Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria 9811646511, 9789811646515

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Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria Edited by Kelechi Johnmary Ani · Victor Ojakorotu

Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria “This scholarly book reveals the age-long manipulation of violence by the Nigerian elite in their quest for power. It clearly documents the difficulty that Nigeria faces in the quest to develop a sustainable democratic culture.” —Eugene Nweke, Ph.D., Deputy Vice Chancellor (Academics) &, Professor of African Politics, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria “Electoral violence has become deeply entrenched in the Nigerian political system and it has over the years presented a negative picture of the country’s nation building process. The chapter on social media clearly identifies the complexities that the nation faces in managing the multiple implications of elections and electoral violence in the Nigerian geo-political space.” —Jonathan E. Aliede, Ph.D., Professor of Advertising and Public Relations, Department of Mass Communication, National Open University of Nigeria “This book presents the reality of electoral challenges and leadership struggle in Nigerian developmental history. It reveals the difficulty that the Nigerian State has faced in selecting the best brains for the countrys’ leadership craft. I therefore strongly recommend the book for the Nigerian power elite, political scholars and global political analysts.” —Okeke-Ogbuafor Nwamaka, Ph.D., Development Studies, New Castle University, Upon Tyne, United Kingdom

Kelechi Johnmary Ani · Victor Ojakorotu Editors

Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Editors Kelechi Johnmary Ani Department of History and Strategic Studies Alex Ekwueme Federal University Abakaliki, Nigeria

Victor Ojakorotu Department of Political Studies and International Relations North-West University Mafikeng, South Africa

ISBN 978-981-16-4651-5 ISBN 978-981-16-4652-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Foreword

Voting and been voted-for, is a fundamental right of a citizenry in any part of the globe. During election, the citizenry uses the electoral ballot to confer legitimacy on an existing government or decide a new path to governance for their geo-political environment in any part of the globe. Election is a tool used by the citizenry to select the political and power elite that will champion the process of nation building in their country. The Nigerian state currently runs a presidential system of government that is characterized by periodic federal, state and local government elections that are carried out every four years in the bid to select those that would coordinate and manage the process of governance. Over the years, the Nigerian electoral process has become characterized by different forms of electoral violence, which takes place before, during and after elections. Unfortunately, the growing tide of electoral violence has progressively sustained studies on the dynamics of electoral violence within the country, thereby prompting Kelechi Johnmary Ani and Victor Ojakorotu to commission University scholars from Nigeria, Gambia and South Africa that extensively interrogated the nature of elections in Nigeria; outlining the causes of electoral violence and the path to its management. This book has seventeen chapters. It started with a general introduction on the nature of electoral violence in Africa, and that was followed by the causes of electoral violence. The dynamics of Nigerian elections up to 2019 general elections were extensively discussed across chapters. The

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concluding chapters presented the place of the media, law, gender and voter education in the management of electoral violence in the country. Finally, I wish to encourage you to pick a copy of this book, published by Palgrave Macmillan and diligently read through the rich content. Professor Olayemi Akinwumi, Ph.D., AvHF, FHSN, MNAL Vice Chancellor Federal University Lokoja Lokoja, Nigeria

Preface

Election has remained a path to power and authority across the globe. African people of all ages has often used election to give people access to leadership of groups, communities and nations. Those elections in precolonial Africa carried force of legitimacy and widespread acceptance as the people generally accept the results and respect whoever is elected to any position of leadership and governance on community affairs. The adoption of western liberal democracy naturally required the use of elections as the road to power. Unfortunately, the African power elite were already used to fighting to attain and preserve power and influence, which was a fundamental determinant of pre-colonial warfare and communal expansion. They gradually began to fall back to the use of violence as a path to attain power and keep it. What started as a pro-active strategy to attain power gradually expanded into a full Machiavellian strategy to attain power desperately and retain it. The desperado for power and the manipulation of violence that went with it, grew in form and scope as well as in impact. Today, African elections have become a theatre of violence. Both the pre-election and post-election era in many countries are today characterized by unlimited violence causing unimaginable destruction of lives and properties. From Cameroon to Cote d’ Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya, etc.; the use of violence has remained the central path to power. This study interrogates the nature of elections and election violence in many African countries. It traced the causes of the governance menace to multiple factors that are not limited to poverty, unemployment, media,

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etc. The study also clearly documented how election violence cripples’ nation building process across many African countries. Consequently, it revealed that states have lost their manifest destiny of national transformation in Africa because they cannot guarantee that legitimate candidates, who should win elections; will rise to power due to the widespread manipulation of violence at all levels of electoral engineering. A number of the articles in this study also presented the way to manage this continental challenge that have become a virus eating-up sustainable efforts to enthrone men and women of authority that can transform the continent. Finally, we present this intellectual meal to you! It has been prepared in seventeen chapters to take care of your hunger for a solution to African electoral violence. We therefore call on all policy makers, all election observers as well as electoral umpires, scholars, students, researchers and teachers; to pick a copy of this book and read through it diligently. You will surely appreciate the experience. Enjoy your intellectual encounter in this study! Abakaliki, Nigeria Mafikeng, South Africa

Kelechi Johnmary Ani Victor Ojakorotu

Contents

1

Introducing Elections and Electoral Violence in Africa Kelechi Johnmary Ani and Dominique Emmanuel Uwizeyimana

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Elections and Electoral Violence in Africa: Causes and Implications Ojighoro Reuben Edafenene and Etchie Peter

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11 21

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Historical Review of Electoral Violence in Nigeria Vincent Okwudiba Anyika and Kelechi Johnmary Ani

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Youth Unemployment and Electoral Violence in Nigeria: A Case of the 2019 General Elections Olu Awofeso and Paul A. Irabor

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Religious and Political Hate Sermons, Electoral Violence, and National Disintegration in Nigeria Samuel Chukwudi Agunyai and Hope A. Ikedinma

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Ethical Moral-Self and Gender as Determinants of Political Participation in Nigeria: A Focus on Southeast, Nigeria Chiedozie Okechukwu Okafor, Uzochukwu Chinweze, and Nanji Rimdan Umoh

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CONTENTS

Justice Delivery and Electoral Dispute Resolution in Nigeria: The Extent, Challenges and Prospects Aluko Opeyemi Idowu

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An Assessment of the Legal Framework Put in Place to Curb Electoral Violence in Nigeria O. A. Ayodele

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Digital Voting and Electoral Violence: Roles of Information Communication Technology in Ameliorating Electoral Crimes in Nigeria Haruna Ishola Abdullahi and Ajiwojuoluwa Oluwaseun Tunwase

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Social Media: A Big Brother in Nigeria’s Electoral Space? Nelson Goldpin Obah-Akpowoghaha and Ikenna Amanchukwu The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the 2015 as Well as 2019 Elections in Nigeria Dokun Oyeshola and Phebe Ubani Electoral Violence and Its Impact on Women’s Political Participation in Nigeria Oluwakemi Roseline Olatunji and Victor Ojakorotu Voter Education and Political Participation in Nigerian Presidential Election: A Comparative Analysis from Southeast Nwali Richard Chidi and Ijeoma Genevieve Anikelechi Mitigating Violence in Nigerian 2015 Elections: The International Community and Donor Agencies Dimensions Lucky Igohosa Ugbudian Political Violence and the 2015 General Election in Nigeria Jolaade Omede and Arinze Ngwube

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CONTENTS

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Political Violence in Isuokoma Clan, 2007–2019 Onyinye Ani, Kelechi Johnmary Ani, and Lucky Igohosa Ugbudian

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Summary and Concluding Notes on the Place of Counselling in Managing Electoral Violence Victor Ojakorotu and Chinedu Hilary Joseph

Index

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List of Contributors

Haruna Ishola Abdullahi Department of Criminology and Security Studies, Chrisland University, Abeokuta, Nigeria Samuel Chukwudi Agunyai Department of Political Studies and International Relations, Northwest University, Potchefstroom, South Africa Ikenna Amanchukwu Department of Political Science, Renaissance University, Enugu, Nigeria Kelechi Johnmary Ani Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike, Abakaliki, Nigeria Onyinye Ani Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike, Ikwo, Ebonyi State, Nigeria Ijeoma Genevieve Anikelechi Department Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria

of

Science

Education,

Vincent Okwudiba Anyika Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike, Abakaliki, Nigeria Olu Awofeso Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria O. A. Ayodele Department of Business and Private Law, Osun State University, Oshogbo, Nigeria

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Nwali Richard Chidi Department of Political Science, Ebonyi State University Abakaliki, Abakaliki, Nigeria Uzochukwu Chinweze School of General Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria Ojighoro Reuben Edafenene Department of Religious Studies, College of Education, Warri, Nigeria Aluko Opeyemi Idowu Department Crowther University, Oyo, Nigeria

of

Political

Science,

Ajayi

Hope A. Ikedinma Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University Ile Ife, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria Paul A. Irabor Department of Political Science, Kings University, Odeomu, Nigeria Chinedu Hilary Joseph Department of Guidance and Counselling, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria Arinze Ngwube Department of Political Science, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti, Nigeria Nelson Goldpin Obah-Akpowoghaha Department of Political Science, University of The Gambia, Serrekunda, The Gambia Victor Ojakorotu Department of Politics Studies and International Relations, North West University, Mahikeng, South Africa Chiedozie Okechukwu Okafor Department of Psychology, Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike, Ebonyi State, Nigeria

Alex

Oluwakemi Roseline Olatunji Department of Politics Studies and International Relations, North West University, Mahikeng, South Africa Jolaade Omede Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Kwara, Nigeria Dokun Oyeshola Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria Etchie Peter Department of Religious Studies, College of Education, Warri, Nigeria

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

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Ajiwojuoluwa Oluwaseun Tunwase Department of Computer Science, Chrisland University, Abeokuta, Nigeria Phebe Ubani Department of International Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria

Relations,

Obafemi

Lucky Igohosa Ugbudian Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Nigeria Nanji Rimdan Umoh Department of Political Science, University of Jos, Jos, Nigeria Dominique Emmanuel Uwizeyimana School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

List of Figures

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3

Extent of justice delivery system in Nigeria Extent of judicial delivery system Justice delivery low satisfactory level by party or candidate

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List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table Table Table Table

7.1 7.2 7.3 9.1

Table 9.2

Youth unemployment rate in Nigeria, 2005–2018 Age distribution of party candidates that contested the 2019 house of representative election in Nigeria Voter registration by age group Means and Standard Deviations of ethical moral-self and gender on political participation ANOVA Summary of roles of ethical moral-self and gender on political participation Means and Standard deviations of high and poor ethical moral-self on political participation Justice delivery System in Nigeria Extent of judicial delivery system Justice delivery low satisfactory level by party or candidate The projected number of internet users in Nigeria (2017–2023) Zisis and Lekkas (2018) Analysis of the 2019 presidential election in Nigeria based on a State in each of the six geopolitical zones and the federal capital territory (FCT)

39 42 43 78 78 79 91 91 91 128

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CHAPTER 1

Introducing Elections and Electoral Violence in Africa Kelechi Johnmary Ani and Dominique Emmanuel Uwizeyimana

Introduction In many African societies, village democracy was the order of the day. It created room for the people to meet and decide the governance strategies as well as elect those that will manage the affairs of their societies, nations, kingdoms and empires. Such elected leaders had widespread legitimacy and acceptance from their subjects. They ensured that the interest of the masses under their sphere of influence and power was central in their decision making process.

K. J. Ani (B) Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike, Abakaliki, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] D. E. Uwizeyimana School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_1

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However, years later, the wonderful state of peace that was enjoyed during pre-colonial elections became overtaken by the appointive might of the colonial masters when they landed in Africa. They began to appoint people who they taught will be loyal to them and do their imperial bidding. That process of appointment was largely rejected by men who were real ambassadors of African communal heritage as they did everything to avoid the suspicious promotion to leadership by “men from strange land” (colonial masters). Consequently, those who have always suffered in the hands of the community leaders quickly jumped into collaboration with the “strange colonial government” as the community saw them then. Gradually, the readiness of the collaborators to do the biddings of the colonial masters created the needed friendly alliance that made them advance each other’s interest. The colonial masters needed local people that will accept whatever exploitative idea that they unleash on the African people on one hand and the collaborators needed the power that the colonial masters were ready to bestow on them on the other hands. That readiness to work for each other, created the needed environment for the rise of warrant chief and all manners of puppets in many colonial African societies thereby distorting the path to power and governance in Africa. The collaborators during the colonial era were used to attain the governance needs of the colonialists. Consequently, the rise of nationalism in Africa was unfortunately overtaken by the educated African power elite. These men went to Europe and America, had learnt the teachings and democratic tenets of the White men. The west also presented western models of democracy as the path to the transformation of Africa to the nationalists. They also clearly stated that it was the people that will emerge from such elections, which was widely antithetical to monarchical system and village democracies that were practiced in many African societies that would become the legitimate leaders of independent African states. With that, African democracy became tied on the garment of western democratic principles and values notwithstanding areas of clashes with African way of life in different parts of the continent. Election in post-colonial Africa became a fundamental game to attain power. Ironically, while there can be election without democracy, it is generally accepted that there is no democracy without election. This therefore underscores the importance of an election to a democracy (Luqman 2009). Hence, in the face of the contemporary world order

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where democracy has become magnified as the path to national transformation irrespective of the brand of democracy, the importance of elections continued to grow in all parts of the continent. The masses continue to demand for elections and liberal democracy without asking for its suitability in ensuring the sustenance of national development. Libya remains one of the African most developed states in history that have been turned into rubbles by the American exportation of democracy and the desperate appetite of the Libyan people for an end to dictatorship that sustained their national transformation. It could be stated that the common thread in the liberal democracy theory is the sanctity of periodic competitive elections (Powell 1982). Unfortunately, the attainment of period elections that have fixed and unchanged timing have remained herculean for many African countries. The sanctity of elections in Africa has been obeyed more, in the breach than in upholding it. Election values, ethics, principles and strategies are widely destroyed across the African continent. Moller and Skaaning (2012) maintains that the tenets and values of the liberal democratic theory includes competitive electoral contest between two or more political parties in a free, fair and credible competition for those seeking elective posts. The competition could also have independent candidates that compete for power without necessarily joining the umbrella of a defined political party. This theory stresses the principle that legitimacy of leaders can only be acquired through an election. The kind of election must be periodic under a liberal democracy. It must have laid down rules of participation and engagement for all the political parties and participants. The process is also meant to be acceptable by the contenders for elective posts and subjects. The procedures or rules of the election must guarantee participation of every eligible voter to cast their ballot for preferred candidates devoid of undue influence, pressure and coercion (Powell 1982). Birch (2008) further asserts that conduct of periodic elections is a necessary condition in the theory of liberal democracy. Election is the process of selection of a sovereign from a collection of candidates or political parties. Anifowose (2003) portrays election as a process of elitist selection by the masses in any given political system. Ironically, an estimated 20% of elections held globally experience some form of violence of which the most frequent occurrences are found in South Asia and Africa (Burchard 2015). Zambia, Chad, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda and Zimbabwe; all have a past history of elections characterized by violent protests. Research

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has shown that an estimated 40% of elections or 20% of all elections conducted across the continent witnessed severe incidents of electoral violence, while protracted civil clash was visible in a few other African countries such as Burundi 2015, Angola 1992, Congo Brazzaville 1993, Zimbabwe 2008, Cote d’Ivoire 2010 and Nigeria 2011 (Burchard 2015). There are many factors that cause electoral violence in Africa. The table that follow presents those factors clearly.

Causes of Electoral Violence

Nature of Politics

Nature of Election

Electoral Institutions

Conditions enabling the use of electoral violence

Factors triggering electoral violence

Patrimonial politics Conflict cleavages Violence as a legitimate political tool Culture of impunity Access to arms Competitiveness Political mobilization Stakes Exposure to attacks System creating clear winner and losers Few regulations about electoral conduct Administration with few checks and little power

Violent actors participating in election Biased police

Misuse of political rights Militant mobilization “Close races” Political usage of electoral administration Election fraud Unwanted or unexpected outcome of the election

Source H˝ oglund, K. (2009)

Omotola (2010) maintain that the physical dimension of electoral violence ranges from arson, looting, shooting, violent interruption of campaign gatherings, armed attacks on polling and collation centers, which include forceful seizure of electoral materials, usually with dangerous weapons, hostage taking, kidnapping and most particularly, assassination of political opponents. The use of coercion by government on the people to vote or register, the abuse of power of incumbency, uneven chances for the opposition parties and their aspirants, politicization of security and electoral officials and falsification of election results represent the structural aspect of election violence (Nwolise 2007).

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H˝ oglund (2009) maintains that electoral violence is the ultimate level of electoral fraud. Therefore, electoral fraud is a covert determination to shape and influence elections outcomes. Electoral violence as defined by Sisk (2008) is “acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition”. Put the other way, it means that electoral violence is intentionally engaged tools of influence in electoral process either to cause delays, interruption or disruption of the election, or influence its results, to determine the winners or to secure endorsement or disapproval of plebiscite or both (Atuobi 2008). Electoral violence is therefore an instrument of coercive action used by actors to advance their interest or to achieve specific political goals (H‚ oglund 2009). Gani Yoroms (2015) described electoral violence as a form of violence that takes place during election process mostly in fragile democracies as direct reactions or consequences of inability to meet the expectations of the electorates.

Dialectics on Electoral Violence in Africa Electoral violence has become the other of the day in African elections. It manifests in different degrees and the scope of sophistication differs from one African country to another. These violent behaviours manifest in different times both before, during and after the elections. In Nigeria’s 2011 elections, violence manifested in two dimensional trend; the election-day and post-election day violence (Goldsmith 2015). It was stated that at least about 100 persons lost their lives while many others sustained various degrees of injuries during the Federal and States election that took place in 2003 (Atuobi 2008). Ironically, in Nigeria, some people have learnt that working, day and night gives, only the barest minimum quantity of whatever is needed to sustain the breath of the pauperized peasants as they continue to live in abject poverty. But directly before their nimble eyes, lies dozens of other people who have languished in many years of greater degree of penury that are financial kingmakers overnight, because they went for gunslide electoral victory, which were often believed as landslide electoral victory as well as victory for democracy and that made all the difference (Ani 2011: 83). The difference that is made from such victory is the quantity of havoc that is unleashed on lives and properties by the disciples of electoral violence. The 1993 election generated post-election violence in

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many parts of the country that led to the loss of lives and properties. It got very heated-up in Nigerian body politics that Nigerians were leaving the violent-prone Yoruba communities to save their lives from the ripple effects of the cancellation of that year’s election. It would be recalled that the winner of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, M. K. O. Abiola was unjustly denied the right to rule the country and later violently dehumanized, which gave fillip to his death. That act denied the majority of Nigerian electorate who voted for him, their absolute right to determine their leader. It equally placed Nigeria on the brink of total collapse, due to the political conflict that followed it, in different parts of the country” (Nwanaju and Ani 2011: 148). Thanks to the interim government of Chief Ernest Shonekan and the total dictatorship of General Sani Abacha that used authoritarianism to quell increasing destruction of lives and properties. The manipulation of violence continued in 2003, 2007, 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria. In Cote d’ Ivoire, Gbagbo’s refusal to cede power after losing the election plunged the country into violence that forced “more than 1 million people to flee” (Nweke and Ani 2011). The death toll remains known but the United Nations documented some 500 deaths, while Human Rights groups say thousands were killed (The Nation 2011: 62). It took the intervention of the United Nations and the support of ECOMOG to over-power Gbagbo and install the legitimate winner of the country’s election. It would be recalled that even before the Cameroonian President, Paul Biya came up with the 7 October 2018 Presidential election date, his military men have been carrying out targeted pre-election killings, extensive raping of young girls and women as well as burning down of civilian houses in Ambazonia (Ani et al. 2018). All opposition politicians were anointed for destruction and those that did not escape into exile or asylum abroad had their lives and properties destroyed. Things got worse when the Ambazonia Restoration Forces (ARF) began guerilla-like confrontations and unleashing high casualty level on the supporters of President Paul Biya from Ambazonia region (Ani et al. 2018). The indiscriminate killings, raping of young girls and women and the burning down of houses of the people of Ambazonia created an unprecedented future of fear, insecurity and widespread destruction of lives and properties in Ambazonian parts of Cameroon (Ani et al. 2018). The experience of electoral violence in Zimbabwe cannot be neglected. The crisis was later aided by the June 2000 parliamentary elections which

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were announced by the president on 16 May 2000 soon after the constitutional referendum outcome. That was the first election ZANU PF conducted in competition with the MDC opposition party. Out of 120 selected constituencies, the opposition MDC won 57 seats in parliament (Ani et al. 2018). The outcome of the election results posed a great challenge to the ruling ZANU PF as it was a sign of rejection. Both before and during the election, violence, intimidation, and press censorship became widely used against the opposition MDC party. There was total media ban in covering all political activities of the MDC opposition party in both print and electronic state media. At the peak of the electoral violence that followed, there was series of deaths of some members of parliament (MPs) on both MDC and ZANU PF, and the political crisis that followed that necessitated holding of by-elections due to the massive killing of parliamentarians (Ani et al. 2018). Analyst who believed that the presence of President Mugabe and his sit-tight position was the major cause of electoral violence in the country were proven wrong when the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe was also characterized by widespread killings before, during and after the elections leading to massive migration outside the country (Ani et al. 2018). In the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya, an estimated 600 innocent lives were lost to post-electoral violent clashes following contested electoral results (Atuobi 2008). The electoral conditions preceding the 2010 Kenyan post-election violence was a typical situation of stiff competition which subjectively exposed both rivals to attacks. Bamgbose (2012) explained that the unnecessary political ambition of the president insinuated a political environment that resonate superfluous post-election violence in Kenya. Furthermore, in the just concluded 2017 Kenyan general elections, the annulment of the 8 August election results on the ground of illegality and irregularities by the Kenya Supreme Court occasioned series of serious electoral violence across the country, particularly in the capital city of Nairobi (BBC News 5 September 2017). There were threats and counter threats from the opposition while the ruling party rejected the annulment of the election results (Aljazeera News 21 September 2017). In a re-run election with less than 40% of voter turnout, less than half the number recorded in annulled August’s vote, President Uhuru Kenyatta was declared winner amidst controversies surrounding the suspension of the re-run in 25 constituencies believed to be the stronghold of the opposition in the name of security fears (BBC News 30 October 2017).

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However, from the few examples above, it could be inferred that Africa is a major theatre of electoral violence. The nature and scope of the violence is dependent on the push and pull effects of the forces that drive the electoral misbehaviour. This book is divided into seventeen chapters. Each of the chapter discussed a topical issue that has direct bearing on the causes, nature, impact and management of electoral violence in Africa. Examples were drawn from a number of African states, regions in the continent as well as a generic review of the electoral situation across the continent. Chapter one is a general introduction of the study. The second chapter discussed the causes and implications of the electoral violence across many African countries. That chapter is followed by the theoretical investigations into the place of finance and the gender dimensions to environmental violence in Africa. Youth unemployment and electoral challenges that manifested in Nigerian Fourth Republic followed suit. The above chapters were followed by the discussion on the militarization of youths at the eve of African elections as a fore-runner to electoral violence and the subsequent chapters that searched for solution to the electoral violence malady. Palliative measures were presented through the advocacy for ethical politics, poverty management and the use of language as instrument for sound communication of peaceful electoral process, justice delivery, digital voting and the promotion of legal instruments that are needed to abort the manifestation of electoral violence across many African states. The case studies of political violence in the 2015 general election and how political violence has affected the small community of Isu in Ebonyi State Nigeria were also documented. In conclusion, this book holds promise to ideological frameworks that will salvage Africa from the horror of recurrent electoral violence that have murdered electoral peace in the continent. Kindly satisfy your curious appetite with the inherent intellectual meal that have been preserved in the chapters that follow. Enjoy yourself as you read to the last page!

References Ani, K. J. (2011). Politics About Failed State in Nigeria: Dialectics on Value of History to Nation Building Challenges 1960–2010. Enugu: FirstBook. Ani, Kelechi Johnmary, Chapanyi, Helen Folefac, and Wose Kinge Gabriel Tiobo. (2018). Zimbabwean Political Crisis and Regional Peace Initiatives. EBSU Research Insight: Multidisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Issues, 1(1): 103–120.

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Ani, Kelechi Johnmary, Gabriel T. Wose Kinge, and Ojakorotu Victor. (2018). Political Crisis, Protests and Implications on Nation Building in Cameroon. African Renaissance, Special Issue, December, pp. 121–139. Anifowose, Remi. (2003). Theoretical Perspectives on Elections. In General Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, eds. Anifowose Remi and Babawale Tude, 23390–9887. Friedrich Ebert. Atuobi, Samuel Mondays. (2008). Election-Related Violence in Africa. Conflict Trends 1: 10–15. Bamgbose, Adele Jimoh. 2012. Electoral Violence and Nigeria’s 2011 General Elections. International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities, 4(1): 205–219. Birch, S. (2008). Electoral Institutions and Popular Confidence in Electoral Processes: A Cross-National Analysis. Electoral Studies, 27(2): 305–321. Retrieved from https://ucdenver.instructure.com/courses/3034/files/377 982/. Burchard, Stephanie. (2015). Why Election Violence in Africa Matters. Institute for Defence Analyses. Africa Watch: 9. Gani, Yoroms Joses. (2015). Electoral Violence, Arms Proliferations and Electoral Security in Nigeria: Lessons from the Twenty-Fifteen Elections for Emerging Democracies. Golsmith, Arthur. (2015). Electoral Violence in Africa Revisited. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(5): 818–837. H˝ oglund, K. (2009). Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences. Terrorism and Political Violence, 21: 412–427. Luqman, S. (2009). Electoral Institution and the Management of the Democratisation Process: The Nigerian Experience. Journal of Social Sciences, 21(1): 59–65. Moller, J., and Skaaning, S. (2012). Democracy and Democratization in Comparative Perspectives: Concepts, Conjectures, Causes and Consequences. Abingdon: Routledge. Nwanaju, I. U., and Ani, K. J. (2011). Post-Conflict Inter-Group Forgiveness: Tool for Sustainable National Peace and Development in Nigeria. International Journal of Social Science, 3(1): 145–151. Nweke, Eugene N., and Ani, Kelechi Johnmary. (2011). Peace Building in PostConflict Cote D’ Ivoire: Can Transitional Justice and Forgiveness Make any Difference. EBSU Journal of Social Sciences, 1(2): 32–45. Nwolise, Osisioma. (2007). Electoral Violence and Nigeria’s 2007 Elections. Journal of African Elections, 6(2): 155–179. Omotola, Shola. (2010). Explaining Electoral Violence in Africa’s ‘New’ Democracies. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 10(3): 51–73. Powell, B. G. Jr. (1982). Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

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Sisk, Timothy. (2008). Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence. Paper prepared at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, March 24–28, 2008 in San Francisco California, United States of America. The Nation. (2011). Annan, Others in Talk with Ouattara, Gbagbo. Nigeria, p. 62, Tuesday, May 3.

CHAPTER 2

Elections and Electoral Violence in Africa: Causes and Implications Ojighoro Reuben Edafenene and Etchie Peter

Introduction Electoral violence and political disturbances have gained a considerable and increasing attention from academics and policy makers in recent years. This is so because electoral violence or political disturbances have resulted in thrice as many deaths as wars between states since World War II (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In African states, electoral violence has become a nursery ground for harvest of deaths. In Kenya, Cote D’ Ivoire, South Sudan and a number of other African states, what started as quest for national power by members of the political elite, representing different ethnic groups launched these states into full time armed conflicts and civil war. Regrettably, a major locus for electoral violence in recent years has been sub-Saharan Africa, where 80% of the countries located in this region suffered from civil and political crises. From Nigeria that is the most populous in Sub-Saharan Africa to the tiny states of Gambia; electoral violence has not only heated up the national polity, but has led

O. R. Edafenene (B) · E. Peter Department of Religious Studies, College of Education, Warri, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_2

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to the loss of lives and properties in different parts of their sovereign states. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people have been turned to “refugees” running into neighbouring countries, while thousands of others have found themselves living as internally displaced persons due to their destruction of their homes and killing of their bread-winners in the course of pre-and post-election violence. In these affected African states, electoral violence has direct effect on the nature of trade and economy. The people’s economic base is often threatened because they can’t freely go to farm or market. There is still the wild culture of ensuring lockdown in many parts of the continent during elections. Unfortunately, when you lock the people down to practice crude paper and ink elections, the economy is often negatively affected as businesses will be held stand-still. The economy of that state would have been naturally hampered by the dynamics of electoral as well as other forms of political violence. Hence, development in its various forms has remained an illusion. Due to the complexity of the problem, various explanations have been offered by scholars. There are growing bodies of research that highlight the association between elections and election violence in Africa. This chapter discusses the inextricable nexus between electoral violence in Africa and its implications for nation building across a number of states in the continent. An attempt would be made in the section that follows to review the nature of electoral violence in Africa, starting from Nigeria and wrapping it up with Zimbabwe.

Factors That Promote Electoral Violence in Africa Essentially, colonial rule has always been a violent phenomenon. It was imposed by violence and maintained by its potential capacity for violence (Ogbogo 2012). Globally, colonialism abhors the independence of people, just as it disregards whatever system of organization that existed prior to it. Thus, the early years of the twentieth century violently marked the beginning of the end of indigenous political, economic and social systems in most part of Africa. In most Anglo phone countries, the advent of British imperialists was destructive to the life of the people. The socalled “scramble for and partitioning of Africa” as Christened by the invading force of the British Colonialists was accompanied with naked brutality and the manifestation of tendencies akin to “terrorism”. This savage brutality, which characterized the conquest and occupation of most

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African States, produced on the part of the people, prolonged bitterness towards the colonial administration occasioned by sporadic rebellions. It is therefore, not out of place, to say that colonization is largely responsible for the institutionalization of political violence in most part of Africa and the continued militarization of the polity. The colonial masters found it more expedient to appeal to ethnic sentiments in order to divide the African elites and create exploitative relations of power. As aptly observed by Salawu and Mohammed (2005), at independence, ethnicity was bequeathed to the post-colonial African governments so that the post-Independence elites could consolidate their control over their society and continue the exploitative relations of power. The Berlin West African Conference was a meeting that destroyed the foundation for peaceful inter-group relations in Africa and ensured the rise of militarized integration among the African people. By the time that the colonial masters have been forced out of the African continent, they have already enshrined the manipulation of force in attaining power within the continent. Unfortunately, the post independent African leaders never worked hard to ensure that violence was controlled in the quest for the attainment of power. They reinforced the manipulation of force and arms in ensuring that they had access to power and ensured that they kept it through the act of corruption, which provoked military resistance and coup d’ etate in many countries of the continent. It would be recalled that since the onset of democratization in different parts of the world, sequel to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the wind of political changes that swept Eastern Europe, many countries have made attempts, even if feeble in some cases, to come to terms with the necessity of enthroning a project of democratization (Umar 2009). In this regard, both military and civilian dictatorships, in Africa and other parts of the world have crumbled. In Africa, the military men reigned for years and undermined nation building processes. The leadership of Mobutu Seko, Idi Amin of Uganda, Sani Abacha, etc. did not only destroy the chances for democratic election but laid the foundation for the militarization of the elective processes as soldiers were unleashed on the masses to ensure that they carried out the will of the military class by installing one of their affiliates as the winner of any election in different countries of the continent. The end of military rule witnessed the rise of the former military generals as democratic leaders. They reigned with iron fist and became authoritarian and seat-tight leaders across Africa. The negative wind of democratic authoritarianism led to the Arab Spring leading to the

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dethronement of the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia and even the Americanengineered killing of Ghadafi as well as the destruction of the Libyan State. Many African states have since moved towards installing institutions and structures of significant democratic bent (Remmer 1995).

Electoral Violence in Nigeria Nigeria has not been left out of the bandwagon of democratization. Evidently though, at independence in 1960, the country experimented with parliamentary democracy that was fashioned after the British model. It was however truncated in 1966. It was only after 13 years in 1979 when the Second Republic began. The Second Republic likewise collapsed in December 1983. Having had to contend with various military governments since the collapse of the Second Republic in 1983, the country had progressively lost all the known vestiges of democracy, including the cherished democratic values of accountability, rule of law and the flourishing of fundamental civil and political liberties. Prior to the advent of the British colonialism, Nigeria as a political entity was not in existence. The territories that now make up Nigeria existed as separate sovereign entities, societies, communities, kingdoms and emirates. In January 1879, Miss Flora Shaw, a correspondent of the London Times Magazine who later married Frederick Lugard suggested in an article published in the Times with the name “Nigeria” for the whole territory. As from 1900, the name was adopted (Usman 2009). Fourteen years later, the country was amalgamated. The circumstances that forced the British Government to amalgamate the Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 were neither motivated by political exigencies nor by close understanding among the diverse elements of the conglomerations that were later to be called Nigeria. By 1914, it had become clear that Northern Nigeria, because of geographical location and cloudy economic prospects, was not likely to be viable and in fact Lugard’s administration was finding it difficult to maintain the Northern Protectorate which was running a deficit. It was therefore thought that by amalgamating the two protectorates, the North which was land locked would have access to the sea for the purpose of more effective trade. The problem of political instability between the different sections of Nigeria has thus come to be blamed on the amalgamation which many Nigerian politicians still refer to as the “mistake of 1914” (Bello 1978). It is important and perhaps cautious to note that all the political crises in Nigeria

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from pre/post-independence to date have germinated from the seed of ethnicity sowed in Nigerian politics by the colonial masters (Omotola 2008). It is important to note that even before independence, some political crises were recorded in Nigeria. Beginning in 1953 when Action Group (AG) attempted to make an inroad into the North to sell the issue of independence, a tour of the North organized by the AG, led to a largescale riots in Kano in 1953 (Albert 1993). This riot led to attack on Southerners living in Sabon Gari area of Kano as well as supporters and officers of the Northern Radical Party, Northern Elements Prospective Union (NEPU) (Albert 1993). The Igbo were the major victims in this conflict despite the fact that they were not responsible for the plight of the Northerners in Lagos. Thus, most of the political and electoral instabilities that have been witnessed in Nigeria were promoted by ethnic chauvinism (Obakhedo 2011). Typical examples after the 1953 riots was the Tiv and Western region crisis (Ogbogo 2012). The Tiv crisis was connected to the opposition of the Tiv to the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) led Northern regional government and their demand for autonomy of the Middle Belt. The Western Region crisis was a product of a number of factors which include the split within the Action Group (AG) itself and fallout of the 1964 and 1965 Federal and regional elections, respectively (Ogbogo 2012). The political turmoil recorded in the Western region was basically over who should succeed Chief Awolowo as premier, having moved to the Federal Legislature as the leader of the opposition. Against Awolowo’s wish, Akintola became the premier with least possible consultation with Chief Awolowo (Ogbogo 2012). This created big dissension in the Action Group (AG) party. On May 25, 1962, a riot broke out in the Western Legislative Chamber in which a free for all fight ensued and it led to the declaration of the state of emergency by the Federal Government which also set up a commission of enquiry to investigate the financial investment policies of six western statutory corporations (Osaghae 1998). The 2019 general elections caused massive deaths in different parts of Nigeria. In Rivers and Bayelsa states, for example, innocent citizens up to 57 were killed and maimed due to election violence (George 2019). Some security agents deployed to maintain law and order were also killed in Bayelsa and Rivers State, respectively. In the Southwest of Nigeria, there were cases of electoral violence in some states such as Lagos State, Ogun

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State and Oyo State. In the Northern part of the country, the following states also witnessed some level of electoral violence: Adamawa, Kano, Bauchi and Katsina.

Electoral Violence in Zimbabwe According to report produced by the Research and Advocacy Unit (2018), by reference to public data on political violence for the period 1998–2018, Zimbabwe is compared with four of its neighbours that share a common history of armed struggle and electoral violence. These neighbours include Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. The analysis shows Zimbabwe to be the most violent of the five countries, with most violence aimed at civilians by political militia, and a very significant amount of violence (46%) occurs during elections. Zimbabwe has an unenviable reputation for being the most politically violent country in Southern Africa, certainly since the civil wars ended in Angola and Mozambique, and the independence of Namibia and South Africa (RAU, 2018). The country was born out of a particularly violent struggle against white settler political domination. They entered a new internecine conflict in the 1980s and since 2000, has been the subject of violent elections, mass displacements and continuous repression. It will be recalled that late President Mugabe fought white supremacy and became a legitimate president of the Zimbabwean State. Unfortunately, instead of integrating the white settlers and building a united and peaceful country, he forcefully took back all the indigenous land that were annexed by the white ancestors thereby causing national and international resistance from the apologists of white supremacy in Zimbabwe. Consequently, the supporters of these white land owners were alleged to have continuously sponsored opposition against Mugabe leading to violent elections and mass killings in Zimbabwe. When President Mugabe finally died, his successor, who has assumed power through the support of military oligarchy in the country also conducted another election that generated nearly the same degree of bloodletting and national disunity among the indigenous people, in line with the President Mugabe electoral and violent culture.

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Implications of Electoral Violence for African Development The process of nation building in many African countries has been undermined by electoral violence. In cote D’ Ivoire, President Koudou Laurent Gbagbo launched the whole country into total armed crisis and electoral violence when he lost election to President Ouattara Alassane. It took the intervention of French and ECOMOG forces to ensure that he surrenders power and hand over to the duly elected Ouattara. Unfortunately, the armed conflict that followed the electoral crisis has developed into a full-fledged ethnic confrontation leading to massive destruction of lives and properties before relative peace could return to the country. Nigeria has remained a crippled African Giant because of the inability of the electoral umpire to carry out a full-fledged free and fair election. The pre- and post-election period are characterized by massive kidnapping, killing and disappearance of the political elite. It is also a period for the destruction of individual properties like car and party secretariats. In the after-math of the June 12 electoral crisis, there was full time armed conflict across a number of the ethnic groups in Nigeria; who felt that they were wrongly schemed-out in the political process. When electoral violence develops into widespread national crisis, the economy of the state largely becomes hunted. The foreign investors and tourists are discouraged from investing in an unstable economy. Those that already have businesses within the country can hardly grow the business as they stay indoors away from crisis. Again, the spirit of fear that is often generated by the impact of electoral violence would necessarily push many of the citizenry to lock themselves up or stay away from the constituencies that have been overtaken by political violence. The implication is that the degree of national productive output and revenue are largely reduced. Similarly, the people’s interest, income and savings level would naturally drop thereby affecting per-capital income and standard of living. The crisis of electoral violence when it develops into full-fledged civil war causes refugee problems, mass migration and internal displacements in the affected country. The pull and push effect of refugee and migration problem that Zimbabwean political crisis created on the South African state remains unimaginable. It creates population explosion and crisis of employment as well as national planning.

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Conclusion and Recommendations This study has presented a scholarly review of electoral violence in Africa. The chapter traced the monster of electoral violence to colonialism and the undue scramble and partition of Africa by the western powers in their bid to maintain their imperial interest. It revealed that at independence, the post-colonial power elite were selfish and desperately sustained the exploitative colonial leadership lifestyle thereby leading to the emergence of military coups that aborted democratic governance completely. When the military successfully entrenched themselves, they exhibited greater degree of corruption and violence to a worrisome level across the continent. The study went further to focus specifically on the contemporary dynamics of Nigerian and Zimbabwean elections as basis of analyzing electoral violence in Africa. It found and revealed that in these two mentioned states; electoral violence has continued to manifest from independence to their most recent elections. Finally, to propound a contextual solution to the lingering political violence in Africa, it is therefore imperative to recommend to governments and African politicians to consider the following as a way forward in our political experience. i. Politicians should allow constructive criticism and opposition. ii. Politicians as well as non-politicians should desist from corruption. iii. The media should be improved to transmit elections live from anywhere within the country. iv. Political leaders should desist from buying fire arms illegally for their thugs. v. Political office holders should be made to give account to the nation and their constituencies before leaving office and anyone found to be corrupt should be given life-imprisonment and total refund of what was stolen. If it is properly implemented, it will instill fear and sanity in the heart of political leaders in Africa. vi. Political candidacy should not be based on financial capability, but on integrity and responsibility. The money involved in election in most African nations is too high, thereby, technically edging out poor people from political leadership opportunity.

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Bibliography Albert, I.O. (1993). Inter-Ethnic Relations in a Nigerian City: A Historical Perspective of the Hausa-Igbo Conflicts in Kano. 1953–1991. Ibadan: IFRA. Albert, I.O. (2007). Re-conceptualising Electoral Violence in Nigeria in Albert, I.O.; Marco, D.; and Adetula, V. (Eds.) Perspective on the 2003 Elections in Nigeria. Abuja: IDASA and Sterling Holding Publishers, pp. 47–54. Anifowose, R. (1982). Violence and Politics in Nigeria; The Tiv and Yoruba Experience. Enugu: Nok. Babarinsa, D. (2002). The House of War. Lagos: Tele Communication Publishers. Bello, A. (1978). My Life. London: Cambridge University Press. Dye, R.T. (2001). Politics in America. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle Rivers. Fearon, D.D. and Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War. American Political Science Review, pp. 75–90. George, A.T. (Friday, August 9, 2019). Why we Can’t Afford Violent Election. Vanguard, 43. Gwamna, J.D. (2010). Religion and Politics in Nigeria. Jos: African Christian Textbooks (ACTS). Friedrick, E.S. Elections and Conflicts in Sudan. Retrieved August 10, 2019 from http://www.fes.de/Gpol/en. Human Rights Watch. (2007). Criminal Politics: Corruption, Godfatherism and the Funding of Political Violence, a Report on the 2007 General Elections in Nigeria. Retrieved April 10, 2009 from www.hrw.org/2007/01/08/Crimin alPolitics. Igbuzor, O. (2009). Electoral Violence in Nigeria. Retrieved September 6, 2010 from http://www.centrelsd.org/papers. Johan, B. and Hoglund, K. (2016, March). Crisis of Governance in South Sudan: Electoral Politics and Violence in the World’s Newest Nation. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 54(1): 67–90. Kenya Red Cross Society. (2008). Kenya: Electoral Violence, Operations Update (No. 18, 2008). Retrieved November 12, 2008 from https://reliefweb.int/ report/kenya/kenya-electoral-violence-operations-update-no-18-0. Makum, M. and Saxena, S. (2004). Africa at the Crossroads in Mbaku, Makum; and Suresh, Saxena (Eds.) Africa at the Crossroads: Between Regionalism and Globalization. London: Praeger, pp. 1–34. Momoh, H.B. (2000). The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: History and Reminiscence. Ibadan: Sam Bookman Publishers. National Elections Data Book. (1997). Nairobi Institute for Education in Democracy. Nwolise, O.B.C. (2007). Electoral Violence and Nigeria’s 2007 Elections. Journal of African Elections, 6(2): 155–179.

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Obakhedo, N.O. (2011). Curbing Electoral Violence in Nigeria: The Imperative of Political Education. African Research Review: International MultiDisciplinary Journal, 5(5): No. 22. Ogbogo, E.I. (2012). Colonialism and Political Violence in Nigeria with Reference to Idoma Land 1908 to 1960. SAU Journal of Humanities, 1(1): 144–152. Omotola, S (2008). Explaining Electoral Violence in Africa’s “new” Democracies. A paper on Electoral Reform, Political Succession and Democratization in Africa. Presented at the 27th Annual Conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), held at Benue State University, Makurdi, Benue State, Nigeria, November 16–19, 2008. Osaghae, E.E. (1998). Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. London: C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. Preventing Electoral Violence in Sudan. Retrieved September 12, 2020 from https://www.usip.org/programs/preventing-electoral-violence-sudan. Remmer, K.L. (1995, October). New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization. Comparative Politics, 28(1). Rose, R. (1978). Is Choice Enough? Elections and Political Authority in Hermet, G.; Rose, R.; and Rouquie, A. (Eds). Elections Without Choice. London: Macmillan, pp. 196–212. Salawu, B.I. and Mohammed, A.Y. (2005). The Myth of Ethnicity and Its Implications for Democracy in Saliu, H.A. (Ed). Nigeria Under Democratic Rule: 1999–2003. Vol. 11. Ibadan: University Press Plc. Ugiagbe, T.U. (2010). Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Implications for Security, Peace and Development. Retrieved September 6, 2010 from http://www. monitor.upeace.org/archieve.cfm. Umar, M. Z (2009). Democratic Transitions in Nigeria: Lesson Learned in Olutayo, O.A.; Ogundiya, I.S.; Amusat, J. (Eds). State and Civil Society Relations in Nigeria. Ibadan: Hope Publications Ltd., pp. 374–390. Usman, A.F. (2009). Historical Genesis and Trends of Political Instability in Nigeria, pp. 125–139. Wikipedia. (2013). The Online Encyclopedia and Analysis from Systex Solution Team. Zimbabwe Political Violence and Elections. 2018. Retrieved August 7, 2019 from Research and Advocacy Unit. Users/User/Downloads/Zimbabwe%20political%20violence%20&%20elections.pdf.

CHAPTER 3

Historical Review of Electoral Violence in Nigeria Vincent Okwudiba Anyika and Kelechi Johnmary Ani

Introduction The use of violence to pursue political ends has been a persistent practice in Nigerian politics since the country’s independence in 1960. The various military interregnums that have been experienced in Nigeria were prodded by pervasive violence that marred the electoral processes which threatened the political stability of the country. Persistent incidents of electoral violence in the Nigerian political processes have made some authors see electoral violence as part of Nigeria’s political culture. Some common forms of electoral violence that have been identified in Nigeria include the use of thugs to harass or intimidate voters or disrupt voting processes, the use of military men to intimidate voters, hijacking of electoral materials, armed clashes between rival political supporter groups,

V. O. Anyika (B) · K. J. Ani Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike, Abakaliki, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] K. J. Ani e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_3

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shooting of voter, political opponents by thugs, stuffing of ballot boxes, kidnapping and assassination of political opponents, burning of election materials, harassment of electoral officials, among others. Electoral malpractices such as the use of violence have tilted Nigeria’s democratic movement backwards. As one of the most power countries in West Africa and the most populated country in Africa, Nigeria has not been able to champion democratic cause owing to her inability to sustain a stable democratic process. This paper looks at the concept of electoral violence, nature of electoral violence in Nigeria, its major drivers and the way forward to a peaceful and non-violent political process.

Understanding the Concept of Electoral Violence The concept of electoral violence which has over time become synonymous with the Nigerian political process is perennial discourse in the Nigerian political space and beyond that has engaged scholars across the bounds of nations. In their various attempts to define the phenomenon, scholars and authors have put up some definitions. Olowojolu et al. (2019) defined electoral violence as the deployment of violence as a strategy for acquiring political power. Sisk (2008) see electoral violence as a politically motivated violence whereby political actors use coercion and threats as instruments for achieving political ends. Ezeibe (2020) defined electoral violence as consisting of all election stimulated coercive acts such as interparty frictions, kidnapping of political opponents, murder of opponents, use of dangerous weapons to threaten or intimidate political rivals, voters, electoral officers and party supporters, disruptions of voting processes, use of thugs to hijack electoral materials, and other similar violations of electoral legal frameworks intended at achieving the political goals of some desperate and power drunk politicians. Igbuzor (2010) defined electoral violence as acts of violence that are associated with pre-, and post-electoral processes. He further listed the various forms of electoral violence to include use of thugs to disrupt voting processes, disruption of political meeting and rallies, use of lethal weapons to threaten and intimidate party candidates, party supporters, voters and electoral officers, hijack of electoral materials, harassment of party supporters, assassination of political opponents, burning down of electoral officers, and other coercive electoral crimes. According UNOWAS (2017) electoral violence comprises the various violations of extant electoral legal frameworks through acts such the use

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of offensive, indecent or vituperative words against political opponents, murder of political rivals, frictions among opposing party supporters, stuffing of ballots boxes with fictitious ballot papers, intentional exclusion of some communities from electoral process, and threatening of voters and party supporters through acts of terror. UNOWAS (2017) also identified other dimensions of electoral violence as verbal, symbolic, psychological, physical, structural or institutional violation of citizens’ right to free and fair election. UNOWAS further stated that the tensed ambience created by electoral violence poses serious threat to the voters thereby limiting their participation in the electoral processes. UNOWAS also stated that widespread violence could lead to outright cancellation of an electoral process or undue interference by the military (UNOWAS 2017). Adesola and Abimbola (2014) refer to electoral violence as various forms of negative political practices such as violent demonstrations, assassination of political opponents or rival political supporters, arson and looting of electoral offices, destruction of political symbols and campaign facilities, intimidation of voters, kidnapping of party supporters, disruption of political campaigns, interparty clashes, harassment of voters or electoral officials, disruption of voting processes and hijacking of voting materials which occur before, during and after elections aimed at influencing the outcome of the electoral process. Fischer (2002) as cited in Olowojolu et al. (2019) defined electoral violence as organized acts of coercion carried out by political actors or their lieutenants aimed at altering the outcome of an electoral process in the interest of the perpetrators. Fisher (2002) further identified various manifestations of electoral violence to include threats to life of political opponents, hate speech, exchange of verbal punches during campaigns, political debates and rallies, blackmail, arson, physical assaults, assassinations, hijacking of electoral materials, disruption of voting processes, and intimidation of party supporters, electoral officers, election observers through the use of force. The positions of these authors provide significant insights into the phenomenon of electoral violence in the Nigerian political space. Hence, taking from the foregoing, electoral violence holistically comprises all forms of coercive strategies deployed by political actors before, during and after elections intended at disrupting the process, altering its outcome or contending its outcome. Such practices which have become part of political activities in Nigeria have endured for sixty years unmitigated and have negatively affected the country’s quest for nationhood.

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Theoretical Framework The perennial violence that has marred the struggle for political power in Nigeria can be construed within some theoretical paradigms. The concept of dialectical materialism espoused by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel provides pertinent background for understanding why the Nigerian electoral processes have been enmeshed in violence. The notion of dialectics implies that the conflict or friction of opposites is innate in man. Thus, the exigencies of the material world often pitch humans against one another in their quest to achieve material ends. In a country where politics have been given ethnic and religious colouration the struggle for political power becomes very fierce and intense having been heated up by ethnic and religious sentiments. Each distinct group which identifies with a particular political party see the acquisition of state power as a do-or-die affair. They see the acquisition of power as a means of survival or retaining relevance in the political system. Such has been the fate of Nigeria. In their bid to acquire political power at all cost perpetrators of electoral violence in Nigeria exhibits conducts that show some modicum of Machiavellian thinking. This psychological disposition entails the rationalization of unscrupulous, devious and outrageous political scheming or manoeuvres aimed at achieving political power. The manipulativeness, callousness, indifference to morality of ethical standards shown perpetrators of electoral violence demonstrate a variant of political realism that is akin to Machiavellianism. This psychological disposition has reinforced in the thought of some political actors on the false grounds of ethnicity and religion. The use of violence by political actors is a devious political orientation that has become ingrained in the thinking of some political actors.

A Review of Electoral Violence in the Nigerian Political Process Electoral violence began to manifest in the Nigerian political process right from the First Republic (1960–66). The parties that emerged in the First Republic were founded along ethnic lines. Hence, the contest for political power among the political parties was conceived as a battle for political supremacy among the three dominant ethnic nationalities, namely, Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. The three major political parties of the First Republic, namely, Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the

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Action Group (AG) and the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroun had overwhelming support in their respective ethnic bases. The NPC was massively supported by the Hausa/Fulani of the Northern Region. The AG in the same way was massively supported by the Yoruba of Western Region while the NCNC has similar support among the Igbo of the Eastern Region. The divisive lines along which the party was founded made room for the build-up of ethnic sentiments. Also, the fact that the north was predominantly populated my Muslim Hausa/Fulani further while the south was predominantly Christian also made room for the incorporation of religious sentiments into the political process. The ethnic-based parties deployed various means to manipulate the political process to favour their respective groups. The census crisis of 1962/63 which threatened the unity of Nigeria was caused by widespread inflation of census result in the ethnic-based political regions for the purposes of electoral advantages. The 1964/65 elections in Nigeria was punctuated by several incidents of violence. Some of the political actors that participated in the electoral process were engaged in kidnapping, arson, murder and intimidation of political opponents (Babarina 2002). The elections were marred by so many irregularities resulting to incessant protests that led to breach of peace and order in many parts of Nigeria. The Nigerian military capitalized on the lawlessness and turmoil that attended the 1964/65 elections and staged the first coup d’état on 15 January 1966. The coup plotters and executors targeted and killed some key political actors of the First Republic such as Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who was the Prime Minister, Ahmadu Bello, who was the Premier of the Northern Region, S.L. Akintola, who was the Premier of the Western Region, Festus Okotie Ebo, who the Finance Minister and others, thus, bringing the First Republic to a brutal end. It was the lawlessness and turmoil that followed the election that made the military stage the first coup d’état in Nigeria in 15 January 1966. The coup plotters targeted and killed some key political actors of the first republic such as the Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the premier of the northern region Ahmadu Bello, and the premier of the western region, S.L. Akintola. In the Second Republic (1979–83), incidents of electoral violence further manifested. The 1983 general election was highly controversial. The political parties that participated in the election accused each other of rigging elections. For instance, in the western region, there was an

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outbreak of violence when it was announced that the two states controlled by the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) have been lost to the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The announcement of the result created deep ill feeling among some Nigerians in the two states who felt that the announced result of the election did not reflect popular will. There was widespread apathy and resentment among Nigerians who felt robbed by the outcome of the polls. Several violent demonstrations were recorded after the announcement of the election result. It was against this backdrop that the military spearheaded by General Muhammadu Buhari staged another coup d’état. Buhari ousted the government of President Shehu Shagari and initiated measured aimed at riding the country of corruption, indiscipline and lawlessness. Buhari’s regime was toppled in 27 August 1985 by another military coup led by General Ibrahim Babangida. The Babangida regime allowed for the development and mobilization of political activities in preparation for the third republic. Two political parties, Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC) were registered and allowed to participate in the political processes by the Babangida’s regime. The regime held presidential election in June 1993. The election though considered free and fair was annulled by the head of state. The nullification of the June 12 presidential election precipitated violent demonstrations, industrial action and civil disobedience across the country. The invalidated election results showed that the candidate of the SDP, MKO Abiola garnered majority votes. The annulment of the election was considered unjustifiable by the masses and civil society organizations. The political instability that attended the cancellation of the June 12 election made General Babangida to hurriedly handover over governance to the illegal Interim National Government led by Chief Ernest Shonekon. The unpopular Interim National Government which was constituted by Babangida and foisted on Nigeria was sacked by another military General, Sani Abacha who forcefully assumed leadership of the country. Abacha also went ahead to arrest and detain Chief MKO Abiola who had declared himself president following the cancellation of the June 12 presidential general election which most Nigerians considered free and fair. Upon his arrest, Abiola was charged for treasonable felony. He later died in prison in 1998. Following the sudden death of Abacha on June 7, 1998, General Abdusalami Abubukar took over the office of head of state. It was under his leadership that Nigeria conducted elections that will usher in another civilian administration in Nigeria.

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Elections in the fourth republic were not different from what it used to be in the past. The general elections of 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 were engulfed in series of electoral violence. The 1999 election, however, witnessed minimal violence because it was supervised by the military. The overwhelming military presence in the election processes caused voter apathy and low level of political participation. The 2003 general election which was conducted by the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo was marred by gross irregularities (Adesola and Abimbola 2014). The various elections conducted in the year were fraught with electoral violence such as use of violent thugs for intimidating political opponents and disruption of voting processes, widespread rigging and murder of political opponents (Olowojolu et al. 2019). The report of the United States Institute of Peace on the 2003 elections revealed that about 100 persons were killed during the electoral process. Widespread rigging that characterized the election was mostly done in favour of the ruling People’s Democratic Party. Obasanjo, the incumbent president secured a second tenure from the election. Many other PDP candidates in the election were also declared winners. The 2007 elections which were conducted by the outgoing administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo were also marred by large scale electoral irregularities and widespread violence. The United States Institute for Peace’s report on the 2007 election revealed that about 300 people were killed in the many instances of violence that were associated with the electoral process. Inokoba and Kumokor (2017) noted that the 2007 elections were fraught with widespread electoral irregularities such as ballot stuffing, inflation of vote figures, announcement of poll results for units where elections never held or were inclusive, use military and police to rig votes in favour of the ruling party, among others. They further stated that the results that were finally announced at the collation centres were in many cases different from the actual figures that were declared at the polling units. Inokoba and Kumokor (2017) emphatically stated that the 2006 Electoral Act was brazenly violated by political actors with impunity. Series of malpractices that characterized the election were also reported by the Human Rights Watch in 2007. According to the Human Rights Watch, the elections were characterized by pockets of political killings, violent frictions among rival political groups, arson and disruption of voting processes. The presidential candidate of the PDP, Umaru Musa Yaradua, who was declared winner of the 2007 presidential election, admitted that the

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process that brought him to power was fraudulent (Obakhedo 2011). Upon his assumption of office, he set up an electoral reform committee that was chaired by Justice Uwais. The committee were mandated to make articulate measures that would address the irregularities that have marred the Nigerian electoral system. The submissions and recommendations of the committee were incorporated into the Electoral Act. President Yar’adua in his efforts to address the ills that have characterized previous elections allowed the judiciary to exercise its independence in the adjudication of electoral issues. The independence of the judiciary was demonstrated through various court judgements that upturned the election of some candidates of the PDP in favour of the candidates of the opposition parties. For instance the gubernatorial election in Edo State which returned the candidate of the PDP as winner was upturned by the court in favour of the candidate of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Adams Oshomole. President Yar’adua died in 2010 and did not complete his first term, his deputy Jonathan who was from the Niger Delta in southern Nigeria rose to power and emerged as the candidate of the ruling party for the 2011 presidential election. Following the choice of Goodluck Jonathan as the candidate of the ruling PDP, some northern political elements such as Iyorchia Ayu, Bello Kirfi, Adamu Ciroma, Yahaya Kwande, Bashir Yusuf Ibrahim and Lawal Kaita were of the view that the north had not completed their eight year tenure in accordance with PDP zoning formula (Inokoba and Kumokor 2017). The emergence of Jonathan created ill feelings among so many northern politicians. The pre-election atmosphere was tensed owing to the barrage of ethno-religious sentiments that speculated in the media. Some politicians exploited ethnic sentiments in their campaigns. The 2011 election which was seen in some quarters as the most credible in Nigerian history after the 1993 election was not without its flaws. Several elections related violence was recorded across the Nigerian states. Following the declaration of Goodluck Jonathan as the winner of the April presidential election, some northern states witnessed violent demonstrations and killings. According to Human Rights Watch report on the election, the violence that followed the declaration of Jonathan as president led to the loss of 800 lives. The organization also reported that about 65,000 people suffered internal displacement following the violence that followed the 2011 election (Human Rights Watch 2011). The Nigerian Red Cross Society put the displacement figure at 48,000 (Omenazu and Paschal 2011).

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The 2015 general election was conducted in a climate of insecurity that has engulfed the country arising from the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents and its factional groups in North eastern Nigeria. Ahead of the 2015 general elections, there was some political permutation that became a game changer. The minority parties merged and became known as All Progressive Congress (APC) and formed a formidable opposition to the ruling PDP. Some powerful political elements in northern Nigeria and South western Nigeria joined the APC. The 2015 general election became more like a political battle between Northern and Southern Nigeria; although the North had very significant allies in the south. In the build up to the 2015 elections the political campaigns were marred by calumny and bitterness. Political opponents used strong vituperative remarks against one another. The media houses were used as channels for propagating scandalous and sentimental campaigns. The political atmosphere became so charged that some Nigerians feared the worst could happen after the declaration of the presidential result. It was reported by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) that at over 58 persons were murdered prior to the conduct of the 2015 general elections (Olutola 2019). Ahead of the 2015 election, the presidential candidates of the PDP and APC were made to affirm their commitment to the peace of Nigeria through the National Peace Committee for 2015 General Election coordinated by the immediate past military head of states, General Abdusalami Abubakar (rtd). Some international figures also made efforts to ensure that the 2015 election would not destabilize the peace of Nigeria. Among such figures was the US Secretary of States, John Kerry who flew into Lagos and held meeting with the candidates of the PDP and APC on the election. In preparation for the 2015 the Independent National Electoral Commission made some innovations. The body deployed the use of electronic card readers for the purpose of voters’ accreditation. This was a bid to forestall multiply voting and to ensure that only registered voters were allowed to vote. A new voters registers was compiled by the electoral body and names of registered voters were displayed at their respective polling units. Voters were also issued permanent voters card. The election eventually came and saw the candidate of the opposition, Muhammadu Buhari emerge as president elect. Though the 2015 was considered by many as being fair and better than the immediate past four elections, several cases of irregularities that involved massive rigging, under age

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voting, non use of card reader for voters accreditation, ballot stuffing, etc. were reported (Sanni 2019). Incidents of violence were recorded before, during and after the election. The Nigeria Security Tracker reported that 106 deaths were associated with the election; 62 of the victims were murdered before the election while 44 died from post lection violence (Sanni 2019). These violent incidents were recorded in eighteen states which include Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Enugu, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kogi, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Plateau and Rivers (Vanguard, April 12, 2015). The acceptance of defeat by President Jonathan played significant role in calming the nerves of his political supported who became very uncomfortable with the outcome of the election. Jonathan’s reiteration that his political ambition was not worth the blood of any Nigerian demonstrated his disposition and commitment to the peace of the country. The 2019 general elections which held in February and March were marred with obvious flaws as the electoral process witnessed high incidents of violence. The high incidents of killing associated with the election added to the high number of lives that the nation suffered in the hands of the insurgents in the north east and Fulani herdsmen that were spreading southwards from north central states and herd series of violence clashed with farmers. It was reported that starting from the political campaign period that commenced in 2018 to three weeks after the election, about 630 persons died from electoral violence (Human Right Watch 2019; Premium Times, July 31, 2019). States like Akwa Ibom Benue, Ebonyi, Imo, Kano, Lagos, and Rivers recorded high incidents of electoral violence (Premium Times, July 31, 2019). Electoral materials were stolen, voters were harassed and electoral processes disrupted. The military were used for the intimidation of voters. Some military men who had become politicized were used by devious politicians for perpetration of electoral malpractices. In River state for instance, one of the soldiers that were interfering with process was killed by an unknown gunman. In retaliation for the loss of their man, the soldiers went on rampage shooting sporadically at the residents killing unknown number of persons, several persons dived into the river with gunshot wounds in their bid to escape from the vicinity. According to residents several dead bodies were found the following day floating in the river. The soldiers also carried out massive arrest and arbitrarily detained many persons. The spokesperson of the Independent National election confirmed that the soldiers interfered unduly in the electoral processes. He accused

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the soldiers of intimidating voters and unlawful arrest of electoral officials (Human Rights Watch 2019). In the gubernatorial election which was held in March widespread incidents of violence were recorded in some states such as Bauchi, Benue, Kano, Sokoto, Plateau and Rivers States. Among these affected states, Kano and Rivers were worst hit. The Nigerian Police Force announced that 128 persons had been arrested nationwide for electoral violence that included theft of ballot, vote fraud and homicide (Reuters, Feb. 25, 2019). Also the police force announced that it recovered 38 weapons and a cache of explosives from the suspected electoral miscreants.

Key Drivers of Electoral Violence in Nigeria Some factors have pointed been outlined as underlying the persistent use of violence for pursuing electoral goals in Nigeria. One of the factors that have sustained the use of violence is that the laws establishing the Nigerian security outfits such as the police and army allows for political control of these agencies. This legal weakness allows parties in power at the centre to often monopolize the use of these forces for electoral manipulations and harassment or intimidation of political oppositions. Another factor that drives electoral violence is that the Nigerian Land Use Act as well as the 1999 constitution and other extant legislations give the federal government the sole power over petroleum resources and financial and monetary policies. Hence, access to political means access to unrestrained economic power. The over-centralization of power gives the government at the centre sole authority over economic activities through financial and monetary regulations. Often economic actors align with parties they feel would protect their interest. Such individual often try to manipulate electoral processes using any means including violence. Elections were perceived as end game to an unrestrained access to economic power. Historical factor is another key factor that explains why the strategy of violence has often been deployed by the political actors in Nigeria. Some inherent historical realities of the Nigerian peoples have hamstrung the smooth development of sound political culture that is free from the use of violence for achieving political goals. This comes from the fact that Nigeria is a heterogeneous society divided along ethnic, linguistic and religious lines. Ethnic consciousness is a very strong factor in Nigerian politics. The foremost Nigerian political parties as earlier started were practically ethnic-based political parties. The NPC was mainly for

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the Hausa/Fulani in the Northern Region, the AG was the party of the Yoruba in the Western Region and the NCNC was the party for the Igbo and other minority ethnic groups in the Eastern Region. The ethnic groups which supported the popular parties in their enclaves saw the winning national elections as the only means of asserting their dominance and having access to the nation’s resources. According to Kwarkye (2015), long-standing ethno-regional rivalries and tensions have snowballed democratic electoral contests into violent struggles, hence, elections are conceived by the ethnic-minded political actors as battle grounds for political dominance and national resource control. In the First Republic, the key political figures were seen as ethnic champions and their primary project the cause of their respective ethnic groups. Another factor that drives electoral violence in Nigeria is the general conception of political power as the fastest means to affluence. For most persons in Nigeria, political power is synonymous to unlimited affluence. Hence, being a supporter of the ruling party means privileged and exclusive access to contracts that are awarded by the government or its agencies. During the electoral processes, people who feel that their economic prospects can better be served by a particular party or candidate engage in all sorts of politicking including the use of violence. Obakhedo (2011) pointedly noted that the main push factor of persistent electoral violence in Nigeria is the dangerous psychological disposition of desperate Nigerian politicians who perceive political power as fastest and shortest means to unlimited wealth accumulation which they consider difficult through other legitimate enterprise. This disposition also accounts for high and suffocating tide of political corruption in Nigeria. The huge material and monetary benefits that are associated with political offices in Nigeria which surpass those of most developed countries make political offices fiercely contested for. Elections were seen as battle ground for resource control and in most case violence had been deployed as means of influencing the outcome of electoral processes. If elections were solely for purpose of serving the people, the participants would have no use for violence since they all competed for the common good. It is the motives that surround such quests that make it a violent endeavour.

Conclusion The use of violence to pursue electoral goals is a negative political practice which political actors in Nigeria have refused to jettison in Nigeria.

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Political parties have often demonstrated equal potential for the use of violence by arming their respective thugs who served as foot soldiers and carried out any directive of their pay masters. Balance of terror among major contending political parties has become a ground for stability. A major consequence of persistent electoral violence in Nigeria is that it has sustained voter apathy and made peaceful and well-meaning patriot lose interest in politics. Another disturbing consequence of electoral violence is that arms which get into the hands of thugs were usually not mopped up after the elections. Such arms remain in circulation and are often used for armed robbery, kidnapping, inter-communal conflict or trafficked to volatile regions of the country where the demand for arms and weapons is high. Finding solutions to electoral violence is a task that must be surmounted if the Nigerian democratic process must advance to an acceptable standard.

References Adesola, Samson Adesote, and John, O. Abimbola. (2014). Electoral Violence and the Survival of Democracy in Nigeria’sFourth Republic: A Historical Perspective. Canadian Social Science, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 140–148. Albert, Isaac Olawale. (2007). Reconceptualizing Electoral Violence in Nigeria. In I.O. Albert, D. Marco, and V. Adetula (Eds.), Perspectives on the 2003 Elections in Nigeria. Abuja: IDASA and Sterling Holding Publishers. Campbell, John. (2019). Tracking Election Violence in Nigeria. Council on Foreign Relations. cfr.org/blog/tracking-election-violence-nigeria. CLEEN Foundation. (2015). Electoral Violence Risks in the 2015 Gubernatorial Elections: A Policy Brief. Election Security Brief 012. Egobueze, Anthony, and Ojirika, Callistus. (2017). Electoral Violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Implications for Political Stability. Journal of Scientific Research and Reports, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 1–11. Ezeibe, Christian. (2020). Hate Speech and Election Violence in Nigeria. Journal of Asian and African Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/002190962 0951208. Fischer, Jeff. (2002). Electoral conflict and violence: A strategy for study and prevention. IFES White Paper, January 2002. IFES. https://www.ifes.org. Human Rights Watch. (2007). Election or “Selection”? Human Rights Abuse and Threats to Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria. New York. Human Rights Watch. (2011). Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed800. Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/ 16/nigeria-post-electionviolence-killed-800.

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Human Rights Watch. (2019). Nigeria: Widespread Violence Ushers in President’s New Term, June 10. Igbuzor, Otive. (2010). Electoral Violence in Nigeria. Asaba, Action Aid Nigeria. Inokoba, Preye K., and Kumokor, Isaac. (2017). Electoral Crisis, Governance and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 139–148. Kwarkye, Sampson. (2015). Roots of Nigeria’s Election Violence. Abuja: Institute for Security Studies. Obakhedo, N.O. (2011). Curbing Electoral Violence in Nigeria: The Imperative of Political Education. African Research Review, Vol. 5, No. 5. https://doi. org/10.4314/afrrrev.v5i5.9. Olutola, Olajire. (2019). Security Agents and Elections in the 2015 Nigeria’s General Elections. Journal of Education, Society and Behavioural Science, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 1–12. Oluwojolu, Olakunle, Rasak, Bamidele, Ake, Modupe, Ogundele, Oluwaseun, and Afolayan, Magdalene. (2019). Trends in Electoral Violence in Nigeria. Journal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 37–52. Omenazu, E., and Paschal, N. (2011). Nigerians Displaced Polls Violence-Red Cross. Daily Independent (Lagos), 21 April. Sanni, Kunle. (2019). 626 Killed During 2019 Nigerian Elections. Premium Times, July 31. Sisk, Thomas. (2008). Election in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence. Papers prepared for the International studies association annual meeting, San Francisco, California, March 24–28. UNOWAS. (2017). Understanding electoral violence to better prevent it. UNOWAS. https://unowas.unmissions.org.

CHAPTER 4

Youth Unemployment and Electoral Violence in Nigeria: A Case of the 2019 General Elections Olu Awofeso and Paul A. Irabor

The Problematic Election as one major indicator of representative democracy constitute key element in democratization process of modern government. This position is also in line with the view that election provides opportunity for acceptability of government and accord authority to elected candidate in representative democracy (Birch 2008; Mazepus 2017). To this end, election is expected to be conducted in a free and fair manner to ensure its credibility and acceptability by the electorates. This is imperative because the centrality of election in representative democracy is based on fair and transparent electoral process (Diamond 1999; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002).

O. Awofeso Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] P. A. Irabor (B) Department of Political Science, Kings University, Odeomu, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_4

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Albeit successful democratic transition in Nigeria since 1999, the conduct of credible election has remained a challenge, characterized by malpractices and irregularities such as stuffing of election box and destruction of election materials by armed groups, dual registration of electorate, delayed in election materials to the polling centre, falsification of election results, etc. (Azeez 2005; Omotola 2010; Onapajo 2014; Osaghae 1998). These activities logically lead to violent conflicts and clashes such that politics has been seen as a do-or-die affair in Nigeria (Ake 2001). Explicating the foregoing may require further investigation into the roles of youths in electoral violence. In Nigeria, prevailing records have showed that electoral related violence is organized by the political elites (Agba et al. 2010; Ogundiya 2003; Onapajo 2014; Nwolise 20072016). Further studies have identified youths as prominent executors of electoral violence (Esiri ; Inokoba and Maliki 2011; Ogbeide 2013; Omeje 2007). Focusing on the 2019 general elections, this study analysed the roles of unemployed youths in electoral violence and examined its implications for credible election in Nigeria. The study made use of secondary data. Therefore, relevant literature on youth unemployment and electoral violence in Nigeria were purposefully selected for content analysis. The study has five parts. Combined with this starting note, the subsequent part provided background definition to the concepts of election, electoral violence, youth and youth unemployment in Nigeria. While the third part situated the study with relevant theory, the fourth part discussed the roles of unemployed youth in electoral violence during the 2019 general elections. The fifth part is anchored on the implications of unemployed youth in electoral violence for credible elections in Nigeria, before conclusion. Election and Electoral Violence Elections represent one of the principal mechanisms for gaining consent by the citizens. Viewed from this perspective, the meaning of election has gained credence in representative democracy because direct democracy became almost impracticable as a result of increasing population associated with modern political society (Katz 2000; Diamond 1999). Therefore, election has been defined as the means through which the electorates select persons to fill political offices (Lijphart 2008; Omotola

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2010; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002). Relatedly, Dye (2001) refers to election as the process through which qualified adult citizens participate in the selection of candidates that will governed the state on their behalf. Inference from these definitions revealed some important features such as fair participation of the electorates and candidate for elections to be accepted by the populace. It is the participation of the electorates that makes election a unique feature of democratic governance. The functions of election includes; enabling voters to select leaders and make them answerable for their actions and inactions in office, solidifying and legitimatizing the polity, and providing opportunity for citizens to offer constructive criticism through expressing partisanship (Lijphart 2008; Schedler 2001; Waldemar 2013). Political violence that arises during the conduct of election can be described as electoral violence. Birch et al. (2020) and Fischer (2002) defined electoral violence as planned actions exhibited through verbal threats or hate speech, physical assault, etc. which adversely affect and influence the electoral process. It also means an act of violence perpetrated during election periods (Bratton 2008; Omotola 2010). To this end, Höglund (2009) explained that electoral violence can occur at disparate periods in electoral process including pre-election violence (e.g. in the periods of voters registration and electioneering campaigns), Election Day violence (such as stuffing of election box and destruction of election, harassment and intimidation, falsification of election results, etc.) and post-election violence (protests and conflicts over election results whether real or imagined). Major incidences of electoral violence are manifested in physical force (Ashindorbe 2018; Dickson 2012; Fischer 2002; Onapajo 2014). Moreover, Nwolise (2007) identified psychological and structural dimensions to electoral violence as experienced in Nigeria. The psychological perspective of electoral violence is anchored on authorized (use of state agents such as the police) and unauthorized (use of phone calls or text messages) actions to instil fear during electoral process. On the other hand, structural dimension to electoral violence is a product of systemic disequilibrium such as uneven opportunities for contestants, deliberate alterations of date and time of election, politicization of security and electoral officials etc.

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Youth and Youth Unemployment in Nigeria Youth is a phase in human lifecycle that succeed childhood leading to maturity. It is also used to refer to young people collectively irrespective of gender (Nweke 2005; Omeje 2007; Ogbeide 2013). While variation may exist regarding the age bracket of youth across countries, the United Nations (2016) defines youth as individual whose age falls between 15 and 24 years. In Nigeria, the National Youth Policy (2009) identified citizens between the ages of 18 and 35 as youth. Yet, variant chronologies of youth age exist in relations to employment in both private and public institutions in Nigeria (Esiri 2016; Inokoba and Maliki 2011; Nweke 2005). The dilemma of youthhood in Nigeria is further compounded by socio-cultural and economic factors which may delay or hasten youthhood. For instance, Ogbeide (2013) revealed that some youths and adults are incapable of accomplishing basic responsibilities of their age in Nigeria. Moreover, studies including Inokoba and Maliki (2011), Ogbeide (2013) and Omeje (2007) converge on the energy and mental alertness that characterized youthhood. According to Omeje (2007), youth is the time of inquisitiveness, vigour and action. Inokoba and Maliki (2011) further opined that youth represents the most vulnerable, dynamic and complex segment of the population. As the most populated country in the Africa continent and one of the biggest population of youths globally (United Nations 2016), unemployment has been a major challenge in Nigeria. Recent figure by the National Bureau of Statistics (2017) indicated that among the 85.08 million individuals in active labour force, 16 million were jobless in the third quarter of 2017. The report further showed an increase in the quantity of unwaged persons from 17.6 million in the final quarter of 2017 to 20.9 million in the third quarter of 2018 (National Bureau of Statistics 2018). Expectedly, such increase in the rate of unemployment will have a corresponding effect on youth unemployment. Table 4.1 revealed the rate of youth unemployment in Nigeria between 1998 and 2018. Analysis from the table showed an increasing rate in youth unemployment from 3.87% in 2005 to 6.03% in 2018. Statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (2018) indicated that from the estimated 200 million Nigeria’s populations, 22.64 million individuals in the range of 15 and 35 years of age were jobless or underemployed in year 2018.

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Table 4.1 Youth unemployment rate in Nigeria, 2005–2018

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Year

Youth Unemployment (%)

2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005

19.68 19.96 20.67 16.3 12.62 9.84 9.75 9.71 9.65 9.49 8.66 8.51 8.88 9.04

Source National Bureau of Statistics (2018)

The challenges of youth unemployment in Nigeria led to the implementation of poverty alleviation programmes by the government such as the National Directorate of Employment established, 1989; National Poverty Eradication Programme, 2001; National Social Investment Programme, 2016 (Ajakaiye 2002; Antai and Anam 2014; Sule and Adamu 2019). However, these policies have been largely ineffective in view of the raising rate of youth unemployment in Nigeria (Agwu and Kadiri 2014; Sule and Adamu 2019). Various factors accounted for the increasing rate of youth unemployment in Nigeria. Nwagbara (2007) and Mbaya (2013) revealed that youth unemployment is a function of inability of the government to make provision for sufficient basic amenities and industries to generate employment opportunities and bolster trade. This viewpoint is also accepted as the main source of monetary inequality and mass destitution that characterized social existence in Nigeria (Adeniran and Sidiq 2018). Yet, other studies including Inokoba and Maliki (2011), Ogbeide (2013), Samuel (2017) opined that increasing supply of educated manpower particularly among university graduates, lack of employable skills, rural–urban migration, rapid population growth, among others. Therefore, it is passable to understand that unemployed youths, particularly those in the lower strata may take to anti-social behaviour to eke

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out living. Nwagbara (2007) noted that unemployed youth have engaged in violent crimes such as politically motivated killings, ritual killings, kidnapping and cult related violence.

Political Elite Theory: A Reflection on Youth Recruitment in Electoral Violence in Nigeria Otherwise known as elitism, elite theory gained credence in political science through the contributions of Gaetano Mosca (1939), Vilfredo Pareto (1915), and Robert Michels (1915). The theory is predicated on the primacy of political power for the continued domination of the few who possesses the ability to govern over the masses of people who are destined to be governed. Mosca (1939) conceived of elites as complex aggregations of powerful political, economic and social groups squabbling over policy matters. He identified the characteristics of the elites as the ability to manipulate the masses and exercise political control. For Pareto (1915), the difference between elites and masses is based on the concepts of residues of combinations and persistence of aggregates, which made it possible for the elites to rule the unenterprising masses. The residues of combinations means cunning while the residues of persistence aggregates means force. To this extent, Pareto (1915) recognized two types of elites; those who rule by cunning and those who rule by force. Michels (1915) is popular with the idea of ‘mass mind’ which conditioned the masses to submit to the domination of a small minority. According to Michels (1951), majority of human beings are prone to pretty speech within the sight of solidarity and incapable of self-government. Thus, elites employ different methods such as oratory, persuasion, force, etc. to perpetuate themselves in power. In relation to this study, elite theory revealed the urge for political power and power relations among Nigerian politicians as the basis for youth recruitment into political thuggery and to incite violence during election. Ake (2001) noted that the capture of state power in Nigeria is a platform for primitive accumulation, money politics and political patronage. Since the existence of irreconcilable interests among elites accounts for their disunity (Mosca 1939), the adoption of thugs and hooligans to assassinate and coerce contending competitors during election is not in doubt in Nigerian politics. Affirming the use of political thugs in Nigerian politics, Agba et al. (2010) observed that the conduct of election necessarily draws with it,

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violence competition and the use of political thugs by desperate politicians to destroy election materials, assassinate or kidnap perceived opponents. Inokoba and Maliki (2011) further showed that unemployed youths are susceptible to political thuggery which has become enterprising as a means to escape poverty. On the other hand, intra party conflict has been more frequent in Nigeria’s politics. Personalization of party structure and monopolization of nomination process are evidence in rancorous party primaries, which also exert great influence on electoral violence in Nigeria (Esiri 2016). In this context, politics means nothing but desperate tussle for political power and warfare by factions among the governing elite.

Youth Unemployment and Electoral Violence in Nigeria: A Discourse on the 2019 General Elections Since 1999 which marked the beginning of the Fourth Republic in Nigeria, the conduct of election affirmed much discontent with youths at the centre of most electoral violence (Ashindorbe 2018; Omotola 2010). In view of the extent of violence, rigging and irregularities that portrayed the conduct of elections in Nigeria, the late President, Musa Ya’ Adua declared that the 2007 general elections was not free and fair (National Democratic Institute 2012). However, some factors made the 2019 general elections very significant to the youths. According to the United Nations (2016) and the National Population Council (2018), Nigeria’s population is about 200 million. The national median age that divides Nigeria’s population into two equal parts is about 18 years (National Bureau of Statistics 2018; National Population Commission 2018), which corresponds to the minimum voting age and the starting age to adulthood in Nigeria. Campaign for youth participation in political offices resonated into the signing of ‘Not Too Young To Run Act’ into law by President Muhammudu Buhari on May 2018 (Etim and Duke 2019; Onapajo 2019). The Act is an amendment on age reduction for candidates contesting for the state House of Assembly as well as the House of Representatives from 30 years old to 25 years, respectively (Okogba 2018; Onapajo 2019). More so, age reduction was also effected for candidates contesting for the House of Senate and Governorship from 35 to 30 years, while age reduction from 40 to 30 years was effected for the office of the President

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Table 4.2 Age distribution of party candidates that contested the 2019 house of representative election in Nigeria Political parties

All Progressive Congress Peoples Democratic Party Social Democratic Party Others Total (%)

Age Distribution/No. of Candidates 18–35

36–50

51–70

70+

Total

15 6 40 1234 1295 27.99

159 177 150 1749 2235 48.32

164 173 68 686 1091 23.58

0 0 1 4 5 0.11

338 356 259 3673 4703 99.99

Source INEC (2019)

(Etim and Duke 2019; Okogba 2018). The developing proof of youth recruitment into politics became clear through the participation of candidates including Omoyele Sowore, Fela Durotoye, Tope Fasua, among others (Okogba 2018; Onapajo 2019). Further information in Table 4.2 showed the age distribution of candidates that contested the 2019 House of Representatives election in Nigeria. A total number of 4703 candidates contested the 2019 House of Representative election out of which 1295 (27.99%) candidates were between the ages of 18 and 35 years. This was in contrast to the 2015 general elections where youth represented 18% of candidates that contested the House of Representatives election (Commonwealth Observer Group 2019). Notwithstanding milestone enactment towards expanding youth participation in political offices, the institutional framework of dominant parties prevented the upward mobility of youths in the political space. Some of the barriers cited include exorbitant nomination fees, high cost of running campaign and the traditional ideology which promotes agedness as prerequisite for leadership (Aliyu 2019; Commonwealth Observer Group 2019). Accordingly, Michels’ (1951) Iron Law of Oligarchy finds expression in this context that any kind of human organization is ultimately decreased to ‘oligarchy’ such that if laws are enacted to regulate the domination of leaders, the laws bit by bit debilitate and not the leaders. Thus, the 2019 general elections witnessed the support of the youths canvassing for votes in the interest of the already established older candidates, instead of making space for upward mobility of youth in elective positions (Commonwealth Observer Group 2019).

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Nonetheless the ‘change’ slogan of the APC which contributed to its success in the 2015 general elections, the government have had course to face the challenges of youth unemployment and rising cost of living (Jubril 2017; Omilusi 2017). This necessitated the need for the inauguration of the National Social Investment Programme in the year 2016 to provide skill acquisition programme with monthly stipends and loans to unemployed graduates. In another development, statistics revealed by the INEC shows that out of the 84,004,084 voters that registered during the 2019 general elections, youths between the ages of 18 and 35 constituted 42,842,083 voters representing 51% of the total registered voters (see Table 4.3). In the face of unresolved youth unemployment coupled with the population of youth as the largest voters, the 2019 general elections was significant to youth as key determinant of the winner of the elections. However, not only did the 2019 election recorded the lowest turnout compared to the 2011 and 2015 elections (Commonwealth Observer Group 2019; INEC 2019), it also showed the abysmal participation of youths as political thugs and agents for vote trading and rigging (Aliyu 2019; Commonwealth Observer Group 2019). Commonwealth Observer Group (2019) noted that youths were used as bodyguards by the politicians during the 2019 general elections, and youth wing of the APC and PDP were mobilized to intimidate voters who will not vote for their candidate. Occurrences of vote repression were accounted for in Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Kaduna and Lagos states (Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room 2019). The degree of violence that characterized 2019 general elections was unprecedented, that the INEC ordered supplementary Table 4.3 Voter registration by age group

Age Group 18–35 36–50 51–70 70+ Total Source INEC (2019)

Number

(%)

42,842,083 25,201,225 12,600,613 3,360,163 84,004,084

51 30 15 4 100

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gubernatorial elections in six states including Akwa Ibom, Niger, Lagos, Imo, Ebonyi, Rivers, Kogi, Kano and Benue (Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room 2019).

Youth and Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Implications for Credible Election Electoral violence drives fear in the minds of the electorates, thus impeding the conduct of credible election. The recruitment of unemployed youths by the political elites to cause violence in election bears correlation to the primordial perceptions and attitude of Nigeria’s political elites. Youths sees the political elites as persons above the laws and constitution which is capable of giving the youth false image and dulling the pains that result from thuggery (Ashindorbe 2018; Onapajo 2014). Thus, patronage politics by those who can afford the ‘price’ hold sway in Nigeria politics. Youth involvement in electoral violence continues to drive the culture of political thuggery in Nigerian politics. Esiri (2016) and Ani (2017) noted that the services of thugs are engaged during elections by party bulwarks. More so, rival groups within political parties also use violence during contest and thugs play vital roles such as stifling and snatching ballot boxes (Commonwealth Observers Group 2019; Isumonah 2012). Relatedly, election in Nigeria is represented in do-or-die politics such that electorates have no confidence in the conduct of election. Historicizing the culture of electoral violence in Nigeria democracy, Egobueze and Ojirika (2017) observed that political elites traverse parties, to secure political power, the rancorous struggle within parties created discontent, factions and political violence. Studies have showed that youths that engaged in election related violence are largely drawn from poor economic background (Esiri 2016; Inokoba and Maliki 2011). Thus, the need for the government to create enabling socio-economic and political environment and provide social amenities to facilitate economic activities, thereby creating job opportunities in order to absorb the unemployed youths. This will help to redirect the energy of the youths against violent activities towards productive ones. Further still, ignorance, illiteracy or absence of sufficient information on politics contributed immensely to youth violence during election (Onapajo 2014; Nwolise 2007). To this end, there should be mass education for the youths by the Civil Society Organizations, National

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Orientation Agency, and the Mass Media on the danger of involving in electoral violence and probable punishments for wrongdoers. Another prerequisite to guide against electoral violence in Nigeria is to deemphasize the excessive premium placed on political power. When politics becomes less lucrative, the desire to win political power at all cost through the recruitment of unemployed youths to incite violence during election will reduce. This will keep political elites back on the track and guide against politics of bitterness that permeates party politics in Nigeria.

Conclusion The study has been able to establish that the recruitment of unemployed youths by the political elites during election as mercenary largely accounted for the spate of conflict and violence during election in Nigeria. Through state-sponsored violence and godfatherism, elections have been subjected to rigging and irregularities, as political elites continue to drive the culture of political thuggery in Nigeria. Albeit the adoption of ‘Not Too Young To Run Act’ in the course of the 2019 general elections, the traditional ideology which promotes agedness as prerequisite for political leadership continues to drive false image and dulling the pains that result from political thuggery. In the face of increasing unemployment and poverty, the institutional framework of dominant parties prevented the upward mobility of youths in the political space due to exorbitant party nomination fees and high cost of running campaign. It is not in doubt that youth constitutes larger percentage of the Nigerian population, therefore the need to inculcate the right political values in youths by stakeholders (Civil Society Organization, National Orientation Agency, Political parties etc.) to achieve credible election in Nigeria. The government should also promote good governance in order to engender youth employment and socio-economic development.

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CHAPTER 5

Religious and Political Hate Sermons, Electoral Violence, and National Disintegration in Nigeria Samuel Chukwudi Agunyai and Hope A. Ikedinma

Introduction Religious or political hate sermon has remained a recurrent global phenomenon that has ravaged not only the peace, but also the security of nations (including African states) in the international system. While the effect of religious and political hate sermons on national disintegration has remained debatable, the nexus between hate utterances made by religious and political leaders and provocations has been established for long (Afolabi 2015). For example, the growing trend of hostility and

S. C. Agunyai (B) Department of Political Studies and International Relations, Northwest University, Potchefstroom, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] H. A. Ikedinma Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University Ile Ife, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_5

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hatred against political opponents or Western civilisation by some political elites or religious fanatics is borne out of hate sermons. This example is likened to Imam Ibrahim Mudeiris’s description of Israel as cancer and AIDs that plague the entire world (Kenneth 2005), and Biden’s description of Donald Trump as one who cozies up to dictators and fans the flames of hate and division (Anna 2020). Hate sermons, especially from religious and political leaders, are capable of provoking worshippers and loyalists into violence against certain people, government, and countries. They are also usually targeted at other religions and political opponents. Thus, the reports by Anna (2020) over inflammatory remarks made by Biden and Trump against each other and their party; and CAIR and CRG (2016) over the hatred of Islam by Islamophobic organisations in America are apt here. This shows that hate sermon is a global phenomenon and not only an African problem. However, the increasing rate of religious and political hate sermons and its grave implications have been well documented in African countries including Nigeria (Afolabi 2015; Ezeibe 2015). Evidence shows grave consequences of hate speeches which include electoral, religious, and political violence, instability, riots, burning of churches and mosques, killings, disunity, defamation, insecurity, failed state, among others (Onapajo 2012; Olusola 2018). Evidence from the literature shows that while hate speeches and expressions are common among the religious and political elites, their uses for incitement are a strategy deployed by some religious leaders to divide and impose their wills or preferences on their members during elections (Cox et al. 2015; Kenneth 2005). During elections in most African countries, including Nigeria, religious houses (churches and mosques) become a market place where political leaders canvass and sell themselves to the people. These leaders, according to Akinkuotu (2020) propagate hate sermons and recommend candidates or parties to be voted for, instead of promoting the unity and peace of the country. This does not only divide the people, but also provoked them into violence. Violence, whether electoral, religious, or political, is partly caused by inflammatory sermons disseminated to the people by religious and political leaders in Nigeria. The people are oftentimes provoked into violence when they began to contemplate on the hate speeches conveyed to them by their clerics or political leaders against certain groups, parties, or leaders (Ezeibe 2015). For instance, after the announcement of the 2011 election results that declared Jonathan, the winner of the election, supporters of Buhari in the

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North went on rampage over inflammatory speeches made by some political and religious leaders (Babatunde and Avasiloe 2015) who had earlier uttered that all Muslims should vote or support only Muslim candidates in the general election and that they should reject the election results if it does not favour them (Onapajo 2012). Showing support for an aspirant is not necessarily bad, but inciting members or supporters through hate sermons against other aspirants can be problematic. It is a potential source of tension when supporters of candidates who lost an election feel their loss was due to hate sermons by clerics or political leaders of other religions or parties. Tensions before, during, and after elections, according to Babatunde and Avasiloe (2015), are sometimes caused by politicians and some religious leaders who allegedly draw support for their choice candidates using hate sermons. The forgoing, notwithstanding, scholarly attention such (Barigbon 2018; Ezeibe 2015; Olusola 2018), have again begun to focus on the effect of hate speech, on Nigeria’s democratic consolidation, religious violence, political instability, and national development. Given this premise, it is observed that not enough academic attention has been deployed to this phenomenon, most especially, on its effect on Nigeria’s disintegration. Therefore, this paper is conceived to provide an analysis of the nexus between hate (religious and political) sermons and electoral violence and disintegration. Therefore, the objective is to contribute to an existing body of knowledge on the phenomenon by examining the theoretical discourses on the politics of hate sermons in order to contextualise the intersection between hate sermons and electoral violence on the one hand, and national disintegration on the other hand in the present democratic era of Nigeria. Understanding the influence of the effect of hate speech on the gradual disintegration of Nigeria will be very helpful in the design of relevant policies, interventions, and laws that can adequately control and punish perpetrators of hate sermons in Nigeria. Also, our understanding of the contexts that effectively control and regulate hate sermons or speeches is critical to accomplishing sustainable peace and national integration in Nigeria. Drawing on the elite theory, the study aims to provide adequate information on the following questions: How have religious and political hate sermons influenced electoral violence in Nigeria? What are the effects of religious and political hate sermons on Nigeria’s gradual disintegration and description as a failed state?

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To ensure a pragmatic approach to addressing these questions, the study is organised into sections. The meaning of religious hate sermon and national disintegration is discussed in the next section. In the subsequent sections, we present the theoretical framework and content analysis of documents, based on the effect of religious and political hate sermons on electoral violence and Nigeria’s disintegration, redressing hate sermons or speeches, and lastly conclusion.

A Review of Religious and Political Hate Sermons and National Disintegration Religious hate sermons are expressions, talks, or teachings mainly by clerics, which are laden with disaffection, contempt, and sometimes, discrimination or hatred towards a certain group of people (Omenka 2010). Sermons are speeches made by clerics in religious houses (churches and mosques). While hate speeches can be perpetrated by anybody, religious hate sermons are usually expressed and perpetrated by clerics (Pastors, Imams, Deacons, Deaconesses, and other religious leaders) at worship centres or houses. Hate sermons are speeches that tend to incite people to take actions that are contrary to their own. This is similar to Ezeibe’s (2015) view on hate speech, which describes it as a gesture, writing, or speech that could incite people into prejudiced actions or violence. Prejudiced actions are biased, prejudged, and partial. Most religious hate sermons by clerics incite worshippers to be biased in their thinking and actions. These clerics dictate who is to be supported during elections and consequently, cause members of their congregations to prejudge other people wrongly (Ezeibe 2015). Hate sermon or speech, is an expression that conveys discrimination, abuse, contempt, intolerance, and incitement on the grounds of religion, ethnicity, race, culture, language, personality, profession, and political ideology. Religious hate sermons are, sometimes, expressed in the form of fake prophecies and untrue proclamations. In buttressing this definition, Oguntola-Laguda (2015) reveals how a popular cleric in Nigeria, gave a prophecy and proclaimed that he would win the 2011 presidential election. This might have resulted in some of his members’ decision in not voting other candidates they might have preferred in that election. This submission is consistent with the observation of Rufus and Ayanwu (2019) about a controversial Rev. Father who, during a church sermon, openly told worshippers not to vote Goodluck Jonathan, who

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was then the incumbent president, but vote Muhammadu Buhari in the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. It can be termed hate sermon when Pastors and Imams incite their congregations by using fake news and foul language to tarnish other people’s dignity and integrity. Yahaya (2019) describes a hate speech as that which robs others of their dignity. Kenneth (2005) reveals how a Muslim cleric incited followers at a mosque in Jerusalem, telling them to see Jews as murderers of prophets, sons of pigs and monkeys. This is could have potentials in triggering the war and destabilising the entire world. It is in view of this that Haider (2016) concludes that, sometimes, religious leaders incite and support electoral and political violence. A religious hate sermon could also be defined as an untruthful and erroneous expression against a certain group, religion, or aspirant by clerics in a bid to impose their interests on their congregations, or make their congregations support their preferred candidates in general election (Sulaiman 2016). Viallón (2015) observes that the role played by religious players in support of democracy and political change is driven by their interest, hence, the use of illusive prophetic prediction of electoral outcomes to influence worshippers’ voting choices. This is perhaps partly responsible for Karl Marx’s conclusion that religion is a tool for oppressing and suppressing the thinking of the masses, making them come to submission. During general elections in Nigeria, many religious clerics impose their thinking on congregations through hate sermons, and by so doing, suppress the thinking of some worshippers. In a bid to show different forms of hate speeches, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2013) reports that it could take the form of spreading ethnic and racial ideas by any means possible, incitement, and use of provocative speeches to trigger violence, expression of abuse, insults, and libel, as well as participating in organisations that incite discrimination. Similarly, a political hate speech, according to Kayambazinthu and Moyo (2002), is a war waged by verbal expressions uttered by politicians. It is an inflammatory speech that derogates opposing political groups, downgrades political leaders, as well as political activities or feats. Politicians, during electioneering campaigns, engage in hate speeches to discredit their political opponents (Ezeibe 2015). One of such examples is the expression by Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari in that there will be no peace in Nigeria, unless Jonathan wins the 2015 presidential election. Another is the speech made by Patience Jonathan that anybody found

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mentioning ‘APC change’ should be stoned (The Nation 2015). The hate expression of Abu King Shuluwa, in the Daily Independent (2013) is particularly more revealing. He said that Nigeria will disintegrate if former President Goodluck Jonathan contested in the 2015 presidential election. Today, Nigeria has not disintegrated, but there is an increasing spate of divisions and traces of disunity that could eventually lead to Nigeria’s break up if nothing is done to control the spread of hate expressions in the country. An attempt to cause disintegration is disloyalty and the elevation of ethnic, religious, and primordial interests over that of the nation (Sulaiman 2014). It is the feeling of disaffection to one’s country or government and division along ethnic and religious lines (Morgan 2016). National integration is the subset of nation-building, which, in itself, is very complex (Ajayi and Ajaye 2005). It is an attempt by individuals, groups, or governments to bring people and communities from diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds under the umbrella of the broad concept of nationality (Onyeakazi and Ejike 2018). National disintegration is, therefore, the opposite of national integration, and can be seen as the subversion of national interests for personal, ethnic, or religious interests. The promotion of hate sermons/speeches to incite people to be disloyal or unpatriotic to the nation has potentials of resulting in national disintegration. For instance, the use of zoo and monkeys, by Nnamdi Kanu to describe Nigeria and some Nigerians, especially those from the North and Southwest is a hate expression aimed at disintegrating Nigeria. The foregoing is well captured in the analysis of Audu (2017) who submits that Kanu’s group has repeatedly maligned Nigerians and vowed to destroy Nigeria. It is divisive to direct certain groups of Nigerians not to participate in general elections or to give quit notice to certain ethnic groups asking them to return to their regions. Consequently, hate speech, whether political or religious, has implications for Nigeria’s disintegration (Audu 2017). A critical look at inflammatory expressions by Kanu and some Northern youths has shown that Nigeria appears more divided and disunited under Buhari’s administration. For instance, the anxiety of Major General John Enenche, a senior military officer under this administration, over inciting speeches on social media, was particularly alarming when he concluded that hate speech is ‘capable of jeopardising the unity of the country’ (Audu 2017). Similarly, Vice-President, Yemi Osibanjo,

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decried the growing spate of inflammatory speeches under this administration and warned that it is ‘a species of terrorism, capable of disintegrating Nigeria’ (Agbese 2018). All of these might have made the former President; Obasanjo concludes that Nigeria is fast drifting to a failed and badly divided state, with old fault lines, opened up in greater fissures and with drums of hatred, disintegration, and separation choruses almost everywhere in the country (Akinkuotu 2020). This unfortunate condition in Nigeria, made Audu (2017) asked: what then, can be more divisive than a provocative speech declaring other ethnic groups to quit Northern Nigeria? Similar to this question, was the report that a Pentecostal Pastor in Nigeria urged his followers to unanimously support a Christian presidential candidate in the 2011 elections (Onapajo 2012). Indeed, Nigeria is gradually reverting to disintegration and if adequate controls and measures are not put in place, there could be a possible break up in the subsequent elections.

Theoretical Underpinning of Hate Sermons Hate sermon or expression is a device commonly deployed by the elite, especially the political elite, to influence the decision of the ruled or majority in the society. In this context, hate sermon or speech is more of an elitist phenomenon, and even so, it is perpetrated by the ruled class. The elitist theory holds the view that in any society, there are few people, who by position (political, official, appointment, or election), power, wealth, and outstanding qualities lead or rule others (the majority). This means that a society is stratified into what Mosca (1939) classifies as organised ruling and the unorganised ruled class. Similarly, Pareto (1935) sees the elite as those above the other classes, while Mitchels (1966) refers to it as domination of the elected over electors. Thus, every organisation, whether political, religious, socio-cultural, or economic, has elite members in different strata as classified by Pareto (1935): governing, nongoverning, and political elites that are circulatory, where newer elites are replacing old elites. Even in churches, there are leaders and followers who can be classified into the ruling elite and the ruled. The ruling or leading class is usually fewer, focused, and more organised than the ruled, making it easy for the suppression of the ideas of the majority (Flew 1985). For instance, Pareto (1935) notes that the ruling elite holding power tend to use such power to sustain their position, abuse it, or promote their gains at the expense

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of others. Similarly, Mitchels (1966) opines that leaders are important in every organisation, but that they abuse organisational opportunities for personal gains through their personal qualities or principles like party discipline. Mosca (1939) submits that the ruling elite abuse their position through force, wealth accumulation, and deception of the ruled. Applying Pareto’s circulatory, Mosca’s ruling class, and Michels’ oligarchy elitist models, the following can be deduced: 1. all organisations, including religious organisations (churches and mosques), have ruling elites (governing, non-governing, and political). However, governing and non-governing elites are more common in religious organisations; 2. the ruling elite are fewer, more organised, and domineering, making them more powerful than the ruled class; 3. the ruling elite have access to wealth, power, resources, and use of force to command obedience and respect; 4. the ruling elite, sometimes, tend to abuse their position and power for personal gains; and 5. the ruling elite have always ruled, either through the use of force, diplomatic intrigues, cooperation, or deviousness. Religious hate sermons or speeches are instruments usually deployed by clerics and political elite, especially during elections in Nigeria, to suppress or manipulate the interests (choices) of people for prospective political candidates (Agbese 2018). They incite and deceive the masses to believe what in reality is fake and untrue. Members of the clergy are the ruling elite in religious circles. By their position, they have power, respect, honour, and sometimes, the overwhelming support of their congregations. This gives them the impetus to willfully direct and control their members. In this context, the clerics, who are fewer in number, are the ruling class; the congregations are the ruled majority class. In contemporary Nigeria, some religious leaders have abused their role as a result of the engagement in hate sermons and speeches. An instance of such abuse of religious roles provoked the association of Christian without Borders (CWB) to rebuke the Christian Association of Nigeria for keeping silent and failing to caution its members over hate speeches and provocative statements from sacred altars (Ainoko 2018).

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Pastors and Imams have openly uttered statements that seem misleading and therefore, suppressed the interests of their congregations for their own selfish gains (Ainoko 2018). For instance, in Nigeria, religious leaders engaged in prophetic electoral predictions, which seem to attract politicians to their worship centres on the one hand and influenced the voting choice of their worshippers on the other hand for primordial interests (Afamefune et al. 2020). For instance, in Nigeria, religious leaders engage in prophetic electoral predictions which seem to attract politicians to their worship centres on one hand and influence the voting choice of their worshippers on the other hand (Afamefune et al. 2020). The predictions by father Mbaka that Atiku would win the 2019 presidential election and Mr. Uzodinma, the current Governor of Imo State, would take over the seat of power from Ihedioha are good examples (Afamefune et al. 2020; Nwachukwu 2018). Evidence shows that politicians, on visitation to worship centres, especially during elections, do not visit empty-handed (Onapajo 2012). Also, some Pastors and Imams have been caught in the web of using hate sermons to show contempt and disaffection towards other cultures, religions, and certain politicians from certain ethnic groups. The reports of Egbas (2017) and Udodiong (2017) about Apostle Suleman, a Christian cleric, who ordered members of his congregation and other Christian faithful to kill Fulani herdsmen, buttress this. This is not limited to the Christians as the Muslim clerics have also been heard inciting their members against members of other religions. On the global front, Kenneth (2005) reports how most international Muslim terrorists have killed innocent people in the name of religion. Members of some terrorist organisations are radicalised by their leaders and clerics through hate sermons and speeches that incite them against other religions or certain groups. The indoctrination process of these terrorists is coated with the belief that Muslims who die fighting against the perceived enemies will receive rewards in Heaven. This erroneous belief has made some Muslim faithful indulge in massive killings of Christians at the slightest provocation. Ezeibe (2015) affirms this claim by revealing how Boko Haram insurgents were brainwashed into being hostile towards everything pertaining to the Western ideology. Although this terrorist organisation has also attacked Muslim worship centres, the majority of their attacks have been towards Western educational institutions and Christian communities and places of worship. The report of Ezeibe (2015) further shows how Ima Sadiq, a cleric,

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incited Muslims to only vote Buhari in the 2015 presidential election. He claimed that it would be sinful to vote against Muslim aspirants. Political elite, just like religious clerics, are also guilty of using hate speeches during electioneering campaigns. Just like the clerics, political elite, through hate speeches, incite people against opponents. It is usually skewed to soil the integrity and dignity of political opponents. Also, Ezeibe (2015) reports how the wife of the former president, Patience Jonathan, referred to Buhari as a brainless old man during the build-up of the 2015 presidential election. He (Ezeibe) also recalls how Ayodele Fayose, a former Governor of Ekiti State , spreads fake prophecies and news that Buhari may likely die in office like the other three late presidents from Northwest Nigeria. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the elitist theory provides a good and robust explanation of hate sermons or speeches, electoral violence, and national disintegration in Nigeria. This is because hate sermon or speech is usually conceived and orchestrated by the elite and sold to ignorant followers, who thoughtlessly display actions or attitudes to meet the interests and desires of the ruling class. On several occasions, religious leaders and political elite, through hate sermons and speeches, have incited their members and followers into violence and actions that promote disunity in Nigeria. For instance, statements like, ‘The North would make Nigeria ungovernable if Jonathan wins the 2011 presidential election’, credited to Alhaji Kaita Lawan, could disintegrate the country (Ezeibe 2015). All of these go to show that the elite, whether religious or political, are the leading culprits of electoral violence that have continually retrogressed and disintegrated Nigeria. Afolabi and Avasiloae (2015) also shared a similar view by noting that Nigerian politicians use Boko Haram as a tool for sowing the seed of mistrust and exploiting ethnoreligious differences. Politicians are members of the political elite which Pareto (1935) classified as one of the components of the elite strata in the society.

Religious and Political Hate Sermons/Speeches: Electoral Violence and National Disintegration in Nigeria There is robust evidence in the literature on the influence or effects of hate sermons or speeches on electoral violence (Afolabi and Avasiloae 2015; Ezeibe 2015; Haider 2016). However, information on its influence

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on national disintegration has not been adequately explored. However, few studies have reported that religious or political hate speeches are capable of ruining the political well-being and stability of any country (Barigbon 2018; Olusola 2018; Yahaya 2019). For instance, while Barigbon (2018) observes that Nigeria’s multi-religious nature, coupled with unprecedented spread of hate, fake, and divisionary sermons or speeches, have all contributed to disunity and violence that have not only marred elections but have also displaced thousands of Nigerians. Olusola (2018) avers that a religious hate sermon or speech hinders peacebuilding, development, and the peaceful co-existence of people in societies. In Nigeria, hate speeches and sermons are the leading causes of pre-election violence. Before and after elections, politicians and political parties are engaged in the use of hate sermons during campaigns to sell and make their party’s ideology, manifestos, and programmes known to the electorates. In the process, most politicians deploy derogative and inflammatory comments at campaign grounds to discredit opponents (Ezeibe 2013, 2015; Jega 2012; Jimoh and Opara 2018; Rufus and Ayanwu 2019). This has accounted for incessant cases of on-the-spot violence at campaign grounds before general elections. This is similar to observations and findings reported by the National Human Rights Commission (2015) on the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria which was marred by pre-election violence caused by political hate speeches. Similarly, the report of Human Rights Watch (2011) reveals that Rivers and Kano States were worst hit by pre-election and post-election violence. Specifically, the report shows that members of the People Democratic Party (PDP) and All Progressive Congress (APC) routinely clashed between 2017 and 2019 over political hate comments. Consequently, the former Governor of Kano State, Rabiu Kwankwaso, was advised by the police not to visit the State in 2018, so as not to breach public peace and security. All of these ugly circumstances point to the fact that political hate sermons, are the cause of electoral violence during the electioneering campaigns in Nigeria. Thus, the sporadic shooting of guns, unguided use of machetes and knives by hoodlums, and the seizure at campaign rallies or venues are few examples of how a political hate speech can lead to electoral violence in Nigeria. Buttressing this submission, Odufowokan (2015) reveals that the hate statement by Ambode, over Sanwo-Olu’s mental health was responsible for the violence that erupted at the rally ground in Lagos State. During the event, a popular supporter of the party and Sanwo-Olu, M.

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C. Oluomo, was stabbed in the neck. This was a testament to the degree of pre-election violence in Nigeria. Similarly, the report of Egbas (2017) attributed the cause of the violence to inordinate utterances of aggrieved politicians who were angry that the former Lagos State Governor, Mr. Akinwunmi Ambode, did not get a second term ticket. There was a vehicle that was burnt because it had the picture of a political opponent. That was a vehicle with the picture of the former President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan burnt at a PDP campaign rally in Plateau State, Northcentral Nigeria. The act was carried out by some youths who were loyal to APC and its presidential candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari. A critical look at the picture shows that Nigeria is divided and its peaceful co-existence is threatened by electoral violence caused by unguarded utterances of some members of the political elite in the country. Evidence exists that the use of places of worship by some clerics to preach hate is partly responsible for electoral violence in Nigeria (Agbakwuru 2018). In addition, the utterance of General Buhari (as he was fondly called before his emergence as president of Nigeria) that, ‘Muslims should vote only Muslims’ in the 2011 general elections was partly the cause of the 2011 electoral violence in parts of Northern Nigeria (Afamefune et al. 2020). Violent protests against this election outcome by youths in the North resulted in the deaths of about 800 people as well as arson attacks on worship centres (International Crisis Group 2011). Besides violence resulting from electioneering campaigns, hate speeches and sermons have also threatened the social fabric of the country. For instance, the call by some pastors over the retaliatory killing of Fulani herdsmen is a call for disintegration (Ainoko 2018). These buttress the position that actions of some political and religious elites in terms of unguarded utterances are antithetical to Nigeria’s national integration. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that hate sermons and speeches are the causes of most pre-election and post-election violence in Nigeria. Thus, hate speech has had a significant influence on electoral violence and national disintegration in the country. Religious hate speeches and sermons cause psychological harm to the citizenry as well as national disunity. This invariably threatens democratic consolidation and national development (Rufus and Ayanwu 2019). For instance, a lot of hate speeches during the build-up of the 2011, 2015, and 2019 presidential elections have threatened the peace and unity of Nigeria. Besides, voting patterns during these election periods are defined by ethnic and religious biases and not national interests. This invariably threatens the national

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integration of the country as most Nigerians only vote to promote their ethnic and religious interests. Having seen its effects on electoral violence and national disintegration, it is equally imperative to identify the triggers of hate sermons and speeches in Nigeria.

Triggers of Religious Hate Sermons/Speeches in Nigeria Nigeria is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural country, and religion plays a key role in the political, social, and economic life of the people (Esimaje 2012). During elections, religious houses play host to most political aspirants and political party executives. Sometimes, politicians are given opportunities to reel out campaign promises to the congregations of some religious leaders. This must have led OguntolaLaguda (2015) to conclude that politicians negotiate with electorates through different platforms during political campaigns. Rather than discussing real issues affecting the country, some politicians resort to abuse, defamation, discrediting, and hate-profiling one another (Afamefune et al. 2020). Evidence shows that President Buhari was, at several times, abused and nick-named ‘Baba-go-slow’ (which is interpreted to mean inefficiency and delay in decision-making) during the 2015 general election campaigns (Odufowokan 2015). Similarly, his political opponent, Goodluck Jonathan (the then incumbent), was called a clueless president by the political elite in Buhari’s party (Ezeibe 2015). These tantrums are unhealthy and pose threats to peaceful co-existence in the country. Some of the triggers of hate sermons and speeches include: 1. inordinate interest of politicians to loot rather than serve the people; 2. the fear of losing in an election or the idea of winning at all costs; 3. intolerance of opposition and political opponents; 4. poor performance and dominance of the ruling party in government; 5. inter-faith cold war/violence; and 6. zero-sum politics. 1. Inordinate interest of politicians to loot and not to serve

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Different situations in Nigeria have shown overtime that very few politicians and contenders in elections have the interests to serve the country. They are specifically not interested in the people, but in the looting of public funds. Ejiofor (2007) concludes that most political office holders seek power for personal aggrandisement, an ambition they often pursue at all costs. This is because, according to Oguntola-Laguda (2015), most politicians who won in many of the previous elections in Nigeria reneged on their campaign promises. Ojo (2010) and Nkemdili (2013) conclude that rather than good governance, Nigeria is ravaged by politicians’ inordinate desires to mismanage and loot public funds, hence, the incessant cases of governance failure. Politicians’ inordinate desires account for reasons the majority of them, are bent on abusing and discrediting opponents through the spread of hateful and derogative words. This view is similar to what Christian (2013), Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD) (2016), and National Human Rights Commission (2015) report about politicians. They aver that instead of discussing issues, politicians are fond of using derogative words in local dialects to disgrace opponents. Baiyewu (2015) adds that political parties and politicians who engage in verbal attacks during campaigns lack innovative and developmental ideas. 2. The fear of losing in an Election or the idea of winning an Election at all costs The fear of losing in an election has made many Nigerian politicians to resort to abusive and hate speeches with a view to promoting themselves. In doing this, they bring their opponents into disrepute. Such actions are usually followed by backlashes from the opponents. When situations like this escalate, then the country is in turmoil. Elections in Nigeria are popularly referred to as ‘a do-or-die affair’. Elections have been fraught with violence because politicians see them as a do-or-die affair. This ended up throwing tantrums at one another during campaigns in a bid to win (Ibraheem et al. 2015). In addition, there is the idea of winning elections at all costs. This idea has pushed political aspirants or contenders into using inciting and violent words, which in the long run, cause post-electoral violence in the country. In view of this, Oguntola-Laguda (2015) reveals that General Buhari, having lost the 2011 presidential election, engaged in hate speech that incited people into violence at the expense of the

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existing Electoral Acts. In this unfortunate case, Buhari wanted to win the election at all costs. The desperation for power and control of government has led most Nigerian politicians into the use of hate speech (Rufus and Ayanwu 2019). These submissions, however, are congruent with the findings of Collier (2010) which reveal that loss of power or control of the government is challenged bitterly, unlawfully, and violently in Nigeria. 3. Intolerance of opposition and political opponents The inability of some political office holders to compete with or withstand opponents during and after election is a potential source of hate speech in Nigeria. In Nigeria, it is the habit of the ruling party to suppress oppositions by whatever means. This often involves the use of hate speeches that do not only abuse, discriminate against, and defame the character and integrity of opponents, but also incite violence. This has partly contributed to the gradual disintegration of Nigeria. Disrespect for opposition parties by the ruling party triggers hate speech (Rufus and Ayanwu 2019). Similarly, Ezeibe (2015) observes that the intolerant nature of Nigeria and her politicians promotes the use of hate speech. 4. Poor performance and dominance of the ruling party in government Party dominance or the extended stay of a certain political party in government could heighten the tendency for hate speech. This is especially when such party has been criticised for underperformance. Most politicians and opposition parties, especially in Nigeria, in a bid to end long-term dominance of the ruling party, deploy the strategy of hate expressions to vilify the ruling party. For instance, the current ruling party in Nigeria, the APC, was able to end the 16-year dominance of the PDP through effective use of hate speeches and propaganda. There was massive hatred towards PDP’s dominance before the 2015 presidential election. This gave rise to the use of hate speeches during campaigns to discredit some of the achievements and candidates of the party. It was reported that a chieftain of the APC threatened that the 2015 presidential election would be rigged and roasted and they were not going to court to seek redress, but were going to drive the PDP out of power. Similarly, it was

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also reported that Mr. Buhari threatened that if the PDP and its government rigged the 2015 presidential election as they did in 2011, there would be violence and they would be disgraced out of office (Vanguard 2012). 5. Inter-faith cold war/violence Nigeria is a country stratified along with three main religions. While the majority of Nigerians practise Islam and Christianity, a handful of them belongs to the African Traditional religion. However, evidence shows that unguarded utterances and religious hate sermons by clerics from both leading religions have significantly contributed to electoral and religious violence in the country. These two religions play hosts to politicians during elections, and the clerics play a key role during the electioneering campaigns. They incite congregations through hate sermons and fake prophecies to vote along religious lines. Evidence shows that while Imams incite Muslims to vote for Muslims in general elections, their Christian counterparts, during sermons, direct members to vote for Christians. These clerics pacify members of their congregations and persuade them to vote politicians whom they prefer. This is in consonance with Karl Marx’s conclusion that religion is a tool used to pacify the oppressed masses. Similarly, Orji and Uzodi (2012) have attributed religious hate sermons and speeches alongside their resultant electoral violence to religious dichotomy in the country. 6. Zero-sum politics The politics of ‘the winner takes all, and the loser takes nothing’ is a contributory factor to religious hate sermons and speeches in Nigeria. It drives unhealthy rivalry between winners and losers in elections. Unhealthy rivalry is sometimes displayed or manifested through the use of hate speeches or sermons to degrade, witch-hunt, insult, and disgrace political opponents. Jega (2012) holds a similar view that the zero-sum character of election provokes politicians into the mobilisation of ethnic

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feelings. He also avers that when most Nigerian politicians lose elections, they resort to negative hateful speeches by blaming it on the lack of free and fair election.

Redressing Hate Sermons or Speeches in Nigeria Having established the fact that religious and political hate sermons and speeches are the leading causes of electoral violence and the gradual disintegration of Nigeria, it is of great importance to suggest measures and means of forestalling this menace, especially ahead of the forthcoming 2023 general elections. In the paragraphs that follow, the following suggestions were provided as measures to control hate speech in Nigeria. First, the Nigerian Constitution clearly stipulates limitations of freedom of speech. Such limitations and the punishment for making speeches beyond constitutional provisions should be made public through public awareness programmes. There is no point duplicating laws, through sponsoring of fresh hate speech bills, since there are provisions in the Constitution against hate speech. Rather than making a new law on hate speech, there should be prompt implementation of the provisions of the 1999 Constitution on hate speech. Passing a new bill may naturally kill freedom of speech, considering the political tension that now exists in the country. Furthermore, having identified constitutional provisions against hate speech, there should be immediate prosecution of perpetrators of hate speech. People must be held responsible and punished for spreading fake, hateful, and derogative words which incite violence. Hate speech thrives in Nigeria because nobody has been punished for it. Until punitive measures are entrenched, it will continue to threaten peaceful co-existence in the country. Prosecution of perpetrators of hate speech will discourage others from engaging in it. However, punishment of culprits must be free, fair, and subject to evidence of a violation of constitutional provisions on hate speech. In addition, the electorates, whether at campaign rallies or at worship centres must desist from accepting lies and value-laden sermons, prophecies, or manifestos that are capable of dividing the country. They should remain rational in their thinking and strongly uphold nationalistic ideals and values. This will help put an end to the suppression of their interests by the ruling class or the religious elite. Youth leaders in particular should

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educate the youth against being manipulated by any political or religious leaders for violence. This would reduce electoral violence in the country. Moreover, institutions of democratic consolidation such as political parties, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and others should educate and control hate speech at all levels of electioneering. This could be done through party disciplinary measures and INEC’s electoral guidelines. For instance, parties should replace or suspend any member found using hate speech at campaign rallies. INEC should also disqualify candidates found guilty of hate speech. This could help control the spate of hate speeches in the country. Finally, emphasis should be placed on promoting tolerance among politicians, especially during and after elections. The idea of winning at all costs by politicians should be jettisoned for the unity and development of the country. In addition, candidates should develop genuine and strong interests in service delivery to the citizenry rather than in looting public funds for their personal gains. Also, they should review and tolerate some of the constructive criticisms of opposition parties. This would consolidate Nigeria’s democracy.

Conclusion This study has shown that religious and political hate sermons and speeches are triggered by intolerance, winning elections at all costs, longterm inter-faith hostilities, zero-sum politics of winners take all and losers take nothing, and underperformance of government in power. These factors have provoked electoral violence, which in turn, has threatened peace and unity in the country. This chapter put forward that there is need to strengthen the existing legislation against hate speech rather than proposing new ones. This has become important given the tense political situation the country now is, and as preparation towards the 2023 general elections.

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Jimoh, A. M., and Opara, G. (2018). Hate Speech Offenders to Die by Hanging in Senate’s New Bill. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/sto ries/201803010113.html on November 20, 2019. Kayambazinthu, E., and Moyo, F. (2002) Hate Speech in the New Malawi. In H. Englund (ed.), A Democracy of Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New Malawi. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab. Kenneth, L. (2005). Incitement in the Mosques: Testing the Limits of Free Speech and Religious Liberty. ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law, 27 Whittier L. Rev. 3. Mitchels, R. (1966). Political Parties. New York: Free Press. Morgan, C. (2016). Analyzing Sustainable Development Issues in Africa. London: Marriot. Mosca, G. (1939). The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw Hill. National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria. (2015). A Pre-election Report and Advisory on Violence in Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, February 13. Nkemdili, N. K. (2013). Governance Failure, Poverty and Ethno-Sectarian Conflicts in Nigeria: Implications for Sustainable Development. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 15(4): 99–115. Nwachukwu, J. O. (2018). 2019 Presidency: Father Mbaka Attacks Buhari, Atiku, Predicts Winner of Election. Daily Post, October 20, 2018. Available at: https://dailypost.ng/2018/10/20/2019-presidency-father-mbakaattacks-buhari-atiku-predicts-winner-election/. Odufowokan, D. (2015). 2015 Campaigns: The Issues, Excesses, Violations. The Nation, March, 29, p. 8. Oguntola-Laguda, D. (2015). Religion, Leadership and Struggle for Power in Nigeria: A Case Study of the 2011 Presidential Election in Nigeria. Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae, 41(2): 219–233. Ojo, E. (2010) A Survey of Ethno-Religious Crisis and Its Implications for Nigeria’s Nascent Democracy. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 12(2): 182–198. Olusola, I. (2018). Tackling the Problem of Hate Speech during Elections in Nigeria. Wilson Center, African program, Policy Brief No. 17. Available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-southern-voices-networkfor-peacebuilding. Omenka, N. I. (2010). Blaming the Gods: Christian Religious Propaganda in the Nigeria—Biafra War. The Journal of African History, 51(3): 367–389. Onapajo, H. (2012). Politics for God: Religion, Politics, and Conflict in Democratic Nigeria. Journal of Pan African Studies, 4(9): 42–66. Onyeakazi, J., and Ejike, O. C. (2018). National Integration in Nigeria: A Philosophical Insight. International Journal of Novel Researches in Humanities, Social Sciences and Management, 1(1): 51–61.

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Orji, N., & Uzodi, N. (2012). Post-election Violence in Violence: Experiences with the 2011 election. Abuja: Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre. Pareto, V. (1935). The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology. New York: Dower. Rufus, A., and Ayanwu, M. N. (2019). Hate Speeches and Disrespect for the Opposition Parties in Nigeria: Implications for Democratic Consolidation and National Development. Sociology and Anthropology, 7(3): 132–139. Sulaiman, K. O. (2014). Jerusalem as a Uniting Factor for Muslims and Christians: Historical and Scriptural Grounds. The IAFOR Journal of Arts and Humanities, 2(1): 32–29. Sulaiman, K. O. (2016). Religious Violence in Contemporary Nigeria: Implications and Options for Peace and Stability Order. Journal for the Study Religion, 29(1): 7–16. The Daily Independent Newspaper, Friday, March 8, 2013, p. 13. The Vanguard Newspaper, May 15, 2012, p. 11. Udodiong, I. (2017). Hate Speech, Especially from Pastors, Should Never Be Tolerated. Pulse.ng news, Nigeria. United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. (2013). General Recommendation on Combating Racist Hate Speech”, CERD/C/GC/35. Villalón, L. A. (2015). Cautious Democrats: Religious Actors and Democratisation Processes in Senegal. Politics and Religion, 8(1): 305–333. Yahaya, Y. (2019). Hate Speech and the Challenges of Nation Building in Nigeria. International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 3(5): 291–294.

CHAPTER 6

Ethical Moral-Self and Gender as Determinants of Political Participation in Nigeria: A Focus on Southeast, Nigeria Chiedozie Okechukwu Okafor, Uzochukwu Chinweze, and Nanji Rimdan Umoh

Introduction The most prominent limiting factor of progressive political participation in Nigeria is poverty, defined in terms of the inability to withstand the temptations and intimidations of the politics of money bags. In the past elections, voter turnout was more dependent on religion, ethnicity

C. O. Okafor (B) Department of Psychology, Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike, Ebonyi State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] U. Chinweze School of General Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] N. R. Umoh Department of Political Science, University of Jos, Jos, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_6

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and political interest (Centre for Democracy and Development 2019). However, observation of the 2019 general elections across various states in Nigeria shows that voter turnout in Nigeria’s general elections is becoming significant regardless of religion, ethnicity and political interest. It seems, however, that a greater percentage of these voters are propelled by the perceived financial gains as shown in voting-buying and rigging during elections, and calculated decamping from political parties prior to elections (Lucky 2013; Babatunde et al. 2019). Prominent among the theories that are geared towards explaining the scenarios is resource theory (Brady et al. 1995). This model describes socioeconomic status as positively related to political participation based on the evaluation of occupation, income and education indices. Other factors characteristic of this model include age, gender, marital status, residential mobility. In the context of economic poverty as evidenced in Nigeria (Okafor et al. 2019), it was proposed that specifying the causative mechanisms between ethical moral-self and political participation should start with examining possible relationships between political participation and other plausible moderating variables such as gender. Kern et al. (2015) aver that age and gender significantly influence political participation. This allows men and older individuals to easily engage in the more institutionalized forms of political participation, while women and younger individuals are more involved in the less institutionalized forms of political participation (Smets and van Ham 2013). Kasa (2015), observed that poverty and the dearth of education and related opportunities among women contribute to their exclusion from positions of political power and authority. These exclusionary action arrangements are supported by the existing discriminatory legal framework and sociocultural values and beliefs that uphold patriarchy and are structured to subjugate women. In many sub-Saharan African countries, Nigeria inclusive, gender is often a determinant of access to education, more so when families have limited resources. The resource theory also explains gender discrimination as encompassing decisions on employment, sharing of family inheritance and appointments or elections to critical political and other decision-making positions (Kasa 2015). In the same vein, the political representation of women is hampered by childbearing, their levels of educational attainment, employment, low remunerations and limited finances, restricted access to or non-membership of powerful social

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networks, political thuggery and nocturnal political meetings and sociocultural and religious inclinations (Karl 2001; Nnaji 2009; Fatile et al. 2012, 2017; Ogbogu 2012; Samuel and Segun 2012; Falade 2014; Olufunke 2014). Despite the preponderance of studies on the influence of these factors identified in the resource theory as determinants of gender equality and equity, research on the combined influence of ethical moral-self and gender in the political engagement of citizens in a corrupt political system is scarce, thus necessitating a relatively new line of inquiry. The instant study was conducted to fill this gap by mulling over questions on the extent of the influence of gender and the ethical moral-self on the political participation of citizens in Southeast Nigeria? This study was therefore, to ascertain the impact of the combination of the variables of the ethical moral-self and gender on the political participation of citizens in a country bedeviled by political corruption. In evaluating the perspectives of men and women on political participation, we hypothesized that: (i) Gender significantly influences political participation; (ii) Ethical moral-self significantly influences political participation; and (iii) there will be combined significant influence of ethical moral-self and gender on political participation.

Method Design of the Study The study adopted the cross-sectional survey design. It is a design that enables the collection of data for drawing inferences about populations of interest at one point in time (Olsen and George 2004). Area of the Study The study area is Southeast Nigeria, which is one of the three geo-political zones in Southern Nigeria. It is comprised of five states, namely: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo. The predominant ethnic group in the Southeast of Nigeria is Ibo, and the main religion is Christianity. Participants Five hundred and twenty-nine (529) adult citizens from the Southeast of Nigeria formed the sample that participated in the study. The sample

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was made up of 251 males and 278 females within the ages of 18 and 64 years with a mean age of 34.67 years. Participants were drawn from Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo States. Instrument Two instruments were used to design the questionnaire for data collection—the Ethical Moral-Self Inventory (EMSI) and the Political Participation Scale (PPS). The Ethical Moral-Self Inventory is one of the five scales in the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (TSCS) (Fits 1965). EMSI consists of the 28 Moral-Ethical Scale items on a 5-point response scale ranging from “Completely false” = 1 to “Completely True” = 5. EMSI has been developed into an independent inventory by Omoluabi (1999) owing to the increasing significance of morality in Nigerian clinical and social research. Morality, in the context of this scale, is conceptualized as the tendency of an individual to adopt the principles of fairness, equity, integrity, justice in guiding his or her behaviour in social interactions. The ethico-morality concept therefore covers more grounds than adopting the principle of right and wrong to evaluate social situations. The test–retest reliability coefficients obtained for the full TSCS test of which EMSI is a subscale are: 0.92 by Fits (1965) and 0.74 by Ezeilo (1982). Olukoye (1998) obtained a concurrent validity coefficient of −0.15 by correlating EMSI with the Index of Self-Esteem (Hudson 1982). The Nigerian norms score of 63.96 was the basis for the interpretation of the participants’ scores. Scores higher than the norm indicate high ethical and moral behaviour while scores lower than the norm indicate poor ethical and moral behaviour (Omoluabi 1999). The Political Participation Scale (PPS) is a modified version of Lodahl and Kejner’s (1965) Job Involvement Scale (JIS) which originally consists of 18-items, having a response format range from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. The coding also ranged from 1 to 5, respectively. Ejiogu (1986) adopted and validated the original scale in Nigeria with a split half reliability of 0.76. In adapting the scale for use in the present study, five lecturers from the Alex Ekwueme Federal University, NdufuAlike, Ikwo, Ebonyi State, Nigeria (3 from the Department of Political Science and 2 from the Department of Psychology) modified and examined the face and content validity of the original scale in terms of measuring political participation. In the process, the word “work” was replaced with “political activities” in items 1, 5 and 8; “my work/job”

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were replaced with “politics” in items 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14 while items 2, 10, 11, 16 and 18 were deleted. In all, the scale was left with 13 items to measure political participation. All the lecturers certified the face and content validity of the scale as modified, to ensure the measurement of political participation. The reliability of the scale was obtained through the test–retest reliability method using two-week interval responses of 60 Civil Servants drawn from 6 State-owned Ministries in Southeast Nigeria. The result of the test–retest yielded a high correlation coefficient of 0.65. Procedure The respondents were drawn by convenience sampling carried out on daily basis in the market places, churches and offices within a period of two weeks. A total of 600 paired copies of the questionnaire instrument (120 paired copies in each state) were distributed in the five states of the Southeast, Nigeria. Fifty-five (71) pairs of the questionnaire instrument were invalidated: 24 for not having been properly filled, and 47 for not having been returned, leaving us with 529 participants for data analysis (88.2% return). The total scores of each individual on the EMSI were interpreted and categorized. Scores higher than the general norm (which is 63.96) indicate higher ethical and moral behaviour while scores lower than the general norm indicate poor ethical behaviour. Participants’ scores on PPS were not categorized since the instrument was used only as criterion score in all the analyses. Statistics Two-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used for data analysis in order to test the study hypotheses. Results Table 6.1 shows that participants with poor ethical moral-self obtained a higher total mean of 35.00 (SD = 9.85) when compared with participants with higher ethical moral-self who obtained a lower total mean of 32.65 (SD = 12.56) on political participation. Male participants obtained a relatively equal total mean of 33.45 (SD = 12.43) when compared with females who obtained a total mean of 33.61 (SD = 11.03) on political

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Table 6.1 Means and Standard Deviations of ethical moral-self and gender on political participation Ethical moral-self

Gender

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Poor

Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total

35.3000 34.7851 34.9900 32.4636 32.8079 32.6494 33.4459 33.6107 33.5388

9.50470 10.10462 9.84936 13.65615 11.58258 12.56113 12.42912 11.03176 11.65146

80 121 201 151 177 328 231 298 529

High

Total

Table 6.2 ANOVA Summary of roles of ethical moral-self and gender on political participation Source

Sum of squares

Ethical Moral-Self Gender Ethical Moral-Self* Gender Error Total Corrected Total

df

Mean square

F

Sig

Observed power

701.375

1

701.375

5.188*

0.023

0.623

0.880 22.346

1 1

0.880 22.346

0.007 0.165

0.936 0.684

0.051 0.069

70,974.232 666,724.000 71,679.456

525 529 528

135.189

* Tested at p = 0.05

participation. ANOVA was used to test the significance of the observed mean differences. See Table 6.2. The result of the ANOVA in Table 6.2 shows that political participation is determined by the ethical moral-self at a p value of 0.05, F(1525) = 5.19, p = 0.02. Impliedly, there is a significant difference between the levels of influence of poor ethical moral-self and high/healthy ethical moral-self on political participation. The result indicates an insignificant influence of gender on political participation, and a non-significant interaction of ethical moral-self and gender on political participation.

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Table 6.3 Means and Standard deviations of high and poor ethical moral-self on political participation Ethical Moral-Self

Poor High

Mean

35.043 32.636

Std. Error

95% Confidence Interval

0.838 0.644

Lower bound

Upper bound

33.397 31.371

36.688 33.901

The result in Table 6.3 shows clearly the mean differences between poor and high/healthy ethical moral-self and the confidence intervals of these means.

Discussion The result of this study indicates that political participation is significantly determined by the ethical moral-self. This means that there was a significant difference between political participants with poor ethical moral-self and those with high or healthy ethical moral-self. Hence, the second hypothesis was accepted. Observation of the mean shows that people with poor ethical moral-self participate more in politics. This result is in agreement with Okafor et al. (2019) who observed that moral strength of political actors in Nigeria have been watered by poverty and corruption. The present result may not be a surprise because it represents a wider age group of adult citizens from the Southeast, Nigeria. Thus, the result seems to point to the current trend of weak political will to engage in progressive and sincerely political voyage. The result shows that ethical moral-self and gender have no significant interaction on political participation. This means that there was not a significant difference between males and females on political participation. This result contradicts Kern et al. (2015), Kasa (2015) who found that women were less active in politics when compared with men. The major tenet was that women were less educated; more restricted by physical strength and therefore less exposed to political opportunities. However, the result of the current study seems to have captured the reality of the current political dimension where more affirmative action is being taken to include women in politics. This leaves no significant difference between

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males and females on political participation. It seems therefore, that whatever matters in political participation is based on principles of decision and action. The result indicates an insignificant impact of gender and ethical moralself on political participation. This means that there was no synergy between gender and ethical moral-self in determining political participation.

Implications and Recommendations The result of this study has implications for political re-orientation of Nigerian citizens particularly in the Southeast zone. First, the political office holders should muster the political will to demonstrate that public trust is purely a mandate for selfless services. Second, the government should intensify the fight against corruption by avoiding the sacred cow scenarios. The effort should also be made in schools, colleges and universities to educate the teaming youth that service to fatherland is patriotic and self-denial.

Limitations of the Study One major limitation of this study is finance. The researchers were unable to reach a wider population of Nigerian citizens in the Southeast zone due to limited funds. Thus, data collection was focused only on a sample of 529 participants who were obtained in convenience. More funds would have ensured a rigorous hunt for more participants.

Conclusion This study investigated ethical moral-self and gender as determinants of political participation among Nigerian citizens of Southeast extraction. The result of the study shows that ethical moral-self significantly determined political participation; that gender is not a significant determinant of political participation, and that there is no significant interaction of ethical moral-self and gender on political participation. This result is in tandem with the current political trends in Nigeria. Notably, the trends expose negative social forces as demonstrated in the result of this study, that should be effectively contained. To this end, this study has the following conclusions:

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1. Political participation in Nigeria today is a matter determined by moral decay, and therefore represents a match against political and economic stability. 2. Gender has non-significant impacts on political participation in Nigeria. This proves that researchers on gender and political participation have been successful in ensuring that the place of women in key political positions is emphasized.

References Babatunde, H. O., Shaibu, M. T., & Ariyo, O. O. (2019). Money Politics in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Implications for Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation. Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Science, 7(4), 34–42. Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation. American Political Science Review, 89(2), 271–294. Centre for Democracy and Development. (2019). Nigeria Electoral Trends. Retrieved on 18/04/2019 from http://www.cddwestafrica.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/02/Nigeria-Elrctoral-Trends.pdf. Ejiogu, K.C. (1986). Reward Preference, Marital Status and Sex as Predictors of Job Involvement. Unpublished M.sc Thesis University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Ezeilo, B. N. (1982). Cross-Cultural Utility of the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale. Psychological Reports, 51, 897–898. Falade, D. A. (2014). Political Participation in Nigerian Democracy: A Study of Some Selected Local Government Areas in Ondo State, Nigeria. Global Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 14(8), 16–23. Fatile, J. O., Adepoju, O. A., Adepoju, E. C., & Ayeni, L. (2017). Women Participation in Local Governance and Nigeria Democratic System: A Study of Selected Local Governments in Lagos State (1999–2016). International Journal of Advanced Studies in Business Strategies and Management, 5(1), 52–86. Fatile, O. J., Akhakpe, I., Igbokwe-Ibeto, C. J., & Oteh, C. O. (2012). Feminism and Political Participation in Nigeria: An Empirical Analysis. International Journal of Asian Social Science, 2(7), 1077–1092. Fits, W. H. (1965). Manual for the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale. Nashville: Counsellor Recordings & Tests. Hudson, W. W. (1982). Index of Self-Esteem. The Clinical Measurement Package: A Field Manual. Chicago: Dorsey Press.

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Karl, M. (2001). Women and Empowerment: Participation and Decision-Making. London: Zed Books Ltd. Kasa, J. (2015). Challenges and Opportunities of Women Political Participation in Ethiopia. Global Journal of Economics, 3(4), 1–7. Kern, A., Marien, S., & Hooghe, M. (2015). Economic Crisis and Levels of Political Participation in Europe (2002–2010): The Role of Resources and Grievances. West European Politics, 38(3), 465–490. Lodahl, T. M., & Kejner, M. (1965). The Definition and Measurement of Job Involvement. Journal of Applied Psychology, 49, 24–33. Lucky, O. O. (2013). Money Politics and Vote Buying in Nigeria: The Bane of Good Governance. Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences, 4(4), 3 Quarter III. Retrieved on 20/12/2017 from www.onlineresearchjournals.com/aaj oss/art/116.pdf. Nnaji, I. M. (2009). Women and Democratic Governance in Nigeria: A Case Study of Enugu State. A Thesis dissertation: University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Ogbogu, C. O. (2012). The Role of Women in Politics and in the Sustenance of Democracy in Nigeria. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3(18): 182–119. Olukoye, E. I. (1998). The Effect of Age and Gender Differences on Morality and Self-Esteem of Nigerian Adolescents. Unpublished M.sc Research Project, Department of Psychology, University of Lagos. Okafor, C. O., Chinweze, C. U., Ani, C., Umoh, N. R., & Nwosumba, V. C. (2019). Political Participation and Ethical Moral-Self in face of Political Corruption: Exposing Psychology of Poverty. Paper presented at the International Conference on Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, held at the University of Lagos, Nigeria, December 4–6. Olsen, C., & George D. M. (2004). Cross-Sectional Study Design and Data Analysis. Illinois: Walden University Collage Board. Olufunke, A. J. (2014). Women’s Political Participation at the Local Government Level: A Case Study of Akoko South West Local Government Area, Ondo State, Nigeria. European Scientific Journal, August 2014 (Special Edition), 223–237. Omoluabi, P. F. (1999). Ethical Moral Self Inventory Manual. Department of Psychology, University of Lagos. Samuel, O., & Segun, J. (2012). Gender Relations in Nigeria’s Democratic Governance. Journal of Politics & Governance, 1(2/3), 4–15. Smets, K., & Van Ham, C. (2013). The Embarrassment of Riches? A MetaAnalysis of Individual Level Research on Voter Turnout. Electoral Studies, 32(2), 344–359.

CHAPTER 7

Justice Delivery and Electoral Dispute Resolution in Nigeria: The Extent, Challenges and Prospects Aluko Opeyemi Idowu

Introduction Elections in Nigeria since the independence in 1960 had been a ‘do-ordie’ affair among the contestants starting from party primaries to the Election Day and post-Election Day. In fact, the phenomenon of election disputes is ubiquitous starting from the first republic politics to the present fourth republic politics. Several lives were lost to election related matters and several valuable goods were equally destroyed. The principles of the end justify the means were widely utilised in the extreme negative destructive manner. This had created severe lacuna in the prospect of leadership in Nigeria (Aluko et al. 2019). The kind of leaders that emerges from such circumstances had lead Nigeria into deep political, economic and social shambles. The judicial arm of government is usually at the rescuing service for the political system. A few of the cases of electoral disputes since Nigeria

A. O. Idowu (B) Department of Political Science, Ajayi Crowther University, Oyo, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_7

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returns to democracy in 1999 were logically concluded and resolved by the judiciary. In each electioneering period, usually every four years’ intervals, which had resulted into six (6) 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 general elections so far in the fourth republic Nigeria, various degree of electoral dispute severity are the order of the day. In all the thirty-six states in Nigeria, there is an average of ten (10) reputed disputes per election types ranging from the Local Government to the State and the Federal Government contested public offices (Aluko 2020). All or many of the disputed cases in the elections are directed to the designated election tribunals at the various levels. These levels can be election tribunals for State or Federal Assemblies elections, gubernatorial election and Presidential elections. The election disputes arising from the Local government elections are directly under the state electoral commission and its election tribunal. Many election violence tumults that have the magnitude of disrupting the medium of governance and peaceful transition of political power and government, abridging the democratic process or even to the extent of disintegrating the country had been subsided by the judicial justice delivery system. With such novel rescue services by the judicial justice delivery system, there still persist some measures of electoral violence in the country (Aluko 2019). Even the disputed cases handled by the judiciary justice delivery mechanism had various extents of trust and acceptability among the contestants and the electorates. In some quarters, such as the presidential election dispute resolution and the gubernatorial election dispute resolutions, had created more lacuna and polarity in the political system other than the desired unity in diversity (Angerbrandt 2018). This phenomenon had cast a shadow on the prospect of the acceptability of the justice delivery system of the judiciary on the resolution of elections disputes in Nigeria by various stakeholders. The stakeholders in this case include the electorates, the political parties, the interest groups and the international observers. The objective of this study is to analyse how the justice delivery system impact electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria’s fourth republic and its extent. In a more lucid way, the question of concern is how does justice delivery system impact electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria’s fourth republic? As a compass to that, the extent of dispute generated, the extent of trusted by electorates and the level of satisfaction by political party or candidates on the electoral dispute resolution system in Nigeria will be analysed.

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The theoretical framework of broken window and tyre burning theory are used to buttress the analysis on the onset of mishap in a political system such as electoral violent, its aftermath and reasons why electoral violent are domicile as part of the lacuna in the system. Mixed research design is used to elicit data using the tools of questionnaire and interviews. The study is organised to introduce the subject of discussion, conceptual clarification, literature reviews on electoral dispute in Nigeria, forms of electoral disputes in Nigeria, research methodology and discussion of findings. Conclusion is premised on good governance and strong institutional framework to curtail the menace of election violence in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarification Justice Delivery The concept of justice delivery is an important term in the social sciences, humanities, law and other related disciplines. In its simplex form, the term justice delivery means a situation whereby a task is done effectively and efficiently as required by the rules and regulation guiding its operations. The concept of justice delivery is seldom interchanged with service delivery in management and administrative field of studies. Therefore, it is semantic across the disciplines. However, a service delivered may not actually be a justice delivered. The service delivered may not be in consonance with the laws enabling it. The central meaning and focus of justice delivery is on the principles of good governance and fairness, equity, equality and separation of power (Oyedele et al. 2018). The government’s conducts are expected to bring about justice delivery and not inequality, partiality and partisanships. Therefore, the executives, legislatives and the judiciary are expected to a large extent to exhibit the principle of justice delivery which is important in good governance. It is important to know what justice means at this point before examining how it is delivered. Justice in a civilised society’s justice system is a concept that means the mechanism that determines guilt in criminal cases, adjudicates on disputes between individuals, families and businesses, protects vulnerable children and allows the public to hold the Government to account (United Kingdom Ministry of Justice 2016).

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In civilised societies, laws are meant to be observed by both state officials and the citizens. Any social conflicts that arise are resolved through fair and prompt judicial decisions. Also, Polycom (2016) purported that justice delivery is about the rapidity, accessibility, accountability and transparency derived from the use of information communication technology (ICT) to enhance a resultant effect on the judiciary in providing quality and adequate services.

Broken Window and Tyre Burning Theories Electoral dispute is societal abnormal which is an evidence of a major breakdown in political, social and economic structures in the polity. A little abandonment of any aspect of the state administrative functions gives lee way for controversies to infiltrate the polity. The broken window theory explains the embryology of violence in the society why tyre burning theory shows the possible symbols of disputes. They explain the inextricably linked between the dimensions of electoral dispute and justice delivery in resolving the electoral disputes alongside the government and the causative agents of controversies. These theories are applicable because they explain electoral dispute as a disorder which can be resolved and curbed with certain political or policy adjustment in the polity. These indicators, as observed by Wilmot (1994) as well as Shelden and Brown (2003), revealed that the societal decay strengthened by poor governmental planning and execution of developmental policies, bring about unresolved dispute and violence. Other social vices coupled with disobedience to the law and constituted authorities cause violence amidst poverty. Therefore, electoral dispute resolution strategy must be provided by the government for peace and development in the country. The window-guard strategy is a mechanism which is applicable to prevent windows from being broken. It prevents socio-political and economic neglect in the polity. It safe guards the society’s window from being broken down by any individual, social or political group. The window-guard strategy is a dual monitoring mechanism, which employs both the general community members on the one hand, as the chief agent of safe guarding the polity for proper accountability, check and balance, the government official personnel—judiciary, on the other hand, is the counterpart of the window-guard strategy mechanism, which guides the general community members on the general principles to upheld so as to prevent the breakdown of law and order in the community.

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The tyre burning theory as used in this paper is embedded and as well as collaborated with the broken window theory. It has a continuation of perspective with the broken window theory. Tyre burning theory as pioneered by Aluko (2016) sees disputes, which include electoral dispute, crime and violence, as occurrences which are regular in human societies. According to Aluko, when people: ...get themselves together and move in cluster chanting offensively and agitating peacefully at the initial stage but suddenly get infuriated by either law enforcement interception, psychological over-stimulation or a planned work of the protesters. Suddenly the ply cards and banners turn to sticks and stones and the hallmark of the protest and violence is burning and destruction of properties such as cars, shops, motorcycles, houses and even human life. The final signature to be left on the major roads and pedestrian pathway after the end of the violence is carbons of incombustible tyres which is remains of the burnt tyres. Tyre burning is the hallmark of violent protest in a community which simply indicates a breach in law and order that the state security agencies could not nip to the bud before it onslaught. (Aluko 2018: 136–137)

Electoral Dispute in Nigeria The history of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria politics dates back to colonial era. From the 1950s, elections in Nigeria depict a war fought with bloodshed to determine who gets what, when and how. The weapons used include religion, ethnic sentiments, outright bribery, power of incumbency, corruption and the abuse of electoral processes among others (Alanamo 2005; Alfa 2011). Electoral behaviour in Nigeria has not been largely conditioned by some ideologies, party programmes or the merit of those standing to be elected, but by political calculation based on ethnic, religion, geopolitical location, power tussle at all costs among others (Alanamo 2005). In the 1960s, political parties were regionally biased. This makes electoral disputes to occur easily among the various regional aspirants. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) is based in the North, Action Group (AG) was in the West, while the National Council of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), was based in East. After independence, the first major national election by the political parties degenerated into conflict (Alfa 2011). More importantly, the election dispute within the AG affected the peace

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of the country and the 1964 elections at its conception, execution and outcome (Alanamo 2005). Alfa (2011) further noted that, the sources of the electoral disputes include the intimidation of the electoral officers to falsify electoral results and other records. Other source of the electoral dispute was the terrorising of the electoral officers in charge of elections to abscond from their offices (Olowojolu et al. 2019). However, the aftermath effects of the elections indicated that they have not learnt from their past mistakes because the processes were laced with electoral frauds that culminate into election violence. The 1998/99 general elections were a shadow of the previous elections in the country but a large extent, the large scale of bitterness, boycotts, thuggery and other malpractices usually associated with electoral process in the country were in a low ebb because Nigeria was just coming out of a prolong military rule that suspended electioneering campaigns and people are enthusiastic for a political change and civilian rule (Ikyase and Egberi 2015). This situation was a total turn around in the 2007 election process. It was a do-or-die affair. The past political feuds that characterised the first, second and third Republics in Nigeria were reincarnated (Aluko 2020). Election rigging in favour of the ruling political party was perpetuated on a large scale and electoral violence in politics was also a major issue of concern due to its nationwide spread. The 2015 general elections were harbinger of violence in some parts of the country especially in the North, but it witnessed a relative peace in the West and South. The reason for the relative peace was because the ruling political party led by President Goodluck Jonathan decided to allow peace to reign without using power of incumbency to frustrate the smooth process of the elections and plans of opposition political parties. Also, reason of electoral violence in the 2011 presidential election (the loss of Muhammad Buhari bid to become the president) was calmed as the incumbent president (Goodluck Jonathan) peacefully allowed the purported announced result of the INEC which declares Muhammad Buhari as the winner to take effect. Even at that, there were pockets of electoral offences and violence across the country for instance in Kwara State, Oyo State, Sokoto State, Taraba State, Kano state and Rivers State among others but it did not degenerate into a large scale or nationwide free-for-all fight as it was in the former elections (Olakunle et al. 2019).

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The international observers and other local observers as well acknowledged that the conceding of victory to the opposition political party and the respect for the peace agreements prior to the elections is a good trend in the peace building in elections in the history of elections in Nigeria (Aluko 2020).

Forms of Electoral Disputes in Nigeria The forms of electoral disputes in Nigeria are in different phases. They are categorised based on the sources of the disputes. Generally, the forms of the electoral disputes are hinged on the way and manner the laws guiding electoral conducts are infringed on (Omotola 2010). No doubt, laws regulate all aspects of human lives. This ranges from social laws to economic laws and political laws. The electoral process is no exception. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended, the Electoral Act 2010, as amended and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Rules and Regulations constitute the legal framework which regulate Nigeria’s electoral process. The forms and what constitute electoral disputes are specified in the electoral act. Electoral dispute is seen as what constitute as threat, whether physical, psychological and structural, to hinder or attempt to influence the outcome of the electoral process (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart 2010). Any conduct—action or inaction which is prohibited by the Constitution or the Electoral Act and any breach to it, constitutes electoral disputes. Electoral disputes may arise as a result of lapses from any of the electoral stakeholders, which include the election management body, Security Officials, Political Parties and their officials, Candidates, Observers, Journalists/Media Houses, individual or the general public (Jega 2015). Breaches or violations of some of these provisions often attract penalties against the offender. Nwolise (2007) and Aluko and Oyedele (2019) identified three forms of electoral dispute according to period of occurrence. These include; pre-election day disputes, election day disputes and post-election day disputes. The forms of electoral disputes can be further reclassified into four according to the nature of the electoral disputes. These include; (i) Physical (ii) Psychological (iii) Procedural and (iv) Structural.

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Methodology This study is on the impact of justice delivery on electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria. It will unravel how does justice delivery system impact electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria’s fourth republic? The variables in the topic include; justice delivery and electoral dispute resolution. Questionnaires were administered on the following stakeholders so as to obtain data on the research questions for this study; Fifty (50) Lawyers in each geopolitical zone will be systematically and purposively selected who had participated in the election dispute resolution within the three election periods across the Federal High Court, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. This will make a total of three hundred (300) samples. Interviews were conducted on some purposively selected personalities for this study. They include Politicians; twelve (12) people who had used the election tribunal to resolve their election crises, two across the six geopolitical Zones. Academics; six (6) academic scholars on Nigeria Elections will be selected and Legal jurists; twelve (12) legal officer who had participated in election dispute litigation, majorly Judges and one election Monitoring Group; Commonwealth Observer Group. A total of thirty (30) people were interviewed in all.

Discussion of Findings How does justicedelivery system impact electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria’s fourth republic? In order to test for the relationships and closeness among variables and to analyse the framework for electoral dispute resolution, data presentation and analysis are drawn from the instrument of questionnaire. Correlation analysis is carried out to test for multi-colinearity. Pearson Correlation revealed that the variables have strong positive correlations above 0.01 at two tail significant levels (0.620** , 0.479** , 0.281** , 0.751** and 1, respectively). This means that all the variables move in the same direction and multi-colinearity is absent. Therefore, the variables are suitable for analysis. The presentation and descriptive analysis of data to determine and analyse the extent of justice delivery by the electoral tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria is presented in Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.

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Table 7.1 Justice delivery System in Nigeria Justice delivery system generates more disputes Frequency Valid

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Total

Per cent

Valid per cent

Cumulative per cent

33.3 60.6 3.7 2.3 100.0

33.3 60.6 3.7 2.3 100.0

33.3 94.0 97.7 100.0

Per cent

Valid per cent

Cumulative per cent

23.1 63.9 10.2 2.8 100.0

23.1 63.9 10.2 2.8 100.0

23.1 87.0 97.2 100.0

72 131 8 5 216

Source Researcher’s Computation (2019), SPSS 16

Table 7.2 Extent of judicial delivery system Justice delivery system not trusted by electorates Frequency Valid

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Total

50 138 22 6 216

Source Researcher’s Computation (2019), SPSS 16

Table 7.3 Justice delivery low satisfactory level by party or candidate Justice delivery low satisfactory level by party or candidate Frequency Valid

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Total

64 137 9 6 216

Source Researcher’s Computation (2019), SPSS 16

Per cent

Valid per cent

Cumulative per cent

29.6 63.4 4.2 2.8 100.0

29.6 63.4 4.2 2.8 100.0

29.6 93.1 97.2 100.0

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JusƟce Delivery System Generates More Disputes 70 60 50 40 30 20

60.6

Percent

33.3

10

3.7

2.3

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

0 Strongly Agree

Agree

Fig. 7.1 Extent of justice delivery system in Nigeria

Table 7.1 shows the extent of justice delivery by the framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria. Justice delivery system generates more disputes. Table 7.1 and Fig. 7.1 revealed the extent of justice delivery by the electoral tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court framework of electoral dispute resolution whether or not it generates more disputes in Nigeria. It shows that the framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria generates more disputes. Thirty-three per cent (33%) strongly agreed to this while sixty-one per cent (61%) agreed. Six per cent (6%) a combination of disagree and strongly disagree affirmed that the framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria does not generate more disputes but rather resolves disputes. This implies that ninety-four per cent (94%), a combination of strongly agree and agree respondents, strongly affirmed that the extent of justice delivery on electoral dispute resolution, by the established frameworks in Nigeria, has generated more disputes. Therefore, justice is not delivered by the electoral dispute resolution framework in Nigeria. The interview respondents’ coded as a1–a6, c1–c3 and d1 all affirmed that the extent of justice delivery by the electoral tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria generate more disputes which are resolved out of court in most cases. However, b1–b4 interview respondents’ added that in the theoretical level, there are no avenues to resolve the disputes that remain unresolved after the Supreme Court’s verdicts, so, that technically

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quenches the unresolved disputes. Practically, the disputes remain prolong after the court process among the political parties. This usually lead to hatred and bitter campaign in the subsequent electioneering period. The studies of Nwangwu and Olihe (2016), Hamalai et al. (2017) and Obi (2018) also certify the fact that the extent of justice delivery by the electoral tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria generate more disputes despite the logical conclusions at the various courts of law. This implies that the study’s findings are significant and they are within the relevant framework of analysis. Table 7.2 shows the extent of justice delivery by the framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria. Justice delivery system not trusted by electorates. Table 7.2 and Fig. 7.2 reveal the extent of justice delivery by the electoral tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria as trusted or not trusted by the electorates. It shows that the existing framework does not earn the trust of the electorates in Nigeria. Twenty-three per cent (23%) strongly agreed to this, while sixty-four per cent (64%) agreed. However, thirteen per cent (13%) a combination of disagree and strongly disagree, respectively, affirmed that the electoral dispute resolution framework is trusted by the electorates. This implies that eight seven per cent (87%) a combination of strongly agree and agree respondents significantly affirmed that the extent JusƟce Delivery System not Trusted by Electorates 70 60 50 40 63.9

30

Percent

20 10

23.1

10.2

2.8

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

0 Strongly Agree

Agree

Fig. 7.2 Extent of judicial delivery system

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of justice delivery on electoral dispute resolution by the established frameworks of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria does not earn the trust of the electorates. Therefore, the electoral dispute resolution framework is not trusted by the electorates. The interview respondents’ a1–a6, c1–c3 and d1 all affirmed that the extent of justice delivery by the electoral tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria are not significantly trusted by the electorates due to high levels of political interference and inadequate independence of the judiciary on election matters. The studies of Carbone and Cassani (2016), Hamalai et al. (2017) and Khan et al. (2017) also certify the fact that the extent of justice delivery by the electoral tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria are not significantly trusted by the electorates due to high levels of political interference, the use of power of incumbency, poor election management, low level of information technology deployment and inadequate independence of the judiciary on election matters. This implies that the study’s findings are significant and they are within the relevant framework of analysis. However, b1–b4 interview respondents’ opined that the trust level in the judiciary is low but gradually improving at each election conducted, which is evident in the reduced extent of election violence after the cycles of the judiciary dispute resolution process. Table 7.3 shows the extent of justice delivery by the framework of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria. Justice delivery has low satisfactory level by political party or candidates. Fig. 7.3 reveal the extent of satisfaction on justice delivery by the electoral tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court framework of electoral dispute resolution by political party and or candidate in Nigeria. They show the extent of satisfaction by the political party or candidates in Nigeria. Thirty per cent (30%) strongly agreed that the political parties and candidates have low level of satisfaction on the justice delivery system in Nigeria. Sixty-three per cent (63%) agreed to this assertion. Seven per cent (7%), a combination of disagree and strongly disagree opined that the satisfactory level by political party or candidates on the extent of justice delivery in Nigeria is not low. This implies that ninety-three per cent (93%), a combination of strongly agree and agree respondents strongly affirm that the extent of satisfaction derived from the justice delivery frameworks on electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria by the political

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70 60 50 40 63.4

30 20 10

Percent

29.6 4.2

2.8

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

0 Strongly Agree

Agree

Fig. 7.3 Justice delivery low satisfactory level by party or candidate

parties and candidates is low. Therefore, the satisfactory level by the political parties or candidates on the extent of justice delivery in Nigeria is low. The interview respondents’ c1–c3 and d1 all affirmed that the extent of satisfaction on justice delivery by the electoral tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court framework of electoral dispute resolution by political party and candidate in Nigeria is significantly low. The a1– a6 interview respondents opined that the party or candidate that achieve justice through the judiciary mechanism will always be satisfied while the loser will not. A departure from this assertion was the late President Musa Yar’ Adua’s confession that the election that brought him to office is neither free nor fair. The general level of satisfaction can be improved through free and fair electoral process without using power of incumbency to win elections. However, b1–b4 interview respondents’ opined that it is difficult for the political party or candidate to trust the cycles of the judiciary dispute resolution process if it did not favour them. The empirical studies of Suberu (2007), Bello (2015), Carbone and Cassani (2016) and Nwankwo (2018) also certify the facts that the extent of satisfaction by political party and or candidate in Nigeria on justice delivery by the electoral tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court framework of electoral dispute resolution is significantly low due to high levels of judicial inconsistency, politicisation of election dispute resolution and inadequate independence of the judiciary on election matters. This implies that the study’s findings are significant and they are within the relevant framework of analysis.

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Conclusion The extent of dispute generated in the general elections in Nigeria is enormous. Out of every single general election, disputes of all forms are evidence. The sources of the disputes are numerous. Some of them include institutional faults from the electoral institution (National Electoral Commission INEC) such as errors in political party registrations, omissions of names from the ballot papers, postponement of elections among others. From political party aspect of the disputes, many party primaries are haphazardly conducted with multiple winners, leading to confusion at the ballots, and the use of political hoodlums to stuff ballots, kidnap opponent, disrupt election proceedings and harass voters. Disputes also arise from pending court adjudication processes yet the candidate is on the ballot paper. All of these disputes points to the sources of the lacuna in the elections in Nigeria. This study revealed that the extent of trust by electorates on the justice delivery system in the quest to resolve electoral disputes is less significant. Only thirteen per cent (13%) of the electorates trusted the electoral dispute justice resolution system in Nigeria. This implies that eight seven per cent (87%) of the electorates which is a very significant number affirmed that the extent of justice delivery on electoral dispute resolution by the established frameworks of electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria is not trusted. Therefore, the justice delivery system need to embark on the re-orientation of the electorates, ensuring the best practice in the system and transparency procedures with the rule of law and supremacy of the constitution as the hallmark principles so as to earn the trust of the electorate. The study also revealed that the level of satisfaction by the political party or candidates on the electoral dispute resolution system in Nigeria is not significant. Only about seven per cent of the political parties or candidates are satisfied with the justice delivery of the electoral dispute resolution system in Nigeria. However, it is important to note that these negligible numbers are majorly the ruling political party and their respective candidates. This implies that ninety-three per cent (93%) of the political parties or candidate’s extent of satisfaction derived from the justice delivery frameworks on electoral dispute resolution in Nigeria is low. Therefore, the satisfactory level by the political parties or candidates on the extent of justice delivery in Nigeria is poor, weak, insignificant

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and low. The electoral system needs to be restructured to include transparency in the transmission of electoral results from all polling units to the designated central coordinating unit. Good governance and strong institutional framework are inevitable tools needed to curtail the menace of election violence in Nigeria. The primary reason why electorates embark on various electoral mishaps is due to the high level of poverty, unemployment, corruption, gerrymandering, nepotism, ethnic chauvinism, religious bigotry and high presence of small and light weapons in the political system among others. The government need to be proactive and responsive to the needs of the citizens so as to reduce the menace of poverty and violence. This will in turn lead to prudent and acceptable electoral system, political stability, economic growth and sustainable development in the country.

References Alanamo, A. (2005). Issues in political violence. Hamson Printing Communication. Alfa, P.I. (2011). Political parties and democratic consolidation in Nigerians (2007–2011). Journal of Policy and Development Studies, 5(5), 49–160. Aluko O.I (2016). Policing election and electoral violence in developing democracies Indian Philosophical Quarterly, 37 (1–4). Aluko, O.I. (2018). Gang and urban violence prevalence on democratic sustenance. ABAC Journal, 38(1). Aluko O.I. (2019). Political culture of violence in developing democracies Nigeria political science association journal studies in politics and society (Non-Thematic Edition) Vol. 7. Aluko, O.I. (2020). Trust and reputation in Nigeria’s electoral process: The context and conundrum. The Africa Review and Brill (Netherland), 46(2), 333–348. Aluko, O.I., & Oyedele, S.O. (2019). Election quagmire and vote buying lacuna in Nigeria’s democracy. Quarterly Journal of Administration, 37 (1). Aluko, O., Ogunseye, I., & Adeyemi, H. (2019). Poverty and electoral challenges in Nigeria. Lapai Journal of Humanities, 10(1). Angerbrandt, H. (2018). Deadly elections: Post-election violence in Nigeria. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 56(1), 143. Bello, S.K. (2015). Political and electoral violence in Nigeria: Mapping, evolution and pattern. IFRA-Nigeria Working paper Series. Carbone, G., & Cassani, A. (2016). Nigeria and democratic progress by elections in Africa. Africa Spectrum, 51(3), 33–59.

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Hamalai, L., Egwu, S., & Omotola, J. S. (2017). Party politics in the 2015 Nigerian elections. In Nigeria’s 2015 general elections (pp. 183–201). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Ikyase, T.J., & Egberi, A.E. (2015). Political violence and democratic stability in Nigeria: Reflecting on the past and chatting the way forward. Review of Public Administration and Management 4(8), December. Jega, A.M. (2015). Electoral reforms in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects. Presentation at the First University of Abuja Public Lecture Series, Thursday October 29, 2015. Khan, H.U., Bankole, O.A., & Alomari, M.K. (2017). Possible effect of IT introduction into the election process: A case study of Nigeria. International Journal of Business Forecasting and Marketing Intelligence, 3(2), 109–129. Nwankwo, C.F. (2018). Vote buying in the 2018 governorship election in Ekiti State, Nigeria. Open Political Science, 1(1), 93–97. Nwangwu, C., & Olihe A.O. (2016). Electoral laws and monitoring of campaign financing during the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 17 (4), 614–634. Nwolise, O.B.C. (2007). Electoral violence and Nigeria’s 2007 elections. Journal of African Elections, 6(2). Obi, N. N. (2018). Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity in election programming in Nigeria. Journal of Nation-Building & Policy Studies, 2(1), 49–71. Olakunle, O., Bamidele, R., & Modupe, A. (2019). Trends in electoral violence in Nigeria. Journal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, 11(1). Olowojolu, O., Rasak, B., Ake, M., Ogundele, O., & Afolayan, M. (2019). Trends in electoral violence in Nigeria. Journal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, 11(1), 37–52. Omotola, J. S. (2010). Mechanisms of post-election conflict resolution in Africa’s ‘new’ democracies. African Security Review, 19(2), 2–13. Onwudiwe, E., & Berwind-Dart, C. (2010). Breaking the cycle of electoral violence in Nigeria. US Institute of Peace. Oyedele, S.O., Omede, A.J., & Aluko, Opeyemi. (2018). E-Governance in Africa: Prospect and challenges International Journal of Administration and Development Studies IJADS, 8(1). Polycom. (2016). White paper: Enhancing courts and justice with technology—A polycom perspective. www.polycom.com. Accessed 2/4/2018. Shelden, G., & Brown, W. (2003). Criminal justice in America: A critical view. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Suberu, R. T. (2007). Nigeria’s muddled elections. Journal of Democracy, 18(4), 95–110. United Kingdom Ministry of Justice (2016). Transforming our justice system: Summary of reforms and consultation. Presented to Parliament by the Lord

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Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice by Command of Her Majesty Crown. Wilmot, P. (1994). Sociology of African independence and nationalism. In O. Otite (Ed.), Sociology: Theory and applied (pp. 181–194). Lagos: Malthouse Press.

CHAPTER 8

An Assessment of the Legal Framework Put in Place to Curb Electoral Violence in Nigeria O. A. Ayodele

Introduction An election is an important element of a democratic system of government and democracy has been defined as government of the people, by the people and for the people. Democracy practically is a social structure of governing a country where political parties and independent candidates vie for elective spots in a forthright election environment, and in which the populace are lawfully allowed to decide those who will run the goings-on of the state in a particular tenure. An election is a vital part of a democratic exercise which allows the electorate to decide fairly and freely who should govern them at every stage of administration from time to time as well as make resolutions that form the political fate of the people; and in the event that the elected one’s flounder, still have capability to remove the political appointees

O. A. Ayodele (B) Department of Business and Private Law, Osun State University, Oshogbo, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_8

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instantly or cause them to be deselected in the subsequent election. Hence, election is a foremost tool used to appoint political management in democratic environments; the mode of involvement in an egalitarian society; and the way of sanctioning an administration; with the masses given the opportunity to select as well as evaluate politically elected appointees who in a sense stand for the governed. In this context Nigeria being a democratic nation has conducted a series of elections in the past, and politicians and other political gladiators had played one role or the other in the rise and fall of democracy. The next sub-topic will give the historical pespectives on electoral violence in Nigeria, background of the elections and the attendance violence. Historical Perspectives on Electoral Violence in Nigeria The first elective principle was introduced by the then governor of Nigeria Sir Hugh Clifford. It was a limited franchise; it was either limited by tax or sex. The election took place in Lagos and Calabar, 3 seats and 1 seat respectively (Ikpeze 2010: 228). The 1922 elective was adjusted to incorporate facilities for Electoral Colleges at the Regional by way of the increase in appearance of Nigerian citizens in the House of Representatives (which contained 148 members) from this body 136 were elected in 1951 (Ikpeze 2010: 229). The earliest detailed and comprehensive electoral law i.e. the Electoral Regulations (1958) for the House of Representatives was constructed and was amended afterwards in 1959 to Federal Legislative House Regulations (Okereka 2015: 5). Nigeria’s political history is pervaded with instances of electoral fighting. The events that took place before independence in 1960 showed that Nigerian nation was a marriage of inconvenience. It started with the minority agitation in 1950s, which led to the compromises arrived at under the independence constitution. Each region was more committed to itself at the detriment of the centre. Shortly after Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960 the ethnic groups began a fierce battle among themselves to gain political control at the federal level. Elections being the only vehicle to convey politicians to political power became “a do or die” affair. The events marked with pillaging and the progression of dishonest, cruel and discreditable and disreputable governments as obscuring history of the Country’s newly found autonomy. This depiction is appropriate seeing as Nigerians developed a behavioural pattern of electoral violence when all general elections (apart from the 1993 general

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election), held as far back after the 1960 independence, were plagued by violence—1964/1965, 1979, 1983, 1999, 2003 and 2007. The general elections of 2011, 2015 and 2019 were equally violent. Nigeria has adopted different types of political formula since independence, for instance, similar to the British parliamentary system of government, Nigeria also operated this type of system of government between 1960 and 1966. The election conducted post-independence during the then administration led by Tafawa Balewa/Nnamdi Azikwe (Prime Minister and President, respectively) in 1964 and 1965 were fraught with prevalent bemoaning of fraud, intimidation and violence (Osaghae 1998). There were protests after and during the Western regional elections of 1964, the elections were said to have been allegedly rigged by the then Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP), with the support of its allied party Northern People’s Congress (NPC) (the ruling party at the federal level). The protests degenerated into pervasive aggression and inter-communal rioting that saw the loss of hundreds of lives (Anifowose 1982; HRW 2007). In 1965, a general election took place at the federal level, which was allegedly rigged by the NPC led Federal Government and marred with violence. The violence continued unabated, until the Nigerian military came with force precisely on the 15th of January, 1966 when the arising free will of the Nigerian people to choose as they will be truncated by the military intervention in politics (Abdulsalami 2013: 93). The military stayed in power for the next thirteen years and in 1979, they relinquished power to a new democratic administration governed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari under the auspices of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). At the close of its 4 year tenure, the civilian administration headed by Shagari established a transition election to the next civilian government however, history repeated itself, it was massively rigged with the connivance of the body responsible for overseeing the elections at that time, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) together with security personnel (Ogbeidi 2013: 48). That once more determined a recurring of military intrusion in the country’s dealings of state on December 31, 1983. The Administration continued in power until 29 May 1999. It is important to put on record that there was an aborted attempt by the General Ibrahim Babangida led administration to democratize in 1993. The effort to democratize was aborted by the said administration for the reason best known to it. After truncating the process, the military

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junta installed Interim National Government (ING), which was equally thwarted by a “palace coup” in November 1993 (HRW 2007). It suffices to say that between 1960 and 1999 when civilian rule was reinstated, Nigeria furnished only two elected governments and both were toppled in a military coup d’état ahead of finishing their second terms in office. When added up together, the armed forces of the Federation ruled the Nigerian state for almost 30 years of her 40 years’ post-independence, not including the brief three months of provisional National Government (ING) (HRW 2007). However, from the time of the return to democracy, ample efforts are yet to be made by policymakers to reinforce democratic values. Rather, history keeps replaying itself in the country through the continual cases of bribery, corruption and fraudulent elections which resulted into violence in the first place. The 1999, 2003 and 2007 general elections which saw President Olusegun Obasanjo and afterwards late President Umaru Yar’ Adua elected as the First men respectively were flawed by such prevalent violence and fraud. President Umaru Umaru Yar’Adua attested to the corruption, when he remarked that the election that caused his election was marred with a lot of irregularities. Furthermore, Jimmy Carter, a US-based Centre for Democracy, an international observer that monitored the 1999 election, observed in its report about the results of the presidential election as follows: “It is not possible for us to make an accurate judgment about the outcome of the presidential election” (HRW 2007). Likewise, the 2003 elections were more extensively and brazenly falsified than the flawed 1999 polls, and far bloodier ( 2010: 52). These happenings prepared the way for what the national and international observers in a nutshell reported as the most terrible in Nigerian election history, i.e. the 2007 elections, categorized along with the worst, around the world in modern times (HRW’s interviews with the electorate and bystanders on the April 2007 elections). An example of one of such observers is a US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) which reported after the elections were held, that the electoral process “failed the Nigerian people”. The failed elections threw a negative and extremely open light on patterns of brutality, corruption and sheer lawlessness that happens to signify Nigeria’s political climate and to the degree that administrators and agencies at all stages of government allow, embolden and contribute in these happenings.

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The 2011 election was also held amidst fear of the fact that Nigeria may break up. Although, the election was conducted, it was fraught with irregularities and violence. Thereafter, various militia groups were formed all over the nation to frustrate the incumbent government which was eventually voted out in 2015 (Suberu 2019: 16). But the seed of discord sown has germinated and it is now a bane to peace and order today in the country.

Conceptual Clarifications For better understanding of some concepts that will be used in this paper, I shall explain the following: Legal framework, Political violence, Electoral violence and Electoral offences. Legal Framework A framework is a set of principles or ideas that is used when one is forming decisions and judgements about particular matters (Macmillan English Dictionary 2007: 595). Therefore, a legal framework is a system of rules, laws/statutes that establish the way business, politics or society operates. Likewise a legal framework for election regulates the electioneering activities in the polity. In Nigeria for instance, the conduct of elections is regulated by various laws/statutes, including the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN), 1999 as amended, the Electoral Act 2010, as amended and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Rules and Regulations. Political Violence Political violence is a summation of aggression and brutality that is linked to the mechanisms adopted by governing agencies (Obakhedo 2011: 101). It can either arise out of the country itself or beyond the shores of the country; and is usually expressed in diverse ways. The root cause of political violence in Nigeria is electoral violence (Okafor 2011: 1). For instance, Nigerians were dissatisfied with the cancellation of the June 12 presidential election and the subsequent installation of the Interim National Government by the military junta. This degenerated into political violence leading to the development of vociferous and violent groups, for example, National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Niger Delta

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freedom fighters (Egobueze and Ojirika 2017: 4). Also, political violence can be described as a substantial ruinous use of force and coercion executed by a single person or group of persons in a political environment against another person or persons and/or property so as to inflict injury or cause death to persons and/or damage to property (Abdulmajeed 2013: 28). The aim of whom are, the target of victims, adjoining conditions, realization and results possess political significance, and is meant to alter the inclination of the masses in the obtainable orchestration of government authority. Furthermore, it is aimed at modifying the politic, structures, government jurisdiction and therefore also aimed at making a difference in peoples’ existence in communities (Anifowose 1982). Electoral Violence Electoral violence as a concept has no generally accepted definition. And it is due to the controversial question of “violence begets violence” advanced by Frantz Fanon in the age of opposition to colonial rule. The Fanonian dispute bases its premise on the verity that “violence provokes violence”. Hence, there exist supporters of those who strike back to the initial violence of political adversaries as they resist the belief that these persons are carrying out violence. These theorists opined that defensive violence is an act of resisting their opponent’s aggression. They see their counter attack as an act self defence. From the range of definitions available, one can garner a functional definition. A working definition of electoral violence, therefore, will be all forms of violence before, during and after elections (Obakhedo 2011: 101). Electoral violence is a type of political violence. Nevertheless, electoral violence can be differentiated from the political violence family by its singular goal. It is perpetrated by politicians and their supporters (this type of violence takes place close to an election and during elections), to clinch to power by all means. Really, it is designed at influencing/modifying the behavioural voting pattern of the voters, candidates or misrepresenting the results of the elections (Ibeogu and Ikwede 2016: 1608). For this reason, it strives to stay, stop the vote or assemblage of votes, with the aim of obtaining results, which do not indicate the outcome of the ballot box (Ibeogu and Ikwede 2016: 1609).

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Electoral Offences Any behaviour—action or inaction which is forbidden by the Constitution or the Electoral Act and a contravention of which imposes a penalty, is called an electoral offence. The electoral Act 2010 (as amended) is the main legal structure for the running of elections in Nigeria. It provides rules and regulations to ensure free and fair election. Its rules must be obeyed, any violation of its rules is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The Electoral Act contains what should be done and what must not be done. Individuals, groups and political parties, including the electoral body may commit electoral offences and such offenders are liable to criminal trials and sanctions, if convicted. Some of the electoral offences are offences against voter registration (section 117), misconduct at political gatherings (section 119), improper use of voter’s card (section 120), masquerading and voting when not eligible (section 122), neglect of duty by electoral official (section 123), bribery and conspiracy (section 124), and Offence on election day (section 129).

The Influence of Regional and International Instruments The importance of order and transparent electoral system cannot be overemphasized in countries around the world if democracy would thrive (Diamond 2002). Thus, in order to strengthen the practice of democracy, preserve peace and eradicate violence, together with electoral violence, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has established e a number of mechanisms, as well as the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. The Protocol lays out stringent observance with constitutional provisions in electoral practices. Accordingly, it prohibits securing or maintaining power via unconstitutional methods and explains the framework for the conduct of orderly, reliable, free, fair and open elections. ECOWAS has taken some giant stride in recent years. This is with regard to the time when Late Laurent Gbagbo (former President of Cote D’Ivoire), tried to sabotage constitutionalism and it starkly disallowed the said bid through the implementation of regional instruments of inaugurating elective rulership. It threatened to exercise force as an alternative in settling the issue. ECOWAS in addition to this, exerted penalties on a number of its member states. Countries like Niger, Togo and Cote

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D’Ivoire have been suspended for illegal methods used, for instance, wrongful application of the constitution, as well as Guinea and Mali for unlawful government take-over. Accordingly, there is no tolerance shown for power gotten or maintained by unconstitutional means and this is growing into the standard in ECOWAS. The agreement between the member states is that democracy and elective governance are inflexible. The next step taken by ECOWAS is to ensure violent free elections and it has put in place some mechanisms which include investigative assignment and bystander admission. The investigative goal is a review mission taken before conduct of elections. During this phase, ECOWAS offers a variety of types of specialized and monetary aid to member states. The election observation mission which also classes the observer mission ends immediately after the election results are declared publicly. Unfortunately, lacking in post-elections is the tracking mission; hence that ECOWAS can’t keep an eye on the procedures of judicial disputes that accompany defective or rigged elections. Judicial disputes, usually poorly controlled are the source of in-fighting in the communities. ECOWAS has taken steps through its court to ensure free and fair elections, for instance, SERAP v The Federal Republic of Nigeria ( ECW/CCJ/APP/0808) is a matter where the Court held that “the right of Nigerian children to free, quality and compulsory basic education, as the most effective way to address the root causes of the post-election violence and killing”. The problem, though, is that the Court lack enforcement power. It depends on member states’ cooperation to enforce what has been decided. This system evidently invalidates the endeavour put in by the judicial sector. The member state powers repeatedly discount the judgements of the Court. Additionally, today values of democratic governance are typically shared among African countries. This is classified as among the most important concerns of the AU including some regional economic communities. The African Union (AU) also adds to lowering electoral violence through its 2012 Memorandum of Understanding on Stability, Development, and Cooperation. This Memorandum points to the fact that those open and trustworthy elections are a crucial part, which promotes reverence for the fundamental and universal right to peoplecentred and democratic governance. It also prohibits unlawful changes of government.

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Institutional Framework The Nigerian Constitution, 1999 (as amended) and the Electoral Act established an Electoral body charged with the task of overseeing elections in Nigeria. Currently, at the federal level, the Independent National Electoral Commission was established it was also established at the state level by the state governments. However, this paper shall be limited to assessing the effectiveness of the electoral body at the federal level, which oversees the Presidential, National Assembly, Gubernatorial and State Assembly Elections. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established in 1998 to anchor and manage the conduct of elections in Nigeria. The electoral body in Nigeria has come under different names, for example, the body was known as Federal Electoral Commission FEDECO during the 1979 and 1983 elections, but now known as the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Electoral violence is linked in Nigeria with poorly conducted elections. The political elite perpetrates different forms of irregularities in a bid to gain power. However, the June 12, 1993 general election conducted by Professor Humphrey Nwosu is still viewed as the most secure and fairest election ever conducted in the history of Nigeria in which late Chief M.K.O Abiola was recognized to have won. The June 12, 1993 election looking out the past and present elections, it can be avowed that the extent of patron–client syndromes; monetized politics; bullying and rigging were at its most reduced form (Badejo and Obah-Akpowoghaha 2015). However, the elections of 1999 and 2003 that were held under the leadership of Justice Ephraim Akpata and Sir Abel Guobadia respectively, were reported marred with wide spread violence, different forms of irregularities and there was evidence of fraud particularly during results collation processes (Adejumobi 2007). Professor Maurice Iwu took the mantle of leadership of the electoral body in 2005; he was accused of conducting the most controversial elections when compared to past and present electoral chairs. The election of 2007 was marred by massive irregularities, obvious favouritism. The Nigerian government was criticized by Nigerians and foreign observers for conducting elections that fell below acceptable democratic standard. It was too obvious that the late President

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Umaru Musa Yar’Adua admitted that the election that caused him to be president in 2007 was far from free and fair. President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan nominated Professor Attahiru Muhammadu Jega as the new chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 2010 and conducted the 2011 general election and that of 2015. The body expended a huge sum of money on the technological registration process, and in staffing so as to guarantee that the elections were free and fair. Nevertheless, this could not prevent fraud during the elections as there were reports of irregularities and election malpractices (Suberu 2019: 16). As from 2015, political violence took another dimension with the existence of ethnic militia groups, namely Boko Haram, Bakassi boys, Niger Delta Avenger, Odua People’s Congress. The unscrupulous politicians drew from these bodies for themselves bodyguards and used them to disrupt elections.

Legal Framework The Legal framework which regulates our electoral process is made up of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN), 1999 as amended, the Electoral Act 2010, as amended and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Rules and Regulations. These include the constitutional provisions, legislation, rules, regulations and procedures that manage the electoral system design layout, the pattern of electoral institutions and bodies, and the execution of electoral activities. An inclusive, fair, succinct and unchallenged legal and institutional framework composes in itself a high point towards successful and orderly elections (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2018). Constitutional Provisions The Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended provided for legislative and executive powers (sections 4 and 5). It provided for a presidential system of government. The president is to be elected in a general election (section 132). The Executive Governor is elected to govern the state at the said state level. The legislative power is shared at the federal level by the Senate and the House of Representatives (section 47). Adequate provisions are also made concerning the state Houses of Assembly (section 90).

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Elections conducted into the: (a) Offices of President and Vice President; (b) Offices of Governor and Deputy Governor; (c) National Assembly- to wit- (The Senate and House of Representatives); (d) State Houses of Assembly; (e) Offices of Chairmen/Vice-Chairmen of Area Councils (FCT); and (f) Offices of Chairmen/Vice-Chairmen of Area Councils (FCT); and (g) Offices of Councilors of Area Councils Legislature (FCT) (section 78) are carried out by the Commission. The State Electoral Commission is responsible for being tasked with the conduct of election into the offices of the chairmen and councillors at the local government level. The election time is of importance to the smooth running of an election. This is more important to ensure that an administration does stay beyond its mandatory tenure. The election timetable should be in consonance with the constitutional provision and the electoral laws (section 76 of 1999 CFRN). Section 25 of the present Electoral Act stipulates that the elections into each House of the National Assembly, the House of Assembly of a State and Presidential elections is to be held in a period fixed by the INEC Commission pursuant to the Constitution and the Electoral Act (section 25(1)). However, the National Assembly in the proposed amendment sought to change the order of election as follows: National Assembly Elections, State Houses of Assembly and Governorship Elections and Presidential election. It was rumoured that the President would abandon the lawmakers if he contested first. And it was also believed that this proposed change in the election timetable was one of the reasons the president refused to assent to the bill (Sahara Reporters 2018). Persons Entitled to Vote In pursuance of universal adult suffrage enshrined in the constitution, an individual should be registered and his/her name should appear on the Register of Voters, presents himself/herself physically (not by proxy) at the Polling Unit he/she was registered and upon the presentation of a valid voter card is qualified to take part in an election carried out by the Commission (sections 77 and 78). On Election Day, the electorate will utilize their right to take part in an election in favour of aspirants of their choosing. The political aspirants are chosen by the aspirants’ individual parties to contest elections shall be voted through a electoral system known as the “Re-Modified Open-Secret

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Ballot System” (REMOBS). For this process, voters affix their thumbprint on the ballot paper in favour of aspirants in a hidden manner and cast the votes openly. This is a multi-party found system where candidates campaign for the purpose of being elected into office on the forum provided by the political parties (Manual for Election Officials 2015: 8 updated version). Election Tribunal Adequate provision is made in the constitution to redress any wrong done during the election. No aggrieved party is permitted to take laws into their hands. As such the constitution established special courts to expeditiously tried election-related petitions (section 285 (1)). The section provides that the National Assembly Election Tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a person has been validly elected as a member of the National Assembly or not and will also determine when the office is vacant. Every state in Nigeria has similar provisions (section 285 (2)). It is important to note that a time limit of 6 months is set for the Tribunals and the appellate Courts to conclude post-election matters. In the matters of petition concerning presidential election section 239 (1) of the 1999 constitution provides that the Court of Appeal shall, to the exclusion of any other court of Law in Nigeria, have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any question as to whether a candidate is validly elected as President or Vice-President or whether the office has become vacant or not. The Electoral Act, 2010 The Act prohibits certain behaviours before, during and immediately after election. Anyone who flouts the provisions of the Act is said to have committed Electoral offence. Some of these offences are: Offences with reference to the nomination (section 118), Disruptive conduct at political gathering (section 119), Inappropriate use of voters’ cards (section 120), Inappropriate use of automobiles (section 121), Assuming a different identity in order to vote when not eligible (section 122), Neglect of responsibility (section 123), Bribery and conspiracy (section 124), obstruction of confidentiality assured in voting (section 125), Unlawful voting and erroneous statements (section 126), Voting by those not registered to vote (section 127), Disruptive behaviour at elections

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(section 128), Offences on election day (section 129), Financial inducement (section 130) and Threatening (section 131). These offences and the punishment attached are hereunder discussed seriatim. Offences regarding the nomination of candidates for election attract a prison sentence of at most, 2 years on conviction. Viewed as a very serious offence is the offence of printing of ballot paper or what is considered thus and has the ability of being used as a ballot paper or result forms at an election and it attracts a penalty of N50,000,000 or for a prison sentence of a minimum of 10 years or to both. The Electoral Act frowns at disorderly behaviour at political meetings, especially where the persons involved have in their possession offensive weapons or missiles; the offender will be punished upon conviction to a fine of not more than N500,000 or imprisonment for 12 months or both (section 119). Where a person possesses additional Voter’s cards or purchases, trades, procures or deals in voters’ cards different from what is obtainable under Act, such person commits a crime and is liable in being found guilty to a penalty not exceeding the sum of N1,000,000 or a prison term of a period of 12 months or both (section 120). The wrongful utilization of vehicle at election attracts punishment upon conviction to a penalty not more than N1,000,000 or a prison sentence imposed for the period of 12 months or both (section 121). Section 122 forbids impersonation and under age voting, whosoever assumes another’s identity or who aids, abets, counsels or procures the committing of a crime, commits a criminal act and is subject if found guilty to a penalty of not more than N500,000 or a prison sentence of a duration of 12 months or both (section 122 (2)). Any officer in dereliction of duty is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to a maximum fine of N500,000 or imprisonment for 12 months or both (section 123). Section 124 prohibits bribery and conspiracy, selling and buying of votes at the time of election. Whoever carries out the offence of bribery is subject upon being found guilty to a penalty of not more than N500,000 or a prison term of 12 months or both. Anyone who plots with another person, aids or abets some other person to perpetrate any of the offences contained in section 124 of this Act will be held culpable of the same offence and punishment prescribed for such act.

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Section 125 of the Electoral Act enjoins all those physically present during a voting exercise together with every officer given the responsibility for the carrying out of an election including every such officer’s assistants and all polling agents and runners present at a polling booth or where votes are being counted, as the case may be, to preserve and assist in preserve the confidentiality of casting of votes. It went further to say that no person shall gain in a polling unit personal details about the aspirant for whom a voter in that unit intends to vote for or has voted for; (section 125 (3) (a)) or convey in any moment to anyone data collected in a polling unit as to the aspirant to whom a voter intends to vote or has voted for (section 125 (3) (b)). Whoever acts differently from what is obtainable under the provisions of this section commits an offence and is liable on being found guilty to a penalty of not more than N100,000 or to an imprisonment for 6 months or both (section 125 (4)). It is an offence to vote at an election or induces or procures any person to vote at an election, knowing that he or she is prohibited from voting there; (section 126 (1) (a)) or before or during an election, publishes any statement of the withdrawal of a candidate at such election knowing it to be false or reckless as to its truth or falsity; (section 126 (1) (b)) or issues out whatever report regarding the private disposition or behaviour of an aspirant designed to influence the possibility of election of the aspirant or to support or obtain the election of a different aspirant and such report is fake and was publicized devoid of logical basis for credence by the person circulating that the false report is accurate, commits a criminal act and is liable upon being found guilty to a penalty of a sum of not more than N100,000 a prison sentence of 6 months or both (section 126 (1) (c)). The Nigeria electoral law entrenches universal adult suffrage but to be eligible to vote such individuals must register first. Therefore, anyone who deliberately votes or tries to vote in a ward where such one’s name is not registered as a voter perpetrates a crime and is chargeable upon being found guilty to a penalty of not more than N100,000 or to a prison sentence of 6 months; (section 127 (1)) or both or deliberately takes into a voting area during an election a voter’s card assigned to someone else commits a crime and is chargeable upon being found guilty to a fine of N100,000 or to a prison sentence of 6 months or both (section 127 (2)). It is an offence where voting is going on to act or incite people to behave in a disruptive way. The offence upon being found guilty attracts a penalty in the sum of not more than N500,000 or a prison sentence of 12 months or both (section 128).

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The day the election is scheduled to take place, it is an offence to campaign for any political party or solicit for votes or prevents voters from voting or being in custody dangerous weapons in a voting area or not beyond a space of 300 m of a polling unit (section 128). It is an offence for anyone to corruptly alone or by someone else at a period following the date of voting has been declared, explicitly or indirectly offers or renders or pays money to or in favour of any one with the intention of craftily swaying such a person to vote or desist from voting at such election, or due to such person or any other person having voted or not voted in the election; (section 130 (a)) or as a voter receives money or bribe all through the period stated in paragraph (a) of this section, commits an offence and if found guilty is liable to a fine of N100,000 or imprisonment for 12 months or both (section 130 (b)). Anybody who directly or circuitously, alone or by someone else as a representative of, applies or signifies the intent to use force, violence or restrain (section 131 (a)); or wreak or threatens to wreak alone or in conjunction with any other person, any slight or severe hurt, damage, harm or loss on or against someone so as to cause or force such a one to vote or abstain from so voting, by reason of such person having voted or abstained from voting (section 131 (b)); by kidnapping, coercion or a deceptive tool or machination, hampers or stops the liberty and entitlement to vote by a voter or thus forces, makes or succeeds in convincing a voter to vote or refrain from voting (section 131 (c)); or by stopping any political candidates from right to use the media, chosen automobiles, recruitment for political assistance and campaign at an election, commits a crime and is chargeable upon being found guilty of a penalty of N1,000,000 or a prison sentence of 3 years (section 131 (d)). The various provisions of law discussed above are meant to ensure a violent free election.

The Use of Smart Card Reader (SCR) Card reader policy of INEC to authenticate genuine card holders came to public scrutiny at the last in February 2019 general elections in Nigeria. Under Part 1 (Paragraph 15) of the 3rd Schedule to the 1999 Constitution in Nigeria (as amended) INEC is allowed to manage, carry out, as well as oversee all elections with the exception of Local Government Council elections conducted in states. According to section 76 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) allows the Commission to decide what structure will be utilized for the carrying out of elections. In line with the

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Commission’s authority as aforementioned; INEC has since the general elections conducted in 2015 been using the card reader for the accreditation of voters before being allowed to partake in an election (Alebiosu 2016: 70). Although there were areas of concern as a result of malfunctioned card readers, the consensus is that it is a right move in the correct direction. It will go a long way to ensuring the concept of one-vote-perperson in our elective procedure and in so doing force political aspirants to go to the voting public as the collective owner of voting power. The use of SCR was not provided for in the Electoral Act, but was contained in INEC’s Directives, Guidelines and Manuals. The National Assembly amended the Electoral Act in 2018 in preparation for the 2019 general election. The use of SCR was provided for in the Act, but unfortunately the President refused to assent to the Bill. The implication is that where elections took place without using SCR at all or where SCR malfunctioned, elections held will still be reckoned with. This was the holden of the court in the following cases: Edward Nkwegu Okereke v Nweze David Umahi (SC.1004/2015); Udom Gabriel Emmanuel v Umana Okon Umana (SC.1/2016); Wike Ezenwo Nyesom v Dakuku Adol Peterside & Ors, etc. The Supreme Court has, however, laid to rest the controversies generated on the use of SCR when it reasoned as follows in Wike Ezenwo Nyesom v. Dakuku Adol Peterside and Others (SC.1002/2015[2016] NGSC 137): The introduction of the card reader is certainly a welcome development in the electoral process. Although, it is meant to improve on the credibility of those accredited to vote so as to check the incidence of rigging, it is yet to be made part of the Electoral Act. Section 138 (2) of the Electoral Act envisages a situation where the Electoral Commission issues instructions or guidelines which are not carried out. The failure of the card reader machine or failure to use it for the accreditation of voters cannot invalidate the election. The section stipulates as follows- “An act or omission which may be contrary to the instruction or directive of the Commission or an officer appointed for the purpose of an election, but which is not contrary to the provisions of this Act shall not of itself be a ground for questioning the election.” Thus, the Supreme Court held that INEC’s directives on the use of the SCR has not invalidated the use of the manual accreditation process which is fraught with fraud.

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The proposed amendment in section 52(2) seeks to further amend the provision to mandate the Commission to conduct elections by electronic voting or any other method of voting as it may determine from time to time. This is in consonance with what operates globally. However, it was not to be because it was not signed into law. The argument is that Nigeria is not ripe for this because of the challenges in terms of lack of infrastructural facilities and the literacy level of Nigerians.

Causes of Electoral Violence Most of the time, violence erupts from the conduct of party primaries and this has been one of the stumbling blocks to achieving violent free election in the past and presently. Vague and ambiguous laws are enacted to guide the party primaries in (S.87), are difficult to understand provisions. For instance, (S.31) of the Electoral Act; state that INEC should admit any candidate given to represent a particular political party, invariably it is disallowed from refusing “…for any reason whatsoever” notwithstanding the procedure through which the said person was made a candidate. Another closely related issue is the delegate list. For a good electoral system, the naming of who is competent to vote and an assemblage of a record of voters should be revealed to the public. For instance, INEC as an election overseeing body is charged by section 20 of the Act avail all participants, a list of all voters 30 days prior to election, a particular period preceding the election so that those running for office can garner as much support as well as they can to such voters. But, the same cannot be said of the political parties, no law compel parties to give a closing date to the Commission or to candidates or the elected party leaders who will vote in a primary or convention. Sometimes the national executive intervened in the process at the state primaries leading to crisis. Good examples were the unpalatable consequences of state party primaries in Ogun State and Imo State. A few political aspirants started organizing their own primaries and bring their own observers (Adeniyi 2019). Currently, section 34 of the Act simply provides for the notification and publishing of the full particulars including names and addresses of all aspirants that are chosen to represent their political party 30 days preceding the election at the Commission’s offices and website. Candidates whose names were omitted in the past have taken INEC to court for the omission. They have to seek for the enforcement of their rights to legitimately seek for elective offices. The new Bill sought to forestall this by providing

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that candidates should check their names and if there is an omission the candidate is expected to take steps to rectify the anomaly. Aspirants who observe that their names are not contained on the nomination listing are mandated to inform INEC no less than 21 days to the election provided by the recommended S.32(2). Such report must be written, signed and attached to a sworn affidavit. The consequence for neglecting to do this is that it will be believed that the candidate has waived his/her right under the proposed 34(3).

Other Causes of Electoral Violence Apart from the complicity of INEC, political party in power was fond of using the power of incumbency to retain political power. For instance, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) was able to retain political power through the apparatus of the state until 2015, when good conscience was allowed to prevail. The government used the police and the military to intimidate the electorates on Election Day by their heavy presence although under the guise of providing security. During the gubernatorial election in Osun State in 2014 the Guardian captured it thus: Palpable tension and fear hovered over Osun State Friday ahead of Saturday’s governorship election in which 986,177 voters will decide who governs the state in the next four years. Although, 1,407,222 residents registered for the election, only 986,177 persons, representing 70.13 percent, collected their Permanent Voters Card (PVCs). According to the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Prof Attahiru Jega, only voters with the PVCs will be allowed to vote for any of the 20 candidates fielded by political parties for the exalted office. The anxiety gripping the polling derives mainly from the mutual mistrust between the leading political parties- the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).

The experience has been the same under the APC led government in Osun State. The electorates’ wish was subverted when the result of the gubernatorial election held in August 2018 was declared inconclusive through the connivance of INEC. What happened in the re-run election was far from what could be described as free and fair elections. At the national level, there were allegations of government using the instrument of Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) to harass and intimidate perceived enemies of government. One of such allegations

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came from a former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo at a colloquium titled: “Nigeria’s democracy: The journey so far and the role of women” in Abuja (Toromade 2018). A Chairman of the ruling party was alleged to have said once you join APC, your sins are forgiven. At the previous general elections, money was freely employed to buy votes before and during elections (Sule and Tal 2018: 91; Babayo 2019). This is a new phenomenon in the Nigerian politics which is tagged in Yoruba language “e dibo, ki e sebe” that is, vote and be rewarded with money. This becomes an issue in a system where the level of poverty is very high; some of the electorates were prepared to vote for the highest bidder.

Conclusion Elections in Nigeria have often been a “do or die” affair. The incumbent political party used all within its power to subvert the wishes of the electorates to retain power in connivance with the electoral body. The legal framework has established necessary laws to guarantee free and fair elections. The laws have been examined in this paper. However, the will to implement these laws is lacking especially when the culprit is a member of the party in government or if the offence committed is to further the interest of the government in power. In the light of the above, I hereunder make useful recommendations to ensure a free and fair election in Nigeria.

Recommendations Justice delayed is justice denied. Thus, I recommend prosecution of electoral offences and I also propose for the institution for an Electoral Offences Tribunal to be sworn into office prior to elections to handle all electoral offences ranging from fraudulent delimitation of constituencies, registration of voters, offences relating to the contravention time of commencement of campaign, purchasing and trading of voter’s cards, purchasing and trading of votes, thuggery, snatching and stuffing of ballot boxes, corruption of temporary election administrators, etc. The Tribunal could be run by both judicial officers currently in office and past judges. I recommend a constant review of our electoral laws to give room for changes, accommodate grey areas and provide solution to practical difficulties encountered during elections.

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There should be the training and retraining of Election Administrators. Aside from being vital, it is essential for the purpose of conducting free, equitable and reliable elections. With proper training and good predilection, it is postulated that these officials will make sure that the running of elections conform to global standards intended to generate open and adequate results. Electoral Officials should embrace the right attitude by shunning corrupt practices. This is a pre-requisite to the establishment of well-built elective government which will function advantageously for Nigerians. The present trend of vote buying must stop if we want to have credible elections. The present government should strive to put the economy right so as to ease the high level of poverty in the country. Otherwise, it would be difficult to arrest the ugly trend of vote buying in elections in Nigerian.

References Abdulmajeed, H. B. “Causes and Dynamic of Political Violence in Nigeria: Islamic Views on the Solutions.” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention Volume 2, Issue 3, 2013, 28–34. Abdulsalami, M. D. “Historical Background of Nigerian Politics, 1900–1960.” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) Volume 16, Issue 2, 2013, 84–94. Adejumobi, S. Democracy and Governance in Nigeria between Consolidation and Reversal, Governance and Politics in Post- Military Nigeria, 2007, 1–21. https://www.link.springer.com. September 21, 2021. Adeniyi, B. “Pervasive intra-party conflicts in a democratising Nigeria, 2019.” https://www.accord.org.za. September 22, 2021. Alebiosu, E. A. “Smart Card Reader and the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria.” Journal of African Elections Volume 15, Issue 2, 2016, 69–89. Anifowose, R. “Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience, 1982.” http://www.searchworks.stanford.edu. September 22, 2021. Babayo, Sule. “The 2019 Presidential Election in Nigeria: An Analysis of the Voting Pattern Issues and Impact Malaysian.” Journal of Society and Space Volume 15, Issue 2, 2019. https://www.ejournal.ukm.my. September 22, 2021. Badejo, B. T., and N. G. Obah-Akpowoghaha, “A Critical Insight into Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC): Implications for 2015 General Election and Democratic Advancement in Nigeria.” Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Science Volume 3, Issue 2, 2015, 13–22. ISSN(Online): 2321–9467 www.questjournals.org. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

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Diamond, Larry. “Election without Democracy, Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy Volume 13, Issue 2, 2002. https://www. docenti.unimc.it. September 22, 2021. Egobueze, Anthony, and Callistus Ojirika. “Electoral Violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Implications for Political Stability.” Journal of Scientific Research and Reports Volume 13, Issue 2, 2017, 1–11. Article no.JSRR.20750. Electoral Act, 2010 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria—1999–2016 Enactments. Factsheet on the Electoral Act Amendment Bill, 2018 as passed by the National Assembly February, 2018. Ibeogu, A. S and V. I. Nkwede. “Transparency, Good Governance Ethical Conduct and Accountability as an Instrument to Guarantee Financial Corrupt Free Public Service. The Local Government Experience in Ebonyi State 2007– 2015.” Journal of Humanities and Social Science Volume 21, Issue 8, 2016, 66–71. https://www.iosrjournals.org. September 22, 2021. Igini, Mike. “Electoral Laws and the Conduct of the 2015 General Elections.” Being the text of a lecture delivered at The Electoral Institute at The Conference on Post 2015 General Elections: The Real Issues. Ikpeze, O. V. C. “Constitutionalism and Development in Nigeria: The 1999 Constitution and Role of Lawyers.” Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence, 2010, 227–241. International Institute for Demo and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2018. https://www.issat.dcaf.ch. September 22, 2021. Larserud, Stina, UNDP Guidelines on Prevention of Election Violence, June 13, 2007. Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners (Second ed. (New ed)), Oxford, 2007. Manual for Election officials 2015 (Updated version) issued by INEC. Nkwede, J. O., and A. S. Ibeogu. “Political Violence and the Sustainability of Nigerian Democracy.” Journal of Social Sciences Research Volume 8, Issue 2, 2015, 1607–1612. Obakhedo, N. O. “Curbing Electoral Violence in Nigeria: The Imperative of Political Education.” African Research Review, International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia Volume 5, Issue 5, Serial No. 22, October 2011. Ogbeidi, F. O. “Youths violence and Electoral process in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: A Case Study of Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria, 2013.” International Journal of Education and Research Volume 1, Issue 9, September 22, 2021. Ogbeidi, M. M. “A Culture of Failed Elections: Revisiting Democratic Elections in Nigeria, 1959–2003.” Historia Actual Online (HAOL), No. 21 (Invierno, 2010), 43–56.

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Okafor, E. E. “Youth Unemployment and Implication for Stability of Democracy in Nigeria.” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa Volume 13, Issue 1, 2011. Okereka, O. P. “Evolution of Constitutional Government in Nigeria: Its Implementation National Cohesion.” Global Journal of Political Science and Administration Volume 3, Issue 5, September 2015, 1–8. Old vs New—What’s in the Electoral Act Amendment Bill That Buhari Has Thrice Refused to Sign? By Sahara Reporters, New York, September 5, 2018. Osaghae, E. E. Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence, 1998. https:// www.amazon.com. September 22, 2021. Suberu. “Nigeria: Widespread Violence Ushers in President’s New Term, 2019.” http://www.hrw.org. September 22, 2021. Sule, B., and Mohammed K. Tal. “Impact of Money on Nigerian Politics: Exploring the General Elections in the Fourth Republic.” Asia Pacific Journal of Education, Arts and Sciences Volume 5, Issue 2, 2018, 69–98. Toromade, S. Report of Nigeria 2019 General Elections, 2018. https://www.sit uationroomng.org. September 22, 2021. United Nations Office for West Africa and The Sahel (UNOWAS), Understanding Electoral Violence to Better Prevent It, December 6, 2017. Vanguard, Electoral Reform an Appraisal of the Case for e-Voting, April 5, 2017—By Afe Babalola. World Report/Human Rights Watch, 2007. https://www.hrw.org. September 22, 2021.

CHAPTER 9

Digital Voting and Electoral Violence: Roles of Information Communication Technology in Ameliorating Electoral Crimes in Nigeria Haruna Ishola Abdullahi and Ajiwojuoluwa Oluwaseun Tunwase

Introduction The problem with African countries and other parts of the world is good and public-oriented government. African countries have been under the sage of bad governance for years. This problem is now reflecting on the security architecture of African countries one way of ensuring good governance for is through free and fair elections that will lead to emergence of credible leaders (Onapajo 2014). Nigeria as a country has been struggling to realize internationally accepted and commendable electorate processes for ages. One insecurity change that endangers electoral processes in

H. I. Abdullahi (B) Department of Criminology and Security Studies, Chrisland University, Abeokuta, Nigeria A. O. Tunwase Department of Computer Science, Chrisland University, Abeokuta, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_9

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this part of the world is violence. As noted by Herling (2019), election violence is the unruly and dangerous behaviour that is perpetrated either before election, during election or after election. As affirmed by Karl Mark politics is one of the bedrocks of a nation, without effective political structure, the other sub structures of society like economy, education, religion, commerce and industry will be deficient. Election as opined by Oladele (2019), is a process put in place to set up the leadership structure of an organization or a country. In the history of election Nigeria and other African countries, violence has characterized electoral processes. Before Nigeria got her independence in 1960, the election that was conducted in 1959 by her colonial masters was not totally acceptable by the majority of Nigerians, the post-independence elections in Nigeria were also marred by killings, burning of electoral materials, violent campaigns, and assassination of political opponent, violent demonstrations and other acts that undermine peace and stability of a country (Ashindorbe 2018). The 1964 and 1965 elections that bought the leadership at the Federal and regional levels of government had some pockets of violence especially in the Western and Northern Regions (Alemika 2011). The prolonged military dictatorship could not be separated from the election-related violence, in the 1999 election that brought the Fourth Republic to Nigeria; there were pockets of violence in the Northern parts of the country (Steve et al. 2019). The 2007 general election which led to the emergence of late President Umar Musa Yarar’dua was also characterized by protests, demonstrations and killings, ballot stuffing, other types of elections conducted at state and local government levels are characterized by violence. There are a number of studies that have been conducted on electoral violence in Nigeria: Kalu and Gberevbie (2018) carried out a study on election violence and democracy in Nigeria and a study of 2011 and 2015 General Elections in Lagos State. Ashindorbe (2018) worked on election violence and the challenges of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Angerbrandt (2019) researched on deadly elections focusing on postelection violence in Nigeria. The impact of digital technology on election was studied. Consequently, to the best knowledge of the author, no research has been carried out on the digital voting and electoral violence in Nigeria. Hence, this study is to fill the knowledge gap. The study will be guided by the following objectives: The major objective of the study is to investigate digital voting and electoral violence. The specific objectives are to

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assess the different acts that constitute electoral violence and to examine the effects of electoral violence on the nation polity as well as to evaluate the ways of using digital tools in resolving electoral violence. The study applied exploratory and descriptive research methods were based on content analysis of journals, textbooks and online resources. The meanings of independent variables; digital voting, benefits and challenges were explored. This was also applied to the dependent variable; electoral violence and a relationship between the two was established.

Conceptual Clarification Meanings of Digital Voting Esan and Ayeni (2018) maintain that digital voting is a type of election that is conducted through internet-related devices. In the words of Steve et al. (2019) there are many types of digital voting. The electronic voting systems serve as an improvement on the manual elections; where voting materials are usually moved around. The popular one is the stand equipment where government agencies and electoral umpires monitor the conduct of elections. In this process, the uneducated voters will be thoroughly guided by appropriate officials who are not likely to be agents of any political parties that presented candidates for an election (Tuccinadi et al. 2011). Another type of electronic or digital voting is online voting; in this regard, voters could open cast their votes after due authentication has been done. This process is used in advanced countries where the level of literacy is high and there are infrastructures in place to facilitate smooth running of the electoral activities as argued by Peter and AbdulRahman (2018). The high rate of internet penetration through mobile devices led to the wide acceptance of this kind of voting patterns. Most of the internet users connect to cyberspace through mobile phones, laptops, desktops and other related devices which facilitate the adoption of digital voting (Materu 2014; Simon and Jones 2012).

Electoral Violence Travnick (2014) maintains that electoral violence is the physical, psychological and structural acts that may lead to physical, psychological and environmental injuries that are inflicted on individuals that take part in elections in different capacities. Election violence is also defined as the struggle between influencers to gain upper hand in a contest situation.

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There are many areas of electoral violence that characterized elections in Nigeria. The violence leads to disquiet in the social fabric of society (Schneider and Senters 2018; Kovass and Bjarnesen 2018).

Crime-Related Activities in Electoral Violence Assault and Battery: This is a criminal act that involves intimation, harassment and inflicting injuries on persons, the injuries could be physical, psychological and structural (Ashindorbe 2018). As part of violent activities that are involved in election, Assault and Battery are perpetrated by election thugs who are hired by candidates with presumption of losing an election. There are street urchins, Motor Park boys, and these criminally minded people carry out their dastardly acts with sticks and other dangerous weapons. In Nigeria and other parts of Africa, this type of electoral violence characterized elections (Angerbrandt 2018; Daxecker and Prins 2016). Arson: As part of activities that are inherent in electoral violence; perpetrators set property like houses, cars and other valuables that are torched in the process (Gyimah-Boadi and Frazer 2011). Murder: This involves taking other people’s lives without any legal backing, during electoral violence in Nigeria, many innocent souls have been wasted (Obakhedu 2011). Theft: One crime that is associated with electoral violence is stealing of property from innocent citizens. During electoral violence, hoodlums and other criminally minded people take advantage of the lawlessness to remove people’s property against their will (Hao and Ryan 2016).

Merits of Digital Voting Qadah and Taha (2007) as well as Alvarenz and Hall (2008) outlined the following advantages of digital voting over manual or traditional types of voting patterns. In the area of security of voting process, electronic voting fares better. The problem of transmission of sensitive and non-sensitive voting materials over long distance to polling units will be permanently overcome. Digital voting guarantees the security of human and nonhuman input into the electoral processes. In domestication of the process to the current insecurity in Nigeria, digital voting provides fortress for the election materials. One of the greatest security challenges Nigeria is facing

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as a country is kidnapping (Collier 2009). There are instances where electoral officials were abducted; vehicles transporting materials were burnt along with those election materials, late delivery of materials and untimely arrival of electoral officers create a lot of tensions which instigate preelection violence. In the 2019 General Elections in Oyo State, electoral materials were snatched in transit. In Gubernatorial Elections in Kogi and Osun States in Nigeria, elections were marred by monumental violence. Electoral materials were snatched and altered, most of the Independent Electoral Officers were obstructed from discharging their official duties (Adesote and Abimbola 2014). The post-election violence in Kogi State led to the burning of the People Democratic Party state’s chairman alive. In Rivers State, 2019 gubernatorial election claimed the lives of more than fifty people. The civilians and law enforcement agents were killed. All this violence could be better addressed by electronic voting. Accuracy is one area where digital voting has precedence over manual elections (Obiefuna-Ogejiofor 2018). Human beings are fallible; in the process of calculation of results, at every stage of manual voting there could be errors which may create protests and degenerate to violent actions by the aggrieved political party supporters. In Nigeria, and most parts of Africa, elections are characterized by tensions (Ley 2017). This has untold effects on the electoral officers, and results in their inefficiency, in some instances, some electoral offices are not provided with heavy duty calculators to handle the complexity of election figures, coupled with the facts that some polling and returning officers have phobia for numeric (Birch and Muchinki 2018). All these challenges could be overcome with the introduction of digital voting; this enhances speedy calculation of results with a high sense of accuracy and reliability (Adesote and Abimbola 2014). The inaccurate computation of results is one of the factors that spark off post-election violence in Nigeria. In terms of economy, digital voting enhances prudent utilization of financial resources. In every election period, at the state and the Federal levels, huge financial resources are committed to elections to cover expenditures like security, printing and transmission of election materials, employment and payment of staff for smooth operation of election (Ahmad et al. 2015; Alemika 2011). Digital voting will assist in overcoming most of these challenges. When Electronic voting is actually embraced, the election over-head costs will be reduced. This encourages individual could log in to the approved website, effect accreditation and vote for candidates of their choice (Vonnahme 2019; Angerbrandt 2018). Another merit of

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Table 9.1 The projected number of internet users in Nigeria (2017–2023) Zisis and Lekkas (2018) Year

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2020

2023

Internet users (Millions) Change

72.4 –

92.3 27.49

113.3 22.75

134.2 18.45

154 14.75

172 11.69

187.8 9.19

Source Statrum Digital market Outlook (2019)

digital voting is confidentiality; election as defined by Zisis and Lekkas (2018) is the expression of conscience. Some electorates find it difficult to cast their votes for the candidates of their choice due to ethic and religious circumstances. When digital voting is adopted, voters can vote for candidates of their choice without any fear of intimidation or harassment (Avgerou et al. 2019; Kalu and Gberevbie 2018) (Table 9.1). From Table 9.2, from 2017 to 2018, the percentage increase in the number of internet users was 27.49%. This signifies an increase in the number of digital literacy and preparedness to adopt digital voting even from 2018 to 2019 as well.

Links Between Digital Voting and Election Violence Digital voting has the benefits of reducing instance of election violence, it reduces instance of physical presence during election. According to Annand and Divya (2012), digital voting overcomes the problem of appearing physically in an election venue to cast votes, instead, voting could be carried out at the corner of one’s home. The appearance of electorate instigates violence, political intimidation and other social crises. Digital voting promotes economy in the administration of election, the money that will be spent on securing elections could be available for improvement of critical infrastructures like health, education and road reconstruction and maintenance (Collier 2009). The cost of election in Nigeria and other sub-Sahara African countries is enormous. The election budget in Nigeria is more than the budget of some countries like the Republic of Benin, Chad and Niger. Despite huge expenditure on election, most Nigerian elections are characterized by protests, voter intimidation and fraudulent practices (Ikyase and Egberi 2015).

State

South-west North-west South-south South-East North-Central North-East

Zone 6,313,507 5,391,581 3,215,273 1,935,168 1,401,895 1,385,191

Registered voters 1,196,40 2,006,410 678,167 452,765 489,482 604,240

Accredited votes 1,156,590 1,964,751 666,589 451,063 486,254 580,203

Vote cast 1,089,567 1,891,134 642,169 421,014 459,676 554,203

Valid votes 67,023 73,617 24,420 30,049 26,446 26,446

Rejected votes

5,223,940 3,500,447 2,548,684 1,484,105 915,641 804,988

Not voted

16.26 35.08 19.98 23.31 34.69 41.89 171.21 28.54

82.74 64.92 80.02 76.69 65.31 58.11 427.79 71.30

% active % participation Apathy

Source https://www.inecnigeria.org/2019-presidential-election-results/, https://www.pulse.ng/news/politics/presidential-election-see-results-here/qcv met8, modified by the author

Lagos Kano Rivers Enugu Kwara Gombe Total Average total For the 6 States

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

S/No.

Table 9.2 Analysis of the 2019 presidential election in Nigeria based on a State in each of the six geopolitical zones and the federal capital territory (FCT) 9 DIGITAL VOTING AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE …

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Theoretical Framework Social control theory by Travis Hirsch 1969, as affirmed by Breckin (2018) outlines the possibility of committing crime by an individual depends on the availability of the following socio-variables. Attachments to other members of family, groups, and the general society, commitment to the societal norms, values and practices, involvement in positive activities and belief in the common and positive goals of a society. An individual that lacks any of the following variables will likely go into crime, those that possess them will not likely to commit criminal activities. As per election digital voting and election violence, the political thugs are among members of society that are not well attached to the mainstream social structure. Thus, they seize election opportunities as means of expressing their displeasure to the injustice melted on them by the society. On this ground, they are not committed to the values and norms of society, they do not involve in the positive actions in society and lack of belief and confidence in the ability of the existing leadership to address their grievances (Kalu and Gberevbie 2018). Those who believe in the progress of society will be interested in adopting digital voting system to avert crises that are associated with manual election. When electoral process in credible, free and fair, it results in emergence of responsible and people-oriented leaders that will transform the society in positive ways. Conflict theory by Karl Marx, explains society as combinations of productive social relations that are characterized by divergent interests which results in perpetual clashes among the capitalist and proletariat. In an election, professional politicians especially, in the African countries see election as means of getting political power to control resources and give masses slim benefits. The conflict of interest emerges from the desperation of unscrupulous politicians and their political allies to tamper with the process to achieve their selfish interest at the expense of the masses (Omar 2016).

Findings and Discussions It is established that digital voting leads to the restoration of sanity in an electoral process. The application of digital voting will enhance public confidence in elections and promote good governance. Violence in an election does not yield any positive results; it leads to destruction of property, loss of life, wastage of scare resources that might have been invested

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in the development of public infrastructures. The number of internet users is on the increase; this creates soft landing for digital voting and credence to the electoral processes. As the world is turning to technology to address most of her social problems confronting socio-economic development, election could not be left out in the interest of democracy and national development. There is no gainsaying manual election is marred by violence like killings, intimidation of voters and other criminal activities. The election processes in terms of campaigns, registration of voters should be devoid of fraudulent acts. The violence is a reflection of society. It occurrence in Nigerian and other African countries does not speak well of the image of the country and desired political leadership. At the end of the day, people have to suffer from the perpetration of violence. The killings and destruction are hindrances to growth and development. From Table 9.1, Lagos State has the highest number of registered voters; 6,313,507 voters, out of this only 16.26% actively participated in the election, Kano State in the Northwest recorded 5,391,581 registered voters while only 35.08% of the registered voters participated in the election. In general, across the six states selected in the six geo-political zones, the average value of the electorates that actively participated in the poll was 28.54, while the value of political apathy was 71.30. As indicated in Table 9.1, one major reason for people’s resolution not to take part in election is violence.

Conclusion and Recommendations From findings, electoral violence is fraught with criminal acts that are likely to destroy the social fabrics of a state. If the trends are not checked through the appropriate application of digital voting system, the current poor governance, which results in the slow development of African countries, may worsen. Hence, to stimulate development in every aspect of social structure, digital voting must be embraced. Although, the current beneficiaries of electoral violence will resist the digital voting, there is need to sustain the superior arguments and practical evidence in favour of digital voting. This chapter will be beneficial to electorates, government at the various levels, electoral empires, international and local election observers, non-governmental organizations and researchers in the field of election and electoral crimes. There is the need to include digital voting on election literacy campaign in Nigeria. The platforms that have similitude for digital voting

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should be introduced from the primary to the tertiary levels of education in Nigeria. There is a need for legal framework to support the commencement of electronic voting at the local, state and federal levels in the country. There is also the need to install reliable cyber security programmes to allay fears of hackers and instill confidence in the digital voting system and electorates.

References Adesote, A. S., & Abimbola, J. O. (2014). Election Violence and the Sustainability of Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: A Historical Perspective. Canadian Social Sciences, 10(3): 140–148. Ahmad, S. A., Abdullah A. S. B., & Arshad, R. C. (2015). Issues and Challenges of Transition to E-Voting Technology in Nigeria. Public Policy and Administration Research, 5(4): 95–103. Alemika, E. E. (2011). Post-Election Violence in Nigeria: Emerging Trend and Lessons. Jos: University of Jos Press. Alvarenz, M. R., & Hall, T. E. (2008). Electronic Election: The Perils and Promise of Digital Democracy. Woodstock, United State: Princeton University Press. Angerbrandt, H. (2018). Deadly Elections: Post Election Violence in Nigeria. A Journal of Modern African Studies, 56(1): 143–167. Annand, A., & Divya, P. (2012). An Efficient Online Voting System. International Journal of Modern Engineering Research, 2(4): 2631–2634. Ashindorbe, K. (2018). Election Violence and Challenges of Democratic Consolidations in Nigeria. Indian Quarterly: A Journal of Internal Affairs, 74(10): 92–105. Avgerou, C., Mensiero, S., & Poue lmernacou, A. (2019). Trusting E-voting amid Experiences of Electoral Malpractices: The Case Study of Indian Elections. Journal of Information Technology, 34(20): 263–284. Birch, S., & Muchinki, D. (2018). Election Violence Prevention: What Works? Journal of Democracy, 25(3): 385–403. Breckin, E. (2018). How Can Conditional Cash Transfer Diminish Crime? An Application of Social Control Theory by Travis Hirsch. Social Criminology, 6(2): 1–8. Collier, P. (2009). Wars, Guns and Votes. London: Bodley Head Press. Daxecker, U. E., & Prins, B. C. (2016). The Politicization of Crimes: Election Competition and Supply of Maritime Piracy in Indonesia. The Journal of Public Policy, 169(3–4): 375–393. Esan, A. O., & Ayeni, T. P. (2018). E-Voting in Nigeria: Barriers to Full Implementation. Journal of Computer Engineering and Information Technology, 7(3): 123–133.

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Gyimah-Boadi, E., & Frazer, E. J. (2011). Prevention of Election Violence in Africa. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University Press. Hao, F., & Ryan, P. Y. A. (2016). Real-World Electronic Voting: Design, Analysis and Development. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Ikyase, T. J., & Egberi, A. E. (2015). Political Violence and Democracy Stability in Nigeria. Review of Public Administration and Management, 4(8): 32–40. Kalu, T. O., & Gberevbie, D. E. (2018). Election Violence and Democracy in Nigeria. A Study of the 2011 and 2015 General Elections in Lagos State. Kaduna Journal of Humanities, 2(1): 60–70. Kovass, S. M., & Bjarnesen, J. (2018). Violence in African Election: Between Democracy and Big Man Politics. Vaux Hall, London: Zed Books. Ley, S. (2017). To Vote or Not to Vote: How Criminal Violence Shapes Electoral Participation. Journals of Conflict Resolution, 62(9): 1963–1990. Materu, S. F. (2014). The Post-Election Violence in Kenya: Domestic and International Legal Processes. New York City: Springer Publication. Obakhedu, N. O. (2011). Curbing Election Violence in Nigeria: The Imperative of Education. International Multi-Disciplinary Journal of Ethiopia, 5(50): 99–110. Obiefuna-Ogejiofor, O. (2018). Advancing Electronic Voting System on Nigeria Electoral Process: Legal Challenge and Future Direction. Journal of Sustainable Development, Law and Policy, 9(2): 187–219. Omar, S. (2016). Exploring Conflict Theory in Education. British Journal of Educational Studies, 54(3): 288–307. Onapajo, H. (2014). Violence and Votes in Nigeria: The Dominance of Incumbents in the Use of Violence to Rig Elections in Africa. Journal of Politics, 49(2): 27–51. Peter, S. A., & AbdulRahman, I. (2018). Political and Economic Effects of PostElection Violence on National Development. Net Journal of Social Sciences, 6(20): 18–26. Qadah, G. Z., & Taha, R. (2007). Electronic Voting System: Requirement, Designs and Implementation. Journal of Computer Standard and Interfaces, 29(3): 376–386. Schneider, R., & Senters, K. N. (2018). Winners and Losers of the Ballot: Electronic vs. Traditional Paper Voting System in Brazil. Latin American Politics and Society, 60(2): 41–60. Simon, B., & Jones, D. (2012). Broken Ballots: Will Your Vote Count? United State: Stanford University Press. Steve, A., Nwocha, M., & Igwe, I. (2019). An Appraisal of Electoral Malpractice and Violence as an Albatross in Nigerian’s Democratic Consolidation. Beijing Law Review, 10: 77–97. Travnick, M. (2014). Electronic Voting: To Have or Not Have. European Scientific Journal, 3(Special): 24–230.

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Tuccinadi, D., Wolf, P., & Nackerdin, R. (2011). Introduction to Electronic Voting: Essential Considerations. Chicago: International Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance. Vonnahme, G. (2019). Electronic Voting System. Journal of Politics, 64(2): 365– 369. Zisis, D., & Lekkas, D. (2018). Design, Development and Use of Secure Electronic Voting System. Hershey, USA: IGI-Global.

CHAPTER 10

Social Media: A Big Brother in Nigeria’s Electoral Space? Nelson Goldpin Obah-Akpowoghaha and Ikenna Amanchukwu

Introduction Presently, elections into many state offices in Nigeria are marked not only by acute social divisiveness but are also characterised by outright civil rancour, conflict and violence. This paper examines the extent to which this pervasive social malignancy in Nigeria’s electoral space can be ameliorated through the instrumentality of the social media. This deliberate instrumentalisation involves the utilisation of, most especially, the ‘ubiquity’ potentialities of the social media as an independent surveillance agency over the country’s electoral space.

N. G. Obah-Akpowoghaha Department of Political Science, University of The Gambia, Serrekunda, The Gambia I. Amanchukwu (B) Department of Political Science, Renaissance University, Enugu, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_10

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The need for a solution to the problematic of electoral mal-practice is urgent. This is because Nigeria’s kaleidoscopic democratisation process is being daily buffeted by unending waves from its electoral crisis. It is for this reason that the country’s democratisation process has been aptly described as chaotic, turbulent and even undemocratic (Mustapha 2009: 71). This succinct summation of Nigeria’s democratisation process is an implicit reference to; one, the cascade of sophisticated, systemic and systematised violence in the electoral space and two the myriads of allegations of electoral malfeasance which directly implicate the country’s electoral body. To be sure, credible reports have repeatedly explicitly indicted Nigeria’s election management agency, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), over its handling of elections especially the 2003 and 2007 general elections (Obi 2011: 377). These failures by INEC have almost always been succeeded by a flurry of technical and administrative electoral reforms (Obi 2011: 371). However, the universalised ineffectuality of these reforms when coupled to the crippling incapacity of the country’s prime democratic structures—judiciary, the security apparatus and the traditional media—to stem electoral malfeasance suggests a need to considerably broaden the search for a panacea beyond the orthodoxal prophylaxis adopted over the years by the state and civil society groups. It is in this regard therefore that this paper interrogates the viability of the social media as a ‘Big Brother’ or an ubiquitous and non-partisan observer of Nigeria’s electoral space.

Conceptualisation of Terms The Big Brother Big Brother essentially refers to a capacity to observe and monitor even the most hidden aspects of human activity in any area of society. In this paper, the concept of ‘Big Brother’, which in originality is an Orwellian construct, is taken to mean the ability of the social media to monitor Nigeria’s electoral space. However, this characterisation, to be sure, of the social media as a ‘Big Brother’ in contemporary society is not unprecedented in the literature (Bernardi 2016: 1). The concept of Big Brother originated from George Orwell’s work ‘1984’ (1947). In that work Orwell anticipated the social media when he imagined a scenario in which the totalitarian state, through ‘Telescreens’

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(sophisticated closed circuit T.Vs in every facet of society which are all monitored from a single headquarters) which he conceptualised as ‘Big Brother’, is able to totally monitor every aspect of a citizen’s existence. In its Orwellian conceptualisation ‘Big Brother’ is the cynical apogee in the evolution of the totalitarian state. However, the social media conceptualised as a ‘Big Brother’ in this paper is the complete antithesis of the intrusive Orwellian ‘Big Brother’. This feature of the social media is readily apprehensible from its existing praxis in contemporary society i.e. the social media is viewed not only as a liberating agency but also as a social leveller (Bernardi 2016: 1). Furthermore, in order to properly contextualise and situate his ascription of a Big Brother status to the social media Bernardi uses progressive terms such as ‘democratizing potential’ ‘spreading of knowledge’ and ‘bettering of people’s lives on a worldwide scale’ to denote the antecedents of the social media. This is in sharp contrast to the Orwellian construct in which ‘Big Brother’ is clearly depicted as intrusive, oppressive, emasculative and excessively antagonistic to the basic social instincts of the individual. However, even though the conceptualisation of ‘Big Brother’ in this paper is entirely dissimilar to the Orwellian construct they both, nevertheless, share an important elemental structurality. This shared structure refers to the crucial feature of ‘ubiquity’ or omnipresence, which means the ability to be everywhere and thus be able to report on each and every event as they occur. In fact, it is this feature of ubiquity which imbues the Big Brother concept either way with its ontological strength. The distinguishing feature of ubiquity inherent in the social media allows an individual operator to record and report live events in real time either as images or moving events. This feature of the social media is crucial and cannot be overemphasised. It is apposite to note here that the ability of the state and its agencies to effectively prevent journalists or more accurately the traditional media, over the years from accessing scenes of social turmoil has led to the endemism of extensive abuse within the body politic. In contrast, the social media has a livid potentiality to liberate the citizenry from its age long dependence on the traditional media and other intermediate agencies thus enabling the common citizen to finally project his or her voice to the wider world (Ceron 2017: 137). In a state such as Nigeria, this need is particularly urgent because of the acute partisanship of prime democratic institutions like the media, the judiciary and the security agencies. These institutions singly and collectively have often played rancid ignoble roles in Nigeria’s turbulent electoral history.

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Nigeria Electoral History at a Glance The struggle for political power in Nigeria is fierce. The intensity of the struggle which has directly inspired several electoral reforms (and military coups) has been attributed to the country’s multi-ethnic nature. To be sure, the extent of the polarity within the electoral space has de-aligned and grossly compromised key democratic institutions in the country. Thus, across Nigeria’s political landscape it is common to witness pivotal ‘civil’ institutions playing very sordid and insidious roles in the electoral space thus acting as retarding enzymes in the overall democratic process. For example, in the first republic the police and the press were implicated in the desecration of the electoral space, in the second republic the police singlehandedly acted as an undemocratic ‘kingmaker’, in the fourth republic the police, sections of the press and the judiciary have all been fingered as anti-democratic agents in the electoral space. As a consequence of these untoward interferences the history of elections and party politics in Nigeria is not an edifying narrative as it is usually coloured by tumult and unimaginable and unending bloodbath (Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006: 57). The electoral tumult has been attributed to the inordinate striving for power a direct consequence of, though not wholly restricted to, to the country’s geo-political framework and politics (Obi 2011: 368)—itself a product of British social engineering. The contest for political power within the Nigerian state is so fierce that conflicts are generated not only when the contestants involved are from across Nigeria’s ethnic fault lines but even so when they are from the same ethnic stock. For example, it was the electoral crisis in the almost wholly Yoruba Western Region which ultimately shattered the tottering First Republic whose legitimacy had been worn away, in any case, by incremental electoral violence across the country. The opprobrium which attended party politics praxis in the First Republic led to an unconscious collective recoil from and revulsion with democracy and democratic institutions in Nigeria. This general revulsion etched an enduring legacy onto the psyche of the body politic; i.e. a deep seated distrust of party politics in Nigeria which resulted in obsessive– compulsive attempts by the state to systematically ‘guide’ party politics in Nigeria. The pervasive distrust of party politics directly engendered the spate of suggestions, in the immediate aftermath of the civil war, for the

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adoption of a no-party system by the Nigerian state. For example, immediate post-civil war scholars such as Okion Ojigbo (On the Advantages of a No-Party State 1972) highlighted the merits of zero party system while at the same time casting fetid aspersion and scorn on the mechanics of electoral politics in Nigeria. This largely utopic imagery that elections and party politics should be excluded from any future political construct in Nigeria resonated warmly within the then military hierarchy. This feeling was clearly conveyed by the then head of state Murtala Muhammad to the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) (Phillips 1980: 4). The CDC adhered to this military short order and debated the issue. However, in the end it rejected the no-party state and the one-party state option for reasons such as the country’s heterogeneous nature and the fascist connotation of the no-party state (Phillips 1980: 4). Though momentarily stymied by this rejection in its ambition to permanently exorcise the demons of politicking, electioneering and elections through the criminalisation of partisan politics in the body politic, the military elite did not despair. Instead it sought other means of attaining its ends. Consequently, it adopted the extreme variant of ‘guided democracy’ as a way of checking the excesses of party politics in Nigeria (Amuwo 1992; Phillips 1980; Agbese 1999). Indeed, the desire to constrict the electoral space became a fetish (which completely bankrupted the democratic process thenceforth) of all military regimes up to 1999 and even beyond. In 1999, the substitution of the highly discredited military elite for a civilian administration in Nigeria’s power echelon did not in the main douse a now deeply ingrained statist obsession to ‘guide’ the electoral process. Again, this neurosis is understandable given that the 1999 general elections which were used to midwife the transition itself were heavily laden with varying degrees of electoral malfeasance. The height of the dissensus was acutely exemplified by the fact that it needed a Supreme Court pronouncement to finally settle the disputes which arose from the election. Meanwhile amid the dispute, the body politic which had previously endured the trauma of an election annulment in 1993 was suffused with the palpable tension of yet another termination of the entire transition process by reactionary elements within the military (The Carter Centre/National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1999: 32). In the aftermath of the transition to civilian rule, with the principal democratic institutions now under the firm occupation of both covert and overt supporters of different political blocs there was an increasing

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national tendency to rely on foreign election observers. However, on balance the impact of election observers on Nigeria’s electoral space have been muted.

Foreign Election Observation: A Null Factor in Nigeria’s Theatre of Electoral Warfare In Nigeria as with many developing states in the world the priming of the reports of election foreign observer missions to synchronise with the political realities of the political system has resulted in such reports losing considerable purchase. One of the widely accepted precepts of liberal democracy is a periodic conduct of free, fair and open elections (Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006: 26). Foreign observer missions are important because they help uphold the sanctity of democratic elections by stressing adherence to these tenets. In other words, they help ascertain the extent to which an election corresponds to the liberal tenets of freedom, fairness and openness. It is based upon this view, in liberal-democratic politics at least, that the reports of election monitors or observers usually command great political salience. In fact, most governments, groups and individuals may structure relations, diplomatic or otherwise, with a body politic based on election observer report. However, election observers’ reports are also equally viewed with suspicion and scepticism because most reports are tailored to conform to political realities, thus diluting its observations on electoral vice considerably. These political realities are almost a sine qua non in the modern state—more so in the typical state in Africa with the severe ethnic fault lines crisscrossing its boundaries. Consequently, in drafting its final report foreign election observers are expected to display prudency and tact in their narration of events observed. Thus even in the face of open electoral malfeasance foreign observer reports in a state inundated with rabid separatist tendencies like Nigeria may be deliberately subjected to a ‘tunnel vision’ analysis in order to assure the state’s structural integrity which is of more primary importance to the international community. An even-handed report may in all likelihood predispose such a state already liberally festooned with weak institutions towards instability or ultimate collapse. The reality of this scenario in the Nigerian case was aptly captured in the final report of the Carter Centre and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in the aftermath of the highly disputed 1999 general elections. The report glaringly skirted around the

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key issues; was tame and unsure in its admonishments and ended by paternalistically calling on all involved to work together in correcting the lapses observed in the electoral system (The Carter Centre/National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1999: 32). Cyril Obi (2011: 379) has bitterly castigated foreign election observers for this pragmatist approach to election observation in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. Obi further averred that such conciliatory or phlegmatic or bland election observation report had become in the final analysis a veritable mill for the production of repeat electoral offenders. Another angle which may be readily advanced to discredit an election observer report is the inability of observers to cast an exhaustive gaze across a given political space. This failing is magnified several times over in a backward economy due to a blanket paucity of communication infrastructure and transportation facilities. Thus, given the acute infrastructural deficit in these regions, invariably, election observation groups have little choice but to extrapolate from whatever limited empirical data is at hand to draft their final reports. Consequently, in the light of an uncomplimentary election report a political actor casting about for an excuse, can quite easily castigate and dismiss an entire report based upon this loophole. Thus it is for these reasons among others have the arms of delinquent political actors in Nigeria been strengthened in electoral infractions. And thus equally have electoral malfeasance—and the concomitant demands for electoral reforms—repeated itself like a broken record in Nigeria’s political history.

Electoral Reform in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic It is a historic fact that the singular greatest threat to Nigeria’s democratic institutions and process has been, and still remains, the endemic turbulence within the country’s electoral space. This germ has predisposed the state to recurring military incursions. Consequent upon this historic reality there has been no let within civil society and the state to reform the electoral process. It is important to highlight the fact, however, that transition to civilian rule did not radically alter the disposition of the political elite to electoral contests. If anything at all the transition revealed the very low democratic credentials of most political actors in the country (Obi 2011: 367). In spite of this the political elite, similar to the military, maintained an unbending resolve towards electoral ‘reforms’.

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The inaugural administration of the Fourth Republic which, in many respects, was a direct beneficiary of Nigeria’s sordid electoral process (Ihonvbere 1999) carried out sweeping reforms of the electoral system. However, in spite of these reforms, the 2003 and 2007 general elections which that administration oversaw were marred by gross electoral irregularities (Herskovits 2007). In fact, both elections have the dubious distinctions of being the worst elections in the country’s history. Nigeria was only rescued from another cataclysmic disruption of its democratic process, especially with respect to the 2007 general election, by an almost unanimous national resolve to break with the historic infamy of never having witnessed the transferral of power from one civilian administration to another civilian administration. The system was also tremendously stabilised by the acknowledgement of the successor civilian administration of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua of the culpability of the electoral process which brought it to power and its unalloyed determination to set afoot a fresh series of electoral reforms to correct the malady. The assumption by the vice president of the presidency upon the death of Yar’Adua did not dampen the fervour for electoral reform. However, despite the reforms, the most outstanding of which was the introduction of electric card readers and the massive use of senior academic staff as electoral returning officers, the old pathogenic influences maintained their historic hold in the body politic. The 2011 and 2015 general elections contested by figures across Nigeria’s great dichotomies of south/north Christian/Muslim progressive/conservative brought Nigeria’s electoral crisis almost to a head. The 2011 general election was greeted by the most destructive postelectoral violence the country had witnessed in the Fourth Republic (Vasudevan 2011). Its gruesomeness is sufficiently exemplified by the sadistic butchering of several of the country’s National Youth Service Corp members engaged by the electoral body as polling officers. The 2015 election campaign on the other hand was pockmarked by ethnicity, name calling, threats and counter-threats than any meaningful debate on state policy (Lunn and Harari 2015: 8). In this respect, it was therefore unsurprising that a reprehensible outcome of the recriminative ‘campaigns’ of the 2015 general elections was a significant systematic ethicisation of the public space. This low politics set the background for one of the largest peace time migrations ever witnessed in the post civil war era. The full economic cost of that election induced ‘mfecane’ to Nigeria may perhaps never be known. Even the validity of the election results,

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despite the rather enterprising innovations introduced by the electoral body, was also contested on prime time T.V as millions of Nigerians and members of the international community watched with bated breath. On its part, the 2019 general election was anti-climatic in the sense that it witnessed the reversal of whatever few gains that had been achieved since the advent of civilian rule. Thus, ultimately the outcome of the presidential election was besmirched and called into question by the resort of the challenger to a lengthy court action. An interesting observation of electoral reforms in Nigeria is that most reforms are only effective only so long as the political class have not sufficiently acculturated enough with the reform to be able to undermine it. As soon as they do, the ‘reform’ rapidly loses its potency and therefore its hold upon the political actors. For example, the use of senior academic staff from the universities as returning officers had appeared revolutionary at first at least it appeared to deal with the perennial problem of the falsification of electoral results which is as old as the republic. However, by the arrival of the 2019 general elections one begins to frequently hear reports of senior academic staff being indicted for electoral malpractices bordering on falsification of results. Moreover, the very high premium placed on political power has made political parties to engage in a thinly disguised macabre contest to outdo each other in the perpetuation of electoral fraud and violence. The ingredients of this contest not only involve crude violence but also lewd financial co-optation of both the citizen voter and electoral agent and a subversion of the entire electoral code. Consequent upon these regressive anomalies within the electoral space in Nigeria there is a need for a framework capable of monitoring elections in Nigeria in such a way as to dispel all suspicion of either partisanship or fraud. In order to attain this end such a framework, given the pathologic influences in Nigeria’s electoral space, must not only be distinctly revolutionary it must also possess the inherent features of detachment and anonymity, objectivity and ubiquity. It is based on these requirements that we necessarily advance the social media. To be sure the social media which has lately come into social consciousness and has contributed immensely to redefining social imagery worldwide appears to be very relevant to Nigeria’s present electoral debacle. The social media apart from possessing elements of detachment and anonymity, objectivity and ubiquity is also unique because of its structural decentralisation. This feature of de-centrality is crucial and critical. The intrusion of the state on individual liberty has long been a thorny

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issue. Consequently, the absence of state influence or any bloc control over the social media is not only emblematic of, but also harkens back to the neo-liberalist cry ‘to roll back the state’ as far as possible. The social media conforms admirably with this neo-liberalist intention for the state because it is an un-coerced and ungoverned public sphere (Benkler 2006). Thus, the social media, given its disembodied nature, cannot be easily subjected to systematic state violence or financial co-optation. Indeed, this singular identity has enabled the social media to connect the world in ways unimaginable to just some few decades ago.

Social Media: Connecting People with Politics? The social media originally conceived as a medium of social exchange or interaction over wide distances (Gerbaudo 2012: 34), has had a monumental impact on global politics. In very succinct but also vivid terms, an Egyptian activist summed up activist use of social media during the Egyptian revolution as the platform which organised and connected people. The advent of the social media with information and communication technology has now, to all intents and purposes, finally broken down the long restrictive ‘barrier of space and distance’ which had initially been heavily breached with the arrival of the jet plane. Following Nancy K. Baym (2015) the phrase ‘social media’ was first used around 1994. However, within the first decade of its operation the social media was affecting societies and human discourse and interactions in unforeseen ways (Van Dijck and Poell 2015: 1). Interestingly, if present global events are anything to go by, Van Dijck and Poell are right when they opine that the extent of the impact of the social media on human society is far from being completed. Social media is broadly classified as episodic and non-episodic (Doss et al. 2016: 275). Episodic social media refers to social media which are not blog like and also relay information which are unrelated to previous information e.g. Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter and Vine. Non-episodic social media are those that are structured like a blog e.g. Facebook, Tumbir and pinterest and have the capacity to sustain a continuing narrative in contrast to the episodic model like Snapchat, Vine, Twitter and Instagram. However, irrespective of nomenclatural identity, an overwhelming commonality of the social media is youth dominance. The young generation taken as individuals born after 1981 is, in comparison to earlier generations, at the epicentre of the communication revolution (Doss et al. 2016: 275).

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Indeed, the infusion of the elements of youth and technology in the socalled ‘Twitter revolutions’, greatly influenced the outcome. Asides their characteristic energy and vigour youths are often motivated and guided by idealistic if fatalistic ambitions which act as a veritable propellant for their objectives. But even more importantly youths, as Doss et al. have rightly noted above, have a natural affinity with technology which older members of the population lack. Based on the sheer strength of their technical ability in cyberspace youths can and have often easily circumvented most attempts by the state to disrupt online communications. For example, during the 2009 elections in Iran protesters circumvented the Twitter Shutdown by the Iranian authorities through the use of proxy servers which thus enabled the youth protesters to broadcast their own version of events (Imre and Owen 2014: 113). Thus the social media is a reservoir of opportunities which only requires some technical savvy to access (Bebawi 2014: 135). It is mainly for this reason that, in recent times, the social media has been deployed for use in initiatives in which youths are predominant. The most prominent of these programmes are social initiatives which are targeted at education and health. For example, in Canada peer led diabetes prevention among the Chinese and south Asian communities, nicknamed ‘peer to peer or P2P’, is wholly delivered over Facebook, which is a popular social networking platform among the youth population (Amari et al. 2015). In fact, a majority of the participants in the diabetes programme were of the view that the social media was an ideal tool for mediating the programme because of the younger generation’s immersion in social media technology. Similarly, in education, the use of information communication technology tools is transforming the learning space in Africa according to a report on e-learning on the continent (Baijnath, 2013: 34). On the growing popularity of e-learning in Africa, the Meraka Institute (Baijnath, 2013: 35) observed that despite the dearth of internet infrastructure in Africa, in contrast to the high internet penetration in the global north, Africa and the developing world in general, at least, depend on mobile phones for internet connectivity. In general, the display within cyberspace of student’s technological virility with respect to their academic pursuit has led Nariend Baijnath (2013: 36) to describe youths as members of a highly technical population who outstrip and outshone the earlier generations who are just coming to terms with these technologies. This assertion is supported by Samuel K. Doss et al. (2016: 278) who noted

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that students, who he termed ‘generation D’, are vastly different from previous university students in their search for knowledge and dissemination of information. It is also important to note that, contrary to a widely held view, findings from Doss’s study show that social media in and of itself is not inimical to student’s ability to concentrate on their studies. Furthermore added to its being a sphere for youth exchange, the social media is a great social leveller because it enables all especially the two broad genders of male and female to participate freely and equally without let (Dzandu et al. 2016: 132). The non-discriminatory outlook of the social media has made its endless opportunities and information accessible to all strata of society. Furthermore, the social media has also become an emerging domain for the acquisition of civic principles and acculturation into civic praxis. For example, one of the participants in the Sunflower movement in Taiwan noted that popularisation of the Sunflower movement in the social media specifically Facebook inspired a civic revolution among the youths. In the sense that young people who had formally held a deep and abiding distrust of politics and the political process began to pay closer attention based on the presentation of the movement on social media (Tsatsou 2018: 9). The social media are also increasingly being adopted across all age grade and business enterprises because of its astonishing spatial reach. For example, the ‘non-episodic’ Facebook is not only immensely popular among the youths it also has the highest global commercial penetration of any network (Von Dijck and Poell 2015: 4). It has been estimated that Facebook’s monthly penetration is in excess of a seventh of the global population (Baym 2015: 1). Thus it is altogether unsurprising why Face-book has become the focal rallying online forum of choice for youth political mobilisation. Mobilisation is here taken to mean the temporary assemblage of a concourse of previously unacquainted individuals committed to the attainment of certain goals—in our sense here mainly political goals. In recent times it has become apparent that the social media is not only a forum for opinion formation but also provides a veritable basis for citizen mobilisation (Ceron 2017: 137). The use of online media technology to mobilise huge concourses of diverse populations has truly come a long way since 2003 when Bill Wasik was able to organise, through an email, a small motley crowd as a sort of fanciful artistry (Gerbaudo 2012: 39). A little while later Wasik’s revolutionary innovation was widely adopted for the staging of festive events. However, it was not long before this peculiar feature of an online

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crowd—made distinguishable by its liquidity, i.e. ability to assemble and disassemble within a very short period of time—was discovered and ruthlessly exploited by social activists. Thus with this discovery came such terms as ‘flash mobs’ ‘smart mobs’ or ‘flash crowds’; in its essentiality these terms point to a sort of ‘liquid sociality’ brought about by online media (Gerbaudo 2012: 39). We must hasten to add that these highly liquid assemblies, which are mainly youth dominated, are possible not only because of the devices these youths carry but also because of certain innate features associated mainly with the youth population. It is one thing to issue a call through the social media for an impromptu assembly at a chosen spot, it is entirely a different thing to respond enthusiastically to this call. Thus youths are naturally imbued for this sort of irregular expedition. Keniston (1971: 9) has variously described the stage of youth as a turbulent period in which the individual is eager to challenge every preexisting societal norm. More often than not it is this overpowering urge to question and challenge basic taken for granted norms which leads the youths to be at the epicentre of most revolutionary struggles for social and political change. Consequently, in the last two decades, under the impulse of this natural biological drive, the youth population across the world has through the agency of the social media significantly reconstructed the nature and manner of social discourse. By liberally and frequently exploiting the agency of the social media the youths have successfully ‘moved’ other sections of the population towards acquiescing to significant societal restructuring thereby literally bringing to fruition the mission statement of Facebook which pledges to enable its users to remake their world in terms of freedom and openness.

Social Media and Citizen Activism The role of the social media in activating citizen activism worldwide has been monumental. In short the social media has to all intents and purposes become an indispensable tool in the toolbox of the social agitator. To be sure, the full capability of the mobilisational potentiality of the social media was first felt in the Arab Spring. Its use was further explored in the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement and all the later social movements that followed the Arab Spring. In an empirical study on the Sunflower democratic movement (a movement which comprised students and civic groups in Taiwan and occupied the Yuan—the Taiwanese parliament—from 18 March to 10 April 2014), it was found that Facebook was

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heavily utilised for the organisation of the protests (Tsatsou 2018: 9). The participants in the Sunflower movement averred that certain features of Facebook such as its diversity, openness and speed together with certain unique tools such as ‘comment’ and ‘follow’ were fundamental towards its adoption by the movement (ibid.: 9). There were also suggestions that Facebook fostered feelings of mutual support among users. Panayiota Tsatsou has suggested that the use of the internet to mobilise demonstrators predates contemporary social movements. Some of the earliest use of the internet as a platform for social agitation according to Tsatsou (2018: 3) occurred in the 1990s. A few notables were Mexico’s Zapatista Army of National liberation, the protest against the world Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in 1999 and the J-18 anti-globalisation protests also in 1999. However, by the turn of the twenty-first century the use of social media by social movements had moved out of the domain of a few selected organisations into the toolkit of virtually every social activist and revolutionary. The popularity of social media among activists has been attributed mainly to two distinct features—its so-called Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) and Perceived Usefulness (PU). Dzandu et al. (2016: 127) has defined PU as the extent to which an individual expects or believes that a certain technology is pivotal to job enhancement while the PEU is the level of effort required to use a system effectively by the user. Dzandu et al. (2016: 132) found that with respect to the social media a prospective user need not possess any unique skills to be able to utilise it effectively. This means in other words that the PEU ranking of the social media is rather favourable to new users. Similarly, the natural ‘desires of youth’ such as uploading pictures and social interaction with contemporaries has enhanced the Perceived Usefulness of social media among the youth population. When taken together therefore, the PEU and the PU has enabled the social media to challenge the dominant idea or view of the traditional ‘organisation’. This is because given the social media’s PEU and PU, together with its effective mobilisation ability hierarchical ranking which characterise the traditional organisational structure are either rapidly falling away or even non-existent in cyberspace. Thus, Shirky (2008) has observed that the social media has become a veritable tool for organising individuals without any physical structure. This conceptual evolution occasioned by the social media has forced scholars to seek fresh analytic

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paradigms in which to situate the emergent ‘virtual organisations’. In this respect some writers have observed that organisations in cyberspace are increasing relying on what has been described as ‘Swarm intelligence’; in the sense that there are no noticeable leader and such a role if it exists can be occupied by anyone at any time (Tsatsou 2018: 5). Textually ‘Swarm intelligence’ is akin to ‘choreographic leadership’ which means that those who inspire a movement may also organise or lead it. However it has also been equally suggested that it is primarily because social media mobilisations are usually bereft of any physicality in terms of hierarchical leadership that the time span of most social media-inspired protests are usually very short (Van Dijck and Poell 2015: 3). Thus while the social media is excellent for the facilitation of social gatherings, it may not be able to sustain these gatherings in virtual space in a manner in which a gathering in a public physical space can be sustained (Bebawi 2014: 160). The most it can do is the creation of a sense of solidarity. It is based on this glaring failure that Bebawi suggested that for the social media to strengthen its political relevancy it should extend beyond being a mere ‘network of brains’. However, the idea that the social media may, in the final analysis, largely end as a politically sterile ‘network of brains’ appears farcical to say the least. After all, it is rightly observed, even though some former so-called centres for public agitation remain, i.e. New England Town Hall they are no longer as relevant and pungent as they once were in political discourse (Poster 2001: 178). Thus, irrespective of the fact that the social media largely operates in cyberspace this should not distract or denigrate in any way its inherent potentiality to facilitate a sustained imaginative discursive exchange. This discursive exchange albeit in virtual reality nonetheless (as has occurred frequently) can transform into a cohesive physical action (Ceron 2017: 137). In this regard, Panayiota Tsatsou (2018: 4) through her empirical study of the democratic movement in Taiwan opined that Facebook served not only as an agency for political mobilisation but also for physical political action thereafter. To be sure, mobilisation through the social media either for social activism or any other task is carried out through online ‘platforms’. In recent years there has been an unprecedented explosion in the internet of a myriad of ‘platforms’. In the main these online platforms serve, for social activists, as useful aqueducts for channelling solidarity and support. For example, through online platforms, communities in the Diaspora have initiated powerful connections with western activists and cable networks

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thus expanding substantially the visibility of their struggles (Pantti and Boklage 2014: 85). The exponential growth in the number of online platforms has led to the suggestion that the world is in the midst of a ‘platform society’ (Van Dijck and Poell 2015: 1). All these platform societies together with online agencies like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram have played fundamental roles in the last two decades or so in orchestrating and sustaining the social revolutions which have radically restructured the political space in vast tracts of the world.

Social Media and Social Revolution: A Synoptic Discourse Barı¸s Çoban (2016: xviii) has prophesied that the rise of the social media revolution is an indication of the rise of an insurrectionary culture in many parts of the world. This assertion is akin to the classical but problematic chicken and egg conundrum. One therefore wonders if the social media is the immediate cause of the rise of the insurrection culture or whether the insurrection culture is caused by other factors but utilises the social media as a veritable transmission and organising agency. Whichever preceded the other, what is clear however, is that it is increasingly apparent that the advent of the social media has radically altered, for the first time, since the tacit acknowledgement of some sort of social contract between the rulers and the governed, of the power equilibrium existing in society. That this epochal social realignment began in the Middle East and North Africa region, the nest of hereditary dictatorship (presidential and monarchical), is highly revealing of two outcomes; first, it showed the extent to which the power differential in society has been altered in favour of the hoi polloi and second, it revealed the immerse power of the social media to dislodge the dominant narrative even in such conservative societies as Tunisian where the Arab spring began. The harassment of a Tunisian mendicant Abdullaziz Bouazizi by corrupt state officials pushed the hapless Bouazizi into publicly committing self-immolation. That single act precipitated an unprecedented uprising which led to the overthrow of the Tunisian head of state Ben A1i (in power since 1987) on 25th of January 2011. That event which was faithfully and efficiently disseminated through the social media set off a revolutionary contagion across the entire region. Thus, on 11 February 2011 that revolutionary contagion noisily consumed Hosni Mubarak of Egypt before berthing in Libya, Syria, Yemen and a host of other states in

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the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The themes which had both engendered and enlivened the revolution like the agitation for greater social equity and political inclusion were rapidly transmitted around the world through the agency of the social media. It was therefore unsurprising when social protests along the line of the Arab Spring erupted in Spain on the 15th of May 2011 through the indignadoes or indignants movement; in the United States on 17th of September 2011 through the Occupy Wall Street movement. The ‘Occupy Movement’ was shortly to be emulated worldwide including Nigeria. The wide scale use of social media in these revolutions also inadvertently triggered a major structural change in the praxis of journalism worldwide. Indeed, from the Arab Spring it was observed that the ubiquitous use of the social media led to its entwinement with the rest of society (Van Dijck and Poell 2015: 1). In the field of mass communications, both as an intellectual curiosity and in praxis, the advent of the social media has led to the bifurcation of journalism into two great spheres: mainstream journalism and alternative journalism. Mainstream journalism refers to traditional structures of journalism while alternative journalism on the other hand is reportage that seeks to capture or build on the ordinary lives of the common people (Bebawi and Bossio 2014: 4). Bebawi (2014: 124) has also conceptualised ‘alternative reporting’ to mean the utilisation of the social media for journalistic purposes by non-professionals. The ‘nonprofessionals’ of course refers to protesters, bloggers and activists. The rise of the alternative media is, to be sure, a historically unprecedented avenue through which the mass can ventilate itself without fear of censorship by the state (Allen 2005: 18). This characteristic of the social media, as Allen rightly observed, was displayed fully during the South Asian tsunamis in 2004. As has been mentioned earlier, the capacity of the social media to allow for uncensored viewing of images and videos is perhaps its strongest advantage. It is this component according to Bebawi (2014: 93) that makes the ‘truth-value’ of social media reportage considerable in relation to traditional media reportage. An even more interesting angle to alternative journalism is the collaboration between ordinary citizens and professional journalists. The collaboration between ordinary citizens and professional journalists through the agency of the social media is termed ‘networked journalism’. Networked journalism is a synergy and exchange of ideas across time and space between professionals and amateurs (Bebawi 2014: 58). This model of journalism was made popular during the Arab Spring

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(Diana Bossio 2014: 16). Bebawi (2014: 19) noted that the sharing of information among media organisations, individual journalists and activists was particularly useful as a powerful lobby whenever there was a crackdown on traditional journalists. In contrast to the lone citizen journalist who posts online resources in a random manner the networked journalist is more purposeful in the harnessing of information as a result of the control exerted by mainstream or professional journalists. Furthermore, networked journalism among other advantages allows for the ordinary citizen to relay his story without any interference from any superiors or the exigencies of news management in mainstream or traditional media (Bebawi 2014: 74). It is a common practice globally for elements within the traditional media to either consciously or unconsciously relay establishment ‘thinking’ within liberal democracies or be brazenly partisan in developing countries. The novelist George Orwell has observed, though in a different context, in ‘Notes on Nationalism’ (1978) the ability of the media to deliberately misrepresent the facts. The phenomenon of press partisanship is particularly relevant to Nigeria where traditional media organisations have often been accused of taking the part of one group or the other during electoral contests and thus deliberating distorting news in favour of a group. The advent of the social media has the capacity to circumvent this arrangement as ordinary individuals are now increasingly functioning as news dispensers (Bebawi 2014: 23). The translation of the individual into ‘base stations’ invariably means that the ‘gate keeping role that mainstream media have traditionally played’ has been considerably weakened (Bebawi 2014: 134). Invariably and increasingly unpopular discourses can be brought unto the public space through these online platforms unlike in the past an anti-establishment discourse ran the risk of being filtered at the ‘gates’. A good example is the Sudan where the highly repressive regime succumbed to pressure for reforms as a result of revelations of its gross human rights abuses by networked journalists. These abuses which include shooting of unarmed protesters by government forces were captured on video by networked journalists and simultaneously live streamed on the British Broadcasting Corporation (Africa Eye) thus giving immerse pungency to the uprising and the demands of the protesters. Thus working together traditional journalists and the networked journalists have given repeated expression through the social media to the earnest desires of many individuals around the world for more social inclusiveness.

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Social Media and the Search for Freedom That much hackneyed phrase ‘global village’, a lexicon achieved through the widespread instrumentalisation of the information communication technology (ICT), has attained greater traction recently following the contagion of social protests engineered through the social media. This syncretisation of technology and social protests has enabled demands for greater political openness and freedom from territories and peoples unimagined decades ago. The increased trend towards greater political openness, freedom and social equity is exemplified in the rise of online anarchist hacktivist groups such as ‘Anonymous’. Hacktivism, the amalgamation of ‘hacking’ and ‘activism’ has been defined as ‘activism gone electronic’ (Jordan and Taylor 2004). Hacktivist groups such as ‘Anonymous’ relentlessly prowl cyberspace seeking to demolish barriers to freedom through the hacking of classified databases. For their theoretical underpinning hacktivist groups lean on the nineteenth-century arch-anarchist Mikhail Bakunin (Bernardi 2016: 11). It is in the appreciation of the jihadic zeal by these online groups for unfettered freedom by all irrespective of class or station, in the information super highway and their attempts to circumvent attempts by state agents to silence communication in cyberspace through low tech radios that Bernardi has aptly ascribed ‘guerrilla status’ to these groups. In the Endsars protests which punctuated social activities in many cities in Nigeria in October 2020, all the key indices of the social media x-rayed in this essay were clearly observed. First, the protests which went under the Endsars hashtag enabled the youth to openly defy the ruling elite in Nigeria. Two, the protests connected with the Nigerian Diaspora in a powerful way: individuals such as the footballer Odion Ighalo, the Boxer Anthony Joshua and John Boyega the actor all tweeted their support. The African-American Diaspora was also engaged through the social media. Even the CEO of Twitter Jack Dorsey tweeted his support. Three, there were massive solidarity protests in major capitals around the world. Four, the protests began with no defined leadership. However, people defined as social media ‘influencers’ took up the cause but never did inherit the mantle of leadership. Five, in contrast to the allusion by Bebawi above that social media inspired protests are akin to a mere ‘network of brains’ and thus incapable of sustaining a physical action for long the endsars

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agitation now has the distinction of being the country’s longest running social protests in its history. Finally, the attempt by the state to block external online sources of funding for the protests was smoothly circumvented by the switch to bitcoin (Adegoke 2020; George 2020; Endsars: How Nigeria’s anti-police brutality protests went global 2020). Consequently, as can be seen from Nigeria’s endsars experience, it is apparent that social media not only helps to propagate democratic ethos within the body politic it also acts to undermine the dominant narrative by only making it one among a slew of alternative narratives (Recuero 2015: 2). In the last two decades, as has been noted in the narrative, the social media has not only acted decisively in countering dominant discourses and enthroning different political ideas it has also acted although somewhat less decisively as a veritable election monitoring ‘Big Brother’.

The Social Media as Big Brother in Nigeria’s Electoral Space The use of the social media in election observation in Nigeria is still largely unsophisticated and infantile because of its restriction to reporting past events rather than capturing those events as they occur. This is the truly revolutionary aspect of the social media. In its original conception Big Brother’s power of omnipresence was its main aspect. In many respects George Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ anticipated the social media, i.e. especially on the possibilities of technological surveillance of the citizenry. However, in the Orwellian conception ‘Big Brother’ is a force of oppression, suppression and a deliberate constriction of the human spirit through its omnipresence. The social media, the modern realisation of Big Brother in modern human experience, on balance, has been a force of freedom and liberation everywhere. The utility of the social media as a tool for the pursuance of political and social liberation has been assured not only through revolutionary action at the street barricades of autocratic states but also in the defence of electoral choices made by the ordinary individual at the polling booth. For example, during the 2009 elections in Iran the desperate attempts by the state to control the flow of information was overwhelmed by an equally trenchant determination of ordinary Iranians to widely publicise the political tumult occurring in their country (Featherman 2015: 23).

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It is now difficult to say exactly when and where the social media was first used as an agency of election observation. On his part, Clay Shirky (2009) has suggested that the use of the social media as an agency of election monitoring and observation began with the Nigerian 2007 general elections. Asides election observation, there was also a significant use of social media during the 2012 removal of oil-subsidy protests. In that respect Kudus Oluwatoyin Adebayo (2016: 38) has examined the extent to which the social media was handily and effectively deployed to mobilise an otherwise apolitical and lethargic population, not only in Nigeria but also in the diasporas, to resist the state. The social media’s devastating deployment in the massive endsars protests has been mentioned. In elections observation however the social media is yet to assume a revolutionary aspect. The use of the social media in the 2011 elections was largely restricted to the relaying of election results on online platforms. Similarly, in the 2019 general elections in Nigeria, the social media was largely reduced to covering the aftermath of an electoral violence rather than capturing the live event or exposing electoral offenders. However, the potentiality of the social media in Nigeria’s electoral space is great. In the main, the country processes the factors i.e. a vibrant youth population which can transform the social media into a revolutionary force in the electoral space. Other indices include an activist diaspora which has always eagerly taken up the cudgel of social protests against the state in contrast to the rather apathetic local population. In fact, studies by Bastian (1999) and Everett (2009) show that as early as the 1990s Nigerians in the United States were among the first nationals to arrive in cyberspace. This fact is in itself politically significant as online diasporas have, as previously noted in this narrative, featured prominently in the gestation, birth and ultimate success of social movements. In addition to a vast social media savvy mostly youthful population seething with revolutionary fervour there is a growing number of equally revolutionary online media. There is also an innovating electoral body which has shown it has little or no compunction in drafting modern technology to meet its extant challenges. What one envisages is the possibility of the INEC transforming these variables into a cohesive electoral framework capable of not just singeing but stymieing further underhand dealings in the electoral space. Similar to its revolutionary recruitment of members of the NYSC and the academia into the electoral space the electoral body could recruit and

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train, both in Nigeria and the diaspora, social media savvy youths on election monitoring. The youths will be recruited in significant numbers to prevent financial co-optation, from every ward in the federation and also networked to the INEC and online mass media and perhaps traditional media. During elections these bands of specially trained volunteer youths will invest the electoral space and by the sheer weight of their numbers dissuade the committal of malpractice. And should such malpractice occur however transmit the action as they are taking place. Meanwhile the diaspora also networked to the INEC will be kept in reserve as a bastion of resistance should the state become an abettor of electoral infraction. This brings us to the problematic of state suppression of the social media. In Nigeria the state has evinced an increasing morbid distrust of and hostility towards the social media. In the aftermath of the endsars protests, legislation against social media use was seriously contemplated. However, in fairness social media hostility is not unique to Nigeria alone. Ceron (2017: 3) has pointed out that a deep and abiding abhorrence for internet freedom is a contagion that is sweeping equally across autocratic and democratic politics. For instance, Turkey under the increasing autocratic Islamist party has evinced an increasingly intolerant posture to social media freedom. While in the United States, the modern day bastion of democracy, a former mayor has bitterly blamed the internet for ‘interfering’ with democratic governance. However even with the state acting as a barracuda against the social media its agency in the electoral space can still be relatively undiminished. We have already noted how attempt by the state to disrupt social media communication was circumvented by youths in some polities including Nigeria. Thus civil society groups can fill the stead of the INEC and act as a coordinating agency for the mobilisation of youths, the online media and the diaspora. Another problem at least, with respect to Nigeria is the issue of ethno-regional tension. This was clearly made manifest during the endsars protests. The protests clearly revealed that the social media was not immune from ethno-regional sentiments. The protests were restrained only to the southern parts of the country as the north characterised the protests as an attempt to discredit the northern president. Thus in order to dilute the message of the endsars hashtag another hashtag was raised in the north ‘northern youths demand security’ (Adegoke 2020).

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Conclusion In view of the debilitating state of affairs with respect to the electoral space in Nigeria this paper has suggested a model in which the electoral body acts as a coordinating agency of civil society group triumvirate of youths (who would be at the frontlines generating the data), the online media and the diaspora. This model may not necessarily bring electoral ills in the country to an immediate halt but it has the capacity to significantly reduce its incidence. The risk of exposure will act as a powerful deterrent. The rise of the social media in recent years as a tool of social agitation has been phenomenal. The strong point of the social media has been the feature of ubiquity. It is for this reason that it has been conceptualised as a ‘Big Brother’. The use of the social media as an observer of elections would be revolutionary in the sense that it would not only name and shame, it would unearth the tactics of the operators of electoral violence.

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CHAPTER 11

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the 2015 as Well as 2019 Elections in Nigeria Dokun Oyeshola and Phebe Ubani

Introduction Elections are central to the operation of democracy in that people are given the freedom to choose who represents them in government. Democracy on the other hand has been one of the foremost system of government that gained prominence since the end of the cold war. Democratic governance is a desire for many as it is adjudged globally to be the form of governance that promotes freedom (Osabiya 2014). Past elections in Nigeria, with the exception of 2015 based on local and international observer reports, have not been credible due to series of electoral rigging and manipulations, ballot box stuffing and snatching, violence and

D. Oyeshola · P. Ubani (B) Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria D. Oyeshola e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_11

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so on (Abubakar 2015; Nwokeke and Jayum 2011; Araba and Braimah 2015). The exception, that is 2015 elections, according to credible local and international observers, was said to have experienced moderately small violence or voter fraud as against the previous elections that have been conducted. Also, 2015 election was an exercise that demonstrated that elections must not and does not have to be a do-or-die issue between and among individuals and political parties (Araba and Braimah 2015). The 2019 election, on the other hand, was filled with high rate of tension, intense campaign, violence, threats and it demonstrated that elections must be a do-or-die issue as there was the desire to win at all cost (Sule 2019). The conducting of elections, registering political parties, organising the activities of political aspirants and regulating electorates in preparation for an election have been the function of an election management body in Nigeria called the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (Sule 2019). Despite the credibility of 2015 elections, according to Sule (2019), Nigeria electoral processes still face challenges as a result of bribery, prejudice, loopholes, lack of proper preparation and professionals, et cetera. Furthermore, the election management body in Nigeria is presumed as one of Nigeria’s challenges in the electoral processes. Therefore, this paper is an investigation of INEC’s role in the conduct of the 2015 and 2019 elections, why the 2019 took a different turn from the 2015 election and recommendations on how INEC can improve its performance in conducting future elections in Nigeria. This paper relied on both primary and secondary data collection and a narrative method of analysis. The primary data was collected through the administration of interview with four (4) INEC ad-hoc staffs and two (2) randomly selected individuals based on their knowledge and involvement in elections in Nigeria. The secondary sources involved books, journals, newspapers, Internet sources and existing relevant matters in relation to the subject matter. This paper will also outline Nigeria major general elections, discuss and analyse activities of INEC in 2015 and 2019 elections using the elite theory and map out the way forward before the conclusion.

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Major General Elections in Nigeria---An Historical Overview Nigeria as a major democracy has had the experience of elections and electoral processes since the days of colonisation. Five different phases of elections so far held in Nigeria can be identified: 1. The period of colonisation, elections were held between 1922 and 1959; 2. The beginning of independence, witnessed elections between 1960 and 1965; 3. The years of military rule; (1979, 1993, 1999); 4. The years of civilian regime in between years of military rule; and 5. The years of civilian regime after military rule (1999 to-date). The following elections were held during the military regimes: (i) The 1979 elections, under the first coming of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (ii) The elections held in 1992–1993 under General Ibrahim Babangida and (iii) The elections of 1999 under General Abdusalami Abubakar. Starting from 1983, the civilian regimes witnessed another set of elections. These were: (i) The 1983 general elections under the Alhaji Shehu Shagari, NPN government, (ii) The 2003 and 2007 general elections under Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, (iii) The 2011 and 2015 general elections under Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, and (iv) The 2019 general elections under General Muhammadu Buhari. Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, Nigeria has conducted six different elections from 1999 to 2019. The practice of elections in Nigeria has been discussed by different scholars, domestic and foreign observers. Nigeria’s past elections have been characterised as being less credible;

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they involve fraudulent activities and violence which has resulted to lack of good governance in Nigeria (Abubakar 2015). According to Osabiya (2014), elections in Nigeria have always been manipulated. People’s votes do not always count, and politicians win elections even without votes from voters, notably the 1999 and 2003 elections. According to him, thuggery which is not alien to electioneering in Nigeria scares Nigerians and it results in a poor turnout of voters during elections (Osabiya 2014).

INEC, 2015 and 2019 Nigeria Elections INEC is permitted by the 1999 Constitution as amended to conduct, handle and oversee elections in the country. Its other key functions include voters’ registration and education, registering political parties, observing the formation and activities of the political parties, monitoring the nomination process as well as the campaign process, media and civic education, fixing dates for election, election supervision and inspection, the announcement of results and post-election reviewing (Adeyemi 2016). Since the establishment of the Commission, six (6) different elections have been conducted; the 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 elections. The most recent which is the election of 2019 was observed to be less credible as against the 2015 elections which was seen as the most credible, free and fair elections since the beginning of the Fourth Republic. Lessons from the 2011 elections were learnt, and applied in the conduct and preparation for 2015. According to local and international observers, the election experienced moderately small violence or voter fraud as against the recent elections that have been conducted since then earlier. According to the Commonwealth (2019), former President of Malawi, Dr. Bakili Muluzi said that the 2015 elections in Nigeria was a vital step in the advancement of democracy in Africa’s most populous country and an important member of the Commonwealth. Despite the lack of proper organisation and technical malfunctioning, the 2015 election processes was fair, free and credible (The Commonwealth 2019). The 2015 elections were an exercise that demonstrated that elections must not and does not have to be a do-or-die issue. It was said to have showed the dominance of the significance of the people above a section in the country (Araba and Braimah 2015). Furthermore, regardless of the intensity of contest between the two main political parties in 2015 (PDP and APC), there was a spirit of collaboration that existed in their activities

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before and after the elections. According to Araba and Braimah (2015, p. 53) “none of the candidates including the incumbent was desperate for power. The idea behind the election was to win and not to capture the election as in the case of other elections. There were reports of minimal cases of rigging, manoeuvring of the votes, intimidation of the votes and violence including complete assassination of opponents”. Furthermore, the 2015 elections and the final outcome were different from that of other elections. Fourteen political parties were registered by INEC to participate in the 2015 general elections and there was an equal opportunity for all political parties, as opposing the practices in other elections, whereby the ruling party took advantage of its status to rule over others. Total valid votes in 2015 were 28,587,564. General Muhammadu Buhari of the APC emerged the winner with total votes of 15,424,921 (53.96%) and his opponent Goodluck Jonathan had 12,853,162 (44.96%) total votes (Araba and Braimah 2015). This marked the first success of an opposition over the ruling party in Presidential elections in Nigeria. According to Adeyemi (2016), the 2015 elections was unique because parties did not take laws into their hands, and they chose to seek redress in courts and electoral panels. President Goodluck Jonathan accepted defeat and handed over to the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari. Minimum report of rigging, manoeuvring of votes and intimidation of the electorate as well as violence supports the uniqueness and credibility of 2015 elections (Araba and Braimah, 2015 and Interview 9/10/2019). The 2019 elections on the other hand was conducted under the chairmanship of Professor Mahmood Yakubu. As a result of logistics and operations challenges, Professor Yakubu around 03:00 a.m. announced the postponement of the elections to the next week. According to This Day Newspaper (27 February, 2019, p. 1), the conduct of the 2019 elections was filled with electoral irregularities associated with the INEC, irregularities such as lack of ballot paper and smart card readers, as well as the cancelling of votes that were valid. This assertion collaborated with the response from an ad-hoc staff, “the card readers were rendered useless and billions of money was used to procure it” (Interview 10/10/2019). The Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) commented that in spite of the elections been postponed, the elections experienced evident logistical challenges, for example, the late commencement of the election. The observers recounted that the polls did not start by 8am which was the scheduled time for commencement.

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Additionally, there were some factors that evolved since 2015 that posed as contributing factors to the less credibility of the 2019 elections among such includes the economic hardship of the country, the increase in unemployment and insecurity. This was collaborated with the response of an ad-hoc staff “the 2019 election was conducted in the context of economic recession, when Nigeria had already become the world capital of the poor. So many people living below the poverty line. Elections offers opportunity for people to make money, through brides from politicians. The economic climate under which the 2019 election was conducted meant that the election cannot be credible because a lot of people wanted to profit from it. Killings became rampart, virtually every state, people were killed by political thugs”. With the proliferation of political parties and presidential candidates to 91 and 73, respectively, APC and PDP remained the main contenders. However, both parties experienced fierce competition and intra-party rivalry during the primaries. It was further assumed that in some cases, the party primaries did not hold in accordance to the rules of the governing primaries, and concerns were raised about the integrity of the primaries and democracy within the party. This resulted in multiple cases in the court and some primaries have been cancelled (The Commonwealth 2019). Furthermore, the religious favour played a critical role as religion was constructed to favour APC by religious clerics and other manipulators (Sule 2019). The 2019 elections recorded the lowest voter turnout in comparison with that of the 2011 and 2015. In 2011, the turnout was 56.4%, in 2015 the turnout of voters was 46.8% but in 2019, only 39.09% turnouts was recorded. Some of the reasons for the low turnout could be political apathy, insecurity and the postponement of the elections from 16 to 23 February 2019. Total valid votes in 2019 were 27,324,583. General Muhammadu Buhari of the APC emerged the winner with total votes of 15,191,847 and his opponent Abubakar Atiku had 11,262,978 total votes (The Commonwealth 2019). According to Ojukwu et al. (2019), a brochure on the 2019 election showed that 72 million voters collected their Permanent Voters Cards out of 84 million voters that registered; there were 91 political parties that registered; 119,973 Polling Units were recorded; there were 120 Accredited Domestic Observers and 36 Foreign Observers; and the 1558 positions were contested by 23,000 candidates. The election was regarded as the costliest in Nigeria’s history because the Federal Government officially funded the election with the sum of

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#242bn; #189bn went to INEC while the remaining #53bn was used for security purpose during the election. Donors also contributed immensely to the commission (Ojukwu et al. 2019). Regardless, this did not translate into a better credible election at the end of the process (Interview 9/10/2019). The 2019 election attracted a lot of controversies. Immediately after the election, the opposition party claimed that the election was filled with widespread fraud, including the stealing of ballot boxes, buying of votes and impersonation. It was also alleged that the police found some explosives. The 2019 election fell short expectations (Ojukwu et al. 2019).

INEC in the 2015 and 2019 Elections: Reviewing the Elite Theory This paper is guided by the theoretical underpinnings of the Elite theory. This theory argues that some individuals in the society form a caucus; these set of individuals are powerful and influential in the society, and they rule for their self-interest. They are called the elites and they include retired military officers, government ministers and leaders, et cetera. The elite theory postulates that a small number of individuals, groups and industries hold power and can influence decisions in the society (Adetayo 2017). Those in support of this theory postulate that government decisions excessively favour the elites above others in the society. The elite theory is associated with the writings of Wright Mills, Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, among others. The elite theory explicates that the Nigerian political electoral system is made up of cadre or elite parties which are involved in manipulating the feelings of the populace for self-interest goal of obtaining economic benefits. According to the elite theorists, the manipulative strategies against the masses by the political elites survive because they are well knowledgeable, structured and have the awareness of high standards unlike the populace. Nigeria, since independence, has witnessed the “circulation of elites” as theorised by Pareto; this has to do with the replacement of elites from time to time, in order for major changes to occur in the society (Ibietan and Ajayi 2015). Elite theory antagonises the pluralist theory, a theory that assumes that all persons, or at least the multitude of social groups, have equal power.

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This theory brings to the understanding that elites often times take advantage of the (disadvantaged/poor) economic situation of the country to buy the will of the people through material and financial giving. This, however, can explain the character of the Nigerian party politics (Aminu 2017). There is lack of competition between candidates in same party, the existence of godfatherism and other manipulations, lack of healthy inter-party competitions and relations. This character of political parties in Nigeria can be said to be the cause of pervasiveness of electoral crisis and manipulation of electoral processes (Ekundayo 2017). Furthermore, most political candidates tend to use dubious and fraudulent means to win the elections at all cost and this was evident in the 2019 elections and this can be attributed to the fact that political parties do not live up to expectation. The elite theory makes us understand that the 2015 and 2019 elections were not devoid of electoral manipulations and violence as a result of the existence of elites in the country. These elites want power at all cost, the people already in power find it hard to give up their power whereas others are struggling to gain or hijack power. The effect there leads to godfatherism, militarism, corrupt practices, rigging and other electoral malpractices, which was manifested in both 2015 and 2019 elections. It is an arguable fact that the activities of INEC in both 2015 and 2019 elections differed resulting in the credibility and less credibility of 2015 and 2019 elections, respectively. However, some activities were same like the postponement of both elections, the existence of fraudulent activities, the use of lecturers and Corp-members as ad-hoc staffs, the registration of political parties and the association with civil societies. Nevertheless, there are some factors that have been highlighted as responsible for the disparities of the elections and INEC’s performance in both elections. These factors would be examined below.

The Personality of the Leadership: The personality of any leader in an organisation has an impact on that organisation, be it negative or positive. Despite the various roles played by various members of an organisation, the progress or regress of the body still very much depends on leadership. Like the 2015 and 2019 elections mirrored, however, personality of a leader cannot be ignored. In 2015, the chairman of INEC was Professor Attahiru Jega, who had once served as ASUU leader. While Professor Mahmood Yakubu was the

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chairman during the conduct of the 2019 election. According to a respondent, Professor Jega and his team had more credibility than the current leadership headed by Professor Mahmood Yakubu. It was observed that the Chairperson in 2019 was and is partial in handling electoral issues which was not the case in 2015. INEC under Professor Jega was more responsive, open and transparent than the Commission under Professor Yakubu (Interview 9/10/2019 and Interview 10/10/2019). Professor Jega’s personality played a fundamental role in the credibility of 2015 election. Furthermore, he was described as “an astute intellectual with a strong sense of ethics and morality” Iyobosa (2010). According to Davidson, Shola and Udora (2019), the election held in 2019 was totally different from the election in 2015 and Professor Yakubu who was in charge of the election was alleged the worst chairperson since 1999. He was also alleged to be corrupt, greedy, in pursuit of traditional sentiments and petty religious. In support of the above, Ojeifo (2019) argues that INEC compromised the credibility of the 2019 election. He went further to state that Mohammed Musa who was a senatorial candidate of the governing All Progressives Congress (APC) was also involved in the production and supply of sensitive electoral materials like the Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs), which was not right and the chairman was aware of this and did not take any action against it. Ojeifo (2019) also commented that the leadership of the INEC under Yakubu was imprudent and the commission failed woefully to deliver an outcome that is pan-Nigeria unlike the 2015 presidential election conducted by the Professor Attahiru Jega. Another respondent observed that, the personality of the headship of INEC in 2015, the person of Professor Jega was more disciplined and keener. This observation collaborates with the comment of Ewache (2010), “Professor Jega is a self-disciplined man which is legendary”. The respondent went further to note that Professor Jega had the interest for the country, which served as a guide for him to be able to select those who worked along with him in the 2015 election. The idiosyncrasies factors of Professor Jega actually made the 2015 election more credible than that of 2019 election. Professor Jega stood his ground vehemently, working according to the electoral laws and not the politicians, using the INEC guideline in the collation and counting of the election results (Interview 10/10/2019).

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Logistics In terms of logistics, there were some noticeable differences. In 2015, logistics appeared better organised than in 2019. One of the reasons for the postponement of the 2019 election was the challenge of logistics. Although there was logistics support from organisations in 2019, it was not organised and coordinated as that of 2015 where there was the DGD II project (organisations that made up the DGD II project includes the European Union, United Nations Development Programme, the Canadian International Development Agency, among others). The DGD project II was a project set up to support the 2015 election through the provision of financial, logistical and technical support. A visible support of the DGD II project to INEC in the conduct of the 2015 election was the improved voter registration through I.C.T and the improved legal and policy framework. There was also the introduction of Smart Card Readers (SCR) which was used for voter’s identification and authentication. The introduction of the SRC was believed to have drastically curbed rigging which made the election successful. According to the respondents, in 2015 there was the introduction of biometrics which was already in place by the 2019 election. However, this in itself created a crisis of confidence and credibility for the commission because the commission announced that a server was going to be used during the election but at the end it did not use a server and said it did not have a server, which created its own disparities and lack of credibility (Interview 9/10/2019). This in itself led to fraudulent practices during the election (interview 10/10/2019).

Fraudulent Activities A respondent affirmed that in 2019 election, a lot of electoral fraudulent acts took place as in contrast to the 2015 election. The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Development in Africa Election Observation Mission (EISA EOM) to Nigeria commented that the violence that associated the conduct of the 2019 election outweighed that of 2015 election, leading to loss of lives and properties of Nigerians. The respondent went further to comment that the fraudulent activities both in 2015 and 2019 are empirical evidence that 2015 election was more credible than 2019 election (Interview 9/10/2019). Another respondent noted that the security conditions of 2015 was better in that it was mostly not supportive of

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election malpractices unlike the 2019 elections (Interview 10/10/2019; Ojukwu et al. 2019). Malpractices like stealing of ballot boxes, making announcement of results where elections were not even held, increasing figures, acquiring of ballot papers illegally and thumb-printing, the late start of the voting process, results manipulation, among others, were rampant in 2019.

Postponement of Elections The 2015 election was postponed for security reasons while 2019’s postponement was due to logistical and operational challenges with pockets of security challenges (Commonwealth 2019; Ojukwu et al. 2019). According to a respondent who was one of the observers of both elections, the 2019 election was cancelled just few hours to the election making it seem suspicious as people were ready for the election. Both local and international observers were already on their different locations to observe the election only to discover no more election (Interview 11/10/2019). The postponement of the 2015 election on the other hand was done a week before the Election Day making room for enough adjustments.

The Use of Smart Card Readers (SCR) The Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room reported that there was a significant change in the 2015 election with the introduction of the Smart Card Readers (SCR). The SCR limited the chances of rigging by politicians because these politicians lacked the ability to manipulate it. According to Sections 10, 11 and 13 of the INEC Regulations and Guidelines, the SCR emphasised the necessity of verification and the process of voting, which abolishes the Incident Forms. The utilisation of the Smart Card Readers was to guarantee that the process of voting was transparent and open to all. It was also used to ensure that the results were not manipulated (Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room 2015). However, in the 2019 election, the use of the card readers were questionable. According to This Day Newspaper (27 February 2019, p. 1), major complaints of voters during the 2019 election revolved around the card readers and the complaints included the following: failure to verify thumbprints, inability to produce true identity of card holders, lack of recognition of some alphabets relating to some forenames. Another

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respondent commented that during Professor Jega’s leadership, there was nothing as emergency voting, anyone without PVC could not vote but during the 2019 election, even without PVC people were able to vote leading to fraud, malpractice, suspicion, lack of trust and credibility. The respondent also added that as a collation officer during the 2019 election, he observed that people were able to vote as many times as possible because there was no avenue to identify those who had voted and not voted (Interview 11/10/2019).

Way Forward The following may constitute a way forward for credible elections in future elections in Nigeria (1) The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as its name implies, must and has to be independent, non-partisan, neutral, transparent and free from any form of influence or interference by either the incumbent President or politicians. The Commission should be able to make decisions and stand by them. Additionally, the Commission should make itself accountable before, during and after elections. Within the body, INEC should ensure that staff members are not partisan, and it should be firm in ensuring discipline of staff. However, to achieve this, a good framework has to be in place to guide the activities of INEC. The legal and normative electoral framework in Nigeria requires a review towards ensuring independence, fidelity to their primary assignment and the cause it owes its purpose to, as well as accountability (2) The appointment of the INEC officials should be done through a proper recruitment mechanism. In addition, the chairmanship should be by promotion, other tests inclusive to ensure meritocracy, rather than appointment by the President. (3) INEC as a body must ensure early preparations to avoid the option of postponement due to finance, logistics or operational challenges. Preparations for another election should begin immediately after an election, the Commission should not wait until election date is close before preparations begins. (4) INEC should intensify voter education in preparations for future elections. There should be mass mobilisation and orientation of

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the electorates who need to be conscious, vigilant and participatory in terms of their voting at periodic elections, because many do not know their rights and privileges when it comes to electoral matters. (5) Elites use manipulative strategies against masses because they are well knowledgeable, structured and have the awareness of high standards unlike the masses. As a result of this, electorates must and have to be educated and well informed of their rights and privileges during electoral process to be able to overcome the manipulative strategies of the elites. (6) Electoral offenders should be prosecuted, and this will strengthen INEC. It will ensure INEC credibility if the necessary institutions are put in place to enforce the law. In addition, electoral offences tribunal should be established and the full application of electoral laws. Not much has been done as regards electoral offenders thereby encouraging bad behaviours from politicians since offenders are usually not prosecuted.

Conclusion This paper concludes that the activities of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 2015 differed from its activities in 2019 due to some reasons such as the different personalities of the Chairmanship of the Commission, the postponement of the elections, fraudulent acts, the use of card readers, the influence of politicians and many more. However, it can be argued that even the 2015 election was not totally free, fair and credible because it still had the features of other elections in Nigeria such as fraudulent acts, killings, ballot box snatching, over voting, et cetera. Nevertheless, INEC as the Election Management Body of Nigeria can improve on its activities in the conduct of future elections in Nigeria thereby resulting in credible elections.

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References Abubakar, A. (2015). ‘Promoting Credible Elections in Developing Countries: International Development Partners and Civil Society Organizations in Nigeria’. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations. 9(5), 190–199. Adetayo, O. (2017). Assessment of the Roles of European Union in Consolidating Nigeria’s Democracy (1999–2015). A thesis submitted to the Hezekiah Olawasanmi Library, OAU Ile-Ife, Nigeria. Adeyemi, A. (2016). Election and Electoral Processes in Nigeria History. Lecture delivered at Afe Babalola University, Ado-Ekiti. Aminu K. (2017). Intra-Party Politics and Primary Elections in Peoples Democratic Party: A Study of the Emergence of Gubernatorial Candidates in Kaduna State (1995–2015). A thesis submitted to Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria. Araba, A. A., & Braimah, J. O. (2015). ‘Comparative Study of 2011 and 2015 Presidential Elections in Nigeria’. Global Journal of Human-Social Science. 15(7), 49–54. Davidson, I., Shola, O., & Udora, O. (2019). ‘NBA Accuses INEC Officials of Aiding Election Rigging’, This Day Newspaper, February 27, 2019, p. 1. Accessed 19/10/2019. Ekundayo, W. (2017). ‘Political Elite Theory and Political Elite Recruitment in Nigeria’. Public Policy and Administration Research. 7(5), 1–8. Ewache, A. (2010). ‘The Man Attahiru Jega’. The Will, June 8, 2010, p. 1. Accessed 19/10/2019. Ibietan, J., & Ajayi, O. (2015). ‘The Governing Elite and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the Fourth Republic’. Journal of Human and Social Science Research. 6(1), 14–21. Iyobosa, U. (2010). ‘INEC Chairman-Jonathan Picks Jega’. Leadership, June 5, 2010, p. 1. Accessed 19/10/2019. Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room “Report on Nigeria 2015”. www.pla cng.org. Nwokeke, O., & Jayum, J. (2011). ‘The Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’. Journal of Politics and Law. 4(2), 128–138. Ojeifo, S. (2019). ‘INEC and the Failure of Due Diligence’. This day Newspaper, March 15, 2015, p. 1. Accessed 19/10/2019. Ojukwu, U., Mbah, M., & Maduekwe, V. (2019) ‘Elections and Democratic Consolidation: A Study of 2019 General Elections in Nigeria’. Direct Research Journal of Social Science and Educational Studies. 6(4), 53–64. Osabiya, B. J. (2014). ‘Nigeria and Democratic Elections’. Journal of Good Governance and Sustainable Development in Africa. 2(3), 53–64.

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Sule, B. (2019). ‘The 2019 Presidential Election in Nigeria: An Analysis of the Voting Pattern, Issues and Impact’. Malaysian Journal of Society and Space. 15(2), 129–140. The Commonwealth (2019). ‘Nigeria General Elections, 23 February 2019’. The Commonwealth Observer Group. New York. www.thecommonwealth.org.

CHAPTER 12

Electoral Violence and Its Impact on Women’s Political Participation in Nigeria Oluwakemi Roseline Olatunji and Victor Ojakorotu

When it comes to general development, we have witnessed women being intimidated, especially in a developing country like Nigeria. However, the major contributors to this marginalization include intimidation, thuggery, and violence (Rasak and Garuba 2017) which all play out on the ego of these women. It has been established that sexual and gender-based violence targeted towards women hamper a nation’s development. In the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPFA) report, violence against women is defined as “any act of gender-based violence as a result of physical, sexual, or emotional hurt including threats of such derogatory acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life” (Kamau and Nzomo 2012). Since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, there have been numerous

O. R. Olatunji (B) · V. Ojakorotu Department of Politics Studies and International Relations, North West University, Mahikeng, South Africa V. Ojakorotu e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_12

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accounts of political violence, thuggery, and intimidations of opposition, irrespective of their gender. To minimize the occurrence of political gender-based violence and other gender-related issues, Nigeria adopted the Treaty on the Eradication of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1985, with the intention of enforcing laws to protect the rights of women (Rasak and Garuba 2017). In addition, other policies adopted by Nigeria include the 1985 Beijing Platform for Action, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo protocol), The African Charter on People’s Rights, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, the Nigerian Constitution embodies respect for fundamental civil and political rights and reflects most electoral human rights laws and policies (European Union 2011). Not minding the requirements of the laws and policies stated above, the nation is lagging in the implementation of the 30 articles of the CEDAW. Even after agreeing to implement the 35% minimum exemplification of women folk in voting and non-elective positions in Nigeria, the impact is yet to be seen as the number of females in the lawmaking house has not improved. There may be a decline in numbers which has been attributed by Johnson (2016) to the masculinity play of politics in the nation. Elections, as we know, should be the hallmark of democracy and participation in elections forms components of fundamental human rights of citizens in such democratic societies. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “elections are expected to be competitive, free and fair; where the rule of law influences the ability of the elected representatives to exercise decision-making power, a constitution that emphasizes the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals, and which places checks on the leaders and on the extent to which the will of the majority can be exercised against the rights of minorities”. Nevertheless, in Nigeria, there is little regard for the legal concept that governs the election system because there is generally bad blood among those vying for control and those who will most likely lose it. During the electoral process, this typically leads to more violence. In the April 2007 general elections, Nigeria saw a rise in the number of female candidates from all parties. For instance, a total of 1220 women candidate vied for 1532 positions, with 660 females winning the primary elections.

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The outcome showed that 93 people were elected in voting, including 52 in various State Houses of Assembly, 27 in the House of Reps, 9 Senators, and 6 Deputy Governors. There are also many women appointed to various positions (Igbuzor 2014). This election produced Patricia Olubunmi Etteh, the first female speaker of the House of Representatives, who was removed barely after four months in office. In 2011 elections, only one woman contested for the position of the presidency and because of the nature of Nigeria’s political system, she did not make it beyond the primaries of her party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) (Igbuzor 2014). Despite all this, Nigerian women are yet to throwing their weight in the political climes of the nation and this was one of the key areas identified during the 1995 Beijing Conference.

Conceptual Clarification Election Elections are the most basic indicator of democracy. It is a process in which qualified people vote to choose a person or group of persons under the rules and procedures of the electoral system to hold an official position (Omotola 2007). Elections have been central to competitive politics. Ideally, they guarantee political participation and competition, which in turn are pivotal to democratic transition and consolidation (Omotola 2010). It is worth noting, that election results do not guarantee longterm democratization and integration. This method is often used to mask autocratic government, which Andreas Schedler refers to as “electoral authoritarian rule” (Andreas 2002). As a result, after casting a vote, individuals have almost no right to decide who their leader is, even after voting, just like in most African Countries (Said 2000). Violence A precise definition of violence requires four elements. Violence is a behaviour that is (a) intentional, (b) unwanted, (c) nonessential, and (d) harmful. All four elements are necessary to properly include all acts that belong in the category and to properly exclude similar acts that are not violence, such as self-defense (Hamby 2017).

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There are four popular ways to defining violence in the scientific literature. Exemplar approach: For example, the Violence page on the American Psychological Association (APA) website simply puts violence as an extreme form of aggression, such as assault, rape, or murder (American Psychological Association, n.d; Abrahams et al. 2014). Social psychology approach: This approach tends to use the term “aggression” more than “violence” (Parrott and Giancola 2007). According to Parrott and Giancola (2007), aggression is any behaviour intended to harm another person and they define violence as any aggressive act that causes extreme physical harm, such as injury or death. This view of violence and aggression was also supported by DeWall et al. (2011). Public health approach: According to the World Health Organization (WHO), violence is “The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation”. This is one of the stronger definitions of violence. Animal research approach: Defines violence as “a pathological form of aggressive behaviour that is not subjected to inhibitory control mechanisms and that has lost its function in social communication” (Koolhaas et al. 2010). In its 1996 resolution WHA49.25, declaring violence a leading public health problem, the World Health Assembly called on the World Health Organization to develop a typology of violence that characterized the different types of violence and the links between them. According to Foege et al. (1995), a few typologies already exist and are discussed in brief below: • Self-directed violence: this involves suicidal behaviour and/or selfabuse. • Interpersonal violence: this is usually between two people who are either familiar or not familiar with each other. • Collective violence: this includes social, political, or economic violence and it is usually aimed at advancing a particular social agenda, for example, crimes of hate committed by organized groups, terrorist acts, and mob violence.

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Electoral Violence Electoral violence is seen as “intimidation directed towards electoral actors and/or objects that occur in the context of electoral contest” (Birch et al. 2020). This can occur before, during, or after an electoral process and anyone can be the target (contestants, electoral officials, or even voters). Electoral violence can involve one or more of the following practices: use of force to disrupt political meetings, forcefully disrupting voting at polling stations or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral officials or to cause injury to any person connected with electoral processes (Igbuzor 2014). Some major sources of party-political violence in Nigeria are: Hate Campaign, Corruption, Insecurity, Unemployment, Failure of the justice system, Abuse of Power, power grabbling.

Political Instability Political instability implies a state of political turmoil in a nation. There could be occurrences of death and a massive hit on the economy of the nation (Egobueze 2013). Scholars have described Nigeria as an “unfinished state”, (Joseph et al. 1996) and as “a truculent African tragedy” (Ayittey 2006) amid abundant human and material resources, which are propelled in the vicious cycle of poverty and autocracy. One of the major factors responsible for political instability is the failure of the political class to sufficiently adhere to the basic tenets of democracy and constitutionalism (Kew 2006). As a result, Nigeria has been finding it difficult to establish and maintain a stable political culture and an orderly political procedure, resulting in social and political instability (Anyanwu 1982). This has led to high level of corruption and consequently to impedance in national development and political uncertainty.

The Nigerian Women and Political Participation: An Overview We will begin this discourse with a proper understanding of how the Nigerian woman has fared over time. According to Igube (2004), the understanding of a woman and womanhood in Nigeria is a function of the inter-play of the societal dynamics of the three cultures that form the Nigerian heritage.

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These are the European culture which was brought to Nigeria by the colonialists, the Arabian beliefs, and the precolonial traditional culture. The European projection of women and womanhood is characterized by Christian theology and ideology. It is believed that it was the woman who persuaded Adam to eat the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden and thereby sin against God (Gen 3: 2–12). This marked the beginning of her problems and since then, this perception has defined her role, her worth, and her status in society. The Bible creation story postulates that Eve was made from the rib of Adam, thus, she is presented as an attachment to man to be used for his pleasure. Since then, women pay for causing the downfall of humankind. Islam was introduced to Nigeria by the Arabs, along with the Arab culture. This culture introduced the perception of Purdah in the society. Purdah is the custom in identifiable Muslim and Hindu civilizations of examination of womanhood from manhood or unfamiliar person, particularly by method of a curtail (Bahadori and Pande 2017; Aderibigbe 2004). This means that women are usually expected to stay at home or their faces to be covered. The major issue with the Purdah institution is that it hinders women’s movement (Adams 2008). Under this injunction, a woman may be viewed as weak and incapable of decision-making. Consequently, the husband is vested with decision-making responsibilities (Bahadori and Pande 2017). Worthy to note also is the conception of regional differences. Some practices take place in the different geopolitical regions of the nation which influence the way in which women are viewed and the way in which they view themselves. Ethnic differences also exist. The woman from the East is more affected by harmful widowhood practices than her Northern mate. The women from the South West have better education (Umar 2017). Regardless of ethnic group, race, or nationality, women across the world, including Nigerian women, are seen to be subordinates to their male counterpart, occupying second class status in the society, oppressed, subservient, poor, etc. (Okafor and Akokuwebe 2015; Orokpo et al. 2017). Growing up in a society that expects her to be unheard and unimportant, the Nigerian girl-child grows into a woman who has an extreme low self-esteem and who does not feel she could contribute to anything important in society. This ripples into how she feels about decision-making, both at home and in the society. Her father needs her to serve her brothers. Her boss expects her to cower when he talks. Her husband expects her to be silent when he makes suggestions and to ultimately just swallow those suggestions. How

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then would she believe that she is strong enough to make policy decisions that can affect the whole nation or a constituency? Therefore, it is no surprise that, in three field of politics, the Nigerian women suffer a pathetic outcome. With almost half of the Nigerian electorate as women, their participation in policy or decision-making positions is dismal (Okafor and Akokuwebe 2015). Igube (2004) also submitted that women are characterized by a subordinate, low status. This deprivation undoubtedly has forced women to begin to question whether all these came with creation or whether they are natural. This has instigated some agitations, debates, and discussions to convince further womenfolk to get participation in making political decision in the society, especially in the political field. Considering all that the Nigerian women already have against them daily, it is safe to say that any little hindrance is enough to discourage them from full participation in politics and electoral violence is one of such hindrances.

Nigerian Women and Politics: Until the role of women in national leadership is recognized, our national problems will remain unresolved. For this reason, Nigerian women are joining their counterparts from other climes to mount pressure on the government to allocate 30% quota in political offices for women. Despite any visible social and political advancement, women generally find themselves at the receiving end of gender exploitation in each civilization universally. According to Agbalajobi (2009), the Commonwealth People’s Forum held in Nigeria in 2008 described heavily on the role of government and civil society. This addressed the formation of the necessary strategies to expand good behaviours for women across the globe of influence in congress. In Nigeria, women account for about half of the nation’s populace of over 200 million people; however, this numerical strength has not been fully reflected in the number of women in Nigerian governance (Okoronkwo-Chukwu 2013; Mohammed and Zaid 2014; Oloyede 2016; Idike et al. 2020). Nigeria cannot claim to be a fully democratic country until there is a significant turn-around in the condition of women generally, first of which is their empowerment towards accessing different aspects of governance

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as equal partners with their male counterparts. Agbalajobi (2010) maintained that their exclusion from key political positions in political party organs and public offices only enforces the patriarchy in the society which portrays women as just housewives whose only relevance is in the kitchen and not the political sphere. Historically, Nigerian women had experienced some form of bigotry virtually in most community development, whether with voting or being voted for. Even dating back to the precolonial era, there was the Clifford constitution of 1922 which limited the people who could vote and be voted for to only grown-up males who had lived in Calabar and Lagos for 1 year or more with a gross annual income of $10 (Brown 2013; Ogbogbo 2009). After that, the Richard constitution of 1946 came with a reform that only reduced income requirements to N50.00. When the Macpherson constitution was introduced, the reform only removed income requirements but still limited the people who could vote and be voted for to only tax paying adult males (Abdulsalami 2013; Okereka 2015; Chidi et al. 2017). It was after 1979 that Nigerian women above 18 were allowed the right to vote. It took fifty-seven years for women to meet up with their male counterparts on the right to vote and be voted for (Obasanjo 2012). The first republic had no women in the federal legislature. However, during the 1961 regional elections, the Eastern House of Assembly recorded the election of three women. The second republic was somewhat better as Franca Afegbua was the only woman who made it to the Senate in 1983 (Oloyede 2016; Orokpo et al. 2017). This republic lasted for three years before it collapsed. The third republic looked as though things were going to take a turn for the better as eight female aspirants for governorship emerged, which was only 2.6% of the 300 gubernatorial candidates at the time. This resulted in none of the women making it to the government houses as all seats were won by men (Orokpo et al. 2017). One would think that the fourth republic would be any better, since we have seen an increase in education and exposure of women. However, data available proves that only about 5.6% of women that is 631 female contestants were registered in the 1999 election, out of which 180 won (Oleru 1999). This figure represents 1.6% of the total number of elective positions available in that era. Furthermore, in 2011, the largest number of women in government was recorded and that was reduced by 62% in 2019.

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In 1999, three women made it into the senate, four in 2003, eight in 2007 and 2011, and only seven in 2015 and 2019 (Oloyede 2016; Orokpo et al. 2017). These figures were not better in other positions as the number of winning females from the election saw a decline. For instance, in 2011, 99 women were elected to office but this declined to 76 and 62 in 2015 and 2019, respectively (Oloyede 2016; Oni 2014; Adefemi and Agunbiade 2019; NWTF 2019). Statistics showed that about 11% of the candidates who contested for election in 2007 were women out of which one woman contested for Presidency; 33.9% of governorship aspirants were female; 13.5% of people who contested for the Senate were female; 15.6% of the House of Representatives contestants were female; and 15.8% of the contestants for various state House of Assemblies were women. After the elections and appointments only about 7.5% of notable governance roles in Nigeria were occupied by women (Oloyede 2016; Oni 2014). Yar’Adua promised that his administration would allot 30% of its appointments to women; however, Action Aid said, in their assessment after one year that only 11% of appointments were given to women (Ake et al. 2019). The 2011 elections came with better promise with 809 women emerging as candidates for different positions and different political parties. At the end of the elections, instead of a reflection of this rise in the number of women voted into office, there was a slight decline from 7.5% that was achieved in 2007 to 7.1% in 2011 (Oni 2014). The number added reduced to 5 percent of elected positions being occupied by women in the 2015 elections (Oloyede 2016; Oni 2014; Adefemi and Agunbiade 2019). However, President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration appointed 33% of its members as women but it reduced to 19% in President Muhammad Buhari’s tenure (Okon and Orlu-Orlu 2016; Idike et al. 2020). Njoku (2012) is of the opinion that the decrease in the number of women in active policy-making can be related to a succession of ferocity and terrorization linked with the Nigerian party-political structure. Power grabbing has become so rampant in Nigeria that politicians would do all it takes to get and keep power to themselves and will employ all measures such as intimidation, thuggery, kidnapping, killing, etc. to achieve victory during elections. This makes it hard for women to contest as women are more compassionate and are not known for aggressiveness. This scares women away from playing the Nigerian kind of politics and they would rather watch from the side lines.

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Election Violence and Nigerian Politics After the first republic, no administration in Nigeria have been exempted from violence. Thuggery had an almost official position in different states of the country. As it stands today, the more thugs you have in your employ, the more likely you are to win an election. This thuggery thrives because it is a supply of income to unemployed thugs and a means to achieve an end for the politicians who employ them. Gboyega (2004) stated that thuggery and party-political ferocity are essential tools in the fingers of ambitious power explorers. This is because these thugs are used by the political godfathers and these godfathers are the high and mighty in the social order, and they include either the kingmakers or the kings themselves. These godfathers have almost become part of the Nigerian constitution of which people usually say that if you do not have a godfather, you would not go far in politics. This has made these godfathers almost invincible and untouchable by law, since they can afford police protection and in turn, this invincibility is extended to the thugs who commit their atrocities. Therefore, it looks as though thuggery and electoral violence are here to stay. This has, over time, resulted in women’s political apathy suffered in the campaign procedure in Nigeria.

Causes of Election Violence in Nigeria Jonathan (2016) summarizes the causes of political unrest in Nigeria as follows: Poverty and unemployment; Jonathan (2016) stated that a good number of Nigerian youths are either unemployed or underemployed and that the promise of money makes crime an enticing way out. This makes them easy prey for no-good politicians who are looking for people to perpetrate their nefarious activities since they cannot do it themselves. This poverty mindset drives them to take up the acts of election violence without thinking of its impact on their future and that of future generations. If they were gainfully employed and doing something good with their lives, someone would hardly walk up to them and ask them to throw away their lives to become mercenaries. Sit-tight syndrome: This happens when an elected official refuses to give up his position because of the personal gains he is receiving from it. This means that they go to any length to ensure that none of his

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opponents win him, including intimidation, killing, maiming, abduction, blackmail, etc. This breed diverse practices of violence. Prebendalism: Prebendalism, as the title suggests, is a democratic structure in which elected representatives and public workers feel they have a right to a share of government treasure, and use them to benefit their supporters, co-religionists, and members of their ethnic group. In Nigeria, politicians see the play of political affairs as investment. Esew (2003) maintained that politicians invest massively in the election process and do not want this investment to go to waste. What do they do? They employ every means necessary to ensure that they get into power to recoup all the money they have spent during the election. They go into all practices of violence and terrorization to take out anyone who stands in their way to victory. Most politicians are not interested in working for the betterment of the masses. Ethnicity: Ethnicity is another causal factor of electoral violence (Birch et al. 2020). Nigerian leadership is based on ethnic divides and loyalty. It is a certain belief that some positions are meant for some ethnic groups. Hate speech campaign: Speech, gesture, writing, conduct, or demonstration that could result or instigate individuals to hostility or harmful act is regarded as hate speech (Ezibe 2020). When a campaigner resorts to using hate statements to describe their opponents, it can cause a succession of violent actions. Prior to the 2015 elections, record of clashes and fights that started because of news articles making the round about the candidates were witnessed. The bitterness fuelled by these messages forced some youths to take up arms in the form of fighting the corruption that had eaten deep into the fabric of the polity (The Guardian 2015). Other factors that can encourage electoral violence in Nigeria are electoral abuse, greed, corruption of electoral practices or processes, thuggery, and abuse of power (Campbell 2010; Rasak and Garuba 2017). Election campaigns are not as clean and organized as they should be. There have been cases of clashes and fights in campaign trails. Election rigging also facilitates violence. For instance, about 117 cases of ballot box grabbing remained stated in Delta State in the 2011 elections (European Union Election Observation Mission 2011). These kinds of reports escalate violence because people decide to fight for their votes. No one wants to sit back and hear a result that is not indicative of their votes (Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance 2011).

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Rumours, false news, and inflammatory messages concerning the outcome of an election or the events of the election could trigger electoral or post-electoral violence as was seen in Nigeria’s 2011 elections (Harwood and Campbell 2010; Ofili 2011). It is apparent that the major sources of electoral violence in Nigeria are dependent on societal factors such as political culture and ideology, literacy level, accountability and efficiency of electoral bodies, economic development, and political stability.

Incidence of Election Violence in Nigerian Politics Following the trend of electoral violence in Nigeria, it is obvious that violence is a major contributing factor to low politics partaking among Nigerian women. In 2003, for example, there were records of clashes between parties, assassinations of aspirants, and community unrest, predominantly in the Niger-delta zone (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart 2010). Report has it that Senator Gbemisola Saraki, one of the nine female senators in the National Assembly, narrowly escaped death at the hands of paid assassins who were sent to kill her. Senator Iyabo ObasanjoBello had the same experience (Kehinde David 2018). Others include Janet Olapade, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) leader in Odigbo Local Government Area, Ondo State, who on 13 August 2002 was assassinated, Joyce Fatai, former Nasarawa State Commissioner for Women Affairs and Social Development, who was assassinated on 3 May 2003 (Olufunke 2012). Other women who have had to pay the price for electoral violence in Nigeria over the years are Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, Madam Suliat Adedeji, and many others who are termed “victims of the predilection of Nigerian politics” (Luka 2011). Njoku (2012) further asserted that thugs were recruited in the south west for the 2003 and 2007 elections where they were used to rig elections. Some of them even hijacked the elections and took up ballot boxes. Some officials taking control of the elections, together with some voters were badly injured. The election was rife with intimidations by the thugs making voters vote against their wishes. Even election representatives were mandatory to compromise the results in favour of certain parties.

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In fact, people were so sure that the 2007 elections would be inundated with violence that most people did not bother going out to vote which resulted in a low voters’ turnout. In Rivers State, there were literal threats made to voters and several political kidnappings took place prior to the elections (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart 2010). Thankfully, the next election in 2011 was a lot better as the election was more credible and better organized. However, there was still post-election violence in the North that recorded the most casualties the nation has had in an election led violence. The main targets of this unrest were non-Muslims, opposing party members, leaders, supporters, and state institutions. Some National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members were also attacked (Orji and Uzodi 2012). The hoodlums saw these NYSC members as part of the INEC institution and because they were mostly non-indigenes, they were easy targets. Meanwhile, the corps members were only co-opted as ad-hoc election staff to serve as neutral persons since they were non-indigenes. Report has it that these hoodlums raped and killed two female corps members. Some protesters stormed Gadau village and assaulted and raped other female corps members. Bauchi State Police Command confirmed this by announcing that “indefinite number female Corps members were raped, battered and mugged by furious youths in Gadau village” (Orude 2011; Mohammed 2011). This was a slight representation of what kinds of assaults most women go through during election violence (Tribune 2011). Another newspaper house reported the invasion of a female boarding house at the Federal College of Education, Kano. However, there was no account of sexual physical attack (Mgboh and Ebije 2011). Different forms of assault were dealt to people during the 2011 post-election violence, especially physical assault. There were reports of people who were beaten, injured, and maimed by protesters using different weapons like machetes, cutlasses, and arrows (Asemota 2011). There were numerous gunshot injuries as reported by various hospitals (Iadan 2007). A local human rights defender told Amnesty International (2011) that, “The pattern of the killings now is extremely worrying, with attacks on women, children and the elderly” (2011). The 2015 elections were not as violent as 2011 but it was not free from violence too. About 58 people were murdered in violent clashes as a result of the elections (Premium Times 2015). For instance, Ebonyi state recorded arsons, gunshot, and the killing of a collation officer on

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Election Day (Nkwede 2016). The year 2019 had a more violence ridden election process. Human Rights Watch (2019) reported that about 606 people were murdered before, during, and after the elections, including women and children. The powerlessness of the legal system to arrest and prosecute committers of electoral violence only encourages and empowers the act more. People believe that they can do anything and get away with it because they know people “in high places” which has only fuelled electoral violence more. Violence against women is one issue that needs to be handled critically.

Conclusion As observed from the above discussion, no country can grow or call itself developed when peace is absent. Worthy to note is the fact that violence affects women more than men and ends up instilling fear in the polity, even when there is no reason for fear. Whenever there is electoral violence, women may lose their lives or lose the lives of their husbands, brothers, and sons, so no matter what way the violence hammer swings, women are always affected by it. It has also been shown that frustration from failed systems, disappointment from expected results, and nonexistence of reverence for the rule of law and fundamental human rights foster violence while impunity encourages it. This will only motivate political apathy in women with most of them withdrawing from contesting or even participating in the electioneering process. This paper revealed that election violence is a huge factor mitigating against female participation in politics. If the Nigerian government is interested in having more women participate in the electioneering process, they need to make it a point of duty to curb election violence and to educate women more about why their participation in politics is for the betterment of the nation. Rule of law should be upheld. If people are prosecuted for election violence not minding what their level in the society is, it will boost women’s trust in the judiciary, knowing that there is punishment for anyone caught in the act of election violence.

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CHAPTER 13

Voter Education and Political Participation in Nigerian Presidential Election: A Comparative Analysis from Southeast Nwali Richard Chidi and Ijeoma Genevieve Anikelechi

Introduction Since independence, there have been several elections conducted in Nigeria. These include: 1963, 1964, 1979, 1983, 1993, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019. In these various election years, there have been controversies over voter registration, voter turnout and vote validity which are the critical components of political participation. The controversies that stem from voter registration, voter turnout and vote validity are all dependent and determined by the degree of voter education. In other words, voter registration, voter turnout and vote validity are predicated on good and proper voter education. Hence, prior to the

N. R. Chidi (B) Department of Political Science, Ebonyi State University Abakaliki, Abakaliki, Nigeria I. G. Anikelechi Department of Science Education, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_13

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investigation of the identified variables in 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria, there is need for retrospect into past elections in Nigeria. Historical antecedence has shown that the issue of voter education has been at its lower ebbs, hence the challenges experienced in our electoral process. For instance, the 1963 and 1964 general elections recorded low voter education which affected voter registration, voter turnout and vote validity in the country. Nohlen and Krennerich (1999) posited that out of the 15 million eligible voters in the 1964 general elections, it was 5,761,483 that voted. The election which was the first national election in the independent Nigeria was contested by the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) was led at that time by Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of the Northern Region, and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) was led by Michael Okpara, the then Premier of the Eastern Region. That election was marred by monumental ethnoreligious sentiments owing to lack of proper voter education that reflects true federalism. During the 1979 Nigeria’s general elections, which Shehu Shagari won, recorded the total of 48,633,782 registered voters whereas only the total of 16,846,633 number of valid votes were cast. Ibeanu and Orji (2014) gave the instance where Plateau State recorded 48,279 rejected votes in the 1979 presidential election due to inefficient voter education across the constituencies of the state. It should be noted that the 1983 presidential election recorded 25,430,096 valid votes out of 65,304,818 registered voters. The controversy that trailed the electoral register later surfaced with renewed strength as FEDECO released the list less than 15 days to the election, which contained the total of 65,304,818 registered voters, greater than the country’s population as at 1963 with an increase of eighteen million from the 1979 registered voters, which requires no statistical or mathematical skills to suspect serious inflation of the 1983 electoral register (Diamond 2002). Adeola (2019) recorded that 12 June 1993 presidential election registered 39,000,000 voters while the total valid votes cast was 14,293,396, which was a show of inadequate and improper voter orientation by the electoral umpire and other relevant agencies. Siollun (1998) maintains that although the voting pattern of 1993 has subsequently been cast as unprecedented cutting across ethnic, religious and geographical patterns; the true picture is a little unclear. The 1999 Nigeria’s presidential election had 57,938,945 registered voters, 30,280,052 voter turnout and 431,611

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invalid votes while valid votes totaled 29,848,441 which was an indication of inadequate voter education. The 2003 presidential election had 60,823,022 registered voters, and voter turnout was 42,018,735 while invalid votes totaled 2,538,246 and the valid votes totaled 39,480,489. The election was markedly different as INEC was confronted with irregularities in the voter registration review. The 2007 presidential election had 61,567,036 registered voters and total valid votes of 35,397,517. However, it can be argued that nothing gave better credence to this position than the tardiness that characterized the voter registration exercise throughout Nigerian history. It will be noted that in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria, it had 73,528,040 registered voters; the votes cast totaled 39,469,484 while 38,209,978 were valid votes and 1,259,506 votes were invalid. The election which had Gen Muhammadu Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) as the principal contender adjudged to be the most peaceful and credible poll in the democratic history of Nigeria was later became characterized as having the most bloodshed (Adeola 2019).

Statement of the Problems and Methodology One of the issues that have critically remained in the front burner of academic discourse in Nigeria is the low level of political participation which has been blamed on poor voter education (Ibeanu and Orji 2014). This challenge of low voter education has resulted in low voter registration, low voter turnout, high invalid votes as well as other negative electoral outcomes. It is on record that over one million votes cast in the Nigerian presidential election of April 2011 were rejected during counting, mainly because the ballots were wrongly marked (Ibeanu and Orji 2014). Although, the rejected votes constituted 3.2% of all votes cast in that election, the several observers noted that the number was rather high and could have been markedly lower if voters had received adequate voter education (Ibeanu and Orji 2014). Ibeanu and Orji (2014) postulated that the situation was more serious in some States like Niger, Jigawa, Sokoto and Yobe where rejected votes were over six percent of all votes cast as shown below; Jigawa had 1,214,774 votes cast, and 74,008 (6.1%) were rejected; Niger had 1,090,540 votes cast, and 71,373 (6.5%) were rejected; Sokoto recorded 973,242 votes cast, and 63,434 (6.5%) were rejected while Yobe had 662,913 votes cast, and 40,798 (6.2%) were rejected.

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In the same way, elections since independence have been witnessing decline in the turnout of voters across Nigerian states. Some of the elections have seen declines in voter turnout as high as 70%. For instance, the voter turnout in the Presidential election in Anambra State in 2011 declined around 90% (Ibeanu and Orji 2014). The same declining voter turnout was reported in the Edo and Ondo Governorship elections in 2012 (Ibeanu and Orji 2014). These twin problems of rejected ballots and declining voter turnout at elections are widely attributed directly and indirectly to inadequate voter education. Thus, numerous reports on the general elections called on INEC to strengthen voter education in order to dissipate other issues linked to voter education in Nigeria such as poor voter turnout and poor participation in voter registration, lack of understanding of voting procedures, underage voting and election violence. In fact, it has been noted that the violence that Nigerians experienced in the aftermath of the 2011 general elections was partly due to negative mobilization by political actors and by implication inadequate voter education (Ibeanu and Orji 2014). Though several scholars like Ibeanu and Orji (2014), International IDEA (2002), Mulyata (2011), Falade (2014), Ushie (2005), Omotola (2004), Nwankwo (2005) and Iyayi (2007) have all carried out studies in relation to voter education, voter registration, voter turnout and vote validity in different places and years yet none of them made a comparative analysis of the identified variables especially as it concerned the 2015 and 2019 presidential elections. Hence, this study is therefore an attempt to make a comparative analysis of improvement of voter registration, analysis of relative difference between voter turnout in the 2015 and 2019 presidential elections of Nigeria and the impact of low voter education on votes validity in the 2015 and 2019 Nigeria’s presidential elections. This study is a qualitative study. It relied on existing literature, as well as focus group discussions in the data collection process. The analysis of the data collected was done thematically. It was presented in such a way to allow readers to identify clearly the finding of the study.

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Conceptual Clarifications Voter Education Ibeanu and Orji (2014) maintain that voter education simply teaches the citizen, his or her role as a voter. It covers the duties of the electorates, voting procedures, relations with electoral management body and vote protection. From the foregoing conceptualization, the study viewed voter education as a medium of inculcating into eligible voters, the new and positive orientation of voting as well as other information for increasing political participation and awareness. Voter Registration It is the eligibility requirement of a person to be entitled or permitted to vote. When eligible voters are coerced or propelled to go and vote, especially, when they are largely influenced to perform their civic responsibility of voting, it is called voter registration drive (Carroll 1995). The study deduced from the conceptualization above that voter registration is a medium of integrating the prospective voters into the official voter register of their country for political participation. Voter Turnout Voter turnout refers to the gross total of eligible voters who participated either through accreditation or voted in an election with the aim of choosing the suitable candidate for a particular office in a given season. It is also viewed as the gross total of eligible members of a particular place who are mobilized to vote in a particular election. Vote Validity Vote validity is viewed as the accurate adherence to the stipulated electoral guidelines, especially as it concerns eligibility of voter, proper co-ordination of the exercise by the umpire, proper thumb printing or marking of the ballots, etc. by voters. In other words, it means a voter conducting him or herself orderly, according to the rules and regulations guiding the elections and also the voter thumb printing and casting the ballot properly.

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Vote Buying The concept of vote buying is a situation where a voter sells his or her vote to a political party candidate or political party on itself for either socio-economic, political, material or other gains which could be outside his or her normal wish in a particular election. In other words, it is selling and buying of one’s vote in election for whichever purpose best known to the seller and the buyer in an election. Political Participation Political participation is the right of the eligible citizens or members of a particular area to partake in the political processes of their area without undue restrictions, especially having attained certain constitutional requirements. Theoretical Framework: The Field Theory of Voting This study is centered on the field theory of voting. Campbell and Converse (1960) states that the central thesis of this model is attitudes, defined as orientations to the elements of national politics, which could be viewed by the voters as negative or positive. This implies that the citizens’ participation in the political activities, programs, issues, etc. is a function of positive or negative perception they have, about the entire political system and its processes which has to do with the legitimacy of the constituted authority, etc. In other words, the positive or negative attitude of the citizens towards participation in the political affairs is influenced by their perception about the entire political system. Therefore, this theory is relevant in addressing voter education and the associated dwindling political participation that continued to threaten Nigeria’s overall democratic development. The participation of an individual or group of individuals in the political process is an act of attitudinal perception, which could be positive or negative. The orientation of an individual towards a political party, candidates of a party, electoral umpire even the administration of the entire government determines his attitude towards the system. For instance, if the orientation is negative, definitely the attitude towards the political system must be negative as the case of Nigeria that have been experiencing low turnout of voters, high level of wrongly marked votes and even political violence since the democratic

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history of the country. The theory is very relevant to this study because high degree of voter education is required to change the negative orientations of the Nigerian electorates to positive attitudes towards political participation. This study maintains that the major factors are lack of love, lack of moral standard, lack of confidence on the government institutions, party or its candidates and institutional decay. In other words, there is no trust and passion between the electorates and the elected elite as well as the institutions involved in the elections. The misconduct of electoral processes and activities by the electoral umpire often motivates crises that have brought instability in Nigerian socio-political and economic sectors. Politically, this syndrome has caused a lot of harm than good in Nigeria’s polity owing to the fact that our democracy is no longer on the basis of the right candidate on the right position to deliver the dividends of democracy to the entire country and not to a particular people or a particular group of people, but now it is only for those who can control the process of acquiring state power and spend the money.

Empirical Review of Literature Comparative Improvement in Voter Registration in the 2015 and 2019 Nigeria’s Presidential Elections Ibeanu and Orji (2014) wrote on the approaches to civic and voter education in Nigeria. The study which adopted analytical theory with survey research method argued that the twin problems of rejected ballots and declining turnout of voters in elections are widely attributed both indirectly and directly to inadequate civic and voter education. However, the authors recommended strengthening voter education as a panacea to rejected ballots and declining turnout of voters in Nigerian general elections. The study like other studies in the social discourse has its shortcomings especially its less attention to voter registration not minding its significant role in the Nigerian political participation. Although, the authors emphasized much on the rejected votes and low turnout of voters as the major challenges of political participation in Nigeria without recourse to voter registration, which is the foundational basis of participation in Nigerian politics.

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Agu and Okeke (2013) wrote on voter apathy and revival of genuine political participation in Nigeria. The study has major focus on investigating the causes of voter apathy with the help of class theory, and the content analytical research method. The authors argued that the age of voters, the occupation and gender are all significantly the major precipitators of voter apathy. The study covered from 1999 to 2007 general elections in Nigeria and maintained that voters’ apathy is orchestrated by incompetence of INEC, unemployment, political environment as well as electoral violence and therefore called on the government of Nigeria to ensure the engagement of capable hands into INEC assignment and also disengage of those who are not proactive as well as ensure that those issues raised above are resolved. The study accused INEC extensively, as if the Commission alone can ensure credible election in a country like Nigeria with over 250 different ethnic nationalities and divergent historical background and mentality. Although, the study acknowledged voter registration as one of the major variables of a credible election, where civic and voter education should be strengthened; yet, they still focused on INEC without recourse to other voter education agencies such as media, NGOs, etc. that have the ability to change the negative mindset of Nigerians over poor voter registration. This study is considered to be more elaborate in the sense that it captured so many variables that can make a smooth and successful voter registration in Nigeria especially with emphasis on the human capital requirements, the institutional consensus, financial requirements, etc. But faulted its inability to make comparative analysis of voter registration exercise in the previous electioneering periods knowing too well that the present and future socio-economic and political challenges cannot be surmounted in isolation of the past situations. The study has its merits and demerits like other studies in the social discourse. Therefore, the literature above could not acknowledge the impact of low voter education on vote validity in the 2015 and 2019 Nigeria’s presidential elections. That is to say that the literature paid no attention on the negative effects of low voter education on the vote validity which is the major interest of voter education via political participation.

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Discussions Comparative Improvement of Voter Registration in the Southeastern Nigerian States During the 2015 and 2019 Presidential Elections The available data showed that there is improvement in the voter registration in the southeastern states of Nigeria during the 2019 presidential elections more than the 2015 presidential elections, where Abia State recorded the highest with 21% followed by Ebonyi and Enugu with 18 and 17%, respectively, while Imo and Anambra have 14 and 12%, respectively. Therefore, the 2019 voter registration in the zone improved with 16.4%, more than the outcome of the 2015 voter registration in the zone. The improvement in the 2019 voter register was an expression of high hopes that the people had. The Igbo people were disposed towards participating actively with freehand to choose who becomes their leader which the people yearned for. There was widespread desire for a change of the present administration due to its harsh tax regime and hardship arising from bad human resource management policies especially as it pertains to civil and public servants’ wages and salaries as well as meeting up to the economic situation of the country. These unpopular activities formed the springboard that necessitated the aroused interest of making a change which the people believed can only happen through the ballot box, hence, the arousal of widespread mindset to arm the Igbo people with the voter’s card which had ordinarily been seen as the axe man of any bad administration. FGD (2019) added that the improvement in voter registration was necessary for documentation factor. The voter’s card is seen a top class means of identification after the drivers’ license and international passport, unfortunately, the latter two means of identification are often believed to be capital intensive to acquire, while the voter’s card is free as the cost of the card is even borne by the government. Some Nigerians who sought to do one transaction or the other that needed a formal and legal identification often wait for the time of voter registration to queue and obtain their cards, even if they are coming to vote in election or not. They necessarily acquire it for the fact that it gives them identity as Nigerians. FGD (2019) maintained that the third factor is the heightened mobilization of the mercenaries of the government of the day which was due to the excessive engagement of youths, women and even the juvenile as political office holders with the mandate to explore all possible means to mobilize their people. The disgust mood against the elite group and against

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the unpopular governance creates apathy against registration, forcing the elite to go down to the grassroots and mobilize their people to register and vote in a bid to retain power and maintain their status under the cover of liberating the society from bad governance. Difference in Voter Turnout During the 2015 and 2019 Presidential Elections. The result of this study reveals that voter turnout in the 2015 presidential elections in the southeastern states of Nigeria was higher compared to the voter turnout in the 2019 presidential elections. The difference is so glare that in the 2019 presidential elections as Enugu State recorded 25% voter turnouts in the zone. This implied that the 2019 voter turnout of Enugu State decreased within 25% from the voter turnout of the 2015 presidential elections followed by Imo State that dropped to 20% while Abia State dropped to 14% as Ebonyi State dropped to 13% and Anambra state dropped to 11%, respectively. FGD (2019) argued that the failure of the opposition political parties to organize themselves and forge a common front for the people to actualize their dream of changing the government that has made them suffer untold hardship and even been owed benefits and gratuities alongside pensions without requisite employment showed how weak democratic culture is in Nigeria. The threat by the government with cultists-driven squad in uniform and non-uniform men that progressively intimidated the urban and rural population worsened the faith of the citizenry in Nigeria. Impact of Low Voter Education on the Vote Validity in the Southeast The result revealed that there is improvement in the impact of voter education via the vote validity in the southeastern states during the 2019 presidential elections, more than the 2015 presidential elections in the geopolitical zone. The result showed that Ebonyi State has the highest impact of voter education with 6% vote validity. Imo State vote validity dropped to −1% while the vote validity for Enugu is 0% and the rest of the states, namely Abia and Anambra improved with 1%, respectively. To this effect, the total per cent impact of voter education on the votes’ validity in the southeastern states of Nigeria improved with 1.4% from the outcome of the 2015 presidential elections in the zone.

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FGD (2019) supported the available results even when some discussants posited that the improvement is too insignificant. They maintained that Nigerians have never been mobilized with such high level of voter awareness in the previous election years as recorded in the 2019 elections. The social media airspace was almost Nigerian electoral affair which captured over 80% of literates and non-literate Nigerian voters with any simple device that can assess the Internet, electronic media, print media, etc. FGD (2019) also maintained that the opposition with the promise of the acclaimed federal might be educated overtly and assured the people that their votes are already protected. According to the masses, that assurance culminated to the invalidity of votes in Nigeria: The multiple interests of the citizenry on personalities and not party logo created the problems of validity too. FGD (2019) added that the choice was hard to make because it was a battle of the conscience and the cumbersomeness of the ballot paper added to the intimidation by the government of the day which did not allow the opposition even in their own comfort zone to vote. The deployment of thugs and even security agencies at the polling units to deliver the mandate of the ruling government via the seat-tight agenda threw fear into voters.

Conclusion and Recommendations In conclusion, the study is believed to have provoked the need for the advancement of voter education that will penetrate into the sub-conscious minds of Nigerians with a view to eradicate the negative orientations they have about Nigerian politics, especially in relations to voter education and political participation. The study advocated that political actors and the relevant managers of electoral process should build and maintain high sense of confidence, credibility, transparency as well as accountability because lack of trust in the institution of government charged with such magnificent responsibility of conducting elections can make the citizens lose interest in any political issue. Hence, the study concluded that there is nexus between the voter education and political participation; indicating that there will be no effective and efficient participation in the political process without a high pedigree of adequate voter education. At this juncture, the study made the following recommendations: i. Southeasterners should rise to their civic responsibilities to be able to hold political bourgeois accountable for democratic dividends

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and other constitutional obligations. At such, they should move enmesh to register and obtain voter’s card in the subsequent voter registration exercise since voter’s card is an instrument of positive change not just for identification. ii. Southeasterners should have the mindset that election is an opportunity to vote-out unpopular candidate or party and vote-in a credible candidate or party. Of course, the time of election is an opportunity of the citizens to make a credible choice of the right leadership. That is, making their votes count as to break the jinx of elitism recycling. iii. The government and other relevant agencies should grant adequate priorities to voter education considering the fact that teaming Nigerians are not educationally and technologically advanced. Voter education should be a daily assignment to the people concerned to ensure that every Nigerian person is adequately re-oriented positively.

Bibliography Adeola, O. (2019). Results of Past Nigerian Presidential Elections Since 1979. Legit Newspapers, 13 February 2016. Agu, S. U., & Okeke, V. O. (2013). Voters apathy and revival of genuine political participation in Nigeria. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 4(3), 27– 30. Rome-Italy: MCSER Publishing. Retrieved from https://www.researchg ate.net/publication on 10 May 2019. Campbell, A., & Converse, P. (1960). The American Voter. New York: Wiley Publications. Carroll, D. (1995). Civil and Voter Registration and Identification System: Proposed Implementation System. Washington, DC: IFES. Davies, A. E. (2006). Money and Politics in the Nigeria Electoral Process: A Memo of Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Ilorin. Diamond, L. (2002), Free and Fair: The Administration and Conduct of the 1983 Nigerian Elections. In A. A. Akinsanya and G. J. Idang (Eds.), Nigerian Government and Politics: 1979–1983. Calabar: Wusen Publishers. Dudley, B. (1982). An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press. Falade, D. A. (2014). Political Participation in Nigerian Democracy: A Study of Some Selected Local Governments in Ondo State, Nigeria. Global Journals Online, 1(2), 20–23. Retrieved from https://globaljournals.org/item/4382-

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political-participation-in-nigerian-democracy-a-study-of-some-selected-localgovernment-areas-in-ondo-state-nigeria on 3 September 2019. Gonzalez Ocantos, E., Jonge, C. K., & Nickerson, D. W. (2014). The Conditionality of Vote-Buying Norms: Experimental Evidence from Latin America. American Journal of Political Science, 58(1): 197–211. Ibeanu, O., & Orji, N. (2014). Approaches to Civic and Voter Education: Nigeria’s Experience in Comparative Perspective. Abuja: INEC and Ford Foundation Publications. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2002). Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997: A Global Report on Political Participation. Stockholm. lyayi, F. (2007). Elections, INEC and the Problem of Election Mindset in Nigeria. The Electoral Journal, 1(1): 1–25. Khemani, S. (2015). Buying Votes Versus Supplying Public Services: Political Incentives to Under-Invest in Pro-Poor Policies. Journal of Development Economics, 22(117): 84–93. Leight, J., Pande, R., & Ralston, L. (2015). Value for Money? VoteBuying and Politician Accountability in the Laboratory. Retrieved on 30 August 2019 from http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/LeightPandeR alstonVoteBuyingAndAccountability.pdf. Lucky, O. (2013). Money Politics and Vote-Buying in Nigeria: The Bane of Democracy. Mediterranean: Journal of Social Sciences, 5(7): 84–99. Milbrath, L.W. (1965). Political Participation. Chicago. Rand Mc Nally College Publishing Company. Mulyata, H. (2011). The Impact of Voter Education on Voter Participation: The Case of Kaduna Square Stage (1) Compound in Luska, Field Research Report Submitted to the Department of Adult Education and Extension Studies, University of Zambia School of Education. Nohlen, D., & Krennerich, M. (1999). Elections in Africa: A data handbook. Nwankwo, O. B. C. (2005). Political Parties and the Challenges of Democratic Federalism in Nigeria. American Journal of International Politics and Development Studies, 1(1): 205–228. Omotola, J. S. (2004). The 2003 Nigerian Second Election: Some Comments. Journal of Political Science Review, 3(l): 127–138. Ovwasa, O. L. (2014). Money Politics and Vote Buying in Nigeria: The Bane of Goo Governance. Afro Asian Journal of Social Science, 5(7): 97–106. Siollun, M. (1998). June 12, 1993 Election: Full Results. Retrieved from www. nigeria.gov.ng on 28 September 2019. Terri, L. (2003). Valid Vote Definitions, State of Michigan, Lansing, Department of State.

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Ushie, E. M. (2005). Electoral Malpractices and Democracy at the Grassroots in Nigeria. American Journal of International Politics and Development Studies, I(I): 177–189.

CHAPTER 14

Mitigating Violence in Nigerian 2015 Elections: The International Community and Donor Agencies Dimensions Lucky Igohosa Ugbudian

Introduction The destructive nature of electoral violence in Nigerian society cannot be overemphasized. This was demonstrated in the violence that engulfed the country during the electoral process culminated in unimaginable deaths and insecurity. One of the major impacts of the violence was the truncation of democratic governance leading to military rule. It is instructive to state that most countries in Africa also had similar experience of still birth democratic governance rule characterized by violence and consequent military rule. The series of attempts to kick-start democratic rule on the continent failed until the 1990s. The 1990s witnessed multi-party re-democratization in Africa. Prior to this era, several African countries were either under a one party or autocratic rule. Nigeria also joined the bandwagon as the Ibrahim Babangida

L. I. Ugbudian (B) Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_14

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regime kick-started transition programme which, however, turned out to be endless following the cancellation of the presidential election on 12 June 1993. Democratic governance was, however, restored by the regime of Abdusalami Abubakar that succeeded General Sani Abacha who had embarked on self-secession programme. By 29 May 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn into power as democratically elected President of the country. Obasanjo which contested under the People Democratic Party (PDP) had defeated a consensus and joint candidate of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) and All Peoples Party (APP), Olu Falae in the election conducted on 27 February 1999 and which set the stage for the fourth republic in the country.1 Election, a major pillar of selecting political leadership in a democratic governance gives eligible citizens the rights to contribute to the decisionmaking process. Kofi Annan (2015) submitted that even as elections have become the norm, democracy itself is called into question when elections are not enough if they are not conducted with integrity and able to reflect the real will of the people. In other words, election that is integrity compliant sets example which attracts respect and norms enshrined in international agreements and good governance practices. The hallmark of the foregoing is that such election promotes human rights and citizens’ right to participate in the selection of political leaders and make the leaders accountable.2 Integrity deficits in the Nigerian electoral process usually degenerated into violence as was seen in the previous democratic experiments, especially, First and Second Republics. The violence that followed elections that period eventually culminated in the collapse of the democratic process. Elections since 1999 have not been different and have largely been controversial and disputed thus brewed violence and insecurity. The election violence on every cycle assumed low-scale violence as demonstrated in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections where hundred lives were lost. Indeed, the 2011 post-election violence remained the worst in the Fourth Republic as over 800 Nigerians died despite the election being regarded as the best since 1999. The 2015 elections hence became a litmus test in the democratic governance and continued existence of the country. This explained the various level of interest in the 2015 general elections including that of donor agencies and international community.

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Election and Electoral Violence Anifowose (1982) conceived election as a process that involved the electing of political leaders by the majority of the people in any country.3 The resort to an indirect political system in the selection of political leaders could be traced to the increasing rise of population and expansion of towns due to development which makes the mass of the people seating in the National Assembly and taking decisions. Thus, representative’s democracy led to regular and periodic elections with the objectives of electing a group of leaders to hold forth for the people for a given term. The work of Anifowose made invaluable contribution to the dynamics of elections in Nigeria and gave insight to the elections in the first republic. Okoye (2003) cited in Ugbudian (2019) believed elections are diverse and complicated activities and variables that complement each other.4 In a nutshell, Okoye described election as a practice that entails the combination of acts and processes that are intertwined and have impact on the conduct and behaviour of the people. Consequently, elections give opportunity to eligible citizens to exercise their fundamental rights of electing their leaders. It is instructive to state that election-based activities covered the process of updating and registering voters, enacting and amending the electoral laws, election funding, political party primaries, campaigns, electronic and the print media, actions of security agencies, and casting counting and declaration of results as well as the contestation that often followed it expressed by the aggrieved candidates. The apparent lack of integrity in the electoral process is the major factor that necessities electoral violence in the political space. Okoye dwelled on a broad spectrum of the process of election and electoral violence during Nigerian elections but laid emphasis on the 2003 elections. Balogun (2003) cited in Ugbudian (2015) conceived electoral violence as the deployment of physical force by contesting parties and supporters with the aim of gaining underserved advantage in the struggle for power through harassment and intimidation of rivals and sometimes snowballed into undemocratic usurpation of political power.5 The most important impact of the violence is unleashing of malpractice strategies, deliberate disenfranchisement of the stronghold of the rivals and withdrawal of candidature by the oppressed rivals. The work of Balogun made a very insightful contribution to the dynamics of cycle of violence in Nigerian electoral process which has led to fragile democratic governance in the country. Ladan (2006) described electoral violence as threats of violence

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and actual acts of physical violence that occurred during electioneering cycles. The violence that is perpetuated within the electoral cycles, namely, pre-election, election-day and post-election which involved carting away of electoral materials, sending away of voters and manipulation of the election outcomes is classified as electoral violence.6 Ladan made a useful and insightful contribution to electoral violence in Nigeria revealing the tactics and strategies adopted by the violent entrepreneurs. Nwosu (2009) cited in Ugbudian (2019) perceived electoral violence as an organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail or abuse of a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay or influence an electoral process. The author’s work made useful assumptions on electoral violence in Nigeria focusing in the danger such acts has caused in the Nigerian democratic governance. Electoral violence is described by Karim (2011) cited in Ugbudian (2019) as any conduct that includes the use of acts that leads to the disruption of election, stealing of electoral materials and causing of harms and injuries to electorates and officials with the sole aim of acquiring power.7 The view of Karim is germane to the Nigerian electoral violence and electoral studies. The acts of violence during electoral process are detrimental to inclusive democratic process because of the wanton destruction and poor turnout of voters. Coupled with the foregoing is the domination of the political space by violence which its degeneration undermines the development of the affected country. The implication of this is that for democracy to thrive there must be peaceful, credible, fair and non-violent electoral process. The avalanche of violence is Nigerian as demonstrated by the various views is incumbent on the acts of using arms and ammunitions to decide electoral victors rather than the ballot ballots by the political parties and candidates. The concomitant effect of the violence is the militarization of the Nigerian electoral space with attendant loss of interest in the process by the mass of the population.

Election in Nigeria: Historical Perspective The conduct of election in Nigeria has not been devoid of violence. Since the colonial era, violent crept into the Nigerian electoral map but from the 1960s it assumed unparalleled scale. The general election of December 1959 that ushered in independent Nigerian political leaders was affected by acts of violence that questioned the integrity of the outcome. The country experienced complicated and unprecedented

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violence in the general election of 1964 which was boycotted in parts of the country and the Western Regional Legislative election of 1965 which witnessed high-scale killing of opponents and loss of property.8 The intensity of the struggle for power by the political actors in the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and the Action group (AG) and the deployment of security and electoral officials in favour of the NNDP played significant role in the violent. Given the failure of the security personnel to bring the violent situation under control and the partisanship of the Central Government, the violence became protracted and was only quelled following the Military coup of 15 January 1966.9 The violence that occurred in 1965 is usually regarded as the violent and calamitous electoral violence in the history of the country which ended in 1966.10 Similarly, elections between 1979 and 1983 which is regarded as the Second Republic were not violent free. The election of 1979 supervised by the military was relatively peaceful and violent free; however, the election conducted under the administration of Shehu Shagari witnessed outbreak of violence in several states including Ondo and Oyo.11 The trajectories of the 1983 violence led to usurpation of power by the military under the leadership of Muhammadu Buhari blaming the electoral violence and poor governance for their actions. The reasons for their action could also been expanded to include inordinate ambition and greed for power by the military. I must say that the power struggles and intrigues within the military made them to embark on endless transition to democratic government. The June 12 presidential election debacle could be seen from intrigues in the highest echelon of the military. The re-democratization of the country in 1999 was a huge relief from the unfulfilled promises of previous military autocrats. By May 1999, Abdusalami Abubakar, a military ruler, after a brief transition programme, handed over to General Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP. The February 1998 election was marred with a low degree of violence but was classified as credible and free and fair. A very good example was the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and Carter Centre which reported that “the transition from military to civilian rule was generally conducted without violence but observed some electoral irregularities and outright fraud”.12 The election in 2003 witnessed a higher propensity of violence than the 1999 general election. The 2003 elections according to reports were characterized by “low intensity armed struggle”13 led by political thugs sponsored by the

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conflict entrepreneurs within the political class especially in the Niger Delta. In the 2007 election, the violence manifested in varieties of ways; the election was worse than that of 2003 and it marked the deployment of armed gangs against opponents and disruption of the electoral process such as snatching of ballot papers, tempering with results and partisanship of the leadership of the Election Management Body and security personnel. The prelude to the violence was laid by the President Obasanjo who described the election cycle as do or die situation. The 2007 was christened as a period of “civil strife rise by social, political tension and sporadic use of violence, but in which armed conflict was not formally declared”. The intensity of malpractices including violence in the 2007 election made the courts to upturn some of the declared results. The prominent cases were that of the Gubernatorial election in Edo, Osun and Ekiti States. The 2011 election witnessed the worst violence in the Fourth Republic as over 800 lives were lost and billions of naira worth of property destroyed in the violence that followed the presidential election. The violence could be traced to the internal politics of the ruling PDP and the regional, ethnic and religious dimensions of the electioneering cycle. The violence invariably created fears, anxiety and insecurity that put the country on the brink of disintegration.

Prelude to the General Election in 2015 The violence dimension of the 2011 presidential election witnessed loss of hundreds of lives, unmitigated destruction of means of livelihood and social services, both private and government sectors that partly destabilized the country. It must be said that the electoral violence was further exacerbated by the rising insurgency of the Boko Haram sect. The hateful campaigns during pre-election cycle in 2011 election by contenders for the seat of the president further destabilized and divided the country along socio-religion, ethnic and regional lines.14 The violence in the pre-election cycle degenerated into unprecedented height following the nomination of presidential candidates by 14 political parties in December 2014 and casting of ballots in the presidential election. And for the 2015 presidential election, the PDP candidate, Goodluck Jonathan, and Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, were the two major aspirants in the election and also contributed to violence due to the divisive and threats by their supporters. Given the

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pattern of the violence, it will be safe to state that conflict entrepreneurs played significant role in the process with the aim of gaining undue advantage. The palpable fear, threat and actual violence that occurred in the country during the 2015 election cycle which witnessed the death of hundreds of people according to National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) received national and international attentions.15 Several highly placed Nigerians expressed fear that if nothing was done large-scale violence could break with daring consequences for the country. They cited the mass movement by millions of Nigerians to their state of origin for fear of being caught in the violence across as happened in 2011. The foregoing led to interventions by national and international as well as donor agencies in the attempts to mitigate the threat and actual pockets of violence.

Donor Agencies and Elections in Nigeria Since 1999 The eve of the twenty-first century witnessed renewed interest of donor agencies in Nigerian democratization process. This led to a numbers of interventions in the process including funding of the electoral body and civil society organizations. There is no gainsaying that the donor agencies were driven by the need for the strengthening of democratic process and values in the country. The foundation for international agencies’ support for Nigeria was laid during the administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, 1999–2007.16 Within the period several developmental agencies began to support and show interest in the country especially in the entrenching of democratic values. This foundation was further strengthened and maintained by the Umaru Yar’Adua’s administration. The Jonathan administration sustained and promoted the partnership which made several other donor agencies to join the common fund pool in the country. International development partners and donor agencies began to vigorously support the conduct of election in Nigeria when democratic governance was restored on 29 May 1999. The country hosted several international community promoted donor and development agencies such as the United Nations bodies, namely, United National Development Programme (UNDP); World Health Organization (WHO); World

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Bank; the European Union (EU); the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA); the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA); the Indian Technical Cooperation (ITEC) and the German International (GIZ).17 These agencies engaged the Nigerian government in deepening and promoting democratic institutions through funding of the electoral body and civil society groups personnel and programmes. The intervention prior to 2011 was largely carried out by the donor agencies under the Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) platform but was further strengthened and renamed as the Democratic Governance for Development (DGD).18 The donor agencies under the DGD platform provided financial and technical supports to both electoral and CSOs to promote transparency and credibility in the 2011 elections. The supports of the Donor agencies could also be said played a crucial part in the 2011 election being regarded by national and international observers as the best in the country since 1999. The DGD project is worth USD $80 million over five years (2011– 2015). The project succeeds the erstwhile Joint Donors’ Basket Fund project implemented between 2003 and 2007. The DGD project is managed by the UNDP with funding from the following agencies: • The European Union (EU); • The UK Department for International Development (DFiD); • The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD); and • The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).19 The Democratic Governance for Development project is managed by the UNDP, under the overall supervision and direct implementation, respectively, of two seasoned international administrators in the UN system: His Excellency, Ambassador Daouda Toure, the UN Resident Coordinator in Nigeria, and Dr. Mourtada Deme, the Project Director.

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The DGD Project covers the duration of the 2011–2015 electoral cycles and aims to assist Nigeria in consolidating and advancing democratic governance and accountability. DGD has financed and implemented scores of projects aimed at the following critical areas: • • • • • •

Strengthening the National Assembly, Strengthening the political parties, Improving the electoral process, Increasing the capacity and performance of civil society, Reinforcing the role and effectiveness of the mass media, and Empowering women in political governance.20

Donor Agencies Role In The 2015 Nigerian General Elections Given the fact that the first phase of the project focused essentially on achieving violent free, peaceful and legitimate as well as generally acceptable elections in 2011, the next cycle of the project includes the 2015 election and aimed at deeply democratic values and sustainable elections.21 It is imperative to note that the donor agencies implemented several programmes aimed at promoting and inculcating democratic values on the Nigerian people which will invariably create an enduring environment for peaceful, transparent and credible elections. One of the landmark programmes implemented was a measure to prevent violence in the 2015 election and entrenched peaceful election was series of peace accord signed by political gladiators across the country and sponsored by donor agencies. The donor agencies such as UNDP and EU among others provided the funding for the logistic and organization of the accord which brought stakeholders in the country to a round table.22 The accord had the 12 presidential candidates, chairmen of political parties, INEC leadership and security agencies. The major features of the agreement were sensitization of the Nigerian people, re-orientation of the political stakeholders and deployment of peaceful educative mechanisms. The candidates and political parties’ leaders were admonished and they endorsed an accord to restrain their supporters from engaging in violent behaviours and hate messages as well as accept the outcome of the election. The accord led to the formation of National Peace Committee (NPC) as an institution to interface with the stakeholders on peaceful

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conduct of the elections. The NPC played crucial roles of engaging the stakeholders in driving peace in the elections’ cycle. The point in emphasis is that the donor agencies were creating the necessary logistical environment for the emergence of the accord which helped to promote credible, transparent and acceptance of the outcome by the various parties which further deepened democratic process in the country. It must be said that another significant area in which donor agencies were in interaction with the youth on electoral matters. The DGD project thus also engaged in youth reorientation on electoral participation. In the attempt to promote the deepening and strengthening of democratic tenets among the youth which will help in the conduct of credible and transparent election thereby preventing violence in 2015, UNDP in conjunction with the ministry of youth development and INEC organized town meetings for the youth. The major theme of the town hall meeting held across the six geo-political zones—South-East, South-South, South-West, North-Central, North-East and North-West was effective participation of youths and stakeholders in the 2015 general elections. At the same time, the town hall meeting for the South-West held at La Chateau Centre, Ibadan, had Chidinma Ibekwe, a ranking officer in the ministry of Youth Development represented the minister.23 He reiterated the objectives of the meeting stressing that it was held to encourage and motivate to participate fully and promote peaceful and credible as well as violent-free election. The minister admitted that the huge population of the youths made them a major partner for conducting peaceful election as well as building sustainable democratic values. Also, the ministry and UNDP and DGD embarked on the initiative titled enhancing effective youth participation in 2015 general elections project. Participants were drawn from several youth organizations and educational institutions. Most of the participants expressed delight in attending the meeting as they learnt a lot.24 In the same vein, USAID, DFID, EU, UNDP among others continued funding of political education through several outlets such as mass media and seminars in the country. In this context they sponsored anti-violence drama and jingles on traditional and news media in 2015 election cycle. The American National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) both based in the United States also ran programmes in support of peaceful elections. At the same time, the donor agencies supported and trained electoral officials and civil society organizations in the country. The Nigeria Civil

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Society Situation Room was largely funded by the DFID and other agencies.25 The Situation Room managers were monitoring, analyzing and reporting the electoral indexes. Consequently, the support and training became handy as the Situation Room conducted a robust engagement and dialogue with Nigerian democratic process and 2015 general elections, which culminated in the most successfully and peaceful general elections since 1999.

International Community and the 2015 Elections The humanitarian and refugee disaster inherent in violence in Nigeria on the West Africa sub-region and Africa in general largely explained the key attention international community and institutions paid to the country in the election cycle. The threat and actual low-scale violence that pervaded the electioneering made the United States president, Barack Obama, to issue a message to Nigerians on the eve of the election. According to Barack Obama, admonished Nigerians have the opportunity to rewrite the democratic history of their country having defeated division and military through collective efforts by electing their president peacefully and not engage in any sort of violent. He further stressed that peaceful and successful election and democratic progress will help the country to meet and overcome its urgent national challenges. Obama concluded by urging Nigerians irrespective of socio-religion and ethnic leanings to keep the country together and promote the security, prosperity and fundamental human rights of the citizens. And promise to partner and collaborate with the country as friend of the United States.26 In addition, the US secretary of state John Kerry in January 2015 engaged in shuttle diplomacy to Nigeria meeting with the key contenders, President Jonathan and General Buhari in the quest to douse the raging hate messages and infighting among the political class which portend grave danger. Secretary John Kerry was able to extract commitment to follow the laid down rules governing the elections which will prevent violence in the election. He, however, charged that Nigerians involved in violence during the election will be placed on visa ban.27 In the same vein, the US and the British governments issued a joint statement during the collation and counting of the votes condemning any attempts to subvert the wills of the Nigerian people. The statement pointed to its observation of disturbing indications that the collation process may be subjected to deliberate political interference.28

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In the light of hate campaigns and pockets of violence orchestrated by the political class in the pre-election cycle, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda called for an end to it and promoted peaceful election in the country. She urged the Nigerian political class to denounce and stop acts capable of inciting their supporters into violent during electioneering. This threat was aimed at mitigating resort to violence by the political class in the attempts to be victorious in the election. Indeed, the threat of arrest and prosecution to a large extent put fears in the hearts and minds of the Nigerian, particularly, the political class. She condemned the pockets of violence in the pre-election period and submitted that the ICC classified such crimes as falling under the powers of the ICC if the Nigerian courts failed to prosecute the offenders. The ICC prosecutor reiterated the danger in engaging in electoral violence with attendant loss of lives, livelihood and displacement of victims. In a nutshell, she averred that “the conduct and outcome of elections in Nigeria, free from violence will not only prevent further instability in the country but will also send clear message that electoral competition does not have to result in violence and crimes that shock the conscience of humanity”.29 Also, the leaders of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) interacted with President Goodluck Jonathan, General Muhammadu Buhari and INEC on ensuring violent-free election. The team also impressed on the stakeholders to abide by the peace agreement endorsed by the candidates and relevant authorities. Similarly, the British High Commission encouraged the candidates and supporters to be peaceful. The High Commission urged the political parties and Nigerians to be peaceful and honour the terms of the peace accord to avert violence in the election.30

Conclusion The implication of violence that pervaded the previous election and the 2015 pre-election cycle due to the adversarial stands of the political class inevitably drew national and international attentions. The international community could be explained in two dimensions, donor agencies and international community. The several donor agencies in the country which operated under a single platform, DGD embarked on a number of programmes towards transforming the violence. In the same vein, the international community including the United Nations interfaced with

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the stakeholders and relevant authorities in promoting peaceful conduct of the election. For instance, the pressure put on the major candidates by the international community and donor agencies in diverse ways in no small measures helped to restrain the political class and their supporters. In a nutshell, the combined roles of the donor agencies and international community hugely contributed to the peaceful outcome of the election and acceptance of the process by the losers. This could be seen in several losers in the elections including the president Jonathan who conceded defeat and congratulated General Buhari. The paper thus submitted that the international community and donor agencies’ role in the election helped to prevent the high possibility of violence captured in several warning indicators on the election. The role of these institutions could better be understood in the statement by the then-president elected, General Buhari who appreciated their efforts. In the words of President Buhari “EU nations and the US played key roles in the nation’s stabilization during the critical period”.31 It must be said that the apparent role of the international agencies could be seen in the building of the capacity of members of civil societies and INEC personnel. This was manifested in the ability of the civil societies to deploy its personnel to hundreds of polling ballot across the country while establishing situation rooms for collating and analyzing of field data and incidences. At the same time, the training and funding support to INEC improved the skills and knowledge of the electoral officers, both ad hoc and permanent staff. There is no gainsaying that the supports offered by international organizational and donor agencies have not only empowered the vital segment of the Nigerian society but also deepened democratization in the country.

Notes 1. Albert Isaac Olawale (2011) “Analysing Electoral Violence in Nigeria”, in Linus N. Asiegbu (ed.), Critical Issues in the 2011 General Elections in Nigeria. Abuja: Institute for Security Studies, pp. 38–62. 2. Annan Kofi (2015) Kofi Annan Encourages Peaceful Nigerian Elections with Integrity available at http://kofiannanfoundation.org/newsroom/ press/2015/01/kofi-annan-encourages-peaceful-nigerian-elections-integr ity13/04/2015. 3. R. Anifowose (1982) Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and The Yoruba Experience. New York: Nok Publishers. 4. Ugbudian Lucky Igohosa (2019) A Hstory of Electoral Violence in Nigeria (1964–2011). A PhD Thesis in the Department of History

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5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29.

and International Studies and submitted to the Postgraduate School, University of Uyo, Nigeria. Ibid. M. T. Ladan (2006) “Causes of Electoral Violence in Nigeria”, in M. T. Ladan and Aisha Kiru (eds.), Election Violence in Nigeria. Lagos: AFSTRAG Nigeria. Ibid. B. Dudley (1982) An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. London: Macmillan. E. Osaghae (1998) Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. London: Hurst. Ibid. Ibid. Human Right Watch (2004) Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence, June. Ibid. L. I. Ugbudian (2015) 2015 General Election in Nigeria: The Role of Abuja Peace Accord. A paper presented at The Electoral Institute (INEC), Abuja conference on Nigerian 2015 General Elections 26–27 June. National Human Right Commission (ND) Pre-Election Violence Kills 58 in Nigeria, NHRC—Report available at www.nigerdeltawatch.org 13/04/2015. Ibid. Kelechi Onyemaobi (2015) Foreign Inputs in Nigeria’s Socio-Economic, Political Progress. In: Newswatch Times (Lagos) 30 March. WWW.UNDP. (2014) Report on DGD Project in Nigeria 2011–2015. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Levinus Nwabughiogu (2015) Jonathan, Buhari Endorse Violence-Free Polls, How to Make Polls Credible—Annan, Anyaoku, Jega, Gambari. In: Vanguard (Lagos) 15 January. Kanayo Umeh (2015) Ministry Partners UNDP on Effective Youth Participation in Elect Ion. In: The Guardian (Lagos) 5 March, p. 29. Ibid. Ibid. Alade Ade, K¯alu Vincent, Igbokwe Chioma and Aidoghie Paulinus (2015) Epic Battle: Nigerians Decide Jonathan, Buhari’s Fate Today. In: The Sun (Lagos) 28 March, p. 5. Ibid. Ibid. Abiodun Fanoro and Lemmy Ughegbe (2015) Politicians Will be Tried for Aiding Violence Says ICC. In: The Guardian (Lagos) 17 March, p. 6.

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30. Ibid. 31. Tony Akowe (2015) Buhari Hails EU; US for Standing by Nigeria. In: The Nation (Lagos) 10 April, p. 7.

Bibliography Abiodun Fanoro and Lemmy Ughegbe (2015) Politicians Will Be Tried for Aiding Violence Says ICC. In: The Guardian (Lagos) 17 March, p. 6. Academic.oup.com. Alade Ade, K¯alu Vincent, Igbokwe Chioma and Aidoghie Paulinus (2015) Epic Battle: Nigerians Decide Jonathan, Buhari’s Fate Today. In: The Sun (Lagos) 28 March, p. 5. Albert Isaac Olawale (2011) “Analysing Electoral Violence in Nigeria”, in Linus N. Asiegbu (ed.), Critical Issues in the 2011 General Elections in Nigeria. Abuja: Institute for Security Studies, pp. 38–62. allafrica.com. B. Dudley (1982) An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. London: Macmillan. E Osaghae (1998) Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. London: Hurst. eujournal.org. Human Right Watch (2004) Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence, June. indianexpress.com. Kanayo Umeh (2015) Ministry Partners UNDP on Effective Youth Participation in Elect Ion. In: The Guardian (Lagos) March, p. 29. Kelechi Onyemaobi (2015) Foreign Inputs in Nigeria’s Socio-Economic, Political Progress. In: Newswatch Times (Lagos) 30 March. Kofi Annan (2015) Kofi Annan Encourages Peaceful Nigerian Elections with Integrity available at http://kofiannanfoundation.org/newsroom/press/ 2015/01/kofi-annan-encourages-peaceful-nigerian-elections-integrity13/04/ 2015. Levinus Nwabughiogu (2015) Jonathan, Buhari Endorse Violence-Free Polls, How to Make Polls Credible—Annan, Anyaoku, Jega, Gambari. In: Vanguard (Lagos) 15 January. L. Hamalai, S. Egwu and J. S. Omotola (2017) “Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections”, Springer Science and Business Media LLC. L. I. Ugbudian (2015) 2015 General Election in Nigeria: The Role of Abuja Peace Accord. A Paper Presented at The Electoral Institute (INEC), Abuja Conference on Nigerian 2015 General Elections 26–27 June available @ www. inec.gov.ng.

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M. T. Ladan (2006) “Causes of Electoral Violence in Nigeria”, in M. T. Ladan and Aisha Kiru (eds.), Election Violence in Nigeria. Lagos: AFSTRAG Nigeria. National Human Right Commission (ND) Pre-Election Violence Kills 58 in Nigeria, NHRC. Report available at www.nigerdeltawatch.org 13/04/2015. ncicc.org.ng. Nwokeke P. Osinakachukwu (2011) “The Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria”, Journal of Politics and Law, 08/31/2011. R. Anifowose (1982) Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and The Yoruba Experience. New York: Nok Publishers. Tony Akowe (2015) Buhari Hails EU; US for Standing by Nigeria. In: The Nation (Lagos) 10 April, p. 7. Ugbudian Lucky Igohosa (2015) 2015 General Election in Nigeria: The Role of Abuja Peace Accord. A paper presented at The Electoral Institute (INEC), Abuja conference on Nigerian 2015 General Elections 26–27 June. Ugbudian Lucky Igohosa (2019) A History of Electoral Violence in Nigeria (1964–2011). A PhD Thesis in the Department of History and International Studies and submitted to the Postgraduate School, University of Uyo, Nigeria. WWW.UNDP (2014) Report on DGD Project in Nigeria 2011–2015.

CHAPTER 15

Political Violence and the 2015 General Election in Nigeria Jolaade Omede and Arinze Ngwube

Introduction The 2015 general elections witnessed series of election violence before, during and after the elections. Before the election proper, a lot of assumptions were made regarding the probable extent of violence that was to be unleashed on the Nigeria polity. These assumptions were somewhat justified given the prevalence of violence that had characteristic the Nigerian electoral space since 1999 to the present. A major assumption was that the 2015 elections were going to be bloody, than the 2007 and 2011 elections. The underlying reason for this assertion was the incessant attacks by the Boko-Haram insurgent in North Eastern states of Bauchi, Borno, and Gombe in Nigeria. This is compiled with communal fighting between the Tiv and Fulani in Benue and Plataea states fuelled the ominous doom that J. Omede (B) Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Kwara, Nigeria A. Ngwube Department of Political Science, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_15

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ported to befall Nigeria. In addition to these two factors, it is a known fact that before the elections proper, some “politicians had threatened to unleash violence while certain ethnic militias had also threatened to set the country ablaze should their candidate lose election” (The News, 2015 April 6–13: 34). The introduction of hate speeches and smear campaigns accentuated through the use of broadcast and print media further heightened the political tension among the populace. In spite of these contributory factors, stakeholders including the contending parties, civil society organisations, eminent personalities and international community did their best to avert serious violence that could disrupt the elections and thereby lead Nigeria into chaos and dismemberment. The Abuja Peace Accord of 14 January, 2015 and the updated accord of 14 February, 2015, warnings by the police to erring voters to keep away from polling units after casting their votes, the ruling by the Federal High Court putting a stop on the use of soldiers on Election Day are cases of mitigating an eventual eruption of political violence. Given Nigeria’s electoral experience series of violent acts were perpetrated throughout the country the question that this work seeks answers to is on electoral violence in Nigeria and policy implication on the policy on the polity?

Conceptual Clarification Election Roberts and Edwards (1991: 43) defines election as a procedure of electing a person to fill an office through the choice made by electorates who are qualified to vote according to the rules and regulation of the electoral system of the country. Election is a process of choosing between alternatives. It is done only through forms of procedures generally accepted which has to be accepted in the polity (Ujo 2000: 249). Harris (1979: 120) sees election serving as a platform for political parties to make presentation and programme and candidates for the voters who are qualified to take part in the election. Harris in this definition limits election to political party’s activities alone. Honderich (1989: 145) posited that “election serves as a forum people make their choice. In the same vein, Satori (1897: 76) describes election as a participatory process”. Dudley (1992: 70) emphasises the legitimization of government with elections. Dolbeare and Edelmal (1971: 103) election in Africa

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has been discoloured as war. He posited that in most sub-Sahara African countries, elections had been characterised by force and fraud. In which electoral competition among political parties or candidates takes shape of a Hobbesian struggle, which is the war of every man against every man. Finally, from the foregoing, election will nurture a new political culture if it is conducted constitutionally by increasing popular participation in the democratic process. It is the only instrument that legitimises any regime in government.

Significance of Election Elections are part of the process that brings to light the strength and weakness of a political institution in society as a whole. It makes understand the level of political consciousness and participation of the citizenry. It is on the basis of this that voter rights and credible elections become a critical political and social discourse in Nigeria. Voting is the legal, political and social mechanism through which the citizens are able to express their participation in elections. It is the only singular act through which people participate in the political process. The role that periodic, free and credible elections play in ensuring respect for political Rights is enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the Charter of the Organization of American States, the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is the basic and fundamental international guarantee of voting rights and free elections, Article 25 states that: Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions; To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic election which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the elections; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in the country (ICCPR).

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Background of Political Violence in Nigeria It will interest to note that there are forms of political violence in contemporary social-political conflicts. Political violence is violence which is created by the people or government. In order for political goals to come into reality. It is used by a state against others. It is noted that politically motivated violence is applied by non-state actors against the state. The non-verbal action on the part of government can be characterised as a form of political violence. It is not in all cases can link violence to elections. The heightened tension created by competition for public office helps in creating existing conflicts and new ones. A big example is the denial of resources to politically identified groups within their territory. One begins to understand the imbalance of power which exists between state and non-state actors. It takes the form of asymmetric warfare. It is a situation where neither is directly able to assault the other. However, relying on tacts such as terrorism and guerilla warfare. This has often included attacks on civilians and created a breakdown of law and order. This has affected the economy and be a stall to development. It will interest you that political violence entwines closely with economic violence because the political status will determine economic opportunity. It will interest you that unemployed young people becoming willing tools to be used in perorating violence by politicians in committing such act. The presence of violence is due to the lack of consensus on governance, doubtful legitimacy of governing institutions and unresolved issues. Many individuals are of the opinion that the political system will respond to the demands of the populace. This is due to past experience and responding to these stands. They are of the view that violence justified their actions; this becomes vital in the achievement of their political objectives. It is becoming interesting to note some governments in some countries see the vitality of the adoption of violence in intimidate their populace to achieve their evil agenda. The aftermath of political violence result to a lot of changes within the state society and individually. It is important how individuals and households affected at the micro level. It may interest one how it affects the individual income, health and education attainment. The individual’s predicament can affect a state economic growth. It poses serious threat to the legitimacy of a nation. This has a tensely of it affecting the voting participation in a country. Take for instance in the area of voter registration, participation in community meeting, and participation in local political gatherings.

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Stages of Political Violence Pre-Elections Violence Before the elections various forms of violence were carried out by both supporters of the political parties involved. However, the trend is higher between the two major political parties in 2015 in Nigeria that is the APC and PDP against each other, some of the notable cases include: The first notable violence encountered by voters’ is psychological violence in the pre-election stage in 2015 polls. This was caused by the postponed presidential elections held on 11 April, 2015 which was presumed to eventually become bloody therefore, many voters desisted from voting. Voters that ventured out to cast their votes proceeded with caution and trepidation. Some of the voters came out for the accreditation exercise and never returned to cast the vote. Okrika shooting in Rivers state happened when the campaign rally of APC governorship candidate (Dakuku Peterside) was truncated by explosion and gunshots fired by thugs supported to be sympathetic to the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The casualty revealed one policeman dead while more than fifty (50) people were injured (The Nation, February 20, 2015). The National Human Right Commission (NHRC) in one of its report indicated that pre-election violence occurred in states like Kaduna, Benue, Lagos, and Rivers states. In Ibadan Oyo state two persons were killed following mayhem at a political rally in Odinjo on 1 March, 2015. The March 16, 2015 rampage on Lagos streets by members of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) calling for the removal of the INEC chairman, Prof. Attahiru Jega. The group was supported by an amorphous group called the Committee of Concerned Nigerians (CCN) as well as some militant groups from Niger Delta. The protesters destroyed banners and campaign billboard of the All Progressive Congress candidates. More than 5000 people with over 50 buses under the aegis of CCN blocked a section of the road, distributed pamphlets and causing a traffic snarl that lasted for hours (The Nation, March 17, 2015: 1, 4). Continuous attacks and bombings by the militant Boko Haram through the use of suicide-bombing in North East still persist in the pre-election periods. Their major mission was to attack soft targets like

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motor parks, schools worship centres, markets among others (The Nation, March 2, 2015: 6). As a build up to the election, however, the BokoHaram insurgents adopted other strategies which included shooting, harassing people, snatching electoral materials and setting them ablaze (The News, April 6–13, 2015).

During Election Violence On the 12th of April (2015) a day of the elections, unidentified gunmen attacked caused pandemonium and destroyed public properties at the central primary school in Alkali Local Government in Bauchi State. This is a place which is been used as a collation centre, the Alkali Divisional Police Station and the INEC office. Bauchi state still witness some distractions in particularly on the Election Day (April 11, 2015), gunmen stormed Bugurum Primary school in Darazo local government Area (The News, April 6–13, 2015: 3). This scares off voters and making the process susceptible to manipulations of the gunmen syndicates. Their primary Style of focus of Attacks Shooting and attacks of collation centres, snatching of electoral materials and destroying sensitive material by setting them ablaze. Attacks in Borno and Gombe states on the Election Day took the turn of men suspected to be Boko Haram members opened fire on voters at the polling stations killing at least seven people in the neighbouring villages of Birin Bolawa and Birnin Fulani in the Nafanda District of Gombe. Attacks in Dukku (80 km from Gombe city) where voters were shot at while queuing to cast their votes. It was claimed that three (3) people were killed by the insurgents while two (2) others were injured. Attacks on miringa town in Biu Local Government area of Borno state where insurgents shot at voters on Election Day. At the coinage twenty-five (25) people were reportedly killed and five (5) people injured. The major Pattern of attacks is setting houses and voting material ablaze and the use of communications- “text messages their and verbal warnings” instructing people not to participate in the voting exercise. The National Human Rights Commission also reported acts of violence resulted in fatalities in Edo, Gombe, Akwa-Ibom, Borno, Bauchi, Lagos, Osun, Rivers and Yobe State. Others states where violence occur red are Benue, Imo and Niger State. In all, the NHRC noted that and estimated fifty lives (50) were lost in the violence. The nature of the violence includes allegations ballot boxes snatching and card readers and

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related elections material, arson attacks on INEC assets and Police and the use of light weapons indiscriminately especially in some states like Akwa-Ibom, Imo, Delta and Rivers State where there was widespread availability of small arms and light weapons. Other nature of the Election Day violence includes; • Shooting, ballot box snatching and killing. • The appearance of the symbol and name of unregistered political parties on the result sheets (especially in six local government areas of Rivers State). • Hijacking of INEC materials by armed thugs allegedly suspected to be members of a particular party. • Taking as hostage most of the wards and units in contentious areas. • Replacing of genuine INEC ad hoc officials and materials with fake ones (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 2). • Accusations and counter accusations of the results allegedly being overturned in favour of opposing party (especially among PDP, APC and LP particularly in Ekiti state) (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 6). • Intimidation, violence and other irregularities such as theft of ballot boxes, attacks on opposition members by thugs and policemen and violation of electoral irregularities by agents of the ruling party (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 8). • State-sponsored intimidation of opposition members, this probably according to APC “accounted for the low turnout of voters across the state”. • Using of thugs to undertake illegal thumb-printing of ballot papers. The thugs according to eye witness accounts, claimed that: Thugs did not allow many voters (APC opposition members) to participate in the accreditation while no party agent was allowed to stay in any of the polling units...they also force corps members who worked as ad hoc staff to abandon card readers...to enable them stuff the ballot box...fake policemen were shooting to scare voters to allow thumb printing of ballot papers... (statement by APC Ekiti state Publicity Secretary-Taiwo Olatubosun). (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 8)

These types of violence in typical in most of the five (5) states were not spots exhibit same pattern. Open ballot snatching and unprecedented monetary inducement of voters, diversion of electoral materials meant for

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other units were deployed to units in the area to ensure that election did not start as scheduled. Cross River state • Compromise by security and electoral officials • Opposition members either beaten up, machete or detained unlawfully • Results sheet carted away and filled in Private places and returned to INEC for declaration • Massive invasion of polling units and collation centres by thugs wielding machetes knives and other dangerous weapons. Bayelsa Shooting at collation centre with over 150 thugs/party supporters invaded the area and unleashed havoc despite the presence of security men (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 9). Cross River Materials for the election were hijacked by militants; there were nonavailability of materials in about 8 units. Following transportation challenges hence, the cancellation of election in most polling units (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 9). Warri Diversion of materials, intimidation of electoral offices and illegal changes of polling units, and harassment of ad hoc electoral staff- by Electoral officer, INEC for Warri South Local Government Area, Delta state (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 11). Akwa Ibom • Diversion of electoral materials • Thumb printing of ballot papers in the home of private citizen • Snatching of ballot ballots boxes by suspected thugs (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 54). • Inability to hold election in certain units due to lack of electoral materials and because “certain politicians hijacked both INEC officials and the materials to their houses where election for the area took place” (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 11).

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INEC even though claimed the Saturday April 11 Governorship and Houses of Assembly were generally peaceful with 88.9 per cent polling unit opened for accreditation between 8 a.m, also agreed that overall, many parts of the country remained relatively peacefulduring the elections. Some states, however, recorded a significant number of violent incidences, the most affected being Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Ebonyi and Ondo states. INEC showed that there were 66 reports of violent incidences target at polling units, the commission officials, voters and election materials (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 6). The five states mentioned above are predominately PDP controlled states. The March 28th Presidential election showed that the PDP lost the elections to be the APC by a margin of over 2million votes. The same five states all have Governors having finished serving the stipulated two tenure of four years each, and had to ensure that their replacement/nominee won at the polls to ensure that PDP continues to rule in the affected states by “Whatever means” (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 58). The Gbodo clashed in Ife between the supporters of the APC and PDP in which three (3) people were reportedly killed. • The killings in Asom in Logo Local Government, Markurdi, Benue State on April 11, 2015-three people dead and six people injured. • Shooting between police and hoodlums in Ilorin, Kwara state who were protesting APC’s victory, the incidence took place “from Niger Street, Ikokoro Street and Taiwo Isale. The protesters (youths) were armed with guns, Knives, and Charms”. • Also, Osi in Ekiti Local Government Area of Kwara state protesters destroyed two cars parked in the Osi, Monarch’s palace and in Ekiti state violence erupted in Itawure on the outskirts of Efun Alaye on April, 2015. The African Centre for Leadership, Strategies and Development stated that Saturday the April 11 elections, in Rivers state was bloody and fraudulent in many ways as the result were cooked-up due to many unacceptable reasons such as; • The Declaration by the INEC Resident Electoral Commission of result from areas where elections did not hold.

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• Widespread arson was recorded as Presiding officers were not willing to follow INEC directives that card readers must be used. Rather, they proceeded with Manuel accreditation against the rule set by INEC. Card carrying members of the PDP were allowed to bring results of their local government areas into INEC office (The Nation, April 13, 2015: 11).

Political Security Context of the 2015 General Elections The political environment that existed in Nigeria in the period building up to the 28 April 2015 general elections create some anticipation and trepidation that the election was not going to be violent free. In spite of the Abuja January 14, 2015 peace Accord and the February 14, 2015 followup peace agreement by the National Peace Committee, several groups (both domestic and international) expressed serious concerns about what to expect during the elections. These concerns were not only based on Nigeria’s electoral antecedents (2003, 2007 and 2011) but also predicate on happenings within the polity which showed ominous signs of the country treading towards the part of danger. According to the joint report of the The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republic Institute (IRI) (2015) on Nigeria’s preparedness for the 2015 General Elections noted the efforts of INEC and missing Gaps on the part of the stakeholders. This tends to affect citizenry confidence in the election.

The Peace Initiatives In the efforts to prevent violence and ensure commitment to free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria, leaders of the two major political parties as well as other signed a peace agreement known as the Abuja Accord, the Accord set out among other things to: One day sensitisation workshop organised (by the office of the National Security adviser and the office of the special adviser to the president on Inter-Party Affairs) on January 14, 2015. Attendance includes various stakeholders from the Contesting Parties, Civil Society Group, Youth Organisations, INEC officials, members of the diplomatic corps etc. The main highlight of the workshop was the “identification of the

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factors that could trigger Electoral violence and how to nip them in the bud” (www.Punchng.com Accessed on 14 April, 2015). This workshop led to the signing of the Abuja Peace Accord by key Presidential candidates. As follow up to the Abuja Accord, the National Peace Committee on the 2015 Elections also initiated an agreement between the PDP and APC presidential flag bearers as part of the efforts to prevent violence. This agreement which one could tag as fresher-follow-up to the 14th January 2015 Abuja Accord, was signed on February 14, 2015. This date was symbolic because it was when the original election was scheduled to hold before being postponed. Moreover, February 14th is celebrated worldwide as Valentine’s day- a day set aside to demonstrate and show love- a demonstration and commitment to peace between and among the political contenders in Nigeria (The News, April 6–13, 2015: 35). Essentially, the fresh February 14, 2015 showed the readiness of the contenders to commit themselves to; • Renew the pledge for peaceful elections • Free and fair elections, free and devolve of violence • Ensure their supports refrain from violence or any acts that may in any way jeopardise the collective vision of a free, fair and credible elections • Ensure that INEC and all security agencies to strictly adhere to their constitutional roles • Abide and respect the outcomes of the elections.

Impact of Political Violence The National Human Right Commission in Nigeria observed that political violence disillusions the high sense of civic pride, sacrifice and co-existence among Nigeria. It also leads to a decline in the confidence and the honesty of elections as well as the undermining of the efficient administration of the polls. The Inability to prosecute perpetrators of violence showed government complicity and high sense of irresponsibility as well as the lack of commitment of government to bring perpetrators to justice (The News, April 6–13, 2015: 3). Violence is a manifestation of the flawed process of choosing candidates for party positions. One observes the existence of patronage system

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taking advantage of weak democratic norms in political parties. “In Particular, the selection by party leaders of a preferred candidate over the popular wish, gives room to the “selected” candidate and his godfathers to become victorious at all costs”. This coupled with the “winner takes all” frame of reference in Nigeria political system, exacerbates exclusion, inequality and ultimately to use of fraudulent means to ensure victory (IRI/NDI 2015). Violence has also led to the lack of confidence in the security forces. The analysis of pre, during and post-election violence indicated that some members of the police force aided and abetted prominent politicians in participating in electoral fraud most especially by “looking the other way” when violence is perpetuated by political thugs. It acts as a form of divisiveness and fragmentation of the country along ethnic and tribal lines. One observes the continuation of violence by the Boko Haram sect in the North East, most of the violence witnessed particularly during the governorship and state Assemblies period occurred predominately in the North, South-South and South-Eastern states. Clearly, the degree and magnitude of the governorship elections violence can be likened to what happened in 2011. Apparently irked by victory of the PDP candidate Jonathan Goodluck (South South), as against the loss of Buhari (Northerner) violence erupted in two core Northern cities of Kano and Bauchi. In Kano property was destroyed while in Bauchi state, ten (10) youth corps members that were involved in the conduct of the election were slaughtered (Vanguard, January, 2015). The 2015 political violence led to breakdown of low and order. The high incidence of political thuggery, disregard for electoral and civil laws manifested in unrestrained violence and characterised wanton destruction of lives and property. In addition, the unnecessary acrimonious use of “hate speeches”, provocative words, propagandist documentaries and inflammatory languages by the various contenders through the media (Television and Newspaper Via paid advertorials) showed a high disregard for the rules of the game. The media who collects high amount of money for paid adverts, political contenders who were out to win at all costs no matter who ox is gored; the government which utilises state resources to outweigh opposition contributed to the blatant disrespect for the rules of the game during the 2015 general elections. In order to understand the recourse to violence, Prof Attaihru Jega- the then INEC’s Chairman Prognosis on what makes elections in Nigeria so violence prone is instructive. Jega

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(2015) attributed violence in countries such as Nigeria to the tendency for contestants, political parties, politicians to see electoral contest as that to engage in and win at all cost… where no low level of institutionalisation, stakeholders tend to use resources at their controlin the contest for political power…where the wealthy will bribe, the student will riot, the workers will strike, the mob will demonstrate. Other Effect of Violence and Electoral Infraction include; • Low voter turnout • Distrust of INEC officials. Instead of cancelling outright the results in crises prone state, the returning Resident Electoral Commissioner declared the result of certain areas flooded with irregularities as inconclusive • Violence and fraud in the main five (5) states declared as the epitome of violence and the actual outcome of victory by the PDP in those areas has been seen as a confirmation of the original plan by the PDP to “rig the election and use all means possible to ensure victory for its candidates” (Secretary of APC media Committee in Ondo state, The Nation, April 13, 2015: 8).

The Way Forward Jega (2015) identified some factors that will enhance peaceful elections in Nigeria. These he recognised as the ten (10) tenets of non-violent elections. They include internal party democracy, effective intra-party conflict resolution accountability, supremacy of rules, uncertain electoral outcome, willingness to accept outcomes, moderation of electioneering trust in institutional redress, promotion of inclusiveness and welfare for staff. Gambari (2015) proffered two major suggestions relevant to the study. First, he enthused that the security agencies and INEC should secure lives and properties and proves a sense of fairness to all stakeholders. The security should be seen as facilitators and support the INEC to carryout successful future elections. Furthermore, the contestant must adhere strictly to the rules of the game and also educate their supporters. This will guide against violence. It is expected that electorate should have trust and confidence in the electoral process. It is also expected that government will reinforce security measures within the framework of law

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and without intimidation to facilitate the conduct of the polls in all the states of the federation. There should be heavy sanction on those who breach the law. For instance, perpetrators of violence-thugs must be identified and punished according to the law. Here, citizen diplomacy will come in handy. Photographs and videos of violators should be posted online to a designate judicial institution with a name like “The Electoral Judicial Bureau” an ad hoc body for the trial of electoral offences. In addition, digitalvirtual camera should be mounted in strategic location by the security agencies in particular, the Nigeria Civil Defence Corp (NDSC). Images of perpetrators are to be transmitted real on line to INEC Headquarter coordinating centre. The police and the state security services should be employed to arrest the identified thugs. More importantly, the existing INEC electoral Act (As amended 2010) should be revisited. It has been noted that the electoral act stipulated very light punishment for violence perpetuators. For example, Electoral offences in part VII (Electoral Act, 2010 Amended) with light sanctions include among others 95A 1136 2010 No. 6(95): Prohibition of certain conducts. The government should make known to the security services their constitutional obligation on the need to be professional and impartial in provision of election security to the citizenry (IRI/NDI 2015). In addition, and extension of Gambari suggestion, political parties and candidates should sensitise party supporters at the grass root level on the political party code of conduct and provisions of the Abuja Accord and the commitment of candidates and party leaders to avoid and reject violence (IRI/NDI 2015). Finally, there should be a rigorous implementation of the election acts and punishments of the offenders. The table below shows the offence and the subsequent punishments.

Bibliography Ademoyega, A. (1981). Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup. Ibadan: Evans Publishers. Africa In Depth. (2015). NIGERIA: All Eyes on 2015 Africa Practice. Johannesburg, Lagos, London. www.africapractice.com. Chief Obafmi Awolowo V. Alhaji Shehu Shagari & ORS. www.pavilionpersonal. com. Retrieved 5 June 2017.

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Diamond, L. (1988). Class Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Dikewoha, P. (2015). APC Kicks as Wike Leads in Rivers. The Nation, April 13, 10 (3183). Dolbeare, M., and Edelman, J. (eds). (1971). American Politics, Power and Change. Lexington, DC: Health and Co. Dudley, B. (1992). An Introduction to Nigeria Government and Politics. Lagos: Macmillan Press. Ejue, B., and Ekanem, S. (2011). Voter Rights and Credible Elections in Nigeria: The Imperative of Rethinking the Content of Citizenship Education. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Vol. 1 (19) Dec, pp. 286–294. Gambari, I. (2015, March 27). Election Issues on Polls Eve. Channels Television. Harris, W. (1979). Day of the Carpetbagger: Republican Reconstruction in Mississippi (1st ed.). Louisiana State University Press. Henry Ikhilea. (2015). NHRC to Open Probe of Pre-Polls Violence and Hate Speech. The Nation, February, 20, 10. Honderich, T. (1989). Political Violence, the Alternate Probability (Seminar paper No. 3). University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies. IRI/NDI. (2015). Nigeria International Election Observation Mission Final Report. Jega, A. (2015). Address at a Sensitisation Workshop Themed 2015 General Election, Sensitisation Workshop on Non-Violence. Abuja. Jide Ojo. (2015). Can Abuja Peace Accord Guarantee Non-Violent Elections. Punch, January 21. Kazeem, I. (2015). Protesters Shut Down Akwa Ibom Over Killing, Ballot Boxes Snatching. The Nation, April 13, 2015. Nohlen, D., Krennerich, M., and Thibaut, B. (1999). Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook. Oxford University Press. Odunayo Ogunmola. (2015). Ekiti Labour Party Accuses INEC, PDP of Robbery. The Nation, April 13, 10. Ogbeidi, M. (2010). A Culture of Failed Elections: Revisting Democratic Elections in Nigeria, 1959–2003. Historia Actual Online 43–56. Okwy Iroegbo-Chikezie. (2015). Pro-Jonathan OPC on the Rampage Through Lagos. The Nation, March 17. Olaniyi, B. (2015). Observers: Rivers Election Bloody, Fraudulent. The Nation, April 13, 10. Oluokun Ayorinde. (2015). Victims of Violence. The News, April 6–13. Orji, N., and Uzodi, N. (2012). The 2011 Post Election Violence in Nigeria Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) and Open Society Initiative for West Africa.

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Roberts and Edwards. (1991). A New Dictionary of Political Analysis. London: Edward Arnold. Satori, G. (1897). The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. The Nation, April 13, 2015: 6. Ujo, A. A. (2000). Understanding Elections a Guide for Students and Elections Managers. Nigeria: Anyaotu Enterprise Publishers. Vanguard. (2015). January, Jonathan Buhari Endorse-Violence Free Poll, On. www.vanguardngr.com. Accessed 13/4/2015. Yusuf, A. (2015). INEC Probes 66 Violent Incidents in 19 States. The Nation, April 13, 10 (3183).

CHAPTER 16

Political Violence in Isuokoma Clan, 2007–2019 Onyinye Ani, Kelechi Johnmary Ani, and Lucky Igohosa Ugbudian

Introduction Isuokoma has witnessed a number of political violence in recent years. The violence created insecurity and instability in the Clan. There is no gainsaying that political violence is any act of threat of violence related to political contestation. Also, it is an act that seeks to determine, delay, or influence a political process through threats, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, or assassination.1 Indeed, Isuokoma is an agrarian community; it is not devoid of political violence. Since the first republic, there have been challenges of political violence in the community. For instance, in the 1991 governorship election when there was an electoral contest between National Republican Convention

O. Ani (B) · K. J. Ani · L. I. Ugbudian Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike, Ikwo, Ebonyi State, Nigeria K. J. Ani e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_16

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(NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) violence broke out between the parties. There was also an intra-party violence between members of the NRC between Mr. Akpugo and Eng. Umu Anyawu who were fighting over a seat in the House of Assembly at the time when Ebonyi State was still Under Abia State. Available records revealed that there were political violence Isuokoma in particular and Ebonyi State at large during the 2003 general election. This followed the non-display of voter’s register in the pre-election cycle and in the non-serialization of presidential ballots; non-appearance of INEC officers in many polling stations; party thugs and agents took over voting in all polling stations; and also bribery of security personnel on election day. It was also evident in the implausible results and lack of access to collation centers by the media, observers and opposition party agents in the election center. Political violence remains part of the electoral cycle in Ebonyi State and Isuokoma clan.2 The study addresses the danger posed by political violence in Isuokoma. The consequences of political violence are often unpalatable and retard development with attendant loss of lives and property coupled with this is the emergence of insecurity and instability, which destroys peace and harmony. This study addressed these problems while attempting to proffer preventive measures. The broad objectives of the study are to examine political violence and its effects in Isuokoma clan and to provide possible solutions to it.

Methodology For the purpose of this work, data were gathered from primary and secondary sources. The primary source includes oral interviews. The respondents included stakeholders such as community leaders, party leaders and members of political parties among others were interviewed. Fourteen reliable sources where interviewed in the course of this study. The secondary data are books, journals, magazines, newspapers and internet materials. The data were analyzed qualitatively and descriptively using historical approach.

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Literature Review Violence is defined as “the illegitimate and unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will or desires of other people in the society”.3 The word “violence” is derived from the Latin word violentia, meaning “vehemence” that connotes “a passionate and uncontrolled force, a use of physical force that injures, damages, violates or destroys people or things”.4 Violence Prevention Alliance addresses the problem of violence as defined in the World Report On Violence Health (WRVH) thus “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal development or deprivation.”5 Political violence is a violence penetrated by people or government to achieve political goals.6 It refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies. From the foregoing, it can be observed that there is a correlative relationship between the two concepts. In fact, they are complementary.7 Political violence is different from electoral violence though usually used interchangeably. Electoral violence is a part of political violence. Electoral violence is an election motivated crises employed to alter, change or influence by force or coercion the electoral behavior, patterns or possibly reverse the electoral decision of voters to favor a particular individual, group or political party. It usually occurs during electoral cycle. While political violence occurs during electoral cycle and off electoral period. Isu Priscilla Osinachi in the work titled Political Violence In Ebonyi State 1999–2015 paid more attention on political violence in Ebonyi State, the author gave a brief but precise history of political violence in Ebonyi State. The author stated some possible causes of violence but only concentrated on the tangible part of violence. The author concentrated on election violence thereby failing to outline other parts of political violence, which may not necessarily involve the use of force. The author gave an insight into political violence in Ebonyi State.8 Nnorom, Kingsley C, Ave Tyail Wase Theophilus and Targba Aondowase in their work titled Political Violence Its Effects On Social Development In Nigeria explained the concept of political violence and pointed out the causes. The authors also gave a brief history of political violence in Nigeria where they noted, “political violence has been part

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of human history, present in the history of all humanity for ages”. It is an endemic feature of most of the evolving world political system. In developing countries, like Nigeria where politics has become an essential feature of the people means of wealth. The authors examined the effect of political violence but because of the broad nature of their scope of study, the authors carried out a survey analysis of major political violence in Nigeria.9 Lucky Ugbudian in the Social Media Post Election Violence and 2011 Election In Nigeria, pointed out that violence occurs in three stages in terms of elections, this stages included pre-election, election and postelection. The author noted that one of the major features that has defined the electoral process in the country and in the republic is violence. The author gave a precise rundown of occurrences of electoral violence in Nigeria. The author made a remarkable contribution on electoral violence in Nigeria without emphasis on Isuokoma.10 Agbadu Blessing Udoka in her work Election Violence in Ebonyi State Nigeria 2007 –2015 gave a historical review on electoral violence as a part of political violence in Nigeria. The author subdivided it into pre-independence election and post-independence election, the author pointed out the key players of electoral violence in Ebonyi State to be the politicians, political parties, security agents, electoral personnel/institutions, citizens and media. The author did not write extensively on any form of violence in Isuokoma clan however, the author made a useful contribution to electoral violence in Ebonyi State.11 The above studies contribute in one way or the other directly or indirectly to the subject of this research. As seen above, no portent effort has been made to present an encompassing account of political violence in Isuokoma clan between 1999 and 2019. Rather most scholars have incorporated several aspects of the phenomenon to fit their respective objectives, and the neglect of this aspect of political violence in Isuokoma is the gap this work intends to fill. History of Isu Okoma Clan Isuokoma is a clan under Onicha Local Government that consists of ten villages, namely: Agbebo Isu, Echara Isu, Mgbaneze Isu, Anwanato Isu, Umuniko Isu, Mgbalukwu Isu, Obegu Isu, Egueke Isu, Agba Isu and Ojiegbe Isu.

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According to Chief Ani Gabriel Ani, the Prime Minister of Isu autonomous community: Isu was founded by somebody from Isukwuato, he was a hunter named Ezentum Ugbota, He came to hunt in Isu as hunting was a very lucrative business, He lived at Agbaebor, after a short period of time he brought his wife, she gave birth to ten children who founded ten villages in Isuokoma. Three villages disappeared probably as a result of inter communal conflict. Seven villages remaining there are: Agbaebo, Echara, Mgbanaeze, Anwanato, Umuniko, Mgbanukwu, Obeegu. Later on Ojiegbe from Ishielu and Agba came to naturalize in Isuokoma.12

The view of Chief Ani was further buttressed by Elder Okorie Odii13 He claimed that the origin of the clan can be traced to a great hunter, Ezentumoke Ugota, who hailed from present day Isukwuato Local Government Area of Abia State. It was during a hunting expedition that he found Isuokoma after traveling over seventy-five kilometers in search of greener pasture. Ezentumoke Ugota settled at the present Agbaebo, the eldest among the ten children of the clan and the patriarch’s home. Anthony Okike Chukwu14 stated that the patriarch usually went back to his original home Isukwuato to sell the meat from the wild animals killed, and to visit and interact with his relatives. Ezentumoke Ugota later developed interest and decided to settle permanently in Isuokoma, with his entire family. He successfully convinced his wife and both settled at Agbebo Isuokoma. The name Agbebo originates from the patriarch in honor, respect, and memory of two huge Agba trees found and used as shed and later as house for months. The trees were so huge that it sheds off rain, control heat during dry season, and served as house during that period. He also lived and dry the killed wild animals from hunting under the Agba tree. Aside hunting, the couple engaged in traditional agriculture with emphasis on farming and animal husbandry aided by the fertility of the land. Hunting and farming became a lucrative business that Ezentumoke Ugota traveled round the vicinity for extension and enjoy socio-human interaction for the certification of the sociological demand of human nature. Elder Okorie Odii15 further stated that Ezentumoke Ugota and the wife, Ugbana Eze were blessed with ten children all males. The children were named: Nwooke Eze, Aga Nwaenum, Nwaogo Ekpaite Igboke Eze, Ugwuemene Ekuma, Anieze Njoku, Ntum Anoke, Omennwogo Igbo,

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Ngwu Uta, Amata, Ufojo. Ezeogo Ambrose Ogbu noted that the ten children grew to villages thus: Agbaebo, Echara, Mgbanaeze, Anwanato, Umuniko, Mgbanukwu, Obeegu, Ezekporke, Amata and Ufujo.16 Due to the intellectual endowment of Ezentumoke, being conscious of internal security, scattered the children and they lived in a circular formation to control external attacks. Each of the ten children paid homage to the patriarch at intervals, while he engaged in regular visitation to ensure that each of the villages live on the principle and doctrine of the clan. The ten villages grew to a measurable height in population and development that each village desired for an improved leadership. This desire made Ezeporoke, Amata and Ufuojo villages to break out from the authority of their father. This separation of authority by force was against the original doctrine of the clan. Three of the ten villages (Ezeoporoke, Amata and Ufuojo) became victims for disobeying the doctrine and principles by which the clan is known, “obedience and hard work as a basis for success”. Consequently, severe punishment was imposed on the three rebellious villages. The other seven villages met and decided that the affected villages be chased away and ceased to be part of the clan for their disobedience. The three villages left the clan and settled in far clans but within the zone. The exit of the three villages resulted to demographic reduction. The remaining seven villages, Agbaebo, Isu Echara, Mgbaneze, Anwanato, Uminiko, Mgbalukwu and Obeegu met on a representative base at present Ogudiri, part of the area where one of the chased away brother—villages (Amata) lived, and they decided never to reduce their population again. A very strong ritual was collectively conducted, using ten ogbu trees representing the ten villages, and the place was named “Ogudiri” to represent the collective authority of the ten villages of the clan, the place was later renamed “Egueke”. Egueke became the patriarch’s unity square and decisions taken at Ogudiri Egueke are binding on every citizen of the clan both home and abroad. Egueke became the eighth village as each of the seven villages sent ten representatives to settle permanently at Egueke. The people of Agba and Ojiegbe who earlier served as laborers in Isuokoma, requested for their permanent settlement, their request was granted with a set of condition, namely, “payment of tributes on annual basis to Isuokoma council of elders” which certified and signified that they were visitors but accommodated as part of the clan on request. Nja Wilson Sunday17 observed that the Agba and Ojiegbe people accepted the condition leading to a final approval. The two groups were given a

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portion of land for their settlement and granted village autonomy under Isuokoma clan, bringing the number of villages to ten as earlier was, thus: Agbaebo, Echara, Mgbanaeze, Anwanato, Umuniko, Mgbanukwu, Obeegu, Egueke, Agba and Ojiegbe, to complement “Isuezineri”. Political History In the Historical Development of IsuokomaClan by Elder Okorie Odii,18 the traditional polities of the clan are purely democratic. Democracy is practiced to reflect age, experience, ability to respect the healthy ones. The traditional leadership combined the executive, legislative and judiciary arms, using the established political institutions to form the elements of representative democracy. • • • • • •

Family head—Ezi na ulo Extended family rep—Umunna Elders (by age)—Ndi okenye Titled (wealthy ones)—ndi ogaraya nwu Sister/lady group—umu ada/umukpu Town development union—out mmepe obodo.

The above institution combined toward promoting popular participation based on their wealth of experience, popularity and ability to help and be effective in all the expected activities. However, final decision on any given matter is not vested on any individual the representatives. Representatives are drawn from traditional political institutions including the elders and the titled groups who decide and direct the eldest man to pass on the agreed judgment. The eldest man controls “ofo” a symbol of authority of either the family, lineage, village, or clan while the age grade group or sister-lady group (Umuada) serves as police on demand to ensure total obedience and respect to the peoples constituted authority. The traditional institution was the supreme political body until the emergence of colonial rule in the early twentieth century. The colonial government imposed warrant chiefs, customary court judges and revenue collectors purely relegating the traditional political institutions and leaders. Although politics commenced in the community in 1923 following the enfranchisement of Nigeria, the participation of Isuokoma people was from the 1960s when Anoke Odii contested for the state house

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of assembly. Also, Hon. Nwoye Okike contested for the state House of Assembly then in old Imo State. Other politicians also participated in the political process since the 1990s. For instance, Francis Chukwu Mgbana, Chief Boniface Okereke and Innocent Eze emerged were elected as councilors. Ebonyi State was created on 1 Oct, 1996, then, Isuokoma produced the second executive Chairman Chief Donatus Odii Njokwu and many more councilors. Njoku Mathias Ngwu19 stated that Chief Donatus Njokwu emerged the third executive chairman of Onicha Local Government Area, after his tenure, Isuokoma produced the fifth local government Chairman, Mrs. Chinyere Nwaanoke. Isuokoma has also produced member representing Onicha West Constituency in the state’s House of Assembly, Hon. Nwenugu Nwite and Mike Anoke Ude umanta respectively. While the present chairman of Onicha Local Government, Ogbonnaya Igboke is of Isu extraction.

Nature of Political Violence Politics is an activity. It is therefore a series of action called a process. Politics is also a method of government. It deals with the form, organization and administration of a Nation. It includes also a regulation of its relations with other nations and political principles, conviction, opinions and sympathies of citizens and parties.20 Politics is an inescapable and pervasive human endeavor that prevails in all spheres of life that is as old as human history.21 Politics is an empirical science that studies the shaping and sharing of power: deciding “who gets what, when and how” Lasswell22 and Easton23 defined politics as the persistent pattern of human interaction in a society mainly oriented toward “authoritative allocation of values”. Markle defined politics from two perspectives, positively he said “politics is a noble quest for good order and justice” while negatively “politics is a selfish grab for power, glory and riches”.24 Violence on the other hand is any act that centers on the use of force to intimidate, threaten or harm opponent. Violence could include the use of weapon such as gun, ammunition, cutlass, sticks and so on that would inflict injuries on persons. It can also have been described as the manifestation of anger, frustration and hostility through the application of physical force. Violence according to David in Ugbudian25 is the pursuit of incompatible interest and goals by different groups. The process of

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achieving the incompatible interest among political actors often degenerates into threat of violence or actual violence. Violence to Corsini cited in Ugbudian26 is an expression of hostility and rage through physical force directed against persons or properties. According to Giscard27 “the term violence is defined as any act which cause or may cause any physical, psychological, emotional, verbal or economic harm, whether this occurred in private or public life, in peace time or in conflict situation”. Political violence is the pursuit of incompatible political interest and goals by different political groups, the process of achieving this incompatible interest degenerates into violence or threat of violence. It is a politically motivated crisis employed the political class to alter the political gains. Political violence is conceived as any act related to the getting and allocation of power, which may cause physical, verbal, emotional, psychological or economic harm due to unbalanced interest and ideology in power. Violence has obviously become the strategy people and government adopt in pursuing their political goals with the belief that violence is necessary in order to achieve their political objective. Political violence is the manifestation of political difference that could end up in threat to peace in the society. Violence takes various forms in the political system due to competing interest and struggle over values and resources. Political violence can occur as electoral violence, which has three forms such as pre-election, election and post-election or violence in the distribution of values and good order and ideological violence (cold war). Political violence could also be a product of frustration and anger over deliberate exclusion from access to state’s or natural resources based on political party affiliation.

Causes of Political Violence in Isuokoma Politics in Isuokoma clan is dominated by violence. Political violence seems to be a necessity in the political system of Isuokoma clan. Political violence is not only glorified and expressed by desperate politicians but has also characterized the political behavior of the clan There is no gainsaying that political violence has bedeviled the political system in Isuokoma and there are various factors that may be regarded as the causes, they include.

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Electoral Malpractice Isuokoma has witness series of electoral malpractice ranging from snatching of ballot boxes and papers to manipulation of electoral result and bribery/forcing the masses to vote unwillingly. These electoral malpractices have proven to be the cause of political violence in Isuokoma clan. This was demonstrated in the just concluded 2019 general election. Onu Glory claimed that the members of the APC carried ballot printed ballot papers in the attempt to win the 2019 general election.28 On the other hand, Supreme Nwite, a PDP member said in 2007 election at Ekenu polling unit which was the stronghold of ANPP, the PDP members snatched the pulling box that culminated in shooting and fighting. Unfortunately, Uwa Njokwu was mistaken as the ballot box was stolen and subsequently short by the rival political party thugs.29 Electoral malpractice is a major cause of political violence in Isuokoma, it occurs either during the election or after the election. For instance, when the figures of votes were altered or when the results are contrary to the expectations of the masses, there is bound to be argument, which eventually leads to political violence. This was occurred in the 2019 gubernatorial election and led to the eventual death of a Udenu Orji at Mgbalukwu polling unit. In the light of the foregoing, it is germane to state that when there is an alterations of electoral process (electoral malpractice) political violence is inevitable. Godfatherism and Struggle for Power Nja Wilson Sunday pointed out that there has always been political violence in Isu, because of the role of godfathers.30 The Prime Minister of Isu autonomous community Chief Sir Ani Gabriel Ani (Mallam Gab) stated that political violence is terrible in Isu, especially during elections, mostly caused by the issue of godfatherism.31 The foregoing revealed that godfathers have contributed to the outbreak of political including electoral violence in Isuokoma. This was demonstrated in the 2015 Local Government chairmanship election contested between Ifeanyi Chukwuma Odii and Nicolas Ogbonnaya Eze. The actual violence was between their godfathers Igboke and Chief Donatus Njokwu and this resulted in the introduction of cultism in Isuokoma. The godfathers used their connection and resources to hired thugs and sponsored candidates that may not necessary work for the development of Isuokoma but enrichment of the

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others politics. This explains the deployment of arms and ammunition as well as thugs during the political contest in Isuokoma. At the same time, some ambitious politicians in Isuokoma want to be at the helm of authority through any means. Most of those who were not satisfied with the appropriate political process resorted to violent activities that included kidnapping of opponents, killing, hate speeches among others, to alter the political process in their favor. For example, in the 2019 election where according to Okonkwo Maduabuch, there was an open confrontation and argument between the candidates of the senatorial position for PDP and APC and it led to violence between their supporters.32 Illiteracy Njokwu Mathias Ngwu stated that that most Isu people are not educated, whereas politics is good in the hands of civilized and educated people and with the level of illiteracy politics became a do or die affair.33 Wilson34 argued that when the educated are led by illiterates, everybody becomes blind. Illiteracy manifested both on the sides of the politicians and the masses. Most of the Isuokoma politicians were not properly educated and therefore lacked the ethics of politics, which would have deterred them from indulging in activities that would result to political violence. On the side of the masses, more than half of the masses are uneducated, therefore they lack the intellectual ability to discern the do’s and don’ts of politics, they lack political enlightenment and this has proven to be a major cause of political violence in Isuokoma. For example, during the councillorship election, the person who according to the zoning formula was to occupy that position was uneducated, it was later given to Awaffi community and this resulted in political violence as the people of Umuniko community revolted. Poverty and Unemployment The role of poverty and exploitation in political violence cannot be overemphasized. The execution of developmental project and resources meant for Isuokoma is central to political violence in the community. The battle often assumed a struggle between the employers and the employed and the poor. The lack of development of the community by the political class promoted unemployment. The consequence of lack of development

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include non-existence of enabling environment for investors and business to thrive leading to the high rate of unemployment. In this context, Isuokoma has high rate of unemployment especially the youths. Latent Anger for Lack of Development and Uneven Distribution of Resources Chijioke Njokwu35 noted that there is usually violence/threat of violence when the masses feel that the state resources are not fairly distributed or when the rate of underdevelopment in their area is substantially poor. On the other hand, Isuokoma people usually resorts to violence against the ruling government if after voting them their community remained unchanged and underdeveloped. For example, the people of Umuniko Isu revolted against the ruling government for not responding to their urgent need and lack of water resources in 2015. Clash of Interests This usually result to cold war between opposing parties, the violence usually takes the form of abuses, hate speeches and criticism, abusive music and animation. Clash of interest has proven to be a cause of political violence in Isuokoma. Onu Glory36 stated that some of the political violence in Isu were not usually actual physical violence, some were Cold War and threat of violence. it is this cold war sometimes bursts into actual violence. On the other hand, when there is clash of interest between two political giants, there is bound to be violence. The intra-party violence that occurred in 2007 between Michael Anoke Udeumanta and Silvester Nwenugu Nwite of PDP who were contesting/aspiring for the position of Federal House of Representative is a good example. The clash of interest between the duo led to an intra-party violence in Isuokoma, thereby creating insecurity and instability. Abuse of Political Process The deliberate sidestepping of agreements by the ten villages on sharing of political offices by individuals has played significant role stoking violence in Isuokoma. This was noted by His Royal Highness, Ezeogo Ambrose Ogbu37 who posited that the main cause of political violence in Isuokoma is the abuse of political process. Isuokoma practice zoning system where

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if community A produces a king or councilor, the next tenure goes to community B when this sharing formula is abused violence becomes inevitable. He further stated that “politics in Isuokoma is done based on rotation, for example, Isu is controlling the local government while Onicha Igboeze is holdig the House of Assembly seat. The attempt to circumvent this process culminates in violence”.38 Corruption (Selfish Desire, Greed, Chauvinism) Corruption and the aforementioned are among the various causes of political violence in Isuokoma. In most cases, the citizens get fed up with the level of corruption practice by the ruling class, they engage in activities that results to direct or indirect violence or threat of violence mostly done via the newspapers, social media and verbally. When Micheal Anoke Udeumanta and Silvester Nwenugu Nwite were accused of their involvement in corruptible acts, violence erupted, as their supporters were deployed to engage in physical combat.

Impact of Political Violence in Isuokoma Clan The impact of political violence in Isuokoma clan will take a cursory look at its effect on the social, economic and political space of Isuokoma. This will analyze and reveal the danger caused by political violence in Isuokoma land. Social Impact To a very large extent, political violence has affected the social relationship among the people of Isuokoma clan in diverse ways. The Isuokoma people that belong to different parties don’t relate very well with each other and distrust each other. This was well noted by His Royal Highness, Ezeogo Ambrose Ogbu Ezwntum II, if you’re not in party A, you have no relationship with even your brother in party B.39 This shows the level of social decadence in Is. It was further stressed by Chief Rubeen thus if you’re not in the ruling party, you would be regarded as a bad person.40 In the same vein, Mr. Mathias averred that if you’re not a member of a party you would be regarded a nobody,41 with the foregoing it is evident that the social relationship among the people of Isuokoma has been destroyed and political violence has planted the seed of discord in their midst.

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It has also affected the unity of the people as even brothers fights themselves over party differences. Isuokoma no longer have a pinch of unity among them as though every activity has been colored by politics. For example, when there is non-political meeting, person from various political parties has their own special and reserved space and canopy. The social cultural activities of Isuokoma clan such as festivals, trade, marriages, have become political oriented and driven. This has disrupted the ancient socio-cultural activities of the clan. People are scared to gather for any social activity because of the fear of attack by their opponents. There is no doubt that the social life of Isuokoma clan has been negatively affected by political violence. Economic Impact The impact of political violence on the economy of Isuokoma clan is an unmitigated disaster. The economy of Isuokoma is suffering from the severe effects of political violence. The economy is under the control of those at the helm of power, and with the way Isuokoma clan politicians are behaving. it is obvious that the economy is the motivating Factor and reason why majority of the people go into politics. The apparent control of the economy of Isuokoma community by the political class has contributed to the lack of growth and expansion of the sector. For instance; the instability and insecurity occasioned by political violence led several traders, investors and business concerns leave the community. Mr. Alfred I Chukwu42 stated that during the 2007 primary election, the random shooting by thugs led to the closure of the market. Political violence has left a negative legacy on the economy of Isuokoma clan manifested in the level of underdevelopment in the aspect of infrastructure. This is because the most of the politicians were biased in the building of infrastructure focusing on where their major supporters reside. The provision roads, electricity, water supply and schools are restricted only to the localities of rich politicians. Godwin C. Okereke43 pointed out that a whole village can remain underdeveloped because the opponent of the ruling party resides there. This is showed in the in the lack of renovation of the Isu—Enugu road. The point here is that with the level of underdevelopment caused by political violence, the economy cannot strive because most infrastructures such as electricity, good road and schools are vital to economic development.

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Another phase where political violence has affected the economy is in the aspect of market/business patronage. People patronize only their party supporters, as Chief Rubeen said “the opposing parties fights against your business”44 they do things that will enhance the folding up of your business. The ruling parties give economic contracts and support to their party members whether efficient or not. Mr. Wilson Sunday45 noted that political violence has led to slowdown of development and economic retardation. In a nutshell, political violence has left a heavy blow on the economy of Isuokoma clan. Political Impact The impact of political violence on the politics of Isuokoma clan cannot be overemphasized because it has negatively affected the politics of the clan in all ramifications. The politics of Isuokoma is characterized with bribery electoral violence, hatred, electoral malpractice and bad leadership. Political violence in Isuokoma clan has resulted in political apathy. Must people believe that their votes do not count, especially when the declared winner is not their preferred candidate. In the same vein, it has also resulted in the fielding of incompetent persons into political positions. In other words, when there is political violence, there is high tendency that most people won’t come out to vote thereby giving room for incompetent people to win elections. This has contributed to vote buying by the political class. According to Wilson,46 political violence in Isuokoma has resulted in political monopoly of power by the PDP, which has further killed people’s interest in politics. The PDP has been dominating the politics of Isuokoma since the inception of modern political activities in the clan. The Monopoly of PDP is not devoid of political violence. It is, therefore, as a result of political violence that the party gained political monopoly in the clan. PDP has had a very strong ground in politics in Isuokoma and has made it almost impossible for another party to win elections in the clan. Security Impact Political violence is a threat to the security of Isuokoma clan. In the community, there is usually fear and insecurity especially during election cycle. It must be noted that the politicians usually heat up the

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politics with fear and tension during political seasons in the community. Thus, often degenerate to restriction in the free movement of goods and services as well as people. The security situation was worse by the partisanship of the security personnel. Consequently, security officers bias and lack of will to carry out diligent investigation emboldened the thugs in unlashing violence on the people. Indeed, some of the police personnel were accused of providing official cover for thugs and political leaders during political violence. This was buttressed by Wilson47 who claimed that cultist and thugs were provided with guns and other dangerous weapons during elections and after the election, these weapons are not retrieved from them and as jobless youths, they make use of the weapons for rubbery and other criminal activities. The aftermath of this is usually insecurity. The implication of the rampart political violence in Isuokoma is not only in the destruction of security infrastructure but creation of security of instability, loss of lives and property, rising wave of criminalities and scaring away of business concerns and investors in the community.

Conclusion and Recommendations The work has been able to reveal the ranges and growth of political violence in Isuokoma Clan, caused by corruption, abuse of political process, godfatherism and electoral malpractice among others. The substantial rate of political violence in the community has resulted in insecurity, underdevelopment, loss of lives and properties among others. During the period of study, political violence dealt a heavy blow on the community. The study has shown that Isuokoma has witnessed a substantial height of political violence during the period under review, the political class is the major contributors of the violence and they make use of uneducated thugs to achieve their aims. The lack of political will in the managing of the political affairs of Isuokoma land created its own challenges such as violence and underdevelopment. This has become demonstrated in a series of actions most culminated in unpopular candidate winning and representing the community through fraudulent and violent ridden elections. The outcome of the emergence of self-imposed and unpopular elected political leaders is diversion of resources meant for the community, promotion of poverty, insecurity, unemployment and underdevelopment. The study concludes that there should be a constructive orientation on the people on the appropriate political behavior.

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We wish to conclude with the following recommendations: first, the study recommends a mechanism for managing election violence in Isuokoma. The impartial leaders drawn from religious leaders and civil society should drive the mechanism. Second, the rotation of political powers agreement should be signed by all the political parties in Isuokoma to prevent breach of the agreement. The security officers should be retrained on professionalism and management of political process. There should be a targeted and massive orientation of the people on political choices and development. Youth empowerment and employment is another necessary measure that will reduce the rate of political violence in Isuokoma clan. To achieve a political future void of violence and tension, the people of Isuokoma clan should be patriotic, selfless and transparent, uphold integrity and have love for one another.

Notes 1. Fischer (2002), in Adesola Samson Adesote and John O. Abimbola, “Electoral Violence and the Survival of Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Historical Perspective”. Canadian Social Science (Vol. 10, No. 3, 2014): 141. 2. Uno Ijim-Agbor (2007), “The Independent National Electoral Commission as an (IM) Partial Umpire in the Conduct of the 2007 Elections”. Journal of African Elections (Vol. 6, No. 2). 3. Robert Paul Wolf (1969), “On Violence” Cited in Aver, Tyavwase Theophilus (2013) “Political Violence and Its Effects on Social Development in Nigeria”. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (Vol. 3, No. 7; September). 4. Ted Honderich (2002, p. 91; 2003, p. 15). Cited in Vittorio Bufacchi (2007) “The Concept of Violence”. Political Studies Review (Vol. 3). 5. WHO (2016), Global Campaign for Violence Prevention: Violence Prevention Alliance Cited in John Nancwat Dombong (2007), “The Impact on and the Response of the ECWA To The Violent Activities of Book Haram in Nortern Nigeria”, https://scholar.sun.ac.za. 6. Political violence—Wikipedia, en.m.wikipedia.org. 7. Ted Robert Gurr (1970), “Why Men Rebel” cited in Tyavwase Theophilus Aver (2013), “Political Violence and its Effects on Social Development in Nigeria”. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (Vol. 3, No. 7; September). 8. P.O. Isu “Political Violence in Ebonyi State 1999_2015” a Final Year Project Submitted to the Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex-Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Ebonyi State.

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9. Kingsley C. Nnorom, Tyavwase Theophilus Aver, and Aondawase Targba (2013), “Political Violence and Its Effect on Social Development in Nigeria”. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (Vol. 3, No. 17, September). 10. L.I. Ugbdian (2016), “Social Media, Post Election Violence and 2011 Election in Nigeria”, in Dr. D. I. Ajegbo and Dr. K.J Ani (eds.), Communication and Contemporary Historical Development in Nigeria (Essay in Honour of Elder Ngwuoke Ngwuoke). Abakaliki: De Joe Press, 198. 11. B.U. Agbadu, “Election Violence in Ebonyi State, Nigeria 2007–2015”, a Final Year Project Submitted to the Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex-Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Ebonyi State. 12. Ani Gabriel Ani. (March 6, 2020), 76 Years, Prime Minister of Isu Autonomous Community, Interviewed at the Igwe’s Palace (Umuniko road). 13. Elder Okorie Odii (2017), Historical Development of Isuokoma Clan. Cheston Agency; Enugu. 14. Anthony Okike Chukwu (March 6, 2020), 82 Years, a Civil Servant and Educationalist, Interviewed in his Compound at Achi Uzam. 15. Elder Okorie Odii (December 27, 2019), 72 Years, a Teacher and Civil Servant, Interviewed in his Compound at Mgbom, Anwanato Isu. 16. His Royal Highness, Ezeogo Ambrose Ogbu Ezwntum II, (March 2020), 67 Years, Interviewed at Isu Palace. 17. Nja Wilson Sunday (March 19, 2020), 42 Years, a Civil Servant, Interviewed at Nkwo Market Square. 18. Elder Okorie Odii, Historical Development of Isuokoma Clan. Cheston Agency; Enugu, 2017. 19. Njoku Mathias Ngwu (March 6, 2020), 58 Years, The Head Master of Isu Secondary School, Interviewed in the School Premises. 20. Akpenpuun Dzurgba (2008), “Nigerian Politics and Ethical Behaviour”. John Archers Publishers limited, Ibadan. 21. A.I. Kamoru and O. Abimbola (2015), “Religion and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria”, in Ethnic Minority Agitations and Political Development in Nigeria, 2015, Vol II Donafrique Publishers. 22. H. Lasswell (1958) Politics Who Gets What, When and How? New York World Publishing Company. 23. Easton, D. (1965). “A Frame Work of Political Analysis” https://www. Jstor.org/stable/2146832, Englewood: The Academy of Political Science, Prentice Hall, (Vol. 83, No. 4 December, 1968). 24. Philip Terzungwe Vande (2015) “Politics and Development in Tivland Since 1960”, in “Ethnic Minority Agitations and Political Development in Nigeria” (Vol. II, No. 4).

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25. L.I. Ugbudian (2016), “Electoral Violence in Kenya and Nigeria, 2007 and 2011”, A Paper Presented at the Department Of History And International Studies Seminar, University Of Uyo, Nigeria. 26. L.I. Ugbudian (2019), “Electoral Violence in 2012 Governorship Election in Edo State”. Iroro Journal of Humanities (Vol. 1; December). 27. N.S. Giscard (2009), “Curbing Electoral Violence in Nigeria: The Way Forward”. Maiduguri Journal of Peace, Diplomatic and Development Studies (Vol. 1, No. 1). 28. Onu Glory (December 27, 2019), 31 Years, An Election Official, Interviewed at Anwanato Isu. 29. Supreme Nwite (December 27, 2019), 56 Years, a School Teacher, Interviewed at Nkwoagu Isu. 30. Nja Wilson Sunday (March 6, 2020), 42 Years, a Civil Servant, Interviewed at Nkwo Market Square. 31. Ani Gebirel Ani (March 2, 2020), 70 Years, Prime Minister Isu Autonomous Community Interviewed at Isu Palace. 32. Njoku Mathias Ngwu (March 12, 2020), 58 Years, An Educationist, Interviewed in Isu Primary School. 33. Nja Wilson Sunday (March 19, 2020), 42 Years, a Civil Servant, Interviewed at Nkwo Market Square. 34. Okonkwo Maduabuchi Ani (March 7, 2020), 39 Years, a Pharmacist, Interviewed at Nkwo Market Square. 35. Chijioke Njoku (March 8, 2020), 30 Years, a Civil Servant, Interviewed in the Local Government Council. 36. Rubeen Obaji (December 27, 2019), 76 Years, a Retired Civil Servant, Interviewed at Awanato Isu. 37. Njoku Mathias Ngwu (March 12, 2020), 58 Years, an Educationist, Interviewed in Isu Primary School. 38. Onu Glory (December 27, 2019), 31 Years, an Election Official, Interviewed at Anwanato Isu. 39. His Royal Highness, Ezeogo Ambrose Ogbu Ezwntum II (March 2, 2020), 67 Years, Interviewed at Isu Palace. 40. His Royal Highness, Ezeogo Ambrose Ogbu Ezwntum II (March 2, 2020), 67 Years, Interviewed at Isu Palace. 41. Rubeen Okorie (December 27, 2020), 76 Years, a Retired Civil Servant, Interviewed at Awanato. 42. Njoku Mathias Ngwu (March 7, 2020), 58 Years, an Educationist, Interviewed at Isu Secondary School. 43. Alfred I. Chukwu (January 3, 2020), 41 Years, a Civil Servant, Interviewed at Nkwoagu Isu. 44. Godwin C. Okereke (January 3, 2020), 71 Years, a School Teacher, Interviewed at Nkwoagu Isu.

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45. Rubeen Obaji (December 27, 2019), 76 Years, a Retired Civil Servant, Interviewed at Awanato Isu. 46. Nja Wilson Sunday (March 6, 2020), 42 Years, a Civil Servant, Interviewed at Nkwo Market Square. 47. Nja Wilson Sunday (March 6, 2020), 42 Years, a Civil Servant, Interviewed at Nkwo Market Square.

Bibliography Agbadu, B.U. “Election Violence in Ebonyi State, Nigeria 2007–2015”, a Final Year Project Submitted to the Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex-Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Ebonyi State. Akpenpuun, Dzurgba. (2008). Nigerian Politics and Ethical Behaviour. Ibadan: John Archers Publishers limited. Easton, D. (1965). “A Frame Work of Political Analysis”. https://www.Jstor. org/stable/2146832. Englewood: The Academy of Political Science Prentice Hall (Vol. 83, No. 4; December, 1968). Elder Okorie Odii. (2017). Historical Development of Isuokoma Clan. Cheston Agency: Enugu. Fischer. (2002) in Adesola Samson Adesote and John O. Abimbola. (2014). “Electoral Violence and the Survival of Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Historical Perspective”. Canadian Social Science (Vol. 10, No. 3). Giscard, N.S. (2009). “Curbing Electoral Violence in Nigeria: The Way Forward”. Maiduguri Journal of Peace, Diplomatic and Development Studies (Vol. 1, No. 1). Honderich, Ted. (2002, p. 91; 2003, p.15). Cited in Bufacchi, Vittorio (2007) “The Concept of Violence” Political Studies Review (Vol. 3). Ijim-Agbor, Uno. (2007). “The Independent National Electoral Commission as an (IM) Partial Umpire in the Conduct of the 2007 Elections.” Journal of African Elections (Vol. 6, No. 2). Isu, P.O. “Political Violence in Ebonyi State 1999_2015”, a Final Year Project Submitted to the Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex-Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Ebonyi State. Kamoru, A. I., and Abimbola, O. (2015). “Religion and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria”, in Ethnic Minority Agitations and Political Development in Nigeria (Vol. II, DonAfrique Publishers). Lasswell, H. (1958). Politics Who Gets What, When and How. New York World Publishing Company. Nnorom, Kingsley C., Aver, Tyavwase Theophilus, and Targba, Aondawase. (2013). “Political Violence and Its Effect on Social Development in Nigeria”. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (Vol. 3, No. 17, September).

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Political violence—Wikipedia, en.m.wikipedia.org. Robert, Gurr Ted. “Why Men Rebel”. Cited in Aver, Tyavwase Theophilus. (2013). “Political Violence and Its Effects on Social Development in Nigeria”. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (Vol. 3, No. 7; September). Ugbudian, L.I. (2013). “Electoral Violence in 2012 Governorship Election in Edo State”. Iroro Journal of Humanities (Vol. 1; December). Ugbudian, L.I. (2016). “Electoral Violence in Kenya and Nigeria, 2007 and 2011”. A Paper Presented at the Department of History and International Studies Seminar, University of Uyo, Nigeria. Ugbdian, L.I. (2016). “Social Media, Post-Election Violence and 2011 Election in Nigeria”, in D.I. Ajegbo and K.J. Ani (eds.), Communication and Contemporary Historical Development in Nigeria. (Essay in Honour of Elder Ngwuoke Ngwuoke). Abakaliki: De Joe Press. Vande, Philip Terzungwe. (2015). “Politics and Development in Tivland Since 1960”, in Ethnic Minority Agitations and Political Development in Nigeria (Vol. II, No. 4). WHO. (2016). Global Campaign for Violence Prevention: Violence Prevention Alliance Cited in John Nancwat Dombong, “The Impact on and the Response of The ECWA to the Violent Activities of Book Haram in Northern Nigeria”. https://scholar.sun.ac.za (2007). Wolf, Robert Paul. (1969). “On Violence” Cited in Aver, Tyavwase Theophilus Political (2013) Violence and its Effects on Social Development in Nigeria”. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (Vol. 3, No. 7; September).

CHAPTER 17

Summary and Concluding Notes on the Place of Counselling in Managing Electoral Violence Victor Ojakorotu and Chinedu Hilary Joseph

Summary Notes Elections can be very strong tool for national transformation on one hand. It can also influence national stagnation and retardation, when men and women who promotes resource mismanagement are brought to power. This edited volume interrogates election and electoral violence in Africa by African-based scholars from dozens of universities. The eighteenchapter study dissected the nature of elections and election violence from different perspectives. The first chapter of this study started with an introduction by Ani and Ojakorotu. They presented the colonial foundation of elections in Africa and how the imperial colonial governments across Africa, formed alliance with the elite in some parts of the continent, to institutionalize

V. Ojakorotu Department of Politics and International Relations, North West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa C. H. Joseph (B) Department of Guidance and Counselling, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2_17

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Western democratic practices as against the forms of traditional democracies practised by many African communities. It revealed that there is persistent systemic failure, policy inconsistency and administrative mishaps across the continent and a typical example is the persistency of electoral violence in Africa. This is seen in North, South, East, Central and West Africa. They maintained that it seems that electoral violence has become a norm in the continent for elections to be filled with violence and inconsistencies. In West Africa, this mishap is conspicuous in the 2007, 2011, 2015 and by extension in the 2019 general elections in Nigeria as well as in the Cote d’ Ivoire elections. The study found progressive the persistency of electoral violence in Africa. The theoretical construct of origin of violence cycle and its typology is used to explain the ‘genetic’ structure of violence in the developing countries of Africa. The conclusion of the study is premised on the fact that there must be specific structures to resolve all forms of violence in African countries and their effectiveness is a major factor that must ensure sustainable nation, sub-regional and continental development. The chapter was followed by the study on causes and implications of elections and electoral violence in Africa by Ojighoro, Reuben Edafenene and Etchie Peter. They argued that electoral violence is no longer news on the African continent, because even the electioneers are prepared for it. They maintained that electoral violence is a major phenomenon in Africa that seems to defy all possible solutions or remedy. They went further to state that with the current trend or love for power by Africans, especially the leaders, it is even becoming more difficult for electoral violence to be curbed in modern day Africa. Often times, the atmosphere in most African countries is usually tensed before, during and after the elections, thus, properties are destroyed, lives are wasted and people are displaced as a result of electoral violence in many African countries. According to them, it is a truism that the African continent is in a state of turmoil, as crisis upon crisis have continued to occur. More worrisome is the fact that the great percentage of these conflicts are induced by the election process as election periods in Africa are referred to as a do-or-die season. Thus, Africa due to the desperado of the political elite has become enmeshed in a conundrum of electoral violence orchestrated by the inability of the key political actors to identify the major reasons behind the gloom of political violence that erupts each time elections are slated and conducted. One interesting thing about Africa’s electoral violence is the fact that this violence commences before

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the elections, heighten during the actual elections and continue after the elections. The political instability experienced on the continent and the reduction of some states or parts of the country, to a shadow of their original state is largely traceable to electoral violence. From the West, East and North to the Central sub-region of Africa; electoral violence has become a norm rather than an exception as there is barely a state in Africa that has not tasted the bitter pill of electoral violence. While the search for a remedy is ongoing, the study advanced an argument that paying close attention to the finance and gender factor will get Africa out of the clutches of electoral violence as both concepts have close linkages with electoral violence. The article that followed still maintained that Nigerian political history is often undermined by high level of political violence. Anyika and Ani therefore traced the nature of electoral violence in Nigeria from the first republic to the 2019 general election. They maintained that political violence in the country has undermined national development, while ensuring that national peace and security are at its lowest level in all the regions of the Nigerian State. Olu Awofeso and Paul A. Irabor wrote on youth unemployment and electoral violence in Nigeria during the 2019 General Elections. According to them, youth unemployment is a major driver of violent electoral behaviour in Nigeria. They revealed further that the recruitment of unemployed youths by the politicians naturally incite violence and disrupt the electoral process in a bid to attain political objectives and to settle scores with political contenders. The low voter’s turnout that characterized the 2019 general elections in Nigeria provided another perspective to the involvement of youths in electoral violence. The study found that unemployed youths played crucial role in repressing voter’s turnout which had significant impact on the credibility of the 2019 general elections. The study consequently suggested formal and informal approach to political education as well as the provision of employment opportunities towards harnessing the drive and energy of youths in order to achieve credible election in Nigeria. They found that Nigeria’s journey into nationhood has been characterized by several events ranging from military intervention in civil war, ethno-religious conflicts, corruption, political instability, insecurity and economic crisis among others. Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999 after about three decades of military rule later raised the hope of its citizens that constitutionalism, rule of law and credible democratic process will be restored. Almost two decades after,

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six successful democratic transitions and general elections, the country is still struggling to consolidate its democratic process. While elections have been hailed as the hallmark of democracy in Nigeria, the challenge of conducting free and credible elections that will be acceptable by all parties has been a challenge in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Elections anywhere brings moments of uncertainties because of multiplicity of actors who struggle for political relevance and control of the government. In Nigeria, electoral politics and elections are often laced with fractious violence, which often compromises the integrity of elections. The return to democracy in 1999, according to them, has multiplied rather than diminished the incidences of electoral violence in Nigeria. While contemporary violence has been seen as a rupture from the past. Through the context of the theory of securitization, the study explores how the perverse Nigerian electoral politics produces ‘securitized youths’ and further constrains peace and security in the country. The study argues that the very trajectory of perverse electoral politics in Nigeria facilitates the development of securitized youths. The study shows that the securitization of youths often takes place when politicians, hiding behind security challenges in the country, recruit youths as private bodyguards and arm them, but in turn, use them as political thugs during elections and protect them from interrogation by the state security institutions. It further reveals that this often subverts due process and contributes to state weakness and possible collapse. The study concludes by making some recommendations on how to reverse perverse electoral politics and deconstruct the securitized youths for peace and security in Nigeria. Samuel Chukwudi Agunyai and Hope A. Ikedinma wrote on religious hate sermons, electoral violence and national disintegration in Africa. They argued that religion in itself is neither evil nor divisive, but those who manipulate it have repeatedly deployed it as a divisive instrument through the spreading of hate sermons, aimed at inciting, canvassing and mobilizing supports for known politicians during election. Thus, religious hate sermons by clerics are potential sources of electoral violence, political instability and insecurity in Africa. A whole lot of worshipers or followers have been provoked into violence through unguided utterances of religious leaders. While studies in hate speech, have been more focused on its effects on electoral violence, political instability, democratic consolidation, and national development. Information about its effects on the increasing

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disintegration of Nigeria under Buhari’s administration has been hardly examined. Okafor Chiedozie Okechukwu, Chinweze Uzochukwu and Umoh Nanji Rimdan focused on the role of corrupt political elite in entrenching electoral violence. They argued that the deep-rooted and widespread culture of impoverishing the masses, using policy formulation and implementation by the power elite has made the masses very vulnerable to the token given by the Nigerian elite, in exchange to buy vote as well as unleash violence on the people during elections. The political landscape in Nigeria has long been bedevilled by corruption. This is evidenced by active political engagements defined and sustained by material gains accruable and accessible based on individual or collective political affiliations. The study examined the roles of ethical moral-self and gender on the political participation of the Nigerian electorate in Southeast Nigeria. The study sample consisted of 529 adult citizens who were resident within the 5 States that make up Southeast Nigeria. The sample comprised 251 males and 278 females within an 18–64-year age range, with a mean age of 34.67 years. The instruments for data collection were political participation scale, developed from the job engagement scale, and the ethical moral-self scale. Data analysis using 2-way ANOVA Statistics in the SPSS version 22 showed a significant role of the ethical moral-self in political participation, F(1,525) = 5.19, p= .02; non-significant influence of gender, and non-significant interaction of ethical moral-self and gender in political participation. The result of the study reflects the effects of moral decadence and loss of ethical integrity that underlies the corrupt practices, thereby engendering political instability in Nigeria. The study recommends sincerity and a selfless approach to political participation by political actors and followers, now and in the future. Idowu maintained that justice delivery and electoral dispute resolution in African while focusing more on Nigeria. He maintained that elections among the contestants in Africa are ‘do or die’ affairs and this starts from party primaries to the election day and post-election days. At each point, the judicial arm of government is usually at the rescuing service for the political system. With such rescue services, there still persist some measures of electoral sanity notwithstanding the widespread use of violence in the country. This study analysed the extent of justice delivery by the electoral dispute resolution system in Nigeria. As a compass to that, the extent of dispute generated, the extent of loss of trust or passiveness of the electorates and the level of satisfaction by political party or candidates

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on the electoral dispute resolution system in Nigeria were analysed. The theoretical framework of broken window theory was used to buttress the lacuna in the system. Conclusion was premised on good governance and strong institutional framework as a way to curtail the menace of election violence in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. O. A. Ayodele engaged in the assessment of the legal framework put in place to curb electoral violence in Nigeria. He argued that elections are the modern and acceptable means of changing governments all over the world as they bestow legitimacy on governments. People are governed through their elected representatives; and this is done through the ballot boxes. Election being the popular method of securing acceptability from the people and the international community has become violent with political parties fighting tooth and nail to hedge out one another through various means of fraudulent practices (known as electoral offences having been criminalized by law). It is trite that law is a mechanism for maintaining peace and order and the electoral process is no exception. The Electoral Act as amended, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Rules and Regulations constitute the legal framework which regulates the Nigerian electoral process. These laws regulate the right to vote and be voted for as well as the formation of political parties. The laws also regulate elections proper and dispute associated with it. However, unscrupulous politicians have bastardized the entire political process and elections have become theatres of war, despite the copious provisions of the laws aimed at ensuring orderliness before, during and after elections. Breaches and violations of these laws attract penalties, which on conviction may be a fine, a term of imprisonment or both. Despite this fact, it has been found out that most of the offences committed during elections are not prosecuted due to affiliations to one political party or the other; especially those that rigged for the political party in government. Therefore, this paper assessed the effectiveness of the laws put in place to curb electoral malpractices and punish electoral offences in Nigeria and made valuable recommendations in order to achieve peaceful and credible elections in the country now and in the future. Haruna Ishola Abdullahi and Ajiwojuoluwa Oluwaseun Tunwase wrote on digital voting and electoral violence: roles of information communication technology in ameliorating electoral crimes in Nigeria. They presented election as one of the ways people express their conscience by

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voting for leaders of their choice in most parts of the world. However, some unscrupulous politicians leave no stone unturned to perpetrate electoral violence like snatching of ballots boxes, intimidation of voters, maiming as well as kidnapping of political opponents and altering election results. Hence, the study addresses digital voting and electoral violence concerning the roles of information communication technology in ameliorating electoral crimes in Nigeria. The study applied exploratory and descriptive research methods based on content analysis of journals, textbooks, and online resources. It was anchored on the conflict theory by Karl Marx and the social control theory of Hirsch. Findings showed that the positive deployment of information communication technology (ICT), will address electoral violence, the exorbitant cost of administering elections, thereby leading to the emergence of credible leaders that will facilitate socio-economic development in Africa and reduce endemic corruption and other criminal activities. It recommends the application of ICT devices like phones, computers and the establishment of reliable internet security to prevent the activities of cybercriminals. Goldpin Obah-Akpowoghaha and Ikenna Amanchukwu extended the media role in election by interrogating their emerging role as a central actor in the electoral process. It would be recalled that the contemporary Nigerian electoral culture is often influenced by the heavy manipulation of social media to discredit a given voter or election, generate true and fake result as well as unleash an imaginable degree of e-bullying upon the electorates, contenders to political office and the electoral umpire, irrespective of how modest the party manifesto is or the degree of INEC preparation and readiness for the election. The conclusion of the 2019 general elections in Nigeria indicated quite clearly that there is yet no end in sight to rancour, conflict and underhand dealings in the country’s electoral contests. This observation is underpinned by the fact that the technological, ethical and policy innovations of the electoral body was easily and crassly if contemptuously and cynically outmanoeuvred by outlandish and sophisticated electoral malpractices by the major political parties. The advent of this electoral malfeasance against the backdrop of a relatively successful 2015 general elections has cast an unsightly pall on Nigeria’s hitherto satisfactory democratization journey. However, this dark pall is characterized by streaks of light provided through the agency of the social media. Indeed, the instrumentality of the social media through its operationalization as a tool of civil society activism has enabled, for the first time, a glimpse, if isolated and few, into polling activities on polling day.

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The paper interrogates the concept of social media and the possibilities therein for the monitoring of the electoral space in Nigeria. Dokun Oyeshola and Phebe Ubani investigated into the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the 2015 as well as 2019 elections in Nigeria. They emphasized that elections in Nigeria have been riddled with different dimensions of undemocratic activities and mismanagements but the 2015 election was tagged different and commended as the most credible by local and international observers. The 2019 election was some sort of a reverse from that of 2015 as the process was observed to have lacked credibility. The disparity between the elections in 2015 and 2019 was what this paper examines. The paper concludes that the activities carried out by INEC in 2015 was quite different from that of 2019 leading to the general acceptance of the credibility of 2015 election and the lack of credibility of the 2019 election. The study recommends that with effective and proper management, INEC can conduct credible elections in the future. Olatunji O. focused on the impact of electoral violence on women. She argued that violence has been termed as one of the major impediments to economic growth and development. Violence committed against women in particular are said to impede progress in achieving development. The political system in Nigeria has historically been characterized by violence, uncertainty, fear, harassment and marginalization of women in the electoral process, in the sense that men are the occupants of the majority of the political positions in the country and this constitutes major impediments to women’s aspiration in contesting for elective positions at all levels of government within the country. Statistical figure gathered so far since the commencement of the Nigerian’s ongoing Fourth Republic in 1999, shows that, the participation of women in terms of contesting for electoral position in the act of governance in Nigeria has been at the minimal compared to their male counterparts and this could be termed as a way of cutting down women’s involvement in electioneering process. The relevant information for this paper will be gathered through secondary data, involving sourcing materials from books, journal papers, internets, articles, newspaper and other academic materials both published and unpublished to unpack the impacts of violence on women’s political participation in Nigeria. Nwali Richard Chidi and Ijeoma Genevieve Anikelechi did a historical review of voter registration and election process in Nigeria. They argued that since independence, the country has done poorly in the process of

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voter education, thereby undermining the degree of voter turn-out as well as increasing the number of invalid votes across different states of the Nigerian federation during presidential elections. The study emphasized that in Southeastern Nigeria, voter turn-out have continued to go down due to the poor level of mobilization of the electorate. They consequently recommended a number of strategies that would help in promoting voter education and political participation in Nigerian elections. Ugbudian, Lucky Igohosa examined the role of the international community and donor agencies in mitigating violent in the 2015 general elections. The hate campaigns and cycle of violence that emerged in the Nigerian political scene in the run-up to the 2015 general elections reminded the world of the 2011 post-election violence, which led to the death of over 800 persons and questioned the unity of the country. The chapter maintained that in the attempt to promote the security and stability of the country and peaceful conduct of the election, international community and donor agencies interfaced and supported relevant stakeholders. Donor agencies such as UNDP and DFID sponsored the workshop that led to the Abuja Peace Accord leading to the formation of the National Peace Committee. Similarly, the international community championed by actors like the United States, United Kingdom, ICC and others voiced their opposition against any form of violence and threatened to sanction those who engaged in it. The findings showed that the role of both bodies helped to promote security and peace in the election captured in the losing incumbent president conceding defeat. Jolade Omede and Arinze Ngwube discussed political violence and the 2015 general elections. They maintained that political violence in any governmental structure is seen as suicidal and an act of administrative anarchy by the perpetuators. The study revealed that there are many reasons which may warrant violence to ensue in any polity especially during electioneering exercises, among which marginalization and gross manipulation are key features. The chapter identifies the sources of violence in Nigeria elections by giving considerations to the following four-fold research questions. What are the factors that precipitate electoral violence in Nigeria? Can democracy be sustained amidst electoral violence? What are the implications of violence elections on Nigeria’s future democracy? How can elections in Nigeria be violent free? The conclusion is premised on the fact that political violence had caused Nigeria more damage to her image internally and externally. This had made her to lose credibility among many states in the world. However,

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recommendations were made to the electoral body the general populace and the government on the need and how to have free, fair and credible elections. Onyinye Ani, Ugbudian Lucky Igohosa and Kelechi Johnmary Ani wrote on political violence in Isuokoma Clan. They traced the origin and changing nature of electoral politics in Isuokoma. The study used extensive oral interviews that were randomly selected to document the causes and the effects of electoral violence in Isuokoma in contemporary times. They recommended multidimensional peacebuilding strategies for the management of political violence in the community.

Concluding Remarks on the Place of Counselling in Managing Electoral Violence Counselling has become a fundamental tool for the management of multiple social problems that undermine contemporary human society. The fact that contemporary culture of democratic elections across the globe has become a major driver of violence implies that there is need for multi-track approaches towards its management. While a number of strategies like voter education, corruption management, etc.have been advocated in the earlier chapters; we are of the strong opinion that the services of professional counsellors are needed by INEC and political parties as well as the international observers in the management of the multiple forms of political violence. It should be noted that some of these violent acts during elections in Nigeria, generates unimaginable degree of neurosis that requires the intervention of professional counsellors in guiding victims and their relatives on the positive ways of coping and moving-on, after such a negative experience. Finally, it is strongly recommended that private and public agencies should partner to invite, sponsor and ensure that as many that needs professional counselling during elections are objectively attended to. Electoral violence has evidently done more harm than good in that the psychological and social stability of people which is an area of concern to counselling field is continuously been threatened. People could hardly survive form the trauma, heartbreak and ache that often accompany electoral violence not to mention the post-traumatic experience. Many victims are faced with the only option of living with its effects which have an

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unforgettable imprint on their minds. Therefore, there is need for strategies to nip electoral violence in the bud, hence the role of counselling and the counsellor is in a better position to execute the counselling services. Counselling is an aspect of psychology which adopt behavioural modification techniques. Counsellors as custodians of counselling play significant roles in correcting and modifying maladaptive behaviours and negative thought patterns which often account for electoral violence. The counsellors operate in different settings, such as correctional facilities, schools, hospitals, youth camps, higher institutions, private establishments among others. These settings allow the counsellors to reach the youth who most times constitute a large proportion of electoral violence perpetrators. Since violence is a function of emotional outburst and social maladjustments and counselling focuses on the elements that constitute social-emotional learning, metacognitive skills and behavioural patterns, then there are possibilities of stemming the trend of electoral violence. Electoral violence are powerful forces that affect and threaten the achievement of a meaningful society, satisfaction of basic human needs for safety, security and personal fulfillment. Electoral violence does not appear to be exiting our communities and societies therefore it cannot be ignored or swept under the rug because its deteriorating effects are alarming. Many counsellors through research on resolution of conflict, national healing, and prevention of bullying and emotional intelligence are already addressing electoral violence issues. This indicates that there is hope and counsellors are capable of helping individuals (especially electoral violence perpetrators) to realize and examine their beliefs and values so that they can exhibit the attitudes and habits that would benefit and promote the society. Counsellors are uniquely and professionally trained to offer assistance and ensure peaceful coexistence among every individual in the society so as to collectively deal with the phenomena of electoral violence. Counselling aims not only at helping the people understand and accept themselves as ‘they are’, but also at helping individuals reach a state of selfautonomy (Sharf 2012). The self-autonomy is preceded by understanding oneself and regard for oneself. It takes the understanding of yourself to make meaning of the feelings and emotions of others in your environment. There are approaches in counselling and psychotherapy that are effective in dealing with conflicts and promoting peace. One of which is called Person-centred therapy proposed by Carl Rogers. Person-centred therapy and counselling have a common goal of making an individual or a client ‘a fully-functioning person’. One of the goals of this therapy is to

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offer unconditional positive regard and that individuals are equipped with the ability to grow psychologically, emotionally and ultimately become a fully functioning person. A fully functioning person is a person who is in touch with their deepest and innermost feelings and desires, understands their own emotions and are capable of expressing their feelings without hurting others (McLeod 2014). They are well balanced and well-adjusted and always in the process of becoming, growing and changing to accommodate others’ view, attitudes and beliefs. Obviously with these qualities, such a person is less likely perpetrator of electoral violence.

Characteristics of a Fully Functioning Person According to McLeod (2014) and Braime (2019), the following are some of the characteristics of a fully functioning person. They; 1. Embrace the needs of others as an important part of what is right. In other words, they not selfish. 2. Possess a growing openness to creativity and new experience. 3. Are willing to make realistic choices and are open to feedbacks. 4. Live in congruence/harmony due to their ability to understand and 5. Embrace their own emotions and that of others. 6. Lack defensiveness because they show positive regard and do not judge. 7. Accept others. 8. Are aware of social responsibility and the need for congruent relationship with others.

How to Become a Fully Functioning Person If electoral violence will seize in our society then every citizen should be ready to be a fully functioning person. The therapy has some core conditions which serve as frame of reference for achieving change and a fully functioning person. Roger, the proponent of this therapy believed that once these conditions are met, change will occur. The conditions are six but three will be explained here due to their peculiarity to the concept of electoral violence and they include Congruence, Unconditional Positive Regard and Empathy.

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1. Congruence: This simply means that the counsellor/therapist is real and/or genuine, open, integrated and authentic during their interactions with the client. It refers to balance between the inner and outward experience of an individual (we/us) in reference to the client (other people). Congruence represents self-awareness that is the counsellors’ emotional dispositions are clear to him and he is able to express them assertively. In other words, the ability to reconcile their emotions and feelings with the external experience and influence with the sole aim of avoiding misconceptions or misunderstanding. In applying this condition and becoming a fully functioning person, young people should be real and aware of their feelings, actions and communications with other people to avoid provocations. They should endeavour to be spontaneous and open in their relationship with others. They should adopt the condition of congruence so that they can be aware and open to their emotions and control them before they get out of hands, consequently they are less likely to react unconsciously in tensed situations. 2. Unconditional Positive Regard: This means that the Counsellor should have no conditions for caring for and accepting the client (Ramsey 2019). The therapist appears in counselling relationship with the attitude of ‘I accept the way you are’. Once the client is accepted in therapeutic relationship unconditionally, then his or her self-esteem is boosted, then he or she can gain the confidence and trust to bare his feelings or emotions without any sense of guilt. One of the factors that fuel electoral violence is discrimination but with the understanding of this concept. It will be known that unconditional acceptance of others is very instrumental in resolving conflict and ensuring peace. In relation to electoral violence, if each of us or the perpetrators can accept our neighbours or loyalists of other political parties unconditionally without reference to their personal, political, religious affiliations but to common good. Then, peace will be the other of the day. This condition unveils the feeling of being cared for and being fully accepted. Of course, no human will act violently when they know that they are being cared for or accepted. It helps individuals to care deeply for themselves and for others by not involving in violent activity. 3. Empathy: This refers to the counsellor’s ability to understand sensitively and accurately (but not sympathetically) the client’s experience and feeling in the here and now (LaBare, n.d.). This is another

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condition which is necessary and needs to be imbibed in order to become a fully functioning person. Empathy means being sensitive to the change, the fear, confusion, rage or tenderness that the other individual is experiencing. This condition allows you to understand what the other person is going through and not to judge too quickly. These conditions are expected to play out in a therapeutic relationship. Of a truth, no human exists in isolation, we all are existing or interacting with one another through one relationship or the other. We exist through the roles or positions we occupy at one point or the other, such as head of a family, leader of a group, employees and colleagues. In each of these roles, relationship is the medium of interaction. In counselling or psychotherapy, therapeutic relationship comprises a counsellor/therapist and a client/patient. Therefore, to apply these conditions, every citizen must see themselves as a counsellor who is helping out in every relationship. When this is the case, no one will be judgemental or rude or violent, because everyone will always have the impression or orientation of helping out as a counsellor in whatever circumstance. In addition, the therapy and its conditions advocate ‘growing’. Therefore, since most of the perpetrators of electoral violence are youths. This therapy will be very effective in channelling their energies into a more productive venture because they will be drawn towards being responsible for themselves and their society through their choices. It will equally assist them to stay in tune with own emotions and appreciate the necessity of growing as a person. It will expose them to the fact that humanity and compassion comes first in all things, because every individual irrespective of our differences, desires to be loved, respected, valued, cherished and cared for. If this is clear and accepted by all and sundry, then we will desire the good of others which will automatically spur us not see violence as an option, because it hurts. Generally, the counsellor can; • Gather information about electoral violence, how it affects our communities and how we (especially the perpetrators) can all be part of the solution needed to promote peace in the society. Electoral violence need to be understood before they can be resolved hence the counsellor should be certain about his knowledge its dynamics.

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• Sensitize every citizen on being observant and watchful for signals of destructive behavioural and thought patterns that are capable of disrupting peace and igniting violence. They help citizens to be aware of the psychosocial effects of electoral violence, what thoughts go through their minds, how they feel and the means responding it. • Expose every citizen to the knowledge about the beliefs and sources that are possibly sustaining the prevalence of electoral violence as well as the consequences. • Have a prevention-based plan that will help moderate the threats and effects of electoral violence, such plan should also include intervention activities. They can make posts advocating regard for human lives, conflict resolution, community-building, and empathy. • Counsellors should be involved in data collection, analysis and use to identify areas where violence can be found, and help lead data discussions regarding appropriate prevention and intervention activities. • Collaborate with teachers, students, parents/guardians, school leaders, and community partners because it is key component of efficient response to electoral violence. Collaboration is necessary in that electoral violence is an issue of great concern to all and affect everyone from individuals to societies. The counsellor should not work in isolation but should interact, share ideas, and source for supports. • Organize for community roundtable discussion which will create room for complaints and self-reflection so that individuals can identify and express how they feel so as to suggest resolutions. • School counsellors are responsible for identifying the problems and making those who are in decision-making positions aware of the problems and possible solutions so appropriate action can be taken to resolve the issues.

In Conclusion Violence has become part of our daily encounters. Therefore, counsellors need to be strong advocates for the delivery of prevention and intervention-focused activities that relate to electoral violence. They should sensitize young people (who are mostly used by political gladiators) on being assertive, initiating and engaging in discussions for conflict resolution. They visit various youth groups, association and clubs for easy accessibility.

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References Braime, H (June 10, 2019). The 7 Characteristics of the Fully Functioning Person. Accessed from https://www.becomingwhoyouare.net/the-7-charac teristics-of-the-fully-functioning-person on 12th May, 2021. LaBare, K. M (n.d.). Rogers Three Characteristics/Attributes Needed for ClientTherapist Relationship. Accessed from https://web.cortland.edu/andersmd/ rogers/rogers.html on 11th May, 2021. McLeod, S. A (February 5, 2014). Carl Rogers. Simply Psychology. Accessed from https://www.simplypsychology.org.carlrogers.html on 11th May, 2021. Ramsey, K (March 18, 2019). Carl Rogers and the Core Conditions of Counselling. Accessed from https://medium.com/achology/carl-rogers-and-thecore-conditions-of-counsellinga87167028905 on 12th May, 2021. Sharf, R. S (2012). Theories of Psychotherapy and Counselling: Concept and Cases. 5th ed. Brooks/Cole, Cengage learning.

Index

A Abia, 30, 75, 76, 203, 204, 242, 245 Abiola, M.K.O., 6, 26, 109 Abubakar, Abdusalami, 26, 29, 163, 210, 213 Abuja Peace Accord, 222, 226, 235, 271 accountability, 14, 86, 172, 188, 205, 217, 237 accreditation, 29, 30, 116, 127, 199, 229, 231, 233, 234 Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), 28 Action Group (AG), 15, 25, 32, 87, 213 Akwa Ibom, 30, 43, 232 amalgamation, 14, 153 Arab Spring, 13, 147, 150, 151 authoritarianism, 6, 13 authority, 31, 35, 74, 86, 106, 116, 145, 200, 220, 221, 246, 247, 251

B Babangida, Ibrahim, 26, 103, 163, 209 Bayelsa, 15, 30, 43, 232 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPFA), 177 Berlin West African Conference, 13 bribery, 87, 104, 107, 112, 113, 162, 242, 250, 255 British Broadcasting Corporation, 152 Buhari, Muhammadu, 26, 29, 41, 52, 55, 56, 60, 62–66, 88, 163, 165, 166, 185, 197, 213, 214, 219–223, 236, 267 businesses, 12, 17, 85, 105, 146, 245, 252, 254–256 C campaign, 4, 23, 28–30, 37, 41, 42, 45, 55, 60–66, 88, 93, 112, 115, 119, 124, 131, 142, 162, 164, 181, 186, 187, 211, 214, 220, 226, 229, 257, 271 campaign rallies, 61, 67, 68

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. J. Ani and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4652-2

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INDEX

card readers, 29, 30, 115, 116, 142, 165, 171, 173, 230, 231, 234 Carter Centre, 139–141, 213 Chad, 3, 128 Christians, 25, 57–59, 64, 66, 75, 142, 182 Civil Society Organizations, 26, 44, 45, 215, 218, 226 coercion, 3–5, 22, 23, 106, 115, 177, 243 Committee of Concerned Nigerians (CCN), 229 communication, 8, 141, 144, 145, 153, 156, 180, 230, 275 Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), 197, 214 Constitution, 7, 31, 44, 67, 89, 96, 102, 105, 107–112, 115, 164, 178, 181, 184, 186, 200, 206, 227, 235, 238, 265, 268 Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), 139 corruption, 13, 18, 26, 32, 75, 79, 80, 87, 97, 104, 119, 181, 187, 253, 256, 265, 267, 269, 272 Côte d’Ivoire, 3, 4, 6, 11, 17, 107, 108, 264 coup d’ etat, 13, 25, 26, 104 Court of Appeal, 90, 92–95, 112 Cross River, 30, 232, 233

D democracy, 2, 3, 5, 14, 35, 36, 44, 55, 68, 74, 84, 101, 102, 104, 107, 108, 110, 119, 124, 131, 138–140, 156, 161, 163, 164, 166, 177–179, 181, 201, 210–212, 237, 247, 257, 266, 271

E Ebonyi State, 8, 30, 44, 75, 76, 189, 203, 204, 233, 242–244, 248, 257, 258 ECOMOG, 6, 17 economy, 12, 17, 120, 124, 127, 128, 141, 181, 228, 254, 255 Ekiti, 30, 60, 214, 231, 233 Electoral Act, 27, 28, 65, 89, 105, 107, 109–117, 238, 268 electoral fraud, 5, 88, 143, 170, 236 electoral officers, 22, 23, 88, 127, 221, 232 elite theory, 40, 53, 162, 167, 168 Endsars, 153–156 Enugu, 30, 75, 76, 129, 203, 204, 254, 258 Ethiopia, 3 ethnicity, 13, 15, 24, 54, 73, 74, 142, 187 executive, 63, 85, 110, 117, 247, 248 F Face-book, 144–150 failed state, 52, 53 Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), 103, 109, 196 First Republic, 24, 25, 32, 83, 138, 184, 186, 211, 241, 265 force, 4, 6, 8, 12–14, 17, 23, 26, 31, 37, 38, 40, 58, 80, 103, 104, 106, 107, 115, 116, 148, 152, 154, 155, 180, 181, 183, 187, 211, 227, 231, 236, 243, 246, 248, 249, 273 fully functioning person, 274–276 G gender, 8, 38, 74, 75, 78–81, 146, 177, 178, 183, 202, 265, 267 gender equality, 75

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god-fatherism, 45, 168, 250, 256 governance, 1, 2, 18, 26, 37, 45, 64, 84, 85, 97, 107, 108, 123, 130, 131, 156, 161, 164, 183, 185, 204, 209–213, 215–217, 228, 268, 270 gubernatorial election, 28, 31, 44, 84, 118, 127, 214, 250

Instagram, 144, 150 interim government, 6 Interim National Government (ING), 26, 104, 105 international observers, 84, 89, 104, 161, 162, 164, 171, 216, 270, 272 Isuokoma, 241, 242, 244–258, 272

H hate speech, 23, 37, 52–56, 58, 60–62, 64–68, 187, 226, 236, 241, 251, 252, 266 House of Assembly, 41, 111, 184, 242, 248, 253 House of Representatives, 41, 42, 102, 110, 111, 179, 185, 252 Human Rights Watch, 27, 28, 31, 61, 190

J Jigawa, 30, 197 Jonathan, Goodluck, 28, 30, 52, 54–56, 60, 62, 63, 88, 110, 163, 165, 185, 186, 214, 215, 219–221, 236 judiciary, 28, 84–86, 94, 95, 136–138, 190, 247 justice, 8, 28, 76, 84–86, 90–96, 109, 119, 181, 235, 248, 267

I illiteracy, 44, 251 Imo, 30, 44, 59, 75, 76, 117, 203, 204, 230, 231, 248 Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 29, 42, 43, 68, 88, 89, 96, 105, 109–111, 115–118, 136, 155, 156, 162, 164, 165, 167–173, 189, 197, 198, 202, 217, 218, 220–222, 229–238, 242, 257, 268–270, 272 information communication technology (ICT), 86, 145, 153, 268, 269 insecurity, 6, 29, 52, 123, 126, 166, 181, 209, 210, 214, 241, 242, 252, 254–256, 265, 266 instability, 14, 26, 52, 53, 140, 181, 201, 220, 241, 242, 252, 254, 256, 265–267

K Kaduna, 30, 43, 229 Kano, 15, 16, 30, 31, 44, 61, 88, 129, 131, 189, 236 Katsina, 16, 30 Kenya, 3, 7, 11 kidnapping, 4, 17, 22, 23, 25, 33, 40, 115, 127, 185, 189, 251, 269 Kogi, 30, 44, 127

L Lagos, 15, 29, 30, 43, 44, 61, 62, 102, 124, 129, 131, 184, 229, 230 legislature, 15, 111, 184 legitimacy, 1, 3, 138, 200, 228, 268 Libya, 3, 14, 150 local government area, 188, 230–234, 245, 248 Lugard, Frederick, 14

282

INDEX

M Marx, Karl, 24, 55, 66, 130, 269 media, 7, 18, 28, 29, 56, 89, 115, 135–137, 143–157, 164, 202, 205, 211, 217, 218, 226, 236, 237, 242, 244, 253, 269, 270 military rule, 13, 88, 163, 209, 265 monarchical system, 2 morality, 24, 76, 169 Muslims, 25, 53, 55, 59, 60, 62, 66, 142, 182, 189

N National Council of Nigeria and Cameroun, 25 National Democratic Institute (NDI), 41, 104, 139–141, 213, 218, 234, 236, 238 National Directorate of Employment, 39 national disintegration, 51, 53, 54, 56, 60–63, 266 National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), 29, 61, 64, 215, 222, 229, 230, 235 Nationalism, 2, 152 National Orientation Agency, 45 National Peace Committee (NPC), 29, 217, 234, 235, 271 National Republican Convention (NRC), 26, 242 National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), 142, 155, 189 Nigeria Civil Defence Corp (NDSC), 238 Nigerian Land Use Act, 31 Northern People’s Congress (NPC), 15, 24, 31, 87, 103 Not Too Young To Run Act, 41, 45

O Ogun, 15, 30, 117 oligarchy, 16, 42, 58 Ondo, 30, 188, 198, 213, 233, 237

P parliamentary elections, 6 peace building, 61, 89 Perceived Ease of Use (PEU), 148 Perceived Usefulness (PU), 148 pinterest, 144 Plateau, 30, 31, 62, 196 plebiscite, 5 pluralist theory, 167 political participation, 27, 73–81, 179, 181, 195, 197, 199–202, 205, 267, 270, 271 political parties, 3, 24–26, 31, 33, 42, 44, 45, 61, 63–65, 68, 74, 84, 87–89, 93–96, 101, 107, 112, 115, 117–119, 125, 127, 143, 162, 164–166, 168, 184, 185, 200, 204, 211, 212, 214, 217, 220, 226, 227, 229, 234, 236–238, 242–244, 249, 250, 254, 257, 267–269, 272, 275 politics, 6, 8, 15, 21, 24, 31, 33, 36, 40–42, 44, 45, 53, 63, 66, 68, 73, 77, 79, 83, 87, 88, 103, 105, 109, 119, 138–140, 142, 144, 146, 156, 168, 178, 179, 183, 185, 186, 188, 190, 200, 201, 205, 214, 221, 222, 244, 247–249, 251, 253–256, 258, 266, 272 polling units, 27, 29, 97, 111, 114, 115, 126, 166, 205, 226, 231–233, 250 population, 17, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43, 45, 75, 80, 145–148, 155, 196, 204, 211, 212, 218, 246

INDEX

poverty, 5, 8, 39, 41, 45, 73, 74, 79, 86, 97, 119, 120, 166, 181, 186, 251, 256 power, 1–4, 6, 11, 13, 16–18, 22, 24, 28, 29, 31, 32, 40, 41, 44, 45, 57–59, 64, 65, 68, 74, 78, 84, 87, 102, 103, 106–110, 116, 118, 119, 130, 138, 139, 142, 143, 149, 150, 152–154, 157, 165, 167, 168, 178, 180, 181, 185–187, 201, 204, 210–213, 220, 228, 237, 243, 248–250, 254, 255, 257, 263, 264, 267, 273 power of incumbency, 4, 87, 88, 94, 95, 118 presidential election, 6, 7, 26–28, 54–56, 59–62, 64–66, 84, 88, 104, 105, 111, 112, 129, 143, 165, 169, 196–198, 201–204, 210, 213, 214, 229, 233, 271 press censorship, 7 protectorates, 14 R referendum, 7 Religious hate-sermons, 54, 58, 66 rigging, 25, 27, 29, 41, 43, 45, 74, 88, 109, 116, 161, 165, 168, 170, 171, 187 Rivers, 15, 30, 31, 43, 44, 61, 88, 127, 129, 189, 229–231, 233 S Second Republic, 14, 25, 138, 184, 210, 213 security, 4, 7, 15, 30, 31, 37, 51, 61, 87, 89, 103, 118, 123, 126, 127, 132, 136, 137, 156, 167, 170, 171, 205, 211, 213, 214, 217, 219, 221, 232, 234–238, 242,

283

244, 246, 255–257, 265, 266, 269, 271, 273 separation of power, 85 Shagari, Shehu, 26, 103, 163, 196, 213 Shaw, Flora, 14 Shonekon, Ernest, 26 Sierra Leone, 3 Smart Card Reader (SCR), 115, 116, 165, 170, 171 Snapchat, 144 Social Democratic Party (SDP), 26, 42, 242 soldiers, 13, 30, 31, 33, 226 Soviet Union, 13 Sunflower democratic movement, 147 Supreme Court, 7, 90, 92–95, 116, 139

T terrorists, 59, 180 Third Republic, 26, 88, 184 thuggery, 41, 44, 45, 75, 88, 119, 164, 177, 178, 185–187, 236 trade, 12, 14, 39, 113, 148, 216, 254 Tumbir, 144 Twitter, 144, 145, 150, 153 Tyre burning theory, 85–87

U Uganda, 3, 13 unemployment, 8, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43, 45, 97, 166, 181, 186, 202, 251, 252, 256, 265 United Nations, 6, 38, 41, 55, 170, 215, 216, 220 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 178, 216, 218

284

INDEX

V village democracies, 1, 2 voters’ registers, 29, 37 W warrant chief, 2, 247 Y Yar’Adua, Umaru, 28, 104, 110, 142, 185, 215

Yoruba, 6, 24, 25, 32, 119, 138, 221 Youth, 8, 36, 38–45, 56, 62, 67, 80, 144–148, 153, 155–157, 186, 187, 189, 203, 218, 222, 233, 234, 236, 252, 256, 257, 265, 266, 273, 276, 277

Z Zambia, 3 Zimbabwe, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 16–18