President Morsi employed a mix of counter-insurgency and counterterrorism tactics against Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. The Egyptian armed forces even deployed in demilitarized Zone C,11 in coordination with Israel, for the first time since 1967. Nevertheless, “under Field Marshal Tantawi and President Morsi, vindicated suspects were admittedly released much more quickly than under Mubarak” (Canadian Security and Intelligence Service 2014, 39-40). A year later, Morsi was removed from power by the country’s military with the support of a fragile coalition of secular groups, religious minorities and Salafists. Canada’s concern about Islamists in power puts into sharper focus the Canadian government’s reaction to the coup. Although the Muslim Brotherhood was not inclusive of other parties during its one year in power, Morsi was the first democratically elected president of the country and the events surrounding his removal have been described by Human Rights Watch as one of the “worst unlawful killings in Egypt’s modern history” (Human Rights Watch 2013a). In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird called the situation a coup, but he also held Morsi accountable for his own actions and responsible for his own demise (quoted in Spegele 2013). Canada led the way in congratulating coup leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, on his election to the presidency of Egypt. Baird reaffirmed Ottawa’s commitment to stand by Egypt in its efforts to confront terrorism, including in the Sinai Peninsula. While acknowledging that the new president faced difficult challenges “in leading Egypt toward a more democratic, inclusive, secure and prosperous future,” Baird nevertheless asserted that “Canada remains committed to supporting Egypt in making a 11

Demilitarized Zone C is a zone in the Sinai that was demilitarized following the 1973 Sinai War between Israel and Egypt.

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peaceful and meaningful transition to democracy, based on respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.”12 Canada’s concern about the stability of the Middle East is further illustrated by Ottawa’s justification of its foreign policy toward Jordan, a country which did not experience sustained popular mobilization against authoritarianism and can usefully serve as a comparative vantage point. In 2014, Ottawa decided to consider Jordan a country of focus for the government’s international development efforts. This stands in stark contrast to the decision not to consider Egypt or Tunisia as priority countries at a time when support for their transitions may have affected the manner in which these transitions unfolded. In comparative terms, Jordan’s economic performance puts it somewhere between Egypt and Tunisia. General government debt is roughly similar in Egypt and Jordan, with Tunisia faring better; all three countries have a negative general government balance, with Egypt faring the worst. Poverty, including child poverty, is higher in Egypt (26.3 and 26.4 percent) than it is in Jordan (14.4 and 20.1 percent) (Finger et al. 2014, 11, 77). But, according to the Government of Canada website, Canada and Jordan have strong bilateral relations, based on common interests and values as well as people-to-people links. Jordan has demonstrated a leadership role in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East and has constantly promoted efforts to bring about an end to the conflict. As a moderate Arab state with a constructive foreign policy on key regional issues, Jordan is a natural partner for Canada and an effective interlocutor between the Arab World and the West.13 Canada’s concern for the role played by Islamist forces in the Arab uprisings has led its government to dismiss the protests in Bahrain as not genuine. When Bahrain’s majority Shia population took to the streets in 2011 to demand a greater say in government and an end to “systematic discrimination against them in jobs and services,” the Sunni al-Khalifa ruling family called in the Saudi military to crush protests (BBC 2015). In spite of serious concerns over the handling of the protests,14 the Canadian government publicly backed 12 See www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2014/06/04b.aspx?lang=eng. 13 See www.canadainternational.gc.ca/jordan-jordanie/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canadajordan-jordanie.aspx?lang=eng. 14 See the chapter on Bahrain in Human Rights Watch (2014), as well as Human Rights Watch (2012; 2013b).

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its Bahraini counterpart. During two trips to Bahrain in mid- and late 2013, Baird praised the leadership of the country without mentioning human rights violations and the suppression of the democratic struggle. Instead, he blamed opposition to the al-Khalifa ruling family on Iran: We should be very clear that Iran’s interference in some of its neighbours’ internal political affairs is something that’s distinctly unhelpful, and it’s never motivated by good….There is violence, where police officers have been targeted….There’s been Molotov cocktails. Even potential use of or planned actions of improvised explosives. There have been other connections to nefarious tactics, including terrorists trying to blow up the causeway. A plot was foiled there. (quoted in Blanchfield 2013) Not only has the Canadian government publicly backed the rulers of Bahrain, but also sales of arms to Bahrain “shot from zero in 2011 to [CDN]$250,000 in 2012” (Blanchfield 2013). This has prompted Walter Dorn, a defence expert with the Canadian Forces College and the Royal Military Academy, to admit that this raised a red flag, affirming that it was “fair to ask — but harder to answer — whether weapons from Canada may have found their way into the hands of rights abusers, be they despotic governments, rebels or criminals” (ibid.). Roland Paris agreed that it “is really strange timing that Canada would be increasing a sale of arms or military equipment, let’s say, at this moment when Bahrain has been involved in violently repressing its own peaceful democracy demonstrators,” adding that the minister’s relative silence on the Bahrain crackdown in particular “raises questions about the consistency of our policy and it suggests hypocrisy” (Paris 2013b). Canada’s trade interest is a key factor in explaining not only the Canadian government’s silence on, but also its tacit approval of, Manama’s handling of pro-democracy demonstrators in 2011. Indeed, Canada is seeking to make economic inroads in the Arab world and Iraq; Jordan and the GCC countries are high on this agenda. The Canadian government has signed a free trade agreement with Jordan and is negotiating similar arrangements with Bahrain. The Canadian reaction to popular uprisings in Yemen and Syria did not depart from the general trend discussed above. In both instances, Canada condemned the violence associated with the uprisings and Canadian officials had harsh words for leaders using violence against their own people. Ottawa imposed sanctions on the regime of Bashar al-Assad and joined in implementing UN

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Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2140 (February 2014), under which former Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh and two prominent Houthi rebel leaders were designated in November 2014 as using violence to threaten the transition in Yemen. However, the Canadian government did little else than provide humanitarian aid. In fact, Canada withdrew from the Friends of Yemen development group in 2012, only one year after the start of the transition, even though the Yemeni economy is the weakest of all Arab economies and economic woes have been identified as a major factor of youth mobilization in the country. In Syria, when peaceful mobilization descended into civil war, Ottawa expressed serious concerns about the role of Islamist forces in the conflict. This would prompt the government to initially oppose and ultimately decide not to participate in Western efforts, spearheaded by the United States, to train and equip opposition forces. The Canadian decision to engage in Libya seems to stand in stark contrast to the trend sketched out above. When Libyans descended in the streets to demand Muammar Gadhafi’s departure, the demonstrations quickly developed into an armed rebellion centred on the city of Benghazi. In response, Gadhafi’s forces carried out systematic attacks by air and ground forces that frequently targeted non-combatant civilians. Concerned with the violence, the UNSC voted Resolutions 1970 (February 26, 2011) and 1973 (March 17, 2011), calling on the international community to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas in Libya. On March 18, 2011, Prime Minister Harper announced that Canada was committing six CF-18 planes to the enforcement of a no-fly zone as per UNSC 1970. In making the announcement, Harper said, “One either believes in freedom or one just says one believes in freedom. The Libyan people have shown by their sacrifice that they believe in it. Assisting them is a moral obligation upon those of us who profess to believe in this great ideal” (quoted in Nossal 2013, 115). On March 23, 2011, Operation Unified Protector was launched to enforce the UNSC resolutions. On March 27, the North Atlantic Council accepted responsibility for the military operation in Libya under UNSC Resolution 1973: “The transfer of command authority over engaged air assets to the Commander, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Unified Protector ([Canadian] Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard of Canada) was completed on March 31” (Holland 2012, 61). Canada was one of the original members of the coalition to protect Libyan civilians and it took an active part in efforts to limit the capacity of the Gadhafi

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regime to do harm. It participated in the joint NATO effort through Operation Mobile, actively inspected cargo going into the country, and imposed a travel ban and an asset freeze on Gadhafi and his close associates.15 Canada was also “one of the leading NATO members engaged in the air war over Libya. During the operation, Canadian pilots flew 10 per cent of the airstrikes and dropped more than 550 laser-guided bombs and Canadian warships engaged in combat for the first time since the Korean War” (Nossal 2013, 115). It is important to note, however, as Kim Richard Nossal reminds us, that Canada was “relatively slow to become engaged on the Libyan file” (ibid., 114). Ottawa’s messaging was initially focused on advice to Canadians working in or travelling to Libya. Its tone hardened a full week after the February 17 “Day of Rage,” when pro-Gadhafi forces committed the first civilian massacre. Speaking to a meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, then National Defence Minister Peter MacKay described Gadhafi’s abuse of power as “outrageous and insidious” and he strongly argued that Canada ought to “stand united with like-minded and peaceful nations in support of the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people” (quoted in ibid.). That same evening, Harper stated that Canadian officials had been instructed to prepare a list of options and that none would be ruled out. When he made his decision known, Harper received strong support from both his own Conservatives and the Opposition Liberals for Canada’s decision to go to war against Libya. The debate in Parliament made sustained reference to the “responsibility to protect” doctrine (Holland 2012, 60). However, according to US officials, the political objectives of Unified Protector included the facilitation of a transition to a new government, for which reason Gadhafi had to leave. The argument was thus made, and subsequently hotly debated, that the protection of civilians entailed regime change (see Nossal 2013; Bellamy 2011, 263–69; Bajoria 2011). One cannot account for this, Canada’s most active engagement in any of the Arab transitions, without invoking alliance commitments and their importance to Canadian decision makers since the September 11 attacks. Canada’s desire to please the United States by demonstrating that it is a serious partner in security and defence has been identified as “the major driver in its shift from the role of peacekeeper during the Cold War to peace supporter in the twentyfirst century” (Holland 2012, 52; see Gotlieb 2004). Canada, which has drawn 15

See www.international.gc.ca/international/libya-libye.aspx?lang=eng.

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the lessons of the post-2003 Iraq freeze in Canada-US relations, does not want “to alienate the United States by spending too little on defense, thereby incurring the charge of being a free rider, relying on its southern neighbour to defend it, and risking retaliation, such as United States restrictions on Canadian exporters’ access to the giant United States market” (Holland 2012, 53). In a context where Canada was not going it alone, the cost to the Canadian government was much lower than the opportunity that being part of the Libya operation provided.

Conclusion: Troubled Waters; Tough Choices Since September 11, 2001, Ottawa’s concern about an Islamist threat to international security has increasingly been driving Canada’s foreign policy in the Middle East, including its reaction to the Arab uprisings. Under the Harper government, even the pursuit of fundamental Canadian values, such as democracy promotion, has been enlisted in support of strategic motives. Ottawa’s reaction to the territorial expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a case in point. In October 2014, Prime Minister Harper delivered an impassioned argument in favour of Canada’s contribution to the US-led airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. Speaking before the House of Commons, Harper described ISIL as having: established a self-proclaimed “caliphate,” at present stretching over a vast territory, roughly from Aleppo to near Baghdad… from which it intends to launch a terrorist jihad, not merely against the region, but on a global basis. Indeed, it has specifically targeted Canada and Canadians, urging supporters to attack (quote): “disbelieving…Canadians…in any manner,”…vowing that we should not feel secure, even in our homes. More shockingly, ISIL’s words are matched by its actions. In the territory ISIL has occupied, it has conducted a campaign of unspeakable atrocities against the most innocent of people. It has tortured and beheaded children. It has raped and sold women into slavery. It has slaughtered minorities, captured prisoners, and innocent civilians…whose only crime is being or thinking differently from ISIL. (Maclean’s 2014)

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Thus, the prime minister sought and obtained a six-month mandate to conduct strikes in Iraq, and contribute a refuelling aircraft, two surveillance aircrafts and the necessary personnel to the US-led effort.  Further, Harper announced the extension of the deployment of Canadian Armed Forces’ advisers to the Iraqi security forces. The prime minister, however, made it clear that “the government of Canada is prepared to engage in actions against ISIL…in Syria, but only as long as those are not interpreted as war against the government of Syria” (Fisher 2014). This attitude caused many observers to question whether Harper was prompted by the responsibility to protect civilians from ISIL’s terrorist attacks or whether he had joined the US-led coalition for strategic motives, more specifically to contain a terrorist threat, which could justify collaborating with the Assad regime (The Ottawa Citizen 2014). Unlike the majority of cases explored in the other chapters in this volume, intervention was not the hallmark of Canada’s foreign policy toward the countries of the Arab uprisings. To the contrary, at a time when these countries were undergoing significant changes, Canada’s policies and statements were characterized by tremendous prudence and restraint. If the “Harper doctrine of humanitarian intervention” does not seem to have applied in these instances, it is because the prime minister’s concerns with Islamicism and stability had to contend with the reality of Canada’s limited capabilities and its inability to act unilaterally. No matter how prudent Ottawa has tried to be in responding to the Arab uprisings, Canada’s policy toward the Arab world is increasingly running against its own contradictions. Ottawa’s focus on countering perceived Islamist threats to Middle East stability and to international peace and security is increasingly colliding with the government’s claim that Canada stands opposed to regimes that slaughter their citizens and imperil freedoms. Widening the gap between Canada’s claim and its actions is Ottawa’s growing interest in establishing trade links with Arab countries. Canada has signed a free trade agreement with Jordan; it is negotiating similar arrangements with Bahrain and in 2014 it designated the United Arab Emirates a strategic partner. None of these regimes are democratic, and at least one is engaged in the violent repression of part of its population. But Canada’s economic interest in the region is bound to grow, as it is intimately linked to the Harper government’s economic conservatism and to the concomitant focus on trade as the main driver of Canada’s prosperity (Bricker and Ibbitson 2014).

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Where does this leave Canadian foreign policy in the Arab world? Analysts make the point that “[f]or better or worse, political Islam is part of the political scene in the region and we must approach it without simplistic stereotypes” (Jones 2012, 456). In this context, Canada will likely navigate troubled waters as it seeks on the one hand to counter what it perceives as the primary threat to peace and security and, on the other, to deepen trade links with the Arab world. In so doing, Ottawa is finding itself allied with strange bedfellows, including regimes it has labelled as “thugs” (Syria) and as serious human rights offenders (Egypt and Bahrain). Such a foreign policy is not without risk. In the recent past, Canada adopted strong declaratory stances, but it had a limited presence in the Middle East. This decreased the risk that Canada’s positions, even though they may have provoked strong reactions in the region, would have direct dire consequences on Canadian interests. Now that Canada seems intent on increasing, at least its commercial presence in the region, it will perforce become more vulnerable. Given the complexity of the political dynamics in the region, Ottawa should develop “a sophisticated and multidimensional understanding of this phenomenon, across the region and also within each national context. Above all, one-size-fits-all approaches must be avoided” (ibid.).

Works Cited Bajoria, Jayschree. 2011. “Council on Foreign Relations Analysis Brief: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect.” March 24. www.cfr.org/libya/ libya-responsibility-protect/p24480. Barry, Donald. 2010. “Canada and the Middle East Today: Electoral Politics and Foreign Policy.” Arab Studies Quarterly 32 (4): 191–217. BBC. 2015. “Bahrain Country Profile — Overview.” BBC, May 20. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14540571. Bellamy, Alex J. 2011. “ Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm.” Ethics and International Affairs 25. Blanchfield, Mike. 2013. “Canada Exporting Arms to Countries with Dicey Human Rights Records.” The Globe and Mail, December 8. www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-exporting-arms-tocountries-with-suspicious-human-rights-records/article15817569/.

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Bricker, Darrell and John Ibbitson. 2014. The Big Shift: The Seismic Change in Canadian Politics, Business, and Culture and What it Means for Our Future. Toronto, ON: HarperCollins. Brynen, Rex. 2007. “Canada’s Role in the Israeli-Palestine Peace Process.” In Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice, edited by Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani. 73–89. Waterloo, ON: CIGI and Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Rex Brynen, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh and Marie-Joëlle Zahar. 2013. Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab Worl. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Canadian Security and Intelligence Service. 2014. Pitfalls and Promises: Security Implications of a Post-Revolutionay Middle East — Highlights from the Conference. Ottawa. Cannon, Lawrence. 2011. “Statement by Minister Cannon on Egypt to House of Commons.” Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. February 3. CBC. 2011. “Harper Says ‘Islamicism’ Biggest Threat to Canada: Prime Minister Says Conservatives will Bring Back Controversial Antiterrorism Laws.” CBC News, September 6. www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ harper-says-islamicism-biggest-threat-to-canada-1.1048280. Clark, Campbell. 2011a. “PM Resists G8 Calls for More Aid to Egypt, Tunisia.” The Globe and Mail, May 26. www.theglobeandmail.com/ news/politics/pm-resists-g8-calls-for-more-aid-to-egypt-tunisia/ article2036781/. ———. 2011b. “On Mideast Peace and Arab Spring, Harper Stands Apart.” The Globe and Mail, May 26. www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ on-mideast-peace-and-arab-spring-harper-stands-apart/article4263465/. Clark, Janine A. 2007. “Canadian Interests and Democracy Promotion in the Middle East,” In Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice, edited by Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani. Waterloo, ON: CIGI and Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 2005. Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Ottawa: DFAIT.

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Finger, Harald, Daniela Gressani, Khaled Abdelkader, Khalid AlSaeed, Alberto Behar, Sami Ben Naceur, Christine Ebrahimzadeh, Asmaa ElGanainy, Samar Maziad, Aiko Mineshima, Pritha Mitra, Preya Sharma, Charalambos Tsangarides and Zeine Zeidane. 2014. Toward New Horizons: Arab Economic Transformation Amid Political Transition. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Team. Fisher, Matthew. 2014. “Harper Says Canada Prepared to Attack ISIL in Syria, but Not Assad Regime — Prime Minister Stephen Harper Says Canadian Mission is to Combat ISIL, Not Interfere in Syria’s Governance and Civil War.” Postmedia News, 14 November. www.canada.com/Fis her+Harper+says+Canada+prepared+attack+ISIL+Syria+Assad+regi me/10379177/story.html. Gause, F. Gregory III. 2011. “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability.” Foreign Affairs 90: 81–90. Gotlieb, Alan. 2003. “The Chrétien Doctrine.” Maclean’s, March 31. ———. 2004. “Romanticism and Realism in Canadian Foreign Policy.” C. D. Howe Benefactors’ Lecture, Toronto, Ontario, November 3. www.cdhowe.org/pdf/benefactors_lecture_2004.pdf. Government of Canada. 2014a. “Canada–West Bank/Gaza Strip Relations: Bilateral Relations.” February. www.canadainternational.gc.ca/west_ bank_gaza-cisjordanie_bande_de_gaza/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/ canada-wbg-cg.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2014b. “Canada and Iran: Canada’s Direct Diplomacy.” March. www.canadainternational.gc.ca/iran/canada-iran/direct_diplomacydiplomatie_directe.aspx?lang=eng. Hillmer, Norman and Jack Granatstein. 2008. From Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the 21st Century. Toronto, ON: Thomson Nelson. Holland, Kenneth M. 2012. “How Unipolarity Impacts Canada’s Engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18 (1). Holloway, Steven Kendall. 2006. Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.

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Human Rights Watch. 2012. World Report 2012: Bahrain. Human Rights Watch. www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-bahrain. ———. 2013a. “Egypt: Security Forces Used Excessive Lethal Force — Worst Mass Unlawful Killings in Country’s Modern History.” August 19. www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-used-excessivelethal-force. ———. 2013b. World Report 2013: Bahrain. Human Rights Watch. www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/bahrain. ———. 2014. World Report 2014. Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch. www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2014_web_0.pdf. Jones, Peter. 2012. “The Arab Spring: Opportunities and Implications.” The International Journal (Spring). Maclean’s. 2014. “Transcripts: Harper’s Iraq Speech, and the NDP, Liberal Responses — The Prime Minister Lays Out His Plans to Combat the Islamic State in Iraq, and Mulcair and Trudeau Respond.” MacLeans, October 3. www.macleans.ca/news/canada/transcript-stephen-harpersspeech-to-the-house-on-iraq/. Malone, David. 2003. Canadian Foreign Policy Post 9/11: Institutional and Other Challenges. Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. McDonald, Marci. 2006. “Stephen Harper and the Theo-cons: The Rising Clout of Canada’s Religious Right.” The Walrus, October. http://thewalrus.ca/stephen-harper-and-the-theo-cons/. Musu, Constance. 2012. “Canada and the MENA Region: The Foreign Policy of a Middle Power.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18 (1). Nossal, Kim Richard. 2003. “The World We Want? The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals and Interests in Canadian Foreign Policy.” Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. ———. 2013. “The Use — and Misuse — of R2P: The Case of Canada.” In Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Interventions, edited by Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Paquin, Jonathan. 2012. “Is Ottawa Following Washington’s Lead in Foreign Policy? Evidence from the Arab Spring.” The International Journal 67.

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Paris, Roland. 2013a. “Missing in Action: What Happened to Canada’s Foreign Policy?” CIPS (blog), October 31. http://cips.uottawa.ca/ missing-in-action-what-happened-to-canadas-foreign-policy/. ———. 2013b. “Baird’s Tough Talk on Human Rights Rings Hollow in Bahrain.” OpenCanada.org, December 10. http://opencanada.org/ features/blogs/roundtable/bairds-tough-talk-on-human-rights-ringshollow-in-bahrain/. Robertson, Colin. 2013. “Stephen Harper and a ‘Rising’ Canada.” CIPS Blog (blog), December 12. http://cips.uottawa.ca/stephen-harper-and-arising-canada/#sthash.ixGJ1l0u.dpuf. Schmitz, Gerald J. 2013. “Canada and International Democracy Assistance: What Direction for the Harper Government’s Foreign Policy?” Centre for International and Defence Policy Occasional Paper No. 67. Queen’s University. August. www.queensu.ca/cidp/publications/ occasionalpapers/OP67.pdf. Spegele, Brian. 2013. “Interview: Canada FM Baird Says Morsi ‘Accountable’ After His Ouster.” The Wall Street Journal, July 4. http://blogs.wsj.com/ canadarealtime/2013/07/04/interview-canada-fm-baird-says-morsiaccountable-amid-egyptian-coup/. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. 2010. Rights & Democracy: Moving Towards a Stronger Future: Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. Ottawa, ON: House of Commons. 40th Parliament, 3rd Session. June. www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/403/FAAE/Reports/RP4625550/ faaerp01/faaerp01-e.pdf. The Ottawa Citizen. 2014. “Editorial: The Syria Divide in Foreign Policy.“ The Ottawa Citizen, October 8. http://ottawacitizen.com/news/world/ editorial-the-syria-divide-in-foreign-policy. Thompson, John Herd and Stephen J. Randall. 1994. Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2013. “Canada-US Relations and the War on Terror.” In American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry, edited by Stéfanie von Hlatky. 86–112. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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Whyte, Kenneth. 2011. “How He Sees Canada’s Role in the World and Where He Wants to Take the Country: Prime Minister Stephen Harper in Conversation with Kenneth Whyte.” Maclean’s, July 7. www.macleans. ca/general/how-he-sees-canadas-role-in-the-world-and-where-hewants-to-take-the-country/.

3 Lessons Learned? Public Opinion and the Afghanistan Mission Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Richard Nossal

Introduction When the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien announced on October 8, 2001, that it was committing Canadian forces to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, little did the government — or Canadians — know that this decision would commit Canada to a 12-and-a-half-year intervention in a country in which direct Canadian national interests were not at all clear. Canada’s long involvement in Afghanistan from October 2001 until March 2014 was a transformative event for Canadians in many ways. But now that the mission is over, and the dates of the conflict have been inscribed on the National War Memorial in Ottawa, added to the commemoration of other wars in which Canadians have been involved since 1899, what lessons might we learn from the engagement in Afghanistan that will be applicable to future cases of Canadian intervention? In this chapter, we argue that one of the key findings from the Afghanistan mission is that much of Ottawa’s policy making on the issue was influenced by the dynamics of domestic politics instead of foreign policy imperatives. During the Afghanistan mission, public opinion in Canada played a crucial role in limiting the Canadian government’s willingness to pursue clearly articulated interventionist policies. While, as Derek Burney, Fen Osler Hampson and Simon Palamar note in chapter 10 of this volume, Stephen Harper began his

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prime ministership with a strong sense of duty to the Afghanistan mission, it is clear that his government’s policies on Afghanistan were affected not only by the difficulties being encountered by the international mission in Afghanistan itself, but also by domestic politics in Canada. Unable to find ways to dampen public opposition to the mission, and fearful that the mission and its human costs would lose them votes among a highly skeptical public, the governing Conservatives quickly sought ways to limit the potential political damage. The influence of public opinion was thus indirect: rather than prompting the government to embrace new policies (such as an end of the military mission), public opinion pushed the Harper government into actively seeking to limit public mobilization by depoliticizing the issue. In this, the Conservatives found common cause with the main Opposition party during this period, the Liberal Party of Canada. While it was a Liberal government that began the mission in 2001 and the Liberal government of Paul Martin that decided on the Kandahar mission in 2005, the Liberal Members of Parliament who were elected to the 39th Parliament in 2006 were deeply divided on the mission. They, like the Conservatives, had a highly ambiguous view of the mission. This elite consensus, in turn, prompted both parties to collaborate with each other to remove Afghanistan from the Canadian political agenda, and to agree with each other that Canada should withdraw from Afghanistan as soon as possible. Consequently, the Canadian Armed Forces continued with the mission in Kandahar, adjusting to counter-insurgency (COIN), as Caroline Leprince outlines in chapter 5, but fundamentally disconnected from the political process back home.

Public Opinion and Afghanistan For much of the time that the Canadian Armed Forces were engaged in Afghanistan, Canadians remained remarkably unpersuaded by the mission. Support for the mission was tepid; opposition to the mission was considerable (see Figure 1). To be sure, public opposition to the mission varied with the nature of the Canadian role in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Many commentators simply aggregate the mission into a single undertaking that, they suggest, ran in an unbroken straight line for 12 and a half years. But this is an inaccurate way to characterize — and thus to analyze — Canada’s contribution to the international effort in Afghanistan.

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Figure 1: National Distribution of Canadian Public Opposition toward the Intervention in Afghanistan (2001–2014) 100 90 80 Kandahar (NATO)

70 60

Training (NATO)

50 40 30

War on terror

Kabul (UN)

20 10 0

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Source: Compiled from opinion polls from Angus Reid Strategies, Decima Research, Ekos Research Associates, Gallup, Ipsos Reid, Innovative Research Group, Léger Marketing, Nanos Research, and Strategic Counsel. A complete list of polls is available from the authors.

On the contrary: the mission had four distinct phases. The first was Canada’s participation in the US-led intervention to assist in the overthrow of the Taliban government, a contribution of combat troops that ran from October 2001 until July 2002. The second phase was the stabilization mission under the auspices of the United Nations in Kabul from 2003 to 2005. The third phase was the combat and reconstruction operation in Kandahar between 2006 and 2011. The final phase, from 2011 to 2014, was when the Canadian Armed Forces contributed to the training of the Afghan National Army under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As shown in Figure 1, public perceptions of these different phases present some significant nuances. Canadians largely supported their country’s participation in the “war on terror”; opposition was minimal, varying between 26 percent and 33 percent. The decision to contribute to the UN mission to secure Kabul was also widely approved by Canadians, with only 22 percent of public opinion opposing the deployment. By contrast, the combat operation in Kandahar from 2006 to 2011 was, for most of the mission, perceived negatively by Canadians. At the outset,

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disapproval was relatively mild, with 37 percent opposed. However, this figure quickly rose to well over 50 percent, and remained above that level for much of the remainder of that phase of the mission, reaching as high as 59 percent in September 2006 and August 2010. But once the combat mission came to an end in 2011, the decision to engage the Canadian Armed Forces in the training function from 2012 to 2014 was mostly seen positively by Canadians, with opposition hovering around 35 percent. Figure 1 shows a rational public opinion that was reacting to the evolving nature of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. In hindsight, we can observe a Canadian public whose attitude toward the use of force was still highly committed to the “Canada-as-peacekeeper” ideal (Martin and Fortmann 1995; Munton and Keating 2001; Munton 2003; Granatstein 2004; Boucher and Roussel 2008; Massie and Roussel 2008). When military operations focused on securitization (Kabul in 2003–2005) or training (2012–2014) — two activities that are consistent with the broad idea of peacekeeping — Canadians largely endorsed the decision to deploy troops in Afghanistan. On the other hand, when military operations did diverge from the peacekeeping template, as in the deployment to Kandahar from 2006 to 2011, Canadian public opinion remained lukewarm at best and hostile at worst. Figure 1 presents an examination of Canadians’ preferences as a coherent, homogenous population. However, when it comes to public opinion, “Canada” is a fictional concept. It is misleading to think of Canada as singular, aggregate entity, where one can observe a comparable attitude distribution from coast to coast. On the contrary: Canada is a collective body politic composed of federated regional population clusters whose preferences vary greatly from one another (Wilson 1974; Nevitte 1995). There is no such thing as one “Canadian” public opinion from which one can extrapolate a tendency over time and across issues; instead, there are multiple “regional” public opinions. Figure 2 demonstrates why a regional understanding of Canadian public opinion is essential. First, as can be observed, public policy preferences regarding the Afghanistan mission differed dramatically from one region to another. Respondents in Quebec were consistently the most opposed to any involvement in Afghanistan. Throughout the Kandahar deployment, opposition in Quebec rarely fell below 60 percent, and ran as high as 77 percent; overall, opposition in Quebec averaged a staggering 66 percent. On the other hand, Alberta’s

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Figure 2: Regional Distribution of Public Opposition toward the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan (2001–2014) 100

Quebec Alberta ROC

90 Kandahar (NATO)

80 70 60 50

War on terror

Kabul (UN)

Training (NATO)

40 30 20 10 0

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Source: Compiled from opinion polls from Angus Reid Strategies, Decima Research, Ekos Research Associates, Gallup, Ipsos Reid, Innovative Research Group, Léger Marketing, Nanos Research, and Strategic Counsel. A complete list of polls is available from the authors.

respondents were the most favourable to Canada’s various commitments in Afghanistan. On the Kandahar mission, the opposition of Albertans rarely exceeded 50 percent, with an average of 39.8 percent unfavourable opinion. Overall, between 2001 and 2012, the spread between opinion in “dovish” Quebec and “hawkish” Alberta was 26 points. Public opposition in other regions of Canada lay in between these two extremes. In the case of the Kandahar deployment, average opposition was more important in British Columbia (49.8 percent), followed by the Atlantic provinces (48.2 percent), Ontario (46.8 percent) and Manitoba/Saskatchewan (46.3 percent). In short, how one interprets Canadian public opinion on the Afghanistan issue during the decade following September 11 depends mostly on where one sits in Canada. From the heights of Mont-Royal in Montreal, one would get the impression of a population hostile to the mission overall and massively opposed to the Kandahar deployment. By the same token, if one were to attend the Calgary Stampede, one would conclude that Canadians supported

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a combat role for the Canadian Armed Forces. However, from the perspective of the CN Tower in Toronto, Canada would appear to be divided, with more or less half of Canadians opposed to military operations in Kandahar. So which of those points of view is a “true” reflection of Canadian public opinion toward operations in Afghanistan? All of them are representations of Canada, but none of them could be said to meaningfully represent all of Canada.

Did Public Opposition to the Mission Matter? For much of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, political elites — elected officials, members of their staff and public servants — had to try to grapple with the domestic political ramifications of the lack of support for the mission. For example, both the newly minted Harper government and the Department of National Defence were anxious about the public’s reaction to the move to Kandahar in early 2006. A May 2006 internal briefing note on public opinion research submitted to the minister of national defence had indicated that support for the Afghanistan operations was declining rapidly, especially in Quebec. The report suggested that knowledge of the mission in Afghanistan was not improving as much as awareness of the intervention, and that such a gap could “be filled by unfounded conclusions rather than informed discourse” (Government of Canada 2006). Public support in Québec for the mission would never rise above 40 percent. Nevertheless, this was not a problem restricted to Quebec; public support in other provinces, such as British Columbia or the Atlantic provinces did not rise above 45 percent after 2007. While emphasizing and inflating the influence of Quebec, commentators on both sides of the linguistic divide only reasserted a simplistic image of the “two solitudes” and underscored the complex regional ramifications of public opinion in Canada (Boucher and Roussel 2008; Massie, Boucher and Roussel 2010). One might sympathize with the difficulty faced by Canada’s political elites: they were confronted with a rich environment of conflicting public preferences that differed with mission specifications (stabilization versus combat versus training), allies (UN-, NATO- or US-led operations), regions and contextual events in Ottawa (for example, elections, debates over mission extensions or Afghan prisoners). But the common perception on the part of political elites appears to have been that there was pervasive opposition to the mission among the Canadian public. It was this perception of opposition that

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appears to have prompted the Harper government to cycle through a chaotic and incoherent set of justifications in an effort to find one that resonated with Canadians (Boucher 2009). However, any assessment of the influence of public opinion on Canadian policy making must begin with the recognition that the opposition always remained passive. Consider, by way of contrast, public opposition to Canadian participation in the Iraq war of 2003. In that case, there were massive and very active popular protests in February 2003, when more than 100,000 people marched in chilly –26°C weather to protest against possible Canadian participation in the “coalition of the willing” being organized by President George W. Bush for an American-led invasion of Iraq. However, in the case of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, what considerable opposition there was never actually materialized into tangible political pressure on the political elites; public demonstrations were either non-existent or minor. Furthermore, Afghanistan was not an important issue during the four federal elections that occurred during the mission. Indeed, the elections of 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011 were all remarkable for the absence of discussion about the mission in Afghanistan. In retrospect, public opposition toward Canada’s Afghanistan policy only manifested itself when pollsters interviewed private citizens, in a passive fashion. How to explain the passivity of Canadian public opinion that remained so opposed in principle to operations in Afghanistan without being actively expressed? What we see in this case is an example of what the political scientist V. O. Key, Jr. (1964, 268) described as latency: “the opinion discovered by survey questions is often a latent opinion in the sense that the question has not been salient in the minds of the respondents until the query was put to them by the interviewer.” To understand how the public influences policy making on foreign and defence issues, one has to explore how — and why — some public preferences remain latent or passive while others become activated or mobilized. Politicians are less concerned with public attitudes that remain passive — in other words, attitudes that might be identified by polls — but that do not turn into a political force to reckon with (Key 1964; Stimson 1991; Powlick and Katz 1998). Public attitudes may be more or less supportive of some decisions, but if those attitudes do not mobilize into active political opposition, politicians’ room to manoeuvre remains quite significant. Nevertheless, public opposition is a necessary a priori condition for any prospect of social mobilization; for a social movement to mobilize,

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there must be contention over policies. Stated differently, public opinion and public mobilization are necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for democratic responsiveness.

Explaining Latency and the Afghanistan Intervention Why did Canadian opposition to the Afghanistan mission fail to mobilize? We argue that the reason lies in the lack of political opportunity for a fullyfledged protest movement to form. Political opportunities are those exogenous factors that affect mobilization and the impact of social movements on policy. Although definitions differ, political opportunity stresses the structural and dynamic prerequisites necessary for protest movements to emerge (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Tarrow 1998; 2012). In the case of the Afghanistan mission, we argue that political opportunity was reduced for four reasons: access to the political arena; shifting alignments; elite consensus; and the structure of the Canadian state.

Access to the Political Arena The first reason is access to the political arena, in other words, the degree of openness of a political system (Meyer, 2004; Tarrow 2012). Comparatively speaking, the political arena in Canada during the intervention in Afghanistan, in particular between 2004 and 2011, was extremely open, with the large number of political parties represented in Parliament — the Conservative Party of Canada, the Liberal Party of Canada, the Bloc Québécois (BQ), and the New Democratic Party (NDP) — articulating an array of positions on social and fiscal issues important to Canadians. Such wide access to the public sphere meant that opposition to the mission was, in effect, channelled and filtered by the various parties, minimizing the likelihood of active protest. This openness was accentuated by the frequency of elections. Between 2001 and 2011, Canadians went to the polls on four separate occasions (2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011). Elections offer a forum where ideas and policy preferences are debated and decided upon, and once over, elections also confer credibility and legitimacy to the policies of the winning party. The frequency of elections expanded political openness, which, in turn, restricted the political opportunity for highly contentious issues, such as Canada’s combat mission in Kandahar

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from 2006 to 2011, to evolve into a mobilized social protest. Paradoxically, the fact that Canadians were thrust into election campaigns so often in such a short period of time probably decreased the political opportunity for the Afghanistan issue to be transformed into a political crisis, confirming Charles Tilly’s (2004, 13) observation that “democratization actually limits the range of feasible and effective popular collective action.”

Shifting Alignments A second factor that affected political opportunity in this case is what Sidney Tarrow (2012) calls shifting alignments. Certainly the period 2006–2011 was one of shifting political alignments in Canada. The Liberal Party, which won majorities in 1993, 1997 and 2000, won a short-lived minority government under Paul Martin in 2004; it then became the Official Opposition after the January 2006 election, and then slipped into third place behind the NDP after the May 2011 elections. The Conservatives formed a minority government in 2006, with another Conservative minority after the 2008 elections. In the May 2011 elections, the Conservatives finally achieved a majority. These shifts had the effect of stalling political opportunity for public mobilization against the Afghanistan mission. The Conservatives were more comfortable with a foreign policy that acknowledged Canada’s military power than were the Liberals (Massie 2008). This is especially true in the case of Canadian deployment in Kandahar. Although it was a Liberal government that joined the US-led mission to Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, and a Liberal government that agreed to deploy a battle group to Kandahar in 2005, these commitments were framed as an extension of a foreign policy centred on failed states, human security and the responsibility to protect (Government of Canada 2005). However, when the Conservatives took office in February 2006, they rapidly changed this framing, reaffirming Canadian national interests and focusing mostly on security issues. In his first speech as minister of national defence, Gordon O’Connor (2006) suggested that Canada’s mission to Afghanistan was “most of all in [Canada’s] national interest. On September 11th 2001, terrorists attacked North America and Canadians were killed. Let me be clear: when terrorists attack Canadians, Canada will defend itself. That’s why we’re in Afghanistan.” In March 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper expressed the same idea by pointing out that Canada intervened in Afghanistan to defend its national interests (Harper 2006). Despite the change in framing, however, it was difficult for the Liberals to disavow the mission that they began and sustained for so many years. Given these shifts

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in the political landscape after 2005, it was unlikely that the Canadian public would mobilize into a social movement to push for a reversal of the decision to deploy troops in Afghanistan. Moreover, the shifts in the political landscape in the mid-2000s were also characterized by a westward shift in the centre of political gravity in Canada. What Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson (2013) call “the big shift” in Canadian politics was cemented by the Conservative majority achieved in the May 2011 general election. This signalled the end of the natural axis between Ontario and Quebec that had always dominated Canadian politics. Instead, the 2011 election saw an alignment between almost all the Western provinces — British Columbia was the only province where the Conservative Party did not win by a landslide — and Ontario. Many authors argued that this shift in Canadian politics was synonymous with a thorough transformation of Canadian society, which was slowly becoming more Conservative, coinciding with the demise of the Liberal Party (Newman 2011; Martin 2011, Flanagan 2009). We suggest that this “big shift” limited the mobilization potential of public opposition to Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. Public support for military activities in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011 was strongest in the West (especially in Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan) and in Ontario. Consequently, the shifting alliance that can be observed in Canadian politics from 2006 to 2011 toward the West was mostly beneficial to opinions that supported the Afghanistan mission and served to marginalize public opinion that opposed such a commitment, namely in Quebec, British Columbia and the Atlantic provinces. In essence, with a political base that was, on average, more favourable to military involvement in Afghanistan than other Canadians, the political instability that was endemic between 2004 and 2011 in Ottawa discouraged actual public mobilization on the issue.

Elite Consensus A third factor influencing political opportunity is elite consensus. Without some elite polarization on an issue, the opportunities for a movement to mobilize into a political force are limited. And when elites’ positions ebb and flow between supporting or opposing issues, political opportunity shuts down even more significantly to limit the capacity of public mobilization. This was particularly noticeable in the case of Canada’s Afghanistan mission.

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There was considerable consensus among Canada’s political elites: they all demonstrated remarkable ambivalence about the mission (Turenne-Sjolander 2009; Massie, Boucher and Roussel 2009; Nossal 2011; Roussel and Boucher 2011). While all the political parties in the House of Commons crassly used the Afghanistan issue to try to score domestic political points against each other, no party made its position on Afghanistan a centrepiece of its political posturing (Nossal 2010). In order to make sense of the yoga-like positions assumed by Canada’s major political parties on the issue of the Afghanistan intervention after 2006, we need to highlight those moments when the parties had to articulate their position: in debates and votes in the House of Commons, and during election campaigns. It is important to stress that, until the federal election of 2011, the two main parties — the Conservatives and the Liberals — were in general agreement on Afghanistan. To be sure, there was some divergence during the votes in the House of Commons in May 2006 and April 2007, when both parties overtly used the Afghanistan file for domestic political/electoral purposes. And between 2007 and 2011, the Liberals were quite happy to excoriate the Conservative government on the issue of the Afghans detained by the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan. However, despite the extensive political debate that occurred on the issue of Afghan detainees in the House of Commons, we lack sufficient empirical data (either in the form of public opinion polls or analyses of media coverage) to ascertain whether this issue had a corresponding impact on public opinion. Indeed, it is possible that the debate on Afghan detainees muddied public opinion on the Afghanistan mission. Hence, on the broader issue of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan (whether Canada should contribute to military operations in Afghanistan or not), Conservatives and Liberals presented a consensual opinion from April 2007 onward. Considering that until 2011, both parties were receiving more than 60 percent of votes, there was not much dissension among political elites that could have been used to increase the political opportunity for public mobilization on the Afghanistan mission. Sarah Kreps (2010, 201) argues that elite consensus leaves governments free to ignore public opinion, suggesting that the reason for this is that alliance membership provides “systemic incentives” to maintain alliance solidarity rather than bend to public opinion. While we disagree with her about the causal mechanisms of this dynamic in the Canadian case — there is little evidence that Canadian elite consensus was motivated by alliance solidarity and considerable evidence that it was driven by partisan electoral calculations

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— we agree that Kreps is right about the outcome. Elite consensus does influence the capacity of public opinion to coalesce into a political force, which explains why, in the case of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, elite consensus did not affect public opinion. Kreps recognizes this phenomenon at work: “Elite consensus has not had a top-down impact on public opinion, however, as prevailing views in the public opinion literature might expect; the public remains deeply sceptical of operations in Afghanistan” (ibid., 192). Moreover, the decision of the Harper government to appoint a blue-ribbon panel led by former Liberal cabinet minister John Manley to provide advice on the Afghanistan mission further blunted contention at the elite level. When the panel’s report was published in 2008, it served as a bridge-builder and face-saver for both Conservative and Liberal elites trying to find common ground on Afghanistan (Government of Canada 2008). In effect, the Manley panel broadly supported the Canadian decision to participate in operations in Afghanistan and proposed some recommendations, such as a possible troop departure in 2011, which were rapidly accepted by the Harper government. The report also served as the basis upon which both the Conservative and Liberal parties came to terms in the House of Commons vote held in March 2008 to extend the mission to 2011. Finally, this bipartisanship, even if the parties embraced it only for electoral reasons, had the consequence of removing the Afghanistan intervention from the Canadian political agenda. The other political parties, the NDP and the BQ, expressed different attitudes toward the Kandahar deployment. From 2006, the NDP consistently demanded that the government withdraw Canadian troops from Afghanistan and limit Canada’s involvement to development assistance and diplomatic initiatives. This position was clear in their 2011 electoral platform, which promised that an NDP government would bring the mission to an end: “In its place, we will commit to an on-going civilian development program focused on women, youth and children; regional diplomacy; the rule of law and human rights; institution building and humanitarian assistance” (NDP 2011, 20). The BQ, for its part, adopted a more nuanced approach. While the Bloc recognized the need for Canada to participate in the international effort in Afghanistan, it emphasized the need for a rebalancing of the Canadian mission by increasing the development and diplomatic initiatives while decreasing slightly the military aspects of the intervention. If there was some disagreement within the Bloc on specific issues, such as the balance between military and humanitarian objectives, these debates remained circumscribed

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on questions of how the Kandahar mission was conducted, rather than an opposition to Canada’s presence in southern Afghanistan. Thus, on many occasions, BQ leader Gilles Duceppe argued that Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces needed to be committed to the reconstruction and securitization of Afghanistan. The 2008 BQ electoral platform articulated this position explicitly: “Canada will always have a role to play in Afghanistan and as a part of the International Security Assistance Force….It should be available to accept another, less aggressive, type of mission. Canada should serve in the more stable provinces of the country” (BQ 2008, 211; authors’ translation). In this context, Conservative, Liberal and even BQ elites advocated an active military Canadian presence in Afghanistan. We suggest that one further factor reduced the impact of elite consensus: the complex multi-dimensionality of the issue. The Afghanistan mission involved a number of different policy objectives, some of which, such as the humanitarian or development objectives, were difficult to oppose. Likewise, the highly multilateral context of Canadian participation — as one country among many in Afghanistan — may have led Canadians (who understand, if only inchoately, the dynamics of multilateralism) to take a more nuanced perspective on the mission. Finally, the human costs of the mission made it exceedingly difficult to protest. In other words, Canadians may have felt that the mission was deeply problematic or flawed, and thus not supportable, and might have expressed those sentiments to a pollster. But, given the number of Canadian lives lost in the mission, there may have been a hesitation to actively express an opposition that would, in essence, declare that those lives had been lost in vain. All these considerations, compounded by an important elite consensus, muddled the particulars of the Afghanistan intervention and limited the probability of public mobilization. Thus, except for the NDP, there was no fundamental and clear dissensus among political elites on the Afghanistan issue. Consequently, there was little likelihood that public mobilization would coalesce around particular elites for most of Canada’s deployment in Kandahar. Furthermore, as the House of Commons voted in March 2008 for a firm withdrawal of regular troops from combat in 2011, this dramatically reduced the scope for policy representation (Risse-Kappan 1991; Soroka and Wlezien 2004; 2010). In a stroke, the Afghanistan mission had been turned into a non-political issue — despite strong public opposition.

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The Structure of the Canadian State The fourth and final factor that shaped the lack of political opportunity for public mobilization against Canada’s military involvement in Kandahar is the structure of the Canadian state. As many authors have noted, political representation — how policy makers respond to public preferences — is strongly influenced by institutional factors (Risse-Kappen 1991; Lijphart 1999; Soroka and Wlezien 2004; 2010). There are usually two variables that define state structures: a vertical division of power in unitary or federal systems, and a horizontal division of powers in presidential or parliamentary systems. The vertical division is not much of an issue in Canada on matters related to national defence: constitutionally, and in practice, national defence falls under the complete jurisdiction of the federal government. In this context, Canadian federalism — political power shared on specific jurisdictions between the federal government, provinces and territories — does increase the political opportunity for public mobilization since there is just one actor constitutionally responsible for defence policy in Canada. Thus, it has been easy to identify the Government of Canada and more specifically the Harper government as the main “power broker” on the decision to deploy and maintain the Canadian Armed Forces in southern Afghanistan, where they were engaged in highly dangerous military operations. However, the fact that Canada is a parliamentary system has greatly limited the prospect of public mobilization. First, as Stuart N. Soroka and Christopher Wlezien (2004, 552) have shown convincingly in their comparative study of opinion-policy dynamics in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, “policymakers are less representative in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems, reflecting the relative imbalance of power between the executive and legislature. In parliamentary systems, the cabinet exercises substantial control over policy decisions in all domains.….Thus we might expect governments in parliamentary systems to be less reliably responsive to the public.” Because in parliamentary political systems the leader of the party that wins the most seats in the legislature is entitled to form the government and thus control the executive, the government is less subject to public pressure and can often pursue policies that are unpopular without the fear of losing power until the next election. To be sure, between 2006 and 2011 the Conservative government was in a minority in the House of Commons, and thus had minimal control of the legislature. However, the Liberals were unwilling to use Afghanistan as the issue on which to defeat the government

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and call new elections. In essence, since there was a consensus between Conservative and Liberal elites on the broad aspects of the Afghanistan intervention, policy representation remained marginal. Furthermore, the Harper government tried to make the mission as invisible as possible, thus limiting public mobilization. This was accomplished through a process that Philippe Lagassé has memorably called the “laundering” of executive authority through the House of Commons (Lagassé 2010; see also Lagassé’s testimony to the House of Commons, Standing Committee on Defence in Government of Canada 2012, 12h40). Although the executive is the only proper constitutional authority for the despatch of the Canadian Armed Forces abroad, the Harper government arranged with the Liberal Opposition to pass a parliamentary resolution bringing the Kandahar mission to an end in 2011, with a promise to bring all of Canada’s soldiers home. As Harper famously put it in an interview in January 2010, “We will not be undertaking any activities that require any kind of military presence, other than the odd guard guarding an embassy” (Akin 2010). But this process allowed the Harper government to hide behind the parliamentary resolution and claim that in withdrawing from Afghanistan, his government was just following the will of Parliament. Indeed, the fear of losing political support continued to be so strong that in the spring of 2010, Harper undiplomatically rebuffed the equally undiplomatic efforts of the UK and US governments to strong-arm his government into committing Canadian forces to a training mission, relenting only when the Liberal leader, Michael Ignatieff, and his foreign affairs critic, Bob Rae, sandbagged the Conservative government in the summer of 2010 by suddenly changing Liberal policy and embracing a training mission. And again, the two parties cooperated to reduce the putative political damage to their political fortunes: the Harper government promised not to put the training mission to a vote in the House of Commons so that Ignatieff and Rae would not have to expose the deep divisions in Liberal ranks about Afghanistan; for their part, the Liberals promised that they would not take advantage of the embarrassing change of policy that they had forced on the Conservatives (Nossal 2011). Finally, we should not underestimate the impact of the regionalization of Canadian politics. Public preferences, in particular on defence and security issues, vary greatly from one province to another (Massie 2008). This reality is especially true with respect to Canada’s mission in Kandahar where, as we have noted above, there was a sharp contrast between Albertan and Quebecois

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public opinion. And constituents from these provinces voted massively for the Conservative Party in the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011 federal elections, essentially constituting the electoral base of the Harper mandate. Conversely, the Conservatives were unable to make any significant inroads in Quebec, where electors supported the BQ in 2004, 2006 and 2008, and then voted massively for the NDP in 2011. In short, the parliamentary system makes it possible for political parties to ignore and diffuse the opinion of some constituencies while pandering to their bases. Parliamentary systems increase the political opportunity for some constituents, for example, voters from Alberta, Manitoba or Saskatchewan, in the case of the Afghanistan mission, while rapidly closing the window of opportunity for contrarian, non-voter public opinions, such as Quebec’s. In hindsight, institutional factors were stacked against public mobilization despite the fact that a strong proportion of Canadians opposed military engagement in southern Afghanistan.

Conclusion We argue that political elites in Canada heavily shaped their approach to the Afghanistan mission according to their perceptions of Canadian public opinion. Prime Minister Stephen Harper came to power in February 2006 as a strong supporter of the mission, and early in his tenure tried hard to convince a skeptical public to embrace the mission. By 2008, he appeared to become a skeptic himself and seemingly sufficiently worried about the polls that he sought to remove the issue from the political agenda. The Liberal Opposition was no less ambivalent about the mission after 2006. A series of Liberal leaders — Bill Graham, Stéphane Dion and Michael Ignatieff — all had strong incentives to cooperate with the Conservatives in taking the mission off the agenda. Thus, despite a lack of direct influence on policy making, public opinion played an important, albeit indirect, role in the willingness of political elites to remove the Afghanistan mission from the political agenda. But the net effect of using the Afghanistan mission as a political football, as Canada’s political elites did from 2006 on, was to cast doubt on what Canadian soldiers and bureaucrats who were engaged in the mission were actually doing in Afghanistan. Without the ability to articulate any greater strategic purpose than the need to bolster the partisan electoral fortunes of

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their respective parties, both the government and the Liberal Opposition deprived the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan of crucial domestic political support. We argue that a more careful dissection of public opinion in Canada would have suggested another alternative. The attitudes of Canadians toward the Afghanistan mission might not have been enough to prompt the government and the Opposition to abandon the mission and head for the exits, if only because the political environment between 2006 and 2011 limited the capacity of public opposition to mobilize, suggesting that both public preferences and political opportunity appear to be necessary but insufficient conditions for political representation. For future interventions, we conclude that the government of Canada’s room to manoeuvre — and for leadership — is much more extensive than political elites appeared to believe during the Afghanistan mission.

Works Cited Akin, David. 2010. “Afghan Role to Be ‘Strictly Civilian’: PM.” Canwest News Service, January 7. Boucher, Jean-Christophe. 2009. “Selling Afghanistan: A Discourse Analysis of Canada’s Military Intervention, 2001–2008.” International Journal 64 (3): 825–42. Summer. Boucher, Jean-Christophe and Stéphane Roussel. 2008. “From Afghanistan to ‘Quebecistan’: Quebec as the Pharmakon of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy.” In Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for Manouvre?, edited by Jean Daudelin and Andrew Schweller. Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press. BQ. 2008. Présent! pour le Québec: Plateforme électorale 2008. Bricker, Darrell and John Ibbitson. 2013. The Big Shift: The Seismic Change in Canadian Politics, Business, and Culture and What It Means for Our Future. Toronto, ON: HarperCollins. Flanagan, Tom. 2009. Harper’s Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Power. Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Government of Canada. 2005. International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Ottawa, ON: Supply and Services.

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———. 2006. Public Opinion Research. Briefing Note to the Minister. Department of National Defence. May 12. Document obtained through the Access to Information Act. ———. 2008. Independent Panel on Canada’s Role in Afghanistan. Ottawa, ON: Supply and Services. ———. 2012. “Evidence.” Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence. February 16. www.parl.gc.ca/ HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=5395665. Granatstein, J. L. 2004. Who Killed the Canadian Military? Toronto, ON: HarperCollins. Harper, Stephen. 2006. Address by the Prime Minister to the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan, Kandahar, March 13. http://pm.gc.ca/ eng/news/2006/03/13/address-prime-minister-canadian-armed-forcesafghanistan. Key, V. O., Jr. 1964. Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York, NY: Knopf. Kreps, Sarah. 2010. “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan.” Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (2): 191–215. Lagassé, Philippe. 2010. “Should the Commons Vote on Deploying the Forces?” The Globe and Mail, November 24. A25. Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Martin, Lawrence. 2011. Harperland: The Politics of Control. Toronto, ON: Penguin Canada. Martin, Pierre and Michel Fortmann. 1995. “Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World.” International Journal 50 (2): 370– 400. Massie, Justin. 2008. “Regional Strategic Subcultures: Canadians and the Use of Force in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 14 (2): 19–48. Massie, Justin, Jean-Christophe Boucher and Stéphane Roussel. 2010. “Hijacking a Policy? Assessing Quebec’s ‘Undue’ Influence on Canada’s Afghan Policy.” American Review of Canadian Studies 40 (2): 259–75.

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Massie, Justin and Stéphane Roussel. 2008. “Au service de l’unité: le role des mythes en politique étrangère canadienne.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 14 (2): 67–93. McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, eds. 1996. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Meyer, David S. 2004. “Protest and Political Opportunities.” Annual Review of Sociology 30: 125–45. Meyer, David S. and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity.” Social Forces 82 (4): 1457–92. Munton, Don. 2003. “Whither Internationalism?” International Journal 58 (1): 155–80. Munton, Don and Thomas Keating. 2001. “Internationalism and the Canadian Public.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 34 (3): 517–49. NDP. 2011. Giving Your Family a Break: Practical First Steps. http://xfer. ndp.ca/2011/2011-Platform/NDP-2011-Platform-En.pdf. Nevitte, Neil. 1995. “The Dynamics of Canadian Political Culture(s).” In Introductory Readings in Canadian Government and Politics, edited by Robert Krause and R. H. Wagenberg. Toronto, ON: Copp Clark. Newman, Peter C. 2011. When the Gods Changed: The Death of Liberal Canada. Toronto, ON: Random House Canada. Nossal, Kim Richard. 2010. “Making Sense of Afghanistan: The Domestic Politics of International Stabilization Missions in Australia and Canada.” Association for Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand, University of New England, Armidale, NSW, July 5. ———. 2011. “Don’t Mention the War: The Afghanistan Mission and Bipartisanship in Australia and Canada.” Canadian Political Science Association, Wilfrid Laurier University, May 17. O’Connor, Gordon. 2006. “Speaking Notes for the Honourable Gordon J. O’Connor, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute Annual General Meeting.” Ottawa, February 23.

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Powlick, Philip J. and Andrew Z. Katz. 1998. “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus.” Mershon International Studies Review 42 (1): 29–61. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1991. “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies.” World Politics 43 (3): 479–512. Roussel, Stéphane and Jean-Christophe Boucher. 2011. “The Myth of the Pacific Society: Québec’s Contemporary Strategic Culture.” In Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, 2nd ed., edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Soroka, Stuart N. and Christopher Wlezien. 2004. “Opinion Representation and Policy Feedback: Canada in Comparative Perspective.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 37 (3): 531–59. ———. 2011. Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Stimson, James A. 1991. Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings. Boulder, CO: Westview. Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2012. Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, Charles. 2004. Social Movements, 1768–2004. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Turenne Sjolander, Claire. 2009. “A Funny Thing Happened on the Road to Kandahar: The Competing Faces of Canadian Internationalism.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 15 (2): 78–98. Wilson, John. 1974. “The Canadian Political Cultures: Towards a Redefinition of the Nature of the Canadian Political System.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 7 (3): 438–83.

4 Canada and Somalia Learning from the Legacy of Failed Intervention Aisha Ahmad

Introduction For more than two decades, Somalia has been one of the most extreme cases of state failure in the modern world. When the government collapsed in 1991, clan conflict and extreme drought conditions culminated in an acute humanitarian catastrophe. Together, the famine and civil war prompted the international community to intervene in the crisis. Canadian forces were first deployed to Somalia as UN peacekeepers, charged with safeguarding humanitarian aid and protecting civilians from famine and civil war. While Canada was successful in securing major roads for the transport of aid, the mission was fraught with complications and suffered from expanding mandates. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) ultimately proved to be a point of national disgrace for Canadians. Despite the fact that the majority of Canadian troops served honourably, evidence of criminal violence by several members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) discredited the peacekeeping operation. The detention and inhumane treatment of Somali children, the baiting and slaying of two Somali youth, and the torture and murder of a Somali teenager at the hands of Canadian soldiers tarnished the reputation of Canadian forces at home and abroad.

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The tragedy of the Somalia intervention is that the 1992–1995 UN mission was driven by humanitarian objectives. Canada had no hard economic, political or security interests in Somalia. Despite its comprehensive mandate and altruistic agenda, however, the mission ended in scandal and failure. Since the UN withdrawal, peace and political order have not yet returned to Somalia. The failure of the UN mission raises important questions about the difficulty and feasibility of international humanitarian interventions in other cases of complex civil war. This chapter draws upon field interviews and primary and secondary source materials to evaluate Canada’s engagement in Somalia. To start, it examines the legacy of Canada’s military operations during the UN peacekeeping mission. It addresses the human rights abuses committed by some Canadian soldiers against Somali civilians, in what has been called the “Somalia Affair.” The chapter goes beyond these grim details, however, to examine two other important, but often overlooked, enduring consequences of the UN intervention in the civil war. First, the UN intervention had both an immediate and a long-term effect on the tribal balance of power in Somalia. As peacekeepers tried to secure the roads for aid delivery, they inadvertently enriched some Somali subclans, while excluding rival clans from benefiting from those resources. The mission failed to properly account for the complex clan politics on the ground and, as a result, inflamed tribal competition. In this way, the intervention did not just become mired in clan conflict — it was an active agent in its escalation. Second, the resources from the intervention also built a powerful new war economy that endured long after peacekeepers withdrew from Somalia. The business elite that profited most from the UN mission continued to be key economic players in the post-intervention period, and their relationships with clan militias funded the civil war. In the years following the UN mission, foreign aid continued to be an important source of revenue for both businesses and warlords. Canada left Somalia in 1993, but the impact of the intervention on Somalia’s civil war endured for another two decades. The remainder of the chapter unfolds in five parts. The first provides a brief historical account of Canada’s role in the 1992–1995 UN mission in Somalia. The second details the atrocities of the Somalia Affair in particular. The third examines the two long-term legacies of the UN intervention: heightened tribal conflict and the emergence of a new civil war economy.

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The fifth provides a comparison of UNOSOM to the 2007–2014 African Union-led intervention in Somalia. It concludes with a discussion of lessons from Canada’s engagement in Somalia, which may speak to other cases of intervention in complex civil wars.

Canada and the UN Mission to Somalia On January 26, 1991, the Somali government collapsed and the country descended into a brutal clan-based civil war. Tribal warlords divided the countryside into privately held fiefdoms, while their foot soldiers looted, extorted and abused the civilian population. By 1992, war and drought had culminated in a devastating famine crisis. On April 24, 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 751, which deployed a small contingent of peacekeeping troops to monitor a ceasefire agreement between the two dominant clan factions in the capital city of Mogadishu, and secure the transport of humanitarian aid to famine victims. Though initially hesitant to commit troops, the Canadian government gave in to domestic public sentiment and pledged its support for the UN operation (Dawson 2007, 46). The intervention was first designed as a small-scale operation with limited objectives. The mandate of the UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was to monitor the ceasefire and safeguard the delivery of humanitarian aid. Only 50 peacekeepers were deployed to the Somali theatre. Canada formally committed troops and aircraft in August 1992, and took a leadership role in airlifting humanitarian aid and safeguarding its delivery to distribution centres in Mogadishu (ibid., 68). However, the scope and capacity of UNOSOM I was very limited, rendering the mission ineffective. Given the weakness of the UN presence, powerful warlords took turns either assaulting or ignoring the peacekeeping mission. As the security situation deteriorated, aid convoys were subjected to extortion and obstruction at the hands of local militia, thus preventing resources from reaching famine victims. Airlifting the aid was designed to circumvent the looting along the major roads leaving Mogadishu, but bandits quickly learned innovative new ways to pillage airlifted food aid. This meant that Canada’s aid “operations could not alleviate the suffering because they could not assist the areas of greatest need” (ibid., 67). Frustrated by this obstruction, the

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UNSC decided to escalate the military power of the operation to provide increased protection for aid deliveries. On December 3, 1992, the UNSC passed Resolution 794, which included a Chapter VII clause that authorized the use of “all necessary means” to protect aid convoys and restore peace to Somalia. The resolution created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the successor to the UNOSOM I mission. UNITAF was a multinational, UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operation led by the US military, which was mandated to use force to establish a secure environment for the effective delivery of humanitarian aid. The majority of UNITAF’s 37,000 troops were American soldiers; however, under the new mission, Canada committed an additional 900 soldiers to safeguard aid delivery to a key region of central Somalia (ibid., 127). Canadian troops had initially planned to lead the mission in the northern coastal city of Bossasso, which was reasonably peaceful and not suffering from famine. However, with the start of the UNITAF mission, in late December 1992, Canada assumed responsibility for protecting aid delivery to Beledweyne, a tumultuous district near the Ethiopian border in central Somalia. The Beledweyne mission was a much more hostile and unpredictable field environment (ibid., 149). As a key smuggling route to and from Ethiopia, Beledweyne provided attractive economic opportunities for militias and bandits alike. Canada’s Beledweyne mission proved a mix of both success and failure. The UNITAF mission successfully managed to secure and control the main roads between key aid distribution centres across the countryside (Hirsch and Oakley 1995). US forces removed militia checkpoints from Mogadishu to Baidoa. The increased troop presence and authorization to use force cleared some of the obstructions to aid delivery that had plagued UNOSOM I, so that aid deliveries could safely reach major cities across central and southern Somalia. In support of this initiative, Canadian troops stationed in Beledweyne were charged with securing operations within a 30,000 km2 zone. The Canadian contingent successfully secured these major roads for the transport of emergency aid for famine victims throughout this region, and also provided additional support for local medical and education projects (Bush 1998, 98).

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Despite these successes, however, UN peacekeepers were regularly under attack from local militias, and increasingly found themselves caught in the complex clan conflict. Faced with escalating costs and the prospect of a long, drawn-out commitment, by 1993 the Americans sought an exit from the Somali theatre. As the United States signalled its reduced commitment and the difficulties of the Somalia mission became more apparent, the Canadian government also planned a withdrawal from the UN effort. On March 26, 1993, the UNSC passed Resolution 814, which authorized the transition of leadership from UNITAF to a new, broader UN-led mission. On May 4 of that year, the UNITAF mission passed the torch to a larger Chapter VII UN-led mission, which was mandated to pacify and disarm combatants, restore law and order, continue humanitarian relief operations, support a political settlement between the factions and rehabilitate domestic political institutions. This sweeping agenda put the United Nations on a perilous course. Belligerence toward peacekeepers worsened and the operation became increasingly involved in dangerous combat operations against clan factions. Canada saw the end of UNITAF as an opportunity to transfer responsibility for Somalia to other states. The United Nations repeatedly requested Canadians stay on in support; however, by this point, the Somalia mission had become exceedingly costly and dangerous, and public interest in Somalia had declined. By mid-June 1993, Canada withdrew the last of its armed forces from Somalia, leaving the UNOSOM II mission to other contributing states. The United States began a systematic withdrawal of all its troops in Somalia in late 1993. By spring of 1995, the last UN forces had pulled out of the Somali theatre, leaving Somalia to be governed by a plethora of rival clan warlords. Over the course of the three-year mission, the UN operation gradually and continuously expanded in both scale and scope, while peacekeepers became increasingly embroiled and implicated in the civil war violence. The disappointment surrounding the UNOSOM mission was further marred by allegations of ill conduct by UN peacekeepers. Criticisms were levied against Italian, American and other troop-contributing countries for excessive civilian casualties during the intervention. In Canada’s case, the indictments were even more extreme. The human rights violations committed by Canadian forces in Somalia were so egregious that the Somalia Affair is recorded as one of the most disreputable episodes in Canadian military history.

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The Somalia Affair The 1993 Somalia Affair was a military scandal involving soldiers from the CAR stationed at Beledweyne. The scandal resulted in a military investigation, a commissioned public inquiry and, subsequently, the complete dissolution of the CAR. The scandal centred around three key incidents of violence against unarmed children. First, Canadian soldiers at Beledweyne arrested a number of school-aged Somali children whom they allegedly caught stealing food aid during the famine. Investigations uncovered photographs of young children who were arrested, bound and blindfolded, with signs saying “thief” hung around their necks. Sherene H. Razack (2004, 5) notes, “As military police investigations revealed, several soldiers had posed for such photos, sending them home as souvenirs.” The images showed the detention, abuse and public humiliation of impoverished Somali children by heavily armed Canadian soldiers. Second, on March 4, 1993, under the leadership of Captain Michel Rainville, Canadian soldiers baited and shot two unarmed Somali teenaged civilians, one of whom was killed. Rainville’s commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu, had ordered that any theft of aid and supplies be considered an act of sabotage, an offence that allowed Canadian troops to use deadly force against suspected thieves (ibid., 75). Under Rainville’s command, on March 4, Canadian troops laid out bait of food and water across the Canadian wire, and then assumed hidden positions to target potential thieves. That night, two Somali teenagers, Abdi Hunde Bei Sabrie and Ahmed Afraraho Aruush, approached the food rations. As they grew closer to the bait, the boys grew frightened and started to run away from the compound. In response, Rainville and his men opened fire, wounding Sabrie and killing Aruush. Both teenagers were shot in the back while fleeing from Canadian soldiers. Aruush was shot execution-style several minutes after being injured by the first round of shots. According to the report Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, “the deceased had been first shot in the back and subsequently ‘dispatched’ with a pair of shots to the head and neck area. Maj. Armstrong considered that the wounds were consistent with the Somali being shot as he lay wounded on the ground” (Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 1997, 184).

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Initially, the CAR defended the killing, and argued that Canadian soldiers had acted properly in defence of the base. However, evidence that the boys were baited and shot was later uncovered. Third, the most egregious recorded atrocity by members of the CAR was the brutal torture and murder of a sixteen-year-old Somali boy named Shidane Abukar Arone. On the evening of March 16, 1993, Canadian soldiers caught the Somali youth hiding in a toilet in an abandoned US compound that was near to, but not inside, the Canadian base. CAR soldiers arrested Arone on suspicion of theft. The boy neither resisted arrest nor did he show any signs of aggression against Canadian troops. When interrogated, Arone claimed that he was looking for a lost child (Razack 2004, 94). At that time, Captain Michael Sox ordered two soldiers, Master Corporal Clayton Matchee and Private Kyle Brown, to detain the teenager. For the next four hours, Matchee proceeded to torture the bound and blindfolded teenager, with the knowledge and perhaps assistance of Brown. Matchee also took photographs of the abuses, which showed him smiling over the shattered body of the boy, which had been beaten with a baton and burned with cigarettes. The subsequent military inquiry and court martial proceedings found that several Canadian soldiers witnessed the torture and were in earshot of Arone’s screams, but that none took any action to stop the abuse. In fact, the soldiers deemed the mistreatment of detainees appropriate, as earlier that day Captain Sox had passed down orders from commanding officer Major Anthony Seward to “capture and abuse prisoners” (Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 1997, chapter 13). In his testimony, Seward affirmed that he did “order Somali intruders to be abused during the conduct of apprehension and arrest” (ibid.). After extensive beatings and torture, the teenager died around midnight on March 17. The last words he screamed before falling into unconsciousness were, “Canada, Canada!” (ibid., executive summary). In the months and years to follow, the Canadian public learned of the atrocities committed by the CAR in Somalia. Violent and racist actions by these soldiers called into question Canada’s legitimacy and preparedness in participating in international peacekeeping missions. Given Canada’s selfidentification as a peacekeeping nation, the Somalia experience was a blow to the national consciousness. More disturbing, however, were the allegations of a military cover-up of the atrocities. Missing documents and false witness further shook the public’s

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confidence in the armed forces (ibid.). After an opaque and ineffective internal military investigation, the government bowed to public pressure to commission a public inquiry to investigate the behaviour of the CAR in Somalia. The public inquiry found that several commissioned officers and senior civil servants demonstrated evasiveness and dishonesty in their testimonies (ibid.). The inquiry also found that the CAR had deliberately destroyed evidence of the criminal behaviour that had taken place during the Somalia mission (ibid., chapter 39). Faced with this incriminatory evidence, on September 1, 1995, the CAR was formally disbanded.

Enduring Consequences of Intervention in Somalia After the Somalia Affair, the Canadian government disengaged from Somalia and hesitated in making any new commitments to the failed state. However, the 1992–1995 UN mission had enduring consequences, which continued long after Canada and other troop-contributing countries had withdrawn from Somalia. The UN intervention left behind two key legacies: first, an intensified rivalry between competing subclans; and second, a powerful new war economy that empowered clan warlords. Understanding how these two legacies affected Somalia’s long-term prospects for peace offers important insights for other cases of intervention in complex civil wars.

Tribal Rivalry Although Somali society is traditionally organized along tribal lines, contemporary clan conflict is a modern phenomenon. The collapse of the Somali state was the result of decades of foreign interventions in Somali politics and society.1 Almost immediately after Somalia gained political independence from colonialism, both the Soviet Union and the United States

1

Somalia’s borders were delineated by European colonialism. Competition between British, French and Italian imperialists split the Somali people into five distinct political units: French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Ogaden (eastern Ethiopia), British Kenya (Kenya), British Somaliland (Somaliland) and Italian Somaliland (southern Somalia). See Touval (1963) and Sheik-Abdi (1977). For a discussion of the challenges of transition from trusteeship to political independence, see Lewis (2002, chapters 7-8).

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turned the Horn of Africa region into a theatre for superpower competition.2 Throughout the Cold War, covert Soviet and American support propped up a military dictatorship led by President General Siad Barre of the Darod clan. Clan competition festered under the Barre regime, in particular among clans that felt the Darod had excluded them from political power and economic opportunities (Schraeder 1992; Schwab 1978; Laitin and Samatar 1987). Barre’s irredentism and aggression against Kenya and Ethiopia exacerbated these clan rivalries at home (Saideman 1998). It was only after foreign funding dried up at the end of the Cold War that Barre’s government found itself bankrupt and incapable of maintaining political order against the rising tide of tribal opposition parties. The legacy of colonial and Cold War interventions in Somalia was therefore instrumental in the collapse of the modern state, and the 1992–1995 UN intervention should be considered within the context of this much longer history of foreign interference in Somalia. The UNOSOM mission may have been fundamentally driven by humanitarian objectives; however, it entered into a social and political environment that had already been constructed over the course of decades of foreign interference in clan politics. Given this historical legacy, UN peacekeeping troops also became entangled in complex clan politics, inadvertently taking sides in the pre-existing tribal conflict (Daze and Fishel 1998, 156). The collapse of the Barre government had resulted in a wave of extreme clan violence, which included purges of the Darod population in Mogadishu, as well as cleansing campaigns against the Isaaq and other minority clans.3 When the UN mission arrived in Somalia, Mogadishu had fallen under the control of two key rival Hawiye subclans. Over the next three years, the UN intervention heightened competition between the two dominant Hawiye subclan factions in Mogadishu: General Mohamed Farah Aideed’s Somali National Alliance (SNA) and President Ali Mahdi’s United Somali Congress (USC). Aideed’s SNA faction hailed from the Habargidir subclan, whereas Mahdi’s USC party largely represented the Abgal population in the region. Importantly, in 1991, the international community had recognized Mahdi as the legitimate president of Somalia, despite his inability to control the countryside or

2 3

For a discussion of how economic mismanagement culminated in state collapse, see Mubarak (1997) and Leeson (2007). Personal interviews with survivors, 2007, 2009 and 2013.

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consolidate power over the capital city. Nonetheless, because Mahdi was legally recognized as the head of the Somali state, he enjoyed diplomatic privileges that allowed him greater access to UN political decision makers. Businesses from the Abgal and other allied Hawiye subclans also managed to secure aid contracts from the UN mission.4 General Aideed boycotted the 1991 conference in Djibouti where Mahdi was appointed president, and rejected the 1992 UN intervention. Aideed believed the UN operation, including humanitarian relief operations, was a boon to Mahdi’s faction and a threat to his own economic and military interests. This perceived pro-Mahdi bias increased animosity toward UN peacekeepers. Aideed’s faction also began targeting humanitarian aid convoys, directly undercutting famine relief. This obstruction of aid aimed to neutralize Mahdi’s economic advantage, but instead prompted peacekeeping forces to take aim at his SNA forces, which reinforced Aideed’s belief that the UN mission had a pro-Abgal, anti-Habargidir bias. As the Habargidir and other minority clans felt increasingly excluded from Mahdi’s government and threatened by the international mission, UN peacekeepers were specifically targeted in the clan war. The grisly murders of Pakistani soldiers in July 1993 escalated conflict with the SNA dramatically. As the Americans focused their efforts on removing Aideed from power, the United Nations found itself at war with the SNA. The conflict peaked on October 3, 1993, when Somali militiamen shot down a US Black Hawk and killed 18 Americans in battle. Like other troop-contributing countries, Canadian peacekeepers in Beledweyne also found themselves embroiled in the clan conflict. Beledweyne was Aideed’s hometown, making it a key city in the ongoing clan conflict. Because the UN mission was perceived to have a pro-Mahdi bias, the local community perceived Canadian troops with suspicion and hostility (Dawson 2007, 149). Given this lack of trust, looting of aid and supplies at the Canadian base in Beledweyne became a common occurrence, and Somali gunmen regularly threatened Canadian soldiers and aid convoys (ibid., 153). The longer the UN mission stayed in the Somali theatre, the more it became embroiled in the clan competition. By 1993, the UN mission had been reframed as an all-out war against Aideed, which further mobilized the 4

Interview, 2009.

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Habargidir and other powerful Hawiye clans to target the United Nations. Far from being a politically neutral humanitarian mission, the UN operation became a key player in the ongoing clan conflict. Lacking the ability to distinguish between these rival clans, Canadian soldiers clashed with local communities without even understanding which groups they were fighting against. As foreign soldiers grew more aggressive against their targets, even some Abgal communities mobilized against the UN intervention (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). Intense clan violence was already underway before UN peacekeepers arrived in Somalia. Canada’s operations in Beledweyne did not create this clan conflict. The UN intervention as a whole did, however, inadvertently intensify these rivalries and participate in clan clashes. The international community had officially recognized Mahdi’s government, which alienated powerful rival subclans. Canada had therefore entered into a war theatre where UN troops were already perceived by rival communities to have a clan bias. Furthermore, the UN mission brought a large volume of the humanitarian aid into the war theatre, which created new opportunities for clan competition. Given the immense influx of foreign resources, rival clans competed over lucrative contracts from the UN mission, which had long-term consequences for Somali peace. Long after the UN withdrawal, these powerful clan factions continued to fight over the foreign aid resources coming into Mogadishu markets.

Civil War Economy In any civil war, foreign aid has a transformative effect on local markets.5 However, large-scale international interventions not only produce a sharp spike in formal aid flows to the state, but they also include a wide array of political, military, economic and humanitarian activities, which together bring an unprecedented volume of resources into a host state. In the Somali case, the UN mission gave birth to a dynamic and resilient civil war economy, which has had a lasting impact on state failure. Throughout the UN mission, aid literally became a type of currency that dominated the informal economy. Donated sacks of grains were the functional equivalent of cash, which Somalis 5

There are a number of critical studies that identify the pernicious economic effects of foreign aid in complex civil wars. See Andreas (2011), Anderson (1999) and Paris and Sisk (2009).

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used to trade and barter for other goods.6 Those businesses that controlled the flow of aid grew immensely powerful.7 Most significantly, the resources from the intervention helped to create and empower new economic elites. After the collapse of Barre’s government, established business people fled the country to escape clan purges, and a new business community emerged in the capital city.8 This new business class acquired contracts from the UN mission, and local warlords provided them with a permissive environment to conduct their business operations. Aid contracts, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, were a key source of revenue for these businesses (Ahmad 2012, 324). As a prominent trader from the Yaqshiid district Su’uq Ba’ad market in Mogadishu explained, “UNOSOM brought heavy investment and money. After 1990, the greatest opportunity was UNOSOM. Many businesspeople got contracts. There were contractors for everything. Without UNOSOM, the business community couldn’t make any money. Small businesspeople became millionaires. Aid helped the humanitarian and the business side too.”9 These businesses forged a powerful elite pact with armed groups to monopolize and dominate aid distribution within their turfs. Aid was co-opted and subverted by elites who profited from the crisis and developed strong economic incentives to spoil a future peace process (Natsios 1997, 82–86). These business elites were empowered by the insecurity. Because the countryside was so unstable, international organizations were unwilling to send their personnel to the hinterland to ensure that aid was being delivered appropriately. Instead, aid was brought to regional distribution centres and then subcontracted to local business partners to transport it to otherwise inaccessible internally displaced person (IDP) camps. In some instances, businesspeople created bogus non-governmental organizations (NGOs), claiming to service an imaginary IDP camp in a distant and insecure region. Aid donations to these fake NGOs would then be diverted directly to local markets for sale.10 The profits were then split between the business and the armed group that provided it with protection. Some UN officials were

6 7 8 9 10

Interviews with aid workers, 2009, 2011 and 2013. Interviews with business elites involved in aid transport, 2009. Interviews with businesspeople who left Mogadishu after 1991 because of clan purges, 2009. Interview with trader, 2009. Interviews with aid workers in Somalia, 2009, 2011 and 2013.

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oblivious to the scale of these operations, while others simply turned a blind eye to the corruption.11 Over the course of the UN mission, local aid agencies, businesses and militias built a powerful triadic relationship that shaped the civil war economy for years to come. Although the flood of resources from the UN mission declined when the troops withdrew, a smaller but steady flow of foreign aid continued to flow into Somalia. After UNOSOM, Canada shifted its support for Somalia to funding large international organizations, such as the World Food Programme (WFP), although even these contributions were nominal relative to other donor states.12 Nonetheless, because there was no functioning government to work with, international support was largely channelled through large aid organizations that provided emergency and humanitarian relief to the failed state. Also significantly, the WFP and other large aid organizations in the country continued to use the same subcontractors that gained power during the UNOSOM mission.13 The steady supply of aid provided revenue for both businesses and the armed groups that protected them. Over time, these business elites developed nationwide industries worth hundreds of millions of dollars.14 Local strongmen set up their clan territories as warlord protection rackets, each extracting rents from their business base. Warlords maintained their hold on power by taxing businesses in exchange for security, while the business class learned to use its economic leverage to protect itself from overtaxation (Ahmad 2015). This symbiotic relationship between the business class and security providers created a new political equilibrium, which held Somalia in a state of enduring conflict long after the UN mission ended. This deeply entrenched political and economic structure shaped the course of the Somali civil war for more than two decades.

11 12 13 14

For an insider’s view of the UNOSOM mission, which fails to account for the extensive criminal elements of the aid industry, see Foragassy (1999). In 2011, Canada committed $350 million of funding to WFP initiatives around the world over five years. However, Canada has not been a leading donor to Somalia since the UN withdrawal. Interviews with leading Somali business contractors, including those with large WFP contracts, October-November 2009. Interviews with more than two dozen leading business owners in Mogadishu, 2009 and 2013.

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An African-led Initiative Seventeen years after the failed UN mission, a new international intervention was launched in Somalia. Following a highly contentious US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2007, the African Union (AU) staged a landmark peace enforcement operation in Somalia to rout a radical Islamist insurgency and reconstruct the Somali government.15 AU troops hailed from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Djibouti, making the UN-sanctioned African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) the largest AU-led peacekeeping operation in history. Backed by US weapons and funding, AMISOM soldiers engaged in an aggressive counter-insurgency operation against Islamist militias that had taken hold of the state. By 2012, Mogadishu and most large urban centres in southern Somalia had come under the control of AMISOM and the Islamists had been systematically pushed out of key positions. The improved security in these cities has resulted in an economic boom and political revival of the state.16 On August 20, 2012, a new government was established in Somalia, formally ending the period of statelessness. On September 16, former university professor and dean Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was inaugurated as the president of Somalia. On November 5, Fozia Yusuf Haji Aden was appointed the first female minister of foreign affairs and deputy prime minister. Civilian control of both the presidency and foreign ministry marked a distinct shift in Somali politics. The AU initiative demonstrated a much more sophisticated cultural understanding of Somali society and clan politics than the 1992–1995 UN mission did. The new government has also endeavoured to include all clans in a power-sharing arrangement.17 At the time of writing, however, the government is still fragile and the state remains contested by insurgents. Assassinations and explosions target the new Parliament and executive on regular basis, and the new Somali armed forces are comprised of a loose alliance of poorly trained and unruly clan militias, which lack a functioning central organizational structure and mandate.18

15 16 17 18

For a history of Islamism in Somalia throughout the civil war, see Marchal (2004). For a discussion of the rise of radical Islamist insurgency in Somalia, see Verhoeven (2009). Interviews, Somali Chamber of Commerce, 2013. Interview with AMISOM and author observations, 2013. Author observations, 2013.

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Moreover, corruption has been reported at an astonishing rate. The 2011 UN Monitoring Group report alleges that 70 percent of all foreign assistance aimed at reconstruction and development is looted by government officials, and that these funds never make it to state coffers (BBC News 2012). While the government has endeavoured to include as many clan leaders as possible, this has also increased the number of actors seeking opportunities to pilfer foreign resources. Each new position the government creates to accommodate a potential spoiler comes with the implicit incentive to extract private revenues from the international intervention. Nonetheless, the increased political stability has resulted in an economic boom in AU-controlled territories, in particular in the capital city. Not only has the influx of international organizations infused cash into the local economy, but the new government has also encouraged foreign investment. The Somali diaspora have been an especially important social force in this change. In the past two years, thousands of members of the diaspora have returned to Somalia and invested in the local economy. This increased investment has been a windfall for the construction industry and a driving force in job creation.19 The diaspora community has proven to be a powerful class in the local economy, with considerable political influence in the new government. The return of the diaspora has, however, created friction with local business elites. On the one hand, the increased investment has been a boon to business as a whole, and diaspora dollars are welcomed in markets. On the other hand, some business elites who have benefited from state failure and lawlessness, may see the diaspora and the new government as a threat to their interests and power. If politically or economically sidelined in the process, these established elites, who continue to have relationships with armed strongmen, are capable of disrupting the state-building process. Additionally, the powerful relationship between aid, business and armed groups that was created during UNOSOM has continued throughout the AMISOM period. Throughout the 2011 famine crisis, Mogadishu markets were replete with illicitly pilfered sacks of grains. During the renewed conflict, the local business elites who trafficked food aid consolidated their economic and political power. “Now in Mogadishu, the government soldiers are looting [all the] food relief, especially the strong clans,” explained Dr. Hawa Abdi, a humanitarian doctor working in Somalia. “The minority [clans] 19

Interviews with business owners and the Somali Chamber of Commerce, 2013.

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are just running to and from Mogadishu. They are on the road starving. Most of the relief is being taken by the government side. Most of it is being sold on Bakara market. They are [then re-] selling it in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somaliland.”20 Furthermore, in a response that was eerily reminiscent of Aideed’s actions during the UN mission, in 2011 the Islamist insurgency also banned and obstructed food aid at the height of the famine, worsening the humanitarian crisis in those territories under their control. The insurgents argued that the WFP was corrupt and undermining Somali agriculture, accusations that many Somalis believe to be true (BBC News 2009). However, the fact that aid resources appeared to disproportionally benefit pro-AMISOM businesses may also explain their decision to obstruct relief efforts. Overall, the current AU intervention and the new government have had greater success than the early UN mission in navigating complex clan conflict on the ground. Although insecurity remains high, the new administration has tried to broker agreements across clan divisions, bringing many rival clan communities into the government system. This cross-clan cooperation has been necessary to check the Islamist insurgency, but it has also meant that these clan communities remain largely autonomous. The government therefore remains fundamentally fragmented along clan lines.21 Nonetheless, AU forces have exerted control over the capital city and nearby regions, creating pockets of order that have legitimized the civilian-run central government. Despite these successes, AMISOM has been subject to many of the same challenges that undermined the UN mission. Most notably, the material and financial resources brought into Somalia through the AU mission have reproduced and reinforced some of the pernicious processes that were created during the UN era. The windfall associated with the AU mission has renewed clan competition over both foreign aid and government corruption. This suggests that resource diversion is a common problem for international interventions in any complex civil war theatre.

20 21

Interview, Dr. Hawa Abdi, February 2012. From 2011–2013, I served as chief operating officer for the Dr. Hawa Abdi Foundation pro bono. Interview with Canadian political analyst Matt Bryden, 2014.

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Lessons Learned for Canada Canada has had limited engagement with Somalia in the past 20 years. The atrocities committed by CAR soldiers and the failure of the overall UN mission tarnished Canada’s self-image as a peacekeeping nation. In the immediate aftermath of the scandal, Canada balked at the prospect of another complex peacekeeping mission on the African continent. Notably, both Canada and the United States were reluctant to intervene in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, with disastrous consequences. More recently, however, Canada has participated in a number of other interventions, including in Afghanistan, Haiti and Libya. Canada is also involved in counter-insurgency operations in Iraq. Looking forward, the failed UN mission in Somalia offers important lessons, which speak to other cases of Canadian intervention in complex civil wars. First, the Somalia Affair brought to light evidence of serious human rights abuse at the hands of Canadian soldiers. The torture and murder of Somali detainees, and the subsequent cover-up by high-level officials, should never have happened in the first instance, and most certainly never happened again. However, in 2005, Canada signed an agreement that facilitated the transfer of detainees arrested by Canadian soldiers to the Afghan government. In 2007, allegations surfaced that Afghan security forces may have tortured and murdered these detainees, possibly with the knowledge of the Canadian military. Over the course of the investigation, evidence and testimony revealed that detainees had been subjected to “beatings, whipping with power cables, the use of electricity, knives, open flames and rape” (CBC News 2009). In 2009, former senior Canadian diplomat Richard Colvin testified that “the likelihood is that all the Afghans we handed over were tortured” (ibid.). He also suggested that many of the detainees were not involved in the insurgency at all: “In other words, we detained and handed over for severe torture a lot of innocent people” (ibid.). If Canadian forces were indeed aware of these abuses during the transfers, then Canada could be guilty of war crimes (Gionet 2009; Sassoli and Tougas 2011; Hendin 2013; Grover 2011). Notably, when this evidence of torture was first uncovered, the Canadian government refused to publicly release evidence of the detainee transfers, in clear violation of Canadian law. In the midst of the scandal, Prime Minister Stephen Harper also controversially prorogued Parliament, stifling investigation into whether Canadian forces were complicit in the torture.

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When the documents related to the transfers were finally released, the pages were very heavily redacted, leading critics to accuse the government of a blatant cover-up of atrocities. Given the government’s active obstruction of the investigation, the Afghan detainee scandal suggests that Canada may not have learned even the most basic lessons of the Somalia Affair. Second, the Somalia experience clearly demonstrates that in-depth knowledge of local culture, language, religion and ethnic and tribal politics is essential for effective intervention. Without detailed information and understanding of local conflict dynamics, peacekeeping forces inadvertently take sides in complex identity-based conflicts, putting both themselves and their host communities at risk. Intervening in a civil war without detailed, intensely local knowledge of the field environment can worsen pre-existing rivalries. The Somalia Affair proved that Canadian soldiers needed training on how to operate respectfully across deep cultural divisions; however, Canadian analysts and policy makers also need to understand local conflict dynamics, lest oversimplified or grandiose ideas about intervention lead to disastrous outcomes in the field. The Canadian Forces “key village” approach used in Afghanistan (see chapter 5 of this volume) indicates that there has been some learning since Somalia. Effective intervention strategies in these types of conflicts must be designed with comprehensive, country-specific knowledge. There is no silver bullet model for all international interventions across time and space, so specific regional expertise is critical to success. Thinking ahead to future cases of intervention, Canadian scholars, analysts and policy makers who have deep familiarity with the language, culture and local politics of the target state are well positioned to design more effective intervention strategies, based on empirically rigorous evaluation of the target state. These expert insights are too often not present at the decision-making table. Third, by comparing the 1992–1995 UN mission with the 2007–2014 AMISOM mission, it is not clear that Canadian soldiers necessarily belong on the frontlines of modern peacekeeping operations. The AU mission has demonstrated a far better understanding of local conflict dynamics, and has had greater political success in supporting a broad-based government. Although regional security organizations face many of the same challenges as Canadian peacekeepers, they may also have a greater interest in successfully completing missions in their own backyards.

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Notably, despite incurring significant losses on the battlefield and suffering retaliatory terrorist strikes at home, AMISOM troop-contributing countries have remained committed to the Somali theatre for over seven years. Because neighbouring states are affected by their immediate security environment, regional security organizations such as the AU may therefore be more willing to take on high-cost, long-term peace enforcement missions. In contrast, the Canadian public may be less willing to support extended involvement in dangerous missions which do not clearly involve any Canadian security interests. Given that effective peace operations in complex conflict environments require a very long time frame, this issue of commitment is especially important. Finally, the Somalia experience shows that more attention needs to be paid to how resources from an intervention have both short- and longterm consequences for conflict duration and state capacity. The tragedy of Canada’s Somalia experience is that it was, at the outset, fundamentally driven by humanitarian considerations. However, bringing large volumes of foreign aid resources into a complex conflict produced a number of serious secondary consequences in terms of both conflict intensity and duration, as intervention resources inflamed rivalries and created a powerful new war economy. Despite its other successes, the AMISOM mission has reproduced these problematic processes. This suggests that the economic consequences of large-scale interventions need to be critically examined. Canada’s experience in Somalia was traumatic. Learning from the failed engagement, however, is necessary to ensure the mistakes of the past are not repeated. Looking ahead, before committing to an intervention in a complex civil war, decision makers should start by building a team of Canadian experts with deep local knowledge of the prospective field environment. The critical questions will then be: How do local identities map onto the political fault lines of the conflict? What is the relationship between these armed groups and criminal business networks? Does the intervention strategy account for contentious identity politics and create incentives for cooperation across these local divisions? And, given the answers to these questions, are Canadian soldiers really the best suited to head such an intervention, or would other regional actors be more appropriate leaders on the ground? Such an approach may help create a more sober, realistic understanding of intervention, rooted in on-the-ground realities of these challenging field environments.

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Works Cited Ahmad, Aisha. 2012.“Agenda for Peace or Budget for War? Evaluating the Economic Impact of International Intervention in Somalia.” International Journal 67 (2): 313–31. Spring. ———. 2015. “The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia.”  International Security 39 (3): 89–117. Winter 2014/15. Anderson, Mary B. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace — or War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Andreas, Peter. 2011. Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. BBC News. 2009. “Somali Rebels Order UN to Stop Food Imports.” BBC News, November 25. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8378446.stm. ———. 2012. “Somalia Anger at Corruption Claims in Leaked UN Report.” BBC News, July 7. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18878272. Bush, Kenneth D. 1998. “Somalia: When Two Anarchies Meet.” In Canada and Missions for Peace, edited by Gregory Wirick and Robert Miller. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. CBC News. 2009. “All Afghan Detainees Likely Tortured” CBC News, November 18. www.cbc.ca/news/canada/all-afghan-detainees-likelytortured-diplomat-1.798059. Dawson, Grant. 2007. Here Is Hell: Canada’s Engagement in Somalia. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press. Daze, Thomas J. and John T. Fishel. 1998. “Peace Enforcement in Somalia: UNOSOM II.” In The Savage Wars of Peace: Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations, edited by John T. Fishel. Boulder: Westview Press. Foragassy, Helen. 1999. Mission Improbable: The World Community on a UN Compound in Somalia. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Gionet, Marc. 2009. “Canada the Failed Protector: Transfer of Canadian Captured Detainees to Third Parties in Afghanistan.” Journal of Conflict Studies 29 (0). April 1.

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Grover, Sonja. 2011. “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Declining of Its Jurisdiction in Not Ordering the Repatriation of a Canadian Guantanamo Detainee: Implications of the Case for Our Understanding of International Humanitarian Law.” The International Journal of Human Rights 15 (3): 481–508. March 1. Hendin, Stuart E. 2013. “Unpunished War Criminals, The Shameful Legacy of Canada’s Military Involvement in Afghanistan.” Liverpool Law Review 34 (3): 291–310. November 1. Hirsch, John L. and Robert B. Oakley. 1995. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1994. Somalia: Information on the Status of Relations between the Murusade (Sub-clan of Hawiye) and the Other Hawiye Sub-clans, Especially the Habr Gedir, in Areas Where the Murusade Reside. March 1. SOM16717.E. www.refworld. org/docid/3ae6ad8d10.html. Laitin, David D. and Said S. Samatar. 1987. Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Leeson, Peter T. 2007. “Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after Government Collapse.” Journal of Comparative Economics 35. Lewis, I. M. 2002. A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. 4th ed. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Marchal, Roland. 2004. “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War: Before and after September 11.” In Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, edited by Alex de Waal. London, UK: Hurst and Company. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada. 1997. Dishonoured Legacy : The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/bcp-pco/ CP32-65-1997-1-eng.pdf. Mubarek, Jamil A. 1997. “The ‘Hidden Hand’ behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of Somalia.” World Development 25 (12).

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Natsios, Andrew S. 1997. “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos.” In Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, edited by Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Paris, Roland and Timothy D. Sisk. 2009. The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations. London, UK: Routledge.2011 Razack, Sherene H. 2004. Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Saideman, Stephen M. 1998. “Inconsistent Irredentism? Political Competition, Ethnic Ties, and the Foreign Policies of Somalia and Serbia.” Security Studies 7 (3): 51–93. Spring. Sassoli, Marco and Marie-Louise Tougas. 2011. “International Law Issues Raised by the Transfer of Detainees by Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.” McGill Law Journal 56 (959). Schraeder, Peter J. 1992. “The Horn of Africa: US Foreign Policy in an Altered Cold War Environment” Middle East Journal 46 (4): 571–93. Autumn. Schwab, Peter. 1978. “Cold War on the Horn of Africa.” African Affairs 77 (306): 6–20. January. Sheik-Abdi, Abdi. 1977. “Somali Nationalism: Its Origins and Future.” Journal of Modern African Studies 15 (4): 657–65. December. Touval, Saaida. 1963. Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Verhoeven, Harry. 2009. “The Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States: Somalia, State Collapse, and the Global War on Terror.” Journal of East African Studies 3 (3): 405–45.

5 Living among the Population in Southern Afghanistan A Canadian Approach to Counter-insurgency Caroline Leprince

Introduction Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Canada deployed its armed forces to Afghanistan, where they would be embroiled in a type of warfare they had never encountered during their years of peacekeeping. This kind of turmoil was found to be profoundly different from conventional warfare for which contemporary armies are traditionally trained and equipped. Over the past decade, the war in Afghanistan has demonstrated that even the most powerful armies can experience significant difficulties when faced with a less powerful enemy that uses asymmetric military tactics. While contemporary military forces have significant firepower and sophisticated combat systems, the use of kinetic force alone proved insufficient to defeat the Taliban insurgency. Shortly after Canada arrived in Kandahar Province, it became obvious that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) needed a counter-insurgency doctrine to adapt its operations to this new paradigm of warfare. Not surprisingly, when the Canadian counter-insurgency doctrine was officially published in late 2008, it showed many similarities to that of the United States. Considering the high level of integration that exists between the two armed forces, this

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outcome was to be anticipated. However, this chapter looks at Canadian and US collaboration from a new angle, asking whether Canada’s sensitivity to counter-insurgency influenced how its American ally conducted asymmetric warfare. To do so, this chapter analyzes the evolution of the use of counter-insurgency tactics by the CAF during its engagement in Kandahar Province from 2005 to 2011. During the first years, the hard-fought battles to maintain ground were based on an enemy-centric approach1 that proved unable to tackle the insurgency. The influx of additional American troops to Kandahar in 2009 was the turning point that gave the Canadian-led Task Force Kandahar (TFK) the means to realize its ambitions. It created an unprecedented opportunity to adopt a new counter-insurgency strategy centred on the protection of the population. First introduced in the village of Deh-e-Bag in June 2009, the implementation of the “key village” approach rapidly demonstrated its capacity to address the root causes of the insurgency. With the American surge that arrived in spring 2010, the key village approach expanded and was used to plan stability operations in the villages of Dand and Panjwayi districts. This chapter captures first-hand experiences of counter-insurgency and gives a privileged insight on some difficult lessons learned during the war in Afghanistan.

Canada’s Arrival in Kandahar Province: An Unexpected Encounter with Counter-insurgency Following Canada’s refusal to deploy soldiers to Iraq in 2003, the government felt compelled to take on a significant and visible commitment in Afghanistan. Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier shaped and used this deployment to support his vision for the transformation of the CAF. During the preceding two decades, many officers in the CAF had become uncomfortable with Canada’s reputation as a peacekeeper. They strived to make the CAF a combat-oriented organization that could battle alongside the US armed forces (Marten 2010, 219-20). Kandahar was the opportunity they had been hoping for. At the time, however, no one could have foreseen the kind of fighting that would ensue, since there were no previous attempts 1

The concept of an enemy-centric approach is defined as destroying the insurgency using offensive military action, thereby eliminating the insecurity generated by the insurgents (Jardine and Palamar 2013, 592).

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to hold ground. The intervention in Kandahar rapidly morphed into a more ambitious one, where the troops would soon be embroiled in the unforeseen quagmire of an insurgency. From 2006 to the end of 2008, successive TFK rotations made significant efforts to deny the insurgents freedom of action in southern Kandahar Province, but ultimately proved unable to tackle the insurgency. The CAF had fewer than 2,800 soldiers to cover the whole province, an area spanning over 50,000 km2. In their effort to find and destroy the enemy, the CAF launched Operation Medusa in 2006, a battle analogous to those typical of conventional war fighting, involving heavy artillery and air strikes. The resistance of Taliban forces was fiercer than expected; instead of retreating, they took advantage of the terrain of the Arghandab River to build a defensive position. In the end, the operation was considered a tactical victory for the CAF, but it would also be known as the deadliest battle for Canadian soldiers. Because of its limited number of troops, Canada had to resort to — in so-called insurgency terms — “mowing the grass.” In other words, they moved into a village to destroy the insurgents only to leave a few days later (White 2010). This enemy-centric approach proved unable to provide the deterrence effect intended, as the Taliban would return in the days following the operation. As a result, Canadian soldiers were limited in their actions and could not effectively separate the population from the insurgents, a basic tenet of counter-insurgency. Canadian soldiers settled down in the districts and built forward operating bases, combat outposts and strong points in an attempt to hold ground and fight the insurgents. However, they had no choice but to stay in these fortified camps, since the scarce resources made it impossible to live within the villages. This made it difficult to obtain good intelligence on the population’s dynamics and to distinguish between the insurgents and local population. While on foot patrols in villages, it was not uncommon for Canadian soldiers to come under small arms fire; once tensions calmed down, the insurgents would conceal their weapons and hide among the villagers. The Taliban obtained harbour in these villages either by sympathy or coercion, and Canadian soldiers were unable to do more to protect the population from the Taliban presence. Another major difficulty faced by Canada was its inability to establish the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan with the population. For instance, Canada was criticized for leaving corrupt officials in place who were the main source of grievance for the locals. Sarah Chayes, a former

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American journalist who has lived in Kandahar city since the fall of the Taliban, publicly blamed Canada for colluding with government officials who were hated by the people (Chayes 2013). Moreover, it proved difficult for Canadian soldiers to build trust and confidence with the Afghan population because the operations lacked synchronization. For example, it would not be uncommon to see multiple units with different mandates patrol in the same village on the same day. The main failing, however, remained that the locals’ needs and grievances that had been identified remained unaddressed (Popov 2011, 67-68). The Canadian aid program encountered numerous delays during this time, as no funds were released to the provincial reconstruction team during two rotations (Leprince 2013, 364–68). This adversely affected the credibility of Canadian soldiers in the eyes of local leaders. Overall, despite their pleas to NATO to obtain more troops, successive Canadian generals faced the same dismal metric from before 2009 of too much area to cover with the meagre forces available. It was not until the publication of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan in 2008 that the conditions were put in place to address this situation. The report approved the extension of Canada’s military presence beyond 2009 on the condition that NATO secured an additional battle group of approximately 1,000 soldiers to be deployed to Kandahar by February 2009. At the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, NATO promised to free up American troops to partner with Canada in the south. This influx of troops created an opportunity to move beyond this enemy-centric approach and find new ways to make the population the centre of gravity.

Similarities between Canadian and US Counterinsurgency Doctrines Shortly after Canada arrived in Kandahar, it became obvious that the country needed to adopt a counter-insurgency doctrine to better support operations in this particular type of warfare. The Land Force Doctrine and Training System2 (LFDTS) — then commanded by Brigadier-General Stuart Beare — became responsible for writing this doctrine and providing guidelines for the armed forces. Acting as the director of Army Training of LFTDS at 2

The organization was renamed in July 2013 to Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre as part of the reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces.

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the time, Colonel Dean Milner mentioned that “since we didn’t have our own counter-insurgency doctrine, we mostly relied on the Americans.”3 During the course of writing this doctrine, Canadians regularly visited the US Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24) was drafted. A strong partnership evolved between the Canadians and the US Counterinsurgency Center, as senior officers of both armed forces regularly exchanged communications and held workshops. This helped shape the synergy found in both countries’ counter-insurgency doctrines (Fenton 2010). The process resulted in the publication of the first Canadian counterinsurgency operations doctrine in late 2008. Since the Canadian doctrine was developed in close collaboration with the United States, it comes as no surprise that they share many of the following underlying principles for counter-insurgency operations (Verret 2013, 97–99): • separate the population from the insurgent; • protect the population; • win hearts and minds; • address grievances; and • provide for credible governance. Both doctrines also recognize that because of the complexity inherent to counter-insurgencies, no insurgency can be won by military means alone. The Canadian doctrine, therefore, considers that only an approach that brings together the expertise of multiple government departments and agencies to address the root causes of the political and socio-economic grievances can provide enduring outcomes. Furthermore, both doctrines clearly state that the civilian population is the centre of gravity and all actions should be aimed at obtaining popular support for the legitimate government (Chief of Land Staff 2008, 1–14). With the adoption of its new counter-insurgency doctrine, the CAF were better equipped to align their tactics, techniques and procedures to counter the Taliban insurgency. 3

Interview with then Major-General Dean J. Milner, commander of Canadian Contribution to the Training Mission in Afghanistan and commanding general of NATO Training Mission — Afghanistan (2013-2014), commander of TFK (2010-2011) and director of Army Training of LFDTS (2005–2007), Kingston, October 17, 2014.

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Implementation of the Key Village Approach in Dand District One of the greatest challenges following the adoption of the Canadian counter-insurgency doctrine was to find how to implement counter-insurgency theory into effective practices in the field. When Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance took command of TFK in 2009, the conditions were in place (with the addition of 1,000 US soldiers) to adopt a new counter-insurgency strategy. This was a key moment for Canada and its strategy as it moved away from an enemy-centric approach to a population-centric approach.4 When Operation Kantolo started in June 2009, the objective pursued by TFK was to provide a more reliable security presence at the village and district level. General Vance championed this new counter-insurgency strategy and implemented a key village approach in Canada’s area of operations. The rationale behind the key village approach was to decentralize power from the provincial level directly to the districts. Rural Afghanistan is primarily based on a tribal system; therefore, its population identifies with key leaders in its immediate vicinity at the village and district levels. By reinforcing the structures in place at the district level, the idea was that the CAF would be in a better position to isolate the insurgents from the local populace. In order to encourage the villagers to pledge not to protect the insurgents, General Vance explained how “the CAF promised them to reinforce their infrastructure and provide enhanced security to their village. In return, the town’s malik [chieftain] had to ensure fiscal transparency, engage actively with his population to be part of a security framework and showcase his village to entice other communities to request similar improvements.”5 The strategy was intended to isolate the Taliban from the majority of the population by concentrating on the areas where 75 percent of the population lived, that is, Kandahar city and its suburban areas. The first key village was inaugurated on June 23, 2009, in Deh-e-Bag, just south of Kandahar city. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) selected the town for its latent agricultural potential and ample

4 5

The concept of this approach consists of allocating counter-insurgent resources to directly secure the population, which in turns deters the insurgents’ capacity to target the locals (Jardine and Palamar 2013, 592). Interview with Lieutenant-General Jonathan Vance, commander of TFK (2009-2010), September 25, 2014, Ottawa.

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opportunity for infrastructure investment. Canadian soldiers moved into the Dand District Operational Coordination Centre (OCC-D), where the offices of district leader Haji Ahmadullah Nazek and the district police chief were already located. As mandated by Government of Afghanistan Order 3501 in 2007, the OCC-D aimed to create an information node between the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the district-appointed leaders. On the military side, decentralization of authority to the district levels led to the creation of the position of battlespace commander. The first in this role, Major Mark Popov was responsible for all the security, reconstruction, governance and development initiatives in Dand district. Always acting in close coordination with the ANSF, the battlespace commander’s staff mainly worked from the OCC-D in order to coordinate all the stakeholders’ actions. On the other hand, the Canadian soldiers from B Squadron, the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), followed the district stabilization plan and started living among the villagers in Dand with Afghan national forces. This approach was bottom-up, not top-down, as it was essential to consult the population first, before any military force attempted to live among them and to respect their will if they refused.6 Furthermore, the Canadian whole-of-government partners offered capabilities that complemented those of the military. This shared effort to advance Canada’s international policy in Afghanistan combined the resources and expertise of many government departments and agencies, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, CIDA, the Correctional Service of Canada and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.7 In Dand, one civilian stabilization officer was assigned to the OCC-D and worked on a daily basis with the district leader and his staff to improve governance and accountability. This capacity building helped the governor establish priorities for his district and learn how to effectively communicate them to his population, in order to ensure accountability and transparency. In addition, efforts were invested in long-term development and implementing sustainable initiatives. For example, during their first months at the OCC-D, efforts were made to obtain a tashkiel for Dand, since the district was not officially recognized by the national government. Recognition would ensure Dand would receive the

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Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Popov, battlespace commander of Dand district (2009-2010), October 16, 2014, Kingston. It is noteworthy that the Government of Canada abolished CIDA in 2013, incorporating its mission into that of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.

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government services it was entitled to. As well, before deciding to build a school, the civilian stabilization officer would coordinate with the Ministry of Education to ensure — based on their tools to assess the number of people and the distance to other services — it fit in the national education strategy, and that sufficient resources would be allocated afterward to maintain it.8 Although, the OCC-D did not exist prior to 2009, Canadians were able to contribute to setting the conditions for its expansion in just a few months. The OCC-D rapidly became a necessary governance structure in the eyes of the population. The villagers would visit the OCC-D to obtain compensations for property damages, request information on the status of development projects and settle disputes with neighbours. The key village approach thus proved to be a successful endeavour, as signs of progress were rapidly observed in terms of stability and development in Deh-e-Bag.9

Expansion in Dand and Panjwayi Districts With the American “surge” promised by President Barack Obama, 30,000 additional US troops were deployed to Afghanistan by the summer of 2010, with a significant portion assigned to Kandahar. Following this reinforcement, it was decided that the Canadian-led TFK would reduce its area of operations to just two districts, Dand and Panjwayi, while the Americans assumed responsibility for the remainder of the province (Leprince 2013, 374-75). Concretely, this meant that the following TFK commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Ménard, had a greater concentration of forces in his area of operations than all previous Canadian commanders, with the addition of several US units — totalling about 2,500 American soldiers — being placed under TFK command. His vision differed slightly from Vance’s and he decided to forego the key village approach to implement his new strategic plan. Focusing on the protection of Kandahar city and its outskirts, his plan consisted of establishing a larger concentric ring of security — to keep insurgents at bay — and a smaller ring of stability — to foster governance and economic development. Despite the changes made at the strategic level, there was no noticeable difference in the way the day-to-day operations were conducted in Dand and 8 9

Phone interview with Rosalee LaPlante, CIDA stabilization officer at the OCC-D in Dand district, October 29, 2014. Phone interview with Major Enno Kerckhoff, operations officer for the OCC-D in Dand district, November 7, 2014.

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Panjwayi. Since the authority had been decentralized to the district levels, the battlespace commanders continued to follow their district stabilization plans that established the priorities for their respective area of operations. However Deh-e-Bag was no longer considered a priority at TFK headquarters. In an unexpected turn of events, General Ménard was removed as commander of TFK in June 2010, after it was brought to light that he had an intimate relationship with a subordinate. Answering the call for an immediate replacement commander, General Vance returned to Kandahar and resumed command of TFK. The key village approach was brought back to the forefront within short order, and more Canadian and US troops were to be sent to Panjwayi. In September 2010, Brigadier-General Dean Milner assumed his new function as commander of TFK for what would be Canada’s last combat rotation (House of Commons 2008).10 As the campaign plan for Operation Hamkari was ready to be implemented, all the conditions were in place with the US surge to build on the progress already achieved. In the words of General Milner, “General Vance’s village approach showed positive results, so I was able to expand on this and push it through Panjwayi. I didn’t just do one, I did ten villages, because I had the troops.”11 A major undertaking of Operation Hamkari was to build a 17-km road between Mushan and Sperwan Ghar in order to reach isolated villages. This played an essential role in connecting the population with their governance structure and creating more economic opportunities by allowing the farmers to sell their produce at the bazaar. In the year preceding the end of the Canadian combat mission in July 2011, US soldiers progressively assumed more leadership positions within TFK. Lieutenant-Colonel John Paganini, commander of the US 1st Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, worked directly under General Milner’s command and led a combined Canadian and US battle group in Dand district. During the summer of 2011, he explained that a heavy emphasis was placed on pushing the enemy further westward, and TFK gained a lot of momentum building operational space between Kandahar city and the Taliban. “What General Vance started in Dand — using Deh-e-Bag as a reference point to everybody else — we continued to expand on it. However instead of using a key village approach we used the district stability approach,” said Lieutenant-Colonel

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The motion passed in the House of Commons in March 2008 to prolong the military mission to Afghanistan was conditional on notifying NATO that Canada would end its presence in Kandahar as of July 2011. Interview with Major-General Dean J. Milner, Kingston, October 17, 2014.

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Paganini.12 Though not as much money was spent in these villages as in Dehe-Bag, reconstruction programs were still put into place to facilitate access to water, build irrigation canals and help farmers sell their produce at market.13 In conjunction with restoring security in the districts, the representative of Canada in Kandahar, Tim Martin, and General Milner had a strong partnership and shared a common strategic vision that aimed to connect the districts with their provincial governor, Tooryalai Wesa. “But the most important [thing],” according to Martin, “is that Operation Hamkari was developed in cooperation with the Afghan authorities. We responded to Afghan needs in a way that reflected the authentic leadership of the Afghan district governors because our goal was to increase the Afghans’ confidence in their government.”14 In fact, Operation Hamkari was considered particularly successful because it partnered Canadian and US forces with the local security forces throughout its operations. The increase in the number of ANSF personnel, in conjunction with their improving capability and capacity, was also instrumental in the successes achieved. Between 2003 and 2011, the Afghan 1st Brigade — based in Kandahar Province —increased its number of operational kandaks15 from one to five, bringing its total strength to 5,000 soldiers. The number of Afghan national police also swelled during this time. In Panjwayi alone, the police capacity increased to more than 600 policemen. Canada’s Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams helped improve the capacity of the ANSF by working side by side with them, thereby improving their capability (Burtch 2013).16 Partnering with the ANSF helped build trust and confidence with the local population. Sharing the same cultural background, the ANSF understood the population and its dynamics far better than the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force ever could. This was also the opinion of General Milner, who said, “General Habibi, commander of 1st Brigade, is brilliant 12

Phone interview with Lieutenant-Colonel John Paganini, director of the US Counterinsurgency Center and battlespace commander in Dand district 2010-2011, October 29, 2014. 13 Ibid. 14 Phone interview with Tim Martin, representative of Canada in Kandahar 2010-2011, November 19, 2014. 15 This is a military unit of the Afghan National Army consisting of approximately 600 troops, equivalent to a battalion in Western military. 16 The Canadians provided a wide array of basic training courses such as first aid, improvised explosive device awareness, searching of suspects, police vehicle maintenance, human rights awareness, and administration and leadership skills.

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in counter-insurgency; he just gets it.”17 According to General Habibi, who recently completed the Canadian National Security Programme, a one-year course at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, the key to win counterinsurgency “is to address the roots of grievances. By listening to the village elders, the ANSF found solutions with them to resolve their problems.”18 Also, when the coalition forces entered a new village with the permission of the village leader, the ANSF would be the ones responsible for searching the compounds. Their presence in the compounds did not offend the locals as much as if foreign troops had conducted the search. By paying attention to cultural sensitivities, the Canadian and US forces encountered less resistance in their day-to-day operations. In summary, during the last Canadian combat rotation in Kandahar, the successes achieved were possible because of the decentralization approach to the district level and by partnering with local security forces. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Paganini, this approach also continued to be used by the Americans after the Canadian departure from Kandahar in July 2011.19

The Revision of FM 3-24: Canada’s Influence on US Conduct of Counter-insurgency Operations Upon his return to the United States, Lieutenant-Colonel Paganini was appointed director of the US Counterinsurgency Center in Kansas, where his experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq informed his opinion on counterinsurgency. Many of the lessons learned in southern Afghanistan made him realize the importance of empowering host-nation institutions in a counterinsurgency setting and of the need to partner with local security forces to obtain more enduring outcomes in a population-centric setting. These practices helped him revise the FM 3-24: “A lot of what we did in Kandahar Province were things that I learned from General Vance and General Milner; also from Mark Popov and B Squadron, RCD. That informed a lot of the dialogue and the ‘what’ into the counter-insurgency doctrine that we tried to revise.”20 17 18

Interview with Major-General Dean J. Milner, Kingston, October 17, 2014. Interview with Brigadier-General Ahmed Habibi, commander of Kandahar 1st Brigade, Toronto, November 27, 2014. 19 Phone interview with Lieutenant-Colonel John Paganini, October 29, 2014. 20 Ibid.

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A modification was made to move from the “clear-hold-build” approach introduced by the US doctrine in 2006 and add more nuances in the planning of operations with the “define-shape-clear-hold-build-enable” model. Initially, the “clear-hold-build” strategy involved to clear or separate the insurgents from the population, hold the village by establishing security, and build the institutional capacity with development. However, these steps proved insufficient to set the conditions necessary to ensure the stability of a village in a counter-insurgency setting. The introduction of the define phase aimed to collect intelligence and information to prepare the operation. Then, the commander would visit the village to shape its environment prior to the clear phase. The shape phase gives other options to commanders in the field besides resorting to kinetic operations and depends more on their interactions with the local leaders, the positions chosen to occupy and the forces they enter with. Last, the enable phase helps bring about enduring solutions by making commanders take a step back and letting the locals find their own solutions (Coombs 2013). The enable phase proved to be particularly difficult for soldiers in Afghanistan, as they are naturally inclined to be driven to action. That said, Lieutenant-Colonel Paganini pointed out that there is no “go-to” model in counter-insurgency, as every situation is unique with its own peculiarities. Put simply, if something worked in Dand, it does not guarantee success if applied the exact same way in Panjwayi. During its six-year involvement in Kandahar Province, the CAF’s sensitivity to counter-insurgency had an enduring influence on Canada’s US allies. Not only did the Americans continue to use the district stability approach after Canadian departure from Kandahar, but they also integrated some CAF tactics, techniques and procedures in the FM 3-24. With regards to the district stability approach, it was found that living among the locals increased the population’s security and, more importantly, its perception of their own security (Popov 2011, 70–72). It also proved to be a successful and sustainable measure over time, as signs of progress were observed in terms of stability and development years after the departure of Canadian soldiers. In March 2014, Major-General Milner returned to Kandahar, accompanied by the Canadian Ambassador in Afghanistan, Deborah Lyons, to visit the Panjwayi district centre. The district governor and his staff warmly welcomed General Milner like an old friend. “It’s night and day from when we were there,” said General Milner, “What proves it is that we didn’t talk security. We talked about other things like employment, increasing the agriculture,

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development and the need for more schools.”21 These conversations could not have taken place in early 2011, proving that the improvements in the security situation increased considerably and were sustained during subsequent years.

Conclusion The Afghanistan experience is not unique; the world appears to be becoming a more dangerous place with ideological extremism spreading in the poorest regions of the globe. Recent actions carried out by the Islamic State, Boko Haram and several al-Qaeda-affiliated groups continue to disturb international peace and security. The countries where these terrorist groups operate have a common denominator: they all suffer from conditions of extreme poverty. Each government apparatus is unable to provide basic needs to their population. Within these lawless environments, terrorist organizations and criminality are bound to emerge, exploiting the vacuum left by the state’s loss of its monopoly on the use of force, and transnational criminal activities are often pursued at its borders (for example, weapons smuggling, drug and human trafficking, and so on). Canada must therefore be ready to operate in these complex environments, as future conflicts are likely to occur within these weak and fragile states. The hard-won lessons learned in the Afghan districts can help better prepare Canada for the challenges of the twenty-first century. Critical lessons on counter-insurgency stemming from the Afghanistan experience include: • Commitment of significant troops. A significant impediment to winning the war in Afghanistan was the lack of sufficient resources to implement the counter-insurgency strategy. Considering the number of villages to protect, living among the population to separate them from the insurgents was, in retrospect, impossible to achieve without the commitment of NATO countries to provide enough troops to accomplish this goal. Counter-insurgency is a complex endeavour that requires enough troops to accomplish its objectives and the commitment of resources must be sustained for a long period of time. Moreover, the experience in Afghanistan revealed that it was preferable to invest troops in a reduced area and progressively expand as the situation in the area improved. 21

Interview with Major-General Dean J. Milner, Kingston, October 17, 2014.

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• District stability approach. Decentralizing the approach to the district level helped provide an acute understanding of the security environment in which operations took place. It also helped to better prioritize the operations by taking into account the needs of the districts. By doing so, it also reduced the lack of coherence that often occurred between different rotations. Prior to its implementation, successive Canadian commanders would bring their “new” strategic plans, and removed the troops from defensive positions to reallocate them to other areas. However, what the local population saw was the troops leaving. This sent the message that the CAF was unable to protect them from the Taliban. However, the district stability approach was able to ensure long-term stability because it was decentralized to the district level and ensured a more comprehensive understanding of the security situation in the district. In turn, this allowed the consolidation of the gains made in villages before moving on to other contested areas. • Partner with local security forces. This has proven to be the most effective way to conduct operations. Because the local security forces share the same cultural background as the population, it is easier for them to build trust and confidence with the local population. They also have a deeper knowledge of the security and cultural environment they operate in, which helps them conduct effective counter-insurgency operations. Canada invested a lot of effort to improve the capacity of the local security forces by working side by side with them. This is particularly important because the transfer of authority to the local security forces should always be the intended goal in these operations. Therefore, all efforts devoted to enhance the local forces’ capability will better prepare them for when the coalition force leaves. Partnering with the local forces does have its challenges, but it allows for far better results and has a more significant impact on the population. • Listen to the population. This was a key lesson that showed the most significant results. An international coalition can come in with all the best intentions in the world; however, it is the local leaders who have the necessary influence to institute change in their communities. By asking for the advice of the local leaders,

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the coalition helps reinforce the governance structures in place, and brings legitimacy to the village leader. It also provides an opportunity to find solutions in conjunction with the villagers to their own problems, which, in turn, holds more promise to guarantee their buy-in. It is only by maintaining a relationship based on trust and cooperation with the local leaders that the coalition can hope to make sustainable progress, such as protecting the rights of women. Just like in any other nation, it is important to preach patience, because changing mentalities takes time. During its years in Afghanistan, the CAF built itself a reputation among its allies as being very effective at counter-insurgency. The key for their success was their ability to make themselves close to the population by listening to their concerns and learning to negotiate with them. By taking into account the locals’ views, rather than imposing their will, the Canadians worked closely with the Afghans and helped them make long-term decisions about their security.

Acknowledgements I would like to sincerely thank General Jonathan Vance, Major-General Dean J. Milner, Afghan General Ahmed Habibi, M. Tim Martin, LieutenantColonel Mark Popov, US Lieutenant-Colonel John Paganini, Ms. Rosalee LaPlante, Major Enno Kerckhoff, M. Howard Coombs and Captain Tim Abbott for their insightful talks and their commitment to remembering this significant moment in our history. This chapter has also benefitted from the careful reading and comments of Julien Tourreille, Kevin Langlois, Eric Jardine, Stephen M. Saideman, Fen Osler Hampson and George Petrolekas. I am solely responsible for the analysis and conclusions reached herein.

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Works Cited Burtch, Andrew. 2013. “At the limit of Acceptable Risk: The Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team, 2006-2011.” International Journal 68 (2): 314–30. Chayes, Sarah. 2013. “Assessing the Transition in Afghanistan.” Testimony Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, July 11. Chief of Land Staff. 2008. B-GL-323-004/FP-003, Counter-Insurgency Operations. Ottawa: Department of National Defence. Coombs, Howard G. 2013. “Afghanistan 2010-2011: Counterinsurgency through Whole of Government.” Canadian Military Journal 13 (3): 16–24. Fenton, Anthony. 2010. “The Future of Warfare: Canadian Counterinsurgency Manual Reflects US-Canada ‘Synergy.’” In Multinational Integration: Observations, Insights, and Lessons, 109–12. Centre for Army Lessons Learned Handbook. Kansas, AK. House of Commons. 2008. Motion adopted. 39th Parliament, Sitting 66, Session 2, Vote no. 76, March 13. Jardine, Eric and Simon Palamar. 2013. “From Medusa Past Kantolo: Testing the Effectiveness of Canada’s Enemy-Centric and PopulationCentric Counterinsurgency Operational Strategies.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36: 588–608. Marten, Kimberly. 2010. “From Kabul to Kandahar: The Canadian forces and change.” American Review of Canadian Studies 40 (2): 214–36. Leprince, Caroline. 2013. “The Canadian-Led Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Experience: A Success Story?” International Journal 68 (2): 359–77. Popov, Mark. 2011. “Coins in the dust: battlespace commanding and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.” Australian Army Journal 8 (2): 59– 84. Verret, Major Marc. 2013. “Comparing Contemporary Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Theories.” Baltic Security & Defence Review 15 (1): 95–122. White, Patrick. 2010. “Canada’s Kandahar Legacy Rests on a Shift in Strategy.” The Globe and Mail, January 1.

6 Securing the Pearl of the Caribbean The Canadian Contribution to Haiti’s Security and Stability, 2004–2014 Gaëlle Rivard Piché

Introduction Since the early 1990s, Canada has contributed greatly to Haiti’s reconstruction and stabilization efforts. With the return of a multinational military force and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004, Canada became one of the main donors and a key partner on the ground for Haiti’s stabilization and security, recognizing the importance of long-term engagement toward Haiti. Ten years later, while Haiti remains a priority for the government, Canadian assistance to the country’s security sector has become increasingly focused on specific aspects of the reform of the Police Nationale d’Haïti (PNH). The security situation has significantly improved since 2004. Nonetheless, much remains to be done in order to ensure the sustainability of the progress achieved so far. Events such as the earthquake in January 2010 and the cholera epidemic in 2013, show that Haiti is still vulnerable and highly volatile. There is a general understanding that Haiti is not yet able to ensure its own stability and the security of its population against the many challenges the country is

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facing. Long-term strategy and commitments from Canada and other donors remain a necessity for Haiti’s recovery and stability. Overall, Canadian intervention in the Haitian security sector has remained focused on technical aspects. Like most donors, Canada has focused on increasing the capacity and the level of professionalism of Haitian security institutions over the past 10 years. The PNH reform represents a first and crucial step toward Haiti’s stability. Yet, the evolution of the security situation and the overall environment in Haiti indicates that the solution to its stability and development is political, requiring more initiatives at the local level, which are often beyond the State’s1 reach. The argument presented here is twofold. The Canadian intervention for the stabilization and security of Haiti has been significant and has certainly contributed to the progress witnessed since 2004. However, a focus on the technical aspects of the PNH reform process, lack of a clear strategy to guide Canada’s intervention 10 years after the articulation of the wholeof-government approach, a shift in Canada’s priorities toward international assistance and uncertainty regarding the future of the UN presence in Haiti have slowed Canada’s efforts. This chapter first presents an overview of Canada’s historical participation in Haiti’s stabilization efforts, along with the reform of its security and justice institutions. It then turns to the Canadian contribution to the MINUSTAH and the broader stabilization initiatives from 2004 to 2010, characterized by the whole-of-government approach. These efforts have significantly improved the security situation in Haiti. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the realignment of the Canadian support in Haiti in the period following the earthquake. Institutional changes and political shifts seem to have affected the assistance offered to Haiti, and resulted in the lack of a long-term strategy regarding Haiti’s security and stability.

1

In this chapter, “State” refers to the central governing entity within Haiti, while “state” refers to the country as a whole.

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History of Violence and Intervention in Haiti (1986–2004) Since its independence in 1804, Haiti has been marked by a series of dictatorships and military coups that have shaped the political culture of the country, as well as relations among the State, the security institutions and the population. After the departure of former President Jean Claude Duvalier in 1986, a new constitution was adopted by plebiscite, which provided for the reform of the armed forces, the creation of a new civilian police force and the reinforcement of judiciary guarantees toward the protection of human rights (Beidas, Granderson and Neild 2007). In December 1990, JeanBertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest from the popular neighbourhood of Portau-Prince, won the first democratic election by receiving over two-thirds of the popular vote. However, he was quickly overthrown in 1991 by the armed forces. The Forces Armées d’Haïti (FAd’H), threatened to be weakened by reforms planned in the new constitution, reinstated a military dictatorship led by General Raoul Cédras, forcing Aristide into his first exile. Following the military coup, and in accordance with the sanctions imposed by the Organization of the American States, Canada suspended its development assistance to Haiti. Ottawa also lobbied for the adoption of mandatory sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force. In 1994, Canada deployed 600 military and 100 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers under the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), which was authorized alongside the multilateral military intervention Restore Democracy in September 1994 (Rossignol 1994). UNMIH was mandated to restore security, demobilize the armed force and create a new civilian police force. Canada contributed significantly to the three successive UN peace operations in Haiti from 1994 to 1997 and to the police mission from 1997 to 2000 through its police and military contingents. However, the premature departure of the United Nations in 2000 was quickly followed by a deterioration of the political and security climate. Rapid polarization between Aristide’s supporters and opponents created a highly volatile environment, which led to a rebellion against Aristide in late 2003. The risk of open armed conflict and international pressure from the United States, France and Canada forced Aristide into a second exile. In February 2004, the UNSC authorized MINUSTAH, which was deployed later that year. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the MINUSTAH mandate included

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three main elements: the stabilization of the security situation throughout the country, the reform of the PNH and the organization of presidential elections by the end of 2005. Deployments of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) in March 2004 and of MINUSTAH later that year, did not result in an immediate improvement of the security situation. Following the departure of Aristide, the security situation was back to the level of 1993 (Donais 2005). A general state of insecurity and lawlessness characterized 2004 and 2005, because of the presence of armed bands of ex-members of the FAd’H and paramilitary groups active under Cédras’ military junta, local gangs and criminal groups, as well as tensions between Aristide supporters and opponents, and the absence of a true and functioning policing force (Kolbe and Hutson 2006; Amnesty International 2004). In November 2004, popular frustration turned into a violent uprising known as Operation Baghdad in Cité Soleil and downtown Port-au-Prince (Lunde 2012). It took most of 2005 for the situation to significantly improve, despite the intervention of the PNH and MINUSTAH. The repressive approach of the PNH, combined with the lack of legitimacy of the interim government, fed popular mistrust against Haitian institutions. MINUSTAH, supporting the PNH, was increasingly seen as an occupation force. The situation only improved after the general election in February 2006, won by René Préval. Operation Baghdad demonstrated to the international community the need for an innovative approach to address violence and disorder in Port-au-Prince, through a context-specific disarmament and reintegration strategy, and the reform of the justice and security institutions.

The Evolution of the Canadian Approach toward Haiti In 2005, the Canadian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Paul Martin, presented its new foreign policy priorities in Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. The statement identified state fragility and weakness as a security threat to Canadian security, which should be addressed through integrated and longterm assistance to weak, failed and fragile states. As pointed out in chapter 5 of this volume, critiques of this policy pointed to the lack of coordination and

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cohesion between different Canadian agencies as an explanation of the lack of results in previous stabilization and reconstruction efforts. In response, the 2005 statement notes that addressing the needs and challenges faced by fragile states requires a holistic vision encompassing the diplomatic, defence and development sectors (Government of Canada 2005, 13). The whole-of-government approach was designed, therefore, to articulate in a more coordinated and integrated manner the Canadian response to the new challenges posed by complex environments of interventions such as Haiti and Afghanistan. The new policy statement led to the creation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Team (START) and the establishment of the Global Peace and Security Fund (GFPS) to support START initiatives in Haiti and elsewhere. Based inside the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), START’s initial mandate was to coordinate the whole-ofgovernment approach policy and the engagements toward fragile states among different Canadian agencies and departments (Government of Canada 2005). Haiti presented a great opportunity for Ottawa to put into practice its new integrated approach. Indeed, the statement highlights Canada’s “leading role in supporting the strengthening of police capacity in Haiti” (ibid., iii). In the second half of the 2000s, Haiti became the second-largest recipient of Canadian assistance (after Afghanistan) and Ottawa’s priority in the Americas. Longterm commitment and an integrated approach were perceived as essential to Haiti’s peace and stability: “Recent examples, such as Haiti, illustrate that human rights and human security remain unachievable ideals without stable state structures to provide for them” (ibid., 20). The election of Stephen Harper in 2006 changed, to some extent, the focus of Canadian international assistance and progressively put aside the wholeof-government approach proposed under Paul Martin. The lack of perceived progress in Africa and, in particular, Afghanistan fed harsh criticisms regarding the lack of tangible results of Canadian assistance (Brown 2007; 2012). In 2007, and despite the lack of a clear development policy, Canada announced that Latin America would replace Africa as its regional priority and would adopt “a whole-of-government approach toward a more prosperous, secure and democratic hemisphere” (DFATD 2015b). Haiti remained a country of focus and the biggest recipient of Canadian assistance on the continent. Yet, the shift in priority from security and stability toward economic and

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commercial objectives, demands for tangible results, which increased incentives for short-term targeted initiatives, as well as rising doubts about the ability of CIDA to be effective, certainly affected Canadian assistance to Haiti’s stabilization and reconstruction (Brown 2012).

The Canadian Contribution to Haiti’s Security and Stabilization: 2004–2010 Since 2004, the early Canadian strategy toward Haiti was to prioritize security and stabilization, in accordance with other regarding donors and the MINUSTAH mandate. This “security first” approach emphasized stabilization and policing through military presence, and security sector reform, which focused first and foremost on the reinforcement of the PNH. It also included support for the reform of the judicial and the penitentiary systems. These efforts remained mostly technical, focusing on training and capacity building. Canada presented itself as a champion of the multilateral effort to stabilize and rebuild Haiti, having channelled most of its participation through MINUSTAH. Since 2006, Haiti has received more than $1.4 billion in development and humanitarian assistance, including $850 million since 2010 (DFATD 2015a). START and the GFPS also supported bilateral and multilateral initiatives to reinforce the State’s security capacity, stabilize the security environment and support violence-reduction initiatives. It enabled Canada to diversify its contribution and put into practice its wholeof-government approach. Through START, Canada invested more than $80 million in Haiti between 2006 and 2011 (DFATD 2012).

Reinforcement of the PNH The most significant Canadian contribution to the security sector was toward the reinforcement of the PNH, both in terms of human and financial resources. The PNH was severely weakened after the withdrawal of the United Nations in 2000. In 2004, only 2,500 agents remained, most of the infrastructure was destroyed and there was virtually no institutional capacity (Fortin and Pierre 2008). Furthermore, 10 years after its creation, the PNH was perceived as corrupt and predatory. Aristide had politicized the young institution through the nomination of supporters in key positions inside the PNH command. The former president had also called for “zero tolerance” and encouraged the

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creation of vigilante groups composed of off-duty PNH members to target criminal elements and political opponents. Ottawa conceived the reform and professionalization of the PNH as an essential element to ensure Haiti’s stability, in line with the security first strategy adopted from 2004. Ottawa authorized the deployment of 100 United Nations police officers — known as UNPols — who would serve in MINUSTAH. Coming mostly from the RCMP and Quebec’s provincial and municipal police services, these police officers had a comparative advantage in terms of expertise, skills and language over UNPols from other national contingents. Early in the mission, language had been identified as an issue undermining training and co-location with the PNH; therefore, a strong francophone police contingent was a great contribution to the MINUSTAH. Yet, Canadian UNPols were not always used in ways that would maximize their impact on the ground, because of the necessity for the United Nations to ensure a balance between the different national contingents and respecting the multinational nature of the peace operation. Some Canadian UNPols felt they were not used to their full capacity, relegated to activities below their rank or expertise. A majority of Canadian policemen also felt they were generally very qualified relative to other national police contingents contributing to MINUSTAH (Saint-Pierre and Tanner 2012). Nonetheless, Canadian UNPols were involved in the training, monitoring and vetting of PNH recruits. They also held leadership positions as police commissioner, deputy commissioners and regional commanders. In terms of financial resources, the majority of GFPS funding toward Haiti from 2006 to 2008 targeted the PNH through four different projects — approximately $14 million. These projects included deployment of police experts with the MINUSTAH, refurbishing of the police school, strengthening of the Inspectorate General’s capacity and renovation of police stations (DFAIT 2009). Furthermore, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) financed the development of the police academy for the training of PNH officers. Although authorized in 2008, the construction of the new police academy has yet to start (Berthiaume 2014). After a false start in 2005, the police component of MINUSTAH designed a “police reform plan” with some contributions from the PNH leadership. René Préval finally approved the plan in 2006, which gave the PNH and MINUSTAH the necessary political support to move forward. The PNH made important progress until the earthquake in January 2010, despite a

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lack of reform in other sectors and the outdated constitution slowing down any political process. The PNH’s strength increased progressively, reaching 9,000 agents by the end of 2009. While these numbers were well below the objective of 14,000 for 2010, they demonstrated clear progress in a challenging environment.

Stabilization of the Security Environment Canada also contributed to the stabilization of the security environment through its police and military personnel, first under the US-led MIF and then under MINUSTAH. Ottawa initially deployed a force of 500 military personnel through Operation Halo, which was part of the MIF, and then ensured the transition to MINUSTAH. Once the UN force was deployed, two senior officers joined the MINUSTAH headquarters through Operation Hamlet. This number was raised to three in 2005, and five in 2010. Canadian UNPols were also involved in operations with the PNH, through support for specific operations against armed groups in red zones, and colocation in police stations in different regions of the country. In 2005 and early 2006, MINUSTAH, mainly through Brazilian battalions, conducted a series of operations against armed gangs in dangerous sectors of the capital, including Grand Bel Air and Cité Soleil. These operations, however, lacking strong and clear support from the Haitian interim government, only fed popular opposition toward MINUSTAH and reinforced distrust of the PNH, which was still perceived as corrupt and predatory. In late 2006, newly elected President René Préval announced that armed gangs would have to either disarm or die. This clear and strong support from the Haitian government enabled the MINUSTAH military and police components to support the PNH through large-scale operations in the problematic areas of Port-auPrince. By the end of 2007, public order was mostly reinstated, and homicide and kidnapping numbers started to drop (Dorn 2009). This tendency was maintained up until the January 2010 earthquake. Through these operations, the PNH, heavily supported by the MINUSTAH police and military components, managed to access and increase its presence in zones controlled by armed bands, criminal gangs and paramilitaries. These efforts, while in line with the security first vision adopted by Canada and other donors, were not sufficient to ensure the country’s long-term stability. The security first approach and the focus on PNH capacity assumed that violence and public disorder were because of the security vacuum created

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by the weak Haitian police. Yet, relations between the State and society were quasi-non-existent in many of these communities (Kivland 2012). For the most part, these operations ignored the political nature of unrest and violence in Port-au-Prince, and minimized the need for dialogue with local actors outside of the State’s reach. Nevertheless, in 2008, the UNSC recognized the continuing weakness of the PNH and its inability to ensure public order and stability without the support of MINUSTAH (UNSC 2008). Hence, MINUSTAH was restructured in order to adapt to the evolving needs of Haiti in terms of security. Between 2006 and 2008, the number of military personnel was reduced, while the number of UNPols and formed police units was increased. Furthermore, several donors, including Canada, began funding local initiatives to improve security, reinforce the State and improve the PNH footprint in communities where the State was previously absent.

Community Security and Violence-reduction Initiatives As demonstrated by the allocation of the GFPS, Canada’s priority in the security sector was clearly the reinforcement of the PNH. Yet, through the whole-of-government approach, Canada also recognized the importance of community security and the need to prevent the “gangsterization” of certain neighbourhoods through violence-reduction programs (DFAIT 2009, 62). Ottawa was careful about supporting this kind of initiative, considering that efforts at the local level should be seen as complementing the reform of the PNH and an entry point for the reinforcement of PNH-community relations. Between 2006 and 2008, START allocated over $2 million to support three different community violence-reduction projects. These projects varied greatly in terms of size, scope and methodology, which may have reflected a lack of vision regarding the objectives and the strategies that should be adopted to improve security and address violence in communities where the State was either weak or absent. It also suggested a lack of coordination with MINUSTAH and other partners in order to understand the context of intervention and articulate the multinational effort at the local level. However, it represented a move in the right direction, as donors often focus too much on the national elite and very little attention is given to community-based projects and bottom-up initiatives (Shamsie 2008).

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DFAIT considered one project funded by Canada and led by Viva Rio Haiti, a Brazilian non-governmental organization (NGO) based in downtown Portau-Prince since 2006, particularly successful (DFAIT 2009, 63). Viva Rio Haiti was mandated to develop a community policing methodology based on its experience in Rio de Janeiro since the early 1990s on the one hand, and on the strategies adopted by MINUSTAH’s Brazilian battalion to stabilize popular neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince on the other hand. The NGO also played a crucial role in the mediation of peace accords between rival gangs, in collaboration with the Commission Nationale pour le Désarmement, le Démentèlement et la Réintégration. For every month with no homicide, Viva Rio would organize a raffle for the community and its leaders. Prizes included scholarships, professional rewards and motorcycles. Viva Rio also organized cultural events, in addition to educational and cultural activities. Surveys by Viva Rio demonstrate that the violence was significantly reduced after the implementation of the peace accords. Yet, following an audit in 2010 ordered by DFAIT, and despite a good evaluation in 2009 (DFAIT 2009), START first postponed and finally did not renew Viva Rio Haiti’s funding (Viva Rio Haiti 2011), which had not only a negative impact on the activities of the NGO, but also a disruptive effect on the entire community that relied on Viva Rio for a wide variety of resources, including employment. Overall, from 2004 until the 2010 earthquake, Canada’s intervention in Haiti’s security sector focused mostly on the strengthening of the PNH, through multilateral and bilateral initiatives. Attention was also given to community security issues, recognizing the absence of the State at the local level, which were more or less successful, but demonstrated Ottawa’s willingness to be consistent with the whole-of-government approach adopted by its different agencies. These initiatives remained short sighted, despite the recognized need for long-term assistance to ensure sustainable results.

Canada’s Response to the Earthquake On January 12, 2010, a massive earthquake hit Haiti, killing approximately 200,000 people and displacing 2.3 million Haitians — more than 20 percent of the country’s population (Amnesty International 2014). The natural disaster affected the security situation in Haiti, especially in Portau-Prince. First and foremost, it destroyed most of the progress that had been

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made in terms of infrastructure and administrative capacity (Zanotti 2010). Second, it provoked important migration movements from downtown Portau-Prince, which was severely damaged from the earthquake, toward camps and eventually new areas north of the capital. For some time, the PNH and MINUSTAH were unable to respond to security and safety concerns, in particular regarding gender-based and sexual violence (Gerntholtz and Rhoad 2010). Third, the damages at the national penitentiary in Port-au-Prince allowed a massive escape of prisoners, many of whom had been arrested during the stabilization operations from 2007 to 2009; several returned to their community, altering the newly established order. These changes affected the security and stability in key areas of the capital, including Bel Air and Cité Soleil. Crime rates increased in the two years following the earthquake (Muggah and Kolbe 2012; Kolbe and Muggah 2012). Canada significantly increased its assistance to Haiti following the disaster. At the military level, Canada increased its personnel contribution to the MINUSTAH military headquarters to 10 people, and deployed Operation Hestia to provide humanitarian assistance for the three months directly after the earthquake. The number of police officers was also raised by 50 percent, with authorization for up to 150 Canadian UNPols to participate in MINUSTAH. Additionally, START funded the replacement of the PNH’s infrastructure and materials that were destroyed in the earthquake. Despite delays in security and safety improvements, the push made by the international community, including Canada, to respond to the disaster enabled a general recovery that can be observed today.

2012–2014: Constraints and Uncertainty over Canadian Assistance Since 2012, Canada has downsized its assistance to the security sector to levels prior to the earthquake, and the impact of previous shifts in international assistance under the Conservative government can be witnessed in Canada’s contribution to Haiti’s peace and stability. Canada announced in 2012 that its contribution to Haiti would be reviewed to ensure its effectiveness (Mackrael 2013; Fantino 2012a), which stirred controversy domestically and put a strain on bilateral relations between the two countries (De Grandpré 2013a; Clark 2013; Hoffman 2012). In the meantime, Canadian support to the security sector became increasingly focused and targeted specific elements of PNH

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reform. Programs supporting community security initiatives were either suspended or cancelled, which in some cases has had a disruptive effect on partners’ activities and the communities targeted, as discussed earlier. Between 2012 and the end of 2014, START contribution to Haiti was only $9 million, a significant diminution in comparison to the previous period. Two main factors explain these changes. First, a series of political shifts and institutional changes in Ottawa have significantly affected the Canadian contribution to Haiti’s peace and security. Second, the uncertainty surrounding the future of MINUSTAH and the UN presence in Haiti beyond 2016 is reflected by the lack of a clear Canadian strategy for Haiti and what appears to be an overall donor fatigue after 10 years of engagement.

Continued Efforts to Strengthen the PNH The PNH has certainly made important progress since 2004, despite the setbacks of the earthquake. The ability of the Haitian police to overcome the consequences of this disaster may demonstrate that the PNH is increasingly resilient and has gained important experience since the earthquake. In 2012, the newly elected President Michel Martelly approved the five-year PNH development plan, targeting 2012–2016. Surveys suggested an increase in popular trust of the police (International Security Sector Advisory Team 2013). Nonetheless, lynching remains present in Haiti, which suggests that the population prefers to take justice into their own hands rather than deferring to the State (MINUSTAH 2013). Many challenges lie ahead. The ambitious development plan is unlikely to be completed by the end of 2016. A new five-year plan is currently being developed by the PNH itself to ensure progress beyond 2016, but its implementation will depend on the ability of the Haitian government to support its police force politically and financially. Furthermore, even if the objective of having 15,000 police agents is reached by the end of 2015, the strength of the PNH will still be below international standards for the number of police agents per 1,000 inhabitants. The Haitian State does not yet have the necessary resources to fully support the development and deployment of its police throughout the country. Today, police stations in the provinces are still often poorly equipped, and the number of agents is insufficient. Most of the resources are concentrated in Port-au-Prince.

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When it comes to specific programs supporting the professionalization of the PNH, it is interesting to note how these initiatives are often implemented in relatively peaceful areas. For example, the community police unit, funded and trained in part by Canada, is mostly active in Petionville, one of the wealthiest zones of the capital. The needs for community policing are definitely more urgent in the poor neighbourhoods, where relations between the police and the population are still very thin. In these neighbourhoods, the PNH is less visible, their presence is scattered and MINUSTAH continues to be essential for stability and security. Yet, the tendency to focus on short-term, quick results guides the implementation of such programs in less problematic areas. Furthermore, the lack of progress in the reform of the justice system prevents the complete professionalization of the PNH. In the absence of the rule of law, and with juges de paix who are still undertrained and often corrupt, PNH agents have few incentives to fulfill their functions. A police service is the mirror of the society in which it evolves; a professional, effective and accountable police force cannot survive in an environment where there is no rule of law or judicial guarantees for all. The next two years are critical in the development of the PNH to ensure its ability to maintain security and public order throughout the country, considering the announced drawdown of the military component in 2015 and the withdrawal of MINUSTAH after 2016.

Changes in the Canadian Contribution to Haiti’s Security After the withdrawal of Ottawa’s support for the earthquake recovery in 2012, Canada’s contribution in terms of military and police personnel returned to the level of 2009. However, Canadian assistance to the security sector became increasingly focused on the PNH, leaving aside community security initiatives. While building on the Canadian comparative advantage in terms of policing expertise enables Canada to maximize its contribution, the sustainability of the PNH reform process relies heavily on a holistic approach that considers the social and political context in which the PNH evolves. However, the lack of a clear foreign policy replacing the 2005 International Policy Statement, a shift in international assistance priorities and the uncertainty regarding the future of MINUSTAH undermine the Canadian ability to do so.

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Shift in Canadian Foreign Policy: From a Security First Strategy to Economic Prosperity The 2005 foreign policy statement emphasized the responsibility of Canada’s government to protect its citizens by contributing to international efforts toward peace, security and stability through the whole-of-government approach. It was illustrated by the Canadian efforts in Haiti and in Afghanistan. However, the 2006 change in government and a series of reports on the ineffectiveness of Canadian aid led to a change in Canada’s motives for international assistance and intervention. There was a noticeable shift from security and stability priorities, as well as the role and duty of Canada as a member of the international community toward economic prosperity and self-interest through the promotion of the Canadian private sector in international development: “beyond the security imperative, there is an economic imperative to our development work” (Fantino 2012b). Reflecting this reality, evidence suggests that since 2012, there has been a disengagement by Canada regarding Haiti’s security, or at least a lack of vision to ensure long-term security and stability. First, in 2012, the revision of international assistance commanded by then Minister of International Development Julian Fantino has affected the amount of financial resources available through other channels for Haiti’s security and reconstruction. Canada’s commitment to Haiti was only reconfirmed at the end of 2014, and a clear strategy remains to be formulated. Furthermore, the interview given by Fantino to the newspaper La Presse later that year, where he denounced the lack of progress in Haiti’s reconstruction based on the excessive amount of trash on the streets of Port-au-Prince, put a strain on Canada-Haiti relations (De Grandpré 2013b; Clark 2013). His statement reflected impatience for the lack of results and progress he expected to witness during his visit to Haiti in November 2012. Haiti’s president, as well as the United States and the United Nations, quickly denounced his statement. Second, the merging of CIDA and DFAIT to form the new DFATD in the spring of 2013, led to the de facto end of the START program in Haiti, which had an important impact on the Canadian contribution to the Haitian security sector. CIDA faced severe criticisms regarding the lack of perceived results of Canadian official development assistance in the previous years, which certainly contributed to its fusion with DFAIT. In 2013-2014, only a couple of small projects were funded through START. Canada lost a way to engage

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effectively with other donors and Haitian institutions through small ad hoc programs that had a strong and quick impact on the ground. Most community violence-reduction initiatives were funded through START, as well as many bilateral projects targeting the justice and security sector. The fusion of CIDA and DFAIT could ultimately increase the coordination and coherence of Canadian international assistance, but for now, it has resulted in the reduction of its support to Haiti’s security and stability. Haiti was confirmed as a country of focus for Canada in 2014, but assistance is now driven by new thematic priorities: maternal health and economic growth (DFATD 2015a). However, much remains to be done in the security sector, and while the country is more stabilized, it remains highly volatile, as demonstrated by the latest electoral crisis (Granitz 2014).

Uncertainty Regarding Multinational Involvement in Haiti Most of Canada’s contributions to Haiti are done through multilateral channels, which affects, to some extent, its ability to show quick and concrete results. Uncertainty surrounding the future of MINUSTAH and international assistance after 2016 has certainly contributed to the lack of a clear and renewed Canadian strategy regarding Haiti. Increasing donor fatigue as well as other pressing international security issues may lead to the disengagement of the international community with Haiti. In the current context, it is fair to say that it might be difficult for Canada to articulate a coherent and longterm strategy for Haiti in line with other donors’ priorities. However, it may ultimately undermine the development of the PNH and the broader security sector, in a period that is critical to security and stability. Lessons from the premature withdrawal of the United Nations in 2000 should be kept in mind in order to prevent the deterioration of the political and security situation to a level where international intervention would once again be judged necessary. Almost 10 years after Canada’s International Policy Statement, the lack of a clear foreign policy guiding Canada’s strategy for fragile states and development assistance more broadly has certainly contributed to the apparent stagnation of the Canadian efforts toward Haiti’s security and stabilization. The shift from security to economic imperatives and the need for quick and tangible results led to a lack of long-term vision to ensure the reinforcement and the development of the Haitian State. Much has been achieved, but the reform of the national police only represents the first step toward Haiti’s

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stability. More efforts at the local level are needed in order to create social capital, ensure development and provide a sustainable solution to the cyclical political crises that have shaped Haiti’s recent history. Security is essential to attaining other development goals, including the issues of maternal health and economic prosperity now prioritized by the Government of Canada.

Conclusion Since 2004, Canada has been a significant partner in Haiti’s progression toward security and stability, positioning itself as one of the main donors and a champion of multilateral efforts for the reconstruction of the country. The whole-of-government approach has guided, to some extent, the Canadian intervention, which has made a significant contribution to the reform of the Haitian security sector, in particular regarding the national police. Furthermore, Canada has developed a clear expertise regarding participation in police missions and police reform programs. However, the initial commitment to an integrated approach has progressively faded, at least in the security sector. Additionally, a shift in foreign policy priorities without the formulation of a clear national strategy for international assistance, pressure for more immediate results and institutional constraints since 2012 have reduced the Canadian impact in Haiti, a situation that has been deplored by several partners, including the Haitian government. Ten years after Canada’s International Policy Statement, Canada is in need of a new Haiti strategy in order to ensure the sustainability of the progress made since 2004 and to avoid repeating previous mistakes. Previous experience in Haiti and elsewhere should teach Canada that security sector reform is a long-term process. Premature withdrawal of peace operations and large-scale stabilization interventions can be counterproductive. When the United Nations exited Haiti in 2000, it left behind a young and inexperienced police force that ultimately was unable to maintain security and public order. Four years later, Haiti fell back to the situation of 1993 and the international community faced an even greater challenge. Haiti may not have met the international community’s expectations after 20 years of intervention. However, it is important to note that significant progress has been accomplished and Haiti represents a challenging case with a long history of nation-building failure. Expectations about what can be achieved in

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the short and medium terms should be tempered. Nonetheless, the uncertainty surrounding the future of MINUSTAH and the broader international presence in Haiti poses problems for the Canadian response within a multilateral framework, and the sustainability of what has been achieved so far in Haiti. Reforming the PNH is a crucial first step toward Haiti’s security and stability. It is also a long-term process that requires strong commitment from its donors and main partners. Canada has developed an important expertise that should not be dismissed. These efforts should go beyond technical assistance and address the different components of the entire security system, within and outside the State’s structure, in order to truly enhance security and enable long-term stability and development. Thus, a holistic and long-term vision should guide the future of Canadian assistance to Haiti’s security and stability.

Works Cited Amnesty International. 2004. “Haiti: Breaking the Cycle of Violence: A Last Chance for Haiti?” Amnesty International. www.amnesty.org/en/library/ info/AMR36/038/2004/en. ———. 2014. “Facts and Figures — Haiti: Displaced People Still Leave in Despair Four Years after Devastating Earthquake.” http://reliefweb.int/ sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Displaced%20people%20still%20 leave%20in%20despair%20four%20years%20after%20devastating%20 earthquake.pdf. Beidas, Sandra, Colin Granderson and Rachel Neild. 2007. “Justice and Security Reform after Intervention: Haiti.” In Constructing Justice And Security After War, edited by Charles Call, 69–112. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press. Berthiaume, Lee. 2014. “Canadian Promise to Build Haitian Police Academy in Limbo.” Ottawa Citizen. http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/ canadian-promise-to-build-haitian-police-academy-in-limbo. Brown, Stephen. 2007. “Le Rapport Du Sénat Sur L’aide Canadienne À l’Afrique: Une Analyse À Rejeter.” Le Multilatéral 1 (3): 6-7. ———. 2012. “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives.” In Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid, edited by Stephen Brown, 79–107. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press.

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Clark, Campbell. 2013. “Haiti Stunned by Fantino Plan to Freeze Aid.” The Globe and Mail, January 4. www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ haiti-stunned-by-fantino-plan-to-freeze-aid/article6941946/. De Grandpré, Hugo. 2013a. “Nous ne sommes pas une oeuvre de charité, dit Julian Fantino.” La Presse, January 4. www.lapresse.ca/actualites/ politique/politique-canadienne/201301/04/01-4608262-nous-nesommes-pas-une-oeuvre-de-charite-dit-julian-fantino.php?utm_cate gorieinterne=trafficdrivers&utm_contenuinterne=cyberpresse_vous_ suggere_4608248_article_POS2. ———. 2013b. “Haïti: Les Fond Pour Les Nouveaux Projets Sont Gelés.” La Presse, January 4. www.lapresse.ca/actualites/politique/politiquecanadienne/201301/03/01-4608248-haiti-les-fonds-pour-les-nouveauxprojets-sont-geles.php. Donais, Timothy. 2005. “Back to Square One: The Politics of Police Reform in Haiti.” Civil Wars 7 (3): 270–87. Dorn, A. Walter. 2009. “Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006–07.” Intelligence and National Security 24 (6): 805–35. DFAIT. 2009. Summative Evaluation of START’s Global Peace and Security Fund — Haiti. Ottawa, ON: DFAIT. DFATD. 2012. “START in Haiti.” July 17. www.international.gc.ca/startgtsr/haiti.aspx. ———. 2015a. “Haiti.” January 13. www.international.gc.ca/developmentdeveloppement/countries-pays/haiti.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2015b. “Canada’s Strategy for Engagement in the Americas.” www.international.gc.ca/americas-ameriques/stategy-stratege. aspx?lang=eng. Fantino, Julian. 2012a. “Julian Fantino: The Status Quo of Foreign Aid Is Not an Option.” The Globe and Mail, December 10. www.theglobeandmail. com/news/politics/julian-fantino-the-status-quo-of-foreign-aid-is-notan-option/article6149440/. ———. 2012b. “Reducing Poverty — Building Tomorrow’s Markets.” Presented at the Economic Club of Canada, Toronto, November 23. www. acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/NAT-1123135713-Q8T.

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Fortin, Isabelle and François-Pierre Pierre. 2008. Haiti et La Réforme de La Police Nationale d’Haïti. Ottawa, ON: The North-South Institute. Gerntholtz, Liesl and Meghan Rhoad. 2010. “Sexual Violence in Haiti’s Camps.” Human Rights Watch, December 27. www.hrw.org/ news/2010/12/17/sexual-violence-haiti-s-camps. Government of Canada. 2005. Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Overview. Ottawa, ON. Granitz, Peter. 2014. “Haiti’s Political Crisis Is About to Get Worse.” Foreign Policy, November 24. www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/24/ haiti_political_crisis_elections_martelly. Hoffman, Steven. 2012. “You Can Focus on Trade, But Don’t Call It Aid.” The Globe and Mail, December 7. www.theglobeandmail.com/globedebate/you-can-focus-on-trade-but-dont-call-it-aid/article6043881/. International Security Sector Advisory Team. 2013. “Haiti Country Profile.” International Security Sector Advisory Team/Igapare Institute. International Security Sector Advisory Team. Kivland, Chelsey L. 2012. “Unmaking the State in ‘Occupied’ Haiti.” PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 35 (2): 248–70. doi:10.1111/ j.1555-2934.2012.01202.x. Kolbe, Athena R. and Robert Muggah. 2012. “The Economic Costs of Violent Crime in Haiti: The Impacts of Haiti’s Surge in Crime Endure Long after the Shooting Stops, with Children Especially Vulnerable.” The Guardian, August 22. www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/ aug/22/haiti-violent-crime-economic-costs/print. Kolbe, Athena R. and Royce A. Hutson. 2006. “Human Rights Abuse and Other Criminal Violations in Port-Au-Prince, Haiti: A Random Survey of Households.” The Lancet 368 (9538): 864–73. Lunde, Henriette. 2012. “The Violent Lifeworlds of Young Haitians: Gangs as Livelihood in Port-Au-Prince Ghetto.” Fafo. Mackrael, Kim. 2013. “With Post-Quake Aid under Review, Minister Presses Haiti on Rule of Law.” The Globe and Mail, September 5. www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/with-post-quake-aid-underreview-minister-presses-haiti-on-rule-of-law/article14117962/.

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MINUSTAH. 2013. Phénomènes de Lynchages: Une “Justice Populaire” Qui Mine La Société Haïtienne. 007. Les Dossiers Du Mois. Port-auPrince: MINUSTAH. Muggah, Robert and Athena R. Kolbe. 2012. “In Haiti, Violence amid the Rubble.” The Globe and Mail, March 5. www.theglobeandmail.com/ commentary/in-haiti-violence-amid-the-rubble/article550656/. Rossignol, Michel. 1994. “Haiti: International Efforts to Restore Democracy.” Library of Parliament. Saint-Pierre, Xavier and Samuel Tanner. 2012. “Les Compétences Policières et Les Retombées Intérieures Des Missions Internationales.” In Maintenir La Paix En Zones Postconflict; Les Nouveaux Visages de La Police, edited by Samuel Tanner and Denoit Dupont, 237–54. Montreal, QC: Presses de l’Université de Montréal. Shamsie, Yasmine. 2008. “Canada’s Approach to Democratization in Haiti: Some Reflections for the Coming Years.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 14 (3): 87–101. UNSC. 2008. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. S/2008/586. New York. Viva Rio Haiti. 2011. ONÈ RESPÈ FOR HAITI: Recovery, Security and Development at Local Level. Mid Year Report — April 1/Sept 30, 2011 PID 330097. Rio de Janeiro: Viva Rio. Zanotti, Laura. 2010. “Cacophonies of Aid, Failed State Building and NGOs in Haiti: Setting the Stage for Disaster, Envisioning the Future.” Third World Quarterly 31 (5): 755–71.

Part Two The Domestic Side of Intervention

7 Canada’s Development Interventions Unpacking Motives and Effectiveness in Canadian Foreign Aid Stephen Brown

Introduction: Framing Aid Motives What have been the overarching goals of Canada’s foreign aid program over the past 15 years? How have the Liberal and Conservative governments expressed them? And what impact do the motives have on the effectiveness of these “development interventions”? This chapter assesses Canada’s aid at the macro level. It does not evaluate aid projects or programs, per se, but rather the broader rationales — the extent to which they were invoked and the implications for development — using aid-related initiatives to illustrate the trends. To do so, it goes beyond the usual dichotomy of self-interest versus altruistic aid motives applied to Canadian foreign aid. Instead, it adopts an analytical framework, based on Maurits van der Veen’s (2011) seven “frames,” that expresses the motives for foreign aid. For each one, this chapter explores the extent to which the goal has been used to justify aid initiatives and the consequences for aid effectiveness, comparing the record of Liberal and Conservative governments since 2000.

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Historically, the most important analyst of Canadian foreign aid has been Cranford Pratt. He conceptualized debates over foreign aid as a clash between two perspectives. On one hand, the “humane internationalist” view, espoused by most development specialists within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as the majority of Canadians, is based on an ethical commitment to reducing poverty and inequality around the world. On the other hand, the “international realist” perspective, favoured by many politicians and most officials from other government departments, as well as corporate executives, sought to advance Canadian commercial and security interests (Pratt 1999; 2003; see discussion in Black 2014). Similarly, Keith Spicer (1966), author of the first book on Canadian foreign aid, speaks of a “trinity” of altruistic, commercial and political motives, an expression that David Morrison, in his history of CIDA and Canadian aid, also uses (Morrison 1998, 12–16; for a critique, see Nossal 1998). The underlying rationales for foreign aid, however, are more complex than the broad altruistic/humanitarian, diplomatic/geopolitical and commercial categories that most authors use. Van der Veen’s book, Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid, compares frames in the statements of politicians in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. In it, he identifies seven categories of aid goals: “security, power and influence, economic self-interest (wealth), enlightened self-interest, self-affirmation and reputation, obligation and duty, and humanitarianism,” recognizing that some can overlap (van der Veen 2011, 10). His categorization improves on previous conceptions of motives by unpacking the multiplicity of frames that can be characterized as self-interested, in addition to bringing attention to ideational (as opposed to material) goals, which tend to be overlooked in discussions of motives for aid. Figure 1 places the seven frames in a two-dimensional matrix according to the degree of self-interest/altruism they embody and the extent to which they are material or ideational goals. With respect to the first dimension, economic self-interest and humanitarianism both constitute material goals, whereas reputation and obligation are ideational ones. By way of illustration in the second dimension, economic self-interest and reputation are both selfinterested, while humanitarianism is altruistic.1 1

This figure is meant to be illustrative rather than definitive. Regardless of any quibbles regarding the exact placement of each goal along the two continua, it is the broad placement of the frames that matters for the purposes of this chapter.

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Figure 1: Mapping the Frames Material

Self-interested Economic self-interest/wealth Security Enlightened self-interest

Altruistic Humanitarianism

Power/influence

Ideational

Self-affirmation/reputation

Obligation/duty

Source: Author.

This chapter uses each of these seven categories to analyze Canadian aid interventions since the turn of the twenty-first century. It finds that the emphasis on specific goals varies over time and not necessarily neatly according to the party in power or the prime minister. The broad pattern, however, suggests that the Paul Martin Liberals and the Stephen Harper government placed great emphasis on the security frame, but the Conservatives largely abandoned the frame after the withdrawal of Canadian troops from combat roles in Afghanistan; the Jean Chrétien and Martin Liberals emphasized ideational frames more than the Conservatives, and more effectively; and the Harper government has been focusing its message on two rather contradictory material frames in recent years — economic self-interest and humanitarianism. A focus on economic self-interest is actually detrimental to development interests, while the strategic deployment of altruistic language can camouflage some harmful practices impelled by a motive absent from van der Veen’s framework — domestic political interests, particularly electoral calculations. The latter could even be considered a “master frame” for interpreting aid policy, as argued in this chapter’s final section.

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Applying Aid Frames to Canada Frame One: Security Security became an important justification for foreign aid, in Canada and elsewhere, after the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. The effect on Canadian development assistance, however, was not immediate. A policy statement on aid, entitled Canada Making a Difference in the World, released in 2002 but first drafted before September 11, makes no mention of Canadian security interests (CIDA 2007). After Paul Martin succeeded Jean Chrétien as Liberal Party leader and prime minister, his government released an international policy statement, “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.” Unlike the previous white paper, it was replete with mentions of the need for security, warning for instance that the lack of development abroad “will have an impact on Canada[’s]…long-term security” (DFATD 2005, 1).2 National and global security became important aid considerations in parallel with Canada’s participation in the so-called “war on terror,” all the more after the 2006 election of a Conservative government led by Stephen Harper. In Afghanistan in particular, security and development considerations fused, as military actors became increasingly involved in the delivery of foreign aid, particularly after Canada assumed the leadership of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the Afghan province of Kandahar in 2005. Canadian official development assistance (ODA) to Afghanistan rose exponentially from a meagre $7 million in 2000 (the last year before the USled invasion) to a peak of $345 million in 2007 (equivalent to 11 percent of all Canadian bilateral aid), dropping to $101 million in 2012, after Canadian combat troops left the country (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2014c). US-occupied Iraq also became an important destination of Canadian aid, receiving $386 million in 2005 (14 percent of Canadian bilateral aid), mainly in the form of debt relief (ibid.).3 The security focus of Canadian aid ebbed after 2007, and in particular after handing over responsibility for the Kandahar PRT to the Americans in early 2011. The changing importance in Canadian aid of Afghanistan and other countries can 2 3

For an analysis of the government’s vision of development in the 2005 policy statement, see Brown (2007). On the burgeoning literature on the relationship between security and development, see Spear and Williams (2012). These OECD figures represent net ODA expressed in current US dollars.

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been seen in Table 1, which provides a snapshot of the top recipients in 20022003, 2007-2008 and 2012-2013 (two-year averages). Table 1: Top 15 Recipients of Canadian ODA — Gross Disbursements as a Percentage of Total ODA (Two-year Averages) 2002-2003

2007-2008

2012-2013

States ExYugoslavia

2.5

Afghanistan

6.2

Tanzania

2.6

Afghanistan

2.5

Haiti

3.0

Haiti

2.6

Cameroon

2.3

Ethiopia

2.7

Ethiopia

2.4

Côte d’Ivoire

2.1

Iraq

2.1

Mozambique

2.2

Congo, Dem. Rep.

1.9

Indonesia

1.8

Afghanistan

2.1

Bangladesh

1.6

Mali

1.7

Ghana

1.9

China

1.5

Sudan

1.7

Mali

1.5

India

1.4

Ghana

1.7

Congo, Dem. Rep.

1.4

Iraq

1.1

Bangladesh

1.6

Côte d’Ivoire

1.3

Ethiopia

1.0

Mozambique

1.5

South Sudan

1.2

Vietnam

1.0

Senegal

1.4

Bangladesh

1.1

Tanzania

1.0

China

1.2

Senegal

1.0

Mali

0.9

Tanzania

1.1

West Bank and Gaza Strip

1.0

Mozambique

0.8

Palestinian Adm. Areas

1.0

Pakistan

1.0

Indonesia

0.8

Pakistan

1.0

Kenya

0.9

Total above

22.3

Total above

29.6

Total above

24.1

Data sources: OECD (2010, Table 32; 2014b, Table 32).

It is hard to precisely measure the impact of security-motivated aid on Canadian and global security. Clearly, billions of dollars in Western aid have not succeeded in bringing peace and security to Afghanistan and Iraq. How effective was security-oriented aid in achieving development? Unsurprisingly to aid experts, the hundreds of millions of dollars in Canadian aid delivered in Kandahar, which was mainly based on very short-term security interests, may have had some short-term impact (see chapter 5 of this volume), but failed to provide sustained development outcomes (Breede 2014; Taylor 2013, 7). Even the official Canadian government evaluation of its Afghanistan aid program during the period 2004–2012 recognized that “short-term implementation strategies [in Kandahar]…failed to ensure sustainable, long-term development results” (Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development [DFATD] 2015, 48). Nonetheless, Canada did prove its loyalty

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to its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, in particular the United States, in sharing the security-related burden, regardless of actual long-term results.

Frame Two: Power and Influence The Chrétien government, at least in the prime minister’s final years during which he was motivated by the desire for a legacy, tried to influence its fellow donor countries. The clearest case of this attempt was at the 2002 Group of Eight (G8) summit, held in Kananaskis, Alberta, where Chrétien placed Africa at the heart of the summit agenda, which led to a joint African Action Plan. After a period in the 1990s during which the Chrétien government had effectively cut it in half, Canadian aid to Africa grew rapidly (Brown 2013, 182–84). Martin continued the emphasis on Africa, but by the time he succeeded Chrétien, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair had seized the mantle of leadership on aid to Africa. Harper initially continued along the path laid out by his Liberal predecessors, doubling both total aid expenditures and in particular aid to Africa. Within a couple of years, he started to take a new direction. In 2007, he announced a new emphasis on the Americas, breaking with the donor consensus on the need to focus on the poorest continent.4 His government sought less to influence other donors than to influence the governments of recipient countries. The 2007 federal budget announced the government’s “aim to be among the largest five donors in core countries of interest” (Government of Canada 2007, 262). However, by its own admission, the Harper government has achieved the goal of being among the top five bilateral donors in only 8–12 out of CIDA’s 20–25 official countries of focus in any given year between 2007 and 2011 (Government of Canada 2014).5 Even with “top five” status, it is unclear whether Canada holds considerable sway in those 8–12 countries (Brown 2007, 101). It is hard to argue that Canada had much influence over its donor peers at any point in the period examined in this chapter. However, since the mid2000s, Canada’s influence on development issues has declined, exacerbated

4 5

On the regional distribution of Canadian aid over time, see Brown (2013). The originally stated goal did not specify that it was meant to apply only to bilateral donors, but the government scorecard (Government of Canada 2014) excludes multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. As a result, the actual number of countries in which Canada actually is a top five donor would be lower than the government figures indicate.

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by the Harper government’s “go-it-alone” approach and its subsequent cuts to the Canadian aid budget (discussed below) — while the global aid total reached a record high in 2013 (OECD 2014a).6 It tried to regain influence by championing maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH), a Canadian priority since the 2010 G8 summit in Muskoka, Ontario. However, as David Black notes, “Canadian leadership aspirations on MNCH have been constrained by a paucity of followership” (Black 2013, 243; see also Brown and Olender 2013, 166–70).

Frame Three: Economic Self-interest Economic self-interest has been an important part of Canadian aid, even before the founding of CIDA in 1968 (see Spicer 1966). Tied aid — that is, requiring grants and loans to developing countries to be spent in Canada — epitomize commercial self-interest. As well, CIDA long supported the Canadian private sector, including through a dedicated “industrial cooperation” unit. In addition, Chrétien’s Kananaskis announcements in 2002 included CDN$100 million to support Canadian investment in Africa. The sectoral priorities for aid announced by the Chrétien government in 2002 and Martin in 2005 included support to the private sector. Although the Harper government eliminated tied aid by 2013, Canadian commercial self-interest has increased considerably since the early 2010s, clearly visible in the discourse of successive ministers. For instance, Julian Fantino, minister of international cooperation (2012-2013), declared that the Canadian government has “a duty and a responsibility to ensure that Canadian interests are promoted” by its aid program, and that “Canadians are entitled to derive a benefit” (quoted in Mackrael 2012). He and his successor, Christian Paradis, have consistently emphasized the role of the Canadian private sector, increasingly aligning Canada’s development program with the interests of Canadian mining companies, to the extent that one can speak of a “recommercialization” of Canadian aid (Brown 2014; see also Audet and Navarro-Flores 2014; Goyette 2014). 6

In 2014, according to preliminary figures, Canada had the tenth-largest aid program in the OECD, while 15 OECD countries provided more aid than Canada as a proportion of their gross national income, including eight European countries that were more than twice as generous as Canada (OECD 2015a). As one observer notes, “If there is anything worse (from the diplomatic point of view) than the value-imperialism of the strong, it is the value-imperialism of the weak. It lacks political clout…it can make Canadians seem too precious by half to their counterparts abroad” (Stairs 2003, 252).

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Even before CIDA merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2013, it was having trouble defending its legislated “central focus on poverty reduction” (Government of Canada 2008, Subsection 2[1]). In most instances, a March 2013 internal review of CIDA programming invoked Canadian commercial interests to justify aid levels to countries of interest, making no reference to development needs or poverty reduction (Mackrael 2014). The abolition of CIDA in 2013 will likely facilitate further commercialization of Canadian aid. The first policy paper published by the new DFATD, the “Global Markets Action Plan,” seeks to “entrench the concept of ‘economic diplomacy’ as the driving force behind the Government of Canada’s activities through its international diplomatic network” (Government of Canada 2013, 11). The only mention of foreign aid is an expression of the desire to “leverage development programming to advance Canada’s trade interests” (ibid., 13). The emphasis on the Canadian extractive sector’s interests was already reflected in the Conservative government’s choice of Peru, Colombia and Honduras as new CIDA countries of focus in 2009, but was subsequently amplified by the addition of mineral-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mongolia and Myanmar to Canada’s list in 2014.7 The growing emphasis on commercial self-interest is likely to reduce the effectiveness of Canadian aid at reducing poverty, inasmuch as poverty reduction is a secondary goal. It might not fare much better in promoting Canadian corporate interests if previous experiences are any indication. For instance, CIDA’s Industrial Cooperation Program spent CDN$1.1 billion between 1978 and 2005, but an internal evaluation found that only 15.5 percent of projects from 1997 to 2002 had actually been successfully implemented (CIDA 2007, 8, 13, 17).

Frame Four: Enlightened Self-interest The enlightened self-interest frame relates to the pursuit of global public goods, such as “peace, stability, environmental health [and] population control” (van der Veen 2011, 10). It provides a point of potential convergence between altruistic and self-interested actors, for they can agree on the need to

7

The Democratic Republic of the Congo was actually already an important recipient (see Figure 1).

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promote development, whether out of concern and solidarity or the benefits that a peaceful, stable, prosperous world would bring to Canada. In practice, it is difficult to identify concrete measures that Canada has taken to make positive contributions in these areas through the use of foreign aid. The principle exception concerns the environment, in particular climate change mitigation and adaptation. Canada has provided significant assistance to developing countries, while resisting any commitment to reducing emissions domestically, acting as a spoiler in international negotiations in this area. Although Canada’s record under Chrétien and Martin were far from exemplary, under Harper’s government, Canada has increasingly eschewed “enlightened” multilateral approaches that are essential to reach global public goods (Brown and Olender 2013, 174–79).8 Canada has thus shown a limited commitment to using aid to meet its long-term interests, in particular since the Conservative Party came to power.

Frame Five: Self-affirmation and Reputation Canada used to enjoy a positive international reputation, but it is generally perceived to be in decline, at least since Harper was elected in 2006, epitomized by its failure to obtain a seat in the UN Security Council in 2010. In fact, the Harper government has deliberately sought to distance itself from the “liberal internationalism” of previous governments (Paris 2014, 277–81). The Harper government continually touts its leadership on a variety of development issues, as evidenced by a plethora of DFATD press releases, but there is no sign that other countries actually recognize Canada’s selfprofessed leadership in the development field, as argued in frame two. In Afghanistan, Canada adopted three much-publicized “signature projects” to “brand” its aid program: the high-profile rehabilitation of Kandahar’s Dahla Dam; promoting education; and the eradication of polio. However, all three fell short of their objectives (Breede 2014; Canadian Press 2014; Watson 2012a; 2012b; see also DFATD 2015). The adoption of such highprofile, stand-alone projects illustrates how attempts at self-affirmation can 8

The proportion of aid allocated to multilateral institutions, however, barely decreased, averaging 28 percent under the last eight years of Liberal governments (1998–2005) and 27 percent during the first eight years of Conservative rule (2006–2012) (author’s calculations, based on data from OECD 2015b). It is possible, however, that the contributions shifted between different types of organizations, for instance, from UN development agencies to the World Bank and regional development banks.

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actually backfire by bringing attention to disappointing results, if not outright failure. Public international criticisms of Canadian aid policies are relatively rare, but senior Canadian officials’ responses have done little to enhance their government’s reputation. For instance, in 2013, when UN and US State Department officials criticized Fantino’s announcement that Canadian aid to Haiti — one of Canada’s top aid recipients (see Figure 1 above) — would be frozen, he petulantly retorted, “Shame on them,” adding, “These comments... are irresponsible when matched with our commitment. We should be thanked upside down and sideways” (quoted in Kelly 2013).9

Frame Six: Obligation and Duty In the realm of foreign aid, most international norms constitute soft law rather than hard obligations or duties. Both Liberal and Conservative governments avoid statements that would suggest that they are obligated to provide aid or that there is a right to development (which was recognized by the UN General Assembly in 1986), preferring to portray aid as an act of munificence. Governments would rather use their own voluntary commitments as their benchmarks for aid. The Conservatives have even dedicated a web page to tracking how it has already achieved or is on track to meet its international assistance commitments (Government of Canada 2014), although not without fudging some of the numbers.10 The commitments listed, however, leave out some key international ones. The Conservative government officially abandoned Canada’s pledge to allocate 0.7 percent of gross national income to foreign aid, made by Canada and other industrialized countries at the United Nations in 1970 and most recently reaffirmed in 2002. Using that metric, it was under the Chrétien Liberals that

9 10

For an in-depth examination of Canada’s contribution to security and stability in Haiti, see chapter 6 of this volume. As noted above, the goal of being one of the top five donors morphed into becoming one of the top five bilateral donors — and a success rate of about 50 percent is presented as sufficient to constitute “completing” the commitment. Similarly, the Harper government’s goal of spending 80 percent of bilateral aid in its 20 countries of concentration, announced in 2009, can only be considered “completed” by measuring instead the opaque subset of bilateral aid that the government refers to as “country program aid” (Government of Canada 2014). Carment, Calleja and Samy (2013, 7-8) calculate that the figure for bilateral aid as a whole in 2011 was actually 39 percent, less than half the target.

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Canada reached the nadir of 0.22 percent in 2001, lower than any year since 1965; however, starting in 2011, the Conservatives reversed the subsequent increases (OECD 2015b), which coincided with the scaling down of aid to Afghanistan (see Figure 2 below). The ratio for 2014 is 0.24 percent (OECD 2015a), significantly lower than when the Harper government was first elected, and it will probably fall further, as the Canadian economy grows and the government continues to cut the aid budget, possibly falling below the 2001 low point in 2015. The government also underplays the commitments it made by signing the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. According to an OECD evaluation, Canada met only two of the nine quantitative targets that it pledged to achieve by 2010; for some indicators, its record actually worsened (OECD 2012, 170). In this, Canada was not alone: most donors failed miserably to meet their Paris Declaration commitments. Figure 2: Generosity of Canadian Aid (1974–2014)

0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Net official development assistance as a percentage of gross national income

0.7

Year

Source: OECD (2015b). Note: The figure for 2014 is preliminary. The UN target is 0.7 percent.

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Frame Seven: Humanitarianism A comparison of the aid data for the last eight years of Liberal governments (1998–2005) with the first eight years of the Harper government (2006–2013) reveals some interesting results. Notwithstanding the greater focus on selfinterest highlighted above, under the Conservatives, Canada has significantly increased the proportion of bilateral aid spent in least-developed countries (from 16 to 26 percent, on average) and more than halved the share spent in upper-middle-income countries (from 10 to 4 percent). The Conservatives also considerably boosted the proportion of aid spending committed to humanitarian assistance (from seven to 12 percent).11 The Liberals occasionally invoked social justice as a motive for helping the poor, at least at the rhetorical level (see, for instance, DFATD 2005, 21, 27), and provided a high-profile response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. The Conservatives have placed greater emphasis on the charitable side of aid and have increased the visibility of humanitarian responses, in particular after the Haitian earthquake of 2010. The choice in 2009 of food security as one of CIDA’s three priority themes, along with children and youth, also fits within the humanitarian frame. Since 2010, Canada has also placed great emphasis on “saving” women and children under the MNCH initiative.12 Although the growing prominence of humanitarian activities and spending in low-income countries can be considered welcome from a development perspective, one must not conclude that it is unproblematic. Canada’s limited efforts to combat climate change, for instance, increase the probability of future natural disasters. Moreover, the nature of aid, and not just its destination, must be taken into account. For example, assistance to a leastdeveloped country could actually be meant to support the activities of a Canadian mining company, rather than poverty reduction. As chapter 4 of this volume illustrates well, food aid can be harmful in many ways to developing countries, even if it is framed as “humanitarian.”

11

12

The percentages are the author’s calculations based on figures from the OECD (2015b). A caveat on the interpretation of those figures: a large proportion of the aid is not allocated by income groupings. This proportion decreased under the Conservatives, from 34 to 30 percent, on average. Still, the greater specificity under the Conservatives is not enough to account for the relative increase in aid to least-developed countries and/or the drop in the proportion allocated to upper-middle-income countries. For critiques of Harper’s approach to and emphasis on MNCH, see the blogs of the McLeod Group (May-June 2014), at www.mcleodgroup.ca/tag/maternal-health/.

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The Hidden Frame: Domestic Political Interests A limitation of van der Veen’s (2011) seven frames is that he conceptualized them to be applied only to public discourse. Studying politicians’ publicly expressed motives, however, ignores the fact that no politician will admit to saying something mainly in order to get elected. For that reason, I refer to self-interested electoral considerations as an eighth frame. It is called “hidden” in a nod to James Scott’s (1990) concept of the “hidden transcript,” even though it is not particularly hard to discern. It could also be considered a master frame through which to interpret the seven others.13 All governments play to the domestic public when taking new foreign policy and aid policy initiatives. As mentioned above, Chrétien, for instance, was thinking of his legacy when he adopted a focus on Africa in 2002 — since concentrating aid on Africa, the region of greatest need, is often considered a manifestation for charitable concern (Black 2015). The Harper government, in particular, has placed great emphasis on visible, short-term results — best illustrated by the three signature projects in Afghanistan — which is often detrimental to aid effectiveness, as it discourages attempts to solve root problems (Vollmer 2014). Global development requires transformational activities to reduce poverty over the long term, not “band-aid” assistance to alleviate the symptoms of poverty for a few years. Harper himself has prominently touted his government’s leadership on MNCH (rather than leave the file to the minister of international development), presumably trying to burnish his image of a caring prime minister (see, for example, Government of Canada 2015), as opposed to rather distant and cold, as many perceive him. Domestic political considerations can be observed in the choice of some countries of focus, none more than Ukraine. The latter has been on all four Liberal and Conservative lists of countries of concentration, despite being on the border of the European Union and, thus, a natural place for Canada to leave to the European Union to focus on. The explanation lies in the fact that more than one million Canadians (and potential voters) are of Ukrainian descent. The Conservative Party in particular has targeted ethnic minorities for electoral purposes, a phenomenon that was particularly apparent over the summer of 2014, when Tory ministers, junior ministers and Members of

13

Similarly, Nossal (2014) argues that to understand Canadian foreign policy under the Harper government, one should consider the “primacy of the ballot box.”

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Parliament (MPs) “consulted” with diasporic communities and announced new aid projects in their countries of origin.14 Finally, in 2010, the Harper government reorganized its funding of Canadian NGOs, increasing its control over their geographic and sectoral priorities, and began to defund well-respected development NGOs that had publicly criticized Conservative policies and practices, including KAIROS, Alternatives, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, the Mennonite Central Committee, and Development and Peace (see Brown 2012). Beginning in 2012, the Canadian Revenue Authority began auditing a number of non-profit organizations, including development NGOs, that were critical of the Conservative government (Beeby 2014). These measures are widely interpreted as attempts to silence dissent. In a similar vein, the Harper government also closed two development-related think tanks/research organizations that operated independently, but relied heavily on government funds: Rights & Democracy in 2012 and the North-South Institute in 2014. Domestic political considerations, including electoral calculations, may burnish a governing party’s image and increase its chances of re-election, but they hamper aid effectiveness by introducing and even prioritizing nondevelopment-related concerns. The politicized “branding” of development assistance (for example, countries and regions of concentration, themes of focus, special initiatives) also makes it more likely that they will be abandoned when a new party assumes power, thereby increasing harmful aid volatility and unpredictability.

14 For instance, in August 2014 alone: Christian Paradis, minister of international development, announced new assistance to Haiti at a round table with members of the Haitian-Canadian community in Montreal; Lois Brown, parliamentary secretary for international development, along with local Conservative MP Jeff Watson, held a “consultation” with the Ukrainian diaspora in Windsor and announced funding for a new project in Ukraine; Brown also announced new assistance to Ukraine at a round table with local Conservative MP Kelly Block and the Ukrainian diaspora in Saskatoon; Alice Wong, minister of state for seniors, announced new humanitarian assistance to the Philippines at a Filipino community event in Vancouver; Minister of Finance Joe Oliver announced new assistance to the Caribbean at the Caribana Toronto Festival; Conservative MP Peter Goldring announced new food assistance to Somalia at a public event with the Somali community in Edmonton; and  Brown co-hosted four separate, local round tables with Southern Ontario Conservative MPs Peter Braid, Brad Butt, Susan Truppe and Mike Wallace (DFATD 2014). The decision to list the Philippines as a country of focus in 2014 can also be interpreted in the light of electoral calculations. Still, it possible that these meetings were used to leverage diasporic support for the Conservative Party without necessarily motivating the aid allocation decisions.

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Conclusion Van der Veen’s seven motives provide a useful framework with which to analyze the goals of Canadian “development interventions” and their evolution. There is, however, no simple distinction to be made between Liberal and Conservative governments. After all, most foreign aid programs continue, regardless of who is in power; the changes are mainly in the framing of new initiatives. Moreover, successive Canadian governments, in particular Harper’s, have lacked a clear vision or overarching policy for development (Bülles and Kindornay 2013). Nonetheless, certain patterns emerge: Martin and Harper (until Canada pulled out of a combat role in Afghanistan) placed greater emphasis on security as a foreign aid frame than did Chrétien, reflecting changes in the international security environment. Under Harper, Canada has decreased its use of aid to achieve already weak ideational goals, namely obligation/ duty, self-affirmation/reputation and power/influence, with the notable exception of MNCH (which may prove ineffective in reaching those goals), despite frequent Canadian government claims of international leadership. Enlightened self-interest has also declined. By way of contrast, the Harper government has increasingly emphasized two material goals, economic selfinterest and humanitarianism, at the rhetorical level and as evidenced by some aid allocation data. Of these trends, only the recent decline in security considerations and, more important, the increased emphasis on humanitarian motives can be linked to improved aid effectiveness. However, the latter is undermined by the marked new prioritization of commercial interests that stands out starkly as a recent Conservative motive. CIDA’s absorption into DFATD is likely to increase the prominence of Canadian commercial interests in Canadian aid programs, potentially via a whole-of-government approach. Finally, an examination of a final motive — a hidden master frame that is not part of van der Veen’s framework — reveals how domestic political interests can undercut even the most altruistic of goals. As is the case for military interventions, development interventions have less of an impact in development when a country tries to go it alone. To be more effective, Canadian aid should focus more on working with development partners — both donors and recipients — for long-term objectives, rather than branding short-term initiatives that play to the domestic audience. It

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should also prioritize poverty reduction in developing countries as its primary goal, as mandated by Canadian law. Using aid for non-development purposes hampers its ability to attain development objectives, and often fails to achieve its other goals as well, be they material or ideational. Emphasizing altruism (both humanitarian motives and the idea of a duty or obligation), however, risks reducing support for foreign aid among non-development actors and, as argued in a previous volume of Canada Among Nations, could therefore jeopardize aid budgets (Brown 2008). Nonetheless, altruistic and selfinterested goals can be compatible, particularly in promoting global public goods out of “enlightened self-interest.” Reducing and even eliminating poverty around the world is clearly a global public good that would also benefit Canada in myriad ways.

Acknowledgements I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding that helped make this chapter possible. I also thank the Canada Among Nations editors and workshop participants, as well as Calla Barnett, for very helpful comments and suggestions.

Works Cited Audet, François and Olga Navarro-Flores. 2014. “The Management of Canadian Development Assistance: Ideology, Electoral Politics or Public Interest?” In Rethinking Canadian Aid, edited by Stephen Brown, Molly den Heyer and David R. Black, 179–92. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. Beeby, Dean. 2014. “Canada Revenue Agency’s targeting of charities under scrutiny.” CBC, August 5. www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-revenueagency-s-targeting-of-charities-under-scrutiny-1.2728017. Black, David R. 2013. “The Muskoka Initiative and the Politics of Fencemending with Africa.” In Canada Among Nations 2013: Canada-Africa Relations: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, edited by Rohinton Medhora and Yiagadeesen Samy, 239–51. Waterloo, ON: CIGI.

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———. 2014. “Humane Internationalism and the Malaise of Canadian Aid Policy.” In Rethinking Canadian Aid, edited by Stephen Brown, Molly den Heyer and David R. Black, 17–33. Ottawa, ON: University of Ottawa Press. ———. 2015. Canada and Africa in the New Millennium: The Politics of Consistent Inconsistency. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Breede, H. Christian. 2014. “Defining Success: Canada in Afghanistan 2006– 2011.” American Review of Canadian Studies 44 (4): 483–501. Brown, Stephen. 2007. “‘Creating the World’s Best Development Agency’? Confusion and Contradictions in CIDA’s New Policy Blueprint.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies 28 (2): 213–28. ———. 2008. “CIDA under the Gun.” In Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room to Manoeuvre?, edited by Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen, 91–107. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. ———. 2012. “CIDA’s New Partnership with Canadian NGOs: Modernizing for Greater Effectiveness?” In Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid, edited by Stephen Brown, 287–304. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. ———. 2013. “Canadian Aid to Africa.” In Canada Among Nations 2013: Canada-African Relations: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, edited by Rohinton Medhora and Yiagadeesen Samy, 181–94. Waterloo, ON: CIGI. ———. 2014. “Undermining Foreign Aid: The Extractive Sector and the Recommercialization of Canadian Development Assistance.” In Rethinking Canadian Aid, edited by Stephen Brown, Molly den Heyer and David R. Black, 277–95. Ottawa, ON: University of Ottawa Press. Brown, Stephen and Michael Olender. 2013. “Canada’s Fraying Commitment to Multilateral Development Cooperation.” In Multilateral Development Cooperation in a Changing Global Order, edited by Hany Besada and Shannon Kindornay, 158–88. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Bülles, Anni-Claudine and Shannon Kindornay. 2013. “Beyond Aid: A Plan for Canada’s International Cooperation.” Ottawa, ON: North-South Institute.

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Canadian Press. 2014. “Dahla Dam’s Future at Risk as Canada Ends Work in Afghanistan: Report.” CBC, November 15. www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ dahla-dam-s-future-at-risk-as-canada-ends-work-in-afghanistanreport-1.2836462. Carment, David, Rachael Calleja and Yiagadeesen Samy. 2013. “Canada in Focus: How Good Is Our Foreign Aid Policy?” Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. CIDA. 2007. Executive Report on the Evaluation of the CIDA Industrial Cooperation (CIDA-INC) Program. Gatineau, QC: Canadian International Development Agency. www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/ IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/Evaluations/$file/INC_ExecutiveReport-E.pdf. DFATD. 2005. Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Gatineau, QC: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. ———. 2014. News Releases — 2014: August. Ottawa: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. www.international.gc.ca/media/ minpub-index/news-communiques/2014/index.aspx?lang=eng#aug. ———. 2015. Synthesis Report — Summative Evaluation of Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program. Fiscal Year 2004-2005 to 20122013. Gatineau, QC: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. Government of Canada. 2007. The Budget Plan 2007: Aspire to a Stronger, Safer, Better Canada. Ottawa, ON: Department of Finance. www.budget. gc.ca/2007/pdf/bp2007e.pdf. ———. 2008. Official Development Assistance Accountability Act. Last amended on June 26, 2013. Ottawa, ON: Department of Justice. http:// laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/O-2.8.pdf. ———. 2013. “Global Markets Action Plan.” Ottawa, ON: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. http://international.gc.ca/globalmarkets-marches-mondiaux/plan.aspx. ———. 2014. International Assistance Commitments. Ottawa, ON: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. July 24. www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/CAR-616141241-PD4.

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———. 2015. “PM Harper and Bill Gates Renew Call to Advance Global Maternal, Newborn and Child Health Priority.” Ottawa, ON: Office of the Prime Minister. February 25. http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/02/25/pmharper-and-bill-gates-renew-call-advance-global-maternal-newbornand-child-health. Goyette, Gabriel C. 2014. “Charity Begins at Home: The Extractive Sector as an Illustration of Changes and Continuities in the New de facto Canadian Aid Policy.” In Rethinking Canadian Aid, edited by Stephen Brown, Molly den Heyer and David R. Black, 259–75. Ottawa, ON: University of Ottawa Press. Kelly, Tim. 2013. “MP Fantino Sets Record Straight on Haiti.” Vaughan Citizen, January 15. www.yorkregion.com/news-story/1935198-mpfantino-sets-record-straight-on-haiti/. Mackrael, Kim. 2012. “Fantino Defends CIDA’s Corporate Shift.” The Globe and Mail, December 3. www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ fantino-defends-cidas-corporate-shift/article5950443/. ———. 2014. “Commercial Motives Driving Canada’s Foreign Aid, Documents Reveal.” The Globe and Mail, January 8. www. theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/commercial-interests-taking-focusin-canadas-aid-to-developing-world/article16240406/. Morrison, David R. 1998. Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Nossal, Kim Richard. 1998. “Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada’s Interest in Development Assistance.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 21 (1): 35–56. ———. 2014. “Primat der Wahlurne: Explaining Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, ON, March 29. OECD. 2010. Development Co-operation Report 2010. Paris: OECD. ———. 2012. Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration. Paris: OECD. ———. 2014a. “Aid to Developing Countries Rebounds in 2013 to Reach an All-time High.” Paris: OECD. www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-todeveloping-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-an-all-time-high.htm.

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———.2014b. “Statistics on resource flows to developing countries.” December 23. Paris: OECD. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm. ———. 2014c. Query Wizard for International Aid Statistics. Paris: OECD. http://stats.oecd.org/qwids. ———. 2015a. “Development aid stable in 2014 but flows to poorest countries still falling.” April 8. Paris: OECD. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ development-aid-stable-in-2014-but-flows-to-poorest-countries-stillfalling.htm. ———. 2015b. Query Wizard for International Aid Statistics. Paris: OECD. http://stats.oecd.org/qwids. Paris, Roland. 2014. “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era.” International Journal 69 (3): 274–307. Pratt, Cranford. 1999. “Competing Rationales for Canadian Development Assistance: Reducing Global Poverty, Enhancing Canadian Prosperity and Security, or Advancing Global Human Security.” International Journal 54 (2): 306–23. ———. 2003. “Ethical Values and Canadian Foreign Aid Policies.” Canadian Journal of African Studies 37 (1): 84–101. Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press. Spear, Joanna and Paul Williams. 2012. “Conceptualizing the SecurityDevelopment Relationship: An Overview of the Debate.” In Security and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison, edited by Joanna Spear and Paul Williams, 7–33. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Spicer, Keith, 1966. A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada’s Foreign Policy. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Stairs, Denis. 2003. “Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy.” International Journal 58 (2): 239–56. Taylor, Scott. 2013. “Make No Mistake: Afghanistan a Well-intentioned Failure.” Embassy, July 10. Van der Veen, A. Maurits. 2011. Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

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Vollmer, Frank. 2014. “Debating ‘Visibility’ and Its Effects on the Effective Delivery of Official Development Assistance — Diagnosis, Justification and Possibilities.” Information Development 30 (4): 298–312. Watson, Paul. 2012a. “Canada’s Afghan Legacy: Shoddy School Buildings and Sagging Morale.” Toronto Star, July 15. www.thestar.com/news/ world/2012/07/15/canadas_afghan_legacy_shoddy_school_buildings_ and_sagging_morale.html. ———. 2012b. “Canada’s Afghan Legacy: War on Polio an Uphill Battle.” Toronto Star, December 22. www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/12/22/ canadas_afghan_legacy_war_on_polio_an_uphill_battle.html.

8 The Gender Turn in Canadian Military Interventions Stéfanie von Hlatky

Introduction During the war in Afghanistan, some of the most striking images published showed female soldiers from the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) interacting with Afghan women and children in conflict-affected communities. The increased visibility of female soldiers during the ISAF intervention highlighted the importance of women for community-level engagement, which was central to the mission objectives. This chapter describes recent international efforts to integrate a “gender perspective” in how military interventions are designed and implemented. It details how Canada has adapted to this “gender turn” in military interventions, focusing on its involvement during the war in Afghanistan. The central puzzle is about the implementation and implications of gender reforms, an inevitable policy adaptation that represents a fundamental challenge for military organizational culture in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). As other chapters in this volume make clear, in particular chapters 4 and 6, interventions can have a profound impact on the domestic politics of other countries, whether this change is positive, negative or mixed. Including a gendered lens in the design and conduct of military interventions is no different. At home, government departments and agencies attempt to

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harmonize policies with international norms, which imposes some growing pains. Abroad, the goal is to transform gender dynamics through nation building. This chapter argues that while the CAF favours a gender-blind approach, it is increasingly contested by the emerging gender-mainstreaming frame. Evidence to support this claim is drawn from comparing policy approaches of the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). The chapter also points to the experience of Canadian women in combat roles, to show how the gender turn in the armed forces is implemented in practice.

Background The point of departure for the official recognition of gender awareness as central to international security management came in 2000, with the adoption of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). The resolution promotes the participation of women in all phases of conflict, from prevention to resolution. More specifically, it “urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict” (UNSC 2000). It highlights the importance of including a gender perspective in how responses to conflict are designed, meaning that interventions must take into account how conflict affects everyone — women, men, girls and boys — in distinct ways. It further calls attention to the reality of gender-based violence and the need for greater protection of women and girls living in situations of armed conflict. Finally, Resolution 1325 (and follow-on resolutions) sets out operational mandates for the accomplishment of these objectives, while pursuing interagency coordination. Since 2000, countries have committed to implement national action plans (NAPs) in order to demonstrate compliance with Resolution 1325. To date, Canada has published its first NAP progress reports for the years 2011-2012, 2012-2013 and 2013-2014. In addition, organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have followed suit with their own implementation benchmarks. NATO launched a series of WPS initiatives in 2007, to monitor its members’ progress with regards to Resolution 1325

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benchmarks. NATO is currently in the process of updating its reporting process with the nations, to collect more complete data on female integration in the national armed forces of the alliance’s 28 member states. Canada is well regarded with respect to the inclusion of women in the military, making it a natural leader for the promotion of Resolution 1325 and the integration of the gender perspective in its approach to international security issues more broadly. Canada has frequently been branded as “progressive” on issues of gender equality because it was among the first countries to initiate high-profile reforms, such as the promotion of equal opportunity for women in Canada in 1970 by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, with recommendations aimed specifically at the CAF (DND 2014). From 1979 to 1985, Canada initiated the project Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles (SWINTER) to investigate the integration of women in previously restricted military roles. In parallel, the Combat Related Employment for Women trials began in the mid-1980s to assess women’s physical suitability for combat roles. In 1989, all military occupations were opened to women, with the exception of submarine service, which was later opened in 2000. Gender equity in the CAF was monitored within DND as of 1990, with the establishment of the Minister’s Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces, tracking the proportion of women in the armed forces (DND 2014). What is counterintuitive about the history of women in the Canadian forces is the fact that these early achievements have resulted in a military organizational culture that is anchored in a gender-neutral ethos, meaning there is no acknowledgement of gender differences in the Canadian military’s recruitment, training or retention policies, with the exception of genderspecific cultural requirements for deployment in countries where there is a high level of segregation between the sexes (von Hlatky 2014). This gender-neutral predisposition conflicts with Canada’s international pledge to implement the WPS agenda, as defined above. While Canada’s commitment to Resolution 1325 is upheld through the formulation of key initiatives coming out of DFATD, enthusiasm for the gender perspective has not been shared by the CAF and DND. The CAF formerly limited its approach to gender balancing, focusing on the recruitment and retention of women in the armed forces, but it is resisting the turn toward gender mainstreaming. In contrast to gender balancing, gender mainstreaming implies the consideration of gender as a central concern throughout the policy

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process, from design to evaluation. Gender mainstreaming is a transformative strategy to integrate a gender equality lens at every stage of the policy-making process. The aim is for gender analysis to become mainstream by “making visible the gendered nature of assumptions, processes, and outcomes” (Walby 2005, 321). Just as it has become intuitive to consider risk analysis in policymaking frameworks, for instance, gender is increasingly being recognized as a necessary factor to consider, hence the term “gender mainstreaming.” The puzzle to investigate is to uncover the reasons for this tension between gender balancing and gender mainstreaming in Canadian defence policy, with an emphasis on women in the armed forces.

Gender and Military Organizational Culture It is necessary to sketch the chronology of gender-related policies in DND and the CAF to understand the role that gender plays in Canadian defence policy, but we also need to identify the underlying assumptions motivating these changes. To do this, I developed a simple typology of four alternative approaches to military organizational culture as it relates to gender. The aim is to show which strand of feminism is represented in Canadian policies that have implications for the government’s commitment to the WPS agenda. The first approach is called “standpoint feminism” and assumes that differences in gender can yield comparative advantages in terms of military effectiveness (Keohane 1989; Goldstein, Pevehouse and Whitworth 2008). This approach views the integration as a win-win because gender diversity brings diverse skills that can be deployed for the benefit of the military as a whole. It is a model that pushes for gender-based reforms that focus on “equivalency” instead of strict “equality.” Equivalency “acknowledges without prejudice the differences of physical biology and socially constructed gender in sentient individuals enacting personal agency and…focuses on the kinship environment of the… military, emphasizing maximization of the contributing qualities an individual brings to the exchange” (Brownson 2014, 767). The second approach is called “liberal feminism” and promotes gender equality as an end in itself, irrespective of the advantages or disadvantages that might result from the greater participation of women in the armed forces. According to this approach, female representation in the military and access to positions at all ranks is a basic right under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, period. The liberal feminist approach contrasts with standpoint

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feminism, because it focuses on gender balancing goals as a priority and makes little distinction based on gender in the process, meaning that men and women should be treated equally. Here, the best international example is the Israel Defense Forces, because military service is mandatory for both men and women and has been since its inception in 1948. The third approach is “counter-feminism” and views the integration of women in the armed forces as undermining military effectiveness. The argument here is that the inclusion of women lowers the physical standards required for the military and disadvantages men in the long run, because they have to compensate for this loss in physical ability as more women join the military. In a nutshell, the idea is that “war is not a fair business” (Serrano 2014, 36). This approach is consistent with the view that women in combat will be unable to carry their kit and will rely on male members of their unit to pick up the slack. This approach is also mirrored in personal accounts of former servicewomen, who have testified to the “hidden curriculum of masculinity in training, which socializes female recruits to accept the ‘malestream’ and reject deviating interpretations” (Taber 2005). Counter-feminist arguments were also heard in a Canadian context when the military was making its case against full female integration to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in the late 1980s. The argument was that more women in the military, particularly in combat roles, would undermine unit cohesion and overall effectiveness (Eichler 2013a). Other objections to women’s full integration relate to fraternization, field accommodations, and insufficient physical strength and stamina during high-intensity deployments (Austen 2013). The fourth approach is “postmodern feminism,” and offers a critical assessment of military organizational culture in general, stating that militaries are masculinist and exclusionary. Therefore, this approach does not view the integration of women in the armed forces as desirable at all. On the contrary, the practical implication of this approach is the elimination of national armed forces based on the belief that, at best, their very presence incites conflict, and at worst, militaries are institutions of female exclusion and oppression. A more nuanced postmodern feminist view would accept the inclusion of women in the armed forces after an overhaul of traditional military organizational culture. As Maya Eichler notes, “Nearly 25 years after the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Decision, the combat arms remain almost exclusively staffed by men and closely tied to a masculinized warrior image” (2013a, 258). According to this perspective, the participation of women in the

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armed forces is only acceptable if exclusionary and oppressive practices in the military are eradicated. While these four categories represent ideal types in order to show a broad spectrum of views on gender and security, it is possible to come up with country cases that embody each category fairly well. An overview of Canada’s gender-related reforms in the field of security and defence demonstrates that the dominant approach for DFATD has become standpoint feminism, while at DND and in the CAF, liberal feminism has prevailed. Compared to Canada, other countries have displayed different attitudes when it comes to the integration of women in the armed forces. In the US military, approaches have varied from liberal feminism to counter-feminism. In Australia, recent statements from the army have revealed more postmodern feminist undertones, with the former Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Morrison, openly critiquing masculinist military organizational culture. To illustrate the tensions between the various strands of feminism that have influenced security-related policies in the Canadian government, the next section compares gender-related reforms in DFATD and DND since the adoption of the UN (and subsequently NATO) WPS agenda. Comparing DND with DFATD is important because these two departments are the government leads when it comes to interventions. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is also briefly discussed to offer another organizational viewpoint.

The Gender Turn: DFATD versus DND The following discussion demonstrates that gender-related policies and initiatives implemented by DFATD are different in nature from the policies pursued by DND.1 While DFATD has decided to embrace the gender mainstreaming approach, DND appears unlikely to follow suit in the near future. It is perhaps most striking when comparing which staff training courses are offered and delivered in both departments. DFATD has integrated training courses in accordance with Resolution 1325, such as “Integrating Gender Equality into Programming” and “Managing for Gender Equality Results,” in addition to more tailored WPS training sessions for personnel 1

When the first two NAPs were submitted, DFATD had not yet been amalgamated. Reporting was done separately by Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Post-amalgamation, gender-based initiatives and reporting within DFATD have been harmonized.

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during pre-deployment. On the DND and the CAF side, the offerings are slim. The Peace Support Training Centre offers a presentation on “Women and Conflict” as part of the “Military Observer” course, which discusses the greater vulnerability of women in conflict situations, and there is broader diversity training for all personnel, but it is still very limited. There are two main sources of data to inform the comparison between DFATD and DND when it comes to including gender into policy-making approaches related to Canada’s participation in international security cooperation. One key reason to explain the difference might be that DFATD is the government lead when it comes to measuring the implementation of gendermainstreaming initiatives in federal programming. Its WPS monitoring activities are the purview of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce (START). It would be fair to argue that through its START role, DFATD has self-selected to be the guardian of government-led gender-mainstreaming reforms. This is, however, a fairly recent development. DFATD has only started to collect gender-mainstreaming implementation data from other government departments since 2011 through the National Action Plans on WPS.2 Although reporting is done through START, the activities of DFATD (at the time, DFAIT and CIDA), the RCMP and DND are described and compared. These are essentially self-assessments by the individual agencies, but based on a common set of more than 20 indicators. Table 1 amalgamates some of the key indicators to simplify the comparison. Table 1: Classification of Gender-related Practices in International Security since 2000 Practices

DFATD

DND No

Gender-focused training course

Yes

Inclusion of gender analysis in policy approach

Yes

No

Gender-specific data collection

Yes

Incomplete

Source: Author.

It is worth noting that the RCMP is closer to DFATD than DND when it comes to the implementation of gender-based reforms. The RCMP does include gender training for its officers and its self-assessment demonstrates that a gender analysis informed the design of its concept of operations. This 2

See www.international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/women_peace_security-femmes_paix_securite. aspx?lang=eng.

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concept was “guided by a gender-based analysis to identify and address the differential impacts of conflict on women and girls” (DFATD 2013). The RCMP also collects gender-specific data to monitor and further encourage greater female participation in peace operations. In terms of political leadership, the Canadian government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper has championed the cause of maternal and child health, which is complementary to Resolution 1325, but beyond this, the WPS agenda has not benefitted from high visibility. One of the most active spokesperson has been the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Deborah A. Lyons, who has been very vocal on women’s rights issues during her mandate. In her view, gender dynamics in Afghanistan were improved since 2001, and now that the Canadian mission is over, she continues to advocate in favour of further female participation, echoing the principles of 1325: “Afghan women have an essential role to play to ensure that this progress continues. Women must be included in the peace process and they must be empowered to participate in decision-making at all levels” (Lyons 2014). In addition to the annual progress reports compiled by START, DND also submits separate annual reports to NATO (the Canadian Forces National Report to the Committee for Women in NATO Forces) that can be found online starting from 2008 (although reporting started in 2000). In these reports, individual NATO countries submit information on policies related to the recruitment and retention of women in the armed forces, as well as “women-friendly” policies. In the Canadian case, the report summarizes the legal basis for women’s integration into the armed forces, the main policies for implementing gender mainstreaming and basic data on the presence of women in the military, including figures for each service. Finally, the report details the CAF recruitment, training and retention policies targeting women. What stands out in many of the Canadian reports is the lack of data on the proportion of servicewomen who are deployed (see Figure 1), with the following note as an explanation: “The percentage of women deployed on CF operations normally corresponds with the percentages displayed in the columns to the left as gender is not a factor in selection for deployment. However, the percentage of CF women deployed to combat operations such as in Afghanistan is in the range of 8%” (NATO 2009, emphasis added).

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Figure 1: Proportion of Female Service Members by Category (%), 2008

Source: Committee for Women in NATO Forces (2008).

In its reports to START, DND is more explicit. For the 2013 report, DND discloses that, “As of March 31, 2013, 145 of 1142 (10%) deployed CAF personnel on international operations were women. During the reporting year, 11 of 46 (24%) civilian employees deployed in support of CAF designated international operations were women” (DFATD 2013). Nevertheless, it will remain difficult for researchers to get a complete picture of female participation in the CAF until it starts collecting data that would be relevant for the assessment of its gender integration policies. Mainstream outlets such as FrontLine Defence magazine have even reported on the issue: “As yet, either nobody knows, or they aren’t talking. [DND] insists it has not collected information specifically about women’s combat experience in Afghanistan, and has no definite plans to do so” (Bray and MacLean 2012). These remarks are echoed by some of our allies. In a 2009 report published by the British Ministry of Defence, the researchers note that, “As the [CAF] has not applied any gender-based restrictions on employment since 1989 [2000; author’s correction], from a policy perspective the integration of women into the combat arms is now considered a fait accompli. Thus, they consider that there is no formal requirement to continue monitoring the effects of gender integration on operational performance or team cohesion” (Cawkill et al. 2009, 20). This contradicts a recently published US Congressional Research Service report on women in combat, which cites the Canadian experience as an example to show inclusion of women in the 16-week infantry course yielded “poor results” (Burrelli 2013, 12). While there are indications that senior CAF leadership is now addressing gaps in implementing the WPS

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agenda — such as gender-based policy analysis and the incorporation of gender perspectives in military doctrine, planning and operations — progress should be measured more systematically than has been the case in the past.

The Gender Perspective in Canadian Military Operations As previously mentioned, NATO’s first response to Resolution 1325 was a policy document drafted in 2007 with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which outlined the alliance’s commitment to the WPS agenda. During its 2010 Lisbon summit, NATO adopted an action plan on the implementation of Resolution 1325 to develop a systemic approach to integrate the gender perspective in NATO-led operations and missions. Finally, in June 2014, NATO updated its WPS strategy and increased its visibility with the help of the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, Mari Skåre (who ended her term in October 2014). This commitment was also included in the 2014 Wales summit declaration. In the case of Afghanistan, the Canadian contribution included participation in a NATO-led mission and, thus, was subject to the implementation of Resolution 1325 guidelines, as stated in NATO’s WPS goals. Inclusion of the gender perspective is much harder to report on in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) framework, given that gender reporting was not similarly monitored by participating nations. The Afghanistan experience thus provides insight on how the gender perspective was operationalized by Canada during expeditionary missions. As previous research has highlighted, the participation of women in the CAF is a broader issue than removing barriers for female integration based on legal arguments. Women operating in combat zones are likely to face more discrimination than those in roles regarded as more “civilian” (Winslow and Dunn 2002). While the SWINTER trials showed that both men and women can perform to the same physical standards, the social barriers to the participation of women in the armed forces are more difficult to address, both analytically and in practice. Gerhard Kümmel (2002), for example, demonstrates that the integration of women in the armed forces must be strongly embedded in approaches to military leadership, but few studies chronicle the experiences of women in combat to identify the successes and challenges of gender integration in the military.

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Canada’s military intervention in Afghanistan (between 2001 and 2014) provides the ideal testing ground for the integration of women into the CAF. The CAF’s participation in both OEF and NATO’s ISAF represents the first opportunity for female military personnel to be deployed specifically in combat roles across services. So, while Canada was part of the first group of Western countries to allow women into combat roles, there were no opportunities in the 1980s and 1990s to see how women would perform in high-intensity combat situations. While numbers are available on the proportion of women in the armed forces, DND data on the percentage of women deployed in combat operations is patchy. Even if the CAF does not always disclose the number of women who volunteered and were deployed in combat roles during Afghanistan, scholars have crunched the numbers. Krystel Chapman, for instance, found that between 2001 and 2011, 310 women occupied combat positions (Carrier-Sabourin 2012). This means that women held 8.3 percent of combat positions within the CAF (Bell 2011). The breakdown is as follows: 83 women in the infantry, 58 in field artillery, 34 combat engineers, 20 pilots and 9 in armour. While the study states that this represents a three-fold increase when compared to the 1990s, this is a difficult comparison to make, given that Canadian interventions in the 1990s did not include a combat component across services. Therefore, women did not volunteer to take part in offensive combat missions as they did in Afghanistan. In the air force, there are published accounts of female tactical helicopter pilots participating in peacekeeping operations in Haiti and Somalia, but very few personal accounts published by Canadian women who participated in combat operations during the war in Afghanistan, with the exception of excerpts drawn from Nichola Goddard’s personal correspondence (Turenne-Sjolander and Trevenen 2010). She was killed in action in 2006. At the NATO level, there is no available record of gender composition within ISAF personnel, only vague estimates indicating that between seven and 15 percent of ISAF personnel are female. In a report commissioned by Skåre, it is further noted that there were no women at ISAF HQ with a rank higher than colonel, which means that no women participated in the decision-making meetings (Lackenbauer and Langlais 2013). While the ISAF Operational Plan included a gender annex, the interviews conducted in the research leading up to the publication of this report showed that gender awareness within ISAF was low, with the exception of the specially trained gender advisory team. Gender advisers were tasked with offering gender-awareness briefings to military personnel and were supported by the ISAF HQ military leadership, including the ISAF

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commander and the chief of staff. A key implementation challenge was that many gender adviser positions were left vacant (ibid.). Gender work in ISAF thus strongly relied on the personal commitments of individuals, rather than the product of gender mainstreaming in any institutionalized sense. While gender mainstreaming is present in NATO’s key documents, such as the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40.1 and Policy for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions, execution is only partial and varies across NATO’s membership. More concrete achievements were realized through the deployment of Female Engagement Teams, Mixed Engagement Teams, Mixed Civil-Military Cooperation Teams and Cultural Support Teams, but reliable accounts are sparse. During the war in Afghanistan, gender awareness appeared to operate through more informal channels. Indeed, gender analysis is mentioned as an important factor in the development of ISAF’s counter-insurgency strategy, because of the hierarchical relations between men and women in Afghanistan. The fact that this was a population-centric operation meant that Canadian military planners eventually incorporated gender and cultural factors into the analysis. To the extent that a gendered lens was used by the CAF, it was predominantly focused on the Afghan population, through the prism of cultural awareness. This experience may have deeper implications for the role of women in the military. Indeed, the type of conflict that women participate in as soldiers — in this case, counterinsurgency operations — may influence how successful their participation is perceived to be by their peers, by government and by society in general. Given that female engagement with Afghan communities was perceived favourably, this “successful” experience can contribute to changing negative attitudes toward the full integration of women in the military. As Karen Davis, a DND expert on gender, notes, “in Missions like in Congo or even Afghanistan, where women’s rights issues are really at the forefront, it’s important for the civilian population to see women, to have interactions with them” (cited in Bell 2011). The realization of this “comparative advantage” might be one of the mechanisms through which perceptions and attitudes begin to shift. Another lesson from the Afghanistan experience is that women who were deployed faced more than just battlefield stress. Generally speaking, women and men have different experiences when in the military (Cohn 2013; Sjoberg 2009; Sjoberg 2014). Women are more often exposed to cumulative stressors, which include high-intensity combat experiences, military sexual trauma and separation from family (Street, Vogt and Dutra 2009). This was the case in the context of

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the OEF and ISAF, where in addition to PTSD from combat, there have been several reports of sexual assault cases on bases, in particular at the Kandahar Airfield. Whether one looks at the case of Canada, where barriers for full female participation in the military were lifted more than a decade ago, or the United States, where combat military occupations will be open to women following the 2013 decision, defence officials have failed to thoroughly study and address some of the underlying problems that women face in the military, whether at home or abroad: “(1) ensuring physical and occupational competency, (2) eradicating sexual harassment and assault, or (3) realistically promoting the full acceptance of females as military leaders and, ultimately, as warriors” (Brownson 2014, 766). Despite a respectable record in terms of gender-related policies, the CAF still suffered major sexual harassment scandals in the late 1990s and more recently, which culminated in an external review on sexual misconduct in the CAF and the publication of a damning report on the organization’s culture.

Conclusion One of the key lessons from this chapter is that future research and policy on gender perspectives in Canada’s military interventions will depend on systematic data collection. Existing research on recruitment, retention and selection for deployment is extremely hard to come by and the challenge is even greater for gender-based research (Higate 2001). The few Canadian studies that have been published are based on interviews and exit surveys done with female military personnel and are consistent with cross-national trends. They identify professional challenges that are specific to women who have reported that they never felt fully integrated into the military, and that their ability to be promoted while in the military or their ability to find good jobs after leaving was hindered by the lack of experience brought on by exclusion (Winslow and Dunn 2002; Taber 2005; Davis 2007). In terms of Canada’s military organizational culture, fear of saying something offensive has gotten in the way of a thorough evaluation of the consequences of female integration into the military and the remaining barriers for their full participation, during peacetime and deployments. As Kingsley Browne (2007, 182) mentions, “sensitivity about ‘gender issues’ has resulted in a system of double standards and a climate of political correctness… [which] is so strong that revealing reservations about the performance of women in the military is likely to be a career-terminating event.”

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The year 2015 marks the fifteenth anniversary of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. It is obvious from this analysis that Canada’s progress has been uneven to date. Referring to the four gender approaches developed in this chapter, Canada’s compliance with these international guidelines has varied by department. While DFATD’s policies and reforms are consistent with the standpoint feminist approach, given its pursuit of far-reaching gendermainstreaming initiatives, DND’s efforts are more consistent with the liberal feminist approach, meaning that its policies are articulated in gender-neutral terms and focus on gender balancing. The CAF, more specifically, actively resisted the gender mainstreaming turn until Jonathan Vance because chief of the defence staff in 2015. A second lesson from this chapter is that greater harmonization must take place within departments, as well as among them. Within DND, efforts must be made to bridge both civilian and military approaches to gender training. On the DFATD side, the amalgamation of Foreign Affairs and CIDA translates into the reconciliation of two distinct organizational cultures, with implications for how the gender file is managed. Moving forward, promoting a broader dialogue between DND, DFATD and the RCMP on Resolution 1325 would be logical. Finally, as Saideman’s introduction to this volume makes clear, Canada always intervenes in multinational contexts and, thus, learning from allies and partners when it comes to gender mainstreaming should be a constant effort. The Australians, for instance, are implementing ambitious reforms within the Australian Defence Force with a policy called “Pathway for Change,” and Scandinavian countries continue to provide gender-based training for Western armed forces. This exchange of best practices between allies appears to be a fruitful avenue for building on the momentum of the gender turn in military interventions.

Acknowledgements I wish to acknowledge the generous support of the Queen’s Senate Advisory Research Council, as well as Gabrielle Schachter for her research assistance.

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Works Cited Austen, Ian. 2013. “Armed Forces in Canada Resolved Issue Long Ago.” The New York Times, January 24. www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/world/ americas/armed-forces-in-canada-resolved-issue-long-ago.html?_r=0. Bell, Stewart. 2011. “Women Filled 8.3% of Canada’s Combat Positions in Afghanistan: Study.” National Post, October 25. http://news.nationalpost. com/2011/10/25/women-filled-8-3-of-canadas-combat-positions-inafghanistan-study/. Bray, Richard and Chris MacLean. 2012. “Infantry Women.” FrontLine Defence 9 (5). www.frontline-defence.com/index_archives.php?page=2026. Browne, Kingsley. 2007. Co-ed Combat: The New Evidence That Women Shouldn’t Fight the Nation’s Wars. New York, NY: Sentinel. Brownson, Connie. 2014. “The Battle for Equivalency: Female US Marines Discuss Sexuality, Physical Fitness, and Military Leadership.” Armed Forces & Society 40 (4): 765–88. Burrelli, David F. 2013. “Women in Combat: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, Washington, DC, May 9. Carrier-Sabourin, Krystel. 2012. “Sisters in Arms: The Extent of Female Canadian Forces Members’ Involvement in Combat.” Paper presented at the Women in International Security Canada Workshop, Montreal, QC, May 25-26. Cawkill, Paul, Alison Rogers, Sarah Knight and Laura Spear. 2009. Women in Ground Close Combat Roles: The Experiences of Other Nations and a Review of the Academic Literature. UK Ministry of Defence. Cohn, Carol, ed. 2013. Women and Wars. Malden, MA: Polity Press. Committee for Women in NATO Forces. 2008. www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ topics_101371.htm. Davis, Karen D. 2007. Women and Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Perspectives and Experience. Winnipeg, MB: Canadian Defence Academy Press. ———. 2013b. “Militarized Femininities in Canada’s War in Afghanistan.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, April 2–6.

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DFATD. 2013. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. Progress Report 2012-13. www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/women_ report_2012-2013_rapport_femmes.aspx?lang=eng. DND. 2014. “Women in the Canadian Forces: Backgrounder.” www.forces. gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=women-in-the-canadian-armed-forces/ hie8w7rm. Eichler, Maya. 2013. “Women and Combat in Canada: Continuing Tensions between ‘Difference’ and ‘Equality.’” Critical Studies on Security 1 (2): 257–59. Goldstein, J. S., J. C. Pevehouse and S. Whitworth. 2008. International Relations, 2nd Canadian edition. Toronto, ON: Pearson/Longman. Higate, Paul Richard. 2001. “Theorizing Continuity: From Military to Civilian Life.” Armed Forces and Society 27 (3): 443–60. von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2014. “Why the Canadian Forces Can’t Be Gender Blind.” The Ottawa Citizen, July 18. www.ottawacitizen.com/news/ national/the-canadian-forces-cant-be-gender-blind. Keohane, Robert O. 1989. “International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint.” Millennium 18 (2): 245–53. Kümmel, Gerhard. 2002. “When Boy Meets Girl: The ‘Feminization’of the Military, an Introduction also to be Read as a Postscript.” Current Sociology 0 (5): 615–39. Lackenbauer, Helené and Richard Langlais, eds. 2013. Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-Led Operations and Missions. Brussels: NATO. Lyons, Deborah A. 2014. “Statement by Canada’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Deborah A. Lyons, on the 58th Session of the UN Commission of the Status of Women.” Kabul, March 20. DFATD. www.international.gc.ca/ afghanistan/news-nouvelles/2014/03_20.aspx?lang=eng. NATO. 2009. Canadian Forces 2009 National Report to the Committee for Women in NATO Forces. www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/meetingrecords/2009/national-reports/canada-national-report-2009.pdf. Serrano, Lauren F. 2014. “Marine Infantry Isn’t Broken, It Doesn’t Need to Be ‘Fixed.’” Marine Corps Gazette, September. Sjoberg, Laura. 2009. Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge.

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———. 2014. Gender, War and Conflict. Malden, MA: Polity Press. Street, Amy E., Dawne Vogt and Lissa Dutra. 2009. “A New Generation of Women Veterans: Stressors Faced by Women Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.” Clinical Psychology Review 29 (8): 685–94. Taber, Nancy. 2005. “Learning How to Be a Woman in the Canadian Forces/ Unlearning It through Feminism: An Autoethnography of My Learning Journey.” Studies in Continuing Education 27 (3): 289–301. Turenne-Sjolander, Claire and Kathryn Trevenen. 2010. “Constructions of Nation, Construction of War: Media Representation of Captain Nichola Goddard.” In Canadian Security into the 21st Century: (Re)Articulations of Security in the Post-911 World, edited by Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, 126–49. Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press. UNSC. 2000. Resolution 1325, Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace and Security. October 31. www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps. Walby, Sylvia. 2005. “Gender Mainstreaming: Productive Tensions in Theory and Practice.” Social Politics 12 (3): 321–43. Winslow, Donna and Jason Dunn. 2002. “Women in the Canadian Forces: Between Legal and Social Integration.” Current Sociology 50 (5): 641–67.

Part Three Responsibility to Protect

9 Syria and the Responsibility to Protect Jane Boulden

Introduction At the time of writing, Syria remains in the depths of a brutal civil war. Accurate estimates are impossible, but reasonably reliable estimates suggest that the conflict has caused a minimum of 150,000 deaths and generated almost four million refugees, almost half of whom are children, as well as 7.6 million internally displaced persons. Accusations of torture and violations of the laws of war and international humanitarian law have been made on all sides. The widespread violence and the resulting lack of order in various regions in the country has helped facilitate the establishment and strengthening of new violent groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). International responses to the conflict have taken a variety of forms, and include the imposition of bilateral and multilateral sanctions against the Bashar al-Assad regime, humanitarian aid and refugee assistance. The calls to intervene militarily in this conflict have been many. The United States and Canada have undertaken air strikes in Syria in pursuit of ISIS targets, but to date, there has been no intervention in response to the Syrian conflict itself. This chapter undertakes two linked tasks. The first is to give a sense of Canadian policy on the conflict in Syria as it has evolved over time. This review is based primarily on an analysis of official government documents,

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particularly speeches and statements made by the prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs and the ambassador for the Office of Religious Freedom. Statements by government officials at hearings before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development are also used. The chapter does not walk through the specifics of the Syrian conflict in detail, beyond the key events that triggered international and Canadian responses. Nor does it cover in detail the current campaign against ISIS, although the events prompting that campaign are clearly linked to the Syrian conflict. Indeed, Canada’s decision to join the military campaign against ISIS can be seen as an end point in what was until then a strong focus on the situation in Syria. The second task is to discuss some of the inherent tensions in the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine that are raised by the Syria case, and to use that as a foundation to raise some questions about the current state of the theme of this volume — intervention. In particular, the events in Syria and the international response to them (or lack thereof) provide a backdrop for exploring when and on what basis Canada, as well as other states, decide to intervene militarily in other states and what factors are in play when they decide against such action. The chapter concludes by arguing that the Syrian case is not a clear-cut test of the R2P doctrine. Rather, it represents another step in the evolution of the norm that neither propels it forward nor sets it back. The Syrian case does, however, provide interesting insight into attitudes about intervention generally. The success of US efforts to enforce the global norm against the use of chemical weapons demonstrates that a credible use of the threat of intervention can lead to norm enforcement. And yet, the United States was alone in finding the norm violation significant enough to warrant an interventionary response, demonstrating that at this point in time, Canada and other US allies such as the United Kingdom prioritize other factors over norm enforcement when it comes to decisions about intervention.

Canadian Policy on the Conflict in Syria Rights Read through official statements, the initial Canadian response to the crisis in Syria was framed through the lens of human rights. Within a few days of the start of the protests in Syria on March 15, 2011, and the subsequent

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reports of the deaths of a number of protesters, the Canadian government’s first response called on the government of Syria to “respect the rights of its people to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression,” and also to investigate the deaths (Cannon 2011). As the protests strengthened and the Syrian government’s response escalated, the Canadian government quickly added condemnation of the use of force against civilians to its assertion of the rights of the protesters. These two linked themes are the core elements of the Canadian position as it evolved over time in response to the changing nature of the situation in Syria. As part of their call for the Assad regime to respect the rights of Syrian citizens, the Canadian government also consistently stated that the violations of rights should be investigated and those responsible should and would be held accountable. This approach suited the nature of the crisis in the early days when the general judgment was that what was going on in Syria was an echo of other Arab Spring uprisings. The focus was thus on the rights of the protesters, with broad support for a “democratic reform” agenda. To that end, in June 2011, Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird pushed the reform issue a step further in stating that Assad “can reform or he can go” (House of Commons 2011). By the fall of 2011, Canadian government officials were using a stock phrase that recognized the Syrian people’s quest for a “brighter future” that “respects freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development [DFATD] 2011a; 2011b). In this phase of the crisis, therefore, as with other Western states, Canada was dealing with the Syrian situation as a question of Syrian citizens pushing for democratic reform and excessive government repression in response. By late summer 2011, the Canadian government shifted position significantly, calling on Assad to step down. In early August, the government called the Syrian government actions a “campaign of terror” and indicated that the Assad regime had lost legitimacy, and on August 18, Canada joined with US President Barack Obama and the leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom in issuing formal statements calling for Assad’s resignation (Harper 2011). At this point, the call for Assad to resign became the central theme in Canada’s statements on the crisis, although it was still consistently joined by the call for an end to violence against the protesters. While the latter invocation is inherently based on a human rights foundation, the government’s formal evocation of human rights eases in this period, indicating a shift from an emphasis on democratic reform to an emphasis on regime change.

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The government’s main formal course of action during the first year of the crisis was the imposition of sanctions. Beginning in May 2011, the Canadian government imposed sanctions against a group of individuals and entities associated with the Syrian regime. Government statements are clear and careful in indicating that these were targeted sanctions aimed at pressuring members of the regime and not at adding to the hardship of the Syrian people. As the level of government-led violence increased, Canada, along with other countries, expanded the scope of the sanctions being implemented, as well as the number of individuals and entities affected by them. By August 2012, a total of 129 individuals and 44 entities were under sanction. The regime of sanctions implemented by Canada was articulated as a response to the violence and repression being used by the Assad regime in violation of international human rights obligations. In 2014, the government added new sanctions relating to a United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria’s chemical weapons, including a ban on exports to Syria of dual-use equipment and chemicals that can be used in chemical weapons. The call for Assad to resign raised the question of how a regime transition would occur and who would take Assad’s place. Initial contacts between Canadian government officials and Syrian opposition groups began fairly early in the crisis (Martin 2012). In keeping with the human rights approach, in a speech to the Friends of Syria group meeting in Tunis, Minister of Foreign Affairs Baird indicated that Syrian opposition groups needed to develop a clear vision for the post-Assad era that included the protection of religious minorities. “The basic rights of every Syrian must be respected” (Baird 2012). Reflecting that same kind of concern, in April 2012, Baird announced support for opposition groups in the form of $1 million in pro-democracy programs to “allow the opposition to gain the skills and resources needed to promote the values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (DFATD 2012c). As the conflict evolved and deepened, the nature of the Syrian opposition and their inability to unite made Canadian decision making about support for the opposition problematic. The government maintains a position that does not officially recognize any group of the Syrian opposition, although Canadian government officials have engaged with various opposition leaders, and the government has provided “carefully calibrated” training support to the opposition in the areas of governance and human rights (see House of Commons 2013a; 2013b).

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With the opening of Canada’s Office of Religious Freedom in February 2013, the question of rights once again became a central theme in Canadian government statements on the crisis. Earlier government statements about the importance of the opposition ensuring that their post-Assad vision would include protection for minority rights, presaged the focus of statements to come by Ambassador for Religious Freedom Andrew P. W. Bennett. Beginning shortly after the office opened, Bennett issued statements on the situation in Syria in response to specific events affecting religious minorities such as the abduction of archbishops and nuns, and an attack on a Shiite mosque. On occasion, Minister Baird also made separate statements on these same issues, an indication of the weight the government places on the issue of religious rights and freedom in the foreign policy context.

Humanitarian Aid Humanitarian aid was another central element in the Canadian response to the conflict in Syria. As of March 2015, Canada had committed $403.5 million in response to the conflict. Funnelled through a range of United Nations, International Red Cross and non-governmental organizations, the aid is intended to help respond to the humanitarian crisis created by the conflict, particularly with the massive flow of refugees to neighbouring states. While Canada has provided aid to all countries in the region suffering the effects of the Syrian conflict, Jordan has been a particular focus of both Canadian humanitarian and development aid. It receives well over 80 percent of the $210 million in development aid that Canada has committed to the region during the conflict, and 68 percent of security and stabilization assistance (DFATD 2014). The focus on Jordan reflects the particular needs of that country as a major recipient of the refugee flow from Syria, but also the close relationship between Canada and Jordan.1 Canada’s response to the plight of refugees and the countries dealing with them in the region stands in contrast to its own willingness to accept refugees from the conflict. In 2014, the Canadian government committed to accepting 1,300 Syrian refugees, 200 government-sponsored refugees and 1,100 privately sponsored refugees. In January 2015, the government announced 1

See, for example, Baird’s remarks before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, No. 076, 1st Session, 41st Parliament, April 30, 2013, www. parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6117074&Language=E&Mode=1 &Parl=41&Ses=1.

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a commitment to resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees in Canada over a threeyear period, for a total of 11,300 refugees. While this increased commitment was welcomed, it was also controversial because of the government’s stated desire to prioritize refugees from religious minorities in Syria.

International Actions Canada was an advocate for international efforts to respond to the crisis in Syria, supporting the various Arab League and UN-led efforts to develop a peace plan, as well as calling for stronger action by the UN Security Council. The inability of the Security Council to agree on measures to respond to the growing conflict in Syria was the subject of divisive politics at the international level. Canada was particularly vocal in calling on the Security Council to take action against the Syrian regime, especially in early 2012, when it expressed its disappointment “in the extreme” with the Security Council’s inability to agree on a way forward (DFATD 2012a). The impasse at the Security Council prompted a variety of other international initiatives. One of these was the formation of a group of states called the Friends of Syria (also known as the Group of Friends of the Syrian People). The main goal of the Friends of Syria initiative was to generate action against Syria outside of the stalemated Security Council. Meetings began in April 2012 and have continued through 2014. Two working groups were created, one focused on sanctions against Syria and the other on economic recovery and development. Canada played a lead role in the Friends of the Syrian People International Working Group on Sanctions, and hosted a working group meeting in Ottawa in June 2013. At their height, the Friends of Syria meetings involved well over 100 states. Over time, however, the broader Friends of Syria process has faltered and seen diminished participation. Canada is among those countries that have given less emphasis to this channel of activity. Indeed, citing concerns about extremist elements and the Opposition’s views about minority rights, Canada withheld its own formal recognition of the Syrian National Coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, even as the December 2012 Friends of Syria meeting formally did so. While there are a variety of reasons for the diminution in enthusiasm for the Friends of Syria process, the disaffection with it is an indication that the stalemate at the Security Council

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is not the only obstacle to a substantive international response to the Syrian conflict.

Security Issues In the midst of the focus on rights, the initial Canadian response cited traditional security issues, referencing concerns about the impact of the situation on security in the Middle East and the potential for the conflict to spill over Syria’s borders. Beginning in December 2012, Canada raised concerns about the rise of terrorist activity within Syria, and by late 2013, Canadian officials were highlighting the question of “foreign fighters” in Syria and the region as a major concern.2 There is little question that the ongoing violence in Syria and various internal problems in neighbouring Iraq facilitated the rise of what became known as ISIS or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. At the time of writing, the threat posed by ISIS and the territorial gains they have made have superseded the Syrian conflict as a pressing security threat at the international and national level. Indeed, in contrast to the reluctance of the Canadian government to consider military action in Syria (discussed below), in September 2014, the government decided to send military advisers to assist those in Iraq fighting ISIS, emphasizing that the advisers were being provided in a non-combat role. These new security developments, and the Canadian commitment to respond to ISIS militarily, brought about a shift in the Canadian position on the Assad regime. This change occurred in the context of similar changes in the positions of Canadian allies such as the United States, which were also signalling a shift in emphasis in their positions on Syria in the context of the fight against ISIS. In November 2014, noting that “we are not interested in any war with any government in the region,” Prime Minister Stephen Harper maintained that Assad should go and that the only solution to the conflict in Syria was one based on political compromise among moderate elements in both the government and the Opposition (Chase 2014). In October 2014, in response to developments on the ground and to a request from the United States, the government announced that it would provide six CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft and associated resources to assist in multilateral 2

See, for example, government testimony at the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, No. 007, Second Session, 41st Parliament, December 5, 2013. See also Shepherd (2013, A14).

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air strikes against ISIS in Iraq. Five months later, in March 2015, the government returned to the House of Commons to ask for the support of the House to extend Canadian involvement in the air campaign for a further 12 months, and to expand the mission to include Syria. On the latter issue, the government’s position was based on the fact that ISIS fighters and many of their assets had moved into Syria to avoid the air campaign in Iraq (House of Commons 2015). In contrast to the air campaign in Iraq, which was based on a request from the Iraqi government, the decision to extend the air campaign into Syria was a government decision to join the United States in engaging ISIS in Syria as part of a collective self-defence exercise. The permission of the Syrian government was neither sought nor provided. Strictly speaking, the Canadian decision to extend its military action into Syria is a decision about the threat posed by ISIS, rather than a decision to intervene in Syria in response to the civil war. In practical terms, however, the separation of these two situations is not so straightforward. There can be little doubt that the war in Syria facilitated the rise of ISIS. And, the ability of ISIS to move back and forth freely between Syria and Iraq is, at least in part, a function of the Syrian government’s minimal control over certain areas of the country. At the time of writing, the decision to extend the air campaign against ISIS to include ISIS assets in Syria had just been made. It remains unclear, therefore, to what extent the campaign against ISIS will ultimately affect the war in Syria.

Chemical Weapons In July 2013, a Syrian government official confirmed long-standing assumptions that the country possessed chemical weapons (The Guardian 2012). In making the announcement, the Syrian foreign affairs ministry spokesperson stated that the weapons would only be used against external aggression. Six months earlier, in December 2012, reports suggested that the government had used chemical weapons in Homs. This was followed by other allegations of chemical weapons use beginning in March 2013, prompting a United Nations investigation into the allegations.3 Inspectors associated with the UN investigation were in Syria on August 21, 2013, when a chemical weapons attack in a suburban area of Damascus occurred, resulting in hundreds of deaths and an even greater numbers of casualties. The attack was

3

A good chronology of these events can be found in Nikitin, Kerr and Feickert (2013).

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quickly and widely publicized, prompting an international debate over how to respond. Having earlier established the use of chemical weapons as a “red line” event, President Obama began laying the groundwork for military action in response to the attack. In formal remarks at the end of August 2013, he argued that Syria’s violation of the norm against the use of chemical weapons could not be left unaddressed, citing the security risks associated with leaving open the possibility that chemical weapons could be used again and/or could fall into the hands of terrorists (Obama 2013a). Although the UK Parliament voted against a motion calling for a response to the chemical weapons attack, including the possibility of military force, President Obama continued to move forward with plans for military action against Syria. In early September, in response to queries about how US military strikes could be averted, US Secretary of State John Kerry indicated that the complete dismantling of the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal was the only way. Russia seized on this possibility and initiated a series of intensive negotiations on a detailed plan for the dismantling of the Syrian chemical weapons program, with the agreement of the Assad regime. In response, President Obama simultaneously affirmed the case for military force and announced that he had asked Congress to postpone a vote authorizing the use of force to give time to test this diplomatic path (Obama 2013b). Throughout this whole process, the Canadian position was in keeping with the general principles articulated by President Obama. In the House of Commons in December 2012, Minister Baird indicated that the Canadian government “will not tolerate” the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime (House of Commons 2012). In a conversation with President Obama after the August attack, Prime Minister Harper agreed that the use of chemical weapons required a “firm response” from the international community (Harper 2013). However, the Canadian government was not offering to participate in the military action being contemplated by the United States, France and, until August 29, the United Kingdom. In a statement on August 29, Prime Minister Harper said that the Canadian government was a very reluctant convert to the idea that there needs to be military action in response to the Syrian situation, and he was clear that Canada “has no plans of our own” for a military mission (CBC 2013). Harper did, however, make a clear distinction between the decision not to join military action and the government’s support for the principles involved, and for Canadian allies planning to take action based on those

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principles. He stated: “we are convinced that notwithstanding our reluctance, that the risks of the international community not acting in the face of what appears to be an escalation, and likely further escalation without action, in the use of chemical weapons as a weapon of warfare is an extremely dangerous precedent” (ibid.). The next day, Minister Baird echoed that statement with stronger words, calling the attack despicable and abhorrent, and saying that a “clear message on the proliferation and use of such weapons must be sent to rogue regimes around the world” (DFATD 2013). The statements by Minister Baird and Prime Minister Harper placed the chemical weapons attack in the broader context of the Syrian conflict, indicating a belief that a political solution was the only way to halt the violence, a refrain that continued into 2015. The speed with which the deal to eliminate Syrian chemical weapons came about obviated the need for Canada to articulate the exact nature of its decision not to consider military intervention, even while supporting the principle that a chemical weapons attack must be addressed. It is unclear, therefore, whether the decision not to join military action was based on the idea that the situation was not a sufficiently high priority for Canada to necessitate a response or whether the decision was based on other factors. Depending on how the Syrian conflict evolves, this issue may yet reappear, as there have been allegations that Syria has not completely eliminated its stocks of chemical weapons. Having laid out the policy evolution, what explanations are there for these choices? As with any foreign policy decision, a wide range of factors come into play in the decision-making process. Many of the factors are pragmatic ones. A straightforward answer to why any state would hesitate to intervene in Syria is because it’s Syria. At the heart of the Middle East, sharing borders with Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, Syria is a key player in the complex and multi-layered politics that characterize the region. That complexity is deepened by the recent history of intervention in the region, which has not been positive. A number of the states considering a military response to the crisis in Syria were states that have recent experience with conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, which led to far longer and far more costly commitments than originally anticipated, with a consequent resistance to military action on the part of their publics. A number of those states also have strong ties to Israel, and they thus would weigh heavily any possibility that military intervention in Syria might adversely affect Israeli security. With all

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of these factors in mind, the likelihood of unintended consequences for all concerned is more apt to be assessed as higher than the likelihood of success. Added to this is the tradition of resistance to intervention in the region and the deep resentment such intervention causes, which, in this case, was being further intensified by the events in Libya, including the death of Moammar Gadhafi. In combination, these factors weighed heavily on the non-intervention side of the equation. When viewed through this lens, one sees the extent of the strength of the impulse to intervene — particularly with respect to the use of chemical weapons — as it had to be sufficiently strong to overcome these significant obstacles. All of these factors apply in the Canadian case. And, for Canada, there is the additional question of feasibility. Speaking during the international debate about how to respond to the August 2013 chemical weapons attack, Minister Baird noted that Canada did not have the type of military assets that were currently being considered for use in response to the attack, such as cruise missiles.

Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect The Canadian reluctance to consider joining other states, in particular the United States, in intervening in Syria following the chemical weapons attack of August 2013, provides a link to a broader discussion of intervention and R2P. The international debate that arose in the aftermath of the August chemical weapons attack over whether to intervene militarily in Syria, revealed some important fault lines associated with current thinking about intervention generally, and the concept of R2P specifically. In a case in which the responsibility to protect was considered applicable, why was there such limited advocacy of this principle as a starting point or additional rationale for action? And, what does that tell us about the current state of thinking about R2P and intervention? The affirmation of the R2P doctrine in the UN 2005 World Summit Outcome document (UN General Assembly 2005) was the beginning of a UN process of codification or at least a formal articulation of the meaning of R2P. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome document establish that both

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individual states and the international community have a responsibility to protect populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” an interpretation that was affirmed the following year by the Security Council. Building on that foundation, in 2009, UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon issued a report on R2P that sought to elaborate on how these provisions might be implemented. He stated that the ideas established in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document form three pillars: that states have a responsibility to protect their population; that when the state lacks that capability the international community has a responsibility to assist; and, if a state fails to protect its citizens, the international community must respond, including the possibility of the use of force. On that basis, there are two avenues for arguing that the conflict in Syria constituted a case for R2P. The first is to argue that, taken as a whole, the nature and extent of the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights standards amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity. This is the approach taken by the UN Human Rights Council.4 The second is to argue that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime constitutes a war crime and/or a crime against humanity (Blake and Mahmud 2013, 244). Either separately or together, these arguments constitute the basis for implementation of pillar three of R2P — the failure of a state to protects its citizens from these kinds of mass atrocities. And yet, for the duration of the Syrian crisis, only a small number of international actors asserted the applicability of R2P. These include the European Union, the UN Human Rights Commissioner, the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Secretary-General. Even those states trying to build support for military action in response to the regime’s use of chemical weapons did not turn to R2P to support their case, even though R2P clearly provides an argument for taking action outside the Security Council when it is unable to agree. Part of the answer lies in the factors discussed above that weigh heavily against a decision to intervene militarily, such as the complex politics of the region, concern about being drawn into another long-term commitment and feasibility. States that are already hesitant about intervention are unlikely to advocate for the invocation of R2P. The answer also partly lies with the association of R2P with the UN-authorized intervention in Libya. The debate 4

See, for example, Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/25/23, March 28, 2014.

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about international responses to the situation in Syria was deeply coloured by the ongoing international action in Libya, in response to the Gadhafi government’s threats against specific groups associated with the protests and conflict. Even before Gadhafi’s death in October 2011, Russia and other states had flagged their concern about the way in which the UN Security Council mandate was being implemented in Libya. In that context, early attempts at a Security Council Presidential Statement (which requires unanimity) and a Security Council resolution on Syria failed. The death of Gadhafi and Russia’s long-standing relationship with the Assad government combined to deepen Russian resistance to any Security Council action, even as the situation in Syria shifted from one characterized by anti-government protests and government crackdowns to full-scale civil war. Although Russia took the lead in resisting Security Council action, China also took a position against a Security Council response, emphasizing the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states (in contrast to their willingness to abstain on these issues in the past). To date, together, Russia and China have vetoed four Security Council resolutions on Syria and stymied the development of others. Whether or not R2P was invoked, there is a clear lesson in President Obama’s continued determination to proceed with the use of force as a response to the use of chemical weapons, even when key allies such as the United Kingdom fell by the wayside. That lesson is that the clear, credible and sustained threat to use force can achieve a great deal. In this case, it brought about something that had otherwise been well out of reach for a number of years — a formal admission of the existence of the Syrian chemical weapons program accompanied by a speedy, internationally managed and verified elimination of that program. This would not have occurred without President Obama’s resolve to uphold the international norms and laws surrounding chemical weapons use. But the sequence of events also created a significant dilemma. In order to achieve the disarmament of chemical weapons, the international community had to deal with the Assad regime as the formal government of Syria. For those states, including Canada, who consistently and frequently stated that the Assad regime was illegitimate and must go, this created an inherent tension in their positions. In order to make an achievable and credible deal on chemical weapons, negotiations had to occur with Syrian officials at the highest levels. And, in order to ensure the deal was fully implemented and that the chemical weapons were dismantled and removed, Syrian government officials had to

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be partners in that process. Assad and his regime, in other words, had to be dealt with as official representatives of the Syrian government, at least for as long as the chemical weapons disarmament process took to complete. In this sense, for advocates of R2P, the non-use of R2P as a justification may have been a blessing in disguise, as an association of R2P with the dismantling of the Syrian chemical weapons program is also an association with a relegitimization of the Assad regime. Given that, for many, it is the totality and scope of the massive human rights violations, ranging from documented extensive torture of prisoners to significant and sustained violence against citizens, including children (of which the use of chemical weapons is a part), that is the more compelling argument for R2P, it is a bitter irony that achieving the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons contributed to the perpetuation of the Assad regime. If we accept that the credible and imminent use of force can have an impact, as demonstrated by the Assad regime’s willingness to give up its chemical weapons program, we must then come back to two questions: “to what end” should force be used and to what extent can we expect states to see those ends as worth upholding, regardless of specific circumstances? For all the debate about when, and how and by whom R2P should be invoked, there has been very little discussion of what constitutes protection. For example, does the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons constitute the achievement of protection of Syrian citizens? If yes, does the Syrian case suggest that advocates of R2P should consider a prioritization of protection goals? Should one kind of protection — the removal of chemical weapons from the Assad regime’s resources — take priority over another — the removal of the Assad regime itself? What is the relationship between protection and regime change? In some situations R2P is synonymous with regime change. Those advocating for R2P must face and work through this inherent tension in the concept. In situations of internal conflict, where the government is the source of the threat or the violence against a given group, it is difficult to imagine how long-term adequate protection of the population is achieved without a change in government. Is it possible to envisage a scenario in Libya, for example, where Gadhafi stayed in power, but the various groups that had opposed him and/or taken up arms against him would not, at some point, have been subject to some form of retribution? This raises a subsidiary question to what

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constitutes protection, which is: how is protection measured temporally? Does the end of the immediate threat to the population constitute protection? Is the objective simply to end the immediate threat of violence or is there a requirement for an outcome that ensures long-term protection? The determination of the United States to use force in response to the Syrian chemical weapons attack stands in contrast to the unwillingness of other states, including Canada, to be part of that response. The decisions of a number of states on this issue were clearly influenced by recent experience with interventions in the region. This suggests that for some states, these kinds of priorities override the argument that some basic rules and prohibitions in international life must be upheld regardless of specific timing or circumstances. What we don’t know is the extent to which their unwillingness to use force in this instance was further conditioned by an assumption that the United States would enforce the rules anyway. Put another way, how much of their decision making on this issue was conditioned by an assumption that the rules would be enforced by the United States even without their participation? As discussed in the introduction to this volume, the consistent multilateral nature of Canadian interventions has two possible explanations — the power of norms or Canada’s limited military capacity to engage in intervention. For Canada (and for other allies such as the United Kingdom) the case of Syria is an example where the power of norms was not sufficient to overcome other factors weighing against a decision to intervene — even in the situation of a devastating civil war where the government in question has engaged in massive human rights violations and used chemical weapons against its own population. What does this mean for the status of R2P? The Syrian case is not a straightforward case study of the status of the norm, because the extent to which it is applicable is not universally agreed upon and there was no strong group of advocates arguing for its applicability. Even though various UN organs, including the Security Council, have affirmed its role and importance, R2P remains far from a universally accepted, entrenched normative principle that states turn to automatically. In that sense, it is difficult to say definitively what role the Syrian experience will play in the evolution of the R2P norm. Some, including authors in this volume, see the failure of R2P to be used in the discussion about intervention in Syria as a further step back for R2P in the aftermath of Libya. This kind of argument has been made before in the context of the failure of the international community to invoke R2P in

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response to the conflict in Darfur — a failure that was considered a significant blow to the concept. And yet a few years later, the Security Council invoked R2P in Libya. In that sense, the failure of R2P to provide a rallying cry for international intervention in Syria is one more step in the evolutionary process, signalling a pause, but not a fatal blow nor a push forward. While it does not tell us anything definitive about R2P, the Syrian case does give us significant insight into the public and governmental attitudes to intervention of Western states in the aftermath of their experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here we see that for all but President Obama, it is not normative issues that win the day, but an unwillingness to engage in intervention, even when a state’s behaviour is egregious and when large numbers of a population have been deeply impacted through torture, imprisonment, massive population displacement and significant fighting, including the deliberate targeting of civilian populations.

Works Cited Baird, John. 2012. Speech given at the Friends of Syria meeting, Tunis, Tunisia, February 24. www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speechesdiscours/2012/02/24a.aspx?lang=eng. Blake, Jillian and Aqsa Mahmud. 2013. “A Legal ‘Red Line’? Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons in Civil Conflict,” UCLA Law Review 61. Cannon, Lawrence. 2011. “Statement by Minister Cannon on Protests in Syria.” No. 112, March 19. www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/newscommuniques/2011/112.aspx?lang=eng. CBC. 2013. “Syria Military Mission not Planned by Canada, Harper Says.” CBC, August 29. Chase, Steven. 2014. “Harper Says He Has No Interest in Toppling Syrian Regime, Fight Only with the Islamic State.” The Globe and Mail, November 14. DFATD. 2011a. “Minister Baird Condemns Ongoing Violence in Syria.” News Release No. 329, November 3. www.international.gc.ca/media/ aff/news-communiques/2011/329.aspx?lang=eng.

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———. 2011b. “Statement by Minister Baird on Syria’s Suspension from Arab League.” News Release No. 348, November 16. www.international. gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2011/348.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2012a. “Canada Outraged by Increased Violence in Syria and Deeply Disappointed by Security Council Paralysis.” February 4. ———. 2012b. “Address by Minister Baird at the Friends of Syria Meeting.” Tunis, Tunisia. February 24. www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/ speeches-discours/2012/02/24a.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2012c. “Canada Renews Commitment to Syrian People.” News Release April 1. www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/newscommuniques/2012/04/01a.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2013. “Baird Reaction to John Kerry Statement on Syria.” August 30. ———. 2014. “Canada’s Response to the Situation in Syria.” www. international.gc.ca/international/syria-syrie.aspx?lang=eng. Harper, Stephen. 2011. “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the Situation in Syria.” August 18. www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2011/08/18/ statement-prime-minister-canada-situation-syria. ———. 2013. “Prime Minister Harper speaks with President Obama.” August 27. www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/08/27/prime-minister-harperspeaks-president-obama. House of Commons. 2011. Foreign Minister Baird’s statement in the House of Commons Debate. Edited Hansard 41 (1). 1st Session, 41st Parliament, 1455. www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language= E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=1&DocId=5081248. ———. 2012. Edited Hansard (193). 1st Session, 41st Parliament, December 6. www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mo de=1&Parl=41&Ses=1&DocId=5924732. ———. 2013a. Foreign Minister Baird’s statement in the House of Commons Debate. Edited Hansard 146 (248). 1st Session, 41st Parliament, 1925, May 7. www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language =E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=1&DocId=6142961. ———. 2013b. Minutes of Proceedings. Meeting No. 7. 2nd session, 41st Parliament, December 5. www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/ Publication.aspx?DocId=6375782&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41& Ses=2.

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———. 2015. Edited Hansard (188). 2nd Session, 41st Parliament, March 24. Martin, Barbara. 2012. Testimony of Barbara Martin at Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, no. 019, 1st Session, 41st Parliament, February 8. www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/411/ SDIR/Evidence/EV5331879/SDIREV16-E.PDF. Nikitin, Mary Beth D., Paul K. Kerr and Andrew Feickert. 2014. “Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service 7-5700 R42848. September 30. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/ R42848.pdf. Obama, Barack. 2013a. Statement by the President on Syria. August 31. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-presidentsyria. ———. 2013b. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria. September 10. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/ remarks-president-address-nation-syria. Shepherd, Michelle. 2013. “Young Canadians Join Ranks of Foreign Fighters Opposing Assad: Ottawa ‘Acutely Aware’ that at Least 100 Have Left for Syria in the Past Year.” Toronto Star, August 24. The Guardian. 2012. “Syrian Regime Makes Chemical Warfare Threat.” The Guardian, July 23. www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/23/syriachemical-warfare-threat-assad. UN General Assembly. 2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome. www.who.int/ hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf.

10 The Call of Duty Harper’s Doctrine on Military Intervention Derek Burney, Fen Osler Hampson and Simon Palamar

Introduction The “call of duty” underpins Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s belief system and outlook toward military intervention in today’s troubled and unstable world.1 It is not that Canada’s current prime minister has rejected or turned his back on humanitarian principles in deciding whether, where or when Canada should commit its military forces abroad. He has not. Nor would it appear that such commitments are solely driven by a narrow calculation of Canada’s self-interest or by mere political opportunism. Far from it — Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq are all countries where direct Canadian interests are sometimes difficult to discern. Humanitarian principles and broader considerations of national security are both fused together in the prime minister’s decision to join the ad hoc coalition to defeat Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), also known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), just as they were in Canada’s earlier decision to join (and then lead) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 1

In this chapter, we typically use the word “duty” to connote a moral duty: an obligation that someone believes they have as a consequence of their deeply held beliefs about right and wrong, but are not legally bound to uphold. While we use two tort law concepts — “duty to rescue” and “non-delegable duty” — in this chapter to describe Stephen Harper’s intervention doctrine, we use these as analogies, rather than as strict legal concepts.

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(NATO’s) bombing campaign to topple Libyan dictator Muammar Gadhafi. However, on closer inspection, there appears to be a deeper ethical rationale that runs through the prime minister’s strategic calculus (and by extension, the Cabinet members of his defence and foreign policy team). It appears that Harper holds a strong belief that Canada cannot shirk from its duty or duck when bullets are flying, bombs are falling and global order is threatened. When its allies put their lives on the line to save others and defend liberty and democracy, so must Canadians. Free riding is not an option. Or to quote John Stuart Mill, “Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing” (Mill 1867, 36). This chapter uses the concept of the “operational code” to help make sense of why Prime Minister Harper and his Cabinet decided to order the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to intervene abroad.2 Operational code, in this context, refers to an individual or group’s basic subjective understanding of the way politics (both domestic and international) work, and the crude rule of thumb they use to make decisions in that political environment. The operational code therefore has two components: instrumental beliefs (for example, the most efficient way to select and achieve political goals) and philosophical beliefs (for example, the way the world “is” and how it ought to be) (George 1969). To be clear, an operational code, in the language of cognitive behaviour research, is closer to a set of “schemata,” or “working hypotheses about reality,” rather than a dogma that individuals perfectly adhere to (Walker 2003, 266). The operational code governs general behaviour, but it is flexible enough to allow deviations from the script, particularly when facts or events that appear to be inconsistent with a specific worldview (or that pose major practical challenges to a code’s instrumental elements) arise (ibid.). A chief executive’s operational code is not a perfect tool for explaining their policy decisions. In certain types of political systems there are strong reasons to suspect that one individual’s view of the world will have little effect on policy outcomes. Operational codes may be particularly poor tools for understanding decisions made in presidential democracies, where there is a clear division of powers, and legislatures can play a large role in making decisions about war and peace. In Canada, however, where the executive

2

This chapter is not a comparative study of Harper and other Canadian prime ministers who have sent the CAF overseas, and as such, we make no claims about what sort of operational codes other prime ministers have employed when making such decisions, or about how different or similar Harper’s code might be compared to that of, say, Jean Chrétien’s.

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branch is fused to the legislature, decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of the prime minister. The executive’s dominance is further cemented by the strict party discipline in the House of Commons (Lijphart 2012; Pal 1988). Finally, above all else, when deciding whether to deploy Canada’s armed forces, the prime minister has no legal obligation to consult the House of Commons, let alone receive its approval.3 In the end, deploying Canada’s military forces is a Crown prerogative, meaning prime ministers have a disproportionate influence on the decision to go to war when compared with some other Western democracies, such as the United Kingdom, where tradition gives Parliament a virtual veto over such decisions (Lagassé 2013). This chapter provides a brief assessment of the Harper government’s decisions to send the CAF into Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq, and to stay out of Syria. Public statements by the prime minister suggest that Harper’s operational code rests on a view of the world where Canada is a member of a community of nations and peoples with shared values, preferences and aspirations. Not all peoples — and governments in particular — are part of this community. While Harper’s code is not quite Manichean, it does see the world in terms of “friends and foes” (Schönwälder 2014). Canada, as a member of this community, has a duty to support and stand by its like-minded allies, and to aid those in distress. According to Harper: The world that Canada strives for is the world that the founders of the United Nations wanted from the beginning, as boldly articulated in their declaration of 1942: a world where life, liberty, independence and religious freedom are defended, where human rights and justice are preserved, and where all join in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world. In such a world, there can be prosperity for the impoverished, justice for the weak, and, for the desperate, that most precious of all things, hope. (Harper 2014) Harper’s operational code on intervention is related to, but distinct from, what critics refer to as his rejection of Canada’s “liberal internationalist consensus”

3

That being said, the practice in recent decades has been to consult with Parliament in the form of “take note” debates when Canadian troops are sent overseas even for peacekeeping missions (Hampson 2003).

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(Paris 2014, 274).4 Harper’s operational code grows out of skepticism about the methods (but not the goals) of the postwar international order. Harper does not reject the legitimacy or usefulness of the UN-centred, law-based system that the United States built in the wake of World War II, but his moral code questions whether strict adherence to the letter of the law should be an end unto itself. More important than the rule of law are the fundamental values that the law is meant to protect. As Harper (2003) suggested to an audience of Canadian Conservative politicians and activists in 2003, “debates on foreign affairs should be fought on moral grounds. Current challenges in dealing with terrorism and its sponsors, as well as the emerging debate on the goals of the U.S. as the sole superpower, will be well served by conservative insights on preserving historical values and moral insights on right and wrong.” He continued that: conservatives should have answers. We understand, however imperfectly, the concept of morality, the notion that moral rules form a chain of right and duty, and that politics is a moral affair. We understand that the great geopolitical battles against modern tyrants and threats are battles over values. We can disagree vehemently with the values of our civilization’s opponents, but that does not deny the validity of the cause in their eyes. Without clear values ourselves, our side has no purpose, no meaning, no chance of success. Conservatives must take the moral stand, with our allies, in favour of the fundamental values of our society, including democracy, free enterprise and individual freedom. This moral stand should not just give us the right to stand with our allies, but the duty to do so and the responsibility to put “hard power” behind our international commitments. (ibid.) Instead of strict fealty to the principles of maximalist multilateralism, Harper’s code prioritizes, at the margins, (his own notion of) justice over

4

Roland Paris defines the consensus as “the conviction that working through international institutions generally served Canadian interests and values, that energetic multilateral diplomacy provided Canada with opportunities for international influence which it would have otherwise lacked, that strengthening rules and norms in all areas of international affairs was critical for a country in Canada’s position of openness and vulnerability to global forces, and that promoting reconciliation and the peaceful settlement of disputes abroad was both a reflection of Canada’s success as a multicultural society and a means of contributing to international security” (Paris 2014, 274-5).

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lawfulness, and emphasizes a moral duty to help one’s friends and protect the weak over a legal obligation to intervene (or refrain from doing so), as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm advocates. Harper summarized his view on the relationship between foreign policy goals and procedures in 2010, when discussing the economic policy coordination that followed in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. In his eyes, mutually beneficial cooperation was not a matter of “the structure of global institutions. It is more a matter of attitude” (Harper 2010). Harper’s doctrine on intervention also contains a strong humanitarian impulse, something both his supporters and critics often lose sight of. His code demands that Canada, when possible, aid and assist would-be friends in other countries that live in the shadow of sectarian fanaticism, strongman authoritarianism or under the threat of crimes of mass atrocity. In this regard, and ironically perhaps, Harper and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) — which authored the report The Responsibility to Protect — share some views in common. That being said, while Harper shares the ICISS’ humanitarian impulses, he does not share the rest of their view of the world. The ICISS embedded a very specific set of assumptions and beliefs about the nature of international politics in the R2P doctrine. R2P is not the only logic for humanitarian intervention, and it would be a mistake to conclude that because a government cites humanitarian concerns when justifying an overseas military intervention, that they are necessarily subscribing to R2P. The ICISS made this exact point — R2P was its effort to reconcile two sets of goals (using military force to save lives while respecting Westphalian sovereignty and legal equality) that are often in tension with each other, which is often lost in contemporary debates about military intervention. In order to allow military interventions while upholding sovereign equality, the ICISS holds up the UN Charter and UN Security Council (UNSC) as the foundational document and the key political organ that make this bargain and doctrine work, at least in principle. The ICISS lays out a “constitutionalist” vision for humanitarian intervention that allows governments to act on their humanitarian impulses, but within the framework of international institutions, laws and procedures. R2P explicitly rejects the notion that governments have the right to intervene in the affairs of others, and instead justifies armed intervention on the basis that by not doing so, governments standing idly by would be neglecting legal obligations that the ICISS argues are an innate feature of sovereignty (ICISS 2001).

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Military interventions with humanitarian motives long preceded R2P, and it is easy to point to examples where states cited humanitarian motives as far back as the early nineteenth century to justify the use of armed force (Finnemore 2004). The ICISS tried to promote a very particular definition of sovereignty: one that includes a responsibility of governments to care for their own citizens, and one that requires foreign governments to step in when states have eschewed that sovereign responsibility. Harper’s code is different. It does not emphasize the universal responsibilities of sovereign governments, but instead stresses a duty to aid the weak and to stand by like-minded allies. Harper’s statements about why Canada has intervened (or considered intervening) overseas do not reflect a belief that the duty to intervene comes from a state’s sovereign responsibility. Instead, the duty, as he understands it, comes from at least two sources. One is a duty to stand by allies that share democratic traditions and Western, pluralistic values with Canada. A second is an obligation that stems from the belief that once Canada has made a commitment to aid a nation’s people in distress, Canada must at least make an effort to follow through on that original commitment. Ultimately, Harper’s operational code — at least as military interventions are concerned — is a reactive one. Canada’s interventions under Harper’s governments have largely happened out of a feeling of obligation to act because others are acting. Whether Harper’s reluctance to act as an entrepreneur and leader who initiates and spearheads military interventions is an instrumental reaction to Canada’s limited financial and military muscle, or a reflection of a deeper philosophical belief, is unclear. It is, however, consistent with the notion that “middle powers” such as Canada often exert the greatest influence by working within and reinforcing the prevailing international order. The key difference when it comes to the Harper government and military intervention is that the Harper government sees itself working in a world of friends and adversaries and of the strong and the weak, rather than in a world where various political actors enjoy nominally equal rights and obligations. The prime minister thus believes that Canada has a moral obligation to follow through on Canada’s commitments after it has plunged into dangerous waters, even if the decision was taken on someone else’s watch. And such obligations are not to be cast aside when the going gets tough or the promise of success seems elusive. “Duty,” a word that repeatedly surfaces in the prime minister’s speeches and pronouncement by Cabinet members, lies at the heart of Prime

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Minister Harper’s moral universe and his own, unique brand of tough-minded internationalism. Of course, when politicians make public statements, they should be interpreted with a degree of skepticism. However, there are at least two very good reasons to use the public record to at least make a preliminary assessment of these closed-door decisions. First, the Canadian Cabinet operates under a blanket of secrecy, and the Access to Information Act only applies to Cabinet records that are at least 20 years old (Minister of Justice of Canada 2015). This limits the practical available source material that one can use to assess recent Cabinet decisions. Second, making public statements about foreign policy (which are recorded for posterity), particularly in an electoral democracy, does create audience costs for governments and the risk that their political opponents will use their words against them. This creates — in principle at least — the incentive to be relatively truthful and consistent when laying out policy and sending troops overseas. Thus, statements made to the media or in Parliament are far from worthless, and may shed considerable light on decisions to go to war. Finally, there is ultimately no single reason why the Canadian government has decided to send armed forces overseas now or in the past. Military interventions should be understood as an equifinal phenomenon (Bennett and George 1997; 2005). Equifinality is the principle that a final state or event can be arrived at in many distinct ways. In politics, revolutions are equifinal, just as election results are (a politician can lose an election because of overwhelming support for their opponent, or simply because of a lack of enthusiasm for their own candidacy, just to name two possibilities). Likewise, there are many reasons why a government can end up ordering its military forces into overseas combat, and there is more than one way to use humanitarian concerns to justify the use of force. This chapter argues that Prime Minister Stephen Harper (and his Cabinet) follows his own pattern when making decisions about where and when to deploy the CAF overseas. Some of these outcomes — such as deploying aircraft to Libya and Iraq — could occur under a different prime minister who was ardently committed to the R2P doctrine. In other words, similar outcomes can have different causes. That is the essence of equifinality and an inconvenient feature of reality.

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Duty-driven Internationalism Two moral principles are at the cornerstone of the Harper government’s value-based approach to vital matters of war and peace: duty to rescue and non-delegable duty. Duty to rescue is a tort concept that refers to the duty of a person to rescue another who is in a dangerous situation (Bauhn 2011). Generally, there is no ethical or legal onus on a person to help someone who is in peril. If someone is drowning and you are standing on the shore, you have no legal obligation to come to their assistance and are not liable if they drown. However, if you are already in the water or start swimming toward them, in tort law you have a moral duty to assist them — that is, once a rescue is undertaken, the rescuer has a duty to act and thereafter will be liable for his or her negligence. (An even greater obligation applies to an on-duty lifeguard or emergency worker who might be standing on the shoreline because of the terms of their employment.) As discussed below, the “duty to rescue” principle, by way of analogy, offers some insight into why the Harper government stayed the course in Afghanistan, even when it was apparent that the mission was floundering and that “peace, order and good government” would not come quickly to that war-torn nation. A non-delegable duty, another tort principle, is an obligation that cannot be outsourced to a third party (Thayer 1916; Milani 1994-1995; 1999). Nonderogation of duty or deviation from assignment applies to those situations where the fulfillment of an obligation rests solely with the obligor. For example, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of employees while they are on the job rests with the employer and not with a “third party,” such as government inspectors who are there to ensure that an employer is in compliance with safety legislation. Canada’s involvement in both the NATO-led coalition in Libya and the new coalition that has been formed to defeat ISIS, as argued below, are expressions of the prime minister’s belief that Canada should not outsource its security responsibilities to others: in the Harper government’s eyes, the obligation to deal with humanitarian disaster, dictators and the scourge of terrorism is an irrevocable national one. And, if we are members of a shared military and humanitarian enterprise with allies — as typically we are — then we have a double duty: to those we are trying to help and to our allies. In the prime minister’s mind — at least as reflected in his public statements

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— as a nation, we cannot shirk our duty and pass the buck, even when it is expedient to do so. In the non-delegable moral frame of reference of the Harper government, Canada has an unbroken “duty beyond borders,” which involves obligations that cannot be readily transferred or pushed onto other countries or international institutions. Both principles help to describe the Harper’s government’s stance toward Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, Libya and now Iraq.

Afghanistan and the Duty to Rescue The killing of two Canadian civilians in a Kabul hotel on March 21, 2014, served as a grim reminder of the enormous cost to Canada of its 12-year commitment to Afghanistan. It took place just days before Canada’s remaining military contingent was due to leave Afghanistan. Afghanistan was and is a country where Canada has no vital interests at stake. In fact, before the 2001 attacks on the United States, Canada (and especially the Canadian military) had very little knowledge of the country, its people or the challenges they faced. It was more than remote. Our reason for getting involved in early combat operations was primarily solidarity with a neighbour that had been attacked at home. Later, a desire to mend fences with the United States when Canada decided not to join the American invasion of Iraq, coupled with internal pressures from the leadership of Canada’s military, led the Chrétien and then Paul Martin governments to put a sizable contingency of Canadian troops in Kabul (Stein and Lang 2007; Hayes 2008, 284). By any measure and from all accounts, the decision determining Canada’s early involvement was instinctive, and not based on a thorough assessment of the long-term implications of intervening. Following the mission in Kabul, Canada bit off much more than it would prove able to chew — Kandahar — a mission in which it was woefully outnumbered and inadequately equipped. That decision was taken on the basis of minimal analysis about the scope of the challenge and even less on our ability to handle the task. General Jim Jones, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, had preferred that Canada take on a role in either of the less volatile provinces of Herat and Ghōr (Willis 2011, 53).

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Harper, who first came to power in the 2006 federal election and formed a minority government, inherited the Kandahar mission from the previous Liberal government. Nevertheless, Canada’s new prime minister made no secret of the fact that he and the members of his government strongly supported the mission as a matter of principle and national duty, even though it was already apparent that the mission was foundering. And he would choose to stay in Afghanistan for eight more years, in spite of the fact the Taliban (which had decamped to Pakistan following the American-led invasion in 2001) continued to gain in strength and Afghanistan’s National Security Forces (ANSF), composed of both the army and the police, were in no position then (or even now) to take over from NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). When Harper took office, the Americans were distracted by the difficulties they were encountering in Iraq, which was the primary focus of their military efforts. Afghanistan was being largely ignored. Canada’s own body bag count was growing. While in early 2006 the majority of the Canadian public (as reflected in opinion polls) supported the mission (see Figure 1), the public would soon grow increasingly skeptical of the effort. Figure 1: Canadian Public Opinion on the Mission of inCanada's Afghanistan, 2004–2011 Do you approveCAF or disapprove participation in military action in Afghanistan?

Percentage of Respondents

45 40 35 30 25

Strongly Approve

20

Somewhat Approve

15

Somewhat Disapprove

10

Strongly Disapprove

5 0

Q2

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q2

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

2004

2006

2006

2006

2007

2007

2008

2008

2009

Source: Data are from Environics and Angus Reid Strategies.5

5

From 2004 to 2009, Environics asked Canadians, “Do you approve or disapprove of Canada’s participation in military action in Afghanistan?” From 2009 to 2011, Angus Reid Strategies asked, “Overall, do you support or oppose the military operation involving Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan?” Both firms reported results according to a four-point ordinal scale. Results have been aggregated into two categories for clarity. “Approve” and “Disapprove” refer to Environics poll data, while “Support” and “Oppose” refer to Angus Reid Strategies poll data.

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In 2006, the prime minister realized that the mission would have to be extended. But, in a departure from the behaviour of previous Liberal governments, in May he went to the House of Commons to secure parliamentary approval for an extension of the mission until 2009, a pattern that the Conservatives would repeat on both the Libya and Iraq files. The House narrowly passed the motion. The “duty to rescue” imperative was apparent in the prime minister’s remarks when he defended the mission before the vote. While stressing that the mission had both national security and humanitarian imperatives (to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban and give the Afghan people a better life), he made it abundantly clear that this was not a “throwaway option” (Government of Canada 2006, 1549). Having committed troops and treasure to Afghanistan, Canada could not simply walk away from the Afghan government, people and our allies, a point he would repeat time and time again. In the prime minister’s mind, there was a continuing moral obligation — akin to saving a drowning swimmer because we were already in the water — that was triggered when Paul Martin’s Liberal government pledged to aid the Afghan people, and was bolstered by the fact that Canada’s troops were now conducting counterinsurgency operations with the Afghan government’s formal blessing. The prime minister continued, “our rationale for being in Afghanistan is clear. It is in the interests of this country. We are there as well at the invitation of the Afghan government. We are taking part in a multilateral operation sanctioned by the United Nations. Our mission there is not some sort of throwaway option among competing alternatives. It is not a manufactured make-work project to keep soldiers and diplomats busy. It certainly is not a unilateral effort on Canada’s part” (ibid.). At the end of his speech, the prime minister returned to the theme of commitment, reiterating his apparent belief that, as nation, we could not head for the exit but were obligated to follow through and finish the job we had begun: “There we have it, the reaffirmation of Canada’s intent expressed through a clear and renewed commitment, a commitment that builds on past achievements, a commitment in line with Canadian values, a commitment that allows us to finish the job” (ibid., 1605). A year later, with the mission still in jeopardy and the realization that any prospect of “success” would depend on extending Canada’s commitment beyond the new 2009 deadline, the prime minister reached out to the

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Opposition again, but in a different way.6 In the fall of 2007, the government established a blue-ribbon panel, led by former Chrétien Cabinet minister John Manley, which would assess and make recommendations on the future of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. After consulting widely with Canadians, a variety of experts both inside and outside of the country, and conducting a tour of four of Afghanistan’s provinces where it could assess the situation first-hand, the commission delivered its report. The commission made numerous recommendations. These included bolstering Canada’s military operations in Kandahar with an additional 1,000 troops. It also recommended that Canadian troops be equipped with unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters to improve their capabilities and reduce the number of casualties that came from moving troops around on the ground. It was particularly scathing about the way Canada was carrying out its development assistance programming, and offered numerous recommendations to make Canada’s aid delivery more targeted and focused. What was perhaps the commission’s most significant recommendation was that the Canadian military mission should remain in Afghanistan past February 2009, while increasing its efforts to train the ANSF. Since Afghans would eventually have to take responsibility for providing their own security, the commission suggested prioritizing the effort to help that transition happen, without setting an arbitrary date for when the transfer should take place. This recommendation ultimately paved the way for the CAF’s move away from what was overwhelmingly a combat mission, to the training mission that concluded Canada’s military intervention in Afghanistan. The Harper government accepted many (but not all) of the commission’s recommendations. Again, although the prime minister harboured reservations about the mission, he nevertheless decided to extend it to 2011. The 2011 deadline, however, was also one that would come and go as the prime minister and his Cabinet realized that still more needed to be done to stabilize Afghanistan’s tenuous security situation. On November 10, 2010, Stephen

6

By appointing a prominent Liberal to lead the panel, Harper was also able to blunt any criticism from the Opposition, since the panel’s recommendations would, in effect, be coming from one of their own. At around this same time, allegations that the Government of Canada had delivered Taliban prisoners to the Kabul government with full knowledge that the Afghanistan government would torture these detainees, had surfaced. Recruiting the Opposition to help write Canada’s Afghanistan policy gave Harper another tool to shield himself from the detainee scandal.

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Harper announced that Canada would not be pulling out its troops as he had earlier promised, but would move from combat to training the Afghan army when the mission in Kandahar ended in 2011. Was Harper’s decision to remove Canadian troops from combat in 2011 and refocus Canada’s efforts on training the ANSF in Kabul consistent with the claim that Harper operates under a code emphasizing duty and moral obligation? Critics have described Canada’s drawdown from Kandahar and withdrawal from Afghanistan as “cutting and running” (Elmer 2011; Watson 2012; Walkom 2014; Siddiqui 2013; 2014). After all, the move from the frontlines of Kandahar to the relative safety of Kabul happened while the United States continued intense combat operations in Kunar and Paktika, and the United Kingdom and Denmark were still fighting the Taliban in Helmand. However, Canada remained in Afghanistan. While Harper’s strident language about Canada never “cutting and running” from Afghanistan may, on the face of it, suggest a determination to not change course regardless of circumstances, it is not incompatible with changing policies from engaging in direct combat with the Taliban to supporting the ANSF in their fight against the insurgent group. Fulfilling a duty and inflexibly doubling down on a position is not necessarily the same thing. The verdict on Afghanistan is decidedly mixed, not so much about Canada’s role, but about the manner in which the West as a whole acted. Mostly, the verdict reflects a deep frustration with the inconclusive result, the often-erratic manner in which both military and civilian efforts were conducted, and the glaring weaknesses of the corrupt Karzai government. Unquestionably, there has been some progress, notably in expanding access to primary education, and in the health and life expectancy rates of the Afghan people. However, it would be highly premature to conclude that the enormous expenditure of lives and treasure will ensure long-term stability in Afghanistan. Many other lessons can be derived from the experience. Crucially, injecting military force into the affairs of another country — no matter how noble or rational the initial intent — cannot single-handedly resolve what are fundamentally political problems. Nation building is simply not part of the military tool kit. Furthermore, democratically elected governments have little stomach for drawn-out and costly military engagements that yield checkered results, and are unlikely to take up a similar burden any time soon. Moral codes and noble foreign policy intentions do not trump a government’s desire to win elections in the face of a war-weary public.

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Libya: A Non-delegable Duty The stage was set for military intervention in Libya when two regional organizations took quick action a few weeks after public uprisings against Libyan dictator Muammar Gadhafi’s regime. As Gadhafi had few friends in the Arab world, the Arab League’s condemnation came as no surprise. In the case of the African Union, Gadhafi had more friends, but his actions clearly did not sit well with those African states that had turned to democracy. The Arab League suspended Libya’s membership in February 2011, while the African Union also issued a strong denunciation of the Libyan government. As the situation in Libya deteriorated, the UNSC swung into action, issuing UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, which authorized member states to “take all necessary measures…to protect civilians” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, establishing a no-fly zone (NFZ), an arms embargo, and economic sanctions (UNSC 2011, 3). The rationale for the imposition of a NFZ over Libya was ostensibly to avert a bloodbath by Gadhafi’s forces, specifically in the cities of Benghazi and Tobruk. Canada was one of the first countries to commit forces to the mission, which eventually totalled 18 countries. The Canadian mission began with the deployment of the frigate HMCS Charlottetown, to help evacuate Canadians from Libya. This was followed on March 19, 2011, by Canada’s decision to join with Britain, France, Italy and the United States with six CF-18s to enforce a NFZ and engage militarily with Libya, a mission which NATO eventually took over and subsequently included Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain (called Operation Unified Protector [OUP]). The NATO campaign was also supported by Jordan, Qatar, Sweden and the United Arab Emirates. By August 2011, the Libyan National Transitional Council, with NATO’s support, had taken over the country and removed Gadhafi from power. Presented to the world as a success, the mission ended on October 31, 2011. As noted by Kim Richard Nossal (2013), the House of Commons debated the mission three times. The first time was a “take note” debate of Canada’s contribution following the passage of UNSCR 1973, which the House unanimously approved. The second time occurred on June 14, 2011, when the government sought parliamentary approval for a three-month extension of the mission, which the House also supported, save for one dissenting vote cast by Green Party leader Elizabeth May. The third vote was taken on September

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26, 2011, to extend the mission for another three months after Gadhafi’s fall, although this time the New Democratic Party dissented, arguing that Canada’s subsequent involvement in Libya should be confined to a humanitarian role. Although R2P figured prominently in statements by members of the Opposition in debates about the mission and appeared to have been the basis for their support, government officials never once uttered the R2P phrase, despite humanitarian considerations sitting at the forefront of their public statements justifying the mission. For example, when Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird addressed the House of Commons on June 14, 2011, seeking its support for an extension of the mission, he made it clear at the outset of his remarks that fear of a bloodbath in Benghazi was the main reason Canada intervened: “We continue to believe,” he said, “that without the intervention of the international community and the adoption of resolution 1973, Benghazi, the home of the opposition who were within range of Gadhafi’s forces in March, would have been utterly devastated.” And he went on to point out that “Canada has been vocal in condemning the targeting of civilians by the Gadhafi regime, and the impact of that regime’s actions on the hundreds of thousands of peoples who have been trapped in Libya or, worse yet, forced to flee its borders” (Government of Canada 2011, 1015). Although sensitivities about invoking R2P in official statements (because it might offend the Russians and Chinese who abstained from voting on UNSCR 1973) may have been involved, the government also did not want to invoke a concept that was so closely associated with former Liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, who had championed and helped design R2P. At the same time, however, it was also clear that the government believed Canada had a duty to act to save Libyan lives in the name of liberty and freedom. This was not a responsibility the government believed Canada could leave to others, but one that it had to take on itself. To quote Baird again, “the government understands the genuine concerns of Canadians who oppose the use of lethal force and of turning to military action to resolve the problems of the international community. I believe this is an instinct that all Canadians share, and is a credit to us all. At the same time, we have a responsibility to act when we can, when our objectives are right, when our objectives are clear, to protect and to assist those who share the values and would share the institutions for which many of our ancestors gave up their lives so that we could enjoy the benefits” (ibid., 1025).

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The prime minister left much of the public speechifying on Libya to his foreign affairs minister and defence minister. He did not clearly reveal his own views on the mission until November 2011, when he gave a speech that paid tribute to the Canadian troops who had served in the mission. Quoting Shakespeare, he observed at the conclusion of his remarks that “History shows us this: that freedom seldom flowers in undisturbed ground. And so, while few nations exceed our home and native land in its passion for peace, a generous spirit will not blind us to injustice. Still less shall ‘modest stillness and humility’ make us indifferent toward oppressors. And, heaven forbid that we should fail to do that of which we are capable, when the path of duty is clear” (Office of the Prime Minister 2011). The same as in Afghanistan, the results of NATO’s intervention in Libya were mixed. On the one hand, Gadhafi was swept from power and met a gruesome end, opening the way (at least in theory) for a government that was more responsive to the needs of its people. This, of course, did not happen. By late 2014, Libya was in a state of civil war, with its territory divvied up among two competing national governments and Islamist militias. While it is impossible to say whether NATO could have prevented this state of affairs by following Gadhafi’s overthrow with a stabilization mission, it arguably would have helped. Responsibility for Libya’s current situation does not lie solely with Canada, but with Western nations as a whole, which were unwilling to devote the resources necessary to put Libya back on its feet. Part of this recalcitrance stems from the fact that UNSCR 1973 and OUP were never broadly supported. Brazil, China, India, and Russia all abstained during the vote on UNSCR 1973.7 Germany joined those states, as Berlin believed that a NFZ would be insufficient to stop the Gadhafi government from preying upon civilians, and could draw Germany into a situation where they would be expected to commit additional resources, including soldiers on the ground (Baltrusaitis and Duckenfield 2012). OUP used some NATO resources, but only on an ad hoc fashion. Turkey, and many of NATO’s eastern European members in 7

The motives of these four states are probably mixed. On the part of Russia and China, the abstention was probably a two-pronged gambit: neither wanted to be singled out as the country that allowed a massacre in Libya, but neither wanted to bolster any assertions that the United States had the right to interfere in the affairs of other countries. India and Brazil both likely did not trust American claims that any intervention would be for humanitarian purposes, and also worried that by voting “yes” they would pave the way for the United States using force elsewhere (Jones 2011; Sun 2012).

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particular, held reservations about the mission, and provided limited support. While NATO “à la carte” was sufficient to dethrone Gadhafi, no one wanted to shoulder the burden of helping Libya rebuild alone. The mess in Libya today is directly attributable to free riding in the Western alliance and the absence of a leader willing to take on the burden of facilitating a Libyan peace process. Harper’s code on intervention has its clear limits, and it seems, in his mind, that Canada’s moral obligation did not constitute an open-ended commitment to Libya, particularly when Canada’s allies were unwilling to do the same.

Syria: An Obligation to Allies A lack of enthusiasm among allies also contributed to Harper’s stance on the Syrian civil war. The clearest example comes from August 2013, when the Syrian government bombarded the Damascus suburb of Ghouta with chemical weapons, killing more than 1,400 people. Prime Minister Harper did not argue that Canada should send its armed forces to Syria. As in the cases of Afghanistan and Libya, there was a strong humanitarian justification for militarily intervening in the conflict — if the prime minister had wished to make one. In fact, Harper alluded to this possibility when he described the sarin gas attack as an “outrage” (Clark and Taber 2013). Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird added to Harper’s position by claiming the stakes were very high. Baird asserted that if the world did not respond to the Ghouta attack, this would constitute “a green light to hit again,” and “evil forces elsewhere” might be convinced that they could “get away using these weapons of mass destruction” (Fekete 2013a). Harper’s and Baird’s statements suggest that both were appalled (as was much of the rest of the world) by the attacks, and their scale and indiscriminate nature meant that there was a case to be made for intervening. Harper also rejected the notion that Canada’s first responsibility was to a rigid interpretation of international law, stating that “when we see developments that we think in the long term are dangerous for the planet, and therefore us as well, we are simply not prepared to accept the idea that there is a Russian veto over all of our actions” (Fekete 2013b). Harper thus hinted at a willingness to entertain the possibility of bypassing the UNSC, where Russia would likely have blocked any resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria. Instead,

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Canada’s duty was first and foremost to like-minded allies and to the victims of crimes against humanity. The reason, however, that the Canadian government took no steps against the Syrian government in the wake of the attack on Ghouta was that Canada’s allies — namely, the United States and United Kingdom — were unprepared to act. Once US Secretary of State John Kerry suggested that his government would accept a bargain where the United States would not intervene if Syria disarmed itself of chemical weapons, Russia quickly acted to broker such a deal. With the prospect of achieving a minor victory that could, in principle, protect Syria’s civilians from the threat of further chemical weapons attacks, the United States made it clear that military force was off the table. Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, the House of Commons, haunted by the spectre of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, voted to keep the United Kingdom’s armed forces out of Syria. With two of Canada’s principal allies ruling out taking action, Harper was relieved of the obligation to assist them. Furthermore, without these two allies, there was no realistic prospect that Canada could change the facts on the ground in Syria on its own.

Iraq: A Non-delegable Duty without Immediate Promise of Success The principle of a non-delegable duty figured prominently in the government’s decision to commit Canadian forces to the US-led coalition to combat ISIS in Iraq. Although the government had earlier committed up to 69 special operations forces to help train the Iraq military, the decision to engage in direct combat operations using air power was put to a parliamentary vote on October 7, 2014, after two days of heated debate in the House of Commons. Opposition members accused the government of dragging the country into an ill-advised war with neither a plan to help the conflict’s civilian victims, nor a clear strategy to achieve victory. The government was able to secure a majority “yes” vote with 157 members, to send six CF-18s, one refuelling aircraft and two surveillance planes, but the numbers on the “no” side (134) were sizable, with all New Democrats and most Liberals voting against the motion (along with one abstention). When Prime Minister Harper introduced his motion to the House on October 3, he began his remarks by outlining the dire humanitarian consequences of ISIS’s

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actions: “In the territory ISIL has occupied, it has conducted a campaign of unspeakable atrocities against the most innocent of people. It has tortured and beheaded children. It has raped and sold women into slavery. It has slaughtered minorities, captured prisoners and innocent civilians whose only crime is being or thinking differently from ISIL. Indeed, by late summer, ISIL stood on the brink of committing large-scale genocide in Northern Iraq” (Government of Canada 2014a, 1205–10). He then went on to point out that he was proposing to commit Canadian forces to combat ISIS not simply on humanitarian grounds, but also “to avoid a situation that was clearly headed to a wider, protracted and much more dangerous conflict” (ibid.). Although the prime minister noted that the threat from ISIS could “grow quickly,” he did not suggest at the outset that it posed a major, direct threat to Canada. Rather, the main rationale for getting involved in the mission was to do our duty, ensure our voice was heard and support our allies. Harper urged: all members to consider and to support the motion….recognizing that in a democracy, especially one approaching an election, there is rarely political upside in supporting any kind of military action, and little political risk in opposing it….Of course, one could say that while the mission is evidently necessary, we do not have to be the ones doing it, because others will. But throughout our history, that has never been the Canadian way… to do only the most easy and praiseworthy of actions and to leave the tough things for others. Indeed, we should be under no illusion. If Canada wants to keep its voice in the world — and we should since, so many of our challenges are global — being a free rider means not being taken seriously. (ibid., 1214-15) It is important that the prime minister did not try to oversell the mission by promising a quick victory or claiming there were prospects for rapid progress. He also set a six-month deadline for the effort (after which Parliament would be allowed to review the mission) despite the prevailing view that political timelines undermine military strategy and that defeating ISIS in Iraq could easily take years. When Foreign Affairs Minister Baird rose the following Monday in the House of Commons to speak in favour of the motion, he was just as explicit about Canada’s moral duty to take military action and not leave the job of combatting ISIS to others: “Anyone who accepts the premise that ISIL

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is a threat to our security while leaving the fight against ISIL to others is abrogating their moral responsibility and their duty of care.” And he went on to say, “At the end of the day, we know that pedantry is easier than principles. It is easier to make excuses than to take responsibility, and it is easier to criticize the risks of action if we are not held accountable for the risks of inaction. However, any government or aspiring government should be held to a higher standard than that” (Government of Canada 2014b, 1210). As Jeffrey Simpson of The Globe and Mail argued, however, the government had a needle to thread in determining the scope of the mission once it had decided to join the coalition. It had to participate “at a minimum cost, which is what six CF-18s, humanitarian assistance and trainers represent. Anything more might have inflamed public opinion at home; anything less might have offended Washington and other allies. Put another way, once Harper decided to participate, he had to walk a narrow line” (Simpson 2014). Polls showed that public opinion was solidly behind the government’s position. Global News’ Nick Logan pointed out that: Almost two-thirds (or 64 per cent) of Canadians said they’re strongly or somewhat in support of Canada sending jets, likely CF-18s, to launch strikes on ISIS targets in Iraq, according to an exclusive Global News/Ipsos Reid poll. That’s more than the number of Canadians who supported Canada taking on a combat role in Afghanistan, based on a poll conducted in 2001, and significantly more than the number of respondents who would have supported Canada sending troops into Iraq in 2003, as a part of the U.S.-led coalition which Canada did not take part in. Both missions entailed having troops on the ground. Only the United Nations-backed NATO intervention in Libya — which did not entail having Canadian troops go into the country — had greater support, with 70 per cent of Canadians saying they were in favour of it. (Logan 2014) Public support for the mission may have been robust in the autumn of 2014, but it may also be fleeting and not a reliable anchor for military engagement in distant regions about which Canada knows so little and in which it has limited economic interests. As of 2015, the coalition that is intervening in Iraq has still failed to clearly define the end game. What does the US-led coalition wish to achieve in the long run? Is there a political settlement that Iraq’s Shia, Sunni and Kurds can all accept and support? If and when ISIS is defeated,

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how will Iraq’s fractious ethno-religious groups strike a deal that can secure their country’s future and reduce the risk of future sectarian bloodletting? Just as in Afghanistan and Libya, it is easy to identify the short- to mediumterm military goals that Canada and its allies want to achieve in Iraq. How to secure a long-term political settlement in Iraq — as in Afghanistan and Libya — is a far murkier question. Ultimately, defining and achieving that long-term settlement is crucial. A failure to do so would mean Canada’s intervention in Iraq might become just another well-intentioned, but ultimately bloody, expensive and inconclusive military adventure. As the list of such interventions piles up, democracies will be even less inclined to attempt military engagements anywhere. We will be left with a “law-of-the-jungle” world. The answers to these questions and the solutions to these challenges are far beyond the grasp of any single political leader, and are a reminder that while military interventions are an unpleasant but indispensable part of the foreign policy tool kit, they are not panaceas.

Conclusion The R2P is not the only rationale for sending military forces to achieve humanitarian goals. Stephen Harper’s rationale for extending Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, and for sending Canadian forces to Libya and Iraq, shares many humanitarian impulses with R2P, but ultimately is a different doctrine. Harper’s operational code sees a world divided among friends and foes, and the strong and the weak. Thus, Canada’s obligation to send military forces abroad is not a matter of living up to its sovereign responsibility under a global constitutional order. Instead, according to Harper, it is an obligation based on moral principles that predate the postwar liberal international order. Taken as a whole, the examples of Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq suggest that even if Harper does not embrace the language and ideals of Liberal foreign policy, his government and Canada are still willing to try to establish some degree of stability in an often-troubled world. Harper’s code, which emphasizes a duty to NATO allies, making foreign policy decisions on the basis of values and deep-held notions of right and wrong, and that downplays — at the margins — the role of formal international institutions and hard-and-fast legal obligations, has emerged at

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a time when legitimate doubts about the ability of the postwar institutions to manage conflict and avert human-made catastrophe are common, even among the liberal minded (Gordon and Jain 2013). The UNSC, in particular, has been incapable of fulfilling its mandate to sustain global order. However, hastily cobbled together, informal coalitions of various kinds have also had spasmodic effects at best. It is by no means clear that using a doctrine that emphasizes personal beliefs about how the world is (or ought to be) to determine whether to intervene in foreign crises is going to yield more satisfying results. Whether committed to on the basis of a belief in legal obligations, or on the basis of subjective moral beliefs, military interventions by themselves cannot resolve global strife. Military engagement without leadership, tangible commitments, clearly defined goals and a willingness to negotiate settlements once the fighting is over, will be doomed to failure. In the long run, failed military interventions, regardless of motive, risk exhausting democratic governments preoccupied with public opinion. Simply because Harper makes peace and war on the basis of a moral code does not mean he is not a politician concerned with staying in power and bolstering his party’s electoral fortunes. While Harper’s record of answering the “call of duty” puts his own stamp on a proud Canadian tradition of global service, without a more concerted global effort and firm US leadership, a “might-isright” era of rising fanaticism and narrow self-interest will trump notions of duty and principles of collective security.

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Works Cited Baltrusaitis, Daniel F. and Mark E. Duckenfield. 2012. “Operation Unified Protector: Triumph or Warning Sign?” Baltic Security and Defence Review 14 (2): 21–47. Bauhn, Per. 2011. “The Extension and Limits of the Duty to Rescue.” Public Reason 3 (1): 39–49. Bennett, Andrew and Alexander George. 1997. “Process Tracing in Case Study Research.” MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, October 17–19. http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/teaching/ ps816/ProcessTracing.htm. ———. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Clark, Campbell and Jane Taber. 2013. “Harper Pressed for Syria Debate.” The Globe and Mail, October 8. Elmer, Jon. 2011. “Retreating from Kandahar to Take Tripoli.” Al-Jazeera, July 19. www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/07/201171884846529830.html. Fekete, Jason. 2013a. “Canada Takes Aim at Russian Support for Assad Regime.” The Calgary Herald, September 5. ———. 2013b. “G20 Leaders Split over Syria.” Ottawa Citizen, September 7. Finnemore, Martha. 2004. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. George, Alexander. 1969. “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making.” International Studies Quarterly 13 (2): 190–222. Gordon, David and Ash Jain. 2013. “Forget the G-8. It’s Time for the D-10.” The Wall Street Journal, June 16. Government of Canada. 2006. House of Commons Debates, May 17. (Mr. Harper, CPC). http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.asp x?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&DocId=2215122. ———. 2011. House of Commons Debates, June 14. (Mr. Baird, CPC). www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mo de=1&Parl=41&Ses=1&DocId=5089492.

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———. 2014a. House of Commons Debates, October 3 (Mr. Harper, CPC). www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mo de=1&Parl=41&Ses=2&DocId=6715248. ———. 2014b. House of Commons Debates, October 6 (Mr. Baird, CPC). www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mo de=1&Parl=41&Ses=2&DocId=6717243. Hampson, Fen Osler. 2003. “Canada: Committed Contributor of Ideas and Forces, but with Growing Doubts and Problems.” In Accountability, International Law and Institutions, and Uses of Military Forces, edited by Harold K. Jacobsen and Charlotte Ku. 127–53. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Harper, Stephen. 2003. “Rediscovering the Right Agenda.” Citizens Centre Report 30 (10): 73–77. ———. 2010. “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.” January 28. www.pm.gc. ca/eng/news/2010/01/28/statement-prime-minister-canada-worldeconomic-forum-davos-switzerland. ———. 2014. Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 25. Hayes, Geoffrey. 2008. “Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the Numbers.” In Afghanistan: Transition Under Threat, edited by Geoffrey Hayes and Mark Sedra. 281–98. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. ICISS. 2001. The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre. Jones, Bruce D. 2011. “Libya and the Responsibilities of Power.” Survival 53 (3): 51–60. Lagassé, Philippe. 2013. How Should Canada’s Parliament Decide Military Deployments? Lessons from the United Kingdom. Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. Lijphart, Arend. 2012. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries. 2nd edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Logan, Nick. 2014. “Majority of Canadians Back Use of Fighter Jets to Strike ISIS in Iraq.” Global News, October 2. http://globalnews.ca/ news/1595317/majority-of-canadians-back-use-of-fighter-jets-to-strikeisis-in-iraq/. Milani, Adam A. 1994-1995. “Patient Assaults: Health Care Providers Owe a Non-Delegable Duty to Their Patients and Should Be Held Strictly Liable for Employee Assaults Whether or Not within the Scope of Employment.” Ohio Northern University Law Review 21: 1147. ———. 1999. “Living the World: A New Look at the Disabled in the Law of Torts.” Catholic University Law Review 48 (2): 328–417. Mill, John Stuart. 1867. Inaugural Address at St. Andrews. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer. Minister of Justice of Canada. 2015. Access to Information Act. R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1. Nossal, Kim Richard. 2013. “The Use — and Misuse — of R2P: The Case of Canada.” In Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, edited by Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray. 110–29. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Office of the Prime Minister. 2011. “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada Paying Tribute to Troops who Served on Libyan Mission.” November 24. www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2011/11/24/statement-primeminister-canada-paying-tribute-troops-who-served-libyan-mission. Pal, Leslie Alexander. 1988. “Prime Ministers and Their Parties: The Cauldron of Leadership.” In Prime Ministers and Premiers: Political Leadership and Public Policy in Canada, edited by Leslie Alexander Pal and David Taras. 87–96. Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada. Paris, Roland. 2014. “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era.” International Journal 69 (3): 274–307. Schönwälder, Gerd. 2014. “Principles and Prejudice: Foreign Policy under the Harper Government.” CIPS Policy Brief No. 24. Siddiqui, Haroon. 2013. “Memo to Chris Alexander, Canada’s New Immigration Minister.” Toronto Star, July 25. ———. 2014. “Canada Should Resist Obama’s Flawed War on the Islamic State.” Toronto Star, October 1.

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Simpson, Jeffrey. 2014. “This Isn’t ‘Harper’s War.’” The Globe and Mail, October 8. www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/this-isnt-harperswar/article20966258. Stein, Janice Gross and Eugene Lang. 2007. The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar. Toronto, ON: Viking Canada. Sun, Yen. 2012. “Syria: What China Has Learned From Its Libya Experience.” Asia Pacific Bulletin 152. Thayer, Ezra Ripley. 1916. “Liability without Fault.” Harvard Law Review 29 (8): 801–15. June. UNSC. 2011. Resolution 1973 (2011). S/RES/1973 (2011). March 17. Walker, Stephen G. 2003. “Operational Code Analysis as a Scientific Research Program: A Cautionary Tale.”  In Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, edited by Colin Elman and Miriam Elman. 245–76. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Walkom, Thomas. 2014. “Why Stephen Harper Should Thank Vladimir Putin.” Toronto Star, August 29. Watson, Paul. 2012. “Canada’s Afghan Legacy: Failure at Dahla Dam.” Toronto Star, July 14. Willis, Matthew. 2011. “Canada in Regional Command South: Alliance Dynamics and National Imperatives.” Whitehall Papers 77 (1): 49–67.

11 Geriatric Interventions The Demographic Horizon of Collective Security Christian Leuprecht

Then I heard the voice of the Lord saying “Whom shall I send? And who will go for us?” And I said: “Here I am. Send me!” (Isaiah 6:8) In the aftermath of the Cold War, there was a modest sense of enthusiasm about making the world a better place. Liberal democracy had won out. Now it was only a matter of turning around the fate of atavistic Cold War remnants manifest in disparate conflicts across the world. Liberal internationalists, longing to realize a Kantian “perpetual peace,” came together with armed forces in search of a raison d’être in this new security environment. A quarter of a century on, in the aftermath of Afghanistan and Iraq, those same democracies are morally, fiscally and politically exhausted. Whether it is Libya, the Baltics, Iraq or Syria, insofar as there are commitments compared to the Balkans and Afghanistan, the parameters of intervention are prone to be limited, patient, local and flexible. In these recent expeditionary missions, NATO member states have been confining themselves to the provision of air capabilities, along with broad-based support and training for local military and security forces, while regional actors have been sharing greater responsibility for operations in their neighbourhood. This chapter argues that this trend of limiting exposure to expeditionary interventions is a function of endogenous effects — not of these conflicts per se, but of the demographic constraints faced by Western democracies and their second-order effects on those select countries that have traditionally shouldered much of the collective-security burden.

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Interventions, so the argument goes, are demographically contingent. There are two dynamics to this argument: demand and supply. The demand side is concerned with the way demographic change affects stability: local, domestic, regional, international and transnational.1 Contrast this with the supply side, where there are fewer countries and reduced capability to respond to greater demand for international interventions. This chapter examines how demographic change is constraining the ability of Western industrialized democracies, notably the Anglosphere (Vucetic 2011; Bennett 2004) — the community of English-speaking states, nations and societies centred on Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States — and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and affiliated countries to intervene internationally, as well as the bifurcation of the “interventionist effect” among allied countries as a result of demographic differentiation. This chapter first makes the case of the importance of population aging by discussing interventionism, and then explores the constraints that population aging imposes on interventionism. The chapter contends, however, that the criteria that have determined Canadian interventions will continue to be applied, albeit qualified by the new demographic reality. However, Canada’s relatively privileged demographic position is likely to extend Canadian leverage, which is likely to make it more expedient for Canada to participate in interventions as it becomes an even more indispensable partner in assuring collective security.

The Political Demography of Population Aging Demography is not destiny; it is not deterministic, and neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Demographic trends do, however, allow us to anticipate future developments in size and distribution of population groups. As such, demography is a harbinger of challenge and opportunity, a multiplier of conflict and progress, and a resource for power and prosperity (Teitelbaum 2014; Winter and Teitelbaum 2013; Dabbs Sciubba 2011). Fertility, mortality and migration are the only set of variables in the social sciences that can be projected forward over the medium term with a high degree of accuracy: the 1

For the purpose of this chapter, I do not dwell on this dimension (see Goldstone, Kaufmann and Toft 2011). Suffice it to say that demographic change is necessitating plenty of heavy lifting yet to come.

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population that will be growing old over the coming decades has already been born and we also know the average number of children to which a woman in a given location is likely to give birth. Until fairly recently, high birth rates kept populations fairly young. Owing to war and epidemics such as the plague, few people ended up growing old (Livi-Bacci 2007). Innovations in public health and food security have changed that. The result was a decline in death rates. Birth rates would initially remain high before eventually levelling off. That change in birth and death rates, and the delta between them, is largely responsible for the phenomenon depicted in Figure 1, known as the demographic transition. Figure 1: The Demographic Transition

40

Population Growth Birth Rate

30 Death Rate

Population (increasing)

Birth and Death Rates (per thousand people)

50

20

10

0 Time >

Source: Leahy et al. (2007, 17).

Yet the demographic transitions occur at different times in different countries, and among different ethnocultural groups, resulting in countries and population groups at various stages along the demographic transition. This explains why some countries are aging rapidly, while others are bulging with youth. With the exception of the United States, all NATO members are affected by population aging. The scope of this aging process is remarkable. By 2050, at least 20 percent of the population in allied countries will be over 65. This

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demographic development is historically without precedent; we do not know what to expect from a state under these demographic conditions, because never will the proportion of old people have been as large, nor do we have a good understanding of the impact of population aging on economic growth and finances (Friedman 2005; Bloom, Canning and Fink 2011). Most of the world’s affluent countries — in Europe, East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) and North America — have completed their demographic transition and have stable or very slow-growing populations. For a state to sustain its population (assuming zero net immigration), fertility levels must exceed about 2.1 children per woman. Today, the United States is the only liberal democracy that comes close to meeting this requirement. Most other liberal democracies fell below this threshold some time ago. A growing number, including Germany and many in Eastern Europe, have seen their total fertility rate fall well below 2.0 children per woman, so that they are forecast to decline in population in the near future (see Table 1). Table 1: Countries Projected to Have Declining Populations, by Period of the Onset of Decline (1981–2045) Already declining

Onset of decline: 2009–2029

Onset of decline: 2030–2050

Hungary (1981)

Italy (2010)

Azerbaijan (2030)

Bulgaria (1986)

Slovakia (2011)

Denmark (2031)

Estonia (1990)

Bosnia & Herzegovina (2011)

Belgium (2031)

Georgia (1990)

Greece (2014)

Thailand (2033)

Latvia (1990)

Serbia (2014)

North Korea (2035)

Armenia (1991)

Portugal (2016)

Singapore (2035)

Romania (1991)

Cuba (2018)

Netherlands (2037)

Lithuania (1992)

Macedonia (2018)

Switzerland (2040)

Ukraine (1992)

Spain (2019)

UK (2044)

Moldova (1993)

Taiwan (2019)

Puerto Rico (2044)

Belarus (1994)

South Korea (2020)

Kazakhstan (2045)

Russian Federation (1994)

Austria (2024)

Czech Republic (1995)

Finland (2027)

Poland (1997)

China (2029)

Germany (2006) Japan (2008) Croatia (2008) Slovenia (2008) Source: Adapted from Jackson and Howe (2008); excludes countries with populations less than one million.

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Never before has humanity witnessed such dramatic, widespread aging among the world’s most industrialized and powerful military allies. Two longterm demographic trends coincided to produce population aging: decreasing fertility rates and increasing life expectancy. These developments have only a moderate effect on the pecking order among the world’s three most populous countries. Yet, the impact on “the rise and fall” of other “great powers” (measured by population size), as Table 2 shows, is marked: by 2050, Nigeria is projected to displace the United States as the third-most populous country in the world. Table 2: Largest Countries Ranked by Population Size (1950, 2005 and 2050) Ranking

1950

2005

2050

1

China

China

India

2

India

India

China

3

United States

United States

Nigeria

4

Russian Federation

Indonesia

United States

5

Japan

Brazil

Indonesia

6

Indonesia

Pakistan

Pakistan

7

Germany

Nigeria

Brazil

8

Brazil

Bangladesh

Bangladesh

9

UK

Russian Federation

Ethiopia

10

Italy

Japan

Philippines

11

Bangladesh

Mexico

Mexico

12

France

Philippines

Congo, DR

(15) Germany

(16) Japan

(21) France

(23) France

(22) UK

(24) UK

(23) Italy

(25) Germany

Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division (2012), Tables S.3, S.4, 20-21).

As Table 2 shows, demographic changes are having a marked impact on countries that have shared the brunt of international security obligations in the past. These changes in demographic size and composition are also having important second-order effects on the political and social culture in those countries, with ramifications for international interventions. Aging populations tend to be less predisposed toward war. As fertility rates decline, parents become disinclined toward risking the life of a child by going to

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war. At the same time, social citizenship obligations of the welfare state are increasingly crowding out defence spending, as evidenced by national debt loads and the difficulty experienced in realizing major military procurements.

The Demographic Horizon of Interventionism An unprecedented 70 percent of people in the developed world are between 15 and 64 years of age. Never before has that proportion been as high — and it is only expected to decline. This has important implications for consumption, productivity, tax revenue and fiscal expenditures. The costs created by the NATO allies’ and great powers’ aging populations will constrain spending on economic development and national defence. Population aging causes military personnel costs to rise. As demographic growth slows — Canada’s birth rate has been below replacement fertility for decades, and demographic growth has been sustained increasingly by immigration — but as economies continue to grow, the labour market tightens. Concomitantly, the nature of modern military organizations — as Morris Janowicz (1960) observed four decades ago — is less and less “an organization set apart” for a uniquely specific purpose, but is instead increasingly approximating any other privateor public-sector organization. As a result, it competes for the same highly skilled and educated labour. The combination of a tightening labour market and growing competition of a small pool of highly qualified labour causes salaries to grow exponentially (European Defence Agency 2006). As population aging stresses the dependency ratio between the old and the young, the provision of international security is partially a function of pension systems, health care and social spending. Aging populations and shrinking workforces are forcing NATO member countries to spend more of their defence budgets on personnel costs and pensions, to the detriment of research, development and procurement of sophisticated technology. This is especially problematic given that technological innovation is not just essential to assuring the ability to assert collective-security interests; technological innovation is also integral to harnessing the efficiency gains that are more indispensable than ever to secure, maintain and augment collective-security “productivity” in heavily constrained fiscal times. Although the United States spends about four percent of GDP on defence (as opposed to roughly one percent in Canada), about 50 cents of every dollar spent on defence goes to compensation, an amount that, certeris paribus, is slated to

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rise to 70 percent before 2030; pension payments amount to over $50 billion a year, health care costs to another $50 billion (of a total US defence budget of about $735 billion in 2014). As the military organization continues its shift from an institutional to an occupational format that is driven by self-interest and a free market, these liabilities are projected to rise (Moskos 1977). To ensure an all-volunteer force remains an attractive and competitive employer of choice in a tightening labour market, it needs to overhaul compensation systems, increase pay and benefits, and modernize pension plans (Williams 2004; 2007). Pensions, then, are a liability insofar as they are ongoing and growing obligations that add little value to defence capabilities per se, but an asset in attracting and retaining highly qualified personnel in a tight labour market where secure pensions are increasingly scarce. The substitution effect of capital for labour — manifest in advanced technology — is premised on highly motivated, qualified, trained and skilled operators to contest fourthand fifth-generation warfare (Moskos, Williams and Segal 1999). In opting for quality over quantity, mandatory military service is jettisoned for a professional all-volunteer force. Yet savings generated through reductions in personnel are at risk of being reallocated to attract and retain highly qualified personnel. Moreover, the cost of intervention is disproportionately borne by those few who commit to military service. The distributive effects that pension obligations have within public and defence budgets stand to be mitigated or exacerbated by the way pension obligations are funded. Funded pension systems, such as those found throughout the Anglosphere — nuances owing to demographic differences notwithstanding, such as the US baby boom — redistribute income through the purchase of assets by workers and the sale of assets by retirees. They encourage workers to save, thereby increasing capital, productivity and GDP growth (Culhane 2001). By contrast, countries such as China, France, Germany and Russia tend to pay pension obligations out of general revenue (that is, current contributions, instead of being invested to grow, pay for current liabilities — a system commonly known as “pay as you go”). Assuming that defence spending in the aggregate remains constant, every euro spent on retirement benefits is one less to spend on other services, let alone weapons, research or personnel. The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, by contrast, use funded pensions to augment social security. Pay-as-you-go systems redistribute revenue from the working-age population to pensioners through taxes. When the benefits paid replace a high proportion of average earnings, they also create a disincentive to save and work past the normal retirement

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age, both of which depress GDP. In light of population aging, pay-as-you-go systems are fiscally unsustainable, because they have to be paid for either through tax increases by the working-age population or through issuance of government debt (thus crowding out defence spending). Yet, many pay-asyou-go countries already register some of the highest marginal tax rates in the world. This is problematic insofar as high payroll taxes are a drag on a workforce’s competitiveness. Pay as you go is a vicious circle: as countries raise taxes to pay for pay as you go, their workers become increasingly uncompetitive, thus, further undermining the ability to pay for the pay-asyou-go system. At the same time, the Anglosphere is aging less rapidly than other countries, owing largely to higher fertility rates and immigration. As a result, the pressure of having to choose elderly care over defence spending remain favourable, and the increased substitution effect of labour for capital in defence budgets is bound to be smaller. Table 3 is notable for stagnating or declining populations of prime working age owing to aging outpacing population growth, even in countries with high rates of immigration, such as France, Spain and Switzerland. While these countries’ labours force face an unprecedented decline, the proportion of their population over 60 years of age will rise by 50 percent on average. As Europe, Japan and South Korea each lose one-quarter to onethird of their prime labour force by 2050, the dependency gap widens. A growing dependency ratio aggravates the situation further by depressing GDP growth as people work less, exercise their exit option by defecting to lowertax jurisdictions, migrate to the underground economy, opt not to work at all and, squeezed by high taxes, opt for fewer children. Owing to comparatively low social security promises, the Anglosphere tends to be less affected by social aging than other allied countries. Americans, for instance, have the highest prediction of when they expect to retire (67.2) and by far the lowest expectations regarding governmental support of their retirement (AgeWave and HarrisInteractive 2009). Conversely, countries with some of the greatest expenditure burden on aging populations are making matters worse by encouraging early retirement to ease their unemployment burden while shying away from reducing old-age benefits. The opportunity cost of stressed pension schemes and social services is less money for more sustainable investments in technology to spur gains in productivity. Suboptimal use of productive labour also risks exacerbating social conflict

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Table 3: Aging and Labour Force Change in Major European and Other Countries (2009–2050) % Change in: Total population

Population 15–60

Population 60+

Bulgaria

–29

–46

13

Belarus

–24

–42

46

Ukraine

–23

–40

21

Japan

–20

–37

19

Romania

–19

–38

50

Poland

–16

–38

70

Russia

–18

–36

47

Germany

–14

–32

32

Hungary

–11

–26

33

S. Korea

–9

–36

146

Portugal

–6

–26

54

EUROPE

–6

–24

47

Italy

–5

–24

41

Greece

–2

–23

54

Czech Republic

–1

–23

57

Denmark

1

–6

29

Austria

2

–18

59

Finland

2

–10

36

China

5

–17

175

Netherlands

5

–9

53

Belgium

8

–7

52

France

9

–6

56

Switzerland

13

–4

56

Spain

14

–13

93

Sweden

14

4

40

United Kingdom

18

7

51

United States

28

15

97

Canada

32

9

116

Ireland

39

17

164

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2011, chapter 2).

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over pensions, migration and labour/employer relations (Friedman 2005; Kaufmann 2012; Vanhuysse and Goerres 2012). In terms of comparative demographic constraints, Canada has greater potential to spend more on defence than some other allies; nonetheless, it has long preferred to minimize what it spends on guns in favour of maximizing spending on butter (Leuprecht and Sokolsky 2015). This proposition is difficult to measure in the short term, as either cuts to defence spending, cuts to authorized troop strength or both, and, consequently, per capita military spending and active soldiers are omnipresent across NATO member countries, the United States first and foremost among them. Still, the US defence budget’s expenditure burden within NATO is on the rise: from an apex of almost 77 percent in 1952, it bottomed out near parity at 55 percent in 1999 (Davidson 2012). Yet, the spread in transatlantic expenditure bifurcation among NATO member countries has been widening ever since (Larrabee et al. 2012). Adjusted for constant prices and exchange rates, the current US contribution to NATO could be argued to be approaching 75 percent. Over the same period, the authorized active strength of Canada’s, Australia’s (which, at roughly two percent of GDP, spends about twice as much on defence as Canada) and New Zealand’s armed forces has remained remarkably stable, while those of the United States and United Kingdom has been on the wane. Yet total military spending cannot be readily parlayed into military commitment and capabilities, endogenous and exogenous determinants of levels of defence spending can be difficult to disentangle, and US defence spending encompasses defence elements that in many other countries are a civilian expenditure, notably the coast guard. The United States, for instance, is estimated to comprise some 85 percent of NATO’s combat capacity. For the majority of NATO members — those already moderate in size — cuts are impeding their ability to sustain a full-spectrum warfare capacity and its deployment. Henceforth, the fiscal room necessary to maintain the extent of their global position and involvement, let alone adopt major new initiatives, is becoming ever more constrained. The political demography of population aging is, thus, an intervening variable in projecting political, economic and military power. In terms of continental defence, Canada is hardly immune, since its population is older than that of the United States or Mexico. Still, relative to demographic trends among conventional European NATO allies, Canada is well positioned, a differentiating trend that is poised to bolster Canada’s international security partnership with the United States (Leuprecht 2014).

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Discussion: When to Intervene When most of the public does not have to bear the human risk involved, citizens may be more disposed to intervene. Fiscally stretched governments, however, are less likely to answer the call, as they pander to electorates that prioritize health and social spending over defence (Global Agenda Council on Aging Society 2012). The extent to which people today are older, richer, taxed, subsidized and cynical is without historical precedent. That makes the sort of financial sacrifice necessitated by a prolonged intervention less likely to be borne. Government spending and taxation relative to private income has grown substantially over the past 50 years. The overwhelming majority of this dividend accrues to the public at large via entitlements. During a period of prolonged peace, the public have structured their lives (in particular, the size of their houses and their debts) on the assumption that current levels of income, taxation and benefits will remain fairly stable. The sacrifices necessary to pay for a robust intervention would be felt more keenly by publics that are not only used to comfort, but in fact rely on it: one cannot make one’s house smaller and easier to pay for, magically reduce one’s mortgage or readily revert to early-twentieth-century levels of medical care. Such sacrifices may be bearable if the public identifies strongly with the endgame of the intervention. However, whereas publics mostly used to believe that the nation was an end in itself, modern publics are less idealistic. Given the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq, calls to sacrifice for the nation will ring hollow when there is money to be made and a comfortable life to be lived, particularly if the goal of the intervention is not immediately palpable. As I have observed elsewhere (Leuprecht and Sokolsky 2015), Canadian interventionism has rested on two seemingly contradictory dimensions of its strategic culture. The first is that Canada has historically embraced an expeditionary approach when it comes to defence policy and the posture and deployment of Canadian military power. “From Paardeberg to Panjwai,” as eminent historians David Bercuson and J. L. Granatstein (2012, 193) have written, “Canadian governments…have believed that one of the key missions of the Canadian military is to deploy abroad.” These deployments have served the national interest because in imperial wars, world wars, the Cold War and myriad limited conflicts that have characterized the post-Cold War and post9/11 period, Canada has contributed extremely useful and highly regarded forces to the efforts of allies to contain global threats and lesser challenges

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posed by regional instability to the security and stability of the West and, therefore, to Canada. Along with an expeditionary orientation, Canadian interventionism has a predilection for expediency. Forces have been dispatched overseas to send a message and, by so doing, to guarantee Ottawa “a seat at the table,” along with a sense of status and prestige (Sokolsky 1989; Massie 2014). This expeditionary strategic culture allowed Canada — which was never regarded, nor saw itself, as a great power — to nonetheless show larger nations (e.g. Britain and the United States), international organizations, such as the United Nations, or allied nations such as the members of NATO that Canada is ready and able to put a shoulder to the wheel when military forces are needed to defend allies, deter aggression, or keep or enforce the peace. In other words, Canada has been willing to do its share of the hard, dirty work. Doing so wins Canada diplomatic recognition, political acceptance, entrée into arrangements, treaties, and alliances that are important to Canada and Canadians, and a voice on how future international policies will be pursued. Were Canada not to take part in such missions abroad, friends and enemies alike would have concluded long ago that Canada is of no consequence, does not deserve to be heard and ought not to be accorded any favours in bilateral or multilateral negotiations over matters of consequence. (Bercuson and Granatstein 2012, 193-94) These operations assured Canada an international profile which, safely situated between two oceans and adjoining a decidedly benign and friendly hegemon, it would otherwise not have enjoyed: “the main and overriding motive for the maintenance of Canadian military establishment since the Second World War has had little to do with our national security as such…it has had everything to do with underpinning our diplomatic and negotiating position vis-à-vis various international organizations and other countries” (Eayrs 1965, 84). When assessing whether and how to intervene, Canada will continue to weigh the benefits of securing a seat at the table and leveraging influence over international decision making on collective security, as well as electoral payoff in the form of status and prestige with domestic electorates. Given

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the growing demand on strained resources, as well as the nature of alliance politics, no meaningful contribution will be turned away. In the end, when and where allies do opt to intervene, the parameters are likely to be limited, patient, local and flexible. Given reduced overall capacity among allies, two subsidiary conditions are likely to qualify as Canada’s core condition for intervention: expediency. First, Canadian participation in coalition operations stands to benefit from participation by regional partners, not solely to maximize tactical effect, but for purposes of legitimating an intervention both domestically and abroad. Insofar as allied interests and Canada’s align, allies have a vested interest in bringing Canada into the proverbial boat. Second, for interventions to be saleable and sustainable, it needs to be evident that Canada will be better off as a result of the intervention. The cost of interventions makes that a high bar to clear.

Conclusion Never have there been so many people in the world. Never have there been so many old people. Never have they comprised a greater proportion of the population. Never have they been more affluent. And never have they wielded more political power. Such are the endogenous effects imposed by a historically unprecedented demographic horizon that is introducing considerable uncertainty into international interventions by virtue of being historically unprecedented. The rise in age of the median voter and the proportion of older voters is bound to affect public policy priorities. Older people tend to be more reliant on the state than younger ones. Not only do older voters thus have an incentive to resort to rent seeking, but because of their advanced age they also have an incentive to favour short-term payoff over long-term strategy. Foreign policy rarely wins elections; domestic policy does. Ergo, social entitlement programs are likely to crowd out defence spending. Politicians are not just loath to curtail entitlement programs; electoral logic suggests that they are actually prone to expand them to appeal to this, the fastest growing cohort among the electorate. Stubbornly soft economic conditions further exacerbate the impact on defence spending as governments strive to balance their budgets by cutting defence. Yet national defence and international

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instability tend to require a long view, which will be increasingly difficult to defend as the gambit of existential political payoffs for an aging population grows. The end effect is less overall capacity to intervene among allied countries. Technological innovation goes some way toward harnessing the sort of efficiency gains that are more indispensable than ever to secure, maintain and augment collective security “productivity” in heavily constrained fiscal times. Robotics in military operations, whether cyborg “soldiers” on the battlefield or drones in the air, holds out considerable promise, at least insofar as the ability to reduce the labour intensity of collective security. But innovative military technology is exceptionally expensive, requires sustained patience over long development horizons, and an eventual political commitment to procure and roll it out. It is also neither clear nor obvious that such technological innovation necessarily reduces labour requirements. While military robotics may automate some functions previously performed by human beings, operators will remain indispensable to ensure strict compliance with international law, such as the Law of Armed Conflict, the constitutional and legal bounds within which armed forces in democracies operate, as well as military and professional ethics, national caveats, mission mandates and rules of engagement. Machines may perform functions, yet we are still far from the age where machines will be able to make the many and complex difficult judgments that encumber civil-military relations and, perforce, strategic planning, military operations and tactical decisions. Democratic citizens are unlikely to relegate such judgment calls to machines anytime soon. And in a tight labour market where the skill set such operators will need to have are increasingly at a premium and reflected in their ability to command hefty salary premiums, the fiscal gains from substituting capital for labour will be less than “technoptimists” might anticipate. More populous countries with economies that are accordingly larger will necessarily continue to have greater potential military capacity than Canada. Nonetheless, relative demographic trends and differentiation bode well for Canada’s ability to continue to assert its strategic interests through international interventions. Canada can leverage its relative demographic advantage to meet and bolster the expediency conditions for intervention: its relatively favourable demographic trends will make Canada an increasingly indispensable defence partner country. Canada’s demographic trends are less favourable than America’s, but they are better than those of many allies.

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Owing to its privileged demographic position, Canada will continue to benefit from a great deal of discretion and autonomy over both, the extent of the interventionist burden it shares, and how it shares that burden.

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Friedman, Benjamin M. 2005. The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. New York, NY: Alfred Knopf. Global Agenda Council on Aging Society. 2012. Global Population Aging: Peril or Promise? World Economic Forum: Committee on Improving the State of the World. Goldstone, Jack A., Eric P. Kaufmann and Monica Duffy Toft. 2011. Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Jackson, Richard and Neil Howe. 2008. The Graying of the Great Powers. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Janowitz, Morris. 1960. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Kaufmann, Eric P. 2012. Whither the Child? Causes and Consequences of Low Fertility. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Larrabee, F. Stephen, Stuart E. Johnson, John Gordon IV, Peter A. Wilson, Caroline Baxter, Deborah Lai and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth. 2012. NATO and the Challenges of Austerity. Monograph 1196. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Leahy, Elisabeth, Robert Engelman, Carolyn Gibb Vogel, Sarah Haddock and Tod Preston. 2007. The Shape of Things to Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World. Washington, DC: Population Action International. www.populationaction.org/wp-content/ uploads/2012/01/SOTC.pdf. Livi-Bacci, Massimo. 2007. A Concise History of World Population, 4th ed. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Leuprecht, Christian. 2014. “Political Demography of Canada-US Codependence: Defence and Security.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20 (3): 291–304. Leuprecht, Christian and Joel J. Sokolsky. 2015. “Defence Policy ‘Walmart Style’: Canadian Lessons in ‘Not-so-grand’ Strategy.” Armed Forces and Society 41 (3): 541-562.

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Contributors

Aisha Ahmad is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. She received her Ph.D. from McGill University, and was a fellow at the Belfer Center on Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. Aisha has completed fieldwork in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Somalia on the relationships between criminal networks and insurgencies. Her research has been published in leading scholarly journals, including International Security and Security Studies. She is currently completing a book on the rise of militant Islamist groups out of civil war. Jean-Christophe Boucher is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at MacEwan University. He is currently a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute; a research fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University; senior fellow at the Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les relations internationales du Canada et du Québec; and book review editor for the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal. He holds a B.A. in history from the University of Ottawa, an M.A. in philosophy from the Université de Montréal and a Ph.D. in political science from Université Laval. At present, he and Kim Richard Nossal are writing a book on the domestic politics of Canada’s Afghanistan mission. Jane Boulden is professor at the Royal Military College of Canada, and is currently a research fellow at the Queen’s University Centre for International and Defence Policy. From 2004 to 2014 she held a Canada Research Chair

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in International Relations and Security Studies. From 2000 until 2004, she was a MacArthur Research Fellow at the Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford. Her recent books include a co-edited volume with Will Kymlicka titled International Approaches to Governing Ethnic Diversity, (Oxford University Press, 2015), as well as the edited volume of Responding to Conflict in Africa, the United Nations and Regional Organizations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Earlier books include The United Nations and Nuclear Orders, co-edited with Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss (United Nations University Press, 2009); Terrorism and the UN: Before and after September 11th, co-edited with Thomas G. Weiss (Indiana University Press, 2004); and Peace Enforcement (Praeger, 2001). Stephen Brown is professor of political science at the University of Ottawa. In 2015, he was senior fellow at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research, University of Duisburg-Essen (Germany). He is the editor of Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid (2012), as well as co-editor of Rethinking Canadian Aid (2014) and The Securitization of Foreign Aid (2015). Derek H. Burney, senior strategic advisor of Norton Rose Fulbright, served as chief of staff to Brian Mulroney (1987–1989) and as Canada’s ambassador to the United States (1989–1993). He was directly involved in negotiating the free trade agreement with the United States. Fen Osler Hampson is a distinguished fellow and the director of the Global Security & Politics Program at CIGI. He is also co-director of the Global Commission on Internet Governance, a joint project with CIGI and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He is chancellor’s professor at Carleton University and a former Jennings Randolph Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. Stéfanie von Hlatky is assistant professor of political studies at Queen’s University and the director of the Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy. She received her Ph.D. in political science from Université de Montréal in 2010, where she was also executive director for the Centre for International Peace and Security Studies. In 2010, she was a postdoctoral fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies and a policy scholar with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. In 2011, she was a visiting professor at Dartmouth College’s Dickey Center for International Understanding. Prior to joining

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Queen’s, Stéfanie was a senior researcher with the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. She has published in the Canadian Journal of Political Science, International Journal, European Security, Asian Security and the Journal of Transatlantic Studies, and has a book with Oxford University Press entitled American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (2013). Her new book, The Future of US Extended Deterrence (co-edited with Andreas Wenger), analyzes US security commitments to NATO (Georgetown University Press, 2015). Stéfanie is the founder of Women in International Security-Canada and current chair of its board. Her research is funded by NATO, the Canadian Department of National Defence, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Government of Ontario’s Ministry of Research and Innovation and Fulbright Canada. Caroline Leprince is a policy analyst at Public Safety Canada and an associate fellow with the Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies. She was previously a research assistant with the Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs for the Department of National Defence, an organization that advised the Chief of Land Staff on the future security environment. She also served as a member of the Canadian Armed Forces’ Primary Reserve for nine years, during which time she deployed with the Psychological Operations unit in Kandahar, Afghanistan. She has published several publications in peerreviewed and policy journals on the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan, counter-insurgency operations and civil-military relations. She holds a master’s in project management from École des sciences de la gestion and a master’s in political science from Université du Québec à Montréal. Christian Leuprecht is professor of political science at the Royal Military College of Canada and senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. He holds a Governor-in-Council appointment to the Governing Council of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, is president of the International Sociological Association’s Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution RC01, and a United Nations Security Structure Expert. Christian is cross-appointed to the Department of Political Studies and the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University, where he is also a fellow of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations and the Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy. As a foremost expert on security and defence, political demography, and comparative federalism and multilevel governance, he is regularly called as an expert witness to testify before committees of Parliament.

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Rohinton Medhora joined CIGI as president in 2012 after having served on CIGI’s International Board of Governors since 2009. Previously, he was vice president of programs at the International Development Research Centre. He received his Ph.D. in economics in 1988 from the University of Toronto, where he also subsequently taught for a number of years. Rohinton’s fields of expertise are monetary and trade policy, international economic relations and aid effectiveness. He has published extensively on these issues, and in addition to his association with the Canada Among Nations series, he co-edited (with Bruce Currie-Alder, Ravi Kanbur and David Malone) International Development: Ideas, Experience, and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 2014). Kim Richard Nossal is professor of political studies at Queen’s University. He received his B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Toronto and taught international relations at McMaster University from 1976 to 2001. He is the author of a number of works on Canadian foreign policy, including The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 4th ed., co-authored with Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin (2015). At present, he and Jean-Christophe Boucher are writing a book on the domestic politics of Canada’s Afghanistan mission. Simon Palamar is a research associate with CIGI and a doctoral candidate at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA). His work on nuclear weapons proliferation and arms control has been recognized by the Simons Foundation and Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He is a past recipient of the Barton Award in Arms Control and Disarmament. Christopher K. Penny is associate professor at the NPSIA at Carleton University. As a reserve military officer, he served as a senior legal advisor during Operation Unified Protector, from July to September 2011. His chapter expresses his personal opinions alone and does not necessarily reflect the position of any other individual, state or organization. Gaëlle Rivard Piché is a Ph.D. candidate at NPSIA, Carleton University. Her dissertation explores how security sector reform affects the production of public order and ultimately violence in post-conflict countries and fragile states. She conducted extensive field research in Haiti and El Salvador. Her research interests also include issues related to policing, crime and violence in time of peace. In 2014-2015, she was a Fulbright research fellow in the

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International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The quality of her research has been acknowledged by several award-granting institutions including the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Canadian Department of National Defence and the International Development Research Centre. Dane Rowlands received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Toronto, and has since been teaching at NPSIA, where he currently serves as director. His primary research interests are in multilateral financial institutions, official development assistance, economic development, migration and conflict intervention. Stephen M. Saideman is the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University. His research interests focus on the causes and consequences of intervention into intra-state conflicts. He was a Canada Research Chair and a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow. His current work focuses on the role of legislatures in the civilian control of militaries in the world’s democracies. Hugh Segal is Master of Massey College and a senior fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs. He is a former chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism. A former Special Envoy for Canada to the Commonwealth, he chairs the NATO Association of Canada, is a fellow of the Canadian Institute of Global Affairs in Calgary and is a lifetime fellow of the Institute for Research on Public Policy in Montreal. Marie-Joëlle Zahar is professor of political science and fellow at the Centre for International Research and Studies at the Université de Montréal. From March 2013 to August 2015, she was senior expert on power sharing on the Standby Team of Mediation Experts at the UN Department of Political Affairs. Marie-Joëlle is co-author (with Rex Brynen, Pete W. Moore et Bassel F. Salloukh) of Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World (Lynne Rienner, 2012) and co-editor (with Stephen M. Saideman) of Intra-State Conflict, Government and Security: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Assurance (Routledge, 2008). Her work has appeared in several journals including Global Governance, the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Critique internationale, and International Peacekeeping as well as in multiple edited volumes on conflict resolution and peace implementation.

CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2015

Elusive Pursuits: Lessons from Canada’s Interventions Abroad — the 29th volume of the influential Canada Among Nations series — examines Canada’s role in foreign military and security missions, including the country’s tendency to intervene under the auspices of international institutions. Canada is not just among nations in these efforts, but in nations on a regular basis. This book considers the longer-term impact of these interventions and draws the lessons to be learned from Canada’s past and current interventions, with the certainty that there will always be a next time.

Canada Among Nations 2015

Canada has been almost continuously involved in major international peace and security enforcement operations since the early 1990s, as part of multilateral efforts to stop wars, monitor peace, avert genocide, promote development or, occasionally, to topple dictators and even win wars. It has deployed anywhere from 1,000 to 4,000 personnel overseas annually since the Gulf War, and participated in missions in Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Libya, East Timor, Iraq and Syria. This volume looks at Canada’s role as interventionist within three broad themes: the lessons learned from interventions in Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia and Haiti; the domestic side of intervention, including Canadian foreign aid and the gender equation in military interventions; and the responsibility to protect, addressing the larger principles and patterns that influence Canada’s engagements.

Canada Among Nations has been the premier source for critical insight into Canadian foreign policy issues since 1984. This edition continues that tradition by providing students, policy makers and practitioners with a timely compendium of expert opinion on how Canada’s past and present military and peacekeeping missions can provide guidance for engagement in the future. FEN OSLER HAMPSON is a distinguished fellow and the director of the Global Security and Politics Program at CIGI. He is also co-director of the Global Commission on Internet Governance, a joint project with CIGI and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He is chancellor’s professor at Carleton University and a former Jennings Randolph Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.

Published by the Centre for International Governance Innovation in partnership with the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.

L E S S O N S F R O M C A N A D A’ S I N T E RV E N T I O N S A B R O A D

Hampson / Saideman

STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN is the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University. His research interests focus on the causes and consequences of intervention into intra-state conflicts. He was a Canada Research Chair and a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow. His current work focuses on the role of legislatures in the civilian control of militaries in the world’s democracies.

Elusive Pursuits

ISBN 978-1-928096-11-5

www.cigionline.org

9 781928 096115

Edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Stephen M. Saideman