Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I: The 2023 Election and Beyond 3031271394, 9783031271397

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Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I The 2023 Election and Beyond Edited by Esther Mavengano · Sophia Chirongoma

Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I

Esther Mavengano · Sophia Chirongoma Editors

Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I The 2023 Election and Beyond

Editors Esther Mavengano English and Media Studies Great Zimbabwe University Masvingo, Zimbabwe

Sophia Chirongoma Midlands State University Zvishavane, Zimbabwe

ISBN 978-3-031-27139-7 ISBN 978-3-031-27140-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Zimbabwe. The Great Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe of record hyperinflation. A country with one of the highest literacy rates in Africa. The country that bequeathed the concept of “a military assisted transition” to the world. The Zimbabwe of the Zimbabwean Exodus, even as the country continues to attract fortune hunters from diverse corners of the globe. One could go on, but the point being made is a simple and straightforward one: Zimbabwe enthrals as it disappoints. It promises as much as it shatters hope. This volume on “Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I: The 2023 Election and Beyond” is a timely, strategic and valuable addition to the bourgeoning literature on what might be called Zimbabwe Studies within African Studies. Benefiting from the increase in the number of postgraduates from state and private universities in the country, as well as those graduating from universities in South Africa, Europe and North America, Zimbabwe Studies is making a notable contribution to African Studies. Operating in an environment that many would associate with fear, timidity, crises and paralysis, generations of Zimbabwean scholars have offered valuable insights into the post-colonial condition. To be fair, they have been joined by generations of dedicated Africanists who have invested in trying to understand Zimbabwe, Africa and the Global South. Elections in Zimbabwe are an intriguing phenomenon, as this volume testifies. Historical, ideological, economic, theological-religious, psychological and other factors have been at play. They are likely to continue v

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to be relevant in the future, for Zimbabwe, Africa and other contexts. Contestation of ideas and ideals. Mockery. Violence. Against women and girls, and men and boys. Rejected results. Flashes of brilliance by one or more of the gladiators (mostly male). Accusations and counteraccusations. Rigging and gloating. Generational tensions and competing spiritual allegiances. Promises and outright lies. This volume has picked up and elaborated on most of these themes, competently projecting and offering a sobering prognosis of the 2023 harmonised elections and beyond. If the multifarious prophets who have spiritualised the Zimbabwean landscape have been making their own prophecies and distributing them on social media, they have been joined by academics who have deployed social analysis to provide insights into the future. The Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD), bringing together the heads of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches and the Union for the Development of Apostolic Churches in Zimbabwe Africa (UDACIZA) issued a call for a national sabbatical on elections in October 2019. It proposed a seven-year “ceasefire” period for trust and confidence building. Rather unsurprisingly, the call was actively resisted by the political parties, some civil society groups and some citizens, for diverse reasons. Time will tell the validity or otherwise of their intervention. This volume reflects the national preoccupation with elections and highlights the perils and promises of the same. Long live academia! Long live Zimbabwe! Mayibuye iAfrika! Harare, Zimbabwe

Ezra Chitando

Ezra Chitando (Ph.D.) serves as professor of Religious Studies at the University of Zimbabwe and Theology Consultant on HIV for the World Council of Churches. He is also extraordinary professor at the University of the Western Cape. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2493-8151.

Acknowledgements

Esther Mavengano and Sophia Chirongoma would like to thank God, Mwari, in our Mother tongue (ChiShona language), for the guidance and wisdom throughout the editorial trajectory of this volume. Our heartfelt gratitude also goes to Ambra Finotello, Geetha Chockalingam and Ulrike Stricker-Komba at Palgrave Macmillan, whose constant support and advice made our task easy. We are indebted to colleagues and friends, particularly external reviewers whose constructive comments motivated new reflections and refreshing insights. We also worked with a team of reviewers of the chapters whose professional conduct profoundly enhanced the ultimate quality attained.

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Contents

1

Introduction: The Electoral Terrain in Zimbabwean Politics Esther Mavengano and Sophia Chirongoma

1

Part I Electoral Environment in Zimbabwean Politics 2

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Pre and Post Election Conflicts in Zimbabwe: The Way Forward Joseph Dzavo Cordoning off the Debris of Electoral Violence and Generative Hegemony in Zimbabwean Politics: Spying on the 2023 Harmonised Elections Andrew Mutingwende The Semiotics of Political Schisms and Prospects of Nation-Rebuilding: “Varakashi 4ED” and the “Nerrorists” Esther Mavengano and Thamsanqa Moyo

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Voting: Bliss or Blisters? The Zimbabwean Experience Winnet Chindedza, Admire Mhindu, and Farisai Mlambo

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‘Shifting the Voting Burden to Others’: Abstainers and Turn Outers in Zimbabwean Elections Gift Mwonzora

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CONTENTS

Part II Language, Politics and Elections in Zimbabwe 7

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The Interaction of Language and Politics: Polysemanticism in the Aphorism ‘We Died for This Country, so We Will Rule Zimbabwe Forever’ Esther Mavengano Stoking the Flames of Conflict in Zimbabwe’s Electoral Terrain: Detecting and Reporting Hate Speech in Online Media Tichaona Zinhumwe Hate Speech Within the Electoral Political Processes in Zimbabwe Bernard Pindukai Humbe, Sophia Chirongoma, and Nomatter Sande The “New Old Dispensation”: A Sociolinguistic Analysis of Selected ZANU PF Speeches in the Post-Mugabe Era and Implications on Zimbabwe’s Electoral Process Wellington Wasosa Shona Language as a Tool in Winning Political Support During Campaigning: A Case for Buhera South in Zimbabwe Maradze Viriri and Eunitah Viriri Political Poetic/Theatrical Campaigning Pieces in Indigenous Languages in Rural Communities: The Case of Bikita District in Masvingo, Zimbabwe Beatrice Taringa

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Part III Electoral Institutions and Human Rights in Zimbabwean Politics 13

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Adjudication of Presidential Election Disputes in Zimbabwe: A Case of Chamisa v Mnangagwa Takunda Chikwati

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The Judiciary and Electoral Disputes in Zimbabwe’s Contemporary Politics Fabian Maunganidze

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CONTENTS

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Political Dialectics and the Role of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) in Elections Kudzai Cathrine Bingisai

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Electoral Laws, Reforms, Transparency and the Credibility of Elections in Zimbabwe Fabian Maunganidze

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Kudzai Cathrine Bingisai holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Political Science and a Master of Science Degree in International Relations from the University of Zimbabwe. She is currently doing her doctoral studies in International Relations at Babes, -Bolyai University in Romania. Her research interests include but not limited to social linguistics, political economy, technology in elections, gender equality, food security and international organisations. She has attended several international conferences and workshops. Takunda Chikwati is a lawyer and a full-time lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University’s Law School. His research interests are in criminal law, constitutional law and labour law. Of his 3 years’ teaching career, he has been lecturing Criminal law and Procedure, Constitutional law, Labour law and Alternative Dispute Resolution. He has prosecuted in the high court when he was a prosecutor with the National Prosecuting Authority for 15 years. He is also a practising legal practitioner at Matutu & Mureri Legal Practitioners. Takunda Chikwati is an LLD. candidate and holds an LLM. (UNISA), LLBs. from Midlands State University (MSU) and a postgraduate diploma (Great Zimbabwe University (GZU)). Winnet Chindedza (Ph.D.) is a lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University in the Department of Curriculum Studies. She teaches Literature in English and Academic and Professional Communication. She supervises Ph.D., Masters and undergraduate students. She is a holder of Ph.D. in English

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from the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, a Master’s degree in English and a Bachelor’s degree in English from the University of Zimbabwe. She is a prolific writer, she has published articles, book chapters and a book. She has written a lot on gender and feminism. She edits and reviews articles and book chapters. Sophia Chirongoma is a senior lecturer in the Religious Studies Department at Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. She is also an academic associate/research fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion (RITR) in the College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA). Her research interests and publications focus on the interface between culture, ecology, religion, health, politics and gender justice. Joseph Dzavo (Ph.D.) earned his doctorate at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa, a Master of Education in Philosophy of Education obtained from Midlands State University in Zimbabwe and a Bachelor of Education Primary with Specialization in Social Studies from Great Zimbabwe University. He also holds a Diploma in Education from the University of Zimbabwe. He is a full-time lecturer and head of department at Madziwa Teachers’ College and a part-time lecturer at Ezekiel Guti University in Zimbabwe. His research focuses on teacher education, politics and gender issues. Bernard Pindukai Humbe (Ph.D.) attained his doctoral degree in Religion Studies from the University of Free State, South Africa. He is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Great Zimbabwe University where he also serves as the Coordinator of Great Zimbabwe University Herbal Garden. He is also an academic associate/research fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa. His areas of research interest include Religion and COVID-19, African Traditional Medicine and Traditional Healing, African Indigenous Religious Knowledge Systems (AIRKS), Traditional Law and Social Development, Religion and Entrepreneurship, Religion and Social Transformation, and Religion and Power. Fabian Maunganidze (Ph.D.) is an experienced pastor, lawyer, scientist and lecturer. He is passionate about law, business and motivation. He is currently the Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences and the Chairperson of the Department of Physiology at the

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Midlands State University in Gweru, Zimbabwe. He is also a researcher who is interested in business development, intellectual property rights and medical law. He has more than 25 years business experience, more than 17 years lectureship experience and more than 16 years pastoral experience. He has a great deal of knowledge in chemical pathology, human physiology, human rights law, medical law and constitutional law as well as experience in business rescue and product development. He has authored a number of books on Christian living, motivation and marketing. He is currently the examiner in Marketing Strategy and Business Law at the Southern Africa Institute of Marketing (SAIM). He has been a business consultant for many companies in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Esther Mavengano is a lecturer who teaches Linguistics and Literature in the Department of English and Media Studies, Faculty of Arts at Great Zimbabwe University in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. She holds a Ph.D. in Linguistics and Literary studies obtained from the University of North West in South Africa. Her research areas maintain the interface of linguistics and poetics. She has interests in language policy and planning, sociolinguistics, language practices and linguistic ideologies, media and political discourses, cultural and religious discourses, English as foreign/second language, rhetoric and language use, translingual practices in Anglophone African fictional writings, Identity issues in contemporary transnational Anglophone/African literature, religion and gender, discourse analysis, stylistics, Zimbabwean literature and language education in “multi” contexts. She has published in reputable international journals including Cogent Arts and Humanities, African Identities, Literator, Journal of Multicultural Discourses, among others. She is a research fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, UNISA, South Africa and a postdoctoral fellow at Alexander von Humboldt, Germany TU (Technische Universitat Dresden) Institute of English and American Studies, Department of English. Admire Mhindu (Ph.D.) is a full-time lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University in the Communication Skills Section and a holder of a Ph.D. in Language and Media Studies. She has published several articles, book chapters and presented papers at international conferences. Her research interests are in line with language policy implementation, teacher education and literature.

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Farisai Mlambo (Ph.D.) is a lecturer who teaches Children’s Literature, Poetry, Literary Theories and Criticism, English education studies in the Department of Teacher Development in the English unit at Great Zimbabwe University. She earned her Ph.D. at the University of South Africa (UNISA). She holds a Masters of Languages (English) obtained from the Great Zimbabwe University. She has interests in writing about inclusive issues because she is visually impaired. She is also a reviewer for a Journal of Afrifuture. Thamsanqa Moyo (Ph.D.) is a senior lecturer in the Department of English and Media Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. He holds a Ph.D. in English from the University of South Africa. His research interests are in indigenous knowledge systems, communication, life-writing, particularly in the Zimbabwean context and African literature. Andrew Mutingwende is a lecturer in the Department of English and communication at Midlands State University in Zimbabwe. His research interests are in discourse analysis, language and politics, religion and language use. He has published in these areas. Gift Mwonzora (Ph.D.) is a Zimbabwean scholar who holds a Ph.D. in Political Sociology from Rhodes University in South Africa. He has worked as a research fellow at Rhodes University in the Department of Sociology and in the Department of Law at the Northwest University in South Africa. He is a current research fellow in the Institute of Institutional Change and Social Justice at the University of Free State (UFS) in South Africa. He has published on areas that include democracy, democratisation, transitional justice, elections, social media, human rights, social movements and political violence. Nomatter Sande (Ph.D.) holds a Ph.D. in Religion and Social Transformation from the University of KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa). He is an African Practical Theologian. He is a research fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion (RITR) in the College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA). His research interests include theology, disability studies, missiology and gender issues. Beatrice Taringa (Ph.D.) holds a Doctor of Philosophy in Education Degree, Master of Education Degree, Bachelor of Education Degree in Curriculum and Arts Education specialising in Indigenous Language Education, ChiShona, all from the University of Zimbabwe. She also

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attained a Diploma in Education specialising in ChiShona and History from Gweru Teachers College. She is a lecturer in the Department of Languages and Arts Education in the Faculty of Education, University of Zimbabwe and a postdoctoral research fellow at University of South Africa (UNISA), Department of Language Education, Arts and Culture. She is an individual consultant for Curriculum Issues in Education in the area of Language, Culture, Gender and Human Rights. She is also a member of the Research Institute for Theology and Religion (RITR), UNISA, Circle of Concerned African Women Theologians. Eunitah Viriri (Ph.D.) holds a Doctor of Philosophy in Languages, Linguistics and Literature from the University of South Africa. She is a teacher educator at Great Zimbabwe University and has published and presented papers in Language, Culture and Educational issues. She is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg in South Africa. Maradze Viriri (Ph.D.) holds a doctoral degree in Onomastics from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He has published several publications in referred journals and has also presented conference papers in a number of international conferences. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of Teacher Development at Great Zimbabwe University. His main research interests are in onomastics, gender, language policy, and indigenous knowledge systems. Wellington Wasosa (Ph.D.) is a senior lecturer and current Chair of the Department of African Languages and Literature at Great Zimbabwe University. He holds a doctoral degree with the University of South Africa. His research interests are on African literature and culture, onomastics and sociolinguistics. Tichaona Zinhumwe is a Ph.D. student in Film and Television at the University of Johannesburg. He is a lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University where he teaches Television and Radio journalism in the English and Media Studies Department. His research interests cover television and radio news and current affairs programming. His desire is to discover how television and radio current affairs programming can be harnessed for deliberations to create a genuine democratic dispensation in Zimbabwe. He is also interested not only in linguistic research of broadcast discourse in genres such as news and current affairs, but he also wishes to unravel the pictorial and visual discourses and semiotics of television images and how they contribute to telling the television story.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2

Fig. 5.3

Fig. 5.4

Fig. 5.5

Fig. 5.6

Periphery-centre framework implementation (Adapted from Dzavo [2020, p. 301]) Illustration of the use of approaches to presentations (Adapted from Dzavo [2020, p. 303]) Behold the New!: MDC-A Presidential Campaign Picture, 2018 (Source Business Day, 10 July 2018) MDC-A’s Presidential Campaign Poster: Behold the New: Jobs Agenda—Munhu Wose Kubasa! (Source Available @https://www.dreamstimw.com) ZANU-PF’s Presidential Campaign Poster: Clean, Fresh Water for All (Source Available @https://www.dreams timw.com) ZANU-PF’s Presidential Campaign Poster: Kujekesa Nyika Yese Nemagetsi (Electrifying the Whole Nation) (Source Available @https://www.dreamstimw.com) ZANU-PF’s Presidential Campaign Poster: Affordable, Quality Healthcare Guaranteed (Source Available @https://www.dreamstimw.com) ZANU-PF’s Presidential Campaign Poster: The Voice of the People is the Voice of God (Source Available @https://www.dreamstimw.com)

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 5.7

Fig. 8.1 Fig. 11.1

Jonathan Moyo’s comment on Zimbabwe’s Political Campaigns via Twitter (Source @ProfJNMoyo twitter handle) We will crush Chamisa like lice-Chiwenga Shona language components commonly used in speeches

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Electoral Terrain in Zimbabwean Politics Esther Mavengano

and Sophia Chirongoma

Introduction The chapters in this volume critique the culture of political violence in three phases: the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial epochs. Reflecting on how elections have been conducted from when Zimbabwe gained political independence in 1980, the contributors pay attention to how the three stages, pre-election, during elections, and after elections, have been riddled with hate speech, political violence, intimidation, and gross human rights violations. The role of electoral institutions such as the

E. Mavengano (B) English and Media Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa TU (Technische Universitat Dresden), Institute of English and American Studies, Department of English, Dresden, Germany S. Chirongoma Midlands State University, Zvishavane, Zimbabwe

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_1

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Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), the Judiciary, and the Constitutional Court also form part of the discussions in this chapter. The contribution of human rights organizations, human rights activists, and the advocacy of the civil society in the observance of democracy, transparency, and upholding basic human rights during the electoral process is another dimension covered in this volume. In essence, the clarion call raised by the contributors of this volume is that the Zimbabwean electorate, key among them, political elites, and ZEC should work together to ensure that the 2023 harmonized elections are not fraught with violence, intimidation, and electoral irregularities. The values of peace, unity, and solidarity among the Zimbabwean citizens are the recurring themes yearned for by the contributors of this volume.

Zimbabwean Political and Electoral Terrain While the government of Zimbabwe purports to upholding the principles of democracy, good governance, as well as conducting free, fair, and transparent elections, contesting political parties, independent candidates as well as supporters of election candidates have often queried either the electoral processes or the outcome of the elections. The hurling of hate speech, threats, and violence between electoral candidates seems to have taken center stage not only in the Second Republic; rather, it can be tracked back to the First Republic. The ongoing hustling and tussling for electoral support between competing parties has become the main cause of hate speech which is aptly described by Mbembe (2006) as the ‘grammar of violence,’ where the political contenders exchange accusations, counter-accusations, and disparaging exchanges. The use of technology, particularly social media has made the dissemination of information faster and more efficient. As the information technology becomes widespread, political elites have turned to using the cyberspace as a mode of communicating with the electorate. As noted by Chirongoma and Mutsvedu (2021), reverberated by Ponde-Mutsvedu and Chirongoma (2022), the widespread use of information technology has also exacerbated incidences of cyberbullying and the spreading of false information. In the context of Zimbabwean politics, particularly, the electoral environment, the authors of this volume illustrate how the use of information technology can be perceived as both friend and foe. This is illustrated in the chapter by Mavengano and Moyo which brings out the polarization between ‘Varakashi’ (destroyers), denoting supporters of the ruling party

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ZANU-PF and the Nerrorists (Nelson Chamisa’s loyalists), who engage in a war of words via the cyberspace. As noted by Chitando and Tarusarira (2017), the ruling party ZANUPF is on record for bragging that only those who participated in the Chimurenga war of liberation are worthy of aspiring to take up the Presidential office. Hence, the rhetoric ‘Zimbabwe Ndeye ropa,’ denoting that national independence, was gained through bloodshed on the warfront. Since Zimbabwe is said to have been born through the barrel of the gun and the blood of the war heroes is the seed of national independence, all those who are aspiring to run for the presidency, especially, the youthful politicians like the aspirant Nelson Chamisa, leader of the main opposition, CCC are constantly reminded that such aspirations are a pipedream. On the other hand, the main opposition leaders and a handful of independent candidates are resolute that while war credentials are appreciated and respected, they should not be the ultimate defining factor for one to qualify for political leadership in the contemporary Zimbabwean context. They contend that one’s leadership qualities and commitment to uphold democracy, good governance, and implementing positive change and transformation should also be considered as important factors in qualifying to win the support of the electorate. Peering into the 2023 harmonized elections, this volume seeks to offer some insights into creating a level playing field where the electorate have the freedom to use the ballot box to choose political parties and political representatives of their choice without fear or favor.

Unfulfilled Electoral Promises: Not yet Uhuru! As the presidential race for the 2018 elections reached its peak, the key presidential contenders, Emmerson Mnangagwa representing the ruling party ZANU-PF, and Nelson Chamisa, the leader of the main opposition party, MDC-A intensified their electoral campaigns. As they conducted campaign rallies nationwide, they made several promises, drawn from portions of their election manifestos. Some of the promises were also inscribed on huge banners, displayed in public spaces, especially along the main roads both in urban and rural areas. One of the promises made by Mnangagwa was a commitment to ‘Delivering the Zimbabwe you want.’ Herewith, Mnangagwa was piggybacking onto some of the key concerns raised by the Zimbabwean religious leaders in 2006, when

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they delivered the document, ‘The Zimbabwe We Want,’ which summarized their key concerns, particularly bemoaning human rights abuses, poverty, and hyperinflation. In promising to deliver ‘the Zimbabwe you want,’ Mnangagwa was vowing to exercise servant leadership. He was also committing to remain true to the calling of a ‘listening president,’ one who is keen to addressing all that which was missing in the lives of the electorate and ensuring that all their basic needs were met. In the same breath, Mnangagwa pledged to heed the wishes of the electorate by declaring that ‘The Voice of the People is the Voice of God.’ Such a pledge raised the hopes of the electorate who were made to believe that the ‘New Dispensation’ would respect and honor their hopes and aspirations (Chimininge, 2019; Takudzwa, 2022). Cognizant that the bulk of the Zimbabwean populace, more than 75% of the population identify as Christians, the presidential contender appealed to the electorate’s spirituality by invoking the name of their deity and assuring them that their voices would be heeded. Five years after these promises were made, the bulk of the Zimbabwean population are still awaiting the fulfillment of such promises. These unfulfilled promises reverberate the point raised by Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020), echoed by Mamvura (2021) who restated that it is futile to replace the sitting head of state, without implementing a complete upheaval of the governance system. Such a status quo is akin to the biblical teaching whereby Jesus cautioned his disciples about the futility of putting new wine in old wineskins (Mark 2:22). On the other hand, one of Chamisa’s 2018 presidential campaign catchphrases was ‘Behold the new!’ In this case, Chamisa was appealing to both his youthfulness and the new governance policies which he had in store for the Zimbabwean citizenry. Herein, Chamisa was alluring the electorate’s imagination, where new blood usually comes with fresh and innovative ideas. He also promised to launch the SMART agenda, an acronym standing for Sustainable and Modern Agenda for Real Transformation. Being alert to the fact that Zimbabwe was and continues to reel with an unbelievably high rate of unemployment, currently estimated at over 90%, Chamisa promised to implement the ‘Jobs Agenda-Munhu Wose Kubasa’ (Everyone must go to work). This raised high hopes, particularly for the youth, among whom the majority have never been formally employed. Even though Chamisa lost the presidential race, several of his ministers are parliamentarians and those who voted them into power are

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yet to see these promises being delivered. Peering into the 2023 presidential election, Chamisa has maintained his campaign diction and tailored it to the forthcoming election as ‘Behold the New: 2023 Election.’ As the gap between the haves and have-nots continues widening, the bulk of the population, which is languishing in poverty, unemployment, food insecurity, erratic power cuts, and the shortage of clean and safe water, especially in urban areas, continues to lament ‘Not yet Uhuru!’ They are pinning their hopes on the 2023 harmonized elections, where they are crossing their fingers that whoever they vote into power will ensure that all the unfulfilled 2018 election promises will eventually be made good by the incoming government. The chapters in this volume are divided into three interrelated parts. Below, we provide a summary of the chapters and their thematic areas.

Part I: Electoral Environment in Zimbabwean Politics (2–6) The five chapters in this part deliberate on the volatile electoral environment within the Zimbabwean political realm. The authors in this part do not simply outline the impediments and challenges riddling the Zimbabwean electoral processes; rather, they also venture into tendering some solutions that can be implemented to smoothen the electoral route which is littered with thorns and prickles. Chapter 2 by the title, “The Pre and Post Elections Conflicts in Zimbabwe: The Way Forward,” is authored by Joseph Dzavo. In this chapter, Dzavo articulates how politically induced violence and conflicts in Zimbabwe have a long history stretching back to the pre-colonial period. The chapter explores the culture of political violence in three phases: pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial epochs. It also outlines the various reasons why the culture of political violence remains a critical phenomenon in society. Cognizant of the fact that schools are entrusted with the responsibility to promote, among learners, democratic values that provide fertile ground for upholding justice, unity, tolerance, peace, stability, and the prosperity of a country, Dzavo proffers that the education system, particularly primary and secondary schools should be utilized as socialization spaces to interrogate and eliminate political violence. In this light, he proposes a learning framework which opens an opportunity for inculcating democratic values among the young people in Zimbabwe. Dzavo reiterates that if learners, educators, and school leavers uphold

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the democratic values enshrined in the content which is part of their curriculum, this will filter through in their communities, resulting in their respect for democratic practice around election time and beyond. In Chapter 3 titled, “Cordoning off the Debris of Electoral Violence and Generative Hegemony in Zimbabwean Politics: Spying on the 2023 Harmonised Elections,” Andrew Mutingwende contends that the outcome of the March 26, 2022, Zimbabwean by-election serves as a precursor for what will transpire in the forthcoming 2023 harmonized elections. To illustrate his point, Mutingwende draws some parallels from the by-elections back to the 2018 electoral patterns. He then uses the established similarities to predict the likely outcome of the 2023 elections. Mutingwende likens the by-election race, fronted by the three major contending parties: the Zimbabwe African National UnionPatriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), and the MDC-Alliance to interesting ‘crime scenes’ which ignited the proliferation of citizen journalism through web-based social media platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook, You-Tube, Twitter, and sundry. The chapter assumes that synonymous existence of the so-called political and electoral ‘crime scenes’ between 2018 and March 26, 2022, are likely to endemically repeat themselves in the subsequent elections. Utilizing the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) linguistic framework, the chapter engages in a qualitative selection and analysis of citizens’ comments and photos on the ‘March 26 by-elections’ Facebook page to predict the outcome of the forthcoming 2023 elections. It concludes by restating the fact that citizen journalism offers a more reliable, less propagandistic, rawer, and faster ‘breaking news’ feeds than official state-controlled journalism does. Chapter 4 authored by Esther Mavengano and Thamsanqa Moyo is titled, “The Semiotics of Political Schisms and Prospects of NationRebuilding in Polemics from “Varakashi 4ED” and Subversive “Nerrorists.” Herein, the authors reflect on how Achille Mbembe’s political formulation of the postcolony and Michael Halliday’s socio-semiotics analysis provide important discursive prisms into Zimbabwe’s troubled political terrain. It is their contention that Emmerson Mnangagwa’s rise to the helm of power in 2017, through a military coup, brought some disconcerting dynamics in contemporary Zimbabwean politics. They proceed to note how the battle and undertakings of power have given birth to the grotesque constructs of Varakashi (supporters of the ruling party) and Nerrorists (supporters of Nelson Chamisa, also self-styled as

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Nero). The chapter adopts a qualitative approach to analyze news and responses from Varakashi and Nerrorists on Twitter to debate on these constructs in relation to the electoral politics in Zimbabwe. The chapter’s main thrust is to illustrate how the hostility between these groups replicates dominant leitmotifs of Mugabe’s despotic rule including what Mbembe articulated as mutual zombification, blind loyalty, and political inertia. The authors postulate that Zimbabwe retains its unstable haunted grounds, especially during elections periods due to its failure to break away from toxic political culture. The chapter concludes that Zimbabwe’s problems are not yet over since the nation remains ensnared in harmful matrices of vexatious partisan politics that continues to take precedence during elections. Chapter 5 entitled, “Voting: Bliss or Blisters? The Zimbabwean Experience,” is authored by Winnet Chindedza, Admire Mhindu and Farisai Mlambo. The authors of this chapter reflect on the voting process in Zimbabwe, that is, the pre-, during, and post-voting period. They elaborate the fact that while the process of voting is intended to grant the electorate an opportunity to make an important decision for the wellbeing of the group, organization, or country, in Zimbabwe, the electoral process has often left the electorate feeling dejected and let down because of election outcomes. Informed by the mixed utility theory of vote choice regret due to unfulfilled promises by the politicians, the chapter critiques the cunning language and insincere pledges made by some politicians during the campaign process. In Chapter 6 titled, ‘Shifting the Voting Burden to Others’: Abstainers and Turn Outers in Zimbabwean Elections,” Gift Mwonzora discusses some of the key factors influencing the electorate either to turn up for elections or to abstain from the voting process. Some of the factors which were identified as influencing voter behavior and low turnout in Zimbabwe include a decline in political interest stemming from enduring electoral manipulation, low efficacy, intimidation and political violence, diminished trust in political and state institutions, poor voter mobilization and absence of early socialization and habituation in the electoral processes. On the other hand, it was also noted that voter turnout in Zimbabwe is mainly influenced by the desire to exercise constitutional and citizenship rights as well as the desire to fulfill the moral duty to vote for leaders/parties of choice. Mwonzora also elucidates the importance of understanding political behavior, not only in Zimbabwe, but beyond, because such information helps to inform policy literature on election

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management and citizen participation in conventional and unconventional politics. The chapter concludes by proffering recommendations that can catalyze the democratization process, explicitly locating the citizenry at the level of decision-making and participatory democracy.

Part II: Language, Politics, and Elections in Zimbabwe (7–12) The six chapters in this segment mainly focus on the use of language in Zimbabwe’s electoral and political terrains. They reflect on how language can either be used for good or bad in politics, particularly when campaigning for support. Chapter 7, authored by Esther Mavengano, is entitled, ‘The Interaction of Language and Politics: Polysemanticism in the Aphorism ‘We Died for This Country, so We Will Rule Zimbabwe Forever.’ Herein, Mavengano explicates the dashed hopes and aspirations of postindependent Zimbabwe which was envisaged as ushering in an era free from regimes of domination, while unleashing socio-economic justice, public freedoms, and democratic electoral culture. She contends that this utopian vision was ruined by the post-independence leadership which adopted a dictatorial culture, heightened by a reconstructed monolithic national historiography of the liberation struggle. It is also Mavengano’s assertion that the state’s reference to having participated in the war of liberation has become part of the regime’s survival narrative that legitimizes a perpetual hold onto power. Resultantly, citizens are tragically polarized by being classified either as fellow comrades or patriots or ‘mhandu’ (adversaries), in nuanced dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Anchored on Critical Linguistics, Political Discourse Analysis, and Cognitive Metaphor Theory, this chapter qualitatively analyzes the discourse of entitlement, paying particular attention to its linguistic and non-linguistic aspects. The main thrust of the chapter is to lay bare how the popularized discourse of entitlement, couched with a grammar of violence denies the citizenry their civil rights to elect a different government apart from the ruling Zimbabwe African National Unity of Patriotic Front (ZANUPF). It concludes by reiterating the pertinent need for interjecting the myopic rhetoric of deceit and confrontational politics that generate a painful disillusionment for the common citizens. Tichaona Zinhumwe authored chapter eight by the title, “Stoking the Flames of Conflict in Zimbabwe’s Electoral Terrain: Detecting and

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Reporting Hate Speech in Online Media.” This chapter explores how hate speech was detected, framed, and reported in Zimbabwe’s unregulated web-based online media outlets, such as ZimEye, Zimbabwe Mail, and New Zimbabwe. The reportages took place during Zimbabwe’s local and parliamentary by-elections held from March to October 2022, widely considered as a test run to the forthcoming 2023 general elections. Zinhumwe takes note of how the politicians used false arguments, linguistic conventions such as name-calling and metaphoric constructions of animals and insects to dehumanize their opponents. It is against this backdrop that the author contends that these publications endorsed, and amplified hate speech made by politicians from the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), and the main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). Wearing the lens of Critical Discourse Analysis, Zinhumwe critiques the unregulated online media publications for failing to uphold journalism ethics and for being complicit in fanning political violence, by quoting verbatim vitriol from politicians, without subjecting it to editorial gatekeeping processes. The chapter concludes by explicating how abusive and inflammatory hate speech published in the purposively sampled publications, compromised the human dignity of the victims as well as serving as the spark which started off the fire of violence that broke out after inflammable speeches from politicians. Chapter 9, “Hate Speech Within the Electoral Political Processes in Zimbabwe,” is authored by Bernard Pindukai Humbe, Sophia Chirongoma, and Nomatter Sande. They highlight the fact that as Zimbabwe draws closer to the 2023 harmonized elections, political hate speech is becoming more widespread. Adopting a historical approach and tapping into the Hate Speech Theory, this chapter explores the factors that perpetuate toxic political hate speech and hate infuriated political violence in Zimbabwe. The authors of this chapter also note that the availability and access to social media have heightened political name-callings, derogatory speeches, and disdain. Cognizant that the current political landscape provides fecund ground for hate speech, decorated with multiple political rivals, party conflicts, schisms, coalitions, and re-coalitions, the chapter concludes by suggesting the urgent need for not only sanitizing the political landscapes, but cleansing and expunging them of hate speech. Wellington Wasosa is the author of Chapter 10, titled, “The ‘New Old Dispensation’: A Sociolinguistic Analysis of Selected ZANU-PF Speeches in Post-Mugabe Era and Implications on Zimbabwe‘s Electoral Process.”

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In unison with the authors of Chapters 4, 7, and 9 above, Wasosa restates the fact that hate speech spewed by the contending political parties is one of the major causes of political intolerance and violence rocking the Zimbabwean political landscape since independence. According to Wasosa, when the post-Mugabe leadership came into power, they pledged to effect a paradigm shift in party and government policies, hence ushering in a ‘new dispensation’ and a ‘second republic.’ In this light, the author concurs with critics and other political players who assert that there is nothing new within the ruling party, ZANU-PF, as the hostile and violent attitudes toward the opposition have remained intact. It is from this context that this chapter interrogates Emmerson Mnangagwa, other leaders, and supporters’ speeches with the intention to expose the disturbing dissonance and trouble the discourses of change in Zimbabwean politics after the fall of Mugabe from the helm of power. Premised on the tenets of Critical Discourse Analysis, Wasosa explains how power relations are enacted in discourse. The chapter concludes by recommending that political parties and their supporters must desist from hate speech, particularly because it breeds violence and intolerance. The title for Chapter 11, authored by Beatrice Taringa, is “Political Poetic/ Theatrical Campaigning Pieces in Indigenous Languages in Rural Communities: The Case of Bikita District in Masvingo, Zimbabwe.” Herein, Taringa deliberates upon how Zimbabwe has seen rapid political transformation as its political landscape changed from an almost one-party state in the first decade of independence (1980–1990), to multi-party governance from the 1990s to date. She explains how this political transition has thrust the long-time ruling political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), into fighting for dominance against new political organizations such as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), and the recently established Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). The chapter notes that the increase of political players has inevitably intensified competition for the electorate. It is against this backdrop that Taringa examines how politicians have resorted to devising poetic/ theatrical indigenous language pieces to canvass for support, especially the rural electorate which comprises over 65% of the total Zimbabwean population. “ChiShona Language as a Tool in Winning Political Support During Campaigning: A Case for Buhera South in Zimbabwe,” is the title for Chapter 12. In this chapter, Maradze Viriri and Eunitah Viriri reflect

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on the utility of the indigenous ChiShona language as a resource for garnering political support. Using Buhera South in Zimbabwe as a case study, the authors explore how political candidates use ChiShona to communicate with the electorate and convince them to vote for them. Informed by the Political marketing theory, Viriri and Viriri illustrate how using ChiShona language in Buhera South (as well as in other Shona-speaking communities) is a strategic, technical, and crafted version of political communication in an endeavor to gain political support. The chapter concludes by reaffirming the fact that indigenous languages are a powerful tool through which people dialogue and come up with meaningful decisions which can help in the development of the country at large. Hence, the authors recommend the promotion of our local languages in all political discourses.

Part III: Electoral Institutions and Human Rights in Zimbabwean Politics (13–16) The four chapters in this part reflect on the role of electoral institutions such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court within the electoral processes. They also deliberate on how issues of human rights are either enhanced or infringed upon during the electoral processes in Zimbabwe. Chapter 13, titled, “Adjudication of Presidential Election Disputes in Zimbabwe: A Case of Chamisa v Mnangagwa,” is authored by Takunda Chikwati. In this chapter, Chikwati argues that the effective adjudication of electoral disputes is one of the most important aspects of the democratic process as it guarantees the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. He also emphasizes the importance of having an electoral justice system that protects the electoral rights of citizens. Using the concept of democracy and electoral justice, the chapter employs a non-empirical and qualitative methodology to analyze the opinions of the courts in presidential election disputes from various jurisdictions. However, the emphasis is on the 2018 Zimbabwean case of Chamisa v Mnangagwa. The chapter also critiques the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court’s evidentiary requirements for the adjudication of presidential disputes. The main contention is that although the Judiciary is generally not expected to interfere in elections, their adjudicatory role makes them reluctant to readily overturn the results of elections. According to Chikwati, the difficulty in proving that there were substantial irregularities in the electoral process which affected

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the election result is the most probable reason why numerous petitioners on election disputes are unsuccessful. The author articulates this point by noting that for instance, both in general elections as well as presidential elections, there is a presumption of validity of the announced election results. Hence, the burden rests on the petitioner to prove irregularities in the election process on a standard above that which is normally required in civil cases. Furthermore, the petitioner must show that the irregularities were substantial and that the irregularities affected the election result. Otherwise, if the petitioner fails to prove the relevance of the irregularities to the final electoral outcome, the court will be inclined to legitimize the election. In view of these legislations, the chapter concludes by recommending that the electoral laws should be unambiguous, and they should be presided over by a totally independent electoral management body. In Chapter 14, Fabian Maunganidze writes about “The Judiciary and Electoral Disputes in Zimbabwe’s Contemporary Politics.” In this chapter, Maunganidze asserts that while elections are supposed to serve as a transparent way of expressing the people’s will in selecting leaders, some irregularities in the electoral system can result in disputes that spill over into the courts or escalate into protracted conflicts. Hence, the courts have a mandate to provide a peaceful resolution platform for contested electoral outcomes. Using qualitative desk-based research methodology, this chapter connects with the theoretical framework of the separation of powers. It analyzes the centrality of the judiciary in public disputes especially those affecting the very concept of democracy and separation of powers. The chapter also reiterates the fact that the judiciary should uphold the law and it should prevent self-help in electoral disputes which can deteriorate into protracted disputes or civil war. Reflecting on the Zimbabwean electoral disputes, Maunganidze recommends the simplification of the election petition process, the alignment of electoral laws with the Constitution, the total independence of the judiciary, and the non-partisan approach to electoral dispute resolution. Authored by Cathrine Kudzai Bingisai, Chapter 15 is entitled, “Political Dialectics and the Role of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) in Elections.” The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the dialectics of the role of ZEC in elections and how this important electoral institution is perceived in Zimbabwe’s political landscape. Using realism theory and social reconstruction theory, Bingisai assesses the challenges faced by ZEC in elections and provides recommendations that if implemented, will help to give credit to Zimbabwe’s elections. The key

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issues raised in this chapter are that Zimbabwe’s election period is associated with problems connected to vote rigging, delays, and inconsistencies on the announcements of election results as well as the acceptability of the election results. The author also notes that the ZEC has been constantly critiqued for not delivering free and fair elections and for being politically aligned. This is compounded by the fact that the President of Zimbabwe has been critiqued for appointing the Chairperson and Commissioners of ZEC. The chapter concludes by recommending that a solely Independent Electoral Commission with requisite digital skills should be appointed to handle the 2023 Zimbabwe elections and beyond. Chapter 16, by the title, “Electoral Laws, Reforms, Transparency and the Credibility of Elections in Zimbabwe,” is authored by Fabian Maunganidze. Foregrounding the fact that electoral laws influence the credibility of any election, this chapter discusses how the Zimbabwean electoral laws, electoral management, and choice of electoral system have been topical for decades. Maunganidze also tenders that any efforts to call for electoral reforms in Zimbabwe, though legitimate, have often been regarded as an agenda for regime change by external forces. The main thrust of this chapter is to elucidate the fact that, while electoral law reforms are not a destination, deliberate efforts by all stakeholders to embrace the process can sanitize the electoral process even where flaws exist. To achieve this goal, the author makes use of the qualitative desk-based research methodology as tools for analyzing the Zimbabwean electoral disputes and current electoral legal framework in light of the calls for electoral reforms. Connecting with the concept of electoral democracy and the sanctity of elections as a true reflection of the will of the people, this chapter delves into the legitimacy of the reform calls and how these have influenced the trajectory of the electoral reform process. Maunganidze also proffers the fact that the transparency of the electoral system will ultimately influence the credibility of Zimbabwe’s harmonized elections in 2023. The chapter concludes by recommending the continuing review of the electoral laws with a full alignment of the Electoral Act to the Constitution in addition to the full independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC).

Conclusion The compilation of this manuscript was motivated by the realization of the fact that electoral politics has become a common topic discussed by almost every Zimbabwean, in various fora. The ongoing humanitarian

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crisis, precipitated by erratic rainfall patterns which expose the bulk of the ordinary Zimbabweans to food insecurity as well as the runaway inflation, has inevitably spurred almost every patriotic Zimbabwean, whether domiciled in the motherland or in the diaspora to put on their thinking caps and reflect on the political terrain. The 2022 by-elections, the violence, politicking, hate language, and the electoral irregularities which were witnessed before, during, and after the announcement of the election outcome ignited the fire into the bones of the editorial team to birth this volume. The contributors to this volume have given life to the idea which was birthed by the editors. Their contributions are testimony to the fact that every human being is a political animal. It is our sincere hope and prayer that the reflections and the recommendations proffered in this volume will contribute toward positively transforming the forthcoming 2023 electoral processes in Zimbabwe as well as offering important insights to other countries which are also sailing in the same boat as Zimbabwe.

References Chimininge, V. (2019). ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God’: A critical reflection on the use of God in promoting political legitimacy in the new dispensation in Zimbabwe. Journal of Politics and Religion, 32(2), 37–59. Chirongoma, S., & Mutsvedu, L. (2021). The ambivalent role of technology on human relationships: An afrocentric exploration. In B. D. Okyere-Manu (Ed.), African values, ethics and technology: Questions, issues and approaches (pp. 155–172). Springer, Palgrave and MacMillan Publishers. Chitando, E., & Tarusarira, J. (2017). The deployment of a ‘Sacred Song’ in violence in Zimbabwe: The case of the song ‘Zimbabwe Ndeye Ropa Ramadzibaba’ (Zimbabwe was/is born of the blood of the fathers/ancestors) in Zimbabwean politics. Journal for the Study of Religion, 30(1), 5–25. Mamvura, Z. (2021). “Kutonga Kwaro Gamba”: Politics and the renaming of defence cantonments in the “Second Republic” in Zimbabwe. GeoJournal, 86, 2279–2293. Mbembe, A. (2006). On the postcolony: A brief response to critics. African Identities, 4(2), 143–178. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J., & Ruhanya, P. (Eds.). (2020). The history and political transition of Zimbabwe (pp. 1–5). Springer, Palgrave and MacMillan Publishers. Ponde-Mutsvedu, L., & Chirongoma, S. (2022). Tele-evangelism, Tele-health and cyberbullying in the wake of the outbreak of COVID-19 in Africa.

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In F. Sibanda, T. Muyambo & E. Chitando (Eds.), Religion and the COVID-19 pandemic in Southern Africa (pp. 103–114). Routledge. ISBN: 9781032147833. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003241096-7 Takudzwa, M. K. (2022). Praising the Croc, despising Nero: The politics of hero-worshipping leaders through music and speech in Zimbabwe. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 00, 1–12.

PART I

Electoral Environment in Zimbabwean Politics

CHAPTER 2

Pre and Post Election Conflicts in Zimbabwe: The Way Forward Joseph Dzavo

Introduction Zimbabwe went through various phases of human development from the pre- to the post-colonial era. In these epochs, political leaders with different orientations of democratic values emerged and subjected their subjects to varying levels of violence as an observation of ‘democratic’ values. Conflicts are not only peculiar to Zimbabwe, but manifest in other countries as well. Politically, violence in Zimbabwe is not directed at a particular political party, but it is a national problem witnessed across the different political parties. There are many reasons ascribed to political violence. These include making a choice on which political party to support, irritation over a certain political party’s regalia, factionalism and disgruntlement over a political party’s succession matrix, the love for power and resources, as well as criminal orientation vented through political activities. The political violence culture remains a critical phenomenon in society. Among the

J. Dzavo (B) Madziwa Teachers’ College, Shamva, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_2

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critical reasons, why it has remained so, are the desire to hold on to political power beyond the expected time span by leaders. This subsequently reduces the democratic space both within a political party and nation at large. This chapter critiques the culture of political violence in three phases: the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial epochs. In addition, the chapter critiques the role of education in addressing this phenomenon and subsequently suggests a learning framework to address the democratic space in Zimbabwe and other countries with the same status quo.

History of Conflicts in Pre-Colonial and Colonial Zimbabwe The abuse of democratic values can be traced to the early Shona states. The period dates back to the fifteenth century, when the Torwa dynasty moved into other areas around the country in search of resources. The successive Shona states coincided with the coming in of the Portuguese, and later, the groups set up by Mfecane from the South. The subsequent periods were characterised by raids and strife between the royal dynasty and the Mwari cult. In the 1830s, Changamire’s state was engulfed by factions moving away in different directions across the country. The main cause of conflicts was centred on economic resources and the desire for political power. Resources ranged from minerals, livestock, and grain. Labour for the construction and strengthening of states was also a source of abuse as the strongest states needed subjects or slaves (varanda) to work for them for production and for defence. In the 1890s, the coming in of the British settlers shifted the abuse of democratic values into another form. The now most powerful white colonialist brought in an indiscriminate expropriation of African resources like land. In 1894, the settlers used a legal instrument, the first constitution of the country, to justify the abuse of democratic values (Banana, 1990; Beach, 1974; Dzavo, 2020; Sibanda, 1990). Rau (2011) states that in Zimbabwe, politically motivated abuse of democratic values dates as far back as the pre-colonial era. History tells us that during the pre-colonial era, the abuse of democratic values was mostly driven and inspired by the struggle for land, resources, and chieftainship, while in the colonial era, it was mostly centred on the struggle for land and ethnic recognition. In the post-colonial era, however, the abuse of democratic values became much more pronounced and mostly

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centred on the struggle for political hegemony. This period has seen many Zimbabweans being exposed to all forms of violence, particularly before, during, and after elections. It is from this historical background that the abuse of democratic values could be associated with power or the desire to have power, all for the purpose of controlling resources in an unjustified manner. This scenario puts humanity in the spotlight of destruction if the democratic values are not embraced (Cohen & Gelbrich, 1999; Conard, 1995; Conard, 2016).

Conflicts in Post-Independence Zimbabwe In post-independent Zimbabwe, intra- and inter-party abuse of democratic values is a major feature. The reasons for this phenomenon range from control of political party activities, undefined succession politics, and the desire to win political elections, among other factors (Bulawayo24, 2017; Hungwe, 2013; Ndlovu, 2014; Ndlovu, 2017; Sims, 2015; The Chronicle, 2014; The Zimbabwean, 2017; Wigmore-Shepherd, 2014). Mugabe (2018) and Machakaire (2018) attribute the abuse of democratic values to the fact that one would have represented a certain political party as an agent in elections and this angers other citizens belonging to opposing political parties. The fear of manipulation of the election is also seen as the other cause of abuse of democratic values by members of one political party on another. The NewsDay (2018) attributes abuses of democratic values to members of a certain political party being seen wearing the party regalia of a certain party perceived as not worth of support. Booysen (2012), Masiyiwa (2013), and Zim Eye (2018) blame those who hold political office as responsible for the abuse of democratic values. The same leadership is seen as responsible for organising youths into bases where they (the youths) are incited to engage in the abuse of democratic values for different reasons. Political bases are basically groupings of people for the purpose of mobilisation of supporters. The bases form temporary shelter for a specific period till the task is accomplished. In a research project conducted in Mazowe and Shamva districts, Dodo et al. (2016) established that the districts got embroiled in political violence that left people injured, dead, and traumatised, with a lot of property destroyed. The abuse of democratic values involved weapons of various types and with differing capabilities. The abuses were perpetuated by various interested groups who play a critical role in the Zimbabwean

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politics. Reports say political bases were seen as a major feature in the Zimbabwe election periods. The bases were used as institutions for the perpetuation of terror, pain, fear, and coercion, among others. Though these bases were established by formal political movements and sponsored by various stakeholders, they were largely driven and sustained by the youths who were sometimes abused while in other cases they capitalised on the situation to further their criminal activities. Tshabangu (2006) attributes the causes of the abuse of democratic values to the approaches of passive citizenship education. This passive approach consists of non-questioning and a narrow definition of patriotism which is attached to partisan dictates. Subsequently, this kind of approach leads to the abuse of democratic values and reduction of democratic space. Those belonging to different choices of affiliation are labelled as non-patriotic and are viewed as needing re-orientation through various means possible, including physical abuse. Following the preceding line of thinking, Bailey (2000) advocates for the adoption of rationality as an actual moral decision by society. Its rejection leads to a total surrender to irrationality or blind obedience to other decisions which, in turn, invites the brutalities of the totalitarian regimes that usually abuse democratic values. The interpretation could be that, if society rejects debates or reason over important issues affecting society, liberty, justice, and the notion of equality are compromised. This can open floodgates of abuse of democratic values in any society. Tshabangu (2006) posits that in most African schools, the classroom is highly structured. The teacher exercises unequivocal authority in such matters as seating arrangements, movement, controlling, and initiating all types of interaction within the group. The fact that the teacher exercises unquestioned authority in the classroom perpetuates a culture of nontolerance. As a result, learners gradually become moulded into passive, unquestioning citizens who get to worship the leader or any institutional arrangement and dare not oppose the tide. The school, in this case, as suggested by Tshabangu, can nurture or groom future dictators vicariously, who would be bent on abusing democratic values in the communities they find themselves in. Yet, schools should be seen as promoting the inculcation of democratic values in learners (Ferreira & Schulze, 2014; Subba, 2014; Tshabangu, 2006). It is because of this that democratic values are highly threatened. The subsequent results of the preceding scenario, described in the previous paragraph, are inter-party and intra-party conflicts, which

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encourage the abuse of democratic values. The common features coming from the sources presented highlight politics and the desire for economic benefits as possible causes of the abuse of democratic values. In addition, the school structure and its systems are not left out as potential culprits in the fuelling of the abuse of democratic values.

The Role of Schools in Promoting Democratic Space In a study of three primary schools in Harare, Namasasu (2012) highlighted that the social studies curriculum has content that could promote democratic values. The subject was also seen as being rich in human rights issues and issues to do with governance, all of which provide a good recipe for the promotion of democracy in Zimbabwe. In line with the promotion of democratic spaces in society using the school, Tshabangu (2006) opines that teachers are afraid of dealing with concepts that may be construed to be political, or they are labelled agents of certain political parties if they teach such democratic issues. This, in turn, attracts negative consequences on the part of those teaching such kinds of content. Nevertheless, it creates a challenge for the effective development of democratic values, because a socio-political environment fostering active student participation in all aspects of life is the only viable route and great enabler for responsible democratic values in education (Tshabangu, 2006). Namasasu (2012), however, found out that the challenges of promoting democratic values in schools were squarely at the implementation level. Distortion in implementation first occurs during textbook writing, official approvals, and publishing. This is then amplified at the school and classroom levels because of the dominance of the textbook as a teaching aid. Resultantly, there is failure to make significant links to the actual environment and contexts in which pupils live. In addition, an examination-driven curriculum perpetuates a low-quality implementation of a democratic, values-related curriculum, for it is largely characterised by rote learning and limited practical democratic-oriented activities. Teachers also rely on textbooks rather than being guided by the syllabus in preparation for a social studies subject, which is a key subject in the development of democratic values in learners. This, in a way, creates a scenario where teachers fail to realise the values and attitudes contained in the syllabus. Some of the textbooks used

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by teachers act as the teachers’ manual in teaching the subject. To this effect, certain teachers have difficulties implementing a democratic values curriculum in the primary schools. In a study carried out in Harare, Namasasu (2012) elaborated that senior teachers usually did not use the syllabus, but simply got the approved textbooks and extracted whatever material they thought was suitable for the lessons. In this regard, most teachers could not directly apply and interpret the official document. Rather, the official document was indirectly applied and interpreted through the approved textbooks. Some textbooks are produced for commercial purposes and may not articulate certain democratic values as expected. Tshabangu (2006), on the other hand, cites numerous inhibiting factors around the implementation of democratic values education in Zimbabwe. Tshabangu unearthed poor delivery in the classroom and reported that there was evidence of apathy by school heads and teachers due to lack of knowledge and skills, as well as effects of personal psychological states. Tshabangu (2006) also observed that schools were highly examinationcentred and tended to marginalise certain activities. Other factors include the lack of community involvement and high teacher turnover, creating a difficult working environment for those left behind. Teachers also found it difficult to deal with political content, despite it being part of the official syllabus against the prevailing socio-political conditions in Zimbabwe. In addition, Tshabangu (2006) further highlighted the presence of passive inculcation as opposed to active inculcation. Passive inculcation means non-questioning subordination and deferring to the status quo. This is associated with indoctrination, making learners intolerant to individuals having different views to those perceived to be correct (usually on political affiliation). Active inculcation means being responsible and critical of institutional arrangements. This is against the notion that learners have a sacred, moral, and legal right to be active participants in the search for solutions bedevilling their world of existence. By extension, learners are not just citizens to be; rather, they are active citizens as they pass through the school. Therefore, they need to be active in practising democratic values. Though teachers find it difficult to draw a curriculum based on democratic values or have an opportunity to teach these values because of the macro-political environment, they still have ample opportunities to practice and apply the democratic values across the spectrum of the educational process within the school (Dzavo, 2020). In the same vein, parents

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and teachers should consider striking a balance between protecting the child and allowing each child the full right to participate, as enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 12.1, to which Zimbabwe is a signatory (Dzavo, 2020; Tshabangu, 2006). Based on the foregoing, schools should allow learners to practice democratic values freely and actively. This is also in line with Freire (2000), who argues that educators should socialise learners into active namers of the world and not let others name the world for them. This implies that primary schools should be at the forefront in practising democratic values if the world is to realise democracy. Through teacher–pupil interaction, Tshabangu (2006) established that the school administration and teachers were authoritarian, based on the school policies as well as elements of control noted on assemblies. The schools dictated the starting and ending times despite, in some cases, the long distances travelled by most learners. As learners jostled into the classrooms, there were murmurs of disapproval over the dictation of times to the learners. Teachers, in their wisdom, selected prefects and decided the school trips, sports, and social programmes. Tshabangu (2006) further observed that before the last bell, several learners would have slipped away—a sign of challenging the status quo, in the process waiting to face punishment in the future. In his interaction with the heads of schools and teachers, Tshabangu (2006) noted that the school heads concurred that child participation was minimal both inside and outside the classroom. Teachers were constrained by the education process as they often focused on completing the syllabus (teaching the subject instead of teaching the children). One of the school heads indicated that child participation, if not closely monitored, could be disruptive. In that regard, learners’ views were not taken into consideration. Teachers indicated that they were under pressure from authorities to complete the syllabus; hence, they were teaching subjects and not the learners. These observations by Tshabangu (2006) lead to adverse consequences for responsible individuals and independent thinking. Learners may not be able to solve the challenges that face them as they enter the adult world.

Codes of Conduct in Primary Schools and the Development of Democratic Spaces Use of codes of conduct may promote or hinder the promotion of democracy in a school or country. McManus (1995), as cited in Sylod and

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Mpofu (2016), is of the view that codes of conduct or application of punishment on learners do not curb unwanted behaviour but aggravate it. They further indicate that this may not discourage misbehaviour but, rather, reinforce the pupils’ view of adults as treacherous. These scholars imply that codes of conduct may have a negative impact on the development of democratic values. Teachers, as the adults in the school, who try to control learners, may be viewed differently by the learners they try to control. This is also in line with Namasasu’s (2012) findings on how the ethos and climate of the school impacted, either positively or negatively, how learners experience democratic values. In line with the foregoing, therefore, one finds that it is the role of the school to determine the direction of the inculcation of democratic values in schools. Mwamwenda (2014) proposes that the rules and regulations in schools are rigid, strict, and punitive, providing an undesirable environment for the development of democratic values. In the same vein, the lack of adequate supervision of learners may give older and stronger learners the opportunity to bully others. This environment appears unfriendly for the inculcation of democratic values. Hurlock (1974), as cited in Mwamwenda (2014), observes that the school is the second most important social agency for the development of a child’s personality. Teachers have a great influence on the learners’ personalities and the development of democratic values. If the value system taught at home is similar to that upheld by the school, the two will contribute positively to the child’s personality development, in this case, the development of democratic values which help to curb political conflicts in any given nation. Subba (2014) claims that democratic values reflect in both formal curricula through explicit teaching and throughout the hidden curriculum codes of conduct, mission statements, and classroom interactions that model democracy and respect for the rights of all. Codes of conduct, therefore, should guarantee learners’ rights. In this way, learners can develop an appreciation of democratic values and have a strong attachment and commitment to those values. The interaction pattern between teachers and learners in schools at times creates a situation of compliance with authority, at the expense of democratic participatory culture. Rules and routines tend to dominate this relationship. Sherman (1996), as cited in Thornberg and Elvstrand (2012), calls the process of socialisation into rules, routines, and subordination in schools ‘student zing’, in which compliance with authority, rules, timekeeping, routines, and so on, ensures their inclusion as a

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student in the school world while the student is being prepared for the world of work. The norm of obedience to authority is, according to Milgram (1974), as cited in Thornberg and Elvstrand( 2012), a basic element in the structure of social life. Both at home and at school, authorities and parents expect and tell children to obey adults who have authority over them. Milgram (1974), as cited in Thornberg and Elvstrand (2012), argues that this internalised norm in people is problematic because it could result in blind obedience and override people’s other internalised norms and values, and even make people harm others under the influence of authority in a hierarchical situation. Morality does not disappear but, instead, shifts to a radically different focus. The person feels a sense of responsibility to authority but feels no responsibility for the content of the actions that the authority prescribes.

Lessons from Other Countries on the Role of the School in Nurturing Democratic Values Globally, there have been extensive reports of waves of political conflicts. Such conflicts have been due to different phases of human development. Reference is made to the First (1914–1918) and Second (1939–1945) world wars, in particular the political violence that characterised the stated periods. Even so, one cannot choose to ignore global conflicts in recent decades, in which devastating abuses of democratic values engulfed most parts of the world. There are displacements and maiming of thousands of harmless civilian populations by other civilians in some cases, or government security forces exerting the same on their citizens. Some of these horrific activities encompass ethnic, racial, and xenophobic attacks (Dodo et al., 2016; The World Post, 2012, 2014). From the foregoing, violation of democratic values and conflicts appear to be a result of schools inadequately fulfilling or reneging on their role of teaching democratic values in learners across the globe. The role of schools is not only to prepare the youth for the working place, but also to be democratic citizens who one day will support democratic values (Botha et al., 2016). Kershaw (2005) cites several countries in the world, among them Rwanda, as case countries where the abuse of democratic values made international headlines. In some of these countries, there were interventions through the introduction of democratic education in schools. In

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some cases, some of the interventions were backed by legal instruments to ensure their inclusion in curriculum implementation, while in others, the commitment remains questionable. In some countries, tremendous achievements have been realised while in others, the environment remains tense. In subsequent paragraphs, the focus is on selected countries across the globe. In a study conducted by Tibbitts (2015) for the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO), the Republic of Korea was presented as one of the countries where great efforts towards the teaching of democratic values in schools have been made. Tibbitts (2015) reports that there was general enthusiasm in the teaching of democratic values but there were problems with the learning environment, such as oversized classrooms and an authoritarian style of school leadership. In light of the problems noted, according to Tibbitts, the Korean government undertook the following measures: first, the Gyeonggi provincial office of education announced the Gyeonggi Charter of peace education in 2011 to create a friendly environment for peace and the inculcation of democratic values in the region. Physical punishment in schools was prohibited by the Elementary and Secondary Education Article 31(8), in which a teacher is prohibited from using a tool or part of his or her body to inflict pain on a learner. This is also in line with what came out from Subba’s (2014) study which recommended that democratic values should be reflected in all walks and aspects of life. It is against this recommendation that democratic values should not only be taught but practised in schools. According to Subba (2014), the Indian government places greater value on schools as places where there should be the development of democratic values of equity, freedom, and justice among others. The government believes that for democracy to strive, democratic values should be taught among learners as a way of life. To Indians, teaching democratic values means preparing children to become citizens who preserve and shape democracy in the future. In order to achieve this, Subba (2014) indicates that the government came up with the National Curriculum Framework (NCF, 2005) which strongly advocates values like cooperation, respect for human rights, tolerance, justice, responsible citizenship, diversity, reverence towards democracy, and peaceful conflict resolution. Earlier on, the National Policy of Education (NPE, 1986) had also emphasised the teaching of democratic values to eliminate intolerance,

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violence, and superstition, and to uphold social, cultural, and scientific principles to make India a democratic and progressive nation, taking pride in its cultural heritage. The Indian experience is in line with Banks’ (1990) and Chinoda’s (1986) views that teaching democratic values prepares learners for the tackling of civic issues adequately. The critical aspect of the Indian experience is a supportive policy framework to guide the inculcation of democratic values in schools. The Indian experience (Subba, 2014) referred to above buttresses the notion that schools indeed should have a role in inculcating democratic values. If schools indeed have this role, one wonders, then, at what age this should start. Some countries like Zambia put much emphasis on the inculcation of democratic values at secondary schools, while others like Kenya focus much on adults to address the phenomenon of the abuse of the democratic values of its citizens, which continues to haunt the states ( Onyulo, 2017). This focus on secondary-school-going learners is motivated by Kohlberg’s conventional reasoning and negates the pre-conventional reasoning found in primary-school-going learners. Stage two, which is the instrumental relativist, forms the base for fairness of behaviour in learners, regarded as the core of democratic values. This latter stage is mostly concentrated in primary-school-going children (Mwamwenda, 2014; Santrock, 2010). This is a critical age in which any nation should strive to invest her future. The democratic future is not in the hands of the adults or political parties but in the young whose age ranges from zero to fourteen years. It is to these that the values of justice, liberty, and equality should be quickly exposed. In Europe, Croatia came up with a National Framework, introduced in 2010, on the teaching of democratic values. In the period 2012–2014, the Ministry of Science, Education, and Sports worked on a programme on the implementation of democratic values. Based on the outcome of the programme, the Croatian Ministry developed for implementation a curriculum on democratic values for primary schools (Tibbitts, 2015). Public discussions were organised by the Croatian Ministry of Education before and after the period of experimental implementation as well as during the development of the cross-curricular implementation (Tibbitts, 2015). This demonstrates the level of commitment by the Croatian government to effectively address issues of democratic values. The engagement in public discussions also shows the need for public support to enable effective curriculum implementation in schools as the

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public becomes aware of the value of what their children learn in schools, which is also critical for society. This is in line with the views of Murphy (1999), who indicates that in an ideal state, all citizens clearly understand and share democratic values and these form part of the education system. It also agrees with Rogan and Grayson’s (2003) construct of capacity to support innovation and support from outside agencies. Other stakeholders like the community and policymakers are critical in effective curriculum implementation, in this case, the inculcation of democratic values as shown by the Croatian state. Tibbitts (2015) further highlights that a legal policy framework guides the teaching of democratic values in Colombia, South America. The aim of teaching democratic values is included in the General Law of education. The general education law requires learners to be educated in justice, peace, democracy, solidarity, and other democratic values under Articles 14, Article 20, f, and Article 23, 4 (Tibbitts, 2015). The law establishes that democratic values are mandatory in basic subjects. The problem, however, is the lack of elaboration on which subjects and how the democratic values should be reflected. This challenge in Colombia contrasts with what Banks and Clegg (1985) and Parker and Jarolimek (1985), as cited in Bafaneli and Setibi (2015), when they say that social studies is a subject responsible for the inculcation of the democratic values of justice, equity, freedom, and dignity in primary schools in a democratic country. The dilemma in Colombia on which subjects advance democratic values falls into the profile of implementation construct (Rogan & Grayson, 2003). The profile of the implementation construct is designed to offer a ‘map’ of the learning area and also a number of possible routes that could be taken to a number of destinations. This enables curriculum planners at the school level to determine where they are, and their strengths. The clarity in learning areas could possibly define the adequate and effective inculcation of democratic values in Colombia, for liberty, justice, and equality. Hansen (2009) asserts that the Rwandan genocide was a crime of ‘hatred’, implying that irrational ethnic hatred caused it, when in fact the genocide served primarily as a political agenda. At the same time, the Rwandan genocide highlights how the desire to settle private scores and the need to acquire material benefits took centre stage. This scenario exposed the lack of democratic values in the social system in Rwanda before the genocide. The Berghof Foundation (2012) indicates that after the 1994 Genocide, the Rwandan Government, in partnership with the

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German Government, worked towards reconciliation and national reconstruction. The Rwandan Government came up with a policy through the National and Reconstruction Commission and worked with the Germany International Weiterbildung Und Entwicklung to ensure the development of democratic values in schools. To this effect, the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) set objectives that stressed teaching democratic values in schools. MINEDUC’s 2003–2008 strategic plan introduced active pedagogy as an approach to ensuring that democratic values prevail in primary schools. Hilker (2010), however, felt that the challenges in Rwanda were far from over because of the debate over the content of the curriculum and pedagogy that remain sources of conflict, including teacher-centred pedagogy. Hilker (2010) further stresses the lack of effective supervision on the part of the government and its development partners in ensuring that the ground remains viable for the teaching of democratic values. Non-governmental organisations usually focus on democratic governance and economic development at the expense of the real activities in the classroom. Rwanda made the right decision in acknowledging that education is the right channel in reconstructing society towards the practice of democratic values. However, what constitutes the correct or appropriate values brought in more challenges (Hilker, 2010; Lynch, 2016). Rogan and Grayson’s (2003) principles cater for these challenges where the three constructs converge to illuminate how the effective implementation of the inculcation of democratic values was threatened. Where there is no consensus over pedagogy and the content of democratic values, then teachers in that country are bound to implement the inculcation of democratic values in the best way each teacher understands the process. Where policymakers cannot effectively communicate a position or have a proper supervision strategy, then the capacity to support the implementation and supervise it ceases to exist. When this happens, the reconstruction of the state is not realised and society remains undemocratic; the abuse of democratic values becomes the order of the day. This mainly affects the justice systems, the liberty, and equality of citizens (Lynch, 2016; Rogan & Grayson, 2003). Rogan and Grayson (2003) further highlight that the neglect of the phenomenology of change, that is, how people actually experience change as distinct from how it was intended—is at the heart of the spectacular lack of success of most of the social reform. In Rwanda, the purpose of social reform was agreeable. However, the process was

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problematic and, hence, the intention and implementation of democratic values were at variance. The Michigan Department of Education (2009) highlights that core democratic values are the fundamental beliefs and constitutional principles of the American society which unite all Americans. The values are expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the US Constitution, and other significant documents, speeches, and writings of the nation. Baker and Franklin (1998) add the Bill of Rights/Amendments and Pledge of Allegiance to the list given by the Michigan Department of Education above. Baker and Franklin (1998) further indicate that learners are provided with a booklet on the teaching of core democratic values in the schools. In addition, social studies as a subject was also used in conjunction with the booklet on democratic values. Bahmueller (1992), Giannini (1992), and Quigley and Bahmueller (1991) all highlight that CIVITAS, a framework for civic education and a series of social studies bulletins, are critical publications designed to guide teachers in the understanding and inculcation of democratic values in schools. In the same vein, the Michigan Department of Education produces materials for the teaching of core democratic values in the form of a module catering for different age groups (Michigan Department of Education, 2009). The situation in the United States of America (USA) is in line with Thompson (1981), as cited in Babarinde (1994), who says that education should be practical and should be able to prepare a child to live in the community. The approach in the USA, littered in most cases with supportive activities, is conducive for the inculcation of democratic values in learners. This action of providing a framework and some bulletins on how to guide implementation helps bridge the epistemological gap between the intentions of policymakers and the end user. The supportive stance makes social reform possible in any given society. This is so because Reconstructionism is possible where the state, teachers, community and learners are ready for curriculum implementation, in this case, for the so-called sensitive content covering democratic values. It also gives confidence to teachers to effectively articulate and practise the inculcation of democratic values such as justice, liberty, and equality in schools (Ferreira & Schulze, 2014; Lynch, 2016; Rogan & Grayson, 2003). Regardless of efforts to inculcate democratic values in schools, there are challenges of one kind or another. For instance, the abuse of democratic values in Kenya remains a critical phenomenon to date. According

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to Hansen (2009), the abuse of democratic values has played out in different ways throughout Kenya’s history. It dates back to 1888 when Waiyaki wa Kenya, a Kikuyu Chief, was abducted and killed by the British after burning down the Fort of British East Company. The British colonial policy in Kenya was based on the effective ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy, which relied on building alliances with certain ethnic groups, thereby escalating tensions between selected and other ethnic groups. Therefore, besides its immediate relationship with the abuse of democratic values, colonialism, through divide-and-rule policies, brought about or escalated inter-community conflicts whose effects still determine the prevalence of the abuse of democratic values. Onyulo (2017) and Hansen (2009) concur that after independence in 1963, the ruling party in Kenya appeared serving the interests of the ethnic Kikuyu and that provided a rich environment for the abuse of democratic values by disgruntled ethnic groups who felt that there was discrimination against them in the distribution of the economic gains in the country. Onyulo (2017) further highlights that intra-party violence is also common in Kenya, citing the abuse of democratic values that characterised the ruling party politics during party primaries in preparation for the August 2017 general elections. Despite decades of violence in Kenya, the government has done very little to address the inadequate inculcation of democratic values through education. Jwan and Kisaka (2017) note that though the government made reference to the teaching of democratic values through the National Goals of Education of the Republic of Kenya of 1964, it has paid very little attention to the practice in schools. Hansen (2009), however, suggests legal and institutional reforms as a means of solving this catastrophic problem in Kenya. In the same vein, Onyulo (2017) notes that in 2013, the Kenyan government enacted a series of measures like early warning systems that aimed at group interventions in disputes before they escalated. These strategies, however, target adults, most of whom are already involved in political violence, leaving schools that are supposed to shape the new world order through the inculcation of democratic values in learners. A nation that concentrates on legal and institutional reforms, which exclude educational reforms, may only enjoy short-term moments of peace. Such reforms are likely to be superficial and may not endure, as they may slightly address the market forces which are based on the spontaneous practice of democratic values as part and parcel of a people’s culture. Sustainable democracy and peace can only be realised

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when addressed through education at an early age; hence, education is not an option but a priority if justice, liberty, and equality are to be realised (Dzavo, 2020; Mwamwenda, 2014; Rogan & Grayson, 2003; Thornberg & Elvstrand, 2012). South Africa, a multicultural society or a rainbow state coming out of the apartheid period, has major challenges in addressing issues of democratic values. South Africa witnessed some of the most gruesome xenophobic attacks in Southern Africa. These attacks displaced thousands of foreigners, some had their shops looted and set ablaze while some immigrants were hacked to death (BBC, 2015; CNN , 2015; The Week Magazine, 2015). Despite these violent activities, the South African government has not been lying idle. The country has put strategies in place and displays commitment and a clear-cut vision to effectively address the issue of inculcating democratic values in schools. According to Waghid (2014), the inculcation of democratic values in South Africa has been informed and guided mainly by three primary considerations. The first is to encourage people not to repeat the racist, repressive, and authoritarian apartheid past. The second is to engender public deliberation to ensure that all are engaged with, situated in, and connected to the democratic aspirations of others. The third consideration is to recognise the rights and responsibility of all citizens, uphold the rule of law, develop respect for the other as persons through our human interdependence (ubuntu), and contribute towards building an equitable and just society on the basis of reconciliation with, and mutual recognition of, the other. Waghid (2014) further highlights thatThe Department of Basic Education (DoBE) in (2011) provided a practical guide for teachers, which is believed to promote the inculcation of democratic values enshrined in the constitution. The practical guide provides examples of how schools and classroom management can incorporate democratic values. The guide also gives teachers practical examples across several learning areas on how to develop a variety of lessons around democratic values in a democracy. The DoBE, sees as its main function the development of programmes that facilitate and promote the integration of democratic values in schools. The DoBE, therefore, lists the following documents as critical in the enhancement and implementation of democratic values in schools: Values, Education, and Democracy (2000); Manifesto on Values, Education, and Democracy (2001); Integration Guide Book for Principals and

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Teachers (2004); Values and Human Rights in the Curriculum (2005); the National School Pledge (2008); and Youth of South Africa (2008). The Department of Education (2003) indicates that the manifesto emphasises democratic values which the education system should actively promote, among them tolerance, social justice, equality, respect, and rule of law. The manifesto further explores how democratic values can be taught as part of the curriculum. In a study done by Botha et al. (2016), there is evidence that learners in primary schools in South Africa were aware of democratic values and expected their peers, and adults, to practise them. This could actually serve as proof of the efforts made by the South African government to have democratic values developed in schools. The impact of these efforts to inculcate democratic values by the South African government may be difficult to assess considering the xenophobic incidents highlighted in this background. This could, possibly, be explained by Rogan and Grayson’s (2003) profile of implementation. It highlights the impact of the differences that occur among teachers in terms of the implementation of democratic values as a possible contributory factor to the discrepancies noted in South Africa. This is also supported by Ferreira and Schulze’s (2014) study which revealed that certain South African schools showed gaps between the policymakers’ intentions regarding democratic values and their interpretation. The intentions need face-to-face epistemological support despite the presence of documents highlighted in this section. The efforts, nevertheless, show great commitment by the South African government towards addressing forms of violence in the republic through the inclusion of inculcation of democratic values in the curriculum to ensure that liberty, justice, and equality are realised.

Centre-to-Periphery Framework The Centre-to-Periphery framework (Dzavo, 2020) can be one of the main approaches that can be used to bring the school and the community, to identify, debate, discuss, dramatise, sing, and dance, and reflect on real issues threatening peace and development in our societies. Critical issues that threaten identities, humanity, and the future of a people can be easily dealt with, just like in the traditional education systems, where events and special gatherings created platforms for the exchange of ideas and knowledge on critical social, spiritual, physical, and economic matters in a

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less offensive nature. This indeed propelled society forward in a peaceful and harmonious state, a heritage that Western education then destroyed. The periphery starts with the learner in the community, with or without the assistance of the members of society identifying a social ill or model behaviour to be discouraged or emulated by society if society is to realise peace and development. The issue should be that which can threaten or act as a therapy to the challenges in society. The writer is informed by the background that society has a problem, and that the solutions to the problem are in the community. Therefore, the school and community have a role to play. The school, in this regard, should not be isolated from the community but serve as the extension of the community. The writer presents the proposed framework with the understanding that schools differ in many ways from each other, and so do the way they fulfil their role in the promotion of democratic values. The writer bases this current effort to suggest a framework for the promotion of democratic values on the assumption that the schools in Zimbabwe are essentially the same and, are, therefore, expected to benefit from the proposed periphery-centre framework.

Periphery-Centre Framework The framework has the name ‘periphery-to-centre’ because the focus is on learners bringing in issues related to democratic values to the class and school for interrogation. This is so that the learners can have a major responsibility for their learning both at school and in the community. Learners are also able to design and make their own open investigations in long-term community-based projects (Rogan & Grayson, 2003). The framework has three levels, namely, Class Level, School Level, and School-Community Partnership Level. The following objectives guide the framework: To: 1. Ensure learners develop skills and values that enable them to be active and informed citizens of Zimbabwe. 2. Assist learners to develop democratic values and enable them to engage purposefully as citizens in the school, community district, and national levels now and in the future.

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3. Allow learners to develop knowledge and understanding of the country’s representational democracy through the constituencies’ representation approach. 4. Inculcate in learners, respect for others of a different race, colour, gender, language, political affiliation or other opinions, region, national or social origins, birth, age, or status, with an awareness of their own inherent prejudices and biases and commitment to overcome these. 5. Build confidence in claiming the democratic values and expecting others to protect, respect, and fulfil them.

Class Level Learners bring in issues for discussion and interrogation to the whole class in the presence of a facilitator. Each learner acts as a representative of the village or community (constituencies) where they are coming from. There should be varied issues of concern should be varied. Examples could range from the following: violence, bullying, substance abuse, class rules conflict, welfare issues, life-threatening issues, risky behaviour, and good-worthy emulating citizens in the communities in which they live. These presentations should take place at least twice a week.

School Level At the school level, various classes bring in issues deliberated in different classes with the same or different themes interrogated at the class level. As representative(s) from each class (constituencies) present issues in the presence of the whole school, facilitators in the form of prefects and teachers help to moderate the proceedings. At this level, cases of comparison of community-based groups are in relation to the promotion of democratic values. Representatives can also link their own school’s cultural maps to other schools and, as a result, broaden their appreciation of shared and different identities across their wider communities. These presentations should take place at least once every week.

School–Community Partnership Level This level is based on the best selected themes presented from constituencies in the school. The venue for these presentations could vary. For a

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start, this can take place at the school, but later the venues could alternate between the school and any other convenient venues in the community. At this level, school facilitators can assist learners for quality presentations. These presentations should occur at least once a term to create desire in community members and also for the purpose of quality productions (Fig. 2.1). The first thing needed to direct implementation and protect schools, considering the sensitivity associated with these democratic values, is a government policy on the inculcation of democratic values. The implementation of democratic values should not be regarded as an event but, rather as a process that should proceed once a policy has been enunciated or passed. The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ), through the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, is expected to adopt the framework on the inculcation of democratic values to help in guiding schools on their role in promoting the democratic values in learners in primary schools. This leads primary schools and local agencies to implement democratic values.

Fig. 2.1 Periphery-centre framework implementation (Adapted from Dzavo [2020, p. 301])

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The adoption and possession of the framework may not be enough. There is need for monitoring and developing teachers using the suggested framework. The development comes in the form of workshops or any other organised training on how to interpret curriculum related to democratic values, and align it with the periphery-centre framework. Monitoring is critical and should involve various ministry structures, up to the lowest structure in the schools, to make sure that schools play their role in promoting democratic values in pupils. There is also need for monitoring, development, and implementation of all required resources to ensure the promotion of democratic values in primary schools. Resources come in different forms, but concern is with human, material, and financial resources to enable the practice and implementation of democratic values in schools and in communities through the schools. An acceptable teacher–pupil ratio is necessary to enable teachers to apply participatory methodologies that are friendly to promoting democratic values as proposed by the framework. Large ratios make it difficult for teachers to play their role as they struggle to manage learners as well as material resources that enable the practice of democracy in their practice. Adequate funding is necessary to support internal and external quality programmes that are well-resourced so that participants and community members remain interested in rolling out and attending the presentations on democratic values. The school administration should facilitate the availability of resources and negotiate the use of these resources to ensure the learning of democratic values in schools. In addition, the school administration should interface and interact with the community on the promotion of democratic values as well as the community interfacing and interacting with schools in the same role in the promotion of democratic values. This cordial two-way interaction between the school administration and the community is critical if the promotion of the democratic values, which form the unit of analysis, is to have long-term, enduring benefits in society. The teachers’ role should rely much on the rapport between the school administration and the community as provided for by the government policy to ensure the realisation of the channel of the inculcation of the democratic values from the Class Level, School Level to the School-Community Partnership Level. The researcher is aware that the backgrounds of learners are full of strengths and constraints, and that may propel or delay the learning situation at the class level. It is at this

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point that the teachers should provide adequate guidance to learners to ensure efficiency. The democratic values are sensitive; hence, they need participatory methods that easily accommodate both participants and the audience at various levels. Consumers of this proposed framework should take note that the process of the promotion of the democratic values is context specific and will play out differently in each school.

Approaches to Presentations The following are suggested approaches, but these are not exhaustive: role play, simulations, drama and poetry, puppetry, music and dance, news reading (simulation of a real broadcasting media/press), and simple oral narrations. Discussions should then follow the presentations focusing on the promotion of democratic values. Figure 2.2 illustrates the inclusion of discussions after each presentation targeted at promoting democratic values in learners, whether at the school or community-partnership level stage. The discussions should focus on aspects or areas that promote the democratic values of pupils. At the community level, parents should also participate in the discussions. Discussions at whatever stage is critical for it help to clear misconceptions about the presentations as well as bridge the gap in understanding the productions presented. Discussions also reinforce key concepts, directing the understanding of democratic values. This can help schools to play their role in the inculcation of democratic values in pupils in primary schools.

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Fig. 2.2 Illustration of the use of approaches to presentations (Adapted from Dzavo [2020, p. 303])

Exit Skills . If a project has successfully developed the democratic values in learners, it may provide opportunities for learners to continue to engage with the issues they would have identified after the programme. . Spontaneous practice of the democratic values by learners should be realised.

Conclusion This chapter explored the culture of political violence in three phases: the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial epochs. In addition, the chapter critiqued the role of education in addressing this phenomenon and subsequently suggested a learning framework to address the democratic space in Zimbabwe and other countries which have the status quo.

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Dodo, O., Nsenduluka, E., & Kasanda, S. (2016). Political bases as the epicentre of violence: Cases of Mazowe and Shamva, Zimbabwe. Journal of Applied Security Research, 11(2), 208–219. Dzavo, J. (2020). The role of primary schools in promoting democratic values of justice, equality, and liberty in pupils: A study of Shamva district, Zimbabwe. University of Fort Hare. Ferreira, C., & Schulze, S. (2014). Teachers’ experience of the implementation of values in education in schools: Mind the gap. South African Journal of Education., 34(1), 1–7. Freire, P. (2000). Pedagogy of the oppressed. The Continuum. International Publishing Group. Giannini, R. (1992). Civitas: A framework for civic education. Organization of American Historians Magazine of History, 7 (1), 67. Hansen, T. O. (2009). Political violence in Kenya. A study of causes, responses and a frame work for preventative action. Institute for Security Studies. Hilker, L. M. (2010). The role of education in driving conflict and building peace in the case of Rwanda. UNESCO Monitoring Report: Education for All Global. Hungwe, A. (2013). Zim’s perpetual conflict. Retrieved July 9, 2017, from https://www.financialgazette.co.zw Jwan, J. O., & Kisaka, S. T. (2017). Democracy ethics and sound justice: Implications for secondary school leadership in Kenya. South African Journal of Education, 37 (3), 1–8. Kershaw, I. (2005). War political violence in twentieth century. University Press. Lynch, M. (2016). Philosophies of education: 3 types of student-centred philosophies. Retrieved July 3, 2018, from https://www.theedadvocate.org/philosophieseducation-3-types-student-centered-philosophies/ Machakaire, T. (2018). Soldiers sexually abused mdc-election agent agents. Retrieved August 15, 2018, from http://biti.www.dailynews.co.zwarticles/ soldiers-sexually%20abuse-mdc-elections-agents-biti Masiyiwa, G. (2013). Kereke/musakwa feud threatens to plunge bikita west into violence. Retrieved January 8, 2018, from https://ourvoiceourlifestory.wordpr ess.com/kereke-musakwa-feud-threatens-to-plunge-bikitawest-intoviolence Michigan Department of Education. (2009). Our core democratic values. Retrieved July 7, 2018, from http://www.michigan.gov/documents/10-02core-democratic-values-48832-7.pdf. Mugabe, T. (2018). MDC alliance polling agents’ homestead burnt down in arson attack. My Zimbabwe. Retrieved August 9, 2018, from https://www.myzimb abwe.co.zw/news Murphy, L. B. (1999). Institutions and the demand of Justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs. Princeton University.

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Mwamwenda, T. S. (2014). Educational psychology an African perspective (3rd ed.). Heinemann Higher and Further Education (Pty) Ltd. Namasasu, O. (2012). The quality of citizenship education in Harare primary schools: An evaluation of curriculum implementation. University of Zimbabwe. Ndlovu, S. D. (2014). Causes of political conflict and possible panacea, and solutions. Retrieved July 6, 2017, from https://www.Herald.co.zw Ndlovu, N. (2017). Refrain from violence, fight for leadership positions. Retrieved July 7, 2017, from https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017 Onyulo, T. (2017). In restless Kenya, 70% worry about another round of heavy bloodshed with presidential elections. The Washington times. Retrieved May11, 2017, from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/kenya-electi ons-renew-violence-fears Quigley, C. N., & Bahmueller, C. (1991). Civitas: A framework for civic education. NCSS Publications. Research Advocacy Unit-RAU. (2011). Politically motivated violence against women in Zimbabwe 2000–2010. A review of public domain literature. RAU. Rogan, J. M., & Grayson, D. J. (2003). Towards the theory of curriculum implementation with particular reference to science education in developing countries. International Journal of Science Education, 25(10), 1171–1206. Santrock, J. W. (2010). A topical approach to life span development. (5th ed.). McGraw-Hill. Sibanda, M. J. (1990). Turmoil and tenacity Zimbabwe 1890–1990. College Press. Sims, B. (2015). Zimbabwe a conflict history. Retrieved July 7, 2017, from https://www.insighttoconflict.org/blog.PeaceDirect Subba, D. (2014). Democratic values and democratic approach in teaching A. Journal of Educational Research, 2(12A), 37–40. Sylod, C., & Mpofu, J. (2016). Effectiveness of ministry of primary and secondary education circulars in managing students’ misconduct in Zimbabwean Schools. IOS Journal of Research and Method in Education., 6(3), 32–36. The Chronicle. (2014). Zanu pf, mdc-t warned over intra-party violence. Retrieved July 7, 2017, from http://www.chronicle.co.zwZanuPf.mdc The Week Magazine. (2015). South African xenophobia: Why is there so much hatred of foreigners? Dennis Publishing. The World Post. (2012). Egyptian revolution: Abu Dhabi gallup center report shows empirical analysis of conditions. Retrieved November 11, 2018, from https:// www.huffpost.com/entry/abu-dhabi-gallup-center-egypt_n_1199318 The World Post. (2014). Hosni Mubarak, former Egyptian President, denies ordering protesters killed. Retrieved September 21, 2017, from https://www. irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/mubarak-denies-ordering-killingof-protesters-during-2011-uprising-in-egypt-1.1896144

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Thornberg, R., & Elvstrand, H. (2012). Children’s experiences of democracy, participation and trust in school. Retrieved November 11, 2018, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235331447_Children%27s_ experiences_of_democracy_participation_and_trust_in_school Tibbitts, F. (2015). Curriculum development and review for democratic citizenship and human rights Education. UNESCO. Tshabangu, I. P. (2006). Student participation and responsible citizenship in a non-polyarchy: An evaluation of challenges facing Zimbabwe school. International Educational Journal., 7 (1), 56–65. Waghid, Y. (2014). African philosophy of education reconsidered on being human. Routledge. Wigmore-Shepherd, P. (2014). The changing actors of political violence in Zimbabwe. Retrieved July 6, 2017, from https://www.crisis.acled.data. com/-cha Zim Eye. (2018). Mnangagwa to blame for attack on mdc councilor. Retrieved October 10, 2018, from https://www.zimeye.net/2018/10/10/mnanga gwa-to-blame-for-attack-on-mdc-councillor/

CHAPTER 3

Cordoning off the Debris of Electoral Violence and Generative Hegemony in Zimbabwean Politics: Spying on the 2023 Harmonised Elections Andrew Mutingwende

Introduction The analysis begins amid a terrible electoral crisis in post-colonial Zimbabwe just after the 26 March 2022 plebiscite and a few months before the 2023 harmonised elections. Through the window of a CDA linguistic framework, the chapter spies into the 2023 harmonised elections by playing detective on the 26 March 2022 by-elections which form the nerve centre of a new line of linguistic inquiry into citizen journalism. It casts a searching glance at online posts by participants to bring to the fore an often-neglected field of citizens’ political engagement as reflected through the “26 March 2022 by-Elections” Facebook

A. Mutingwende (B) Department of English and Communication, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_3

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page. The page became awash with the much-discussed 26 March 2022 Zimbabwean by-elections in which the electoral wrestling match by major contending political parties morphed into violence, electoral malpractices and a contested poll outcome which the researcher cordons off as crucial pegs to analyse the “crime scenes”. This is a forensic science term adopted to match this chapter’s in-depth scientific approach to language behind citizen journalism that reserves reflections of electoral politics in post-colonial Zimbabwe and how the existing trajectories cast shadows on future elections. The chapter uses the by-elections as a database that provides an effective lead into the 2023 harmonised elections. In Zimbabwe, a spurt in web-based citizen journalism was ignited by the state’s authoritarian leadership and media hegemony that continued to throttle democratic and expressive spaces (Mare, 2015; Willems, 2016). This counter-hegemonic online participatory politics gatecrashes the hegemonic mainstream media’s gatekeeping policies (Willems, 2016). Agreeably, citizen journalists achieve this “through generating their news content with less scrutiny by gatekeepers. Unlike mainstream media, the internet offers great liberty for its users to bypass state control” (Jalli, 2020: 82). In terms of research, the present study noticed the superfluity of the epistemological coverage of the nexus between official mainstream journalism and politics at the expense of citizen journalism. This approach may be interpreted as exclusionary, linear and traditional. Therefore, I take a detour towards a more informed and inclusive linguistic analysis of political engagement by subaltern civilians often excluded from the political making of nations. In making reliable predictions, the chapter briefly recedes to the 2018 previous elections that initiated the second republic after Mugabe to capture and collate electoral trends that are inherent in the political system governing post-colonial Zimbabwe. The chapter assumes that synonymous existence of the so-called political and electoral “crime scenes” between 2018 and 26 March 2022 is likely to endemically repeat themselves into subsequent elections. Against this backdrop, the road to the 2023 elections is narrow and littered with a catalogue of disasters that widens the “crime scene” as the ruling party’s manipulative addiction for expediency will work to misdirect the opposition votes of a hardened people already adapting to test the alternative.

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Background The electoral graph of political intolerance in most authoritarian postcolonial states in Southern Africa like Zimbabwe has been on the high constant with an addiction towards violence. Tools of coercion as governance system have become a synonym of hegemony and state collapse which both have made countries like Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Somalia and Sudan the “worst performing” states in Southern Africa according to The Failed States Index table of 2008 (Gebrewold, 2009). Zimbabwe’s post-colonial personalisation of state security has morphed into coercion and brazen violence. Evidently, barely a decade after Zimbabwe’s new dawn in 1980, the ruling party’s zest towards totalitarian one-party state was shown in its courtship of the Joshua Nkomo-led PF-ZAPU party to achieve its co-option which, though successful, led to the ethno-genocide dubbed Gukurahundi against the Ndebele-speaking minority tribe in the Midlands and Matabeleland (Gukurume, 2017). True, the blood-letting electoral violence of 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013 offered a clear glimpse into the ruling party’s unquenchable propensity to destabilise opposition formations. The intensification of political and electoral polarity was especially ignited by “the coming in of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999 which changed the political landscape; it challenged the political narratives of the land” (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 277). The NO majority vote against ZANU-PF in the constitutional referendum of February 2000 and its subsequent electoral near-defeat by the Tsvangirai-led MDC especially in the 2000 and 2008 polls triggered a heat wave of full-scale violence on opposition supporters by state-bankrolled security agents (Michira, 2014; Moyo, 2018). The state’s abrasive and merciless thrash on opposition supporters stretched to unchecked extremes in the form of urban informal sector demolitions and the destabilisation of the white community during the Fast Track Land Reform Program (Moyo, 2018). Worst, the 2008 electoral stalemate that morphed into the Government of National Unity (GNU) provided a temporary panacea as “the most contentious issue was the militarisation of the ZEC which opposition political parties demonstrated against between 2016 and 2017, claiming that it compromised the independence of the commission” (Rusinga, 2021: 96). The state’s abortive attempts to quell civic disgruntlements against misrule sprouted into mushrooming hashtag

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social media protests that served as red indicators of the long-serving leader, Mugabe’s end times through a military coup. After deposing Mugabe, on 24 November 2017, Emmerson Mnangagwa was sworn in as the new President and he “made repeated promises of free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections” but this turned ironic (Rusinga, 2021: 92). The 1st of August 2018 and the January 2019 cold-blooded murders by the military can be taken as reflexes of the ruling party’s provocations after the poll results. After the 2018 polls, the controversiality of the elections led to the Constitutional Court with the then MDC-Alliance questioning President Mnangagwa’s legitimacy and the ZEC’s chicanery as a captured institution (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019). The MDC-Alliance incurred staggers and near-falls at the hands of the Mwonzora-led MDC-T’s constitutional ideologies such as belongingness of party identity and assets, as well as indiscriminate recalls of its (MDC-Alliance’s) counsellors and MPs that created vacancies for the 26 March by-elections. A few weeks towards the by-elections, the MDC-Alliance party launched a new name, the Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC) that contested and won the 26 March by-election polls.

An Overview of the Politicisation of the Zimbabwean Mainstream Media and the Emergence of Citizens Journalism Tight-fisted media surveillance and hegemony by the state in Zimbabwe since the 1980 independence are a gesture indicating intolerance towards plural politics and participatory leadership. Under the influence of the then President Mugabe, the available private owned Joy TV was heavily sanctioned, leading to its closure in May 2002 and “[t]he printing press of the Daily News was bombed by suspected state sponsored activists” (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 278). The sprouting of the Tsvangirai-led MDC in 1999 and its daring tussle with the long-standing ZANUPF party in the electoral ring that subsequently followed culminated in serious media polarities and surveillance by the state. In the 2000s, the state-controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) and Zimpapers heavily delegitimised the opposition movement in order to soil its image in the eyes of the public. In the 2000 referendum plebiscite, the

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opposition “gave ZANU-PF political scars after a historic near-lose and controversial election” (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 277). The march that thronged the capital, Harare during Mugabe’s ouster was jointly a celebration of the “end” of media hegemony (Fitiwi et al., 2018). However, the second republic with President Mnangagwa, especially in the following year 2018, came with a constellation of exclusionary water-tight publicity, particularly against the then MDC-Alliance party since it “was a threat to ZANU-PF’s political shelf-life and the only option was to make use of state apparatus to suffocate any publicity attempt” (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 277). True, to bolster political expediency and to delegitimise the opposition especially the political outfit, the CCC, “[t]he coverage of ZANU-PF was also high in state controlled news platforms” (Fitiwi et al., 2018: 6). This also contributed to the rise of citizens’ journalism which Jalli (2020: 70) defines as “a type of journalistic activity carried out by individuals with no professional journalism training”. This becomes a form of media decentralisation from trained but state-monitored journalists to the free but untrained publics to give media coverage to virtually every issue affecting the nation. The link between citizen journalism and state politics is a game of wars and the rise of the former was mainly ignited by two factors; first, the constricted expressive space in the mainstream state-controlled media and the spurt in modern social media technology. Classic world examples of the influence of web-based social media in politics are the Arab Spring which swept “in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, Oman, and Djibouti” in which citizens shared political issues affecting their nations using personal media gadgets despite state hegemony sanctioning information dissemination (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 278). Jalli (2020: 71) observes that “bypassing governmental restrictions on traditional media” is possible through webbased citizen journalism. Participatory politics through social media proves to be a huge contribution ushered in by modern technology in Africa. Indeed, “the Southern African region cannot be excluded from the narrative of social media related political participation” (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 278). Though citizen journalism has its demerits which implicates a doubt in objectivity, truthfulness, accountability and credibility, “the massive number of social media users increases the possibility for citizen journalism content to reach wider audiences than do traditional media outlets” (Jalli, 2020: 70). In addition, its “anonymity provides an

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opportunity for whistleblowers to share confidential content to the public without jeopardising their own safety” (Jalli, 2020: 72). As intimated earlier, this chapter targets the analysis of Facebook comments on the 26 March 2022 by-elections noticing the rise in Facebook users and their political participation during the 26 March by-elections.

Participatory Politics Through Facebook In the whole world, “[t]he latest statistics by Social Baker claimed that Facebook users numbered 1,280 million in 2019” (Jalli, 2020: 70). In 2011, between July and August, the UK mass protests that took place were ignited by Facebook motivated political participation (Mare, 2015). Similarly, in Zimbabwe, cyber-activism around 2008, through the use of Facebook was on the rise (Mare, 2015). Indeed, “with a backdrop of media censorship and monopolies which allowed only the stories which were deemed favourable to the ruling party, people found solace on Facebook as an alternative public sphere to actively participate in political discourse” (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 281). Indeed, “the user-friendly interface of social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter have made it easy for people to upload and share their content” (Jalli, 2020: 72). This can be instanced by what transpired during Mugabe’s waning political tenure and end times that began in October 2015, when a litany of online hashtag protest movements encapsulating “#ThisFlag, #ThisGown, #ThisFlower and #Tajamuka/Sesijikile” ruptured in criticism of Mugabe’s reign (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 278). The relations between the Zimbabwean politics and social media reached boiling point through a counter-state discourse political activism in form of “the famous “Baba Jukwa” page [which] boasted of about 400 000 followers at its peak” (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 282; Sabao, 2017). This faceless Facebook page unveiled heinous crimes within the government and made reliable predictions about human rights breaches. From 2013 onwards, “the use of Facebook to traffic political views was on the rise” (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 279). The much-thronged anti-Mugabe celebration in November 2017 including the sombre atmosphere that engulfed the public following the 2018 controversial elections was extensively discussed on Facebook. Hence, personal online accounts such as “Facebook should be understood

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and conceptualised as alternative discursive spaces of political engagement for the marginalised groups, the so called subaltern” (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 281). It is, therefore, imperative that this chapter unlocks the key to participatory politics through citizen journalism as espoused by the “26 March 2022 by-Elections” Facebook page which commanded a huge following.

Research Method and Corpora This chapter is a discourse-linguistic qualitative approach to participatory politics by citizen journalists who aired their political views on the “26 March 2022 by-Elections” Facebook page that commanded a huge following around the 26 March 2022 by-elections. The major aim is to base predictions on the 26 March by-elections and to achieve an effective “peep” into the trajectories of the forthcoming 2023 harmonised elections as espoused through Facebook. Citizen participation in Zimbabwean politics during the 26 March by-election showed the extent to which Facebook civil engagement in politics can go to alter political landscapes. During the process of data gathering, this researcher joined the “26 March 2022 by-Elections” Facebook page as a participant observer to capture the by-elections discourse through participants’ interactions. To avoid biased selection criteria, posts which attracted a lot of “Likes” and comments were targeted, hence their topicality and controversiality. The extracted comments in this study are in English and Shona. After collecting the corpus, I grouped the data thematically based on their subject matter, then I carried out a transcription of comments in Shona into English for the benefit of a non-Shona speaking reader. Taking the by-election patterns as the database, the researcher made reference to the 2018 harmonised elections to trace parallel patterns, then mapped them on the 2023 harmonised elections through probabilism. The nucleus of the thematised corpus centred on issues to do with the ZEC’s electoral malpractices, its alleged capture by the state and a call for electoral reforms as heinous human rights violations and the incredibility of the by-elections loomed. The guiding questions for this study are: How do the state’s media regulations promote the development of citizen journalism? In what way does state-owned media differ from citizen journalism and how does the state react to the latter? What are the similarities between the 2018 harmonised elections and the 26 March 2022 by-elections? How effective

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is citizen journalism in reporting the development of the 26 March 2022 by-elections? Based on the above answers, in what way are the existing 26 March 2022 by-elections trends reflecting the nature of the 2023 harmonised elections? For easy reference, in the analysis section, codes were attached to data for referral purposes such as P1, P2, P14 and so forth; P taken for participant or alternatively Facebook post.

Theoretical Grounding Principal scholars in politics and power relations (Gebrewold, 2009; Praeg, 2007; Žižek, 2008) have painted a picture of Southern African states’ generative hegemony through the abuse of state apparatuses for political expediency. For Gukurume (2017), Willems (2016) and Mare (2015), one of the machineries that perpetuate this hegemonic tendency is the mainstream media which is often gagged by the states’ interference to shrink democratic spaces. The nexus between media and politics has been approached with a weaponry of linguistic frameworks, such as CDA (see Eisenlauer, 2013; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Sani et al., 2012), Appraisal and Evaluation (see Sabao, 2014), Genre Theory (Raback-Schink, 2012; Sabao, 2014). The scholars concluded that mainstream reporters engage in heteroglossic stance taking in favour of the ruling elite and at the expense of the subaltern. In the Zimbabwean context, state-owned media is in fetters due to the state’s crippling hegemony to throttle alternative views from the civic organisations and the opposition groups (Jakaza, 2016; Sabao, 2014; Willems, 2016). Innumerable scholars (Gukurume, 2017; Mare, 2015; Saunders, 1999; Willems, 2016) and sundry have played enough neighbourhood watch on the state’s capture of mainstream media. In the context of Zimbabwe and on a different note, scholars, like Sabao (2017), Mangeya and Tagwirei (2021), go an extra mile in glimpsing into civic engagement in politics through web-based media basing on the Baba Jukwa and the politically motivated jokes that indeed exposed massive state corruption and predicated future outcomes. While acknowledging the contribution by existing literature, this chapter establishes a point of departure by taking a detour from the mainstream analytical approach to media and electoral politics in order to open up analytical spaces for a more informed linguistic study of unrestrained subaltern voices in citizen journalism in Zimbabwe. To crutch this conceptual crippledness, this chapter adopts CDA framework to

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explore web-based posts obtained from the much frequented “26 March 2022 by-Elections” Facebook page.

Critical Discourse Analysis Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a linguistic framework that views language as a social practice, the means by which people interact. Discourse is a staged and goal-oriented social practice because it functions to serve a communicative purpose in a discourse community. The central focus of CDA is the analysis of the utterance’s meaning in context or how individuals use language in context for communication. van Dijk (1995) cited in Michira (2014: 3) adds that “CDA focuses on power, dominance and inequality and how these are reproduced or resisted by various social groups in their discourses”. This is true because “texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009: 10). The purpose for analysing discourse is that it entails hidden agendas. Michira (2014: 3) gives a more concise and harnessing observation that “CDA seeks to reveal concealed relations and causes between discourse and society most of which are not evident to the people involved in the discourse”. Thus, CDA is the analysis of language use in context to unravel hidden agendas. This chapter, therefore, explores how social media users interact through the Facebook space and to explore the language used for Facebook social interactions around the 26 March 2022 by-election events. It uses the CDA framework to analyse participants’ posts in the context of the 26 March 2022 by-elections. The precipitation of the by-election events and the controversial 2018 election patterns are used to provide a more precise analytical binocular into the upcoming 2023 harmonised electoral patterns.

Contrastive Overview of the 2018 Harmonised Elections and the 26 March 2022 by-Elections It is heuristic that Zimbabwe’s electoral race is the gearing of giants for war and blood. The November 2017 coup that deposed Mugabe and which ushered in the “operation Restore Legacy” was synonymous to a stealthy crocodile in wait. With the “Operation Restore Legacy” on the presidential dais, the pre-2018 campaign was a “peaceful process, well managed and transparent. Voters turned out in large numbers particularly at the onset

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of voting” (The Commonwealth report, 2018: xi). Pressure mounted on ZANU-PF as the unexpected Chamisa-led MDC-Alliance party rejuvenated following its split and death of its founding father Richard Tsvangirai. For political expediency, in both the 2018 and 26 March 2022 polls, the ruling party targeted the ZEC as its election machinery. The fabric that held ZEC’s credibility was frayed by the ruling party’s interference especially in 2018 when “it protracted to release the results” (Commonwealth report, 2018: ix). A perfect whodunit investigation of 1 August 2018 and the January 2019 bloodbath tracks down to the ZEC as the chief initiator of the skirmishes. In terms of media coverage, for the main opposition party, both elections showed a “systematic and extreme bias in favour of the ruling party” as “ZANU-PF received largely positive coverage in the government-controlled media whereas MDC Alliance received more negative coverage than the other parties” (Rushinga, 2021: 98). Acts of impunity in both polls such as the 2018/2019 killings and the Kwekwe/Nyatsime murders around the 26 March 2022 byelections foregrounds state security and judiciary capture as no known perpetrator has been brought to book. Since 2018, the Mwonzoraled MDC-T has been used as ZANU-PF’s stooge to punish Chamisa’s party as manifested through indiscriminate recalls of the MDC-Alliance’s party members, identity theft and property confiscation (Moyo, 2018). Resultantly, Rushinga (2021: 109) contends that “the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe did not pass the credibility test”. The 26 March 2022 by-elections ensued after their protracted suspension early in 2020 citing the observance of COVID-19 regulations. This accumulated to twenty-eight (28) and one hundred and five (105) parliamentary and council vacant seats respectively owing to deaths and recalls of members by MDC-T party. For the CCC party, the road to the 26 March by-elections and the political climate beyond the polls were raggedy and dotted with manipulation of campaign spaces, abductions, killings and torture similar to 2018. This resulted in the boom of webbased protests. For instance, the “26 March 2022 by Elections” Facebook page became awash with calls for the need for electoral reforms. The Kwekwe and the Nyatsime murders that implicated the agency of ZANUPF are mere marginal debris of the coming 2023 conflagration. Based on the 2018 electoral trajectory, I then collate this with that of the 26 March 2022 by-elections to establish parallels regarding that both were held under the same incumbency of President Mnangagwa and his tussle

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with fronting opposition formations, in this case the Chamisa-led CCC and the Mwonzora-led MDC-Alliance.

Analysis In terms of analysis, this chapter targets Facebook comments that received most “Likes” and posts, hence their controversiality and topicality. The researcher joined the “26 March 2022 by-Elections” Facebook page as a participant observer for the purpose of data collection. Against this backdrop, this research rests on a new analytical footing to explore 6 popular posts on topical issues of heated discussion revolving around the need for political and electoral reforms, need to call an end to assault on civic liberty and the expression of the electoral outcome of the by-elections. One of the most fundamental points of discussion revolved around the state’s hegemony on mainstream media and the shrinkage of democratic campaign spaces for the opposition: P1. zbc kusanyara, when CCC was campaigning u never aired their rallies, but boom results! zbc you aren’t ashamed of yourself, when the CCC (party) was campaigning you never aired their rallies, but now boom results! In P1 above, the Facebook participant is addressing the state’s main broadcaster, the ZBC and its reticence and partisan stance towards the CCC opposition party’s pre-by-election rallies. The post is overloaded with self-censorship euphemisms as the restrainful participant might be suspecting infiltration of the Facebook platform by state agents. The deployment of the second person deictic “you” might be referent to President Mnangagwa and his ZANU-PF party’s machinations in sanctioning ZBC to deny the CCC party free airplay in order to misdirect its votes. The participant did not capitalise the abbreviation “ZBC”, just like he did to “CCC” to indicate the institution’s loss of trust and impartiality. The temporal adverbial word “when” is a cast of wistful memories back to hugely thronged CCC by-election rallies in Bulawayo, Gweru and Mutare which were not fairly aired on the ZBC airwaves. Elation seems to fuel the participant’s hope through the adversative and bi-labial plosive exclamative “but boom results!” The user’s retaliatory gesture against the ZBC is made following a foiled ploy to destabilise the CCC party through state

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media and hence “the state’s entities were greatly exposed for their biased and negative coverage of the opposition and they lost a huge audience” (Mungwari & Ndhlebe, 2019: 277). The CCC supporters’ release of long-bottled-up expectations was manifested through chiding the ruling party when it came second after the CCC: P2. Hamusati matanga vanhu veZanu Pf. Hapana achada kutambura, nyangwe nemaSupporter enyu haachade kutambura. It’s not yet enough people of Zanu Pf. No person wants to continue suffering any longer. Even your Supporters do not want to suffer anymore. The message of the participant in P2 above offers a definite celebratory and apocalyptic close to ZANU-PF’s rule. The expression “Hamusati matanga vanhu veZanu Pf/it’s not yet enough people of Zanu-Pf” echoes back the 2023 harmonised elections where the participant imagines ZANU-PF will be massively voted out more than in the by-elections. The ruling party is presented as the sole cause of suffering even among its supporters and hence, “nyangwe nemaSupporters enyu haachade kutambura/ Even your supporters no longer want to suffer anymore”. The use of negatives in the second statement in P2 exaggeratedly creates a utopian sensation of an anti-ZANU-PF future electorate frantically waiting to dislodge the party in the upcoming 2023 elections. This statement is merely being spurred by the CCC’s vote garnering far above the ZANUPF’s. P2’s second statement breaks the structural rule of punctuation through the unconventional capitalisation of “Supporters” to capture the interlocutors’ attention by particularising the so-called supporters perhaps as state security agents and institutions: the police, army, youth militia, the ZEC, the judiciary and sundry as forming a constituent of ZANUPF’s machinery set to jointly destabilise the CCC party. The participant, through a superfluity of elation he receives from the CCC poll victory, thinks that the captured state institution membership has reached a point of disillusionment and, therefore, the dynamism of their party affiliation from ZANU-PF to the CCC. One of the posts that attracted a lot of “Likes” and posts was the implication of the ZEC as a victim of state capture. Participants mock its acquiescence and duplicity:

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P3. The problem is ZEC is captured and these people work for their bellies not for people of Zimbabwe and it’s a shame, Zec, must fall. The participant in P3 above vents out her anger against the ZEC’s chicanery in the management of the elections as it displays characteristics of state capture. She views the ZEC as an extended electoral machinery to rig the elections on behalf of ZANU-PF and to the detriment of the CCC party. This view runs concordant to Rushinga (2021: 109) who observes that “the political environment still favoured Zanu-Pf with a questionable independence of the ZEC” (Rushinga 2021: 109). The use of the proximal deictic “these people” in P3 foregrounds the ZANU-PF top supporter who after setting ZEC corruptly to work, “work for their bellies not for people of Zimbabwe…”. The participant’s use of the third person plural possessive “their” is both scathingly distancing and exclusionary. She nuances at the ruling party’s belly politics as she indicates her dissociative attitude towards “their” (ZANU-PF’s) misrepresentations of the Zimbabweans that voted the party into power which turned to selfaggrandisement deals. In P3, the participant wishes ZEC to be dislodged for betraying its mandate as it is in a marriage with the ruling party when it is supposed to be independent. P4 Ko iro hure rezanu richafa rini ndoratikuvadzisa nenhamo. When will this zanu prostitute die? she has caused us untold suffering/poverty The participant in P4’s statement comes with an unrestrained irate force in implicating the ZEC chair, Priscilla Chigumba as ZANU-PF’s “prostitute” and he wishes her to get dismissed through a rhetoric question because “she has caused us much suffering”. The call for her dismissal is meant to accordingly pave the way for the 2023 harmonised elections. The term “prostitute” politically suggests the ZEC’s oscillations between feigning independence when it is secretly marrying with ZANUPF. The nauseated expression “richafa rini/when will she die?” negates the longevity of the so-called prostitute’s existence, an internal wish towards electoral reforms ahead of 2023. The participant seems aware of the ZEC’s alleged escapades in the 2018 controversial elections during

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which it suffered massive condemnation when its running of the elections became questionable. In P4, the abbreviation “zanu” (ZANU-PF) has “PF” removed and is not capitalised to indicate the participant’s disoriented attitude towards the ruling party. The participant linguistically reduces it as he feels it is waning from the political scene and perhaps imagines its anti-climax in the 2023 harmonised elections. The statement “ndoratikuvadzisa nenhamo/she has caused us untold suffering/poverty” is doubly semantic. The participant seems to cast back memories into the ugly past of the 2018 controversial polls and the cold-blooded civilian murders by the military that held Priscilla Chigumba at the helms and now the ZEC which she represents seems to re-create its electoral DNA. Second, it implicates the socio-economic subterranean effects of political and electoral violence by the state through the ZEC’s authoring of political illegitimacy. Participant in P5 continues the chide. P5: Pandanzwa zigadzi iro richitaura kuti ‘definitely ready’ ndanzwa kuda kurutsa. When l heard that massively huge woman saying ‘definitely ready,’ l felt like throwing up. The participant’s exclusion of the ZEC chair’s name to favour the far demonstrative “that” is equally distancing in as much as he dislikes witnessing the ZEC running the 2023 polls without proper reforms. He expresses disgust towards the ZEC chair during the announcement of the by-election results to the point of wanting to spew vomit. Vomiting as an involuntary action is stimulated by previous sensation and knowledge of a nauseating entity or a reflex to an incongruous ingestion. It rests against this common knowledge that the participant in P5 reacts to the ZEC’s previous handling of the ballot in the by-elections and back in the 2018 contested polls. P6: Havaguti kumwa ropa vanhu veZANU. Vakomana learn kudzorera next time tiri kungopera. #2023 mkomana muoffice. MHDSRIEP!!!!!! They never get satiated to suck blood, these ZANU people. Guys learn to fight back next time, we are getting finished. #2023 the young leader in office. MHDSRIEP!!!!!!

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The post came following the Kwekwe murder following the skirmishes at a CCC rally in which the ZANU-PF youth were implicated as perpetrators. The participant mobilises the CCC party youths to fight back during such skirmishes. The futuristic adverbial “next time” significantly offers time-specific probabilities and is semantically pithed in the possibility for the same occurrence of violence and murders along a progression towards the 2023 polls. The post shows a hardened adaptive courage to withstand violence. The abbreviation, MHDSRIEP (May His Dear Soul Rest In Eternal Peace) is solemnly salutary to the murdered victim. The “mukomana/young man/leader” viral on social media platforms is a referent to the youthful CCC leader, Nelson Chamisa’s predicted assumption of office in 2023. The posting of the ZEC chair’s photo under the Kwekwe murder mystery, which this researcher avoids to include here for ethical reasons, might be a track to the whodunit investigation linked to the ZEC’s mishandling of the polls and even traceable back to the 2018/2019 killings.

Findings and Conclusion The chapter draws from the 26 March 2022 plebiscite as an interesting crime scene due to its superfluity of electoral malpractices and human rights abuses. By turning back the clock to the 2018 harmonised elections to juxtapose with the by-election trends, the two are not contradictory. Nailed by physical evidence, both plebiscites bear marks of woe and addictive brazen murders with impunity, the ZEC’s alleged chicanery, a contested electoral outcome, shrunken democratic spaces, abductions and torture. Using probabilism based on this homogeneity, this trajectory is likely to mutate itself in 2023 including the unprecedented takeover of the CCC party if electoral reforms around the following are met: government control of the electoral machinery, the media and ideology; overturning election results..; the curtailment of fundamental freedoms and massive constraints on the opposition; violence and intimidation with military backing; the benefits of incumbency and abuse of state resources as well as vote buying; and the manipulation of traditional leaders. (Rushinga, 2021: 92)

This chapter closes this analysis by the observation that intimidation and chronic exposure of victims to forms of torture reflective of the 2018 or

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26 March 2022 will create more resilience and adaptations to the systems than the purpose the systems were originally initiated to serve. By analogy, a soldier’s prolonged exposure to constant war hammering and bombings will adapt him to “withstand pressures beyond his ordinary ability… [u]nder constant bombardment” and his “skin feels thick and insensitive” (Steinbeck, 1971: 1090). It is, therefore, the predictions of this analysis that varied chronic forms of torture to civilians throughout history have hardened them to the point of adaptation and any furtherance of such a system is more likely to fuel the resentment of the electorate whose retribution lies in the ballot.

References Commonwealth. (2018). Zimbabwean harmonised elections. www.thecommon wealth.org Eisenlauer, V. (2013). A critical hypertext analysis of social media: The true colours of Facebook. Bloomsbury Academic Publishing. Fitiwi, M. et al. (2018). Zimbabwe conflict insight. Addis Ababa University Press. Gebrewold, B. (2009). Anatomy of violence: Understanding the systems of conflict and violence in Africa. Ashgate. Gukurume, S. (2017). ThisFlag and #ThisGown cyber protests in Zimbabwe: Reclaiming political space. African Journalism Studies, 38(2), 49–70. Jakaza, E. (2016). Subjectivity in newspaper reports on ‘controversial’ and ‘emotional’ debates: A multi-theoretical approach. Language Matters, 47 (1), 3–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/10228195.2025.1060513 Jalli, N. (2020). Exploring the influence of citizen journalism content on the Malaysian political landscape. Kajian Malaysia, 38(1), 67–88. https://doi. org/10.21315/km2020.38.1.4 Machin, D., & Mayr, A. (2012). How to do critical discourse analysis: A multimodal introduction. Sage. Mangeya, H., & Tagwirei, C. (2021). WhataApp jokes and the dialogue on Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup. http://hdl.handle.net/11408/4533 Mare, A. (2015). Facebook, youth and political action: A comparative study of Zimbabwe and South Africa (Ph.D. dissertation). Rhodes University. 228 p. Michira, J. N. (2014). The language of politics: A CDA of the 2013 Kenyan presidential campaign discourse. International Journal of Education Research, 2(1), 1–18. http://www.ijern.com/journal/January-2014/01.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2017. Moyo, C. (2018). Social movements, social media & civil resistance in Zimbabwe, 2016–2017: Lessons for the future. The International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies, 6(2), 137–145.

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Mungwari, T. N., & Ndhlebe, A. (2019). Social media and political narratives: A case of Zimbabwe. Sociology International Journal, 3(3), 277–287. https:// doi.org/10.15406/sij.2019.03.00187 Praeg, L. (2007). The geometry of violence: Africa, Girard, modernity. Sun Press. Raback-Schink, B. R. (2012). The influence of media bias perception on space publication. University of North Dakota. Rusinga, R. (2021). Zimbabwe’s 2018 harmonised elections: An assessment of credibility (Vol. 20). https://doi.org/10.20940/JAE/2021/v20i1a5 Sabao, C. (2014). Towards the theory of genre? Reflections on the problems and debates on theorising ‘genre.’ The Dyke, 8(2), 1–13. Sabao, C. (2017). Citizen journalism on Facebook and the challenge of media regulations in Zimbabwe: Baba Jukwa. http://hdl.handle.net/11408/2010 Sani, I. et al. (2012). Linguistic analysis on the construction of satire in Nigerian political cartoons: The example of newspaper cartoons. Journal of Media and Communication Studies, 4(3), 52–59. Saunders, R. (1999). Dancing out of tune: A history of the media in Zimbabwe. Edwina Spicer Productions. Steinbeck, J. (1971). Symptoms (Why soldier’s won’t talk). Viking Penguin. Van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Discourse semantics and ideology. Discourse and Society, 6(2), 243–289. Willems, W. (2016). Social media platforms, power and information in Zimbabwe’s recent elections (285 p). LSE. Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (Eds.). (2009). Methods of critical discourse analysis (2nd ed.). Sage. Žižek, S. (2008). Violence. Picador.

CHAPTER 4

The Semiotics of Political Schisms and Prospects of Nation-Rebuilding: “Varakashi 4ED” and the “Nerrorists” Esther Mavengano

and Thamsanqa Moyo

Introduction The transition from Robert Mugabe to Emmerson Mnangagwa in 2017 in leadership opened vistas for thinking about resolving conflict and promoting national rebuilding. Although it is true that Mugabe contributed immensely to the current socio-political crisis in Zimbabwe, this fact does not merit the reduction of the multifaceted problems to a single individual (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009, 2013). This chapter builds on Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s argument and posits that Zimbabwe’s problems are rooted in a toxic political culture which has sadly remained intact, long after Mugabe is gone. We further argue for nuanced discursive understandings of the present-day political enunciations of Varakashi and Nerrorists . We examine how these constructs denote retrogressive

E. Mavengano · T. Moyo (B) Department of English and Media Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_4

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political practices that legitimate violence, hate speech, partisan politics and maintain political paralysis that militates against nation-rebuilding. Halliday’s (1978) socio-semiotics, Mbembe’s (1992, 2001) formulations of the postcolony and Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2009) notion of a failed national project provide essential discursive entry points into the persistence of Mugabeism and its link to the concepts of “Varakashi” and Nerrorists discussed in this chapter. Hove (2021) remarks that the post-independence era in Zimbabwe has been replete with the crudest vocabulary and grotesque dramatisation of political contestation. In this chapter, we examine how the constructs of Varakashi and Nerrorists endorse such reading of contemporary Zimbabwe. There is a general consensus that language can be used in politics to incite, inflame, heal and unite the nation (Mavengano et al., 2022). In this study, we consider the multi-modal nature of the tweets that construct political discourse from Varakashi and Nerrorrists. We noted that both linguistic and nonlinguistic aspects are used in political contestations in Zimbabwe. As the nation is heading towards the 2023 harmonised elections, it is salutary to study politics as a life-and-death affair. Robert Mugabe’s statement to the effect that the ruling party has many degrees in violence and that the party has only used a few of those is a case in point. Tekere (2007) in his autobiography, in order to scaffold the self and his warrior colleagues, refers to the liberation war as having reached the apogee of excitement when he states that “Hondo yakunakidza vakomana” (The war has become very interesting guys). Referring to Tekere’s Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in the 1990s, Mugabe said that “ZUM will zoom itself to doom”; an attempt at alliteration that carried threatening connotations. This also carried the same implications as the statement he made about Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU), when Mugabe characterised him as a cobra in the house and that the only way to deal with a snake is to strike its head. The serpentine imagery was a characteristic of Mugabeism and its view of electoral conduct in Zimbabwe. Such a political culture tends to be consciously or unconsciously replicated even in those who purport to be fighting for a tolerant dispensation. Implicit in the above statements is the proclivity to glorify, through various semiotic elements, violence in all its forms as a weapon of choice. Sachikonye (2011: 20) sees this as a relic of the liberation war where total victory and annihilation of the enemy are the only acceptable outcomes. It feeds into the ZANU-PF narrative that the war of liberation was an

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outright victory and not a product of negotiation. In this way, all forms of negotiation and consensus-building are anathema in the Zimbabwean political landscape. It is a dangerous militarist, macho construction where political players take no prisoners in their fixation with winning at all costs. The Youth Brigade in the early 1980s represented that kind of approach to electoral contestation; so did the Green Bombers after 2000 where people had to be whipped and bayoneted into voting for a particular party. The annihilation of the “enemy” in both physical and propaganda domains was witnessed in the crushing of PF-ZAPU so that they could surrender to the ruling party as a docile and prostrate entity. This was the same logic in the 2008 Presidential Run-off when the Movement for Democratic Change entered into negotiations for a unity government as a violated and limping party after the murderous “Operation Mavhoterapapi” (Operation Who did you Vote for). Fisher (2006: 51) refers to this approach as fearism, which refers to the deliberate attempt to cultivate and instil a culture of fear in order to impose party hegemony. This background is important in understanding the grammar of mutual intolerance, at an intellectual but equally intimidating level by the Varakashi and Nerrorists . A critical engagement with these discourses is part of an effort to uncover complicated systems of political thought and practices that interfere with attempts to re-imagine political contestation in Zimbabwe.

Mbembe’s Political Thought and Halliday’s Socio-Semiotics This study is interdisciplinary in nature as it brings out an interface of linguistics and politics in contemporary Zimbabwe. The interdisciplinarity stems in conceptual synthesis of Functional Linguistics (FL) and politics by using insights from two thinkers; Mbembe’s political thought and Halliday’s (1978) socio-semiotic approach in dialoguing the prevailing environment as the nation prepares for the 2023 harmonised elections. Considering Zimbabwe’s troubled historiography since 2000, it is imperative to examine whether there are noted shifts from what Moyo (2018) calls the enduring and worrisome system of Mugabeism in the present political culture. Mbembe’s conceptualisation of power in the postcolony and his notions of commandment, the grotesque, conviviality and mutual zombification provide important framing lenses and rich discursive sites to interrogate the political terrain in Zimbabwe’s post-Mugabe era. The study adopts qualitative research methods by

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analysing purposively selected tweets from pro Emmerson Mnangagwa groups known as Varakashi and supporters of the opposition leader, Nelson Chamisa, who are called Nerrorists . Creswell (2003) states that an interpretivist paradigm works with qualitative research as its methodological approach and is pertinent to this study because it is used to elucidate and comprehend the political thinking expressed through the analysed tweets. The tweets are publicly shared on the internet and a considerable number of citizens engage in political debates on this platform (Chibuwe, 2020). The major goal is to explore and problematise the political philosophy embedded not only in naming, but also in the semantics engrained in the Varakashi and Nerrorists discourses in the context of the Second Republic vis-à-vis what Mbembe (1992, 2001) elaborates as the aesthetics of tyranny, buffoonery and simulacra of the postcolony. Mbembe (1992) has theorised that power in the postcolonial state is staged or dramatised in spectacles of commandment, a concept that refers to a mode of rule that recreates the violent authority that bears a resemblance to colonial regimes. The discussions in this study do not only focus on how power is enacted through commandment but also bring to the fore how the subjects of power have turned to be politically zombified in a convivial space. The ruled and ruler dichotomy is blurred and ambivalent paralysis takes precedence. Essentially, during moments of grotesque autocracy, the sovereign power is performed against othered bodies with the toxicities/obscenities of Zimbabwe’s political space. The notion of the grotesque as theorised by Mbembe (1992) denotes obscene components in the postcolony. Since the analysed tweets are generated through the semiotic resources such as text, images, videos, a semiotic analysis becomes relevant in order to bring out the metafunction of the Varakashi/Nerrorists ’ multi-modal tweet discourses. The semiotic perspective offers interpretive insights to account for both linguistic and non-linguistic modes of meaning production in communicative texts or discourses (Halliday, 1978). Scholars in semiotics such as Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and Halliday (1978) view language as a complex system of signs with social (and political) functions. Halliday’s socio-semiotic theory of language extended the scope of semiotics beyond linguistic signs and drew attention to the multimodal communication practices and situatedness of pragmatic dimension of meaning production (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2001). Halliday (1978) draws attention to the unison of the text (language), context (linguistic or non-linguistic) and social structure. He understands language as an

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exceptional system of symbols with a social function capable of articulating the meanings which all other sign systems can make. In the same vein, Nöth (1990: 476) observes that semiotics “expands the analytical horizon from the verbal message in the narrower sense to the multiplicity of codes” in the communication process. In other words, the semiotic perspective of communication proffers a rich and multifaceted approach to human communication and acknowledges the numerous extralinguistic codes (Andima, 2019; Nöth, 1990).

The Varakashi Phenomenon While the Zimbabwean political terrain has been dominated by violence of an overtly physical kind, Emmerson Mnangagwa orchestrated a different dimension to party campaign politics in Zimbabwe’s fragile contestation for power. We contend that there are still continuities with the Mugabe era in that political contests are still framed in discourses of war, labelling and unnecessary polemics. Thus, addressing a ZANU-PF rally in May 2018, Mnangagwa exhorted the ruling party youths to galvanise themselves for a different, but reinforcing war front. He said: Some of us are old; you are still youthful and masters of technology. The new digital chat rooms are war rooms. Jump in and hammer enemies online. Don’t play second fiddle. (Mwareya, 2020) (Italics added)

It is instructive to note the bellicosity of the word hammer the enemies, it is enunciated as a project of crude force and not persuasion or seeking to convince the electorate. While it is difficult to define precisely the notion of Varakashi due to its recent expansion and multiplicities with the mushrooming of 4EDs groups, its toxic political logic is evident. It seeks to construct the ruling party as occupying a higher political pedestal that affords it the permission to be listened to or risk dire consequences of the hammer. Following from the above, Mnangagwa personally materialised the faceless online ZANU-PF affiliated group called Varakashi and the implications thereof. Varakashi is a Shona word which means destroyers, annihilators of opponents; those that scatter and dismantle “dissidents”. The word carries connotations of violence, condemning political contestants to enemies. In order to magnify the task cut out for this group, Mnangagwa, as reported in the Newsdzezimbabwe online publication of 16 October 2022 under the headline “Svasvangai Vanhu Muna 2023: ED

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urges ZANU PF Youths”, boldly declared “Hamuvarakashi chete, munovasvasvanga vanhu” (….). This is the language of brute force that harks back to the failed national project of the 1980s. The notion of Varakashi is a declaration that those at the helm of political power in Zimbabwe do not lose elections because loss is not an option for the ruling party. It is also an intellectual construction of the Border Gezi school of ideology. The Varakashi concept is punctuated with discourses of naming, misnaming and de-naming political players and the liberation struggle serves as a framing reference to enact the (il) legitimacy of the political contestants. Masunungure (2020: 29) perceives Varakashi and their objectives as a “socio-psychology of death, terror, fear and intolerance”. As an intellectual defence brigade, the Varakashi group is characterised by crudity, toxicity, hostility and an “uncritical and undemocratic brand of politics” (Moyo, 2019: 16). They are fanatical supporters of Mnangagwa and his government and will not hesitate to play dirty in their scorched-earth defence of the regime. According to Mwareya (2020), the brief of this group is to disrupt debate and stymie criticism of Emmerson Mnangagwa and his government. The group is not overly concerned with whether the debate is constructive or not; theirs is to defend the regime from what they narrowly see as the proliferation of sellouts and puppets in online platforms, an example of captured intellectualism. Not surprisingly, they are always available 24 hours a day on the internet. Mwareya (op cit) speculates that in view of their state recognition and being given a blank cheque by the country’s number one citizen, it may not be far-fetched that some may be on government payroll while others may merely be party zealots. Characteristically, the faceless group “disrupts conversations with interjections or that such conversations are driven off topic by volleys of disingenuous interjections” (Mwareya, 2020). Varakashi refer to Chamisa (leader of the main opposition party in Zimbabwe) as Khamisa which is isiNdebele meaning one who approaches politics with the mouth open and the mind shut). Moyo (2019: 15) is probably right to construct the Varakashi as the “regime enablers and gatekeepers”. Nick Mangwana, the information secretary of the ruling party, sees this group as “Varakashi’ ED’s cyberspace foot soldiers” (ZWnews, 2021). In order to entrench the view of ZANU-PF’s ubiquity, sense of invincibility and to torpedo any hope for change in the coming 2023 elections, an array of neologisms that border on the vulgar have been crafted to bolster the above. The most salient one is the construction of the opposition as dogs given to merely barking without bite (Vachingohukura

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isu tichingotonga). This means the opposition is always barking uselessly while we lord it over them. The dog image has been seized by the Varakashi to construct the opposition as a nuisance and an inconvenience that retards national development, and that they expend their energies in frivolities. Far from fighting for the good of the nation, the opposition is framed as a reactionary force at the behest of the erstwhile oppressors. They are, in the words of Tekere characterising PF-ZAPU then, “…germs in the country’s wounds and they will have to be cleaned up with iodine. The patient will have to scream a little” (Astrow, 1983: 67). This discourse of screaming or of noise-making dogs, of recalcitrant sellouts who never surrender (Fanon, 1963), is at the heart of the Varakashi’s modus operandi as the elections approach and is “all meant for the Machiavellian reasons to maintain and expand regime power and diminish that of opponents” (Masunungure, 2020: 33). It is a continuation of the discourse of “Shamu ine munyu” (inflicting maximum pain). The concept of Varakashi is a new phenomenon in a new era, but it reflects certain continuities in the unreformed ZANU-PF’s conduct of electoral politics. We argue that with the creation of Varakashi and the emergence of the Nerrorists in the fragile politics of Zimbabwe, party politics has become even more important as a social identity than the idea of the nation and this constitutes intractable political polarisation. According to Masunungure (2020: 28), this “narrow(s) citizens’ perceptions of politics and shape(s) their subsequent behavior”. Accordingly, the creation and recognition of this group have led to the burgeoning of proestablishment shadowy groups purporting to support Mnangagwa. There are now Teachers4ED, Touts4ED, Pastors4Ed, Mapostori4ED and many others. The proliferation of these groups, ostensibly in support of the party but in reality to access material dividends, is meant to cast the opposition as engaged in a Sisyphean struggle. It is a strategy meant to weaken and scatter would-be voters for the opposition, to view their cause as a lost one even before elections. However, it will be remiss of us not to draw upon the views of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2009) quoted in Masunungure (2020: 29) that intolerance is “engendered by a willingness to restrict the rights of a disliked person or group based on their differing views”. This means that the existence of the Varakashi is a response to a perceived threat to the ruling party. There is no gainsaying the fact that Zimbabwe has witnessed toxic and intolerant politics since independence. There has been mutual hatred between the ruling party and most opposition parties, and this

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got worse with the emergence of the MDC on the political landscape. To examine the Varakashi, it is also necessary to interrogate the groups to which they are responding to; it is to explore the poisoned chalice handed to Zimbabwe by the ruling party’s inordinate stay in power that has resulted in contested, bloody and hate-filled elections. The language used by the Nerrorists is as toxic and brainwashing as that used by the Varakashi.

Varakashi 4ED Versus Nerrorists: Dialectical Relations and Counter-Discursive Terrain Given that Mugabe’s rule was generally known as an autocratic model of governance that produced a toxic political environment (Helliker & Murisa, 2020; Mavengano & Hove, 2019; Mlambo, 2013; NdlovuGatsheni, 2009, 2012), it is important to examine the transitional politics in Zimbabwe. Twitter provides a site to interrogate the feasibility of a paradigm shift in political epistemology after Mugabe’s prolonged ruinous reign. What is the nature of political communication that is produced by Varakashi and Nerrorists on Twitter? What does this mean for transitional politics and the possibility of new practices in Zimbabwe? These are some of the questions that seek critical inquiry in order to generate more insights on how the turn-around in Zimbabwe’s political landscape can be achieved. The discussion in this section thus focuses on the challenges of political polarity and partisan politics between Varakashi 4ED and supporters of the main opposition leader, Nelson Chamisa, in modernday Zimbabwe. It is quite fascinating to analyse the onomastic dynamics at play in Zimbabwe’s contemporary political milieu. Nelson Chamisa is called “Nero”, a shortened version of his first name. The opposition supporters are named Nerrorists and their function is to produce counter-discourse to the dominant narratives of Varakashi. The following multi-semiotic text is analysed as part of Varakashi’s discourse.

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@NdunaDexter and 9 others 1:42 am · 1 Apr 2022

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Arguably, the above tweet is semantically laden and fraught with repulsive emotions. The various political messages are encoded through both the verbal and non-verbal semiotic strategies. One of the unmistakable messages from the above-cited tweet is the disparagement and insults directed at the opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), which is not only viewed as an enemy but “Western puppets producing falsified accounts”. The CCC supporters or Nerrorists are warned about their impending doom in the 2023 upcoming elections. This is captured through biblical allusion presented in Greek “Mene, Mene, Tekel, Parsin” (your days are numbered) and “you have been weighed on the scales and found wanting”, consequently, your kingdom is fractured or divided and given to others (Persians in biblical context). Following this biblical analogy, Varakashi predict the end of Nelson Chamisa’s leadership in CCC in the same way King Belshazzar of Babylon met his demise. The message is portentous because it announces not only the end of political reign but also the death of the king (in this case, Chamisa). In the bible, it is God that makes this declaration, because of the King’s evil ways. One then wonders why Varakashi assume such divine powers. Varakashi 4ED’s discourse also conveys hostility of the ruling party towards the West. The latter stands accused of supporting opposition politics and working towards attaining regime change in Zimbabwe. Thus, the verbal association of the CCC with the CIA is not unintentional but rather a deliberate linguistic strategy that accentuates attitudinal and emotive meanings. The construction of the MDC or CCC as puppets of the West symbolises a threat to a sovereign state and its “peace-loving citizens”. Thus, Varakashi 4ED deliberately create animosity to justify their ruthless crackdown on “state enemies” (Chibuwe, 2020). In this regard, the above tweet is laden with motifs of outright power. By implication, the CCC is perceived as a party that upholds American political ideological standpoint that targets regime change in Zimbabwe. However, it has been argued by several scholars such as Roger (2017), Mavengano and Hove (2019), among others, that ZANU-PF’s notion of enmity is problematic. As it appears, Varakashi blindly adopt the ill-defined construct of an enemy which refers to everyone who subscribes to a different political consciousness apart from that of ZANU-PF. This is a worrisome development, considering the fact that President Mnangagwa initially assigned the Varakashi role to the young and vibrant youth of the party. It is irrefutable that the nation’s hope for new conceptions of national politics

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and nationhood is anchored on these very people whose mindsets have been poisoned. The following extract is a tweet from CCC supporters (Nerrorists ).

Mambo weChipinge @TeamChipinge ED + his cabinet #varakashi come here with your drums

8:22 am · 6 Apr 2022

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Commenting on African oral literature, Finnegan (2012) posits that proverbs are laconic expressions that function as a rich source of imagery on which more elaborate interpretations could be made. Proverbs are philosophical and an essential part of African oral tradition passed on from one generation to the next. Thus, the above tweet locates political discourse in Zimbabwean socio-cultural milieu. According to Halliday (1978: 2), language is “interdependent with cultural context and cannot be represented by a single discreet system. Instead, it has to be investigated within a socio-semiotic framework”, and that it is a social reality which is itself an edifice of meanings. In another context, Edelman (1964) underlines the fundamental function of symbols in the process of encoding and decoding meaning in versatile political communication. In this case, the proverb is employed to portray human attributes and to expose the follies of both Varakashi and ZANU-PF leadership. The tweet creates conspicuous political messages that inject Varakashi discourses through a multi-modal semiotic system that combines linguistic and visual elements. In the ChiShona dialect, which is a dominant indigenous language in Zimbabwe, there’s a proverb that goes, “uyo anoridzira ngoma benzi kuti ritambe naiyewo anopenga” (one who plays the drum for the mad person to dance, is also mad), this serves to reprimand Varakashi. Arguably, the ChiShona lexical item Varakashi woven together with the proverb in the above tweet reflects the dominance of the Shona ethic in Zimbabwean politics. Readers do not miss political innuendoes entrenched in this tweet because of the accompanying lexical items showing a purported insane man wearing ZANU-PF insignia dancing to the beat played by Varakashi who are also putting on the party’s regalia. Varakashi who are exhorted to help their cohort who is psychologically ill paradoxically join the poor man in his insane undertakings. It is obviously difficult to differentiate these participants in their mutual lunatic dance. The figurative implication here is that not only the leader (ED), is a victim of insanity but rather the entire party. ED is an associative reference to Mnangagwa’s initials (Emmerson Dambudzo). The author of this tweet exploits ambiguity embedded in the neologism “4ED”, to denigratingly depict a psychotic condition of everyone who shares the ZANU-PF political philosophy. For Varakashi, ED is a polysemic acronym that stands for the party and state President, Mnangagwa, as well as the Economic Development programmes which are meant to fulfil the national Vision 2030. This duality generates semantic ambiguities and humour which can only be unpacked through a consideration

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of the prevailing socio-political contexts. In a different context, Berger (2017) states that satire is employed to invite the readers’ attention. Bhungalia (2020) commenting on the use of humour affirms that to laugh in the face of power is to stress that your rule has no power over me. It is to scandalise the sanctioning power. Yet, the satire in the above tweet creates what Hamamoto (1989) terms “nervous laughter” because of the tragic insinuations embedded in a metonymic representation of an insane leadership running a country. Captured below is another trail of tweets from Varakashi.

Varakashi4ED Masvingo Province Tweets Varakashi4ED Masvingo Province

638 Tweets Follow Varakashi4ED Masvingo Province @Varakashi4EDmsv We defend & promote national interest in light of relentless national sabotage by é detractors of Zimbabwe who have added socially media among weapons Joined August 2022

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Varakashi4ED Masvingo Province Retweeted

Tinoedza Zvimwe @Tinoedzazvimwe1 26 Dec We remember a great man and a People’s Soldier!!

8 20 81 Varakashi4ED Masvingo Province Retweeted

Varakashi4ED @Varakashi4ED 26 Dec

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His spirit lives on. Gone but not forgotten. VARAKASHI4ED will always protect and defend the gains of our hard won independence. Rest in power Cde Magamba Tongogara taken from us by the enemy on 26 December 1979. Tiri kurakasha mhandu Commander Varakashi from Masvingo Province spell out their function as to defend and promote “national interests”. They also share the view that the “nation” is being sabotaged by its purported enemies who are using social media as a destructive tool. In a second tweet Varakashi repeat vow to defend the gains of the liberation war. Their vows are made in memory of a late and prominent liberation hero Josiah Magamba Tongogara.

Tweets from Nerrorists Self-Renamed Varakashi 4CCC Varakashi 4ccc

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Follow Varakashi 4ccc @Varakashi4ccc THE CITIZENS COALITION 4 CHANGE (CCC) IS A POLIT➋➋~➊˜➋➋➋ ICAL PARTY Zimbabwe Born 18 April 2000 Joined December 2022 2 Following 5 Followers 7:59 am · 28 Dec 2022 Evidently, both Varakashi and Nerrorists ’ discourses convey a familiar impulse to “defend” their party leaders, produce their own political predispositions and subvert discourses from the others’ camp (Pindayi, 2021). This “duty” is undertaken without careful consideration of what is at stake for the entire nation. Such political culture and practices run the risk of replicating Mugabe’s model that stressed partisan politics (Mwareya, 2020; Ndlovu, 2018; Tshuma et al., 2022). This model does not compel political leadership to be accountable to the electorate, rather to rely on their naïve supporters. It is worrisome to note that hate speech is deployed as an important trope in dialogic interaction between Varakashi and Nerrorists . There is need for concerted efforts to challenge such toxic political philosophies and practices for a nation to embark on a turn-around trajectory. While the negative impact of partisan politics is visible on the socio-economic and political fronts, both Varakashi and Nerrorists obstinately stick to party allegiance. This reality resonates with Mbembe’s (1992, 2001) formulations of the postcolony where there is mutual zombification and conviviality. Mbembe (1992) contends that the state and its citizens in a postcolony collectively create a state of political paralysis. This further deters the demand to dismantle autocratic culture that preserves incompetent politicians. A re-birth of the nation involves a radical overthrow of old political habits and perceptions in order to nurture a new reality. The turn-around can only be seen when both Varakashi and Nerrorists desist from using what Bakhtin (1981) postulates as monologic discourses, hate speech, repressive traits, political violence and intolerance which were perfected under Mugabe’s leadership which claimed to possess degrees in violence (Blair, 2002; Hove, 2021).

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Such a political environment promotes political competition, accountability and freedom of expression which are necessary in building a democratic national space. A Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) remarked, postindependence Zimbabwe adopted an imperialist script of governance. This remark endorses the claim that postcolonial democratic ideals are yet to unfold. Drawing lessons from history, transition is not arrival but rather a process of becoming. This implies that it should remain under the academic scrutiny in order to quickly identify any faults and pitfalls that hamper the development of a new affirmative politics. In summary, the day-to-day realities in the present-day do not speak to the national ideals of the “celebrated military coup” and the earlier optimism about the “post” Mugabe nation. It is thus, desirable and inevitable to deeply reflect on what Raftopoulos (2013) refers to as a hard road to reform. Politicians and their supporters, civil organisations and other players should jointly seek to address the contradictions inherent in the Second Republic in order for the nation to recover from the history of socio-political and economic taints. The transformative process calls for the overhaul of the entire political and governance systems; otherwise, the claim about a new dispensation remains an elusive idea due to unresolved issues (Gaidzanwa, 2020; Ndlovu, 2022).

Dialectics of 2023 Elections Embedded in Tweets’ Multi-Semiotic Codes The post-Mugabe era has also seen the emergence and entrenchment of polarities between official discourse and reality on the ground. Both leaderships in ZANU-PF and CCC seem to encourage the ongoing Twitter warfare which hampers national unity and rebuilding. The everyday political fighting does not address bread-and-butter issues; neither does it resolve outstanding electoral reform processes. Both parties should desist from using terror and harmful practices which continue to make things fall apart in reminiscence of Chinua Achebe’s (1958) classic novel. The following tweet from Varakashi 4ED shows ZANU-PF head office in the capital city Harare, Zimbabwe. The Mnangagwa’s candidacy is foregrounded through his picture placed at the building that symbolises ZANU-PF. The erect structure suggestively conveys fortitude of the party. The smiling face of the president also shows a reassured posture as his party has already endorsed his presidential candidacy.

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8:20 am · 25 Dec 2022

Varakashi4ED Masvingo Province @Varakashi4EDmsv #ZANUPF #Varakashi4ED The blood of our fore fathers saturates this country so that the black man enjoys and benefits from the gains of #Zimbabwe and the Second Republic. We have a task of working towards 5 Million Votes @edmnangagwa @Varakashi4ED @JonesMusara @KMutisi

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Shirihuru The Great. and 8 others 1:25 pm · 17 Dec 2022 Kress and Van Leeuwen (2002, 2006) talk about the visual grammar and further contend that colour is a semiotic mode. Similarly, Halliday’s (1985) Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) also offers critical insights which treat language as a sophisticated multi-level system of communication. In multi-semiotic discourse, a text communicates through various semiotic codes that work in a complementary manner to produce meanings (Eco, 2000). Essentially, the aesthetic choices are partly determined by the functional and ideological needs of the creator of the text. The compelling statement “join the winning team, team ZANU-PF” declares the ruling party as outright winner of the 2023 elections. The present continuous verb “winning” represents the party as an everlasting winner. The semantic parallelism between lexical and visual semiotics is a telling evidence of ZANU-PF’s confidence in winning 2023 elections. Equally important, the images poly-functional as they also suggest that ZANUPF’s presidential candidate, Emerson Mnangagwa, enjoys solidarity from party members whose raised “clenched fits” are possibly ready to thrash enemies. Ironically, the team ZANU-PF is composed of only men (un) consciously exposing how women occupy marginal spaces within the ruling party. In its sarcastic communication, it is clear that ZANU-PF is determined to continue occupying the state house in Zimbabwe. Yet, as Masunungure (2010: 17) has argued, “the one party system in Zimbabwe

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has, among other things, cultivated intolerance of the opposition and of dissent”. This reluctance to relinquish or share power makes Mnangagwa “Mugabe’s shadow” (Rutherford, 2018: 54). Notwithstanding an ecstatic momentary relief ushered in by the power change in 2017, the 2018 shootings showed how Mnangagwa and his cronies are not ready to bring any political change that does not benefit the coup leaders. The metaphor of a shadow underscores not only their inseparability but also their resemblance in the execution of political duties. The Mnangagwa administration should implement its reform narrative, to “walk the talk” (Gaidzanwa, 2020; Hove, 2021; Moyo & Mavengano, 2021) Of major concern for Mnangagwa’s critics is his self-serving governance style that is evident in the formation of 4EDs parallel structures. Mbembe (1992: 8) made an illuminating remark that “the excesses of autocrats are cynically derided and parodied, yet at the same time applauded and emulated by their subjects”. This explains why even denigrated CCC supporters in some cases emulate ZANU-PF’s violent tactics to an extent of using its grotesques name as Varakashi4CCC. They seem to compete with their political mentors from the ruling party who boast about possessing degrees in violence. This corroborates Mbembe’s (1992) elucidations on conviviality and mutual zombification which are notions that expose the ambivalent relationship between the subjugated and ruling elite. The linguistic electoral slogans “ED Pfee” (Emmerson Mnangagwa “shrewdly” gets into power) and “Ngaapinde Hake Mukomana” (let the young man (Chamisa) take presidency) are semantically hollow. These two parties present nothing of political substance to the electorate through what Ferme (1999) speaking in the context of Sierra Leone describes as staging politics and dialogics of publicity. This conveys a crisis of change and reminds us the relevance of Ayi Kwei Armah’s novel entitled The Beautyful ones are not yet born, which continues to speak to the present-day politics in postcolonial Africa. Zimbabwe is still a deeply fractured nation where the ruled live in endless nervous conditions (Dangarembga, 1988), and disorientation which speak about the uncertainty of hope (Tagwira, 2006), for a sustainable nation rebuilding under the Second Republic.

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Conclusion The foregoing discussion evidently interjects and conveys a disturbing scenario of semantic dissonance in discourses about Operation Restore Legacy, New Dispensation and Second Republic which were constructed to justify the removal of Mugabe from power. The ordinary Zimbabweans still live in precarious socio-economic and political conditions which speak to the paradox embedded in political constructs in Zimbabwe’s postMugabe era. This raises polemical questions that remain to be addressed, what type of legacy is being preserved in the post-coup era? Whose legacy is restored? Who benefits from such popularised tropes of political change in Zimbabwe? Clearly, the Mnangagwa-led government continues with a culture of lethal politics and muzzling opposition voices. This unfolding situation blurs the boundaries between the (post-) Mugabe eras and further complicates the previous understanding of the removal of Mugabe from power. Common Zimbabweans are prompted to rethink the initial reading of the coup. The current government, in its narcissistic desire for self-protection, is prepared to crash (kurakasha) all citizens who speak against its tyrannical methods of governance. Zimbabwe’s historiography continues to be riddled with a contested political terrain. The recent mushrooming of 4ED groups across the nation conveys a fundamental dynamic on how the regime and its enablers are determined to retain power through personalised patronage politics. Furthermore, 4ED construct is employed in lexicalisations of us/them/sons and daughters of the land dichotomies which are brought to the fore in problematic power retention conversations about citizenship, nationhood and (un) belonging. The Varakashi political philosophy perpetuates Mugabeism and reminds the nation of the ubiquitous political violence.

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Halliday, M. A. K. (1978). Language as social semiotic: The social interpretation of language and meaning. Arnold. Halliday, M. A. K. (1985). An Introduction to Functional Grammar THIRD EDITION . Hodder Arnold. Helliker, K., & Murisa, T. (2020). Zimbabwe: Continuities and changes. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 38(1), 5–17. Hove, M. L. (2021). Spectacles of transition: Texts and counter-texts in the historiography of Zimbabwe in transition. In O. Nyambi, T. Mangena, & G. Ncube (Eds.), Cultures of change in contemporary Zimbabwe: Socio-political transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa (pp. 156–170). Routledge Publishers. Kress, G., & van Leeuwen, T. (2001). Multimodal Discourse: The modes and media of contemporary communication[M]. Arnold. Kress, G., & Van Leeuwen, T. (2002). Colour as a semiotic mode: Notes towards a grammar of colour. Visual Communication, 1(3), 343–369. Kress, G., & Van Leeuwen, T. (2006). Reading images: The grammar of visual design. Routledge. Masunungure, E. V. (2010). THE ‘MENU OF MANIPULATION’ AND THE 2013 ZIMBABWE ELECTIONS. Towards explaining the ‘technical knockout. Journal of African Elections. 13(2), 94–121. Masunungure, E. V. (2020). Zimbabwe’s Fragile independence, 1980–2020. In E. V. Masunungure (Ed.), Zimbabwe’s trajectory: Stepping forward or sliding back? (pp. 1–46). Weaver Press. Mavengano, E., & Hove, M. L. (2019). Kaka country: An intertextual reading of national dysfunction in Bulawayo’s We Need New Names and Jinga’s One Foreigner’s Ordeal. Literator, 40(1), a1595. https://doi.org/10.4102/ lit.v40i1.1595 Mavengano, E., Marevesa, T., & Nkamta, N. P. (2022). Religion and language as a panacea to peacebuilding and development in Zimbabwe: A critical discourse analysis approach. Language Discourse and Society, 10(2), 23–34. Mbembe, A. (1992). The banality of power and the aesthetic of vulgarity in the colony. Pubic Culture, 4(2), 1–30. Mbembe, A. (2001). On the postcolony. University of California Press. Mlambo, A. (2013). Becoming Zimbabwe or becoming Zimbabwean: Identity nationalism and state-building. Africa Spectrum, 48(1), 49–70. Moyo, C. (2019). Social media, civil resistance, the Varakashi factor and the shifting polemics of Zimbabwe’s social media “war”. Global Media Journal: African Edition, 12(1), 1–36. Moyo, N. E. (2018). Dismantling the system of Mugabeism. Self-published.

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Moyo, T., & Mavengano, E. (2021). A Déjàvu of Orwellian proportions: Rereading animal farm in the context of Zimbabwean politics of change. In O. Nyambi, T. Mangena, & G. Ncube (Eds.), Cultures of change in contemporary Zimbabwe: Socio-political transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa (pp. 171– 184). Routledge Publishers. Mwareya, R. (2020, September 20). Meet the Varakashi: Zimbabwe’s standing army. World Ethical Data Foundation. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2009). Do ‘Zimbabweans’ exist? Trajectories of nationalism, national identity formation and crisis in a postcolonial state. Peter Lang. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2012). Elections in Zimbabwe: A recipe for tension or a remedy for reconciliation? Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2013). Coloniality of power in postcolonial Africa: Myths of decolonization. CODESRIA. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (Ed.). (2015). Mugabeism? History, politics, and power in Zimbabwe. Palgrave Macmillan. Ndlovu, N. (2022). Twitter and political discourses: How supporters of Zimbabwe’s ruling ZANU PF party use Twitter for political engagement. Journal of Eastern African Studies. https://doi.org/1080/17531055.2022.2076385 Ndlovu, R. (2018). In the jaws of the crocodile: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s rise to power in Zimbabwe. Random House. Newsdzezimbabwe. (2022, October 16). “Svasvangai vanhu muna 2023.” ED urges ZANU PF Youths. Nöth, W. (1990). Handbook of semiotics. Indiana University Press. Peirce, C. S. (1985). Logic as semiotic: The theory of signs. In R. E. Innis (Ed.), Semiotics: An introductory anthology (pp. 4–23). Indiana University Press. Pindayi, B. (2021). The Internet, political mobilisation and civic engagement in Zimbabwe from 2015 to 2020: Investigating the role of Twitter (PhD thesis). University of Cape Town. Raftopoulos, B. (2013). The 2013 elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era. Journal of Southern African Studies, 39(4), 971–988. Rutherford, B. (2018). Mugabe’s shadow: Limning the penumbrae of post-coup Zimbabwe. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 52(1), 53–68. Sachikonye, L. (2011). When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe. Weaver Press. Saussure, F. (1916 [1985]). Course in general linguistics (R. Harris, Trans.). Duckworth. Tagwira, V. (2006). The uncertainty of hope. Weaver Press. Tekere, E. (2007). A lifetime of struggle. SAPES Trust.

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Tshuma, B. B., Tshuma, L. A., & Ndlovu, M. (2022). Twitter and political discourses: How supporters of Zimbabwe’s ruling ZANUPF party use twitter for political engagement. Journal of Eastern African Studies. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/17531055.2022.2076385 ZWnews. (2021, September 4). Nick Mangwana Salutes ‘Varakashi.’ ED’s cyberspace foot soldiers.

CHAPTER 5

Voting: Bliss or Blisters? The Zimbabwean Experience Winnet Chindedza, Admire Mhindu, and Farisai Mlambo

Introduction The voting process in Zimbabwe has brought mixed feelings to the Zimbabwean voter, the winning party in jubilation and the losing parties in ‘Great Depression.’ The crockery and dissembling language of the politicians leaves a lot to be desired. The voting system is characterized by a lot of uncertainty as the opposition parties always complain about the uneven playground. ‘Vote for peace and prosperity, vote for change, vote for economic empowerment’ has been the language used during campaigns. However, this has not been fulfilled as the electorate is saddened by the post-election results. Therefore, the electorate needs to be wary of the language of the politicians. However, everyone has a right to vote for what he/she falls for. The voter observes the events surrounding the election period in anticipation, listening to campaign speeches, debates and conventions pertaining to the elections, and the voter starts weighing on expected

W. Chindedza (B) · A. Mhindu · F. Mlambo Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_5

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economic rewards and losses. He/she then decides on which party to vote for. The consequences of a certain party choice are then judged by the voter in terms of his/her personal economic situation, that is, pocketbook voting or in terms of the economic well-being of the nation as a whole, that is, sociotropic voting (Dawns, 1957; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981; Krause, 1997). Therefore, the electoral period conveys different meanings to different persons. During the campaign period, the voter critically analyzes policy achievements of the governing parties or officials, to compare these achievements and future policy plans to the alternatives put forward by opposition parties or candidates, and, in case of dissatisfaction with the present ruling party, the voter may want to alter the relative power positions between government and the opposition parties or candidates. Therefore, voters must evaluate candidates’ promises in terms of the post-election role that the elected officials will have to play. The critical focus of voters should be on a given set of elected officials, who use their constitutional powers to try to move government policy in their preferred direction. Such officials, when voted into power, just disappear and reappear in the next campaigns; they are interested in fulfilling their selfish ambitions and they are not worried about the welfare of the voter who voted them into power. Many a time in Zimbabwe, the voter is persuaded to vote for politicians who use persuasive language. If it is the ruling party, their language will be so persuasive that the voter will vote them back into power, even though they did not fulfill what they promised in the last elections. The ruling party will cite what made them not to fulfill promises made in the last elections, the most popular being sanctions, which most rural voters do not understand. The language of the candidates is so crafty and foxy to the extent that the innocent voter believes them. What is most interesting in Zimbabwe is that the opposition parties blame the ruling party for the sanctions imposed on the country and the ruling party takes it on, on the opposition parties. It is a blame game for the politicians. All this is done to convince the voter into voting them to power. After giving an introduction of the voting process, voters and politicians in Zimbabwe, we now move on to briefly discuss the theoretical framework that informed this chapter.

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Theoretical Framework The Mixed-Utility Theory of Vote Choice Regret: An Overview The chapter builds on pre-, during and post-election periods in Zimbabwe. Soon after elections are conducted, some voters are not totally happy with their decision, and others think they made a bad decision. This indicates that the inclination to regret can be explained by the mixedutility theory, whereby voters try to exploit a mixture of instrumental and expressive utilities. The theory that informs this chapter supposes that a voter derives utility from two sources: how much he/she likes the party for which he/she votes (expressive utility), and how much his/her vote makes a difference to the party that is elected (instrumental utility) (Bol et al., 2018). According to Bol et al. (2018), a voter regrets his/her choice if he/she realizes, after the election, that she made a choice that did not maximize her overall utility. They contend that a voter regrets voting for a party if the utility of voting for some other party is higher than the utility of voting for another party; it can be either the party he/she likes the most or the party he/she dislikes the most among the viable parties (Bol et al., 2018). To illustrate the difference between the two utilities, we give examples of two voters in Zimbabwe. There are three main political parties in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF), which is the ruling party, the main opposition party, Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) and the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A). For our illustration, we will use two main popular parties, that is, CCC and ZANU (PF). Voter A is an expressive voter and votes for ZANU (PF) because it is the party that defends the policies he/she stands for. Voter B is an instrumental voter and he/she votes for CCC because it is the party that (supposedly) will implement his/her most preferred policies. The key difference between the two is that A is not affected by the probability of winning of the different parties when he/she decides for which party to vote; he derives satisfaction from the act of voting for his/her preferred party. By contrast, B does consider the different parties’ probabilities of winning, as he/she wants his/her vote to influence which party is elected. That goal typically implies voting for a party that has some chance of winning in his/her local district.

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Most Zimbabwean voters are partly expressive and partly instrumental; they are faced with a two-choice voting, for their instrumental and expressive choice. The voter is in a dilemma. At district level, the candidate votes for a member of parliament (CCC) he/she thinks has policies that work out for the development of the country he/she believes in (instrumental), and a presidential candidate for the party he/she likes (ZANU-PF) (expressive voting). The voter will regret his/her choice if he/she realizes that his/her vote could have elected party B. He/she also thinks that he/she would be better off under the policies of party B than under the policies of the party that won the election. So, most of the voters regret their choices. To such voters, voting brings blisters instead of bliss. Having discussed the utility theory as the one informing this chapter, we shift our attention to messages that are used by politicians to lure voters during the pre-election period in Zimbabwe. As shall be demonstrated, politicians use language that tries to convince the voters that they will get maximum utility by voting them into power. Pre-election Campaigning Political parties in Africa use different campaign strategies to win the hearts of the electorate. Hallin and Mancini (2004: 26), cited in Chari (2018), observe that ‘Political parties and candidates in both democratic and non-democratic states are employing campaign tactics similar to consumer product advertising.’ If campaigning is likened to consumer advertising, the implication is that politicians use language which has some ‘trickery’ to mislead or trick the electorate into believing that they will deliver if they are given the mandate to rule. Campaigning in Zimbabwe is done through rallies, on television and radios as well as on social media. In this chapter, we will do a content analysis of messages that political parties pass to the electorate through posters and billboards. Particular focus will be on the analysis of the messages in an endeavor to establish how political parties either coerce or persuade the electorate through the language they use in campaigning. Campaigning can be done face to face at rallies or through media. Various forms of media such as newspapers, televisions, radios and billboards have been used in Zimbabwe and beyond by political parties to campaign during the pre-election period. There are differences in access to such media in different countries. Isbell and Appiah-Nyamekye (2018)

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observe that Ghana enjoys a free media environment. They add that in Ghana, 56% of the population across all levels of education see the radio as a primary source of information on political developments in their country. However, in some parts of developing countries like Zimbabwe, some citizens do not have access to the radio or television, and in such cases, politicians make an effort to meet face to face with the electorate through campaign rallies. According to Paget (2019) in Lewanika (2019), the predominant means of campaigning in Africa is the rally. Thus, political parties reach out to those without access to media through rallies, all in an effort to convince them, through promises, that they should be elected into power. In the run-up to the 2018 general elections, parties in Zimbabwe campaigned through rallies, posters and billboards and, in some cases, these were broadcast on the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation Television (ZBC). Lewanika (2019) notes that election campaigns are the channels through which political candidates contest to win votes through declaring their capability and attesting to their capacity to serve, lead, decide and command political affairs. Chigora and Chilunjika (2016) quote Part XXIB 1609 of the 2012 Electoral Act as saying that all political parties should enjoy access to media. However, these scholars note that ZANU-PF enjoys domination in the use of public media in Zimbabwe while the opposition complain that they have not been permitted to market and advertise their ideas through the public platform. In the subsequent section, we analyze some of the messages that came from those who wanted to be voted into power during the pre-election periods in the 2018 presidential elections. Particularly, we will analyze messages on posters and billboards that were used for campaigning. All the messages on the billboards analyzed in this chapter were also broadcast on ZTV. Posters Used for Campaigning in Zimbabwe The MDC-A used the image in Fig. 5.1 below as one of its campaign posters to lure the electorate during the 2018 harmonized election campaign. It can be noted that the language used is enticing. Everyone is happy to get new things and the poster says, ‘Behold The New!’ Being an opposition party, the MDC-A is promising the electorate ‘New’ things which obviously will be better than what the ruling party is offering. The poster further claims that if voted into power, the MDC-A will

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ensure transformation, opportunity and prosperity for the electorate. According to the results published by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission for presidential elections, the MDC-A presidential candidate, Nelson Chamisa, garnered two million one hundred and forty-seven thousand four hundred and thirty-seven votes [2,147,437] (Africanews, 2 August 2018). It is clear that the language used in the campaign poster in Fig. 5.1 and many others contributed to this high number of votes. This is because the promises made during the pre-election period convinced these voters that they would get what they yearned for: transformation, opportunity and prosperity. Politicians also use exaggeration to try and convince the electorate that they should be voted into power. This can be better understood if one analyzes the following messages on MDC-A and ZANU-PF billboards below (Figs. 5.2 and 5.3). MDC-A presidential candidate, Nelson Chamisa promised jobs for all in his jobs agenda. In Fig. 5.2, the

Fig. 5.1 Behold the New!: MDC-A Presidential Campaign Picture, 2018 (Source Business Day, 10 July 2018)

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MDC-A uses the Shona language to ensure that the message reaches as many people as possible as it is the language spoken by the majority of Zimbabweans. One may wonder if it is practical that everyone in a country can be employed. ‘Munhu wese kubasa’ (Jobs for all) is hyperbolic since it is practically impossible to employ all employable citizens in any economy. For example, a report on employment in the United Kingdom (May 2022) shows that the unemployment rate was at 3.7%. A strong economy like the UK also grapples with unemployment, yet a politician in a developing country like Zimbabwe promises employment for everyone. Whether this was going to be practical or not, a certain number of people were convinced that they would get employed if they voted Nelson Chamisa as their president in the 2018 elections. This is because the message was crafted in a manner that addressed what they expected. Similar hyperbolic messages are seen on some billboards for ZANU-PF presidential candidate (who finally won the 2018 elections) Emmerson

Fig. 5.2 MDC-A’s Presidential Campaign Poster: Behold the New: Jobs Agenda—Munhu Wose Kubasa! (Source Available @https://www.dreamstimw. com)

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Fig. 5.3 ZANU-PF’s Presidential Campaign Poster: Clean, Fresh Water for All (Source Available @https://www.dreamstimw.com)

Dambudzo Mnangagwa (infamously known by his initials E.D.). Many promises were made, albeit in an exaggerated way, to lure the electorate into voting for him. Apparently, this was the first time E.D. was contesting as a presidential candidate since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. He had been in government as a Member of Parliament and Minister for various ministries. However, in 2018, he was contesting for presidency, and thus, he had to make promises that would distinguish him from his predecessor, Robert Gabriel Mugabe. On the above campaign billboard (Fig. 5.3), ZANU-PF presidential candidate promised clean and freshwater for all. In the background, there are two seemingly rural women reading what is written on the billboard. They expect this promise to be fulfilled if E.D. wins the election. There is some exaggeration in this campaign message as it may not be easy to achieve this in just five years, yet it had been difficult for R.G. Mugabe and his government (which E.D. was part of) to achieve it in about thirtyseven years of continuous rule. The message is deliberately and carefully

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crafted to make the electorate believe that better things were coming in the ‘New Dispensation’ under E.D. Mnangagwa. If election results failed to bring bliss, then the expressive voters would be disappointed because the outcome would have brought blisters. On the billboard in Fig. 5.4, he promised to avail electricity to the whole country. Like Nelson Chamisa, E.D. Mnangagwa uses the Shona language to reach out to as many Zimbabweans as possible. ‘Kujekesa Nyika Yese Nemagetsi’ (electrifying the whole country) is hyperbolic since a growing economy like Zimbabwe may not afford to avail electricity to every part of the country, especially during a time when the populace is struggling to get basic needs like food and health care. If these promises were fulfilled, voters would experience bliss, but if they were not fulfilled, their hearts would be full of blisters as what they expected would never be fulfilled. As Bol et al. (2018) note, a voter regrets his/her choice if he/she realizes, after the election, that she made a choice that did not maximize his/her overall utility. Usually, politicians do not care about how the electorate would feel about the empty campaign promises but suffice it to say that the trick of using hyperbolic language in the run-up to the elections facilitated E.D. Mnangagwa’s victory in the 2018 presidential elections. On the billboard in Fig. 5.5, ZANU-PF promises the electorate affordable and quality health care. Everyone likes to have access to health care and such a promise is most welcome to the electorate. Politicians are aware of the people’s needs; hence, during campaigning, they target such things and come up with well thought-out messages to lure people into voting for them. In this case, the 2018 ZANU-PF presidential candidate promised affordable and quality health care which every normal human being yearns for. Because people need these basic services, they are left with no choice but to vote for those who promise to deliver such once voted into power. Below the main message on the billboard in Fig. 5.5, there is another message that is also carefully crafted to lure the electorate. It says, ‘Delivering the Zimbabwe you want.’ The electorate would, thus, consider how much it likes the party for which it votes (expressive utility), and how much its vote makes a difference to the party that is elected (instrumental utility) (Bol et al., 2018). In this case, the voter would vote for a party that promises to deliver the Zimbabwe he/she wants, that is, ZANUPF. The electorate votes with high expectations that what the politicians promised would be fulfilled once they are voted into power.

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Fig. 5.4 ZANU-PF’s Presidential Campaign Poster: Kujekesa Nyika Yese Nemagetsi (Electrifying the Whole Nation) (Source Available @https://www.dre amstimw.com)

On the billboard in Fig. 5.6, the ZANU-PF presidential candidate promises to be a listening president. God is Supreme and people try their best to obey his commandments. The ZANU-PF presidential candidate pledges to listen to the people’s voice as it is also the voice of God. This message is meant to make people believe that their voices would be heard in a democratic country. According to Munck (2014: 12) ‘democracy is about the value of equality, in the sense that every person who lives under a government has the same claim to freedom and thus should have his or her preference weighted equally.’ ZANU-PF promised to offer such freedom to the electorate in 2018. In a way, the bringing in of ‘God’ in the campaign message above would also attract those who call themselves Christians as they believe that God speaks to people through other people.

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Fig. 5.5 ZANU-PF’s Presidential Campaign Poster: Affordable, Quality Healthcare Guaranteed (Source Available @https://www.dreamstimw.com)

It is, however, interesting to note that critics have argued that politicians often make empty promises which they never fulfill. For example, a tweet by Professor Jonathan Moyo on 24 September 2022 claims that what politicians promised during campaigning in 2018 were mere empty slogans. He suggests that pre-election campaigning should be content based. Thus, according to him, politicians should give delimitations of what they would do and in what timeframe (Fig. 5.7). We have discussed what politicians do during the pre-election period and the ‘tricks’ they use to win the hearts of the electorate. On the Election Day, voters are given an opportunity to choose the leaders of their choice through the ballot, and within a short time, results will be announced. In the subsequent discussion, we examine what happens after the elections.

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Fig. 5.6 ZANU-PF’s Presidential Campaign Poster: The Voice of the People is the Voice of God (Source Available @https://www.dreamstimw.com)

The Post-election Period Post-election periods in Zimbabwe have always followed a similar pattern as far as events that happen after elections are concerned. A close scrutiny of the post-election events in Zimbabwe reveals that since its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has had almost similar or identical events that follow just after elections. The post-election period is a time period or phase in the electoral cycle, which reiterates that elections are an interlinked process whereby following or during the announcement of election results. The electorate patiently waits for the anticipated results. The voter regrets his/her choice if his/her party loses, that is, voter regrets as is defined by the utility theory. Theoretically, the post-election period is a

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Fig. 5.7 Jonathan Moyo’s comment on Zimbabwe’s Political Campaigns via Twitter (Source @ProfJNMoyo twitter handle)

period of evaluation by the voters on whether the party they voted for has performed well or not. According to the utility theory, expressive voting is when a voter assesses the voting of their party and how they performed. Thus, during the post-election period, expressive voting is put to test when the voter makes an evaluation of his/her voting rights of their party of choice. Resultantly, this post-election evaluation process would become the yardstick through which the elections are measured as bliss or blisters. The electoral processes are often complex and dynamic. Most often, the length of a post-election phase or period is determined by the election process. Blissful elections bring joy to voters who made the correct choice and may have a reasonably short post-election period, while blisterful elections may take longer post-election periods. This is due to the fact that in blisterful post-election periods, there is more of the security sector agency involvement, with more peace organizations involved and most often regional and international peace organizations get invited.

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This prolongs the post-election period or phase, making it the most blisterful period. Just the delays in announcing election results are enough to turn the period into a blister inflicting phase. While elections are conducted every five years in Zimbabwe, the postelection phase is usually placed near the end of the elections in order to take advantage of the freshness of events among the electorate and the commission of the elections. In Zimbabwe, due to unresolvable issues, post-election periods do not have any starting time and ending time. Most often, issues are carried over into the following elections while candidates and contestants are still haggling over the past election events. This on its own is an indication of how blister filled the post-election period is as far as the process is concerned. Having a post-election period that is carried over to the next election period is a clear demonstration of how blisterful a post-election period can be in Zimbabwe. Post-election Language Any contesting party manifesto is full of flowery language that is sweet to the ears of the voter. This would give an impression that the impending election would be very blissful. This is so in order to woo the voters. This is completely different in the post-election phase in Zimbabwe. Postelection language should be calm and soothing to the stakeholders of the election. It should be a language that should give hope in a reconciliatory manner to both the losing electorate and the winning electorate. The post-election language should be the basis of the future of a successful nation. Both the losing electorate and the winning electorate should shun violence-based language that characterized the election period; they should use language that is pregnant with hope for the future of the nation. However, this is not the case with the Zimbabwean post-election language. Due to the theoretical underpinnings of expressive voting, voters in the post-election period will be bitter with the impact of their voting, which may not have made any difference as they would have wished. The desire of the voter would be that their vote should be instrumental in achieving a win for their party. However, the blisterful delays in result announcement and an eventual loss would put a voter in the post-election period in a different language situation. Zimbabwe has had a history of political violence which usually escalates during the pre- and post-election periods (ZADHR Report, 2018). Makumbe, cited in Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva (2014), argues that

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at the attainment of political independence in 1980, ZANU-PF took on a commandist and regimentalist character rather than a democratic character in its operations. Violence has been part of virtually every election since 1980, with anyone who dares to oppose the establishment labeled a traitor whose ambition is to reverse the gains of independence (Masunungure, 2009). This has led to post-election blisters than bliss. Post-election Period Practices Since 1938, there have been activities that are carried out just after elections which might be labeled as post-election practices. It is, however, very important to note that any election has a post-election or challenge that it faces. Therefore, evaluating an election is important to address those problems or challenges. Post-election periods are periods synonymous with certain expectations and, hence, practices are formulated to be followed after elections. Such practices are for the improvement of the electoral process management and justice, that is, the review of the legal framework and to identify key areas needing reforms, the review of institutional performances, review and assessment of staff performance and need for professional capacity building, review of organizational collaborations between security sector agencies, justice and peace organizations, state and non-state actors. Post-electoral practices are also there to improve electoral security whereby the institutional performance of the security sector agencies is assessed and capacity building recommended if needed, and whereby collaboration with stakeholders is established for the purpose of next elections. Post-electoral practices are also carried out in order to improve the infrastructure for establishing peace after the election. With these practices in place, it is expected that the next election will be blissful rather than full of blisters. Makonye et al. (2020) suggest that since independence from British colonial rule in 1980, Zimbabwe’s elections have been inherently violent in their conduct, implying that they have been very blisterful. Pre- and post-electoral violence pervaded the 1980 general plebiscite that ushered in majority rule, but with so many cases of violence reported among the major contesting parties, such as the ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). Elections are considered an essential cog of democracy. Alleged manipulation of the electoral process by Mugabe’s ZANU-PF has conceivably led to protests and riots by supporters of the

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opposition party, the general citizenry and the clergy, including their followers. This has resulted in very violent and blisterful post-electoral dynamics in Zimbabwe. Makonye et al. (2020) suggest that the dynamics of post-electoral periods in Zimbabwe are centered around the militarization of elections, murder of opposition activists, ethnicity, war rhetoric, and narratives by the ruling party, destruction of opposition homes, violent land grab by the ruling party, draconian legislations, ruling party’s belief in a one party state, state sponsorship of violence, illegal sanctions, incitation of violence by the opposition, the absence of a succession plan on the part of the ruling party, political intolerance between parties, politics of the belly and polarization of political parties. This generally implies that elections in Zimbabwe are generically blisterful. Post-election Results Announcement During the results announcement, both the opposition parties and the ruling party electorate suffer deliberate delay in result announcement, propelling loud waging tongues and bad language. Since 1980, the postelectoral process has seen opposition party members being victimized and houses being looted in high residential areas like Chitungwiza, Highfield and Harare (Makonye et al., 2020). This means that even before the results are announced, the post-election period is marred by blisterful events of voters victimizing each other along party lines. Another example is when Zimbabwe held its national elections on 30 July 2018. According to Makonye et al. (2020), the electoral process was generally peaceful until 1 August 2018, when demonstrators took to the streets of Harare demanding the immediate release of the presidential election results. Arguably, the police failed to contain the situation and sought the assistance of the military, which fired live ammunition toward the unarmed civilians. Makonye et al. (2020) further reiterate that, by the end of 1 August 2018, at least six (6) people had been tragically killed, thirty-five (35) had been injured, and extensive damage and destruction of property had been caused. This is a perfect example of how a blisterful post-election period in Zimbabwe may be like. Following these incidents, on 12 September 2018, the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, His Excellency Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa, appointed a Commission of Inquiry in terms of Section 2(1) of the Commission of Inquiry Act [Chapter 10:07] through the Proclamation

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6 of 2018 published in Statutory Instrument 181 of 2018, to investigate matters of public welfare arising out of the tragic events in Harare on 1 August 2018 (Makonye et al., 2020). The article concluded that the coverage of the public hearings was polarized and that Zimbabwe is a divided and polarized state.

Opposition Parties The victory of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), in both the legislative and presidential elections, and the deadly crackdown on the opposition that followed seriously undermine the prospects for genuine Zimbabwean democracy since 1980. Post-electoral violence in Zimbabwe resulted in the murder of hundreds of MDC supporters and activists (Alexander & Tendi, 2008; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Dzimiri et al., 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2008). In the rural areas, the post-election period has seen citizens from the opposition parties being dislodged from their residential homes only because they are from the opposition parties (Dzimiri et al., 2014). For the opposition parties, the voting process has always brought blisters to their doorsteps, and hence, they are no longer able to justify the process and the need for voting. The opposition in Zimbabwe has come to know and understand that the voting process always causes blisters, and hence, the expressive voting process is of no use at all.

Ruling Party The deliberate ploy by the ruling party electorate to believe whatever the ruling party leaders say has seen a creation of a wild and misguided postelection period in Zimbabwe. Though there is clear evidence of some of the allegations by the opposition parties, the ruling party leadership and electorate choose to turn a blind eye and continue believing that everything is fine with the ruling party (Alexander & Tendi, 2008; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Dzimiri et al., 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2008).

Conclusion From the above analysis, it can be best assumed that most Zimbabwean voters are partly expressive and partly instrumental; they are faced with a

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two-choice voting, for their instrumental and expressive choice. The prevoting period to the Zimbabwean is a period of waiting in anticipation, and the post-election period brings blisters to the voter who desperately needs change as the presidential seat is won by the ruling party and partly, a bit of bliss as the candidate he/she voted for at provincial level won the race. The voter hopes that this candidate would implement the policies that were promised during the campaign period. So, voting in Zimbabwe brings different feelings to voters. The two main political parties, CCC and ZANU-PF, have put most Zimbabweans into a dilemma. The opposition CCC, by losing the presidential elections, means that the promises they made to the voter that they will fulfill what the ruling party failed to do during their reign have not been fulfilled. Also, ZANU-PF failing to deliver the promises it made during campaign brings blisters to the Zimbabwean voter. The Zimbabwean politician’s foxy and crafty language yields nothing but blisters to the earnest Zimbabwean voter.

References Africanews, 2 August 2018. Alexander, J., & Tendi, B. (2008). A tale of two elections: Zimbabwe at the polls in 2008. Politique Africaine, 111(3), 111–129. Bol, D., Blais, A., & Laslier, J. F. (2018). A mixed-utility theory of vote choice regret. https://www.researchgate.net. Accessed 15 September 2022. Bratton, M., & Masunungure, E. V. (2008). Zimbabwe’s long agony. Journal of Democracy, 19(4), 41–55. Business Day, 10 July 2018. Chari, T. (2018). Political communication in regressed democracy: An analysis of political party advertising campaign in Zimbabwe’s 2008 harmonised election. https://www.researchgate.net Chigora, P., & Chilunjika, A. (2016). Dealing with electoral fraud in Zimbabwe: A critical appraisal of the 2012 Electoral Act. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), 21(11), 29–34. Dawns, A. (1957). The median voter theorem. http://www.jastor.org. Accessed 15 September 2022. Dzimiri, P., Runhare, T., Dzimiri, C., & Mazorodze, W. (2014). Naming, identity, politics and violence in Zimbabwe. Studies of Tribes and Tribals, 12(2), 227–238. https://dreamstimw.com. Accessed 18 September 2022. Human Rights Watch. (2008). World report. Human Rights Watch. Isbell, T., & Appiah-Nyamekye, J. (2018). Ghanaians rely on radio and Television but support for media drops sharply. www.afrobarometer.org

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Kinder, D., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1981). Sociotropic politics. https://econpapers.rep ec.org Krause, K. (1997). A review of politics, policy and organisations. https://resear chgate.net Lewanika, M. (2019). Campaigning, coercion and clientelism: ZANU PF’s strategies in Zimbabwe’s presidential elections 2008–2013 (Unpublished PhD thesis). London School of Economics and Political Science. Makonye, F., Ehiane, S. O., & Otu, M. N. (2020). Dynamics of the preand post-electoral violence in Zimbabwe since independence in April 1980– November 2017: Research. African Renaissance, 17 (1), 95–120. Mapuva, J., & Muyengwa-Mapuva, L. (2014). The SADC regional bloc: What challenges and prospects for regional integration? Law, Democracy and Development, 18, 22–36. Masunungure, E. V. (2009). Zimbabwe militarized electoral authoritarianism. Journal of International Affairs, 65(1), 47–64. Munck, G. L. (2014). What is democracy? A reconceptualization of the quality of democracy. Democratization, 23(1), 1–26. Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights Report. (2018). Postelection violence monitoring. ZADHR.

CHAPTER 6

‘Shifting the Voting Burden to Others’: Abstainers and Turn Outers in Zimbabwean Elections Gift Mwonzora

Introduction It cannot be gainsaid that several Zimbabweans have been abstaining from elections for a long time, with the reasons varying (Laasko, 2003; Sachikonye, 1990, 2002; Sithole, 1997). Chief among these is the flawed electoral process. However, other reasons, including—but not limited to—diminished interest in politics, lack of socialisation or habituation in electoral processes, violence and intimidation, limited political choices, have also contributed to voter apathy. As one scholar opines, ‘in the Zimbabwean case, the need to educate the voters did not arise because of the novelty of multi-party elections, but because of a concern over their trivialisation that was evident given the level of voter apathy’ (Laasko,

G. Mwonzora (B) Unit for Institutional Change and Social Justice, University of Free State (UFS), Bloomfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_6

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1996: 225). Such reasons then explain the obtaining electoral behaviour among the generality of the Zimbabwean citizens. Relatedly, we also need to account for those who vote. There are reasons why they still believe in the power of elections. One is that they are convinced elections are the only route to choosing a government of their choice and liking (Dahl, 1971). Hence, through participating in elections, they are performing and exercising their civic, constitutional and citizenship rights and duties (Blais & Achen, 2019). To this end, their political participation expressed through voting is one way of fulfilling their rights and responsibilities as rights holders. Such actions are in sync with the democratic ideals as encapsulated in the national constitution, regional and continental protocols, and statutes, namely the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), as well as global covenants and conventions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). More importantly, we see that those who turn out to vote not only in Zimbabwe, but the world over believe in the power of efficacy to s/elect rulers who will govern the state. In this regard, by voting, voters place trust and faith in the political and electoral system. This is to suggest that they believe their efforts will be efficacious. Here, I refer to both individual efficacy and collective efficacy. Political efficacy, in general, is understood as ‘the feeling that individual political action does have or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties’ (Campbell et al., 1954: 187).

Theoretical Perspectives on Participation and Voter Behaviour In large part, the literature on conventional and unconventional forms of participation has tackled varied issues that drive or motivate citizen participation (Kaim, 2021; Stockemer, 2014). This scholarship speaks of agency and efficacy (Becker, 2004; Karp & Banducci, 2008). The literature underscores the role of agency and efficacy in driving citizenry participation, including in electoral politics (Condon & Holleque, 2013). To date, there is a handful of studies on why citizens also disengage in political and electoral politics (Glasford, 2008). This is apart from studies that speak of the party redundancy thesis (Enyedi, 2014). Others also elucidate how contextual and socio-psychological factors play a role in galvanising citizen participation in elections, and politics read more broadly (Mutz,

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2002). This strand of literature dwells on the socialisation thesis, which is a habit-forming attitude that can nurture from a young age (Inglehart, 1977; Quintelier, 2015). Others also speak of youth participation in politics by investigating whether youths are apathetic, or they are alienated from the political system (Dahl et al., 2018). On the global scene, a corpus of literature focusing on electoral integrity (Norris et al., 2014; Schedler, 2002) facilitates a better understanding of why citizens abstain from voting. The bulk of this literature largely illuminates how and why citizens in some jurisdictions choose to disengage from electoral processes like voting (van Ham, 2015; van Ham & Lindberg, 2016). This literature shows that trust deficit and low confidence in many elections make the electorate exercise their right to stay away from the voting booth (van Ham & Garnett, 2019). As van Ham (2012) notes, much of the world’s elections have been primarily viewed as unfree and unfair, as epitomised in the qualifications of flawed polls and rigged elections. Due to perceived notions of electoral manipulation, others then decide to shun participating in elections. By borrowing the analytical insights of Hirschman (1970), who developed the voice, exit and loyalty lens, some choose to disengage (i.e. to exit) from the electoral processes. Extant African election studies have also paid attention to all these barriers that affect electoral participation (Nwankwo, 2018; Nwankwo et al., 2017). Examples abound in countries like Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria, where issues around political violence have disincentivised voting (Gutiérrez-Romero & LeBas, 2020; Mac-Ikemenjima, 2017). One of the criticisms of this prodigious set of literature is that the questions around why some citizens choose to disengage from voting get subsumed in the more significant debates around electoral manipulation. To the extent that what primarily exists are generalised perspectives on voter abstention (Runciman, 2016; Ryabchuk, 2016). This lacuna merits a deeper scholarly analysis to offer a fine-grained and richer understanding of voter behaviour in the context of an ever-growing trend of voter abstention coupled with low voter turnout in many elections in contemporary Africa. In Zimbabwe, an expanding body of academic and policy scholarship deals with the integrity of elections (Masunungure, 2014; Sithole, 1997). This election-focused literature has long acknowledged the varied issues that engender electoral manipulation and contestation. Earlier research has also examined the nature of the political system and the country’s context in how it either inhibits or incentivises electoral participation,

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including voting (Laasko, 2003; Sachikonye, 1990, 2003; Sithole, 1997). Insights gleaned from this corpus of literature provide greater analytical purchase in examining voter behaviour and electoral democracy in Zimbabwe and Africa.

Zimbabwe’s Election History: A Reason to Stay Away from Voting Zimbabwe is a country that attained its independence from the white British settler regime in 1980 after a protracted period of armed struggle. Though many anticipated that the attainment of independence would yield electoral democracy, this was not the case, as witnessed in successive electoral contestations, particularly at the turn of the new millennium (Masunungure, 2004; Kriger, 2005). To this end, it is correct to observe that the country has had a troubled and tumultuous electoral history. Following the 1980 elections, there has been intense contestation and concerns over the integrity of the Zimbabwean polls (Bratton et al., 2016). To this end, the electorate has refrained from voting, discouraged by the enduring electoral manipulation by the incumbent Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. However, one could equate the decision to abscond from voting to throwing away the baby with the bathwater. Since then, the country was to hold subsequent elections in 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2005, March 2008–June 2008, 2013, and recently in 2018 (IFES, 2022) and another election due in 2023. Harking back to history, in late 1999, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, was formed from labour union and civil society ranks. Following its inception, it heavily challenged ZANU-PF’s electoral hegemony. The ruling ZANU-PF party responded by deploying political violence against opposition members, supporters, activists and sympathisers, including teachers in rural areas. This orgy of violence led to internal displacements and massive deaths through state-orchestrated murders and torture (Alexander & Tendi, 2008; Masunungure, 2009, 2011). Through such violence, some Zimbabweans developed an intense loathing of politics, particularly voting. An unintended consequence is that this use of violence in some areas also led to the electorate voting for the incumbent party in fear of reprisals. In some constituencies, this led to a surge in opposition support and victory. This surge was because the electorate abhorred the deployment

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of violence as a mode of political campaigning and mobilisation by the incumbent. The plausible argument is that in all these elections, the citizenry still felt they were efficacious insofar as their votes would count and lead to the victory of their preferred candidates. However, this has not been the case, particularly since the 2000 and 2002 elections. While the country has held a series of elections, these elections can be termed ‘elections without democracy’ (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002). This makes us rethink the potency of (flawed) elections as a medium of enhancing good governance in societies. It is against this context that it is worthwhile to reflect on what scholars term the ‘electoralist fallacy/ fallacy of electoralism’ ‘which equates elections with democracy’ (LustOkar, 2006: 457, see Karl, 1995). However, we see that in the context of Zimbabwe and elsewhere, the regularity of elections has not helped boost voters’ confidence as expressed in low voter turnout.

Turnout and Participation in Elections For citizens to participate in electoral processes, they need to trust the system. However, political scientists contend that trusting individuals can opt out of political and civic processes because they trust others to participate on their behalf (Pattie et al., 2003: 458). This claim appeals to generalised perspectives on social trust and how social trust also engenders disengagement and withdrawal (Gaidyte, ˙ 2015). But for others, they participate in civic and political processes based on their trust in the political/electoral system or institutions (Niemi et al., 1991). It is then unsurprising that people with a sense of political efficacy generally tend to participate in civic and political processes (Bernardi et al., 2022). However, looking at the Zimbabwean context, we generally see a diminished sense of political efficacy as expressed in how citizens disengage from voting. This brings us to the two-way definition of internal and external efficacy (Balch, 1974). Scholars conceive internal efficacy as an individual’s competence and feelings ‘to understand and to participate effectively in politics’ (Craig et al., 1990: 29). However, external efficacy is all about the citizenry’s perceptions of the government’s responsiveness to their demands (Converse, 1972; Craig et al., 1990). As Bandura (1997) opines, internal efficacy is about personal beliefs that one can produce effects through political action. Others, namely Verba et al. (1995), argue that political participation is underpinned by the desire to influence policy and the need to fulfil civic duties. Other

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scholars, for example, Almond and Verba (1963), speak about civic and political culture. In this regard, one can also contend that how the youth are socialised in political processes has a bearing on how they ultimately engage in electoral politics in the later stages of their lives. But in the Zimbabwean context, it is critical to note that it is not only the youth who abstain from voting as other age groups also opt not to vote. Scholars aver that socialisation and habituation in civic and political processes help to nurture civic and political orientations (Goerres, 2007). Consequently, this helps to embed a high sense of political efficacy and activism.

Voter Perceptions on Electoral Malfeasance Among the factors that disincentivised voters to participate in elections in Zimbabwe are issues around perceptions of political institutions. Generally, the Zimbabwean populace feels that no matter how hard they try, the election results will always favour the incumbent ZANU-PF party (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018b). It is not surprising that to this end, they maintain a defeatist attitude towards elections. This attitude is fuelled by sentiments that they will always be cheated of victory, hence their disinterest and non-participation. This point relates to the efficacy concept discussed in the preceding sections. To the informed voters, they weigh the prospects of their favourite parties, that is, whether they can win elections and ultimately political power within such contexts. After making these decisions, some decide not to be bothered by participating in elections when they know their preferred candidates will not win. This is notwithstanding the fact that the right to vote and participate in electoral processes is guaranteed in the Zimbabwean constitution under section 67 (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). The point is that the Zimbabwean electorate comprising the youth and the middle-aged population has become apathetic over successive years (Masunungure, 2011). To understand this apathy, one needs to look at the trust deficit enveloping the whole electoral process, mainly how citizens have come to view elections as a way of s/electing those who govern them (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005). Admittedly, one needs to locate this apathy within a country context. Previous studies have examined how and why Zimbabwean elections are primarily viewed and correctly so, as unfree and unfair since the coming of independence in 1980 (Dorman, 2005; Sithole, 1997). Since then, Zimbabwe has held successive polls. However, it is the quality and

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integrity of these elections that remains a subject of controversy. The menu of manipulation of the country’s elections is not only limited to fears of ballot stuffing and unfair media coverage of the opposition. It extends to the parcelling of farming inputs, implements and the politicisation of food aid in the rural areas (Kriger, 2005; Ndakaripa, 2020). Conversely, this has also incentivised rural citizens to participate in party and electoral activities. However, more importantly, those who disengage from participating in elections also exercise their agency by abstaining. However, others do participate by voting. It will, however, be simplistic to view Zimbabwean voters as a group representing one political party. The turn outers comprise voters who support and sympathise with the ruling party and those who support the opposition (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018b). While generally not so much concerned about policy and issue substance, those who support the opposition believe in voting to change the status quo (remove the incumbent). However, for those who support the incumbent, participation in the elections is the surest way to keep their preferred party of choice in power (Southall, 2013). Having said the above, the public mood regarding Zimbabwean elections has generally been indifferent and negative. This is because many view the flawed elections as avenues of rubberstamping the incumbent ZANU-PF regime. This has largely contributed to the apathy that pervades the Zimbabwean political scene.

Intimidation and Political Violence The effect of intimidation and actual deployment of political violence is a significant issue that hinders voter turnout in some contexts (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017). This has also been the norm in Zimbabwean rural constituencies (Alexander & Tendi, 2008; Kriger, 2005; Masunungure, 2011). However, it should also be understood that intimidation has worked both ways. It has been used to mobilise community members to vote because not doing so will mean they will be denied food handouts and agricultural inputs by the ruling ZANU-PF regime (Dendere, 2021; Meredith, 2018). Traditional leaders in rural Zimbabwe have thus utilised coercive methods to enhance turnout in elections (Kriger, 2012). Notably, the older generation and the poverty-stricken populace in rural areas have turned out to vote mainly because they are promised rewards of freebies or handouts to those who would have voted. In this regard, the ZANU-PF party has utilised hard and soft powers to mobilise voters.

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In terms of hard power, in some instances, intimidation, including physical violence, has also depressed turnout as citizens disengage from voting. This was particularly evident in the 2008 June run-off elections (Masunungure, 2011). Whereas some voters went on to vote due to the fear of the ZANU-PF youth militia, war veterans, army personnel and traditional leaders, some shunned the elections due to fear (Masunungure, 2009, 2011). Scholars have also established that in Zimbabwe, even in cases where naked violence is not deployed over the past elections, ZANU-PF utilises what is termed the ‘harvest of fear’ (Zamchiya, 2013). By the harvest of fear, the party resorts to the constant reminder of past episodes of violence. It is far from clear how this reminder of violence affects voter turnout (differently or similarly) across constituencies. However, what is beyond dispute is that most Zimbabweans end up shunning the electoral arena owing to political violence that has characterised the country’s political arena. In some cases, the fear of incumbent loss weighs hard on the shoulders of voters who live in, for example, highly charged political environments such as Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe in Mashonaland East province in Zimbabwe and elsewhere (Human Rights Watch, 2008). To this end, through the mobilisation of the ZANU-PF local structures and traditional leadership, voters turn out in record numbers to vote (Masunungure, 2009). However, the turnout in such constituencies remains a subject of debate considering that it might reflect incumbent support or it can be an act of vote rigging. It seems clear in other politically volatile environments; voters also vote to secure security (human security) (Hickman, 2011). This is particularly truer in contexts where witch-hunts and reprisals follow post-voting. The episode post-March 2008 elections where ZANU-PF unleashed violence under the ‘Operation code-named -Makavhotera Papi – Whom Did you vote for’ (Masunungure, 2011) is an illustrative example. Like a double-edged sword, intimidation has worked in either propping up voter turnout or breeding apathy within the Zimbabwean context.

Effect of Mobilising Structures on Voter Turnout Mobilising structures in society, namely political party institutions, election management bodies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs), family, educational, social networks,

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traditional leaders and communities, play a significant role in voter registration campaigns and actual voter participation (Mwonzora, 2020). Within this context, one can see that there has been spirited mobilisation by the Zimbabwean political parties for citizens to vote each time elections are due. Notwithstanding this strident push for voter mobilisation, a considerable chunk of the Zimbabwean youth, especially those in cities and towns, have in the past years stayed away from elections (RAU, 2013). An explanation for low youth turnout may be that politics is viewed as boring and not interesting. The reason for this also rests in the policies of political parties and the type of leadership that populates Zimbabwean party institutions (Musarurwa, 2018). The middle and older generations pack the ZANUPF, MDC and (now) Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) leadership. Consequently, the youth are left out of leadership and decision-making positions (Musarurwa, 2018). This breeds a sense of being left out, ultimately leading to apathy. There seem to be grounds for arguing that this heavy dominance by a gerontocratic class in politics has made young men and women view Zimbabwean politics as uninspiring. It seems clear this has negatively affected the zeal and enthusiasm of the younger generation to partake in party and electoral activities, including voting. Strictly speaking, the existing political parties in Zimbabwe do not capture or address youth issues with the vigour and attention these issues deserve. This neglect then has a negative effect on the mobilisation of the youth vote. These enduring neglects through policies and action continue to be a source of discontent and disaffection among the youth consequently breeding apathy and disengagement in politics and civic processes. This apathy is perpetuated further by party belonging and campaigning which often translate into partisanship and polarisation (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018b). Due to this polarised nature of the Zimbabwean political context and the associated violence that comes with political contestations, many youths then decide to stay away from political activities. Just to put the discussion into perspective, Zimbabwe is a country that is highly polarised along political party belonging (LeBas, 2006). To the extent that the negative energy characterising elections, particularly the violence, hate and inciteful language and the mudslinging affect electoral participation, especially for first-timers. Considering such a context, some citizens choose to abstain from elections.

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Government Responsiveness Turnout and apathy in elections largely depend on how citizens view the government in power. In Zimbabwe, as is elsewhere across the globe, the amount of attention people give to politics (political attention) or the value they attach to elections has, over the past decades, shaped their electoral participation (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018a). This participation is also shaped by what is termed as external political efficacy. While there are reasons to question the legitimacy of ZANU-PF rule, most Zimbabweans have over the years voiced their concerns on whether and to what extent the government responds to their individual and collective demands. These concerns are echoed in sentiments whether the voice of citizens (citizenry voice) will be heard (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). Such calculated decisions then inform whether they can participate or opt out of electoral processes. However, looking at the country’s declining political economy characterised by the high cost of living and poverty, many have thus viewed the government as unresponsive to their plight. Hence, they see no need to vote for an unresponsive government. Yet, for others, they feel the urge to participate in electoral processes to vote out a non-performing and unresponsive government.

Distrust in State Institutions It is beyond dispute that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) has been tainted and viewed with low confidence by the public (Mwonzora & Xaba, 2020). While this is not a comforting thought, it is telling of how trust deficit, perceptions of lack of autonomy, independence and credibility, and state capture have fuelled strong public sentiments of resentment towards the country’s EMB (European Union, 2018: 9). Like the sword of Damocles, this distrust in state institutions continues to hang around the neck of the incumbent and has led to political withdrawal, public cynicism and civic disengagement. In disengaging, citizens resort to voter apathy. Developed societies or democratic nations where you find citizens with high trust in their governments and confidence in state institutions as expressed in high voter turnout (high efficacy) seem to present a different pattern (Gaidyte, ˙ 2015). It is also apparent that what lacks in the Zimbabwean context is the administrative application by ZEC and legislation by parliament of electoral reforms contained in the 2013 constitution as well as in the Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry (Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry, 2018).

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Habituation and Socialisation It is public knowledge that the Zimbabwean urban youth has been shunning elections. This is mainly because they have not been socialised or habituated into political and electoral processes. Scholars note that one needs to be habituated or socialised to participate in civic and electoral processes (Gomez, 2013). This might happen from a young age. We can see this with the older generation. In Zimbabwe, the now older generation participated in the armed liberation struggle, and through the socialisation process, they got conscientised into political activism. We can draw parallels with the contemporary Zimbabwean youth cohort to this extent. This habituation also helped in socialising such a liberation cohort into the values of participating in civic and electoral processes. It is thus unsurprising that the older generation—especially the rural folk—religiously participate in electoral processes. Looking at the contemporary Zimbabwean youth, one can see that apart from perceptions of electoral manipulation and other institutional barriers, they are less worried about elections. This is not only because they are disillusioned with the electoral process (Musarurwa, 2018), but they suffer from unemployment such that their livelihood source depends mainly on the older generation.

Propaganda and Turnout To understand the turnout of Zimbabwean rural voters, especially the older generation and the uninformed voters, one needs to consider the deployment of ZANU-PF propaganda. For the past decades, ZANUPF has perfected the use of propaganda to the extent that it portrays those who vote for the opposition as ‘selling out’ on the gains ushered in by the independence struggle. In this prism, voting for the opposition is viewed as perpetuating neo-colonialism. It is framed as bringing back white minority rule through electing ‘appendages’ of the West (Masunungure, 2011). Unfortunately, the fear of perpetuating white rule under the misrepresentation that voting for the opposition would return the country to the West has found takers in some remote rural areas (Boone and Kriger, 2010). To the extent that some have turned out to vote in their numbers in defence of ZANU-PF (party of choice) as a way of keeping the West at bay. In such communities, anti-voting sentiments are perceived as acts of disservice to the country and nation.

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Negating the Civic Duty Although voting is every citizen’s civic and moral duty (Putnam, 1993) and is part of the broader citizenship rights, even the educated Zimbabwean youth who are reeling under a collapsed economy generally feel it is the duty of adults who can change the status quo on their behalf. Considering this apathy, it is arguable whether the country requires an electoral system like Australia, where voting is compulsory (Louth & Hill, 2005). This is mindful of the fact that in the 2012 census, Zimbabwe had 7.2 million eligible voters though surprisingly less than 5 million voted in the 2018 elections (NDI/IRI, 2018: 25). As scholars observe ‘in the past, however, young Zimbabweans have registered to vote and turned out at the polls in far smaller numbers than their share of the votingage population would allow’ (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018a: 6). This depressing reality makes one wonder whether people still attach importance to elections. The latter claim resonates with public sentiments of democratic disenchantment, whereby Zimbabwean citizens view elections as some ritualistic exercise done after every five years but do not produce the desired results. Unsurprisingly, citizens become apathetic and disincentivised to participate in electoral processes in such contexts. Within this context, it is worth rehashing the question posed by scholars regarding whether citizens fail to participate in civic life ‘because they can’t, because they don’t want to, or because nobody asked’ (Verba et al., 1995: 269).

Conclusion From the preceding discussion, it is apparent how several disablers and enablers counteract and incentivise the participation of the Zimbabwean citizenry in electoral processes. The reasons for abstaining from the elections do, however, seem to outweigh the motivation for participation. The former is influenced by the decline in political interest owing to enduring electoral manipulation, low efficacy, intimidation and political violence, diminished trust in political institutions, poor voter mobilisation and absence of early socialisation and habituation in electoral processes. Some factors disincentivising electoral participation also stem from political failings, party system (e.g. the winners takes-all model/first past the post electoral system), heightened polarisation and political economy. Cognisant of the above, there is a need for electoral reforms

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and democratisation of the electoral system. Doing so will help the citizenry to believe once again and have faith in the power and importance of elections. This confidence-boosting measure will equip the citizenry to think that their agency (political expressions) will subsequently count. Ultimately, citizens can build trust in the political process to the extent that they will have confidence that they can democratically s/elect leaders of their liking and choice through voting. However, despite the setbacks that hinder citizen turnout in elections, some Zimbabweans still vote as they believe elections are the only vehicle to transform their demands into actionable policies that will improve their livelihoods. Some see voting as an avenue to exercise and express their democratic, constitutional and citizenship rights by rewarding (voting for) the incumbent or punishing the incumbent (voting for the opposition) at the polls. In conclusion, there is no singular explanation as to why some specific groups of people turn out to vote or abstain in Zimbabwe, as the reasons vary. They range from individual (psychological), collective decisions and contextual factors (political, economic and social).

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PART II

Language, Politics and Elections in Zimbabwe

CHAPTER 7

The Interaction of Language and Politics: Polysemanticism in the Aphorism ‘We Died for This Country, so We Will Rule Zimbabwe Forever’ Esther Mavengano

Introduction The discourse about who qualifies to be in political leadership including the office of the president in postcolonial Zimbabwe remains unresolved. This subject is considered as one of the polemical challenges in Zimbabwe’s transitional politics (Hove, 2021; Moyo & Mavengano, 2021; Ranger, 2005; Sachikonye, 2011; Tshuma & Ndlovu, 2020). The

E. Mavengano (B) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa Department of English, Institute of English and American Studies, von Humboldt at TU (Technische Universitat Dresden), Dresden, Germany

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_7

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battle for power in Zimbabwe has created political impasse that sustains a problematic tense environment which debatably impedes transformative effort. It is alleged that ZANU-PF constructed a narrative of entitlement which is punctuated with images of blood, death and war massacres to discredit opposition contestants. It is also argued that the grotesque emblems are often deployed as essential tropes to caution audacious political opponents and ordinary Zimbabweans who talk about regime change (Muchemwa, 2010). Oddly, Mpofu (2016: 4) asserts that the concepts of heroism and Zimbabwean-hood are a ‘reflection of choices made by the powerful political elite.’ Arguably, this scenario interrupts the prospects of attaining democratic rule based on competing political participation and peaceful transition of power. The arguments about entitlement frequently centre on the legacy of the liberation war and imbedded in the political avowal ‘we died for this country, and therefore, we rule it forever.’ On the other hand, ZANU-PF justifies what it views as ‘keeping historical memory alive,’ not only as a way of remembering collective resilience but also as a claim of legitimacy. It is this political stalemate that calls for renewed conversations as the nation approaches its second elections after the removal of Mugabe. The current study explores the political dialectics and semantic implications of the engendered proclamation in Zimbabwe’s current political landscape. This context is significant as the Mnangagwa administration vows to depart from Mugabe’s model of leadership. The polemical questions that the study seeks to address are: Whose political ideology is embedded in the metaphorised narrative ‘we died for this country?’ Who is entitled to safeguard liberation legacy? Drawing discursive praxes from critical linguistics, political discourse analysis and conceptual metaphor theory, what meanings are conveyed through such a political philosophy? What could be done to generate new political perspectives in present-day Zimbabwe?

Multi-Perspectival Conceptual Field: Critical Linguistics, Political Discourse Analysis and Cognitive Metaphor Theory The study adopts an interpretivist qualitative research tradition which is relevant to the defined research objectives. Qualitative research design acknowledges the influence of the socio-political contexts and diverse viewpoints in meaning production (Berg, 2001). The key strength of

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qualitative research utilised in this study is that it seeks to explain the socio-political practices and behaviour as situated activities in the human world with the intention to develop nuanced readings. Conceptually, the study taps from an interdisciplinary and discursive site that harnesses insights from three related theories: Critical Linguistics (CL), Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) and Cognitive Metaphor Theory (CMT). The engagement with this eclectic theoretical orientation is informed by the knowledge about the complex nature of human communication. Together these theories could generate fresh insights on enunciations and intricacies of power in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. The current inquiry is significant as it is undertaken in the context of upcoming 2023 elections. While CL underscores the essence of probing or developing an open-minded approach to human communication (Fowler, 1986, 1987, 1991), PDA draws out an analytical gaze to the entanglement and discourse and its function including ideological purposes. CMT underlies cognitive dimension. Most importantly, these conceptual frameworks share a discernible focus on the relationship between language and its socio-cultural environment. Language, as it is understood in the Saussurean linguistics, is an autonomous abstract system which is also self-regulating and somewhat arbitrary in its genesis and its relationships with the non-linguistic world. This view of language which disregards the function of the social world in the use of language and meaning production received vehement contestation from linguistic scholars like Fowler (1986, 1987, 1991), Bakhtin (1981), Croft (1993), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Chilton (2004), van Dijk (1993, 1997) and Wilson (1990), among others. Van Dijk (1997: 11) expounds that critical-political discourse analysis examines the means by which ‘political power, power base or domination’ manifest in and are enacted through discourse structures and practices. It is thus appropriate to argue that an academic inquiry of the language-politics relationship offers illuminating and refreshing insights about politics in present-day Zimbabwe. Chilton and Schaffner (1997: 206) contend that ‘politics cannot be conducted without a conscious use language.’ In other words, these scholars, like Aristotle and Cicero, interpret politics as a discursive phenomenon that manifests in discourse through language use. Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) CMT also provides important discursive frames to read and understand the function of metaphorisation engrained in the examined discourse. From a cognitive linguistic theorisation, the practice of metaphorisation and meaning making follow the model of reasoning by

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analogy (Lakoff, 1993). This is done through the transference or cognitive cross-domain mapping of the received metaphorised information and the socio-contextual knowledge (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Following these related conceptual insights, this study aims to shed more light on the dialectics in the logic ‘we died for this country.’

Zimbabwe’s Historiography Used as Political Ammunitions or a Memory Retention? Commenting on the problematic politics of transition in Zimbabwe after the overthrow of Robert Mugabe, Hove (2021: 156) argues for ‘a polysemic understanding of the past,’ which significantly reminds us of the infant days in the post-independent Zimbabwe. Hove further points out that ‘the current intractable political problems in Zimbabwe can be traced to the majority-minority discourses and troublesome ‘national identities’ that compete with alternative visions of nationhood stirred by Robert Mugabe in 1980’ (2021: 156). His argument and observations about the importance of locating Zimbabwe’s current political troubles in postcolonial historiography offer salient entry points into the current discussion. Muchemwa (2010) asserts that from as early as in 1983, the former president, Robert Mugabe, and the ruling party constructed exclusionary ideas of a nation and nationhood which were anchored on disruptive politics and Otherisation. It is purported that in these nationalist narratives, the ruling elite emphasised a haunted past of the nation, interspersed with exclusions, cautious erasure of some historical details and foregrounded selected materials that were deemed fit for national archiving and commemoration (Muchemwa, 2010). In these warped narrations, Mugabe and his allies locate themselves as the only legends and liberators who heroically fought in a revolutionary war to dismantle colonial rule (Mpofu, 2016; Ranger, 2005). Most prominently, these powerful officials imbued their historiographical discourse with the intention to impose monological reality to use Bakhtinian terminology. Their account of the nation and its history as re-imagined by the ruling elite is driven by what Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (2009) could describe as the quest for single storytelling. Their narration of the nation intentionally erases or dislocates the perceived ‘outsider’ storytellers. The politics of memory was later assigned to talented ‘patriotic artists, war veterans and intellectuals’ like the late Vimbai Chivaura, Tafataona Mahoso, Godfrey Chikowore, Sheunesu Mpepereki and Claude Mararike among other

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‘appointed members’ within the ruling party. These ‘gifted patriots’ used their eloquent skills to ‘mis/educate’ the nation about ‘a re-imagined patriotic history.’ The pseudo patriotic intellectuals poignantly garrisoned the heritage of an autocratic ruling elite by distorting the nationalist historical memory. Despite this criticism, imagined nationalist consciousness was woven with some celebrated historical information such as references to sacrifices made and war carnages. Ranger’s (2005) title ‘rule by historiography’ is a telling evidence of how ZANU-PF monopolised power through a conscious appeal to the public memory. Yet, Tendi (2008: 380) notes that: Patriotic history divides Zimbabweans into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’, such that any direct opponents to the ruling ZANU-PF party and Robert Mugabe are automatically typecast as ‘sell-outs’, ‘puppets’, ‘un- African’ and ‘pro-colonial’, while supporters of ZANU-PF are classified as ‘patriots’. This patriot/sell-out distinction is also extended to the rest of the world, with those ‘against’ ZANU-PF branded ‘enemies’ of black Africa.

Tendi (2008: 279) further argues that ZANU-PF is projected as ‘alpha and omega of Zimbabwe’s past, present and future.’ Yet, according to Adichie (2009), single story telling has dreadful effects as it generates negative labels for those who are Othered. The story or a particular version is also always imperfect in the absence of other stories. Seidel (1985: 45) postulates that discourse ‘of any kind,’ is political because it serves as a site of struggle, a semantic space in which meanings are produced or challenged. Sadly, and deceptively, supporting the ruling party is the only criterion for one to qualify as a patriot citizen in Zimbabwe. Of note here is that nationalism as an enterprise or an ideology remains essential to the present-day Zimbabwean politics. This narrative has persisted to the existing period. This desires a great deal of rigorous academic questioning to foster fresh sensibilities of nationalism and patriotism as accurately argued by Ranger (2005).

Blood and Death Insignia: Metaphorisation and Polysemantic Signification This section provides an interesting rendition of the propaganda discourse during election time in Zimbabwe showing the shrewdness of ZANU-PF in using language and politicking as strategies to retain power. Halliday

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(1978), in his Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG), provides pertinent insights about how particular linguistic choices, such as lexical items including verbs, function to conjure up specific semantic and emotive influence. This points at how language is intentionally employed to create explicit and hidden meanings in human communication. Members of the ruling elite in Zimbabwe claim that they ‘died for this country’ to attain independence from British colonialism. For Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphor is not simply a linguistic or ornamental device or a stylistic resource, but rather, a cognitive phenomenon. In cognitive linguistics framework, metaphor is understood as mapping/s from a source domain onto a target domain (Croft, 1993). The oratory of metaphorisation in ‘we died for this country ‘evokes a collective memory of ‘patriots’ who gallantly sacrificed their lives to save their motherland from foreign intrusion. It cannot be denied that these heroes valiantly fought and won independence and, therefore, should be celebrated by the nation. Writing in a different context, Forest and Johnson (2002: 526) point out that the deployment historical events and artefacts whose memories transcend times bring the past to the present and make such events and symbols ‘effective in mobilising national movements.’ The use of a pronoun ‘we’ could be interpreted as an acknowledgement of combined and mass-based effort against colonial domination. The metaphor of the ‘living dead’ underscoring an embedded ‘bloodshed’ during the war speaks about the agony these ‘heroes’ went through just to protect their oppressed people. Strauss and O’Brien (2007: 2) call this ‘the politics affect’ because of its emotive or sentimental appeal. It is thus appropriate to argue that in the context of Zimbabwe, imagined patriotic history nationalism serves as ways of managing disgruntled citizens (Dansereau, 2005). The aphorism ‘we died for this country’ is a highly polysemous and hyperbolic saying that invites multiple interpretations. In this regard, the aphorism has also a silver lining if you want to look at some of the sacrifices made by the heroes of the liberation struggle. In other words, it is not everything which went south. Therefore, it is crucial to point out the positives of ‘dying for one’s country,’ although this may not pardon the wrong doings and excesses of the living heroes in the postcolonial era. Van Dijk (1993) notes that in political discourse, the prominence of self-presentation and negative Other presentation are fundamental rhetorical strategies. In the same way, Chilton (2004) remarks that certain metaphors are profoundly involved in shaping structures of political philosophies. Some of the living ex-combatants in power use the maxim

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that ‘they died for the country’ which for them becomes a currency to self-entitlement. It could also point to the physical death of their comrades who died in the war, whose blood becomes a currency for the surviving comrades who feel that they have to enjoy the fruits of the struggle on behalf of the dead. Nare and Mataire (2022: 292) observe that: [by] ZANU-PF’s standards, liberation war credentials are the most important attribute that one should possess in order to have any position of authority in government. Terms such as ‘comrade’ are revered and reserved for top liberation war heroes

However, to portray ZANU-PF officials as the only ‘dead and living’ heroes is misleading. This distortion of history comes together with misrepresentation of marginalised Zimbabweans who by implication ‘did not die to liberate the nation.’ The ZANU-PF dead/living heroes become redeemers of the nation, which is an evocation to biblical Moses and Joshua who saved the Israelites from Pharaoh’s wrath. This implicit analogy suggests how common Zimbabweans today, including members of the opposition parties, should pay tribute to only heroes from ZANUPF. Yet, talking about dying for the country, they need to look at the irony associated with the dying? Who died and who didn’t? Furthermore, are dead heroes included or are their relatives included? If so, to what extent compared to the living? In the light of the ZANU-PF perspective, who exactly did not die for the country? What about the masses that provided services like cooking food, sent on dangerous undertakings without even receiving military training to fight back or to protect themselves? The risk they took does not qualify them as dead living heroes? The same masses reported to the ‘comrades’ the whereabouts of soldiers even after being beaten or killing of their loved ones. What about women who were raped and traumatised by the fighting comrades who seriously required the satisfaction essential for them to continue with the battle? In some cases were left with children who have no totems? These thought provoking questions reveal how Zimbabwe’s historiography becomes a site of contestation. Even within the ruling party, some members lose their liberation/nationalist credentials after a fall out from favour (Gonye et al., 2017). Paradoxically, Zimbabwe’s current socio-political and economic realities interject the redeemers’ motif. For instance, it is absurd to associate modern Zimbabwe with the theological

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Promised Land that has milk and honey in abundance. Thus, the saviour motif in ZANU-PF’s discourse of entitlement creates political satire and strongly conveys existing political illogicalities. Contemporary Zimbabwe is a country where ordinary citizens languish in perpetual poverty, die in dilapidated hospitals due to insufficient medical equipment, just to mention but a few out of the numerous socio-economic and political ills (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009, 2011). In addition, ZANU-PF’s politics of Otherisation in the postindependence society is evident in ‘us/ them/ and patriots/ sellouts’ dichotomies. The dominant ‘us’ group is in power and controls national resources among other aspects, whereas the Othered/them group survives at the fringe of this political cosmos. As far as ZANU-PF is concerned, everyone who opposes its political thinking and practices is an enemy. While ZANU-PF leadership in its semantics of power claims to represent the interests of all Zimbabweans, the concept of Zimbabweanness as already stated assumes a monological sense (Muchemwa, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Mlambo, 2013, 2016). It is also appropriate to view othering practices rampant in ZANU-PF as traceable to the Cartesian binaries that were typical of the colonial era. ZANU-PF has this generation in its structures. These are people who during colonial rule experienced the restrictions that whites imposed on various aspects like right to vote, right to walk in First Street, right to drink clear beer, etc. The polysemantic nature of the liberation and entitlement narratives is evident because the ruling party also threatens to deal with ‘sell-outs’ and ‘enemies’ who try to dislodge it from its privileged position. When it comes to elections, ZANU-PF officials including Mugabe are on record declaring that regime change is not going to take place through the outcome of a ‘ballot box’ (Bratton & Masunungure, 2011). The ruling party’s stubborn politicking undermines the democratic processes. Such a political culture is an antithesis to the claim for patriotism, as ZANU-PF’s threat that it will go back into the ‘bush’ generates semantic dissonance. The threat is directed at civilians who are the very people the party claims to protect. Fairclough (1989: 129) rightly asserts that ‘an ideology of the powerful class is turned into a universal belief through the process of naturalisation.’ Similarly, in Foucault’s (1980) vocabulary, powerful members of the society are part of regimes of truth whose knowledge is imposed on the population. Cognitive linguists, Lakoff and Johnson (1980), postulate that metaphors are deployed to map ontological correspondences across

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conceptual domains (source and target). If we are to analyse further, the death and blood metaphors embedded in ZANU-PF’s narrative of entitlement can provoke more nuanced connotations. For example, when one literally dies, what is left behind is a cadaver or human remains. This corpse cannot be kept among the living humans, since it is a body without life or mind which is in the process of decomposition. Going by this analogy, it could be argued that the self-serving politicians and officials in the present government in Zimbabwe are metaphorically dead and in a state of decomposition. Hence, unbefitting to continue ruling the living. It is also appropriate to think about the ‘figuratively dead officials’ in terms of zombie signification. Zombies are human corpses that mystically come back to life mostly to haunt the living. They are blood-thirsty, insensitive, vicious, life-threatening and domineering. This cognitive mapping is imperative with regard to the understanding of political relations between rulers and the ruled in current Zimbabwe. Since zombies resemble humans, they certainly deceive their human preys. In a context where the nation is constructed as a collective ‘we’ family’ to which all citizens belong, it is quite obvious that these politicians are naively seen as part of the national family. The apparent obsession with blood and blood-shedding, which is accentuated especially during election campaigns, speaks about a developing predatory state in Zimbabwe (Bratton & Masunungure, 2011). The zombie political characters have lost conscience and remembrance of the ideals of the liberation struggle. In their egocentric pursuit of power, they disregard the plight of the living populace. Chitando and Tarusarira (2017) affirm that Zimbabwe is considered as a product of bloodshed ‘Zimbabwe Ndeye ropa’ and only those who can spill blood again have the mandate to rule. The implication here is that if the opposition parties are not ready to kill or get killed, then, they must forget about ever taking power in Zimbabwe. Muchemwa (2010) has earlier on condemned what he called ZANU-PF’s obsession with bones, blood and the cemetery. As a logic of political survival, the war narrative is usually used to fuel political violence especially during elections. Furthermore, Nare and Mataire (2022: 292) contend that ‘a deep attachment to the liberation struggle has overshadowed almost everything else which had seen the party focusing on the past rather moving the country forward.’ They go on to explicate that although the protracted liberation war is a fundamental element of Zimbabwean history and its significance cannot

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be challenged, there is need to move past the struggle and concentrate on the growth of the country (Nare, & Mataire, 2022). ZANU-PF’s lethal and kamikaze political narratives produce schemes of segregation, elimination and separations between the alleged enemies/others/unpatriotic/puppets/sell-outs and the privileged ‘patriotic’/citizens, nationalists (Mavengano & Hove, 2019; Mavengano, 2020). Such a narrative serves as a re-enactment of the fictive Orwellian world in Animal Farm where the pigs enjoy the privileges of a ruling class at the expense of the rest of animal kingdom (Orwell, 1945). However, it is imperative to note that the ruling elite sometimes presents its oppressive ideological worldview ‘under the pretext of celebration the all-inclusive nation,’ for instance, during ‘fetished’ activities such as the Independence Day and Unity Day commemorations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009:946), Galas, Biras and State funerals (Muchemwa, 2010).

Change in Crisis or ‘Crisis of Change’ in Zimbabwe From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the aphorism ‘we died for this country’ attracts several possible readings. It has been mentioned that ruling elite in some cases uses it as the logic of electoral violence against the opposition. ZANU-PF appears to be ‘deliberately erasing’ the fact that the masses including the members of opposition parties today were also victimised and some lost not only their loved ones but also their limbs during the war. Southall (2013) opines that, what further complicates Zimbabwe’s political landscape is the troubling entanglement of the ruling party, the army and the state. It is from this context that Helliker and Murisa (2020: 10) problematise the notion ‘post-Mugabe era.’ They claim that such a construct is misleading because it assumes that Mugabe’s legacy has been undone when that is not the case. In addition, the practices of Mugabeism ‘are not reducible to Mugabe the person as they are embedded within ZANU-PF organisationally’ (ibid, 2020: 10). Likewise, Chigudu (2019: 211) highlights a perpetual political problem in Zimbabwe: The ruling party boasts that it cannot lose power through the pen, meaning through a vote. One wonders why the elections are ever conducted. Perhaps just for window dressing and to hoodwink the international community.

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Chigudu’s remarks speak about what Moyo and Mavengano (2021) refer to as change in crisis. Although the Mnangagwa-led government has and is still trying to distance itself from Mugabe’s reign, the autocratic discourses have not yet ended. The unfolding socio-political situation and the use of language in the political discourses speak about a sad continuity of despotism and practices of callousness against dissenting voices (Hove, 2021). As a result, the nation endures political stagnation. The everyday negation of the political Other or ‘stripping of rights’ in Agamben’s (1998) theorisation of sovereign power is quite visible and has increased its rhythm in Zimbabwe’s politics as the nation approaches the 2023 elections. Surprisingly, this is typical of Mugabe’s oppressive regime. This is not in sync with the highly publicised discourse about a new dispensation that is claimed to embrace democratic principles. Liberation rhetoric continues to be used by the ruling party to justify its cling on power. It is usually during election times that ZANU-PF always throws all cautions and pretences to the dogs and enforces violent means to win elections at all costs. The urgency of peace-building and national development is not always recognised (Mavengano & Marevesa, 2022). The security forces gunned down protesting civilians in Harare on 1 August 2018 before the announcement of the results of the presidential elections. This incident is one among many telling cases of political intolerance in post-coup Zimbabwe. Certainly, this situation exposes a bewildering lack of thoughtful consideration by the ruling class to stop political conflict in order to promote peace and national growth.

‘Riding on the Croc’: Can It Be a Benevolent Gallop for the Nation? The ascendancy of the current President of Zimbabwe, Emerson Mnangagwa, to power brought a respite to a populace that was weary of Mugabe’s autocratic rule (Hove, 2021). In the same vein, Chigudu (2019) states that the removal of Mugabe was expected to provide an opportune moment that would redefine the political culture in Zimbabwe. The exhilaration was augmented by an anticipation of a shift from Mugabeism, a dictatorial political philosophy and culture as the notion is theorised by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009, 2015). However, it appears to be a difficult feat for Mnangagwa whose political apprenticeship was done by Mugabe for more than five decades since they met during the liberation war. The change of power from an old horse, as

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Mugabe was generally christened by his critics during his last days, to a crocodile (croc), which is Mnangagwa’s wartime nickname, brought to the fore a new political reality. ZANU-PF and Mugabe have been in power for too long and the political culture they adopted cannot be easily dislodged from Zimbabwe’s political life (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). The old horse imagery symbolically condemned Mugabe-led government’s incompetency and failure. It is from this context that even though the rise of the croc was questioned by some sections of the society and international institutions, the simple fact of Mugabe’s removal from the office was viewed by many as a political achievement on its own. It is, thus, necessary in this study to examine the metaphor of a croc as symbolic representation in the context of post-Mugabe political leadership in Zimbabwe. The significance of this context in semantic evaluation is explained by a number of modern language philosophers. Bakhtin (1981) underscores that the social context offers a semantic dimension which is germane in contemporary linguistics. In other words, language (including figures of speech) is considered as a socio-political phenomenon whose use is determined by the immediate context. Gibbs (1990) offers illuminating insights about comprehending figurative referential meanings entrenched in metaphoric expressions. What then are referential meanings of the croc metaphor? In a different context, Nesi (1995: 272) describes ‘a croc metaphor as symbolising someone with a big mouth but not good with their hands.’ It is also common knowledge that a croc is a vicious and sneaky reptile which uses its mouth to attack and tear into the flesh of its victims. It is strategic and makes well-calculated attacks of its oftentimes gullible prey. The croc, which is a noxious predator in this regard, symbolises a life-threatening scenario which can be arguably figuratively resembles the English analogy, from a frying pan into the fire. This cognitive topology or image schema structure, if applied to the reading of political discourse, conveys a troupe of a dictator. The nation under the care of a croc conjures up a telling imagery which fits into Fisher’s (2006: 51) notion of fearism… ‘an experience of fear that is normalised…keeping the cultural matrix of fear operative.’ Furthermore, the malicious traits of a croc are more frightening than that of an ‘old horse’ whose most obvious fault was inability to gallop in a racecourse (governance). Although Mugabe’s failure as a political leader cannot be merely associated with this simplified interpretation since during his reign, he also demonstrated vicious characteristics. Yet, the point remains relevant because the fact that Mnangagwa outsmarted Mugabe to an extent

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of toppling him from power speaks about how cunning and vicious Mnangagwa could be when dealing with his political contenders. From the unfolding socio-political realities in post-coup society, it is apparent that the mere removal of an incumbent head of state leaving the entire political system in place does not yield any significant transformation (Mamvura, 2021; Mlambo & Gwekwerere, 2019; Ndlovu, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020). There are numerous unresolved issues such as political intolerance and electoral conflict that continue to hamper a possible transformative process (Helliker & Murisa, 2020; Roger, 2017). Such as, a toxic political culture survives through the use of what Mbembe (2006) theorises as ‘grammar of violence’ to scare potential opposition parties who protest against dissatisfaction of electoral practices and violence among other political problems. Those who are labelled sell-outs live in precarious socio-political conditions to use Judith Butler’s (2004) words. Like the pigs of Orwellian fictive world, ZANU-PF and its allies declare entitlement to the material, financial resources and power at the expense of Othered citizens (who are less animals) (Moyo & Mavengano, 2021). The suppression of political freedoms takes place in the context where Mnangagwa repeatedly vows to be a ‘listening president’ who values the voice of the people because it is ‘the voice of God’ (Chimininge, 2019; Takudzwa, 2022). The sarcasm in the words is evident. Seemingly, the demise of Mugabe is not the end of history of autocracy in reminiscence of Fukuyama’s (1992) hypothesis, although in another context. Paradoxically, the ‘voices of those marked as political outsiders do not matter at all. The present political epoch is deeply marked by Mugabeism’ (Noyes, 2020). It is the voices of the ruling class that assume divine power just like the voice of God. Southall’s (2003) remarks about the challenge of moving beyond a difficult legacy remain relevant in understanding troubled transitional politics in modern-day Zimbabwe. Mnangagwa’s pledge to depart from Mugabe’s harmful legacy is not yet put into political practice in current Zimbabwe. Conscious use of language that promote national unity, reconciliation and serenity is essential in the transformative politics of post-Mugabe Zimbabwe (Mavengano, Marevesa & Nkamta, 2022). Thus, the system of Mugabeism as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) contends remains uninterrupted.

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Concluding Remarks As a way of concluding, the study reflected on the semantic possibilities embedded in the construction of the narrative of entitlement. The claim serves a site of contestation and evokes multiple interpretations in the context of current political landscape. This includes functioning as a narrative of remembering the national history although this is a disputed argument. The aphorism also fuels a toxic political biosphere since some citizens become the marginalised subaltern whereas others are considered privileged patriots who are entitled to rule Zimbabwe forever. In this regard, the Mnangagwa-led administration is found wanting as it fails to implement transformative measures that speak to the desired turnaround. This has given birth to increased pessimism about the prospects of living in improved socio-economic and political conditions. It is thus necessary to consider alternative political dispensation that could bring about peace, reconciliation and development of the nation. All citizens, not just a ruling class, are entitled to freely make political choices through a transformed electoral process. The study concludes that ordinary Zimbabweans are still dejectedly ensnared in a cul-de-sac national space that greatly reminds them of Mugabe’s rule. It all boils to an aphorism by a selfish click justifying its greed and decision to cling to power at a time they have failed and proven to have no capacity to rescue the situation. Drawing from these observations, what then is the ideal political framework for creating and sustainable environment? This study does not claim to provide comprehensive solutions. Rather, it concludes that the entitlement narrative is also meant to muzzle opposition voices of those who occupy the subaltern positions in Zimbabwean political landscape. Therefore, it recommends that there is an urgent demand for transformations of political thought and practices in contemporary society. The political space should be open to all interested competitors and the ruling party should desist from undermining electoral processes. The problematic politics of patronage should as well be addressed to permit freedom of political choice. It cannot be overstated that the current government needs to encourage diversity in political participation and cultivate new national ethos that embrace inclusivity and foster unity in difference.

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CHAPTER 8

Stoking the Flames of Conflict in Zimbabwe’s Electoral Terrain: Detecting and Reporting Hate Speech in Online Media Tichaona Zinhumwe

Introduction Hate language has remained a huge problem in Zimbabwean politics and the media. The dawn of the Second Republic under President Emmerson Mnangagwa in November 2017 raised hopes of the people of Zimbabwe for political tolerance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020). Mnangagwa promised a shift from the late President Robert Mugabe’s authoritarian rule, which was characterized by negative discourses that incited hostility and hatred for members of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Media Monitoring Project (MMPZ) (2009), Mare and Tsarwe (2015). At his inauguration, Mnangagwa offered an opportunity for political tolerance and a pathway towards a peaceful and inclusive country (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020). Despite Mnangagwa’s grandstanding, the occurrence of hate speech has continued. This study

T. Zinhumwe (B) Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_8

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provides an analysis of how hate speech from ZANU PF and CCC politicians were detected, framed and reported in ZimEye, Zimbabwe Mail Daily and New Zimbabwe. Mnangagwa’s claim to roll back Mugabe’s legacy of political hatred and hate speech will also come under scrutiny, to find out if there has been a let up in the use of hate speech by political actors under his rule. The by-elections witnessed a resurgence in the use of hate speech in political discourses with politicians directing abusive statements to their opponents. The framing theory is deployed to investigate hate speech in news stories and how readers discerned meanings. Critical Discourse Analysis is employed as a methodological tool to deconstruct meanings embedded in hate language. Fairclough (2013) points out that the intention of critical discourse analysis is to raise consciousness of the power of language in shaping events and influencing readers and the audience’s views. The chapter also wishes to assess whether hate speech spewed by the politicians influenced the audience to act violently against perceived enemies.

Background The origins of hate speech in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the 1980s when The Herald and other public media relentlessly maligned and disparaged the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) opposition leader Joshua Nkomo during political disturbances in Matabeleland and some parts of the Midlands, known as Gukurahundi (Sibanda, 2021). The Gukurahundi (a Shona word meaning the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains) claimed more than 20 000 lives at the hands of the state (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ) and The Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) (2001). The word Gukurahundi was used as a metaphor to show the dehumanization of the Ndebele people and their re-construction under Mugabe as the “other” in Zimbabwe’s political matrix during this sad period (Sibanda, 2021). Mugabe’s government regarded civilians in Matabeleland at that time as rubbish that had to be washed away by the government militia, the 5th Brigade. Zimbabwe’s elections since 1995 have been plagued by allegations of irregularities characterized by violence and hate speech (Mashingaidze, 2016; MMPZ, 2009; Zimbabwe Peace Project, 2009). Violence in the 2008 re-run campaign period was unprecedented in the country’s electoral history and it has continued to rear itself in subsequent elections. In addition to electoral violence, has been the extreme

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use of inflammatory and intimidating hate speech by politicians, and this has been reported in the media (MMPZ, 2009). Studies at hand on hate language and electoral politics in Zimbabwe focus on official mainstream public and private media as theatres of hate speech and they generally blame Mugabe and ZANU PF politicians for using inflammatory language against opponents (see Mare & Tsarwe, 2015; MMPZ, 2009; Munoriyarwa & Karombo, 2020; ZPP, 2012). Mainstream media especially the national broadcaster the ZBC, The Herald and Sunday Mail has during elections behaved like campaign posters, churning propaganda and hate language on behalf of their preferred politicians and political parties (Munoriyarwa & Karombo, 2020). This study differs in its approach, in that it tries to detect hate speech in unregulated web-based private online media outlets which are generally regarded as alternative news platforms to the official media. The curiosity in this research follows what I view as an apparent dearth of studies on hate speech in unregulated online publications which sprouted at the turn of the century and offer citizens important sites for political intercourse. Through the Zimbabwe Media Commission and the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe, the government is the principal player in media policy and regulation and because of the controls, this has denied some citizens especially members of the opposition CCC space and airtime on the public media. As a result of this, the opposition is resorting to online publications to access and articulate political messages without fear of government restrictions. While the online publications are providing an alternative public sphere with a counter hegemonic script to mainstream public media, little is known about how they are dealing with hate speech. MMPZ (2009) points out that the most evident dangers of hate speech and its effective dissemination in the public domain is that it encourages hate crimes against targets of hate speech. Hate speech by its nature arouses hostility and public contempt for individuals who are targets to an extent that they no longer deserve to have their basic human rights protected (ibid.). Maina et al. (2010) state that hate speech or incitement to violence by politicians, community leaders or journalists has resulted in massive violence and mass killings in many countries across the world. In Rwanda, hate propaganda through the Kangura newspaper and Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) whipped the Hutu population into a killing frenzy against the Tutsis and paved the way for the genocide in 1994 (Mafeza, 2016). Referred to as hate

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radio station, RTLM was founded and owned by political actors associated with hardliners within the ruling regime who were responsible for organizing and implementing the genocide. RTLM spewed hate speech against the minority Tutsis and close to a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed during the Rwandan genocide. Kangura and RTLM used symbolic language to stigmatize and dehumanize the Tutsi (Mfeza, 2010). Tutsis were given a set of characteristic labels such as cockroach or Inyenzi (ibid.). Whereas the RTLM and Kangura openly took sides with the genocidaires in Rwanda, this chapter seeks to reflect on how Zimbabwe’s independent online media framed hate speech.

Literature Review There is no consensus as to what hate speech is, rather different authors provide different definitions. To unpack hate speech, the study uses working definitions from various authors.

Problems in Defining Hate Speech Munoriyarwa and Karombo (2020) note that it is difficult to define hate language because the concept is subjective. One of the early scholars on hate speech Spertus (1997) defines hate speech as abusive messages, hostile messages or flames. Sood et al. (2012) identifies hate language as insults and profanity with malicious intent while Xiang et al. (2012) focus on vulgar language and profanity related offensive content. Noriega and Iribarren (2011) who made conducted a study on hate speech on American commercial talk radios define it as divisive language that involves the use of us-versus-them framework to position perceived opponents or those with different worldviews as enemies. They categorized hate speech into five domains namely: divisive language, dehumanizing metaphors, false facts, flawed argumentation and violent speech. This study uses three of the domains namely divisive language, flawed argumentation and dehumanizing metaphors to locate hate speech in ZimEye, Zimbabwe Mail and New Zimbabwe. MMPZ (2009) gives a broader definition of hate speech and describes it as “use of language intended to degrade, intimidate, or incite violence or prejudicial action against a person or group of people based on their race, gender, age, ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, language ability, moral or political views,

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socio-economic class, occupation or appearance, mental capacity and any other distinctive liability”. The study adopts the MMPZ definition as it is broader and covers political hate language.

Hate Speech and Journalistic Ethics Ideally, the media should be instruments of conflict resolution and to give information that respects human rights and promote peace (Mare & Tsarwe, 2015). In their study on the role of the Zimbabwean mainstream media in triggering violence, Tsarwe and Mare noted that the media is often complicit with politicians in fanning political violence. They advocate for peace journalism, which they argue promotes responsible journalism. Its approach strives to promote stories that highlight peace initiatives in order not to bring harm to society. Online media has increased the availability of content deemed harmful on the Internet (Manganga, 2012). To understand how the online publications can contribute to the spreading of hate speech, the study steps into the realm of the Internet. The Internet is regarded as an arena for opinion exchange which goes beyond regulation (Manganga, 2012). Over the last few years, social networks in Zimbabwe have experienced a surge of abusive and toxic behaviour motivated by hate (ibid.). The Internet is viewed as a theatre for opinion exchange which goes beyond regulation as anyone who has a computer and a connection can express themselves (Staar, 2004). Because of such unregulated freedoms, the Internet makes itself a tool for a controversial representation of social realities (ibid.). In this way, these platforms enable anyone to express themselves freely and this encourages the dissemination of hateful content on the web. Chari (2009) points out that Internet-based publications and social media has become a democratic public sphere for circulating ideas that could have been muzzled by the by state-controlled media platforms such as The Herald, Sunday Mail and the ZBC. He notes that the online newspapers and websites that focus on Zimbabwe that should provide impartial and balanced stories are also embroiled in polarization. He identifies main ethical challenges faced by online media practitioners as among them the gate keeping role of editors which he argues has been subverted by the Internet resulting in the quality of media products being compromised. Chari (2009) argues further that Journalists no longer feel compelled to adhere to ethical cannons of their profession owing to certain qualities of Internet journalism such as instant

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publication which makes journalists take less time to check their stories thereby undermining journalism ethics. Consequently, journalism ethics such as exercising responsibility, fairness, impartiality and objectivity are being sacrificed because Internet journalism is not regulated. Chibuwe (2020) notes that fake news and mudslinging became defining elements during the cyber-contestation on social media especially Twitter, WhatsApp and Facebook between Chamisa’s followers nicknamed “Nerrorists” and Mnangagwa’s followers nicknamed “Varakashi”, as they battled for the votes of the Zimbabwean electorate in the July 2018 elections. Be that as it may, it should be noted that the government of Zimbabwe has been making efforts to censor the cyberspace and online publications deemed hostile to it, (Karekwaivanane & Msonza, 2021). This culminated in the enactment of the Data Protection Act in 2021 which seeks to punish those who abuse social media and Internet and communication networks. But some digital and cyber experts warn that the Act infringes on media freedom, free speech and promotes self-censorship. As the political temperatures rose ahead of the 2023 elections, politicians used inflammatory language at rallies and other platforms recorded by online media outlets, to express their ideologies and to malign their opponents.

Hate Speech and the Law Although Sect. 61 sub Sect. 5 (a–d) of the Zimbabwe Constitution recognizes instances when the right to freedom of expression may be legitimately restricted, there is no legislation that directly regulates hate speech. The section restricts freedom of expression and freedom of the media when this is likely to lead to incitement to violence and advocacy of hate speech or injury to a person’s reputation. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act refers to media conduct in their coverage of elections. The act compels the media not to promote political parties or candidates that encourage violence or hatred against any political party or class of persons in Zimbabwe. Despite the existence of laws that restrict hate speech, politicians flagrantly violate them with impunity. At international level, freedom of expression as it relates to hate speech is addressed by protocols determined by documents like the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) of 1965 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICPPR) adopted in 1966 by the United Nations. Article

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4(a) of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) states that signatories shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred. Public authorities and public institutions are prohibited from promoting or inciting racial discrimination. ICERD obliges governments to condemn and eliminate racial discrimination by both public institutions, officials and private individuals. According to ICERD, three situations constitute offences punishable by law and these are dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin. With regard to discrimination, Article 20(2) of the ICPPR states that any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. While Zimbabwe has legal safeguards to guard against hate speech and is a signatory to these international articles, hate speech continues unabated during election periods.

Framing Theory, Slanting the News Tuchman (1978) defines news as the social construction of reality and points out that news media set the context in which citizens discuss public issues such as elections. Tuchman further argues that news is a window on the world and through its frames, we can learn about ourselves and others. Frames organize strips of the everyday world or any other of the multiple realities. Tuchman defines a strip as an arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity. Thus, frames turn happenings of the day to a discernible event. Without the frame, Tuchman posits that events would be happenings of mere talk. Framed, the strip becomes recognizable and it imparts meaning to an occurrence. Another constituent feature of a news frame is that frames both produce and limit meaning. A frame can be defined as a central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration (Tankard, 2001). Frames are sometimes defined by those in power and then picked up and transmitted by the news media. Framings of news are suggested by particular devices that are used during the processing of news stories. These devices include headlines, leads or beginning paragraphs and pull quotes (quotes taken

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from an article and set in large type). The online publications used headlines and news leads to frame hate speech stories and this influenced the way the readers interpreted the issues. Without media frames, according to Tuchman (1978), much of what happens and what is said in the world will remain mere talk and incomprehensible sounds. Framing helps journalists to quickly and routinely process large amounts of information and for audiences who may rely on those reports to understand the world. Entman (1993) argued that framing is the selection of some aspects of a perceived reality, making it more salient in a text. Framing covers the discourse, or the way the story is told, in terms of the arrangement, emphasis or de-emphasis and magnification or diminution of any of the elements of the news content such as headlines, quotes, leads and photos. Framing of news in the mass media can systematically affect how recipients can perceive news. English sociologist Stuart Hall (1997) theorized the phenomenon of preferred reading which offered a good illustration for how readers may or may not agree with ideologically coded messages depending on their own positioning. What is particularly important is that ideology operating within representational mediums such as the press is not a simple matter of top down domination as Gramsci’s theory of hegemony encourages us to believe. Readers of ideological messages can exert power onto the text when decoding. The potential for a reader to hold a negotiated or oppositional position in relation to such texts is always present.

Critical Discourse Analysis Critical discourse analysis pays attention to the linguistic component of language use in the media and it contends that news is a representation of the world in language (Kareem al-Utbi, 2019). The underlying ideological positions and perceptions of power relations can therefore be determined from the textual structure of media content. Thus, analyses of media discourses can assess the ideological practices of representation through use of language by the publications. Van Dijk (1993)describes Critical Discourse Analysis as a new cross discipline that comprises the analysis of talk in virtually all disciplines of the humanities and social sciences such as anthropology, ethnography and media. Critical Discourse Analysis is multidisciplinary in origin and sometimes shares interests with disciplines that study social groups and social structures such as politicians and the media. As such, Henry and Tator (2002) point out that

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Critical Discourse Analysis can be used as a tool for deconstructing the ideologies of the mass media and elite groups such as politicians. Fairclough (2013) points out that the intention of critical discourse analysis is to raise consciousness of the power of language in shaping events and influencing readers and audience’s views. Critical discourse analysis is employed in this study to unpack political ideological standpoints and underpinnings of their discourses. The study tries to give a deeper understanding of the way language is used to persuade and manipulate both individuals and social groups to commit hate crimes. Furthermore, the study identifies hate speech in political discourses and analyses how it is framed in the online publications. By doing this, it is necessary to understand if hate speech is likely to change or influence the way the audience think about targets of hate speech. The research is qualitative, and it used Critical Discourse Analysis to study spoken words from politicians and written language from stories retrieved from ZimEye, Zimbabwe Mail and New Zimbabwe archives. There is an endeavour to question how the online publications make a reproduction of the represented political ideologies from ZANU PF and CCC politicians. The study seeks to answer the following question: How is hate speech framed, detected and reported in online publications? Critical Discourse Analysis identifies and analyses three types of statements that were directed to targets of hate speech and these are: divisive language, that is, us-them constructions, dehumanizing metaphors of animals and insects which attacked opponents and flawed argumentations or fallacies to validate claims. Critical discourse analysis also unpacks political ideological standpoints and underpinnings of their discourses. This gives a deeper understanding of the way language is used to persuade and manipulate both individuals and social groups to commit hate crimes. This will help to understand if hate speech is likely to change or influence the way the audience think about targets of hate speech. Austin’s speech act theory is used to analyse how language or utterances was used to make an instruction to audiences implicitly. The theory emphasizes that the utterances have a different or specific meaning to its user and listener, other than its meaning according to the language. Hence, this study seeks to find out if speeches by politicians were interpreted by the listeners as a different act from that intended by the speaker. Interviews were conducted with two academics and two journalists. This was done to elicit data on how hate speech could be detected in political discourses and to demarcate where freedom of speech should end.

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Although political hate speech is endemic in Zimbabwe, I will analyse five stories so as to avoid redundancy by picking many stories. Each story is a representation of issues to be analysed under the categories of hate speech. Data will be presented and analysed thematically based on the three categories of hate speech used in the study.

Findings The electoral environment during the by-elections campaign period were characterized by acts of violence, intolerance and use of hate speech. Preachers of hate language recorded during the period under review comprised politicians, religious cum political leaders and online media outlets who reproduced the toxic language from the perpetrators. Findings identified instances and news reports in online publications deemed to be inflammatory, offensive and abusive.

Categories of Hate Speech Five stories were analysed in accordance with Noriega and Iribarren’s (2011) categories of hate speech. The study used the categories of divisive language, flawed argumentation and dehumanizing metaphors to locate hate speech in the publications. The stories should be thought of as a representation of hate speech and revealed an amalgam of problems regarding the issue. The stories were selected and retrieved from the publications websites. They were coded based on the news impact they made using news values such as prominence, conflict and human interest. Although there are exceptions, Harcup and O’neill (2016) point out that news stories must generally satisfy news values such as the power elite, conflict and relevance if they are to be selected. Stories concerning powerful individuals such as politicians and carrying negative overtones such as conflict are good news for the news media. They should also be relevant to readers. Invariably, the main perpetrators of hate were senior government officials and politicians such as Vice President Costantino Chiwenga, former security minister Owen Ncube, CCC spokesperson Fadzai Mahere and CCC deputy chairperson Job Sikhala who were originators of inflammatory and abusive language. Lowly ranked politicians such as Abton Mashayanyika were also caught making inflammatory comments. I discovered that politicians from ZANU PF and CCC defined news frames

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of hate speech and the online media outlets then picked them up and transmitted them without editing out hate speech. In doing so, the publications failed to create a peaceful co-existence between Zimbabwe’s political parties. Tankard (2001) suggests a list of eleven framing mechanisms or focal points for identifying and measuring news frames and these are: headlines, subheads, photos, photo captions, leads or intros, source selection, quotes selection, pull quotes, logos, statistics and charts. The study identified four framing devices used by the publications during the processing of news. The headlines, leads or beginning paragraphs, photos and quotes were selected to study hate language. Their diction was sensational and influenced the way readers ended up interpreting issues. It can be argued that by quoting offensive, threatening and abusive language without condemning it, the online publications were complicit in acting as messengers of hate speech. They became instruments for creating a polarized society that characterizes Zimbabwe’s national psyche today, as the country titters towards the 2023 election.

Hate Speech---The Offenders and Victims The most violent period during the by-elections was during the campaign period before the March 26 by-elections in Kwekwe, to fill a vacant parliamentary seat. A CCC supporter was stabbed to death in Kwekwe by suspected ZANU PF supporters. Addressing his supporters, Zimbabwe’s Vice President Constantino Chiwenga who is also ZANU PF’s Second Secretary issued a warning to CCC and its leader Chamisa and threatened that ZANU PF would crush them like lice. He likened the ruling party ZANU PF, to the Biblical Philistine giant Goliath which would have no problem crushing the opposition. He belittled the CCC and described it as a small and insignificant party. The story appeared in New Zimbabwe 27 February 2022 under the headline “We will crush Chamisa like liceChiwenga”. It also appeared in ZimEye on the same date with a headline “Ruling party ready to crush Chamisa like a “lice” says Chiwenga”. Chiwenga said: I have heard others here saying down with triple C, let me assure you that there is nothing that it can achieve, you see how we crush lice with a stone. You put it on a flat stone and then flatten it to the extent that even flies will not make a meal out of it. That is what we are going to do to CCC. We are a Goliath and CCC is a small insignificant party. You can’t

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just oppose for the sake of opposing. You oppose every time. You want to oppose who?

Lice are tiny, wingless, and parasitic insects that feed on human blood. Timmermann (2008) notes that metaphors comparing victimized individuals or groups of people to insects or disease-carrying animals is dehumanizing and enables human beings to convince themselves that others are valueless and sub-human. He contends that such utterances change the thinking and behaviour of audiences and conditions and prepares them for hate crimes such as genocide. Before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, hate speech was a political tool mainly used to mobilize Hutus to kill the Tutsi. The inciters of genocide and the media frequently described their targets the Tutsis as inyenzis or cockroaches, which should be exterminated. Noriega and Iribarren (2011) posit that metaphors characterize targets of hate speech, and they are used in non-human terms to depict them as virulent pests or repulsive reptiles. They stress that the metaphors are not merely rhetorical flourishes but they are the key components with which the public’s concept of the targets are re-inforced and articulated. ZimEye and New Zimbabwe did not help matters; their screaming headlines had the effect of exacerbating an already tense situation. Respondent one, a media academic avers that the language used by Chiwenga as reported by New Zimbabwe and ZimEye went beyond freedom of expression and represents hate speech which may amount to calls for violence against political opponents. The incendiary speech by Chiwenga had an effect on the intended ZANU PF supporters. Is it a coincidence that ZANU PF supporters killed a CCC supporter in Kwekwe a day after Chiwenga threatened to crush the CCC like lice? New Zimbabwe and ZimEye who quoted Chiwenga’s virulent speech verbatim were complicit in spreading hate speech. They should have toned down on the diction in their headlines. They should practice selfcensorship; they are the gate keepers and should edit out hate speech from their stories in order to create a peaceful co-existence between Zimbabwe’s political parties.

While online journalists interviewed said they are aware of their social responsibility to guard against hate speech in their stories, they need it to sell the copy. Respondent two a journalist said:

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Naturally, when a story is likely to stoke hatred or anger, it is not fit for publication but at the same time the anger or hatred (in the story) need to be exposed to stir conversations, it sells the story.

According to the Austin Speech Act Theory, language may be interpreted by the listener as a different act from that intended by the speaker. This makes it difficult to distinguish hate speech from political rhetoric. Listeners pick up the meaning of a speech act differently. It may appear to listeners to say something completely different from what the speaker infers. Austin problematizes the speech act and argues that the uttering of a sentence is part of the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as just saying something. It is therefore important to find out if political rhetoric or utterances using figures of speech can lead people to take violent action against perceived enemies. Respondent three an academic in linguistics said: Listeners pick up the meaning of a speech act differently. Chiwenga may have used the metaphor of the lice to explain the ernomity of defeat ZANU PF was going to inflict on CCC, it may mean they were going to inflict a crushing defeat on CCC. It may not mean the physical crushing of CCC and its supporters.

Figure 8.1 shows the picture of Zimbabwe’s Vice President Constantino Chiwenga who threatened to crush the CCC like lice, (Courtesy New Zimbabwe). Framing of news pictures involves the selection of certain thematically related news attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular news object is reconstructed and represented as a news report (Tuchman, 1978). The picture in Fig. 8.1 created the news context within which the readers located, perceived, identified and labelled the Vice President with what is happening in the story. Respondent one said: Chiwenga’s hand gesture and his facial expression resonates with his threat to crush CCC like lice. The picture frame that we get here is of someone who is intolerant to other views, and this can stir readers’ animosity towards the Vice President.

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Fig. 8.1 We will crush Chamisa like lice-Chiwenga

See no Evil, Hear no Evil The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) is yet to arrest a clergyman and ZANU PF politician Bishop Abton Mashayanyika who threatened the CCC leader Chamisa with death. The story was published by ZimEye on 13 July 2022 under the headline “Mnangagwa loyalist openly threatens to kill President Chamisa”. There is an attempt by the headline to besmirch President Mnangagwa. Instead of naming Mashayanyika who is the culprit in the headline, ZimEye tried to drag Mnangagwa into the saga. The reading of the headline is that Mnangagwa could be linked to the threats on Chamisa. New Zimbabwe published the same story under the headline: ZEC fails to condemn threats of violence against Chamisa; Says never came across the statements . Mashayanyika used disparaging figures of speech such as “sell outs” and “witches” to stir hostility against Chamisa and his supporters. Mashayanyika said:

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When we say down with a witch, we mean the witch should be killed. When we say down with sellouts, we mean they should be killed and when we say down with Chamisa, we mean he should be killed. Have you understood that? So, when I say down with them, you must respond emphatically, knowingly fully well what I mean. Down with the CCC! Down with Chamisa!

Respondent four, a journalist said: While journalists remain conveyors of uttered words, there is little they can do to determine the language used by politicians. However, it remains imperative for journalists to remain professional and shun conveyance of such hate and derogatory language. Journalists should not quote harmful and hateful content from politicians. However, at times hate speech avails trending opportunities which tend to attract more views.

Despite openly inciting violence, Mashayanyika is a free man. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), mandated by the laws of the country to run peaceful elections, has not condemned threats of political violence that were issued to Chamisa. ZEC spokesperson Jasper Mangwana said the commission did not come across the threats and in any case, they have no jurisdiction in matters that involve political opponents issuing threats of violence, (New Zimbabwe, 16 July 2022). The ZEC Act compels the media not to promote political parties or candidates that encourage violence or hatred against any political party or class of persons in Zimbabwe.

Othering Political Opponents The CCC was also complicit in spreading hate speech. ZimEye published a story under the headline Journalists assaulted by ZANU PF Thugs on 25 August 2022. It quoted opposition CCC spokesperson, Fadzayi Mahere’s twitter handle saying ZANU PF “thugs” had assaulted CCC supporters and the journalists who intended to attend a rally that was set to be addressed by party leader Chamisa who was on a campaign trail in Gokwe during a by-election in June. New Zimbabwe also published the story and used the headline: Gokwe violence: Chamisa motorcade attacked; Journalists beaten up by suspected ZANU PF Thugs . Mahere said:

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Violence perpetrated by Zanu PF thugs has broken out at the venue of the Gokwe Kabuyuni Rally. Zanu PF thugs are assaulting citizens who had come to attend the rally.

Mahere used the words “ZANU PF thugs” twice in two subsequent sentences to describe ZANU PF supporters. Respondent two said: The word “thugs” tarnished ZANU PF supporters and implied they are violent people like robbers and murderers. Mahere could have used the word “supporters” instead of “thugs” to describe the ZANU PF people. It is a clap-back, Mahere is speaking back to ZANU PF assaults, and this is in conformity with the golden journalistic rule of the right to reply.

The political context during which Mahere made the inflammatory speech should be negotiated to fully gauge the likely impact of the discourse on the audience. Although the language used is divisive, no political violence broke out after the speech.

Inflammatory and Intimidating Hate Speech Owen Ncube, a former Minister of State Security, threatened to unleash violence against CCC supporters whom he described as “sell-outs”. He promised that violence against them in 2023 would be worse than what was witnessed during the 2008 Presidential run-off election when more than 200 opposition MDC supporters were killed in an orgy of violence after Morgan Tsvangirai defeated Mugabe in the first round of the Presidential election. Zimbabwe Mail published the story under the headline Mnangagwa’s ally vows brutal 2023 election violence worse than 2008, while New Zimbabwe published it under the following headline Mudha threatens bloody 2008 violence. Addressing ZANU PF supporters in Mberengwa, Midlands’s province, Ncube said: I would like to assure Mberengwa residents, elders, those who listen and those who will be alive, that 2023 will be worse than 2008. We will not allow Nelson Chamisa, a stray cat, to take our inheritance. While Mnangagwa escaped a bomb attack, survived ice cream poisoning, and jumped the border, Chamisa has never done anything heroic.

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van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), in their study on pragmadialectical approach to argumentation note that a direct personal attack, namely abusive ad hominem, is one that is directed to the personality of the opponent and aimed at discrediting the opponent as a serious discussion partner. The attack involves a negative characterization of the opposing party in terms of his/her character, skills or abilities. Rather than addressing Chamisa’s ability as a political leader, Ncube dismisses him based on illogical reasoning. There is an error in logical reasoning, the interlocutor (Ncube) attacks the person Chamisa rather than what he stands for. Walton (1987) argues that a standpoint should be defended by relevant argumentation and their interlocutor should use appropriate language in defending their standpoints. A ZANU PF politician reiterated Ncube’s utterances: You have been told that 2023 will be worse than 2008. We will not just leave you while you are selling out. Even during the liberation struggle, there were sellouts, but they were dealt with. Some left their grandchildren. If you sell out, we are going to deal with you in a crude way.

Respondent two said: All these are lies that are being cooked to portray Chamisa as an agent of the West so that people who are still bitter with colonialism will not vote for him. The word “sellout” had a sinister meaning during Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. If the guerillas labelled you a sellout, it meant instant death by execution. Ncube is threatening the CCC supporters with death if they continue supporting Chamisa.

Danesi (1993) points out that a major weapon in a liar’s arsenal is name calling, which is intended to hurt someone’s reputation. The liar can accuse and discredit opponents by accusing them of untruthful wrongdoing. ZANU PF calls CCC a puppet of the West to malign them. The Zimbabwe Mail’s lead to the story reads: Mudha Ncube, a top Zanu PF official in Midlands Province and a close ally of President Emmerson Mnangagwa, has threatened to unleash an orgy of violence against opposition members ahead of the 2023 general elections.

The role of a lead or introduction in a news story is to hook the reader into reading the article or convince them to read the article. The lead

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makes a statement that summarizes what the article is about. The choice of diction used in the introduction such as “a close ally” creates the impression that the President connived with Ncube to issue the threats.

Stoking Flames of Hate Speech Kana pane munhu weZANU PF ari pano enda unotaurira Mnangagwa kuti uri mupurwa wemunhu. Unoona munhu achiti tucha tucha ndosapota ZANU PF. Taneta, vanhu vedu vashungururudzwa. (If there are ZANU PF supporters here, go and tell Mnangagwa (Zimbabwean President) that he looks like a monitor lizard. No sensible person supports ZANU PF. Our people are tired of this regime.

This is a sound bite from a speech that got Job Sikhala, a senior CCC official arrested for inciting violence during a funeral wake for Moreblessing Ali, a CCC supporter who was murdered and mutilated by a suspected ZANU PF supporter in Nyatsime. New Zimbabwe published the story under the headline Police Confirm Job Sikhala’s Arrest as Nyatsime Burns. The speech was followed by an orgy of violence involving CCC and ZANU PF supporters in the area. Mupurwa is a Shona word for the monitor lizard, a hideous reptile which combines characteristics of a snake, dragon and crocodile. Respondent three said: The utilisation of animal, reptile, insects and other unflattering figures of speech excite public contempt for those individuals or groups who are its targets. The Sikhala speech dehumanised its victim (Mnangagwa) as a valueless sub-human. The speech changed the thought of its listeners and prepared them for hate crime. Sikhala stirred up emotions of his supporters and violence followed his speech. Although Sikhala did not burn the property of ZANU PF supporters, his words did.

Although ZANU PF supporters were involved in violence, the use of name calling and melodramatic language to describe them is hate speech and unethical journalism. The most evident dangers of such hate language and its dissemination in the public domain is that it encourages hate crimes as happened in Nyatsime where the use of emotive language by Sikhala exacerbated an already polarized situation, leading to violence.

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Conclusion Zimbabwe’s well-documented incidents of hate speech and election violence continue unabated, there is no difference despite the change from the Mugabe regime to Mnangagwa’s administration. Political discourses continued to take belligerent overtones and this increased violence during the local and parliamentary by-elections held in 2022. Although the contribution of online media publications to election discourses cannot be underestimated as they provided breaking news to readers offering them real-time news feeds to audiences, they perpetuated hate language during this period as they quoted hate language without editing it. The study established that the most evident dangers of hate speech and its dissemination in the public domain is that it encourages hate crimes against targets of hate speech. The use of emotive language exacerbates politically polarized situations as can be evidenced in the Kwekwe and Nyatsime incidents during which violence broke out after political leaders used inflammatory and abusive language to address their supporters. Online media institutionalized language to transfer certain political ideologies when they quoted without editing toxic language from politicians. Journalists should abide with codes of ethics and not allow inflammatory language from politicians in their stories. Freedom of expression and hate speech should not be confused. Freedom of expression allows journalists and politicians to share their views without fear, but hate speech offends the audience and subsequently fuels disunity among citizens. The study recommends that journalists should maintain the middle of the road approach when covering politicians. It is imperative they hold politicians accountable and should call them to order when they spew vitriol on social media. It would be good for online publications to not to publish or broadcast offensive messages by politicians so that the messages do not go viral. More importantly, online media should continuously raise awareness on the need to utilize online media for nation building and to inculcate a culture of tolerance.

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CHAPTER 9

Hate Speech Within the Electoral Political Processes in Zimbabwe Bernard Pindukai Humbe, Sophia Chirongoma , and Nomatter Sande

Introduction In this chapter, we examine various forms of hate speech uttered by various Zimbabwean political, religious and community leaders. In an endeavour to provide a contextual understanding of the hate speech excerpts, the chapter also discusses the Zimbabwean electoral political processes. Hence, in our exploration of the various hate speeches, we

B. P. Humbe (B) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] B. P. Humbe · S. Chirongoma · N. Sande Research Institute for Theology and Religion at the University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa S. Chirongoma Midlands State University, Zvishavane, Zimbabwe N. Sande West Midlands, UK

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_9

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juxtapose the viewpoints of the members of the ruling party, ZANU PF and its supporters, regarding the situation in Zimbabwe, with those of the opposition parties and other critics of the government. It documents the ruling party’s venomous verbal attacks on its political opponents and its critics in civil society as well as outlining the responses of those that have come under attack. It also discusses the provocative and fiery language used and the intransigence exhibited by some opposition parties and some of their supporters, particularly the youth. In unison with Kika et al. (2020), our chapter notes the recurring similarities in the rhetoric used before and after the “new dispensation” in 2017, although the language has become increasingly immoderate and unrestricted.

The Constitution of Zimbabwe on Fundamental Human Rights The Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment 20 of 2013) guarantees various fundamental rights. These include the absolute right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment [Sect. 53], the right to demonstrate peacefully [Sect. 59], the right to freedom of expression and of the media [Sect. 61], and the right not to be unfairly discriminated against on such grounds as their ethnic or social origin, religious beliefs, political affiliation or opinions [Sect. 56(3)]. One of the founding principles in the Constitution is the principle of good governance, which binds the State and all institutions of government, and this includes “a multi-party democratic political system” [Sect. 3(2) (a)]. In line with this founding principle, the Constitution provides for various political rights such as the right to make political choices freely [Sect. 67(1) (b], the right to participate in the activities of a political party of their choice [Sect. 67(2)(a)], the right to campaign freely and peacefully for a political party [Sect. 67(2)(b)], the right to participate in peaceful political activity [Sect. 67 (2) (c)] and the right to participate, individually or collectively, in gatherings or groups or in any other manner, in peaceful activities to influence, challenge or support the policies of the Government or any political or whatever cause [Sect. 67(2) (d)]. The various portions of the Constitution cited above are testament to the fact that it propounds for an open society, which respects the freedom, humanity and dignity of all persons, a society which does not make any room for hate speech. Paradoxically, the history of the

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Zimbabwean electoral process in the first dispensation under the leadership of the then President Robert Mugabe is infamously known for spats of anarchy, intolerance and election rigging. Following the abrupt end of Mugabe’s reign for almost four decades, November 2017 ushered in a second republic, under President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The “new dispensation” promised new reforms including, freedom of speech and respect for human rights among other sweeping changes (Kika et al., 2020). However, it is now five years after the inception of this new dawn, there seems to be no end in sight when it comes to halting the churning out of hate speech.

Why and How Hate Speech Is Dangerous Seemingly, there are some contestations associated with the dictates of the Zimbabwean constitution on free speech. Since every person has a right to hold and express their opinion, the same can also be categorized as hate speech. This implies that in the electoral political process, there is a tendency of censoring free speech by labelling it as hate speech. This hate speech is propagated through a variety of media including statements uttered by senior political, religious, business and societal leaders. History has proven that hate speech has the propensity of inciting violence. Hate speech is public speech expressing hatred towards a group based on grounds such as their ethnicity, political affiliation or religion. The purveyors of hate speech stigmatize and vilify members of the group concerned and incite the public to despise them, discriminate against them and even physically attack them (Kika et al., 2020). According to Malunga (2020) “Incitement is a very dangerous form of speech because it explicitly and deliberately aims at triggering discrimination, hostility and violence, which may also lead to or include terrorism or atrocity crimes”. In view of Malunga’s view, in the build up to election times in Zimbabwe, hate speech that does not reach the threshold of inciting violence is not something that the democratic political landscape feels threatened by. What prompts free speech to be called hate speech is the idea of incitement. Hate speech covers many forms of expressions which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred, violence and discrimination against a person or group of persons for a variety of reasons. It poses grave dangers for the cohesion of a democratic society, the protection of human rights and the rule of law. If left unaddressed, it can lead to acts

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of violence and conflict on a wider scale. In this sense, hate speech is an extreme form of intolerance which contributes to hate crime (Kika et al., 2020). It is also important to acknowledge that although hate speech does not trigger incitement in various ways, hate speech remains impactful. Depending on who has used it, it is a weapon to endorse and reinforce impunity and to beam a spotlight on political leaders.

Blame Game and Retaliatory Hate Speech Since the formation of Zimbabwe’s main opposition party MDC, MDCT, MDC-A and subsequently the CCC, the ruling party, ZANU PF has been on a rampage demonizing the opposition parties as the progenitors of economic problems. Opposition leaders are often scapegoated for economic woes rooted in profound structural problems. It has become a norm that ZANU PF has vented their anger towards opposition members. For instance, the plummeting economy, rising unemployment and runaway inflation are all being blamed on the opposition, whose main crime is said to be that they are the instigators of economic sanctions which they invite from the West. On 25 October 2019, Zimbabwe President Emmerson Mnangagwa attended a rally against Western sanctions in Harare. Similarly, on 25 October 2022, there was another massive antisanctions rally organized by the ruling party in Harare. Like Mugabe, his predecessor, Mnangagwa, blames the sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union since 2001 for the economic ills and he contends that the sanctions are being orchestrated by the main opposition party, with the intention to topple his party from power. ZANU PF has been blaming the MDC; MDC-A and currently the CCC under Nelson Chamisa for the challenges faced by Zimbabwe today. The MDCA and subsequently the CCC is branded as an imperialist party sponsored by the western powers with the main goal of assisting the West to engineer the regime change agenda. Hence, the ZANU PF party refers to the opposition as western imperialist lapdogs designated as zvimbwasungata in Shona (Kenneth Takudzwa, 2022). Addressing the huge gatherings at these anti-sanctions rallies, Mnangagwa used very strong language and he described the Western sanctions as a “cancer” sapping the economy. He put it succinctly, “Every part and sector of our economy has been affected by these sanctions like a cancer”. This had a strong bearing on the behaviour of his supporters who denounced the sanctions during marches held around the country (Dzirutwe, 2019). So, ZANU PF politicians

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have targeted senior Opposition officials as part of a widespread electoral strategy to galvanize ZANU PF patriotism and nationalism. For example, on the 27th of July 2022, in a tweeter handle, ZANU PF PATRIOTS, one of the ZANU PF officials tweeted that “Chamisa will never lead Zimbabwe, never!! Zimbabweans will never give a sanctions beggar a national leadership position”. As noted by Humbe and Mawere (2016), the opposition is negatively painted as a cohort of “sell-outs”. Furthermore, leaders of the opposition and their supporters are derided as enemies of the revolutionary gains that came with sweat and blood. There has always been a retaliatory use of hate speech each time ZANU PF accuses the opposition of inviting the sanctions to Zimbabwe. The main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, which has since metamorphosed into the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) has continuously objected and they have never tired restating that they are not the cause of the country’s economic crisis. For instance, in his response to the 2022 anti-sanctions protest, Advocate Nelson Chamisa the leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition charged that “The greatest sanction in this country is ZANU PF and ZANU PF being the head of sanctions against the people must go” (Garusa, 2022). This has led the other portion of the Zimbabwean populace to regard these anti-sanctions campaigns as meaningless. Hence, some people are no longer taking them seriously because in some quarters, critics of the current regime are unveiling evidence to support the view that the government is the chief culprit in abusing citizens. Besides the issue of sanctions, ZANU PF has used regional elections to sarcastically communicate its perpetual grip on power. For instance, the Permanent secretary in the Ministry of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services issued the following cynical statement after Hichilema won the Zambian elections in 2021: In the folklore of matrimonial unions, there is always that bridesmaid who is never destined to marry. She will be part of a number of bridal crews but for her, the BIG Day will never come. After each wedding, the newly-weds make new friends and stop communing with certain “singles.”

Clearly, Nick Mangwana used the above statement to mock and scoff Nelson Chamisa who was then the leader of the main opposition, Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A). In essence, Mangwana made the above statement to dampen the hopes of the opposition party

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members by declaring that the Zambian opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema’s electoral victory will not turn Chamisa’s fortunes (Chekai, 2021). The effect of this hateful rhetoric by Mangwana was meant to demotivate prospective supporters from allying themselves with Chamisa in the 2023 election. There is a high likelihood that after listening to such a rhetoric, citizens would lose confidence in the election process because they would have already been made to believe that no other party, but the ruling party is destined to win the 2023 harmonized elections.

Online Disinformation and Hate Speech Are Rife in Zimbabwe Social media used to be a source of light entertainment for many Zimbabweans. However, as we head towards the watershed 2023 election, it has become a source of disinformation and hate speech for it has been used to instil fear in some targeted political parties. One of the staunch opposition party supporters and an ardent critic of the ruling party’s misgovernance is the human rights activist, Hopewell Chin’ono who has been the object of ridicule, demonization and being incarcerated by the state agents. A pertinent example of the online hate speech targeted towards him is a recent incident when a ZANU PF supporter, Gachange@TinotendaGacha1 posted a picture of Hopewell Chin’ono, wearing ZANU PF regalia. He then inscribed the following comment, “Hopewell4ED, mazizi muchaita sei (owls, what is your game plan)? In the African context, mazizi (owls) are regarded as bad creatures which are used as witchcraft familiars. Calling someone zizi (an owl) is intended to inflict despondence and pandemonium on a considerable number of people who were following and relying on Hopewell’s tweets as a genuine source of information on the voyage train for 2023 elections. Hopewell is well-known as a fierce critic of the ZANU PF government, he has fearlessly exposed the government’s corruption, incompetence in running the health delivery system, looting of national resources and abuse of human rights. Though he has been arrested several times and has spent countless nights detained in prison, Hopewell has remained steadfast. Hence, the mischief of posting a picture of Chin’ono wearing ZANU PF regalia and purportedly encouraging people to register and vote for ED in 2023 was intended to demean and confound anyone who took critics of the ruling party as serious. Additionally, referring to them as owls was a punt meant to paint members of the opposition as enemies of humanity, akin

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to how the Zimbabwean society treats owls which are strongly believed to be witchcraft familiars. As clearly stated by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO forum, the tweet exhibited various forms of hate speech. In describing hate speech, they put it across as follows: It should be pointed out here, that under the rubric of hate are both expressions of obvious hate and also lies. It is important to note this because it is obvious that saying, by word or letter, something hateful, and telling a blatant lie, can both lead to hateful actions against a person or an organisation, and even violence.

Thus, the politics of hate speech has an impact on “out-of the ballot-box” and “in-ballot-box” electoral processes in Zimbabwe. Refuting the claims made in the above-mentioned tweet, Hopewell promptly responded with a tweet saying: zananupf trolls have photoshoped the picture so that it appears as if I am endorsing president munangagwa’s election in 2023. It shows the height of desperation when a ruling party deceives citizens. President munangagwa should run on his track record not false endorsements.

Clearly, Hopewell was aware of the reaction to be generated by this photoshopped picture to his followers who would rise against him. While rebutting the mistruth and the hate speech spewed by the ZANU PF supporters, Hopewell’s response was also full of hate speech. He calls them “trolls”, which is a demeaning designation. Furthermore, besides misspelling the acronym ZANU PF and the name Mnangagwa, he uses small caps, which is a cunning way of belittling an individual or an institution.

Language of Purging Off the Opposition When President Mnangagwa ascended to the presidency, he resorted to hate speech against perceived opponents, opposition party and civil society activists, this promoted violence in the March 2022 by-elections, posing the danger of spilling off in the run-up to elections in 2023. The provocative language to foment violence is also exhibited in their slogan. Each time President Mnangagwa addressed his supporters at a rally, he ended the slogan saying, pasi nemhandu (down with enemies), pointing

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his fist down. By far, the worst slogan that promoted violence was ZANU PF’s. The phrase pasi nemhandu was used during the liberation struggle to declare that the mentioned opposition force (which was regarded as a traitor), must be killed. The reason for the extermination was that the targeted opposition members were perceived as betrayers of the struggle (Humbe & Mawere, 2016). While addressing ZANU PF supporters in Mutasa district in October 2022, in Manicaland, President Mnangagwa’s utterances raised fears of more violence in the lead up to the polls. He made the following utterances: Next year, we will have elections starting from councillors, Members of Parliament and presidential elections. Munotivimbisa here kuti mucharakasha twupwere utwu? (Do you promise us that next year, you are going to destroy these youngsters?) Hamuvarakashi chete munosvasvanga (You will not only beat them, but you will also completely destroy them). During the war of liberation, people would die, people would get injured, people would sleep hungry, they would get bitten by snakes, but all those challenges brought about your liberation. (Gumbodete, 2022)

This rhetoric invoked war memories in ZANU PF supporters and the suffering as usual became an instrument of rallying them together against the opposition. As such, President Mnangagwa’s utterances were criticized heavily. The Zimbabwe Peace Project executive director Jestina Mukoko responded saying: The issue we continue to speak about is how our leaders like to use hate language. It is the driver of political violence. They do not physically fight among themselves as leaders, but political violence manifests in their supporters. It’s kind of strange that he said this, and yet the following day in his column in State media on Sunday, he talked about peace. At the end of the day, it’s worrying if the issue of peace is not followed and becomes mere rhetoric. (Gumbodete, 2022)

The challenge with the utterances made by the incumbent is that he is traversing on citizens’ democratic rights in elections, such as the right to vote out the ruling government. The incumbent’s words would incite his party’s supporters to attack opponents of the regime, drive them out of their homes or punish them in various other ways. Mukoko’s comment on the disingenuousness of President Mnangagwa’s words about peace is well

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evidenced in his address to Zimbabweans during the country’s 38th independence anniversary celebrations on 18 April 2018. He made a clarion call for all leaders of political parties to be exemplary in their conduct and shun violence ahead of the first harmonized elections under the new administration which were set for July that year. He said: “let us all shun and condemn all forms of violence, divisive, hurtful (language) and hate speech” (https://www.herald.co.zw/president-condemns-violencehate-speech/). However, there appears to be a mismatch between the President’s call for peace and his supporters’ appetite for violence. ZANU PF has mastered the art of double standards, they labelled CCC party members as sell-outs for having meetings with British leaders, yet in September 2022, the ZANU PF leader, President Emmerson Mnangagwa shook hands with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair in Rwanda, breaking years of frosty relations with the ex-Labour party leader. Posting on social media after meeting Blair, Mnangagwa said it was time to let bygones be bygones for Zimbabwe to flourish. Said the President: For Zimbabwe to flourish, we cannot let history hold us back. It was a pleasure to meet Tony Blair (@InstituteGC) and Baroness Scotland, Secretary General for the Commonwealth (@PScotlandCSG). (https:// www.thezimbabwean.co/2022/09/president-mnangagwa-meets-uks-for mer-prime-minister-and-sanctions-architect-tony-blair/)

Thus, the ZANU PF government often sought to delegitimize and create antagonism towards their critics and opponents by depicting them as traitors. Yet, the maligned critics and opponents would often simply have been exercising their democratic rights (Kika et al., 2020). During campaigns towards the 26 March 2022 by-elections, hate speeches by politicians were uttered in a more serious and confrontational manner. The intensification of the struggle between ZANU PF and the CCC was depicted in the rhetoric content which became more acute, polar, corrosive and violent. A video of a traditional chief Abiton Mashayanyika from Mberengwa, who was addressing a ZANU PF rally vehemently said that Chamisa and his supporters must be killed, trended on the social media. The hateful message, which was delivered in Shona, spread so fast. It incited serious violence against CCC members just because they were supporting the opposition. The contents of this video were very dangerous, particularly because the message was communicated in vernacular language, which means that it could be comprehended by

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many, including the uneducated who happen to be very active in killing and or maiming opposition members. According to Mangwaya (2022), the video triggered outrage with human rights activists saying that the death threats were out of order especially as the country is preparing for general elections in 2023. Mashayanyika is still a free man despite earlier claims by the police that they are investigating him (Mangwaya, 2022). The impact of this callous remark will have far-reaching consequences in the long term and such remarks have a proclivity for doing more harm than good. Typical of President Mnangagwa and Abiton Mashayanyika, words were also uttered by ZANU PF’s Vice President Constantino Chiwenga when he issued a terrifying warning to the Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC) and its leader Nelson Chamisa saying that ZANU PF would crush the party like lice. He made these remarks while addressing a Kwekwe rally on 27 February 2022 in the following words: “I have heard others here saying down with triple C, let me assure you that there is nothing that it can achieve, you see how we crush lice with a stone”, said Chiwenga. He then proceeded with the following contemptuous threats: You put it [lice] on a flat stone and then flatten it to the extent that even flies will not make a meal out of it. That is what we are going to do to CCC…We are a Goliath and CCC is a small insignificant party. You can’t just oppose for the sake of opposing. You oppose every time. You want to oppose who? (https://allafrica.com/stories/202202280110.html)

Lice are tiny, wingless and parasitic insects that feed on human blood. They are perceived as enemies of humanity which cause serious pain each time they sting human beings, thus, they should be always crushed on first sight. This hate speech by Chiwenga is a replica of what the former President Robert Mugabe said in Hwange, in the run-up to the 1990 election, when he warned whites against supporting the then main opposition, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). He said: We are saddened that there are others who want to see us divided. But people must not listen to small, petty little ants which we can crush.

The hate speech would accompany and encourage attacks against ZUM supporters and officials including the attempted murder of businessman and former mayor Patrick Kombayi, the ZUM candidate for Gweru

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Central by CIO aides (Malunga, 2020). In the same manner, the results of Chiwenga’s impactful inflammatory statements targeting the CCC party yielded his desired results when Nelson Chamisa held a campaign rally in the same city. One of Chamisa’s party supporters Mboneni Ncube was allegedly brutally stabbed with a spear by suspected ZANU PF supporters who were using spears and machetes amid Chamisa’s rally address. It is apparent that, since Chiwenga’s statements were potentially explosive, they ignited violence in the not-so-distant future. Thus, uttering such statements at a time when the country was experiencing a skyrocket of politically motivated attacks targeted at CCC supporters was perilous. These remarks are not just empty rhetoric or political theatre. When politicians use hate speech, domestic terrorism increases (Piazza, 2020). The execution of Mboneni had concerted psychological effects on his family and the CCC family at large who used to attend Chamisa’s rallies. This was mostly felt by those who attended the rally venue, witnessing the horrendous incident. As noted by Humbe and Mawere (2016), the outbreak of violence targeted towards members of a specific political party elicits feelings of intimidation, down spiritedness and feeling traumatized to the spine. These incidents of violence precipitated by hate speech from ZANU PF resulted in Chamisa declaring that his party would bar journalists from the public media from covering their events. According to Zaba (2022), as a party that purports to be a champion of democracy, it must learn to tolerate divergent views. It should be emphasized that Chamisa’s reactionary stance would lead to his supporters becoming violent towards journalists from the public media.

Hate Speech Against Religious Leaders: Mediating the Menu of Manipulation The problem of hate speech is that it is not confined to political parties but it has wider application. From time to time, the Catholic Bishops have criticized the government and expressed concern about the situation in the country. Rather than addressing the concerns raised, the ruling party has roundly condemned the Bishops. The condemnatory language used in 2020 is similar, although more extreme, to the language used during the Mugabe era. The Bishops referred to the use of the security forces in a brutal crackdown to pre-empt planned protests against government that were planned for 1 July 2020. The brutal crackdown led to the

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arrest of 18 people, the abduction of eight and the assault of 11 more people. In response, the Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Monica Mutsvangwa, launched a vitriolic attack on the Bishops, saying that their allegations were evil and baseless. She singled out the head of the ZCBC, Archbishop Robert Ndlovu, and described the pastoral letter as an “evil message” meant to stoke a “Rwanda-type genocide”. She demeaningly described Bishop Ndlovu as one who had become “the chief priest of the agenda of regime change that is the hallmark of the post-imperial major Western powers for the last two decades”. She described the Bishops as “an evil-minded flock of misled narrowminded bishops”. Commentators characterized the Information Minister’s outburst as dangerous hate speech. The MDC Alliance called the comments “incendiary hate speech” and “unacceptable”. “The singling out of a Ndebele archbishop… is discrimination on tribal grounds”, tweeted MDC Alliance spokesperson, Advocate Fadzai Mahere, warning against the reviving of Zimbabwe’s “history of genocide”. In the 1980s, thousands of civilians—mainly ethnic Ndebeles—were killed when the late ex-President Robert Mugabe unleashed a military-style crackdown known as Gukurahundi. The Ndebeles were perceived to be backing the opposition. “There is no crisis, political or otherwise”, said the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Nick Mangwana. He accused the ZCBC of joining groups seeking “to manufacture crises”. Mr Mangwana defended the government. “Zimbabwe, like most countries in the world, is currently grappling with challenges attendant to illegal sanctions, drought and the coronavirus pandemic”. Addressing a ZANU PF politburo meeting, President Mnangagwa told party officials that men of the cloth were free to join or form their own political parties if they were itching for a showdown with him. He blurted out the following statement: It is most unfortunate when men of the cloth begin to use the pulpit to advance a nefarious agenda for detractors of our country. Those who want to enter the political realm are welcome to do so. They must come out and form political parties.

The above statement was uttered against the backdrop that President Mnangagwa has continually blamed his political opponents of working

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with foreigners to try to destabilize the country. He called them “bad apples” and warned that he will “flush” them out. Online media platform has also been awash with stories which propagate the language of intolerance in Zimbabwe. Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp have been used as propaganda instruments to denigrate some political leaders using hate speech. Thus, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Organization describes social media as a new vector in political discussions. For instance, an editorial in the Herald on 21 August 2020 contained the following comments: Read from any angle, the so-called pastoral letter had the effect of stoking disunity, disharmony, and acrimony. Apart from the innuendos and connotations manifest in the title, “The march is not ended,” the letter also contemptuously prescribed how a democratically elected Government with the mandate of the people should govern. In their reprehensible letter, that was shorn of diplomacy and indeed lacked moral rectitude, the bishops had the temerity to say; “It is not clear to us as your bishops that the national leadership that we have has the knowledge, social skill, emotional stability and social orientation to handle the issues we face as a nation”. Such unholy gibberish can never be expected of people who claim to be men of the cloth, let alone representatives of one of the biggest churches in the world. It’s either they join politics or remain as pastors.

This is not the first time that the Catholic Bishops have expressed their concerns about the running of the country and received forthright criticism from the government. However, elections, protests and fundamental freedoms of expression which form an integral part of social dialogue, have been met with brutality fuelled by hate speech (Kika et al., 2020).

Gendered Hate Speech According to Malunga (2020), hate speech is not limited to ZANU PF. The opposition has deployed it too. A case in point is the 2018 gendered hate which was disgorged in the MDC, during the fight over the succession of Morgan Tsvangirai between Nelson Chamisa and Thokozani Khupe. The case of Thokozani Khupe is one stark example of how this one aberrant characteristic of Zimbabwean politics has stealthily filtered into the “new dispensation”. Khupe, one of the four female presidential candidates and a senior female politician in MDC-T, was besieged by a crowd of MDC Alliance supporters in Harare hurling abuses at

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her and shouting, “hure, hure, hure!” which means prostitute in Shona. Her crime was standing as a candidate against Nelson Chamisa, which was enough to provoke some to resort to verbal abuse and hate speech extreme enough to threaten her personal safety (Bosha, 2018). Opposition supporters would similarly use hate speech against the Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, Priscillah Chigumba labeling her as hure rezanu (ZANU PF’s prostitute). The use of hate speech to sexually denigrate women is especially prevalent across the political divide and societal spectrum and especially on social media. Most common is the use of the word hure (prostitute) to describe and sexually denigrate women. These women have been exposed to all sorts of hate language, they have had to endure slurs and jeering, for no other reason, except that they are female, unmarried and they have dared to contest for positions which have been predominantly a male preserve. These myopic, male-centred trajectories uphold the view that, “respectable women” must be married and, if they are part of a political party, submit to the male leadership of that party. The unmarried women or the “rebellious” women, which appear to be Khupe and Chigumba’s transgressions, do not belong to and are not subject to any men. They are “misfits”, a social deviant who must be put back in her place or disciplined by men, who exclusively hold society’s mandate to judge all women (Bosha, 2018). Another victim was Fadzai Mahere who was cyber bullied by ZANU PF supporters who on several occasions called her a hure. The ZPP believes that hate speech that intends to degrade, intimidate or incite violence against someone based on political affiliation, race and ethnicity is harmful. We are also aware that hateful words can all too easily lead to physical attacks on citizens and set off a cycle of violence. In Zimbabwean political matters, women have been seriously subjected to incivility, especially on social media. Women who occupy leadership positions are at odds with stereotypically female characteristics and, as a result, are often devalued. Thus, according to Rheault et al. (2019), recent evidence from civil society suggests that women in politics are targeted disproportionately by uncivil comments online. Paradoxically, women have also been on record for using hate speech against fellow women. A case in point is the hate-filled statement uttered by the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC)’s interim chairperson Tabitha Khumalo. Soon after the March 26 by-elections, she declared that there was no room in the party for erstwhile colleagues, Thokozani Khupe

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and Douglas Mwonzora, equating them to snakes trying to creep into the house. This is what she said: We have a situation where a snake sneaked into the house, swallowed all the kids and when we attempted to kill it, we did not finish it off … And now we want it to be part of the family. No. You can’t bandage a snake because when it heals, it will bite you (https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/mwonzorakhupe-described-as-snake-in-the-house/). The serpent is attributed to the devil in the Bible, it is an archetype of evil or enemies in the world (Munhuweyi 2020). In an African set up, the snake is one of the worst creatures which should be killed at first sight. Hence, the CCC’s interim chairperson was not only conscientizing her party of the unscrupulous and deceitful behaviour that Khupe and Mwonzora had exhibited towards the party, which deserved barring from re-joining the party, but she was also inciting hateful attacks on them by likening them to a serpent.

Hate Speech in Songs The CCC has a song which goes, “yellow, yellow, tisu nyuchi dzinoruma” (yellow, yellow, we are the stinging bees). It seems the CCC supporters were swayed by the desire to metaphorize bees. This was a powerful metaphorisisation of violence incitation. The supporters were communicating a strong message to ZANU PF that the years of docility are over, in the 2023 elections, they would fight back. In this case, members of the CCC were made fully aware that political violence is meant to prevent citizens from peacefully participating in democratic elections. Hence, the song is intended to energize them and to start viewing themselves as rancorous bees, ready to sting whenever they are provoked. In African politics, there are situations where bees played important roles to liberate the oppressed. For example, it is widely understood that Kamuzu Hastings Banda, the founding father of Malawi defeated colonialism through “guerilla warfare” spearheaded by swarms of bees (https://www.newsday. co.zw/2015/02/mugabe-embarrass). Whenever the bees are fighting an enemy, they operate as a team to defeat the adversary. In essence, bees are synonymous with the concept of working hard and they do it zealously (Stanton, @@2022). Under Nelson Chamisa, bees are a symbolism of the CCC’s invincibility. Music is an integral medium of political communication in any

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polity. In a country without democratic space for leaders of opposition parties, songs because they are blind, are valuable to communicate the party’s violent behaviour patterns since their leaders are prone to arrest and abduction. Music and speech have been used as a way of political influence, communication, and translating the party image, agenda or goals and mission for a political party support base building (Kenneth Takudzwa, 2022). Through the Nerorization of the CCC party, it carries elements of strong leadership credentials, and style and hero-worship. Thus, songs impact the masses to be swayed in their behaviour and electoral decisions (https://shakespeareandbeyond.folger. edu/2020/06/23/bees-metaphor-politics-hierarchy-wild-things/). At several of his rallies to drum up supporters for the 26 March 2022 by-elections, some of Chamisa’s speeches were targeted towards sending a message to the ruling party. For example, in one of the speeches, he said; “ZANU PF haina matitle deeds eviolence. This time vakangotirova tinodzorera” (ZANU PF is not the only party capable of inflicting violence. This time around, if they attack us, we will strike back). As noted by Humbe and Mawere (2016), such utterances propel the party, which was once a victim, to become a reactionary group designed to foil the intimidation strategies of ZANU PF. However, the CCC’s promises to fight back appeared to be a worrying imitative adoption of ZANU PF’s style of politics which was anchored on violence. As expected, these hate speeches were met with silence from Chamisa, and there was no rebuke from the government or other political parties.

Critical Reflections Since Zimbabwe attained political independence from the colonial regime more than forty years ago, political violence, especially during election times, has become endemic. In the new dispensation, hate speech has become the seedbed for political violence, creating a volatile and toxic electoral environment. The polarization between competing political leaders has provided fecund ground for violence, intimidation and a very unstable electoral environment. In concurrence with Malunga (2020), our chapter notes that leaders, be it political, religious or traditional leaders play a pivotal role in promulgating hate speech and its translation to violence. The correlation between hate speech and the outbreak of violence as illustrated in the various cases discussed in this chapter are testament to the fact that leaders who sanction hate

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speech inevitably incite citizens to do the same and to resort to violence (Malunga, 2020). These outbursts of violence have far-reaching repercussions, resulting in the alienation of the general populace from electoral democracy, especially those in the opposition. This approach of intensifying hatred on anyone who is depicted as an opposing force by ZANU PF has made nationhood in Zimbabwe more complex since hate speech has become a recipe in breeding intolerance among citizens. As Zimbabwe draws nearer to the 2023 harmonized elections, it is pertinent that as a nation state, we work together tirelessly to rid the political arena of both hate speech and politically motivated violence. These two are Siamese twins which need to be surgically separated and spiritually redeemed from their corrosive effects on electoral democracy. As has been clearly revealed in this chapter, at the core of statesponsored human rights violations is hate speech driven by intolerance and hatred for divergent views. Hate speech manifests itself through formal and informal statements from the ruling ZANU PF party and its members and supporters, as well as hate speech from the main opposition MDC and all its offshoots including the MDC Alliance, MDC-T and the CCC. History has taught us that hate speech often serves as the spark which starts off the fire of violence and it is also used as a tool to instil fear within the masses. Leaders in their various capacities as political, religious, traditional, civic society and human rights leaders should all join their hands and heads to cleanse society of hate speech and inculcate good governance, constitutional democracy and peacebuilding. All these are crucial pillars for free, fair and transparent harmonized elections in 2023. Hate speech is an extreme form of intolerance, it is the igniting force for gross human rights violation targeted towards those who are categorized as the other. Perpetrators of hate speech are notorious for spreading falsehoods and disparaging stereotypes about members of the targeted group. The otherization of the opposition or the other way round, by equating them to pests, insects and other demeaning categorizations has been used to strip the other of their humanity and dignity. This causes the targeted groups undue marginalization, persecution and humiliation. Consequently, they will be living in constant fear for their lives and that of their loved ones. Hate speech poses grave dangers for democratic values, the protection of human rights, the rule of law, peace and stability. All these have a cumulative impact on the 2023 electoral processes.

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Our findings in this chapter resonate with Piazza (2020), who restates that whenever politicians use inflammatory language, such as hate speech, they entrench existing divides, and this makes their societies more likely to experience political violence and terrorism. There is therefore need for politicians to find common ground as citizens of one nation, to work towards rebuilding and restoring democratic values, peace, unity and solidarity. In an endeavour to move away from polarization, the following speech, delivered by Nelson Chamisa in February 2022, when he was invited by the Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT) party in Tanzania as a guest speaker, offers some instructive lessons. Reflecting on how much hate speech has characterized Zimbabwean politics, he bemoaned the use of the term “opposition”, particularly considering how it has been used by the ruling ZANU PF party to propagate hate feelings to anyone who does not subscribe to the ZANU PF ideology. He put it across as follows: I do not understand why we should call one ‘the ruling party,’ and the other ‘opposition.’ That language is wrong, we must have ‘government’ and the ‘alternative government.’ In the African setting, when we say he is opposition, there is enmity, you are treated with suspicion, you are harassed, you are arrested, assaulted, you are killed, you are maimed because you are opposition. (https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=u4XWq4v1ldg)

As mentioned in the above excerpt, in Zimbabwean politics, the term bato rinopikisa (opposition party) denotes dissention, rebellion and being unreasonably argumentative. Such designations have serious hateful connotations. It is against this backdrop that he then proposed the use of terms like “alternative government” as neutral terms which serve as a mark of mature democracy. Such overtures will open inroads for democratic, peaceful and progressive 2023 harmonized elections.

Conclusion The crux of this chapter was to foreground the impact of hate speech in Zimbabwe’s democratic spaces. Drawing insights from the Hate Speech theory and utilizing grey literature, our chapter has assessed various excerpts and forms of hate speech and how these have often served as

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the spark which starts off the fire of violence, intimidation and the perpetration of gross human rights violations. The chapter has also noted that hate speech is not confined to one political party, rather, it has been illustrated that both political divides, the ruling party and opposition parties have been found wanting when it comes to churning out hate speech. In conclusion, our chapter reiterates that, as Zimbabwe heads towards the 2023 harmonized elections, it is pertinent for political leaders, supporters of competing political parties, leaders of religious bodies, civic societies and human rights organizations to make concerted efforts in restoring and reclaiming democratic values as essential preparatory ground for peaceful and democratic elections, in 2023.

References Bosha, S. (2018). Politics, hate speech and violence against women: Mugabe’s legacy for Zimbabwean politics. https://aidsfreeworld.org/statements/2018/ 8/31/politics-hate-speech-and-violence-against-women-mugabes-lasting-leg acy-for-zimbabwean-politics. Accessed on 18 December 2022. Chekai, L. (2021). Zimbabwe: Nick Mangwana Mocks Chamisa over Hichilema victory. https://allafrica.com/stories/202108170792.html. Accessed on 20 November 2022. Dzirutwe, M. (2019). Zimbabwe’s president says Western sanctions a ‘cancer’ eating at economy. https://www.reuters.com//article/us-zimbabwe-politicsidUSKBN1X41AC. Accessed on 2 December 2020. Gumbodete, P., (2022). ED fuelling hate speech. https://www.newsday. co.zw/local-news/article/200002169/ed-fuelling-hate-speech. Accessed 10 December 2022. Garusa, T. (2022). Zimbabwe: CCC’s Chamisa attacks Zanu-PF for ‘child abuse and terrorising citizens. School Kids Forced Into Anti-Sanctions Events’ https://allafrica.com/stories/202210280289.html. Accessed on 5 December 2022. https://www.newsday.co.zw/2015/02/mugabe-embarrass. Accessed on 16 December 2022. https://shakespeareandbeyond.folger.edu/2020/06/23/bees-metaphor-pol itics-hierarchy-wild-things/. Accessed on 18 December 2022. https://www.newsday.co.zw/2015/02/mugabe-embarrass. Accessed on 18 December 2022. https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/mwonzora-khupe-described-assnake-in-the-house/. Accessed on 18 December 2022. https://www.herald.co.zw/president-condemns-violence-hate-speech/. Accessed on 18 December 2022.

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https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2022/09/president-mnangagwa-meets-uksformer-prime-minister-and-sanctions-architect-tony-blair/ Accessed on 18 December 2022. https://allafrica.com/stories/202202280110.html. Accessed on 18 December 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4XWq4v1ldg. Accessed on 18 December 2022. Humbe, B. P., & Mawere, M. (2016). Intra- and inter-party violence in Africa: Narratives and reflections from Zimbabwe. In M. Mawere & N. Marongwe (Eds.), Myth of peace and democracy? Towards building pillars of hope, unity and transformation in Africa. Bamenda: Langaa Research and Publishing Common Initiative Group. Kenneth Takudzwa, M. (2022). Praising the Croc, Despising Nero: The politics of hero-worshipping leaders through music and speech in Zimbabwe. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 0(0), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/002190 96221080195. Kika, M., Nhara, Y., Mandinde, W., & Sibanda, F. (2020). Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO forum, the language of intolerance, intransigence, authoritarianism, and violence in the new dispensation in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and The National Transitional Justice Working. Malunga, S. (2020). Annual national transitional working group lecture, hate speech: The trigger and fuel of violent atrocity. https://www.facebook.com/ watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=880748979404296. Mangwaya, M. (2022). Chamisa death threat bishop walks free. https://newsday. co.zw/thestandard/local-news/article/200000356/chamisa-death-threat-bis hop-walks-free. Accessed on 18 December 2022. Munyoro, F. (2018). President condemns violence, hate speech. https:// www.herald.co.zw/president-condemns-violence-hate-speech/. Accessed on 10 December 2022. ‘Mwonzora, Khupe described as snake-in-the house’. https://www.thezimbab wemail.com/zimbabwe/mwonzora-khupe-described-as-snake-in-the-house/. Accessed on 16 December 2022. Piazza, J. (2020). When politicians use hate speech, political violence increases. https://www.penncapital-star.com/commentary/when-politicians-use-hatespeech-political-violence-increases-opinion/. Accessed on 17 December 2022. Rheault, L., Rayment, E., & Musulan, A. (2019). Politicians in the line of fire: Incivility and the treatment of women on social media. Research and Politics, 6(1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018816228. Zaba, Z. (2022). Editor’s Memo: Hate speech retrogressive, destructive. https:// www.newsday.co.zw//theindependent/tennis/article/4066/editors-memohate-speech-retrogressive-destructive. Accessed on 17 December 2022.

CHAPTER 10

The “New Old Dispensation”: A Sociolinguistic Analysis of Selected ZANU PF Speeches in the Post-Mugabe Era and Implications on Zimbabwe’s Electoral Process Wellington Wasosa

Introduction After toppling his predecessor, Robert Mugabe, in November 2017, the incumbent, Emmerson Mnangagwa, promised a “… shift from politics of the old, characterised by politics of entitlement, thuggery, violence and intimidation to an inclusive democracy in which diversity is celebrated and the rule of law and constitutionalism are sacrosanct” (Ziburawa, 2018: 1). However, there has been an observation that Mnangagwa who is a long-time top aide of Mugabe has failed to break from the political

W. Wasosa (B) Department of African Languages and Literature, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_10

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system, sometimes referred to as Mugabeism, established by his predecessor. Mugabeism entails Mugabe’s legacy of autocracy, which includes electoral fraud, political intolerance, execution of political opponents and civil activists, press censorship and a number of gross human rights abuses (Melber, 2017). Zimbabwe’s elections have been largely marred by controversies, with one such being the ruling party ZANU PF’s use of institutionalised violence inflicted on the opposition and voices of dissent. This attitude can be observed through the manner the party uses language, whether oral or written, which has been generally categorised as hate speech. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination research of 2013 notes that hate speech refers to all communication, verbal, written or symbolic, that insults a racial, ethnic and political group, whether by suggesting that they are inferior in some respect or by indicating that they are despised or not welcome for any other reasons. Although the focus of this discussion is on ZANU PF under the leadership of Mnangagwa, this does not imply that the use of hate speech excludes the opposition. However, the intention of this discussion is to analyse if there has been a change in terms of language use in the “new dispensation” as compared to the “old dispensation”. Language in political discourses undoubtedly mirrors the political actors’ ideology and at the same time influences the behaviour of supporters who align themselves with their parties. Drawing discursive insights from Critical Discourse Analysis, this discussion will, among other things, examine how language is used especially by ZANU PF and its impacts on the political environment as well as the electoral process.

Conceptual Framework As indicated above, the analysis is based on the tenets of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). According to Bakhtin (1986), discourse broadly refers to the use of language in the context of social life, the intersection of sociocultural practice, social life and language. As Fairclogh (1992) observes, discourses are certain ways in which language is typically used in specific social domains. The concept of discourse defines language as occurring in specific social contexts reflecting specific codes, expectations, ideological pressures and presuppositions. Moreover, a given society and culture can be built up from recognisable discursive practices such as those in political contexts. As observed by van Dijk (2003: 353–354),

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Critical Discourse Analysis….questions about the way specific discourse structures are deployed in the reproduction of social dominance, whether they are part of a conversation, or news report or other genres and contexts. Thus, the typical vocabulary of many scholars in critical discourse analysis will feature such notions as “power”, “dominance”, “hegemony”, “ideology”, “class”, “gender”, “race”, “discrimination”, institutions, social structure and social order, besides the more familiar discourse analysis notions.

Also associated with Critical Discourse Analysis is the concept of hegemony. This refers to a consensual relationship between the led and their leaders constructed in and by discourse (Bates, 2008). Furthermore, under the notion of hegemony, it is argued that a target audience buys into the ideas of a particular social and political group, thus allowing that group to have power over it. Thus, Bates argues that hegemony is the notion that humanity is not ruled by force alone but also by ideas through which a view of the world may be constructed. Therefore, Critical Discourse Analysis becomes relevant in this research’s endeavour to analyse how language use by the ruling party not only helps to entrench its hegemony but also how it affects its supporters’ behaviour.

Zimbabwe’s Toxic Political Environment The political environment in Zimbabwe has been characterised by violence and polarisation stretching back to the colonial era when the Smith regime used different forms of violence in an attempt to muffle and get rid of the Black Nationalist movements. With the advent of independence, the expectation was that the democratic space was going to widen but, unfortunately, it has been shrinking up to the present moment. More often than not, the ruling ZANU PF party has been initiating and sponsoring violence against members of the opposition parties (Alexander & Tendi, 2008; Masungure, 2011; Sachikonye, 2011). These include the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) from the early 1980s until the signing of the unity accord in 1987, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in the 1990s and the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) from its inception in 1999. Because of infighting, there have been various splinter groups within the MDC such as MDC-T led by the late Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC-M led by Arthur Mutambara and MDC99 led by Job Sikhala. Some MDC members led by Nelson Chamisa

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formed the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) formed in 2022 abandoning the brand as the battle to control the party continued. The ideology and attitude of the ruling party towards opposing groups can be observed from use of language which has generally been hate speech (National Peace, 2022). This has contributed to the culture of violence and intolerance, as language has the potential to influence the behaviour of party supporters. From independence in 1980 up to November 2017, Zimbabwe was under the leadership of Robert Mugabe, which has generally been described as despotic (Melber, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Among other issues raised against his rule is the failure to tolerate the opposition and presiding over institutionalised violence. Regardless of being Mugabe’s top aide, Mnangagwa promised to bring a new approach and culture different from his predecessor. However, some critics like Ndawana (2022) have been sceptical about the sincerity of Mnangagwa, given his closeness to Mugabe. A motivational speaker, speech writer and newspaper columnist Ndawana posits that, “Chants of a new dispensation are merely pious rhetoric. They are platitudes of imaginary renewal or rebirth… Incessant allusions to usher in a new dispensation are a banality” (Bulawayo24, 20 July 22. https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinionsc-columnist-byo-221510.html). In one of his speeches after assuming power, he boasted about his relationship with Mugabe: I was with the former president for over 54 years. I don’t regret that; I feel very proud. It was necessary. It is history. Each step where we worked together was a privilege, and in terms of history, that was necessary. (https://www.brainyquote.com, 15 July 2022)

It is against the background of Mnangagwa’s entwinement with Mugabe that critics like Ndawana (ibid.) question whether there is any difference in approach to politics by Mnangagwa from his predecessor Mugabe. As observed in a Research and Advocacy Unit report cited in Macheka (2022), Zimbabwe has an unfortunate reputation of being the most politically violent nation in Southern Africa, apart from during the times of civil wars in Angola and Mozambique as well as apartheid in South Africa. Events in the liberation struggle, such as the Chimoio and Nyadzonia massacres, the Gukurahundi massacres of the early 1980s targeting mostly Ndebele-speaking ZAPU supporters and the unprecedented political violence from 2000 following the formation of arguably the most formidable opposition the MDC in 1999, are all a pointer to the toxic

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political environment. As argued by Sachikonye (2011), the current political rivalry between the ruling party and opposition is an extension of the historical pattern of intolerance for political opposition that began in the colonial era. For example, as Macheka (ibid.) notes, during the 2008 elections and the presidential run-off of the same year pitting Robert Mugabe against Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC, people’s hands were cut off either on the upper or lower arms, with the executors asking the victims whether they desired “long or short sleeves”. The country witnessed the worst political violence in the 2008 elections when the ruling party’s candidate, Robert Mugabe, lost to the MDC, led by Morgan Tsvangirai in the first round. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), which is accused of lacking impartiality and independence, withheld the results for several weeks instead of the five days as prescribed in the constitution, allegedly to alter them so that the margin of defeat to Mugabe would be respectable. Eventually, there was a presidential run-off in which a number of opposition supporters were either murdered or maimed by members of the ruling party and state security agents. This forced Morgan Tsvangirai to withdraw his candidacy as a sign of protest against state-sanctioned violence and murder of his supporters. The election went ahead, with Mugabe being declared the winner but, unfortunately, the international community, including regional blocks such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), refused to recognise his presidency (Badza, 2008). In the end, the belligerent parties were forced into negotiations, resulting in the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009. The GNU was short-lived, ending after five years in 2013, and the elections which followed were again marred by accusations of rigging and violence. The first elections after the deposition of Mugabe were held in July 2018. The July 2018 post-election period was marred by violence when the security forces shot and killed six supporters of the MDC Alliance, leaving thirty-five with various forms of injury following the delay in the announcement of the presidential election result which it claimed to have won. Eventually, the President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, appointed a commission led by former South African President Motlanthe to investigate the causes of violence. The 2018 Motlanthe Commission identified the perpetrators of the 2018 post-election violence as members of the defence forces and/or the police (https://www.veritaszim.net, 27 April 2022). Because of the unpleasant history of political polarisation and violence, the government of Zimbabwe has established the National Peace

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and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) in order to heal the wounds of the past, but it has been labelled ineffective because of, among other issues, the lack of political will to implement the recommendations. However, the establishment of the commission itself is an acknowledgement of the fact that the political environment has been toxic and there is need for some cleansing. Sachikonye (2011) and Masunungure (2009) concur that violence has been part of virtually every election in Zimbabwe since 1980, with anyone who has dared to oppose the status quo being labelled a traitor who has the intention of reversing the gains of independence. Thus, from the above discussion, there is no doubt that political leaders promote and get involved in political violence in Zimbabwe especially during elections which compromises their credibility.

Discussion Language has the potential to influence the manner people behave and organise their world. As noted by Sapir and Whorf, quoted in Mapara and Wasosa (2012: 286), Language embodies ways of experiencing the world, of defining what we are. That is, we not only communicate in particular languages, but more fundamentally become a person we are because of the particular language in which we grew up. Language above all else, shapes our distinctive ways of seeing the world. Language then is a carrier of a people’s identity, the vehicle of a certain way of seeing things, experiencing and feeling, determinant of particular way of life.

Therefore, language use by entities like political parties has a bearing on the manner they behave and relate to others belonging to different parties.

Death Threats to Members of the Opposition Parties From the earlier observations, the ruling ZANU PF has a history of failure to tolerate the opposition, which it has labelled enemies of the state. One of President Mnangagwa’s favourite slogans is Pasi nemhandu (Down with enemies). The slogan “down with” has its roots in the liberation war and it was used against perceived enemies of the revolution by the then ZANU party, and they were supposed to be killed. It is important to note

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that there was violence within and between the liberation movements, which also resulted in several deaths of fighters of the struggle. Sithole (1999) refers to these as struggles-within-the-struggle. This stance by the ruling party that opposition supporters ought to be assassinated has been vindicated by a ZANU PF party member who called for the assassination of the leader of CCC Nelson Chamisa, his family and supporters. Abton Mashayanyika, a bishop of the Habakkuk Apostolic Faith Mission, while addressing a gathering in Mberengwa North under Chief Mapiravana at Rampopo Hills on 13 July 2022, explained the history and meaning of the slogan pasi (down with) and at the same time encouraging violence against the opposition CCC: Kana ndichiti pasi naMuzorewa ndinoreva kuti ngaafe Kana tikati pasi nemuroyi tinoreva kuti ngaafe Kana tikati pasi nemutengesi tinenge tichireva kuti ngaafe Kana tichiti pasi pasi naChamisa tinenge tichiti ngaaurawe…nevana vake nezvimbwasungata zvake Pasi pasi neCCC (When we say down with Muzorewa, we mean he should be killed When we say down with the witches, we mean they should be killed When we say down with the sell-outs, we mean they should be killed And when we say down with Chamisa, we mean he should be killed …with his children and supporters. Down, down, with the CCC). (https://www.youtube.com, 18 July 2022)

It is significant to note that Muzorewa (Abel) was the leader of the African National Congress (ANC) and became the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1979 after he made a pact with Ian Smith. This move was seen as treacherous and against the blacks people’s quest for independence, hence the position that he should be killed. This, therefore, vindicates the argument that ZANU PF’s failure to tolerate opposing voices has its roots in the liberation struggle and this has continued in the post-independence era, as the party has declared itself the only legitimate party to govern the country. It also leads to what Schelder (2002) has termed elections without democracy as there is clear instigation of violence against members of the opposition parties. The main players among the Black Nationalist movements were ZANU and ZAPU. It is interesting to note that ZANU split from ZAPU in 1963, ostensibly because of differences in the approach to the liberation struggle. However, the split tended to be largely on ethnic grounds, as ZAPU became largely dominated by Ndebele-speaking members while

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those in ZANU were Shona-speaking. Unfortunately, this polarisation on ethnic lines was a recipe for disaster as a civil war erupted after the attainment of independence in 1980. ZANU won most of the seats and later accused ZAPU of harbouring the intention of launching an insurrection to topple the government. According to The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report (1990), the leaders of ZAPU were incarcerated and tortured, while an estimated 20,000 Ndebele-speaking supporters were butchered in Matabeleland provinces and parts of the Midlands. The government claimed to be fighting dissidents of the young independent nation, hence, the naming of the operation Gukurahundi, a Shona term which literally means (washing of the chaff). Yet, the chaff refers to humans deemed undesired and condemned by the sovereign power in Giorgio Agamben’s vocabulary (Agamben, 1998). During the period of Gukurahundi massacres, the current President, Mnangagwa, was the Minister of State Security and he has been labelled as one of the chief architects of the genocide. At a rally in Victoria Falls on the 5th of March 1983, he referred to the dissidents as “cockroaches” and he went on to assert that there was need to use the DDT pesticide to cleanse the house (Zimbabwe) (CCJP, 1997; Mail and Guardian, 2017). In other words, he was calling for the assassination of opposition ZAPU supporters. This language is typical hate speech as it denotes the extreme negative feelings against the opposition and its supporters. It involves all forms of expression that spread, incite, promote or justify hatred. As Kayambazinthu and Moyo (2002) argue, hate speech denotes any speech, gesture, conduct, writing or display which could incite people to violence or prejudicial action. Some of these include the spreading of ideas based on racial or ethnic superiority or hatred, inciting people to hatred, contempt or discrimination against members of a group on the basis of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, threats, expression of insults, ridicule or slander of persons or groups or justification of hatred, contempt or discrimination on the grounds of, and participation in, organisations and activities which promote and incite racial discrimination. Hate speech has also been conceived as “verbal terror” or a war waged on others by means of word. Aside from causing danger of physical assault, hate speech risks violent reaction (Neisser, 1994). The ruling ZANU PF leadership has also used metaphors for destruction against the opposition, which has fanned violence and promoted polarisation in politics. Some of Mnangagwa’s other favourite expressions when referring to his party’s intentions to defeat the opposition are

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Tinovarakasha, togovasvasvanga (We crash them, then we destroy them). These are clear metaphors for violence and destruction and this sends the message that the opposition should not allowed to exist. Not to be outdone, the Vice President, Constantino Chiwenga, while addressing a by-election rally in Kwekwe on the 26th of February 2022, equated ZANU (PF) to a Goliath that would crush the opposition like lice (The Standard, 27 February 2022). Thus, there is implication by the ruling party of using violence and killing of the opposition members which in turn affects the credibility of elections. Political parties use social media to ratify their ideology, policy frameworks and to mobilise support. It has the advantage that it increased the reach of media to a wider audience with little or no costs at all and most importantly, there is also freedom to express one’s innermost feelings without censorship. ZANU PF has created several social media platforms like Twitter and one such platform is named Varakashi, literally translating to “The Destroyers”. It is most probable that the name was chosen because of Mnangagwa’s favourite saying that tinovarakasha (We will destroy them) in reference to the opposition. The nomenclature of the platform is in itself problematic as it implies a violent approach towards the opposition which is deemed as an entity deserving to be sent into oblivion. As observed by Auwal (2018), social media, if used properly, can be a tool and innovation which propels economic and political transformation but, at the same time, if abused, is a threat to peaceful co-existence through the proliferation of hate speech and/or comments. There has been an outcry for leaders to desist from using hate speech as this is tantamount to inciting violence among the supporters. Sithole, cited in Muzondidya (2009: 176), explains the origins of this culture of intolerance: The liberation struggle also left a significant mark on Zimbabwe’s political culture. The commandist nature of mobilisation and politicisation under clandestine circumstances gave rise to the politics of intimidation and fear. Opponents were viewed in warlike terms, as enemies and therefore illegitimate. The culture from the liberation struggle was intolerant.

Because of this, the Civic Society Organisations (CSOs) have warned that 2023 could turn out to be one of the bloodiest election campaigns based on events leading to the March 2022 by-elections and systematic harassment of opposition members by the state agents. Also of equal concern

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is the proliferation of hate speech, especially by members of ZANU PF. The Zimbabwe Peace Project June 2022 report shows that ZANU PF was the leading perpetrator of political violence. In line with this, Zimbabwe Divine Destiny Bishop Ancelimo Magaya, speaking at a Crisis Coalition in the Zimbabwe press conference on 13 July 2022, noted that the party leaders and their supporters were not being arrested for inciting violence: We have seen people that have called for the death of Chamisa, people who have out rightly declared that you won’t be able to write, we will write for you. Even the Vice President insinuated violence when he said they are a Goliath that crushes lice like CCC. (https://bulawayo24.com, 20 July 2022)

One of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Lawyers, Beatrice Mtetwa, has written to the concerned institutions like the Zimbabwe Republic Police to investigate the matter, as a death threat was made to the leader of the biggest opposition party in the country. The video for the call of his death has gone viral but nothing has been done, with ZANU PF disowning him and yet it was at the party’s rally with the people in attendance wearing the party’s regalia. The threat of death on opposition party members, as observed above, has been part of ZANU PF ideology. During the campaign for by-elections at St. Mary’s in Chitungwiza on 23 March 2022, Mnangagwa threatened to shorten the lives of the Mthwakazi Republic Party (MPR) leadership (Bulawayo24 news, 27 June 2022). He also labelled them demonic: We have those with the spirit of dividing the country; they are possessed with legions of demons. If you are possessed with the legion spirits you better get into water and die there. I urge you not to listen to Mthwakazi that speaks nonsense. Zimbabwe will remain a republic and unitary state.

The concern for the Mthwakazi party has been that the Matabeleland region has been lagging behind in terms of development as compared to other regions. Its major goal is to go back to the pre-colonial boundaries and be a separate region from other Shona-speaking regions. While it has been labelled an extremist secessionist group and intending to fuel ethnic divisions in the country, it is without doubt the region is one of the least developed and “there is a political glass ceiling separating and precluding minority groups in favour of the majority domineering group (Shona)”

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(Dube & Ndebele, 2018: 190). On top of that, Palmberg (2004) notes that in the cultural field, the Zimbabwe identity has become equated with Shona while the Ndebele and other non-Shona are, if not excluded, then omitted. Just like in other cases against the opposition, the ZANU PF leadership has shown lack of tolerance and even wishing death to the party members. Muzondidya (2009) posits that ZANU PF’s culture of intolerance has badly affected the practice of democratic ideas it has espoused as it has approached elections as “battles” and sees its political opponents as enemies that need to be destroyed rather than as political competitors. The threat to shorten the lives of the leaders of the MPR party is testimony to this culture within the ZANU PF where those opposed to it are treated as enemies who should be killed. This stance has the negative effect of strangulating political efficacy, which is “… the feeling that individual political action does have or can have an impact upon the political process, that is, it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties” (Campbell et al., 1954: 187). In the end, this puts the credibility of elections into jeopardy due to the prevalence of hate speech in the political discourses especially those of the ruling party.

Disrespect of Constitutionalism In a bid to remain in power, ZANU PF has threatened not to adhere to constitutionalism under the guise of protecting the nation’s sovereignty. Robert Mugabe once declared: A constitution is just a piece of paper and also; it may be necessary to use methods other than the constitutional ones. (https://www.brainyquote. com, 15 July 2022)

This was in reference to the constitutional requirement to hand over power in the event of defeat by the opposition. Thus, according to him, it was necessary not to observe the dictates of the constitution as the opposition was “a puppet of the West” intending to “reverse the gains of independence”. Mnangagwa has continued on the same trajectory of showing signs to wilfully disrespect the constitution. On several occasions even during addresses to the party supporters, Mnangagwa has highlighted his wish to go beyond the limits as stipulated in the constitution: 2030 ndinenge ndichipo

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(In 2030 I will still be there).

After touring the newly-constructed parliament building in Mt. Hampden outside Harare on 20 July 2022, he said he wanted to go beyond the second term to oversee the completion of various infrastructural projects he initiated. This is not different from what his predecessor, Robert Mugabe, used to say as he threatened to ignore the country’s constitutional dictates. Above all, this could be an intent by Mnangagwa to violate the constitution as it stipulates that the President cannot go beyond two terms and, of which even if he wins the 2023 election, this should end in 2028. The party has been accused of amending the constitution, taking advantage of having the majority in both the lower and upper houses, for its own benefit of remaining in power, not for national development. Also, from another perspective, he is virtually declaring himself a winner of all forthcoming elections, thereby shutting the door for the opposition even if it wins.

Sabotaging Opposition on Service Delivery The ZANU PF party has threatened to stifle development in areas, especially urban councils that are run by the opposition. Since 2000, the opposition has won the majority of contested urban seats, both parliamentary and local council. However, the government, through the Ministry of Local Government, has been accused of meddling in the towns’ affairs, which has resulted in poor service delivery to the residents. This has been viewed to be a deliberate strategy to weaken the opposition and some mayors of cities, notably Harare, have been suspended or even arrested on allegations of corruption or incompetence. The President openly told the people in towns that voting the opposition would not bring development in their areas as the government would not take into consideration their grievances. Speaking to Chitungwiza residents while soliciting for votes in the March 2022 by-elections, he warned them: Kana uchida kubata haungaisi duwo rako mugomo Kuita mashura kuisa riva mumvura uchida kubata shuro… Kwete nematanho eopposition hazvisvike (If you want to catch fish, you cannot set your net in the mountain It is futile to put your trap in water when you intend to catch a hare… If you the structures of the opposition, your needs and aspirations will not reach [the government]). (https://www.youtube.com, 15 July 2022)

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Thus, this declaration makes the electoral process a mere formality as the people’s wishes would be disregarded. In other words, the people are discouraged from voting for the opposition as the result would be a nullity leading to electoral contestations such as a flawed process and rigged results.

The Opposition as a Puppet Movement for Regime Change There have been several threats and declarations that the ruling party would not allow the opposition to rule the country. In response to those pursuing a regime change agenda, Mnangagwa ridiculed such prospects, and he went on to advise anyone in the opposition camp who would have dreamt of becoming the next President to immediately brew traditional beer as a way of appealing to the ancestors to deliver oneself from such a curse. He put it across as follows: Kana ukarota uri kuState House, unofanira kubika doro kuti midzimu yandirashireiko (If in your sleep, you dream of being in the State House, as soon as you wake up, you should brew the traditional beer to enquire on why your ancestors have abandoned you).

In Shona culture, just like in many African cultures, ancestors (midzimu) are the living-dead who are the link between the living and God (Mwari). They are responsible for protecting the living against the dangers they may encounter in their lives. They also ensure that they live good lives. When they are upset, misfortune will befall the offenders. Thus, in this context, Mnangagwa is in effect brushing aside those supporting the opposition to take over the reins of power, as supporting the opposition is tantamount to inviting a curse from the ancestors. This stance by the party President vindicates the idea that there has been no change in terms of attitude by ZANU PF towards the opposition, even after the demise of Mugabe. On this, Mbofana (2018: 1) observes: As the violence, persecution, and repression of Zimbabwean opposition figures…continue unabated, people from all around the world, and particularly in Zimbabwe, are finally awakening to the realisation that what they believed was a ‘new dispensation’ was just but a fallacy. Typical of most crooks - who pretend to be what they are not - it does not take long

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before their true personalities come to the fore, and are exposed for who they truly are. ZANU-PF has always been a divisive, oppressive and violent political party ever since its formation in 1963, and it has never changed over its 55 years of existence. It is then a huge mystery why anyone would have swallowed hook, line and sink the yarn that, suddenly and overnight, this blood-thirsty political outfit - which prides itself with war - would change and become the dove of peace, unity and development.

Often, there has been persistent and deliberate vilification of opposition parties simply on the basis that they were not involved in the war of liberation. The former liberation movement, thus, portrays itself as the sole liberator and patriotic movement which has the legitimacy to rule the country. Addressing a rally in Chiredzi District before Mugabe’s ouster, Mnangagwa said, Vane nzeve dzekunzwa inzwayi Vane meso ekuona onesesayi Musangano uyu uno unonzi ZANU PF unoera Uchatonga ugotonga ugotonga Vanovukura vachingovukura Tichingotonga tichingotonga (Those with ears listen Those with eyes to see observe This party called ZANU PF is sacred It will rule and rule and rule Those barking will bark We will be ruling and ruling). (https://www.youtube.com, 15 April 2022)

The speech was made amid intense factional fighting within the party and Mnangagwa pledged loyalty to Robert Mugabe, only to topple him a few months later. The implication from the speech is that regardless of the election results, the party would continue to rule. There have been accusations of manipulation of institutions which should act independently, like the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) so that the electoral process favours the ruling party (Masungure, 2011). Thus, at the end elections become just a charade to fulfil a constitutional requirement but if the outcome is not favourable to the ruling party, it will be considered null and void. There has also been deliberate manipulation of the war history to suit ZANU PF’s agenda of entrenching its power. As argued by Kaderi (2014), political versions of war history

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can contribute to (re)producing violence by indoctrinating citizens about national “heroes” and enemies and the role of violence. Political violence has become a common phenomenon in post-independence Zimbabwe as young citizens either engage in politics as patronised violent activists or remain disengaged from politics in fear of violence. As has already been noted, there have been declarations by ZANU PF that it will never surrender power to the opposition even if it loses elections. During the March 2022 by-elections campaign in St. Mary’s Chitungwiza, Mnangagwa warned the opposition that its quest to rule Zimbabwe will be in vain: Kustate house kuya muudzei muCCC uyu kuti munhu anofamba neshoka kubva kuno kuinda kuChina anotanga kusvika ari muno asati asvika (Tell the CCC leader that one who travels on foot to China (from Zimbabwe) will first arrive whilst one here will not have arrived at state house). (https://www.youtube.com, 15 July 2022)

This is not different from what Robert Mugabe used to say during his tenure as President of ZANU PF. He even alluded that the vote would not remove his party from power: Nyika haingaendi nebhilo (The country cannot be lost through the stroke of a pen). (newzimbabwe.com 15 July 2022)

He even swore by his mother that this will never happen; Ndinopika namai vangu Bona hazvife zvakaitika (I swear by my mother Bona that this will never happen). (newzimbabwe. com 15 July 2022)

In Shona culture under which Mugabe grew, swearing by one’s mother signifies the seriousness of one’s stance or claim. It is almost regarded as a truth. Therefore, in effect, he literally shut down the door on the then MDC leader to rule the country as he was a “puppet” of the West, as Mugabe once said on 22 March 2007, Tsvangirai, you want to rule this country on behalf of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. As long as I am alive, this will never happen (newzim babwe.com 15 July 2022).

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As observed by Mapara and Wasosa (2012), the opposition leaders have been labelled zvimbwasungata, a term derived from zvimbwa zvewasunga uta (dogs that would follow anyone they see carrying a bow and arrow), a Shona term mainly used during the liberation struggle to refer to sellouts. There has been a deliberate attempt to portray ZANU PF as a Pan-Africanist movement and yet it was responsible for infringing on the people’s rights. Moyo et al. (2013: 20) argue that “Mugabe was …a demagogue, totalitarian and a fake pan-Africanist dredging up memories of colonialism in order to seek tenuous black brotherhood while riding roughshod over the rights of Zimbabweans”. This posturing poses the danger of labelling the opposition as lacking interests of the black people and hence voting for it is tantamount to bringing back white minority rule (Masungure, 2011). Unfortunately, this trajectory has been accepted by most of the electorate in the remote rural areas where people vote in large turnouts for ZANU PF (Boone & Kriger, 2010). Above all, this has the potential of creating an environment under which members of ZANU PF can justify violence against the opposition as they would be “safeguarding the country’s independence and sovereignty”. According to ZANU PF, it is the only legitimate party to govern the country as it virtually owns Zimbabwe. The politics of exclusion has been rampant in the country, with supporters of the opposition being denied access to certain resources, services and goods that are supposed to benefit every citizen of the country (Kriger, 2005; Ndakaripa, 2020). For instance, the presidential agriculture input scheme and food aid have been made to be a privilege for those who support the ruling party (https://reliefweb.int 15 March 21). Thus, from a neo-liberal perspective, Mugabeism was largely a form of “authoritarianism marked by antipathy towards norms of liberal governance…” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 1144). The opposition has also been labelled a puppet of the West, which makes it illegitimate to be a government. There have been accusations that the opposition MDC, and now its off-shoot CCC, are there to advance interests of the West, not for the improvement of the people’s lives. There is regular reference to the liberation struggle so as to give the impression that the ruling party is the only authentic liberator while all other parties are there to advance neo-colonial interests. This is part of “…patriotic history, which sought to deify ZANU-PF heroes while vilifying political opponents” (Ranger, 2004: 7). As he stared possible defeat by the MDC, the then President Mugabe accused the West of trying to

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effect regime change in Zimbabwe. For example, at a ZANU PF rally in 2002, he encouraged terror against the whites: Our party must continue to strike fear in the white man, our real enemy (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/6/robert-mug abes-most-famous-quotes).

On another occasion, he stated that just like during the colonial period, the country was still at loggerheads with Britain: We are still exchanging blows with the British government. They are using gay gangsters. Each time I pass through London, the gangster regime of Blair “expresses its dismay”(https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/ 9/6/robert-mugabes-most-famous-quotes).

This is in reference to an incident in which a gay activist Peter Tatchell attempted a citizens’ arrest on Mugabe during a visit to London in October, 1999. His onslaught against the British even includes criticising the “harsh” weather, especially during winter. During a rally in Mutare in 2013, he said; Britain is a very small cold uninhabitable country with very small houses (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/6/robert-mug abes-most-famous-quotes).

He went on to adamantly call for non-interference in the politics of Zimbabwe by the former coloniser. This was during the Earth Summit in South Africa 2002 when he declared that, We have fought for our land, we have fought for our sovereignty, small as we are we have won our independence and we are prepared to shed our blood. So, Blair keep your England, and let me keep my Zimbabwe (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/6/rob ert-mugabes-most-famous-quotes)

As argued by Mapara and Wasosa (2012), ZANU PF is also known for political posturing and xenophobic name-calling against the white nationals whom they label agents of regime change. Unsurprisingly, Mnangagwa has continued on the same trajectory, castigating the opposition for being a front of the West and also advancing

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the interests of the former coloniser. He accused Nelson Chamisa, the leader of CCC, of being a front of the West and he further alleged that his father was a member of the Rhodesian Security forces opposed to the liberation struggle. During the March 2022 by-elections rally in Chitungwiza, he insinuated that in the same manner the Rhodesians were defeated, the opposition is going to meet the same fate: Kupusa rudzii ikoko kekuti kuva nehanya nekuda varungu Zvino ndazonzwa nhasi kuti mwana wemupuruvheya Maparuvheya ndiwo atairwa nhawo muhondo takavarakasha, tikavarakasha Zvino vana vacho tiri kuvarakasha nevhoti…havana kwavanoinda zvachose (What naivety is that to admire and support whites I have heard today that he [Nelson Chamisa] is a child of a traitor We thoroughly thrashed the traitors during the war (of liberation), we thoroughly thrashed them Now we going to thoroughly thrash their children with the vote…they are not going anywhere). (https://www.youtube.com, 15 July 2022)

Thus, in the end, the country has been polarised along political and racial lines. In 1980, the government had adopted the policy of reconciliation but after facing a formidable challenge to its rule, especially after the formation of the MDC in 1999, the whites have been a target of the party as they have been shown to be sympathetic to the opposition. There has been state-sanctioned violence against the whites, which reached its peak during the farm invasions of the 2000s, as the whites were deemed illegitimate citizens since they were not indigenous. An unidentified ZANU PF supporter was observed on video making biblical reference in order to demonise the opposition supporters. According to him, it is against God’s wishes to oppose the incumbent President Mnangagwa as he was ordained to rule: Ini ndinotenda kuti vose vanotenda kuna Mwari vachainda kudenga Ndinotenda zvakare kuti kune vaye vanoda zvematongerwe enyika vakafanana nesu kana vanhu vasingadi ZANU PF denga ravo hakuna Vasingadi ZANU PF asi vachida zvematongerwe vachida futi Mwari ndinotaura kuti denga ravo hakuna Kana uchienda kuchechi asi usingadi ZANU PF, denga rako hakuna Bhaibheri rinotaura kuti ivayi pasi pevatungamiri, Saka iwe kana uchiita zvematongerwe enyika usingadi VaMnangagwa usingadi ZANU PF, denga rako hakuna (I am certain that those who believe in God will go to heaven

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I am also certain that those in politics like us who do not support ZANU PF will not go to heaven Those who do not support ZANU PF but are into politics and believe in God, I tell you that there will be no heaven for them If you go to church but you do not support ZANU PF, there is no heaven for you The bible tells us to be loyal to your leaders, so if you are into politics but you do not support ZANU PF there is no heaven for you). (https:// www.youtube.com, 15 July 2022)

The portrayal of opposition supporters as “unholy” and “not fit for heaven” is part of the failure to tolerate the voices of dissent. Additionally, it can also have the negative consequence of instigating violence against the so-called evil opposing entities as the language qualifies to be labelled hate speech by virtue of it invoking negative sentiments. The ZANU PF party has unashamedly justified the use of violence to guarantee the vote. The then President Robert Mugabe once said: Our votes must go together with our guns. Any vote we shall have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote shall be its security officer-its guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins. (https://www.brainyquote.com, 15 July 2022)

The use of violence by the ruling party towards the opposition since 1980 has been one of the main reasons for disputed polls but there is no change in this approach even in the “new dispensation”. One of the issues raised against the ruling party is the deliberate disinformation about the mission of the opposition so that it appears justifiable that the ruling party remains in power forever. For instance, the opposition has been labelled a violent party allegedly harbouring weapons of mass destruction in its efforts to effect regime change. One such example is when Nelson Chamisa said that, unlike during the 2018 elections, in which he claims to have won the presidential vote, the next elections will see his party defending the people’s vote. This has been deliberately misconstrued to mean that he will use violence if he loses the election. Mnangagwa had this to say while campaigning for the March 2022 by-elections in Chitungwiza: Ndonzwa zvonzi naChamisa ndikaruza ndoita mhirizhonga Baba vangu Shumbawe

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Zvino wanatsa watiudza pane nguva tagadzirira (I heard Chamisa saying that if he loses he will get violent Ooh my father Shumba [his totemic designation] It is fine that you have told us in time, we are prepared). (https://www. youtube.com, 15 July 2022)

This can be viewed as a way of inciting and justifying violence against the opposition under the pretext of defending the party and the state as there has always been conflation between the two. Experience and evidence point out to the fact that ZANU PF is the major instigator, perpetrator and sponsor of political violence in the country, while the opposition has been largely on the receiving end (Wasosa, 2018). There are relatively a few incidents in which the opposition has inflicted violence on the ruling party supporters.

Conclusion This discussion has demonstrated that, just like under Robert Mugabe, there is continued use of hate speech against opposition parties by the ruling ZANU PF under Emmerson Mnangagwa, regardless of his pledge to usher a new dispensation. The language used, whether as campaign speeches or written propaganda, including that posted on social media, includes use of offensive remarks resulting in the assault of personalities and insult against members of the opposition, with the white citizenry being labelled agents of regime change. This encourages the culture of intolerance and political polarisation which, consequently, leads to violence. An analysis of the ruling party’s use of language shows its failure to tolerate the opposition and its unwillingness to relinquish power even in the event of an electoral defeat, as it portrays itself as the only legitimate political party by virtue of liberating the country from colonialism. Unless there is a change in the manner the party uses language, the country will continue to witness violence as before, since the opposition is viewed as an enemy of the state which, in cahoots with the Western powers, is attempting to reverse the gains of independence. Above all, this will make the electoral process controversial and contestable, as the environment remains toxic.

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References Alexander, J., & Tendi, B. M. (2008). A tale of two elections: Zimbabwe at the polls in 2008. Politique africaine, 111(3), 111–129. Auwal, A. M. (2018). Social media and hate speech: Analysis on comments on Biafra Agitations and youths and Arewa Youths’ ultimatum and their implications on peaceful co-existence in Nigeria. Media and Communication Currents, 2(1), 54–74. Bakhtin, M. M. (1986). Speech genres and other essays. University of Texas Press. Bates, T. R. (2008). Gramsci and the theory of hegemony. Journal of the History of Ideas, 36(2), 351–366. Badza, S. (2008). Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections and their implications for Africa. African Security Review, 17 (4), 1–6. Boone, C., & Kriger, N. (2010). Multiparty elections and land patronage, Zimbabwe and Cote d’lvoire. Commonwelath and Comparative Politics., 48(2), 173–2002. Campbell, A., Guvin, G., & Miller, W. E. (1954). The voter decides. Row, Peterson. Dube, P., & Ndebele, L. (2018). Group animosity and social identity in Lovemore Majaivana’s music. In I. Muwati, T. Charamba, & C. Tembo (Eds.), Singing the nation and politics: Music and decade of crisis in Zimbabwe, 2000–2010 (pp. 188–205). Midlands State University Press. Fairclogh, N. (1992). Discourse and social change. Polity Press. Kaderi, A. S. (2014). Political history, political violence: Peace-building citizenship interventions. In S. Niyozov & P. Tarc (Eds.), A rice compendium…working with, against and despite “best practices” educational conversations around the globe (pp. 75–81). Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto. Kayambazinthu, E., & Moyo, F. (2002). Hate speech in the new Malawi. In H. Englund (Ed.), A democracy of Chameleons: Politics and culture in the New Malawi. Elanders Gotab. Kriger, N. (2005). ZANU PF strategies in general elections, 980–2000: Discourse and coercion. African Affairs, 104(414), 1–34. Macheka, M. T. (2022). Political violence and faceless perpetrators in Zimbabwe: Reconceptualising a peace building strategy. Cogent Social Sciences, 8(1), 1– 13. Mapara, J., & Wasosa, W. (2012). Self-inflicted tragedies: An assessment of the impact of language use by political parties in post-independence Zimbabwe. Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development, 2(13), 286–292. Masunungure, E. V. (2009). Defying the winds of change: Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections. Weaver Press and Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Masungure, E. V. (2011). Zimbabwe’s militarised electoral authoritarianism. Journal of International Affairs, 65, 47–64.

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Mbofana, T. R. (2018, August 9). Zimbabwe’s ‘new dispensation’ that never was! https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-142 714.html. Accessed 20 March 2018. Melber, H. (2017, December 14). Zimbabwe: Stopping a dynasty does not mean democracy. https://www.dandc.eu/en/article. Accessed 17 November 2020. Moyo, T., Gonye, J., Hlongwana, J., & Kangira, J. (2013). Remembering or re-membering? Life-writing and politics of narration in Morgan Tsvangirai’s autobiography: At the Deep End (2011). Journal for Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(2), 15–26. Muzondidya, J. (2009). From Buoyancy to crisis, 1980–1999. In B. Raftopolous, & A. Mlambo (Eds.), Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from pre-colonial to 2008 (pp. 167–200). Weaver Press. Ndakaripa, M. (2000). Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections: Funding, public resources and vote buying. Review of African Political Economy, 47 (164), 301–312. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2009). Making sense of Mugabeism in local and global politics: “So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe”. Third World Quarterly, 30(6), 1139–1158. Neisser, E. (1994). Hate speech in the new South Africa: Constitutional consideration for a land recovering from decades of rational repression and violence. South African Journal of Human Rights, 10(1), 33–356. Palmberg, M. (2004). Music in Zimbabwe’s crisis. In S. M. Thorsen (Ed.), Sounds of change: Social and political features of music in Africa (No. 12, pp. 18–46). Sida Studies. Ranger, T. O. (2004). Nationalist historiography, patriotic History and the history of the nation: The struggle over the past in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies, 30(2), 215–234. Sachikonye, L. (2011). When a state turns on its citizens: Institutionalised violence and political culture in Zimbabwe. Jacana Media. Schelder, A. (2002). Elections without democracy: The menu of manipulation. Journal of Democracy, 8(1), 127–141. Sithole, M. (1999). Zimbabwe: Struggles-within-the-struggle (1957–1980). Rujeko Publishers. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP). (1997). Breaking the silence, building true peace: A report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and Midlands, 1980–1989. Legal Resources Foundation. United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. (2013). General recommendation on combating racist hate speech, CERD/C/GC/35. Van Dijk, T. A. (2003). Critical discourse analysis. In D. Tannen, D. Schifrfrin, & H. E. Hamilton (Eds.), The handbook of discourse analysis (pp. 352–371). Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Wasosa, W. (2018). Singing for self-defence or fanning political violence? An analysis of selected songs by pro-MDC musical groups. In I. Muwati, T.

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CHAPTER 11

Shona Language as a Tool in Winning Political Support During Campaigning: A Case for Buhera South in Zimbabwe Maradze Viriri

and Eunitah Viriri

Introduction Politicians all over the world embellish their language in a unique way to give extra effect and force to their message in an endeavor to achieve their objective of winning more votes. This can be embodied in rhetoric or propaganda, involving repetition, promise, colloquialism, word coinages, pidginized and figurative expressions. Wherever politics evolves, propaganda is a major tool in deciding the vote. Propaganda itself is not possible without language. By studying language in circumstances where all its functions and variations are taken into consideration, it is possible to learn more about how perceptions, convictions and identities are influenced by language. In political speeches during election campaigns, ideas are conveyed to the people with the aim of winning their hearts during elections. It is argued, in this research, that propaganda as an

M. Viriri (B) · E. Viriri Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_11

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aspect which is often used by most politicians is characterized by exaggeration and rhetorical questions (Omozuwa & Ezejideaku, 2010). The intrinsic link between language and politics has long been recognized. Aristotle, cited in Turow (2012), wrote, ‘… that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech.’ Kulo (2009) observed that politicians use language, applying approaches which range from traditional rhetoric to other literary devices when trying to win the support of electorates. Language plays a very important role in our day-to-day operations. It is the basic tool of communication. Almutalabi (2019) noted that when campaigning, politicians communicate using powerful language which creates an emotional atmosphere which can influence prospective voters to vote for the speaker come election period. According to Vygotsky, cited in Ball and Peters (2000), language influences the way we think, and hence, the language which people use to relay messages has a major bearing in influencing the way the recipients of the intended message think. Similarly, Beard (2000) notes that political communication literature is rife, with studies commenting on how a message sender’s image is facilitated or debunked by language choice. Jones and Wareing (1999) observed that language levels alter political realities when nouns, verbs and adjectives are tweaked to different degrees of moderation or extremity. Joseph (2009) has it that political leaders of different parties constantly work to win good will, obtain public understanding and protect political interests. They sell themselves and their policies just like the business personnel sells goods, commodities and services using persuasive language. Shona, which is a mother tongue for people in Buhera South, is vital in framing the thinking and emotions of these people. The way a message is worded partially determines how persuasive it is. Therefore, language is a propaganda tool that should not be underestimated. Soules (2015) views propaganda as a type of message aimed at influencing opinions or behavior of people. Woolley and Howard (2016) noted that propaganda may provide only partial information or be deliberately misleading. Casey (1935) observed that the central problem in politics today is propaganda. He noted that elections these days have long ceased to be a struggle between fundamental policies; instead, they are now ‘a race for the best position, for flashlights’ which can be best achieved through propaganda, which in most of the cases leads to the choice of a wrong candidate chosen after using lavish language to attract

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the electorate. This research seeks to examine the use of Shona during campaigns in Buhera South. Omozuwa and Ezejideaku (2010) opined that the language of political campaigns is laden with persuasion, propaganda and rhetorical questions, with the view to cajoling the electorate and thus garner votes. The aim of politicians is to get votes which will earn them seats in various political structures. Priority in the minds of politicians in Buhera South is to win support from the electorate by using the language of persuasion. In the heat of campaigns, political aspirants constantly work to win good will, obtain public support and protect their political interests. They ‘sell’ themselves and their policies using lavish Shona laced with idioms, proverbs, euphemisms, exaggerations and plain folks. Omozuwa and Ezejideaku (2010) aver that this aspect of language ‘is intended to pass the needed information to the electorate with the view to convincing or appealing to them and has an effect of causing the electorate to have a change of mind.’ The choice of certain words and expressions can have a major impact on how the recipients will respond to the message. Politicians in Buhera South use literary devices in Shona when addressing their potential electorate to convince them to vote for them during elections. The Shona language is rich in literary devices which are usually used by political aspirants to win votes. These literary devices include metaphors and euphemisms. Szila’gyi (2004) noted that metaphors and euphemisms are clever ways to break into someone’s head and direct their thoughts. They can carry positive or negative connotations or present things as better or as worse than they really are. Most often, politicians in Buhera South try to pacify the audience in order to make an unpleasant reality more palatable. This is accomplished by using words in Shona that are bland and euphemistic. Politicians in Buhera South also use plain folks during their political campaign speeches. By using these plain folks, these politicians will be trying to convince their audience that their ideas are ‘of the people.’

Theoretical Framework The political marketing theory and the critical discourse theory guided this research. According to Ovidiu (2013), the political marketing theory puts emphasis on the use of rhetorical devices, language strategies and discursive tactics in a campaign message. In the same vein, politicians in Buhera South make use of the richness of the Shona language by using the various Shona literary devices to persuade people to vote for them during

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elections. Butler and Collins (1994) observed that the political marketing theory entails the commercial marketing by political candidates as they try to win the electorate. In democratic parties all over the world, it is the right of every candidate to campaign. Broadly, political marketing, according to Franklin (1994), can be defined as the marketing in political organizations that focuses on facilitating value exchange and building relationships with various stakeholders such as voters, opposing parties or candidates, and the media. In the case of Buhera South, politicians will be jostling for positions and so they will be using their linguistic competence in Shona to persuade the electorate to vote for them. Kaskeala (2010) views political marketing as the process by which political candidates and their ideas are aimed at voters to meet their potential needs and, thus, gain their support. At a micro-level, marketing would focus on the communication and exchange relationships between individual stakeholders and political actors, while at a macro-level, its emphasis would be on the interrelationship between a relation-based approach and the political marketplace. In simple terms, political marketing refers to certain forms of political communications within electoral campaigns. The political marketing theory has the potential to reflect the work of political marketers in their bid to get elected during elections. Thus, it offers theoretical lens through which to examine political behavior by political candidates during campaigns as they use the Shona language to persuade voters to vote for them. Butler and Collins (1994) observed that an essential political marketplace would accordingly involve a core segmentation strategy designed to target four groups: (1) the political party’s core supporters, (2) the party’s national members, (3) the party’s voter base and (4) voters in general. Thus, this study looked at how politicians in Buhera South used the Shona language to win the support of voters during elections in the past and also look at the prospects of the 2023 political campaigns. Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 276) say that critical discourse analysis is concerned with language use in speech and writing, meaning-making in the social process, and is a form of social action that is socially constitutive and socially shaped. Discourses can be appropriated or colonized, and put into practice by enacting, inculcating or materializing them. The critical discourse theory will come in handy when analyzing the speeches by political candidates and responses from interview participants.

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Research Methodology The study employed a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach provides a better understanding of the research problem (Creswell, 2013). The qualitative research design is appropriate for this research which looks critically at the use of Shona in Buhera South during campaigns. The research is ethnographic in nature and is committed to the naturalistic perspective as it focuses on understanding the research phenomena in situ and interprets phenomena in terms of the meanings that people bring to them. The researcher attended rallies where political candidates used Shona language in their bid to persuade the electorate to vote for them. Interviews on the effectiveness of the use of Shona as a medium of communication during these campaigns were carried out with at least 10 people who attended the political gatherings. These ten people were chosen from the crowd who attended the rallies. The ten people were purposively sampled and interviewed on the effectiveness of the use of Shona language when addressing rallies by political candidates. The strength for the purposive sampling afforded the researcher room to judge particular people as suitable for the provision of the required information (Cohen et al., 2011). The study sample consisted of 10 adults, 5 females and 5 males, who attended the political gatherings in Buhera South. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the participants. To ensure consistency in the interviews, the researcher recorded the proceedings of the interview sessions. Since participants were above the age of 18 years, the researcher sought their consent by making them fill in consent forms or verbal consent. The participants were assured that the study was purely for academic purposes. This qualitative research on the effectiveness of the use of Shona language during political campaigns sought to answer to processes, meanings and questions that focus on how Shona discourse is interpreted and given meaning. Questions to be answered by this research are: 1. How popular is the Shona language in Buhera South? 2. How effective is the Shona language during political campaigns? 3. To what extent does the use of the Shona language by political candidates during political campaigns influence people’s decisions during voting?

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Findings Speeches by Political Candidates During Campaigning Rallies The presentation of findings is as follows: speeches by political aspirants and responses from interview participants are presented and then analyzed, bringing out Shona literary devices punctuating these speeches and then the likely influence which each of these literary devices may have on the electorate will be given as well. In the presentation, quotes from the political aspirants and interview participants are given and analyzed. Literary devices which punctuate speeches of political leaders during campaign are brought to the surface and analyzed. Results from the research show that most aspiring politicians use Shona language to woo supporters to vote for them during elections. The results demonstrate that the use of Shona for political campaigning in Buhera South plays a major role in decision making for the electorate when it comes to choosing candidates to represent them in different political portfolios. Language component

Percentage

Exaggerations Metaphors Euphemism Irony Proverbs Pronouns Plain folks

25 20 15 12 10 10 8

Based on the research results shown in Fig. 11.1, it is evident that most of the speeches by politicians in Buhera South are characterized by exaggerations. Other components of the Shona language are also used with the aim of enriching their speeches to persuade the electorate to vote for them. Below is a detailed discussion of these language components and how they were used by the politicians in Buhera South.

Metaphors The main literary device used by politicians in Buhera South during campaigns in their speeches is metaphors. In the following quotation, the speaker used a lot of metaphors to persuade the voters to vote for him and at the same time disparaging his rival. The speaker had this to say.

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LANGUAGE COMPONENT

PERCENTAGE

Exaggerations

25

Metaphors

20

Euphemism

15

Irony

12

Proverbs

10

Pronouns

10

Plain-folks

8

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Fig. 11.1 Shona language components commonly used in speeches

Zimbabwe haibvumi kutongwa nezvimbwasungata zvekumaviririra. Imi ndinoziva kuti makangwara zvekuti hamungabvumi kutungamirirwa nezvimbwasungata zvisingagoni kana kunyora mazita azvo. Muri vachenjeri vekumabvazuva imi saka ndisarudzei ini Moses wenyu, ndikusvitsei Canaan kune uchi nemukaka. Uyu wandirikukwikwidzana naye uyu anokusiyai muri murenje mukafa nenyota nenzara (Zimbabwe will not accept to be ruled by puppets from the West who cannot even write their names correctly. You are the wisemen from the East, vote for me, I am your Moses, and I will lead you to the promised land of Canaan where there is honey and milk. This one who is contesting me will leave you stranded in the desert, and you will starve because of hunger and thirsty.)

In the above excerpt, the country, Zimbabwe, is personified. Zimbabwe is presented as if it is a person who has the sense of choice, akin to a person who has a mind to make a choice. Metaphors are usually used as communication tools, and they give sensitivity stating comparisons to emphasize an idea. The language features of metaphors are represented in euphemism meaning, experimental value, rational value and expressive value. The form of meaning is manifested in the features of the metaphorical form to express a message or ideology. The use of metaphors manifests an attitude of politeness on the side of the speaker because it refines and expands the meaning of the speech value. Speech events are a way of conveying more than what is said. That is, the message is broader when compared to what is expressed. Thus, either directly or indirectly, metaphor is very loaded with character.

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Euphemisms During one of the campaign rallies which the researcher attended, a political aspirant addressing the electorates said, Imi vanhu veBuhera South makangwarisa kudarika vanhu vese munyika ino, ndinodaro nekuti munoziva munhu kwaye wekuvhotera. (You people of Buhera South, you are the most intelligent people in the country. I am saying so because you know the best person to vote for who will represent you.)

The speaker went on to say, Ndinoziva vanhu veBuhera South muri vanhu vane njere, nokudaro ndine chivimbo chekuti hamungabvumi kutungamirirwa nemunhu asingazivi kuti pfuti yakaita sei uye inoridzwa sei? (I know you people of Buhera South as educated people, and as such, I have confidence that you will not accept to be led by someone who does not know what a gun looks like and who does not know how to operate it.)

In this case, the speaker was being euphemistic because Buhera South is often regarded as the least developed district in Buhera in terms of the literacy level and infrastructure-wise. In this case, the speaker is attempting to pacify the audience through euphemism in order to make an unpleasant reality more palatable. This is accompanied by using words that are bland and euphemistic. In his speech, there are elements of satire. Satire has been defined in various and often complex ways, but essentially satire involves the ridicule of either individual politicians or political parties. Satire aims to use laughter as a weapon, pointing out folly and, by implication, suggesting that political behavior should change. In most of the cases, the speakers used satire when trying to disparage their rivals in the political race. During one of the rallies, the speaker said, Mungasarudza uya ane sutu imwe semhashu, ko mari yebudiriro anozoiwanepi achimboshaya mari yekutenga nhumbi dzekuzvipfekedza. (How can you choose someone who has one suit like a grasshopper? Where will he get the money for development when he cannot raise money for clothing himself?)

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In this speech, the speaker is satirizing his opponent in the political race. What came out in these speeches was also confirmed by one interview participant who had this to say, Kazhinji mune zvematongerwe inyika izvi, vanoshandisirana chibhende vachinyombana kuti tisavhotere avo vavanokwikwidzana navo. (In most cases in politics they use euphemisms to disparage rivals in the political race.)

Proverbs Politicians in Buhera South use proverbs during their campaigning speeches. During one of the rallies, one of the speakers said, Tisakanganwe chazuro nehope. (Let us not forget that which happened yesterday just because we got asleep during the night.)

Reference here was being made to the events during the colonial rule, the war atrocities and the ill-treatment of blacks during this period. By so doing, the speaker instilled fear in the audience, and as a result, the audience had no option but to vote for him in order to avoid going back to the period being referred to by the speaker. One common proverb used by the politicians is, Musasvora mbodza neinozvimbira.” (Do not judge a book by its cover.)

During the rally, the speaker went on to say, Pandinenge ndaresva, musatya kunditsiura nekuti ndiri mwana wenyu, hamungandirashe nekuti ndakoniwa. Ane benzi ndeane rake, kudzana unopururudza. (Whenever I err, do not hesitate to reprimand me because I am your child. You cannot reject me because I have a made a mistake. If you have a mentally challenged child, you will be happy if he or she does anything good.)

One participant had this to say about the use of proverbs by political candidates,

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Kushandiswa kwetsumo kunoita kuti tifungisise maringe nemashoko atinenge tichiudzwa uye tsumo dzinopa uremu pamashoko ose anenge achitaurwa. (The use of proverbs makes us think deeply about what has been said.)

Usually, by using the aforementioned proverb, the politician will be urging the electorate to give him or her the chance to lead them by voting for him or her rather than just discarding him or her from the onset.

Pronouns During these political campaigning rallies, almost every speaker will be heard saying, Mumusangano, iwe neni tine basa. Ini kwamuri ndiri muranda wenyu, changu chandinoita kutakura zvose zvamunenge mandituma ndonosvitsa kwazvakarehwa ndozodzoka nemhinduro. (In this political party, you and I have a duty. To you I am a servant, my duty is to carry all your grievances to the top and come back with the answers.)

In the quotation above, the speaker is making sure that he is using pronouns which involve the audience and then himself. On the effectiveness of the use of pronouns, one interview participant had this to say, Pakushandisa chisazitasingwi zvinobva zvaratidza kuti isu navo, tose tine basa rekuita kuti bato rienderere mberi uyezve zvinoratidza kuti anotiremekedza. (By using pronouns, the speaker is showing us that we have a role to play to make sure that the party moves forward, and it shows the respect he has for us.)

By doing so, the speaker is likely to win the hearts of the electorates by giving them the responsibility of making sure that the audience comes first and then he comes second in protecting the party. What voters in Buhera South respect very much is a person who appears to put them first before himself or herself.

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Exaggerations Speeches by politicians in Buhera South are often punctuated with a lot of exaggerations which are meant to woo the electorates to vote for them. During the rallies, the following statements were constantly made: “Ikozvino kana mukandisarudza ndoda kuti munhu umwe neumwe wenyu ane mwana akapedza chikoro anouya naye ndomupinza basa. Pamusoro pezvo, ndichada kuti pose pane chikoro ndaisa clinic kuti musafambe nzendo refu kana muchida kurapiwa. (If you vote me into office this time around, then everyone who has a child who has finished his or her education must come so that I can secure employment for them. In addition to that, I will make sure that I build a clinic at every school in the district.)

Exaggerations are part and parcel of propaganda which punctuates most of the speeches by politicians in Buhera South. Political propaganda is nothing new in Buhera South, just like in the rest of the world. A common statement during campaigning rallies is, Mukasavhota zvakanaka, tinodzokera mudondo. (If you do not vote wisely, we will go back to the jungle.)

Reference here is being made to the fact that if the electorate votes for the opposition party, then the ruling party will resort to war, just like the war which was waged to overthrow the Smith regime. In this instance, the speaker will be using the fear technique which can also be termed as ‘appeal to fear.’ The fear technique is perhaps the most common form of propaganda and the one which is common in Buhera South. By making people afraid of the alternative, they naturally tend to support the position of the speaker. Political propaganda tends to target the fears and anxiety that most people of Buhera South view as fundamental. When people are in fear for their personal and economic security, they tend to be highly motivated to vote for those they perceive as protecting their way of life. The speaker went on to say, Vhoterai ini ndisina pandinozeza, kana ndichida kuona president handiiti zvekutanga ndambogogodza padoor, hungopinda. (Vote for me, I am fearless and resolute. When visiting the president, I don’t make an appointment I just go straight to meet him.)

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One participant concurred that exaggerations were part and parcel of political rallies, when he said, Wedzeredzo inofanirwa kuvepo kuti muwane rutsugiro, asi kuti chinofanira kuwanda ichokwadi ndiko kuti vanhu vazotsigira musangano. (Exaggerations are part and parcel of political campaigns and these will help the party to gain support, however it must not go to extremes. Giving people promises that come to materialize is what makes people support the party.)

The exaggerations in the above speeches concurred with what came out during interviews. One interview participant had this to say on exaggerations by politicians in their speeches, Kazhinji vanhu vanoda kuvhoterwa ava vanotaura zvinhu zvisingafi zvakaitika, chinangwa chiri chekuda kuvhoterwa chete. (In most cases, these political aspirants will promise certain things which are not realistic, the reason being that they want to be voted into office.)

Plain Folks Political aspirants use plain folks as a strategy to win support during their speeches. The use of plain folks is a trick in which the speaker demonstrates, through his or her speech, that they are like the rest of us. During one of the rallies, one political aspirant said, Mazuvano handisi kurara nekufunga nhamo yatiri kusangana nayo mudzimba umu. Zviri pachena kuti nekuda kwezvirango zveupfumi, tose tiri kurara tisina zvatadya.Vana vedu vari kutadza kuenda kuchikoro nekuda kwezvirango zveupfumi. Izvezvi kutaura kudai, handitozivi kuti shuga inotapira sei nekuti mari yekuti ndiitenge handina nekuda kwezvirango zveupfumi. Vana vedu ivezvi vatochembera vasina kuroora nekuti pfuma yeroora yacho vanoiwana kupi. (These days, I am not managing a decent sleep because of the poverty we are experiencing in our homesteads. It is a naked truth that because of the sanctions, we are sleeping on empty stomachs. Our children are failing to go to school because of sanctions. Right now, I cannot even recall how sugar tastes, because I do not have money to buy due to the sanctions. Our children are now ageing yet they are not married because they cannot afford the lobola payment.)

By using these plain folks, the speaker here is attempting to convince the audience that they [the political party], and their ideas, are of the

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people. Through these exaggerations, the speaker will be seeking to make the people approve and accept him/her without examining the evidence of what he or she will be saying. Exaggerations in politics sway the emotions of the electorate using shining ideals or virtues such as education, democracy and economic emancipation.

Discussion This research has established that components of Shona language which include metaphors, proverbs, pronouns, euphemisms, plain folks and exaggerations come in so handy to politicians in Buhera South when they deliver their campaigning speeches to the electorate. It has been clearly illustrated and illuminated that the use of Shona by politicians during campaigns goes a long way in forging a close relationship between the political aspirants and the electorate. Shona language has been seen to be the ideal language for political campaign in Buhera South. Using some of the components in Shona language, political aspirants in Buhera South have been able to persuade the rural electorate to vote for them. They have achieved this through persuasion and propaganda which can best be achieved through rhetoric, which is common in Shona language. Aristotle, cited in Charteris-Black (2005), defines rhetoric as ‘the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.’ It can also refer dismissively to language filled with empty phrases and false sentiments. Most importantly, the identification of Shona as the sole language of communication was seen as the main reason why politicians in Buhera South have a close relationship with the electorate. Using Shona, potential political candidates win the hearts of many electorates by persuading them to vote for them. It is also by using the Shona language, which is understood by most residents of Buhera South, that these politicians manage to change the attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviors of the rural electorates. It is assumed that components of Shona language are so appealing to the people to the extent that they can influence decision making on the minds of the electorate during elections. In some of the speeches, the use of Shona during campaigns is so evident that some of the speeches evoke emotions, resulting in some of the listeners crying. It has been suggested that great efforts must be put in place to continue promoting Shona as a medium of communication so that it continues to grow just like other world established languages.

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The use of pronouns, ‘imi and ini’ (you and I), may tell us a lot about how much responsibility a speaker wants to assume for an idea. The use of plain folks enables the speaker to place himself or herself as being in the same situation with the people whom he or she will be addressing. In most of the instances, when the political candidates use plain folks, they will be attempting to convince their electorate that they are in the same plight with the speaker. One politician in Buhera South has been a winner in most of the elections because he appealed to the voters as ‘a man of the people.’ In Nigeria, a contender to a political office would always try to give people the impression that he/she is one of them either by speaking to them in their local language or dialect or by putting on the people’s traditional attire during campaigns. This propaganda device was used by President Jonathan during 2011 elections. He said, ‘Fellow Nigerians, I once had no shoes. If I could make it, you too can.’ This placed much emphasis on his humble background, and it appealed to people too. In the same vein, politicians in Buhera South use the same strategy to win the support of the electorate during elections. There is extensive use of metaphors by politicians in their speeches during the political campaigns. The use of these metaphors is meant to create an image of the speaker as a serious political contender who will never give up. This concurs with Charteris-Black (2005: 57) who noted that ‘within all types of political systems, from autocratic, through oligarchic to democratic; leaders have relied on the spoken word to convince others of the benefits that arise from their leadership.’ In political speeches during election campaigns, ideas and ideologies need to be conveyed through language so that they are agreed upon by the receivers as well as others. Political speeches by political candidates in Buhera South are usually punctuated by metaphors. Metaphors are linguistic symbols which give concrete labels to abstract ideas. This is made possible because of the perceived similarity between objects and concepts as regards particular features that these politicians want to convey easily. Metaphors give strength because they contain two ideas, namely in the form of facts and processed thoughts. The use of metaphors by politicians in their speech is very important because metaphor is one of the language features that tend to refine speech so that the meaning or message conveyed affects the development of attitudes and character of the listeners. The speakers in the case of political speeches will be aiming to convince the listener to vote for him or her. Sumarsono (2014) states that pronouncing language features like metaphors will cause perlocutionary power, and thus, the

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speech will influence the listener in ways both real and expected when he or she makes a choice during voting. This effect is manifested in the values contained in the language features of metaphors which are one of the goals of these political speeches of campaigning. Baldo and Maria (2022) say that the use of metaphors in political discourse helps to convey views and ideas indirectly and this represents the efforts of the political elite to maintain etiquette and manners in speaking during campaigns. From the results, it is evident that politicians in Buhera South use proverbs in their speeches very often. Proverbs and proverbial sayings, with their communicative significance and value, have for centuries been equally popular with all nations due to the enormous significance and functions which they intend to carry and due to the influence they have. Mieder (2000) says that proverbs continue to be used to moralize, to instruct, to advise and to reflect on everyday occurrences. By employing proverbs in their speeches, these politicians from Buhera South will be wishing to strengthen their arguments, express generalizations and influence or manipulate other people. Malik (2019) views proverbs to be by far the richest man’s prominence, being a privilege and a multifaceted reflection of communication activities. They serve the presence of an ongoing process of mentality as an effective language component which appeals to the mind. Malik (ibid.) regards proverbs as reflections of the most powerful resource which language makes available whenever humans are prepared to reach the utmost of elegance. Proverbs have the major and most important fact to be stated in that they have certain functions to achieve when they are used in certain communicative situations. Whether spoken or written, proverbs always convey countless senses, intentions, experiences and purposes in life. People of Buhera South are staunch traditionalists who respect their language and whenever they want to discuss serious matters in life, they resort to proverbs to air out their inner thoughts.

Conclusion This study has explored the main Shona components used by politicians during campaigns. The aim of this study was to examine the use of the Shona language as a tool in winning the support of the electorate by aspiring political candidates in Buhera South. Thus, the study looked at how politicians maximized the rich literary devices found in the Shona language to persuade people to vote for them. The Shona language has

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been seen to be ideal for politicians in Buhera South to further their political aspirations, thereby winning the support of the rural electorate. Language is a powerful tool which can influence one’s reasoning to a great extent. The conclusion drawn from this study is that language is a powerful tool which can make one change his or her mind. As the main findings of the study revealed, the ability to maximize on the richness of the Shona language goes a long way in persuading the electorate to vote for certain political aspirants. The Shona language as a medium for daily social interaction for the people of Buhera South is an important tool used by politicians to win the hearts of the electorate to vote for them. As we draw closer to the watershed 2023 elections in Zimbabwe, we wait to see if political candidates in Buhera South will resort to the extensive use of the Shona language as they used to do in the past to persuade the electorate to vote for them.

References Almutalabi, M. (2019). Exploring the significance of proverbs in English language. Chan University. Ball, A. R., & Peters, B. G. (2000). Modern politics and government (6th ed.). Macmillan Press. Baldo, P., & Maria, R. (2022). Metaphor and irony on reviews for Spanish and American prisons. International Journal of Society, Culture and Language, 10(1), 1–14. Beard, A. (2000). The language of politics. Routledge. Butler, P., & Collins, N. (1994). Political marketing: Structure and process. European Journal of Marketing, 28(1), 19–34. Casey, R. D. (1935). Party campaign propaganda. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0002716235179003 Charteris-Black, J. (2005). Politicians and rhetoric: The persuasive power of metaphor. Palgrave Macmillan. Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2011). Reaearch methods in education. Routledge. Creswell, J. W. (2013). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches. 4th Edition, SAGE Publications. Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. Sage. Franklin, B. (1994). Packaging politics. Edward Arnold. Jones, J., & Wareing, S., et al. (1999). Language and politics. In L. Thomas (Ed.), Language society and power (pp. 31–47). Routledge. Joseph, J. E. (2009). Language and politics. Routledge.

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Kaskeala, A. (2010). Value creation in political marketing. Aalto University School of Economics. Kulo, L. (2009). Linguistic features in political speeches (Unpublished thesis). Lulea University of Technology. Malik, H. A. (2019). Exploring the significance of proverbs in english language. Alsuna: Journal of Arabic and English Language, 2(1), 30–38. Mieder, W. (2000). Proverbs: A handbook. Folklore Handbooks. Omozuwa, V., & Ezejideaku, E. U. C. (2010). A stylistic analysis of the language of political campaigns in Nigeria: Evidence from the 2007 general elections. OGIRISI: A New Journal of African Studies, 5(1), 89–115. Ovidiu, A. (2013). Marketing concepts within the political field. The USV Annals of Economics and Public Administration, 13, 42–49. Soules, M. (2015). Media, persuasion and propaganda. Edinburgh Press. Sumarsono. (2014). Sociolinguistic. Pustaka Belajar Szila’gyi, A. (2004). Propaganda, disinformation, and the power of words: Media and language use. Centre for Independent Journalism. Woolley, S. C., & Howard, P. N. (2016). Political communication, computational propaganda, and autonomous agents: Introduction. International Journal of Communication, 10(2), 112–126.

CHAPTER 12

Political Poetic/Theatrical Campaigning Pieces in Indigenous Languages in Rural Communities: The Case of Bikita District in Masvingo, Zimbabwe Beatrice Taringa

Introduction The chapter sought to examine the effects of poetic/theatrical pieces (campaign slogans) that political players use in canvassing for support in the run-up to the 2023 harmonised elections. The study is based on multiple case studies of two purposively selected slogans and poetic/theatrical linguistic pieces coined by the political players for use in their political campaigns in the rural areas and implications to peace and nation building in the context of unhu/ubuntu. The chapter outline includes the background to the chapter, the purpose, chapter questions,

B. Taringa (B) University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_12

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significance, delimitation, limitations, theoretical framework and review of related literature, methodology and presentation and discussion of chapter findings. The chapter closes with the conclusion and learning points.

Background to the Study From independence to the late 1990s, Zimbabwe had been more of one-party state such that the ruling Zimbabwe African National UnionPatriotic Front (ZANU-PF), led by Robert Gabriel Mugabe, enjoyed dominance over relatively ineffective opposition parties. The opposition parties then were usually regional outfits such as the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Ndonga in Chipinge, Manicaland. This gave ZANU-PF the monopoly in the national political sphere. In the process, the party had had an opportunity to establish strongholds and created its all-weather electorate that only consumed ZANU-PF campaign diet, especially in the rural and commercial farming areas. The absence of strong opposition parties made elections a mere formality and a ritual that resulted in what Chari (2011) calls “mock pluralism” where elections produced a drama of pretence. The birth of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2000 led by Morgan Richard Tsvangirai turned the Zimbabwean political landscape into a tight contest. The entry of the MDC in the political terrain overshadowed all other opposition parties that ever contested against the ZANU-PF party since independence in 1980. As the struggle for winning elections heightened, the Zimbabwean political landscape turned volatile as the two political parties adopted every means and strategy available to outwit each other. The language for campaigning got crude as the two portrayed each other as enemies, sell-outs and all sorts of names rather than appreciating each other as contestants. Some political campaign strategies are beneficial to communities while some are destructive and divisive as they create a chasm between political actors. Previous research concentrated on how some campaign strategies influence political violence through inciting supporters. Studies are yet to be conducted on poetic and theatrical linguistic styles devised and adopted by the political players as party slogans to canvass for support from the electorate, and the implications of this to ethics and professionalism in the context of unhu/ubuntu. In addition, there are no studies

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that have explored the possibility of coming up with patents and prototypes of such slogans. It is against this background that this chapter, using an inductive qualitative critical content and discourse analyses, sets to examine poetic/theatrical pieces of campaign slogans that political players devise to compete for the electorate’s support in the run-up to the 2023 harmonised elections.

Purpose of the Study Using critical content and discourse analyses, the current chapter seeks to examine the effect of poetic/theatrical pieces of campaign slogans inductively and qualitatively. This section also examines the implications of the pieces in the context of promoting unhu/ubuntu whose ethics promote peace, stability and nation building.

Statement of the Problem There is a gap in knowledge when it comes to examining the effect of content and discourse of slogans that political parties devise and use to campaign for the electorate’s vote in Zimbabwe. This is an essential area of academic enquiry, especially now when the nation is preparing for the 2023 harmonised election period. There is also a need to assess the implications of the campaign slogans in the context of unhu/ubuntu with regard to peace, stability and nation building. The proclamation of the campaign period opens the ground for political players to canvass for electoral support. No previous studies are known to have attempted to explore the content and discourse of campaign slogan narratives and their possible implications to national peace and stability. This is despite the assumption that language is an intangible cultural heritage tool that humanity can use in either nation building or destruction if used without a proper guiding framework. The operations of these political parties are governed and informed by the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) and guided by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) guidelines. It is therefore imperative to assess the campaign slogan items against the set theoretical framework. Many a times, media and scholars blame the political parties’ slogans for being inflammatory and tending to fanning political violence. Political players also blame media for partisanship. The phenomenon of elections and election processes and procedures in Zimbabwe is topical. The elections have been repeatedly labelled unfair and discredited by some organisations and observers. The chapter

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employs unhu/ubuntu as lenses for exploring the content and discourse of the slogans and their implications to national peace and stability.

Research Questions The chapter is informed by the main research question: What are the effects of the poetic/theatrical campaign slogans used by ZANU-PF and CCC in the run-up to the 2023 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe? This is covered through the following research questions: a. What is the content and discourse of the political players’ slogans for campaigning in run-up to the 2023 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe? b. What are the implications of the content and discourse of those slogans to peace, stability and nation building in Zimbabwe in the context of unhu/ubuntu? c. What are the opportunities for and limitations in coming up with patents and prototypes?

Significance of the Study As indicated earlier in the background, on several occasions the media blamed political players’ campaigning slogans, especially by ZANU-PF and MDC-T, as inflammatory and fanning political violence indirectly. Some media and political analysts argue that the media was making claims that are unsubstantiated and most of the court cases that were launched in this regard collapsed in the constitutional court for lack of evidence. The subject of campaigning and campaigning slogans in Zimbabwean elections is topical. Several studies on political players and elections in Zimbabwe concentrated on gender disparity in coverage and hegemonic coverage of dominant parties, especially their presidential candidates. Furthermore, most of the studies used Western theoretical frameworks. No known study focuses on the linguistic and poetic styles that the political players devise. This chapter sought to assess the level of innovativeness in view of coming up with patents and prototypes and its implications for peace, stability and nation building in Zimbabwe. The chapter will benefit the stakeholders, the electorate, political players and media personnel as it shares insights on content and discourse of the campaign slogans in the run-up to the 2023 harmonised elections.

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Delimitation Geographically, the study is limited to Zimbabwe. Conceptually, it is a research focusing on aspects of the content and discourse of the poetic and theatrical campaign linguistic styles of slogans that political players devise and use when canvassing for political support. The study examines the implications of the slogans on peace, stability and nation building in Zimbabwe. Taking a cue from Bryman and Bell (2007: 127), the selection of the slogans was inevitably influenced by the type of research problem the study sought to explore. The research sought to carry out an in-depth case study of the poetic and theatrical linguistic styles of the campaign slogans and their implications for ethics and professionalism and, subsequently, for national peace and stability in Zimbabwe in the context of unhu/ubuntu. It is not within the scope of this study to cover more political party slogans or other activities by these political players for an in-depth qualitative study like this.

Theoretical Framework Theoretical framework is the guiding lenses in any inquiry. Unhu/Ubuntu is the lenses that I adopted in exploring the phenomenon, that is, the content and discourse of the poetic and theatrical pieces of slogans that political players use in canvassing electorate support in the run-up to the 2023 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe. The African philosophy of ubuntu/unhu has been subject to scholarly research for too long now. Some of the debates like, whether the Africans have a philosophy, can Africans philosophise and whether the Africans have requisite skills to do philosophy remained unresolved in re-discoursing unhu/ubuntu. It is not the aim of this chapter to attempt resolving the controversy but simply to consider debates in contextualising ubuntu/unhu in the election campaign slogans, with the view to explore the possibility of registering patents and prototypes and fostering peace, stability and nation building in the run-up to the 2023 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe. These and other debates will be discussed in the section in a bid to contextualise the unhu/ubuntu philosophy in the discourse of political players’ campaigning slogans. This chapter attempts to address this academic gap by exploring the campaign slogans phenomena using African lenses germane to our Zimbabwean context.

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Overall, unhu/ubuntu has been explained in terms of its characteristics by scholars. It is an embodiment of the values of the spirit of oneness and brotherhood, according to Museka and Madondo (2012). It also embodies the virtues that celebrate mutual social responsibility, mutual assistance, trust, sharing and unselfishness, self-reliance, caring and selfrespect, among others (Khomba et al., 2011). It is an African philosophy characterised by responsible personality, honesty, justice, trustworthiness, hard work, integrity, a cooperative spirit, hospitality and devotion to the welfare of family and community (Nziramasanga, 1999: 62). In addition, unhu/ubuntu involves upholding ethical values (Ramose, 1999) as well as a quality of being a human being with a good disposition towards others (Bondai & Kaputa, 2016). Also, the chapter attempts employing unhu/ubuntu as lenses for exploring the content and discourse of the slogans in view of assessing possibility of registering them as patents and prototypes. The chapter also assesses their implications on peace, stability and nation building in the contexts of Unhu/Ubuntu.

Brief Review of Related Literature In the first decade of majority rule (1980–1990), the ruling party, ZANUPF, enjoyed a political honeymoon because of its forceful monopolisation of the political space. As Ciiffe et al. (2007) opine, “For many Africans, the paradise promised them turned out to be starvation diet, unemployment and a gun to the head”. Disaffection and alienation set in, and this resulted in the withdrawal of popular support from the nationalist party, ZANU-PF, culminating in the rejection of a government sponsored draft constitution in 2000 (Ciiffe et al., 2007). With the rising wave of opposition, in most developing societies, tempers always seem to rise at election time. Thus, numerous election studies have shown that political violence is a major feature of the politics of elections in Zimbabwe. Reports of political violence prepared and released by civic organisations have also painted similar grim pictures in this regard (Ciiffe et al., 2007). Similarly, Sithole and Makumbe (1997: 122) submit that the ZANU-PF party is experiencing a gradual decline in elite cohesion which is manifested in electoral challenges of independent candidates which have far-reaching consequences in overcoming the present state of weak opposition in Zimbabwe. In other words, the scholars are aware of the absence of a viable opposition party in Zimbabwe. In that case, they suggest that a viable opposition could come from a splinter group inside the ZANU-PF

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itself. Sithole and Makumbe (1997: 122) commented that “Observers of Zimbabwean political scene are likely to assume that Zimbabwe was until the 1990s a one party state”. This is so since, for the better party of the 1980s, Zimbabwe’s political leadership had been advocating for a oneparty system. However, “… in the true sense, Zimbabwe has never been a one-party state before or after independence in 1980. It is true that Zimbabwe has been, for all practical purposes a de facto one party state” (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 122). A tendency that has always been there both during the colonial rule and after independence has been a strong drive towards de jure one party government, but this never materialised (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 122). Consequently, general and presidential elections have been held at regular interval. Since majority rule in 1980, Zimbabwe has never foreclosed multiparty election opportunities, the power structure has limited opportunities by maintaining and perpetuating one-party psychology for the first eleven years of independence. The opposition was weak and in the form of independent candidates.

Research Methodology The chapter is based on a qualitative set of research arrangement and interpretation that relies on thick descriptions mined via interviews, observation and textual analysis of poetic and theatrical linguistic styles of the ZANU-PF and CCC political slogans used in their 2023 elections campaigns. The research employed a multiple case study design. The chapter is based on cases of two political parties’ slogans for critical content and discourse analysis. It explores innovativeness of the slogans and the possibility of registration of patents and prototypes as well as their implications for peace and nation building. The three instruments, namely textual analysis guide, interview guide and observation guide were used to vet content and discourse of the participants’ political party slogans. The focus group discussion with participants was held using the Teams meeting platform in situ in their homes. The choice of instruments was informed by the purpose of the study, which is an exploratory one and this determined the kind of data to be generated, presented and analysed. The chapter uses the grounded theory as both method and coding scheme. Also, the study utilises thematic web-like data analysis in combining subthemes into themes and themes into global themes and global themes into a story that is ready for coverage. The six participants, three from each political party were interviewed on their perceptions of the content and

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discourse of their political party’s slogans and those of the other party. The interview also discussed the possibility of registering patents and prototypes and implications on peace and nation building in Zimbabwe before, during and after the election period.

Research Findings: Data Presentation, Analysis, Discussion and Interpretation Five global themes emerged in the findings of the chapter. These themes include the content and discourse of the slogans used for campaigning in the run-up to the 2023 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe; implications for ethics and professionalism; implications for peace and nation building in Zimbabwe in the context of unhu/ubuntu; political players’ accountability for the content and discourse of their campaign slogans; and, the possibility of harnessing the slogans into prototype and registered knowledge for campaigning during other political elections. These are going to be presented, analysed and discussed below with relevant interpretations proffered. A quadruple approach is utilised where raw data is given as is from interviewee or textual source. Breaking down data is done to shed light, cross-checking on whether the findings affirm or negate the existing narrative and finally, the meaning of the finding to a body of knowledge. Theme 1: The Content and Discourse of the Slogans Used for Campaigning in the Run-up to the 2023 Harmonised Elections in Zimbabwe ZANU-PF According to the Southern Eye Reporter, Jairos Saunyama, on AMH, and Mbare Times, ZANU-PF had begun popularising its new slogan in preparation for the 2023 harmonised elections. The new election campaign was recently unveiled during the Mashonaland East Provincial coordinating committee held in Marondera. In addressing delegates, Mashonaland East Provincial Chairperson Michael Madanha motivated the party officials to take part in mobilising people ahead of the 2023 harmonised elections. He pledged a hands-on approach to mobilise people to join ZANU-PF so that they meet their provincial target of 800 000 votes for Mashonaland East to realise the national target of 5 million votes. The Chairperson encouraged that they unite for a common purpose and desist

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from condemning and labelling others as belonging to some factions. The message and slogan posted on 31 May 2021 is accessible on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. This is against the 7,8 million eligible voters out of the total voting population of 16,3 million according to the worldpopulationreview.com. When asked on the meaning and implication of the word and ideophone “Pfee!”, this is what participants expressed: Participant 1: We have changed the slogan from the one that we used in 2018. In 2018, the slogan was “ED Pfee”. The slogan for this coming election is “#2023 Five Million Votes, ED Pfee”. The number is pronounced so that we know the target that we are working towards and probably share across provinces and districts. The ideophone “Pfee!” simply means gently and carefully to avoid making any mistake. So, “Pfee!” means gently and carefully with no intention of hurting anyone. Participant 2: “#2023 Five Million Votes” means we want 5 million votes for our presidential candidate, H.E. ED Mnangagwa. We have no doubt, with the 5 million votes we are in. The ideophone, “Pfee!” simply means confidently- since he is certainly going to win the election. It is an action of installing him to the position with no doubts. Participant 3: “ED Pfee” means we are installing H.E. ED Mnangagwa to the presidency. We are working to install our candidate to the presidency of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The ideophone “Pfee!” is demonstrating that we install him unanimously with the 5 million votes. It also simply means with the support of the masses.

Ideophones in Shona language are constructions that graphically represent how an action was conducted. They form mental images of action and performance. Thus, the participants perceive the ideophone “Pfee!” as graphically representing persuasion or action done gently, confidently and unanimously without anyone being coerced. Basing on such assumption shows that any feeling that the slogan is an incitement for violence is a misinterpretation. It follows that supporters choose to misread, misinterpret and act according to individual will in the guise of being incited. According to Mbare Times, “#GandangaNdiroNgaritonge” was posted on 15 September 2020. Upon asked on their take of the content and discourse of the slogan, “#GandangaNdiroNgaritonge”, the participants expressed their views thus:

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Participant 1: We are trying to encourage the electorate to agree with us on the suitability of our presidential candidate H.E. ED Mnangagwa. The content words imply that he is an ex-freedom fighter who participated in the liberation of this country. Participant 2: It is not intimidating anyone but rather showing the electorate that he is a hero since he contributed to the liberation of this country, Zimbabwe. Participant 3: The content words are a reminder to what our president H.E. ED Mnangagwa did for this country; that he deserves our recognition as a country. We are not coercing anyone but encouraging and appealing for the electorate to honour him for the priceless sacrifice he made.

The participants’ views are in sync with the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 6) that reiterates that Zimbabwe is founded on the respect for the values and principles of the recognition of and respect for the liberation struggle. The content and discourse points to the respect of our liberation war heroes and even considering paying back through voting for him. In other words, political violence is a choice, and it has nothing to do with the slogans. CCC According to Goba Cynthia (2022, May 22), a reporter with The Standard newspaper, the CCC political party unveiled its campaign slogan, “Ngaapinde Hake Mukomana” (NHM), loosely translated to “let the young man in”. The party hopes to contest the next 2023 harmonised elections. The triple CCC political party is targeting 6 million votes for their presidential candidate Advocate Nelson Chamisa. Upon asked on the content and discourse implication of their election campaign slogan, in the form of a phrase, “Ngaapinde Hake Mukomana”, the following are perceptions of the participants: Participant 1: It is an encouragement to the electorate that it is them that let the CCC presidential candidate into the post of presidency. The slogan is not intended to incite or intimidate anyone. It is just an appeal to the electorate to support our hunt and push for 6 million votes for the presidential candidate. Participant 2: The sentence implies that, together with the electorate, we reinstate the political party’s presidential candidate. Already the party’s supporters know the candidate as Mukomana (young man). It is also

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an appeal to the electorate, reminding them that for us to install him to the country’s presidency, it is only possible through adding their votes. Participant 3: We are simply marketing our candidate and, especially his youthfulness which does appeal to our party supporters. It is not meant to offend anyone or incite anyone into violence. It is the imagination of the youthfulness of our candidate that gives hope to Zimbabwe, especially the young generations … in a bid to poll 6 million votes for the presidential candidate, Advocate Nelson Chamisa.

Similarly, the slogan’s content and discourse is meant to attract the electorate and retain them. This is geared to reach the 6 million voters’ threshold that they are targeting for the presidential candidate. The view that the slogan is intended to incite the CCC supporters into acts of violence is therefore dependent on individual interpretation. Considering the content and discourse of the slogans of the two political parties, political violence is therefore complex that cannot be pointed out and easily exposed. This is contrary to the 2018 post-election analysis that was said to be characterised by hate speech (Kubatana.net). The slogans are actually parading what political parties have to offer and are making humble requests for the support of the electorate. The slogans treat the electorate as a client and the other political party as a contestant and not an enemy. This is a good approach to political campaigns although it may be because the elections are still months away. The findings from the views of participants from the two political parties agree with Chari’s (2011) functions of political advertising. According to Chari (2011), political advertising is the means by which parties and candidates present themselves to the electorate and it increases citizens’ engagement with political issues as well as increasing their participation in elections. This shows that slogans and political advertising may be saving the same purpose. The only difference noted is that, while political advertising publicises both the party and the candidate to the electorate, the selected slogans popularise the presidential candidate only. This could be the reason why the previous elections analysts argued that media concentrates on the presidential candidates from big political parties ignoring the minority ones and other contestants at various levels, especially women candidates.

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Theme 2: Implications for Ethics and Professionalism Political party players are supposed to be guided by ethical guidelines and professionalism in their operations. There are organisations and state agencies to serve as watchdogs in the operations of the political parties, especially during the campaign periods and the run-up to elections. So, when asked on what ethics and professional guidelines govern their operations during the campaign period and the politicising of aid and service provision in rural areas, this is what they had to say: ZANU-PF Participant 1: We are abiding by general ethics, and we know “right and wrong”, “good and bad”, “rational and irrational” as well as “professional and unprofessional”. To that end, we know that “killing, coercing, harming and detaining are wrong, bad, irrational” and unprofessional. So, by campaigning we are only reminding the electorate of the need to make informed choices. We are not the ones distributing food aid and service provision, thus there is no way we can deny opposition supporters the aid. Participant 2: We are abiding by the Constitution, the supreme law of the land … that every person has the right to support the political party of their choice. I am supporting ZANU-PF, the political party of my choice. I do not deny that there are some supporters who may influence that the opposition supporters be denied aid and services, but it is wrong if it happens. I simply tell them what my political party offers. It is working towards eradicating hunger and empowering people through projects and programmes like pfumvudza and the presidential input scheme. Participant 3: It is good to share my understanding of ZANU-PF with others so that they are not left out in the good that they stand to benefit if they support ZANU-PF. As leaders, we do not exclude people. They are an electorate to me that I feel I have to find a convincing way of luring them rather than punishing them.

Considering the above excerpts, it is clear that the party leadership would like to foster the spirit of peace and stability. They are guided by the rule of law and the ZEC election protocol. There is barely inflammatory and inciting tendency in the slogans. The only noticeable limitation with this set of participants is that there may be no difference between ZANU-PF Party, donors and the national government or whether the government and donors are subsidiary to the

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ZANU-PF political party. Despite that small limitation, the preparation for the 2023 elections is promising to be against hate speech and political violence. CCC The CCC participants also demonstrated the need to uphold good ethics and professionalism in attracting and retaining the electorate. They even made an assurance to be guided by the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) and the ZEC regulations in campaigning. This is captured in the narratives that they made: Participant 1: The only currency that assures me of a vote to the CCC political party is respect of human dignity. I realised that we should not take Zimbabweans for granted when it comes to their votes. I do not have access to aid or service provision. I must be careful in the contest and try to establish a mutual relationship with the electorate that is neither material nor reward based. Participant 2: Zimbabweans are such kind of electorate who cannot be lured by lip service neither can they be coerced into voting for political parties. Attributes like lying and cheating have not worked before. There are some among the electorate who can even quote a statement that a party made and never fulfilled. With that in mind, I told myself that all I can offer is my allegiance to the community if they vote my political party candidate into power. Participant 3: I must show that I am human through the way I talk to the electorate. I display a kind of servant leadership and show humility. The kind of electorate we have can tell me they are fed up with political players. One person asked me that, “Do you see me like a person who still wants to be told on where my x belongs to?” This is a sign that they belong to their political parties already. It seems to me that campaigning and chanting slogans is just a formality. To me, it shows that there is a need for personalised campaign strategy far from the universalised one size fits all.

Considering the two political parties’ perspectives, it is apparent that ZANU-PF has confidence that they own the electorate while the CCC party knows that the electorate is unpredictable and can bring shockers. The differences in perception could be attributed to the fact that the electorate is largely rural which is considered a ZANU-PF stronghold; and the CCC is only trying to make in-roads. It is also evident that the electorate is hostile to the CCC which may be attributable to the electorate’s

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belonging to ZANU-PF which is their all-weather political party. Thus, the insights raised in this theme, to some extent, resonates with the observation that political advertising is meant to inform, entertain and educate (Chari, 2011; Johnson & Kaid, 2002). The major difference is that the slogans are merely focusing on parading the presidential candidate for the harmonised 2023 elections ignoring all other candidates of other levels. Theme 3: Implications for Peace and Nation Building in Zimbabwe in the Context of Unhu/ubuntu ZANU-PF Participant 1: Both campaign slogans are encouraging the electorate to appreciate the need for concerted effort in installing H.E. ED Mnangagwa in the presidency without coercing. It shows that we respect the electorate’s decision. This is in line with the principles of unhu/ubuntu which fosters the dignity of difference and tolerance which are key to national peace and stability. Participant 2: The respect of the rule of law states that every person has the right to support the political party of their choice… this is a recipe for peace and stability. By appealing for support, it means that I am sure that I may or may not get everyone. It may therefore not come as a surprise that in our stronghold, there may be a number of spoilt votes and those that vote for other political players. Participant 3: I have witnessed those dynamics election after election that, in a competition, we do not win everyone’s heart. But of course, in our strongholds like this, we wish to collect maximum number of votes. The maturity that we have with experience in these elections shows that it is not about slogans chanted but personalities that cause political violence.

The above insights raise pertinent issues to do with violence in elections that is a matter of choice. In other words, slogans are neutral but there are other supporters who do not tolerate difference. CCC The participants who are in the CCC leadership were of the perception that the elections period is an emotionally packed phase that needs maturity and tolerance. To them, political parties’ leadership know much about the Zimbabwean electorate and that their getting emotional is out of duress and desperation. This is captured in the insights they raised:

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Participant 1: We think hard in order to come up with ideas and the slogan that as a political party we all agree on. We even do homework to know every bit and piece of the participants’ needs in the elections, voters’ threshold and the general election processes and procedures. We also acquaint ourselves with the guidelines. So, there is nowhere a campaign slogan can be inflammatory and inciteful as that could attract a ban from ZEC or being criminalised according to the Constitution. Such fears force the political parties into compliance and that reduces the likelihood of the pieces causing violence. Participant 2: The slogans themselves are neutral and their inflammatory and inciteful tendencies may be structural, hidden and very difficult to detect. The tendencies may be by implication and the political party players take advantage of that and pull shockers only in the last minute when the chain has started and will be irreversible. Such hidden aspects may not be a fault of anyone, rather the people who, despite their age, just succumb to peer pressure when the elections fever grips them. To tell the truth, it is not new content words that are going to emerge but the same words in the slogans when new meanings are attached to them. Thus, there shall emerge semantic extension when original meanings are discarded and new ones are constructed. This may electrify the elections terrain. Participant 3: It appears like there is licence that comes with the proclamation of the elections that even the parties that are in dialogue simply discard the dialogue. The opponent really knows what we are capable of doing. The contestants in the other political party panic.

The insights raised by the participants in the above verbatim quotes confirm what Chari (2011) called the three dimensions of thematic analysis, that is, to attack the opponent, acclaim and defend themselves. These sometimes go off-hand and unconsciously incite violence or offend the opponent. This is against the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), which Muzambi (2017) affirms provides fundamental freedoms such as the freedoms of conscience, which also includes freedom of thought, opinion, religion and belief. In their contributions, ZANU-PF supporters said that they were abiding and guided by ethical and professional standards. This refutes the literature that they manipulate food and social services aid such that the opposition has a mammoth task of winning over people being fed and sustained by ZANU-PF. Literature also identifies other investments made by ZANU-PF into rural area electorate. These include the traditional chiefs who are said to be installed based on their allegiance to

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ZANU-PF. Furthermore, ZEC is said to be manned by mostly retired military officers who serve as a ZANU-PF structural investment. Thus, according to the Institute for Security Studies research, there is mixing of state events and party activities. In this case, it may be difficult to penalise any one given the fact that campaigning is and should not be an event or one off thing but a continuous process before, during and after elections. Theme 4: Political Players’ Accountability for the Content and Discourse of Their Campaign Slogans ZANU-PF Participant 1: The content words in the slogans are echoing our aspirations as political players in the political field. They showcase our fears and our perception of the enemy. So, the words, the idiophonic construction and even sentences are merely wishes, hopes and dreams. The number 5 million is an estimate judging from our previous capacity and the total number of registered voters in Zimbabwe. Participant 2: The content words are imaginary, basing on the assumption that “words make worlds”. Also, we just believe that “words and dreams shape reality”. Words are said to be powerful, now why should we limit ourselves. Participant 3: The election slogan is tantamount to a war cry. It is an imagined victory that boosts the political party’s confidence. It is even a strategy of boosting morale among the party supporters. It is even a way of attracting the electorate that everyone else is voting for ZANU-PF except you, hence 5 million votes for the presidential candidate.

It emerged from the participants’ statements that they communicated with the electorate through their slogans. They expressed their wishes and hopes through chanting those slogans. CCC Participant 1: The content words of the slogans are a description of what the political party offers to the electorate. They are a way of “sweetening” the campaign language. As political players, we do a pre-election survey in the media in which we come up with the prediction of the poll threshold. This is then set at +/− the 6 million who are expected to vote for our presidential candidate, Advocate Nelson Chamisa. Participant 2: The poll threshold is based on our capability as noted in the previous election’s session. The slogan phrase is to convince even those

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supporting our opposition that our candidate has already been granted permission to rule by the masses of Zimbabwe who will vote for him. We are well aware that others may be saying “never”… they should be informed that he is the people’s choice. So, our slogan is based on what we believe. Participant 3: Social media is another litmus test on the possible number of votes that our presidential candidate can poll. Though the number is a guess, it is a result of certain statistical measures.

The content words are given in a musical way that hooks onto the memory for easy remembrance. Also, chorus style to make people to even pronounce them unconsciously. The slogan is a well thought out war cry. Thus, the slogans have almost the same purpose of informing, entertaining and educating (Africa Democracy Encyclopaedia Project, 2006; Chari, 2011; Johnson & Kaid, 2002). Theme 5: Possibility of Harnessing the Slogans into Prototype and Registered Knowledge for Campaigning During Other Political Elections These slogans are innovations and mental creations that educate, entertain and canvass for the electorate during the election period. They are broadcasted on air and people are enjoying. Also, the slogans have been translated into different languages. This is what the participants said upon being asked on the possibility of registering the slogans as patents and publishing them: ZANU-PF Participant 1: Yes! There is that possibility of using them for adverts if there are people that may want the slogan as a brand. This may help in fundraising for the political party’s activities. Participant 2: Yaaa! Publicising it may actually help in increasing coverage. Also, that it may exist even beyond the election period to market the party’s brand. This may help in publicising the liberation struggle since H.E. ED Mnangagwa is a liberation war hero. Participant 3: Already, it is a patent. No one can use it without the permission from the producer. Also, it is the ruling party’s brand. This is the reason why you see that it is branded on our regalia and assets to help popularising the brand. The presidential candidate stands for the party’s brand.

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CCC Participant 1: The slogan is the label for the party’s brand. The slogan is the party’s innovation and mental creation. It is supposed to be protected from piracy, that is, either politically instigated or poaching for abuse. Participant 2: Once released, the slogan automatically becomes the party’s intangible heritage asset. To this end, it is the party’s property and anyone who intends to use it will have to get written permission from the producers. It is unfortunate that this knowledge is not registered as patent, neither is it protected against abuse by people. Participant 3: We underestimate issues like protecting our intangible heritage assets until when we have an important piece of our slogan stolen. We have not thought of that; for known or unknown reasons, linguistic, poetic and theatrical assets may be stolen.

Considering the insights raised by the participants, the board overseeing these slogans ought to consider them for registration as patents and prototypes help in bringing entrepreneurship in the campaign processes. It helps in having the political parties as contestants and not as enemies thus eradicates animosity. A gala for showcasing of the slogans can possibly make the contestants aware of the content and discourse of their slogan on whether it yields the desired outcome. The slogans may inform and educate the electorate and monetise them through registration of patents and prototypes.

Conclusions The purpose of the chapter was to uncover the content and discourse of the purposively sampled two main political parties’ campaigning slogans in the 2023 harmonised elections. The study explored the slogans’ implications to ethics and professionalism, peace and stability as well as how to account for such content and discourse. The data revealed that the intentions of participants were to popularise and market their presidential candidate and that the candidates were guided by ethics and professionalism. For those that breach campaign regulations, it is a matter of choice that they chose to digress from the constitution and ZEC guidelines.

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Learning Points Basing on the findings of the chapter, the following learning points have been identified. . The political party’s leadership does respect the rule of law and the will to maintain peace. . The political parties are aware that their campaigning slogans are censored if they use inflammatory words, inciting messages and hate speech. . There is a need to have a database for the slogans and other linguistic pieces so that they are patented and registered prototypes for those that may need to use them.

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PART III

Electoral Institutions and Human Rights in Zimbabwean Politics

CHAPTER 13

Adjudication of Presidential Election Disputes in Zimbabwe: A Case of Chamisa v Mnangagwa Takunda Chikwati

Introduction Elections constitute a very important part of democracy in that it guarantees fairness in the selection of representatives of the people. Generally, elections are organised through various processes that ensure the effective participation of all eligible members of the population. But there is no perfect process, hence disputes are likely to arise. The electoral process itself encompasses the pre-election, election, and post-election periods (Malunga, 2018). These three periods involve several activities including delimitation of boundaries, voter registration, nomination of candidates, voter education, accreditation of observers, voting and counting of votes. Therefore, challenges can arise in any one or more of these periods which may result in the eruption of disputes that can spill over into the courts. To defuse the potentially devastating consequences of electoral disputes,

T. Chikwati (B) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_13

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the various constitutions and/or subordinate legislation provide for electoral dispute resolution including the various legal remedies that may be available. The judiciary, as one of the three arms of government, has the responsibility for ensuring the fairness, integrity, legitimacy, and transparency of the electoral processes through electoral justice and the protection of human rights. Electoral justice refers to the means and mechanisms for ensuring that each action, procedure, and decision-related to the electoral process is in line with the law (Joseph & Mcloughlin, 2019). As such, an electoral justice system aims to protect or give people who believe that their electoral rights have been violated, an opportunity to register their complaint, get a hearing, and receive adjudication. Therefore, the role of the judiciary in an electoral justice system is to decide whether there were any irregularities in the election processes and if there were, to then decide what is to be done. By such acts, the judiciary actually participates in the electoral process, howbeit indirectly. One school of thought argues that this participation is necessary in ensuring a level playing field between incumbent officeholders and their challengers. But other schools of thought hold the view that unelected officials making up the judiciary should not intervene in democratic electoral processes since the review power of the courts amounts to interference with the will of the people (Tokaji, 2011). It would seem as if the courts can remove someone who would have been elected by the voters resulting in the disenfranchisement of those who would have voted. However, the courts do not usually take elections lightly and only overturn an election result where there is overwhelming evidence irregularities in the election. Otherwise, the courts should generally defer to the preferences of the citizenry as expressed through their choice of parliamentary representatives. Unfortunately, many disputing parties are often aggrieved by the decisions of the courts especially in presidential elections because they do not agree with the reasoning of the courts due to their failure to understand the evidentiary requirements of the courts. This has happened in recent years in Zimbabwe and even in the United States of America. This chapter delves into how the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court has tackled the presidential election challenge of the disputed 2018 elections. Using non-empirical and qualitative methodology, this chapter analyses the opinions of the courts in presidential election disputes with an emphasis on the 2018 Zimbabwean case of Chamisa v Mnangagwa. The

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focus is on the assessment of the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court’s evidentiary requirements and the ultimate adjudication of the presidential disputes that arise.

Democracy and Electoral Justice Democracy, as a concept, hinges on the principle of separation of powers amongst the three arms of government, being the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary for the prevention of the undue concentration of power. Essentially, power is divided amongst the three arms in a way that ensures checks and balances that are vital for the prevention of one arm of government from sliding into absolutism (Tuleja, 2018). Although the judiciary is the only arm of the three that is not elected to office, this is crucial for the maintenance of its impartiality and non-partisan character. In fact, it is only an arm that is not involved in the electoral processes that can independently adjudicate in election disputes with impartiality upholding the law with fairness. Under normal circumstances, the Judiciary does not interfere in elections, but where disputes have arisen, the courts may need to step in to defuse tensions. This usually happens when the ruling elites attempt to subvert democratic principles, so as to entrench themselves whilst infringing on the rights of others. In such cases, there is a need for judicial activism since the intervention of the Judiciary in disputes is accepted as the fairest way of resolving disputes including election disputes (Tokaji, 2011). Elections are pivotal in democracy, so the efficiency and fairness of elections is a critical cog in the wheels of democracy. The calls for electoral justice are therefore justified since that is where the guarantee for fairness and the rule of law is evident. The electoral regulatory system itself must ensure clarity, fairness, and free expression so that the will of the voters can be upheld. Hence, as Joseph and Mcloughlin (2019) posit, A key dimension of the rule of law in a democracy is the concept of electoral justice. Electoral justice ensures that elections meet high standards of integrity and guarantees that there are mechanisms in place to restore electoral integrity when it has been violated.

Therefore, electoral justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. Presidential elections can never be acceptable especially to

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the losing parties if there is no electoral justice. There must be strong institutions and laws that guarantee electoral justice in all cases (Joseph & Mcloughlin, 2019).

The Judiciary’s Involvement in Electoral Dispute Adjudication There is no doubt that disputes can only be fairly resolved by those who are not party to the dispute, and this is the basis of the role of the judiciary in electoral disputes. In the Woolas V The speaker of House of Commons case of 2011, the court gave a brief history of how the judiciary reluctantly got involved in the determination of the elections of members of the House of Commons. For example, in 1604 after a disputed election in Buckinghamshire, the court of Chancery ordered a new election. After the new election, the issue was referred to a committee of commons which challenged the right of the court of Chancery to annul an election of the commons. It seems the parliamentarians believed the court should not be in competition for dignity or authority with the parliament. If courts were to give orders to parliament that would suggest that the courts had more authority than parliament. It was therefore believed that the parliament was the proper judge of who is elected or not, hence the freedom of election would be unduly interfered with if the courts were to decide on the process or outcome of elections. Until 1868, the House of Commons was the sole judge over disputed elections. As such, in 1867 a bill was introduced recommending that the power to any disputed elections be referred to the court of the Queen’s Bench. The judiciary initially expressed very strong opposition to undertaking this work, but the Bill became the Parliamentary Elections Act of 1868. The Act empowered the judiciary presiding over an election petition to reserve a question of law for the court. Thus, the concept of a petition is now firmly entrenched in electoral parlance as a means by which the validity of an election is questioned in a specially designated court of law (Nyane, 2019). It is this concept of electoral dispute resolution that has been adopted in many countries including Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, according to Mirriam Azu (2015), the general thinking in jurisprudence is that it is unfair and contrary to the principles regulating adult suffrage that the administrative sins of election officials be visited upon voters so long as the latter have voted in accordance with the law. This has been adopted by many courts all over the world.

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For example, in the 2012 case of Opitz v Wrzesnewskyj, the court held that: By contrast, if a vote cast by an entitled voter were to be rejected in a contested election application because of an irregularity, the voter would be irreparably disenfranchised. This is especially undesirable when the irregularity is outside of the voter’s control and is caused solely by the error of an election official.

The Zimbabwean Constitutional Court followed this thinking in Chamisa v Mnangagwa (herein the Chamisa case) holding that it is an internationally accepted principle of election disputes that an election is not set aside easily merely on the basis that an irregularity occurred. However, in McCavitt V Registrars of voters of Brockton, the Canadian court in 1982 stated that whenever the irregularity or illegality of the election is such that the result of the election would be placed in doubt, then the election must be set aside.

The Zimbabwean Legal Framework for Electoral Dispute Resolution for Presidential Elections In Zimbabwe, the Constitution provides for laws governing elections and the main subordinate legislation giving effect to the constitutional provision is the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13]. In the Zimbabwean legal framework, the role of the judiciary in the resolution of electoral disputes and the processes of electoral petitions is straightforward. In fact, the whole electoral process has a lot of legal implications, and the courts are expected to render timeous and non-partisan resolutions to any election disputes. The Constitution of Zimbabwe in terms of Section 155 provides for regular, free, and fair elections. Moreover, Section 156 obligates the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to ensure that whichever voting method is used, it is simple, accurate, verifiable, secure, and transparent. This is also included in section 3 of the Electoral Act. In other words, the section reiterates the general principles of a democratic election. Indeed, democracy is at the heart of the Zimbabwean Constitution with section 1 providing that Zimbabwe is a unitary, democratic, and sovereign republic. In addition, section 67(1) gives every citizen the right to free, fair, and regular elections.

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An established legal framework regulating the electoral system means that anyone aggrieved by the electoral process has recourse to the courts of law. But the extent of the court’s interference with the will of the people is a conscientious issue. The question that is always asked is, “Are the courts justified to disfranchise the citizens if it so deems fit?” However, the law as we shall see may be structured in a way to make this a mammoth task for those intending to overturn an election outcome. Disputes pertaining to elections are sui generis in nature for we have a specialised court that deals with petitions relating to the presidential elections, being the Constitutional court (according to section 167(2)(b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe). The electoral court, established by the Electoral Act, on the other hand, has jurisdiction to hear appeals, applications, and petitions on the election processes including election results for all elective positions (Section 161 of the Electoral Act). This entails that the Magistrates’ courts deal with other matters including the nomination of candidates and criminal cases that occur during the election period. According to the law in Zimbabwe, an election petition may be lodged with the electoral court for any reason whatsoever including want of qualification, disqualification, electoral malpractice, or irregularity (Section 167 of the Electoral Act). Petitioners are required to provide security for costs within seven days of lodging their petition (Section 168(3) of the Electoral Act). Otlogole (1994) states that this creates the impression that election petitions are sui generis. Though normally contested as private actions between petitioner and respondent, election petitions may allege criminal behaviour with the far wider public interest. The law also prescribes that petitions must be presented within 14 days after the end of an election (Section 168(2) of the Electoral Act). The trial is held in an open court and the petition must be determined within 6 months from the date of presentation (Section 182(1) of the Electoral Act). An appeal shall be determined within three months from the date of lodging the appeal (Section 182(2) of the Electoral Act). However, decisions of the Electoral court on questions of fact are final but those on questions of law may be subject to appeal (Section 172 of the Electoral Act).

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Presidential Election Dispute Challenges in Zimbabwe: The Case of Chamisa v Mnangagwa In Zimbabwe, the latest electoral petition challenging the results of a presidential election is that of 2018 by the losing candidate Nelson Chamisa. The petitioner alleged that there were irregularities that warranted the overturning of the declaration of Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa as the winner of the 2018 presidential elections. It is apparent that some interpretations by some courts internationally are targeted at making it difficult to overturn an election result. However, Section 156 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe requires that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) must ensure that whichever voting method is used, is simple, accurate, verifiable, secure, and transparent. It is therefore baffling whether these principles are considered when a court allows irregularities simply because they do not feel the irregularities that affected the results of the elections. The mere fact that there were irregularities indicates that the process was neither accurate nor transparent. However, the court still went ahead and endorsed the elections with irregularities as credible. Therefore, the assertion by the court in the Chamisa case that it is an internationally accepted principle of election disputes that an election is not set aside easily merely on the basis that an irregularity occurred is at variance with the letter of the law. Indeed, whenever there is an irregularity or illegality in an election, and such irregularity has affected the result of the election, such election shall be set aside. The findings of the case also suggest that in the Zimbabwean electoral justice system, the standard of proof required of the petitioner is generally higher than that required internationally. In most jurisdictions, however, the standard of proof in presidential election disputes merely goes beyond a balance of probabilities and falls below the criminal standard of proof but that seems not to be the case in Zimbabwe. This places an onerous burden on petitioners in Zimbabwe to provide evidence of irregularity, a scenario that makes overturning election outcomes very difficult. On the basis of these findings, the interpretation of the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court in the Chamisa case creates an impression that Zimbabwean courts deviate from the letter of the law and instead resolve election disputes, taking into account extra-legal factors. This may be in response to the commonly held position that elections the world over are known to be imperfect, hence it would be against public policy to strike down the voters’ choice by strict adherence to the law. This may also be

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construed as undemocratic as it tends to favour the incumbent in any electoral dispute. In the Chamisa case, the court reiterated its stance to declare an election void only when it is satisfied from the evidence provided by an applicant that the legal trespasses are of such a magnitude that they have resulted in substantial non-compliance with the existing electoral laws although the Act does not require substantial non-compliance. The chief justice went further to state that an applicant must prove that the entire election process is so fundamentally flawed and so poorly conducted that it cannot be said to have been conducted in substantial compliance with the law. The word “entire” signifies an extremely high level of noncompliance. However, an election result that has been obtained through fraud should necessarily be invalidated. This view is generally adopted by many African States whenever they deal with election petitions.

Evidentiary Requirements for Presidential Election Petitions Set in Chamisa v Mnangagwa From the Chamisa case, it is possible to deduce several evidentiary requirements for presidential election petitions. (i) Grounds of the petition Section 167 of the Electoral Act is wide enough to include any reason whatsoever, but the grounds generally fall into three categories, which are the eligibility of the candidate, electoral fraud, and administrative irregularities. The Chamisa case involved several grounds but eventually rested on the ground of administrative irregularity. The main allegation was that ZEC failed to properly count the votes consequently announcing the wrong results. In terms of Section 177 of the Electoral Act, an election can only be set aside by reason of any mistake or non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act if it appears to the electoral court that the election was not conducted in terms of the principles in the Electoral Act and such mistake or non-compliance affected the result of the election. According to this provision, non-observance of the rules of an election must affect the election result. Hence, any mistake or non-compliance that affected the result should invalidate the election.

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(ii) Burden of proof The ZEC chairperson is obliged to declare the results of an election once vote counting is complete and such declaration in terms of Section 110(3)(f)(ii) of the Electoral Act creates a presumption of validity of the declaration (Chamisa case p. 7). At common Law, it is generally presumed that all official acts are rightly and regularly done. It is also presumed that official records are accurate. These presumptions are rebuttable. Section 12(2) of the Civil Evidence Act provides that a copy of or extract from a public document that is proved to be a true copy or extract or which purports to be signed and certified as a true copy or extract by the official who has custody of the original shall be admissible in evidence on its production by any person and shall be prima facie proof of the facts stated therein. It is, therefore, the duty of the petitioner to adduce evidence in rebuttal. The onus and burden of proof rests with the applicant and it is for him to prove to the satisfaction of the court that there were irregularities in the conduct of the election. In Chamisa (para 7), the court held that: It is for the applicant to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the election was conducted in a manner which fell substantially below the statutory requirements of a valid election and that the result was materially affected warranting a nullification of the result or invalidation of the election.

In Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo and Others v John Dramani Mahama and Others (2013, para 550), the court held that: Where a party alleges non-conformity with the electoral law, the petitioner must not only prove that there has been non-compliance with the law, but that such failure of compliance did affect the validity of the elections. It is on that basis that the respondent bears the burden of proving the contrary. This emerges from the long-standing common law approach in respect of alleged irregularity in the acts of public bodies. Omnia praesumntur rite et solemniter esse acta: all acts are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly. So, the petitioner must set out by raising firm and credible evidence of public authority’s departures from the prescriptions of the law.

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(iii) Standard of proof Generally, in civil cases, the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities and in criminal cases, it is beyond reasonable doubt. In presidential election petitions, the standard of proof is not uniform. It varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Chamisa (para 12), the court commented on the standard of proof but was silent as to whether it should be on a balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt. It did however mention that the petitioner had the duty to satisfy the court from the evidence that the legal trespasses are of such a magnitude that they have resulted in substantial non-compliance with existing electoral laws. What this implies is that the petitioner must establish the facts they rely on to overturn an election and then the onus will shift to the respondents to demonstrate the non-existence of gross irregularities. It seems however that the petitioner has an above-normal burden in trying to discharge the onus on him to establish irregularities. In some jurisdictions, the standard of proof in presidential election disputes goes beyond a balance of probabilities but falls slightly below the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the Zambian case of Lewanika & Others v Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba (1998, para 4), it was held that: Parliamentary election petitions were required to be proved to a standard higher than on a mere balance of probability and therefore in this, where the petition had been brought under constitutional provisions and would impact upon the governance of the nation and deployment of constitutional power, no less a standard of proof was required.

So, the standard of proof is a degree higher than that required in civil cases. In Raila Odinga and Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Others (2017, para 152), the Kenyan court also held that the standard of proof remained higher than the balance of probabilities but lower than beyond reasonable doubt. But where there are criminal allegations, proof beyond reasonable doubt is expected. In Ghana, however, the standard is on a balance of probabilities. The court said in the Nana Akufo (para 62 & 460) case:

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The standard of proof in especially election petitions, a species of a civil case, is on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of probabilities. (emphasis is mine) It is only when crime is pleaded or raised in the evidence that the allegation sought to be proved must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In Zimbabwe, the standard of proof seems to be beyond any shadow of doubt. In Chamisa (para 12), the court said: the applicant failed to place before the court clear, sufficient, direct and credible evidence that the irregularities that he alleges marred the election process materially existed. Applicant did not prove the alleged irregularities as a matter of fact.

So, if the evidence needs to be clear, it ceases to be on a balance of probabilities. The definition of the term “clear”, denotes being free from ambiguity or doubt. The evidence further needs to be sufficiently straight to the point and convincing or authentic. The standard required here is even beyond reasonable doubt. It should be an undisputed fact. In this case, the court had earlier commented that the applicant needed more than just an admission by ZEC of the inaccuracies of the figures to show the result was affected. This was a blatant violation of Section 117 of The Electoral Act which only requires that the mistake or non-compliance did affect the result. The court seems to have erred in this respect. The court’s reasoning in dismissing the case does not seem to hold water since both parties admitted that the inaccuracies affected the results, the logical reasoning was to declare the election void. Instead, the court went further and said the applicant ought to have averred that there was no winner. The court ignored a reasoning that was consistent with the dictates of the law and adopted one that prejudiced the applicant.

Is There Hope for Future Elections? Whilst losing election candidates in Zimbabwe can challenge the outcome of elections, it is difficult for the courts to nullify election outcomes. However, as Tokaji (2011) posits, courts are sometimes justified in distrusting political actors. They sometimes embark on all sorts of gimmicks to win power. Moreover, incumbent officeholders may adopt self-entrenching measures that make it difficult for voters to remove them

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from office. Alternatively, they may choose in-action and leave in place electoral rules that do not promote a level playing field for election candidates. This is the situation in Zimbabwe where electoral reforms have not been effected to include voters in prisons, the diaspora, the disabled, and the poor. That is why Justice Scalia in McConell v FEC (2003) remarked that, the first instinct of power is power retention.

Conclusions and Recommendations Good international relations are pivotal to national development, hence free and fair elections entrench the true values of a functional democracy giving legitimacy to the process in the eyes of the international community. But the numerous irregularities in most elections drive those who lose to turn to the courts seeking redress. Judicial intervention is becoming significant in this political process throughout Africa and the world. It is without doubt that the role of the judiciary is the protection of electoral rights and the resolution of electoral disputes. Consequently, the emerging trend indicates that elections have become more litigious as politicians are moving from the ballot box to resolving disputes in courts. Election disputes now regularly flood the courts, but most of them are unsuccessful, probably due to the difficulty in proving that there were substantial irregularities in the electoral process, and they affected the election result. The legal requirements appear simple, but the process is insurmountable. Initially, the judiciary presumes that the announced elections are valid. It then burdens the petitioner to prove irregularities in the election process on a standard above that which is normally required in civil cases. The next stage is for the petitioner to show that the irregularities were so substantial that the election was not conducted according to the law. Finally, the petitioner should prove that the irregularities affected the election result otherwise the irregularities were irrelevant, and the court will legitimise the election. Perhaps, this is the judiciary’s way of evoking the doctrine of avoidance. So, the trend shows that courts are generally unwilling to declare an election invalid. H. Nyane (2019) states that in the Lesotho case of Mathaba & Ors v Lehema & Ors (1993), the court made a finding that the election was not conducted in accordance with electoral law but nevertheless justified its refusal to vitiate the elections saying although some of the apparent irregularities and discrepancies are sufficiently serious, the court could not postulate that the result does not reflect the

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will of the people. This trend is prevalent in most African courts including in Zimbabwe. In Chamisa, the court said the applicant needed more than just mere admission by ZEC of the inaccuracy of the figures to show that the result was affected. Such a wide discretion held by the bench is more often than not used to legitimise unworthy election results. It is therefore our recommendation that: . The electoral laws be unambiguous regarding when an election should be nullified or ordered to rerun. . The electoral laws should ensure the total independence of the electoral management body. . There should be no interference in the electoral process by the incumbent government.

References Azu, M. (2015) Lessons from Ghana and Kenya on why presidential elections usually fail. African Human Rights Law Journal, 15, 150–166. https://doi. org/10.17159/1996 Bribena, K. (2020). The judiciary and democratisation in Africa: The role of courts in Nigeria’s elections. Journal of nation Building and Policy Studies. https://doi.org/10.31920/2156-3132/2020/v1n1a9 Chamisa & Ors v Mnangagwa CCZ42/18. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013. Hofisi, S. (2018). Changing voting patterns, exertions on electoral legitimacy: Towards transformative Justice in Zimbabwe. Journal of African Foreign Affairs. https://doi.org/10.31920/2056-5658/2018/v5n3a2 Joseph, O., & McLoughlin, F. (2019). Electoral justice system assessment guide, international institute for democracy and electoral assistance. https://doi.org/ 10.31752/idea.2019.21 Lewanika & Others v Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba [1998] ZMSC 11. Malunga, S. (2018). Were Zimbabwe’s elections free, fair and credible? The final scoresheet. African Arguments. https://africanarguments.org/2018/08/zim babwe-election-free-fair-credible-final-score-sheet/ Mbha, H. B., et al. (2019, April 16–17). Protecxting fundamental rights in electoral disputes: African Electoral Jusrisprudence Network—Inaugural Discussions. O. R. Tambo Hotel, Johannesburg. McCavitt v Registrars of Voters of Brockton 434 N.E. 2d 620. McConell v Federal Election Commission 540 U.S. 93 (2003).

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Moupo Mathaba and Others v Enoch Lehema and Others 1993-94 LLR & LB 402. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo & Others v John Dramani Mahama & Others [2013] GHASC 5. Nyane, H. (2019, July 3–5). The role of judiciaries in presidential electoral disputes resolution in Africa. 4th Annual International Conference on Public Administration and Development Alternatives, Johannesburg, South Africa. Ojwang, B. J. (2013, April 23) Election disputes and the judicial process: Emerging lessons. Colloquium for selected bench of the judiciary Working Committee on Election preparations. Great Rift Valley Lodge, Naivasha. Opitz v Wrzesnewskyj [2012] 3 S.C.R. 76. Otlogole, B. (1994). Judicial intervention in the election process: Botswana’s experience. The Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa, 2(2), 222–233. Raila Odinga and Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Others PRESIDENTIAL PETITION NO. 1 OF 2017 . Richard, E. (2019). Judgment day: The danger of courts taking over politics. Magazine issue 21 September 2019 The Civil Evidence Act [Chapter 8:01]. The Zimbabwe Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13]. Tokaji, D. P. (2011). The role of judges in election law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 159, 273–292. Tuleja, P. (2018). Division of power and the problem of excessive concentration of power in the light of the Polish Constitution. Przeglad ˛ Konstytucyjny, 4, 59. Woolas v The Speaker of House of Commons (2011) 2 WLR 1362. Yusuf, O. (2008). Democratic transition, judicial accountability and Judicialisation of politics in Africa: The Nigerian experience. International Journal of Law and Management, 50(5), 236–261.

CHAPTER 14

The Judiciary and Electoral Disputes in Zimbabwe’s Contemporary Politics Fabian Maunganidze

Introduction Elections are supposed to be a transparent way of selecting political leaders according to the will of the majority whilst considering the interests of the minority. However, there are no perfect electoral processes and systems. Hence, the management of elections and perceived irregularities in the electoral system used often lead to disputes that may need the courts to adjudicate (Mutangi, 2019). The law and the courts are vital to prevent people from resorting to self-help when they want to address their grievances. Therefore, they provide a peaceful resolution platform for defusing tensions created by contested electoral outcomes (Nyamutata, 2012). Ideally, election results should settle the issue of representation, but disputes often arise (Mutangi, 2019). It has been argued that challenges to the electoral outcomes are not necessarily an indication of weakness in the process, but rather an indicator of the openness and strength of

F. Maunganidze (B) Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_14

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the political system (Nyamutata, 2012; Petit, 2000). Like any process, the electoral process is not immune to violations and complaints. So, the availability of effective resolution systems buttresses the legitimacy and integrity of the election, although flaws may continue to exist (IFES, 2019; Mutangi, 2019; Nyamutata, 2012). Even the established democracies like the United States of America have seen the results of their elections being challenged. One of the latest is the refusal by Donald Trump in 2020 to accept Joe Biden’s victory and taking the matter to court (BBC News, 2020). In Zimbabwe and Africa in general, opposition parties have launched numerous challenges to the outcomes of elections (Nyamutata, 2012; Siachiwena & Saunders, 2021). However, in many cases, the courts have upheld the results of the elections despite the presence of flaws in the electoral processes (Siachiwena & Saunders, 2021). So, the framework for intervention of the judiciary in the electoral process is likely to impinge on the legitimacy and credibility of the elections in any country. Zimbabwe has seen numerous court challenges to its electoral outcomes (Mutangi, 2019). In all the challenges, the judiciary has been playing an important election dispute resolution role, although other platforms are also involved. A significant positive step is the establishment of the Electoral Court to expedite the electoral dispute resolution process. However, there is still room for improvement as the legal remedy for these disputes is still inadequate. Independent observers have highlighted the lack of clear legal appeals and complaints mechanisms in the Zimbabwean electoral laws (IFES, 2019). Using qualitative desk-based research methodology, we analyse some of the electoral disputes that have reached the courts in Zimbabwe, emphasising on the evolution of the role of the judiciary in the country’s electoral history. The Separation of Powers and Functions of the Judiciary in a Democratic System The concept of democracy hinges on the prevention of the excessive concentration of power by putting in place a system of separation of powers between the three arms of government, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. This separation of powers divides political authority amongst the three arms and provides for checks and balances that prevent one arm of government from operating beyond its limits and tipping over into absolutism (Manyatera & Hamadziripi, 2013).

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Of the three arms of government, the executive and legislature are directly elected into office, but the judiciary is not. This ideally makes the judiciary non-partisan and impartial, but some can also argue that the intervention of an arm of government which in itself is not democratically elected, into a dispute of the legitimacy of a democratic process is questionable (Nyamutata, 2012; Tokaji, 2011). But it can also be argued that the very existence of an independent judiciary as a mediator of disputes and an arm that upholds the fairness of the law with impartiality, makes the judiciary the most suitable arbitrator for electoral disputes. As Tokaji (2011) argues, normally the judiciary should not interfere in elections. However, where the ones in power are seeking to entrench themselves with no respect for democratic principles or where the rights of the minority are at stake, judicial activism is deemed necessary and the intervention of the judiciary is warranted (Tokaji, 2011). Articles 3(1) and 3(5) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance lay down the commitment of State Parties to the respect for human rights and democratic principles as well as the separation of powers. This commitment has been expressly provided for in the Zimbabwean Constitution of 2013 which dedicates at least 4 Chapters to the setting up of structures that ensure the separation of powers in the Zimbabwean system. In a webinar hosted by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) in 2021, Dr. Alex Magaisa, stressed the importance of the judiciary in the doctrine of separation of powers and its crucial function as a referee in the resolution of electoral disputes. That is why the Zimbabwean Constitution as well as other legislation like the Electoral Act have given the judiciary the electoral dispute resolution (EDR) function to avoid leaving the trajectory of the disputes to the disputants themselves (ZESN, 2021). The Constitution in Section 69(3) gives every person the right to “access [to] the courts, or to some other tribunal or forum established by law for the resolution of any dispute” including electoral disputes. However, there are other legal instruments that regulate EDR in Zimbabwe. Section 155(2)(e) of the Constitution is more specific to EDR requiring the State to “ensure the timely resolution of electoral disputes” therefore making the EDR a constitutional principle (LSZ, 2018). Indeed, every electoral dispute needs to be resolved in the interests of justice. But justice is not a simple concept to fathom. Generally, justice is regarded as substantive or procedural. Whilst procedural justice involves the adherence to the process of fairness according to the set rules of

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law, substantive justice is more inclined on probing the justness of the laws (Nyamutata, 2012). Therefore, the justice that the disputants seek is dependent on whether it is according to the current laws (procedural) or the laws themselves are not just (substantive) or both. It has been said that “justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done” and this is the standard that courts must meet during proceedings (Nyamutata, 2012). It is interesting that Zimbabweans’ levels of trust in the justice delivery system in EDR differ along party lines. The ruling ZANU-PF party supporters have been found to trust the Zimbabwean courts whilst opposition supporters doubt the independence of the judiciary (Kronke, 2018). This significantly affects the perception of justice in the same population. Section 165(1) of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe outlines the principles of justice as well as the role of the courts in safeguarding human rights, freedoms, the rule of law and ultimately, justice. Therefore, the courts in Zimbabwe are constitutionally tasked with enhancing the protection of the fundamental freedoms and human rights which the electoral process also seeks to preserve.

Judicial Independence The doctrine of separation of powers is intricately connected to judicial independence since the judiciary superintends the checks and balances guaranteeing democracy. Therefore, the judiciary must be free from interference and independent of legislative or executive control. The courts ensure that the other two pillars of the state maintain respect for human rights, hence the courts must be free from interference whether perceived or actual. This judicial independence can be “institutional independence” where there is no interference with the courts and judicial officers, or “individual independence” in which judicial officers are free to act impartially without external interference (Gordon & Bruce, 2016). Judicial independence in EDR is often threatened when political actors attempt to ignore the country’s laws as a way of ensuring political survival (Kronke, 2018). In a ZESN webinar, Portia Kurima, one of the panellists bemoaned the Zimbabwean executive’s alleged hold on the judiciary saying that it leads to low confidence in the institution. In the same discussion, Professor Lovemore Madhuku claimed that the constitutional provisions giving the sitting President the final say in the appointment of judges compromised the judiciary (ZESN, 2021).

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Madhuku’s contention echoes the sentiments of Manyatera and Hamadziripi (2013) on the court’s decision in the 2013 case of Jealous Mawarire v Robert Mugabe which has been a subject of much debate focusing on judicial independence. It was argued that the judgement was merely to legitimise the executive’s desires, although the dissenting judges had grasped the correct interpretation of the Zimbabwean Constitution in this case. If the majority judgement was flawed, the question would be whether they were acting independently or under the influence of the executive. When we consider the 2018 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe, the independence of the judiciary also comes onto the spotlight. Even before the elections, cases related to the elections were brought to the courts. These included the Mavedzenge v Minister of Justice case where ZEC’s lack of de jure independence from the Minister of Justice was challenged through an urgent chamber application in 2017. The hearing was delayed until a few weeks before the election and this was interpreted by some as a lack of independence. Moreover, delays in other judgements or the overturning of judgements in a way that seemed to benefit the ruling party were perceived as a lack of judicial independence (Kronke, 2018). In the 2018 presidential election, the victory by Emmerson Mnangagwa over Nelson Chamisa was by less than 1% of more than 50% threshold for one to avoid a runoff. Chamisa alleged that there had been a fraudulent counting and tallying of the votes and petitioned the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe (CCZ). The court however ruled that there was no sufficient and credible evidence proving the widespread presence of irregularities to warrant a change of the electoral outcome (Siachiwena & Saunders, 2021). It is within the power of the judiciary to come out with a finding that may or may not be popular, but this highly publicised case has reignited the debate on the independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwean Electoral Disputes and the Mediation of the Judiciary The mediation of electoral disputes by the courts is provided for in both the Constitution and the Electoral Act. Section 167 of the Electoral Act entitles any aggrieved candidate to file a petition “complaining of an undue return or an undue election of a member of Parliament by reason of want of qualification, disqualification, electoral malpractice, irregularity

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or any other cause whatsoever”. Such petitions must be lodged within 14 days with the Registrar of the Electoral Court. The Electoral Court of Zimbabwe (ECZ) hears the case and decides on whether the party which should have been declared the winner was duly elected or it was the other contestant. It is also possible for a rerun to be ordered in terms of Section 159 of the Constitution, which mandates the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to hold new elections within 90 days of a vacancy (IFES, 2018). In Zimbabwe, the judiciary has often been castigated for taking a partisan stance, but whether this is true depends on the analyst. A pan-African, non-partisan research network, Afrobarometer together with Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) conducted a survey in 2018 interviewing more than 9,600 adult Zimbabwean citizens, looking at governance, democracy, economic conditions and other issues. They found that there was a general lack of independence that dampened the public’s trust in both ZEC and the courts. However, the ruling ZANUPF supporters trusted ZEC and the judiciary more than the opposition supporters (Kronke, 2018). This verdict on both the electoral management body (EMB) and the courts is definitely a bad one for institutions that are supposed to safeguard democracy. Jurisdiction for Electoral Disputes and Appeals The Electoral Act provides for the various jurisdictions of the courts for election-related complaints and violations in Zimbabwe. Part VI of the Electoral Act gives jurisdiction over “voter registration appeals” to “designated magistrates” although there seems to be no clarity as to who designates the magistrates. Parts XIA and XII of the Electoral Act gives jurisdiction over “candidate nomination appeals” to the ECZ, whilst the jurisdiction for “campaign disputes or violations” is given to the MultiParty Liaison Committees according to Part XXIA of the Electoral Act. For “campaign expenditure disputes”, Part XVI of the Electoral Act grants jurisdiction to any “competent court” which may be a local Magistrates Court although there is no clear definition in the law. For petitions against results, Section 111 of the Electoral Act gives jurisdiction to the CCZ for presidential elections whilst the Electoral Court has jurisdiction for parliamentary and local elections in terms of Part XXIII of the Electoral Act. For the various election offences like corrupt practices, violence

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and intimidation or any other offences, the Electoral Act gives jurisdiction to the director of public prosecutions and the High Court (IFES, 2018). A Sample of Election Disputes in Zimbabwe From independence, the Zimbabwean courts have received hundreds of election petitions, but only a few have succeeded. In 2013 alone, there were 101 petitions challenging the parliamentary election results, 95 were from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and 6 were from the ruling ZANU-PF (Mutangi, 2019). Of these petitions, 99 were dismissed on technicalities and only 2 were determined on their merits. The issue of most election petitions not being determined on merit was explained by the court in Konjana v Nduna ECH 6/18 where it was emphasised that there was prioritisation of strict procedural compliance in cases of election petitions (USAID, 2019). The Margaret Dongo Case In 1995, Margaret Dongo became the first person to challenge the results of an election in Zimbabwe and win against the ruling ZANU-PF party. Dongo held the Sunningdale seat in Harare prior to the elections but fell out with the hierarchy of the party. She was replaced as party candidate by Vivian Mwashita, but she still contested as an independent candidate and narrowly lost the election. However, Dongo petitioned the court alleging vote rigging. The High Court ruled in her favour in August 1995 and ordered fresh voting in the district which she won. The Dongo v Mwashita case has since opened the flood gates of election petitions that have characterised the political landscape in Zimbabwe (Dorman, 2003). The Priscilla Misihairabwi Case In the 1996 municipal elections, an NGO activist Priscilla Misihairabwi, wanted to contest after having compiled a dossier highlighting the fraudulent voter registrations in Harare’s Avenues district. She exposed the flawed electoral rolls showing that hundreds of voters purported to be residing on evidently vacant lots were registered. Her candidacy was declared invalid by the Registrar-General, Tobaiwa Mudede and she appealed to the Supreme Court which quashed the Registrar-General’s decision and declared that Misihairabwi had the right to contest in the

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elections. This was a remarkable ruling by the court as it delved into the merits of the case and boldly overruled the Registrar-General’s decision (Dorman, 2003). The Fidelis Mhashu Case In a case similar to the Misihairabwi case, the High Court also held in favour of Fidelis Mhashu in the Mhashu v Chiroodza & Others HH 43-97 case. After losing in the ruling ZANU-PF primary elections and failing to represent the party, Mhashu contested the mayoral election in Chitungwiza as an independent candidate. He however successfully petitioned the High Court claiming that the electoral roll for Chitungwiza “was so defective that it cannot be said that the electoral process was itself not flawed” because the roll comprised only of homeowners in the area, even though it was evident that most residents were tenants (Dorman, 2003). This was another successful petition which supports the independence of the Zimbabwean judiciary in electoral dispute mediation. The Morgan Tsvangirai Case In Registrar General of the Elections & Ors v Morgan Tsvangirai 2002 (1) ZLR 185, a presidential candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai representing the MDC sought an order from the High Court compelling the RegistrarGeneral to ensure the preparation of a common voters roll for the 2002 presidential election containing only the names of the persons entitled to vote. The contention was that presidential elections are not constituency-based therefore, proof of residency in a specific constituency was unnecessary. The High Court then ruled in Tsvangirai’s favour, but the Registrar-General appealed to the Supreme Court which set aside the reasoning of Makarau J in the High Court. Many have been perplexed by this unusual reasoning of the Supreme Court since the presidential elections are national and proving residency in a particular constituency seems unnecessary. The Madzingo Case In Madzingo & Ors v Minister of Justice 2005 (1) ZLR 171 (SC), Malaba JA dismissed the application noting that “notwithstanding, its importance

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to democracy, the right to vote is, anomalously not guaranteed as a fundamental human right”. He even said that the opposition’s argument was ill conceived since in the Zimbabwean Constitution, freedom of expression did not include the right to vote. This ruling was after the applicants who were employed and resident in the United Kingdom, but were appropriately registered in their constituencies back home sought to be allowed to vote remotely like those on State assignments like the Zimbabwean embassy staff, but the authorities refused. The applicants contented that this refusal infringed on their right to freedom of expression in terms of Section 20 of the Constitution. It seems that the court used a technicality to avoid the issue of the diaspora vote which remains topical even up to present day. Many people hypothesise that the Zimbabweans in the diaspora are more likely to vote for the opposition, hence their inclusion may not be in the interests of the ruling party. Whether this decision amounts to a partisan judiciary is however subject to debate. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Case In the presidential elections in 2008, ZEC failed to announce the results of the election for up to 6 weeks, claiming that it needed to carry out the verification process efficiently and accurately before announcing results. When ZEC failed to announce the results 6 days after the elections, the MDC made an urgent chamber application to the High Court seeking to compel ZEC to announce the results. The MDC & Morgan Tsvangirai v Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission & Ors [2008] ZWHHC 37 case was heard by Uchena J, 7 days after the election, on 5th of April 2008 and the judgement was delivered 9 days after the hearing, on 16th of April 2008. Even then, the ZEC had not yet announced the results although it was 16 days after the election. The ZEC’s initial arguments that the court had no jurisdiction and that the matter was not urgent were both rejected by the court. However, the claim of accurately verifying the results and the claim by the Commission Chairperson that they had received complaints which made it necessary to consider a recount of the votes in some constituencies and that the recounting decision was at ZEC’s absolute discretion was accepted by the court. The court further held that it did not have the jurisdiction to inquire into ZEC’s decision. So, the MDC application was dismissed. Whether this decision holds water in light of Section 156(b) of the 2013 Constitution is debatable because the subsection compels ZEC to ensure that “the

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results of the election or referendum are announced as soon as possible after the close of the polls”. The Jealous Mawarire Case In Jealous Mawarire v Robert Mugabe N.O. and 4 Others CCZ 1/13, there was a petition for the court to declare that elections be held not later than 30 June 2013. This was on the backdrop of the government of national unity (GNU) where electoral reforms were agreed to be put in place before the 2013 elections to ensure that they are free, fair and credible. Unfortunately, ZANU-PF stalled the electoral reforms, but still wanted the elections to go ahead without the reforms, although the opposition wanted the elections to be held by 30 October after electoral reforms. A citizen then petitioned the court in May 2013, to order the then President Robert Mugabe to announce a date for elections which had to be held by 29th of June 2013. The court needed to interpret the meaning of Section 58(1) of the Constitution which grammatically means that elections should be held ‘within’ four months ‘after’ the dissolution of Parliament. Although the court admitted that this was the grammatical meaning in its majority judgement, it however adopted a purposive meaning claiming that the grammatical meaning would be an absurd interpretation which would allow Zimbabwe to be governed without the legislature for 4 months and this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution. However, in his minority dissenting judgement, Malaba DCJ heavily criticised the majority judgement for being essentially a political judgement because it was contrary to the Constitutional provision. The president then announced the date claiming that his hands were tied although SADC requested a postponement of the elections (Mavedzenge, 2020). The Justice Mavedzenge Case In the Mavedzenge v Minister of Justice CCZ 05/18 case, the court also took a purposive interpretation of Section 232(a) of the 2013 Constitution which gives ZEC the exclusive mandate for elections administration. However, Section 192(6) of the Electoral Act provides for the approval of ZEC’s electoral regulations by the Minister of Justice before they can come into effect. Mavedzenge then petitioned the Court seeking a declaration that Section 192(6) of the Electoral Act is unconstitutional. The

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matter dragged for almost a year, being heard on 5th of July 2017 and the judgement only being delivered on 31st of May 2018. This was just 2 months before the 2018 general election. The applicant contented that considering the literal meaning of Section 192(6) prevented the independent promulgation of electoral regulations by ZEC since it required the Minister’s approval first before proclaiming regulations. Hence, the Minister can literally approve or disapprove ZEC’s draft regulations. The court rejected this grammatical interpretation, adopting a purposive interpretation and holding that the provision does not imply the enjoyment of veto power by the Minister, but that he simply had to check the draft regulations for compliance with the law. It has been argued that this interpretation and decision by the court undermined the independence of ZEC (Mavedzenge, 2020). It remains open to debate whether this decision by the CCZ was in the interests of justice since it has opened the judiciary to criticism. The Gabriel Shumba Case The decision by the Constitutional Court in May 2018 in the case of Gabriel Shumba & 2 Ors v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (2018) ZWCC 4 has upheld the contentious decisions in a few other cases before it. An application was made to the court seeking an order compelling ZEC to cater for the voting of Zimbabwean citizens residing outside the country (in the diaspora). The court held that only those who are resident in a certain constituency are given the opportunity to vote in a particular election. This is despite the fact that Part XIV of the Electoral Act is liberal enough to allow diplomats stationed outside Zimbabwe and their spouses to vote by post (IFES, 2018). This means that the facility is there and can be availed to all citizens in the diaspora, but it is currently restricted to those out on state business alone. This reasoning especially for the presidential elections is similar to that of the Supreme Court in the Tsvangirai case of 2002 above. Even where a voter is registered in a constituency, there is no provision for him or her to vote whilst outside the country because the registration is not only constituency-specific but also polling station-specific. This argument is similar to the Madzingo case above.

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The Gift Machona Konjana Case The case of Gift Machona Konjana is a result of a botched tallying of parliamentary election results for the Chegutu West Constituency National Assembly seat during the 2018 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe. The applicant claimed that ZEC incorrectly captured data resulting in Dexter Nduna of ZANU-PF being declared winner even though he had fewer votes than the applicant Gift Konjana of the MDC Alliance. Even ZEC confirmed that there had indeed been a mistake. On petitioning the Electoral Court for a nullification of the result, the court dismissed the petition for failure to comply with Rule 21 of The Electoral Rules. It was held that the court could not condone a defective petition even where the petition may seem to have merit. Konjana appealed to the Supreme Court which ruled that the election petition should have been concluded within 3 months as prescribed by Section 182(2) of the Electoral Act. It was further held that the stipulated period of 3 months could not be exceeded under any circumstances, so the case was struck off the roll. Konjana then applied to the Constitutional Court in Konjana v Nduna CCZ 9/21 and the court held that the applicant had failed to demonstrate the constitutionality of the matter. The court stressed that the Supreme Court decision could not be appealed against since it is the final court of appeal in Zimbabwe, except in those matters stipulated in Section 169(1) of the Constitution, over which the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction. The court blamed the applicant and his lawyers for failing to handle the case properly and held that “it would be improper to expect the Court to bend the rules and seek to rectify the situation in this application as that would set a bad precedent”. This unfortunate case exposed the incompetence of the systems in ZEC whilst showing the level of adherence of the court system to strict rules which every petitioner is supposed to observe. That is why many cases end up being dismissed for technicalities rather than on merits.

Conclusion and Recommendations The cases considered here just enlighten on the role of the judiciary in elections. The claims of partisan tendencies by the judiciary may not be completely unfounded, but they should be taken in context. Ultimately, justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. The judiciary must have absolute independence so that there is unwavering trust in the fairness of any adjudication that may be required from the

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courts. Court decisions should not seem dubious, especially where there is a general observable trend towards the support for the interests of one party. It is therefore our recommendation that: . the election petition process and the whole EDR be simplified so that there are fewer technical bottlenecks that complicate the process. . the Electoral Court be a permanent court that can hear all matters before, during and after elections. . the appointment, dismissal and remuneration of judges be free from political influence. . enough funding be availed for the efficient and expeditious resolution of electoral disputes through reasonable caseloads. . there be alignment of electoral laws with the Constitution so that there be no ambiguity which may affect the quality of the judicial decisions during EDR. . there be a sober and non-partisan approach to EDR by all independent institutions including ZEC and the courts.

References African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 2004. BBC News. (2020, November 15). US election: Trump says Biden won but again refuses to concede. Retrieved July 20, 2022, from https://www.bbc. com/news/election-us-2020-54952098 Dongo v Mwashita & ORS 1995 (2) ZLR 228 (H). Dorman, S. R. (2003). ‘Make sure they count nicely this time’: The politics of election observing in Zimbabwe. https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/retrieve/949/ Make+Sure+They+Count+Nicely.pdf Gabriel Shumba & 2 Ors vs. Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (2018) ZWCC 4. Gordon, A., & Bruce, D. (2016). Transformation and the independence of the judiciary in South Africa. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR). http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/transition/3.pdf International Federation for Electoral Systems (IFES). (2018). Elections in Zimbabwe 2018 general elections frequently asked questions. https://www.ifes. org/sites/default/files/2018_ifes_zimbabwe_general_elections_faqs_final.pdf

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International Federation for Electoral Systems (IFES). (2019). Addressing election disputes and election offenses in Zimbabwe. https://www.ifes.org/ sites/default/files/addressing_election_disputes_and_election_offenses_in_ zimbabwe_one_pager_july_2019.pdf Konjana v Nduna CCZ 9/21. Konjana v Nduna ECH 6/18. Kronke, M. (2018). Bonded autonomy: What limits Zimbabweans’ trust in their courts and electoral commission? (Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 52). https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ab_r7_policypaperno52_bou nded_autonomy_of_zimbabwes_electoral_commission_and_courts.pdf Law Society of Zimbabwe (LSZ). (2018). Handbook on constitutional & electoral litigation in Zimbabwe: Context, legal framework and institutions. https://kubatana.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Handbook-onConstitutional-and-Electoral-litigation-in-Zimbabwe.pdf Manyatera, G., & Hamadziripi C. (2013). Electoral democracy in Africa: A critique of Jealous Mbizvo Mawarire v Robert Gabriel Mugabe N.O. and 4 Others CCZ 1/13. https://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle= hein.journals/unbotslj17§ion=6 Mavedzenge, J. (2020). The Zimbabwean Constitutional Court as a key site of struggle for human rights protection: A critical assessment of its human rights jurisprudence during its first six years. African Human Rights Law Journal, 20, 181–205. Mavedzenge v Minister of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and Others CCZ 2018/05. Mhashu v Chiroodza & Others HH 43-97. Mutangi, T. (2019). An overview of the practice and procedure when litigating election petitions in Zimbabwe. https://old.zimlii.org/content/ove rview-practice-and-procedure-when-litigating-election-petitions-zimbabwe Nyamutata, C. (2012). Electoral conflict and justice: The case of Zimbabwe. African Journal of Legal Studies, 5, 63–89. https://doi.org/10.1163/170 873812X628124 Petit, D. (2000). Resolving election disputes in the OSCE area: Towards a standard election dispute monitoring system. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/ b/17567.pdf Registrar General of the Elections & Ors v. Morgan Tsvangirai 2002 (1) ZLR 185. Sachikonye, L. M. (2004). Zimbabwe: Constitutionalism, the electoral system and challenges for governance and stability. Journal of African Elections, 3(1), 140–159. Siachiwena, H., & Saunders, C. (2021). Elections, legitimacy, and democratic consolidation in Southern Africa lessons from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi.

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Journal of African Elections, 20(1), 67–114. https://doi.org/10.20940/ JAE/2021/v20i1a5 Tokaji, D. P. (2011). The role of judges in election law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 159, 273–292. USAID. (2019). An analysis of the legal framework governing elections in Zimbabwe. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00W598.pdf Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN). (2021). Independence of the Judiciary: Implications on electoral democracy in Zimbabwe. https://kub atana.net/2021/06/04/independence-of-the-judiciary-implications-on-ele ctoral-democracy-in-zimbabwe-activity-highlight/

CHAPTER 15

Political Dialectics and the Role of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) in Elections Kudzai Cathrine Bingisai

Introduction International instruments such as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) provide that every citizen has the electoral right to participate freely and fairly in elections. In addition, Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007) specifically urge States to build and strengthen national election management bodies that are unbiased and independent. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2015) as well as the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the

K. C. Bingisai (B) University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_15

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SADC region (2003) mandates the establishment of the independence of the judiciary and electoral institutions. The Southern African Development Community—Parliamentary Forum (2001) also recommends for an absolute Independent Electoral Commission to conduct elections. The forum acknowledges the importance of peaceful political environment and an impartial electoral commission in the Southern African region. Principles and Guidelines on the Independence of Election Management Bodies (EMBs) in the SADC region (2007) provide for financial independence of electoral management bodies in order to execute their electoral mandates effectively. However, questions continue to emerge as to whether an independent and impartial electoral commission is realistic and whether an electoral commission is capable of announcing acceptable election results. The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) mandates the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to prepare, conduct and supervise elections. Prior to its establishment in 2004, elections were managed by the Registrar-General of Elections, under the supervision of the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC). Since 1980, Zimbabwe has been holding elections after every five years, hence the importance of voter education, and an updated voter register. In Zimbabwe, voter registration is ongoing, and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission keeps and maintains the record (Electoral Act:13). According to the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), voter registration determines an individual’s eligibility to vote. Citizens in Zimbabwe can exercise their right to vote through voter registration, according to the country’s constitution. Section 155(2) (a) of the Zimbabwean Constitution states that the State must take all relevant means, including legislative measures, to guarantee that all eligible persons are registered as voters. The provision implies that all registered voters despite of gender have the right to vote. In accordance with Section 36A of the Electoral Act:13, the President may at any moment direct that a new voter registration be announced in the Gazette on the advice of the Commission. Therefore, on September 9, 2017, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, the then-President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, declared that the Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) would commence on September 14, 2017 (ZESN, 2018). Section 156(a) provides that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission must ensure simple, accurate and transparent voting method. This study is an investigative analysis of political dialectics and the role of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission in elections.

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The study begins by explaining the electoral commission and theories used in the research. After the theoretical framework, methodology and scope for this study is presented. The study also discusses and explains the various aspects that the participants expressed toward the investigative analysis of whether the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is a friend or foe.

The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission In this study, the acronym ZEC is used interchangeably with Commission. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is established under Chapter 12 of the Constitution as an electoral management body. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Section 238 establishes the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which is headed by a Chairperson selected by the President of Zimbabwe after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission and the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders. Section 239 assigns the Commission several functions, including preparing for, conducting and supervising elections for the office of President, Parliamentarians and local government councilors, registering voters, delineating electoral constituencies, wards and other electoral boundaries and ensuring that elections and referendums are conducted efficiently, freely, fairly and transparently. The Commission is tasked with voter education to general citizens. According to Mayer (2011: 633), “Indeed, some scholars have come to the undisputed conclusion that education plays a major role in fostering citizenship participation.” According to Praktikno (2009: 53), “elections at all levels of government are considered relatively free and fair when there is full citizen participation.” In addition, the Commission works in accordance with laws governing elections namely the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] and Referendums Act [Chapter 2:10]. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act of 2013 guides the electoral system in Zimbabwe. Section 67 of the Constitution provides political rights, include the freedom to create, join and engage in the activities of any political party or organization of one’s choice, as well as the right to free, fair and frequent elections. The Commission is also responsible for conducting voter registration. Biometric voter registration was first used in the 2018 Zimbabwean elections. Contemporary technology is capable of crediting elections as free and fair, since vote counting, and results publishing can be done with the use of technology. Zimbabwe’s political environment calls for an

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electronic ballot vote counting, as the Zimbabwe traditional voter registration system has always been condemned of not being up to date. The Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ZEC is responsible for building competence in the use of technology in election procedures. Despite that Zimbabwe Constitution provide for independence of Commission, appointment of Commissioners by the President remains a questionable case towards promoting and ensuring independence. In accordance with Section 238 of the Zimbabwe Constitution, the President nominates the ZEC Chairperson after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission and the Parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders. This is despite the fact that the Commission must be able to carry out its constitutional duties in an effective and independent manner. The African continent has abundant natural resources, yet continuous socioeconomic and political challenges continue to manifest. Zimbabwe has not been spared from the effects of COVID-19 and the 2022 RussiaUkrainian War, Zimbabwe’s economic conditions were negatively affected with a sharp increase in the price of goods and services. Zimbabwe is currently confronted by a challenging economic environment. Mavhunga (2022) published an article titled, “Price of Bread Up 100% in Zimbabwe since Russia Invaded Ukraine.” As of April 26, 2022, Zimbabwe’s loaf of bread price was hiked to two United States Dollars (USD$2). The article expressed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had caused bread prices to skyrocket in wheat importing countries such as Zimbabwe. It is not a conducive environment to hold elections during a period of economic hardships as the election outcome will not be a true reflection of people’s choices as more votes will be attained by the political party that manages to address the politics of the stomach. As of the 2018 elections, the European Union Election Observation Mission (2018) stated that the economic hardships, as well as the population’s reliance on food aid and state development projects in some rural areas, made voters susceptible to election manipulation and intimidation. There is a temptation to engage in unethical practices due to food aid assistance. Peaceful, free and fair elections cannot coexist with a poor economic state as human beings are likely to suffer from the will of self survival. Credible elections ought to be transparent and the electoral management body should be independent from the ruling party. According to Posner and Young (2007: 23), “While the increased frequency of elections on the African continent has brought optimism, it has been closely accompanied by another, much more concerning trend of election-related violence.” Zimbabwe’s

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elections seem to be marred with varying levels of political violence and disputation. Yet, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is mandated to ensure free and fair elections without violence (Section 239 of Zimbabwe Constitution). The Commission seems to be weak in handling political violence making Zimbabwean elections a trail of conflicts and violence. Electoral violence is an obstacle to democratic consolidation. However, this study does not focus on election violence in Zimbabwe instead, it seeks to determine whether the electoral commission is a friend or foe.

Realism Theory This study used the realism theory that explains the behavior of states in the international system. Ilodigwe (2019) states that “realists’ ideas can be traced back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau.” According to Armitage (2013), “the international political atmosphere is anarchic, with conflicts within and between states unavoidable.” In support of the realism theory, Zimbabwe has been strategically using manual voters register since 1980 elections up to the 2013 elections. Every state, like human beings, aims at maintaining and expanding his or her own power. The realism theory elaborates aspects that are usually involved in the electoral cycle and challenges faced by ZEC, voters and how political parties influence the electoral cycle and issues to do with democracy and human rights. Waltz (1979: 47) argues that the driving force of survival is the primary factor influencing the behavior of states in the international system and in turn ensures that states develop offensive military force and some strategies to increase their relative power. The researcher used the realism theory in order to recognize the loopholes which are unlawfully holding back the smooth holding of elections in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the researcher made use of realism theory to get an in-depth insight on the political dialects and role of ZEC and its implementation of the biometric voter registration system. The realism theory also expresses that existing institutions are established with the distribution of power. The domain of realist power can be explained on when, what, how and by whom. Therefore, it can be argued that ZEC adopted BVR on elections to change the face, ensure the credibility of elections by eradicating conflicts and violence. Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 727) define institutions as “formal and informal rules and processes that regulate social interaction by limiting and facilitating

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actors’ behavior.” In this sense, it can be argued that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, shift from the manual voter registration system to the BVR was largely inspired by realism which stresses the importance of survival in the international system. Given the realistic nature of human beings, violence is prone to take place due to the struggle for power and contested election results. Hence, the study adopted the realist theory so as to establish whether the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is a friend or foe when it comes to preventing electoral violence in Zimbabwe.

Social Reconstruction Theory The study also made use of the social reconstruction theory in relation to transformation from the manual voter registration system to the biometric voter registration system even though the theory is based on improving the education sector. Brameld (1971) utilizes the social reconstructionism theory to propose that the curriculum structure should split up classes into different age groups. Giroux (2005) states that society should aim at developing better visions than current ones since society is always threatened by several factors such as political corruption, unemployment and global warming. Hill (2006) states that the reconstruction theory was developed in the twentieth century when there was technological advancements and educational challenges. This approach was adopted focusing on the implementation of digital technology in elections rather than relying on the manual voter registration system. According to Olivia (2005), social reconstructionists are reactive leaders as they always seek to improve societal setup. The study considers an electoral commission that is willing to change traditional manual voter registration as a transformational agent as well as promoting its relevance. The study considered that sustainable development and mutual political agreement for present and future generations in Zimbabwe rely on social reconstruction. Reconstructionists believe that there are always solutions to upgrade traditional mechanisms. Hence, the researcher made use of the social reconstruction theory as it proclaims innovative and transformational change in society.

Methodology and Scope This study exclusively made use of a qualitative research design upon which data was gathered using interviews and secondary data analysis. Saunders et al. (2016: 124) state that the term “ontology” relates to

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beliefs about how reality works. Research objects could include individuals and organizations. The ontological disposition of a researcher determines the research participants and their value in the research process. In this study, the researcher sought to determine whether the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is a friend or foe and the key players upon which participants were both men and women from academic institutions, civil societies, political analysts, journalists and the general citizens of Zimbabwe from different political affiliations. The choice of participants of this study was shaped by one’s view of reality. It was therefore the researcher’s view that this phenomenon of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission as a friend or foe could be better evaluated if the views, attitudes and perceptions of these participants are collected and analyzed through interviews. Data was presented in the form of themes based on the research findings. Telephone interviews were conducted with the participants from which voluntary consent was sought before engaging in administering the research questions. The study made use of realism which is based on describing what we see and experience in terms of the reality’s underlying structures that influence the occurrences that can be observed (Saunders et al., 2016: 139). This philosophy argues that reality is not seen but sensations produced by the actual world (Saunders et al., 2016). Using reality and social reconstruction theory in an endeavor to explain whether the ZEC is a friend or foe, an analysis to respondents’ view was critically done so as to determine the role of the Commission in elections. Ethical considerations such as confidentiality, informed consent, right to or not to participate, were respected and upheld throughout the study.

Discussions: Voter Education The research findings presented that ZEC is responsible for conducting free, fair and transparent elections. All the participants acknowledged that it is the responsibility of ZEC to conduct free and fair elections. However, some of the participants cited that the Commission is failing to generate uncontested election results giving reference to the case of Chamisa v. Mnangagwa constitutional petition after the 2018 elections. Respondent 2 said that “the Zimbabwean elections, since the inception of ZEC in 2004 have been contested for their credibility.” All the participants expressed that ZEC is not really performing its duty when there are always issues on the credibility of election results and the voters’ register.

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The research findings also revealed that ZEC is responsible for designing, printing and distributing ballot papers to polling centers. However, due to hard copies, the visually impaired people fail to have equal access to the resource materials, therefore failing to cater to the needs of some disadvantaged members of the community. Respondent 14 expressed concern over the provision of braille material, an issue that has long been petitioned before the Commission to address. The participants further expressed that, Zimbabwe has 16 official languages, and as such should be the case on voter education information dissemination toward promoting principles of democracy. During the interview discussions, issues arose pertaining to the financial capability of the Commission to conduct voter education and print materials in diverse languages in all mass media. Participants acknowledged the role of ZEC in promoting voter education on social media and press. The study found out that ZEC made use of media such as newspapers, radio and internet in voter education. Respondent 12 expressed that, “radio has the potential of wide coverage, however, we must not forget fellow citizens who are deaf .” The study presents that there is no adequate decentralization of vital information such as voter registration and voting to disabled people such as those with hearing impairment. The research findings also revealed that ZEC should really strengthen its voter registration process. Most of the participants expressed concern that despite Zimbabwe having elections since 1980, there are citizens who do not even know the requirements needed to register to vote. The crucial question to ask is, are those people even aware of the biometric voter registration system?

Voter Registration During the interview discussions, only one participant expressed that she was not aware that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is responsible for maintaining the biometric voters’ register. The respondent expressed that, I do not even know that ZEC is responsible for voter registration.....what is BVR.........what is the difference between ZEC and the Government of Zimbabwe?

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The researcher also found out that voter education ought to be taken seriously in order to eradicate such confusions and misunderstandings from the citizens concerning electoral commission and the government. An interesting finding was that most of the participants were aware of the BVR. The research findings also revealed that ZEC is responsible for promoting digital technology in elections. Digital technology is also important in the conduct of elections to ensure credibility and transparent. According to Respondent 1, The manual voters’ register has been used by the Zimbabwe government since 1980 elections except recently in the 2018 elections when biometric voter registration was adopted.

The respondent further indicated that the challenges of having an updated voters’ register in past elections including 2013 elections led to the outcry for a biometric voter registration system. Respondent 3 expressed that manual voter registration used in previous elections was a slow process, associated with long queues at the RegistrarGeneral. By removing the deceased voters from the voters’ list and adding new registrants, the Registrar-General was required to update the voters’ list, which was not always the case. The Zimbabwe Electoral Act Chapter 2:13 has the mandate for registering, transferring and removals of the dead from the voters’ roll. Most of the participants further highlighted that during the 2013 elections, there were accusations of electors’ slips being used to vote whose foundation could not be discovered. The research findings implied that the participants praised ZEC as most of the participants acknowledged that the manual voter registration process acted as a major barrier to voter turnout leading to an inaccurate voters’ register. The study found that despite technology in the voters’ registration process, manual paper registrations were not totally scratched off from the process. Respondent 5 highlighted that besides the biometric voters’ registration system, ZEC also employed a registration and data verification process on paperwork which was done manually. However, Respondent 6 indicated that: Voter registration exercise remains a crucial and indispensable process in the electoral cycle in Zimbabwe because in most countries including

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Zimbabwe itself, only those who are registered to vote ultimately participate on the Election Day.

The principles of transparency and accountability could be ensured by a system of biometric voter registration. The study also found out that the manual voters’ register was being manipulated by former president Robert Mugabe and the ZANU PF Party. The participants expressed that the ZANU PF Party has been controlling the manual voters’ register to its benefit so that the party wins in all the elections. Respondent 7 argued that the manual voters’ roll contained several ghost voters who were not removed from the voters’ list. The participant further highlighted that the ZANU PF party controlled the voters’ register so that it can pave way for multiple voting. Another interesting finding was that the voter registration process in the urban areas was not as strict as it was in the rural areas. The participants expressed that at times the ZEC registration teams would either open late or close too early. Revealing the foe side of ZEC, Respondent 11 expressed that at one point, ZEC could not release the manual voters’ roll when it was being asked for it. The participants’ argument was based on the fact that in the case of Dabengwa and ZAPU v Chairperson of ZEC and 2 others, the voters’ roll was not accessible. Dabengwa had asked for the electronic voters’ roll in 2012, unfortunately ZEC failed to cooperate. The participant further stated that the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights even asked for the voters’ roll before voter registration commenced and the voters’ register could not be accessed upon request as it was not up to date. Most of the study participants also noted that the manual voter register was not best fit for Zimbabwe elections. When asked if the Biometric technology has made a difference in the 2018 election results, most of the respondents were of the view that the biometric devices improved the credibility of elections as the biometric machines reduced multiple voting. Respondent 10 said that The biometric voter registration system is also capable of promoting peaceful and credible elections in the forthcoming 2023 harmonized elections.

However, another participant expressed that while both domestic and international observers praised the 2018 elections as free and fair, there

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were several problems and obstacles that called into doubt the legitimacy and integrity of the results. A post-election audit conducted by several parties uncovered evidence of irregularities, technological failures and election officials’ willful cooperation in the overall conduct of the elections. Some of the study participants also argued that neither the regulatory nor the administrative framework for electoral management body were able to ensure genuine elections, even with the presence of the biometric voter registration.

Results Management System: Tallying, Transmission and Declarations of Results All the participants expressed that it is the sole responsibility of ZEC to handle election results. Respondent 1 said that Perhaps the greatest failure of ZEC in the 2018 elections is the manner in which the Commission handled the whole aspect of the 2018 results and the Chamisa v. Mnangagwa constitutional petition.

The participant further indicated that from counting, tabulation, declaration and transmission of results, manifest failures were noted, electoral violence and there is a lot of uncertainties in the 2023 Presidential Elections. Respondent 3 also said that after 2018 elections, there was a lot of discussions over elections from which tallying, transmitting and publishing results, and petitions were brought contesting the process and methodology adopted by ZEC in the results annunciation. Mchomvu (2011) asserts electoral violence is often triggered by the losing party, which usually claims that they lost the elections unfairly. Nevertheless, in case of Zimbabwe 2018 elections, from the interviews conducted, the participants indicated that the Judiciary did not receive much compliment in its work to resolve electoral disputes with allegations of favoring the ruling party. Most of the participants indicated that the ZEC’s delivery of the results on election day failed miserably, among other technological issues that did not come as a surprise to quite several Zimbabweans since Zimbabwe’s elections have always been accused of fraud. Such an environment demotivates electoral participation with specific reference to young people and women. During the interview discussions, Respondent 4 shared the following:

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ZEC failed to adhere to the codes of conduct of the Electoral Act and the Electoral Code of Conduct. When in 2008, government announced election results instead of the Commission itself.

Respondent 6 blamed electoral violence on ZEC for failing to handle electoral conflicts and violence. All the participants expressed their concern with time taken by ZEC in counting election votes. As such, political violence occurred after the 2018 elections, due to the electoral commission’s delay in releasing election results. This resulted in the shooting of civilians by suspected security forces. Respondent 6 further critiqued the fact that ZEC takes a lot of time in counting ballot papers, and he suggested that such a status quo calls for digital technology to allow voting online. Hence, the study uncovered that Zimbabwe has always been in a crisis of tallying, transmission and declarations of election results.

Temporary Workers The research findings revealed that ZEC temporarily relies on temporary workers especially teachers to provide operational voter registration support during electoral activities. Respondent 9 expressed that adequate training and preparedness is therefore indispensable to the efficient electoral administration. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act 14(3) states that, “The Commission is free to nominate anyone to help it with voter education.” The Act further stipulates that such person to conduct voter education must be a permanent resident of the country. The Commission may delegate voter education task when it so deems fit. Most of the participants acknowledged that ZEC tried its best in training the staff and for cascading the training in the constituencies and polling stations. Respondent 12 indicated that the question of the effectiveness and efficiency of the trainings, however, could not be ascertained in view of the numerous errors discovered in elections and the significant amount of spoilt ballot papers. According to the ZESN (2018), voter illiteracy is caused mainly by the Commission’s restricted, administrative, under resourced and undemocratic voter education system, which has fundamental problems. Respondent 15 felt that electoral trainings are not given enough period and ZEC staff are influenced by political parties and candidates. Such a scenario which limits effective and efficient role of the Commission.

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Lack of Objectivity During the interview discussions, Respondent 10 indicated that ZEC lacked objectivity toward promoting democracy through their management of elections in the 2013 and 2018 elections. Respondent 10 further highlighted that ZEC was ineffective in promoting free, and transparent elections in the 2018 elections though the biometric voter registration system was used. Respondent 8 concurred with Respondent 10 saying: Nothing new is ever going to come out of ZEC in the 2023 elections as long as it continues to be accused of being political aligned with the ruling party.

During the interview discussions, Respondent 9 expressed that ZEC is not communicative to citizens because by-elections held in 2022, some of the names of voters were moved to new wards without even informing the affected voters. The participants further expressed that the intention was only to frustrate citizens not to vote. The research findings imply that the Commission is failing to keep the citizens informed on the place of voting if changes have been made.

Manipulation by Government and Security Officers Majority of the participants questioned why the ZEC Commissioners are chosen by the President of the government (of the ZANU PF party), and hence the legitimacy of the election process becomes questionable. Respondent 7 contended that ZEC must operate with complete autonomy and that electoral law must explicitly provide ZEC exclusive authority and responsibility for accrediting election observers. The respondent indicated that, “to be honest, ZEC is not independent to the Government of Zimbabwe.” Participants also stated that ZEC’s independence and post would ultimately increase trust in ZEC and the vital work of managing the elections. Respondent 6 questioned the Electoral Act’s provision granting the Minister of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs authority to enact ZEC guidelines. Respondent 6 indicated that in the run-up of both the 2013 elections and 2018 elections, ZEC clearly developed cracks and divisions that compromised its autonomy and objectivity.

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In another interview, Respondent 4 stated that ZEC is manipulated by members of the security forces. The participant indicated that the Commission must not depend on the government to fulfill its responsibilities. The participant expressed her point in the form of the following question, “Can ZEC get the trust from the Zimbabwe citizens in bringing free and fair in 2023 elections when security forces are on ZEC’s neck?” In another interview, the respondent stated that as long as the State President has the responsibility of announcing the election date, then ZEC will never be an independent commission. Respondent 3 proposed that the election date itself must be set by the Commission and not the President. All the study participants concurred that ZEC should provide its election road map together with election dates rather than wait for the President to proclaim them. Additionally, the participant questioned the appointment of a former Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) member Utoile Silaigwana to lead ZEC in the 2018 elections. The study noted that the appointment of the former military personnel limited the credibility of ZEC and led to suspicion of election rigging. Respondent 8 put this point across as follows, “how can one expect credible elections when Silaigwana is appointed as the Chief Elections Officer?…” However, another participant expressed that at times, the appointment is based on qualifications and merit without intentions of manipulating the Electoral Management Body. Most of the participants indicated that the probability that ZEC is going to manage the 2023 elections well is 50:50. The possibility of violence and results contestations in the forthcoming elections therefore presents further justification to reforming election management and the independence of Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. With such an eye-opening view and political state, is it even impossible for Zimbabwe to hold free and fair elections? The researcher noted that the independence of the Commission only exists in theory and such a scenario overlooks the mandate of holding free and fair elections.

Lack of Fusion Between Election Administration, Electoral Cycle and Electoral Governance The study’s key finding was that there’s a slight or no separation of electoral governance, electoral cycle and election management in both the 2013 and 2018 Zimbabwe’s elections. Most of the participants were unanimous that Zimbabwe’s elections were treated as an event rather than a process. This was substantiated by the fact that the electoral design

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and management did not recognize the link between the electoral cycle, administration and governance. Respondent 2 indicated that Zimbabwe appears to view elections as a one-time event that does not require thorough institutional development or planning because the same events of violence happened in 2013 and in 2018. The participant further expressed that unfortunately in the post-2018 elections, a lot of violence occurred particularly in Harare City where lives were lost. Such a political environment is not expected in a democratic state where elections must be held in a free and peaceful manner and their outcomes respected by all.

Conclusions This research sought to evaluate the efficacy of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. The semi-structured interviews were used in the study’s qualitative methodology to ascertain the targeted respondents’ perspectives. Several important lessons were generated from the study that will contribute meaningfully to the 2023 elections and beyond, voter registration and democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe and strengthening of the electoral process. The conclusion and lessons learnt can be summarized as follows: The study concludes that ZEC has two faces, the one projected in the ZEC operative framework which is friendly in taking its responsibilities such as voter education, voter delimitation and electoral results announcement. However, the interviewed participants presented the foe side of ZEC as a politically aligned organization. The research study found out notwithstanding the fact that ZEC dominates election administration in Zimbabwe, the government also has a significant impact on the electoral process and election administration with its actions. It is imperative to take into account ZEC’s need for strengthening and reform, as well as the role performed by the Government of Zimbabwe, political parties and media on election administration. For instance, the credible election administration depends on the behavior of political parties in the electoral process, the role of voters exercising their sovereign right to register and vote, and the judiciary’s settlement of any rising electoral disputes. The study concluded that the Zimbabwean elections are associated with poor election management and election violence. As the participants indicated in the study, electoral violence in Zimbabwe is caused by the

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disputed election results. If left unresolved (election management), the potential for electoral violence is worse come 2023 elections and beyond. Unfortunately, good practices by ZEC (such as voter education, voter registration and ensuring free and fair elections) are outnumbered by bad practices (such as accusations of rigging and alignment with the ruling party). While the 2018 elections saw a notable progress in the legislation and the way the elections were conducted, thanks to the introduction of the biometric voter registration system, the shortcomings noted if not addressed would make the 2023 elections extremely difficult to execute. The findings show that there have been issues with the entire electoral cycle, including the creation of laws, ZEC’s independence and autonomy, the process for registering voters, transmitting election results and resolving electoral disputes. As a result, it has been determined that ZEC, in its current form, cannot be trusted to deliver an electoral procedure that is credible in the 2023 elections.

Recommendations ZEC should launch elections preparations early enough to mitigate the shortcomings and challenges that were noted in election administration in both the 2013 and 2018 elections. Enhanced planning and management capacity of ZEC is important to the entire electoral process in a timely and well-sequenced manner. A context-based determination on suitable election technology should be done by ZEC and should conclude the process latest by March 2023. The Commission should develop an automated voter registration system for voter registration and the maintenance of the voter’s register. This should include an automated system for the registration of Zimbabweans in the diaspora. Automated voter registration will serve in enhancing the inclusion of voters particularly those who do not have time to go and register at ZEC outlets or ZEC district offices. The study also recommends ZEC to promote and adopt eBallot system whereby voters cast their candidate choices online. eBallot ensures that election results are trustworthy and instant results. There is no need to wait for ZEC to count the election results then announce as this would be done automatically and in real time. ZEC instead should recruit intellectual assistance from academics in the local universities, nongovernmental organizations and trusted advisors for technological support in its operations. Scientific researches on challenges

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and opportunities of e-voting should be conducted by researchers. The Commission itself, without government assistance, should create a favorable electoral atmosphere that guarantees the respect and satisfaction of general suffrage and fundamental human rights and freedoms. It should also make sure that candidates for political parties and the general support campaign take part in all electoral processes without restriction and without fear of being criticized. The ZEC must ensure that electoral campaigns take place in all electoral processes without restriction and that its voter registration field officials are properly trained in the use and management of the registration system and verification equipment in future exercises to avoid unnecessary delays, long queues and equipment malfunction. The voter registration field officials should be effectively trained, this can be achieved by increasing worker training expenditure so that workers are capacitated and boost the quality of work. Additionally, the ZEC should consider co-partnership with the National Registrar Department on citizenship documentation to support upcoming voter registration efforts. Such cooperation can assist in reducing or eliminating the registration of deceased people. The Commission must step up information transmission through media channels, inclusive of people living with disabilities to raise standards of understanding on the use of technology in elections to boost confidence in the citizens. ZEC should prepare a realistic election operational plan to guide in the preparation of 2023 elections and beyond so as to prevent violence—a cancer for elections. In this case, academic and civil societies must work with ZEC to boost citizens’ confidence on electoral processes. The most important factor in ensuring credible elections in Zimbabwe is by promoting a transparent Independent Commission. There is no way elections can be free and fair, while the Commission is accused of being aligned with the ruling party, State President and Constitutional Court. Zimbabwe needs an Independent Electoral Commission that is ready to uphold the fundamental principles of democracy and rule of law. ZEC should be independent from the Government of Zimbabwe, political parties or individuals or groups interested in election results. The 2023 Zimbabwean elections could witness another sad electoral history of having disputed elections and accusation of rigging unless ZEC presents transparency in its handling of the elections to the satisfaction of the electorate.

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The Government of Zimbabwe should ensure that ZEC is allocated adequate funding to initiate the voter registration and election preparations in time. The Commission should have financial independence after the annual budget is announced so as to promote effectiveness of its performance and independence. The prevailing economic and political environment in Zimbabwe points to a very volatile election in 2023 if the government does not put in place a conducive environment in place. In addition, the Government and the judiciary should remain independent to harmonize jurisdictions arising from elections disputes. The study recommends political parties and civil society to continuously deploy agents to be trained by ZEC to support ZEC’s efforts and advance transparency. Further research on the role of political actors should be conducted in analyzing the independence of ZEC. International organizations such as the European Union should also continue to support electoral processes so as to enhance and promote transparency in elections. Local and international observers should continue monitoring the electoral environment to boost citizens’ confidence in the electoral process.

References African Union. (1981). African charter on human and peoples’ rights. African Union. African Union. (2000). Constitutive Act. African Union. African Union. (2007). African charter on democracy, elections and governance. African Union. Armitage, D. (2013). Foundations of modern international thought. Cambridge University Press. Brameld, T. (1971). Patterns of educational philosophy. Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act of 2013. Cyllah, A. (2014). Elections worth dying for? A selection of case studies from Africa. Sage Publications. Dabengwa and ZAPU v ZEC & Others (SC 32 of 2016, Civil Appeal SC 418 of 2015.) Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. Electoral Act (2004) Zimbabwe Constitutional Law Chapter 2:13. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa and Electoral Commission Forum of SADC Countries. (2003). Principles for election management, monitoring, and observation in the SADC region. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.

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European Union Election Observation Mission. (2018). EU EOM Zimbabwe harmonised elections 2018 final report. EU EOM. Zimbabwe. Giroux, H. A. (2005). Border crossings: Cultural workers and the politics of education (2nd ed.). Routledge. Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 725–740. Hill, L. G. (2006). Principles for education of the social reconstructionists and critical theorists: A yardstick of democracy (Electronic Theses & Dissertations. Paper 461). Ilodigwe, D. (2019). Machiavelli and the limits of realism in international relations. Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy., 7 (1), 20–38. Mavhunga, C. (2022, April 26). Price of bread up 100% in Zimbabwe since Russia invaded Ukraine. Voice of America. Available at. https://www.voa news.com/a/zimbabwe-loaf-of-bread-now-costs-2-a-100-increase-since-rus sia-invaded-ukraine-/6545373.html. Accessed 13 June 2022. Mayer, A. K. (2011). Does education increase political participation? Journal of Politics., 73, 3633–3645. Mchomvu, F. J. (2011). Prevalence of conflicts over the legitimacy of election results in Africa: Can the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) provide a Panacea? A case study of ECOWAS and SADC. University of Pretoria. Olivia, F. P. (2005). Developing the curriculum (6th ed.). Pearson. Posner, D. N., & Young, D. J. (2007). The institutionalization of political power in Africa. Journal of Democracy, 18, 126–140. Praktikno. (2009). Political parties in Pilkada: Some problems for democratic consolidation. In M. Erb & P. Sulistiyanto (Eds.), Deepening democracy in Indonesia? Direct elections for local leaders (Pilkada). Institute of South East Asian Studies. Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2016). Research methods for business students (7th ed.). Pearson. Southern African Development Community—Parliamentary Forum. (2001). Norms and standards for elections in the SADC region. United Nations (General Assembly). (1966). International covenant on civil and political rights. Treaty Series, 999, 171. Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. McGraw-Hill. Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN). (2018). Enhancing citizen participation in electoral processes through voter education. ZESN. Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act Chapter 2:12. Zimbabwe Gazette Extraordinary. (2022, March 30). Statutory Instrument 59 of 2022. Vol. XCX, No. 31.

CHAPTER 16

Electoral Laws, Reforms, Transparency and the Credibility of Elections in Zimbabwe Fabian Maunganidze

Introduction Democracy generally entails vesting power in the people even though it is usually exercised through agents or representatives elected by the people (Democracy in brief, 2016). According to Article 21(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), ‘Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.’ Hence, in any democracy, transparent laws are needed for selecting representatives. Indeed, electoral laws determine the credibility of any election and fundamental flaws in the laws whether latent or explicit can negate the very essence of democracy that elections seek to uphold. Genuine democracy is linked to regular, credible, free and fair elections which can also be utilised in ratifying decisions, constitutional amendments and legislative measures (Ramraj, 2020). The SADC guidelines define credible elections as an electoral process which enjoys considerable support and has the confidence of not only the citizens of the country but

F. Maunganidze (B) Department of Physiology, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3_16

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also the regional or international community. As such, the elections must lead to results which are mutually agreeable to the participating entities actively competing in the electoral process (SADC, 2015). Section 67 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for political rights which are further elaborated in the Electoral Act. They provide for free and fair regular elections based on universal adult suffrage and equality of votes. The elections must be conducted by a secret ballot, and the whole process must be free from violence and other electoral malpractices. In this chapter, we use qualitative desk-based research methodology to analyse the Zimbabwean electoral laws and attempt to unravel the development trajectory that they have taken highlighting some of the sticking points that may have been raised. Electoral Systems The type of electoral system used has a significant bearing on the electoral outcomes. An electoral system is the mechanism of translating the votes cast in an election, into representative seats won by individual candidates and parties (Reynolds et al., 2008). Although the process of elections is the most orderly, viable and transparent process for legitimate and acceptable leadership succession (Adejumobi, 2000), the electoral system adopted can affect their impact on the representation of citizens in government. Electoral systems mainly fall into 3 broad families: the plurality/majority systems family, Proportional Representation (PR) and mixed systems. The First Past the Post (FPTP) System This is the most popular of the plurality/majority systems family. It results in a clear-cut choice for voters choosing between individuals, instead of parties. Therefore, popular candidates are more likely to win and they are more accountable to the electorate. The system promotes a closer link between the elected representatives and their constituencies. Extremist parties are often excluded from representation unless they have support that is concentrated in a specific geographical area (Reynolds et al., 2008). The personal reputation of a politician is very important in an FPTP system and the elected representatives have greater accountability to the electorate (Menocal, 2011). Although the system is simple, it is criticised for excluding minorities and smaller parties and creating wasted votes.

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For example, a party may lose in all the constituencies by very narrow margins getting 49% of the total votes, but no legislative seats (Reynolds et al., 2008). This system has been used in Zimbabwe for the parliamentary elections since 1985 (Sachikonye, 2001) and is still being used for the National Assembly seats. Proportional Representation (PR) Systems PR systems like the List Proportional Representation (List PR) are more party centred. Each party presents to its electorate, a list of its candidates in order of preference. During elections, the electorate votes for a particular party and when the votes are collated, each party receives their allocation of legislative seats in proportion to their overall share of the total votes. This means that a party that receives 49% of the overall votes should also be allocated 49% of the seats. The winning candidates are then taken from the party list depending on their position on the list (Reynolds et al., 2008). So, the List PR system gives significant power to party leaders who rank the candidates on each party list (Menocal, 2011). Although there are only a few wasted votes, independent candidates are not encouraged and parliamentarians are not accountable to the voters (Reynolds et al., 2008). In Zimbabwe, the Senate seats are determined using the List PR system. Mixed Systems In some countries, a majority/plurality system like the FPTP can be used parallel to a PR system. The two are embraced but running independent of each other. In other countries, a form of Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system is used where the PR system is used together with another system so that the disproportionality that arises due to the majority/plurality system or any other system is compensated for by the PR system. This gives a much more proportional representative outcome than a purely parallel system. The mixed systems have enjoyed wide adoption by many of Africa’s new democracies as well as the former Soviet Union (Reynolds et al., 2008).

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Election Management in Zimbabwe As a signatory to the SADC principles, Zimbabwe has elevated the fundamental principles and domesticated them at the constitutional level. Even some of the provisions of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] are in line with the SADC principles requiring the country to hold regular, peaceful, free and fair elections and referendums, where necessary, conducted by secret ballot and free from electoral malpractices. The Zimbabwean Constitution entrenches the doctrine of separation of powers. It also promotes the legitimacy and transparency of the electoral system used, through the creation of independent commissions like the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) which manages elections in the country. Section 156 of the Constitution mandates ZEC to ensure that at every election and referendum, the voting method used is simple, secure, verifiable, accurate and transparent. The voting materials must be secured and kept safe, and the announcement of results must be without unnecessary delays. Moreover, mechanisms must be put in place to eliminate electoral malpractices and electoral violence (ZEC, 2022a). However, there are still calls by the opposition parties and the international community for more electoral reforms. The Evolution of the Electoral Laws from Independence to 2022 The traditional African governance system had its own democratic practices and principles, but the concept of elections is of Western origin (Adejumobi, 2000). At independence, the Lancaster House Constitution was adopted in Zimbabwe and it introduced a PR system of elections and a ‘one person, one vote’ concept (Sachikonye, 2001). The bicameral (2 house) system had a 100-seat House of Assembly (Lower House) that had 20 seats reserved for whites and 80 seats for elected blacks, as well as a 40-member Senate (Upper House). The Senate was made up of 14 blacks elected by the black members of the House of Assembly, 10 whites elected by the white members of the House of Assembly, 6 presidential appointees and 10 traditional chiefs (Moyo, 1992). In 1987, the amendment of the Electoral Act jettisoned the PR system and the 20 seats that were reserved for whites. The ‘winner takes-all’ FPTP system was introduced, which was used in all elections until 2004. A powerful executive presidency was also introduced (Sachikonye, 2001).

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The election management body (EMB) then consisted of the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC), responsible for election supervision, the Registrar-General of Elections who managed the elections under ESC supervision, whilst the Delimitation Commission was in charge of the delimitation of electoral districts. There was also an Election Directorate responsible for providing logistical support to the Registrar-General. It was the responsibility of the Registrar-General to register voters, compile registers of voters, conduct the process of voting, counting, collation of the votes and announcing the election results (Sachikonye, 2004; ZEC, 2022b). Since the management of elections in Zimbabwe has been under attack for decades, there has been reforms that have significantly changed the laws. Indeed, the EMB was accused of being partisan and was for all purposes part of the bureaucracy of the state. The ESC was virtually powerless and was populated with presidential appointees. It did not run elections, but simply supervised them contrary to the recommendations by the SADC Parliamentary Forum (Sachikonye, 2004). In 1997, the ESC recommended the setting up of an independent ‘Elections Commission’ responsible for the whole electoral process (ESC, 1997). It was also suggested that there be a compromise between the FPTP and PR systems for there to be fairness (Sachikonye, 2004). There was a restructuring of the electoral management system in 2004 based on the 1997 ESC recommendations, the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections as well as the submissions of civil society organisations and political parties. The ESC eventually gave way to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and this set up was also incorporated into the 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution (ZEC, 2022b). The Zimbabwean Governance Structure The nation of Zimbabwe is a constitutional democracy with a governance set up observing the doctrine of separation of powers (Parlzim, 2022). According to Section 88(2) of the Constitution, the executive authority of Zimbabwe vests in the President who exercises it, subject to the Constitution and through the Cabinet (IFES, 2018). The Legislature is made up of a bicameral Parliament with an 80-member Senate and a 270-member National Assembly as well as the President (IFES, 2018; Parlzim, 2022). The Judiciary is the third pillar of government consisting of the court system including the Constitutional, Supreme and High Courts (IFES, 2018).

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The Current Zimbabwean Electoral Laws Several national and regional instruments contain the laws and regulations that are applicable in the conduct of elections in Zimbabwe. On the national level, the main legal instruments are the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013, Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] and the Electoral Regulations of 2005. At the sub-regional (SADC) and regional (African) level, Zimbabwe is party to the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections of 2004 (updated in 2015), SADC Norms and Standards for Elections (2001), the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO) (2003) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) of 2007. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) Elections in Zimbabwe are managed by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) which is mandated with the preparation, conducting and supervision of voter education, elections and referendums, registration of voters, compilation and maintenance of voters’ rolls and registers, delimitation of constituencies, procurement, designing and printing of electoral materials, as well as handling complaints. Moreover, ZEC can also recommend to Parliament, the funding of political parties. Although Section 239(j) of the Constitution empowers ZEC to instruct persons in the employment of the state or local authority to act in order to ensure free, fair and transparent elections, the commission does not have the power to force compliance (IFES, 2018). General Electoral Regulations The 4th Schedule of the Constitution specifies the eligibility to vote. One must be a Zimbabwean citizen who is 18 years or older. Previously, individuals who were born in Zimbabwe, but whose parents were from another country, were not allowed to vote. However, the High Court of Zimbabwe turned down this rule in the 2017 case of the Movement for Democratic Change (T) & Ors v Zimbabwe Electoral Commission & Ors (2017) ZWHHC 5, and ordered that individuals above 18 years, born in Zimbabwe and permanently resident in the country, are eligible to vote if at least one of their parents is from the SADC region.

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Voter registration is polling station specific; hence, proof of residency is required for registration according to Section 157(1)(b) of the Constitution and Section 23 of the Electoral Act and this excludes those outside the country (in the diaspora). This was confirmed in May 2018 by the Constitutional Court in the case of Gabriel Shumba & 2 Ors v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (2018) ZWCC 4 where the court stated that only those who are relevant to a certain constituency are given the opportunity to vote in a particular election. Exceptions are diplomats stationed outside Zimbabwe and their spouses who can vote by post (IFES, 2018). The announcement of official results should be done as soon as possible after the completion of counting, within five days of polling as provided for in Section 110(3)(h)(i) of the Electoral Act. It is the sole mandate of ZEC to announce election results, so Section 66A of the Electoral Act criminalises the unofficial announcement of results. Moreover, Section 167 of the Electoral Act entitles any disgruntled candidate to file a petition to ZEC detailing the alleged irregularities. The petitions are then heard by the Electoral Court, which decides on the matter based on the available evidence. If none of the candidates is entitled to be duly elected, the seat will remain vacant until fresh elections are held within 90 days, in accordance with Section 159 of the Constitution (IFES, 2018). The System for the Presidential Elections In the Single Member Majority system applied for the Presidential election, the winner must obtain an absolute majority of the votes cast described as a minimum of 50% of the votes plus one vote. Section 110(3)(f)(ii) of the Electoral Act specifies that a presidential candidate can only be declared a winner after receiving more than half the number of votes. In the case of the winning candidate failing to secure an outright majority (more than 50%), Section 110(3)(f)(iii) of the Electoral Act requires a run-off election to be conducted between the top two candidates within 28–42 days. In that run-off or in an election in which there are only two candidates, the one with the greater number of votes is declared the winner of the election. Therefore, in the presidential election, a candidate must not just receive the most votes, but must receive more than half of the votes cast hence the ‘50% plus one vote’ (COG, 2018; Silaigwana, 2018).

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The Electoral System for the National Assembly Seats and Local Authority Elections Unlike in the presidential elections, the National Assembly seats are allocated using the FPTP System. According to Section 66(1) of the Electoral Act (read together with Section 133 for Local Authority elections), the candidate with the most votes is declared the winner. Where two or more candidates have the exact number of votes and the addition of one vote entitles any of the candidates to be declared elected, Section 66(2) of the Electoral Act empowers the Chief Elections Officer to determine the winner by drawing lots in the presence of a judge of the Electoral Court. According to Section 124(1) of the Constitution, Zimbabwe is divided into 210 electoral constituencies contributing 1 seat each to the National Assembly. An additional 60 National Assembly seats are reserved for women. For local authorities, there were 1958 wards in 2018 and each one was represented by a candidate. According to the FPTP system, the candidate with the highest number of votes must be declared the winner (Silaigwana, 2018). The Electoral System for Senate Seats The Senate seats follow a different system from that of the presidential and National Assembly elections. According to Section 120(1) of the Constitution, the Senate has 80 seats of which 16 are reserved for Chiefs, 2 are for the President and Deputy President of the National Council of Chiefs, 2 are reserved for representatives of persons with disabilities whilst the remaining 60 are from the PR system. The Chiefs’ quota in the Senate is determined from the National Council of Chiefs elected in terms of Section 37 of the Traditional Leaders Act (Chapter 2:13). Two Chiefs are elected to the Senate from each non-metropolitan province by the Chiefs, whilst the President and Deputy President of the National Council of Chiefs are Senators ex officio. According to Section 45C (4) of the Electoral Act, six seats are filled from each of the 10 provinces based on the party-list PR system. Therefore, Senators are not elected directly by the voters. The party lists must be made according to the provisions of Section 45E(2)(d) of the Electoral Act. Section 45E(f) further provides for a so-called Zebra list for Senate candidates where the party list has male and female candidates listed alternatively and every list must be headed by a female candidate.

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The Electoral System for Provincial Councils Section 268(1) of the Constitution provides for provincial councils in the 8 non-metropolitan provinces. The members in these councils are elected using the party-list PR system according to the provisions of Section 268(3) of the Constitution read together with Section 45E of the Electoral Act. The Provincial Councils are made up of 10 members per province as determined according to Sections 45I of the Electoral Act. Members on party lists are allocated seats based on the proportion of seats given to the contesting parties using the calculations on the provincial returns of votes for those parties fielding candidates in the elections for the National Assembly. As in the party lists for Senate, every list must be a Zebra list with females and males listed in alternating order and every list must be headed by a female candidate (Silaigwana, 2018). The Electoral System for the Women’s Quota Seats in the National Assembly Section 124(1)(b) of the Constitution provides for the women’s quota of 60 seats in the National Assembly. 6 women from each of the 10 provinces are elected using the party-list PR system although the lists submitted by the parties for the women’s quota must contain women candidates only. As in the Senate elections, the proportion of seats to be allocated to each party for the women’s quota is calculated based on the provincial returns of votes only for the parties fielding candidates in the National Assembly elections (Silaigwana, 2018).

Some Sticking Points in the Current Electoral Laws The calls for electoral law reforms have often been brushed aside by the ruling ZANU-PF party as an agenda for regime change by external forces (Rusinga, 2021). But heeding the calls can sanitise and legitimise elections even where flaws still exist. According to the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) Report of 2018, the legal framework for elections is generally sound, but critical gaps still exist, and some laws are inconsistent with the 2013 Constitution. Persistent intimidation, post-election violence, partisan behaviour of security forces and the state media, and the

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inability of ZEC to implement its mandate fully were observed. Therefore, the COG was unable to fully endorse the credibility, inclusivity and peacefulness of the 2018 electoral process. The reluctance by the ruling ZANU-PF to allow electoral reforms has prompted election boycotts before. In 2016, opposition parties created the National Electoral Reform Agenda (NERA), a unified platform mandated with pushing for electoral reforms. It was agreed in April 2018 to amend the electoral laws, but it was still argued that the fundamental election management remained flawed since ZEC was still under state control and the military still had access to the control of the electoral process (Rusinga, 2021). Other outstanding issues raised included the alignment of electoral laws to the Constitution and international instruments like the African Charter on Democracy and Governance, financial and operational independence of ZEC and the development of a transparent electoral process free from manipulation (COG, 2018; The Conversation, 2017). There is no law requiring the registration of political parties in Zimbabwe although the Political Parties (Finance) Act [Chapter 2:11] of 2001 entitles political parties obtaining at least 5% of the votes cast in a general election, to public funding (EISA, 2008). There is also no provision for the addition of a new party like the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) which attained the threshold in the by-elections in 2022 after winning 19 seats in Parliament (CIASA, 2022) and there is no requirement for the recipient political parties’ finances to be independently audited (USAID, 2019). There have been calls for a legally enforceable code of conduct for political parties in Zimbabwe, but this has not been addressed (EISA, 2008; ZESN, 2019, 2021). In 2018, the government promised elections that are peaceful, free and fair. Indeed, there was free movement of candidates throughout the country in 2018 with no strict enforcement of the existing repressive laws, although the laws were not removed. Political parties were allowed to campaign openly before voting (Malunga, 2018). But ZEC was still accused of lacking independence especially since the regulations made by ZEC in terms of Section 192(6) of the Electoral Act need the approval of the Minister of Justice (Malunga, 2018). Moreover, ZEC does not have the power to punish violators of electoral laws (USAID, 2019). Section 3(2) of the Constitution guarantees general adult suffrage to all Zimbabweans for elections, but Section 67 as read together with paragraph 1(2) of the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution also allows

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for additional residential requirements by the Electoral Act. This residency requirement has affected the implementation of the principles of universal suffrage leaving out the millions of Zimbabweans in the diaspora (USAID, 2019; ZESN, 2021). The Constitutional Court in the cases of Madzingo in 2005, Bukaibenyu in 2017 and Shumba in 2018 held that ZEC had no obligation to arrange for Zimbabweans outside the country to vote except for those on government mission. In the Tsvangirai case of 2002, it was also argued that voting is constituency based, but it was argued that this does not apply to presidential elections (USAID, 2019). It therefore seems inimical to deny the bona fide Zimbabweans in the diaspora a vote since they have genuine reasons for being outside the country. Whilst Section 155(2)(a) of the Constitution mandates the state to put in place legislative measures for registration of eligible citizens as voters, the Electoral Act is mum on people with special needs like those who are in hospital, disabled or in prison. Section 59(4) of the Electoral Act provides for assistance of disabled persons by electoral officers, but this may also involve asking the voter’s voting intentions hence affecting the secrecy of the ballot (USAID, 2019). It is argued that in 2018, ZEC failed to ensure that the voters’ roll is transparent, clean and verified (Malunga, 2018). They also failed to make the roll available for inspection by all interested stakeholders before election date (CIZC, 2018) as required by Section 155(2)(c) of the Constitution, although the ruling party was allowed access (Malunga, 2018). Section 21(1) of the Electoral Act requires the voters roll to be opened to the public for inspection during office hours, but more could be done to make it available for inspection at polling stations well before polling starts, for transparency (USAID, 2019). Although the repressive Public Order and Security Act (POSA) was repealed by the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act, many of the repressive provisions were not changed (USAID, 2019). Despite a peaceful pre-election period in 2018, six people were killed by state security forces attempting to break up an opposition protest after the elections (Malunga, 2018). Sections 155(2)(d) of the Constitution and 160 of the Electoral Act provide for equal and fair access of all political parties to both private and public print and electronic media but ZEC is not empowered to enforce these provisions on behalf of the political parties (USAID, 2019). Unfortunately, reports on the 2018 elections allege that there was clear

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bias and favouritism of the ruling party over the opposition (CIZC, 2018; COG, 2018; Malunga, 2018). Moreover, some of the repressive privacy provisions of the repealed Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) were moved to the new Cyber and Data Protection [Chapter 12:07] (ZESN, 2021). Traditional leaders are precluded from being members of political parties by Section 281(2)(a) of the Constitution and this has been upheld by the High Court in Election Resource Centre v Charumbira & 2 Others (2018) ZWHHC 270 (USAID, 2019). However, there were reports of the partisan involvement of traditional leaders in the 2018 electoral process (CIZC, 2018; ZESN, 2021). For example, 30 traditional leaders were allegedly deployed in Gokwe Chireya, as election agents that were representing the ruling ZANU-PF party (CIZC, 2018). ZEC is required by Section 239(h) of the Constitution to conduct and supervise voter education and Section 40C of the Electoral Act gives ZEC the authority to order anyone who is giving information that ZEC considers false or misleading to stop doing so or to correct the information. This law, however, can be abused, in conflict with the guarantees of freedom of expression enshrined in the Constitution (USAID, 2019). ZEC is also responsible for designing and printing ballots in terms of Section 239(g) of the Constitution, but this process should be transparent to the voters and political parties. However, in the 2018 elections, ZEC was accused of not being transparent in the printing or the safe custody of ballot papers before distribution (Malunga, 2018; USAID, 2019). Moreover, there are no laws regulating the testing of the indelible ink or the ultra violet machines used in the electoral process (USAID, 2019). The prudent management of the voting process is also crucial for credibility. In 2018, bogus polling officials managing undesignated polling stations were reported in Seke Ward 5. There were high numbers of assisted voters in some areas like Masvingo raising fears of intimidation. There were also reports of threats to and bullying of opposition polling agents, some of whom were barred from observing the vote counting process (CIZC, 2018). The COG grudgingly endorsed the 2018 voting process as credible although they suggested that the exhausting and laborious counting process be streamlined in terms of Section 156(a) of the Constitution (COG, 2018). Whilst the overall voting process may be free and fair, the management of the results can provide a loophole for manipulation. In the 2018 election, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance

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party alleged the presence of serious mathematical errors. This was made worse when ZEC adjusted the results of the presidential elections saying that Emmerson Mnangagwa’s tally was 50.59% from the original 50.8% (Malunga, 2018). The failure of some polling stations to have V11 forms for recording results was reported in Makoni North and the final results are alleged to have been completed in the absence of party agents and polling staff (Rusinga, 2021). Citing a ZESN statement, CIZC reported that about 21% of polling stations did not post Presidential election results as required by the law (CIZC, 2018). To aggravate the situation, ZEC wrongly tallied the Chegutu West parliamentary results declaring Dexter Nduna of the ruling ZANU-PF as the winner only to admit later that they had made a mistake. This seriously dents the credibility of ZEC’s results management system.

Conclusion and Recommendations Considering the history of postcolonial Zimbabwean elections, a lot has been done to advance democratic principles. However, a lot still needs to be done to uphold the sanctity of elections as a true reflection of the will of the people. The downplaying of legitimate calls for reforms by some members in government is deplorable, but those who have stuck to the cause have greatly influenced the trajectory of the electoral reform process. Zimbabwean electoral laws are much better now than they used to be in the year 2000, but there is still much more to be done. Free and fair elections should never be taken as a regime change agenda, but a process of expressing the will of the people. It is our recommendation that: . There should be a continuing review of the electoral laws in line with the SADC and AU guidelines. The Electoral Act should be fully aligned to the Constitution. . ZEC should be fully independent and impartial and should report directly to the National Assembly. Its funding should be directly from the Consolidated Fund not from the Ministry of Justice. . There should be an Act regulating the formation and operations of political parties and there should be severe penalties for intimidation and violence. . Both the state and private media must be free to provide equitable coverage of all political parties and media laws including a citizen

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friendly social media code of conduct for parties, promoting freedom of expression. ZEC should adequately prepare for people with disabilities and avoid assisted voting to ensure secrecy of the vote. The counting, collating and tabulation process should be transparent, verifiable, secure, and simple in line with Section 156 of the Constitution. There should not be any undue delay in declaring election results. ZEC should work closely with civil society organisations in ensuring adequate and correct voter education, especially for the marginalised groups. Where electoral disputes occur, the courts must exhibit independence, competency and impartiality in their adjudication.

References Adejumobi, S. (2000). Elections in Africa: A fading shadow of democracy? International Political Science Review, 21(1), 59–73. Bukaibenyu v ZEC Chairman & Others CCZ 12/17. Citizens in Action Southern Africa (CIASA). (2022). Preliminary Statement 26 March by-elections. https://ciasouthernafrica.org/2022/03/27/prelim inary-statement-26-march-by-elections/ Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) Report. (2018, July 30). Zimbabwe harmonised elections. https://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inl ine/Zimbabwe%202018%20COG%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CIZC). (2018). Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections fail to pass the credibility test. https://kubatana.net/2018/08/01/zimbabwes2018-elections-fail-pass-credibility-test/ Democracy in Brief. (2016). https://static.america.gov/uploads/sites/8/2016/ 07/Democracy-in-Brief_In-Brief-Series_English_Hi-Res.pdf Election Resource Centre v Charumbira & 2 Others (2018) ZWHHC 270. Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13]. Electoral Amendment Act No. 6 of 2018. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). (2008). Zimbabwe: Electoral system. https://www.eisa.org/wep/zim4.htm Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC). (1997, November). Report on a workshop on electoral reform held in Harare.

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Gabriel Shumba and 2 Others v Minister of Justice, Legal & Parliamentary Affairs and 4 Others CCZ 04/18. Hilton Chironga v Minister of Justice and Others CCZ 14/2020. International Federation for Electoral Systems (IFES). (2018). Elections in Zimbabwe 2018 general elections frequently asked questions. https://www.ifes. org/sites/default/files/2018_ifes_zimbabwe_general_elections_faqs_final.pdf Madzingo and Others v Minister of Justice and Others 2005 (1) ZLR 171 (S). Malunga, S. (2018). Were Zimbabwe’s elections free, fair and credible? The final scoresheet. African Arguments. https://africanarguments.org/2018/08/zim babwe-election-free-fair-credible-final-score-sheet/ Menocal, A. R. (2011). Why electoral systems matter: An analysis of their incentives and effects on key areas of governance. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/7367.pdf Movement for Democratic Change (T) & Ors v Zimbabwe Electoral Commission & Ors (2017) ZWHHC 5. Moyo, J. (1992). Voting for democracy: Electoral politics in Zimbabwe. UZ Publications. Parliament of Zimbabwe (Parlzim) Publication. (2022). How we are structured. https://parlzim.gov.zw/how-we-are-structured/ Political Parties (Finance) Act [Chapter 2:11]. Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation (PEMMO) in the SADC Region (2003). Ramraj, V. V. (2020). Democracy and Authoritarianism. https://doi.org/10. 1093/oxfordhb/9780198799986.013.30 Registrar General of Elections & Others v Tsvangirai 30/2002 ZWSC 18. Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., & Ellis, A. (2008). Electoral system design: The new international IDEA handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). http://www.eods.eu/library/IDEA.Electoral% 20Systems%20Design%20EN.pdf Rusinga, R. (2021). Zimbabwe’s 2018 harmonised elections: An assessment of credibility. Journal of African Elections, 20(1), 90–114. https://doi.org/10. 20940/JAE/2021/v20i1a5 Sachikonye, L. M. (2001). The electoral system and democratisation in Zimbabwe since 1980. Journal of African Elections, 2(1), 118–140. Sachikonye, L. M. (2004). Zimbabwe: Constitutionalism, the electoral system and challenges for governance and stability. Journal of African Elections, 3(1), 140–159. SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections of (2015). Shumba & 2 Ors v Minister of Justice, Legal & Parliamentary Affairs & 5 Ors (2018) ZWCC 4.

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Silaigwana, U. (2018). The electoral system in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). https://www.zec.org.zw/final/files/Electoral%20S ystems%20in%20Zimbabwe%20.pdf The Conversation. (2017, September 13). Zimbabwe needs wide reforms to have credible elections. But it may be too late. https://theconversation.com/zim babwe-needs-wide-reforms-to-have-credible-elections-but-it-may-be-too-late83473 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948. USAID. (2019). An analysis of the legal framework governing elections in Zimbabwe. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00W598.pdf Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN). (2021). Electoral reforms tracking report: January–July 2021. https://kubatana.net/wp-content/upl oads/2021/09/Electoral-Reforms-Tracking-Report-web.pdf Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) Position Paper. (2019). Political party regulation in Zimbabwe. https://kubatana.net/2019/10/01/politicalparty-regulation-in-zimbabwe/ Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). (2022a). Political and electoral rights. https://www.zec.org.zw/pages/political_electoral_rights Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). (2022b). Historical background. https://www.zec.org.zw/pages/history

Index

A apathy, 24, 111, 116–120, 122 Aphorism, 8, 136, 140, 144 B Buhera South, 11, 216–220, 222–225, 227–230 C Campaigning, 8, 94, 95, 99, 101, 115, 119, 209, 216, 220, 223–225, 227, 229, 234, 236, 237, 245, 248, 250 ChiShona language, 11 Citizen journalism, 6, 47, 48, 51, 53, 54 conflicts, 5, 9, 12, 19, 20, 22, 26–28, 31, 33, 37, 65, 141, 143, 153, 158, 174, 291, 298, 318 Constitution, 12, 20, 34, 112, 116, 120, 172, 173, 195, 201, 202, 238, 250, 258, 261, 273, 275, 276, 279, 280, 282, 283, 288, 289, 310–320

Contending parties, 6 credibility of elections, 199, 201, 291, 296 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 6, 9, 10, 47, 54, 55, 150, 156, 157, 192, 193, 218 Critical Linguistics (CL), 8, 132, 133 D democracy, 2, 3, 8, 11–13, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30, 33, 34, 37, 39, 105, 107, 114, 181, 187, 188, 197, 227, 257, 259, 261, 268, 272, 274, 276, 291, 294, 299, 303, 307, 311 Democratic values, 5, 6, 19–41, 187–189 Dialectics, 132, 134 E efficacy, 7, 112, 115, 116, 120, 122, 201, 301 Electoral Act, 13, 95, 261, 262, 264, 265, 267, 273, 275–277,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and S. Chirongoma (eds.), Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27140-3

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INDEX

280–282, 288, 289, 299, 308, 310, 312–319 electoral disputes, 11–13, 257, 259–261, 268, 272, 273, 275, 283, 297, 301, 302, 320 Electoral irregularities, 2, 14, 258 Electoral laws, 12, 13, 264, 266, 269, 272, 283, 307, 308, 316, 319 electoral petitions, 261 Electoral politics, 7, 13, 48, 54, 71, 112, 116, 151 Electoral reforms, 13, 53, 56, 57, 59, 61, 120, 122, 268, 280, 310, 316 Electoral violence, 49, 140, 150, 291, 292, 297, 298, 301, 302, 310 F Factionalism, 19

M metaphorisation, 133, 136

N national historiography, 8 nation building, 167, 233, 235–238, 240 Nation-rebuilding, 6, 66 Nerrorists, 3, 6, 7, 65–68, 71, 72, 74, 80, 154

O online publications, 69, 151, 153, 154, 156–159, 167 onus of proof, 265

I independent judiciary, 273 indigenous language, 10, 11, 76

P partisan politics, 7, 66, 72, 80 poetic/theatrical pieces, 233, 235 political behaviour, 7 political inertia, 7 political landscape, 9, 10, 49, 53, 67, 72, 132, 144, 173, 234, 277 political players, 10, 67, 70, 233–237 political rivalry, 195 political support, 11, 237 political tolerance, 149 political violence, 1, 5, 7, 9, 19–21, 27, 33, 41, 80, 85, 104, 113, 114, 117, 118, 122, 139, 153, 163, 164, 185, 186, 188, 194–196, 200, 205, 210, 234–236, 238, 242, 243, 245, 291, 298 Polysemanticism, 8 prognosis, vi

J Judicial independence, 274, 275

R reportages, 9

G Generative hegemony, 54 Grounded theory, 239 H Harmonized elections, 2, 3, 5, 13, 176, 179, 187–189 hate speech, 1, 2, 9, 10, 66, 80, 149–161, 163, 166, 167, 171–177, 180–184, 186–189, 192, 194, 198–201, 209, 210, 243, 245

INDEX

S school leavers, 5 separation of powers, 12, 259, 272–274, 310, 311

T twitter, 6, 7, 52, 72, 81, 154, 163, 183, 199, 241

U unhu/ubuntu, 233, 235–238

V Varakashi 4ED, 74 violence, 2, 5, 8–10, 14, 19, 21, 29, 33, 35, 37, 48, 49, 60, 61, 66, 69, 80, 84, 105–107, 111, 114, 115, 118, 119, 143, 150, 151, 153–155, 158, 160, 163, 164, 166, 167, 173, 174, 177–179, 181, 184–187, 189, 192–200, 205, 206, 208–210, 241, 243, 246, 247, 276, 291, 292, 298, 300, 301, 303, 308, 315, 319 voter turnout, 7, 113, 117, 118, 120, 295 Voting, 7, 67, 91–94, 98, 99, 103, 104, 107, 108, 112–119, 121–123, 202, 203, 206, 219, 224, 229, 241, 242, 257, 261, 263, 277, 281, 288, 294, 296,

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298, 299, 310, 311, 316–318, 320 Y youth, 4, 21, 22, 27, 58, 61, 69, 74, 113, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 172 Z Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 3, 6, 8–10, 49–51, 56–61, 66, 69–71, 74, 76, 81, 83, 84, 93–100, 105, 107, 108, 114, 116–121, 132, 135, 137–143, 150, 151, 157–159, 162–166, 172, 174–188, 192, 193, 196–210, 234, 236, 238–240, 244–248, 274, 276–278, 280, 282, 296, 299, 315, 316, 318, 319 Zimbabwe’s political landscape, 12, 72, 140 Zimbabwean politics, 2, 6, 10, 22, 52, 53, 76, 119, 135, 149, 183, 188 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), 2, 11–13, 49, 50, 53, 56, 58–61, 96, 120, 154, 163, 184, 195, 204, 235, 244, 245, 248, 250, 261, 263–265, 267, 269, 275, 276, 279–283, 288–304, 310–313, 316–320